WINTER IN THE LAND OF RÛM:
KOMNENIAN DEFENSES AGAINST THE TURKS IN WESTERN ANATOLIA

A Master's Thesis

by

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To the memory of my grandfathers

Simon van Nispen

&

Humberto De Luigi, Sr.

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Archaeology.

Dr. Charles Gates
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ABSTRACT

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January 2015

Castles constitute the most abundant group of Byzantine remains in Anatolia, and offer historians and archaeologists the opportunity to more fully understand both Byzantine settlement patterns and defensive systems through the ages. However, due to their inaccessibility, lack of distinctive construction techniques, and an absence of evidence for secure dating these monuments have often been neglected by Byzantinists. At the same time, historical sources of the eleventh and twelfth centuries make it clear that the Komnenian emperors Alexios, John, and Manuel all engaged in extensive fortification activities. This thesis seeks to critically unite the historical and archaeological evidence for Komnenian fortifications, with the goal of further understanding the Komnenian defensive strategy and evaluating its results. Following a historical overview of Turkish settlement in Anatolia and the Byzantine response, forty Komnenian castles are surveyed, half of them historically attested and the other half assigned to the period based on historical likelihood and, where

possible, stylistic similarities with known Komnenian fortifications. The conclusion argues that while the Komneni were generally successful in dealing with the Selçuks diplomatically, they were unable to solve the problem of the nomadic Türkmen, against whom their fortification program was overwhelmingly directed.

Keywords: Western Anatolia, Byzantine, Anatolian Selçuks, Türkmen, Alexios, John, Manuel Komnenos, Kılıç Arslan, Castle, Fortifications, Defense Strategy, Settlement

ÖZET

RÛM TOPRAĞINDA KIŞ:
BATI ANADOLU'DA TÜRKLER KARŞISINDAKİ KOMNENOSLARIN MÜDÂFAASI

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Kaleler, Anadolu'da Bizans kalıntılarının en bol olduğu grubu teşkil eder ve hem tarihçilere hem de arkeologlara, Bizans müdafaa sistemlerini ve yerleşim desenlerini anlamlandırabilmek için bir fırsat verir. Halbuki kalenin ulaşılmazlık, özgün olmayan inşaat tekniği ve kesin tarihleme için kanıt eksikliği yüzünden bu yapılar, Bizans araştırmacıları tarafından ihmal edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda, M.S. 11. ve 12. yüzyıllara ait tarihi kaynaklar göstermektedir ki; Aleksios, Yannis, ve Manuel Komnenos tarafından kapsamlı bir tahkimat inşa edilmiştir. Bu tez, Komnenoslar dönemindeki kaleler için tarihsel ve kazılardan elde edilen bilimsel kanıtları ciddi olarak birleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu şekilde, Komnenoslar'ın müdafaa stratejisi anlaşılabilecek ve onun sonuçları değerlendirebilecektir. İlk Türk yerleşimi ve Bizans müdahaleleri hakkında genel bir tarihsel taslaktan sonra, kırk adet Komnenoslar dönemine ait kale incelenmiştir. Yarısı tarihi kaynaklardan bilinirken, diğer yarısı da Komnenoslar dönemi tarihsel olasılık ve stilistik kriterler araştırılarak

elde edilmiştir. Sonuç bölümü; Komnenoslar'ın Selçuklularla diplomatik açıdan ilişkilerinin başarılı olduğunu fakat göçebe Türkmenlerle sorunlarının çözülemediğini ayrıca Komnenoslar'ın savunma sistemini Türklere karşı değil göçebe Türkmenlere karşı olduğu gerçeğini kesin olarak ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Batı Anadolu Bölgesi, Bizans, Anadolu Selçuklular, Türkmenler, Aleksios, Yannis, Manuel Komnenos, Kale, Tahkimat, Müdafaa Strateji, Yerleşim

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

İndik Rûm'u kışladık, çok hayr ü şer işledik

Üş bahar geldi, geri göçtük Elhamdü-lillah

We went down to Rûm to winter, deeds good and bad we did there

Come the Spring, we returned home, praise be to God

Yunus Emre

***

The Roman world was defined by its cities, with their massive public buildings and aqueducts, and by its road system which allowed the legions to travel the civilized world from end to end to deal with any threat to Rome's imperium. The capital itself was not walled until the third century. By contrast, Constantinople from its foundation was defined by its walls. Built by Theodosios II to expand the city founded (and walled) by Constantine, the walls of Constantinople are the most salient expression of the Byzantine defensive mentality. They allowed the empire to survive its darkest days and they were the basis from which ambitious emperors launched their attempts at revival. Every Byzantine dynasty left its mark on these

walls as they were constantly repaired and reinforced both to counter omnipresent threats and to allow emperors to physically leave their mark in Byzantine history.

When one travels through Anatolia, the sheer number of castles encountered is striking. In addition to the plethora of standing remains, dozens of towns and villages bear toponyms such as Hisar, Asar, or Kale, which preserve the memory of a castle even when the remains no longer exist or the location itself long ago lost its strategic importance. These remains offer us testimony that at some time in history an emperor or a sultan, a local potentate or even the local peasantry had something to protect and were willing to expend an enormous effort to do so. Castles can have several functions. The most obvious and the most common are as military bases, garrison posts, or control points for strategic bridges and mountain passes. But they can also be residences for the ruler or the aristocracy, like the Blachernae Palace or the Topkapı Sarayı in İstanbul. Castles and walls can also be a way for an empire or an emperor to promote himself. Such is the case with Selçuk fortifications, and also the walls of Constantinople itself. And of course they can also be refuge sites for the local population. The function of a fortification can also change dramatically over time. As an example, Diocletian's palace in Split, Croatia, was built as a personal residence for the retired emperor and a garrison post for his personal guard. This was a fortress as a statement of power, a message to his empire and its people that he and his new system of government and defense had saved them. In the turmoil of the sixth and seventh century, the residents of nearby Salona took refuge in the abandoned palace and converted its symbolic function to one of grim practicality in the face of the Avar and Slav invasions. Examples of this sort of reuse abound in Anatolia; in the Dark Ages many of the monuments of antiquity were repurposed as foundations for defense systems. Fortifications themselves were also regularly

reused and rebuilt. During peaceful times cities spread far beyond their walls and people left their hilltop refuges, and fortifications decayed either through neglect or due to conscious demolition. Yet when conditions became more dangerous these same sites were reoccupied and their walls were rebuilt. Fortifications were only rarely constructed *de novo* and thus they always bear a record of their history within themselves.

Komnenian fortifications usually had both a past and a future. They were often times built on the remains of earlier Byzantine walls, or walls from Late Antiquity or even the Hellenistic period. Subsequently, they were used by the Laskarids, the Latins, the Selçuks, the Turkish emirates, and ultimately the Ottomans. On these walls the historical political, social, and military situations of the ages are written. But this wealth of information is not always written in a "language" that is easy to understand. In the Komnenian period inscriptions are frustratingly rare, even when compared with the situation in the Dark Ages. While criteria like masonry techniques and the composition of mortar can be used to tentatively establish relative chronologies, without some fixed points it is difficult to fit these into an historical framework. Fortunately, the eleventh and twelfth centuries are well covered by Byzantine historians, who regularly mention the construction of fortifications in the course of their narratives. In addition, accounts written by the Crusaders as they crossed western Asia Minor provide valuable counterpoints to the Byzantine histories, describing the cities and the countryside in admirable detail and from the perspective of an outsider.

This thesis will explore the contribution which archaeology can offer to the historical record. When Alexios I came to power in 1081 the Byzantine defensive system in Anatolia had been neglected for decades and the army which had

supported and defended the fortified cities had also decayed. Consequently Alexios and his successors John and Manuel had to rebuild a defensible frontier which would provide some measure of security for the cities and people of Byzantine Anatolia. Under their direction the empire recovered much of western Asia Minor, including the all-important river valleys and the coastal plains, which allowed a limited return to normal economic and agricultural life. It is clear that each of the Komneni took the work of fortification seriously and allocated significant resources for this task. Alexios focused on reclaiming the coasts and the first Anatolian Selçuk capital of Nikaia (İznik). John pushed into the interior, fortifying Laodikeia (Denizli), Lopadion (Uluabat) and Achyraous (Balıkesir) among others, as well as directing an extensive restoration of the fortresses of the southern Anatolian coast. Manuel was the most prolific builder, and his most significant act was the creation of the new theme of Neokastra, fortifying Pergamon (Bergama), Adrymyttion (Edremit) and Chliara (Darkale) and their surroundings.

Meanwhile, the Selçuk Turks established themselves more securely and permanently, with the capital of their state first at Nikaia and then at Konya. For most of this period, the Selçuks were more concerned with other Turkish states in Anatolia and Mesopotamia than with the Byzantines, and despite the Byzantine hostility towards the Turks so frequently encountered in the written sources it is clear that Constantinople and Konya viewed each other with a high degree of mutual respect and tolerance. This diplomatic accommodation was often undermined, however, by the nature of Turkish settlement. While the Selçuks and their sultans quickly adopted an urban way of life, their nomadic followers, known as Türkmen, continued to practice their traditional transhumant lifestyle, moving annually between their high summer pastures (yaylas) and the warmer, wetter river valleys

(kışlaks) where they wintered their flocks and engaged in raids of the Byzantine towns. Byzantine historians do not always recognize that the sultan could not really control these groups, and to the extent that he could control them he obviously preferred that they direct their attacks away from his own possessions. Geographically, the Türkmen were concentrated on the Anatolian plateau, to the west in the area around Dorylaion (Eskişehir), Kotyaeion (Kütahya), and Akroinon (Afyonkarahisar), to the north around Gangra (Çankırı) and Kastamon, and to the south on the Pamphylian plain and the Tekke plateau. These areas all bordered Byzantine territory and consequently the emperors were obliged to campaign and build fortresses almost constantly, regardless of the agreements they reached with the Selçuk sultans. The culmination of the Byzantine revival was to have occurred in 1176 when Manuel Komnenos led a large campaign against the Selçuks and Kılıç Arslan II, but his army was utterly defeated at Myriokephalon and the Empire never again seriously entertained thoughts of reconquering the east.

Chapter two is an outline of the history and the historical record of the Komnenian emperors, focusing heavily on their military campaigns and their building activities in Anatolia. In addition, the origins of the Selçuks in Anatolia and the nature of their settlement patterns will be discussed. I begin in 1025, when medieval Byzantium was at the height of its power, and finish in 1204 with the Fourth Crusade, although the period from 1081 to 1180 is covered in greater depth. The third chapter explores Komnenian fortresses in detail and tries to answer the question of whether there is a distinctive Komnenian style which can be used to identify fortresses which are not mentioned in the historical record. I have identified more than forty castles, city walls, and forts which fall into the Komnenian period, mostly in western and southern Anatolia. I have divided this chapter into six

sections, two each for each emperor, the first listing his historically attested building activities and the second listing those fortresses which I believe can be assigned to him. My conclusion will summarize the defensive strategies of each emperor as well as offer an assessment of their results.

The castles of Anatolia have been noted by travelers since the nineteenth century, but as most of these travelers were far more interested in classical and Roman remains their descriptions rarely go beyond calling a castle Byzantine. The first modern scholar to focus on eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine fortifications specifically was Helene Ahrweiler in the 1950s, although her work only mentions historically attested castles (Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 1960). Wolfgang Müller-Wiener also studied middle and late Byzantine remains in western Anatolia, and sought to use archaeology to expand on our historical knowledge (Müller-Wiener, 1961). A more detailed investigation of the Komnenian period, incorporating both archaeology and history, was done in the 1970s and 1980s by Clive Foss, who studied the fortifications both in the context of the decline of the classical city and in terms of regional defenses against the Turkish invasion (Foss, 1982; 1985; 1990; 1998). Since Foss's work there has been no general study or overview or Komnenian fortifications, although several sites have been surveyed or exacavated over the last twenty years. Many of these new findings were reported and discussed during the First International Sevgi Gönül Byzantine Studies Symposium in June 2007, and several of the projects mentioned therein have been ongoing since. This thesis reevaluates several of Foss's conclusions in light of the last two decades of archaeological work. In addition, studies of early Turkish settlement in Anatolia have advanced considerably in recent years, again in light of archaeological evidence. In the 1970s and 1980s the important works written by Speros Vryonis

(1971), Osman Turan (1971), and Claude Cahen (1968) relied almost exclusively on historical texts, and in the case of Vryonis and Turan were heavily colored by the ideological biases of the authors. While Cahen did try to incorporate archaeological evidence as a corrective, he obviously had far less data available than we have today. Today the history of Anatolian Selçuks, the Türkmen nomads, and their relationship with Byzantium has been and is still being thoroughly reassessed by historians like Carole Hillenbrand (2008), Andrew Peacock (2010), and Songül Mecit (2013). This thesis brings together recent historical and archaeological research.

CHAPTER 2

ANATOLIA FROM THE FIRST TURKISH RAIDS TO THE FOURTH CRUSADE

2.1 Byzantium in the Eleventh Century[1]

"Such was Monomachos in his earlier years,
enjoying multifarious delights and petty distractions."
(Attaleiates, 89)

When Basil II (976-1025) died late in 1025 the Byzantine Empire stretched from southern Italy to the Caucasus Mountains, and Basil's successful military campaigns and domestic policies had effectively neutralized nearly every conceivable threat (Figure 1). Yet Basil's successors utterly failed to maintain this position of strength and instead allowed the defense system to decay as they squabbled amongst themselves. In short, the provincial nobility or landed aristocracy was no longer effectively controlled by the emperor, and in fact emperors were made and unmade by civil or military aristocrats, who then turned the apparatus of state on their real and perceived rivals, spending their energies intriguing in Constantinople while the frontiers were ignored (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 283). Romanos III Argyros (1028-34) and Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-55) were both civil aristocrats

[1]For the general framework of Byzantine history in the eleventh and twelfth centuries my main secondary sources have been George Ostrogorsky's *History of the Byzantine State* (1957), Michael Angold's *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204: A Political History* (1997), Warren Treadgold's *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (1997), and John Haldon's *Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World: 565-1204* (1999). For the general framework of Turkish settlement my sources have been the books and articles of Speros Vryonis and especially Claude Cahen, in addition to Andrew Peacock's *Early Seljuk History: A New Interpretation* (2010).

who married Zoe (1028-50), the daughter of Basil's brother Constantine VIII (1025-28), and both dedicated the worst of their collective incompetence to the destruction of the military, reducing its numbers and allowing those eligible for service to buy exemptions. In addition, Constantine IX completely dismantled the army of Iberia in 1053 or 1054:

> "For a formidable army used to be stationed in Iberia and drew its support and supplies from the neighboring public lands. But the emperor deprived them of this means of support, and by taking away such a great power, not only did he lose his own allies but he turned them into powerful enemies, granting them to the enemy as an invincible addition." (Attaleiates, 2012: 79)

Constantine both feared a potential rebellion and wanted to convert these soldiers from a financial obligation into tax-payers; even before disbanding this army he had dramatically debased the coins with which they were paid (Treadgold, 1995: 40; 216-217). Lost native troops were usually replaced by mercenaries, a practice which would only become more fraught as Turkish attacks increased in intensity and frequency, and as the Byzantine Empire increasingly dealt with hired soldiers from a position of weakness rather than strength. Perhaps in the time of Basil II the argument can be made that mercenaries were more professional, more specialized, and easier to control; mercenaries were loyal to their paymasters in a way that indigenous troops might not always be (Haldon, 1999: 93). But without strong commanders and especially without regular pay, the conditions prevalent in the middle of the eleventh century, these mercenary troops could prove extremely fickle, and had no connection to Byzantine traditions or to the land they were supposed to be defending (Charanis, 1975: 17-18). Constantine IX also witnessed what would become the final break between the Roman and Orthodox Churches. Only a strong Emperor could have used his diplomatic clout to prevent ecclesiastical disagreements from becoming political, and Constantine was unable to moderate the hard line taken

by Patriarch Michael Keroularios. Thus, the papal legates and the Byzantines mutually excommunicated each other, an event not at all unprecedented but which in this case would never be rectified (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 298). Constantine died in 1055 and after Theodora, Zoe's sister and co-empress, died in 1056 without any children, the remnants of the Macedonian dynasty were finished. The new Emperor, Michael VI, had been chosen by Theodora and was also from the civil bureaucracy. In addition his previous position had been the *logothetes ton stratiotikou* and so it had been he who had been paying the armies with Constantine's debased coinage (Treadgold, 1997: 597). During his short reign the excessive promotion of civil servants only increased, and the military aristocracy rallied behind Isaac I Komnenos (1057-1059) whose relatives would ultimately reign throughout the twelfth century.

The Komneni were originally from Thrace but during the reign of Basil II Isaac's father Manuel had been given lands in Paphlagonia and had built a fortress there known as Kastra Komnenon (Kastamonu). Before rising in revolt, Isaac had been the commander of the Anatolian field army and although his reign was brief he attempted to strengthen both the army and the treasury after the excesses of his predecessors. To do this he resorted to the confiscation of property, including even Church property. Keroularios, who had been the decisive agent in Isaac's accession, found this unacceptable and Isaac attempted to have him deposed on charges of usurping imperial authority (Angold, 1991: 11). Yet during the synod of deposition Keroularios died, and as the Patriarch had been beloved by the people of Constantinople, Isaac's situation became untenable. Without the support of the Church he had no choice but to abdicate and enter a monastery, allowing the throne to pass to Constantine X Doukas (1059-67), who again came from the civil aristocracy and reinstated the worst practices of his predecessors. The army was

neglected entirely, the civil bureaucracy ballooned, and the right to collect taxes was farmed out to the highest bidders (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 302). In addition, the defense of the eastern frontier was entrusted to Armenians and Syrians who were at the same time being persecuted for their diversions from orthodoxy (Angold, 1997: 42). By the end of his reign the consequences were becoming clear, especially on the frontiers. Byzantium found itself surrounded by external enemies and severely lacking in defenses.

2.2 Early Turkish Incursions in Anatolia

"My lands are too small to accommodate you and to provide what you require. The best plan is for you to go and raid the Byzantines, to strive on the path of God and to gain booty. I shall follow in your tracks and aid you in your enterprise." – İbrahim Yınal
(Ibn al-Athir, 546)

The first mention of the Turkish raiders in Anatolia comes from the chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, who refers to them as a "death-breathing dragon, accompanied by a destroying fire" (Vryonis, 1971: 81) which terrorized the Armenian kingdom of Vaspurakan in 1016-1017, or more likely a decade later in 1029 (Cahen, 1968: 67). This initial incursion was probably not the work of the Selçuks, nor even directly authorized by them, but it was nevertheless considered extremely disruptive for the Armenians and according to the Byzantine historian George Kedrenos it caused the Armenian prince Senekerim to cede his kingdom to Byzantium in exchange for lands in Cappadocia (Vryonis, 1971: 54). In any case, the Selçuks were occupied until 1040 with a struggle against the Ghaznavids for Khorasan. Their victory in 1040 at Dandanakan established the Selçuks as a powerful state in the Middle East, and after 1040 raiding activity in Anatolia increased dramatically.

The first attack came around 1043, in which the Byzantine governor of Syria Leichoudes was taken prisoner. While Attaleiates attributes this attack to the Selçuk sultan Tuğrul and claims that annual raids began after this date (Attaleiates, 78-79), Cahen characterizes the raiders as Türkmen, who were in fact fleeing the Selçuk advance following Dandanakan (Cahen, 1968: 67-68). In 1045 a force under the command of Kutalmış (a cousin of Tuğrul) attacked Erciş on Lake Van and took its commander prisoner. From 1046 to 1048 Kutalmış and Ibrahim Yinal (Tuğrul's foster-brother) were engaged in a struggle with the Shaddadids for control of Caucasian Albania (Peacock, 2010: 140). Kutalmış besieged the Shaddadid capital Dvin for a year and a half, while Ibrahim Yinal also ventured further into Anatolia, attacking Chaldia, Tao, Taron, Trebizond, Mantzikert, and destroying utterly Arzen (Erzurum). This raid culminated in the Battle of Kapetron, where a Selçuk force inflicted its first defeat on a major Byzantine army. Ibn al-Athir reports that Ibrahim returned with 100,000 captives and ten thousand camels laden with booty (Ibn al-Athir, 546). In 1054 and 1055, Tuğrul himself campaigned in both Anatolia and Caucasia, sacking Paipert and Perkri, and unsuccessfully besieging Mantzikert (Ibn al-Athir, 599; Attaleiates, 81-82). In 1055 Tuğrul entered Baghdad and entered into negotiations with the Caliphate, presenting himself as a defender of Sunni orthodoxy and promising to restore order to those Islamic lands which were experiencing the depredations of the Türkmen (Cahen, 1968: 23-25). Naturally their customary raiding activities were extremely disruptive in the context of a settled state. But as Bar Hebraeus notes, Tuğrul himself maintained his Turkish identity:

> "I am a minister (or, servant) of the Head of the Kingdom of the ARABS, and in all the countries over which I reign I have made to triumph the proclamation of the Khalifah, and I have made men to rest from the oppression of the governors MAHMUD and MES'UD, who were my predecessors. And it is evident that I am not inferior in any wayto them. Now they were slaves of the Khalifah who enjoyed dominion (i.e. they ruled), but I

> am the son of free men, and am of the royal stock of the HUNS. And besides thesethings, although I am honored even as they were honored, I think that service to me, and the manner in which I am distinguished, should be greater than theirs." (Bar Hebraeus, X:225)

The Selçuk sultan had a careful balance to maintain, between the orderly administration of his lands and the needs of his army which was composed mostly of Türkmen. Anatolia served as an ideal area for the latter. It was not populated by Muslims and thus could serve as an acceptable outlet for the Türkmen when they were not needed on campaign. The rest of Tuğrul's reign saw continued raids which the Byzantines were unable to control, much less stop, and the Anatolian military aristocracy rose in revolt against the bureaucrat emperor Michael VI, backing Isaac I Komnenos (see above). In 1057 another Turkish army, led by Dinar, sacked Melitene (Malatya), killing or enslaving the inhabitants and carrying off huge amounts of booty (Vryonis, 1971: 88). It must also be noted that Isaac had also denuded the frontier of troops to support his bid for the throne (Angold, 1997: 41). The Byzantines lost Ani to the Turks in 1064 and saw Kaisareia (Kayseri) sacked shortly thereafter. Yet this apparent solution to the problem of the Türkmen soon became its own problem, as chiefs who wished to establish themselves free from Selçuk suzerainty were able to do so in Anatolia. In 1067 and 1068 they pushed even further west, to Amorion, Ikonion (Konya) and even as far west as Chonai (Honaz) in 1070. In stark contrast to encountering any resistance, some of these raiders even found themselves fighting as mercenaries for the depleted Byzantine army (Cahen, 1969a: 147-148).

