

THE BUKHARAN EMIRATE AND TURKESTAN UNDER RUSSIAN RULE

IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA: 1917-1924

A Master's Thesis

by

SELİM ÖZTÜRK

Department of

International Relations

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

Ankara

May 2012

To My Mother and My Grandmother

THE BUKHARAN EMIRATE AND TURKESTAN UNDER RUSSIAN RULE
IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA: 1917-1924

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

İhsan Dođramacı Bilkent University

by

SELİM ÖZTÜRK

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĐRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

May 2012

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Prof. Mark Padraig Almond

Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Prof. Norman Stone

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Taşansu Türker

Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel

Director

ABSTRACT

THE BUKHARAN EMIRATE AND TURKESTAN UNDER RUSSIAN RULE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA: 1917-1924

Öztürk, Selim
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Mark Pdraig Almond
May 2012

This thesis analyzes the transformation and evolution of Bukharan state and society from a feudal monarchy, Bukharan Emirate, firstly to Bukharan People's Republic as a transition regime, and from this to a national republic as Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic in perspective of political history. While focusing on the transformation and change in the region, the outside and inside factors accelerating the transformation such as Russian intervention and invasion into the region, Russian capitalist penetration, increase of national awakening through the Central Asian intelligentsia and Jadid movement in the region are in detail reviewed. In addition, the identity formation of Uzbekistan and Central Asian republics are analyzed in detail during the period of this transformational era. While focusing upon the Emirate of Bukhara in detail, the related regions, states and communities in Central Asia are also reviewed.

Key Words: Bukharan Emirate, Bukharan People's Republic, Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian intervention, Russian capitalist penetration, Central Asian intelligentsia, Jadid movement.

ÖZET

RUS DEVRİMLERİ DÖNEMİNDE RUS HÂKİMİYETİNDEKİ BUHARA EMİRLİĞİ VE TÜRKİSTAN: 1917-1924

Öztürk, Selim
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Mark Padraig Almond
Mayıs 2012

Bu tez, Buhara'nın devlet ve toplum yapısının feodal monarşiden ilk önce geçiş dönemi rejimi olan Buhara Halk Cumhuriyetine ve bundan da ulus devlet konumundaki Özbekistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetine transformasyonunu ve evrimini siyasi perspektif çerçevesinde analiz etmektedir. Bölgedeki değişime ve transformasyona odaklanılırken Rus müdahalesi ve işgali, Rus kapitalizminin bölgeye nüfuzu, Orta Asya'daki aydınlar sınıfının ve Ceditçilik hareketinin etkisi ile gelişen ulusal uyanış gibi değişime etki eden iç ve dış faktörler de detaylıca incelenmiştir. İlaveten Özbekistan'ın ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerinin bu dönemdeki kimlik oluşumları ve inşa süreçleri detaylıca analiz edilmiştir. Bunun yanında, genel olarak Buhara Emirliğine odaklanılırken bu süreçle ilgili olan Orta Asya'daki ilgili bölgeler, ülkeler ve topluluklar da incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Buhara Emirliği, Buhara Halk Cumhuriyeti, Özbekistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti, Rus müdahalesi, Rus kapitalizminin bölgeye nüfuzu, Orta Asya'daki aydınlar sınıfı, Ceditçilik hareketi.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is a fruition of a both burdensome and gratifying process of study. My greatest thanks are for my thesis supervisor Mark Padraig Almond, who shared his profound scholarship with utmost attention to my work. He was always encouraging, helpful and supportive during my study. My gratitude for him is far beyond expression. He gave me the chance of writing this thesis with him. This is great happiness and honor for me. He will always be my teacher.

My greatest thanks are also for Taşansu Türker. I can never forget his help, support and encouragement. He honored me by taking place in the jury committee. It is very great honor and happiness for me. I am really thankful to him for his help in my difficult process of thesis defense. He will always be my teacher.

I am very grateful to Norman Stone for his kindness of taking part in my thesis committee. My gratitude for him is far beyond expression. This is indefinable honor and pride for me. I will always be thankful to him. He will always be my teacher.

My greatest thanks are also for Timur Kocaoğlu. He gave a large interview to me about his father, Osman Khodzhaev and history of Uzbekistan. I am very thankful to him for his help and support.

I am also thankful to Ömer Ayçiçek. He is head of department in my job. He gave time for my thesis studies at work and helped me complete my studies. He is both a good boss and a friend.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. The Ancient and Early History of Bukhara and Samarkand.....	3
1.2. Ethnicity.....	8
1.3. The Derivation of Bukhara and Samarkand’s Religious Importance and Holiness in the Muslim World.....	14
1.4. Religiosity in Bukhara.....	16
1.5. The Reasons of Russian Conquest.....	22
CHAPTER 2: RUSSIAN INTERVENTION AND BIRTH OF JADIDISM.....	29
2.1. Early Russian Expansion and Campaigns.....	29
2.2. The Great Game on Turkestan: The Early Relations among Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, British Empire and Bukharan Emirate.....	31
2.3. The Russian Conquests.....	33

2.4. The Improving Relations between the Emir and Tsarist Russia.....	36
2.5. Capital Penetration in Bukhara.....	40
2.6. National Awakening and Jadidism.....	46
2.6.1. Jadidism in Bukhara.....	46
2.6.2. The Reasons of Emergence of Jadidism.....	50
2.6.3. The Jadids and Russian Educated Intellectuals.....	52
2.6.4. Birth and Increase of National Awakening.....	54
2.7. Emir Alim Khan (Pro-Modernist but Anti-Reformist Character).....	57
CHAPTER 3: REVOLUTIONARY ERA.....	60
3.1. Pre-Revolutionary Era.....	61
3.2. Other Main Muslim Operating Forces in Russia-wide.....	63
3.2.1. Alash Orda Autonomous Government.....	63
3.2.2. Kokand Autonomous Government.....	66
3.2.3. Bashkurd Autonomous Government.....	68
3.2.4. The Khivan Khanate.....	70
3.3. February Revolution Era.....	71
3.4. October Revolution Era.....	76
3.5. The Right of Self Determination and Struggle of Classes in Turkistan...83	
3.5.1. The Right of Self Determination.....	83

3.5.2. The Struggle of Classes.....	85
CHAPTER 4: BASMACHI MOVEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA.....	89
4.1. Basmachi Movement in Central Asia.....	90
4.2. Arrival of Turkish Officials to the Region.....	96
4.2.1. Arrival of Jemal.....	96
4.2.2. Arrival of Enver.....	97
4.3. The Basmachis after Enver.....	102
4.4. The New Regime in Bukhara after the Fall of Monarchy.....	105
4.5. On the Way of Disbandment of the People’s Republics.....	110
4.6. Reorganization of Central Asia and Sovietization Policies in the Region.....	112
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	124
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	129
APPENDIX A.....	132
APPENDIX B.....	138
APPENDIX C.....	140
APPENDIX D.....	142
APPENDIX E.....	147

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of Bukharan Emirate and the evolution from a medieval state to a national republic during the subjugation years under the Tsarist rule and the early years of the Soviet Union was significant to understand the creation, the nation building and the state building process of modern Uzbekistan state. Uzbekistan was more important than other Central Asian states owing to its position's being more strategic rather than others. The best reason behind its importance was that Uzbekistan had superiority of being the most populous state among others with its population of estimated almost 29 million. In addition, Uzbekistan's history and culture was deeper than others because of Uzbek ancestor states such as Bukhara Khanate, Bukhara Emirate, Khivan Khanate, Kokand Khanate, Shaibani Khanate, Timurid Emirate etc. These Uzbek dynasties had ruled Central Asia at once upon a time, therefore it was clear that the Uzbek and their predecessors' influence, in spite of a mixture of Tajik and Uzbek influence, was rather influential upon other communities in the region. Also, Uzbeks and Tajiks lived together and so it was very difficult to distinct one from other. They both were sedentary societies thus they were stronger and developed societies rather than other Steppe communities.

Being a sedentary society enabled to leave more strong influence on the region. In addition, Uzbekistan as a successor state of Bukharan Emirate in the region was located upon the most important and strategic parts of Central Asia such as Fergana Valley and Transoxiana(Bukhara and Samarkand), Sri Darya , Amu Darya and Tashkent. Especially Fergana Valley was the cotton stock of all Central Asia.

At present, Uzbekistan has one of the best economies in the region with its natural gas resources. A probable development in Uzbekistan had bigger potential to cause impact upon other Central Asian states. For example, in recent years, the increasing threat of radical Islamist groups and terrorism in the region either arising from Afghanistan and pouring into Central Asian states such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan or some Islamic trends such as Wahhabism backed by Saudi Arabia influenced the Central Asian states. Especially Uzbekistan was far more uneasy about dissident groups inside or neighboring outside, because it was a reality of a religious tradition and auld history dated back to long before. For that reason, it is important to analyze the Emirate of Bukhara and socio-ethnic, socio-cultural, socio-religious structure of the ancient state in order to learn the madrasah oriented state, the importance of clerical class in Bukhara, the role of madrasahs, mullahs and madrasah students inside the formation and administrative system of the state. Without understanding this, it is far difficult to analyze the potential threat of radical Islamic groups and their spreading impact inside the Uzbek population in some parts of the country. It is so clear that the country still carries the remnants and effects of the past and this feature now shapes the current situation and reflects the effects of the past over the present-day society. Therefore, it is significant to review and analyze the history of Bukharan society and state, the evolution and transformation

process of the state and society in order to evaluate both the background and the present developments in Uzbekistan and all Central Asia.

1.1. The Ancient and Early History of Bukhara and Samarkand

Bukhara and Samarkand are historically ancient Sogdian cities. The locations of cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were known as Sogdiana. Sogdians were ancient ancestors of modern Tajiks. Sogdiana was a part of Persian Empire as a satrapy, a province, in the administrative system of Persian Achaemenid Empire in 500 BC. After the conquest of Alexander the Great, the region began to be called as Transoxiana. Transoxiana, in Latin language, means across the Oxus River. The Oxus River means Amu Darya in Greek language. Romans and Greeks called Sogdiana as Transoxiana. Transoxiana was ruled by Seleucid Empire, Bactrians and Kushans after Alexander's Helen Empire dissolved. The region of Sogdiana, in other name Transoxiana ruled by a federation of principalities and the capital city was Samarkand in the eighth century when the Arab armies destroyed Sassanid Empire. Transoxiana was a neighboring region to Khurasan, Khwarazm, Sinkiang and Tokharistan. So, these regions were in interaction with each other. Both of the local people in these regions, Sogdians, Khwarazmians, Tokharistanians and Persians in Khurasan were ethnically Iranian people. In addition, these regions were multi-cultured and a group of religions were common among the local peoples. "Several religions coexisted in Central Asia of that time. An amalgamation of Zoroastrianism (and in some cases also of Hinduism) with kindred ancient native beliefs, Manichaeism, Buddhism, Christianity and shamanistic cults were close neighbors

without the fierce competition that would soon come with Islam”.¹ Zoroastrianism, approved as the official religion by the Sasanian dynasty, was strong in Khurasan, but beyond the Amu Darya was out of Sasanian influence in terms of religiosity. In Transoxiana, Manichaeism, another type of Persian based religion, was common instead of Zoroastrianism. In the following centuries, in Transoxiana and Sinkiang, Manichaeism spread and became the main belief.² Sogdians in Transoxiana also transferred Manichaeism to Uighurs in Sinkiang. Both Bukhara and Samarkand, main principalities of Sogdiana, were very wealthy cities because of locating over the Silk Road. They can also be named as cities of merchants or commerce. After Sassanids were destroyed totally in 651 with the conquest of the last satrapy Khurasan, the Arab armies under the command of Qutayba ibn Muslim turned towards Sogdiana (Transoxiana). Qutayba made a series of dramatic and heroic campaigns over Transoxiana and Khwarazm between 705 and 715.³ The transformation of Sogdian cities, Bukhara and Samarkand from their ancient culture, religion and tradition to Islamic ones began with Qutayba ibn Muslim and continued in the reigns of Umayyad and Abbasid. For example, to display the example of transformation and conversion, Qutayba’s policies in Samarkand after the conquest of the city can be informative. As Tabari narrates:

(Qutayba) was brought the idols, which were despoiled and then placed before him; amassed, they were like an enormous edifice. He ordered that they be burned, and the non-Arabs said to him: “Among them are idols the burner of which will be destroyed!” Qutayba said: “I shall burn them with my own hand!” Ghurak came, knelt before him, and said: “Devotion to you is a duty incumbent upon me. Do not harm these idols!” Qutayba called for fire, took a brand in his hand, stepped forward, proclaimed “God is great!” set fire to them, and they burned fiercely. In the remains of the gold and silver nails that had been in them, they found fifty thousand mithqals.⁴

Tabari continues: Then Qutayba set off, returning to Merv. He deputed (his brother) Abdallah ibn Muslim over Samarkand, and left with him massive (numbers of) troops and much war material, saying to him: “Do not let a (non-resident) polytheist (mushrik) enter any of Samarkand’s gates without having a seal on his hand. If the clay has dried before he goes out,

¹ Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),48.

² Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 48-49.

³ Ibid, 57.

⁴ Ibid, 61-62.

kill him! If you find on him a piece of iron or a knife, or anything else, kill him! If you close the gate at night and find any one of them inside, kill him!⁵

After the battle of Talas in 751, the whole Persian oriented Central Asia and its Iranian natives (Persians, Sogdians, Khwarazmians and Tokharistanians) and also Turks were converted in Islam. These main actors of Central Asia soon became members of Muslim civilization with the Arab language and script.⁶ After the dissolution of Abbasid Caliphate, Transoxiana, with its Arabic name Mawarannahr meaning “between the two rivers- between Amu Darya and Syr Darya”, came under the rule of Samanid Dynasty. The Samanids were the governors of Samarkand, Bukhara, Shahs (Tashkent) and Herat, gifted by Abbasids in return to their conversion to Islam and services to the Caliphate in the region. Bukhara also became Samanid’s capital city.⁷ Since the Samanids were Iranian originally, Persian effect in cultural and linguistic terms was born out in the region again. In addition, The Samanid dynasty’s power and glory peaked under the reign of three great amirs: Ismail (892-907), Ahmad (907-13) and Nasr (913-43). It was during their rule that Transoxiana emancipated itself from the role of being Khurasan’s subordinate province and moved to the forefront of Islamic Central Asia.⁸ The Samanids were destroyed by the Qarakhanids in 999 thus Bukhara and Samarkand came under the rule of Muslim Turkic dynasty after an Iranian based cultural and political domination. The linguistic and cultural physiognomy of Samarkand, Bukhara and other cities and towns as well as of the agricultural population of the countryside remained Iranian, though with an increasing shift from the Sogdian and Khwarazmian variants to Persian.⁹ After the Qarakhanids ruled the oases, the nomadic lifestyle of Turkic tribes began transforming into sedentary at that time. In

⁵ Ibid, 61.

⁶ Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 68-69.

⁷ Ibid, 71.

⁸ Ibid, 73.

⁹ Ibid, 83.

addition, the installation of the Qarakhanid Turkic dynasty in the region was important in another aspect: the reign of Turkic sovereignty had begun in the region of Mawarannahr that continued until the Russian invasion in the middle of the 19th century. Most of the glamorous and splendid mosques, madrasahs, mausoleums and minarets that made Bukhara and Samarkand the prominent centers of Islamic world were built in the reign of Samanids and then Qarakhanids. After the Qarakhanids; the Gaznavids, the Seljukids, the Qarakhitayids, the Khwarazmshahs ruled the region of Mawarannahr (Transoxiana) until the Mongols emerged from the steppes. After the division of Mongolian Empire into four khanates, the lands including Sinkiang, Semireche and Transoxiana passed to the rule of Chaghatay Khan and his sons. “About a century after the Mongol invasion, some Chaghataid khans began to convert to Islam. This tended to happen when they chose to live not in Semireche but in Transoxiana, thus among staunchly Muslim population”.¹⁰ The population of Transoxiana, especially Turks who had come to the region in times of Kok Turkic Kaghanate and then Qarakhanid did not remain nomadic, instead, they adapted the local Iranian people’s sedentary situation. Turks were different from nomadic Mongols when Genghisid’s armies arrived there. The sedentary population of the region, either Turkic or Iranian, conserved the civilization of Islam much more than peoples of other neighboring region.¹¹ “Islam played a fundamental role in the resilience of native identity and renaissance during these years of Mongol rule, and an especially seminal part was assumed by its Sufi dimension”.¹² The 13th and 14th centuries were important for the strengthening of tariqas and Sufi orders in Central Asia, especially Bukhara and Samarkand. The Kubraviyya, Yasaviyya and Naqhsibandi tariqas were so common and effective. Kubravi Shaykh Sayf al Din

¹⁰ Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

¹¹ Ibid, 117.

¹² Ibid, 117.

Bakharzi of Bukhara was a famous character among religious people in the reign of Mongols. Even, Berke Khan of the Golden Horde (1257-67), a convert to Islam, came to Bukhara to visit the Shaykh Sayf al Din Bakharzi was so influential that he had influence inside the administrative system of the Mongols.¹³ The Naqshibandi tariqa, founded by Kwaja Baha al Din Naqhsiband of Bukhara (1318-39) was a Sufi order and got more influential than other tariqas in following centuries. The Naqshibandi Order continued in a chain through the khalifas of the shayks. After Baha al Din Naqhsiband, Khwaja Muhammad Parsa, Khwaja Yusuf Hamadani, Khwaja Abd al Khaliq Gijduvani maintained the tradition of the Order. Except the shayk of Yasavi tariqa, Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi who was ethnic Turkic originally from the city of Yasi; the other khwajas of both Naqhsibandi and Kubravi orders were Persian originally. These traditions of maintenance of sufi orders in a chain throughout the centuries helped the region consolidate its religious structure. The region was governed by Timurids and then first Uzbeks, Sheybanids (1500-99). Sheybanid dynasty traced their roots to Genghis Khan. They put an end to the Timurid dynasty and conquered almost all the Central Asia.

The Shaybanids were Turks like the Timurids, although they spoke a different dialect, Kipchak, in contrast to the local Turki; both led a partly nomadic way of life and had a tribal social structure, although again this must have been more pronounced among the newcomers; both were Sunni Muslims, like the bulk of the sedentary population of the area; and the Uzbeks had been sufficiently exposed to Arabo-Persian Islamic culture to ensure a fundamental continuity.¹⁴

¹³ Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 149.

The Shaybanids weakened because of the wars with the Safavids in Persia. The Shaybanid dynasty in Bukhara was replaced by the Janid dynasty (Astrakhanids) in the beginning of the 17th century through a marriage. Nadir Shah, the ruler of Iran and founder of Afsharid Dynasty after the Safavids, made campaigns over Bukhara and captured the city in 1747. After that time, the khanate could not secure its existence from the Manghit dynasty, a strengthening Uzbek tribe against the Janid dynasty. Shah Murad of the Manghits, the first emir of Bukharan Emirate, captured the throne from the Janid dynasty and Bukharan Khanate was replaced by the Emirate of Bukhara in 1785.

1.2. Ethnicity

The Emirate of Bukhara is located in the heart of Central Asia as an ancient monarchy which had ruled during 1785-1920. The emirate was one of the three Uzbek khanates in Central Asia. It was geographically surrounded by Khivan Khanate in the northwest, Khanate of Kokand in the east, Afghanistan in the south, Kazakh steppe in the north and nomadic Turcoman tribes located in Transcaspia region, known as Turkmenistan today, in the southeast. The Emirate ruled the most important and historically and religiously valuable cities such as Samarkand and Bukhara. The city of Bukhara was the capital city of the Emirate.

Inside the Emirate, the ruling ethnic class was Uzbeks and the other natives of the country were consisted of Tajiks, Turcoman, Kirghiz, Persians, Jews, Indians and Arabs. The ethnic map of the region was very changeable in the years. Many different ethnic communities came to the region through the wars or migration. But, the last and final shaping was conducted by the Turkic conquerors. The final shape

was given by the Turco-Mongol invaders of Genghis Khan. Iranians were the first inhabitants in Central Asia. Persian speaking Tajik peoples were descendants of early Iranians. Then the Turkic groups arrived in the region. Turcomans were the first arrivals as a Turkic group in the tenth century and they maintained their ethnic, cultural identity and nomadic life style. After Turcomans, Uzbeks were the last arrivals and they became the ruling group in the region.¹⁵ The Uzbeks were a group of Moslem, Turkiospeaking, nomadic tribes of mixed Turkic, Mongol, and Iranian origin.¹⁶ During the Russian protectorate era in Bukhara, the ethnic composition is that Uzbeks were the majority by 55-60 % and living in Zarafshan, Kashka Darya and in the river valleys of Central Bukhara, Tajiks were the second largest group living in the mountainous eastern region (Eastern Bukhara) by 30%, Turcoman were 5-10% living alongside the Amu Darya and Kelif. In addition, there were several thousand nomadic Kirghiz population, living in Karategin. And, other minor ethnic groups including Persians, Jews, and Indians also live as habitants of main towns.¹⁷ The Uzbeks and Turcoman were the two major Turkic communities in the region. Although there was no ethnic identity consciousness in the emirate, Uzbeks were known as sedentary population. The Russians also named both Uzbeks and Tajiks who were sedentary and semi sedentary in Bukhara as Sarts. The nomadic population was known as Turcoman and they were different in terms of culture, life style, and linguistics. Uzbeks are the latest arrivals in the region and had the primary role of ruling ethnic group deriving from Timurids and Shaybanids which had ruled the region for a long time. “The name Uzbek thus now includes a fairly heterogeneous population, ranging in culture from fully sedentary merchants and craftsmen to

¹⁵ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 5.

¹⁶ Ibid, 3.

¹⁷ Ibid, 5.

seminomadic communities having a strong tribal orientation”.¹⁸ The importance of Uzbeks as the ruling ethnicity was based on being Uzbek ethnically of the Manghit dynasty of the Emirate. The Uzbeks, Tajiks and nomadic Turcomans were major ethnic groups in the emirate. These three populations were originally orthodox Sunnite. In addition, there were minor ethnic groups such as Arabs, Jewish, Gypsies and Persians which have either different sects or different religions.

The reason of Uzbek population’s leading role in the region was the Uzbek rulers for centuries. “Since the sixteenth, Bukhara had been an Uzbek kingdom, and the Uzbeks who were Sunnis represented the largest group in the emirate (778,000 inhabitants in 1920 or 50.7 percent of the population).With the accession to the throne of the Manghits, who came from a major Uzbek tribe, the Uzbek elite became the mainstay of power, and struggles for power itself merged with age old tribal struggles”.¹⁹ But, the Uzbek ruling elite constructed a very specific system between Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks in the Emirate and other two khanates (Kokand and Khiva). In the Uzbek khanates, for the pattern of government, Persians were chosen although the ruling clans were Uzbeks. It is claimed that some khans’ mothers were Persian, so this policy of Persian based government became a continual tradition.²⁰ The Tajik population was the second largest one after Uzbeks. Since Bukhara and Samarkand were the old and traditional Samanid Dynasty’s²¹ cities, there were a large amount of

¹⁸ E.Bacon, Elizabeth, *Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study In Culture Change*, (New York: Cornell University Press,1966), 18.

¹⁹ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans.,*Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 16.

²⁰ E.Bacon, Elizabeth, *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 74.

²¹ Samanid Empire is a Persian state which ruled Transoxania and Khorasan between 819-999. The Samanids was founded after the collapse of Abbasid Empire and destroyed by Kara-Khanids.

Tajik inhabitants. Tajiks were also Sunnite and belonged to the Hanafi Madhhab²² like Uzbeks. To be more explanatory, Helen Carrere D'Enchausse gave statistical information in her book *Islam and the Russian Empire*: "In the early years 1920s, half of the population of the emirate was Uzbek, 31 percent was Tajik, 10 percent was Turcoman, 6-7 percent Kirghiz and the rest made up of Arabs, Persians, Hindus and Jews".²³ In addition to major ethnic groups like Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turcoman in the Emirate, there were minor ethnic populations including Moslem Arabs, Shiite Persians, Jews and Gypsies. Since Arab armies stormed the Central Asia during the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates centuries ago, there were small amount of Arab population, stayed back in the region. "The Arabs were found scattered in small, compact enclaves in the eastern oases...Some believe themselves descended from the Arab armies who conquered Turkistan in the seventh and eighth centuries, while others have a tradition of coming to Turkestan in the fourteenth century during the reigns of Timur. In 1926 censuses, 28,978 Arabs were enumerated".²⁴ The Bukharan Jews were the most interesting ethnic group among the others. They were sedentary and generally merchants. It was also estimated that they were numerous than Christians in Turkistan. "Known generally in the West as Bukharan Jews, Central Asian Jews were actually settled in a number of eastern oasis towns and cities such as Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Kokand and Khatyrchi...In 1926, 18.98 Jews native to Central Asia were counted".²⁵ They were not accepted as the equal people like Muslims and were exposed to too many restrictions. The Jews were eight or nine

²² It is the most prominent one of the four main Muslim madhhabs (school of law) in Sunni Islam. The leader of the school was Imam Abu Hanifa an-Nu'man (699-767). The school has the most adherents among other schools in Sunnite Islam.

²³ Carrere D'Enchausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 1.

²⁴ E.Bacon, Elizabeth, *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 22.

²⁵ E.Bacon, Elizabeth, *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 22.

thousands in claims and generally merchants and craftsmen in capital, so they were so effective in Bukhara's economic life. In addition, they were restricted from many laws that Muslims had. For example, they could not buy a house without the Emir's approval.²⁶ When Russian armies entered Bukhara and founded the protectorate over the emirate, Jews took a large breath and managed to have some rights. Maybe the single ethnic group, who were content of Russian invasion in the Emirate, was the Jews in the emirate. Russians behaved Jews better and abandoned the restricting laws upon Jewish community in the country.²⁷ According to General Von Kaufman, Jews were a useful partner for Russia to maintain an influence over the country.²⁸ Jews were also the best supportive tool for the existence of Christian power in the region against Muslim inhabitants and the local Muslim kingdom.

The Persians as a Shiite group had a different importance for the Emirate. They were not local people like Tajiks in the region. Although they had same origins with the Tajiks, they were different in terms of their religious sect. They were the later arrivals in the region like Moslem Arab colonies. Most of them were war captured slaves of the Emir. "These trace their origin to the Persian inhabitants of Mary (Merv) who were led into captivity when the Emir of Bukhara captured the oasis in 1785. In the 1926 censuses 9,188 Persians were counted."²⁹ Besides, the Persian slaves had importance for the bureaucracy and army of the emirate. The Emir of Bukhara used Persians in administrative roles in order to limit the influence of Uzbek tribes. The same system was commonly used in other Muslim countries like Turkey and Persia. While Turkish system was based on converted Christian Balkan

²⁶ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 130.

²⁷ Ibid, 130.

²⁸ Ibid, 130.

²⁹ E. Bacon, Elizabeth, *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 23-24.

population in military and administrative system, the Persian Empire used the similar system through the use of Georgians and Armenians. The Bukharan Emirate as a Moslem state followed the same way in administration like other Moslem co-partners. The power of Uzbek aristocracy was lessened in high administrative system by the rulers through appointing Persians to the office of Kush begi, the prime minister, thus consolidating the loyalty to the ruler.³⁰ The Manghit dynasty had to diminish the power of Uzbek tribes, which would be a future threat for the authority, and had to produce a new class to fill in the gap in the administrative system. Persian slaves of the Emir were the best choice for this policy. Thus the Manghit dynasty managed to consolidate their power and authority. The Manghit dynasty pursued more clever policy than their Genghisid predecessors and founded a non-Uzbek army and created Persian based administrative class, originated from Persian slaves while diminishing the efficiency of Uzbek tribal leaders in addition they gave importance to taking the support of the clergy so that Manghit dynasty was able to centralize the power and authority in their hands.³¹

The population of Bukhara was composed of three groups like sedentary, semi nomadic and nomadic. “Bukhara’s population at the close of the nineteenth century was usually estimated at two and a half to three million, of whom two-thirds lived in the three western oases. Of the khanate’s total population, 5 percent was sedentary, 20 percent seminomadic and 15 percent nomadic. Between 10 and 14 percent of the population was urban.”³² The sedentary population was named as Sart and nomadic ones were generally known as Turcoman and Kirghiz. The name of Sart

³⁰ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 7.

