

CIGALAZADE YUSUF SINAN PASHA: A 16TH CENTURY OTTOMAN
CONVERT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

A Master's Thesis

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To mom, dad, Melis and Burcu

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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in

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ABSTRACT

CIGALAZADE YUSUF SINAN PASHA: A 16TH CENTURY OTTOMAN CONVERT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

Biçer, Merve

M.A., Department of History

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This thesis focuses on the life of Scipione Cicala, *also known as* Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, who was a significant Genoese convert inside the 16th century Ottoman court. Based on the reports of the Venetian bailos and ambassadors in Constantinople, the study aims to draw a portrait of Cicala to indicate how these bureaucrats envisaged Cicala and his personal, political and economic relationships in line with the changes inside the Ottoman court and the Mediterranean Sea. Through his prestigious duties in both Eastern and Western parts of the Sultanate, his patronage networks, imperial marriages and his relations with hereditary family, this thesis aims to explain how an “Ottoman” diplomat was perceived both in his hometown (Italian peninsula) and in the Ottoman Empire.

Keywords: Cicala, Cigalazade, the Republic of Venice, the Ottoman Empire, Mediterranean world, converts, *Kul* system, Veneto- Ottoman relations, *dispacci, relazione*.

ÖZET

CİGALAZADE YUSUF SİNAN PAŞA: AKDENİZ DÜNYASINDA 16.
YÜZYIL OSMANLI DEVŞİRMESİ

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Bu tez, 16. yüzyıl Osmanlı sarayında bulunan ve önemli bir devşirme olan Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Paşa olarak bilinen Genovalı Scipione Cicala'nın hayatına odaklanmaktadır. İstanbulda ikamet eden dönemin Venedik bailoları ve büyük elçilerinin yazdığı raporları temel alan bu çalışma, bu bürokratlarının Cicalayı ile Osmanlı sarayı ve Akdeniz içindeki değişimler çerçevesinde kurduğu kişisel, politik ve ekonomik ilişkilerini nasıl gözlemlediklerini göstererek, bir Cicala portresini çizmeyi amaçlar. Devletin doğusunda ve batısında aldığı önemli görevler, patronaj ilişkileri, hanedan evlilikleri ve öz ailesi ile kurduğu ilişkiler göz önünde bulundurularak, bir "Osmanlı" diplomatının hem doğduğu topraklarda hem de Osmanlı Devleti içinde nasıl algılandığını göstermek amaçlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cicala, Cigalazade, Venedik Cumhuriyeti, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Akdeniz dünyası, devşirmeler, *Kul* sistemi, Osmanlı-Venedik İlişkileri, *dispacci*, *relazione*.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Subject and Sources

The second half of the sixteenth century was a turning point both for the Ottoman court and for the relations between the Empire and the Republic of Venice in terms of changing political and economic dynamics and the balance of power. In this period, the Venetian commercial activities in the Levant shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to combat new enemies, such as England and France, along with other Italian maritime states¹ such as Florence, Ragusa and Genoa, Venetians gave further importance to their political ties established with the Ottoman court by their permanent representative (*bailo*) and their

¹ The Italian peninsula between the 9th and 15th centuries was composed of many independent states mostly in the central and northern regions of the peninsula. By the 11th century, many cities, such as Venice, Milan, Florence, Genoa, Pisa, Siena had become large trading metropolises, which were able to conquer independence from their formal sovereigns. Besides, The Ottoman Empire cooperated with Genoa, Venice's rival, on the sea, granting the Genoese extensive commercial privileges as early as 1352 and later on giving them a long term monopoly over alum production in the area of Magnesia.

ambassadors.² Moreover, in this period the viziers, who were a part of the *Kul* system as the servants of the Sultan and members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, started accumulating power and wealth and created their own network inside the court to sustain their position against the central government. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Sultans started to establish their own network through their *musahibs* (imperial favorites) to break the viziers' patronage networks. At the same time, women in the court established their own factions in order to balance their power inside the court.³

This thesis centers on the life of Scipione Cicala, who was known as Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan in the Ottoman court,⁴ in order to understand how Venetian *bailos* and ambassadors envisaged Cicala due to the changes both inside the court and in the Mediterranean Sea. Through his prestigious duties in both Eastern and Western parts of the Sultanate, he established networks of patronage and family and maintained his relations with his original family in Sicily, which was under Spanish authority, even after his entrance into the court. Focusing on these relations, this thesis aims to explain how an "Ottoman" diplomat was perceived both in his hometown (Italian peninsula) and in the Ottoman Empire.

This work sets out to explain Cicala's position and his career's ups and downs inside the court through the networks established by his marriages and

² Halil İnalçık, "An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations," in *Venezia: Centro di Mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e Problemi*, ed. Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos Manoussacas, and Agostino Pertusi (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1977), 83-90.

³ Günhan Börekçi and Şefik Peksevgen, "Court and Favorites," in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 151-154 and Maria Pia Pedani, "Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy," *Turcica* 32 (2000), 9-32.

⁴ In the Venetian reports, the name Cicala was used instead of Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan. We can also see variations of the name, such as Cigala or Cigalla. Hereby I will use Cicala in reference to Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan throughout the thesis.

cooperation with other important court figures and their protection. It also aims to understand the identity of a convert who was once a Genoese corsair and then became an Ottoman statesman through the relations he established with other representatives of the Italian peninsula such as Safiye Sultan, Chief White Eunuch Gazanfer and especially the Venetian *bailos*. An examination of the relations among these figures or their relations with other bureaucrats from different ethnic backgrounds helps us understand if their identities contributed to the establishment of stable factions or relations among these people, or with the Republic of Venice. In addition, with relations and dispatches of the different *bailos*, who observed the changing attitude against the Republic inside the court and the Mediterranean Sea, this work aims to explore the perception of an Ottoman convert from the Venetian aristocracy, who always alienated themselves from the notion of the convert. Through the chronical writers who witnessed the period, such as Mustafa Ali, Peçevi, Selaniki, Naima and Hasan Beyzade (except for Naima) this thesis tries to understand different aspects of the events and figures to complete the Venetian point of view.

Beyond the fear of Turks, as a famous Italian proverb reveals “*Oh mother, the Turks are coming!*” (*Mamma, li Turchi!*)⁵, Italian city- states never interrupted their relations with the Ottoman Empire due to their interest in the Levant. The Republic of Venice in particular established this position more systematically. The Venetians observed the Empire and the Sultan’s servants in order to stabilize and keep their position under control as much as possible. They also gave importance to the ethnic background and social position of the converts to

⁵ Şerafettin Turan, *Türkiye- İtalya İlişkileri: Selçuklular’dan Bizans’ın Sona Erişine*, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), 9.

understand their new identity as Ottoman statesmen. Cicala became a very significant figure, which indicates that the Mediterranean world of the sixteenth century was open to dialog and interaction between different states and religions.

From one side, the figure of Cicala reveals the qualifications of a convert who was able to obtain a very different social and economic position by changing his religion. Cicala improved his position and used his skills as a corsair to become a capable admiral in the Ottoman Empire. His relations with the Venetian *bailo* help us to see how he situated his position with the Ottoman Sultan and inside the court as well. He also allows us to see how the Republic of Venice regarded the converted Ottoman statesmen and how these people situated themselves inside the court. Finally, the presence of his brothers Filippo, Carlo and his mother makes him a more noteworthy example. Cicala's case draws a picture of a Mediterranean man who could easily come and go between different boundaries, as Emilio Sola named his book "*Los que van y vienen*"⁶. Besides, this shows that the Mediterranean Sea was united by its geographical, cultural and economic qualifications as Braudel depicted.⁷

In order to understand these dynamics and changes inside and outside the court, the Venetian documents of the *bailo*⁸ and extraordinary ambassadors⁹ have

⁶ Emilio Sola Castaño, *Los que van y vienen: Información y fronteras en el Mediterráneo clásico del siglo XVI* (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2005).

⁷ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973).

⁸ *Bailo* was the protector and representative of the Venetian subjects inside the Ottoman court in the name of the Venetian Republic.

⁹ *Oratore straordinario* was the extraordinary ambassador sent to Constantinople only for peace treaties and important celebrations such as enthronement of a new Sultan. The Ambassador only presented his *relazione* when he turned back to Venice after his mission.

crucial significance.¹⁰ These letters, which were written daily, were named *dispacci* (dispatches) and those which were written as final reports at the end of the *bailo*'s stay in Constantinople and read in the Venetian Senate were named *relazioni* (relations).

With the agreement of 1540 with the Ottomans,¹¹ each Venetian *bailo* had the possibility of staying in Constantinople for three years and continued the tradition of writing their *dispacci* nearly every day. The final report, *relazione* explains the Ottoman territories, its military and administrative institutions, and the qualifications of the Sultan of that period with the important figures close to him. Along with the social, political and economic conditions of the Empire, the *bailo* summarizes the relations of the Ottoman Empire with its neighbors and enemies. The *bailos* inform the Republic also about the conditions of the Venetian subjects, his own household and the commerce of the Levant. While a *relazione* draws a general picture of the Ottoman Empire with its institutions and main figures, the dispatches explain the ongoing daily routine not only inside the court but also inside the Empire.

Through these reports, it becomes easy to understand the relationships between the sultan, his family and his bureaucrats inside the court. In addition, the decisions made by important figures, the establishment of their relations with Ottoman or foreign statesmen becomes more clear. While the *bailo* also observed the social and economic life of the Sultan's subject people, we can see the other

¹⁰ For detailed sources on the Venetian *bailo*, see Tommaso Bertele *Venedik ve Konstantiniyye: Tarihte Osmanlı- Venedik İlişkileri*, trans. Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012); Eric Dursteler *İstanbuldaki Venedikliler: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

¹¹ Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye*, 99.

side of the established systems of the Ottoman Empire inside the court: hatred and intrigue among important Viziers, Sultanas or other bureaucrats, which resulted in the establishment of factions. Through the detailed descriptions of the *bailos* we can contextualize significant court figures from the beginning of their career to the end. This is of particular importance as the Ottoman documents are typically not very helpful for us to understand the creation of an Ottoman statesman's identity because they tend to omit the person's interactions inside and outside the court as well as his early life before the court, except for the Ottoman chronic writers who participated in the events themselves and narrated them from their point of view as eye-witnesses.

Among these Venetian reports, this study mainly focused on the 23 files (*filze*) that indicate the period between 1576 and 1609 when Cicala became the target of the Venetian bureaucrats. According to Cicala's personal life, court life or his relations with the *bailo*, some files included five or six letters written on different days. There are even rare cases where the *bailo* wrote several letters on the same day. With the dispatches, it becomes clearer to understand the reasons that affected the ups and downs of Cicala's career and the establishment of his identity as Genoese by origin and as an Ottoman statesman. They also show us the details of his relations with the court people and his hometown. It becomes easier to see Cicala's relationships with his hereditary family, his visits to his mother and his attempts to establish a career for his youngest brother Carlo inside the Ottoman Empire. In addition, through *dispacci* we can see how he regarded the Spanish Empire and the Papal State by following his excursions in the Mediterranean Sea through the Italian peninsula and Venetian dominions. The

dispacci are also instrumental in making clearer the reasons of Cicala's immediate rise and fall in his political life. After the Ottoman- Habsburg war of 1596, he obtained the title of Grand Vizirate for only a month. Furthermore, on the Safavid frontier in the last period of his life, he had many defeats despite his supreme authority.

Other important sources are the *Relazioni* of Gianfrancesco Morosini, Giovanni Moro, Matteo Zane, Lorenzo Bernardo, Girolamo Cappello and Ottaviano Bon that explain their relations in the Senate of the Venetian Republic between 1585 and 1609. These relations help to understand the situation in the Mediterranean Sea, and the Hungarian and Safavid frontiers, where Cicala had important duties. These documents also draw a general picture of the social, economic and political atmosphere around Cicala, which helped situate him inside the court among the Ottoman statesmen and foreign ambassadors, mainly the Venetian ones.

Along with the Venetian *relazioni* and *dispacci*, the diary of the ambassador Leonardo Donà, who stayed in Constantinople in 1595 narrates all aspects of the capital and the Empire. The ambassador also makes very careful observations about the relations between the foreign and Ottoman court figures.¹² Another important source is Stephan Gerlach, who was an orator of the Habsburg Ambassador who eye-witnessed the period between 1577 and 1578, which coincides with the very early Ottoman life of Cicala.¹³

¹² Leonardo Donà, *Itinerario... Memorie... Relatione.... Ambasciatori.... Costantinopoli*, Fondo Donà dalle Rose, 23, 68r- 226v (dated October 27, 1595).

¹³ Stephan Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, trans. Türkis Noyan, ed. Kemal Beydilli, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Kitapyayinevi, 2006).

The reports the Venetian Senate (*deliberazioni*) and some dispatches of the governors of the islands, such as Deer Island in the Indian Ocean, Cyprus, Zakynthos and Milos, also help us see the position of Cicala and especially his father Visconte Cicala. Through these sources, we can see how the corsair activities of the Cicalas remained without punishment and how they moved easily in the Mediterranean Sea close to important Venetian dominions such as Cyprus, Corfu and Crete.

The Calendar of the State Papers related to English affairs in Venice, summed up the dispatches related to Cicala's relations with foreign ambassadors inside the court. These documents show the English point of view and reveal details of Cicala's attitude towards the Spanish, French and English ambassadors despite their limited information to draw Cicala's portrait.

Ottoman chroniclers reveal significant information on his character and the events and circumstances around him, which helps us to enrich Cicala's portrait. The chroniclers such as Mustafa Ali, Selaniki, Peçevi and Hasan Beyzade, who lived in the same period with Cicala, reveal different aspects of the same events or court figures as they were members of different factions.

In addition to the Ottoman chronicles, Koca Sinan Pasha's informative notes (sing. *telhis*) presented directly to the Sultan point out how Sinan Pasha negatively affected the decision making of the Sultan when Cicala was on the point of becoming the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada. Moreover, while presenting his own idea to the Sultan, he revealed not only the qualifications of

the statesmen but also the conditions of different institutions and situations such as the financial sources of the Empire and the condition of the Arsenal.

It should be noted here that Venetian bureaucrats sometimes misunderstood the process of Ottoman traditions and establishment of institutions or they exaggerated the situation. Moreover, as they alienated themselves from the figure of the convert, they had a very subjective and often humiliating interpretation of the converts inside the Empire even when the converts had brilliant careers.

The different perceptions of the image of Cicala in the Ottoman chronicles and the Venetian documents define the methodology of this study. In this context, while analyzing the narrations on Cicala, I examine what these documents reveal about Cicala, and his Mediterranean and Ottoman environment as well as the manner in which these were told.

1.2 Historiography

One of the most important early studies written on Cicala is the study of Cardinal Ilario Rinieri's *Clemente VIII e Sinan Bassa Cicala*. Rinieri depicts a convert who could not separate himself from his hereditary religion and family and even tried to change his religion in the last period of his lifetime. According to Rinieri, who used archival sources of the Vatican, Cicala even tried to

cooperate with the Spanish Empire and Pope Clement VIII.¹⁴ Rinieri's work is very valuable through the richness of the archival sources and helps us understand Clement VIII's relation with Cicala. The study of Gaetano Oliva *Sinan Bassá, Celebre Rinnegato del Secolo XVI*, is a more detailed study which was published as two articles in 1907 and 1908.¹⁵ Although both studies reveal important information about Cicala's relations with the Pope, his maritime activities and intervention in the Calabrian problem, it draws the figure of Cicala very subjectively, as a very valuable loss of Catholic belief who tried to recompense for it.

Gino Benzoni in his article on Cicala in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* in 1981 reveals more detailed and less subjective research.¹⁶ In addition to criticizing the interpretation of Oliva and Rinieri, Benzoni also uses Venetian archival sources.

On the phenomenon of Cicala, Evrim Türkçelik makes a very significant contribution with his work *Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha y el Mediterráneo entre 1591- 1606*. Türkçelik examines the appointment of Cicala as the admiral of the Ottoman Armada and its reflections both inside the Ottoman Administrative system and the Mediterranean world. With the contribution of Spanish and Venetian archival sources, he points out the Spanish Empire's close observance and intents to trace the Venetian policy of Cicala. In addition, he shows the changing attitude of the sixteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy in Mediterranean

¹⁴ Ilario Rinieri, *Clemente VIII e Sinan Bassa Cicala* (Roma: Civiltà Cattolica, 1898).

¹⁵ Gaetano Oliva, "Sinan-Bassa (Scipione Cicala) Celebre Rinnegato Del Secolo XVI", *Archivio Storico Messinese*, VIII (1907), 267-303 and IX (1908), 70-202.

¹⁶ Gino Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)", *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (DBI)* (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1981), XXV.

politics. He also examines the transformation of Spanish oriental policy during the transition from the reign of Philip II to the reign of Philip III.¹⁷

“Das «negotium secretum» der Familie Cicala” of Jan Paul Niederkorn, on the other hand, uses Spanish Archival sources to show the position of the Spanish court against Cicala’s conversion.¹⁸ V.J Parry, Tayyip Gökbilgin and Mahmut Şakiroğlu also write encyclopedia entries on Cicala by using the Ottoman documents. More than Cicala’s Mediterranean activities, these entries focus on Cicala’s role in the Ottoman- Hungarian wars and the Safavid frontier.¹⁹ In addition to these studies, Günhan Börekçi, Cornell Fleischer, Baki Tezcan and Emrah Safa Gürkan also mention Cicala in order to explain the political, social and administrative changes both inside the Empire and the Mediterranean Sea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where Cicala played a role.²⁰

Although the Mediterranean history is among the most studied subjects, we should mention Fernand Braudel, whose *Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II* was published first in 1949 and became a classic of Mediterranean studies. In his book, Braudel focuses on the common elements of Mediterranean history and then unifies all geographical, political,

¹⁷ Evrim Türkçelik, *Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha y el Mediterráneo entre 1591- 1606*, unpublished Ph.D thesis, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, 2012.

¹⁸ Jan Paul Niederkorn, “Das «negotium secretum» der Familie Cicala”, *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 101(2-4), 1993, 425- 434.

¹⁹ V. J. Parry, “Cighala-zade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden and London, 1978), vol. II, 33-34; M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, “Cigalazade”, *Islam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1940-1986), vol. III, 161-164; Mahmut Şakiroğlu, “Cigalazade Sinan Paşa”, *TDVIA*, vol. II, 525-526.

²⁰ William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1591-1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983); Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541 -1600)*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Günhan Börekçi, *Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I and His Immediate Predecessors*, unpublished Ph.D thesis, The Ohio State University, 2010; Emrah Gürkan *Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go- Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry*, unpublished Ph.D thesis, The Georgetown University, 2012.

economic and social elements of the Mediterranean World.²¹ Another important historian, Andrew Hess, mainly focuses on the political and religious differences of the Mediterranean World.²²

Alberto Tenenti, Gino Benzoni²³ Paolo Preto²⁴ and Tommaso Bertelè²⁵ and Eric Dursteler,²⁶ reveal different aspects of the Veneto-Ottoman relations and figures as well as point out the Venetian bureaucrats and subjects inside the Ottoman Empire. Salvatore Bono and again Tenenti focus on corsairs, pirates and elaborate on different aspects of the Mediterranean Sea.²⁷ These studies give significant information on the activities of the pirates of Uskoks, Malta and Barberia. They also describe the entrance of the English and Dutch piracy in the competition and show the position of the Republic of Venice in a time of important changes in the Mediterranean World.

On the notion of converts, Lucetta Scaraffia, Bartolomé y Lucile Bennassar, Salvatore Bono, Natalie Zemon Davis, Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra²⁸ emphasize encounter and interactions through corsair activities and

²¹ Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1949).

²² Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

²³ Carlo Priovano, ed., *Venezia e i Turchi: Scontri e Confronti di Due Civiltà*, (Milano: Electa, 1985).

²⁴ Paolo Preto, *Venezia e I Turchi* (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1975).

²⁵ Tommaso Bertelè, *Il Palazzo degli Ambasciatori de Venezia a Constantinopoli e le sue Antiche Memorie*, (Bologna: Apollo, 1932).

²⁶ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*.

²⁷ Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice (1580-1615)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

²⁸ Lucetta Scaraffia, *Rinnegati: per una Storia dell'Identità Occidentale* (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1993); Bartolomé Bennassar and Lucile Bennassar, *I cristiani di Allah: la Straordinaria Epopea dei Convertiti all'Islamismo nei Secoli XVI e XVII* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1991); Salvatore Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e Musulmani fra Guerra, Schiavitù e Commercio* (Milan: Mondadori, 1993); Natalie Zemon Davis, *Trickster Travels: a Sixteenth-Century Muslim between Worlds* (London: Faber and Faber, 2007); Miguel Ángel de Bunes, *La imagen de los musulmanes y del*

political conflicts and conquests in the Mediterranean Sea. Emilio Sola, Benjamin Arbel, Natalie Rothman and Paolo Preto²⁹ explore the people who became acceptable subjects on both sides such as merchants and advisers or favorites and spies.

The works of Maria Pia Pedani on Safiye Sultan³⁰, Benjamin Arbel on Nurbanu Sultan³¹, Ebru Turan on Ibrahim Pasha,³² Antonio Fabris on Hasan Veneziano³³, Elvin Otman on Alvise Gritti³⁴ and Emilio Sola and Gustavo Valente on Uluç Ali³⁵ show different aspects of these important converts in terms of their identity and their relations with the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire.

Since the Italian peninsula experienced the invasion of Otranto during the reign of Mehmed II, the fear of “Turks” became a significant concern even in the 16th century politics of the Italian city- states. In their studies, Giovanni Ricci,

norte de África en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII: los Caracteres de una Hostilidad (Madrid: Instituto de Filología, CSIC, 1989).

²⁹ Sola Castaño, *Los que Van y Vienen*; Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Preto, Paolo. *I Servizi Segreti di Venezia*. (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994).

³⁰ Pedani, “Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy”, 9-31.

³¹ Benjamin Arbel, "Nur Banu (c. 1530-1583): A Venetian Sultana?", *Turcica*, 24 (1992), 241-259.

³² Ebru Turan. *The Sultan’s Favorite: Ibrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Universal Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Suleyman (1516-1526)*, Ph.D thesis, University of Chicago, 2007.

³³ Antonio Fabris, “Hasan ‘il Veneziano’ tra Algeria e Costantinopoli,” *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 5 (1997): 51-66.

³⁴ Elvin Otman, *The Role of Alvise Gritti within the Ottoman politics in the Context of the “Hungarian Question” (1526-1534)* (M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2009).

