# TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT WITH FOCUS ON THE IMPACT OF STATE ELITES, GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Ankara
May 2012

To Zeynep

TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT WITH FOCUS ON THE IMPACT OF STATE ELITES, GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

By

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
May 2012

I certify that I have read this thesis and I have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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ABSTRACT

TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT WITH FOCUS ON THE IMPACT OF STATE ELITES, GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION

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April 2012

This dissertation is aims to analyze the change of Turkish religious right from National View parties to the Justice and Development Party in its goal and issue orientation in terms of the importance given to religion, and the influence of state elites, globalization and Europeanization in this process. This analysis will become possible with the help of a set of theoretical approaches offered to explain the causes and nature of party change particularly those of them examining the role of environmental changes in the change of party ideology or policy.

Based on a detailed examination of the views and policies of relevant parties on issues of foreign policy and domestic politics, it is observed that Turkish religious right has evolved from a conservative religious movement with occasional radical tendencies to a moderate conservative one. The impact of state elites in this change is detected to be related with their secularist conception and applications which could be explained in short as opposition to the presence of religion in public life in substantial ways. Globalization and Europeanization, secondly, is explored to be associated with the process with the strong propensity and willingness they bring in to religious right towards the adoption and promotion of western political, economic and

cultural norms, principles and institutions, and establishment of deeper and closer relations with the west.

In foreign policy, the movement has shown a gradual shift from a substantially culturalist to a pragmatist and rational approach. While the National View parties followed a foreign policy program defending the necessity of establishing close ties with the Muslim world and minimizing relations with the West; the Justice and Development Party is with the idea of leading Turkey into a process of greater integration and cooperation with the west. The JDP has not turned its back to the Muslim world, but concerns for political, legal and social reforms have started to occupy a more important place in its Middle East agenda compared to traditional cultural concerns.

In domestic politics, secondly, the most remarkable change is detected in transition from a succession of parties aiming to introduce Islamic norms and principles in public life to a party aiming to introduce rights and freedoms for its conservative electorate through the mechanisms provided by liberal democratic systems with clear detachment from the goal of introducing Islamic law and state.

Keywords: Party Change, Secularist State Elites, Globalization, Europeanization, Turkish Religious Right, Foreign Policy, Religion and Secularism

ÖZET

TURKİYE'DE DİNİ SAĞIN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ VE DEVLET SEÇKİNLERİ, KÜRESELLEŞME VE AVRUPALILAŞMA FAKTÖRLERİNİN BUNA ETKİSİ

Köni, Hakan
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Bu doktora tezi Türkiye'de Milli Görüş partilerinden Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisine dini sağın hedef ve konu yöneliminde dine yapılan vurgu noktasında geçirmiş olduğu değişimi ve devlet seçkinleri, küreselleşme ve Avrupalılaşma faktörlerinin bu süreçteki etkisini analiz etmek amacıyla yazılmıştır. Bu analiz, parti değişiminin nedenleri ve şeklini açıklamak için ortaya atılan bir grup teorik yaklaşımdan, özellikle çevresel değişikliklerin parti ideolojisinde veya siyasetinde meydana gelen değişikliler üzerindeki rolünü inceleyen yaklaşımlardan, yararlanılarak yapılacaktır.

İlgili partilerin dış ve iç politika meseleleri konusundaki görüş ve icraatlarının detaylı bir incelemesi sonucunda, Türkiye'de dini sağın kimi zaman radikal eğilimleri olan muhafazakar dini bir hareketten ılımlı muhafazakar bir harekete dönüştüğü gözlenmiştir. Bu değişimde devlet seçkinlerinin etkisinin desteklemiş oldukları, kısaca dinin kamusal alanda varlık göstermesine ciddi oranda karşıtlık olarak açıklanabilecek, laiklik anlayışı ve uygulamalarıyla alakalı olduğu görülmektedir. Küreselleşme ve Avrupalılaşmanın söz konusu süreçteki etkisiyse dini sağa kazandırdıkları batılı siyasi, iktisadi ve kültürel norm, ilke ve kurumların kabul görüp

desteklenmesi, batıyla daha köklü ve samimi ilişkiler kurulması yönündeki eğilim ve isteklilikte görülmektedir.

Dış politikada hareket oldukça kültürel bir yaklaşımdan giderek pragmatist ve rasyonel bir yaklaşıma doğru kayma göstermiştir. Milli Görüş partileri İslam dünyasıyla yakın ilişkiler kurma ve batıyla ilişkileri minimize etme gereğini savunan bir dış politika programı desteklerken Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Türkiye'nin batıyla daha derin bir entegrasyon ve işbirliği sürecine girmesinden yanadır. AKP İslam dünyasına arkasını dönmemiştir fakat siyasi, hukuki ve sosyal reform kaygıları partinin Ortadoğu programında geleneksel kültürel kaygılardan daha önemli bir yer tutmaya başlamıştır.

İç siyasetteyse en dikkat çekici değişiklik kamusal hayatta İslami normlar ve ilkeler tesis etmeye çalışan bir partiler silsilesinden muhafazakar seçmen tabakası için liberal demokratik sistemlerin sağladığı mekanizmalar aracılığıyla haklar ve özgürlükler getirmeye çalışan, İslam hukuku ve devleti gayelerinden tamamen uzaklaşmış bir harekete doğru geçişte gözlenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Parti Değişimi, Laik Devlet Seçkinleri, Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma, Türkiye'de Dini Sağ, Dış Politika, Din ve Laiklik

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This dissertation has been completed as a result of a very arduous process of research, writing and revision. Among the people whose help I must appreciate in the emergence of this work, I must cite Prof. Ergun Özbudun first who recommended me to write my dissertation on the secularist view and applications of Turkish state elites with a historical, theoretical and empirical perspective and its corresponding impact on the transformation of Turkish religious right. His comments and advice throughout the progress of the work and the research program he provided were the most important factors contributing to the writing of this dissertation.

I must deliver my special thanks to my supervisor Asst. Prof. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, who accepted to undertake the job from Mr. Özbudun upon my request, for his contribution to the content and quality of the dissertation. The thoughtful, tolerant and easygoing manner that he assumed during the discussion and evaluation of my progress in research, writing and revision was the key for the completion of the work. His encouragement to make some research on globalization and Europeanization to build a more comprehensive analysis of causes associated with the transformation of Turkish religious right has helped improve the dissertation substantially.

My thanks are to Department Chair Prof. Elisabeth Özdalga. The thoughtful and tolerant approach that she demonstrated particularly concerning some administrative

issues has allowed me to continue with my dissertation until it is completed. Her recommendations to further develop the work in analytical terms and to establish more countenanced links between the independent and dependent variables have helped improve the work in empirical and analytical terms significantly.

Again I deliver my special thanks to other two members of my dissertation progress jury Asst. Prof. Saime Özçürümez and Asst. Prof. Şaban Kardaş, who have attentively followed the progress of the work through the review jury meetings, particularly for their contribution to the development and clarification of the theoretical framework of the dissertation, for their encouragement to make further research to establish firmer links between parts of the dissertation and for their advice towards the strengthening of the dissertation in terms of empirical and argumentative authenticity all of which have contributed to the quality and content of the work substantially.

I thank Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel, who participated in the jury with the dissertation defense examination, particularly for his comments and recommendations about the parts of the work on Ottoman and early Republican history which motivated me to make a further research and analysis into the historical and intellectual origins of state elites' conception of secularism. I believe that especially the chapter on state elites has been developed substantially by his presence in the defense jury.

A part of this dissertation is written in Sanya City of tropical Southern China, where I collected the materials to lay down the spine of the work. I am thankful to my wife and her close relatives for the accommodation they provided in such a beautiful environment. The tropical fruits, beaches, touristic places and natural wonders of the re-

gion were some of the best things that could help a PhD student in his dissertation writing process.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation work is carried out with a purpose to make an in-depth analysis into the causes and aspects of the change in the goal and issue orientation of successive parties of Turkish religious right concerning the importance assigned to conservative religious concerns. The argument of this dissertation is that the Turkish religious right has recast itself from a conservative religious movement endeavoring to titivate the state and society with a sort of Islamic character, reaching to campaigns for establishing an Islamic state in some cases, to a relatively moderate one that aims to introduce rights and freedoms for the conservative segments of the society within the limits provided by secular democratic system (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 322-328; Çınar and Duran, 2008: 20-22; Dağı, 2004: 136-143; Öniş, 2001: 291-292; Öniş, 2006: 123-125; Toprak, 2005: 170); and that the state elites, globalization and Europeanization have been some of the most important actors and factors producing this change. The state elites are observed to be involved in the process with the type of secularism they support, often compared to French secularism, and the mechanisms of tutelary

powers they enjoy in Turkish political life (Özbudun, 1994: 189-205; Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 3-29; Dağı, 2005: 26-27; Heper, June 2005: 216-220; Kuru, 2009: 161-235). Globalization and Europeanization, secondly, are explored to be effective in the process in a number of ways that include the socialization of Turkish religious right in line with global political values, principles and institutions and its production of a moderate middle class of entrepreneurs, intellectuals and opinion leaders (Öniş, 2006a; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010; Dağı, 2004).

The members of Turkish religious right that will be taken under scrutiny in this dissertation to search for the proposed change will be the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party – which will be named as National View parties in general – the Virtue Party and the Justice and Development Party. Chapters of the dissertation will be assigned to the review of the theories on the causes and aspects of party change, particularly those of them examining the impact of environmental changes on party policy or ideology, with a purpose to draw the theoretical framework of the dissertation (Chapter 2); historical, legal and political underpinnings of the secularist character of the Turkish state elites (Chapter 3); the impact of the 28 February secularist reaction on the moderation of Turkish religious right (Chapter 4); globalization and Europeanization with regard to their impact on the same effect (Chapter 5); the change in religious right's foreign policy orientation (Chapter 6); and the change in its approach to various domestic political issues related with religion and secularism (Chapter 7).

Theoretical studies of party change proliferate over the causes that lead to party change. A group of variables which include leadership change, dominant party coalition change and environmental change are incorporated in the broader literature as factors associated with party change (Harmel et. al., 1995: 4-7; Harmel and Janda, 1994: 266-268; Wilson, 1994: 275; Panebianco, 1988: 240-241; Harmel and Tan, 2003: 410-412; Harmel et. al., 1995: 7-8). In a research over the impact of environmental factors on the prospects of party change, which is the main theoretical dimension of our dissertation topic, Harmel and Janda measure a significant correlation between (1) the factors of regime opposition, economic development and income distribution and (2) party ideological extremism (Harmel and Janda, 1982). In this dissertation, the variable of regime opposition/tolerance is employed in the operationalization of the strong secularist character of the state elites who are legally identified as the guardians of the regime in Turkey. Harmel and Janda theorize that in democratic systems where there is a powerful coalition of regime defenders, political parties tend to steer clear of ideological extremism for they could face with heavy chastisements due to their potential threat to foundations of the state. Again, in the case of the later two variables, Harmel and Janda observe that in a country which experiences a remarkable economic development with a gained trend towards a more egalitarian income distribution, parties with extreme ideological programs are likely to have less of an appeal (Harmel and Janda, 1982). This last two factors, economic growth and more egalitarian income distribution, will be reprocessed here in this dissertation to be operationalized in the factors of globalization and Europeanization by augmenting their explanatory powers with some political and social assets.

Chapter Three is thus assigned to the examination of the secularist state elites in Turkey with a perspective to their historical origins, their view to the place of religion in the state and society, and the ways and mechanisms they utilize for political activism. The emergence of the secularist state elites in Turkey dates back to westernizing trends of Ottoman reform policies first introduced to renovate the Ottoman army but gradually maintaining with the adoption of western political, intellectual and social traditions as a process supported by a class of secular bureaucracy and west-oriented intellectuals. The process of political and social westernization initiated by Ottoman reforms and restructuring went on after the establishment of the Republic with the adoption of a principle of secularism more rigid than many of its examples in the west aspiring to minimize the space of action and appearance to religion in social and public life (Bellah, 1958: 3). Led by the Turkish Armed Forces, the judiciary, the Republican Peoples Party, and some media and civil society organizations, the secularist state elites in contemporary Turkish politics have been the key force demarcating the space of action for conservative concerns of Turkish religious right. The secularist state elites have particularly been opposed to attempts to introduce Islamic statehood, norms and principles in public life.

In Chapter Four, a detailed analysis is offered to the political activism of the state elites for secularist purposes after their perception of a rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism – actuated with the issuance of a warning and a list of resolutions to the government during 28 February 1997 NSC Meeting, opening of a closure case against the WP, and then against the VP, introduction of various political bans and punishments to the party organization etc. – particularly concerning the impact that it

generated for the canalization of the religious right in favor of a more moderate and centrists political line (Mardin, 1983: 139-149; Cizre, 1996: 232-247; Kuru, 2009: 202-231). As a product of successive hits received from the state elites, the parties of Turkish religious right have been motivated to reform their party goals and programs.

Chapter Five will offer an analysis of the transformative forces of globalization and Europeanization. The chapter will first be given to the theoretical examination of globalization in economic, political, social and cultural domains, and various tendencies and reactions that it produces in the countries with which it interacts. Briefly defining globalization as liberalization, internationalization and universalization in various domains, an attempt is made in Chapter Five to explore the ways it has transformed Turkish sociopolitical and economic life by its production of a moderate middle class of entrepreneurs, intellectuals and civil society and the entrance of Turkish religious right to a process of political socialization in line with global values and norms. Europeanization, analyzed in the second part of the chapter and identified as a regulated, formalized and specialized form of globalization, is observed to produce a trend of moderation in Turkish religious right with the adaptive pressures that it applies to Turkey for the harmonization of the movement with global values and principles promoted by Europe.

Chapter Six will examine the change in foreign policy vision of the Turkish religious right. It will be stated that a major change is observed from a cultural vision to a rational and pragmatist one. The National View parties advocated that it was in Turkey's best interest to strengthen its ties with the Muslim countries of the Middle East

and to minimize relations with the West. The union and cooperation among the western states was perceived as substantially formed around membership to Judeo-Christian traditions, which was in many cases characterized as inimical towards Islam. For National View, Turkey's integration with the Middle East promised greater gains and advantages which would also mean to respect our common historical and cultural heritage with the Middle East. (Erbakan, 1975: 229-270; NOP Party Program, Articles 98-100; NSP Party Program, 41-43; WP Party Program, Article 28).

The Justice and Development Party has transformed this traditional foreign vision. The idea that west was united around Christianity and that it was inimical to Islam is quitted in JDP. The role and effect of religion is relatively minimized in the party program. The party regards Turkey's integration and partnership with the West and the East both as vital to Turkey's national interest. For Turkey's economic, political and social development, JDP governments actively participate in UN and NATO missions, and it has paid great efforts to in Turkey's road to EU membership. The party works for improved relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East for political and economic reasons in addition to traditional cultural concerns of being the members of the Islamic civilization. The JDP's foreign policy vision could be best described in short as multilateral, multidimensional, pragmatic and rational displaying a strong similarity with global trends and realities (Davutoğlu, 2009: 501; Davutoğlu, 2004; Usul, 2006: 205-215; Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 139-141).

The second area of change examined in this dissertation, in Chapter Seven, is the view and policies of the movement concerning some domestic political issues about

religion and secularism. The National View campaigned to introduce extensive rights, freedoms, opportunities, norms and institutions in Turkey in service to traditional religious concerns. For National View, secularism was a guarantee for freedom of belief and conscience, protection from oppression of the religious and separation of politics from religion (NOP Program, Article 6; Erbakan, 1975: 49-56; WP Party Program, Article 4; Öniş, 1997: 754). The National View construed religion and morality as a prerequisite of political, economic and industrial development, and as the source of order and peace in society. The most controversial issues raised by the National View were its calls for the establishment of an Islamic regime and introduction of some Islamic norms in various public places (Erbakan, 1975: 92-93, 109-111, 149-157; Karakaş, 2007: 24-26; Mecham, 2004: 343-347; Öniş, 2001: 286-288).

The role of religion in the program and the goals of the JDP is relatively minimized. JDP resembles the Welfare Party in its interpretation of secularism as promoting freedom of conscience, belief and thought, but it lacks the idea of establishing an Islamic regime. The major issues of concern to the party concerning conservative politics have been to introduce headscarf freedom in universities, repudiate the lower coefficient barrier applied to graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, and minimize the obstacles imposed on the religious education in Quran Courses and public schools. The party declares its strong support for liberal democracy, secularism, human rights, and rule of law. It runs its campaign for these aspects of conservative politics in the context of the rights and freedoms provided by the democratic constitutional system (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 20-21; Kuru, 2009: 176-187; Dağı, 2006: 89; Çınar and Duran, 2008: 33; Duran, 2008: 82-83; Dağı, 2005: 30).

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO PARTY CHANGE: FRAMING THE

THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION

This chapter frames the theoretical structure of the dissertation after an extensive

literature review process conducted on theories of party change. In the part of the

chapter on literature review, the focus will be on identifying the concept of party

change and the group of causes which are presented to be associated with party

change. But greater attention will be given to the analysis of reasons that produce

party change which include leadership change, dominant coalition change and envi-

ronmental change. The factor of environmental change is going to be processed in

greater detail for it will constitute the major theoretical foundation of the work to

explain the set of changes observed in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish reli-

gious right. Based on this, the dependent variable of the dissertation will be ex-

plained as the change in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish religious right in

terms of the importance given to religious concerns. And the independent variables

presented to explain this dependent variable will be the state elites, globalization and Europeanization.

2.1. The Research Question

This dissertation is devoted to the study of the change of Turkish religious right in terms of its goal and issue orientation from National View parties of the 1970s to today's Justice and Development Party with a view to its causes and the aspects. As the research has shown during the course of this dissertation work, there is a plenty of causes which have been associated with the change of the movement. The work in hand is due to bend on the analysis of a number of causes which are considered to be more important than the others which include (1) the rigid secularism of the state elites and (2) the process of globalization and Europeanization that the country is undergoing. While analyzing these factors, an attempt will be made to explore how these causes have come to be and in what ways they intervene in the configuration of the proposed change in the Turkish religious right. After the examination of the causes, the work will continue with the examination of the aspects of change in the movement. In the last two chapters, we will try to explain the process of change in foreign and domestic political domains regarding the importance given to various conservative religious concerns. And all of this will be done at a more general level in the light of the theories of party change which provide us with a rich set of analytical tools to figure out the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the changes that parties may experience under the impact of various developments.

2.2. Literature Review

2.2.1. Describing Party Change

Harmel and Janda describe party change as "any variation, alteration or modification in how parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do," implying, more generally, any change in party organization, program, goals and strategies (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 275). At an earlier work, Janda offers a more systematic examination of the concept of party change: By making use of the conceptual framework that he developed on the organizational characteristics of the parties, Janda incorporates a thorough design for the set of specific changes that parties can witness in reaction to various agents, developments and events that they encounter (Janda, 1980). The propositions are summed under six headings that include changes in political tactics, organizational structure, issue orientation, organizational identity, goal orientation as well as organizational death.

Janda maintains that in the domain of political tactics, a party can change its campaign tactics in search of greater electoral competitiveness by building direct contact with individual voters, organizing public meetings and mass rallies, using mass media, registering voters and transporting them to the ballot box. At other times, parties

can devise tactics to restrict competitiveness of other parties or they can develop strategies to break down the government to try their chances in an early election. Secondly, a party can recast its organizational structure by changing the complexity of the organization, centralization of the power, relations with other organizations, and incentive systems. Thirdly, a party can change its traditional issue orientation on major political issues and ideological matters. Fourthly, a party can change its organizational identity by adopting a different name, splitting into a number of parties or merging with another party. Fifthly, a party can reform its goal orientation by reorienting its basic political strategy in favor of competing for votes in elections against other parties, trying to restrict the competitiveness of other parties and subverting the government in power. Finally, a party can meet with its organizational death by terminating through a split, losing most of its activists, being absorbed into another party, or voluntarily dissolving itself (Janda, 1990: 15-16).

2.2.2. Review of Independent Variables of Party Change

2.2.2.1. Leadership Change

Theoretical approaches to the party change judge leadership change as one of the most important developments that could be associated with party change for a number of reasons. First, people can have differences in their abilities, orientation and willingness by nature and, depending on this, transition of the party leadership from

one person to another could bring in many changes in a party. Party change could be more pronounced if the office of party leader is decorated with extensive powers to determine the party agenda; assemble relevant party organs; disseminate views on issues; determine new strategies, policies and organizational structures; and sign and approve the final documents issued in the party (Wilson, 1994: 275-281; Janda, 1990: 12-13; Deschouewer, 1992: 13; Harmel and Janda, 1994: 266).

Second, change in party leadership could accompany a set of other changes in the party for the reason that a new leader elected can try to leave his/her personal mark in party's list of achievements during his tenor. For party leadership elections are usually held very frequently, a new leader can be motivated to move quickly to put his sign on the records of party by also featuring his personal goals and interests (Harmel et. al. 1995: 5). The new party leader can try to establish new offices and replace traditional office holders with new party members who are closer to him and who will work to materialize his goals and motivations, for instance (Panebianco, 1988: 244).

Third, the aptitude of a party leader to effectively communicate with and persuade the voters, activists and members could at times be an important factor facilitating party change particularly in cases where there is a structural need for the support of party organization for the purpose as a rule described in party regulations. In these cases, the difference between successive party leaders in their aptitude to rally the support and agreement of the party organization for his desired goals will become an

important factor shaping the prospects of party change which could end up with success or failure depending on the talents of the leaders (Harmel et. al. 1995: 4-5).

Lastly, leadership change could appear as a destabilizing development from an organizational point of view too. It is often regarded as a natural entry point for change in organizational theories. It stands as an occasion to reconsider the party agenda, those strategies not adopted in the past, and the plans prepared for future purposes. Leadership change is thus regarded as a volatile phenomenon in the life cycle of the parties for restructuring and regression (Gilmore, 1988: 10-14). Gilmore states that:

> The most dramatic example of the opportunity of a new leader to set a new agenda is the political transition. In a political campaign, we explicitly link the debate about critical issues to the single choice of a new executive. New ideas are put forth and priorities are reordered. Patterns of coalition are often realigned and new alliances are formed (Gilmore: 11).

Based on these, Harmel et. al. put forward two hypotheses by which they propose that (1) leadership change could produce party change no matter how the party performs in elections and that (2) leadership change produces a greater propensity of party change if the party has a strong leadership structure.

2.2.2.2. Change of the Dominant Coalition

Dominant party coalition refers to the company of a majority or plurality of members in a party with their agreement and action in unison about the decisions and policies adopted in a party, thereby becoming the major base of power in the party. Harmel

and Tan argue that for such large organizations as political parties tend to resist change; there must be some good reasons for them to introduce changes and a power configuration that facilitates change (Harmel and Tan, 2003: 410). Wolinets similarly points out that party change is closely associated with the presence or absence of a dominant coalition in control of power and its view towards change (Wolinets, 1996: 125).

Harmel and Tan observe, based on a study on seven cases of dominant coalition change in British and German political systems and their corresponding impacts on party change, that if there is an intense factional rivalry originating from some ideological, strategic and organizational preferences in a party, and if the traditional party coalition gets defeated to its rival, a period of extensive party change could be expected over various domains. And they maintain that if the change in dominant coalition is accompanied with a change in party leadership, a more substantial set of changes could take place in the party (Harmel and Tan, 2003; also see Harmel et. al. 1995: 7-8, 15-17 for an earlier version of these findings).

At an earlier work, Harmel and Janda, with a more assertive style, detect, in an article titled as "An Integrated Theory of Party Change," by making an analysis of some selected party change examples that party change could occur only with an imposition from the dominant coalition. They maintain that dominant coalitions are likely to introduce changes when it is estimated that the benefits of the change are greater than its costs. The benefits could be the consolidation or the preservation of the dominance of the dominant coalition or the advancement of the goals of the party (Harmel

and Janda, 1994). Harmel and Janda's theory is applied to Latin America's volatile party systems in a work in 2007 for testing and refinement as a result of which a number of other correlations are found concerning the relationship between dominant coalition change and party change. By examining a large pool of non-consolidated Latin American democracies, Harmel and Taylor-Robinson discover that the ability of the dominant coalition to introduce beneficial changes will be minimized if there are threats to democratic regime. That is because uncertainties and fears of political discontinuity generate a foggy environment that blurs the vision, willingness and punctuality of the decision-makers. Secondly, the ability of the dominant coalition to make cost-benefit analysis of electoral or office failure is weakened in case of high electoral volatility. And finally, in party systems where the loss of government is accompanied with exclusion from the parliament, the dominant coalition can find it difficult to make cost-benefit analysis for a prospective party change due to their excessively marginalized political existence (Harmel and Taylor-Rabinson, 2007).

2.2.2.3. Environmental Change

Environmental changes are those variations in the exterior of the party that generate a tide of change on various domains of the party. Its examples may include a decline in electoral support, failure to be incorporated in a coalition government, events and phenomena with tremendous political and ideological impact, or some other developments that inhibit democratic traditions within the party. Harmel and Janda examine the effect of environmental changes on party change with reference to the impact

they exert on the abilities of the parties to achieve their primary goals (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 267-268). While doing this, they adopt a scheme of party classification borrowed from some theoretical work developed on classifying parties according to their primary goals (Strom, 1990: 566-570; Bruce et. al., 1991). By also making some additions, they group parties as vote-maximizing, office-maximizing, policy/ideology advocating and intra-party democracy maximizing parties.

For vote-maximizing parties, firstly, a major decline in the electoral share of the party is postulated as the main environmental change stimulating party change. As the main goal of these parties is to win the votes or the elections, a decline in electoral share motivates the party organization to adapt to the changing environment so that the loss of the public profile could be compensated. If these parties experience an increase in the ratio of votes, they can be emboldened towards gauging more radical policies (Janda, 1990: 6-8; Janda et. al. 1994: 2-3). For office-maximizing parties, secondly, the leading external stimulus is pointed out as any environmental condition that impedes the party's participation in the government, such as the reluctance of other parties to invite the party in a coalition formation, electoral defeat of a traditional coalition partner, or the differentiation of other parties in ideological terms and therefore increased likelihood of exclusion from government coalitions. For policy/ideology-advocating parties, thirdly, which are distinguished with their concern for policy purity and implementation of a particular program notwithstanding electoral defeat or exclusion from the government, external stimuli may include such events and phenomena as the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the ensuing decline of the appeal of communism as a party program; political pressures from other do-

mestic ideological, political and constitutional power blocs; international terrorism; economic and political interdependence; globalization; and the rise of environmental concerns among many others. Finally, for intraparty-democracy maximizing parties concerned for a broad representation of the views of the most party members possible, external factors that could produce party change could be changes in party membership numbers, change in the character of party members (e.g., from agrarian to industrial classes), or general changes in the views of party members (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 269-271, 280-281; and also Harmel and Taylor-Robinson, 2007).

Strom maintains that contemporary political parties display characteristics associated with all of these types, but often one of them leads in front of the others. Based on this, the party behavior can be symbolized as follows in formulation:

$$B = w_1 V + w_2 O + w_3 P + w_4 I = 1$$

Where

B = Party behavior

V = Vote-seeking behavior

O = Office-seeking behavior

P = Policy-seeking behavior

I = Intra-party democracy maximizing behavior

w_1 through w_4 are coefficients representing the weight of each factor on party behavior, ranging up to 1.

$w_1 + w_2 + w_3 + w_4 = 1$

2.2.2.3.1. Examples to Party Changes Originating from Environmental Changes

Deschouwer argues that there have been a number of environmental changes after the Second World War that forced the parties to adaptation. Erosion of traditional social and religious bonds was one of the environmental changes compelling many parties to adjust their organization and strategies. Parties that based their ideological stance on social and religious traditions were now to tune down their ideological party profile, introduce a strong leadership, and enlarge the party base and organization by sharing some power, traditionally in firm central control, with the masses. Another change in the party environment, which affected leftist parties in particular, was the emergence of the welfare state. The welfare state was instrumental in weakening collectivism as a party characteristic as the state was now more successful at meeting the people's needs. The parties had thus lost their traditional authority stemming from stability and trust and were now compelled to supply the electorate with solid benefits (Deschouwer, 1996: 274-276).

In a case study conducted on the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) of the Netherlands, for instance, a party formed from the unification of three confessional parties in 1980, which shows the characteristics of an office-seeking party and, to a lesser extent, a policy-advocating party, it is observed that due to unsatisfactory electoral results and exclusion from the government, the party was motivated to introduce a number of modifications in its policy platform. The external shock, the 1994 electoral defeat, motivated the CDA to slightly mitigate its hard core religious conservative stance, for which religion was no longer a political guide, but more often an ap-

peal to defend principles of justice, awareness of responsibility, solidarity and stewardship. With the introduction of a new program, called "new ways, firm values," that involved modifications in the party's traditional policy vision, the party's loss of popular support was to be compensated. Though the party reiterated its concerns for traditional Christian democratic values such as family life and social security, it now favored a more decentralized state incorporating more liberal policies in areas such as drug use, marriage and immigration (Duncan, 2007: 72-76, 78-81).

In another research on eight predominantly vote-seeking parties from Germany, Britain and the USA, which are analyzed through 78 adjacent elections to investigate the effect of poor electoral performance on party identity change, Janda et. al. observe that there is very high correlation between decline in electoral support and change in the party manifesto. Setting a table of codes involving particular policy orientations between liberal-conservative and left-right policies that parties make attributions in their election manifestos, it is demonstrated that parties tend to recast their policy programs and platform in reverse proportion to the degree of satisfaction from electoral results (Janda et. al., 1995).

In "Party Policy Change: The Case of the Democrats and Taxes, 1956-1968," John Burns investigates the alteration of the tax policy of the Democrat Party in the USA between 1956-68 vis-à-vis external and internal causes. Inflation, decrease in the average growth of per capita income, and the public opinion being the main external factors and elite actions being the internal factor examined, he explains that economic crisis had a direct effect on the proposed change and that elite policies were also

important in the sense that their perceptions, motivations, planning and initiatives were influential even in the absence of the external causes. The public opinion had an indirect effect on policy makers, and indeed was more often shaped by the elites rather than the vice versa. It is observed that this particular conjuncture motivated the Democrats to respond by introducing Keynesian policies, in form of tax breaks for companies and individuals, to recover from the economic recession, particularly to stem the decline in the growth rate, rising inflation, and waning real income level (Burns, 1997).

2.2.2.3.2. Environmental Change as a Factor of Party Ideology/Policy Change

In a research over 25 parties, Harmel and Janda examine factors contributing to the formation of particular party ideologies, from extremist to centrist, portrayed on a left-right spectrum. The policy preferences employed to identify parties as left or right parties include the approach of the parties towards (1) public ownership of the means of production, (2) the government's role in economic planning, (3) redistribution of the wealth and (4) provision of welfare services. Accordingly, parties strongly favoring these policies are labeled left wing parties, while those strongly opposing them are labeled right-wing parties. The parties whose positions are not for strongly defending or strongly opposing such policies are labeled neutral. The scores each party is given in these variables is used to measure party extremism as well as ideological consistency and ideological distance from the mean of other parties (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 27-30).

Conceptualizing parties according to their ideologies this way, Harmel and Janda contend that a number of factors are closely associated with party extremism no matter whether they are rightist or leftist. First, they find that the nature of the electoral system and the number of political parties is highly correlated with distance of party ideologies from the center of the ideological spectrum. Accordingly, ideological extremism is greatly influenced by whether elections are held according to "majority principle," where only the winner of elections can enter the parliament, or according to the principle of "proportional representation," where parties can enter in the parliament proportional to the votes they have in elections (correlation rate with party extremism: 0.50). The parties will have greater tendency to stray from extremism in electoral systems operating according to majority principle compared to the other one. That is because in proportional electoral systems, even though extremist parties may get a very small proportion of votes, they can at least find place in the parliament to benefit from the opportunities provided by being in the parliament as well as from the possibility of joining in a coalition government. After successive failures of not being able to enter the parliament and the government in majority electoral systems, parties will be discouraged from extremism for matters of survival (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 31, 34; Hermens, 1938: 25). It will also matter a great deal for the prospects of party extremism whether it is a two-party or multi-party system that rules in a particular country (correlation rate: -0.33). In two-party political systems where the elections are held according to the majority rule, parties are motivated to shift their policies and goals to the center of ideological spectrum so that they can address the widest number of voters (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 31, 34).

Secondly, the possibility of rule by a coalition government is explored to be highly associated with ideological extremism because such a likelihood provides extremist parties with a structural space of survival, as they can be incorporated in a coalition (the rate of correlation: 0.50). However, in political systems where governments are traditionally formed by a single party, extremist ideological parties with limited electoral support have few chances of survival, and thus they are compelled to mitigate their ideological stance (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 31-32, 34).

Thirdly, the degree of regime opposition is found to be negatively correlated with emergence and survival of ideological parties (-0.12). Contrary to what could be expected that governments will be driven to defend more ideological policies with the purpose of warding off an authoritarian backlash, it appears that if political regimes proscribe membership to extremist ideologies, parties will be deterred from ideological extremism under fears of party closure, bans from political bans or other type of punishments that may be brought by the defenders of the regime (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 32, 34; Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 374).

Fourthly, a negative correlation is measured between affluence and party extremism (correlation -0.20). Societies enjoying high levels of GDP per capita accompanied by relatively equal income distribution are more likely to have centrist parties. But in societies where there is a large gap in income distribution, there is a high propensity for party ideological extremism (correlation is 0.32). When people are deprived of economic, social and political opportunities, especially extremist parties on the left of

the ideological spectrum will have a strong appeal (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 32-34; Milnor, 1969: 104-105).

2.3. Theoretical Framework

2.3.1. The Dependent Variable

The purpose of this dissertation is to offer a theoretical and empirical analysis to the party change witnessed in the course of Turkish religious right. As the type of party change can take various forms as it is cited above which may include changes in political tactics, organizational structure, issue orientation, organizational identity, goal orientation and organizational death, an attempt to incorporate all the changes that took place in these domains will exhaust a dissertation work (Janda, 1980). Thus the work in hand will focus on the change in the issue and goal orientation of the movement particularly vis-à-vis the degree of importance assigned to religion in its successive parties. It is the argument of this dissertation that the Turkish religious right has been subject to a remarkable change in its goal and issue orientation from a highly conservative movement that had the goals of dressing up the state and society with an Islamic character to a moderate rightist one trying to introduce rights and freedoms for the pious in line with liberal democratic, secular and global ideals. An attempt will be made in the last two chapters to exposit this particular change with an

examination of the earlier and later members of Turkish religious right in two policy areas, i.e., (1) foreign policy and (2) religion and secularism. In trying to do this, a rich and in-depth set of research materials will be used that involve the analysis and examination of party programs; goals; projects; policies; publications, speeches, and declarations released by party leaders, other members and party centers; bill of indictments for party closure; defence documents of the litigated parties as well as some other works produced by experts of Turkish religious right to shed light over the course of events and processes.

2.3.2. Identifying The Turkish Religious Right in Its Issue and Goal Orientation

In attempting to explore the change in the issue and goal orientation of Turkish religious right, we will rely on a hypothesis that among the party types classified according to their goals – vote-maximizing, office maximizing, policy/ideology advocating and intra-party democratizing – the Turkish religious right has born characteristics closest to the policy/ideology advocating parties. While this behavior was the most powerful in National View parties with their manifestations to introduce an Islamic society and state, it has been inherited by the Justice and Development Party too to a lesser extent exhibited in its ambitious campaign to introduce some rights, freedoms and opportunities for the religious conservative segments of the society. The elements of policy/ideology advocating behaviors in JDP include the waging of legal and political struggle for the (1) liberation of wearing headscarf in schools and universities, (2) removal of the legal barriers in front of the graduates of Imam-Hatip

schools for entering the universities and various public posts, (3) introduction of some religious norms and principles in some areas that does not violate the secularist principle, (4) promotion of the proliferation of schools that teach religious courses in addition to modern sciences, and (5) development of relations with Muslim countries of the Middle Eastern on cultural and historical bases (Kuru, 2009: 181-198; Hale, 2005: 299-300).

But it needs to be added that the list of causes canalizing the Turkish religious right to amend its profile has also generated pressures for the renovation of its party type too to some extent. To put it more clearly, while on the one hand mitigating its ideological character, the movement has also acquired some remarkable vote-seeking, office seeking and intraparty democracy maximizing concerns. The vote-seeking concern of the movement is often observed in JDP's attempt to reach to a wider electorate by pulling the party to the center of right. This is expected to increase the chances of the party for a single party government which will make it more comfortable in job and will also enhance its legitimacy with a greater electoral support from the public. The party also pays attention to its relations with other right parties for a potential coalition in case of a lower voter turnout as it is seen in its cooperation with Nationalist Action Party for various policies from time to time.

The party displays some intraparty democracy maximizing behaviors too insofar as there had emerged, particularly during the second half of the 1990s, a group of party members who were uncomfortable with the centralization of the power in the hands of Necmettin Erbakan with very little space for intraparty opposition, competition

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and confrontation. Thus some party members including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and Abdullatif Şener were voicing the necessity for some structural changes in favor of a more democratic tradition within the party even before the establishment of Justice and Development Party.

2.3.3. Independent Variables

An important part of this dissertation will be devoted to the exploration and examination of the independent variables of this particular change. The literature on Turkish religious right incorporates a list of factors argued to be instrumental in this process which include (1) leadership change from Necmettin Erbakan to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, (2) the emergence of a new coalition preceding this leadership change, and (3) the rigid secularism of the state elites, globalization, Europeanization, resulting democratic socialization, a strengthening moderate middle class among the environmental changes.

The change of the leadership in Turkish religious right after the emergence of some oppositional factions against the traditional coalition led by Necmettin Erbakan was a remarkable development in the history of the movement to the extent that it is followed with a period of extensive restructuring and reformation. The process took a period of time with the spread of some opposing views against traditional party policies, strategies and ways in the beginning which went on with the application of some pressures on and the marginalization of the uncomfortable party members. This

was then followed by the emergence of a faction in the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and Abdullatif Şener who had the purpose of capturing the party leadership and displacing the traditional party coalition to introduce extensive changes in various domains of the party but only to fail under a heavy campaign waged by the traditional party coalition administered by Necmettin Erbakan from outside with calls for obedience, unity and resistance. A more radical step was taken after this when the new coalition decided to split from the party for the introduction and implementation of their goals in the formation of a new party, the Justice and Development Party.

