

UNDERSTANDING THE NEW MIDDLE EASTERN LEADERS: AN
OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

A Master's Thesis

by

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Ankara

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To My Parents and Beloved Grandmother

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OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Political Islam and particular Islamist organizations have broadly gained strength across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the post-Cold War era. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is viewed as the world's largest and most influential Islamist organization impinging upon the wider landscape of contemporary MENA politics. The psychological approach contends that the characteristics of leaders making foreign policy are crucial to understanding ultimate foreign policy outcomes (Hudson 2005). In this literature, the study of leaders' beliefs is one the most progressive approaches to world politics which focuses on leaders' belief systems and their impacts on foreign policy-making (Leites 1951; George 1969). By utilizing the operational code analysis, this research aims to unravel the general patterns of Islamist foreign policy

manifested itself in three MB-affiliated MENA leaders' foreign policy behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings era: Egypt's Morsi, Tunisia's Ghannouchi, and Hamas' Meshaal. Two main hypotheses are posited in this thesis. First, the foreign policy beliefs of three MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not significantly different from the world leaders' included in the 'norming group.' Secondly, it is hypothesized that foreign policy behaviors of three Islamist leaders designate uniformity pattern even though these leaders operate in quite different political and cultural settings. The analysis results yield that operational codes of three MB leaders are analogous to the average world leader's since there are only a few statistically significant differences. The findings also support the argument that despite operating in different political systems, all three MB-Islamists exhibit similar foreign policy behaviors towards the 'other' in a strategic environment.

Key Words: Operational Code Analysis, Islamist Foreign Policy, Muslim Brotherhood, Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Leadership

ÖZET

YENİ ORTA DOĞU LİDERLERİNİ ANLAMAK: OPERASYONEL KOD YAKLAŞIMI

Canbolat, Sercan

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Siyasi İslam hareketi ve belli başlı İslami örgütler Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da muazzam bir şekilde güçlenmişlerdir. Müslüman Kardeşler dünyanın en büyük ve en etkili İslamcı hareketi olarak görülmektedir ve bu özelliği ile Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika politikalarının genel tabiatını ciddi şekilde etkilemektedir. Psikolojik yaklaşım, karar verici durumunda olan liderlerin karakteristik özelliklerinin dış politika çıktılarını anlamada çok kritik bir önemi olduğunu iddia eder (Hudson 2005). Bu literatür içerisinde, liderlerin inançlarının dış politika yapımına

etkisi çerçevesinde çalışılması dünya politikalarını anlama gayesi ile geliştirilen en yenilikçi yaklaşımlardan birisidir (Leites 1951; George 1969). Bu çalışma Operasyonel Kod Analizi kullanarak, Muhammed Mursi, Raşid Gannuşi ve Halit Meşal'ın dış politika davranışlarında kendisini gösteren İslamcı dış politikanın genel motiflerini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde iki ana hipotez öne sürülmektedir. Birincisi, Müslüman Kardeşler örgütü ile ilintili olan üç liderin dış politika inançları ile 'standart örneklem' içerisinde yer alan dünya liderlerinin inançları arasında kayda değer bir farklılık bulunmamaktadır. İkinci olarak, tamamen farklı siyasal ve kültürel yapılarda yer almalarına rağmen üç İslamcı liderin dış politika davranışlarının tam benzerlik modeline işaret ettiği varsayımında bulunulmuştur. Analiz sonuçları iki örneklem arasında sadece birkaç ve istatistiksel olarak çok önemli olmayan farklılık olduğunu saptayıp, üç Müslüman Kardeşler lideri ile ortalama dünya liderinin operasyonel kodlarının birbirlerine yakın olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca, araştırmanın bulguları farklı siyasi sistemde hareket etmelerine rağmen üç İslamcı liderin stratejik çevre içerisinde tanımladıkları 'ötekiye' karşı birbirine benzer dış politika davranışları gösterdiği argümanını desteklemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Operasyonel Kod Analizi, İslamcı Dış Politika, Müslüman Kardeşler, Dış Politika Analizi, Siyasi Liderlik

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Any approach to foreign policy decision-making that dismisses the critical role of individual leaders and their cognitive systems, albeit being parsimonious, is destined for explanatory deficiency. Structural and state level constraints notwithstanding, each and every foreign policy decision is made by human actors. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized that fact when he said, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make.”¹ Building on Kissinger’s observation, if every single foreign policy outcome must materialize through human agency, then it is high time to acknowledge that a leader’s cognition is the part and parcel of understanding foreign policy making since all individual leaders are psychological beings.

However, proponents of structural and rationalist approach argue that although individual leaders occupy decision making settings, their particularities make little

¹An interview with Henry Kissinger that took place in January 1975, as quoted in Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 13.

difference when they confront with insurmountable structural limitations and the rationality barrier in international politics (Waltz 1979). The early generation of political psychologists weighed in on the debate by arguing that structural forces are not always critically significant and a decision maker can be “incapable of making objectively optimal choices” due to his/her “bounded rationality” (Simon 1985). Moreover, although the cognitive paradigm gives credit to realist assumptions of rationality and systemic structure in the study of foreign policy, it accentuates the role of human actors in interpreting those structural constraints and making an idiosyncratic cost-benefit calculation. As Wolfers (1962: 42) pointed out, “factors external to the actor can become determinants only as they affect the mind, the heart, and the will of the decision maker.” Similarly, it is also argued that foreign policy studies focusing exclusively on structural and situational variables are inherently underspecified since these factors do not always trump leaders’ beliefs and perceptions. Particularly, Brecher et al. (1969) emphasized the analytical necessity of focusing on leaders’ individual psychologies including the ‘psychological climate’ and the ‘attitudinal prism’ of leaders which function as a causal mechanism to understand foreign policy making. In other words, a leader’s personality and beliefs are of paramount importance in analyzing decision-making process because the outside world “does not exist independently from actors’ subjective beliefs about how the world works and how they could best achieve their goals within this world” (Malici and Buckner 2008: 787).

In fact, in addition to constructivists, contemporary rationalists of many stripes do recognize an important role that psychology plays in the explanations of foreign

policy. Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (1997: 16) concur that “uncertainty and the subjective beliefs of actors are essential features of the choice process, and ... that uncertainty makes the question of differences in perceptions central.” Despite that acknowledgment, Young and Schafer (1998) argue, the rationalist camp emphasizes expected perceptions, a ‘proxy variable’, to analyze leaders’ cognitions rather than making effort to ‘get into the heads of leaders.’ According to Young and Schafer (1998: 64), the fallacy in this approach is that “blanket assumptions about international actors do not hold... because all leaders do not think about power in the same way. Moreover, interests vary by individual statesmen, let alone by state.”

From the vantage point of psychological approach, cognition of a leader is instrumental in explicating his/her behaviors in the foreign policy realm since cognitions lay the basis of human behaviors in politics and how humans perceive and interpret the outside world. In this context, the essential concepts e.g., power and interest that constitute the heart of the study of international relations are subjective interpretations of the political universe. Both conceptions stem from the decision makers’ personal beliefs and perceptions and therefore they are cognitive in nature. For instance, while Mao had a belief that the political power arises from a rifle barrel, Gandhi squarely thought otherwise and these two national leaders triggered very different and consequential political transformations in their countries (Young and Schafer 1998).

1.1. Significance of the Study

Since the second half of the 20th century, when Snyder et al. (1962) formed the foundation of foreign policy analysis (FPA) field, the study of decision makers in the IR discipline has developed to a great extent. Preston (2010), in his review of the leadership studies literature, pointed out the most vibrant research programs regarding leaders psychologies as cognitive mapping, image theory, leadership trait analysis, and operational code analysis.² Similarly, through using one of these leadership assessment tools, this study subscribes to the contention that the human actors constitute the heart of international politics (Hudson 2005). Nevertheless, this thesis also shares the scholarly concerns that while the bulk of FPA-style leadership studies focusing excessively on Western international relations, the scientific studies on non-Western countries and leaders are very rare (Kesgin 2011; Özdamar 2011; Özdamar *forthcoming*).

Political Islam and Islamist groups have reasserted themselves as resilient actors of world politics since the late 20th century both within democratic systems e.g., Refah Partisi or AKP in Turkey and also through resistance movements and terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda (Rubin 2011). The old and deep-seated grievances of Muslim communities against the Western colonization which still lingers in different forms such as superpower penetration into the region and also secular nationalistic parties' ineptitude to accomplish political and economic development must have contributed to the ascent of the Political Islam in MENA (Özdamar 2011). After assuming the political

²For other reviews of the leadership studies literature, see also Schafer and Young (1998), and Rosati and Miller (2000).

power, while some ‘neo-Islamist’ (and/or post-Islamist) movements opted for a peaceful integration to the domestic and international system and exhibit cooperative behaviors such as AKP in Turkey, many other Islamist movements did not take part in democratic politics and proved rather confrontational toward established orders.

Considering the Islamist movements together, however, the MB holds the distinction of being the oldest, largest and most powerful Islamist group operating in the Muslim world (Leiken and Brooke 2007). Despite its significance in the MENA and world politics alike, the MB’s political leadership style and its conceptualization of foreign policy are understudied within the IR discipline. The bulk of studies analyzing the MB lacks ‘realistic empathy’ since the field of Middle Eastern studies is fraught with political and cultural biases of the Western world (White 1991). The field is also devoid of rigorous scientific methods to understand both the sources of Islamist foreign policy and the leaders of MENA region. In addition, there is a dearth of studies in the literature of foreign policy analysis (FPA) focusing on political Islam and its new leadership as a distinct political philosophy with idiosyncratic foreign policy preferences. Lastly, North American FPA approaches are geographically bounded and not frequently applied on the non-Western cases due to theoretical and methodological issues (Kesgin 2011; Özdamar *forthcoming*).

1.2. Research Questions and Overview

This research attempts to bridge these gaps in the literature with the aim of expanding the geographical coverage of Western-originated operational code approach. Particularly, this study hones in on three MENA leaders, Morsi of Egypt, Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and Meshaal of Gaza as the representatives of the new generation of Islamists. This thesis utilizes the operational code construct as its leadership assessment tool to examine foreign policy belief system of the new MENA leadership imbued by the MB-style political Islam (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969; Holsti 1977). Operational code analysis is a method designed particularly for studying key political beliefs of a decision maker and addressing the question of “what the individual knows, feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in human affairs” (Schafer and Walker 2006: 29). Modern operational code research program employs the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to measure an individual leader’s operational code beliefs (Walker et al. 1998).

The relative dearth of systematic studies on non-Western leaders and the sources of Islamist foreign policy in MENA prompted particular research interests and therefore laid the foundations of this study. The research puzzle is searching for a casual linkage between Islamist leaders’ ideological beliefs and their foreign policy preferences. This line of inquiry sparked the author’s attention on further questions and determined the direction of research. How do political Islamists e.g., the Muslim Brothers make sense of international relations? What are the general patterns of Islamist leaders’ conceptualization of foreign policy? What is the MB leadership’s image of ‘other’?

How do MENA leaders make foreign policy decisions and do they differ from the average world leaders?

After a review of the leadership studies literature and studying operational code approach, the sketchy inquiries above morphed into three systematic and interrelated research questions. First, what are the philosophical (diagnostic) and instrumental (prescriptive) beliefs of three MENA leaders? Second, how do three MB-affiliated MENA leaders compare to the average world leader? Third, what are the foreign policy strategies of three Islamist leaders: is the new MENA leadership's approach to foreign policy rational/pragmatic or ideological/revolutionary? Building on these research questions, this study posits two main hypotheses to be tested with data. The first hypothesis is that the foreign policy beliefs of MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not different the beliefs of world leaders (predominantly operating in the West) included in the norming group (Walker and Schafer 2006). Second, the foreign policy behaviors of three Islamist MENA leaders are very similar although they operate in quite different political, economic, and cultural settings. The analysis results first show that the operational codes of three MENA leaders are analogous to the world leaders' scores since there are a few statistically important differences. The results also confirm the second hypothesis that despite operating in different political systems, three MB-affiliated MENA leaders exhibit similar foreign policy behaviors especially in terms of tactics and strategies they pursue towards 'other' to achieve their objectives. Similarly, an analysis of belief systems of three Islamist leaders from 2011 to 2013 reveals some

general patterns in how MB-driven political Islam reasserted and articulated itself as an ideological source of foreign policy.

1.3. Organization of the Chapters

The structure and central arguments of this thesis are as follows. The next chapter first provides a comprehensive overview of the foreign policy analysis literature and briefly reviews, the relevant literature, leadership studies and explicates the methodological background and coding procedures of the chosen ‘at-a-distance’ leadership assessment tool: Operational Code Analysis. In this chapter, the upsides of using this particular psychological approach along with a few operational code studies on MENA leaders are discussed. Then, chapter 3 focuses on the origins of the MB movement and its evolution from social charitable organization to a powerful political actor in MENA and world politics. This chapter also presents a concise psychobiography of each Islamist leader to take a snapshot of the three leaders’ personal backgrounds and political profiles in their adult life. The use of leader’s psychobiography particularly allows testing the hypotheses of operational code construct against the qualitative observation and factual information on leaders’ personal backgrounds.

Next, the fourth chapter sets the research design and methodology of this study in which the research questions and hypotheses are broached. In this chapter, the nuts and bolts of research design are explained in details including the relevant research tools employed, VICS and Profiler Plus, temporal and spatial domain of the study, data

sources, and the case selection. This part also introduces the dependent and independent variables of the research with an emphasis on how they are conceptualized and operationalized in the operational code literature.

The following two chapters, chapters 5 and 6, respectively put the operational code profiles of three MENA leaders into broader and comparative perspective and they attempt to establish a linkage between leaders' operational code beliefs and their foreign policy behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings era. The latter chapter concentrates heavily on the explaining the real-life foreign policies of three MENA leaders one by one so as to show to what extent their political belief systems are substantial to their foreign policy decision-making. Lastly, the concluding chapter discloses the crux of Islamist foreign policy under new MENA leadership by presenting the general patterns of MB-affiliated Islamist leaders' foreign policy behaviors. This part also puts forward a few broader policy-relevant recommendations for US foreign policy towards the MENA region and briefly discusses the insights of this research for future studies in the field.

This study has added value to offer both in the leadership studies and foreign policy analysis field due to several reasons. Initially, it challenges the conventional wisdom concerning the MB movement and its leaders whose images portrayed in the West as hostile, ideology-bounded and irrational actors. To test the Western-embedded narrative on Islamist leaders, this study aims to show how international relations are perceived from the MB-affiliated leadership's standpoint. It examines foreign policy behaviors of three MENA countries from the vantage point of their leadership. Thus, this research follows the lead of pioneering studies in the relevant academic niche

during the last decade (Malici and Buckner 2008; Kesgin 2011; Özdamar 2011; *forthcoming*).

Second, this study makes a notable contribution to FPA field since in the rational actor paradigm the beliefs and perceptions have become significant elements in the realist modeling of strategic interactions between states (Lake and Powell 1999). This research shift led to departures from the premises of conventional rational actor approaches. These approaches e.g., game theory take the actors and their preferences as given and assume the structure of the game as external to the strategic interaction between players. Contrary to these approaches, this study does not take decision makers and their preference orderings as given but instead it draws them from a rigorous and independent cognitive theory. Third, another meritorious aspect of this research is its attempt to expand the North American leadership assessment methods to the study of three strategically important countries in the MENA. With its original research design to use in MENA cases, it aims to challenge the argument that North American FPA approaches are geographically and methodologically bounded and they are not frequently applied to the non-Western political systems (O'Reilly 2007; Kesgin 2011; Özdamar *forthcoming*).

In broader terms, finally, this thesis makes a noteworthy contribution to making sense of MENA politics from the standpoint of new political leaders affiliated with the strongest Islamist force in the region. Despite the plethora of commentaries, and descriptive studies on Egypt, Tunisia, and Gaza Strip, there are very few systematic studies focusing on the political leaders of these countries and assuming Islamism as a

distinct political philosophy with its idiosyncratic foreign policy preferences. With its extensive coverage of Egypt's, Tunisia's and Gaza's Islamist leaders and their foreign policy behaviors in the aftermath of Arab uprisings, this study sets forth a nuanced approach to understand new MENA politics that increasingly impinges on today's world politics.

CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Overview of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) Literature

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature as a subfield of International Relations (IR) can be traced back to the late 1950s and 1960s although FPA-style studies have been around so long as there have been diplomats and scholars who have aimed to comprehend why leaders have made the choices they did with regards to interstate relations. Basically, Hudson (2007: 12) conceptualizes FPA as “the subfield of International Relations that seeks to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behavior, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, acting singly and in groups.” In the early 1950s, however, most of the studies were based on system-level explanations without necessarily referring to the cognitive, psychological and social factors that matter in the decision-making processes of decision makers. The study of foreign policy, prior to the 1950s, was generally dominated by single case studies which were limited in time and space and with their

idiographic nature they could not generate theoretical generalizations that may be applicable for other contexts and time frames. Thus, Levy (2003: 255) describes the foreign policy studies before the 1950s as “more descriptive, policy driven, and interpretive rather than theoretical.”

In retrospect, it is observed that the bulk of theoretical studies in IR hinge on states as their grounds and all decision making units, whether be it a group, a single leader, or a state, are approximated to the unitary rational actor which primarily refers to the state itself (Hudson 1995; 2005; 2007). Namely, this approach is known as ‘black-boxing’ of the state (Hudson 2007: 3-4), or as a ‘billiard ball model’ of state interactions in international politics which can also be termed as ‘actor-general theory’ (Waltz 1979; Clarke and White 1989). In this context, FPA comes into prominence in the IR discipline with its assumption that human decision makers, act singly and/or in groups, are the ground of all that occurs between nations. Therefore, FPA-style scholarship offers a development of actor-specific or actor-oriented theory³ which may pave the way for the realization of generalizable insights at the level of middle-range theory⁴ (Rosenau 1966, as cited in Hudson 2005).

According to Hudson (2005; 2007), three paradigmatic works, including the works by eminent scholars like Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954; 1962), James Rosenau (1966), Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956; 1957; 1965), have

³In this study, the terms actor-specific and actor-oriented theories are used interchangeably that both refer to a form of middle-range theory.

⁴Here, whereas actor-general theory accounts for the behavior of actors in general (i.e, game theory), actor-specific and/or actor-oriented theory explains the behavior of particular actors in a detailed manner (such as FPA theory).

laid the base of the FPA research program. *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (1954; also see Snyder et al. 1962; 2002) by Snyder and his colleagues prompted scholars to consider below the nation-state level of analysis and the individuals involved in decision-making process:

We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision-making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society (Snyder et al. 1954: 53).

Particularly, Snyder et al. (1954) have underscored the decision makers' preferences and perceptions that are necessary to be included in foreign policy explanations by referring to the 'dual-aspect' of decision making process. By doing so, they brought in the FPA's hallmark of particular emphasis on *foreign policy decision-making* as opposed to foreign policy outcomes (Hudson 1995; 2005). Here, they (Snyder et al. 1954: 12) contend that "if one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary."

The milestone work of James Rosenau aimed at the development of actor-oriented middle-range theory which can be accomplished through a robust aggregate statistical exploration and confirmation. In taking this approach, Rosenau (1964; 1966) also underlined the need for integrating information at several levels of analysis in understanding foreign policy which bequeathed to FPA its thrust for multi-level and multi-causal explanations of the decisions. Particularly, Rosenau's pre-theorizing

approach inspired researchers to lay bare cross-nationally applicable generalizations about the foreign policy behavior of countries in a rigorous and systematic fashion. As Rosenau (1966: 98-99) commented:

To identify factors is not to trace their influence... To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other... Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations... Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory.

With their seminal work, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) maintained that sticking merely to the analysis of power distribution within an interstate system, without references to foreign policy undertakings, understanding foreign policy outputs was misled. Here, the Sprouts (1965: 225) associated the policy undertakings with intentions, strategies and decisions of the human beings and “there can be nothing to explain or predict, let alone the achievement in foreign policy-making, unless there is an undertaking.”

They contributed to the development of the field by also suggesting that researchers need to pay attention to the ‘psycho-milieu’ of the individual decision makers and groups involved in foreign policy decision-making process.⁵ Here, it is important to note that particular discrepancies between the real and perceived operational environment may transpire which possibly beget to suboptimal decisions in

⁵The term psycho-milieu can be defined as the international and operational environment or context as it is perceived and interpreted by individual decision makers and groups. Also See Hudson (2005 and 2007).

foreign policy-making. The Sprouts (1965: 118) also revealed the conspicuous difference between FPA and the aforementioned actor-general theory by arguing that:

Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual's probable motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive behavioralist undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies.

In a nutshell, the insights of these three works can be boiled down to a single but an incisive message: “the particularities of the human beings making national foreign policy were vitally important to understanding ultimate foreign policy choice” (Hudson 2005: 7). However, these particularities should be incorporated to the larger theory-building project which employs multiple levels of analysis, spanning from the most micro to the most macro, and cross-national explorations. Additionally, it has been accentuated that the process of foreign policy decision-making is at least significant, if not more, than the foreign policy decision as an ultimate output (Rosati 1997). In that sense, these three groundbreaking works established three main areas of research in FPA literature that zero in on respectively: the decision-making of small/large groups, comparative foreign policy (CFP), and psychological/sociological explanations of foreign policy.

That said, given the intricacies involved in foreign policy decision-making stipulate the need for having a particular approach to FPA focusing exclusively on the decision making which is imperative to a holistic understanding of foreign policy behavior (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). To that end, FPA is furnished with several models

and theories which enable us to comprehend how domestic politics, various decision making units, biases and misperceptions and also uncertainty in international politics can impinge on the ultimate decisions. Kinder and Weiss (1978) argued that the academic literature on decision making has been divided into two competing camps: studies based on rational actor model (RAM) and works aimed to challenge that dominant paradigm. By the same token, more recent scholarly studies within FPA field can be defined and categorized as an internal and/or external critique directed towards the rational choice school.⁶

2.2. Rational Actor Model

First of all, RAM has been acknowledged as the dominant paradigm of IR discipline and the linchpin of foreign policy decision-making. MacDonald (2003: 551) claims that RAM is seen “as the post plausible candidate for a universal theory of political behavior, whose simple and intuitively plausible assumptions hold the promise of unifying the diverse subfields of political science.” However, the rational choice paradigm approaches to the study of foreign policy without saying anything about the particularities of individual decision makers since most of the scholars of decision-making embark on their analysis with the ‘rational actor’ assumption. This approach stems directly from the realist paradigm which assumes states as unitary actors acting to

⁶Internal critique of rational actor model comes from again rational choice scholars like Allison and Zelikow(1971), Halperin (1974) who introduced bureaucratic politics, organizational process model and bounded rationality whereas cognitive/psychological paradigm raises a strong external critique to discredit the hegemonic discourse of rational choice school.

maximize their power and security and minimize losses because they operate within an anarchic international system (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1995).

This realist rationale generally is seen as ideal type of state interaction in the ‘self-help’ system and thus underpins the most optimal form of decision making (Neack 2008; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Here, realist scholars conflate decision makers with state in accordance with the basic presumption that realists make about leaders: “any and all leaders act in ways consistent with the long-term and persistent national interests of the country and since the national interests do not change, changes in leadership have little consequence” (Neack 2008: 31). Thus, the set of decisions made by the individual leaders are conceived as the decisions of the state in the realist school. One of the leading realist scholars Hans Morgenthau (1948: 5, as cited in Neack 2008) made a point regarding the linkage between national interest and decision makers that directly shapes foreign policy:

We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman --past, present or future— has taken or will take on the political scene... Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.

Moreover, the literature on RAM to foreign policy sets forth an anti-thesis to cognitive leadership studies by assuming that all leaders are constrained by the international system in the same way so that individual differences are washed off by overriding systemic forces (Waltz 1979). Accordingly, in order to downplay the influence of human-agency on foreign policy decisions, the protagonists of rational

choice tend to use the word ‘regime’ in lieu of ‘individual.’ McGinnis (1994: 69) points out that:

Any individual who attains a position of major foreign policy responsibility will have been socialized through education and processes of political selection to pursue some set of common goals. Individuals differ in their perception of the national interest but role expectations reinforce a sense of common interests.

The decision-making models that offered by RAM have been devised as a ‘black boxes’ in which a very basic economic utility calculation is made by the insiders (regimes, decision makers, bureaucracy) that react to their political environment and make decisions in the same way. In essence, RAM argues that individual leaders use similar cost-benefit calculation strategies to analyze all options at hand and then choose a policy to maximize their payoffs rather than following strategies in accordance with their perceptions and beliefs (Bueno de Mesquita 1997; Fearon 1998). This decision-making framework, however, was not fully systematized until Allison and Zelikow (1971) constructed their ‘rational choice model’ that provided no room for decision makers’ personalities, perceptions, defected information processing (and consequential miscalculations) and other psychological variables⁷

Accordingly, proponents of RAM eschew to focus on individual leaders except to the degree that they are seen as all calculating and rational individuals whose primary aim is to stay in power. Therefore, this paradigm prioritizes the ‘expected utility theory (EUT)’ which stemmed from the studies of von Neumann and Morgenstern in the late

⁷For the further inquiry of whether rational choice research agenda pays attention to decision makers’ personalities and perceptions see also Steinbrunner (1974).

1940s (as cited in Neack 2008). EUT, grounded on the basic tenets of microeconomics, argues that “the decision maker is assumed to be able to rank preferences according to the degree of satisfaction of achieving these goals and objectives” (Sage 1990: 233). In other words, this paradigm suggests that all leaders, with different individual goals, risk tendencies and preferences, are still expected to do what will be in their prime interests that is mostly understood as ‘leader’s political survival’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; 2009).

For all of its merits, the rational choice paradigm continues to attract a myriad of criticisms on the grounds that it gives no attention to the leaders’ personalities, biases and political beliefs and how these particularities may influence both countries’ foreign policy choices and international relations in general. Following this aim, the next section teases out the literature on cognitive/psychological school of FPA and its criticisms on the hegemonic paradigm, RAM.

2.3. Cognitive Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy

Psychological and cognitive characteristics of decision makers have been a part and parcel of decision-making research agenda since its inauguration as a sub-field of FPA, and many of the ground-breaking studies of this literature give psychological approach a paramount place in their analyses (Jervis 1976; Leites 1951; Smith 1968; Snyder et al. 1962; Sprout and Sprout 1965; Khong 1992). Building on these classics, numerous research programs, focusing on different psychological factors, have been formed in the

FPA literature. Scholars have analyzed the linkages between foreign policy decisions and images (Boulding 1956; Hermann 1985; M. Cottam 1992; 1994; Schafer 1997), operational codes (George 1969; Holsti 1970; Walker 1977; Walker et al. 1998), perceptions and misperceptions (Cottam 1977; Holsti 1972), integrative complexity (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977) and several personality traits of decision makers (Etheredge 1978; Weintraub 2003; Hermann 1970; 1977; 1987; 1999; Schafer 1999).

