

EUROPEANIZATION OR NOT? TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CYPRUS  
PROBLEM, 1999-2014

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by  
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Ankara  
February 2015



To the memory of Meral Uluđ  
(1947-2010)

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BILKENT UNIVERSITY  
ANKARA

February 2015

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.

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## ABSTRACT

### EUROPEANIZATION OR NOT? TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, 1999-2014

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February 2015

This thesis sought to illuminate how the Europeanization process takes place, in the context of enlargement by providing empirical findings regarding the EU's potential to impact on the foreign policies of candidate countries. By placing Turkish-EU relations and the Cyprus dispute within a theoretical framework of Europeanization, with particular emphasis on the Historical Institutional strand of new institutionalism, this dissertation examined how the EU impacted on Turkey's Cyprus policy between 1999 and 2014. Alongside EU-related factors such as the credibility of both EU conditionality and accession perspective, what accounts for change is predominantly determined by how domestic actors perceive it, and the extent to which domestic power struggles are affected by it.

Keywords: Turkey-EU Relations, Europeanization, Cyprus Dispute

## ÖZET

AVRUPALILAŞMA MI DEĞİL Mİ? TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI VE KIBRIS SORUNU,  
1999-2014

Uluğ-Eryılmaz, Burçin

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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February 2015

Bu çalışma, genişleme sürecinde Avrupa Birliği (AB)'nin aday ülke dış politikalarını etkileme potansiyelini Avrupalılaşıma perspektifinden incelemiştir. Türkiye-AB ilişkileri ve Kıbrıs sorununu Avrupalılaşıma kuramı ve özellikle yeni kurumsalcı yaklaşımlardan Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık boyutuyla ele alıp, AB'nin Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs politikasını 1999-2014 döneminde nasıl etkilediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu çalışma, politika değişiminin sadece AB boyutundaki inandırıcı bir AB koşulluluğu ve katılım süreci faktörüyle değil, ulusal aktörlerin bu süreci nasıl algıladığı ve ulusal düzeydeki güç mücadelesinin bu süreçten nasıl ve ne derece etkilendiğiyle de açıklanması gerektiğini ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, Avrupalılaşıma, Kıbrıs Sorunu

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This dissertation intends to shed light on how the Europeanization process takes place, if at all, in the context of enlargement by providing empirical findings as to the EU's potential to influence the foreign policies of candidate countries. By locating Turkish-EU relations and the Cyprus dispute within a theoretically informed understanding of Europeanization, with particular focus on the Historical Institutionalist variant of new institutionalism, this dissertation seeks to explore how the EU impacted on Turkey's Cyprus policy between 1999 and 2014. To what extent can the 'EU anchor' lead to change in Turkey's Cyprus policy, in view of its candidacy dating from 1999 and the ongoing accession talks since 2005? Moreover, how do dynamics of domestic politics –in interaction with the EU- play a part in changing Turkey's Cyprus policy?

A more specific attempt is thus directed towards understanding the relationship between domestic political pressures and foreign policy choice by the AKP government concerning the Cyprus problem. The exploration of this relationship suggests that the EU's potential in transforming the foreign policy of EU candidate countries is both context-dependent and questionable. Alongside EU-related factors

such as the credibility of both EU conditionality and accession perspective, what accounts for change is predominantly determined by how domestic actors perceive it, and the extent to which domestic power struggles are affected by it. Therefore, the EU's potential in transforming the foreign policies of candidate countries is critically assessed.

This introductory chapter explains the following: what the thesis is about; the research topic; the main arguments; the conceptual framework of Europeanization with reference to new institutionalism and its particular strand of Historical Institutionalism; the justification of our research agenda; the relevance of the research topic to the analytical toolkit of Europeanization, new institutionalism and HI; the research challenges faced; the reasons for choosing Cyprus as a case study; the tools and methodology; and the research design.

## **1.1 Europeanization as a Conceptual Framework**

### **1.1.1 Definition of Europeanization**

Over the last decade, the term 'Europeanization' has been widely used in researching the EU's potential to affect several policy areas, including foreign policy, of its members and candidate states alike (Grabbe, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; 2007). The tools and enforcement mechanisms at the EU's disposal such as trade agreements, technical and monetary aid, association agreement and most importantly, membership enable it to serve as

the strongest actor in promoting Europeanization process throughout the European continent. Europeanization is generally referred to when domestic structures, identities, national policy preferences, interests and national patterns of governance are affected by pressure from developments at the European level. The most refined and minimalist definition of the concept might be domestic political change generated by European integration (for different approaches see Olsen 2002, 923-924; Ladrech, 1994: 17; Harmsen and Wilson 2000, 14-18; Vink, 2003: 63-74; Bache and Jordan, 2006: 20-23; Featherstone, 2003: 6-12; Risse et al., 2001: 3; Radaelli, 2003: 30; H eritier, 2001). To illustrate, Olsen (2002) explicates five different uses of the concept of Europeanization as:

- changes to external boundaries;
- development of institutions of governance at the EU level;
- penetration of national and sub-national levels of governance;
- exporting forms of political governance and organization that are peculiar to the EU beyond its own territory;
- political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.

Likewise, Harmsen and Wilson (2000: 14-18) have categorized eight different usages of the term Europeanization by building upon the relevant literature. The first usage takes up Europeanization as the emergence of new forms of European governance as a result of European integration with an emphasis on the socializing potential of EU institutions on domestic actors' interests and identities. The second usage refers to Europeanization as national adaptation of domestic structures,



institutions and policy-making processes in response to developments at the EU level. The third usage handles Europeanization as policy isomorphism, which relates to the degree of convergence among member states in some policy areas. The fourth usage conceives Europeanization as both a constraint and an opportunity for domestic political actors in the sense that sometimes European requirements confront governments who might be unwilling to adopt a specific policy in the face of hollow domestic support. Just the opposite can also be valid when European requirements as an external constraint turn out to be an opportunity for governments, who can utilize the EU as a pretext to implement their own policy agenda, while using the same domestic opposition as a bargaining card during EU negotiations. That is to say, governments may seek to be voluntarily bound by the 'EU constraint' so as to accomplish difficult reforms at home and to gain strategic superiority over their rivals both within government or beyond (Featherstone, 2003: 9). The fifth application corresponds to Europeanization as the modernization of economically backward and geographically peripheral members, such as Ireland and Greece, through structural reforms which aim at urbanization, secularization and enhanced economic prosperity. In the sixth usage, understood also as 'transition', Europeanization is meant to be joining 'Europe' in the framework of EU enlargement. Evidentially, 'joining Europe' connotes particularly Central and East European members who adopted democratic principles, market economies and administrative institutions in line with the EU's membership requirements after the end of the Cold War. The seventh usage puts forward Europeanization as the reconstruction and reshaping of identities which focuses on the ways with which EU policy affects the cultural and political identification of member states as well as a

redefinition of their identities within the EU institutions. In the eighth usage of the term, Europeanization corresponds to transnationalism and cultural integration which points to practices of interaction in everyday life and their power to transcend borders in terms of both cultural and political identities as well as legal, administrative and political borders within and across states. It is apparent that despite differences, what all of the usages above adhere to is the common task of understanding ‘change’ that the EU brought to the member states and candidate states.

Also, Bache and Jordan (2006: 20-23) have been among the scholars who widely contributed to the debates over the meanings of Europeanization. They categorized six main approaches to the term ‘Europeanization’ by referring to several studies in the Europeanization scholarship. Those main categories embrace first, Europeanization as the top-down impact of the EU on its member states as a widely-cited approach to Europeanization. Accordingly, Europeanization is identified as “the process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative structures” (Héritier et al., 2001: 3). The second usage refers to Europeanization both as creation of new powers and accumulation of policy competences at EU level, thus equating Europeanization with European integration itself. The third meaning takes Europeanization to mean the growing importance of the EU as a guide for domestic actors’ preferences and policies. The fourth category corresponds to Europeanization as a facilitator for horizontal transfer of policies, ideas and practices between member states, mostly through learning and borrowing. The fifth usage relates Europeanization to the two-

way interaction between states and the EU, suggesting that Europeanization is rather a circular or bi-directional process involving both states' adaptation of their institutions, policies and ideas to the EU (top-down) as a response to pressures, as well as 'uploading' of their policy and institutional models and styles to the EU (bottom-up) thereby shaping and domesticating the European Union. Börzel notes that states, depending on their action capacity and policy preferences, seek to upload their policy models and institutional structures in order to minimize adjustment costs that they will later be exposed to (Börzel, 2002; 2005). The sixth and last category equates Europeanization with an external constraint on national actors and their autonomy which is discursively constructed. Accordingly, adaptation pressures emanating from the EU are not objective phenomena; rather, they are constructed discursively by domestic actors who, by pointing to the EU 'scapegoat', seek to legitimize and justify financially costly and politically risky domestic reforms such as labour reforms or environmental protection. All in all, it can be said that some of these categories are inter-related on the grounds of being either the EU as source of change (independent variable) or the EU as a subject of change (dependent variable). More precisely, while the first category fits nicely into the EU acting as an independent variable, the second one treats the EU as a subject of change, or the dependent variable.

Nonetheless, definitions are neither exhaustive nor unproblematic, since most of the time each author tends to select one or two of them in accordance with his/her research purposes and conduct the study accordingly. Actually, as Major (2005: 175) argues, the overall aim behind the discussion is to 'understand the dynamic

interaction of national and European levels in a chosen policy field and to account for the impact of the EU at the national level of policy, polity and the politics of EU Member States’.

Apart from the problem of proper definition of the term ‘Europeanization’, the major analytical issue revolves around whether Europeanization is a theory or nothing more than an explanatory concept for understanding domestic change. While Olsen (2002) acknowledged that Europeanization is a useful “attention-directing device and a starting point for further exploration”; for Radaelli (2004) its potential contribution lies in its focus on processes of change. For Börzel it enables us to study interactive relationship between the EU and national levels beyond causes of European integration. Likewise, for others like Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 338-340), Europeanization is not deployed as a theory. Rather, it is a phenomenon which needs to be explained by applying a variety of existing theories including comparative politics, liberal intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance and international political economy.

Thus, the challenge is not one of inventing descriptions or concepts relating to Europeanization, but rather modelling the dynamics and processes of change helped by empirical studies (Olsen, 2002: 944). On the task of how to theorize domestic adaptation to the European integration, Radaelli (2004) posited that Europeanization should be seen as a problem rather than a solution. Because it is known that theory comes into scene when a researcher needs “to answer *how* [*emphasis original*] European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic political systems” (Vink and Graziano, 2007: 12). It would be quite misleading, however, to suggest that

dynamics of change were not addressed, or core research questions did not emerge to date. Apart from that, a further difficulty lies in applying the concept to foreign policy that is compounded by problems particularly in measuring the impact in a policy area due mainly to the intergovernmental nature of decision-making.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the challenge for this research is to take into account the relatively weak competences of the EU in foreign policy domain when compared to the communitized areas of the first pillar.

It seems equally important to be aware of delimiting and understanding Europeanization more thoroughly, as one needs to differentiate it from other similar concepts such as ‘convergence’ and ‘European integration’. To illustrate, for the sake of conceptual refinement, Europeanization should not be used interchangeably with convergence because of the difference between a process and its consequences (Radaelli, 2003). Although convergence is frequently seen an ultimate goal of European integration, a detailed scrutiny of the literature reveals “domestic adaptation with national colors” (Cowles et al., 2001: 1) and show differentiation and different starting points for national adaptation due to national actors and traditions (see for example, Ladrech, 1994; Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 606; Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel, 2005: 61). Yet, one should not neglect a level of convergence achieved, especially in first pillar policies such as monetary policy in terms of adopting monetarist policy to join the European Monetary Union (Vink and Graziano, 2007: 10). Differential impact and diversity stem from the fact that varying national political systems, legal cultures, societal relationship and cultural

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<sup>1</sup> The reasons will be underlined in detail in the Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

structures resulting from distinct historical interaction between state, society and the market are translated into differing national adaptations to the same European requirements (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Héritier et al., 2001; Knill, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003).

Similarly, Europeanization should not be confused with European integration. The latter is concerned with integration theories in general as to why countries pool and delegate part of their sovereignty in the context of supranational institutions. Yet, the former seeks to explain what this process brings about at the domestic level. More specifically, integration analyzes what happens to the state and its sovereignty (strengthening or weakening of it) whereas Europeanization focuses on what happens to domestic institutions and actors (Börzel, 1999: 576-77). Accordingly, as Major (2005: 178) points out, Europeanization is only one mechanism under the broader construct of European integration. Thus, the former cannot exist without the latter.

In order to understand the dynamics of domestic change one also needs to investigate the ‘subject’ of Europeanization research or ‘what’ is being Europeanized. Broadly speaking, effects of the EU at domestic level can be traced through different domains such as institutions<sup>2</sup>, actors<sup>3</sup>, policy-making processes, ideas and policies<sup>4</sup> as dependent variables. While conducting search on domestic

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<sup>2</sup> For example, see Mair (2000) for party systems; Conant (2001) for courts; Anthony (2000) for public law; Harmsen (1999) for national administration.

<sup>3</sup> For example, see Ladrech (2002) and Bomber (2002) for political parties; Grote and Lang (2003) for trade associations; Bellier (2000) for European Commissioners.

<sup>4</sup>For example, see Checkel (2001) for citizenship; Schneider (2001); Thatcher (2004) for telecommunications sector; Lavenex (2001) and Lavenex (2007) for refugee and asylum policies; Radaelli (2003) for public policy; Knill and Lenschow (2001) and Haverland (2003) for environmental policy; Wong (2005); Gross (2009); Bache and Jordan (2006); Miskimmon (2007); Economides (2005); Major

adaptation as a response to the EU, case selection may not be restricted necessarily to an EU member state *per se* but may also concentrate on a non-member state like Switzerland (Fischer, 2002) and candidate states (for the eastern enlargement process see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005; 2007; Grabbe, 2001; 2002; 2003; for Turkey, see Terzi, 2010; 2012; Kaliber, 2012; Nas and Özer, 2012; Ulusoy, 2008; Aydın and Açıkmese, 2007).

Scholarship on Europeanization produces various definitions and different analytical models in line with the authors' respective vision as to whether change/impact occurs at the level of policy, polity, politics, institutions, actors, ideas, interests or ways of doing things. In sum, Europeanization 'follows no single logic' (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004), owing to the nature of different policies in the EU, and a variety of analytical models are applied for analysis of those policies.

That being said, Europeanization is defined in this study as the process of change at the domestic (policy) level originated by adaptational pressures coming directly or indirectly from the EU, the process whose nature and extent is determined by a complex combination of factors such as the level of incompatibility; credibility of conditionality and membership perspective; endogenous factors such as actor preferences and contextual limitations (i.e. history –path-dependent EU-Turkey relations and Turkey's Cyprus policy); and the relative position of a state *vis-à-vis* the EU, i.e. whether it being a member or candidate country.

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(2005); Rieker (2006) for foreign policy; Caporaso and Jupille (2001) in Cowles et al for gender equality policy

### **1.1.2 Measurement of Europeanization**

Apart from dealing with how the EU leads to domestic change (meaning mechanisms of Europeanization), one of the most important issues in the Europeanization research agenda entails the ‘measurement’ of the EU’s domestic impact. The Europeanization scholarship has categorized five different outcomes regarding the direction and scope of domestic change: inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and transformation.<sup>5</sup> Inertia means absence of, and resistance to, change which leads to non-compliance with European legislation and increase in adaptational pressures in turn. Retrenchment refers to situations where resistance to change leads to blocking of European requirements and results in ‘negative’ change or nationalization of domestic policies. Absorption denotes the incorporation of EU requirements without a significant modification of domestic policy; thus, the level of policy change is low. Accommodation occurs when a state accommodates European requirements by adapting their policy without changing its core features and collective understandings. Therefore, it leads to only partial change. Transformation arises when a state replaces existing policy with a fundamentally new and different one, or by changing existing policy to the extent that core features and collective understandings of political, economic and social structures are systemically changed. Examples are the constitutional balance of power between domestic institutions, the political culture of a state or macro-economic policies and currencies of states. As will be shown in the fifth chapter, this categorization may enable one to underline temporal processes, and the extent of

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<sup>5</sup> For the relevant literature, see Heritier (2001); Knill (2001); Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001); Börzel (2003); Börzel and Risse (2003).



change in Turkey's Cyprus policy, especially in different periods of time starting from 1999 onwards.

### **1.1.3 Intellectual Origins and Evolution of Europeanization**

For a long time, most of the scholarly work on European Studies has been devoted to the developments at the European level and focused on the extent to which domestic conditions affect supranational institution building as well as policy making. Indeed, the roots of the Europeanization literature can be dated back to Peter Gourevitch's (1978) article on the international sources of domestic politics, though his study did not use the term 'Europeanization'. The early literature was mainly concerned with the 'bottom-up' dimension of EU-member state relations underpinning the role of member states in European integration process (Börzel, 2005: 46). In those theories of integration, domestic politics is treated as a key explanatory factor of the integration process. Their fundamental aim was to conceptualize and explain the effect that EU member states have on the processes and outcomes of the integration process. Two rival theoretical approaches, however, disagreed on the role that member states have played in the evolution of European integration. On the one hand, the intergovernmentalist school takes the member state and governments as a major driving force behind the European integration and policy-making to privilege their respective strategic and economic interests (for a more detailed analysis see Hoffmann, 1982; Moravcsik, 1991; 1998). The neo-functional and multi-level governance approaches, on the other, paid close

attention to domestic interests and actors (interest groups such as business associations, trade unions as well as regions) who pressure for further integration to promote their economic and political interests (Börzel, 2005). Neo-functionalists looked at the dynamics behind the accumulation of power embedded in supranational institutions (particularly the European Commission and European Court of Justice) who seek to bolster the power of European institutions *vis-à-vis* the member states (see Haas, 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998).

Building upon this, in the 1990s, the research focus shifted towards the impact that the European integration process and the evolving European system of governance have on national level politics and policies (see Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005). As the EU has become a more extensive level of governance, a momentum developed so as to understand the opposite direction of influence, namely the EU's impact on member states, which brings us to Europeanization (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 10). This growing body of 'top-down' analyses seeks to underline how and to what extent the communitization of national policy areas within the first pillar of the EU paves the way for institutional and policy changes at the domestic level, and whether it leads to a convergence of national policies through rules, laws, directives and norms developed at the European level (see Börzel, 1999; 2003; 2005; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill, 2001; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Goetz and Hix, 2001).

Overall, the Europeanization scholarship perceives the issue from two different angles. On the one hand Europeanization refers to "European polity-building" (Harmsen, 2000: 52) as such:

The emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001: 3).

Though the term Europeanization is not a synonym for European integration, the above definition comes very close to European integration in the sense that it understands Europeanization as an accumulation of institutional arrangements emanating from integration and such a conception may well be fitted into ‘bottom-up’ perspectives discussed earlier.

On the other hand, what this conception of Europeanization leads to is the “consideration of the ways in which existing political structures and models are being redefined by the emergence of this new level of governance” (Harmsen, 2000: 52). This second sense of the term ‘Europeanization’ thus exclusively deals with patterns of national adaptation –institutional, organizational, policy level, interests, ideas, beliefs etc.- to European integration in a top-down fashion. In his widely-cited article, Ladrech (1994: 69) supports this line of reasoning by identifying Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making”. Here, the focus is rather on adaptation at the institutional and organizational level and policy change, where a clear European model or policy template exists to exert on domestic structures, i.e. the first pillar of the EU edifice. Reflecting again a top-down line of causality, Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 4) defined Europeanization as embracing “processes of

a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies”. As a matter of fact, the emphasis placed on the process being originated, first at the EU level and then impacted upon domestically, entails ambiguity as to which (EU or domestic level) comes first, or who is affecting whom (Featherstone, 2003: 18). A common denominator of all those top-down interpretations is that they predominantly focus on downward adaptational pressures coming from the EU to the domestic level.

Building upon bottom-up and/or top-down scholarship of Europeanization, more recent studies have increasingly dealt with dynamics of causality as involving a two-way interaction between states and the Union, i.e. Europeanization as a circular process. According to this logic, every change at European level is a simultaneous product of member states whose domestic politics is a major factor in the process. In other words, member states are not ‘passive receivers’ of European policies but can ‘proactively shape’ European policies, institutions and processes which they will adapt afterwards (Börzel, 2005: 62). Within a dynamic interaction with the EU, member states both shape and are being shaped by the EU. For example, in a comparative study of environmental policy, Börzel (2002) noted how national executives sought to minimize the domestic implementation costs of adopting the EU’s environmental measures by trying to upload their own policy models to the EU level. Yet, a definition of Europeanization as a circular, dynamic and mutually

constitutive process involving a simultaneous interaction between domestic and EU settings entails the methodological problem of ‘who is affecting whom?’ since “it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variable” (Major, 2005: 177). Considering Europeanization as a process means that EU policies and institutions lead to change in national policies, the result of which is ‘Europeanized policy’, whereas once taking into account the mutually constitutive nature of this process, tracing the EU’s impact proves difficult because it cannot be known whether those EU generated impacts (Europeanized policy) originated from the national, or the EU level. For the sake of analytical rigidity, the empirical analysis of foreign policies nurtured by the Europeanization framework requires parsimony with regard to which definition and dimension will be adopted in the research. Thus, in order to get rid of that analytical trap, as well as to be able to trace the effects of the EU on national foreign policy, not vice-versa, this dissertation adopts a top-down and downloading dimension of Europeanization, namely, domestic change generated by European integration. This is especially valid in this thesis as it deals with a candidate country, and therefore, the latter’s capacity to ‘upload’ policy preferences is minimal.

#### **1.1.4 Patterns of Europeanization**

Europeanization as an analytical framework is generally categorized with regard to the direction and pattern of domestic change, i.e. how European-level developments feed back into domestic level as a result of pressure from the EU.

Among several approaches to the concept, Europeanization refers to national adaptation of policies, institutions and policy-making processes for domestic use in response to developments at the EU level (top-down dimension, reception or downloading -EU as a source of change) (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000). In contrast, the Europeanization process may also involve states' proactive exportation of their policy, position, preference, norms or model to the EU level by getting them adopted as European common policy (bottom-up dimension, national projection or uploading -EU as a subject of change). Another dimension of EU influence concerns the horizontal<sup>6</sup> pattern of 'socialization' and interest/norm/identity reconstruction and internalization with regard to EU norms and identity.

Specifically, a top-down process of Europeanization implies adaptation and modification of domestic policies, structures, decision-making processes, and institutions in response to demands (adaptational pressures) coming from the EU level. A top-down perspective seeks to understand how and to what extent European integration has led to change in national policies and whether it generated convergence or persistence of national policies and positions. In other words, Europeanization can be basically conceptualized as the "penetration of the European dimension into the national" (Major, 2005: 176). According to this perspective, the state is rather "reactive" since it adapts and adjusts its domestic structures and policies in line with the constraints and requirements of European settings (Wong, 2006: 8). Yet, the extent and nature of EU influence may hinge upon a variety of

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<sup>6</sup> Horizontal Europeanization refers to socialization, learning, identification with EU norms, procedures, identities, ideas and ways of doing things, pursuing 'appropriate behavior' and developing 'coordination reflex' etc. as a result of long-term interaction with EU institutions and officials. For example, see March and Olsen, (1989); (1998); M.E. Smith (2000); Tonra (2003); Glarbo (2001); Checkel (2001); Lavenex (1999).

domestic factors in member states which affect their capacity to adapt (Wong, 2006: 8). Concerning the top-down perspective, Wong (2007: 326) underlines several indicators of Europeanization at national (foreign policy) level, such as the growing importance of European political agenda for domestic politics; compliance with common objectives, positions and actions of the Union; the priority given to the EU policy over national policy; and the internalization of membership with its obligations as well as the integration process itself.

The bottom-up pattern, in turn, takes place once a member state's national foreign policy, norm, position or model is projected or uploaded onto the EU level, thereby contributing to the development of a 'common European policy'. This dimension is particularly concerned with explaining the impact that member states have on the outputs and processes of European integration. Put differently, member states are not passive receivers of policies as in the top-down approach, rather, they act as a 'change agent' who proactively shape policies and processes at the EU level (Wong, 2005), which they will adapt afterwards (Börzel, 2005: 62). Drawing upon this, basic indicators of national projection would be the existence of a member state's attempt to amplify its influence at international stage; a state's attempt to affect other members' foreign policies; a state's utilization of its EU membership as a leverage to achieve its interests abroad; and being successful in having specific national foreign policy goals adopted at the EU level (Wong, 2007: 326). For example, Germany was able to Europeanize its low deficit and strictly-defined macro-economic policies to be adopted as convergence criteria in the framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. Also, the United Kingdom succeeded in

Europeanizing its sanctions on Argentina during the Falklands conflict in 1982 (Wong, 2005: 9).

A third aspect of EU impact, namely socialization, shares basic assumptions with social constructivism which believes in the transformative cognitive impact and power of the interaction with the EU institutions and actors in changing interest, identity, expectations and beliefs of domestic actors to account for change. Highlighting the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1989; 1998) and processes of persuasion, it is argued that European policies, norms and the collective understandings attached to them exert adaptational pressure on the domestic level, since they do not fit with domestic norms and shared understandings. This perspective suggests that Europeanization paves the way for domestic change through socialization and collective learning, leading to norm internalization and the development of new identities (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 59). It follows more of a gradual pattern of Europeanization since the habit of cooperation and consultation can be developed via continued interaction between elites and institutions within the EU over time, which would pave the way for change in attitudes, preferences and expectations of actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). Here, the process of domestic change is more voluntary, less hierarchical and indirect in nature, which may produce domestic change "through the alteration of beliefs and expectation of actors" (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2). Socialization as a pattern of Europeanization also involves a learning process of rules, norms and standards of behavior culminated over time through endured cooperation between member states, their institutions and elites. Studies in the last decade have revealed



that participation in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) frameworks would have a strong socialization impact on member states through elite interaction within bargaining circles of the CFSP which show signs of internalization of EU norms and interests (M.E. Smith, 2000; Tonra, 2003; Checkel, 2001; Lavenex, 1999; Glarbo, 2001). That is to say, over the last 30 years, the CFSP itself went beyond being merely a rationally set up institution but turned out to be a socializing force that “shapes perceptions, structures policy choices, and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining others (Wong, 2006: 203). Accordingly, indicators of third dimension include emergence and internalization of shared policy principles, norms and particular ways of doing things among decision-makers; the creation of a coordination reflex and resulting approximation between definitions of European and national interests and positions (Wong, 2007: 326); the recourse to the European option as an instinctive choice as well as the value attributed to a European approach in a particular policy decision (Gross, 2009).

These three major patterns of Europeanization should not be treated as mutually exclusive. Rather, as will be illustrated in the national case studies in the following chapter, they involve a mutually constitutive, interactive, and dialectical relationship, each performing a role in domestic change (Radaelli, 2002; Börzel, 2003). Given the fact that member states cannot be detached from the EU as an entity, mechanisms of Europeanization is commonly understood as a two-way process involving top-down and bottom-up dimensions. This is mainly because every change at European level is a simultaneous product of its member states whose domestic politics is a major

factor in shaping policies, styles, outcomes and norms at the European level. A horizontal approach of socialization would also explain the modes of EU influence at the domestic level. As one scholar clearly pointed out, “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines” (M.E. Smith, 2000: 10).

### **1.1.5 Mechanisms of Europeanization**

Europeanization is concerned with explaining how the EU impact occurs. Throughout the last decade, a substantial level of energy has been devoted to understanding the mechanisms of Europeanization which is related to the process of how European integration feeds back into domestic political systems, policies, interests, identities and institutions (for example, Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel, 2005). This dissertation does not only make the case for how this process unfolds, namely mechanisms of Europeanization, but also seeks to show how it *actually* works especially during the accession process. Through which processes and mechanisms do European level developments (institutions, policies and identities) penetrate the domestic level and produce change? Which mechanisms seem more appropriate with regard to foreign policy field, and why? Could the same mechanism(s) be applied both to current members and candidates as well? Does Turkey constitute an exception in this regard, and if so, why?

The Europeanization literature has underlined several mechanisms through which Europe can induce change in domestic arrangements meaning that there is no single

approach adopted by scholars to explain the domestic impact of European policies. Some scholars (like Héritier et al., 1996) identify the institutional congruence (or level of misfit to adapt to European measures) between European and domestic arrangements as the most important variable to account for domestic change. Others emphasize the extent to which European policies have altered domestic opportunity structures and interest constellations (Lehmkuhl, 1999; Schneider, 2001). Yet another group of scholars focus on both, namely, arguments of institutional compatibility and domestic opportunity structures (Knill, 2001; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Börzel, 1999). Some argue that during the accession process, Europeanization is achieved ‘directly’ through accession negotiations and the principle of EU conditionality (for example see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007; Grabbe, 2003; 2006). By contrast, scholars like Checkel (2001) and Lavenex (1999) dwell on the cognitive impact of Europe on beliefs and expectations of actors to account for domestic change.

There is a wide agreement in the Europeanization literature that a precondition for any adaptation process to take place is the existence of a “misfit” (Börzel, 1999), the incompatibility or the “mismatch” (Héritier, 1996: 149-176) between EU requirements and the domestic situation. Put simply, the misfit creates adaptational pressures, which in turn induce domestic change. The ‘goodness of fit’ (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001) between the European and domestic level determines the degree of pressure for adaptation produced by Europeanization (Börzel, 2003: 5; Börzel and Risse, 2003: 61). Accordingly, “The lower the compatibility between

European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 61).

In their widely-cited research, Börzel and Risse (2003) advanced a three-step framework embracing adaptational pressures, mediating (intervening) factors and domestic change, thereby conceptualizing the adaptational process in response to European pressures. Accordingly, the process of Europeanization begins with the emergence of adaptational pressures resulting from the institutional ‘misfit’ between the European model and domestic arrangements which in turn induces domestic change. For the Europeanization process to take place, firstly the EU should disturb the domestic equilibrium at political, institutional and societal level. It is assumed that the misfit between European requirements and domestic arrangements provide societal and political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58). By the same token, as far as EU enlargement and candidate states are concerned, the EU accession process generates misfit in acceding countries and may bring about new resources such as money, expertise, ideas and legitimacy which empower some domestic actors *vis-à-vis* others to pass over opposition and manage the transition process (Grabbe, 2003). Yet, a “misfit is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for domestic change” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 74): “Whether misfits produce a substantial effect at the domestic level depends on the presence of various factors facilitating adaptation and serving as catalysts for domestic change” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 63). These factors are commonly named as mediating or intervening factors which may be facilitating or constraining domestic change. That is to say, alongside a necessary condition of

misfit, the possibility for any domestic (policy) change to occur hinges on the capacity of actors to exploit new opportunities and avoid constraints. This is in turn affected by two ‘mediating factors’, as sufficient condition but leading to opposite effects: *multiple veto points* and *formal facilitating institutions* (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58). The existence of the former in a state’s domestic political and institutional structure can empower different actors with divergent interests who resist pressures stemming from the EU to avoid constraints and to exert influence, thereby hindering national adaptation and change. The latter, on the other hand, provides actors with material and ideational resources to benefit from new opportunities, thus inducing national adaptation and change. Consequently, whether or not misfit leads to redistribution of resources among domestic actors, their differential empowerment, and a resulting domestic change is determined by “a low number of veto points and the existence of facilitating formal institutions” (Börzel, 2003: 9).

Veto players refer to a group of domestic actors for whom the conditionality and domestic adoption costs are disadvantageous for their relative power position but “whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo” (Tsebelis, 2002). An example of veto players includes the transport liberalization policy of the EU, which empowered societal and political actors in highly regulated Member States who have been pushing for further deregulation. More specifically, a reform coalition in Germany was capable of exploiting EU policy to avoid domestic opposition to liberalization whereas trade unions and sectoral associations in Italy, as effective veto players, were able to impede any prospect for domestic reform (Héritier et al., 2001). Further, in their study on Greece, Featherstone et al. (2001) emphasized limits

of external empowerment by the EU arguing that due to several domestic social and political constraints as veto points, technocratic empowerment in the face of commitments to the European Monetary Union was not powerful enough in tackling the pension reform (See also Tinios, 2005; Matsanagis, 2007; Tsarouhas, 2008; 2012).

Concerning formal facilitating institutions, British public agencies and complementary institutions such as the Equal Opportunities Commission, provided women's organizations with an opportunity to implement the EU's equal pay and equal treatment directives in advancing gender equality. In France, lacking such a formal institution resulted in the failure of French women in overcoming domestic resistance to implement the EU's equal pay and equal treatment policies (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). As evident from these examples, Börzel and Risse argue that adaptational pressure stemming from 'misfit' is not sufficient; mediating factors should also be considered in order to account for domestic change.