The events that transpire with leadership and dominant coalition change in Turkish religious right attest to many of the findings propounded in the theoretical literature of party change. The literature on the change of Turkish religious right points out that the willingness, dynamism, and readiness of the new party coalition and the leadership for change; their goal to put their mark on the list of achievements of the movement; the sympathy that the electorate demonstrated against them; their capture and control of the power mechanisms in the party and the government; their positive approach to change for matters of survival and success; their material difference from the traditional party leadership and coalition in their vision and mission have been closely associated with the set of changes that the movement has undergone (Heper and Toktaş, 2003; Öniş, 2006: 125). It will not be wrong to say that the change in leadership and dominant coalition would lead to a set of other changes in the movement from an organizational point of view too (Gilmore, 1988).

Due to the limitations of the scope of a dissertation, the impact of leadership and dominant coalition change will not be examined in this work. The work in hand will be devoted to the impact of a number of environmental changes and stimuli on the issue orientation of Turkish religious right. These environmental changes and stimuli include (1) the rigid secularism of the state elites, and (2) globalization and Europeanization. While the rigid secularism of the state elites will be analyzed within the theoretical framework of regime tolerance and party extremism offered by Harmel and Janda (1982), the rest of the variables will be scrutinized with a view to the impact of equalization of income distribution and affluence on party ideological change with some additional theoretical extrapolations. There are some other reasons in limiting the set of independent variables to these two variables only apart from the necessity to narrow down the scope of a dissertation work: Firstly, it is assumed in this dissertation that the state elites have been the most important variable producing the proposed change in the ideological course of the Turkish religious right. An analysis to historical, philosophical, administrative and functional aspects of the state elites is deemed to be going to explain a large part of our main thesis. Globalization and Europeanization, secondly, provides us with a rich and comprehensive set of tools that help us explore the set of changes taking place in economic, social, cultural and political domains – those changes that are not covered by the state elites' activism.

2.3.3.1. State Elites

As included above, Harmel and Janda measure a -0.12 correlation between regime opposition and party ideological extremism in the pool of 25 party cases, a type of relationship which can be opened as the more the degree of regime opposition the less is the likelihood of party extremism and a degree of correlation (0.12) which can be interpreted as notable. Sigelman and Yough measure regime opposition with regard to the presence or absence of following five indicators in a given country which include freedom of group opposition, interest aggregation by associational groups, press freedom, role of the police and number of government sanctions against perceived threats (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 365). Our examination will be based on an argument that in Turkey regime opposition to real or alleged anti-secularist policies and activities of the religious right has had a much greater impact and has acted more toward the moderation of the ideological tone of the religious right. This is because, firstly, there has been a very strong class of state elites in Turkey with a strong secularist tradition, framed on the model of rigid French secularism, which prohibits the entrance of religion in public sphere (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 233-235; Çınar and Duran, 2008: 20-22; Öniş, 2001: 291-292; Narlı, 1999; Toprak, 2005: 170). Thus in this dissertation work rigid secularism of the state elites will be employed as our proxy variable for regime opposition. And, secondly, the politics of the religious right differ substantially in Islamic countries like Turkey compared to the Christian Democracies, in the sense that Islamic politics may substitute for secularist politics so far as Islam has an overall legal and political framework that can be used to constitute the legal infrastructure of a political system. It also has various historical and

contemporary examples including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria and Egypt (Hale, 2005: 299-300). Therefore, regime opposition is regarded to be effected much more heavily in democratic countries with a substantial Muslim population like Turkey than it is observed in other countries and thus it remains as a more imperative independent variable for moderation of Islamist movements.

Chapters Three and Four will be devoted to the exploration of the style and characteristics of the defenders of regime in Turkey with a view to their historical and philosophical formation as well as the mechanisms they exploit to maintain their presence in politics, the justifications offered to this end and specific occasions of state elites in action in contemporary Turkish political life.

2.3.2.2. Globalization and Europeanization

Harmel and Janda incorporate two factors into the list of independent variables that affect party ideological extremism which match very well with a set of developments that have taken place in the socioeconomic life in Turkey, i.e., affluence and sectoral inequality. They maintain that societies which are characterized with low levels of GNP per capita, unequal income distribution and a sharply divided class system could give birth to political parties with extreme ideological tendencies. They measure a correlation of -0.20 between affluence and party extremism, and another correlation of 0.32 between sectoral inequality and party extremism. Accordingly, when people are deprived of economic, social and political opportunities and rewards, ex-

tremist parties will have stronger appeal (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 32-34). An attempt will be made here in this work to expand the scope and scale of Harmel and Janda's socioeconomic variables in a way to include the abovementioned two variables too to make us equip with a richer set of analytical tools. More clearly, the variables of affluence and sectoral inequality will be rediscovered in two more comprehensive and inclusive proxy variables, i.e., globalization and Europeanization to enable us to incorporate some social, political and intellectual factors too which will be summarized here below.

Globalization and Europeanization are argued to be a potent set of variables exerting tremendous impacts on the socioeconomic and political life of countries that it comes to contact with. Globalization could be considered as a short summarizing name for unification, growth, expansion and stabilization of economies; spread of some universal political norms and principles like democracy, human rights and rule of law as well as multilateralism, cooperation and partnership in the sphere of international relations; and diffusion of collective, authoritarian and closed systems in favor of individualist, liberal and open societies (Scholte, 1997; Dodge and Higgott, 2002; McGrew, 2000; Halliday, 2002). Many of what comes with globalization are indeed considered as the main elements of centrist, moderate and mild party ideologies which is exactly the opposite of extreme ideological formations.

Europeanization, secondly, is distinguished as a regulated and safer form of globalization that shows impact particularly on the European continent. The values and principles that it promotes are almost no different than globalization which may in-

clude in more specific terms spread and settlement of free market economies, democracy, rule of law, human rights, multilateralism, collectivism as well as individual, group and gender rights and freedoms. Europeanization differs from globalization with its more formalized, diplomatic, legal and strict structure with its specialized organs, decision-making processes and problem-solving mechanisms (Risse et. al., 2001).

To begin with, it is very commonly argued in the literature of Turkish political Islam that the rapid economic growth that the country has witnessed since 1990s as a product of economic globalization patronized by Turgut Özal has been a source of substantial socioeconomic and political transformation. It is particularly regarded as being instrumental in the emergence of an Islamic bourgeoisie who produced wealth through manufacturing and marketing of goods and who were thus able to benefit from the rewards and the opportunities presented by the system. This economically and politically powerful middle class of entrepreneurs are pointed as an agent of peace, stability and moderateness among religious right wing cadres to constitute a barrier against extreme ideological formations. They tended to share an idea that a state of political and economic instability that could emerge as a result of some radical political movements would cost them enormous economic losses (Öniş, 2001: 289-291; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 113-120).

Globalization is deemed to be linked with the growth of a class of influential Islamic intellectuals too who have come to appreciate and promote the elements of globalization originating from the west with a conviction that westernization in political, eco-

nomic and social terms does not always contravene Islam and that it is indeed most often in the interests of the Muslims to adapt to the global condition. Among the leading members of this class, we can count Fethullah Gülen, Ali Bulaç, Hayrettin Karaman, İsmet Özel, leading members of the Iskenderpaşa religious community among many others (Aras and Çaha, 2000; Dağı, 2004). This class of intellectuals constitutes a body of actors who communicate with and convey their opinions to the political leaders of Turkish religious right as well as the general conservative electorate to serve as an ultimate office of teaching, consultation, deliberation, confirmation, reformation and transformation.

Globalization is also regarded to be related with a process of political socialization on the part of the members of Turkish religious right. Many scholars of Turkish politics argue that the Turkish religious right has shown a genuine ideological transformation which brought them closer to understand and appreciate the virtues of global political, economic and social values. An increasing support for EU membership, democracy, human rights and rule of law draws attention on the part of Turkish religious right with many material steps taken (Öniş, 2006a; Kösebalaban, 2004).

As to the Europeanization, it is argued to be effective in the process of ideological transformation with the adaptive pressures that it brought by the accession talks communicated in EU summits and *acquis communautaire*. The Turkish political elites have been in favor of introducing and implementing many of the reforms for a number of reasons. Europeanization is, first, considered as an important road for Turkey's economic and industrial development with the funds, resources and oppor-

tunities provided to member and candidate countries. Secondly, it is expected to help the settlement of European standards in the domain of civil-military relations to mean that it will minimize the powers of the military to intervene in the political processes. Europeanization is expected to bring greater rights and freedoms for the conservative electorate to remove the legal barriers in front of headscarf, Imam-Hatip schools and religious education. Finally, the members of the Turkish religious right seem to have experienced a learning process that brought them to welcome European values and institutions (Özbudun, 2007; Tocci, 2005).

The theoretical design of the dissertation could be displayed in terse in figure 1 below

Figure 1: Theoretical Framework

Independent Variable 1	Independent Variable 2
REGIME OPPOSITION	AFFLUENCE & SECTORAL INEQUALITY

Proxy Independent Variable 1	Proxy Independent Variable 2
RIGID SECULARISM OF THE STATE ELITES	GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION

Dependent Variable

TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT

2.4. Contribution of the Work

The work in hand is expected to contribute to the studies of Turkish religious right in a number of ways. Firstly, it differs from the majority of the research and analysis in the area with its original theoretical analysis. There are very few perspectives to the

transformation of Turkish religious right developed with a view from the theories of party change. Thus it has been one of the purposes of this work to locate our empirical findings in the broader literature of comparative politics. Secondly, it offers a detailed analysis of the nature of the party change concerning issues about foreign policy, and religion and secularism by tracing them in party programs, goals, policies, speeches and declarations by party leaders and other leading party members, minutes of party closure court cases, and apologies presented by parties. Thirdly, it aims to scrutinize the nature and origins of the secularist state elites' conception of secularism and religion by conducting a detailed analysis of how it has come to be and how it is actuated starting with the late Ottoman period and continuing with military and judiciary interventions, memorandums, party closure cases, and apologies. And finally, it brings a theoretical view to the studies of globalization and Europeanization vis-à-vis their impact on various party characteristics in a more comprehensive, deeper and clearer way by exploring their significance and implications in the domains of economy, politics, culture and society and linking them with our empirical findings and analysis.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to explore and conceptualize the set of tools that will be employed in explaining the course of policy/ideological transformation that Turkish religious right has experienced with focus on the type and specifics of factors that are

associated with such political processes. Our first task has thus been to review the literature on theories of party change by paying special attention to the causes that produce party change which include leadership change, dominant coalition change and environmental change as well as the type of changes that they produce. While doing this, a greater part of the literature review is assigned to the role of environmental changes on party change with an intention to employ it in framing our theoretical design. Based on this preliminary work, a theoretical background of the dissertation is formed to involve, in brief, the identification of the dependent variable – the policy/ideological change of Turkish religious right – and the independent variables that are deemed to be the most instrumental factors among others in the emergence of this proposed change – the rigid secularism of the state elites, globalization and Europeanization.

CHAPTER III

TURKISH STATE ELITES AND THEIR SECULARISM

In this chapter, Turkish state elites will be taken under scrutiny regarding their view and policies towards the role of religion in public life, with a historical and philosophical perspective. An in-depth analysis will be offered of the type of secularism adopted by the state elites, who envisage not only the separation of religion and state but also the exclusion of religion from the public sphere and its relegation to private life. It will be observed that the roots of contemporary Turkish secularism go back to the Ottoman reform period during which a gradually growing campaign of westernization was put into action leading to the introduction of comprehensive reform packages in military, administrative, political, legal and educational domains. Gaining speed in the 19 century, the reformists had introduced a set of reforms that aimed to minimize the role of religion in public life, a process carrying on until the end of the First World War with a degree of increasing penetration to sociopolitical and economic life. The end of the First World War and the establishment of the Republic brought greater changes, including a very rigid secularist campaign against religious

institutions and life. Religion was totally excluded from the public life and elements of religion were prohibited from public visibility.

The introduction of multiparty politics raised hopes to mitigate this rigid secularism, though by then a class of state elites had already established itself, consisting of the military, the judiciary and the Republican Peoples Party and other civil bureaucracies, a class that regulated its members' political conformity and sought to check civil society with secularist policies. During the multiparty period, the state elites were involved in politics through direct or indirect intervention in political life in cases of anti-secularist upsurge. The period after the 1990s was exemplified with more moderate interventions to politics, possibly as a result of globalization, but it was also a scene of great tension, with the ascendance of the religious right in Turkish political life and the rise of calls for greater representation of religious right political ideals.

3.1 The Ottoman Legacy

3.1.1. The Classical Period

According to Stanford Shaw, religious motivations were one of the leading reasons behind the emergence of the Ottoman Empire alongside some economic concerns. The Ottomans were aided with a powerful set of ideological and pragmatic goals in

their expeditions to the west. While serving to the purpose of spreading Islam and expanding its borders with Jihad or through communication with the Christian communities in the western borders in the first place, the Ottomans were also observing great interests in collecting booties in wars against the Byzantine Empire (Shaw, 1982: 33). Some others, similar in pointing out to the importance of religion in Ottoman state formation, argue that state and religion were two major sources of the government's power. Religion and state were often used in unison as din-u devleti Osmani when an official order was released by the authorities (Mardin, 1981: 194; Mardin, 1983: 139; Davison, 2002: 223-224).The founders of the Ottoman Empire including Ertuğrul Gazi, Osman Bey and Orhan Bey were all decorated with titles of Gâzi (veteran of holy war), iftiharul mujahidîn (the pride of mujahedeen), şereful guzzât (the honor of veterans), al-muazzamul mujâhid (great mujahed), sultânul guzzât (the Sultan of the Veterans) to demonstrate their involvement in Islamic matters in their most significant examples as the head of the state (Dursun, 1989: 110-111).

In addition to the religious character of the state and the rulers, the Ottoman ruling elite were accompanied by many notables of religious origin in their military campaigns, governmental and religious matters. The leader of the Âhi order in Ankara Sheikh Edebali, who is claimed to be the father-in-law of Osman Bey, his son Şeyh Mahmut, Âhi Şemsettin and many other religious dignitaries and dervishes had taken part in gazas and conquests (holy wars) and they were assigned various administrative, political and legal posts in the statecraft. The sheiks and other members of the religious society were often gifted villages and towns by the Ottoman Beys to contribute to Islamic life and practice in the country. The religious elites enjoyed a poli-

cy of protection, proximity and tolerance assumed by the Ottoman Rulers. Some of them were appointed as muftis as a supreme office of fatwa against whom the rulers and the subjects were equally dependent on religious issues. Their views pertaining to religious aspects of the matters were highly respected (Gündüz, 1989: 14-20; Köprülü, 1959: 89-93; Ocak, 1999: 241-243). The impact of the Âhis and other religious orders was felt in their powers to select the Beys too in consultation with viziers and provincial governors (Beylerbeyi). Orhan Bey and Murat II were selected as Beys after the decision of the Âhis, for instance. The seizure of Ankara from the control of the Âhis was an important event which shows how powerful the Âhis had grown during the foundation of the Ottoman State (Uzunçarşılı, 1984: 496).

3.1.1.1. Religion in Ottoman Educational Life: Medreses

During the foundation of the state, the administrative cadres of the Ottomans were occupied by the hodjas, bureaucrats of earlier Seljuks and Ilhanids, members of various sufi orders, Islamic knights as well as dervishes who were educated in medreses of Iran, Egypt and Crimea. One of the first policies adopted by the Ottoman rulers after the conquests was the establishment of medreses with an aim to contribute to religions, social, cultural, scientific awareness of the general public but also to educate the special work force to be employed in administrative posts. The first Ottoman medrese was established in Iznik in 1331 to proliferate in numbers in a short time. After a successful education in medreses, the graduates were able to be judge, mufti and teachers (Akgündüz, 1997: 247-300; Baltacı, 1976: 56-58). The leading mem-

bers of the Ottoman Imperial Court including the grand vizier, some other viziers, judge of the army (kadıaskers), court calligrapher (nişancı) as well as the Şeyhulislam were all graduates of medreses who were able to come to these offices with a mechanism of appointment and promotion. Until the capture of Istanbul by Mehmet II., the religious bureaucracy enjoyed a great impact on the government after which they were challenged by the slave bureaucracy in public offices. For instance, the Çandarlı Family of ulema origin occupying the office of Grand Vizier since the foundation was eliminated and the office was transferred to the slave bureaucracy by Mehmet II. soon after the capture of Istanbul (Dursun, 1989: 122-123).

The number and qualifications of medreses proliferated in the Ottoman Empire by time in response to necessities and initiatives of the ruling elite. While in the beginning they gave education at a basic level, during the time of the Conqueror and afterwards medreses were established specializing in areas of traditions of the Prophet (Hadis), Koranic Exegesis and Jurisprudence which were named as Sahnı Seman, Darul Hadis, Süleymaniye, Müsille-i Süleymaniye among others. The educational curriculum in medreses included religious areas of knowledge as enumerated above and such secular sciences as mathematics, geometry, astronomy, medicine, logic and literature (Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 20-23; Baltacı, 1976: 16-37; İnalcik, 2003: 174-179).

3.1.1.2. Religion in Ottoman Law

The legal system in the Ottoman Empire was based on Şeriat in essence. The Ottoman Sultan was required to obey the Islamic law much as the rest of the people. It was one of the duties of the Sultan to apply and protect the Şeriat. Yet there had developed a domain of law called as customary law (örfi hukuk) over time inherited from earlier Arab and Turkish Muslim states. The customary law was not a rival legal system to Islamic law. It had emerged to fill in the gaps of the Islamic law, to regulate those areas which are not covered by the Islamic law, and to give prompt response to the necessities of the time. As the head of the state, the Ottoman Sultan was endowed with the authority to introduce laws about the political order and organization in service to public good and in the context of following good traditions. The customary law originating from the Sultan was incorporated in legal documents issued by the Sultan which include Kanunnames, Adaletnames and fermans (İnalcık, 2000: 27-36; Aydın, 1994: 375-391).

3.1.1.3. Religious Bureaucracy in Central Government and Their Duties

The Ottoman state structure incorporated a plenty of incumbents from the ulema with sizable power sources and authority in their hands. During the foundation of the state, the judge of Bursa (Bursa kadısı) was the leading member of the religious bureaucracy. He was the highest legal authority in the country with his areas of responsibilities covering the administration of the judges and teachers, and the resolution of

religious and legal disputes between the residents of Bursa and between the members of the army. Due to the increasing burden on the judge of Bursa with the expansion of the state, another legal office called as the Kadıasker (judge of the army) was instituted by Murat I. in 1363 and the judge of Bursa Çandarlı Halil Hayrettin Paşa was brought to its head (İpşirli, 1994: 267-269).

Kadıasker was responsible for administering the educational and legal organizations, seeing to legal needs and disputes of the army and the ruling elite in time of war and peace. Kadıasker was a founding member of the Divan-ı Hümayun (The Imperial Court) and was granted the authority to issue judgments on behalf of the Sultan by Mehmet II in his Kanunname as one of three offices entitled to do it. The duties of Kadiasker in Divan-ı Humayun included delivering opinions in the area of Islamic law when needed, undertaking various responsibilities in statecraft, and seeing to the lawsuits falling in his domain of authority. Kadiasker was the representative of the ulema in Divan- Humayun and he was coming after the grand vizier in protocol (Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 151-157; Uzunçarşılı, v. 2, 1995: 589).

Another leading member of the ulema playing an important role in Ottoman state structure was the Şeyhulislam. The office of Şeyhulislam was established during the reign of Murat II. in 1425 as an office of fatwa and Molla Şemseddin Fenari was appointed as first Şeyhulislam. The office remained as a supreme religious authority until 1922. While it was a modest institution in the beginning, Şeyhulislam was nominated as the head of the ulema class and was promoted over the Kadiasker in religious hierarchy during the reign of Mehmet II. and it acquired a remarkable signifi-

cance and respect during the tenor of Zenbilli Ali Efendi, Ibn Kemal and Ebussuud Efendi in the 16th century. Şeyhulislam was responsible for the appointment and promotion of the judges, muftis and medrese teachers. But more importantly, Şeyhulislam was a supreme office of fatwa. The domain of issues covered by the fatwas included by time the declaration of war and peace, taxation, deposition and killing of the Sultan or those issues of lesser political importance like prayers, inter-actions (muamelat), innovations like coffee and tobacco to make the Şeyhulislam an important political actor with his powers of approval and control (Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 173-214; İpşirli, 1991: 269-271; Uzunçarşılı, v.3, 1995: 449-450). The ruling elite and the slave bureaucracy were put in a hard position when they were not granted fatwas for various policies. For instance, the call of the II. Bayezid for fatwa from the Şeyhulislam Mevlana Zeynel Arabi to organize an expedition to Memluks for their sanctuary to Cem Sultan was rejected and the expedition was cancelled. The names of Sultans deposed and killed with the fatwa of the Şeyhulislam, on the other side, include Sultan Ibrahim in 1648, Mustafa IV. during the time of Mahmut II., Abdul-Aziz in 1876, Murat V. and Abdulhamid II. (Dursun, 1989: 243-247).

3.1.1.4. Religious Bureaucracy in Ottoman Kaza and Sanjak Administration: Judges (Kadıs and Mevleviyets)

Starting with the foundation of the state, the Ottomans were appointing a judge to the conquered lands with the purpose of distributing justice. The conquest was consid-ered as completed with the appointment of judges and subaşıs (military governor).

The judge of the Kazas was the highest legal, political and municipal authority in Kaza administration. He was appointed directly by the central authority and was not subject to the sanjak or provincial administrations. His main duty was solving disagreements among the public according to the laws of the Şeriat and the traditions, but he was also the head of administrative, financial, military and municipal matters in Kazas. The judge of the sanjaks, mevleviyet, was the highest legal authority in his unit, but was supposed to work in cooperation with Sanjak Beyi and Beylerbeyi in political and municipal matters. Thus it can be said that the members of the religious bureaucracy were granted extensive powers and authority in Ottoman peripheral government observing the application of Islamic law and order in their domain of government (Akdağ, 1974: 400-406; İpşirli, 1994: 263-267).

3.1.2. The Period of Stagnation: Innovations and Reforms

The Ottoman Empire was introduced to a process of innovations and reforms in its domestic structures taking speed with the late 17th century due to a course of stagnation shadowed out with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at Vienna in 1683. The defeat and the accompanying stagnation was closely associated with the shift of the balance of power between the Ottomans and the West against the Ottomans in military, economic and technological domains. With the help of technological and scientific advancements achieved, Europe had discovered the New World and had found new routes to the East to grow huge gold reserves in its treasure. European states had also improved their military and naval powers substantially. With the shift of superi-

ority in military and economic domains to the West, the Ottomans were not able to deal with their traditional enemies and were introduced to a process of decline. The defeat in wars against Austria and Russia was also another source of economic deterioration as the wars were an important revenue gate of the Ottomans. The process was further exacerbated with the capitulations (trade concessions) granted to some European states which led to the destruction of Ottoman economic and industrial development in progressively greater scales (Berkes, 1998: 23-25; Karpat, 1959: 3-8; Zürcher, 2007: 15-19; Ahmad, 2002: 34-43).

3.1.2.1. The Tulip Era and Secularizing Trends

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1714-1717 War against Austria and the signing of the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 remain a critical date in the history of Ottoman secularization. The defeat was interpreted by the Ottomans that it would not be possible any more to defeat the European powers with traditional military means and technology and that the Ottomans had to turn to Europe for inspiration and innovations. Furthermore, the perception of growing threat from Russia and Austria was forcing the Ottomans to look for allies in the west French being the most notable candidate as it was also in trouble with the same countries. With the Treaty of Passarowitz, the Ottomans were thus introduced to a process of close links with and observation of Europe that was intended to improve the military capabilities in the first place but also leading to a rise of interest in French civilization and culture (Karagöz, 1995: 173-182; Ergil, 1987: 8). This particular period in Ottoman History, lasting

until the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730, is named as the Tulip Era to have underlying effects in the process of innovations and reforms adopted in following years with substantial secularizing tendencies.

Envoys were sent to various European countries, Mehmet Çelebi being one of them, for observations on European civilization and education, and to give reports on aspects of it that could be adopted by the Ottomans (Lewis, 2003: 45-46). Mehmet Çelebi had noted during his observations in France the effective usage of technology and science in military domain. He delivered a report to the incumbents for the removal of traditional military system in favor of the adoption of more effective technology and methods, and invitation of foreign officers and technicians to do this job (Berkes, 1998: 33-36). The invitation of foreign officer corps and attempts to build European style military structures had some implications for secularist politics because the transfer of the elements of material culture involved the importation of various non-material cultures too attached to them in various ways. The employment of non-Muslim officer corps in the army was opposed by the ulema, first of all, as it was deemed against the religion to give Muslims under their authority. Secondly, there were issues and practices prescribed by religion in the education and application of even very rigid areas of knowledge like mathematics, geometry, medicine and geography.

But the Tulip Era was important in the process of Ottoman secularization mostly because of a spirit of worldliness that it generated. It was a period of time characterized with decline in moral and religious concerns and a rise of interest in the material

world exemplified with the cherishing of the elements of Western civilization, culture, literature, architecture and arts. The traditional rich segments of the Ottoman society liked spending money for mosque constructions and various religious endowments in the past, but the Tulip era saw the construction of palaces, manors, pools, parks, gardens and fountains. It saw the emergence and proliferation of operas, taverns, parties and coffee houses (Berkes, 1998: 26-30).

Ibrahim Müteferrika appears as the most leading reformist intellectual of the Tulip Era. He was the person opening the first official Ottoman printing permitted to be used for publication of non-religious items. Ibrahim was concerned with innovation and awakening in Islam. He defended the importance of introducing new methods and ideas from the west. In the book that he wrote on the causes of Ottoman stagnation titled Usûlül Hikem fî Nizâmıl Umem, he argued that the Ottomans were falling behind Europe because of their inability to follow them in technological developments but also because of the failure to devise wise political methods, laws, procedures and principles to establish viable political regimes unlike west. Ibrahim made a distinction between three types of government including monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, and went on with the virtues of democratic government with its promotion of popular representation and parliamentarianism. According to Ibrahim, the good governance that came with democratic movements in Europe was closely associated with their advance in front of the Ottomans. The Muslims were in a state of ignorance. While adopting the latest military technology and methods, in the first place, the Muslims had to employ modern technological and political means to gain

wealth and establish unity among the Muslims with viable political and administrative methods (Altuntek, 1993: 196-197).

A class of conservatives was in the rise in the same period who were opposed to a total campaign of Westernization. Christianity was still an enemy of Islam for them. It was wrong to rely on the Christian states in partnership and alliance. Cultural and social westernization would also mean a denial of traditional Islamic heritage which was never acceptable. The betrayal of France in 1807 was a proof of this fact. French was indeed motivated to expand over the Ottoman lands. They argued that if the harmony of traditional institutions was broken, it might not have been possible to unite them again (Dursun, 1998: 251-257).

3.1.3. The Period of Decline

The Period of Ottoman decline starting with the defeat of the Ottoman Army in Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca caused a greater tide of innovations and reforms in the Ottoman Empire compared to the previous of Tulip Era. The War was mobilized with a discourse of Jihad, but the defeat meant that it would not be possible to deal with Russia with religious zeal and traditional military methods. It would not be enough for the Ottomans to adopt new military techniques and methods, but there was also a need to change their traditional social and cultures structures too. The failure was indeed related with some cultural and traditional traits of the Turkish people which were not adaptive to new methods

and technologies, and thus a radical transformation was needed in body politic (Shaw, 1971: 167).

There were conservative oppositions to this thinking, however, stemming from an alliance of the ulema and the military. The conservatives stressed the importance of religious differences between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Their methods were unacceptable some times as seen in the denial of the European experts of the authority of the God on earth. They believed that wars can be won with military means only. Based on the history of wars between members of two religions, the conservatives never relied on the partnership and cooperation with Christian states. For them, the reformers were more like traitors. Modern methods and ideas of the West was a new stratagem to enslave the Muslims. The dispute turned violent at times, and conservatives organized in various assaults against the reformer bureaucrats and the Padişahs; they ruled fatwas, agitated the army and preached for the repudiation of certain reforms and the punishment of those who introduced them (Zürcher, 2007: 24; Ahmad, 2002: 34-43; Ahmad, 2007: 25-26).

Yet Selim III. was a strong supporter of the reformistsreformists' cadres. He agreed with the idea of a comprehensive reform program that would cover all aspects of the life. A reform package called New Order (Nizamı Cedid) was launched to carry out desired reforms. Most remarkable reforms related with secular politics was the opening of the Military Engineering School (Mühendishâne-i Berri Humâyun) in 1795 by the side of the Naval Engineering School (Mühendishâne-i Bahri Humâyun) established by Mustafa III. in 1776. These schools were intended to replace the Janissary

army which was the most threatening member of the conservatives. The curricula of the schools did not include the traditional Islamic areas of knowledge covered in medreses except the Arabic language but were rather decorated with modern sciences and areas of knowledge. Many of the teachers working in these schools were French officers and specialists. In addition to these, many other cartographers, astronomers, geographers, and even poets and painters were invited and recruited from France to raise the qualifications of Ottoman Army to the European standards. Many of the students who graduated from these schools would be the intellectual fathers of Ottoman modernization. There was a sizable increase in the number of foreigners in the Ottoman Empire in this period. An impact of these officer corps on Ottoman secular tendencies was their introduction and enjoyment of some western manners and ways of life (Lewis, 2002: 57-60; Berkes, 1985: 111-112).

There was a remarkable debate against religion during the period of New Order. Some reformists sought the causes of Ottoman decline in religious fanaticism and superstitions. Selim III. was in agreement with them and he was motivated to crash the ulema and the Janissarys as well as the authority of the Şeyhulislam for a more successful reform process. However, the ulema, Janissaries, ayans and derebeys united against him to dethrone and kill. According to them, Selim was not a defender of Islam any more. He was more like a Frenchman (Berkes, 1998: 82-85; Ergil, 1987: 12).

3.1.3.1. Mahmut II.

The forerunner of the Tanzimat period II Mahmut was an intimate devotee of western civilization. For him, the recovery of the Ottoman Empire required a comprehensive reform process covering military, political, administrative, legal and social domains. To do this, he knew that he had to break the powers of the Janissaries and the ulema as they had aborted many reform attempts by previous Padişahs and statesmen.

The Janissary army was abolished successfully in 1826 and a list of reforms in its aftermath. He maintained the tradition of inviting foreign officer corps to train and improve the army. A growing practice in the military domain, which was learnt from the Governor of Egypt Mehmet Ali, was the sending of military students to various countries of Europe for education. Two more military schools were opened by Mahmut II. for the modernization of the army in European style in addition to previously established military and naval engineering schools, i.e., Imperial Music School (Mızıkayı Humayun Mektebi) in 1831 and School of Military Sciences (Mektebi Ulumi Harbiye) in 1834. The first school was established to replace Mehterhaneyi Humayun to educate drummers and trumpeters for the army led by an Italian instructor, Donizetti Paşa. The second was opened as an example of French School of Military Sciences with the medium of education being French and the curriculum being imported from its French model (Lewis, 2002: 80-84; Metin, 2010).

In the realm of civilian education, a School of Medicine (Mektebi Tıbbîye Şâhâne) was established in 1827. Dârul Ulûmu Hikemiye-i Osmanîye ve Mektebi Tibbiye Şâhâne (Ottoman Imperial School of Physical and Medical Sciences) was established in 1838 as an improved form of the medical school. All the Ottomans were able to go to these schools. Mektebi Maârifi Adliye and Mektebi Ulûmi Edebiye were established to educate government translators and to translate scientific books from European languages (Berkes, 1985: 111-112; Göktaş, 2009: 19-21; Metin, 2010). These schools were built as secular schools attached to the Ministry of Education outside of the jurisdiction of Şeyhulislam. Many of the intellectuals, reformists and leading statesmen of the 19th century were graduates of these schools (military and civilian) to be the vanguards of social, political, intellectual and educational modernization of the Ottoman Empire. They were the barracks of the emerging secular bureaucracy. While some of these schools gave education in French language, some others required the knowledge of French language from the students and they had Muslim and non-Muslim teachers. (Karagöz, 193-194; Shaw, 1983: 78; Mardin, 1983: 139-143; Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 232-233;).

An important development in secularist politics during the reign of Mahmut II. was the introduction of a central bureaucratic system and transfer of the powers and authority of the ulema to various ministries and directorates. The ulema was highly independent in terms of its revenues, employees and establishments in the past. They held courts and issued rulings from their own residences. But Mahmut II. opened an office and department of Chief Mufti and made them directly accountable to the palace. The Chief Mufti was an office holder appointed by the government. With the

establishment of the Ministry of Justice afterwards, the powers of the ulema was further minimized as the appointment of teachers and judges, and administration of schools and colleges were transferred to the Ministry of Justice any more. Another important development in terms of the weakening of the ulema was the establishment of Directorate of Foundations. Religious Foundations (Evkaf) constituted a serious revenue gate for the conservative ulema. To break one of the economic power bases of the ulema, II. Mahmut established the Directorate of Foundations. The directorate took the foundations under a central authority by which the revenues were collected from one hand and distributed directly for religious purposes in constructing mosques, paying the salaries of religious staff and in other religious activities (Lewis, 2002: 92-94; Berkes, 1998: 98-99).

3.1.3.2. Tanzimat Period

Tanzimat period was the real beginning of Ottoman modernization. The reforms that it brought were far more extensive than previous reform attempts penetrating to almost all domains of Ottoman life. It was an important milestone in Ottoman secularization with various reforms introduced in political, administrative, legal, social and educational realms. The period started with the declaration of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun in 1839 soon after the death of Mahmut II. and continued until the declaration of first Ottoman Constitution in 1876.

One of the most significant achievements of the Tanzimat reforms was the introduction of a concept of Ottoman citizenship. This was important as the traditional Ottoman society was a Muslim dominant society with rights and privileges over the non-Muslim subjects of the state. This was the part of a thinking called Ottomanism to prevent nationalistic secessions from the Empire particularly in the Balkans. This issue was handled more seriously with the Reform Edict in 1856. As a part of this concept, the non-Muslim members of the society were allowed to benefit from many rights and privileges granted to the Muslims. The notion of justice and equality was taken to the center of legal, political and administrative processes (Karpat, 1959: 10-11).

3.1.3.2.1. Secular Reforms in Legal Domain

In the legal domain, an important development was the introduction of a Penal Code in 1840 with parts of its articles and methods borrowed from the French Penal Code. Another Penal Code was prepared in 1858 with more borrowings from western sources. A Commercial Code was adopted in 1850 based on French Commercial Code by which first time the concepts of interest and bill of exchange were introduced to the Ottoman legal system. Statutory Courts (Nizamiye Mahkemeleri) were established in 1840 operating according to secular principles to see to criminal and commercial cases. As a deviation from the traditional Islamic legal system, Statutory Courts embodied Muslim and non-Muslim judges at the same time and the witnessing of the non-Muslims were accepted in the courts from then. A Land Law was in-

troduced in 1858 according to which ownership and inheritance was regulated according to secular principles of equality of man and woman. A process of the codification of the Şeriat was in order sometimes in itself and sometimes in unity with secular European laws. A Civil Code was prepared by Ahmet Cevdet Paşa according to Hanefi school of Jurisprudence completed in 1876, but aspects of family and personal law were excluded from the codification as a deviation from classical Islamic law. Codification of Islamic law was important insofar as it opened the gate of ijtihad as a chance to introduce some changes in Islamic law (Ortaylı, 1986: 165-167; Ergil, 1987: 24-27).

3.1.3.2.2. Secular Reforms in Education

There were remarkable secular reforms in the educational realm also. At the primary school level, priority was given to the opening and proliferation of Rüşdiyes to educate students for government offices, military and medical schools. The traditional sıbyan mekteps and medreses run by the ulema were not able to raise students for newly established bureaucratic cadres and high schools, and instead of reforming the traditional religious schools which would agitate the conservatives, a decision was made to establish new schools under the authority of Ministry of Education. The curriculum of Rüşdiye's were filled with modern sciences including mathematics, geography, history, French language, painting in addition to a limited number of courses on Arabic, Iranian and religion. Rüşdiyes did not have the heavy load of religious courses taught in medreses and sıbyan mekteps. In 1845, idadis were established as

the secondary school division of the Rüşdiyes to serve to the same purpose. Another important development was the opening of Darulmuallimin in 1848 and Darulmuallimat in 1970 (Male and Female Teacher Schools) with the purpose of meeting teacher needs of Rüşdiyes and Idadis based on secular thinking and modern educational curriculum (Berkes, 1998: 175-192; Ortaylı, 2005: 183-185; Metin, 2010).

In addition to Rüşdiyes and Idadis, the Tanzimat period saw the opening of Sultanis, first one being the Galatasaray Sultanisi established in 1868 with an intention to give high quality of education for government offices and military schools. Galatasaray Sultanisi was characterized as a very highly secular school giving education in French language. Many of the teachers were French and many of its students were non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. The school was under the authority of French Ministry of Education. Appointments were made by the French ministry. Its curriculum included education of modern and ancient European languages, modern social and natural sciences, and law (Lewis, 2002: 122; Davison, 1990: 173; Ortaylı, 2005: 184; Berkes, 1985: 116-117).

At the level of higher education, a number of developments draw attention. Mektebi Mulkiye (School of Government) was established in 1859 to educate students for non-military government offices. The graduates of Mulkiyes would work in administrative, legal and municipal jobs. The students in this school were taught economy, law, international relations, statistics etc. with addition of some other courses afterwards. Mektebi Hukuk (School of Law) was opened in 1860 to meet the personnel

needs of Statutory Courts like judges and the others, the offices formerly occupied by the graduates of higher medreses (Davison, 1990: 171).