2.3 Romanos IV Diogenes and the Battle of Mantzikert

"But I will not imitate your severity and harshness." – Alp Arslan
(Attaleiates, 301)

When Romanos IV Diogenes came to power in 1068 he not only had to confront the relentless attacks of the Turks, he also had to contend with the ongoing political strife in Constantinople, as well as the decayed and depleted army. He married Eudokia, the widow of his predecessor, but the Caesar John Doukas (brother of Constantine X) was not to be a loyal subordinate (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 304). Romanos immediately led campaigns against the Turks, and in both 1068 and 1069 he had middling success at best, as he was never able to force a decisive encounter (Friendly, 1981: 149-162). In 1071 the opportunity finally arrived, and Romanos met the army of the Selçuk sultan Alp Arslan at Mantzikert (Malazgirt), where he suffered a total defeat and was captured by the sultan.[2] This battle is rightly seen as a major turning point, although at the time Alp Arslan did not change his policy toward Anatolia and made no serious attempt either to consolidate his gains or to take advantage of the fact that Anatolia was now truly undefended. Rather, he concluded a fairly generous treaty with Romanos and ostensibly seemed to welcome a peace settlement which would allow him to focus on matters outside of Anatolia, in particular his ongoing confrontation with the Fatimids in Egypt (Cahen, 1969a: 148-149). In any case, the intentions with which Romanos Diogenes and Alp Arslan established their treaty were irrelevant a year later, because both rulers were dead. After the battle, even though he had been set free by the sultan, Romanos was

[2]Romanos offered battle despite being without his infantry archers and so the mounted Selçuk archers could harass the Byzantines with impunity. In addition, the Byzantine army was drawn away from their camp as the Selçuk forces engaged in their traditional tactic of organized retreat. As the daylight faded, Romanos signaled for his army to return to their undefended camp, but this retreat turned into a rout when Alp Arslan saw the opportunity and ordered an attack. By this time the Byzantines, especially the heavy cavalry were exhausted from their long day of marching across the steppe, although Romanos did unsuccessfully try to rally his forces to finally engage the Turks. See pages 144-153 in Brian Carey's *Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071*, with tactical maps drawn by Joshua Allfree. Carey puts all the blame for the loss on Romanos, on the one hand because Romanos placed substantial parts of his army under men of questionable loyalty and on the other hand because of his disastrous decisions immediately before and during the battle, in which he disregarded centuries of Byzantine strategic doctrine due to his intense desire for a decisive encounter.

immediately deposed in favor of Michael VII Doukas (1071-1078) and was ultimately blinded in Kotyaeion (Kütahya), dying almost immediately. Alp Arslan's death was no more dignified. He was murdered by a prisoner during an expedition against the Karakhanids in Central Asia (Cahen, 1968: 30). His son Melikşah was to be an administrator and not a warrior, and so at this crucial time Anatolia was largely left to the Türkmen.

The decade following Mantzikert is highly complicated from both the Byzantine and Selçuk perspectives. Romanos was replaced by Michael VII Doukas (1071-1078), "a pitiful puppet, a cloistered bookworm, surrounded by court intriguers and long-winded pedants" (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 305), on the insistence of the Caesar John Doukas and Psellos. Alp Arslan was succeeded by his son Melikşah, but the new sultan also had to deal with the sons of Kutalmış, Süleyman, Mansur, Alp-Ilek, and Devlet, who began to establish themselves as rulers since no other members of the Selçuk family were present in Anatolia (Cahen, 2001: 8). It must be stressed that the loss of Anatolia was not the inevitable consequence of Mantzikert, but rather resulted from the decade of disorder which followed the battle (Figures 2-3) (Angold, 1997: 117). The Byzantine army in Anatolia, although not destroyed in the battle (Theotokis, 2014: 79), quickly fractured into groups loyal to the new emperor, groups under various pretenders, and the group led by Roussel de Bailleul, a mercenary commander who ultimately rebelled against the empire in 1073. Meanwhile the Türkmen who had followed Alp Arslan into Anatolia had no real leader but also no significant enemy preventing them from staying. On the contrary, the Byzantines themselves turned to the sons of Kutalmış for aid against one another. In 1078 the general Nikephoros Botaneiates, the future emperor, revolted, and turned to the Türkmen who had by this time gathered around Süleyman

and Mansur. Michael was actually forced to abdicate before Botaneiates reached the capital, but although Botaneiates' Turkish followers nominally swore fealty to him, they were in reality independent and established themselves just across the Bosphorus (Vryonis, 1976: 6). The Turks then aided Botaneiates against yet another imperial pretender, Nikephoros Bryennios. Furthermore, still another would-be usurper, Nikephoros Melissenos actually granted his Turkish soldiers access to the fortified towns and cities which they had previously avoided (Cahen, 2001, 9). At the same time, a Turkish raider called Çaka (Tzachas) was captured by the Byzantines and attracted the attention of the Emperor Botaneiates. Although he lost his position when Alexios I came to power, he used the knowledge he had gained in Constantinople to establish himself in Smyrna. His *beylik* enjoyed several successful years of piracy in the Aegean (Brand, 1989, 3). In the east the Danişmendids (about whom more will be said below), and later the Mengücekids, Saltukids, and Sökmenli took advantage of both the lack of an imperial presence and their remoteness from the great Selçuk sultan to establish independent states, although their early history is largely unknown. By the time Alexios I Komnenos came to the throne in 1081 the Turks occupied almost all of Anatolia. As Anna Komnene wrote:

> "there was a time when the frontiers of Roman power were the two pillars at the limits of east and west – the so-called Pillars of Hercules in the west and those of Dionysos not far from the Indian border in the east. But at the time we are speaking of, the boundary of Roman power on the east was our neighbor the Bosphorus, and on the west the city of Adrianople." (Anna Komnene, 205-206)

From this complex narrative several salient points emerge. Firstly, the Byzantine response to the threat was at best incompetent and at worst actively self-defeating. The earliest incursions were ignored almost entirely and even as the empire was forced to take notice no coherent or appropriate response was forthcoming. The reigns of Constantine IX and Constantine X in particular served to

weaken the Byzantine military and forced the empire to hire unreliable mercenaries, ultimately including the Turks themselves. Secondly, the Byzantines engaged in a disastrous struggle between the military commanders and the bureaucratic elite in Constantinople, ensuring that even an accomplished general like Romanos Diogenes would not be successful. The empire focused on re-establishing its nominal authority in the Anatolian provinces even as they were being lost in practice (Angold, 1997: 118). After Mantzikert, this contradiction inspired the emperors and aspiring emperors to turn to the invaders themselves as warriors to help them seize or keep the throne. By giving the Turks access to the towns, the Byzantines likely inspired them to stay and consolidate their gains instead of merely raiding and withdrawing. From the Selçuk side, the raids and campaigns before 1071 tend to return again and again to the same places (Peacock, 2010: 144). After 1071 the Turks became increasingly opportunistic. In the east the Danişmend, Mengücek, Saltukid, and Sökmenli founded independent *beyliks* in a frontier region beyond the reach of the Great Seljuk sultan and no longer defended by the Byzantines. In the west Çaka of Smyrna and the sons of Kutalmış used the empire to establish their polities, the latter ultimately becoming the Selçuk Sultanate of Rûm. As the Selçuk state established itself and the Byzantines attempted to recover, the activities of the Türkmen would threaten the security of the new frontier region as well as undermine diplomatic attempts at coexistence.

2.4 Sources for the History of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

Before Mantzikert, the activities of the Selçuks in Anatolia (but not necessarily the Türkmen) are recorded by the Islamic historians, although only insofar as they relate to the Great Selçuks. The battle itself was seen a momentous

occasion in Islamic history, and thus finds a place in almost any universal history, although many accounts are formulaic and thoroughly divorced from any relationship with the ongoing Turkification of Anatolia (Hillenbrand, 2008). The earliest source to present events in Anatolia from an Anatolian perspective is the history of Ibn Bibi, but his history begins only in 1192 and thus offers no information on the first century of the Anatolian Selçuk state. An alternate source is the *Mir'at al Zaman* of Sibt b. al-Jawzi, who covers the reigns of Tuğrul, Alp Arslan, and Melikşah, though again the early Anatolian sultans are not covered. Al-Jawzi is primarily concerned with events in Baghdad, deriving his information from the historian Ghars al-Ni'ma (Peacock, 2010: 9). One of his departures from events at Baghdad concerns the Battle of Mantzikert, and this fairly long account became the main source for many other Islamic chroniclers. But again, the doubtlessly complex mix of Selçuk rulers with their Türkmen nomadic subjects, the degree of Islamization among the Selçuks, and the actual impact of the newcomers on agriculture and daily life in Anatolia are largely unmentioned (Hillenbrand, 2008: 85).

For the twelfth century the Selçuk record is sparser. Occasional mentions are made by some Syrian authors from Aleppo and Damascus, but these only concern the Anatolian Selçuks insofar as their policies intersected with Syria and Mesopotamia (Cahen, 1968: 56-57). Ibn al-Athir's *al-Kamil fi'l Tarikh* deals extensively with the crusades and thus with Byzantine diplomacy, although it was of course written somewhat after the events it describes, in the thirteenth century.

For writers who were closer to the events, the best sources are Armenian, Jacobite Syrian, and Georgian. Although they again focus on the east and are stronger for the period before Mantzikert, they come closer to offering a true picture

of Selçuk motives in Anatolia. Aristakes of Lastivert describes the Selçuks as a divine punishment:

> "[God] poured His wrath down upon us by means of a foreign people, for we had sinned against Him. But once again He regretted this and ceased visiting His evils upon us, for He is merciful. But He did not grow totally angry nor did He hold His grudge forever. He was obliged to try us, since He is the righteous judge; yet He hastened with His mercy, since He is the forgiving Father. He regretted the evils visited upon us since He is the God of mercy. Indeed He displayed both toward us: first requiting us with a deserved vengeance, then His anger would pass so that we would not be completely exterminated." (Aristakes 11:65)

He later describes a devastating raid led by Tuğrul:

> "The year after this occurred was 503 of our era [1054]. Now the same month, and the same date of the month as [the previous year] when [the Selçuks] took the land captive, and burned Arcn and other cities and *awan*s, that death-breathing, bloodthirsty and murderous beast, the Sultan [Tughril, 1055-1063], advanced with countless troops, elephants, carts, horses, women, children, and much preparation. Skipping over Archesh and Berkri, they came and camped near the city called Manazkert in the Apahunik' district, seizing all the extensive places in the fields. [The Sultan] dispatched marauding parties across the face of the land: north as far as the stronghold of the Abkhaz and to the mountain called Parxar to the base of the Caucasus; west as far as the forests of Chanet'ia; and south as far as the place called Sim mountain. And they seized the entire land as reapers working a field.
>
> Who can record the evils which [the Selçuks] then visited upon the land? Whose mind is able to enumerate them? The entire land was full of corpses—cultivated and uncultivated places, roads and desolate places, caves, craggy spots, pine groves and steep places—and [the Selçuks] set on fire and polluted all the cultivated places, homes and churches. And the flame of that fire rose higher than the furnace of Babylon. In this way they ruined the entire land, not once but three times, one after the other, until the country was totally devoid of inhabitants and the bellowing of animals ceased." (Aristakes 16:92-94)

Despite the religious tone and the strong influence of the Old Testament (Thompson, 2001: 96) on his writings, Aristakes gives details which are lacking in the Islamic and Byzantine sources. He includes the specific targets of the raid, and also mentions areas which were avoided. The Selçuks are most interested in land, and cities are seen as an impediment to their easy access to the land. Their burning of the lands of Armenia would certainly have been seen by the inhabitants as divine wrath,

but the Turks themselves were at this point clearing the land to make it more suitable to their partially nomadic way of life.

Another Armenian, Matthew of Edessa, follows Aristakes as seeing the Turks as a harbinger of the apocalypse, but he sees them more as an inevitability than as a punishment. He portrays the Armenian king Senekerim after a very early setback:

> "Sitting down, he examined the chronicles and utterances of the divinely inspired prophets, the holy teachers, and found written in these books the time specified for the coming of the Turkish troops. He also learned of the impending destruction and end of the whole world." (Hillenbrand, 2001: 96)

Matthew wrote almost one hundred years after this early raid, however, so his view that a conquest was inevitable is clearly tainted by hindsight. In his section describing the Battle of Mantzikert, he mentions both Alp Arslan's initial desire for a treaty and his generous treatment of the defeated Romanos. It is only after Romanos is betrayed that Alp Arslan unleashes the fury of the Turks on Anatolia:

> "The Byzantine nation has no God, so this day the oath of peace and friendship taken by both the Persians [Turks] and Byzantines is nullified; henceforth I shall consume with the sword all those people who venerate the cross, and all the lands of the Christians shall be enslaved…henceforth all of you will be like lion cubs and eagle young, racing through the countryside day and night slaying the Christians and not sparing any mercy on the Byzantine nation." (Hillenbrand, 2008: 244)

Matthew here echoes Aristakes who also blames Byzantine treachery for the subsequent Turkish occupation of Anatolia (Aristakes 24: 173). As Armenians, neither writer was particularly in favor of either the Byzantines or the Turks. Thus, their accounts are in some ways more objective, in addition to being focused on the events in these important areas of Anatolia. Furthermore, since their accounts can be situated within a long tradition of Armenian historiography, their biases and stylistic characteristics can be taken into account when assessing their accuracy.

Georgian chronicles are even more explicit in describing the sort of area which attracted the Turks:

> "They [the Turks] led a blessed existence; they would hunt, relax, take their pleasure, and they experienced no lack of anything. They would engage in commerce in their cities, but would invade our borders for their fill of captives and plunder. In spring they would ascend the mountains of Somkhiti and Ararat. Thus during summer they would have ease and recreation on the grass and pleasant fields, with springs and flowering meadows. So great was their strength and multitude that you could say 'All Turks of the whole world are here'." (Peacock, 2005: 221-222)

Caucasia experienced Turkish incursions even before Anatolia, and the pattern of the attacks there foreshadows the early attacks in Anatolia. While the Turks were interested in plundering cities, their main objective was the pasturelands. Cities which could threaten these pastures needed to be destroyed. Interestingly, Georgia suffered more invasions while engaged in a damaging conflict with Byzantium. After the Georgian king David the Builder expelled the Türkmen from Georgia, raids in Anatolia increased (Peacock, 2010: 151).

As for the Byzantine sources themselves, The History of Michael Attaleiates was dedicated to Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081) and the author was in an ideal position to observe the breakdown of the Byzantine army before and after Mantzikert. He was present at the battle and his account is both detailed and dramatic; he captures well the despair felt by the Byzantines:

> "It was a terribly sad sight, beyond lament and mourning. For what could be more pitiable than the entire imperial army in flight, defeated and chased by inhuman and cruel barbarians, the emperor defenseless and surrounded by armed barbarians, and the tents of the emperor, the officers, and the soldiers taken over by men of that ilk, and to see the whole Roman state overturned, and knowing that the empire itself might collapse in a moment?" (Attaleiates, 297)

Attaleiates contrasts the emperors and generals of his day unfavorably with the glorious Romans of the past:

> "The commander of the army cares not one whit for the war nor does what is right and proper by his fatherland, and even shows contempt for the glory of victory; instead he bends his whole self to the making of profit, converting his command to a mercantile venture, and so he brings neither prosperity nor glory to his own people. The rest of the army, for their part, take the cue of

> injustice from their leaders and with an unstoppable and shameless fervor they inhumanly maltreat their own countrymen. They violently seize their property and act like the enemy in what is their own home and country, falling short of the nominal enemy in no respect of evildoing or plunder." (Attaleiates, 357)

He is clearly referring to the extensive reliance on mercenaries, and to the tendency of even the generals to abandon their posts in an effort to manipulate events in Constantinople. Furthermore, Attaleiates hints at the fact that the deep dissatisfaction felt by the people of Anatolia allowed them to more easily accept the Turkish invaders.

For the Komneni and their immediate successors, three sources are of the greatest importance. These are the *Alexiad* of Anna Komnene, and the histories of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. Anna Komnene, as the eldest daughter of Alexios I, was naturally not an eyewitness to much of what she describes. Yet she was able to make use of her husband Nikephoros Bryennios's unfinished history. In addition, Anna had hoped that she would succeed her father instead of her younger brother John, and so the *Alexiad* alternately minimizes and denigrates him. Despite her ostensible lack of objectivity, Anna conveys the Byzantine reaction diplomatically and militarily to both the Turks and the Crusaders. In 1081 the empire had almost entirely disappeared, and Anna's work is the only Byzantine history which documents the beginning of its recovery. The history of John Kinnamos continues where Anna leaves off, with the accession of John II Komnenos in 1118. Kinnamos was born after John's death and so his history covers Manuel I Komnenos's reign in much greater detail, the period to which he was an eyewitness. Like the *Alexiad*, Kinnamos's history glorifies his emperor, although it unfortunately breaks off just before Manuel's greatest defeat at Myriokephalon, although the historian was probably present at the battle. His style is less overtly learned than that

of Anna, with fewer classical allusions and no attempt to write in "Attic" Greek. Kinnamos was an imperial secretary, a bureaucrat, and thus had a normal education which prepared him for his job. Niketas Choniates's history also begins with the accession of John, but it continues until after the fall of Constantinople to the Crusaders in 1204. This longer perspective means that Choniates takes a far less adulatory tone toward the Komneni, as he looks for the seeds of that disaster in their reigns. By reading Choniates and Kinnamos together it is easier to get an idea of what really happened. Kinnamos is richer in detail but sometimes this detail is used to obfuscate rather than enlighten.

As for the Crusaders, their own narratives are often valuable because they depict the realities of life in Anatolia during this period. During the First Crusade, the anonymous, probably Norman, author of the *Gesta Francorum* writes of encounters with the Turks from Nikaia, Dorylaion, and Herakleia (*Gesta*, II:viii, III:ix, IV:x). He stresses their great numbers and says that one "could not find stronger or braver or more skillful soldiers (*Gesta,* III:ix). In addition, he introduces what will become a recurring theme in crusader narratives, harsh criticism of the Byzantines. Following the surrender of Nikaia, he claims that Alexios freed the Turks so that he could use them himself to obstruct and hinder the crusaders (*Gesta*, II:viii). Fulcher of Chartres, another eyewitness, emphasizes the bravery of the Turks and their skill with the bow (Fulcher, I:IX:4), which confused and devastated the crusader armies in their first encounters with the enemy (Fulcher, I:IX:5, X:6). Although not an eyewitness account, the history written by Albert of Aachen is longer and more detailed than the written eyewitness accounts; Albert did not only use the available writings, he also used oral reports of the participants (Albert: 2-3). For the Second

Crusade, Odo of Deuil, the chaplain of the French king Louis VII, is the best eyewitness source; he describes Romania, as he calls Byzantine Anatolia, as such:

> "Romania, a land which is very broad and exceedingly rugged with stony mountains, lies beyond [Constantinople], extending to Antioch on the south and bordering Turkey on the east. Although all Romania was formerly under Greek jurisdiction, the Turks now possess a great part and, after expelling the Greeks, have devastated another part; but where the Greeks still hold castles the two peoples divide the revenues. In such subjection the Greeks retain the territory the Franks procured because they went in quest of Jerusalem; the lazy people would have lost all if they had not defended themselves by importing knights from various nations, thus compelling gold to redeem gold. Nevertheless, they always lose (but since they possess much they cannot lose all at once), for mercenaries do not suffice a people without forces of its own." (Odo of Deuil, 88-89)

Odo succinctly notes all salient characteristics of the landscape, as well as the political and financial conditions which compel the Byzantines to resort to mercenaries. While the crusader narratives often excessively criticize the Byzantines for their perceived lack of support or even outright treachery, they nevertheless also offer compelling testimony about conditions in the Anatolian countryside.

2.5 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1081-1118: Alexios I Komnenos

> "The Emperor Alexios, fighting two-fisted against barbarians who attacked him on either flank, maneuvered round Byzantium, the center of the circle as it were, and proceeded to broaden the Empire."
> (Anna Komnene, 206)

As has been mentioned previously, when Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) came to power little to nothing remained to the Byzantines in Anatolia aside from the Black Sea coast, the fortresses and fortified cities near the sources of the Maeander, and Attaleia (Figure 4). His army was small and composed of mercenaries along with a few elite Byzantine units, though by the end of 1090 defeats in Europe meant that he had only 500 soldiers available (Haldon, 1999: 93). Even Nikomedeia was in a precarious position, being threatened by the nascent Selçuk Sultanate at Nikaia; the

Aegean coast as well as the islands were under attack from Çaka, the Turkish lord of Smyrna (İzmir). Çaka had previously been a prisoner of the Byzantine emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081) and had risen in the court to the level of *protonobilissimus*. In any case, with Alexios in power, Çaka left the capital and established himself in Smyrna and Ephesos, and used his knowledge of Byzantium to make war on the empire. "He met a certain man from Smyrna who had considerable experience in [shipbuilding] and to him he entrusted the business of constructing pirate vessels. Somewhere near Smyrna a large fleet was equipped." (Anna Komnene, 233) In the early years of Alexios's reign it was Çaka who posed the greatest threat to the capital itself, since he fully understood that only a combined land and sea operation would be able to take the city. Due to this threat, Alexios quickly realized that the more prudent course of action was to establish a truce with the Anatolian Selçuk "sultan" Süleyman at Nikaia (Charanis, 1969: 214). Thus from the beginning Alexios also saw the Selçuks as potential allies,[3] a state of affairs which would continue under his successors, despite the inevitable hostilities which would regularly surface. In 1091 Çaka went so far as to claim the title of emperor but as he prepared his attack Alexios cleverly sent a letter to Kılıç Arslan claiming that Çaka knew "perfectly well that the Roman Empire [was] not for him" and that "the whole mischievous plan [was] directed against [the sultan]" (Anna Komnene, 274-275). Finding himself caught between the sultan and the Emperor near Abydos on the Hellespont, Çaka reached out to Kılıç Arslan, who feigned friendship, invited him to dinner, and killed him. Although Anna claims that the removal of the threat led to peace in the maritime provinces, and the *megas doux* John Doukas did

[3]In fact Alexios had recognized the potential of Turkish allies as early as 1074, when he persuaded Tutuş, the Emir of Damascus and brother of Melikşah, to deal with Roussel de Bailleul by tacitly promising to legitimize Turkish conquests in eastern Anatolia (Anna Komnene, 33-34).

successfully reclaim the Aegean islands and most of the coast, the Byzantines did not yet have the armies or the money to fully fill the power vacuum left by Çaka.

Regarding the earliest Anatolian Selçuk Sultanate, it had first been established around the time that Alexios had become the emperor. Since the earlier sources like Attaleiates finish before this date and the later sources are more explicitly pro-Komnene, the exact circumstances of its founding are obscure. What is clear is that the Byzantine civil war had allowed the Turks to occupy both the abandoned countryside and those cities to which imperial claimants had granted access, since the Turks at this point were largely ignorant of siege warfare. Thus for a significant fortified city like Nikaia to have become their first capital, and Süleyman to have become their first sultan, Byzantine assistance was required. Naturally, the later sources put the "blame" for the complete loss of Anatolia on Michael Doukas, Nikephoros Botaneiates and especially on Nikephoros Melissenos, yet another of the Byzantine generals who had contended for the throne during the civil war. Of Melissenos, Nikephoros Bryennios writes that due to his ambitions he willingly ceded all the cities of Asia, Galatia, and Phrygia to the Turks (Bryennios, 300-301). Yet Frankopan has an intriguing suggestion that it was actually Alexios himself who should be held accountable, because Bryennios's accusation is not elaborated upon and Anna Komnene does not mention it at all. As Frankopan notes, by the time the historians wrote about the loss of Anatolia, Alexios and his family were beyond criticism, whereas Melissenos had largely disappeared from history (Frankopan, 2006: 176-179). A pro-Alexian point of view, best exemplified by the *Alexiad* itself, naturally stresses the desperate situation in which Alexios found himself upon his accession and the heroic actions by which he "saved" Byzantium. The reality may have been more complicated. Even Anna states that Alexios was

eager for peace with the sultan and after very limited attempts to recapture the coasts of the Gulf of Nikomedeia concluded a treaty in June 1081 that made the border between the two the River Drakon (Yalakdere) near the site of Helenopolis (Anna Komnene, 130). This boundary of course left Nikaia well within Turkish territory, but the Byzantines in possession of the coasts. This state of affairs was ostensibly acceptable to both sides, since Alexios turned his attention west to deal with the Normans and north to deal with the Petchenegs, while Süleyman left his lieutenant Ebu'l Kasım in Nikaia to campaign in Cilicia and Syria.