³⁵ Emilio Sola Castaño, *Uchalí: El Calabrés Tiñoso, o el Mito del Corsario Muladí en la Frontera* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2011); Gustavo Valente, *Vita di Occhiali*. (Milano: Casa Editrice Ceschina, 1960).

Mustafa Soykut and Özlem Kumrular point out the perception of this fear besides its effects and reflections in the Mediterranean.³⁶

Metin Kunt, with his important article *Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment*,³⁷ explains the establishment of the factions or the cooperation among the converts according to their ethnic origin. He also points out the important converts' interactions with their hereditary families. *Bir Osmanlı Kimliği* of Salih Özbaran should also be mentioned for he mainly emphasized the image and significance of *Rumi* identity both from Ottoman and foreign perceptions. He also explains the perception of "Turks" in the Italian peninsula and their contribution to the spread of this image in Europe.³⁸

Despite the number of the studies on Cicala that has been done, we do not have a portrait of Cicala, which takes the dynamics inside the Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean into consideration. In other words, although this thesis utilizes the Venetian documents as a basis, it aims to draw a portrait of Cicala, while explaining Ottoman administrative, political, economic and social dynamics, which affected both the Ottoman court life and the life in the Mediterranean. Among the foreign documents that reveal important details about the Ottoman court life, the Venetian ones are outstanding. By drawing a detailed potrait of Cicala and his period, this study gives the possibilty of comparison with

³⁶ Giovanni Ricci, *Ossessione Turca: In una Retrovia Cristiana dell'Europa Moderna* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2002); Mustafa Soykut, *Image of the "Turk" in Italy: A History of the "Other" in Early Modern Europe: 1453-1683*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001); Özlem Kumrular, *Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının Kökeni, Türk Korkusu*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008).

³⁷ Metin Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5, 3 (June 1974).

³⁸ Salih Özbaran, *Bir Osmanlı Kimliği*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004).

other foreign and Ottoman sources that depicts the 16th century Ottoman court with the important figures inside it. By doing so, it will contribute to a more detailed history writing of Cicala and the world around him by comparison of various narrations. I also aimed to make a contribution to the literature by observing the relation between Cicala and his brother Carlo from the Venetian point of view, since Cicala and his family were on the agenda of the Europeans, particularly of the Papal State, the Spanish Empire and the Venetian Republic.

CHAPTER II

CICALA AND THE WORLD AROUND HIM

In this chapter, I will explain the *Kul* system of the Ottoman state and how the Venetians envisaged this system. In doing so, I aim to portray both the system in which Cicala arose as an admiral of the Ottoman Armada and Grand Vizier, and to see the relationship between the Venetian bailos and Cicala with the background of the image of Cicala that they envisaged.

2.1 Establishment of Kul system in the Ottoman Empire

As a Near Eastern Muslim state power, the entire ruling system of the Ottoman Empire depended on the will of the ruler. The *Kul* system included all the servants of the Sultan, from the lowest to the Grand Vizier who were equal to one another and responsible only to the rulers. In the fifteenth and sixteenth

centuries, the Ottoman *Kul* status was limited to one's position in the social system. The military unites (*ehl- i seyf* = men of the sword) dealt with conquests, organization and administration of the state. The non- military masses (*sürüler* or *reaya* = herd) were obligated to deal with public production and to pay their taxes.

Considered in this way, the Ottoman Empire looks like a centralized state of an Eastern conceptual type with a perfectly functioning socio- economic mechanism, which determined the place of every person in society.³⁹ From the beginning, the Ottoman Empire protected its nucleus; the military group organized around their leader Osman Ghazi, which became the keystone of the entire socio- political structure.⁴⁰

In the Ottoman *Kul* system, slavery depended on resignation to the will and command of the Ottoman Sultan, where, in return, subjects took the honor of representing his unique authority.⁴¹ The chief distinctive feature behind the directly empowered senior ruling elite and the numerous bureaucrats of the State offices was the Janissary Corps and the Six Regiments- all united by their being *Kul* of the sultans. In this respect the sultan's slaves were filled with the awareness of their own enormous importance for the State, and with self- confidence, claiming that they were "the right hand and the wing of the Ottoman

³⁹ Evgeni Radushev, "The Ottoman Ruling Nomenclature in the 16th and 17th Centuries," *Bulgarian Historical Review* 3-4 (1998), 5.

⁴⁰ Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17; Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 83- 84.

⁴¹ Sir Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Printed by T.N. for Joanna Brome, 1682), 8.

dynasty”, as pointed out in the Janissaries’ regulations.⁴² Lybyer states this commitment of the *Kul* members:

The most vital and characteristic features of the this institution were, first, that its personnel consisted, with few exceptions, of men born of Christian parents or of the sons of such, and second, that almost every member of the Institution came into it as the sultan’s slave throughout life no matter to what height of wealth, power and greatness he might attain.⁴³

Then Lybyer explains the motivation of the slaves not to return to their old religions after becoming a part of the Ottoman administration system:

“The Ottoman system deliberately took slaves and made them ministers of the state, it took boys from the sheep- run or the plow- tail and made them courtiers and husbands of princesses, it took young men whose ancestors had borne the Christian name for centuries and made them rulers in the greatest of Muslim states, and soldiers and generals in the invincible armies whose main joy is to beat down the Cross and elevate the Crescent...”⁴⁴

The Christians who converted to Islam in the *Kul* system were taken according to their skills and tactics in order to be used against their ex-patriots. In the times of war or conquests, they became primary pioneers that were familiar with the habits and situation of their lands of birth and moved in their old territories easily. Often, they also had the opportunity of sending money to their hereditary families.⁴⁵ Islam turned into an occasion to provide a larger field of

⁴² Radushev, “The Ottoman Ruling Nomenclature,” 36.

⁴³ Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), 36.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 45.

⁴⁵ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 6.

maneuver in social and political spheres, even if that meant being the slaves of the Sultan.⁴⁶

The Ottomans directly adopted the institution of slavery from the Anatolian Seljuks. The Seljuk Sultans had personal guards named *has gulam* (imperial slaves) that were a mix of Anatolian Christians who were slaves or prisoners of war. They followed the Sultan during war time, while in peace time they provided the security of the palace. Their training took place in special palace schools named *taştane* or (*gulamhane*). There they were chosen as different categories of guards and were trained as *candar*, *silahdar*, or *sipahi* in order to form the Seljuk military order.⁴⁷

The Seljuk regular army, organized in this fashion, was full of converted Greeks, Armenians and even Western Europeans. Many of the members of the Sultan's Council (*Divan*) and other senior state officials were imperial slaves (*has gulâm*) who had made their way up their career ladders.⁴⁸ Anatolian Seljuks succeeded in building up an armed organization based on service landownership which was under Byzantine influence and on the regular army of slaves which was inspired by the Islamic tradition. This whole armed force was balancing the chaotic nomadic militarism of the Turkmens. Ultimately the unification of the tribes into one state and the conquest over practically all of Asia Minor from

⁴⁶ Local people converted to Islam in order to receive some favors from the ruling class, such as exemption from taxes, promotion in bureaucracy and so forth. See Richard Maxwell Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 116.

⁴⁷ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi*, Vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1959-1971), 269- 281.

⁴⁸ Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1966), 28-30.

Byzantium called for a strong central power, which relied on an efficient and disciplined army.

The *Kul* system transformed during the reign of Mehmed II with the transformation into the Ottoman structure of administration as a homogenized society. In order to establish his centralized authority, the Sultan tried to abolish the pre-Ottoman Anatolian and Balkan feudal aristocracies. From one side, the political, military, and economic elite of the Balkan territories were defeated on the battle field. Then these local feudal nobles were integrated into the Ottoman state structure in the army or into the local and central administration, so they could have a chance to continue their existence as a political and economic force. On the other side, the elites of the Anatolian Seljuks namely *beyliks*, were integrated into the system by purchasing large estates. The *malikâne-divanî* system was an ownership shared between the landowner and the centralized State: part of the revenue collected by the owner of the states (the *malikâne* part), and the other (*divanî*) remained at the disposal of the State and usually the treasury gave it as *timar*. In the *timar* system, The Christian *sipahis* (fifteenth – first half of the sixteenth century) who in return for their military service received portions of the centralized rent as *timars* and turned to Islam in the course of time.⁴⁹

However, until Mehmed II, some influential families such as Evrenosoğulları, Mihaloğulları, Malkoçoğulları, and Turahanoğulları put the Sultan's centralized power in jeopardy, when their interests did not coincide with his. In order to stabilize his power, Mehmed II confiscated all properties of his vizier and jailed him in Edirne after the capture of Constantinople. The Sultan also

⁴⁹ Radushev, "The Ottoman Ruling Nomenclature," 9-11.

abolished landownership of his statesmen and blocked their participation in governing. Although certain families like the Evrenosoğulları, Mihaloğulları or Firuzoğulları succeeded in preserving part of their estates, their economic and political influence remained local.⁵⁰

Since the middle of the fifteenth century, people of varying ethnic origins gained a significant presence among the Ottoman ruling elites. Since as a rule the military- administrative system was filled with cadres trained in the Palace schools, practically all posts in the state administration were recruited by Greeks, Albanians, Serbs, Bosnians, Bulgarians etc. The ruling elite of the State was formed outside the Muslim- Turkish ethnos, or more precisely – with its minimal participation. The esteemed researcher of Ottoman History, Franz Babinger, reflecting on the perfectly elaborate Ottoman system of governing slaves, concludes:

While in other countries a rigid class structure held the common people down, on the Bosphorus the meanest slave could hope, through force of character and good fortune, to rise to the highest offices in the state. But this perfect social equality, which everywhere forms the foundation of Oriental despotism, existed only for the master race of the faithful. Between it and the *reaya* there yawned an enormous gulf.⁵¹

According to Machiavelli, in the European West the people started to seize the power from the religious and aristocratic monopoly. In the Ottoman Empire “people” became “masses”. Even if Machiavelli did not observe very well the difference between *reaya* and the military organization in the social structure, he

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 14- 15.

⁵¹ Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conquerer and His Time* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

analyzes very well the importance of the cavalry and infantry army of the *devşirmes* for the Sultan's authority. It is remarkable that Machiavelli did not take into consideration the presence of the provincial *sipahis* and he assumed that they were not capable of influencing political development. However, the Janissaries did not appear simply as a military support system of the regime for conquests and suppression of internal opposition. The entire *devşirme* system and the Janissary organization, the Sultan's guard units and corps who served the palace with their way of selection, training and command, formed the central authority as human potential. Therefore, we can say that "the Kingdom of the Sultan" was in the hands of his army. As Machiavelli stated:

“Nowadays, for all rulers, except the Sultan of Turkey and Egypt, it is more necessary to satisfy the people than the soldiers, because the people are now more powerful. The Sultan of Turkey is an exception because he always keeps twelve thousand foot- soldiers and fifteen thousand cavalry in his service near him, and the security and strength of his Kingdom depends on these forces. Hence, he must keep these forces friendly, and pay more regard to them than to others. Likewise, since the Kingdom of the Sultan of Egypt is completely in the hands of the soldiers, he too is obliged to keep them friendly, without considering what the people may want.”⁵²

2.2 *Kul* system in the European and the Venetian Perceptions

The Ottoman Empire could not manage to make conquests on the Italian peninsula and settle in these lands as was feared of them. As Machiavelli

⁵² Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Q. Skinner and R. Price, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 71.

mentioned in a letter dated 1521, the Italian city-states used to talk constantly of “the impending Turks and the crusades to be formed against them.”⁵³ The event that caused the Italian city-states to perceive the presence of the “Turks” the most was the Ottoman expansion into Otranto after the fall of Constantinople. In 1480, all the Italian states but Venice formed a defensive alliance against the Ottomans, while Venice maintained its alliance with the Ottomans which was well known to other states.⁵⁴ With Mehmed II’s death a year later, the “Turks” withdrew from this territory of the Kingdom of Napoli and the physical presence of the “Turks” at least came to an end on the Italian peninsula.

However, the presence of the “Turks” continued to have its place in the minds and policies of Europeans. They constructed an identity of the “Turk” as an object of fear in discourse and defined them as the “other.” The Italian peninsula worked also as a station for Europe, which otherized and defined Turks as barbarians in the period of Ottoman encounter.⁵⁵ Accordingly, in Alfonso d’Este II’s Ferrara, nobles joked about alleged raids by “Turkish” pirates and noble women set up games in which their knights were held hostage by these pirates.⁵⁶ These all indicate to us that a flow of orientalism started to flourish in Italy.

In this context, poems and books that were written on “Turks” and their religion indicate that the Italian peninsula was making an effort to become acquainted with the Ottomans. As a prominent poet from the Kingdom of Naples, Torquato Tasso started writing his masterpiece *Jerusalem Delivered* (*La*

⁵³ Ricci, *Türk Saplantısı: Yeniçağ Avrupa’sında Korku, Nefret ve Sevgi* (İstanbul: Kitap, 2005), 7.

⁵⁴ Gino Benzoni, “Il “farsi turco”, ossia l’ombra del rinnegato,” in *Venezia e i Turchi: Scontri e confronti di due civiltà*, (Milano: Electa, 1985), 95.

⁵⁵ Mustafa Soykut, “Tarihi Perspektiften İtalyan Şarkiyatçı ve Türkologları”, *Doğu- Batı* 20 (2002), 52- 53.

⁵⁶ Ricci, *Ossessione Turca*, 71.

Gerusalemme Liberata) influenced by the unsuccessful siege of Hungary in the court of the Duke of Ferrara.⁵⁷ Although unsuccessful, Paganino Paganini and his son Alessandro published a Holy Kur'an in Venice in 1538.⁵⁸

Firstly, it is necessary to consider the way the word Turks was used when we talk about the perception of Turks in Europe. What the Europeans meant by the word was Muslims in general. The Academy of Crusca in Florence defined the word “Turk” in 1691 to mean a person of the faith of Muhammed, not as Ottoman.⁵⁹ According to Şerafettin Turan, among those who use the terms *Turchi* and *Turchia*, Italian literature had a significant place. Although the exact geography was lacking in this literature, the territory they meant were the areas Turks lived.⁶⁰

In a more common term, making himself Turk (*farsi turco*) signifies becoming a Muslim in the sixteenth century.⁶¹ These people, who became Muslims later on, could also be identified as “Turk by profession” (*turco de profesión*).⁶² Bailo Francesco Morosini stated that there were two types of “Turks”:

One consists of those who are native- born of Turkish parents, while the other is made up of renegades who are sons of Christian parents, taken by force in the raids which the fleets and the irregular troops customarily conducts on Christian lands, or else they are from among the Signor's subjects and tax- payers, removed by force from their own village. These,

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 31- 74.

⁵⁸ Eros Baldissera, “Corano: primo tentativo di stampa Venezia 1538,” <http://venus.unive.it/arabic/arabiyat/doc/CoranVe%20per%20VIF.pdf>

⁵⁹ *Vocabulario degli Accademici della Crusca*, 3rd Edition (Floransa, Accademia della Crusca, 1691), 1736.

⁶⁰ Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya İlişkileri*, 9- 11.

⁶¹ Benzoni, “Il ‘farsi turco’,” 91- 133.

⁶² Diego de Haedo, *Topographia e historia general de Argel* (Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliofilos Espanoles, 1927).

while still children, are circumcised and made Turks either by enticements or by force.⁶³

Nevertheless, due to the power of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans became prominent as the “Turks”. The governor of Algiers Barbarossa from Lesbos, Hasan Pasha from Sardegna, Uluç Ali from Calabria and Hasan Pasha from Venice were the well known converts of the 16th century who became “Turks by profession” as the generals of the Ottoman Armada.

There were also contribution of the Italians to Mehmed II during the siege of Constantinople. Ciriaco de Pizzicoli and Ciriaco de Ancona worked for the construction of the fortifications on the Bosphorus for the Sultan. The Genoese minority in the capital helped the Sultan to establish a bridge near Galata.⁶⁴ There were also situations when the Italians were converted in masses: In 1544, Barbarossa made 4000 Ischia subjects his slaves in one excursion. In 1588, there were 2500 Italian slaves from the Veneto region.⁶⁵ Luigi Bennassar in his book named *I Christiani di Allah* observed the Spanish Inquisition documents and stated that there were 402 Italian and 459 Spanish converts between 1550 and 1700.⁶⁶ In the course of time the converts started to create buffer zones where their interests unified with the interests of the corsairs and the merchants of the Mediterranean Sea. For example there were islands such as Tabarca, Pantelleria and Lampedusa which paid taxes to both the Christian and Muslim authorities to

⁶³ Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 94.

⁶⁴ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 8.

⁶⁵ Ricci, *Ossessione Turca*, 57.

⁶⁶ Bennassar, *I Christiani di Allah*, 144.

create a common and neutral area for commerce. In these regions the currency of both sides was valid.⁶⁷

Machiavelli, in his book named *The Prince*, makes an important analysis of the Ottoman Empire's administration and *Kul* System in which the "Turk by profession" arose, from his place as a contemporary observer of the period after Mehmed II. In the book, he tried to reveal important features of the governments of successful rulers and the differences among the powers that he observed. He also points out the establishment of the Ottoman Empire's centralized power through the type of landownership and slavery system. This description gives us a great portrait of a European point of view of the Ottoman Empire. He firstly emphasizes the central power of the Ottoman Sultans and the governing of their territories.

The Turkish kingdom was governed by only one ruler and the others were his servants. The territories conquered by the Ruler were divided into sanjaks. The Sultan could know what was happening in all his dominions, as the sanjaks were directly connected to his authority. He could also send officers to various administrations whose places could be changed and moved as the Sultan pleased.⁶⁸

According to well-known politician from Florence, as the slaves of the Sultan owed their position to their unique ruler, they would remain loyal to him. Machiavelli did not believe that these servants could be easily dissuaded of their

⁶⁷ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 15- 28.

⁶⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 15.

loyalty. He warns that the enemies that wanted to engage in battle had to prepare very powerful armies instead of believing in the Sultan's armies' disunity.⁶⁹

In the 16th century, one of the debates on the issue of the convert was the loyalty of the slaves to the ruler. The priests of the *Order of Sante Trinita* that worked to return converts to their original belief in the Italian Peninsula, had this attitude against the notion of the convert:

Generally Turks and Barbarians chose poor Christian youth that could not find anything to wear or eat while working in the ships or the poor young shepherds and showed them affection. When this youth who wore silk clothes, ate abundantly and protected by their servants, the conversion from Jesuit belief became a happiness whose teaching was not yet understood.⁷⁰

There were even some converts who found being Muslim more relaxing in terms of consuming wine and meat. During his Inquisitional interrogation, Giuseppe di Pozzoli confessed his desire to return to *Torchia* just in order to eat meat as he wished.⁷¹

Until the end of the sixteenth century, the Inquisition of Rome did not put rigid regulations to block Christian conversion to Islam. For the first time in 1562 the Inquisition started the interrogations. They did not give importance to the cases of Jews or Muslims that accepted Christianity. The main target of the Roman Inquisition in the 16th century were the converts who fought against Christianity after their conversion.⁷² The Italian peninsula was geographically

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 16.

⁷⁰ Ricci, *Ossessione Turca*, 76.

⁷¹ Scaraffa, *Rinnegati*, 79- 82.

⁷² *Ibid*, 103- 109.

more open to interaction and changes in the Mediterranean. Moreover the Roman Inquisition remained slower to block the phenomenon of conversion when we consider the rigid regulations of the Spanish Inquisition.

According to reports of the Venetian *bailos* and ambassadors, the most disturbing side of conversion for the Venetian Aristocracy was the ease of social mobility. They found the rise of people to high ranking duties from the lower class unacceptable. Moreover, they did not believe in the sincerity of their conversion and did not regard them as faithful people.⁷³ Marc'Antonio Barbaro in his *relazione* of 1573 stated that people who did not come from aristocratic families and learn the discipline of bureaucracy by birth tended to become arrogant after their conversion.⁷⁴ For a Venetian bureaucrat who was aristocratic and would remain as such; honor, political discipline and nobility were qualifications that could not be obtained later. That is why Venetians always approached converts with suspicion. As they did not trust their conversion's sincerity, they stood automatically as untrustworthy.

In the case of Cicala the situation was more disturbing, because, if Cicala became disloyal and untrustworthy, he would betray his Ottoman Sultan which would make only the Papal and Spanish states happy, while the Venetian interests would be jeopardized in the Levant and the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁵ For this reason, he never had a good image in the eyes of the Venetians. Another disturbance of the Venetians was the easy submission of converts to the Sultan in political and juridical terms. The Venetian *bailo* Gianfrancesco Morosini stated that:

⁷³ Benzoni, "Il 'farsi turco'," 109.

⁷⁴ Scaraffa, *Rinnegati*, 161.

⁷⁵ Benzoni, "Il 'farsi turco'," 109.

“The renegades are all slaves, and are proud to be able to say, ‘I am a slave of the Gran Signor!’ For it is known that it (Ottoman Empire) is the dominion or the Republic of slaves, where it is they who are in command.”⁷⁶

2.3 The Developments Characterizing the 16th Century Veneto-Ottoman Relations

2.3.1 Cooperation of Corsair Activities with Imperial Armies

From the beginning of the 16th century, the corsair activities started to significantly change the sphere of the Mediterranean Sea. Not only Christian Emperors but also Muslim sultans started to justify the aggressive activities of the corsairs with religious excuses under their protection in order to erode the other side. The Republic of Venice had a vast commercial network from the Aegean, Ionian and Adriatic Seas to Sicily and Gibraltar. In the same region, the Venetians tried to protect their vast commercial points and networks with both their military and commercial forces and to balance their position in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the European powers and the Ottoman Empire continued their maritime confrontations.⁷⁷ Thanks to corsair activities, the political, military and commercial activities of the Islamic and Christian world integrated with the

⁷⁶ Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 93.