Şinasi appeared as a leading intellectual of the Tanzimat period who advocated and supported the necessity of westernization reforms in the Ottoman Empire. He is known as the father of the movement of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. In his writings, he elaborated on ideas of citizenship rights, freedom of expression, public opinion, liberal ideas, national consciousness, constitution and liberty. He introduced many literary works and forms from European literature including theatre, poetry and stories. He translated many books and literary pieces from European languages (Berkes, 1998: 197-198; Mardin, 2006: 296-306).

3.1.3.3. The Period of Constitutionalism

The period of Ottoman Constitutionalism starting with the declaration of the Ottoman Constitution and the opening of the parliament had many implications for secular politics. While Article 11 of the Constitution indicated that "the religion of the state is Islam," the removal of the Muslim and non-Muslim differentiation, institutionalization of the concept of Ottoman citizenship, and introduction of various rights and liberties were important steps towards secularization. The articles of the Constitution from 8 to 26 pertaining to common rights of the subjects incorporated provisions about freedoms and rights of the citizens including citizenship rights, personal freedom, personal safety, freedom of belief, freedom of press, right to petition, right

to be civil servant, inviolability of private property, prohibition of torture among many others (Shaw and Shaw, 2004: 222; Ortaylı, 1986: 167-168).

3.1.3.3.1. Influence of the Young Ottomans

It is argued that behind the declaration of the first Ottoman constitution, there was the influence of intellectual currencies of thought propagated by the Young Ottomans (Genç Osmanlılar). Young Ottomans were intelligent much as they were intellectual. They were aware of the potential of a conservative backlash against reform attempts and thus they followed a road from within Islamic doctrines for the introduction of reforms. They often argued that Islam was not irreconcilable with reform and many of the European political institutions and principles were embodied within the text of Islam. What needed was a careful interpretation (Davison, 1963: 219-233).

Namık Kemal was a leading member of the Young Ottomans. For him, the cause of the Ottoman failure was political and economic and the recovery was through educa-tion and constitutionalism. He argued that Islam and liberal constitutionalism were not in contradiction. While there were significant differences between classical Is-lamic political doctrines and contemporary political ideas, Islam was open to renova-tion and change depending on the circumstances. The west had been superior to the Ottoman Empire due to the promotion of the ideas of liberty and progress. The Ot-tomans thus also had to adopt contemporary political and legal developments in the west by establishing a republican regime, a parliamentary government assigning the

sovereignty to the people, and taking the public will and consent as the source of political action (Davison, 1963: 223-231; Berkes, 1998: 209-213; Karpat, 1959: 12-13).

According to Namık Kemal, the Tanzimat reforms had many erroneous applications. The idea of cultural westernization was not right in case of the Ottoman Empire for it did not have anything to do with Ottoman progress and recovery. The Ottomans had to keep their loyalty to traditional Islamic values. They were the foundations of the Ottoman society and attempts to remove them would be an attempt to our existence. Reforms had to be worked from within Islam (Berkes, 1998: 216-217).

The fate of the first Ottoman Constitution and the parliament did not last long, however, due to the outbreak of the War with Russia in 1877. They were suspended indefinitely. The period was followed with a regime of oppression. The intellectual champers were occupied by the Young Turks this time who defended the restoration of the Constitution and the Parliament. Contrary to the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks displayed a positivist outlook in their approach to religion and politics (Bellah, 1958: 2). They were reactive to the authoritarian and dictatorial Hamidian regime. They were closer to the secular constitutionalism of the Tanzimat reformers in outlook.

3.1.3.3.2. Secularist Policies during Second Constitutionalism

After the declaration of Second Ottoman Constitutionalism in 1908, it is observed that the Şeyhülislam was trying to enhance his powers and authority over various political, administrative, educational and other institutions. He had a seat in the cabinet and he was the head of Şeriat Courts as well as the Ministry of Foundations. Turkists and the Westernists were against an office of Şeyhülislam with extensive powers. They had an opportunity to curb the powers of Şeyhülislam during the First World War when the Union and Progress Party had taken the government under its total control. He was first removed from the cabinet in 1916 and his jurisdiction over Şeriat Courts was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. A secular court of appeals was established above the religious courts, and the duty of the appointment of judges was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. The administration of the foundations was transferred to the Ministry of Foundations. And finally his traditional authority over the medreses was transferred to the Ministry of Education (Berkes, 1998: 416-418; Ergil, 1987: 45-47).

In legal and administrative domains, the Law of Family Rights was adopted in 1817 in which the secular and religious concerns were united. In the new Family Law, the women were allowed to start a divorce case. In case of an attempt to polygamy by the husband, the wife would be able to apply to the court for divorce. Various public, educational, and participatory rights were granted to women in sociopolitical life. In 1916 and 1917, western calendar was adopted to in place of the Hijri calendar with

an excuse of removing the problems encountered in temporal and fiscal matters (Shaw and Shaw, 2004: 365-367).

3.2   Republican Period

After the end of the Independence War, which was supported by the religious and bureaucratic elites at the same time, Atatürk and his close friends, who were educated in the societies of late Ottoman bureaucratic elites, started a campaign of modernization and westernization much deeper and more comprehensive than its examples during the Ottoman Empire, most commonly named as the Kemalist Revolutions that negated the classical status of the religious elite as equal in power to the secularist elite. The goal of the Kemalist Revolution was summarized by Atatürk as elevating the Turkish nation to the level of contemporary civilizations. The idea of contemporary civilization held by Atatürk and his associates had a very broad character, aiming to transform the Turkish nation in all political, economic, social and cultural spheres (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 233-235; Davison, 2002: 219, 237-238; Zürcher, 2007: 172-173). The roots of this thinking in the west date back to the Enlightenment era and the idea of liberating man from the scholastic medieval thinking nurtured by religious institutions of the time.

Having their origins in their admiration of western modernization, Kemalist state elites construed religion as an obstacle to Turkey's journey to contemporary civilization. Religion was a source of fanaticism, ignorance and hatred against progress and

reason. In a modern society there could have been no place for religion (Davison, 2002: 237-238, 248-253, 263, 265; Mahçupyan, 1998: 54; Öniş, 2006b: 104, 106; Heper, 1981: 249-251; Erdoğan, 2005; Lewis, 2002: 267-271; Tamimi, 2000: 9-12). Serif Mardin describes religion as a very central part of the traditional Turkish society with its function to mystify certain rituals and practices, obscuring Turkey's goals for modernization and development like a wolf trap (Mardin, 1983: 154-157).

Consequently, secularism was presented as a very strong characteristic of the Turkish Republic. The type of secularism adopted by the state elites was a very assertive one which was deemed to be the only way to break the institutional hold of Islam over the state and the society (Kuru, 2009: 173-176). Contrary to the role of religion in the majority of the Christian world, Islam had penetrated all aspects of sociopolitical life in Muslim Turkish society, and accordingly, a much more radical theme of secularism was supposed to be introduced to countervail its power. In turn, a secular nationalism and rationalism was introduced as the new official identity to replace the traditional religious identity and to fill the resultant moral vacuum. This new identity was indoctrinated to the people in newly established social centers like People's Houses (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 233-235; Bellah, 1958: 3; Mahçupyan, 1998: 65). However, it is very commonly argued that Kemalism was not able to present an alternative morality addressing people's reason and conscience, and thus its cultural modernization theme was doomed to fail.

Religion was pushed to the margins of the private life of citizens and religious institutions were taken under the control of public authority. Caliphate was abolished and

the office of sheikh 'l-Islam was replaced by the Presidency of Religious Affairs and Directorate of Foundations (Davison, 2002: 220). Reforms were introduced to erase the signs of religion in public life (Heper, 1981: 249-251; Zürcher, 2007: 172-173; Toprak, 2005: 170). A radical example of these reforms was the prohibition of the fez, turban and other religious attire and introduction of hat law (Davison, 2002: 237-238; Lewis, 2002: 267-271, 402-404). Even further, these reforms were sometimes introduced with a discourse of "breaking the idols." The Islamic dress style was an idol, the Islamic calendar was an idol, Islamic law was an idol and the Arabic alphabet was another idol, all of which had to be replaced with their versions from the "civilized" Western world (Ahmad, 2002: 99-101). Reforms were deemed necessary to destroy the power of religious ideas, traditions and arrangements in front of development and progress. Turkish secularism is thus most commonly interpreted as an example of modernization against Islam (Davison, 2002: 214; Esposito, 1998: 98).

Table 1 below presents a list of leading reforms adopted by Atatürk and his followers during the early Republican period, in line with this tradition of approach to the state of affairs between religion and politics. It could be very easily observed here that these secularist reforms and policies are part of a social and cultural project as well as having political motivations that aim to introduce new forms of life to break the institutional bond of religion on Turkish social, cultural and political life.

Table 1: Secularist Reforms and Policies during the Republican Era

-Abolition of the Caliphate, the office of Sheikh 'l-Islam, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1924

-Establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Reisliği) and the Directorate-General of Foundations (Evkaf Müdürlüğü), 1924

-Introduction of the Law of Unity of Education (Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu), closure of centers for Religious Brotherhoods and Orders, those places known as lodges, hermitages and medresehs (tekke, zaviye ve medreseler), 1924

-Closure of the Progressive Republican Party due to accusations that it became a center of anti-secularist opposition, 1925

-Introduction of the dress reform and Hat Law prohibiting religious attire such as fez and male turban, 1925

-Adoption of the Gregorian calendar and abolition of the lunar calendar, 1925

-Adoption of Swiss Civil Code, 1926

-Replacement of Arabic Alphabet with the Latin Alphabet, 1928

-Removal of the constitutional article pertaining to Islam as the official religion of the state, 1929

-Removal of religious courses from the school curricula, from 1933-1940s

-Adoption of penal, commercial and procedural laws imported from various European countries

-Adoption of Western metric system of measurement,

-Closure of the Free Republican Party on the grounds that it became a center for anti-secularist opposition, 1930

-Introduction of the surname law, 1934

-Change of the official week holiday from Friday to Sunday, 1935

-Change of the language of Prayer Calls from Arabic into Turkish, 1932-1950

-Prohibition of going for Pilgrimage, 1934-1947

This holistic secularism was implemented by a class of state elites. During the early republican period, Atatürk, İsmet İnonü, and his other close associates were the main actors of the state elites, applying their influence through the office of the presidency, the office of the prime minister, the government, parliament and the Republican People's Party. With the rise of the Democrat Party after the introduction of multiparty politics and its electoral victory, the role of the government and the parliament in the state elites was interrupted. The settlement of the military as the leading actor of the state elites, which was not as active then as it is now, corresponded to the time after the 1960 military coup, when the Turkish Armed Forces were identified in the 1961 Constitution as the guardian of the Turkish state against internal and external threats – a duty incorporated in the internal service code of the Turkish Armed Forces too. Today, the members of the state elites include the military judiciary, the Republican People's Party, some media centers, some business, trade and industrial unions, secularist intellectuals, and some professional groups (Heper, 1985: 48-149; Toprak, 2005: 170).

This particular class of state elites has adopted an idea of the state above society, with their responsibility being to enlighten, educate and guide the people; to discover and implement policies for the public's good and interests. It is therefore a class characterized with elitism, responsible politics and strong leadership. The public good and interest deliberated by the state elites has been executed in a comprehensive westernization and modernization program with a positivist outlook to be guided

by science and reason (Heper, 1985: 48-66; Özbudun, 1994: 192-200; Mahçupyan, 1998).

3.3   The Multiparty Political Era

The introduction of multiparty politics brought a set of changes in the rigid secularist line of the state elites, led by the Republican Peoples Party of the time. The RPP was troubled by electoral concerns. They were fearful that the party's militant secularist policies over the previous twenty years had attracted a great deal of resentment from the people, and that this would cause them a disastrous electoral experience. To this end, the RPP demonstrated an inclination to bring in some liberties for religious practice. Some of them that could be cited here are opening the tombs and shrines to the public, removing the legal barrier against going on Pilgrimage, permitting the recruitment of religious preachers in the army, introducing elective religion lessons in schools, opening Imam-Hatip Courses in various cities to meet the need for religious services, establishing the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University, voting affirmative for the return to Arabic prayer calls in an initiative proposed by the DP deputies, and endorsement of the anti-communist fatwa of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Ahmad, 1994: 440-442; Zürcher, 2007: 233; Bozan, 2007: 13-14).

Despite these attempts, the RPP lost the elections to Adnan Menderes's Democrat Party in 1950. But the concerns of the state elites about republican and secularist reforms continued, as the nature of the threat changed. The new liberties introduced

were never meant to abandon the Kemalist reforms. The RPP had lost control of the government. The liberal rightist DP was provided with an important mechanism to address the calls of the public for religious rights, freedoms and reforms – only to draw the opposition of the RPP deputies. Accordingly, the DP tried to exploit the religious feelings of the people for electoral purposes, and the RPP had to protect their reforms. The DP had passed the amendment of Article 524 of the Penal Code, relating to the reading of prayer call in Turkish: the Imams would be free to recite prayer calls in Arabic or Turkish upon their choice. The ban on Koran recitations via radio was removed; formerly elective religious courses were made mandatory; permission was given for production and marketing of religious publications; and there was a striking rise in the number of mosques and preacher schools. The Imam-Hatip Courses were turned into Imam-Hatip Schools. In 1959, Higher Islamic Institutes were established for the graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools to continue their education and training (Ahmad, 1994: 440-442; Zürcher, 2007: 233; Landau, 1978: 248-254; Bozan, 2007: 14-15). DP's controversial policies were accompanied by speeches by Adnan Menderes promising the removal of the dress reform and return to the Arabic alphabet. The Imams' verbal attacks on the RPP in speeches were an equally important concern to the RPP.

The DP presented itself as a centrist party opposed to religious radicalism. And this was true to a great extent, which could be ascertained from their various campaigns against centers of religious radicalism, and plenty of other examples: the DP government had closed various Islamic journals, such as Büyük Doğu, Sebilurreşat and İslamiyet; the leading religious nationalist ideologue Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was

brought to court and; a DP party member from Samsun, Hasan Fehmi Ustaoğlu, was dismissed from the party for demurring to Atatürk. Said Nursi was brought to court, charged with secretly undermining the republican and secularist foundations of the state. Millet Partisi (Nation Party) was closed on grounds of violating secularist reforms. And similarly, Türkiye Milliyetçiler Derneği (Turkish Nationalists Foundation) was closed for being an anti-communist organization (Ahmad, 1994: 444-447; Landau, 1978: 263-267; Kırçak, 2001a: 59, 63-67). In many of these cases, the DP was supported by the RPP too, to become a parallel group of state elites declaring its determination to protect republican values. The RPP was too committed to sacrifice Kemalist reforms for religious freedoms.

Another important issue of the time concerning religious radicalism was the presence of a Sufi order called Tijanis. Tijanis were known for their attacks to Atatürk busts and statutes and their calls for return to Arabic prayer calls. In a typical response to such opposition, the RPP and DP countered Tijanis by closing the order and sentencing its leader to ten years' imprisonment. In 1951, the DP passed the Atatürk law in the parliament to prohibit and establish punishments for defaming Atatürk (Zürcher, 2007: 233; Landau, 1978: 262-263; Kırçak, 2001b: 53-54). Though the DP drew the attention of the secularist forces, its religious agenda was very limited. and often it reflected electoral concerns. The DP's religious reforms were introduced within the framework of freedom of belief and conscience; for this reason, the DP had passed a law in the parliament in 1953 to protect the freedom of conscience.

The DP was critical of the militant secularism of the state elites as well as their elitist formation. Accordingly, it was not right to consider the nation as a collection of people inclined to backwardness and bigotry who could be kept under control with weapons and bayonets. The idea that religion hinders progress and has to be minimized or even deleted in a modern society was not acceptable. The RPP had to respect freedom of belief and conscience or risk losing power (Ahmad, 1994: 446; Zürcher, 2007: 234).

The 27 May regime established after the 1960 military intervention introduced some other changes in the nature of the state elites' secularism. The government was dissolved and a military junta was established to rule for the next 18 months. Contrary to what was expected, the National Unity Committee did not attempt to reintroduce the militant secularism of the early republican period. They rather observed some functional benefits in the use of religion for some public purposes. Religion would be employed in producing peace and stability in the country. For this reason, the NUC endeavored to give a national and also a progressive nature to religious institutions. Religion would have stayed pure and it would not have been subject to political exploitation if it had been taken under state control. The idea of reading the Quran and the prayer calls in Turkish was totally abandoned. Contrary to earlier members of the state elites, religion was not deemed as a source of backwardness, bigotry and unreason by the junta leaders. It was counterproductive to be inimical to religion and religious services. It was argued that domestic tension was not produced by elements of Islamic culture, but likely originating from foreign influence. Wearing Çarşaf, for

instance, was a tradition imported from the Christians (Ahmad, 1994: 450-453; Landau, 1978: 257-259; Kırçak, 1993: 100-101).

The NUC had adopted the religious reforms the DP implemented in 1950s, and even added to them. The curricula of the Imam-Hatip schools and High Islamic Institutes were supplemented with addition of modern sciences so that they could produce better teachers. This paradigmatic change did not mean that the NUC opposed Kemalist reforms. The NUC believed that Turkification of religion would be demanded by the people themselves as they grew more aware of their culture and history (Ahmad, 1994: 452-453).

After the return to democracy, the parties were again showing inclinations to employ religion in their political campaigns. Both the RPP and the newly established Justice Party (JP), led by Süleyman Demirel, argued that they had brought many religious freedoms and that they would do more for the pious if they were elected, while also accusing one another of antireligious inclinations. Demirel and his deputies were often accused of being Freemasons, and the RPP of being a communist party. Freemasons were servants to Israel and Judaism, and therefore they were enemies of Islam. The RPP, on the other hand, was trying to destroy religion and morality in the country under the façade of secularism. RPP was also accused of planning to close the mosques and religious schools. The JP won the elections in 1965. The broad policy goals of the JP included many religious reforms. The number of Imam-Hatip schools and Koran courses was rising. The JP was leading a campaign to open an Imam-Hatip school in every city, and clearing the way for their students to enter uni-

versities, a goal that they had achieved in 1976. Religion was employed as an important tool for combating radical leftist ideology. Religion was also deemed to help ameliorate social problems related to rapid economic development (Ahmad, 1994: 454-459; Bozan, 2007: 16-17; Kırçak, 2001b: 60-61).

In 1970, a new actor emerged in Islamic politics that would dominate the political venue for the next 30 years. Necmettin Erbakan established the National Order Party (NOP) by splitting from the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel. The NOP entered Turkish political life with an ambitious religious conservative agenda that included the goal of instituting an Islamic society, a society with all its facets in agreement with Islam. The party promised to introduce radical reforms when they entered the government: cinemas, theatres, and bailey schools would be closed, and football would be prohibited. Such policy promises put a lot of material in the hand of public prosecutors to bring the party into the courtroom for closure. And so was it done after the military memorandum of 1971 (Ahmad, 1994, 460-461; Landau, 1978: 274-275).

The change of leadership in the RPP from İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit had added some new ideological views to the RPP program. The party had assumed a center left social democratic policy line. Ecevit was proposing to introduce land reform in the entire country. He was accusing Erbakan of being a capitalist for his opposition to land reform. Despite their differences, Ecevit and Erbakan formed a coalition government between 1974 and 1977. As the vice-premier, Erbakan held a number of important ministries. The state elites were alarmed by the rise of his power. Bureau-

cracy and educational institutions were being occupied by Erbakan's cadres. The secondary school level of the Imam-Hatip schools was reopened, and plenty of new Imam-Hatip schools were opened with the initiative of the NSP branch of the government. In his election campaigns, Erbakan promised a mosque and a Koran course in every village, an Imam-Hatip school in every county, a High Islamic Institute in every city; Ayasofya would be opened to prayer. Erbakan was distressing the state elites with his religious campaign (Ahmad, 1994: 462-464: Bozan, 2007: 16-17).

Towards the 1980s, quelling a state of armed interdenominational conflict was at the top of the agenda of secularist politics. In various cities of the country, there had appeared a Sunni-Alawite clash. The Alawites were being accused of apostasy and communism, and they were thus targeted by the Sunnis. The Alawites were most often supportive of RPP and they were indeed its most loyal voters. What followed were massacres of Alawites, martial law, and eventually the military intervened to prevent their slaughter (Ahmad, 1994: 466-567).

During the same period, the Iranian revolution took place. It had a great impact on religious political groups in the country, and the state elites feared that the revolution would spread to Turkey and other neighboring countries. It was claimed that Iran was providing propaganda and money to the revolutionaries in Turkey. In 1979, the National Salvation Party organized a meeting in Konya, called the Jerusalem Meeting. The meeting soon turned into a radical religious demonstration, with the participants, wearing fez and other religious attire, chanting various slogans for the introduction of Şeriat law. All of these events brought religious radicalism to the top of

the agenda as an anti-secularist threat that, the government decided, had to be countered with serious measures (Ahmad, 1994: 467-468).

3.4   The Gates of State Elites to Politics

The ways individual members of the state elites exercise power in politics differ from one another in contemporary Turkey, though often they act in accordance with their interpretation of their role in society, and their duties to it. The most powerful member of the state elites is the military, the author of three coups d'état, carried out in 1960, 1971 and 1980. The involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces in the political process is legitimized by some constitutional provisions and internal service codes that charge the army with the duties to protect the country against internal and external threats and guard the secular constitutional system. The Internal Service Code of the Turkish Armed Forces describes the duty of the Turkish army as the protection of the country and the Republic of Turkey as it is identified by the Constitution (Article 35). And similarly, Internal Service Regulation of the Turkish Armed Forces rule that Turkish Armed Forces defends the country against internal and external threats by force if necessary (Article 85). These provisions have constituted the legal framework for the military interventions of the last century, as well as the Armed Forces' safe exit from political engagement without legal prosecution (Özbudun, 1999: 110; Heper and Güney, Summer 2000: 620-621; İba, 1998: 147-148).

The military is thus granted the right to take unilateral action without consent of the political elites in case they perceive the need to defend against a threat, to reserve peace and security, and to enjoy extensive tutelary powers. The National Security Council, established by the 1961 Constitution and still active today after certain reformations, is the administrative organ that assembles military and civilian bureaucrats to deliberate national security issues and to deliver the recommendations of the Armed Forces to civilian authorities. The members of the National Security Council (NSC) include the president, prime minister, chief of general staff, deputies of the prime minister, attorney general, minister of defense, minister of interior, minister of foreign affairs, commanders of the Turkish ground, air and naval forces, and the commander of the gendarmerie forces. The NSC serves as a leading platform for military bureaucrats to apply their tutelary powers in the country by communicating their views to the political elites on a regular basis. Article 118 of the Constitution stipulates that the NSC deliver its views to the Council of Ministers "on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, determination and implementation of the national security policy of the State." The involvement of the NSC in politics is enhanced with a very broad definition of national security in Article 2 of the Law of National Security Council. Article 2 defines national security as the protection of the constitutional order, national existence and integrity; promotion of the interest of the country in the international field in all social, political, cultural and economic domains; and preservation of interests originating from international treaties vis-à-vis internal and external threats (Özbudun, 1999: 108; Cizre, January 1997: 157-158; Hale, 1996: 272-273; Heper, 2002: 55-66; Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 320-322).

In addition to the NSC, the military delivers its messages to the authorities and the general public through press releases, speeches, and most recently through official websites. A recent example of military involvement in Turkish politics vis-à-vis Islam were actuated after a NSC meeting held on February 28 1997, and ensuing communication between the military and the government to take necessary actions to combat religious radicalism; another is a memorandum issued through the website of the Office of Chief of General Staff on 27 April 2007 against the candidacy of Abdullah Gül for presidential elections with a declaration that the military may intervene into the process if the first round of the presidential elections are not cancelled.

The judiciary, secondly, can get involved in aspects of party politics through the Constitutional Court and the public prosecutor of the Supreme Court, by monitoring whether the parties are observing their legal obligations. In the case of the religious right, the Judiciary is particularly attentive to inspect specific party policies and programs to check whether they abide the principle of secularism. In cases where the relevant organs of the judiciary observe that a party is violating this particular principle, they can initiate a court case for the punishment of the party. The court case starts with the Public Prosecutor's presentation of a file to the parliament for the prosecution of the party. If the application passes the votes of the parliament with a 2/3 majority of votes, the file is brought to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court can decide to punish the party with a majority of two-third of the votes. Legal provisions involving the prosecution of a party for violating the principle of

secularism are located in articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and Law of Political

Parties. The article 68 paragraph 4 of the constitution stipulates that:

> … The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall
> not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity
> with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule
> of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular
> republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship
> or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime…

Article 69 continues that it is the Constitutional Court which determines whether a

party is violating article 68, paragraph 4 of the Constitution after the filing of a suit

by the Chief of Public Prosecutor of the Republic. The Constitutional Court shall

decide the dissolution of a party if it determines that the party is a center of activities

against 68:4, if party organs execute such activities intensively and in determination.

If the violation is not executed intensively and in determination, the Court can decide

to deprive the party of state aid wholly or partly. Party members who have caused the

closure of the party "cannot be founders, members, directors or supervisors in any

other party for a period of five years." And finally, "political parties that accept fi-

nancial assistance from foreign states, international institutions and persons and cor-

porate bodies shall be dissolved permanently."

Article 101 of the Law of the Political Parties, another source of judicial action

against political parties, similarly rules that the legal power to dissolve a party is held

by the Constitutional Court in cases of the violation of article 68 of the Constitution

by a party seeking power, perpetrating and provoking such actions or accepting ma-

terial assistance from foreign sources. The degree of punishment, ranging from party

closure to budgetary cuts, will depend on the intensity and magnitude of violations.

Before opening a lawsuit against a party for this matter, the Public Prosecutor corresponds with the party to allow explanations for the violations stated; if the party does not or cannot provide them, the Public Prosecutor applies to the Constitutional Court.

In addition to its role in party closure cases, the Constitutional Court embodies the leading actor of the state elites with regard to determining the limits of secularism to be observed by political elites and other actors. Article 24, paragraph 5 of the Constitution stipulates that:

> No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets.

This provision of the Constitution is important in the sense that political elites or any other entity cannot refer to religion as a source of social and economic action, nor legal and political action. More clearly, the Constitution decrees a concept of secularism that prohibits religion from social, economic, political and legal action, to represent one of the most comprehensive conceptions of secularism in the world.

The media, thirdly, serves the cause of the state elites in a variety of ways. The most important function of the media vis-à-vis secularist politics is its service as a set of publicity, publication and broadcasting institutions through which the leading members of the state elites – the military and the judiciary – deliver their messages and opinions to the public and to Islamist politicians. It is also employed as a platform of debate and deliberation for the professional and intellectual members of the state elites to share their deliberative processes with the public. An equally important

function of the media, which was very commonly used during the February 28 Process, is its service as a body of surveillance over religious politics, allowing the state to discover and decipher anti-secular activities of various religious actors.

The business and industrial community, fourthly, can join in the strongly secularist coalition as an economic interest group. As a part of the private economic sector holding a sizable part of the economy in their hands, the opinions they express and particular economic policies they adopt can bear a great deal of importance for the economic base of the country. They constitute an economic support base for the generality of state elites.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, an analysis is offered to the emergence, characteristics and mechanisms of secularism assumed by Turkish state elites starting with an examination of the nature the relationship between religion and politics in Ottoman Empire. Classified as an Islamic state in its origins, the Ottoman state was introduced to a process of westernization and secularization due to a state of weakening against the west exemplified in military defeats, economic retreat and administrative problems. The state was met with an increasingly greater tone of reform agenda first aiming to renovate the army but then springing to political, intellectual and social domains also with the thinking that development and progress bear a comprehensive character. When it was reached to the end of the First World War and the establishment of the

Republic, a great deal of progress was recorded in terms of the secularization of the state in model of western states.

After the end of the Independence War, a gradually intensifying secularist campaign was run by Atatürk and his close associates, as the earlier representatives of the state elites, on behalf of transforming the political profile of the country to a contemporary one. Bearing a kind of thinking viewing the religion as characteristically inhibitive and backward concerning progress, taking its origins from the enlightenment ideas of rationalism, materialism, positivism, and thus reactionism to religion in a modern society, a very comprehensive set of revolutions were initiated to disestablish the institutional hold of religion on Turkish political, social, educational and daily life.

While witnessing a degree of moderation with the introduction of multiparty politics and ensuing political developments taking place until today, this secularist vision is maintained by a group of state elites including the military, judiciary, business and industrial community and the media among others who enjoy a set of legal and political provisions to exert their impact in Turkish political life on issues of religions politics when needed.

CHAPTER IV

28 FEBRUARY PROCESS: SECULARIST REACTION AND ITS RECEPTION

BY THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT

This chapter is assigned to the examination of the secularist opposition expressed
with the 28 February Process with regards to the tide of change that it generated in
issue and goal orientation of the Turkish religious right. In trying to do this, we will
first examine the rising threat of religious fundamentalism, and then the secularist
reaction displayed against it and then the way that the reaction is met by the religious
right to lead itself into a state of ideological reformation towards a more moderate,
centrist and conciliatory political line. The rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism
was evidenced with the calls of various Welfare Party deputies for the transformation
of the political, legal and social character of the state and the society towards an Is-
lamic one as a development becoming public since 1990s. Some of those develop-
ments were made subject to the accusations posed against WP in its closure case. The
developments were met with a heavy reaction by the state elites involving the issu-
ance of 28 February 1997 NSC Meeting resolutions delivered to Prime Minister

Necmettin Erbakan urging him to take serious actions against radical religious movements and actions, first; and then the opening of a closure case against the WP, and then the Virtue Party, ending up with its closure and introduction of various punishments to its organization and some members. The result of these secularist reactions was the transition of the religious right to a period of ideological moderation exemplified in the elimination of the radicals in and outside of the party, encouragement of a group of reformists in the party, declaration of loyalty to and respect for the secularist principle and other sensitivities of the state elites, and search for alternative political programs in contemporary universal values and principles.

4.1. The Road to 28 February 1997 NSC Meeting: Background

The Welfare Party enjoyed a dramatic increase in its electoral share in local and parliamentary elections since its establishment in 1984. The table below shows its electoral share in general and municipal elections until its closure in 1998. Steadily growing since the first election it joined in 1984, the Party was the winning party of 1995 general elections with 21.37 percent of the votes. The party had come to the office with a very ambitious political and social campaign. There were radical voices rising in the Party as well as from the grassroots for the introduction of Islamic law and statehood.

Table 2:	Welfare Party Electoral History						
	1984	1986	1987	1989	1991	1994	1995
General Elections		4.76 percent	7.16 percent		16.90 percent, a		21.37 percent
Municipal Elections	4.44 percent			9.8 percent		19.14 percent	

a: In general elections held in 1991, WP was united with Nationalists Workers Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi) and Reformist Democratic Party (Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi).

Although the number of incidents and activities that could be considered as radical did not amount to more than ten maybe, their content was judged as radical enough to represent a threat to the secular foundations of the republic according to the Constitutional Court. A look at the list of accusations incorporated in the Bill of Indictment prepared by the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassations Vural Savaş can give a better idea here:

On March 23 1983, during the meeting of the leaders of political parties in the national assembly about constitutional amendments, the Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan was quoted to defend the introduction of Islamic law within the context of a multiple system of law that would replace the Turkish law system. And on January 13 1991, Necmettin Erbakan presents the following speech in Sivas:

> If you don't serve the Welfare Party, your prayers will not be accepted. One cannot be Muslim without serving to the Welfare… This party is an army of Islamic Jihad… If you are a Muslim, you have to be a soldier of this army… Alms must be given to headquarter of the army of Jihad, to party centers in the counties… (Vural, May 21 1997)

At another occasion, Welfare Party Representative Şevki Yılmaz was claimed to propagate, in a speech before his election as a representative from Rize on March 27

1994, that Koranic Order, Islamic state and Islamic law had to be established in the country and that the Muslims had to wage jihad for this purpose and work in service to Welfare Party which was devoted to this project. And on 8 of May 1997, WP representative from Şanlıurfa Ibrahim Halil Çelik was quoted to say in the lobby of the parliament that

> There will be bloodshed if you try to close the Imam-Hatip schools during the WP Government. Turkey becomes worse than Algeria. We want the bloodshed indeed… I support Şeriat to the core. I am longing for the introduction of Şeriat (Vural, May 21 1997; *Sabah*, May 10 1997).

While there was a growing reaction from various members of the state elites against these kinds of actions by WP deputies, no serious action was taken for some time to come. President Süleyman Demirel was urged by the army generals to take the issue of *irtica* (religious reactionism) into the agenda of the National Security Council, but he was reluctant to do so for he was fearful of the emergence of a crisis. But the organization of an *iftar* at the manor of the prime ministry on January 11 1996, which was joined by leaders of a group of religious orders and communities, put an end to the state of inertia from the part of the state elites. The organization was taking place when there was a growing contempt about *Ajzmendis* due to their protests against secularism and Atatürk (Poyraz, 2007: 321, 397; *Sabah*, 11 January 1997). On January 18 1996, President Süleyman Demirel was invited to the office of chief of general staff for the first of a list of briefings he was given about the threat of *irtica* and to discuss the actions to be taken. The first serious action taken in this process was the removal of 13 lieutenants and sergeants from the army during the Supreme Military Council Meeting held on 1 August 1996 due to their allegations with *irtica* ac-

tivities. The Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Güven Erkaya was expressing

accumulated concerns of the army about *irtica* as follows:

> A state of chaos emerges if the laws are not applied in this country. It under-
> mines the foundations of the state of law. You may not like certain provisions
> of the constitution. But you have to obey them as long as the constitution is in
> force… Article 24 of the Constitution states that one cannot defend a şeriat
> state. It is our natural right to expect the representatives to move according to
> their oaths. The representatives of a party are advocating the şeriat regime
> outright. I find it extremely dangerous for the representatives of a party in
> government to do so in terms of secular republic. (Ergin, 1997)

On another occasion, Erbakan was accused of ignoring certain national security is-

sues with his visit to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi with the purpose of improving

ties with the Muslim world. The meeting had gathered a considerable reaction from

the state elites when Qaddafi was claimed to nominate himself as the head of the

Council of Islamic Command and that Erbakan was a member of the council. Equal-

ly important in provoking reactions was Qaddafi's insults to Turkey about the PKK

issue. Qaddafi was advising Turkey not to persecute the Kurds, let them have their

state and stop the war against people fighting for their independence (Binay, 1996;

Oral, 4 May 1997).

4.2. Sincan Events and Secularist Reaction

The tension rising this way, the famous Sincan events prompted the leading actor of

the state elites, the military, to intervene in the political process on 28 February 1997.

It was a special night organized by the Mayor of Sincan District Bekir Yıldız in An-

kara on 2 February 1997 like one of those known as Jerusalem Night to protest Isra-

el. The program, which was joined by the Ambassador of Iran, turned to a call for şeriat regime and symbolic attacks to the pillars of secularism in Turkey. Events were brought to the attention of the public by a heavy secularist media campaign with calls for reactions and protests all around the country. The army had displayed its reaction by sending 20 tanks and 15 armored vehicles to the district on February 5 in a parade. On February 23, General Güven Erkaya was indicating that "Radical religious currencies constitute a great danger for Turkey's future. *İrtica* has turned to be a more dangerous threat than PKK" (*Milliyet*, 12 July 1997).

Waiting until the monthly National Security Council Meeting, the generals presented a list of resolutions on February 28 1997 to be signed and adopted by Prime Minister Erbakan against the danger of *irtija*. In the meeting, political Islam was stated to be the most serious danger to national security, secularist constitutionalism and democracy. The list included 18 resolutions parts of which included (1) the closure of unofficial Koran courses, (2) a freeze on the appointment of members of the Welfare Party for civil service, (3) monitoring and inspection of bank accounts belonging to religious communities and orders, and (4) once again prohibiting the wearing of headscarves in public offices.

Erbakan was urged by the military to take action against militant religious organizations and it was stated that the military would undertake the duty itself in case of his failure. In the meantime, some deputies from the other partner of the Government, the True Path Party, started to present their resignation and transfer to other parties.

The government lost its majority in the parliament which ended up with the resignation of the Prime Minister and the fall of the government on June 18 1997.

The leading secularist business association, TÜSİAD, was criticizing that religious radicalism could generate economic instability in the country by harming economic production and foreign trade. And in a united declaration publicized by TÜRK İŞ, DİSK, TİSK, TESK, and TOBB, it was indicated that:

> Turkey is facing one of the most serious dangers in its republican history. Turkey is being driven into a civil war. Democracy is ruptured, *irtica* has turned to an undisputable danger and contemporary secular republic established by Atatürk is under threat. There is an urgent need for the establishment of a new government loyal to Atatürkist principles and revolutions defending the democratic republic (*Sabah*, 22 May 1997).

4.2.1. The Reception of the Reaction by the WP

According to a majority of the specialists on Turkish politics, the February 28 Process starting with the reaction of the armed forces against rising threat of anti-secularist opposition has been the most important development producing the witnessed change in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish religious right. The movement was introduced to a process of de-Islamizing its discourse, eschewing incidents of political tensions and assuming a consensual and moderate posture. The clue of this tendency was given right in the beginning with Necmettin Erbakan's responses to the critique of the generals during the National Security Council Meeting on 28 February 1997. Erbakan was trying to assure the generals by saying that "we are respectful for secular democracy" (*Milliyet*, 3 March 1997). And he was going

on: "I expect your understanding. It will put me under pressure if you indicate all of what you say one by one. We have taken the necessary message from this meeting" (Değer, 2 March 1997). And after the meeting, Erbakan was reporting: "We have made the decisions together. We are in agreement with Turkish armed forces. We are in consensus" (*Sabah*, 3 March 1997); and that "There is no disagreement and discordance on top of the state mechanism, there is a complete accord. The meeting is held in mutual love and sympathy" (*Milliyet*, 3 March 1997). What was understood from the immediate developments was that the WP was not likely to assume a radical oppositional attitude against the views of the army generals and that a process of change would follow towards the adoption of a more moderate party political line.

