

CONTEMPORARY FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE AND
TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: CASE OF UK
INDEPENDENCE PARTY

A Master's Thesis

by

YUSUF GEZER

Department of International Relations

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

Ankara

September 2013

CONTEMPORARY FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE AND
TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: CASE OF UK
INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

YUSUF GEZER

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

ANKARA

September 2013

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Norman Stone

Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Clemens Hoffmann

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel

Director

ABSTRACT

CONTEMPORARY FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE AND TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: CASE OF UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Gezer, Yusuf

M.A., Department of International Relations

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Norman Stone

September 2013

If and how far-right parties are able to come together and cooperate as a transnational movement within the EU? This thesis will try to understand how far-right parties in European Parliament come together and cooperate despite their nationalist agenda and what is this cooperation's impact on politics in Europe. This thesis assumes that contemporary far-right parties discard nationalistic concerns and aspirations in favor of transnational cooperation. In accordance with this purpose, definitions of ideology, fascism and far-right will be defined and then these definitions would help to understand which parties could be accepted as far-right parties. After defining them, this thesis will examine underlying aspects of the transnational cooperation between far-right parties in Europe and try to determine how this transnational cooperation became reality despite far-right parties' nationalistic stand. Furthermore,

a case study will be conducted to understand what is a far-right party's ideology and stance towards European Union in general.

Key Words: Contemporary Far Right, European Parliament, EFD, UK Independence Party.

ÖZET

AVRUPA'DAKİ MODERN AŞIRI SAĞ VE ULUSLARARASI İŞBİRLİĞİ: BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK BAĞIMSIZLIK PARTİSİ VAKASI

Gezer, Yusuf

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Norman Stone

Eylül 2013

Aşırı sağ partiler nasıl ve ne şekilde bir araya gelip uluslararası bir hareket olarak AB içerisinde hareket edebiliyor? Bu tez, aşırı sağ partilerin milliyetçi programlarına rağmen nasıl bir araya gelip işbirliği içerisine girdiklerini ve bu işbirliğinin Avrupa politikalarına etkisini anlamaya çalışacaktır. Bu tez, modern aşırı sağ partilerin milliyetçi kaygılarını uluslararası işbirliği için bir kenara bıraktıklarını varsaymaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, ideoloji, faşizm ve aşırı sağın tanımları yapılacak ve bu tanımlar hangi partilerin aşırı sağ olarak değerlendirilebileceğini anlamaya yardımcı olacaktır. Tanımlamaların ardından, bu tez aşırı sağ partilerin AB içerisinde yaptıkları uluslararası işbirliğinin altında yatan nedenleri ve bu işbirliğinin, aşırı sağ partilerin milliyetçi duruşlarına rağmen nasıl gerçekleştiğini araştıracaktır.

Buna ek olarak, bir aşırı sağ partinin ideolojisini ve Avrupa Birliđi'ne karşı olan tutumunu belirlemek amacıyla bir vaka analizi yapılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Modern Aşırı Sağ, Avrupa Parlamentosu, EFD, Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of the people and institutions I have mentioned below.

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Norman Stone. Without his invaluable help, support and guidance, this project would not have been completed. I also would like to express my appreciation to thesis committee members, Asst. Prof. Dr. Clemens Hoffmann and Asst. Prof. Dr. Ioannis Grigoriadis, without whose constructive comments and criticisms, this thesis would not have been successful.

Special thanks to Asst. Prof. Dr. Nil Şatana for her extensive support, understanding, encouragements and valuable advice to me. I would not have been where I am right now without her.

I would like to convey my thanks to my father Sabahattin, my mother Hasene and my sister Aynur, for their understanding and love.

I am heartily thankful to best my friend Ömer Kavuk. The time I spent writing my thesis became easier with his invaluable friendship. I also would like to express my special thanks to my best friends in Ankara, Ali Pınarbaşı, Fatma Şafak, Ece Kurtboğan, Gülçe Kurtboğan and Çağdaş Yıldırım.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY.....	8
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	11
3.1 Ideology And Politics.....	12
3.1.1 Defining Ideology.....	12
3.2 What Is Neo-Fascism?.....	17
3.2.1 Neo-Fascism’s Predecessor: Classic Inter-War Fascism.....	17
3.2.2 The Three Waves of Neo-Fascism.....	19
3.2.3. Defining the Contemporary Far-Right.....	20
3.2.3.1. Populism.....	24
3.2.3.2 Nationalism: Central Feature of the Far-Right?.....	25
3.2.3.3. The Far-Right and the Question of Immigration.....	27
3.2.3.4. Euro-Skepticism.....	29
CHAPTER 4: FAR-RIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.....	32
4.1 European Parliament.....	33
4.1.1 Far-Right in the European Parliament.....	35
4.2 Who Is The EFD? Analysis of the Far-Right Political Group.....	38
4.3 The Far-Right as a Transnational Movement in the European Parliament.....	41
CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY - UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY.....	52
5.1 What Is UKIP?.....	53

5.2 Analysis of Manifesto Data	54
5.3 Analysis of Speeches and Interviews	58
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION	68
BIBLIOGRAPHY	75

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Results from 2004 EP elections (European Parliament, 2013b)	34
Table 2 – Results from 2009 EP elections (European Parliament, 2013b)	34
Table 3 – List of political parties in the political group EFD per state	37
Table 4 – European political groups' cohesion rates on all policy areas (adapted from Vote Watch Europe 2013a)	44
Table 5 – EFD cohesion rates for all policy areas (adapted from Vote Watch Europe 2013a).....	46
Table 6 - Loyalty to national party and political group for each MEP in EFD.....	47

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Distribution of seats and political affiliation for 2009 – 14 Term.....	36
Figure 2 – European political groups cohesion rates on all policy areas (14.07.2009 – 04.07.2013).....	43
Figure 3 - Scatter plot graph of loyalty to national parties and political groups	48
Figure 4 - Average number of parliamentary questions, speeches and amended reports per MEP by European political groups (VoteWatch Europe 2011, 12).....	51

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Recent trends all over Europe re-open questions about fascism and neo-fascism all over Europe; political forces, dynamics and attitudes are changing and popular demands (or discontent) are giving rise to the far-right.

In many European states there is a growing dissatisfaction among the European population that is generally no longer expressed in openly racist terminology, but ‘has somewhat made way for more subtle emphasis on cultural integration, intolerance towards minority groups’ (Haddad and Piven 2013).

In 2010, France expelled approximately 1,000 Roma and 11,000 the year before (BBC 2010a), despite being EU citizens and were returned to Romania sparking controversy. The French government defended the repatriation policy by stating it is “decent and humane” (BBC 2010b), because the Roma were living in deplorable conditions. Former French President Sarkozy also said that the camps had to be dismantled, because they were “sources of crime, prostitution, trafficking and child exploitation” (BBC 2010c). During the May 2013 protests against gay marriage in

France, intolerance against homosexuals, women, migrants, and secularity were also expressed (Abtan 2013).

The United Kingdom also shares a recent, but troubled past full of intolerant anti-immigration policies and rhetoric. In 2010, as part of a counterterrorism project, authorities installed surveillance cameras in predominantly Muslim neighborhood (USA Today 2010).

Then in 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech on immigration¹, which sparked a fury of criticisms from Brussels labeling the speech as “unintelligent” (Helm 2013).

France and UK are also not the only European states convulsed by popular discontent and the rise of far-right parties. Lega Nord in Italy, True Finns in Finland, Progress Party in Norway, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Danish People’s Party in Denmark, Golden Dawn in Greece, Party of Freedom in the Netherlands and Swiss People’s Party are all examples of political parties that to different extent advocate far-right values such as: anti-Muslim or islamophobia, anti-immigration, homophobia, Euroscepticism, anti-globalism, nationalism, anti-abortion, anti-austerity, and pro-deportation of migrants (Haddad and Piven 2013).²

The European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, László Andor said that the speech creates a “serious risk of pandering to knee-jerk

¹ In his speech he said: “and let me set out how we are going to do this: by stopping our benefits system from being such a soft touch; by making entitlement to our key public services something migrants earn, not an automatic right /.../ On benefits: right now the message through the benefit system is all wrong. It says that if you can’t find a job or you drop out of work early, the British taxpayer owes you a living for as long as you like, no matter how little you have contributed to social security since you arrived” (Cameron 2013)

² It must be noted that these beliefs do not unite all far-right parties or even grassroots movements across the continent; not all parties share common values and positions.

xenophobia /.../ Blaming poor people or migrants for hardships at the time of economic crisis is not entirely unknown,” (Helm 2013). It is not just the British conservatives that are willingly joining in the scapegoating of migrants and intolerant rhetoric. Failures of the Conservatives have brought gains and popularity to UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP), but also a far-right movement; the English Defense League (EDL). In Britain, there are “growing fears that the league - despite its official multiracial stance - has become a ready-made army for neo-Nazis who for years have operated underground and that tensions will erupt resulting in major disorder” (Al Jazeera 2010b) as the number and scope of protests and street violence is growing.

“The continent seems to be experiencing a shift in ideology that is centered less on notions of liberty and inclusion and more on protectionism and exclusion” (Al Jazeera, 2010a). Even United Nations Secretary General (UN SG) Ban Ki-Moon warned Europe of a new development on the continent - the so-called “politics of polarization” (UN News Center 2010). Ban Ki-moon’s “profound concern” (UN News Center 2010) is related to the lack of improvement in the policies and attitudes towards immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants.

When speaking to The Voice of Russia, Benjamin Ward, the Deputy Director of the Human Rights Watch said that “there is certainly good evidence to suggest that extremist parties have grown in support and in strength in many countries in Europe in the last decade or so, including in countries that don’t have any tradition of extremist parties.” (2013).

However, the reason that it is important to understand the dynamics of this phenomenon - the rise in the far-right in Europe - is the fact that far-right rhetoric, norms and attitudes have become 'socially acceptable' and also because:

the mainstreaming of the politics of extremist political parties is a very important part of understanding why they pose such challenge to human rights in Europe. It is not simply the activities of the sort of archetypal skinhead thugs, it is the effect that they are having on mainstream politics” (Benjamin Ward for The Voice of Russia 2013).

Furthermore, the far-right is quite influential, because it not only challenges current ruling parties, their agendas, and policies, but also because they “pose electoral competition”³ along with being “evidence of voter and media concern about real or perceived problems” (Bale et al 2010: 411). And many center-right (and even other parties) governments adopt⁴ the concerns and agendas as their own. This phenomenon occurred in the UK for example with the ‘New Labour’ Party.⁵

The underlying assumption that this thesis adopts is that the EU has not been an obstacle to the revival of far-right parties. The far-right nationalist and populist parties elected to the EP have experienced electoral success nationally and at the European level (Vasilopoulou 2009: 8). Various economic, social, political and ideological factors played a role in the emergence of far-right parties that have successively become more extreme in their rhetoric, agenda and policies. Although

³ This electoral competition also takes the form of far-right parties preventing socialist governments from forming by joining non-socialist coalitions or giving support to center-right coalitions (Bale et al 2010: 412).

⁴ Bale et al (2010: 414) show that this is a three step process with three different strategies. At first, leading parties do not change their policies until the challenge becomes strong enough. When this threat becomes big enough they will attempt to 'diffuse' their influence and power, but when the far-right secures enough electoral support, they adopt their policies.

⁵ The New Labour in the UK adopted this policy of “getting tough on immigration” particularly because they witnessed the consequences of leading parties ignoring the far-right in other European states (Bale et al 2010: 422-3).

the EU started as a peace project, which was to prevent any future destructive catastrophes, such as armed conflict, by bringing together once feuding states and locking them into cooperation and mutual dependence. Yet, while the EU was intended to provide a space for democracy, respect for human rights, freedom, rule of law, economic cooperation and prosperity for citizens of Member States, far-right parties are present and operating continent-wide sending a worrying message over the fragile future ahead.

Far-right parties have managed to influence politics on the national and regional level by mainstreaming their positions on multiculturalism, EU integration, EU enlargement, and immigration policy.

The ‘anti-system’ attitudes of far-right groups undermines the legitimacy of the EU and its values, because they attack the very basis on which the EU was erected. In fact, the EU is becoming a platform for anti-immigration, anti-integration and xenophobic values propagated by far-right parties. For some it may be surprising therefore that EU values have not quelled far-right aspirations or prevented these ideas from developing.

The question that this thesis will attempt to answer *is if and how these far-right parties are able to come together and cooperate as a transnational movement within the EU*, more precisely, the European Parliament, since “within the EU framework, the rise of the Radical Right has generated much less scholarly debate” (Startin 2010: 430). The focus will be on the ideological obstacles or catalysts for this cooperation.

For this reason, literature review will look at ideology, fascist and neo-fascist ideology in order to better understand key components of neo-fascist ideology and

contemporary far-right parties. Since interwar 'classic' fascism, it is a widely undisputed that a central feature of far-right groups, movements or parties is nationalism. This has led several scholars studying fascism and neo-fascism to assume that transnational or regional cooperation between these groups and parties is very unlikely, because they are unable to 'transcend' over their focus on the 'nation', national interests and in some cases the belief in national superiority.

However, the 6th and 7th legislature particularly speak to the fact that the European Parliament (EP) has over the past decade witnessed far-right groups coming together to form political groups within which they exchange views, information, converge ideas and adopt common positions regarding questions discussed in the EP, which is now a co-legislative body in the EU. For this reason, we must question this idea that far-right parties are too diverse and too nationalistic for meaningful and influential co-operation. Even if some have argued that these groups are not too influential within the EP or do not exhibit too much real power over regional politics, the important issue is that there is interest and willingness to cooperate.

The thesis will therefore confront this development. Is nationalism really a central component of contemporary far-right parties? Is it only propagated and used to rally and mobilize on the national level but dismissed when cooperation on the international level is necessary? Or are far-right parties able to cooperate without dismissing their nationalistic concerns?

The hypothesis of this thesis is:

H1: Contemporary far-right parties discard nationalistic concerns and aspirations in favor of transnational cooperation.

Under ‘nationalistic concerns’ the author also understands all the elements that are related such as racism, xenophobia, anti-immigration stance, euro-skepticism etc. Later chapters will discuss how these elements of the far-right ideological framework are connected. What this means is that the author assumes that in order for contemporary far-right parties to cooperate within the only democratically elected EU body - the EP - they must dismiss or at least downplay their nationalisms to the minimum required for effective cooperation to take place.

This thesis therefore takes on the challenge set out by Sen; a call for further discussion on right-wing populism and its affect on the EU. The author will engage in what Sen calls ‘systematic discourse’ on far-right parties in Europe and within the EP, because they hold the “potential to the change the very essence of the European Union and therefore demand a greater academic dialogue on the subject” (2010: 66).

CHAPTER 2:

METHODOLOGY

In order to either accept or reject the hypothesis set out by the author it is imperative to study the phenomenon of transnational cooperation on the EU level and therefore case research will be employed. Three European far-right parties currently part of the extreme right group EFD will be intensely studied with the purpose of finding out which elements of neo-fascist ideology are prominent in their party agenda with a particular emphasis on nationalism. This will then be compared to ideological stance of the political group EFD in order to determine if there is a shift in priorities.

