MASCULINITIES IN YILMAZ GÜNEY'S STAR IMAGE IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

A Ph. D. Dissertation

by

ZEYNEP KOÇER

Department of
Graphic Design
İhsan Doğramaci Bilkent University
Ankara

May 2012

To mom and dad

MASCULINITIES IN YILMAZ GÜNEY'S STAR IMAGE IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

ZEYNEP KOÇER

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in

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May 2012

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Graphic Design.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Dilek Kaya
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Graphic Design.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Graphic Design.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Gürata
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Graphic Design.

Assc. Prof. Dr. Savaş Arslan
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Graphic Design.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Özlem Savaş
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

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Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

MASCULINITIES IN YILMAZ GÜNEY'S STAR IMAGE
IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

Koçer, Zeynep

Ph.D., Department Graphic Design

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Dilek Kaya

May 2012

This dissertation approaches Yılmaz Güney as a social event and a phenomenon. It argues that Güney created a male Anatolian myth with his on-screen and off-screen masculinities, his physical difference from other Yeşilçam star and his moralistic attitude toward women. In order to investigate this myth, the dissertation historicizes Güney's star image within the socio-economic and political discourses of the 1960s and 1970s and points to an ambivalence, which stems from the contradictions in Güney's star image. The dissertation aims to demonstrate this ambivalence in Güney's star image by discussing the ordinary and extra-ordinary characteristic of stardom and the socio-economic and political ramifications of the late-republican modernization project.

Keywords: Masculinity, Star Studies, Yılmaz Güney, modernization in Turkey

ÖZET

1960LAR VE 1970LERDE YILMAZ GÜNEY'İN YILDIZ İMGESİNDEKİ ERKEKLİK KURULUMLARI

Koçer, Zeynep

Doktora, Grafik Tasarım Bölümü

Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Dilek Kaya

Mayıs 2012

Bu doktora tezi Yılmaz Güney'e bir sosyal olay ve fenomen olarak yaklaşmaktadır. Teze göre, Güney gerek film ve film-dışı erkeklik kurulumları ve kadına yaklaşımı gerekse diğer Yeşilçam yıldızlarıyla arasındaki fiziksel ve toplumsal farklar üzerinden bir Anadolu erkeği miti yaratmıştır. Bu mitin incelenemesinde Güney'in yıldız imgesi, 1960lar ve 1970ler sosyo-ekonomik ve politik söylemleri üzerinden tarihselleştirilmiştir. Güney'in yıldız imgesinin içinde barındırdığı çelişkilerin, modernleşme ve Anadoluluk kavramları açısından ikircikli bir yapı oluşturduğu tespit edilmiştir. Doktora tezi, bu ikircikli yıldız imgesini, yıldız çalışmaları literatürü ve Türk moderleşme projelerinin ortaya çıkardığı sosyo-ekonomik ve politik sonuçlar üzerinden incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Erkeklik, Yıldız Çalışmaları, Yılmaz Güney, Türk modernleşmesi

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Purpose of the Study

Yılmaz Güney was a prolific screenwriter, filmmaker and a star in Yeşilçam.[1] He was born in Yenice, Adana in April 1st 1937.[2] During his youth, he worked as a "water carrier, farmhand, cotton-picker, butcher's apprentice and scribe." (Wakeman, 1998: 405) In the late-1950s Güney came to İstanbul first to study economics but he soon dropped the college to work in the film industry. Since that decision, Güney had a rough and controversial journey for over two decades in Yeşilçam. From 1965 to 1975, Güney acted in approximately 106 films, which he

[1] Yeşilçam is the name of the Turkish Film Industry that was influential between the 1950s and 1990. It took its name from a street off İstiklal in Beyoğlu, İstanbul where the majority of the film companies were located. The neighborhood was also a cinema-friendly place with coffeehouses, restaurants, nightclubs and cinemas, which were mostly filled with film producers, directors and actors. Yeşilçam also refers to a "certain type of filmmaking- in a way, a comparable to the name "Hollywood," especially classical Hollywood cinema." (Arslan, 2011: 11) Yılmaz Güney rose to stardom 1960s and continued his career in the 1970s, which are known as the Golden Years of Yeşilçam due to the immense number of film production during the period.

[2] Fatoş Güney told that Yılmaz Güney can be one or two years older since he told her that his parents registered him for a birth certificate after some time. (Güney, F., 2012)

either wrote or co-wrote.[3] In 1968, Güney directed his first film,[4] *Seyyit Han*. Even though national and international film critics would recognize Güney as a major success with films like *Endişe / Anxiety* (Gören, 1975) and *Sürü / The Herd* (Ökten, 1978), in terms of audience reception, he was already a social phenomenon with his action-adventure films in Anatolia. Referring to his past experience during the exhibition of a Güney film in Sivas, Murat Belge states that the audience had a constant interaction with Güney throughout the film. Some yelled, "watch your back brother Yılmaz" whereas some were angry with Güney for trusting one of the other characters in the film. (Kahraman, 1996: 202) Yusuf Koç, a close friend of Güney, recounts:

> When one of his films was premiered in Ankara, two hundred cars were waiting to accompany Yılmaz in Kızılcahamam. Hundreds of people brought red carpets from their homes, painting the streets of Ankara to red so that Yılmaz would walk on red carpet, like a star should. (as cited in Kahraman, 1996: 136-137)

One can find similar examples[5] that highlight Güney's phenomenal popularity during the Yeşilçam era. The most striking among these could be the events following

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[3] Before 1965, Güney wrote short stories and some of them were published in literature journals. His intention however was to be a part of Yeşilçam but when "he was imprisoned in 1961 for propagating socialism due to a short story- *Üç Bilinmeyenli Eşitsizlik Sistemleri*- he wrote in 1956," (Güzel, 1994: 25) that intention was delayed. He was imprisoned for over a year a half and later sent to Konya to live in exile for six months. During his sentence, he finished his novel, *Boynu Bükük Öldürler*, which won the prestigious literary Orhan Kemal Award in 1972. When he was finally free on June 1963, Yeşilçam was hesitant to embrace him due to his criminal record. This is also the reason why Güney changed his last name from Pütün to Güney. Atıf Yılmaz was the only director who hired Güney to write scripts for his films. It was again Atıf Yılmaz, who gave Güney his first acting role in *Bu Vatanın Çocukları* (Yılmaz, 1958).

[4] Although Yılmaz Güney directed several films before *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968), in his autobiography and in the letters he wrote to his wife Fatoş Güney, he refers to *Seyyit Han* as his first film.

[5] Another critic who wrote his personal viewing experience of a Güney film is Atilla Dorsay. Dorsay (2000: 77) wrote: "I watched *Hudutların Kanunu* in April 1st in Istanbul Beyoğlu Lüks Movie Theater. It was full. In his first appereance audience started clapping Güney and his every significant dialog or act was followed by more clapping and screaming."

Güney's arrest after he fired his gun in Altay Palas in Urfa in 1966 and got arrested. Once his arrest was made public, "hundreds of people sent confession letters to the police stating that they fired the gun not Güney." (Kahraman, 1996: 136) When a similar incident occurred at a hotel in Bursa, "the owner of the hotel said that it was an honor for him that Yılmaz Güney broke the mirrors in his hotel." (Dündar, 1996)

Güney was a Yeşilçam star of a different kind. Contrary to his handsome, urban, and upper class contemporaries such as Ayhan Işık, Ediz Hun, Cüneyt Arkın or Göksel Arsoy, Güney was a thin, dark-skinned man coming from a lower class Kurdish family of Adana. Even Ayhan Işık affirmed Güney's difference once by saying that Güney "looked like a Kurdish boy who washed car windows at traffic lights." (as cited in Kahraman, 1996: 106) Güney also considered himself to be quite different from other Yeşilçam stars. He suggested, "Beautiful men are not the men of this society. They are the men of American cinema." (as cited in Dorsay, 2000: 33) When Tarık Dursun Kakınç described Ayhan Işık as the handsome king in an interview with Güney, Güney said, "Well, if he is the Handsome King, then I am the Ugly King." (as cited in Özgüç, 1976: 39) The next day, Tarık Dursun Kakınç (1965: 9) announced the arrival of the new king on a two-page spread with the title "The Ugly King of Our Cinema." Güney never had a problem with his physical appearance's being different than the rest of Yeşilçam stars; moreover he embraced his roots and throughout his career he discursively constructed himself as an Anatolian man. In an interview explaining his work as an actor, Güney said:

> In my earlier work, I have played the man who tries to stay out of trouble; a man who is subjugated and oppressed. Even if he tries to stay out of trouble, he is forced to become a part of the tragedies and finally he breaks. He rebels and fights but loses all the time. I have always played *my people*. [italics mine] (as cited in Yeşil, 1992: 11)

When the big film distributors and exhibitors realized that Güney's films were very profitable, they removed the embargo[6] on Güney in the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, he preferred to continue working with small film companies. Güney explained the reason behind this choice as follows: "I find it more right to help the weak and powerless... I am not a product of the cosmopolitan minority of Beyoğlu audience;[7] I am a product of *my people of Anatolia*." [italics mine] (as cited in Özgüç, 1976: 76)

One particular discourse repeats itself in both the above quotations and in other extra filmic materials on Güney. It is the discourse of the "Anatolian man" with whom Güney associates himself. Any attempt to explore the "Anatolian" would immediately call for an investigation of the connotations of Anatolia first.

In the novels of the late-Ottoman Era, Anatolia was considered the place to run away from the excessive westernization in Istanbul during the modernization movement in the years of the decline of the Empire. In these novels, which were basically cautionary tales, young Ottoman men were advised by the male elite of writers to draw the boundaries of adopting Western values and preserving their cultural distinctiveness which comes from Anatolian values of tradition and religion. In this long time of turbulence Anatolia was always the solace, a place to run to and last resort to confide into after wars and defeats. It was "not only a piece of land, but rather an ideal." (Yalçın, 2002: 23) Later, during the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a

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[6] Embargo was due to Güney's imprisonment in 1961.

[7] Beyoğlu is a neighborhood in İstanbul. Starting with the late Ottoman era, Beyoğlu has been the focus of cultural activities and the living space of the Ottoman upper class as well as the rich foreign minorities. In the 1960s, Beyoğlu became the heart of film industry and is still one of the cultural centers of Istanbul with its cinemas, cafés, restaurants and shopping facilities. In the context of Güney's usage of Beyoğlu, it refers to being foreignized since Beyoğlu has long been used as a metaphor of a foreign culture, a bourgeois culture that was associated with excessive modernization / westernization and degeneration.

resistance toward the foreign occupation arose in Anatolia, which fought and won the National War of Independence. The victory expanded the connotations of Anatolia from being a space of purity to being the glorified birthplace of the national resistance. Accordingly in the novels of the early-republican era, Anatolia was perceived as the sacred space embedded with the values of tradition, morality, honor, dignity, sincerity[8] and more importantly Anatolia was nationalized because it was not westernized; hence not foreignized.[9] Yalçın (2002: 149) refers to certain terms used to as synonyms of Anatolia in the press such as *Mukaddes Vatan* (Beloved Nation), *Sevgili Küçük Asya* (Dear Little Asia) and *Mübarek Koca Türk İli* (The Grand Sacred Turkish State) to describe the nationalistic connotations of Anatolia. Consequently, Anatolianness was also constructed to embody the same values.

Güney's star image was constructed as a local star who embodies the "sacred," "traditional" and "authentic" Anatolian values and presented as capable of giving his "indigenous audiences something that Hollywood luminaries cannot; reflections of the known and close at hand, typologies of the contingent, intimate dramatizations of local myths and realities." (Babington, 2002: 10) This process of authenticating authenticity was constructed through constant emphasis on Güney's Anatolian roots and socio-economic class in the extra-filmic materials and through the repetition of particular roles in films based on Güney's screenplays which provided the audience with glimpses of his real life struggles; the brutality of

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[8] In Reşat Nuri Güntekin's *Çalıkuşu* for instance, Anatolian people and the Istanbulites are frequently compared. These comparisons based on hospitality, sincerity, and desire to share always champion Anatolian people. (Yalçın, 2002: 185-186)

[9] Peyami Safa's *Sözde Kızlar* is one of the novels that idealizes Anatolia and discusses the degeneration in Istanbul. According to the author, "Anatolia is the only cure to this corruption because all the honorable and moral people in the novel look at Anatolia as the hope for salvation. Anatolia in this sense becomes the place of high morality." (Yalçın, 2002: 106-107)

bloodshed, how his father was almost shot to death in front of his eyes. Both the filmic and the extra-filmic are utilized to make his audience "bear witness to the continuousness of his own self, no matter how different his roles are." (Dyer, 1986: 11) His on-screen performances, where he was portrayed as the poor and oppressed Anatolian shepherd, bandit, cattle smuggler, artisan, peasant or urban thug who finally broke down and rebelled against injustice became the catalyst of a long journey of interaction and adoration by his male audience who supposedly shared similar oppressions in their everyday lives. That is why, according to Dorsay (2000: 31) "just like how the working-class women who live in poor conditions identify with Şoray and Koçyiğit in love stories, Anatolian men identify with Güney in his every film."

It must be noted that Güney's popularity continues even today. Social and popular media contribute to his legend with non-scholarly books, magazine articles, posters and interviews. *Milliyet Sanat* covered Güney's life and work in its September 2009 issue in the memory of his 25th death anniversary. National television channels still show Güney's films and they are also being sold in many film stores and on online shopping sites. Recently, director Nuri Bilge Ceylan said that he "wished to see a Yılmaz Güney Museum in Adana."[10] His wish was granted partly in 2011, when a new Turkish cinema museum with a special *Yılmaz Güney Collection* was opened in Adana. In Ankara, *Yılmaz Güney Stage* was renovated and

[10] In the closing remarks of the 16th Altın Koza Film Festival in Adana, Nuri Bilge Ceylan expressed his thoughts on the necessity of a museum that honors Yılmaz Güney's works. (June 15, 2009. "Adana'ya Yılmaz Güney Müzesi," *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved from http://www.haberinyeri.net/Kultur-Sanat/Adana'ya-Yilmaz-Guney-Muzesi_63803.html

reopened on December 10th, 2009 to celebrate Human Rights Day with the screening of *Yol* (Gören, 1982).

Despite continuing social significance, little scholarly research has been done on Güney. By the time this dissertation was written, there were only a few theses (Aksu, 1997; Battal, 2003; Yüksel, 2006) in the Higher Education Council (YÖK) database relating to Güney. Moreover, even though many national and international scholars have explored Güney as an auteur, focusing on his cinema, they did not discuss Güney's star image that extends beyond his films even though Yeşilçam was a star cinema and Güney was one of its biggest stars. Similarly, in terms of the investigation on Güney's films, scholarly and non-scholarly research have not paid much attention to Güney's action-adventure films even though they were the ones that established an organic bond with his male audience. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap by exploring Yılmaz Güney as a star and a social phenomenon and focusing on the forms of masculinities constructed by his filmic and extra-filmic images. This way, the dissertation attempts to contribute to star studies and visual and cultural studies in Turkey.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This dissertation approaches Yılmaz Güney as a social event. It acknowledges Güney's phenomenal status and considers his star image as an "embodiment of culture." (McDonald, 2007) The dissertation argues that Güney created a male Anatolian myth with his on-screen and off-screen masculinities, his physical

difference from other Yeşilçam star and his moralistic attitude toward women. The aim of the dissertation is to explain Güney's phenomenal status through this myth. That is why; it explores masculinity constructions in Güney's on-screen and off-screen star image taking into consideration the socio-economic and political discourses in the 1960s and 1970s. The most recurring characters Güney played on-screen are the character of *eşkıya*; a form of social bandit and *kabadayı*; a form of a just and moral gangster. This recurrence of particular roles is what establishes a bond between the star and the audience since "audience identification is achieved principally through the star's relation to social types." (Dyer, 1998: 99) Both *eşkıya* and *kabadayı* were utilized to construct Güney's star image as an Anatolian man; the protector of traditional values of honor and morality who reflect certain anxieties and fantasies of lower / working class migrant men. While the anxieties are closely related to traditional values of morality and female sexuality, which are perceived to be under threat due to the emergence of capitalism, modernization, urbanization and industrialization, the fantasies are related to the gratification gained by the acts of Güney in procuring justice, morality and male authority.

However, it is not possible to understand why some actors become stars and others do not just by looking at their screen roles. A broader investigation needs to be done which involves the construction and circulation of their images in the media since star images are made up of both the filmic and the extra-filmic materials such as newspaper articles, magazines, gossip columns, fan letters, biographies and so on. The research on the extra-filmic materials portrays Güney as a "man of contradictions." The dissertation aims to demonstrate this ambivalence in the Ugly King myth through the socio-economic and political ramifications of the late-republican modernization project in the 1960s and 1970s.

1.3 Methodology

Yeşilçam cinema has long been defined and remembered with its melodramas. However, Güney was not a star of melodramas even though his films had melodramatic elements. Rather he was a star of the action-adventure genre and rural films. That is why; the dissertation will discuss thirty-one films [11] belonging to these two genres. It is a fact that Güney produced many critically acclaimed films after 1974 such as *Endişe / Anxiety* (Gören, 1974), *Sürü / The Herd* (Ökten, 1978) and *Yol / The Way* (Gören, 1982). However he did not star in any of them since he was in prison during their production. As this dissertation explores Güney's star image, it limits itself to the films before 1974.[12] The choice of these films is not random. The first idea was to look at the box-office records of Güney's films in order to choose the most popular ones. Unfortunately, there is not much data on box-office results from the 1960s. Due to this lack, it was decided to search the popular magazines and journals of the 1960s and 1970s in order to see if there are any surveys or articles on the public reception of Güney's films. Other than popular magazines, it has been observed that film journals such as *7. Sanat* and *Gelişim Sinema* conducted surveys with moviegoers and critics to find out their favorite films. These surveys point to certain films of Yılmaz Güney. Also particular films were very much discussed and appreciated by critics and won awards at national film competitions such as *Antalya Altın Portakal Film Festival* and *Adana Altın Koza Film Festival*.[13] Finally Güney paid extra attention to some action-adventure films since he believed they were the

[11] The list of the films can be found at the Appendix
[12] Arkadaş (Güney, 1974) is Güney's last film as an actor.
[13] Those films are *Kızılırmak Karakoyun* (Akad, 1967), *Hudutların Kanunu* (Akad, 1966), Seyyit Han (Güney, 1968), *Umut* (Güney, 1970), *Ağıt* (Güney,), *Baba* (Güney, 1971), *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974),

ones that "established an organic bond with the audience.[14]" (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) The thirty-one films are chosen based on all these scattered sources.

As previously mentioned, star images are made up of both the filmic and the extra-filmic material materials. Moreover, in terms of Yeşilçam cinema, audience's fascination with stars "extends beyond their screen appearances." (Kaya-Mutlu, 2002: 181) That is why; it was decided to undertake a wide research at the *National Library* in Ankara on the extra-filmic images. Cinema magazines of the 1960s and 1970s were investigated because the audience "seems to follow these magazines mostly to find out about stars, especially their off-screen lives." (Kaya-Mutlu, 2002: 184. The magazines chosen for investigation are *Ses*, *Pazar* and *Perde*. The reason behind the choice of these specific magazines is twofold: First, even though there were plenty other magazines that were published during the 1960s and 1970s, these three magazines were among the most popular sites where popular cinema and its actors were discussed. Secondly, these magazines continued to be published for over five years, showing a certain persistency that was not very common in the Turkish popular magazines at that time. Especially *Ses* is very important since it was published from the time Güney rose to stardom to the time he was sent to prison for the last time in 1974, making it a very important cultural site of meaning where Güney's star image can be traced from the beginning until the end. In addition, *Milliyet* newspaper temporarily opened its archives to public making *Milliyet Magazine İlavesi* accessible online. As the research continued to the 1970s at the *National Library*, it has been realized that during Güney's imprisonment years, the number of extra-filmic materials on Güney decreased to such a degree that it became

[14] Those films are *Canlı Hedef* (Güney, 1971), *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968), *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974), *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971) and most of his action-adventure films in the 1960s.

impossible to read his star image from the magazines. Other resources needed to be found. In exploring the imprisonment days, primary resources *Selimiye'den Mektuplar* which involved Güney's letters to his wife, Fatoş Güney and *Oğluma Hikayeler,* which included Güney's short stories to his son, Yılmaz Güney, were used. In addition, other secondary resources, which involved interviews with Fatoş Güney, Güney's prison friends, doctors and prison guards, were also used. The methodology that is used to analyze Güney's star image is discourse analysis and textual analysis. The conceptual tools that are used to further the analysis are marginalized and hegemonic masculinities, modernization projects of the 1930s and 1950s and the discursively constructed image of the Anatolian man.

1.4 Limitations of Study

Richard Dyer (1986: 18) suggests that stars are "categories of class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and so on." Therefore, Güney's star image cannot be reduced only to the discourses on masculinity since there are certainly other approaches and discourses - such as ethnicity - through which his star image can be read. Also, it is a fact that the meanings produced from these discourses could be read differently at different time periods. In other words, Güney's star image would certainly have different connotations in the 2000s when compared to the 1960s and 1970s. With that in mind, the dissertation is only interested in what Güney's star image meant in the 1960s and 1970s in relation his filmic and extra-filmic masculinities. Thus the dissertation limits itself to investigate particular

aspects of Güney's image at particular time periods and with a specific interest on masculinity.

This leads to another limitation of the dissertation, which is ethnicity. The dissertation fully acknowledges the fact that Güney was a Kurdish star and director. However, it also argues that his Kurdishness has not yet been constituted as a major characteristic of Güney's star image until the late 1970s. Since the dissertation limits it to exploring Güney's star image between 1965 and 1974, it does not dwell on the issue of ethnicity in general and how it is reflected in Güney's works and masculinity formations as a Kurdish actor and director in particular.

Another limitation of the dissertation is its methodology. Psychoanalysis has been a widely adopted as an analytical tool to investigate gender relations. Nonetheless, it has received vast criticism for being a universal, acultural and ahistorical grand theory. Güney's star image is deeply related to the socio-economic, cultural and political discourses in Turkey. By the time Güney rose to stardom, Turkish economy and politics were going under major structural changes. The ramifications of these changes are among the catalysts of Güney's phenomenal status. Therefore this dissertation chooses to explain Güney's masculinity constructions through the socio-economic and cultural discourses, rather than attributing them to a universal psyche.

1.5 Overview of Chapters

Chapter Two involves the literature review on masculinity theories starting with biological determinism, to sex-role theory and the socialist and culturalist perspectives on masculinity studies. The chapter also includes a literature review on modernization theories starting with the classical modernization theory to the theory of multiple modernities, alternative modernization and its different interpretations such as liquid modernity, non-Western modernities, local modernities etc.…

Chapter Three merges masculinity and modernization theories and looks at Turkish modernization projects and their gender constructions in literature, theatre and film. The chapter includes detailed analyses of masculinity and femininity constructions in the late-Ottoman era, early-republican era (1920-1950) and the late-republican era (1950-1980) taking into consideration the modernization projects that were being undertaken in each era.

Chapter Four looks at Yılmaz Güney's star image in the 1960s by exploring both the filmic and the extra-filmic materials. It discusses different masculinities constructed by his films and investigates if / how they correlate to his off-screen image.

Chapter Five is an investigation of Güney's military years (1968-1970). The chapter involves the exploration of the filmic and the extra-filmic material on Güney during the time of isolation; his divorce with Nebahat Çehre, his marriage with Fatoş Süleymangil, his decision making process to dismantle the Ugly King myth and the making and analysis of *Umut* (Güney, 1970).

Chapter Six explores Güney's star image in the 1970s, focusing on both the filmic and the extra-filmic materials. It covers Güney's isolation years at Selimiye Military Prison (1972-1974) and pays specific attention to Güney's last film as an actor, *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974).

The final chapter is reserved for conclusions and further suggestions.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES ON MASCULINITY AND MODERNIZATION

2.1 Masculinity Theories

Studies of masculinity have their roots in women studies. As a result of the changes in the social position of women and in an attempt to question women's social, economic, and political positions and representations, scholars started to explore the concepts of domination and subordination within various discourses such as class, race, ethnic identity, capitalism, and patriarchy. As the scholarly work grew, it paved the way to queer studies which first elaborated on the problems of homosexuality and later dealt with issues varying from homosexual / heterosexual dichotomy and stereotyping (Dyer, 1984; Straayer, 1996; Rich 1997) to eroticization of Asian men in gay porn videos, (Fung, 1991) to the possibility of gender-bending in Spanish cinema in relation to Franco's regime, (Acevedo-Munoz, 2004; Maddison 2000) to the analysis of transvestism (Woodhouse, 2000) and gender performances (Butler, 1990, 1993). One of the major contributions of queer studies to masculinity studies is that it opened up the issue of hierarchy among men to discussion and

elaborated on the possibilities to perceive masculinity as unfixed and fluctuating. The first wave of criticism on masculinity came in the 1970s when the sex / gender dichotomy and biological determinism were considered insufficient to explain masculinity adequately. The next wave of criticism was toward sex-role theory.

Sex-role theory attaches certain sets of expectations for men and women and these expectations are considered to be internalized smoothly and effectively by the help of different institutions such as family, schools, and media. Starting with the works of Lewis Terman and Catherine Miles in 1936, the first generation of sex-role theorists perceived people as passive recipients and claimed that "to be a man is to play a certain role." (Edley & Wetherell, 1995: 100) The key figure in the development of sex-role theory was Talcott Parsons who had "questions of how people were fitted into structures - what he called socialization - and he used psychoanalysis as a tool to approach sex-roles as internalized, taken-for-granted." (Carrigan, Connell, Lee, 1985: 554-556) In his analysis Parsons used terms like "masculine personality" and "feminine personality" which according to Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985: 556) turn his argument to a "normative standard case and fail to register tension and power processes *within* gender relations." This approach gave little autonomy to people's behaviors claiming that they rarely act as free agents but rather act like actors on stage, playing parts which have been assigned to them by birth. During the 1950s and 1960s sex-role theory continued to explore women in relation to the institution of family. One example is Mirra Komarovsky's work on the American working-class families, *Blue Collar Marriage* (1964), where she offers "detailed descriptions of script-following in courtship and within marriage" (as cited in R.W. Connell, 1995: 22) as well as developing "a general argument about modernization producing a clash between a

female homemaker ideal and a career girl ideal." (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 556)

The importance given to certain institutions in facilitating subject-formation and the assumption of sex roles call into mind the Althusserian concept of ideology. Althusser (1971: 136) names institutions such as the "church, government, family and education as Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs)." ISAs function by ideology and ideology uses interpellation to hail individuals as subjects of particular ideologies. When an individual answers to the hailing, he/she is transformed into a subject and hence assumes a certain subject position. In other words, interpellation becomes a process by which language identifies and constructs different social positions for everyone. For that reason, while individuals think of themselves as free and autonomous beings, they are actually answering to the ideology that is constantly interpellating them which, according to Althusser, is necessary for the survival of the dominant social structures. It can be argued that by suggesting specific roles to both men and women and considering that these roles will be assumed smoothly without any struggle, sex-role theory reproduces the Althusserian subject of ideology. In other words, subjects became parts of ISAs and work within that very ideology.

Sex-role theory received vast criticism. According to R.W. Connell (1993: 599), sex role theory "gives no grip on the distribution of power, on the institutional organization of gender, on the gender structuring of production, on the emotional contradictions of sexuality, or the emotional complexities of gender in everyday life." In other words, the theory perceives society as a place of no conflict to the point that each and everyone will assume their roles immediately. Hence there is neither a consideration of power, nor any struggle. Moreover, in sex-role theory when a man or

a group of men vary from the presumed norms of male behavior, it is considered as "deviance and a failure in socialization." (Carrigan, Connell, Lee, 1985: 578) Another criticism related to fixed gender roles came from Nigel Edley and Margaret Wetherell (1995: 101-102) who argue that sex-role theory decides for male dominance by attaining certain privileged positions to men such as ambition, confidence strength and prudishness, weakness, emotionality to women but fails to justify why these roles are defined the way they are.

Despite fixing certain roles for men and women, sex-role theory is different from biological determinism since it does recognize change. It dwells on the changing sex-roles but change is "always something that happens to sex-roles that impinges on them hence failing to grasp change as a dialectic arising within gender relations themselves." (Carrigan, Connell, Lee, 1985: 579-580) Notwithstanding its setbacks, sex-role theory paved the way for a culturalist approach to gender because even though it assumed the internalization of particular roles for men and women, unlike biological determinism, it approached social behavior as a "kind of performance," (Edley and Wetherell, 1995: 71) which differs in every culture.

Following sex-role theory of the period between the 1940s to the 1960s, the 1970s witnessed the rise of a masculinity literature that explores the different ways men were oppressed[15]. This oppression was linked to the sex-role but "the oppressor was not taken to be women; rather it was taken to be the *male role*." (Carrigan,

[15] Sex-role theory was not completely abandoned in the 1970s. Joseph Pleck, a social psychologist primarily concerned with the male sex role, wished to understand masculinity not as something permanently fixed by childhood experiences, but as a role that changes over the lifespan of the individual; as a role that is itself not stable, but undergoes significant changes. He rejected biological determinism and the psychoanalytical approach to sex-role and wished to assert the importance of social expectations. (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 570-573)

Connell and Lee, 1985: 567) The literature suggested that the male role did not have to be that oppressive, over-bearing and crushing if masculinity could be modernized. In this sense the "healthy modern man does not possess exclusively gender-consonant traits, but a mixture of masculine and feminine." (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 567) Masculinity literature was not unique to the 1970s however in the 1970s it became a genre that debated men's liberation and the ways in which masculinity could be reformulated. Yet in the later years, masculinity literature of the 1970s received criticism for its attempt to reassure masculinity and reestablish hegemonic masculinity.

> It is not, fundamentally, about uprooting sexism or transforming patriarchy, or even understanding masculinity in its various forms. When it comes to the crunch, what it is about is modernizing hegemonic masculinity. It is concerned with finding ways in which the dominant group - the white, educated, heterosexual, affluent males we know and love so well - can adapt to new circumstances without breaking down the social-structural arrangements that actually give them their power. (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 577)

Within the literature on the sociology of masculinity in the 1970s, Tolson's work is "the first serious attempt to explore class difference in the construction and expression of masculinity." (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 576) Tolson (1977) explored the meanings of being working / middle class men both in the work place and in the family and argued that working / middle class masculinities have different relations to capitalism, which also compel them to act differently in the family. Tolson (1977) suggests that working class men who face oppression in the work place by middle-class men tend to act more dominant in the family household. Other than Tolson, scholars like Seidler (1989) and Delpy and Leonard (1992) also took capitalism to the core of their research and argued that in the formation of gender identities capitalist structures constitute a major role. Coming from a Marxist background, these scholars perceived masculinity as a "set of distinctive practices that

emerge from men's positioning with in a variety of social structures such as work and the family" (Tolson, 1977: 102) and suggested that gender, race and class have unique ways of integrating into the capitalist structures. That is why they need to be explored as factors that affect the ways men place themselves within social structures.

The socialist perspective on gender faced criticism mainly from culturalist perspectives which take its theoretical background from the works of theorists Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson and Richard Hoggart who, during the 1950s and 1960s, developed a broader definition of culture as "the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life" (Williams, 1994: 60), a concept which perceived culture as a way of conflict (E. P. Thompson) and integrated the Gramscian concept of hegemony (Stuart Hall). Considering this theoretical background, the fundamental critique of the culturalist perspective toward both sex-role theory and socialist perspective was that they were categorical theories, which try to explain men's social position in the public and private sphere "by a single overarching factor" (Mac an Ghaill, 1996: 1) and that they approached gender as an area with no conflict or struggle assuming that the roles will be internalized smoothly. R.W. Connell (1987; 1995) is among the first scholars who suggested moving away from all categorical theories since they propose homogenous gender identities." Following Stuart Hall's integration of hegemony into cultural studies[16], R.W. Connell's social theory of gender (Connell 1987, 1993, 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) highlights that both masculinity

[16] Following Gramsci's theory, Hall (2002) argues that every text is embedded with ideology but the audience or the readers do not necessarily internalize it. They do not need to be passive subjects to the ideology in the text but rather choose to read the text from three hypothetical decoding positions. According to Hall (2002: 128-138), these positions are: a dominant reading which accepts the ideology in the text; a resistant reading which opposes the ideology in the text and a negotiated reading which while accepting the ideology also resists to it to some extend according to the class positions and discursive repertoire of the audience.

and femininity are not given but rather constructed in relation to different power relations, socio-political changes and contradictions. In this sense, gender in general and masculinity in particular become unfixed and fluctuating. They are adopted "from a range of possible styles and personae emerge from the gender regimes found in different cultural and historical periods." (Wetherell and Edley, 1999: 336) In addition masculinities are discussed "with respect to power struggle, division of labor and patterns of emotional attachment." (Carrigan, Connell, Lee, 1985: 591) Moreover culturalist perspective explores the notion of power as a mechanism, which not only involves domination and subordination of women by men, but also subjugation of men by other men. They acknowledge the plural nature of masculinities - some in conflict with each other. Still, it is "not enough to recognize diversity in masculinities." (R. W. Connell, 1995: 37) Relations between different kinds of masculinity, "relations of alliance, dominance and subordination also need to be recognized" (Connell, 1995: 37) because among these multiple masculinities some are more oppressive and dominating than others. In other words, according to Connell's theory, gender is not only constructed relationally but also hierarchically since it consists of multiple masculinities and femininities in a given culture. Since culture is an area of struggle and conflict, masculinity becomes an area, which is open to compliance, negotiation and resistance to dominant group, named as hegemonic masculinity.[17]

Hegemonic masculinity comes from the concept of hegemony. According to Gramsci, interpellation would not be enough for the dominant class to continue its dominant position because; people do not simply follow their instincts unconsciously. In other to achieve hegemonic position, dominant class not only

[17] R.W.Connell coined the concept of hegemonic masculinity in his book *Masculinities.*

needs to win the consent of the subordinate classes by making them perceive their norms and values as common sense, but it also needs to work out ways to reestablish and regain this dominant position which is contested and confronted regularly. Consequently, hegemonic masculinity refers to a set of circumstances in which power is won and preserved. Therefore in understanding of different kinds of masculinities, first, an examination on the practices in which hegemony is constituted and contested - "the political techniques of the patriarchal social order" - (Connell, 1995: 21-30) need to be made. Second, since hegemony involves the division of labor, the definition of some kinds of work as more masculine than others, establish a source of tension between the gender order and the class order.[18] Third, the negotiation and enforcement of hegemony involves the state.[19] Considered within this theoretical framework, hegemonic masculinity becomes "the cultural dynamic by which a group of men claims and sustains a leading position in social life." (Connell, 1995: 77) Even in patriarchal societies, "men too, may experience subordinations, stigmatizations or marginalizations as a consequence of their sexuality, ethnic identity, class position, religion or marital status." (Hearn and Morgan, 1990: 11) Hegemonic masculinity recognizes the existence of hierarchies of power among men. In other words, different modes of masculinity - complicit, subordinate and marginalized - have a hierarchical relationship with hegemonic masculinity. Complicit masculinity refers to the formations of a masculine identity, which accept the norms, socio-economic expectations, and ambitions, which are set by hegemonic masculinity. In other words, complicit masculinities support what

[18] Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985: 594) give the example of heavy manual labor, which is generally felt to be more masculine than white-collar and professional work.
[19] According to Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985: 594) the criminilization of male homosexuality as such was a key move in the construction of the modern form of hegemonic masculinity.

hegemony constructs as real, natural, current and ordinary. Subordinate masculinities, on the other hand, are in opposition to the hegemonic form and hence do not legitimize it. Subordinate masculinities can be produced collectively as a well-defined social group and a stable social identity. They can also be transient identities (R. W. Connell, 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985).

Connell (1995: 37) suggests that "hegemony is not automatic and may be disrupted – or even disrupt itself." The reason for Connell's argument is related to the fluid nature of hegemonic masculinity. It is a concept, which is open to change since it requires consent. In other words, far from having a fixed character, "hegemonic masculinity is a position always contestable." (Connell, 1995: 76) Yet, according to Connell, even though the definition of what constitutes hegemonic masculinity may be altered, one aspect is susceptible to change. That is the patriarchal aspect of hegemonic masculinity:

> "as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, it [hegemonic masculinity] guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women." Connell (1995: 77)

For sure, the meaning and the power relations within patriarchies are also bound to change in different eras and cultures. What is at stake here is patriarchy's ability to find different ways to oppress women even though the circumstances change. In other words, hegemonic masculinity legitimates the oppression of women above everything else and it is hegemonic so far "as it embodies a successful strategy in relation to women." (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 592) This aspect of hegemonic masculinity is also the reason why "very large numbers of men are

complicit in sustaining the hegemonic model because most men benefit from the subordination of women." (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985: 592)[20]

Connell suggests, "the task of being a man involves taking on and negotiating hegemonic masculinity" (as cited in Edley and Wetherell, 1999: 341) because "men's identity strategies are constituted through their complicit or resistant stance to prescribed dominant masculine styles." (Edley and Wetherell, 1999: 341) This particular argument gave rise to numerous ethnographic researches on ethnic, racial, sexual and national masculinities, which have shown different strategies, adopted by men to negotiate their position and formed alternative masculinities. These studies of alternative masculinity formations vary from the particular ways Christians and Goths "craft masculinity projects out of available cultural resources" (Wilkins, 2009), to the strategies of Sri Lankan men who act docile, submissive and effeminate in order to gain access to domestic work in Italy (Nare, 2010) to challenging the generalizations about American fraternity masculinity (Anderson, 2008) to more theoretical approaches of looking at alternative masculinities as processes of "endless becoming" which occur through continuously negotiation with the hegemonic form. (Nilan, 1995: 67)

Wilkins (2009: 344) draws attention to the subcultures and argues for the ability of subcultures in creating alternative gender identities because "they provide community and support for practices that might otherwise be isolating." Accordingly, Wilkins (2009: 344) suggests that since subcultures "collectively

[20] Subordination of women is not the only reason for this compliance. There is also "the element of gratification through fantasy and compensation through displaced aggression." (Carrigan, Connell, Lee, 1985: 592)

manipulate dominant meanings of masculinity," they enable "more flexibility in the performances of masculinity." Lena Nare (2010: 72-73) looks at the intersection of race, ethnicity and masculinity in her research on the Sri Lankan male domestic servants in Italy and argues that Sri Lankan men strategically exploit the stereotype of submissive, docile and effeminate Sri Lankan men and use deference as a strategy to maintain the distance toward their employers and by the same token safeguard their own independence and privacy. Similarly Eric Anderson (2008: 616) looks at the American fraternity system, which is considered to be hegemonic in its "institutionalized, gender-segregated, racially exclusive, sexist and highly homophobic masculine peer culture." However, his research demonstrates that not all men within fraternities are complicit with the hegemonic masculine form. Rather, some of them "resisted many tenets of hegemonic masculinity and constructed a normative and institutionalized form of masculinity based on inclusiveness than marginalization." (Anderson, 2008: 617)

Despite its contributions to the masculinity studies field, hegemonic masculinity has also been widely criticized. The majority of the criticism is based on the insufficiency of the term in its applications to real men (Flood, 2000; Beasley, 2008; Wetherell and Edley, 1999). Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley (1999: 336) question Connell for "leaving aside how the forms he identifies actually prescribe or regulate men's lives." They argue that even though men may conform to hegemonic masculinity; they are left to wonder how this conformity might look like in practice. According to Wetherell and Nigel (1999: 336), the hegemonic masculinity in Connell's initial writings tends to be correlated with "what might be called macho masculinity." Arguing from the same vein, Christine Beasley (2008: 88) points to some of the insufficiencies of hegemonic masculinity such as how it's meaning as a

political mechanism is tied to the word *hegemony*, as a descriptive word referring to *dominant* and as an empirical reference specifically to *actual groups of men*. Beasley (2008: 88-89) suggests that while dominant forms of masculinity do not necessarily legitimate power, those that do legitimate it, may not necessarily be socially celebrated or common.

In his writings, Connell's approach to the real life practices of real men has been unclear. Even though Connell does suggest that hegemonic masculinity is an ideal, he still claims that it can be achieved. For instance, in 1985, Connell wrote that "the hegemonic model may only correspond to the actual characters of a small number of men," (as cited in Carrigan, Connell, Lee, 1985: 592) in his book published in 1995 he acknowledges that hegemonic masculinity is neither intended as a description of real men nor a personality type of an actual male character. Rather, it is a set of ideas, which no man is able to fully embody. After much criticism, in 2005, Connell revisited the concept of hegemonic masculinity with Messerschmidt. The reason for the rethinking of the concept, according to Connell, is the changing world gender order due to the effects of globalization and imperialism and the neoliberal market economies. Due to these changes in the new millennium, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) propose the term "socially dominant masculinities" as an equivalent for hegemonic masculinity. Moreover they also suggest that this socially dominant group is now the economically privileged men of transnational corporation but Connell also suggests "many men who hold significant social power do not embody hegemonic masculinity." (Connell, Messerschmidt, 2005: 838) Even though Connell revised the subject, the reference to a privileged group of men as bearers of hegemonic masculinity once again includes actual men. As Beasley (2008: 86) argues the concept of hegemonic masculinity, now used in a global hegemonic form on a world scale, is

still understood to refer to a particular group of men and yet remain singular and monolithic.

Another criticism is on the singular nature hegemonic masculinity. Wetherell and Edley (1999) question whether it would be possible to talk about multiple hegemonic masculinities. Connell addressed this criticism in his 2005 article with Messerschmidt when he proposed that because globalization created a new world gender order, this new order need to involve the rearticulation of national hegemonic masculinities into the global arena. What is at stake is that, this time, the new formulation of hegemonic masculinity of Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) propose multiple versions of hegemonic masculinity making them plural.

The ways in which the concept of hegemonic masculinity is sufficient to explain different modes of masculinities in different cultures at different times with particular power relations and division of labor are still widely debated. What is at stake here is that hegemonic masculinity has been very influential in the field of masculinity studies. Not only it facilitated immense scholarly research on the negotiation strategies of minorities, subcultures and ethnic groups who have been sexually and racially marginalized, it also helped to decenter masculinity studies from the realm of the West and to move to other parts of the world. For this dissertation, the concept is crucial. Hegemonic masculinity is an important conceptual tool explore Güney's star image because of Güney's relation to the hegemonic discourses of male beauty in Yeşilçam, his difference in socio-economic background and his political inclinations. All of these factors not only marginalized Güney's filmic and extra-filmic masculinities. Therefore, before moving onto analyzing Güney's star image, it is necessary to explore Turkish modernization

projects to better comprehend the gender configurations in Turkey during Güney's film career.