The usage of psychological variables in political science can be traced back to the Harold Lasswell's vital work *Psychopathology and Politics* in 1930 which introduced political psychology as an academic field in social science (as cited in Hudson 2005). In the 1950s and 1960s, some scholars including Snyder and his colleagues (1954; 1962), Sprout and Sprout (1956)⁸, Brecher et al. (1969) and Brewser Smith (1968) provided important studies regarding to the influence of psychological factors on foreign policy decision-making. Particularly, Brecher and his team (1969) elaborated on the Sprouts' (1956 and 1965) original thought of 'psychological milieu' by delving into the decision makers' psychological environment including their elite images and personal attitudes. Brewser Smith (1968, as cited in Rosati 1997) focused on other psychological factors such as 'ego-defense mechanism', 'object appraisal', and also 'engaged attitudes.'

According to Levy (2003), there are two waves of decision-making studies that help indicating the extents of cognitive school's influence in FPA-style works. In the first wave, which commenced by the work of Snyder and his colleagues in 1954 and

⁸The insights of twoprominent works penned by Snyder et al. (1954; 1962) and the Sprouts (1956) were explored in details in the first section of the literature review.

continued until 1971, there were more rooms for cognitive approach to become effective since scholarly studies on the importance of information and communication in foreign policy decision-making and decision makers' definition and interpretation of the political environment dominated the FPA research agenda. However, there was a dearth of rigorous theorizing about the psychological factors in the decision making process (Rosati 1997). Therefore, it is fair to say that early scholars missed the opportunity for an outright incorporation of psychological variables in FPA tool-kit.

With the inception of second wave, which emerged with the important work of Allison and Zelikow (1971) on the bureaucratic politics and organizational process models of foreign policy decision-making, there was even less leeway for cognitive tools in the area of foreign policy studies. Here, the decision making process is shaped either by pre-specified routines and standard operating procedures or bureaucratic actors' organizational roles that overlook different belief systems, personalities, and information processing styles of decision makers (Halperin 1974; Levy 2003).

However, two groundbreaking works of Jervis (1976) and Steinbrunner (1974) which were the products of the 'cognitive revolution'⁹ initiated the new research areas regarding psychological approach and successfully integrated this research program into the study of foreign policy. First, Levy (2003: 255) discerns not only the underperformance of early works but also a major breakthrough in cognitive decision

⁹The phrase 'cognitive revolution' is used to describe the intellectual movement which started in the 1950s and the academic trends in this era are also known as 'cognitive sciences.' An underlying logic behind the cognitive revolution was the idea that it is possible to make testable inferences about human mental processes through developing rigorous functions in computer science and artificial intelligence. See Pinker (2002) for further information.

making literature by arguing that “psychology had little direct influence on early decision-making models in IR literature, and that the turning point in the systematic development of a cognitive paradigm of FPA came with Jervis’s (1976) seminal study of *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*.”

Many scholars agree on a point that the literature on political psychology and its relevance for the study of foreign policy were brought together and early insights turned into a ‘systematic cognitive paradigm’ of foreign policy decision-making by Jervis’s innovative work (Rosati 1997; Levy 2003; Lebow 1981). Basically, Jervis (1976) contributed to development of cognitive approach by providing a comprehensive synthesis of theory and empirical evidence from various perspectives in social psychology supported by a good number of historical examples. Jervis’s study also showed, for the first time in literature, that “many policy outcomes predicted by psychological models could also be explained by systemic and/or domestic political models” (Levy 2003: 261). Hence, his call for alternative explanations made a vital methodological contribution which was a great leap forward in the project of applying psychological models to foreign policy behavior.

More specifically, Jervis (1976) has debated thoroughly how decision makers’ attitudes change, how decision makers learn lessons, if any, from history, how cognitive consistency influences leaders, and an analysis of common patterns of misperception regarding decision makers. As Jervis (1976: 28) encapsulated: “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others.” Rosati (1997: 53) gives credit to Jervis’s

study by arguing that “not only did he illustrate the relevance of a cognitive approach for FPA and IR, he also used such perspective to critique what he saw as simplistic assumptions of both deterrence theory and the spiral model of state interaction in world politics.” In this respect, Jervis’s foray gave rise to many more specific research areas and accelerated some others in IR discipline such as the study of threat perception and cognitive biases (Lebow 1981; Holsti 1970; George 1979).

Second, Steinbruner’s (1974, as quoted in Rosati 1997) study *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* is acknowledged as another landmark in cognitive school of foreign policy which originated a ‘cognitive theory of decision.’ With this model, Steinbruner (1974) illustrated that the RAM¹⁰ “has great difficulty in explaining governmental decision-making and performance, especially under real-world conditions of complexity and uncertainty” (as cited in Rosati 1997: 54). Also, Steinbruner (1974) offered a coherent and rigorous theoretical framework for the psychological study of foreign policy by discussing how individuals make consequential decisions within the cognitive process model and how the model works under a wider collective decision-making context as generally occurs within the government. As Steinbruner (1974: 14) argued that: “In essence, it is cognitive operations of human mind working in interaction with the organizational structure of the government which set workable limits on highly diffuse decision problems.”

Another vibrant research program within the cognitive school is an ‘analogical explanation (AE)’ of foreign policy decisions which introduced by Khong’s (1965;

¹⁰In fact, Steinbruner (1974) named the dominant approach in IR as “the analytic paradigm” instead of saying “rational actor model.”

1992) work *Analogies at War*. With this paradigmatic work, Khong examined the use of analogies particularly in foreign policy decision-making and also in international politics through a specific framework called AE. Substantively, Khong's AE model is consistent with the extant theories of cognitive science since this model embraces the canonical principle that individuals are dealing with a complex environment and massive information. The AE model reduces a plethora of stimuli to a basic analogy which renders the elusive information much more simple and comprehensible for decision makers. However, Khong (1965: 45; as quoted in Levy 2003: 267) argues that analogies are often, but not always, misemployed by political elites because "particular policy preferences may lead decision-makers to select those analogies that support their positions, either subconsciously because of cognitive consistency, or deliberately for leverage in political debates."

In his study, Khong cites a number of examples to support his proposed decision-making model including the US grand strategy regarding Vietnam in the late 1960s. Khong uses his model to reveal the analogy between Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy towards Hitler's Germany in the 1930s and American foreign policy behavior with respect to Vietnam impasse in 1965. The AE model argues that such an analogy does suggest the eschewing of appeasement strategy and therefore prescribe swift escalation to avert a communist expansion in Asia which prevailed within the preference orderings of President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk regarding Vietnam conflict (Khong 1965).

Ultimately, Khong makes a vital contribution to the cognitive paradigm by arguing that decision makers' beliefs and reading of a particular historical case through the lenses of analogical reasoning can shape their foreign policy preferences (Levy 2003). Khong (1992), therefore, devised a robust decision-making model to deal with these impediments to valid inference and warned researchers to be cognizant of the cognitive and motivated biases of leaders in foreign policy decision-making.

2.4. Leadership Studies in Foreign Policy Decision Making

The provenances of leadership studies literature date back to the 19th century that can be found in Carlyle's 'great man theory of leadership' (Carlyle 1888, as cited in Rosati 1997). Here, the key contention of Carlyle's theory is that world history can be virtually explained and understood by the impact of 'great men and/or heroes', who innately have political skills and power, on the historical developments and the political system. Therefore, Carlyle (1888: 2, as quoted in Rosati 1997) argues that "the history of the world is but the biography of great men." The studies that employ the 'great man theory' use biographies of great leaders such as Napoleon of France and Churchill of Britain which were limited in their scientific basis and methodological rigor (Segal 2000). More importantly, this anecdotal and methodologically-flawed theory is not rightly applied to today's research designs since there is an inadequate empirical data and scientifically weak case studies.

Broadly speaking, it can be argued that there are two potential divides that the literature on leadership studies can be grounded and discussed most effectively (Schafer 2000; 2010)¹¹. These are ‘methodological’ and ‘psychological constructs’ cleavages which correspond to differences between: (1) idiographic vs. nomothetic researches and (2) personality/unconscious vs. cognitive/conscious characteristics. Firstly, idiographic research focuses on single or a few research topics and its added value is appraised by the extent to which this research can delve into the details of research subject. Idiographic approaches are characterized by the holistic or depth-psychology analysis of subjects, so that they utilize ‘psychobiography’ as a research tool to probe the leader’s whole life in depth to predict general patterns of his/her political behavior (Greenstein 1969; Schafer 2000; Winter 2003). The psychobiographies involve various specific methods such as interviews, biographical materials, and behavioral analysis that come from the psychology discipline. The prominent idiographic works include Leites’s (1951; 1953) analysis of Soviet Politburo; the Georges’ (1956) on Woodrow Wilson; Erikson’s (1958) study on Martin Luther; Glad’s (1980) on Jimmy Carter; Post’s (1993 and 2003) Saddam Hussein; and Renshon’s (1996) on Bill Clinton.

Nomothetic approaches, however, aim to derive broad and generalizable patterns from a greater sample of subjects and wrestle with the basic question that “how one or a few psychological characteristics typically manifest in political behavior across a variety of individuals” (Schafer 2010: 7). The research methods used in a nomothetic approach primarily involve content analysis, survey research, laboratory experiments.

¹¹ In order to highlight the literature on leadership studies I decided to borrow and use Mark Schafer’s method for dividing and analyzing the existing studies on individual-level psychology. For further insights, see Schafer (2000; 2010).

Particularly, the method of content analysis has become increasingly prevalent in FPA-style works and eventually bore fruit with the development of ‘at a distance approach’ which enable researchers to employ available tools to detect psychological indicators in subjects without having direct access to the subjects (Hermann 1980; Schafer 2000; 2010).

The latest generation of FPA scholarship is laden with nomothetic approaches that mostly employ at a distance and quantitative methods in their studies. Some examples of such approaches are: Axelrod (1972; 1976) and Bonham et al. (1978) on cognitive maps; George (1969; 1979) Walker et al. (1998; 1999; 2003) on operational code analysis of leadership; Hermann (1980; 1984; 1987; 1997) on leadership trait analysis (LTA); Boulding (1956), Herrmann (1984; 1985), and Cottam (1985; 1992) on image theory.¹²

Secondly, the divide, albeit an inchoate one, between personality/unconscious and cognitive/conscious particularities of subjects constitutes another watershed in the literature on leadership studies within FPA. It is an inchoate division because although several scholars within the field of political science (Schafer 2000; Schafer and Criclow 2010) have thought the divide helpful, many psychologists have opposed this differentiation since they consider ‘personality’ to be the most comprehensive notion for behavioral and mental functioning of human thinking (Greenstein 1969). As Schafer (2010: 9) pointed out:

¹²That list of the some nomothetic studies in FPA literature is not meant to be exhaustive but a short sample of important works that give birth to new research areas in the field.

Cognition is mental functioning that involves relatively conscious thinking about a subject or object: cognitive manifestations are such things as beliefs, prejudices, images, schemata, attitudes, and operational codes... Personality, on the other hand, is a combination of psychological factors generally considered to be more unconscious responses and reactions including such things as motives, ego-defense mechanisms, personality traits and other components of depth psychology.

With regard to personality studies, leadership traits and motives have become the focal points in the research program. Winter (2003) argues that traits are the unconscious constructs that are relatively easily seen in individuals, roughly the things that visible upon first impressions. Likewise, motives are often conceptualized as an unconscious drives to realize wanted end states or to avert undesired end states and used interchangeably with the word 'needs' (Winter 1980; 1987). The studies on leadership traits occupy a major place in the FPA-style scholarship such as 'Big Five' traits of leaders (Digman 1990; Goldberg 1993; Winter 2003), 'motive imagery' as an analytical tool in political psychology (Winter 1980; 1993).

LTA is another significant research program in leadership studies which places itself upon the intersection point of two sides with its eclectic character.¹³ In other words, it draws its theoretical underpinnings from each camps of political psychology. Margaret Hermann's early studies (1974; 1980; 1984; 1987) built the foundation of LTA. Particularly, Hermann's later works (1999; 2003) are seen as a major breakthrough in showing how 'at-a-distance approaches' can allow researchers to determine quantitative indicators of the leader's psychological traits which are

¹³Here, I briefly broach LTA and Op-code analysis, two leading research programs of leadership studies, because they are discussed in detail in next section of the chapter.

statistically linked with foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy behaviors of states (Schafer 2000; 2010).

In conclusion, early studies on leadership analysis used biographies of leaders and used mostly qualitative methods to examine the personality of decision makers (Laswell 1977, as cited in Levy 2003). Accordingly, image theory, operational code analysis, and cognitive mapping are exemplified as the most successful research programs within the cognitive approaches on foreign policy decision-making.¹⁴ Yet, it can be argued that these models paid little attention to a leader's perceptions of the political universe let alone the change in the beliefs system of the individuals from time to time. The promising trend in leadership studies came with the studies that embraced the 'at-a-distance method' that offers content analysis of leaders' speech acts to examine the leader's personality from a distance. There are several scholars who employed 'at-a-distance' content analysis method which made a notable contribution to the actor-specific studies within FPA field (George 1969; Holsti 1977; Hermann 1980 and 2001; Schafer 2000; Walker 1983; 1990).

However, some scholars prioritized the qualitative analysis of leadership style and mostly used the psychobiographies of leaders or just their biographies which inevitably limit the generalizability of scientific findings of a study such as Post's analysis of Saddam Hussein leadership profile through his psychobiography (Post 2003; Hermann 1980; Hermann and Preston 1994). Also, qualitative studies using only biographies of the leaders have commenced to lose their prominence and quantitative

¹⁴The list of major works in the literature for each of the research programs is presented under the discussion of idiographic vs nomothetic divide within the leadership psychology literature.

methods e.g., LTA and operational code analysis have been used more frequently since these approaches employ a quantitative method and have a broader range of applicability in almost every cases of foreign policy as long as there are available speeches made by decision makers.

2.4.1. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)

LTA is another line of at-a-distance inquiry within the leadership studies which concentrate on the decision maker's personal particularities such as motive, personality traits, and decision-making style in explaining foreign policy decisions (Hermann 1970; 1980; 1999; 2003). Through an assessment of leaders' personalities LTA attempts to "typologize leaders with specific reference to foreign policy dispositions" (Hudson 2005: 11). Hermann conceptualizes leadership style in a way that account for how leaders come to terms with other individuals in the political universe including their advisors, constituencies, and political rivals and also how "they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions" (Hermann 2003: 181). LTA research program determines different leadership styles in accordance with the answers given to following three questions:

- (1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment – do they respect or challenge such constraints?
 - (2) How open are leaders to information coming from their environment?
 - (3) What are the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions? Are leaders motivated by a cause, the desire for power and ideology or by an interest in building relationships?
- (Hermann 1999: 5)

Through seeking answers for these questions, Hermann's framework measures seven different psychological traits of leaders. These traits are: need for power, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, distrust, in-group bias, task vs. relationship orientation, and belief in ability to control events (Hermann 1999). Here, Hermann has constructed a coding scheme to calculate each trait of leader's personality and the score for each trait ranges from zero to one. Following this procedure, each leader can be placed into one of eight most general leadership styles: "evangelistic, expansionistic, directive, actively independent, influential, incremental, collegial, and opportunistic" (Hermann 2003: 185). In LTA project, leaders' profiles are determined via a comparison of their traits' scores to the 'norming group' which includes the personality traits of a large group of world leaders. Thus, leaders' ranking in comparison to the 'norming group' prescribes how they are motivated towards the environment, will react to political constraints, and their sensitivity towards the incoming information.

Hermann's typology has been acknowledged as instrumental in explaining many leaders' foreign policy decisions along with foreign policy decision-making and LTA has constructed a typology of world leaders' profiles which includes Bill Clinton, Hafez Assad, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, Micheael Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and also Tayyip Erdoğan and Tansu Çiller (Hermann 1999; 2001; 2003; Dyson 2006; 2009; Dyson and Billordo 2004; Görener and Ucal 2011; Kesgin 2012). More recently, proponents of LTA have studied the decision-making process in the US and Britain throughout the run-up to the invasion of Iraq which demonstrated how

leaders' personalities and decision-making style may have a consequential impact on ultimate policy preferences (Shannon and Keller 2007; Dyson 2009).

Dyson (2009: 329) contends that LTA, as a method of leadership assessment, "has led to multiple, fruitful lines of research and has been applied to many leaders around the world." LTA's content analysis method based on the assumption that what individuals say to their environment and how they say verbal things is illustrative for their basic political psychology. Accordingly, this method maintains that decision makers' choices of specific words reflect their leadership styles. As the founder of LTA commented:

In effect, the trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency counts. At issue is what percentage of the time in responding to interviewers' questions when leaders could exhibit particular words and phrases are they, indeed, used (Hermann 2003: 186).

In essence, Hermann's method of leadership analysis has been acknowledged as modified operational code framework in conjunction with content analysis that enables researchers to compare and contrast world leaders' decision and interpersonal styles, motivations and some political beliefs (Young and Schafer 1998). It can be argued that the promise of LTA framework is its efforts to integrate the psychological characteristics of decision makers into a more comprehensive picture of leadership profiles that are statistically linked to several different foreign policy orientations (Hudson 1995; 2005; 2007) This framework, therefore, enables researchers to make specific educated guesses about leaders' reactions and decisions in multiple levels of

foreign policy decision-making and a variety of foreign policy cases (Levy 2003; Hudson 2005; Kesgin 2012).

However, LTA method has been criticized on the grounds that it fails to explore the leader's personal characteristics in details and takes only a snapshot of a certain moment in foreign policy decision-making process (Rasler et al. 1980). Hermann (1980: 69) addresses these criticisms by arguing that “personality can be contextually dependent and this can be determined by studying diverse material.” What distinguishes Hermann's framework from other leadership assessment tools is that this research program does not treat any of personality traits in isolation on the contrary it concentrates on how these psychological traits are linked with contextual factors (Görener and Ucal 2011).

2.4.2. Operational Code Analysis

In the aftermath of Cold War, there was a growing need for actor-specific analyses since both RAM and other mainstream IR theories failed to anticipate and account for the demise of one Soviet Union and the end of Cold War (Walker and Schafer 2006). In this context, operational code analysis has gained prominence in conjunction with other FPA-style studies. Operational code analysis is a classical approach to foreign policy within the cognitive/psychological paradigm that focuses narrowly on a leaders' political belief system or more broadly on a set of beliefs embedded in the character of a leader that is emanating from the cultural matrix of a society (Walker et al. 1998;

Walker 2000; Walker and Schafer 2006). Accordingly, the beliefs of political leaders are used as causal mechanisms to account for a set of foreign policy decisions (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969, 1979; Walker 1983, 1990; Walker and Schafer 2006).

The core argument of operational code research program is that key individuals and their political beliefs highly matter in explaining foreign policies of states which were not addressed effectively by many IR theories and also decision-making approaches to foreign policy. While operational code approach argues that belief system of leaders may act as causal mechanisms in explaining why they prefer a certain foreign policy decision from a set of other alternative policies, rational choice paradigm ignores the differences in leaders' beliefs and perceptions and also their impacts on foreign policy decisions which were the reasons for its failure to foresee and explicate the end of the Cold War.

2.4.2.1. Evolution of Operational Code Analysis towards the Leadership Assessment Tool

The operational code research program was originally developed by Nathan Leites (1951; 1953) as conceptions of political strategy in Soviet ideology to examine the decision making style of the Soviet Politburo as a political unit. Leites explained Soviet Union's precarious relations and uncommon bargaining behavior with the US leadership by analyzing belief systems of Lenin and Stalin which, he claimed, had a profound impact on the mindsets of other Soviet leaders and thus shaped the *modus*

operandi of Soviet Politburo especially in foreign policymaking domain (Schafer and Young 1998; Schafer 2010).

Next, the results of Leites's study were translated and categorized by George (1969) into answers to a set of questions regarding to philosophical and instrumental beliefs that make sense of the perceptions about the political universe, the role of the leader in that universe, and strategies aiming at the efficacy of various instrumental means. George (1969; 1979) elaborated on Leites' study by developing two main groups of political beliefs which are the answers to the ten questions posed in his ground-breaking study. Firstly, the five philosophical beliefs enable researchers to highlight leader's perceptions of the political universe and the role of 'other' with whom the leader confronts in this universe. The second set contains five instrumental beliefs which show the image of 'self' and provide a mapping of the means for the ends in accordance with the most optimal strategy and tactics for the achievement of foreign policy goals (George 1979; Walker 1990).

These two sets of beliefs are used together to account for decision makers' tendencies and attitudes on foreign policymaking (Schafer and Walker 2006). Put it differently, George (1969: 200) argues that these ten fundamental questions "would capture a leader's fundamental orientation towards the problem of leadership and action." The ten questions of operational code research program are listed below (George 1969: 200):

“The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code are:

P-1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4. How much “control” or “mastery” do self and other have over historical development? What is self and other’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

P-5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code are:

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?”

George (1969: 202) further contributed to operational code approach by re-conceptualizing the first two philosophical beliefs (“What are the sources of conflict?” and “What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?”) as ‘master beliefs’ that functioned as a primary constraint on the belief systems and perceptions of the leaders. Following George’s seminal work, a good number of qualitative operational code analyses were brought in the literature which employed George’s theoretical template

and verified the causal mechanism offered by early scholars of the program (Johnson 1977; Walker 1977; Stuart and Starr 1981; Walker and Falkowski 1984).

Particularly, Walker's (1977) study on Henry Kissinger's leadership style was quite significant because he systematically analyzed the relationship between political beliefs and foreign policy behavior by exploring the interface between Kissinger's political beliefs and his bargaining behavior during the Vietnam impasse. This work is seen as "the most consistent attempt to connect the operational code to the policy behavior of a leader" (Walker and Schafer 1998: 73). Loch Johnson (1977) also contributed to the theoretical arsenal of operational code construct which laid the foundations for the development of quantitative approach within the research program. Johnson's study of Senator Frank Church's belief system found that "the beliefs in operational code were arranged along a continuum making the answers to philosophical and instrumental questions applicable to interval-level scales, thus facilitate comparison among political actors" (Young and Schafer 1998: 70).

Building on George's framework, Holsti (1977) constructed a leadership typology on the basis of leaders' operational codes by answering George's ten questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs. He established six types op-codes (A, B, C, D, E, F) which were later reduced to four groups (A, B, C, DEF) by Walker (1983, 1990). Holsti's typology is based on the nature (temporary or permanent) and the source (individual / society / international system) of conflict in the political world, derived from the '*master beliefs*' which are answers to the P-1, I-1 and P-4 questions. Table 1 represents the revised version of Holsti's (1977) typology in details:

Table 1. Contents of the Revised Holsti’s Operational Code Typology. Adopted from Walker (1983; 1990).¹⁵

<u>TYPE A</u>	<u>TYPE C</u>
<p>Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit</p> <p>Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A “conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.</p>	<p>Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit</p> <p>Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible. Resources other than military capabilities are useful.</p>
<u>TYPE DEF</u>	<u>TYPE B</u>
<p>Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit</p> <p>Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.</p>	<p>Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit</p> <p>Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.</p>

¹⁵In the revised Holsti (1977) typology, instrumental beliefs are highlighted as bold, and philosophical beliefs are not highlighted.

In the late 1990s, the turning point for operational code research program came with the paradigmatic work of Walker and his colleagues which paved the way for an excessive body of literature on leadership analysis to flourish subsequently. Firstly, Walker et al. (1998), that focused on the change in Jimmy Carter's political beliefs in the late 1970s, established an 'at-a-distance' and quantitative operational code research agenda which "allowed for measurements of such things as the subject's view of conflict propensities in the world and the utility of conflict as a means of policy by the subject himself" (Schafer 2010: 11).

To that end, Walker and his colleagues (1998) developed The Verbs in Context System (VICS) that is an automated content analysis system which draws inferences about a decision maker's operational code establishment basically from public sources that includes speeches, interviews or other public statements made by the leaders. The VICS, as a content analysis technique, is referred to a set of methods that are used to retrieve the patterns of beliefs from a leader's public statements and then draw inferences about public behavior which are consistent with these beliefs (Walker et al. 1998; Walker and Schafer 2006). In order to locate leaders' images of the 'self' and 'other' in one of the four quadrants of Holsti's typology, the VICS indices of the master beliefs (P-1, I-1, and P-4 scores) must be mapped on the horizontal (P-4) and vertical (P-1/I-1) axes in Table 1. Thus, a researcher can make educated guesses about strategic preferences over the goals of settle, submit, dominate, and deadlock (Walker and Schafer 2006). Table 2 provides the 'nuts and bolts' for calculating the VICS indices for the master beliefs.

Table 2. The Verbs in Context System Indices for Beliefs in Leader's Operational Code¹⁶

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
P-1	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2	REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of others' tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation** for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of control)	Self (P-4a) or Other (P-4b) Attributions (Self plus Other Attributions)	1.0 high to 0.0 low self-control
P-5	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of control)	1 minus [Political Future x Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low Role
I-1	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of tactics)	1 minus Absolute Value [%X Minus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
	a. Coop v. Conf tactics	Where X = Coop and Y = Conf	
	b. Word v. Deed Tactics	Where X = Word and Y = Deed	
I-5	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of power)	Percentages for Exercise of power Categories a through f	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward	a's frequency divided by total	
	b. Promise	b's frequency divided by total	
	c. Appeal/Support	c's frequency divided by total	

¹⁶All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1 and I-2 varying between -1.0 and +1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications'' (Watson and McGaw, 1980:88).

	d. Oppose/Resist	d's frequency divided by total	
	e. Threaten	e's frequency divided by total	
	f. Punish	f's frequency divided by total	

Therefore, it can be argued that with the development of VICS the cognitive studies within the FPA literature has shifted from the qualitative operational code and LTA studies to more quantitative and more generalizable analyses which advanced the scientific rigor of cognitive research program within the FPA discipline. However, the controversial issue of when political beliefs matter in the decision making process has reflected a greater concern within FPA discipline regarding the actual linkages between leaders' beliefs and their foreign policy behaviors.