⁷⁷ Alberto Tenenti, *Venezia e i corsari, 1580-1615* (Bari: Laterza, 1961), 8- 9.

movement of considerable goods and people. With the reinforcement of the Spanish Armada and the presence of Barbarossa in Egypt and Algiers, the Western Mediterranean became the point of interaction for the two powers.⁷⁸

Between 1575 and 1580, the Western powers of England, Holland and the Baltic Sea started to integrate themselves in the Mediterranean sphere, by moving both as commercial and corsair ships, which made the situation more complicated for the Venetians. They did not only attack the Venetian ships, but also from the 1580s started to enjoy capitulations from the Ottomans. Although it was forbidden, in return they took necessary goods from the Venetian ports. Along with the new western merchants, there were Uskoks from Habsburg Croatia that were composed of Slavs and Dalmatians who escaped from the Venetian and Habsburg authorities. Uskoks were protected by the Pope since they paid their taxes on time and by the Habsburg emperors who were glad to spoil Veneto-Ottoman peace. The Uskoks also attacked only Ottoman and Jewish ships so as not to offend their Christian allies. Thanks to the peace treaty with the Ottomans in 1574, the Venetians had to sustain the peace in the Adriatic Sea.⁷⁹ As the Uskoks continued attacking the Ottomans, the Venetians had trouble inside the court with the complaints of the Sultans that used these attacks as an excuse to obtain Venetian dominions.⁸⁰

At the end of the 16th century, the military Armada of the Venetian Republic was still very powerful. However, in the course of time as other

⁷⁸ Maurice Aymard, "XVI. Yüzyılın Sonunda Akdeniz'de Korsanlık ve Venedik," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisad Fakültesi Mecmuası* XXIII/1-2.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 223-226.

⁸⁰ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazione degli Ambasciatore Veneti al Senato durante il secolo XVI*, Serie III, vol. 2, 377.

Christian states, they had to use prisoners as oarsmen, because they had more difficulty in finding manpower from Greece and Dalmatia than they once had. Especially after the battle of Lepanto, they had to use men from the Habsburg territories and Northern Italian principalities. Thus, the 16th century corsair activities and the change of the Venetian military ships' crews became important defects that hindered Venetian influence in the Mediterranean Sea. While Venetian nobles started to retreat from the sea, they rehabilitated the great Po valley and transformed the economic structure of the Republic.⁸¹

One of the breaking points in the establishment of the Venetian political consciousness for the Veneto- Ottoman Relations was the battle of Lepanto. Although the victory of Lepanto created a great enthusiasm and desire to unify against the Ottoman Empire for the European powers,⁸² the Venetians had different experiences in this period. While the European powers were glad to defeat Süleyman I's son, the Venetians suffered from the loss of Cyprus, which was one of the most important Venetian dominions in the Mediterranean Sea.

⁸¹ Tenenti, *Venezia e i corsari*, 144.

⁸² Gino Benzoni, ed., *Il mediterraneo nella seconda meta' del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1974.

2.3.2 Veneto-Ottoman Relations and Battle of Lepanto

In 1570, with the ultimatum of Sultan Selim II, the Venetians were forced to leave the island to the Ottoman powers. Despite the promises of the Knights of Malta, the Pope Paul V and the Spanish crown, the Venetians remained alone in the battle initially and they had to ask for the French king Charles IX's intervention during the peace negotiations. Despite the arrival of the great admiral Andrea Doria, the Christian powers did not save the island. Finally, the Venetians lost their valuable island and other Ionian islands such as Zakynthos, Cephalonia, and Kythira while Castelnovo and Candia were destroyed by the Ottomans.⁸³

After the battle of Cyprus, Pope Paul V, the Spanish king Philip II and the Venetians got organized in order to avenge the Ottomans. In 1571, the European powers led by Carlo V's son Don Juan de Autriche defeated the Ottoman armada guided by Müezzinzade Ali Pasha close to the Naupaktos near the Gulf of Corinth. While Europeans regarded the destruction of the Ottoman naval power as a great success, they did not continue with subsequent victories against the Ottomans. The Christian forces dissolved while dividing the battle spoils and the Venetians remained without allies to recover not only their physical loss but also their diplomatic relations inside the Ottoman court. In addition, the commerce in the Levant was in danger and it had to be reestablished.⁸⁴ The Venetians showed again their capacity in diplomacy and did not lose control. Despite the bailo de Barbaro's great desire to negotiate with the Ottomans; he was kept as prisoner in

⁸³ Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol.2 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 667.

⁸⁴ Benzoni, "Il 'farsi turco'," 91.

his house in Pera.⁸⁵ It was not only the *bailo* who was the target of the Veneto-Ottoman tension. The Venetian merchants inside the capital were also kept in the house of the *bailo*. In return, in the hope to save the Venetian hostages, the Venetian Republic imprisoned the Ottoman merchants in the core of Venetian commerce, Rialto.⁸⁶

The Ottoman Empire was very dominant in its relations with the Venetians, so the *bailo* had to wage a psychological war inside the Ottoman capital. During the tension of the Lepanto war, the *bailo*'s house, full of Venetian imprisoned subjects, had to support the covering of the windows and turn the house into a total prison. In short time the Ottoman laborers reopened the house's windows.⁸⁷ In addition, some important statesmen close to the Sultan were planning to attack the Venetian dominions in the Mediterranean. Koca Sinan Pasha wanted to organize an attack on Corfu. Ferhad Pasha had a plan to conquer Kotor in Montenegro, while Cicala wanted Cythera, which was the biggest of the Ionian islands situated in the east of Morea.⁸⁸

After the victory of Lepanto, the Venetians understood that they were not capable of continuing the war without the support of the European powers and they sought for the peace that had been tried to be established by the French intervention. The Ottoman Empire was not offended by the Lepanto war, on the contrary, they only seemed motivated. The Republic desperately had to start negotiations and established the peace in 1573 with two ambassadors, namely

⁸⁵ Bertele, *Venedik ve Konstantiniyye*, 108.

⁸⁶ Preto, *Venezia e I Turchi*, 128.

⁸⁷ Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, ed. *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato. Vol. 14: Costantinopoli, Relazioni inedite (1512-1789)*, (Padua: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1996), 177- 192.

⁸⁸ Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2005), 216.

Marcantonio de Barbaro and Aloisio Mocenigo. The cost of European victory was very heavy for the Venetians. They had to leave Cyprus and Sopot to the Ottomans and pay a war compensation of 300.000 Venetian ducats. Furthermore, the tax for the island of Zante was increased and they had to return the Ottoman territories occupied during the battle.

According to *bailo* Lorenzo Bernardo's *relazione* dated 1590, the loss of Cyprus was one of the main reasons why the Ottomans did not take the Venetian ambassadors and *bailo* inside the court seriously. The Ottomans took the island very easily and enjoyed the booty of this significant island. Their subsequent tough behavior showed that they still remembered their victory. Moreover, they clearly saw that the Venetians were isolated and could be defeated and all their territories could be easily occupied. As the Venetian Republic was closer from the sea route, it could be an easy step to reach the universal monarchy of the Ottoman Empire.

The *bailo* then used successful tactics to create a powerful image of the Republic inside the Ottoman court. According to the *bailo*, the Venetians had to reinforce all their dominions and increase the number and the quality of its ships inside the Mediterranean Sea and especially on the Dalmatian shores. The Venetians had to create an image that all Christian princes and powers would organize quickly when the Venetians needed their help. The Ottomans should be convinced that Venetians were not alone in front of the Ottoman naval power, which apparently realized its power for the first time. The Venetians wanted peace not because they had to recognize the Ottoman naval superiority, but only to take advantage of their presence as before. Moreover, now that the Ottoman Empire

was aware of its naval capacity it would not stop. So the Venetians had to create an image that they were still capable of defending themselves against the Ottomans if they wanted. Besides, as the negotiations and reputation became their tool to establish ties with the Ottomans, they had to stay close to the Sultan's great enemy, the Spanish Empire. The Ottoman Sultan still took his enemy seriously and respected them inside the court. The *bailo* planned to stay close to the Spanish not only for intelligence but also to scare the Ottomans that they could take their help in case it was needed. However, it was important not to become too close in order not to be accused of being a Spanish ally.⁸⁹

The Venetians constantly complained about not seeing the respect and commitment they wanted from the Ottomans. The *bailo* Lorenzo Bernardo emphasized the difficulty of negotiating with the Ottomans by an example. According to him, negotiating with the Ottomans seemed like playing with a crystal ball where one of the players threw it violently. The other neither sent it in the same way nor let it fall down, because in both ways the ball would be broken.⁹⁰ If the Venetians stayed calm and did not move with timidity, they could find a way to negotiate. Besides, if they became as superb and ignorant as the Ottomans, it would only be like blowing air to the fire.⁹¹

The last important tactic used to reinforce the Venetian image was to give presents to the Turkish statesmen before the negotiations, as they gave importance

⁸⁹ Albèri, vol. 2, 376- 379.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 380: “*Mi pare che bene intendono quelli il negoziare con i Turchi che l’assomigliano al gioco della palla di vetro la quale essendo da uno de compagni mandata con forza, non bisogna né violentamente ribatterla, né timidamente lasciarla cadere in terra, perché nell’uno nell’altro modo senza dubbio la palla si romperà.*”

⁹¹ *Ibid*: “*... perché chi fa altrimenti e con furore tratta con la superbia e ignoranza turchesca, fa come quello che soffià tutto il fuoco.*”

to this also among themselves. However, one had to know that anything could be taken from them, without their desire and quickly. Because giving presents was a tradition which was organized according to one's position inside the court. It was important to present the gift in the right time and place in order to take advantage of it⁹². The timing was so important that Lorenzo Bernardo regarded it as a medicine that could heal or accelerate death.⁹³

As we can understand from the *bailos*' personal consideration, the Venetians, until their defeat in Cyprus, trusted in their naval power and regarded Ottoman presence just as a key to continue their commerce in the Levant. It seems that the Venetians were very offended by the Cyprus loss and subsequently tried to discover a cure for their wound. The Venetians were so scared of Ottoman expansion into the Venetian dominion that they tried to calculate the Ottoman Empire's relations with its enemies. The *bailo* was eager to see that the Spanish Empire would give up negotiating with the Ottomans, as their benefits would clash in the Mediterranean. Moreover, he was glad that the Safavid and Hungarian frontiers were not calm which meant the Ottomans could not find an opportune time to attack the Venetians⁹⁴.

The Venetians lost an important key-stone in the Mediterranean Sea. They could only protect their rights to trade in the Levant which was becoming more expensive over the course of time. As the Venetian Ambassador Gaspero Contarini pointed out in the conference of Bologna in front of the Clement II;

⁹² *Ibid*, 381- 382.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 383: "... perchè il dono è come la medicina la quale presa in tempo debito dà la vita e fuor di tempo può accelerare la morte."

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 370.

during the reign of Süleyman I “The whole of the Republic of Venice and the property of its subjects were in the hands of the Sultan.” After the reign of Süleyman their situation continued to get worse. Moreover, the Ottomans supported the humiliation of the European power, as did the Pope by nominating the Venice’s immediate desire for peace as dishonorable.⁹⁵

Actually the Levantine commerce was not as productive for Venetians as it once was. There were not as many merchants as before because of the taxes, storage expenses and money exchange. Besides, the presence of Jews in commerce put them in a difficult situation, as they were doing commerce under the Venetian flag and with their ships, thanks to the capitulations.⁹⁶ There were two important commerce centers for the Venetians; İzmir and Constantinople which were significantly affected by corsair activities, as the *bailo* Ottaviano Bon pointed out in his *relazione* of 1609. According to the *bailo*, during the long Ottoman wars, commerce in the port of Constantinople decreased. In addition, as the Sultanas became less powerful, Venetian jewelries and textiles had difficulty finding a place in the Ottoman market. Along with the Jews, now the English and French ships started to appear. Despite their occasional appearances, the market started to fill with different products it had not seen before such as gunpowder, saltpeter, sulfur. However one of the most important Venetian products, silk was affected by the Toscana ships which passed through Ancona, Ragusa and arrived in Constantinople. There were also foreign ships from the north, which smuggled shiny silks. According to the *bailo*, the Venetian Republic was the most useful nation for the Ottoman Empire in terms of commercial relations and labor force,

⁹⁵ Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 668- 672.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, vol. 3, 326.

as the Venetian silk, velvet, wool and other expensive products were still very valuable. In addition to the Venetian subjects still under the protection of the *bailo*, those from the islands of Candia and Tine were working in the Ottoman arsenal under difficult conditions especially as caulks, carpenters or oarspersons, with or without payment.⁹⁷

2.3.3 Cicala's Intervention to The Grain Problem

One of main problems that the Venetian *bailos* faced in the Ottoman court was grain imports. Grain commerce with non-Muslim states had been prohibited since the period of Yıldırım Beyazıd. However, the Venetians and a few Italian states had permission to import grain at limited levels. The precautions of the Ottoman Empire did not block the smuggling of grains onto the Anatolian and Rumelian shores. Local merchants sold grains to European merchants at higher prices. Besides the merchants, there were also high rank members of the court that secretly participated in grain smuggling.⁹⁸ The Ottoman captains charged with sustaining the Seraglio's grain needs participated in smuggling before returning back to the capital. After the first half of the sixteenth century, the grain

⁹⁷ Pedani- Fabris, *Relazioni Inedite*, 520- 523.

⁹⁸ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1975), 74- 85.

smuggling and *Celali* rebellions affected the Empire very negatively and caused famine.⁹⁹

During the presence of Cicala, Venetian *bailos* had difficulty in convincing the Sultan to sell them cereals. In the Ottoman court the trade of cereal was prohibited because of imperial needs, so the ruling elite in some way could manipulate the commerce. Beyond Cicala, due to common antipathy against the Venetians, the Sultan prohibited strictly the commerce not only inside the territories but also in the Mediterranean. Cicala had permission to control the grain smuggling with his corsairs that, which served as an excuse for his aggressive maritime activities to the Sultan. They could not control the traffic of cereal by staying at sea the whole year and capturing ships of various Italian origins. In addition, Malta and the island of Cythera came under the attack by Cicala, as they were important points of cereal traffic and intelligence for the Ottomans.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 78.

¹⁰⁰ Albèri, vol. 3, 430; ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fols. 285r (dated April 21, 1598).

CHAPTER III

THE PORTRAIT OF CIGALAZADE IN *RELAZIONI* AND *DISPACCI*

3.1. Cicala's Early Life and Family

Scipione Cicala was born in Messina estimatedly between 1543 and 1548 to a Genoese father and a converted Muslim mother as one of their three sons. His father Visconte Cicala, (or Cigala, Cigalla, Cicada or Çigã in Genoese dialect) came from a Genoese aristocratic family, which had many members such as cardinals, important merchants, generals and ambassadors. The Cicalas were one of the 28 families in Genoa which were accepted as noble by Carlo V and could take administrative duties by being registered to the *Liber Civilitatis*.¹⁰¹ Some important Genoese aristocratic families remained under the Spanish Empire's aristocracy between the 16th and the 17th centuries and could expand their commerce to Spain, Philanders, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples and the Canaries.

¹⁰¹ Andrea Lercari, "I Cicala: un'antica e nobile famiglia genovese in Sicilia," *Storia* 2 (2005), 61.

Generally they stabilized their position in Sicily, where they could make grain commerce which was very scarce in the Italian peninsula as well as other military and political duties.¹⁰²

Visconte's two brothers had important ecclesiastic careers. His older brother, Gianbattista Cicala later took the name San Clemente as a cardinal and became a protector of Visconte's maritime activities.¹⁰³ Visconte Cicala had his own ships that he used not only for corsair activities but also for commerce between Sicily and Spain under the banner of Sicily. After participating in the capture of Barberia (or Maghreb) in 1530 and the expedition of Tunisia in 1535, Visconte stabilized his position in Messina, Sicily as a merchant under the Spanish crown and was awarded for his corsair activities against the Ottomans and the Barbarians in the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁰⁴ On 27 October of 1538, during the conquest of Montenegro (Castelnuovo) in the Balkans, Visconte Cicala captured the daughter of an Ottoman Bey and married her after her conversion.¹⁰⁵

Filippo, one of Visconte's four sons, was in the Spanish Armada combatting against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. He was one of the founders of a religious army named *Ordine Militare della Stella* which cooperated

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 58-59, Domenico Montuoro, "I Cicala, una famiglia feudale tra Genova, Sicilia, Turchia e Calabria," *Mediterranea: Ricerche Storiche* VI (2009), 277.

¹⁰³ The Cardinal San Clemente could also take the Pope's consent to release his nephew Filippo Cicala, after paying the damage done by Filippo through his corsair activities. Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deliberazioni, Roma, Ordinaria, Filza 1, 39v-49r. For further information on Cardinal Gianbattista Cicala, in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, Roma, 1981, vol. XXV, p. 304- 309.

¹⁰⁴ For Visconte Cicala's maritime activities against the Ottomans and Italian maritime Republics with his famous galleon named *Cigalla*: ASVe, Dispacci dei Rettori, Cipro, 1 (dated November 29, Dicembre 5 and 6, 1557); Archivio Proprio, Roma, 16 (dated March 31, June 14 e 21, July 5, August 2, 1561); Senato, Lettere dei Provveditori da Terra e da Mar, filze 823 (dated January 17, 1559), 1195, (dated January 12, 13, 24, 1559) 1196, (dated between October 1560 and March 1561).

¹⁰⁵ Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe), Senato Dispacci Costantinopoli (SDC), filza 50, fol. 89v (dated Novembre 20, 1599).

with the knights of Malta and to help fight against the Ottoman armada in the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁰⁶ According to a poem written by Nicolo' Colosso after Cicala's attack of Reggio in 1594, Filippo had to confront his brother Scipione, who was defined as the new champion of the wounded Christianity and as always ready for battle.¹⁰⁷ Before his carrier in the sea, Filippo was also elected senator three times in Messina and took other important public duties.¹⁰⁸ It was Carlo Cicala, Scipione's younger brother that took him and the Maltese knights in contact.¹⁰⁹ Carlo was a merchant of slaves and a statesman in Messina inside the Spanish bureaucracy. He married a member of a noble family of Messina named Beatrice del Giudice, thus having a possibility to enter the regional aristocracy and by undertaking different duties he established ties with the Spanish aristocracy.¹¹⁰ The most unknown Cicala brother was Giulio who had important ecclesiastic duties in Genoa.¹¹¹

In 1560, the two Cicalas, Visconte and Scipione, fought during the Battle of Djerba in Tunisia alongside the famous Genoese Admiral Giovanni Andrea Doria against the Ottoman forces led by Piyale Pasha. In 1561, while waiting for the title of the Admiral of the Sicilian navy, Visconte and his son Scipione became the slaves of another famous corsair Dragut Reis.¹¹² Dragut arrived in

¹⁰⁶ Giuseppe Galluppi, *Nobilitario della città di Messina* (Napoli, 1877), 271.

¹⁰⁷ Salvo Pappalardo, "Ambizione politica, commercio e diplomazia alla fine del XVI secolo: Carlo Cicala," *Acque, terre e spazi dei mercanti: Istituzioni, gerarchie, conflitti e pratiche dello scambio dall'età, antica alla modernità*, Daniele Andreozzi, Loredana Panariti and Claudio Zaccaria, eds. (Trieste: Editreg, 2009), 3.

¹⁰⁸ Gino Benzoni, "Cicala, Filippo," *DBI*, 345.

¹⁰⁹ Fabrizio D'Avenia, *Nobilita allo specchio: ordine di Malta e mobilità sociale nella Sicilia moderna* (Mediterranea Quaderni, 2009), 79.

¹¹⁰ Benzoni, "Cicala, Carlo," *DBI*, 345.

¹¹¹ Lercari, "I Cicala," 62.

¹¹² Vilma Borghesi (a cura di), *Vita del Principe Giovanni Andrea Doria scritta da lui medesimo incompleta* (Genova: Compagnia dei librai, 1997), 152-155.

Constantinople and Scipione was represented as a gift to Sultan Süleyman I. When he entered the Ottoman court, his father was imprisoned in the Prisons of Yedikule.¹¹³

3.1.1 Cicala's Conversion and Reactions

As we are informed by the French ambassador inside the Ottoman court Antonie de Petremol, Cicala was about 17 or 18 years old¹¹⁴ when he was accepted to the court, converted to Islam and became a page of the Sultan.¹¹⁵ Not only did the conversion of Cicala capture the attention of Europe both during his lifetime and after his death, but also later it caused polemic among historians. Especially Pope Clemente VIII regarded his conversion to Islam, thus neglecting his original belief, as an adolescent error in his letters written to Cicala. On the other hand, the Pope did not lose his faith on Cicala and waited for his return not only to his homeland but also to his original religion.¹¹⁶ Pope Clement was so eager to realize his plans on Cicala that he even supported the position of the other two Cicala brothers. The Cicala brothers were not considered as total nobles because of being born from a converted mother. Despite their baptism and noble marriages, the brothers had to take the consent of Pope Clement VIII in 1596.

¹¹³ Albèri, vol. 3, 292.

¹¹⁴ Also Andrea Doria points out that Scipione was 18 years old, when he was captured. Borghesi, *Vita del Principe*, 155.

¹¹⁵ Gino Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)", *DBI*, 320.

¹¹⁶ Pappalardo, "Carlo Cicala," 30.

They could obtain governmental duties with this consent inside the Spanish Aristocracy, as the governmental duties were privileges only granted to Aristocracy.¹¹⁷ Besides in the same year the Pope accepted Cicala as a member of the Knights of Malta in his decree.¹¹⁸ In his book “Istoria della Sacra Religione et Militia di S. Giovanni Gerosolimitano,” Bosio, a 16th century poet who wrote about the Knights of Jerusalem, tried not to accuse Cicala of his conversion emphasizing the promise made to him in return of his father’s release from the prison in Constantinople, even though his father was actually already poisoned then.¹¹⁹ Moreover, Cicala’s doctor Giovanni Tommaso Minadoi of Aleppo, tried to explain the privileges enjoyed by Cicala in the court thanks to Sultan Selim’s protection, who was attracted to Cicala because of physical abilities and his beauty and then made him the Aga of Janissaries, the head of these military corps.¹²⁰ According to *bailo* Antonio Tiepolo, Cicala was 28 years old when he took this duty. Despite remembering his old culture and language, he became contradictory to both, because he really became an “Turk.”¹²¹ As we can see from the Tiepolo’s observation Cicala adapted into the Ottoman administrative system and started to represent the Ottoman bureaucracy. In the very early periods of his career he started to put forward his Ottoman identity in terms of political relations.

Even though from the European point of view Cicala’s conversion was the loss of a faithful brother, and although they were disturbed by the incident, they

¹¹⁷ D’Avenia, *Nobiltà allo specchio*, no. 96, 79.

¹¹⁸ Domenico Montuoro, “I Cicala,” 281.

¹¹⁹ Benzoni, “Cicala, Visconte,” *DBI*, 341.

¹²⁰ Giovanni Tommaso Minadoi, *La Historia della guerra fra Turchi et Persiani* (Rome: Stamperia di I. Tornerio e B. Donangeli, 1587), 194.