³¹ Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 180.

³² Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 5.

used for the sedentary population in the emirate was not differentiated as the Uzbek or Tajik origins. After Russia came to the region, they chose to define the people as Sart, not as Uzbek or Tajik. Turco-Mongol dynasties, dated back to Uzbek Khan, conquered the oasis cities in the early sixteenth century. After that time, the name Uzbek coming from Uzbek Khan was used for dynasties and tribes, but not to the Turkic sedentary communities which adapted to the Tajik way of life. The sedentary people were known as Sart, an Indian word meaning merchant and used by early Turks for Iranian speaking Tajiks in oasis cities. But, Sart was used commonly for all communities either Persian or Turkic by nomadic peoples after a time.³³

1.3. The Derivation of Bukhara and Samarkand's Religious Importance and Holiness in the Muslim World

The name of Bukhara means 'lucky place' in Sogdian language, a branch of old Persian language. The name of Samarkand means 'stone fort' in Sogdian language. Asmara means stone or rock and *kand* means fort or town in Sogdian. In addition, there is another claim about the name Samarkand's meaning. In Turkic language, it means 'rich city' which is derived from '*Semiz-Kent*'. *Semiz* means rich and *kent* means city in Turkic language. There are also other meanings which were given by Arabs, the new visitors of the region in the 7th century. "*Madinat al sufriya* (the copper city) and also *Madinat al tujjar* (the city of merchants) was named for the city of Bukhara in Arabic. Also, the name of *Fakhira* for Bukhara and the name of *Sumran* for Samarkand were used in Arabic".³⁴ In addition, the installation of

³³ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 17-18

³⁴ Frye, Richard N., *al-Narshakhi's the History of Bukhara*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 27.

religious and holy cult and identity of Bukhara and Samarkand in Muslim world began after the Arab conquest. While Arabs were giving new names and meanings to these ancient cities, they loaded an Islamic cult and great religiosity to these cities. And this strengthened in the reigns of Muslim dynasties in the centuries. The name of Bukhara was, even is today, and called as *Bukhara-i Sharif* (Holy Bukhara). Sharif means holy in Arabic language. The religious and holy importance of Bukhara and Samarkand was also referenced through the hadiths by Muslim scholars. Richard N. Frye gives a place to a hadith about Bukhara and Samarkand in his book *al-Narshakhi's the History of Bukhara* to demonstrate the Islamic prominence of these cities.

The Prophet of God said that Gabriel told him that in the hand of the East was a country called Khurasan. On the Judgment Day three cities of Khurasan will be adorned with red rubies and coral, and their radiance shall shine about them. Around these cities will be many angels praising, glorifying and exalting God. They will bring forth these cities in grandeur and pomp onto the plains, as a bride who is brought into the house of her betrothed. In each of these cities will be 70,000 banners and under each martyr will be 70,000 believers, speaking Persian and receiving solution. On the Judgment Day on every side of these cities to the right and left, front and rear, for ten days of journey it will be filled with martyrs." The Prophet said, "Oh Gabriel, tell me the names of these cities." Gabriel replied, "The name of one of these cities in Arabic is Qasimlya and in Persian Veshgird. The second in Arabic is Sumran, and in Persian Samarqand. The third in Arabic is Fakhira and in Persian Bukhara. The Prophet asked, "Oh Gabriel why is it called Fakhira?" He replied "Because on the Judgment Day, Bukhara shall excel all other cities in glory because of the multitude of martyrs (buried there)". The Prophet cried, "God bless (the people of) Fakir and purify their hearts by the fear of God; improve their actions and make them among the merciful of my people."³⁵

The holy buildings constructed in the era of different Muslim dynasties also enabled these cities to obtain religious and holy identity throughout the centuries. The buildings such as mosques, minarets, mausoleums, tombs and madrasahs in the cities were and prominent in terms of architectural in addition to religiosity and holiness. The well-known ones of them are madrasah of Ulug Beg, Ser-Dar Madrasah, Tilya Kori Madrasah, Bibi-Khanym Madrasah, Gur-e Amir Mausoleum, Observatory of Ulugh Beg, the Registan (ancient center of the city) in Samarkand and Kolyan Minaret, Masjid-i Kalan, Mir-i Arab Madrasah, Ismail Samani Mausoleum, Chasma Ayub Mausoleum, Lab-i Hauz (ponds), the Ark (massive

³⁵ Frye, Richard N., *al-Narshakhi's the History of Bukhara*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 27-28.

fortress surrounding Bukhara's city center) in Bukhara. These buildings and their importance were known and they were displayed as the best Islamic architects of Muslim world by Muslim people, even in today.

1.4. Religiosity in Bukhara

Bukharan population was mostly orthodox Sunnite Muslim. The most important cities of the emirate were known as the holy centers of Sunnite Islam, especially Samarkand and Bukhara. The cities had a source of traditional religious fame and legacy among other Muslim countries. In the nineteenth century, Islam was so effective in Turkestan and the khanates. Especially, Bukhara was one of the leading cities in terms of implementation of Islamic practices, for instance it was compulsory for each man to attend the daily prayers, especially the morning prayer of the day and Friday prayer.³⁶ For these reasons, the citizens of Bukhara were very traditional and conservative in many aspects. They were open to influence of clergy and loyal to the orders of their holy emir. In addition, Bukhara and Samarkand were important centers about religious education in addition to being commercial and administrative centers in the Emirate. The madrasas in these cities had been growing mullahs and clergy for the emirate. The religiosity of these cities dated back to very early times. Centuries ago, they were famous with their religious scholars, for example Imam Bukhari, born in Samarkand and lived in Bukhara in the reign of Samanids, was a famous scholar of the Hadith and his books were the most reliable and advisable sources throughout the Islamic world. Both Bukhara and Samarkand

³⁶ E.Bacon, Elizabeth, *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 76-77.

had lots of madrasas for students to take religious education; and had lots of mosques and tombs which influenced the cultural atmosphere of the Emirate.

On the religious level, its madrasas-Miri Arab madrasa being the most famous one-gave the city the reputation of one of Islam's foremost centers of learning and orthodoxy, while its Sufi shaykhs and dervishes-here the aforementioned shrines of Baha al-Din Naqshband in Qasr-i Arifan and of Abu Bakr in Sumitan led the roster- added their dimension of wide appeal and participation by the masses.³⁷ The holy madrasas in both Samarkand and Bukhara not only welcome students from the citizens but also other khanates and students coming to take education from all the Muslim countries.

The Emirate of Bukhara was mainly a Sunni Muslim State. In Sunni theology, the people of Central Asian states were mostly adapted to Hanafi sect. The major ethnic groups in the Emirate like Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turcoman were Sunni Muslims. Bukhara and Samarkand were famous with the Sufi orders of Hanafi sect. These cities were the birth places of Sufi orders and from here these philosophies spreading to the whole world. These orders are still effective and common in Sunni Muslim countries. There were Sufi brotherhoods, spreading to the population in the region such as the order of Naqshibandi which was very common in Bukhara and Samarkand, the order of Qadiriya in Fergana, Kubraviyya in Khwarazm and Yassaviyya which was followed by the nomads.³⁸

Not only Sunni groups but also there were Shiite groups like Persians coming from Merv region of Iran due to captivity in a war. Population of Bukhara was Sunni

³⁷ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 178.

³⁸ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 33.

in majority, but there was a Shia minority that emerged after the capture of Marv city in the eighteenth century.³⁹ And, there were Shiite Ismailis living in Pamir region. Population of Bukhara was Moslem in a great majority except Jews and Hindus who were playing an important role in commercial life. On the other side, the Muslim population was divided in two as Sunni and Shi'a. Although the great majority was Sunni, there were Shi'a population among Tajiks in central Bukhara, and all the population was Shi'a in eastern Bukhara.⁴⁰ The different type of Shiite population was located in eastern Bukhara. They are now known as Pamirians and their region is inside the borders of current Tajikistan. The sect of this Shiite population was known as Ismaili. Their theological concept was based on doctrines of Shia's Seven Imams while Persians in Iran adapted to the doctrines of Twelve Imams. The peoples coming from Marv originally were under the influence of Iran's Twelve Imams oriented Shi'a and they were different from the Shi'a of Ismailis living in eastern Bukhara. The most important non-Muslim population was Jews living in Samarkand and Bukhara and dealing with trade. Since their non-Muslim and Jewish identities, they were exposed to humiliation by Muslim authorities.

The system of the government was very religion based and it was composed of the cooperation of the emir and the clergy's influence. Islam and the holiness of the title of Emir was an important tool in the hands of the Emir to keep the society together. The title of the Emir instead of the title of Khan had the importance of religiosity and holiness. The title of emir was firstly used by the Samanid rulers, founders of the first historical Tajik state. Since Muhammad Rahim obtained the power and founded his own dynasty, the Manghit dynasty used the title of emir and

³⁹ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 31.

⁴⁰ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 5.

then the title of sayyid so that they could trace their genealogy to the Prophet. Even, Emir Alim, the last ruler, used the title of Caliph in addition to other titles.⁴¹ The title of emir used by Manghits instead of khan displayed the change of their legitimacy of ruling from Turco-Mongol to Islamic based. The title of emir means ‘‘Commander of Believers’’ deriving from Amir al Muminin. In some claims, the use of title emir by Manghits for their rulers was due to their genealogy not tracing to Genghisid dynasty.⁴² In Turco Mongol tradition, the begs or tribal chieftains could not take the title of khan if they did not own the blood of Genghisid family. For example, Timur used the title of emir in spite of ruling a very huge empire. According to the claims, the reason of Manghit ruler’s taking the title of emir was either strengthening their Islamic religious legitimation over the conservative and tribal masses, or that their trace did not go to the Genghisid ancestry so their use of the title of Khan was impossible. For that reason they chose the use of the ruler’s title from khan to emir. There are also other claims about use of title emir by Manghits. According to Dr. Nurettin Hatunoglu⁴³, use of title ‘emir’ by Manghits could be their purpose to trace themselves to Emir Timur. In addition, passing the caliphate from Mamluks to Ottomans and emergence of Ottomans as the leading power of Sunni Muslim world was effective for Manghits to use title of emir instead of khan, as an old and inefficient concept in the eighteenth century. Since Manghits were Sunni and ally of Ottomans against the Shi’a Safavids, the emphasis on Sunni Islam by Manghits can

⁴¹ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 17.

⁴² Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 180.

⁴³ Dr. Hatunoglu was the son in law of Emir Alim Khan (the last emir of Bukhara)’s youngest son, Shahzade Abdulkebir Yuce, who lives in Gaziantep city with his family, Turkey. Hatunoglu was an academician at Zonguldak Karaelmas University. His sources are from the documents of Shahzade Abdulkebir Yuce, the son of the last Emir.

be a rational policy.⁴⁴ In addition, they began using the title of sayyid in the early 19th century. It was also a fact that the religion began more effective in political and social life of the country after the installation of the Manghit Dynasty in Bukhara.

The reason behind the increasing importance of religion was Bukharan rulers' attempts to get support of tariqas, sufi orders, madrasa students and mullahs which were strengthening groups in the region because of spreading to the layers of the society. The increasing value in the late 18th century and 19th century was religiosity and devotion rather than owning the blood of Genghisid Dynasty. For example, Sayyid Emir Haydar, second ruler of the country, began using the title of Sayyid (meaning a grandson of the prophet). Belonging to a family of Sayyid (grandson of Imam Hussein who was the son of Imam Ali and grandson of the prophet) was an influencing factor to maintain sovereignty in this era.⁴⁵

The class of clergy and mullahs took a strategic place in administrative and daily public life in the Emirate. Their influence was very strong and valid upon the students of madrasas. "On the level of culture the clergy of Bukhara could take most pride in its past, its traditions and the power that it represented. Those in charge of the emirate's countless mosques were formed in some 150 madrasas which contained more than 20 000 students. These madrasas figured among the oldest in the Muslim world".⁴⁶ They can be named as the Central Asian versions of Mecca and Medina because of many mosques, shrines, madrasahs and tomb of many holy sheikhs in these cities. "Bukhara was a prestigious center of the Muslim world: the emir, after the caliph, was the second personage of the world Islamic community; and all the

⁴⁴ Hatunoglu, Nurettin, *Turkistan'da Son Turk Devleti Buhara Emirligi ve Alim Khan*, (Istanbul: Otuken Nesriyat A.S., 2011), 42.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 44.

⁴⁶ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 33.

representatives of Islam in the emirate were the pillars of that Muslim state and helped to preserve for the community the face that history had forged for it and that gave it that central place".⁴⁷ The clergy class in these cities were automatically both influential over the Emir and his government; and the masses. The clerical class in Bukhara was extremely influential over the mass consciousness and other secular authorities of the state because of Bukhara's ancient and traditional religious position in Islamic world. The clergy had such enormous influence over madrasah students that it could organize and direct the masses hence it had an enormous power of pressure upon the governmental authorities.⁴⁸ The clergy was also against every type of reformist movement. The Mullahs could persuade or suppress the emir on behalf of the clergy's interests. In the late 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, the increasing reformist Jadid Movement⁴⁹ would face the opposition of the mullahs. Since the Mullah party owned the power of mobilizing the masses and madrasah students, it was the best solution for the emir to act together with the mullahs against the reformists aiming to limit the monarch's authority. This policy of emir pushed the reformists to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in the Revolution era in future against the emir's authority.

The problem about Sunni Islam's extreme influence and its results, a hard conservative society, is very disputable about Bukhara. Sunni Islam in Turkistan especially in the Emirate and other Khanates got shaped differently from the other societies in the Middle East. The communities in that region suffered from the disconnection with other parts of the Muslim world. The best explanation about that

⁴⁷ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 35.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 33.

⁴⁹ Jadidism was a reformist movement borne out in Russian Empire. It was indoctrinated by Muslim intellectuals within Russia. They firstly aimed to reach European modeled education in Turkistan. Their reforms programs were in field of culture and education in the beginning. Later it spilled over politics and ideology. They turned out as biggest opposing movements against monarchs in Turkistan.

issue did come from Olaf Caroe, ex-British administrator in India and Sovietolog. According to Sir Olaf Caroe, the link between Turkestan and the rest of Muslim world was cut off long before the Soviets, even before the Tsarist Russia. He implies the birth of Shiism under Safavid Dynasty in Iran. After the emergence of Shiah in Iran, Sunni Transoxiana and Shiah Persia had a theological rift between themselves, so Turkestan was imposed to isolation for centuries and that caused the fanatical exclusiveness in Bukhara. In addition, the change of trade routes which had connected Central Asia to Middle and Far East since the Ilkhanid Dynasty in the thirteenth century, and increasing importance sea routes between the Persian Gulf and the Southern Chinese Ports was another factor for the isolation of Central Asia.⁵⁰ In sum, these factors caused the Bukhara and its civilization to be contained and lose its links with other part of the Sunni Muslim world, which was in more interaction with modernization, the Western influence and developments. These reasons caused Bukhara to be late for accepting and adapting the reforms and innovations than other Muslim states.

1.5. The Reasons of Russian Conquest

There were many reasons for Russia's decision to invade Central Asia and Khanates according to historians. It depends on how the historians approach the matter for instance economy-based, international relations, prestige and glory for the Tsarist regime or mission of civilization by Russia over the Central Asian peoples. The best classification was included in the book of David McKenzie, *A History of Russia, and the Soviet Union and beyond*. McKenzie classified the views in three

⁵⁰ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenword Press, 1964), 29.

groups like Tsarist, Sovietic and Western. According to Tsarist officials, the reason of invasion of Central Asia can be explained with a package of necessities like St. Petersburg's policy to secure the Russia's interests, possessions and merchants in the region, threatening the British influence in India after the defeat of Crimean War; and of spreading the superior Russian culture over the region.

N.A. Kryzhanovskii, governor general of Orenburg and Cherniaev's immediate superior, sounded the theme of "the white man's burden":

It seems to me that it is time to stop catering to the languages and customs of our weak neighbors (the khanates). We can compel them to conform somewhat to our customs and impose our language on them. In Central Asia we alone must be the masters so that with time through us civilization can penetrate there and improve the lives of those unfortunate offspring of the human race.⁵¹

The governor general emphasizes the necessity of Russian intervention because of spreading superior Russian-European values and civilization over uneducated and uncivilized Moslem communities in Turkistan. In the Tsarist view, the rivalry between Russia and Britain is another reason for Russia's conquest in the Khanates.

War minister Miliutin, the superior of the above-mentioned conquerors, noted in 1882 Turkestan's significance as a threat to British India: In case of a European war we should especially value the occupation of (Kokand khanate) bringing us closer to the northern regions of India...Ruling in Kokand, we can constantly threaten England's East Indian possessions. This is especially important since only there can we be dangerous to this enemy of ours.⁵²

Russia's Tsarist officials also explain their conquest with the security of Russian diplomatic and commercial interests in the region. Russia had been suffering from hostile actions and captures of Russian merchants by nomadic Kazakhs. And these nomadic forces were supplied asylum by the Khanates. Although Russian officials warned the governments of Bukhara many times, the Emirate did not take any precautions. This reason pushed Russia to intervene in Bukhara at the end. "In 1914 an official tsarist publication titled Asiatic Russia summarized and evaluated Russian expansion in Central Asia a generation after its agitation against Russia;

⁵¹ MacKenzie, David & W. Curran, Michael, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond*, (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 342.

⁵² MacKenzie, David & W. Curran, Michael, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond*, (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 342.

attacks on Russian settlers, merchants, and diplomats by savage tribes; and the need for defensible frontiers”.⁵³ In addition, for many years, nomads had given harm to Russia’s possessions and Russia could not take a satisfying precaution from the Emirate to prevent the looting and captures of Russian citizens. Russia began pursuing a policy to prevent these harms caused by nomads. “Russia’s aims in Central Asia in the 1840’s and 1850’s were both political and economic. Bukhara and Khiva had to be persuaded to refrain from any hostile actions against Russia, including possession of Russian slaves and granting asylum to Kazakhs fleeing from Russian justice”.⁵⁴ On the other side, there were other views, which tried to explain the conquest in an economic manner, and they were especially Soviet oriented views about Russian conquest. They were approaching the matter with compulsory economic and commercial reasons of Tsarist Russia.

Soviet historians until Gorbachev stressed the British danger and economic motives for Tsarist expansion. Wrote S. S. Dmitrev: Central Asia was essential to Tsarist Russia not only as a source of raw materials, especially as a cotton base for Russian cotton textile manufacturers, but as an important market for the sale of goods produced by Russian industry, The Russian bourgeoisie sought new sources of raw materials, new markets for its industrial products.

N. A. Khalfin, a Soviet specialist on Central Asia affirmed:

The interruption in the receipt of American cotton compelled the (Russian) government, merchants, and industrialists... to view differently the question of turning the Central Asian khanates into sources of raw materials...Central Asia, regarded hitherto by Russian merchants and industrialists primarily as a profitable market, now acquired the significance of an important source of industrial raw materials.⁵⁵

According to Seymour Becker and his book *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia*, he pointed out the development of capitalism and bourgeois monarchy which were trying to supply the needs of its internal markets. While the European powers absorbed their raw material sources from their overseas colonies, the most easily reachable colony was Central Asia as a neighboring region of Russia. Turkistan seemed to be a suitable choice for Russia, not being able to reach the overseas, in

⁵³ Ibid, 343.

⁵⁴ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 10.

⁵⁵ MacKenzie, David & W. Curran, Michael, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond*, (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 344.

order to cover the urgent needs of its developing industry at home. While Russia was becoming a bourgeois monarchy and capitalism directed the governmental policies of the empire at home and abroad; Central Asia was seen as a colony by Russian capitalists in order to supply raw material for internal markets. Especially, the source of supply for raw cotton in Turkestan was crucial for the needs of the growth of Russian capitalism.⁵⁶ Cotton had a great deal of importance for Russian markets at that time and Russian textile industry. Cotton had the biggest share in the commercial relations between Russia and the Emirate of Bukhara and other Khanates. Cotton of the khanates was the most important reason for the Russian conquest in Central Asia, because Russian textile industry had developed so rapidly and had depended on imports from outside by 1850. On the other side, Russian markets were suitable for Central Asian cotton imports. For example, 31% of Russian imports from the khanates were raw cotton in 1860. Indeed, Russian textile industry did not only need raw cotton as an importer, but also needed raw cotton to export manufactured cotton goods. For instance, 95% of cotton was marketed in Asia and 53% of manufactured cotton goods were exported to the khanates.⁵⁷ The outbreak of American civil war was the biggest enforcement for Russia to intervene in the Bukhara and other khanates, which owned a great deal of cotton resources; because the USA was the biggest cotton exporter to Russia during the 19th century. However, when the Civil War broke out between North and Southern states, the export was cut off thus caused the increase of cotton prices and raw material needs for Russia. The US was the largest supplier of cotton to Russia until the American civil war broke out. Since the Union blocked the confederate ports and the cotton exports stopped, Central Asian cotton's importance increased for Russia's alternative

⁵⁶ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 16.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 16.

source of supply. Owing to the civil war and increasing need of cotton in internal markets, Central Asian cotton's price tripled from 1860 to 1862; and it doubled again by 1864.⁵⁸ At that point, Russia's increasing commercial relation with the Emirate of Bukhara and other Khanates should not be ignored in the 19th century. Mutual trade relations enabled and strengthened the mutual economic interdependence between Russia and these ancient Central Asian states. "Between 1863 and 1867 the annual value of Russia's exports to Central Asia more than tripled, and the khanates' share of the Russian export trade to all Asia rose from 22 to 42 percent".⁵⁹ The economic motives were so strong for cause of invasion but they were not sufficient on themselves. On the other side, some western intellectuals approached the matter in a different way and with different explanations.

According to Firuz Kazemzadeh, an American scholar, Soviet writers generally focused on economic reasons for the conquest. They emphasized the growing trade between Tsarist Russia and the khanates of Turkestan since the middle of the 18th century, but his volume of trade was very small and the cotton industry was relatively insignificant for the government to accept the demands of Russian bourgeoisie to make large conquests.⁶⁰ In addition, according to Kazemzadeh, the military's position was more powerful factor to force the conquests in Turkestan and Transcaspia. Especially, the Crimean defeat was making the army impatient and furious to substitute the fiasco with new conquests on the way of nationalists-imperialist ideology of Panslavism.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Ibid, 16.

⁵⁹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 17.

⁶⁰ MacKenzie, David & W. Curran, *Michael, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond*, (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 345.

⁶¹ Ibid, 345.

The Crimean defeat was a turning point at Russia's foreign and military policy in the second half of the 19th century. It blocked Russia's plans to reach the overseas by destroying the Ottoman Empire. The European coalition, led by England did not permit this in Crimea. After that, Russia's turning towards Asia was to aim both satisfy its disappointed and furious imperial army and to threaten the British possessions in India through the conquest of the emirate of Bukhara which was a neighboring state to Afghanistan, a country under the British influence and a buffer state on the road to British India.

On the other side, the fear of containment by Britain and the Porte⁶² after the Crimean defeat increased in St. Petersburg. Mainly, Russians were not mistaken. "In 1854, St. Petersburg's fears were reawakened by the activities of Turkish envoys, who attempted to ally the Central Asian khanates with the Porte (thus indirectly with Great Britain, the sultan's protector) against Russia. Turkey's plans were frustrated by the ancient antagonism among local powers..."⁶³ Turkey could use the influence of the Caliphate and Islam to construct ties with the conservative Emirate and other Khanates against Russian infidels. "Equally disturbing were conquests achieved in northern Afghanistan at Bukhara's expense in the late 1850's by Dost Muhammad, the emir of Kabul, who had been an ally of Britain since 1855. In the year following the conclusion of the Crimean War the weakness of Russia's position was borne out when Britain applied pressure to Persia, Russia's protégé, forcing her to evacuate the independent state of Herat and grant commercial privileges to British traders".⁶⁴

⁶² The Sublime Porte is used for the central government of Ottoman Empire.

⁶³ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 12.

⁶⁴ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 12.

To sum up, Russia had several reasons to invade Turkistan, capture the lands of Kokand, and establish protectorates in Bukhara and Khiva. Especially for Bukhara, cotton potential in this country for Russia's developing industry, its borders with Afghanistan which was a buffer zone with British India, and Russian armies' intentions to repair their glory and prestige after the Crimean defeat made the conquests inevitable. In my opinion, the Crimean defeat in 1854 was the main factor triggering Russia to target the Central Asia. The defeat caused Russia to cease its spreading policies in East Europe, the Caucasus and the Balkans for a while. The conquest policy of Turkistan was the best choice for both not attracting the reactions of the Western rivals and for owning a region that was a potential colony for Russia's raw material needs. In addition, it seemed a very profitable policy because it would produce threat for Britain in terms of approaching India and Afghanistan while not disturbing Britain's other victorious European allies. Russia never destroyed the Emirate of Bukhara and also Khiva like it did in the Khanate of Kokand. Since Bukhara was a borderland to Afghanistan, Russia only established a protectorate and recognized the rule of the Emir. It was also a detailed policy not to encounter Britain severely.

CHAPTER 2

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION AND BIRTH OF JADIDISM

In this chapter, I focus on the early Russian expansion and conquests in the region. I also review rivalry among Russia, Britain and Ottomans over the region. In addition, the improving between Bukharan Emir and Tsar, capital penetration in Bukhara, and national awakening in Central Asia are analyzed. Also, I touch upon Jadidism, reasons of emergence of Jadidism, difference between Jadids and Russian educated intellectuals. Finally, I point out Emir Alim Khan, the last ruler of Bukhara, and his pro-modern and anti-reformist character.

2.1. Early Russian Expansion and Campaigns

Under the rule of the Golden Horde, born just after the division of Genghisid Empire among his sons; the Kipchak Steppe, can be called as European Russia, and the Kazakh Steppe of Central Asia were in interaction in terms of both political unity and economy. The trade ways on the Steppe regions were controlled by the Horde. The commercial and trans-shipment system continued after the decline of the Horde

in the late 14th century.⁶⁵ After that time, Muscovy, the future Russia, began expanding to the Steppes to fill in the power vacuum in the area. Russia conquered the Kazan Khanate in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556 thus succeeded in opening the way to the Kazakh Steppe. “Commerce was the major concern of the embassies from Central Asia in the 17th century. Bukhara and Khivan merchants maintained an active trade, carrying their goods to Astrakhan, Samara, Kazan, Nizhii Novgorod, Iaroslavl, and Moscow itself.”⁶⁶ However Russian merchants could not trade because Bukharans and Khivans were suspicious of non Moslem merchants in their region. They did not want to share their commercial monopoly inside their countries. In addition the Russian citizens, the merchants and fishermen near the Caspian Sea were captured by Kazakh and Turcoman raiders and sold in slavery in Bukhara and Khiva. Neither Khivan nor Bukharan administration did prevent nomads from making these assaults.⁶⁷ The principal duties of Moscow’s embassies in the khanates at that period were to rescue the Russian citizens and collect information regarding trade routes to India.

The first armed expedition of Russia to the region was held by Peter the Great (1689-1725) towards the Khivan Khanate. However, the attempt failed and the result was horrifying for the Russians. The Khivans slaughtered soldiers and sold the remains into slavery.⁶⁸ Russia in the early 18th century was not so strengthened to make successful campaigns to Central Asia. Therefore, Peter I changed his policy from direct penetration of the region to improvement of commercial relations, rescuing Russian citizens from slavery and opening a trade route to India. However it

⁶⁵ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 9.