In operational code research program, scholars chose to define and operationalize 'beliefs as causal mechanisms' in order to inform game theoretical models by constructing a set of behavioral preference orderings that could reveal the instrumental links between beliefs and behaviors (Walker and Schafer 2004; 2006). These preference orderings are utilized to inform the scores attached to actors' sequential moves between conflict and cooperation strategies. Walker and Schafer (2004; 2006) refined these preference orderings that derived from the master indices of operational codes of the leader by establishing a 'theory of inferences about preferences (TIP).' TIP is a deductive theory of preferences in which the inferences are made by comparing the subject's master belief scores (P-1, I-1, and P-4) with the norming group composed of world political leaders. The details of Walker and Schafer's TIP and also particular predictions about the leaders' preferences are provided in the following table.

Table 3. Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP). First (Basic) Version. Adopted from Walker and Schafer (2006).¹⁷

Self	Other	Values	Preference Order in a 2 X 2 Strategic Game
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	+ & >	Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appease)
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	+ & =	Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Deter/Reward)
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	+ & >	Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Exploit)
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	- & <	Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Bluff)
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	- & =	Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Punish/Compel)
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	- & >	Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully)

This renewed research program has led to a growing body of literature on operational code analyses of leaders and also novel research areas which include studies on change in political beliefs and its impacts on policy behavior, group decision making e.g., the relationship between leaders and advisors, political beliefs of rogue leaders, operational code and democratic peace theory, operational code and game theoretical models (Walker et al. 1999; 2003; Marfleet 2000; Walker and Schafer 2000; 2006; 2007; Schafer and Crichlow 2002; Feng 2005a; 2005b; 2006; Schafer et al. 2006; Malici 2005; 2006; Malici and Buckner 2008; Criclow 2006; Drury 2006; Renshon 2008; 2009; Winter 2011). Nevertheless, in comparison to other sub-fields of operational code research program, the literature on change and continuity in leaders’

¹⁷Note: “+” indicates above and “-” indicates below the norming mean, and “<, >, =” indicate below, above, or within the norming average range, which is P-4a ±1 SD. The mean values for the norming group of world leaders are: P-1 = +.30, SD = .29; I-1 = +.40, SD = .43; P-4 = .22, SD = .13) (Malici and Buckner 2008).

beliefs has been viewed as inchoate and limited in terms of its empirical footing (Renshon 2008).

2.4.2.2. Change in Leaders' Operational Codes

Several studies within the cognitive paradigm have contributed to an understanding of change and/or continuity in leaders' political beliefs over time. Loch Johnson's (1977) *Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior* focused on the change and degree of change in the operational code of leaders stemming from changes in environmental aspects that fuel psychological pressure on foreign policy makers. Following Johnson's 'research agenda-setting' study, several scholars examined whether there is a continuity or change in operational code of a number of political leaders, including J. Foster Dulles (Holsti 1967 and 1970), Henry Kissinger (Walker 1977), Woodrow Wilson (Walker 1995) Jimmy Carter (Walker et al. 1998), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Criclow 2000), Fidel Castro (Malici and Malici 2005), Mao Zedong (Feng 2005a and 2005b), George W. Bush (Renshon 2008), and more recently Neville Chamberlain (Walker et al. 2012).

Cognitive theory, informed by the works on both schemas and cognitive consistency, based on the assumption that central/master beliefs are the most consequential in understanding the process of cognition and perception (Rosati 1997). As Milton Rokeach (1968: 3) summarized three main premises of cognitive theory:

First, not all beliefs are equally important to the individual; beliefs vary along a central-peripheral dimension. Second, the more central a belief, the more it will resist change. Third, the more central the belief changed, the more widespread the repercussions in the rest of the belief system.

These central arguments notwithstanding, cognitive paradigm subsumes different accounts on the issue of change in leaders' belief systems and there are two competing theories within the cognitive approach that deal with the puzzle of continuity and/or change in political beliefs: (1) Cognitive Consistency Theory (CCT) and (2) Schema Theory (ST). Firstly, CCT underlines the overall rigidity of operational code beliefs due to their tight interconnectedness and, if the change occurs, it will be a sudden and all-encompassing belief system change in nature that impinge on all levels of foreign policy decision-making and the ultimate policy preferences (Rosati 1997). Jervis further elucidates the cognitive consistency by arguing that "if a person's attitude structure is to be consistent, then incremental changes among interconnected elements cannot be made. Change will be inhibited, but once occurs, it will come in large batches. Several elements will change almost simultaneously" (1976: 170).

There are numerous studies that support Jervis's theoretical argument. For example, Holsti (1970) claim that Dulles's enemy image of the Soviet Union was fundamentally constant throughout his term in office. Heradstveit (1979) observed consistency in Israeli and Arab images towards each other during the 1970s. After Walker's work (1977), Starr (1984) also analyzed the political beliefs of Kissinger and found consistency pattern between his pre-office, incumbent office, and post-office beliefs. Moreover, Schafer and Crichlow (2000) argue that the operational code beliefs

of Bill Clinton remained stable during his terms of office despite a set of radical events in international politics that occurred in the 1990s. Thus, there is a growing body of literature in leadership studies which premised on cognitive consistency theory (Jervis 1976; George 1969; 1979; Holsti 1967; 1970; Heradstveit 1979; Starr 1984; Ben-Zvi 1978; Walker 1977; 2000; Walker et al. 1998; Walker and Schafer 2006; Crichlow 1998; Schafer and Crichlow 2000 Feng; 2005a; 2005b; 2006).

On the other hand, ST contends that political beliefs are much more isolated and inconsistent with each other which make them less resistant towards external stimuli and more open to incremental changes over time (Rosati 1987). Larson (1985) supported this causal mechanism by providing empirical evidence with her work on the origins of the Cold War in which she found constant change in the belief systems of Truman, Byrnes, and Harriman who incrementally but inevitably came to embrace a hostile image towards the Soviet Union. Similarly, Rosati (1987) also found a constant fluctuation in the beliefs of Jimmy Carter and also his foreign policy advisors Brzezinski and Vance between the years of 1977 and 1979 which marked with major belief changing events for the US leadership such as 1979 events: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian revolution within the same year. To date, however, the literature on leadership studies, as informed by the cognitive theory, has suffered from the paucity of theoretical and empirical works on ST underscoring the increased frequency and consequential impact of changes in political beliefs rather than continuity and stability among them.

By reviewing the literature, it can be argued that although there are many FPA-style studies that examine the impact of leaders' belief systems on foreign policymaking, there are limited number of studies that focus on change in a leaders' operational codes and its impact on foreign policy behaviors of countries in different time frames (Walker et al. 1998; Walker et al. 1999; Renshon 2008). One of the few examples is Renshon's study (2008) which concentrates on the change in leaders' operational code that is rooted from the 'belief changing events' but he prefers to name as 'traumatic shocks' which refer to the threats of impending inter-state wars and major terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks on American homeland.

Renshon (2008: 827) contends that only a few of the studies in the literature were designed in such a way so as to distinguish between multiple potential causes of belief changes and he adds that "although these researches supported the contention that operational codes were more flexible than initially posited, they could not explain why and how these changes materialized and influenced states' foreign policy behaviors." For this reason, it is safe to argue that there are more studies in the literature which underline the stability of the leaders' operational code and most of the political beliefs of decision makers inclined to remain unchanged.

2.4.2.3. Applying the Operational Code Approach to the Study of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Leadership

Despite the fact that Nathan Leites (1951; 1953) originally developed an operational code construct to analyze a non-Western political group (the Soviet Politburo), contemporary operational code research agenda mostly focuses on Western-based leaders and political groups because of its highly technical and automated methods that engender problems when employed to analyze different cultural and political settings (Özdamar *forthcoming*). Therefore, it has been relatively difficult to apply operational code approach to examine national leaders and decision-making groups which operate in non-Western political systems that have an impact on the dynamics of foreign policy behaviors of states in different parts of the world such as MENA region. Admittedly, Western-originated FPA theories have mainly suffered from ‘boundedness’ and ‘inapplicability’ problems when used for non-North American cases and the operational code approach to foreign policy also could not break this ‘universal inapplicability’ mold. As a result, there are very few FPA-style studies that zero in on non-Western cases and political Islam as a distinct political ideology with particular foreign policy behaviors (Crichlow 1998; O’Reilly 2007; Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008; Picucci 2008; Jugaz 2010; Walker 2011; Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and Canbolat 2012; Özdamar *forthcoming*; Jacquier 2012).

In retrospect, Western IR academia commenced to study the impacts of religion of Islam and religious political groups and/or leaders (e.g., the Mullahs) on foreign policy preferences in the aftermath of Iranian revolution of 1979. However, the early

studies were underdeveloped in terms of their methodologies and theoretical approaches that failed to examine the impact of political Islam on foreign policy (Dawisha 1985; Lewis 1991). Afterwards, the sources of foreign policy in the Islamic world have been studied by both Muslim scholars with an Islamic perspective to religion-foreign policy nexus and also by other scholars who applied Western-oriented geopolitical theories to expound MENA's international relations (Abu Suleyman 1987; Lewis 1995; Fuller and Lesser 1995). Although there has been an upsurge of scholarly interest in the Islamic movements and leadership in the wake of cataclysmic events such as 9/11 attacks, US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the literature on Islamic leaders' influences on foreign policies choices of MENA countries can be, at best, defined as inchoate. Thus, this study aims to address the consequential gap in the FPA literature.

The extant but limited literature on operational code analyses of MENA political leaders can be traced back to Criclow's (1998) study measuring the operational codes Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres comparatively that shaped not only Israeli foreign policy but also Arab-Israeli peace process and so the Middle East politics from the 1970s to 1990s. Israeli political leaders were the first subjects of operational code research program regarding the application of operational code approach to MENA leadership cases. In his study, Criclow (1998: 623) observed that "both leaders' conception of their political environment changed over time, from conflictual in the 1970s to neutral in the 1990s but unlike Rabin, operational code of Peres underwent acute fluctuations, in response to the perceived different situational context." O'Reilly (2007) focused on 'rogue state leadership' in the world and used an operational code

analysis to explain the *modus operandi* of rogue states by analyzing belief systems of the leaders of those states. The author studied the political leadership of Muammar Kaddafi as a case study to shed some light on a rogue state of mind. O'Reilly (2007: 24-25) basically found out that “in examining the operational code of Kaddafi a distinct world view emerges dissimilar to that of the average world leader...the time cross-sectional analysis of Kaddafi’s operational code reveals transformations indicating learning did occur from 1993 to 2005.”

Similarly, there were a few more FPA-style studies that focused on rogue leaders and their foreign policy behaviors especially in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks and the global war on terror (GWOT). Malici (2007) and Malici and Buckner (2008) aimed at theorizing on the foreign policy preferences of rogue leaders by establishing a link between the levels of their frustration with the perceptions of hostile American foreign policy towards their regimes and, in return, their escalatory and aggressive foreign policy behavior. By examining the psychology of rogue leaders such as Kim Jong-il of North Korea he suggested a ‘realistic empathy’ towards rogue leaders and the mutual advantages of pursuing engagement strategies rather than containment (Malici 2007). Realistic empathy is defined as “understanding how a situation looks like to another person or group. It does not necessarily imply sympathy, or tolerance, or liking-but simply understanding... trying to look at his situation through his eyes rather than at him as an individual (White 1991: 292). According to peace researchers, this concept stands as one of the greatest contributions of psychology into the field international

relations since it functions as “the great corrective for all forms of war-provoking misperception” (White 1984: 160).

Building on this theoretical template, Malici and Buckner (2008) elaborated on the psychological profiling of rogue leaders and broaden the research agenda on rogue leaders by examining the operational codes of two MENA leaders: Iran’s Ahmadinejad and Syria’s Al-Asad. Their study provides evidence against the conventional wisdom that Iran and Syria are antagonistic states headed by bellicose leaders and Ahmadinejad’s and Al-Asad’s uncompromising policy behaviors stem from their perceptions of “US actions towards their countries as highly hostile that threaten the survival of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus” (Malici and Buckner 2008: 798). Accordingly, analyzing the operational codes of these rogue leaders makes an added value to the literature since conflict resolution studies must include an analysis of the way in which the rogue regimes perceive the American foreign policy towards their countries and regions.

In parallel with the study of rogue leaders, there have been a few studies in the late 2000s that utilize the operational approach in the study of terrorism and terrorist organizations mainly operating in the MENA region (Picucci 2008; Jugaz 2010; Jacquier 2012). These authors have the common starting point that “beliefs are central feature of terrorist decision-making and therefore to understanding their behaviors...Understanding the beliefs of terrorist organization is also therefore a crucial element in informing counter-terrorism efforts” (Picucci 2008: 117). However, contrary to conventional operational code approach these studies aimed to focus on political

actors (both individual leaders and groups) who do not take part in a state's leadership structure but continue to have an impact on MENA's international relations (Jacquier 2012).

The latest subject matters of operational code studies on terrorism have been the well-known terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (Picucci 2008; Walker 2011; Zugaj 2010), Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas (Picucci 2008), and the leaders of Al-Qaeda Osama Bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri (Walker 2011; Jacquier 2012). For example, Walker's (2011) study highlights significant differences between the operational codes of Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri which provides significant insights on Al-Qaeda's terrorist behaviors and strategies to achieve their political aims and the capabilities of the global jihadist movement. However, there is a growing critical perspective on these leadership studies using 'at a great distance' theoretical approaches and methods that, albeit being parsimonious, are destined to be bounded in its scope and substance (Jacquier 2012; Özdamar *forthcoming*).

More recently, there has been a bit resurgent interest in the MENA leadership and regional politics owing to the fact that popular uprisings in the Arab world pave the way for the reconfiguration of political power centers and make Islamist movements and their leaders an indispensable actor in understanding the changing character MENA's international relations. In the aftermath of Cold War, the Islamic movements resurged and manifested itself in both terrorist activities or resistance organizations against to expansionist states (Picucci 2008; Özdamar 2011) and also in democratic systems such as in Tunisia with the Ennahda Movement (Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and

Canbolat 2012; Özdamar *forthcoming*).¹⁸ In his study, Özdamar (2011) analyzes the operational codes of three Islamist leaders of MENA in a comparative manner: Erbakan of Turkey, Khomeini of Iran, and Kaddafi of Libya. The author then makes an assertion that although these MENA leaders have very distinct personal characteristics and political experiences, their approaches to foreign affairs show a notable uniformity. Here, Özdamar (2011: 13) underlines that while “all three leaders showed very negative and high scores of P1 and very high scores of P4b (with low P4a scores)” that can be explained by their nations’ early experiences of Western colonialism and imperialism, these leaders’ foreign policy strategies “showed a mixed picture. The most general pattern is the Islamists see themselves as cooperative if opportunities arise.”¹⁹

Next, another study attempts to examine the operational code of political Islamist leaders operating in MENA to find a general pattern of foreign policy strategies of these leaders regarding contexts of action and tactics to accomplish political goals (Özdamar and Canbolat 2012). In this research, the authors attempt to make a comparative operational code analysis of two generations of Islamist leaders to question whether there are general patterns of belief systems about foreign policy among Islamist leaders of MENA.²⁰ Accordingly, it is argued that the neo-Islamists have also similar operational code beliefs along with old generation of Islamist leaders and the empirical

¹⁸Two of these three studies by Özdamar (2011) and Özdamar and Canbolat (2012) were presented at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association in 2011 and 2012. These researches are still in progress and not published. Özdamar (expected to be published in 2014) is a forthcoming book chapter project which summarizes main findings of previous two studies in a comparative manner.

¹⁹Özdamar’s (2011) empirical findings from the operational code analysis of Political Islamists in MENA mostly overlap with Malici’s (2007) and Malici’s and Buckner’s (2008) findings and concluding remarks about the rogue state leaders in MENA that increase the validity and reliability of both findings.

²⁰The first generation of Islamist leaders can be defined as ‘old generation’ including Erbakan of Turkey, Khomeini of Iran and Kaddafi of Libya (Özdamar 2011). The second generation called neo-Islamists and the leaders are Erdoğan of Turkey, Ahmadinejad of Iran and Meshal of Palestine.

evidence supports the early assumption that “political Islam as a distinct political ideology seems to have a rather unified worldview” (Özdamar and Canbolat 2012: 19). However, the authors also expected to find stark differences between the new and old Islamist leaders but there is no preliminary evidence that confirm this assumption up to this point. The only significant difference among the new generation of Islamists is found in Erdoğan’s P4a (self-control over events) score which is markedly higher than all of the coded Islamist leaders of MENA.

2.5. Conclusion

In brief, despite being fruitful and cutting edge sub-field of IR, the literature on North American FPA-style scholarship is associated with ‘boundedness’ and ‘inapplicability’ problems. Yet, as the final section of the chapter showcases, the operational code analysis stands out very useful in the study of Middle Eastern leadership and the Islamist philosophy on international politics. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the operational code approach to foreign policy can be applied to the MENA politics since it proved instrumental in analyzing the political belief systems of national leaders operating in the Non-Western context including MENA leaders cited in the preceding section.

CHAPTER 3:

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND NEW MENA LEADERS

3.1. Introduction

In the post-Arab uprisings era, Islamist movements have broadly gained strength and reasserted themselves across the MENA region. Among others, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) holds the distinction of being the oldest, largest and most powerful Islamist group operating in the Muslim world (Leiken and Brooke 2007). The Egyptian MB's political wing Freedom and Justice Party has garnered 47 percent in the first parliamentary elections and his candidate Mohamed Morsi won the presidential elections in the post-Mubarak era while the MB offshoot in Tunisia has obtained about 40 percent of the assembly seats in 2011. Furthermore, Hamas, a branch of the MB in Palestine, has been governing the Gaza Strip since June 2007.

To put the MB's popularity into perspective, in 2012 RAND analysts anticipate the North African MB membership to be hover over 600,000²¹ whereas MB leadership places the number at 2,000,000 plus followers in Egypt alone. Similarly, Barry Rubin, senior researcher at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), argues that "today, the MB is the most important international political organization in the Arab-speaking world even as the organization lacked formal legal status in Egypt for almost sixty years."²² Yet, Munson (2001) points out that despite its magnitude and significance in the region, scholars still know very little about the origins, the political evolution of the MB and the characteristics of its leadership. This research aims to address this gap within the political science field with a focus on the foreign policy belief systems of the MB-affiliated leaders operating in MENA. Following this aim, first the historical background of the MB and its fickle relations with the relevant states of MENA is presented. In the next section, the psychobiographies of three political Islamist leaders are discussed to expound upon their personal backgrounds and political inclinations in their adult life.

²¹For further information on the MB membership in the Egypt, North Africa and MENA, see the 2012 RAND report "The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement" here: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1247.pdf (Last Access: 18.05.2013).

²²Barry Rubin "Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood" June 2012, Footnotes published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. To reach the report, see: <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1708.201206.rubin.muslim-brotherhood.pdf> (Last Access: 18.07.2013).

3.2. The History of Muslim Brotherhood in MENA

The Egyptian MB²³ was founded by Hasan al-Banna in March 1928 as an organization that acted out of the formal political system and aimed at the far-reaching Islamic reformation of the secular society and also the Egyptian state's modus operandi. Al-Banna viewed the Western influence within Middle East as a 'malaise' that would debilitate and eventually destroy the Eastern societies by alienating them from Islamic creed and ideals (Hourani 2002). Accordingly, the MB emerged as a resistance movement to foreign forces which spearheaded the local resistance against Western colonialism and imperialism along with the more secular and liberal segments of society. Another source of inspiration for the founding fathers of MB was the abolition of caliphate by the new Turkish republic which had lasted almost since the religion of Islam emerged many centuries ago. According to early MB leadership, therefore, there was an immediacy of restoring and re-asserting Islam into the heart of Muslim societies not only socially but also politically (Rubin 2011).

The MB's most important venture to accomplish Islamic overhaul of the society was the *Dawa*²⁴ movement which literally means the 'religious outreach' and/or 'proselytism' through social services to address the needs of low-income families, as well as religious indoctrination within the society (Wickham 2011). Through the pursuit

²³The original name of the organization was the 'Society of Muslim Brothers' when it was established in 1928 and then became known by a more name within Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. For further information on the early period of the Society of Muslim Brothers, see Edgar (1987).

²⁴The *Dawa* is a contested term and it is still debated within the Islamic circles. The term is also translated into English as "to appeal to become a Muslim." On this debate, see also Palestinian Media Watch: http://palwatch.org/STORAGE/special%20reports/Jihad_is_the_way_by_Mustafa_Mashhur.pdf (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

of *Dawa*, the organization's primary objective was not to seek power for itself immediately but rather to engineer an ideal Muslim community that would itself desire a political system and public sphere based exclusively on the 'Shari'a'.²⁵ In this context, The MB flourished very rapidly in the Egyptian society and gained tens of thousands of followers and opened a vast number of branch offices in the country during the late 1930s (Cleveland 2004). The movement's popularity mostly stemmed from its comprehensive social programs and vibrant organizational structure. The MB gained further popularity in Egypt following the Great Depression of 1929 since the organization successfully mitigated the side-effects of economic slump by its social programs (Aknur 2013). Considering these reasons, Munson (2001) argues that the MB had five offshoot offices in 1930 which increased to fifteen by 1932 and the number of offices skyrocketed to three hundred by 1938 due to the meteoric upsurge in organization's membership. Although exact membership numbers are not verified with the historical data, it is claimed that three hundred branch offices represented approximately between 50,000 and 150,000 followers of the MB in the late 1930s (Mitchell 1969).

In a similar vein, Ehrenfeld (2011) contends that the Brotherhood is a quasi-conglomerate organization that has various offshoots worldwide while most of them are operating in the MENA region. Yet, this Islamist movement differs from a conventional international organization because it is more akin to a loose and heterogeneous religious

²⁵Shari'a (also spelled as Sharia) is the fundamental religious concept in Islam that refers to the moral code and law of Islam. However, in Arabic it literally means 'the path leading to watering place.' For the discussion, see also: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/538793/Shariah> (Last Access: 20.12.2013).

coalition of Islamists that can have disparate political objectives and strategies to accomplish them (Ayoob 2008). For example, during the 1980s the Egyptian MB encountered with a fervent and far-reaching opposition from almost all of its branches in the MENA when it embarked on to establish a centralized platform between the MB's offshoots under Egyptian leadership.

Even though the MB was branded as an apolitical religious organization social reform-oriented society in its early years, the movement started to bear a political image in the late 1930s following a general strike transpired in Palestine during the same years. The MB leadership decided to play a direct role in Egyptian politics by announcing its own candidates for the parliamentary elections in 1941 for the first time in its history (Munson 2001). Then, the movement launched a massive electoral campaign and called for a political reform and an outright withdrawal of British troops from the country. This radical political move by the MB led to the protracted Egyptian government's crackdown and repression on the organization. In 1941, many MB leaders including the founder Hasan al-Banna were incarcerated and the MB's public rallies and demonstrations were outlawed.²⁶

Afterwards, the Egyptian government disbanded the organization in 1948 due to its involvement in violent protests and anti-government activities that threatened the regime's survival. This move by the regime against the Islamic movement sparked a spiral of violence between two sides that resulted in the assassination of Mahmud

²⁶Council on Foreign Relations: "Three Myths about the Muslim Brotherhood," Steven A. Cook. The op-ed can be reached at: <http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2012/06/27/three-myths-about-the-muslim-brotherhood/> (Last Access: 20.04.2014).

Fahmi an-Nukrashi, the Prime Minister of Egypt. In the same year, the top MB leader al-Banna was murdered by agents, who were believed to be hired by the government, in return for the death of al-Nukrashi. Consequently, the Brotherhood was cowed into submission by the government's crackdown and went down underground till Suez Crisis of 1956 during which it took part in guerilla warfare against the joined forces of Britain, France, and Israel (Nedoroscik 2002).

However, the turning point for the movement and its relationship with the government came with the revolution in Egypt in 1952.²⁷ Here, the MB offered a covert support to Free Officer Movement led by Gamal Abdul Nasser and backed up the establishment of a new government under his leadership. However, although the relationship between the MB and Nasser's government could be construed as amicable during the early stages of Egyptian revolution, the organization soon discerned that Nasserist party was going to form a secular order undergirded by a nationalist doctrine (Fondren 2009). This rupture in the alliance antagonized both parties in a way that they were pitted against each other, time and again, in the political arena.

After Nasser consolidated his grip on power during the early 1954, he initiated a massive crackdown on Islamist movements in Egypt and imprisoned many MB leaders without any charges lasting until his death in 1970. Paradoxically, this heavy clampdown on MB leadership by the Egyptian state led to the internationalization of the movement with the formation of offshoots in many MENA countries including Syria, Jordan and Palestine. While the MB's Egyptian top brass was forced to go into exile or

²⁷Steven A. Cook, "Three Myths about the Muslim Brotherhood"

underground in the late 1950s, with the help of Saudi kingdom they acquired financial aid and sanctuaries which enable the MB to establish a global structure of Islamist constituency (Wickham 2013). Apart from opening several branch offices in the MENA region, an Islamist network was formed in Europe which comprises religious cells in Germany, France and Switzerland and this emergent international structure help the MB to survive both in regional and international politics.²⁸ These cells provided the MB with a solid base around the globe that would extend its political lifeline as a transnational religious movement. Overall, these developments enable the MB movement to become an important actor within the Muslim communities of MENA and then in the world.

On the other hand, the MB leadership decided to step up its militancy and violent activities in line with the teachings of the movement's new ideologue Sayyid Qutb who has become very influential during the 1950s and 1960s with his seminal work called *Milestones* (1964). In his study, Qutb (1964; as cited in Cleveland 2004) elaborated on al-Banna's theoretical treatise on political Islam and radically altered the organization's moderate character by preaching the believers for a 'jihad' which is defined as the revolutionary mission for destroying all 'jahilliyya' polities in the region and establishing an Muslim states instead.²⁹ Regarding to foreign affairs, the MB's old philosophy was imbued with an extreme anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism as the

²⁸Barry Rubin, "Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood"

²⁹Sayyid Qutb has a dichotomous approach regarding the nature of society which are Jahilliyya and Muslim societies. Whereas Islamic principles can be totally applied to Muslim societies thanks to Shari'a, jahilliyya societies are deprived of such Islamic order (Cleveland 2004). Qutb called for a jihad which originally refers to 'internal struggle' of individual humans rather than a 'holy war against the Western world' According to Qutb the jihad aims to remove the jahilliyya societies in the Middle East and to build an ideal Muslim community instead (Qutb 1964).

early MB leaders defended violence against the US and terrorist acts against Israeli state whose right to exist was not acknowledged by the movement. The MB's approach to international relations is also influenced by a fierce criticism of Western life-style and 'modernism' and a virulent rhetoric on Western foreign policy towards Muslim world. Consequently, the early Islamists in the movement perceived Western countries and particularly the state of Israel as imperial oppressors and enemies of Islam (Mitchell 1969).