Multiple methods of data collection will be used. Both secondary data and primary data will be used. This also includes manifestos, speeches, publications, party websites, and other materials. All these different sources will help enrich and contextualize the data with the purpose of comparing EFD agenda, interests and priorities and chosen case study parties. To analyze far-right parties' ideology we must follow through with the methodology set out by examining manifesto data, speeches, articles, and interviews. The categories used as indicators of party

positions are those inspired by the definitions of fascism, neo-fascism and relevant for the study of far-right parties in the EP.

This will allow theory testing; do contemporary far-right parties actually discard nationalistic questions in favor of transnational cooperation on the European level? But it also allows enough interpretative space for theory building in case information collected does not support the hypothesis.

Since this research question can only be answer by looking both at political-parties and their aggregate – the EFD – the research will simultaneously examine multiple units of analyses. The author initially hoped to conduct a multiple case design, which would analyze European contemporary far-right parties, which have joined far-right political groups in the EP as case studies. However, the language barrier in investigating far-right parties from different EU Member State in the EP only allows one case study, since all parties publish party materials in the official language of their state. The author is therefore able to analyze thoroughly the UK Independence Party, since their manifestos, policy papers, speeches and interviews are all in English. The author admits that this is a disadvantage of this research. A multiple case design would yield multiple examples of the same process – the dismissal of nationalistic concerns on the European level – and would help support the hypothesis or prove that no such process takes place.

The second unit of analysis is the far-right political group currently operating and cooperating in the EP.

Discourse analysis is an appropriate research method in this type of research, because it gives the researcher an opportunity to analyze qualitative information about social

occurrences, developments and processes. It will not only help accept or reject the theory set out by the author, but also give an opportunity to formulate a new theory if findings allow this. Far-right transnational movement is a relatively new and un-researched field, so there is space for theory building.

Briefly historical analysis will also be employed. The author will compare and contrast different ideas, values and ideologies of 'classic' interwar fascism and contemporary forms of neo-fascism or the extreme far-right. This analysis will be accompanied with an evaluation of different debates, narratives and opposing arguments of historians, sociologists and political scientists to determine the nature of these ideologies. Without looking into the past, we cannot properly understand the origins of far-right parties today or how they operate and cooperate within the EP.

Over the course of the research, the author also found relevant quantitative data regarding Members of European Parliament voting and this will also be employed as supplementary information to determine how far-right MEPs vote within their political groups.

CHAPTER 3:

LITERATURE REVIEW

To be able to test the hypothesis posed in the introduction, we must define key concepts and search for definitions, which will be employed by the author of the thesis. Before we can determine these definitions, we must look at key authors in this field and how they have studied and conceptualized terms and concepts used in this thesis.

Ideology must be defined and conceptualized, because fascism is a type of ideology. If the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the occurrence of far-right parties, than ideology of the extreme right must be examined, because contemporary far-right parties will be looked at primarily through the lens of 'ideology'. This is because contemporary far-right parties have not (yet) manifested themselves as regimes in Europe.

This section will also focus on the necessary theoretical foundation needed to explain the terms 'fascism' and 'neo-fascism', their key elements and development. It is important to analyze 'classic' interwar fascism because "both for the adherents of extreme nationalism and for their enemies, interwar fascism thus provides a basic

paradigm through which contemporary rightist groups are defined or define themselves” (Prowe 1994: 289). The literature review also covers already prevalent attitudes and understandings of neo-fascism.

3.1 Ideology and Politics

“Ideology is critical to politics because it provides people with possible preferences and opinions about issues in which they have no direct stake” (Bawn 1999: 303). Even when individuals may or may not have a ‘direct stake’, ideology must be, according to Michel Foucault, a “pervasive, intangible network of force which weaves itself into our slightest gestures and most intimate utterances” (Eagleton 1991: 7). For ideology to work, it must penetrate into every pore of our life and inhibit every thought and perception in order to have real tangible effects. It is for this reason that ideological positions have enormous political consequences (Bawn 1999: 303) on a collective or aggregate level. People can be easily mobilized because of their ‘ideological preferences’ and this can affect policy decision-making.⁶

3.1.1 Defining Ideology

Ideology is one of “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science” (Jost et al. 2009: 308) with almost as many definitions as theoreticians who try to

⁶ By casting votes, writing letters, demonstrating, and through other means of political participation. (Bawn 1999: 303-4).

conceptualize the term.⁷ “The concept of ideology is often used in the media and the social sciences, but it is notoriously vague” (Van Dijk 2006: 728). Some of the definitions of ‘ideology’ available are incompatible because they are contradictory (Eagleton 1991: 2) adding to the confusion in defining the term. Although a clear and widely accepted definition is lacking, the term usually carries a negative connotation (Van Dijk 2006: 729).

Van Dijk offers a definition of ideology: “an ideology is the foundation of the social representations shared by a social group” (2006: 729). Furthermore, “ideologies more generally are associated with social groups, classes, castes, or communities, which thus represent their fundamental interests” (2006: 729). Roger Eatwell offers a slightly different definition; “an ideology is a set of basic ideas and policies about the organization of society” (Eatwell 1992: 71). Žižek claims that ideology is a “generative matrix that regulates the relationship between visible and invisible, between imaginable and non-imaginable, as well as the changes in the relationship,” (Žižek 1994: 1).

According to Bawn (1999) ‘ideological preferences’ include motivations and interests that are in some way removed from the beholder, but not all agree with this notion. Eagleton argues that ideology is something external that creates new desires, but “they must also engage significantly with the wants and desires that people

⁷ Eagleton provides a myriad of definitions commonly used to explain ‘ideology: a) process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life; (b) a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class; (c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; (d) false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; (e) systematically distorted communication; (f) that which offers a position for a subject; (g) forms of thought motivated by Social interests; (h) identity thinking; (i) socially necessary illusion; j) the conjuncture of discourse and power; (k) the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; (l) action-oriented sets of beliefs; (m) the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; (n) semiotic closure; (o) the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations; (p) the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality. (Eagleton 1991, 1-2).

already have, catching up genuine hopes and needs” (1991: 14-5). Yet, Žižek argues that “ideology is the exact opposite of internalization of the external contingency: it resides in externalization of the result of an inner necessity” (Žižek 1994: 4). This means that ideology comes from a personal and internal need of individuals, which is externally projected.

Some authors suggest that ideology sees the world as it should be and how to attain social, economic, and political ideals (Jost et al 2009: 309). Lind also argues that ideology offers a “vision of the public good, with pretensions to consistency that usually comes attached to theories of history” (Lind 2000: 19). Payne explains further that “the goal of metaphysical idealism and vitalism was the creation of a new man, a new style of culture that achieved both physical and artistic excellence,” (Payne 1995: 8).

Therefore, “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured” (Denzau and North 1994, 2000 in Jost et al. 2009: 309). Martin Seliger, a political philosopher has argued that ideology must necessarily also explain and justify means for actions needed to achieve certain ends prescribed by the ideology (Eagleton 1991: 6). Eatwell adds that fascism is at the same time a critique of current society, a utopian vision of a future society and a proposition for the transition into the envisioned new society (1992: 72). For example, Payne argues that in the case of inter-war fascism there was a “willingness to engage in acts of wholesale destruction” (1995: 8) or mass murder in order to achieve the desired Utopia.

Therefore, the first dimension of ideology is the dismissal of the current world order. The second is a set of wider-ranging goals for a perfect society or world. The third dimension is a prescription of how it is to be achieved.

These visions of a utopian society are also based on particular systems of belief. Accordingly, Bawn states that “ideology is an enduring system of belief, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances” (Bawn 1999: 305). Certain ideologies “crystallize and communicate the widely (but not unanimously) shared beliefs, opinions, and values of an identifiable group, class, constituency, or society” (Freeden 2001, Knight 2006 in Jost et al 2009: 309). These systems of belief are about the society as a whole - and not about the diverging interests within society- and as Ling argues “ideological politics takes as its object society as a whole; partisan politics - as the term suggests - is motivated by the interests of parts of society” (Lind 2000: 20). The two terms ‘ideological politics’ and ‘partisan politics’ must always remain separate and distinct.

It is exactly in the imagining of utopian, better societies that the Nazi Party did so well. Fascist strands all envision their groups as a “super-culture, or the men who would become 'supermen'” (Loewen 2013: 317). Furthermore, the Nazi re-imagination also included an element of ‘self-overcoming’. This ideal included a modern sensibility as a different option to outdated and “traditional modes of thought and practice” (Loewen 2013: 317). But Griffin reminds us that all ideology is contradictory; promising utopias that can never be fulfilled (Payne 1995: 8).

Therefore, ideology is not just about beliefs, but also about power. It is a tool used to naturalize, universalize and disguise interests of certain social groups (Eagleton

1991: 30). It also serves the purpose of legitimizing⁸ those social groups or classes that hold a dominant or privileged position within society (Eagleton 1991: 6). In order to perpetuate its own ideas, ideology must legitimize the power and domination of the privileged groups or classes in order to ensure its acceptance by individuals.

Again, we cannot forget that “successful ideologies must be more than imposed illusions” (Eagleton 1991: 15). Žižek argues that “an ideology is really 'holding us' only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality - that is, when ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality itself” (Žižek 1989: 49). Ideologies must speak to the real needs and desires felt by the individuals upon which it is inflicted. Any illusion ‘sold’ to individuals must be recognizable otherwise it will be dismissed (Eagleton 1991: 15) as irrelevant.

Correctly Van Dijk also highlights an important, but curious functioning of ideology. Since individuals ascribing to an ideology are unaware to a full extent of the ideology’s true motives or workings, individuals assume that they possess the ultimate truth⁹, while others possess ideologies (2006: 728).

Furthermore, when speaking about ideology as being something ‘more’, we can also understand it as David Hawkes does, as a ‘meta-science’. By that, Hawkes argues that ideology is a science about science, and has its very own “genealogy of thought”

⁸ According to Eagleton (1991: 5-6), the process of legitimation includes a variety of different tactics. This includes promotion of certain norms, naturalizing and universalizing ideas until they become unquestioned values of society, negating contradictory ideas, excluding opposition, and obscuring social reality into an image that fits the needs of the ideology.

⁹ On the one hand, it is possible that many ideological statements may be “empirically true, they are false in some deeper, more fundamental way” (Eagleton 1991: 16). On the other, the anti-false-consciousness approach argues that an individual’s social conditions, ideas and activities cannot be false. What can also be said is that with ideology we ‘suspend our disbelief’ (Eagleton 1991: 23).

(Hawkes 2001: 2 ch.), or it can also be seen as ‘science of ideas’ (Antonie Destutt de Tracy in Roskin et al. 1997: 99).

3.2 What Is Neo-Fascism?

In order to understand contemporary neo-fascism, we must understand the main elements of fascist ideology,¹⁰ despite the fact that not all current far-right extremist parties are “heirs of fascism” (Ignazi 1995: 4). Just like ideology, fascism and neo-fascism also remain one of the vaguest terms in political science (Payne 1995: 3). Similarly, just as ideology seems to always belong to ‘them’ and not ‘us’, the term ‘fascism’ has also been more frequently used by its opponents than proponents (Payne 1995: 3). Fascism is a sub-type of ideology.¹¹ It has a set of beliefs¹²; it promotes abstract ideas, but also has a plan for action that would bring about change desirable for fascists.

3.2.1 Neo-Fascism’s Predecessor: Classic Inter-War Fascism

Generally speaking, fascism can be seen as an “extreme form of nationalism” (Roskin et al 1997: 113) coupled with “fake socialism” (1997: 113), which is usually

¹⁰ Ignazi took a similar approach in his work and stated that “the centrality of fascist ideology in defining the extreme right political family, we have to stipulate some basic traits of this ideology” (1995: 4).

¹¹ Other ideologies include: classic liberalism, classic conservatism, modern liberalism, modern conservatism, Marxist socialism, social democracy, communism, neoconservatism, communitarianism, feminism and environmentalism (Roskin et al. 1997: 99-120).

¹² Although ideology has been defined as a set or system of beliefs, Finchelstein (2008: 322) says that fascism “never became an articulated system of belief. It was always a changing set of tropes and ideas,” (323).

associated with ideological leanings and systems in 1920s Italy and 1930s Germany (Evans and Newnham 1998: 168).

Firstly, fascism can be seen as a movement, a regime (Finchelstein 2008: 320), but also an ideology (Sternhell 1976: 32). Some have argued that fascism should not be reduced to just an ideology, it was a political organization¹³ that opposed the new international political order dominated by Western, capitalism¹⁴ and pluralistic democracies (Linz 2003: 66-7). These movements were “violently nationalistic and authoritarian” (Bogdanor 1987: 226-8). Their roots lie in the Great War, the economic depression that followed and the general sense of disillusion, but were also a reaction against the liberalism that developed in the 19th century (Wilkinson in Griffin 1995: 27), as well as the entry of the masses into political decision-making (Sternhell 1976: 32).

Roger Griffin defines fascism as “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism” (Griffin 1995: 35). Payne offers a different definition; fascism is “a form of revolutionary ultra-nationalism for national rebirth that is based on a primarily vitalist philosophy, is structured on extreme elitism, mass mobilization, and the ‘*Fuhrerprinzip*’, positively values violence as end as well as means and tends to normalise war and/or military values” (Payne in Levy 1999: 100). Emilio Gentile sees fascism as being structured around a “militaristic party that had a totalitarian conception of state

¹³ These movements were able to consolidate themselves as regimes, but their survival depended on the support of several key players. In Italy, these were the army, church, monarchy, large landowners and strong capitalists (Wilkinson in Griffin 1995: 28).

¹⁴ The anti-capitalist predisposition stressed by Linz was a type of hostility manifested towards the international stockexchange and Jewish capitalism (Linz 2003: 65)

politics” (Finchelstein 2008: 320). Mann understands fascism as the “the pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism” (Mann 2004: 13).

3.2.2 The Three Waves of Neo-Fascism

For some theoreticians such as Prowe (1994: 297) what Europe witnessed from the 1950s onwards, is an extension of interwar fascist ideologies, particularly those fascist tendencies that emerged right after World War II:

Moreover, the physical/social conditions and political culture had not changed as dramatically after the war as is often assumed. The profound fears and mistrust regarding the economy and social stability, triggered by the Depression, had not abated.

The study of neo-fascism has divided the phenomena into three stages, or waves. The first wave came directly after World War II until the 1960s. In this period, neo-fascism was mainly present in Germany, because of post-war division of the State and was supported by those who still believed in Nazism (Kolb 2012: 9). The second wave came in the 1960s in Germany, France and Britain, but none achieved much success or influence (Kolb 2012: 9). However by 1980s – the third wave – parties with neo-fascist ideology were able to secure seats in national parliaments and achieved greater success (Kolb 2012: 9), but to different extents in different countries with different time-lines of their rise and fall. Many scholars have developed theories to explain the rise of the far-right since the 1980s and how they challenge the notion of Western, liberal, social democracies.