⁶⁶ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 9.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 9.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

could not succeed in other policies except improving trade.⁶⁹ Russia had to struggle with the Kazakh nomads who raid both Russian people along the Russian frontier and the trading caravans during the 18th century. Russian armies occupied the Kazakh Steppe between 1824 and 1854 and this was the first of the Steppe's history to be ruled by a sedentary power.⁷⁰

2.2. The Great Game on Turkestan: The Early Relations among Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, British Empire and Bukharan Emirate

After the British armies completed the invasion of India and turned towards Afghanistan, the first official links were established between Britain and Bukhara in 1838. At first, Britain guaranteed Bukhara not to intervene and emphasized his aim of friendship. However, Bukharan emir Nasrallah gave hostile reactions to British officials and rejected hand of friendship. Emir consolidated his rejection by blaming the British as infidels.⁷¹ On the other hand, Emir was very close to Russians who were also infidels. The main reason behind this policy was Bukhara's commercial links with Russia. However, Emir Nasrallah's anti-British policies caused Bukhara to pay a very heavy burden at the beginning of the 20th century. When Emir Alim, the last ruler of Bukhara, applied to British officials in India to ask for help against Bolsheviks, Britain rejected his application because of early policies of Bukhara against Britain. In short, Bukhara damaged its reliance for British Empire.⁷² Bukhara's hostile acts against the other khanates and cooperation with Russia

⁶⁹ Ibid,9.

⁷⁰ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 10.

⁷¹ Hatunoglu, Nurettin, *Turkistan'da Son Turk Devleti Buhara Emirligi ve Alim Khan*, (Istanbul: Otuken Nesriyat A.S., 2011), 46.

⁷² Ibid, 46.

threatened the future of Turkestan. Both British and their ally, Ottomans attempted to change Bukhara's pro-Russian and hostile policy. Although Ottoman Empire was not as powerful as to have strategic and economic interests and gains in Turkestan, the Sublime Porte pursued a pro-British policy because of being an enemy of Tsarist Russia and cooperating with England against Russia. Especially, after the Crimean War, the Ottoman and British policies were relatively common against Russia.⁷³ Since Ottomans had cultural and religious links because of owning the Caliphate, the Sublime Port tried to direct these states against Russian Empire. Russian policies were harmful and threatening for both the Sublime Port because of attempting to reach the high seas over Turkey's straits, and for England because of threatening British existence in India by annexing Turkestan. The main policy developed by the British and supported by the Port was to enable the khanates, especially Bukhara, to merge and defend them against Russian expansion.⁷⁴

For example, the Sublime Port sent a message to Bukharan emir to express his disturbance about Bukhara's hostility against Khiva and Kokand Khanates. In the message, it is written that:

For a time, as you are aware that, there have been conflicts and wars in the region and these bloody struggles among Muslims gave harms to the patriotism and clemency of the Caliphate. It is hoped by us that you will not approve this evil situation due to your responsibility of being a good believer and this evil situation will change into a unity and auspices among you.⁷⁵

But, the warnings and suggestions to the emirate did not make any impact. The skirmishes among the three khanates maintained and benefited Russians in terms of intervening and controlling the region. On the other side, the Emirate was the fewer payers of the internal conflicts among the Muslim khanates. It was put into the protectorate after Russian invasion but secured more advantages and rights than the Khanate of Khiva, which was limited to protectorate with very few rights. The

⁷³ Hatunoglu, Nurettin, *Turkistan'da Son Turk Devleti Buhara Emirligi ve Alim Khan*, (Istanbul: Otuken Nesriyat A.S., 2011), 48.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 48-49.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 48.

biggest payer was Kokand, because it was destroyed and took his place in pages of history as a result of Russian total occupation.

2.3. The Russian Conquests

Russian armies turned to Central Asia and started their great campaign in 1855. The main campaign, which began in 1855, was also a start of Tsarist Russian period in Turkistan that lasted until 1917 Revolution. There were three phases in terms of Russian expansion in Central Asia. The first one was Russian annexation and pacification of the Steppe Region between 1730 and the middle of the 19th century. The second one was between 1855 by which time Russian Army captured Syr Darya line to 1865 in which time Tashkent was occupied and in 1867 in which time the Governorate General of Turkestan was established.⁷⁶ After the capture of Tashkent from Kokand Khanate, the city was declared as the main headquarters of Russian Turkestan and had the importance which it had not gained throughout its history. In both Tsarist and Soviet rule, Tashkent was the heart of Russian administration. And then, Tsarist armies headed to other two khanates, Bukhara and Khiva. The third phase was Russia's intervention into the khanates like the annexation of Kokand and establishment of protectorate upon Bukhara and Khiva, in addition the defeat of Turcoman tribes in the battle of Gok Tepe in 1881, resulting the capture of Transcaspia and Marv oasis by 1884.⁷⁷ The main conflict broke out between Bukhara and Russia over the invasion of Kokand's territories firstly. Indeed, Russia benefited much from the internal conflicts between the khanates. These Central Asian states had been struggling with each other for years and were very

⁷⁶ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 35.

⁷⁷ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 35.

hostile to each one. Bukhara and Khiva were rivals to each other because of their disputable claims upon Merv and the left bank of the lower Syr Darya. Besides, there was rivalry and dispute between Bukhara and Kokand because of Bukhara's intervention in districts of Djizak, Ura-Tube, Khodjakent, Tashkent and Turkestan.⁷⁸ Bukhara invaded the Fergana Valley in 1839-1842 and in 1863 thus reduced Kokand into a status of vassal. The conflicts between two khanates continued until Russia entered the region⁷⁹. Instead of uniting against a common enemy, the khanates sought ways to benefit from a high power's attacks on one another. "The enduring rivalries among the Central Asian khanates prevented the formation of a united front against the Russian invader, and Bukhara's involvement in Kokand's internal affairs became the immediate cause of Bukhara's conflict with Russia".⁸⁰ The Emir of Bukhara Muzaffar al Din preferred gaining advantages from the Russian attacks on Kokand by invading Kokand's territories together with Russia. While Russian General Mikhail Grigoryevich Charniev⁸¹ had a war with Kokand and went over to capture Tashkent, Emir Muzaffar al Din attacked Kokand Khanate and captured the cities of Ura Turbe, Djizak(Jizzakh), Katta Qorghan and Khodjent. This was the breaking point between Russia and Bukhara. The Bukharan emir's invasion of the Kokand Khanate angered Russia. Russia punished Bukhara with the suspension of its trade. For Russia, territorial gain was not important; however it was very cautious about the strengthening of an actor at the expense of another in the region.⁸² The Bukharan Emir followed wrong policies regarding Kokand against the Russian

⁷⁸ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 4.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 4.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 4.

⁸¹ General Mikhail Grigoryevich Charniev was the military governor of Turkestan Oblast between 1865-1867. During the Charniev, Turkestan was an oblast dependent on Orenburg Governorate-General, not a separate Governor Generalship.

⁸² Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 22.

interests. Russia replied to acts of Bukharan emir Muzaffar al Din by occupying Samarkand in 1868. Emir's army could not stand against the powerful and modernized Russian troops. In the wars between Russia and Bukhara, Russia only lost very few soldiers although Bukhara's numerous troops were killed and many thousands were wounded. The arithmetic imbalance in terms of killed and wounded troops between Russia and Bukhara was extremely high. It was clearly impossible to resist by Bukhara against a technological and technical superiority of Russian troops. "Bukhara emerged from the war of 1865-1868 in full possession of her legal sovereignty but a de facto dependency of the Russian empire".⁸³ With the treaty of 1868, Bukhara had to accept the protectorate under Russian rule and annexation of Samarkand to Turkestan Guberniia under Russian rule. "The peace treaty, signed on June 30, 1868, gave Russia all the conquered territories: Khojand, Ura Tube, Jizzakh, Katta Qorghon, and especially Samarkand, which controlled the headwaters of the Zarafshan (all Bukhara's water), and finally, all the commercial advantages which the Russian leaders had previously been unable to obtain. Bukhara became a state under Russian suzerainty".⁸⁴ When the Emir of Bukhara realized the danger, it was too late. Russia was a reality in the region and they had to learn how to get along with a major power. Although the Emir made several attempts against Russian influence in Turkestan, it failed. "The emir renewed efforts to organize a coalition comprising Kokand, Khiva, Kashgar and Afghanistan and backed by Turkey and Great Britain, but his overtures were everywhere rejected".⁸⁵ For the Emir, there was no any choice rather than agreeing and obeying Russians.

⁸³ Ibid, 33.

⁸⁴ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 145.

⁸⁵ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 30.

2.4. The Improving Relations between the Emir and Tsarist Russia

The deteriorated relations after the 1868 Treaty was a bit repaired with the treaty of 1873. Russia rewarded the Emir of Bukhara because of the Emir's aids and support to Russian forces in their campaign against Khivan Khanate. Bukharan Emir Muzaffar al Din preferred helping Russians in the Khivan campaign of Russia and cared about Russian interests at that time. On the other side, the Emirate again chose to attack a Central Asian Muslim country instead of helping him to war against an infidel.

During the campaign against Khiva the emir of Bukhara preserved a friendly attitude toward Russia, probably more out of fear than any nobler emotion.⁸⁶ ...Muzaffar responded immediately to the governor general's (General Von Petrovich Kaufman⁸⁷) request for fresh grain and camels. On April 23 Kaufman wrote the emir, thanking him for his hospitality and calling him Russia's trustworthy friend and ally.⁸⁸

Indeed, Bukharan Emir had no choice rather than aiding Russians. He tried to pursue a balance policy not to be exposed to Russian threat. Russian Governor General Kaufman believed in the emir's sincerity and loyalty and gave him a small strip of Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amu Darya as a reward although the emir's policy was relatively self-interested, for instance, he secretly supported the resistance of Khivan Turcomans while seeming friendly to Russia at the same time.⁸⁹

After the emirate came under the protectorate of Russians, Bukharan Emir was respected more than other khanates by Russians. The Emirate was seen as the best ally of Tsarist rule. Among other khanates, the best relations with Governorate General of Turkistan were conducted by Bukhara. This was an advantage for Bukharan elite. In addition, Russians gave higher status to Bukharan Emirate rather

⁸⁶ Ibid, 60.

⁸⁷ General Von Petrovich Kaufman was the first Governor General of Turkestan between 1867-1881. He was known as conqueror of Turkestan in Russian military history.

⁸⁸ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 60.

⁸⁹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 60.

than Khiva and Kokand. Russia behaved Bukhara more generously than other two khanates in the 1873 agreement. For example, Bukharan emir had the right to communicate with Russian government directly although Kokand was destroyed and Khiva was forced to withdraw part of its territory. While Khiva was called “the docile servant of the Emperor of all the Russians” and forced to accept the administrative hierarchy under Russian rule through the 1873 agreement, it seemed a type of friendship treaty to Bukhara.⁹⁰ Russia’s soft attitude towards Bukhara was related to geographical importance of the Emirate in the region. The existence of Britain in India and British influence in neighboring Afghanistan caused Russians to pursue a more careful policy over Bukhara. “By avoiding political presence in Bukhara, Russia was able to ask Britain to observe a similar attitude in Afghanistan. Bukhara was an important factor in the division of Russian and British spheres of influence in Asia”.⁹¹ For these reasons, Russia accepted the privileged status of Bukhara, and the Emir became a cooperative ally for Russian administration. For example, the Emir of Bukhara had a right to contact with the Tsar although Governorate General of Turkestan was quite disturbed about the Emir’s privileged rights like bypassing governorate and directly contacting with St. Petersburg. “Bukhara’s external relations came under the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, while Turkistan was placed under the supervision of the ministry of war. Russia was represented in Bukhara by a political agent⁹², who acted like an ambassador and came under the foreign ministry; this gave Bukhara a semblance of quasi-

⁹⁰ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 38-39

⁹¹ Ibid, 39.

⁹² Russia was represented in Bukhara by a political agent, who acted like an ambassador and came under the foreign ministry; this gave Buykhara a semblance of quasi-independence which contributed to the external prestige of the emir.(Carrere D’Encausse : 39)

independence which contributed to the external prestige of the emir”.⁹³ The Bukharan governing elite consisted of bureaucracy, and military, both of which based on Persian slavery; and the most important one, the clergy which were controlling madrasah students. For that reason, the Emir tried to act carefully for his policies by cooperating with the mullahs who had great influence over conservative and traditional public masses. On the other side, the Emir pursued very different policies outside, especially towards St. Petersburg, an infidel and invader country. For example, Emir Muzaffar al Din had some problems with the mullahs after sending his successor Prince Abd al Ahad to Russia to take confirmation for crowning as an emir. The clergy saw that attitude as betrayal to traditions and Islam. “A decade earlier Muzaffar had chosen as his successor his fifth son, Abd al-Ahad, the Beg of Kermine, who now went to Moscow and received the imperial confirmation.”⁹⁴ In fact, after Abd-al Ahad’s trip to Russia, during which he had openly admired much of what he saw, the clerical zealots turned increasingly to Abd-al Malik⁹⁵ as their last hope”.⁹⁶ Abd al Ahad, taken the imperial confirmation, succeeded to the throne in the end. Abd al Ahad pursued the same way like his father, the way of getting along well with Russian suzerains. On February 1880, Abd al Ahad celebrated Alexander II’s accession by organizing a parade and fireworks demonstration in Karshi. In the celebrations, Captain Arandarenko as a representative of the Governor General participated. In addition, Emir Muzaffar sent his one of sons, Mansur to St. Petersburg for education in the early 1880s. In 1883,

⁹³ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 39.

⁹⁴ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 87.

⁹⁵ Malik was one of Emir Muzaffar’s princes. He made revolt attempts against his father and his brother Abd al Ahad. Since Ahad was known as Russian ally and took confirmation from St. Petersburg, Bukharan mullahs supported Malik for the emirate. But, his revolt tries failed.

⁹⁶ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 87.

Abd al Ahad sent presents and 100 000 rubles in gold to Alexander II's coronation. In return, Alexander II honored Emir Muzaffar and Crown Prince Abd al Ahad with the orders of St. Anna, St. Andrei and St. Stanislov.⁹⁷ Indeed Bukharan Emir and Russian Tsar as monarchs had very good relations. Of course, the Emir behaved like that because of necessary conditions. His country was in a status of protectorate and his military power's capacity was so poor and insufficient in a comparison with Russian troops in Turkistan Guberniia. It was a fact that the negative conditions necessitated him to ally with St. Petersburg. However, it was another fact that the Emir, as an authoritarian monarch, did not hesitate to cooperate with Russians against any internal opposing movements. For instance, Jadids (reformists of Bukhara) were suppressed by the Emir for years, and in the next period, they saw the best solution as cooperation with the Bolsheviks to escape from Emir backed by the Tsar during the civil war era. The Emir rejected revolting against Russia during the civil war because he thought he would cooperate with whatever came to power in St. Petersburg. But developments did not happen as the emir planned after the civil war. There had been consciousness in the emirate and that forced the emir to obey any power coming from Moscow or St. Petersburg.⁹⁸ However, the Bolsheviks preferred to appeal to the intellectuals, Jadids, instead of appealing to the mullahs and begs who prayed for the Tsar for years.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ibid,91.

⁹⁸ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 100.

⁹⁹ Ibid,102.

2.5. Capital Penetration in Bukhara

The capitalist penetration in Bukhara started with the construction of Trans-Caspian railways. Introduction of railroads to Bukhara enabled Bukhara to adapt to Russia and the West. The railways directly changed the system of Bukhara in a manner of economy, society and culture. Opening of Bukharan society to the Western world through railways was a first attempt for unpreventable change in the Emirate in the following years. “The first consequence of the conquest was the opening of Central Asia and Bukhara to capitalist penetration, especially after the construction of the Trans-Caspian railway. This project, undertaken for military purposes, profoundly altered the economic life of Central Asia”.¹⁰⁰ The most benefited group in Bukhara in the construction of railways was merchants. Although railways benefited Russia to take the region under control more effectively and this situation worried the Emir; merchants were profitable because of decrease in their costs for carriage. “The railroad did not strip Bukhara of its central role, but connected the city to Moscow and to Nihny-Novgorod. And whereas the carriage of pud (or 16.38kg) of goods by caravan from Bukhara to Orenburg would cost a much as three rubles, the railway brought the cost down (carriage guaranteed and insured as far as Moscow) to 70 kopecks per pud, which considerably improved the situation of the local merchants”.¹⁰¹ In addition to benefits and advantages for the inner merchants, it enabled Bukhara to open to the world markets. The foreign merchants could arrive in Bukhara for trade. The railway enabled Armenian, French and Jewish merchants to arrive. It was not only beneficial for Russian merchants. There were so many European merchants, coming to Bukhara for trade that the Emir put surtax on

¹⁰⁰ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 39.

¹⁰¹ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 40.

karakul in 1905 in order to protect Russian and Bukharan merchants. But, Bukhara continued to attract karakul buyers from London, Paris, Berlin and Constantinople as well as Moscow.¹⁰² Opening of Bukhara to foreign traders provided increase in economic development of the country and that opening up inevitably would bring the enlightenment in political and social life.

After the spreading influence and control by Russians in the region and increase of capitalist penetration year by year, the number of settlers began to increase both in Turkistan and in Bukhara. Russians began to come to Bukhara from 1873 on and they brought their civilization through constructing roads, railways, garrisons and customs posts. According to 1896 census, 12,150 Russian subjects were in Bukhara and there were 8000 soldiers among them. And, in the beginning of the Great War, the Russian population in the emirate was almost 50, 000 except military staff. Towards the end of the 19th century, Russian colonies increased more along the railroad and Amu Darya.¹⁰³ According to 1906 census, 5,378,000 Central Asians and 322, 000 Russian settlers were in Turkestan.¹⁰⁴ Of course, the policy of settling Russians by Tsarist rule in the region began causing problems between settlers and indigenous people. The indigenous people consisted of peasant farmers, nomads and seminomads. And, the number of Russian settlers increased year by year. The settlers backed by Russian administration gained their lands by expelling the indigenous owners of these lands.¹⁰⁵ Until the indigenous people lost their lands and water rights to Russian settlers, they had to welcome the introduction of Russian institutions and methods of the Tsarist policy of colonization between the years of

¹⁰² Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 135.

¹⁰³ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B. Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 40.

¹⁰⁴ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 179.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 179-180

1906 to 1911. But, the revolt broke out in 1916 because the sufferings reached the peak in the end.¹⁰⁶ The reaction of local peoples to settlers, who came to the position of being more advantaged than the local people, began creating anxiety in Russia during the civil war period. Not only local masses but also the emir and the clerical elite were not content with these settlers. In Russian administration both in Tsarist rule and Provisional Government era, there was an anxiety of immediate attack of indigenous people to settlers in the region. The changing of production tools and economic power in Bukharan society from one hand to another through capital penetration and settler policy caused some social explosions and problems while there were its benefits and profits for the country. It is undoubtedly right that Russians brought so many helpful innovations to the region for the benefit of local people and Bukharan state. "They established a good road and railway system and adequate port facilities on the Caspian and Aral seas...They secured the Chinese, Afghan and Persian frontiers; they considerably developed trading facilities and the supply of raw materials..."¹⁰⁷ Russians constructed roads, railways and ports on the Caspian and Aral Seas. In addition, they secured the Chinese, Afghan and Persian borderlands. They also developed trade and supply of raw materials. The construction of railways, industrial development, and the growth of towns and entrance of Russian capital in rural production had reinforced and enlarged the Emirate's relations with Russia and improved capitalist relations inside the emirate. These developments caused social changes inside Bukharan socio-economic system such as destruction of traditional rural ownership, acceleration of class differentiation in villages, increase of commercial character in agrarian production, and the peasantry's specialization in cotton cultivation resulting a progressive adaptation of

¹⁰⁶ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 41.

¹⁰⁷ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 39.

other sectors of the economy.¹⁰⁸ The only innovation was not railroad in Central Asia. There was also construction of telegraph network by Russians throughout Turkistan and protectorate khanates. “During the previous decade the Russian telegraph network had spread throughout Russian Turkestan, reaching Tashkent in 1873, Khodjent in 1875, Samarkand and Kokand in 1876, and Katta-Kurgan, on the Bukharan frontier, in 1878. General Von Kaufman raised the question of a telegraph link to Bukhara several times at the end of the 1870’s, but apparently without insistence and consequently with no effect”.¹⁰⁹ For example, the telegraph crisis was the clear evidence for the influence of clergy over the Emir in Bukhara. The telegraph link reached the borders of Bukhara but it could not enter the city due to the Emir’s refusal, because the clergy was against all types of innovations inside Bukhara. As a protector of conservative-traditional social structure, the class of mullahs was keen on struggling every change and renewal. They were severe defenders of Emir’s old authority and early system in the country. They considered the changes were against Islam since they came from an infidel power. However, Emir’s approval of their desires was related to Emir’s necessity to take their support to continue his rule over masses. Otherwise, there was not any problem to implement with Russian orders according to Emir’s perspective. The emirs, both Muzaffar’s son Abd al Ahad and Ahad’s son Sayyid Alim, had Russian life styles. They spent most of their time during their principdoms in Russia. For instance, Alim took Russian education in Russian schools and knew about Russian literature and culture well. On the other side, they had to pursue balanced policies for not irritating domestic actors.

¹⁰⁸ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 44.

¹⁰⁹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 88.

“On substantive questions Muzaffar successfully resisted Russian pressure on slavery, the slave trade, and postal communications and he managed for nine months to avoid an agreement on the construction of the telegraph line, the one issue on which Russia was adamant.¹¹⁰ If the emperor chose to command him to comply, but his authority in the khanate would thereby be undermined because of the clergy’s hold over the masses. A complete Russian takeover in Bukhara would be the inevitable outcome”.¹¹¹

In the end, Russians and modernization won the game and the Emir had to step back against Tsarist decisiveness. The telegraph line to Bukhara entered the holy city, Bukhara in 1884, because the Russian support behind the Emir was vital for him to maintain his sultanate. An immediate clash with the Tsar or the Governor General of Turkestan in the region would end his reign.

Russian capitalism was taking control of Bukharan economic life and gaining every sector in the country. Through the established Banks, Russian based capitalism penetrated financially in the Emirate. Russian banks spread all over the Bukhara at the beginning of the 20th century. Every bank had a monopoly in economic life. For example, the Russo-Asiatic Bank had a monopoly of railway construction; the Azov and Don Bank had cotton trade and the Siberian Commercial Bank had the sector of cotton purchases and imports of manufactured goods. In addition, the State Bank, the Volga Bank and Kama Commercial Bank were the other banks, operating in the emirate.¹¹² Although there were local merchants and businessmen, they could not be compared to Russian capitalists and monopolists. Bukharan people were peasants and villagers in a great majority. Through these banks and monopolies, Tsarist Russia penetrated capitalism and included Bukhara financially to its economic system. On this way, customs union was established among Russia, Khiva and Bukhara in the last years of 19th century. Thus the khanates’ economic interdependence with Russia was completed after the political and military

¹¹⁰ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 90.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 89.

¹¹² Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans, *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 42-43

protectorate. The increase in amount of exports and imports between two countries consolidated the interdependence in economic realm, especially in finance and trade. “The inclusion of Bukhara in the empire’s customs system had the effect of developing considerably Russo-Bukharan economic relations: in 1865 Bukhara’s exports to Russia totaled 3,306,000 roubles and its imports 1,913,000 roubles; by 1913 exports had risen to 31 million roubles and imports to 35 million”.¹¹³ On the eve of the World War I and Revolution, in Bukhara, the industrial development emerged as being depended on Russian settlements. The basic reason of this was that Russians formed the skilled labor force.

In both Bukhara and Khiva the ownership of the new factories was predominantly Russian, and the management and skilled workers were entirely so. By contrast, the unskilled labor force was drawn from the natives of the two countries. The total number of workers has been estimated at almost 1300 for Bukhara in 1905, and 400-500 for Khiva in 1917.¹¹⁴ By 1913 the total was twenty six, of which nineteen were owned by Russians, three by Russian Tatars, three by the emir of Bukhara, and one by a Bukharan merchant.¹¹⁵

Since the proletariat class was Russian settlers in the region, the effects of Revolution spread through this Russian settler class. In the khanates of both Bukhara and Khiva, the operating factories belonged to Russians and the skilled labor force was Russian originally. However, the unskilled workers consisted of natives. The total number of workers in Bukhara was 1300 in 1905 and 400-500 in Khiva in 1917. The number of factories was twenty six by 1913 and nineteen of these factories belonged to Russians, three belonged to Russian Tatars, three belonged to the Emir and one belonged to a Bukharan merchant.¹¹⁶ On the contrary, Bukharan indigenous population was peasant, uneducated and forming unskilled cheap labor force in the region. The local workers completely lacked theoretical infrastructure in order to carry out the Revolution. In railroads and factories, Russian workers were the main

¹¹³ Ibid, 40.

¹¹⁴ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 145.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 145.

¹¹⁶ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 39.

workforce and they carried features of proletariat class in the region. Local people worked in fields and at works not requiring technical labor force. This situation became a disputable matter for years and seen as the lack of proletariat class in the region. After the fall of Emirate, the new Bukharan state and Khorezm state(replaced instead of Khivan Khanate) were founded as Bukharan Soviet Public Republic and Khorezm Soviet Public Republic instead of socialist republics like other ones, Turkestan ASSR and Kyrgyzstan ASSR. According to Soviet views, the reason was explained that there had been no proletariat class in Bukhara and Khiva in previous period, so there should be a transition period for declaration of a socialist republic.

2.6. National Awakening and Jadidism

2.6.1. Jadidism in Bukhara

National awakening among Russian Muslims including Crimea, Turkistan, Steppe Region and the Khanates began with the introduction of *usul-i jadid* schools programmed by Ismail Gasprinsky, a Crimean Tatar intellectual. *Tarjuman*, meaning the Interpreter, was founded in 1883 by Ismail Gasprinsky. That journal aimed to propagate the ideas of reform of religious education and pan-Turkism. Gasprinsky's purpose was to enable all the Turkish peoples in the empire to unite primarily around a common literary language and a common culture thus reaching the national recognition in next.¹¹⁷ And then, he developed establishment of school method throughout the regions where Turks lived in majority. The first schools were opened in Crimea and aimed to open in other Turkic places. The *usul-i jadid* schools aimed to give modern education in Turkestan and the Khanates. Thus, an enlightened class

¹¹⁷ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 60.

would be created in next period as a result of this educational reform that targeted to replace the religious-conservative based madrasah education with modern education. For Gasprinsky, educational reform was very important for the political and cultural awakening of Turco-Tatar peoples, modernization of Islamic life and emancipation of women in society. The name of this program was Jadidism and the reformed schools, established according to the aims of this modernization program, were known as Usul-i jaded schools (new method schools).¹¹⁸ Jadid Movement was introduced in Bukharan emirate through these Jadid schools and managed to create a small educated elite which would direct the fate of the country in future. The first school in Turkestan was opened by famous Jadid leader Munavvar Kari in Taskent. In Bukharan Emirate, Jadids were led by Abd ar Rauf Fitrat, Bukharan intellectual. The well-known Jadid leaders of Bukhara were Fayzallah Khodzhaev, Usman Khodzhaev, Abdulrauf Fitrat, Munavvar Kari, Poet Colpan, Polat Khodzhaev, Sadallah Khodzhaev, Ubeydullah Khodzhaev. They formed the government of Bukharan People's Republic in 1920 after the fall of monarchy. On the other side, the Emir and mullahs were very disturbed about the activities of Bukharan Jadid leader Abd ar Rauf Fitrat. "Both the Jadid group in the khanate and the Constantinople organization shared common aims and to some extent a common membership. The spokesman for both groups was Abd ar Rauf Fitrat, who left Bukhara for Constantinople in 1910 and there became the best known propagandist for reform in the khanate and the acknowledged ideological leader of the Bukharan reform movement".¹¹⁹ Although Jadidism improved in field of education and clashed with the clerical education method of madrasahs; it was inevitable to spill over the

¹¹⁸ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 160.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 163.

political arena in future. By Gasprinsky, it aimed the modernization and unification of Turkic nations through this new method.