In 1970, Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency in Egypt and embarked on the process of 'de-Nasserization' which changed the relationship between the Egyptian government and MB to a great extent. Sadat's policies emboldened the Islamist movements to resurface in Egyptian politics and help government to counterbalance and also contain secular voices which were associated with the Marxist and Nasserist parties (Aknur 2013). However, the government's decision to remove the Nasserist legacy which manifested itself in the lowering Egypt's close relationship with the Soviet Union and signing a peace agreement with Israel in 1978 after the Camp David summit did not receive an approval from the large segments of Egyptian society. As a result, the tacit alliance between the regime and organization disappeared rapidly which led to a new wave of confrontations.

Meanwhile, violent Islamist groups reasserted themselves in the political arena due to the heightened tension in Egypt and militant Islamist's impatience with the incremental approach of the MB to come into power. In response to the militant resurgence, Egyptian government started to use the Shari'a partially as the source of

legislation and jurisprudence. Although Sadat strove to portray himself as being a 'Believer President' and 'Muslim Ruler', in October 1981 he was assassinated by the Islamist militants belonging to radical organization called al-Jihad (Albrect and Wegner 2006).

Hosni Mubarak became a president in 1981 following the assassination of Sadat who pursued different strategies towards the moderate Islamist movements primarily the MB and extreme groups like the Jama'a Islamiyya. Mubarak regime allowed moderate MB members to participate in the parliamentary elections without forming their own party while subjecting them to a strict state surveillance. However, the president also ordered the imprisonment of leading MB leaders along with the arrest of radical factions in both 1995 and 2000 before the general elections. In the early 1990s, the surge in violent activities of militant groups led to abandonment of appeasement policies and the government once again started an oppressive campaign to debilitate radical factions' offensive capabilities. Disconnected from the political arena again, the MB demanded the government to make political openings for moderate Islamist groups and to minimize suppressive measures against the movement during the late 2000s.

That highly bleak historical record notwithstanding, the wave of uprisings in the MENA provided the MB with a great opportunity to play a paramount role in the future of many Arab and Muslim countries and to shape the political landscape of the MENA region (Ehrenfeld 2011). Prior to the downfall of Mubarak regime, the MB held a low profile in the massive demonstrations took place in Tahrir Square and only after the popular uprising gained full momentum, its top leaders Yusuf al-Qaradawi and

Mohammed Badie called for the full participation of their followers. According to Rubin (2012), the MB leadership made a strategic move since having a high profile in the demonstrations would lead to a regime crackdown on the movement first and foremost if the popular uprising faltered and failed to put an end to Mubarak's grip on power. After Mubarak government was ousted by the Egyptian military, the MB increased its participation and emerged as one of the indispensable actors in the post-Mubarak Egypt.

In February 2011, the movement's top ideologist al-Qaradawi summoned more than one million MB supporters to launch a huge demonstration in Tahrir Square which overshadowed the joint campaigns of Egypt's secular and liberal in the same year and provided the MB with a leading role in the revolution (Wickham 2013). After winning most of the assembly seats in the parliamentary elections and then assuming the top executive office in the presidential elections, the MB took the center stage in Egyptian politics and it appeared to play a pioneering role in the post-Arab uprisings MENA. Moreover, Rubin (2012) argues that the Egyptian MB's power grab in 2012 had reasserted itself as the leader of a Sunni Islamist bloc in the Muslim world which comprises Meshaal's Hamas, Ghannouchi-led Ennahda party in Tunisia, the several local branches in MENA including Syria, Jordan, and relatively smaller offshoots in Libya and Lebanon.

In Egypt, the candidate of the MB for presidential elections, Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically elected leader of Egypt despite the profound suspicion of the Egyptian military establishment manifested itself under the office of Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Nevertheless, the MB's grip on power was short-

lived since its presidential nominee Morsi's ill-advised policies and incompetent leadership especially in the management of Egyptian economy and the surge of widespread public exasperation directed to the MB which prompted the military to put an end to the MB's political rule in June 2013 (Shama 2014). The military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, also suspended the last Egyptian constitution made under the leadership of Mohamed Morsi.³⁰

Currently, the military-dominated Egyptian government declared the MB a terrorist organization by implicating its members to a car bombing targeting at the headquarters of the security services in the Nile region in December 2013.³¹ The government lastly passed a law that allows officials to confiscate the MB's financial assets and disband any public demonstrations of the group which, as Zachary Laub argues, impeded the likelihood of political dialogue and reconciliation between the MB and newly formed Egyptian government.³² Building on this historical background, a brief glimpse into personal profiles and political backgrounds of today's most prominent MB-affiliated Islamists leaders will help providing a snapshot of the new MENA leadership in the wake of 2011 Arab uprisings.

³⁰The BBC News Portal, "Egypt Crisis: Army Ousts President Mohamed Morsi," can be reached at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23173794> (Last Access: 25.05.2014).

³¹The Al Jazeera News Portal, "Egypt Declares Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Group," for further information see: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/egypt-declares-brotherhood-terrorist-group-201312251544398545.html> (Last Access: 27.05.2014).

³²For the most current developments in Egypt after the downfall of Morsi regime, see Zachary Laub's report published by Council on Foreign Relations in January 2014 from here: <http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991> (Last Access: 20.02.2014).

3.3. Introducing Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated MENA Leaders: Morsi of Egypt, Meshaal of Gaza Strip, and Ghannouchi of Tunisia

In this section, the psychological biographies of three MB-Islamist leaders are discussed in depth to shed some light on the leaders' political and socio-economic characteristics in their youth that have an imprinting effect on the current political profiles of three MENA leaders analyzed in this study.

3.3.1. Mohamed Morsi

Mohamed Morsi was born in August 1951 in Egypt's Sharqiya province on the Nile delta.³³ He earned a Bachelor degree in Engineering from Cairo University in 1975, then a Master of Engineering in Metallurgy from the same university in 1978. He then received a PhD degree in Engineering from the University of Southern California in 1982. Mr. Morsi worked as a teaching assistant and a lecturer at the Cairo University, Faculty of Engineering and also at the University of Southern California in the US. He then became a faculty member and assistant professor at the University of North Ridge in California between 1982 and 1985. His children were born in the US in the early 1980s and they still hold US citizenship. Afterwards, he headed back to his home country and worked as a Professor and Head of Materials Engineering, Faculty of Engineering at Zagazig University from the late 1980s to 2010, during which he was

³³ His full name is Mohamed Mohamed Morsi Issa Hayat. His birth place Sharqiya province is situated in Nil Delta town Al Adwa on the north of the capital Cairo.

also elected as a member of the Faculty Staff Club at the same university.³⁴ Apart from his academic occupations, moreover, he was also elected as a member of the International Conference of Political Parties and Organizations, and founding member of the Egyptian Committee for Resisting the Zionist Project that has many offshoots across the Middle East region.

However, Mohamed Morsi's meteoric rise in Egyptian politics commenced with his five-year term in the People's Assembly of 2000- 2005 as leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc.³⁵ During his tenure in parliament, Dr. Morsi played a crucial role and he was praised as one of the most active members of People's Assembly and featuring in the most renowned questioning sessions in the assembly such as the notorious train crash accident of 2002 in which he placed the blame on the government and called for the entire council of ministers to step down immediately.³⁶ Morsi was arrested and held under detention numerous times by government forces because of his fervent opposition to oppressive policies and measures of Mubarak's regime. For instance, following the fraudulent elections in 2005 Morsi orchestrated popular protests in favor of judges asking for independence and rejecting referral of some judges to the Competence Commission to blacklist them for their statements against the obviously rigged elections. In May 2006, consequently, Morsi was arrested

³⁴The IkhwanWeb News Portal: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29964> (Last Access: 18.05.2013).

³⁵The Egyptian Parliament is also known as People's Assembly which is in charge of legislative authority and monitoring the governmental activities. For further information on People's Assembly, see also Egyptian State Information Service: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=977> (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

³⁶Atlantic Council Website: <http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/will-assiut-train-crash-galvanize-morsis-government-action> (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

along with 500 members of the MB after their demonstrations in front of the North Cairo Court Complex and imprisoned for seven months behind bars.

Owing to his effective opposition in parliament, he was selected as the best parliamentarian during the years 2000-2005 by international monitoring agencies. Additionally, after his political success in the assembly, Morsi was chosen as a member of the MB's Guidance Bureau, the highest authority within the organization, by the group's Shura Council. Morsi continued his political ascent after his release in 2006 and was elected as the head of the Freedom and Justice party which is the political spin-off of MB organization. He was taken into custody again along with several MB leaders of Egypt on January 28, 2011 also known as the 'Friday of Anger' that epitomized the revolution of January 25. The Mubarak regime aimed to prevent them from participating in the revolutionary protests across Egypt but failed in its last endeavors to contain Morsi's and his party's influences on the escalating popular unrest in the country.

After the demise of Mubarak's rule, Mohamed Morsi received 24% of total vote in the first round of the presidential election in May 2012. Morsi competed with Ahmed Shafiq, a former chief of air forces and the last prime minister of Mubarak's regime, and managed to get 52% of the vote in the run-off election.³⁷ Morsi was sworn as the fifth president of Egypt in June 2012 and became the first Islamist leader to hold the office. Nevertheless, Dr. Morsi was not the first choice of MB for presidential elections and nominated in the final days right after it became certain that MB's only candidate

³⁷BBC News Portal: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18371427> (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

Khairat al-Shater, a prominent magnate and deputy leader of the organization, would be barred from running for presidency by the SCAF due to technical reasons.³⁸In that respect, it is also argued that Morsi's rapid rise to power within the MB and then across Egypt stems from his personal connection and allegiance to al-Shater who is acknowledged as the sole mastermind behind the MB's political strategies.³⁹

After assuming presidency, Morsi pushed the military, presiding over the SCAF and which acted as an interim government, out of the political arena. This move was welcomed by the many segments of Egyptian society including liberals and other Islamist groups who had showed their stark opposition to the military rule in the post-Mubarak Egypt. However, Morsi's disastrous performance during his presidency especially his mismanagement of the Egyptian economy and authoritarian policies led to a widespread public resentment at him which reached its peak in June 2013 (Shama 2014). Consequently, on July 3, 2013, Morsi government was officially ousted by the Egyptian army following the defense minister al-Sisi's ultimatum calling for Morsi's resignation from the presidency (al-Awadi 2013). The downfall of Morsi regime sparked a fierce turmoil in Egypt and armed skirmishes emerged between MB supporters and the Egyptian armed forces. In November 2013, the ousted president Morsi was put on trial for allegedly ordering the killing of many demonstrators in

³⁸For further information about the transitional period and the role of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, see also Azzam (2012): http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/bp0512_azzam.pdf (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

³⁹Guardian News Portal: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/24/profile-mohamed-morsi> (Last Access: 20.06.2013).

December 2012. Most currently, Morsi's trial was adjourned until early 2014 due to "technical" reasons.⁴⁰

3.3.2. Khaled Meshaal

Khaled Meshaal was born in 1956 in the village of Silwad, near the West Bank city of Ramallah, Palestine.⁴¹ Following the 1967 war his parents, along with many Palestinian families, moved to Kuwait where his father worked as a preacher in a local mosque. In the 1970s, the Gulf Emirate of Kuwait served as the hotbed of pro-Palestinian activism and Arab nationalism.⁴² In this context, Mr. Meshaal strictly committed himself to the Palestinian cause and Arab nationalism in his early ages and joined the local chapter of the MB in Kuwait in 1971. Afterwards, while Meshaal was studying physics at Kuwait University, he continued to take an interest in political Islam that manifested itself in his extracurricular activities.

For instance, Meshaal established a radical student group known as the 'List of the Islamic Right' in which Meshaal spearheaded a robust campaign against Yasser Arafat-led 'Palestine Liberation Organization' on the university campus.⁴³ He received a Bachelor degree in Physics from the same university and then started to teach in Kuwaiti schools. He got married in 1981 and has seven children, three girls and four

⁴⁰BBC News Portal: "What's become of Egypt's Morsi?" The piece can be reached from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806> (Last Access: 25.03.2014).

⁴¹ For a more succinct version of Meshaal's biography, see also Özdamar and Canbolat (2012).

⁴² Al Jazeera News Portal: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/04/20086150597219693.html> (Last Access: 22.05.2013).

⁴³BBC News Portal: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3563635.stm (Last Access: 22.05.2013)

boys from that marriage.⁴⁴ Meshaal-led student group was still operating in Kuwait while the, Palestinian resistance movement, Hamas was founded in 1987 after the first Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation known as the 'first intifada'. He also participated in the foundation of Hamas and became a member of the group in the same year. However, Meshaal decided to move to Jordan right after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and he immediately became the leader of the Hamas branch in that country. Later, he became chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau in 1996 that criticized Yasser Arafat for his weakness and indecision vis a vis Israel's aggression and oppression of Palestinian community.

In 1997, Meshaal became the target of an assassination attempt authorized by the Netanyahu administration of Israel who described that Meshaal was the leading figure in Hamas and blamed him for the murder of innocent Israeli civilians in Palestinian suicide bombings but Mossad's assassination plot failed in Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan, outraged by the Israeli plot in the Jordanian homeland, saved Meshaal's life by conditioning the release of Mossad agents -arrested by Jordanian police following the assassination attempt- to the Israeli government's handover of the antidote.

Nevertheless, King Abdullah decided to disband all the offices of Hamas located in Jordan and Meshaal was shortly imprisoned and then deported in 1999.⁴⁵ After he temporarily resided in Qatar until 2001, Meshaal moved to Damascus, Syria where he

⁴⁴ Jewish Virtual Library Portal, A Project of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Mashal.html>

⁴⁵ Council on Foreign Relations Website: <http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-khaled-meshal-aka-khalid-meshaalkhaleed-mashal/p11111> (Last Access: 22.05.2012)

had resided until the outbreak of Syrian uprising in 2011. In the late 2011, Meshaal-led Hamas declared its allegiance to the Egyptian MB and formally joined to the movement in the aftermath of Egypt's revolution of 2011. In February 2012, as the popular unrest in Syria turned into full-blown civil war Meshaal left Damascus and reverted back to Qatar and he still lives there. In the same month, Meshaal and Hamas government in Gaza declared their support for the Syrian opposition against al-Asad government.⁴⁶

Mr. Meshaal is the third chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau after the assassinations of Hamas' founding leader Sheikh Yassin and then his successor al-Rantissi and he still occupies the top executive office in Gaza (Özdamar 2011). Khaled Meshaal frequently publicized his ultimate political objectives concerning the Palestinian problem as follows: (1) to put an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories by crafting a 'just peace' between the embattling parties and (2) to unify formerly invaded territories under the authority of one Palestinian state in accordance with the 1967 borders.⁴⁷

3.3.3. Rachid Ghannouchi

In this study, although he has not assumed a public office and executive role yet, Rachid Ghannouchi is chosen as Tunisia's top political Islamist leader for three reasons. First,

⁴⁶BBC News Portal: "Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar. See the link: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17192278> (Last Access: 20.02.2013).

⁴⁷Al-Monitor News Portal: An Interview with Hamas Leader Meshaal: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/khaled-meshaal-interview-hamas-leader-gaza.html> (Last Access: 22.05.2013)

he is both the top political leader of Ennahda movement and its chief theoretician who masterminded the organization for decades. Second, several experts on political Islam and Middle East who are well versed in Tunisia's political system and parties identify Ghannouchi as the leader controlling Tunisia's Renaissance Party from behind the scenes and take the reins of the current government.⁴⁸ Third, Ghannouchi is the most prominent public figure that represents Tunisia's Islamist movement abroad and visited several countries as Tunisia's political leader where he made a dozens of public speeches. In that sense, the availability of leaders' public speeches is crucially important for the operational code research program. There is a paucity of public speeches made by Tunisia's Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh, who came into power in 2013, and the President Moncef Marzouki who is not affiliated to Ennahdha movement. Conversely, he is recognized as a secular and left-leaning liberal politician in Tunisia.⁴⁹

Tunisian politician and Islamic thinker Rachid Ghannouchi was born on June 22, 1944 in a small village in the Gabes province that located in southeastern Tunisia, which was held under French rule in those days.⁵⁰ Although he was born to a peasant family, his father was a memorizer of the Holy Qur'an and one of the few literate persons in the neighborhood. Ghannouchi was raised in a very religious household as the youngest one of the ten siblings and he studied in the conventional Az-Zaytouna schools where he was exposed to the impacts of Westernization and its secular nature

⁴⁸See also Esposito (2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/guest-voices/post/tunisia-after-its-first-free-elections/2011/10/24/gIOAsuYgCM_blog.html (Last Access: 22. 05 2013).

⁴⁹For further information about President Marzouki, see: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107555>

⁵⁰His surname is also known and spelled as "al-Ghannushi" or "Ghannoushi" in the international media and academic circles depending on the usage of French or English sources on the subject.

for the first time. Tamimi (2001) argues that this experience led to the incremental erosion of his Islamic piety and he even ceased praying and memorizing the all parts of the Holy Qur'an in his childhood. After this watershed in his life, Ghannouchi became more interested in the socialist and secular ideas echoed by Abdel Nassir of Egypt but his commitment to these ideals did not last very long. When Ghannouchi travelled to Egypt to receive a Western university education, he immediately learned that Westernization in the Middle East was not what he had envisaged in his early ages and he left Egypt with a great disappointment.

He then moved to Syria where he earned a bachelor degree in philosophy from the University of Damascus in 1968.⁵¹ Ghannouchi reverted back to Islam after his inconclusive attempts to join the nationalist movements during his stay in Syria. In his biography penned by Azzam Tamimi (2001: 18), Ghannouchi himself tells that the day of June 12, 1966 was the critical juncture in his life because “that very night I shed to things off me: secular nationalism and traditional Islam and I embraced what I believed was the original Islam, Islam as revealed and not as shaped or distorted by history and tradition.”

In the aftermath of his graduation, Ghannouchi lived in France for one year during which he participated and became active in the Islamic *Dawa* movement known as ‘Tablighi Jamaat.’⁵² In France, while Ghannouchi embarked on a post-graduate

⁵¹Oxford Islamic Studies Online “Ghannushi, Rashid al-“: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0269> (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

⁵²More specifically, Tablighi Jamaat is a religious movement first emerged in India in 1926 and theorized by Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi and aimed to address the decaying values and neglect of fundamental principles of Islam that are regarded as menaces to all Muslim world. The founding members prescribed a spiritual reformation by operating at the grass-root level to bring all disenchanting

education (Master's Degree), he also worked as seasonal laborer there. Ghannouchi headed back to Tunisia after spending one year in France which he describes this period as the hardest and most demanding year of his life. He commenced his academic career as a secondary-school philosophy teacher while he became more involved in *Dawa* Movement's activities in Tunisia. Subsequently, Ghannouchi founded a powerful Islamic organization called the 'Islamic Tendency Movement (ITM)'⁵³ in 1981 with the aim of challenging the secular policies pursued by the Egyptian government under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba.

Ghannouchi-led ITM became a widespread and very influential Islamic organization at short notice that threatened the Bourguiba's grip on power. Consequently, Tunisian government banned the organization and imprisoned roughly 500 members of the ITM including its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi. In 1981, he was charged with running an authorized and outlawed organization and sentenced to eleven year's confinement in return. He was released from imprisonment in 1984 but Ghannouchi did not abandon his confrontational stance against the oppressive policies of Bourguiba regime. Those frictions with the government engendered a massive crackdown on Islamic movement in Tunisia and led to the jailing and ostracism of numerous ITM leaders. Ghannouchi firstly received a life term of forced labor in 1987 but this verdict was revoked a year later.

individuals closer to Islam. The Arabic term '*Dawa*' can be translated into English as 'proselytization.' For further information on this Islamic movement, see Ayoob (2008).

⁵³The Ghannouchi-led movement is originally named as the 'Harakat Al-Ittijah Al-Islami' and it became very influential in the 1980s in Tunisia. In 1989, Ghannouchi and his associates changed its name to Harakat an-Nahdaa.k.the Ennahda Movement which is usually translated into English as the 'Renaissance Party' in Tunisia.

However, Ghannouchi decided to go into a voluntarily exile in London and he lived in Europe from the early 1990s to 2011. After the deposal of Tunisian dictator Ben Ali in January 2011, Ghannouchi headed back to Tunisia on 30 January 2011 and galvanized the erstwhile dormant Ennahda movement into action for the country's recent elections. Currently, Ghannouchi is acknowledged as the top ideologue and political leader of Tunisia's Renaissance Party, the political wing of Ennahda movement, which is originally inspired by the Egyptian MB and branded as its local offshoot in Tunisia.⁵⁴

In October 2011, Ghannouchi-led Renaissance party outvoted its more secular and liberal competitors and received 37 percent of the popular vote and won the majority status in the parliament after getting 40 percent of the assembly seats.⁵⁵ However, the Renaissance party stepped down in January 2014 and handed power to a caretaker government after facing a popular unrest and rising terrorist attacks aimed at the Ennahda government.⁵⁶ The root causes for public indignation at the Ennahda leadership were (1) the government's bad performance in managing Tunisia's already faltering economy and (2) the assassinations of two prominent political figures affiliated to the secularist camp in Tunisia.⁵⁷

In the literature, however, it is also argued that Ennahda party's Islamism and political strategies are more moderate and conciliatory than the original MB movement

⁵⁴BBC News Portal: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859> (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

⁵⁵Al Jazeera News Portal: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011102721287933474.html> (Last Access: 01.04.2014).

⁵⁶Al Jazeera News Portal: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/tunisia-pm-resigns-as-part-transition-plan-201419145034687910.html> (Last Access: 01.04.2014).

⁵⁷The New York Times News Portal: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-hands-power-to-caretaker-government.html?_r=0 (Last Access: 20.03.2014).

and leaders of Ennahda party take Turkey as a source of inspiration, or model, and likened their organization to AK Party of Turkey.⁵⁸ Here, Ghannouchi inspired from the success of Turkey's AK Party which embraces a secular system of government and underscores the separation of state and the religion to achieve a pluralist society and socio-economic rights of all citizens in the community.⁵⁹

In his works, Ghannouchi also expounded upon the *problematique* of reconciling the fundamental principles of Islam with the idea of progress and modernity and several scholars argue that he holds an unorthodox approach to several moot points discussed within Islamic world. For example, in contrast to Sayyid Qutb of the Brotherhood, Ghannouchi construes Islamic doctrines as an ideological and philosophical counterweight to Westernization in which the Islam is seen neither inferior nor superior to Western-monopolized modernity and he underlines the possibility of coexistence and cooperation between two different worlds.⁶⁰

3.4. Conclusion

In summary, the historical record concerning the MB reveals the movement's transformation from a social charitable organization to a robust political force in the

⁵⁸American Thinker Web Portal:

http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/12/rashid_ghannouchi_john_espositos_islamist_in_tunis.html
(Last Access: 10.06.2013).

⁵⁹Washington Post Guest Voices: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/guest-voices/post/tunisia-after-its-first-free-elections/2011/10/24/gIQAsuYgCM_blog.html (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

⁶⁰Oxford Islamic Studies Online: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0269> (Last Access: 10.06.2013).

MENA politics. The review of historical background of the MB and its leadership also shows the intricate relationship between the MB-led Islamist movement and MENA governments which can be likened to a ‘roller coaster’ characterized with its ups and downs. In this context, Islamist groups have increased their political clout and visibility in the MENA since the second half of the twentieth century (Özdamar and Canbolat 2012; Özdamar *forthcoming*).

With the surge of political Islam, the MB has become the most influential Islamist movement operating in the Muslim world. Additionally, the MB has emerged as a strong international force with its vibrant network established within Europe and North America. Therefore, Rubin (2011) contends that because of its leading role both in the Sunni world and in many Muslim communities around the globe the MB is the most significant revolutionary organization in the world. Its gravity and importance in the MENA notwithstanding, the MB is still understudied within the IR discipline (Özdamar and Canbolat 2012; Özdamar *forthcoming*). Particularly, in the FPA literature there is a dearth of studies that zero in on the MB and its leadership as an idiosyncratic political ideology with specific foreign policy orientation. One of the objectives of this research is to address such a void in the FPA field.

In the final analysis, the review of three MENA leaders’ personal backgrounds and early political profiles reveals both a set of general patterns and differences between these leaders. The similarity pattern among the group can be dissected as follows: first, all of three MB leaders hail from very modest socioeconomic backgrounds. Second, they are all college educated, religiously raised and directly engaged with the religious

institutions. Third, all three leaders went up against established order in their respective countries and utilized religious affiliation and political Islamism as part of their political mobilization tactics.

The dissimilarities, however, can be summarized by three main lines of argument. Initially, each leader of the MB, profiled in this study, operates in distinct and diverse political and socio-cultural settings in different three countries of MENA. In fact, the offshoots of MB-oriented political Islam have flourished and evolved quite differently in studied MENA countries because of the peculiar forms of relationship between the MB's local offshoots and the ruling regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Gaza Strip. While Egyptian MB and Tunisian Ennahda movements underwent tremendous state repression and political ostracism since their inceptions, Palestinian Islamist leadership enjoyed more political leeway during its early stages and managed to form their own state in Gaza at the expense of a secular Fatah in West Bank and hostile Israel. This subtle but significant difference must have contributed to Hamas chief Meshaal's perception of 'other' and particularly the attribution of higher historical control to himself compare to Egypt's Morsi and Tunisia's Ghannouchi.

Second, these three MB-Islamists hail from MENA countries that have different economic and industrial development levels and distinct colonial histories that have an impact on three leaders' conceptualization of 'self' and 'other.' Lastly, while Morsi of Egypt and Ghannouchi of Tunisia travelled to Western world and lived in Europe and/or in the North America, Meshaal of Palestine has never been in the Western countries that would provide him with a first-hand observation of Western 'modernism'

and 'life-style' which are heavily chastised by MENA's political Islamists. That said, Meshaal resided in several MENA countries during his protracted exiles in 1990s and early 2000s e.g., Syria, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan and formed Islamist networks between these countries and Gaza Strip.

CHAPTER 4:

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

This thesis is predicated on the contention that leaders' beliefs have paramount significance in affecting the foreign policy decisions of states and these beliefs can act as causal mechanisms in explaining why leaders opt for a particular foreign policy decision. The two underlying assumptions that underpin the argument above are (1) individual leaders matter in foreign policy decision making process (Hermann et al. 2001) and (2) the belief systems of political leaders that hold top executive offices reflect the 'cognition of the state' (Schafer 2000). In this study, therefore, the focus will be on analyzing the causal relationship between the mindset of a state's executive leadership and its foreign policy behavior as a process outcome.