Likewise, in their analysis of Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 10-17) prioritize domestic actors' capability –in the form of domestic opportunity structures and veto players- which is likely to modify or limit European signals, thereby setting the pace and degree of Europeanization. Accordingly, the EU sets the adoption of rules as conditions to non-members, in return of the rewards in the form of assistance and institutional ties, including membership. EU conditionality damages the 'domestic equilibrium' or existing distribution of bargaining power and preferences in society by introducing rules to be complied with. Conditionality takes place in two different ways:

intergovernmental bargaining and differential empowerment of domestic actors. The former concerns the cost-benefit assessment of the target government calculating the benefits of complying with EU rules *vis-à-vis* domestic costs for their adoption. Whether or not rule adoption is achieved as a result of effective conditionality not only depends on governmental preferences, but also on the existence of veto players. In the latter, differential empowerment of actors, conditionality works indirectly, by solving some policy problems in favor of certain domestic actors (generally by increasing their influence in the political system). For example, the adoption of EU rules may produce “welfare or power costs” or losses for some actors who would like to reject EU conditionality to retain their relative power position and influence in the political system. In the final analysis, the authors conclude that since rule adoption has to be performed and implemented by the government itself, the ultimate domestic change in the face of effective conditionality hinges upon the cost-benefit analysis of the government who tries to balance the domestic, EU and international pressures to maximize its own benefit. The balancing act of government in turn depends upon factors such as the determinacy of conditions; the size and speed of rewards; the credibility of threats and promises (conditionality); and lastly, veto players and the size of adoption costs (for details see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 661-679; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 12-17).

As seen, Europeanization helps gauge not only domestic changes themselves, but also the processes of change by giving primacy to endogenous factors in terms of the state actors’ capacity to modify or limit European signals, thereby setting the pace and degree of Europeanization. Thus the EU’s transformative power has its limits,

since the domestic impact of the EU has been differential showing significant variation across policies and institutions (Börzel, 2012). In order to account for variation in domestic change, therefore, the Europeanization scholarship has increasingly focused on the factors mitigating the EU's transformative power, and the conditions under which domestic change occurs. In fact, mediating factors are important for this study, as they enable one to account for variation across countries and between members and candidates. As this dissertation shows, apart from effective conditionality and credible EU accession perspective as the EU level factors, domestic sources of change in the form of capacity, willingness, political and ideological preferences of the government, pressure groups, public opinion, and political parties, and differential empowerment of them as constraining or facilitating factors need to be considered. Since this dissertation attempts to underline how and to what extent EU conditionality can impact on Turkey's Cyprus policy as a candidate state, the argument of misfit created by conditionality and concomitant mediating factors is highly relevant in that it takes up the issue of 'domestic change' in the sense of actor's strategic interests and preferences (cost-benefit analysis) as well as redistribution of resources as -opportunities and constraints- across domestic actors by taking into account the existence of veto players. Lastly, it provides a comprehensive understanding of conditionality between the EU and candidate states which affect government's calculation of adoption costs and its ultimate decision in favor of policy change.





**Figure 1: The conceptualization of domestic adaptation process leading to change according to Europeanization framework. Adapted from Börzel and Risse (2003).**

### **1.1.6 Relevance of Europeanization as a Conceptual Framework to the Case of Turkey's Cyprus Policy**

Though not being an all-encompassing idea, the potential contribution of Europeanization as a research agenda stems from the fact that it helps gauging the analysis of the EU's impact on domestic level by laying out the framework of how multilateral cooperation and institutions can influence national policy preferences. The second utility of Europeanization as an analytical toolkit comes from the fact that it captures not only domestic change itself, but also the process and mechanism of adjustment, namely how change takes place. That is to say, it helps focus on processes of change (Radaelli, 2004). Third, while laying out a framework for domestic adaptation process, Europeanization opens the 'black box' of the state by underlining the importance of endogenous factors and their capacity to adapt, resist

or produce change. These endogenous factors may include domestic actors, policies, policy-making processes, traditions, pressure group politics, party political contestation, domestic institutions, actors' calculation of adoption costs, public opinion attitudes, the perception of the EU within the eyes of both decision-makers and public opinion. Unlike intergovernmentalism, the 'Europeanization' approach implies not only the role of non-state actors, and decision-making elites in formulating national foreign policy (Wong, 2007: 331), but also points at their capacity to facilitate or impede change at the domestic level. Fourth, it directs the attention of the researcher from the issues of the cause of European integration or process of European decision-making towards the nature of "reciprocal relationship" between the national and European level (Börzel, 2002: 195). Put differently, it does not only focus on domestic change, but also puts this domestic change in a dynamic perspective with the EU level (Major, 2005: 187). What is more, the term 'Europeanization' is now being utilized to underpin the dynamics of the EU enlargement process (Grabbe, 2002; 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005), in terms of the acceptance and implementation of both the 'regulative pillar' and 'normative pillar' (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 2) of the EU. Thus, it explains the process of the acceptance and assimilation of formal *acquis communautaire* by candidate states as well as less formal norms of democratic behavior.

Coming to the area of foreign policy, 'Europeanization' offers a perspective to grasp the dialectical relationship between the EU and national levels; between actors and the EU as an external incentive; and lastly between European integration (EPC/CFSP/ESDP) and its impact on national settings such as patterns of overall

change or persistence. Foreign policy cooperation at EU level is frequently criticized as being organized by intergovernmental decision-making leading to the absence of clear-cut benchmark and model of EU. Therefore, the impact of the EU is expected to be relatively difficult to detect because it takes the form of little beyond ‘voluntary’ modifications in national foreign policy, in contrast to obligatory implementation of EU laws and regulations in the first, community pillar. Despite criticisms and methodological difficulties inherent in the nature of this policy area, cooperation in foreign and security policy accompanied by broader cooperation within the EU is expected to have an impact on national foreign policies. In this vein, so as to account for this impact, Europeanization as an analytical framework is valuable in analyzing the dialectical relationship between national and EU levels as well as in unveiling mechanisms of domestic change. As one scholar put it, the Europeanization framework provides a “healthy corrective of overemphasis on interstate bargaining” by going deeper into domestic political settings with particular theoretical insights (Ginsberg, 2001).

Taking these ideas together, the growing salience of Europeanization as a research agenda emanates from the fact that it handles the process of ‘the EU impact, domestic factors, and resulting domestic change’ through taking into account the interaction between sub-national (interest groups, business associations, think-tanks, opposition parties and other non-state actors), national (government and other domestic decision-making circles) and EU levels (member states, technocrats in Brussels, requirements of candidacy in general and CFSP/ESDP in particular) to account for domestic change.

There is no standard notion in the Europeanization scholarship concerning the exact ways of exploration of modes and processes, i.e. mechanisms of EU influence and domestic/external constraints *vis-à-vis* pressures for change emanating from the EU. Yet, to gauge how the European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic policies and political systems, or to understand how domestic adaptation and processes of rule transfer, namely, ‘change’ can be traced, scholars generally resort to a variety of different approaches falling under the umbrella of ‘new institutionalism’. This dissertation constitutes no exception in this regard.

## **1.2 New Institutionalism**

Institutional theory prioritizes the role of institutions as essential forces in the analysis of political behavior. Representing a reaction to the ‘behavioralist revolution’ in the 1950s and 1960s, the new institutionalist perspective challenges the behaviorist reduction of political behavior in terms of either individual calculations of self-interest or the impact of broader social forces and criticizes the behaviorist denial of autonomous existence to political institutions. Scholars increasingly tend to use this perspective in analyzing member state behavior and identifying ways in which states have adapted their behavior as a result of their participation in EU institutional context (for example, see White, 2004a: 47). The crux of the approach is that ‘institutions matter’. Coined by March and Olsen (1984: 734), ‘new institutionalism’ goes beyond the old version of institutionalism by not only examining the effects of institutions on individuals but also by exploring the

interactions between the two. Institutions are viewed as a result of human action at the same time being a constraining factor for the latter (Peters, 2012). New institutionalism is based on a more extensive understanding of the term ‘institutions’ and unlike its old version, it focuses further on the broader normative environments within which institutions operate. In this regard, norms, understandings and principles are dealt with as forces of structuring political life. Also key to this analysis is that “institutional factors can shape both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power among them in a given polity” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 6). Also, new institutionalism has a much wider interest in understanding institutions within their specific socio-historical contexts.<sup>7</sup>

### **1.2.1 The Variants of New Institutionalism**

New institutionalism does not constitute a uniform body of thought and a significant number of variations exist under the banner of new institutionalism. Peters (2012) identified several of strands including normative institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, international institutionalism, network institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism. New institutionalism, however, has evolved through basically three variants: historical, rational choice (RCI) and sociological institutionalism (SI), each seeking to understand how institutions shape political strategies and influence political outcomes and each, in turn, painting a different

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<sup>7</sup> For further information about the new institutionalism, see March and Olsen (1989: 40-46); Hall and Taylor (1996); (1998); Peters (2012); Harmsen (2000); Lowndes (2002); Blyth (2002); Goldmann (2005); Hay and Wincott (1998).

picture with regard to the relationship between institutions and behavior and the process whereby institutions originate and change (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936-937). In principle, they all see institutions as rules structuring behavior. Although it lies beyond the confines of this study, the most basic dividing lines between rational choice and sociological institutionalism concern first, their focus on different aspects of role and function of human agency and second, the differing importance they attach to institutions in analyzing political behavior of individuals. Concerning the first dividing line, namely approach to human behavior, the rational choice version assumes that human behavior is instrumental and purposive, acting rationally in a consistent effort to maximize welfare and power and achieve interest-driven purposes in a given situation. Rational actors pursue the “logic of consequentialism” (March and Olsen, 1989; 1998) meaning that they have fixed preferences and act instrumentally in order to maximize their interests through resources at hand. In general, the actor’s goals and preferences are given exogenously in the institutional analysis denoting that it is possible to observe general patterns of behavior outside of the political system, which may be regarded universal predictors of behavior (Harmsen, 2000: 59). Indeed as Blyth argues, rational choice ontology perceives actors *a priori* to institutions and ideas, which are created by the actor for her/his own convenience (Blyth, 2002: 306).

Regarding the question of how institutions affect the behavior of individuals, the rational choice logic assigns institutions a somehow secondary importance while recognizing that specific institutional configurations may affect actors’ ability to maximize their benefit. It is believed that institutions influence the strategic

calculation of actors, but not the initial determination of their interests (Harmsen, 2000: 59). As actors may recognize that their interests may be better realized by participating in institutions, they are voluntarily constrained by the latter (Peters, 1999: 44). In fact, RCI denies that institutional factors produce behavior or shape individuals' preferences, which they perceive as prior to institutions and relatively stable. This is unlike other forms of institutionalism who see preferences as shaped by institutions (Lowndes, 2002).

Conversely, the sociological or constructivist version of new institutionalism hinges on the assumption that actors are mostly motivated by internalized identities, norms and values and they choose the most appropriate and legitimate course of action among alternatives, referring to the "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen, 1989; 1998). SI tends to see individuals as social beings and 'satisficers' acting habitually, rather than utility maximizers. It attaches a primary role to institutions in analysing the political behavior of individuals through emphasizing the interactive and mutually constitutive character of the relationship between institution and individual action. Political institutions are influential on actors' behavior to such an extent that they shape their identities, interests, beliefs and norms.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, as HI will be the main theoretical toolkit in the thesis, it will be examined in detail in the section 1.3.

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed analysis of this account, see Hall and Taylor (1996); March and Olsen (1989; 1998); Harmsen (2000).

### **1.2.2 The Relevance of New Institutionalism to the Case of Turkey's Cyprus Policy**

The relevance of new institutionalism for this dissertation lies on at least three factors. First, new institutionalism is useful in the sense that it accounts for actor behavior in the context of its interaction with institutional settings. Because new institutionalism does not only focus on the impact that institutions exert on individuals, but goes beyond that by exploring the interactions between the two (Lowndes, 2002: 91). Second, no matter which version is studied, 'processes of change' with regard to the Europeanization process underpin the new institutionalism, thereby providing a very fertile theoretical ground for this dissertation. Since institutions, both at national and European level, lie at the heart of this research, processes of change can be conceptualized through new institutionalist tools. Third, mediating (explanatory/intervening) factors leading to domestic change can be best theorized and exemplified within the new institutionalist perspective.

### **1.3 Historical Institutionalism**

This study adopts new institutionalism though a specific focus on its Historical Institutional (HI) variant. It is assumed in this study that HI provides a more coherent and consistent approach than other strands of institutional analysis in transcending a perennial dichotomy of structure (context and circumstances) and agency, institution and behavior as well as determinism and particularism in social sciences, since it opts for a complex juxtaposition of the two (Thelen and Steinmo,



1992; Hay and Wincott, 1998). Instead of relying either on institutional determinism or actor-based particularism, HI scholars tend to focus on reciprocal influence between institutional constraints and political strategies on the one hand, and interaction of ideas, interests and institutions, on the other (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Such a dynamic relationship in the institutions relies at the center of the HI framework which emphasizes that

The institutions ... can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies of political conflict and of choice (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 10).

The historical institutionalist framework conceptualizes institutions as formal and informal rules, norms, compliance procedures, routines, standard operating practices that structuring the relationship between individuals in a given polity or economy, which shape political actors' goals (in addition to self-interest) but also the way they structure power among them, privileging some and putting others at a disadvantage (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). Thus, the distinctive character of HI points out the asymmetries of power related to the development of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1998: 938). By not just shaping actors' strategies and interests (as in the rational choice branch) but their goals, ideas and preferences as well, and by mediating relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure and constrain political situations and outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9). Conceived in this way, institutions as "patterned relations" (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12) might span a diverse phenomena ranging from the structure of party systems, the rules of electoral competition, the relations among branches of government, the structure of economic

actors like trade unions, to norms and foreign policy making decisions. Moreover, unlike rational institutionalist scholars who overwhelmingly emphasize institutions' coordinating functions, historical institutionalists bring temporality and timing in politics and embrace institutions as the legacy of historical processes emerging from particular historical conflicts and constellations (Thelen, 1999: 382).

Historical institutionalists have a more eclectic understanding of human nature, arguing that individuals are both norm-abiding rule followers and self-interested strategic actors (Steinmo, 2008: 126). Thus, HI perspective does not reject the rational choice idea that actors are utility maximizers acting in accordance with their strategies and interests, but goes beyond that, seeking to know what they are trying to maximize and why they emphasize certain goals over others. This is underpinned by a historically based analysis of how these processes occur (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9). Indeed how one behaves hinges on the individual, on the context and the rules (Steinmo, 2008: 126). HI scholars want to know why a certain choice was made (which might be a product of either rule-following or interest-maximizing behavior, or, alternatively the both) and why a certain outcome took place by going into historical evidence (Steinmo, 2008: 126). By taking history seriously and paying attention to long-term processes, historical institutionalists try to make “understandable the overarching contexts and interacting processes that shape and reshape states, politics and public policy making” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 693).

Thus, HI presents a framework for a process-oriented analysis to account for policy continuities over time within countries and cross-national policy differences across time as well (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 10). Whereas for some, history

might be an essential interest in the past *per se*, for others, historical research might be a method in order to expand the universe of cases that can be used to illustrate (or verify) general theoretical models. But for HI scholars, history and historically-informed investigation matter because social reality can best be understood as tracing temporal processes and sequences and unfolding of processes over time (Pierson, 2000: 264; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 698-99; also see Steinmo, 2008: 127-28). History is central to HI since “political events happen within a historical context” and “behavior, attitudes and strategic choices take place inside particular social, political, economic and even cultural contexts” which has a direct consequence for the decisions or events (Steinmo, 2008: 127; see also Harmsen, 2000: 60-61). It is based on the logic that when an event occurs necessarily affects *how* it occurs. Rather than treating history as a chain of independent events, and variables independent of each other, HI considers interactive effects of multiple causal variables, focusing on how the sequence and temporal ordering of and interactions among different political and economic processes influence institutional and other outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 128, see also Collier and Collier, 1991). Examining patterns over time implies that an historical institutionalist places particular events in a particular time but without missing the overarching patterns, which is very likely to offer the most compelling dependent variables (Steinmo, 2008: 135). That is to say, they look at both the trees and the forests (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 711).

As one of the eminent analyst of HI points out, the historical institutionalist framework involves two critical themes. First, this body of thought is historical

because it realizes that political development must be regarded as a process that unfolds over time. And second, it is institutionalist because it acknowledges that much of the political implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether being formal rules, structures or norms (Pierson, 2000: 264-265).

What characterizes historical institutionalist scholarship's distinctive research strategy is the existing desire to address big and real-world empirical questions and outcomes (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 694-98; Steinmo, 2008: 125). HI scholars usually ask why something important happened, or did not happen, or ask why certain structures or patterns take place, e.g. revolutions, democracy, in some times and places, but not others? Why have welfare states emerged and developed along various paths? (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 697). Much attention has been paid to explaining variations in significant events and patterns with a due regard to context within which they take place. Tracing historical processes over time thus remains a way of understanding historical outcomes or matters of great interest such as revolutions, regime transformations, social movements, the development of the modern state, and transitions to democracy.

Historical institutionalism puts a special emphasis on ideas in that actors operate in an environment abound with institutions and ideas about institutions. Actors perceive and interpret what is possible, legitimate and desirable, and conceptualize and assess their strategic conduct through their cognitive filters (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956) or mental maps (Pierson, 2000: 260), which in turn are shaped “both by

the institutional environment in which they find themselves and existing policy paradigms and worldviews” (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956-957).

There are also other strands of new institutionalism even more associated with the role of ideas such as discursive institutionalism (see Schmidt, 2002; 2005; 2008) and normative institutionalism. Discursive institutionalism (DI) takes ideas and discourse seriously, by focusing on the substantive content of ideas and/or on the interactive processes that serve to generate those ideas and communicate them to the public. Discourse embraces not only ‘what is said’, including narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scenarios, or images. But it also refers to ‘who said what, to whom, where and why,’ or the interactive processes by which those ideas are constructed and communicated. Historical institutionalism, by contrast to DI, explains change from the outside, by taking courses of action and seeing how they perform over time. For Schmidt, it can nevertheless complement discursive institutionalist explanation, by illuminating how formal institutions shape discursive interactions. Discursive institutionalism endogenizes change, explaining how and why public actors bring about institutional change, thereby incorporating agency into HI (Schmidt, 2010).

According to Peters (2005: 5), DI represents ‘the least structural approach’ relative to other variants since its focus on ideas tends towards the exclusion of structural considerations. In DI, institution as a structure appears to imply common understandings and even beliefs rather than hierarchical formal structures, and they do not exist ontologically distinct from the individuals. Ideas are not hierarchical ordering principles, instead, they are the products of interaction, shared

communication and discussion among the members (Peters, 2012). Unlike discursive institutionalism, the HI has a much stronger concentration on organizations and structures (Peters, 2012). It is also argued that given its focus on ideas and the acceptance of ‘logic of appropriateness’ in shaping behavior, HI appears to come close to normative institutionalism. Notwithstanding commonalities with normative approach, HI has a “well-developed interest in history and the impact of institutions across time” (Peters, 2005: 84).

It has been a widely-held belief in the HI literature that, the approach is much better suited to explaining longitudinal stability, continuity and persistence of patterns within countries and cross-national variations (for example see Pierson, 2000; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Peters, 2012). In order to understand the sources of political and institutional stability, development, diversity and change, and to integrate the role of time and history in the analysis, historical institutionalists frequently employ two analytical tools: the concept of path-dependency and critical junctures. While the former involves the argument that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environment and political maneuvering but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories, thereby accounting for over-time continuities within countries. The latter suggests that crucial moments of institutional formation send countries along different developmental paths, thus providing a logic for grasping diversity and cross-national differences (Thelen, 1999: 387).

A more straightforward formulation of path-dependency implies that earlier policy and institutional choices made at specific point in time trigger a path of development or trajectory which are likely to impact on subsequent choices and

outcomes of a sequence of events. The concept of path-dependence represents a causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence by providing a tool to explain why particular historical moments have lasting consequences (Pierson, 2000: 252). Once established, every step along the path induces further movement in the same direction as the cumulative commitments and choices on the existing path generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity which make shifting from one path to another, or reversing the course costly and difficult.<sup>9</sup> A clear logic concerning the reinforcement of a particular path is captured by what Pierson (2000) calls the mechanism of increasing returns<sup>10</sup>, or a positive feedback effect, which implies that “the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path” for the reason that the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time, although it is not necessarily the most efficient alternative in the long run (Pierson, 2000: 252). Once established, the path becomes increasingly locked in as all the other actors adjust themselves to the prevailing pattern (Thelen, 1999: 385).

The HI literature provides illustrative examples to understand how positive feedback operates in institutional persistence. For example, Pierson (2000: 259) argues that the allocation of political authority to particular actors leads to power asymmetries, which in turn becomes a key source of positive feedback because

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<sup>9</sup> For an excellent analysis of how institutions induce self-reinforcing processes that make reversal of course increasingly unattractive over time, see North (1990).

<sup>10</sup> The concepts of path dependency and increasing returns are explained by what mathematicians called Polya urn process (see Pierson, 2000: 253). Apart from political science, this argument have been widely used in the study of international trade, the causes of economic growth, and the emergence of new technologies. For example, David (1985: 2007) applied the concept to the development of “QWERTY” typewriter keyboard by arguing that actors adapt to prevailing institutions by investing to learn the rules in ways that make institutions locked in (for example, people learn to type in a particular way and firms produce components that fit with the standard).

certain actors impose rules on others, or may use political authority to change the rules to enhance their power. Also, when policy is deemed an informal institution, and once designed, induces self-reinforcing processes too, by locking actors into a current option and making reversals of course increasingly unattractive overtime due to dramatically high cost of exist (Pierson, 2000: 259; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 710).

As a corollary to Pierson, Ikenberry (1994) discusses the distributive effects of institutions in relation to policy implications of the feedback mechanism. He asserts that political arrangements and policy feedbacks lead to the differential empowerment of actors in the sense that policies feedback overtime by blocking some policy alternatives since choices at one point in time set off particular paths. Similarly, Vogel (1996: 9) emphasizes that ideas about the role of the state in the market and structural features of the political and economic contexts of advanced industrial countries reflect and reinforce differences in cross-national trajectories. As seen, this body of thought does not conceive institutions as a neutral coordinating mechanism but rather as reflecting, reproducing, and magnifying particular patterns of power distribution by exploring power relations and integrating agency into the analysis (Thelen, 1999: 394).

The notion of change is articulated by the HI through the conceptual apparatus of critical junctures which constitutes the starting points for many path dependent processes.<sup>11</sup> Critical junctures are the choice points of departure from established

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<sup>11</sup> For a well-documented articulation of the concept, see Collier and Collier (1991), Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), David (2007); Pierson (2000); Thelen (1999); Pierson and Skocpol (2002).



patterns (Thelen, 1999), forking of the road (David, 2007), formative moments (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002), or turning points characterized by a situation in which

the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343).

As the definition above implies, the contingency (or non-predictability, choice selection among alternatives) and power of agency are core characteristics of critical junctures.

Another dominant explanation of change in the HI literature has been “punctuated equilibrium”<sup>12</sup> denoting that institutions remain stable (at equilibrium) until they are faced with (punctuated) an exogenous pressure for change. This logic, however, is criticized for disregarding endogenous sources of change and for downplaying the power of human agency (Steinmo, 2008: 129).

Although change is not a central element of the historical institutionalist approach, given its attentiveness to self-reinforced and change-resisted path-dependent processes, the relevant literature explicates numerous factors (external and internal) to the political process that might lead to cleavages in the existing pattern and trigger incentives for a break from the path (for example see, Thelen, 1999; Peters, 2005). Accordingly, institutions are capable of change –though a bounded

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<sup>12</sup> The term was put forth by Krasner (1984). For a detailed elaboration of the concept, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992); Pierson (2000).

one- through learning and can move along the path by responding to new information originating from their own experiences, or information coming from experiences of other institutions (Peters, 2005: 78). Also, political conflict with a specific reference to conflict over policy ideas is demonstrated as a source of institutional and policy change or ‘punctuations’ with the development of alternative policies (Peters, 2005: 79). For some scholars (such as Pierson, 1996; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 708-709), the path would be adaptive rather than static. These scholars treat incremental adjustment and evolution as a process of gradual change, arguing that dysfunctional elements are embedded in most institutions’ initial formation. Therefore, demand for change arises in response to inadequacies in institutional design.

### **1.3.1 Historical Institutionalism and Europeanization of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy**

The academic scholarship on Turkish-EU relations overwhelmingly concentrates on the issues including the pace of Turkey’s domestic transformation due to EU candidacy (EU-induced change, lack of change or backlash) with reference to ups and downs in the relations (Narbonne and Tocci, 2009; Ulusoy and Verney, 2009; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; 2008); the EU’s accession dynamics in relation to transformation of Cyprus conflict (Tocci, 2002; 2003; 2005; Ulusoy, 2008; Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005); or the EU’s role in conflict resolution concerning the Cyprus dispute (Diez and Tocci, 2009). Besides, there is an emerging literature

on Turkish Europeanization addressing the limits of the EU's transformative power and whether the Europeanization approach needs further qualification when meeting the Turkish case (Börzel, 2012; Nas and Özer, 2012). Looking through different theoretical lenses such as rational choice institutionalist and/or sociological institutionalist (Terzi, 2010; 2012; Yılmaz, 2012; Nas, 2012), and discursive accounts (Kaliber, 2012), the students of Turkish Europeanization converge on the idea that the EU's domestic impact on Turkey shows significant variation when discussing certain policy areas (Terzi, 2010; 2012; Kaliber, 2012; Macmillan, 2012; İzci, 2012; Tsarouhas, 2012), actors (Terzi, 2010; Öner, 2012; Öniş, 2009), and issue areas (Yılmaz, 2012; Özer, 2012). Moreover, it is generally observed in those studies that the EU conditionality and credibility of accession perspective has been widely studied as foreign policy pressure. Yet, the role of domestic actors and/or factors in relation to conditionality and accession process in inducing domestic change have been either eliminated (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010; Aydın and Açıkmüşe, 2007; Oğuzlu, 2010) or overestimated (Kaliber, 2012). Although the bulk of those studies are stimulating, they fall short of addressing the complex interactive pattern between the EU and domestic levels, which in fact lies at the heart of the second generation Europeanization studies (Börzel, 2012). Moreover, there has been little scholarly engagement with the HI as an analytical tool to investigate Turkey's relationship with the EU (but see Camyar and Tagma, 2010; İcoz, 2011), let alone its Cyprus policy.

Europeanization in the specific Turkish context should not be taken as dismissing the impact of Europe in general sense first on the 19th century Ottoman Empire and

later on the Republican period. In fact, the terms ‘Europeanization’, ‘Modernization’, ‘Westernization’ and ‘Civilization’ have been frequently used interchangeably in Turkish political discourse. The policy of Westernization has been realized from the 19th century onwards by the Ottoman Empire as an antidote to the decline of the Empire (see Camyar and Tagma, 2010). Measures in this regard included a desire to be integrated in the European state system as well as course of action to revive the state by modernizing the administration and the military (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). Coming to Republican era, for the Turkish state elite, the attraction of Europe remained undiminished. As Europe began reorganizing itself into the Common Market, the Turkish state elite translated their goal of Europeanization into the policy of integrating Turkey into this new European structure (Aydınlı and Waxman, 2001). The desire to become ‘European’ as well as the belief in Western values and virtues of Western political systems has been crystallized in Turkey’s membership to various Western institutions such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), NATO as well as its association status within the EEC (European Economic Community). According to Turkish elites, membership to these institutions would not merely anchor Turkey in the Western state system but would also work towards the fulfillment of the state elite’s centuries-old dream of being accepted as part of Europe (Müftüler Baç, 2005:19). No doubt, Turkey’s transition to multi-party system in 1950 could be seen as another piece of evidence in this context. Hence, always having a European outlook and aspiration, for the Turkish political and military elites, EU membership reflected the ultimate

solidification and confirmation of Turkey's 'European', 'Westernized', and 'modern' identity (for similar points see Heper, 2005; Oğuzlu, 2006; Karaosmanoğlu, 2000).

Seen from this light, the Helsinki decision of December 1999 granting Turkey a candidacy status to the EU appears to be a crucial evolutionary point with essential feedback effects along the same path, i.e., Turkey's longstanding European vocation. Turkey's candidacy to the EU can be regarded as a structural precondition for a particular outcome, notably the possibility of Turkey's full membership. Notwithstanding the association relations dating back to 1963 Ankara Agreement, the Helsinki decision made Turkey-EU relations more institutionalized, as it involving rigid compliance criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) and monitoring mechanisms (Commission's Regular Reports). Further, the launching of accession negotiations in October 2005, which embraced benchmarking in the negotiations of individual chapters, strived to put Turkey along a membership path.

In terms of relations with the EU, the established characteristics of Turkey's Cyprus policy has its own imprint on the policy processes and outcomes, which in turn constrain Turkish policy makers' current preferences and choices. Yet, when the EU is conceived as a structural feedback mechanism, both at economic, ideological, cultural and organizational levels, Turkey's Cyprus policy turns out to be a dependent variable, thereby becoming a focal point of this dissertation's analysis of path dependent institutional change, inertia, retrenchment, persistence and so on. Therefore, it is asked how the nature of Turkish-EU relations, evolving in a particular path, impacted on government's action/behavior/policies on Cyprus? 'Policy' is treated in this study as an informal institution and further, while we

explain the origins and evolution of the Cyprus conflict, we will be tracing the self-reinforcing dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus policy. Once established, policies become a structuring of rules for both decision-making elites and the general public alike, since a specific policy design may constrain enormously the resources and strategies available to political actors and they, therefore, become important in shaping political processes and outcomes (such as the partial suspension of Turkey's negotiation process due to the crisis over the Additional protocol).

Once tracing the path of Turkey's Cyprus policy, it has been realized that policy persistence in Turkey's Cyprus policy can best be captured by the HI framework. The AKP government could not transform Turkey's Cyprus policy, but only a 'limited and partial change' occurred in the course of 2002-2004. Why? Turkey's Cyprus policy has become entrenched and locked-in overtime, making it difficult to reverse for government elites who have been constrained by the initial formulators' prior choices (evolved from 1960 to 1974 and from 1998 to 2004). The overwhelming role of the ideas of the security-oriented military and civilian bureaucracy, as initial formulators of Turkey's Cyprus policy, who used to see foreign policy and specifically the Cyprus problem as their *domaine réservé*, and the particular historical context (1963-1967 experience of inter-communal violence leading to Turkish military intervention in 1974) within which policy was formulated, have also been endorsed by the majority of Turkish society. Altogether they constitute the institutional, ideational, and historical aspects of the particular path chosen by Turkey on its Cyprus policy.

That being said, the attractiveness of HI for this dissertation emanates from several factors. First, it provides a useful analytical bridge between agent and structure (understood as context and circumstance) without downplaying either the role of political agency or the institutions in explaining outcomes. Moreover, as Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 27) succinctly articulated, HI helps us capture “the dynamic interplay of humans both as agents and subjects of historical change”, which would thus allow for a flexibility to treat political behavior both as a dependent and independent variable influenced by macro socio-political and economic structures (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 11). Third, HI offers the theoretical leverage for grasping policy continuities over time within countries. It incorporates the notion of ‘contingency’ into the analysis through historical context, ideas, preferences of political agents, conflict and choice in shaping outcomes though without disregarding overarching temporal processes and sequence of patterns over time.