The tone of this immediate response by Erbakan was saved in the aftermath of the meeting. During the party group meeting held in the parliament a week after, Erbakan was saying that "Turkey is a democratic country. There is not a regime problem in Turkey. All those artificially-produced problems are left behind. We will establish the Great Turkey all together." He was going on by expressing the opposition of the WP against "radical groups" and the necessity to educate them for their adaptation to social peace and consensus (*Milliyet*, 5 March 1997). His points were repeated with his speech after a talk with the leader of Motherland Party Mesut Yılmaz when he said "Turkey is a democratic and secular state. Turkey is a state of law. We all want the implementation of these things in earnest… Neither democracy nor secularism could be given up" (*Milliyet*, 6 March 1997).

Soon after, a campaign of suppression and liquidation was launched in the party against the radicals. As a beginning, Şevki Yılmaz and Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan were invited to the Office of Prime Minister by Erbakan to caution them not to rise up the tension and refrain from provocative actions (*Milliyet*, 7 March 1997). In opposition to a speech by İbrahim Halil Çelik which said that if Imam-Hatip Schools were closed, Turkey would turn to Algeria and Iran and that there would be bloodshed and mischief, Erbakan was responding:

> We don't let any insults against our army. Army has a special place in WP's belief… Everybody must know that Turkey will not be an Algeria or Iran. Turkey is a democratic country. Democracy is settled here. Law is settled here. Turkey is a secular country. WP is the guarantor of secularism (*Sabah*, 14 May 1997).

Erbakan was supported by the moderates in the party. One of the intellectual founders of Just Order program, Süleyman Akdemir, was saying that

> WP is occupied by some people like Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and Şevki Yılmaz who think that Islam is about male-turban (sarık) and frock (cübbe). Either the WP will be a center party or the radicals will capture the party… Turkey needs packages of negotiation, secularism, human rights and justice… (Kul, 26 March 1997)

It was stated that Erbakan was similarly disturbed from debates by party leaders known for their radical speeches on issues of male-turban, frock, headscarf and Imam-Hatip schools. Erbakan was opposed to any party member raising the tension with or without knowledge (*Milliyet*, 16 April 1997). An interrogation order was issued by Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan against Şevki Yılmaz due to some speeches he made on some TV channels. And at another time, Erbakan was expressing his personal apologies to Municipal Governor of Gaziantep Celal Doğan for some verbal attacks directed by Şevki Yılmaz (*Sabah*, 31 May 1997).

A more material step was taken with the signing of the NSC document by Erbakan and transition to the implementation phase of the resolutions. As a beginning, authority over Koran courses was transferred to Ministry of Education with a very careful oversight mechanism. A process was started for the closure of dervish lodges for those of them which were discovered to be open still. And a headscarf ban was put into action starting to its application in the hospitals first (*Milliyet*, 13 March 1997).

WP's conciliatory and moderate behavior was opposed by some radical Islamist groups. In a paper distributed by "Muslim Students of DTCF" in Ankara University Faculty of Languages, History and Geography, WP was accused of 'flattery' and 'surrender without being able show any resolution against the regime.' It was said in the paper that

> Is it not so dramatic and doesn't it tell us a lot the striking similarity between (1) the complex of inferiority that the secular-Kemalist gang suffers against the west and (2) the submissive fatigue that the WP suffers against the dominant powers and its mission of becoming a regime validator? (*Milliyet*, 1 May 1997)

The emergence of this conciliatory and centrist tendency was reflected in WP's foreign policy view also. Global Forum of Spiritual and Parliamentary Leaders to be held in Konya on 6-9 October 1997 for a discussion of Islam in 21st century found exceptional support from the moderates in the Party led by Erbakan. WP was claimed to be searching for establishing a global mission for itself as an example of a striking break from the internationalism of the National View movement known for its suspicions and reservations about the West, Christianity and Israel. A joint work

was prepared by State Ministers Fehim Adak, Abdullah Gül and Minister of Culture Ismail Kahraman for the Forum. The purpose of the Forum was to bring religious and political leaders closer for the resolution of ongoing humanitarian crises. It was expected that Turkey's historical heritage of originating from being a crossroad of interreligious relations and communication would facilitate the Forum goals with which the WP was extremely pleased. Organization stood as a critique of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis which claimed that conflicts and wars in the future would be shaped according to the differences in culture and civilization over the countries. A special interest was exhibited to the Forum by Erbakan who met the conference organizers in his office to deliver his support for the goals of the Forum (Kul, 21 April 1997).

4.2.2. The WP Closure Case and Defense

Despite the cooperative and conciliatory policy adopted by the WP in response to the reaction of the armed forces, events were followed by the second leading actor of the state elites, the Judiciary, to lead Welfare Party into a judicial process. A Bill of Indictment was submitted to the Constitutional Court by the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassations Vural Savaş with a demand for the closure of the Party with claims that the WP had violated the secularist principle. The first accusation directed to the Party was about its introduction of a parliamentary bill for the abolition of headscarf ban. According to the Public Prosecutor, the attempt of the Party was a violation of secularism and the WP was insisting on passing this bill for electoral

purposes despite their knowledge. The second type of accusations involved provocative speeches by the party leader Necmettin Erbakan, and some parliamentarians and mayors including the Mayor of Rize Şevki Yılmaz, Ankara Representative Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Ankara Representative and Vice-President of the Welfare Party Ahmet Tekdal, the Mayor of Kayseri Şükrü Karatepe, Şanlıurfa Representative İbrahim Halil Çelik, and the Mayor of Sincan District. The speeches recorded on different occasions involved calls for abolition of secularism, introduction of Şeriat regime, and preparation for armed resistance to carry out these goals. The third type of accusations was about the reluctance of leading members of the incumbent Welfare Party to take actions against these anti-secularist campaigns. And finally, the Welfare Party was accused of opening new Faculties of Islamic Theology and Imam-Hatip schools without any need. These educational institutions were accordingly introduced in the beginning to meet the necessity of religious personnel, but they were turned into alternative educational institutions against secular schools in opposition to their founding principle (Vural, May 21 1997).

The WP defense presented to the Constitutional Court against the accusations directed in the bill of indictment remained a critical document for the prospects of party change that would be followed in the aftermath of the court case. The whole defence was devoted to prove the argument that WP was one of the most loyal actors of Turkish political life to secularism and other principles of the Constitution. Though the Constitutional Court was not persuaded with the arguments presented, the defense was an expression of a serious commitment for WP's loyalty to secularism to be pursued then and in the future for a simple reason that a failure to do so would

lead to a process of persecution reaching to as far as party closure and imprisonment of the leadership cadre.

A solemn statement was given in the defense which said that "WP is the real defender and guarantee of the secularist principle of the constitution." Examples were given to this from the party program and various speeches and policies by party members. The Article 4 of the party program was indicating that

> Our Party believes in freedom of thought and conscience; it considers all the pressures against freedom of thought and conscience as a violation of secularism… Secularism is not enmity against religion. It is rather introduced and put into action as a principle to defend freedom of religion and conscience against all types of violations (Article 4 of the WP Program).

Accordingly, this principle was reiterated with repetition in all the speeches made by WP deputies in the assembly and outside. Here were some examples:

> To act against secularism means acting according to scholastic thinking. It is a behavior of acting in a dogmatic and scholastic style for an ignorant person to apply pressure by saying that our religion orders this way and you will all abide by it by making impositions in an ignorant way. We don't want such a style in the country (WP Defense).
>
> Secularism means acting with knowledge and reason (WP Defense).

About the set of accusations on Imam-Hatip schools, headscarf issue, speeches by party members, the argument presented by the WP was that either there was a very serious misinterpretation and misunderstanding by the public prosecutor, or the evidence that he provided was not substantive (See Appendix 1 for the defense of the WP against specific accusations). But even then, a number of initiatives were taken in the party for the suppression and removal of some party deputies considered to be impairing the party with their radical tendencies. After a number of warnings issued,

Şevki Yılmaz and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan were removed from the party on 20 June 1997 before the finalization of the decision of the Constitutional Court.

Despite all the attempts and apologies of the WP, the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassations Savaş Vural was found justified in all the accusations directed in the Bill of Indictment. The process finalized with the closure of the Welfare Party on 16 January 1998 with the decision of the Constitutional Court that the Party had turned to a center for anti-secularist movements. The decision went on with the abolition of the deputyship (milletvekilliği) of the WP representatives Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and İbrahim Halil Çelik. Same representatives were prohibited from being founders, members, executives and auditors of another party too. And finally, properties of the Party were to be transferred to the Treasure (Constitutional Court Decisions, January 16 and February 22 1998).

The impact of the military reaction and closure case on the change of policy/programmatic orientation of the party could be stated in a number of points. First of all, it was understood that a political campaign which included calls for Islamic law and statehood would certainly lead to party closure and political persecutions, and thus the parties established in the future had to avoid such policies in order not to experience similar problems. Commitments made for loyalty to democracy, secularism, rule of law etc. in response to the reactions of the state elites since the rise of the tension would thus constitute the backbone of the parties that the movement would establish in the future. Furthermore, it was understood that the party had to search for

alternative political programs in order to survive in competitive Turkish political system which is often argued to be found in the adoption of a set of political values and principles brought by globalization and Europeanization.

Secondly, the political ban brought to party leader Necmettin Erbakan was important in terms of the prospects of party change that would follow in its aftermath. As it is cited in Chapter Two, party leadership change is sometimes considered as the most decisive development leading to party change in various domains due to the differences in views, capabilities, tactics and traits among the leaders but also because leadership change is often observed as a new entry point for political parties. The fact that Erbakan was ousted from political life by the state elites stands as a good example of how influential the state elites were with their powers to manipulate other factors also. While the influence of this leadership change in policy line of the movement was observed in as early as the leadership of Recai Kutan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's inauguration to JDP leadership brought greater changes in the profile and program of the movement as it will be explained below.

Finally, the overarching influence of the state elites on the change in goal and issue orientation of the WP was manifested with the introduction of various political bans to radical figures of the party too like Sevki Yilmaz and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan who were some of very few persons leading to the radicalization of the party with their speeches and actions. Their removal from the party and a tacit warning ruled against potential extremist tendencies meant the weakening of what could be called as the

radical coalition by cutting their influence in the formation and shaping of party policy and goals.

4.3.The Virtue Party

As a precaution against a potential closure of the Welfare Party, a new party was established on December 17 1997 with the name Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) by İsmail Alptekin. With the closure of the WP on 16 January 1998, all the non-banned representatives of the WP moved to Virtue Party and Recai Kutan was brought to the leadership on 14 May 1998. One of the most important priorities of the VP since its establishment was to prove its difference from the WP particularly in those issues that could bring it into conflict with the state elites on issues related with secularism. The causes that led to the closure of WP were noted and a very serious commitment was made not to repeat them.

In his speech during the First Party Congress held on 14 May 2000, Kutan was explaining that no belief, opinion or conviction would dominate in the country during the VP government and he was saying "We consider this as a natural result of Republic with its principles of democracy, secularism and rule of law" (*NTV-MSNBC*, 14 May 2000). And he was similarly saying in one of his speeches he made before:

> Everybody will be free in their beliefs. No pressure will be applied on anybody even though they may not be believers. State will be equidistant to all religions. The source of the laws issued in the parliament will be science and reason. We are against the idea that here is the orders of a religion and that the laws will conform to it (*Sabah*, 2 November 1999).

Kutan was expressing his willingness for the introduction of American secularism in Turkey in an interview conducted by David Rockefeller. He was saying that "For us, secularism is the one adopted by the USA… The VP is aiming to integrate secularism, democracy, religious and moral values all" (*Sabah*, 23 October 1999).

The policy of restraint from real or controversial anti-secularist party behaviors, which had started to shape quickly with 28 February NSC Meeting, was taking a more material shape with the closure of the WP and prime of the Virtue Party. A solemn declaration was released by party leader Recai Kutan to indicate that the VP was not a continuation of the WP. Kutan was expressing his party's resolution to preserve domestic peace and stability when he said "We will not be party to any conflict during our electoral campaign." He was going on by saying that as VP they would always be in favor of reconciliation and peace (*Hürriyet*, 11 February 1999). In 2001, when he was evaluating the NSC decisions on combating *irtica*, Kutan was saying that "*İrtica* is one of the most important problems in the country." He was going on by saying that whoever tried to suspend democracy and freedoms by trying to turn them to what they were in history was an *irticacı* (*Sabah*, 12 April 2001).

A sign of the goal of the VP to emphasize its dissociation from WP politics was the attempt of Recai Kutan to terminate Erbakan's influence in the party as well as the just order discourse he propagated. Kutan was expressing his distaste with Erbakan's directives about nomination of Merve Kavakçı as candidate and then his encouragement to Kavakçı to give her loyalty oath in the assembly with headscarf. Kutan was

rebelling by saying "That is too much. If they decide something, they must ask us as well," and he was going on: "It (Kavakçı's attempt) was a very unnecessary behavior. It was very indecent" (*Sabah*, 4 May 1999). While opposing Erbakan's attempts to rule the party from outside, Kutan was declaring the end of the traditional just order discourse too developed and promoted by Erbakan as the party program of National View parties. Kutan was saying that "We don't use the concept of just order. There is no such thing… It was an academic debate… We will move away from the just order slogan any more" (Çekirge, 11 July 1998).

The VP demonstrated a great concern not to draw secularist opposition on headscarf issue too, which was one of the areas that WP was accused of violating secularism. To this end, Kutan was saying that they would not keep the issue of headscarf in the agenda even though they believed that it was the right thing to do (*Hürriyet*, 9 February 1999). He was trying to persuade Kavakçı not to come to the Assembly with her headscarf in fear of the emergence of a new conflict with the state elites (*Sabah*, 1 May 1999). While Kutan was trying to avoid problems with the state elites, there were some other party members like Nazlı Ilıcak who were known for their various activities that could be considered as a clear break from traditional policy foundations of the movement. Nazlı Ilıcak was organizing a reception in her manor in honor of Recai Kutan during which the guests were presented wine. In a report by the reporter of Daily Telegraph, the wine was pouring like water in the reception. Ilıcak was stating that the VP did not have any goals to introduce a Şeriat regime and that that's why she was in that party (*Sabah*, 6 June 1998). In a similar incident, VP parliamentary candidates were visiting pavilions to ask for the votes of the hostesses

waiting for their customers. The candidates were saying "Vote for us. We know your problems as well as those of your workplace. We will help you when we come to the government" (İçgen, 12 April 1999).

The WP attempt to prove harmony with and loyalty to concerns of the Turkish Armed Forces took a more solid shape during the VP. Kutan was stating that they didn't have any problems with the army and that they were able to understand the sensitivities of the army on issues of secularism (Çetin, 11 February 1999). To keep the channels of communication with the army at a pace, while preparing the updated program of the VP, Kutan was sending a letter to the chief of general staff to take his opinion about those issues that he could be concerned. Kutan was saying that "The VP is the most loyal party to the laws and the constitution" (Ertürk, 28 March 1999). This process was supported by the overall VP electorate too. In a nationwide survey conducted by VP, the people were asked the most reliable institution in Turkey and interestingly for 47 percent of the people who said that they would vote for VP in next elections army was the most reliable institution in Turkey (Ertürk, 25 August 1998).

Kutan was promising that the mistakes committed by the WP during electoral cam-paigns would not be repeated by the VP. For this reason, party members who would join in the campaigns for 18 April 1999 elections as speakers and managers were given education and seminars on secularism and democracy. In this process, Kutan's speech booklets were taken as the base and the main subjects that the speakers were to emphasize with insistence were summarized as democracy, secularism, human

rights, freedoms, rule of law, economy and foreign policy (*Hürriyet*, 8 February 1999).

A remarkable development was the approaching of some WP deputies to Israel and the Jews. During a visit to USA, an assembly of VP deputies including Recai Kutan, Abdullah Gül, Ali Coşkun and Temel Karamollaoğlu were meeting with members of Jewish lobby in the USA with representatives from the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, American Jewish Committee, Presidents of Conference of American Jewish Organizations etc. (*Sabah*, 2 November 1999). And in a similar incident, VP leader Recai Kutan was hitting the glasses with Israeli Minister of foreign affairs Simon Peres. The approach of various party members towards Israel was an important deviation from traditional National View goal of anti-Israeli sentiment.

The process of moderation and cooperation initiated by 28 February military reaction and the closure of the WP was not found enough by the judiciary, however. The VP was brought to the courtyard by the Public Prosecutor with an accusation that the party was a continuation of the WP and that it violated secularism with some provocative actions and speeches by its members on the headscarf issue. The Public Prosecutor was found justified by the Constitutional Court not for the first but for the second accusations and a decision was ruled for the closure of the VP and introduction of political bans to a list of party members (Constitutional Court Decision, 22 June 2001). The ouster of what could be called as the group of radicals in the party including Merve Kavakçı, Bekir Sobacı and Ramazan Yenidede served as a structural adjustment from outside for the approximation of the party towards greater degree of

moderateness and cooperation with the state elites. The lesson drawn from the closure case was that the movement had to be more careful about the sensitivities of the state elites on issues of secularism and that whatever they do on behalf of conservative politics they had to observe legal and constitutional limits and that they had to work in cooperation and coordination with the legal and military members of the state elites.

4.4. The Justice and Development Party

With the establishment of the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish religious right was introduced to a deeper and more comprehensive process of change. Under the impact of a number of variables, the ideological line of the JDP was converging towards the center right. Some leading party members like Abdullah Gül were even motivated to move the party somewhere between the right and the left (*Hürriyet*, 12 July 2001). The impact of state elites in this process of moderation was manifested in a number of ways including the intimidation of party members from sponsoring radical policies in fear of political persecution through military and legal processes, and an ensuing process of political socialization, first; and second, in the removal of Necmettin Erbakan from the leadership of the movement with all the charismatic and authoritative status he enjoyed to be replaced gradually by an emerging coalition of reformists calling for new ways and programs in the movement.

4.4.1. Secularist Backlash as an Instrument of Moderation

The secularist backlash directed against Turkish religious right starting with the military memorandum and following party closure cases against the WP and then the VP remain as the most influential factor motivating the founders of the Justice and Development Party to reconsider the goal formation and issue orientation of the movement towards a more moderate one with very limited appeal for ideological concerns. The JDP deputies came to acknowledge more firmly that they had to stay away from clashes with the state elites in order not to experience the same troubles as the WP, VP and their deputies. The signs of this line of thinking could be read in as early as the emergence of the split in the movement between the traditionalists and the reformists which was itself the result of secularist intervention into politics.

After the ruling of the Constitutional Court decision for the closure of the VP, Abdullah Gül was delivering his opinion to the journalists by saying that:

> Our party is closed down; past mistakes must not be repeated. We want a healthy formation anymore. What needs to be done at this stage is to make a critique of the past mistakes and then to move towards unity with negotiation, without making any impositions (Yılmaz, 25 June 2001).

For the new party that the reformists were intended to establish, Gül was saying that the party would not be an "ideological" and "marginal" party. He was going on:

> We will not be a religionist (dinci) party nor the party of the religious people (dindarlar) only… We believe that there cannot be any democracy without secularism and no secularism without democracy… We don't regard us as the continuity of the VP. We will keep away from populism, exaggeration and we will be realist… We will not return to the mistakes of the past. Our priority will be the economy (*Hürriyet*, 12 July 2001).

In response to questions of "what is new with you," Gül was saying that they were all in the process of change including Erdoğan. He was going on: "We have all experienced important things in last five years. Erdoğan and us, we are all making genuine self-criticisms. This self-accounting covers our past mistakes also" (*Hürriyet*, 12 July 2001).

A material step was taken in favor of the implementation of this policy orientation during the closure case process of the VP in the domain of foreign policy. Against the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Chechnya, a voting session was held in the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe for the suspension of Russia's voting rights in the Assembly in order to pressure it to stop the campaign of aggression in Chechnya and move into a process of dialogue with elected Chechen representatives. As an example of a very dramatic break from the foreign policy approach of the National View movement, Abdullah Gül was using a negative vote in the session. Russia was saving the sanction with a very small margin of negative votes (*Hürriyet*, 31 January 2000).

While he was talking in the past like "my reference is Islam" and "democracy is not a purpose, it is an instrument," the leading reformists in VP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was now saying that he would not treat seriously those who pronounced "Şeriat State" (*Hürriyet*, 8 February 2000). Similarly, in a speech that he made in his exit from prison in 2000 before the establishment of the JDP, Erdoğan was stating "We gave up making religious politics decorated with religious motifs and stories; we

shall not do any such politics; we will show how the religious people make politics"
(*Hürriyet*, 16 May 2000).

There were some other reformists like VP Istanbul representative Mukadder Başeğmez who argued that 28 February Process had indeed been better. For him, although the secularist reaction was cast in a very undemocratic way, it had been helpful for the turn of the religious right towards recognizing the importance of global and universal political values. He was arguing that there was an urgent need for the transformation of certain Islamic doctrines in favor of more contemporary norms particularly on issues of gender rights and equality. The woman had to share an equal space with man in the mosque and the politics, and the tradition of thinking the woman as a sex object abhorred and driven to a dark corner of the house had to be abandoned (Türenç, 12 February 2000).

4.4.2. The Impact of Erbakan's Removal from Politics

Organizationally, WP and VP shared many features in common with traditional Islamic political organizations with certain structures and procedures that it incorporated like absolute leadership, unconditional obedience to the leader, top-down decision making and appointment processes, stringent disciplinary norms towards which the members were expected to show strict loyalty and obedience (See, for example, *Sabah,* 15 May 1999). Erbakan was located on top of this structure and there was not much of an objection to his office until the advance of 28 February Process (See for

example *Sabah*, 23 March 1998). As an example to this tradition, in a meeting joined by the wives of party members, Erbakan's wife Nermin Erbakan was talking to the ladies that "This (paper) is white. But it must be accepted as black if we say that it is black… Obedience is essential. Do obey and don't let the tradition spoiled" (*Hürriyet*, 3 May 2000). It can be said almost with precision that without the external stimuli issued by the state elites leading to Erbakan's prohibition from politics, Erbakan would keep ruling in the party preserving his privileges and powers something which he was enjoying even during the leadership of Kutan by giving instructions through informal channels of communication.

Erbakan's prohibition from political activism thus meant a very serious organizational crisis in the movement. The prestigious charismatic leader was ousted and his exceptional authority as the office of ultimate decision-maker was suspended. The absence of a leader like Erbakan in Virtue Party was one of the most important reasons for the emergence of oppositional voices in the party who were united around a party coalition called as 'reformists.' The reformists were distinguished with their objection to traditional political methods applied in the party as well as the ineffectiveness of the solutions offered towards the challenges (*Hürriyet*, 19 September 2000). In line with this, Abdullatif Şener was identifying Abdullah Gül's candidacy for party leadership in VP as a search for renovation and he was going on: "This (Abdullah Gül's candidacy) is a development that addresses to the political vacuum generated in the country originating from ersatz political understandings" (*Hürriyet*, 9 March 2000). For Erdoğan, Turkey was in search of three things: The first was a change of

mindset. Second was structural change and the third was civilization, contemporary civilization (Donat, 29 February 1999).

According to the innovationists, Erbakan and his close associates were unable to deal with domestic and global crises that the party was facing and when this was united with the authoritarian party structure, the party was inevitably driven to failure and loss. The movement was in urgent need to renovate itself in almost all the domains, not only in style of politics but also in the process of policy making too. The organizational structure of the movement had to be changed in favor of a more democratic one that would enable close communication and contact among upper and lower echelons of the party as a major instrument to develop viable policies through voicing, discussion and deliberation of issues and concerns *(Milliyet,* 22 February 1998; *Sabah,* 23 March 1998; *Sabah*, 16 May 1998; *Hürriyet*, 13 May 2000; *Hürriyet*, 6 October 2000). The movement was supposed to mitigate its ideological formation from a religious conservative to a moderate one to address to the interests of the generality of the electorate. When he was asked about the concept of 'Muslim left' that he uttered about the political program of the new party, Abdullah Gül was saying that:

> I speak very clear. We want to be a party of all Turkey. There is need for a party that will work for the interests of all the citizens. We want to establish a party that will not be in service of the pious only, but those who are not pious too. We want to be in service of all the citizens. We want to establish a party that will serve to entire Turkey in a way comprising all the citizens (*Hürriyet*, 12 July 2001).

Abdullah Gül was stating that he was not an office of safekeeping nor he was working on a base of permission. He would undertake authority and responsibility and he

was saying: "We will grasp entire Turkey with a new style and concept of governance" (*Hürriyet*, 9 March 2000). Abdullah Gül was stating that "There cannot be any democracy with sidestepping. Demands of the grassroots must be taken into account. For a party in progress rather than in retreat, there is a need for a democratic, transparent and bold posture" (*Hürriyet*, 1 May 2000).

Criticisms about the lack of intraparty democratic tradition were paramount during the leadership of Recai Kutan in Virtue Party. The reformists were opposed to what they called as Kutan's safekeeping leadership (*emanetçi liderlik*), government of the party from Erbakan's house, tradition of submission (*biat*) and permission (*icazet*), prohibitions ruled to party members by Erbakan, hand-kissing as a sign of obedience etc. as the sources of the failure to develop effective solutions, viable political programs and prompt response towards challenges and troubles faced (*Zaman*, 24 March 1998; *Hürriyet*, 9 March 2000; *Sabah*, 23 March 1998; *Sabah*, 15 May 1998; *Sabah*, 16 May 1998; *Sabah*, 3 April 1999; *Hürriyet*, 16 May 2000; *Hürriyet*, 10 August 2000). Erdoğan was criticizing Kutan by saying that "You are not able to make initiatives. Because initiative is in the hands of others. This is the reason of all the problems that the party experiences" (*Hürriyet*, 9 August 2000).

The party that the reformists were intended to establish would cast its difference from the traditionalists with the great importance given to intraparty democracy. A leading reformists Abdullatif Şener was announcing the decision of the reformists to establish a new party in order to change the concept of politics alien to the people and to transport public demands into political representation. Şener was pointing out

that democratization was not limited with voting in the elections only on the part of the people, but it also had to incorporate the citizens into the processes of decision making. The program of the new party would thus ensure all the essentials of intra-party democracy *(Hürriyet,* 19 July 2001).

4.5.Analyzing the Change in Foreign Policy

The influence of secularist reaction on the transformation of Turkish religious right in its approach to issues of Islamic statehood, Islamic law, headscarf, Islamic norms and applications in public life etc. is examined in above sections with reference to responses given to the reactions issued by the state elites. An analysis of the impact of state elites on the change of foreign policy approach and policies of the movement will be in order in this section. Although the secularist reaction expressed with the 28 February Process did not involve much of an opposition to the foreign policy orienta-tion of the WP and VP, there were a number of foreign policy concerns at play inhib-iting the members of the religious right from attempts to implement their traditional foreign policy goals to appear as a moderating structural framework, a process fur-ther strengthened with the tide of moderation and centralism adopted by the JDP in response to secularist backlash.

The origins of this change could be found in the inauguration of WP to the govern-ment in coalition with True Path Party. While the movement was supporting a for-eign policy goal targeting to minimize relations with the west and leading to a pro-

cess of cooperation and integration with the Muslim world (Erbakan, 1975a; Erbakan, 1991; Erbakan, 1993b), it was realized in government office that the party was not recognized a very free space of action due to a foreign policy framework already established. To put it more clearly, Turkey's membership to and close ties with NATO, UN and European countries were incorporated as major tenants of Turkish foreign policy and the chances were too little for WP to divert from this route in order to put its earlier goals into action. As a part of its NATO membership, Turkey was supposed to preserve its warm relations with the USA and other NATO members. The goal to become a part of contemporary civilization had to be advanced with greater cooperation with the west and its global political economic institutions like USA, UN and EU.

More to this, there were some other developments initiated by Turkish armed forces that the WP had to settle with such as the military agreements and protocols signed with Israel for purposes of modernization and cooperation. Due to the current state of affairs, the WP was not possible to sustain a low level of diplomacy with Israel as it was often propagated by Erbakan in his books and campaigns (Erbakan, 1975a). Turkey was motivated to keep its relations with Israel at a high level because of its membership to the western security framework, some US-related interests necessitating close relations with Israel as well as certain domestic political economic concerns. For some specialists, the process of cooperation and solidarity was also a product of sympathy nurtured by members of Turkish Armed Forces towards Israel for "in many ways the Israelis were just like them: modern; westward-looking; hav-

ing a shared Arab other; fellow victims of terror" in addition to the goal of promoting a set of interests related with alliance with the USA (Robins: 2007, 299).

When we turn to the chances of WP goals to establish deeper and firmer ties with the Muslim world, it was observed that the WP was substantially disabled with a number of military-related foreign policy concerns. To start with, it was not possible to establish close links with Syria due to the residence provided to Abdullah Öcalan and also because of Syrian claims on Hatay. There was problems with the Iranian neighborhood too for Iran was accused of permitting PKK camps in its Turkish border and supporting radical Islamic movements in Turkey (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 139-143; Robins, 2007: 295). Erbakan's tent meeting with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi was also ending up with failure and reactions from the state elites as well as other domestic actors as Qaddafi was advising Turkey to let PKK establish a Kurdish state in South East Turkey and also because he was announcing Erbakan as a member of the Council of Islamic Command established to introduce Islamic regimes in the Middle East (Binay, 1996; Oral, 4 May 1997).

The expectation from religious right to respect Turkey's traditional foreign policy concerns in its neighborhood was casting itself in more rigid terms with the 28 February Process during which the successive party closure cases, political bans and imprisonments were compelling the founders of the JDP to adopt a relatively moderate and centrist party line. It was understood with Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's declarations that the newly-established party would not be a "marginal" and "ideological" party and that they would give up religious politics, the movement

would reframe a substantially new political discourse in foreign policy domain also without much significance assigned to religious concerns (*Hürriyet*, 12 July 2001; *Hürriyet*, 16 May 2000). The idea of minimization of relations with the west and integration with the Muslim world promoted by WP and, to a lesser extent, by VP was being reformed in favor of an idea advocating the development and deepening of the relations with the west in economic, political and social areas, on the one side, and introduction of a pragmatist perspective to relations with Muslim countries, on the other. Turkey's historical and cultural ties with the Muslim world would be re-spected, but Turkey would endeavor to promote reform in the Middle East for a more democratic and egalitarian with respect for human rights and rule of law (Dağı, 2006: 92-93).

This general framework was developed into a more sophisticated form with the new foreign policy understanding promoted by Ahmet Davutoğlu who was assigned vari-ous posts in the foreign policy team of the JDP to be appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009. The general principles of JDP foreign policy goals and preferences which found a space of implementation since JDP's introduction to the government in 2002 could be briefly stated as resolving all problems with neighbors, acting in multilateralism, transforming Turkey into a center country, promoting glob-al values and principles in the Middle East with a rhytmic and dynamic diplomatic campaign (Davutoğlu, 2009a: 501; Davutoğlu, 2004).

A noteworthy example of the desertion of the idea of Islamic internationalism and unity, with a distaste of and distancing from the non-Muslim west, as a part of its

centrist and moderate policy line, was the participation of the JDP to an international coalition titled as Alliance of Civilizations aiming to eradicate potential conflicts among members of different religions, nations and cultures to be brought to its co-presidency together with Spain in 2005. In line with this, the JDP was organizing the International Islamophobia Conference in 2007 in Istanbul as an attempt to improve dialogue among religions and cultures (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 2006: 109; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 164).

4.6.Secularist Opposition during the JDP Period

Despite the substantial scale of change in the political line of the religious right, the secularist reaction went on during the JDP period too particularly on issues of head-scarf, Imam-Hatip schools, Koran courses and some related matters. In 2003, the JDP started a campaign to pay tuition fees for economically disadvantaged students for their education in private schools. Hüseyin Çelik distributed a paper for this matter, but the campaign was harshly objected to by a counter-campaign from the state elites, with the claim that the target of the initiative was to provide funds to private schools belonging to the Gülen group. The bill prepared by the JDP in the parliament was vetoed by President Necdet Sezer for the reason that more than 20 percent of the funds the bill disburses would go to schools whose education programs contradict secularism (Kuru, 2009: 182).

In February 2006, the Council of State ruled that it is unacceptable for a school principal to wear a headscarf even in the street. This ruling was condemned by the generality of the public and surprisingly, the judges who made this decision were targeted by an assassin who succeeded in killing one of them. The attention of the state elites immediately turned to the JDP as the cause of this violence, but the police uncovered that the assassination was related to a "deep secret" state organization known as Ergenekon.

Another important event was the opposition of the secularists to the nomination of Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül as candidate in the presidential election. The secularists were united in protests in major cities, calling for a more modern president—referring to the headscarf worn by Abdullah Gül's wife and his previous membership in the National View, aspects anathema to secularism. The office of the presidency was considered as one of the last fortresses of the secularist state. It was given broad executive, legislative, judiciary and appointive powers by the 1982 Constitution, with an aim to serve as an office of tutelage and control mechanism against irresponsible policies of the parties. It was forecast to be occupied by secularist state elites, mostly from the military, and it was never thought that the Islamists would one day grow so powerful as to claim a right to occupy this position. Despite protests, Abdullah Gül won the electoral process in the parliament. But the process drew opposition from the secularist camp, who were fearful that the Islamists would use this office to Islamize the judiciary and universities. Thus the RPP appealed to the Constitutional Court with a claim that the election of the president required the participation of 2/3 of the parliament. Özbudun and Gençkaya argue that the opposition of the

RPP was groundless because the 1982 constitution does not require the participation of a particular number of representatives to any round of the elections and that the presidential candidate could fail only if he cannot receive the necessary ratio of votes determined for each round. Thus the application of the RPP to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of the first round of elections was not compliant with the 1982 Constitution (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 97-98; Özbudun, 2007: 48-50). When Abdullah Gül failed to secure the participation of 367 representatives in the first round, the RPP duly applied to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of the electoral process. Subsequently, the military issued a memorandum through the website of the office of the Chief of General Staff, which said that the military would directly intervene unless the presidential elections were cancelled. The tension rose with the declaration of Abdullah Gül that he would not withdraw his candidacy. However, the Constitutional Court cancelled the first round of elections, and thus the presidential elections (Constitutional Court Decision, 2007/54).

This was followed by the JDP searching early parliamentary elections, and introducing a constitutional amendment for the election of the president with the direct vote of the people through referendum. The amendment was opposed by Necdet Sezer and vetoed. Sezer's veto was supported by a campaign by the RPP. When the parliament returned the bill to the President again, Sezer and the RPP appealed to the Constitutional Court to reject the amendment, but failed to persuade the court. Elections took place in July 2007 with a clear victory for the JDP, which gained 47 percent of the votes. Although the JDP was still short of a two-thirds parliamentary majority, they were now supported by the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), and later on

the Democratic Society Party, the Democratic Leftist Party, the JP and some independents, providing Abdullah Gül with a sufficient number of votes to elect the president. The new parliament thus elected Abdullah Gül as the new president of Turkey. The parliament also ratified the amendment for the election of the next president via referendum in October 2007 (Özbudun, 2007: 50-51; Kuru, 2009).

A more important political clash took place after the introduction of a constitutional amendment, with a united action by the Nationalist Action Party and the JDP, for the repeal of the headscarf ban at universities. The argument of the two parties was that the headscarf ban violated the equality principle. All citizens of the country were able to benefit from the public services on equal basis and the right to higher education was not to be denied for reasons not explicitly defined by the law. Articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution were thus to be amended to allow the use of headscarf at universities (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 107). The initiative was opposed by the leading actors of the state elites: the Judiciary, the RPP, the Democratic Leftist Party, the Council of Higher Education, the secularist Media, and some intellectuals. The Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, issued a warning to the NAP and the JDP to state that a closure case would be started against them unless they quit the initiative. Despite this warning, the amendment indirectly lifting the headscarf ban passed from the parliament with over 400 affirmative votes of JDP and NAP representatives (*Milliyet*, 10 February 2008). The newly appointed President of the Council of Higher Education issued an order about freedom of dress on university campuses. But the issue was not settled, as some universities rejected to apply the decision.

The RPP and the DLP appealed to the Constitutional Court subsequently for the cancellation of the amendment. The court agreed with their appeal and annulled the amendment in the interpretation that the amendment would place pressure on those students who do not wear headscarf, and also that the court had a right to apply and observe the headscarf ban because the parliament acted irresponsibly and passed the amendment in violation of the secularist principle of the Constitution (Constitutional Court Decision, 2008/116; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 107-108).

The headscarf initiative led to the most serious clash between the JDP and the state elites since the breakaway of the party from the National View Movement. After this most recent headscarf controversy, the Public Prosecutor of Supreme Court, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, filed a closure case against the party, with a call for political bans to more than seventy party members, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç and also President Abdullah Gül. According to the Public Prosecutor, the party had turned into a center of anti-secularism, with its party leaders, ministers, representatives, municipal governors and party organization delivering speeches and participating in activities that violated the principle of secularism.

The list of accusations included the following: First, the party was trying to prepare the ground for the transformation of the basic principles of the Republic by removing the headscarf ban and by filling the bureaucratic cadres with Islamist party members. Secondly, the party was exploiting religious symbols for political purposes by playing on the headscarf, restricting the sale of alcohol and discriminating against the

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restaurants selling alcohol, and applying a social censorship based on religious principles (*Milliyet*, 14 January 2008). Thirdly, the party was exacerbating the divide between the religious and the non-religious. Fourthly, the party was secretly trying to reshape and reorient the secular legal structure of the country through a kind of gradualism. The accusations were again tied to the remarks of party leaders on the headscarf issue. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was noted to say that it was the *ulema* who should decide on the issue of wearing or not wearing headscarf, rather than the judiciary (*Hürriyet*, 16 November 2005). Other party members were noted to say that the religious should be free to wear the headscarf in schools and universities, as well as the public offices; and similarly, to tell a woman to remove her headscarf was a very huge social blunder that had to be abandoned. And finally, according to the Public Prosecutor, the JDP was conspiring to bring an Islamic Şeriat regime. It had not abandoned anything from the program of the earlier religious right parties and the party was trying to hide its real intentions (*AKP İddianamesi*).