It was primarily a Muslim reformist movement with pan-Turkic overtones, which aimed at modernizing the Muslim system of education and also at introducing a uniform Turkic language for use by all the Turkic peoples in Russia. In the second of these aims it achieved no success, but in the educational field its progress was remarkable and a large number of so-called Jadid schools were set up in the larger towns of the Turkestan province...¹²⁰

The Bukharan Jadids had difficulty maintaining education in reformed schools, because both Tsarist officials and the Bukharan governing elite, the Emir and clergy, were against their existence. Tsarist administration saw them dangerous because of their pan-Turkist tones and ideas. Also, Jadid schools got more success than Russian schools in the region. Through these schools, intellectuals as a small elite were on the way of creation, so this threatened the colonizers. In addition, the local compradors of Tsar were deliberate to this emerging new class. The mullahs were basic representatives of *usul-i kadim* method in education. *Usul-i kadim* was the conservative, religious and traditional madrasah based education method supported by clergy in Bukhara. It had a legitimacy dated back to centuries ago in Holy Bukhara and Samarkand cities so that is the reason of the Kadims' disagreement with Jadids. The Kadims saw themselves as the representatives of ancient historic traditions; religious based teaching of Islam and values. The advocates of the old method blamed the representatives of *usul-i jadid* to be infidels and saw them as their enemies. The emirs, both Abd al Ahad and his successor Sayyid Alim Khan, considered that the support of clergy to direct the peoples was a must therefore they followed a suppression policy against educational reform and reformist jadids. "Frustrated by the opposition of the emir's government to educational reform, the Bukharan liberals soon broadened their aims and began to look elsewhere than to Russia's Moslems for leadership in their attempt to modernize

¹²⁰ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 41-42.

Bukhara. Their attention was attracted by the liberal revolution in Persia in 1906 and even more by the liberal nationalist Young Turk revolution in Turkey in 1908”.¹²¹ The constitutional revolutions in leading Moslem countries such as Turkey and Persia enforced the Bukharan Jadids to turn their direction to the developments in these countries. They were good examples in order to give direction to their plans and aims. “Late in 1909 a group of Bukharan exiles in Constantinople founded the Bukharan Society for the Dissemination of Knowledge (Bukhara Tamim-I Maarif), whose goals were to found schools in the khanate and to finance the sending of Bukharan students to study in Constantinople”.¹²² The Young Turk Movement and their social party Union and Progress became the guide for both Bukharan and Khivan jadids, getting education in Ottoman lands. Jadids in Khivan Khanate and Bukharan Emirate called themselves as Young Bukharans and Young Khivans after they had graduated and returned from Constantinople. Constantinople was the safest place for reformists because they could have any aid and support from the nationalist Turkish Government, especially after Union and Progress Party came to power through a coup in 1913. “The Jadids also put forth great efforts to send students from Bukhara to Turkey, fifteen in 1911, thirty in 1913, and only World War I put a stop to this advance. While these figures seem insignificant in themselves, the young students in Turkey were living in an exciting atmosphere of pan-Turkism and hostility toward Russia”.¹²³ Sending students to Turkey was the best method for a preparation of change and reform on the perspective of Jadids. It was a kind of public diplomacy policy at that time for Bukharan reformists. On the other side, it was the best way for Ottoman Young Turks to export their regime to influence the Central

¹²¹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 162.

¹²² Ibid, 162.

¹²³ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 200.

Asian Muslim Turkic states. The Russian authorities were aware of that threat therefore they took their precautions on the eve of World War I. The reformists were exposed to arrests and prosecutions inside the Emirate. And, the ones in Turkey could not return back to their countries. The Jadid schools were badly affected just after the outbreak of the Great War. The schools and Jadid activities were suspected by Russia due to their close links with the Ottoman Empire which attended the war on the side of Central Powers in November 1914, in addition there were a large number of Bukharan students and emigrants in Constantinople.¹²⁴

2.6.2. The Reasons of Emergence of Jadidism

The meaning of Jadid in both Arabic and Persian language is “new”. Jadidism means the renewal or reform. The basic institution of Jadid reform was the new method school itself. These schools were the site of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the next generation. Through them, the Jadids disseminated a cognitive style which is quite different from that of the maktab and thus created a group in society that was receptive to their ideas. These schools were also crucial to the social reproduction of the movement.¹²⁵ Jadids emerged as the new elite of Turkestan as a result of transformations of Central Asian society and economy under severe Russian influence and rule. These new and modern elite attempted to make a cultural transformation of Turkistan despite the obstacles produced by the traditional structure of Central Asia. The native societies and traditional cultures in Southern Central Asia, the lands of Transoxiana, were isolated from other parts of the world

¹²⁴ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 164.

¹²⁵ Adeeb, Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 103.

before Russian armies arrived in the 1860s. Although Samarkand and Bukhara had been prominent cities of Muslim world regarding owning the learning centers and location of the Silk Road centuries ago, local wars and skirmishes for power, wealth and territory among the khanates in the region were under way in the beginning of the 19th century. But, The Russian invasion brought the region a change and impulsive force for transformation in realm of politics, economics, culture and society.¹²⁶ The power and influence of the traditional political structures and local emirs and khans were lessened and limited by tsarist officials in Turkestan, for instance the khanates were reduced the level of protectorates.¹²⁷ The Tsarist interventions and effects caused by these interventions caused the Jadid movement to emerge and increase for the call of social reform in Muslim regions of Russian Empire. The basic purpose of Jadids was the implementation of an internal reform in order to replace the old one with the new social order which is modern but Islamic.¹²⁸ The Jadid movement's fundamental philosophy was the Bukharan intellectuals' seeking a way to solve their country's suspension between medieval Islam and modern West. The general feature of the Jadids is that they consisted of intellectuals like authors, poets, educators and students rather than economic and commercial actors. It was true that they got the support of shopkeepers, merchants and minor officials who were in expectancy of educational, clerical, fiscal and administrative reforms. As the last point, it should not be forgotten the Russians' civilizing and enlightened role upon Russian Muslims and reform movements in Turkistan.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled empire: gender and power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 14.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 15.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 15.

¹²⁹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 164-165.

2.6.3. The Jadids and Russian Educated Intellectuals

The Central Asian Jadids were a bit different from the ones in European Russia and Transcaucasia. For example, Central Asian Jadids were much closer to the Islamic cultural tradition rather than other Jadids in other parts of Russia. The Jadids of European Russia, especially intellectuals of Crimea and Volga Tatars, and Transcaucasia took Russian education in modern Russian schools or academies. For example, Ismail Gasprinsky had attended a military academy in Moscow and served as a secretary of Ivan Turgunev in Paris for two years.¹³⁰ In addition, it should not be skipped that the Jadids of Crimea and Volga Tatars were the founding fathers and leading personalities of the Jadidism. Central Asian Jadids were not only different from the Jadids of European Russia but also different from the small number of Central Asian modern- secular and Russian educated intellectuals. As their well-known name for these intellectuals, *munevvers*, which means intellectuals in Arabic language, was used. They were commonly known as *munevvers*. These Central Asians with a modern Russian secular education were in majority Tatar and Kazakhs. While Central Asian Jadids (Jadids of the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Turkestan) were coming from families of the old cultural elite, Central Asian Tatar intellectuals, whose families arrived in the region after the Russian conquest, came from aristocratic elites.¹³¹ The Kazakhs also came from aristocratic families. The Kazakh aristocracy emerged in the Steppe by the middle of the 19th century.¹³² And, this Steppe aristocracy was very secular as compared with the other aristocrat groups in Bukharan, Khivan and Turkestan. Since there was no madrasas giving a religious

¹³⁰ Adeeb, Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 105.

¹³¹ Adeeb, Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 105.

¹³² *Ibid*, 105.

based education in the Steppe, and Kazakhs did not have a tradition of madrasa learning, Kazakh children were sent to Russian schools since the beginning of the 19th century and this situation caused a birth of a secular Kazakh elite class in the Steppe. ¹³³ “The Russian conquest of Turkestan brought the Qazaq steppe under greater influence of the Islam reproduced in madrasas, as madrasa students found it safer to travel to the steppe in the summer. Writing in 1910, Ahmet Bukeykhanov saw two competing new elites emerging in the Qazaq lands, one formed like him in Russian institutions, the other increasingly Muslim and formed in the madrasas of Central Asia and the Volga”.¹³⁴ The secular intellectuals of Central Asia generally went to Russia to take education. To give an example, Mustafa Chokay, who was a descendent of Khivan royal family and a famous leader of Kokand Autonomous Government, which was founded in 1917 and was destroyed by the Bolsheviks in 1918, got education in law faculty in St. Petersburg University. Although Chokay’s activities were similar to Jadids, he belonged to the group of Russian educated secular intellectuals. Even, to demonstrate the distinction between Jadids and secular intellectuals, “it was very difficult to find any interaction or link between them before 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution. The Jadids represented the modernization of the Muslim cultural tradition of Central Asia; the secular intellectuals were fluent in the idiom of European thought. The Jadids spoke to Muslim society in order to achieve cultural change; the secular intellectuals spoke to the Russian state and Russian society in order to achieve political change”.¹³⁵ When Jadids and secular intellectual group merged into a common political movement in 1917, the modern educated intellectuals had the leading role in the politics although Jadids had

¹³³ Ibid, 106.

¹³⁴ Adeeb, Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 106.

¹³⁵ Adeeb, Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 106.

numerical majority and influence over the local people; because modern secular intellectual group owned an advantage of using Russian language and Russian political idiom perfectly.¹³⁶ Central Asian Jadidism as being different from Russian educated modern secular intellectuals, concentrated on Muslim modernism, because Jadidism's rhetoric had its roots in Islamic tradition and culture of Central Asian Muslim society.¹³⁷ Therefore, their basic emphasis was upon the modernity which was congruent with the true essence of Islam, and modernization of Muslim society through a new understanding of Islam.¹³⁸ In addition, there was a difference between the Jadids and secular intellectuals about the program for the political future. For example, the main idea of Russian educated secular intellectuals (munevvers) was not separated from Russia; instead, they were favor of national, territorial, cultural and federal autonomy for the Muslim nationalities under the rule of Russia. In short, they were much more interested in cultural matters rather than political.¹³⁹ However, The Jadids were the severe advocates of full independence for future program.

2.6.4. Birth and Increase of National Awakening

Although Jadids had conducted their secret activities against the authoritarian regime with the aim of weakening the national feeling in society, it was not so effective when compared to power of ruling elite backed by Tsar and religious class. In the early 19th century, some developments, triggering the nationalist feeling, happened in Russia. The first one is the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904. The defeat of Russia in that war was a milestone for colonized people

¹³⁶ Ibid, 107.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 113.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 113.

¹³⁹ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 100.

especially Russian Moslems inside the borders of Russia. “The years 1904 and 1905 were exceptionally difficult for the Russian empire. In 1904 the empire, apparently strong and victorious, was defeated by Japan. This defeat was significant not only for Russia, but also the world: it was the first time for many centuries that a conquering power the Christian West had collapsed before a non-white people”.¹⁴⁰ The idea of independence awakened among Russian Muslims after that defeat. For them, defeating Russia became possible now, even by an eastern nation. The cult of Russian glory and superiority ceased, and this situation was a forerunner of difficult days for Tsardom. Nikolai Petrovich Ostroumov¹⁴¹ (1846-1930) an educationalist in Turkestan and editor of Turkistan Wilayatining Gazeti from 1883 – 1917, Central Asian students had visited Russia to see the imperial glory and power, but the visits ceased suddenly just after the defeat against Japan. The defeat of Russia by an eastern power encouraged Central Asian Muslims to escape from Russian domination. Russia lost its efficiency and glory in the eyes of Muslim communities. Moreover, 1905 Revolution encouraged the increase of national consciousness more.¹⁴² The second important event in Russia was 1905 Revolution, as a result, its spreading influence in Central Asia. The Revolution of 1905 brought constitutional monarchy, establishment of the State Duma, a multiparty system and declaration of Russian constitution of 1906 to Tsarist Russia. The Monarchy’s mandates and power were restrained. Although there were not local regional partners of 1905 Revolutionists in both Turkestan and Bukhara, this was an important occasion which

¹⁴⁰ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 71.

¹⁴¹ Nikolai Petrovich Ostroumov was an educationalist in Central Asia. He studied Arabic, Turkic languages and Islam. He arrived in Tashkent in 1877 as an inspector of Russian schools in Central Asia. He served as a director of Turkestan Teacher’s College. Then he was appointed as the editor of Turkistan Wilayatining Gazeti by General Kaufman. He served in his new job under the governorate general of Kaufman and Charniev till 1917.

¹⁴² Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 178-179.

would display its effects in the next period. “The indigenous Turkestan population took no part in the revolutionary unrest of the years 1905-7, though in the guberniya this took the form of extremely violent clashes. In Turkestan, revolutionary developments were helped by the presence of deported Russian social democrats”.¹⁴³ These social democrats, being exiled in Turkestan by Tsarist administration, organized the Russian railroad workers in the region and enabled the revolution to spread to the whole empire. Although Russian 1905 Revolution did not influence Turkestan reformists to move, 1906 Revolution in Persia and especially 1908 Revolution in Turkey had more influence upon them. The importance of 1905 Revolution and Russian defeat in war of 1904 caused the weakness of Tsarist administration thus power vacuum in both Turkestan and Bukhara. These factors reflected in the region as revolts of peasants and increase of Jadids’ activities and reform demands.

Firstly, the indigenous peasants, who lost their lands and water rights to Russian settlers and were disturbed about being used as cheap labor, and the nomadic Turkic tribes revolted against Russian administration in 1916 on the eve of the Revolutions. Although this revolt did not have any nationalist tendency, instead, included economic reasons; it was important to be the most effective one among other revolts since the 1868, especially regarding the size of the peasant, villager and nomadic rebellions increased after 1905. The great revolt of 1916 was caused by Tsarist policies in terms of economy and military. The Turkestan people, who had been exempted from military service for years, were forced to attend as workers in fronts. “The immediate cause of the great rebellion of 1916 was the Imperial Decree of June 25 calling up non-Russians for labour duties in rear of the Russian forces

¹⁴³ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 72

engaged in the First World War. The quotas set were 250.000 workers from Turkistan and 243.000 from the four oblasts of the Steppe Region”.¹⁴⁴ Besides, enforcing the peasants and villagers to specialize in only cotton agriculture against grain caused Central Asians to suffer from starvation and scarcity during the war period. These economic factors became basic reasons for revolts. Secondly, the reformists, conducting their secret activities underground, began emerging to the arena and had more nationalist feeling than peasant revolts. The reform winds from Persia and Turkey were successful examples and guides for their aims. These two movements combined after the 1917 Revolutions and especially the expansion of Soviet rule in the whole region. It was possible to see this in the cooperation of Basmachi forces and Bukharan Jadids in the early 1920s. For that reason, the two events, 1904 defeat and 1905 Revolution, were milestones on the way of national awakening of local people and Young Bukharans’ struggle.

2.7. Emir Alim Khan (Pro-Modernist but Anti-Reformist Character)

Sayyid Mir Alim succeeded to the throne after his father Abd al Ahad’s death in 1910. He was very close to Russian lifestyle because he took education for four years in the Nikolaevsky Cadets in St. Petersburg. He had numerous Russian books in his library and he frequently visited Russia like his father.¹⁴⁵ The Bukharan princes’ recognition and adoption to Russian life style and culture began in the reign of Emir Muzaffar . He sent his sons to St. Petersburg for travels and education. And then, Abd al Ahad did the same thing and sent his son Alim to Russia for education.

¹⁴⁴ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenword Press, 1964), 92.

¹⁴⁵ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 163.

The good relations and loyalty between St. Petersburg and the Emirs was encouraged through early education and frequent visits. Mission civilisatrice policy of Russia became successful over the Emir and his family. The Tsarist administration also appreciated the Emirs, because both Abd al Ahad and his son Alim took Russia's approval before their succession to the throne. The Emirs were protected, helped and honored by Russia in consideration of their loyalty.

The tsarist Government not only helped the Emir against his own people, it understood also how to flatter his vanity.¹⁴⁶ A. Polovtsoff relates: "Later on, when the new railway line which linked his country through Orenburg to Russia was completed, he was given a large saloon car lacquered in cherry red and ornamented with reproduction of his Order of the Star of Bukhara, so that railway officials should know what an exalted passenger was inside. He was immensely proud of this imperial gift."¹⁴⁷

Since Alim seemed very Western and modern in his early years of sultanate, the reformers got content with his succession. They expected him to allow reforms and take side near reformers against the mullah class. But, it did not happen. Though he made several administrative reforms, the context of reforms remained limited and did not include freedoms. He pursued closer policies to mullah class and demands of Russians. On the other hand, Alim Khan was a real Jadid in terms of his background education and training though he was displayed as an enemy against Jadids. If he was a merchant's son instead of a crown prince, he would have been a Jadid. For that reason, Alim Khan's position near the Kadims (traditionalists) and against the Jadids

¹⁴⁶ Coates, Zelda K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 59.

¹⁴⁷ Coates, Zelda K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 59.

was related to politics and rather than being related to ideas and opinions. The organizing of Jadidism as a strong political oppositional movement in Bukhara forced Alim Khan to take his side near the Kadims because they were hard advocates of monarchy.¹⁴⁸

As an orthodox Moslem state, Bukhara itself was embarrassed by the sultankhalifs proclamation of holy war against the Allies. Emir Alim demonstrated his loyalty to Russia by donating several million rubles to the Russian war effort; in September 1916 he journeyed in person to the front to present the emperor with a gift of one million rubles. At home the Bukharan government proved its loyalty by suppressing all opposition and forbidding the reading of newspapers or the discussion of current events.¹⁴⁹

It is a fact that Alim was a very pragmatic man. Even though he carried several spiritual ranks and titles such as a title of Emir (meaning Commander of Believers) and claimed to be a sayyid by tracing back to the prophet, he chose to remain an ally of Russia in the Great War although Ottoman Sultan and Caliph Sultan Mehmed V declared jihad for Muslims worldwide. In sum, although he was a modern and western styled man in accordance with his education and training in Russia, he had a responsibility to rule as a monarch in his country so it was crucial for him to take support of the mullah class, owning a strong authority over conservative and uneducated public and numerous madrasa students, the Russian officials. The bad destiny for him was that he could not guess the fall of Russian Tsar and increase of Bolshevism in Russia in next period.

¹⁴⁸ Hatunoglu, Nurettin, *Turkistan'da Son Turk Devleti Buhara Emirligi ve Alim Khan*, (Istanbul: Otuken Nesriyat A.S., 2011), 26

¹⁴⁹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 164.

CHAPTER 3

REVOLUTIONARY ERA: FEBRUARY AND OCTOBER REVOLUTIONS

In this chapter, I try to point out the stages, developments and conditions that prepared the traditional Bukharan society and identity to transform into a level of Peoples' Republic. This transformation was important for the birth of Uzbekistan nation state in the region in future. I focused on the civil war conditions, and the developments in the region during the March and February Revolutions which were the most remarkable parameters for the collapse of ancient traditional structure of Bukhara and also the increase of bourgeoisie nationalist class, known as Young Bukharans, which was the most prominent internal actor for the modernization and transformation of the society and country. I also try to analyze the Bolshevik intervention as an independent variable into the struggle for reform and change between feudal classes led by the monarch and bourgeoisie nationalists, because the Soviet intervention was a crucial factor for the transformation of the Bukharan society and the country. It was both an important and compulsory catalyst for the change of the country and the local society. I analyze the examples of establishments of Alash Orda, Bashkurd and Kokand governments as role models with their national characters for the Bukharan Jadids. In addition, I try to analyze the matter of class

struggle in Bukharan Emirate, and I focus on the class struggle between the bourgeoisie nationalist class a feudal aristocracy class in Bukhara instead of a class struggle between the proletariat class and capitalist class as it occurred in Russia.

3.1. Pre-Revolutionary Era

Both Russia and the neighboring regions were in chaos just before the 1917 Revolutions. The Great War conditions struck Tsarist Russia, and Tsarist Russia could not stand the heavy burden of the war. The civil war was about breaking out inside the country. In 1916, an important event occurred in the Steppe region of the Empire. Then the uprisings spread to Turkistan. Native Muslim communities upraised against the ongoing poverty and starvation in the lands of Central Asia. The indigenous in Central Asia were force to renounce their water rights and irrigation lands for the behalf of Russian settlers. Since the policy of specialization in cotton production was implemented in Turkistan and the grain needs were supplied from Russia; Turkistan and the Steppe fell into starvation because of collapse of grain supply in the war years. Moreover, recruitment of Moslem natives by Tsarist regime was the last triggering factor for break out of uprising. The uprisings were pressed by the governorate general of Turkistan. The uprisings in the Steppe continued until February Revolution.¹⁵⁰ The international arena was also full of problems and questions just after the Great War. Ottoman Empire, as the most prominent and leading state for Muslim countries in the world, was about collapsing at the end of 1917. Persia was inside anarchy and Afghanistan was in a war with Britain. In China, the ruling Manchu dynasty fell and the region of Sinkiang (the lands of the late Kasghar Khanate) was in power vacuum due to the lack of ruling authority. Central

¹⁵⁰ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 121.

Asia was shaken by the effects of Revolutions at that time period. Inside the borders of Turkistan, at least 40,000 German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war were deployed by Russia.¹⁵¹ Just before the February Revolution, the peasant revolt broke out in 1916 among the Steppe peasants of Central Asian Muslims. The inconsistent policies and enormous increase of Russian and Ukrainian settlers in Central Asia caused native population to give reactions to the Russian rule. The break out of 1916 peasant revolt was a result of these reactions to inconsistent policies. After the February Revolution, the native people got hopeful about the possible change of ongoing Russian policies in the region. They expected the restoration of their rights over water sources and lands.¹⁵² After the February Revolution, a wind of freedom influenced the Steppe, Idil-Ural and Turkistan regions. There was not enough intelligentsia among Central Asian Muslims at that time (in revolutionary era). For instance, 97-98 % of the population was illiterate except a very small group of the Kazakhs.¹⁵³ There was no enough intelligentsia among Muslim elements to organize a modern state in the region. There was no military tradition for centuries. They were excluded from military service. There was also exception in the khanates. They had few military forces because of remaining under protectorate. Communication services, railways, telegraphs or industrial facilities, all of them belonged to Russians.¹⁵⁴ Among the peoples of Turkestan, there was not an idea or identity of nation and nationality. The communities were tribal, nomadic, especially in Turkmen basin and the Steppe, and bound to Islam extremely in Turkestan, the khanates, the emirate and Fergana. Especially, sedentary population was under severe influence of

¹⁵¹ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964),98.

¹⁵² Ibid, 97

¹⁵³ Ibid, 97.

¹⁵⁴ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 97-98.

religiosity. The peoples did not recognize the Western ideologies like nationalism or nation concept because of the illiteracy of majority and lack of an intelligentsia.¹⁵⁵

3.2. Other Main Muslim Operating Forces in Russia-wide

3.2.1. Alash Orda Autonomous Government

February Revolution provided Muslims of Russia a relaxed atmosphere in order to take initiative and organize for unity depending on a common culture. 1916 Revolt mostly harmed nomadic Steppe society, the Kazakhs. So, the first attempt to declare a territorial autonomy came from the Kazakhs who organized all the Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in 17 November 1917. These developments were clearly results of the slight atmosphere brought by February Revolution. Alash Orda¹⁵⁶, a moderate national Kazakh Party, was founded by Kazakh intellectuals who were Russian educated, modern, moderate and secular. The basic policy of Alash Orda was to demand redistribution of the lands and end of colonization. They made an emphasis on agrarian issues and problems instead of politics. They openly supported the Provisional Government, February Revolution and continuation of war against Germany. Briefly, they were advocates of Kerensky and his government that were not too strong enough to enforce them to obey without any right. Alash Orda's party program envisaged some important decisions like ceasing the Russian settlers' immigration to the region, ceasing the recruitment of Kazakh males to force them to use as labor force at fronts, and giving the cultural-national autonomy to Alash Orda. The prominent leaders of Alash Orda were Alihan Bukeyhanov, Ahmad Baytursunov

¹⁵⁵ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 97.

¹⁵⁶ Alash Orda means Alash Host. Alash was a mythical founder of the Kazakh people.

and Mir Yakup Devlet. For instance, Ahmed Baytursunov, leader of the party, was a moderate nationalist and was against the Bolshevik regime. Moreover, Alash Orda and Kazakh intellectuals did not openly favor pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, because they were opposed to Tatar cultural hegemony.¹⁵⁷ It is well known that pan-Turkism was an ideology doctrine by Tatar intellectuals. There was a disagreement between Tatar and Kazakh echoes at that era. They were disagreed over some methodological issues regarding the context of autonomy. There were differences and distributions about their programs in the new era between Tatar leaders and Kazakh leaders. For example, in the all-Russian Muslim Congress¹⁵⁸ which was sponsored by Tatar leaders in Moscow on May 1, 1917; the future political program was discussed and a common resolution was decided on. “It was agreed that the form of government most capable of protecting the interests of the Muslim peoples was a democratic republic based on national, territorial and federal principles, with national-cultural autonomy for the nationalities which lacked a distinct territory”.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, Kazakh leaders and Alash Orda Party sponsored another Congress, the all Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in Orenburg in April 1917, one month later after the all Muslim Russians Congress and firstly declared to support territorial autonomy.

The Third all-Kirgiz (Kazakh) Congress, convened in Orenburg in December 1917, proclaimed an autonomous Kazakh region under the Alash Orda. This autonomous region had two centers, one at Semipalatinsk and the other at Dzhambeyty in the Ural oblast. The declared purpose of this autonomy was not apparently to create a Kazakh state, but merely to prevent the spread of Communism into the Kazakh steppe.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 101.

¹⁵⁸ The first all-Russian Muslim Congress was held in Moscow on May 1, 1917. The Congress envisaged a national-cultural autonomy based on national, territorial and federal principles for Russian Muslims.

¹⁵⁹ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 100.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 101-102.

The Kazakh Steppe hosted harsh skirmishes between Bolshevik and Ataman Dutov's forces. Although Kazakhs firstly supported anti-Bolshevik forces at first and took a position against the Bolsheviks, the situation changed in November 1918, because the anti-Bolshevik government of Admiral Kolchak, established in Omsk, declared that it would not support territorial autonomy of Kazakhs anymore. After Kolchak rejected to assist Kazakhs, Alash Orda leaders planned to join Zeki Velidi Togan's Bashkir State and to construct a union by cooperating Turkestan autonomists and Jadids. Bu it failed. After Kolchak began suppressing Kazakhs because of being antagonist towards the indigenous that would create a separation in Russia, Kazakhs got into cooperation with the Bolsheviks.¹⁶¹ Finally, the Bolsheviks forces took all the control of the Steppe till March 1920 after Admiral Kolchak's forces were defeated totally in May 1919 in Siberia. After that, Alash Orda government left its place to Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

According to Sir Olaf Caroe,

The Alash Orda or Kazakh State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg, where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.¹⁶²

The Steppe, of course, sensed more the influence of the Revolution and the Civil War rather than Turkestan. The penetration of revolutions was more sensible in the Steppe because there were 1, 5 million Russian and Ukrainian settlers and 40,000 European war prisoners inside the borders of the Steppe. The principal participants in Russian revolutions and civil war were these Russians and Central European subjects rather than natives. However, Turkestan contained less Russian element, over

¹⁶¹ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 237-238.