2.2 Modernization Theories

Arif Dirlik (2002: 20) defines classical theory of modernization as a discourse which "enforces a cultural homogeneity that is consistent with a program of modernization conceived, if not along Euro American lines, but along their functional equivalents." Classical theories of modernization formulate this program by lining up all countries in a linear path where history is perceived as linear and continuous. In these theories, modernization is synonymous with westernization and each country has to go through the same phases in order to be modernized / westernized.

Classical modernization theory uses certain categories such as science and technology, religion, culture, urbanization, and family and gender roles, in order to accomplish and sustain superiority over the definition of the modern. By presuming that these categories all have a superior default, which is set by the West, the West becomes capable of constructing the Other through their "lacks" in these categories. It is possible to see the comparison between the "advanced" and "backward" counties in terms of these categories in the works of Bernard Lewis and Daniel Lerner. In his book, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Lewis (2002) focuses on the social, economic and cultural reforms of the late-Ottoman and Kemalist era. Lewis (2002: 439) argues that the adaptations and translations of European literature

"helped to familiarize Turkish readers and spectators with some aspects of European manners and customs otherwise entirely alien to them." In terms of arts, Lewis (2002: 441) clearly states the importance of Western art and claims that it is "more intelligible than their own [Ottoman] ancient calligraphy and design." While the journals on philosophy, geology, natural sciences, gave its readers a "clear and vivid picture of Western achievements in these fields," (Lewis, 2002: 437) Western music is the "secret an aspiring newcomer must penetrate." (Lewis, 2002: 442) From these examples it can be argued that just like how Flaubert "spoke for and represented the Egyptian courtesan," (Said, 1976: 6) Lewis hides his agency and proposes his ideas on modernization as the absolute truth. In doing so, Lewis champions these reforms in helping Turkish people in the road to modernization by learning Western arts, literature and music and above all "teach them the Western manners" (Lewis, 2002: 440) without critically evaluating the differences between the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and the West. Lerner (1965), also speaking from birds-eye, constructs a classical modernization theory on the assumption that any country which is not industrialized is backward, resulting in the generalization that "economic development, which signals a path that needs to be followed, is the key to modernity." (Lerner, 1965: 25)

1990s saw the emergence of the theory of multiple modernities. The theory grew as a reaction to the classical modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s and it suggests that they provide "an oversimplified, empirically incorrect and normatively questionable view of this world." (Schmidt, 2006: 77). Multiple modernities seem to imply that "there are as many modernities as there are modern - or modernized - societies." (Schmidt, 2006: 80). Nevertheless, this does not suggest an infinite number of modernities. What is at stake is the possibility of other

modernities which are "*outside* the West and cannot be fully understood in terms of the categories and concepts developed to make sense of *western* modernity." (Schmidt, 2006: 80)

S.N. Eisenstadt is among the first scholars to theorize multiple modernities. He (1999: 283-284) argues that rather than the clash of civilizations[21] or the end of history[22] what we are witnessing is the "development of multiple modernities." However, even though distinct types of modernities occurred within different nation-states, "in many respects they are international" (Eisenstadt, 2000: 2) because modernity started in the West and moved into different parts of the world. Eisenstadt (2000: 14) claims that modernity first reached different Asian societies, then the Middle Eastern countries and finally came to Africa. The path that it followed though was similar in all of these countries. Eisenstadt also argues that modernization was "carried forward by specific social actors" (Eisenstadt, 2000: 14) who possess different visions on what constitutes a modern society. As a result of the programs of these social actors, the traditional political orders were broken down and they became catalysts of new possibilities in the construction of a new order. (Eisenstadt, 2000: 5) These modernizing societies also adopt the "basic model of the territorial state and later of the nation-state." (Eisenstadt, 2000: 14) This is followed by the adoption of the "basic premises and symbols of western modernity and West's modern institutions - representative, legal and administrative." (Eisenstadt, 2000: 14) This is how according to Eisenstadt (1999: 289) multiple modernities are mostly formed; through the integration of "different themes and institutional patterns of the original western modern civilization." Unlike Lewis (2000) and Lerner (1958),

[21] See Huntington, S amuel1997. *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York. Touchstone.
[22] See Fukuyama, Francis 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. Free Press.

Eisenstadt does not champion immersing into these themes and institutional patterns but rather suggests their reconsideration / re-appropriation by non-western societies. That is how, new models of modernization programs could construct a specific collective identity and with regards to the multiple numbers of cultural and social formations, Western model of modernization would lose its homogenizing aspects. (Eisenstadt, 2000: 24)

Eisenstadt's argument on multiple modernities is important because it opens up new ways to approach modernity. However, it still accepts that the start of modernization happens in the West and only through reformulations of Western institutions; other countries are able to form their own modernities. In other words, Eisenstadt argues (1999: 285) that "the different dimensions of the original Western project have indeed constituted the crucial starting and continual reference points for the processes that developed among different societies throughout the world." Hence his argument still considers West as superior whose elements, even though they are reformulated, *will be* used to create multiple modernities. Ballantyne (2008: 54) disagrees with Eisenstadt's claim and argues that rather than the themes and institutional patterns of the West, the "diverse civilizational legacies (that) give rise to multiple models of modernity." In other words, Ballantyne's argument on the formation of multiple modernities champions the traditions, norms, folklore and cultural differences in each society in producing their creative adaptation.

Another aspect of Eisenstadt's argument is his assumption that modernity starts in the West and later moves on to Asia and the Middle East and finally Africa. This argument immediately calls for a hierarchy between geographies and proposes a horizontal line of modernization – very similar to classical modernization theory.

Also, this hierarchy suggests that a certain amount of time needs to pass in order for modernity to reach to different geographies. For instance, Africa, which is at the bottom of Eisenstadt's list, is presumed to get modernized the latest.

Another term that is used to describe different types of modernities is alternative modernity. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (1999) calls for thinking in terms of alternative modernities but she also argues that this does not mean "one blithely abandons the Western discourse on modernity since that is virtually impossible." (Gaonkar, 1999: 13) To think in terms of alternative modernities, then, is to look for a cultural theory of modernity. Unlike an acultural modernity, which is "a theory of convergence," (Gaonkar, 1999: 15) cultural modernity suggests "different starting points for the transition to modernity lead to different outcomes." (Gaonkar, 1999: 15) In other words, "at every national or cultural site, people rise to meet modernity and appropriate it in their own fashion." (Gaonkar, 1999: 17) This rearticulation leads to "creative adaptations" as sites where people "make themselves modern, as opposed to being made modern by alien and impersonal forces and where they give themselves an identity and destiny." (Gaonkar, 1999: 16) It is these creative adaptations that enable us to question the present, which is "the attitude of modernity." (Gaonkar, 1999: 17) What is more, these creative adaptations are the reasons why "modernity is an incomplete project." (Gaonkar, 1999: 17)

Similar to Gaonkar, Nilüfer Göle (2000) stresses the necessity to decenter the West from the equation of modernity and to look at the peripheries instead. This, according to Göle (2000: 45-46), will allow us to "grasp global modernity in a multidimensional direction, and thus create an awareness of similarities between seemingly unconnected historical and cultural experiences." Nilüfer Göle (2000)

suggests that both local, multiple and alternative models of modernity contribute to formation of non-western modernities. According to Göle (2000: 44), non-western modernities is a "theoretical and methodological effort to create new ways of reading and seeing some aspects of social life which have been either repressed as discordant with modernity or judged and dismissed as regressive or transitory phenomena." Göle (2000: 45) proposes four ways of contemplating on non-western modernities, which are "decentering the West, introducing coeval time, and replacing the perspective of "lack" with "extra" modernity and dissonant traditions." Decentering the West is to take the geographical proximity out of the equation when thinking about modernities because then it becomes possible to approach the "intellectual references among non-western countries horizontally" (Göle, 2000: 45) and hence find "similar representations and common myths" (Göle, 2000: 46) among them. Göle (2000: 46) also suggests that the similarities, which are observed in non-western countries "create an awareness of similarity between seemingly unconnected historical and cultural experiences." Decentering the West makes possible to think of modernities not based on the socio-cultural and political structures of the Western countries, but rather urges non-western countries to explore their own infrastructures. When the West is decentered, "the periphery seizes this moment as another kind of opportunity unthought of in Europe." (Kaup, 2006: 129) In this sense rather than imitating the West, non-western countries "undergoes yet another (now post-modern) cycle of modernity's development." (Kaup, 2006: 129)

Nevertheless, decentering the West, in Göle's (2000) argument also leads to categorizing non-western countries in a single group through the possible similarities in their representations and common myths. In this regard, this interconnectedness may not only lead to the foundation of a homogenized group but also to positioning

that group in opposition to the western countries - all leading to the reproduction of the two polls of the binary opposition - the West and the non-western - once again.

In this sense, coeval time stands as a more elaborate way to approach non-western modernities. With coeval time, Nilüfer Göle (2000: 46-49) suggests avoiding the temporal and spatial deception by arguing against the horizontal line of development. First, she stresses the (mis) usage of the word "civilization" in many non-western countries. By giving the example of Turkish modernization projects, Göle suggests that the modernizing elites in the non-western countries tend to use the motto of reaching the level of contemporary civilization. This, according to Göle (2000: 48) is a good example of the ideological time dimension of modernity:

> Although contemporary means present time, sharing the same time, the Turkish mode of modernization points at a time in the future, "contemporanization" denoting becoming rather than being a contemporary of the West and sharing the same time and experience.

In this sense, contemporary becomes not the present time, but the ideal time non-western countries need to be in once they are modernized. Time becomes ideological because non-western countries do not consider themselves being contemporaries with the West and therefore envision entering into "Western" time. This is where Göle stresses the importance of coeval time by proposing that the level of modernization of a country cannot be assumed according to their proximity to the West. Coeval time suggests that the histories of modernity can happen at different times and in different ways in different cultures. One country does not need to follow a more modern one in order to reach a higher state of modernization. In other words, the countries that are considered backward by the West can actually be more modern in their own infrastructures. In this sense, when coevalness is considered in relation

to the Western and non-western countries, it does not "imply similarity but on the contrary necessitates an awareness of the asymmetrical reconstructions of the relationships between modernity of the West and the others." (Göle, 2000: 49)

Other than multiple and alternative modernities, Göle discusses extra modernity. She argues that modernity in non-western countries is not simply a lack because "in the non-Western contexts, modernity cannot be approached in symmetrical terms." (Göle, 2000: 50) Rather, non-eastern modernities have an extra character, which is "both as external to the West and as additional and uncommon." (Göle, 2000: 50) Göle's approach to think in difference not in lack is similar to the goal of global modernity studies which is a way of "reading lack otherwise" or abandoning the negative rhetoric of deficiency and inferiority in the assessment of "modernities at large" around the globe." (Kaup, 2006, p: 132)

In terms of de-traditionalization, Göle's points to the relationship between modernity and tradition and argues that in non-western countries where "authoritarian forms of modernization prevailed," (Göle, 2000: 52) there occurs a rupture, a cut with the past. Consequently, old traditions are destroyed or ignored instead of being interpreted in order to move forward along the road to modernization. This destruction, according to Göle (2000: 53), results in a "discontinuity between traditions and modernity in non-western contexts." Nonetheless, discontinuity does not necessarily mean the death or the revival of traditions but rather a "paradoxical search for harmony between subjectivity and modernity" (Göle, 2000: 55) since, for instance, just when it is assumed that "globalism takes over local life-styles, a newfound interest for traditions, local aesthetics, past memory appear in unexpected forms." (Göle, 2000: 54-55)

Göle's argument on de-traditionalization is in opposition with Raymond Lee's (2006) conceptualization of liquid modernity. Lee (2006: 362) associates liquid modernity with a "borderless world", where everyone is a consumer and a nomad and cannot be restrained spatially and temporally. In this world, traditions disappeared long time ago and people only revive dead traditions or invent new ones "as a form of entertainment for global tourists." (Lee, 2006: 362) Other than liquid modernity, Lee (2006) explores reflexive and multiple modernities. What these three models have in common is that modernity can never be singular again and now "represents a spectrum of meanings marked by different cultural agendas." (Lee, 2006: 365) Reflexive modernity, according to Lee (2006: 359) is a "second theory of modernity" which unlike "first modernity" is a conscious attempt to "mark and redraw the boundaries and the consequences." Reflexive modernity thus becomes in a way a righting the wrongs of the first modernization attempt whereas liquid modernity does not give any opportunity for reconstruction because it liquidifies everything to the point that there is no "prospect of returning to an original solid state." (Lee, 2006: 365) It can be argued that this pessimistic vision of liquid modernity is the opposite of reflexive modernity which is more optimistic, almost naive, in the sense that it argues for the possibility to "reconstruct the foundation of the first modernity" (Lee, 2006: 365) without making the mistakes of the first modernity. Where do multiple modernities stand in relation to liquid and reflexive modernities? Lee (2006: 366) associates multiple modernities with "non-western modernizations' expressions of postcolonial social growth." In this sense, the notion of multiple modernities targets the destruction of the "colonial assumptions of modernity as universal and hegemonic." (Lee, 2006: 366) Here, Lee limits his theory to the countries founded after decolonization and does not include countries that

were never colonized such as Iran or Turkey. Lee (2006: 364) also suggests that multiple modernities provide a criticism to the west-oriented understanding of a singular modernity. He gives the example of Confucianized modernity of East Asia and argues that even within East Asian countries such as China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where there are common Confucian values, these common values "may not be sufficient to represent *a* specific modernity."

The rise of scholarly works on multiple and alternative modernities suggest that a horizontal line of development in modernization is not longer applicable. Rather we can talk about different modes of modernities, which occur at different times and in different cultures. With respect to the discussions above, the next chapter looks at how modernity is appropriated in Turkey in the early-republican era of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s and in the late-republican era of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

CHAPTER 3

MODERNIZATION PROJECTS IN THE EARLY-REPUBLICAN (1920-1950) AND THE LATE-REPUBLICAN (1950-1980) ERAS

Since the establishment of the Turkey in 1923, Turkey has witnessed many appropriations of modernity by different social agents. The following is an analysis of the modernization projects in the early-republican era and the late-republican era.[23] It is important to highlight the fact that dividing the past into periods and identifying landmarks and turning points that are supposed to separate periods are a subject of interminable discussion." (Zürcher, 2007: 1) In dividing the periods as the "early-republican" and "late-republican," the landmarks that were taken as separating points were the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the 1950 elections in Turkey since both landmarks point to the start of two different modernization projects; the modernization project of Republican People's Party (RPP) and the modernization

[23] Even though 1980's and 2000's witnessed different modernization projects, the dissertation chooses to limit itself to the period until the 1980s since the dissertation investigates Yılmaz Güney's image until the end of 1970s.

project of the Democrat Party (DP) with its successor Justice Party (JP). Since the dissertation looks at different gender configurations, which were produced due to the socio-cultural and economic changes that were initiated by these two modernization projects, it chooses to periodize the years between 1920 to 1950 as the early-republican and the 1950-1980 as the late-republican.

Alev Çınar (2005: 7) suggests that every modernization project has an ideal future and they all have the "common goal to transform society toward that ideal future." The concept of ideal future here should be understood as a dreamed ideal for each country to become a better place for its citizens. In Turkey, this ideal future differs according to the socio-economic and political programs of the ruling parties. This dissertation aims neither criticize nor champion one project or the other but rather to trace these historical periods in order to provide a background on these socio-economic and political changes over the years.

3.1 Modernization in the Early-republican Era (1920-1950)

Lee (2006: 365) argues that the need to establish uniqueness and a unique identity suggest that multiple modernities are "potentially nationalistic because it is impossible to speak of the emergence of one kind of modernity without referring to its national identity." Accordingly, in the core of early-republican modernization lays the rupture from the Islamic Ottoman Empire with its entire socio-political infrastructure and the foundation of a modern and secular nation-state. By rupturing the link between the Ottoman Empire, early-republican modernization not only

helped delegitimize the Ottoman Islamic Law but also used nationalism as a tool for nation building since it empowered the Turkish national subject and established national sovereignty. In other words, early-republican modernization was nationalistic in its attempt to replace the idea of *ümmet* (religious community) with *millet* (nation) as well as the Ottoman history and culture with a discursively invented Pre-Islamic Turkish culture and history. Western tools of modernization such as advancement in technology, science, and fine arts were considered integral to this invention, however because it was a nationalistic revolution based on invented traditions geared toward the entire socio-cultural, political and economic infrastructure, it was also unique to Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk started with the political reforms. On November 1st, 1922, Ottoman Dynasty was abolished. That followed the foundation of the Turkish Republic on October 29th, 1923. On March 3rd, 1924 Caliphate was abolished and later that year, the Turkish Constitution was adopted. The social reforms, on the other hand, were more difficult since according to Şerif Mardin (1971: 205), "religion in the Ottoman Empire was the mediating link between local and social forces and the political structure." Social cohesion, social justice and overall social structure in the Ottoman Empire came from Islam. That is why, even though the Ottoman Empire's political and judicial authority was terminated, the social values and traditions, which were inherited, were still intact in society. In other words, Islam did not only connect people to the state, it also provided them with a way of

life. Thus, in an attempt to rupture that mediating link, a strong substitute needed to be found. Secularism was that substitute[24]

For that matter, The Directorate for Religious Affairs Religion (DRA) was founded in 1925 and Orthodox Islam was taken under full state control. In 1924 the Education Bill was accepted and was incorporated into the 1924 constitution. The Education Bill brought religious schools under state control providing secular coeducation. The press supported the coeducational system. In an article in *Resimli Şark*, Nami (1932: 10) wrote that coeducation could not be considered as "immoral or shameful because since men and women need each other in the later years of their lives, it would not be wise to separate them." In addition Nami (1932:11) claimed that the students who go to coeducational schools

> get to know each other better and they look at each other with more respect whereas the students of the separate sex schools tend more to meet in apartment buildings, dance and even reenact the flirting scenes they see on film theatres with each other.

The Civil Code was passed in 1926 and provided the legal framework for all other social reforms to flourish. Women were given equal rights in courts in terms of divorce, inheritance and the custody of children. Their testimonies were considered equal to men in court. Later in 1934 women were granted suffrage and in the "1935 elections 18 women (4.5% of the Assembly) were elected, the highest number of women deputies in Europe at that time when European countries including France

[24] However, it would not be correct to suggest that Kemalist revolution was anti-religious since it did not ban religion but rather regulated and confined Islam into private sphere. It can be argued that the replacement of Islamic Law with secularism is also the reason why secularism has become a quasi-religion and a new sense of legitimacy in Turkey.

and Italy did not even have female franchise." (Göle, 1996: 38) Like religious education, women's attire was also another link to the Ottoman heritage. However, Kemalist revolution did not ban veiling but rather encouraged women to abandon it. In an article entitled "Madamlık Matmazellik" in *Resimli Şark* (1932: 45) the veiling is talked about as a "tradition of Arabic culture which does not belong to Turkish culture and women do not need to hide themselves from men." Arabic script was replaced with Latin letters in 1928. The press supported the reforms and perhaps one of the most striking articles which combines the reforms on women, social life, equality of sexes and language is the article published in *Resimli Şark* where Turkish language was praised and it was reminded to the readers that "Turkish language does not allow any difference between men and women; there are no titles to address married and single women just like how there are not any different titles for married or single men." ("Madamlık Matmazellik", 1932: 45) Considering the multiple numbers of reforms on women's rights, it can be argued that femininity was a major concern in the early-republican era. It also means that women's emancipation requires a major change in the gender dynamics and the understanding of masculinity. The following is an analysis of the gender constructions of the idealized femininity and masculinity in the early-republican era.

3.1.1 Kemalist Femininities

On Keriman Haris' title as the 1932 Beauty Queen of the World:

> Keriman Haris is a perfect representative of a nation who fought an independence war, ruptured its bonds with the Islamic tradition, Ottoman culture and its mentality, established a secular education for everyone, took up pre-Islamic Turkish culture, history, proved to everyone how Turks have an honorable past and emancipated Turkish women. (Resimli Şark, 1932)

The above quotation clearly declares that the newly formed Turkish Republic is secular, nationalistic and emancipated. Furthermore its emancipation can be best represented in the image of its ideal woman. This is particularly unique to Turkey considering that "every revolution redefines attributes of an ideal man, yet the Kemalist revolution celebrates an ideal woman." (Göle, 1996: 64) The ideal woman was imagined to be secular, well educated, and active in the public sphere. She was an idealist nationalist who would / should go to under-privileged Anatolian villages to serve her nation and help make it a modern and civilized place particularly through education and medical assistance. The press contributed to this image. In a letter published in *Resimli Şark*, an Istanbulite, who defines herself as a spoiled and selfish bourgeois girl, wrote about her experience in rural Turkey. She acknowledges that before she went to the village, she looked down on peasants and thought of them as dirty, illiterate and miserable people. However, after spending her summer in the village, she started to appreciate the beauty in every part of her nation and realized that her country was not limited to fancy ballrooms and restaurants or the beauties of Istanbul. She ends the letter addressing to her nation: "Oh my dear and beautiful country! You are worth loving more than anything and even any mother. I am so sorry for those sons of yours who do not understand that." ("Dağ Kızları", 1932)

However, perhaps the most striking example of how nationalism and woman question are combined is the letter written by Atatürk's own mother addressing to Atatürk. In that letter, Zübeyde Hanım guarantees her son the loyalty of Turkish women to their nation: "My dear son! Turkish mothers bored their children for the nation and sacrificed them in the name of the nation. They will continue to do so due to this kind of love of their nation." (1932: 8)

There are many criticisms toward the reforms of Kemalist revolution on the woman question, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is at stake here is the criticism on the "patriarchal nature" of these reforms which was brought by scholars like Şirin Tekeli, Zehra F. Arat, Yeşim Arat, Ayşe Durakbaşa and Ayşe Kadıoğlu in the mid-1980s. They acknowledge the importance of early-republican reforms for encouraging women to participate in the social, economic and political life; however, they also criticize the Lawmakers for neglecting to create the social conditions for these reforms to be effective in the private sphere. Because patriarchal norms and values remained untouched, early-republican reforms were not satisfactory in altering the strong traditional norms and values of patriarchy especially in the rural areas. In other words, the main argument of these scholars was that early-republican reforms emancipated women in the public sphere, but did not "liberate them." (Kandiyoti, 1987: 317)

Tekeli (1995: 12) suggests that the Civil Code had a "patriarchal nature by recognizing the husband as head of the family." Göle (1996: 38) argues that according to the Civil Code, "the husband was entitled to choose domicile and the wife had to obey him and needed his consent to work outside the home." This resulted, according to Durakbaşa (2000: 148), in the continuation of patriarchal

norms to be “practiced and replicated in the private realm.” Moreover, it also prevented women’s access to employment and education opportunities especially in the more-populated rural areas since “only 20 % of the population lived in the cities.” (White, 2003: 147) That is why, only a small proportion of upper-class women were able to benefit from these opportunities resulting in the “class-bound and uneven” (Jayawardena, 1986: 37) nature of the reforms. Durakbaşa (2000: 149) also argues that “the main normative categories of classical patriarchy, *şeref* (family reputation) and *namus* (honor) were fully preserved during the Kemalist reform era and women were expected to conform to appropriate sexual behavior in order to protect family reputation and honor.” Thus women continued to be “the symbol of honor of family and nation.” (Arat, 2000: 26) This, according to Arat, (2000: 26) became problematic because “the notion of honor restricts women’s sexuality, behavior and opportunities.” In sum early-republican reforms are criticized deeply by these scholars since “socialization path followed by women, permitted by will, support, and regulation of men was determined at the expense of the individual and sexual identities of women.” (Göle, 1996: 78)

Admittedly, it is quite difficult to expect a change in the cultural and traditional norms with these reforms in such a short period of time, especially since, “popular mobilization and feminist demands for these reforms were absent” (Koçtürk, 1992: 32) In other words, it takes overnight to pass the political, economic and cultural reforms from the parliament and see theirs applications in the judicial, educational and political spheres, but it sure takes more than overnight to integrate social reforms into the cultural traditions and modes of living of a society, ruled under Ottoman Sharia Law for five hundred years. Nevertheless, early-republican reforms did “attempt to penetrate into the life-style, manners, behavior and daily

customs of the Turkish people, beyond the transformation of the state apparatus" (Göle, 1996: 58)" and despite all its setbacks, Kemalist revolution "was groundbreaking and successful in allowing Turkish women to participate in society at all levels to an extent of unheard in Europe or the US at the time." (White, 2003: 158)

3.1.2 Kemalist Masculinities

Even though there are multiple numbers of scholarly works on the construction and the critique of Kemalist woman, there is not much research on Kemalist masculinities. One important medium in exploring Kemalist masculinities (Jale Parla, 1990; Deniz Kandiyoti, 1997; Elif Bilgin, 2004; Ayşe Saraçgil, 2005) has been the late Ottoman and the early Republican literature. These researches not only reveal different male subjects in the novels of both periods, but also discuss these masculinities within different discourses such as nationalism, excessive-modernization and fundamentalism. Elif Bilgin (2004: 95) takes novels, novellas, and newspaper articles as her main cultural site of meaning in the late Ottoman period and the Republican era and it is through that literature she reads the masculinities created by the male elite. She argues that the Ottoman male elite took on the role of the father[25] and suggested appropriate gender roles especially for

[25] Late-Ottoman period was also a time of turbulence since the Ottoman dynasty was dissolving. In other words, the order of the Symbolic Father was being shattered. That is why literature presents a major anxiety triggered by the perception of the loss of authority. Fatherlessness and misguidance have been repetitive themes. This loss of the father and severe anxiety resulted in the de-masculinization of culture and according to Bilgin (2004: 120) this anxiety was "the cultural theme of the late-Ottoman literature."

young Ottoman men and women in the micro-societies they created in their novels. Similarly Jale Parla (1990) also discusses masculinity constructions in the late Ottoman literature. According to Parla (1990: 44) "the fathers/the writers[26] would know everything, teach everything and intervene with the narrative structure to make sure that the characters really learn what they teach. And yes, they will judge."[27] In this sense, the first novels were cautionary tales, which were "pedagogically driven." (Bilgin, 2004: 85) The motivation behind these novels was to send a message to society about the right and the wrong ways of becoming western. In other words the late-Ottoman male elite were not against westernization but rather westernization and modernization was a question of drawing and managing boundaries.

The most important boundary was space. By dividing the public and private space with the help of gender segregation that came with Islam, the male elite of the late Ottoman era was able to turn the "family into a castle of chastity." (Bilgin, 2004: 90) Family was protected in a way that westernization was not allowed to permit to the family sphere[28]. According to Bilgin (2004: 90), the protection of private space from westernization as the "last castle of chastity" was a new type of patriarchy, which "brought into existence different from the traditional order but one which was also explicitly claimed to be different from the Western family." In other words, the private, which was associated with family, femininity and spirituality, was used to

[26] Those fathers according to Parla (1990: 95) were "Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ahmet Mithad, Samipaşazade Sezai, Muallim Naci and Recaizade Ekrem."

[27] For instance in *Müşahedat*, Ahmet Mithad gives the role of the observer to the author and hencee includes himself to the novel. He becomes one of the characters. The novel becomes writer-centered where the writer tells his social desires through inner monologue, adopts the role of the father of one of the characters in the novel and makes plans for the future. Moreover he judges and evalutes the actions of the characters all the time using fatherhood as a strategy to guide, protect and judge. (Parla, 1990: 60-63)

[28] Later in the dissertation Bilgin (2004: 126) will argue that it was Kemalism that allowed westernization to enter the sphere of family when she suggests, "with interfering with Family Law, under Kemalism, the sphere hitherto most resistant to westernization and transformation would thus be radically dismantled and defabricated."

set the limit of westernization, making the institution of family a major concern for the late Ottoman male elite.

Space as boundary was not limited to the realm of the family but extended to certain neighborhoods as well. However for neighborhoods / the outside, literature turns to the male characters to discuss neighborhood as a boundary between westernization and tradition. As Bilgin (2004: 101) suggests "several districts of Istanbul were deemed to be the last castles of spirituality." For instance, in the late Ottoman literature, Beyoğlu is a mirror of the West. It is flooded with dangers for the corrupt young people just like Europe. "These dangers are particularly related to the body, sensuality and sexuality." (Parla, 1990: 67) The distinction is apparent especially in Peyami Safa's novel *Fatih Harbiye* for which Bilgin (2004: 101) suggests that while the former is where "traditions lived and persisted", the latter is the locus of cosmopolitan life where various different cultures intermingle. The city, in this sense, presents a danger of getting lost amidst cosmopolitan streets and more importantly it becomes the "realm of the *flaneur* who is very much scared of for his autonomous ways and persistent curiosity." (Bilgin, 2004: 105) It can be suggested that the late-Ottoman male elite associated the public with their male characters and the private with their female characters. However, they did not let them burden-free within these domains as well. While the young men had to be careful not to become a *flaneur*, the women had to be cautious about maintaining their distance to the outside so that they would not be infected with excessive-modernization.[29]

[29] An important observation Bilgin (2004: 107) makes in the novels of the late Ottoman period is related to the fate of the young men and women who cross the boundaries drawn by the male elite. She argues that while the excessively westernized Ottoman men face losing their honor, women lose their lives.

Other than the *flaneur*, Bilgin (2004) discusses the "the first Other of Turkish literature" the dandy and the wastrel as metaphors of the threat of excessive-westernization. The dandy and the wastrel posed threats because they were represented to have lost "their true essence and manhood and cultural spirit becoming effeminate" (Bilgin, 2004: 257) partly due to fatherlessness and cosmopolitanism. The ideal masculinity, on the other hand, was "combined with patriotism, altruism and respect for the mother as the beholder of culture's distinctiveness at a time of accelerated westernization and in the face of feminized threat of modernization." (Bilgin, 2004: 109-110) Cultural distinctiveness is especially important because it suggests the denial of culture which is "the denial of the Father and it leads to disaster." (Parla, 1990: 26) Therefore the hegemonic masculinity was constructed to have a proper Islamic culture and decency, despite the absence of the Father. Saraçgil (2005) presents the character of Selim Paşa in *Sinekli Bakkal* as an example of idealized masculinity in the late Ottoman era. She (2005: 275) argues that Selim Paşa is a real man who considers his duty and honor and defending the system he presents as the most important things in life. Perhaps one of the best examples that form the dichotomy of hegemonic and marginalized masculinities of the late Ottoman era is Ahmet Midhat's *Felatun Bey and Rakım Efendi*. Saraçgil (2005: 126) suggests that Felatun Bey[30] is the first example of the young decadent man who has become excessively French-ized in the Turkish literature of the Ottoman era. "He is lazy… pretentious, arrogant about stuff he does not know… and very extravagant." (Naci, 1990: 35) He is a bad role model who is

[30] Similar to Felatun Bey, his sister Mihriban is also the first example of a series of female characters that fall victim to excessive modernization in these novels.

misunderstood and feminized- overly cautious about his clothing, manners and overall physical appearance. He is a slave of his desires and has no sense of responsibility. He is also a wastrel and a snob who spends his father's inheritance on women, gambling, and clothing. Rakım Efendi, on the other hand, is Ahmet Midhat's ideal man. "He comes from a poor family… He is a self-made man" (Naci, 1990: 37-38) He is honest, hardworking, determined, balanced in his emotions and passions and is dedicated to defend the values of his society. He is also very much inclined to the West however, unlike Felatun Bey, Rakım Efendi is able to maintain a balance between the Western life style and his own values. In other words, he is able to draw the necessary boundaries of how much he should westernize. Saraçgil (2005: 133) argues that the difference between Felatun Bey and Rakım Efendi is most clear in their relationship with the foreigners. While Felatun Bet tries to act like them in the expense of being ridiculous, Rakım Efendi gains their respect and support with his strong personality. In other words, the problem and danger in the modernization of Felatun Bey lies in his severed bonds with his culture, his loss of cultural distinctiveness, and his attempt to westernize helplessly. Recaizade Ekrem's *Araba Sevdası* presents a similar example with the male protagonist Behruz Bey so as Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar's *Şıpsevdi* with the character of Meftun Bey who actually comes from a poor family but desperately tries to imitate the Western life style.

The loss of cultural distinctiveness is not the only reason why the male elite of the late Ottoman era was so much worried. The feminization, or rather de-masculinization of Ottoman culture and young Ottoman men, especially due to being seduced by wrong women who are either Western or excessive-westernized Turkish women was another concern of the male Ottoman elite. Parla (1990: 17) suggests:

> the most significant danger / devil that would shake the Father's authority and misguide the son in the lack of Father's guidance is not science and technology that would come from the West. Rather it was sensuality. In the late Ottoman literature the mind and body are not only separated from each other but they are constructed in opposition to each other. Any bodily emotion was approached suspiciously. In all novels, love is divided into spiritual love and passion. Female characters are categorized into two groups; the angel and the devil, based on their love toward the male character. The former suggests a kind of spiritual love while the latter is associated with bodily passion and desires. The biggest disaster that awaits young men who has lost their father and severed their bonds from the Islamic culture is this second group of women.

That is why the fathers / authors created the ideal woman as "asexual, unreal, exaggerated and awry who considers sex as despicable." (Bilgin, 2004: 95-96) According to Bilgin (2004: 120-121) female characters in these novels constitute "extreme categories" since they were either admired for being perfects mothers, wives, sisters or criticized for excessive westernization. It is possible to argue that the female characters in the novels of the early Republican are embedded with similar concerns with the female characters of the late-Ottoman era. In this regard the female body both with certain amalgamations and restrictions became the major space of interest. By referring to novels of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Halide Edip Adıvar, Bilgin (2004: 154) argues that the female characters who were "seductive were associated with materialism, the loss of spirituality and cultural distinctiveness." Saraçgil (2005) argues likewise by suggesting that excessively westernized female characters in the early-republican literature are also portrayed as dangerous. In both of these periods, seductive and sexually uncontrollable hence excessively westernized female characters are portrayed as misguided and have the potential to corrupt young Ottoman or Turkish men. In other words, the boundaries that were drawn for appropriate femininity as represented in the late-Ottoman literature remained the same in the early-republican era. Reşat Nuri Güntekin's

Çalıkuşu is a good example how the ideal woman and the limits of her emancipation are discussed. In Reşat Nuri Güntekin's novel *Çalıkuşu*, Feride is portrayed as a modern, secular and educated woman. She desperately wants to be a mother but since she is not married that is not possible. After being betrayed by her excessively westernized fiancée, Feride leaves Istanbul and moves to a small village in Anatolia to find solace. There, she builds a life for herself and manages live independently. That is why; Saraçgil (2005: 266-268) argues that the way Güntekin decided to end the novel becomes interesting. Just when the reader starts to believe that Feride can be free like a bird and be on her own, the novel present the fatherly figure of Dr. Hayrullah who decides, for her, what she needs in order to be happy in her life. First he marries Feride to "save" her and later sends Feride back to Istanbul from where she ran away in the first place. In other words, Feride is allowed to be modern, well educated, secular, and strong to the degree that the male elite / writers, Güntekin in this case, saw fit.

To sump it, it can be argued the most fundamental issue in the late-Ottoman and early-republican literature was westernization. Novelists like Ahmet Mithat, Recaizade Ekrem, Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar, Halide Edip Adıvar, Peyami Safa, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar all "expressed their worries regarding the loss of cultural roots, and tried to express what they understood from westernization or tried to bridge Eastern and Western values." (Naci, 1990: 33) Also it can be suggested that these novels speak loudly of a singular hegemonic masculinity, - an ideal - that can be best exemplified in the image of Rakım Efendi. This hard-working, honest image of the self-made man emerges as the hegemonic masculinity of the late Ottoman novels. The others, dandy, flaneur and the wastrel as epitomized in the constructions of Felatun Bey or Behruz Bey in Recaizade Ekrem's

Araba Sevdası are presented as marginalized due to their loss of cultural distinctiveness. The female characters, on the other hand, are either glorified due to their motherhood, virginity and submissive manners or demonized due to their seductiveness and loss of virtue.

Just like how the representation of ideal femininity is monolithic and similar in both periods, the hegemonic form of masculinity in the early-republican era is quite similar to the late-Ottoman period. However, there is one major and fundamental difference between the two periods when it comes to masculinity formations. While the affirmed late-Ottoman male subject appreciates the Ottoman regime and sees it as his duty to defend it, the early-republican male subjects are determined to destroy it. In other words, the main difference between the two lays in the former's determined attitude toward preserving the system, (Bilgin, 2004: 90) and the latter's ambition to rupture all bonds with the Ottoman dynasty. That is why; the male subjects of the early-republican era are first and foremost secular. The novels of the period present examples. They emphasize reforms on education as the fundamental elements of social and political change in Turkey." (Yalçın, 2002: 161) In *Yeşil Gece* for instance religious education is problematized. The novel clearly describes the "unhealthy, damp and cold buildings, the increase in desires and passion in students and the corruption in religious teachers who use religion as a way of making money." (Yalçın, 2002: 162-163) In his analysis of the differences between the Ottoman and the early-republican masculinities in poems, Kayıran (2004: 116) stresses the same attitude toward religion. Kayıran (2004: 116) defines Republican poetry with its male subject which becomes "multiple and secular" when compared to the Ottoman era. Secularism becomes the common denominator in the Republican poetry regardless of the political views of poets like Nazım Hikmet,

Mehmet Akif Ersoy or Mehmet Emin Yurdakul who all have a common style which "secularizes the spiritual world." (Kayıran, 2004: 116) Kayıran (2004: 116) argues that these poets constructed their male subjects with one common desire: They are dedicated to "save the society from poverty and darkness, fight against Western imperialism and hence rebuild the society and the state."

In analyzing the difference between the late-Ottoman and early-republican masculinities, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's image can be adopted as a tool, for he was literally envisaged as the father of the Turks after the Grand National Assembly gave him the surname, Atatürk, with respect to the adoption of the Law of Surnames in 1934. As Kandiyoti (1997b: 122) suggests, the figure of Atatürk "portrayed in military uniform and Western tuxedo" provides some clues about the soldier / citizen male subject of the Kemalist era. Serpil Sancar (2009) argues that nation-states are formed after wars and they result in the male dominance of initial political elite who was the soldiers of the wars. This is true for the early-republican modernization. Just like Atatürk, the soldiers who fought the National War of Independence and the big landowners who contributed to the war especially in organizing the public in the Eastern parts of Turkey, formed most of the parliament. Accordingly, the hegemonic male image, which is constructed, based on the founders of the Republic, suggested men to be healthy, brave and strong in uniform and well educated, polite and gentlemanly in tuxedo. Bilgin (2004) also explores the image of Atatürk giving particular attention to his gaze. According to Bilgin (2004: 173) while Atatürk's face was genderless, "the gaze was paternal, authoritarian and domineering insinuating authority and control." This gaze is also associated with the difference Bilgin proposes between the early republican and the late-Ottoman era. While the late-Ottoman era was a time of de-masculinization, early-republican era was about

"cultural masculinization" (Bilgin, 2004: 161) since State culture has been based on "the depiction and glorification of masculinity" (Bilgin, 2004: 171) and secularism which created "a chivalrous, heroic, masculine imagery which was shared by men and women alike." (Bilgin, 2004: 174) Unlike Bilgin, Deniz Kandiyoti (1997b) emphasizes the differences between the late-Ottoman and the early-republican masculinities. According to Kandiyoti (1997b: 221),

> the man of the new republic did not represent hierarchy, fixity and absolute authority but rather he was aspiring to a domestic setting in which these values were overthrown, in which emotional distance between spouses were replaced by love and companionship, in which both men and women were emotionally involved and close to their children, and in which the conjugal pair could claim some autonomy from their elders.

Firdevs Gümüşoğlu also reaches similar conclusions based on her research of over a thousand books from 1923 to 1998 in order to see how boys and girls are portrayed in schoolbooks. In these books Gümüşoğlu (1998: 101) examines appropriate gender roles defined for male and female. Gümüşoğlu (1998) claims that until 1945, the schoolbooks included no reading passages or pictures that point to a gender hierarchy or difference. In other words, neither the mother nor the father was given specific duties such as housework or employment. According to Gümüşoğlu (1998: 103) "the mother and the father are both thoughtful and care for each other and there is no hierarchy in responsibilities. Both the father and the mother are the keystones of the house."[31] Even though Gümüşoğlu's research point to a less patriarchal structure in

[31] However starting with 1945, Gümüşoğlu (1998: 105) argues that "mothers are shown to be in the kitchen with their aprons on and we witness that the housework is done by the mother." In another argument Gümüşoğlu (1998: 117) claims that in the school books of the Kemalist era, while mothers take their children to buy new clothes, encouraged to study and work, from 1945 until 1997, women are "not even portrayed as a person who can control money even for grocery shopping. It is the father who earns money and who buys the food. The mother 'cooks, does the laundry, and cleans the house and irons."

the family when compared to the late-Ottoman era due to reforms on secularization, it also supports the criticism by feminist scholars on early-republican reforms which suggests the neutralization of femininity by accepting it as "equal" not "different" than masculinity. Kandiyoti (1997) also suggests that fatherhood has changed shape in the early-republican era. The father of the late Ottoman era who was very distant and authoritative was replaced with a closer father-daughter relationship in which fathers "had a special bond with the daughter who would be cared, educated." (Kandiyoti, 1997: 213) While Gümüşoğlu present examples from schoolbooks, Saraçgil's (2005) research looks at early-republican literature. Based on the novels, Saraçgil (2005) suggests that the ideal man of the 1930s was not a bourgeois. He was a courageous man who fought for the nation's independence. He was rational and his rationality came from being a soldier. More importantly, he was a good father who took good care of his family. However, masculine authority and patriarchal power relations are also present in these novels since the future of the family is based on the decisions of the father which suggests his status as "the head of the family," and "the decision-maker." If the father is not firm in his acts and righteous in his decisions, his family falls apart. Reşat Nuri Güntekin's *Yaprak Dökümü* (1930) and *Kızılcık Dalları* (1932) are examples of weak fathers and the dire consequences their families face due to the loss of male authority.