Süleyman died in 1086, killed by his cousin Tutuş, the Selçuk ruler of Syria. Ebu'l Kasım declared himself the sultan and promptly broke the treaty with Byzantium. Like Çaka, he built a fleet with the intention of attacking the capital (Anna Komnene, 202). Alexios's response was to send Manuel Boutoumites by sea and a Byzantinized Turk named Tatikios who had been commanding Byzantine forces against the Normans and Petchenegs to handle land operations (Brand, 1989: 3). Boutoumites succeeded quickly in his objective, and as Tatikios was pushing Ebu'l Kasım back, Alexios proposed peace and invited Ebu'l Kasım to Constantinople to discuss terms. Ebu'l Kasım had by this time also captured Nikomedeia and so while he was in the capital Alexios ordered the construction of a fortress near Helenopolis known as Kibotos or Civetot (Anna Komnene, 203-204), which thus controlled the entrance to the gulf. At the same time Alexios was engaged in diplomacy with the distant Great Selçuk sultan Melikşah, who though he had no designs on Anatolia nevertheless considered Ebu'l Kasım no less an affront to his authority than Süleyman had been (Cahen, 1968: 80). While simultaneously entertaining and flattering Melikşah's ambassador Siaous, Alexios concluded a treaty

with Ebu'l Kasım against Bursuk (Prosouch), Melikşah's experienced general. Anna Komnene describes his strategy:

> "For when two enemies of the Roman Empire were fighting one another, it would pay him to support the weaker – not in order to make him more powerful, but to repel the one while taking the city from the other, a city which was not at the moment under Roman jurisdiction but would be incorporated in the Roman sphere by this means; little by little a second would be taken, and then another, so that Roman influence, which was then reduced to almost nothing, especially since Turkish military strength had increased, would be much extended." (Anna Komnene, 205)

Although the Byzantines did not yet regain Nikaia, Alexios was able to convince Siaous, who had been sent to propose a marriage alliance, to switch sides. Melikşah had sent Siaous with a document that commanded any Turkish commander to return his conquered city to the Byzantines, and by converting Siaous (both politically and religiously), Alexios was able to use this letter to regain Sinope. For his part, Siaous was made the *doux* of Anchialos, on the Bulgarian coast (Brand, 1989: 4). Undeterred, Melikşah sent another army commanded by Buzan (Pouzanos) with the same offer of marriage for Alexios. Buzan's siege of Nikaia did not take the city but his army had done enough damage that Ebu'l Kasım tried to come to terms with Melikşah, hoping to bribe him with gold. Melikşah rejected this overture and turned Ebu'l Kasım over to Buzan, who promptly had him strangled (Anna Komnene, 207). As fate would have it, shortly thereafter in 1092, Melikşah died, and the Great Selçuk Empire would never again intervene in western Asia Minor (Cahen, 1968: 81). The sultanate of Nikaia fell to Süleyman's son İzzeddin Kılıç Arslan I (1092-1107). With no hope of an alliance with the east to dislodge the Turks still so uncomfortably close to his capital, Alexios now turned to the west.

By 1095, when Alexios appealed to Pope Urban II for assistance, Byzantium's position was as stable as it had been before Mantzikert. The new sultan Kılıç Arslan was directing his ambitions east toward the Danişmendids. The

Danişmendname is extremely problematic as a historical source; it relates in a poetic and heroic style the deeds of Melik Danişmend Ahmad Ghazi, which were initially oral tales describing his personality and his military prowess. The work was compiled during the reign of İzzeddin Keykavus II (1246-1257) and was later embellished by Arif Ali under the patronage of the Ottoman sultan Murat II (1421-1451) (Köprülü, 1992a: 41-42). Therefore, the work likely describes conditions in three different centuries, and certain religious aspects may pertain more to the Ottoman period than to that of the early Danişmendid *beylik*. The *ghazis* are described as carrying the banners of Abu Muslim and Battal Ghazi, accompanied by *seyyids* (descendants of the Prophet), *shaikhs*, and barefoot dervishes. Their golden crests are woven with the words "victory is from God and conquest is at hand." (Köprülü, 1992a: 42) The *ghazis* attack churches and monasteries, and even convert the Christian populations by force in their zeal. More reliable information concerning the early Danişmendids is difficult to find, but in the twelfth century they were the main rivals to the Selçuks in Anatolia. Kılıç Arslan regarded them as his subjects, much as the Great Selçuk sultan Melikşah had regarded *him* as an unruly subject (Cahen, 2001: 11). By 1095 Danişmend Ghazi controlled Ancyra (Ankara), Kaisareia (Kayseri), and Sebasteia (Sivas), in other words the northern route across Anatolia. The focal point of the conflict between the Selçuks and the Danişmendids was and would be Melitene (Malatya), the key point by which both the northern and southern routes across Anatolia led to the east (Cahen, 1968: 84).

As for Alexios, he saw in the crusaders an opportunity to finally make significant gains in Anatolia. He insisted that their various commanders swear an oath of fealty and promise to return to him all the conquered territories that had once belonged to the empire (Anna Komnene, 322-329; Fulcher, I:IX:1; *Gesta*, II). Yet

Alexios also made his own plan to take Nikaia, ordering his general Boutoumites "to suborn the barbarians in Nikaia by all kinds of guarantees and the promise of a complete amnesty, but also by holding over them the prospect of this or that retribution – even massacre – if the [crusaders] took the city" (Anna Komnene, 331). Meanwhile, Kılıç Arslan broke off his siege of Melitene when he realized that his capital (where he had also left his family) was in fact facing a serious threat. Yet after arriving and engaging the crusader armies in a daylong battle, the sultan decided to withdraw and wait for a better opportunity. He sent a message to the garrison telling them to "do just what you consider best" (Anna Komnene, 335), likely knowing that the option of surrender to the Byzantines was available. Thus just as the crusader siege was beginning a final assault, Boutoumites "climbed to the battlements and set up there the imperial scepters and standards, and acclaimed the emperor to the accompaniment of trumpets and horns." (Anna Komnene, 338) As promised, the Byzantines allowed the Turks to leave, and they also took Kılıç Arslan's wife prisoner, since she was Çaka's daughter. She thus served as proof of the fall of Nikaia to those Turks still occupying Smyrna and the Aegean coast (Anna Komnene, 346). Alexios dispatched his brother-in-law John Doukas to secure their surrender.

In the meantime, the crusader armies, guided by Tatikios, moved east towards Dorylaion (Eskişehir). They met the full army of the sultan, which included Danişmend detachments, and won an overwhelming victory, seizing the Selçuk camp and forcing their army into flight (Fulcher, I:XI-XII; *Gesta,* III:ix; Runciman, 1969a: 293-294). They now faced a choice of routes, and chose the most westerly, which would head south, avoiding the salt desert and passing Philomelion (Akşehir), Ikonion (Konya), and Tyana before reaching the Cilician Gates (Runciman, 1969:

292). For the Byzantines, this westerly route also served well, as it may have further intimidated the Turks of Smyrna (Shepard, 1996; 87-88). However, it must be mentioned that while the crusaders' chronology is well-known, the campaign of John Doukas is less so. According to Anna Komnene it should have taken place *while* the crusaders were already in Antioch in 1098. Thus the crusaders would already have left Anatolia and would not have played even a threatening role towards those Turks who remained (Roche, 2009: 151). Here again it must be remembered that the Turks who had occupied the Aegean were not in any way Selçuks or loyal to Kılıç Arslan (Roche, 2009: 152). Rather, the relative ease with which first the crusaders and then the Byzantine army crossed western Anatolia indicates that the Selçuk hold on the western lands had been extremely tenuous and ceased to exist after the successful siege of Nikaia and the Battle of Dorylaion. Yet concomitantly, the Byzantines possessed neither the men nor the money to properly reoccupy or protect the plateau, which had in any case never been well suited to Byzantine settled life and agriculture. By contrast, the plateau was ideally suited to the transhumant Türkmen, as it resembled their ancestral lands in northern Iran and Central Asia (Cahen, 1968: 85). And so, for the next two centuries the Turks would not have a permanent presence on the Aegean or Black Sea coasts; they were effectively pushed back to the Anatolian plateau, although their raiding would continue to be a problem. Ikonion would become their capital city, and the Selçuk sultans would turn to a "continental" way of life (Cahen, 1968: 85). To this point Alexios's efforts had all been ostensibly successful, although he soon faced growing tensions with the crusaders, and the difficulties with the Türkmen would recur unceasingly.

As has been mentioned, the crusader armies were being guided and aided by Alexios's general Tatikios. Along their route, he had been accepting cities and lands

taken back from the Turks in the name of the emperor (Brand, 1989: 3), and thus Philadelphia (Alaşehir) as well as significant parts of Ionia, Phrygia, and Lydia had once again come under Byzantine control (Foss, 1982: 149). Alexios himself also led an army toward Antioch (Anna Komnene, 348), but he got only as far as Philomelion before he collected the Byzantine subjects and returned to safer territory (Anna Komnene, 350; *Gesta,* IX:xxvii). Yet as the crusader host departed from Anatolia their ambitions and rivalries began to surface. After months of besieging Antioch with the crusaders, Tatikios abruptly left and returned to Alexios. According to Anna Komnene, the reason was that Bohemond had falsely caused Tatikios to believe that the soldiers were plotting to murder him. An ongoing theme in the Alexiad is that the Norman Prince Bohemond had designs on Antioch from the beginning, and thus he needed to be rid of Tatikios in order to have a reason for breaking his oath of fealty to Alexios (Anna Komnene, 343). For his part, Bohemond claimed that Tatikios had left due to his cowardice and that thus the oath was nullified (Runciman, 1969b: 313-314), and that Antioch was his by right since "the city had been acquired by his negotiations and stratagems" (Fulcher, I:XXV:4). Alexios lost no time in trying to deny Bohemond access to the sea and thus to any reinforcement. The Byzantines already controlled the ports of Latakia, Valania, and Maraclea as well as Cyprus, and Alexios also ordered the occupation and construction of fortresses at Korykos (Kızkalesi) and Seleukia (Silifke) in Cilicia (Fink, 1969: 373). Following an unsuccessful attempt at taking Latakia and a belated visit to Jerusalem to repair his relationship with the other crusader leaders, in 1100 Bohemond was captured on the road to Melitene by the Danişmend leader Melik Ghazi and was held as a prisoner in Neokaisaria (Niksar) for several years (Fulcher, I:XXXV).

The Crusade of 1101 was organized primarily to reinforce the nascent crusader kingdoms, but those who set out faced considerable difficulties simply in reaching Jerusalem. Neither the Byzantines nor the crusaders had reoccupied or fortified the Anatolian plateau, and Kılıç Arslan and Danişmend Ghazi had recovered from their earlier defeats. Having learned of Bohemond's capture, the Lombards (who formed the majority of the force) pushed to make Neokaisaria and Bohemond the first objective. They were able to get as far as Ancyra and after massacring the Turkish garrison (Ancyra had been taken by Turks shortly after Mantzikert) they duly turned it over to the Byzantines, although by this time the city was too far away from Byzantine territory to be held (Treadgold, 1997: 624). The next major fortress, Gangra (Çankırı) was too well-fortified to take, and Turkish attacks had started to become more frequent. In addition, the army was running out of food in an area with no market towns and only unripe grain in the fields (Lea Cate, 1969: 354-355). The expedition met its end at Mersyphon (Merzifon) when it was attacked by a combined force of Selçuks and Danişmends, who set aside their differences to deal with their common enemy (Turan, 1971: 167-169). Two other groups of crusaders attempted to retrace the route of the First Crusade, but both were defeated and almost entirely destroyed by Kılıç Arslan at Herakleia Kybistra (Ereğli). Although some of the crusaders held Alexios accountable for this debacle and accused him of treachery, the fact is that he had explicitly warned them to follow the same route as their predecessors (Anna Komnene, 355-356). The expedition had been a failure both diplomatically and logistically; the crusaders of 1101 had foolishly chosen a route without adequate supplies and had the misfortune of having to fight against the combined Turkish force.

That Turkish alliance soon dissolved, again over the issue of Melitene, and Bohemond for his part was able to parlay this disagreement into a release from captivity (Fulcher, II:XXII). Danişmend Ghazi saw Bohemond as a potential ally precisely because he was the enemy of both Alexios and Kılıç Arslan (Cahen, 1968: 86). Thus the emperor and the sultan also reconciled, with Kılıç Arslan even sending troops to aid Alexios when Bohemond reemerged attacking Epiros in 1106 (Cahen, 2001: 13). When Danişmend died in 1104 Kılıç Arslan was at last able to take Melitene, as well as establish his capital at Ikonion. In 1107 he too died intervening in Upper Mesopotamia, and with him the alliance with Byzantium died as well. During the reign of his son Şahinşah (1110-1116)[4] Türkmen attacks resumed almost everywhere. These attacks were sometimes officially sanctioned and sometimes not, but this distinction meant little to the Byzantines. Again it is clear that aside from the fortified cities, Anatolia was in no place secure, with bands of Turks raiding even to the coast (Anna Komnene, 453) although of course they always withdrew with their booty. In 1116 Alexios set out against Şahinsah in what would be his final military campaign. He used the route running south from Dorylaion past Polybotos (Bolvadin) and Philomelion and sent back any Christians to safer territory. Near Philomelion Alexios defeated Şahınşah. The sultan, according the Anna, agreed to a treaty by which the borders would be set as they had been before the Battle of Mantzikert (Anna Komnene, 488). Such a treaty would have been impossible to enforce at this point, so Anna probably meant that the sultan accepted Byzantine sovereignty in principle and agreed to stop the raids (Cahen, 1968: 92). In any case, the Türkmen did not accept the agreement and Şahınşah was deposed, blinded, and strangled. His brother İzzeddin Mes'ud (1116-1156) became the sultan and Alexios

[4]Şahinsah was in fact taken prisoner when his father was killed, and for three years his cousin Hasan of Cappadocia ruled as regent in Ikonion.

withdrew without having achieved any meaningful expansion of Byzantine territory, though the retreat was orderly and he safely conveyed the Christian refugees back to Bithynia. Considering the state in which he had come to the throne, the reestablishment of a professional army capable of such an orderly retreat was a significant achievement and one that would greatly benefit his successors (Birkenmeier, 2002: 79-80).

In summary, Alexios began his reign in chaos and spent it struggling almost without rest against enemies on all sides. Despite his efforts almost all of Western and Northern Anatolia was either Turkish territory outright or was subjected to raids. Further to the east the crusader princes were beyond Byzantine reach. Yet Alexios was nevertheless a successful emperor. It was because of his actions and his diplomacy that Byzantium had survived at all. While the countryside may have remained dangerous, the major cities and towns, especially along the coasts, were in Byzantine hands and provided a basis for his successors to build upon. Perhaps most importantly, he left the army far more disciplined, loyal, and reliable than it had been when he came to power. In a stark contrast to the decades of intermittent civil wars which had preceded his reign, Alexios, John, and Manuel, father, son, and grandson, reigned for almost one hundred years, in wartime no less.

2.6 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1118-1143: John II Komnenos

> "East and West saw me warring, and I attacked the nations of both continents. I remained but little in the palace; nearly my whole life was lived out of a tent, and I have always diligently sought the open air." – John II Komnenos (Choniates, 42-43)

With the accession of John II Komnenos (1118-1143) Anna Komnene's narrative ends, and Choniates and Kinnamos offer only brief summaries as preludes

to their more detailed writings on Manuel. Thus John's reign is much less well-covered than that of either his predecessor or his successor. It is clear, however, that where the Turks were concerned he intended to pursue his father's policy. In 1119 he directed his first campaign against Laodikeia on the Lykos (near modern Denizli) and took the city, expelling the Turkish garrison and Alp-Kara, its commander (Kinnamos, 5-6; Choniates 12). He also fortified the city. The next year he set out against Sozopolis (Uluborlu) in Pamphylia. Both Kinnamos and Choniates describe the difficulties in approaching this citadel (Kinnamos, 6; Choniates, 13) which had been well-fortified by Romanos Diogenes (Foss, 1982: 153) but lost nevertheless. John took the fortress by luring the Turkish defenders out with a feigned retreat, a typically Turkish tactic that required discipline and careful timing (Birkenmeier, 2002; 89). He concluded the year's campaign by taking several other fortresses to open the route south to Attaleia (Kinnamos, 7; Choniates, 13).

Due to wars in Europe, John could not campaign in the east again until 1130 or 1132. By 1130 the dominant Turkish power in Anatolia were the Danişmendids, which had united under the leadership of Gümüştekin (1105?-1134/35). While during this period the Selçuk sultan Mes'ud was usually the junior partner to Gümüştekin in a Turkish alliance, John's campaigns coincided with a rupture in their relationship (Cahen, 1969b: 677). His purpose was initially less to conquer the Danişmendids than it was to curtail their raids on adjacent Byzantine territories (Kinnamos, 13), and on his first campaign he took Kastamon, though it was quickly recaptured by Gümüştekin (Kinnamos, 14; Choniates, 19). In 1134 or 1135, shortly after receiving the title of *melik* (king) from the Caliph in Baghdad Gümüştekin died, and his son Melik Muhammed (1134-1142) came to power with ostensibly greater ambitions (Bar Hebraeus, X:294). On his coinage he styles himself as "Μέγας

Μέλικις πάσης Ῥωμανίας καὶ Ἀνατόλης", the Grand King of all Romania and the East, meaning essentially those areas of Asia Minor and upper Mesopotamia which were under the control of Turkish emirs (Oikonomides, 1983: 198; 201-202). Now John and Mes'ud joined forces (however briefly – the troops sent by Mes'ud secretly deserted the Byzantines) against Muhammed, and the Byzantines retook Kastamon and also successfully besieged Gangra (Çankırı), "one of the largest and most illustrious of the cities of the Pontos that had not been subject to the Turks in former times" (Choniates, 20; Kinnamos, 15). Yet despite his impressive victory, soon thereafter "the Turks returned in even greater numbers and much stronger than before" and retook the fortress (Choniates, 21).

John spent the next three years campaigning in Cilicia and Syria, and just as the Danişmendids had undone his gains so too the sultan Mes'ud "had taken advantage of the opportunity to launch attacks against the Romans" (Choniates, 31). Once again he was successful so long as he was in the field, but he could not rest easy in the capital. In 1139 he decided to push even deeper into Danişmendid territory, all the way to Neokaisareia (Kinnamos, 21). The campaign was not lacking in bravery but it was nevertheless inconclusive due to both the very cold winter and to the defection of the emperor's nephew John, who the emperor feared would reveal the full weakness of his army to the Turks (Choniates, 34-36). In any case, it seems unlikely that even had he taken Neokaisareia that the gain would be permanent, given the unrelenting and opportunistic nature of the Danişmendids.

In 1142 John was again obligated to counter a Turkish threat to Sozopolis. During this campaign one of the more extraordinary episodes is described by both historians (Kinnamos, 22; Choniates, 37-38). While pursuing the fleeing Turks, John came to Lake Pousgouse (Beyşehir Gölü) which contained several islands inhabited

by Christians. These have been identified as Mada Adası and Kilise Adası, though only the latter preserves its fortifications (Foss, 1998: 158-160). Although Christian, these islanders were well within Selçuk territory and refused to submit to John, forcing him to mount siege engines on rafts to make an assault. This incident demonstrates that at least some Byzantine peasants accepted Selçuk rule instead of placing their hopes on the often-distant emperor, while the Selçuks could take the obvious benefits which came from having peasants working the land (Cahen, 1968: 156-157). John died in 1143 in a hunting accident (Kinnamos, 24; Choniates, 40)[5] while once again pursuing the Komnenids' "burning desire to unite Antioch to Constantinople" (Choniates, 39). Although it had seemed as though war with the Latins was inevitable, John's death and Manuel's immediate departure for the capital prevented its outbreak.

When compared with that of Alexios, John's reign seems much more straightforward. He campaigned almost constantly, but his campaigns always had a clear objective. Unlike Alexios, whose wars were almost always defensive and reactive, John made attempts to expand and roll back the Turks in Lykia, Pamphylia, Pisidia, and Paphlagonia, and his efforts in Cilicia and Syria apparently had a similar purpose. He wanted to reestablish imperial control and access to the key cities of the empire, and he evidently believed that this was primarily a military issue instead of a diplomatic one. When compared to both his father and his son, John seems to have engaged in far less diplomacy. Part of this difference is probably due to the far less detailed nature of the sources for his reign, especially when compared with the overwhelming (even confusing) mass of details presented by Anna Komnene. But it also stands to reason that John, who came to power possessing a professional and

[5]Robert Browning has suggested on the basis of two nearly contemporary orations that John was actually murdered, but this view has not found wide acceptance (Browning, 1961: 229-235).

battle-tested army (Birkenmeier, 2002; 95), was simply using the most effective means at his disposal to solve problems. Choniates even relates that in 1139 before the expedition against Neokaisareia the army complained bitterly about their exhaustion, lack of adequate supplies, and absence from their domestic affairs (Choniates, 33). In addition, by John's reign Turkish immigration from Iran had stopped almost entirely (Cahen, 2001: 13), and furthermore he did not have to contend with a Crusade outside the walls of Constantinople or crossing Byzantine Anatolia. Yet the question must be asked, was John really all that successful? His campaigns in Paphlagonia and Syria accomplished almost nothing of any permanence, and his defense of western Anatolia was ephemeral at best; Manuel would be fighting for most of the same cities again and again. Only his fortresses seem to have had a truly lasting value, a lesson which his son Manuel certainly seems to have learned well.

2.7 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1143-1180: Manuel I Komnenos

> "The science of generalship knows one excellent thing:
> that he who braves danger for his country sways matters in balance.
> Should one not grasp this, he loses everything." - Manuel I Komnenos
> (Kinnamos, 197)

After securing his accession in Constantinople, Manuel turned his attention to the east (Figure 5). Raymond of Antioch initially tried to take advantage of Manuel's absence to lay claim to Byzantine territory in Cilicia, but Raymond's own troubles further east with Zengi of Mosul, who conquered Edessa in 1144, forced the crusader prince to petition for Byzantine help (Magdalino, 1993: 42). The Selçuk sultan Mes'ud also caused trouble in the area, pillaging and capturing Prakana near Seleukeia. In the meantime, Kinnamos also says that the Turks raided the

Thrakesian Theme and the Cayster valley. In 1146 Manuel led his first campaign against the Turks, defeating them at Akroinos (Afyonkarahisar) (Kinnamos, 38-39). Advancing further he stormed and destroyed Philomelion, releasing those Byzantines who had been confined there (Kinnamos: 40; Choniates, 53). Although he was unable to take the Selçuk capital, the expedition was a success, and the destruction of Philomelion (repeating the actions of his grandfather a half-century earlier) demonstrates that his objective was less about conquest than about demonstrating Byzantine power to the Selçuks and the west (Figure 6).

For the rest of the decade Manuel was largely preoccupied with the Second Crusade and its aftermath, a crusade which was devastated by the Selçuks as it proceeded across Anatolia without significant Byzantine support. In fact, the pillaging and destruction caused by the crusade itself actually incited the Greek residents to make common cause with the Turks. The German army was defeated near Dorylaion and the French reached Attaleia but were unable to continue over land (Lilie, 1993: 157). Particularly with the French, Manuel seems to have been unwilling to assist; they were evidently considered more dangerous to Byzantium than the Turks. In the meantime the Norman king of Sicily Roger II took advantage of the situation to attack Greece, which lacked the troops that Manuel had withdrawn to keep an eye on the crusaders (Magdalino, 1993: 51). In addition to the war with the Normans, developments in the Balkans prevented Manuel from turning back to the Turkish situation until 1157 or 1158.