The EU’s relations with Turkey here acted as both a structural and exogenous constraint. Apart from Turkey’s persistent bid for EU accession; the credibility of accession perspective provided to Turkey, the effectiveness of EU conditionality; Cyprus’ application and its eventual EU membership; EU’s linkage policy in Cyprus problem and compliance procedures of Copenhagen criteria, all operated as exogenous institutional factors for the AKP government since 2002. Thus, the specific pattern and nature of the Turkish-EU relations is regarded as part of an important structural consideration for Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

There are also endogenous dynamics constraining the policy choices of the government. In the context of accession, by creating incompatibility between EU requirements and the domestic situation, the EU conditionality disturbs the domestic *status quo* in the candidate state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; 2007). More precisely, in the EU accession process, conditionality may solve some policy problems in favor of certain domestic actors, generally by increasing their influence in the political system. Thus Europeanization also operates “indirectly” through redistributing resources across domestic actors. The incompatibility may furnish some domestic actors with opportunities (i.e. political, legal, economic resources or legitimacy for their ideas) *vis-à-vis* others, to surpass opponents and comply with the EU criteria (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58; Grabbe, 2003). Conversely, the adoption of EU’s requirements may produce ‘welfare or power costs’ for some actors who would like to rebuff the EU conditionality on several grounds to retain their relative power position and influence in the political system. Indeed, from Turkey’s declared candidacy at Helsinki European Council in 1999 onwards, the European accession process has apparently disturbed the domestic political equilibrium in Turkey by boosting the power and influence of some domestic actors over others. To illustrate, the incompatibility between the EU position and the Turkish position over Cyprus took the form of EU conditionality by leading to a realignment of two opposing coalitions and their power struggles within Turkey, acting as veto players and facilitating actors. In this study, *veto players* include the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, TSK); the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the other opposition party Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP), who emerged as passionate



advocates of the *status quo ante* in Turkey's Cyprus policy. *Facilitating actors*, acting as pro-EU reformists and championing a federalist solution in Cyprus, include the government under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) as well as the increasing participation of NGOs, particularly the most eminent and effective ones in terms of lobbying activities across the Ankara-Brussels axis, such as the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (*Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*, TÜSİAD).

The Europeanization framework also suggests that any policy change required by EU conditionality is ultimately decided and implemented by the government that assesses the benefits of complying with EU rules *vis-à-vis* the domestic costs for their adoption (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). While it was the AKP government who decided a policy change in Cyprus by actively endorsing the UN-sponsored peace plan for the reunification of the island, the capabilities of domestic actors as veto players and facilitating actors should not be overlooked. This is because those actors influence the government's decision to facilitate, retard or reject policy change, particularly once the cabinet became reluctant after 2005 to take radical steps to transform Cyprus policy to comply with the EU conditionality. This highlights the fact that the pace and extent of Europeanization is not linear, unidirectional and homogenous but it is rather context-dependent. Therefore, one needs to deconstruct the interactive pattern between various elements at the domestic and EU levels. Keeping in mind that governments –as political actors- may act with different motivations at different periods, this dissertation argues that the cost-benefit calculation by the AKP government in formulating its Cyprus policy was largely

affected by a dynamic combination of EU-related and domestic factors, such as the prevalent desire for EU membership in society and the state establishment, the ability of the Union to provide a credible membership perspective backed up by an even-handed approach to the Cyprus problem and the strong resistance of anti-reformist domestic circles in their struggle with pro-EU forces.

### **1.3.2 Research Challenges**

While explaining Turkey's Cyprus policy by using a HI framework, one should also point out research challenges that have arisen from the weaknesses of the HI framework in terms of its theoretical and methodological limits. Historical institutionalist scholarship has been generally questioned on two grounds. The first criticism is centered on the 'scientific credibility' of the HI framework (for example, Peters, 2012; Steinmo, 2008; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Thelen, 1999; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996). HI was particularly criticized by the rational choice institutionalists as inelegant, atheoretical and was even dismissed as storytelling (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12). Therefore, prominent HI scholars have pointed to the need to devise a more compelling and explicit theorizing on the interaction of ideas, interests and institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 14; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 950). Indeed, the historical institutionalist research programme is endowed with a motivation to explain real world puzzles and rare events, rather than to find generalizable laws of history or politics (Steinmo, 2008: 134). It was argued that HI scholarship does not provide a fertile ground for prediction, but it is rather

interested in explanation. Yet, for HI scholars, predictions can only be “proximate” due to “contingency and the complex interaction of interdependent variables over time” (Steinmo, 2008: 134). At best, this would become an advantage for avoiding the dangers of capture by theory (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 718), which would bring reductionism through elegant but unrealistic laws at the expense of the complexity of human political action (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 26).

Second, notwithstanding promising attempts at exploring change such as critical junctures, punctuated equilibrium and path dependency, HI is criticized for devoting less attention to a sophisticated understanding and compelling theorizing of dynamics inducing change, other than illuminating, on an *ad hoc* basis, learning, environmental change, dysfunctions of the initial design, political and military conflict, power asymmetry, economic crisis and external shocks as landmark developments leading to change (Peters, 2012; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942; Pierson, 2000; but see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 as an exception). Other than the question of institutional dynamism, HI was criticized for being silent with regard to the interaction of institutional and ideational variables in policy formation and processes of institutional creation (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 955; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2).

In our view, no matter how accurate or not those criticisms are, this study utilizes a HI framework due to the benefits that this brings along. This dissertation benefits from HI premises when considering the relevance of temporality and sequencing of temporal processes over time, explaining embedded persistency (in Turkey’s Cyprus policy), its focus on institutions such as political actors (decision-makers, political parties, NGOs), policy (Turkey’s Cyprus policy), and Turkey-EU relations as

structural constraint or opportunities, contingent nature of human agent involving ideas, choice, decision, power as political aspects of institutional stability and change; and placing political behavior in a historical context. Thus, HI is fitting not only because it is a core contribution to the EU-Turkey relations literature, but also because the political treatment of history is key to understanding the Cyprus problem.

#### **1.4 Rationale for Selecting Turkey's Cyprus Policy as a Case Study**

Among the many hurdles on Turkey's journey to the EU, the Cyprus problem occupies a special place as different bodies of the EU have consistently put pressure on Ankara to recognize the Republic of Cyprus as well as to withdraw the Turkish troops from the island. In fact, the reasons for selecting Turkey's Cyprus policy as a case study are multifold. First, the Cyprus policy embraces almost all basic contours/determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) such as diplomacy, law, security, morality, geopolitics, history, power politics, confrontation, reconciliation, economy and social dimension.<sup>13</sup> In other words, since Turkey's Cyprus policy is to a large extent reflective and indicative of parameters underlying TFP in a broader sense, it is possible to argue that any policy change (as a result of Europeanization) in Turkey's Cyprus policy would strengthen the linkage between Europeanization and national foreign policies (TFP as a case) in the literature. What is more, the Cyprus impasse has been occupying a central place within TFP making with

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<sup>13</sup> This argument was confirmed by a career diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs in an interview with the author at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

implications for regional and global security, especially since 1974. It also carries enormous importance in terms of the “national interest” with strong emotional characteristics touching on the feelings of national pride of a large majority of Turkish society, governments and other domestic players such as the bureaucracy (especially the Foreign Ministry), Parliament and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) alike.

Second, it is very difficult to isolate Turkey’s foreign policy steps, especially on the Cyprus dispute, from the extent and quality of its relations with the EU. Indeed, the Cyprus problem is tied to Turkey’s bid for EU membership as part of the Political Criteria and Enhanced Political Dialogue since its EU candidacy in 1999. Even before that, it has been representing a major parameter determining the nature and pace of Turkey’s relations with the EU owing to both internal decision-making mechanism of the EU, and the involvement of certain member states like Greece and Cyprus into the dispute with vested interests against Turkey’s regional security concerns.

Third, the EU’s “linkage policy”<sup>14</sup> of tying Turkey’s accession ambition with its orientation towards the Cyprus dispute was implicitly stated by the EU’s various documents of Turkish-EU relations, including the Helsinki European Council’s Presidency Conclusions, Accession Partnerships, the European Commission’s Progress Reports and the Negotiation Framework Document as well. Whereas Cyprus membership to the EU with a prior settlement of the problem was not

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<sup>14</sup> “Linkage policy” pursued by the EU has been stated by several authors such as Brewin (2000); Müftüler-Baç and McLaren (2003); Müftüler-Baç and Güney (2005); Tocci (2002); Tsakonas and Dokos (2004).

deemed a condition for Cyprus starting from Corfu and then the Essen European Council decisions in 1994, a solution was put forward as an additional criterion for Turkey's accession process. More practically, one can observe a correlation between the degree of Turkey's contribution to a settlement in the form of giving tacit support to inter-communal talks or terminating the support and intensifying financial, economic, security and institutional ties with Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the nature of its relations with the EU.

The fourth reason relates to the particularities of “accession Europeanization”<sup>15</sup>, which underlines that candidates are not in a strong position to ‘upload’ or project their national preferences onto the EU level because formal accession process involves highly ‘asymmetrical power relations’ due to strict accession conditions and the membership carrot being at the EU’s disposal. Therefore, the “nature of accession process has reduced the ability of candidates to negotiate concessions such as transitional periods and derogations” (Grabbe, 2003: 305) thereby giving a ‘top-down’ and vertical character to Europeanization process.

### **1.5 Methodology**

This thesis employs Europeanization as its conceptual framework and HI as a theoretical tool to explain how and to what extent Turkey's Cyprus policy in the post-Helsinki period has been affected by the interaction between domestic actors/factors and exogenous factors at the EU level. Historical institutionalist

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<sup>15</sup> The term was coined by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2007).

insights of path-dependency and a process-tracing methodology is applied to the analysis of how or to what extent Turkey's Cyprus policy in the post-Helsinki period has changed and how the process of this policy change has been affected by the interaction between domestic factors/actors and exogenous factors at the EU level.

Regarding the methodology of this study, a qualitative approach centered on process-tracing with regard to EU-Turkey relations and Turkey's Cyprus policy is backed up by qualitative research techniques of interviews and content analysis of primary and secondary documents. Particularly, elite interviews (including politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats and journalists, particularly officers in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Northern Cyprus, officials of the European Commission, especially its Delegation to Ankara); content analysis of primary official documents, binding and advisory decisions of the EU, statements and speeches of policy-makers and diplomats of the EU and Turkey (including declarations, agreements, policy positions and so on); memoirs of important historical and political figures relating to Turkish foreign policy and Cyprus issue and lastly, primary documents pertaining to Turkish-EU relations are used. Throughout the whole process of researching and writing this dissertation, the most important difficulty faced was one related to qualitative study limitations, particularly the nature of the Cyprus issue itself. The high level of dynamism and ups and downs embedded in this perennial debacle and the uncertain fate of ongoing peace talks presented a challenge for researching Cyprus as a case study. We tried to address this problem by stopping the empirical analysis at 2014, so as not to get carried away with the most recent developments.

## **1.6 Chapter Breakdown**

This dissertation is divided in six parts: the first part is the introduction. The second chapter discusses the application of Europeanization as a research agenda to the unique area of foreign policy. It particularly asks through which processes and mechanisms do European level developments (institutions, policies and identities) penetrate the domestic level and produce change? Which mechanisms seem more appropriate with regard to foreign policy field and why? Could the same mechanism(s) be applied both to current members and candidates as well? Does Turkey constitute an exception in this regard? Thus the chapter provides a comparative perspective on Europeanization of national foreign policies by illustrating the cases of UK and Poland, as member state examples, with reference to how it occurs in the accession context.

The third chapter is devoted to a brief explanation of Turkey-EU relations starting from Turkey's application to the European Economic Community (EEC) for Association status in the early 1960s onwards. Then the evolution of those relations is analyzed with regard to the origins and developments of the Cyprus problem with a specific emphasis on the Cypriot application to the EU and its eventual membership, with an elaboration of how it evolved from being a bilateral Turkish-Greek problem to a trilateral one, affecting Turkish-EU relations.

As already mentioned, during the accession process, Europeanization is achieved "directly" through negotiations and the principle of EU conditionality (for example, see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007; Grabbe, 2003; 2006). The fourth chapter



elaborates on the sources of incompatibility (misfit) between EU requirements and Turkey's responses to the Cyprus dispute. It particularly looks at the policy positions of Turkey, both prior to and the aftermath of AKP's coming to power, and the EU with regard to the Cyprus problem. In addition, it explores how Turkish-EU relations have been affected by the extent of misfit, which provides the degree of EU's 'adaptational pressures' in the form of conditionality.

Apart from 'direct' Europeanization through the EU conditionality by disturbing the domestic status quo in the candidate state, Europeanization operates 'indirectly', through redistributing resources across domestic actors as well. The fifth chapter presents how veto players and facilitating actors have placed themselves *vis-à-vis* the Cyprus imperative in the context of the process of Turkey's accession to the EU; besides repositioning domestic actors as either facilitators or barriers in response to European requirements (or conditionality), an analysis of different factors affecting the cost-benefit calculation by the AKP government in implementing Cyprus policy is illustrated. This chapter also explains how Europeanization has operated in the Cyprus case in different periods by concomitantly generating differing levels of impact on policy change. In conclusion, dwelling upon Turkey's Cyprus policy in the accession process, and by building on the HI perspective, this dissertation provides a critical analysis of the EU's potential for inducing change in the foreign policies of 'candidate' nations. By building on the premises and insights of the HI framework, the EU's insufficiency as an exogenous/structural constraint, is particularly reviewed with regard to Turkey's credibility of membership perspective, the EU's institutional structure and political will (or lack of it), by paying additional

attention to the repercussions on, and interaction with, Turkey's domestic political settings embedded in certain historical and institutional structures.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **EUROPEANIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY: CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES**

#### **2.1 Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Its Applicability**

The review of the Europeanization literature reveals that plenty of work has been devoted to the EU's socio-economic policy areas where regulatory and obligatory rules and laws required greater convergence among members, which is in turn relatively easy to detect. Nevertheless, Europeanization as a process of domestic adaptation in foreign policy has acquired a widespread usage with the emergence of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1979 and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) following the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 (Featherstone, 2003: 10). In other words, increasing EU efforts in foreign policy cooperation throughout the 1990s as well as the Union's highly ambitious Eastern Enlargement project led to a revival of scholarly interest in Europeanization of foreign policy. Hence, a specific research agenda of Europeanization and foreign policy has evolved through the gradual increase of EU competences in this area.

In fact, the type of policy (foreign) to be Europeanized or whether this policy area belongs to the first or second pillar is highly instrumental to understanding how Europeanization evolves, especially once the predominantly intergovernmentalist nature of foreign policy field in the EU's edifice is taken into account. As indicated before, scholarship on Europeanization produced various definitions and different analytical models in line with the authors' respective vision as to whether change/impact occurs at the level of policy, polity, politics, institutions, ideas, interests or ways of doing things. Therefore, Europeanization "follows no single logic" (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). When it comes to Europeanization of foreign policy, for example, the area where the EU has a rather loose policy framework for adjustment (since the CFSP rarely requires the adaptation of national legislation and where different instruments and procedures are available for policy-makers), a clear pattern of 'institutional' adaptation may not become suitable (for example, see Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 14; Smith M.E., 2004: 58-59).

Even though there is a relatively broad literature on Europeanization in Comparative Politics/Public Policy school (such as Olsen, 1996; Radaelli, 2003; Börzel, 1999; Börzel, 2005; Cowles et al., 2001; Knill, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003 among others), this is seemingly not the case with application of the term in foreign policy area.<sup>1</sup> The limited amount of conceptual research on Europeanization of foreign policy can be attributed to both methodological

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<sup>1</sup> Key texts concerning Europeanization of foreign and security policy include Major (2005); Wong (2006); (2007); Ioakimidis (2000); (2001); Featherstone (1998); (2000); Featherstone and Kazamias (2001); Fanes (2001); Natorski (2004); Barbé (2000); Economides (2005); Smith, K.E. (2000); Smith, M.E. (2000); (2004); Torreblanca (2001); Escibano and Lorca (2005); Alaminos (2000); Tonra (2000); (2001); (2003); Manners and Whitman (2000); Miskimmon (2007); Gross (2007); (2009); Rieker (2006); Aydın and Açıkmese (2007); Ulusoy (2008); Bache and Jordan (2006); Stavridis (2003); Couloumbis (2000); Tsakonias (2001); Terzi (2010); (2012).

problems of its application to this policy area and the unique characteristics of foreign policy at national and European levels.

First, member states are very sensitive regarding their sovereignty on foreign policy issues, where national concerns prevail over European ones. In other words, foreign policy is one of the core tenets of national sovereignty. This partly reveals the lack of consensus and variations in degree of compliance among member states, thereby leading to different interpretations of behavior (Natorski, 2004: 7). This then explains why the CFSP still operates through intergovernmental bargaining and why the pace of integration in foreign policy issues has been more piecemeal than first pillar policy areas. Thus, “treaties, not legislation, govern CFSP” (Major, 2005: 183). In foreign policy cooperation,<sup>2</sup> all key decisions are taken unanimously; powers of supranational institutions are highly curtailed (i.e. the European Court of Justice and European Commission) and finally governments are not subject to legally binding adaptation pressures in the form of laws and rules as in communitized areas such as transport, environment or agricultural policy.

Second, highly related to nature of foreign policy explained above, the Union is not capable of serving a clear-cut institutional or policy model via CFSP to be

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<sup>2</sup> Established in 1979, the EPC initially developed outside of the Treaty framework. It consisted mainly of regular meetings to coordinate national stances on international political issues. The EPC was incorporated in the Treaty by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, although still on an intergovernmental basis. The EPC was superseded by the CFSP as the intergovernmental second pillar of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. As such, the CFSP did not operate with the same legal instruments as Pillar I, such as directives or regulations. Instead, it used to be equipped with tools like common declarations, positions, statements and joint actions. The Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on 1 January 2009, eliminated the three-pillar structure, by making the CFSP a more integral part of the EU. The legal basis for the CFSP was laid out in the Title V, Articles 21 through 46 of the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, unanimity is retained in areas of foreign and security policy, which is still “subject to specific rules and procedures” (Article 24(1) Treaty on European Union). <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN>. Accessed on 22.12.2014.

emulated or taken over by its member states as in communitized areas. More precisely, the EU foreign policy agenda is often characterised by deep-rooted cleavages and tensions among member states as seen in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and in the 2003 Iraq war.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, as far as the CFSP is concerned, the point of reference through which the level of divergence/convergence is determined appears to be more diffuse than any other policy area of the EU, where visible institutional and legal rules and norms exist. Thus, for a researcher, it seems to be difficult, though not impossible, to detect any foreign policy adaptation or transformation.

The final concern is related to a methodological challenge in pinpointing the net EU impact or influence from other domestic and global processes for change (see e.g. Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005; Börzel, 2003; Major, 2005). Domestic sources of change may well be tied to government changes, pressure groups and public opinion (Major, 2005: 183). In terms of exogenous factors for policy change other than the EU, one can consider the effects of globalization, international political events (e.g. end of the Cold War, conflicts in the Balkans, terrorist attacks on September 11, Iraq War in 2003 and so on), affiliations with other international institutions (such as NATO and IMF), and a possible special relationship with third parties (such as the U.S.). Hence, it is not always easy to determine whether Europeanization has “overtaken domestic processes or just added to them” (Radaelli, 2004: 9). Moreover, pertaining to the European impact, the extent of change in foreign policy of candidate states like Turkey and their propensity to an EU-oriented foreign policy is likely to hinge upon such factors

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<sup>3</sup> Actually, the history of European integration in foreign policy is also laden with longstanding splits between federalists versus intergovernmentalists; Atlanticists versus Europeanists and between big and small states about the nature and future trajectory of European integration (Major, 2005).

of “whether the EU fully supports the Europeanization processes of candidate states by offering them promising rewards and costly punishments”; “whether the parties consider each other as security threats or security providers”; “whether the EU is seriously and wholeheartedly encouraging the pro-EU local circles in their attempts at adopting the EU’s norms and rules”; whether the EU provides them with clear timetables for eventual accession backed by detailed programmes aimed at the acceleration of the membership process”; and “whether candidate states fully share in the idea that the most appropriate thing for them would be to do what the European Union requires in the accession criteria” (Smith, K.E., 2000: 33-46; Grabbe, 2002: 249-68 cited in Oğuzlu, 2004: 97).

In spite of the aforementioned challenges in application of Europeanization concept in the foreign policy field, we still need to understand how this process unfolds, namely the mechanisms of Europeanization, and how it actually works in member states, especially during the accession process.

A number of scholars documented possible changes taking place in members states’ foreign policies in the context of Europeanization. Among the early studies concerning Europeanization of foreign policy, Keatinge (1973: 138) pointed to how Irish foreign policy has been reoriented as a result of its membership to the EEC. Later, Saeter (1980) applied a similar perspective to the case of West Germany. Particularly within the last three decades there have been only a few works concerning foreign policies in connection with the CFSP. Among them, Hill’s early study (1983:199-201) acknowledged the use of the EPC as a card in political bargaining, its relevance as a factor enhancing a country’s role and external identity in the world as well as its function in showing less domestic accountability to both public opinion and parliaments. Later, the

edited volume of Hill (1996) enumerated a wide range of institutional aspects of adaptation to the EU, administrative and political domestic factors, state's attitudes towards the CFSP, socialization effects and shifts in public and elites' opinion. The study further pointed out that the EPC has served for participating states the following functions: increased influence in multilateral fora and in bilateral relations with other countries or blocks; improving their prestige and international image (i.e. via Presidencies); a pretext for inaction; a means for deflecting external pressure; and a cover for shifts in national foreign policy. What is more, smaller states may enjoy access to more and better information, an expansion and modernization of foreign services and influence in the attitudes of major powers (Hill and Wallace, 1996). While providing an insightful comparative empirical evidence, the study does not provide explicit theoretical explanations.

Manners and Whitman (2000) make use of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to examine the foreign policies of the EU member states in a comparative framework. The work assesses the impact of Europeanization on member states' national foreign policies without explicitly acknowledging the term 'Europeanization'. Proposing a distinctive 'European' approach to FPA, they mainly analyze three set of issues each representing different elements shaping the foreign policies of EU member states: foreign policy change, foreign policy process and foreign policy actions. In terms of foreign policy change which is more relevant to our study, the authors discussed adaptation and socialisation. Overall, their findings point to both diversities as well as similarities, among others: national EU foreign policies are separable but no longer separate from the EU context; there is some socialization effect but not complete; domestic,



European and national foreign policies have become difficult to differentiate in this multi-level political system in the EU; there remains divergences mainly because of history, tradition, culture and bureaucratic politics (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 243-273).

Ben Tonra (2001), in his comparative study of foreign policies of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, enumerates the effects of CFSP upon national policies as:

- access to more information even of higher quality;
- unparallel access to international decision-makers;
- expansion and restructuring of administration and development of positive and dynamic diplomatic culture.

In his contribution to the edited volume of Manners and Whitman, Tonra (2000: 245) studies the Europeanization of national policies of Denmark and Ireland according to which he identifies Europeanization of foreign policy as:

A transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making.

What is evident in the above definition is the emphasis on norms and values as important subjects of change as well as the idea that Europeanization of foreign policy is not a clear-cut domestic policy adaptation, but more a gradual and diffused process requiring transformation, which may thus take time. In fact, foreign policy Europeanization is seen by many scholars as much more a process of socialization than a forced and formal adaptation (for example see Tonra,

2001; Glarbo, 2001; Aggestam, 2004). Furthermore, the most important contribution of the Europeanization concept in foreign policy area according to those scholars is that the unexpected socialization of foreign policy elites brought integration forward which was designed to avoid supranationalism at the outset (Wong, 2007: 333). This evaluation seems especially appropriate for actual members and latecomers of Eastern enlargement, rather than for 'would-be members' including Turkey, who does not have so much discretionary power at hand to question, negotiate or defer existing European positions and policies which are being formulated without input from candidates.

From a similar point of view, Smith (2000) provides a conceptual framework for measuring change in the foreign policies of member states and notes that member states gradually reorient their foreign policy cultures through their enduring participation in CFSP. For him four major indicators of domestic adaptation to EU foreign policy cooperation are: elite socialization; bureaucratic reorganization; constitutional change; and the increase in public support for EPC/CFSP (Smith, M.E., 2000: 614; Smith, M.E., 2004: 746-747).

Others, like Hill and Wallace, stress the transformed context in which member states operate by saying that "...habits of cooperation, accepted advantages of shared information, responses to common threats, cost saving through increased collaboration have all significantly altered patterns of national policy-making" (1996: 12). In this context, they do not dismiss the possibility that participation in the EPC/CFSP helps to bolster a shared sense of identity and mitigate perpetual differences (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 9). The common belief of those authors stated above is the possibility of a redefinition of national interests

and identities in the context of 'Europe' which fits rather nicely with a sociological institutionalist or constructivist accounts of Europeanization.

In the edited volume of Carlsnaes, Sjørnsen and White (2004), Jørgensen dwells upon at least three different meanings of Europeanization in the context of European foreign policy. First, the term Europeanization is used to describe 'adaptation', that is, how national foreign policies have been changed, transformed or adapted as a result of European integration. The second meaning of Europeanization is about some aspects of foreign policy being elevated to EU policy-making level (elevation), which would include, for example, foreign economic policy and more specifically, decisions regarding tariffs and other trade related issues. The third meaning refers to processes of 'empowerment' of the bulk of member states who are able to conduct a foreign policy that goes beyond their own borders, that is through gaining an international horizon, access to increased information and having access to major decision-makers, participation in making of EU foreign policy, avoiding fears of both being trapped in traditional great power politics and being targeted by major non-EU actors (Jørgensen, 2004a: 48-50).

In his focus on the issue of Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy, though acknowledging that changes were part of the democratisation process that Spain underwent since 1975, Torreblanca (2001) attributes the wider process of political, social and economic changes to the EU membership itself. In his twofold typology of policy change, he refers to logics of 'policy convergence' (downloading) and 'policy transfer' (uploading). The main reason behind the former has been to be accepted as a full and loyal member of the Western

democratic nations, while the logic behind the latter has been to promote national interests in Latin America and Mediterranean by using EU membership. In both cases, European foreign policy-making institutions have structured preferences as well as outcomes in Spain.

Ioakimidis (2001) focuses on the Europeanization of Greece and its foreign policy by concluding that

(...) Europeanization works towards the direction of weakening the relative power, role, control and autonomy of the central state institutions, while at the same time strengthening the power and autonomy of the subnational units, actors and society as a whole (2001: 75).

While his assessment above refers to the wider process of Europeanization of Greece, in another study Ioakimidis points out that in the case of the CFSP “Europeanization can be taken to involve the internalization of the objectives, policy styles, procedural and institutional requirements of the CFSP by an EU member state’s foreign policy” (Ioakimidis, 2000: 359). The author then elaborates on the Europeanization process that Greece has been undergoing in foreign policy area at four distinct but interrelated levels:

1. European policy (national contribution for the development of the EU)
2. foreign policy objectives (broadened thematic and geographic policy agenda)
3. policy instruments and style (pragmatic, problem-solving and issue-oriented style; increasing role of multilateral organizations, importance of negotiation and compromise)

4. foreign policy-making in terms of institutions, procedures and processes (reorganization of the foreign ministry, institutionalization and de-personalization of policy-making).

Although there remained an existential ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993) at the heart of the CFSP, what is certain is the embedded character of structures of cooperation as well as substantial hurdles on the way either towards explicitly federal foreign policy or the reassertion of national autonomy (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 5). Accordingly, for some scholars European foreign policy (EFP henceforth) can be defined as “a system of external relations, a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions” (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 5). The same scholars also point to a dialectical relationship between agency and structure of the EFP which is seen as “...an intensive system of external relations, in which the cooperating actors which constitute the system intertwine” (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 12). In a similar vein, White highlights the fragmented nature of EFP by arguing that it comprises three different types of ‘subsystems’ which are:

- ‘*Community foreign policy*’ (refers to external consequences of the Common Commercial Policy codified by Treaties of Rome and cover trade and development relations with third parties thus constituting the foreign economic policy dimension of EFP;
- ‘*Union foreign policy*’ (refers to political dimensions of EFP and consists of the coordination of the foreign policies of member states in a process that, from the 1970s until the Single European Act of 1986 was conducted

outside Community framework in the name of European Political Cooperation – EPC- and then upgraded by Treaty on European Union –TEU- by setting up the CFSP and then ESDP as a separate pillar;

- ‘*National foreign policy*’ refers to the separate foreign policies of member states (White, 2004a: 54-55).

Obviously, national foreign policies are not replaced by EFP. Yet, as White states “the context in which they operate, the processes through which they are made and their outputs all show very clearly the growing impact of Europeanization” (White,1996: 60). What is frequently underlined about the CFSP is the fact that it is intergovernmentalist in nature, meaning that primacy rests with national capitals rather than the Commission but “intergovernmentalism in theory does not erode sovereignty: in practice, over time, it too has ties that bind” (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 11). It should be noted that what we mean by EFP in this study is particularly the CFSP sub-system in the context of Turkish accession process to the EU.

Among a number of empirical studies documenting the impact of the EU on national foreign policies of member states (though some of them consists of security, defence and commercial matters), Wong (2006) focused on the effect of EU membership and European institutions such as EPC, CFSP and ESDP on French policy towards East Asia. He applied all three dimensions to the Europeanization of French foreign policy by arguing that states joining the EU have to adapt to pressures for change in their foreign policy emanating from the EU even before accession. What was evident from French policy towards China, Vietnam and Japan for Wong was that Europeanization has taken place with its bottom-up dimension (uploading) because France invoked European policy and

objectives by presenting its national interests and preferences under the EU umbrella only to augment its influence in East Asia. To illustrate, France took the lead in formulating collective EC sanctions on China in 1989 and opening EU markets to Vietnam after 1991. It also used the EC as a cover for protectionist measures against Japan throughout the 1980s (Wong, 2006: 193). However, this should not be taken to mean that European policy did not act as an agent for change in France's East Asian policy. That is say, top-down Europeanization has also been evident, particularly in the area of trade. For example, due to the common commercial policy conducted by the Commission, France had to shift its policy in line with liberal economic thinking in the EC since the Single European Act of 1986, and for example, abandoned ten years of quota over Japanese car imports in 1991.

In another empirical study, Miskimmon (2007) examined the impact of the CFSP on Germany's foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, Germany has come under intense adaptational pressures from its partners in the EU and the CFSP itself to play a more high-profile role in managing international affairs in general and crisis management in particular. He particularly analysed the role of Germany in the evolution of CFSP and asked whether Germany's foreign and security policy is Europeanized to the extent that German and European foreign policies can be considered identical. Highly similar to Wong's results concerning France, Miskimmon found that Europeanization as a bi-directional and two-way process is relevant for the German case since both pressures coming from its EU membership, and the role and influence of Germany in the development of CFSP were put under the spotlight. In searching for a downloading effect, Miskimmon follows Smith's

four criteria of domestic adaptation, namely bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, elite socialization and changes in public opinion *vis-à-vis* the CFSP with an addition of resource allocation as the fifth indicator of domestic adaptation. Germany's role in the development of the CFSP was examined in the context of negotiations leading to Maastricht Treaty and Amsterdam Treaty; Germany's European Council Presidency in 1999 which coincided with the Kosovo war and the subsequent German design of a Stability Pact for South East Europe; and finally the operational leadership of Germany in EUFOR DR Congo to monitor the Congolese elections of 2006.

The study dwells on the hypothesis that adaptational pressures felt at the domestic level will be mitigated once Member States are able to put their imprint on policy formulation at the EU level thereby achieving 'goodness of fit' between two levels which have been evident in the German-led initiative of Stability Pact for South East Europe reflecting the policy preferences of Berlin for the future of European foreign and security policy. Adaptational pressures coming from CFSP did not result in change in content and scope of German policy due to broad consistency, or 'goodness of fit', between the nature of CFSP and that of Germany. For example, there are shared principles on multilateralism, the primacy of diplomacy in conflict resolution, and the salience of crisis management. The most outstanding effect of downloading has been felt by the *Bundeswehr* (German Armed Forces). First, in the context of the need for greater resource allocation to equip the army for crisis management operations under the Petersberg arrangements and second, to mitigate legal constraints on the use of force. While the former failed due to domestic budgetary constraints which emanated from German unification, an economic downturn as well as from the



need to meet European Monetary Union (EMU) convergence criteria, the latter was undertaken by the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of 12 July 1994 allowing for German deployment of troops in out-of area crisis management operations, though with a dominant aim of transatlantic burden sharing. Consequently, limited Europeanization in German case has been tied not only to the modest military capabilities of Europe but also to broad consistency between nature and scope of the CFSP and that of Germany.

As seen, no matter how the EU's impact and adaptational pressures for change on national foreign policies are invisible, indirect, weak, and difficult to measure, some real changes have been documented as a result of the interaction between national and European levels in the scholarly literature on Europeanization of foreign and security policies. At least for member states, besides top-down adaptational pressures, repeated interactions with the EU and enduring participation in the CFSP mechanisms paved the way for the reorientation of their foreign policy cultures (M. Smith, 2000; 2004) as well as a 'coordination reflex' (Tonra, 2003) among bureaucrats and decision-makers of states. Building upon the overview of the relevant literature on Europeanization of foreign policies, therefore, one can expect to observe some degree of Europeanization in the foreign and security policy domain.