Based on the above arguments, it can be concluded that the hegemonic form of masculinity idealized in the image of the new Republican man was a modern, secular and nationalist subject. Subordinate masculinities, on the other hand, were the muscles of the society. Serpil Sancar (2009: 62) argues that industrial capitalist employment system produces two groups of male subjects by dividing them according to mind and body. In other words, in capitalism there are men who work

with their minds and men who work with their muscles. Moreover the muscle and the mind become metaphors of two different and conflicting classes and this division still prevails in Turkey. (Sancar, 2009: 61-63) Even though early-republican reforms could not initiate the contribution of private sector to Turkish economy, based on Tuba Kancı's (2009) research on the school books of the early-republican era, it can be argued that a particular group of men were indeed considered to be the muscles of society. While hegemonic form of masculinity established certain occupations more superior such as politics, law, engineering, armed forces, education, it simultaneously defined some as subordinate such as mining, farming and construction work. As a strategy of hegemonic ideology, in the schoolbooks these occupations were valued and Turkey was pictured to be a classless society. This appreciation is established through the suggestion that "every man is capable of doing something useful for his country and those men did their jobs with happiness and became heroic by the discipline, patience, endurance and sacrifices they show in their jobs." (Kancı, 2009: 95) That is how, in comparison to the ideal educated men of the new republic who work in prestigious professions, these men belonging to the subordinate forms of masculinity are valued through their muscle strength. They are considered "heroic" in their efforts to assist their county. Perhaps the most important aspect of all of these different masculinity constructions, regardless of their hierarchical positions, is that neither one of them was "illiterate or a religious devout." (Kancı, 2009: 95)

Hegemony is established at its best if the norms and values of the dominant group are internalized without any conflict. In other words, hegemony works as long as society is complicit with the ideals put forward by dominant powers. In terms of gender configurations, it is possible to see this kind of hegemony during the early-

republican era. However, due to the lack of civil organizations and civil identity, mostly because of the strong-handed approach of the government in establishing order and control, hegemonic masculinities and ideology did not face coercion. Until 1950s, it was still difficult to form a civil identity due to the on-going military dominance. There was no bourgeois culture and military values were still intact in society. It was only after the mid-1950, different voices started to be heard in literature, theater and films which gave rise to alternative forms of masculinities which were in opposition to the well-educated, gentlemanly, urban, nationalist soldier / citizen. The major reason for this proliferation of alternative forms of masculinities in culture was the changing socio-economic and political discourses in Turkey after Democrat Party (DP) came to power in the 1950 elections, which was followed by the military intervention in 1960 that increased civic rights widely with new amalgamations to the 1924 constitution.

3.2 Modernization in the Late-republican Era (1950-1980)

The Republican People's Party (RPP) was the sole ruling agency until 1950. During its rule, Turkey's economy was heavily dependent on agriculture. Atatürk established a series of agricultural reforms to support peasantry. These reforms were so effective that, according to Şevket Pamuk, (1991: 127) "approximately 80 percent of the country's population continued to live in rural areas." However, when most of the rural population was called for military service due to keeping the Turkish army ready for a possible integration to the ongoing

Second World War, a decline in agriculture started and continued due to government policies such as "forcing purchases from producers at below-market prices during the war years." (Pamuk, 1991: 130) When the Second World War ended, Turkish politics and the Turkish economy began to go through a structural change. In 1950 Turkish citizens experienced the first free elections, which resulted in a change of power from RPP to DP. DP government chose to downplay cultural modernization and privilege foreign investment for industrial development. The most fundamental outcome was the emergence of a bourgeois class and the establishment of capitalist infrastructures. Modernization in agriculture and industrialization were encouraged which caused a structural change in the economy. Capitalism was the prime outcome of this structural change. In other words, while the modernization movement of the early-republican era could be associated with culture, in the 1950s and 1960s, it was economy. The stable economy of peasantry started to crumble and Anatolian men initiated a massive internal migration from rural Anatolia to big coastal urban cities - mainly Istanbul -which became the catalyst of rapid urbanization. Rural-to-urban migration, which continued over two decades, also paved the way to the emergence of hybrid cultures as well as different socio-economic classes. The change redefined hegemonic forms of masculinity as the businessmen, the entrepreneur, technocrats and industrialists rather than the Law-making soldier / citizen.

It should be made clear at this point that the intention of the dissertation is neither to group real men into particular categories such as hegemonic, subordinate, complicity and marginalized nor to fix Law makers in the 1930s, and the industrialists and bourgeois in the 1960s to the hegemonic group. The dissertation fully acknowledges the fluid and unfixed nature of gender configurations as well as the possibility of change in the definitions of hegemonic masculinity, which is

always an area of struggle. It is a position always contestable. Moreover, the possibility of multiple number of hegemonic masculinities in a culture is also acknowledged considering the impact, glorification and effect on marginalized forms of masculinities among the society; suggesting that some forms of marginalized or subordinated masculinity formations can become hegemonic within their own subculture or within society on a larger scale. However the economic and political power of particular groups of men at a time of one-party rule in Turkey cannot be ignored especially due to the absence of popular mobilization and civil society. With that in mind, the following part of the chapter looks at lower / working class masculinities, which were driven into crises during the 1960s due to the consequences of urbanization, capitalism, rural-to-urban migration and the emergence of a bourgeois culture.

3.2.1 Lower / Working Class Anatolian Men: Masculinity Crisis

In her analysis on the sex-role patterns of the peasant village, Deniz Kandiyoti (1997a: 61) suggests that the stable economy of peasantry continued to survive on its own momentum until it "came into contact with market-oriented production." The technical developments, economic developments, arrival of new agricultural machines and overall modernization in agriculture transformed the power dynamics in patriarchal economy[32] which has already suffered wartime

[32] In patriarchal economy, the wealth belonged to the eldest male in the house and it was transmitted to the biggest son after the father's death. Hence young men had to wait in line to receive their share and women had no claim on the capital they help to grow.

difficulties, leaving many small landowners incapable of competing with the amount and the price of product the factories produced. As agricultural profit began to be insufficient and possibilities of paid labor emerged in the cities, young Anatolian men initiated a massive rural-to-urban migration. One of the most significant changes that came with it was the emancipation of the sons from their fathers, which signaled the decline of the father's power over his sons. That is how, according to Kandiyoti, (1998: 281) "the material bases of classical patriarchy crumbled under the impact of new market forces, capital penetration in rural areas." As young men emancipated themselves from their fathers, they assumed leadership on their own and formed their own separate families in the urban cities. This resulted in the manifestation of different family structures that are formed due to rapid dissolution of rural agriculture culture and the emergence of new hybrid urban life-styles in Turkey.

Bourgeoisie offered a new way of life with its consumption patterns, ways of social conducts, norms and values which brought about a particular kind of anxiety to the lower / working class migrant men that stemmed from the fear of losing traditional norms and values especially due to the dissolution of traditional patriarchy. This anxiety in particular, became the catalyst of the preservation of traditional patriarchal values such as family honor, shame and dignity. Hence, Anatolian migrants re-equipped themselves with patriarchal tools to exercise control over their wives', daughters' and sisters' sexuality since traditional patriarchy turns the female body into a socio-cultural mechanism of male honor which is sustained through chastity, integrity, subjugation and repressed sexuality. It can be argued that even though men emancipated themselves from their fathers and hence crumbled the patriarchal system in the village, when it came to applying the same for women, they

were reluctant. Perhaps the most striking example is about a man who still remembers how his "grandfather spitted on his father's face for allowing his wife (the interviewee's mother) to eat with him on the same table." (Sancar, 2009: 114) In other words, Anatolian masculinities remained patriarchal when it came to the matters of family honor, dignity and women's sexuality. Durakbaşa (2000: 149) argues that just like in the early-republican era, "the main normative categories of classical patriarchy were fully preserved during the years of rural-to-urban migration." In order to protect the family reputation and honor due to the fear of adultery, rape and negligence of housework, most women were pushed into being housewives[33] and confined to the domestic sphere. They were mostly denied access to paid labor opportunities and faced even more oppression in the city. In other words, the rural change in Turkey did not affect the asymmetry between men and women but it only affected "the social stratification among males." (Kandiyoti 1997: 64) For sure, this gender dynamic cannot be considered as fixed and it is open to change as the socio-cultural and economic circumstances change however as Smith, Hilary and Winchester (1998: 329) suggest, "men have been effective in maintaining patriarchal associations such as the family."

Another anxiety that arose from bourgeoisie was the crisis Anatolian masculinities faced due to the loss of paternal guidance. Serpil Sancar (2009) argues that this loss makes masculine experiences fluid, sensitive and fragile because success is no longer inherited. It needs to be won, earned and gained through the right steps without the guidance of the father, which is the reason why young

[33] According to Deniz Kandiyoti (1997a: 46) women were also responsible for this subjugation because they neither "challenged the traditional gender roles nor men's opportunities." Sancar (2009: 122-123) argues likewise and suggests, "the change in the father-son power dynamics did not affect women." Therefore the dissolution of classical patriarchal system did not provide a passage from the women's unpaid labor in the villages to paid labor in the cities like their husbands or brothers.

Anatolian migrant men in the cities felt insecure and unprotected. In addition to this insecurity, they needed to earn their living, which immediately signals a new paternal authority: the employer, the bourgeois. In other words, they were now in another and perhaps a more oppressive vicious cycle due to selling their labor to the capitalist market instead of their fathers. This change is the basis of Serpil Sancar's (2009) argument in the definition of muscle / mind duality of the industrialized economy making capitalism just a substitute for feudal economy.[34] From her research, Sancar (2009) observes that regardless of class distinction, employment stands out as the most important aspect of masculinity in Turkey since it brings power that brings respect. While employed men are respected, unemployed men are regarded as *serseri* and *aylak* suggesting both insolence and weakness. According to Sancar (2009), this attitude among men toward employment suggests, "men's social value is measured by his economic power." (Sancar, 2009: 102) That is also the reason why; unemployed men are more susceptible to producing "dangerous, irregular, violent masculinities." (Sancar, 2009: 97) During the interviews, Sancar (2009) came across with different unemployed, lower-class men who adopted different methods when they felt threatened by the changing world and gender order. These included "racist discourses, tendency to humiliate women and desire to pick up fights." (Sancar, 2009: 108) In this sense, violence becomes a strategy that is used to overcome the

[34] In order to explore the mind/muscle dichotomy, Sancar (2009: 62-73) investigates how the discourses of "head of the family, fatherhood, morality, drinking, gambling, prostitution, employment, the ideal wife, honor of the woman and working women" are used as strategies to form muscle masculinities" and how "luxury, sports cars, socialization, the threat caused by women executives and colleagues, risk taking, boys' high schools and their cultures, family, the ideal wife and prostitution" are adopted as tools to define 'the image of the businessman as the mind of capital" (Sancar, 2009: 73-89)

fears and anxieties of neither being able to live up to the norms of hegemonic masculinity nor being able to negotiate it through employment.

While violence is one strategy for unemployed men, perhaps the most appreciated strategy of working-class masculinities is the image of the self-made men. Sancar (2009: 123) argues that "the image of the blue-collar proletariat become the catalyst of a masculine identity which is self-made, liberated and in charge of his own destiny." That is why, almost all the working-class men Sancar (2009: 58-62) interviewed took pride in shaping their destiny and hence using their current position as self-made men as a strategy to empower working-class masculinities in order to negotiate with hegemonic. Another strategy adopted by lower / working class migrant men can be investigated in the characters of the 1950s and 1960s Turkish literature on rural Anatolia. According to Saraçgil (2005), starting with the 1950s, the political and economic plan of DP government and early-republican reforms started to be questioned, especially with novels on the rural life in Anatolia which set the duality of the rural and the urban and gave rise to the figure of male *eşkıya* - a form of social bandit.

When the 1960s came to an end, Turkey witnessed the rise of the Left and the ultra-nationalistic groups. It was a time of economic struggle, back-to-back military interventions and chaos. According to Saraçgil (2005), both the Turkish Left and the Turkish ultra-nationalistic group defined the ideal masculine subject as a brave, self-sacrificing, idealist comrade filled with love for his nation. He was a like a soldier, ready to fight for his ideal.[35] Saraçgil (2005: 340-345) suggests that the ideal

[35] Saraçgil (2005) argues that after the 1971 military coup, heroism and determinism were also added to the characteristics of Turkish leftist men.

masculinity was a militarized masculinity and can be traced in Turkish literature. She gives the example of Samim Kocagöz's *İzmir'in İçinde* (1970) where soldiers and officials are affirmed and "military values are presented as the highest values of the society." (Sancar, 2005: 342) The novels of the period also suggest the comeback of the patriarchal male subject. Femininity was desexualized, taken under male control and motherhood was glorified. Saraçgil (2005) especially finds Kemal Tahir's male subjects to be surprisingly attached to the traditional norms of morality in their treatment of women who once again appear as objects to be feared. The seductive woman reappears, this time in a different context. She may no longer only corrupt men into becoming excessively-westernized like the late-Ottoman and early-republican era, but in the 1970s, she becomes a distraction who would avert male comrades from the real cause - revolution. The difference with the seductive women in the late-Ottoman and early-republican era with the literature in the 1970s is that, this woman does not have to be a promiscuous Westerner or excessive-westernized Turk. She may indeed be one of the female comrades. In other words, "purely based on her biological sex, she has the tendency to go bourgeois," (Berktay, 1995: 252) so she needs to prove her dedication to the cause by throwing herself wholeheartedly into the struggle." (Berktay, 1995: 253) Since women cannot be completely trusted, they cannot become real actors, but only side players who are subjugated to live under rules and regulations decided by men. As Berktay (1995: 251) suggests Turkish Left is "a social organism or structure in which it is men who make and apply the rules, the norms and patterns women have to go by." It is possible to see the similarity between the ideal masculinity of the 1970s and the early-republican

hegemonic masculinity when they are approached from the perspective of the comeback of the soldier / citizen. Based on this similarity, it can be argued that in a time of political and economic turbulence, both Turkish literature and Yeşilçam, which will be discussed later, remasculinize their male characters by bringing back the heroic soldiers whose only determination was to liberate the country and save people.

To sum up, on the verge of dissolution, the late-Ottoman literature presented cautionary tales with the bleak stories of dandies, *flaneurs* and wastrels as its male subjects. The male writers assumed the role of the Father who was concerned with excessive-westernization portrayed as feminization of Ottoman culture in a time of modernization movements. With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the male elite changed hands from the writers to the Lawmaking soldier / citizens. This new male elite established national sovereignty and re-masculinized culture. 1950s witnessed the rise of alternative masculine cultures and the criticism of the early-republican reforms particularly by the character of *eşkıya* in Turkish literature on rural Anatolia. These novels continued into the 1960s but unlike the 1950s, in the 1960s the criticism was geared toward the market economy and the brutality of capitalism. The fathers became oppressive, and cruel just like capitalist structures. The sons who were mostly lower class workers denied their heritance and tried to find their own way without the guidance of the father. As the perceived threats coming from the West is translated to the political and cultural rhetoric as being stuck in East / West dichotomy, starting with the 1970 brutal capitalism, fatherlessness and the economic problems, together with the socio-political chaos, once again de-masculinized Turkish society, resulting in a series of novels and films on the socio-economic and political crisis in society in general and masculinity in

particular. Men became soldiers again; ready to overcome "their" anxieties which resulted in another re-masculinization / re-militarization of the society. Since the quickest way to overcome male anxieties is to oppress women, control their sexuality and bind her acts with traditional norms and values, the masculinities in the 1970s once again remained patriarchal. Even though love was not forbidden, men's first commitment was to the cause. Revolution came before love since once it is made, it would solve all the problems including the woman question.

It is very interesting to see this much ambivalence toward westernization in a country that has never experienced colonialism. Nevertheless while all Turkish modernization projects wanted to modernize / westernize Turkey, they were also cautious and hesitant toward the West due to growing cultural anxieties that if Turkey was to be modernized a little bit much, it might lose its traditional values.[36] That is why modernization has long been perceived both as a desired state and a threat in Turkey. This love and hate relationship with the West can be seen in the construction of different masculinities and similar femininities in Turkish literature long before the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Another and a more significant medium which this ambivalence can be investigated for this dissertation is Turkish cinema in general Yeşilçam in particular.

[36] The traditional norms and values mentined here are the core values of traditional patriarchy which value family honor, and define gender relations from the shame / honor angle. Remembering that the norms of traditional patriarchy were still intact during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the cultural anxieities related to excessive modernization are particularly related to the honor and sacredness of women.

3.2.2 Yeşilçam and Modernization in the Late-republican Era

The ambivalent attitude toward modernization can be best seen in the dichotomy of urban Yeşilçam melodramas between the rich boy / poor girl[37] and rural films of the peasant and the feudal landholder. These melodramas perceived Turkey as a nation with no class conflict[38] even though class distinctions became apparent due to the emergence of bourgeois and working class cultures as a result of urbanization, industrialization and rural-to-urban migration. The rural films, on the other hand, perceived the village as a happy place without any conflict until the 1960s. In the 1960s, these films on rural Anatolia started to establish the peasant / feudal landholder (*ağa*) dichotomy but they still did not problematize landlessness, which was the primary reason behind that very duality.

Nezih Erdoğan (1998: 265) stresses the themes of class mobility and migration as the "ground upon which melodrama plays and activates its machinery of desire." By installing the fantasy of easiness of class mobility and "constructing wealth as powerless in relation to love," (Erdoğan, 1998: 268) Yeşilçam melodramas cope with the anxieties of lower and working classes. Kılıçbay and Onaran-İncirlioğlu (2003) suggest several methods that are adopted by Yeşilçam in order to

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[37] To be sure, the rich boy / poor girl scenarios are not the only way to approach Yeşilçam since Yeşilçam is not a homogenous event however, the repetitive nature of certain themes cannot be ignored in the sense that they allow us to recognize identical themes that arise out of particular socio-cultural and economic anxieties. Nevertheless, the stories of rich boy/poor girl are particularly important. Since the bourgeois are objects of desire, according to Erdoğan (1998: 265) identification is established by "justifying the audience's (especially the female audience's) desire for, and wish to be desired by the upper-class." This is the reason why stories of rich boy/poor girl become very popular and common in Yeşilçam.

[38] However, this perception is not unique to 1960s since as Maktav (2001: 161) argues in the 1930s and 1940s, Turkish cinema produced majority of its films in tune with the "Kemalist ideology and supported the ideological discourse of RPP." According to Maktav, RPP's perception for Turkey, especially as a classless nation, was reflected in films of "Muhsin Ertuğrul films of the 1930's and Faruk Kenç, Talat Artemel, Vedat Örfi Bengü, and Baha Gelenbevi in the 1940's." (Maktav, 2001: 163)

ease these anxieties such as "easiness of class mobility, promotion of cross-class love and reeducation of the rich." In Yeşilçam melodramas, class mobility is easy and one of the ways for upward mobility is marriage. When the poor girl marries the rich boy, she immediately becomes a part of upper class. That is also the reason why cross-class love and marriage are promoted in Yeşilçam melodramas. Even though the rich and the poor are clearly marked with different codes and values and the love between them is belittled and presented as impossible making "belonging to different worlds" a repetitive line, at the end of the film their economic background does not become an obstacle for their undying love. Moreover, because of love, the rich starts to appreciate the virtue, morality and honesty in the world of the poor. The rich not only learns the norms and values of the poor, but adopts them as well. This, according to Kılıçbay and Onaran-İncirlioğlu (2003:) is the "reeducation of the rich." Similar to upward mobility, downward mobility is also easy. For instance while a rich business owner can bankrupt in one night, a poor man can inherit a large sum of money, a poor girl can become a famous singer or an actor in one night as well.

In one of his speeches The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes suggested, "In every neighborhood, there will be one millionaire." (Maktav, 2001: 163) The lives of many Yeşilçam stars became examples of this suggestion by supporting and fostering collective desires and beliefs. "Türkan Şoray, Muhterem Nur and Neriman Köksal lived in poor conditions in Istanbul before becoming huge stars." (Maktav, 2001: 165) Consequently, the ideological message regarding the easiness of upward mobility in Menderes' speech, is articulated in the star status of stars like Şoray or Köksal because the lower / working class were not only watching the possibilities of upward class mobility in Yeşilçam melodramas, they were witnessing it.

So, if the rich can be educated and cross-class love and class mobility are possible, where do we see the ambivalence in Yeşilçam melodramas? According to Kılıçbay and Onaran-İncirlioğlu (2003: 243-247), Yeşilçam links the dichotomy of good / evil to the dichotomy of lower class / upper class. Maktav (2001) argues likewise. He suggests that between 1950 and 1970, Yeşilçam associated morality and dignity with its poor / Anatolian characters and corruption with its rich / westernized characters. However "this does not mean that Turkish cinema is against bourgeoisie and the West." (Maktav, 2001: 166) Like in literature, it is, again, a question of boundary. Female body and sexuality are commonly used to draw these boundaries. Rich women are represented as lost causes who are sexually emancipated and hence excessively westernized. That is why Yeşilçam melodramas do not usually care for what happens to them at the end because they do not have an honor that can be protected or saved. They may die, go to prison or continue to live in shame. The female social climber, on the other hand, receives severe punishment for abandoning her values and traditions to become rich.[39]

Upper class male characters are only villainized when they threaten the traditional norms and values; the masculinities of Anatolian men. They are condemned if they are excessively westernized and immersed in the Western life style. This rich bourgeois is portrayed as well educated but not well mannered. He is a snob who is self-centered and arrogant. He is a lavish consumer who is embedded with all the fetish objects that come with his life style. His excessive-modernization

[39] The camerawork and the mise en scene in Yeşilçam melodramas are sympathetic toward the innocent lower / working class girl who fell victim to the bourgeois men. She is still punished at the end of the film but her punishment can be approached from two angles; one that uses her as an example in a cautionary tale and the other is saving her from her ill-fate by death and hence honoring her.

is a threat to the traditional Anatolian values and to the honor of innocent lower / working class women. Since female honor is associated to male honor, he is also a threat to lower class and working class masculinities. The bourgeois is also an Istanbulite, which is the precondition of hegemonic. Being an Istanbulite necessitates certain kind of upper class taste, which does not only come from financial capital but also from cultural capital. Taste, which comes with education, is the privilege of the Istanbulite elite. This is also the reason why; in many Yeşilçam melodramas as well as in Güney's films, class mobility depends only on economic power; not cultural capital. Power comes with wealth so when Güney becomes a wealthy gangster or a famous *kabadayı*, it is enough for him to gain respect. But, it is not enough to be hegemonic and hence Yılmaz Güney's male characters either negotiate their way or resist hegemonic forms of masculinity in order to form alternatives. No matter how powerful Güney's male characters become in the films, due to their Anatolian heritage and the perceived lack of cultural capital that comes with that heritage, they cannot become hegemonic.

Another male character Yeşilçam uses to criticize excessive-modernization is the male social climber. Admittedly, while the female social climber has immense number of examples in Yeşilçam, it is not common to see her male counterpart. However Yılmaz Güney's onscreen and off screen masculinities are all about the male Anatolian social climber. What is at stake is that unlike the female social climber, the male social climber is given a chance to understand his mistakes and return back to his old life as in *Balatlı Arif* (Yılmaz, 1969) or *Sevgili Muhafızım* (Jöntürk, 1970) because traditional norms of honor and morality do not put restrictions on the sexuality of men.

The stories of the rich and poor which dominated Yeşilçam melodramas in the 1960s, started to disappear in the 1970s. It can be argued that the ongoing chaos in the 1970s Turkey could no longer be subdued by the rich boy / poor girl stories so Yeşilçam recalibrated by producing new working-class masculinities and femininities which were in tune with the cultural changes in society.

Özkan's (2009) analysis of the differences between the internal migration films of the 1960s and 1970s provides insight to the main difference in Yeşilçam films of the two periods. According to Özkan (2009: 132) while the films of the 1960s focus on the socio-economic level of migration, 1970s films focus on the individual and his / her desperation and sufferings. In other words in the 1960s poverty and suffering of the migrants are not individualized and challenged. Rather they were reduced to the questions rich / poor opposition. However, starting with the 1970s migrants are constructed as stuck in the values of the city and their village since they can neither fully adapt the new values nor let go of the old ones. This became the reasons of oppression, despair and the crisis in masculinity. As Ulusay (2004) suggests, with the 1970s, male protagonists finally faced the difficulties and traumas of the urban life.

Umut Tümay Arslan (2005) makes one of the most detailed analyses of the representations of masculinity crisis in Yeşilçam in the 1970s. She explores the connections between orphanage, father-son relationship and savior - hero (*kurtarıcı kahraman*) in Yeşilçam in the 1970s by looking at the anxiety, instability and collective panic in the Turkish society as a result of capitalism and modernization. (Arslan, T. 2005: 10-24) In other words, while in the 1960s, Turkish society had hope toward the positive outcomes of modernization, urbanization and

industrialization, in the 1970s; these aspects became a matter of concern due to the increasing unemployment and chaos in the society. The anxieties were mostly male. That is why according to Arslan (2005), the popular films of the era reflect these anxiety of masculinity crisis / loss of masculine power and authority through their male characters only to subside them with the figure of male savior - hero and hence provide fantasies which stem from social structures. In other words, "with the collapse of the fantasy of unity in society, the voice of melodramas becomes masculine." (Arslan, T. 2005: 20)

Arslan (2005: 13) discusses the films in two main categories; conservative populist films (CPF) and radical populist films (RPF).[40] While the CPF glorify their male protagonist, the RPF involve trivialization and glorification dialectic. In other words, in these films, there is a constant free play between presenting the male hero as ordinary and extra-ordinary until the hero is glorified for good. For instance in *Babanın Oğlu*, Murat is not shot separately from other workers of the factory when he waits in the line to receive his pay check or when he is working. He is among the crowd during a strike. However in another scene he is the one worker who is brave enough to stand up to his boss and ask why they have not received the salary raise they were promised. (Arslan, T. 2005: 123-125) In other words, while Murat is trivialized with the former, he is glorified with the latter as the only one who defends the rights of the poor. In other words, "the hero is both pulled into the social context and pulled out of it simultaneously." (Arslan, T. 2005:123)

[40] The terms conservative populist films and radical populist films are coined by Douglas and Kellner. See Douglas & Kellner

While the RPF involve scenes that present the desperation and powerlessness of the male hero, the CPF do not. In CPF the male hero is presented as "the one who is exempt from all kinds of lack." (Arslan, T. 2005: 95) Both types of films construct the father / the son and the Law / the Society dichotomies and hence present their male character as son - the society and as the Father - the Law. Despite their difference, both CPF and RPF accept the Father's Law at the end of the film. In CPF this acceptance happens either at the beginning or at the end of the film. In other words, the films either establish the protagonist as the savior of the poor and desperate who would solve their problems, ease their pain and hence be accepted and appreciated as the Father / Law at the beginning or in the middle when he rebels to injustice and declares his superiority. On the other hand, in RPF due to the trivialization glorification dialectic,[41] this acceptance takes time. It is only after the film establishes its character as a "Just-Father" who is conscious enough to criticize the police, - even if he is one - protests with the students and helps the poor, then the Son / the Society relinquishes all power and hand it to the Father / the Law. That is how, the conflict between the Son and the Father is resolved by the voluntary relinquishment of power. In other words male anxieties, fears and misery are all portrayed in these films but at the end, they are all resolved by the acceptance of the protection of the Father / the Law who would willingly do the fighting for his Son / the Society.

[41] The dialectic also provides the binary opposition of being from the people and being outside the people (*halktan / halk dışı*). For instance Arslan give the example of *Polis Cemil* who on the one hand is from the people because he cannot have his son operated due to poverty and his refusal to take bribes and on the other hand he is outside the people because the misery and poverty of the people are shown through his gaze making him an observer not a participant.

This chapter explored the anxieties triggered by bourgeoisie, capitalism, rural-to-urban migration and modernization among migrant men based on literature, film, theatres and ethnographic data. It was argued that both literature and films have provided gratifications to the lower / working class men with masculinized heroes. These anxieties and gratifications are important because they are they main reasons that made Yılmaz Güney a phenomenon. Nonetheless it should be highlighted that event though Güney's films, which will be discussed in the following chapters, have melodramatic elements, they are not melodramas. They neither put the tormented love story between the rich girl and the poor boy to the core of their narrative nor present naïve happy ending to their audiences. They are in Özgüç's (2005: 333) words, are not the examples of "young lovers' cinema." They are action-adventure films with the recurring character of *kabadayı* and rural films with the character of *eşkıya*. They tell stories where the male hero embarks on a journey, faces difficulties, finds himself in dangerous situations, but at the end manages to complete his quest. It is during this journey, audience identification was established through the hypermasculine male character of *kabadayı* or *eşkıya* who present gratifications to the anxieties of lower / working class Anatolian male audience. This is also one of the reasons why Güney's star image and masculinity formations were indeed different than the stars of melodramas such as Ayhan Işık, Cüneyt Arkın, Göksel Arsoy and so on[42].

The following chapter presents an analysis of Güney's on-screen masculinity constructions as a star of action-adventure genre and rural films. It dwells on the

[42] The dissertation does not suggest a homogenous group of actors who play the same roles. In other words, the dissertation fully acknowledges that star images are not fixed and stable. The media groups all of these stars in comparison to Güney's image in terms of the hegemonic understanding of male beauty in Yeşilçam.

differences in his star image in comparison to the above-mentioned stars and more importantly explore the anxieties and gratifications were present in his films.

CHAPTER 4

YILMAZ GÜNEY'S STAR IMAGE IN THE 1960s

This chapter explores Yılmaz Güney's star image in the 1960s. It starts with his on-screen image in rural films where he most commonly plays a type of social bandit- *eşkıya*. The section about the rural includes a detailed background on social bandits based on the theoretical frameworks of Eric Hobsbawn, Anton Blok, Graham Seal, the representations of banditry in Turkish literature, the masculinity constructions in Güney's rural films, the characteristics of male *eşkıya*, his relationship to the feudal oppressors, the ideological underpinnings of the story, mise en scene and camerawork and how they are related to the anxieties regarding modernization projects.

The second part of the chapter looks at Güney's on-screen star image in action-adventure films set in the urban city. The section underlines two male subject formations: The lower / working class man and the *kabadayı* – a form of gangster. Both of these characters are explored through the investigation of the usage of space, the mise en scene and the narration, the outcomes and ramifications of modernization

projects and femininity constructions. The section also involves an investigation on censorship regulations on Güney's films.

The third part of the chapter explores the Anatolian male triad called "*At, Avrat, Silah*" – the horse, the woman, the gun. Since it is possible to see the articulations of the triad in both rural and action-adventure films, it is explored separately.

The last part of the chapter is the analysis of Güney's off-screen image in the 1960s based on the research made at the *National Library* in Ankara. The section explores the ways in which Güney's off-screen is constructed and facilitated in drawing and managing certain boundaries.

4.1 The Concept of Social Bandit & *Eşkıya* in Güney's Rural Films

According to Eric Hobsbawm, social banditry is a form of social protest that is typical of, but not necessarily confined to, peasant societies. Social banditry emerges mostly in societies who are in transition, especially from an agrarian economy to a modern capitalist one and who have been facing rapid industrialization and urbanization. Then, social banditry can be considered as a social revolt against the destruction of traditional norms and values by modernizing elements or oppression from higher authorities such as landholders.

State authorities regard social bandits as criminals. Nevertheless they are loved and protected by the peasant society for two main reasons: They are considered as

fighters of justice, heroes, and avengers and they share particular moral codes[43] that emerge from the norms and values of the peasant society they are raised in. In other words, the ideal social bandit does "not transgress the rules of what the peasants accept as morality." (see in Antony, 1989: 126) For sure, bandits do not have to be real people who are romanticized and celebrated in folktales but can be fictional characters who are created in the mass media. Regardless, "wherever and whenever significant numbers of people believe they are the victims of inequity, injustice and oppression, historical and / or fictional outlaw heroes will appear and continue to be celebrated after their deaths." (Seal, 2009: 83)

Since its release, *Bandits* have attracted much attention and became the catalyst of immense number of scholarly research especially by non-Western scholars. Hobsbawn is criticized for blurring the lines between fact and fiction, myth and reality as well as romanticizing social bandits (Blok, 1972; Slatta, 2004; Wagner, 2007; Antony, 1989). Scholars from all over the world provide empirical and anthropological data on different social bandit formations which are not necessarily of peasant origin, emerge in agrarian societies, noble, moral or adopt banditry as a mechanism of social protest against oppression (Frank, 2000; Tranter & Donoghue, 2010; Antony, 1989; Wagner, 2007) such as thuggees,[44] occasional thugs, hereditary thugs, dacoits, bandidos, larrikins, bushrangers, vigilantes. Moreover, as Anton Blok

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[43] "The moral code is a set of informal guidelines for approaved and disapproved actions. Because outlaw heroes are part of cultural traditions they are aware of behavioral norms. This knowledge does not mean that they will always behave accordingly, but those who do so, or are seen as doing so, are likely to become and remain the heroes of their people and to be mythologized." (Seal, 2009: 78)

[44] The thugs lived on the land owned by the landholders, called *zamindars.* (Wagner, 2007: 361) The relationship between the thugs and the *zamindars* was reciprocal; the thugs received protection and assistance and in return the *zamindars* received a substantial share of the loot the thugs brought back from their expeditions. (Wagner, 2007: 362) The thugs even paid taxes. The relationship between the thugs, the local elite, and the authorities was completely institutionalized, indeed normalized and that the thugs were regarded as an asset and viable source of income at all levels of the indigenous administration. (Wagner, 2007: 362-363)

(1972: 496) argues “rather than promoting the articulation of peasant interests within a national context, bandits tend to obstruct or to deviate concerted peasant action”, “first, by putting down collective peasant action through terror; second, by carving out avenues of upward mobility which, like many other vertical bonds in peasant societies, tend to weaken class tensions.” (Blok, 1972: 499-500)

The criticism toward Hobsbawm’s conceptualization of social banditry is out of the scope of this research so as the arguments regarding if the social bandit was a myth, fiction or real. What interests this dissertation is the socio-economic and political relations between the social bandit / outlaw with peasant protest and social rebellion and the widely accepted fact that “the Robin Hoods are psychologically real and do represent the aspirations of the people who invent and perpetuate them.” (Antony, 1989: 125)

4.1.1 Characteristics of *Eşkıya*

Banditry is not a new concept to Turkish literature, folk tales, nostalgia, and oral tradition. On the contrary, real or fictional, social bandits have found representations in Turkish films and literature, lived in the folk tales and oral traditions in Anatolia since “the mid-sixteenth century in Aydın.” (Özgüç, 2005: 163) Moreover, for the people of Anatolia, social bandit was not simply a myth. Yaşar Kemal, a very famous author who also wrote novels on the oppression of peasants and the courage of *eşkıya* in the 1960s, considers it as a form of social revolt. He gives the examples of how bandits helped organize big revolts, especially

in the National War of Independence. "*Eşkıya* from all over the country like Yörük Ali, Efe, Demirci Efe in the Aegean side or Karayılan around Antep and Gizik Duran in the Toros Mountains helped Mustafa Kemal in his revolt for independence." (Kemal, 1974: 1-2)

In the 1960s, the figure of *eşkıya* appeared in the Anatolian novels. Yaşar Kemal and Orhan Kemal are among the novelists who told the stories of the humiliated male Anatolian peasants or seasonal workers. They discussed how they become the object of market economy. For instance Yaşar Kemal in *Ortadirek* portrays Turkish peasants as men who "overcome the insurmountable roads, are victorious over nature but remain helpless against the system of man." (Naci: 1990: 289-290) The male characters in Anatolian novels are weak and helpless toward feudal powers and oppressive capitalist employers but they still desperately try to survive. These novels present two solutions to this masculinity crisis: "Anatolian man would either find gratification in the acts of the *eşkıya* who takes his revenge or he would try to exist in the modern capitalist world that continuously belittles him." (Saraçgil, 2005: 328) What is important in these novels is the way they set the duality between the peasant and the feudal landholder (*ağa*[45]). More importantly, they construct the character of male *eşkıya* - a form of social bandit - a former peasant, shepherd or an artisan who rebels to the oppression of landholders and heads

[45] The character of *ağa* is also commonly portrayed in Anatolian novels. Appeared in Yakup Kadri's *Yaban* for the first time (Yalçın, 2003: 205), the character of Salih *Ağa* is an example of corruption and is the core of feudal system in the Anatolian villages. "He is cruel. He owns everything and he collects all power in his hands." (Yalçın, 2003: 206) Similarly in Yaşar Kemal's novels, *ağa* is again "the tyrant and the reason for the disturbance in Çukurova due to his status as the unjust big land owner." (Yalçın, 2003: 132) Almost every film set in the rural can be presented as examples of *ağa* cruelty.

to the mountains. This is the kind of *eşkıya* Güney plays in his films and writes about in his screenplays and novels. The forms of masculinities that are constructed with the character of *eşkıya* are mostly marginalized forms since they are in conflict with the State authorities and / or feudal landholders.

Unlike Hobsbawm's social bandit, *eşkıya* in Güney's films are not to be worshipped. They are neither loved nor respected by the peasants. They are represented as cruel, brute and violent. In *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969) *eşkıya*s kidnap and rape women. They rob the peasants and they are capable of killing one of them or even their own immediate family. They become *eşkıya* for different reasons but even if that reason used to be a moral one, it no longer exists. *Eşkıya*s love fame and glory. They want others to fear them. They are ruthless and definitely not championed by the peasants. They have no moral code. They are represented as savages who can be - as in *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969) - powerful enough even to challenge the *ağa* in the village.

Güney's portrayal of *eşkıya,* for sure, is way different. Güney's *eşkıya* is the kind Yalçın (2003: 132) calls as the "good *eşkıya* who lives in the poems, legends and hearts of the people and his legend pass from generation to generation through oral tradition." He is a perfect example to Hobsbawm's social bandit: He delivers justice, lives by particular moral codes and is respected by the peasants. There is also a particular repetitive pattern which is the "inevitable rebellion of the oppressed; purification through violence; the necessity to use the gun; the journey which is continued mostly alone or with the support of a loved one, loyal friend." (Scognamillo: 1987: 159) It is important to highlight that when *eşkıya* resorts to violence; his actions are always justified because he "needs to be seen as having a

just cause and to be pursuing it honorably." (Seal: 2009: 78) In this sense, Güney's male characters share similar tendencies in terms morality, violence, oppression, norms and values with Hobsbawm's social bandit.

İnce Cumali (Duru, 1967) can be presented as an example in terms of the relationship between good *eşkıya* and peasants. In the film peasants do not tell Cumali's whereabouts to the gendarme since they believe in his innocence and morals. *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967) is another example. When Kozanoğlu Hüseyin joins other *eşkıya*, he learns that the villagers do not support them because they steal from them. He tells the leader, Kıllı Ebubekir, that if they steal from the poor, they could not survive in the mountains because in times of need, there would be no one to help them. Ebubekir tells him: "I don't care. The first goal of any eşkıya is to find food. We are invaders. We might even reconcile with our worst enemy even for food and protection. Remember that." Kozanoğlu realizes that he needs to provide food and more men for the gang so that they would agree to attack his father's murderer, Çomar. So, he starts to travel from one village to another, saving the peasants from corrupt officers. Meanwhile he also raises an army to himself. As a gift to his brave and just acts, peasants give him eggs, meat, honey, cheese and bread. When he goes back to his gang, everybody is surprised to see how much food he brought. The leader is appreciative. He tells Kozanoğlu he is happy that Kozanoğlu chose to listen to him and start robbing the peasants. Kozanoğlu replies: "I did not steal. They gave these to me as gifts for helping them."

The second similarity with Hobsbawm's social bandit and Güney's *eşkıya* is about morality and honor. Güney's portrayals of *eşkıya* live by certain moral codes and for that he gains the love and respect of peasants and those around him. Other

than not stealing from the poor, Güney also does not hurt anyone but his enemies. He does not even hurt animals. Just the opposite, he cares for them. For instance in *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968), when Haydar, his enemy, tells Seyyit that they must fight for Keje, the woman they both love, Seyyit agrees.

> Haydar: "Do you see this sparrow on the tree? If you can shoot it right between its eyes, Keje is yours."
>
> Seyyit: "It is a poor sparrow. I won't. It has no challenge over me. I am the great Seyyit Han and it is just a small sparrow. I could not hurt it."
>
> Haydar: "You have killed lots of men. Can't you just kill this little sparrow?"
>
> Seyyit: "Whoever has a vendetta toward me, my honor and my bread, I would kill. But this is just a small sparrow."

Similarly, in *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967), when Kozanoğlu goes to fight with his gang, he does not shoot anybody other than the man who killed his father. Because of his morals, unambitious attitude, and values, one *eşkıya* tells the other "there is something missing in Kozanoğlu." The other replies: "He is missing deceit, mischief, ill-manners… He is missing *eşkıya* blood." With the dialog and mise en scene, Kozanoğlu's difference as a moral and just man is made clear to the audience. Perhaps the comparison between *eşkıya* Hamo (Erol Taş) and *eşkıya* Mehmet (Güney) in *Dağların Oğlu* (Atadeniz, 1965) is one of the best examples in Güney's films to see the difference between the good and the bad bandit. Hamo, Mehmet and another *eşkıya* - Şehmuz - crash a wedding. While Mehmet quietly takes their money, Hamo yells at them. He harasses women and kills men. He fires his gun randomly and terrorizes the guests. During the heist, Şehmuz gets shot. Hamo suggests leaving him but Mehmet choose to carry him to a safe place. When Mehmet falls asleep, Hamo kills Şehmuz and tells Mehmet that he died because of his wound and that he would have wanted them to share the loot in two rather than three. When

the gendarme catches up to them, Hamo tells Mehmet that he has a daughter he needs to take care of so Mehmet needs to stall the gendarme while he flees. Mehmet says he has no one in this life so he does not mind helping a good friend. Hamo promises he would come back for him but never does.

In terms of moral code, unlike other *eşkıya*, Güney's portrayal do not rape or kidnap women. Just the opposite, he has respect for women and tries to protect them. For example, in *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969), when Mehmet (Güney) goes to the mountains to hunt down *eşkıya*, he finds a woman they have kidnapped. He takes her with him and goes down to the village to deliver her to her husband. But the husband refuses to look at her face and shuts the door. Mehmet could not bring himself to leave her out in the cold so takes her with him. One night *eşkıya* come to *ağa*'s house to punish him for putting a prize on their hands. They beat him and rape his wife. After they leave, *ağa* enters the bedroom where his wife was crying loudly. He looks at her, throws her a gun and leaves the room. We hear one gunshot and he starts to cry. Later, both in regret and in desperation he tells what happened to Mehmet: "I had no choice. I would not be able to look at anyone. Now I am a respectful man but I wish I had a choice." After listening to him, Mehmet takes the woman to his husband once more. Mehmet:

> "I am here for the wife you refused to take because she was taken to the mountains by *eşkıya*. It hurts your manhood, your pride, huh? Well, you are not a man! Real manhood is not leaving her in misery like that. Real man does not leave her alone."