At that time Manuel renewed his diplomatic agreement with the new sultan Kılıç Arslan II (1156-1192), although war soon broke out again when the Byzantine army, commanded by the emperor, marched through the sultan's territory (Kinnamos, 190; Choniates, 110). With the continuing significant Byzantine interest

in Antioch, the lack of a direct and safe land route back to the capital was to be an ongoing problem. Several years of warfare ensued, without significant gains by either side. Finally the two powers attempted a more permanent diplomatic solution, and in 1162 Kılıç Arslan himself came to Constantinople "to petition the emperor regarding matters beneficial to him." (Kinnamos, 204; Choniates, 118). Manuel aimed to impress his guest with the might and wealth of Byzantium, treating him to lavish banquets and elaborate entertainments. Manuel "charmed [the sultan] with horseraces, and according to custom set alight some boats and skiffs with liquid fire, and absolutely gorged the man with spectacles in the hippodrome, whereby the grandeur of cities is particularly likely to appear." (Kinnamos, 207). The terms of their agreement left the sultan in the position of vassal:

> "Throughout his life to be hostile to those who cherished enmity against the emperor, but to be friendly to those who, on the contrary, were settled in his favor. Of the cities which he had won, he would give the greater and more notable to the emperor. It was not allowed for him to make peace with any of the enemy unless the emperor directed. He would fight as ally with the Romans on request, and come with his entire force whether the conflict was an eastern or a western one. Nor would he allow those who lay beneath his authority, but who are clever at living by thefts and customarily are called Turkomans, to do any harm whatsoever to the Romans' land, unpunished." (Kinnamos, 207-208)

In other words, the whole of the sultan's foreign relations would be conducted on the whim of Byzantium. Yet at the same time, Kılıç Arslan was eventually accorded certain dignities, such as being enthroned beside the emperor and the right to serve as the intermediary between Byzantium and other Turkish emirs (Magdalino, 1993: 77). In any case, Kılıç Arslan would also benefit greatly from this treaty, as it allowed him to consolidate his own power in Anatolia while Manuel turned his attention once again to the situation in the west.

Kılıç Arslan II had finally become the sultan of Ikonion in 1156. During his long reign he greatly expanded Selçuk territory as well as strengthening their hold on

that territory. In the early years of his reign he had to consolidate his power, and thus despite the Byzantine incursions he was anxious to make peace. Both rulers realized that there was no clear border between their territories and that each had more dangerous enemies. For the Selçuks, the most significant rivals were still the Danişmendids, whose ambitions stretched at least as far west as Ancyra. The Danişmendid ruler Yağıbasan had allied himself with Kılıç Arslan's brother Şahinşah (who held Ancyra and Gangra) and also supported his young nephew Mehmed in Melitene (Cahen, 2001: 24). In 1164 Yağıbasan died and the ensuing succession was contested, which allowed Kılıç Arslan to take Elbistan as well as his brother's strongholds of Ancyra and Gangra (Cahen, 2001: 27). Naturally his successes drew the attention of Nureddin, the Zengid ruler of Syria, who was approached by Şahinşah, Afıdun of Malatya, and Dhu'l-Nun of Sivas. In 1173 Nureddin led a campaign into Anatolia, although its distance from his real power base in Syria encouraged him to settle matters quickly and reestablish the status quo (Cahen, 2001: 28). Thus Kılıç Arslan lost most of what he had gained, although when Nureddin died in 1174 the sultan quickly and bloodlessly regained all of it. At this point Şahinşah and Dhu'l-Nun turned to Constantinople for help (Cahen, 2001: 29).Kılıç Arslan's consolidation was thus ensured both by his own diplomatic skills and the timely deaths of his greatest potential rivals. The Danişmendids essentially disintegrated after the death of Yağıbasan, and Nureddin was too preoccupied to do more in Anatolia. In 1174 the Selçuks were the preeminent power in Anatolia, and Manuel felt compelled to do something to check their ever growing power.

Manuel also made use of the decade of peace in Anatolia, continuing the Komnenian policy of fortifying territory which was exposed to Türkmen raids. As his destruction of Philomelion demonstrates, however, he was most interested in

securing territory which could actually be held. John had built fortresses at Achyraous, Laodikeia and Lopadion with the goal of restoring agricultural productivity in the western Anatolian river valleys (Magdalino, 1993: 125). Regardless of treaties with the Selçuks, these areas were always subject to disruptive raids which may or may not have been tacitly encouraged by the sultanate. Manuel's fortifications were concentrated to the northwest, in the new province known as Neokastra. Choniates mentions three of them, Chliara, Pergamon, and Adryamytteion, which:

> "were suffering terribly at the hands of the Turks. Formerly, the neighboring provinces had not been settled because the inhabitants of villages were exposed to enemy attack. Manuel fortified these with walls and protected the nearby horse-breeding plains with fortresses. In this way, these fortress towns swelled in population and abounded in the good things of civilized life." (Choniates, 150)

Most importantly this prosperous new province contributed to the imperial revenues. The new fortresses also allowed Manuel to change the way the Byzantines related to the Türkmen, requiring them to pay for winter pasturage and to stop attacking travelers (Magdalino, 1993: 127). The logical next step would be to push the Turks further east by advancing into the Anatolian plains.

In 1174 Manuel began preparations to check the growing power of Kılıç Arslan. His pretext for war was that the sultan had not abided by the terms of the agreement of 1162. In particular he had not returned any cities to Manuel, nor had the Türkmen attacks entirely ceased (Cahen, 2001: 28). Yet the bigger reason was undoubtedly that Kılıç Arslan had become far too powerful and the alliance which had benefited both sides now only appeared to benefit the Selçuks. In addition the Emperor believed that a campaign against the Turks would increase his prestige in the west if presented as a crusade. His first action was to fortify two key points on the road to Ikonion, Dorylaion and Soublaion. Unlike the fortresses of Neokastra,

the intended purpose of these two was to secure the road for pilgrims as well as crusaders. As a letter from the Pope Alexander III indicates:

> "He has constructed a certain great and populous city in the middle of the land of the Sultan of Iconium, where he has placed the Latins and Greeks to defend it, and by this city he dominates agreat region of the Turks, so much that he has restored the road for all Christians, both Greeks and Latins, to visit the Lord's Sepulcher." (Magdalino, 1993: 96)

Naturally Manuel's motives were in fact more practical. While he may have wished to impress his western audience with a grand gesture, the land route through Anatolia to the Holy Land would also bring more tangible benefits. Throughout the 1160s neither the Byzantines nor their erstwhile Selçuk allies could guarantee the security of pilgrims on the road, and consequently the Italian maritime trading cities were taking them by sea. Constantinople lost both money and a chance to recruit mercenaries (Lilie, 1993: 213). In addition Byzantium also had continuing interests in the crusader states themselves, and needed reliable access to them. Kinnamos even relates that the Byzantines planned a naval expedition to Egypt against Saladin, although his narrative breaks off at just this point (Kinnamos, 300). Here too the resurgent empire looked like an appealing ally for the crusaders, who were dealing with the growing power of Saladin (Magdalino, 1993: 97). Despite the support of Pope Alexander only Philip of Flanders answered the call and traveled to the Holy Land; the Byzantines proceeded toward Ikonion alone (Lilie, 1993: 212).

At the beginning of the campaign in 1176 Kılıç Arslan offered peace, but Manuel further demanded that the sultan reinstate the Danişmendids, a condition which was clearly not going to be met. Manuel's attack would be twofold. He sent Michael Gabras to Paphlagonia to take Amaseia (Kinnamos, 293), and afterwards he was to continue to Neokaisareia. His hope was for a Danişmendid insurrection while he was assaulting Ikonion, thus ensuring its success (Lilie, 1991: 41). In the

meantime Manuel proceeded to Dorylaion, passed through western Phrygia and Laodikeia to Chonai (Kinnamos, 298; Choniates, 177-178) and from there he followed the course of the Maeander River to Soublaion, at which point he entered Selçuk territory. Kılıç Arslan once again requested peace, and Manuel ignored the advice of his most senior officers, men experienced in combat with the Turks, and continued on. Choniates puts the blame on the desire of Manuel's less experienced relatives, who were eager for glory (Choniates, 179). After leaving the ruined fortress of Myriokephalon he had to cross very difficult terrain in the defiles of Tzibiritze[6] and here Kılıç Arslan made his attack. Unfortunately Kinnamos's narrative breaks off right before the battle, so only Choniates records what happened. Manuel's army was burdened with many pack animals and heavy siege engines intended for Ikonion, and once in the narrow pass the Selçuk archers unleashed their arrows and surrounded the Byzantine army in the pass. The Byzantine siege engines turned into a barricade which further trapped the army (Choniates, 181). The battle became a rout and the Emperor, according to Choniates, lost heart, even enduring extremely disrespectful verbal abuse from a subordinate who chastised him for not accepting peace when it had been offered (Choniates, 186). As night fell the Byzantines were surrounded without hope of escape, although Manuel himself considered fleeing (Choniates, 187). Kinnamos, despite not actually recording the battle, foreshadows it two times and says that he personally saw Manuel fighting bravely, "resisting entire Turkish regiments" (Kinnamos, 192) and "surpass[ing] the bounds of human excellence" (Kinnamos, 207).The next day Kılıç Arslan through an emissary again

[6]The fortress of Myriokephalon only appears in Choniates's account and the location of the battle has been the subject of debate. According to Choniates the defile should be the Kufu Çayı, in the vicinity of Choma. But the other sources are in agreement placing the battle one day's march from Konya (Michael the Syrian, 200; Kinnamos, 44) at Tzibrelitzemani, ten kilometers west of Konya (Belke, 1984: 238). Hendy locates Tzibrelitzemani at the Bağırsak Dere Boğazı, between Konya and Lake Beyşehir (Hendy, 1985: 146-154).

offered peace on very similar terms, although he requested that Manuel demolish the fortresses at Dorylaion and Soublaion.

This time Manuel had to accept and the army withdrew to Chonai still being harried by the Turks. Choniates puts the blame for this on the sultan (Choniates, 191), but it is more likely that Kılıç Arslan's forces were not entirely disciplined and saw the chance to gain more booty. Manuel destroyed Soublaion but not Dorylaion and as a result the sultan sent a huge force which pillaged the whole of the Maeander valley down to the Aegean coast (Magdalino, 1993: 99). Yet nevertheless the Byzantine army was evidently in good enough shape to ambush this Selçuk army as it was returning from the raid (Brand, 1992: 17). For Manuel himself, however, the defeat at Myriokephalon was traumatic, and he compared it to Romanos Diogenes's defeat at Mantzikert (Choniates, 191). Given the grand motives which Manuel had espoused, Kılıç Arslan's disinclination to take more territory is surprising. As with Alp Arslan in 1071, Kılıç Arslan's policy was focused on his own realm. Myriokephalon was probably not even perceived as being a particularly significant battle by the Selçuks. There is only one Muslim source which even mentions the battle, but it is short and straightforward (Hillenbrand, 2008: 155) and contrasts with the large number of sources which describe and glorify the victory at Mantzikert. It is true that the Muslim sources never really focus on the Anatolian Selçuks, but even Ibn Bibi does not mention it in his dynastic history (Hillenbrand, 2008: 157).

2.8 Anatolia from the death of Manuel to the Fourth Crusade

In 1180 Manuel died; his successor was his eleven-year-old son Alexios II (1180-1182), with his mother Maria of Antioch as the power behind the throne. Shortly thereafter Kılıç Arslan took Kotyaeion and Sozopolis (Choniates, 262) and

this combined with Byzantine losses in Europe inspired Manuel's cousin Andronikos I Komnenos (1183-1185) to seize the throne for himself. Andronikos utterly destroyed the carefully constructed Komnenian system of government and relentlessly persecuted anyone whom he perceived as an enemy (Treadgold, 1997: 656). In the end his arbitrary cruelty prompted Isaac II Angelos (1185-95; 1203-1204) to rebel. Andronikos was blinded and mutilated, and then dismembered in the Hippodrome (Choniates, 348-353). Isaac restored some measure of stability during his decade in power and even apparently rebuilt the fortress at Choma-Soublaion, calling it Angelokastron after his new dynasty (Ahrweiler, 1966: 282). But relations with the west continued to deteriorate, and prevented the Byzantines from taking advantage of what Cahen describes as the Selçuk "crisis of growth" (Cahen, 2001: 39).

At the end of his long and successful reign Kılıç Arslan partitioned his territories among nine of his sons, his brother, and his nephew. This partition illustrates which cities were considered as definitive parts of the Selçuk territory: Sivas and Aksaray, Tokat and its surroundings, Niksar, Kayseri, Elbistan, Malatya, Amasya, Ereğli, Niğde, Ankara along with Çankırı and Kastamonu, and Kütahya and Uluborlu. Dorylaion was also included in the territory of Ankara, and Kılıç Arslan retained only Konya for himself. Turan saw this partition as an attempt at imposing a feudal system in the tradition of past Turkish states like the Göktürks or the Great Selçuks (Turan, 1971: 242). Cahen, on the other hand, saw the partition as an attempt to deal with the Türkmen. Most of these cities were on the borders of the Selçuk realm, and Kılıç Arslan was thus seeking to organize his sultanate as it expanded. Significantly, Gıyaseddin I Keyhüsrev (1192-1196; 1205-1211), whose mother was a Greek Christian, was granted the recently conquered Uluborlu and Kütahya. This

being the case, it has been assumed that Keyhüsrev spoke Greek fluently (Shukurov, 2013: 130-31) and this may have been the reason he was granted territories that would have been largely Greek-speaking. Predictably, however, the Selçuks began infighting even before the death of Kılıç Arslan, and the situation was not settled until 1205 when Keyhüsrev definitively controlled the sultanate and all of its territories. By that time the situation in Anatolia had completely changed due to the Fourth Crusade and its aftermath.

As it happened, the Byzantines and the Selçuks both experienced their crises of succession at the same time, meaning neither was able to take advantage of the other's difficulties and expand. For the Byzantines, the crisis became a catastrophe when Constantinople was lost in 1204. For the Selçuks, the crisis was only temporary, and under Keyhüsrev and his successors İzzeddin I Keykavus (1211-1220) and Alaeddin I Keykubad (1220-1237) the sultanate reached its apogee. In 1207 Attaleia was taken, in 1214 Sinope, and in 1221 Kalanoros (Alanya) became Selçuk cities. An inscription on the Kızıl Kale in Alanya describes Keykubad:

> "the shadow of God in the lands, the splendor of the victorious empire, the helper of the flourishing community … the enlivener of justice in the two worlds, the sultan of the land and the two seas, the holder of the two horizons, the crown of the house of Selçuk, the master of king and sultan, *Abu'l Fath* Keykubad b. Keyhüsrev b. Kılıç Arslan, the proof of the Commander of the Faithful – may God make his reign last eternally." (Mecit, 2014: 113-114)

CHAPTER 3

KOMNENIAN FORTIFICATIONS: THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

Eustathios of Thessalonike compared the first three Komnenian emperors' reconquest of Anatolia to a series of waves; saying that Alexios drove the Turks back from the sea, John pushed them back further, and Manuel removed them entirely (Eustathios, 29). In light of the historical facts, this praise is clearly overstated, but it does express generally the pattern of the Komnenian fortification policy. Alexios generally restricted his efforts to the coasts, John built fortresses which protected the major routes from the coasts to the interior, and Manuel attempted both to reinforce John's foundations and to push still further east with his fortresses at Dorylaion and Soublaion (Figure 7). Fortifications are often singled out for praise by both the panegyrists and the historians, but those same histories also make it clear that fortifications alone were not enough to counter endemic Turkish raids on the surrounding territories. By analyzing historically attested fortifications and comparing their construction techniques with undated or unattested fortifications in the frontier regions, a fuller picture of the Byzantine defensive strategy can be reached.

3.1 Previous Studies

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, travelers in Anatolia noted many remains of fortifications, but the interests of most of these early visitors lay more in recording inscriptions and identifying classical cities than in the later Byzantine centuries. Calling a fortification "Byzantine" or medieval says nothing about whether that fortification was constructed to counter the Arabs, the Turks, or for some other purpose entirely. Thus, although the locations of many fortifications are known, they are all too often undated and lacking in context which can make them useful to a historian. Stylistically, they were often crudely and hurriedly constructed, which was appropriate under the historical circumstances but makes them far less interesting to an art historian than a Byzantine church or palace (Foss, 1982: 146-147). From an archaeological perspective, several surveys have been conducted but very few excavations, so ceramic and numismatic evidence which could confirm or disprove conclusions based on historical reasoning is still lacking.

Without a doubt Clive Foss has made the greatest contribution to an understanding of Komnenian fortifications. In addition to numerous books and articles concerning the cities and regions of western Anatolia, under the auspices of the British Institute at Ankara, he conducted in-depth surveys of the Turkish vilayets of Kocaeli and Kütahya, in which he identified and described all Byzantine remains within their boundaries (Foss, 1985; 1996a) as well as attempted to set these remains into a historical context. In addition to the contribution these publications have made to an understanding of their subjects, they also provide a valuable framework for future surveys in as yet unstudied vilayets. The Kütahya project focused on Byzantine Kotyaeion, a city with a substantial castle but a largely unknown history, whereas the Kocaeli project focused on Nikomedeia, a city well-known in history but

which had escaped much scholarly attention. Foss also co-authored a more general study of Byzantine fortifications with David Winfield (Foss and Winfield, 1986), which attempts to set out a methodology for studying and dating them. Another general work is "A Skeletal History of Byzantine Fortification" by Arnold Lawrence (Lawrence, 1983) though it is indeed quite "skeletal" in its treatment of fortifications constructed after the ninth century.

The British Institute's castle survey was continued by Hugh Barnes and Mark Whittow in the 1990s (Barnes and Whittow, 1998), although with a different focus. Rather than attempting to survey entire vilayets, this survey identified five sites along the upper Maeander and spent a season at each of them. Unfortunately only the preliminary reports and a brief summary have been published. In addition to this project, Whittow's doctoral thesis offers a more in-depth look at many of the sites and fortresses along the Maeander (Whittow, 1987).

Detailed regional surveys of Byzantine fortifications exist for several other regions as well. For the Pontos, from Sinope to Trebizond, Anthony Bryer and David Winfield have written an extremely detailed and lavishly illustrated survey of the Byzantine monuments (Bryer and Winfield, 1985). Naturally this work focuses on the Empire of Trebizond, which due to historical circumstances and geographical isolation led an existence almost entirely divorced from the Byzantine Empire. In Cilicia, which was of more interest and importance to the Komnenian emperors, Robert Edwards has written a thorough survey which both encompasses and supersedes all previous work on the region (Edwards, 1987a). Although it focuses on Armenian fortresses, Byzantine and Crusader castles (which were often re-used and re-built by the Armenian princes) are also described and illustrated. Outside of Anatolia, Nikolas Bakirtzis has written on the fortifications of Aegean Macedonia, in

particular those of Thessaloniki (Bakirtzis, 2010). Here again the focus has been on considering these monuments in their historical and geographical context.

Finally, mention must be made of the *Tabula Imperii Byzantini.* This long-term project seeks to map the Byzantine road system throughout the empire. In addition to its excellent maps, the TIB offers extensive bibliographies for all of the sites and cities that it mentions. Although the volumes dealing with Bithynia and Mysia have not yet appeared, the volume dealing with Phrygia and Pisidia covers numerous sites which were important in the Komnenian period (Belke and Merisch, 1990).

3.2 Fortifications of Alexios I Komnenos

While Alexios is credited with the construction of many coastal fortresses, few have been securely identified (Figure 8). These are the fortresses of Didyma/Hieron, Seleukeia, and Korykos. In addition, Anna Komnene mentions the fortress of Kibotos (Civetot), near or at Helenopolis on the southern coast of the Astacene Gulf (İzmit Körfezi), and also gives a detailed description of the construction of a fortress known as Sidera near Lake Baanes (Sapanca Gölü). The exact location of the former is questionable and the latter has not been found.Finally, the walls of Nikaia contain Selçuk grave stones which must have been incorporated after Alexios reclaimed the city in 1097.

3.2.1 Didyma/Hieron (Didim, Aydın)

The fortress at Didyma was constructed on the remains of the famous Temple of Apollo (Figure 9). In addition, it had served as a fortress two times before in its history, first against the Gothic invasion of the third century and then in the seventh

century against Arab raids, when it was also made into the bishopric known as Hieron (Foss, 1977: 479). In the reign of Alexios it was again apparently rebuilt and further augmented with a semi-circular wall projecting beyond the east colonnade. The walls inside the temple used spolia and rubble without any sort of arrangement, while the new semicircular wall used rough and unsorted spolia without any decorative arrangement and a good deal of mortar. Such a construction style reveals only that the work was completed quickly. Without the inscription found during early twentieth century excavations it would be impossible to date the work (Foss, 1982: 157-158), although a coin of Alexios was found in the cistern south of the main staircase leading to the nave (Knackfuß, 1941:26).

The inscription found at Didyma is open to interpretation, since the date is not completely clear. It can be dated to 1088/9, 1094, or 1103/4[7] depending on whether the inscription mentions the second or the twelfth indiction[8], all within the reign of Alexios but all in different historical circumstances (see above, 2.5). In addition, the renovator of the castle is described as the vestarch and *doux* of Crete Michael Phoukas the Karatouinos, titles which only make sense if the later date is preferred, due to Alexios's changes to the hierarchy of Byzantine titles (Ragia, 2007: 138-139). This would mean that the renovation of Hieron was not actually a response to the Turks, but rather against the Italians in the south Aegean (Ragia, 2007: 141). On the basis of historical likelihood, Foss prefers to read the date as 1094, since this was after the murder of Çaka but before the full reconquest of the southern Aegean coast (Foss, 1982: 157). But it seems unlikely that Alexios would have ordered the fortification of a relatively unimportant site when he was preoccupied with troubles

[7]A much earlier date in the tenth century has also been proposed, based on the epigraphic character of the letters, but H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler convincingly argues for dating it to the reign of Alexios based on historical circumstance and the titles mentioned (Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 1960: 184-185).

[8]The Byzantine indictions followed a fifteen year cycle which had begun in the year 312. See A. Bryer's chapter "Chronology and Dating" in *The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies*.

much closer to Constantinople. Furthermore in 1097 or 1098 John Doukas defeated a large army of Turks near Ephesos that was commanded by several Turkish emirs from the region, causing them to flee toward the interior (Anna Komnene, 347). During her narrative of this campaign Anna makes no mention of any Byzantine stronghold south of Ephesos. Thus it makes the most sense to see the fortress of Hieron as demonstrating that not every fortification dated to the reign of a particular emperor need to have been built under his intimate direction.

3.2.2 Korykos (Kızkalesi, Mersin)

In 1099 Alexios ordered the royal eunuch Eustathios to fortify Korykos and Seleukeia in anticipation of an attack by Bohemond (Figures 10-11). Anna Komnene says that "it had been a very strong city, but later fell into ruins" (Anna Komnene, 363) (Figure 12). Ostensibly on this basis Foss, Winfield (Foss, 1982: 159; Foss and Winfield, 1986: 22-23) and in particular Lawrence believe that the fortress was constructed in the seventh century if not earlier. Lawrence notes the extensive use of classical spolia, including the arch which serves as the main gateway, and argues that the site would have been ideal for defense against the seafaring raids of the Arabs (Lawrence, 1983: 177). Edwards, however, believes that there is no evidence for construction prior to the twelfth century, further noting that the Arab geographers make no mention of a fortified site and that no bishop is attested during the period of the Arab invasions (Edwards, 1987a: 166-167). Due to the large amount of ashlar blocks Lawrence's suggestion seems more plausible, as this fine masonry suggests that the buildings so repurposed had either just fallen into disrepair or were demolished specifically to build the castle (Figure 13).