¹²¹ Albèri, vol. 2, 143: “Agà dei Giannizzeri, giovane ancora di ventotto anni. Onde tiene memoria ancora e della lingua e delle cose de’ Cristiani, ma si mostra durissimo contro di loro, forse perché veramente sia fatto turco.”

also tried to understand his reasons for accepting Islam and an Ottoman Sultan's domination without merely blaming him, taking into consideration his young age or the promise made to him. Moreover, it is clear that the conversion increased Cicala's reputation and made him a focus of attention in the court and around the Mediterranean Sea.

As an Ottoman convert, Cicala could represent the Ottoman Slavery system with the ups and downs of his career. Because of his harsh attitudes against the factions led by Sultan Safiye, Cicala lost his important duties many times, but saved himself through his marriages that brought the enormous protection of Sultan Süleyman I's granddaughter and important allies made inside the court such as Koca Sinan Pasha. Cicala also did not hesitate to show his power in the Mediterranean, and became a good Ottoman statesman and representative of the Sultan's authority and power outside the Imperial court. The echoes of his presence continued even about fifty years later of his death. A fake Mahmud as Cicala's son who was accepted willingly in Europe and converted to Christianity created an enthusiasm.¹²² Moreover Nicolae Jorga points out that he became very Christian and took the name of Johann Michail Cicala in Polonia.¹²³ The Papal State that could not convince Cicala to return to his homeland and hereditary religion, regarded as a victory the conversion of Cicala's fake son. This indicates that Cicala was still regarded as the stolen treasure of the Europeans and even the return of his son to his real motherland could be a recovery for them.

¹²² Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)", *DBI*, 338.

¹²³ Jorga, vol. 3, 163.

The name Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan, which he took after his conversion, became significant in European circles as did the event of conversion itself. By his name Cigalazade, meaning the son of Cicala, the famous convert could preserve his father's surname. By this way, he reminded himself of his noble origins. For example, Cicala showed how proud he was of his surname and family while he was talking to the *bailo* in 1598. He asked the *bailo* if he knew his cardinal uncle Cicala and took the possibility to brag about his origins.¹²⁴ Preserving his original name and indicating it through different ways was a phenomenon inside the Ottoman Empire in this period. As did Cicala, other converts belonging to the Ottoman elite could make a reference to their origins in the court. The converts could show their fidelity to the Sultan thanks to their administrative or military successes while they apparently did remember their homeland. Gran Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, for example, who was a Bosnian by origin, built the famous Drina Bridge with the caravansaray and the shops around it. Another famous Ottoman vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha built a mosque and a school in the village of Ruznik in Albania, which he specified as his original home *vatan-ı asli* in his *vakıfiye*.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol. 287v: “*Dimostrandomi se io havevo conosciuto il Cardinale Cigala suo parente, da che presi occasione di essaltare la nobiltà della sua famiglia.*”

¹²⁵ Kunt, “Ethnic Reginal (Cins) Solidarity”, 235.

3.2 Career and Networks Inside the Ottoman Court

From the beginnings of his career, Cicala could always stay under the Sultan's consideration and enjoy the protection of the imperial figures primarily through his marriages. After the successful military campaigns and conquests in the Eastern frontier and the Balkans, Cicala proved himself as an important Ottoman statesman. In order to keep the Sultan's attention he protected his relations with Gazanfer Agha and Sultan Safiye, through presents adding to the protection of Mihrimah Sultan and Koca Sinan Pasha.

As the Venetian *bailo* Marcantonio Barbaro mentioned in his *relazione*, Cicala became Kapıcıbaşı, the head of the Portieres, and received 200 *aspri* as payment which was regarded as fifty times higher for this occupation. Antonio Tiepolo emphasized that being Kapıcıbaşı was regarded as a privileged duty in this period. Cicala, in March 1574, accompanied the brother of the Moldovian prince named Alexandre, whose purpose was to dethrone Ioan Voda.¹²⁶ Alexandre's intention created rebellion in the Balkans and Cicala had grand loss of man in the first contact. Again because of this task, Cicala was regarded as incapable and coward by the Venetian.¹²⁷ However with the help of Tartar armies and the governor of Silistre, Cicala managed to suppress the rebellion with the addition of the Janissaries. Ioan Voda was decapitated by the governor of Silistre

¹²⁶ Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)," *DBI*, 320.

¹²⁷ Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 162.

and all refugees of the region were pardoned for the normalization of the region. In 1574, Cicala entered in Constantinople victoriously.¹²⁸

Cicalazade Yusuf Sinan, in October of 1576, married the daughter of Vizier Ahmet Pasha (also the granddaughter of famous Mihrimah Sultan, who was Sultan Süleyman I's daughter and the rich Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha's wife).¹²⁹ Mihrimah Sultan, possessor of enormous heritage, not only provided Cicala with a huge dowry including gold and valuable clothes, but also showed her support for him against his rivals inside the court.¹³⁰ *Bailo* Moro also observed Sultan Mihrimah's protection of Cicala against his enemies inside the court such as Safiye, Ferhad, Damad İbrahim or Halil Pashas who would be glad to see him disfavored.¹³¹

Even though Cicala could enjoy the protection of the Sultan and Mihrimah Sultan, he was unexpectedly sent away from the court and became the governor of Bassora in 1578, because inside the capital he could not suppress the rebellion of the *Sipahis* because of the rigid regulations on wine prohibition. As the Venetian *bailo* reported, Cicala lost his reputation inside the court and Cicala himself regarded it uncomfortable to having left her wife in the capital for a new duty closer to the Sultan.¹³² Moreover, Cicala lost his wife and thus lost his

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 321.

¹²⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 13 (dated October 13, 1579).

¹³⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 9, fol. 236v (dated October 5, 1576): “*Il Cigala Agà per Gianizzeri massime (soprattutto) che fra pochi giorni prenderà esso per moglie una figlia di Acmat Bassà genero della Sultana Vecchia, la quale per queste nozze fa spese grandissime in prepararle la dote. Al sposo oltre honoratissimi presenti di robbe mando li di passati ancor 30 mila cechini da mettersi in ordine onde questo parentato viene egli ad haver talmente stabilite le cose sue, che non può mancargli simili, et maggiori honori.*”

¹³¹ Albèri, vol. 3, 374: “*E' di circa 45 anni; ha per moglie una figliuola che fu di Rusten bassa, e la suocera che vive tuttavia, per esser nata di Sultan Suleiman, è stimata da quei di dentro, e lo mantiene in riputazione, contra il desiderio de'suoi emuli che lo vedriano volentieri depresso.*”

¹³² ASVe, SDC, filza 12 (dated June 4, 1578).

opportunity to take advantages of the benefits gained through his marriage.¹³³ However, in 1580 Cicala was able to return to the capital in order to marry the sister of his deceased wife and regain his privileged position inside the court.¹³⁴ Despite the protection of Mihrimah, Cicala could not stay in the capital and he was sent to the Safavid frontier in 1581.¹³⁵

Ferhad Pasha, brother in law of Sultan Murad III, favored Cicala to be a vizier on the condition that he stayed in Revan for two years for the protection of the area. Ferhad Pasha's intention with this offer was to keep his rival away from the Sultan's protection. However, Cicala turned the situation to his favor by becoming the General of the whole army in the East. Ferhad Pasha, who was aware of Cicala's lobbying against him, provoked the army in Revan and put Cicala's authority in danger.¹³⁶ According to *bailo* Morosini, Cicala was a capable and valuable statesman who had important moves in the Safavid wars. However he could never gain the trust of others because of his Italian and high born origins as Lorenzo Bernardo added.¹³⁷ Besides *bailo* Giovanni Moro added that Cicala could make a huge fortune and reputation during the years of governing Bagdad thanks to his actions against the Safavid, and he could be nominated as the

¹³³ ASVe, SDC, filza 14 (dated December 10, 1580): "*Questa notte passata è morta la moglie di Cicala che era figliola del giù Magnifico Acmat Bassà onde sono mancati al Cicala li favori grandi che egli haveva a questa porta.*"

¹³⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 14 (dated January 21, 1580): "*Il Cicala arrivò la settimana passata in Costantinopoli, e dicono che piglierà per moglie la sorella minore della moglie morta, che effettunadosi tornerà nel credito di prima ----- per l'auttorità della sultana che fu moglie di Acmat Bassà e figliola di Rustem Bassà. L'ambassador dell'imperatore che è venuto a resieder a giusta porta fece l'entrata giovedì passato con incontro assai honorato, et io mandai la mia famiglia ad incontrarlo per far il solito ufficio di complimento, che la fu concesso.*"

¹³⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 15 (dated Augusto 5, 1581).

¹³⁶ Koca Sinan Pasha was also supporter of Cicala in lobbying against Ferhad Pasha: Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), 116, 121.

¹³⁷ Albèri, vol. 3, 292: "*E' stimato uomo molto valoroso, ad ha fatto in questa guerra di Persia onoratissime fazioni, ma per esser italiano non si fideranno mai di lui compiutamente.*" Also in Albèri, vol. II, 344.

Admiral of the Armada, if there had not been any lobbying against him. Cicala responded to Ferhad Pasha's lobbying when he accepted the duty of governing the Castle of Erivan and the whole region around it as Vizier.

The hostility between Cicala and Ferhad Pasha became more apparent during Ferhad Pasha's arrival to the Eastern frontier. On the one hand, Ferhad Pasha was regarded by the army under his control as an engineer of the fortress in Van, thus more than a commander; on the other hand, he was disturbed by Cicala's success and sharing his authority with him. Besides, Cicala was regarded not as capable a commander by the soldiers. However, he was chosen by Ferhad himself.¹³⁸ Reciprocal to Ferhad Pasha's hostility, Cicala did not regard him a capable general nor deserving of the position of a high commander. Therefore, when Cicala became the governor of Revan with the title of Vizier, he appointed Haydar Pasha in the position of Ferhad Pasha as a governor there.¹³⁹

According to the news arriving from Revan,¹⁴⁰ Cicala's armies were damaged without any particular defeat against the Safavid and Georgian soldiers; meanwhile Ferhad and Özdemiroğlu Osman Pashas, other important commanders of the Eastern frontier, were on their way to join him.¹⁴¹ Despite the devastation of

¹³⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 23, fol. 62r-v (dated March 4, 1586): "*Continuano più che mai le voci de soldati, li quali straparlano della persona di Fercat senza alcun rispetto minacciandolo nella vita, et stimandolo poco ben capitano uno più tosto ingegniero, dicono, che in tempo suo. che è stato in Persia, ha più tosto atteso a fabricar, che a combatter oltre che tra lui, et Cigala non è basta intelligentia et sebene da esso Ferat fu creato Bassà.*" Also in Albèri, vol. 2, 344.

¹³⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 18, fol.149v (dated November 1, 1583).

¹⁴⁰ Albèri, vol. 2, 366. As the bailo Lorenzo pointed out in his *relazione* (1590) Venetians were sharing intelligence with the Safevid Empire until 1470, the period of Uzun Hasan. Besides, they had a secret pact to unify against the Ottomans until 1505, so the bailo expected a possible cooperation with them.

¹⁴¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 20, fols. 386r-v (dated December 28, 1584): "*Ne sarà la Serenità Vostra avisata da Revan se intende , che essendo uscito il Cigalla con buona banda di gente per far corriere nel paese inimico, che haveva tagliati a pezzi diversi Persiani, et Giorgiani, di che quindi hanno fatto grande allegrezza, ma dalle altre parte s'intende, che era seguito il contrario, perchè i*

his army, reported as 300-400 soldiers by the *bailo*, Cicala took Revan and became its governor.¹⁴² While Cicala could save himself from the Safavid attacks, Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha was injured in the battle of Van and died leaving Cicala as the commander of the Eastern frontier armies.¹⁴³ Among the gossips made about Osman Pasha's death, the worse one was that Osman Pasha died out of anger of Cicala's failure, which was due to his choice of saving his brother-in-law Hasan Pasha (the son of Ahmet Pasha) who lost many Ottoman soldiers and was trapped among the Safavid armies in Tabriz.¹⁴⁴ Cicala lost not only a huge number of his army but also the trust of Osman Pasha by saving his brother-in-law. Osman Pasha reminded him that the army was more important for the Sultan than a young man and that he was responsible for making his beard grey. Cicala's attack to save his relative turned into a great embarrassment and sadness for him.¹⁴⁵

Turchi hanno ricevuto danno di molta importanza, sebene non si sono intesi li particolari del successo."

¹⁴² ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fols. 122r- 123r (dated October 2, 1585): "*Persiani habbiano data la rotta a Curdi popoli favorevoli a questo Signor et altri finalmente affermano, che Tocomat, per il quale soleva esser il Beglierbei di Ravan fortezza tolta da Turchi a Persiani in questa guerra, sia andato con molta gente sudetta esso Ravan, dove venuto a battaglia con il Cigalla che hora ha in governo quella fortezza, habbia tagliato a pezzi 3 o 4 mila Turchi, et appenna il Cigalla si è salvato.*"

¹⁴³ ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fols. 293r and 305r (dated December 9, 1585).

¹⁴⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fol. 394v (dated January 8, 1585): "*All' hora il Cigala vedendo il cognato in pericolo non si potè contener, che con tutto l' essercito, che haveva seco non lo soccorresse, et all' hora Persiani discendendo dalle coline con gran impeto presero, et amazzarono grandissimo numero di Turchi, talché il Cigala appena fugendo solo si salvò nel campo.*"

¹⁴⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fol. 395r (dated January 22, 1585): "*All' hora Osman Bassà pieno di sdegno riprese gravamente il Cigala, il qual si escusava che astretto dalla necessità per recuperar il cognato haveva combattuto con Persiani, et li disse, che lui lo haveva fatto diventar la sua barba di bianca che era negra, et che al Signor non importava la vita di un giovane, ma la conservatione del suo essercito, per la qual rotta, non solo Osman senti dolore, et sdegno grandissimo ma anco il Cigala restò talmente vergognato, et perso di animo che non si vide mai più allegro.*"

Despite the successful attacks of Cicala against the Safavids and valuable interventions with his soldiers,¹⁴⁶ after the death of Osman Pasha, he could not leave a good impression neither in the eyes of the Janissaries nor the *Sipahis*. During the siege of Tabriz and the establishment of an Ottoman fortress there, soldiers always complained about the inflation and the famine that Cicala preferred to ignore, and Osman Pasha's willingness to pass the winter there, which Janissaries protested by cutting his pavilion's ropes and forcing him to return. Besides after the conquest of Tabriz, Safavids attacked Ottoman headquarters, killed many governors and Pashas and robbed much of the Ottoman artillery. According to *bailo* Morosini, Safavids were aware of the turbulences and rebellions inside the Ottoman army and kept on their constant attacks.¹⁴⁷ Then Cicala was charged with the construction of a fortress in Van to block these attacks. Luckily, Safavid army was not well organized and its artillery was highly damaged by Ottoman *Sipahis* and Janissaries. Besides they were not so capable of using the artillery that they recovered from the Ottomans.¹⁴⁸

During the construction of the fortress of Van, Cicala had many difficulties in the organization and in providing the needs of the army such as salt and wood. Many of the soldiers escaped or died of disease leaving their timariots without heirs. Cicala confiscated their territories for imperial treasury, which caused many rebellions. The remaining soldiers complained about the promises made to them about returning home after the victory of Tabriz to take a rest. Despite the

¹⁴⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fol. 305v (dated December 10, 1585): “*E se in questa battaglia non fosse stato il valor del Cicalla grandissimo et la risoluzione sua arditissima a improvvisa di sparar per ultimo rimedio.*”

¹⁴⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fols. 393r- 397v and 435r – 437r (dated January, 8 and 22, 1585).

¹⁴⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 23, fol. 61r (dated March 4, 1585). Also in Albèri, vol. 2, 360.

conquest of Tabriz, the Ottoman army was surrounded by Safavids and had difficulty in establishing intelligence with Constantinople.¹⁴⁹ Contrary to the promises, Cicala wanted to precede his armies while the new Safavid Shah Abbas I took the throne in 1587 and was still trying to establish his power and organize his armies against the Ottomans.¹⁵⁰ In this period, Cicala took the government of Bagdad, while Ferhad Pasha became the governor of Ganja in 1588.¹⁵¹ After the occupation of Nihawand and Hamadan, Cicala established fortresses in Ganja as ordered by the Sultan, who did not want to make peace with Safavids until the Ottomans fortified its boundaries.¹⁵²

In 1589, together with the governors of Tabriz Cafer Pasha and Hasan Pasha, Cicala sent a letter to Constantinople in order to complain about Ferhad Pasha's conduct of government. According to this complaint letter, because of Ferhad Pasha, the armies lost the chance of taking Caspian region a few times. In addition, Ferhad Pasha was said to have failed to realize the needs of his community and was accused of stealing.¹⁵³

Along with their mutual hostility, the two generals also had different interpretations of the war. Gerolamo Cappello, who summarized one of the letters sent by Cicala in 1598, stated that the Safavids wanted to make peace, thus halting

¹⁴⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 23, fols. 111r-v, 368v, 369r, 403r-v (dated March 19, May 15, May 28, 1586).

¹⁵⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 25, fol. 104r (dated March 18, 1587).

¹⁵¹ Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 213.

¹⁵² ASVe, SDC, filza 28, fol.38v (dated September 10, 1588).

¹⁵³ ASVe, SDC, filza 29, fol.27r (dated March 11, 1589): “*Li Capi più principali che si trovano implicati contra Persiani si mostrano malissimo contenti di Ferrat Generale, et particolarmente il Cigala et Giaffer Bassà di Tauris con li quali si è unito Assan Bassà figliolo, che fu di Memet già primo Visir et tutti tre insieme hanno formato arz contro di lui dicendo che poco curasse il pubblico bene, poi che haveva più d'una volta perduta l'occasione di andar a prendere Casbia, ma che si tratteneva per maggior commodità di robbare, affermando, che li soldati et ogn'altro restassero malissimo contenti di lui.*” Ibrahim Pasha, brother in law of Sultan, was also one of the complaint owners against Ferhad Pasha: in Naima, vol. I, 122.

their advance. Cicala also wrote in the letter that they had been fighting with the Safavids for 12 years, that they had killed important Safavid generals and captured a large amount of land from them. Accordingly, Cicala captured Fort Niavend and positioned himself there. Now, the Safavids demanded peace in order not to lose Casbin, because Fort Niavend is like a key to Casbin. Cicala, who did not trust the Safavids, demanded 4000-5000 soldiers in his letter so that even in the case of a peace agreement they could still maintain their forces there and fight back if the Safavids did not keep their promises. The reason of this distrust was that Müşid Kürdi, who was supported by the Safavid king, was talking of taking Fort Niavend back. Cicala commented that even this evidence itself showed that the Safavids were actually not willing to have peace. If they were not to be stopped right away, the Safavids would be more relieved to make the damage they would like and it would take an even bigger army to take them down. In order to prevent possible disorders, the frontiers needed money.¹⁵⁴ Cicala, as the hawkish general he was, talked about the preparation of the Safavid armies for a new campaign against the Ottomans and emphasized the importance of continuing the war against the Safavids, because he would not trust them even during peace time.¹⁵⁵ On the other hand, in the letter sent to Constantinople, as reported by the Venetian *bailo* in August 1589, Ferhad Pasha was thinking of making peace with Safavids despite the proceeding of their armies and he also talked about the arrival of a Safavid group, who still had some areas between

¹⁵⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 29, fols. 410r-v (dated July 21, 1589); filza 30, fol.13r (dated July 26, 1589).

¹⁵⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 29, fol. 402r (dated July 21, 1589): “*La diversità di avisi, che vengono da quelle parti scrivendo il Cicala, che li Persiani a mettono all’ordine per uscire in campagna, et il Generale, che desiderano la pace fa che qui non si sappia a chi prestare intera fede et quelli che vogliono sostentar la parte del Generale dicono che’l Cicala che ama la guerra introduce tutte queste novità per metter il Signor in necessità di continuar in essa.*”

Tabriz and Caspian region under their control, probably with the desire of peace.¹⁵⁶

Cicala presented a dagger covered with jewelry valued 150.000 sequins (Venetian gold coins) to Sultan Murad III.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, there were gossips running inside the court that Cicala could be the grand admiral of the Ottoman armada through this very valuable gift presented to the Sultan. However, surprisingly Cicala was sent to Georgia because of a rebellion. Even though Cicala had difficulty in suppressing the rebellion because of geographical conditions, the Georgian King accepted to obey the Sultan; because Ferhad Pasha took his brother hostage and brought him in Constantinople along with many presents to Sultan Murad III and his wife Safiye Sultan.¹⁵⁸

Meanwhile, Cicala received the support of his wife's grandmother Mihrimah Sultan inside the court, and through presents he tried to establish good relations also with Gazanfer who was originally a Venetian subject. Gazanfer was one of the most famous and influential statesman and a very important ally of Safiye Sultan, with whom he governed the most influential faction inside the court. Even though he was stronger in the faction he belonged, he also did not deny the alliance of Cicala and tried to be a mediator between him and Safiye who was the supporter of Ferhad Pasha.¹⁵⁹ Memi Aga, who was a member of Cicala's household, was also an important ally. He was originally a Venetian from

¹⁵⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 29, fols. 474 R, 480r-v (dated August 19, 1589).

¹⁵⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 32, fol. 64r (dated September 15, 1590): "*Per questa settimana è sta presentata al Gran Signor per nome deto Cigala un pugnol con il manego et fodro giogelato di valore di cecchini cento, et cinquanta mille.*"

¹⁵⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 32, fols. 64r, 81v, 138v and 444v (dated September 15, 1590).

¹⁵⁹ Albèri, vol. 3, 424: "*Il Cicala, ... alla Porta egli avesse altro amico che il capiaga, la prima persona di dentro appresso il re, con il quale solo, come italiano, egli s'intende bene, e col mezzo suo si mantiene nel capitanato, stimato da lui al pari della vita.*"

Chioggia. He married one of Hasan Pasha's daughters. Memi Aga's most powerful ally was Gazanfer who was also Cicala's protector.¹⁶⁰

After his successful career in the Eastern frontier and the Balkans, Cicala could gather the attention of the Sultan and became the head of the Ottoman Armada (*Kapudan-ı Derya*) in 1591.¹⁶¹ Through this duty, he had the privilege of participating in the Divan (imperial counsel of the Sultan) and staying in the core of the Empire. Moreover, he could react quickly to gossips or lobbying made against him by becoming closer to the Sultan and his principal rival Grand Vizier Ferhad Pasha, who was always supported by Safiye. According to the English ambassador Lello, obtaining this title meant having a powerful network inside the court and being protected by the Sultan.¹⁶² As *bailo* Ottoviano Bon observed, the Admiral of the Armada was one of the most prestigious five titles of the Empire, along with Grand Vizier, Head of Janissaries, and Head of the Sultan's ports and Treasurer. Moreover one would have high possibility of earning money and living comfortably, as he had control over the Arsenal and the taxing of many Ottoman isles in the Mediterranean.¹⁶³

We could see from the relations between Safiye Sultan, Gazanfer, Ferhad Pasha and Cicala that the factions inside the court relied more upon personal interests than the origins of the converted statesman of the Ottoman Empire. Safiye Sultan, who was originally Albanian and a wise and friendly ally as

¹⁶⁰ Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 162; Albèri, vol. 3, 428.