¹⁶² Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 104.

400,000 settlers. Therefore the effects of revolutions were felt less in Turkestan than the Steppe. The reasons were severe influence of Islamic culture, and limited intelligentsia who owned political comprehension to enforce a government like Alash Orda did. The Russian settlers of Turkestan, industrial and railway workers played main role in the era of Revolutions.¹⁶³

3.2.2. Kokand Autonomous Government

After the replacement of Turkestan Committee with Tashkent Soviet, the Muslims of Turkestan declared their territorial autonomy, and Kokand Government was founded. The leader of the Turkestan Autonomous Region was Mustapha Chokayev. Kokand Government was founded in 28th November, just after the declaration of liberty was announced by Lenin and Stalin on 15th November. However, the Government only lasted two months.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, Chokayev tried to find aid and support to resist the Bolsheviks, but he could not become successful. As Alash Orda had sought aid from the Whites in Siberia, Kokand attempted to ask help from Ataman Dutov and Orenburg Cossacks but could not take any result. Kokand embarked on uniting Alash Orda but it was an abortive effort. Also, Kokand tried to ask for aid from Bukharan Emir Alim Khan, but the Emir rejected because of the Jadids' support to Kokand Government. Kokand could not find enough arms to defend the city. No one responded to this offer of arms purchase of Kokand. For instance, the Bukharan Emir rejected the Kokand's demand of purchasing arms from

¹⁶³ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 103.

¹⁶⁴ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 105.

the emirate.¹⁶⁵ Kokand was assaulted by the Red Army under the command of Ossipov¹⁶⁶. The Kokand government could not overwhelm forty five Bolsheviks in Kokand citadel.¹⁶⁷ The Red Army stormed the city and 5000 people were massacred. And, Mustapha Chokayev had to flee to Europe.¹⁶⁸ Autonomous Government of Turkistan was blamed for being a bourgeoisie nationalist and puppet of the Whites.¹⁶⁹ According to Helen Carrere d'Encausse,

The collapse of Kokand autonomy was inevitable, for it had neither sufficient political forces, nor troops, nor means. While it represented the heartfelt wishes of southern Central Asians, its effort could not find support, for it had no real ties with the general population. Still, this ephemeral government was far more important than its brief duration might indicate. It gave the first manifestation of open opposition to Soviet power in the name of local autonomy, and it gave birth to the Basmachi movement, which prolonged Central Asian protest against integration into the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁰

The historical importance of Kokand was the attempt to grant self-determination of Muslims in Central Asia under an autonomous Turkestan. It was the first attempt in Turkestan to gain the territorial autonomy by Central Asian Muslims. Also, it was crucial for its outcomes resulting emergence of Central Asian Muslims' revolting movement, Basmachi revolt. The Soviet official discourse about the destruction of Kokand was also informative and interesting. According to the Soviet view;

Kokand Autonomy, a counter revolutionary bourgeois nationalist organization in Kokand which at an all Muslim Congress held in Kokand on the 26th November 1917 declared itself as the government and called upon the Turkestan Council of Peoples' Commissars at Tashkent to hand over its power. Under the flag of Kokand the Turkestan tried to establish the older order. On the 20th February 1918, Red Army forces with the help of the poor people of Uzbekistan occupied the old city of Kokand and liquidated Kokand. The leaders of Kokand with a small force fled from the city and continued their struggle against Soviet power in the ranks of the Basmachi.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 227.

¹⁶⁶ K. P. Ossipov was the military commissar of the Turkestan ASS Republic.

¹⁶⁷ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 104.

¹⁶⁸ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 105.

¹⁶⁹ Coates, Zelda K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 74.

¹⁷⁰ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 228.

¹⁷¹ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 106-107.

3.2.3. Bashkurd Autonomous Government

After October Revolution, a National Bashkurd Government was established on 29 November 1917. Orenburg was the capital city of the autonomy. In addition, Alash Orda's government center was same with Bashkurd's, Orenburg. In addition, a national army was formed under the defense ministry of Zeki Velidi Togan. He was generally known as Velidov. He also became the leader of the state after a while. His government was much more real and stronger than other Muslim autonomous governments in Russia. "The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declaration of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also."¹⁷² Togan also had personal contacts with both Lenin and Stalin. However, the revolutionary leaders of the Soviet did not want a strengthened autonomy in the middle of the country. In January 1918, the Red Army attacked Orenburg and denounced the governments and both Bashkurd government and Alash Orda government opted for cooperation with White forces under Kolchak and Russian Cossacks under Dutov.¹⁷³ The Whites succeeded in recapturing Orenburg but they declared the non-recognition of any autonomous region or government inside Russia at time that they collected power and seemed likely to overcome the Bolsheviks.¹⁷⁴ However, in 1919, Whites were exposed to great defeat. The Bolsheviks captured Orenburg again. And, both Bashkurd and Alash Orda governments had to negotiate and cooperate with Bolsheviks. Both Velidov, leader of Bashkurds and Ahmad Baytursunov, the leader of Alash Orda made some attempts to merge their governments in Orenburg but Bolsheviks did not

¹⁷² Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 104-105.

¹⁷³ Andican, Ahad, *Cedidizm'den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESI*, (Istanbul: Emre Yayinlari, 2003), 57.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 59.

permit this and separated two governments by creating a Russian region in Orenburg. Lenin decided to cease these autonomous governments by taking Frunze's warnings about Muslim autonomous regions into consideration.¹⁷⁵ And, Velidov's armed force was forced to join the Red Army and then Lenin decided to send it to Ukrainian front for the war against Denikin although Velidov insisted in sending it to Turkestan front.¹⁷⁶ It was the only armed force of a Muslim government. Although other Central Asian Muslims were not recruited in the reign of Tsardom, the only exception was Bashkurds; Bashkurd soldiers served in the Tsar's army. "In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre."¹⁷⁷ The Soviet leaders did not want to share any authority inside all of Russia. The increasing threat of Basmachis in Turkistan, and the intervening policies of Britain and Afghanistan forced Moscow not to leave any problem producer inside the middle of the country. Zeki Velidi Togan made some mistakes in his political career influencing the stand of Bashkiria. For instance, his delivering Bashkurd troop to the Red army was a big mistake. And then, the Bashkurd leaders attempt to put a program aiming the compulsory expropriation of all Russian settlers in Bashkiria was another mistake since it frightened the Russian officials. Besides, Togan's efforts to aid the Alash Orda state in Kazakhstan and attempt to establish joint government with them provoked Moscow to take immediate precautions against him and his Bashkurd

¹⁷⁵ Andican, Ahad, *Cedidizm'den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESİ*, (Istanbul:Emre Yayinlari, 2003), 60-61.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 60.

¹⁷⁷ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 109.

government.¹⁷⁸ After Togan saw his project failing and Moscow's preparation targeting himself, he left to Turkistan region over Baku to attend the national struggle of Basmachi forces.

3.2.4. The Khivan Khanate

The situation in the khanates was so different from the Steppe and Turkistan. There were not enough Russian settlers to bring Revolution to the region. There were only a few railway workers and that was all. On the other hand, these khanates were struggling with different troubles and turmoil rather than civil war and revolutions. For example, in Khiva, there was an uprising of nomadic Turcoman armed tribes against Uzbek sedentary ruling elite, The Qungrat dynasty of Khiva. Turcoman raiders led by Junaid Khan captured Khiva and installed his own authority over sedentary Uzbek population. There were also Khivan Jadids and their party, Young Khivans. Their role was almost same with Bukharan Jadids and Young Bukharans. Young Khivans, as the most moderate, modern and intellectual class of Khiva, called the Red army for aid against the terrorizing authority of Turcoman leader Junaid Khan. The Red Army, in January 1920, captured Khiva and forced Junaid Khan to withdraw to the Karakum Desert. Immediately after deposal of the last Khan Said Abdullah Khan, Khwarazm Soviet People's Republic was declared thus Young Khivans Party came to power with the aid of the Red Army.¹⁷⁹ Young Khivans had to struggle much more against Junaid Khan, the leader of uprising Turcoman tribes rather than Khan of Khiva. Muhammad Qurban Junaid Khan operated in the khanate

¹⁷⁸ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 107.

¹⁷⁹ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 111.

against Uzbek aristocracy and he was also against the Jadids (Young Khivans) because he was a feudal tribal chieftain. Junaid Khan also saw the Soviets in the region as an infidel enemy and operated against them too. In Khiva, the conditions were so much similar to Bukhara. There was no capitalist bourgeoisie inside the country, instead feudal aristocracy and uprising ethnic- tribal elements as main operating classes. The Young Khivans as the representatives of bourgeoisie nationalists were struggling against these counter revolutionary elements. There was also Khwarazm Communist Party (KCP) looking like Bukharan Communist Party in Khiva presided by Juma Niyaz Sultan Murad. Both Young Khivans and Khwarazmian Communists were fractions of early Khivan Jadids. As it occurred in Bukhara, the Bolsheviks chose to cooperate with Young Khivans since they saw them more convenient transistors in the feudal society for the transition period.

3.3. February Revolution Era

There were many operating forces in Russia-wide against the Soviets. When Russia withdrew the Great War in 1917, Russia was drifting into the Civil war that lasted until 1922. The Bolshevik forces and the Red army gave large extended struggle against both internal dissidents and foreign powers in Russia-wide. They were warring with internal enemies consisting of representatives of the old regime such as forces of General Denikin, General Kornilov, and General Wrangel at the south of Russia, General Yudenitch at the northwest of Russia and with the White forces of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and Russian Cossack forces of General Ataman Dutov in Orenburg, strategically important location for transition to Central Asia. In addition, there were foreign powers' military deployments inside Russia such as

British, French and American troops in Arkangelsk (these troops stayed until 1919) and 72.000 Japanese troops in Vladivostok (Japanese troops stayed until 1922).¹⁸⁰ All of these Allied forces deployed in Russian lands aimed to collapse the Bolshevik regime and install a pro-war regime to get help again against the Central Powers. There were also other socialist groups such as Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks warring against the Bolsheviks. And, there were Czech legions numbered 45.000¹⁸¹ and constituted a threat for the Soviet forces (these troops were captured during the war with Austria and organized again to war for Russia, but after the Russia's withdrawal from the war, they remained idle in the middle of the Russian lands.). In the years of late 1917 and early 1918, the released prisoners of war from Germany and Turkey, who spread inside Russia, were causing problems for Russia. In addition Britain constituted a threat for Russia in case of its interventionist policies, targeted Russia. On the other side Turkistan was under the containment of the armies of Whites and Cossacks under the command of Denikin and Wrangel at the north of the Black Sea and under command of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, therefore the Bolsheviks had difficulty installing Soviet power in Central Asia.¹⁸²

The Governorate -General of Turkestan, residing in Tashkent, was replaced with a civilian Turkestan Committee. The Committee included five Russians and four natives, so the representation of the natives was encouraged with the February Revolution. The last military governor general of Turkistan, Kuropatkin was arrested by Tashkent Soviet.¹⁸³ And he was replaced by Schepkin, a former Kadets deputy.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Sander, Oral, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994* (Ankara: Imge Kitapevi Yayinlari, 2009), 29.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 27.

¹⁸² Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 96-97.

¹⁸³ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 187.

¹⁸⁴ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 122.

The diplomatic relations with Bukhara were not interrupted in the reign of Provisional Government. As it had been in the reign of Tsardom, both Tashkent and the foreign ministry were responsible with the relations with Bukhara. The only change was the name of the Imperial Political Agency in Bukhara with the Russian Residency.¹⁸⁵ After the new regime was installed, the Jadids did not lose any time to apply to the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet to persuade them to press on the Emir for reforms. Emir Alim also did not remain behind the Jadids, and he immediately presented his congratulations, loyalty and friendship to the new government in Petrograd and its representatives in Tashkent, the Turkistan Committee, and in Bukhara, the Russian Residency.¹⁸⁶ The Provisional Government in Petrograd took account of the reform demands of the Jadids and warned the Emir about the new order that would never let peoples of Bukhara be deprived of rights.¹⁸⁷

The manifestation of reforms of the Jadids were formed of some demands such as establishments of a budget and a regular fiscal system, control over the local governors, control over the Emir's civil list establishment of an autonomous administration of the capital and perhaps of other towns in the khanate improvement of education, especially in the madrasas and finally, with respect to the Russian institutions, an expansion of the postal and telegraphic network, the road network, and cultural institutions.¹⁸⁸

Emir Alim Khan was informed about the reform manifestation and was dictated to implement them as soon as possible by the Provisional Government. "Yielding to the pressure from Russia, Alim on March 18 promised Miller that he would begin the reforms by declaring an amnesty, lightening criminal punishments, establishing a printing press and permitting the publications of newspapers."¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 188.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁸⁸ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 129-130.

¹⁸⁹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 190.

When the mullahs learned the news about reform declaration of the Emir, the tension accelerated in the city of Bukhara. Their worries also rose when Alim Khan replaced his high bureaucrats with the ones close to the Jadids.¹⁹⁰ But, Emir Alim was aware that he had to satisfy the new regime somehow to maintain his rule. Emir's approval of a few reforms did not only rescue the independence of the emirate, but also juridical and political foundations, the essential components of its social structures, and the regime itself. On the other hand, he did not avoid applying for the path of coercion and rejecting the reforms when he was aware that the power of Provisional Government was in decline.¹⁹¹ Indeed, Emir Alim was not a person antagonizing the reformism and renewal. He was educated in Russian schools and his library was full of Russian books. He was known with his modern personality. But, he had some responsibilities such as maintain his rule and satisfying the internal groups. He was a ruler of traditional, religious and patriarchal country. He also knew how to play the game in realpolitik. He inherited from his predecessors how to act for balance of power. He knew about shifting from the collapsing power to the strengthening one in the crisis times. However, he was not very aware of ideological developments. When he encountered the increasing Bolshevik power in the region, he thought that he could stand by agreeing with them just he had done with Tsarist Russia and then with the Provisional Government. His basic philosophy was to agree with whoever came to power. He also remained away and objective against the developments in Turkistan, for instance the event of Kokand government's collapse by the Red army. However, at that time, he was not aware that he did not have any chance against the increasing Soviet power.

¹⁹⁰ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 190.

¹⁹¹ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 146.

During the era of Provisional Government, it was not very possible for enforcement and implementation of reforms in Bukhara, because both the Provisional government and Turkestan Committee were not strong and forceful enough for solving that question. Firstly, Russia was inside the war and dealt with the fronts. There was not military force to enforce the Emir and operate in the region for the acceptance of the demands. In addition, the position of the public opinion was another preventive factor. The reforms did not have advocates among the native population in the patriarchal Bukharan society. For that reason, the implementation of reforms required deployment of Russian troops in Bukharan lands, however it was not very possible at that time when Russian armies were in battles on German and Austrian fronts. Even, a probable intervention of Russian forces in Muslim areas of Central Asia might cause Afghan intervention.¹⁹² According to S. Becker, “the use of Russian troops might provoke a general uprising throughout the Moslem areas of Russia and raise the threat of Afghan intervention in Russian Central Asia”.¹⁹³ In addition, the Provisional Government centered in Petrograd was not sufficient to analyze the situation of Bukhara and evaluate the developments properly. “The Provisional Government installed on the ruins of the monarchy was very divided and uncertain about what solutions might settle the national problem”.¹⁹⁴ In Turkestan and the khanates, the Provisional Government was far from responding to the reform demands of the indigenous population. For example, a group of exiled Jadids in Samarkand came to express their national ideal to Alexander Kerensky, the prime minister of the Provisional Government. Kerensky’s reply to the Jadids was: “I know Turkistan and its population well. I believe in your loyalty and reject the rumors

¹⁹² Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 196.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 196.

¹⁹⁴ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 121.

about disturbances supposedly being prepared among you against Russia. But I warn you that if such an eventuality were to occur, I should take the most far-reaching measures of coercion.”¹⁹⁵ Because the government had some many difficulties and problems that it had to deal with under the conditions of the war, they could not focus on Turkistan and Bukhara. So, the problems and conflicts in the Turkistan region and Bukhara were not prioritized by Kerensky and his friends. Kerensky expected indisputable loyalty and dependence from these protectorates of the old regime in his government’s era without focusing on the reasons of questions increasing instability in the region.

3.4. October Revolution Era

In the years of late 1917 and early 1918, the released prisoners of war from Germany and Turkey, who spread inside Russia, were causing problems for Russia. In addition Britain constituted a threat for Russia in case of its interventionist policies, targeted Russia. On the other side Turkistan was under the containment of the armies of Whites and Cossacks under the command of Denikin and Wrangel at the north of the Black Sea and under command of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, therefore the Bolsheviks had difficulty installing Soviet power in Central Asia.¹⁹⁶ The British support to the counter revolutionary movements in the Soviet controlled Central Asia during 1918 and 1919 was the main threat for the Bolsheviks. The reason behind the British interventionist policy in the region was Britain’s fear about Turkey and Central Powers’ operating in the Middle East and India after the collapse of Tsarist Russia and birth of power vacuum that enabled the penetration of the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, 144.

¹⁹⁶ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), 96-97.

Central Powers to spread. In order to take precautions for this penetration, prominent British generals in the region, General L.C. Dusterville¹⁹⁷ and General W. Malleon¹⁹⁸ operated throughout Baku and Transcaspian regions.¹⁹⁹ Britain's main purpose behind the intervention in Russian was preventing the possible advance of Turks and Germans in Central Asia. For that reason, Britain backed the anti-Soviet government established in Ashkhabad thus aiming to organize a deterrent force before German and Turkish expansion towards Persia and India. On the other hand, Ashkhabad was more focused on operating against Soviet Turkestan while Britain dealt with the penetration on Transcaucasia and the Caspian Sea in order to put a barrier before the Central Powers.²⁰⁰ Great Britain was active to back the anti-Bolshevik forces any time against the Bolsheviks in Central Asia. Especially, Britain's interventionist policies and activities gained speed between 1918 and 1919. They cut the links of Turkmen lands from Moscow. They organized a Turkmen government in Transcaspia in Ashkhabad. In Transcaspia, a government established in Ashkhabad by Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists (SRs) was being backed by the British in Persia (Meshed) in 1918. But, the puppet government, backed by English forces, could not capture Tashkent. Turkistan campaign of Britain backed anti-Bolshevik forces failed and Britain could not maintain its support to Mensheviks and SRs in Turkmen country because of the conditions of just after the Great War.²⁰¹ In February 1919, the Red Army attacked Turkmen troops and no popular uprising

¹⁹⁷ General Lionel Charles Dunsterforce was a British general who led the mission of Dunsterforce which aimed to occupy oil fields in Baku and the Caucasus.

¹⁹⁸ Sir Wilfrid Malleon was a major general in British army who led the mission of Malleon which aimed to prevent German-Turkish influence in British controlled regions, and to back the Transcaspian Government in Ashkhabad against Tashkent Soviet.

¹⁹⁹ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 230-231.

²⁰⁰ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 215.

²⁰¹ Coates, Zeldia K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 75.

supported Transcaspia forces. British army under Gen. Malleson withdrew instead of resisting the Red forces.²⁰²

The Jadids were divided into two fractions after the October Revolution and the consolidation of the Soviet power in the region. For instance, the former Jadids, which were converted to communism, were members of the Bukharan Communist Party. For example, Sadriddin Aini and Abd al Vahid Burkhanov, famous former Jadids, directed the party newspaper. The Young Bukharans, led by Fayzallah Khodzhaev, radical Jadid, tried every way to seem friendly to the Bolsheviks.²⁰³ The BCP and Young Bukharans were hostile to each other. Especially, the BCP was disturbed about the Russian support to Young Bukharans. But, the Bolsheviks were in cooperation with Young Bukharans since it was beneficial and helpful for Russian interests in the short run. Young Bukharans' liberal nationalist and progressive vision and their struggle against the despotic monarchy and feudal groups made them more acceptable and cooperative rather than the BCP. In addition, Young Bukharans were more acceptable to Bukharan population. Their experiences and skills, they had obtained for a long term, were more useful for Russia to cooperate.²⁰⁴ Young Bukharans were more suitable to respond to the needs of the patriarchal and clerical society because of their pro national and cultural sides. They gave the image of bourgeoisie nationalists and liberals rather than direct communists, and this image was important for the society that had been used to traditional, religious and patriarchal institutions for centuries.

²⁰² Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 231.

²⁰³ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 228.

²⁰⁴ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 228.

After the October Revolution and consolidation of Soviet power, the feudal aristocratic rulers in Transoxiana began getting hurried due to the declarations and statements of Soviet rulers in Moscow regarding the region. Lenin was against the colonial status of Bukhara and Khiva; and he insisted on freeing all the nations. In his speech at the Seventh Party Conference, he said “We are for a fraternal union of all peoples... We certainly do not want the peasant in Khiva to live under the khan of Khiva. By developing out revolution we shall influence the oppressed masses.”²⁰⁵ Lenin’s policy in brief was deposal of Emir Alim and Khan Isfendiyar. The statements of the Soviet leaders in terms of the rights and freedoms of workers and peasants, establishments of republics, federation with Soviet Russia caused the rulers of Bukhara and Khiva to take a stand against the October Revolution. Soviet regime was relatively different from the benign suzerain Romanov dynasty and the weak regime of Provisional Government. Soviet regime seriously posed a threat for Alim and Isfendiyar.²⁰⁶ When the Jadids could not take enough support from the weak regime of the Provisional Government and its branch in Central Asia, Turkestan Committee; they turned to the Bolsheviks. However the Emir was extremely disturbed about the Bolsheviks’ discourse about freedoms and destruction of feudal aristocratic institutions. The Emir saw the Soviets as a great threat as he had not seen the Tsardom and Provisional Government, because the Emirate’s relations with Tsarist Russia as a protectorate had been compatible and it also took a large breath in the era of the Provisional Government owing to the Civil War and chaos throughout Russia. However, everything went bad because of the increase of the Bolsheviks day by day. In the freedom atmosphere of February Revolution, the Jadids considered that they would achieve the national reconquest by the help of the new regime but

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 204.

²⁰⁶ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 205.

when they saw the failure of the Provisional Government, they shifted to the side of the Bolsheviks.²⁰⁷ Although Jadids favored cultural and national full independence for their country, they did not have any choice rather than cooperate with an outside power to reduce the Emir to submission. At the last stage, they had to escape from Bukhara because of the Emir and mullahs' extreme suppression. They began their propagandas in Samarkand and Tashkent in order to take support of and persuade the Bolsheviks. Fayzallah Khodzaev proposed Tashkent Soviet to provoke an armed uprising in Bukhara, however Tashkent did not respond to that offer at once, because the Red Army was dealing with Dutov in the Steppe and Kokand in Turkestan. Khodzaev tried to pull attention to military preparations of Alim Khan and offered to prevent him. Alim Khan's military preparations, establishing alliances with Afghanistan and attempting to take support of British India was a threat for the future of the Jadids. Young Bukharans were very worried about strengthening of the Emir and they were certainly insistent on reforms but their reforms demand was limited inside the border of the Emirate. They did not dream of a reform throughout Turkistan.²⁰⁸ For example, even though they applauded Kokand government at first, they could not say opposite to the invading forces of the Red army then. In fact, they were dependent and needy on the Bolsheviks; therefore they were considering themselves firstly. Moreover, they did want the joint intervention in Bukhara but they were against the total collapse of the Emir's power. Although Kolesov²⁰⁹ planned to replace the Emir's sovereignty with the revolutionary committee, the Young Bukharans insisted on a constitutional monarchy because of the public's

²⁰⁷ Carrere D'Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 149.

²⁰⁸ Carrere D'Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 154.

²⁰⁹ Fedor Ivanovich Kolesov was chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan ASSR and a member of the Turkestan krai committee of the party between the years from 1917 to 1918.

situation. The public in Bukhara were not ready yet to accept the institution of a new regime. In addition, the Emir was the key actor of backing for the uprisings and reforms. Kolesov was decisive to install the revolutionary committee by eliminating the Emir if the ultimatum was not accepted.²¹⁰ “Kolesov himself had told him that the emir knows better than we do that it is not possible for him to live in peace and good relations with us. One day or another it will be necessary to speak and the languages of the debate will be that of cannon and machine guns”.²¹¹ On the other side, the Young Bukharans saw the intervention as a solution to restrain the authority and sovereignty of the Emir thus they believed in implementing the reforms. “By calling upon the Bolsheviks to act, they believed they could save the Emir from an irreversible choice that would condemn Bukhara to outright reaction, to the ossification from which they were striving to extract it, or to outright annexation”.²¹²

Alim Khan got in contact with General Malleson in January 1919 to approach Britain.²¹³ Major General Sir Wilfred Malleson had led the Mission Malleson aiming to cut the German-Turkish influence into Afghanistan and India during the great World. In addition, he was famous for his backing the Transcaspia Government against the Bolsheviks in the region. Malleson sent a small quantity of arms after getting approval from the British existence in India. Malleson also warned the Emir not to provoke Tashkent Soviet and pursue a policy of neutrality.²¹⁴ Emir Alim also urged the Afghan king to found alliance against the approaching Soviet power. After Afghanistan went out of the third Anglo-Afghan War (March to July 1919) by

²¹⁰ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 154-155.

²¹¹ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 158.

²¹² Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 154.

²¹³ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 215.

²¹⁴ *Ibid*, 215.

victory and obtaining its independence, Amanullah Khan began to give importance to the Emirate of Bukhara because of its position as a buffer state between Afghanistan and Soviet Turkestan. Bukhara's membership to a league of Central Asian Moslem States under the leadership of Amanullah Khan was also another factor behind his interest to Bukhara.²¹⁵ Amanullah had some dreams about being a prominent leader of Muslim nations under the British colonial rule. Since he ended the British imperialism upon his country after a victory, he saw himself as the protector of Muslim nations suppressed under the British rule.²¹⁶ On the other side, the reports about Afghan military experts in Bukharan army for a possible war against Russia were sent to Tashkent. So, Frunze informed Lenin about increasing threat about a possible attack of Bukhara and Afghanistan upon Soviet Turkistan.²¹⁷ Frunze gave the order of an attack on Bukhara on September 1, 1920. The Young Bukharans led by Fayzallah Khodzhaev still attempted to persuade the Red Army for another solution instead of direct military intervention and kicking the Emir out. They openly avoided a great extended uprising of the population. But, Frunze was decisive to start the operation. On 2 September, the Red army forces invaded Bukhara. Jadids also attended the Red army units and entered Bukhara together.²¹⁸ General Frunze informed Lenin with a report that: "The fortress of old Bukhara was taken today following a powerful attack by Red and Bukharan units. Tyranny and coercion have been vanquished; the red flag of revolution is floating over the Rigistan."²¹⁹ Also, *Izvestiya* wrote the historical event; "The revolution in Bukhara

²¹⁵ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 226.

²¹⁶ Andican, Ahad, *Cedidizm'den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESİ*, (Istanbul: Emre Yayinlari, 2003), 177.

²¹⁷ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 226.

²¹⁸ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B. Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 164.

²¹⁹ *Ibid*, 164-165.

has triumphed. The two capitals, centers at once strategic and commercial, are in the hands of Bukharan red troops and Muslim regiments of the Red Army. Because of Bukhara's religious character, this revolution will have a considerable importance for the whole of Central Asia".²²⁰ On 31 August 1920, Emir Alim Khan firstly fled to Dushanbe in eastern Bukhara, present day Tajikistan and then had to leave for Afghanistan that he did never return to his country again; and then settled in Kabul. After that time, he directed his opposition movement upon Bukhara in this country. On October 8, the new regime was declared with the new name of the state, the Bukharan Peoples' Republic.