For a time Alexios's policy seems to have successfully prevented Bohemond from receiving help from the west (Lilie, 1993: 72) but perhaps as early as 1109 (Lilie, 1993: 108) and certainly by the reign of John Korykoshad been lost and had to be reconquered on the emperor's campaign against Antioch in 1137 (Lilie, 1993: 117). By the late 1160s Korykos was under the control of the Armenians, according to Benjamin of Tudela, who describes the city as "the frontier of the empire of Thoros[9]" (Benjamin, 15). Choniates accuses Manuel's finance minister, John of Poutze, of diverting money needed for the upkeep of the navy to the treasury (Choniates, 55-56); in light of this the ultimate loss of Korykos is unsurprising.

Korykos actually comprises two fortresses, one on the mainland and the other, smaller, castle on an island close to the coast. The land castle has a square shape, square towers, and a fully concentric plan, the only one in Cilicia (Edwards, 1987a: 163). The sea castle has a single wall circuit and its Byzantine walls were more extensively reconstructed by the Armenians than those of the mainland castle. On the mainland, the Byzantine plan survives on the south and east walls, notable for their square towers, whereas Armenian rounded towers project from the north wall (Edwards, 1987a: 14). Nevertheless, Edwards notes that even on the south side the Armenians refaced the walls with newly quarried ashlar blocks, making the land castle a better example of Byzantine construction (Edwards, 1987a: 164). Edwards sees all the re-used ashlar blocks as being the work of Eustathios, and thus assigns what he refers to as small crude and large crude masonry (Edwards, 1987a: 21-22) to the fourteenth century Lusignan occupation (Edwards, 1987a: 165). By contrast Foss sees this as representing the twelfth century Byzantine work since for him the castle was constructed in the seventh century (Foss, 1982: 159). Likewise, Lawrence only

[9]Prince Toros II, lord of Armenian Cilicia from 1144/45-1169. For an account of the kingdom's history and a gazetteer see T.S.R. Boase's *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia,* 1-33 and 145-185.

attributes what he calls "the first unseemly repairs to the outer line" to Eustathios (Lawrence, 1983: 179), and Winfield concurs with this view, though without the artistic judgment (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 22). Considering the need for haste and the limited manpower available, it seems highly unlikely that he would have been able to do much more than shore up the formidable, if ancient, fortifications of Korykos.

3.2.3 Seleukeia (Silifke, Mersin)

Like Korykos, Seleukeia was hastily refortified by Eustathios, but it seems to have remained Byzantine for far longer, until the 1180s (Figure 14). Kinnamos and Choniates both mention John's campaign against Levon[10], who had conquered most of Cilicia and was besieging Seleukeia (Kinnamos, 16; Choniates, 29). During the early 1130s it was the Byzantine border town along the Cilician coast, and after it passed to Levon II[11] it was alternately controlled by both the Franks and the Armenians. Consequently, the building history of the castle, especially the renovation work of Eustathios, is almost impossible to determine without excavation (Figure 15) (Edwards, 1987a: 228). One of the only indisputable remains of the Komnenian period is the dry moat, which is mentioned by Anna; "at once, too, Seleukeia was rebuilt and strengthened with ditches all round the city" (Anna Komnene, 363). Yet even here it is most likely that the original ditches were also heavily augmented (Edwards, 1987a: 228-229). Seleukeia illustrates very clearly the difficulties in constructing chronologies of often-rebuilt and repaired fortifications in the absence of excavation.

[10] Prince Levon I, Lord of Armenian Cilicia from 1129/30-1137.
[11] Prince Levon II, Lord of Armenian Cilicia from 1187–1198/1199 and then king of Armenian Cilicia from 1198/1199–1219.

3.2.4 Kibotos/Civetot/Helenopolis? (Hersek, Yalova)

The fortification known as Kibotos to the Byzantines and Civetot to the crusaders no longer exists, but its location is nevertheless known due to the important role it played in history (Figure 16). It had been built on Alexios's orders in 1087 while he was entertaining Ebu'l Kasım in Constantinople (Anna Komnene, 203-204), and was located near or possibly on the site of the older city of Helenopolis, although this identification is not certain.[12] The site is on Dil Burnu, a peninsula formed by alluvium carried down by the Yalakdere creek, which projects north into the gulf of Iznik; thus it both controlled access to the gulf and served as a port for travelers going between Nikaia and the capital. Although no remains survive today, the nineteenth-century traveler Charles Texier noted many remains of walls near the shore (Ulugün, 2010: 183). According to the chronicler Orderic Vitalis, Alexios had intended to garrison the fortress with Anglo-Saxon mercenaries, but the castle was never actually completed (Orderic, 38-39). Albert of Aachen refers to this castle near to Civetot as "ancient and abandoned" and says that the crusaders had to supplement the missing gates with their shields to fend off the pursuing forces of Kılıç Arslan (Albert, 42-43). As Foss suggests this apparent ruin was most likely the fort left unfinished by Alexios (Foss, 1996a: 65).

[12] While Foss is quite certain that Helenopolis and Kibotos are one and the same (Foss, 1996: 64), İnalcik identifies Helenopolis with the Ottoman Yalak-Hisar (modern Yalova) (İnalcik, 1993: 74). Furthermore, neither Ainsworth nor Texier equated Helenopolis with modern Hersek (Ulugün, 2010: 173; 183). In Anna Komnene it seems, contrary to Foss, that the two places are distinct. In addition, Helenopolis was famous for its thermal springs, which do not exist on the peninsula but are in fact located further to the west. Finally, the sources state that Peter the Hermit and his followers initially pitched a camp at Helenopolis (Anna Komnene, 311), but only later, after unsuccessful attacks, did they enter the ruined fortress at Civetot to take refuge.

3.2.5 Sidera

Although the location of the fortress of Sidera is not known (Figure 16), Anna Komnene offers her most detailed description of Alexios's building activity in relation to the fort.

> "South of Lake Baane [Sapanca Gölü] he [Alexios] noticed a very long trench and when he followed its course to the end he concluded from its position and shape that the excavation had not been merely aciddental, nor was it the result of some natural process, but the deliberate work of some human hand. Once he had been led to the same idea he ordered the trench to be dug to a great depth, but fearing that at the point where lake and canal met it might be possible to get across, he built an extremely strong fort there, completely secure and proof against all assaults, not only because of the water, but also because of the height and thickness of its walls – for which reason it was called the Iron Tower. Even today it constitutes a city in front of a city, an outlying bastion to protect a wall. The emperor himself directed its construction from early morning till evening. Enormous sums of money were spent to ensure that the walls should be really strong and impregnable. He paid generous wages to the men who dragged the stones, one by one, even if fifty or a hundred workers were involved at a time. The money attracted not casual laborers, but all the soldiers and their servants, natives and foreigners alike; they were glad to move stones for such liberal pay under the direction of the emperor in person. To them he seemed like a prize-giver at the games. He made skillful use of the crowds who flocked to help and the transport of these huge blocks of stone was made easier."(Anna Komnene, 307-308)

Sidera was thus intended to be a more forward point of defense for the approaches to Nikomedeia and Constantinople. It was probably built in 1095, shortly before the arrival of the first of the crusaders. By this time both Çaka and Ebu'l Kasım were dead, and so only Kılıç Arslan remained to threaten Bithynia. Thus it seems that this new fortress was also intended to set the stage for further gains in Anatolia.

3.2.6 Nikaia (İznik, Bursa)

The recapture of Nikaia was surely the most impressive achievement of Alexios, but since the city had undoubtedly had walls since its founding 1500 years earlier he did not have to build extensively. In their plan and in most of their construction, the walls date to the reigns of Gallienus (253-268) and Claudius

Gothicus (268-270); they run for five kilometers and had over eighty towers, with four main double gates (Figure 17) (Foss, 2003: 250). The greatest testament to their strength is that throughout their history the city was always taken by negotiation or trickery, and never by direct assault. The most substantial alteration was undertaken by Michael III (842-867), who added new towers between the old towers on the south and south-east sections. This work can only be dated due to inscriptions, since the builders of the towers tried to follow the original style (Foss, 2003: 253). In 1065 an earthquake accomplished what no attacker had been able to, and a large section of the eastern wall had to be reconstructed, this time with extensive brickwork instead of stone.

With its apparently impregnable walls and its proximity to the capital, Nikaia was an ideal base for aspiring and successful usurpers. Bardas Skleros in 978, Isaac Komnenos in 1057, and Nikephoros Botaneiates in 1078 all used the city as their base. It was also in this context that the city fell to the Turks of Süleyman in 1081; he had been installed in the city by Nikephoros Melissenos. Naturally Süleyman had no need to add to the substantial fortifications, and the only archaeological remnants of the Sultanate of Nikaia are some Selçuk tombstones which were themselves reused in a later rebuilding. These stones reveal the only glimpse of Nikaia's brief time as a Turkish and Islamic city, and are also the earliest Selçuk inscriptions in Anatolia (Figure 18). One of them commemorates Ahmad the tanner, another Mahmud ibn Abdullah, from Isfahan. Mahmud's stone and another contain quotations from the Kur'an (Foss, 1998, 155-157). They demonstrate not only the distant origins and the rapid advance of the Turks across Anatolia, but also that tradesmen accompanied the Selçuk armies and practiced their craft in the context of

settled life. They offer an insight into life in this period of transition which could never be obtained from Anna Komnene's martial narrative.

As mentioned above (2.5), the crusaders were on the verge of taking Nikaia by force when Kılıç Arslan allowed it to be surrendered to the Byzantines. Thus the city did not suffer a sack, but the siege nevertheless damaged the walls. In particular the crusaders had caused the so-called *Gonatas* or Kneeling Tower[13] on the southwestern corner to collapseby digging beneath it and later setting fire to the tunnels supports (Albert, 120-125). In its place Alexios constructed a smaller tower, which as Foss says is really more of a pentagonal buttress (Figure 19). The work employs reused stones, including the Selçuk tombstones and has its superstructure in the brickwork added after the earthquake of 1065 (Foss, 2003: 257). Like all of Alexios's fortifications, the tower displays hasty and expedient construction techniques. Naturally this means that accurately identifying an undated or unmentioned fortification as being by Alexios is difficult if not impossible, since his constructions are always adapted to their circumstances.

3.2.7 Adramytteion (Burhaniye, Balıkesir)

For a description and discussion in connection with Manuel, see 3.4.2.3.

3.2.8 Possible Fortifications of Alexios

The lack of any distinctive style makes it difficult to assign fortresses to Alexios, and it is quite possible that he was responsible for more than he can be given credit for. Two fortresses in western Phrygia, Aizanoi and Akrokos, may have been constructed by him, as they occupy routes by which he is known to have

[13]The tower had been damaged during Bardas Skleros's attempt to take the city in 978; his removal of the stones at the base caused the tower to lean forward as if kneeling.

traveled and the construction techniques employed give no reason to assign them to John or Manuel.

3.2.8.1 Aizanoi (Çavdarhisar, Kütahya)

The impressive ruins of Aizanoi at first reveal little of its Byzantine history (Figures 20-21). It was apparently an important center well into Late Antiquity until the rise in importance of Kotyaeion with its superior defensive position. The name at least survived into the Ottoman period as Sazanos, a *nahiye* or sub-district of Kütahya; Hisar-i Çavdar, which has led to the name of the current village, most likely referred to only one section of the larger, ruined, ancient city (Foss, 1985: 118). The *temenos* wall of the Temple of Zeus was strengthened and outfitted with round towers faced with rubble and spoils, although only the foundations uncovered during excavations in 1983 and 1984 remain (Figure 22) (Naumann, 1985: 275-283).

The obvious parallel for an Alexian fortress at Aizanoi is Didyma. There too, abundant spoils were used to quickly build a fortress in the midst of enemy territory. Naumann prefers to date these walls to the reign of Manuel (Naumann, 1985: 294) but Aizanoi does not appear to have been on any of his campaign routes and is also far removed from the regions where he enacted extensive fortification programs. Alexios, on the other hand, campaigned in this area late in his reign, and he can also be credited with the nearby fortress of Akrokos.

3.2.8.2 Akrokos (Eğrigöz, Emet, Kütahya)

The present remoteness of the castle at Akrokos belies its former strategic importance (Figures 23-24). The rock on which it stands controls a valley in which two routes through the mountains from Mysia converge and continue east toward

Phrygia. In the *Alexiad* the emperor crosses Mount Olympos (Uludağ) by difficult and lesser known paths with the intention of cutting off a Turkish raiding party which had plundered Mysia (Anna Komnene, 453). It is clear that Akrokos was close to a river valley large enough to allow the two armies to draw up their battle lines. Furthermore, two Byzantine generals pursuing another Turkish force returning from a raid in the Troad were defeated and captured next to an old and abandoned fort (Anna Komnene, 456)[14] which may well have been Akrokos. Furthermore the Turkish forces tried to hide from the emperor in a reed-filled marsh, which Alexios then had burned to draw them out. The castle thus sits at the narrowest point of the valley and is surrounded on either side by broader plains which are today agricultural. Finally, there is a clear connection between the ancient and modern names (Foss, 1985: 112). The Turkish name can mean "crooked eye" but it is likely that this represents an attempt to give meaning to the Greek name, a common practice. That "eğri" is so appropriate to describe a gorge is thus a happy coincidence.

The standing remains complement the text which states that in Alexios's time the fortress was old and not in use. According to Foss the bulk of the fortress dates to the ninth century, with only the gate and minor repairs being later (Foss, 1985: 116-117). The gate's second phase likely represents the work of Alexios. It consists of a rough pink mortar with small pieces of stone and brick and an arch faced with brick. As is typical of Alexios's work, there is no recognizable technique or style to this work, especially since so little survives.

[14]The date of these events is unclear. Foss favors 1117 (Foss, 1985: 111) whereas Vryonis says 1113 (Vryonis, 1971: 149-150). The earlier date is more likely given that Alexios's campaigns in 1116-7 were directed towards Konya and the events mentioned here seem to have been a more spontaneous defensive effort.

3.3 Fortifications of John II Komnenos

While the work of fortification carried out by Alexios always seems to have been constructed in a hasty and opportunistic manner, John's fortifications show a deliberate attempt at controlling a major military route (Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 1960: 185) (Figure 25). This difference mirrors the difference between the campaigns of Alexios and John. Whereas Alexios spent much of his reign on the defensive, John was constantly on campaign in enemy lands. John is known to have built fortifications at Laodikeia on the Lykos, Lopadion, and Achyraous. In addition it seems logical to assign at least a rebuilding of Apollonia Sozopolis to John.

3.3.1 Laodikeia (Kaleiçi, Denizli)

Laodikeia, located in the valley of the Lykos River (Çürüksu Çayı), and its neighboring city Khonai (Honaz) were the last major cities in Byzantine territory before the Selçuk frontier[15] after they were recaptured by John in 1119. Thus the city protected the route running down the Maeander which had previously seen intensive raiding activity. It was also the juncture where the overland route from Lopadion joined with the Maeander route and from Laodikeia an army could either continue east toward Ikonion or march south to Attaleia.

Laodikeia had been an important city well into Late Antiquity, but during the reign of Phokas (602-610) it suffered an earthquake from which excavations reveal it never recovered. Due to the damage done to the water supply the inhabitants seem to have moved ten kilometers south, out of the valley of the Lykos and onto the foothills of Mount Salbakos (Babadağ). The modern city of Denizli grew up around

[15]Both Chonai and Laodikeia had been taken in the decade after Mantzikert but were reclaimed by John Doukas in 1098, who then appointed a military commander for the region at Lampe, still further to the east (Anna Komnene. 348). In any case they must have been lost again late in the reign of Alexios.

one of these new settlements, Kaleiçi, while the other two (Bereketli Hisarköyü and Asartepe) are somewhat further into the hills (Figures 26-28) (Şimşek, 2013: 58). On the basis of both textual and archaeological evidence it seems as though Kaleiçi should be Komnenian Laodikeia, although this identification has been challenged. Whittow preferred to identify the Komnenian city with the older site (Whittow, 1987: 190-192), although when he wrote excavations had only just begun and so the extent of the seventh century abandonment was not yet known. Baykara claims Kaleiçi as a Turkish foundation due to an inscription which mentions Seyfettin Karasunger, the governor of the region during the reign of Gıyaseddin Kayhüsrev II (1236-1246) (Baykara, 1969: 46). Gökçe closely follows Baykara in assigning Kaleiçi to Karasunger (Gökçe, 2000: 65-66), though both scholars do not mention the excavations of the classical site and their implications. Tanyeli seems to have been the first to identify Kaleiçi as the new site of Byzantine Laodikeia, and he claimed that the walls should originally be assigned to John (Tanyeli, 1989: 343) and that Karasunger merely repaired them, a view that has been accepted by both İnceoğlu (İnceoğlu, 2003: 15-16) and Şimşek, the excavator of the classical city. Şimşek also notes that the late antique city had been fortified by Theodosios and Arkadios in the late fourth century and thus would not have needed new walls (Şimşek, 2007: 39-40). In a more recent publication Baykara is dismissive of the archaeological evidence and claims that even well into the Turkish period the Christian population of Denizli continued to live on the ancient site even as they worked in the newer city (Baykara, 2007: 107). This hypothesis does not explain how the purported residents of the older site would have obtained water, and thus it seems far more reasonable to follow the excavators in their belief that there was no settlement of significance there after the water system had been destroyed (Şimşek and Büyükkolancı, 2006: 91).

Both Kinnamos and Choniates mention John's reconquest of Laodikeia in 1119, although only Choniates mentions that a wall was built by the emperor around the city (Kinnamos, 5-6; Choniates, 12). It is logical to identify these walls with those that surround Kaleiçi in the middle of modern Denizli (Şimşek, 2007: 40). The castle wall is roughly rectangular, though it follows the contours of the hill (Figure 27). It measures 280 by 160 meters and appears to have had at least six gates, although they were perhaps not all original as the area used to be Denizli's main market area (Darıverenli, 1943: 5). Into the twentieth century the walls were still eight to ten meters high in some places (Figure 29), although the remains suffered severe damage during an earthquake in 1950. Where they can still be seen, the walls consist of travertine blocks bonded together with lime mortar with gaps filled in with smaller stones or brick pieces, although not in any sort of regular *cloisonné* (Figure 30). On the west wall there is a triangular projection, though the earlier plan more of these projections are shown. The plan also shows at least two square towers; although neither can be seen today (Şimşek, 2007: 41-42).

The sources reveal two more interesting aspects of Komnenian Laodikeia. Odo of Deuil, when he passed through the city in 1148 states that the inhabitants evacuated the city with all their provisions and that the crusaders could not buy any food for their continuing journey to Attaleia (Odo of Deuil, 113-114). Choniates, describing the city in Manuel's time, says that it was not surrounded by walls and that it was a collection of villages on the slopes of the mountain (Choniates, 124). Both of these passages, in addition to the nearly constant raids mentioned as occurring in the Lykos Valley, testify to the insecurity of the region. Thus, if John did in fact fortify this hill, he cannot have intended it to be a place for the protection of the people living in the valley. Rather, it was intended mainly as a military base

along the main campaign route. As Kinnamos says, John left behind a garrison and adequate supplies (Kinnamos, 6). The history of John's campaigns demonstrates that he was more interested in opening and protecting routes to the most important cities than he was in reclaiming and protecting the territories through and in which he campaigned.

3.3.2 Apollonia Sozopolis (Uluborlu, Isparta)

For most of the twelfth century the fortress of Apollonia Sozopolis was the easternmost Byzantine possession. Its strategic location had already been recognized by Romanos Diogenes before the Battle of Mantzikert; according to an inscription the walls were built by him in 1070 (Figures 31-32) (Foss, 1982: 153). The inscription was reused in the wall either during John's rebuilding or perhaps even after the Turks took the city sometime after Mantzikert. John could not take the city by force in 1120, but instead had his commander Paktarios fire missiles at the walls to try and lure out the defenders. When they emerged the Byzantines drew them away from the walls and into an ambush with a feigned retreat. They were then able to take the undefended fortress (Choniates, 13). It remained Byzantine until the death of Manuel, when Kılıç Arslan took it along with Kotyaeion (Choniates, 262) and Dorylaion.

The remains of the walls, gates, and towers show two phases of construction, although the second amounts to little more than repairs (Foss, 1982: 156). This assessment agrees with the history; if the first phase is attributed to Romanos, the second should be the repairs carried out by John after his besiegers damaged the walls. The first phase contains larger stones and more spolia while the second is mostly squared fieldstones with still smaller stones filling the interstices. There is

very little brick used but rows of flat stones seems to serve a similar function in keeping the stone courses level (Foss, 1982: 154).

3.3.3 Lopadion (Uluabat, Bursa)

The fortress of Lopadion commanded a key bridge over the Rhyndakos River (Orhaneli Çayı), and thus the route from Prusa (Bursa) to Kyzikos as well as the route heading southeast toward Phrygia (Figures 33-36). It was located to the west of Lake Apolloniatis (Uluabat or Apolyont Gölü) and by crossing the bridge a traveler would avoid a journey of several days around the lake (Bondoux, 2003: 393). This central location also made Lopadion the place where troops from the Hellespontine provinces could gather, and made it the natural location for the defense of those shores (Hasluck, 1910: 82). Late in Alexios's reign the whole region was raided by the Turkish emir Monoluğ (Monolykos) with a massive army drawn from the east, who found the defenses wholly inadequate (Anna Komnene, 448; 453). During these raids it seems clear that Lopadion was either unfortified or that the fortifications were completely destroyed, since John had to build or rebuild them completely (Kinnamos, 38; Choniates, 20).[16] In addition to the walls, two churches of Saint Michael survive and the village was still a place of pilgrimage until the middle of the nineteenth century on account of a miracle-working icon (Hasluck, 1910: 79). Today the site has been given over to agriculture, although the fields follow the line of the crumbling walls.

According to Hasluck, who saw the walls in the early twentieth century when they were in better condition, the fort was an irregular rectangle measuring about 475 by 150 meters, with the river protecting its long northern side. The southern long

[16]Neither Kinnamos nor Choniates gives a date, but the fortress ostensibly had to be constructed between John's Hungarian War (1129-1130) and his first campaign against the Danişmendids (1132). Thus 1130 is the date most often given in the secondary literature.

side had twelve towers and each short side had six (Hasluck, 1910: 80). The towers were round or polygonal and projected from the walls, and there were at least five gates. Today one large tower remains standing, along with a gate, and a structure containing a vaulted passage. The tower has a core of mortar and rubble and is faced with fieldstones and occasional spolia; the stones are of different sizes and thus some regularity is imposed by brick or stone horizontal lacing courses. The tower was bonded to the wall (Figure 36). On the walls themselves, a recessed brickwork technique was used, so only narrow single brick bands would have been visible, the rest having been covered with mortar (Foss, 1982: 159-161). Thus even broken bricks could be incorporated to fill interstices without unduly damaging the aesthetic impression. Overall the remains give the impression that they were constructed at the same time, and only minor repairs were ever done. When combined with the literary sources, it is clear that Lopadion is a definitive example of John's style of fortification.

3.3.4 Achyraous (Pamukçu, Balıkesir)

Achyraous was built by John in 1139, as a further attempt to fortify the regions west of the Sangarios (Choniates, 33). Like Lopadion it also guarded the overland route to Philadelphia and Laodikeia. The castle stood on a cliff next to a tributary of the Makestos River and thus commanded the route between the plain of Hadrianoutherai and the plains of Lydia and Ionia (Foss, 1982: 162). The name of the site has been the subject of dispute and some confusion. In addition to being called Achyraous it also appears as Ochyrai in Choniates text and as Esseron or Sycheron in crusader accounts. Hasluck preferred this site over Bigadiç (see below 3.3.5.1) for the location of Achyraous (Hasluck, 1910: 94) agreeing with Ramsay,

who had noted that Achyraous replaces Hadrianoutherai (Balıkesir) in contemporary Byzantine documents (Ramsay, 1890: 156), although without mentioning the so-called Hoca Kalesi, as the site used to be known colloquially.