¹⁶¹ Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)", *DBI*, 323.

¹⁶² Orhan Burian, ed., *The Report of Lello, Third English Ambassador to the Sublime Porte* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1952), [hereafter *The Report of Lello*], 68.

¹⁶³ Pedani, *Relazioni Inedite*, vol. 14, 505-506: "Fra li carichi grandi della Porta, cinque sono principalissimi, che danno commodità, et occasione di accumular gran ricchezza, et che sono di gran commodo: Il primo visir, l'agà de' gianizzeri, il capiaga, il capitano di mare, il defterdar grande."

described by the *bailos*, represented herself as Venetian elite and always became a mediator between the Ottoman bureaucrats and the Venetian *bailo* or ambassadors.¹⁶⁴ However, she did not support Cicala, whose origin was clear even from his name. Moreover, Safiye's ally Ferhad Pasha, despite being very supportive of the Venetian Republic,¹⁶⁵ did not ever show sympathy to Cicala.

In 1595, Sultan Murad III died and his wife Safiye became Valide Sultan (Mother Sultan) when his son Mehmed III took the throne. With the intervention of Safiye, who was always a rival to Cicala, Halil Pasha, Sultan's son-in-law, became the new Admiral of the Ottoman Armada a year before.¹⁶⁶ The new Admiral was not as capable as Cicala, according to *bailo* Marco Venier. However, his court is composed of excellent men, not rapacious like those shameless thieves who surrounded Cicala.¹⁶⁷

Cicala and Halil Pasha were very hostile to each other like a cat and a dog as depicted by Leonardo Dona. In order not to let Cicala to make a fortune by his campaigns in the Mediterranean, Halil Pasha accepted to leave the capital with the armada, even if staying in the capital would be more advantageous to protect his position inside the court.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Albèri, vol. II, 345: "*Questa è di nazione albenese, molto savia e prudente, si è mostrata da un tempo in qua molto bene affetta alle cose della Serenità Vostra.*"

¹⁶⁵ Zinkeisen, III, 328. Among many of them, Ferhad Pasha, for instance, promised bailo Bernardo in 1592 to protect the Venetian subjects and their possessions in his lifetime.

¹⁶⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol. 111v (dated April 21, 1598).

¹⁶⁷ Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts (CSP), vol. VIII, 152 (dated January 31, 1594)-

¹⁶⁸ Museo Correr, Fondo Donà dalle Rose, vol. 23, *Itinerario ... Memorie ... Relatione ... amb. ... Costantinopoli*, Leonardo Donà, 226 V (dated October 27, 1595): "*Chalil quarto in ordine ha anche il carico del Capitaniato del Mare... crede essi quest'anno d'essere astretto ad uscir con l'armata, cosa che né a lui né alla mogli aggrada, et quando potesse senza perdere il luoco substituire una dipendente da sé, lo farà volentieri, ma non può tolerare che il Cigala li faccia fortuna. Et perciò stanno tra di essi come il cane et la gatta.*"

After the entitlement of Halil as Grand Admiral, Cicala offered 50000 sequins to him and took the title of vizier after him in the court and became the admiral of Mar Nero Armada. However, Safiye's intervention to the government and her apparent support of Halil, Koca Sinan Pasha's supremacy and his reaction to this faction and finally Ferhad Pasha's immediate destruction and decapitation in 1595 because of the tension between Sipahis and Janissaries,¹⁶⁹ facilitated Cicala's return.¹⁷⁰

In 1596, the battle of Keresztes became very significant for Cicala. In the battle field, Habsburg forces entered among the Ottoman pavilions and got close to the imperial treasure of the Sultan. As recorded by the *bailo*, Sultan Murad III's brother-in-law Damad Ibrahim Pasha who married Sultan's sister Sultan Ayşe, lost all his artillery in the hands of enemies and did not obey the commands of Cicala. Finally, the intervention of Cicala with the Janissaries in the end of the war changed the Ottomans' fortune when the Habsburg forces were very close to the Sultan's tent. Through the intervention of Hoca Sadeddin (the Sultan's advisor) and Gazanfer, Cicala became Grand Vizier. The Sultan presented him a plume from his Turban and gifted valuable clothes.¹⁷¹ Despite the protection of Safiye, Ibrahim Pasha was disfavored by Sultan Mehmed III, who was informed about the Pasha's wrong tactics on the battle field. Ibrahim Pasha lost his position as Gran Vizier, but remained protected by the Sultan as he wrote to his mother after the battle to inform her. Cicala became the target of Safiye, who could not

¹⁶⁹ According to Beyzade, Cicala and Koca Sinan provoked the soldiers against Ferhad Pasha. See Hasan Beyzade, *Hasan Bey-zade Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004), 453-454.

¹⁷⁰ Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)," *DBI*, 328.

¹⁷¹ ASVe, SDC, filza copia 11, fol. 162 (dated November 23, 1596): "*Allora il Re si trasse un pernacchio dal turbante et gilelo mise in testa creandolo suo primo Visir et facendolo vestir di ricchi vesititi.*"

interrupt his election and was informed only by the Sultan's letter who praised Cicala as the protector of his life which was given by Safiye herself.¹⁷² Cicala's favorite, Eunuch Cafer was also awarded for his contribution in the defense of the Sultan. Cafer became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada and the Sultan's other brother-in-law Halil Pasha lost his position, because of Cicala's accusations. According to Cicala, Halil put many people in difficulty in the port of Navarino, stole many ships and loaded his own ships with grapes. Moreover, Christians sank some of his galleons and captured two big ones.¹⁷³ When Cicala became the Admiral, Halil Pasha remained hostile to him and tried everything in his power to depose him. With Damad Ibrahim, they stood by the Venetian *bailos* against him in Mediterranean issues.¹⁷⁴

As it was remarked by Leslie Peirce, in addition to personal capacity and success, statesmen inside the court had to use different tools to empower themselves or their network and to weaken their rivals. These tools were a mixture of not only securing the support of those in higher positions, but also directly influencing the Sultan himself. Moreover, in this period women also had great influence, as Sultan Safiye was in the rise of Cicala by using her personal network to impact Cicala's position.

The governing class of the Ottoman Empire in this period operated not so much on the basis of institutionally or functionally ascribed authority as through a complex of personal bonds and family and household connections. Functionally ascribed authority -authority devolving from one's office certainly existed, but more important was the

¹⁷² ASVe, SDC, copia 11, fol. 163 (dated November 23, 1596): "*Il Re scrive alla madre, come sono da buon luogo avisato scusandosi con amorevolissime parole della privatione d'Ibrahim, al quale pero' haveva lasciate tutte le entarate, dice che riconosce la vita prima da lei che l'ha generato et da poi dal Cigala che l'ha salvato*".

¹⁷³ ASVe, SDC, copia 11, fol. 164 (dated November 23, 1596).

¹⁷⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol. 110v- 111v (dated April 21, 1598).

web of individual relations of patronage and clientage, of teacher and student, of kinship and marriage- that brought one to that office and that one used in the exercise of one's official power. Men as well as women sustained their careers by means of such networks, and men and women played significant roles in the formation of each other's network.¹⁷⁵

However, after the battle of Keresztes, in order to control the army, Cicala took a census and confiscated the *timars* (grants of land revenue) and goods of the escaped soldiers, and decapitated the rebelled soldiers including an important general Yusuf Aga, who was made to wear women clothes to the Pasha of Aleppo in front of the Army. Besides the Khan of Crimea, Gazi Giray was deposed, because of his late arrival to the battle field. Cicala's rigid precautions for the army's reorganization provoked soldiers more and created new rebellions until the Anatolian timariots.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, Cicala kept on putting Venetians in difficulty in the Mediterranean and the *bailo* inside the court. He blocked the fishing boats in Butrinto located in Albania, attacked ships that help Uskoks, supported corsairs against Venetians and gave them license for their activities. The *bailo* had difficulties in saving Venetian subjects imprisoned by Cicala. Because of the Spanish navy sailing close to Zante and Corfu, Cicala blamed Venetians of spying for the Spanish crown and did not facilitate issues about Venetian slaves.¹⁷⁷

Damad Ibrahim Pasha was an important ally of Sultan mother Safiye and an important favorite since the period of Selim II inside the court. He was originally from Schiavonia, close to Ragusa, located in Croatia. According to

¹⁷⁵ Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 149.

¹⁷⁶ Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)," 330.

¹⁷⁷ SDVe, SDC, copia 11, fol. 165 (dated Novembre 23, 1596).

bailo Bernardo, he used to graze animals before entering in Seraglio.¹⁷⁸ Ibrahim was also protected then by Murad III and Mehmed III, because he married the daughter of Selim II and Nurbanu. When Damad İbrahim married his sister, Sultan Murad III presented many gifts for his sister and then supported his sister's husband during his reign.¹⁷⁹ In fact, Damad Ibrahim was not regarded as a capable, intelligent statesman by the Venetians and other bureaucrats inside the court. He obtained this high rank just because he married a Sultana.¹⁸⁰

Safiye did not lose time to protect her family and put an end to the grief of her husband's sister resulting from his disfavored husband Ibrahim Pasha. In the court, Safiye and his sister-in-law formed a great opposition against Cicala who was not expected to keep his title long, as reported by Gazanfer's brother-in-law Halil Aga. Meanwhile, the Sultan returned to Transylvania instead of coming back to the capital directly after the campaign of Egri. Safiye accused Cicala of keeping Sultan away from her in order to block her influence on him.¹⁸¹

Inevitably Cicala lost his position as vizier only after a month to Ibrahim Pasha.¹⁸² Sultan Safiye sent letters to his son instead of waiting for him to return blaming Cicala of his hatred to dethrone Ibrahim Pasha, even to kill him to take his position. Safiye revealed her fear that any harm would come to Ibrahim who

¹⁷⁸ Albèri, vol. 2, 341.

¹⁷⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 22, fols. 396v and 405r. (dated March 25, 1586) "*Ibrain Bassà è nato in Schiavonia vicino mezza giornata a Ragusi, et essendo putto di donato da un Bassà a Sultan Selim padre del presente Imperator: il qual lo fece allevar nel suo Serraglio in compagnia, et al servizio del figliolo, il qual perciò le prese affettione.*"

¹⁸⁰ Albèri, vol. II, 341-342.

¹⁸¹ ASVe, SDC, copia 11, fol.182 (dated December 2, 1596).

¹⁸² İbrâhîm Peçevî, *Târih-i Peçevî*, Vol. 2 (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980), 205 and Naima, vol. 2, 171.

was very much loved by people because of his kindness and success.¹⁸³ However, Gran Vizier Ibrahim had to support insults of Cicala, besides the insult offered by the King through Cicala's retention of the sword of honor and the imperial letters.¹⁸⁴

It was not only Cicala himself who was affected by Safiye's revenge. Lam Ali Çelebi, who was a financial director in Anatolia became chancellor after Cicala's rise, but lost his title only three months later because of supporting Cicala's grand vizierate. Lam Ali also had written the official victory announcement for the battle of Keresztes, praising Cicala's valuable contribution to the victory and named the Sultan as the conqueror of Egri.¹⁸⁵ However, the famous chronicler Naima pointed out that Peçevi,¹⁸⁶ another important chronicler and a witness of the period, found the importance of Cicala in the battle also so exaggerated.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, another chronicler Beyzade pointed out that while the Ottoman army was nearly destroyed Cicala fled near the Tatar soldiers while the Habsburg army was on the point of destroying the Sultan's tent. In order to protect him, all household of the Sultan such as cooks and camel drivers had to fight against them and saved Sultan Mehmed III.¹⁸⁸ However, chronicler Selaniki regarded Cicala's presence very valuable in the battle and defended him.¹⁸⁹ Hoca Sadeddin, who was not very friendly to the Sultan Mother,¹⁹⁰ and Gazanfer also lost their value and was disfavored by the Sultan as important allies of Cicala's

¹⁸³ SDVe, SDC, copia 11, fol. 207 (dated Dicembre 25, 1596).

¹⁸⁴ Albèri, vol. III, 398.

¹⁸⁵ Fleischer, *The Historian Mustafa Âli*, 172. Hasanbeyzade, 496-547, Naima, 94-95.

¹⁸⁶ Peçevi was a nephew of Ferhad Pasha and Hasanbeyzade was the secretary (tezkireci) of Damad Ibrahim Pasha. That can explain their negative attitude against Cicala.

¹⁸⁷ Naima, vol. 1, 163, 168, and 171.

¹⁸⁸ Beyzade, 528- 530.

¹⁸⁹ Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1864), 642.

¹⁹⁰ The Report of Lello, 41.

network after his dismissal.¹⁹¹ After the dismissal of Cicala, members of his faction were so frustrated that they rumored that the women were governing the Empire and leading it to destruction. Cicala would prefer to go to pilgrimage to Mecca and pray for the conservation of the Muslim population instead of seeing the collapse of the Empire.¹⁹²

In 1599, Cicala returned to Constantinople and claimed for his son the title of Kadi of Greece (judge according to Sharia) through the gifts presented to Halil Pasha, the governor of the capital. Cicala kept on his admonitory rotations around Navarino, Lanciano, the gulf of Squillace and Stilo, and the strait of Messina in Southern Italy as the Admiral. He also captured two Ragusan ships full of grain and people and a small ship full of Calabrian salami going to Sicily.¹⁹³

The religious and economic regulations of Spanish and local authorities, became so harsh for Southern Italian subjects that Cicala's intervention to the situation there received a good response despite the terror and hatred he created as an Ottoman figure. In 1599, Murad Reis, the commander of the galleons under Cicala had secret negotiations with Maurizio Rinaldi, a Venetian resident in Napoli, as reported by a Calabrese convert. Besides, also Tommaso Campanella, famous religious man and author against the Spanish authorities had some connections with Cicala that one of his companions escaped to Constantinople and was protected by Cicala after a rebellion in Calabria, Sicily.¹⁹⁴ Cicala's

¹⁹¹ Fleischer, *The Historian Mustafa Âli*, 169.

¹⁹² ASVe, SDC, copia 11, fol. 207 (dated December 25, 1596): "*Soli i dipendenti del Cigala sussurano che le donne governano et che manderanno in rovina l'Imperio per la salute del quale desiderava il Cigala d'esser lasciato andar in pellegrino alla Mecca a fornir li suoi voti et a pregar Dio nel tempio del Profeta loro per la conservazione della Gente Maomettana.*"

¹⁹³ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fols. 285r (dated April 21, 1598).

¹⁹⁴ Montuoro, "I Cicala," 290-291.

attitude to the Spanish in the Mediterranean was so clear. According to the Spanish ambassador in the court in 1599, all the money and Catalan slaves of some French ships in Scio were captured by Cicala, but returned back to the French ambassador. However, the ambassador was not able to compensate anything.¹⁹⁵

On the Italian side, the constant conflict of the Ottomans against the Habsburgs in Europe and Safavids in the East, the turbulences of *Sipahis* in Anatolia and in Constantinople took the attention of Pope Clement VIII, who interpreted these as the symptoms of the decline of the Ottoman power. The pope who was always willing to organize a crusade against the Ottomans, sent Cicala's cousin, Antonio to the Spanish Emperor to convince him for negotiations with Cicala in return of some territories of the Ottoman Sultan to return him to Christianity and destroy the Ottoman Empire, thanks to his cooperation and the crusade powers. However, Clement VIII could not realize his plans.¹⁹⁶

In 1601 Cicala was in Negroponte as the admiral of the navy, which was composed of 37 galleons, three of which were armed. As reported by the *bailo*, Cicala was waiting for the joining of his son to his forces who was the Pasha of Damasco and other galleons. Despite sending his ten galleons to accompany the Pasha of Cairo, Cicala would not hesitate to attack the Spanish army with less than sixty ships. In this period, Cicala was self-confident and thought that even his name could scare his enemies. Even in 1598, the Venetian Ambassador Francesco

¹⁹⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 371v: "*Alla quale ... si duevano, che erano stati restituiti all'Ambasciatore tutti li denari, et schiavi Catellani presi dal Cigala a Scio sopra la nave francese, et insieme tutto lo resto de schiavi sudditi di questa Maestà, il che in effetto non fu mai esequito.*"

¹⁹⁶ Montuoro, "I Cicala," 292.

Sorenzo in Spain said that the sailing of the Turkish fleet made Spain fear to expose the shores of Italy to an attack from Cicala.¹⁹⁷

Cicala also became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada in 1601, thanks to the Şeyhülislam Hoca Sadeddin. The Sultan trusted his adviser Sadeddin who ensured that Cicala could improve the Ottoman Army and block the Christian armies in the sea, as he did in the battle field.¹⁹⁸ Cicala's rigid attitude against the Venetians continued in this period. The governor of the Santa Maura Mustafa Bey was one of the corsairs that put the Venetians in difficulty. The Venetians were tired of Cicala's attitude. When there was rumor that he got dysentery, the *bailo* reported that if God permitted his death, any admiral that took the position of Cicala could be worse than him.¹⁹⁹ In order to protect the Venetians, the Sultan ordered to burn all corsair ships and leave free the hostage Venetian subjects. According to the Sultan's imperial letter, the ships close to Santa Maura were not permitted to arm. According to *bailo's* intelligence, the Spanish armada was trying to reinforce his dominions in Africa. As Cicala's surveillance passed to the Santa Maura, their passage became easier. However, Cicala was trying to pass with his army through Calabria and Puglia. Cicala was expected to meet the Spanish armada in the Mediterranean. He had an imperial command on his hand

¹⁹⁷ CSP, vol. VIII, 336 (dated August 12, 1598).

¹⁹⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol. 98v (April 21, 1598): "*O con molto o con poco numero il Cigala al sicuro vorà uscire con esse, parendo che il suo nome solo basti ad apportar terrore a tutti. La promotione del quale al Capitaneato è stata per ricordo del Mufti nella consulta al Chiosso, che stimando egli, come ha sempre fatto importar grandamente al servizio della guerra l'uscita di buona armata per impedire come egli crede, gli aiuti de Christiani all'imperatore, ha persuaso questo suo concetto al Re, et raccordatogli di darne carico a Capitaneo valoroso ponendogli innanzi il Cigala, et per accrescere quanto si potiale forze da Mare.*"

¹⁹⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fol. 374v (dated August 11, 1601): "*E' venuto aviso che il Cigala si trovasse indisposto di una disinteria, et uscita ma però non se ne ha altramente la certezza, et si come se il Signor Dio permettesse la morte del Cigala sarebbe quasi impossibile che nel carico di Capitaneo del Mare potesse quella Serenissimà Republica peggionare di soggetto tanto pessimamente affetto.*"

that warned the Spanish army to disarm in the Ottoman domains in Africa. However, the Ottoman court was not very eager of this Ottoman-Spanish interaction. Şeyhülislam was very glad that Cicala did not sail with the Imperial armada and the court members expected that the Bostancıbaşı would become the new Admiral of the Ottoman Armada. As the *bailo* said, when the Bostancıbaşı talked negatively about Cicala, the Sultan disapproved him.²⁰⁰ Despite the court's fear of encountering with the Spanish Armada in Africa that aimed to conquer Algiers and Tunisia according to the intelligence, Cicala did not have to worry. The Spanish could not realize their goals, because the Venetian Republic did not ally with them.²⁰¹ Although Venetians were very disturbed about Cicala's attitudes and his protection of the corsairs, he was unluckily the supreme authority to solve the corsair issues.²⁰² Besides, Cicala sometimes gave promises to the *bailo* to resolve his problems. He sometimes appeared more willing to protect the peace between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire, but he behaved contrarily. Other times, he could talk about everything such as Cristian princes or theology without giving permission to the *bailo* for making his statement. The *bailo* always complained about Cicala's double face on important issues and he did not let Cicala deceive him. When Cicala sailed in the Mediterranean, he even assured that he would not disturb the Venetian dominions, but the *bailo* regarded his surveillance as a treat to the Venetian Republic.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, fols. 4r, 27r, 69v, 82r (dated September, 1601).

²⁰¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, fol. 104r (dated December, 1601).

²⁰² ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fol. 296r (dated January, 1600).

²⁰³ ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fols. 25v- 26r, 27v- 28r (dated March 23, 1600) and 153r (dated May 5, 1600); filza 52, fol. 310r (dated January 15, 1600).

When the Ottoman army lost Transylvania and some other important castles after 1600, the court started to organize festivals to suppress the tumults and confusions due to the Hungarian campaign. The Sultan was blamed of not knowing anything about the ongoing war and not leading the war himself. He was so unaware of the situation he would be shocked if some *Sipahis* or *Janissaries* demanded the decapitation of some court members. Cicala's name started to be pronounced as the leader of the Ottoman army in Hungary. However, the court could neither tell the Sultan to lead the war himself nor could they convince him to send Cicala.²⁰⁴ As the *bailo* added, Cicala did not volunteer in leading the Ottoman Army in Hungary even as a Gran Vizier, because being the Admiral of the Armada was more secure even if the title was not as high. If he was promoted as the Gran Vizier, he would find a way to escape the position.²⁰⁵ It was not only Cicala who tried to escape from this hard duty. Even the Sultan's brother-in-law Ibrahim Pasha was trying to return to the capital as a governor. Even if both statesmen were nominated as the supreme authority in the Hungarian campaign, neither of them wanted to be away from the capital and take the responsibility for defeats. Cicala was even content with going to the Black Sea in order to avoid going to Hungary. He was willing to go, even if there were only 10 ships ready. Of course, his only purpose was not to avoid Hungary but also to fill his pocket.²⁰⁶ Moreover, Cicala was very smart in the incident that when the Sultan charged him to organize a Divan with Şeyhülislam and Halil Pasha to discuss next year's war

²⁰⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, fols. 103v, 141v (dated December, 1601).