The closure case was condemned by many political actors in the country from the right and the left at the same time. The JDP had gained 47 percent of the votes in the general elections and it was forming the government. It would raise suspicions about the validity of the political system if such a popular party was brought to the courtroom for closure. The party had risen to power through elections, and it could be removed from power through elections only. The fact that the party had a sizable electoral support also meant that its policies and goals reflected the public will. Thus, the initiative of the Public Prosecutor was an attack against democracy (*Haberturk*, 16 March 2008; *Samanyoluhaber*, 14 March 2008; *Zaman*, 14 March 2008; *Haber7*,

14 March 2008; *HaberAktuel*, 15 March 2008). The pressures of the state elites were also generating a great deal of economic instability in the country. According to Ergun Özbudun, the closure case was damaging Turkey's image and democratic records. Nowhere in the world were political parties threatened with closure for such simple reasons. The Constitutional Court had to reject the accusations of the Public Prosecutor and the case was not to be kept in the public agenda (*Samanyoluhaber*, 14 March 2008; and also Abramowitz, 5 April 2008). But despite all domestic and international reactions, the Constitutional Court found the party guilty of violating the secularist principle of the country. The closure demand was rejected with six "yes" and five "no" votes. But a financial sanction was ruled in form of the cut of 50 percent of the funds that the party received from the Treasury with ten "yes" and one "no" votes.

4.7.Conclusion

To recap the main points of the chapter, the secularist reaction expressed with the military memorandum ruled on 28 February 1997 and ensuing party closures and political bans brought to various members of the religious right has played a critical role in driving the religious right into a process of ideological transformation towards a more moderate and centrist political line. It is observed that the religious right did not prefer to assume a radical attitude towards the secularist reaction, but rather tried to accommodate the pressures of the state elites by punishing the radicals in the movement, declaring commitment to secular and republican principles, and trying to

reformulate the goal and issue orientation of the movement in line with contemporary political norms and standards. In some cases, the reaction was even found justified by some religious right cadres.

CHAPTER V

IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION ON THE TRANS-

FORMATION OF TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT

This chapter is assigned to the analysis of the transformative powers of globalization

and Europeanization on Turkish religious right. Globalization and Europeanization

will be examined in two different sections by first citing the theoretical insights and

approaches that have been offered to them in the wider literature of comparative and

international politics, and then by examining their corresponding impacts on the

transformation of Turkish religious right in its issue and goal orientation after the end

of each section. The main argument of the chapter is that the Turkish religious right,

represented by the Welfare Party of 1990s and its successors, the Virtue Party, the

Felicity Party, and the Justice and Development Party, has been impinged by forces

of globalization and Europeanization to generate a strong propensity to adopt a more

moderate political line. The content of the party program, goals, policies and political

campaigns of the Turkish religious right draw attention with one thing that a greater

emphasis and role is put on a set of universal, global and contemporary values, prin-

ciples and institutions that include democracy, human rights, rule of law, secularism as well as free market economy in the sphere of economy and that the idea of founding an Islamic society and state is totally abandoned. A very keen interest has developed to introduce rights and liberties for conservative people through the mechanisms provided by globalization and Europeanization.

5.1 Defining Globalization

While defining globalization, it will be useful to locate its usage in different domains such as the economy, politics and sociology, to have a wider view. This will facilitate our attempt to figure out the role of globalization in the ideological change of the Turkish religious right by enabling us with a rich set of analytical tools. Globalization is described and studied with different perspectives in different areas of knowledge. In economy, it is defined as the unification of international economies through the removal of barriers to international trade such as tariffs, quotes, and export fees, and also through increasing the volume of production and international trade (Scholte, 1997: 430-432; Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 17). In politics, globalization could be defined as the process of a gradually strengthening multilateralism among the states, originating from issues and concerns that require the cooperation and solidarity of countries over the borders. Those issues and concerns can be related with trade, investment, democracy, human rights, drugs, health, security, terrorism etc. on which the countries are rendered better-off if they move collectively and in cooperation (McGrew, 2000: 131-139; Halliday, 2002: 37-38; Murden, 2002: 156-

157). In social and cultural terms, globalization can be described as the transformation of societies from collective, authoritarian and closed systems to individualist, liberal and open societies, and also as the spread of western social and cultural materials represented in, for example, fast food, Hollywood, styles of clothing, architecture and diverse social and cultural forms. If we combine all of these, globalization can briefly be described as liberalization, internationalization and universalization (Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 17).

5.1.1 Economic Globalization

Economic globalization refers to the process of increasingly greater integration and interdependence of domestic markets and production through cross-border mobility of goods, services, technology and capital (Thompson, 2000: 88-94; Sholte, 1997: 430-432). Economic globalization is not a new phenomenon. There have been trade relations among countries all over the world since ancient times, but these relations have never been as intensive as today. During the 20th century, economic globalization has gained a tremendous momentum. Technological and scientific developments have facilitated production and mobility of economic objects throughout the world. Although there has not been a significant increase in the proportion of international trade in the GDP's of the countries in this period, the volume of international trade has steadily grown huge (Thompson, 2000: 94-97).

After the Second World War, a set of international institutions and organizations are established which include General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to regulate and promote economic globalization. A major goal of these entities was to remove barriers to international trade such as tariffs, quotes, and fees, and to correct international and domestic market failures. This process was accelerated with the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Communism as an important obstacle against economic liberalization was eliminated (Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 26-29; Sholte, 1997: 429-440; Fukuyama, 1989). Leading non-state actors of the economic globalization include Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) with their branches in more than one country and their assets over the GDPs of many small states. Some well-known examples of MNCs and TNCs are IBM, General Electric, Honda, Mitsubishi, Nestle and Michelin (Thompson, 2000: 103-109).

5.1.2 Political Globalization

Political Globalization could be described as the process of a strengthening multilateralism among countries that induce them to cooperate in bilateral, regional and international entities to regulate the gains of modernization and development in the areas of the movement of goods, capital, knowledge, ideas, people; in combating trans-border problems and concerns like terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, drug trafficking, organized crime, human trade, environmental disasters, poverty etc.; as well as for the spread and settlement of universal political norms and values like democ-

racy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality and good governance (McGrew, 2000: 131-139; Halliday, 2002: 37-38; Murden, 2002: 156-157).

Actors of political globalization appear to be many. They include states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and sub-state actors with global, regional and domestic characteristics, examples of which could include the UN, EU, WTO, OECD, OPEC, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, various MNCs and TNCs as well as some major individual states like the USA, Britain, France, Germany. These actors could have differing goals and concerns that may be political, economic, social, environmental or of any other nature. Though widely unequal in their powers, access and influence, they come together on an issue basis in varying compositions to produce and implement global norms, rules and standards. This eventually leads us to an idea of global polity and governance where the actors have been successful in establishing a loose global community through which they can foster their common goods in a collective way (McGrew, 2000: 142-148; Lechner and Boli, 2008: 259-262).

Francis Fukuyama is one of those who has written extensively on the aspects of political globalization related with the spread and supremacy of global political values. What he wrote on as the liberal idea was distinguished from its rivals with its embodiment of democracy, rule of law and market economies. Liberalism was based on rationalism, participation, secularism, individualism, equality and empathy among the people, and thus it was viewed as superior to rival ideologies. These institutions and principles were universals that all the countries needed to follow. Liberalism is

supported by western states and companies as it is regarded as the ideal form that contributes to global civilization. The scale of support was huge, ranging from acts of war, economic sanctions, to political and diplomatic pressure in case of declining to cooperate. And when the countries opted to cooperate, the policies were in the opposite direction, including providing economic, political and military support. It was the main cause of the Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, for instance. They were all fought against totalitarianism and communism. The end of the Cold war was proof that dictatorships and bureaucracies were unable to compete with liberal societies in progress. Globalization then meant no more than expansion of the liberal world order (Fukuyama, 1989).

5.1.3 Social and Cultural Globalization

Social and cultural globalization could be defined as the emergence of common forms of social and cultural structures as a result of increasing contact, communication, immigration and exchange of social and cultural objects between countries. World cultures and societies are exposed to a great degree of contact and communication thanks to facilities and conditions provided by modernity that shorten the distances and bring people together some of which include modern means of transportation, media, TV, internet, phone, and other advancements in technology and science.

We can try to make a distinction between social and cultural globalization here. Social globalization could be defined as the spread of western social structures over the

world, the examples of which can be listed as the replacement of collective, authoritarian, and close social structures with individualist, pluralist, democratic and open ones (Halliday, 2002: 38). Cultural globalization, secondly, can be described as the homogenization of cultural values over the world through the exchange of local cultural forms and the formation of cultures of synthesis. So in the case of cultural globalization, it can be said that the societies are in a trend of adopting and enjoying certain elements of other cultures to produce an international hybrid culture. As a result, national dress styles, cuisines, festivals, organizations and all the cultural things that accompany them in the East have come to share many things in common with those of other countries in the West (Mackay, 2000: 48-49).

According to UNESCO statistics, there is a substantial increase in the trade of cultural assets and products over the world which has risen from $6,800 million in the 1970s to $38,500 million in the 1980s (UNESCO, 1986: 10). The increase in trade of cultural commodities, as well as the instruments that propagate them, means that national cultures are weakening at the expense of an increasingly strengthening global culture (Karim, 2002: 37-40). Television occupies an important place as an instrument to represent and disseminate cultural exports. It is noted that from 1965 to 1996, the number of TV receivers per thousand people has increased four folds over the world. And similarly, when we look at the number of TV channels in Europe, a sharp rise draws attention: from about 20 in 1984 to over 250 in 1996 (Mackay, 2000: 49-54). The internet appears as another important instrument of cultural globalization. It remains a huge source of information, communication, entertainment and

dialogue among different cultures. The usage of the internet is growing all over the world tremendously.

New communications technologies allow instant, inexpensive and global communication over the world. The world is now like a global village where mobility is facilitated tremendously in time and space. This process aids democratic and participatory institutions too. Thanks to advanced means of communication, matters of politics and society are debated by a wider domestic and international public. Opinions are disseminated over a huge social environment where they can be heard, deliberated and decided with access to broader knowledge. Communications revolution opens a gate to diversity, alternative thinking, opposition and liberty for a more democratic community (Mackay, 2000: 55-56).

Social globalization is defined as the transformation of collective, authoritarian, closed and inegalitarian societies to individualist, libertarian, democratic, participant and open societies. This transformation could take place consciously or subconsciously. The communications revolution examined above has lessened the barriers of time and space among societies substantially. The societies have been introduced to a process of dialogue, observation, deliberation, accommodation and adaptation as a result of which socio-cultural institutions have come to share commonalities across cultures.

5.2 Reactions to Globalization in the Islamic World

Elements of globalization can encounter various reactions from a multiplicity of actors in a particular country. Depending on the policy and ideological goals of the actors, globalization can be met with reactions of absorption, accommodation, denunciation or it might be imposed from inside or outside too in certain cases. Absorption takes place most often when global norms and principles share a great deal of similarity with domestic ones. That is especially the case with themes of scientific, industrial and economic development for which almost all the countries show great enthusiasm. Some other elements of globalization which might bear some cultural and political themes could be accommodated into domestic structures with an accompanying set of views. In these cases, countries might be sharing a similar set of principles and institutions with those of global ones and they can get united with one another in a functional way. These two types of reactions to globalization also bear a kind of philosophical approach that supports them against opposing political views. As far as the wider Islamic world is considered, for instance, it is often suggested that globalization is not contradictory with religious values and principles. It is an asset that promotes partnership, cooperation and peace among countries. It is a source of dialogue that contributes to economic, political and social progress for all its members (Halliday, 2002: 45-55).

They may even go further by arguing that Islam is itself a synthesis of the East and the West from the beginning. It was an updated version of Judaism and Christianity in religious terms. Contemporary science and technology was a product of exchange

of knowledge and technology over the countries. Islam was not against anything that originated from outside. Islam was in love of diversity and pluralism. Islam was a product of linguistic, cultural, political and economic integration with the other civilizations.

There have been cases where aspects of globalization are imposed. Some countries are subjected to varying degrees of sanctions and pressures by the international community to reform their social, political and economic institutions according to universal standards that may include introduction of democratic reforms, adoption of international human rights provisions, supremacy of the rule of law, freedom of thought and conscience, gender equality, respect for minority rights and so on. The extent of those pressures could include the starting of a war, international blockade, embargo, exclusion from the international community, downsizing of diplomatic relations and so on.

At other times, globalization could be denounced by various groups of people for various reasons. It might be because it is thought to be an instrument of Western hegemony and domination over the East. For them, it is just a masque for the western imperialism of the previous century. At a lower level, globalization is sometimes interpreted as a grand project by the major power in the West by which they endeavor to spread and establish their political, economic, social and cultural institutions to the rest of the world. For those with this idea, globalization is a threat to state, nation and fatherland. In the Islamic world, for instance, the slogan of returning to traditional Islamic ideals is heard very often. Solution for the illnesses of the time is the return

to faith, holy book and prayer. Islam has its unique political, economic and social institutions (Halliday, 2002: 48-53).

5.3 Approaches to Globalization

5.3.1 Conservatives

Conservatives take classical Islam as the basis of their approach to globalization. They argue that Islam embodies all necessary forms of economic, political, social and cultural institutions by which modernity can be met. They are opposed to the idea that Islam is unable to conform to modern conditions or that it needs to be re-formed in the face of new developments. Conservatives support the ideal of bringing about an Islamic state with a constitution compatible with Islam. Globalization is deemed to be closely tied with Western political, economic and ideological interests and that its cultural and social content is detrimental to the faith which is most often called as "Westoxification" rather than development and progress. Some particular contents of the West that they are opposed to include secularism, socialism and such things that directly aim to marginalize religion in public life as well as the ideas of equality, gender rights, and freedom of religion, which are deemed as in opposition to Islamic values and principles (Monshipouri, 2002: 99-101).

5.3.2 Modernists

Modernists search for a compromise between Islam and modernity. While not rejecting the Islamic civilization, they argue that there can always be found a way to reconcile Islam with the things brought by globalization. Islam could be reconstructed, reinvented and renewed depending on circumstances. The modernists agree with the aspects of political globalization such as democracy, human rights and rule of law by trying to search for their origins in earlier Islamic civilizations. So they argue that modernization can be Islamized and accommodated. However, it cannot be said that modernists concur with all aspects of globalization. They oppose the idea that political modernization requires secularism and marginalization of the religion. And similarly, they don't agree that globalization requires westernization in cultural terms. For the modernists, moral and cultural forms of religion do not need to be brought into conflict with modernity. While they support the global struggle for democracy, human rights and rule of law, they oppose the employment of these mechanisms to establish hegemony and domination on the non-west as well as their usage as an instrument to marginalize religion (Monshipouri, 2002: 101-103).

5.3.3 Liberals

Liberals differ from the other two insofar as they believe in the validity of universal values, principles and institutions that include democracy, human rights, rule of law, market economy and good governance. They don't search for ideal forms in tradi-

tional religious and moral values, nor do they try to accommodate them with modernity. Religion and morality is respected as a part of freedom of thought and conscience, as well as because diversity and pluralism are valued in liberal systems. They believe that there is a universal civilization originating from the West. While it has some political and economic features that countries adopt to become a part of the international society, there are some others that settle by themselves through adaptation, appreciation and synthesis. Even more, some argue that the tradition of Islam cannot compete with its contemporary rivals in many aspects of the life (Monshipouri, 2002: 99-104).

5.4 Globalization as a Moderating Power over Islamic Politics

Turkish sociopolitical and economic life has undergone a rapid transformation particularly starting with the premiership of Turgut Özal in the 1980s. Turgut Özal was a leading champion of laissez-faire economies with his ambitious goals to restructure the Turkish economy. The changes introduced by Turkey's post-coup prime minister in the sphere of economy included abandoning the decades-old import substitution strategy and adoption of an export-led economic growth strategy, privatization of huge public economic enterprises, introduction of free market regulations based on promotion of international trade and finance, flexible exchange and interest rates, and capital mobility (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2002). Political and social reforms came in early 1990s. Turkey was introduced to a period of remarkable economic growth with its attraction of massive foreign investment as well as increasing

volume of international trade and domestic manufacturing sector. This process was facilitated with the participation of the Turkish immigrant population in Western Europe into the economic life with their capital, entrepreneurialism and newly-acquired culture of consumerism (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 20-21; Kuru, 2005: 259).

In this period, the state monopoly on TV broadcast, radios, universities and schools was terminated and the path to a great communications and technological development was opened. A drastic surge of private media incorporations, educational institutions, civil society and intellectual groups took place in Turkish sociopolitical life. There was a tremendous increase in the consumption of TV, radio, cinema and video products. The internet and cellular phones were added to the traditional channels of communication in 1990s. These developments have introduced Turkey into a greater state of integration and communication with the forces of globalization. The elements of political and social globalization, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, freedom, equality, as well as the ideas of open, individualistic and private society were brought to greater attention of the public to meet with various reactions and views by different segments of the society (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 19).

The Islamists of 1970s and 1990s were against the institutions of globalization in the beginning, and sought to limit the content of relations with the west to issues of industrial and economic development. But starting with the midst of 1990s – when Welfare Party was in government in coalition with the True Path Party – they have acquired a positive inclination towards the means and opportunities provided by

globalization to facilitate their goal of establishing an Islamic society. The Islamists were exploiting all communication, transportation, education, broadcasting, publication channels introduced by globalization, and they were also beginning to appreciate parts of global political and social values such as freedom of conscience, public will and parliamentary politics. The Islamists have gradually turned in favor of globalization by changing their policy orientations from anti-western, anti-Zionist, and pro-Islamic to pro-western, pro-globalization and pro-EU. While finding again inclusion in Turkish political life, this adaptation would also provide them with protection from potential secularist reactions (Dağı, 2005: 31-32; Dağı, 2006: 93-96).

5.4.1 Economic Globalization and Turkish Islamic Bourgeoisie

One of the most important contributions of globalization to religious right politics in Turkey has been the emergence of a moderate middle class of industrialists and businessmen. A class of conservative entreprenuers,[1] taking advantage of a liberalizing domestic economic structure facilitated by Özal's free market reforms particularly, was able to produce economies of scale by showing activism and participation in various sectors of the economy. The influence of this particular class on Turkish religious right has been extensively studied in Turkish politics (Öniş, 2006a: 124-125, 128; Karakaş, 2007: 20-22).

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[1] Moderate in politics but conservative in economic, social and cultural life.

This conservative class of industrialists and businessmen has been united in an association named MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği – Association for Individual Industrialists and Businessmen) with motivations to promote their goals and interests. MÜSİAD has been accompanied by a number of other associations of its kind in forthcoming years. As an association of industrialists and businessmen with thousands of members, MÜSİAD's concerns and interests were supposed to be taken into account by politicians and statesmen because of a list of issues related with them like employment, inflation, interest, economic development etc. which were also linked with a list of other social and political issues. MÜSİAD was a remarkable support base for the Welfare Party in the beginning by providing it with various assets of electoral and political support. MÜSİAD was known for its participation to WP's political campaign in direct and indirect means and it was also active in organizing and sponsoring various TV and radio establishments, meetings, speeches, conferences, foundations, advertisements, and products with conservative purposes and themes. (Öniş, 2006a: 124-125, 128; Yavuz, 2005: 109, 111; Karakaş, 2007: 20-22; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 115; Günalp, 2001: 439).

As a result of the observed damages of periods of political and economic instability to economic interests of its members, MÜSİAD was prompted to deliver messages of moderacy and common sense to political groups. Concerning the secularist reaction expressed in 28 February Process, President of MÜSİAD Erol Yarar was expressing his contempt for WP's radicalizing tendencies. He was condemning Erbakan's attempts to rule the Virtue Party under the cover and was saying that

> (VP)'s cooperation with people who led to WP-True Path's collapse has drawn a lot of reaction. That was wrong. People want stability, transparency and seriousness. They don't want conspiracy. They tell you not to be involved with Byzantine type conspiracies (Sabah, 23 April 1999).

MÜSİAD was observing interests in the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and human rights, which would provide them with a hospitable environment for their economic activities as agents of peace and stability (Öniş, 2001: 289-291; Kösebalaban, 2004: 11-12; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 113).

The change for globalism in the political discourse of MÜSİAD was also associated with the perception of the organization that defense of contemporary political and legal principles such as democracy, human rights and rule of law would enable them with capabilities to enjoy the social and cultural contents of their identity. Freedom of thought and conscience was an invaluable asset in this matter. This new policy line would also make it possible for them to criticize the state elites for their frequent intervention in parliamentary and governmental political processes and for their rigid sense of secularism. Particularly, the military was invited to follow its counterparts in the liberal world in terms of the ideal type of civil-military relations, which foresaw the minimization of the role of military to significant domestic and external security issues only. They had to move away from anything resembling dictatorship, towards participatory government promoting civil and human rights for the citizens. (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 116-120).

Another important reason for this paradigmatic change in MÜSİAD was that the idea of minimizing economic relations with the west and uniting with the Muslim world

was economically fruitless that led to huge economic losses as a very lucrative group of markets was abandoned. There was a need to differentiate economic and political concerns as they were most often two different domains and conservative businessmen had to exploit this opportunity at a maximum capacity. And in fact, opening to the global markets was now more of a necessity for purposes of growth, competitiveness and survival.

5.4.2 Islamic Intellectuals

The liberal reforms introduced starting with Özal period in 1980s have been instrumental in the proliferation of a group of Islamic intellectuals who were exposed to elements of political, social and cultural globalization originating from the west. Some of them had grown very influential with their supporters, large scale business enterprises, participation in civil society organizations and political parties. Their famous examples include Fethullah Gülen, Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel among many others. Until the end of the 1990s, the views of these intellectuals displayed similarities to their contemporaries in the rest of the Islamic world such as Sayyid Qutb, Mavdudi, Ali Shariati etc. who were with the idea of establishing an Islamic state and society in their countries (Dağı, 2004).

The February 28 1997 process has been a critical date to speed up the orientation of many Islamist intellectuals from the above mentioned trend to a globalist universalist one. They were now in greater support of the institutional settlement of western val-

ues and principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights. The idea of establishing an Islamic Sharia regime was abandoned in favor of the promotion of western social, political and economic values. This shift towards globalization would, on the one hand, protect the religious right against rigid secularist reactions and, on the other, would enable them with legal mechanisms to enjoy social and cultural aspects of their conservative identity (Öniş, 2006a: 125). It was a necessity to take on these universal values and principles for survival, but the Islamists have also understood the virtues of globalization, which protected their rights and freedoms as well as providing many other opportunities (Atasoy, 2009: 169-172; Dağı, 2004).

Fethullah Gülen is presently one of the leading figures among the Turkish Islamist intellectuals to whom we can assign a special space here. He is distinguished with his views and activism on matters of religion, politics, society, economy etc. with his moderate, libertarian style who communicates them most often in an integrated way via a large industry of publications, conferences, TV channels and many other media instruments. He was critical of some WP policies and goals related with the establishment of some Islamic political ideals in Turkey even before the February 28 Process. In an interview, he talks as follows:

> The difficulty arises when some Muslims and policy-makers consider and present Islam as a purely political, sociological, and economic ideology, rather than as a religion.
> ... Religion in general and Islam in particular cannot be compared with democracy or any other political, social, or economic system. Religion focuses primarily on the immutable aspects of life and existence, whereas political, social, and economic systems or ideologies concern only certain social aspects of our worldly life. (Gülen, 2001)

Fethullah Gülen shows strong commitment to democracy and secularism with a contention that democracy is the ideal form of government in modern world which also meets the expectations of the conservative religious segments of the society and that traditional Islamic political principles must not be incorporated into political programs and policies by any parties. He is a strong supporter of market economy and entrepreneurialism as a road to wealth creation, freedom and service to religion (Aras and Çaha, 2000; Atasoy, 2009: 170-172).

5.4.3 Turkish Religious Right under Political Socialization

It is very commonly argued by scholars of Turkish politics that Turkish religious right has been introduced to remarkable process of socialization in line with universal and global political values, norms and principles taking speed particularly in the second half of 1990s (Dağı, 2005: 28-32; Öniş, 2006a: 124). The decline in the oppositional stance against EU, USA, Israel and global political and economic institutions like UN, IMF and the World Bank in party policies and programs as well as increasing support for contemporary political and legal rules and institutions like democracy, human rights, rule of law, secularism were clear signs of this process (Kösebalaban, 2004: 13; Dağı, 2005: 28). The change was sometimes associated with problems of incompatibility between the classical Just Order and National View doctrines of the movement and elements of globalization. When the Party was brought to the government, it was understood that many of the ideals promoted and promised in election campaigns associated with Islamic politics were not applicable

or practicable. In some other cases, supporters of the movement were detecting various interests in the development and adoption of new goals in line with those things brought by globalization. And still in some other cases, they were realizing that global values, principles and programs were indeed much better and more preferable than those defended by the movement over the years.

The approach of the movement towards globalization was more like conservative, with some modernist inclinations though, until the midst of 1990s characterized with a denunciation of integration and proximity with the west as well as of various western ideas, values and principles and processes. But with a process beginning with the introduction of the WP to the government, leading the movement to intimately meet with processes of globalization, a modernist liberal approach was in the formation in support of integration and cooperation with the west as well as of adoption and accommodation of western ways and norms.

5.4.3.1. Traditional National View Approach to Globalization

A rich number of books, speeches and programs produced by the National Salvation Party and Welfare Party cadres, particularly by traditional party leader Necmettin Erbakan, provide us with suffient resources to demonstrate the conservative approach of the movement towards globalization. The conservatism of the movement was most evident in its foreign policy orientation. To start with, the view of the movement towards relations with the USA was very much negative. It was argued

that the USA had evangelical and imperialistic motivations towards the Muslim world. Reminiscent of Samuel Huntington's theory of clash of civilizations, it was believed that America was trying to weaken and subjugate Muslim countries, in one side, and assist a strengthening Christian hegemony and expansion in the Middle East in the other. Accordingly, the quietude of the USA during the Serbian genocide against the Bosnians, US support to Armenia in 1991 Azeri-Armenian War, again US support to PKK through Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq were material proofs of this thinking (Erbakan, 1993a: 71-77).

Turkey's membership to Customs Union and European Economic Community was opposed with greater vehemence with a belief that EEC was a Christian club established to promote Christian unity and cooperation with some ill motivations about the Muslim world. And they would not accept Turkey to the community as long as it stayed Muslim. A likely accession to the Community would weaken Turkey by also making it dependent on Europe in political and economic terms (Erbakan, 1991: 11-14; Erbakan, 1975a: 235-250, 254-264). As to Israel, the National View was with the idea that it was not possible to execute friendly relations with Israel for Israel was an invader nation massacring brother Palestinians with future goals to invade further in Islamic lands reaching to as far as Turkey (Erbakan, 1975a: 250-254; Erbakan, 1991: 201). The ideals foreign policy orientation for National View was the minimization of relations with western states and international organizations and development and deepening of the ties with the Muslim world. While this was in the economic and political interests of the country, it was also a part of Turkey's historical and cultural ties with the Muslim world to do

so. To this end, Turkey had to leave aside USA, UN, EEC, NATO, IMF and other western actors and work for the establishment of an Islamic UN, Customs Union, military alliance among the Muslim countries (Erbakan, 1975a: 165-270; Erbakan, 1991: 35).

Movement's conservatism in domestic policy areas was not less than its conservatism in foreign policy. The objectives of the party were reaching to as far as introducing an Islamic regime with calls for jihad for this purpose. This was the main reason for the opening of a closure case against the WP. Apart from that, in economy, the movement defended an economic system based on classical Islamic teachings with motivations to remove interest from economic life, replace the interest-based banking system with investment and stock marketing, and fight against the illnesses of capitalist economies like extravagance, luxury, self-preservation and gratification. The party was not against private property and entrepreneurialism, however (Erbakan, 1975a: 149-157; Erbakan, 1975b: 66-81; Erbakan, 1991: 22-27).

Religious education occupied a special place among National View goals: Number of lessons of religion and morality would be increased in public schools; number and quality of Imam Hatip schools, faculties of theology and Islamic graduate schools would be enhanced. Religious education would contribute to the belief and morality of the new generations by teaching them the importance of dignity, integrity, loyalty and respect for the elderly people at a time of growing concerns about them (Erbakan, 1975a: 90-97, Erbakan, 1976: 19-25; Erbakan, 1975b: 14-25). An idea of multiple law system was promoted by the WP with an intention to allow religious

people to benefit from judicial services according to Islamic law (Refah Partisi: 4, 70-79). There were a list of other policies and goals adopted by the WP particularly involving the implementation of various Islamic norms and principles in public life like prohibition of alcohol sale in public restaurants, removal of some Atatürk busts, political campaigns for freedom of headscarf in schools and universities etc. revealing its conservative identity (Karakaş, 2007: 24-25).

5.4.3.2. The WP from Government to Its Closure

A substantially modernist approach was in the development with the introduction of the WP to the government. The party program taking its inspiration from classical religious teachings of the past was faced with realities of the modernity to notify the party with the necessity to reorganize itself in its goal and issue orientation (Tanıyıcı, 2003: 471-472). In foreign policy, in Turkey's economic relations, it was observed that an attempt to move the orientation of the economy from the west to the Muslim East would be counterproductive and regressive for it was in Turkey's greater interests, as a necessity of economic globalization, to be engaged in greater integration and cooperation with the west. The party was aware of the potential contribution of west-dominant international trade, finance and investment to Turkish economy. The import of technological and industrial infrastructure was an equally important necessity. To this end, the WP was introducing a remarkable change in its view to EU, US and western global economic organizations like IMF and World Bank.

The turn of the movement towards the west was also manifest in the emergence of a favorable thinking about western political values and principles such as democracy, human rights and rule of law, a view particularly strong among young party cadres. A belief was growing in the party towards accepting these values and principles as part of a universal culture above religious considerations to which all countries had to pay respect. This remained as another factor motivating the WP to improve Turkey's ties with the west as members of a world community sharing common values and principles. There were many other benefits of the partnership with the west apart from economic and political considerations such as improving Turkey's military power and technology. Turkey's NATO membership and strategic partnership with the USA was critical in this context which had to be preserved without any change.

There was a noteworthy change in the view of the movement towards the members of religions other than Islam who were often suspected as nurturing ill motivations about the Muslim world and developing countries. The participation of the WP to Global Forum of Spiritual and Parliamentary Leaders held in Turkey on 6-9 October 1997 was a good case in point. The Forum was organized as a challenge to Samuel Huntington's idea of clash of civilizations with a belief that solutions could be brought to humanitarian crises taking place on the globe by bringing leaders of different religious and political communities together. In opposition to the tendency to see differences in civilizations as a source of conflict, the Forum stood as a

platform to call attention to the amenities of pluralism and multiculturalism originating from cultural differences (Kul, 21 April 1997).

As a part of this paradigmatic change in the movement, the Minister of State Abdullah Gül was joining in an official visit to the USA in February 1997 during which he was reaffirming the multidimensionality of Turkish-American relations with a depth spreading to various domains and he was going on: "Our government would like to improve these relations" (*Sabah*, 20 February 1997; Çongar, 21 February 1997). Gül was saying that Turkish-American relations were beyond simple relations between two countries. Delivering the intention of the WP-True Path government not to change the course of relations between two countries, Gül was saying that "US officials pronounce that they support democracy, pluralism, free and fair elections and open society. Turkey is also a country like that" to point out to the membership of two countries to common political traditions (Emiroğlu, 28 February 1997; Süzal, 24 February 1997). Gül was expressing his admiration of American secularism and the longing of his party to replace the one at home with American secularism (Süzal, 28 February 1997).

WP's pro-US turn was so remarkable that the party was at times yielding to observing pressures from US authorities in various foreign and domestic political issues. During his US visit, Gül was warned against establishing close relations with Iran for its alleged support to terrorist organizations and abortion of Middle East peace process. In case of its failure to keep relations with Iran at a low, Turkey was threatened with an embargo. (*Sabah*, 21 February 1997). Apart from that, American

officials were expressing their concerns about radical religious tendencies in Turkey and delivering their message that Turkey would be accepted to western community only if the secularist principle was respected. In a meeting between US Secretary of State Maedeleine Albright and deputies of EU Commission in February 1997, the deputies were reporting that the meeting was held "to emphasize the importance given by the USA and the EU to secular Turkey, to express the rising concerns against the problems, and to indicate how important for both sides to reinvigorate the ties and deepen the relations with Turkey." Albright was pointing out to "the necessity to perceive how critical it is for secular Turkish Republic to be linked to the west with close ties… It is very important for secular Turkey to anchor to the west" (*Sabah*, 19 February 1997).

In his visit to the USA, Gül was publicizing the strong willingness of his party for EU membership too. In response to concerns against Turkey's motivations to diverge from the West, Gül was saying that "This concern is groundless. If there is such a concern, take us to the EU immediately" (*Sabah*, 20 February 1997). The desire of the party to enter EU could be better understood when we look at Gül's warnings to warnings to veto NATO's expansion attempts in case of a motivation by EU to close the gates to Turkey (Çongar, 21 February 1997). Gül was returning from the visit with promises given by US officials to support Turkey's EU accession process. Gül's attempts were supported by Erbakan too for he was also emphasizing the importance of establishing an atmosphere of understanding and communication with the USA. America was recognized as a global power, and Turkey had to execute its relations

with it on the base of perceived reciprocal interests (Özcan, 1998: 184-185; Dağı, 1998: 101-102).

The hint of pro-EU turn (Named as European Economic Community at that time) was given as early as its establishment in 1985 indeed. The party leader Ahmet Tekdal, occupying the seat due to Erbakan's ban from politics, was saying that his party was in support of Turkey's membership to EEC with observed interests in the contribution of the membership to Turkey's economic development (Tekdal, 1985: 8-10). The changed attitude of WP leader Erbakan towards Turkey's EU membership was becoming public much before the establishment of the WP-True Path Government. Erbakan was saying that:

> We are not against the Customs Union… What does the Customs Union mean? The Customs Union means Turkey's attainment of competitiveness through the establishment of a healthy economy despite the removal of customs duties and liberation of everything… Who does not want it? (*Milliyet*, 30 December 1995).

As the coalition partner of the WP-True Path Government, Erbakan was giving his support with his signing of the 54 Government Program to the continuation of accession talks with EU in line with the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963. A special importance was given in 54 Government Program to the implementation of necessary reforms and regulations for the functioning of Customs Union Agreement as well as the introduction of harmonization measures for EU accession.

There was a remarkable change in the view of the WP towards Turkey's relations with Israel also. The party was not allowed to put its conservative program into

action in government for reasons. While the pressures of the Turkish Armed Forces were an important reason in this, there were also a number of other important concerns in the agenda. One of those concerns was US calls from Turkey for developing friendly relations with Israel. In case of its disregard, Turkey was being threatened with renunciation of US support to Turkey in diplomatic, military, economic and political arenas. Even more, Turkey was sometimes being advised by the US to turn to Israel for various military and technological items that it wanted to buy from the US (*Zaman*, 6 October 1996). Another concern expected from an improving Turkish-Israeli relations was the potential contribution of Israeli intelligence against PKK which had proved very useful indeed as it was seen in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (Robins, 2007: 299). A final motivation encouraging WP deputies to approach Israeli authorities was to use various American Jewish lobbies to solicit favorable US decisions and policies about Turkey (*Zaman*, 7 June 1997).

In addition to these realpolitik concerns, there were some idealist tendencies growing among WP cadres revealing itself in a belief in the likelihood of reaching peace in Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a striking deviation from the pessimist and malign Israeli image. The WP was hinting to play a mediator role in this process. In response to a question about WP's view of Israel during his visit to USA, Abdullah Gül was saying that: "We want them to live in peace (with Palestine) and we want to play an important role in Middle East peace process" and he was going on by saying that WP was not an enemy of Israel (*Sabah*, 21 February 1997).

There were some other difficulties encountered in the pursuit of traditional National View program apart from those of above motivating the party to suspend it for periods to come. The attempt to introduce an upper limit and various taxes to interest applications in the economy with the declared war of the Minister of Finance Abdullatif Şener against interest were examples to it. Şener's explanations in this direction, soon after the establishment of the 54 Government with True Path Party, was generating a state of instability in the economy by unexpectedly increasing the interest rates at a value of 13 points as well as leading to a rise in the value of foreign currency with warnings issued to foreign investors by specialists against a potential economic crisis in Turkey (Tamer, 24 November 2002).

When the WP was closed, Bülent Arınç was explaining the plan of reformists to establish a new party located in the center and open to the world. The new party would feature democracy and human rights and it would not take the religion under its monopoly. Arınç was arguing that there were some mistakes in the timing and marshalling of certain foreign policy priorities during the WP period. He was saying

> For example, the Far East visit ranging from Iran to Malaysia: Was Iran supposed to be the first country? This was one of the issues that the US was very sensitive in the new world order. This was the case with Libya too (Cerrahoğlu, 22 February 1998).

5.4.3.3. The Virtue Party

Established on December 17 1997, as a precaution against a likely closure of the WP for many, the Virtue Party quickly gathered many of the non-banned WP

representatives in its organization. The modernist approach taking form during the WP-True Path Government acquired a more solid and sophisticated structure in VP's policy perspective. When the state of chaos was recovered after the closure of the WP, a team of party members including Recai Kutan, Şevket Kazan, Abdullah Gül and Oğuzhan Asıltürk, appointed with instructions by Erbakan, were given to the formulation of the programmatic orientation of the party with observed differences from traditional National View line. It was stated in the outset that the VP would not follow the oft-promoted Just Order and National View ideas and that the party would give priority to democracy, human rights and rule of law as the major tenants of its goal and issue orientation (*Radikal*, 22 January 1998).