Today this fortress is colloquially known as İkizcetepeler Kalesi (Umar, 2006: 152) and its geographical situation has been dramatically changed by the İkizcetepeler Dam, which was constructed in 1980. The hill is today located at the northernmost point of the lake formed by this dam (Figure 37), but when Hasluck visited in the early twentieth century the stream surrounded it on three sides and the fourth was also naturally protected by a steep slope (Hasluck, 1910: 93). In addition, prior to the dam construction and the flooding caused by the resulting lake the road coming from the south and heading towards Pteleia (Pamukçu)[17] passed directly below the surviving towers (Mercangöz, 2003: 36-37). The plan was apparently a rough trapezoid two hundred meters in length, with at least five rounded towers, which survive in much better condition than the walls (Figure 38) (Özdemir, 1997: 213-216). Two of these towers still survive to a height of more than five meters, and retain their facing of vertical and horizontal fieldstones, occasional spolia, and brick. The brickwork is used both horizontally and vertically as *cloisonné* (Figure 39) (Foss, 1982: 164). On the higher courses brickwork is used in a decorative fashion, more reminiscent of contemporary churches than fortifications (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 146). According to Foss, this elaborate decoration is due to the personal role played by the emperor in the construction, and combined with the relatively small dimensions it seems clear that the fortress was intended as both a military camp and a demonstration of imperial power (Foss, 1982: 166). The fortress's decoration does contrast with Lopadion's, but according to Choniates John was able to spend more

[17]Pamukçu's older Turkish name was Eftele, an apparent survival of the Greek Pteleia, mentioned in the Life of Theodore the Studite (759-826) in the context of his return from exile in Smyrna to Constantinople (Robert, 1962: 385)

time on the construction (Choniates, 33). Close examination of the better-preserved tower's construction reveals that the brickwork also has the effect of fixing stones of various sizes into more regular courses, thus guaranteeing stability as the walls rose. In addition, the holes now seen at regular intervals in the *cloisonné* courses originally had wooden beams which served to connect the facing to the wall's rubble core. In all likelihood these wooden beams also served to stabilize the tower during construction; Ousterhout notes that without such reinforcement a quickly-constructed building could become deformed or even collapse due to tension and lateral forces (Ousterhout, 1999: 194). By the time the wood had decayed, however, the mortar would have fully set.

3.3.5 Possible fortifications of John

While some of the fortifications which can be attributed to John also fall along the same crucial inland road system as Lopadion and Achyraous, his coastal activities are not mentioned by the historians. In particular, John's campaigns in Cilicia seem to have been accompanied by an extensive program of fortress construction, both in harbor cities and in strategic valleys which separate these harbor cities from the interior.

3.3.5.1 Pegadia (Bigadiç, Balıkesir)

The fortress of Pegadia has no known history aside from a mention in the Life of Saint Peter of Atroa (773-837), but the similarity of the modern name (Robert, 1978: 451), its strategic position, and its masonry style all allow it to be assigned to the reign of John. It is located overlooking the broad plain of the Makestos River, along the same route which passes Achyraous and Balıkesir. Even when Hamilton

saw the ruins in the 1830s not much existed, although he was able to estimate the area enclosed as being less than one hectare (Hamilton, 1842: 116). Today remains of nine towers and some of the walls survive; they consist of brick and stone facing over a rubble core (Mercangöz, 2003: 39). Although most of the facing has disappeared, where it survives it reveals the same sort of *cloisonné* technique which can be seen in the towers at Achyraous (Figure 40). Another parallel with Achyraous is the use of cribwork to attach the facing to the rubble core (Foss, 1982: 189-190). The strategic location of the castle caused Munro to identify this site as Achyraous (Munro, 1897: 258-259), although he apparently never saw the fortress of Hoca Kalesi and thus was not able to compare the two.

3.3.5.2 Sultan Çayir

Although very little remains of the fortress at Sultan Çayır, its proximity to a once-important Roman or Byzantine bridge which spanned the Makestos means that the ruin has been noted many times by travelers and researchers, although it had already been heavily damaged due to quarrying and boracite mining (Hamilton, 1842: 110; Munro, 1897: 163; Hasluck, 1910: 131-32). Enough remains of one tower to see that it was constructed of stone and brick pieces attached to the rubble core with cribwork. The brick pieces are also occasionally arranged surrounding the larger stones, another example of the *cloisonné* technique which regularly appears in John's constructions (Foss, 1982: 191). Taken together with the fortresses of Lopadion, Achyraous, and Pegadia, the remains at Sultan Çayır reveal John's concerted strategy to defend the Makestos Valley against Turkish attacks. In addition, these regular bases would have provided a secure route for the Byzantine

army as it headed south along the frontier zone to the Maeander Valley, another area to which John devoted significant attention.

3.3.5.3 Trebenna and Yarbaşçandır Kalesi (Konyaaltı, Antalya)

Although not specifically attested, some of the Byzantine remains at Trebenna have convincingly been assigned to the reign of John. Trebenna has been known from its coins since the middle of the nineteenth century. Later research focused mainly on the city's classical inscriptions, although Semavi Eyice investigated the Byzantine remains (focusing on a medieval church) during the 1970s (Çevik, 2005: 159). In 2001 more extensive work began under the direction of Engin Akyürek. This research, taken together with mentions of the city's bishops, has indicated that settlement was continuous throughout the Byzantine period, and that the city was only abandoned after the Selçuk conquest of Attaleia in 1207. In the Komnenian period Trebenna's fortunes were inevitably tied to Attaleia's, and John's building activity in the city should be seen in this context. Attaleia was the most important naval base on the Mediterranean and came to play a key role in communications and troop movement to the east. Choniates mentions John's stay in the city in 1142, when he attempted to organize its surrounding provinces (Choniates, 37). Trebenna's Byzantine fortifications fall into two distinct periods. Located on the ancient acropolis, the earlier ones date to the period of Arab raids in the seventh or eighth centuries. These include the lower parts of most of the towers and walls, which incorporate spolia such as Roman period sarcophagi (Akyürek, 2005: 207). In a later period, these walls and towers, in particular those along the western and southern sides were reinforced with rubble stones set in white mortar, along with brick pieces (Figure 41) (Akyürek, 2010: 234). In addition, fresco

fragments from the church in Trebenna ostensibly depict Saint George (Akyürek, 2010: 236-237) the military saint who incidentally also appears for the first time on the coins of John (Grierson, 1982: 220).

The same team which excavated Trebenna also carried out a survey in the surrounding Bey Dağları which tentatively dated the castle at Yarbaşçandır to the reign of John. The castle's northern, northeastern, and western sides are sheer cliffs, so the only fortifications are located to the south and east, with two towers on the southern side (Figure 42). The pottery found during a surface survey was all of the twelfth century. The castle commands the Çandır Valley, one of the routes from the interior plateau of the Teke Peninsula towards Attaleia (Akyürek, 2006: 6-7).

Taken together with Trebenna, Yarbaşçandır Castle seems to be part of John's protection program for Attaleia's countryside. As was the case in other areas like the Western Anatolian and Cilician river valleys, castles were constructed here to monitor and impede the progress of nomadic raiders from the highlands, and to keep them away from the essential harbor cities (Figure 43). It should be noted that the Byzantines never reconquered the interior of Lykia, and that the Tekke Plateau was in many ways a microcosm of the larger Anatolian plateau and was thus an ideal place for the nomadic Türkmen to live. Armstrong has proposed that before the refortification of the coastal areas, the Türkmen and the local Greeks may well have had a mutually beneficial relationship (Armstrong, 2001: 279-280). Kinnamos and Choniates relate the conundrum John encountered at Lake Pousgouse (see above) and in Lykia the situation might have been the same, nominal Byzantine subjects coming to an accommodation with the "enemy". To support her claim, Armstrong describes a specific type of ceramics which initially confounded the archaeologists conducting a survey at Balboura in northwest Lykia from 1986 to 1993. This ware is

wheel-made, very hard, brittle, and brick-red or brown in color. It is decorated with vertical or diagonal parallel lines and was considered an unknown type. Furthermore, since many of these sherds were found at sites with no chronological indicators this peculiar burnished ware could not be dated. The discovery of an almost complete water jar and a one-handled pot of the same fabric in the final destruction layers of a church at Xanthos, which were apparently occupied by squatters in the twelfth and thirteenth century, has suggested a date for this ware (Armstrong, 1998: 322-24). According to Armstrong, this pottery is nomadic, because the water jar has a rounded base and is apparently designed to sit on the ground instead of a table (Armstrong, 1998: 328). Nomadic pottery of the twelfth century in this region can only have been produced by the Türkmen, and thus Armstrong has suggested that this distinctive ware might be used to identify their almost invisible presence in the archaeological record.

3.3.5.4 Kalanoros/Ala'iyya (Alanya)

The castle at Alanya is mostly a product of the Selçuk sultan Alaaddin Keykubad (1220-1237) who famously conquered and refortified the city in 1221, rebuilding and repairing the walls. Yet such an important harbor must have played a role in John's Cilician campaigns and as such it is logical to look for fortification activity which can be associated with him (Figure 44) (Redford, 2000: 14-15). The only definite Komnenian remains of Kalanoros are those of a chapel, built into and over the much older Hellenistic walls, and evidently not converted to a mosque since it lacks a mihrab niche. Although there are no frescoes, the traditional attribution of this chapel is to Saint George (Lloyd and Rice, 1958: 36-37). This would parallel John's association of himself with the military saint at Trebenna and at other coastal

defense sites in the region. According to Redford, however, the walls which connect the harbor to the acropolis should also be Byzantine. Although their style is indistinct, it makes no sense that the harbor would be left undefended when Kalanoros was reestablished as a naval base (Krabbenhöft, 2011: 51-52).

3.3.5.5 Kızılcaşehir (Oba, Alanya)

The fortress at Kızılcaşehir has no known medieval name and sits on a limestone cliff east of Alanya in the Oba valley (Figures 45-46). It appears to have only one major phase of construction and on this basis Redford has dated it to the Byzantine period because it reflects a major investment that could only have been accomplished by the Byzantine state. It is constructed of small stones arranged in rough courses on the northern, eastern, and southern sides. In addition, a small church built into the walls resembles the Byzantine chapels at Kalanoros and Iotape (Redford, 2000: 16-18). In 2004 and 2005 Sema Doğan conducted more extensive research in the castle, including the preparation of a detailed plan. Its dimensions are 121 x 63 meters and the only gate is near the southeast corner. The northeastern corner and the eastern side are protected by a double wall with towers (Doğan, 2006: 65). The survey also revealed pot sherds that date to the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, further confirmation of the fortress as Komnenian (Doğan, 2010: 374).

This castle would have protected the approach to Kalanoros through the Oba valley, similarly to how the fortresses at Trebenna and Yarbaşçandır guarded valleys leading towards Attaleia. Yarbaşçandır shows the greatest parallels; both castles were built on naturally protected sites that only required fortification on their unprotected sides, and neither appears to have had any previous history of

occupation. Although none of this is mentioned in the historical sources, John's program of coastal defense clearly expanded upon the work begun by Alexios.

3.3.5.6 Pegai (Karabiga, Çanakkale)

The walls of Pegai do not appear in any twelfth century historical source, but its strategic location and its construction techniques strongly suggest that it was originally constructed by either John or Manuel. Like Constantinople, the site is a triangular peninsula which was fortified with both land and sea walls, which are poorly preserved (Figures 47-48). The standing remains include most of the twenty-four towers and sections of the walls which ran between them (Figure 49). In addition, there is a citadel in the northeastern corner, which overlooks a fortified upper terrace that in turn overlooks a larger fortified lower terrace. The lower terrace was only identified with cesium magnetometry prospection. The presence of these fortified areas inside the walls indicates that in addition to having a harbor and a garrison, Pegai also had a civilian population (Aylward, 2006: 181).

The walls and towers of Pegai show at least three distinct phases. The earliest consisted of the land wall with its round towers at regular intervals. These towers were built of brick pieces and stones over a rubble core, and the brick was apparently produced locally (Aylward, 2010: 347). The second phase dramatically changed the appearance of the towers; all of them were transformed into pentagonal-shaped structures, faced entirely with brick and mortar and bonded to the earlier rounded face with mortared rubble (Figure 50). In addition, more towers were added to the southern stretch of the wall (Aylward, 2006: 189-190). Finally, a *proteichisma* was added, which must be later than the pentagonal towers because it follows their line closely (Aylward, 2006: 199). Today the first phase can only be seen due to the

deterioration of the second; perhaps this dramatic transformation reflects either the increasing military importance of Pegai or the increasing sophistication of its attackers.

Müller-Wiener proposed a very early date for the first phase of construction, attributing it to Michael III (842-867) while allowing that the second phase was Laskarid (Müller-Wiener, 1989: 169). Foss also recognized two phases but dated both of them to the thirteenth century (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 154-55). According to Aylward, however, the walls must have an initial Komnenian phase. The style of the initial rounded towers shows close parallels with Lopadion and a survey conducted in the surroundings has confirmed that there was no significant settlement here from late antiquity to the twelfth century (Aylward, 2010: 343). This is probably confirmed by the historical record, because Anna Komnene makes no mention of any raids on Pegai (or of Pegai at all) during the Turkish raid of 1113. Thus, it is most logical that Pegai was originally fortified and settled early in the reign of John, perhaps around the same time as the construction of Lopadion. The following two phases could then represent the activity of the Laskarids and/or the Latins, whose presence is well-attested historically. As Aylward notes, only an excavation can answer the question definitively.

3.4 Fortifications of Manuel I Komnenos

Fortifications play a constant role in the reign of Manuel, who was especially concerned with providing protection for the local populations and returning land to productivity. All of his historically attested works are essentially defensive (Figure 51). Early in his reign he built the castles of Metabole and Pithekas, during the long

peace with the Selçuks he founded the new theme of Neokastra, and late in his reign he tried to resettle the Anatolian plateau by rebuilding Dorylaion and Soublaion.

3.4.1 Melangeia-Malagina (Paşalar, Sakarya) and Pithekas (Köprühisar, Sakarya)

Manuel's earliest attested fortification is a castle located near the Sangarios River in the district of Melangeia (Figure 16). According to Choniates and Kinnamos, in 1144 or 1145 Manuel built this fortress to protect Bithynia from Turkish attacks (Kinnamos, 36; Choniates, 52). During the time of the Arab raids, it had been the first *aplekton* where the armies from Thrace and the Opsikion theme met the emperor (Huxley, 1975: 90) but it has fallen into ruin and the territory was occupied by nomads (Foss, 1990: 162-63). Afterwards it regained some of its importance as a mustering post, and was used by both the Germans during the Second Crusade and by Manuel when he advanced to rebuild Dorylaion (Kinnamos, 81; 294). Yet it should be noted that even Manuel generally favored the route running from Lopadion through Achyraous to Laodikeia and the valley of the Maeander; although it was longer it was more secure, allowing an army to leave Byzantine territory much closer to Konya.

Although the general location of Melangeia has always been clear, the specifics of the geography have been the subject of debate. Foss calls attention to the mention of a castle called Metabole in Melangeia (Figure 52) (Kinnamos, 127). This same fortress was also mentioned by Bryennios as being a night's ride away from Nikomedeia (Bryennios, 172) and thus Foss identifies Metabole with a fortress above the village of Paşalar and Melangeia with the plain between this fortress and the Sangarios. Foss noted three distinct periods of construction, one pre-Byzantine, one seventh century, and one from the time of Manuel (Foss, 1990: 172). This last phase

is most evident on a large catapult platform which projects over the valley, and is constructed of mortared rubble faced with brick bands and Hellenistic spolia (Figure 53). The walls which connect this platform to the rest of the castle also have brick bands separating the stone courses, and also employ thin stones horizontally and occasionally vertically to correct the irregularities of the larger fieldstones (Foss, 1990: 170-71). The castle measures about two hundred by two hundred meters, with the most formidable walls to the west and the projecting platform to the southeast overlooking the plain (Figure 54) (Giros, 2003: 218-219).

Nine kilometers southwest of Paşalar, the fortress of Mekece has also been identified with Metabole (Şahin, 1986: 166). While Mekece also borders the plain of Melangeia, it is at least two or three days journey from Nikomedeia (Foss, 1990: 170). In addition, the Byzantine pottery found during surface survey dates to the fourteenth century, whereas Paşalar yielded pottery from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (François, 2003: 302).

According to Kinnamos, Pithekas was also constructed by Manuel, somewhere between Nikaia and Melangeia (Kinnamos, 38). Giros identifies it with Köprühisar (Giros, 2003: 217), although this location is not really on the way between those two sites. Anna Komnene also mentions Alexios's campaign routes in 1113 and 1116; each time he went from Nikaia through Malagina (or as it is called the in the latter instance, the Malagni range) before entering western Phrygia (Anna Komnene, 455; 473). These Malagni mountains must thus be a distinct location from the plain of Melangeia, and Foss identifies them with the Avdan Dağı, south of the İznik lake (Foss, 1990: 177). Anna apparently conflated the two locations due to the similarity of their names; Melangeia was not Byzantine territory during the reign of Alexios, and none of his campaigns were even directed towards Dorylaion and the

older military road. In any case, if Köprühisar is in fact Pithekas the strategic value is evident. It guards the approaches to Nikaia as well as the plains of Yenişehir and Prousa. Unfortunately the only remains of the castle can be seen in the name itself.

3.4.2 The Theme of Neokastra

After concluding a treaty with Kılıç Arslan II in 1162, Manuel began a comprehensive program of fortification designed to protect essential agricultural land from the depredations of the Türkmen (Figure 55). Choniates describes the project in detail:

> "A glorious deed was now performed by the emperor. The cities of Asia, Chliara, Pergamon, and Atramyttion, were suffering terribly at the hands of the Turks. Formerly, the neighboring provinces had not been settled because the inhabitants of villages were exposed to enemy attack. Manuel fortified these with walls and protected the nearby horse-breeding plains with fortresses. In this way, these fortress towns swelled in population and abounded in the good things of civilized life, surpassing many prosperous cities…If Manuel had conceived and performed but one great deed, if one action had profited his subjects the most during the years he ruled the Romans, it was this, perhaps the finest and most beneficial to the common welfare…These fortresses, all with the same name (Neokastra), were sent a governor from Byzantion and contributed annual revenues to the imperial treasury." (Choniates, 150)

It is clear that these fortresses had more than just a military function. They were intended to allow a civilian population to reestablish itself and contribute their productivity to the empire. At the same time they represent a recognition on the part of Manuel that the borders of the empire had changed and that the Turkish presence was permanent (Hendy, 1985: 130-131). In addition to the three cities mentioned by Choniates, several of smaller fortresses can be identified. Although the theme of Neokastra originally encompassed the Kaikos (Bakırçay) valley and the route north towards Adramytteion, during the Laskarid period it extended much further south to

include the Hermos valley and the cities of Magnesia (Manisa) and Sardis (Angold, 1975: 246).

3.4.2.1 Chliara (Darkale, Soma, Manisa)

While it is accepted that Chliara is located somewhere in the Kaikos valley, its exact location has been the subject of some debate. Ramsay located Chliara at the town of Kırkağaç (Ramsay, 1890: 117-18) and this is still the view found in most of non-specialist books and articles. Other possible locations near to Kırkağaç include Maltepe, Nakrasos, and Soma itself, but some researchers have suggested further flung locations at Koyuneli or Gördükkale (Rheidt, 1986: 229-230). This last suggestion is Rheidt's own, based largely on literary sources and medieval itineraries (Rheidt, 1986: 235), but Foss strongly disagrees, preferring to identify Gördükkale with Meteorion (Foss, 1987: 96), the fortress where Michael VIII Palaiologos received the news that Constantinople had been retaken in 1261 (Akropolites, 86). Foss instead places Chliara to the northwest, at Tarhala or Darkale, a village in the hills above Soma (Foss, 1998: 163). Foss claims that the fortifications at Gördükkale are Laskarid, although they are in such poor condition that distinguishing Laskarid from Komnenian work is probably impossible. There are two much stronger arguments for locating Chliara at Darkale and Meteorion as Gördükkale, one based on historical geography and one based on the toponymy. Most importantly, Darkale is actually located above the Kaikos river valley whereas Gördükkale is in the Lykos valley. In the treaty Theodore Laskaris (1204-1222) signed with the Latin emperor Henry (1206-1216) in 1212, Achyraous was given to the Latins while Chliara, Pergamon and Lopadion remained Byzantine. The town of Kalamos (Gelenbe) was left uninhabited (Akropolites, 15). It is clear that by the terms of this treaty the

geographical borders were formed by the Kaikos and Makestos valleys, and that Chliara must have been in the Kaikos border region. Admittedly Kırkağaç is also a geographically logical location, but the similarities between the ancient and modern names favors Darkale[18] (Foss, 1998: 165).

Darkale's outstanding geographical characteristic is its hot spring water, and although in the twentieth century most of the population moved to Soma it used to have a thriving tanning and shoe-making industry (Arel, 1992: 122). There are very few Byzantine remains aside from spolia built into the mosques and fountains and the mortared rubble core of a fortification wall (Foss, 1998: 165). Even these meager remains are enough to show that the place was fortified and also prominent enough to have had a significant church. Soma, only three kilometers to the north, also shows signs of Roman activity (Umar, 2006: 101-102). If there is continuity between Soma and Chliara it would be another example of the way settlements shifted through the centuries between unprotected yet accessible locations on the plains and more defensible hilltop or mountain strongholds. Within the Komnenian period similar examples of this phenomenon can be seen at Pergamon and Laodikeia.

3.4.2.2 Pergamon (Bergama, İzmir)

Thanks to extensive interest in its classical remains, Pergamon is one of the few Byzantine sites to have received extensive attention from archaeologists, and thus it is has been thoroughly excavated and comparatively well-published. While most fortified Byzantine sites have revealed little more than their walls and cisterns,

[18]Ta Chliara – Ta Chlera – Tahlara – Tırhala or Tarhala – Darkale, only the current name has any meaning in Turkish. Likewise, Gördükkale is located near to a village called Medar, which most likely comes from Meteorion. Ramsay identifies Darkale as the Byzantine Trakoula (Ramsay, 1890: 127), but since this name only appears once in history (787) and Chliara is not mentioned before the eleventh century the name of the place could have changed.

Pergamon is also an example of how life was lived inside and around a fortress (Figures 56-57). The city had already been fortified in the third century in the face of Gothic attacks (Rheidt, 1998: 397) and again in the sixth or seventh century against the Persians or the Arabs. In both cases it was the acropolis that was protected, both for its natural inaccessibility and because it offered the most convenient spolia. Where they survive, the walls of the acropolis preserve three distinct phases, Hellenistic ashlar at the base, regularly arranged spolia above this, and finally smaller fieldstones with brick (Figure 58) (Foss, 1982: 168). In the troubled eighth century the city was finally abandoned and remained that way for almost four centuries, although coin finds indicate that the acropolis may have still been used occasionally as a military base (Rheidt, 1998: 402). It was only under Manuel that Pergamon once again showed signs of urban life, although of course in a diminished state.

Whereas the fortifications of late antiquity had been an attempt to preserve and protect the remnants of a civilization in decline, those of the Komnenian period were really a rebuilding. At Pergamon, the security afforded by its status as a military base allowed a bishop to take up residence, which in turn encouraged the limited return of merchants and craftsmen (Rheidt, 1996: 222). Of course, the prosperity of an inland town like Pergamon ultimately depended on the security of the surrounding farmland and of its communication network (Figure 59), and in fact the archaeological evidence indicates that Pergamon was more of a fortified village than a city. The more elaborate houses had three or four rooms (kitchen, living room, storeroom(s)) surrounding an L-shaped courtyard, although houses with only one room and a courtyard are more common (Figure 60). Their construction technique is not so different from that of the facing of fortification walls, mostly

small stones and tile fragments (Rheidt, 1996: 224-228). These houses illustrate that the reality of the Komnenian achievement in Anatolia was far less grandiose than the picture painted by historians and panegyrists. That even these glorified villages were so dependent on the constant presence of the imperial armies indicates just how precarious the Byzantine hold on Anatolia had become.