The different theories on what caused the rise of the contemporary third-wave far-right and what their ideological framework includes is relatively briefly explained in the following sections.

3.2.3. Defining the Contemporary Far-Right

Emine Bozkurt, a Dutch MEP who heads the anti-racism lobby at the European Parliament spoke up about recent trends:

We're at a crossroads in European history /.../ In five years' time we will either see an increase in the forces of hatred and division in society, including ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and antisemitism, or we will be able to fight this horrific tendency.

These developments have not gone unnoticed. The EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom has already commented on recent developments saying that Europe has not witnessed such proliferation of far-right parties in elected bodies since World War II (BNN 2013). Malmstrom also noted that xenophobia, populism and racism are on the rise (BNN 2013).

Since the 1980s, the political landscape of Europe has profoundly changed with the controversial rise of far-right parties (Startin 2010: 429) in France, Belgium, Austria, Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and elsewhere.¹⁵ These developments present a real challenge to social

¹⁵ Actually, the party system in Western Europe changed in two ways: both the left and the right became more extreme with the appearance of new parties like the Greens (Kitschelt 1989; Poguntke 1993; Müller-Rommel 1993 in Ignazi 1995: 2), but also extreme right (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992, 1994a, 1994c in Ignazi 1996: 2). According to Ignazi both emerged, because of a rise in non-materialist values leading to post materialist demands (Ignazi 1995: 2). This has completely redefined the entirety

democracies in Western Europe (Bale et al 2010: 410). Not only have they (re)emerged, but they are “performing strongly in opinion polls, winning seats in parliaments, and exercising greater influence over governmental decisions” (Lifland 2013: 9).

Some highlight the fact that all the elements that fed into fascist attitudes are present again: “despair, confusion, unemployment, extreme nationalism, the longing for a strong hand” (Roskin et al. 1997: 115), “a disillusionment towards parties in general, a growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions, and a general pessimism about the future” (Ignazi 1995: 3). Others point to socio-economic factors, which make the far-right a “durable force /.../ unlikely to disappear” (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 10). Guibernau (2010: 5-8) sums up the leading causes for the rise of the far-right; these causes are globalization and trans-nationalization of politics and our daily lives, economic insecurity and uncertainty, cultural clashes and anxiety caused by immigration, lack of trust in politicians and the political system, insecurity arising from EU integration. Kolb mentions modernization¹⁶ is the leading cause for the far-right’s emergence (Kolb 2012: 10).

According to Norris (2005: 43), it is still unclear if there is one distinct category that can be labeled as ‘the radical right’, such as other categories like ‘Greens’ or ‘Socialists’, making debates on the topic of the ‘extreme right’ very problematic.

From Hainsworth’s ‘The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream’, we can understand the resurgence and the revival of the far-right and extremist groups not just as a return to the ideologies of inter-war Fascism and

of the political spectrum. Ignazi therefore calls both “the legitimate and the unwanted children of the new politics” (Ignazi 1995: 3).

¹⁶ Both Griffin and Eatwell agree that fascism offers an alternative modernization.

Nazism, but as a return of those values into mainstream politics even after its defeat and de-legitimization (Winter 2002). This resurgence is largely accepted by leading authors in this field.¹⁷ The key question then remains, is it a “return to the dark past or the product of new developments” (Hainsworth 2000: 1).

Some such as Merkl and Hainsworth believe that the two occurrences – the contemporary and rising far-right movements and 1930s fascism - are unrelated and any shared ground should not be seen as an imitation or perfect copy (Merkl 2003: 21- 44, Hainsworth 2008), while Kolb (2012: 10) sees the connection as being “only vague”. Both developments of far-right parties can be understood as result of their own specific circumstances.

Other scholars such as Laqueur oppose labeling contemporary far-right groups as ‘fascist’. In many countries more restrictive immigration parties have appeared and policies implemented. According to Laqueur these are nationalist, because “they want to keep foreigners out who do not want to accept the traditional values of the country and to become integrated in its society,” (Laqueur 2007: 48). Laqueur (2007: 52) also argued:

Fascism was the misbegotten child of a certain historical period and as this period now belongs to the past, the chances for a second coming of a movement or movements along the same patterns are highly unlikely, above all in Europe but also in other parts of the world.

On the other hand, it is because of these national variations and unique contexts from which they emerge, that the categorical labels of ‘Fascism’ or ‘Neo-Fascism’ can be

¹⁷ For example, Griffin refers to contemporary far-right parties as nostalgic fascism, the mimetic fascism and the neo-fascism (1993 in Ignazi 1995: 3).

understood as “ideal-type concepts” (Krejčí 1991: 1 in Cheles, Ferguson & Vaughan 1991). Prowe argues that this connection between ‘classic’ fascism and contemporary movements appears to be apparent (1994: 289). From theoreticians to the general public, it is a natural association when observing the rhetoric, agenda and action taken by contemporary right groups. According to Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 4-16):

In collective memory of Europeans, it automatically evokes the Second World War, Nazism and the extermination of 6 million Jews. Labeling a movement as ‘extreme right’ involves associating it indirectly with fascism and its crimes, discrediting it morally and excluding it from the democratic political game /.../ Yet, inevitably, Nazism and fascism cast their shades into the present. One way or another, today’s right-wing extremism is forced to cope with that past, either by embracing it or by distancing itself from it.

This is obviously an important question to answer, because it is necessary to know if these new movements require, as Prowe (1994: 290) puts it, a different type of response. Many radical right parties deny such connections.

Although Europe experienced a transformation and became a ‘New Europe’ with strong democratic foundations and institutions far-right parties still found a place on the European continent by adapting to new democratic electoral systems (Prowe 1994: 297-9). Importantly, these contemporary far-right parties emerged from an extended period of peace (1994: 304). “Its roots are not in the traumatic, all-absorbing war experience and the disorienting emptiness that followed, but in a deep feeling of boredom, alienation and sense of powerlessness” (Prowe 1994: 305). In contrast, Laqueur argues that there is no sign that democracy, freedom and human rights have prevailed, which means that there is still space for radical movements and

regimes to appear, but for different reasons and with different motivations (Laqueur 2007: 53). Goodwin and Evans (2012: 12) argue that “in the first decade of the twenty-first century /.../ well be argued that the far right never had it so good. A combination of immigration, terrorist attacks, an expenses scandal and a financial crisis created a perfect storm”. Ignazi take a different approach:

The decline of party identification, of partisan involvement, and of party members, all indicate that the previous ties between the electorate and established parties are progressively fading away. By consequence, this process enables the emergence of new parties and/or new agencies for the aggregation of demands (1995: 2).

Two other interesting factors about the contemporary right is that it is generally a movement of young Europeans “two-thirds of the people affiliated with them [of right-wing parties and movements in Europe] were younger than thirty” (Lifland 2013). Perhaps it is related to the fact that technology and social media¹⁸ are helping increase cooperation and networks among people with similar views. Peter Walker and Matthew Taylor writing for The Guardian noted that the rise of the far-right in Europe is undeniable and supported “a new generation of young, web-based supporters” (Walker and Taylor 2011).

3.2.3.1. Populism

Scholars, media and politicians all categorize the far-right as being populist without providing a clear definition of what this term means or incorporates. Kolb (2012: 11) provides two main definitions: the first states that populist ideas feed off of people’s

¹⁸ Ignazi attributes the spread of mass media as another cause of the rise of the far-right, because it has enabled people to focus greater attention on parties and their leader (1995: 2).

emotions and provides simple solutions to complex issues, the other definition is about providing people with a solution that will satisfy voters, but does not necessarily mean the best solution. Mudde also stated that since populist ideology assumes that the governing elite is corrupt and unwanted “politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004 in Kolb 2012: 12).

Populism in Europe has changed according to Guibernau.¹⁹ Contemporary right is a form of cultural nativism with populist ideas of a “white Europe” (Guibernau 2010: 13). What this means is that the transnational character of far-right parties has influenced their agendas by looking to preserve European culture and not just defend national concerns and interests. It is because of the far-right’s populist character that these parties pursue policies that seem to counter the current system²⁰ – “the egalitarian and liberal-progressive principals” that social democracies generally follow (Bale et al 2010: 411).

3.2.3.2 Nationalism: Central Feature of the Far-Right?

Prowe says that “antagonistic nationalism and racism” (1994: 295) are actually elements of contemporary far-right parties. For Minkenberg and Perrineau (2007) see these parties as a “collection of nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic, and extremist parties that are defined by the common characteristic of populist ultra-nationalism” (in Startin 2010: 429). From this we can see that many scholars in this field assume

¹⁹ On the other hand, when analyzing fascism Griffin also comprehended as ‘populist ultra-nationalism’.

²⁰ Defeating the current system would also mean creating a new one. The contemporary far-right has ideas of this ‘new world’ just like classical fascism. Mann argues that fascism called for a ‘rebirth’ of a nation that could create ‘a new man’ (Mann 2004: 12).

that nationalism²¹ plays a key role in today's radical right parties, and this for many represents the obstacle to supranational cooperation among these parties.

As Mudde has argued, the right makes a big emphasis on the 'nation' and their interests²² and therefore the radical right has a component of nationalism (Kolb 2012: 12). Guibernau (2010: 4) agrees that far-right movements are diverse and they have different ethnic nationalisms, but these are related to their stance against immigration, particularly Muslim and non-white immigration.

But what are the aims of nationalism and why is it so appealing? Nationalism is a key component of right-wing extremism, because it "aims to protect the national culture and space, as well as the specifically national reproduction process, from groups and institutions that threaten to introduce dramatic changes" (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004: 29).

They criticize the EU, because it has weakened the State, but has also brought about "the disruption of the traditional natural communities, "unnatural" egalitarianism and excessive freedom" (Ignazi 1995: 5). This idea that the EU is directly challenging 'natural communities'²³ connects the elements of 'nationalism' and 'euroscepticism' into the ideological framework of far-right parties.

²¹ A clear definition of the complex phenomenon is provided by Mann who says that 'nationalism' means the unity of a group of people with unique linguistic, physical or cultural attributes and their self-identification as a nation, along with the belief of their superiority (Mann 2004: 13).

²² For fascists common national interests had priority above all else, particularly class cleavages. To succeed, fascists had to take advantage of the hope and need for solidarity amongst the classes that was particularly felt by veterans of the Great War (Linz 1976; Merkl 1975: 66).

²³ This idea of threatened national spaces and culture was also present in classical fascism. It was anti-liberal, because "liberalism is not only associated with the 'pollution of national cultures'" (Levy 1999: 102),

3.2.3.3. The Far-Right and the Question of Immigration

Bale et al. (2010: 411) see immigration as the “core issue” of the populist right. Particularly in the past two decades we can see that political parties that are ideologically right-wing and call for more restrictive immigration policies have appeared (Gallagher et al. in Spanje 2011: 293). The question of immigration is so pertinent, because these far-right parties grew in popularity with “a new generation of voters who grew up amidst rising diversity and European integration” (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 10).

Negative attitudes against migrants have been an increasingly regular occurrence. This is epitomized in Greece, where poor, non-white immigrants are a scapegoat for political, social and economic problems, and this has led to an increase in hate crimes (Kakissis 2013: 87). Prowe explains this phenomena as violence targeting visible symbols of ‘Otherness’; “foreign immigrants who 'irritate' by their very presence because they challenge the most basic sense of power, control over secure, comfortable surroundings” (Prowe 1994: 307). This means that Europe’s melting pot of cultures didn’t produce growing support for the extreme right, but the co-existence of many ethnicities and cultures along with other socio-economic problems²⁴ has created tension and discontent.²⁵

Others write about the failure of multiculturalism and increasing rates of immigration as causes for the revival of far-right parties or their strengthening (Spoerri and Joksic

²⁴ The Economist explains that not everyone agrees with this idea. Matthew Goodwin, an expert on the far right at said: “we are all voting for Nazis because Europe is in recession? That’s claptrap”. Instead, he thinks that worries over national identity, culture and life-styles have played a greater role (The Economist 2012).

²⁵ It has also created a sentiment related to classic fascism’s ‘cleansing’, which is understood as preferential attitudes towards an ethnic or racial group with special privileges for the preferred group (Mann 2004: 16). This also means placing hurdles and obstacles for the ill-favored group.

2012). For example, Fieschi argues that to vote for Le Pen in France automatically means a “xenophobic vote – anti-Muslim and anti-immigration” (Fieschi 2012: 11).

Furthermore, the rhetoric of the far-right has also changed. It moved away from obvious and open racism and became more subtle and vague. Nowadays, the far-right are much more likely to talk about “the importance of maintaining traditional culture and values, the incompatibility of Islam with these liberal values, and other more subtle rhetoric” (Lifland 2013).²⁶

Fieschi develops an argument that explains contemporary far-right in terms of a “a rejection and mistrust of the elite both left and right, a rejection of European technocracy and the European consensus, and a deep fear of globalization” (2012: 11). Zaslove (2004 in Startin 2010: 429) also wrote that these parties reject inclusive immigration policies and globalization. For example, Wilders’ extreme right party exemplifies this frustration with the elite that has not been able to address economic turmoil or (perceived) failure of multiculturalism even in the Netherlands, which has long been seen as country of tolerance.

Emerging, operating and co-operating far-right parties are a byproduct of the social crisis experienced by Europe (Prowe 1994: 307). This social crisis has produced an acceptable tone for speaking about economic, social and political issues: this rhetoric is islamophobic, anti-immigrant and pessimistic about multiculturalism. Scholars and casual observers must remember that such views and positions are not marginalized.

Despite being recognized as the extreme right or even fascist, it has influenced

²⁶ Lifland also says that “anti-Muslim rhetoric is often focused on the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2007. The latter attack is particularly troubling to the far-right because the perpetrators were second-generation immigrants; some politicians cite this as further evidence of Islam’s incompatibility with traditional European culture” (2013).

national and regional politics. For example, “the European Union has been consistently tightening restrictions on who can enter Europe, even as it expands free movement within the continent” (Lifland 2013).

The far-right parties are unified by their anti-immigration sentiments, so much so, that islamophobia has particularly been likened to anti-Semitism of inter-war fascism. “As anti-Semitism was a unifying factor for far-right parties in the 1910s, 20s and 30s, islamophobia has become the unifying factor in the early decades of the 21st century,” (Klau 2011).

The reason why immigration can be connected to nationalistic tendencies is that nationalism comes hand in hand with xenophobic attitudes, which see immigrants as giving those states higher economic costs in social welfare and higher crimes rates, as well as challenging traditional, native national communities (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004: 29).

3.2.3.4. Euro-Skepticism

Another important aspect of the far-right movement is Euro-skepticism, which is exacerbated by the economic and financial problems facing Europe (Lifland 2013). Csergo and Goldgeier (2004: 29) say that one can assume that a European Union that combined a common internal market with strong barriers against an influx from outside the EU space would fit well with the right-wing agenda”, but instead, Euro-skepticism developed when the EU started to enlarge and incorporate Eastern European states as Member, which brought immigrants Eastern Europe, but also

Africa or the Middle East (all of which are culturally perceived to be very different from Western Europeans).