The party program was introduced by Kutan with a slogan of "change." Kutan was saying in a speech that "We don't use the concept of Just Order. There is no such thing. It was a debate in fact. It was an academic discussion" and he was going on "It was a brain gymnastic. Even Erbakan did not try to implement it when he was the prime minister" (Çekirge, 11 July 1998). For Kutan, what needed was the transfer of democracy, human rights and freedoms to Turkey, of those things that make the west superior (Sabah, 2 November 1999). The necessity of this process of adaptation was explained as follows by Gül as follows in a speech:

> It is inevitable to have such vivid political discussions in our country for we are introduced to a rapid process of change together with the world… With the passage of time and experience, the people are motivated to think more realist and healthy. It is without question that – as the leaders of societies – the political parties, politicians and thinkers cannot stay outside of this development… The relationship between politics and religion must be limited with measures taken for freedom of religion and religious education. It is observed that the parties which are established in the name of religion cannot be of any help to religion… (Gül, 9 February 2000)

In economy, it was indicated in VP program that the party was in support of liberal economic system with a goal to minimize the impact of the state in the economy. This was reiterated by Kutan during his visit to the US when he also had an interview with David Rockefeller. Kutan was saying that "My party supports economic liberalism" "*Sabah*, 23 October 1999) and that "We are not a party isolated from its environment. We are in favor of freedom of enterprise. But we are against a submissive economic policy too" (*Sabah*, 2 November 1999). The leading party member Bülent Arınç was in agreement with the change introduced. Arınç was saying that there was a need to reformulate the economic policy of the movement. The Just Order discourse sounded well in rhetoric but it was very difficult to put it into action in practice. Arınç was saying that "It is not possible to bring the interest to the zero line at once, for instance" (*Radikal*, 25 May 1998). The difficulty to remove interest from economy was recognized by Kutan also. Kutan was indicating that

> The economic system in hand is programmed according to an economy of interest. It is not possible to change it. Interest-based economy can remain, but there could be space for interest-free economic applications together with it. The present economic system can keep going, but I don't invest my money in interest (Ertürk, 28 March 1999).

In VP program it was indicated that a priority would be given to Turkey's EU membership. The reason for the desertion of the idea of EU as a Christian club, imperialist and Jewish tool was given by Kutan as follows:

> Circumstances are changing in the world. Conditions of the day are not the same as those in the past. We have made an assessment according to the conditions of the day and we revised our old EU policy. We now say that Turkey must enter the EU… (Çekirge, 11 July 1998)

Concerning VP's US policy, Arınç was saying that they would not do politics without taking the US into account. The colonial era had ended and a new world order had started. The VP was recognizing the virtues of western values (*Radikal*, 25 May 1998). To this end, during his visit to the US, Kutan was meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and in a series of speeches and Forums he participated he was emphasizing the democratic identity of his party and was indicating that "We want the implementation of America secularism in Turkey." During the visit, Kutan was also meeting with leading American Jewish lobbies including American Jewish Committee, Bna'i Brith, Presidents of Conference of American Jewish Organizations and American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee as a development in stark contrast to traditional party line (*Sabah*, 2 November 1999). There was a growing view among the leadership cadres of the party for the necessity and the possibility of bringing a solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict for which Turkey would be ready to play a mediating role. The VP was not an enemy of Israel as it was seen in its congratulation of 50 anniversary celebrations of the establishment of Israel (*Radikal*, 25 May 1998).

VP did not totally abandon the traditional goal and issue orientation of the movement, however. Party preserved its conservatism in a number of issues. VP's party program indicated that the international economic platform established by eight developing Muslim countries, D-8, would be given special importance with motivations to make it more functional and developed. In education, the party was offering a 5+3+3=11-year compulsory educational system instead of the then 8-year system by which the secondary school division of the Imam-Hatip schools would be

able to be reopened. Imam-Hatip schools and other vocational schools would be redesigned to improve their educational quality and latitude (VP Party Program).

5.4.3.4. The Justice and Development Party

Established after the closure of the VP, the JDP came up with a program more attentive to and compatible with global values and principles. While the party maintained a sense of conservatism with the importance that it assigned to Turkey's cultural, historical and religious assets, it was more like a modernist and liberal in character in terms of its approach to elements of globalization which could be ascertained in the emphasis that it placed on democracy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality and market economy in domestic politics; and multilateralism, multidimensionality, trade liberalization, regional and global integration in foreign policy cast as the major goal and issue orientation of the party. Important in this formation was the finalization of the intraparty clash between the reformists and the traditionalists in WP and VP with the split of the movement and the transfer of the reformists to the JDP.[2] With the congregation of the reformists in the JDP, and thus the exclusion of the traditionalist coalition from the processes of decision-making

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[2] While the VP had also introduced itself with a policy orientation similar to JDP, the traditionalists were still exerting influence in VP with their occasional openings in favor of the preservation of traditional party ways. Oğuzhan Asıltürk was one of those traditionalists in VP drawing attention with his highly conservative explanations. In response to Kutan's remarks about the desertion of the Just Order program in VP, for instance, Asilturk was rebelling by saying that "WP is closed down. Concerning WP, our friends can only talk for themselves. There cannot be any talk on behalf of the party" Ertürk, 18 July 1998.

and implementation, the JDP was provided with greater freedoms and capabilities to formulate a more globalist and contemporary party program. A more important reason in this process was of course the growth, as a result of experience and learning through time, of a political mentality characterized with a belief in and preference of western values and principles among the party cadres as a set of more effective, productive, developed and superior institutions.

In August 2000, much before the establishment of the JDP, Erdoğan was saying that "I am executing a campaign for a new formation in the sense of developing a new political mentality, in the direction of building new approaches to domestic and international problems of our country" (*Hürriyet*, 9 August 2000). In Erdoğan's words, Turkey was in need of an intellectual change. The new formation that he was working would be an awakening of Turkey in the context of catching up with the time and civilization (*Hürriyet*, 28 May 2001). Erdoğan was indicating that radical and marginal deals would not do any good and that there must not have been any fights but negotiation for the resolution of the problems of the country (Pamuk, 2001: 179). In a speech in Antalya in May 2003, Erdoğan was saying that they had put off the National View dress and he was telling the party members to forget all such party programs and slogans. He went on

> There is no space in JDP for political and ideological ghosts which shadow the horizon of the people nor for unrealistic political and ideological dreams… It is not possible for ideological considerations or shallow world views to find space in JDP (*Hürriyet*, 17 May 2003).

In his speech at the American Enterprise Institute in January 2004 titled as "Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom," Erdoğan was

identifying democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance as universal values, as a common legacy of the humankind, produced with contributions by different civilizations. Describing Turkey as a member of one of these civilizations, he was indicating the resolution of the JDP to preserve, develop and disseminate these values in Turkey and in the world. In his speech, Erdoğan was highlighting that the JDP would not support a political program designed on narrow ideological frameworks for it was believed that such a party would not be able to address to the challenges of the time and needs of the people. For purposes of success, compatibility, competitiveness and survival, the JDP was required, like any other party, to adopt a more colorful, multidimensional and centrist line (Erdoğan, 2006: 333-337).

The world was witnessing a global political process whereby the ideologies like liberalism, conservatism and socialism were driven to interaction and dialogue leading to the emergence of hybrid and homogeneous political programs to which the JDP was not immune. While expressing the importance given to religion by his party, Erdoğan was expressing his opposition to ideological motivations intended to introduce religious regimes as well as the use of religious symbols for these purposes. The JDP was for a conservatism modern and open to change, a change of evolutionary and gradualist type (Erdoğan, 2006: 333-337).

In similar terms, Gül was arguing that globalization was irresistible. Gül was expressing his belief in the possibility of local people to be modern and contemporary. (*Hürriyet*, 12 July 2001). Despite all the reforms adopted by the VP,

Gül was still critical of VP policies. According to Gül, there was not any contribution of religious politics to religious people and Turkey. Political parties were not instruments of teaching and spreading religion. Gül was considering himself and Erdoğan as more rational, realist and modern. Dervish lodge like party concept where the people put off their shoes in front of its door had to be changed (Sazak, 27 August 2001).

As it was specified by the party and leading deputies, the goal of the new party was to normalize Turkish political life. The new movement would not organize on the base and axis of a political mentality highlighting religion and religious figures, and addressing to religious feelings and beliefs. Priority would be given to economic concerns like economic stability, economic growth, unemployment, free market regulations, sustainable development, distributive justice, integration with the contemporary world as well as to those of others like education, health and social security. The party would not make politics according to ready economic packages like Just Order and National View but would implement dynamic and renewable economic policies within the framework of free market economic system. Turban and issues of that kind which were likely to generate conflicts and polarization would not be used as political tools and they would be handled in the context of the provisions of democracy, human rights and rule of law. The new movement would not try to fight with the regime (Bila, 15 July 2001; Abdullah Gül Hükümeti, 23 November 2002; AK Parti, 16 November 2002; *Milliyet*, 22 November 2002).

5.4.3.4.1. Globalizing Trends in JDP's View of Secularism

A list of papers, booklets and brochures prepared by JDP deputies and supporters provide us with sufficient resources to find out the change in the secularist approach of the party and the impact of globalization in this process.[3] In Project Turkey, it was indicated that no state could be established on religious grounds in our day. That was a necessity of modernity. Secularization was one of the most important aspects of political modernization to which the JDP was loyal much as any other party. An attempt to deny secularism would render the JDP out of date and hinder it from stepping up with the contemporary world. It was not possible for a non-secular state to gain legitimacy in domestic and international political arena. As a part of its membership to the contemporary world, the JDP was supporting the idea that religion had to be relegated to the observance of the matters of the other world while the state had to be responsible for the management of the material world that we live in. Religion had to refrain from attempts to develop political goals and demands while the state was also supposed to stay away from making impositions on the religion. For this reason, political parties and state authorities had to abandon acting and talking on behalf of religion (Project Turkey cited in Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001: 238-243).

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[3] The list of the resources include Türkiye Projesi (Project Turkey), Milli Siyasi Manifesto (National Political Manifesto), Gebze Program Taslağı (Gebze Program Draft) and JDP Party Program. Parts of these documents where the secularist view of the JDP is stated can also be found in Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001: 236-244.

In this context, the JDP was drawing attention to the undesirable consequences of real and potential attacks by the religion and the state towards the domain of the other. While it was possible for the state to make attempts to establish control and domination over the religion by restricting the rights and freedoms of the people for belief, conscience and worshipping; there were many examples to the employment of religious institution as a tool for oppression, discrimination and suppression particularly over those who don't believe in the dominant religion (Metin et. al.; Gebze Program Draft cited in Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001: 243-244).

For this reason, secularism was regarded by the party as a guarantee against religious and political oppressions, as one of the most important institutions of democratic government, human rights and rule of law. Secularism was an essential JDP goal for it was the guarantee of freedom of belief, religion, conscience, expression and organization. The party was expressing its resolution to avoid using religion, religious symbols or slogans for political purposes and its motivation to develop the concept of secularism in Turkey to the level of universal standards (JDP Party Program; Gebze Program Draft).

5.4.3.4.2. Impact of Globalization in JDP's Foreign Policy

In foreign policy, the JDP has drawn attention with greater harmony with and participation to processes of globalization compared to its predecessors with its more systematic, pragmatist, embedded and determined approach. While this was the

product of a thinking which saw globalization as an inevitable phenomenon absorbing all the actors that it comes to contact with into its mechanisms and structures, it was also related with a belief that globalization was essentially good and conducive to the interests of those who agree to cooperate with it. Great advances in science, technology, communication and transportation were erasing national borders and bringing the societies closer together to establish linkages of sympathy, understanding, interest, interdependence, cooperation and integration. Traditional and spiritual values were compelled to scale down their reach to various domains of human life and, in fact, a careful examination would show that they were not against with global values, principles and processes (Gül, 2007: 49, 444; Abdullah Gül Government, 23 November 2002). According to Erdoğan, Turkish society wanted to adopt "a concept of modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief of universalism that accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not disregard the spiritual meaning of the life" (Erdoğan, 2006: 335). And Gül was similarly saying that "We were to prove that a Muslim society is capable of changing and renovating itself, attaining contemporary standards, while preserving its values, traditions and identity" (Gül, 2007: 37).

In this context, the JDP has acquired fame with the frequent emphasis that it put on the importance of global political, economic and social norms and principles which include democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, transparency, accountability, gender equality, regional and global peace, prosperity, market economy and trade liberalization (Gül, 2007: 33, 49; Abdullah Gül Government, 23 November 2002; JDP Party Program). These were the set of superb and gainly values

that had to be adopted and respected by all world countries. These norms and principles were also the part of a global political culture uniting the contemporary world in regional, international and bilateral organizations and motivating them to act in cooperation and partnership in serve to its spread and settlement over the world (Gül, 2007: 39, 50, 87; Aras and Görener, 2010: 84; Kalın, 2010: 100-101). The JDP's agreement with globalization was such that the interests and the well-being of the country were identified as parallel to global interests (JDP Party Program).

Multilateralism has been an important aspect of JDP's foreign policy. As it is often stated, the states are encouraged to cooperation and partnership for purposes of political and economic development, but also to bring effective solutions to a growing type of global problems (Davutoğlu, 2004; Gül, 2007: 40, 77, 84; Aras, 2009; Metin et. al). The list of those problems, as they are enumerated by JDP deputies, include terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, environmental disasters, organized crime, drug trafficking, human trade etc. and they could best be dealt with cooperation and partnership at an international level for which the party was long ready and eager (Gül, 2007: 48, 77).

The JDP was declared to give special importance to Turkey's relations with the leading global actor USA, for these reasons. While preserving the level of military alliance between two countries expressed in the membership of two countries to NATO and their partnership during the Korean War and the Cold War, there was a pressing need to improve the ties with closer relations in political, diplomatic and economic domains too (Gül, 2007: 24, 39; JDP Party Program; *Zaman*, 15 August

2002; Kohen, 3 November 2002). Two countries shared in their adoption of global political and economic norms and principles at home, but they were supposed to join in an international coalition for their spread and settlement in the world too, and particularly in the Middle East and Eurasia (Gül, 2007: 112, 408-410; *Zaman*, 16 July 2001). Political and economic development was a right for world societies much as it was a necessity. This policy line would also contribute to Turkey's domestic prospects too for the JDP deputies tended to deem development as a regional and global phenomenon that would be facilitated substantially in a favorable and hospitable environment. JDP was motivated to preserve the existing tone of relations between two countries also because of the expected contribution of the US-based IMF and the World Bank to Turkey's domestic economic problems as two leading global debtors and creditors (Gül, 2007: 405).

In the Middle East, a major goal of the JDP was to assist the introduction of various political reforms for more democratic, accountable and transparent regimes where the values and principles of human rights, rule of law, good governance, gender equality and free market economies are commonly accepted and implemented (Gül, 2007: 92, 416; Bila, 3 June 2003; *Milliyet*, 29 May and 2 June 2003). JDP was pleased to serve as a model country for these purposes with its advanced structures and was ready to cooperate with international coalitions sharing the same motivations with it. (Aras and Karakaya-Polat, 2007: 478) The solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was another important goal for the JDP. The party was in support of the implementation of the Road Map prepared by leading global actors which included UN, EU, US and Russia. The party was also willing to play a

mediator role in the process by bringing the actors together and trying to persuade them to negotiation. As a country which had good relations with both countries, Turkey's peace-facilitating potential was remarkable. The JDP was observing a domestic, regional and global interest in the termination of Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Gül, 2007: 79, 443; Aras and Görener, 2010: 85-86).

In Cyprus, lastly, the JDP was for reaching a just and permanent solution to the problem. The JDP had initiated a number of schemes for this purpose and the party was in full support of the peace plan prepared by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Gül, 2007: 93, 102).

5.5 Europeanization

Europeanization could be distinguished as a regulated institution of globalization that aims to inhibit vagaries and inexpediencies of globalization in a particular European geography within the extraordinary institutional structure of the European Union. It essentially promotes the values and principles spreading with globalization such as market economies, democracy, rule of law, human rights, intergovernmental collectivism as well as individual, group and gender rights and freedoms; but compared to globalization its relations with member states are more comprehensive, formalized, diplomatic, legal and strict with its specialized organs, decision-making processes, conditionalities and problem-solving mechanisms (Risse et. al., 2001: 3-4).

Risse et. al. interpret Europeanization in abstract as the development and emergence of European type distinct structures of governance on domestic legal, political and social structures of states which try to expand their Europeanness beyond a concept of geographical membership. (Risse et. al., 2001: 3). It could also be described as a process of institution building at European level. The most important agent of Europeanization appears to be the European Union, but it could also take place without any direct links with EU too through participation in other European legal, political and economic international organizations as well as through bilateral relations with individual states. Not only the member states, but also the candidate states are impelled by pressures of Europeanization like in case of Turkey which is conditioned to introduce a long list of reforms that it needs to implement before it becomes a member (Grigoriadis, 2009: 6-7; Diez et al., 2005: 2-7).

Börzel and Risse analyze the process of Europeanization at three different dimensions that include policies, politics and polity. Elements of Europeanization in policy dimension include adoption of European standards, instruments, problem-solving approaches, policy narratives and discourses. In the domain of politics, Europeanization is associated with the emergence of European processes of interest formation, interest aggregation, interest representation and public discourses. And at polity level, Europeanization is traced in the development of European public discourses, intergovernmental relations, judicial structures, public administration, state traditions, economic institutions, state-society relations and collective identities (Börzel and Risse, 2003; also in Matei and Matei).

Europeanization is a process that all the European states are affected to some extent. For many states, questions circulate around its depth, scale, direction, time and pace (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). What is common for all the countries in the process of Europeanization is that it accompanies a set of adaptive pressures that require the states aspiring to be European to introduce some changes and reforms in their domestic structures. Whether a country is able to comply with adaptive pressures is argued to depend on the goodness of fit between European and domestic structures, i.e., whether the domestic structures of the countries bear remarkable similarities with European rules, norms and practices (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Diez et al., 2005: 3-4).

It is hypothesized that the success of Europeanization for a country is closely associated with the nature of a list of mediating factors. These factors include the number of veto points in domestic structures, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and policy-making cultures, differential empowerment and learning (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Existence of multiple veto points in the decision-making processes of a country, first, is foreseen to obstruct the process as the political authority will be shared among a plenty of actors and a consensus or a winning coalition will be needed to rule affirmative decisions (Tsebelis, 1995). Facilitating domestic formal institutions, secondly, which might be ideational similarities or material resources that could be mobilized for the purpose, help establish rapid linkages with European institutions and accelerate the process (Caporaso and Jupille, 2001). If there is a tradition of decision-making on the base of consensus and cooperation in a country as a part of its political and organizational culture, thirdly, Europeanization will be more simple and peaceful for it will be much easier to make decisions in these type of societies

(Katzenstein, 1984). Fourthly, Europeanization could be facilitated by the support of a group of domestic actors who expect to have greater power resources with a process of redistribution of powers instigated by Europeanization. And finally, a process of political socialization towards the adoption of European norms and values experienced by various domestic actors could serve as an important agent supporting Europeanization.

Börzel and Risse contend that adaptive pressures imposed by Europeanization could meet with a number of reactions from the member states the types of which may include absorption, accommodation and transformation (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Member states can absorb European policies and ideas into their domestic structures when there is a high degree of fitness of good between European and domestic structures which does not require a substantial change in domestic structures. The pressures of Europeanization could be met with policies of accommodation too when there is substantial commonalities between European and domestic structures though they may not be in perfect harmony like in case of absorption. In this case, European policies and institutions could be entrained to existing ones with a modest degree of change (Héritier, 1996). The member countries could tend to transform their domestic policies, processes and institutions into substantially different European ones when there are substantial disharmonies between the two. In this case, the essential features and underlying collective understandings will be subject to change under adaptive pressures.

5.6 Europeanization as a Moderating Power on Islamic Politics in Turkey

It will be far from error to say that Turkey's process of Europeanization has contributed substantially to the erosion of the religious conservative vision of Turkish religious right. The adaptive pressures applied by the EU in form of demands for reform and *acquis communautaire* have been very influential in motivating the religious right to drop Islamic political ideals in favor of the adoption of global and universal political norms and values which include liberal democracy, human rights, gender rights, rule of law and secularism. The Justice and Development Party governments have demonstrated a remarkable resolution in adopting and implementing EU reforms through successive harmonization packages to the extent of imprinting them into the list of major goals that the party aims to achieve (Özbudun, 2007).

One of the most important reasons for the pro-EU turn of Turkish religious right is that it deems Europeanization as an inevitable phenomenon that Turkey has to join without delay for the fulfillment of the objectives of development and progress. The religious right has reached to an awareness that Turkey's EU membership will contribute substantially to its economic, political, social, scientific and technological development (Gül, 2007: 93; *Zaman*, 3 March 2002). The traditional foreign policy perspective of looking at the world from glasses of Muslims and non-Muslims had to be dismissed with all its remnants, for this reason, as well as the longing for introducing an Islamic state and society in their classical meanings. The signs of this paradigmatic change were very public during the Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition government and even before that when very material steps were taken for Turkey's

integration with the EU and the west. Erbakan, for instance, was expressing his support for Turkey's signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 with expected contributions of the agreement to Turkey's economic development (*Milliyet*, 30 December 1995).

Another important theme in the context is that the religious right in Turkey has experienced a process of learning by which they have come to appreciate the contemporary legal and political norms originating from the west (*Zaman*, 16 July 2001). A list of political reforms were introduced by successive JDP governments in line with EU conditions in areas of democracy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality, free market, civil society, transparency, good governance etc. with declarations that they were indeed the part of advanced, universal and superb European norms and values that had to be adopted by any country (Gül, 2007: 37, 49). Reforms were implemented not because they were imposed, but because the JDP had belief in their virtue and necessity. It was believed that EU was not standing for a common religion but for common values and institutions. Turkey was thus supposed to strengthen its ties with the west through greater integration (Gül, 2007: 29, 31, 247; *Milliyet*, 3 November 2002). Turkey's EU membership would even be advantageous for the JDP for it would introduce various freedoms in sociopolitical life Particularly on issues of headscarf, Imam-Hatip schools and religious education, a great deal of progress for freedoms was promised with the reforms (Usul, 2008: 179-180; Tocci, 2005: 80). Turkey's integration with the EU was warranted also because of the necessity to deal more effectively with an increasing set of trans-border concerns and problems like

international terrorism, illegal narcotics trade, smuggling, human trade, organized crime, epidemics, poverty and environmental disasters (Gül, 2007: 229-230).

This learning process concurs with the propositions of the theory of sociological institutionalism par excellence offered to explain the type of domestic changes that countries experience under Europeanization pressures. According to the theory of sociological institutionalism, Europeanization is closely associated with the emergence of new norms, practices and social structures of countries bidding to be a member of the advanced |European society (Börzel and Risse, 2003). The theory offers two themes seminal for our purposes here. Firstly, it suggests that domestic institutions develop similarities with European institutions as a product of interaction, exposition and communication in their formal organizational structures, principles of resource allocation, norms and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). And secondly, Europeanization leads to a process of socialization by which the domestic actors internalize superb European norms and rules so that they can become members of the European society in a good standing. Through the processes of arguing, deliberation, persuasion and social learning, actors are socialized into new norms and rules of appropriateness and they tend to redefine their interests and identities accordingly (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Checkel, 2005).

While appreciating European values, it was also expected by the religious right that the process of Europeanization would help break the tutelary powers of the Turkish armed forces in Turkish politics to bring it to its ideal space under the control of civilian authorities: The self-appointed role of the Turkish military as the guardians of

the regime, as its major legal excuse to intervene in politics, had to be mitigated (Gül, 2000; Heper, 2005: 223-24; Dağı, 2004: 143-147; Tocci, 2005: 80). The contempt of the JDP deputies concerning the political involvements of the army was expressed as follows in a newspaper by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan:

> When the political will generates a vacuum, an entity fills it in traditionally. The most powerful entity that can do this job is the Turkish Armed Forces… This was associated with the weaknesses of the politics, not that of the military… Today there is not a serious political crisis. There is a government in action which has taken 66 percent of the votes and the army agrees to return to its barracks. And so they are doing indeed. This was observed during the Özal period too (*Sabah*, 6 December 2002).

It is observed that the JDP government has been successful in its goal to curb the tutelary powers of Turkish Armed Forces in various executive, legislative and judiciary processes through successive harmonization packages that aimed to bring civil-military relations in Turkey to European standards. One of the most important changes introduced by the JDP government was about the role, status, composition and powers of the National Security Council (NSC). The harmonization packages increased the civilian members of the Council from five to nine as a result of which the military members lost their majority status in the Council. An emphasis is put on the advisory character of the Council by also reducing the degree of priority that the NSC advisory decisions are to be given. The frequency of NSC meeting is reduced from once a month to once in every two months. The office of the council secretary general is transferred from the military to a civilian member. To a lesser extent of importance, the NSC's Secretary General representative is taken out of the Censure Board – RTUK to enable a greater space for freedom of expression (Özbudun, 2007: 193-194; Müftülüer-Baç, 2005: 27).

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, two concepts were taken under scrutiny, i.e., globalization and Europeanization with regard to their impact on the restructuring of the policy/ideological formation of the Turkish religious right. Globalization, first, is explored to be a very potent transformative power which introduces tremendous changes in the sociopolitical and economic structures of the contemporary world. Identified in brief terms as internationalization, universalization, liberalization of world economies, political systems and socio-cultural structures, globalization is explored to be a very instrumental factor in the course of change Turkish religious right has undergone from what could be called a radical conservative to a moderatist liberal movement. Globalization is deemed to be influential in the process particularly by its production of a politically moderate, centrist and statist Islamic bourgeoisie and intellectuals, on one side, and by driving the movement into a process of political socialization in line with contemporary values, principles and institutions, on the other.

Europeanization, secondly, identified as a regulated institution of globalization promoting the same values and principles with it in a more formalized, legalistic and bureaucratic way, is observed to incorporate very potent transformative powers in domestic structures of countries trying to Europeanize with the adaptive pressures that it imposes. These adaptive pressures require, first and foremost, the implementation of various reforms by the countries on behalf of liberal democracy, rule of law,

human rights, secularism and market economy considered as the base of European values and principles. Europeanization has been effective in the moderation of the religious right for it was observed that the process would significantly facilitate Turkey's development in multiple domains. It would also provide the movement with powerful mechanisms against authoritarian reactions from the secularist establishment. But more importantly, the religious right was introduced to a learning process to come to believe that European values were indeed advanced, superior and high standard values which had to be adopted for their virtues before anything else.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE OF THE PARTY CHANGE: FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter is assigned to the exploration of the change in party program and poli-

cies of the Turkish religious right in its foreign policy vision from the National View

parties to the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AKP). The

National View parties of the 1970s, 80s and 90s display a strong similarity in their

adoption of a foreign policy view with substantial religious overtones which foresaw

the unity and integrity of Muslim nations, in one side, and minimization of relations

with the West on the other. The National View movement had a negative view of the

West, with a conception that it was heavily infused with elements of Judeo-Christian

traditions adversarial to Islam and Muslims. While it was necessary to maintain links

with the West for the import of science and technology, Turkey had to turn its face to

the Middle East for diplomatic, political, economic and social integration and coop-

eration.

The foreign policy line of the Justice and Development Party, however, is not based on a dichotomy of East-West described in cultural terms. The party deems all types of integration and links with the West as a precondition for Turkey's development and progress. It has the goal to further improve Turkey's ties with the West, with its campaign to establish deeper and firmer links with the UN, EU, NATO, or with individual states. Yet the party pledges to further develop Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern countries as well, for service to Turkey's national interests and for regional and global peace, but also as a part of Turkey's membership to a common historical and cultural legacy. Turkey's social and cultural ties with the East are not considered as an impediment to its relations with the West. The party assumes an assertively multilateral, multidimensional and pragmatic foreign policy vision aiming to minimize problems with neighbor states and believing in the significance of democracy, rule of law, human rights and other basic principles of universal rights and values as the parameters of Turkey's foreign policy orientation.

6.1. The National View Movement

6.1.1. The NOP, NSP and Welfare Party until 1990s

Before the establishment of the National Order Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in 1969, the religious right was finding place in the Democrat Party in the 1950s and the Justice Party in the 1960s. Advocates of the religious right had

been pretty active in right party cadres since the introduction of multiparty politics. The list of achievements they recorded, related to bringing religious freedoms and introduction of various policies with religious motivations, included the repeal of the penal code prohibiting the recitation of prayer calls in Arabic, removal of the ban on Pilgrimages, establishment of Imam-Hatip schools, introduction of voluntary religious courses in primary schools, permission for religious radio broadcasts, establishment of faculties of theology, and the provision of sanctuary and legal assistance to Said Nursi and his collections, among others (Cizre, 1996: 237; Yavuz, 2005: 90-91).

Necmettin Erbakan, who was elected as an independent parliamentarian from Konya in 1969, was finding the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel weak and insufficient in promoting the ideals of the religious right, and was thus motivated to establish a new party with an ambitious and challenging party program. To run a political campaign based on the promotion of national, moral and spiritual values, he established the National Order Party in 1969. The party was closed down after the 1971 military intervention on account of violating secularism, but it was reestablished under the name of National Salvation Party with almost the same party program and goals. The broader party organization and goals were promoted as in line with the National View Movement by the party leader.

The main goal of the movement in foreign policy was explained by Necmettin Erbakan as service to the institution of peace and justice among nations and strengthening Turkey's relations with its existing partners with a regional and global perspective.

The National View movement was in favor of instituting a stable, permanent, national, independent and honorable foreign policy for Turkey. In Turkey's foreign policy, development of relations with the Middle Eastern countries was given particular importance, with a view that such a policy would be in the best service of country's interests, and also that Turkey shared a common cultural and historical heritage with them (Erbakan, 1975a: 229-230; NOP Party Program: Articles 98, 100; NSP Party Program: Articles 41, 42, 43). The movement was generally opposed to Western states and international organizations. The West was believed to be motivated to promote its own interests and had an underlying agenda to occupy, exploit, and weaken the non-west.

The movement was against the improvement and deepening of relations with Western states and organizations on grounds of economic, political and social integration. Relations with the West were legitimate only in cases of the promotion of the notion of justice among nations and the exchange of science and technology. The West was intoxicated with imperialist, exploitative and expansionist goals. It was not possible for a Muslim civilization to benefit from the peculiarities presented by the West because they were preconditioned with membership to Judeo-Christian traditions.

6.1.1.1. The USA

Erbakan was highly cynical of US activism in the Muslim world. In his view, the USA was motivated with evangelical and imperialist goals in the Middle East. It was

trying to weaken Muslim nations with underlying intentions to exploit their natural resources. According to Erbakan, the entire Muslim world was victimized by this. In Bosnia, the USA and other Western actors had closed their eyes to the annihilation of tens of thousands of Muslims. A weapons embargo was imposed on Bosnia by the USA with the excuse that weapons imports would only exacerbate the ongoing conflict; the attempts of the Muslim world to aid the Bosnians were denied. In the Azeri-Armenian War in the 1990s, the USA was providing Armenians with logistics and weapons support from over Turkish air bases and harbors as well as through Operation Provide Comfort (Çekiç Güç) located in Northern Iraq with a self-helplessness of Turkish authorities. In Somalia, the USA was trying to capture rich oil fields as well as killing the local Muslims and trying to convert them to Christianity. In addition, the international coalition forces gathered in Somalia were used to oust the Islamic Sudanese government (Erbakan, 1993a: 71-77).

Erbakan was very critical of Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq too. US military presence in the region was no different than the PKK. Due to the food embargo and the bombardment of Iraqi cities, over fifty thousand people, many of them children, had died. The USA was also supporting PKK activism in the region to use as an excuse for extension of their stay in the region. The US embargo against Iraq required Turkey to stop the functioning of Kerkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline to the detriment of Turkey again, for a huge energy source and revenue gate was lost without any compensation. Operation Provide Comfort was a parallel rule over the regional states under the authority of America. It was a very destructive agent against Turkish sovereignty and independence, and had to be removed. This was also a part

of the National View's campaign of the institution of justice and right in international relations (Erbakan, 1993b: 86-87, 216-222; Dağı, 1998: 67-68).

The Welfare Party was against the US-led global economic enterprises of the IMF and the World Bank. They were considered as agents of US imperialism without power to repair the economic and financial problems of the countries, but only to weaken their sovereignty and independence. The countries were made dependent on the West with these international organizations. Turkey's cooperation with such organizations was producing the same effect, and attempts to further improve these ties would make Turkey a province and vassal of the West. Turkey could be a tool for the interests of other countries (Tekdal, 1985: 8-10).

6.1.1.2. The Customs Union and European Economic Community

The view of the movement on Turkey's bidding for entry into the Customs Union as a part of the European Economic Community was very much negative. It was because the European Economic Community was a Christian club and a contemporary version of Western imperialism (Erbakan, 1991: 11-14). Membership to the EU would be a betrayal to the glorious history and culture, which was built through a centuries-old struggle against the West and its ideology. The idea of a Customs Union was introduced in Roman Catholic Congress before the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome by three leading Catholic prime ministers of the time: De Gasperi, Schuman, and Adenauer. By uniting centuries of warring Christian states, the Community

would end bloodshed among Christians, provide them with a scheme for greater economic development, and in Turkey's case, it would weaken its economy and render it politically and economically dependent on the West. The agreement for the Customs Union would destroy Turkey's nascent industry before it was able to match with its European rivals. The major source of motivation to form the Community was the founding countries' membership in Judeo-Christian-Greek tradition, characterized by enmity against the Orient and the desire to conquer the Islamic civilization (Erbakan, 1975a: 235-250, 254-264; Erbakan, 1991: 90). Western international organizations were a set of concerted tools for the right of the mighty, for the exploitation of developing and poor countries. They were thus against Turkey's mission of civilization to institute justice and right among nations (Erbakan, 1991: 93).

There were some other pitfalls of the Community too. The European Economic Community was envisaging permanent membership for all countries, with an intention to melt all member countries in a single pot of European civilization in contradiction to Turkey's historical, cultural and social structure. The movement would not let Turkey melt in Christianity (Erbakan, 1975a: 235-250, 254-264). According to one scenario, the European Economic Community was an invention of the Jewish bourgeoisie, who wanted to reintegrate Germany into world economy to become an instrument for the development of Jewish capital. According to the Jewish intellectuals, the way to progress was through unity of European states with fluidity in borders and peace and stability among Christian states, so that they would easily be able to transfer funds and commodities across borders and protect their population from potential threats while also preparing the political and economic ground for the estab-

lishment of the Great Israel. For the National View, even the circulation of Jewish capital in itself was reprehensible because its major means of revenue were interest and exploitation (Erbakan, 1975a: 250-254).

6.1.1.3. The Cyprus Issue

The NSP was a coalition partner during the controversial Cyprus issue in 1974. The party was a stauncher defender of Turkish intervention on the island than any other party in the government and the parliament. According to Erbakan, the initiative of the coalition government was exemplary and the NSP was proud of taking part in the political process of the intervention. The operation was considered to be necessary to stop the bloodshed, massacres and oppressions that the neglected Turkish community suffered on the island for decades. The diplomatic cause after the intervention and the separation of the island would be pursued in international political champers accordingly. The National View was totally against a united Cyprus state. The ultimate solution was achieved with the intervention and the separation of the communities. This was the most viable strategy to inhibit further internecine killings. Erbakan was heavily opposed to the inclination of other parties to make a new negotiation, concession or rearrangement in the island (Erbakan, 1975a: 233-234; Erbakan, 1975b: 182-184; Erbakan, 1993a: 73-74).

6.1.1.4. Israel

The National View movement was highly critical of Israel since its early years. Israel was condemned due to its expansionist, oppressive and aggressive policies and goals. Israel was a source of regional and global threat that had to be stymied without letting it turn the world into an atmosphere of bloody chaos. The origins of the contemporary state of oppression at Israeli hands was very carefully planned by famous Zionists of the 19 century. The Jews would be settled in Palestine to use it as a base for expansion into the lands between the Nile and Euphrates. All the people and nations falling between these rivers would be taken under domination, deported and destroyed for the establishment of the Great Israel state (Erbakan, 1975a: 250-254; Erbakan, 1991: 201).

Though that dream was not likely to come true, Israel was doing all of these in the lands that it occupied in Palestine. The brother Palestinian people were subjected to decades of Israeli oppression, massacring, deporting, exiling, starvation and torture; most of them were forced to move to refugee camps in many countries all over the world. What was done in front of the eyes of the international community was unbelievable.

An equally important issue was the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and its declaration as the eternal capital of Israel in 1980. National View would never accept it, and when they would come to power, they would be the most active international actor working for the liberation of Jerusalem. To this end, they had succeeded in deposing

a Turkish minister of foreign affairs with an interpellation in the parliament when their demand to totally cut the relations with Israel was rejected by the government. The National View was heavily opposed to even the smallest level of diplomatic relationship with Israel. They were therefore very critical of a list of Turkish politicians such as Özal, Demirel, and Çiller, who were inclined to establish permanent and intimate relations with Israel (Dağı, 1998: 71-72).

The peace process initiated in various times was nothing more than a deception hiding Israeli goals of expanding further into Palestinian territories with new settlements and walls. The PLO was hopelessly expecting some returns from peace talks. National View was thus in support of Hamas, who were determined to resist Israel with armed means. National View was opposed to some Arab states such as Egypt, due to their cooperation with Israel, to the disappointment of the Palestinians and other Arab states determined to liberate Jerusalem and occupied territories. Islam was not to be exchanged for anything. The movement would defend the rights of these nations in international platforms in line with provisions of national and international protocols on human rights and freedoms (Erbakan, 1975a: 229-230; Dağı, 1998: 72-73; NOP Party Program: Articles 98, 99, 100; NSP Party Program: Articles 41, 42, 43; WP Party Program: Article 28).

6.1.1.5. Integration with the Muslim World

The National View foreign policy vision was characterized by opposition to the West in general, as explained above. Western states and their global institutions were typified by unity around Judeo-Christian values, and they tended to be imperialistic and exploitative in their relations to the non-west and particularly the Muslim world. It was thus a matter of reason for Turkey to turn its face to the Muslim world for development, and to add to its competitive capabilities against the baleful motivations of the West. Turkey had to lead to the establishment of an Islamic United Nations, Islamic Customs Union, Islamic currency, international Islamic military alliance, and accompanying social and cultural institutions of cooperation and solidarity. This would make Turkey great once again, as in the times of the Ottoman Empire. Initiatives had to be introduced for the achievement of this ambitious program, which was likely to take decades with gradual progress. This was the recipe for Turkey's economic, industrial and political progress (Erbakan, 1991: 35; Dağı, 1998: 74-80; Erbakan, 1975a: 165-270).