Another example from *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967) is the scene where Güney rescues the daughter of a high-ranked Ottoman Pasha from the hands of *eşkıya* Kıllı Ebubekir. While his friend Sofu Agha thinks, Kozanoğlu would deliver the girl to

her father and in return asks for money or a position in the Ottoman palace, Kozanoğlu takes her to the entrance of the city. He drops her off his horse and shows the way that leads to the palace. Even the girl is surprised and tells him that if he personally delivers her, he would be rewarded. Kozanoğlu does not care. He rides away while his *eşkıya* friend yells at how dumb he is.

The example from *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969) and *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967) emphasize *eşkıya* as a man who protects women. Unlike the *ağa* who suggests his wife to commit suicide after she is raped, Güney's *eşkıya* portrays a quite different attitude toward female honor. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this "forgiving" attitude toward the violated women stems not from male tolerance. While the female social climber who willingly throws herself into the arms of rich men, the rural women in both films are kidnapped against their will. They are victims not volunteers. For that, their honor is considered to be eligible for savior- by male tolerance and acceptance. *Eşkıya* feels empathy toward the raped women because an attack on her / her body is an attack on his masculinity. By forgiving the woman, he forgives himself for not being able to protect her.

4.1.2 Femininity and Male Honor

Eric Hobsbawm's conceptualization of social banditry has significant class connotations. He not only differentiates the social bandit from a common thug but also theorizes the social bandit as the initiator of political resistance within peasant societies toward oppressive regimes, which are consistent with the behavior of

Güney's representation of good *eşkıya*. Nevertheless Hobsbawn also makes it clear, in both Bandits (1969) and in his reply to Anton Blok (1972), that bandits are not necessarily socially conscious. Hobsbawn (1969: 19):

> As individuals they are not so much political or social rebels, let alone revolutionaries, as peasants who refuse to submit, and in doing so standout from their fellows, or even more simply men who find themselves excluded from the usual career of their kind and therefore forced into outlawry and "crime". They are little more than symptoms of crisis and tension in their society.... Banditry itself is therefore not a programme for peasant society, but a form of self-help to escape it in particular circumstances.

When Güney played an *eşkıya*, he is not born one. He is a victim who is pushed to rebellion due to a brutal action of the antagonist. The targets of the brutal action are almost always women in Güney's immediate family. Therefore, the reason for the social uprisings of *eşkıya* are triggered by female victimization i.e. masculinity crisis followed by the destruction of male honor due to the death or rape of women. In other words, *eşkıya* does not rebel for political reasons rather his motivation is a moral one centered on the discourses of male honor regarding the women in the family. Consequently, these women become metaphors of male honor. Accordingly, they represent the vulnerable side of the male protagonist. An insult or attack on any women inside the family not only becomes a disgrace on family honor but also constitutes an attack on his masculinity. All the mothers who are beaten up and /or raped, the sisters who are kidnapped, tortured and raped, the fiancées who are deceived and the wives who are killed, kidnapped or raped, are among the major reasons why the male protagonist is left with no choice but to rebel. However once he rebels, he can no longer stay in the village because the man he rebels to is almost all the time the *ağa* in the area or his sons.

For instance in İnce *Cumali* (Yılmaz Duru, 1967) Hamo crashes Cumali's sister's hand under a millstone. He massacres Cumali's entire family on the day Cumali was born. In *Koçero* (Ümit Utku, 1964), Beşir *Ağa* kidnaps and rapes Koçero's sister. In *At Hırsızı Banuş* (Jöntürk, 1967), Salih *Ağa* kidnaps Zeynep, Banuş's love interest. In *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967), the corrupt officers of the Ottoman Empire kill Hüseyin's father, beat him, almost rape his sister and burn down his house. After the horrible event, Hüseyin goes to the next village, leaves his sister with a trustworthy friend and joins an *eşkıya* gang. He tells his friend: "I do not have gold to give to the authorities. I cannot leave my father's blood on the ground. I have no other option but to head to the mountains." In *Kızılırmak Karakoyun* (Akad, 1967), Ali Haydar rebels against the *ağa* because his men kidnap Ali Haydar's fiancée. In *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968), Seyyit rebels to the man who trick him into killing Keje, the woman Seyyit loves. A similar example can be given from *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969). In the film Serçe Mehmet (Güney) is an *eşkıya* who is also an *eşkıya* hunter. He kills them for money. Until the end, the film suggests that Mehmet does what he does for money but even his ruthless murder by decapitation is justified at the end of the film when we learn that *eşkıya*s are responsible for the abduction, rape and murder of his wife, which became the catalyst of his crimes. The amount of violence is especially overwhelming in *Aç Kurtlar* (Yılmaz Güney, 1969). Serçe Mehmet beheads the *eşkıya* and collects their heads.

That is how for the majority of the time, female characters are present in Güney's films to act as a trigger, which pushes the male protagonist to action and rebellion. In almost all rural films, *eşkıya* takes his revenge; cleanse his honor by destroying the man who put a shame on his family. In this sense, these films diminish the importance of the oppressive feudal relations in the Anatolian villages

by telling stories of revenge based purely on male honor. This is what makes Güney's films very similar to almost all popular films as they, too, reconstruct dominant ideologies, strengthen patriarchal gender dynamics, and promise fair endings to the protagonist's quest for justice. The storyline is commonly structured starting with an unjust event. The hero, then, starts his journey, faces difficulties and life threatening situations and manages to punish the guilty. These stories not only individualize pain and misery making it easy for the audience to identify with the desperation of the male hero but also provide the gratification that with the right action of the individual hero, every wrong can be rightened.

This narrative structure, which revolves around revenge stories, overshadows the major ideological aspect of rural films, which is landlessness[46] (Scognamillo: 1973; Maktav: 2001). *Ağa* is capable of murder or rape because he is powerful and that power comes from being a big landowner. Maktav (2001: 168) argues that even though both urban and rural films of the 1960s construct the rich and the poor dichotomy, "rural films problematize poverty through the character of *ağa*." In other words "rural films villainize *ağa* but urban films normalize poverty by constructing it as natural." (Maktav, 2001: 169) However, even though the rural films do villainize

[46] The historical facts behind the power of *ağa* and the unequal land distribution have their roots in the 1920s. Yahya Tezel (1986: 370-371) argues that Kemalist government started its agriculture reforms by siding with the big landowners since they were very effective in organizing people during the War of Independence. Hence the 1924 Constitution included articles, which prevented expropriation of private property (Tezel, 1986: 371). The change in the attitude of the Kemalist government from preventing expropriation to facilitating it was due to the Kurdish uprising which started in 1925 and continued until 1930. The uprising was "associated with big landowners in the eastern part of Turkey" (Tezel, 1986: 376). Therefore the 1934 İskan Kanunu targeted the big landowners when it claimed that "the land which belongs to people known as Reis, Bey, *Ağa* and Şeyh will all be claimed as government property" (Tezel, 1986: 377). However, as Tezel (1986: 378) argues, the 1934 Law remained ineffective since there were too many big land owners in every part of Turkey and it was impossible to limit the law depending on certain cities and ethnic groups. Therefore, the land reform remained ineffective in providing equal land distribution. "Four times in nine years – 1928, 1929, 1936 and 1937, Ataturk warned the parliament regarding the necessity of a Land Reform in the opening sermons of the Parliament." (Naci: 1990: 85) However an effective Land Reform could not be complete during the rule of RPP as well as the DP.

ağa, they still present landlessness as a natural given and hence, like poverty; it is not questioned. The unequal land distribution becomes common sense, natural, unproblematic.

Stories of male honor and female victimization do not only overshadow the power relations in the rural and urban. It also diminishes the idea of collective action. In other words, the ideological message of the necessity of collective action against fighting against feudalism or capitalism is eclipsed by revenge stories of male honor. In rare cases where collective action against the feudal ağa is established, its basis still depends on masculinity crisis and anxieties, which again diminishes the underlying issue of landlessness since collective action arises from the masculinity crisis of man.

For instance in *Kızılırmak Karakoyun* (Akad, 1967), Ali Haydar (Güney), a poor shepherd is given the permission to marry Hatice, the tribe leader's daughter after completing an almost impossible task which included his herd to eat salt for three days and cross the river without drinking any water. Nonetheless, Ahmet *Ağa* intervenes and blackmails the tribe leader. He says that he has bought their land and if he does not allow his daughter to marry his son, he would exile them from their land. The tribe leader wants to rebel but for the greater good of the tribe, he decides to sacrifice Hatice and calls off the wedding. At that moment, the resilient, obedient, respectful and taciturn Ali Haydar, finally speaks: "What kind of men have we become? What a shame and disgrace to our manhood that we so easily, almost willingly, sacrificed our honor and manhood. We must bring Hatice back."

The brutality and the unjust rule of *ağa* is present in the film starting from the first scene where he buys nomad's products below the market value and lends them

money for huge interest. His brutality is stressed when he blackmails the tribe by threatening them of exile. However, collective rebellion against *ağa* arises only after he takes Hatice, not after he threatens the tribe of exile. In other words, even though the elements of economic struggle, lack of government authority, and brutality of feudalism are brought together to present an ideological message which problematizes unjust land distribution, films settle with villainizing *ağa* based on male honor- not criticize the reasons which give him the license to kill and rape. Accordingly, Hatice's character is used with regards to the association of female body as a metaphor of land for it was only after her absence, the tribe realizes what has disappeared from their masculine identity and hence question their morals and values. Yet, the motivation behind collective action is once again individualized by the love of Ali Haydar, his fierce speech to other men and his stubbornness to rescue Hatice on his own even if nobody else goes with him.

Kozanoğlu (Yılmaz, 1967) presents a similar case. On his way back to the mountains, Kozanoğlu crosses from a village, which has been burnt down by corrupt officers. He witnesses women's cries of agony and men's misery. Kozanoğlu gathers around them and speaks: "What kind of men are you? Did you get use to having your women raped and murdered? You have to protect your honor. What kind of manhood is this? What kind of people are you? I would rather die than to see these happen to me." The speech affects the remaining men in the village. They quickly join Kozanoğlu's quest to take down the corrupt officers. Again, even though collective action is present in the film, it is overshadowed by revenge stories of men whose wives and daughters are raped by corrupt officers. Rather than rebelling to the oppressive forces for taking their food and supplies, treating them disrespectfully and forcing them to pay high taxes, the peasants rebel with Kozanoğlu simply due to

anxieties of male honor. It is apparent from the examples that the murder or rape of the male protagonist' immediate family members become the catalyst that initiates the journey, turns the film into a revenge melodrama and overshadows the problem of landlessness.

It should be noted that even though Güney's action-adventure and rural films of the 1960s do villainize *ağa* and initiate collective action based purely on male honor, they are still different than other revenge stories of Yeşilçam. Güney's rural films do not restore a new equilibrium. In other words, these films do not have happy endings where the oppressive feudal system ends with the death of the antagonist. Even though the antagonist dies, the system continues. While the audience expects a victory, a "fantasy bribe", (Jameson, 1979: 114), - a just equilibrium, Güney's narratives resist the victory of individual action with bleak endings, especially with the death of the protagonist. When the male protagonist dies at the end of Güney's films, the dominant fiction fails to "foster the collective identifications and desires" (Silverman, 1992: 54) making it possible for the film to open a discursive space to discuss the importance of collective action, criticize modernization projects and point to their failures such as the prolonged feudalism in the villages and brutal capitalism in the cities. According to Ayça (1973: 7) suggests that Güney's films are "like a blade that keeps sharpening and sharpening because with every film Güney starts his struggle over and over again and yet fails again to so he starts again." In other words, with the death of protagonist,[47] audience are advised not to wait for heroes to save themselves, but to take collective action against the forces that oppress them. The

[47] This is very important considering the fact that the male protagonists in Yeşilçam melodramas, if they had received star status - rarely die at the end of the films. For instance, according to the rules Ayhan Işık told the film producers, "one of the conditions of his acceptance of the lead role was that his character would never die at the end of the film." (Pösteki, 2007: 81)

individual hero can only take his revenge, not change the system. Güney argues likewise:

> The one who is all is bound to be defeated. I would like to show people that no matter how strong you are, as long as you are by yourself, you would be defeated. You are bound to die. The ones who are not defeated are the organized ones. (Gümüştaş, 2007: 44)

4.1.3 The Depiction of the Rural as a Place of Absence

Before the 1960s, literature, films and theatre portrayed rural life as serene and comforting. Anatolia was a place where the modern, secular and educated teachers and officials arrived to "correct the ways of the rural." (Scognamillo, 1973: 34) In other words, in the rural films before the 1960s, the rural was presented as a nostalgic construct of cheerful people, colorful traditions with no conflict, which cannot be solved in peace. The same was true for the plays regarding the problems of rural life. In these plays,[48] themes such as bloodshed, supernatural beliefs, exploitation of feudal landholders, and oppression of women were parodied. In other words, "the problems of rural life were mostly presented with a humor elements." (Şener, 1998: 204) 1960s had a slightly freer climate when compared to previous years, which allowed the atmosphere where both Republican reforms and the modernization project of the Democrat Party government started to be questioned. As marginalized religious, ultra-nationalist and socialist groups found cultural and political representations, the realities of the urban and the rural started to be told.

[48] Necati Cumalı's *Nalınlar, Susuz Yaz, Ezik Otlar*; Cahit Atay's *Ana Hanım Kız Hanım, Sultan Gelin*; Nazım Kurtuluş's *Yatık Emine* (adapted by a story of Refik Halit Karay); Turan Oflazoğlu's *Allahın Dediği Olur* are examples. (Şener, 1998: 197)

Stories of class difference, oppression, ramifications of capitalism and feudalism in the villages became the themes of *Köy Romanları* (village novels), which later became synonymous with Anatolian novels. As Scognamillo (1973: 34) suggests "the reality of the rural is very different… The reality is dark and cold. The reality of the village is the bloodshed, the oppression, abductions and rape." While in Güney's rural films of the 1960s, this oppression finds representation mainly through the conflict between *ağa* and *eşkıya* or the rebelled peasant; these films also discuss the ramifications of modernization projects through the depictions of the rural and rural life.

The depiction of the rural and rural life has a particular ideological message in Güney's films. These depictions either point to the total absence or the ineffectiveness of the State in providing its citizens with proper living conditions and opportunities of education and employment. This absence of State power in the rural not only prolongs the power of feudalism and feudal landholders who oppresses the peasants but also it also empowers cruel *eşkıya*s in the mountains.

The total absence of the State power in Güney's films is expressed mainly by the mise en scene in the establishing shots. In almost all films, there are similar establishing shots, which have repetitive formal elements. High mountains, vast and infertile lands are used commonly to describe the rural. There are no forests, not even trees. When the yellowish desert like space meets the horizon, we are filled with a sense of both agoraphobia and claustrophobia since the empty, deserted wide space does not seem to end and when it does end, high mountains rise. The feeling of entrapment is further articulated in these films by the absence of railroads, bus stations, hospitals, schools, factories, courthouses, and government buildings.

Perhaps one of the most powerful cinematography among Güney's rural films in the 1960s is present in *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969). Shot in Muş during the winter of 1969 when Güney was serving his military duty in the same city, Güney chose to use snow rather than high mountains and infertile lands. The cinematography is so powerful that snow - thick; ever-lasting, white, up-to-waist high - is enough to create one of the most hostile, nerve-breaking, disturbing environments in a Güney film. Snow, all the way to the horizon, covering everything around it, preventing agriculture and breaking down any form of communication with surrounding villages demonstrates how lonely peasants are in their struggle to defend themselves. That is also why, when the male protagonist very confidently and aggressively rides his horse full throttle in these vast spaces or lives in a house made of snow undisturbed by the cold with his rifle either in his hand or tied behind his back, his character not only constructs some form of power and control over the landscape but also suggest a substitute for the lack of authority filling in the position of the hero of the film - the charismatic, virile male character who knows the area, his way with guns and horse - in the absence of State and its institutions.

The opening scene of *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967) is another example. The film begins with the sound of gunshots. Mustafa *Ağa*, a big landholder is surprised by an attack on his farm by Ali *Ağa*, another big landholder just before he hears his wife giving birth to a son. Mustafa *Ağa* tells the midwife to save the child. As the midwife leaves the house, Ali *Ağa* kills Mustafa *Ağa* taking control of the area. There is no authority to end the fight among the landholders. The absence of any form of State power such as the police or the gendarme point to the freedom and power of landholders in doing what ever they choose including oppressing peasants and killing each other. More importantly, this feud between two landholders which ends by one

of them killing the other further subjugates the peasants since if a powerful landholder cannot protect himself and his family, how could peasants dare to rebel.

Hudutların Kanunu (Akad, 1966) successfully merges the ineffectiveness of State power and the brutality of the feudal regime. The film starts with a funeral scene set in Delidevran village and the arrival of a state officer to give his condolences. The camera follows the officer while revealing some aspects of the mise en scene; mourning women singing eulogies, men without arms and legs, children covered in dirt and dust. Simultaneously the film reveals the man died while smuggling cattle from the Turkish border for Duran *Ağa*. Even though the State bans cattle smuggling, it fails to solve the problem of landlessness. As suggested in the film even though Duran *Ağa* owns fertile land suitable for agriculture, because he has total control and power over the area, he chooses to push villagers to cattle smuggling because it is a faster way to make money than agriculture. That is why cattle smuggling remains as the only income of the villagers since they neither have fertile lands for agriculture nor any nearby factories to work at. For that, countless men lose their lives along the 700 meter-long borders, surrounded by mine fields and presented as a signifier of loss and pain.

In order to put an end to the misery of the villagers, the new officer of Delidevran promises them that he would persuade Duran *Ağa* to open his land for agriculture so that men of Delidevran would no longer have to risk their lives smuggling cattle from the border. However, the officer also needs to change what it means by being a man in Delidevran since for a long time, masculinity has been defined by the ability to smuggle cattle from the border because it is the only way men can earn money. Therefore, men who are not good at smuggling become

subjects of double marginalization by the hegemonic discourses that dictate men as the breadwinner in the family and by their own society. In an attempt to change that, the officer calls Hıdır (Güney), the most famous cattle smuggler in Delidevran to the station. He takes Hıdır's promise to support his decision to talk to Duran *Ağa* regarding the fertile lands. He also gets Hıdır's consent to build a school to Delidevran so that the children, including Hıdır's son Yusuf, could be educated.

> Officer: Being a man is not being an illegal cattle smuggler. Manhood is fighting with what is in people's minds. This is the real challenge in life, not transferring cattle from one place to another. This is what I understand from being a man.

The plans toward agriculture and education correspond to the vision of the Kemalist modernization project, which paid particular emphasis to enlightenment through education. Official and teachers were sent to Anatolian villagers to educate / modernize the society. Especially, the female teacher became the representative of a liberated nation with its emancipated women. Education was constructed as a nationalistic mission of the new modern woman. It became the key for modernization and civilization used as synonyms. The emphasis on agriculture is also State related. In the 1930s Turkey's economy was heavily dependent on agriculture. Ataturk even declared the peasant as the head of Turkish society giving grand importance to agriculture rather than foreign investment and industrial development. In the film, the teacher, Zeynep, persuades Hıdır that agriculture can "save" them. She gives herself as an example saying that her father was also a peasant who raised her up with the money he earned from agriculture. In this context, both Zeynep and the officer become metaphors of the State and its modernization project. Their arrival signifies the arrival of modernity to Delidevran. Nevertheless

neither the teacher nor the officer is strong enough to stand in the way of the feudal power in the village. Duran *Ağa* sends his men to destroy the fields and burn down the school. With all of the hope gone, Hıdır and men of Delidevran go back to cattle smuggling. Just like his father, Hıdır dies on the minefield.

4.1.4 A Note on Censorship and Audience Expectations

Perhaps one of the major reasons why landlessness and collective action were not explicitly problematized was due to strict State censorship. Starting in 1931, until 1977, the Central Film Commission in Ankara controlled domestic films. The Commission was composed of five members from the Ministry of the Interior (head), the police, general staff of the army, Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of Education which emphasizes the power the government, police and military had in the censorship decisions in Turkey. (Kaya- Mutlu & Koçer, 2012: 74) In order to gain the Commission's approval for production and exhibition, a film was to avoid 10 criteria.[49] The decision was made via majority voting, which would include accepting, rejecting, revisions, or / and ban from international viewing. The Commission was also involved in making decisions on "describing specifically how

[49] 1. political propaganda related to a state; 2. degrading an ethnic community or race; 3. hurting the sentiments of fellow states and nations; 4. propagating religion; 5.propagating political, economic and social ideologies that contradict the national regime; 6. contradicting public decency, morality and national sentiments; 7. reducing the dignity and honor of the military and propagating against the military; 8. being harmful to the order and security of the country; 9. provoking crime; and 10. including scenes that may be used to propagate against Turkey. (Kaya-Mutlu & Koçer, 2012: 74)

a scene should be shot, what the characters should or should not say, how the film should end, and so forth." (Kaya-Mutlu & Koçer, 2012: 74)

Under these circumstances, it was not easy to show the rural as a place of "uncontrolled chaos, lack of opportunities and misery since it goes against the grain of the hegemonic ideology that idolizes the rural life as a place of serenity and peace." (Scognamillo, 1973: 41) Nijat Özön (as cited in Maktav, 2001: 167) argues likewise when he suggests that films about rural realities cannot be made in Yeşilçam "due to the structural formations within Yeşilçam. Yeşilçam industry cannot reach the hands of people who can really demonstrate the life in the rural areas properly." Perhaps, an example from Metin Erksan's film *Aşık Veysel* can be given as an example of how strict and oppressive the Commission was in their decisions. Erksan (as cited in Scognamillo, 1973: 41):

> In *Aşık Veysel*, in one scene there was a shot of fields. The wheat was almost 20 to 30 cm. The censorship boards asked to remove that scene because Turkish fields are not like that. They suggested changing it with the scene of fields full of tractors harvesting the fertile lands.

Güney's cinema suffered greatly from banned films, deleted scenes, and even court appeals. On censorship, Güney (as cited in Armes, 1987: 275):

> It was impossible for us to express our ideas clearly because of the censorship. We had to create a language that would allow us to communicate with the people and this language was found. We were engaged in an illegal communication… For example, we could not say, "organize yourselves" but we showed the dead-end of individualism.

For instance the Commission rejected *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967) and *Aç Kurtlar* (Güney, 1969) based on the 8th and the 9th Articles of the censorship regulation on

the grounds that they were harmful to the order and the security of the State as well as the decision that it provokes crime.

Besides the restrictions of censorship, there was also an economic side of the situation. Yeşilçam was an audience-run film industry which assessed audience expectations and reactions regularly based on each region. The feedback revealed popular stars and genres for each region and film orders were placed accordingly. Yeşilçam, then, was basically a mainstream cinema industry, which was concerned with making the right kind of investment. Güney (as cited in Coş, N., Ayça, E. 1974: 10) explains:

> At the beginning of Seyyit Han (Güney, 1968), we actually planned no fighting or beating. The man comes, marries a girl. They trick him into killing the girl. The man looks and goes away. He did not even bother getting revenge because the man was not courageous. Why? Because the man was only courageous until his wife (Keje) died. This was how the film was going to be. But what did we do? The man came and fought with some men in cowboy hats and moved on. What happened? The film is ruined.

What Güney highlights here is the demand of the producers, which organized the screenplays according to the demands of the audience. In other words, since the audience loved to see Güney firing his gun, fighting with other men, they had to implement fighting scenes to the film[50]. According to Güney (Rayns, 1983: 89) "the central problem is that the people who go to the cinema in Turkey (not to mention the producers and distributors) are conditioned to want a certain kind of movie. You try to do something better, but you don't have the means." Güney's rural films of the 1960s perhaps were not very successful in problematizing landlessness but they

[50] Güney: "Being Yılmaz Güney was difficultt. For instance there had to be a gun involved in every film" (as cited in Cos and Ayca,1974, p. 7)

managed to present the rural as a "constant place of anger and violence" (Scognamillo, 1973: 36) even in strict censorship.

4.2 The Lower / Working-Class Men and The *Kabadayı*: Urban Masculinities

This section of the dissertation continues to discuss Güney's on-screen star image by looking at his action-adventure films in the urban setting. It starts with the career of the first male star of Yeşilçam, Ayhan Işık since his on-screen star image not only "inspired Güney"[51] (Güzel, 1994: 23) in his initial days as a film star but also Güney was compared to Işık throughout his film career. Işık's role as the tough working class male hero in *Kanun Namına* (Akad, 1952) catapulted him to stardom. The same year, Güney was a working as a *pursantaj memuru.*[52]

> Güney: I was a *pursantaj memuru*. I used to travel all over the country. For years I have observed audience responses to film characters in twenty-two cities and countless towns. I looked at what they loved in the movies. For instance, Ayhan Işık became a star with *Kanun Namına*. Back then, I did not know why. Now I do. I can bet on hundreds of thousands of liras that I can turn anyone into a star in six months. Would you have predicted that I could be where I am now ten years ago? You wouldn't. I would. (Ses, January 15th, 1966, Issue 3 p. 6-7)

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[51] Nebahat Çehre: "Yılmaz used to talk about the notes he took from the films he watched. He took notes on the scenes where the audience clapped Ayhan Işık in Kanun Namına." (Güzel, 1994: 23)

[52] During the 1960s, Yeşilçam produced films mostly according to the demand of the audience. Turkey was divided into several regions and each region had film distributors who "commisioned films that involved specific star whose films had been profitable in their region." (Kaya-Mutlu, 2010: 421) The regional distributor could also demand certain genres and plot changes in the films as well. Within that system, *pursantaj memuru* would take the film reels and travel the region in order for people to see the film. Yılmaz Güney worked as a *pursantaj memuru* for a long time before becoming a star in Yeşilçam.

Kanun Namına (Akad, 1952) is famous for being the forerunner of many films, which include car chases and fight scenes with excessive usage of guns and violence - all of which are always present in Güney's action-adventure films. Besides spectacle, what catapulted Güney to stardom was his "observation" of why audience made Işık a star. In *Kanun Namına*, the male protagonist, Nazım (Işık) is a mechanic who kills a man who makes a pass at his wife and sister-in-law; a crime committed in the name of family honor. The camerawork, mise en scene and narration all justify Nazım's acts and present him as a man who is pushed into crime - the core characteristic of Güney's films regardless they are action-adventure or rural melodramas. In the film, Nazım is glorified as the charismatic hero, the defender of male honor - again a fundamental element in all of Güney's films. *Kanun Namına* was an instant hit and it started an era in Yeşilçam which was characterized by Kakınç as "cleansing honor with bullets"- again a core component in any film Güney acted in. What Kakınç suggests was that with the role as an ordinary mechanic coming from a lower/working class, Nazım's character offered a solution to the disgrace of family honor, which glorifies him at the end. *Kanun Namına* also catapulted Işık to stardom making him the charismatic and just defender of traditional values of female sexuality. According to Dyer (1991: 58) what is at stake in thinking about star charisma is the "relationships between stars and specific instabilities, ambiguities and contradictions in the culture which are reproduced in the actual practice of making films and film stars." In other words, if the star is constructed as authentic, real and ordinary, "the effect of authenticating authenticity gives the star charisma." (Dyer, 1991: 133) In this sense, ordinariness becomes an important element of star image. For instance, Douglas Fairbanks "appeared to know all the answers and knew then without pretending anything to be more than an all-

around chap, just a regular American," (Dyer, 1991: 58) in a time when American society was in turbulence. Similarly charisma and phenomenal status of certain stars such as Javier Bardem and Antonio Banderas rely relatively on their "connection to the local social imaginary." (Perriam, 2003: 7)

Ayhan Işık managed to look like an "ordinary chap" on-screen who had the solution to male anxieties about honor and morality. That is why it is important to look at the start of stars' careers when they are bond "to the explosive matter of, respectively, urban and rural / small town desires and frustrations." (Perriam, 2003: 8) In *Kanun Namına*, Işık communicated male anxieties regarding the sexuality of women and provided fantasies and the gratification through revenge. While the former suggest a masculinity crisis, the latter is the solution to avert that crisis most of the time by re-masculinizing the oppressed hero with the most obvious phallic symbol- the gun. However after a decade of acting in similar roles, Işık transformed his star image to a "a wealth gentleman in the 1960s." Dündar (1996):

> There was a need for another man who would defend the honor and dignity of the poor after the man [referring to Işık] who slapped the oppressors, locked himself into a rich palace. A substitute needed to be found. That king appeared soon with his thick moustache; sun burnt skin and an attitude of a mushroom slum bully. He dived among the baby-face actors of Yeşilçam and turned everything upside down (Aynalar: Yılmaz Güney, show TV, April 4th, 1996).

Based on Güney's observation about Işık in *Kanun Namına* and Dündar's argument, it can be argued that Güney not only figured out the way Işık communicated with the male audience through stories of morality and honor but he also appeared at a time when Işık was transforming his star image. What Güney discovered back then is the source of the organic bond between him and millions of

Anatolian men from lower and working classes: empathy toward the fear, worries, and anxieties of lower / working class men about being powerless against oppressive situations. What he offered to them was gratification and fantasies of revenge and triumph. However, by the time Güney was crowned as the substitute of Işık, the socio-economic and political climate in Turkey was shifting. Therefore, the oppressive situations in the 1950s were different in the 1960s. Refiğ suggested that the difference between Güney and Işık was Güney's star image as the representative of the change Turkish society was going through in the 1960s. Refiğ (1979: 12):

> After 1965, both hasty industrialization and phony urbanization – which is nothing but peasantization of big cities made it possible for peasant culture to have democratic sovereignty. The most obvious interpretation of this change in Turkish cinema is the replacement of Ayhan Işık - the protector of traditional values with Yılmaz Güney - a man who migrated to the big cities in search for a new way of justice, a man who destroys old values to place them with his own rural ones.

While Ayhan Işık was the protector of traditional values, Güney was the representative of male anxieties about migration, modernization and urbanization. He was the social climber, the migrant who came to the big city to surrender it. Güney:

> When Fatih Sultan Mehmet took over İstanbul, he was 21 years old. I came to İstanbul at the same age. I rented a room at Tünel, Beyoğlu for four liras a night. I said: "Hello, İstanbul. Surrender now. Please do not make it hard". İstanbul did not listen. My landlord was an old lady. She asked me why I came here. I told her: "I would take over İstanbul". She laughed. But I was serious. No one believed me because I neither had a horse nor a sword. (as cited in Dündar, 1996)

Güney's star image emerged out of marginalization. He was mostly unemployed. Directors and producers did not hire him because of his prior criminal

record.[53] It was Atıf Yılmaz who offered Güney a job as a screenwriter. It was again Yılmaz, who gave Güney his first acting role in *Bu Vatanın Çocukları* (Yılmaz, 1958). Still, Güney's films were not shown in the film theaters of big cities. Güney turned to Anatolia, started to work with small film companies making action-adventure films. The critics ignored the small budget, unscripted action-adventure films because they were not artistic and cinematic enough. On the other hand, it is those action-adventures that created a trend an, which involved gangs, bloodsheds, robberies, unjust situations, deceit, fist, gun, and woman. More importantly they are the films that catapulted Güney to stardom. Güney's decision to act in those action-adventure films was not coincidental. It was intentional. Tuncel Kurtiz:

> When Yılmaz came back from exile, he told me to get together and we made *Konyakçı, Kabadayılar Kralı*. It was terrible. Then we made *Üçünüzü de Mıhlarım* (Olgaç, 1965). When I said, "what are we doing brother?", he said: "Brother, now we need to do this. We need to become the Ugly King so that we can do whatever we want to do. (Hızlı, Ertürk, Mater, 2010: 86)

It can be argued here that Güney was well aware of the effect of his films. In a time of rapid modernization, urbanization, industrialization and the emergence of a foreign bourgeois culture, he was avenging cruel factory owners, dirty accountants, bourgeois employers who make fun of his Anatolian ways, belittle his traditions and target his woman. He was also breaking the hearts of upper-class women who make fun of his clothes and manners. In other words, Güney was repeating a particular social type, which in time - along with the helps of the extra-filmic images - established a sense of self was associated with Güney's star image. This coherentness within "becomes what the star really is." (Dyer: 1998: 11) That is how,

[53] Güney was imprisoned due to the allegations of propogating communism in a short story, *Üçlü Bilinmezlikler Denklemi*.

Güney managed to connect with his Anatolian male audience who were coping with their own psychological predicaments of the modernization project. As Dorsay (1984: 12) suggests these small budget and unscripted films were not cinema masterpieces. However,

> they would, in a very short time, provide some kind of relief especially to the Anatolian local film audience who deal with particular problems through the image of this beaten and battered, sun-burnt ugly king who do not look like jön premiers of Yeşilçam.

Due to the perception that Güney did not only act but lived through these oppressive circumstances, his star image became authentic. Dennis Bingham (1995: 220) suggests that "it is no accident that most of the masculine icons of the American classical cinema - Clark Gable, Cary Grant, John Wayne, Humphrey Bogart - have been perceived by audiences and critics as being themselves and not really action on camera." This is true for Güney's films since along with his star image and masculinity constructions, these films create the assumption that Güney's masculinities are not performed but rather natural.

In those action-adventure films, Güney played two major characters: the lower / working class man, and *kabadayı*: The gangster and the thief. While the former has a male character who rebels at oppressive situations similar to the *eşkıya* in rural films, the latter introduces an omnipotent male protagonist right at the beginning of the film. There are particular tensions, anxieties and fantasies that are associated with both group. It is these tensions that are constructed with regards to the anxieties of modernization that create different forms of marginalized masculinities. The following is the exploration of these masculinities and their relations with the ramifications of modernization in Turkey in the 1960s.

4.2.1 Working / Lower Class Masculinities

This section of the dissertation will explore the marginalized forms of masculinities in Güney's action-adventure films with a lower / working class male protagonist. The section will look at the usage of space; the exterior and the interior as well as the center and the periphery paying special attention to how space while shaping and regulating gender constructions also used to criticize the ramifications of modernization movements.

4.2.1.1 Space

It has been a long tradition to associate space with gender, starting with the late-Ottoman period where public space was associated with masculinity and private realm was considered feminine. In Güney's action-adventure films one of the formal elements that helped construct lower / working class masculinities is again the use of space. In these films, space has ideological interpretations in the sense that it is used to criticize the implications of modernization project of the 1950s which led to rapid and unplanned urbanization. Rapid urbanization led to the emergence of squatter settlements, slums in the peripheries in urban cities whose residences are mostly migrants and low-income families.

Just like how the rural was defined with particular and repetitive establishing shots, the squatter settlements are also constructed with similar establishing shots in almost every action-adventure film that has a lower / working class male protagonist.

These shots include people living in shabby houses, women carrying water from well since they do not have water, men riding donkeys and children either walking to school with their boots covered in mud or playing in the mud. In the urban setting, these establishing shots of *varoş* - the periphery - are usually juxtaposed to the images of high-rise buildings and apartments, people dressed in fancy dresses hailing taxies or driving expensive cars in the center. Not only the exterior, but also the names of certain neighborhoods are also used to signify differences in socio-economic class. The opening shots and the repetition of certain images throughout *Yiğit Yaralı Olur* (Akad, 1966) and *Balatlı Arif* (Yılmaz, 1967) are examples. Similar to how Peyami Safa portrayed Harbiye as the realm of the *flaneur* - the representative of the dangerous of the cosmopolitan western life - and Fatih as the appropriate space to appreciate Ottoman roots and cultural heritage for the young Ottoman men in *Fatih Harbiye* (Safa, 1931), thirty-five years later, in *Yiğit Yaralı Olur* (Akad, 1966), Akad uses Beyoğlu as the space of corruption, excessive westernization and bourgeoisie and Fatih as the neighborhood of the decent working-class men. That is why, Yılmaz's (Güney) fiancée Gül (Hülya Koçyiğit) who craves for luxury and wealth insists Yılmaz that they should move to Beyoğlu even though Yılmaz tells her that they will definitely move to Fatih. Similarly, in *Balatlı Arif* (Yılmaz, 1967), the binary between periphery and center are demonstrated with scenes of Arif's (Güney) long walks from the university in the center to his house in the periphery. Another example would be the scene where Çiğdem - an upper-class girl - offers to have drinks with Arif at her apartment. Arif agrees and they take a cab - the only time Arif is in a cab is with Çiğdem - to her apartment in Nişantaşı- another neighborhood associated with upper-class life. Even though Arif agrees to go with Çiğdem, once he stands in front of the tall, luxurious apartment Çiğdem invites

him in, he changes his mind. Intimidated by her wealth, Arif leaves Çiğdem there and walks back home.

The critique of modernization and urbanization is demonstrated not only with the exterior but also with the interior of the apartments. In *Balatlı Arif* (Yılmaz, 1967), Arif's house is very small. It has a tiny living room with broken windows and low ceiling which almost gives the audience the feeling that Arif would eventually hit his head walking inside the room. Arif studies on the dining table since he does not have his own room with proper furniture. He sleeps on an old futon in the living room. These images are contrasted in the following scenes to Çiğdem's house. As Çiğdem and Arif walk inside the unfinished building on the construction side, Çiğdem complains about the size of the place saying that her stuff can never fit in here. At the same time, we see Arif measuring how many feet only the living room is in complete awe and astonishment.

Like other neighborhoods, varoş consists of different traditional neighborhoods called "*mahalle.*" The residents of *mahalle* in Güney's films usually come from a low economic class. Most of them are migrants who moved close to other migrants from their villages forming a space, which provides some sort of community, belonging, intimacy and collectivity. *Mahalle* has particular traditional norms and values that regulate the life of its residents. That is why *mahalle* is a space "which extends the interior space of the family to the residential street." (Mills, 2007: 336) Living as a close community, the residents of *mahalle* feel they have the right to judge the behaviors and decisions of its residents. For instance in *Kasımpaşalı Recep* (Akıncı, 1965), At home, Recep's mother humiliates him because he does not work and provide for his family. In the neighborhood - his

extended family - Recep is also belittled by the peddlers and merchants because he lives off his mother although he is a grown up. The residents of the neighborhood medal with Recep's idle ways, walking aimless in the city and wasting time at the local coffeehouse. In a way Recep's character is a reminiscent of the flaneur in the novels of the late-Ottoman era. Just like how the flaneur is not appreciated by the male elite writers of the period, in the film no one has any respect for Recep since as discussed in the previous chapters; unemployment for man is a de-masculinizing discourse. There is another aspect, which is important in this scene, and it is the hierarchy that is produced among marginalized masculinities in the neighborhood. Since *varoş* is constructed as the place of low-income families, unemployment and illiteracy by the hegemonic discourse, the forms of masculinities that are constructed are marginalized forms. What is at stake is that *varoş* also becomes a space where complicit masculinities establish their superiority over marginalized ones. For instance, even though they come from lower classes, the merchants in the neighborhood try to adjust themselves to the urban life. They work and earn their living. With employment not only they gain respect but also feel they are one step closer to the hegemonic ideal - since employment makes them feel "urban" and "adjusted." Erman (1998: 541):

> Rural migrants were expected to assimilate into urban society oriented to the West and to become true urbanites by discarding their rural and traditional values and lives and by adopting the lifestyles and values of the modernizing urban elites. They were often seen as failing to do so and there by remaining rural. And this failure to become an urbanite was defined as social and cultural marginality.

In this sense, employment, adjustment, orientation and adaptation of urban manners form complicit forms of masculinities. The butcher who condemns Recep and the

small market owner who looks at Recep with disappointment consider themselves superiors to Recep and accordingly, marginalize the already marginalized masculinity of Recep. This double marginalization - by the hegemonic upper class and the complicit lower / working class - becomes the catalyst of Recep's transformation from an idle lower-class man to a gangster with a volatile and marginalized form of masculinity.

Balatlı Arif (Yılmaz, 1967) is another example of how *mahalle* is a discourse that shapes and regulates certain behaviors as well as particular masculinities. In the film, Arif is a medical student. He lives with his parents who are very supportive and proud of him. Arif is also loved by the whole neighborhood. He loves his neighbors and frequently tells his friends that the neighborhood is like a mother to him - suggesting *mahalle*'s existence as an exterior family. Every morning Arif shaves, wears a suit and tours the neighborhood to care for the sick. People refer to him as doctor even though he has not graduated yet. They also show their support by prohibiting him from doing certain jobs such as carrying wood, bringing water and riding carriages since they consider those jobs appropriate for the illiterate.

In other words, *mahalle* - as the exterior family - not only exalts Arif but also considers his masculinity superior to theirs. They consider Arif as a man who is well adjusted to the city but also in touch with his cultural distinctiveness especially because Arif tells them that as soon as he graduates he will open a small practice where he would cure poor patients for free. As Arif tries to become more of an urbanite - socially and economically - the neighbors feel Arif is getting closer to be a part of the hegemonic group so they treat him like one. In this sense, with the presence of an innate hegemonic form at the neighborhood, even the complicit forms

of masculinities start to position themselves as inferior. In other words, Arif's presence provides a double-marginalization among other men in the neighborhood.

However, even though "higher education improves adjustment to the city, it does not necessarily make migrants feel themselves urbanites." (Erman, 1998: 559) At the end, even though Arif dates a rich girl and studies a prestigious occupation, everything crumbles. The reason for failure stems from Arif's lies regarding his socio-economic background. In order to be friends with the upper class, Arif tells them that his father is a business owner in Balat and he is planning to go to America to further study medicine. When the reality comes out, Arif hides in his neighborhood - to hide in the arms of his two mothers. However both his mother and the neighborhood turn their backs on him because lying suggests an embarrassment and a denial of his roots, his cultural distinctiveness. Arif does not become an excessively westernized snob, but is still punished by his neighborhood only to be forgiven once he understands his mistakes. At the end of the film, Arif becomes a coach driver like his father and quits medical school.