It should be noted, however, that the most scholars have utilized the Europeanization approach to document changes in national foreign policies of 'member states' who are not subject to the conditionality principle in the way candidate countries are. Also, research on Europeanization of national foreign policy has illustrated that the effect of EPC/CFSP varies across countries and even across issue areas within countries. Therefore, there is an urgent need to

study more the intervening variables (or mediating factors) to be able to account for the variation of impact, change or continuity. Seen from this light, as Gerner succinctly put it:

All foreign policy decisions occur in a particular domestic context. This environment includes the values, national character, political culture and historical traditions of a society, its structural attributes (size, level of industrialization, form of government, etc.) and the particular political issues that are important at any time (Gerner, 1995: 21).

Put differently, to properly understand any change in foreign policy of a state one should pay greater attention to domestic factors and the domestic political context within which that policy decision is made. In other words, national traditions function as ‘intervening variables’ in the adaptation process in the absence of a “straightforward connection between adaptive pressures and adaptive reactions” (Hix and Goetz, 2001), thus resulting in what is called “domestic adaptation with national colours” (Risse et al., 2001). What is more, in line with the historical institutional framework, historical context and actor preferences matter, too, since “distinctive national institutional structures and policy choices must be understood relative to longer term historical developments (Harmsen, 2000: 60-61). Also, accounting for the variation of policy effects by the EU across countries necessitates a comparative analysis between candidate states and member states.

## 2.2 Member-State Versus Accession Europeanization

### 2.2.1 Member-State Europeanization: Voluntary Adoption and Socialization

As mentioned before, CFSP represents a distinctive policy area within the EU edifice where member states continue to play a predominant role in setting the pace as well as the limits of political integration. The bulk of CFSP comprises common statements and declarations which are non-binding on member states whereas there are also Union actions and positions which are legally binding under international treaty law, rather than community law. This is because the European Court of Justice (the supranational body of the EU), does not have jurisdiction with respect to the CFSP provisions.<sup>4</sup> That is to say, CFSP is not subject to the Union method<sup>5</sup>, which is treated on a more intergovernmental basis and has no role for EU law and the Court of Justice, while the European Commission and European Parliament (EU) have reduced importance (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011: 582-583).

Decisions regarding CFSP are defined and implemented by the EU's intergovernmentalist bodies, namely, the European Council and the Council of Ministers (Council) acting unanimously. By derogation from this rule, the Council can act by qualified majority, when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives; or adopting a decision on a

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<sup>4</sup> With the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 25b of the Treaty on European Union and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 240a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

<sup>5</sup> The term refers to the EU's *modus operandi*, where the Commission has the power of initiative, the Council of Ministers and the EP decide on the legislation, and the Court of Justice exercises authority as final arbiter on any disputes arising from the Treaties or EU legislation (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011: 582).

proposal by the High Representative following a specific request from the European Council. Likewise, the Council can act by qualified majority, when adopting any decision implementing a Union action or position, or when appointing a special representative.

Nevertheless, if the members of the Council abstaining from a decision represent at least one third of the members states comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision is not adopted (Article 23). Furthermore, the two declarations (Declaration 13 and 14) attached to the Treaty, emphasize the continued freedom of member states to pursue their national foreign and security policies (especially the members of the UN Security Council: France and U.K.), regardless of the common interest.

Nevertheless, even though member states are highly influential in the decision-making process by uploading their specific interests and policy preferences, once an EU common approach is formed, the member states have to “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” with regard to the final decision. Also, they are supposed to “refrain from any action which is contrary to the Union’s interests or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.”

It is true that Europeanization in member states occurs predominantly through voluntary policy convergence, uploading as well as socialization rather than a more coercive policy transfer or downloading. Yet, this should not be taken to mean that member states are not subject to EU adaptational pressures in the foreign policy domain at all. In fact, top-down Europeanization can be observed

in member states, though the frequency and scale would be limited when compared to socialization and policy projection.

Overviews of studies on foreign policy Europeanization in member states reveal that Europeanization occurs predominantly through voluntary policy convergence (top-down), bottom-up projection of national policy, and socialization (Tonra, 2001; Glarbo, 2001; Aggestam, 2001), rather than through forced adaptation to European requirements. Unlike the obligatory implementation of Community Law in the first pillar, in the absence of a supranational and authoritative actor in the CFSP, the EU can hardly ‘enforce’ changes in the foreign policies of its members. Thus the dominant pattern of Europeanization becomes ‘horizontal’, via learning, emulating, and socialization. This phenomenon occurs because it is believed that repeated interactions with the EU and enduring participation in CFSP mechanisms pave the way for a reorientation of foreign policy cultures (Smith, 2000; 2004) as well as for the emergence of a ‘coordination reflex’ (Tonra, 2003) among bureaucrats and decision-makers. Despite a weak level of institutionalized cooperation in the area of the CFSP, the EU does not act as law-maker but can still provide a platform for policy transfer and a forum for discussion and convergence of ideas (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 12) through “horizontal exchanges between member government and the resultant learning of shared policy principles” (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005: 345; for a similar argument see Tonra, 2003: 731-56).

‘Bottom-up’ Europeanization, via uploading of specific interests, policies, and preferences to the EU level, also occurs. Examining the French, German, and British cases suggests that policy projection capabilities and the intentions of those major powers have been influential in the pace and nature of political

integration and in the formation of the CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Gross, 2009). In other words, the pace and extent of political integration have been harnessed by big powers who firstly sought to domesticate the EU by uploading their national policy visions, styles and interests to the EU level to which they have to adapt later. To further exemplify this, the bottom-up mode can be seen in the cases of France projecting the creation of the Political Union; Britain exporting the pillar structure of the CFSP, the EU's Strategy Document; Greece uploading its Cyprus policy and its approach to Turkish-Greek relations; Germany uploading its creation of the Political Union and Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe; and Spain projecting its Latin American and Mediterranean policy. Policy changes in member states are predominantly nationally directed and take the form of voluntary adaptation instead of coercive convergence, and are by and large orchestrated by national capitals so as to better conform to European measures. Rather than affecting the substance and content of policy change, top-down Europeanization (in the form of voluntary convergence) is more evident in policy styles, policy rhetoric, and the institutional and organizational making of foreign policy (for Greece, see Economides, 2005; for France, see Wong, 2006; for Britain, see Bache and Jordan, 2006).

In contrast, as will be laid down in the next section, candidates are exposed to a more coercive pattern of Europeanization since they are required to adopt and implement the *acquis politique* of the CFSP.

### **2.2.2 Europeanization in the Context of Enlargement: ‘Accession Europeanization’ Through Vertical and Top-Down EU Conditionality**

One of the hypotheses underpinning this dissertation is that the Union’s efforts to achieve greater coherence as an international actor will not only impose growing requirements in terms of foreign and security policy on old and new member states, but that the same is valid for candidate states, such as Turkey, too.

To what extent can the explanations in the previous section pertaining to the Europeanization framework, CFSP and member states be applicable to candidate states? No doubt, the bulk of the literature on Europeanization is devoted to the current members, yet, there are scholars focusing on the Europeanization process in candidate states as well (for example see Grabbe, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 2007; Hix and Goetz, 2000; Aydın and Açıkmüşe, 2007; Terzi, 2010; 2012).

The Europeanization framework has peculiar dynamics as far as the enlargement process is concerned. Some scholars point to the dichotomy of “member state Europeanization” and “accession Europeanization” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007: 97). Indeed, through accession negotiations and strict conditionality, particularly designed for Eastern enlargement (namely Copenhagen Criteria), the EU is affecting institutions, policy-making processes and policy outcomes in several policy fields in candidate countries (Grabbe, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; 2007).

Apparently, the tools and enforcement mechanisms at the EU's disposal such as trade agreements, technical and monetary aid, association agreement and most importantly, membership enable it to serve as the strongest actor in promoting the Europeanization process in both accession countries and potential candidates beyond the EU. Among them, it is argued that the EU's most powerful tool is its capability to access to different stages in the accession process, particularly granting candidacy status and starting negotiations (Grabbe, 2001).

As opposed to horizontal and more voluntary version of Europeanization of member state's foreign policies which is based predominantly on socialization, learning and voluntary convergence, in the case of potential entrants, Europeanization occurs through conditionality<sup>6</sup> in almost every area, including foreign policy. Originally designed for and applied to the Central and Eastern European applicants of the EU, EU conditionality was formally declared at the Copenhagen European Council meeting in 1993 and since then has become the bedrock for understanding domestic shifts and tools of fostering change in candidate countries. Also known as the 'Copenhagen Criteria', formal EU conditionality require from the applicants to have stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and finally, a capability to take on obligations of membership, meaning the adoption of *acquis communautaire*<sup>7</sup> and

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<sup>6</sup> EU conditionality will be posited in more detail in Chapter 4 by specific references to the Turkish case and Cyprus issue. Here, it suffices to provide a brief explanation illustrating that candidates are exposed to top-down and hierarchical mechanism of Europeanization in contrast to member states.

<sup>7</sup> Refers to the whole body of EU rules including regulations, directives and other acts; political principles; accession treaties, association and other agreements and treaties signed with third parties, founding and amending treaties of the ECs as well as judicial decisions.



its implementation, including adherence to political and economic objectives of the EU.<sup>8</sup>

The EU conditionality for a mechanism of change in foreign policy area falls under the first as well as third political criterion of adopting and implementing membership obligations, namely the ‘CFSP *acquis*’. This refers to “legally binding international agreements or on political agreements to conduct political dialogue in the framework of CFSP, to align with EU statements, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures where required.”<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, accession countries are expected to participate in the political dialogue and to regularly align their positions with those of the Union, including sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations, and démarches within the framework of the CFSP, if invited to do so. CFSP is also one of those chapters to be negotiated with the EU during the accession talks.

EU foreign policy conditionality is embodied in the Negotiation Framework Document, Accession Partnerships, Regular Reports as well as Strategy Papers. Moreover, these documents constitute significant tools of political dialogue between the EU and candidates during the pre-accession period by not only determining candidate obligations but also acting as a monitoring mechanism. In this regard, Grabbe (2003: 312-317) sets out a typology of mechanisms through which the EU accession process affect institutional and policy transformation in candidates: (1) Models (provision of legislative and institutional templates); (2) Money (aid and technical assistance); (3) Benchmarking and monitoring; (4)

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<sup>8</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm). Accessed on 22.12.2014.

<sup>9</sup> For example, this phrase is stipulated by the last Comprehensive Monitoring Reports on Preparations for Membership prepared for 2004 entrants in November 2003. The text can be retrieved from [http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key\\_documents/reports\\_2003\\_en.htm](http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_2003_en.htm).

Advice and twinning, and (5) Gate-keeping (access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process) (For a concise summary of accession conditionality, see Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006).

Throughout the accession process, applicants are required to fulfill membership obligations by redefining their interests and behavior as well as reorient the direction and shape of their policies. Until accession, each candidate is invited to coordinate its foreign policy with the EU's partners by aligning itself with EU declarations and political demarches, joining EU common positions as well as defending those positions in international forums in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The CFSP does not operate with the legal instruments of directives or regulations, which are subjected to jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.<sup>10</sup> For this reason, during negotiations in this policy area, there is no need for candidates to transpose policy into national law. Rather, they are expected to pledge their "support for and a willingness to be bound by existing foreign and security positions and actions" (Cremona, 2003: 182). However, it is of vital importance to remember that though decisions regarding foreign and security policy are not binding, candidates are still required to align with the '*acquis politique*' (M.E. Smith, 2001) of the CFSP without question if they want their accession process to proceed smoothly.

Hence, candidate countries are being exposed to much more coercive adaptational pressures, which are peculiar to the pre-accession period, since the 'asymmetrical relationship' with the EU consisting of accession negotiations and the principle of conditionality furnish the Union with more coercive ways of

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<sup>10</sup> For a valuable analysis over legal development and status of the EPC and CFSP, see M.E. Smith (2001).

influence on the domestic settings of candidates (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005; Grabbe, 2003). The nature of this relationship is asymmetrical in that candidate states do not have enough power to influence the EU decision-making system but have to meet EU conditions to gain admission (Grabbe, 2003). After all, the EU has highly desirable tools to offer such as full membership, trade and aid benefits as well as institutional ties (Grabbe, 2003: 318). The tight conditions for accession and close monitoring by the European Commission for the transfer and implementation of EU policies thus underpin this highly coercive nature of the accession process for candidate states.

The fact that the Union's relations with candidates can be characterized as perfectly hierarchical, allows us to measure or at least to detect the magnitude and extension of the EU's impact on Turkey's Cyprus policy since 1999. For example, the drastic political restructuring in Turkey through various legal and constitutional changes adopted by Parliament since 2001 (when negotiations had not yet began) has been indicative of the transformative impact of the EU on candidate states like Turkey. In the foreign policy area, the 'win-win' approach adopted by Turkey towards Cyprus problem as well as the rapprochement with Greece would be unthinkable without a credible conditionality and membership perspective given to Turkey, which was crystallized by the EU's decisions to grant it a candidacy status and then to open accession talks. Therefore, it is difficult to analyze recent reforms independent of the EU pressure and prospect for EU membership.

In the Turkish case, Europeanization operated with a specific top-down dimension for several reasons. First, we seek to understand how European integration -mainly the CFSP- affects policy at the national level (in our case

candidate's foreign policy), not vice versa. Second, candidacy does not allow Turkey to upload its national preferences and policies, thereby leaving her with little capacity to negotiate derogations and opt-outs (perhaps only transitional periods).<sup>11</sup> Third, a gradual reorientation of 'foreign policy cultures' would take time as it requires enduring participation in CFSP mechanism through socialization, learning and internalization of rules, norms, interests and identity. Thus, it needs longer time to be socialized through learning and internalizing the norms, rules and values in the process horizontally. In other words, Turkey has so far not had enough time to get involved in long-established cooperation in the EU so as to develop habits of cooperation as well as a 'coordination reflex'. The fourth factor is connected with Turkey's peculiar relations with the EU and membership(s) of Greece and Cyprus to the EU since 1981 and 2004, respectively. By use of EU membership and veto right, Greece's and Cyprus' insistence on 'downloading' their positions on Turkey bolsters the degree of asymmetry already embedded in Turkey's relations with the Union. Fifth, the EU's own institutional edifice, complex political considerations and bargainings in EU circles further increase this asymmetry. The sixth reason relates to the EU's "linkage policy"<sup>12</sup> which culminated in several official documents of EU-Turkey relations as well as statements of EU officials. It rests mainly on tying Turkey's accession ambition with its policy towards the Cyprus dispute and its

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, upon a detailed survey over the relevant literature, we have found two exemptions to this rule: one is related to declaration obtained by Spain during her accession negotiations with the EU in order to make Spanish accession compatible with maintaining and promoting its national interests in Latin America (Torreblanca, 2001: 12). The other counter-example concerns Ankara Agreement, or formally known as 'ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European allies' following intensive bargainings between Turkey -as a candidate country- and the EU in 2002. Also known as Annex II of the 2002 Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, the document determined modalities of consultation with regard to participation of EU's non-NATO members in ESDP operations in case the EU uses the NATO's assets (Akçapar, 2007: 61).

<sup>12</sup> "Linkage policy" pursued by the EU has been underlined by several authors such as Brewin (2000); Müftüleri-Baç and McLaren (2003); Müftüleri-Baç and Güney (2005); Tocci (2002); Tsakonas and Dokos (2004).

positive contribution to reuniting the island under acceptable terms to both sides. The linkage policy of the EU has been implicitly stated in formal documents of Turkey-EU relations, such as the Helsinki European Council's Presidency Conclusions, the Accession Partnership(s), the European Commission's Regular Reports and the Negotiation Framework Document as well. The seventh reason is related to Turkey's longstanding aspirations and willingness with regard to EU membership. The last reason for adopting a top-down perspective in this dissertation is rather connected with a methodological problem. For the sake of methodological and analytical clarity one should be able to distinguish between 'process' and its 'effect'. Therefore, this study consciously restricts itself to understanding the effect of the EU on Turkey's Cyprus policy.

As already discussed, those advocates of top-down approaches argue that misfit is not a sufficient condition to account for domestic change (for example, see Börzel, 2005: 52). This paved the way for a debate about the role of mediating factors (see Börzel, 2005; Haverland, 2000; 2003; Radaelli, 2003). To illustrate, Radaelli (2004: 12) criticizes top-down approaches for being too structuralist and not leaving enough room for agency, while others acknowledged that a top-down perspective simplifies what goes on in the 'black-box' of the state, for example, party political contestation, discursive interpretation, pressure group politics and suchlike (Bache and Jordan, 2006: 23).

Nevertheless, this dissertation's adoption of a top-down perspective should not be taken to mean that endogenous factors and agent's role are totally neglected or omitted. By contrast, the conceptual and methodological departure point of this study is historical institutionalism which treats actor's preferences as vital. In fact, this study endeavours to explore the agent-structure interaction and

conceptualize domestic (policy) change by using the analytical toolkit of Europeanization. That is to say, in addition to the historical context and EU-level factors as exogenous structural determinants, there exists room for agency in the domestic context under the umbrella of mediating (intervening) factors being incorporated in this study. We will explore how and to what extent adaptational pressures from the EU led to domestic policy change. In that context, mechanisms and actors' role are of primary focus, in the form of both veto players and facilitating factors who play a role. They do so not in the sense that they are capable of uploading; rather, in the sense that they receive and/or reject pressures for change stemming from the EU. In other words, in this study, agent's role and its interaction with structure (the EU-related factors and historical determinants) will be explored through certain mechanisms (primarily the EU's impact on national foreign policy) with an additional dimension of the enlargement process at play.

## **2.3 Comparative Perspective on the Mechanisms of “Member-State Europeanization” of National Foreign Policies: Cases of Britain and Poland**

### **2.3.1 General Framework**

Going through the literature on Europeanization studies over two decades reveals that Europeanization is a “matter of degree” (Featherstone, 2003: 4). Also, its impact varies both spatially and temporally meaning that effects are irregular and incremental over time and across national and subnational levels.

Such an asymmetry necessitates, therefore, further empirical analysis to account for differences in the domestic impact of Europe.


The major concern of this section is to see to what extent ‘EU conditionality’ and the Europeanization process can act as an effective tool in changing outcomes in both candidate countries and current members. Therefore, this part aims to set out a ‘common pattern’<sup>13</sup> for Europeanization of national foreign policies by posing questions such as: ‘Under what conditions and with which mechanisms have national foreign policies been affected by their involvement in the EU in general and CFSP/ESDP in particular?’ In order to trace if there is a common pattern, one should first examine different country case studies to see whether similar behaviors, policy changes and reactions have also taken place in Turkey’s Cyprus policy case. Only in this way, can one reach out some conclusions about conditions and mechanisms that Turkey’s Cyprus policy has been affected by its relations with the EU.

Through analysing different country case studies within a comparative perspective, one could judge better whether the EU’s impact in the framework of Europeanization is a random factor in the national realm of members and/or candidates or a regime in itself; whether it is a fixed phenomenon or a contextual factor for domestic change having peculiar spatial and temporal implications. Hence we could see how the process of Europeanization is performed in national context. The output of ‘Europeanization’, namely change or persistence, could be “conditioned by historically-nurtured national opportunity structures and the unique features of the policy field” (Major, 2005: 181). Those historical factors,

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<sup>13</sup> ‘Common pattern’ in this study refers to pressures, conditions (in the case of candidates during enlargement) as well as mechanisms for policy change at the national level.

policy type to be examined, as well as domestic institutional structure, legal culture, traditions of state, state-society interaction and market structure may thus influence the nature and extent of domestic change. Therefore, an examination of different member-state experiences help us construe some generalizations about possible differences between Europeanization process taking place in member states as opposed to the one occurring in a candidacy context. Also, it provides us with an important evidence to account for both ‘mediating factors’ and ‘variation’ in countries as well as to explain why similar pressures produce different results across countries.



**Figure 2: Adaptational pressures from the EU (external input); domestic input (endogenous factors); policy type (whether first or second pillar) and relative position of a state *vis-à-vis* the EU (whether member state or candidate) influence the pattern and mechanism of Europeanization, thereby constituting basic parameters acting as source for policy change.**

Furthermore, comparisons between current members of Britain and Poland with a candidate state Turkey would enhance our knowledge about whether and how different modes of Europeanization processes in foreign policy area, the mechanisms, the extent and the nature of its impact (change or not), and the domestic conditions for change (mediating factors) operated at different national



contexts. In other words, this section is to offer a detailed comparative empirical analysis of different experiences of Europeanization of foreign policies to illustrate how ‘the EU matters’ in national foreign policy.

### **2.3.1.1 Selection Criteria and Justification for The Case Studies Chosen**

Keeping the research manageable and consistent requires choices to be made as to which member states to analyze. First, in line with a historically informed approach on rationally derived foreign policy matters, this dissertation draws an evidence from two member states: an old member state, Britain, and a new one, Poland. Given their EU entry in different periods of time, Britain in 1973 and Poland in 2004, the two cases are instrumental in demonstrating to what extent the temporal/longitudinal factors (length of participation in the EU) in the interaction between domestic institutions and actors on the one hand, and European institutions, on the other are influencing national foreign policy. Second, to make the comparison with Turkey appropriate, the two countries have been chosen on the basis of their political weight and size and their strong attachment to NATO and bilateral relations with the U.S., which frequently led to them being characterized as awkward and/or Eurosceptic members. Indeed, these two cases are chosen not to prove whether the EU matters in national foreign policy, but to illustrate to what extent and how (that is, with which mechanisms) the EU could affect the foreign policy of its even most Eurosceptic members. Third, both Britain and Poland have been known to follow an intergovernmentalist foreign policy approach towards the European integration

project and it is frequently mentioned that once Turkey becomes a member, would adopt a similar policy line. Fourth, the cases of Britain and Poland suggest that geographical factors and historical experiences may act as structural factors in determining security perceptions and alliance preferences, thus accounting for continuities in actors' foreign policy choices. Fifth, the selected cases present a visible example for a top-down mechanism of Europeanization with a complementary, bottom-up process. Due to the leverage of 'veto' in the EU decision-making system and complex political bargainings and exchanges among member states, top-down Europeanization is generally accompanied by bottom-up (uploading) processes, thereby exemplifying the argument that Europeanization usually occurs in a two-way process, particularly in member states. For example, Britain's position has shifted from a Atlanticist, reluctant and Eurosceptic member to one of acting as a balancer between EU and transatlantic interests and positions but also endorsing the institutional and operational evolution of CFSP (and ESDP) to boost the political and security role of the EU. Also, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO refers to the British Foreign Ministry) had to respond to adaptational pressures from the EU. It thus underwent restructuring in order to better adjust to a broadened thematic and geographical workload thanks to the mounting cooperation among European partners. Meanwhile, parallel to the role the AKP government played in Turkey's Cyprus policy, Tony Blair's premiership in Britain suggests that domestic political actors are of paramount importance in fostering domestic policy change.

Throughout the section, only foreign policies (including organizational change in foreign ministries) as well as security and defence policies including matters related to the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) as defence

component of the CFSP of selected member states will be placed under scrutiny. That is to say, trade and commercial policy in the framework of EC's external relations will be excluded.

### **2.3.2 Europeanization of British Foreign Policy: From Reluctant Member to Active 'Europeanizer' in Foreign Policy Area**

The analysis of Europeanization of British foreign and security policy is interesting since Britain's relationship with the EU has been usually characterized as 'awkward', 'reluctant' or 'semi-detached' due mainly to its relatively late membership, its position in favour of an enlarged EU composed of independent states (intergovernmentalist logic), its preference to remain close to the United States (so-called Atlanticist logic) as well as its decision not to join the Eurozone (Bache and Jordan, 2006: 4-9). Notwithstanding its EU membership in 1973, only with the New Labour Party's coming to power –under Tony Blair's leadership- in 1997 did Britain launch a period of fence-mending its relations with the EU characterized by a particular commitment to “constructive engagement in Europe”, to the extent of putting Britain at the heart of Europe (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 75). This new attitude, did not, however, contradict British Atlanticism since it was justified on the grounds that Britain could construct a bridge across the Atlantic (Bache and Jordan, 2006: 8). Moreover, similar to Poland, the British case reveals the significance of domestic political settings (especially political leadership) to account for change at national level.

A historical overview of British contribution to the EU suggests that there had been an ongoing tension involving its desire to strengthen the EU's ability to act

and react on foreign and security issues via the CFSP/ESDP on the one hand, and its feeling of unease at the idea of moving them beyond strict intergovernmental framework so as not to jeopardize its special relationship with the U.S. and unwavering commitment to NATO, on the other. Having lost an Empire, being the head of a Commonwealth, having forged a special relationship with the U.S., Britain used to act separately from Europe. In fact, victory in the Second World War was thought to be owed much to its ability to stand alone: scepticism towards cooperation with Germany and France against the Soviet Union, instead being increasingly reliant on American help (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 73). Seen from this light, not only the dilemmas faced by successive British governments regarding European integration and pro-Atlanticism but also its strong tendency towards intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty could well be explained by the conceptual lenses of the historical institutionalism.

Paradoxically, Britain has played a very influential role in moving forward a common European foreign, security and defence policy. London could not neglect the changing international political landscape starting from 1950s onwards. For example, the 1956 Suez invasion illustrated that both Britain and France were no longer global powers. Also, the success of the EEC, compared to the relative failure of the British-led European Free Trade Area (EFTA) provided an economic impetus for the British accession to the then EEC. What is more, the shrinking of British global military commitments in the late 1960s left them focused predominantly on Europe and the North Atlantic (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 73). Thus, successive British governments have come to realize that a closer engagement with the then EEC was of increasing necessity.

British membership in 1973 coincided with the launch of EPC (predecessor of CFSP). In fact, Britain agreed to participate in the EPC, which represented an intergovernmental strand of European integration. EPC was not seen as detrimental to a sceptical British public and government alike.<sup>14</sup> The EPC provided a platform through which Britain could assert its leadership and where it could enjoy advantages of cooperation without exposing itself to uneasy supranationality or the limits that cooperation might impose on Britain's other bilateral and multilateral commitments (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 189-200). Also, Britain traditionally aimed at exerting its leadership within the EPC/CFSP and benefiting from them without any significant contribution to their further evolution (Hall, 1996: 77). The coming to power of New Labour Party in 1997, however, ushered a new era in British-European relations in the sense that it brought a government more committed to the EU with a substantial interest in the development of CFSP and ESDP, and with an ambitious foreign policy goal that Britain could act as a bridge between Europe and the U.S.

The analysis of how and to what extent British foreign policy has changed as a result of EU membership suggests that 'uploading' has been a dominant pattern of Europeanization when particular examples such as the Saint-Malo Declaration, the European Security Strategy Document, and the creation of pillar structure of the EU are taken into account (Allen and Oliver, 2006). One should also point to the capability of Britain to shape the extent and pace of political integration while not disregarding clear evidence of downloading in institutional and organizational making of foreign policy such as increasing numbers of staff

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<sup>14</sup> In fact, domestic political debates were presented as one of the biggest constraints on the British governments' pursuit of a more open pro-European approach to foreign policy cooperation (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 73).

devoted to CFSP, growing information sharing within the COREU telex network<sup>15</sup> as well as the development of Political and Security Committee (Allen and Oliver, 2006). Overall, London has been drawn closer to the EU through uploading its preferences, thereby signifying Europeanization with national colours and a marked voluntarism.

Following on from the above, membership to the EU and involvement in European integration for over forty years has affected British foreign policy (BFP henceforth), its sub-national levels of government and its institutions formulating foreign policy. For example, Allen and Oliver (2006) have examined how interaction between the FCO and the EU has impacted on the way the former operates and the way it sees the world. They have come up with the conclusion that EU membership has both improved and challenged the FCO's position within the central government (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 52). The evolution of foreign policy coordination under the name of EPC and then CFSP has boosted the FCO's particular competence in this area, thereby compensating its loss of control in some domestic and European affairs. Conversely, as a result of European pressures for decentralization, the FCO had to share its central role in the management of Britain's external policies with "sub-national authorities and domestic departments as well as supranational organizations such as the EU" (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 53). Apart from the FCO, EU business is increasingly carried out by officials from other ministries in tandem with their competences such as trade, industry, environment, treasury, food and agriculture. Moreover,

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<sup>15</sup> Established in 1973, the COREU (French acronym of *Correspondance Européenne*) telex network is a communication network between the Council of the EU, the Member States and the European Commission for cooperation in the fields of foreign policy. This encrypted telex link allowed officials in the Council of Ministers of member states to communicate with each other as frequently as they wished on a confidential line (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011: 510).

the FCO has been no longer the sole authority in determination of EU policy, but has to share its role with the Cabinet Office<sup>16</sup>, the UK permanent representation<sup>17</sup> (UKRep) and European Secretariat (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 60).

Other than power-sharing, the internal reorganization of the FCO shifted from a traditional structure which was previously based on geography, towards one that is tackled with European affairs and individual relations with EU members states in a single command, namely the EU Command (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 61). Another change in the FCO has been the growing number of staff committed to European affairs due to the effect of CFSP, the intensification of European coordination at overseas diplomatic missions and widened policy agenda of the EU itself (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 61). Furthermore, the intensification of EU foreign policy cooperation led to the creation of the post of Political Director, which has been carried out by a diplomat advising on foreign policy and travelling with the foreign secretary or the PM (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 79).

Also, a Strategy Report prepared by the FCO in 2003 had a great deal of commonality with the EU's own strategy document called 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy' (The European Council, 2003). For example, the both documents implied the vitality of multilateralism in tackling proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), international terrorism, human rights and environmental problems and shared a similar vision as to overcoming trans-border international security problems. According to Allen and Oliver (2006: 63), this fact stems from a strong British contribution to

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<sup>16</sup> It assists the PM with its committees and secretariats, particularly those concerning Europe, overseas and national security, and it is made up of civil servants and diplomats from across Whitehall (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 78).

<sup>17</sup> It is an embassy headed by an ambassador drawn from the FCO who is responsible for the daily conduct of EU affairs in Brussels and enjoys a pioneering role in intergovernmental treaty negotiations (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 60)

the preparation of the document, which in turn underscores the fact that Europeanization is a two-way process involving both ‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’ or ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dimensions.

Britain always preferred a reinforced Council of Ministers and a CFSP being kept under tight control and under the direction of national foreign ministers. To this end, in March 1999, the Foreign Secretary proposed the creation of a permanent committee of deputy political directors in Brussels to strengthen the CFSP and Council of Ministers as opposed to the Commission’s competence in external relations. In time, this proposal paved the way for the set up of the Political and Security Committee (COPS) as an integral part of the CFSP edifice (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 63). Put differently, the FCO has been involved in the development of the CFSP through inserting its own particular approach to European integration. The British example thus confirms the argument that Europeanization is not a unidirectional process but a dynamic, mutually constitutive and interactive process. More concretely, member states adjust to developments that they themselves proposed, or in Europeanization parlance, they come to download EU-level structures and practices (such as COPS) that they projected to and shaped (uploaded) before.

All in all, in terms of how the FCO works and is organized; the British case incorporates both conceptualizations of Europeanization process, that is, top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. To illustrate, the creation of the post of Political Director as well as restructuring in the FCO due to increasing demand of overseas diplomatic cooperation with other EU member states are tangible examples of top-down Europeanization. Likewise, thanks to British (FCO) participation in the EPC and later CFSP for years, Britain succeeded in uploading



its specific concerns to the EU level especially through Security Strategy Document of the EU (bottom-up Europeanization). In fact, it was written by Robert Cooper, a British diplomat and former advisor to the PM (Allen and Oliver, 2006: 65). Nevertheless, as far as the organizational restructuring in the FCO is concerned, the EU could not offer a clear-cut model, indeed it does not have one. Therefore, the FCO has been exposed to an ‘indirect’ adaptational pressure –though not coercive- from Brussels meaning that to be able to better respond to intensified foreign policy activity of the EU and the resulting need for diplomatic coordination and personnel, the FCO adjusted its practices accordingly.

Another British executive body that underwent a process of Europeanization in the form of institutional adaptation has been the Ministry of Defence, whose involvement with the EU matters has significantly intensified with the emergence of the ESDP. Particularly the establishment of the ESDP institutional edifice via the Nice Treaty in 2000 and the proliferation of its capabilities have led the Ministry to set up several new posts to deal directly with the ESDP. Also, the other positions’ responsibilities changed to include an EU dimension with the result that increasing number of Ministry officials became exposed to ESDP (Please see Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 80). A substantial degree of the operational and planning staff’s institutional adaptation, however, should not obscure the fact that the British transatlantic reflex remains intact and that NATO remains at the heart of British international security outlook (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 81).