6.1.2. Welfare Party in Government

The Welfare Party emerged as the winning party of the December 1995 general elections, taking 21.37 percent of the votes. The WP was followed by the Motherland Party and the True Path Party, taking 19.65 percent and 19.18 percent of the votes, respectively. When the Welfare Party failed to establish a coalition, the Motherland

Party and the True Path Party agreed to establish a coalition government that would last three months only. Necmettin Erbakan was appointed again by President Süleyman Demirel to establish the government in June, 1996, and this time an agreement was reached with the True Path Party. According to the negotiation, Erbakan and Ciller would occupy the chair of premiership in turns for periods of two years, Erbakan being the first prime minister and the ministries to be distributed in-between. When the WP was introduced to the government, the party leadership had come to realize that it would not be able to pay strict loyalty to the traditional foreign policy discourse propagated in electoral campaigns and party programs. The party had met with some domestic, regional and global realities that compelled it to mitigate its radical foreign policy discourse in a number of areas (Tanıyıcı, 2003: 471-472).

6.1.2.1. Turkish-American Relations and the Operation Provide Comfort

One of these areas was Turkish-American relations and the status of Operation Provide Comfort. In February 1997, State Minister and WP foreign policy team deputy Abdullah Gül was organizing an official visit to USA together with State Minister Fehim Adak in search of dialogue. Upon his return, Gül was explaining his impression of the US view towards Turkey as very positive, unprejudiced and emphatic. Similarly, Necmettin Erbakan emphasized the need to establish an atmosphere of understanding and communication with the USA. The USA was recognized as a major global power, and Turkey had to execute its relations with it on the base of perceived reciprocal interests (Özcan, 1998: 184-185; Dağı, 1998: 101-102).

The policy adopted by the Party regarding the future of Operation Provide Comfort was also in flux. While in the opposition, the WP was heavily critical of the government for its cooperation with and assistance to Operation Provide Comfort, and always voted "no" in the extension votes of the Operation in Parliament. The Operation was against Turkish political, economic and regional interests. It was a campaign of terrorism against brother Iraqis and an agent of occupation rather than peace and relief. But when the WP joined the government, it was observed that it was not possible to drop the Operation at once, and that the cooperation had to continue with the USA. Therefore, the government agreed to extend the duration of Operation Provide Comfort for one more year. The electorate was calmed down with the explanation of the government that there would be no more extensions after this. The Operation was not abandoned after a year, however, but was retooled as Operation Northern Watch, active starting with January 1997. The latter operation did not include the ground mission of the former, and it was tasked with reconnaissance over Northern Iraq and with enforcing the no-fly zone above the 36 parallel (Dağı, 1998: 102-104; Özcan, 1998: 185-187).

A source of tension between the government and the USA were Erbakan's official visits to Iran and the signing of a natural gas pipeline project, valuing 20 billion USD. The project was agreed to after the passing of a decision in the US parliament for the application of various sanctions on countries conducting trade with Iran with volumes over 40 million USD. Iran was accused by the USA of sponsoring international terrorism. Against this, Prime Minister Erbakan responded by Turkey's will-

ingness to cooperate with USA in cases of Iranian terrorist involvements. But there would be no backing from the pipeline agreement (Dağı, 1998: 104).

6.1.2.2. The EU and Customs Union

Another WP foreign policy issue which underwent a substantial modification when it was submitted to the government was the view of the Party to Turkey's EU membership process and the Customs Union agreement. Turkey's economic interests were seen in the integration of the country with regional and global economic and political power blocs. There was indeed a sign of change in the view of the party as early as its establishment in 1985. The new party leader, Ahmet Tekdal, elected in place of Necmettin Erbakan due to his ban from politics, favored the possibility of Turkey becoming an EU member as long as it was to remain an economic entity ensuring equal rights and benefits to member states (Tekdal, 1985: 8-10). The change in the approach was also associated with the emphasis put on the process by the coalition partner, the True Path Party. The benefits of the Union were abundant as long as it did not violate Turkey's rights to sovereignty and national interests. For this reason, the WP gave its consent to the continuation of accession negotiations as agreed to by the1963 Ankara Agreement with the declaration of the 54th Government Program. The Party's view to the Customs Union agreement was also changing to parallel this (Tanıyıcı, 2003: 471-473). As explained by Necmettin Erbakan in a speech, the Welfare Party was in favor of the Customs Union because Turkish economy would attain a healthier structure with it. The Party was in support of developing economic rela-

tions with Western countries. Turkey had to be a part of the Customs Union with a healthy, powerful and competitive industry (*Zaman*, 30 December 1995).

6.1.2.3. Turkish-Israeli Relations

Another important issue on which the WP had difficulty following its party program once it joined the government was Turkish-Israeli relations. Contrary to traditional policy goals of the Party to minimize relations with Israel for the liberation of East Jerusalem and the establishment of the Palestinian state, relations were following a trend of development and deepening, which appeared in form of developing military, political and economic relations. The Turkish Armed Forces were the most important agent of this process, who had seen an interest in developing relations with Israel. For the military, Turkey's improving relations with Israel was more important than anything that Palestinians could provide. Israel was also considered as closer to Turkey in identity terms being modern and western as well as being troubled by the Arabs and victimized by terrorism. Israel would provide intelligence and combat technology against the PKK terrorism claimed to be originating from Syria, Iraq and Iran. It was also expected that Turkey's close ties with Israel would strengthen its relations with the USA (Robins, 2007: 299).

There was an ongoing protocol with Israel even before the establishment of the 54 Turkish Government. The trend continued at an intensifying pace with the introduction of the Welfare-True Path Government. The scale of military relations was very

broad, including weapons purchase, modernization projects, common military practices and trainings, and intelligence sharing. The WP was briefed by the Office of Chief of General Staff for the necessity of the protocols and there were not many chances for the Party to change the protocols except delaying the signing of agreements and the meetings with Israeli officials (Özcan, 1998: 189-191; Köni, 26 August 2010). Afterwards, Necmettin Erbakan's attitude with Israel was changed, and Turkey had to initiate greater economic relations with Israel. Accordingly, developing economic relations would not mean that the WP had changed its desire that Israel withdraw from the occupied lands.

6.2. JDP's Foreign Policy

The transformative effect of the above-mentioned variables on the formation of JDP foreign policy perspective has been much greater. The oppositional posture against cooperation and integration with Western political, economic and cultural institutions and search for their alternatives in the Islamic world has been totally abandoned. Turkey's cultural and historical ties with the Muslim world are respected, but the content of relations with the Middle East is augmented with a group of other political and economic concerns. While trying to carry out the mission of the earlier parties to develop political and economic relations with the Middle East, the JDP also serves as a representative of the West campaigning for the necessity to institute political and social reforms on behalf of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance in the region. Though the National View parties were not against such stand-

ards, they were more concerned with attaining Islamic ideals. Contrary to the denial of the National View to integrate with the West with a perception that the West was trying to undermine our existence, the JDP developed a vision of a world community with which Turkey has to establish rooted links in political, economic and diplomatic terms, let it be the UN, EU, NATO or individual states (Dağı, 2006: 92-93).

One of the most important intellectual architects of JDP's foreign policy vision based upon the background of these developments is a senior JDP foreign policy deputy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has been entrusted with various foreign policy missions since JDP's introduction to the government in 2002. Holding the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2009, Davutoğlu proposed a set of goals, styles and concerns to be adopted by the JDP Government in Turkey's relations with regional and global actors. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey had to resolve its problems with neighboring countries and global political powers to zero, and it had to work for maximum cooperation and understanding to bring solutions to lingering regional and global problems. Secondly, Turkey had to assume a multilateral and multidimensional foreign policy activism by bringing actors from state, interstate and sub-state levels into action, and functionally integrating all political, diplomatic, economic, social and legal goals and concerns. Thirdly, the notion of Turkey as the bridge between the East and the West had to be replaced by the idea of Turkey as a center country with the employment of its geopolitical, diplomatic, political and cultural assets. Turkey had to discover its potential power in its strategic location between Asia, Europe and Africa, and its inheritance of a common history and culture with the Middle East to become one of the leading global powers shaping world politics. Turkey's power sources

were giving it enough space to be considered as a major power that had to be taken into account in regional and global political economic processes. Turkey was also enabled with mechanisms and offices of mediation, negotiation and good offices to serve in the resolution of regional and global crises. Fourthly, Turkish foreign policy had to take into greater consideration such political and social issues as promoting democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms in addition to traditional foreign policy goals. Turkey was standing as a model country in the Middle East with its embodiment of tradition and modernity, religion and secularism in a democratic political system. Finally, Turkey had to adopt a rhythmic and dynamic foreign policy in its fragile environment to match up with its challenges and opportunities. To this end, Turkey had to enhance its role and activism in international organizations. These new perspectives in the view of the Turkish religious right have constituted the backbone of the JDP's foreign policy with slight modifications since 2002 (Davutoğlu, 2009a: 501; Davutoğlu, 2004; Aras, 2009; Aras and Görener, 2010: 82-86; Migdalovitz, 2010a: 2-4; Kalın, 2010: 98-101).

6.2.1. European Union

The AKP accepts contemporary legal and political paradigms like human rights, democracy and rule of law as universal values. Turkey's prospective membership to EU is considered as a great opportunity for domestic political, economic and social transformation. It was for this reason that the head of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had speedily set out for visits to political leaders of EU members soon after

the announcement of AKP's electoral victory in November 2002. It was declared by the party leadership that the priority of the party was not to bring an immediate solution to headscarf and Imam-Hatip schools issues, but rather to speed up Turkey's EU accession process. In his meeting with European leaders, Erdoğan voiced the importance his party attributes to EU membership and the willingness of his party to institute necessary reforms alongside the criteria formulated in Copenhagen 1993 European Council and Helsinki (1999) summits which urge respect for and promotion of democracy, human rights, rule of law, minority rights and a functioning market economy to match up with the competitive European economy. This conditionality was repeated at the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit. After the establishment of the government, the JDP passed one by one the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th harmonization packages in the assembly two per year until July 2004. Some of the reforms introduced include improvement of the powers of civilian bureaucracy vis-à-vis the state elites, abolition of the death penalty, abolition of State Security Courts, greater freedom of expression and greater rights for organization. The reforms have also brought various cultural and linguistic rights to Kurdish citizens for a constructive solution to the persistent Kurdish issue. The harmonization packages were assessed by an EU commission in October 2004 and Turkey was declared as a candidate to start the process of negotiations for full membership (Usul, 2006: 205-206; Duran, 2008: 87; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009: 8; Dağı, 2006: 97-100).

6.2.2. Cyprus

The JDP Government's strong campaign for Turkey's EU membership has brought some new controversies and developments in the Cyprus issue. The resolution of the Cyprus dispute was remaining the most important challenge standing in the way of membership, and the JDP was very eager to find a solution to the decades-old problem, even with a set of concessions granted by the Turkish community, which was standing as an obstacle on Turkey's road to development and modernization (Bagdonas, 2010: 239). The EU accepted Cyprus into the union together with 15 other new members with a process of negotiation led by the Greek Administration in the south. Being a member of the Customs Union, Turkey was urged by the EU Additional Protocol adopted on June 13 2005 to incorporate Cyprus in the Customs Union to indirectly make Turkey recognize the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey signed the Additional Protocol but added that the signing of the protocol did not mean the recognition of Republic of Cyprus as the representative of the entire Cyprus. The EU in return indicated that it recognizes only one state in the island, and that the protocol is a part of the Accession Partnership Document and Negotiating Framework ruled in October 2005 in Luxemburg. This view of the EU was repeated in the November 2005 Progress Report too. In January 2006, the JDP Government declared its Cyprus plan, according to which the additional protocol would be accepted only if the international isolation of Northern Cyprus was abandoned. It was indicated in the plan that an agreement would be reached thereto only if the following four criteria were accepted: the opening of Turkish harbors to Greek ships, opening of Northern Cyprus harbors

to international trade, supply of economic support to Northern Cyprus by the EU and execution of the entire process in the body of the UN (Usul, 2006: 209-215).

The Annan plan represents a very critical stage in negotiations. In case of the approval of the plan by both communities, a federal state of Cyprus would be established with a negotiation similar to the 1960 London and Zurich Agreements. The Annan plan foresaw the establishment of a Presidential Council of six members, two Turkish and four Greek, distributed proportionately to population. Three other non-voting members would be assigned according to population again. Secondly, the president and the vice-president would be selected by the Presidential Council, one from each community, to alternate in a period of five years. Thirdly, a bicameral legislature would be formed consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate would have 48 members, 24 from each community, and the Chamber of Deputies would have 48 members elected in proportion to the ethnical ratio of the population. Fourthly, a Supreme Court would be established with equal number of members from each community with an additional three foreign judges appointed by the Presidential Council (*Annan Plan*, Articles 5 and 6).

The plan was fully supported by the AKP. The plan was presented to the public on April 24 2004 in a referendum by both communities, with the result of 65 percent of yes votes by the Turkish community and 75 percent of no votes by the Greek community. In return for Northern Cyprus's approval of the plan and willingness for negotiation, the EU admitted the Regulations for Economic Assistance and Direct Trade for Northern Cyprus. But the economic assistance was not provided, due to the

opposition of the Greek community. The EU then offered Northern Cyprus to give Varoşa (Maraş) to Greek Cypriots, stop the sale of Greek Cypriot properties in the North, and agree to the common usage of the Famagusta (Magosa) harbor by both communities for the application of the Regulation, but the offer was rejected by Northern Cyprus. The issue of economic assistance was approved lastly by the EU Commission with a decision taken in June 2006. The JDP Government's determination for EU membership, its willingness to sit around the negotiation table for Cyprus for this matter, and its conciliatory attitude represents a very significant change in the course of the Turkish religious right. The JDP was still opposed by Turkish state elites, for it was viewed as inexperienced and naïve in promoting Turkey's rights and interests in the island. Accordingly, the JDP was showing agreement to a set of concessions that could have never been tolerated by the state elites nor by the real representatives of the Turkish community in the Island (Usul, 2006: 211-212; Robins, 2007: 297-298).

6.2.3. Turkish-American Relations

Relations between Turkey and the USA are most commonly identified as a strategic partnership that has changed little since the beginning of the Cold War. With the inauguration of the JDP government, the level and type of relations have been further developed, to be regarded as a "model partnership" by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu (*Today's Zaman*, 4 July 2009). Turkey's close ties with the USA were reaffirmed to carry on as during the Cold War and Post-Cold War for

global and regional security, order and stability, with its active membership to western security, political and economic community. Turkey would support US goals to promote political reforms in the Middle East for democracy, human rights, and rule of law, as well as assisting it in combating international terrorism, eradicating poverty and bringing a solution to Palestinian issue. The JDP had experienced an intimate transformation in adopting these abovementioned universal political values and principles to make them a priority cause compared to earlier National View parties. The agenda of cooperation and partnership appeared to be very broad with the USA. The JDP was first and foremost adopting US nomination of Turkey as a model country in the Middle East with its comparatively advanced political regime to unite democracy, secularism, Islam and modernity. Turkey would support with all its political and diplomatic means the US campaign to break down authoritarian traditions in the Middle East for the introduction of democratic regimes that respect human rights, rule of law, international peace and security (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 2006: 99-111; Oğuzlu, 2008: 9).

Partnership and cooperation would continue in line with Turkey's NATO membership, its deals with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as Turkey's goals to become a full member of the EU. The JDP government would support the US War in Afghanistan with its active participation in the coalition forces, and it would provide all other assistance to combat international terrorism, by which both countries were victimized. An agreement was reached to clean northern Iraq from PKK camps. Turkey would be provided with intelligence by the USA about PKK activism in Northern Iraq. The JDP's strong campaign for EU membership to make Turkey a part of

the West by raising its political, and legal standards was equally welcomed and supported by the USA to produce a greater sense of cooperation (Kalın, 2010: 102-107; Oğuzlu, 2008: 7-8; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009: 12-13).

Issues of the transfer of Caspian and Caucasian energy resources produced another avenue of cooperation and partnership between the countries. The two parties have been strident supporters of oil and natural gas pipeline projects passing from Turkey to the world markets. The issue was very important to break the global energy monopoly, to reduce the dependence of the neighboring countries on Russia, as well as to provide a scheme of energy diversity and security. The cooperation had started during the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to be maintained with the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, which would carry Azeri natural gas to the west (Kalın, 2010: 105)."

The relations have not been without problems, however. Turkey had not agreed to open its territory for the passage and settlement of American troops to open a northern front during the Iraqi war in 2003. The parliamentary bill did not pass the approval of the parliament as well as the president. bringing the relations to a period of cloudiness. Turkey was reluctant to support a US war against a Muslim country, especially if it had no support in international law. Another concern emerged after the start of the war, i.e., increasing PKK activism in Northern Iraq, an actor that benefited from the power vacuum to build up new terrorist camps and disturb the Turkish authorities and incite for trans-border operations. The USA was opposed to Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq under the pressure of the newly forming gov-

ernment as well as the Kurdish leaders in the north, producing tension in bilateral relations (Robins, 2007: 294-295; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009: 12-13; Oğuzlu, 2008: 8).

Another important issue that put a question mark on Turkish-American relations has been Turkey's diplomatic policies to institute close ties with Iran. Turkey regarded Iran as an important trade partner. The transfer of Iranian and Turkmen energy resources through Turkey would be an important revenue gate. But also, Turkey's relations with Iran was characterized with peace and stability for centuries, something which the JDP was not willing to change. The US resolution to apply sanctions to countries which have a volume of trade with Iran over 20 million USD was opposed by Turkey. The tension in relations was increased with Turkey's abstention from taking action against Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Turkey supported the Iranian claims that the enrichment program was solely for purposes of energy production, without having any plans to employ it in producing nuclear weapons. To this end, Turkey cast an abstaining vote during the IAEA voting on Iran in November 2009. The action was criticized by US authorities, and Turkey was urged to respect American concerns in the region (Migdalovitz, 2010a: 45-47; Oğuzlu, 2008: 9).

6.2.4. The Middle East

JDP's foreign policy goals and policies concerning the Middle East display a great deal of differences from those of the National View in style and content. Though some elements, such as the aspiration of being the leader country in the region, have

been saved, they have been expanded in a tremendous scale to turn into an almost absolutely different thing. The National View movement was motivated by an idea of promoting a single Middle East, united around traditional, cultural and historical commonalities rooted in Islam, to be led by Turkey and to counterbalance a conception of a united Christian west. The most remarkable change in this process has been the denial of the notion of East-West enmity based on cultural differences, which is now interpreted by the JDP as a source of dialogue, friendship and partnership. The content of JDP's foreign policy has been occupied with concerns of regional and global peace and prosperity, promotion of democratic, liberal and legal reforms, with a set of roles assigned to Turkey for these purposes.

Based on its geopolitical assets and historical links with the Middle East, the JDP has envisaged a leadership role for Turkey in the Middle East. This is deemed, on the one hand, as a necessity for our national interests if such issues as security, stability, energy etc. are taken into account in a regional and global perspective, but it is also because the JDP regards Turkey an integral part of the Middle East society, towards which it has some responsibilities. It was not reasonable for Turkey to turn its back to its history, culture, and, of course, religion. While developing its relations with the regional states by paying homage to these material and spiritual issues, the JDP has prepared a Middle East role for Turkey to serve as a protector and a mediator for the resolution of regional conflicts and clashes, to facilitate peace, security, stability, prosperity and economic development. In carrying out this duty, the JDP takes the international law and the norms as its base and pays attention to not putting Turkey into a state of tension with individual states and international organizations of the

west. Turkey is considered as a part of a global mission to carry out the above-mentioned goals. The JDP has also strongly supported the idea of a model Turkey in the Middle East with its ability to represent a balance between Islam, secularism, democracy and modernity. Turkey is portrayed as ready to serve as a spiritual and material power source, to fight elements of authoritarianism, backwardness and religious radicalism in the region (Aras, 2010: 82-86; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 133-134).

The AKP has also undertaken a mission to erase the signs of Islamophobia in the West, which has been particularly powerful after 9/11, events to serve as an agent of dialogue among religions, cultures and societies. Islamophobia is deemed as closely associated with reactions and attacks directed towards Muslims in the world in last ten years. For this reason, the party started a campaign and organized a 2007 International Islamophobia Conference in Istanbul, which was joined by leading scholars and policymakers from all around the world. The idea of Clash of Civilizations proposed by Samuel Huntington has been strongly opposed by the Party as a potential source of enmity and hatred among societies belonging to different religions, which could one day unexpectedly materialize in the form of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Thus, in order to combat the conflicts of religious origin and to promote friendship, dialogue and cooperation among nations belonging to different religions, cultures and civilizations, Turkey has been brought to the co-presidency of a UN Commission titled Alliance of Civilizations in 2005, together with Spain (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 2006: 109; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 164).

6.2.4.1. Iran

JDP has adopted the National View goal to institute close ties with the Muslim world, but this time the goal was implemented in a very pragmatist and interest-oriented way. The idea of cooperation and partnership with Middle East countries has been integrated into a wider concept of regional and global peace and prosperity not to harm Turkey's relations with the USA and the west in general. Major themes of Turkish-Iranian relations during the JDP government have been cooperation and partnership on issues of PKK terrorism, Iran's nuclear enrichment program, and production and transport of Iranian oil and gas. In line with the new foreign policy vision introduced by the JDP Government, Turkey is playing an important mediating and peace-building mission in Iran's relations with global powers.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish-Iranian relations were shadowed by Turkey's concern with the possibility of the spread of the Iranian revolution to its own territory. There was a growing literature on Iran's ambitions, plans and projects to export its revolution to Turkey. Iran was accused by the secularist chambers in Turkey of providing money, arms and propaganda to radical religious groups in Turkey (Mumcu, 1997). The participation of the Iranian Ambassador to the famous Sincan events, and his speech against the secularist principle of the republic, which sparked the 28 February Process and secularist campaign against Turkish religious right was at a time when the concerns were the highest. The relations were further harmed by claims that Iran was permitting PKK to use its own territory as headquarters and camps for their attacks on Turkey. Iran was, on the other hand, critical of Turkish

authorities for their provision of sanctuary to Mujahedeen al-Halq, an anti-regime organization aiming to overthrow the Khomeini regime in Iran, as well as Turkey's close ties with Israel and the USA. In 1999, Turkey organized a campaign against PKK camps in Iran's border towns, during which the two countries came to the brink of war. But the tension was soon recovered with the signing of a mutual security treaty (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 139-141).

The relations have shown a trend of increasing development since then. The two countries were equally opposed to the US war in Iraq. The claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was falsified, and attempts to legitimize the war with a campaign of democratization and fight against tyranny had proven too bloody, leading to the killings of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. Countries were thus encouraged to closer relations also to take part in the international coalition for the establishment of the new Iraqi state, as well as calling for the withdrawal of US forces. But a more important issue in the agenda has been Iran's nuclear enrichment controversy. Turkey has mostly been in support of Iran's nuclear enrichment program with the claim that the program is absolutely for peaceful purposes and that Iran does not have any goals of producing nuclear weapons. On a number of occasions, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has also been very critical of the international coalition against Iran's nuclear enrichment. Many of the countries that oppose Iran's nuclear energy production were indeed owners of nuclear weapons, hypocritically demanding that Iran give up establishing nuclear installations for peaceful purposes without any indication that they will ever give up their operational nuclear arsenal. An action had to be taken against Israel first which owned the biggest and only nuclear weap-

ons arsenal in the Middle East to threaten regional security and peace (Migdalovitz, 2010a: 18-20; *Press TV*, 19 May 2010).

While expressing their opposition to the international pressure on Iran, the JDP leadership is not, however, against the resolution of the conflict through diplomacy and peaceful means. The JDP government encourages Iran to work in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prove that its enrichment program is totally for peaceful purposes and that it does not have any motivations to produce nuclear weapons. For this reason, Turkey cast an abstaining vote on the IAEA resolution urging Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment, which is claimed that it runs in a secret facility. Turkey believes in Iran's readiness to respond to diplomatic efforts and opposes imposition of sanctions on Iran. Turkey plays a critical mediating role by meeting and visiting leaders of western campaign against a nuclear Iran as well as the Iranian officials (Davutoğlu, 2009b: 131-132; Migdalovitz, 2010; 20-23; Aras and Karakaya-Polat, 2007: 483-484).

Another important issue between the two countries is the development of Iranian natural gas fields and facilities, and construction of new pipelines for the transportation of Iranian energy sources to the West. The economic concerns of the Turkish officials are very strong as Turkey is an energy-poor country, and also because the use of the Turkish land for the transfer of resources will mean a stable revenue gate to encourage it to further develop relations with Iran despite the anti-Iranian international opposition. The volume of trade between the two countries rose from $1 billion in 2000 to over $10 billion in 2009. It is expected to increase many-fold in the

near future with increasing economic ties. As usual, the chief Turkish imports from Iran are oil, natural gas and related products. In 2001, the existing natural gas pipeline provided 17 percent of Turkey's gas import. In 2007, Turkey won a tender for the development of Iran's South Pars natural gas fields as well as a following pipeline project that would carry the amount of natural gas extracted. The pipeline would also carry Turkmen natural gas (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 141; Migdalovitz, 2010a: 23-24; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 133).

6.2.4.2. Syria

Turkish-Syrian relations were strained until the end of 1990s because of a number of reasons that include Syrian claims over Hatay, Turkey's South-eastern Anatolian Project and Syrian support for the PKK. Hatay was under French mandate after the First World War to gain its independence in 1938. In a referendum held in 1939, Hatay decided to join Turkey, which was opposed until recently by Syria, which claims that Turkey annexed the province with an invalid referendum. Turkey's Southeastern Anatolian Project, secondly, was a source of trouble in relations because of the Syrian claims that Turkey was cutting the trans-flow of water to lower countries. And finally, Turkey was condemning Syria for its overt support to PKK and its provision of sanctuary to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus. The two countries came to the brink of war in the late 1990s for these reasons. But the tension was relieved, with Abdullah Öcalan expelled from Syria and his capture in Kenya to represent a turning point in bilateral relations. In 1999, Turkey and Syria signed the

Adana Agreement, that involved the cooperation of two countries in security and military matters to become the first of a set of negotiations that included cooperation and partnership in many areas (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 142-143; Robins, 2007: 295).

In 2000, the first time in the history of bilateral relations, Turkish President Necdet Sezer organized an official visit to Syria to attend the funeral of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, to be followed by a number of other high-level visits by both sides. In 2004, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Bashar al-Assad in Damascus to sign a free trade agreement for the development of bilateral trade relations between the countries. Relations continued with increasing political, diplomatic and military ties in ensuing years. The volume of international trade between two countries amounted to $1.8 billion in 2009. A set of protocols were signed for the construction of a gas pipeline and cooperation of the two countries in the oil industry. The Turkish businessmen were also allowed to invest in Syria to benefit from cheaper labor and materials thanks to the improving relations. The two countries agreed in 2009 on the conduct of three joint military maneuvers. During the conduct of these maneuvers, defense ministers of the two countries visited the 9th International Defense Industry Fair held in Istanbul, and signed a letter of intent as a sign of cooperation in the defense industry. In May 2009, President Abdullah Gül went for another visit to Damascus with a delegate of Turkish ministers that included Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, after the invitation of Syrian President Assad in return for Assad's visit in 2007 to keep the bilateral relations at a lively pace (Sabiibrahimoğlu; 28 April 2009; Robins, 2007: 296; Migdalovitz, 2010a: 16-17).

6.2.4.3. Israel

Turkish-Israeli relations entered into an intensifying process of development in the 1990s in a very wide range of areas that stretched to as far as military partnership and cooperation. A list of military, political, economic and diplomatic agreements were reached of a nature not even seen among leading NATO members. In January 1994, Turkey signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Israel. It was followed by the signing of a Security and Intelligence Agreement in March 1994. In January 1995, another agreement was signed involving the training of Turkish special police forces and intelligence agents by Israel with their weapons and technical devices to be provided by Israel. The protocols signed in these years constituted the major framework of military and strategic relations between the two countries that involved Israeli supply of weapons and modernization of Turkish jets and tanks. The actor of these agreements on the Turkish side was most often the Turkish Armed Forces, which exploited a state of increasing control of political authority during the Erbakan-Çiller Government. The process was closely related with increasing PKK terrorism, and Syrian and alleged Iranian support of PKK, against which the army was compelled to take quick and effective measures. (Köni, 26 August 2010).

When introduced to the government, the JDP has not attempted to take the earlier National View ideas about Israel into action. Israel was recognized as an important regional actor, trade partner and military ally. It was one of the main foreign policy

goals of the party to bring a permanent peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel has of course been condemned for its human rights violations and military actions verging on genocide, but a belief has always remained in favor of the possibility of a solution to the conflict through diplomatic ways and negotiations led by the international community. The JDP has been very willing to form regional and international platforms to bring the leaders of conflicting communities together for peace and negotiation. Turkey is leading the development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian industrial park for prospective cooperation for peace between the parties. Before the holding of the Middle East Peace Conference in 2007 in Annapolis, Turkey invited the leaders of Israel and Palestine, Shimon Peres and Mahmud Abbas, to speak in the Turkish parliament before the resolution of the conflict. Turkey's mediating role was appreciated by all parties, and Turkey was invited to Annapolis as a party for the resolution of the conflict.

Yet the purposes of the JDP have most often been axed by Israel's dis-proportional measures against the Palestinians and extreme acts of human rights violations that induce them to cease their peace attempts. Turkey harshly condemned Israel's Gaza campaign in 2009, which ended up with over a thousand Palestinians being killed. In the World Economic Forum 2009 held in Davos, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his anger to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Perez during a live broadcast, which produced a sensational effect worldwide. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan requested more time to speak, he interrupted to say that Mr. Peres spoke too loudly to cover his guilt and said that he will never come to Davos again.

The most dramatic event in the history of bilateral relations came in 2010, with Israel's attack to Mavi Marmara, when a group of civil society organizations headed to Gaza to break Israel's Gaza blockade. The events leading to the killing of eight Turkish and one Turkish-American activist represented the most terrible diplomatic and political crisis between the two countries. Turkey immediately summoned its Ambassador to Israel and closed the embassy in Tel Aviv. The Turkish President, Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed their deep concerns and revulsion about the Israeli violation of the Law of Sea and their attacks on aid volunteers. Israel's actions were widely condemned by the UN, EU and other global and regional actors too. Upon the events, Turkey declared that earlier military agreements for Israel's use of Turkish air space and for the conduct of joint military exercise are cancelled (Migdalovitz, 2010b).

Turkish-Israeli relations does not seem be going to recover in the near future. Israel does not wish to apologize for Flotilla attacks. And Turkey will not agree to normalize the relations until Israel changes its attitude. Israel's humanitarian aid attempt for the victims of Van earthquake has been rejected by the Turkish authorities for a period of time (*CNN Turk*, 26 October 2011). Another problem has surfaced with the united attempt of Israel and Cyprus for oil and natural gas exploration attempts in the south of the island after the signing of a bilateral agreement on the borders of an exclusive economic zone in-between. Turkish-Israeli relations are in a process of further soaring with the cancellation of various military agreements and protocols signed in the late 1990s.

6.2.5. Elements of Rupture in JDP's Foreign Policy Activism

The most recent literature points out that the JDP is experiencing a degree of change in its foreign policy style and content from a multidimensional and conciliatory focus to an independent and assertive one. This has been especially the case in Turkish-American relations and the EU process (Öniş, 2011: 49-53). The decline in tone of Turkish-American relations has been mentioned in above section under the topics of Turkey's reluctance to support the coalition forces in Iraq, US opposition to Turkey's cross-border operations in Northern Iraq against PKK forces, Turkey's close ties with Iran and support for Iran's nuclear enrichment program which is believed to be for peaceful purposes, as well as Turkey's intentions to establish close relations with Syria.

Another rupture in the JDP's foreign policy orientation has been the loss of momentum in Turkey's EU accession process. The JDP government has particularly been disillusioned with EU's insistence on the unification of Cyprus at any cost as a condition of the continuation of accession talks. The support of the Cyprus Turks for the Annan Plan was not appreciated. The JDP Government has also been disturbed with offers of privileged membership and pressures to accept the notion of Armenian genocide (Oğuzlu, 2008: 12-13).

6.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to elucidate the major changes in the policies and goals of the Turkish religious right in the area of foreign policy from the National View parties of the National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party and the Felicity Party to the Justice and Development Party. The major change in the foreign policy orientation of the party is explored in the shift from a predominantly cultural to a pragmatist and rational attitude. The National View parties had a vision of dichotomy between the East and the West. The East belonged to the Islamic civilization and the West was shaped by Judeo-Christian traditions for centuries, and the history of the world was written over an adversarial competition between these two poles. The West was driven by the will to exploit and weaken its adversary. The East, on the other hand, had a mission of civilization rooted in its Islamic heritage and exemplified in the history of Islamic states that did not foresee the annihilation of the non-Islamic nor the economic exploitation of the non-Islamic. It was a necessity of reason for Turkey to minimize its political links with western international organizations and actors such as the UN, EU, IMF, World Bank, USA and Israel, and turn its face to the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Turkey had to lead the formation of alternative international organizations and entities in the Middle East as a source of power and development.

The foreign policy vision of the Justice and Development Party is formed on substantially different premises than those of the National View movement. The notion of East-West dichotomy is abandoned in favor of a Turkey that has strong ties with the

East and the West at the same time. The foreign policy decision-making team of the AKP sees Turkey's interests in cooperative relations with the West and the East. The role of religion is minimized in shaping Turkey's relations with its neighbors and global actors. The party deems democracy, human rights, and rule of law as universal values of humanity, with their origins in the West and therefore it is strongly in favor of Turkey's membership to the EU, its active role in the UN and close relations with the USA and other global actors. The agenda of the AKP Government's foreign policy is occupied with all security, political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, social and cultural concerns that lead Turkey to pursue a multidimensional, multipartite, peaceful and dynamic policy in world politics. The AKP government's relations with the Middle East are indeed even more developed than the Welfare Party envisioned. Turkey's powerful economy, stable political system, and secular democracy have been instrumental in its portrayal as a model country in the Middle East by the USA and the EU. With its pacific and conciliatory attitude and its close relations with Iran, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Israel, the AKP Government is also an often solicited office of mediation for peace talks and negotiations in the Middle East.

CHAPTER VII

NATURE OF THE PARTY CHANGE: RELIGION AND SECULARISM

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the transformation of Turkish religious right from National View parties of 1970s, 1980s and 1090s to the Justice and Development Party (JDP) of post-28 February Process in its perspective to matters of religion and secularism. The research has shown that there is a remarkable change in the orientation of the religious right in its view to religious politics in the sense that while the National View parties interpreted religion as one of the major components of their social, political and economic policy goals, JDP's relationship with religion has been relatively limited. In the case of the National View movement, the limits of religious politics has ranged between a concept of Islam as a type of belief taken under guarantee with secularist principle of the Constitution, to Islam as a source of major political action. The aspects of party goals related with freedom of belief, conscience and religion were described in detail in party programs and publications. The movement became an object of opposition originating from the secularist establishment because of some provocative speeches by its members inviting the establish-

ment of an Islamic sharia regime as well as because of certain governmental and municipal policies adapted by party deputies involving application of some Islamic norms in public places.

Established by a group of breakaway party members from the Welfare and later Virtue Party, the JDP declares its dissociation from the idea of Islamic sharia regime and jihadism. The JDP manifests its respect for and loyalty to modern and universal political, legal, social and economic institutions inherited from the west. As a part of its conservative roots, the JDP has been running an ambitious campaign for headscarf freedom, Imam-Hatip schools and Quran Courses. But the JDP pursues its goals for these freedoms and rights as it is believed that they are given as a product of Turkey's membership to some universal values and principles of political conduct such as democracy, human rights and secularism.

7.1. National View Movement

The National View parties of National Order Party, National Salvation Party and Welfare Party were the leading actors of Turkish religious right from 1970s to late 1990s. The limits of National View's religious politics stretched between a concept of social and cultural representation of Islam to a political campaign for the reformation of legal, economic, educational and administrative aspects of public life according to religious beliefs and norms. This radical tendency in one extreme of this religious politics was manifested in certain speeches, policies and electoral cam-

paigns of the party members with their calls for the establishment of an Islamic sha-
ria regime and organization of Jihad for this matter. Successive parties of the move-
ment were thus brought to the court case with accusations of violating the secularist
principle and threatening to bring down the state.

7.1.1. Secularism in National View

The National View had a very critical stance towards secularist interpretations and
practices of the state elites in Turkey. A regime of oppression was ruling in Turkey
under the guise of secularism. While secularism was supposed to serve as a guaran-
tee for freedom of belief and religion, right to religious education and the separation
of religion and state; the secularist practices in Turkey were exhibiting the opposite
tendency. There were many examples to this. For instance, the women who wore
headscarf in their photos were not issued passport. A sizable number of Prayer Lead-
er and Preacher Schools built since 1982 were not opened to education though there
was a huge demand from the people. There were many obstacles against going on
Pilgrimage. Road transportation to Saudi Arabia was not permitted. Only travel via
airways was permitted and it was made very expensive during the Pilgrimage season.
In a secular democratic state, people were endowed with rights of freedom of expres-
sion, education, organization and of the abilities to live and pray according to reli-
gion. It was not possible to talk about a guarantee of human rights in a complete and
modern sense in Turkey (Erbakan, 1994: 78-83; NOP Party Program: Article 6; Er-
bakan, 1975a: 49-56; WP Party Program: Article 4; Öniş, 1997: 754).

Turkey was one of the two countries in the world where the word secularism was cited in the constitution, the other one being France. Many western countries included clauses on official religion of the state in their constitutions. Turkish secularism was a very cheap imitation of the West which never gave the right of the principle. Turkish secularism was characterized as Byzantinism by Necmettin Erbakan according to which the religion and belief was transferred under the control of the state while they had to stay in separation. It was a source of resentment for the pious to be administered by a non-religious body of institutions. What was done on behalf of secularism was indeed a violation of a basic democratic principle where the people were supposed to benefit from basic rights and liberties let them be about religion, thought or anything else. It was a goal of the National View movement to introduce reforms for a clear definition of secularism that would not leave any space for misinterpretations and erroneous policies (Erbakan, 1994: 78-83; Erbakan, 1975b: 153-155).