Interestingly, Sen writes that it is the lack of democracy on various levels – local, national and regional – that has led to the rise of the far-right. What this actually means is that this phenomena is connected to “the erosion of the universal values of the EU within its borders” (Sen 2010: 65).

In her paper Sofia Vasilopoulou wrote about different varieties of Euro-skepticism. According to her, the quick process of European integration influenced the rise of Euro-skepticism particularly since the 1990s (2009: 3). She argues that not all European extreme right parties share a similar opposition to European integration. They have different views on: the principles for which EU stands, the practice and activity of the EU and the future of the EU (2009: 4). According to these guides there are three types of Euro-skepticisms. The first type rejects all European integration, because they reject European cooperation, the second accepts cooperation, but not the EU, the third accepts *status quo* (Vasilopoulou 2009: 7).

Although far-right voters are not the focus of this thesis, it is interesting to note that studies have shown that voters who tend to be Euro-skeptical also tend to vote for far-right parties and this trend overrides other socio-political factors (Lubbers and Scheepers 2007).²⁷

Since the far-right embodies according to Sen (2012: 65) the “elements of racism, xenophobia, authoritarianism and nationalism...” it directly undermines EU values and

²⁷ "Schoen (2008) examined the effects of attitudes toward Turkey's entry into the European Union on vote choice in the 2005 federal election in Germany. He found that citizens' opinions about Turkey's accession to the European Union indeed increased the likelihood to cast an extreme right-wing vote" (Werts 2010: 9)

objectives. But the rise of the far-right shows the ideology that the populist far-right promotes an idea that are already present in society (2010: 65). If we look closely at the ideology of extreme right parties we can see that they also possess an anti-democracy stance²⁸ or an “opposition of principle” (Ignazi 1995: 5). This is what is referred to as their anti-system principal; and it perfectly sums up why these parties may have lasting effects on the EU system set up by EU’s leading architects.

²⁸ In the next chapter, the author will demonstrate how these parties present themselves as guardians of democracy and criticize the EU for its democratic deficit. However, as Ignazi argues they are »antiparliamentarism, antipluralism and antipartism« (1995: 5). Also, “even if such parties do not openly advocate a non-democratic institutional setting, they nevertheless undermine system legitimacy by expressing distrust for the parliamentary system, its procedures and discussions...” (1995: 5).

CHAPTER 4:

FAR-RIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Before going into the analysis of the European Parliament, we should also discuss what the European Union is and what it stands for. It is a regional cooperation based on economic cooperation, but developed as an institution that cooperates in more fields. The EU has pursued the role of a global actor with its own value system that it tries to spread to the rest of the world (Sen 2010: 56). These values are: the respect for human dignity, liberty, solidarity, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights²⁹ by pluralism, justice, and non-discrimination (Charter of Fundamental Rights).³⁰ In the Lisbon treaty, the promotion of peace and well-being of EU citizens, as well as social justice and preventing social exclusion and discrimination are the main objectives of the organization. The goal of integration and cooperation is therefore linked to its aim of safeguarding peace. This is why the study of the impact of far-right-wing populist groups and parties on the EU is

²⁹ The Treaty of Lisbon ensures the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which includes civil, political, economic and social rights. These are legally binding for the EU institutions and Member States. Furthermore, it lists these rights under six categories: Dignity, Freedom, Equality, Solidarity, Citizenship and Justice. It was the Lisbon Treaty, which increased the range of these rights and EU values.

³⁰ It states: the EU is "...founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law."

important, since they may undermine the values for which the EU stands for (Sen 2010, 57).

4.1 European Parliament

The European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected EU body. Every five years since 1979, EU citizens can take to the polls and elected members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The total number of seats in the EP is 736 and these MEPs represent EU's 500 million citizens (European Parliament 2013a). The EP is now a part of EU legislature and it has the power to block or amend many EU laws.

In the European elections, which were held in 2004, the composition of the EP according to political groups voted upon is represented in [Table 1](#) (incoming sixth legislature). The seventh term of the EP has a composition shown in [Table 2](#).

Political group	Seats
EPP-ED - Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats	268
PES - Group of the Party of European Socialists	200
ALDE - Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	88
GREENS/EFA - Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	42
GUE-NGL - Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left	41
IND/DEM - Independence/Democracy Group	37
UEN - Union for Europe of the Nations Group	27
NI - Non-attached	29

Total	732
-------	-----

Table 1 – Results from 2004 EP elections (European Parliament, 2013b)

MEPs form political groups according to political affiliation to better represent their interests and positions (European Parliament 2013c) rather than in national delegations or as representatives of national parties. Currently there are seven political groups represented in the EP. Since the actual location of seats of MEPs are assigned according to political affiliation (left-right continuum) with the agreement of the group chairman (European Parliament 2013c). Therefore, simply looking at the positioning of political groups can reveal much about the self-identification of MEPs and the political groups they choose to join.

Political group	Seats
EPP- Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats	265
S&D - Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats	184
ALDE - Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	84
GREENS/EFA - Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	55
ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists Group	54
GUE/ NGL - Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left	35
EFD - Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group	32
NA - Non-attached	27
Total	736

Table 2 – Results from 2009 EP elections (European Parliament, 2013b)

Importantly, no MEP is forced to vote upon a motion in a certain way, but political groups do adopt a common position after deliberation within the group (European Parliament 2013c). The role of political groups within the EP should not be underestimated. “The political groups have become powerful actors, able to marshal their troops in support of the policy positions of the group leaders” (Raunio 1997; Kreppel 2002; in Hix et al. 2005).

4.1.1 Far-Right in the European Parliament

In the history of the EP, several far right-wing political groups emerged and functioned. From 1984 to 1989 the Group of the European Right was active. Then from 1989 to 1994 the Technical group of the European Right was present in the EP. In the next five years the Technical group of Independent Members functioned. In 2005, the Euronat political group formed, but was replaced in 2007 by Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS), which is widely seen as the first far-right political group formed when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Bulgaria and Romania provided another 6 far-right MEPs from the Greater Romania Party and Bulgaria’s National Union Attack thus fulfilling the necessary minimum for the creation of a political group in the EP, which at the time was 20 (Spiegel 2007). The political group was highly controversial, because it included Jean-Marie Le Pen, the head of French far-right National Front party and Italy's Alessandra Mussolini, the granddaughter of Benito Mussolini.

In the 2009-14 composition of the EP, we can observe that the political group on the far-right is the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) (see Figure 1),

which replaced the far-right Independence/Democracy Group, which was active in the 2004-9 term. Located next to EFD is the European conservative grouping (ECR), which was another new development on the right.




Figure 1 - Distribution of seats and political affiliation for 2009 – 14 Term

The EFD was born out of the failures of IND/DEM and UEM. Shortly after the 2009 elections, right-wing, Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant parties formed a new political group, which consists of the UKIP – Lega Nord axis of leadership (Phillips 2009). UKIP had done well in the elections and Lega Nord's former political group, UEM did not garner enough votes (Phillips 2009). They were the two largest elected national 'delegation' in the EFD with 13 MEPs for UKIP and 9 MEPs for Lega Nord (Euroactiv 2009). Currently, they have political parties from 12 states (2 from Italy) and hold 34 seats. Altogether, the political group was able to surpass the minimum number of MEPs needed for a political group, which is now set at 25, as well as the

minimum number of represented states, which is seven. The list of political parties per state is listed in Table 3.

State	Political Parties	Seats
Belgium	Frank Vanhecke (independent) - Uw Vlaamse stem in Europa	1
Bulgaria	People for Real, Open and United Democracy	1
Denmark	Danish People's Party	1
Finland	True Finns	1
France	Movement for France	1
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	2
Italy	Northern League I love Italy	9 1
Lithuania	Order and Justice	2
Netherlands	Reformed Political Party	1
Poland	United Poland	4
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	1
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	10

Table 3 – List of political parties in the political group EFD per state

A report by the Center for European Policy Studies released shortly after the elections in August 2009 noted that the “biggest change to the new EP is a considerable shift to the right” (De Clerck-Sachsse 2009: 1) in contrast to the record-

low support for socialist and social democrats. De Clerck-Sachsse reminds us that this is due to financial and economic crisis that set in the period preceding the 2009 elections. The big trend of the 2009 elections was that voters became ‘greener’ or preferred to vote for far-right political parties. “Those who sought change opted either for the ‘green new deal’ propagated by the Greens, the radical left or the extreme right” (De Clerck-Sachsse 2009: 1).

4.2 Who Is The EFD? Analysis of the Far-Right Political Group

According to Nigel Farage, the co-President of EFD, the group was created to “provide a voice of opposition within this [European] Parliament” (Euractiv 2009). Quite a few of the parties that form the EFD have been studied by academics, written about in the media, and are generally known for their far-right positions, including their anti-immigration stance, xenophobic and racist rhetoric. This is perhaps best exemplified by their anti-immigration and anti-integration discourse, such as a statement by Matteo Salvini representing Lega Nord who said, “Turkey is not and will never be European, geographically, culturally and in terms of values” (EFD 2013d). With his statement he shows how easily the EFD divides people or nations into ‘us and them’, and focuses on the differences rather than similarities.

Despite the commonly-held view of these parties being extreme right, it is worth looking at their program to determine their common positions; positions that unite far-right parties from different parts of Europe. EFD is “committed to principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation” (EFD 2013) and “favors an open, transparent,

democratic and accountable co-operation among sovereign European States” (EFD 2013).

Their nationalist tendencies are revealed in article 1, where they oppose the creation of a single centralized European federal state (EFD 2013). In article 2 of the EFD Charter it is stipulated that “democracy lies with the Nation States” (EFD 2013). The Charter states that “there is no such thing as a single European people” (EFD 2013 article 2). In article 3, the Charter lays out the right of people and nations of Europe to “protect their borders and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and cultural values” (EFD 2013). This is confirmed by Lega Nord’s discourse on the Schengen, which called it “senseless freedom of movement” (EFD 2013g), which creates security problems.

For EFD, the strengthening of national identity and the expected assimilation of foreigners are two sides of the same coin. Lega Nord’s head Lorenzo Fontana says that he always supported the necessity for “people coming from other cultures, to adapt themselves to /Italian culture/ and not the contrary” (EFD 2013e). For him, assimilation is “essential in order to create the best integration” (EFD 2013e). He supports this argument by giving the example of how Muslims have a different understanding of women’s role in society (EFD 2013e).

The anti-system values are also apparent in the EFD Charter. They oppose the bureaucratization of Europe (article 1) and further integration (article 2). This is complemented by Fontana’s statements on Croatia’s and Turkey’s (potential) EU accession. He says that the poor economic situation of the newest member will cause problems for the neighboring region, which will deal with the consequences alone.

Croatia turns up for the meeting with the Union dragging a deep national debt. Nowadays, it seems to be at least risky to adjoin another element of instability to the European bandwagon, which is already so tatty. Croatia is now the third poorest county of the EU after Bulgaria and Romania, (EFD 2013a)

In the case of Turkey, Fontana argued that instead of sending resources to Turkey, they should be used to help European enterprises and unemployed people (EFD 2013g). Helmer on the other hand, says “I don’t think anyone is particularly happy or excited about it [Croatian accession]” (EFD 2013b).

It is particularly interesting that in the EFD charter, which encompasses only 4 article, the Group also stipulates that it “rejects xenophobia, anti-Semitism and any other form of discrimination” (EFD 2013), which is something political parties within the Group have been accused of on many occasions. Co-President of the Group, Nigel Farage defended their position against open border by stating that “it’s a question of looking at individual parties and deciding whether they are groups that take a strong and principled stance against open borders, or whether they are groups dominated by a racist, xenophobic, or anti-Semitic agenda” (Farage 2009 in Euractiv 2009) signifying that EFD MEPs fall into the first group. In an interview, Bastian Belder says that at the EP he will raise a question on behalf of the EFD group about a court case involving the killing of three Christians in Turkey; this question he says comes from a concern about the ‘rule of law’ in Turkey and about minorities. What may seem as good-will is actually only a concern about the Christian population, the ‘native’ population in Europe and therefore their sister ethnicity, which they are supposed to protect (EFD 2013d).

As a protest group they also look at economic issues. Lega Nord calls for a radical re-establishment of the Union, especially with regard to commercial politics, because European enterprises are vulnerable to foreign competition (EFD 2013g). They also believe that the ECB /.../ ought to start helping more enterprises and less banks.” (EFD 2013g).

“While the formation of this group is worrying given the extreme and xenophobic positions it defends, it is unlikely that it will wield much political influence in the new parliament” (De Clerck-Sachsse 2009: 2).

4.3 The Far-Right as a Transnational Movement in the European Parliament

Prowe in his analysis of contemporary far-right parties noted that neo-fascists were not deterred by Europe’s new democratic norms and institutions, but instead sought to survive in this new political arena, including by co-operating with new like-minded groups in other European countries by “building a pan-European conspiratorial network” (1994: 299).

In order to determine whether far-right parties have created a transnational movement of common extreme right positions, which are being articulated in the international and regional platform provided by the EP, we must look at how united these political parties are. What are their positions and agendas? How are these then jointly articulated in the EP? What role does nationalism play?

According to Fieschi (2000: 518) “/t/he difficulties encountered [by far-right] parties in attempts to form parliamentary groups [in the EP] are indicative of the primacy of nationalisms which undermine any potential for ideological alliances.” Since nationalism plays such an important part of the ideological orientation of MEPs and the national parties, which they represent it creates a dilemma for MEPs on the individual level and parties on party level. Different nationalism within the political group can create collisions because they are basically competing nationalisms. For this reason “national lines are suppressed in favour of ideological cleavages” (Fieschi 2000: 518). But is this true?

There is another dilemma faced by far-right parties in EP, the so-called ‘existential dilemma’:

Being an elected member of a parliament to which many radical-right MEPs are fundamentally opposed is an ‘existentialist’ dilemma which is difficult to square, which ensures an uneasy relationship between the radical-right MEPs, the institution of the EP and the majority of its elected members. What adds to this dilemma for the Far Right is that European elections have often acted as the political arena which has launched the breakthrough of such parties (Startin 2010: 431).

Why have far-right parties done well in European elections? This is very much related to the rising Euroscepticism (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007: 34), even though they remain in disagreement about whether the EU should continue to exist and where its future lies (Startin 2010: 431). Not only is the EP a platform for ‘speaking-out’ radical right views, but it also gives these parties a certain legitimacy (Startin 2010: 432).

With presumed 'national rivalry' among these parties and consequently their MEPs, the 'existential dilemma' and a fiercely negative reaction from other MEPs and EU political elites, Startin (2010: 433) calls the far-right co-operation at best sporadic and without consensus.

There are many signs that point to the notion of transnational co-operation on the far-right.

Firstly, despite the fact the British National party (BNP) won only two seats in the 2009 EP, it was reported in European media, that BNP was searching for coalition partners. Doward wrote for The Guardian that Hungary's Jobbik, France's National Front, Italy's Three-Colour Flame, Sweden's National Democrats and Belgium's National Front, Austria's Freedom Party and other MEPs from Spain and Portugal have agreed to join the coalition and the goals set by Nick Griffin, the leader of BNP (Doward 2009). For Nick Griffin the search did not yield necessary results to secure a political Group and he currently remains a non-attached MEP. This example speaks to the willingness to look for partners and co-operate despite the tendency for their positions to be nationalistic.