Sevgili Muhafızım (Jöntürk, 1970) is another example. In the film Yılmaz (Güney) is a man with nine children. In order to earn his living, he takes a job as a bodyguard for the daughters of a wealthy businessman and moves to his luxurious home. Soon, he becomes addicted to the comfort, luxury and prosperity in the house. He stops thinking of his family and even starts to see them as illiterate and weak. One day he realizes how much he has been changed and suddenly feels very afraid. He leaves the place and comes right back to his poor shabby home. After all, unlike the female social climber who would never be welcomed after being with rich men, redemption is possible for the male social climber.

Like almost every threatening figure in Turkish literature, films and theater, the residences of *varoş* are used to draw certain boundaries of appropriate westernization. However this time, rather than the excessively westernized dandy, the unemployed, womanizer wastrel or the dangerously cosmopolitan *flaneur*, the threat comes from inside- from the threatening Other of Anatolia. Ayşe Öncü (1999) explores the reasons behind the association of the migrants with the images of the *hacıağa*[54] and *maganda*. She argues that the immigrant has two basic components. First, the immigrant is associated with negative values and hence being an Istanbulite is reflexively constructed as the positive Other. Second, the presence of *hacıağa* and *maganda* in the city which is "unjustified, invading" (Öncü, 1999: 97) becomes a tool for the Istanbulites to establish their authority and superiority over them. In other words, once Istanbul and its surrounding Western parts of Turkey are constructed as the center, the rest /Anatolia becomes the periphery. While the Eastern parts of Turkey are "othered" as the religious, illiterate and "unmodern," the Istanbulite is constructed as the cultured, modern, secular, urban and holder of good taste. Naturally, the same characteristics that are constructed to be present in the Istanbulite become the characteristics that form hegemonic masculinity. Nonetheless, literature and film are sympathetic toward their inferior characters. Even though migrants and the lower class are "othered" and humiliated, the camerawork and the mise en scene are sympathetic toward them by championing their cultural distinctiveness and struggles especially through forming binary oppositions, which construct the rich as

[54] *Hacıağa* has economic capital but fails to adapt to the city because of his lack of cultural capital. He is associated with false piety and powerlessness not only among the Istanbulites. *Hacıağa* is also portrayed as tasteless. Good taste is presumed to be something the Istanbulites have and it comes along with accumulated cultural capital. Since *hacıağa* is not equipped with the proper tools to differentiate the good and the bad taste, he does not know how to consume properly so his house becomes a site where lack of cultural capital and overconsumption, which is the symbolic embodiment of vulgarism associated with new wealth is criticized (Öncü, 1999: 103-104).

villains and the poor as heroes. *Yiğit Yaralı Olur* (Akad, 1966) is an example. In the film, Yılmaz's (Güney) boss humiliates him for his dark skin and unshaven face. His stubbornness is considered as a characteristic of "his Siverek ways"[55] which is used as an insult. He belittles Yılmaz as being temporally and spatially behind modernization. While the dialog humiliates Yılmaz for "sticking to his Siverek ways", the narration, mise en scene and camerawork praise him. Honesty, bravery and loyalty are associated with his character while corruption, adultery, and crime are associated with his boss. The film champions Yılmaz's "Siverek stubbornness" and rewards him at the end for remaining moral and dignified - unlike his fiancée, Gül (Koçyiğit) who is left all alone for betraying Yılmaz and "going bourgeois." Therefore, just like how the dandies of the late-Ottoman literature were advised to draw the boundaries between westernization and their cultural distinctiveness, the Anatolian are advised to draw the boundaries between upper class culture and the discursively produced culture of Anatolia. As long as Anatolian characters remain loyal to these boundaries, they are glorified as honorable and respectful. If they transgress the boundaries, their stories become cautionary tales with bleak endings mostly involving murder / suicides.

The stories of boundary drawing and transgression usually find representation through the character of the female social climber. Often, a lower class girl from a mushroom slum becomes attracted to the upper class life. She craves luxury and upward mobility so she starts to hover on the fringes of bourgeoisie and soon after, she becomes a part of that life. However, the female social climber receives severe

[55] Siverek is a village in Adana. It is in the Southern-eastern part of Anatolia in far proximity with Istanbul. "Siverek ways" here used as an insult on Yılmaz suggesting that purely due to his social, economic and ethnic background, Yılmaz is temporally and spatially behind the modern world.

punishment for abandoning her values and traditions for upward mobility. She is either killed by the men in her family or commits suicide in order to re-construct male honor, which was stained by her acts. In a way it is suggested in these films that the female social climber is saved with these murder / suicides. Upper class women, on the other hand, are portrayed mostly as lost causes who do not have honor, which can be saved or protected because they are sexually emancipated. That is why Güney's action-adventure films mostly do not care what happens to them. They may die, go to prison or continue to live in shame. The character of Melahat in *Yiğit Yaralı Olur* (Akad, 1966) is an example. After marrying into money, Melahat moves from her poor neighborhood. Her greediness and corruption are perhaps best represented at the end of the film when she refuses to burn down the building where she forges money together with her husband. Even though they learn that the police are coming to raid it, they try to save the money and hence captured by the police. In other words, Melahat's greediness prepares their end. Yılmaz's fiancée Gül, in the same film is also an example of a social climber. Gül craves luxury. Her hunger for wealth is expressed specifically when she insists on living in Beyoğlu and having a big car. One particular scene at the opening of the film presents an example. After a day of shopping with Yılmaz, Gül opens her presents and dances around her room holding the shiny clothes in her arms. She looks at her reflection in the mirror, smiling as the camera pushes in on the excitement on her face. She throws herself to the bed, holding all the new clothes in her arms and falls asleep. Due to her interest in money and luxury, she even betrays Yılmaz. *Benim Adım Kerim* (Güney, 1967) is another film where social climbers are represented as corrupt. The social climber in the film is Kerim's ex-wife who is not present in the film but talked about at the end when Kerim explains his son why his mother left him. He tells him that his mother

was only interested in money. She was not satisfied with his salary and that is why she left her family. Kerim: “Women want money, son… and they are never satisfied with the amount they get. Without considering whether they deserve it or not, they constantly ask for more... and more...” Just like in rural films, upper class women and social climbers in action-adventure films are used as tools to build up and motivate the male protagonist. They can be villainized or victimized however they cannot be saved because they lost their innocence and virtue - their virginity. However, not every upper class women is beyond saving in Güney’s films.

In his action-adventure films, the male hero saves women from different situations for different reasons. Both the method and the reasons to save women contribute to the construction of particular forms of masculinities. There are two important elements, which facilitate these constructions. They are the place where women are saved from and how they are saved. The former, literally or metaphorically becomes a site where women are trapped and unhappy. In other words, women are not necessarily saved from brothels (literal) but also saved from theirselves (metaphorical). That is why constructing Güney's characters as men who save innocent girls from the hands of immoral men would be an over simplification of his acts. For instance Kerim saves Birsen, a daughter of a rich family in *Benim Adım Kerim* (Güney, 1967). The fact that she has a name suggests her significance in the film. Birsen tells Kerim that she has lots of money but it has no use for her. She admits being a spoiled girl who has never worked for anything because every opportunity and luxury was handed to her on a gold platter. Birsen needs to be saved from the upper-class life she is trapped in. She is not beyond saving like other bourgeois characters because she is able to problematize her situation, which leads to her being depressed and unhappy with her wealth. She is aware of the consequences

of never having worked all her life. She no longer appreciates the luxury of cars, clothes and apartments. Her existential crisis is related to having no purpose in life. She needs to be saved by someone who can "open her eyes" to another kind of life. So Kerim takes her to a mushroom slum in the peripheries of the city; a place he suggests Birsen has never seen before. There she sees peasants, beggars, children covered in mud, women carrying woods, children riding donkeys, people living in miserable conditions. As she watches outside from the window of Kerim's car, we watch her watching them. The camera is positioned so that the audience can see each reaction on her face as well as the images she sees from the mirror on the car. Kerim: "If you want to be happy, you should find the kind of people that would accept you and when you do, you should stand shoulder to shoulder with them forever." Birsen feels connected to the people in the slums so she chooses to live there. The next time we see her, she is working at a fields dressed in traditional clothes. Soon we learn that she has distributed all of her money, stripped herself off her upper class life and transformed herself into a working-class peasant.

> Kerim: "You look much better now."
> Birsen: "I am. I am very good. I am not alone. I work, sweat and earn my meal. For the first time in my life, I love people and they love me back. I think I have found the people that I need to be with."

The ideological underpinnings of Birsen's transformation are two-fold. First, the film criticizes modernization / westernization as a process, which encourages individualism, which leads to isolation and depression. Then suggests that piece and happiness can be found in community, collectivity, tradition and belonging.

Another example is *Kasımpaşalı Recep* (Akıncı, 1965). Recep (Güney) decides to be a gangster in order to earn the respect of his neighborhood.

Interestingly, he does not start with ransacking or looting but rather by going to a brothel to save "a" woman who is neither a relative nor a friend. She is called "my poor one" (*garibim*) by Recep suggesting both the insignificance of the character since she has no name and the superiority of Recep as the man who saved her, named her and took control of her. Hence, the motivation behind Recep's act is not stemmed from the classic scenario of protecting family honor but rather from the need to feel in control of his own masculinity which has been under constant threat not only by the upper-class men who bully him and the upper class woman who does not love him back but also by the people in his own neighborhood who look down on him. In other words, Recep saves *Garibim*, not for her, but for him.

4.2.1.2 Physical Appearance

Just like how stubbornness is used as a character trait to differentiate the rich and evil with the poor and the good, physical appearance is commonly used in Güney's films. Dyer (1979: 109) suggests, "What the character looks like indicates their personality." The look here refers both to the physical appearance of the character ranging from his clothes, hairstyle, accessories, to the way he walks and talks. In *Yiğit Yaralı Olur* (Akad, 1966), Yılmaz's boss sees Yılmaz's fiancée Gül while they are leaving the factory. He comes near her and tells her that "she is too pretty to work at a factory" directly associating beauty with the upper class and ugliness with the working class. Yeşilçam uses clothing and props such as cars, houses and alcohol commonly to shape characters' socio-economic backgrounds. It

is not possible to see a rich character in cheap clothes, driving old cars unless they poise like poor because they have an agenda. The differences are clear-cut which makes it easy to understand the rich and the poor as well as the hegemonic and marginalized forms of masculinities.

Kasımpaşalı Recep (Akıncı, 1965) is a good example to combine the importance in space in forming marginalized forms of masculinity with the significance of physical appearance of the male protagonist. In the film Recep puts on his jacket hanging over his shoulder. His scarf falls from the two sides of his neck and his hat is placed slightly toward his forehead. He goes out to see the woman he loves, Hülya - an upper class woman. In the first scene, we first see Recep sitting on a wall across a house. The camera is subjective. From his point of view, we watch Hülya get off a luxurious car and enter a big villa. The phone rings. On the other side of the line, the camera shows a very typical party scene in many Yeşilçam films. Young men and women dance together as they smoke cigars and drinking whisky- a common signifier of both economic power and moral corruption. Hülya asks for Suat and tells him "the thug, the one wearing weird clothes is back." The next scene is at the exterior of the house. The camera pushes in on Recep as he slowly smokes his cigarette still gazing at the house. On the background, out of focus, we see a group of bikers approaching closer to Recep. As they circle around Recep in their motorcycles, they tell him it has been three months and ask when will he be tired of getting beaten. Without looking at the bikers, Recep tells Hülya: " There are girls in my neighborhood but none of them is beautiful like you." Hülya's friend replies: "What did you expect! Do you look like us so that the women in your neighborhood would look like her?"

Here, both the look, the interior of Hülya's house and the exterior of her neighborhood signify socio-economic difference between Recep and the others. The physical appearance of Recep, sun burnt dark skin, unshaven face, and the "weird" clothes signify inferiority and marginalize Recep's masculinity when compared to the fancy motorcycles and fine suits of Hülya's friends. Hülya's luxurious car, the lavish decoration of the interior of her house and the fact that she does not look like the girls in Recep's neighborhood all suggest socio-economic superiority as well. Also by placing Recep on the exterior of the house, he is cast outside Hülya's world both literally and metaphorically. This is how; *mahalle* becomes a cultural sign as well as producers of certain gendered meanings with this play of boundaries. It "becomes a sign of uncontaminated, natural, physical and authentic masculinity" (Özbay, 2010, p. 649) which is "othered" by the hegemonic.

4.2.2 The Masculinity of *Kabadayı*

As a significant discourse in the Turkish context, *mahalle* does not only produce working class masculinities. It is also the space of the *kabadayı* - a character which finds representation as much as *eşkıya* in Güney's films. The two characters have much in common. They share similar moral codes and their approach to traditional norms; values, women's sexuality and family honor are alike. While *eşkıya* lives in the mountains, *kabadayı* is an urban phenomenon.

The figure of *kabadayı* dates even further back in literature than *eşkıya*. It has been present in the Ottoman literature. He is a quintessential Ottoman male. Ref'i Cevat Ulunay [1955] (2003: 9-10) defines *kabadayılık* as

> urban chivalry whose context was the traditional *mahalle*… *Kabadayı* ensured that the women of the quarter were protected, that there were no importunate visitors from other quarters that dealings among inhabitants were honest and fair, and that infractions of propriety did not go unpunished.

Kandiyoti (1997b: 121-122) suggests that these men are mostly "uneducated but could be artisans practicing their trade, and they were generally respectable members of the community." *Kabadayı* is a socio-cultural identity embedded with certain cultural codes associated with justice, morality, rebellion, endurance, and traditional values. It is a discourse, which changes as the constructions of forms of urban masculinities change. Yılmaz Güney did not bring fighting, beating, *kabadayılık* to Turkish cinema. He took an already existing tradition and adapted it to the socio-economic conditions as well as to the changing urban landscape. This "modern *kabadayı* exalts the virtues of loyalty, unselfishness, and moral rectitude, but with a bitter undertone of perpetual betrayal and disappointment." (Kandiyoti, 1997b: 124) Nevertheless, he is a man outside the Law, a criminal, thief or gangster. He bypasses the system because it prevents him from taking revenge. Instead he judges, punishes or forgives according to his system of justice mostly based on morality and honor. In this sense he is very authoritarian. He does not fear from anything or anyone. He is not an ordinary gangster. He is a legendary one.

Not every *kabadayı* is embedded with these values. In Güney's action-adventure films, the good *kabadayı* - similar to the good eşkıya - is the fighter and deliverer of justice whose actions are always justified. He lives by similar moral

codes as the good eşkıya. The moral code has particular emphasis on honesty, loyalty and revenge. For instance, in Güney's films, good *kabadayı* is never an informer because it is not appreciated by the code. He is required to find and challenge his enemy and punish him himself – not have him sent to prison by the police. In *Çifte Tabancalı Kabadayı* (Aslan, 1969), Güney makes it clear with the statement he makes to the police that he would not even rat his own enemies. In *Azrail Benim /Büyük Örfi* (Uçanoğlu, 1968), Örfi tells the police that he is too dumb to remember who shot him.

4.2.2.1 Glorification

It is important to note here that when Güney played a *kabadayı*, his character is constructed as superior and authoritarian from the beginning of the film. This glorification is established with sequences of heist, which Güney successfully undertakes, or a car chase scene where Güney easily runs away from the police. Sometimes, the masculinity of *kabadayı* is glorified through absence rather than presence on-screen. He is talked about and searched for but cannot be found unless he willingly reveals himself. When this glorification through narration and absence of the male protagonist are considered with how much Recep had to go through to establish himself as a powerful man - saving garibim, ransacking, looting, and etc., in *Kasımpaşalı Recep* (Akıncı, 1965), the difference between the two marginalized masculinities become more clear. While the *kabadayı* of the lower / working class

origin needs to earn his superiority throughout the film, the other one is given that authority at the beginning.

Güney's difference and superiority as a *kabadayı* come from his proximity to other gangsters and to the poor. Arslan (2005) wrote that the male hero savior listens to the problems of the poor and he resolves them. This makes his relationship with the oppressed hierarchical rather than horizontal producing the sense that he is not one of them. (Arslan, 2005: 116-117) One particular scene in *Umutsuzlar* (Güney, 1971) is an example. In the scene Fırat - a famous gangster - sits on a big chair behind a huge desk and frequently accepts people to his presence. People come to him with problems. He produces solutions and has them executed by his men. He is like a Godfather who takes people's good wishes and prayers for protecting and helping them. Similarly, Güney's portrayal of *kabadayı* shares the same kind of lavish life with other gangsters but unlike them, his morals are intact. He neither uses drugs nor sells them. He is not involved in any illegal trafficking. This way of presenting Güney's portrayal of *kabadayı* as a moral and just man not only differentiates him from others but also exalts him. In this sense he has an ambiguous situation similar to Hobsbawm's social bandit:

> Crucial fact about the bandit's social situation is its ambiguity. He is an outsider and rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal rules of poverty.... This draws him close to the poor: he is one of them. It sets him in opposition to the hierarchy of power, wealth and influence: he is not one of them.... At the same time the bandit is, inevitably, drawn into the web of wealth and power, because, unlike other peasants, he acquires wealth and exerts power. He is "one of us" who is constantly in the process of becoming associated with "them".

Since the glorification of the *kabadayı* is not specific to the films of the 1960s but continues to the 1970, perhaps *Canlı Hedef* (Güney, 1970) can be given here as

an example here to present the difference between the moral and immoral *kabadayı*. In the film Bilal and Çino are looking for Asım (Güney) to take their revenge. The two characters are both examples of *kabadayı* but there is a major difference between the two. While Çino challenges Asım for a dual, Bilal tries to have his men capture Asım for him. In other words, while the former wants to settle his conflict personally with Asım with a dual, the latter uses his men. At the end of the dual, Çino misses and an opportunity emerges for Asım to kill Çino. However because he does not want to shed any more blood, Asım does not shoot Çino. Humiliated by Asım's decision to let him go, Çino begs Asım to kill him since he lost his dignity and honor. Asım still refuses and walks away. Çino neither picks up a gun and shoots at him behind his back, nor sends his men to kill him. Instead, he accepts Asım's superiority and joins him in his vengeance. This is an example of the moral code in play. The character of Bilal represents the destruction of the moral code. When he cannot have his men capture Asım, Bilal orders them to kidnap Asım's daughter, Elif. Asım frequently tells them to let her go because what they are doing is immoral and is not appreciated even in their world but Bilal does not care and have his men rape Elif in front of Asım's eyes and later cause her death when the rope that is tied to her wrists breaks and she falls into the river.

4.2.2.2 Mockery of Authority

Another characteristics of Güney's portrayal of *kabadayı* is the way the male protagonist constantly mocks and challenges authority. For instance, in *Şeytanın*

Oğlu, (Aslan, 1967) Kazım (Yılmaz Güney) is a famous gangster who is respected by all convicts in the prison. Among them he is portrayed as a reticent man who is very serious, calm and introspective. He is the man whom everybody comes for advice. However, as soon as a prison guard or a police become a part of the mise en scene, Kazım's behavior changes. In the scene of his first arrival to the prison, the camera follows Kazım from the long corridors to his cell with one prison guard on his each-positioning him at the center of the frame. Kazım enters the cell with his sunglasses on, his jacket hanging over his shoulders, walking as if he is free in the streets with a half-arrogant smile on his face. His carefree attitude makes the guards furious. In another scene, Kazım, in close up, turns around and starts to tell a story that mocks police. As other convicts laugh, the guard tells him to stop. Kazım continues to insult him, playing with the guard's uniform, touching his hat - tools which suggest authority- making jokes about him, as he circles around him.

The scene in *Azrail Benim / Büyük Örfi* (Uçanoğlu, 1968) is very similar. After getting shot five times by Recep, Örfi is in the hospital interrogated by the police. As he lies on the bed, the police officers hover around him. The chief officer asks him to identify the man who shot him. Örfi replies: "Excuse me officer, you know, I am a bit dumb and stupid. I just cannot remember who shot me." As he smiles, the camera pushes in on Örfi and in shot-reverse-shot reveals the anger on the face of the police officer.

Yücel (2008) associates performativity with comedy. He argues that Güney's performance has a comedic element and it is associated with the ethnic identity of the star. Yücel argues that when a character is constructed around comedic features, they are usually "identified as having a Kurdish origin." (Yücel, 2008: 209-232) He gives

the example of Kemal Sunal as İnek Şaban and Kibar Feyzo, İlyas Salman as Bilo, Şener Şen, Uğur Yücel in *Muhsin Bey*, Okan Bayülgen in *Hemşo*. Among them he also includes Yılmaz Güney especially in his urban dramas. He gives the example of the prison scene in *Çifte Tabancalı Kabadayı* (Aslan, 1969) where Güney's character manages to escape from police custody. When the police go to his cell to take him for investigation, they only find his hat. Under his hat is a note, which belittles police authority. Even though the scene has some comedic elements, it is suggested here with the above examples that the "comedic" performance is more of a mockery than a comedy, which is used to empower the male subject when his authority is undermined.

4.2.2.3 The Admirers

Another characteristic of Güney's action-adventure films where he plays a *kabadayı* is the treatment toward women. The most common portrayal of woman in Güney's action-adventure films is what is called here as "the admirer." Admirers have several similarities. First of all, they are beautiful women who wear revealing clothes and have their make up and hair done. Their physical appearance suggests wealth, which even though is always constructed as a powerful discourse becomes insignificant in the hands of a woman. Second admirers also do not have names. They are usually called "*karı*" (woman). The fact that the male protagonist chooses to address the admirer not by her name but as a "woman" further elaborates her insignificance. Third admirers are mute or rarely talk. When they do talk, it is usually

with the permission of the male character. Fourth there is little or none background of who they are and what they do. Fifth, there is never a happily ever after for these women since they either die or abandoned by the male protagonist. In this sense they are temporary pleasures, sources of information, opportunities to exploit. They can never be family.

Almost every action-adventure film has at least one admirer. Some examples can be given starting with "the blond admirer" in *Şeytanın Oğlu* (Aslan, 1967). The blond in the film is a powerful and a smart woman who visits Kazım (Güney) in prison. Her power is legitimized in her ability to pull some strings to visit Kazım everyday in prison. Her intelligence is emphasized in the stories she tells Kazım, which are embedded with an escape plan, which she plans in detail. She also does all the heavy work by bringing guns inside a well-guarded hospital and hiding them. Nonetheless, she needs to be mute since when she talks, she is criticized for "thinking too much." Kazım: "You talk to much *karı*, when woman start to think, nothing good comes out of it." The camera pushes in on her to capture her reaction to Kazım's insult and she smiles in a manner that supposes agreement. Her loyalty is expressed in Kazım's surprise that she comes to visit him every day in prison. Her love is articulated with dialogue. At the end, she choses to run away from police with Kazım. During the chase, "the Blondie" dies. Her death suggests that if she is no longer an object of satisfaction or support, she has no value.

Another example of an admirer is Halil's wife in *Benim Adım Kerim* (Güney, 1967). Kerim decides to use her to obtain information on Halil. Once he starts to flirt with her, she falls in love with him. Halil's wife is constructed as a promiscuous woman through the way her gaze is fixed on Kerim and the way she reveals her

desire to be with him when she tells him how bored she is at this big farm. Like "the blondie", she also does not have a name but rather called as "Halil's wife" suggesting that she is some kind of commodity.

4.3 The Similarities between the Rural and the Urban: *At Avrat Silah*

"*At, avrat, silah*" is an Anatolian male discourse, which corresponds to "horse, woman, gun." The significance of this discourse comes particularly from the fact that regardless of any hierarchical position, the elements of the triad remain sacred for any form of Anatolian masculinity. It is possible to see the articulation of the triad in both rural films and urban films. Because of this common and frequent articulation in both contexts, the triad will be explored separately from both sections.

In the Anatolian social bandit myths, good *eşkıya* does not exist without his rifle, his horse and his woman. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that in Güney's rural films, the male protagonist /the *eşkıya* always carries a rifle, owns a horse and has a woman – dead or alive- who has much significance in his life. The horse is important and valuable not only because it is the main form of transportation but also because it is mostly the only living thing around the protagonist. Horses in these films are also used as metaphors of loyalty. They are not simply animals; they are comrades of the protagonist in his journey. The friendship between man and horse also reveal certain sides of the protagonist. For instance in *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968), horse is used to reveal the sensitive side of Seyyit in the scenes which show him feeding, petting, caring for his horse. He even talks to him. In *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz,

1967), when Hüseyin (Güney) learns that the corrupt officers are coming to raid his village, the first thing he does is to take his horse to a safe place, tie it and cover it with bushes. After he is given a new and stronger horse, Kozanoğlu looks at his old horse in shame as if he is betraying his old friend with a new fresh comrade. His look is very apologetic and filled with remorse. The horse is substituted with a fast, expensive muscle car in the action-adventure films in the urban context as well as in Güney's off-screen image.

Guns, on the other hand, are more complex. Big or small, in the hands of a femme fatale or a hard-boiled detective in a film noir, pointed by a cop in an action film, used by the last girl in a slasher, mistakenly fired by the underdog in a comedy, the gun is never just a regular prop; it has always been directly associated with masculinity. It can remind the male protagonist his castration threat and the female protagonist her lack in psychoanalytical terms. It may signify authority, Law and Order to reconstruct dominant ideology when used by a just cop. In this dissertation, the gun is explored as an integral part of any form of Anatolian masculinity regardless of any hierarchical relations with competing hegemonic, marginalized and subordinate forms. Considering the socio-cultural, and economic connotations of *At, Avrat, Silah* specific to Turkey, the gun is explored by discourse analysis rather than psychoanalysis, which tends to produce a universal, acultural and ahistorical meaning regarding guns in films. For sure, the gun is also used to signify virile masculinity in Güney's films but more importantly, it suggest a way of life: Güney puts this as follow: "The first thing I saw after the face of my mother and my father was the gun hanging on the wall. I saw the horse on the lap of my father. My love for gun and horse started like that in my childhood." (as cited in Öngören, 1974: 40)

For instance in *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967) and *Dağların Oğlu* (Atadeniz, 1965), the male protagonists Cumali and Mehmet show off their impeccable shooting skills in the competitions *ağa* organizes. They hit a moving target within a very far range while *ağa* fails to do. This brings about two major interpretations. First, winning against *ağa* affirms the protagonists' virile, skilled and powerful Anatolian masculinity but more importantly, it shifts the superior position from *ağa* to peasant and open up a space to challenge *ağa*'s authority without having economic power. Challenged by the marginalized one, hegemonic power does not necessarily accept its defeated position as in *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967). In *Dağların Oğlu* (Atadeniz, 1965), after winning the shooting competition, Hamo *Ağa* (Erol Taş) has his men capture Mehmet and instead of killing him, Hamo breaks his fingers and dislocates his shoulder. Mehmet goes into hiding and isolates himself from the society until his fingers are healed and he is re-masculinized. In other words, Hamo takes away Mehmet's impeccable shooting skills, which is culturally significant due to the above-mentioned reasons. That is why *ağa*'s action does not simply stem from his anger toward defeat. Rather it is more about the threat Mehmet poses to his position as authority. In the action-adventure films the gun is again a major part of Güney's character. It is possible to see Güney with his gun posing in almost all action-adventure films.

Even though the gun is a powerful tool in Güney's films, it also point to the defeat of the male protagonist in the sense that it is the final resort. It is the metaphor of male rebellion and signifies the end of the male protagonist's patience toward the oppressing situations he is pushed into. For instance in *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967), the first time Cumali holds a rifle is after learning that his parents were murdered by *ağa*. Similarly in *Kargacı Halil* (Yalınkılıç, 1968), Halil (Güney) is a recluse who lives in

the mountains away from his village because he does not want to be a part of the bloodshed that is going on in his village. He does not use his gun until he learns that his family has fallen victim to bloodshed. *At Hırsızı Banuş* (Jöntürk, 1967) also has a male protagonist who does not use a gun. He rather challenges and belittles *ağa's* authority by stealing *ağa's* precious horses and beating his men up with his fists. Nevertheless, after Sadık *Ağa* tries to abduct the woman he loves (Zeynep), Banuş resorts to his gun. Similarly in *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967), the first time Kozanoğlu holds a gun is to kill the murderer of his father. Another example is *Umutsuzlar* (Güney, 1971). In the film Güney plays a gangster (Fırat) who falls in love with a young upper class college girl, Çiğdem (Filiz Akın).[56] The whole film revolves around their star-crossed love affair. The main problem is that while Çiğdem wants Fırat to leave his gun - his life style as a gangster, Fırat's male friends strongly advise him to leave Çiğdem. They tell Fırat that if leaves his gun; he would most likely be shot to his death. At the end of the film, Fırat choose love and walks out of his apartment unarmed. In front of the eyes of Çiğdem who feels ecstatic that Fırat chose her, his enemies murder Fırat.

One final example is *At, Avrat, Silah* (Güney, 1966) named after the triad itself. The film is important in the sense that it includes not only the three components but also portrays a re-feminization of a masculinized female protagonist. In the film Yusufçuk's (Güney) father was dying. In his deathbed: "My beloved son, the only things I can give to you are my gun and my horse. Find your woman." So when his father dies, Yusufçuk takes what is left from him and head to road. In one

[56] It is worth noting that *Umutsuzlar* (Güney, 1971) is made one year after Güney married Fatoş Süleymangil - a young upper-class college girl - whose family did not approve their marriage because of Güney's criminal ways, gang relations, political inclinations but more importantly his way with guns.

of the villages he was passing by, he meets Alicik (Çehre). Quickly they fall in love, get married and Yusufçuk keeps his promise to his father.

What is interesting about the film is the transition Alicik goes through in order to be worthy of marriage. When Yusufçuk first spots Alicik, she is in a fight with some men who were threatening her father because of his debts. When Alicik was born, the family is disappointed because they were hoping to have a son so her father decides to raise her like a son. Alicik has very short hair, wears trousers, rides horses and uses a gun. She dresses, talks, walks, drinks like a man. Also, she is a skilled shooter and a good rider which all have masculine connotation based on the horse, woman and gun triad. Even her name, Alicik, is a male name, which suggests the masculine elements in her uprising. Therefore, while Yusufçuk falls in love with her since she reminds him of himself - gun-friendly, liberated, independent and male - he also believes that Alicik needs a do-over. She needs to be re-feminized and domesticized. Her gun needs to be taken away as her trousers and pants. At the end of the film, her hair is long; she is dolled up with a dress and is put on make up. It is not easy for Alicik, who has not lived the life of a woman in the traditional sense to adjust to the new circumstances but out of her love for Yusufçuk, she complies. At the end of the film, she is "made" a woman hence ready for Yusufçuk to marry her and keep his promise to his father.

As a major objective correlative in Güney's films, Güney's relationship with guns is highly debated in the extra-filmic materials as well. It was suggested that the media has "learnt that a man cannot live without his gun through Yılmaz Güney" ("Herşeyin Bir Sırrı Vardır," *Ses*, 1967: 46). An article in *Ses* reads:

> As we drove off in his car, he told us not to be afraid because he had been involved in 14 car crashes but he survived all of them. Then, he suggested that if there were a car chasing competition in Turkey, he would probably be the champion in that too. Güney added: I am not only the best actor and a great shooter but also a good driver.

The emphasis on the car and the gun are apparent in this magazine article. The material suggests Güney's skills in driving. Since the car is a metaphor of the horse, what is highlighted here is actually Güney's Anatolian roots even if he was consuming a very non-Anatolian, non-lower class hobby of fast and expensive cars. He is also mythologized just like an *eşkıya* when it is written how Güney managed – miraculously - to survive that many car accidents. The final sentence - added by Güney - includes the gun in the picture as well when Güney emphasizes his skills as a shooter. This aspect was taken to center stage in the same magazine article in which Güney claimed, "He will be the ball trap champion of Turkey." ("Yılmaz Güney Meydan Okuyor," *Ses*, 1967: 46) These words are written in bold next to a very big photo of Güney aiming his gun right to the reader. The writer of the text suggests, "They have known that Yılmaz Güney is a good shooter but seeing he hit 161 plates out of 200 was very convincing." ("Yılmaz Güney Meydan Okuyor," *Ses*, 1967: 460) Both the photograph and the comments in the interview construct Güney as a skilled shooter and as a man who challenges other men into a rifle-shooting contest just like in his films.

Nonetheless, not every time, Güney and guns were used in the same sentence in the media, there was appreciation and admiration. Ses magazine published an article in 1966, which suggested, "If Güney keeps on stabbing people like a bully in his films or beating the photo journalists as if they are big feudal *ağa*s, the end of his career will come very soon." ("1966 da Türk Sineması," *Ses*, 1966: 4) Similarly in

Perde, it is suggested that even though Yılmaz Güney has become a very powerful figure in Yeşilçam, he is bound to lose it all because of "his love for adventure."

> He is a very adventurous young man. He carries a gun with him and does not hesitate to use it. In a bar fight, he acts as if he is in a movie, using his knife and stabbing it into his enemy. He drives under the influence of alcohol and causes people to get hurt. Also he fires his gun inside a hotel making the entire guest terrified. This does not suit a man of cinema. The audience will not tolerate this behavior. This is the one reason he will lose. ("Evet… Neden Kaybederler?" *Perde*, 1966: 20)

In what follows we delve more into media coverage of Güney's off-screen life.

4.4 Yılmaz Güney's Off-screen Star Image and Urban Masculinities in the 1960s

An article in *Milliyet Haftasonu İlavesi* highlights the resemblance of Güney's on-screen and off-screen image as follows.

> Güney is very interested in maintaining the roles in his films in his private life as well. Forbidden loves, stabbings, groundless conflicts and quarrels and fights… All of these are elements that overshadow a film "star." What Güney is not aware of is that the audience is relentless, brutal and unforgiving. ("Yılmaz Güney," *Milliyet haftasonu ilavesi*, 1966: 1)

It is important to highlight the choice of metaphor used to describe the fight between photojournalists and Güney. It is suggested that Güney beat up the photojournalists "as if they are feudal *ağa*s." Similarly, in terms of Güney's bar fights it is suggested by the media that Güney "acts as if he is in a movie." Finally, it is suggested that Güney "maintains the roles in his films in his private life as well." What is at stake in

these articles is that even though they seem to criticize Güney, they in fact help merge Güney's on-screen star image as the man who cannot tolerate being pushed around and bullied with his off-screen image, making different levels mutually reinforcing. In this sense, these kinds of extra-filmic material are more about constructing a consistent star image rather than criticizing Güney for using his gun.[57]

The media looks as if they have an ambivalent attitude toward Güney and his obsession with guns. Nonetheless, the media only contributes to the construction of star's image by producing certain interpretations. Within these possible interpretations, certain meanings are emphasized whereas others are overlooked. It is up to the audience to make up what the star "really" is. For Güney's star image, audience adoration and admiration were independent of media interpretations. For instance following Güney's arrest in Urfa for firing his gun in Altay Palas Hotel in 1966, "hundreds of people sent confession letters to the police stating that they fired the gun not Güney." (Kahraman, 1996: 136)[58] When a similar incident occurred at a hotel in Bursa the same year, "the owner of the hotel said that it was an honor for him that Yılmaz Güney broke the mirrors in his hotel." ("Reklam Uğruna," *Ses*, 1966: 49) Another example can be given from Selahattin Şahin, a journalist in

[57] In addition Güney has always been provided with a chance to explain his acts in the media. For instance the media announced the events at As Club as "Yılmaz Güney stabbed three people in the bar", Güney was provided with a full page of explanation after he was released from police custody. Güney: I am not crazy. Should I have waited for four chairs to be broken on my head? Should I have said, "hit me"? Of course I was going to protect myself. Otherwise I am not a coward or a crazy man who would resort to his gun or knife after drinking a few glasses.

[58] Güney, on the event in Urfa: "In Urfa, 3000 people signed a petition that requested my release from prison. They protested in front of the police station where I was kept for five days. I am not trying to defend myself. If I run for parliament, maybe I would even be selected as member. People love me. When the gun was accidently fired in the hotel, people came up to me and asked me to give the gun so that they would be arrested not me... But I am a brave man. That is why I did not let anyone take the fault. I went to the police and surrendered." ("Ve Nişanlandılar," *Ses*, 1966: 20)

Göreme newspaper: “I was young then. I did not know. But everybody in Nevşehir loved his films. The ones who saw Yılmaz Güney in person had the privilege to brag as if they went to pilgrimage or fought at Gallipoli.” (Kıyafet, 1989: 31) Perhaps a prison friend from İmralı, Ahmet Cebeci, tells one of the most significant examples of how the audience embraced Güney:

> One day I was out visiting family. On the way back to İmralı, I took a bus. When I told the driver I want to go to İmralı, he turned to me and asked if I knew Yılmaz. I showed him a picture of us. The guy was ecstatic. He did not take money from me. He told me: You showed me a picture with Yılmaz Güney. That is enough. (Kıyafet, 1989: 104).

This kind of audience adoration does not only stem from Güney’s filmic performances but from his off-screen life and masculinities as well. After all, as Richard Dyer (1986: 2-3) suggests stars are not only made up of their screen appearances and performances. Rather, as Dyer puts it,

> Star phenomenon consists of everything that is publicly available about stars. A film star’s image is not just his or her films, but the promotion of those films and of the star through pin-ups, public appearances, studio hand-outs and so on, as well as interviews, biographies and coverage in the press of the star’s doings, and “private” life. Further, a star’s image is also what people say or write about his or her, as critics or commentators, the way the image is used in other contexts such as advertisements, novels, pop songs, and finally the way the star can become part of the coinage of everyday speech.

Then a star image is an intertextual construct, an image constructed by both the filmic and the extra-filmic materials. In other words, actors become stars when they “break out of the medium” (Gledhill, 1991: xiii) by being talked about, gossiped on and identified with. Moreover, Gledhill (1991: xiv) remarks, “actors become stars when their off-screen life-styles and personalities equal or surpass acting ability in importance.” Therefore star images are “always extensive, multimedia and

intertextual." (Dyer, 1986: 3) With that background, the next section explores Güney's off-screen star images in the 1960s to understand how star images play at important role in the "production, circulation and negotiation of meanings, identities, desires and ideologies." (Gledhill, p: xiv)

4.4.1 The Beautiful & the Ugly: Ayhan Işık & Yılmaz Güney

The relationship between Ayhan Işık and Yılmaz Güney has been discussed in the previous section in terms of Güney's on-screen star image at the beginning of his film career. The comparison also extends to Güney's off-screen image. Güney himself made the most apparent comparison, which is the story behind the title "Ugly King." In 1965, Güney went to *Milliyet* newspaper and asked Tarık Dursun Kakınç to make an interview with him. At the beginning of the interview, Kakınç asked where they should start. Güney answered with a smile on his face: "*Krallığımdan, ağam*" (from my kingdom). Kakınç was surprised. He told Güney that there was only one king in Turkish cinema and that was Ayhan Işık. When Güney insisted, Kakınç told Güney that unlike himself, Işık was a very handsome man. It was then; Güney affirmed his difference and told Kakınç that if Işık was the Handsome King, then he was the Ugly King. (Özgüç, 1988: 48) The rest was made history on the title in bold fonts of Milliyet newspaper the very next day: "The Ugly King of Our Cinema: Yılmaz Güney." (Milliyet Magazin İlavesi, 1965: 9) Kakınç defined Güney, with his physical appearance: "Yılmaz Güney is a dark young man with thick eyebrows and fine shining teeth." (1965: 9) For him, Güney was important since

> those days audiences were constantly presented with love stories of beautiful men. All the heroes were fine looking, solidly built, neat and healthy. For the first time in Turkish cinema an out of the bounds, not handsome man declares his kingdom (*krallık*) (Kakınç, 1965: 9).

The interview has a particular significance. Two stars who have long been compared along the similarities in their roles. What Kakınç did was to set their differences, for the first time, based on their physical appearances. Özön (1988: 37) argued likewise. He suggested that Güney "broke down the hegemony of beautiful men in Yeşilçam cinema." Maktav (2001: 176) highlights the same issue: "He is not "handsome" like other Yeşilçam stars. He has a physical appearance that is in opposition to the Yeşilçam standards and he carries with him the powerlessness of Anatolian people and the oppression in their lives."

According to Dyer (1991: 133), in fan literature, authenticity is established through "endlessly recurring adjectives such as sincere, spontaneous, real, direct, genuine and so on." In other words, when constantly endorsed and repeated, these adjectives become authentic characteristics of a star.[59] The body of the star is also important in establishing authenticity because "stars reach their audience primarily through their bodies." (Gledhill, 1991: 210) That is why, "qualities that are almost entirely physical: the way the actor is built, what his [sic] face and body say about the way experience has treated him, the way he walks and talks" (as cited in Gledhill, 1991: 201) also become markers of authenticity in a star image. Yılmaz Güney's star image is a combination of the former authenticating strategy of repetition and the latter usage of the body of the star in establishing authenticity in star image.

[59] Nonetheless, this image does not have to be fixed. Rather it is always open to reinterpretations since "there is a constant play of authenticating levels in the process of reading image at different points in time." (Dyer, 1991: 137)

Even though ugliness is a major difference of Güney than other Yeşilçam stars, ugliness does not simply relate to physicality. Özön (1988: 37) claims:

> This ugly man was a revolution in terms of Turkish cinema because finally rural men, the men on the streets would have a hero. From now on, the ugly ones will love, too. As a result, the oppressed and the derelict would get rid of their inferiority complex.

Kakınç (1965: 9) argues likewise.

> The audiences of Yeşilçam are in complete opposition to the stars on screen. Fifty percent of the filmgoers live in poor conditions in the slums. It is true that for a long time the audience was consoled by identifying with the "unreachables" but for the last two years, they went out of fashion. The audience was looking for the oppressed, runt scrubby, exhausted person who resembled them. Yılmaz Güney appeared in those times.

Based on these examples, it is clear that ugliness does not only refer to physical appearance but rather it is associated with a particular socio-economic class. Kakınç (1965: 9) even remarked; "Besides his ugliness, his other important characteristic is that he comes from poverty, scarcity and lack." However also a presupposition emerges from these articles, which suggests that Güney became a star purely, based on physical appearance, as "ugly." This presupposition also identifies Güney's male audiences as people coming from lower classes - "the ugly ones" of the society. In terms of reception, it was suggested in these articles that male audience coming from lower classes in fact no longer enjoyed identifying with the glamorous lives of beautiful stars. Rather, they preferred to see a glimpse of their lives represented on-screen decorated with the stories of revenge and triumph. In other words, the male audience preferred the escapism that was provided by Güney's vengeful acts rather than the glamorous lives of Ayhan Işık, Göksel Arsoy and Ediz Hun. However, what is ignored in these articles is that Güney's films were in fact not

"unglamorous." On the contrary, his films were filled with fast cars, lavish parties, huge houses and beautiful women - all possessed by the male protagonist either from the beginning of the film or at the end. Then it would be a misreading to suggest, ""the unreachables" went out of fashion"" (Kakınç, 1965: 9) with the arrival of Güney. Rather, Güney's films were able to deliver a kind of double pleasure which others could not; the glamour and the vengeance of an ugly Anatolian omnipotent male protagonist; the ultimate escapism.