3.5. The Right of Self Determination and Struggle of Classes in Turkistan

3.5.1. The Right of Self Determination

Self-determination right was the most discussed matter for the Central Asian Muslims after the October Revolution in Russia. Lenin had demonstrated his support to national self-determination before April 1917. For example, in the resolution of the 7th All Russia Conference of the Bolsheviks Party, it was emphasized that "the right of all the nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states must be recognized. To deny them this right, or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure or annexation. Only the recognition by the proletariat of the right of nations to secede can ensure complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations and help to

²²⁰ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 165.

bring the nations closer together on truly democratic lines”.²²¹ In addition, equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia and the right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination were basic principles, released in the declaration of the Council of Peoples Commissars.²²² The declaration was also released in Pravda with address of “All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East”. It wrote that

Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. That is your right.²²³

The October Revolution was supported by peoples in Muslim land because of Lenin’s promises regarding equality and self-determination before 1917. However, the expectancies concluded with disappointment. The reason of disappointment in transformation from Tsarist rule to the Soviets was firstly inheritance of the huge empire taken by the Communists, and that inheritance contained and secured its vital and ongoing strategic priorities. Firstly, the natural sources of Turkestan and Steppe were vital for Russian economy. Secondly, both Central Asia and Transcaucasia was open to British attacks under the conditions of the Great War and Russia’s weakness depending on bad effects of war and civil war inside the country. Thirdly, Central Asia housed two million Russians as settlers. Therefore, it was so difficult for the Bolsheviks to let Muslim lands use their self-determination rights.²²⁴ If the self-determination was permitted for Muslim Central Asian elements to secede, the winds of nationalization would strengthen and load the independence of Muslim regions of Central Asia and Russia.²²⁵ One of the main factors that got Lenin to give up cooperating with Muslims was also increasing armed opposition of Basmachis.

²²¹ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 150.

²²² Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), 105.

²²³ Ibid, 105.

²²⁴ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: the Bodley Head Ltd, 1966), 99.

²²⁵ Ibid, 115.

Frunze also warned Moscow that concession given to Muslims encouraged Basmachi revolt in Turkestan. Frunze repeated his warnings many times to Lenin: “The Muslims are on achieving full power ...Their wish is to obtain the most total independence possible.”²²⁶ The oppressed native people, at that time, expected the October Revolution and Bolsheviks to keep their promises.²²⁷ However, the newly establishing order of the Soviets in the region had to pursue realpolitik to consolidate his power. The British threat was targeting the chaotic regions of Turkistan. Afghanistan as the neighboring state to Bukhara was also posing a threat for Soviet Russia. Therefore the implementation of ideological discourse into the realpolitik was not compulsory for the Soviet ruling elite. “The goal of a socialist society would be furthered by the closest international unity of the working class, not by its division into artificial national units. In fact, as Lenin himself admitted, what he advocated was merely the recognition of the right of self-determination, not the exercise of that right”.²²⁸

3.5.2. The Struggle of Classes

In terms of Central Asian Muslims and Bukharans, there was not a real case such as proletariat brotherhood of all nations living in Russia. Central Asian Muslims did not see the right of self-determination as a consolidating right for the Russia’s unity. They immediately saw it as the right for seceding. In their perspective, the case was the struggle between the colonist and the native not the struggle between the proletariat and capitalist bourgeoisie. Indeed, the struggle concept between capitalist

²²⁶ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966),162.

²²⁷ Ibid, 150.

²²⁸ Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005),203.

bourgeoisie and proletariat was valid for Russians and Ukrainians because these nations were skilled labor force such as industrial workers or railway men everywhere in Russia. However, the indigenous people of Central Asia and Turkistan were either peasants or poor nomads in majority. And, the only increasing class was, for instance, the Russian educated secular intelligentsia in Steppe and Turkistan, and the Jadids or Young Bukharans and Young Khivans in Bukhara and Khiva. Of course, these small elite carried the characteristics of bourgeoisie nationalist instead of socialist and proletariat revolutionist character. According to Safarov,

It was inevitable that the Russian revolution in Turkestan should have been colonist. The Turkestani working class was numerically small and had no leader, program, party or revolutionary tradition. It thus could not rise up against colonial exploitation. Under Tsarist colonialism, it was a privilege of the Russians to belong to the industrial proletariat. Because of this, the dictatorship of the proletariat here took on a typically colonialist character.²²⁹

According to Caroe, there was not a conception of class struggle regarding the conflict between the Bolsheviks and Central Asians. The question got a shape of a struggle between natives and colonists rather than revolutionary concept or class struggle case.²³⁰ The main struggle of those bourgeoisie nationalists was firstly against the feudal aristocracy and clerical classes in Bukhara and Khiva. The situation in Khiva for Khivan Jadids, mostly known as Young Khivans, was a bit different because of their necessity to struggle against tribal powers such as Junaid Khan, leader of Turcoman tribes' resistance. But, the situation in Bukhara was certainly against the authoritarian rule of feudal aristocracy. In order to destroy this class, Young Bukharans needed to find a more powerful partner. This partner had to be an outside power like the Bolsheviks. The basic reason that made young Bukharans and the Bolsheviks approach and cooperates with each other was the similarity of their enemies. For example, the feudal aristocracy of Bukhara, the

²²⁹ Carrere D'Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 148.

²³⁰ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 112.

enemy of Young Bukharan Jadids was the long term partner of the capitalist bourgeoisie of Russian Empire, the enemy of the Bolshevik revolutionists of Russia. This common point enforced the two groups into cooperation. The Bolshevik forces struggling against the Capitalist bourgeoisie represented by the White forces during the civil war, could never accept the obedience of offer of Bukharan feudal aristocracy just as they did in the era of Tsardom and Kerensky's government's period. Lenin's hard and decisive attitude was derived from this theoretical framework. According to Seymour Becker,

The initial triumph and consolidation of Soviet power in Turkestan during the winter of 1917-1918 was accompanied by the establishment in Bukhara and Khiva of regimes openly hostile to the Bolsheviks and enjoying a degree of independence not known in either khanate since the 1860's. The right of self-determination, even to the point of breaking long established ties to Russia, was exercised by governments that in Leninist terms represented not the proletariat nor the poor peasantry, nor even the bourgeoisie, but the feudal aristocracy. Such a development was clearly the product not of Bolshevik design but of Russian weakness. The future of the khanates was inevitably bound up in the larger question of the future of Soviet power in Central Asia.²³¹

In addition, it was impossible for Jadids to cooperate with Bolsheviks forever, because their programs and plans were certainly different from the Bolsheviks. The Jadids favored a regime of constitutional monarchy as the model of the Young Turks of Turkey, thus they hoped to maintain social justice and make Bukhara a leading model for the Muslims of Central Asia. Indeed, the Jadids did never see the case as a matter of class struggle or victory of the proletariat. Their cooperation with the Bolsheviks was not a deliberate preference, but the conditions such as the failure of Provisional Government's rule enforced.²³² Their cultural- national libertarian stands forbade the possible clash in the short run between the two partners. For example, the Soviets did not create a socialist government in Bukhara and also in Khiva like it was in Turkistan and the Steppe (Kirghizstan-Kazakhstan). According to the Soviet view, the traditional and feudal character of Bukhara was preventive for the creation of

²³¹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 211.

²³² Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 149.

socialist republics in Bukhara, so the creation of People's Republic was promoted. The creations of People's Soviet Republics at the first stage instead of socialist republics were aimed to destroy feudal remnants and substitute bourgeois governments.²³³ Because the era of People's Republic was planned by the Bolsheviks as the transition period and the Young Bukharans as the transistor in that era, the Bukharan Communists, for example, was not applied much and expelled from the ruling government. It was obvious that the Soviets needed Young Bukharans, which were more acceptable to the traditions and customs of the population, in order to prepare the convenient atmosphere at the first stage on the way of transformation to the socialist republic.

²³³ Coates, Zelda K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 77.

CHAPTER 4

BASMACHI MOVEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

In this chapter, I try to focus on the reasons, increase and results of the Basmachi movement which influenced the region and Central Asian peoples' national consciousness and their identities as a national resistance movement. The most affected state from the Basmachi movement was the newly established Bukharan People's Republic and its new regime because the movement targeted the new regime of Bukhara openly. The (given) support of Young Bukharan leaders to that movement after a while got this revolt to gain the importance of being a multinational anti-Bolshevik resistance including a large extended coalition of Central Asians. In addition, the feature of a multinational anti-Bolshevik resistance character of Basmachi movement was based on covering all Central Asian rebels not specific on single ethnic identity. Bukharan Uzbeks, Tajiks; and Khivan Turcomans, also Afghans and even West Turkish officials participated inside this revolt. The other importance of the movement was about its advantages and disadvantages for

the Soviet Russia. The Basmachi resistance caused Soviet Russia to get involved in the civil war until 1934 in some regions of Central Asia. But, while maintaining that war, the Soviet units got to take control of each part of the region and this benefited Russia for integrating with the region into the USSR. On the other side, the participation of Turkish officials, having departed from Ottoman Land just after Ottoman's withdrawal from the Great War in 1918, was another case inside the matter of the Basmachi movement. This case created a strong epic especially for Western Turks though it did not create a same impact for Central Asians. I tried to point out the reasons that had caused the break-out of the revolt, its results and its influence upon the Central Asian communities and the Soviets' approach to the region during and after the revolt which, in one sense, made an impact upon the shaping of national identities of Central Asian Muslims. In addition, I touch upon the reorganization of Central Asia from new national republics in accordance with the Soviets' Nationalities Policy and how the Soviets enforced Sovietization policy upon Central Asia. I point out the methods implemented by the Soviets over Central Asians such as separating peoples and creating new nations according to linguistic differences. I also touch upon which methods were used to erase the conception of unified Central Asia and the notion of Turkestan. In addition, I focus on which socio-economic factors lie behind the purge of nationalist leaders and cadres from Uzbek SSR government.

4.1. Basmachi Movement in Central Asia

British interests were under the threat because of the expansion of the Turkish armies towards the Caucasus and the capture of Baku by Turkish General Nuri

Pasha, half-brother of Enver Pasha. Also, German officers were operating in Kabul for offering cooperation to the Afghan Emir Habibullah against British existence in India. On the other side, thousands of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners released after the collapse of Tsarist regime, were all around Turkistan. So, these developments alarmed Britain's anxiety to secure its interests in India.²³⁴ While Turkish-German influence began to spread from the Caucasus towards Turkistan and Afghanistan over the corridor of North Persia, Britain began taking a series of precautions such as sending General Dunsterville to Baku and General Malleon to North Persia.²³⁵ The mission of Malleon was to support a group of Mensheviks and aided them for establishing government in Ashkhabad against the Bolsheviks. British alliance with the Mensheviks was based on Mensheviks' policy of continuation of war against the Central Powers while the Bolsheviks decided to withdraw from war.²³⁶ "The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter."²³⁷

The Basmachi movement emerged in Fergana Valley in which numerous peasant rebels occurred without any political reaction.²³⁸ After the Kokand government was destroyed by the Soviets, the insurrections took a political shape, because the leaders of the failed Kokand government participated in the Basmachi uprising to struggle against the Red Army.²³⁹ There were several groups, adding the

²³⁴ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 115.

²³⁵ Ibid, 116.

²³⁶ Ibid, 117.

²³⁷ Ibid, 118.

²³⁸ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 250.

²³⁹ Ibid, 250.

formation of a strengthened Basmachi force. One of the first attenders, who were the liberal leaders of Kokand collapsed government, was Mustafa Chokai. He had been the leader of Kokand government and became the advocate to Basmachi uprisings. After he fled to Europe from the Red Army, he continued his struggle against the Soviets in Europe. The second group, giving their support to Basmachis, was the socialist leaders, for example Zeki Velidi Togan was one of the best representatives of that group. Togan had aims of uniting Socialists and non-socialists under one single union called as the National Union of Turkistan. As the third group, the conservative class of Bukhara, depended on Emir Alim Khan, also attended Basmachi revolts.²⁴⁰ Especially Emir Alim sent his loyal commanders to the Soviet controlled regions to conduct the war against the Red Army. When the Soviet troops invaded ancient city, Bukhara, the city was exposed to huge destruction by the Red Army. The madrasas were destroyed and the valuable manuscripts in libraries were set fire.²⁴¹ Thus, the Soviets destroyed the remnants of the ancient culture. Emir Alim fled to eastern Bukhara and founded his headquarters in Dushanbe. Here, he organized the Basmachi groups, depended on him, and directed the war remotely until March 1921; after that time he passed to Afghanistan.²⁴² The Emir's leave for Afghanistan changed the progress of the Basmachi struggle, because the struggle firstly seemed like a movement led by the Emir, so this prevented the attendance and support of liberal elite. After Alim Khan left for Afghanistan (from eastern Bukhara), the movement began attracting Jadid support.²⁴³ "The rebellion was becoming a refuge for all who had been victims of Soviet repression. Moreover, the rebels took

²⁴⁰ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 119.

²⁴¹ Ibid, 118.

²⁴² Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 118.

²⁴³ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 177-178.

care to clarify their attitude towards the national government of Bukhara: ‘We are struggling against the Russians and not against the national government. If the Russians leave, we are ready to rally to the national government.’²⁴⁴ The Basmachi movement began spreading fast throughout Turkestan after Bukhara and Khiva’s regimes had been replaced. For example, Junaid Khan, started a struggle against the Bolshevik forces in Transcaspia by directing his troops in the Karakum Desert, collaborated and supported the Basmachi movement thus the uprisings reached from Fergana to Transcaspia.²⁴⁵ Junaid Khan was important for the spread of the revolt to southwest parts of Turkistan. He gave a long struggle to the Soviets after his withdrawal to the desert of Karakum. The Basmachi revolt was an increasing problem for the Soviets in different parts of Central Asia. The density of the revolt drew a line from Fergana to eastern Bukhara and from eastern Bukhara to the deserts of Transcaspia. The mountainous and desert places were more convenient for conducting the resistance for the rebels. The Red army units had difficulty suppressing these local rebels in these areas. Shir Muhammad Beg was operating in Fergana, Devletmen Beg was in Baljuvan, Ishan Sultan was in Darvaz, Junaid Khan was in Khiva and Ibrahim Beg Lakai was in eastern Bukhara.²⁴⁶

The economic and social reasons in terms of birth of Basmachis were also quite important. Although the collapse of Kokand government by the Red Army’s intervention seemed the common reason for the outbreak of the revolt, the fundamental reasons, preparing the infrastructure of the uprisings, were the developments inside the period of civil war and revolutionary era. Cotton production

²⁴⁴ Ibid, 178.

²⁴⁵ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 250.

²⁴⁶ Hayit, Baymirza, *Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934)*, (Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1997), 201.

increased in southern Central Asia alongside the river bands and the region's agriculture specialized in cotton production while importing grain from the north. This caused starvation during the civil war years when the railway transportation was cut under the conditions of war due to increase of grain prices and decrease of local production. That situation caused the emergence of rebels in the region. In Soviet terminology, these rebels were called as Basmachis meaning “*bandits*”.²⁴⁷ “They were the sharp edge of a rural revolt against the cities although they increasingly took on an anti-Soviet political and religious overlay and later, during the unveiling campaign, served to enforce adherence to non-Soviet ideals.”²⁴⁸ These armed people, reacting to famine and bad economic conditions in the region at first, attached to anti-Soviet character in the following years. While Soviet called them Basmachis, they named themselves “*qorbashi*”, meaning police force in Bukharan Emirate and Turkistan.²⁴⁹

The Basmachi movement gained a multi-dimensional character by consisting of the liberal elites of Kokand, the socialist leaders of Bashkiria, the tribal chieftains of Khivan Turcomans, the monarch of Bukhara, the peasants and the Central Asian middle class. The attendance of feudal aristocrats like Junaid Khan of Khivan Turcoman tribes and Alim Khan to the Basmachis with their full support strengthened the movement and enabled to spread in Turkistan-wide. However, the attendance of every anti-Bolshevik operating element to Basmachis prevented the movement from gaining an ideological character, rather than, it developed as a multi-dimensional anti-Bolshevik resistance. The general feature of the resistance was being consisted of separate groups without a unity. Even, there was rivalry among

²⁴⁷ Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled empire: gender and power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 15.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 15.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 15.

these separate groups. This was causing problems and preventing the movement from gaining a success.

The formation of Basmachi forces by a variety of groups was the most important reason for its weakness in its struggle, because lack of a single command and authority over different, independent and idle groups caused the revolt to fail against the Red Army units. In addition, the lack of outside support and aid for the revolt prevented its success. The reason why a common front could not be formed in the Basmachi movement could be analyzed as the non-existence of a political and social unity in Central Asia for centuries even before not only Soviet expansion, but also Tsarist expansion. The multi-tribal and multi-ethnic characteristics of Central Asian Muslims were the biggest barrier for a creation of a common front. In addition, there was a deficiency of strong ideological unity and it could be seen that different groups and fractions, which had been against each other before, got involved in the same revolt after 1920. To give an instance, the Basmachi groups consisting of old commanders of the emir could be classified as monarchists, the units of Junaid Khan the Turcoman were Turcoman ethnic-tribal rebels without having any ideological theory. On the other side, Jadids, having joined the Basmachis, had an ideology in one sense and strongly refused the emir's authority. Also, the birth of each Basmachi group had different reasons. To give an example, the early emerging groups in Ferghana was a reaction to the collapse of Kokand Government, in some parts of Central Asia the reason was the famine due to the cease of grain imports from Russia under civil war circumstances (this was the failure of cotton monoculture policy), in eastern Bukhara the reason was monarchists' reaction to the new regime in Bukhara etc. In short, the non-existence

of a single reason behind the movement was the biggest source of weakness and failure.

4.2. Arrival of Turkish Officials to the Region

4.2.1. Arrival of Jemal

Both Enver's and Jemal's arrivals in Turkistan region were programmed plans conducted by the Soviet leaders for special mission. Firstly, Jemal stepped in Turkistan by coming from Moscow to Tashkent in August 1920. And then, he passed to Kabul, Afghanistan. The Soviet leaders pursued counter-policies against Britain in the region by sponsoring these Turkish leaders. The Soviet policy was to cause turmoil and trouble for British existence in India through these Turkish leaders and pushed Britain to possible trouble, would be produced by never and Jemal.²⁵⁰

It was the policy of Tsarist Russia, noted by Curzon, to keep England engaged in Asia with a view to offsetting any movement by her against Russia in Europe. There may also have been some hope of diverting Eastern Turkish nationalism away from grievances against Russia, and starting it on barren road of Islamic enthusiasm against the British in India across the mountains. But, as the event showed the last thing Lenin wanted was a focus of nationalism in Turkistan itself.²⁵¹

Jemal conducted a number of activities after his arrival in Kabul. He collected the Islamic Revolutionary League and began organizing the Afghan Army. The plan was pursued, and he was in close contact with the Soviets by conducting the activities. Other side, he was playing a mediating role between the Soviets and Basmachis. However, after a while, he gave up conducting activities of mediating and pacifying the rebels, and preparations targeting British India, instead, he focused on organizing rebels to help them bargain with the Soviets for their independence. The Soviet leaders were not late to suspect him of playing a double game and

²⁵⁰ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 122.

²⁵¹ Ibid, 122-123.

pursuing his own aims and plans. Indeed, he was eager to prepare a huge Afghan army by modernizing and training them and then planned to launch a massive attack over British India. After that, he hoped to rescue Turkistan from Soviet rule.²⁵² Since both Enver and Jemal were previous leaders of Union and Progressive Party in Ottoman Empire which had a Pan-Turkist and Pan-Turanist vision, their collaboration with the Soviets were so different and impossible in the long run. He was called back in October 1921. He was assassinated in Tiflis on 21th July 1922 while trying to pass to Germany. His killing was a probably Bolshevik instigation.²⁵³

4.2.2. Arrival of Enver

Enver, one of the three leaders of Ottoman government having decided to participate in the Great War at the side of Central Powers, had fled to Russia after the defeat and was in collaboration with the Bolsheviks. He was advocated by the leaders in Moscow and was prepared for a leadership in Anatolian National Resistance against imperial powers in case Mustafa Kemal's movement failed. However, the things did not go on well for Enver. After Moscow Treaty, signed in 16 March 1921, between Kemal's government and Moscow, Enver's plans failed. And then, Enver changed his option and began making plans to pass over to Bukhara. "After the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship (March 1921, he realized that he could not get Soviet help against Kemal, and apparently decided to attempt the realization of his ambitions, using the Basmachi- the adherents of the Ex-

²⁵² Andican, Ahad, *Cedidizm'den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESI*, (Istanbul:Emre Yayinlari, 2003), 123.

²⁵³ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 123.

Emir of Bukhara- as the first tool to his hand".²⁵⁴ Enver offered the Soviets, with whom he was in good relation, to mediate between them and Basmachis. Although the Soviet elite in Moscow were suspicious of him, they accepted his offer and let him pass to Bukhara.

Enver was encouraged by Young Bukharan leaders to carry the flag of resistance. But, he was also opposed by some Central Asian anti-Bolshevik leaders. Although Enver was encouraged to get in resistance by several nationalist members of Bukharan new government including Osman Khodzhaev, Ali Reza beg and Abdulhamid Arif; Zeki Velide Togan, the leader of Turkestan National Union and ex-leader of Bashkurd government, was opposing to Enver's will to join Basmachis. Even, Togan offered Enver to leave Turkestan for Afghanistan.²⁵⁵ In the letter, sent by Togan to Enver, Togan emphasized that Enver's intervention in this war would cause the movement to gain a Pan-Islamist identity, and advised Enver to support the Turkestan movement by residing in Afghanistan remotely. Togan, in his letter, believed in reaching a solution through founding alliances with internal factions inside Russia, for example he mentioned about cooperating with social revolutionists against the Bolsheviks and then forcing Bolsheviks to agree with themselves.²⁵⁶ In sum, Togan believed in solving Turkestan question among residents of Russia, not by an outside actor. It was clear that there was a dichotomy between Jadid leaders of Bukhara and Russian educated secular Muslim leaders about Enver's attendance and leading for the resistance. But, Enver gave his decision to go through with his dreams.

²⁵⁴ Coates, Zeldia K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 80.

²⁵⁵ Hayit, Baymirza, *Basmacılar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934)*, (Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1997), 198.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, 198.

Enver stepped in Bukhara on October 1921 at the same month that Jemal was recalled by Lenin. Enver was sponsored by the Soviets and was sent to the region mediate between the Soviets and Basmachis and to complete Jemal's mission. His aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach-alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called imperialism.²⁵⁷ However, he attempted to do the same thing that Jemal had tried. He focused on organizing the resistance against the Soviets and rescuing Turkestan from Bolshevik rule instead of pacifying the resistance on Turkistan lands and mobilizing a struggle for Islamic ideals against British imperialism. Both of the two attempts of the Soviet leaders failed. Both Enver and Jemal targeted the Soviets after a while despite having a common mission on behalf of the Soviets. The policy of Soviets did not operate well. Although the Soviet elite planned to hit British imperialism through the Islamic ideals and probable struggle that were planned to organize by Enver and Jemal, they became victims of pan-Turkist ideals and programs of Enver and Jemal. The main aim was to firstly finish the rebels' resistance and keep stability in Turkistan, and then brings Amanullah's Afghanistan who was in antagonist position against Britain, closer to the Soviet side and then creates a revolutionary wind there that would probably strike India, under British imperialism. However, the Red Army had to deal with the chaotic situation and played into trouble in Turkistan as a result. Enver put his plans into practice immediately and joined the Basmachi groups. "Enver Pasha appropriated the old dream of a Pan-Turanian empire, which from the springboard of Turkistan would reproduce the conquests of Cinghiz Khan and Taymur(Timur). He would be the new conqueror, and Turkey would rid itself of Kemal and join his

²⁵⁷ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 123.

empire.”²⁵⁸ Enver purposed to unite all separate forces of the Basmachi groups. And, he dreamed of founding a Central Asian Muslim state. Enver’s dream did not find enough support from Central Asians and did not create the same impact as it did for Western Turkes upon Central Asian Muslims, because it was difficult to persuade and encourage Central Asians regarding Pan-Turanism like Western Turks. Although Jadids were, in one sense, influenced by Pan-Turkist and PanTuranian ideas through the Tatar Muslim intellectuals’ opinions; the pan-Turanian dream in minds of Bukharan and Khivan Jadids was a bit different from the one in minds of Western Turks. For Bukharan Uzbek intellectuals and elite, pan-Turanism meant greater Uzbekistan, so it was same with Enver’s dreams of unifying all Turkic Muslims in West and East under one flag. After taking the leadership of the Basmachi groups, he gave an ultimatum to the Soviet leaders to withdraw their forces from Turkistan at once.²⁵⁹ Moscow responded to him by sending Red Army. Enver sent his emissaries to afghan emir to demand aid for his resistance. Afghanistan responded to Enver’s demand and sent a thousand Afghan troops to Enver.²⁶⁰ These Afghan troops served as Enver’s special guards during his resistance. There are also claims around British support for Enver’s movement in spite of enough and strong evidence about this.

Some said-with what truth we do not know that-Enver received funds and arms from Britain; the only thing certain is that the Basmachi had English rifles and ammunition, possibly obtained earlier British agents in Turkistan.²⁶¹

The Basmachi movement strengthened after Enver’s participation. Although Enver had some problems with tribal chieftains in the beginning, he succeeded in creating excitement against the Soviets in the early times. Enver Pasha’s activities

²⁵⁸ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 178.

²⁵⁹ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 252.

²⁶⁰ Coates, Zelda K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 80.

²⁶¹ Coates, Zelda K. and W.P., *Soviets in Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951), 80.

also enabled the movement to strengthen more and attract more supporters who were discontent under suppression of the Soviet regime. The soaring resistance of Basmachi forces after Enver's arrival in the area and the Soviets' suppression over the new government of Bukharan Peoples' Republic caused a government crisis. The prominent leaders of the new regime's government shifted to Basmachis' side. For example, Mirza Abdulqadir Muhiddinov, one of the chief leaders of the Young Bukharan Party, Muhiddin Maqsumov, and the republic's minister of police and their supporters shifted to the side of Basmachi rebels. Basmachi revolt strengthened towards the end of 1921 in spite of domestic clashes among separate groups inside the movement.²⁶² For example, Abdul Hamid Beg, minister of war and Ali Reza Beg, minister of interior joined Enver's front. Even, Osman Khodzhaev, president of republic, left Bukhara secretly in order for attending the Basmachi revolt.²⁶³ This event weakened the efficiency of the republic and added power and legitimacy of the Basmachis and increased fame and the position of the revolt. The efficiency of the movement began to be felt inside the government of the new regime in Bukhara. Even, Fayzallah Khodzhaev was attempted to assassinate in summer 1922 and Enver was suspected of this attempt.²⁶⁴ On the other hand, the incapability of uniting the separate groups and continuous rivalry among tribes were preventing Enver's dreams. Also, Enver's personal ambition and lack of tact caused his partners to disobey his authority and side against him.²⁶⁵ He used the title of "Commander in chief of all Muslim Troops, the son in law the Caliph and representative of the

²⁶² Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 251.

²⁶³ *Ibid*, 252.

²⁶⁴ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 179.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 179.

Prophet.”²⁶⁶ This benefited him to establish a strong authority among the rebels and tribes, besides it was helpful to enable unity in the region. On the other hand, he collided with the ex-Emir, who was the most prominent advocate for the Basmachis, because of the use of title of “Emir of Turkistan”. Enver’s use of this title in his orders angered ex-Emir Alim because of the fear of shadowing his authority. “His signing of orders with the pompous title of ‘commander in chief of all Muslim troops, so in law of the Caliph, and representative of the prophet’ put him on bad terms with the emir, Alim Khan. Gradually, his coalition force fell to pieces, and he came to the point of battling with his former allies”.²⁶⁷ The prominent Basmachi commanders Ibrahim Beg Lakai, loyal to the emir, left the Enver’s command.²⁶⁸ Enver was killed in a sudden attack of the Red Army units in the morning on 4 August 1922 in Baljuvan, a village in eastern Bukhara.²⁶⁹ His struggle did not last so long, but it did leave an effect which would last more. He became a symbol of dream for unity between Western and Eastern Turks.