²⁰⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, 141v (dated December, 1601); Also in filza 50, fols. 259r (dated Decembre 10, 1599).

²⁰⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 57r (dated May 1, 1599).

issues, he told that he was not a statesman but a simple marine. He would only advise to follow the Islam Law and the Canon.²⁰⁷

In this period of his career, he made his last successful movement and suppressed the rebellion of the *Sipahis* and saved his ally Gazanfer in Constantinople. By the successful intervention of Cicala and important religious authorities and Seyh'ul Islam, the negotiations were made in the Santa Sofia and Gazanfer was saved and gave the *timars* in proportions that *Sipahis* wanted.²⁰⁸ Safiye showed her gratefulness by sending a very affectionate letter to Cicala, which was regarded artificial also by the *bailo* himself. Safiye nearly apologized for her aggressive behaviors towards Cicala until now, because she was always badly informed about him. Then on, contrary to her behaviors before, she would be only beneficial to him.²⁰⁹ Cicala took the support of the Queen Mother in the court, for the first time in his life and increased his reputation among the court elite. Besides, Sultan Mehmed III showed more affection and approval towards Cicala than other ministers, who suppressed the rebellion.²¹⁰ Gazanfer was also so grateful to him that he became more supportive than before, because Cicala was one of the few ministers, who still stood beside him.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, fol. 231r: “*Cigala .. facendole (Il Sultano) dire, che lui non era huomo di stato, ma semplice rais, et capitaneo di galea, et quanto alla opinione sua era, che in tutto si essequisca la legge et il Canon.*”

²⁰⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fols. 60r, 75v (dated March 20, 1601).

²⁰⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, 75 V, 25 March 1601, “*Et la Regina in questi giorni scrisse ad esso Cigala una assai artificiosa lettera, affine di confermarlo a favorire la causa del Capiaga, ma anco a sopire le voci che di lei andavano attorno, nella quale sua altezza quasi scusandosi se fin hora gli era stato adversa per le male informationi fatte di lui, et da qui inanzi si adopererebbe in suo beneficio.*”

²¹⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fol. 308r (dated July 29, 1601): “*Al presente (Cicala) ha più parte nel governo che non ha istesso maggior Vesir.*”

²¹¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fols. 75v (dated March 25, 1601): “*In questa occasione il Cigala si è avanzato assai di riputatione, et affettione approposto il Re attribuendosi principalmente a lui con gran nota dell'altri Bassà il principio dello assetamento del moto passato, et restando dentro il*

Cicala took advantage of the protection of Sultan and his mother Safiye and tried to make his son the *Beylerbey* of Damasco. Because of his young age and dismissal of an experienced old governor without excuse, there were rumors against Cicala. Thanks to the Queen Mother's support, Cicala could buy the title by paying less than 150 sequins. Moreover, he was planning to marry his son to the Sultan's daughter or one of his sisters and make him a vizier promising him to take advantage of his authority and his fortune.²¹² However, as the Admiral of the Empire, Cicala had many difficulties. He tried to expand his army despite financial difficulties and kept on forming alliances with the corsairs such as Kürt Çelebi, who accompanied him in Maghreb. There was also Murad Reis that helped the negotiations in Calabria against the Spanish, despite his discontent about sharing the booty even when Cicala did not participate. With the intervention of Yemişçi Hasan Pasha, arsenal workers could not take their payments. For the construction of new galleons, there were not enough wood.²¹³ Cicala was also always complaining about the disorder inside the Empire to the Sultan. As the *bailo* reported, because of the opium that he used, he was always discontent and grumbling. Safiye Sultan was so disturbed that she wrote a letter to warn him. According to her, instead of exaggerating the situation and disturbing

Capiaga, che infinitamente le sarà obligato, si adopererà egli a favorirlo è sostentarlo con maggior ardore di prima che se ne usciva essendo solo fra tanti gli altri ministri che lo ami ancora il Cigala decadeva assai della conditione sua."

²¹² ASVe, SDC, filza 53, 140r-v (dated March 2, 1601): "*Il figliolo del Cigala è stato fatto Beglierbei di Damasco carico principalissimo con essersi di ciò assai mormorato per ponerci un figliolo di 20 anni in circa età, si sia senza occasione levato uno emir che vi era molto vecchio, et di gran nome, ma il Cigala padre ha convenuto per farlo ottenere al figliolo valersi in questa occasione del mezzo della Regina, che gli è stata favorevole, et vogliono che gli sia costo poco meno di 150 mila cecchini, et che prima del suo ritorno, sperò poi di farlo apparentare con il Re, se non nella figliola almeno con una delle sorelle, et farlo venir a seder Visir alla Porta promettendosi egli al presente molto della sua autorità, et altrettanto delle sue grandissime ricchezze."*

²¹³ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fols. 35 r, 46v, 47r, 48v (dated March 2, 1601).

his son unnecessarily, he should have been the Grand Vizier, if he had known better.²¹⁴

In this period, Gazanfer was very powerful inside the court. He was close to the Sultan and kept enjoying Safiye's support. Besides, he could take the support of his family, such as his sister Beatrice in Harem and her husband Çerkez Ali Aga as well as other allies. As reported by *bailo* Contarini, Gazanfer was the main actor to negotiate with ambassadors for the yearly payments, as he did with the Venetian *bailo*.²¹⁵ He was so influential that he was regarded as a real governor of the Empire.²¹⁶ On the other hand, The Sipahis sent to the Hungarian campaign were not content about their condition. In 1601, about 500 *Sipahis* visited Şeyhülislam to declare their complaints. They were economically in difficulty because of the constant wars. Although the decimal of the timars was increased, they complained about the *Avarız* that Cicala collected. According to the soldiers, Cicala was supposed to use it for artillery or the Armada, but he did not. They also complained that upper class pashas who did not come to war or were not allowed, had *timars*.²¹⁷ Timariots in the campaign were so aggressive that they burnt the tent of the General Commander and decapitated the

²¹⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fols. 340r, (dated July 15, 1601): "*La Regina Madre li giorni passati scrisse una lettera ad esso Cigala disuadendolo da questi gesti lamentevoli con li quali sempre compariva inanzi il Re suo figliolo cruciandolo coll'esagerarli li disordini del suo governo con dirli, che pure racontandoglieli dovesse anco proporre il rimedio, et che se lo sapeva lo farebbe sedere nel luoco di Primo Visir.*"

²¹⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, fol. 17v (dated September 17, 1602).

²¹⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, n. 18 (dated December 14, 1602): "... *capiaga il qual comanda questo imperio.*"

²¹⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, fols.141r-v: "*Al numero di circa cinquecento sono andati a trovar l'Emir principal predicatore, che l'anno passato fu mezano a sedare la loro sollevatione, dolendosi della ingiuria, et danno, che hora si voleva fare alli suoi compagni, et che alla loro militia toccava di ogn'anno di andare alla guerra, et che bisognava sovenirla, et non bastando la essatione delle decime delli timari, ricercavano, che le fusse data anco l'utilità di riscotere quella dell'Avaris, la quella veniva riscossa dal Cigala, appropriandosela la maggior parte, non vedendosi, che egli spendesse in far armata, ne in custodire la navigatione.*"

Defterdar.²¹⁸ During the Hungarian campaign, many soldiers returned in very bad condition without their proper clothes, armies and horses. As some of them declared during their participation in *Divan*, they had to eat bad bread that they had to share with their horses and camels. The food was also defected and the army was damaged. Besides, the French soldiers who accompanied the Ottoman army could easily have titles and changes, as one of them could become the *Sancak Bey* of Salamadria, in Belgrade.²¹⁹ As the soldiers declared, the General of the army had to control different parts of the army as his lieutenant could not govern subdivisions. For the disorder inside the army, Gazanfer Aga, Sultan Mother Safiye and Şeyhülislam were seen as responsible.²²⁰ Besides, the Sultan had difficulty in financing the army for the next year of the Hungarian war. As the *bailo* reported, now more money started to enter to the Imperial treasure from the Arsenal than it did before. However, Cicala also had difficulty in helping find additional source for the treasure as the taxes collected were already consumed. In order to find the money, they appointed government officers to the treasury and they contacted the former tax collectors, who controlled Constantinople's income and expenses.

²¹⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, fols. 158r, 159v (dated December 1601).

²¹⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no. 21 (dated December 28, 1602): “*Continua ogni giorno a comparire molto numero del soldati li quali medesimamente vengono dalla guerra di Ungheria ridotti a tanta calamità et che non è possibile maggiore, perché si vedono spogliati di vestimenti, senza i loro Cavalli et armati, et macilenti... per tanto disagio sofferto, preferiscono parole di estrema desperatione, et alcuni mostrano del pane che hanno convenuto mangiare il quale e cativissimo essendome portato anco qui in casa sono stati in neccessita di nutrirsi fino del cavalli et del camelli.*” “*Vien affermato che nelle fattioni et per li estremi parimenti sia mancato la vita dell'essercito, non si stancano di raccontar le prove fatte da quei pochi francesi, che sono stati in loro compagnia come quelli che per tutto erano li primi in ogni sorte di pericolo, et ad alcuni di essi, che si fecero Turchi sono stati conferiti titoli et carichi di non poco momento ove specialmente ad uno e stato dato il sanzacato di Samandria, il qual e sottoposto Belgrado.*”

²²⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no. 21 (dated December 28, 1602): “*Alcuni con parole mordenti si querelano del presente governo, nominando la Regina madre, il Mufti et il Capiaga.*”

Accordingly, expenses increased to 100.000 sequins per year. In order to find a solution to this, they had meetings with three different tax collectors in four days. The right to collect taxes was granted to whoever could collect more taxes. This system did not allow the tax collectors to work on a fixed salary. However, these officers knew how to take advantage of this situation by acting as tyrants.²²¹

Gazanfer tried to suppress the complaint of the head of the *Sipahis* through valuable gifts or in different ways, but when the General and all army arrived, the tumult became greater. The 200 *Sipahi* soldiers from Anatolia also complained in the Divan for the compensation of their loss. They served for the sake of the religion and the Sultan and put their life in danger and suffered. While they were expecting something in return, they found their families abducted, their territories harmed and the roads blocked.²²² Also some members of the bread makers from Bursa arrived in Scutari in order to see Gazanfer and warn the Sultan that in fact rebels were close to him that prevented him from understanding the real danger. The city of Bursa wanted to show his fidelity and help the Sultans against the rebellions. As the *bailo* mentioned the bread of the Court was sent from Bursa. Now that there were uprisings in Bursa, they only wanted to send the bread of the

²²¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, fol. 45r (17 Ottobre 1602): “*Il Cigala, overo per non sapervi rimediare, trovandosi al presente le entrate diminuite, et lo erario esausto, et tutti questi giorni detti ministri si sono industriati per trovar denari di far incalzare alli Emimi vecchi il datio dell’entrata, et uscita di Costantinopoli, sicome è successo con accrescimento di cento mille cecchini a l’anno, et per ridurlo a questo segno fu deliverato in quattro giorni a tre mani di Datiari, benche l’uno dopo l’altro fosse effetualmente entrato nel datio affittandosi sempre tutti li datii con conditione che se alcuno offerisce di più di poterglielo levare, non permettendo che li Datiari possono guadagnare che un certo stipendio assegnatoli per la amministrazione, ma essi con la sua malitia sano poi benissimo in diversi modi contraminare alle tirannie usategli.*”

²²² ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no.21 (dated December 21, 1602): “*Li Bassa forse 200 spay da Timaro di quelli della Anatolia, gridando ad alta voce, che si debba provvedere ai loro Danni, poiche dopo haver esposte le loro vite, et sofferto tanto in servizio della religione, et del grande Signor in Ongaria mentre speravano col ritorno prender qualche sorte di risposto, non solo trovano che le loro case, moglie et figlioli sono state presa delli soldati del ribello, ma che ancò e altraversata et impedita la strada.*”

Sultan, not to different parts of the Seraglio which arrived to the table of Gazanfer.²²³

Despite the efforts to suppress the uprisings of the *Sipahi*, the court could not escape from rebellious soldiers' demand for Gazanfer's head. Sultan Mother and the Chief White Eunuch were seen as the main reason of tumults in Anatolia and disorder in the Army. Besides, he was very close to Sultan Mehmed III and Sultan Safiye that both prevented him from seeing the turbulences inside the court and Anatolia.²²⁴

In January of 1603,²²⁵ Mehmed III had to listen to the moans of the rebelled soldiers in the public Divan. In Seraglio, Janissaries in the Bedesten and in public areas kept their position. 300 more Janissaries were charged in the prime cortile of the Seraglio and had to close the doors in any great tumult. The Sultan was accompanied by *Kadıasker*, Aga of Janissaries, and the *Şeyhülislam* with some Janissaries and Sipahis that promised to protect him against rebels. As reported by *bailo* Francesco Contarini, 10 Janissaries and Sipahis representing rebellious soldiers complained about the wars and territories lost in Asia and Hungary. Besides, they were very disturbed about his mother's interventions to politics, which caused more chaos. They demanded from the Sultan to send her away from Constantinople.²²⁶ The Sultan did not let them talk about his mother and dishonor himself, but promised to keep her away from politics. When they

²²³ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no. 21 (dated Dicembre 28, 1602).

²²⁴ The report of Lello, 55.

²²⁵ The Venetian calendar year began on March 1. When they differed from the Gregorian calendar in the months of January and February, dates in Venetian documents are marked by "m.v." (more Veneto). For instance, 16 January 1581, m.v. corresponds to 16 January 1582 according to the Gregorian calendar. All dates in the thesis left as they were in the originals.

²²⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no. 26 (dated January, 1602).

insisted on Gazanfer's execution, Murad III tried to apply justice through Islamic law, but Rebels reminded of him the execution of all his brothers and gave him three days threatening to dethrone him. Despite Gazanfer's demand for forgiveness and the Sultan's promises to give benefits, finally Gazanfer got undressed of his satin white dress and got beheaded in front of Sultan Mehmed III in January 1603.

According to *bailo* Contarini, Gazanfer was regarded the closest advisor of the Sultan who always satisfied him with his services and did not deserve such an end. Before he was executed, he had served for 22 years to the Ottoman court and became very close to the last emperors Murad III and Mehmed III as the head of all Eunuchs and the imperial ports. Although he knew the risks of his duty, because of the Sultan's affection towards him, he could not leave his duty. Moreover, Gazanfer made great fortune during the reign of the last two emperors and had the opportunity to intervene in the decision making of Sultan Mehmed III through the *Arz* letters. The Sultan always asked him what he demanded and to write his desire. Everything he said was written without repetition.²²⁷ Moreover, Gazanfer was known as the Sultan's *müşahip*, his protégé, without whom any decision was not made in the court.²²⁸ However, he was so intelligent and capable

²²⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no. 26 (dated January, 1602): “*Si è impadronito il Gran Signore conforme al solito di tutto il suo haver, che si giudica esser immenso acquistato nel servitio dei Imperatori, ma specialmente sotto li dui ultimi col titolo de Capi Agà cioè capo de tutti li eunuchi del seraglio et della porta, et con titolo di sua Bassà che vuol dir camerier maggior, nelli quali officii e stato per 22 anni continui conosceva il suo pericolo, et pero ha volute piu volte uscir di seraglio, ma il Gran Signor mai ha acconsentito per la singular affettione, che le portava tenendo del continuo appresso, et quando capitava dentro le arz, per dimande sopra le quali vuole scriver la sua volontà, sempre dimandava al Capi Agà ciò che voleva, che servivesse et quanto lui raccondeva senza alcuna replica tutto era scritto.*”

²²⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 53, fol. 100r (dated April 4, 1601): “*Universalmente si dice, che egli è fatto Musaip del Re, cioè frequentemente in domestico, et familiare ragionamento con sua Maestà, et adesso anco pare che poche cose si risolvino senza saper anco la opinione sua.*”

that he did not directly show his effect on the Sultan's decision making.²²⁹ After the execution of Gazanfer, the Aga of Harem, who was very close to the Sultan Mother, was also decapitated. As the *bailo* declared, Sultan Murad was very sad about the decapitation of his beloved friend. He was also very sorry about not finding any solution to prevent it. He showed his grief through his tears as he was beating his knees.²³⁰

Meanwhile, Cicala could not escape from the Safavid wars and was sent to the Eastern frontier as the head of the Ottoman armies and his career started to decline during the reign of Ahmed I. The Safavid army under the command of Shah Abbas started to take an offensive position in the beginning of the 17th century. The Safavid King received the support of some Kurdish tribes and four Georgian princes that rebelled against the Ottoman administration. The Safavid armies were accompanied by many Ottoman fugitive soldiers from Anatolia. Besides, the new Safavid started to give importance to intelligence with the Christian kings in order to disturb their common enemy, namely the Ottoman Empire. In 1603, Shah Abbas recovered Tabriz, Genge, Demirkapı, Servan, Revan, Tiflis, and besieged Erivan, the capital of Armenia. As the *bailo* reported, more than 160.000 Ottoman soldiers were lost and 150 pieces of artillery were destroyed. The Safavids put the Ottomans in difficulty in Erzurum. Moreover, Cicala could not take help for his army, because many soldiers were sent for the

²²⁹ Albèri, III, 417.

²³⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, no. 26 (dated January, 1602): “*Si levò il Gran Signor per ritirarsi, stante il sonno dolore, che sentiva, per haver veduto ammazzare sotto li occhi propri la più cara persona che avesse al mondo senza poterne apportar rimedio, essendole cadute le lacrime et fatti alcuni segni d'estrema dispiacere con la mano battendola sopra il ginocchio.*”

Hungarian campaign and to block rebellions in Anatolia.²³¹ Even the recruitments, the help of powerful Kurdish forces and militias of Damascus and Aleppo could not save Cicala then. In 1606, Cicala died in Diyarbakir, where he escaped for his son's help and had to watch the destruction of the Ottoman army despite his supreme authority.²³²

Because of Cicala's rigid regulations and movements according to the deserts from the army, the rebellions inside the Ottoman army increased. The soldiers under Cicala attacked his tent complaining about his actions for personal interests. While he was in the Eastern campaign, he was blamed to visit his son Mahmut, who was the Pasha of Damasco.²³³ While he was in the Mediterranean, he tried to see his mother.²³⁴

The Ottoman army was increased in number in order to supply the need of soldiers in different frontiers. However, because of the delays in payments, the number of rebelled soldiers in Anatolia also increased. The execution of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, the governor-general of Aleppo and the most powerful commander in northern Syria, was the most significant incident in the Eastern frontier. In addition to Canbuladoğlu, there were also other Ottoman soldiers who had important titles inside the army. For example, after the execution of his uncle, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha rose in revolt to protest the situation and in a short time Canbuladoğlu's rebellion became the most challenging problem for the

²³¹ Pedani, *Relazioni inedite*, vol. 14, 491, 492.

²³² Peçevî, vol. 2, 266; The report of Lello, 64; Beyzade, 901.

²³³ ASVe, SDC, filza 54, fol. 4r (dated September 8, 1601): "*Et il figliolo del Cigala vicino alle marine verso Damasco suo Bassalich.*"

²³⁴ Peçevî, vol. 2, 261.

Ottoman Army and the Sultan.²³⁵ Ali Pasha was united with the other principal leaders of Syria against the Ottomans. Besides he was in continuous network with other famous rebel leaders that were once Ottoman soldiers, namely Kalenderoğlu and Said Arab in central Anatolia. There was also Yusuf Pasha, who rebelled against the Ottoman authority, who was once a tax collector in Asia Minor, Magnesia.

As the *bailo* Ottoviano Bon observed, because of the rebellions in Anatolia, the population there started to desolate their homeland. The cities and provinces became ruined and uncultivated. The Empire had difficulty in convincing the ex-habitants to turn back to their homeland. The ones that survived the attack of the rebellions started to translocate to Uskudar, Pera and Constantinople. Despite their bad condition, they had no desire to return to Anatolia.²³⁶

Moreover, Şeyhülislam and other religious authorities wrote a letter to the Sultan in order to charge Cicala with the duty of suppressing the rebellion in Aleppo, which affected the commerce and was known to Bursa. According to the *bailo*'s letters, Cicala did not have more than 25 galleons. Many of his soldiers were sent to his homeland because of the payment problem. The remaining ones were not capable soldiers in using the artillery. Cicala was sent in Alessandria just in order to take the Imperial treasure of 600.0000 sequins,²³⁷ so he did not have the intention to damage his reputation by attacking rebels in this condition. He did not also have the courage to attack them where he was not considered as an

²³⁵ Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 356.

²³⁶ Pedani, *Relazioni Inedite*, 494- 495.

²³⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, fol. 16r (dated September 17, 1602).

effective commander. Cicala waited in Rodi for the return of his soldiers, who were sent to Alessandria (İskenderiye). In this period as emphasized by the *bailo*, Cicala was losing his authority in the Mediterranean.²³⁸ However, when Cicala wrote an *Arz* to the Sultan, he told that he could not go to Alessandria because of the wind.²³⁹ Besides he was still not careful about his movements in the Mediterranean Sea. Gazanfer was one of his allies who was very disturbed and angry about his reactions despite his warnings inside the court as reported by *bailo* Contarini.²⁴⁰ When Cicala sent an army of 17 galleons to sustain the need of bread for the Janissaries from Salonika, a great ceremony for the army's entrance to Constantinople was prepared. The Sultan himself also observed the entrance of the army. By this way, Cicala could cover his unsuccessful attacks in Calabria, southern Italy. However, Gazanfer who was aware of his actions in the Mediterranean complained about Cicala, who lost his 500 men while unnecessarily taking his revenge.²⁴¹

²³⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, fols. 66r- 66v (dated November 3, 1602): “*Per lettere di Aleppo de doi del passato son avisato che Ostrechi Generale per quest’anno non farebbe altra mossa contra li ribelli, ma che svernarebbe in Caramit et forse in Aleppo non che riuscirebbe con disturbo del comertio et io danno di quei negotianti et quando io sia vero si può temere che il ribello habbia a conferirsi in Bursia non più discosta de qui che due giornate. Et il Mufti et gli altridottori della legge hanno fatto arz al Re nel quel dicono che il Cigala al ritorno delle galee di Alessandria sbarcasse a svuiti. Et colle sue genti et altre che potesse havere andasse ad opponersi al sulo. Ribello ma questa provisione non è stata fino qui stimata sufficiente al bisogno né riuscibile impero che il Cigala non ha più che 25 galee malissimo formite di gente da spade, havendone, per denari licentiate la maggior parte che se ne sono andate alle loro casa, né si crede che lui vorra arischiare la sua riputatione, il qual si dice che habbia mandato le galee in Alessandria a levare il Casna et che lui si sia trattenuto a Rodi, aspettando il loro ritorno per non andare in Alessandria dove la sua auctorità poco sarebbe stimata.*”

²³⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, 90r (dated December 14, 1602).