Güney was unique and authentic in his Anatolianness among other stars in Yeşilçam. *Ses* magazine: "Yılmaz Güney is an actor who is raised among people. He has become the hero of fairy tales. Young Anatolian men identify with Yılmaz Güney." ("Ne Yapmak İstiyor?" Perde, 1970: 9) Perde also published a piece on the same issue: "It is easy for Yılmaz Güney to achieve success because he knows what the audience wants. Since he is Anatolian, he knows the place very well so he can produce films which reflect Anatolian lifestyle and ideology." ("Ne Yapmak İstiyor?" Perde, 1970: 49) Director Duygu Sağıroğlu (1966: 6) explains Güney's phenomenal rise by comparing his star image to Fikret Hakan's: "I compared Fikret Hakan with Yılmaz Güney and I saw that Yılmaz Güney is more like us. Fikret can be an Italian, a Mexican. In Yılmaz, the people see themselves ("Yılmaz Güney'in Başını Döndüren", *Ses*, 1996: 3). The "us" in Sağıroğlu's claim refers to being an Anatolian man. Şehmuz Güzel (1996: 71) suggests Güney was "ugly, poor and Anatolian and it is precisely because of these qualities, starting from his first film, the audience embraced him." According to Can Dündar (1996),

> The more Güney hit and slapped, the men in Anatolia or the men living in the peripheries of big cities, men who are oppressed and subjugated exhaled and became proud of this dark, runt and scrubby Anatolian man who avenged their weaknesses.

There is plenty of other material where the discourse of Anatolia was used to define Güney's character. It is as if Güney and Anatolianness go hand in hand, as inseparable identities. Güney was complicit with this construction. Often in the interviews, he stated his deep respect and loyalty to his Anatolian heritage and traditional values. Güney said: "I am who I am, a modest, unpretending man who was raised in the heart of Anatolia, who is dedicated to his traditions and norms." (Perde, 1967) He also suggested that the "secret of his rapid rise to stardom just in three months is his being a Man of the People." ("Yılmaz Güney'in Başını," *Ses*, 1966: 6) Güney also approached his self-given title as the Ugly King, as a compliment: "They called me "the Ugly King." I was not angry. I cannot be angry because I love my dark skin which is burnt under the torrid heat of the South, my calloused hands and my face with prominent cheekbones." ("Ben Yılmaz Güney," *Perde*, 1967: 45) More importantly, just like the media, Güney emphasized the ordinary and the ugly Anatolian in his star image. Güney:

> In those days, the famous stars were mostly kids of big cities. Especially Istanbulites. Their nature, physical appearances resembled more like a Western, American actor. They were very handsome, very beautiful and charming. If one of them would walk on the street, he would be noticed. Those days no one would turn and look at me. Why? Because there are many men who look like me in Turkey. My nose, my thin posture, my attitude, my looks… These are common elements with many men. (Dündar, 1996)

Based on all the above quotations, several terms need to be emphasized here. These are "ordinary," "man on the streets," ugly ones," "Anatolian," "south," "man of the people," "modest," "unpretending," "poverty," "lack," "oppressed" in comparison to "handsome," "Istanbulites", "Western," "American actor," "fine-looking," "solidly built," "neat," "healthy". It can be argued that in both groups

certain terms /words are used as synonyms such as “ordinary,” “man of the people,” “man on the streets” and “handsome,” “fine-looking,” “Istanbulite,” “neat”. Also, while all the words in the first group are constructed a part of the discourse of Anatolia, the rest in the second group can be categorized under the discourse of West forming the binary opposition of not only Anatolian / West, but also Anatolian / Istanbulite. Therefore, just like how ugliness and ordinariness do not simply refer to physical appearance but rather a particular socio-economic class, handsomeness also has class connotations.

Perhaps the most striking example of how Güney’s physical appearance, his socio-economic background and the discourse of Anatolianness are integrated into the body of the news is the article published in *Ses* after Güney attacked three people at a bar in Istanbul:

> It was not easy for Güney to become an actor. Because of the hegemony of handsome stars like Orhan Günşiray, Göksel Arsoy, and the fact that Ayhan Işık and Eşref Kolçak are the “mushroom slum bullies” (*kenar mahalle delikanlısı*), it was not easy for Güney to be noticed. He would not even be accepted to the star contests with the face he had. While Göksel Arsoy would be noticed immediately in a crowded place, nobody would notice Yılmaz Güney because he is an ordinary guy whom you can see everyday walking in the streets. He is people's type (*halk tipi*). He is the oppressed mushroom slum bully, the brave young man of the neighborhood. He is the man on the streets. Despite that Yılmaz Güney dissolved the hegemony of the beautiful man in Yeşilçam. That is why it is impossible to understand how one could jeopardize his career by stabbing three people at a bar just like a bully in his films. (“Çirkin Kralın Suçu,” *Ses*, 1965: 28)

What is most striking here is that only the last sentence of the paragraph mentions the actual news, the bar fight, which resulted in the stabbings of three people. The rest of the news is on the components of Güney’s star image: difficulties in Güney’s life before his rise to stardom, ugliness, ordinariness as being people’s type, and his

triumph in breaking down the hegemony of the beautiful man in Yeşilçam. In other words, the article differentiates Güney from the rest of the mentioned stars purely based on his physical appearance. Then it associates Güney with ordinariness through ugliness. It suggests that Güney would not be noticed on the streets because he was ugly and that made him ordinary. Then, the article goes on to associate ordinariness, ugliness to "people;" coming from lower classes when it suggests that the reason Güney would be unnoticed is because he was people's type. That is how, ugliness and ordinariness become metaphors of a particular socio-economic class more than simple adjectives used to define physical appearance of Güney. The article associates beauty with Göksel Arsoy and suggests that he is not "people's type." Based on this piece of extra filmic material, it can be argued that the between Arsoy and Güney associated ugliness with Anatolia and beauty with Istanbul. Then, Göksel Arsoy who is considered handsome, looks like a Western star while the physical appearance of Güney which is considered to be ugly immediately puts him in the category of Anatolian.

4.4.2 The Ordinary & the Extra-Ordinary: Anatolia & Istanbul

The media constructs star images as something attainable, tangible and real by promoting ordinariness. Then how can stars have glamorous lives, written biographies and tons of paparazzi following them around if they are ordinary? As Erin Meyers (2009: 902) suggests "being Britney [Spears] can never really be an ordinary experience." This dual image of stardom is one of its core characteristics,

which combines "the spectacular with the everyday, the special with the ordinary." (Dyer: 1986: 35) Hence this "extreme ambiguity / contradiction concerning stars-as-ordinary and the stars-as-special" (Dyer: 1986: 43) becomes what characterizes the star. This is this paradox of stardom, that is "never at a point of rest or equilibrium, constantly lurching from one formulation of what being human is to another," (Dyer: 1986: 18) is what constitutes the star phenomenon.

In terms of Güney's star image, while the ordinary is his ugliness, class; his Anatolianness, the extra-ordinary can be traced in his off-screen image; in his short-lived romances, controversial marriages and violent acts; his excessively westernized ways. That is why, the title Ugly King is also a very characteristic of his star image since while the "Ugly" is the ordinary, the "King" is the extra-ordinary. The media used the dichotomy of Anatolianness and excessive westernization as a way to discuss and differentiate the ordinary and the extra-ordinary in Güney's star image. While on the one hand, Güney was portrayed as sympathetic toward socialism and to Labor Party (*İşçi Partisi*) through such news as how "Güney donated his luxurious car to the president of the Labor Party during the elections," ("Filmlerimizin Çirkin Jönü," Perde, 1965: 50) on the other hand, his life style was considered "unfit" for a socialist: "Even though Güney claims to be a socialist, the life he leads is very luxurious. The 1963 Oldsmobile is the kind of car that American millionaires, the capitalists drive."("Sosyalist Kapitalist Artistler, *Perde*, 1968: 20) Güney answered the media by saying that he was able to buy those cars "thanks to the people who pay to see his movies because they love him," ("Sosyalist Kapitalist, *Perde*, 1968: 20) making the issue a matter of public admiration and appreciation and suggesting that his consumption matters are not criticized by people.

Other than his cars, Güney's choice for whisky[60] was also questioned and associated with upper-class consumption patterns. In an article entitled, "Socialist Capitalist Artists": "It is striking how these socialists can afford to drink this much whisky." ("Sosyalist Kapitalist, *Perde*, 1968: 20) When Güney is asked about his whisky consumption, he replied by saying that "there is no alcohol he loves more than *rakı*,[61] however the civilized people in the cities do not like the smell of it so he drinks whisky." ("En Kuvvetli Benim, *Ses*, 1967: 27) When Güney's fast, expensive cars and choice of alcoholic beverage is added to his frequent bar-hopping and lavish houses in upper class neighborhoods, it can be argued that the media was criticizing Güney for living like an upper class bourgeois who was condemned in Güney's films. What is at stake is that this is not simply a criticism of Güney's dedication as a socialist. Rather, it is about the attempt to define and draw the boundaries of the ordinary and the extra-ordinary in Güney's star image. In other words, these articles are about managing the boundaries of how much Güney could / should be westernized / modernized without damaging his Anatolianness - a discourse constructed to differentiate Güney from other stars in the first place. That is why, the more Güney's off-screen image became closer to other upper class stars in Yeşilçam, the more hostile the media got because of the perception that Güney's star image would be an anomaly, forming a grey area between binary oppositions; making his star image as well as his masculinity fluid, unpredictable and hence threatening. Consequently, the criticism on his consumption patterns are more about reminding

[60] Whisky has long been considered as the choice of alcoholic beverage of the upper classes. It is also used in Yeşilçam films to represent the westernized upper classes since whisky is a foreign drink.
[61] Rakı is the most significant traditional alcoholic beverage of Turkey. In the majority of Yeşilçam films in the 1960s, while the upper classes drink whisky, the lower classes drink rakı. Hence, in this context, rakı has particular socio-economic class connotations.

him of who he was defined to be rather than if he was a socialist who has gone bourgeois.

As the lines started to be blurrier, the media naturally started to attack Güney's Anatolianness - the ordinary - in Güney's star image as well. *Perde* magazine argued that Güney was committing the biggest sin by disregarding the norms of Yeşilçam community: "He wears a turtle neck and casual clothes to inappropriate places. In summer because it is hot, Güney takes off his shoes and walks in Beyoğlu with slippers." ("Bütün Günah ve Sevaplarıyla," *Perde*, 1967: 19) On this issue Güney defends himself and argues: "Just because I am a celebrity does not mean that I cannot do what I want to do." ("Bütün Günah ve Sevaplarıyla," *Perde*, 1967: 19) The media persistently attacked Güney's way of dressing. In *Pazar*, Güney is described as the "jacketless guest of the evening:"

> When people saw Yılmaz Güney with his shirt unbuttoned, they were very surprised. Regarding the jacketless' guest of the evening, others said that 'this is not a film set, a famous film star should be careful with the way he dresses. However Güney did not care and mixed with the crowds. (Pazar, November 20th, 1965, Issue. 478)

Güney once again defended his right to choose his clothes: Regarding my clothes... I dress the way I feel comfortable. I do not care about other people's rights and wrongs." (Yılmaz Güney, *Pazar*, 1966: 478)

Just like how Güney's consumption patterns are not related to the socialist / capitalist dichotomy, the criticism regarding his clothes is not about proper fashion. Once again, it is about managing the boundaries by constructing Güney as the unfashionable Anatolian who cannot meet the social norms of upper class society.

This is very similar to the ways the figure of *hacıağa* in the cartoon of the late 1940s and *maganda* in the 1980 were constructed by the hegemonic powers.

In these cartoons, the figure of *hacıağa* is an Anatolian man who took advantage of his wealth and migrated to the city. Unfortunately, financial capital has no value in the eyes of the Istanbulite elite if it does not go hand in hand with cultural capital and *hacıağa* has no of it. He does not know how to talk, act, dress and decorate his house so he is condemned and belittled. His lack of cultural capital, which comes from his Anatolianness, gets in the way of adapting to the city and keeps him in the periphery socially and culturally. The difference between *hacıağa* and *maganda* lies in the danger *maganda* posits by being able mingle with upper class. This makes the masculinity and presence of *maganda* a real threat toward established values since he has the power and authority to restructure them. That is why, Güney's clothes and his ignorance to dress codes are constructed as disrespectful and lacking manners; manners which are decided by the Istanbulite elite. In this context, Güney is like Recep in *Kasımpaşalı Recep* (Akıncı, 1965): "the thug who wears weird clothes." So, when Güney is described through the inappropriateness of his clothes, it is more about drawing the boundaries of the Anatolian / lower - working class and Istanbulite / upper class. On the other hand, even though Güney is clearly denounced due to his "un-evolved Anatolianness," there is also the glorification of the very same issue. Güney was defined as "uncaring" toward media criticism regarding his clothes, which suggests some sort of indifference. In other words, Güney is described as a man who resists changing his physical appearance in order to please the media, Yeşilçam and the cosmopolitan Beyoğlu audience. When approached from this perspective, he is constructed as a man who holds on to the first thing that catapulted him to stardom and gave him his

title as Ugly King, his physical appearance. Güney's resistance to dress appropriately then can be read as a resistance toward adopting the life style pushed upon him by Yeşilçam industry. Considering Güney's attitude toward his constructed "ugliness," this becomes a way of reproducing Güney's Anatolianness in his star-image by declaring that even though he is a major star, he is still the ordinary Anatolian. A similar demonstration of being Istanbulite and remaining Anatolian took place when Gönül Yazar came to sit at Güney's table at As Club in 1966.

> Gönül Yazar entered the club and looked for a familiar face. When she saw Yılmaz Güney, she went near him. Yılmaz Güney offered her a seat. The cute blond of the stage was wearing a mini dress. When she sat next to Yılmaz, Yılmaz realized that her legs are revealed a bit too much so he took out his handkerchief from his pocket and put it on her legs. After chatting for a bit, Yılmaz wanted to leave saying that he has guests, Haldun Dormen, Serezli and other friends, at home. Yazar jokefully replied: "All the divorced men are together huh? Now it is İzzet Günay's turn". Smiling ironically, Güney replied; "There is no talking or sitting like that around me" and as a joke he touched her cheek a little bit. ("Yılmaz Güney ile," *Perde,* 1966: 51)

Gönül Yazar's image fell to the side of the Istanbulite / upper class in the binary opposition of the Istanbulite / Anatolian. As a singer/actress in the 1960s, Yazar was a part of entertainment industry and a frequent club-goer. Her blond hair as highlighted in the article as "the cute blond" and mini dress have long been associated with a Westernized look as well as economic independence. So, when this emancipated image is emphasized with the mini dress, Yazar reminds of the sexually emancipated, Western woman in Yeşilçam films. Then, Güney's act of covering Yazar's legs with a handkerchief becomes a manifestation of a way of life. By covering Yazar's legs, Güney confirms his attachment to the traditional norms of female honor and sexuality. In a way, he shows that although he enjoys the opportunities of a wealthy westernized life, i.e. attending clubs, he still preserves his

traditional Anatolian masculinity. Furthermore, he declares that even if he may be westernized materially, morally he is still Anatolian.

The major off-screen incident that put Güney's Anatolianness to test was his relationship with Birsen Can Ünal and Nebahat Çehre. In order to explore the love triangle and how it relates to the ordinary / extra-ordinary, Anatolian / Istanbulite dichotomies, an analysis of Güney's relationship with Çehre needs to be assessed first.

4.4.3 The Ordinary & the Extra-Ordinary: Birsen Can Ünal & Nebahat Çehre

Nebahat Çehre was an actress who was famous for her proportional physique. Just like how certain adjectives such as brave, tough and Anatolian were repeated to describe Güney, "perfect physique, her beautiful breasts and full lips" ("Birbirlerine Filmlerdeki Gibi," Perde, 1966: 41) were a part of Çehre's star image. It was even suggested by the media that it was through her physique, she was able to become an actress: "She ingratiated herself with the film producers with well-rounded body and big breasts." (1968) Çehre met Güney in 1965 at the set of *Kamalı Zeybek* (Akıncı, 1964). They quickly fell in love and hence started a tormented love affair between Güney and Çehre since the media thought Güney was married to Birsen Can Ünal.

At the beginning of the relationship, the media did not take much interest on the love affair since Çehre was not the first actress in Güney's life. He already had a reputation as a womanizer due to his many short-lived romances with stars like Devlet Devrim. It was only after Güney announced that he was in fact not married to

Ünal, the media was blown away since Güney did not feel the need to declare this fact with his other romances. Media quickly turned Çehre and Ünal into a binary opposition. Birsen Can Ünal was the Anatolian woman whom Güney lived through poverty and despair. She was his life-long companion through all the sufferings and failures. Nebahat Çehre on the other hand was the urban sex symbol, Istanbulite whom he was passionately in love with. While Ünal was the metaphor of the ordinary in Güney, Çehre was the extra-ordinary.

Çehre was very happy with Güney's announcement about his marital status. Ünal was not. She stormed into As Club on January 7th, 1966, after finding out that Güney was dining with Çehre and other friends. After seeing Güney with Çehre, Ünal got out of the club and threw herself in front of a cab while Çehre left the club running. Güney was furious. He left Ünal for good the very next day and ten days later; Perde magazine announced that, "Güney and Çehre were getting married." ("Nebahat Çehre Yılmaz Güney," Perde, 1966: 3)

After the announcement of Güney's marital status, which legitimized their relationship, a series of articles started to appear in cinema magazines, which were geared toward the transformation of Çehre's sexually emancipated, upper class and ignorant image. Güney's approach was similar to the way he treated some upper class women in his action-adventure films.

Regardless it is an action-adventure film or a rural melodrama, some female characters, very few in number, get to be saved by Güney and have a better life. The bourgeois Birsen in *Benim Adım Kerim* (Güney, 1967) is stripped off her upper class existential crisis and proletarianized. *Garibim* in *Kasımpaşalı Recep* (Akıncı, 1965) is saved from the brothel, placed in the house as the woman who waits for Güney

from the window all day. In *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974) the young Melike is given a new perspective to life around her. These are examples of the very privileged number of women who actually are not raped, killed, murdered or abandoned in Güney's films. When discussed along with these female subject positions, Çehre's star image created by Güney and the media is a combination of all of them.

In the first months of their relationship, the media approached Çehre as an eager student and Güney as her teacher, reminiscent of young Melike in *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974), naïve Çiğdem in *Umutsuzlar* (Güney, 1971) or rich Birsen in *Benim Adım Kerim* (Güney, 1967). Güney was handing books to Çehre and teaching her about socialism. Perde magazine soon highlighted that "Çehre started complaining about the unfair salary distribution in Yeşilçam." ("Filmlerimizin Çirkin Jönü," *Perde*, 1965: 50) Güney was complicit with the role of the teacher: "After she met me, the old Nebahat went and the new Nebahat came. Nebahat is my work of art. I would never leave my art, my student behind... like an old suit." ("Evlilik Suya mı Düştü?" *Ses*, 1966: 42) Even after the couple split, Çehre approached Güney as a teacher:

> I was with Yılmaz Güney for three years. In those years he became a university for me. I have seen and learnt so much by living with him. I have learnt from him to listen, to talk and more importantly to think. Would you believe that I find the Nebahat of four years ago to be very ignorant now? ("Yılmaz'ı Bir de Benden," *Ses*, 1968: 33)[62]

At the same time, Güney claimed that Çehre was a woman who was never protected. According to Güney, Çehre's fame as an actress who undresses in films

[62] Until today Çehre remembers Güney as a university and herself as a student: "Yılmaz Güney was my husband and the love of my life. I have learnt so much from him with regards to my perspective over life, my acting. I got to know life with him. He was a lover, a husband and teacher to me" ("Hiç Yaşlanmayan Kadın:" *Star TV*, 2009).

was because Çehre was "misunderstood and misguided." ("Nebahat Çehre Yılmaz Güney," *Perde*, 1966: 3) Just like how Kerim approached Birsen in *Benim Adım Kerim* (Güney, 1967) as the misguided upper-class woman and educated her, Güney argued for Çehre's innocence and suggested that she was simply gullible: "She did not know the right from wrong. I love Nebahat so much. Until this day she was always misunderstood but actually she is a woman who needs a man." ("Nebahat Çehre Yılmaz Güney," *Perde*, 1966: 3)

Based on these interviews, it can be argued that the moralist attitude of Güney in trying to correct Çehre's image as a sexually emancipated woman is more about his traditional, patriarchal image than Çehre's. In other words, Güney was attempting to convert Çehre's star image for his favor. As an Anatolian man he was not expected to have a wife who undresses in movies and wears revealing clothes since in the traditions of Anatolia where he stresses to come from, "women had to be careful with what they wear and how they act." ("Yılmaz'ı Bir de Benden," *Ses*, 1968: 33) That is why; Güney approached the issue of undressing in films not as Çehre's choice. She was, according to Güney, simply deceived by Yeşilçam producers. Moreover, she was deceived because she did not have a proper man in her life to guide her on what is right and wrong. Now that she was with Güney, she would make the right choices and never undress in films. Just like in his encounter with Gönül Yazar at As Club, Güney's acts regarding Çehre are about his star image. It is about showing to the media / audience that even though he is with an upper-class Istanbulite actress / sex symbol, he is still morally a traditional Anatolian man at heart so much that he feels the need to transform Çehre's star image.

Çehre also contributed to the image of the woman who needed to be saved, educated and loved. She argued: "A woman is nothing on her own. A woman needs a man but not every man can give the woman strength. Yılmaz gave me everything... He gave me love, strength..." ("Aşkların En Güzelini," *Perde,* 1967: 8) Moreover, Çehre frequently affirmed her ongoing transformation in the media: 'I guess I have become the kind of woman he wants me to be because he started to love me as much as I love him. Yılmaz is the ideal man." ("Aşkların En Güzelini," *Perde,* 1967: 8)

The media also contributed to Çehre's transformation:

> I have not seen Nebahat this happy for years. Her eyes shine with happiness. She starts to enjoy danger and power for the man she loves. She used to be fragile and dressy like other models. Now she is in a new chapter of her life. She is going to be a real person and represent real people. Nebahat Çehre is going through a transformation. From now one she will live like an ordinary woman instead of being phony. ("Bu Yaman Delikanlıyı," *Ses,* 1966: 5)

Certain words are important in the analysis of this piece of news. First, it is the emphasis on Nebahat's happiness and her newfound taste for danger and power-concepts associated with Güney's star image as an Anatolian man who lives in front of the barrel of a gun. Second is the emphasis on the words "phony," "dressy," and "fragile" which are suggested as a part of Çehre's past while her future holds being a "real person" and "representing real people" since it is "a new chapter;" a fresh beginning. It is important to remember that one of the major characteristics of Güney's star image is its perception as authentic, genuine, real which was not the case for Çehre since she was considered to be the exact opposite.

Çehre's image was being amalgamated with every article and piece of news until *Pazar* magazine run a shocking story that changed the course of events as well as threatened Güney's well-established star image as the epitome of Anatolian

manhood. Birsen Can Ünal was pregnant with Yılmaz Güney's child. Pazar reserved two pages for the love triangle. On the left page was the photo of Güney with Ünal. The caption under the photograph declared that Ünal was expecting a child. On the right side was a photo of Nebahat Çehre with the caption "one big problem." ("Çirkin Kral Dertli," *Pazar*, 1966: 506) As always, the problem was not about Çehre. It was about whether Güney would be able to prove his moral and honorable Anatolian male image. The dilemma was clear. Güney's star image was constructed fundamentally and primarily on the discourse of Anatolianness. For instance in his rural melodramas, in which, "people can find a piece of him," pregnancy ends bloodsheds. In *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967), Cumali offers truce to *ağa* who massacred his entire family just because his lover is pregnant. Similarly in *Dağların Oğlu* (Atadeniz, 1965), Mehmet offers peace to his biggest enemy so that he can be a father and a husband.

Accordingly, in his off-screen image he was expected to do the same by marrying Ünal and being a father to his child. That is why, when Güney announced that he would support his child but he would still marry Çehre, not only the media, but even Yeşilçam was shocked because, for a man who constructs himself "as he is," as "traditional," coming from Anatolia and living according to the norms and Anatolia, his relationship with Ünal presented a dilemma. Güney was even condemned by the film industry. According to Özgüç (1988: 46), *Ben Öldükçe Yaşarım* faced a much-unexpected loss at Antalya Film Festival in 1968, where Güney was "denied an award because of his immoral behavior." (Özgüç, 1988: 46) More over, the preliminary jury did not select *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968) for the national competition at the 5th Antalya Film Festival. The media coverage was also hostile. Güney was criticized for not being "properly Anatolian":

> Yılmaz is really a brave Anatolian guy but what he did with Can is not the kind of behavior a brave Anatolian would do. Leaving aside the mother of your daughter and marry somebody else... Neither God nor people would forgive this. His marriage would most likely be short because he hurt Can so much. ("Bu İşin Son," *Pazar*, 1966: 506)

Another article used a similar argument: "How can a man who is proud to tell that he is *Anadolu çocuğu* (Anatolian boy), disregard the mother of his daughter and marry someone else?" ("Yeşilçam Dışarıya," *Perde*, 1967: 10) Suddenly, Güney's star image as the epitome of Anatolian masculinity was deeply scrutinized: "Yılmaz is really a brave Anatolian man but what he did is not a brave man would do." ("Bedbahtlar Kervanı", *Perde*, 1968: 46) Not surprisingly, his image was once again compared to the "Handsome King"; Ayhan Işık: "If Güney had an organized life like [Ayhan] Işık, it would be possible for him to have bigger financial opportunities and it would be possible to see him as a long-lasting actor." ("Türk Sinemasının Kaderini," *Perde*, 1967: 51) By "organized life," the article suggests an off-screen life without scandals, bar fights and more importantly an illegitimate child. It was suggested that since Işık had a stable private life, he would likely be a long-lasting actor unlike Güney.

The media also turned the scandal to the fans and suggested that if Güney did not marry Ünal, this would have a devastating effect between him and his audience "due to millions of fans' interpretation of morality and dignity." ("Yılmaz Beni Aç," Ses, 1966: 48) They warned Güney: "What Güney is not aware of is that the audience is relentless, brutal and unforgiving." ("Ne Olacak," *Milliyet Haftasonu İlavesi* 1966: 6). Güney was expected to call off the wedding and marry Ünal:

> Yılmaz Güney who is spending sweet days in İzmir with Nebahat Çehre will return to Can and save his illegitimate child no matter what. Güney knows the

> reaction of his audience in this kind of circumstances very well and he calculates what out of wedlock and illegitimate can do to his film career. That is why Güney will marry Can eventually. Otherwise, Güney's audience will disown Güney and his end will come sooner than expected. ("Ne Olacak," *Milliyet Haftasonu İlavesi* 1966: 6)

Despite all the media scrutiny, Çehre and Güney got married on January 30th, 1967 at the roof of Istanbul Hilton. The hostile media started to look for ways to justify the marriage. It was suggested, "the brave child of Anatolia has become a victim of the promise he made" ("Yeşilçam Dışarıya," *Perde*, 1967: 10) since Güney told earlier in 1967 that he would "give her [Çehre] his last name." ("Bitmeyen Bir Aşkın," *Perde*, 1966: 2) Güney reminded of his promise and repeated many times that he was not the kind of man who would break a promise. Soon, there was no longer any discussion about the marriage. The media turned its attention to the unfinished work of transforming Çehre's star image.

In an article entitled "Farewell to Cinema, Hello to Marriage" Güney claimed: "From now on, Nebahat is not an actress. From now on, there is the Nebahat as Yılmaz Güney's wife. She will continue to live as a housewife." ("Sinemaya Elveda," Perde, 1967: 6) In a later interview, Güney repeated his claim: "From now on Nebahat has nothing to do with cinema. She is the woman of her house. Maybe she would act in my films but maybe..."[63] Çehre's transformation was finalized after the marriage. She was taken away from film industry and placed in the house with her consent. Her sexuality was repressed and several limitations regarding her social appearances were set in order to make her "a kind of woman

[63] Later Güney allowed Çehre to act in two films made by him annually.

whom Yılmaz Güney's audience would respect." ("Bitmeyen Bir Aşkın," *Perde*, 1966: 2)[64]

Just six months after the controversial marriage, on August 3rd, 1966, Ünal gave birth to a baby girl, Elif Pütün Güney. The media turned to Ünal and published several interviews about her life, which focused on Güney's negligence. In those interviews Ünal constructed Güney as a typical decadent man whose consumption manners and ignorant attitude resembled the excessively westernized bourgeois in Yeşilçam melodramas. The extra-ordinary had returned to the headlines with negative connotations once again. Ünal suggested that Güney left her 100 liras for her child but he bought dresses for Nebahat that cost 15.000 lira. ("Yılmaz Beni Aç Bıraktı," *Ses,* 1966: 48) She also suggested that Elif, her daughter, was sick because there was no money for gas, food or medical care.

Ünal repeated her disappointment in another interview and claimed that "she has stood by him through the difficult days but when he became rich, he quickly forgot her and his child." ("Sonlarını Merak," Ses, 1967: 7) In describing those difficult days, Ünal was very specific:

> I stole empty beer bottles to support him. I put up with the beatings. Even if I was not married to him, I never looked at any other man. I wanted to kill myself when he beat me. Tülin Elgin who used to live with Yılmaz saw my face the other day, hated Yılmaz and left him that same day. He brought Devlet Devrim to our place and I put up with that too. I told him to get married and guaranteed that I would divorce him the next day so that my

[64] The transformation was so successful that even after the couple split in 1968, Çehre continued to use the same rhetoric: "I wished to be an actor who is praised with her ability to ask instead of her body. I want to play the women of our country (*bizim topraklarımız*). Women you can meet in Taşatar, Zeytinburnu, Balat, Urfa, Toroslar, in the East and in the West. Women, who are down to earth, well grounded. I used to love nightclubs and nightlife but now I sleep early. I love to read books and think about the steps in my career." ("Ben Nebahat Çehre," *Perde*, 1968: 52)

> child won't be fatherless but he did not agree to that. I need to work. He does not let me. (Yılmaz Beni Aç Bıraktı," *Ses*, 1966: 48)

What is particularly interesting is that in the middle of this controversy, Güney was blacklisting certain actresses due to the complexity and scandals in their private lives. In an interview made by Erden Canuysal for Perde Güney explained why he black listed some Yeşilçam actresses as follows:

> Yes I have black listed some of the female stars and I am not going to be in the same movie with them. The names on list have very complicated private lives and their names are involved with love scandals every day. My loving and conservative Anatolian audience naturally resents seeing these stars with me in my films. I agree with them that they do not have to watch them by me. (Bitmeyen Bir Aşkın," *Perde*, 1966: 2)

Güney's decision to announce this black list right at the moment when his love triangle was deeply debated in the media can be seen as an attempt to reaffirm his Anatolianness. In other words, this act can be read as damage control, a way of justifying his Anatolianness amidst the scandals of an illegitimate child, a lavish upper-class life style, expensive gifts and a very controversial marriage. However even though the media stopped villainizing Güney after a few months, there was still much negative criticism regarding his life style which involved domestic disturbances, Çehre's constant attempts to file for divorce, Güney's gambling habits, his mafia connection as well as his action-adventure films which were not appreciated by the media. With regards to Güney, the discourse of Anatolianness that pieced together Güney's star image also dealt with the question of authenticity through the "question of really": Is Güney really acting like an Anatolian man? Why does not he marry the mother of his child like a real Anatolian man would? Why does an Anatolian man spend so much money on cars, houses and whisky? Why

does he risk losing everything with these bar fights when he worked so much to rise to stardom as an ugly man? Why does an Anatolian man like Güney do exactly everything he criticizes about bourgeoisie in his films? In other words, the media simultaneously questioned his sincerity, realness, authenticity since while he was upholding traditional norms, he was living a life which resembled the upper class Beyoğlu audience and "corrupt westernized" Yeşilçam stars he constantly criticized. Drinking, gambling, bar fights, expensive gifts, forbidden short-lived romances and posh apartments in upper-class neighborhoods of Istanbul, all clashed with the dignified, ordinary and humble Anatolian image.

1970s were very different than the 1960s in terms of Güney's star image. Based on the extra-filmic material, it can be argued that these media criticism and antagonism started to subdue after Güney and Çehre got divorced and Güney went to serve his over-due military duty in 1968. In terms of his on-screen image, 1970 witnessed the turning point in Güney's film career as well the milestone in Turkish cinema. The following is an exploration of how.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY YEARS (1968-1970)

Military duty has long been constructed as a rite-of-passage to manhood, an education, a gratitude to nation and a responsibility in the collective psyche of Turkish society. It also holds an important place in the traditions and folklore with many rituals regarding seeing a man off to military duty. That is why; it was surprising to find out that only Yılmaz Güney's military service became headlines in the media. No other star was pictured in military uniform. The only piece of material was spotted in *Milliyet Haftasonu İlavesi* regarding Göksel Arsoy's return from military service: "Göksel Arsoy has returned to cinema after completing his military duty." ("Beyaz Perdemizden Haberler", 1965: 1) This suggests that Güney's military duty had a particular significance, an element that made it worth reporting for a period of almost two years. Considering the socio-cultural and nationalistic discourses of Anatolia as the birthplace of National War of Independence and the

heroic folk tales of sacrifice by Anatolian men and women, for a star who was constructed to be genuinely Anatolian, military duty had major significance.

Right after Güney's arrival at the barracks, a series of magazine articles and photographs started to appear in the media. *Ses* published a piece about Güney while he was in Sivas serving his military duty.

> The Ugly King left his crown and went to the military. Now he wakes up early, eats, exercises and keeps guard. From now on, he would not wear different clothes every day. He would wear a military uniform like everybody ("Ses Sivas'ta," *Ses*, 1968: 27)

It is important to highlight the comeback of the rhetoric of ordinariness in the article at a time of turbulence in Güney's private life. Just like how Güney was introduced to Yeşilçam as the "Anatolian," "ordinary," "common," the phrases like "just like everybody," "with his military friends," and "a regular soldier" were again used. Moreover, it was suggested, "military brought peace to Yılmaz" ("Ses," *Ses*, 1968: 27) because "producers, cameras, bonds, gossip, break-ups. They were all over." ("Ses," *Ses*, 1968: 27) The "peace" that the military would supposedly bring Güney was related to the turbulent years due to domestic disturbance, illegitimate child and gambling and divorce. Other than the headlines, photographs of Güney in military uniform, resting in infirmary; having his picture taken with his military friends; holding a gun and giving a military salute also served for this reconstruction. In this sense, the media suggested that military was the perfect solace Güney needed amidst the discussions of his genuine Anatolianness and ordinariness. In a way, military service was approached as a rehabilitation of Güney's star image. That is why Güney's acceptance to military duty became an event. Güney was complicit: "I

left the conditions of Yeşilçam for two years in 1968 when I went to the military. Every separation brings a fresh look on things. It was as if I was released to fresh air, purified." (as cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 13)

The two-year military service was also the time when Güney started to attack Yeşilçam for the first time. Güney:

> Star system is a commercial game. In order to make Turkish cinema better, we need to deconstruct the star system. As the Star, I am not good. I act in many unsatisfactory and ordinary films. The good Yılmaz Güney is the one who acts in art films. ("Dertli Bir Adam," *Perde*, 1969: 30)

Besides its star system, Güney was also attacking "the corruptness" in Yeşilçam: "I am determined to clean some parasites from cinema. I will no longer have sluts of Yeşilçam act in my films." ("Kralın Boykotu, Ses, 1969: 40). These were all new discourses that became a part of Güney's star image during military service. According to Rayns (1983) this change of mind toward Yeşilçam was a result of isolation because it had the effect of turning Güney in on himself. He gives *Umut* (Güney, 1970) and *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974) as examples of how "Güney's introspections have consistently produced innovations in his work." (Rayns, 1983: 91) Even though *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974) can be read accordingly, *Umut* (Güney, 1970) has to be approached cautiously. It is a fact that while *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974) is a product of two-year imprisonment, *Umut* (Güney, 1970) is a product of two-year military service. There is one major difference between these two-year isolation periods. Military service did not stop Güney from visiting his friends and his daughter, travelling to Istanbul, going to bars and nightclubs and gambling.

Moreover he was free to make films.[65] In other words, Güney had certain privileges based on his celebrity status. On the other hand, during his imprisonment at Selimiye Military Prison, Güney was completely stripped off his privileges. That is why, the two periods should not be considered on equal terms regarding the effects of isolation. Moreover, during his military service, Güney did not stop making action-adventure films despite the hate speech about Yeşilçam. In addition, after his divorce from Çehre in 1968, Güney continued having short-lived romances with Feri Cansel, Seyyal Taner, Sema Özcan and İren Kayno. He was criticizing Yeşilçam from a very moralistic point of view while at the same time indulging the same life style more than ever.

The media that championed Güney right after he started his military duty quickly became hostile again. They criticized Güney's gambling habit and mafia friends. His arrest was taken to headlines: "Güney was arrested for carrying an unlicensed gun at the casino with powerful *kabadayı* of İstanbul such as Dündar Kılıç, Hüsso, İdris, Almera Kemal and Laz Nizam. He was taken into custody." ("Yılmaz Güney'in İki," *Ses*, 1969: 48) In addition the media no longer appreciated his action-adventure films: "His films smell sex, blood and bullets. They are ordinary and nothing but money-making machines for producers." ("1970 Yılı," *Perde*, 1969: 33) According to Atadeniz, Güney "needed a change because if he continued to be a commercial good; he would perish." (Atadeniz, 2010)

[65] *Güney Ölüm Saçıyor* (Atadeniz, 1969), *Kurşunların Kanunu* (Ergün, 1969), *Kan Su Gibi Akacak* (Aslan, 1969), *Belanın Yedi Türlüs*ü (Ergün, 1969), *Bin Defa Ölürüm* (Aslan, 1969), *Çifte Tabancalı Kabadayı* (Aslan, 1969), *Bir Çirkin Adam* (Güney, 1969)

5.1 The Anatolian & The Istanbulite: Yılmaz Güney & Fatma (Fatoş) Süleymangil Güney

By 1969, Güney's star image was beyond control. He fit no side of the Anatolian/ Istanbulite dichotomy, metamorphosing into being not a typically excessively westernized bourgeois as the media feared but became even more threatening since his life was not simply about conspicuous consumption anymore. He became an anomaly, a grey area lacking definition and position within the discourses that created him. Among all the scandals, in 1969, Güney was photographed with an engagement ring on his finger. The media was excited to find out the identity of the fiancée. Güney chose not to tell her name: "I gave my word. My word is my honor. Wait for 16 months and you will see my fiancée." ("Bu Yüzüğün," *Ses*, 1969: 5) Nonetheless, the media soon found out it was Fatoş Süleymangil.

Fatoş Süleymangil and Güney met at a film set in Istanbul while Güney was serving his military service in Muş. Süleymangil was an Istanbulite and was seventeen years old. Her father was an industrialist. She was living in Moda, one of the upper-class neighborhoods of Istanbul. Süleymangil has not heard about Güney. She only knew the handsome stars whose films were shown in big film theaters of Beyoğlu. In a way, she was a part of the Beyoğlu audience that Güney condemned right at the beginning of his career only five years ago. Overall, "Yılmaz was from another world; a world she had no idea that even existed." (Atadeniz, 2010) The next time Güney saw Süleymangil, he asked her to marry him. Süleymangil recalls:

> I was shocked. I told him that I have years of studying in front of me and I want to go abroad for higher education. He said: "Ok, you can continue your education but I want to tell you about myself. I will write to you from Muş [where Güney was completing his military duty at the time]." I got his letters

> and I responded to them. Those letters were like confession letters. He told me everything. His mistakes, his daughter, his short-lived marriage, his past life, his ambitions and future plans. And I believed in him. (Atadeniz, 2010)

The media approached Süleymangil as the young and rich fiancée. Her age and socio-economic background were repeated almost in every magazine article. Phrases like "only 17," "high school student," and "the daughter of a millionaire" became frequent. This rhetoric is important because it constructs Güney once more as the lower class, ordinary Anatolian man through constructing Süleymangil as the extra-ordinary, young, wealthy, well-educated upper class Istanbulite. This image construction is similar to how Güney was positioned in opposition to the famous, wealthy, handsome and Istanbulite stars of Yeşilçam in the mid-1960s, right at the start of his career. Güney was being re-constructed as the ordinary Anatolian once again first through military service and then with Süleymangil's socio-economic class.

Despite the letters and the media coverage, Süleymangil's father belied the engagement.[66] Güney related it to the scandals surrounding his star image.