4.3. The Basmachis after Enver

The Basmachi resistance did not cease after Enver’s death. Although it lost its efficiency and continued to maintain the resistance in low-density after 1924, it succeeded in existing until the early 1930s. For a while, Haji Sami, a Turkish official and a friend of Enver, continued to lead the Basmachi units after Enver’s death and after a while, he left Turkistan. Although the advantage of rebels was to be able to

²⁶⁶ Ibid, 179.

²⁶⁷ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth,(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 252.

²⁶⁸ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans.,*Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 179.

²⁶⁹ Ibid, 179.

pass across Afghan border and collect power to launch anti-attack, their strategy collapsed after the Afghan revolution in 1928. The new Afghan regime allowed the Soviets to operate across the border to sweep the rebels. With the capture of Ibrahim Lakai Beg, the prominent Basmachi commander in 1931, the movement received an irreparable wound and quickly weakened.²⁷⁰ In addition Junaid Khan had to give up the fight. Although he resisted for more than 8 years from his withdrawal to the Karakum desert in January 1920 to September 1928, he was forced to withdraw to Iran. Then, he had to pass to Afghanistan due to the Iran's pressure for his guards to disarm.²⁷¹ He was not captured but he was almost eighty-year old when he was retired somewhere near Herat in Afghanistan, so he did not get into any operating action anymore.²⁷² Towards the end of 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet regime took a range of efficient precautions against revolts in Fergana and Bashkiria. For instance, Bashkurds were exposed to artificial famine and disease and they were forced to leave their lands to Russian settlers. Many of them were driven to mountains and the Steppe. The Soviet regime punished them in the peace era more heavily than in the era of war.²⁷³ In addition, different methods in terms of military struggle were applied for the suppression of the movement. For example, the war prisoners were sent to Turkistan region for being used against resistance. According to Hayit, the Red army in Turkistan including war prisoners consisted of 106,000 soldiers in 1918-19. The war prisoners, named as internationalist legions comprised % 16 of the Soviet army in Turkistan.²⁷⁴ In 1920, Muslim soldiers were also

²⁷⁰ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 127.

²⁷¹ Andican, Ahad, *Cedidizm'den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESI*, (Istanbul:Emre Yayinlari, 2003), 214.

²⁷² Ibid, 214.

²⁷³ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 129.

²⁷⁴ Hayit, Baymirza, *Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934)*, (Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1997), 310.

recruited in Turkistan by force. This policy of recruitment of Muslim soldiers was implemented to gain superiority upon Muslim resisting Basmachi groups.²⁷⁵ “The Red Army, swollen by Muslim recruits, embarked upon an intensive propaganda campaign among the population, presenting the Basmachis as brigands-brigands who were weak and doomed to imminent defeat”.²⁷⁶ The policy aimed to propaganda among Muslims against Basmachis, gaining reliance of Muslim public through these Muslim legions. The real aim was to benefit from Turkestan Muslims in terms of propaganda among public against rebels.²⁷⁷ The Soviet policies after the suppression for Basmachi revolts in Muslim regions developed a different method for softening relations with the peoples in Central Asian Muslim lands. The Turkic Bureau of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee and the Turkic Commission made some reforms for winning the Muslim communities back. The confiscated waqf lands were returned to the religious charities, the madrasas and religious schools were allowed to open again.²⁷⁸ “In economic terms, the New Economic Policy (NEP) made it possible to relax the situation of the Muslims; private business was reestablished; and the requisition of cotton and foodstuffs that had enraged the Muslim was ended.”²⁷⁹ After these appeasement policies of the Soviets in early 1920s, the tension decreased and revolts began weakening in spite of not ending completely. But, after 1923 it gave signs that the rebels’ endeavor to struggle was lessening and people came to the position of quitting resisting against the ruling

²⁷⁵ Hayit, Baymirza, *Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934)*, (Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari,1997), 311-312.

²⁷⁶ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,*Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 179.

²⁷⁷ Hayit, Baymirza, *Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934)*, (Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1997), 312.

²⁷⁸ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,*Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 180.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, 180.

authority anymore, thus the region was in process of integration with the Soviet Union.²⁸⁰

As a conclusion, the importance of the Basmachi movement was its creation of common epic for all Central Asian Muslims which enabled all the elements of Turkistan including the tribes of Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz, the intellectuals, Afghans and West Turk officials like Enver and Jemal for a single aim, an over-all resistance against the Soviets despite comprising varied groups. It was even a fact that an over-all and common resistance like that had not broken out since the Shaibani Khan's time in the 16th century. On the other hand, the movement created disadvantage for Central Asians, because of causing Russians armies to discover, take control and penetrate every part of the region in the Red Army's military operations, from the mountains of eastern Bukhara to the regions along the Chinese and Afghan frontiers.²⁸¹

4.4. The New Regime in Bukhara after the Fall of Monarchy

In this part of the chapter, I focus on the most important issue of the chapter; the transition stage of Bukharan society and state for the Soviet socialist republic. While analyzing the new regime and I point out the structure of the new regime and emphasized its nationalist policies and ever-increasing anti-Bolshevik attitude. I also analyzed the internal and external problems threatening the new regime and the changing circumstances that enforced the Soviets to construct the unity in the region by suppressing the independence of the state. In addition, I focus on two important

²⁸⁰ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 253.

²⁸¹ Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 128.

events in the transition era that enforced the transition to speed. The most important purpose of mine in that part is to display under what conditions and through which developments, the People's Republic was transformed to Soviet People's Republic at first; and then how it was transformed to Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic as a national state of an ethnic group, at the last stage.

In Bukhara, the monarchy was destroyed on 2 September 1920 and the People's Republic was declared on 8 October 1920. The government was presided by Fayzallah Khodzhaev who was the most active man of the new regime. He was the president of the council of ministers, the prime minister, and minister of foreign affairs. The head of state was at first Mirza Abd al Qadir Muhitdinov and then he was replaced by Usman Khodzhaev. The other members of the cabinet comprised of well-known Young Bukharan Jadids. For instance, Qari Yuldash Pulatov was minister of public education and worship, Mukammil ad-Din Makhdum was minister justice, Ata Khodzhaev was minister of interior, Hasan Bay was minister of public health and Mukhtar Khan was minister of finance and economy.²⁸² The most efficient man inside the cabinet after Khodzhaev was Abdulrauf Fitrat. Fitrat was a minister of education and he was the conductor of constructing the national state through his educational and cultural reforms; and of creating the identity of the Bukharan Uzbek society. He was, in short, responsible for nation building of the new People's Republic. The Young Bukharans had nationalist tendencies and began taking an opposing attitude against the Bolsheviks. They also began pursuing nationalist policies through the reforms in education. For example, Abdulrauf Fitrat, architect of educational reforms in Bukhara, conducted the policy of nationalizing the official language. Persian language, which was the official language of the state

²⁸² Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 167.

for centuries, was replaced with Uzbek language. This was an important revolution in cultural life. The new reform was seen as the indication of the new regime's attempt to be "a People's Government", because Persian, the language of elite, was abolished and Uzbek, the language of local people was replaced. This reform also inspired the pan-Turkist ideas again. "The government's most revolutionary measure was to proclaim Uzbek as the state language. By eliminating Persian- which was not only the official language of the emirate, but above all the language of the elite- and replacing it by Uzbek, the language of the people, the government was signaling clearly its intention of being a people's government and no longer that of a few privileged groups; it was also facilitating social mobility".²⁸³ Fitrat, Bukharan minister of education, also made a series of reforms in madrasah system and put the modern education system into implementation in Bukhara. He also organized the Bukharan students to send to Germany for getting undergraduate education in German universities.²⁸⁴ Fitrat also planned to establish the first modern-European styled university in Bukhara.²⁸⁵ "This reform had a further significance: under its impact the old pan-Turanian dream sprang to life again, which had the merit of making the theoretically independent state of Bukhara once more into an important center of spiritual renewal for all Muslims in Russia who had not forgotten their reformist aspirations."²⁸⁶

The new regime began facing problems both inside the country and outside, especially from the Soviets. Inside the country, the Revolutionary Committee of

²⁸³ Ibid, 172.

²⁸⁴ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 248.

²⁸⁵ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 173-174.

²⁸⁶ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 172-173.

Bukhara²⁸⁷ could not keep its promises that it had given before coming to power. This situation put the Young Bukharans into predicament. The revolutionary committee had declared the nationalization of all lands, water supplies, and huge private properties. Even, the Revkom of Bukhara had promised the public opinion to redistribute the confiscated lands, properties and water supplies equally to the peoples of Bukhara.²⁸⁸ However, it was very difficult for the Revkom to fulfill these promises, because the infrastructure of the country was not ready to implement these policies under the existed political, social, economic and cultural conditions of the country.

*Revkom of Bukhara could not keep its promises because of inadequacies of the political and social circumstances of the country. Bukhara's first problem was political. To reform its structures and carry through the Revkom's promises, clearly it was necessary to draw a line through the past and turn to new people in order to run the new institutions. But this was impossible, since Bukhara possessed neither the people nor the material means for such a change.*²⁸⁹

Other problem emerging as a threat for Bukhara was coming from the Soviets. This was the inevitable fate of Bukhara and Khwarazm that they would not escape from. The Soviets saw these countries as its hinterlands and even part of itself for the long run. The bourgeois nationalist regime, according to the Soviet view, was only allowed to provide the transition stage to the socialist state. The Young Bukharans were seen as the people of the bourgeoisie nationalist class and were permitted to remain in power temporarily. The Young Bukharans' coming to power was approved by Moscow in 1920 not to face a public turmoil and uprising, in addition, the increase of Basmachi enforced Moscow to agree with Young Bukharan

²⁸⁷ The All-Bukharan Revolutionary Committee was set up on 14 September 1920 after the fall of Bukhara and collapse of the monarchy. The Committee comprised of the prominent figures of the Young Bukharans such as Fayzallah Khodzhaev, Usman Khodzhaev and Abd al Ahad Arifov.

²⁸⁸ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 246.

²⁸⁹ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 170-171.

Jadids as it was done with the intellectuals of Alash Orda and Turkestan ASSR.²⁹⁰ On the other hand, the war conditions ended and a threat of foreign intervention was not conceivable any more. In 1923-1924, the Soviet government got into strengthening inside. The consolidation of unity of the state was a priority. Therefore, the semi-independent national governments had to be abolished and the implementation of socialism adapted to the particular conditions of the East had to be abandoned in order for providing a proletarian unity.²⁹¹ The first disagreement broke out due to the demand of deployment of Red Army troops on the Afghan frontier under the Soviet command. The Bukharan government did not agree on this and it turned into a crisis between Moscow and Bukhara. Moreover, the Bukharan government could not explain the reason of Soviet troops' existence in Bukhara. Red Army units under the command of Frunze were free to move and were free to get their supplies from Bukharan people. The government demanded the command of Russian troops inside Bukhara. This event also turned into crisis. For the Soviets, keeping troops in Bukhara was necessity because of the Basmachi threat, spreading to the whole country.²⁹² On the other side, Bukharan new regime was shaken with internal conflicts. The Bukharan government dissolved because of the escapes and passing of the ministers and prominent officials to Basmachis' side led by Enver Pasha. Even, Usman Khodzhaev was one of them. The new government was at once organized under the presidency of Fayzallah Khodzhaev and Abdulrauf Fitrat who took the ministry of foreign affairs. While they were struggling against the Basmachis led by Enver at one side and the Soviet pressures at another; they were

²⁹⁰ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 249.

²⁹¹ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 249.

²⁹² Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 176.

seeking aid outside. “These two men, who had stayed in Bukhara to preserve what they could of its independence, sought aid on all sides. Informal discussions with Turkey and Afghanistan led to no positive results, and the Central Asian leaders remained all alone for the assault that they soon had to face”.²⁹³ After a while, they submitted to their fates despairingly.

4.5. On the Way of Disbandment of the People’s Republics

In 1923, two important events which influenced the fate of Bukhara and Young Bukharan regime happened. The first one was the establishment of economic union in southern Central Asia. This was the Soviet enforcement policy to restraint the increasing independent progress of the republics. In March 1923, the first conference was held with the participation of three South Central Asian republics: Turkistan ASSR, Bukhara and Khwarazm. A common economic policy was discussed and it was decided to establish Economic Council of Central Asia. This economic council aimed to integrate currencies, railway, telegraph and postal systems of Bukhara and Khwarazm into the Soviet system.²⁹⁴ Also, three republics (Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara, and Khwarazm) were having a common irrigation, commerce, agriculture and planning systems.²⁹⁵ “Two organizations instrumental in putting an end to the regrouping of all Central Asia under Soviet authority were the Economic Council of Central Asia and the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist

²⁹³ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 255.

²⁹⁴ Carrere D’Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 183.

²⁹⁵ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 254.

Party of the Soviet Union.”²⁹⁶ The second important development was the speech of Stalin that targeted the Russian Muslims who were trying to organize as secret societies, which were especially consisted of Tatar Muslims, against the Soviet regime. The general Soviet policy changed against the Russian Muslims after the 4th conference named as “enlarged conference of responsible workers of the republics and nationality regions” in June 1923.²⁹⁷ In the conference, the Russian Muslims and the government of Bukhara were condemned for ignoring the class interests of proletariat and for pursuing their own nationalist interests.²⁹⁸ There was the fear that the improvement of bourgeoisie nationalism in Turkestan and spread among all Russian Muslims. After the condemnations were oriented against the activities of clandestine organizations of Russian Muslims and bourgeois nationalist tendencies of the regimes of people’s republics in the 4th conference in 9-12 June 1923 in Moscow,²⁹⁹ the operation of the arrest of the dissidents to Bolshevism and advocates of bourgeoisie nationalist government was started. “All the former officials, clerics, important merchants, and landowners were banned from the political community and deprived of the right to vote. Large business firms and then the personal properties of the well-to-do were confiscated while a start at agrarian reform was attempted.”³⁰⁰

The transition period, according to the Soviets, ended and it was time to emphasize the Soviet influence to display the integration of Central Asia to the Union. At the fifth congress of Bukhara Soviets on 19 September 1924, it was accepted on consensus that the People’s Republic of Bukhara was transformed to the

²⁹⁶ Ibid, 257.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, 255.

²⁹⁸ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 181.

²⁹⁹ Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 181.

³⁰⁰ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 255.

Soviet Republic of Bukhara.³⁰¹ In addition, it was approved at the congress that each nation in Bukhara was reorganized as a nation state on its own and joined the USSR.³⁰² The Central Executive Committee of USSR unanimously decided to abolish the Soviet republics, instead, to establish two socialist republics. Instead of these disbanded republics, Uzbekistan SSR was installed as a socialist state of Uzbek ethnic group and Turkmenistan SSR was installed as a socialist state of Turkmens. Both Bukhara Soviet and Khwarazm Soviet and also Turkestan ASSR were totally disbanded on 17 February 1925.

4.6. Reorganization of Central Asia and Sovietization Policies in the Region

Central Asia was divided into the new socialist republics (SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic) after the disbandment of Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara and Khwarazm People's Republics. Instead of these dissolved states, two new socialist republics were founded by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in October 1924. One of these two socialist republics was Uzbekistan SSR which was located in the region of Samarkand, Fergana, Amu Darya and Sri Darya; and the other was Turkmenistan located over the Turkmen regions of Western Bukhara, Khwarazm, and the former Transcaspian region. In addition to these new socialist republics, two autonomous republics (ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) and two autonomous oblasts were established. Two autonomous republics were Tajikistan, a Persian speaking state, which was located on mountainous eastern Bukhara, and Kazakhstan which was formed on the Steppe region. The autonomous regions were Kara Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast and Karakalpak Autonomous

³⁰¹ Ibid, 255.

³⁰² Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 18.

Oblast.³⁰³ Tajik ASSR, which was associated with Uzbek SSR at first, rose to SSR level in 1929, Kazakh ASSR rose to SSR in 1936. Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast, created in 1925, rose to ASSR in 1926 and then rose to SSR in 1936. Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast rose to ASSR in 1932 and transferred from Kazakhstan SSR to Uzbekistan SSR in 1936.³⁰⁴

The upgrading of Tajikistan's status to the level of socialist republic (SSR) in 5 December 1929³⁰⁵ was the most important development after the dissolution of peoples' republics, because the Soviets could, thus, prevent pan-Turkist dreams of Jadids. Tajikistan as a Persian speaking republic in Central Asia, inside the traditional borders of Turkestan, emerged as the biggest obstacle for a probable unified Turkestan.³⁰⁶ "With its reorganizations of Central Asia the Soviet government delivered a terrible blow to the pan-Turk dreams of the Jadids. The fragmentation of Turkistan into national republics endowed with national languages and, worse still, the creation of a non-Turkish republic of Tajikistan, in which a Persian dialect was spoken, put an end to any hope of a regroupment and unification of all Turks of Central Asia".³⁰⁷ In the history of Central Asia, after many centuries, since the collapse of Samanid dynasty, this was the first time that a Persian-speaking state was founded again. The concept of Turkestan that was promoted and defended by Pan-Turkist Jadids in order for creating imagines of historical and ancient Turkish land was somehow challenged by the creation of Tajik state in the region. For the

³⁰³ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 256-257.

³⁰⁴ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 126.

³⁰⁵ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 257.

³⁰⁶ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 184.

³⁰⁷ Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène, trans., *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 184.

Uzbeks, Turkistan meant greater Uzbekistan and Pan-Turkism meant, in one respect, controlling all Turkic groups under Uzbekistan. Therefore, the Soviets ended the dreams of greater Uzbekistan while erasing the concept of Turkistan by creating a Tajik state in Central Asia. The artificially created question increased after Tajikistan and Uzbekistan took their independence in 1991. Although both of the two nations were almost same inhabitants and lived together before the recreation of nations by the Soviets in the 1930s, they were now the biggest enemies to each other. The Uzbek national identity dated back to the historical and ancient Karakhanid dynasty and Tajik national identity dated back to the historical and ancient Samanid dynasty which had been collapsed by the Karakhanids is one of the reasons creating a question between two nation states. In addition, the great amount of Uzbek minority inside Tajikistan and similarly, the great Tajik population in Uzbekistan especially in the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand cause problems between two states. Drawing of the borders by leaving minorities to each state causes a minority question among nation republics. This situation continues to constitute problems among republics of Central Asia, even at present.

The Soviets pursued the policy of “*Korenizatsiya*”³⁰⁸ which allowed the indigenous people of local states to pursue their cultural and national policies. It was given importance to these local states’ encouragement of the local cultures, local political freedoms and their local-native languages during the 1920s. However, after Joseph Stalin came to power, the indigenization policy ended and it was replaced with the great Russification policy all over the Soviet Union. Not only Central Asian states but also Ukraine, Belorussia, and Transcaucasian states were imposed to the

³⁰⁸ It was the policy of the Soviets implemented in the 1920s which aimed to promote native and indigenous peoples’ culture and local languages, and their local states’ semi-independent administrative units and national politics. It was seen as a transition period policy in the Leninist era. When Stalin came to power, the policy shifted to Russification and Sovietization in the late 1930s.

Russification policies of the Soviets. With the concept of Russification, it meant the Sovietization in the all regions of the USSR, because Russian culture and Russian language were seen as the most prior, the most modern, the most probable improved communication tool for being a common and an official language for the communism and for all the nations comprising the Soviet Union. The national local states and their nationalist governing cadres which attempted to oppose to these policies were imposed to harsh sanctions. Even, the purging of national leaders and nationalist local cadres were made by the Soviet authorities throughout the regions under the Soviet rule. The governing cadres in local states promoting their local and native languages were blamed for being bourgeoisie nationalists and suppressing the Russian language which was accepted as the international language of communism by the Soviets. For the policy of Sovietization, the Russian settlers in other local states were given great importance because of their transformative and modernizing characters. They were significant due to being able to spread the Russian culture and Russian language throughout the Union. While the Soviet authorities were implementing these policies, they did not aim to destroy all local and native cultures and linguistics and assimilating the native nations. The local cultures, folks, local languages used inside the local state, national state's constitutional status and national politicians unless they did not act against the Soviet rules and interests were not imposed to any threat of destruction or any harsh sanction and implementation by the Soviet authorities. The only matter was the penetration of Russian language and culture as the superior phenomenon for all the nations of the USSR. Russians were ascribed to the prominent and leading nation of the Union among others; and Russian was emphasized as the common culture and language of communist ideology inside the Union. Not only in realm of culture and linguistics, but also in

realm of economic integration, were the similar policies pursued. For example, the raw materials produced in different local states, for example cotton in Uzbekistan or coal in Ukraine, were transported to the industrial centers of RSFSR and then delivered to other parts of the Union. Thus, the economic and industrial centralization, in other words the Sovietization, was consolidated in the USSR.

After the reorganization of Central Asia according to the rules and regulations of the Soviet Nationalities Policy, the Soviets produced new policies and began implementing them in the region. Especially, the Uzbek state was focused on in these Sovietizing policies because of its historical roots and traditional bonds. It necessitated more detailed policies for Uzbek SSR. Uzbekistan was the most important state among others because Uzbekistan was formed as the nation state of Uzbeks which were ruling ethnic groups of Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate and then Bukharan and Khwarazmian People's Republics which were the last two states that succeeded in standing until the early 1920s. For that reason, both in whole Central Asia and Uzbekistan, the language policy was implemented as a tool of the Sovietization policy. From 1924 to 1933, the Sovietizing policy took speed in Central Asia. The Soviets pursued Russian language policy in Turkestan for Russification of separated ethnic nations, because the Russian language was encouraged as the common official language for both creating common literature and encouraging common culture. The Russian language was declared as the semiofficial and the second compulsory language in the other Socialist Republics of the Union in 1938. For spreading the Soviet regime's influence more in the region, some slogans were produced such as "*the creation of a culture which was to be nationalist in form and socialist essence*", "Domination of the language of the Proletarian revolution", "*the creation of Proletarian-Soviet literature*", and "*internationalizing the*

language". The aim was to incorporate the new Central Asian socialist republics into the system of Soviet Union.³⁰⁹ In order to create more depended nations to the Soviet regime through the reorganization, the Soviets particularly focused on philology. Each ethnic group's philological feature was the most significant reference for the division of Central Asian ethnic communities into national states. After the definition of every ethnic group through ethnic groups' specific languages such as Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen and Kyrgyz; Russian language was imposed as the upper level language by the Soviets to the region for Central Asian Muslims to both use among themselves and to maintain and develop their relations with Russia. In other words, the national republics were obliged to obey this policy. In 1939, the Cyrillic Alphabet was necessitated for non-Russian nations inside the Soviet Union. In addition, in both whole Central Asia but also especially in Uzbekistan, the Soviet regime focused on religion and religiosity which was one of the most important concepts that was keeping different ethnic groups together for centuries. Both unity of religion and unity of religious school, Sunnite in majority was the most important element for natural formation of Sart identity. This identity was erased and disused after 1925.³¹⁰ Before passing to the Cyrillic Alphabet in 1939, firstly Arabic Alphabet used for centuries was erased and Latin alphabet was replaced in the late 1920s. "The elimination of Arabic Alphabet had, in this respect, an essentially political significance. Harsh measures were taken against Islam, a unifying factor, because the problem was particularly grave in most of Central Asia".³¹¹ Even, softening the status of the Shariat and the rights of waqfs by the Soviets in the 1920s

³⁰⁹ Hayit, Baymirza, *Islam and Turkestan under Russian Rule*, (Istanbul: Can Matbaa, 1987), 263-264.

³¹⁰ Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 50.

³¹¹ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 257.

disappeared in the 1930s owing to the harsh measures of the Sovietizing policy in the Stalin era.

The reorganization of national republics in the region and the creation of separate Uzbekistan and Tajikistan republics according to linguistic differences although both of two ethnic groups Uzbeks and Tajiks were bilingual and it was so difficult to distinct them from each other. On the other side, the policy of distinction of Turkic communities was implemented and the basic criterion was Islamic practices of ethnic groups. This was the most convenient method to differentiate Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs and others.³¹² On the other hand, it was very difficult to make distinction between Kyrgyz and Kazakh communities because they were so like each other. Both of two were steppe communities. It was also very difficult to create different nations from these peoples having adapted to the steppe life. Even, Kazakhstan SSR was called as Kyrgyzstan SSR in the beginning and Kyrgyzstan SSR was called as Kara Kyrgyzstan SSR. In addition, the similar difficulty for separating nations was valid for Uzbeks and Turkmen in the region. “Uzbeks and Turkmen had never before lived in separate, ethnically defined states. Kirgiz and Kazakhs had not always been distinguished as separate nations and had previously been known by different names: Kara Kirgiz and Kirgiz, respectively”.³¹³ Not only philological features, religious practices but also customs, traditions and life styles were taken into consideration to identify and build nations. For example, for distinguishing the nations, the women’s dress styles were taken into consideration. In Turkmen regions, Uzbeks were distinguished through the women’s dressing *paranji*, also known as *burqa*, because the Uzbek community was far more religious, their

³¹² Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 50.

³¹³ *Ibid*, 48-50.

women were wearing burqa while Turkmen women were wearing yashmak that only covered some parts of face and slighter than burqa. In addition, the same methods were tried for Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in border areas of Osh city and for Uzbeks and Kazakhs in southern areas of the Steppe.³¹⁴

After putting the separation policy in terms of linguistics into practice, the other unifying elements were taken into consideration by the Soviets, because the Soviets pursued policies which shattered the unity and independence understanding of Central Asian Muslims. “The Leninist approach was to build socialism while encouraging indigenous development and national differentiation.”³¹⁵ On the other hand, the Soviet view was certainly against the harmful ideologies backed by outside powers such as Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. It was attempted to erase the symbols and bonds in social-political and cultural realms. For example, the religion was an important element for the unity of Central Asian Muslims. “The elimination of the Arabic alphabet had, in this respect, an essentially political significance. Harsh measures were taken against Islam, a unifying factor, because the problem was particularly grave in most of Central Asia”.³¹⁶ In addition, the spread of Soviet influence and Soviet backed modernization in the country, in one respect, occurred through the Russian population in Uzbekistan. While these settlers served for Tsarist Russia in past, they now served for the interests for the Soviets as the best and the most natural collaborators for the Soviet Union. “Soviet domination, as the successor of Russian Imperialism only rose to power in Turkestan through the Russians.”³¹⁷

³¹⁴ Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 50-51.

³¹⁵ *Ibid*, 48.

³¹⁶ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 257.

³¹⁷ Hayit, Baymirza, *Islam and Turkestan under Russian Rule*, (Istanbul: Can Matbaa, 1987), 263.

There were at least two million Russian inhabitants in the region.³¹⁸ Even, this fact was enforcing the Soviets and making them feel responsible to interfere and reorganize the region in accordance with its nationalities policy, otherwise these inhabitants would fall into danger, which would probably come from local population.³¹⁹ Also, the Russian population in the region was extremely essential for the Soviets to penetrate its language policy throughout the region. Penetration of Russian language into the whole region would be through these Russian settlers. These settlers had the responsibility to help Russian, the common language of communism, spread to the local peoples.

The most dangerous and threatening issue for the Soviets was the maintenance of Young Bukharan formed government in new Uzbek state. It was well-known about their Pan-Turkist ideas and educational reforms in the era of People's Republic. They were blamed for planning to spread Uzbek influence and found greater Uzbekistan. For these reasons, the national leadership of Bukhara was a crucial threat for the Soviet influence in newly created Uzbekistan. Therefore, Fayzallah Khodzhaev, president of the Council of People's Commissars of Uzbekistan SSR, and the leader of nationalist wing, and also Akmal Ikramov, first secretary of Uzbekistan Communist Party, the leader of Bolshevik wing, were arrested and tried in Moscow for being a Trotskyite and a Rightist. Both Young Bukharan cadres and Bukharan Communist cadres having formed Uzbekistan Communist Party were not allowed to maintain their existence. They were executed on 13 March 1938. The other figures of nationalist cadres in Uzbekistan were

³¹⁸ Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenword Press, 1964), 125.