Figure 2 – European political groups cohesion rates on all policy areas (14.07.2009 – 04.07.2013)

However data on political groups in the EP reveal a different story.

The statistics on data cohesion³¹ collected³² by VoteWatch Europe are extremely useful for this analysis. ‘Cohesion’ in this data means how similarly members of a political group vote; if they vote as a block (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10). The higher the score, the more cohesive a group is. It shows that more than any other political group in the EP, the EFD is by far the least cohesive as can be seen in Table 4. This means that EFD is much less united in voting than other parties, which provides evidence that there are hurdles in harmonizing EFD position.

Political group	Cohesion in Percent (%)
GREENS/EFA	94.62
S&D	91.68
ALDE	88.93
ECR	87.19
GUE/ NGL	79.30
EFD	49.73

Table 4 – European political groups' cohesion rates on all policy areas (adapted from Vote Watch Europe 2013a)

³¹ VoteWatch Europe calculates cohesion in terms of “how united a European political group is in voting situations. This feature can be defined in various ways, but we have here calculated cohesion of the European political groups in two steps: at each vote, we establish an 'Agreement Index' for each European political group according to the Hix-Noury-Roland formula: $A_i = (\max(Y, N, A) - (0.5((Y+N+A) - \max(Y, N, A)))) / (Y+N+A)$, where Y = number of votes "FOR", N = number of votes "AGAINST", and A = number of "ABSTENTIONS". Then, the cohesion rate of a European political group is determined by the arithmetical average of the scores of the Agreement Index” (VoteWatch Europe 2013b).

³² VoteWatch Europe collects data of all roll-call votes during the EP plenary, on legislative and non-legislative issues, final and separate votes (VoteWatch Europe 2013b).

If we look at the EFD voting more closely, we can see in which policy areas MEPs are most united and in which they are most divided. This is shown in [Table 5](#). The four policy areas with the highest rates of cohesion are: internal regulations of the EP, budgetary control, foreign and security policy, and civil liberties, justice and home affairs. All other policy areas have between approximately 37 % to just above 50 % cohesion rate. From this we can understand that the EFD is not very united, except in the policy area of ‘internal regulations of the EP’, which is the only policy area that comes close to the overall rates of other political groups. In all other policy areas the EFD suffers from lack of consensus, which is not experienced by other groups. This means that there is something that sets EFD apart from other political groups and hinders their internal co-operation.

Policy Area	EFD Cohesion in Percent (%)
Agriculture	46.71
Budget	51.94
Budgetary Control	62.57
Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs	53.84
Constitutional and Inter-Constitutional Affairs	51.51
Culture & Education	37.07
Development	46.04
Economic & Monetary Affairs	42.83
Employment & Social Affairs	46.62
Environment & Public Health	50.95
Fisheries	43.65
Foreign & Security Policy	53.98
Gender Equality	43.16
Industry, Research & Energy	49.10
Internal Market & Consumer Protection	40.36
Internal Regulations of the EP	72.72
International Trade	49.77
Legal Affairs	45.33
Petitions	38.46

Regional Development	45.20
Transport & Tourism	43.82

Table 5 – EFD cohesion rates for all policy areas (adapted from Vote Watch Europe 2013a)

It is also possible to analyze individual loyalty of EFD MEPs. As [Table 6](#) clearly shows there is a discrepancy between individual loyalty rates to the EFD political group and to their national parties. What is most striking is that all but one EFD MEPs have loyalty rates to national parties above 80%, whereas only nine EFD MEPs have loyalty rates to the political group above 80%. No EFD member has a loyalty rate of 90% or more for the European political group, while 30 EFD MEPs have a loyalty of 90% or more for their national party. The average loyalty to EFD group is 66.45%, while the average loyalty to national party is astonishingly high at 96.53%.

	MEP	Member State	Loyalty to political group	Loyalty to national party
1	Agnew John Stuart	United Kingdom	51.36	98.93
2	Allam Magdi Cristiano	Italy	83.58	99.68
3	Batten Gerard	United Kingdom	50.93	98.76
4	Belder Bastiaan	Netherlands	66.37	100.00
5	Binev Slavi	Bulgaria	68.97	100.00
6	Bizzotto Mara	Italy	82.56	95.51
7	Bloom Godfrey	United Kingdom	47.32	88.62
8	Buften John	United Kingdom	53.99	99.45
9	Clark Derek Roland	United Kingdom	51.52	98.77
10	Cymanski Tadeusz	Poland	81.43	96.01
11	Dartmouth William (The Earl of)	United Kingdom	52.45	96.65
12	Farage Nigel	United Kingdom	52.76	97.05
13	Fontana Lorenzo	Italy	84.82	98.76
14	Helmer Roger	United Kingdom	73.94	70.66

15	Imbrasas Juozas	Lithuania	48.86	100.00
16	Kurski Jacek Olgierd	Poland	79.51	95.33
17	Messerschmidt Morten	Denmark	64.00	100.00
18	Morganti Claudio	Italy	84.74	98.13
19	Nattrass Mike	United Kingdom	53.63	82.68
20	Nuttall Paul	United Kingdom	55.63	98.54
21	Paksas Rolandas	Lithuania	46.78	100.00
22	Paška Jaroslav	Slovakia	65.71	100.00
23	Provera Fiorello	Italy	82.62	93.80
24	Salavrakos Nikolaos	Greece	59.68	100.00
25	Salvini Matteo	Italy	83.25	95.21
26	Scotta Giancarlo	Italy	84.82	98.91
27	Speroni Francesco Enrico	Italy	83.28	95.84
28	Terho Sampo	Finland	64.91	100.00
29	Tzavela Niki	Greece	60.55	100.00
30	Vanhecke Frank	Belgium	62.16	100.00
31	Villiers Philippe de	France	54.67	100.00
32	Włosowicz Jacek	Poland	78.70	97.04
33	Ziobro Zbigniew	Poland	77.27	91.37

Table 6 - Loyalty to national party and political group for each MEP in EFD

Interestingly, we should not just generalize these statistics across the political group. Numbers vary between national parties. Italian EFD MEPs are in absolute and average terms more loyal to the EFD political group. Although Italian MEPs consist of two national parties – Lega Nord and "Io amo l'Italia" – the percentage of loyalty of the only MEP representing the second party, Magdi Cristiano Allam, is not an outlier and fits neatly into the Italian average or pattern of loyalty and therefore the two parties are not calculated separately, but together. Italian average loyalty to EFD is 83.71%, while the four Polish MEPs averaged 79.23% loyalty, and the two Greek MEPs together averaged 60.12%. The second lowest percent of loyalty of the national parties included in the EFD is UKIP at 54.35% compared to their average loyalty to their national party at 93.01%. The two representatives of Lithuania's

‘Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas’ are in average terms the least loyal EFD MEPs at 47,82% (and are beaten in absolute terms only by Godfrey Bloom), which is unsurprising since their loyalty to their national party is high at 100% for both.

The two variables are not in a linear correlation. The x-axis represents the loyalty to political groups, while the y-axis represents loyalty to national parties in percent. In the scatter plot (Figure 2), we can see that there is no linear relationship or any other relationship; except that EFD MEPs are predominantly loyal to national parties (most are close to the 100 percent line), while loyalty to the political group varies across EFD MEPs.




Figure 3 - Scatter plot graph of loyalty to national parties and political groups

Another striking information revealed in the data is that every EFD MEPs who represented their national party alone have a loyalty to their national party at exactly 100% (this includes the representatives from Belgium, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Finland). This could perhaps mean that they are or

perceive to be under more pressure to fulfill political promises and to in line with their party agenda, whereas other EFD MEPs may feel more comfortable crossing some policy lines if done so in group (the mentality of 'strength in numbers'). However, Greeks and Lithuanians were also very loyal to their national party, while the most 'rebellious' were the Poles and the British.

Also, within their national parties there is also very little deviation. For each group the data is quite concentrated and do not deviate from the mean. For example, in the case of Italy, the percentages range from 82.56 to 84.74 for the eight MEPs or in the case of Poland, the percentages range from 77.27 to 81.43. This is consistent for every national party. Even for UKIP the percentages range generally from 51.36 to 55.63, with only one, but big outlier - Roger Helmer - at 73.94 %.

Comparing this to other political groups, we can see that for EFD MEPs national considerations are very important and may in fact hamper their loyalty to the political group. EFD MEPs experience much higher levels of loyalty for national parties than other MEPs, or in other words, are the least loyal to their political groups. If one looks closely at the data of other political groups – S&D, EPP, Greens/EFA, ALDE/ADLE, ECR and GUE-NGL – all have members from different national parties that display widely different levels of loyalty, but are generally found to be much more loyal to their political groups than EFD MEPs. This means that among these political groups there is no striking pattern. The only real trend across all political groups is that the national parties in the EFD are all consistently the least loyal to their political group. The only outlier in the EFD group is Lega Nord. Only three national parties in the whole EP have loyalty levels as low as EFD national

parties: ECR's United Kingdom Independent MEP, GUE-NGL's Greek Communist Party of Greece and ALDE/ADLE's Austrian Independent MEP.

The 2011 report by VoteWatch Europe reports that “MEPs vote primarily along transnational political lines rather than along national lines, as in EP6” (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10). It bases this on the fact that cohesion rates are higher and rising for EPP, S&D, ALDE and Greens/EFA compared to cohesion for MEPs from the same country (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10).³³ This trend however is not true for EFD.

Also, what stands out from the VoteWatch report from 2011 is graph displaying potentially very informative data (Figure 3). It shows that for a smaller, newer, and less cohesive party, the EFD are relatively vocal. What stands out is the highest number of questions posed by the political group per MEP in the EP. Even the number of speeches given per MEP is higher than four other parties. A conclusion can be drawn from this, that because the EFD as a political group, but also national parties that constitute it are considered “protest parties”, because they oppose the European project, further integration and are generally Eurosceptic, they tend to ask more questions as a form of interrogation. They can also serve to critically challenge and consequently undermine the mainstream discourse of the EP. These challenges however do not necessarily need cohesion. Every MEP may express their own variation of the critique. It may also be used as a tactic to hide their lack of uniformity. By being vocal and offering many different ‘anti-system’ arguments they can hope to disguise their inability to vote similarly.

³³ The only exception is the agriculture as a policy area on which MEPs vote. On this policy area MEPs vote according to their nationality particularly those from France and Scandinavian countries and are not loyal to their political groups (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10).




Figure 4 - Average number of parliamentary questions, speeches and amended reports per MEP by European political groups (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 12).

To see how this loyalty or alliance to political groups and national party works, the author seeks to analyze a case study, this would demonstrate this further. In the case of EFD this is particularly interesting, because it is a party that seems to vote along national lines and its members are firmly loyal to their national parties. Furthermore, from the theory provided earlier it is clear that national considerations, interests and concerns are assumed make-up a big part of their party agenda. On the other hand, other political groups are much more convincing about working on transnational co-operation and creating a platform for spreading their shared ideas and values, which are not tied to national identity.

CHAPTER 5:

CASE STUDY - UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Before we look at UKIP within the EFD, it is important to justify that besides the fact that it is a part of EFD it belongs to the far-right because of other considerations. According to Kriesi et al. (2012: 52) categorized European parties and placed UKIP under ‘Populist right’, the same category as France’s Front National.³⁴ Eriksen and Fossum (2012: 123) also grouped the British National Party (BNP) and UKIP with other European “populist, right-wing fringe parties”. Bale et al (2013: 97) follow the same logic, but add the adjective ‘radical’ in their categorization.³⁵ In their report Goodwin and Evans (2012: 6) state that while the BNP follows ideological extremism with violence and criminality, UKIP calls for the same policies –and is

³⁴ They did this by using meta-categories such as economic liberalism, anti-immigration, Europe welfare, budget, cultural liberalism, culture, army, security, environment, institutional reform, infrastructure (Kriesi et al 2012: 54).

³⁵ They write: One could argue that UKIP has more in common with most of the radical right-wing populist parties of continental Western Europe: it was UKIP after all, who famously invited Geert Wilders to show the film, *Fitna*, in the House of Lords (2013: 97).

therefore ideologically very similar – but does not endorse extremist violence.³⁶ However findings on who votes³⁷ for BNP and UKIP are also revealing about the ideological positioning of the two parties. Research by Goodwin and Evans (2012: 8) shows that “one out of every five BNP supporter and one out of every four UKIP supporter said they had previously served in the armed forces”. Such categorization is also supported by the media for example *The Scotsman* (2013).

5.1 What Is UKIP?

So, what is UKIP? Goodwin and Evans (2012: 12) argue that it has functioned since 2001, but by 2010, UKIP was “offering a combination of nationalist, xenophobic, Eurosceptic and populist policies” – proof of this is in their policy manifestos and speeches.

UKIP is the United Kingdom’s far-right party, which the Prime Minister David Cameron once called “a bunch of ... fruitcakes and loonies and closet racists mostly,” (Taylor 2006). Recently, UKIP has been caught up in several controversial scandals. UKIP MEP Godfrey Bloom said employers were biased against men, gave jobs to under-qualified women and promoted women beyond their qualifications (Meredith 2013). MEP Bloom had previously said that “a woman's place is cleaning behind the

³⁶ This is one of the leading reasons why UKIP is perceived to be ideologically very distant from fascism. Because an important aspect of fascism is also its preponderance, if not full acceptance, support and even encouragement for violence. “When this ideology of violence fused with extreme right-wing nationalism and imperialism and non-Marxist leftist tendencies of revolutionary syndicalism, fascism as we know it today crystallized” (Finchelstein 2008: 321). This is also seen as ‘paramilitarism’, which is a ‘grassroots’ populist coercion aimed at opponents in addition to the police (Mann 2004: 16).

³⁷ As expected, UKIP and BNP supporters have similar concerns: immigration, presence of Muslims in ‘their’ communities, Islam is seen as a threat, state of democracy in Britain (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 8).

fridge" (Meredith 2013). The MEP was not only criticized for his sexist comments, but also racism, when he called to end foreign aid going to "bongo bongo land" (Mason 2013).³⁸ The party's treasurer Stuart Wheeler has also been accused of sexism, when he argued that he:

Would just like to challenge the idea that it is necessary to have a lot of women or a particular number on a board. Business is very, very competitive and you should take the performance of women in another competitive area, which is sport where [men] have no strength advantage. Chess, bridge, poker – women come absolutely nowhere. I think that just has to be borne in mind (Swinford 2013a)

5.2 Analysis of Manifesto Data

One of UKIP's main positions is the necessity of leaving the European Union (UKIP 2013a; BBC 2010a). In their manifestos and policy papers, they cite many reasons for UK's withdrawal from the EU. Broadly speaking, in the General Election 2010 manifesto, they wrote that all of the "global advantages" which the UK poses, such as membership in international organizations, is "threatened by the conflicting demands of being a member of the EU, where the UK now has only 9% of deciding votes" (UKIP 2010). This can be understood as a perceived imbalance between the power UKIP feels they have within the EU and the power they feel they should have or are entitled to.