In this chapter, the research design of this project is discussed by touching upon the nuts and bolts of a study's methodological approach to the study of new MENA leaders. First, the research puzzle and research questions of this project are presented.

Second, it succinctly outlines the relevant research tools -Profiler Plus and VICS- of the leadership studies research program. Then, the chapter moves to expound upon the causal mechanism used in this study and particular methods for analyzing the data. This is followed by the brief discussion on the hypotheses tested in the following chapters. Next, the use of data sources and the selection criteria of speeches are specified. The penultimate section zeroes in on the case selection and why the author deems the subject matter vitally important. Lastly, a few points made regarding the additional value of crafting such a particular research design for the future studies in both operational code analysis and leadership studies research programs.

4.2. The Puzzle and Research Questions

The puzzle that prompted me to study the new generation of political Islamists and their foreign policy decisions is the intriguing causal linkage between an Islamist leader's religious and political ideology and his/her idiosyncratic foreign policy preferences. This puzzle led to many controversial and consequential questions that further appealed my attention on this foreign policy *problematique*. Some questions are: (1) How do political Islamists i.e., Muslim Brotherhood leaders make sense of international relations? (2) What are the patterns of Muslim Brotherhood leaders' conceptualization of foreign policy as a political organization and (3) How do non-Western leaders conduct their foreign policies and how they differ from their international counterparts?

After a distilling process on the research puzzle and a set of preliminary questions, this research will seek answers to the following research questions:

1. What are the diagnostic (philosophical) and instrumental (prescriptive) beliefs of Morsi of Egypt, Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and Meshaal of Hamas?
2. How do three Islamist leaders' operational codes differ among themselves? Put differently, do new MENA leaders speak with one voice in their foreign policy orientation despite their different country-wise backgrounds?
3. How do three MB-affiliated MENA leaders' foreign policy belief systems compare to the average world leader?
4. What are the foreign policy strategies of three MENA leaders: is the new MENA leadership's approach to foreign policy rational/pragmatic or ideological/revolutionary?

4.3. Research Design and Methodology

This research is based on the individual level variables in explaining foreign policy behaviors of states which is also acknowledged as the 'first image' of analysis in the study of international politics (Waltz 1965). This study does not contend that the causal relationship between a top executive's belief systems and the state's foreign policy behavior will account for all foreign policy decisions as this disclaimer was stated by many scholars in the FPA discipline (Walker 1977; Rosati 1984; Kaarbo 1997). That said, the scholarly argument of "who leads matter" in international politics has already

established within the leadership studies literature (Hermann et al. 2001). While Hudson (2005) claims that individual decision makers acting singly or as a group constitute the ground of international relations, this perspective does acknowledge numerous limitations imposed by other actors in the political environment and other factors (systemic or sub-systemic) that constrain the role of human agency in the conduct of foreign policy.

4.3.1. Research Tools: Profiler Plus and VICS

With the aim of finding answers to research questions, the Verb in Context System (VICS) is used in this research. VICS, as discussed in the literature review chapter, enables researchers to examine leaders' operational codes by drawing inferences about the leaders' political beliefs from their public statements. Introduced by Walker et al. (1998) in their paradigmatic work, VICS encodes all transitive verbs used in leader's public speech and group them into four categories: (1) self, (2) other, (3) cooperative, and (4) conflictual utterances of the speakers since "these are considered to be a speaker's linguistic representation of perceived power relationships" (Malici and Buckner 2008: 778).

Through following the VICS coding procedure, a researcher can quantify the value of each recorded verb and its linguistic context with regards to six attributes which are as follows: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context (Schafer and Walker 2006). Here, the calculated VICS

indices for the master beliefs P-1, I-1, and P-4 are used to locate leader's image of the Self and Other in one of the four quadrants in Holsti's (1977) typology. The three master beliefs are plotted on the vertical (P-1/I-1) and horizontal (P-4a/P-4b) axes on the revised Holsti operational code typology (Walker 1990). Building on the master beliefs scores, it becomes possible to locate a leader's image of Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b) which allow scholars to make educated guesses regarding the decision maker's preferences from among the outcomes of settle, submit, dominate and deadlock (Walker and Schafer 2006).

This thesis employs an automated content analysis program called 'Profiler Plus' which codes the leader's use of verbs in speeches to reveal his/her self-other assessment and control over political events in the domain of foreign policy.⁶¹ The software Profiler Plus provides researchers with the operational code and also LTA indices after following a couple of coding procedures. In addition to a computerized content analysis technique, there is also a hand-coding technique available in the VICS methods' toolkit. In comparison to hand-coding technique which requires a researcher's individual coding of the text by reading it word by word, the Profiler Plus does the coding based on the pre-specified coding scheme and grammatical rules that are different for LTA and operational code research programs. Besides, since the procedures of coding are totally automated the users of Profiler Plus are able to guarantee 100% coding reliability in their analyses (Schafer and Walker 2006).

⁶¹The content analysis software Profiler Plus program and VICS indices for operational code scores are courteously provided by Micheal Young of Social Science Automation (SSA), INC. In addition to SSA, I specifically thank to the Moynihan Institute fellow Hanneke Derksen for her help in providing the Profiler Plus and its toolkit. A trial version of Profiler Plus can be downloaded from <http://www.socialscience.net> (accessed 10. 10. 2013)

However, according to Malici and Buckner (2008), the biggest advantage of employing VICS procedures and the Profiler Plus is that foreign policy scholars do not need to base their study on extrapolations and interpretations to make any judgment about the political beliefs of leaders. In contrast, this particular method “allows us to systematically produce statistical evidence for leaders’ beliefs” and since “the VICS procedures lead to quantified results and, it is also possible to engage in comparative statistical operations” (Malici and Buckner 2008: 788). Lastly, while for LTA studies the software program analyzes each word with its attribution to a leader’s seven traits, for operational code research program it traces the leader’s use of transitive verbs to the nature (positive or negative) of his/her self-other assessments and attributions of political power.⁶²

4.3.2. Temporal and Spatial Domains

The temporal domain of the study is based on MB-affiliated leaders’ terms in office as the ‘chief executive’ of the country which allows us to examine the ‘cognition of states’ in the MENA region (Schafer 2000). Three leaders’ incumbency periods are listed below:

1. Khaled Meshaal of Gaza: Chief of Hamas Political Bureau (April 2004-Present).

⁶²For further details about the Profiler Plus and its programming details, please see discussions in Young 2001; Schafer and Walker 2006.

2. Mohammed Morsi of Egypt: 5th President of Egypt (June 2012- July 2013).
3. Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia: Founder and Intellectual Leader of Ennahda party (October 2011- January 2014).

However, these three leaders' speeches are mostly chosen from the late 2011 to 2013. The temporal domain, in this study, focuses on the period between the immediate aftermath of 2011 Arab-revolutions in North Africa and President Morsi's fall from power in July 2013.⁶³

Second, as reiterated above, the spatial domain of research is the three MENA countries and these are Egypt, Tunisia and Gaza Strip of Palestine. The first two countries are located in North Africa whereas Gaza Strip belongs to the Middle East region with respect to the contemporary definitions of both regions. One of the contributions of this study into the FPA literature is its distinct spatial domain that focuses on non-Western leaders and foreign policy cases which are understudied in the field. Additionally, this study hones in on these particular MENA countries in the post-Arab uprisings era since all of them have been governed by Islamist leaders formally and overtly affiliated to the MB movement.

⁶³Leaders' speeches are mostly taken from the post-Arab uprisings period to generate a common temporal domain for the analysis of each MB-affiliated leader.

4.3.3. Data

A wide collection of leader's speeches, press conferences and book chapters penned by leaders from the late 2011 to 2013 is compiled to measure the operational codes of Ghannouchi, Morsi, and Meshaal. This study uses various kinds of three MENA leaders' scripted and official statements that pertain to foreign policy issues. Since spontaneous speeches are not specifically used in the operational code research program (see Dille 2000; Renshon 2009), spontaneous statements made by those Arab leaders are excluded although these remarks focuses exclusively on foreign affairs.

The transcripts of leaders' press conferences and interviews are drawn mostly from online documentation platforms such as websites of the CNN International, the BBC and Der Spiegel. Other scripted texts are accessed from several databases including LexisNexis, and Foreign Broadcasting and Information System. A couple of public statements made in English but most of them were already translated into English by the international media institutions.

This research follows the speech selection criteria suggested by Walker et al. (1998: 182) which can be summarized as "(1) the subject and object are international in scope, (2) the focus of interaction is a political issue, and (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflictual." In addition to these rules, Schafer and Walker (2006) set further criterion that all coded speeches should contain at least 15-20 transitive verbs.

Following these benchmarks, total of twenty six materials were coded in this research. Ghannouchi's speeches are taken from various sources including interviews,

his op-eds, and a book⁶⁴ that includes his remarks on foreign affairs. Seven relatively long speeches were coded for Ghannouchi's profile and out of these seven statements the minimum number of verbs was 16 while the maximum number was 100. In total, 464 verbs were coded for Ghannouchi's operational code. Khaled Meshaal's speeches are accessed from the websites of various international media organizations including Time, Spiegel, and Open Democracy and most of them are interview transcripts. In total, nine speeches were coded in which the minimum number of verbs was 52 and the maximum number was 179. For Meshaal, the total number of verbs coded was 816.

Lastly, due to his short term in presidential office, the preliminary assumption was that finding relatively long and foreign-policy focused speeches of Morsi would prove very challenging. Yet, since Morsi has paid numerous high level visits to other capitals and international organizations it was possible to find out ten speeches most of which are public statements given at international conferences and official meetings. A few of them are interviews and one is his address to the nation i.e., Tahrir square speech. Most of these sources are accessed from two databases LexisNexis, and Foreign Broadcasting and Information System. For Morsi, out of ten speeches, while the minimum number of verbs in a one speech was 28, the maximum number was 160 and the total number of verbs coded is 854. In this study, therefore, the total number of verbs coded for the three MENA leaders' operational code was 2134. All the public statements processed in this research can be found at the index section of the thesis.

⁶⁴The book used for the data is Azzam S. Tamimi. 2001. *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism*. New York: Oxford University Press. The speeches are taken mostly from Chapter 6: The Territorial State and the New World Order.

To prepare the fine data for Profiler Plus program, the author edited and cleaned all of the texts before running the software. All public statements of three MENA leaders are analyzed with an automated coding system, therefore this research assures strong coding reliability and the results can be compared to the norming group sample of world leaders which is also a computerized product (Walker and Schafer 2006).

4.3.4. Methodology

In this study, multiple methods are employed to examine foreign policy behaviors of the MB's political leadership in MENA in the wake of 2011 uprisings. The first method is using a psychobiography of each Islamist leader in which the personal background of the leader and his political career are discussed with an emphasis on leader's psychological characteristics. The use of psychobiographies enables researchers to make a qualitative assessment informed by a plethora of descriptive information on leader's personalities and ideological beliefs. By providing a brief review of three MENA leaders' biographies and their ideological beliefs, this study aims to generate a basis of comparison for the quantitative results derived from operational code analysis. This particular method allows us to test the hypotheses of operational code analysis against the qualitative and factual observation on leaders' personal backgrounds. In the literature, many studies used a leader's psychobiography as a research technique to predict general patterns of the state behavior in foreign affairs (Greenstein 1969; Schafer 2000). This line of literature also includes Nathan Leites' (1951; 1953) studies

on Soviet Politburo's negotiation style that laid the foundations of operational code research program.

Second, the operational code scores of three MENA leaders are computed to profile MB-affiliated leaders by locating their images of 'self' and 'other' on the corresponding quadrants of a coordinate system. By profiling new Islamist leadership, the aim of this study is two-fold: (1) to search for general patterns in new political Islamists' conceptualization of foreign policy, and (2) to compare the operational code beliefs of three MENA leaders with a norming group of world leaders.

Next, this research also uses case study method to add strength to the findings and analytical thrust of operational code analysis. The case study approach is a widely used research tool which can be defined as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple source of evidence are used" (Yin 1984: 23). More specifically, this study draws on two levels of applications of predictions from an operational code analysis research program. First, the level 2 of applying operational code predictions is used which refers to 'comparative case predictions' (Walker and Schafer 2006). Comparative case predictions allow researchers to compare the belief systems of one or more leaders over time and forecast corresponding differences and similarities in their foreign policy behaviors (Walker 2000). By following the level 2 procedures, it is possible to pinpoint statistically important changes in leaders' philosophical and instrumental beliefs and predict shift propensities in their behaviors towards out-group. Walker et al. (1998) and Criclow

(1998) applied this comparative logic in their respective studies to analyze changes in operational code constructs of Jimmy Carter between 1977-1979 and 1980 and also two Israeli leaders Rabin and Peres between 1970s and 1990s.

Second method employed in this research is ‘two-sided dynamic interaction predictions’ which Walker (2000) calls it as level 3 in the application of operational code predictions. This level renders it possible to “combine the VICS scores for philosophical and instrumental beliefs and make predictions about a leader’s tactical initiatives over time and his/her solution strategies for strategic interaction episodes between ‘self’ and ‘other’” (Walker 2000: 27). The level 3 allows researchers to examine both the inclinations of the leaders (through the VICS indices for I-1, I-2 and P-4a) and also the key characteristics of the context for foreign policy decisions (through calculating P-1, P-2 and P-4b scores).

Considering all the key VICS indices together, this analytical image helps researchers to observe a particular leader’s ‘definition of the self-in-situation’ (Walker 2000). However, in level 3 three antecedent conditions must be met by a researcher to systematically test the operational code predictions. These categorical questions are originally posed by Brams (1994): (1) What is the ‘initial’ state of relations between ‘self’ and ‘other’? (2) What is the order and/or sequence of play? (3) Is cycling permitted in the relations between ‘self’ and ‘other’?

Substantively, this research attempts to apply both the level 2 and level 3 in making operational code predictions regarding three MENA leaders’ behaviors in foreign policy realm. While it adopts the level 2 to compare the operational codes of


three MB-affiliated leaders amongst each other and also with the norming group, level 3 is utilized to link these leaders' operational code beliefs to their foreign policy behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings era. Building on these two levels, the study of Middle Eastern leadership from the vantage point of operational code construct and its application to three case studies –Ghannouchi's, Meshaal's and Morsi's foreign policy behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings MENA—will confirm that the operational code construct, a North American FPA theory, can be applied to a particular non-Western context. In these case studies, the operational codes of three leaders are used as causal mechanisms to account for their foreign policy behaviors at the every level of decision making process. Particularly, to pin down three MB-affiliated Islamists' most controversial and consequential foreign policy decisions, the focus will be, mostly, on the three MENA countries' bilateral relations with the important actors in MENA including the US, Israel, Iran, Syria, Gulf Monarchies, and the EU.

4.3.5. Dependent Variable

Foreign policy behavior of a state is posited as the dependent variable in this study. Particularly, foreign policy outputs of three MENA countries are analyzed by establishing a causal linkage between each Muslim Brotherhood leader's belief system and the state's foreign policy behavior under his stewardship. One of the most paramount advantages of using operational code analysis, however, is its analytical rigor that allows researchers to estimate the likely behavior of a leader at different levels

of decision. This additional advantage provides foreign policy scholars with a vantage point to observe all steps of decision making process separately rather than analyzing merely the foreign policy output.

Figure 1. The ‘Causal Mechanism’ Used in This Study.⁶⁵



In the cognitive literature, as Walker (2000) argues, the levels of decisions are conceptualized as follows: (1) behavior, (2) move, (3) tactic, (4) and strategy. Snyder and Diesing (1977; as cited in Walker 2000: 13) elaborated on the framework of leveling decisions with the formula that “a set of behaviors constitutes one or more moves by one actor, a sequence of contingent moves between actors is a tactic, and a set of tactics is a strategy.” With the aim of illustrating the predictive power of operational code construct for every level of decision making, the chapter 6 focuses on three MENA leaders’ actual foreign policy conduct in which all levels of the new MENA leadership’s foreign policy decision-making are anatomized.

4.3.6. Independent Variable

The independent variable in this research is the operational codes of MENA’s new Islamist leaders. More specifically, I operationalized the operational codes of three MB-affiliated leaders of MENA to explain foreign policy behaviors of Egypt, Tunisia, and

⁶⁵The insights on causal relationship between political beliefs and leaders’ foreign policy decisions are drawn from Walker (2000).

Gaza Strip in the post-Arab uprisings era. While Meshaal-led Hamas has been governing Gaza Strip since 2007, both Morsi of Egypt and Ghannouchi of Tunisia assumed the top executive offices only after the 2011 revolutions in these countries. Therefore, this study focuses on these three MENA states' foreign policy behaviors after 2011 Arab revolutions to form a common temporal domain and the data for measuring independent variables were chosen from the same time period. The data were drawn from foreign policy statements of three Islamist leaders under investigation in this research. The Profiler Plus program is employed to measure the independent variables—operational codes of new MB-Islamists operating in MENA—of this research with the help of its computerized-coding system.

4.3.7. Hypotheses

This study begins by deriving hypotheses from existing operational code literature and applying them to the data collected for three MENA leaders. In addition to hypotheses drawn from the extant literature, there are two main hypotheses with the scholarly aim of shifting the focus of North American operational code analysis towards the study of MENA and political Islam.

Building on the research questions, the two major hypotheses constitute the nitty-gritty of this study's proposed contribution to the leadership studies and the FPA literature. First, it is hypothesized that the Islamist leadership in MENA does follow cooperative foreign policy behaviors very similar to their international counterparts.

Hypothesis 1a: The foreign policy beliefs of MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not significantly different from the political beliefs of world leaders included in the norming group.

Second, since all the leaders analyzed here are hailing from the MB movement which embodied by a combination of religious, nationalist and anti-colonial provenances this study assumes that MB-affiliated leaders do have very similar foreign policy beliefs and they are expected to pursue particular foreign policy strategies as a group that resonate in harmony.

Hypothesis 1b: There is uniformity pattern in foreign policy behaviors of three MB-affiliated Islamists even though these MENA leaders operate in quite different political and cultural settings.

Yet, there would be a potential counter-argument for this contention on the grounds that these three MENA leaders operate in different political context and encounter very distinct limitations and/or leeway in foreign policy decision-making. This study will test the proposed hypothesis and its contender with the evidence readily available.

Also, this study examines a group of hypotheses drawn from the operational code literature in chapter 5 which focuses on articulating and interpreting the leadership analysis results. The canonical operational code hypotheses are as follows (Walker 2000; Walker and Schafer 2006):

Hypothesis 2a: P-1 (nature of the political universe) master belief positively correlates with a leader's perception of the outside world as harmonious and peaceful.

Hypothesis 2b: I-1 (approach for selecting goals and objectives) master belief positively correlates with a leader's cooperative/positive-sum game tactics and strategies.

Hypothesis 2c: P-4a (self-control over history) master belief positively correlates with a leader's predisposition to pursue an escalatory foreign policy and brinkmanship tactics.

Hypothesis 2d: P-4b (other's control over history) master belief positively correlates with a leader's tendency to follow de-escalatory foreign policy and risk-averse tactics.

4.4. Case Selection: Why Political Islamists and the MENA region?

This research aims to profile the new MENA leaders affiliated to the MB movement for several reasons. First is the conventional wisdom that Islamism and Islamist groups have broadly gained strength across the MENA in the post-Cold War era (Rubin 2011; Özdamar 2011). Among others, however, the MB is acknowledged as the world's largest and most influential Islamist organization that impinges on the wider landscape of MENA politics particularly in the wake of the Arab uprisings (Ehrenfeld 2011). In

this context, the newly elected Islamist leaders of the MENA and their foreign policy orientation have been drawing an increasing attention from both the IR academia and international foreign policy elites. Therefore, there is an urgent need to study MENA leaders' foreign policy behaviors and learn the strategies they embrace to realize political objectives. A systematic study of the new Islamist leaders will potentially produce an added value by suggesting novel theoretical insights for the leadership and FPA-style studies and also promoting foreign policy-relevant scholarship within the IR academia.

Second, pursuant to the scholarly concerns of Malici and Buckner (2008) focusing on the belief systems of two MENA leaders, Iran's Ahmadinejad and Syria's al-Assad, this study is meant to help shattering the conventional images held in the Western world regarding the certain non-Western leaders and their psychologies including MENA's Islamists. Malici and Buckner (2008: 783) argue that:

The conventional wisdom regarding Iran and Syria is that these are belligerent states headed by hostile leaders. Rarely do policymakers and security analysts make an effort to imagine how international politics are perceived from the Iranian or the Syrian perspectives.

Therefore, this thesis aims to evaluate these simplistic and popular arguments prevailing in the West and, if possible, provide scientific evidence for the counter-argument that the MENA countries, under investigation here, are not necessarily governed by 'hostile' and 'rogue' leaders. Following this aim, this study goes to great lengths to explicate how the three MENA leaders perceive the political universe and

interpret the power competition between the ‘self’ and ‘other’ aiming at the control over history.

Third, after reviewing the recent consequential events transpiring in MENA politics it is safe to argue that the cascading outbreaks of popular uprisings turned the whole region upside down and led to the formation of new political settings and power centers mostly spearheaded by political Islamists. Thus, this study postulates that the new MENA politics and particularly its foreign policy domain offer a very fruitful research area in which the study of foreign policy-making process becomes extremely significant and useful. In the literature, FPA scholars specify a set of particular conditions in which the decision making process is most likely to have an autonomous impact on the decisions. Hagan (2001) argues that decision making is vitally important when the political leaders (1) encounter a high level of uncertainty in responding to international security threats; (2) are constrained with trade-offs across competing goals, including that of political survival; (3) work in decision setting in which political authority is quite diffused and fragmented.

The lack of solid information and the omnipresence of uncertainties complicate the decision making process and prevent leaders from maintaining a record of rational course of actions. In such circumstances, the decision hinges on “how leaders perceive and interpret the threats based on their belief systems” (Hagan 2001: 11). Additionally, Hermann (1976) argues that another condition in which the decision making process becomes paramount is the time constraints imposed by foreign policy crisis. To deal with exigent foreign policy issues, leaders are forced to make hasty and impulsive

decisions with limited information and under the ‘fog of war.’⁶⁶ This political environment will beget to tremendous stress and misperceptions for the leaders which have an impact on the dynamics of regional and international politics (Janis 1982; Jervis 1976). For these reasons, this study zeroes in on the decision-making processes leading to an Islamist foreign policy pursued by the MENA’s new leaders with a particular focus on their conceptualization of international politics in the post-Arab awakening era.

4.5. Conclusion

This research does not contend that all significant foreign policy decisions can be explained by using the causal relationship between leaders’ political beliefs and the foreign policy behaviors of states. This disclaimer notwithstanding, the paramount significance of leaders in foreign policy has already underscored and supported by empirical data in the leadership studies literature. With this research, therefore, the author strives for expanding the systematic study of political leadership beyond the North American and European cases towards the three strategically important countries in MENA to broaden the geographical scope of cognition-oriented FPA theories. Last but not least, thanks to its original research design adjusted to MENA context, this study

⁶⁶The ‘fog of war’ is originally a military concept referring to the level of ambiguity in situational awareness experienced by participants in military operations. The term is often attributed to German military theorist Clausewitz and his seminal study *On War* republished in 2012 by CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. In this study, however, it is used to describe a high level of uncertainty (due to the specter of war and conflict affecting the mindset of decision makers) existing in international politics that greatly influence foreign policy decision-making.

shows that the operational code analysis is a universally applicable research program in the study of political leadership and foreign policy decision-making. Informed by the canonical principles of political psychology scholarship, the operational code construct differs from other cognitive approaches to foreign policy especially with its superior predictive power and its versatile applicability to every level of decision-making processes.

CHAPTER 5:

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Introduction

This chapter expounds upon the belief systems of three MENA leaders by interpreting the data compiled in this research with a focus on two main research questions. First, how do three Muslim Brotherhood leaders' operational codes differ among themselves? Second, what are the operational codes of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated MENA leaders in comparison to norming group of world leaders? While addressing these questions in a systematic approach, this chapter tests all the proposed hypotheses to put the new MENA leadership into a broader analytical perspective.

Following these aims, this section first discusses the quadrants where three MENA leaders' images of 'self' and the 'other' can be located which allow profiling each MENA leader and see whether they are 'Venutian' (Leaders of Type A and C) or 'Martian' (Leaders of Type B and DEF) leaders (Malici 2006). Secondly, the first research question is addressed by highlighting the statistically important differences

between operational codes of three MENA leaders. Third part zeroes in on the question of where do the new MENA leaders stand in comparison to the ‘average world leader’? Here, with the aim of making broader comparison between new MENA leaders and world leaders a ‘norming group’ is included in the discussion. In other words, the use of norming group enables researchers to observe MB-affiliated MENA leadership from a broader perspective and analyze the new generation of Islamist leaders in comparison to the average ‘world leader.’⁶⁷ The norming sample comprises a broad collection of 164 public speeches made by 35 different and diverse world leaders including leaders of both weak and strong states. Next, the strategic preference orderings of three Islamist leaders, as to the foreign policy decision-making, are discussed in details. This part confirms the contention that the operational codes of leaders can be used as causal mechanisms to explicate and predict leaders’ policy preferences at every level of decision making from behaviors to moves and from tactics to strategies (Walker 2000).

5.2. Data Analysis Results: The Belief Systems of Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated MENA Leaders

The operational code analysis of three MB-affiliated Islamist leaders yields both intriguing and consistent results which provides researchers with an analytical guideline to unravel MB-affiliated Islamists’ conceptualization of foreign policy. First of all, all three MENA leaders’ self-image falls under the quadrant A which means that

⁶⁷See Malici and Buckner (2008) for the use of Norming Group data which was obtained from Professor Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida.

Ghannouchi, Morsi, and Meshaal's conceptualization of the 'self' is characterized with a low historical control (P-4a) and a highly cooperative nature of the preferred strategies (I-1) ranging from somewhat cooperative (Meshaal and Morsi) to definitely cooperative (Ghannouchi).

As indicated in the revised Holsti typology (Walker 1983), Type A leaders determine their goals based on shared interests and follow a set of "choices and shift propensities that favor tactics of Appease and Bluff associated with 'Appeasement strategy' in foreign policy" (Walker 2000: 16). Considering the philosophical and instrumental beliefs together, Type A leaders are pragmatic appeasers that pursue "...a strategy of rewarding the opponent for cooperative behavior and avoidance of escalatory behavior in international relations" (Devlen 2010). Therefore, it is safe argue that the three MENA leaders having type A self-images will follow flexible strategies and emphasize cooperation wherever possible rather than promoting an escalatory foreign policy tactics and conflictual foreign policy behavior.