³¹⁹ *Ibid*, 125.

eliminated after the executions of the leaders.³²⁰ Although Fayzallah Khodzhaev had been the prime minister of Bukhara Peoples' Republic and then became the president of Uzbekistan SSR and also Akmal Ikramov was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party in Uzbekistan from 1929 to 1937, in other words, both of two were cooperated as partners for long term; the clash between the Soviets and Young Bukharans controlled Uzbek SSR government regarding the Soviet's pressure for the specialization of Uzbekistan in cotton production as it was enforced in the past broke out.

The economic and social conflict had its origin in the raising of cotton, which the Soviet regime sought to emphasize, as the czarist government had done before it. Local personnel, who at the time of revolution, had seen the perils of economic dependency based on monoculture stirred up the population against orders coming from the central government. Behind the cotton problem, sensed Soviet leaders, was fierce national resistance.³²¹

The main problem was economic but it spilt over the social domain and thus caused the strengthening of national resistance backed by nationalist Young Bukharans who were now in power in the government of Uzbekistan. It was dangerous for the Soviets that the identity of new national republic, Uzbekistan, was built upon nationalist resistance arising from economic and agricultural reasons in the early years of the Socialist Republic. Therefore, the intervention was a necessity for the Soviets to prevent this emerging question. Even though Khodzhaev and Ikramov were politically rivals to each other, they were agreed on the cotton policy of the Soviets. Both Ikramov and Khodzhaev were put in target for using cotton crisis to strengthen nationalist resistance and this caused the purge of last Jadid cadres' remnants in Turkistan by the Soviets. The leaders' arrestment and execution excuses were very interesting. Fayzallah Khodzhaev was accused of burying his brother in accordance with Islamic rites as an excuse for his arrestment, and Akmal

³²⁰ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 263.

³²¹ Allworth, Edward et al., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 262-263.

Ikramov was accused of being a nationalist in a newspaper article as an excuse for his arrest.³²² After the elimination of these last Jadid cadres, Uzbekistan SSR's complete control passed to the Soviets. Thus, while impressing the identity of pan-Turkist Jadidism maintain its influence in the region from the early 1900s, a new Uzbek identity, which was more compatible to the Soviet regime, was built.

On the other perspective, the Soviet penetration in Central Asia and especially Uzbekistan was different from any other colonial power's penetration in the world and even the Tsarist rule's. The importance of the Soviets and their Sovietizing policies of the local regions carried a modernizing mission and modernization character. For example, although it was so difficult to draw exact boundaries in the culturally complex world, the Soviet Union dealt with each Soviet Socialist state for creating their national identities, constructing literary languages and alphabet, and establishing their political hierarchies. In Central Asia, the Soviet ethnographers collected folk tales and focused on local customs to make better analysis to distinct each nation's identity.³²³ The Soviets were different from the Tsarist administrators who only dealt with tax collection and military security. The Soviets focused on the matters of local society or culture because they analyzed the world with different terms. The Soviets saw Central Asia as a primitive region and wanted to modernize it thus the Soviets planned to make Central Asian nations to move towards socialism.³²⁴ The Soviets aimed a complete transformation in terms of economy, politics, culture and society for the region in order to recreate the men and

³²² Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964), 142.

³²³ Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 18-19.

³²⁴ Northrop, Douglas Taylor, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 19.

women of southern Central Asia as true modern Soviet citizens.³²⁵ “Unlike its Tsarist predecessor, however, the USSR was also a distinctively modern and modernizing state. In both center and periphery, that is, it sought simultaneously to build a polity with a common ideal of citizenship and thus its insistent anti colonization also needs to be taken seriously, as more than mere rhetoric. The unveiling campaign in some ways expressed this credo: it aimed to make Uzbeks into Soviet citizens rather than simply imperial subjects”.³²⁶ To recreate a modern society in Uzbekistan, according to the unveiling campaign, the women had to take off their veils firstly.³²⁷ The Soviet program in Central Asia was to modernize the women in order to create a modern nation and modern nations.

³²⁵ Ibid, 19.

³²⁶ Ibid, 23.

³²⁷ Ibid, 23.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The transformation of Bukharan society and state from medieval monarchy to socialist national republic was significant for the transformation and change of Central Asia, because both ancient Bukhara and Samarkand culture and civilization was fairly efficient and influential in the region, in addition the populous Uzbek community had more importance than other nations because of having sedentary population, long historical tradition and civilization and more intellects rather than other nations. In short, the transformation of Bukharan emirate meant the transformation of Turkestan. The most important event that triggered the transformation and change for Bukharan society and state was their first recognition with the Russians. Russian intervention and influence was the basic triggering factor enabling the first step for the change. In 1855, the Russian armies began the great campaign upon Bukhara and in 1868 the treaty putting Bukhara under the protectorate was signed. The subjugation of Bukhara to Russia was the beginning of

Bukhara's facing the Western influence. Firstly the Russian settlers came and these settlers became one of the most significant engine that speed the emirate's transformation, because the two important events, February and October Revolutions, were sensed in Turkestan through these settlers.

The other important development for Bukhara was the installation of Russian schools and then Usul-i Jadid (new method) schools arising from Crimean Tatar intellectuals' project addressing the Russian Muslims in the Emirate. The restrictions of the Emir and mullahs upon Jadid schools and this new educational method caused clash between traditional conservatives and reformists in Bukhara. The reformist Jadids' organizing as a secret society and their continual struggle against the Emir strengthened the oppositional character of reformist Jadids and made them an alternative actor that asked for change and transformation for Bukhara and Turkistan. In addition, Jadid cadres, having emerged from the students, were sent for education outside, especially in Russia and Ottoman Empire. The student getting education in Istanbul, capital of Ottoman State, adapted to Pan-Turkist and Pan Islamist ideas and these developments increased the Jadids' dissident sides.

The other most important events that broke out in Russia and spread to this region was March and February Revolutions. These revolutions enabled the change to speed more in one respect. For example, March Revolution brought the reform consciousness of installing constitutional monarchy and prompted Jadids to persuade the provisional government in Petrograd to force the reforms upon the Emir. The October Revolution was the more significant development that changed the fate of Bukharan society and Bukharan reformist intellectuals, because the increase of Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war influenced the traditional cooperation between the Emir and the Tsar. With the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks chose an

ideological partner for themselves. For that choice, the best suitable actors were Jadids because they asked for change and reform in Bukhara and were struggling against the Emir as the Bolsheviks had done against the Tsar. First time, the ruling power at the head of Russia rejected the Emir's offer to cooperate and emphasized its priorities about not collaborating with a feudal aristocrat. The October revolution supplied full support from Bolsheviks to Jadids and thus the Emir's rule collapsed completely. Although the Jadids were divided into two as Young Bukharans and Bukharan Communists, and Young Bukharans were seen as nationalist bourgeoisie; the Soviet authority gave the mandate of governing to Young Bukharans because of Bukhara's entrenched conservative and feudal society and culture.

The establishment of Bukharan People's Republic and then transition to Bukhara Soviet People's Republic were important stages for the creation of national republic. The transformation from monarchy to republic directly without constitutional monarchy era was through the intervention of Bolsheviks and this intervention prevented the natural evolution of Bukharan state although the Jadids insist on not extracting the Emir from the system completely. On the other side, the Basmachi revolt was the most important event triggering the national consciousness in the region. Of course, not only political developments but also socio-economic problems and construction of railway, telegraph lines and printing of newspapers in Turkestan influenced the transformation and evolution more than politics. The connecting of Bukhara to Russia and the West was through the railway. Railway and telegraph also enabled Russia to strengthen its control upon Bukhara.

For the socio economic problems, the best instance was both Tsarist Russia's and the Soviets' cotton monoculture policy. This policy caused starvation for Central Asians and the 1916 peasant revolts broke out. When the Soviets continued to

implement this policy after the creation of Uzbek SSR, the Uzbekistan government tried to resist. The figures in government coming from Jadids ideologically were annihilated by Stalin. Although the Jadid backed nationalist construction of Uzbek identity was prevented by the Soviets, the era between the early 1900s and late 1930s was the most important parameter for Uzbek history that enabled the creation of modern Uzbek state and society. Especially, Jadids' reform policies like replacing Uzbek language with Persian as an official language and making nationalist education reforms inside the Republic in the period of Bukharan People's Republic were quite crucial in the formation of modern Uzbek identity.

The Uzbek identity question was about the creation of the identity through the Russian intervention and formation of the identity by the local elite and intellectuals. The most important difference that caused problem theoretically between the Soviets and Bukharan nationalist Jadids (Young Bukharans) was that the naturally formed Uzbek identity and national state perception was pan-Turkist and aiming greater Uzbekistan in Central Asia. On the other side, the Soviet created Uzbek identity through the Soviet lingual distinction policy upon nested nations was harmless, stable, Sovietic and aiming controllable and dependent Uzbekistan inside its frontiers. The social evolution and political transformation faced the Russian interference frequently. It was a truth that the start of change on its own was so difficult, so Russian interference was fairly important for the start of change however the frequent interferences caused the natural development of evolution. In addition, it caused many problems for Bukharan society. For example, the ignorance of installation of constitutional monarchy and declaration of republic directly and practice of these issues through the Soviet help caused the increase of Basmachi resistance and a low density war until 1934 in the region. Besides, the cotton

monoculture caused starvation in civil war era and prevented an improvement of a national agriculture and economy in the country. It only made the country dependent on Russia economically. This situation continued in the time of Uzbekistan SSR. Uzbekistan SSR was, thus, built as a satellite socialist state of the USSR.

Even though the new national republic seemed as a satellite country politically, the change and modernization in every sphere gained speed under the rule of the USSR. When the country gained its independence in 1991, it carried intense Russian influence although Islamic consciousness and religious cult, especially in Bukhara Samarkand and the cities in the Fergana Valley region, seemed like sleeping underground, but possible to weak up suddenly.³²⁸ The developments just after dissolution of the USSR were fairly unexpected for the region. Although there was a long, strong and effective penetration of socialist secularism upon the society, the buried and sleeping past of Uzbekistan, also with the influence of radical Islam which penetrated in Afghanistan and prepared to spill over Central Asia, emerged just after the end of the SSR in Uzbekistan. This situation was important because there was an emerging clash, which also had a potential to last in long term, between the modernized and secularized sides and elements, and the oppositional operating sides and elements which take strength from weakening and rising traditional past. Since Uzbekistan is the most important and most strategic state among other post-Soviet Central Asian states, the developments and emerging questions inside this state would potentially influence the others somehow.

³²⁸ In 1991, just after the end of the Soviet influence and the independence of Uzbekistan, a militant Islamic group, known as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, was founded. It aimed to found an Islamic state by overthrowing President Islam Karimov and his secular regime. The group made several attacks in Tashkent targeting Karimov and made several uprising attempts in the Fergana Valley in the 1990s.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adeeb, Khalid. 1998. *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Agabekov, Grigory Sergeyeovich. 2011. *Enver Pasa Nasıl Öldürüldü? [How was Enver Pasha killed?]*. Hasan Babacan and Servet Avsar, ed. Istanbul: Bengi Yayınları.
- Aini, Sadriddin. 1922. *Buhara Inkilabi Tarihi Üçün Materiyaller. [Historical Materials for the Bukharan Revolution]* Tashkent.
- Allworth, Edward (ed.). 1967. *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Andican, Ahad. 2003. *Cedidizm'den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESI. [From Jadidism to Freedom, TURKESTAN STRUGGLE]*. Istanbul: Emre Yayinlari.
- Baysun, Abdullah Receb. 1943. *Türkistan Millî Hareketleri. [Turkestan National Movements]*. İstanbul.
- Biddulp, C.E. 2011. "Russian Central Asia", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (Oct. 1891): 563-597. [Http: //www.jstor.org/stable/ 25197068](http://www.jstor.org/stable/25197068).
- Caroe, Olaf. 1967. *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Carrere D'Encausse, Hélène (trans.). 1966. *Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd.

- Coates, Zeld K. And W.P. 1951. *Soviets in Central Asia*, New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers.
- E.Bacon, Elizabeth. 1966. *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study In Culture Change*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Frye, Richard N. 2007. *al-Narshakhi's the History of Bukhara*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Hatunoglu, Nurettin. 2011. *Turkistan'da Son Turk Devleti Buhara Emirligi ve Alim Khan. [The Last Turkic State in Turkestan: The Bukharan Emirate and Alim Khan]*. Istanbul: Ötüken Nesriyat A.S.
- Hayit, Baymirza.1997.*Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934). [The Basmacis: Turkestan National Struggle History (1917-1934)]*.Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari.
- Hayit, Baymirza. 1987. *Islam and Turkestan under Russian Rule*, Istanbul: Can Press.
- Hayit, Baymirza.1995.*Turkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mucadele Tarihi, [The National Struggle History of the Turkestan States]*. Ankara: TTK.
- Kocaoglu, Timur. 2001.*Turkistan'da Yenilik Hareketleri ve Ihtilaller, 1900-1924: Osman Hoca anısına incelemeler, [Reform movements and revolutions in Turkistan, 1900-1924: Studies in Honour of Osman Khoja]*. Haarlem: SOTA.
- Kocaoglu, Timur. 1987. *Sibirya ve Turkistan'da Esir Turk Subaylari. [The Captive Turkish Military Officers in Siberia and Turkestan]*. Turk Dunyasi Tarih Dergisi. No: 1-11.
- Kort, Michael. 2004. *Nations in Transition: Central Asian Republics*. New York: Facts in File Inc.
- L. Roudik, Peter. 2007. *The History of the Central Asian Republics*. Greenwood Press.
- MacKenzie, David&W.Curran, Michael. 2002. *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond*. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

- McCray, Thomas R. 2006. *Russia and the Former Soviet Republics*, New York: Chelsea House.
- Northrop, Douglas Taylor. 2004. *Veiled empire: gender and power in Stalinist Central Asia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Olufsen, O. 1911 *The Emir of Bokhara and His Country: Journeys and Studies in Bokhara*, London: William Heinemann.
- Sander, Oral.2009. *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994. [Political History]*.Ankara: Imge Kitapevi Yayinlari.
- Soucek, Svat. 2000. *A History of Inner Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey.1964. *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey.1966. *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*. London: the Bodley Head Ltd.
- Yengin, Naci. 2010. *Anayurt'tan Anadolu'ya Buhara Emirligi, Turkistan ve Enver Pasa. [From Motherland to Anatolia, the Emirate of Bukhara, Turkestan and Enver Pasha]*. Istanbul: Bilgeoguz.

APPENDIX A

Interview with Prof. Dr. Timur Kocaoglu

“Professor Timur Kocaoglu is the son of Osman Khodzhaev, who was Young Bukharan Jadid, the minister of finance in the first Bukharan Republic’s cabinet, and later the president of Bukharan People’s Republic. Prof. Kocaoglu served and gave courses at Marmara University, and at Koç University and now serves in Central Asian Studies at Michigan State University. He studies over Turkish Language and Literature, Central Asian studies and Turkic languages.”

Interviewer: What was the reason that caused your father, Osman Khodzhaev to shift to Enver’s side in spite of taking side near the Bolsheviks and conducting a presidency in the Republic at first?

Timur Kocaoğlu: Neither Young Bukharans were a Marxist based political movement nor Bukharan Republic was a Soviet model state. Osman Khodzhaev (1878-1968) and Fayzallah Khodzhaev (1896-1937) were cousins and Osman K. was elder than Fayzallah K. Also, there were two groups in the Young Bukharan movement. The largest one compromised the nationalist intellectuals and its leader was my father, Osman K. while the second one, lesser than other, composed of sincere Marxists and their leader was Fayzallah K.

Fayzallah K. got education in the Jadid School founded by Osman K. in 1911. The aim of Young Bukharan movement was to replace the emirate with an independent state. When we review the flag of Bukharan Republic, there were moon and star on the green floor and the sign of Bolshevism, hammer and sickle did not take place in the flag until the end of 1922. However, the name of the republic was changed into Bukharan Soviet People's Republic in 1923 and the flag included hammer and sickle.³²⁹

The Young Bukharans did not have armed strength. They asked for aid from the Bolsheviks to destroy the Emir's administration. After Emir fled in 1922, Fayzallah K. became prime minister and Osman K. became minister of finance in the new government. In 1921, Osman K. rose to the presidency and later he passed to Eastern Bukhara (present Tajikistan) in order to coordinate and combine the scattered Basmachi groups. At that time, Turkish officials, captured in Transcaucasia and exiled to Siberia by Tsarist armies, escaped from prisoner camps and arrived in

³²⁹ For the flag photos, See Timur Kocaoglu, *Turkistan'da Yenilik Hareketleri ve Ihtilaller: 1900-1924*.SOTA, 2001.

Tashkent. Then, these Turkish officials were invited to Bukharan Republic and these officials were assigned to form the Bukharan army.³³⁰

Osman K. attacked the Russian headquarters³³¹ in Dushanbe and surrounded the Bolshevik units and captured the Russian generals and Russian envoy there. Osman K. condemned the Soviets to withdraw from Bukharan Republic. But, The Soviet forces in Tashkent took action and defeated the Bukharan units. Therefore, Osman K. had to withdraw to the Afghan border. There, Osman K. stated a declaration calling the whole Bukharan people for resistance.³³²

In sum, my father, Osman K.'s stand on the way of national independence since early years of his life did never shift, however Fayzallah K. and leftist group of Young Bukharans pursued the cooperation way with the Bolsheviks.

Interviewer: What are the reasons that Fayzallah Khodzhaev was in cooperation with the Bolsheviks and did not participate in the Basmachi movement? Also, there were some claims that Enver organized assassination to Fayzallah K.? What do you think about these claims?

Timur Kocaoğlu: Fayzallah Khoja appreciated Marxism and believed in sincerity but he was never a traitor. In my opinion, the claims about assassination attempts led by Enver against Fayzallah Khoja were not true. On the other side, Enver was a good friend of my father, Osman Khoja. Enver Pasha always addressed "*Muhterem Efendim*", meaning "Dear Sir" to Osman Khoja in his letters. Also, Enver was never

³³⁰ See Timur Kocaoglu, "*Sibirya ve Turkistan'da Esir Turk Subaylari*", Turk Dunyasi Tarih Dergisi, No. 1-11 (1987).

³³¹ Prof. Kocaoglu preferred to use "Russian headquarters, Russian soldiers, Bolshevik Russia" instead of a terminology of "the Soviets". He especially emphasizes the terminology of "Russian".

³³² See Abdullah Receb Baysun , *Türkistan Milli Hareketleri*, (İstanbul, 1945).

supporter or cooperator of Bukharan Emir. For example, Ibrahim Lakay, close commander of the Emir kept Enver in house jail for a time.

Interviewer: What was the importance of Basmachi movement in the formation of national identity and nation-building of Uzbekistan nation state?

Timur Kocaoğlu: Basmachi movement was not only an important event in Turkestan wide but also in the worldwide. It was the first guerilla movement of the 20th century and a national awakening. The national resistance in Turkey began in 1919 but in Turkestan it began in 1918. Basmachi movement was so severe between 1918 and 1929 and caused a heavy burden for the Red Army units. Although Red army got superiority after 1929, the Basmachi resistance lasted until 1934, for that reason the Basmachi was the first resistance movement and had the longest process among guerilla movements (1918-1934, 16 years). Moscow bombed and burned the villages and towns in order to break the Basmachi movement.

Of course, Basmachi movement is not significant for Uzbekistan and Uzbeks but also all Turkic nations in Turkestan such as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmens. This effect was especially sensed after 1992. During the Soviet period, Basmachi movement was blackened in schools and public spheres.

Interviewer: What are the basic reasons in the failure of Bukharan Peoples Republic?

Timur Kocaoğlu: Bukharan Republic could not found a strong army and the core army established by the Ottoman officers did not have enough arms and soldiers to resist against Red Army. Basmachi bands were divided into many groups. Some of them depended on Osman Khoja and some of them depended on Emir Alim Khan. They also struggled with each other. In order to calm this chaos, Osman Khoja

struggled for seven months between 1921 and 1922. After the defeat of Dushanbe, he had to flee to Afghanistan. After Osman Khoja left, the leftist wing of Young Bukharans obtained the whole control and got under the rule of Bolshevik Russia.

Interviewer: What are the basic reasons of the failure of Basmachis?

Timur Kocaoğlu: The most important reason for the failure of Basmachi movement was its lack of unity and composition of scattered bands. The non-existence of the single center caused lack of coordination. Both Osman Khoja and Enver Pasha could not provide this.

Interviewer: What are the reasons behind Young Bukharans' cooperation with the Bolsheviks?

Timur Kocaoğlu: Young Bukharans were a political movement but they did not have armed force. They organized public strikes in the years of 1919 and 1920 in order to collapse the Emir. But, every strike and uprising was suppressed bloodily by the Emir and his soldiers.³³³ For that reason, the leftist wing of Young Bukharans agreed with the Bolsheviks and asked for help from Red Army to collapse the Emir's authority. On the other side, Bukharan and Russian relations were very close. For example, there were a Russian garrison and a great deal of Russian soldiers in Dushanbe city. Bukharan Emir Alim Khan got educated in Moscow and had strong commercial links with Russia.

Interviewer: Although Emir Alim Khan got modern education in Russia and had a modern lifestyle in his palace, what were the reasons behind his reaction to the reforms and constitutional monarchy?

³³³ See Sadriddin Ayni, *Buhara Inkilabi Tarihi Üçün Materyaller*, Tashkent, 1922.

Timur Kocaoğlu: Alim Khan was a fan of Russian culture and had a Russian styled way of life in his palace. He always took advice from Russian tradesmen, generals and intellectuals. However, Alim Khan always resisted against people's enlightenment, and establishment of Jadid schools. He did not avoid suppress Young Bukharans by killing, jailing, exiling them. Therefore, Young Bukharans was aware of the necessity of demolishing the rule of the Emir, because there was no another way. Alim Khan was also aware that his authority would fall in danger if the peoples took modern education.

Interviewer: What extent did the local people and Basmachi actors take Enver Pasha and his activities serious? What extent did the pan-Turan idealism of Enver Pasha influence Turkestanians?

Timur Kocaoğlu: The intellectuals took Enver Pasha serious very much and political leaders like Osman Khodzhaev tried to help him. Local people also respected Enver Pasha since he was an Ottoman general and his wife was a member of Ottoman dynasty. However, some supporters of the Emir were against Enver.

When Enver Pasha became a martyr, famous Uzbek poet Abdulhamit Colpan wrote a poem dedicated to Enver Pasha and also Osman Khodzhaev, president of Bukharan Republic, wrote two elegies, one was Persian and other was Uzbek. I can present you one of his poems. When Enver was killed, Osman Khoja was in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Interviewer: Dear Professor, thank you for answering my questions.

Timur Kocaoğlu: Thank you.

APPENDIX B

İNTİKAM... AL İNTİKAM!³³⁴ (Osman Khodzhaev's Poem ³³⁵)

Türk balası oruslardan köp sıkıldı,

Er kırıldı, kız ezildi, yurt yıkıldı.

Hamiyetlik ENVER PAŞA onu sorab,

Kelib azadetmek için şehid boldı.

İntikam... Al İntikam!

Vatan için bizimkiler can bereler,

Millet için düşmanlardan öç alalar.

Bugün Çingiz evlatları at oynatıb,

Belde kılıç, omuzlarda beşatarlar

İntikam... Al İntikam!

Türkistandan oruslarını haydab kovub,

³³⁴ See Abdullah Receb Baysun, *Türkistan Milli Hareketleri*, (İstanbul, 1945),114.

³³⁵ This poem was dedicated by Osman Khodzhaev for the martyrdom of Enver Pasha in Baljuvan. It was presented by Prof. Kocaoglu at the end of the interview.

Sahibkiran Timur Bekni şâdeteler.

Balalarge mekteb açıb, ta'lim berib,

Uluğ Beknin tarihini yâdeteler.

İntikam... Al İntikam!

Türklük kanı tamırlarda bugün kaynar,

Erte çıkıb Türkistanda bayrak açar.

Bütün dünya sözimizge kulak salar,

Herbir devlet kelib bizden elçi sorar.

İntikam... Al İntikam!

O gün demek, Türk balası rahat turar,

Barça millet necât tapıb, yüzü küler.

Türk balası kutulmasa tinç oturmaz,

Yer yüzide tanılmasa uruş turmaz.

İntikam... Al İntikam!

Osman Khodzhaev, Kabul, Afghanistan

August 1922

APPENDIX C

Interview with Emir's Family

“Shahzade Abdulkebir Yuce was the last son of Emir Alim Khan and he lived in Gaziantep. They moved to Gaziantep, Turkey in 1983 from Kabul, Afghanistan. He was over seventy year old. He and his sons dealt with fur manufacturing. Dr. Nurettin Hatunoglu was his son in law. He served in Zonguldak Karaelmas University. Shahzade often lived in his daughter's house in Zonguldak. He and his son in law avoided answering questions in detail because of facing any problem and causing a diplomatic problem between Turkey and Uzbekistan. They are particularly careful about being away from politics. I especially requested Mr. Hatunoglu to help me take answers of my questions.”

Interviewer: Mullahs and madrasa students were influential over Emir Alim Khan and his rule. What were its reasons?

Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: Yes, they have impact over the Emir. He was inclined to them and their demands because of political reasons.

Interviewer: Both Emir Alim and his father Emir Abdalahad got education in Russia. There were claims that they had a modern life in their palaces. What do you say about that?

Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: Yes, it is, in one respect, true. They were not unfamiliar about the modern life.

Interviewer: What were the reasons enforcing the Emir to be against Jadids and their reform demands?

Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: He was against them and their reform demands because of political reasons.

Interviewer: Was there a problem between Enver and Emir Alim because of the leadership question for the Basmachi movement?

Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: There was not a friction between them. Emir Alim assigned Enver as “Emir ul Muminin”.

Interviewer: Is your dynasty known in Uzbekistan now? What was the present Uzbek government’s outlook to your dynasty?

Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: They were not any negative outlooks. We were officially invited by the Uzbek government and we visited Uzbekistan.

Interviewer: Thank you for answering questions.

Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: Thank you.

APPENDIX D



Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman, Governor
General of Turkestan, 1867–1882³³⁶



Muzaffar ad-Din, Emir of Bukhara, 1860–1885³³⁷

³³⁶ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 19

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.



Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev, Governor of the
Turkestan Oblast, 1865– 1866; Governor General of Turkestan, 1882–1884³³⁸



Abd al-Ahad, Emir of Bukhara, 1885–1910³³⁹

³³⁸ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 74.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, 98.



Alim, Emir of Bukhara, 1910–1920³⁴⁰



Isfendiyar, Khan of Khiva, 1910–1918³⁴¹

³⁴⁰ Ibid, 165.

³⁴¹ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 177.



Mikhail Vasilevich Frunze, Commander of the

Turkestan Front. 1919–1920³⁴²



Fayzullah Khodzhaev, Prime Minister of Bukharan

People's Soviet Republic, 1920–1924³⁴³

³⁴² Ibid, 212.

³⁴³ Becker, Seymour, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 230.



Osman Khodzhaev, President of Bukharan

People's Republic, 1921-1922

APPENDIX E




Bukharan Emirate

(1785-1920)

Bukharan People's Soviet Republic

(1920-1925)




Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic

(1924-1991)

Republic of Uzbekistan

(Declared in 1991)



Khivan Khanate

(1511-1920)

Khorezm People's Soviet Republic

(1920-1925)