There are also many economic reasons. Firstly, the UK would save from EU trade barriers.³⁹ Secondly, they want to get rid of costly EU regulations for businesses.⁴⁰

³⁸ To defend his comments, MEP Bloom said »"If anybody would care to take a look at the Oxford dictionary this morning, they would find 'bongo' is a white antelope that lives in the forest /.../ There is no connotation of racism about whatsoever. 'Bongo Land' is the land of the antelope." (Paige 2013).

³⁹ They estimate £45m a day plus £60bn a year (UKIP 2013a).

This would therefore mean “freeing enterprise” (UKIP 2013a). In their London 2012 manifesto, they said they would “fight EU red tape strangling London businesses” (UKIP 2012). Thirdly, they oppose Eurozone bailouts, by stating that “London is the financial capital of the world: don’t let it be sold out to pay for Eurozone bail-outs” (UKIP 2012). Overall, UKIP’s attitude towards the EU in financial terms is “w/e simply cannot afford to remain in the European Union” (UKIP 2010).

Furthermore, they believe that the UK must return to a “self-governing democracy” (UKIP 2013a). This derives from a belief that EU laws and regulations⁴¹ are out of British hands,⁴² which is why they demand that the British public have the power to vote locally or nationally on important issues in referenda (2013a) as this would give them more voice and take it away from the political elite in Brussels. According to UKIP, once the UK leaves the EU “Britain will be free to choose a new positive vision for her future, free from the EU straightjacket” (UKIP 2010). UKIP does not support the current *status quo*, because it is “governed by an undemocratic and autocratic EU” (UKIP 2010). We can conclude that UKIP employs aggressive anti-EU rhetoric in favor of what they perceive to be British interests. They not only focus on the EU, but also politics at home. This is mirrored by the fact that 74.1% of UKIP members are either ‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘fairly dissatisfied’ with the way democracy works in Britain (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 20). This is characterized by very low trust in political institutions; the highest being for the police (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 20).

⁴⁰ Particularly because they are decided upon by a non-elected commission (UKIP 2013a).

⁴¹ UKIP does not agree with the fact that the “EU controls Immigration, Business and Employment, Financial Services, Fishing, Farming, Law and Order, Energy and Trade. It seeks now to control Foreign Affairs and Tax.” (2013a).

⁴² On their website, they claim that “Commissioners in Brussels dictate 75% of our laws. None can be repealed by Parliament. We cannot vote for those who make these laws – we cannot remove them.” (2013a).

Also, they want to stop the migration⁴³ that the EU has created. UKIP takes a firm stand on EU immigration and blames the phenomena for low wages, unemployment, crippling social services and pensions in the country (UKIP 2013a). Again, the solution to this ‘problem’ is to leave the EU, since the policies they wish to implement could not be carried out if the UK is still a member of the EU.⁴⁴ This would return control over border to the UK. Generally, they call for “an end to the age of mass, uncontrolled immigration” (UKIP 2013b). They also have a position regarding non-EU migration. They propose that permanent immigration end for at least 5 years (2013a), while limiting future migration to 50,000 per year (BBC 2010a).⁴⁵ Those who are allowed to enter must speak English fluently, be educated and financially capable of supporting themselves, and would be admitted based on a points based visa system and time limited work permits (UKIP 2013a). These requirements are a part of their policy orientation, because they oppose ‘open-door immigration’ (UKIP 2012).⁴⁶

Nationalistic rhetoric is subtle and less obvious than in earlier versions of radical right parties or ‘classic’ fascist parties. For example, in the 2012 manifesto used for London elections, they called for “Priority for Londoners – whatever their ethnic origin – for jobs and housing, over migrants and asylum seekers” (UKIP 2012). From the discourse we can distill that there is an understanding that divides “them” and

⁴³ Manifesto and rhetoric data proves what statistics show about UKIP voters’ and supporters’ attitudes towards immigration. According to data collected by Goodwin and Evans (2012: 18), 50.6% of UKIP supports either disagree or strongly disagree that Britain has benefited from the arrival of people from many different countries and cultures. Also, 82.9% believe Immigrants who break the law should be sent back to their home country, while 35% think that they should be sent home regardless of whether they broke the law. Again 50.6% of supports claim that immigrants are the main cause of crime in society.

⁴⁴ This is explicitly written in their policy paper on immigration, which is still not in its final form and remains a draft on the UKIP website (UKIP 2013b).

⁴⁵ Since UKIP’s 2010 manifesto is no longer available online, the author has used secondary sources when describing its content.

⁴⁶ As this would, they claim, “/create more jobs for Londoners” (UKIP 2012).

“us”; it gives priority, preference and privilege to natives. This priority is also subtly mentioned in the 2010 manifesto, which calls for social welfare benefits to be available only to UK citizens or those who have lived in the country for more than 5 years (BBC 2010a).

Their overt and constant emphasis on the ‘immigration problem’ is another sign of nationalistic tendencies. They find illegal immigration particularly problematic. UKIP says it is imperative that the UK can “identify illegal immigrants and remove them to their country of origin. Exceptions may be made in limited circumstances, but there would be no general amnesty for illegal migrants” (UKIP 2013b). Migrants would also have to sign a legal document “undertaking of residence”, which would allow deportation, if it is violated (BBC 2010a). It is because of this desire to reinstate an unconditional right to freely return asylum seekers that UKIP wants the UK to withdraw from the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Convention on Refugees (UKIP 2013b). This would allow the UK to deport those individuals who are perceived as criminals⁴⁷ or terrorist suspects (2013b).

Multiculturalism is also mentioned in the 2010 manifesto. UKIP’s position is that the Human Rights Act should be repealed, and government’s promotion of multiculturalism must be stopped (BBC 2010a). Particularly controversial was the calls for a *burqa* ban, since according to Farage they are a “symbol of an ‘increasingly divided Britain’” (BBC 2010b). Furthermore, the attitudes of UKIP members towards Muslims and Islam are also very revealing. According to research done by Goodwin and Evans (2012: 19), 63.1% strongly disagree and 21.9% disagree with the idea that Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western

⁴⁷ According to UKIP, overstaying a visa would be considered a criminal offence (UKIP 2013b).

civilization.⁴⁸ This however does reflect more the type of UKIP voters and not necessarily their program.

The big difference between UKIP as a national party and a European party are its proposals for shift in power. Nationally, they promote the return of direct democracy and giving power back to the people (Campbell-Bannerman 2010), whereas on the European level they want to return the power to national parliaments.

5.3 Analysis of Speeches and Interviews

Speeches of UKIP's MEPs are also revealing and help complete the picture of what UKIP is about. Nigel Farage is the central figure leading the party. His prominence and influence is so high that many news channels have called UKIP a "one man band" (The Huffington Post 2013; Shipman and Cohen 2013; Walker 2013), while The Times deemed it a "one-man personality cult" (The Times 2013). His attitudes towards burning issues at home and at the EP must be analyzed in greater detail.

When speaking at the EP, his speeches mainly target the EU as an institution and those who work for it. He emphasizes the democratic deficit of the EU, because of several unelected officials and bureaucrats. He says that ".../ this project is actually fundamentally anti-democratic. They don't want democracy. They don't believe in democracy." (Farage 2012b), while on another occasion he says that all MEPs and EP chairs are "wrong democratically, because no one has ever given consent for this behavior" (Farage 2013b). He stresses repeatedly that the lack of consent given by

⁴⁸ Also, 63.8% answered that they would be 'bothered a lot' and 19.7% said they would be 'bothered a little' by a Mosque in their community (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 19).

the public is a big shortcoming, which undermines EU legitimacy⁴⁹ as a political regional organization.

This is also summed up in Farage's infamous speech criticizing and ridiculing Herman Van Rompoy, the first President of the European Council. He begins his speech by stating European peoples' expectations of the political figure that would represent 500 million people on the world stage and then states: "Well, I am afraid what we got was you" (Farage 2010). He continues:

You have the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low grade bank clerk. The question I want to ask is who are you? I'd never heard of you. No one in Europe had ever heard of you. I would like to ask you President, who voted for you? And what mechanism, oh, I know democracy is not popular with you lot, and what mechanism do the peoples of Europe have to remove you? Is this European democracy? (Farage 2010).

Roger Helmer, just like Farage, has also been critical: "the first thing that Barroso and Van Rompoy must do is to see what has gone wrong and admit it. And as long as they keep saying 'well, it is not our fault', perhaps it's Member States' government', it won't be solved" (EFD 2013b).

In his speeches he often criticizes the euro-zone particularly. "The euro is doomed" (Farage 2012c). He is able to use the economic crisis as the basis for more of his critiques by saying that "it is a European Union of economic failure" (Farage 2012a) and that the "EU Titanic has now hit the iceberg." (Farage 2012a). Similarly, Roger Helmer says in an interview "they are still saying, we need to move to a banking union, we want more integration. It's like an alcoholic saying, I've finally discovered the solution to my problem, I need more whiskey" (EFD 2013b). He adds, "They will

⁴⁹ Farage has told Van Rompoy: "Sir, you have no legitimacy in this job at all" (2010).

not recognize reality. The reality is that the euro has been a disaster. It has failed,” (EFD 2013b). In a different interview Helmer (2013d) says:

This [the closure of the Greek public television] shows a country surely in meltdown, and in a broader sense it shows the euro currency project in meltdown. It has been described as one of the riskiest political adventures of the post-war period. It is a disaster in Greece /.../ Southern Europe, Ireland and increasingly in France.

In his speeches he claims to want to save taxpayers’ money: “Listening to this today it is almost as if this debate has been going on in a padded cell that is the European Parliament as people compete who can be the most stupid /.../ who can waste the maximum amount of taxpayers’ money” (Farage 2013b). On another occasion he was more specific about protection British taxpayers’ interests; “...and I really do hope that that not one penny piece more of British tax payers money goes into propping something up that should be allowed to die” (Farage 2012c).

This anti-EU discourse is complimented by Helmer’s comments: “our position is very clear. We don’t want to be in the EU. We don’t think the EU is helpful to Europe” (EFD 2013b).

It seems that Farage’s or rather UKIP’s primary interests are not to obviously, openly or apparently represent their national interests or the interests of their people, but ordinary people of Europe (at least in rhetoric). That is why Farage argues that “the gap between ordinary voters and the European political class grows wider by the day /.../ just what planet are you on? This pretense that everything is going incredibly well; the EU is mired by deep structural crisis” (Farage 2011a). UKIP’s Euro-skeptical stance means that they can criticize the EU, but the transnational nature of the EP and their political group – the EFD – means that instead of openly

representing British interests they must argue how their interests are the interests of all ordinary voters.

Richard Sulik [leader of the political party Freedom and Solidarity] who led the rebels said: 'I would rather be a pariah in Brussels than have to feel ashamed before my children who would be deeper in debt'. /.../ he has got it right, because he summed up the detachment between Brussels and the real people of the European Union (Farage 2013b).

Not only does Farage frequently sympathize with Southern EU nations suffering from the crisis, which according to him, EU officials caused, but he also stands up for all nation-states, which are losing their independence. UKIP's Gerard Batten gives an example of this lack of sovereignty: "EU Commission visit of border crossing to ensure that nation states do not do checks shows how little respect the EU has for the right of nation states to protect their own borders and citizens," (EFD 2013c). Farage claims that "there is a new nationalism sweeping Europe. You [EU officials] want to abolish the nation-states /.../ You now want this flag and a new anthem to replace nation-states and you don't care how you get there," (Farage 2011b).

When speaking about the growing opposition in Europe to the EU project, integration, enlargement, institutions etc. he says that it is oftentimes referred to as populism, but he denies his. "It is democracy /.../ there is a new democratic revolution sweeping northern Europe" (Farage 2011b). Interestingly he does mention that the big electoral gains made by the True Finns party are "good news" (Farage 2012a) and a true "democratic rebellion" (Farage 2012a).

UKIP also supports the notion of 'nation-states' above the idea of a EU. He says of Van Rompuy: "I have no doubt that it is your intention to be the quiet assassin of

European democracy and of the European nation states.” (Farage 2010). He also on several occasion states that the key mistake made by EU proponents is to believe that wars are caused by existence of nation states, and have therefore given the people of Europe one flag and one currency (Farage 2012b) believing that this would ensure peace on the European continent. But Farage says that Yugoslavia is a perfect example of how it doesn’t work (Farage 2012b) to bring together different peoples of different nations, ethnicities and cultures. He also states: “What we represent, Sir, is not anti-Europeanism. We believe in nation-state democracy,” (Farage 2012f).

Furthermore, while Farage emphasizes the importance of cooperation, Agnew comments on how France and United Kingdom “will never see the end of hostilities” (EFD 2013i), which is very revealing about UKIP’s view about the potential for closer cooperation.

There is more evidence of nationalism in the discourse of UKIP, both in speeches in the EP, but particularly during interviews where Farage may feel freer to express UKIP’s agenda openly without fear of compromising EFD cooperation. When comparing the two different types or levels of discourse we can come to the realization that UKIP or rather its main spokesperson Nigel Farage are talking about the same issue in two different ways depending on the perceived audience. In the EP, Farage criticizes the EP from within and makes fewer references to British interests. However, during interviews, he openly refers to them: “we used to talk about who governs Britain to try and wake people up to the fact that 75% of our laws are made somewhere else. What we are now talking about is how Britain should be governed once we have that independence back” (Farage 2012d). Similarly, in an interview

John Stuart Agnew says “We would much rather have a British agricultural policy for the British farmers and crucially for the British consumers” (EFD 2013i).⁵⁰

Outside the bounds of the EP, Farage can openly state that all of EU’s shortcomings (which are openly discussed by EFD at EP) hurt British interests. “All of that legislation is made in Brussels /.../ Mr. Cameron tries not to talk about that. We cannot change any of that all the while we are a part of this European Union.” (Farage 2012d).

He also argues that he wants to “make sure that my children can grow up in a country that they can call their own” (Farage 2013c). This all comes from the belief that current Member States of the EU are not independent, sovereign and have lost all power to the EU institutions. That is why in an interview Farage says that he hopes the “British people will vote for parliamentary self-government, democracy, all the things our grandparents fought for in two world wars /.../ but not to be governed by Herman Von Rumpoy, please” (Farage 2013a). The emphasis here is on ‘parliamentary self-government’ and ‘democracy’ as two values UKIP and EFD believe they promote. It is also interesting that Farage puts UKIP and EFD values on the winning side of the two world wars, meaning, that he distanced them from nationalism and fascism that characterized the two wars.