Apart from organizational and institutional Europeanization, we should also discuss the impact of the EU on BFP since its membership in 1973. Having engaged for over fifty years with European integration generally as well as the

EPC and its successor the CFSP specifically, BFP “shaped EU foreign policy as well as being shaped by it” (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 187). The basic motivation behind British accession to the then EEC was to boost its economic might and keep its status as an international player rather than Europeanizing its foreign policy. Yet, Britain preferred to actively participate in the EPC process because first, it was an arena for asserting its leadership and second, the intergovernmental nature of the EPC did not contradict with British concerns on sovereignty. The EPC’s course of action partly reflected British willingness in favour of its evolution. For example, the London Agreement which provided for an EPC crisis reaction mechanism, was a British plan. Similarly, the EU’s position in the Middle East which culminated in the Venice Declaration in 1980 involved the British position that the US-led Camp David process did not reflect the legitimate rights of Palestinians (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 190). Again, Britain enjoyed an instant European diplomatic support in the Falklands event in the EPC framework. These examples all point to bottom-up Europeanization in BFP.

As a key member of the EU, Britain strongly rejected proposals for incorporating the EPC into the Community during the Intergovernmental Conference in 1991, instead it opted for the CFSP to remain within an intergovernmental framework. Thus, a pillar structure was created for the CFSP outside the Community framework through the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Britain succeeded in uploading (projecting) its specific preferences and interests concerning ‘intergovernmental foreign and security integration’ onto the EU level (bottom-up Europeanization) although the development of CFSP was

accepted “including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence.”<sup>18</sup>

Part of a larger policy shift following its coming to power in 1997, the New Labour government led by Tony Blair declared its intention to bring Britain closer to the European continent. Evidentially, the Blair factor emphasized the importance of domestic politics in the shaping of member state-EU relationship, as is widely agreed upon in the Europeanization literature. In fact, the reasons bringing Britain closer to Europe as well as signalling green light to ‘autonomous European security’ are multifold. It was partly due to British frustration over and initial inaction of the U.S. and NATO. That is to say, Britain became uneasy with the U.S. opposition to deploy its ground troops in Yugoslavia as well as the withdrawal of American ships that oversee the implementation of arms embargoe in the Adriatic. It was also owing to the inability of the EU to act during Bosnian and Kosovo wars in the Balkans, and American pressure for improvements in Europe’s contribution to NATO, that Britain realized the need for the development of increased foreign and defence cooperation in Europe. In other words, Britain believed that Europe would no longer continue its dependence on American interventions; therefore, Europe should develop its own military capabilities. Being aware of the myriad of domestic political obstacles on the way to adopting the single currency, Blair turned his face to defence (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 75). Thus, Britain’s uneasiness gradually led to Anglo-French defence talks and paved the way for Saint Malo Declaration<sup>19</sup> in 1998, which

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<sup>18</sup> This particular aspect of the CFSP is stipulated in Title V, Article J.4, Paragraph 1 of the Maastricht Treaty. The original text can be accessed at [http://www.hri.org/docs/Maastricht92/mt\\_title5.html](http://www.hri.org/docs/Maastricht92/mt_title5.html). Accessed on 16 May 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Original text is titled “Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence” and can be reached at <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>. Accessed on 15 May 2009.

posited that “*the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.*” Through this declaration, the institutional framework and military structure of the ESDP as the defence component of the CFSP have been set out. It was a clear illustration of uploading specific Anglo-French foreign and security concerns, policy ideas and initiatives to the EU level.

In a speech delivered at the Royal United Services Institute, Blair warned that “we Europeans, should not expect the United States to play a role in every disorder in our backyard” (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999: 73). Likewise in his famous Chicago speech, he asserted that

America’s allies are always both relieved and gratified by its continuing readiness to shoulder burdens and responsibilities that come with its sole superpower status. We understand that this is something that we have no right to take for granted, and must match with our own efforts. That is the basis for the recent initiative I took with President Chirac of France to improve Europe’s own defence capabilities.<sup>20</sup>

Thus by combining its special relationship with the U.S. with its more consensual attitude *vis-à-vis* European matters, Britain aimed at holding together the two sides of the Atlantic (Hoffmann, 2000: 193; Oliver and Allen, 2006: 194). Actually, Blair made it clear that:

For far too long British ambivalence to Europe has made us irrelevant in Europe, and consequently of less importance to the United States. We have finally done away with the false proposition that we must choose between two diverging paths - the Transatlantic relationship or Europe. For the first time in the last three decades we have a

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<sup>20</sup> The Doctrine of the International Community, Chicago, U.S.A., 22 April 1999. Full text can be accessed at [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair\\_doctrine4-23.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html). Accessed on 16 May 2009.

government that is both pro-Europe and pro-American. I firmly believe that it is in Britain's interest, but it is also in the interests of the US and of Europe (Tony Blair, *The Doctrine of the International Community*, Chicago, 22 April 1999).

Without undermining its special ties with the U.S., the new balancer role pursued by Britain suggested a convergence between the EU and Britain, in that while the former moved towards foreign and security integration and several military operations in Macedonia, Kosovo, Central Africa, Bosnia, the latter appreciated and encouraged direction of the EU in this area (i.e. increasing scale, number and geographic diversity of operations as well as its institutional evolution) and even actively participated in most of the operations undertaken within ESDP framework. In this regard, one can observe the dual dimensions of Europeanization going on spontaneously in British case, notably 'uploading' and 'downloading' (for a similar point see Oliver and Allen, 2006: 196).

Also, it is worth noting that increased sharing of information and coordination with EU partners in such areas as the COREU network, in meetings with Political Directors in Brussels and general engagement in policy and institutional development of EPC/CFSP for over forty years has generated a kind of "loyalty and reflex" (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 197) in BFP. This culminated in first, a shared 'European' collectivity as to strategic concerns and policy priorities which has been gradually becoming part of British organizational and cultural outlook. This reached the extent of finding an alternative –and different from the American way - of dealing with Iran's nuclear programme in cooperation with France and Germany (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 198).

Indeed, the UK has long taken a semi-detached approach to the EU, embodied by its opt-outs in Eurozone membership, Social Chapter, Schengen

Area on the one hand, and PM Wilson's 1975 referendum on Britain's EEC membership, PM Thatcher's permanent budgetary rebate in 1984 and PM Blair's rupture over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, on the other.<sup>21</sup> More recently, however, UK is undergoing an important debate vis-à-vis its membership to the EU.<sup>22</sup> Domestic considerations have been the main drivers of this debate, dominated by actors resisting 'more Europe' (Pertusot, 2013). Nevertheless, the anti-Europe momentum has particularly accelerated within the past three years, as both the Conservative Party and British society in general has grown increasingly Eurosceptic (Geary and Lees, 2013).

The reasons for the rise of Euroscepticism are multifold. First, there has been growing concern over the increasing number of immigrants living in the country and that Central and Eastern Europeans are putting British jobs at risk.<sup>23</sup> Though Britain is not a member of the Schengen Area and therefore maintains control of its borders, the free movement directive of the EU's Single Market legally prohibits London from denying EU citizens the right to work within Britain (Geary and Lees, 2013).

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<sup>21</sup> Michael Geary and Kevin Lees, "The UK and Europe: Separation or divorce for the UK and the EU?" September 2013. Retrieved from <http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/131-separation-or-divorce-for-the-uk-and-the-eu/>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Vivien Pertusot, "Tough love between Britain and the European Union." Institut Français Des Relations Internationales. 27 March 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.ifri.org/en/publications/editoriaux/actuelles-de-lifri/tough-love-between-britain-and-european-union>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>23</sup> "Relations between EU and UK tense over UK's changing policy". *Daily Sabah*. 21 October 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2014/10/21/relations-between-eu-and-uk-tense-over-uks-changing-policy>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. Michael Geary and Kevin Lees, "The UK and Europe: Separation or divorce for the UK and the EU?" September 2013. Retrieved from <http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/131-separation-or-divorce-for-the-uk-and-the-eu/>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

Second, the Eurozone crisis erupted in 2009 has further strengthened Euroscepticism in parts of the Conservative Party and the public at large.<sup>24</sup> The Eurozone countries' efforts toward greater integration in response to the crisis have put Britain in a difficult position.<sup>25</sup> While British politicians see the need for greater Eurozone integration and in particular the creation of a banking and fiscal union in order to solve the crisis, they do not want to be part of the new core Europe that is emerging (Kundnani, 2012). In other words, British government wants the Euro to survive in order to forestall the recession a break-up would cause, but at the same time wants to prevent a further marginalization of the UK to which banking, fiscal, and perhaps even some kind of political union is likely to lead (Kundnani, 2012). Therefore, at the European Council meeting in December 2011, as EU leaders endorsed the idea of a treaty setting new budget rules, David Cameron, British PM, vetoed the inclusion of a fiscal union within the European Treaties.<sup>26</sup> His move marked the first time that Britain vetoed a European treaty outright (Geary and Lees, 2013). Following Cameron's veto of the amendment of existing EU treaties to tighten the Stability and Growth Pact, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel responded with negotiating a 'fiscal

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<sup>24</sup> "Britain and the EU: A long and rocky relationship". 1 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26515129>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. Michael Geary and Kevin Lees, "The UK and Europe: Separation or divorce for the UK and the EU?" September 2013. Retrieved from <http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/131-separation-or-divorce-for-the-uk-and-the-eu/>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Hans Kundnani, "The British Question". European Council on Foreign Relations. 3 September 2012. Retrieved from [http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_the\\_british\\_question](http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_british_question). Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>26</sup> "Britain and the EU: A long and rocky relationship". 1 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26515129>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. Hans Kundnani, "The British Question". European Council on Foreign Relations. 3 September 2012. Retrieved from [http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_the\\_british\\_question](http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_british_question). Accessed on 2 January 2015.

compact<sup>27</sup> that every other EU member signed, except Britain and the Czech Republic (Geary and Lees, 2013).

Third reason is related to steady increase in votes for the anti-EU and anti-immigration UK Independence Party (UKIP) over the recent years, thus diminishing Cameron's chances of re-election in May 2015 general elections.<sup>28</sup> The Party, which has no seats in the British parliament but is represented in the European Parliament, campaigns for Britain to leave the EU and places the border control and security issue at the center of its election campaigns.<sup>29</sup> UKIP's surprising rise has forced Cameron to adopt a more hardline position on issues linked to immigration (Geary and Lees, 2013).

Coming under increasing pressure from Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, UKIP and public opinion, David Cameron delivered a speech on Britain's future relations with Europe and laid out his vision for a reformed EU.<sup>30</sup> Cameron has said he will seek opportunities to "renegotiate" Britain's terms of EU membership, and in particular to repatriate powers transferred to the EU level (Kundnani, 2012). He has also promised a referendum on whether Britain should

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<sup>27</sup> Formally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, is an intergovernmental treaty introduced as a new stricter version of the Stability and Growth Pact, signed on 2 March 2012.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128454.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128454.pdf). Accessed on 5 January 2015.

<sup>28</sup> "Relations between EU and UK tense over UK's changing policy". *Daily Sabah*. 21 October 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2014/10/21/relations-between-eu-and-uk-tense-over-uks-changing-policy>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. "Britain's relations with the EU positive: report". 14 February 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.euractiv.com/uk-europe/britain-relation-eu-positive-rep-news-533515>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>29</sup> "Relations between EU and UK tense over UK's changing policy". *Daily Sabah*. 21 October 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2014/10/21/relations-between-eu-and-uk-tense-over-uks-changing-policy>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. "Britain's relations with the EU positive: report". 14 February 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.euractiv.com/uk-europe/britain-relation-eu-positive-rep-news-533515>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>30</sup> David Cameron, "EU speech at Bloomberg". The official site of British Prime Minister's Office. 23 January 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/eu-speech-at-bloomberg/>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.



remain in the EU on renegotiated terms by the end of 2017, if the Conservatives win the next general election in May 2015 (Kundnani, 2012). British PM has expressed discontent with EU-driven social and employment law which has imposed an ever-increasing regulatory burden on British businesses and employers (Geary and Lees, 2013).<sup>31</sup> He set British priorities to be negotiated with European partners and seeks an opt-out of existing social and employment legislation; flexibility for the labour market rules across the EU; a Treaty Change to reform EU's free movement rules to prevent people from moving countries to claim welfare benefits, as part of wider efforts to reduce migration; cutting EU red tape; improving competition; and protecting Britain's financial sector.<sup>32</sup>

Discussions of a potential of British withdrawal from the EU have also sparked debate across Europe, particularly intensified by the UK veto of the "fiscal compact" in 2011 (Pertusot, 2013). However, it is very unlikely that member states will offer much flexibility to the UK, especially if its demands appear disproportionate to others (Pertusot, 2013). For example, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said he wants Britain to remain in the EU but that cherry-picking its level of involvement cannot be an option.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, his French counterpart, Laurent Fabius said "imagine Europe is a football club and

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<sup>31</sup> See also "A Critique by Senior Diplomats of the Fresh Start Group 'Manifesto for Change'". Centre for British Influence Through Europe. Retrieved from <http://www.euoparl.org.uk/resource/static/files/fscritique.pdf>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>32</sup> Michael Geary and Kevin Lees, "The UK and Europe: Separation or divorce for the UK and the EU?" September 2013. Retrieved from <http://esharp.eu/big-debates/the-uk-and-europe/131-separation-or-divorce-for-the-uk-and-the-eu/>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. "A Critique by Senior Diplomats of the Fresh Start Group 'Manifesto for Change'". Centre for British Influence Through Europe. Retrieved from <http://www.euoparl.org.uk/resource/static/files/fscritique.pdf>. Accessed on 2 January 2015. "Britain's relations with the EU positive: report". 14 February 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com/uk-europe/britain-relation-eu-positive-rep-news-533515>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

<sup>33</sup> "In or Out? Britain's Future in Europe". Research Carried Out by Opinium Research for Lansons Public Affairs and Cambre Associates in association with City of London Corporation. 3 December 2013. Retrieved from <http://opinium.co.uk/sites/default/files/opin-inouteurope.pdf>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

you join. Once you're in it you can't say, 'let's play rugby'."<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the former European Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso criticized Britain's proposed reform of the freedom of movement principle, arguing that the EU bloc would never accept it (*Daily Sabah*, 21 October 2014). He also warned that Britain's tough stance on the EU's immigration policy would deteriorate relations with other EU member states as it creates "first- and second-class citizens" within the EU (*Daily Sabah*, 21 October 2014). For Barroso, Cameron's reform plan on cutting the number of EU immigrants with low skills would be "incompatible with EU law," which favors free movement of capital, goods and people within the borders of the EU (*Daily Sabah*, 21 October 2014). Furthermore, reform proposal of EU immigration policy would "alienate" mainly EU members from Eastern Europe whose citizens benefit most from the EU immigration policy (*Daily Sabah*, 21 October 2014). Consequently, much will depend on whether Conservatives will be re-elected in May 2015 and whether Merkel and other leading members of Eurozone, in favour of a new EU treaty granting greater fiscal control to Brussels, might be willing to trade more opt-outs to Cameron in exchange for his acceptance of further integration of the core Eurozone countries (Geary and Lees, 2013).

Following on from the above, the EU improved the tools, mechanisms and options of BFP when dealing with the rest of the World. In turn London has adapted by, as well as contributed to, the way the CFSP moves forward. Hence, British experience does reveal that Europeanization is a two-way process involving both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms, as long as the EU does not

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<sup>34</sup> "In or Out? Britain's Future in Europe". Research Carried Out by Opinium Research for Lansons Public Affairs and Cambre Associates in association with City of London Corporation. 3 December 2013. Retrieved from <http://opinium.co.uk/sites/default/files/opin-inouteurope.pdf>. Accessed on 2 January 2015.

put any limit on Britain's bilateral and multilateral policy options and as long as Britain succeeded in uploading its foreign policy interests and concerns to the EU level. Also, once Tony Blair's policy of middle way is taken into account, British case shows that domestic actors' preferences, policies and ideas matter in adopting a policy change.

### **2.3.3 The Case of Poland: 'Returning to Europe' to be Europeanized?**

Polish foreign policy has been subject to patterns of Europeanization in terms of both adaptation to European practices, norms and behaviour (top-down or downloading) as well as in the form of the projection of its national interests and policy preferences onto the EU level (bottom-up or uploading). From the end of the eighteenth century to 1918, Poland was repeatedly partitioned between Russia, Prussia and the Austria-Hungarian Empire, leading to its disappearance from the map of Europe (Pomorska, 2011: 167). Although Poland attained its formal independence in June 1945, it remained under the Soviet zone of dominance only to become a full sovereign state both nationally and internationally after the collapse of communism in 1989. Polish foreign policy had been reoriented following the break-up of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991. This policy has been symbolized by the notion of 'returning to Europe' which encompassed the idea that Poland had always belonged spiritually and culturally to the West (Szczerbiak, 2012: 7). Politically, this meant the development of liberal democracy; economically, the emergence of a capitalist market economy; and in terms of international relations it referred to forging friendly relations with her neighbours and integration into Western political, economic, and security

structures and organizations, particularly the EU and NATO (Szczerbiak, 2002; 2012).

Poland signed an association pact with the EU, known as a European Agreement, in 1991. Concomitantly, Poland submitted an application for full EU membership in June 1994, and following the decisions of the 1997 Luxembourg summit, it began accession negotiations in March 1998. Next to its full membership of NATO in March 1999, on 1 May 2004 it became one of the largest of the post-communist accession states (in terms of size, military capabilities, population and the economic weight) to join the Union as part of its eastern enlargement (Bajczuk, 2011: 3; Chappel, 2010: 225; Szczerbiak, 2012: 1).

Accession to the EU was considered by Poland as a fundamental move towards democracy and prosperity, and an anchor for its long-awaited aspirations of becoming a 'normal' European liberal democracy with a functioning market economy. For the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), EU membership and particularly participation in the CFSP, meant a process of institutional adaptation in the form of downloading (Pomorska, 2011: 169-171). Due to its wide geographical and issue-related spectrum, participation in the CFSP affected the organizational structure, decision-making process, professionalism of the civil service and standardization of technical and information systems of Polish foreign policy making. Even prior to membership, EU conditionality had led to organizational changes which involved the establishment of new departments dealing with the EU and units responsible for CFSP. Also within the different departments of the MFA, the positions of desk officers responsible for CFSP matters were set up and new posts were created, such as the European

Correspondent, his/her deputy, the Political Director, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassador (Pomorska, 2011: 169).

Like all other candidate states, Poland was obliged to adopt the *acquis politique* of the CSFP, including the use of EU sanctions or aligning with EU declarations and positions on foreign policy, which resulted in broadening the territorial interest of the MFA, such as Latin America, where Poland had no interest before (Pomorska, 2011: 172). Also, participation in the CFSP necessitated teamwork and information-sharing between different units and departments within the MFA. Lastly, Europeanization has taken place in terms of modernization in technical issues such as the installation of the COREU Terminal System (CORTESY), which has become a valuable source of information, analysis, and expertise for Polish MFA officials (Pomorska, 2011: 170).

An analysis of Poland's Europeanization experience provides a vivid example of how a candidate state can upload its national interests by extracting concessions from the EU during the process of accession negotiations. For Poland, the question was not 'whether to join' the EU, but rather 'on what terms'. Such a logical sequence determined the whole negotiation tactics and strategies of the Polish side, which often proposed detailed conditions (Trzeciak, 2012: 8). It should also be noted that the efforts of Polish negotiators were largely subordinated to domestic pressure comprising public opinion, interest groups, and political parties (Trzeciak, 2012: 8).

First, during the formal negotiation process between 1998-2003, Poland's staunch advocacy to receive equal direct payments (subsidies) within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as the member states was particularly

important. Despite an initial reluctance to give any subsidies to accession countries, the EU conceded later and accepted the formula that up to 20 percent of the already secured EU structural funds for the development of rural areas would be moved to finance CAP subsidies, which meant that farmers would receive subsidies from the Polish national budget (Trzeciak, 2012: 10). A second area concerned the purchase of real estate by foreigners, where Poland demanded an 18-year –the longest among the candidates - transitional period for EU entities to buy land in Poland, but eventually came to accept a 12-year transition period for the Western and Northern provinces, and a 7-year for the Eastern provinces (Trzeciak, 2012: 10). In fact, 12 years is the longest period granted to any candidate states, compared with 7 years originally offered by the EU (Trzeciak, 2012: 10; Szczerbiak, 2012: 43).

In terms of the domestic political landscape, although there had been differences of policy style and tactics between the hardline EU-sceptic governments (such as the Law and Justice Party-led government between 2005-2007) and more consensual pro-European governments (such as the Civic Platform-led government since 2007), the substance of policy remained unchanged.

Similar to Britain, Poland has a strong pro-Atlanticist orientation, which means that NATO and relations with the U.S. has a central role in Polish foreign and security policy.<sup>35</sup> For example, Poland participated in the U.S.-led coalition of the willing in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, irritating some European allies such as then French president Jacques Chirac to label Poland an “American Trojan

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<sup>35</sup> In fact, the declaration on strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Poland, signed in 2008, explicitly states the American commitment to the security of Poland (see Chappell, 2010: 238).

Horse” in Europe (Pomorska, 2011: 183). In contrast, Polish officials argued in a very similar way to what Britain did, that close relations with the U.S. meant that Warsaw could act as a bridge between the EU and the U.S. (Szczerbiak, 2012: 45).

This policy was indeed strictly related to the perception of Russian politico-military threat to Polish security and independence, and the specific conviction that only the U.S. and NATO could be trusted to protect Polish security interests. Key tenets of Poland’s security policy are also founded on a) a political geography being situated between Germany and Russia b) the particular historical memory of failure of Poland’s European allies to protect the country against invasion in 1939 and c) the betrayal of the Poles by their allies at Yalta in 1945, consigning Poland to the status of a Soviet communist satellite state (Chappell, 2010: 229; Karasinska-Fendler, 2009: 30). Besides, initial reluctance towards the ESDP was based on the concern that the ESDP would undermine NATO, would exclude non-EU European NATO members, alienate the U.S, and give Russia more influence in the region. The sceptical attitude towards the ESDP, however, has gradually been replaced by pragmatism and Poland has become an enthusiastic contributor to ESDP operations. This shift in Poland’s security thinking has resulted from its desire to become a reliable partner in the face of its questioned European credentials after involvement in Iraqi invasion, a desire to reinforce its role and influence in the Central and Eastern Europe as a self-appointed regional power, and to be included in decisions affecting the country’s immediate security interests by capitalizing on joining the Union’s decision-making inner core, culminating in the so-called “nothing about us without us” approach (Chappell, 2010:243). These considerations in turn led to a

support for the EU developing its own security component, though so long as it is evolved in civil-military domain, concentrating mainly on civilian missions and lower-intensity military operations, thus leaving hard security tasks and defence-related matters to NATO (Chappell, 2010: 226; Karasinska-Fendler, 2009: 30).

Even prior to its accession, in March 2003, Poland decided to contribute its troops to the first military operation in the ESDP framework –operation Concordia in Macedonia (17 personnel). Later, Poland contributed to EUFOR Althea (227 personnel) and EU Police Mission (6 police officers), both in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan; the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine; EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (130 personnel); EU BAM and EUJUST LEX in Iraq; EUFOR TChad/RCA in Chad (400 personnel); the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (28 personnel) (Pomorska, 2011: 173; Chappell, 2010: 235; Bajczuk, 2011: 11).<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, Poland is an enthusiastic contributor to the EU Battlegroups taking on the role of Framework Nation, such as Polish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovak Battlegroup; a Weimar Triangle Battlegroup comprising Poland, France and Germany; and a Visegrad Four Battlegroup embracing Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, that became part of the EU's rapid reaction force (Chappell, 2010: 242). Furthermore, with a view to enhance its own military capabilities and European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, Poland has become one of the biggest participants in the first

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<sup>36</sup> Apart from the missions in the framework of the ESDP, Poland participated in several NATO and UN missions as well. As one Polish scholar points out, the broad geographic area in which Poland has engaged seems to demonstrate as much its attachment to European solidarity and sign of its European credentials as a political investment and building a link for future reciprocity, which was based on the expectation that in case a potential mission is needed in Eastern Europe (possibly against Russia), European countries would be more willing to participate (Chappell, 2010: 236).



research program of the European Defence Agency, called “Defence Research and Technology Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection” and in July 2006, Warsaw joined the “Intergovernmental Regime to Encourage Competition in the European Defence Equipment Market” of the Agency (Bajczuk, 2011: 12).

There is also evidence of successful uploading in the Polish case, though it was argued by some Polish observers that this has been more tangible in setting the EU foreign policy agenda than to changing the actual foreign policy output (Pomorska, 2011: 174). For example, Poland had a keen interest in seeing the EU pursue a much stronger ‘Eastern dimension’ to its foreign policy by intensifying its relations with the post-Soviet Eastern neighbours, particularly Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. The promotion of the Eastern dimension presented a good opportunity for Warsaw to upload its national foreign and security policy agenda to the EU level. Indeed, attempts to conduct an active policy and to shape the EU’s Eastern policy was strongly linked to the country’s aspirations to become a major regional power (Szczurbiak, 2012: 83). The priority of pushing the EU to forge Eastern policy was also intersected with Warsaw’s efforts to promote further eastward enlargement and persuade the EU to design common policies to ensure energy security (against Russia) (Szczurbiak, 2012: 83-84).

The basic premises of Poland’s Eastern policy involved: enabling a bloc of Eastern European states to continue the process of de-Sovietization, by helping them to maintain their independence from Moscow; exporting its own model of transformation by promoting democracy and economic development in the region; and finally, trying to obtain from the EU the offer of membership perspective for Ukraine, the promotion of democratisation and human rights (particularly for the Polish minority) in Belarus, and developing a common EU

approach towards Russia (Szczcerbiak, 2012: 83-84). Even long before its EU membership, Poland actively engaged in persuading the EU to forge a more open policy towards its Eastern neighbours. For example, in his speech at the March 1998 EU summit, which inaugurated Poland's EU membership negotiations, the then foreign minister, Bronislaw Geremek, called for the strengthening of the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours (Cianciara, 2008: 5). This call was reiterated in a discussion document presented at the December 2002 Copenhagen summit which proposed reinforcement of the EU's links with the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Russia (Szczcerbiak, 2012: 85).

During the post-enlargement period, the EU's relations with the Eastern neighbours were conducted within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was proposed by the European Commission in 2004 to achieve democratic transformation and economic development in the post-Soviet states adjacent to the enlarged EU. Though it was originally promoted by the UK and Denmark in 2002 to be directed at Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, upon pressures by France and Spain, the project was expanded to the Mediterranean and southern Caucasus as well (Cianciara, 2008:6).

From Poland's perspective, the ENP was an inadequate instrument to deal with the Eastern neighbours, as it failed to differentiate between the southern (Euro-Mediterranean) and eastern (post-Soviet) dimensions of the ENP, and more importantly, it fell short of providing a clear membership perspective to the latter (Szczcerbiak, 2012: 86). Warsaw's efforts and lobbying to shape the Eastern dimension of EU foreign policy led to an understanding that it was in Poland's interests to Europeanize its foreign policy and forge a common and coherent EU policy (Szczcerbiak, 2012: 87). This was also due to the self-realization of its

weakness vis-à-vis Russia and the tendency of Germany and France to strike bilateral deals with Russia.<sup>37</sup> Poland has thus changed its attitude from criticizing the EU's developing a common foreign and security policy during the discussion over the EU Constitutional Treaty before its accession, and has come to see it as a device to transform its bilateral disputes with Russia to a multilateral forum (Szczerbiak, 2012: 87). Poland has succeeded to partially upload its traditional Eastern European policy objectives by a joint Polish-Swedish proposal of creating an Eastern Partnership (within the framework of the ENP) tabled at a May 2008 meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers. It was officially launched at the European Council meeting in Prague in May 2009 and aimed at promoting political dialogue and economic cooperation between the EU and six former Soviet republics: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

For authors such as Pomorska and Copsey (2010: 313; also see Pomorska, 2011; Szczerbiak, 2012: 112), rather than a foreign policy success, the Polish proposal should be seen as more a process of policy-learning in terms of understanding the value of extensive consultation with the partners and coalition-building as well as the adoption of step by step approach towards developing the Eastern policy based on realistic objectives. Critics also pointed out that the Eastern Partnership lacked specific details of how and when its objectives were to be attained and did not even mention the controversial topic of EU accession (especially for Ukraine) (Copsey and Pomorska, 2010: 320-321; Szczerbiak, 2012: 107). Furthermore, the European Partnership had limited institutional resources and budget compared to the French-proposed Union for the

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<sup>37</sup> For example, Russia and Germany's bilateral deal in 2005 to build a joint Russo-German gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea raised concern in Poland since it would deliver gas directly to Germany with no transit through Poland. Thus, Russia would retain a right to cut off gas supplies to Poland in the future without jeopardizing its bilateral relations with Germany (Szczerbiak, 2012: 97).

Mediterranean in the sense that the former was financed from the budget already allocated to the ENP, thus inflicting no extra costs on the EU budget, and had no secretariat as had been established for the latter (Szczerbiak, 2012: 103).

As part of its Eastern policy, Poland has played a high-profile role in bringing the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of November-December 2004 to a peaceful end, which provided the Polish political and diplomatic elites with an opportunity to mediate the political conflict following the disputed presidential elections, thereby fulfilling a longlasting Polish desire to establish itself as a major player in Eastern Europe. During the crisis, the then Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, successfully moved the Ukrainian case to the top of the EU agenda, helping to focus international and European attention on its Eastern neighbour, and managed to convince the then EU High Representative Javier Solana, as well as French and German governments to support the Polish mission (Szczerbiak, 2012: 89). In contrast, the initial success of Poland in Europeanizing its own foreign policy agenda could not evolve into uploading of its policy substance to the EU level in the aftermath of the crisis. In other words, Poland could not Europeanize its long-term strategic goal and national interest of attaining Ukrainian EU membership by making its preference a common European approach, as it became clear that the EU was unwilling to provide Kiev with a membership perspective (Szczerbiak, 2012: 105; Pomorska, 2011: 177). Yet, the Ukrainian affair demonstrated to the Polish decision-making elites that the CFSP could be used as a valuable instrument in the pursuit of national foreign policy objectives as well as how the EU platform could provide legitimacy and weight to national policy (Pomorska, 2011: 179).

Another area where the Polish political and diplomatic elites sought to develop the EU's Eastern dimension concerned the Union's relationship with Russia. EU-Russia relations are conducted in the framework of a 'strategic partnership' being outside of the Union's neighborhood policies. Though Poland pledged support to this attitude, it ardently advocated the idea of the EU adopting a more coordinated and less compromising and multidimensional approach towards Russia on the basis of the principle of European solidarity (Szczerbiak, 2012: 95). A central aspect of Polish policy in this regard involves efforts to convince other EU member states, especially France and Germany, to conduct their relations with Russia in the context of the EU rather than bilaterally. This was based on the particular conviction that developing a common EU policy and mutual support of member states would be necessary in case of a conflict between Warsaw and Moscow as well as in ensuring energy security (against Russia), in the face of Russia being Poland's primary supplier of oil and gas (Szczerbiak, 2012: 95-97). Thus, with a view to Europeanize through uploading its national interest, the Polish approach vis-à-vis EU-Russia relations has been strongly linked with attempts to push the EU to develop common foreign and energy policies.

Tense relations between the two countries throughout the 2000s spring from several factors such as Poland's attitude in Ukrainian Orange Revolution (lack of support to pro-Russian Yanukovich); American plans to deploy anti-ballistic missile interceptor silos on Polish territory as part of new US missile defence shield; and a more assertive approach towards Russia by the Law and Justice-led government and President who came to power in 2005 (Szczerbiak, 2012: 96-99). All these factors culminated in Poland's November 2006 veto on the European

Commission's negotiating mandate for the renewal of EU-Russia bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It was a political retaliation to a Russian ban on Polish meat and plant products, which was introduced in November 2005, just after the coming to power of the Law and Justice government. This was interpreted by Poland as a Russian reaction to its support for the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. What is more, Poland urged the EU to demonstrate greater unity in its dealings with Moscow over this issue. Yet, the EU could not manage to persuade Russia to lift the embargo, although during the May 2007 EU-Russia summit the EU portrayed the dispute about the export of Polish products to Russia as a 'European' matter, not a bilateral one (Szczerbiak, 2012: 100). Thus, Poland failed to fully realize its particular foreign policy objective at the EU level. Having been unable to capitalize on long-awaited European solidarity, Warsaw linked the dropping of its veto to the condition that the EU would agree on more satisfactory terms concerning energy security in the negotiations with Russia (Szczerbiak, 2012: 99).