The average I-1 score of Tunisia's Ghannouchi is the highest (0,57) among three Islamist leaders while his sense of historical control is the lowest (P-4a= 0,19). It could be argued that Ghannouchi's tactical intensity is definitely cooperative and the location of historical control is very low. Meshall, however, has the lowest I-1 (0,40) score for cooperative approach to foreign policy tactics while his sense of self-control over history (P-4a= 0,22) is the greatest. These differences notwithstanding, Meshall's self-image falls very close to Ghannouchi's and Morsi's in terms of the strategic

orientation barring the Hamas leader's predilection for 'somewhat cooperative' foreign policy tactics.

Morsi's self-image, on the other hand, is situated in between of the two other MB-affiliated leaders. He has a somewhat cooperative approach to tactics in the conduct of foreign policy (I-1= 0,45). According to Morsi's political mindset, the locus of historical control over foreign policy events (P-4a= 0,20) is also low like two other MENA leaders. To recapitulate, all three MENA leaders' images of the 'self' fall within the type A leadership category on the revised Holsti typology (Walker 1983), while highest cooperative approach to foreign policy and lowest sense of historical control belonging to Ghannouchi.

Table 4. P1, I1, P4a and P4b scores for Ghannouchi, Meshaal, and Morsi.

	P1	I1	P4a	P4b
Ghannouchi	0.25	0.57	0.19	0.81
Meshaal	0.18	0.40	0.22	0.78
Morsi	0.28	0.45	0.20	0.80

Figure 2. Operational Code Scores of Average World Leader and Three MB-affiliated MENA Leaders Concerning Their Images of ‘Self’ and ‘Other.’




Table 5. The Indices for Interpreting Leaders’ Three Master Belief Scores: P-1, I-1, P-4. Adopted from Walker (2000).

P-1 Nature of the Political Universe (Hostile/Friendly)						
Hostile						Friendly
Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very
-0.75	-0.50	-0.25	0.0	+0.25	+0.50	+0.75
I-1 Direction of Strategy (Conflict/Cooperation)						
Conflict						Cooperation
Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very
-0.75	-0.50	-0.25	0.0	+0.25	+0.50	+0.75

P-4 Control over Historical Development (Very Low/Very High)

Control				Control		
Very Low	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very High
-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+0.25	+.50	+.75

According to analysis, Ghannouchi, Meshaal, and Morsi have a common perception of ‘other’ in their encounters with the political universe and they all construe the ‘other’ as type C leader. Leaders with Type C operational code pursue a relatively friendly strategic orientation and attribute relatively high sense of historical control to themselves (Walker 1983). Type C leaders are anticipated to show “choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Reward and Deter associated with an Assurance Strategy” (Walker 2000: 16). In similar vein, they are inclined to view the state system as anarchical which overshadows the inherent harmony of interests between the states. For leaders with Type C philosophical beliefs, these common but elusive interests will be achieved through the restructuring of the state system, which in turn will avert the root causes of wars. Walker (1990: 411) argues that restructuring of the anarchical system is required because it is difficult to achieve one’s international goals in the anarchical system because “predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy.”

Ghannouchi views political universe as somewhat friendly (P-1= 0,25) and the bulk of historical control over political events is attributed to the agency of ‘other’(P-4b= 0,81). Ghannouchi’s scores suggest a partially benign perception of the outside world and a high degree of other’s grip over political events which make his other a

Type C leader. Meshall has the lowest P-1 (0,18) and P-4b (0,78) scores among the group of MB-affiliated MENA leaders. While Meshaal's P-1 belief can be located between the mixed and somewhat friendly views towards political universe, Hamas kingpin's sense of other's control over political developments remains very high. Meshaal operational code suggests that he places the 'other' in the quadrant C with somewhat positive view of political realm and a high degree of other's control. Morsi of Egypt, however, has the greatest P-1 (0,28) score but it also falls within the quadrant of somewhat friendly political universe. Morsi's operational code also shows that his P-4b (0,80) dwells in between of two other Islamist leaders suggesting again a high level of other's control in foreign affairs. Since Morsi's political beliefs reveal a rather benign view of the outside world and an acceptance of other's control in foreign policy, he locates the other under quadrant C.

This thesis hypothesizes that “the foreign policy behaviors of MENA's Islamist leaders demonstrate a pattern of uniformity even though they operate in consequentially different political and cultural settings.”⁶⁸ Building on the operational code analysis results, the first main hypothesis is substantiated with the empirical data as leaders' own words. As discussed above, the operational codes of three MB-affiliated MENA leaders are very analogous which put all three MB-Islamists' self-images into a Type A leadership who identify their foreign policy rivals as Type C leaders. Here, the bottom line is that Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi are expected to show very similar foreign policy behaviors. All three Islamists are expected to speak with one voice in their

⁶⁸This hypothesis (1-b) is broached and discussed in details in the chapter 4 titled “Research Design and Methodology” Please see the Chapter 4, pages: 82-83.

conceptualization of foreign policy although three MENA countries' regime types are significantly different in which Islamist leaders encounter very distinct and diverse political and structural limitations existing at both the state and international levels. Political science literature on MENA countries suggests that Tunisia, Egypt, and Gaza Strip differ from each other in many ways e.g., the regime type, governmental setting, political culture, economic structure and etc.

However, this study argues that since their political beliefs are molded by the same classic Islamic sources such as the Quran and the Sunna and the teachings of latter political Islamist doctrinaires like Seyd Qutb, Said Nursi, and Ali Shariati (Özdamar 2011), the MB-affiliated leaders perceive the political universe as somewhat benign and friendly. They feel rather powerless in the international arena and always attribute lower levels of historical control to themselves and their senses other's historical control are generally very high. Lastly, since they are products of the same old MB ideology all three political Islamist leaders have very cooperative strategic orientations hallmarked by the Islamists' non-zero sum thinking on foreign policy.

Additionally, the analysis provides consistent results as to the belief systems of new Islamist leadership in MENA bearing out a few canonical hypotheses established within the operational code research program. As stated in the methodology chapter, this research also attempts to test some extant hypotheses in the literature to demonstrate the universal applicability and generalizability of psychological approaches to foreign policy and decision-making. First, the comparative analysis of three MENA leaders' operational codes shows that the higher the P-1 master belief score, the more

benign and peaceful the leader's perception towards the political universe will be (Walker 2000). Particularly, this study hypothesized that Meshaal's P-1 score will be the lowest due to the tug of war between Israel and Hamas-ruled Gaza while Morsi's P-1 score may be the highest among the group. Because, Morsi was elected to govern one of the most populous and powerful Muslim countries in MENA and his government received sizeable political and economic support from the region and the West that impinged upon his perception of the other actors. The analysis reveals that highest P-1 score belongs to Morsi whereas the lowest to Meshaal within the group which substantiate the hypothesis that P-1 belief (nature of the political universe) positively correlates with a leader's view of the political universe as peaceful and harmonious.

Second, in the literature it was posited that the more intense the tactical cooperation index, the more likely the leader's use of cooperative tactics and strategies in foreign policy-making (Walker 2000). In this study, although all three MENA leaders are expected to show similar foreign policy behaviors, it was postulated that Tunisia's Ghannouchi will be more prone to follow highly cooperative and de-escalatory foreign policy tactics especially vis a vis Meshaal. This assumption is based on the literature on Ghannouchi's psychobiography and political profile in which he is described as 'A Democrat within Islamism' (Tamimi 2001). Therefore, his democratic approach to political Islam along with the moderate stance on secularism and the vision of power-sharing and negotiation in governance should have contributed to his foreign policy beliefs. The results suggest that Ghannouchi's I-1 score is the highest while Meshaal's appears to be the lowest which implies that the I-1 (direction of strategy) master belief

positively correlates with a leader's tendency to pursue cooperative and positive-sum foreign policy strategies.

Next, Walker and Schafer (2006) argue that leaders in the Type B and Type C quadrant are associated with higher sense of self-control over history in comparison to Type A and Type DEF leaders. Put it differently, the higher the locus of historical self-control index, the more likely the leader's preferences favor escalatory foreign policy and brinkmanship tactics. Building on this hypothesis, Hamas' chief Meshaal is expected to have more inclination for brinkmanship strategy and zero-sum game tactics in comparison to Morsi and Ghannouchi. A quick glance on Hamas' history as a resistance movement and its relations with the Israeli state and major Western powers underpins the rationale behind such an educated guess.

The analysis results are in line with the correlation established between the locus of historical control index and the nature of a leader's strategic orientation. Since Meshaal's P-4a score is the highest among the all three leaders, this study verifies that P-4a (self-control over history) belief positively correlates with leader's predisposition to conduct a rather escalatory foreign policy fraught with brinkmanship tactics. In a similar vein, P-4b (other's control over political events) operational code belief is associated with the de-escalatory foreign policy and the potential utilization of Appeasement strategy that prescribes the tactics of Appease and Bluff (Walker and Schafer 2006). Among the studied leaders, Ghannouchi appears to be more inclined to Appeasement strategy whilst Meshaal is hypothesized to adopt a more hostile strategic orientation towards his out-group due to the same reasons discussed above. Inextricably

related with the calculation and interpretation of the P-4a score, the analysis of P-4b belief yields very similar insights which support the final hypothesis drawn from the operational code literature: the P-4b belief positively correlates with a leader's preferences that favor non-confrontational foreign policy and the strategy of Appeasement.

5.3. Comparing Political Islamists' Operational Codes with Norming Group

This section seeks answers for the research question: 'How do three MB-affiliated MENA Leaders compare to the average world leader?' To perform this empirical inquiry, the public speeches of three Islamist leaders are coded and quantified thanks to the VICS coding guideline and the Profiler Plus. With the help of a broader comparison, both the new MENA leaders' perceptions of the 'self' and the 'other' can be understood more profoundly and the immediate policy relevance of this thesis can be better discerned. As stated in the methodology chapter, quantified and computer-coded data allow us to compare the results for MENA leaders' operational code with a group of world leaders so as to put the new MENA leadership into a broader perspective.⁶⁹ The average operational code results of three MENA leaders and mean values for the norming group are illustrated in Table 5.⁷⁰

⁶⁹The mean values for the norming group are (for N=35, P-1= +.30, SD= .29; I-1= +.40, SD= .43; P-4=.22, SD= .13). Adopted from Malici and Buckner (2008).

⁷⁰The norming group is composed of a collection of 35 different world leaders. Mean score for a sample (n=164) of public statements of world leaders from different regions and time periods (also cited in Malici and Buckner 2008).

Table 6. The Operational Codes of Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi Compare to the ‘Norming Group’⁷¹


	Norming Group	Ghannouchi	Meshaal	Morsi
Philosophical beliefs	(n= 164)	(n= 7)	(n= 9)	(n=10)
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.25	0.184	0.284
P-2 Realization of political values (pessimism/optimism)	0.147	0.09	0.044	0.231
P-3 Political Future (unpredictable/predictable)	0.134	0.15	0.112	0.182
P-4 Historical development (low control/high control)	0.224	0.19	0.22	0.2
P-5 Role of chance (small role/large role)	0.968	0.95	0.975	0.96
Instrumental beliefs				
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.57	0.406	0.453
I-2 Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	0.178	0.2	0.22	0.258
I-3 Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	0.332	0.45	0.183	0.233
I-4 Timing of action				
a. conflict	0.503	0.43	0.593	0.562
b. words/deed	0.464	0.26	0.69	0.545
I-5 Utility of means				
a. Reward	0.157	0.06	0.223	0.319
b. Promise	0.075	0.07	0.066	0.089
c. Appeal/support	0.468	0.65	0.413	0.454
d. Oppose/resist	0.154	0.11	0.158	0.176
e. Threaten	0.034	0.03	0.014	0.085
f. Punish	0.112	0.07	0.121	0.068

⁷¹For mean scores for Norming Group, see Walker and Schafer (2006).

Primarily, the table demonstrates that there are very few statistically important differences between new political Islamist leaders, on the one hand, and the average world leader, on the other. Ghannouchi views the nature of the political realm (P-1= 0,25) a bit more hostile than the average world leader (P-1= 0,30). Likewise, Meshaal's perception of the nature of political universe (P-1= 0,18) is more conflictual than Ghannouchi and Morsi and the average world leader (0,30). Besides, although Morsi sees the political universe more friendly than his Islamist comrades, the P-4 score for average leader (0,30) is slightly higher than the former Egyptian president's score (P-1= 0,28).

There are also compelling and consistent results with respect to the core instrumental belief (I-1). First, Ghannouchi's tactical intensity, is more cooperative (I-1= 0,57) than the average leader's direction of strategy in foreign policy decision-making (I-1= 0,40). Second, Hamas chief Meshaal's scores for tactical orientation is surprising owing to the fact that his I-1 score (0,40) is tantamount to mean value for average world leader's tactical preferences. Third, Morsi pursues a more cooperative approach to tactics in the conduct of foreign policy (I-1= 0,45) than both Meshaal and his tactical equivalent, the average world leader.

Figure 3. P-4a Scores for Ghannouchi, Morsi and Meshaal Compared to the Mean Score for the Norming Group.⁷²




The mean scores for self-control beliefs (P-4a scores) of MENA leaders vis a vis world leaders are presented in Figure 2.⁷³ First, the locus of historical control in Ghannouchi's operational code (P-4a= 0,19) is slightly lower than the average score of the norming sample for self's control over historical development (0,22). Likewise, Morsi has a slightly low level of self-control over political events (P-4a= 0,20) in comparison to norming group and Meshaal of Gaza. Yet, Meshall's sense of historical control also overlaps with the norming group's average P-4a score (both are 0,22). This is one of the unlooked-for results in this research just like the overlap between

⁷²The average P-4a score for the norming group is 0,22 and the standard deviation (SD) is 0,13. P-4a scores are plotted on Figure 3 accordingly. The boundaries for P-4a distribution are calculated as 0,09 (below the SD) and 0,35 (above the SD).

⁷³The abbreviations used in Figures 3 and 4 and their meanings are as follows: RG=Rachid Ghannouchi; MM= Mohamed Morsi; KM= Khaled Meshaal and NG= Norming group of world leaders.

Meshaal's and average leader's master instrumental beliefs (I-1). In the final analysis, all three leaders' average P-4a scores are within one standard deviation (0,13) of the mean for the norming group (0,22).⁷⁴

Figure 4. P-4b Scores for Ghannouchi, Morsi and Meshaal Compared to the Mean Score for the Norming Group.⁷⁵



The Figure 3 demonstrates the average P-4b scores for MENA leaders' and norming group's perceptions of other's control over history and international politics. At first blush, it appears that all three MB-affiliated Islamist leaders' average P-4b scores are within one standard deviation (0,13) of the mean for the norming group

⁷⁴Since this part of the chapter merely aims to compare three MENA leaders' belief systems with the average world leader, it focuses on whether there are statistically important differences between three MENA leaders (individually and as a group) and norming group of world leaders. For more information on this method, see Malici and Buckner (2008: 796), and Achen (1982).

⁷⁵The mean P-4b score for the norming group is 0,78 and, like P-4a indice, the standard deviation (SD) is 0,13. P-4b scores are plotted on Figure 4 accordingly. The boundaries for P-4b distribution are calculated as 0,65 (below the SD) and 0,91 (above the SD).

(0,78). These particular results for P-4b scores are not unanticipated because Malici and Buckner (2008: 791) argue in their study that “by definition, when P-4a is more than one standard deviation from the norming group’s mean, P-4b is more than one standard deviation from the mean in the opposite direction and falls within one standard deviation when P-4a is also within one standard deviation.” Since formulas for the P-4a and P-4b indexes are interwoven, the analysis on three MENA leaders’ P-4b belief scores do yield exactly same results and insights that are discussed above within the section on leader’s P-4a scores. Therefore, the interpretation of analysis results for MB-Islamists’ P-4a scores above also applies to the discussion of their P-4b scores.

In the final analysis, a comparison between the operational code results of new MENA leaders with the average world leader confirms the second main hypothesis of this thesis. Building on the results, it is scientifically tenable to argue that “the foreign policy beliefs of MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not significantly different from the political beliefs of world leaders included in the norming group”⁷⁶ since they all identify themselves with Type A leadership and perceive the ‘other’ in political universe as Type C leader.

⁷⁶The quoted statement is the first main hypothesis (1-a) posited in this study. It is discussed in detail in methods and research design chapter. Please see the Chapter 4, pages: 82-83.

5.4. An Essence of Islamist Foreign Policy: Strategic Preferences of New MENA Leadership

This section deals with another significant question of MENA's international relations, 'What are the strategies of MB-affiliated MENA leaders and do they behave rationally in the art of foreign policy making?' With this focus, this part mainly investigates whether there are substantive and consequential statistical differences between three MB leaders, on the one hand, and the average world leader, on the other. In other words, it evaluates whether the operational code scores of three MENA leaders are below (<) or above (>) the average leader's scores (for P-1 and I-1 scores) or more than one standard deviation above (>) or below (<) or within (=) one standard deviation (for P-4a and P-4b).

Decision maker's master beliefs indices allow researchers to put leaders' foreign policy leadership into a broader perspective and unravel not only their strategic preferences but also their perceptions of other's tactical intensity and foreign policy moves. Put it differently, "indices of an actor's key beliefs define the strategic preferences of self (I-1, P-4a) and the perceived preferences of other actors (P-1, P-4b) regarding the political outcomes of domination, submission, settlement, or deadlock in world politics" (Malici and Buckner 2008: 791). In the literature, Walker and Schafer (2006) classified and theorized decision makers' strategic preferences and their sense of other actor's inclinations through the formulation of 'The Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP).'⁷⁷

⁷⁷For more insights on the deductive theory of 'Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)' and its applications see Walker and Schafer (2006) and Walker (2004a and 2004b).

Table 7. Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP). Adopted from Walker and Schafer (2006).

Self & Other Values	Preference Order in a 2 X 2 Strategic Game
Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then	Settle >Deadlock>Submit>Dominate = (Appeasement)
Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then	Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit = (Assurance)
Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then	Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit = (Stag Hunt)
Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, <), then	Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock = (Chicken)
Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, =), then	Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit = (P. Dilemma)
Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, >), then	Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit = (Bully)

Table 7 shows the signs and indices for all master beliefs which enable researchers to observe whether one particular leader's P-1 and I-1 beliefs are below (<) or above (>) the mean score for the norming sample of world leaders. However, the signs for the P-4a and P-4b indices designate whether these beliefs are more than one standard deviation below (<) or above (>), or rather within (=) one standard deviation of the mean for the norming sample. The P-4 indices are particularly significant on the grounds that an individual leader with a higher P-4a value than one standard deviation above (>) the mean for the norming group of world leaders is expected to give more historical control to self rather than to other.

Furthermore, if a leader has an average P-4a score located within (=) one standard deviation it means that he gives approximately equal amount of historical control to self and other. If the P-4a score of a leader is more than one standard deviation below (<) the mean score for the norming group it is predicted that such

leader will attribute most of the historical control to other than to self. Similarly, since P-4b score is equal to 1 minus (-) P-4a score, P-4b belief's locus can be calculated accordingly. By definition, when P-4a falls within (=) one standard deviation it means that P-4b is also within (=) one standard deviation and when P-4a is more than one standard deviation above (>) or below (>) the mean for norming group, P-4b is also more than one standard deviation above (>) or below (>) the mean but in the opposite direction (Schafer and Walker 2006; Malici and Buckner 2008).

Based on Table 7, the first three (1-3) propositions indicate particular ranges for all master beliefs from which it is possible to infer cooperative strategies and the preference of 'settlement' seen as the most likely outcome. In this set of cooperation strategies, as Malici and Buckner (2008: 790) argue, it is postulated that if the settlement outcome proves far-fetched, strategic interaction of the players will unfold as follows:

- (1) The stronger player will use its superior power to impose a domination or deadlock outcome in order to avoid submission;
- (2) equal players will use this parity to impose a deadlock and will accept domination in order to avoid submission;
- (3) the weaker player will seek deadlock but accept submission because it cannot dominate.

The last three propositions (4-6), on the other hand, determine an area for the master beliefs that are logically affiliated with conflict strategies in which the 'domination' outcome ranked as the most probable preference. In the playbook of conflict strategies, if the domination outcome is elusive, the sequence of moves can be described as: "(4) the weaker player will seek settlement but accept submission because it cannot deadlock; (5) equal players will seek settlement but accept deadlock in order to

avoid submission; (6) the stronger player will seek deadlock rather than accept settlement or submission” (Malici 2008: 790).

Considering all the propositions (1-6) together, these predictions provide us with leaders’ logical inferences about what is wanted and also feasible to attain in foreign policy statecraft which depend on the sense of historical power attributed to self (P-4a) and other (P-4b). According to Walker and Schafer (2006), the causal linkage established between these six propositions is rigorous and fairly consistent with the formal models of ‘subjective games’ used in mainstream game theory applications with an emphasis on balance of power thinking as a causal mechanism. Therefore, the rationale behind these propositions is also consistent with the scientific results of formal model simulations of subjective games in which historical control, tactical intensity and perceptions of the players are manipulated (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Walker 1983).

In this framework, it is now possible to address the last research question: what are the foreign policy strategies of three political Islamist leaders and do they behave rationally? Following the TIP procedures, three MENA leaders’ average scores for their master political beliefs are utilized to determine the preference orderings of Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi along with their perceived policy preferences of the ‘other’. The average scores for Ghannouchi are self (I-1= 0,57, P-4a= 0,19) and other (P-1= 0,25 , P-4b= 0,81), for Meshaal the scores are self (I-1= 0,40, P-4a= 0,22) and other (P-1= 0,18, P-4b= 0,78), and lastly Morsi’s belief scores are self (I-1= 0,45, P-4a= 0,20) and other (P-1= 0,28, P-4b= 0,80).

Firstly, while the I-1 scores of Ghannouchi and Morsi are greater than the I-1 belief score for the norming group (0,40), Meshaal's I-1 (0,40) score is equal to the norming group value. Second, P-4a scores of all three MENA leaders are within one standard deviation (0,13) of the mean calculated for the norming group. Accordingly, for Ghannouchi and Morsi, these two scores are instrumental to pinpoint the preference ordering of the 'self' which correspond to the ranges given in proposition 2 in TIP. Substantively, it means that Ghannouchi and Morsi are expected to pursue a combination of cooperative strategies in general and subscribe to a strategy of 'Assurance' in particular. Proposition 2 also postulates that these two leaders following assurance strategy do not necessarily see a disproportional power disparity between themselves and their counterparts. According to assurance strategy, Ghannouchi and Morsi are predicted to order their policy preferences as: settlement (4), over deadlock (3), over domination (2), over submission (1).⁷⁸

However, since Meshaal's I-1 score does not locate the self's preference ordering neither totally within cooperative strategies (propositions 1-3) nor within conflict strategies (proposition 4-6), it is possible to assume that Meshaal's strategic orientation for the 'self' is two-fold that can correspond to either proposition 2 or proposition 5 specified in the TIP. If we assume that Meshaal's score for I-1 is lower than the I-1 score for the norming sample (0,40) and his score for P-4a unchanged (0,22), it basically means that Meshaal tend to prefer conflict strategies and he will not perceive a significant power gap between the self and his other. These potential beliefs

⁷⁸The numbers in brackets denotes the preference ordering for MENA leaders (for the self's strategic preferences) and their perceived preference order for their other (for the other's strategic preferences). The numbers are ranging from 4 as the highest preference to 1 as the lowest preference.

meet the conditions of proposition 5 of TIP in which Meshaal is likely to pursue a Prisoners' Dilemma strategy towards his rivals in foreign policy domain. Lastly, if it is postulated that Meshaal's political beliefs are associated with the proposition 5 in lieu of the proposition 2, his new preference ordering is going to be: domination (4), over settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1). In other words, Meshall's operational code tells us that his strategic preferences are prone to alteration depending on the situational context and the character of 'other.'⁷⁹ The two strategic interaction scenarios epitomizing Meshaal's changing perceptions towards 'other' and two different preference orderings associated with his shifting operational code beliefs are depicted in Table 8.

Table 8. Two Strategic Interaction Scenarios for Meshaal's Shifting Foreign Policy Preferences⁸⁰

Meshaal's Self-Image	I-1 Score (P-4a= 0, 22)	Proposition (TIP)	Preference Order	Strategy	Other
Scenario 1	I-1 > 0,40 (0,41)*	Proposition 2	Settle>Deadlock>Dominate >Submit	Assurance	Egypt
Scenario 2	I-1 < 0, 40 (0,39)*	Proposition 5	Dominate>Settle>Deadlock >Submit	Prisoners' Dilemma	Israel

⁷⁹There is a scholarly debate regarding whether decision makers have a general and consistent operational code or whether there are different operational codes for different issues they are facing in foreign policy domain (Walker et al. 1998).

⁸⁰Table 8 demonstrates two possible scenarios regarding Khaled Meshaal's conceptualization of the 'self.' In this table, the asterisk symbols "*" are used to indicate two hypothetical P-4a belief scores (0,41 and 0,39) to determine Meshaal's multiple can-be preference orderings. To reiterate, this operation is undertaken because Meshaal's I-1 (0,40) and P-4a scores (0,22) are coinciding with the mean I-1 and P-4a scores for norming sample which are taken as benchmarks of comparative statistical analysis.

On the other hand, while three MENA leaders' average P-1 scores are lower than the norming group's average P-1 score (0,30), their scores for P-4b belief is within one standard deviation (0,13) of the average score for the norming sample (0,78).⁸¹ Building on these scores, it is possible to infer the new MENA leadership's perception of other's preference ordering which correspond to conditions stipulated in proposition 5 of TIP. Analogous to Meshall's second perception of the self, three MENA leaders' perceptions of the other meet the conditions of Prisoners' Dilemma strategy. Substantively, Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi perceive their other as hawkish leaders who always opt for a conflictual strategy despite the fact that the 'other' does not exert an inordinate amount of historical power over the leaders of Tunisia, Gaza and Egypt. The perceptions of three MB-Islamists place the other's preference ordering into the game plan of Prisoners' Dilemma strategy which prioritizes domination (4), over settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1).

5.5. Conclusion

The analysis of three MENA leaders' philosophical and instrumental beliefs provides a few general patterns in how MB-incubated political Islam asserted and articulated itself as an independent ideology with particular foreign policy preferences. First, all three leaders place their self-image under quadrant A while they all perceive the 'other' within the quadrant of C. Substantively, these leaders tend to follow Appeasement

⁸¹Both P-4a and P-4b belief scores for all three leaders and the norming group together with the standard deviation value are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 of this chapter.

strategy which prescribes the tactics of appeasement and bluff but they attribute the tactics of reward and deter to other whose foreign policy behaviors are associated with an Assurance strategy. Second, the analysis reveals that there are a few statistically significant differences between the three Islamist leaders and the average leader specified within the norming group. The comparative analysis of these two groups confirms the second major hypothesis of this study which generates some policy-relevant insights for international foreign policy practitioners.