The walls of Pergamon are the best preserved historically attested fortifications of Manuel in Asia Minor.[19] His activity is visible both on the acropolis and on the lower terrace. The work on the acropolis generally follows the line of the older walls and ten square towers are preserved. These walls and towers are faced with a mix of spolia, fieldstone, and brick which is often arranged to form a rough *cloisonné* (Foss, 1982: 168-171). The acropolis walls appear more as a repair and an embellishment of walls that were already serving a defensive function. The fortifications of the lower terrace, on the other hand, appear to have been new, although some sections stand on third century walls. The ancient gymnasium terrace provided a base for a wall and six towers, one square and five rounded. The tower beside the main gate has the most extensive *cloisonné* brickwork forming regular courses; the other towers' brickwork is less regular, with bricks mostly used to compensate for the irregularities of the stones (Foss, 1982: 166-68). Klinkott sees this wall as being Palaiologan (Rheidt, 2002: 625), but the similarities in style with the acropolis walls argues more for a twelfth century date.

Pergamon demonstrates Manuel's goals when he established the theme of Neokastra. He wanted to rebuild and protect the rural economy in these provinces, with the ultimate goal of allowing the empire to benefit from its resources. Yet the difference between the late antique and the restored city must be stressed. Rheidt has

[19] Manuel is also of course credited with an extension of the walls of Constantinople (Choniates, 543 ; Foss and Winfield, 1986).

estimated that early Byzantine Pergamon had a population of 35,000 whereas the Komnenian "city" could have accommodated only 2,400 (Rheidt, 2002: 624-25). Obviously without ongoing extensive imperial military support settlements of this size would have had great trouble remaining Byzantine.

3.4.2.3 Adramytteion (Burhaniye, Balıkesir)

According to the sources, the defenses of Adramytteion were rebuilt or renewed by both Alexios and Manuel, although unfortunately no trace of this work seems to remain. Anna Komnene first mentions that Çaka "had reduced it to rubble and wiped it out entirely" and that it was rebuilt and recolonized by Alexios's governor Eumathios Philokales (Anna Komnene, 436-437). Yet as Choniates indicates, the region surrounding the city was not adequately secured. The location of the ancient and medieval city is not the same as that of modern Edremit; Adramytteion was located on the coastal plain in the Ören neighborhood of Burhaniye (Figure 61). Excavations in Ören undertaken by Tülin Çoruhlu revealed a church dated to the tenth or eleventh century (Çoruhlu, 2006:.229-230) but no traces of fortifications.

3.4.2.4 Other fortresses of the theme of Neokastra

In the Kaikos valley two additional castles can be assigned to the theme of Neokastra (Figure 55). The site known as Kızılasar is located near the town of Kınık about twenty-five kilometers west of Soma. It overlooks a particularly wide part of the valley midway between Chliara and Pergamon and its protective function is evident (Tok, 2010: 307). The walls and most of the towers are in a ruined state, but one tower on the western side is preserved almost to its full height. Its most

prominent characteristic is its extensive decorated brickworkand *cloisonné.* As Foss notes, this style could be assigned to either John or Manuel, but the construction can most logically be connected to the other Neokastra (Foss, 1982: 186-87). Further to the west a hill above the village of Koyuneli has some remains of an ostensibly Komnenian-period wall (Tok, 2010: 307). Finally, the ancient Aeolian city of Aigai (Herodotus, 1.149), on the mountain road between Pergamon and Magnesia ad Sipylum, has been being excavated since 2004. In addition to sparse remains of fortification walls and gates, twelfth and thirteenth century Byzantine pottery has been found in the area of a Byzantine chapel and in the cisterns (Doğer et al., 2008: 210-11; 220).

3.4.3 Dorylaion (Şarhöyük, Eskişehir)

The refortification of Dorylaion is thoroughly covered by the historical sources. In 1175, as a prelude to his ill-fated campaign against Konya, Manuel ordered the city rebuilt. According to Kinnamos, who likely witnessed the construction:

> "Within forty days the emperor had erected the city, and when he encircled it with a trench, settled a great many Romans there, and left a sufficient garrison, he departed and camped in the regions around the Rhyndakos." (Kinnamos, 297)

Likewise, Choniates:

> "Manuel, the first man to carry stones on his back, set the manly example for others to follow. Thus the walls were raised with great speed, the palisade was thrown up outside, and wells were excavated inside for drawing up an abundant water supply." (Choniates, 176)

In addition, two orations of Euthymios Malakes (Stone, 2003) and one of Eustathios of Thessaloniki (Wirth, 1962) extensively praise Manuel for restoring the city and revitalizing its surroundings. This wealth of historical information is unfortunately

not equaled by the nonexistent physical remains. Nevertheless, since the location is known some sense of the strategic value of the site in the context of its surroundings can still be obtained.

Dorylaion was located on the plain of the Tembris (Porsuk) River, and also had access to hot springs which made it well-suited to be a military base (Figure 62). It was also the location of massive imperial stables which provided horses for the army. By the tenth century, Dorylaion served as the second *aplekton* after Malagina, and it was here that the general of the Thrakesion theme met the emperor as he proceeded to the east (Belke and Merisch, 1990: 239). The broad plain provided an ideal location for a large army to gather and organize itself, and the loss of Dorylaion sometime in the decade after Mantzikert severely damaged Byzantine prospects for regaining the Anatolian plateau. Furthermore, the same conditions which made the plain a natural *aplekton* also made it ideal for the nomadic Türkmen, who settled here in great numbers. The sources mention the nomads with their vast herds of goats and cattle, and the same mountain passes by which the imperial armies traveled east also served to convey raiding parties from the plain towards the western river valleys and the coasts. From the Selçuk perspective, keeping the nomads on the Byzantine border yet far from Konya ensured that they would direct their destructive tendencies away from the Selçuk cities. Of course this also made it more difficult for the sultan and the emperor to honor the terms of their treaties, and it was the rebuilding of Dorylaion and the reoccupation of the plain by the Byzantines that ultimately ended Manuel's alliance with Kılıç Arslan (Belke, 1991: 163). It is also telling that after his victory at Myriokephalon Kılıç Arslan did not demand additional territory, but simply "stipulated that the fortresses of Dorylaion and Soublaion were to be demolished" (Choniates, 189). Soublaion was much closer to encroaching on Selçuk

territory; Dorylaion was clearly on a distant border if not outside entirely. Thus Kılıç Arslan's demand that it be demolished must have been made on behalf of the Türkmen who had been driven off by Manuel. Although Manuel did not honor the treaty and demolish the fortress, the plain was again in Turkish hands by 1180, and according to the Arab traveler Al-Harawi was already called Sultanyuki (Sultan Höyüğü/Mound of the Sultan), "at the limit of infidel territory" (Foss, 1996c: 49). When Kılıç Arslan divided his territories among his sons in 1187, Muhiddin Mes'ud received Ankara and its territory, including Dorylaion/Sultan Höyüğü (Turan, 1971: 242).

Based on a nineteenth century description, Foss believes that Dorylaion was originally fortified in the seventh century, with an extension in the ninth century (Foss, 1996c: 52-53). The sources make it clear that Manuel found the walls in a ruined state and had to rebuild them, and Kinnamos mentions that the rebuilt city was smaller than it had been (Kinnamos, 295). Modern satellite images clearly show the foundations of two sets of walls, one on the hill itself and one which surrounds the hill (Figures 63-64). Since Manuel also dug a ditch around his walls, it is the lower section which should be assigned to him. In addition, the fact that this work was completed in only forty days suggests that it was more of a restoration than a complete rebuilding, although the panegyrists naturally want to emphasize the seemingly miraculous nature of this construction in enemy territory (Figure 65), as an anonymous poem likely delivered soon after the completion of the work indicates:

> "[Manuel] spoke and placed a stone with his divine right hand. He laid it down as the mighty foundation stone of this city, and so too did the magnanimous and illustrious men: they laid stones until the builders, like swarms of clustering bees, had completed this admirable work on the spot and this had again become a very significant part of the Roman Empire. The mad dog, who has broken his sharp jaws, shall hurt himself if he dares set his teeth in this wall of stones." (Spingou, 2011: 165-166)

3.4.4 Choma-Soublaion

The fortress of Soublaion is only mentioned in tandem with that of Dorylaion. The name appears to be an alternate Byzantine form for Siblia, and according to the *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* it should be somewhere close to Apamea (Belke and Merisch, 1990: 382) at the headwaters of the Maeander. Thus it is clear that Soublaion was intended to complement Dorylaion, and guard the southern entrance to Phrygia and the Anatolian plateau. The Maeander valley was subjected to constant raids by the Türkmen even after John's program of fortification. While the fortress is mentioned only in passing by Kinnamos and Choniates, Euthymios Malakes provides further details:

> "But the emperor, seeing the city, but rather the remnants of the ancient city, praises the place and thinks it worthy of a city, and raises both the walls and fashions its circuit anew so keenly that it seems in notion that the fashioning of the work cannot be done by deed…the emperor, dripping little sweat, has in some way worked miraculously the raising in four days of this city, as it were which was dead, lying on the ground." (Malakes, quoted in Stone, 2003: 198)

If in fact Manuel spent only four days at Soublaion, then he cannot have constructed much more than a marching camp or perhaps the restoration of a gate. He may have instead simply ordered the construction and again set the example as he had at Dorylaion. Yet the reaction of Kılıç Arslan to this new fortress on the border of his lands indicates that it must have been formidable.

The region around Işıklı has several traces of eleventh and twelfth century fortifications, and one of these should be Soublaion. The situation is complicated by the fortress of Angelokastron, itself a refoundation of the fortress of Choma by Isaac II Angelos (1185-1195) in 1192. Thonemann identifies this site with a höyük east of Işıklı, and cites an inscription that assigns an earlier reconstruction of Choma to Romanos Diogenes in 1070 (Thonemann, 2011: 161). Cheynet and Drew-Bear, on the other hand, have recently connected this inscription with Soublaion instead

(Cheynet and Drew-Bear, 2012: 209-220). In addition to this höyük, the site of Beycesultan, only twenty kilometers away, also revealed traces of Byzantine fortifications when excavations began in 1954 (Wright, 2007: 150). That there are at least two sites to match the names of two fortresses of the correct period would seem to allow the issue to be resolved easily, but so far neither one has been identified with Beycesultan.

3.4.5 Attaleia (Kaleici, Antalya)

While Attaleia features prominently in twelfth-century history, only one source definitely mentions any renewal of the fortifications. This is the Chronicle of Roger of Hoveden, which describes Attaleia as being two cities, one old and abandoned and the new one which was founded and fortified by Manuel (Roger of Hoveden, 157). This reference appears to be erroneous, however, since there is no evidence that the location of the city ever changed, nor indeed that the city ever actually fell to the Turks before 1207. The walls were instead rebuilt in the tenth century, and evidently they were strong enough to resist nearly constant attacks throughout the twelfth century (Foss, 1996b: 8). Thus Attaleia served Alexios, who "was anxious to secure the whole of Cilicia," as a base for his recovery of other coastal cities (Anna Komnene, 359). John was concerned with opening a land route to Attaleia and recovering some of its surrounding territory, as well as developing the harbor cities of western Cilicia (see above). Manuel also came to Attaleia, in 1158, during his Cilician campaign (Kinnamos, 179). All three emperors likely ordered repairs of the walls as necessary, but none of them needed to carry out a major rebuilding. Thus their activities were restricted to protecting its approaches both by land and by sea. Both William of Tyre and Odo of Deuil describe the mixed results

of these efforts in the context of the Second Crusade in 1147. While the city was well-provisioned by sea, its inhabitants were unable to produce anything for themselves due to the constant Turkish presence in the Pamphylian plain (William of Tyre, II-178-79; Odo of Deuil, 128-130).

3.4.6 Possible fortifications of Manuel

Manuel's building program was more extensive than Alexios's or John's, given that he was concerned with more than just securing military routes. Many fortifications assigned to Manuel seem to show at least some attempt at protecting civilian populations in order to return the land to a productive state. It is thus to be expected that his fortifications cluster around one another into distinct groups.

3.4.6.1 Kotyaeion (Kütahya)

The castle at Kotyaeion is undoubtedly the most impressive and imposing fortress assigned to Manuel, and yet it is hardly ever mentioned by the historians (Figure 66). Kinnamos describes a Türkmen attack on Manuel as he was returning from the east in 1159 (Kinnamos, 191) and Choniates relates how the city fell to Kılıç Arslan in 1182 and afterward became part of the inheritance of Gıyaseddin Keyhüsrev (Choniates, 262; 521) who also received the recently conquered Uluborlu (Turan, 242). The strategic value of Kotyaeion is evident; it stands at the edge of the Anatolian plateau and offers easy access in all directions except directly east, where the Türkmen Dağı impedes passage.

The castle has never been excavated but Clive Foss and Robin Fursdon conducted an extensive and detailed survey of the standing remains in 1982. Foss identified four major periods based on mortar, masonry, and construction techniques

and then proposed absolute dates for each one based on historical likelihood (Foss, 1985: 64-79). According to him the earliest phase is of the ninth century, the second phase is Komnenian, the third phase Germiyanid and the latest phase Ottoman. While the last two periods of construction entailed relatively minor alterations to the Komnenian walls and towers, the Komnenian plan itself dramatically altered the earlier plan, adding forty-two new towers, and refashioning fourteen towers from period one to fit the new defensive scheme (Foss, 1985: 68).The preponderant features are the closely spaced U-shaped towers, most of which were apparently artillery platforms (Figures 67-68). The towers were faced with banded masonry with regular alterations of stone and brick courses. When combined with the naturally steep topography these towers would have presented a formidable obstacle to any attacker (Figure 69). The gates were apparently small and very well-defended, and it is clear that the main function of this fortress was as a military base, at least initially.

Foss also recognizes a second phase to the Komnenian work, near the lower gate and connected by style with the lower city wall (Foss, 1985: 84). This detail offers a clue into the way the castle was built. The first phase of period two should probably be seen as the work of John. He favored military fortresses, and apparently devoted significant time and resources to constructing new castles at key points to his exact specifications. By contrast, Manuel's fortifications are somewhat more improvisational and have a hurried character. The lower city wall is also in accord with the attention paid by Manuel to the civilian population. Finally, perhaps the lack of attention paid to Kotyaeion in the historical sources also points towards John as its builder. His reign is covered in far less detail than Manuel's, and both Kinnamos and Choniates excessively praise even minor constructions by Manuel. If

he had also effected a major fortress like Kotyaeion it is only logical that his historians and panegyrists would have mentioned it. The castle would certainly benefit from a targeted excavation aimed at clarifying this speculative chronology.

3.4.6.2 Kayser Kale and Karacahisar

Kayser Kale stands on a high, conical peak about halfway between Kotyaeion and Dorylaion (Figure 70). Although the location is exceedingly remote today, in Byzantine times the most direct road between the two passed below Kayser Kale (Figure 71) (Edwards, 1987b: 679). It was visited by Emilie Haspels in 1950, who noted its commanding views and described it as Byzantine (Haspels, 2009: 107). In connection with the survey of Kütahya province, Clive Foss described the castle in more detail. He noted two periods of construction, assigning the first to the Dark Ages and the second to the twelfth century and most probably the time of Manuel. The style of the masonry is closest to that of the Komnenian lower gate and lower city wall at Kotyaeion (Foss, 1985: 92). Although Foss saw the fortress as an isolated beacon station, he apparently did not recognize that in Byzantine times it was on an important route. There is no evidence that the Byzantine beacon system of the Dark Ages was revitalized and reused under the Komneni, nor is there any reason why it should have been. During the Dark Ages such a system made sense since the Arab raiders did not stay in western Anatolia. The Turks, on the other hand, were always present, especially in the area around Dorylaion and Kotyaeion. Thus it makes more sense to see Kayser Kale as forming a part of a regional defense network along with Kotyaeion, Karacahisar, and ultimately Dorylaion.

The castle of Karacahisar is only nine kilometers from Dorylaion, along the same route as Kayser Kale. It too may once have been part of the Byzantine beacon

network, but in the time of Manuel it was also refortified and used to secure the valley of the Tembris River (Parman, 2001: 453). Like Kayser Kale it should be seen as part of the same defensive network as Kotyaeion. Although none of these sites are mentioned by the historians, they can be compared to Manuel's Neokastra. Unlike Neokastra, however, the valley of the Tembris never formed part of the Laskarid domains; it was lost permanently in the aftermath of the defeat at Myriokephalon. Given the close proximity of the Türkmen nomads and the relative distance of the centers of Byzantine power, it is not surprising that this was the case.

3.4.6.3 Abydos and Atik Hisar/Gavur Hisar (Çanakkale)

Although it has almost no standing remains today, the sources make it clear that Abydos was an important castle in the twelfth century. It played an important role as a toll and customs station on the way to Constantinople and only lost that function when it was superseded by the Kale-i Sultaniye, which became today's Çanakkale (Cook, 1973: 56). Abydos was apparently already fortified, since it was besieged by Çaka in 1092 (Anna Komnene, 275) and was a base for imperial naval expeditions throughout the reign of Alexios (Anna Komnene, 346; 436).In addition, early in Manuel's reign he unsuccessfully suggested that the Second Crusade take the route which crossed into Asia at Abydos instead of trying to pass by Nikomedeia and Malagina (Kinnamos, 72). A poem of Theodore Prodromos says that Abydos was fortified by Manuel (Cook, 1973: 56) but when exactly this occurred or why it was felt to be necessary is unknown.

In 1113 a massive Turkish raiding party reached as far as Abydos and devastated its surroundings (Anna Komnene, 453). Even though the city itself was securely held, further fortification was necessary to truly safeguard the local

population. The castle of Atik or Gavur Hisar guards the valley of the Sarıçay, which is the easiest and most natural road between Abydos and Adramytteion, as well as the route which comes west from Mysia (Türker, 2010: 314). This valley in all likelihood was the route taken by the Turks in 1113. The castle sits on a steep hill which today overlooks the Atikhisar Dam and has a roughly triangular shape. The remains of nine round towers can still be seen; they are faced with brick and stone over a rubble core (Figure 72) (Türker, 2001: 194-95). The brickwork sometimes forms an irregular *cloisonné* and also occurs in regular courses. Lower on some the towers there is a layer of five brick courses and higher up the bricks are arranged into a herringbone pattern. At the same time, the stones become smaller and less regular as the towers get higher. Türker argues that the building techniques show some parallels with known Laskarid architecture but acknowledges that it is extremely difficult to date Laskarid work on style alone (Türker, 2001: 196). Based on historical likelihood, it makes sense to assign this castle to John or Manuel, and since Prodromos specifically mentions Manuel's activity regarding Abydos, it seems logical to assume that his defensive reinvigoration of the city included this defense of its most vulnerable approach.

3.4.6.4 Anaia (Kadıkalesi, Kuşadası, Aydin)

The castle of Anaia is perhaps the most thoroughly excavated middle Byzantine fortress, although when exactly it was constructed is still an open question. It is located in the middle of the resort town of Kuşadası on a much older manmade mound (Figure 73). The standing remains of the fortifications include sixteen round towers and a curtain wall surrounding the seaward side (Foss, 1982: 184). Although it has been noted and mapped by travelers for over a century Müller-

Wiener was the first to propose a date, suggesting the late twelfth or early thirteenth century (Müller-Wiener, 1961: 73). In other words this castle may be either Komnenian or Laskarid. The excavations, conducted since 2001 by Zeynep Mercangöz, have revealed the way in which the castle's function changed over the centuries.

On the basis of historical likelihood, Foss first assigned the castle to the time of Manuel (Foss, 1979: 125), although based on a more detailed survey of the wall construction he pushed the date earlier, to the reign of John or even Alexios (Figure 74) (Foss, 1982: 185). The current excavations have revealed coins of both John and Manuel, as well as seals that date to the later twelfth century (Mercangöz, 2010: 284-285). The attention of the excavators has been focused on the large quantities of Zeuxippos ware which have been discoveredat and around Anaia. In the late thirteenth century the castle evidently became a production center for this type of pottery, which is post-Komnenian. A ceramics workshop has even been discovered in the ruins of a church, which was destroyed by an earthquake, probably in the middle of the thirteenth century (Mercangöz, 2013: 21). Further evidence includes large amounts of wasted pottery which were found in the castle's cisterns, indicating that Anaia no longer required a secure source of water (Mercangöz, 2013: 16). This demonstrates that Anaia changed from a fortress into a factory, likely after the Genoese were given control in 1261 by the Treaty of Nymphaion (Mercangöz, 2013: 170).

The walls and towers at Anaia look most similar to those at Pergamon, with extensive *cloisonné* brickwork surrounding fieldstones. This facing is attached to the rubble core with wooden beams, another feature which supports the position that Manuel built this castle. It may have been due to the increase in piracy that occurred

in the Aegean when the fleet was deprived of funding early in Manuel's reign (Choniates, 55). It is possible that the continuing excavations may be able to answer the question definitively, especially if an inscription can be found.

3.4.6.5 Nikitiaton (Eskihisar, Gebze, Kocaeli) and Ritzion (Darıca, Kocaeli)

These two castles, located on the northern shore of the Gulf of İzmit, can be assigned to Manuel and served both to defend the gulf and to serve as embarkation points for expeditions into Anatolia (Figure 16). Of the two, Ritzion is less well preserved, with only one horseshoe shaped tower surviving (Figure 75). Its base is composed of large blocks, and as the tower rises the stones become smaller and are interrupted by courses of alternating recessed brick. Foss identified two phases of construction, Komnenian and Palaiologan, and assigns the tower to the earlier phase (Foss, 1996a: 49-50). Ritzion appears only once in history, as the place from which Manuel crossed the gulf early in 1160 (Kinnamos, 194).

Nikitiaton is better preserved and has three phases of construction, Komnenian, Laskarid or Latin, and Palaiologan. By analogy with the walls of Constantinople Foss assigns the earliest phase to Manuel (Foss, 1996a: 57-58), although Nikitiaton does not appear in history until 1241 when it was reclaimed from the Latins by John III Vatatzes (1222-1254) (Akropolites, 37). The towers assigned by Foss to Manuel are rectangular and apparently had two levels. The facing is alternating brick which sometimes forms a very irregular *cloisonné* pattern, although all walls and towers bear extensive signs of poorly executed repair work. Actually, the evidence connecting this castle to Manuel is quite thin. While its strategic location cannot be denied, the fortress also seems to be somewhat redundant given the nearby castle of Ritzion as well as the historically attested but no longer extant

castle at Dakibyza to the north. These two castles would have guarded the crossing of the gulf and the land route towards Constantinople.

3.4.6.6 Telmessos (Fethiye, Muğla), Myra (Demre, Antalya) and the Lykian coast

Control of the coasts remained a priority under Manuel, as it had been under both Alexios and John. In Lykia this meant protecting the cities and harbors both from the Türkmen of the inner Tekke peninsula and from the piracy that became endemic in Manuel's reign. The fortress of Telmessos was apparently the center of a defense system intended to protect the harbor (Figure 76). The site itself has both harbor walls which were repaired in the twelfth century and a small upper fortress which appears to be a construction of the later twelfth century and was intended to allow the defenders to overshoot the lower walls (Figure 77). Foss assigns these walls to Manuel based mostly on their extensive use of *cloisonné* and decorative brickwork (Foss, 1982: 193-95). These features appear in John's fortresses as well, but the *cloisonné* employed by Manuel is on the whole rougher and only applied to the towers, as it is at Telmessos. The land defenses were supplemented by fortresses on the island of Makri (Hoskyn, 1842: 146), which can only have been to protect against piracy.