> I did not want to end the engagement. The father of the girl asked me around. Not even one soul told him that I am a good person. They asked him how he could give his daughter to a man like me. They asked him if he had found his daughter on the streets. I am a father, too. I would do exactly what he did. I am not a bully so I ended it. ("Bir Nişan," *Ses*, 1969: 40)

Even though Güney respectfully agreed to Süleymangil's decision, he continued to communicate with Fatoş Süleymangil through letters. In the later years, Fatoş Güney would justify the attitude of her father:

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[66] Fatoş Süleymangil's father: "There is no engagement. My daughter is very young. Whatever you heard is wrong." ("Bu Yüzüğün Eşi Kimde?", 1969: 5)

> I only understood why some men needed guns after I met him. My father did not want us to get married because he was afraid that his daughter would be a widow at a young age. According to my father, Yılmaz was a *kabadayı* who was involved in many scandals. Moreover, he was referred to as a communist. He was a man in front of the barrel of gun. He could be killed anytime, anywhere. My father was right. Yılmaz really was that kind of a man. (Güney, 1998: 19-20)

In 1970 Güney completed his military service. The media announced his comeback to Istanbul with curiosity: "The King has returned to his kingdom but will he be able to retrieve his crown. This is the question everybody is asking." ("Yılmaz Onbaşı," *Ses*, 1970: 14) The King had different plans. Despite the disapproval of Süleymangil's family, Fatoş Süleymangil and Yılmaz Güney got married the same year. Süleymangil:

> I had to leave my family behind. I had to oppose them because they did not want me to get married. I was just 18 years old. But, of course I left my house without their consent. I still feel pain about it because I was their only child and they loved me so much. I was attending college. I had private teachers coming to teach me at home after school. I was learning foreign languages. But, I left that life and started a long difficult journey with Yılmaz (Atadeniz, 2010)

Right after the marriage, a series of articles started to re-appear regarding Güney's star image. Referring to Güney:

> He finally put his life back together. The marriage really changed Yılmaz. He goes to film set from his home and comes right back home when he is done. Many people believed that Yılmaz Güney could not leave his past and bad habits behind. But he had forgotten all of it in his peaceful home. ("Ve Huzura Kavuştu, *Pazar*, 1970: 722)

Based on the archival research, it is a fact that while news on bar fights, stabbings, gambling habits, mafia connections, arrests and short-lived romances ended with the

marriage, news about the stability of Güney's private life and upcoming films emerged. Media applauded Güney for "putting his life back together," and proving the people who thought he "could not leave his past and bad habits behind" wrong. He was finally "more like Ayhan Işık" suggesting stability in off-screen image. In a way the media was both domesticating and re-Anatolianization of Güney's star image. Even though the married couple went to Adana for Güney's new film project, *Umut* (Güney, 1970), extra-filmic material approached the trip as a family matter. The headlines were about how Güney introduced his wife to his father. The choice to take Fatoş Güney to headline instead of Güney's film project was not simply about family re-union but also about re-introducing Güney to his audience as a man who went back to his Anatolian roots- literally. The same piece also provided a photograph of Fatoş Güney wearing a *şalvar* with the caption "Yılmaz had Fatoş wear a şalvar" ("Yılmaz Fatoş'a," *Pazar,* 1970: 725) suggesting both the transformation of Fatoş Güney from an upper-class woman to an Anatolian and the re-construction of Güney as an Anatolian man. Just like how media approached Çehre no longer as a phony actress, they approached Fatoş Güney no longer as a bourgeois as suggested in the article which stated, "His wife, Fatoş wore a *şalvar* just like village girls and Yılmaz Güney looked at her with loving eyes in her *şalvar"* ("Yılmaz Fatoş'a," *Pazar,* 1970: 725).

Süleymangil's attitude was also praised as she was appreciated for being able to adapt to her husband. "Güney has found exactly what he was looking for because even though Fatoş is rich, she adapted to Güney's rules." (Çirkin Kral Baba Evinde", *Ses,* 1970: 41) In the same issue, Süleymangil's ability to cook was celebrated and she was appreciated for earning the love and respect of Güney's mother: "Yılmaz is an Anatolian man and he wants his woman to act accordingly. Fatoş Güney, a girl

from a rich family, was able to make her mother-in-law love her." (Çirkin Kral Baba Evinde", *Ses*, 1970: 41) Fatoş Süleymangil was also complicit with being the proper wife. Moreover just like how Güney protected Çehre as the misunderstood and misguided actress, Süleymangil took Güney under her wings and defended him: "I am very glad that I married him. He a great man but he is misunderstood by everyone." ("Yeni Evliler," *Ses*, 1970: 32)

Meanwhile, Güney continued to make films. He made five[67] films in 1970s before making *Umut* (Güney, 1970). These films were action-adventure films. Among those five films, *Kanımın Son Damlasına Kadar* (Figenli, 1970) stands out as a different action-adventure film in terms of its female protagonist and what she has to say about rural life. In the film Ayşe and Ali come across in the mountains. While Ali is a convict who fled from prison, Ayşe is a young rural woman who ran away from her village because her father settled a dowry with the old landholder of the village in exchange with Ayşe. When Ali asks what she would do, Ayşe tells him that she would go to the big city and live there.

> Ali: "Big city has other rules. No one shows mercy."
> Ayşe: "And they care in the village? They throw me to the fields to work at a very young age. You burn under the torrid heat. When you grow up just a bit, they sell you to an old man who shows no mercy. He treats you like a dog; kicking and beating you… making you wash his feet at bight."
> Ali: "Big city is cruel. They take your destiny from you without paying for it. They open their shops from the skin and the flesh of innocent and lonely woman. It is filled with immorality."

The portrayal of urban life as place of brutality, immorality and injustice is not new in Güney's action-adventure films. However it is a rare case to present the rural as immoral. Here with Ayşe's testimony of how her past was and how her future will

[67] *Onu Allah Affetsin* (Elmas, 1970), *Piyade Osman* (Güney, 1970), *Kanımın Son Damlasına Kadar* (Figenli, 1970), *İmzam Kanla Yazılır* (Aslan, 1970), *Çifte Yürekli* (Evin, 1970).

look like, we become witnesses to the immoral traditions, which allow the father to use his daughter (s) like a commodity. Güney used to put the blame on the feudal landholders. His rural films of the 1960s, suggest the brutality of the landholder who steals, kidnaps, rapes, tortures or murders just like the immoral *eşkıya*. The antagonist here is a peasant, a father who is willingly selling away his daughter. In addition, through this dialog between two characters, it is made very clear that men exploit women regardless the rural or urban context, women are sold to the highest bidder. No wonder the Censorship Commission banned the film's exhibition and distribution based on the 6th Article of contradicting public decency, morality and national sentiments and the 9th Article of provoking the society to crime.

Güney was in the process of re-constructing his star image. He was putting his private life back together after years of turbulence and refreshing his ordinary Anatolian off-screen image. However in terms of his on-screen image Güney was not about the old and the familiar Ugly King myth. Instead he was after the deconstruction of it. Even though his action-adventure films in 1970 are still about the Ugly King, they show some changes to the audience. The real change came in the summer of 1970. That summer together with his wife, Güney went to Adana, visited his father, looked at his father's old house, explored the streets of Adana and experienced the change in the modern city life - with one real life story of his father's hope to find a buried treasure in mind. That idea not only became Güney's first major attempt in dismantling the myth of the Ugly King but also became a milestone and a forerunner in realist filmmaking in Turkish Cinema.

5.2 The First Attempt to Dismantle the Ugly King Myth: *Umut* (Güney, 1970)

Umut (Güney, 1970) tells the story of a former cotton-picker, Cabbar (Güney) who migrated to the big city and became a phaeton driver. Nonetheless, the city life does not treat Cabbar well. He rarely finds customers both because his phaeton is old and dirty[68] and because people tend to use taxis rather than phaetons. Despite this setback, Cabbar refuses his wife's suggestion to go back to the fields to pick cotton for his former landholder. Based on the backstory, it can be argued that Cabbar emancipated himself from the reign of landholders after making enough money to migrate to the city, buy a horse and work as a phaeton driver. However just like how he was oppressed and exploited by the feudal landholder in the village, he is not proletarianized and exploited by the brutal capitalism in the city. When his horse dies, Cabbar tries to find ways to make money but all his attempts fail so he decides to go after a buried treasure together with a friend (Tuncel Kurtiz) who believes that the *imam* (religious leader) can predict the exact location. Cabbar puts his faith and what is left of his savings on the imam who turns out to be a fraud. Having lost everything, at the end of the film Cabbar loses his sanity.

Umut has a very realist tone with its mise en scene, dialog and narration. It is skillful in demonstrating the sufferings, oppression and brutality of capitalism. More importantly it accomplishes to do so not through the dichotomies of the bourgeois employer / working-class migrant or the landholder / peasant but rather through showing the impossibility of surviving in an urban capitalist city covered with advertisements of banks, giving mortgage for apartment, cars and interest rates

[68] The Censorship Committee claimed that Yılmaz Güney's pheaton becomes a metaphor of poverty because it is dirty, old, bakımsız, broken and weak.

which could only serve the rich, not people like Cabbar, who does not even have the money to feed his children. Yet, consumption is pumped with these advertisement as well as the shiny neon lights of casinos, nightclubs and bars.

Cabbar's hope of earning a living as a phaeton driver is shattered one day when an expensive car hits one of his horses. He goes to the police but they do not help. Rather the policeman sides with the owner of the car, humiliating Cabbar and ignoring his desperate but silent cries about his horse. The scene clearly suggests that the police – State - privileges the rich while ignoring the poor for being "dirty, illiterate and criminal." The Censorship Commission requested the removal of this scene from the film[69] based on the grounds that the police favor the rich. The next scene is at a deserted field. In front, there is a carriage, which is loaded with Cabbar's dead horse. Behind, Cabbar follows the carriage as it dumps the horse and leaves. The scene is very dramatic in its simplicity to expresses the helplessness and desperation of Cabbar through using a dead horse and its owner who slowly walks behind carriage with his head down and sitting by his horse without saying a word or shedding a tear in an agoraphobic landscape of infertile land.

The opening sequence offers a glimpse of urban city life in the morning. Phaetons and taxies park by the train station waiting for customers, people sell sandwiches, toasts and beverages and open up their small shops by the road facing the station. As people start to leave the station, life fastens. As taxis and phaetons leave the station one by one, markets and shops start to serve customers. Everyone

[69] No procedure was followed after the death of Yılmaz Güney's horse. And no tazminat was paid. Here it was suggested that when the rich owner of a car kills the horse of a poor phaeton driver, nothing would be done. Report: 24/9/70 No: 211 File: 91122/4905

but Cabbar has found business. Every scene in *Umut* is beautifully structured but yet remains very simple and realistic without any exaggeration unlike many Yeşilçam films, which tend to push the socio-economic difference among the rich and poor to such a level that it becomes unrealistic. In those films while the rich are portrayed as immoral and evil, the poor are constructed to be helpful, happy and appreciative. *Umut* does not repeat that exaggeration. For instance, when Cabbar's horse dies, he visits his former landholders to ask for a loan. They all refuse him and go on with their lives. They are simply indifferent toward Cabbar's misery. The film does not exaggerate the way they turn down Cabbar. The landholder goes back to playing *tavla* with a friend or simply start an everyday conversation with his wife after Cabbar leaves. Their indifferent attitude is not villainized. On the contrary it is normalized. The relationship among the poor are also not championed or glorified. For instance, when the mechanic who repairs Cabbar's phaeton and the man who sells Cabbar the food for his horse hear that Cabbar's horse is dead, they become worried. It is very common to see the bond between lower / working class men in Yeşilçam. When one of them needs help financially, the whole neighborhood gathers to help him. In *Umut* this is not the case. Both the mechanic and the supplier race each other to be the first one to ask Cabbar to pay his debt. They think that because Cabbar would not be able to work any more because of the death of his horse, they can never get their money back. They are both portrayed as frustrated and irritated about the death of Cabbar's horse for selfish reasons. In other words, there is no bond, empathy, assistance or worry for Cabbar and his family.

Umut is realistic in its narration as well. In one scene Cabbar sees a protest organized by other phaeton drivers who are against city regulations, which would ban phaetons. Frustrated with the possibility to become unemployed, phaeton drivers

gather to protest. Cabbar goes to the protest with a Turkish flag in his hand but he does not attend it. He just walks by without participating even though the ban would make matters worse for him and his family. He walks away because he does not believe in the power of collective action. Instead he buys lottery tickets and focuses on personal salvation. It is implied that winning the lottery is easier than changing the oppressive system through Cabbar's indifference to the phaeton drivers' strike. This is yet another realistic motif in the narration since the phaeton drivers neither have the intention to organize nor the power to go on a strike at a city filled with taxis. If they strike, they would only lose their meal ticket since phaetons are not the only form of transportation available in the city. Hence, they have no power over the oppressive system and an unorganized one-day protest is fundamentally futile.[70]

Umut[71] is also an attack on Güney's established star image as the Ugly King. Richard Dyer (1998: 100) suggests, "When a star attempts to overthrow the type to which s/he belongs, it is because he wants to be perceived as an individual rather than a type." Accordingly, *Umut* attempts to de-heroize Güney and bring his image down to earth in different ways. First, Cabbar is not a "fighter." (Maktav, 2001:178) He is very different than the omnipotent male protagonist in his action adventure films and also different than the poor artisan, cattle smuggler or peasant who finally rebels due to the oppressed socio-economic situations in his rural films. In *Umut*, Cabbar's every hope turns out to be a disappointment starting with his decision to be

[70] Still the Censorship Committe suggested the removal of the döviz phaeton drivers carry in the protest. They also want the removal of the slogans heard from the laudspeakers.
[71] According to Onat Kutlar (1968), Güney's first debut as a director signals this change before Umut. He argues that with Seyyit Han, "the audience is allowed to see that fragile side of Seyyit who was real and sincere" (Yeni Sinema, p. 8).

a phaeton driver, to robbing a tourist, to buying lottery tickets, to relying on religious prophesies. Moreover, after every defeat, starting from the event at the police station to robbery attempt and to city regulations that would ban phaetons, Cabbar simply does not rebel. He is even beaten up by another man, which is unlikely to happen to the male protagonist in Güney's films. Third, even after all else fails, in *Umut*, Cabbar does not resort to his gun. In his prior films to *Umut*, Güney's character would turn to his gun to take his revenge after trying so hard not to get in trouble. In *Umut*, Cabbar keeps his gun hidden in a shelf. He reluctantly takes it out when he decides to rob someone. Even with a gun, Güney fails to rob the tourist at a rich neighborhood. The gun is useless in establishing male authority and superiority for the first time in a Güney film. Third, and perhaps most importantly, *Umut* does not have a tangible, physical antagonist. The lack of an actual antagonist points two things. First it strips off the audience from the gratification from the death of the antagonist. In other words, in Güney's prior films to *Umut*, the antagonist is always punished. Revenge is taken and justice is served. Here in *Umut* what the male protagonist gets at the end for his attempts to restore justice is insanity. He does not succeed hence he cannot offer any gratification to the audience. Second, the absence of a tangible antagonist suggests that the whole system with its inequalities, injustice and ignorance is responsible for Cabbar's oppression and insanity. Hence when Cabbar is left in misery as a poor, insane man who has lost everything at the end of the film, there is no one to put the blame on. This break in Güney's star image as the Ugly King to an insane poor man also highlights the politicization of Güney's star image. All of the above factors are representations of "a man who would be lost amidst the new developments." (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 14-15) The lack of a tangible antagonist and Cabbar's lack of interest in the strike point to the power of capitalism.

The search for personal victory and the defeat that comes along with it draw attention to the importance of collective action. The scene at the police station indicates the corruption in State institutions, which favor the rich capitalist and ignore the lower classes. All of these themes lay down the Marxist underpinnings of *Umut*. More importantly the fact that the film is not told from the dichotomy of the rich / poor which is resolved with the personal victory of one peasant who rebels openly puts the blame on the capitalist system making it the villain of the film.

Umut was banned the Censorship Board according to the 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th Articles on September 24, 1970. When asked about the ban, Güney claimed:

> *Umut* was banned because it was classified as a threat to the state. Dangerous to the morals of the people! I think they saw it as a dangerous precedent. If they allowed it, there might be other movies like that… (Rayns, 1983: 90)

Güney Film immediately filed an objection regarding the decision of the Committee to *Danıştay* (Council of State). Three months later, Danıştay removed the ban on the film and allowed its national and international exhibition. *Umut* was a success. It swept the awards at Antalya Film Festival and grossed over 700.000 liras even though "after its first release in Kozan, the regional distributor was furious and yelled that "it was not a Yılmaz Güney film." (Keskiner, 2011) Nonetheless controversy over the film's censorship still made it difficult for Güney to find a producer for his next film (Ryans, 1983: 90). Due to this financial crisis Güney decided to "start from scratch again, acting in commercial movies to build up the money to make *Ağıt.*" (Rayns, 1983: 90)

While the strict censorship and the reaction of regional distributors made it more difficult for Güney to dismantle the Ugly King myth, he was not pessimistic

because socially-realist films like Umut was not the only choice. He valued his action-adventure films because it was easier for the action-adventure films to bypass the censorship mechanism. Güney: “The censorship is waiting like a hawk so we though let’s make a gangster movie.”

CHAPTER 6

GÜNEY'S STAR IMAGE IN THE 1970S

6.1 Güney's On-Screen Image in the 1970s

Güney's action-adventure films in the 1970s point to certain socio-economic discourses just like their 1960s counterparts. One of these discourses is immigration to Germany. *Baba* (Güney, 1971) tells the story of Cemal (Güney) who works as a servant at a mansion with his three children, wife and mother. Cemal's only hope is to immigrate to Germany as a guest worker so he can provide for his family. The film starts with a scene that shows Cemal looking out from the window. The camera captures Cemal's face outside the house, as if he is behind bars, locked in a prison cell with no power to change anything. Just like the lower / working class male protagonists in Güney's film in the 1960s, Cemal's oppression in *Baba* is demonstrated at the beginning of the film using the interior and the exterior of his house. The film then introduces Koray, a typical excessively westernized character who drinks, smokes, brings a different girl every night to the mansion and spends his

time idle wasting his father's money. The night before the medical examination by the German doctor who would decide if Cemal is eligible to immigrate to Germany, Cemal tells his wife that he can no longer deal with Koray's immoral behavior. He suggests that "this job has been taking its toll on" him.

The next scene is at Cemal's house. We see him shaving his moustache. Cemal: "Look at me, saving my mustache for the German doctor." The mustache here represents Cemal's traditional Anatolian male identity, which he willingly sacrifices to look like a Westerner. He believes this is important since a western doctor would examine him. Hence he shaves remorsefully and says: What if he still finds me ugly and rejects me?" The ugliness stems from the fact that Cemal is an Anatolian with or without the moustache. The following scene is at the doctor's office. The doctor orders men who are lined up for the examination to open their mouths. Cemal is irritated but helplessly obeys. The doctor looks at their mouths one by one and rejects Cemal because he is missing one tooth. Cemal tells the nurse that he had passed the physical examination of his government but the nurse orders him to leave. Devastated he goes back and tells his wife that he is an old mule who is missing a tooth. His wife tries to console him by saying that something else would come up because when God closes one door, He opens another one. Cemil protests: "All my life I have waited for God to see. He only made me dependent on others. Yes, he opens doors but not for us." When all else fails, just like Cabbar in *Umut* (Güney, 1970), Cemal goes to the extreme. He takes the blame for the murder committed by Koray in exchange for his family's well being. He considers ten years in prison equal to ten years of labor in Germany. However the situation changes when Cemal is sentenced to twenty-four years instead of ten. His family falls apart; his daughter becomes a prostitute, his son becomes a hit man for Koray, his wife is

raped by Koray, becomes ill and dies. After Cemal learns everything, the film becomes a revenge story instead of continuing to question the ineffectiveness and powerlessness of Turkish government and the immigration policy that humiliates people. Nevertheless, Güney was excited about the film. He saw it as another attempt to dismantle his mythical identity because it would be the first time his audience would see him cry on-screen: "I want them to accept me as men just like themselves. Not a god whom they glorify… A man who suffers like them." (Güzel, 1994: 59)

Yarın Son Gündür (Güney, 1971) is also a typical action-adventure film where Güney along with Fatma Girik play two gangsters who are quite famous among the underworld. However, Güney had a particular intention in making the film. In the film, Kara Çocuk (Güney) and Mavi Çocuk (Girik) take hostage a wealthy family. They ask questions to them and if they fail to answer correctly, they would give Kara Çocuk money. Güney:

> We wanted to introduce the bourgeoisie to our society… The man we kidnap is a wealthy, educated man of privilege. We wanted him to provide right answers to difficult questions. It was only when we asked him how much bread or a few olives cost, then he would not be able answer. That was the reality. The man really did not know. He was never interested. And these are the men who govern us. (Gümüştaş, 2007: 92-93)

While *Baba* (Güney, 1971) discusses the humiliating process of immigration policies, *Yarın Son Gündür* (Güney, 1971) discusses the indifference and ignorance of upper class under the disguise of a gangster film. With the upper class characters, Güney - in a very didactic way - teaches the society that the upper class are unaware of capitalist oppression, not share the same worries with the lower classes by making the characters fail to answer how much bread costs.

Another characteristic of Güney's action-adventure films in the 1970s is their particular emphasis on children. While in the 1960s films, the women in the family were portrayed as the vulnerable side of the male protagonist, in the 1970s films it is the children[72]. In *Son Kızgın Adam* (Davutoğlu, 1970), Yılmaz goes on a killing spree after tricked into believing that Yılmaz's enemies burn his son, Orhan, alive. In *Canlı Hedef* (Güney, 1970), Asım becomes devastated and resorts to his gun after his enemies kidnap, rape and murder his daughter, Elif. In *Sahtekar* (Göreç, 1972), the male protagonist sacrifices himself to save a group of children from a bomb explosion. In *Baba* (Güney, 1971), Cemal avenges Koray and his friends who are responsible for pushing Cemal's daughter to prostitution and use Cemal's son to do their dirty work.

These films are also filled with scenes, which point to the broken relationship between the father and his children. In *Baba* (Güney, 1971), Saliha, Cemal's daughter, is re-introduced to Cemal as a prostitute. Even if Saliha does not recognize him, she grows fond of him and calls him "father" when she learns that it was his nickname. Finding his daughter at a brothel and hearing her say "father" simply devastate Cemal. He takes her out of the brothel and into a nearby *hamam* - a bathhouse. There, Saliha washes up, cleanse and repents. She begs God to save the others just like He has saved her, making it ambivalent whom she refers to as her savior. The scene at the *hamam* is the rebirth of Saliha as the innocent and pure daughter of Cemal after taking a symbolic bath. Meanwhile Koray still has Cemal's son, Ali. Just like Saliha, Ali also does not recognize his father and shoots him to

[72] This fairly new emphasis on children as the new vulnerable side of Güney may also have autobiographical side since Güney had a daughter in 1968 and a son in 1971.

death after Cemal kills Koray. *Canlı Hedef* (Güney, 1970) is another example. In the film Asım explains how his life changed with Elif's birth: "One day I had a daughter. We named her Elif. I had to live for her. There was suddenly something that tied me to this world. I became vulnerable and sensitive like a child. I had to leave secretly otherwise they would harm Elif." Moreover, just to be able to save Elif, Asım begs for forgiveness, tells the men that he would kiss their hands and feet as long as they let his daughter go. Similar to *Baba* (Güney, 1971), Elif tells Asım that she wished he were her father because he is a very decent man. She says she loves him like a father. Asım, the powerful omnipotent *kabadayı,* cries holding Elif in his arms and asking her to call him "father" for one more time. Both scenes are very melodramatic, invoking the vulnerability and the human part of the character, which is Güney's aim since he was attempting to bring his image down to earth.

Other than revealing the vulnerable side of the male protagonist, children also provide the male protagonist with strength and patience since they are the catalysts of revenge. In *Son Kızgın Adam* (Davutoğlu, 1970) Yılmaz tells his wife that he needs to go to the city to find a good job because he does not want his son to be raised like he did even though going back to the city would mean death to him since his enemies were searching for him. In *Baba* (Güney, 1971) Cemal waits patiently in his prison cell for freedom so he can avenge Koray for destroying his family. In *Canlı Hedef* (Güney, 1970), the omnipotent male *kabadayı* flees from the country and takes the risk of being called a coward in order to save his daughter's life. Perhaps the most extreme example is from *Sahtekar* (Göreç, 1972). In the film the male character refrains from being intimate with his girl friend just because he is afraid that she might get pregnant. He is reluctant because he knows he would go to

jail and his child would grow up without a father just like he did. He says he would not let his child to become like him.

Güney also made rural films in the 1970s. One example is *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971), which tells the story of an *eşkıya* (Güney). Even though he is legendary with the ways he manages to stay live under strict State patrols, when all of his friends die, he decides to move to other mountains. As he was walking away from the village, a local merchant shoots him dead. There are two important aspects, which differentiate *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971) from Güney's rural films in the 1960s. First, the ending is quite different even though *eşkıya* dies at the end. In the 1960s films, Güney's character would never run away from a fight just because he is alone. He would not mind fighting with *ağa* or a large group of gendarme on his own. Just the opposite, he would not want anybody else doing the fighting or even helping him. *İnce Cumali* (Duru, 1967), *Dağların Oğlu* (Atadeniz, 1965), *Seyyit Han* (Güney, 1968) and *Kızılırmak Karakoyun* (Akad, 1967) are examples. In *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971), *eşkıya* decides to leave because like in *Umut* (Güney, 1970), there is no concrete antagonist. There is no *ağa* who kidnaps, tortures or rapes. His act of leaving not only points to the defeat of the male character but also points to the dead-end of individualism in a less subtle way than its 1960s counterparts. Moreover, in the films of the 1960s, even if the male hero dies or is captured by the gendarme at the end of the film, he still puts up a good fight. For that his death is glorified and presented as an honorable. Eulogies are made for him as in *Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967) or *Dağların Oğlu* (Atadeniz, 1965). In *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971) *eşkıya* does not only flee, but killed by a simple merchant by being shot behind his back. His death is a coincidence since even the merchant did not know whom he shot until he comes close to the body. The murder is not pre-determined. That is how, the film does not provide the

double gratification of 1960s rural films: the death of the antagonist and the glorified honorable death of the hero. In addition, Güney is a very skillful shooter and has superhuman instincts in his film in the 1960s. He can sense the enemy and traps and escapes from bullets. No bandit Güney played was shot from behind without having the time to defend himself. No bandit of his was this vulnerable to a threat that came from a simple merchant. These are the aspects that differentiate the films from its counterparts in the 1960s and attempt to dismantle the myth of the Ugly King. However, the second major reason why *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971) is different in terms of the myth lies in its female protagonist.

Ağıt (Güney, 1971) has a strong, independent female character as the doctor. She is powerful not only because with her medical knowledge, she cures the villagers but also because she saves *eşkıya*'s life. Her toughness and courage are portrayed in the film when she accepts to go to the mountains with a bunch of bandits just to cure their leader. She is not afraid of them. Moreover, she manages to operate on *eşkıya* under difficult circumstances. She saves his life. Güney and his bandit friends express their loyalty and admiration to her frequently by suggesting that she is the sole reason why Güney is alive. Having this much of authority over the male protagonist is very rare for any male character - let alone a female one. However this power dynamic, which favors the female character, is slightly subverted with her affection to the bandit. When she went to the mountains to cure him, she was no attracted to him. She heard about his legend but still her motivation was professional. Later with every follow up visit, she grew fond of him. Yet, her affection did not stop her from telling the gendarme that he is alive and hiding in the mountains. When she was interrogated about how she has this information, she does not hesitate to tell the officers that she went there and fixed him. Naturally she is judged and accused of

aiding a criminal. She replies by saying that her job is to cure people, not judge and discriminate according to what they do. She tells the officer it is their job to find and punish him if they can.

Amidst financial problems and severe censorship came the military intervention on March 12th, 1972. Güney was arrested for harboring Mahir Çayan, Hüseyin Cevahir and Oktay Etiman. He was sentenced to almost two years and sent to Selimiye Military Prison. Fatoş Güney was six months pregnant. Ironically, in the later years, Güney would suggest that March 12th did for him what he could not. It "saved him from Yeşilçam." (as cited in Kıyafet, 1989: 75)

6.2 The Prison Days and the Politicization of Güney's Star Image

Güney was sent to Selimiye Military Prison in 1972. The number of extra-filmic material decreased to the point that it became impossible to trace his star image from magazines. Therefore this part of the dissertation relies on Güney's letters from Selimiye Prison, his book that consists of thirteen short stories to his son and interviews with Güney's prison mates, guards and Fatoş Güney. These autobiographical data makes it possible to continue exploring Güney's off-screen image behind prison walls. The most significant source is Güney's letters to Fatoş Güney first because they are the primary resources and second because they reveal Güney's ideas, frustrations, joys and anxieties on an almost day-to-day basis throughout his imprisonment.

In his letters from Selimiye Prison, Güney explained his wife how he took on the "role of student in a boarding school." (Güney, 1998: 75) He mentioned frequently that his days "involved books, studying, reading, writing, physical exercise and learning English and French." (Güney, 1998: 75) Güney wrote about those days with a positive attitude. He regarded isolation as a chance to rediscover and reinvent himself. In this sense, his letters involve soul searching as well as self-criticism especially regarding his days as an actor in Yeşilçam. Güney:

> I got to realize the fact that hit me so strong that I could not recover for a long time: I was not a Marxist-Leninist. I was not a communist. I was not even a stable social democrat. I thought of myself as such but I was not. I was devastated. I realized very late that I was a part of the society we wanted to change. (Güney, 1998: 11)

Based on this letter, it can be argued that Güney was remorseful toward his life as an actor in the 1960s, his consumption patterns and ignorance toward the socio-economic climate in Turkey. He blames himself for preaching to be a socialist, while he was actually living the kind of life he was now condemning. He was like the child whose father makes him a wooden cart in *Tahta Arabalı Çocuklar*, the short story Güney wrote to his son. The story shows how hierarchy appears among the children from the same neighborhood, after one of them is given a wooden cart by his father. The commodity causes a disturbance among the children since they start to fight with each other to ride the cart, which immediately establishes a change in the power dynamics of a group of children coming from the same socio-economic class. The one who gets to ride the cart is the privileged owner while the one who pulls the cart is the under-privileged poor- very similar to the scene at the police station in *Umut* (Güney, 1970) when the owner the car is favored by the police in comparison to the poor, "horse" driver, Cabbar. In the short story, while the child who sits in the cart

becomes the superior, the one who pulls it, - the horse[73] - is the inferior. In other words, ownership and hence commodification crumbles not only the friendship among the children but also divides them, making them vulnerable toward capitalist institutions. Tired of being the horse, one of the boys asks his father to build a cart for him, promising that he would share it with his friends. The father agrees just to teach him a lesson. As expected, once the son receives the cart, he starts to bully other children. There is also an autobiographical side of the short story. It goes back to the days when Güney and his friends used to play horse. Güney:

> İsmail and I used to be the horses of rich kids in my neighborhood, when we were eight years old. İsmail would beat all of us, all the horses. One day when that rich kid beat me up because I lost, İsmail was hurt. He came up to me while I was crying by the wall. He told me: "Never again, be the horse of anyone." (as cited in Dündar, 1996)

Güney saw his days of conspicuous consumption and indulgence in the upper-class life style as crimes against himself and argued that he had to punish himself to working, reading and writing. This attitude of taking the blame was a new rhetoric for Güney since just a couple of years ago during his military service, Güney was condemning some female actresses as sluts and Yeşilçam as a corrupt system but he was not putting any blame on himself. Instead he was preaching that he would destroy the system once and for all. It was during his isolation, he started to realize that he, too, was a part of the system he wanted to change. He was also realizing that without changing himself, he could not talk about changing others. That is why, he saw isolation as a second chance, a boarding school when he wrote, "it is as if I am having this great pain of giving birth to myself. I am recreating myself." (Güney, 1998: 176-177)

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[73] Being horse is a game which involves two children. While one of them sit on the cart, the other takes on the role of the horse and pulls the car.

In the later years, Güney expressed his remorse toward his Yeşilçam days in a more clear way. Güney admitted that he "passed from a very low class into an upper class, and he behaved in a way that contradicted his own origins." (Rayns, 1983: 93) Moreover referring to his arrests, gambling issues, scandals and bar fights in the 1960s, Güney admits to have become "very disturbed." (Rayns, 1983: 93) However, he also sees it as an achievement that he was able to "get himself out of the tide he was caught up in." (Rayns, 1983: 93)

Güney did not only blame himself. After taking responsibility regarding his life choices, he continued to criticize and target Yeşilçam. His letters are full of resentment toward Yeşilçam calling it as "the dirt he was in those days." (Güney, 1998: 130) Güney regarded the destruction of Yeşilçam as his first priority:

> This is the first goal: We will dismantle Yeşilçam cinema. We will destroy it. The ones who want to survive will only survive by following us. Everyone who stands in our way will perish. We will not let any immoral men remain in Yeşilçam. (Güney, 1998: 253)

Hakkı Gümüştaş, a prisonmate, recalls Güney's attitude toward Yeşilçam and his life as an actor. Gümüştaş (2007: 20) suggests Güney was fed up with questions of Yeşilçam: "Why were you shooting the mirrors?" "Did you use to beat up women?" "Did you really carry two guns?" If you'd ask something like that, he would just walk away."

There is an obvious rhetoric of hate, despise and resentment toward Yeşilçam. Güney blamed the system for being corrupt, the actresses for being immoral and the producers for being money-greedy. It can be argued that one of the reasons why Güney's ideas about Yeşilçam became so intense is that it was Yeşilçam that created him in the beginning. Now that he was in isolation, he was

assessing his life in Yeşilçam and was becoming more and more furious at it for blinding him with its glamorous life, opportunities and materialistic life style. In this sense, Güney's desperate urge to perish Yeşilçam is also about dismantling what is left in his star image that was constructed by Yeşilçam.

It is possible to see Güney's regret and resentment toward Yeşilçam for in another short story[74] he wrote to his son from Selimiye Prison. In *Düşmanını Aklından Çıkartan Dostlarının Yolunu Bulamaz*, a father teaches his son his friends and foes. The father: "Don't let the beauty of these women (pictures of female actress on the wall), charming looks of the artists or the smiling faces of the presidents of countries and political parties. We are proletariats." It can be argued that just like how the male writers of the late-Ottoman era warned the young Ottoman men with regards to the danger of excessive westernization and the loss of cultural distinctiveness, Güney takes on the role of the father - literally in life and in the story - and preaches his son about the dangers of capitalism and its tendency to blind people with conspicuous consumption, stars, glamour and fabricated desires. In the story, the father puts the pictures of stars, army officers and politicians on one side of the wall clearly stating that they are the enemies. The emphasis on stars gives this story an autobiographical sense and makes it a sort of a confession letter of a father who has learnt from his mistakes and tries to prevent his son from making them. After all "what would a father who is going to leave his son his legacy say to him? I will tell my son all of these in *Oğluma Hikayeler.*" (Güney, 1998: 98)

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[74] *Oğluma Hikayeler* consists of thirteen short stories, which are also cautionary tales of corruption, excessive westernization and degeneration. Every story involves certain core principals, such as courage, ambition, determination, discipline, patience, perception and resistance. In these stories, fathers guide their sons, teach them to learn from their mistakes, help them realize the socio-economic dynamics of the society they live in, clarify who their friends and foes are and explain the futility of superstitious beliefs.

Güney's "schooling" however was not only for his own personal growth and self-searching. He wanted to "shimmer and enlighten all the people around" him (Güney, 1998: 130) starting with his prison mates and Fatoş Güney. He would encourage them to read and write. (Gümüştaş; 2007: Kıyafet: Güzel; 1997) Gümüştaş (2007, 102) writes that Güney "had turned to himself, confessing and admitting his wrong-doing and mistakes. Therefore he wanted everyone around him to be self-critical." In his first letter to Fatoş Güney from Selimiye Prison, Güney asked her to read: "Read Maxim Gorky's *Mother*. If you cannot find it in a bookstore, go to another one. You must find it and read it. Do not get bored. Then read *Sarı Dünya.* [Dimitır Ditov's *Tütün: Sarı Dünya*] (Güney, 1998: 46) He approached reading as a way of relating to the world and finding comfort in days of despair: "My love, do you read? Please read a lot. You will see. It will save you from despair. Maybe you are angry that I am acting like a teacher but do not be." (Güney, 1998: 62) Regarding Güney's role of the teacher, Fatoş Güney suggests that Yılmaz Güney had that effect on her. "He showed her a kind of a world that she had no idea it existed. He opened her eyes and she was hit like a hurricane by the despair, poverty and misery of people." (Güney, F., 2012) Regarding her first trip to Adana, Fatoş Güney:

> Vast cotton fields, people working in those fields, children working bare foot, with flies in their mouths and noses… I was shocked. I told Yılmaz I would work in those cotton fields. He smiled and said he had a better idea. He told me to work at my father's factory. (Güney, F., 2012)

Güney was also instructional in parenting skills. For example, he did not want his son to have long hair and play with dolls. He argued that his son "needs to be

raised like a brave man." (Güney, 1998: 68) Second, he criticized Fatoş Güney for being "over-protective." (Güney, 1998: 109). Güney:

> I want our son to grow up by falling, breaking his bones, head so that he would learn not to cry. So that he can be brave and fearless. Earth and dust would make him strong like an iron. Believe me, life is nobody's parent, my love. Life knocks you down. That is why our son should be prepared. (Güney, 1998: 109)

Similarly in another letter, he advises Fatoş Güney to teach his son to be "unselfish" and "fearless." (Güney, 1998: 122) Based on these two letters, it can argued that Güney wanted his son to be his mirror image of the way he perceived himself to be - brave, fearless, unselfish, like iron, raised by earth and dust. It is not a coincidence that he gave him his own name.

Güney showed his appreciation to the change Süleymangil was going through in his letters by calling her with the very adjectives that were used to define him such as "my lion-hearted courageous wife" (Güney, 1998: 120) and "my brave wife." (Güney, 1998: 57) Güney: "She is brave, patient, honorable, dignified. She is my partner in my pain and struggle." (Güney, 1998: 14) Nevertheless, he also criticized Fatoş Güney in terms of her physical appearance. He advised her to refrain from wearing make-up for she was "Yılmaz Güney's wife, Fatoş and simplicity suits her." (Güney, 1998: 223) Güney added: "You have to be simple, ordinary. Make-up takes that quality out of you. You don't even need it." (Güney, 1998: 223) Make-up is not a new prohibition Güney forced upon his wives. While he was married to Çehre, he would also criticize her because of the way she dressed and wore make-up. Time to time Çehre chose not to use make-up and appear at night clubs with the kind of "simplicity" Güney wanted but other times, she chose to dress-up and put on make-up regardless of what Güney thought about her. It is argued here that the main reason

why Güney forced Çehre to look ordinary and simple was stemmed from the fact that Çehre was a celebrity, a persona well known to the public and Güney was jealous. In terms of Fatoş Güney's attitude, make-up and acts, even though Güney was still acting out of moralistic reasons for not wanting his wife to be perceived as a sexual object, the politicization of his image and the political context of the Turkish Left in the 1970s toward femininity also justified Güney's moralistic approach to femininity. In other words, with the changing socio-political discourses and the politicization of Güney's star image, the connotations of "ordinary" and "simple" took on class connotations. Just like how make-up has always been considered as a bourgeois habit, a sign of excessive-westernization, sexual emancipation and degeneration, "simplicity" and "ordinariness" have always been associated with Anatolianness. Güney was moralist to the point of that, being feudal in relation to the honor of woman." (Şehmuz, 1996: 101) What changed was the additional Leftist approach, which equipped men with the power to regulate appropriate femininity.

Even though these experiences turned Fatoş Güney from a fragile upper-class girl to a committed wife of a communist in prison, Güney was feeling guilty. He frequently admitted in the letters "he has ruined her youth." (Güney, 1998: 157) Because of him- "his foolish husband" (Güney, 1998: 57), - Fatoş Güney had to "resist the prison walls." (Güney, 1998: 14) Fatoş Güney's devotion to Güney and his struggle could also be traced from the interviews with Güney's prison friends. A prison friend from Kayseri, Ünal Erdoğan:

> I would like to pay my respect to that precious Sister. Not only Yılmaz Güney but also all of us in Kayseri owe her so much. I have never met such a loyal friend like her. She would come to the prison door everyday in the morning and bring all of us milk, honey and butter. When I came out, I went to visit her. She acted as if she had done nothing. (Kıyafet, 1989: 69)

Hilmi Güven, prison mate from İzmit:

> Brother Yılmaz is very lucky. Sometimes I'd say to him, "brother you have a wife who is even smarter than you". One day I was hospitalized. They operated on me. When I opened my eyes, sister Fatoş was there. She took care of me until I got better. (Kıyafet, 1989: 77)

When Yılmaz Güney was transferred to Kayseri Prison, Fatoş Güney moved to Kayseri with a couple of friends. Film producer and distributor Üveys Mola recalls: "Sister Fatoş was a very honorable woman. We helped her to get a place in Kayseri. Everyone in Kayseri embraced her honor like his own. They protected her." (Kıyafet, 1989: 61) The embrace and protection offered to Fatoş Güney by the people in Kayseri is more about protecting Yılmaz Güney's honor based on the traditional moralistic values that continued to regulate the society as well as constructed Güney's star image as the epitome of traditional Anatolian masculinity.

Even though Güney called his wife lion-hearted, brave and gallant, in terms of women's contribution to the revolution and women's emancipation, he only acknowledged the presence of women within the working-class and among the comrades.[75]

> To me, the problem in *Yol* (Gören, 1982) is not purely a question of femininity but also a problem of masculinity, a male problem because it is not only women who are oppressed. The real oppressed is the man. When a man oppresses a woman, it is an expression of his subjugation. The emancipation of women is through emancipation of the oppressed class. The oppressed class is the working class and the determining power here is the man. In this

[75] Güney: Our class does not only include men. It includes women, too. We are fighters of working-class. That is why both the men and the women of the bourgeois class is our enemy. Salvation does not come with the fight of women alone (as cited in Güzel, 1996: 100).

> class, which is determined by the male, first the men and then women will be saved (as cited in Şehmuz, 1996: 102-103).

Based on the quotation above, it can be argued that Güney defines the working class as male. Because it is the oppressed class, men become victims of oppression, which gives men the means to oppress women. Therefore is the system is destroyed, men would be emancipated. With the oppression removed from men, men would emancipate women. In other words, looking from a Marxist perspective toward gender, Güney approached oppression as a class issue, rather than a gender issue. Hence even though Güney problematizes masculinity and acknowledges female subjugation, for him the answer lies in class-emancipation.

Güney was released from Selimiye Military Prison in 1974. After his release, he talked to *7. Sanat* and suggested that he "had grown conscious of class differences during his imprisonment." (as cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 5) The first outcome of this two-year isolation was *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974). In an interview Güney stressed the importance of the film as a sign of his transformation and soul-searching: "*Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974: 89) is a product of my imprisonment days and involves reflections of the perspectives we[76] have built up there."

6.2.1 The First Product of Prison Days: *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974)

[76] It is important to note the change of rhetoric in Güney after he was released from prison. While in his past interviews, he rarely used the subject pronoun "we" but rather preferred "I", after prison he tended to use "we" even if he was talking about himself.