Nevertheless, the Civic Platform-led government that took office in 2007 adopted a more consensual attitude, since the new government prioritized the improvement of relations with Russia. The new administration under the premiership of Donald Tusk held the belief that Poland turned out to be an isolated player in the EU and the country's position should be strengthened so that it can garner support for its Eastern policy and be taken seriously by Russia as an important EU member and thus a negotiating partner (Cianciara, 2008: 12). To this end, Poland withdrew its veto on Russia's entry negotiations with the OECD in November 2007, and one year later, Russia partially lifted its two-year embargo on Polish food imports (Szczerbiak, 2012: 100). Concomitantly, in

February 2008 the Tusk government announced the withdrawal of Polish veto on the new EU-Russian agreement in return for a guaranteed EU solidarity and support in energy issues (Szczerbiak, 2012: 100). Overall, Poland did not succeed to convince France and Germany to develop a common policy towards Russia. Rather, for Poland the prevailing mood in the Union opts for a balance between democracy promotion in the region with a tacid approval that the post-Soviet geography is under the Russian sphere of influence (Szczerbiak, 2012: 105). From the Polish perspective, however, the whole affair proved to be part of learning process of ‘how to play the Brussels game’, underscoring the utility of multilateral fora, consultation with allies, coalition-building, using package-deals (rather than sticking to veto), negotiation and compromise, developing culture of consensus and keeping everyone on board in conducting policy to attain foreign policy objectives within the EU’s institutional edifice (Pomorska, 2011: 181).

Furthermore, unlike the Polish strategic priority, the issue of common energy policy and energy security is evolving slowly in the EU agenda (Szczerbiak, 2012: 105). Collectively, EU member states are the world’s largest energy importer, importing about 55% of their energy supply—approximately 84% of their oil and 64% of their natural gas. EU member states increasingly rely on natural gas, particularly to reach ambitious targets to reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 5). Russia has long been a primary supplier of natural gas to Europe. In 2012, Russia accounted for 34% of European natural gas imports, surpassed by Norway (35%) as the lead supplier. (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 5-6). At least until recently, most Russian natural gas exports to Europe flowed through Ukraine and Belarus. For example, prior to the opening

of the Nord Stream pipeline<sup>38</sup> in 2012, about 80% of Europe's natural gas imports from Russia transited Ukrainian pipelines (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 12). Besides, the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, which runs through Belarus and Poland, currently carries about 20% of Russian gas exports to Europe (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 13).

Over the past decade, many European countries suffered several unexpected interruptions in the flow of natural gas due to confrontations between Russia and the key pipeline transit states of Ukraine and Belarus over natural gas supply and transit issues, as happened in 2006, 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 12). Some countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Baltic states, which are in some cases almost exclusively reliant on Russian gas imports, have been particularly susceptible to these fluctuations (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 1). Cognizant of that, Poland wished to see EU develop a common external energy policy (Nowak and Grzejszczak, 2011). Besides, the then Polish PM, Donald Tusk, pushed the EU to redouble efforts to diversify its energy sources, including the extraction shale gas, coal and liquefied natural gas. He also called for more effective mechanisms for gas solidarity in the event of a crisis in gas supply as well as an increased energy security, including through creation of a single European body that would make common energy purchases. In addition, Tusk called for the EU to help finance, up to 75% of the value of the projects concerning gas storage capacity and gas links in member states, which are most dependent on Russian gas.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, Poland is highly critical of such instances of individual member

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<sup>38</sup> It directly connects Russia and Germany (Russia's largest importer) through the Baltic Sea by-passing the transit states such as Poland and Lithuania (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 1).

<sup>39</sup> "Poland Calls for Energy Union", 2 April 2014, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/poland-calls-eu-energy-union-301303>. Accessed on 26 December 2014; "A United Europe Can End Russia's Energy Stranglehold", 21 April 2014, <http://www.ft.com>. Accessed on 28 December 2014.



states such as Germany, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary negotiating long-term and bilateral contracts with Russia, as it could provide the latter with an increased political leverage in the EU (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 7).

Indeed, during negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, Poland was the most enthusiastic supporter of inserting into the Treaty an energy solidarity clause in the case of serious supply problems (Nowak and Grzejszczak, 2011: 49). Thus, the notions of security of energy supply in the EU as well as spirit of solidarity between member states were stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 194, Section 1) as the cornerstones of the EU's energy policy.

In order to mitigate the impact of supply interruptions and overdependence on a single supplier, European leaders have sought to increase their energy security by exploring supply diversification options (Ratner *et al*, 2013:1).<sup>40</sup> In this regard, the EU prioritized an establishment of non-Russian and non-Iranian natural gas pipeline system to transport natural gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia to Europe.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, in the face of rising concern about Europe's reliance on Russian energy and growing public pressure to address global climate change, EU member states have begun to increase cooperation toward an European energy policy. To this end, in early February 2011, European heads of state pledged to complete the integration and liberalization of the internal European energy market by 2014; ensure all European member states are connected to a Europe-wide electric grids and natural gas pipelines by 2015; boost energy efficiency throughout Europe; and better coordinate external energy

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<sup>40</sup> At the 20-21 March EU summit, EU leaders tasked the European Commission to come up with a plan for decreasing energy dependence from Russia.

<sup>41</sup> Examples include Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (2019) and Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) (2019) (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 14).

policies. (Ratner *et al*, 2013: 6-7). Besides, the EU member states started to focus on strategies of energy security based on solidarity mechanisms among member states (especially on the eastern border of the EU), reducing energy demands through introducing more energy efficiency, diversifying the EU's supply routes and expanding energy sources, particularly renewables.<sup>42</sup>

Instead of a common energy policy, strategy, or market, let alone energy union, EU council meeting of 24 October 2014 in Brussels declared “achieving fully functioning and connected internal energy market” as a primary goal. As far as the development of energy policy of the EU concerned, it now seems there is more of a ‘partial’ Polish success in Europeanizing energy policy as there is still a long way for the EU to create a common energy policy, or union as Poland called for.

The process that the issues of energy security and solidarity, and particularly reducing dependence on Russian gas and oil deliveries increasingly becoming the EU's strategic priority since the 2000s, has been further stepped up by the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict broke out on March 2013. In fact, the crisis in Ukraine erupted after its pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich cancelled plans to sign political chapters of the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013. Instead, he sought closer ties with Russia, which triggered an unprecedented popular uprising in Kyev, causing the death of dozens of people and driving him from power in February.<sup>43</sup> Radosław Sikorski, Poland's foreign minister, has played a role in brokering a deal on 21 February between

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<sup>42</sup> For example, the *European Energy Security Strategy* adopted by the Commission and the 2030 energy and climate framework agreed upon by the EU leaders, both in 2014, have underpinned these ideas.

<sup>43</sup> “Tusk Highlights Need of EU Unity vis-à-vis Russia,” 19 December 2014. <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/tusk-highlights-need-eu-unity-vis-vis-russia-310979>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

Yanukovych and the opposition, along with his German and French counterparts.<sup>44</sup>

Russia responded with its military intervention and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula in March 2014, following a referendum staged after Russian forces established control over it. Moreover, pro-Russian militants controlled buildings in more than ten towns in eastern Ukraine after launching their uprising on 6 April. On 11 May, pro-Russian separatists declared a victory in referendum in Donetsk and Luhansk, southeastern provinces of Ukraine, by declaring independence. The armed conflict escalated sharply after Kiev launched military operations in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk to restore government control on 1 July.<sup>45</sup> Poland was included in the EU members of a 'contact group' brokering talks between Russia and Ukraine, together with UK, France, Germany and Italy.<sup>46</sup> Finally, Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists agreed on a truce via the Minsk protocol on September 5 (Anatolian Agency, 3 October 2014).<sup>47</sup>

Being occupied previously by Russia, East European countries including Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been staunch supporters of tougher sanctions by the EU against Russia in response to these events, as opposed to the soothing tones of British, German and

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<sup>44</sup> <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10670931/Ukraine-crisis-World-stands-on-brink-of-conflict-warns-Polish-prime-minister.html>. 2 March 2014. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

<sup>45</sup> "Tusk Highlights Need of EU Unity vis-à-vis Russia," 19 December 2014. <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/tusk-highlights-need-eu-unity-vis-vis-russia-310979>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

<sup>46</sup> <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10679802/Ukraine-Russia-crisis-live.html>, 6 March 2014. Accessed on 24 December 2014.

<sup>47</sup> "Ukrainian Conflict Stirs Fear of Russia in Poland," 3 October 2014. <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/399035--ukrainian-conflict-stirs-fear-of-russia-in-poland>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

French leaders.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, the EU measures against Russia embraced: the suspension of talks with Russia on a wide-ranging economic pact and a visa agreement; restriction of Russian state-owned banks from accessing European capital markets; stopping the export of oil-related equipment and technology to Russia; stopping new contracts for arms imports and exports between the EU and Russia; prohibiting the export of goods and technology that can be used for both military and civilian purposes; outlawing investment in Crimea; introduction of asset freezes and travel ban on senior Russian officials; and denying illegal annexation of Crimea.<sup>49</sup> Thus, Russian gas, on which Europe is dependent, did not become part of the sanctions.

Furthermore, felt threatened by Russia's use of force in Ukraine, Poland repeatedly requested additional permanent deployment of NATO and American military assets to Poland.<sup>50</sup> Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish Foreign Minister, asked for NATO consultations under Article 4 of the alliance's founding treaty, which comes into force when the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any member state is threatened.<sup>51</sup> Despite reliance on American military help,

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<sup>48</sup> Splits over sanctions stemmed from the idea that sanctions would not only hurt Russia but Europe as well, considering financial services, energy, defence sector and trade. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10670931/Ukraine-crisis-World-stands-on-brink-of-conflict-warns-Polish-prime-minister.html>. 2 March 2014. Accessed on 29 December 2014; "While US Sanctions Putin's Top Aides, EU Hesitates At Summit," 21 March 2014. <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/while-us-sanctions-putins-top-aides-eu-hesitates-summit-300850>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

<sup>49</sup> "U.S., EU Coordinate on Russia Sanctions, But Will They Work?" 30 July 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/29/politics/us-eu-russia-sanctions/index.html>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

<sup>50</sup> The U.S. announced that it would deploy about 700 (300 of them in Poland) soldiers and 20 tanks to the Baltic countries and Poland, plus, four F-15 planes to Lithuania and a dozen of F16 fighters to Poland. "Ukrainian Conflict Stirs Fear of Russia in Poland," 3 October 2014. <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/399035--ukrainian-conflict-stirs-fear-of-russia-in-poland>. Accessed on 29 December 2014; "Ukraine Crisis: Poland 'Safe' Says President," 3 March 2014. <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/163900,Ukraine-crisis-Poland-safe-says-president>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

<sup>51</sup> "Ukraine Crisis: Poland 'Safe' Says President," 3 March 2014. <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/163900,Ukraine-crisis-Poland-safe-says-president>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

he also argued that “we should learn from the current crisis that European integration must also continue when it comes to security policy.”<sup>52</sup>

The Ukrainian conflict implied a success for Poland’s Eastern policy in terms of its goals of developing a unified EU approach towards Russia, ensuring Eastern European states’ independence from Moscow, and promotion of democracy and economic development in the region. In effect, the conflict accelerated the process of conclusion of the EU’s Association Agreements with Ukraine (political chapters being already signed on 21 March), Georgia and Moldova on 27 June 2014, each providing for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (i.e. political association and economic integration).<sup>53</sup> Nonetheless, EU leaders resisted the idea of offering Kyev a more tangible EU membership perspective, as opposed to what Poland opted for.

Poland’s European policy and attitude towards European integration were characterized by contradictions emanating from a tension between first, the country’s EU aspirations and capabilities, and second, the ideological gap between an intergovernmentalist vision for Europe of Nations in theory, as opposed to its advocacy of supranationalism and deeper integration in practice (Tzczerbiak, 2012: 79). Whereas Poland’s relatively large size in terms of population (almost 40 million) led to greater influence in the Council of Ministers and the EP and boosted its regional power ambitions, as was exemplified by the tough stance it adopted during the debates over the EU

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<sup>52</sup> “Polish Foreign Minister: ‘Moscow Needs Our Money’,” 10 March 2014.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/polish-foreign-minister-discusses-weak-eu-position-in-ukraine-crisis-a-957812.html>. Accessed on 29 December.

<sup>53</sup> “While US Sanctions Putin’s Top Aides, EU Hesitates At Summit,” 21 March 2014.

<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/while-us-sanctions-putins-top-aides-eu-hesitates-summit-300850>. Accessed on 29 December 2014.

Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties' proposals to revise the voting system agreed as part of the Nice Treaty (Szczurbiak, 2012: 43). In turn, its relatively backward economy (large agricultural sector and low per capita income) did mean limited political resources, thereby resulting in policy persistence in favour of a large EU budget involving substantial regional aid and fiscal transfers from wealthier to poorer members, and support for the CAP. With regard to the second contradiction, in theory, the historical determinants of Poland's attachment to national sovereignty and its Atlanticism made it wary of the development of common European foreign, security and defence policies. In practice, however, given its Eastern policy, Poland became a staunch supporter of the EU's further eastward enlargement and also of deeper integration through the development of a common energy (concerning Russia) and foreign policy.

It should be mentioned at this point that Poland's whole Eastern policy, particularly its attitude towards Russia and its strong Atlanticist policy orientation in security and defence matters can be best conceptualized by the historical institutionalist framework and its particular notion of path dependency. Process-tracing Poland's historical experience of being dismembered twice in the past and a sense of being betrayed in the hands of its European allies at Yalta underscored, first, Warsaw's deep distrust to European powers in security and defence matters, the fear of being dominated by Russia again and thus its Atlanticist reflex and second, its jealousy of national sovereignty and thus pro-intergovernmentalism in European integration, albeit in theory.

As a result, despite an intergovernmentalist philosophy defended in theory, Poland's budgetary needs, agricultural interests, and Eastern policy agenda underpinned the country's preference for pushing for stronger supranationalism

in practice. Whether and to what extent the abovementioned contradictions stemming from capability-aspirations gap will affect the Europeanization experience of Poland further remains to be seen in the future.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **EU-TURKEY RELATIONS AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION:**

#### **SETTING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

##### **3.1 EU-Turkey Relations**

This sub-section aims at providing a background information on the evolution of Turkey-EU relations starting from Turkey's association membership application to the then EEC in 1959 until the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Granting Turkey a candidacy status for EU membership, the Helsinki summit presented a transformed context of Turkish-EU relations by bringing a totally new modality.

Europeanization in the specific Turkish context ought to include the impact of Europe in a general sense first on the 19th century Ottoman Empire and later during the Republican period. In fact, the terms 'Europeanization', 'Modernization', 'Westernization' and 'Civilization' are frequently used interchangeably in the Turkish political discourse. The policy of Westernization has been realized from the 19th century onwards by the Ottoman Empire. The measures in this regard included a desire to be integrated in the European state system as well as a course of action to revive the state by modernizing its



administration and military (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). Coming to the Republican era, for the Turkish state elite, the attraction of Europe remained undiminished. As Europe began reorganizing itself into the Common Market, the Turkish state elite translated their goal of Europeanization into the policy of integrating Turkey into this new European structure (Aydınlı and Waxman, 2001). In the post-Second World War system and particularly in the Cold War context, the desire to become ‘European’ as well as the belief in Western values and virtues of Western political systems has been crystallized in Turkey’s membership to various Western institutions such as the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, NATO in 1952 as well as its associate membership of the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1963. According to the Turkish elites, membership to these institutions would not only anchor Turkey in the Western state system but would also work towards the fulfillment of the state elite’s century-old dream of being accepted as part of Europe (Müftüler-Bac, 2005: 19). No doubt, Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system in 1950 could be seen as another step towards its Westernization drive.

Hence, always having a European outlook and aspiration, for the Turkish political as well as military elites, EU membership reflected the ultimate solidification and confirmation of Turkey’s ‘European’, ‘Westernized’, and ‘modern’ identity (for similar points see Heper, 2005; Oğuzlu, 2006; Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). What accompanied such identity-based considerations, have been two further expectations of Turkish policy-makers from inclusion into the Western institutional structures: the first was about strategic/security concerns with the conviction that Turkey could not survive alone against the communist Soviet bloc (Eralp, 1993: 26). The second aspect of the interest-based motivation

was related to the material/economic benefits necessary for Turkey's economic development (Eralp, 1993: 26).

As a logical corollary of Turkey's aspirations to become a European nation, the campaign for European vocation culminated in its application on 31 July 1959 for associate membership to the EEC, shortly after its creation in 1957. The motivation behind the Turkish attempt included "the culmination of the Turkish orientation to the West; gaining free access for Turkish exports to the European market; and providing a stimulus for economic growth" (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 54). Moreover, the Greek factor should also be emphasized since the Turkish application came only sixteen days after the formal Greek application to the EC. Rooted in deep historical distrust and mutual suspicion, the traditional Turkish foreign policy outlook hinged on keeping a very close watch on Greece, in case that country capitalized on political and economic advantages of a new relationship with Europe at the expense of Turkey (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 54; Eralp, 1993: 27).

The EC for its part responded cautiously by granting instead the status of association (to both Greece and Turkey) since Turkey was not considered sufficiently developed to be admitted as a full member. The Community's favourable response was bolstered by political and strategic considerations related to the cold war context (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 54; Eralp, 1993: 28). First, as front-line states of the NATO, facilitating their economic development was regarded important for political stability in the cold war circumstances. Second, it reflected the desire to keep Turkey within NATO and the willingness of balancing its relations with NATO's Eastern Mediterranean members (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 54). In the meantime, Greece and Turkey were the only two countries

whose association agreements envisaged a prospect of full membership in the long run (Eralp, 1993: 28; Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 54). Negotiations took four years due to the difficulties arising from European policy-makers' concerns over Turkey's Europeanness, cultural and social differences (its predominantly Muslim population), its level of economic growth and relative backwardness, and its democratic deficits. Negotiations halted for about eighteen months after the 1960 military coup in Turkey (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 55).

The ensuing negotiations resulted in the signing of the Association Agreement (the Ankara Agreement) between Turkey and the EC on 12 September 1963, which entered into force on 1 December 1964. This agreement aimed at reducing the economic disparities between Turkey and the Community and committed both sides to the gradual establishment of a Customs Union and eventually to Turkey's full membership (according to Article 28). The Ankara Agreement envisaged three stages that would lead to the establishment of a Customs Union: the preparatory stage, the transitional stage and the final stage. The first stage, planned to last between five to nine years, embraced the introduction of tariff quotas for four of Turkey's main agricultural products: hazelnuts, tobacco, figs and raisins. Turkey was also granted 175 million ECU in loans to assist its economic development. The first stage proceeded smoothly, lasted for seven years, and was concluded by 1 January 1970. During this stage, while the EC granted nonreciprocal concessions to Turkey in the form of financial assistance and preferential tariffs, Turkey was merely obliged to achieve higher levels of economic growth.

The second (transitional) stage started with the signature of the Additional Protocol on 23 November 1970 and came into force on 1 January 1973. The

transitional stage was planned to last a minimum of twelve years and a maximum of twenty-two, aiming at economic harmonization, trade liberalization and policy alignment (economic policy concerning competition, taxation and commercial policies as well as phased adjustment of Turkey to the EC's Common Agricultural Policy by 1995) between the two parties and ultimately the establishment, by 31 December 1995, of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EC (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 59). During this stage, both sides would prepare for a full customs union and Turkey would progress towards adapting the Community's Common External Tariff (CET) to trade with third parties. Concessions on the part of the Community included providing free access to European markets for all Turkish industrial products (except textiles and petroleum products and four industrial products), tariff reductions on textiles, financial assistance and free movement of labour. The gradual elimination of the restrictions on the free movement of labour was envisaged to be finalized by 1 December 1986. The Community agreed to abolish tariffs on imports from 37 percent of Turkish agricultural products in 1973 and granted a preferential rate of tariff on products accounting for 23 percent of Turkey's total agricultural production (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 59). Financial assistance to Turkey was channeled through financial protocols in accordance with a timeline. The three protocols were finalized between 1973 and 1980, yet the Fourth Financial Protocol was blocked in 1981 for political reasons and could not be ratified until 1990 (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 59). In return, Turkey agreed to reduce its tariffs on its imports from the Community on a piecemeal basis. The phased reduction of duties on imports of industrial goods from the Community was arranged via two lists. The first list covered 55 percent of industrial goods and was planned to be

implemented within twelve years, whereas the second list embraced the remaining 45 percent of industrial products and duties were expected to be reduced within twenty-two years.

Ironically, the aftermath of the Additional Protocol marked a beginning of a steady deterioration in Turkey-EU relations for a number of reasons (see a well-documented analysis of Müftüler-Bac, 1997; Eralp, 1993; Öniş, 2000). For Eralp, one of the most important root causes for this was the prioritization of economic issues in relations with the EC, which downplayed the Community's role as a factor in foreign policy (Eralp, 1993: 28-29). In fact, there had been voiced concerns among Turkish industrialists over possible detrimental impacts of implementing tariff reductions on Turkey's nascent industrialization and especially the limited transition period specified by the Protocol for the restructuring of Turkish industry. The complaints of industrialists mounted once balance of payments difficulties arose as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. Although Turkey had already implemented two phases of tariff reduction requirements envisaged by the Additional Protocol, it had fell short of putting into effect a third set of cuts scheduled by January 1978.

Also, there had been other issues resulting in a great deal of dissatisfaction towards the Community's credibility and commitment to the Additional Protocol (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 60-63). The benefits of an association began to be questioned once similar trade concessions and preferential treatment granted to Turkey were extended to other Mediterranean countries in the context of the EC's Global Mediterranean policy adopted in 1975 after the OPEC crisis. What is more, the Community decided in 1978 to impose a unilateral control on Turkish textiles. For the Turkish side, the Community had even declined to

honour its agreed obligations in terms of concessions over agricultural and industrial exports and the entry into force of more Turkish workers into the member states. Moreover, for Turkey, the Community's level of financial aid was not adequate for a possible implementation of a customs union (Eralp, 1993: 29).

The 1970s witnessed a number of developments leading to pulling Turkey away from the EC: the Community's enlargement from six to nine member states in 1973; the 1974 crisis over Cyprus and the ensuing Turkish military intervention; and the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese applications for full EC membership (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 61). The three new members of the EC joining in 1973, the UK, Denmark and Ireland, did not give priority to Turkish membership. In contrast to Turkish policy-makers' predominantly economic motivations (such as industrialization and economic development) colouring its relations with the EC, Europe's positive stance towards the membership applications of some Mediterranean states meant that apart from economic parameters, political concerns including strengthening of nascent democratic regimes through membership gained an increased salience within the Community. For example, in an effort to cope with economic troubles at home, which worsened with the American arms embargo imposed after Turkish military intervention in Cyprus as well as with meeting the requirements of the Additional Protocol, PM Ecevit requested an 8 billion dollar aid package from the EC (Eralp, 1993: 29). Yet, Ecevit had to content with the European offer of 600 million dollar under the Fourth Financial Protocol (Eralp, 1993: 30). Furthermore, the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, as will be explained later, further bolstered the perception in the Turkish side that the EC was "turning

a deaf ear to Turkey's complaints" through discriminatory practices, thereby upsetting the delicate balance between Greece and Turkey (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 61). Apart from the urgency of economic problems, growing domestic political instability due to widespread street violence and the Cyprus debacle compelled Turkish political elites to focus on domestic issues. Against this backdrop, by invoking Article 60 (Self Protection clause), the Ecevit government in 1978 announced a plan to modify the terms of the Association Agreement and asked for a five-year freeze in association relations with the Community, hoping to fulfil its tariff reduction obligations (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 61).

While Ankara started to preoccupy itself heavily with economic problems and political turmoil at home, Greek moves towards accession to the EC in January 1981 caused an alarm in Turkish decision-making echelons arguing that Greece would use its membership to hamper Turkey's eventual membership to the Community and isolate her in Europe. In 1980, the EC assured Ankara that the Greek membership would not affect the Community's relations with Turkey.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, Greece assured the EC that it would not block or veto relations between the Community and Turkey (Müftüler-Baç, 1997: 65). As a last-minute attempt, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen stated at a press conference in Brussels on 30 June 1980, that Turkey would make a formal application for membership by the autumn (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 62; Eralp, 1993: 30). Nevertheless, such a planned move could not be realized owing to the military coup in Turkey on 12 September 1980. Meanwhile, geopolitical considerations, which had characterized the EC's attitude towards Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s, began to be gradually replaced by a growing priority given

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<sup>1</sup> *Bulletin of the European Communities*, EC-Turkish Association Council, 5 February 1980, 2/1980, 1.3.1-1.3.5.

to democracy, thereby marking a serious rift between Turkish-EC relations at the political front (Eralp, 1993: 31; Öniş, 2000: 465).

Thus, the Community responded to the military coup in Turkey through a European Parliament Resolution on 21 January 1982 to suspend the Association Agreement until the political situation in Turkey improved and respect for human rights was restored (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 62). Only after Turkey's return to parliamentary democracy from authoritarian rule in late 1983, did relations with Europe start to improve with a meeting of the Association Council in 1986 and later with the resumption of the Association Agreement on 15 September 1988 (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 62-63). Despite signs of normalization, there had still been a number of unresolved problems that served to create a rift in Turkish-EC relations such as the volume of Turkish textile exports to the Community, the implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol (ratified on 19 June 1981 but failed become operative due to the Commission's decision to delay it), the free movement of Turkish workers in the Community as of December 1986, and Greek lobbying, particularly after its accession in 1981 (Eralp, 1993: 33).

The then PM Turgut Özal, who was elected Prime Minister in 1983, declared Turkey's eventual EC membership as a central policy goal and therefore, embarked upon an import liberalization strategy in order to open up and modernize the economy, boost competitiveness vis-à-vis European powers and prepare the Turkish economy for future membership. The Turkish government also submitted a five-year plan in 1988 to complete the implementation of the Customs Union (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 63). On 14 April 1987, in the midst of the process of gradual reactivation of relations, the Turkish government submitted an official application for membership to the Community. The Turkish application



for membership came at a time of economic trouble as a result of rising inflation, unemployment, and increasing debt problems (Eralp, 1993: 35). Indeed, the Özal government was searching for new sources of financial aid and loans and it was thought the EC membership would fulfill that need. Also, Turkey's isolation in the international arena due to the military intervention had led to greater rapprochement with and in fact a political and financial dependence on the U.S., whose military aid to Turkey began to dwindle as of 1984 and was increasingly tied to the Cyprus issue (Eralp, 1993: 36). Furthermore, a weak democracy, decreasing economic output, disputes with Greece over the Aegean and especially over Cyprus were among the factors leading to this marginalization. At such a conjuncture the Turkish government believed that full EC membership would alleviate those problems by improving Turkey's international image.

Meanwhile, on 20 December 1989, in response to Turkey's application for accession to the European Communities submitted on 14 April 1987, the European Commission declined to offer the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey due to both economic and political reasons. The Commission, in its negative avis on Turkish application, evaluated that the country was not ready for membership, and neither was the Community. The latter was undergoing major changes and was aiming to complete the Single Market. While elaborating on the political aspects, other than the need to expand political pluralism and to improve human rights, the Commission cited

the negative effects of the dispute between Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in Cyprus, on which the European Council has just expressed its concern once again. At issue are the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations (European Commission, SEC (89) 2290 final, Brussels, 20 December 1989).

Instead, the Commission offered the revitalization of the Association Agreement and proposed a set of measures to intensify cooperation between Turkey and the Community in areas such as finance, industry, technology and to strengthen political and cultural relations. Nevertheless, the Commission's proposals were met with Greek resistance at the Council of Ministers, casting her veto not only on the reactivation of financial cooperation and implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol *per se*, but also on any step that would lead to an improvement in Turkey-EC relations. In fact, during the Customs Union negotiations with Turkey, Greece vetoed the final stage of the Turkish-EU customs union proposed by the Commission in December 1994. On 9 February 1995, Greece warned that it would use its veto unless an acceptable date was given for the start of accession talks with Cyprus. Besides, it used the Turkish-EU customs union negotiations to pressure EU members to eliminate conditionality of political settlement on Cyprus' membership to the EU (Brewin, 1999; Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005; Tocci, 2002).

Having been turned down by the negative Commission avis on its application, Turkey stepped up its efforts to complete the long-planned Customs Union with the Community as the final stage of the envisaged association. Talks began in 1994 and were finalized on 6 March 1995 at the 36th Turkey-EU Association Council meeting. On that day the Association Council adopted its decision 1/95 on the completion of the Customs Union<sup>2</sup> between Turkey and the EC in industrial and processed agricultural goods by 31 December 1995. It was ratified

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<sup>2</sup> It was based on the Articles 2 and 5 of the Ankara Treaty which was based on Articles 237 and 238 of the Rome Treaty.

by the European Parliament on 13 December 1995, thereby legally terminating the transitional stage which had started with the 1970 Additional Protocol.

As a matter of fact, during the Customs Union negotiations between Turkey and EC, Greece successfully linked its use of veto with the issue of taking a date for accession negotiations with Cyprus. Only after “the package deal” (Brewin, 2000) or “compromise” (Süvarierol, 2003) of 5 March 1995 during French Presidency, was Greece persuaded to lift its veto for the conclusion of Customs Union Agreement with Turkey, in return for setting a date for opening accession negotiations with Cyprus without a prior solution (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005; Süvarierol, 2003; Brewin, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 1999). Insistency on permanent opposition and confrontation was not sustainable as it could result in a risk of marginalization of Greece in the EU. For Greece, EU conditionality and monitoring could be more effective and therefore, preferable to bilateral relations with Turkey regarding Cyprus and Aegean problems. Kranidiotis, who later became Alternate Foreign Minister, pointed to the pressure exercised on Greece:

The dogmatic and complete denial of Greece to accept the EU-Turkey Customs Union would not only breach Greece’s contractual obligations but it could also lead our country to face a ‘legal coup’ from our partners and the approval of the Customs Union with qualified majority from the Council despite Greece’s objections (Kranidiotis, 2000 cited from Agnantopoulos, 2006: 20).

As of 1 January 1996, with the entry into force of the Customs Union, Turkey abolished all customs duties and charges having equivalent effect as well as quantitative restrictions on imports of industrial goods from the EU. Furthermore, Turkey was obliged to harmonize and apply its tariffs and equivalent charges on the importation of industrial goods from third countries with the EU's Common

External Tariff and progressively to adapt itself to the EU's commercial policy and preferential trade arrangements with specific third countries. This process was to be completed in 5 years.

1/95 decision on the completion of the Customs Union retained the EC's barriers on trade of agricultural goods. However, the two sides committed themselves to move towards free movement of such products. Consequently, though basic agricultural products have been excluded from the initial package, a preferential trade regime for these products was adopted on 1 January 1998. Moreover, Turkey is progressively adopting many aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy. On the other hand, under the Customs Union Decision (article 25), the EU is expected to take as much account as possible of Turkey's agricultural interests when developing its agricultural policy.

Although steel was excluded from Customs Union, it was stated in the 1/95 decision that a separate agreement that would eventually lead to free trade in this product will be achieved. In this context, a Free Trade Agreement with the EU covering products of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) was signed on 25 July 1996 and entered into force on 1 August 1996. Thus both sides agreed to abolish customs duties concerning trade of steel.

The EU had already abolished its tariffs for imports of industrial goods from Turkey before the Customs Union. However, quota restrictions particularly on textile and garment exports to the EU as the trade barriers were retained by the EU. So, the Customs Union did not bring about a significant liberalization for Turkish textile exports to the EU.

Apart from these rather technical provisions related to the establishment and the proper functioning of the Customs Union, 1/95 Decision also comprised an Association Council Resolution. The Resolution provided for the intensification of cooperation between Turkey and the EU in areas not covered by the Customs Union such as industrial cooperation, energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, environment, science, statistics, as well as matters relating to justice and home affairs, consumer protection, cultural cooperation, employment, and information.

According to the 1/95 Decision of the Association Council, the EU offered to deliver a special financial assistance to Turkey as part of the transition which amounted to 2.5 billion ECU over a five-year period. It aimed at alleviating the burden which the opening up of the economy to EU competition would bring to Turkish economic operators on the one hand, and improving Turkey's infrastructure and reducing the economic disparities between the parties on the other hand. Yet, the transfers envisaged within this framework have so far failed to materialize due to the lack of political will on the part of the EU, stemming mostly from Greek veto.