²⁴⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fols. 66r-v and 67r (dated Novembre 3, 1602).

²⁴¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fols. 66v (dated Novembre 3, 1602): “*Sono arrivate questi giorni 17 galee del armata del Cigala licentiate da Negroponte, hanno portato al solito li pani da Salonichi per vestire li gianizzari et con gran festa furono fatte entrare essendosi il Re condotto al chiosco per vederle, al quale procurasi di ocultargli il poco buon successo accaduto al Cigala in Calavria del quale nell istessa del Capiaga con molta nota di lui ho saputo che si è mormorato che per andarsi a vendicare contra gl’arbori et le piante habbia perduto più di 500 de suoi.*”

Another important behavioral change came from the Sultan's advisor Hoca Sadeddin. In 1599, when Cicala was very powerful as the Ottoman Admiral in the Mediterranean Sea, Hoca Sadeddin criticized Cicala's aggressive attitude against Venetians that were the Empire's allies. Like Gazanfer, also Hoca Sadeddin was favorable towards Venetian issues as was the Sultan.²⁴² Sadeddin was very bored of Cicala that he did not hesitate to criticize him in front of Cicala's enemy Halil Pasha. As the *bailo* witnessed, Hoca Sadeddin was very angry that the Empire's dignity depended on Cicala's temper. Koca Sinan Pasha who was not favorable about Cicala's nomination as Kapudan in 1591, then changed his idea in terms of his relations with him. In his two *telhis*, Koca Sinan apparently did not support Cicala's nomination of Admiral.²⁴³ Besides, when the Sultan asked about Cicala, he said that he was using opium. However, Koca Sinan later became his supporter especially against Ferhad Pasha whom he was very hostile.

Actually in this period Hoca Sadeddin and Cicala supported each other with Gazanfer. However, when Cicala showed behaviors that damaged the Empire's interests, Sadeddin did not see any harm to criticize him apparently. Again, we can see that when the interests of the men in the same faction met, the alliances changed.²⁴⁴

Actually it would be very naive to think that Hoca Sadeddin would worry only about the maintenance of the Empire, because here there were also personal interests. When Sadeddin's son became the Kadı of Rumeli, Cicala sent his

²⁴² Albèri vol. III, 421: "*Professava di portar molta affezione a Vostra Serenità perchè, come soleva dire, tornava ella a comodo del Gran Signore.*"

²⁴³ Halil Sahillioğlu, ed., *Koca Sinan Paşa Telhisleri* (İstanbul: İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi IRCICA, 2004) no.2, 2 and no. 201, 240.

²⁴⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 281v (dated June 13, 1599): "*Stimano, et il Bassà et il Mufti cosa pericolosa rimettere alla temerità del Capitaneo la dignità dell'imperio.*"

Defterdar in order to celebrate him. However, Sadeddin found him very insincere and accused Cicala of supporting a very old and unnecessary man instead of his son during the election. The Defterdar of Cicala tried to convince him that Cicala only thought the government's benefit. Cicala was very sorry that the Sultan was not very supportive towards him these days. However, the Defterdar could not convince Sadeddin. Besides the Sultan's advisor was very disturbed about Cicala's aggressive attitudes towards the Empire's friends, namely the Venetians. Sadeddin found fairer to support the Empire's friends, benefits and its old traditions. Despite saying that he followed the regulations of Sultan Süleyman I, Cicala was not very friendly in politics. Hoca Sadeddin would have regarded him more sincere if he supported the Empire's dignity and benefits as he did. He was aware of the Venetians' complaints about Cicala's enslavement of four Venetians which was only the last one among others and the destruction of their ships. Besides, Cicala's exaggerated support for the corsairs was known in the court. He made the passage of the corsair ships in Constantinople possible and put everyone in danger. The corsairs were uncontrollable now and the Sultan did not take advantage of their presence. Moreover, his allies were constantly disturbed. As the *bailo* reported, Sadeddin was so angry that he said even the Sultan would take Cicala's head, if he had known what was really going on.²⁴⁵

Hoca Sadeddin was very disturbed about Cicala's visits to his family in Italy, as a Turkish Muslim descendant and the member of Ulema class. Cicala was criticized about using the Armada for his own interests. However, it is very significant that even one of his supporters criticized him about his visits to the

²⁴⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fols. 282r-v (dated June 25, 1599).

family. According to Hoca Sadeddin, Cicala should not have visited her mother who converted to Christianity. Moreover, he let her mother return back to his house. With these behaviors, Cicala offended God, refused the Sharia and he should have been punished.²⁴⁶

In fact, Gazanfer and Cicala were good allies despite supporting different factions. While Safiye was always hostile to Cicala, because of his parental ties with Halil, Ferhad and Ibrahim Pashas, Gazanfer did not stand against Cicala with her. For example, he was one of the main supporters of Cicala after the battle of Haçova to make him Gran Vizier. He had to take the risk of being disfavored by the Sultan because of exaggerating Cicala's successes during the battle with Lam Ali and Hoca Saadeddin. In return Cicala protected Gazanfer and saved him from losing his head in the great Sipahi revolt of 1601 in Constantinople. Although we can see clearly alliances in important situations, we cannot consider them constant and rigid. As we can see from Gazanfer's behaviors, different alliances among different factions were possible. For example, Safiye's hatred to Cicala could not block Gazanfer's cooperation with him. Besides, despite supporting Cicala, Gazanfer did not hesitate to complain to the Sultan about his activities in the Mediterranean.

When the members of the same factions could not be useful to each other, their cooperation could be easily interrupted and continue under different conditions and times. For instance, after the Sipahi revolt of 1601, Safiye could easily see that how his great ally Gazanfer became the target of hatred in the eyes of Sipahis and Janissaries. In order to protect her position and faction, she had to

²⁴⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 283r (dated June 25, 1599).

let Cicala move on to the same side with them. When Cicala and Seyh'ül Islam suppressed the revolt, she showed the approval of Cicala's entrance to her faction by a very friendly letter sent to him.

3.3 Relations with the Republic of Venice

Despite their constant efforts for friendship, Venetians were always uncomfortable about Cicala's attitudes inside the court and in the Mediterranean. Matteo Zane told in his relation many interesting details about Cicala, which was read in the Senate of the Venetian Republic in 1594. Zane described Cicala as a powerful and capable statesman who was aware of his advantages gained through his parental ties, and gained with marriages by two grand daughters of Rustem Pasha, who was husband of Mihrimah. For example, he did not even hesitate to consume opium in public areas or wine which was prohibited by laws.²⁴⁷

For Venetians, even if being rich, Cicala was very greedy that the *bailo* had to present 500 sequins in total, in his primary contacts with him.²⁴⁸ In addition to the expenses made for Cicala, *bailo* drew a negative picture of him meaning his huge greed, desire to gain more and habit of lying and cheating. According to

²⁴⁷ Albèri, vol. 3, 424: "Il Cicala, è andato crescendo in reputazione mediante l'appoggio della sultana sua suocera, fu figliola di Rusten bassa', della quale ha avuto per moglie due figliuole l'una dopo l'altra, ne gli osta magiar l'oppio, detto afion, come fanno la maggior parte dei turchi per rallegrarsi, ed ancò il bere vino proibitogli dalla legge, sebben lo fa cautamente e con molta circospezione."

²⁴⁸ Albèri, vol. 3, 426.

him, these were why Cicala was the most hated among the other statesmen of the Sultan.²⁴⁹

As Cicala had a crucial intervention in the decision making of the Sultan over cancelling or passing licenses, *bailo* could not do differently. According to the *bailo*, if the Sultan did not declare efficient commands for the Venetian Republic, it was not because he did not want to or the bureaucrats were incapable. It was only duty to Cicala's bad intention towards Venetians.²⁵⁰ Besides, the *bailo* was scared of complaining about Cicala's activities inside the court with fear of the possibility of Cicala lobbying against him. As he could easily reach the Sultan, anything bad could happen to the *bailo*.²⁵¹ Moreover, Cicala did all his activities in the Mediterranean in the name of the Sultan and informed him at the very last minute about his maritime activities that Venetians had difficulty in opposing. According to *bailo* Cappello, Cicala was very comfortable in the Mediterranean issues, because he promised the Sultan that every time he sailed he would do everything to offend the Spanish King whom the Sultan hated.²⁵² Besides his unpredictable activities, Cicala's attitude about the corsairs that attacked Venetian dominions changed from time to time. During his campaign through Montenegro, Cicala punished corsairs who attacked the Venetian dominions such as Santa Maura, Corfu and Zante. After this attitude, the *bailo* asked Cicala's help to block

²⁴⁹ Albèri, vol. 3, 424: "E' ricco di meraviglia e per natura avarissimo, tutto a dedicato ad accumulare, la sua sordidezza non ha paragone, come ancò la falsità della lingua sempre menzognera e volta a fraude e ad inganni, e si può dire con verità che tra tutti i ministri del Re non fu mai alcuno più odiato di lui, ancò dalli medesimi turchi."

²⁵⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 291r (dated June 25, 1599), Albèri, III, 407.

²⁵¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 50, fol. 174v (dated December 11, 1599): "Il Cigala sapendo io la sua potenza, perchè egli, è stato primo Vesir, et hora, è Vesir et Capitaneo et parla quando vuole col Re, et quando io dicessi alcuna cosa contra di lui, egli mi preseguirebbe, et direbbe ogni male di me."

²⁵² Albèri, vol. 3, 408.

some other corsair activities, but he could not get any response. According to the *bailo*, Cicala's only aim was to expand his campaign to his motherland Montenegro, where his mother who was the daughter of the region's governor, was captured by Cicala's father.²⁵³ In addition, some corsairs could conduct their activities under Cicala's protection. When Cicala became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada in 1598, some *Reis* under him who supported his entitlement as admiral, threatened the *bailo* that now it was their time to take revenge from the Venetians.²⁵⁴ In 1599, a famous corsair named Deli Ali could take from Cicala the permission of arming five ships in Santa Maura. Deli Ali captured a Venetian ship *Silvestra*, attacked many other ships and harmed the Venetians inside the ships. Despite the complaint letters sent to the Sultan and the support of Gazanfer and Vezir Halil Aga, the *bailo* could not stop the corsair Deli Ali. He even tried to convince Gazanfer who helped Cicala to arm his galleons to give up supporting him in his activities. In order to mediate with Cicala, the *bailo* always tried to take advantage of Gazanfer's friendship. However, Venetians could not recover their ships nor the Venetian subjects imprisoned by another corsair Arnavut Memi.²⁵⁵ When Cicala captured other three Venetian ships and totally destroyed them, he was apparently accompanied by all his men in five ships whose head was Deli

²⁵³ ASVe, SDC, filza 50, fol. 89v (dated November 20, 1599): "*Io credo che egli sia per coprire con questa sua andata il pensiero, che egli tiene di passar a Castelnovo, ... che egli (bailo) credeva, che il Cigala vi sarebbe andato per vedere la patria della madre che fu figliola di un Bei dei questo luoco.*"

²⁵⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol.130r (dated April 2, 1598): "*Dalli sopradetti chiaussi che il Cicala era stato fatto Capitaneo del Mare, per il che non si può più parlare con questi Reis poiché tutti fulminando, et minacciando, dicono adesso è venuto il tempo che con il braccio del Cigala faremo le vendette contra Venetiani.*"

²⁵⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 50, fols. 239v- 240r (dated January 10, 1599); filza 49, fol. 29v (dated March 15, 1599).

Ali.²⁵⁶ The *bailo* regarded Cicala's activities very cruel and could not secure the situation for the Venetian galleons in the Mediterranean, as Cicala was becoming more aggressive, as were his corsairs.²⁵⁷ According to *bailo* Cappello, Hoca Sadeddin and other important statesman of the Port agreed that Cicala went for sailing like a corsair rather than a General of the Ottoman Armada.²⁵⁸ Cicala was very untrustworthy that even when he became kind, the *bailo* did not believe in him.²⁵⁹ Moreover, when the corsair Deli Ali was captured in 1600, Cicala released him and gave him the license to sail. The famous corsair kept on being a trouble for the Venetian dominions in the Mediterranean.²⁶⁰

Cicala could find the way to present booty for the Sultan to keep on enjoying his protection who gave him the title of grand admiral even if in the court Cicala was not considered as a suitable man for this charge. Besides, he had a wide espionage network that the *bailo* warned many times about Cicala's possible aggressive maritime and territorial activities.²⁶¹ When Cicala was

²⁵⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 50, fols. 230r, 238r (dated December 26, 1599) and fol. 239v (dated January 10, 1599).

²⁵⁷ ASVe, SDC; filza 50, fols. 202r (dated December 26, 1599): "*A causa dell'impresa e anzi total dessoluzione de tre vasselli che venivano da Venetia Con barbara crudeltà e con avisione de tutti gli huomini da cinque fuste capo delle quali era quel scelerato Deli Ali favorito dal Capitaneo...*" and ASVe, SDC; filza 50, fols. 204v (dated December 26, 1599): "*Li sudditi, et vasselli di Vostra Serenità non saranno più sicuri, et il Cigala fatto più ardito attenderà con ogni mezzo di far il peggio che potrà contra di Lei, come l'istesso farebbero li corsari.*"

²⁵⁸ Albèri, vol. 3, 430. "*E però il Mufti et il resto de' grandi della Porta dicevano che il Cigala usciva più tosto da corsaro che da capitano del Gran Signore.*"

²⁵⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol. 285r: "*Se li favori et le cortesie, che io ho ricervuto dal Capitaneo Cigala con la domestica maniera del suo trattar meco, no si rendessero per altre precedenti cause tanto sospette, et dubbie, io potrei affermare alla Serenità Vostra, che non si avesse a desiderar in lui maggior dimostrazione di affetto verso di lei ma perchè egli è tenuto nell'universale molto difficile a rimettere gli odii, et le male impressioni.*"

²⁶⁰ ASVe, filza 52, fol. 55v (dated November 13, 1600): "*Deliali, che fu in galea alla Catena, et che poi dal Cigalla fu liberato, et datoli licenza di ritornare in corso, concludendo, che non potendosi più sopportar tante rovine, potrebbe poi succeder alcun'accidente, del quale non haverebbono a dolersi di Vostra Serenità, ne delli suoi ministri, ma delli proprii.*" also in ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fol. 26r.

²⁶¹ The espionage was indeed reciprocal and from Venetian side was more clear. The Bailo Zane in his relation complained about two Eunuchs one of whom was British and both were very close to

conducting his maritime activities, Messina, where he was born, was under Spanish authority and was not very friendly to the Republic of Venice. So, Cicala did not have any motivation to favor the Venetian benefits inside the court. Sometimes he was behaving so cruel to the *bailo* in his conversations with him. He did not even hesitate to have disturbing talks with the *bailo* about his 21 Venetian slaves in his private bathroom.²⁶²

As the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada, Cicala was paid 40.000 sequins for a year and became also the governor of some islands in the Mediterranean Sea and did not lose his title as Vizier. Cicala had to spend 200.000 sequins and so according to the *bailo* Zane he would be so willing to recover this through his new duty.²⁶³ As reported by the main dragoman Bernardo Rossi, Cicala exploited not only the ministers under him, but also the Mediterranean islands. The island of Chios for example, had to pay 10.000 sequins from resin trees of the island. Cicala did not help *bailo* Zane for the negotiations of Venetian subjects who were made slaves in the Empire. Besides, in this period the Republic of Venice had difficulty in finding grain and for a few years bought from the Ottomans. In 1592, despite the efforts of *bailo* Marco Antonio Venier and Matteo Zane, Cicala interrupted the negotiations for grain, warning the Sultan for the Imperial needs.²⁶⁴ Cicala's attitude against Venetians was so apparent that according to the

Cicala. Bailo emphasized how expensive it was to keep close friendship with them, see Albèri, vol. 3, p. 426.

²⁶² ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 269r (dated March 12, 1599) and filza 54, 219v.

²⁶³ Albèri, vol. 3, 424.

²⁶⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 47, fol. 321r; Albèri, vol. 3, 429, 430.

French Ambassador, Cicala would die happy the day after he conquered Venice.²⁶⁵

As we can understand, all Venetian bureaucrats always had the tendency to have political friends in key positions for their lobbying inside the court. When it came to ethnical and religious similarities the Ottoman converts once had, not only they but also Venetians had the tendency to create strong networks, considering it as a political tool rather than emotional motivation. While Sultan Safiye and Gazanfer became the main figures of significant faction in the Ottoman politics of the 16th century, they did not hesitate, to ally with the Venetians, especially Sultan Safiye, behaving as a descendent of a Venetian noble family. It is clear that Cicala's attitude was very uncomfortable and like a stranger to Venetians. While they were expecting to take advantage of Cicala's apparent identity, they encountered Cicala's apparent hatred.

As an Ottoman statesman and the slave of the Sultan, the Grand Admiral Cicala represented the supremacy and power of the Ottoman Sultan Murad III in the Mediterranean. Even if his surveillance was regarded aggressive by the Venetians, for the balance of power in the Mediterranean Sea, Cicala was not willing to leave the area open to any authority. Besides, in the 16th century piracy started to involve the imperial maritime activities when important corsairs such as Uluç Ali from Calabria, Turgut Reis and Hasan Veneziano, who were famous corsairs that became later the Ottoman Admirals, started to continue their activities under the Sultan's protection.²⁶⁶ Cicala, once a Genoese corsair together

²⁶⁵ Benzoni, "Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)," *DBI*, 324.

²⁶⁶ Valente, *Vita di Occhiali*, 121-5 and Fabris, "Hasan 'il Veneziano'," 51-66.

with his father could find the possibility to use his old skills and remind himself of his surname.

While Venetian bureaucrats were trying to make friends inside the court, they recognized the possibility of making this process easier through presents. As reported in *relazioni* and *dispatches* of different *bailos*, they had to present valuable gifts not only to the Sultan and Sultanas in important events, but also to other statesmen whom they asked for appointments to resolve their problems. During their negotiations with Cicala, *bailos* spent much money and presented gifts, as they did for Sultan Safiye, Gazanfer and other important statesmen close to the Sultan. However, Venetians always had a tendency to see this as a corruption inside the court. As it was mentioned before, they always complained about the money they had to spend for negotiations. Especially Cicala was always described as a corrupted statesman, who took advantage of his position as an influential man. As we understand Venetians disregarded the tradition of *peşkeş* inside the Ottoman court. According to *bailo* Francesco Contarini, making presents was a tradition of the court also among the statesmen. When the Republic of Venice sent him five valuable French made watches, he pointed out that these gifts would be presented carefully by choosing the more important statesmen in the proper occasion. He also added that Ottomans chose contacting Venetians even for products not made in Venice. On this occasion they did not go to the French ambassadors, but to the Venetian *bailos*. Francesco Contarini also added that one of the watches would be given to Mehmet Kira, who was Sultan's uncle

and very important man in the court as well as a Veneto-phile.²⁶⁷ According to *bailo* Girolamo Cappello, Cicala could only soften Safiye's hatred through the gifts or money that he presented to her, as he knew her greedy character. It was not only Cicala that understood Safiye's greed. Hadım Hasan Pasha became the Gran Vizier, thanks to the promise he made to Safiye that he would sustain her economically for the mosque that she wanted to build as long as she supported him in this title. Besides, there was Kira Kadın who economically supported Safiye, in order to stay close to the Ottoman ports.²⁶⁸

3.4 Relations with Hereditary Family

In 1593, the Spanish Empire, aware that Cicala's family remained in Messina, sent his brother Carlo Cicala, who was the subject of the Spanish crown, to Constantinople. As the Venetian *bailo* in Rome Polo Paruta understood from the Spanish dispatches, the King was very ill and tried to negotiate with the

²⁶⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 56, 130r (dated Dicembre 14, 1602): "*Ho ricevuto la lettera di Vostra Serenità con li cinque horologli Francesi, che mi ha mandato delli quali fin hora mi sono capitate tante richieste dalli piu grande ministry che hormai havrano tutti dispensati ma andero compartendoli col progresso del tempo avvantaggiando et in questo et in tutti le altre occorentie quanto più sarà possibile il danaro pubblio ma vedo che questa è una corte dove si accostuma tanto il donar ancò tra loro medesimi che è una stupore mi meraviglio però che nel proposito de horologli Francesi delli quali soli tengono conto, et non di altri non vadino al Sig. Ambasc. di Francia, ma le instantie si drivino alli Baili di Vostra Serenità ne ho mostrato uno a Mehmet Gira perché essendo l'Illustrissimo.*"

²⁶⁸ Albèri, vol. 3, 400- 401.

Ottomans through Cicala's brother.²⁶⁹ The Spanish crown sent high rank officers with Carlo in order to get a respond from the negotiations.²⁷⁰ It was rumored in the court that Carlo arrived to convince the Ottomans not to interfere with the French affairs of the Spanish court. Moreover, the Spanish offered not to organize a league against the Turks if they cancelled the attack of Candia.²⁷¹ Carlo tried to benefit from the situation which was noticed even by the *bailo* for the beginning of his arrival.²⁷² Even if he was not regarded as a high rank Spanish statesman, he would try to secure Spanish interest as well as his own.²⁷³ *Bailo* Matteo Zane had the opportunity to speak at length with Signor Carlo Cicala, as he reported. Carlo told that he had no intention of negotiating between the two Emperors; he was here on his own private business alone. He also had a passport from the Sultan and the protection of his brother.²⁷⁴ Moreover to become successful in his mission, Cicala tried to convince his brother to be Muslim and forced him to return back when he was already in Ragusa. However his efforts remained in vain.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁹ CSP, vol. VIII, 66 (dated April 10, 1593): "*Dispatches from Spain show that the King is in very bad health. The ministers desire to secure the affairs of Italy; and for the same reason they are employing the brother of Cicala, the Capudan Pasha, in Constantinople.*"

²⁷⁰ CSP, vol. VIII, 75 (dated May 18, 1593).