The region of Myra also saw a dramatic recovery during the twelfth century. Although the city quickly contracted to the acropolis in the aftermath of Mantzikert, even under Alexios it began to regain its importance. Several twelfth century chapels have been found in the surrounding countryside and at least two locations (Sura and Beymelek) show signs of revitalized fortification walls (Foss, 1994: 35-36). As at Telmessos, it seems that equal attention was paid to defending the city against attacks from the land and the sea. Between Telmessos and Myra, traces of

Komnenian occupation can be seen at Xanthos, Patara, Kyaneai, and Limyra, as well as in the surroundings of these cities. As on the Cilician coast, the remains include important traces of civilian occupation, most notably chapels and churches (Foss, 1994: 51). Armstrong has demonstrated that the relationship between these coastal Greeks and the Türkmen of the interior was not necessarily always antagonistic, and indeed the greater danger likely came from the sea.

3.5 Epilogue One: The Castles of the Maeander

The project undertaken by the British Institute of Archaeology in Ankara from 1992 to 1998 to survey the castles of the Maeander was directed by Hugh Barnes and Mark Whittow. Their team surveyed six sites in the Maeander valley, almost all of which can be connected with the Komneni (Figure 78). The first castle studied was Mastaura Kalesi, five kilometers north-east of Nazilli, Aydin. The walls and towers of Mastaura are constructed of a fieldstone and rubble core with a facing of roughly coursed fieldstones bonded to the core by cribwork. In addition one stretch of wall preserves two parallel brick bands (Barnes and Whittow, 1992: 120-25). Fifteen cisterns testify that Mastaura once had a large population. The surveyors propose a twelfth or thirteenth-century date based on the wall construction (Barnes and Whittow, 1993: 130). According to them the ancient city of Mastaura moved to the mountain in response to Turkish depredations in the valley; Barnes and Whittow believe that much of the work at Mastaura was done under local initiative rather than imperial direction (Barnes and Whittow, 1994: 193).

The castle at Yöre, east of Mastaura, shows similar construction techniques, and ceramics collected during the survey also suggest a twelfth or thirteenth-century date (Barnes and Whittow, 1996: 15). Ninety kilometers further east, the castle at

Çardak was also apparently used in the twelfth century, with the eighth or ninth century walls being strengthened and a tower added (Whittow, 1995: 24. Finally, located close to Yöre but on the southern side of the Maeander, the ancient city of Antioch ad Maeandrum shows four phases of construction. The surveyors consider the last two Laskarid with the second and perhaps the first being Komnenian (Barnes and Whittow, 1998a: 18). Unique among these castles, Antioch appears briefly in history, as the place where Manuel "transformed himself from a wily traitor to an avowed enemy" (Odo of Deuil, 113) during the Second Crusade's disastrous march towards Attaleia. According to Odo the Turks who had been attacking the crusaders sought and received refuge within the walls of Antioch

The Maeander valley was important both as a military route andas a population center, and it stands to reason that it should have received significant imperial attention. Odo's acecdote shows that the local Greeks reached an accommodation with the Türkmen. While Odo saw this as imperial treachery, in reality it was more akin to the islanders of Lake Pousgouse refusing to submit to John. Despite frequent imperial campaigns, the people of this border region found it easier to cooperate with the seasonal Türkmen raiders than to defend the imperial prerogative. In addition, the surveys conducted by Barnes and Whittow also underscore the limits of survey, as in most cases they have not been able to definitively assign construction to a particular century, much less the reign of any emperor.

3.6 Epilogue Two: Nikomedeia (İzmit, Kocaeli)

The sources present a paradoxical picture of Nikomedeia. On the one hand, its strategic location as the last major fortress before the capital meant that it was

constantly contested and frequently changed hands (Figures 7, 16, 79). On the other hand, most contemporary descriptions of the site describe it as being in ruins. The walls cannot be definitively dated, and Alexios, John, and Manuel all would have had reason to reinforce this important bulwark. Alexios's nearby activity at Sidera and Kibotos is well-attested, and Nikomedeia must have played a role in his defensive system for the capital. As a regular stop for the armies, the city would also have attracted the attention of John, and Manuel would have used it both as a base and as protection for the surrounding countryside. The walls reflect this turbulent history, and bear the traces of repairs and rebuildings from the third century until the Ottoman period. In an effort to make sense of the fortress, Clive Foss identified at least fifteen distinctive masonry types. The earliest phases and the Ottoman work are easily identifiable, but the problem of sequencing the Byzantine phases is intractable (Foss, 1996a: 39-41). The defining characteristic of the walls Foss assigns to the twelfth century is unsurprisingly *cloisonné,* which is careless but constant, possibly representing several periods of repair and reconstruction.

Odo of Deuil wrote a description of the city as it appeared to him in 1147, calling it a ruin in which even the strategic harbor was not used (Odo of Deuil, 88). Although Odo is always critical of the Byzantines, there is no reason to think that he was exaggerating. But at the same time, the fact that the ancient city lay in ruins does not mean that the fortress on the acropolis was not functioning. Many of the cities of Asia Minor had contracted drastically to include only their most defensible areas. The walls and towers of Nikomedeia are thus testimony to the conditions of the age in which they were built.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION: WINTER IN THE LAND OF RÛM

Nikomedeia encapsulates the opportunities offered by detailed studies of Komnenian fortifications, as well as the challenges encountered in such studies. Although it appears frequently in history, the sources can only offer clues to its history, and these clues must be confirmed or rejected based on the remains themselves. In general, the masonry style can provide a rough guide to a fortress's building history. In the case of Komnenian work, especially that of John and Manuel, brickwork and cribwork stand out as the defining characteristics. These are found in all of the emperors' historically attested works and thus it is logical to use them to identify unmentioned castles. Being more specific on the basis of masonry techniques is highly subjective, however. Clive Foss, undoubtedly the authority on Komnenian fortifications, nevertheless often can only cite his own work when offering justification for assigning a fortress to a particular period on the basis of its masonry. He generally assigns careful and regular *cloisonné* to John and less careful more hurried work to Manuel. But surely the circumstances of construction also played a role in determining how much attention to detail would be paid by the builders. For example, was the brick used in decorative *cloisonné* reused or was it produced locally? If the latter is the case, much more specific dating should be

possible. This question can only be answered by excavation, and in many cases answering it may be impossible.

In addition to masonry techniques, historical likelihood is a fruitful if still speculative method for assigning a particular castle to a particular emperor. It appears as though all Komnenian fortifications were constructed on the initiative if not under the direct supervision of the emperor himself. Since the reigns of the emperors, and especially their military campaigns were covered in admirable detail by the historians, we generally have a good idea of when a particular fortress would have been able to attract the emperor's attention, even if its construction is not specifically mentioned. The most salient example of this sort of reasoning is Manuel's reconstruction of Kotyaeion. Additionally, John's fortresses near Attaleia and Kalanoros can likewise be assigned to him on the basis of historical likelihood, as can Pegadia and Sultan Çayir.

If we return to the words of Eustathios of Thessaloniki, how successful were the "three waves" of the Komneni? This question should be answered in relation to both the short and long term perspective. In the short term, the Byzantine twelfth century revival seems almost miraculous. Alexios's energetic and opportunistic campaigns were equaled by his brilliant diplomacy, and he successfully staved off the complete destruction of the empire despite being almost entirely lacking in military and financial resources. He quickly recognized the importance of the coasts and the attention he paid to them was built upon by his successors. Although Alexios's words were often overly ambitious, his deeds show his shrewd pragmatism. Most importantly, he reorganized the Byzantine political system and brought stability to the capital, without which his successors would have been unable to accomplish anything. John's campaigns, especially in Paphlagonia, produced little

of lasting value, but his military road to the east was the logistical basis for Manuel's accomplishments.

Evaluating Manuel is more complex. Manuel's reign is often assessed in light of the Fourth Crusade, but this perspective can minimize Komnenian achievements. Whereas Alexios and John had had the good fortune of having mature and militarily experienced sons ready to take command, Manuel had to leave the empire to a young boy unable to control the factions which had been undoubtedly been festering and chafing at the yoke of the autocratic Manuel. Cheynet has exhaustively catalogued eleventh and twelfth century rebellions and conspiracies. He found that from 1025 to 1081 there were over ninety, and early in Alexios's reign this pattern continued, but during the second half of his reign as well as during the reigns of John and Manuel there were almost no such disruptions. After 1180 the earlier pattern reasserted itself; there were fifty-eight conspiracies from 1180 until the loss of Constantinople in 1204, which was itself in large part due to these intrigues (Angold, 1999: 261-262). Yet it is anachronistic and unfair to expect Manuel to have done more than he did to ensure the succession (Angold, 1999: 268). Throughout Byzantine and indeed Roman history, the successful functioning of the state was irrevocably linked to the emperor, and usually the emperor intended his son to succeed him. Bad emperors could and did destroy the accomplishments of the good ones, and weak emperors invited rebellion. This was an unchanging feature of the Byzantine system, and an attempt to change it would not necessarily have been in the immediate interest of its rulers. As Treadgold points out, had the Komneni wanted to completely restore the empire they would have had to do so by sharing more of their power with potentially hostile elements (Treadgold, 1997: 628-629). It

is almost inconceivable that this would have been successful; the empire would have degenerated into civil war and its external enemies would have taken advantage.

Judging by the attention paid by the emperors, it seems as though threats to the empire were prioritized as follows.

1. Internal revolts and plots against the emperor
2. The Latins
3. The Selçuks and the Danişmendids
4. The Türkmen

In keeping with the standard Byzantine strategy, the lesser threats were seen as acceptable methods of dealing with the greater ones. Thus all three foreign groups could be used to secure the throne, the Selçuks, Danişmendids, and Latins could be used to check the power of the others, and the threat posed by the Türkmen was never dealt with decisively. All three emperors had an obsession with reestablishing Byzantine suzerainty over Antioch, whereas it would have been more realistic to focus on territory closer to the capital. Given that it was the Latins who ultimately took Constantinople, it may seem logical that the threat they posed was correctly prioritized, but this again is to confuse the cause with the effect. The Sack of Constantinople was the result of the internal fighting amongst the Angeli, and the people of the city did not strongly resist the conquest despite their hatred for the Latins (Angold, 1999: 277).

The Byzantine policy regarding the Selçuks was usually successful diplomatically but less so militarily. Rather than seeking to eliminate the Sultanate of Rûm, the Komneni recognized and accepted their presence, usually engaging in normal diplomatic relations (Lilie, 1991: 38-39). They wanted to maintain a balance of power in Anatolia, with the empire playing the predominant but not the sole role,

and they understood that eliminating either the Selçuks or the Danişmendids would only serve to strengthen the other. Thus Alexios's campaigns had the objective of weakening the Selçuks, but John's were more directed at the Danişmendids. Manuel was content after 1159 to make a treaty with Kılıç Arslan, although at this time he would have had the greatest chance of eliminating him (Lilie, 1991: 40). Even the disastrous 1176 campaign can be seen in this light. Manuel attacked Kılıç Arslan because the sultan was not honoring the terms of their treaty, and had used the breakup of the Danişmendids to aggrandize himself instead of returning this conquered territory to Byzantium.

The Byzantine and Selçuk ideologies were not diametrically opposed. For the Byzantines, the Selçuks were simply the latest in a long line of barbarian outsiders whose presence could be tamed and normalized; they could be brought into the imperial system and even used to the empire's advantage. Alexios's advice to John was to espouse moral virtue and to "lay up treasure which will clamp the jaws of the barbarians who breathe enmity against us" (Magdalino, 1993: 28). In this way the Selçuks would recognize the superiority of the Byzantines and the empire would live on. Although this advice may seem somewhat didactic and overly idealistic, the inextricable role the emperors played in all affairs of state means that their ideology is of paramount importance. As for the Selçuk ideology, the lack of sources makes puzzling it out more difficult. It is clear, however, that in referring to themselves as the Selçuks of Rûm they accepted the existence of the Roman Empire and the inherent legitimacy of its rulers (Mecit, 2014: 128). Notably, the Selçuk sultans almost neverattacked the empire and were always eager for treaties that would allow them to focus on establishing their suzerainty over the other Turkish groups in Anatolia and ultimately over Syria, Armenia, and Mesopotamia. Both the

Byzantines and the Selçuks were far more concerned with their legitimacy than they were with their physical territory. For the Byzantines, this meant holding off the Latin west and its claims of preponderance in Christendom. For the Selçuks it meant securing the recognition of the Muslim world as the preeminent defenders of the Dar al-Islam. There was no inherent contradiction between these two ideologies, and this is reflected in the relative lack of warfare between the two states.

This leaves only the Türkmen, an intractable problem which the Byzantines were sometimes able to manage and were never able to solve. It was the Türkmen who were also at the core of the disputes between the empire and the sultanate. They were essential to the Selçuk armies but they were difficult to fit into an organized political framework (Bombaci, 1978: 365). Of course this contradiction had spurred Türkmen activities in Anatolia even before Mantzikert, when the Great Selçuks tried to divert the harmful raids away from their own territory without overtly alienating these essential warriors. Both the Anatolian Selçuk sultanate and the Danişmendid emirate initially developed when groups of Türkmen coalesced around leaders with the prestige and martial prowess to corral them, but as the Selçuk state developed it too faced the problem of what to do with its unruly warriors. The result was that the Türkmen congregated in the Byzantine border regions, specifically the Anatolian and Tekke plateaus. Here they had access to good grazing land for their animalsand tempting targets for their winter raids. It was thus against these raids that the Komneni were obliged to provide physical protection.

The concentration of Komnenian fortifications along the coasts and in the river valleys of western Anatolia demonstrates that these castles were primarily built to defend against the Türkmen. The Selçuk sultanate was best dealt with diplomatically, but the Türkmen recognized no treaties and respected no borders.

These fortifications are the tangible evidence of a Byzantine response to what ultimately proved to be its foremost threat. But the imperial initiative taken in the construction and maintenance of these castles is itself what led to their ultimate failure because the system was too dependent on imperial attention, and the emperor could not be everywhere at once. Whittow agrees that the centralization of imperial authority prevented a successful defense of the land because the emperor saw any sort of autonomous provincial power as a greater threat to his authority than an outside enemy. Furthermore, land itself was not the basis of an emperor's power, which lay only in Constantinople (Whittow, 1996: 66-67). Manuel's policies of resettlement and fortification were thus successful so long as imperial attention continued to be focused on them, and it is certainly true that the Laskarids used and expanded on Manuel's foundations, but here again they were using Anatolia as a basis from which to retake the capital. With the reconquest of Constantinople in 1261 imperial attention shifted away from most of Anatolia forever. By contrast, the Grand Komneni of Trebizond were better able to resist the Türkmen and come to an accommodation with their neighbors, thereby demonstrating what was lacking in western Anatolia, namely local autonomy and a will to resist (Bryer, 1975: 115). As Keith Hopwood has suggested in several articles, the essential conflict was not between Byzantines and Selçuks or Christians and Muslims, but between nomads and settled life (Hopwood, 1991; 2000), a struggle which could have been won if the Byzantines had chosen to fight it.

The Türkmen were a fundamentally different enemy from those which had threatened the empire in the past. The Persians had been a highly organized state whose attacks were always aimed at establishing a more favorable peace treaty. The Arab raids have some superficial similarities with Türkmen activities, but the

essential difference is that the Arabs did not want to stay in western Anatolia. Although the Byzantines could not prevent these raids, they were able to mitigate the damage caused by constructing fortresses both along the frontier and as refuges for local populations. Byzantium's western enemies like the Bulgars and the Slavs were converted to Christianity and brought into the Byzantine system. The Turks, and particularly the Türkmen, could not be placated. Their way of life was fundamentally opposed to Byzantine settlement (at least as the empire wished to see it organized) and at the same time Anatolia was ideally suited for the traditional transhumant lifestyle, more so even than central Asia. The broad plains and fertile river valleys offered abundant pasturage as well as irresistible opportunities for plunder and adventure. The Komneni were extremely energetic in trying to stem this tide, but the emperor could not be everywhere. It is striking how time and again imperial and Crusader expeditions faced difficulties in the same places. If a solution was to be had, it would have been to fully deputize and militarize the local population, and charge them with recovering their lands from the Turks. This never happened, and given the ruling ideology of the Komnenian emperors, it is unlikely that they would have even considered the rewards of such a dramatic transformation of their society to be worth the costs.

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APPENDIX:

OTHER POSSIBLE KOMNENIAN ACTIVITY

Antiochia-ad-Cragum (Güneyköy, Alanya, Antalya)

This site may also have seen building activity under John. A chapel similar to the one at Kalanoros is also built into the fortification walls near the gate (Huber, 1967: 21).

Syedra and Iotape (Aytap, Alanya, Antalya)

The citadel of Syedra has a twelfth-century church (Redford, 2000: 19) and the port of Iotape contains a chapel of Saint George Stratelates (Huber, 1967: 38) just outside its hastily constructed walls.

Philokrini (Bayramoğlu, Darıca, Kocaeli)

This castle has disappeared almost entirely, but was well-described sixty years ago by Dirimtekin who dated it to the Palaiologan period (Dirimtekin, 1954: 52). Foss proposes that they might have been built by Alexios when he was trying to reclaim the coast between Constantinople and Nikomedeia early in his reign (Foss, 1996a: 49).

Dakibyza (Gebze, Kocaeli)

There are no remains but the location is frequently mentioned in history (Foss, 1996a: 50).

Tili (Toprakkale, Osmaniye)

Tili was captured by John in 1137, lost to the Armenian baron Toros II in 1151, and recaptured by Manuel in 1158 (Kinnamos, 180). Both Lawrence and Boase suggest that the black basalt fortress is Byzantine (Boase, 1978: 152; Lawrence, 1983: 183-84). Edwards sees two main building phases, with the earlier being either Arabic, Byzantine, or Frankish (Edwards, 1987a: 245), although by Byzantine he means seventh century or earlier. Hellenkemper attributed one tower to John (Hellenkemper, 1976: 151).

Ephesos (Efes, Selçuk, İzmir)

Ephesos had already contracted long before the Komnenian period. The newer settlement on the hill of Ayasuluk was more of a fortress than a city. It was this fortress that was retaken by John Doukas during Alexios's recovery of the coasts in the wake of the First Crusade. The walls should thus bear at least some traces of Komnenian activity. Foss notes that some repairs to the citadel walls with a "less careful" combination of brick and fieldstone point to Manuel (Foss, 1982: 196). On the other hand, Müller-Wiener's more detailed study concluded that the walls are Laskarid (Müller-Wiener, 1961: 109-110).

Hieron (Anadolukavağı, Beykoz, İstanbul)

This fairly well-preserved castle and its ruined European counterpart were part of the defenses of the capital in the twelfth-century. At this narrow point a chain, like the one at the Golden Horn, could be stretched across the strait to cut off access from the Black Sea. The walls consist of bands of brick which alternate with long, flat stones (Gabriel, 1943: 79. They show many similarities with Manuel's walls in

Constantinople (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 148). Although this castle is almost certainly the work of Manuel, it was not built to counter the Selçuks, who never reached the Bosporos.

Tabala (Yurtbaşı, Kula, Manisa)

Tabala is located on a mesa overlooking the Hermos (Gediz) river and thus it is both naturally strategic and defensible. The site would logically fall into John's network of fortresses between Lopadion and Laodikeia; the crude northern walls may be Komnenian, but most of what survives is Laskarid (Foss, 1979b: 319).

Meteorion (Gördükkale, Akhisar, Manisa)

As mentioned above (3.4.2.1) Rheidt identified Gördükkale with Chliara whereas Foss following Ramsay sees it as Meteorion and dates the walls to the Laskarid period (Foss, 1987: 96-97).

Kharakipolis (Karayakup, Gördes, Manisa)

Tok dates the scant remains at Kharakipolis to the late twelfth or early thirteenth century (Tok, 2008: 383), and considers them to be part of the theme of Neokastra. Foss considers the fort to have been constructed by the Laskarids (Foss, 1987: 92-93).

FIGURES

Figure 1: The Byzantine Empire in 1025, Themes and Major Cities
(Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 2: Empire in 1076, after Mantzikert, before the Civil War
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

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Figure 5: Empire in 1143 at the Accession of Manuel I Komnenos (Wikimedia Commons)



Figure 6: Detailed view of Anatolia in 1143 (Wikimedia Commons)



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
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
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

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

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

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
Figure 29: Walls of Laodikeia (Şimşek, 2007: 46)


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

Figure 31: Apollonia Sozopolis satellite view (Google Earth)

Figure 32: Apollonia Sozopolis castle walls (Photo: H. Canlı)



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

Figure 44: The walls of Alanya, sector 5 is Byzantine (Lloyd and Rice, 1954)

Figure 45: Satellite view of Kızılcaşehir (Google Earth)

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

Fig. 1a Plan of Pegae. Illustration by the author. Numbering for Towers 1–21 follows Müller-Wiener 1989, Abb. 2. The precise location of Müller-Wiener's Towers 1–4, 7, 12, 14 and 17 is unknown.

Figure 47: Plan of Pegai (Aylward, 2010: 345)

Figure 48: Satellite view of Pegai (Google Earth)

Figure 49: Pegai (Photo: Ş. Apaydın)

Figure 50: Pegai tower detail, lower section is Komnenian (Photo: S. Çançin)

Figure 51: Fortifications of Manuel I Komnenos (Wikimedia Commons)



Fig. 6 - Plan de la forteresse de Paşalar

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Figure 53: Metabole (Photo: Sakarya Gezi Rehberi)

Figure 54: The view from Metabole (Photo: Sakarya Gezi Rehberi)



Figure 55: The Theme of Neokastra (Google Earth)



1 Übersichtsskizze des byzantinischen Pergamon (nach Radt, *Pergamon*, Abb. 158 [U. Wulf])

Figure 56: Byzantine Pergamon (Rheidt, 1990: 196)

Figure 57: Satellite view of Pergamon (Google Earth)

Figure 58: Komnenian wall at Pergamon (Photo: Author)

Figure 59: View from the acropolis of Pergamon (Photo: Author)



Figure 60: Isometric reconstruction of Komnenian Pergamon (Rheidt, 1990: Fig. 12)



Abb.5: Kartenskizze zur Bucht von Edremit

Figure 61: Map showing the position of Adramytteion and modern Edremit (Stauber, 1996)



Figure 62: Preger's map of Dorylaion (Preger, 1894: 301)

Figure 63: Satellite view of Dorylaion (Google Earth)


Figure 64: Şarhöyük from the air (Photo: T. Sivas)

Figure 65: View from Dorylaion over the Tembris valley (Photo: Author)



Figure 66: Satellite view of Kotyaeion (Google Earth)

Figure 67: Closely spaced towers of Kotyaeion (Photo: N. Aktaş)

Figure 68: Circular tower, Kotyaeion (Photo: N. Aktaş)

Figure 69: Kotyaeion (Photo: Author)

Figure 70: Kayser Kale (Photo: H. Özyürt)



Figure 71: Route between Kütahya and Eskişehir, passing Kayser Kale (Demirli Köyü) (Google Maps)


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Figure 73: Satellite view of Anaia (Google Earth)

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Figure 75: Ritzion (Photo: J. Roche)

Figure 76: View from acropolis of Telmessos (Photo: M. Schüle)

Figure 77: The walls of Telmessos (Photo: K. Sarıçalı)



Fig. 1. The Menderes Region of Western Turkey. The OU/BIAA Survey: the five castles: 1. Mastaura kalesi; 2. Yılanlı kalesi; 3. Ulubey kalesi; 4. Çardak kalesi; 5. Yöre kalesi.

Figure 78: The castles of the Maeander (Barnes and Whittow, 1994: 189)

Figure 79: View of the gulf from the acropolis of Nikomedeia (Photo: A. Kıyga)