In another interview, Farage admits that UKIP has a “radical policy platform for a new renewed Britain” (2012d) and a part of that plan is to leave the EU since that will benefit the British, because only leaving the EU would allow the British

⁵⁰ Also very revealing is the statement by Agnew on why a common agricultural policy won’t work: “You have got to adopt a common agricultural policy for an area 200 miles north of the arctic circle in Finland and down somewhere in the bottom corner in Crete, at the same time you have got to have a common agricultural policy for farming that uses 500 horse power tractors and those farms that use draft oxygen. You really cannot do it. And you throw in 22 different languages and some completely different cultures into that mix and it isn’t going to work.” (EFD 2013i). This combines different geographies, climates, cultures, languages, development levels as factors of why agricultural integration according to UKIP doesn’t work within the EU context.

government to lift the regulation on health & safety, environment, and employment that is needed to stimulate growth (Farage 2012d). Other party members agree that regulation and green policies raise energy prices such as Roger Helmer (EFD 2013b) and Stuart Agnew (EFD 2013h). And again in a different interview, Farage says that UKIP is “all about is fundamentally changing British politics” (Farage 2013c).

“We’ve had enough of 3 parties that are virtually merged into one /.../ frankly there are very few serious differences between them. We want our country back from Brussels, that’s no. 1 otherwise we can’t govern ourselves. We want to control our borders. Whilst we got no prejudice against anybody immigration has been hopelessly out of control for the past decade” (Farage 2013c)

Also, while outside the EP, it is easier to make statements about immigration of EU nationals: “whilst I wish [Bulgarians] well, and I completely understand that if I was a young Bulgarian I’d be packing my bags and wanting coming to London, there comes a point in life when you actually have to prioritize and start putting your own people first,” (Farage 2013d). Such a statement would be much riskier, if stated on behalf of EFD, which also has one representative from Bulgaria, Slavi Binev representing People for Real, Open and United Democracy.

Immigration is a big topic for UKIP both nationally and regionally, even though the United Kingdom is not in the Schengen free movement zone. UKIP is still critical of the free movement of people, because according to UKIP’s Gerard Batten “it allows migrant to get easily to Calais and make that short hop to Britain. Therefore, although UK is not a member of Schengen, it still bears many of it affects,” (EFD 2013c). He also said that “/t/he EU’s open borders policy is a disaster for ordinary people and has created enormous social problems. It has all been done to further a

political ideology not shared by the people of Europe” (EFD 2013c). This is a statement not just about immigration, but also about multiculturalism, which is oftentimes understood as creating ‘social problems’.

Furthermore, he distances his national party UKIP, his political group EFD and its other members from fascism by stating that “this project [the European Union] could even cause the rebirth of national socialism in Europe. We are headed the wrong way.” (Farage 2012a). He attributes this trend of rising far-right and far-left groups and parties as a reaction to the idea that people’s lives are determined by remote institutions (Farage 2012b). He calls the EU a “union of intolerance” (Farage 2011b). He also argues that because the EFD are a protest group they are misperceived as a fascist group: “anybody that stands up here and dares to give a political view that is different to the received wisdom is written off as mad, insane, violent, fascist...” (Farage 2011b).

What about transnational cooperation? For the answer we can look to an interview conducted with Mr. Farage where he says: “in terms of groups, well, it is very difficult, because, you know, there are huge cultural differences all over Europe which really emphasizes why there shouldn’t be EU. It is very tough for us, you know, we are very much a centrist party in the sense of we are non-racist, non-sectarian, we reject nationalism in its extremes,” (Farage 2013a). Not only is this statement revealing in terms of EFD cooperation, but also how UKIP self-identifies on the right-left continuum. He says that co-operation is difficult and it is hampered by the cultural differences from which national parties that make up the EFD have. This means that the highly emphasized national interests by parties with strong nationalistic positions are an obstacle.

They may share a few common interests – Euroscepticism, restricted immigration, opposition to multiculturalism among others, primacy of ‘nation-states’ – and this allows the formation of the group, but it does not necessarily provide a broad enough platform for deeper and more meaningful co-operation. He further states that: “My worry is that in many European countries, opposition to the project will come from the far left and the far right. Both of whom for us makes it hard to have a marriage.” (Farage 2013a)

However, what helps feed the popularity, legitimacy and mainstreaming of the far-right in the EP is the growing support across the continent for these parties. That is why Farage thinks “there is a very realistic possibility that for many of the major European countries and the minor ones too there will be significant numbers of Euro-skeptic MEPs elected” (2013a) in the next elections. He is also optimistic about the next elections: “I want to lead the UKIP charge next year in the European elections where I believe we can win, top the poll in the UK.” (Farage 2013a). Furthermore “public opinion is saying whilst they [citizens of the EU] want a European cooperation /.../ what they don’t want is this Europe run by unelected bureaucrats like Mr. Barroso,” (Farage 2011a). This trend does not only apply to MEPs, but also for representatives nationally. “Long gone are the days when UKIP was seen to be a party sort of out on the fringes talking about something that only interested a tiny percentage of the population,” (Farage 2012d).

“I may represent the smallest group in this parliament, but it is a group whose ideas and whose views are now being echoed by a growing number of citizens right across this continent” (Farage 2012f).

UKIP's success was also commented on by Lega Nord's Fontana saying that although the British are not in the euro-zone, UKIP's rise shows that this "model of Europe imposed by bankers and high finance is not suitable for the expectations of the common citizens (EFD 2013j).

The EFD as a protest group live up to their name. Their criticism from within include speaking up about not wanting to live in a "Europe run by Mr. Barroso and the Commission, and the so-called community method." (Farage 2011a). When speaking about the consequences of an EU collapse, Farage said: "yes, it will mean that you will lose your job Mr. Barroso, but apart from that why can't we do things as mature democracies? Yes, I want you sacked Mr. Schultz as well. I want you all fired" (2011a). And because of EU's current economic issues, Farage already dismisses EU officials and supporters as "yesterday's men" (2011b).

CHAPTER 6:

CONCLUSION

The far-right as a transnational movement is a relatively new phenomenon, which has been developing and shaping itself as the EU continues to enlarge, integrate and shape its own regional and global identity. Instead of remaining on the fringes and marginalized, they have Europeanized and transnationalized to adapt to the fast changing world. This has not only changed the identity and working methods of the (national) far-right parties, but has also influenced their ideological framework. The author has discovered that external social, political, economic and cultural factors has certainly changed the ideological stance of the far-right, distancing it from the inter-war fascism most people are familiar with and associate with the radical and extreme right. Within this scholarly field there is a lot of disagreement on how to interpret these differences; as three waves, as variations of the same idea, as totally different ideologies, but what the author has discovered is that although this debate continues, there are ideological similarities. These ideological similarities make supporters of the EU process as the first and best attempt to bring peace to the continent very nervous.

Therefore we can see that the relationship between the far-right and the EU is problematic. The ideal that the EU stands for: cooperation, peace, freedom, human rights, democracy, rule of law, togetherness and unity, are to some degree directly or indirectly. Ideas about further enlargement down south and east are firmly opposed (sometimes even violently), because far-right parties and their voters do not believe in the underlying principles: multiculturalism, openness, solidarity etc. While in rhetoric they may support democracy, human rights, peace and cooperation their definitions and views of these differ greatly from those of EU officials and left-leaning politicians.

Since a historical view reveals that the far-right has been gaining more and more prominence and is rumored to be even more successful in the 2014 elections, we can conclude that the EU as an institution that promotes certain values (that are competing with the values of the far-right) has not been an obstacle to their existence, operation and electoral success nationally or regionally in the EP.

This of course raises the important question of the role of nationalism. This ideological element was also raised in the author's research question and hypothesis. Many authors deem nationalism as not only an important part of fascism, but also the contemporary far-right. In the hypothesis, it was assumed that nationalism is discarded in favor of transnational cooperation. This was because the author saw it as an "either or" situation. This means, that according to the author only one could take place; either far-right parties would choose to promote national interests or choose regional, European interests. However, analysis has shown that this process of transnationalization of parties is much more complex than first assumed.

The case study of UKIP shows how on the national level they are still able to promote national interests openly and blatantly. At the European level in the EP, this becomes a lot less apparent, but does not disappear. Together within the political group they are able to find common “protest” arguments, which unites several far-right parties from different corners of Europe, such as the return of national sovereignty and power to national parliaments.

Competing national interests are discarded, but nationalisms, which have common goals, are further promulgated and used to criticize the EU. Some of these was UKIP’s criticism of EU’s democratic deficit, populist consideration, remoteness of EU institutions, economic crisis. However, it seems that the road to searching common nationalisms is a hard one as supported by a comment Nigel Farage made in an interview in Brussels this year where he said that cultural differences made cooperation in the EFD difficult particularly if more extreme forms of nationalism are in question.

Since no MEP is forced to vote according to their political groups it is interesting to note that the EFD is the least cohesive. This means that their positions regarding many different topics are not harmonized. This very fact proves that there is something blocking meaningful cooperation in comparison to other political groups, even radically left-leaning political groups.

EFD cooperation is at best shaky, but what they represent symbolically is a lot more powerful than their actual influence in the EP. It is a symbolic challenge to the predominant ideas and values of the institutions that are growing in numbers and also organization.

Below is a table (Table 7) that compares the values, agenda and ideological framework of UKIP and EFD according to important topics for both UKIP as a national party and EFD as a political group. What is obvious from a first glance is that manifestos, interviews and speeches do reveal more about UKIP's interests and priorities. That is because there is significantly more discourse data available for UKIP as a national party than the EFD as a political group. Not much material is available online about the EFD (even their charter is short – which may also signify that these parties have very few points in common).

Issue	UKIP	EFD
EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Leave EU - Power to Westminster - Rejects bureaucratization - No Eurozone bailouts - Opposes EU laws & regulations - View EU in structural crisis (democratic deficit) - Anti-enlargement - Lift regulations - Loss of independence for nation-states - Support European cooperation - Support European free enterprises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - rejects bureaucratization - rejects centralized EU super-state - rejects further integration - national referenda on treaties

<p>Immigration and Multiculturalism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Anti-immigration - Leave EU (blames EU for migration) -End permanent migration temporarily -Reject open-door immigration / freedom of movement -Withdraw from European Convention on Refugees -Stricter UK border control - Illegal migrants problematic -Strict rules for migrants - Assimilation of foreigners necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -protect borders -strengthen historical, religious & cultural values -rejects xenophobia, anti-Semitism, discrimination
<p>Nationalism & Populism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Prioritizing “long-term” inhabitants / natives -Over-emphasis of the “immigration problem” -Protection of British interests in EU (taxpayers, farmers, consumers) -Focus on ‘ordinary citizens’ -Strong national identity -Loss of independence for nation-states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -primacy of Nation States -idea of ‘European peoples’ is false
<p>Human Rights, Democracy, Freedom</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Belief in nation-state democracy - Withdraw from European Convention of Human Rights -Power back to people by direct democracy -Binding local and national referenda -In EU loss of power and independence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -committed to democracy, freedom and co-operation -open & transparent co-operation

Table 7 – Comparing UKIP agenda with EFD agenda

What Table 7 shows is that UKIP and EFD have similar basic stances, but UKIP's priorities are much more defined, refined, detailed and therefore developed. Both are anti-EU and anti-immigration, but UKIP also promote "Brexit". But the way UKIP and EFD approach national considerations is most interesting. Both promote the importance and primacy of 'nation-state', but on the one hand UKIP addresses British national identity, while EFD is address the 'problematic' idea of Europeanism, which is a new type of nationalism EFD MEPs reject. While they may talk less about "Britishness" (and other EFD national parties about their own national identity) at the EP, all EFD parties can oppose the idea of "European people". The rejection of common attributes of all European people is very significant, because it a disguised form of nationalism or indirect nationalism by deny Europeanism.

Both are protest parties. Both challenge dominant developments, processes, ideas and values. They both challenge these ideas with similar counter-arguments. Both are influenced by nationalism and populism, but ideas are expressed differently, because they expect to have different audiences. However, it is not just about their perceived audiences. It is also about a transformation of the same message and using the EP as a platform to spread ideas of the EU as an external 'threat' or 'evil'.

While some may not see the ideas that the far-right promotes as productive or positive, they certainly believe that their solution to the ills plaguing Europe is the dismantling of Europeanism and with it, the EU. Although the EU has in several cases opposed far-right becoming more than an ideology, but a regime, in the case of Hungary and Austria, the 2014 EP elections will show where the far-right will be positioned in European politics. Will they remain a small political group which lacks

cohesion and a far-reaching common agenda or a larger, influential group that will define the future of 'nation-states', the EU and European citizens.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaron Winter (2002), Review of Paul Hainsworth (ed.), "The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins and the Mainstream," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28 (4): 751-753.
- Abtan, Benjamin. 2013. "In France and Europe the far right kills". *The Hurriyet Daily News*. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetaailynews.com/in-france-and-europe-the-far-right-kills.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48498&NewsCatID=396>
- Al Jazeera. 2010. "The rise of Europe's far-right voices". Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/02/2013224123927515709.html>
- Al Jazeera. 2010b. "Is a storm brewing in Europe?". Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/photo_galleries/europe/2010112275625847519.html
- Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther and Nick Sitter. 2010. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe." *Political Studies* 58: 410-426.
- Baltic News Network. 2013. "Far-right parties might enter European Parliament, Commission fears." Available at: <http://bnn-news.com/parties-enter-european-parliament-commission-fears-99989>
- Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. "Constructing "Us": Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(2): 303-334.
- BBC. 2010a. "French protest against Roma deportations". Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11189075>

- BBC. 2010a. At-a-glance: UKIP general election manifesto. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8617187.stm
- BBC. 2010b. "France sends Roma home Gypsies back to Romania". Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11020429>
- BBC. 2010b. UKIP chief Nigel Farage calls for burka ban. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8464124.stm>
- BBC. 2010c. "Sarkozy vows to continue expulsions of Roma from France". Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11080315>
- Bogdanor, Vernon, ed., 1987. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Bozkurt, Emine. 2011. In Peter Walker and Mathew Taylor. "Far-right on the rise in Europe, says report". *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-rise-europe-report>
- Cameron, David. 2013. "Speech on immigration and welfare reform". Originally given at University Campus Suffolk. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-immigration-speech>
- Campbell-Bannerman, David. 2010. UKIP manifesto 2010. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcenBK7p5HI>
- Csergo, Zsuzsa and James M. Goldgeier. 2004. "Nationalist Strategies and European Integration". *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (1): 21-37.
- De Clerck-Sachsse, Julia. 2009. *The New European Parliament: All change or business as usual?* Center For European Policy Studies (Special Report). Available at: <http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/2009/08/1894.pdf>
- Denzau, Arthur T. and Douglass C. North. 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions". *Ideologies and Institutions* 4: 3-31.

Doward, Jamie. 2009. "BNP set to join European parliament far-right group". The Guardian. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/01/bnp-alliance-european-parliament-funding>

Eagleton, Terry. 1991. *Ideology: An Introduction*. New York: Verso.