²⁷¹ CSP, vol. VIII, 75 (dated May 24, 1593): "*There is a rumor, which took rise in the Seraglio that the Ministers know quite well that this brother of the Capudan is coming on the business of the Spanish truce. It is said that the King of Spain promises not to form any league against the Turk, supposing he attacks Candia, provided that the Turk does not interfere with his designs in France.*"

²⁷² CSP, vol. VIII, 67 (dated August 2, 1593).

²⁷³ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fol. 168r (dated November 26, 1600): "*Esso Signor Cicala ... colle precedenti mie a Vostra Serenità mostrava, che havesse a trattar negotio importante, et di grande interesse a questa porta onde a tutti li ministri sapendo, che egli era partito a Messina di dove per il passato è venuto, qualch'altro per simil negotio, et il desiderio che havevano per riputatione et sicurezza delle cose loro, che le fussero da Spagnoli richieste le tregue, ha fatto credere che venisse per questo.*"

²⁷⁴ CSP, vol. VIII, 98, (dated August 3, 1593).

²⁷⁵ CSP, vol. VIII, 103 (dated August 29, 1593).

In his second arrival to Constantinople in 1600 this time as a Spanish ambassador, Carlo tried to obtain the Ducat of Naxos²⁷⁶, although he was paid by the Spanish crown for the negotiations.²⁷⁷ However when he was expected to take it, due to the intervention of the Ottoman religious authorities Carlo lost his opportunity again because of his refusal of conversion to Islam. Moreover, his mother also had to convert to the Islam.²⁷⁸ For the last time in 1604, Carlo Cicala came to Constantinople to make a secret pact with his brother in return of Cicala's service to the Christianity. His efforts went in vain and Carlo abandoned his desire to obtain benefit from the Ottoman Empire.²⁷⁹ Even when he returned to Scio where Carlo established his second home to continue his relations with his brother, Cicala could not save himself from accusation of infidelity. According to an arz sent to the Sultan by Hafiz Ahmet Pasha, the Pope in Rome and other Christian princes had some plans to take advantage of Carlo and they were very optimistic about him.²⁸⁰ Carlo, however, was not willing to give up on the advantages of his brother's position and constantly provided information about the King of France and the Republic of Venice to him, while he was in Chios. In this way, he could act as a pawn of the Turks and cover up his grain trade.²⁸¹ He was very involved in grain commerce that he kept on even during the negotiations. In 1597, one of his ships was captured by the Venetians because of the shortage of grain in the Venetian Republic. Carlo resolved the problem in a diplomatic way

²⁷⁶ According to Nicolae Jorga, after his assignment as Kapudan, Cicala obtained also the governing of Naxos Ducat and left it to Francesco Coronello. Jorga, vol. III, 162.

²⁷⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fol. 101r (dated November 13, 1600): "*Il Signor Carlo Cigala quando fu qui, teneva commissione dal vicere di Messina di trattare queste tregue, delle quali poi non ne parlo.*"

²⁷⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fol. 357r (dated July 29, 1600).

²⁷⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fols. 210v- 211r (dated January 2, 1600), fols. 168v, 169v (dated November 26, 1600) and 210v, 211r (dated January 2, 1600).

²⁸⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, 303v, 325r (dated February 5, 1600).

²⁸¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, 404r. (February 1600).

with the intervention of the Order of the Knights of Malta and the Venetian Senate turned the grain back.²⁸² Moreover Carlo became a great problem for the Venetians, while working for the Spanish crown's interest in Corfu. The Spanish Empire also wanted to take advantage of the island, as Corfu was an important passage for the Venetian Senate to collect intelligence on Ottomans.²⁸³ In 1600, Venetian dominions in Corfu were attacked by the armadas of the viceroys of Napoli and Sicily while Carlo settled there for commerce and intelligence. He also sent the detailed maps of the fortifications in Corfu, for the attacks.²⁸⁴

Meanwhile, Carlo also sent two letters to the viceroy of Sicily in order to warn them about the movement of the Ottoman Armada even before he left Chios. Firstly Carlo showed his sadness for his brother's attack on Reggio and other regions in Calabria at the same year. He also informed them that his brother obtained from a Ragusan the maps of Manfredonia and Taranto. However, Carlo in his return took the responsibility of calculating the damage Cicala gave to the Spanish crown and of espionage in the Levant against the Spain. Carlo turned into an instrument that kept his brother close to the Spanish Empire.²⁸⁵

When his brother sent letters, Cicala was very careful about them. In order to understand the content of the letters sent in 1600, Cicala firstly threatened the *bailo* to translate the letters and not to tell anyone. Then, he showed them to the

²⁸² ASV, Senato Secreta Deliberazioni, reg. 91 (dated October 23, 1597).

²⁸³ Paolo Preto, *Servizi Segreti di Venezia*, 117- 123.

²⁸⁴ G. Hassiotis, *Venezia e i domini*, 123- 30. Alberto Tenenti, *Venezia e i corsari 1580- 1615*, 66-67.

²⁸⁵ Pappalardo, "Carlo Cicala," 5, 6.

Sultan for the negotiations.²⁸⁶ The Sultan wanted Cicala to respond to the Spanish. He wanted Strigonia from the Spain as a sign of their willingness for peace. Carlo also could take some islands in Archipelago for the negotiations.²⁸⁷ For another letter sent in 1599 by Carlo himself, Cicala took the help of the *bailo* Capello as he was not fluent in enough *lingua franca*. Carlo gave new information about the Christian princes and talked about the Venetians that sent 2000 French soldiers in Curzola. Despite Carlo's intelligence, Cicala was very careful and warned the Sultan not to believe all he said as he could have an intention to break the peace between the Ottomans and Venetians.²⁸⁸

As Cicala himself, his brother's presence also became a trouble for the Venetian *bailo* inside the court. As the French Ambassador revealed a gossip that Carlo was there in order to induce the Ottoman army to attack Venice, so Venice, the Pope, Florence, Savoy, and other Italian Princes would have to ally themselves with Spain against the Ottomans.²⁸⁹ According to this gossip, Venetian *bailo* had already felt away. In order to block the gossip, *bailo* Marco Venier had to make a public appearance despite the chaos in Constantinople among the soldiers. As the *bailo* learned from Carlo's close friend, he stayed all night in the arsenal with his brother the Kapudan, eating and drinking and sleeping in the same bed. Cicala has frequently told his brother that Ottomans had no enemies in the world like the Venetians. However Carlo's presence did not please Cicala's men in the Arsenal. As a conversation with them, because of the presence of his

²⁸⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fols. 48r (dated March 23, 1600). As the *bailo* pointed out the letters were in Latin, then he explained the content with the help of Italian and *lingua franca*: *ibid*, 144r (April 21, 1600).

²⁸⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fols. 146r-v (dated May 6, 1600).

²⁸⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 50, fol. 288r (January 12, 1599): "*Et perchè egli non leggi così prontamente franco, volte che la fosse letta da persona che intendesse la lingua.*"

²⁸⁹ CSP, vol. VIII, 123 (dated April 3, 1594).

brother, Cicala was regarded as a spy in the Ottoman Empire. The *bailo* was very disturbed about Carlo's presence when he saw the two brothers' behaviors even had the same attitude when they both did not recognize French Ambassador and was not aware that there was King in France.²⁹⁰

As we can see, despite the compliments about Cicala's fidelity to the Ottoman Empire by the elite inside the court and his brother's distrustful position between the two Empires²⁹¹, the Sultan could see him as an ambassador for his negotiations and take the advantage of his presence. Besides the Sultan trusted Cicala, as he was informed about all the negotiations between Cicala brothers. As Scipione wrote in his letters sent to Carlo before his arrival, the Sultan was eager to establish peace and negotiations with Spain despite some of his conditions.²⁹² Through Cicala's and the Sultan's behaviors we can understand that both brothers were regarded as diplomats and intermediaries between two Empires.

Bailos asserted that Carlo actually knew that the Spanish would not give up Strigonia, but that his purpose was only the title he would get from the Ottomans and he most certainly did not want the Spanish King to hear about the agreements done about him due to his fear of losing his territory in Messina.²⁹³ Moreover, Carlo's desire to obtain a title in the Ottoman Empire or seek his fortune in the Levant did not finish when he returned to Sicily. He worked to defend the rights of the Messina aristocracy against the Spanish Empire.²⁹⁴ However, Carlo could obtain this important duty after his brother Cicala's death

²⁹⁰ CSP, vol. VIII, 127 (dated May 3, 1594).

²⁹¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fol. 203r (dated May 20, 1600).

²⁹² Benzoni "Cicala, Filippo," *DBI*, 334.

²⁹³ ASV, filza 51, fol. 219r (dated July 29, 1600).

²⁹⁴ Lercari, "I Cicala."

in Diyarbakır in 1606. Besides in 1608 he became the governor of an important religious institution, namely *Arciconfraternita degli Azzurri* in Messina, where he was also elected in 1597 and stabilized his position again in his hometown.²⁹⁵ A long time later, Carlo tried to communicate with his nephew Cicalazade Mahmut in order to seek the fortune of his son Gianbattista this time that turned out to be only another failure for him.²⁹⁶ Despite Carlo's failure, another Cicala family member Domenico Cicala, a relative of Cicalazade's father became voluntary for Spanish-Ottoman negotiations. Domenico knew Ottoman language and lived for some time in the Ottoman territories.²⁹⁷

In 1594, Cicala arrived in Messina to see his mother and his relatives, but he was not allowed by the Spanish authorities to see them. In order to show his power or just for revenge, he attacked Reggio without any counter attacks by the Spanish armada. Cicala burned the city with his men and let them loot the city for four days. According to the letters that he sent to his mother, Cicala told that he burnt the city, because his mother was captured and tortured.²⁹⁸ In another letter that he sent to his mother through the vice- duke of Macheda and the Pope Clement VIII, Cicala expressed his desire to see his mother. Besides he added that if his mother loved him, she would find a way to take the permission of seeing him, as Cicala loved all his family reciprocally. He also promised them let them

²⁹⁵ Benzoni "Cicala, Carlo," *DBI*, 337 and Lercari, "I Cicala," 62.

²⁹⁶ Pappalardo, "Carlo Cicala," 13.

²⁹⁷ Preto, *I Servizi Segreti*, 119.

²⁹⁸ Montuoro, "I Cicala," 289: "*Anco l'anni passati per vedervi era venuto in questo luoco, e non e' possuto essere ch'io abbia avuta ventura di vedervi, e mi fu detto, che vi avevano posta in carcere e ferri, e questo fu causa ch'io avesse messo a fuoco e sacco a Reggio.*"

turn back after their meeting.²⁹⁹ Lucrezia Cicala could take the permission of the Pope in 1598 with his Capuchin friar nephews Antonio and Vincenzo with the promise of convincing Cicala to return to Christianity. Cicala could see his mother and his family in his second arrival to Sicily under the surveillance of his Capuchin relatives. As promised to the Pope, they tried to convince him, but it did not work. In return, Cicala tried to convince his brother Carlo to be Muslim, but could not be successful, either.³⁰⁰

When Cicala tried to convince his family to be Muslims, he was trying to show his fidelity to the Islamic faith. He also tried to consolidate his fidelity to the Sultan by not speaking in Italian even if he could easily understand as the *bailo* observed.³⁰¹ In this way, he could eliminate the suspicion over his Ottoman identity. Besides, he was not the only convert who tried to communicate with his family in this period. In different ways, Gazanfer, Admiral Hasan Veneziano or Sultan mothers Safiye and Nurbanu had also the tendency to the keep their ties with their homeland, the Republic of Venice. Although it could be seen as a phenomenon of the period, their actions were always open to discussion of fidelity among their enemies. For example, despite knowing Italian and inviting his family member to the Palace, being the head of the Sultan's private chambers, Gazanfer was expected to intervene directly in the negotiations and assert his opinions. However, he escaped from direct negotiations with European ambassadors especially with Venetians. He had a tendency to ignore his origins

²⁹⁹ Ibid: "*S'adesso vi manderrano, acciò complisse secondo il gran desiderio ch'io tengo di vedervi, e che non resti in questo modo privo della vista vostra. Io vi prometto rimandarvi, sicché se voi m'amate, come io amo a voi, cercarete licentia di venirmi a vedere.*"

³⁰⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 283r (dated June 13, 1599). Also in Montuoro, I Cicala, 288.

³⁰¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fol. 281r (dated January 2, 1600): "*Il qual ufficio dal Cigala fu udito con molta attenzione, che intende benissimo la lingua italiana, se bene fuge a parlar per il peccato che tengono Turchi di usarla.*"

inside the court. As the *bailo* observed, he did not want to leave any suspicion that he was still a Venetian, by staying away from them.³⁰² Also *bailo* Girolamo Cappello said that Gazanfer concealed his emotions, despite remembering his hometown very well. When he saw that Sultan Murad III was very favorable about Venetian issues, he started to be favorable, too. He even tried to stop Cicala's aggressive attitudes in order not to bother the Sultan.³⁰³ Even if Cicala tried to convert his family in Islam, the sailors under his command became discontent and suspicious about his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, because Cicala's armada did never attacked to the Spanish Armada and his brothers were paid by the Spanish crown. As the Venetian *bailo* learned from a Spanish bureaucrat Filippo was paid 1000 golden coins, while Carlo received 600.³⁰⁴

As it was pointed out by Metin Ibrahim Kunt in his article *Ethnic-Regional (Cins) solidarity in the 17th century Ottoman Establishment*, converted people of the ruling elite inside the Ottoman Empire could establish such relations with their family as Cicala tried to do. "Not only did the slaves remember, then, their original homelands, native languages, and customs, but they were in contact with other members of their families. All these factors undoubtedly helped to establish solidarity among Ottomans with a common background. Ottoman writers refer to this phenomenon as a very natural feature of Ottoman society."³⁰⁵ Gazanfer was an important example of this phenomenon. Gazanfer and his brother Cafer were captured with their mother Maria Franceschina Michel while they

³⁰² Albèri, vol. 2, 346: "*Lui o per timidità o per prudenza non si vuol ingerire in negozi per conservarsi e fugir li pericoli che sovrastano s chi s'intromette in simil manegi; fuge principalmente di trattar negotii de Christiani, et in particolare della Serenità Vostra, per non dare sospetto alcuno come Veneziano.*"

³⁰³ Albèri, vol. 3, 417.

³⁰⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 52, fol. 120r (dated 13 Novembre, 1600).

³⁰⁵ Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity," 236.

were traveling through Budua to see their father who was a chancellor there. Both became very valuable men for Selim II.³⁰⁶ After his rise inside the court as the guardian of the Sultan's Ports, Gazanfer became close to Sultan Mother Safiye and received her protection. He could bring his sister Beatrice in Constantinople. Beatrice converted to Islam with the name of Fatma Hatun, married an ally of Gazanfer, Çerkez Ali Aga and worked for Gazanfer's benefits inside the Harem thanks to her close relationship with Safiye. In 1600, Gazanfer also invited also his nephew, Beatrice's son born from her marriage in the Venetian Republic.³⁰⁷ Besides Gazanfer had come to the court of Selim II with his brother Cafer Aga who became then an important as did his brother, but died long before him in 1582.³⁰⁸ Gazanfer had other Venetian allies inside the court. The famous corsair Andrea Celeste named Hasan Veneziano became the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman armada between 1588 and 1591. Marcantonio Querini named Frankbeyoğlu Mehmed Aga took important duties and died as the leader of the cavaliers in the Sipahi troops in 1602. Mother Sultans Nurbanu and Safiye were important examples of using ethnical ties as a political tool. Despite being Albanian by origin, both women sultans represented themselves as originally Venetian aristocrats.³⁰⁹ There were also Osman Aga and his brother doctor Franghini who were a protégés of Damad Ibrahim and apparent supporters of the Venetian *bailo* inside the court.³¹⁰ They did not only enrich their power with noble ties in the Harem, but also formed important diplomatic relations to obtain

³⁰⁶ Albèri, vol. 2, 346.

³⁰⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 51, fols. 167r (dated May 6, 1600). Also in Albèri, vol. III, 418.

³⁰⁸ Pedani, "Veneziani a Costantinopoli alla fine del XVI secolo", *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 15 (1997): 67-84.

³⁰⁹ Pedani, "Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy", 11.

³¹⁰ Albèri, vol. 3, 404.

benefit inside the court. However, as we can assume, ethnical ties were not necessarily always a great motivation to create networks when the interests of different people from the same ethnics conflicted as happened between Safiye and Cicala.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

As the Venetian adventure in the Levant commerce started long before the Ottoman presence there, the *Serenissima* Republic of Venice was very well prepared in terms of protecting their political, judicial and economic rights against the Ottoman Empire. Through the presence of a *bailo*, the Republic not only protected their subjects and rights inside the Empire, but also had the opportunity of observing the Ottoman governmental mentality through its institutions, the Sultan and finally a very important part of the system: the servants. During their stay in the capital of the Empire, they had the opportunity of observing the Arsenal, the armies and the Armada of the Ottoman Empire, the condition of the Ottoman treasure or the Ottoman subjects' social and economic life. The presence of the *bailo* helped the Republic of Venice follow the ambiance of the Empire and find more accurate and quick solutions to their needs. The *bailo* also tried to keep the relations close with the Sultan through important gifts, while also establishing friendship with the important members of the court, namely royal and converted

people. As the administrative systems and mentality of the two states were totally different from one another, the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire never had stable relations. As a result, all *bailos* had difficulty in completing their charge in the Levant. In the Venetian Republic all important governmental duties were only open to aristocracy. Therefore, the presence of converts in important duties in the Ottoman side was always challenging to accept for the Venetians. Each Venetian *bailo* had to negotiate with the servants of the Sultan in order to resolve their problems. The servants were once simple subject people with different religions and from different regions, who then became a high rank member inside the Ottoman Empire. As the Venetians stated, these servants “were made Turks,” and easily changed their social and economic status by showing fidelity to the Sultan and his religion. This kind of social mobility was impossible in the European world. For a Venetian bureaucrat, who was naturally born aristocratic, it was also unacceptable. When we observe the attitude of the Venetian aristocrats in the court through their *relazioni* and *dispacci*, we can easily see their disappointment of having to have held important negotiations with the converts. Besides, they always stated their shock about the early identity of the converts and they criticized these people harshly, and when they did not approve the qualifications of an Ottoman statesman or their attitude against themselves, they put the blame on their low class origin. In addition, after the loss of Cyprus, Venetians adopted a more sensitive approach in analyzing Veneto-Ottoman Relations and their position inside the court. Many times, the *bailos* depicted the situation as Cicala had personal hatred against them. When we observe the

Venetian documents, we can see that for Venetians, aristocracy was not something that could be gained through education or conversion.

When we observe Scipione Cicala as an example of a convert, we can see different aspects of the 16th century Mediterranean World and especially of the Veneto-Ottoman relations. Scipione Cicala, as the son of famous Genoese corsair Visconte Cicala, started his career under the Spanish flag. While he could continue his life as famous a corsair as his father, his life changed with the loss of a sea battle. Scipione was presented by Barbarossa as a gift to Sultan Süleyman I and became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada in the course of time along with other important duties. He even had the chance to visit his mother in Southern Italy and even attempted to participate in a rebellion with the locals against the Spanish authority there and then attacked the coasts. Cicala also tried to establish a career for his younger brother Carlo, while his other brother Filippo remained loyal to the Spanish crown and never had the opportunity to rise as did his brother Cicala. By the presence of Cicala brothers, we can easily see how talents became more useful than loyal blood to make a career and fortune inside the Ottoman Empire. However, I did not argue in my study the conditions and difficulties of the conversion inside the Ottoman Empire. My main aim was to show the differences between the establishment of Venetian and Ottoman administration, to understand the *bailos*' point of view of the convert as a concept. Cicala not only preserved his surname but also used it positively as a corsair who knew the Mediterranean Sea, its people and the tactics of fight. With the same qualifications he became the target of the Spanish Empire and the Papal State this time as a possible traitor to the Ottoman Empire to ruin it. Carlo, the younger brother, also

became their target who was first a mediator, then an ambassador between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empire. Meanwhile, Carlo tried to take advantage of his brother's career to become a tax collector of the Ottoman Sultan. By the complex figure of Carlo as a merchant of slaves and grain under Spanish protection and a mediator and an ambassador, we see the different aspects of the 16th century Mediterranean actors who played important roles between different sides of the same sea. Moreover, the intention of the Spanish and Papal states on Cicala brothers indicates that in the other side of the Mediterranean world, the identity of an Ottoman convert was never regarded as total loss of the Christian flag. There were always different intentions over the convert such as taking advantage of his presence or regaining one lost member of Christianity. We can also observe that the Republic of Venice never gained anything from Cicala's presence as a capable and successful member of Italian peninsula of the Spanish Empire, in terms of the benefits of the Christian world or political benefits. On the contrary, Cicala always became an obstacle to the Republic of Venice inside the Ottoman court. There was a general tendency among the converts to help their ex-compatriots and among Italian converts to have good relations with the Venetian bureaucrats. One of the most influential figures of the 16th century Ottoman court Gazanfer and the important Sultana Safiye supported each other and known for their Italian origin, they also became good allies of the Venetian *bailo*. Safiye was known as an ex-Venetian aristocratic family member inside the court and she took advantage of this and the *bailo* became an important member of his faction. Significantly, Cicala always remained an enemy to Safiye with his anti-Venetian policies and also a rival to the other members of her faction such as Damad Ibrahim, Ferhad

and Halil Pashas. It should be noted though that as the different *bailos* reported Safiye was originally Albanian, but she revealed herself as Venetian, as did Sultana Nurbanu before her. Gazanfer, however, took some members of his hereditary family by his side and established good relations with other Italians such as Hasan Veneziano or Frenkbeyoğlu. However, when we observe the relations between Safiye, Gazanfer and Cicala and in addition to other important figures close to Cicala such as Koca Sinan, Hoca Sadeddin, we can see that having the same ethnicity becomes only a weak motivation for the converts. When their personal interests were included or their faction was damaged, the relations easily changed. Old enemies could become new allies as Safiye made peace with Cicala for a short time after the loss of Gazanfer, or Hoca Sadeddin, who was supporter of Cicala, changed his attitude after his promotion to the Gran Vizierate after the Ottoman victory on Habsburgs in 1595, when Cicala started to become very aggressive against the Venetians and did not support his son's promotion. Converts used their parental ties in order to reinforce their factions and their positions. More than emotional reasons the converts made practical moves and regarded their hereditary family as man power for their new household. Meanwhile as long as they did not become a danger for the Sultan's authority, the converts not only could reveal their hereditary identity but also could establish relations with their homeland, while the Ottoman system took advantage of these ties and enriched its own men power.

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