Third, the strategic preferences playbook of new MENA leadership is decoded by using TIP that yields many interesting, albeit a few inconsistent, results with regards to the three leaders' strategic behaviors. While the three MB-Islamists' preference orderings for the self mostly correspond to the conditions of Assurance strategy specified in proposition 2 of TIP, their senses of other's preference ordering meet the Prisoners' Dilemma strategy given in proposition 5. Yet, due to their contested ranges, it can be argued that Meshaal's operational code scores render the strategic preferences, those he attributes to himself, fickle. In addition to Assurance strategy, Meshaal is expected to perceive also the Prisoners' Dilemma strategy of proposition 5 as the preference ordering of self. Given the preference orderings attributed to self and other, barring Meshaal to some extent, new generation of Islamists in MENA tend to perceive the other as confrontational actors subscribing to brinkmanship strategies, but not vice versa. However, since the new MENA leaders do not impute a disproportionate amount of historical control to its out-group, they are anticipated to show a 'conditional

cooperation' which recognized as the nitty-gritty of the Assurance strategy (Malici and Buckner 2008).

Through following TIP procedures, it is possible to make solid predictions about a leader's moves, tactics, and strategies in a strategic interaction game. Particularly, the upside of TIP is its rigorous modeling of strategic interaction between states which based on the leaders' beliefs and perceptions or misperceptions (Lake and Powell 1999). In contrast to the canonical assumptions of conventional game theory, operational code studies do not take leaders' profiles and preferences as given but systematically draw them from a discrete cognition-oriented decision-making theory (Malici and Buckner 2008).

CHAPTER 6:

ISLAMISTS' BELIEFS AND NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN MENA

6.1. Introduction

Building on the discussion of three MB-Islamists' foreign policy strategies and their perceptions of other's intentions and strategic moves, this chapter focuses exclusively on the crux of second research question posed in this research: is the new MENA leadership's approach to foreign policy rational or impulsive? This question is tackled by linking the operational code beliefs of three MENA leaders with their countries' foreign policy behaviors during their terms of office as chief executives. In essence, this chapter aims to render the linkage between the operational codes of three MENA leaders and their foreign policy explicit. First, regarding the identification of a leader's 'other', the P-1 index interprets other actors in the political universe to be always the actors that a decision maker references in his public speeches (Walker and Schafer 2006). In the case of MENA leadership, this study finds that all three Islamist leaders refer to the Israel and the US as their main competitors and make references to Jews,

Zionists, and Westerners as their out-group. The following sub-sections will elaborate on the real-life foreign policies of the three MENA leaders separately so as to show to what extent their political belief systems are substantial to their foreign policy decision-making.

6.2. Rachid Ghannouchi: A Moderately Moderate Islamist's Foreign Policy

Rachid Ghannouchi stands out to be the most 'democratically oriented' Islamist leader studied in this research. Considering his moderate views on political Islam and conciliatory approach to power-sharing in Tunisian politics, Ghannouchi is acknowledged as a 'democrat within Islamism' by regional and international academic circles (Tamimi 2001). The Islamist thought of Ghannouchi can be seen as an amalgamation of Western democratic ideals, objective of Islamic unity and solidarity, and the lofty idea of historical interconnectedness between Eastern and Western civilizations. Building on these beliefs, Ghannouchi conceives a possibility of rapprochement between Muslim world and the West through the act of bridging MENA's Islamic thought with the idea of progress and modernity embedded in Western civilization.⁸²

A few criticisms of Zionism and Western foreign policy notwithstanding, Ghannouchi overtly commends the Western world's advances in democracy and

⁸²Rachid Ghannouchi's interview with Council on Foreign Relations. The transcript can be reached at <http://www.cfr.org/tunisia/tunisias-challenge-conversation-rachid-al-ghannouchi/p26660>. (Last Access: 10.08.2013).

economic governance with an emphasis on the level of cooperation transpiring between the Western countries. He usually advocates for having the similar levels of economic and political development through creating venues and organizations for Islamic cooperation similar to Western-originated supranational economic and security platforms e.g., the European Union. In that sense, Ghannouchi's rather idealistic vision of Muslim world and the West can be likened to Erbakan's conceptualization of the 'self' and 'other' in foreign affairs. Turkey's Erbakan was one of the leading political Islamists of MENA who appears to be the 'romantic Islamist' of his own generation (Özdamar 2011).

Ghannouchi has the highest level of cooperative approach towards his 'out-group' among three MENA leaders ($I-1 = 0,51$). Moreover, when the references Ghannouchi made in his speeches are dissected, it appears that his relationship with his 'in-group' is more cooperative than his stance on Western world and Israel and US foreign policy. However, since he is a Type A leader, Ghannouchi is expected to believe that optimism is warranted in international system and view the conflict as temporary phenomenon that transpiring because of human misunderstanding and misperception (Holsti 1977).

On the other hand, Ennahda's leader possesses the lowest level of self's ability to control historical developments ($P-4a = 0,19$). Tunisia's historical encounters with colonialism and Western imperialism played a role in Ghannouchi's very low sense of self's historical control. Tunisian homeland became a property of imperial powers in the 20th century due to (1) its proximity to European continent and the predatory empires of

the era and (2) its strategically important geography in the North Africa (Anderson 1986). Considering these historical facts on the ground, Ghannouchi's attribution of historical control to 'other' outstrips even the P-4a score for Meshaal whose view of the political universe is profoundly shaped by the Israeli aggression and the desolation of the Gaza for decades.

In general, Ghannouchi's rhetoric is very critical of Zionism, Israeli foreign policy and also the autocratic regimes in Muslim world such as Mubarak's Egypt, al-Asad's Syria and particularly Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes in Tunisia. Ghannouchi's critiques on other foreign policy actors operating in the MENA region confirm his relatively low P-1 score (0,25). Regarding the P-1 beliefs, nevertheless, Ghannouchi has a mid-level of trust for his out-group in comparison to Gaza's Meshaal (0,18) and Egypt's Morsi (0,28).

Ghannouchi's depiction of his in-group is the largest of all MENA leaders which includes almost all Muslim countries of the region. His in-group is composed of 'oppressed Muslim people', generally both Shia and Sunni counties of MENA such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Gulf Monarchies and especially Turkey under AK Party government whose political vision and party mobilization are taken as a model and/or source of inspiration by Ennahda movement.⁸³ Ghannouchi views the Turkish example as an instructive playbook to follow in Tunisia's domestic and foreign affairs in the sense of maintaining the movement's Islamist character and following democratic and mildly

⁸³In his interview with the Financial Times, Ghannouchi pointed that "Our thought is similar to that of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey." The transcript can be reached at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24d710a6-22ee-11e0-ad0b-00144feab49a.html#axzz2vUIHkJvr> (Last accessed 20.10.2013).

secular principles at the same time and actively engaging with the political system to avoid resorting to violence and terrorism from the periphery (Tamimi 2001). More specifically, Ghannouchi's in-group involves the MENA countries which accommodate the MB organization and give political space to its offshoots across the region e.g., Jordan, Gaza Strip, Qatar.

In a similar vein, Ghannouchi's definition out-group is the narrowest among all leaders which includes the Zionists, oppressive autocratic regimes in MENA e.g., Syria, Egypt after the downfall of Morsi regime, and Saudi Arabia. Ghannouchi always critiques the autocratic and extremely secular regimes in MENA i.e., Syria and Saudi Arabia for not espousing a moderate version of political Islam and democratic principles in their countries. His out-group lastly includes a number of Western countries due in part to their unconditional support for Israeli foreign policy and in his statements Ghannouchi mainly refers to the US as the sponsor of Israel's military operations against the Muslim world.⁸⁴

Ghannouchi's sense of isolation is the lowest of all leaders owing to fact that after the Tunisian revolution in 2011 his party received a tremendous support from both the Western powers, such as the US and European Union, and regional players like Turkey and Gulf countries. In addition, Ghannouchi's Tunisia does not take part in the power competition between major Sunni and Shia countries in the region because of its geography and the economic and political clout. Ghannouchi-led Tunisia pursues a

⁸⁴Regarding that subject matter, Ghannouchi penned an op-ed titled "Palestine as a Global Agenda." It can be reached at: <http://www.missionislam.com/nwo/globalagenda.htm> (Last accessed 20.10.2013).

cooperative foreign policy towards almost all Sunni and Shia governments on the one hand, and Arab and non-Arab MENA countries on the other.

Likewise, Ghannouchi is prone to establish good relations with many European countries especially with the France and Britain despite Tunisia's early experiences of Western imperialism and French conquests of North Africa in early 1880s. This anomaly in Ghannouchi's state of mind can be explained by his belief-changing life experiences in France and then in his exile to Britain where he met the Western life-style and the principles of pluralist democracy (Tamimi 2001). Hence, it is safe to argue that Ghannouchi's vision of moderate Islamism was burgeoned in those years. In this context, Ghannouchi's take on the Western countries and their foreign policy is very much affected by his individual experiences which are postulated to generate a benign perception of 'other' and the emergence of positive-sum mentality in Ghannouchi's political leadership. These predictions are substantiated by the highest I-1, lowest P-4a and moderate P-1 scores for Ghannouchi.

Apart from Tunisian foreign policy-making, it can be argued that Ghannouchi's moderate operational code beliefs have an impact on Ennahda party's policies at home and its bargaining and/or negotiation behaviors towards other political groups in Tunisia. The Ennahda government's adoption of a new constitution through negotiating with secular and liberal opposition parties showcases Ghannouchi's conciliatory leadership and use of cooperative tactics to achieve political objectives.⁸⁵ Tunisia's new constitution, put into effect in January 2014, stands out as one of the most progressive

⁸⁵The BBC News Portal: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25878534> (Last Access: 20.05.2014).

constitutions in contemporary MENA that is rooted in the principles of liberal democracy.⁸⁶ Therefore, Ennahda's top leadership and its cooperative behaviors in the making of Tunisia's new constitution were widely lauded by regional and world leaders who hailed the new-born constitution as a "model for Arab world" with a particular reference to other post-revolutionary MENA countries i.e., Egypt and Libya.⁸⁷

6.3. Khaled Meshaal: One Leader, Multiple Foreign Policy Behaviors

Meshaal hails from a modest background and he was raised within a religious family and conservative neighborhood where he got involved in religious institutions.⁸⁸ Consequently, Meshaal adamantly went up against established secular orders in his country and the greater MENA. His Islamism is a blend of Arab nationalism, a strong criticism of Western foreign policy and modern life style, and a vitriolic anti-Zionist rhetoric towards Israeli colonization of Palestine. He utilized this strong mixture of Islamism and Arab nationalism as a mainstay of his political mobilization tactics (Picucci 2008). In that sense, his understanding of Islamism and Islamist foreign policy is more akin to Morsi's mindset rather than Ghannouchi's.

⁸⁶The OpenDemocracy Platform: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/zaid-al-ali-donia-ben-romdhane/tunisia%E2%80%99s-new-constitution-progress-and-challenges-to-> (Last Access: 20.05.2014).

⁸⁷The Al Jazeera News Portal: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/foreign-leaders-hail-tunisia-constitution-201427144047687702.html> (Last Access: 25.05.2014).

⁸⁸For further insights on Meshaal's personal background, see the report published by Council on Foreign Relations: <http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-khaled-meshal-aka-khalid-meshaal-khaleed-mashal/p11111#p2> (Last accessed 15.11.2013).

Meshaal has the lowest P-1 score of all leaders (0,18) but still it appears to be a positive score and it remains somewhere close to the P-1 score for the average leader (0,30). His low P-1 score is unsurprising because of the ongoing Palestinian plight under Israeli occupation and Hamas' inherently hostile relations with Israel and the West and the organization's notorious status in the international community which is still branded as a 'foreign terrorist organization' by several major countries including the US, the European Union, Japan, Canada etc.⁸⁹ Thus, it can be argued that Meshaal's political career revolves around his criticisms of Zionism and Western foreign policy.

Meshaal's I-1 score is the lowest (0,40) of all leaders from which it can be inferred that Meshaal has the lowest level of cooperative approach towards his out-group. Yet, his score is still positive and unexpectedly it is also equal to the I-1 score for the average leader (0,40). Therefore, it can be predicted that even if he has a somewhat friendly view towards political universe (P-1), he is prone to pursue cooperative strategies and eschew from the immediate use of military force and conflict-escalatory behavior. However, considering where his operational code corresponds within the ranges of TIP⁹⁰, it appears that his preference ordering can change depending on the character of 'other', and/or the political context, and/or the immediacy of the problem.⁹¹ For example, Meshaal is expected to subscribe to the proposition 2, which encapsulates the Assurance strategy, towards the Egypt's Islamist regime headed by Morsi in post-

⁸⁹For the country reports on Terrorism published by the US Department of State, see: <https://web.archive.org/web/20050511025028/http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm> (Last accessed 15.09.2013).

⁹⁰For further information on varying operational code of a single leader depending on the context, timing and the issue area see Walker et al. (1998).

⁹¹The reasons of the variance in Meshaal's operational code and especially in his preference ordering is specified and discussed in the previous pages of this chapter. To recall, please see the tables 5 and 6 above.

2011 revolution era. Nonetheless, it is assumed that he will be disposed to follow the Prisoners' Dilemma strategy, depicted in proposition 5, towards Netanyahu of Israel in the aftermath of Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008.

Furthermore, since Meshaal always perceives his other's preference orderings to be domination (4), over settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1), it leads to two alternative foreign policy scenarios with three strategic options in total. First, if Meshaal follows the proposition 5 (Prisoners' dilemma strategy) towards Israel (which is more likely behavior) and also perceives Netanyahu to pursue the proposition 5, it will result in the classic Prisoners' dilemma game in which the 'deadlock' always persists (Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008). Second and less likely scenario is: if Meshaal follows the proposition 2 (Assurance strategy) and again perceives Israel's Netanyahu to subscribe to proposition 5, it leads to two alternative strategic options (Walker 2000). Initial option is a persistence of the 'deadlock' resulting from Israel's escalatory and non-cooperative strategy towards Hamas' leadership.

Second option in this scenario is a continuation of 'cooperation' if the Israeli leader acts first towards Gaza through following non-conflictual tactics and constructive dialogue which may prompt Hamas leadership to alleviate the misperceptions for Israeli behavior, then Meshaal will follow suit and there will be an outcome of 'settlement'. In other words, from the standpoint of Meshaal, the Israeli initiative and the assurance for cooperation are needed for him to pursue the Assurance strategy and opt for the 'settlement' since the Assurance strategy essentially means a 'conditional cooperation' (Malici and Buckner 2008). The upshot of these predictions is that Meshaal will either

follow the strategy of Assurance or Prisoners' dilemma towards the 'other' foreign policy actors depending on political context and the order of actors' 'sequential moves' in a game of strategic interactions (Brams 1994).

While he is a leader with the highest P-4a (0,22) score among three MENA Islamists, his sense of self's historical control is also tantamount to the mean score for the norming group (0,22). Additionally, since his P-4a score is within one standard deviation (0,13) of the world average, he does not perceive a disproportionate power relationship between his leadership and other actors such as far stronger American and Israeli leadership. Meshaal's non-outlier scores for his philosophical and instrumental beliefs are evidence that Gaza is not governed by an irrational and inherently hostile leader at all.⁹² On the contrary, Hamas' leader shows a cooperative foreign policy strategy and rational tactical intensity that is very similar to the average world leader.

However, the definition of in-group for Meshaal is the narrowest one in comparison to other MENA leaders analyzed in this study. In his speeches, Hamas' leader usually refers to followers of the Sunni sect of Islam; not including all Muslim world and Arabic-speaking nations of MENA. Meshaal views Shia regimes in Iran and Iraq as his 'other' while perceives Sunni-dominated countries like Turkey and Egypt within his in-group. Therefore, Meshaal's in-group seems to include only the Sunni countries that have good relations with the MB movement and regimes that champion political Islam in their domestic politics such as Turkey under AK Party, Egypt and

⁹²Meshaal himself said, in his with Foreign Policy magazine, these words: "We are not fanatic killers," and "I am not bloodthirsty or against Jews." The transcript of interview can be reached at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/14/exclusive_interview_khaled_meshaal_hamas_syria_israel_gaza (Last accessed 10.02.2014).

Tunisa under MB-affiliated leadership (Tianshe 2010). His in-group lastly includes the sympathizers of MB's vision of Islamism such as Qatar, Yemen and Kuwait where Meshaal has taken refuge or visited several times in his early political career.

Meshaal's out-group is, therefore, is the largest of all three leaders including not only most of the Western countries and Israel but also the Shia countries, and the relatively secular governments in the MENA whose common denominator is their anti-MB rhetoric and policies. This very broad out-group is composed of Western world, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, some Gulf Monarchies, and lastly Egypt.⁹³ Correlatively, owing to fact that Hamas usually resorts to violence and military force, it can be argued that Meshaal's sense of isolation is also the highest among three MENA leaders. Meshaal's view of Western civilization and Western foreign policy is immensely critical and biased. Particularly, Meshaal is highly critical of the American foreign policy towards the MENA and Western countries' unconditional support for Israel's revisionist policies in the region for decades.⁹⁴ The Hamas' linchpin views virtually all Western-originated international organizations e.g., the NATO, the IMF and the World Bank as tools for exploitation of Muslim world. Meshaal's mostly virulent rhetoric against the Western 'other' and high levels of distrust even for the neighboring Muslim nations are verified by Meshaal's relatively low I-1 and P-1 scores.

⁹³Ironically, current Egyptian regime led by military commander al-Sisi declared Hamas as terrorist organization proscribed its activities in the country as of 2014. For further information see, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-egypt-hamas-idUSBREA230F520140304> (Last Accessed 8.3.2014).

⁹⁴For Meshaal's perception of the West and its support for Israeli aggression can be retrieved from: <http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com.tr/2009/01/edited-transcript-of-khaled-meshaals.html> (Last Accessed 20.10.2013).

6.4. A Neo-Islamist's Conundrum: Morsi's Foreign Policy Torn between His Ideology, Egypt's National Interests and the post-2011 Conjunction

Mohamed Morsi comes from the epicenter of MB-oriented Islamism that exhibits all hallmarks of the common ideology characterizing the new leadership in MENA. In that sense, Morsi's political belief system and his conceptualization of foreign policy are imbued with Egypt-based MB teachings (Al-Awadi 2013). That said, Morsi was not the first choice of MB for Egypt's presidential elections and he was nominated at the last moment when the deputy Supreme Guide of MB Khairat al-Shater was disqualified by the SCAF⁹⁵ due to 'technical reasons.'

Therefore, Morsi can be seen as the 'dark horse' of the MB leadership whose swift rise to political power across the ranks of Egyptian politics stems from his personal connection and allegiance to the Supreme Guide led jointly by Mohammed Badie and Khariat al-Shater.⁹⁶ Morsi's Islamism appears to lie in between of other two MENA leaders and it comprises a strong Arab nationalism compounded by anti-imperialist rhetoric, a vision of Muslim solidarity under the banner of MB, and a fierce criticism of Zionism and Israel. Yet, like Ghannouchi and Turkey's Erdogan, Morsi also aims to, at least in his public statements, attain the scientific and industrial development

⁹⁵The abbreviation 'SCAF' stands for Supreme Council of Armed Forces in Egypt which was leading the transition period singlehandedly after the demise of Mubarak regime in 2011.

⁹⁶For further information on "Who is who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood" see the Washington Institute Report at <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/whos-who-in-the-muslim-brotherhood> (Last Accessed 20.10.2013).

achieved by Western countries with the idea of making Egypt a peer competitor of the Zionist Israel and Christian West.⁹⁷

Morsi has the second highest I-1 score (0,45) in the group which suggests a ‘definitely cooperative’ approach towards his counterparts in the domain of foreign policy despite his generally critical stance on Israeli and American foreign policy. The root cause of this contrast can be attributed to his relatively high P-1 score (0,28) within the group. Moreover, his low P-4a score (0,20) which is lower than the average score for the norming group (0,22) must have contributed to Morsi’s imperatively cooperative foreign policy behavior. Put differently, since Morsi has a benign view towards political universe and attributes the bulk of historical control to more powerful ‘other’, Morsi is inclined to follow de-escalatory foreign policy and employ non-conflictual strategy although he is highly critical and one-sided about Israel and Western foreign policy.

The P-1 score for Morsi (0,28) is the highest of all leaders studied in this research; almost equal to the P-1 score for average world leader (0,30). Hailing from the MB’s central zone and assuming the top executive office at one the largest and most influential countries in the MENA can be the contributing factors, albeit indirect, for his positive view of the political universe through augmenting his sense of control over power following the post-2011 Islamist grip on Egypt. Morsi’s P-4a score (0,40) is the second highest in the group and it is located within one standard deviation (0,13) of the mean for the norming group (P-4a= 0,22). Therefore, Morsi does perceive a rather

⁹⁷You can find the excerpts of Morsi’s speech exposing his perceptions of Egypt, the Muslim solidarity and the West here: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/world/middleeast/selected-excerpts-of-president-mohamed-morsis-speech.html?pagewanted=all> (Last accessed 20.10.2013).

symmetrical power relationship between himself and other foreign policy actors just the same as the perceptions of an average world leader.

Similar to Meshaal, Morsi's definition of in-group is quite limited which differs from Ghannouchi's conceptualization of the 'self.' In his statements, Morsi's in-group generally refers to firstly all oppressed Muslim people in the world e.g., Palestinians and Rohingya Muslims and secondly a few Sunni Muslim countries that have warm relations with the local offshoots of MB including Turkey, Qatar, Tunisia, Jordan, Gaza, Yemen, Kuwait etc. In fact, Morsi's public statements, by and large, accentuates the possibility of full-fledged cooperation among Muslim countries in the MENA⁹⁸ which confirms his high and positive I-1 score. His references to Islamic solidarity and cooperation emanate from his adherence to Arab nationalism which is fraught with anti-imperial sentiments. However, Morsi also does not shy away from criticizing other Muslim governments situated within his perceived in-group. For example, Morsi openly criticized the Hamas government in Gaza and closed down the strategic tunnels between Egypt's northern Sinai region and the Gaza Strip following the string of terrorist attacks in the Sinai against Egyptian troops in 2012.⁹⁹

Considering his speeches, Morsi specifies his out-group very broadly which includes first the Zionists and Western backers of Israeli foreign and security policies i.e., the US and Europe; secondly the Shia-led countries of MENA and these are Iran,

⁹⁸On this subject, see President Mohamed Morsi's speech in Tahrir Square in June 2012 published by Ikhwan-web the statement can be reached at: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30153> (Last Accessed 10.02.2014).

⁹⁹For further insights on Hamas-Egyptian relations during Morsi's term in office see the Washington Institute report at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-should-not-romanticize-egypt-muslim-brotherhood-rule> (Last accessed 15.02.2013).

Iraq, and Syria; some antagonist Sunni regimes which disown the MB ideology and confront the local MB offshoots in their countries such as Gulf Monarchies with the exception of Qatar as a sympathizer of the MB. In this respect, it is posited that Morsi's conceptualization of 'self' and 'other' is analogous with Meshaal's but dissimilar to Ghannouchi's sense of political universe. Here, Egyptians' deep-seated and strong Arab nationalism interwoven with anti-colonialist sentiments and Palestinians' grim experiences with Western colonialism and Israeli occupations must have contributed to Meshaal's and Morsi's much broader definition of their out-group.

According to many observers, Morsi's one year rule in presidential palace shows that his foreign policy was unlooked for since new Egyptian foreign policy did not deviate from the trajectory laid by Mubarak's leadership (Gold 2013; Özkan 2013). In other words, Morsi's foreign policy in general does not necessarily reflect the 'old philosophy' of MB concerning the conceptualization of foreign policy and strategies and tactics for achieving political objectives (Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and Canbolat 2012). This line of argument cites many foreign policy events including (1) the continuation of Camp David peace accords with Israel; (2) Morsi's numerous high-level visits to Western capitals where he pledged more political and economic cooperation; (3) lastly the inception of thaw, albeit a fleeting one, in Iranian-Egyptian relations with the 16th Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) Summit in Tehran as an examples of potential inconsistencies with the MB's conceptualization of foreign policy (Guirguis 2012; Gerges 2013; Sharp 2013).

On the other hand, another group of scholars argues that Morsi-led Egyptian foreign policy was monopolized under a certain control of MB's Guidance Bureau which circumvents other bureaucratic institutions including the ministry of foreign affairs (Haber and Ighani 2013; Grimm and Roll 2012). In a similar vein, given that only Morsi is fully in charge of foreign policy without delegating such authority to Guidance Bureau, it is tenable to argue that Morsi's political beliefs and perceptions are heavily influenced by MB's age-old ideology in his making an Egypt's Islamist foreign policy (Haber and Ighani 2013). In order to evaluate these competing arguments systematically and to untangle the causal mechanism in explaining Egyptian foreign policy under Morsi, the following section focuses on the linkage between Morsi's operational code and Egypt's foreign policy behavior during Morsi's short-lived presidency between June 2012 and July 2013.

First, the Egyptian-Israeli relations did not sever and the previous status-quo was largely maintained in security partnership during Morsi's term in office which confounded the expectations of international decision making elites (Haber and Ighani 2013). Although Morsi did not make any high-level visits to Israel, main communication channels were open and both sides upheld full commitment to the Camp David Peace treaty. Additionally, Morsi officially announced that he will respect all of Egypt's international treaties hinting at the Camp David peace accords despite the fact that the MB has always rejected the peace treaty and also the State of Israel. Morsi's

stance on Camp David induces Middle East analysts to conclude that Morsi's team simply replicated the Mubarak' foreign policy when it came to the US and Israel.¹⁰⁰

Gold argues that, contrary to Israeli government's apprehension, "security and intelligence cooperation between Israel and Egypt actually thrived during Morsi's presidency."¹⁰¹ Morsi's operational code beliefs confirm the Egyptian cooperative foreign policy towards Israel in this period since Morsi is postulated to follow Assurance strategy and perceive the Israeli leadership to subscribe to a Prisoners' Dilemma strategy. Likewise Ghannouchi and Meshaal, the scores for Morsi are Self (I-1= 0,45; P-4a= 0,20) and Other (P-1= 0,28; P-4b= 0,80) which respectively correspond to proposition 2 for 'self' and proposition 5 for 'other' specified in TIP. Therefore, Morsi's preference ordering is settlement (4), over deadlock (3), over domination (2), over submission (1) while his perceived preference ordering of Netanyahu is as follows: domination (4), over settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1).