Arkadaş (Güney, 1974) tells the story of two friends, Azem (Güney) and Cemil (Afşar) who get together during a summer vacation years later. Azem is a left wing activist who works in the Highway Construction Unit for the government. Cemil is a wealthy businessman married to an upper class woman, Necibe. Both his wife and Cemil are unfaithful to each other. While Cemil enjoys prostitutes and makes passes at other women including his sister-in-law, Necibe enjoys Cemil's friends when Cemil goes back to Istanbul to attend business. Both of them are portrayed to be heavy drinkers who have lobster meals and spend their days gambling in the casino of the vacation spot which is not unusual considering all of the rich folk in the vacation spot swap partners, gamble and consume too much whisky.

The upper class has long been associated with excessive-westernization and loss of cultural values through materialism lack of morality and honor in Yeşilçam and Güney's films. What is different in *Arkadaş* is the construction of Cemil's character as a peasant who has achieved upward mobility and changed class. According to Güney, Cemil "is not a bourgeois in the traditional sense because he does not carry the qualities of a traditional bourgeois." (As cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) Rather,

> He is a man with peasant origins but changed class. His relationships ruptured his bonds with his essence. He has adapted to his environment and went bourgeois…He reaches wealth in a short time and imitates the bourgeois around him…He is more of a corrupt man who has changed his socio-economic class. (as cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4)

It is possible to see this imitation in the film. For instance, Cemil does not mind other men hitting on his wife. He laughs and considers his lack of jealousy as

being open-minded and being civilized because his upper class wife advises him so. In other words, unlike Azem who is once again a very moralistic and traditional male character - perhaps the only unchanging on-screen characteristic of any masculinity formation - Cemil no longer upholds family honor and regulates his wife's sexuality. According to him, this type of male behavior is an example of being civilized. This issue is highlighted once more with Cemil's lack of reaction toward his wife's question to Azem. Necibe asks Azem how he "deals with his sexual problems" suggesting how he can cope with absence of female companionship whilst on rural duty. Cemil apologizes from Azem saying that his wife is liberated and open-minded. Offended, Azem apologizes for not being that open-minded. Cemil's imitation is also portrayed in two consecutive lunch scenes. While Cemil becomes over-excited about *çiğköfte* when he goes to a picnic in the woods with Azem and his mutual friends, the next day he orders the most expensive fish on the menu among his upper class family and friends.

While Cemil lives his life as an unfaithful upper class businessman, Azem watches Cemil's and his friends' blind ignorance and selfishness with constant disappointment which is demonstrated to the audience with plenty of close-ups to Azem's facial expressions such as his watery eyes, his reluctance to interfere when Cemil's friends complain about the workers who ask for a raise and argue that peasants are neither poor nor ignored because they all have radios, TVs, refrigerators, roads, schools and dispensaries. The reason why Azem does not challenge Cemil's friends' ideas while he spends hours talking to the lower / working class men and women in the vacation spot suggests Azem's belief that upper class is beyond salvation. Except for Cemil. Azem considers Cemil as a man who has lost his way because "in his essence he is a son of a peasant." That is why after observing

Cemil's behavior for some time, Azem finally decides to share his opinion about Cemil regarding his life choices, his unfaithfulness to his wife, gambling and material greed. He reminds Cemil how he "used to get angry when someone looked at the woman by him from 500 meters distance." He asks him to judge how much he has changed since now he does not even care when other men kiss his wife right in front of his eyes. Cemil tells him that he does not care about this stuff anymore because he has outgrown them. At that moment, for the first time in the film, Azem questions Cemil's morals and tells him that "men kissing his wife and him laughing at it," is not civilized but rather is being "degenerated and rotten." While Azem looks for a way to rehabilitate Cemil, Semra, the class-conscious socialist of the film, reminds Azem that his efforts are futile because "Cemil is happy with his life as it is. He is no longer a peasant at heart." Azem ignores Semra's advice. The opportunity reveals itself when Cemil's wife makes a pass on Azem. Azem slaps her. Cemil is enraged and beats up Azem. Azem does not fight back because he is happy to the fact that Cemil has finally given a moralistic reaction. He considers Cemil's act as a wake up call from a long comfortable slumber. The next scene is inside a car. Azem drives smiling while Cemil sits on the passenger seat. Azem takes him to a rural village where they used to work together building a system that would help water the fields.

The village reminds Cemil of the misery, poverty and despair of the peasants. Güney chooses to demonstrate the situation through children as he did in many of his films with the shots of poorly dressed, unhealthy, unhappy children left to live in despair in the deserted plains of Anatolia. He portrays two tourists as they take photos of those children. Cemil gets angry and suggests they should not let them take those pictures. Azem disagrees and tells him that they need to make sure that they

would not find such sights anymore. On the way to the vacation spot, shaken by the experience of village, Cemil gets off the car and starts yelling out his name. His voice echoes right back at him. Azem quietly watches his friend going through an existential crisis in search for himself. Cemil has regained his class-consciousness and gotten in touch with his roots. Optimistic, Azem drives Cemil to the vacation spot. However, as soon as Cemil comes back to his wife and his comfortable life of luxury, he chooses to stay, Azem leaves their house in disappointment.

It can be argued that there is an almost obvious similarity between Güney's off-screen star image in the 1960s and the character of Cemil based especially on Güney's interpretation of Cemil's upper-class ways. He calls Cemil as "a man with peasant origins who changed class, ruptured his bonds with his essence because of his relationships, adopted, went bourgeois and reached wealth in a short time" (as cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) Considering the change in Güney's off-screen star image from the epitome of moralistic values of Anatolia to the King of Scandals who enjoyed an extravagant life style involving drinking, promiscuity, illegitimate child, a former sex symbol as a wife, expensive cars, lavish houses and gambling in the 1960s, it is safe to say that Azem's unyielding attempts to fix Cemil has some autobiographical elements especially because *Arkadaş* was made after Güney's two-year isolation in prison where he claimed to have judged himself for his mistakes, gotten in touch with his roots and regained class-consciousness. That is why in the interview, Güney considers Cemil as man "who has changed his socio-economic class rather than a man who is corrupt." (as cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) It is also possible to see the continuation of Güney's moralist attitude toward life and relationships with each character and their relationship with Azem. For instance, Azem only tries to fix Cemil's morals, not his consumption patterns, his greed or

extravagant life style. He is only angry at Cemil for cheating on his wife and refusing to control and regulate his wife's sexuality; oppressing her to act according to traditional discourses on honor and morality. Azem grows fond of Cemil's stepdaughter, Melike, again for moralistic reasons. Even though she is "beautiful but unaware," Azem is impressed with her, since Melike is innocent, pure and virginal. That is why Azem honors Melike by calling her "a friend" and allowing her to do the same. Based purely on being impressed by Melike's moral values, Azem tries to save her by bringing her books to read and talking to her about for long hours. As Sütüven (as cited in Arslan, S. 2011: 182) suggests, "if one does not consider some pornographic scenes in *Arkadaş*, the film's moral conception might easily belong to an example of Milli Cinema." This is the setback of the film in terms of its ideological message. Rather than discussing socialism and class issues, *Arkadaş* deals with the immorality of one character and suggests that as long as men remain moralistic and patriarchal toward family honor and female sexuality, they are valuable to the revolution of the working-class.

Arkadaş is revolutionary, however, due to the representation of the female protagonist of the film. Semra is dedicated communist who reads books, which are found dangerous by Cemil. Semra confronts Cemil more openly and boldly than Azem right at the beginning of the him by saying that the books she reads are only dangerous to Cemil since he is no longer Brother Cemil but Cemil, the Sir suggesting his socio-economic upward mobility. Semra also warns Azem that Cemil is beyond saving and at the end of the film she is proven right. Ergün (1979: 20) argues that Azem's failure to save Cemil is due to the fact that "Azem acts with his fairly optimistic emotions rather class-consciousness which comes from the fact that Azem represents the transformation of petty bourgeois" (Ergun, 1979: 19) whereas Semra

represents a more hard-core revolutionary thought." (Ergün, 1979: 19) Güney argues likewise. He admits that Azem has some revolutionary ideas but adds that he "is not fully class-conscious so he relies on instincts." (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) That is why referring to the character of Semra who is "triggering, critical and dynamic" (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) Güney (1974) suggests there are "more progressive elements in the film than Azem." (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4)

It is very rare that a female character is represented to be more insightful than the male protagonist, played by Güney. In this sense Semra's character is fairly revolutionary. Usually if there is strong female character like the female doctor in *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971), the narrative relies on a love story and shifts the power dynamics from the woman who saved Güney's character's life and gives it to the male protagonist who abandons her and goes on his way. Here, this is not the case. Just like how early-republican novels set the image of an ideal nationalistic comrade woman, *Arkadaş* presents the example of Semra as the ideal comrade, *Bacı*, (sister) who is educated, class-conscious and perceptive to delicate matters. Just like how the former was constructed to have a nationalistic responsibility to educate and modernize the society, the latter is responsible for spreading communist ideals and enlightening the working-class.

The other male character worthy of analysis is the character of Halil. Halil is a young man from a poor neighborhood who works at the vacation spot with his family as servants. One night when Azem catches Halil slashing the tires of an expensive car, he approaches him. During their conversations, Halil admits to being resentful. His resentment is portrayed in the film with scenes, which show Halil watching young men and women drinking, dancing and flirting at the disco secretly.

Azem then asks Halil why he has long hair. Halil does not answer but considering almost all young rich man have long hair in the vacation spot suggests that Halil wants to be like them and cannot deal with the fact that he can never be; hence the petty crimes of slashing tires and breaking windows. Azem's advice to Halil is reading. Similar to the Kemalist modernization project's approach to education as the key to civilization, the character of Turkish Left embodied here with the characters of Semra and Azem, do believe that reading books and learning about the manifestations of communist intellectuals are actually a way to change the minds of the masses. It is as if Semra takes on the role of the teacher similar to Zeynep in *Hudutların Kanunu* (Akad, 1966) while Azem takes on the role of the officer in the same film. Just like how in *Hudutların Kanunu* (Akad, 1966), the officer and the teacher feel the responsibility toward their nation to educate and modernize the under-privileged, Azem and Semra take on the role of the teacher to lecture the lower / working-class around themselves about better times. Moreover, with Halil's character *Arkadaş* channels the cultural re-masculinization and militarization of society in the 1920s and 1930s. At the end of the film, Halil comes to Azem running, with a smile on his face for the first time in the film, to show Azem his short hair.

The final sequence of the film is important for the closure it gives to all of the characters. Cemil chooses to stay with Necibe. Azem decides to leave the vacation spot because he has lost all hope in Cemil. Melike is left all alone because of Azem's departure and Halil is militarized with a haircut; all proving Semra right about her idea that while it is not possible to change the upper class, people like Halil can be educated. The final sequence also solves the conflict between Azem and Cemil. As soon as Azem leaves the house, we hear a gunshot and Cemil's voice crying out his name. Based on Cemil's dramatic existentialist crisis at the village and the fact that

even if he wanted to leave his life behind he failed to do so, it can be argued that Cemil committed suicide. Nonetheless, one important gesture points to another interpretation of the gunshot. Right after Azem hears the gunshot, he starts to smile. He is ecstatic which suggests it is not possible that Cemil shot himself. A better explanation would be that Cemil is dead to Azem metaphorically together with his hope that upper class men - even if they come from a lower / working class - can be rehabilitated. The gunshot in this sense marks the end of Azem and Cemil's friendship for good.[77] Azem is no longer "a friend" to Cemil but " a friend" to Halil. That is why; Güney suggests that Halil's character is about hope. Güney:

> The start of change in Halil's character is his haircut because when imperialism takes hostage people's minds, it attacks with heavy weapons. It breaks the bonds between people and traditions. It even changes aesthetics. It destroys the values and norms. Being immoral becomes moral. Being dishonorable becomes honorable. While capitalism forms its own rules, imperialist culture is its biggest support. (as cited in Kutlar, 1974: 91)

Arkadaş was also discussed in terms of its narrative structure among the critics. According to an article in *Milliyet Sanat*, (1974: 22) the film "breaks down of classical melodramatic narrative structure of our cinema" due to a particular distance between the film and the audience. It is suggested that "just like how Azem cannot identify with the wealthy life and forced to remain as an observer, the audience who watches Azem watches the film like an observer without dramatic excitement." (1974: 22) The distance created with this new cinematic technique makes it difficult for the audience to identify with Azem. Consequently, the film opens up a space

[77] On the ending of the film, Güney suggests that he had intentionally left the film open-ending regarding Cemil's situation. (as cited in Coş and Ayça, 1974: 6)

where the audiences would be forced to think about the film. Based on his multiple viewing experiences Kutlar (1975: 16) suggests "he has observed the audience and saw that they were in a constant reaction with each other, discussing the film among them." Yılmaz Güney agrees and confirms that rather than identifying with the male protagonist, the film puts a distance between the protagonist and the audience.

> In other films, Yılmaz Güney progresses the narrative. However in this film I am just an observer. I interfere after some time. There is no acting in this film. Moreover, there should be cases, which people should say: I think this man did not act well in this. (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 7)

The lack of identification with the male protagonist is also an attempt in dismantling the Ugly King myth, which according to *Milliyet Sanat*, *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974) manages. (22) Nonetheless, the reviews are ambivalent on this issue. Even Güney argues that the "Yılmaz Güney myth was a product of a long time of consistent acting style and hence it is not possible to dismantle it with one film." (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 6) However Güney also points out some important aspects in the film where the myth is put in question such as the fact that Güney "who is never beaten and defeated is beaten up by Cemil." (Coş an Ayça, 1974: 6) Another example is the final scene where Cemil's wife slaps Azem and Azem does not react at all. He also does not confront the upper-class businessmen who complain about the workers and argue that the village is a happy place. He does not fight with or kill anyone. He does not use a gun to settle his dispute with Cemil. However more importantly, *Arkadaş* does not provide a successful male protagonist. Just like how Cabbar is defeated at the end of *Umut* (Güney, 1970), Azem is also defeated since all of his attempts fail to rehabilitate his best friend. Regardless, it should also be noted that Azem's character is still glorified through his all-knowing attitude in every

scene. In other words, as Altuğ (1975: 16) suggests "he [referring to Azem] observes but actually he is in control of every issue." The camera cuts to Azem's face after almost every argument made by upper class men. In close up we watch Azem's reaction to everything and understand his control as well as his opinions from his mimics and gestures. It should be noted that even though Azem is indeed in control and very perceptive which makes him aware and powerful in the film, he is still different than the omnipotent *kabadayı* in his action-adventure films.

In terms of Güney's attempts to dismantle his Ugly King image, it can be argued that it is usual in action-adventure films to see the character overshadowing the actor, even if that actor is a star. This happens when an actor repeats a particular role, a social type so frequently that the role becomes associated with his star image. Yeşilçam is full examples since the system used work on stereotyping and typecasting according to genre. Güney was the star of action-adventure films. He was the Ugly King- a mythical character, merging the extra-ordinary with the ordinary. What was lacking in this powerful image was the "person" behind the character. This decision to dismantle the Ugly King myth can also be read as an attempt to humanize Güney, seeing him cry on-screen (*Baba*, Güney, 1971); beg for his daughter's life (*Canlı Hedef*, Güney, 1970), beaten up by men (*Umut*, Güney, 1970) or slapped by a woman (*Arkadaş*, Güney, 1974) and hence draw attention to Yılmaz Güney, not the star, the "real" person behind the character.

Arkadaş was well-received by film critics and became the "highest grossing film in Turkish cinema up to 1974 with revenue of over 1. 200. 000 TL - almost four times its nearest competition." (p. 31) Unfortunately, *Arkadaş* is also Güney's last film as an actor and the last film he directed outside prison walls in Turkey. During

the making of *Endişe* (Ökten, 1975), Güney was arrested for the murder of Sefa Mutlu, a local judge, in Yumurtalık. On 1975, Güney was sentenced to nineteen years in prison for manslaughter. Still the debates on whether the nineteen-year sentence was a political move due to the lack of eyewitnesses and matching ballistics reports.[78] Güney did not stop working in prison. He discussed his political ideas in *Güney*.[79] He wrote the screenplays of many films, chose the directors and the cast and edited the films from prison. Back to back Güney produced films, which discussed oblique traditions and the brutality of bloodshed (*Sürü*, Ökten, 1978) oppression of cotton-pickers in the South (*Endişe*, Gören, 1975) and portrayed Turkey as a claustrophobic space even for prisoners on permitted leave with regards to the oppressive military regime and feudal relations of the rural (*Yol*, Güney, 1981). Even under strict censorship which no banned his films but with the military intervention gave military officers to question and arrest anyone associated with the films, Güney's films were sent to international film festivals. Güney received the most prestigious award in Turkish film history, yet, with *Yol* (Güney, 1981) at Cannes Film Festival sharing the Palm O'Dor with Costa Gavras' *Missing*. Even in the midst of open trials, burning of his films, bombing of the film theaters which showed his films and battling health problems,[80] Güney emphasized he would not escape. He would clear his name. Turhan Temuçin, Güney's doctor in Ankara and İzmit Prisons, recalls:

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[78] See Gümüştaş, H. (2007). Yılmaz Güney'li Günler. İstanbul: Arya Yayıncılık. pp. 161-168.
[79] Those articles Güney wrote in the 1970s are collected and published in the book, Siyasi Yazılar.
[80] Güney started suffering from stomachache and was taken to hospital many times during his imprisonment. It was only after he escaped to France, he was diagnosed with stage-four stomach cancer. According to Fatoş Güney, "even though it was possible to diagnose stomach cancer at Cerrahpaşa Medical Hospital at the end of 1970s, Güney's health problems were ignored which according to Fatoş Güney was a political decision." (Güney, F. 2012)

> I wanted Yılmaz to come back to Ankara so I could take care of him but he wanted to be transferred to İmralı because of the open air and the sea. So I talked to a high level officer at the Justice Department. He rejected Yılmaz's transfer on the grounds of possibility of escape. So I told him about the event in İzmit prison. I told him that Yılmaz saw me off until the highway, out of the prison. The guards loved him that much.[81] If he wanted to escape, he could easily have. (Kıyafet, 1989: 49-50)

However after the military intervention in 1980, the pressure on Güney got worse. The army officials opened more trials and the total sentence from all the open trials came up to almost a hundred years. Military regime also made it almost impossible for Güney to publish a story, write a screenplay, or make films. On October 9th, 1981, Güney left Isparta Prison to visit his mother in Muş. Instead, together with his family, Fatoş Güney, his children Yılmaz and Elif Güney, he left the country, fled to Switzerland and later immigrated to France where he made his last film, *Duvar* (Güney, 1983). Yılmaz Güney died of stomach cancer on September 9th, 1984. He was 47 years old. His funeral was held on September 13th at the Pére Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.

[81] There are plenty incidents told by Güney's prison friends regarding the love and the respect of prison guards, gendarme and poliçe coming from all over Anatolia. Kazım (as cited in Güzel, 1994: 102) tells how "250 guards rushed to search Güney's cell. They all came near him, shook his hand, huged and kissed him. One of them even gave brother Yılmaz 100 lira thinking that Yılmaz may need it more than he does."

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation approached Yılmaz Güney as a star who created a particular Anatolian male myth through his filmic and extra-filmic masculinity constructions. It explored these constructions in Güney's star image in the 1960s and 1970s in relation to the socio-economic and political modernization projects of the Republican People's Party (RPP) in the early-republican era and of the Democrat Party (DP) and its successor Justice Party (JP) in late-republican era.

The dissertation has explained the series of socio-political reforms of RPP and argued that they were mostly geared toward de-traditionalization of Ottoman culture and de-institutionalization of religion. It has been argued that this top-down socio-political modernization project idealized its subjects, regardless of gender differences, as nationalistic, secular and positivist. DP, on the other hand, facilitated a socio-economic modernization project, which became the catalyst of industrialization, rural-to-internal migration, urbanization, the emergence of

capitalist infrastructures and hybrid cultures. It is suggested here that the shift from the definition of hegemonic masculinity as the nationalistic soldier / citizen to the capitalist industrialist or technocrat was about modernizing hegemonic masculinity because the new hegemonic form constructed its own marginalized forms especially from the lower / working class migrants. One major observation that emerged from the research is that, despite their differences in their economic and cultural programs, both modernization projects were not against westernization. Rather westernization was a matter of drawing and managing boundaries of how much the society was supposed to modernize.

The research on literature, film and theatre starting from the late-Ottoman era to the end of 1970s has shown that this boundary has been based on invented moral values. Just like how Ottoman male elite of writers (i.e. Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ahmet Mithad, Samipaşazade Sezai, Muallim Naci and Recaizade Ekrem) guided young men through the ruble of the Ottoman Empire and warned them about the threat of losing one's cultural distinctiveness, writers like Yakup K. Karaosmanoğlu, Halide Edip Adıvar, Reşat Nuri Güntekin, Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil emphasized the western ideals of the early-republican modernization but warned its subjects to remain moral and virtuous. Both periods presented the promiscuous and seductive women, over-feminized dandies and wastrels as lost causes; vanished in the modernizing streets of İstanbul by becoming excessively westernized.

The most popular entertainment in the 1960s and 1970s was Yeşilçam films. The research on Yeşilçam has shown similar boundaries regarding westernization. Yet, the dissertation has argued that this boundary came to include the dichotomy of the rich Istanbulite / the poor Anatolian in the late-republican era due to rural-to-

urban migration, emergence of new socio-economic classes and gender identities. Regardless of gender differences, while Yeşilçam melodramas associated wealth with the characters of the sexually emancipated Istanbulite snobs, dandies, and wastrels, they praised lower / working Anatolian migrant characters due to their piety, virtue, modesty and strong bonds with their traditional Anatolian roots. Despite villainizing and denouncing the excessively westernized characters, Yeşilçam melodramas also fetishized upper class life with expensive cars, lavish houses, and beautiful dresses.

This love and hate relationship with the West and modernity can be traced in the cultural and artistic production since the late-Ottoman era and it marks the ambivalence of Yeşilçam. More importantly, it provides the foundation for the investigation of Güney's star image since among all Yeşilçam stars, Güney's constant oscillation between both sides of the Istanbulite / Anatolian dichotomy through his physical appearance, lavish lifestyle, filmic and extra-filmic masculinities, heritage and socio-economic class, makes him the star who embodied this ambivalence toward modernization more than any other.

In the mid-1960s, when Güney first started his film career, his star image was constructed as an "authentic" Anatolian man. The result of the research on Güney's filmic masculinities suggests that the process of authenticating authenticity in Güney's on-screen image depended on the repetition of particular roles as the poor and oppressed Anatolian shepherd, cattle smuggler, artisan, peasant who finally broke down, became an *eşkıya* or a *kabadayı* and rebelled against injustice. These roles established an organic bond with Güney's audience who supposedly shared similar oppressions in their everyday lives. In these masculine genre of films these

characters were portrayed as moral saviors and heroes of lower / working class men who were subjugated under the tyranny of feudal powers and capitalist structures. However Güney's phenomenal success does not stem from "his connection with masculine genres, but because of his presence in these genres as a bandit figure, rebelling against the system and using means both good and bad to achieve his end." (Arslan (2011: 186)

It has been argued in the dissertation that Güney neither invented the figure of *eşkıya* or *kabadayı* nor was the first or the last actor to portray either of them. Nonetheless, more than any actor in Turkish cinema, Güney's characters' are considered as "collectivist bandits, the hero of the poor who could not rebel" (Maktav, 2001: 177) because Güney's portrayal of *eşkıya* and *kabadayı* were just rebels who acted along certain moral codes of honor and offered gratifications to male anxieties of urbanization, bourgeoisie and feudal oppression by procuring justice for the oppressed. However, the dissertation found out that Güney's male characters did not specifically target the oppressive feudal system in the villages or brutality of capitalism in the cities but rather communicated male anxieties regarding female body and sexuality. This is because, the motivations behind rebellion of the male protagonist stemmed from the victimization of a female character - mostly wife, mother or sister of the male protagonist – through rape, murder or torture. Once the female character was used as the catalyst of action, these films became revenge stories, which communicated anxieties of de-masculinization and provided gratifications of re-masculinization i.e. "the cleansing of honor with bullets."

In other words, even though the elements of economic struggle, lack of government authority, inefficiency of land reforms, and brutality of feudalism were

brought together to present an ideological message and encourage taking collective action, films settled with villainizing *ağa* or the bourgeois based on male honor - not criticize the reasons which gave him the license / power to kill or rape.

In rare cases, where the films did present collective action, the motivation yet again arose either due to rape and murder of women (*Kozanoğlu* (Yılmaz, 1967) or abduction of a woman (*Kızılırmak Karakoyun* (Akad, 1967). After the marginalization of their already marginalized masculinities due to their weakness and inability to defend women - the representative of their masculinity - men in both films decided to strike back to re-masculinize themselves - not change the oppressive living conditions and the feudal regime of the landholders.

It should be highlighted here that regardless of being action-adventure or rural, films were undergoing a strict censorship during the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore it was not easy to demonstrate the socio-cultural, educational, political and economic struggles. That is why; the death of the male protagonist became particularly significant in Güney's films because the lack of a just new equilibrium at the end of these films pointed the dead-end of individualism. With these bleak endings, Güney's films managed to communicate the idea that individual action was bound to fail in restoring a just system for the lower / working class.

In terms of the ineffectiveness of State power and the oppressive capitalist system, Güney's films also used particular formal elements in both rural and action-adventure films. In rural films, vast, yellowish, deserted infertile lands, thick, up-to-waist high snow, high mountains all provided a sense of claustrophobia and agoraphobia at the same time. The nonexistence of hospital, courts or any other governmental institution further reinforced the absence of State power. The only

State authorities were the army officers and female teachers who failed to carry out the social engineering program of the early-republic by carrying the torch of Enlightenment to the rural villages since they, too, were powerless against feudal powers. Similar repetitive pattern is discernible in Güney's action-adventure films with their portrayals of the periphery as a place of segregation with no electric, proper housing, water system, schools and hospitals. It has been argued in the dissertation that, these repetitive patterns suggested the failure of the agrarian and educational program of the early-republican modernization as well as the capitalist socio-economic program of the late-republican modernization. Taken all together, these findings empower Güney's filmic masculinities as the man who very confidently and aggressively rides his horse full throttle, survives in the mountains, remains moral in the cosmopolitan city, brings down old values, replaces them with his own and applies his justice system with his gun and hence becomes a substitute for authority of any kind.

The dissertation also investigated the extra-filmic materials on Güney since; off-screen image is an integral part of any star image. Similar to Güney's on-screen image, the process of authenticating authenticity was at play in Güney's off-screen image. It has been exemplified in the dissertation that first, the discursively constructed connotations of Anatolia were utilized and integrated into Güney's off-screen masculinities. Later, these "Anatolian values" were constantly repeated until they were associated particularly with Güney's star image. After all, as it was constructed in many magazine articles, Güney was "raised in the heart of Anatolia," "an Anatolian boy" or "someone more like us." Terms such as "courage," "morality," "integrity," "raised among people," "honesty," "humility," were employed to construct Güney as an "authentic" Anatolian man. Güney's physical

appearance - “ugly,” “ordinary,” “sunburnt skin,” “calloused hands,” “big nose,” “thin posture,” and “dark eyes” - was compared to other Yeşilçam stars like Ayhan Işık, Göksel Arsoy, Cüneyt Arkın[82] and later employed to strengthen the “authentic” quality in Güney’s star image. It has been observed from the extra-filmic materials that the final step was to associate Güney’s physical difference to his socio-economic background and heritage. Güney contributed to this construction by affirming his difference and naming himself as the “Ugly King” of Yeşilçam cinema whose audience were referred to as “the ugly ones,” “men on the streets,” and “oppressed and the derelict.” It was suggested in the media that they finally had a star who looked, walked, talked and acted like them. This leads to another findings of the dissertation. The extra-filmic materials suggests that since Güney’s rise to stardom, the lower / working class male audience no longer enjoyed identifying with the glamorous lives of “handsome,” “upper class,” “fair,” “Istanbulite,” “unreachable,” “fine-looking,” “solidly-built” and “neat” stars. However, it is argued here that Güney’s action-adventure films were in fact very spectacular like the films of handsome stars; filled with muscle cars, lavish lives and beautiful women within the grasp of the male protagonist. Therefore, Güney’s films were able to deliver the ultimate escapism through the victory and glamour of the “ugly,” yet, powerful Anatolian man.

[82] It should be noted that the group of Yeşilçam stars that were exemplified in comparison to Güney’s star image is not taken as a homogenous group. The dissertation fully acknowledges that their star images differed at different periods in Yeşilçam (i.e. Ayhan Işık’s star image is different in the 1950s when compared to 1960s or Cüneyt Arkın’s star image is different in the 1960s when compared to 1970s) What is at stake here is that the comparison between Güney and other starsa re made in relation to the difference in their physical appearance. While these stars fit the hegemonic understanding of male beauty in Yeşilçam in the 1960s, Güney’s physical appearance – with his dark skin, thin posture and dark eyes – was not complicit to the hegemonic discourses.

Throughout his film career, Güney was constructed as a moralist patriarchal Anatolian man who "transformed Çehre's sex symbol star image into a housewife," "covered Gönül Yazar's legs at a club," "made Fatoş Güney wear a *şalvar* during their visit to Adana," "criticized his wives' upper class attitudes," "blacklisted female sex symbols," "made a list of appropriate female actors that *his* audience would appreciate to see in his films," "directed films about *his* audience" and "saw himself as a product of Anatolia not cosmopolitan minority of Beyoğlu audience." Despite this persistent media emphasis on Güney's ordinary Anatolian image, Güney *was* a star. He was beyond ordinary. He was a "King" even if an "Ugly" one. This ambivalence is a fundamental characteristic of any star image and it combines "the spectacular with the everyday, the special with the ordinary." (Dyer: 1986: 35)

The clash of the ordinary and the extraordinary present themselves in Güney's off-screen masculinities. The research on the extra-filmic material has shown that, Güney's lavish lifestyle in the 1960s together with his relationship and marriage with Nebahat Çehre opened up platforms where Güney's ordinariness and Anatolianness were scrutinized. The media was very critical of Güney's consumption patterns, blaming him for "owning fast cars," "having short-lived romances," "giving expensive gifts," "consuming whisky," and "living an extravagant and adulterous lifestyle reminiscent of the upper class characters." At the same time, media *also* attacked Güney's Anatolianness by criticizing his "Anatolian ways," "his violation of dress code," "his tour in Beyoğlu in slippers," "un-evolved ways," "his virile Anatolian masculinity," "bar fights," "stabbings" and "car accidents." These findings suggest that while the former was a criticism of the extra-ordinary in Güney's star image, the latter was a criticism of the ordinary. Both, on the other hand, were about managing the boundaries of westernization since Güney

was constantly transgressing his constructed Anatolianness and urbanized Istanbuliteness. Güney answered to all criticism by affirming his Anatolianness through his resistance to change his "Anatolian" clothes and "Anatolian" morality just to please the upper class minority. Perhaps one of the best examples of this duality is how Güney - who enjoyed nightclubs, drinking and female companionship - covered Gönül Yazar's legs with his handkerchief at As Club. With this act, Güney emphasized that even if he was westernized materially, morally he was still Anatolian. All of these made it difficult for the media to control Güney's star image especially because his organic bond with the audience could not be broken no matter what. This uncontrollable image formed a grey area making Güney's star image and masculinities fluid, unpredictable and hence threatening.

The findings of this dissertation suggest that the most significant criticism toward Güney's mythical Anatolian male image came after Güney chose to marry Nebahat Çehre over his pregnant ex-girl friend, Birsen Can Ünal. Ünal was constructed as the ordinary in Güney's star image - the Anatolian woman whom Güney lived through poverty, suffering and despair. Nebahat Çehre was fabricated as the extraordinary - the Istanbulite upper class actress. Even though in time, Çehre's "phony," "misunderstood," "misguided," "dressy," and "sexy" star image was transformed to a "real person representing real people," Ünal's pregnancy was a game-changer. It was suggested by the media that Güney - "a man who claims to be Anatolian," "lives by Anatolian norms," and "believes in *at, avrat, silah*" - was supposed to marry Ünal. This decision damaged Güney's Anatolian image and it took him a divorce, two-year military service, a new marriage, and the success of *Umut* (Güney, 1970) to amend what was broken.

The other finding of the dissertation is Güney's rhetoric of hatred toward Yeşilçam - "immoral," the dirt he was in," "capitalist," and "corrupt." This rhetoric, which first started during Güney's military days, was sharpened during his imprisonment at Selimiye Military Prison. Based on the study it has been shown that Güney was holding Yeşilçam and its star system responsible for his life choices in the 1960s. That is why, it is suggested that Güney's zealous attempts to perish Yeşilçam and to dismantle the Ugly King myth were based on Güney's quest of vengeance toward Yeşilçam; which constantly reminded him of his past endeavors. Nonetheless, dismantling such a mythical image was not an easy task since the very myth that he wanted to destroy was the myth that created his star image in the first place.

Umut (Güney, 1970) was Güney's first attempt in that direction. Five important aspects, which were geared toward demythifying Güney's image have been observed in *Umut*: First the male protagonist, Cabbar (Güney), is not unbreakable; he is beaten up by other characters and humiliated by his wife. Second, he is defeated at the end. Third, he does not resort to fighting or guns. Fourth, he is indifferent toward collective action. Fifth, and more importantly, in *Umut*, there is no actual, tangible antagonist like *ağa*, *eşkıya*, gendarme, capitalist employer or cruel *kabadayı*. Güney does not provide the gratification of the defeat of the antagonist. Instead the film suggests that the whole feudal system which Cabbar runs away from and the whole capitalist system which leads Cabbar to delirium with its inequalities, injustice and ignorance are responsible for his tragic end. Güney continued this approach of humanizing his characters in *Baba* (Güney, 1971), *Sahtekar* (Göreç, 1972), *Canlı Hedef* (Güney, 1971) and *Son Kızgın Adam* (Davudoğlu, 1970) through showing his vulnerable side as the father who fails to save his children. Güney cries

for the first time in *Baba* (Güney, 1971). In *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974), he is slapped by a woman. *Ağıt* (Güney, 1971) presents a strong female character who saves *eşkıya*'s life. In the same films *eşkıya*'s death is not glorified. Instead it is presented as a coincidence since a simple merchant shoots him to death behind his back. On the other hand, with his off-screen image, Güney was once again being constructed as an "Anatolian," "ordinary," "common," "just like everybody" and "regular" with his marriage to "upper class," "Istanbulite," "daughter of a millionaire" and "young" Fatoş Süleymangil. However, more than any other factor, what subdued the "man of scandals" and brought back the "*eşkıya*" was the politicization of Güney's star image in the 1970s.

Between 1972 and 1974, Güney was imprisoned at Selimiye Military Prison where he realized he was "not even a stable social democrat, "a part of the society he wanted to change," "not a Marxist-Leninist," "very disturbed" and "not a communist." It was during his imprisonment that Güney "had grown conscious of class differences." Based on the research on Güney's letters to Fatoş Güney from prison, books on interviews with his prison mates, guards, doctors and interviews conducted with Güney, it has been argued in the dissertation that Güney saw himself as a student who was reading, writing and thinking about Marxist ideas as if "in a boarding school," "giving birth to himself," "confessing and admitting his wrong-doing and mistakes."

The first product of the new politicized star image of Güney was *Arkadaş* (Güney, 1974). It has been argued that the film allows an autobiographical reading of Güney's life in the 1960s with the character of Cemil. Cemil's construction as a man who changed class, ruptured his bonds with his peasant background because of his

relationships, adopted, went bourgeois and reached wealth in a short time," (Coş and Ayça, 1974: 4) is reminiscent of Güney's rise to stardom. What is interesting in the film is Güney's persistence to uphold a moralistic attitude and communicate the idea that if the corrupted morals of the bourgeois can be fixed, they can actually be saved. In the film, Azem (Güney) only tries to restore Cemil's long-forgotten Anatolian morals, not his extravagant life style. He is only angry with Cemil for cheating on his wife and refusing to control and regulate his wife's sexuality. The same moralistic attitude is at play in Melike's character who is appreciated by Azem only for moral reasons of being innocent, pure and hence virginal. Due this particular persistence on morality and female sexuality, the film fails to deliver its ideological message even if the elements of bourgeois life, working class ideals, and so on were integrated into the film.

Yılmaz Güney died on September 9th, 1984 at the early age of 47. Yet, he still remains as a figure of identification both with the Anatolian male myth he created and with his politically charged star image. This is mostly because Güney's star image embodied particular male anxieties of lower / working class men with the character of charismatic, volatile, strong, vengeful, ugly Anatolian *kabadayı* or *eşkıya*. These anxieties arose from the socio-economic and political changes in the 1960s and 1970s such as industrialization, urbanization, the emergence of capitalism and a bourgeois culture and rural-to-urban migration. The massive wave of rural-to-urban migration facilitated the formation of multiple hybrid cultures and family formations in general and masculinity configurations in particular. The emergence of a bourgeois culture not only sharpened class distinctions but was also taken as a threat to traditional norms and moral values, which were reflected in many Yeşilçam melodramas. Nevertheless, rather than melodramas, Güney's films communicated

male anxieties through action-adventure films where his aggressive, hyper-masculine, and volatile male characters became representatives of a particular masculinity crisis of lower / working class Anatolian men. Nonetheless, Güney's masculinities were also chaotic, in a flux and fluid. On the one hand, his off-screen image was constructed as the brave, aggressive, violent Anatolian who broke down the hegemonic understanding of male beauty in Yeşilçam, on the other hand he was compared to the excessively westernized bourgeois in Yeşilçam films who acted against all the discursively constructed values of Anatolianness since Güney was immersed in a life of conspicuous consumption. Moreover, he married Nebahat Çehre over marrying the mother of his child, Birsen Can Ünal. Even if he disregarded all the moral values that were endorsed on his star image, Güney's marital decision still provided significant gratifications to his male audience. After all, the marriage proved that the ugly Anatolian with an aggressive, uncontrollable, volatile hyper-masculinity, made the rich, desirable, upper class Istanbulite fell in love with him and agreed to leave her acting career to be a housewife for him.

With his acts, speech, love affairs, life style and filmic characters, Güney was a man of contradictions in the 1960s. His star image, in that sense, was in a flux forming a grey area between the dichotomy of the West / Istanbulite and the East / Anatolian. The 1970s produced a new interpretation of Güney's star image as it was highly politicized during his days of imprisonment. During those years and the ones that followed after Güney immigrated to France, his star image has gotten to embody the ideals of the Leftist movement and the struggles of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Yet, the image and the legacy of the ugly, ordinary Anatolian who "came to Istanbul to conquer it" with his aggressive, determined, courageous and unyielding

masculinity toward oppression of any kind, still lives on in eulogies, poems, songs, films, documentaries and memoirs.

As further suggestions, the dissertation proposes the exploration of Güney's image during his prisonment years. Between 1975 and 1981, Güney stayed in more than twenty different prisons in Turkey. From 1981 to 1984, he lived in exile in Europe before he passed away. It would be intriguing to explore how imprisonment, the Leftist movement, exile and diaspora played a part in the politicization of Güney's star image during those years. Another aspect of interest would be ethnicity, which this dissertation did not dwell on due to the fact that Güney's Kurdishness was not discoursively constituted before the mid-1970s. The discourses on ethnicity can be investigated in relation to Güney's hyper-masculine star image which, then, can become a comparative study between Güney and İbrahim Tatlıses in order to understand the differences in their constructed Kurdishness, and their relations to the modernization projects of their periods.

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APPENDIX

A. LIST OF SAMPLE GROUP OF FILMS

Utku, Ümit. (director). 1964. *Koçero* (Koçero). Kervan Film.

Akad, Ö. Lütfi. (director). 1965. *Kasımpaşalı Recep* (Recep, the Kasımpaşalı). Televizyon Film.

Atadeniz, Yılmaz. (director). 1965. *Dağların Oğlu* (Son of the Mountains). Metin Film.

Atadeniz, Yılmaz. (director). 1965. *Kan Gövdeyi Götürdü*. Metin Film.

Olgaç, Bilge (director). 1965. *Üçünüzü de Mıhlarım*.

Akad, Ö. Lütfi. (director) 1966. *Hudutların Kanunu* (The Law of the Border). Dadaş Film.

Akad, Ö. Lütfi. (director). 1966. *Yiğit Yaralı Olur*. Metin Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1966. *At Avrat Silah* (Horse, Woman and Gun). Kazankaya Film.

Akad, Ö. Lütfi. (director). 1967. *Kızılırmak Karakoyun.* (Red River, Black Sheep). Dadaş Film.

Aslan, Mehmet (director). 1967. *Şeytanın Oğlu.* (The Son of the Devil). Şahin Film.

Duru, Yılmaz (director). 1967. *İnce Cumali*. İrfan Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1967. *Benim Adım Kerim* (My Name is Kerim). Şahin Film.

Jöntürk, Remzi (director). 1967. *At Hırsızı Banuş* (Banuş, the Horse Thief). Efes Film.

Yılmaz, Atıf. (director). 1967. *Balatlı Arif*. (Arif from Balat). İrfan Film.

Yılmaz, Atıf. (director). 1967. *Kozanoğlu* (Kozanoğlu). Dadaş Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1968. *Seyyit Han* (Seyyit Han). Güney Film.

Yalınkılıç, Yavuz. (director). 1968. *Kargacı Halil*. Objecktif Film.

Uçanoğlu, Yücel. (director). 1968. *Azrail Benim /Büyük Örfi*. (Örfi, the Great). Amaç Film.

Aslan, Mehmet (director). 1969. *Çifte Tabancalı Kabadayı*. (Double-gunned Kabadayı). İrfan Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1969. *Aç Kurtlar* (The Hungry Wolves). Güney Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1970. *Umut* (Hope). Güney Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1970. *Canlı Hedef* / *Kızım İçin* (Live Target / For My Daughter). İrfan Film.

Figenli, Yavuz. (director). 1970. *Kanımın Son Damlasına Kadar* (The Last Drop of My Blood).

Jöntürk, Remzi (director). 1970. *Sevgili Muhafızım* (My Dear Bodyguard).

Davudoglu, Zafer. (director). 1970. *Son Kızgın Adam* (Last Angry Man).

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1971. *Umutsuzlar* (The Hopeless Ones).

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1971. *Yarın Son Gündür* (Tomorrow is the Last Day).

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1971. *Baba* (The Father). Güney Film.

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1971. *Ağıt* (Eulogy). Güney Film.

Göreç, Ertem. (director). 1972. *Sahtekar* (The Con Man).

Güney, Yılmaz. (director). 1974. *Arkadaş* (The Friend). Güney Film.