Eatwell, Roger and Noel O'Sullivan (eds). 1992. *The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought Since 1789*. Twayne Publishers,

EFD – Europe for Freedom & Democracy. 2013c. "EU states stop acting over abuse of Schengen". Available at: http://www.efdgroupp.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/eu-stops-states-acting-over-abuse-of-schengen.html?category_id=21

EFD – Europe for Freedom & Democracy. 2013f. *Our Charter*. Available at: <http://www.efdgroupp.eu/about-us/who-we-are/charter.html>

EFD – Europe for Freedom & Democracy. 2013g. "Jaroslav Paska comments the EU pressure on Hungarian government." Available at: http://www.efdgroupp.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/jaroslav-paska-comments-the-eu-pressure-on-hungarian-government.html?category_id=21

EFD – Europe for Freedom & Democracy. 2013h. "Stuart Agnew: 'Europe is in a vicious circle of recession on the contrary of the United States'". Available at: http://www.efdgroupp.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/stuart-agnew-europe-is-in-a-vicious-circle-of-recession-on-the-contrary-of-the-united-states.html?category_id=21

EFD – Europe for Freedom & Democracy. 2013i. "We would much rather have a British agricultural policy for the British farmers and consumers". Available at: http://www.efdgroupp.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/we-would-much-rather-have-a-british-agriculture-policy-for-the-british-farmers-and-consumers.html?category_id=21

- EFD – Europe for Freedom & Democracy. 2013j. “UK, triumph of Nigel Farage at the local elections”. Available at: http://www.efdgrou p.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/uk-triumph-of-nigel-farage-at-the-local-elections.html?category_id=21
- EFD – Europe of Freedom & Democracy. 2013a. “Integration of Croatia in the EU, Lorenzo Fontana: ‘We need an immediate suspension or we will face serious dangers’”. Available at: http://www.efdgrou p.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/integration-of-croatia-in-the-eu-lorenzo-fontana-we-need-an-immediate-suspension-or-we-will-face-serious-dangers.html?category_id=21
- EFD – Europe of Freedom & Democracy. 2013b. “ ‘European economy will continue to fail’ says Roger Helmer”. Available at: http://www.efdgrou p.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/european-economy-will-continue-to-fail-says-roger-helmer.html?category_id=21
- EFD – Europe of Freedom & Democracy. 2013d. “A new Chapter opened for Turkey accession”. Available at: http://www.efdgrou p.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/a-new-chapter-opened-for-turkey-accession.html?category_id=21
- EFD – Europe of Freedom & Democracy. 2013e. “Jesolo-Venetian coast: stop to beach hostesses, there’s frighten of some tensions with Muslim immigrants”. Available at: http://www.efdgrou p.eu/newsroom/opinions/item/jesolo-venetian-coast-stop-to-beach-hostesses-there-s-frighten-of-some-tensions-with-muslim-immigrants.html?category_id=21
- Eriksen, Erik O. and John Erik Fossum. 2012. Rethinking Democracy and the European Union. New York: Routledge.
- EurActiv. 2009. “Far-right MEPs form a group in European Parliament”. Available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections/far-right-meps-form-group-europe-news-222083>
- European Parliament. 2013a. “About Parliament”. Available at: <http://www.euoparl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00b3f21266/At-your-service.html;jsessionid=2FEFE65734E DD499FE313EE2F5A637B3.node1>
- European Parliament. 2013b. “Political Groups”. Available at: <http://www.euoparl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/007f2537e0/Political-groups.html>

European Parliament. 2013c. "Composition of Parliament". Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/004a50d310/Composition-of-Parliament.html>

European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, Official Journal of the European Communities, 18 December 2000 (OJ C 364/01), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b70.html>

Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham. 1998. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books.

Fieschi, Cathrine. April 30, 2012. "How the far right is becoming mainstream," *New Statesman*.

Finchelstein, Federico. 2008. "On Fascist Ideology". *Constellations* 15 (2): 320-331.

Freedon M, ed. 2001. *Reassessing Political Ideologies*. London: Routledge. In Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60: 307-337.

Goodwin, Mathew and Jocelyn Evans. 2012. *From Voting to Violence? Far-right extremism in Britain*. London: Searchlight Educational Trust. Available at: [http://www.channel4.com/media/c4-news/images/voting-to-violence%20\(7\).pdf](http://www.channel4.com/media/c4-news/images/voting-to-violence%20(7).pdf)

Griffin, Roger. 1995. *Fascism*. Oxford University Press.

Guibernau, Montserrat. 2010. "Migration and the rise of the radical right: Social malaise and the failure of mainstream politics," *Policy Network Paper*. London: Barrow Cadbury Trust.

Haddad, Mohammed and Ben Piven. 2013. "The rise of Europe's far-right voices". *Al Jazeera*. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/02/2013224123927515709.html>

- Hainsworth, P (2000) *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, Pinter.
- Hawkes, David. 2004. *Ideology*. London; New York. Routledge. Available: <http://analepsis.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/hawkes-ideology.pdf>
- Helm, Toby. 2013. "EU warns Cameron over 'knee-jerk xenophobia'". *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/30/eu-cameron-xenophobia-immigration>
- Helmer, Roger. 2013d. "Roger Helmer- Closure of greek public television: 'We've never seen this in peace time!'". Available at: <http://www.efdgroupp.eu/medias/videos/item/roger-helmer-closure-of-the-greek-public-televisionwe-ve-never-seen-this-in-peace-time.html>
- Hix, S., Noury, A., Roland, G. 2005. "Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament", In Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland. 2009. "Voting patterns and alliance formation in the European Parliament". *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* 364 (1518): 821-831.
- Ignazi, Piero. 1995. *The Re-emergence of the Extreme Right in Europe*. Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien.
- Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60: 307-337.
- Kakassis, Joanna. 2013. "Failed States, Case Study: Greece. Has Greece's dysfunction reached the point of permanent crisis?" *Foreign Policy*. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/europe_s_basket_case
- Klandermans B. and Mayer N. (eds.). 2006. *Extreme Right activists in Europe*. Routledge.
- Klau, Thomas. 2011. In Peter Walker and Mathew Taylor. "Far-right on the rise in Europe, says report". *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-rise-europe-report>

- Knight K. 2006. Transformations of the concept of ideology in the twentieth century. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 100:619–26. In Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60: 307-337.
- Kolb, Ole. 2012. "Nationalism in the globalized age: An assessment on the variations of contemporary right-wing populism in Europe." Unpublished master's thesis. Netherlands: University of Twente, School of Management and Governance.
- Krejci, J. 1991. "Introduction: Concepts of left and right". In Cheles, Michalina, Luciano Fergusun and Ronnie Vaughan, eds., 1991. *Neo-fascism in Europe*. London: Longman.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter and Bruno Wueest 2012. *Political conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laqueur, Walter. 2007. "Fascism in the Twenty-First Century". *Social Science and Public Policy* 44 (4): 48-53.
- Levy, Carl. 1999. "Fascism, National Socialism and Conservatives in Europe, 1914-1945: Issues for Comparativists." *Contemporary European History* 8 (1): 97-126.
- Lifland, Amy. Winter 2013. "Right Wing Rising: Eurozone Crisis and Nationalism," *Harvard International Review, The Global Notebook*: 9-10.
- Lind, Michael. 2000. "Politics after Ideology". *The New Leader*: 19-21.
- Linz, Juan J. 2003. "Fascism as 'latecomer': an ideal type with negations". In Kallis, Aristotle, ed., *The Fascism Reader*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Loewen, G.V. 2013. "Image and Imagination in Fascist Ideology". *Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences* 7 (2): 317-332.

- Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P. (2007). Euro-scepticism and extreme voting patterns in Europe. Social cleavages and socio-political attitudes determining voting for the far left, the far right, and non-voting. In: Loosveldt, G., Swyngedouw, M. & Cambré, B. (2007). *Measuring MeaningfulData in Social Research*. Leuven: Acco, 71-92.
- Mann, Michael. 2004. *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mason, Rowena. 2013. "Ukip tells Godfrey Bloom to stop referring to 'bongo bongo land'". *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-rise-europe-report>
- Meredith, Charlotte. 2013. "Godfrey Bloom, Ukip 'Bongo Bongo' MEP, In Sexism Row". *The Huffington Post*. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/08/15/godfrey-bloom-ukip-sexist_n_3759968.html
- Merkel, Peter H. and Weinberg Leonard (eds.). 2003. *Right-Wing extremism in the 21st Century*. Frank Cass.
- Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair. 2006. *Representative Government in Modern Europe* (4th edn). Boston: McGraw-Hill. In Spanje, von Joost. "The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative Analysis of 'Anti-Immigration' and 'Far Right' Parties." *Government and Opposition*, 46: 3 (2011), 293-320.
- Minkenberg, Michael and Pascal Perrineau. 2007. "The Radical Right in the European Elections" *International Science Review* 28 (1): 29-55.
- Nigel Farage 2013c. Nigel Farage on UKIP local election success. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLRZREzee8w>
- Nigel Farage. 2010. Who is Herman van Rompuy? Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqovTGjYjM4>
- Nigel Farage. 2011a. I want you all fired. What the EU should be. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkT2YC1gim8>

- Nigel Farage. 2011b. The Union is in a state, Mr Barroso. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ii0Yc6_dwyo
- Nigel Farage. 2012a. I owe no allegiance to the EU flag. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bsl1_ju7Vxw
- Nigel Farage. 2012b. The Right and the Left Rising Up Across Europe. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr76C1w49Nk>
- Nigel Farage. 2012c. Nigel Farage on the Euro. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiQJnuXCTLU>
- Nigel Farage. 2012d. Nigel Farage on the rise of UKIP. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLuVhskTkVQ>
- Nigel Farage. 2012e. Nigel Farage destroys Barroso's State of the Union. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L6SdRfZqah0>
- Nigel Farage. 2012f. UKIP Leader Nigel Farage first speech to new President Schultz. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mhq7vXIjNFI>
- Nigel Farage. 2013a. Nigel Farage looking at 2014 European elections. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfPzwLGSKgY>
- Nigel Farage. 2013b. Slovakia said no to Greek bailout. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExxfGIsqz88>
- Nigel Farage. 2013d. UKIP Nigel Farage full interview on Australian TV. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAyzWKXtbq0>
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New York: Cambridge.
- Paige, Jonathan. 2013. Ukip MEP Godfrey Bloom insists that "Bongo Bongo Land" simply means land of the antelope. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ukip-mep-godfrey->

bloom-insists-that-bongo-bongo-land-simply-means-land-of-the-antelope-8752692.html

Payne, Stantley, G. 1995. *History of Fascism 1915-1945*. University of Wisconsin Press.

Phillips, Leigh. 2009. "Ukip, Lega Nord form hard-right bloc in EU Parliament," euobserver. Available at: <http://euobserver.com/political/28394>

Prowe, Diethelm. 1994. "Classic 'fascism and the new radical right in Western Europe: comparisons and contrasts'". *Contemporary European Politics* 3 (3).

Raunio, T. 1997. "The European perspective: transnational party groups in the 1989–1994 European Parliament". London, UK: Ashgate; Kreppel, A. 2002. "The European Parliament and supranational party system: a study in institutional development". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roskin, Michael G., 1939- (1988). *Political science: an introduction* (3rd ed). Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Sen, Somdeep. 2010. "Right-wing Populism and the European Union". *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 9 (2): 56-71.

Shipman, Tim and Tamara Cohen. 2013. Did UKIP leader Nigel Farage blow his chance to become an MP by refusing to run in Eastleigh by-election? Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2286846/Did-UKIP-leader-Nigel-Farage-blow-chance-MP-refusing-run-Eastleigh-election.html>

Spiegel. 2007. "Extreme Solidarity: Far-right Parties Form New Group in European Parliament." Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/extreme-solidarity-far-right-parties-form-new-group-in-european-parliament-a-459793.html>

Spoerri, Marlene and Mladen Joksic. 2012. "Europe's Far-right Goes Mainstream: the Failure of Multiculturalism?" Carnegie Council.

- Startin, Nicholas. 2010. "Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11 (4): 429-449.
- Sternhell, Zev. 1976. "Fascist Ideology". In Laqueur, Walter, ed., *Fascism, a Readers Guide, Analysis, Interpretations, Bibliography*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Swinford, Steven. 2013. "Ukip treasurer: Women are not competitive enough for the board room". *The Telegraph* 2013a. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10244637/Ukip-treasurer-Women-are-not-competitive-enough-for-the-board-room.html>
- Taylor, Ros. 2006. "Cameron Refuses to apologise to Ukip". *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/apr/04/conservatives.uk>
- The Economist. August 12, 2012. "Culture Matters More". Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/21560294>
- The Huffington Post. 2013. "Nigel Farage, Ukip Leader Told To Limit Media Appearances". Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/07/10/nigel-farage-bullied_n_3574619.html
- The Times. 2013. UKIP: 'One-man cult' that stamps on critics. Available at: <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article3703856.ece>
- UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party. 2010. Manifesto. Available at: <http://www.ukip.org/issues/2013-01-25-10-55-7/2010-manifesto>
- UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party. 2012. A Fresh Choice For London. Available at: <http://www.ukiplocal.co.uk/media/pdf/UKIPLondonManifesto.pdf>
- UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party. 2013a. What we Stand for. Available at: <http://www.ukip.org/issues/policy-pages/what-we-stand-for>

- UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party. 2013b. Immigration. Available at: <http://www.ukip.org/issues/policy-pages/immigration>
- UN News Center. 2010. “Secretary-General cautions against new ‘politics of polarization’ in Europe”. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36488#.UjI_CUMaNmSo
- USA Today. 2010. “UK police ‘deeply sorry’ for cameras in Muslim neighborhoods”. Available at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-09-30-british-muslims_N.htm
- Van Dijk, Teun A. 2006. “Ideology and discourse analysis.” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11 (2): 115-140.
- Vasilopoulou, Sofia. 2009. ‘Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right’, *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 5 (1): 3-23.
- Vote Watch Europe. 2011. Voting in the 2009-2014 European Parliament: How do MEPs Vote after Lisbon? Available at: http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/votewatch_report_voting_behavior_26_january_beta.pdf
- Vote Watch Europe. 2013. National Party Statistics. Available at: <http://www.votewatch.eu/en/national-parties-loyalties.html>
- Walker, Peter and Mathew Taylor. 2011. “Far-right on the rise in Europe, says report”. *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-rise-europe-report>
- Walker, Tim. 2013. Ukip would be finished if Nigel Farage fell under a bus, says treasure. *The telegraph*. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10248087/Ukip-would-be-finished-if-Nigel-Farage-fell-under-a-bus-says-treasurer.html>
- Walpole, Jane R. October 1979. "Why Must the Passive Be Damned?" *College Composition and Communication*. 30(3): 251. In Bush, Don. "The Passive Voice Should Be Avoided--Sometimes." *Technical Communication*, 28:1 (First Quarter 1981), 19-20, 22.

Ward, Benjamin. 2013. "Is far right Europe's new normal?". Available at: <http://antisemitism.org.il/article/76864/far-right-europes-new-normal>

Werts, Han. 2010. "Euro-scepticism and extreme right-wing voting behaviour in Europe, 2002-2008." Unpublished master's thesis. Nijmegen: Radboud University Nijmegen.

Zaslove, A. (2004), "Closing the door? The ideology and impact of radical right populism and immigration policy in Austria and Italy", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9 (1), pp. 99-118. In Startin, Nicholas. 2010. "Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11 (4): 429-449.

Žižek, Slavoj. 1994. *Mapping Ideology*. New York: Verso.

Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. *The Sublime object of Ideology*. New York: Verso.