In his leadership assessment manual, Walker (2000) outlines (from bottom to up) all levels of foreign policy decision-making of the leaders associated with Assurance and Prisoners' Dilemma strategy. Building on this framework, firstly, the preferred behaviors of Morsi will be 'reward' and/or 'promise' while Netanyahu's behaviors are perceived to be 'threaten' and/or 'punish.' Second, the moves of Morsi all focus on 'cooperation' while Netanyahu's moves are expected to be 'mixed.' Third,

¹⁰⁰For more insights on this subject, see the op-ed written by Dina Ezzar at: <http://english.ahram.org/NewsContentPrint/1/0/76837/Egypt/0/Morsis-foreign-policy-failures.aspx> (Last Accessed 20.12.2013).

¹⁰¹Zack Gold, "Why Israel Will Miss Morsi" Foreign Affairs, 20 August 2013. The op-ed can be reached at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139835/zack-gold/why-israel-will-miss-morsi> (Last Accessed 20.12.2013).

whereas Morsi favors the tactics of ‘reward’ and ‘deter’, he perceived Netanyahu to follow the tactics of ‘compel’ and ‘punish.’ Regarding the strategic orientation, Morsi’s tactical intensity and moves are associated with the Assurance strategy towards Israel while he perceives Netanyahu to embrace the Prisoner’s Dilemma strategy in his foreign policy towards Egypt. Walker and Schafer (2006) further elaborated on the prediction template and added the ‘levels of interaction’ typology to the TIP.

According to this typology, Morsi’s initial solution strategy to a foreign policy crisis will be ‘non-zero-sum’ whereas Netanyahu is expected to pursue a ‘zero-sum’ strategy. Therefore, Morsi’s restructuring strategy will be ‘cooperation’ although he anticipates Netanyahu’s later strategy to be ‘conflictual.’ Following this analytical framework, the anatomy of Morsi’s two significant foreign policy decisions towards Israel is performed: (1) the continuation of Camp David peace treaty, (2) making cooperation with Israel on Sinai at the expense of Hamas-Egyptian relations.

Initially, Morsi demonstrated full cooperation in his posturing on Camp David and favored the tactic of reward as a part of his Assurance strategy towards the Israeli state. While the decision of nullifying the treaty would fulfill the MB’s old philosophy regarding Zionist Israel, Morsi anticipated the risks of such radical decision. Above all, by abrogating the treaty, Morsi will jeopardize the national interests of Egypt for the sake of Islamist ideology and this decision will most likely pit the Egyptian bureaucracy and military establishment against Morsi regime since the Egyptian military is given a supreme constitutional authority over the issues of war and peace (Al-Awadi 2013). Secondly, Morsi was preoccupied with the internal disturbances and collapsing

Egyptian economy which threatened the very survival of his regime and therefore the conjuncture was not suitable for making a ‘revolutionary foreign policy.’¹⁰²

On the contrary, Morsi strove to have a balanced relationship with Israel to not antagonize the Western powers because of the immediacy of Egypt’s economic considerations. Acknowledging the various risks of scraping the Camp David, Morsi himself declared a tentative approval of the peace treaty. The decision of maintaining Egyptian allegiance to Camp David accords can be explained by Morsi’s preference ordering and his perception of Netanyahu’s potential strategic interaction. Morsi’s preference ordering of the self suggests that he prioritizes a settlement towards other actors particularly whose perceived control over historical developments is greater. Morsi perceives Netanyahu’s preference ordering as proposition 5 that favors domination first and then if there is a window of opportunity for two sides through cooperative dialogue Netanyahu will opt for a settlement.

Alternatively, since Morsi clings to Assurance strategy characterized by the tactics of Reward and/or Deter his overall strategy substantively means a strategy of ‘conditional cooperation’, if Netanyahu moves first and initiate cooperation towards Egypt, Morsi will follow suit. This prediction is drawn upon the Theory of Moves (TOM) developed by Brams (1994: 28) who argues that “if it is rational for one player to move and the other player not to move from the initial state, then the player who moves takes precedence, its move overrides the player who stays, so the outcome will

¹⁰²On Egypt’s non-revolutionary foreign policy, see Mohamed Morsi’s Speech at Cairo University published by Ikhwan Wed. The statement can be reached at: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30156> (Last Accessed 20.12.2013).

be induced by the player who moves.” Therefore, Netanyahu’s policy initiative will serve as a correcting arm to amend Morsi’s misperceived preference ordering he attributes to Netanyahu in the first place. In the final analysis, Morsi’s decision to maintain the peace with Israel is an outcome of his Assurance strategy in which he favored the tactic of Reward towards Netanyahu because the communication channels between Egypt and Israel were wide open. Moreover, Israel exhibited signals of cooperation and policy initiative in Egypt’s suppression of extremist groups in the Sinai which reassured the both sides of Camp David about the significance of maintaining the treaty (Aftandilian 2013). This particular decision elucidates the Morsi’s conundrum in foreign policy decision-making that is fractured along the lines of the MB’s ideology, the exigencies of the office, and the combination of internal and external realities facing Morsi’s presidency.

Second foreign policy case is related to Morsi’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict together with Morsi’s policies toward Hamas and Israel in the wake of rising terrorism in the Sinai region. Considering this case, it is observed that Morsi’s foreign policies toward Gaza and Israel have laid bare a stark discrepancy between the MB’s philosophy of international relations and the gravity of Egyptian national interests. Even though the MB leadership always proclaims support for Palestinians against the ‘Zionist usurpers’, Morsi’s behaviors towards Israel and Gaza appear to subordinate the MB’s ideology to the priorities of the president’s office.

In this context, Morsi government took two controversial foreign policy decisions: the continuation of cooperation with Israel to contain extremism in Sinai, and

the indecision to lift the blockade on Gaza's border with Egypt and closure of underground tunnels between Gaza and Northern Sinai. First, after a terrorist attack claimed the lives of 16 Egyptian soldiers in the turbulent Sinai region in August 2012, Morsi's government first called for minor changes of the Camp David peace treaty to remove limitations on the deployment of Egyptian troops in the Sinai (Aftandilian 2013). However, after Israel opposed to a revision of the treaty and pressured the Egyptian government for its deployment activities, Morsi chose to cancel military deployments and he maintained the tacit cooperation with Israel at the expense of Hamas.¹⁰³ Then, Israel signaled a more cooperative behavior and engaged in a constructive dialogue to coordinate Israeli and Egyptian security policies in accordance with Camp David accords to stamp out the extremist attacks in the Sinai (Sharp 2013).

Morsi's decision in this case was an outcome of his pursuit of Assurance strategy in which he used the tactics of 'appeasement' and 'reward' towards Netanyahu while he perceived Netanyahu to follow Prisoners' Dilemma strategy and the tactic of 'compel' before two actors reach a 'settlement.' When Morsi moved first and demanded a revision of treaty, Netanyahu subscribed to an escalatory foreign policy and employed the tactic of 'compel' since proposition 5 suggests that he is prone to dominate the other in the first place. After perceiving Netanyahu's escalatory move, Morsi's operational code regressed to the tactic of appeasement because Morsi attributes the bulk of historical control to Netanyahu rather than himself (P-4a= 0,20).

¹⁰³Zack Gold, "Why Israel Will Miss Morsi" Foreign Affairs.

In the second part of Morsi's foreign policy decision, following the Israeli government's signals of positive dialogue for coordination and Netanyahu's de-escalatory move, Morsi altered his tactical intensity by favoring the tactic of 'reward.' Subsequently, Morsi exhibited very cooperative behavior to coordinate the military deployments with the Israeli intelligence and respecting the peace treaty with Israel which resulted in a 'settlement' in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Following the logic of settlement, Morsi shied away from removing the siege on Egypt's border with Gaza Strip which contradicted the MB's ideological affinity toward Hamas and Palestinian cause.

More radically, in 2013, Morsi decided to close down a series of underground tunnel along the Gazan-Egyptian border in coordination with Israel to eliminate the smuggling of weapons between Gaza and the Sinai (Haber and Ighani 2013). Morsi's key advisor Essam el-Haddad overtly expressed the government's policy of closing the tunnels by arguing that "we don't want to see these tunnels used for illegal ways smuggling either people or weapons that can really harm Egyptian security"¹⁰⁴ This statement alone highlights the subordination of MB's ideological objectives to the priorities of Egyptian national interests and the exigencies of the post-2011 conjuncture in MENA.

In a nutshell, these exemplar foreign policy cases confirm the contention that Morsi confronted with a conundrum during his short-lived tenure in which his foreign

¹⁰⁴For further insights on Morsi's decision to close down the tunnels, see Taylor's and Saleh's piece published by Reuters at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/us-palestinians-tunnels-egypt-idUSBRE91H0JA20130218> (Last accessed 20.12.2013).

policy was torn between the MB's old ideology, the imperatives of the presidential office, and the new conjuncture materialized following the 2011 revolution. This study contends that the operational code approach presents an exceptional explanatory and predictive power to make sense of Morsi's intriguing foreign policy behavior from a vantage point of decision-making theory informed by the universal principles of cognitive psychology.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter attempts to connect the operational code results for three MENA leaders to the real-life foreign policy events transpiring in the contemporary MENA politics. Accordingly, the operational code analysis of MB-originated Islamist leadership in MENA provides a blend of mainly confounding and slightly anticipated results. These insights allow us to generate a cognitive framework to search for the general patterns of Islamist foreign policy and to make sense of new MENA leaders' political strategies and tactics for accomplishing foreign policy objectives.

Considering three MB-affiliated MENA leaders' cognitive diagnostic and prescriptive beliefs together, it boils down to the argument that the new MENA leadership is expected to prefer cooperative strategies. However, since all three leaders subscribe to an Assurance strategy they will exhibit a strategy of 'conditional cooperation' (Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008). Strikingly, in contrast to popular narrative in Western mass media and many academic circles about MB organization and

its leaders, Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi do not subscribe to a confrontational strategy. On the contrary, they all perceive the Western world and Zionists e.g. the US and Israel as imperialistic and hostile powers whose ultimate objective is to jeopardize the survival of their respective regimes in MENA.

CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION

The concluding chapter engages in four major tasks: (1) providing the most condensed version of the study's motivation and the phases of research, (2) succinctly reviewing the analysis results and revisiting the main hypotheses, (3), summarizing the theoretical and policy-relevant implications of this thesis, and finally (4) indicating a few worthwhile avenues for future research in a similar vein.

7.1. Motivation and Building Blocks of the Research

I aim to achieve two main research objectives in this thesis: (1) broadening the geographical coverage of North America-originated operational code analysis by applying it to MENA context and (2) challenging the conventional wisdom held in the Western world with regards to MB-defined Islamism and its political leadership. This study compiles three leaders' foreign policy speeches as the data for analyzing their

operational code profiles. Next, leadership assessment tools, the VICS method and the automated content analysis program Profiler Plus, are employed to systematically generate statistical evidence for the leaders' political beliefs. By using the state-of-the-art content analysis software, it is possible to get 100 percent coding reliability for the analysis and to perform comparative statistical applications (Schafer and Walker 2006). After the operational code profiles of three MENA leaders are described, I reflected on the analysis results and discussed the implications of the findings where a connection between the leaders' belief systems and their foreign policy behaviors is also established.

7.2. Re-visiting the Results

An operational code analysis of MB-originated Islamist leadership in MENA yields interesting and challenging results that confound the conventional images of Islamist leaders held in the Western world. An analysis of foreign policy belief systems of three Islamist leaders from 2011 to 2013 discloses some general patterns in how Islamism and particularly the MB as an ideology and actor reasserted themselves and conducted foreign policy in the post-Arab uprisings era. The most prevalent theme in MENA leaders' public speeches is anti-Western rhetoric. From these speeches, it is inferred that all three leaders are very critical of all sorts of Western intervention towards the MENA. Their indignation at the Western foreign policy towards MENA and the foreign and

security policies of Israel are verified by relatively low P-1 and P-4a scores which, together, represent their somewhat high level of distrust towards ‘other.’

Moreover, MB-affiliated Islamist leaders share a common perception of disparity in historical control because their statements appear to reflect a notably low level of historical control attributed to ‘self’. Their personal encounters with ‘Zionists’, ‘Imperialists’, and ‘Colonizers’ and their ideological reading of the MENA’s history are the contributing factors for their sense of loose command over political developments which confirm their somewhat low P-4a scores. Regarding the direction of strategies, the analysis shows that the MB-Islamists speak with one voice in their tactical intensity and their foreign policy behaviors generally resonate in harmony.

The general theme is that if tactical opportunities emerge, the MB-Islamists prove cooperative in varying degrees from somewhat (Meshaal and Morsi) to definitely cooperative (Ghannouchi). Substantively, the three leaders are very cooperative towards their in-group. Nonetheless, the breadth of their definition of in-group changes from one leader to another. While Meshaal has the narrowest definition of in-group, Ghannouchi has the most inclusive in-group and Morsi’s perception of ‘us’ appears in-between of this in-group spectrum. Meshaal proved relatively more frustrated (and/or angry) and confrontational due to Palestinian territories status and his antagonistic relations with Israel and the Western countries allied with Israeli government. All in all, however, the new MENA leaders including Meshaal see themselves as cooperative towards both their in-group and, albeit to a lesser extent, their out-group.

Building on these results, firstly it is observed that the operational codes of three MB-affiliated MENA leaders are highly similar which put all three MB-Islamists into the Type A leadership quadrant and identify their other in the foreign policy realm as Type C leaders. Here, the bottom line is that Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi are expected to show very similar foreign policy behaviors. The results are interesting since three MENA countries' regime types are different in which the MB-affiliated leaders experience very distinct and diverse political and structural limitations existing at the state and international levels. Put together, the first group of findings supports the *Hypothesis 1b* which contends that all three Islamist leaders exhibit very similar foreign policy behaviors despite their quite different country-wise backgrounds.

Secondly, a comparative analysis of the operational code scores of new MENA leaders with the average world leader substantiates the *Hypothesis 1a*: the strategic and philosophical beliefs of three MENA leaders are notably similar to the political beliefs of world leaders included in the norming group. Therefore, the policy-oriented recommendation for the US foreign policy towards MENA region is as follows: Three MENA leaders' non-outlier scores for his philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs are evidence that Egypt, Tunisia, and Gaza Strip are not governed by an 'irrational' or 'inherently hostile' or 'rogue' leaders at all.¹⁰⁵ In contrast, the new MENA leaders are predicted to pursue cooperative foreign policy strategies centered on rational tactical orientation when a window of opportunity appears and these are

¹⁰⁵The concept of 'rogue leader' and its usage for the particular non-Western leaders in the context of US foreign policy under George W. Bush presidency is drawn from the studies of Malici (2007) and Malici and Buckner (2008), although it originally did not refer to the MB-affiliated Islamist leaders in the MENA.

evocative of the behaviors exhibited by an ‘average leader’ in world politics (Schafer and Walker 2006).

Thirdly, in terms of the preference orderings of new MENA leadership, the upshot of analysis is that while the new MENA leadership’s perception of other’s preference ordering corresponds to conditions specified in proposition 5 in TIP (Prisoners’ Dilemma Strategy), their preference ordering for the self fits to the conditions specified in proposition 2 (Assurance Strategy). That said, three MENA leaders’ perceptions of the other meet the conditions of Prisoners’ Dilemma strategy which also appears to be one of the two preference orderings that Meshaal attributes to himself. Therefore, Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi perceive their other as a hawkish leader who always attempts to dominate and prefer rather conflictual strategies although the ‘other’ does not exert an inordinate amount of historical power over the leaders of Tunisia, Gaza and Egypt.

7.3. Theoretical and Policy-Relevant Implications

The theoretical and policy-oriented implications of such particular study on new MENA leaders are manifold. First, it can be argued that North America-originated cognitive approaches to foreign policy can be applied to non-Western cases as well and these approaches have a lot to offer for researchers to gain a nuanced view towards regional and international politics. Particularly, the analysis results showcase the top-notch explanatory and predictive profiling tools of operational code approach in studying the

new MENA leadership from a vantage point of an independent decision-making theory informed by the canonical principles of political psychology. Second, this thesis is another testimony to those subscribing to a notion that the human beings occupy the epicenter of international politics (Hudson 2005). The use of stereotypical and dichotomous portrayals of the Islamist regimes in MENA like the perceptions of ‘rogue’, ‘irrational’, ‘crazy’, ‘inherently hostile’ cannot account for how the non-Western leaders comprehend the outside world and which approaches they use to cope with their out-group.

In contrast, the leadership assessment tools, such as the operational code construct, provide systematical evidence as to leaders’ distinct personal characteristics and engage in comparative analysis of these differences. The empirical findings of this study do not confirm the simplistic and popular appraisals in the West regarding the new MENA leaders and the sources of the Islamists’ foreign policy. Next, a comparative analysis of a group of MENA leaders with a sample of 35 diverse world leaders hailing from both small/weak and major/strong provides the opportunity to put new MENA leadership into broader and most systematic perspective. This comparative statistical application implies that it is now possible for researchers to gain a better perspective of how the leaders studied here think about and behave towards the inherently convoluted political universe compare to the average ‘world leader.’

Prior to outlining the policy-relevant implications, here it is apt to make two disclaimers concerning the theoretical conclusions of this research. First, although it suggests an explicit linkage between leaders’ psychological particularities and their countries’ foreign policy behaviors, this study refrains from contending a sole and direct

causal mechanism between leaders' beliefs and the foreign policy outputs i.e., ultimate decisions. By following the arguments of Kaarbo (1997) and Kesgin (2011), this study postulates that the impact of a leader's belief system on foreign policy can be best attributed to the decision making process rather than foreign policy outputs. Kaarbo (1997: 572) suggests that personality features "affect process the most, outcomes the second, and outputs the least." Similarly, the second disclaimer of this thesis is also drawn from the leadership studies literature. As Rosati (1984) and also Walker (1977) argue, the cognitive research programs do not claim an outright marriage between leaders' beliefs and their behaviors that can account for all foreign policy decisions of the states. This study also avoids from the contention that all foreign policy decisions can be traced to a nexus between individuals' beliefs and their political behavior. In contrast, as Kaarbo (1997: 577) points out "any direct translation from individual level variables to foreign policy is difficult." In many foreign policy cases, multi-level analysis can still be more instrumental with the aim of eluding reductionist overdose through incorporating more systemic and sub-systemic variables into a research.

With regards to policy-relevant implications, this study offers an instructive point of view for decision makers in charge of conducting Western and/or American foreign policy towards MENA countries and their leadership. Considering three MB-affiliated MENA leaders' cognitive diagnostic and prescriptive beliefs together, the whole discussion boils down to the argument that the new MENA leadership is expected to prefer cooperative strategies when conciliation opportunities arise. That said, since all three leaders subscribe to an Assurance strategy, they will exhibit a strategy of 'conditional cooperation' rather than an unconditional acquiescence towards

their out-group (Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008). Strikingly, in contrast to the mainstream narrative in Western mass media and many academic circles regarding the MB movement and its leadership, Ghannouchi's, Meshaal's and Morsi's foreign policy cannot be reduced to the allegations that describe the MB's approach to foreign affairs as a 'dyed-in-the-wool' inimical.

This thesis challenges the commonplace assumption that the MB's deep-rooted hostile ideology towards the Western countries is the sole source underlying an Islamist foreign policy in MENA. All three leaders analyzed in this study do not appear as irrational and parochial foreign policy leaders and they do not necessarily conduct an ideology-bounded foreign policy through the pursuit of non-cooperative and escalatory strategies. On the contrary, they all perceive major Western powers and also the Israeli governments as interventionist and hostile actors ill-disposed towards Islamist governments of MENA. In other words, from the standpoint of new MENA leadership the international powers and particularly the US appear to be threatening powers whose ultimate foreign policy objective is to remove the fledgling Islamist regimes in the post-Arab awakening MENA.

7.4. Avenues for Future Research

The first potential trajectory for future studies is advancing on the research topics of psychological and behavioral empathy within the fields of foreign policy and conflict resolution studies. In addition to psychological empathy, the importance of behavioral empathy is also underscored within the leadership studies literature with reference to a

chess game logic in explaining strategic interactions between decision makers (White 1991). Due to its limited scope, this thesis focuses heavily on ‘realistic empathy’ which is recognized as one of the main strands of psychological empathy and it attempts to apply this significant concept to understand new MENA politics by getting into the minds of key individuals (White 1984). Therefore, future studies on non-Western leaders can tap into this understudied area in the field of political psychology. Behavioral empathy necessitates the prediction of other actor’s future behaviors to provide a better strategic roadmap for the resolution of conflicts and/or foreign policy crises. In other words, there is a need for analyzing the operational codes of both leaders of the two countries that locked into a foreign policy crisis to assume a behavioral empathy in future studies.

Additionally, to suggest decision makers a full-fledged strategic perspective for the aim of preventing the escalation of foreign policy crises scholars may need to incorporate both psychological and behavioral empathy into their studies. The upside of such scholarly works will be the use of beliefs and perceptions as the basis of game theory modeling of strategic interactions between conflicting states instead of taking the decision makers and their preferences as given (Lake and Powell 1999). For instance, in order to gain a more profound understanding of Arab-Israeli conflict, foreign policy analysis scholars may examine the operational codes of both Israeli prime ministers and political leaders of Hamas and Fatah and then plug the relevant leaders’ political beliefs into a realistically modeled strategic game. Such game theoretic model that rests on leaders’ idiosyncrasies is meritorious because it does theorize every inch of a strategic

interaction between Israel and Palestine from the micro-behavioral variables to a macro-state level interaction. For the current issues in the conflict, researchers can choose from many foreign policy cases in the post-2000 era e.g., the 2006 Lebanon war, the Operation ‘Cast Lead’ in 2008, and most recently the Operation ‘Pillar of Defense’ in 2012.

Another promising vein of research will be the simultaneous use of multiple ‘at-a-distance’ methods of leadership analysis in one study to provide the most detailed profile of an individual leader. It is likely that studies as such make a notable contribution to the FPA field since there are quite few studies that employ more than one leadership assessment tools (Kesgin 2011). In his research, Kesgin utilizes both LTA and operational code methods to examine the personalities of all Turkish and Israeli prime ministers since the early 1990s and describes the use of two approaches of leadership studies at a time as the strong suit of his dissertation. A particular research design incorporating manifold measures of leadership yields further insights about the leaders’ profiles, which constitutes a greater basis for comparison between distinct and diverse theoretical and policy-relevant implications of the analysis. In addition to LTA (Hermann 1980; 1984; 2003; Hermann et al. 2001), future studies can draw on many at-a-distance constructs including role theory (Holsti 1970; Walker 1987), cognitive style (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Tetlock 1983), cognitive maps (Axelrod 1976), and image theory (Herrmann 1984; Cottam 1985) and potentially employ them to profile same political leader(s) together with the operational code analysis.

Next, this study focuses exclusively on the last generation of political Islamists operating in MENA rather than a broader group of Islamist leaders since it would go beyond the scope of a single research project. Moreover, Islamist foreign policy in distinct time periods and various Islamist leaders have been studied in the relevant literature (O'Reilly 2007; Picucci 2008; Özdamar 2011; Özdamar *forthcoming*). Yet, there is still much work to be done to draw fuller picture of political leadership in MENA region. For example, a comparative analysis of belief systems of new generation of Islamists with the beliefs of “older generation” will allow researchers to put Islamists and their foreign policy into broader and more systematic perspective (Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and Canbolat 2012).

Furthermore, since political Islamism is not a static and monolith movement there is a need to study other political organizations in MENA which claim to be ‘true’ representatives of Islamism such as Salafi al-Nour Party of Egypt or terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Future studies may fulfill the void in the literature on non-Western leaders by profiling particular leaders affiliated to different strands of political Islam and then comparing their personalities with the leaders’ studied before. Such undertaking will help expanding the North America-originated leadership studies literature to other strategically important countries in the non-Western world.

Finally, rarely do foreign policy scholars make an effort to link psychological characteristics of leaders with large-N foreign policy behaviors data for a broad collection of countries. This study attempts to correlate the belief systems of MB-affiliated Islamist leaders with foreign policy behaviors of three MENA countries

without using state level data due to its very demanding technical procedures and event data scarcity for the post-2011 MENA. In the literature, there are only a handful of studies that integrated systematic political psychology insights and foreign policy event data and directly linked operational codes with foreign policy behavior (Picucci 2008, Kesgin 2011). Thus, the huge part of this task still remains to be done by the prospective studies on FPA. In this particular niche of foreign policy studies, however, the scholarly objective should be the “marriage between individual and state level data” (Kesgin 2011: 7).

To accomplish this marriage, researchers can use event datasets to measure the state foreign policy behavior as a dependent variable of the study while leadership characteristics taken as the independent variables. The event data, which based on a coding scheme called Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO), can be obtained from Penn State Event Data System (PSEDS).¹⁰⁶ The use of event datasets from PSEDS to analyze state behavior in foreign affairs is commended and suggested by many prominent scholars of FPA (Hudson 2005; 2007; Walker and Schafer 2006; Breuning 2007). A better-established linkage between political psychology variables and large-N foreign policy behavior data can be potentially a breakthrough in foreign policy studies with the integration of individual and state levels of analysis which will rid the FPA field of many problems and criticisms lingering today.

¹⁰⁶Penn State Event Data System/Project (PSEDS) was formerly known as Kansas Event Data System (KEDS). It was renamed the PSEDS after one its founders Philip Schrodtt (with Deborah Garner) started his tenure in Pennsylvania State University in 2010. The datasets can be reached at: <http://eventdata.psu.edu> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

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APPENDIX

Speeches Coded:

Khaled Meshaal

Meshaal, Khaled. "Author Zdenek Lokaj's Interview with Hamas Chief Khaled Meshaal" September 2010 (Last Access: 20.01.2014).

----- "The Making of a Palestinian Islamist Leader: An Interview with Khalid Mishal" (by Mouin Rabbani) *Journal of Palestine Studies* 37(3): 59-73. September 2008.

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Mohamed Morsi

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Rachid Ghannouchi

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- "Selected Excerpts from the book 'Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism' including several interviews with Mr. Ghannouchi" (by Azzam Tamimi), May 2001.
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- "Rachid Ghannouchi: the Foreign Policy Interview" (by Marc Lynch of Foreign Policy Magazine", December 2011 (Last Access: 10.02.2014).
- "Transcript of Rachid Ghannouchi's Speech at Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID)" March 2012 (Last Access: 10.02.2014).
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