Moreover, Turkey's efforts to align itself to the EU's commercial policy towards third countries produced the Free Trade Agreements between Turkey and the then EFTA (European Free Trade Area) members as well as Israel, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland, Macedonia, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and the Palestinian National Authority, among others.

The approval of the Customs Union marked a major watershed in the evolution of Turkey's link with Brussels. The important aspect of this agreement was that from Turkey's perspective it was considered as another step on the road to full membership. The fact that 1/95 Customs Union decision was not solely limited by and went beyond economic and trade matters led the Turkish political leaders to believe that the Customs Union constitutes an important cornerstone towards Turkey's accession to the EU. However, it soon became clear that the EU itself did not perceive the customs union as such (for example, see Öniş, 2000; Eralp, 1998: 44).

This divergence of opinion turned out to be a very controversial issue in Turkey, as many began to consider the Customs Union, especially in the absence of the prospect of full membership, to be economically against Turkey's interests and politically unacceptable. The main domestic criticisms of the Customs Union came from Islamist or conservative groups in Turkey who ideologically opposed further integration of Turkey into Europe (Hale and Avcı, 2001: 34). There have also been domestic critics suspicious of the terms of Customs Union. Therefore, some argued that the customs union should be made conditional on full membership (for a discussion, see Hale and Avcı, 2001; Eralp, 2000).

It was thought that while the customs union places important economic obligations on Turkey, it does not grant the Turkish government an effective role or veto right in the decision-making mechanism of the EU that defines those obligations (Hale and Avcı, 2001: 35). In fact, the 1/95 decision provides that whenever the European Commission is drawing up new legislation of direct relevance to the operation of the Customs Union, it will 'informally consult' Turkish experts. If such consultation fails to produce an agreement, the matter

will be submitted to the Customs Union Joint Committee in which Turkish experts are also involved. Nevertheless, these procedures for consultation still fell short of an effective participation by Turkey in the EU bodies and real powers of decision-making remain in the hands of member states or the EU's own institutions (Hale and Avci, 2001: 35).

As already stated above, Turkey was obliged to take on the trade agreements or association agreements of the EU with third parties through the signing of separate agreements. This would create a difficulty and a clash of interest for Turkey whenever it had to sign an agreement with a country such as Cyprus or Armenia. For example, following EU membership of Cyprus, Turkey had to extend its Association Agreement to Cyprus by signing an Additional Protocol. Turkey signed it but refused to ratify it; thus accession negotiations with the EU were suspended, *inter alia*, because of this problem. Those critical of the Customs Union decision held that it did not deal with the issues of budgetary transfers and free movement of labor. For the EU side, these crucial questions would only be handled if and when Turkey became a full member.<sup>3</sup>

Those pessimistic about the amount of EU's financial transfers argued that Turkey could not get sufficient financial compensation for the loss of import duties. What is more, the envisaged financial assistance of 2.5 billion ECU (3.2 billion dollar) could not be released by the EU. Neither could the Fourth

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<sup>3</sup> Although free movement of labour between Turkey and the EC was to be effective as of 1 December 1986 as envisaged by the Additional Protocol, necessary talks could not be held due to uneasy political relations between the parties during late 1970s and early 1980s. The 1/95 Decision excluded the issue of free movement of labour and left its discussion at a later time when Turkey achieved full membership. In fact, together with the fear of inflow of Turkish workers into Europe, the cost of Turkish accession in the framework of agricultural, regional and structural funds are major concerns of the EU regarding Turkey's accession.

Financial Protocol be materialized (600 million ecu) due to the Greek veto. This meant that Turkey could not receive a financial compensation from the Community for the loss of customs duties and it could not enjoy the flow of Community funds to facilitate the transition. Unlike its opponents, supporters of the customs union believed that Turkish industry has adapted itself very well to the new competitive environment, and not a single sector suffered from important problems (Hale and Avci, 2001).

In fact, most of the Turkish political elite greeted the Customs Union with enthusiasm and regarded it as a preliminary stepping stone to the eventual goal of full membership. Since the customs union is believed to constitute the deepest form of integration short of full membership, Turkey perceived itself as being ahead of all other potential applicants from Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, the EU has been changing dramatically since the 1980s. For example, its interpretation of democracy became much comprehensive compared with the rather restrictive interpretation offered at the time of Greek or Spanish accession to the Community (Öniş, 2000: 465). The political element of the European project has become increasingly more important. Membership status was progressively resting on performance in relation to democratization and human rights. The Turkish political elite could not understand the tremendous change that had taken place in the nature and direction of the European integration project during the course of the 1980s and 1990s (Öniş, 2000: 465). Indeed, the Turkish political elite's vision or perception of European integration is still shaped by the parameters of the Ankara Agreement, which defined the Turkish-EU relations in predominantly economic terms, namely the customs union combined with free movement of labour.



Yet, Turkey's own democratic deficits and the Greek factor severely constrained its relations with Europe in the post-customs union era which resulted in the failure to activate the Fourth Financial Package and other envisaged financial assistance to Turkey which was an integral part of the original Customs Union arrangement.

Only one month after the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU entered into force, a diplomatic controversy, with a seemingly imminent military aspect, called 'Kardak/Imia Crisis' broke out between Ankara and Athens in 1996. The core of the dispute was about sovereignty of the islets and rocks in the Aegean, including Kardak/Imia, in the southeastern Aegean over which Ankara denied Greek claims for sovereignty on the grounds that they have never been subject to international legal agreements, nor is there any clear demarcation of maritime boundaries between Turkey and Greece. For the former, those islets and rocks are located in "grey areas", the territorial status and ownership of which is disputed (for a detailed scrutiny of the crisis, see Kramer, 2000: 169-170; Fırat, 2001: 466-467). The American efforts of reconciliation between the parties led to de-escalation of the tension, yet, the Kardak/Imia islet issue still remains unresolved. Being frustrated by Turkey's policy, Greece hardened its position toward Turkish-EU relations. It not only garnered support for his position from the EU but also vetoed conclusion of financial protocol for aid to Turkey in the context of Customs Union. For example, Greece has come to obtain endorsement of the EU via first, the European Parliament's condemnation of Turkey's policy and second, with the declaration of the EU's Council of Ministers on 15 July 1996, which stated that relations between Turkey and the EU should be guided by respect for international law, international agreements, and the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of EU member states and it called for “the avoidance of any action liable to increase tensions; the use or threat of force” (Kramer, 2000: 170). In addition, concerning the Kardak/Imia issue, it suggested that Turkey accept the international arbitration of International Court of Justice in accordance with Greek demands (Kramer, 2000: 170). The Greek position on the Kardak/Imia islet became the official position of the EU, therefore, Kardak/Imia was one of the several examples of how bilateral Greek-Turkish problems other than Cyprus could be Europeanized by Greece through uploading into the EU level, thus worsening Turkish-EU relations. The dilemma faced by Brussels was to appease Greece to overcome its blockade of better Turkish-EU relations on the one hand, and to keep relations with Ankara on track, or at least achieve partial improvement just as other member states would prefer.

The next critical turning-point in Turkish-EU relations came at the Luxembourg European Council held in December 1997. At this summit, EU leaders decided on the list of candidate countries for membership in line with recommendations of the Commission outlined in Agenda 2000. However, Turkey was explicitly excluded from the list and was not accepted as a candidate country. Although Turkey was declared to be “eligible for membership” it was not characterized as a candidate as the other ten former communist applicant states of Central and Eastern Europe, plus Malta and Cyprus.

Turkey was put in a separate category in that the EU formulated a special “European Strategy” for Turkey to help prepare for accession. This strategy also included intensifying the Customs Union and financial cooperation, changing its laws and participating in certain programmes to be decided case by case. But it was not given official candidate status nor offered a timetable for accession

negotiations, thus “the questions of the ‘when?’ and ‘how?’ of Turkey’s full membership” was left ambivalent (Eralp, 2000: 18). What is more, the EU linked Turkey’s eligibility as a candidate to progress on issues not contained in the Copenhagen criteria, such as the resolution of Turkey’s differences with Greece over the Aegean and a Cyprus settlement. In a nutshell, the EU stressed that strengthening Turkey’s ties with the Union depended on:

- (1) Turkey’s pursuit of political and economic reforms
- (2) Improving its human rights record and better treatment of its Kurdish minority
- (3) Improving relations with Greece and settling the Aegean dispute through legal process, including the ICJ
- (4) Support for the UN efforts in Cyprus
- (5) Not objecting to Cyprus’ membership in the EU
- (6) Persuading the Turkish Cypriot community to join the Greek Cypriots at the accession talks with EU (Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12-13 December 1997, paragraph 35).

As a reaction to the Luxembourg decisions, the then Turkish PM Mesut Yılmaz announced the suspension of the political dialogue with the EU and refused to participate in the European Conference to which Turkey was invited together with other applicant countries. Though political relations hit rock bottom, the government decided to continue the relationship with EU based on the Association Agreement. Turkey’s apparent omission from eastern enlargement generated a deep sense of disappointment, feeling of strong isolation and marginalization among the Turkish political elite and the public at large. The

Turks were outraged by this decision because allegedly weaker democracies and economies such as Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania were included (Yesilada, 2002: 95). Turkey, which was ahead of some countries in terms of economic and political criteria as well as adaptation to the *acquis communautaire*, felt discriminated against and argued that some countries were put ahead of Turkey because of political considerations and the political support they garnered from among EU members. The inclusion of Cyprus in the first group of candidates with which the EU wanted to open membership negotiations created a deep feeling of resentment that the EU was taking the side of Greece on the Cyprus issue and acting under her influence. The Turkish government announced that it no longer viewed the EU as a third party mediator in Greek-Turkish affairs and over the Cyprus problem (Yesilada, 2002: 96). Moreover, government officials started to emphasize that the EU was not an obsession for Turkey and Turkey had other foreign policy alternatives (Eralp, 2000: 19).

On the economic front, relations with the EU continued under the Customs Union. However, in this context, there were discussions to review the Customs Union arrangement (Eralp, 2000: 19). For example, many of the regulations and laws necessary to implement the Customs Union did not go through the Turkish Parliament but kept waiting in lower committees (Eralp, 2000: 19). It was argued by some members of the government that the Customs Union was working to the disadvantage of Turkey and pointed to the fact that since its inception, Turkey's foreign trade deficit increased considerably (Eralp, 2000: 19; Yesilada, 2002: 96). It was also frequently emphasized that Turkey was the only country that had entered into a Customs Union with the EU and at the same time was denied participation in the Union's membership plans (Yesilada, 2002: 96). Also,

Turkey had the disadvantage of implementing the customs union without getting financial assistance from the EU (Eralp, 2000: 19). The most frequently stated argument was that the CU was linked to the prospect of Turkey's full membership by many in Turkey. Since this prospect seemed problematic, this relationship could be revised (i.e. replacement with a free trade agreement) (Eralp, 2000: 19).

In the aftermath of Luxembourg decisions, another crisis erupted in Turkey's relations with the EU over the issue of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by which the EU began to move toward creating its own 50-60 thousand strong EU rapid reaction force (RRF) mainly responsible for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance tasks. The EU required an automatic access to certain NATO equipment, facilities, especially heavy lift capability and intelligence.

Faced by the unwillingness of the EU to offer a clear membership perspective, Turkey viewed these proposals as another attempt by the EU to marginalize Turkey's participation in European affairs and blocked a NATO-EU deal during the NATO summit in Washington DC in April 1999 (Yesilada, 2002: 96-97). Ankara had asked for assurances that it would be involved in the planning and decision-making in EU crisis management operations, especially those that touch directly on its own security interests. Ankara rejects an EU demand on drawing 'automatically' on NATO assets to manage a crisis in which NATO chooses not to become involved. Instead, Ankara insists that the EU's access to these assets be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thus Turkey's demand for closer consultation and involvement in EU decision-making in EU crisis management operations have hindered the coordination of crisis management planning between NATO and the EU.

At the heart of Ankara's objections lied suspicion that unless Turkey have a say in how these forces would be deployed, resources could be used against her interests, possibly in disputes with Greece over the Aegean or Cyprus (Yesilada, 2002:110; Larrabee and Lesser, 2002: 66). Besides, Turkey concerned that most of the crises that the EU or NATO might face in the future are likely to be on or near Turkey's periphery (Larrabee and Lesser, 2002: 66). Eventually, a compromise was achieved through an American-British sponsored plan, known as Ankara Document, which was later adopted at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. Turkey dropped its veto on EU cooperation with NATO in return for assurances or a commitment that the EU's ESDP would not be used against other NATO allies (i.e. Turkey) and the island of Cyprus, even if unified, will remain outside the regional security structure. In addition, the plan guaranteed that Turkey would be closely consulted in the case of an intervention by the EU's RRF in any contingency in the geographic vicinity of Turkey or one that affected Turkish security interests (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 120). Beyond all, the dispute served to deepen mistrust between Ankara and Brussels. Many Turks see the dispute as a further proof of the EU desire to exclude Turkey from its security affairs (Çayhan, 2003: 46).

Somewhat paradoxically, however, within two years of the Luxembourg decisions, there had been a drastic U-turn in Turkey-EU relations since Turkey was declared a candidate for full EU membership at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 on an equal footing with the other candidates and on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. Indeed, there have been 3 main reasons behind the policy shift of the EU from an exclusive to an inclusive strategy towards Turkey in 1999.

First, the Kosovo war and the need to bring the international security and stability to the forefront of EU agenda. Indeed, the conflict in Kosovo once again threatened (after Bosnian war) stability in the Balkans. Turkey complied with the UN sanctions against Serbia and eventually involved in the NATO bombing of that country (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 128). Following the war, Turkey contributed a unit of 1,000 troops to the peacekeeping force, KFOR (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 128-129). NATO's operations in Kosovo in 1999 showed that the EU was not capable of moving swiftly to ensure stability and security in her adjacency and had to rely on the American military might and political decisiveness (Christensen, 2009: 7; Çayhan, 2003). The Kosovo conflict made it clear that it would be difficult for Europe to maintain a stable economic and political system if instability occurs in her adjacent areas because of the increasing erosion of borders between Europe, Middle East and Eurasian regions. Turkey's role as a country adopting capitalist economic system and with a long term ties to the West, its secular and democratic political system with a predominant Muslim population, is seen critical in the promotion of stability in the hub of Middle East, Balkans, and Eurasia. Thus, the EU felt a need to create stability in the EU's neighbouring countries by introduction of a more inclusive enlargement strategy (Christensen, 2009: 7). It was thought that the best way of ensuring the stability and Western orientation of Turkey was to grant it an accession perspective (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011: 547). In effect, the EU realized that geopolitical and security risks might arise if Turkey was excluded as her alienation after Luxembourg was thought to be responsible for the lack of progress on Cyprus, the Aegean, and the future of reformulation of NATO-ESDP cooperation (Yesilada, 2002: 97).

Second, center-left majority in the European Council paved the way for a more accommodating position *vis-à-vis* Turkey's EU membership. Indeed, in the late 1990s, the social democratic wave affected all major member states in the EU and brought about "a perception of Europe as close to the idea of multicultural citizenship" (Christensen, 2009: 7). In 1997, Turkey had two significant member states opponents, Germany and Greece. However, both of them adopted a consensual policy towards Turkey's bid for EU membership prior to the Helsinki decision in 1999. Germany had experienced a change of government in 1998. As opposed to former coalition of CDU/CSU under Chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, who conceived Europe as a Christian Club and had an exclusionary orientation towards Turkey, new coalition government of SPD/Green under leadership of Gerhard Schröder, held a more positive attitude regarding Turkey's place in Europe (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011: 546; Christensen, 2009: 7).

Third, visible sign of change in Greek foreign and security policy towards Greek-Turkish relations and Turkish-EU relations brought forward by PM Costas Simitis and Foreign Minister George Papandreou in late 1990s (Tsakonas, 2010; Kazamias, 2006; Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 123-124; Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2003; Economides, 2005; Öniş, 2001: 38; Christensen, 2009: 7). As part of the process of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy embarked upon by PM Simitis, there was a shift in policy marked by a steady improvement in relations with Turkey, leading eventually to Greek support for Turkey's candidacy at Helsinki (Economides, 2005). Turkish-Greek relations have witnessed a *détente* since 1999. The reasons for dramatic improvement in the bilateral relations are multifold. First, after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the



Kurdish separatist movement PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-Kurdistan Worker's Party*), had to leave Syria when that country was faced a threat from Turkey that Ankara was ready to use all means including military force. It became clear that he was taken to Greece twice to find a new sanctuary and eventually was captured by the Turkish Security Forces in Kenya as he was leaving the Greek embassy in February 1999 (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 123; Yesilada, 2002: 97). This event led to a deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations dramatically. Three cabinet members, including the Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos and intelligence chief were asked to resign (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 123). Pangalos, known as hardliner on Turkish-Greek relations, was replaced by the moderate George Papandreou as the new Foreign Minister (Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2003).

Paradoxically, the Öcalan affair prompted a process of eventual rapprochement between Turkey and Greece (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 123). Two countries launched a quiet dialogue to explore ways for improving relations which paved the way for regular high level ministerial meetings and confidence-building measures across the Aegean sea (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005; Economides, 2005). Also, personal relationship between the two Foreign Ministers, Papandreou and Cem, was conducive to consolidation of this *rapprochement* (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 123). Moreover, the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999 facilitated mutual emergency assistance and sympathy between the two societies and had a psychological impact in popularizing and reinforcing the *détente* process (Öniş, 2001: 38; Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2003; Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005; Economides, 2005).

Furthermore, as a clear manifestation of its policy of Europeanizing Greek foreign policy, Simitis' PASOK government sought the adoption of European single currency. In order to meet the criteria of Eurozone membership his government felt the need to cut its budget deficit, thus improved relationship with Turkey would serve to decreasing military spending, which tended to rise in the previous period due to intensified perception of threat from Turkey (Benli Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 123; Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2003).

In addition, the underlying logic of Turkish-Greek *rapprochement* leading to Greek support to Turkey's candidacy at Helsinki can be explained through the Greek leadership's recognition that it would be more difficult to settle its long-standing bilateral disputes with Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus if Turkey was isolated and deprived of the EU membership perspective (Öniş, 2001: 38). Put differently, Greece's bargaining capacity *vis-à-vis* Turkey would be dramatically improved via the EU's pressure on Turkey with a package of conditions, rewards and monitoring (Öniş, 2001: 39; Tsakonas, 2010: 19-20). Hence, Greece realized that if it endorsed Turkey's bid for EU membership, it would eventually make bilateral problems of Aegean dispute and Cyprus problem part of Turkey's relations with the EU. For example, Greece used the Cyprus' EU accession as a condition for not vetoing Turkey's candidacy and thus enabled Cyprus' membership before a settlement of the Cyprus question (Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2003). Finally, Greek government decided to abandon its veto and supported Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. The shift that took place in Greece's traditional stance towards Turkey in the late 1990s was also explained by drawing upon the literatures on international socialization and strategic culture (both material and ideational) (for example, see

Tsakonas, 2010). Accordingly, Greece embarked upon a deliberate strategy, marked by an ideational change in favour of a pragmatic approach, to socialize Turkey into the EU institutional and normative environment (Tsakonas, 2010: 21).

The Helsinki summit marked a moment of historic significance for the future of Turkish-EU relations. This decision also helped reverse the deep sense of isolation prevailed in Turkey over the past two years. According to the Helsinki decisions, Turkey was to participate in Community programs open to other candidate countries and agencies. Turkey was also invited to the meetings between candidate states and the Union in the context of the accession process. Besides, a single framework for coordinating all sources of EU financial assistance for pre-accession was created. More importantly, the Helsinki European Council concluded that a resolution of the Cyprus dispute was not conditional upon Republic of Cyprus for its EU membership [paragraph 9(b)] whereas policy changes expected from Turkey included, among others, the pursuit of settlement of its problems with Greece and Cyprus (paragraphs 4, 9(a), 12). Hence, paragraphs 4, 9a, 9b, and 12 of the Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions<sup>4</sup> raised a particular concern in Turkey at that time, as Turkey was exposed to non-Copenhagen political preconditions and obligations unlike other candidates. For example, overwhelmingly denoting Turco-Greek problems over the Aegean, paragraph 4 stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and urges candidate states to resolve their border disputes and other related issues, or failing that, to bring the dispute to the ICJ in a

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<sup>4</sup> The details and repercussions of those articles for the Cyprus question and the Turkish-EU relations will be explained in the next section.

reasonable period of time. The Council also stated that, it would review the situation by the end of 2004 in relation to Turkey's accession process.

The next section dwells on the genesis and evolution of the Cyprus issue and presents how it evolved from a bilateral Turkish-Greek context to a trilateral one incorporating the EU, thus having a direct implications over Turkish-EU relations.

### **3.2 The Cyprus Debacle: Its Genesis and Evolution**

The reasons for studying the Cyprus question as a case study are multifold and have already been explained in Chapter 1. To recap briefly, since Turkey's Cyprus policy is so reflective of parameters underlying the TFP, any policy change (as a result of Europeanization) to be observed in Turkey's Cyprus policy would strengthen the linkage between Europeanization and national foreign policies (TFP as a case) in the literature. Besides, the Cyprus question has been occupying a central position within TFP making with repercussions for regional and global security, especially since 1974. Indeed, by assuming a key role in Turkish-EU relations the Cyprus issue has not only determined, but also been determined by, those relations before and since 1999. The Cyprus impasse has always played a pivotal role across the Brussels-Ankara axis and presently plays a very important part in the current stalemate in Turkish-EU relations.

The island of Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 until 1878<sup>5</sup> when it was handed over by Ottoman Sultan *II. Abdülhamit* to Britain for administration, although legal authority of the former over the island prevailed. Yet, during the First World War, by using the excuse of Ottomans being part of the opposing camp, Britain occupied the island which came under British colonial rule that lasted until 1960, when it became an independent republic.

The newly emerged Turkish Republic had recognized the sovereign rights of Britain over the island via the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Not until the 1950s did Cyprus become a major concern for Turkey when the Greek Cypriots, supported by the Greek government intensified their efforts to realize *enosis*<sup>6</sup> and Britain for its part began to give up its grip over the island. Also, during the course of 1954-1958, Greece made ill-fated efforts at internationalization of the Cyprus issue by bringing it to the UN agenda in search for Cyprus' independence on the basis of the principle of self-determination. The official position of Ankara was in favor of the partition of the island (*taksim*), yet it opted for independence as the second best strategy on the condition that in an independent Cyprus Republic, Turkish Cypriots would have the status of community with equal rights with the Greek community (Larrabee and Lesser, 2002). In a vote dated 4 March 1959, the Turkish Parliament endorsed the independence of Cyprus Republic (Firat, 2002: 614).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Previous to Ottoman rule, Cyprus came under Hittite, Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, Roman, Byzantium, Arabic, Frankish (Lusignans), Genoese, Mameluk and Venetian rule.

<sup>6</sup> *Enosis* refers to the idea of union with mainland Greece. It dates back to 1830s, when Greek populations living outside the Kingdom of Greece wanted to join it. In Cyprus, *enosis* denoted annexation of the island to Greece and was actively promoted by the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the EOKA resistance movement, initially to terminate British rule, and then to revise the 1960 Constitution's power-sharing arrangements with Turkish Cypriots.

<sup>7</sup> Policy change in Turkey should be read in the context of Cold War years throughout 1950s when both governments in Turkey and Greece had identified their national interest with that of the NATO

The Republic of Cyprus was born from a compromise between the two main communities on the island (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots)<sup>8</sup> and three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey and Britain. Building upon the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, three multilateral treaties, i.e. the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee were signed in 1960 and declared in the Constitution to “shall have constitutional force and cannot in any way amended”. The Treaty of Establishment set up the Republic of Cyprus, while the Treaty of Alliance allowed Greece and Turkey to station troops on the island. With the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey, Greece and Britain were conferred, as guarantors of the island’s independence and its constitution, a right to intervene together or alone so as to preserve or reinstate the state of affairs should the constitutional order be threatened. Article 185 of the Constitution as well as Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee prohibited total or partial union with any other state.

For the Turkish side, the significance of these agreements stems from the fact that they established on the one hand an internal balance between the two communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and on the other hand an external balance between Turkey and Greece (as Guarantor powers and with a right to deploy military presence on the island) in the Eastern Mediterranean (Denktaş, 1999). Also, the salience of the agreements can be related to their ability to address the root causes of the conflict and outlaw them (Denktaş, 1999).

For example, Greek Cypriot demands for enosis and the Turkish Cypriot demand

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and Western Alliance led by the U.S. Indeed, Washington was very cautious not to lead a fissure in the southwest flank of the NATO that would enable the USSR to capitalize on. Therefore, American pressure on both governments was primarily directed to prevent an armed clash between two strategically important allies, thereby ensuring strategic balance in Eastern Mediterranean.

<sup>8</sup> Other smaller groups include Latins, Maronites and Armenians.

for partition was forbidden, while those treaties overcame the Turkish Cypriot fear of being dominated by Greek Cypriots. It was a functional federation based on political equality of the two communities and their obligation to share sovereignty with their respective powers of self-government. Geographical separation was avoided through this guaranteed system of bi-communal partnership. For the Greek-Cypriot side, Turks had been given a larger share in the administration than their numerical status dictated. Therefore, the major task was to reduce and destroy the perceived restrictions of their sovereignty (i.e. the Treaty of Guarantee), to embark on a quest for a favourable revision of the status quo in order to allow for the representation of the majority (i.e. Greek-Cypriots) in a more balanced way (Richmond, 2002: 122).

Three years later, the constitutional order threatened to deteriorate when President Makarios proposed to amend the constitution. The thirteen proposals included, *inter alia*, abolishment of the right of veto of the President and Vice-President; the vice-President of the Republic to deputize for the President in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to reform his duties; Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House; the Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputize for the President of the House of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties; the Constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished; unified municipalities to be established; the administration of justice to be unified; the numerical strength of the Security Forces and the Defense Forces to be determined by a law; the

proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and of the Forces of the Republic, i.e. the Police and the Army, to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; and the Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.<sup>9</sup>

The agreed formula based on a fragile institutional and political balance did not work and the proposed amendments were unacceptable for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey alike, because the former would be relegated to a minority status. Intercommunal strife (which had been suppressed since 1960) was aggravated, leading to the collapse of constitutional rule in 1964 and civil disorder until 1974. In deploying peacekeeping force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 (Security Council Resolution 186 S/5575 dated 4 March 1964) to help ease the tension, the UN required the consent of the island's government.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the resolution referred to the 'Government of the Republic of Cyprus', which served to legitimate it (by then wholly comprised of Greek Cypriots) in the eyes of the international community.<sup>11</sup> In 1974, the Greek military junta in Athens (1967-1974) attempted (but failed) to overthrow pro-independence Makarios and install pro-enosis Nicos Sampson as president. Relying on Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty (to protect the island's independence and restore constitutional order) and only after the refusal of its appeal to Britain as one of the other guarantor powers to act together to protect island's independence<sup>12</sup> Turkey landed troops in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 and following its second intervention on 14 August, occupied

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<sup>9</sup> For a more detailed information see "The 13 Points: November 1963". Retrieved from [http://cyprus-conflict.net/13\\_points.html](http://cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.html). Accessed on 11 January 2015.

<sup>10</sup> Although the UNSC's Resolution of 186 (1964) agreed to appoint a mediator, upon Turkey's suspicions over impartiality of the mediation efforts, the UN had to undertake 'good offices' mission between the two communities on the island since 1968.

<sup>11</sup> Because the UN recognition constitutes a legal benchmark for other states and international organizations alike, the UN's move had set the stage for the international community.

<sup>12</sup> See Sonyel (1999) for a detailed account of the British point of view concerning the origins of the conflict.



the northern part (about %36 of the island).<sup>13</sup> The Turkish military intervention led to a cease-fire and division of the island into the Turkish Cypriot North and the Greek Cypriot South.<sup>14</sup> The Turkish side first established interim administrations and autonomous governments,<sup>15</sup> which turned into Turkish Federated State of Cyprus<sup>16</sup> in 1975. As a last step in 1983, in an attempt to assert their equal partnership *vis-à-vis* the Greek Cypriots in a future federal republic of Cyprus,<sup>17</sup> the Turkish Cypriot side, by claiming the right of self-determination, declared independence under the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC henceforth). After this proclamation, the UN Security Council declared the TRNC as legally invalid (UNSC 541/1983) and called upon all states not to recognize, facilitate or in any way assist it (UNSC 550/ 1984).<sup>18</sup> Not recognized by any member of international community other than Turkey, it has thus remained an isolated entity.

What is more, echoing the UN, the European Commission, the European Parliament and foreign ministers of member states declared that they would continue to recognize the Greek Administration as the only legitimate government under the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, the then EC and its member

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<sup>13</sup>Before 1974, Turkey had staged limited air bombardement on Greek Cypriot forces (who had been aided by Greeks) in 1964 and 1967 in order to retaliate against violent attacks and economic blockades that Turkish villages were exposed to.

<sup>14</sup>Bizonality was consolidated especially after the Population Exchange Agreement between the two communities in 1975, in which the Turkish Cypriots in the South are allowed to proceed the North (approximately 65.000) and the Greek Cypriots are allowed to move to the South (approximately 120.000). See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

<sup>15</sup>Interim Turkish Administration of Cyprus in 1967 but connotation of 'interim' was dropped in 1971.

<sup>16</sup>In fact, it was not a federated state but was thought to join in a federation with the Southern part.

<sup>17</sup>This point was particularly articulated by Founding President Rauf R. Denktaş in a personal interview with the author conducted in his office in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus on 24 May 2010. In the declaration of independence, it was stated that the founding of TRNC does not constitute a barrier for a solution which will be based upon equality of two communities within a federal state.

<sup>18</sup>Also see General Assembly Resolution 37/253 adopted on 13 May 1983 (prior to the declaration of independence of TRNC).

states regarded the UN as the appropriate framework for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute, therefore strongly supporting the efforts of the UN and Secretary General(s) with a mission of Good Offices aiming at a just and viable solution. For this very reason, understanding the EU's position *vis-à-vis* the stalemate on Cyprus issue would be incomplete without underlining the UN parameters for solution.

Indeed as early as 1974 when Turkish troops landed on Cyprus, the UN called for an end to the Turkish military intervention and withdrawal of foreign military forces and personnel from the island and required from all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus (UNSC 353/1974). In its subsequent decision (UNSC 360/1974), the UN declared its disapproval of Turkish unilateral military actions against the Republic of Cyprus, although it later adopted the General Assembly Resolution<sup>19</sup> calling for negotiations to be conducted on 'an equal footing' between the representatives of the two communities under the good offices of Secretary General of the UN.

Besides, the Denктаş-Makarios (1977) and Denктаş-Kyprianou (1979) High Level Agreements have also been widely cited in the UN documents as being part of the UN parameters of solution. Specifically, Turkish Cypriot leader Denктаş and Cypriot President Makarios agreed on the general guidelines for a solution in 1977, the major points of which included independence, non-alignment and a bi-communal federal republic; a territorial division not to reflect only population differences but also reflect economic viability, productivity and land ownership; and designing the central government to be able to safeguard the

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<sup>19</sup> General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) at 2275th plenary meeting on 1 November 1974. This resolution was later adopted by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC 367/75).

unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal nature of the state. Building upon these guidelines Denktaş and Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou signed the Ten Points Agreement in 1979 which additionally stipulated that there should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all the citizens of the Republic (Article 3); the Republic will be demilitarized (Article 7); the parties agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks (Article 6); there will be guarantees for independence, sovereignty, territorial integration and non-alignment of the Republic as well as guarantees against union in part or in whole with any other state or a partition and secession of any kind (Article 8).

The UN has been exercising a good offices mission between the two Cypriot communities to reunite the island since 1968, yet it could not have generated a satisfactory result for both parties. The UN parameters for a solution were established by relevant UN Security Council Resolutions over the years<sup>20</sup>; 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements; Secretary General's good offices between the parties as well as his proposals, reports, and plans<sup>21</sup> directed at a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. According to the established UN body of work, a mutually acceptable, just and lasting solution must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation which must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of

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<sup>20</sup> Parameters for a comprehensive political settlement of Cyprus problem was either explicitly stated or confirmed in several UN Security Council Resolutions including, *inter alia*, UNSC 649(90); UNSC 716(91); UNSC 750(92); UNSC 774(92); UNSC 789(92); UNSC 1250(99); UNSC 1251(99); UNSC 1475(2003); UNSC 1548(2004); UNSC 1758(2007); UNSC 1789(2007); UNSC 1818(2008); UNSC 1847(2008).