To this end, the Welfare Party prepared a constitutional amendment negotiation proposal where a set of very fundamental changes were offered regarding the articles of secularism in the constitution. In the proposal, a multiple system of law was offered that incorporated a secular and a religious law in its fabric. It was considered as a basic human right to have a multiple system of law (Refah Partisi: 4). The word secular (laik) in Article 2 of the Constitution was to be removed and the concept of secularism described in Article 24 was to be replaced with a softer interpretation of secularism that included the freedoms of expressing, promulgating, learning and

teaching religious beliefs and views as well as organizing, living and praying according to religious beliefs (Refah Partisi: 70, 79). The Article 4 of the Constitution prohibiting the amendment of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution – which describes the form and characteristics of the state among which secularism and republicanism is most important for our purposes – as well as any proposals for their amendment, was to be removed (Refah Partisi: 71). And finally, the provision in Article 24 prohibiting the establishment of social, economic, political or legal order of the state on religious basis, in part or whole, was also to be amended (Refah Partisi: 79-80; Saybaşılı, 1998: 40-43).

The National View was against the provision on religious exploitation too incorporated in article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code. This article was based on an assumption that people were ignorant and very open to manipulation without any ability to reason and make choices. Everybody had to have the right to express their thoughts and to listen to the views of others no matter what they could be. And they had to be free with their independent choices too. This provision of the Penal Code was in contradiction with the constitutional rights of the citizens to freedom of thought and expression (Erbakan, 1975a: 54-56). Secularism understood this way was respected as a prerequisite of the democracy which was in fact an important goal of the movement to realize. People had extensive social and political rights in liberal democracies. The state was to be minimized to the execution of some essential goods and services only. State mechanisms would not necessarily have any rights to impose a particular ideology over its people, neither materialist nor spiritual.

The movement was opposed to the traditional secularist view portraying Islam as a reactionary force against science and reason for which it had to be cast out of political and social life. Islam was indeed in the origins of the material and spiritual sciences both. Many of modern sciences and areas of knowledge like astronomy, physics, chemistry, mathematics, medicine, history and geography had been developed by Muslim scholars of the Middle Age. The sciences inherited from the ancient Egypt, India, Greece were translated, studied, advanced and systematized by the Muslim world to be exported to the West through various channels of interaction. Contrary to the idea that religion promoted ignorance and backwardness, religion was indeed the source of material and spiritual perfection. Religion was the way for prosperity (Erbakan, 1975a: 67-82; Erbakan, 2006: 15-20).

7.1.2. Education

The party attached a great importance to religion in all levels of education. The essentials of party goals related with religion and morality included the following: Removal of elements of materialist education to be replaced by a moral, acceptable and pragmatist educational curriculum, attachment of greater importance to courses of religion and morality, expansion of the number and type of Imam-Hatip schools, establishment of more and much developed religious faculties and graduate schools. The movement would campaign to

> bring up new generations who are proud of their great and glorious history, loyal to their past, preserving their traditions and customs with respect and faithfulness, devoid of all types of imitation, aware of their national character

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and always bearing the consciousness of belief and determination to do better than the day before (Erbakan, 1975a: 92-93).

The educational system in Turkey was materialist. Particularly in sociology and psychology lessons, the students were exposed to a heavy atheist and anti-religious learning: The origins of the man were traced to the apes. There was not anything as religion. It was produced by the men who were fearful of the natural events such as fires, floods, earthquakes for which they had started to pray the powerful and destructive objects around. Kaaba was initially an imitation of ancient Greek tradition who were filling in the Acropolis with the idols that they were worshipping. And the emergence of the faith in oneness of the God was a product of social evolution from these traditions. For the National View, these teachings had nothing to do with science and reality. The religion of Islam as based on belief in one God was existing much before the ancient Greeks as we know it from the Prophets Moses, Abraham, Noah and Adam (Erbakan, 1975a: 93-95; Erbakan, 1975b: 16-19).

As a product of the materialist view in education, a generation of people was growing up with contempt for Turkish moral, social, cultural and historical values. There was a remarkable decline of moral standard: Chastity (*iffet*) as the basis of a healthy family and social life was neglected. The youth were growing disrespectful of their elderly people with their long hairs and whiskers. In addition to these, the schools had turned to hot beds of anarchy and terrorism due to the spread of radical leftist currencies of thought. It was a goal of the National View to give an end to these by promoting education of religion and morality in schools. That would be one of the most effective weapons against social and political disorder in the country. This

would also help to produce a citizenry loyal to their country, and honest and incorruptible in the economic life (Erbakan, 1975a: 90-97; Erbakan, 1976: 19-22; NOP Party Program, Articles 19-26; NSP Party Program: Articles 65-73). The leading spiritual member of Turkish religious right Zahit Kotku was saying that

> (A Muslim) refrains from sins; ill-gotten (haram) and prohibited things. He tries to acquire superb virtues like mercy; compassion; love; respect; mutualization; unity in property, spirit and body; brotherhood, communitarianism; acquaintanceship; intimacy; generosity; chastity and innumerable other qualities.
>
> A child is no different from an animal in its birth. It lives with its salacity and lust like animals. It does not have its reason yet. When he reaches to his adolescence, he is given a choice between good and bad; angel and devil to become a dignified or a miserable and lowly being. (Kotku, 171-173)

The sources of this educational policy of the National View was finding its place in Articles 10 and 14 of 1961 Constitution which stipulated that the state prepares necessary conditions for material and spiritual development of the people and that every citizen has the right to develop his material and spiritual being. And similarly, rights and freedoms of expression, thought, belief and conscience of the citizens were written down in Articles 11, 19, 22, 26, 29 of the Constitution (Erbakan, 1975a: 92; NSP Party Program: Articles 65-73).

Minimum hours of religious courses would be increased, their time would not be shifted to night time after the normal school hours, those who attended to those courses would not be persecuted by leftists teachers; and the number of Imam-Hatip Schools, Faculties of Theology, and Islamic Graduate Schools would be increased much as the number of universities of technical and general sciences. The scientific competency and qualifications of Imam Hatip Schools and Islamic Graduate Schools

would be developed upon needs and necessities. In addition, personnel of the Directorate of Religious Affairs would be improved in terms of their material and spiritual conditions (Erbakan, 1975a: 92-93; Erbakan, 1975b: 14-25; Erbakan, 1976: 22-25).

7.1.3. Economy and Development

National View put a strong emphasis on religion and morality in the sphere of economy too. A high standard of morality would serve to the well-functioning of the economy by ensuring the loyalty of the people to integrity, right and justice in places where there were legal gaps that could have been used for evil intentions otherwise. At the same time, there was a broad area of interaction in the economy not regulated by the laws that could work only with the adoption of superb moral principles on the part of the citizens (Erbakan, 1975a: 109-111).

The view of the National View to economy was even more sophisticated as it was argued that there was a particular economic system in Islam unique in itself with clear lines of separation from communist and capitalist economies. Contrary to the communist economies, Islamic economy was not the enemy of the private property. Ownership of the private property was promoted and rights of the people thereto were inviolable. Entrepreneurialism was encouraged because the wealth it generates was the road to perfection in many material and spiritual things. Capitalist economies, on the other hand, were contaminated with various spiritual illnesses like extravagance, luxury, self-preservation and gratification. They were also associated

with a set of macro scale problems like interest, inflation, unemployment, huge gaps in income distribution, and poverty to produce lots of other social problems (Erbakan, 1975a: 149-157; Erbakan, 1975b: 66-77; NOP Party Program, Articles 48-50; WP Party Program: Article 19). One of the founders of National View Movement who encouraged his friends and followers to political activism Zahit Kotku was stating that:

> For good and all, 'contentment (kanaat) is a non-depletable treasure.' It is the source of peace in this and the other world. Discontentment and cupidity are two disasters which don't leave any peace and safety in the person himself and in the society that he lives in… The money earned through interest, alcohol, gambling and such things does not bring anything except ravage. The best way is the way of contentment. If contentment is sustained canonically (helal yoldan), it does not impede accomplishing great things. We must make sure that nobody is oppressed of his right; one must not be engrossed in raunchiness, sinfulness, extravagance in sauciness when he becomes rich, and he must not be above himself with haughtiness (Kotku, 1994: 42-43).

The "just economic order" of the National View movement had explored five diseases that needed to be treated for a viable and promising Turkish economy. It was the goal of the party to implement this policy when it was introduced to the government. These diseases were interest, unjust taxation, money printing, currency exchange and present banking system. First of these, interest, was closely associated with high inflation, poverty, and social unrest. The interest was the process of making money through the trade of money rather than production. It was generating inflation because the investors were adding the rate of interest on the price of commodities to make profit. In addition, it was not right to make money from the debtors with ever-growing rates of interest. The poor were getting poorer crashing down under interest payments and the rich were getting richer in an unjust way without any labor. The right thing was the process of earning money through production and manufacturing.

The National View would remove the concept of interest from the Turkish economy (Erbakan, 1975a: 152-157; Erbakan, 1991: 22-27; Öniş, 1997: 754).

Investment in stock market would be an alternative to interest. The trade of bonds and securities was a real trade, and profits that came with it were profits based on real economic interactions. This system would be developed in our country for the transformation of the banking system. Though the money would be collected in the banks again, it would be invested in production this time (Erbakan, 1975a: 152-157).

As far as the taxation policy was concerned, secondly, the state was levying taxes on various goods and services though it was not involved in their production, which was not right. Also, the rich were paying less of taxes whereas the poor were paying more of it while it was supposed to be the other way. The National View would therefore reform all the law of taxation and funding. A third problem was about free money printing by the state. It was no different than stealing the money of the people when it was done without any material property to match it. That would also cause inflation and greater poverty on the part of the poor (Erbakan, 1991: 24-25).

The problem with the banking system, on the other hand, was that it was based on earning revenues with high interest rates. Instead of investing the money in interest earnings, the national view movement would transfer it to the development of industrial capacity, infrastructure and other types of investments that would serve to our development. Due to high interest rates, the people trying to run a business with bank loans such as the tradesmen, industrialist, businessmen and the farmers were facing

the problem of rising costs. And this was inhibiting production, employment and also leading to devaluation and inflation. In a just economic order, banks would be integrated to a system of profit sharing in which they would establish joint ventures with entrepreneurs through which they would be directly involved in production. This would decrease the cost of production and also the inflation (Erbakan, 1975a: 152-157; Erbakan, 1975b: 78-81).

7.1.4. The Welfare Party Bill of Indictment for Closure

The National Salvation Party was closed down after 1980 military intervention on the grounds that the party had turned to a base for religious radicalism. The successor Welfare Party established in 1985 was, however, to introduce a more radical party organization which was implicated with accusations of campaigning for the introduction of Islamic sharia regime at the peak of its electoral populism. Until the closure of the party in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, the party broadened its electoral base and radicalized its party program to be interrupted by the National Security Document of the Turkish Armed Forces known as 28 February Process. Some of the actions and policies of the party members included in bill of indictment presented by the General Public Prosecutor for the closure of the Welfare Party can be cited here to illustrate the radical Islamist tendencies of the movement. According to the Public Prosecutor, the Welfare Party was in violation of the secularist principle of the Turkish Republic and was attempting to establish an Islamic sharia regime:

If we are to have a short look at some of the accusations in the Bill of Indictment, in a speech on 23 March 1993 in the national assembly, first, the head of the Welfare Party Necmettin Erbakan was stating that every citizen had to be able to live in a system of law that he preferred based on his belief and thoughts. There had to be a multiple system of law that could be used by members of different social and religious groups. Second, on 13 April 1999, Necmettin Erbakan was saying in a party group meeting in the Assembly that Just Order would be instituted in peace or with bloodshed, kindly or by use of force. All the means would be used for this matter. It was the people of Turkey who would decide it and Welfare Party would use power when it was necessary (Refah Partisi Kapatma Davası, 1998: 32).

7.1.5. Other Controversial Issues

There was a list of other policies that has not been subject to WP closure case, but still to incite opposition from other members of the state elites: The party had a heavy antidrug campaign. Strict regulations were brought against alcohol sale in public restaurants and it was totally prohibited in state restaurants. Some Atatürk sculptures were removed from public spaces for various reasons (Karakaş, 2007: 24-25; Mecham, 2004: 344). Necmettin Erbakan was meeting with representatives of Egyptian Muslim Brothers soon after he was introduced to the premiership. He was inviting leaders of religious brotherhoods to the residence of prime minister for iftar. And before the Sincan events, a parliamentary bill was presented for freedom to use headscarf in public places. WP was trying to open the road for military careers to students

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of Imam Hatip schools (Karakaş, 2007: 26). Others included RP's attempts to build a mosque in Taksim square, to change working hours in accordance with Ramadan, and the roadside markings in big cities to reflect an Islamic view (Öniş, 2001: 286; Mecham, 2004: 343).

As the mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was taken under investigation because of his reading of a poem from Ziya Gökalp in December 1997. He was tried and sentenced to imprisonment to also lose his office of the mayor of Istanbul. At another occasion, he was quoted to say: "You will be either Muslim or secularist. You cannot be both at the same time" (Mecham, 2004: 345, 347).

According to Welfare Party perspective of secularism, wearing of headscarf in schools and public offices was not a violation of secularism, but was a part of freedom of conscience and belief. The party was therefore organizing political campaigns for freedom of headscarf use in these places as a part of its party goals. Constitutional Court stated that use of headscarf in public places was against the secularist principle of the constitution and political campaign of the welfare party was thus violating secularism. According to the Constitutional Court, the Welfare Party was exploiting the religious feelings of the people for this purpose.

The Virtue Party established after the WP displayed substantial changes from its successor. The most striking difference of the party was its support to integration with the EU and the West. But the Virtue Party was also closed because of the rejection of Merve Kavakçı to remove her headscarf in the National Assembly. She was not pre-

vented by the members of the Virtue Party. And she gave the oath of representative with her headscarf despite opposition by the left wing representatives (Öniş, 2001: 287-288; Mecham, 2004: 348).

7.2. The Justice and Development Party

The JDP has adapted a more moderate party program and set of goals compared to its predecessor National View movement. The JDP has been declaring since its establishment that it is opposed to any attempts pertaining to the introduction of an Islamic sharia regime. It disclaims any links with Islamism as a political doctrine. The general ideological line of the party is identified by the party itself and the intellectuals as Conservative Democracy. Aspects of JDP's conservative democracy can be read in JDP's founding "Development and Democratization Program" decorated with strong emphasis on and respect for democracy, secularism, rule of law, human rights, freedom, pluralism and diversity. JDP exemplifies a basic difference from earlier national view parties in the sense that it traces the development of these modern political paradigmatic values and principles to the west to which it declares its loyalty and service. The party believes in the idea that its policy goals can fully be accomplished in a liberal democratic political system (Dağı, 2006: 89).

As a part of its conservative origins, the JDP voices its continued interest in our traditional, cultural, historical and moral values in which religion lingers as a leading source of formation. Most leading examples of this new orientation are manifested in

its campaign for headscarf, Imam-Hatip schools, religious education and Quran Courses. However, the JDP differs from the earlier parties of Turkish religious right in the sense that it runs its campaign for its goals within the limits of rights and freedoms presented by the existing political system. The party leaders argue that the reason for them to come in conflict with the secularist establishment is the authoritarian leanings of the assertive secularists rather than the motivations of the party to violate secularism and democracy (Çınar and Duran, 2008: 33; Duran, 2008: 82-83; Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 20-21; Özbudun, 2006: 547-548).

In addition to this policy transformation, the party illustrates a significant change in the political style of the Turkish religious right. The party expresses its opposition to radical political changes in favor of respect for common sense, prudence and gradual change (Dağı, 2005: 30). Some others interpret this as transition from a provocative to a conciliatory style of politics in terms of the ways the party tries to achieve its major goals. For this reason, the party pays utmost attention to keep away from hot debates with the state elites in its search for religious rights and freedoms even if it may be considered that defense of those rights are not against democratic and constitutional system in Turkey. Burhanettin Duran argues that JDP's conservative democracy is a program offered by the Turkish religious right to normalize the Turkish political life after 28 February process. For this reason, the Party is most careful not to make any reference to Islam as a legal, political and economic system (Duran, 2008: 81-82).

JDP's party policy orientation expressed in its concise form as conservative democracy has also been a specter of change in the character of the party from a substantially ideology seeking to a partly vote maximizing party. The party has been more concerned with the ratio of the votes it obtains in the elections with a perception that parliamentary majority is the most advantageous asset that a party can have in achieving its goals and policies. Thus it has been more concerned with the expectations of the electorate and has widened its sources of appeal by pulling the ideological line of the party from extreme to center right. It is therefore observed to be more moderate and pragmatist compared to its predecessors Welfare Party and Virtue Party (Duran, 2008: 83; Kuru, 2009: 176-181; Dağı, 2005: 30-32).

7.2.1.The Justice and Development Party's View of Secularism

The party displays a great deal of similarity with National View Parties in the way it frames secularism. Contrary the assertive secularist position of the state elites, the party interprets secularism as a guarantee of freedom of belief, conscious and thought and a protection against official and unofficial canals of oppression against religious life and practice. But the party pronounces its distance from the idea of introducing an Islamic sharia regime as well as other Islamic alternatives to social, political and economic institutions of public life in Turkey. It is a main goal of the Party to promote democracy, justice, human rights, freedom and free market economy. The Party declares its membership to the provisions and conventions of international society

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with its modern political, economic and social institutions (Kuru, 2009: 176-181; Dağı, 2006: 95-97).

The JDP's approach to religion and secularism is stated as follows in the party program:

> Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity and secularism as a prerequisite of democracy, as a guarantee of freedom of religion and conscience. Party is against interpretation of secularism as enmity against religion.
>
> Secularism is essentially a principle that ensures the members of any religion and belief to practice their prayers in peace, to promulgate their religious opinions and shape their lives accordingly and, for nonbelievers, to organize their lives as they want. Secularism is thus the principle of freedom and social peace.
>
> Our party is against the exploitation of religion and ethnicity as a political tool. It finds attitudes and behaviors harassing religious people and discriminations they suffer due to their religious beliefs and choices as against democracy, human rights and freedoms. On the other side, it rejects the exploitation of religion as a tool for political, economic purposes or for other interests as well as its employment as a means to establish pressure over those who think and live differently.
>
> …
>
> As a necessity of the principle of secularism, all the facilities will be provided for the citizens to acquire religious education. In primary schools and high schools, elective religious courses will be given to students with the permission of the custodians of students in addition to lessons of Religious Culture and Morality Knowledge (JDP Party Program).

Bearing a concept of secularism like that behind the party program, the JDP has been running a political and social campaign for reframing the legal and constitutional provisions to ensure freedom of using headscarf in universities, repudiation of the YÖK barrier against the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, and improvement of the Quran Courses and religious courses in normal schools. However, the campaign of

the party for these matters is found in violation of the secularist principle of the secularist state elites. Ahmet Kuru examines the ongoing political and legal clash between the two factions of Turkish politics by classifying them as passive and assertive secularists with reference to issues cited here above (Kuru, 2009: 187-198; Yıldız, 2008: 52).

7.2.2. Headscarf

The headscarf controversy is very recent one. There was not a uniform measure adapted by the public authorities against wearing headscarf in universities until late 1990s. Headscarf wearing was not a common sociological theme among university students until 1970s and 1980s which might be considered as a peak of political and economic liberalization started with the introduction of multiparty politics. In 1984, headscarf ban came into effect in universities but it was not applied by all the universities uniformly sometimes because of the protests of the students and sometimes because certain university administrations autonomously decided not to apply it. However, the ban has gradually been more commonly applied by the universities under legal and unofficial pressures of the assertive secularists. Headscarf ban was one of the hottest themes of late 1990s with daily news of students forced out of classes, campuses, exam rooms and ceremonies. In 2000, a university student Nuray Bezirgan was dismissed from her classroom with a group of her friends. She was then tried and sentenced to 6 months of prison because of distracting the education of her schoolmates with her violation of the dress code. In 2004, European Court of Human

Rights ruled that headscarf ban was necessary and it did not violate the European Convention of Human Rights (Upon the appeal of the student). European Court of Human Rights repeated its decision to another appeal made by another student (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 100-102).

Contrary to the view of the state elites, the JDP has the contention that wearing headscarf in schools and other public places does not bear any political character. It can never be considered as a part of a political doctrine that defends Islamic sharia regime. In a liberal democratic society, citizens enjoy certain rights and freedoms that cannot be violated by any state or non-state organ. The way the people cover their body can never be instructed by a public authority. It is a most basic human right and a part of freedom of belief, conscience and thought. With such an approach to the headscarf issue, first related examination of the JDP came to the agenda with the events that followed the appointment of Erdoğan Teziç as the new head of Turkish Board of Higher Education, YÖK, in 2003. Soon after his appointment, Erdoğan Teziç widened the scope of headscarf ban by also prohibiting the use of wigs. He also added that a school principal must not wear headscarf even in the street let alone the school. The JDP found these measures as very extreme and followed by introducing a bill in the parliament to remove Erdoğan Teziç and reorganize the YÖK, but the bill was vetoed by Necdet Sezer under very heavy opposition from other members of the state elites as well (Kuru, 2009: 187-193).

Second important event related with the headscarf took place in December 2007 when the Nationalist Action Party presented a constitutional amendment bill in the

parliament to prepare the legal ground for the abolition of the headscarf ban in universities. The initiative was fully supported by the JDP and also other right party members in the parliament. But the Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya ruled a warning that such an action would lead to the opening of a closure case against both parties. But despite the opposition, amendments over two articles of the Constitution were approved by the parliament in February 2008. The laws reiterated equality before the law and brought an end to discrimination for reasons not clearly defined by the law to mean that it should be free to use headscarf in the schools and universities. After the approval of the amendments by the President Abdullah Gül, YÖK took the initiative to apply the laws by distributing instructions to the universities to permit entrance with headscarf. But under heavy reactions from presidents of some universities, the RPP and the Democratic Left Party (DLP), the Constitutional Court repudiated the laws with a claim that they are in violation of the principle of secularism (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 62-63).

7.2.3. Imam-Hatip Schools

The second issue leading in the agenda of JDP's religious politics is the Imam-Hatip schools. The major problem pressuring the JDP deputies concerning its electoral base and party goals is the application of a barrier to the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools in their entrance to university examination something which was introduced during the 28 February process. The barrier is the application of a lower coefficient in the

calculation of the points of Imam-Hatip school graduates that substantially decrease their competitive advantage compared to graduates of other public schools. The extent of the barrier is such that those students cannot be admitted to certain universities and departments even if their answers to all the questions are correct.

The secularist establishment argues that Imam-Hatip schools' curriculum is filled with traditional Islamic and moral sciences and therefore their graduates must be employed as prayer leaders and preachers in public service. But the members of Turkish religious right argue that the curriculum of Imam-Hatip schools includes those social and science courses taught by other public schools and that the fact that they also receive religious courses as a matter of preference cannot be turned into a tool of violation in their preparation to university examination. It cannot be argued that people cannot learn religious and moral courses if they will not use it in their occupational life. It is a constitutional right of every citizen to learn and practice their religion as a part of freedom of conscience, belief, practice and thought. The JDP deputies interpret the application of the barrier of lower coefficient as a source of discrimination.

For this reason, the JDP presented a bill to the parliament in 2004 to increase the coefficient of the Imam-Hatip schools as well as other vocational schools that would increase their chances though not lifting the barrier absolutely. The bill was met with a heavy media campaign by the secularist establishment. It passed the votes of the parliament with the support of other right parties as well, but it was vetoed by President Necdet Sezer. Another bidding was made in December 2005 by Minister of Ed-

ucation Hüseyin Çelik who had ruled an instruction that would enable the students to transfer to normal public schools in the last year of their education. After taking some extra courses, they would take the university entrance examination under the same condition as graduates of non-vocational schools. The instruction was cancelled by the Council of State on the grounds that it does not abide by the secularist principle (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 63-64; Kuru, 2009: 193-196).

7.2.4. Quran Courses and Other Controversial Issues

The Quran Courses have been another leading goal in the agenda of JDP's religious politics. In December 2003, the JDP Government started an initiative by way of the Directorate of Religious Affairs to improve the condition of the Quran Courses. The measures taken for this purpose included the opening of night courses, the reduction of the minimum student number to open a course from 15 to 10, removal of the limitation of two months, permission to open dormitories. But the initiative met with the barrier of the Council of State which cancelled all the policies adapted. Again in 2005, the JDP introduced a bill in the parliament to reduce the punishment of opening illegal Quran courses from two years to a prison sentence of six months and one year. The bill passed the parliament, but again it is vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Kuru, 2009: 196-198).

A relatively less sensational issue that the JDP Government has drawn the reactions of the state elites is the attempt of the party to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages

from the cafeterias of the ministries and other state organs and to limit its consumption in public places. In 2004, a regulation is passed by the JDP Government that puts limits and greater control over the alcohol consumption by giving the municipal and city-county councils the authority to issue liquor licenses and to determine the places to drink alcohol. Although it has been claimed that JDP is ruling these measures because of the prohibition of alcohol in Islam, the JDP Government draws attention to the health problems it generates as well as social and cultural problems that it leads. Alcohol market and consumption is thus taken under strict controls (Yıldız, 2008: 53; Karakaş, 2007: 32).

There has been some other policies that may be associated with religious politics adapted by the JDP on some gender issues. They include legal proposals to divide parks and beaches with separate sections for men and women, and swimming pools with only-women and only-men days. Against the accusations, JDP deputies replied by saying that such measures were adapted in European countries also. A related theme was the introduction of adultery as a crime according to Turkish Penal Code in 2004. But the clause was cancelled under heavy oppositions and clashes (Yıldız, 2008: 53; Karakaş, 2007: 34; Cizre, 2008: 9).

And lastly, JDP tried to make a bidding to appoint imams to new mosques that has been neglected from public attention as well those mosques that did not have imams for reasons. But it cannot be said that it has been successful due to the limitations imposed on the Directorate of Religious Affairs. To this end, JDP made an attempt to reorganize the Diyanet in order to make it an autonomous public entity by removing

it from the authority of the government. But the attempt was rejected and vetoed by President Necdet Sezer.

7.5. Conclusion

To summarize the main points of the chapter, it has been observed that there is a substantial change in the goals and policies of the Turkish religious right from National View parties to the Justice and Development Party with regard to their view to religion and secularism. While the National View Movement had a view of religion that had to be employed substantially in shaping Turkish social, political, economic and cultural life, the JDP assumed a more moderate party program with a limited appeal to religion. The JDP has strayed away from a discourse of religion as a political program. It declares its opposition to the idea of Islamic sharia regime. The JDP has been campaigning for freedom of wearing headscarf in universities, removal of the YÖK barrier to graduates of Imam-Hatip schools and removal of limitations imposed on Quran Courses. But its campaign is carried out in abidance by the rights and privileges provided by the democratic political system with a respect for human rights, secularism, rule of law, and pluralism. Contrary to the National View Movement, the JDP does not offer an Islamic alternative to economic life and does not foresee a substantial role for religion in Turkey's road to development. JDP's politics is most often interpreted as conciliatory, pragmatist, moderate and legalistic.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation is devoted to the examination of the change in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish religious right towards a strikingly more moderate and centrist political line with a theoretical, empirical and historical analysis. An attempt will be made here in the conclusion to summarize the main points of the work with a discussion of the findings under the light of the set of theoretical tools and perspectives employed to operationalize them.

Theoretical studies on party change proliferate over the type of changes that parties experience as well as the causes that produce them. Kenneth Janda points out to six areas that party change can take place including party political tactics, organizational structure, issue orientation, organizational identity, goal orientation or party organizational death (Janda, 1980). This dissertation is given over to the examination of the change of Turkish religious right in two of these areas, i.e., the goal and issue orientation (See Chapters Six and Seven). The literature on the causes that produce party

change is yet much richer than the one devoted to the nature of party change. Among the causes that produce party change, three general categories draw attention including leadership change, party coalition change and environmental change (Harmel and Janda, 1994). The focus of this work has been to explore the role and impact of a set of environmental changes identified in the secularist reaction by the state elites, globalization and Europeanization among others.

While trying to do this, we have benefited from a research by Harmel and Janda in which they examine the type of factors that come to play with prospects of party ideological extremism as the major driving force of the goal and issue orientation of a party. Among these factors, three of them are seminal for our purposes, i.e., regime opposition, affluence and sectoral inequality. Harmel and Janda measure a correlation value of -0.12, -0.20 and 0.32 between party ideological extremism and regime opposition, affluence and sectoral inequality in order (Harmel and Janda, 1982). In framing the theoretical design of the dissertation, the variable of regime opposition is employed in the operationalization of the rigid secularism of the state elites and the latter two variables, affluence and sectoral inequality are reprocessed, by making some theoretical additions, for their operationalization in the factors of globalization and Europeanization.

Upon this theoretical formation prepared in Chapter Two, Chapter Three is assigned to the analysis of the rigid secularism of the state elites argued to be the leading cause of the transformation experienced by the religious right. Taking its origins from the Ottoman reforms, the state elites have developed a behavior and attitude of

secularism reactionary to religion and opposed to its political and social representations in the public similar to the example of militant French secularism. While the state elites have demonstrated a strong determination against attempts to introduce Islamic political norms and institutions in Turkey like its many examples in secular political systems, they have been against some social, cultural and spiritual aspects of the religion too. Its leading members including the armed forces, the judiciary, Republican Peoples Party, some media organization, various professional groups and civil society organizations, the state elites enjoys a rich set of legal, political and technological tools and mechanisms to play their role in Turkish political life. The armed forces reserve their rights for political activism in their internal service codes and regulations while the judiciary can get involved in political processes through the Constitutional Court, with its legal powers to define and interpret secularism and monitor the abidance of political parties by the secularist principle as the two leading agents of the state elites.

In Chapter 4, a detailed examination is offered to the secularist reaction expressed with 28 February Process with regard to the tide of change that it generated in Turkish religious right. 28 February Process remains as the most striking example of the political involvement of the state elites for secularist purposes in a coordinated action. Starting with the issuing of a National Security Document by the military members of the National Security Council, the events went on with a heavy social, political and legal campaign against the Welfare Party and its successors which ended up with the closure of successive parties, political bans to a number of leading politicians, and introduction of various punishments and measures against perceived

threats. The movement was thus motivated to reformulate its goal and issue orientation with declared commitments to refrain from acts of religious radicalism and respect the secularist and Republican principles written in the Constitution.

In Chapter Five, globalization and Europeanization are taken under scrutiny concerning their impact on the political line of the religious right. The first part of the chapter is given to the examination of globalization with a theoretical and empirical perspective by describing what it denotes in different domains and how it comes to play with the policy perspective of the religious right. If we review what globalization means in specific domains: Economic globalization is identified as increasingly greater integration and interdependence of domestic markets and production. Political globalization, secondly, is characterized as the process of strengthening multilateralism among countries and spread of some global political norms and principles. Social and cultural globalization, lastly, is considered to be associated with the emergence of common forms of social and cultural structures among countries (Scholte, 1997; Dodge and Higgott, 2002; McGrew, 2000). Globalization is detected to be linked with the trend of moderation in Turkish religious right in so far as it has produced a statist middle class of entrepreneurs and intellectuals, and a process of political socialization experienced by the religious right towards the internalization of the elements of western economic, political, social and cultural values and principles.

Europeanization is examined in the second part of Chapter Five, which is considered to be a potent agent of change. Europeanization promotes such global principles and norms as market economy, democracy, rule of law, human rights, multilateralism etc.

but it is distinguished from globalization with its more comprehensive, formalized, legal and binding nature as well as being decorated with – in the case of EU – specialized organs, decision-making processes, conditionalities and bureaucracies (Risse et. al., 2001: 3-4). The impact of Europeanization on domestic structures of countries is observed in the adaptive pressures that it generates as well as a process of socialization that it introduces its potential members. In case of Turkish religious right, it is observed that the movement has shown a great tendency in responding to Europeanization pressures for a number of reasons that include the contribution of the movement to Turkey's prospective development, the process of political socialization that it has generated and expectations that Europeanization would contribute to the reformation of civil-military relations in Turkey in line with its examples in the liberal world.

After the examination of the most leading causes of change in the issue and goal orientation of Turkish religious right, an attempt is made in last two chapters to explore the nature of change taking place in domains of foreign policy and domestic politics by starting with the view and policies of the National View movement in this process and continuing with the ways they are reformulated in the Justice and Development Party. In the domain of foreign policy, it is detected that the earlier members of Turkish religious right, National View, were motivated to turn the face of Turkish foreign policy to the Muslim countries of the Middle East and minimize the relations with the west. The movement was supporting the idea that Turkey shared a common history and culture with the Middle East and that it was in its best interests to develop and proliferate relations with the Middle East. Relations with the west would be

maintained only in the areas of science and technology to be employed in industrial and economic development of the country while a very comprehensive and deep set of relations were to be maintained with the Muslim countries. Integration and unity with the west was detrimental to Turkey's national integrity because the unity of the west was formed around their membership to Christianity. In addition, the west had a secret agenda to undermine the Muslim world to which Turkey should have never joined.

Starting with the rise of the electoral appeal of the Welfare Party and its introduction to the government, the issue and goal orientation of Turkish religious right has wrapped into a substantially different one with the Justice and Development Party. JDP has abandoned the tendency to perceive a world divided along religious and cultural lines in a rational and pragmatist way. A need is emphasized to improve Turkey's relations with the west but also the east. While not denying the importance of the historical and cultural values in its relations with the Middle East, Turkey is also accepted as a part of the western civilization with its political, diplomatic and military membership to global and regional international organizations as well as its bilateral relations with individual states.

The change in the issue and goal orientation of the religious right in domestic politics is explored to be more extensive. The National View movement had a vision of Turkey undergoing major economic and industrial transformation with a strong attachment to Turkey's religious, moral and cultural values. Particularly during the Welfare Party coalition government, a heavy campaign was launched to transform the social

and cultural face of Turkey towards a more conservative and religious society that in some cases arrived at calls for support to the establishment of an Islamic Şeriat regime voiced by the party members in election campaigns and party meetings.

The Justice and Development Party, however, has learnt from the experience of National View's clashes with the state elites that the idea of introducing religious contents in Turkish political system is heavily opposed by the state elites who may cast their reactions through military interventions, party closures, prison sentences, political bans and expropriations among others. The Justice and Development Party has been in favor of minimizing the role of religion in party's orientation to various issues and in framing major party goals. The notion of establishing an Islamic Şeriat regime is abandoned. Party's relations with religious politics revolved around attempts for introducing liberties, rights and opportunities about headscarf, Imam-Hatip schools and religious education all of which have been conducted within the mechanisms permitted by secular democratic system.

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APPENDIX 1

Against the accusations directed on issues of religious education and Imam-Hatip

Schools, it was stated by the WP that the party was absolutely loyal to the secularist

principles of the Constitution and that all the policies adopted were in abidance by

legal and constitutional norms. It was indicated in the Bill of Indictment that

> Religious education is the most serious impediment in front of raising up secular and democratic thinking people… and that a state cannot be secular if it agrees to millions of its students having religious education and get their structure of thinking accordingly (Vural, 21st May 1997)

According to WP, this accusation did not have any legal ground because religious

education was a right given by the Constitution. It was indicated in the Constitution

that

> "Education and training of religion and morality is conducted under the supervision and inspection of the state. Education of religion and morality is among the compulsory courses given in primary and secondary schools. In places other than these, religious education could be given only according to the choice of the people or the demand of the legal custodians of the children" (1982 Constitution, Article 24, Paragraph 4).

For this reason, Public Prosecutor's view that religious education was harmful and

that it was the most serious impediment to science and that it was against secularism

to give religious education to millions of students was not based on any legal ground.

The WP was not in violation of but loyal to the secularist principle with its promotion of religious education (WP Apology).

As to the claim of the Public Prosecutor that the WP was in violation of the secularist principle with its disregard for the recommendations of the National Security Council about the closure of Imam-Hatip schools, not opening new Imam Hatip schools hereinafter, stopping actions in this direction and agitating the public with speeches on this subject; it also did not have any legal ground and WP was not in violation of the secularist principle. That was because it was not obligatory to apply the recommendations of the NSC. NSC was an advisory and consultative organ and it was not a crime not to follow its recommendations (WP Apology).

When we look at the response against accusations about speeches made by various party members, it was generally stated in the Defense that either there was not any substantiated evidence about them or that they were misinterpreted by the public prosecutor as a violation of secularist principle.

According to the Public Prosecutor, Erbakan's speech for the introduction of a system of multiple laws was against secularism. But it was argued in the Defense that the speech was made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and as a part of the immunity rights of the representatives, it could not be subject to judicial processes. A right to immunity was legally given to deliberate on issues in the process of policy making. Even more important, the speech was not intended to replace the secularist principle of the Constitution as there was not a direct reference to change the secular-

ist principle. As to Erbakan's speech that "Just order will be established… It will be decided by Turkey… whether the transition will be soft or hard, sweet or bloody," the reference here was to just order rather than the şeriat order. And it would be introduced with democratic means through elections. Blood was the work of the rival parties who would try to interrupt the materialization of the just order with all the traditional bloody means they were accustomed to use but who would still be dealt with legal means. When we look at the list of accusations directed to Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Huseyin Ceylan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şükrü Karatepe and Şevket Kazan, as it is incorporated in the Defense, there were very serious problems with the evidences provided and arguments offered. First of all, two of the speeches attributed to Şevki Yılmaz were made when he was not a member of the WP. And as to the third speech, there was a video cassette about it only which was not known when and where it was recorded. As to accusations about others, there was not again any evidence except some video cassettes which were not known when and where they were recorded for which they could not be accepted as evidence. The accusation directed to Ahmet Tekdal concerning his reference to "right order" did not mean Şeriat and could not be interpreted as an attack to secularism. Thus the WP was never in violation of the secularist principle contrary to what the Public Prosecutor claimed (WP Defense).