<sup>21</sup> Previous proposals for solution of the Cyprus problem of the UN included de Cuellar Peace Plan of 1986, Ghali Set of Ideas of 1992, Confidence Building Measures of 1994, the Annan Plan of 2004.

partition or secession (particularly, UNSC 649/90; UNSC 716/92; UNSC 750/92; UNSC 774/92; UNSC 1251/99). To reiterate, this formula has become the official common ground for the internationally (UN) sponsored search for a settlement.

Even if parties more or less accepted the UN-sponsored formula of bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, differences would still exist as to what this formula would in fact imply for each party (Axt, 1999: 190-191). For the Greek Cypriots, a federative solution would mean swinging back to the pre-1974 *status quo*<sup>22</sup>: a federation with a strong central government; single sovereignty, personality and citizenship for all Cypriots; free movement of persons; unrestricted purchase of property; restitution of lost property in the North instead of global exchange or compensation; some territorial readjustments including the return of the agricultural region of Güzelyurt (Morphou) and the touristic region of Maraş (Varosha) to Greek Cypriots; the removal of Turkish troops; the removal of Turkish settlers; and the continuation of the “Republic of Cyprus” by federalizing it via a constitutional exercise.

On the contrary, for the Turkish Cypriots, a federal solution would embrace recognition of the equality of two separate peoples with differing cultures, religions and languages; the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, emphasizing guarantees by Turkey, including troops on the island; a weak central government and stronger federal governments; the readjustment of Turkish territory, excluding Güzelyurt (Morphou) and Gazi Mağusa (Famagusta); compensation, global exchange and ‘limited’ return instead of property

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<sup>22</sup> Denoting the political and military situation before the Turkish military intervention in 1974.

restitution; the creation of a ‘new’ partnership state; and an emphasis on strong bi-zonality.

The parties cannot even agree on when and how the conflict was triggered.<sup>23</sup> For instance, the Greek Cypriots treat the Cyprus question as a “problem of invasion” (of Turkish troops) that started in 1974, whereas for Turkish Cypriots, the genesis goes back to 1963, when they were ousted from power by their Greek compatriots, thus ending the partnership state of the former “Republic of Cyprus”. As to what the constitutional style of the Republic implicated, Greek Cypriots perceived it nothing but a “unitary state”; for the Turkish Cypriots, it was a “partnership state” based on a functional federation embracing political equality of the two communities (see Denktaş, 1999).

What is more, the two sides disagree on the source of sovereignty and power sharing. For example, the Turkish Cypriots opt for strong federal states (founding states) who would transfer some of their sovereignty to central government<sup>24</sup> and the rest would be vested in the federal states. Whereas for Greek Cypriots, source of the sovereignty would rest with the ‘strong’ central government from which sovereign power of federal (founding) states would emanate.

For Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the state of affairs that had been established through the 1959 and 1960 Agreements in Cyprus had been damaged: the internal balance was upset by the Greek Cypriots’ move to end the 1960 partnership in 1963. Further, the external balance was altered with the UN’s decision in 1964 legitimizing the “Government of Cyprus”, which was at the time

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<sup>23</sup> Rauf R. Denktaş, founding president of the TRNC, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Nicosia, Northern Cyprus.

<sup>24</sup> The extent of the sovereignty of central state is to be determined by the will of federal (founding) states.

composed only of Greek Cypriots. It further deteriorated when, Greek Cypriots gained EU membership under the banner of the “Republic of Cyprus” on May 2004 without settling the issue and before Turkey had become a member. For Turkish Cypriots and Turkey alike, whereas the proclamation of the TRNC served to recover the internal balance, concerning the external balance, Turkey has reacted with a ‘persistent objection’ to what it regards as the ‘illegal’ unilateral application of Greek Cypriots for entry into the EU and the EU acceptance of that membership.<sup>25</sup>

The EU and its member states strongly endorse the UN’s parameters for solution as appropriate framework for settling the Cyprus dispute. While formulating its policy positions, Brussels frequently refers to UN decisions and practices opting for a non-divided and reunified state having a single sovereignty, personality and single citizenship with a federal government. According to the EU, political solution should be found “under the aegis of the UN (...) with a view to creating a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation” (EU Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12-13 December 1997, paragraph 28).

What is more, via the Greek’s EU membership in 1981, the EU got drawn into a wider Turco-Greek problem in the Eastern Mediterranean by serving a further complication of the Cyprus dispute. In fact, in the beginning, the European Commission had a more balanced approach to Turkish-Greek relations in the face of Greek membership application of 1975 to the EC by stating that “the Community should not become party to the disputes between Greece and Turkey” (European Commission, 1976: 3) and took measures to prevent Greek-

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<sup>25</sup> An anonymous career diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal interview of the author, 3 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.

Turkish dispute from disturbing closer EC/EU-Turkish relations (for measures undertaken see Agnantopoulos, 2006: ix). In fact, the twin pillar political strategy of Greece towards Turkey involved first, accession of Cyprus to the EU and second, forging a link between the rapprochement between Ankara and Brussels with progress on the Cyprus problem (Stivachtis, 2002: 50). Greek membership also meant that by using its veto power in Community institutions, Greece wanted to hinder the recognition of Turkish Cypriots within the economic framework of the EU (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 285). Besides, the practical goals of Greek policy were to have Turkey commit to peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes (i.e. Aegean disputes) in the framework of legal norms and also to have the EU adopt the position that the use of force in solving problems is unacceptable (Evriviades, 2003: 247).

Indeed, the Greek political strategy towards Cyprus dates back to 1988 when the former successfully managed to link the opening of the second stage of the Association Agreement between the Union and Cyprus leading to Customs Union (in 1993) with the overall Mediterranean policy of the Community (Stivachtis, 2002: 50). Furthermore, Athens made a subsequent diplomatic manoeuvre by forging a link between the Greek concession over improvement in Turkish-EC relations with progress on resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Greece eventually uploaded this policy to be adopted at Community level in April 1988 when the European Council Presidency Conclusions stated that “the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations” which was later reiterated in the Dublin European Council decisions on 25-26 June 1990.

Another occasion that helped bring the issue to a deadend for the EC and Turkish-EC relations was the Greek Cypriot application to the Community for

full membership on 3 July 1990. What motivated Greece and Greek Cyprus most was the conviction that Cypriot accession would pressurize Turkey to make concessions on the reunification of the island in exchange for satisfying Turkish ambitions for accession. In addition to domestic economic and political considerations, the reasons behind application were to undermine geostrategic superiority of Turkey; to attain security guarantees against Turkey by making an attack on an EU member state politically costly, to use the elements of the EU *acquis* concerning the free movement of goods, services, and people to offset claims of Turkish side for division in Cyprus; to make the EU pressurize Turkey to withdraw its forces from the Northern part of Cyprus since Turkey would be regarded as occupying a part of the territory of an EU member state; to pressurize Turkey to push Turkish Cypriots' for an agreement on Cyprus favourable to Greece so that Cyprus can achieve membership with problems solved; and to delink the accession of Cyprus from its political problem simultaneously (Richmond, 2002: 130; Stivachtis, 2002: 34-53; Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 285-286; Dodd, 1998; Evriviades, 2003: 246-47; Tocci, 2002: 117-119).

As noted before, although the Commission avis in 1989 on Turkish application for membership was turned down on the grounds that the country was not ready for membership, the Commission responded positively to the Cyprus application on 30 June 1993 (European Commission, COM (93) 313 final, Brussels, 30 June 1993). In the Commission Opinion, the division of island was seen as a substantial obstacle to EU accession because at the outset, the widespread view in the then EC underlined that Cyprus membership to the EU was not possible without prior political settlement. Although the Community considered Cyprus as “eligible for membership”, the Commission opinion also



made it clear that “political settlement of the Cyprus question would (...) strengthen the ties which link Cyprus to Europe”. Evidentially, at that time the dominant rationale within the European circles was that the membership perspective given to Cyprus might act as a catalyst for the resolution of the dispute. Therefore, the document visibly elaborated that “Cyprus’ integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question”. This was because it was thought that Cyprus membership to the EU was conditional upon a resolution of the problem; thus the Community stated that “as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession.” In case intercommunal talks fail to produce a negotiated settlement, the Commission also warned that “(...) the situation should be reassessed in view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks and that the question of Cyprus's accession to the Community should be reconsidered in January 1995.”

To that end, the Council of Ministers appointed a European Observer in February 1994 to evaluate the situation in Cyprus. The European Observer’s Report<sup>26</sup> on Cyprus dispute published on 23 January 1995 put all the blame on the Turkish Cypriot side by arguing that no progress was made in the field of confidence-building measures between the two communities in Cyprus as a result of the Turkish Cypriot position (European Observer’s Report on Cyprus, 23 January 1995). Throughout the report, much credit had been given to what Clerides, then Greek Cypriot leader, had proposed. By contrast, Denktas’s proposals for solution or his responses to Clerides’ arguments have been either disregarded or dismissed for not being ‘viable’ (i.e. Part III, Article 12). While

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<sup>26</sup> The full-text of the Report is republished in Dodd (1998: 172-180).

noting a concern for increasing armament in both sides, the Report claimed that it was the Turkish side who first initiated the rearmament on the island. Therefore, it recommended that “Turkey (...) bring about more conciliatory attitudes by making a gesture as regards its military presence and Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus.” Thus, Turkey claimed that the even-handedness of EU’s approach towards two sides has been greatly damaged once more.

At the Corfu European Council in June 1994 (and reaffirmed at the Essen European Council in December 1994), it is declared that “the next phase of enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus and Malta” by reaffirming that “any solution of the Cyprus problem must respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and high-level agreements.” This was because during the Customs Union negotiations between Turkey and EC, Greece successfully linked its use of veto with the issue of taking a date for accession negotiations with Cyprus. As seen, conditionality of political settlement before accession of Cyprus was not yet totally withdrawn by the EU. Only after “the package deal” (Brewin, 2000) or “compromise” (Süvarierol, 2003) of 5 March 1995 during the French Presidency was Greece persuaded to lift its veto for the conclusion of a Customs Union Agreement with Turkey, in return for setting a date for opening accession negotiations with Cyprus without a prior solution (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005; Süvarierol, 2003; Brewin, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 1999).

On the other hand, in addition to influencing Customs Union negotiations between the EC and Turkey, Greece has succeeded to ‘upload’ or ‘project’ its policy preferences and national interests concerning ‘Cyprus membership’, to the EU level (bottom-up Europeanization) owing largely to the EU’s own internal

decision-making mechanisms. Particularly by Greek efforts, prospect for positive Turkish-EU relations as well as Turkey's bid for accession was firmly tied in with Ankara's favorable attitude towards settlement in Cyprus. Thus, Cyprus impasse; its path to EU membership as well as Turkish-EU relations was 'Europeanized' by Greece who was able to enjoy membership advantages successfully within the EU. Indeed full membership of Cyprus in May 2004 would not have been possible without an effective Greek lobbying in the Union and its threat to "wield its veto stick in Council of Ministers" as to the Eastern enlargement project unless Cyprus was included in the first-wave candidates and negotiations with it would begin even in the case of no political solution (Süvarierol, 2003: 62). To illustrate, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declared that "If Cyprus is not admitted, then there will be no enlargement of the Community" (Cyprus News, 1996 cited in Baç and Güney, 2005). On another occasion, Theodore Pangalos, the then Greek foreign minister, stated that "It is Greece which will determine when Cyprus will join the European Union" (Pangalos, 1997 cited in Brewin, 2000).

Another clear manifestation of Greek influence on the Cyprus' accession could be seen in the Agenda 2000 document which was prepared by the Commission and later adopted by the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. It stated that "accession negotiations with Cyprus should start six months after the conclusion of the IGC". It was added in the same document that negotiations "could start before a political settlement is reached." Soon after, the Luxembourg European Council recommended to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1998 by incorporating it into the fast track country

list. The decision of the EU was based upon the conviction that (as written in Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions):

The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations which must continue with a view to creating a bi-community, bi-zonal federation.

Particularly since the 1990s, Turkish-EU relations have not been able to evolve independently of the problems between Turkey and Greece, including the Cyprus issue by giving reference to international law and UN efforts to that effect. While granting Turkey candidacy status, the Helsinki European Council reported that the resolution of the Cyprus debacle was not a precondition for accession of Cyprus to the EU. Yet, it explicitly linked Turkey's pre-accession process to settlement of its problems with Greece and Cyprus. Soon after the settlement of the Cyprus problem was also included in *the 2001 Accession Partnership Document* for Turkey as one of the short-term priorities. The EU assumed that given the strong possibility of a veto by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to block Turkey's eventual accession to the EU, Turkey was expected to adopt a more active and conciliatory approach in the dispute before Cyprus' entry (Tocci 2002, 107-109).

Indeed, as will be shown in the next chapter, the Greek Cypriot application to the Community and its eventual accession process leading to membership in 2004 helped worsen the issue for the EU and partly resulted in the current impasse in Turkish-EU relations (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **EU CONDITIONALITY AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ON THE CYPRUS CASE**

#### **4.1 Sources of Incompatibility Between EU Requirements and Turkey's Cyprus Policy**

The level of mismatch between EU requirements and a country's existing policies is among those factors determining the nature and extent of Europeanization. Thus, pinpointing the EU's impact on Turkey's Cyprus policy necessitates to underline sources of incongruence between the requirements of Brussels on Ankara on the one hand, and Ankara's position on the other. Understanding sources of incompatibility is also of significance because the Cyprus impasse has always played a pivotal role across the Brussels-Ankara axis and lies at the heart of the current stalemate in Turkey-EU relations. In the context of accession, EU adaptational pressures take the form of direct EU conditionality, which is underpinned by a linkage policy in the specific context of Turkey, and has an indirect effect by leading to power reallocation of domestic actors. The following will characterize positions of the EU and Turkey over Cyprus, with an aim to underscore the 'goodness of fit' between the two, which

in turn determines the extent of pressures coming from the EU for a change in Turkey's Cyprus policy.

#### **4.1.1 The EU's Position: From Self-Declared 'Impartiality' to Active Engagement**

The European Union and its predecessor European Community, have displayed considerable interest in the Cyprus dispute (e.g. see Brewin, 1999; 2000; Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005). Actually, the EU's indirect involvement in the conflict began in the 1960s, when Greece (1962) and Turkey (1963) concluded association agreements; the association status granted by the Community to Cyprus in 1972; Turkey's EU candidacy since 1999; and lastly, Cyprus' accession to the EU in 2004. Moreover, the fact that Cyprus is located in a region, whose stability is of enormous importance to the EU both politically and economically and the fact that the parties to the dispute, notably Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey have close relations with the EU, have not only contributed to the EU's interest and concern but also accorded it a special role.

In fact, the Union had previously adopted a 'policy of even-handedness' towards its associate members of Turkey and Greece and asserted 'the rule of non-discrimination' in the Association Agreement signed with Cyprus in 1972. In other words, the then-EC was trying to stand at an equal distance in the Greek-Turkish dispute, taking into account Cold War political conditions. Despite initial hopes, that policy has become unviable once Cyprus signed its own Association

Agreement in 1972<sup>1</sup> and it could only be sustained until Greece became a EU member in 1981. In view of the increasing separation of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot economies and mounting pressures upon Turkish enclaves, the then-EEC had to insert a non-discrimination clause into the Agreement with Cyprus in 1972. Designed primarily to protect British privileges and Turkish Cypriots' economic rights, Article 5 of the Agreement stipulated that "The rules governing trade between the contracting parties may not give rise to any discrimination between the member states or between nationals or companies of these states or nationals and companies of Cyprus" (Brewin, 2000: 23).

Unlike its policy of even-handedness towards the two recognized entities of Greece and Turkey during the 1960s, the rule of non-discrimination was difficult to implement because there was only one recognized sovereign state on the island, namely the Republic of Cyprus. Nonetheless, after 1974, emergency aid was distributed by the European Commission through 'international non-governmental agencies' to by-pass the governmental control of the Greek Administration, thereby delivering 18 percent of the aid to the North.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, in 1976, the Committee of Representatives of the Member States in Brussels (COREPER) concluded a 'gentleman's agreement' which permitted the continuation of exports from Northern Cyprus to England and Ireland via Rotterdam, thus making local certification of exports from the North possible (Brewin, 2000: 23). The first financial protocol which distributed 18 percent of the money loaned to Turkish Cypriots and successive protocols were all supposed

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<sup>1</sup> The Agreement came into force on 1 June 1973.

<sup>2</sup> For example, the Joint Parliamentary Committee of EEC-Turkey Association Council on 24 April 1975 specified that "to ensure that the Community's food aid to the population of the island is effectively delivered and distributed, regardless of the ethnic community to which they belong or the area in which they live".

to benefit the ‘whole island’. In March 1980, it was decided that financial and technical cooperation should “be applied for the benefit of the entire population of the island” (Brewin, 1999; 2000). However, EC rules require that rules be implemented by governments. Besides, The European Investment Bank required that only host governments are entitled to guarantee loans for the assurance of repayment. Previous aids distributed to Turkish Cypriots had become possible thanks to the Commission’s hesitancy of governmental control by delivering money via international non-governmental agencies. Nor was the Greek Cypriot government informed of the COREPER’s gentleman’s agreement which allowed Turkish Cypriot authorities to issue certificates for their exports.

Expectedly, Greek Cypriot government was not supposed to certify the citrus fruits which would probably be produced on the property and terrain detached from Greek Cypriots after 1974. Yet, the fact that the EEC recognized Greek side as the only legitimate government of Cyprus strengthened Greek Cypriot claims over legitimacy of their administration while contributing to a worsening of the economic situation of Turkish side (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 284). That is to say, rather than contributing to working for common economic and political interests of the two communities, EEC policy of non-discrimination did barely produce the expected results.

Likewise, prior to the accession of Greece, an ‘even-handed’ approach of the then EC had been visible since both the Council decision on 24 June 1975 and Commission Avis on 23 May 1979 concerning the Greek application for membership had stressed that the Community would not be drawn into the conflict between Greece and Turkey. Certainly, following Greek accession to the then EC in 1981, the economic situation of Turkish Cypriots was made even



worse by the fact that Greek Cypriots –supported by Greece as a member- brought suits against fruit merchants and citrus fruit importers from Northern Cyprus in several EC member states with an aim of questioning the legality of certificates issued by TRNC authorities which was required by EC regulations for the import of agricultural imports. Subsequently, on 5 July 1994, the European Court of Justice decided that the movement and phytosanitary certificates issued by authorities other than those of the Republic of Cyprus should not be accepted (*Anastasiou case*, 5 July 1994, Case C-432/92). This meant that the Court banned the export of citrus fruit and potatoes from Northern Cyprus to European states, thereby justifying Greek claims that these exports originated from confiscated (claimed to be occupied) property of Greek Cypriots and, therefore, had to be certified by the Republic of Cyprus itself (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 285). Being binding upon member states, via this decision, internal administrative requirements for governmental certification overruled Article 5 of Association Agreement, which prohibited discrimination against Turkish Cypriot nationals and companies with the aim of protecting the Turkish Cypriot economy (Brewin, 2000: 24). Not only did the Court’s ruling partly legitimize Greek Cypriots’ claim on property rights on the northern part of the island (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 285); it also had serious repercussions on TRNC’s economy in that nearly 60 percent of its entire export, but especially citrus fruit and clothing sectors, were negatively affected.<sup>3</sup> Put more bluntly, the decision of the Court contributed to the worsening of the economy of Northern Cyprus which had already been adversely affected by embargoe of Greece and international community since 1963 and 1974 respectively.

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<sup>3</sup> See “Kıbrıs Tarihçe” [History of Cyprus], <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-tarihce.tr.mfa>. Also see Arslan (2005) for a more detailed elaboration of effects on TRNC’s economy.

Another episode of direct involvement of the EC came with the fledgling EPC's statement under French chairmanship issued on 16 July 1974 following the coup d'état conducted by the Greek junta against President Makarios of Cyprus. Nine members expressed their concerns and confirmed their attachment to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and their opposition to all intervention and interference.

In the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EEC issued another statement on 22 July 1974 simultaneously with UNSC Resolution 353, calling for parties to apply the cease fire and to work for the restoration of the constitutional order in Cyprus. Since the EEC categorically opposed any idea of either enosis or partition, the EPC's statement supported the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and denounced any idea of intervention in Cyprus. Yet, they could hardly do more than that owing to the fact that whilst French and Irish governments made strong statements in favour of government side, the Germans and British endorsed American efforts to mediate between Turkey and Greece, that is, between the two community leaders, Rauf Denktaş and Glafcos Clerides (Brewin, 2000: 24). It was understood that the EC wanted to prevent further military advancement of Turkey on the island since Turkish troops had already intervened on 16 July 1974. The EPC initiative could not prevent Turkish response because the latter had justified its intervention on the basis of 1960 Guarantee Treaty (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 284). From Ankara's perspective, the credibility of the EC, as self-appointed neutral arbiter, was tremendously diminished because the balance in Greek-Turkish relations was increasingly tilting towards Athens.

Another occasion of the EC involvement came with the common statement issued by the then EC upon the declaration of the ‘independence’ of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 16 November 1983. Concomitant with the UN’s position, member states reaffirmed “their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus” and reiterated that “they continue to regard the government of President Kyprianou as the sole legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus.” What is more, they called for “all interested parties not to recognize this act, which creates a very serious situation in the area.” Once Turkey recognized the TRNC, member states this time issued a new statement on 27 March 1983 by calling upon “the Turkish Government to withdraw this recognition”, and confirmed “their support for the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the pursuit of his mission of Good Offices in accordance with Security Council Resolution 541.” Later on, the policy of “non-recognition of TRNC” was reaffirmed by the European Court of Justice in its Judgement of July 1994 (Case 341/92).<sup>4</sup>

In fact, the EPC and the European Council was not the sole platform through which the EC/EU demonstrated interest concerning the Cyprus question. In its various resolutions, the European Parliament (EP) made it clear that the Cyprus problem has implications for basic values and principles upon which the EU is based. It also proposed preferred formula for resolution of the dispute and reiterated linkage between Turkey’s relations with the EU and its policy towards Cyprus. For example, the Resolution adopted in March 1988 stipulated that

the unlawful occupation of part of the territory of a country associated with the Community by the military forces of another associate

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<sup>4</sup> “The European Union and the Cyprus Question”.

partner presents a major stumbling block to the normalization of relations with the latter (paragraph 2).

In paragraph 3, it called for a solution that completely echoes what Greek Cypriots would prefer:

the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to consider the ways and means whereby a state of law might be re-established in Cyprus, and to devote particular attention to the possibility of a resumption of negotiations between the communities under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, with the aim of conferring on the Republic of Cyprus the status of a federation, the constituent parts of which would be in proportion to the composition of the population which would guarantee the rights of the two communities, free the island from the presence of all foreign troops and guarantee freedom of movement, freedom of establishment and the property rights of members of both communities, and ensure the security of both the Greek and Turkish communities, and to keep the European Parliament informed on a regular basis.<sup>5</sup>

No doubt the Cyprus problem has been further complicated by realization of Greek membership to the EU in 1981, which paved the way for an irrevocable involvement of the latter as an additional player in bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Rather than being motivated by inherent hostility (towards Turkey), what accounted most for Greek attempt for membership had been security concerns and the necessity to balance military and strategic superiority of Turkey through non-military means (Evriviades, 2003: 246). Since then, it would have been irrational to expect from the EU to keep its equal distance to parties and act as a neutral arbiter in settling their problems. From mid-1980s onwards, it became clear in Turkish political circles that Greek inclusion into the Union constituted a formidable barrier to potential Turkish membership of the European Community.

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<sup>5</sup> “The European Union and the Cyprus Question”.

As noted before, the prospect of accession of Cyprus to the EU was seen by both Brussels and Athens as a factor contributing to the process of finding a just and viable solution to the Cyprus impasse. EU circles and the Greek Cypriot leadership alike suggested that a Cyprus accession process would act as a catalyst for the parties involved (so-called *catalytic effect* of the EU), particularly for Turkey, in finding a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Apart from the Commission's avis in 1993 concerning Cyprus' application for membership, in the *Agenda 2000* document prepared for enlargement, the Commission pointed to the facilitating capacity of "the Union ... to play a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting settlement" (European Commission, 1997: Vol. I, Part II, Item IV). A similar wording also appeared in the Luxembourg European Council decision in December 1997 that "the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation" (Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 1997). Also, the official vision of the Greek Cypriot side envisioned that "the country's accession process can facilitate efforts of finding a solution to the political problem of Cyprus" and the then Cyprus Foreign Minister Kasoulides expressed at the opening of negotiations that accession "will act as a catalyst, inducing all sides to work for an early solution" (Republic of Cyprus, 1999).

Before proceeding with a shift in the policy of EU as demonstrated particularly since the Corfu and Essen Summits of 1994 as well as the Agenda 2000 document and the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, it is best to emphasize the 'legal misfit' between the EU and Turkish positions as regards the legitimacy of Cyprus' application to the EU on behalf of 'Cyprus as a whole'. From the beginning, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots alike opposed a unilateral Cyprus

application to the EU and entering into accession negotiations in the name of the whole island as unlawful since it is in contravention of the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959 and 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 286; Ertuğruloğlu, 2003: 224; Axt, 1999). To recall, as a stepping stone for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, on 11 February 1959, Greece and Turkey signed three treaties in Zurich which later laid the basis of the Constitution of Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Those accords included the Basic Structure (or Foundation Treaty which was accepted as Basic Articles of the Constitution), the Guarantee Treaty (between Turkey, Greece, and the UK), and the Alliance Treaty (between Greece and Turkey). Also known as ‘Zurich Accords’, they were later confirmed by a joint memorandum signed between those three states plus representatives of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in London on 19 February 1959.

In fact, the legal grounds of opposition by Turkey and Turkish Cypriot side to the application and eventual accession of Cyprus to the EU are based on Article 50 and 185 of the 1960 Constitution; Article 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee (which reiterates, *inter alia*, Article 185 of the Constitution); and lastly, Articles 8 and 22 of the Basic Structure (which correspond actually to Article 50 and 185 of the Constitution respectively).<sup>6</sup> Article 50 of the 1960 Constitution stipulates that the President and Vice-President, separately or conjointly, shall enjoy a right of veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate. Furthermore, both Article 1 of the Guarantee Treaty and Article 185 of the Constitution have forbidden Cyprus –partially or as

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<sup>6</sup> Full-texts of those documents are available at official website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

a whole- to join any economic and political union with any other state and also prohibited the partition of the island. For the Turkish side, Article 2 of the Guarantee Treaty is also of vital importance according to which the Guarantor Powers undertake to prohibit any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other state or partition of the island. Hence the Turkish side underlines that by virtue of relevant legal provisions, the Greek Cypriot administration could not become a member of the EU before Turkey, nor could it even apply for membership.

These ideas have been based to a large extent on the Opinion of the British international jurist Maurice Mendelson, which was submitted to the UN by the then Turkish government on 25 July 1997 (UN Document A/51/951, S/1997/585, 25 July 1997).<sup>7</sup> He specifically argues that Cyprus' membership to the EU "would amount to participation, in whole, let alone in part, in an economic union." Besides, "To the extent that the EU constitutes a political union", Article 2 of the Guarantee Treaty would also be infringed according to him since membership was "likely to promote, directly or indirectly, union with Greece." Therefore, Mendelson argued that as far as "the two Guarantors concerned, the UK and Greece, are under an obligation of their own to refrain from promoting Cyprus' membership of the EU and, indeed, to use their veto to prevent it." Although the text uses the wording of 'state', Mendelson described the EU as an association of states with all of whom, including Greece, the Republic of Cyprus would be in economic and political union. Thus once joined the EU, Cyprus would be "far more closely connected to Greece politically, militarily,

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<sup>7</sup> For a detailed information see "Opinion of Professor M. H. Mendelson Q.C. on the Application of the Republic of Cyprus to Join the EU", UN Document A/51/951, S/1997/585, 25 July 1997. The summary of the document is republished in Dodd (1998: 193-196).

economically, ethnically, and geographically” than it would “to any other member state.” In addition, with respect to Article 50 of the Constitution, Mendelson maintains that “there could well be an objection to membership of an organization of which only one of these two was a member.” He attributes the absence of Vice-President in office since 1963 to prevention of him from doing his job and further argues that the Turkish Cypriot Community, whom the Vice-President would represent, opposes Cypriot membership of any organization of which both Greece and Turkey are not members.

Conversely, to the dismay of Turkey and TRNC alike, the Greek Cypriots and later the EU had adopted a contrary point of view which had hinged upon arguments of international jurists saying that the Republic of Cyprus is eligible to become an EU member, since the articles stated above do not prohibit Cyprus from becoming a member of international organizations (UN Document A 52/481, S/1997/805, 17 October 1997).<sup>8</sup> Basically, the legal misfit emanated from a different interpretation of Article 1 of the Guarantee Treaty as to the nature of the EU, whether ‘it is a union with several states’, therefore can be accepted as international organization from the Turkish point of view, or whether it is a ‘cooperation with a group of states in establishing a supranational organization of a political and/or economic character’ as emphasized by the Greek Cypriots and the EU alike. By referring to Article 1 of the Guarantee Treaty, the jurists pointed to the distinction made in the 1960 Constitution between ‘a political and economic union with any other state’ on the one hand, and membership of ‘external organizations and pacts of alliance’ on the other.

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed information see “Opinion of James Crawford [Cambridge], Gerhard Hafner [Vienna] and Alain Pellet [Paris]”, as submitted by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the UN. The summary of the document is republished in Dodd (1998: 196-198).



For this reason, the wording of the ‘union with any other state’ cannot be relaxed so as to include international organizations, nor can the EU be accepted as a state. Moreover, they underlined that “the member states have transferred certain defined elements of governmental authority to the European Union, not to each other”. Another point made by them concerns that “as the member states of the EU exercise collective control over the institutions of the EU, Cyprus therefore would not be in union with any one of those states, but with them all”, thus Cyprus would not be dependent on any single state. With regard to the Opinion of Turkish side as to Article 50 of the Constitution, they argue that the office of Vice-President has not been occupied since 1963 when Turkish Cypriot office holders under the Constitution progressively withdrew from participation due to constitutional difficulties at that time. Since the “provisions of the 1960 Constitution dealing with the Vice-Presidency, as with other provisions for Turkish Cypriot representation in the Government of Cyprus, are presently inoperative,” there is no Vice-President to exercise a veto right. Nor is the President of the TRNC elected to office by Turkish Cypriots heir to Vice-President who was elected by Turkish Cypriots under 1960 Constitution because a veto power is vested in certain officials of the Republic of Cyprus; it “cannot be transformed into a wholly different and unexpressed veto power to be exercised by the present leadership of the Turkish Cypriots.” Lastly, as to the Article 2 of the Guarantee Treaty, the jurists argued that the Guarantor Powers did not enjoy veto power over decisions of Cyprus in foreign affairs by neither the Constitution nor the Guarantee Treaty.

As seen, a legal misfit entails one of the most fundamental incompatibility points in the positions between EU and Turkish side concerning the Cyprus

problem. To reiterate, it largely revolves around vagueness as to first, what the EU represents, i.e. whether it is a state, a supranational institution or, an international organization and second, whether the Cyprus accession would lead to an ever closer relations and even *enosis* with Greece through the backdoor.

In the beginning, the widespread view in the then-EC underlined that Cypriot membership to the EU was not possible without prior settlement. Nonetheless, beginning at the Dublin Summit of 1990 and then confirmed at the Corfu and Essen Summits of 1994, and the 6 March 1995 decision of the EU General Affairs Council, the EU had considerably revised its position, arguing that Cyprus could become a member even without prior settlement of the issue, though it was still thought that Cyprus' accession to the EU would act as catalyst for a negotiated solution. For example, in the first European Council held after Cyprus' application for membership, European leaders at Dublin in June 1990 declared that "the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations."<sup>9</sup> As a result of successful Greek diplomatic pressure, at the Corfu European Council in June 1994, the EU acknowledged that "the next phase of enlargement (...) will involve Cyprus" thereby not including the wording 'settlement as precondition' for Cyprus' future accession for the first time (Corfu European Council, 24-25 June 1994). This decision was reaffirmed by the European Council meeting at Essen on December 1994. In the subsequent European Council decisions at Cannes (1995), Madrid (1995) and Florence (1996), it was reiterated that negotiations with Cyprus will commence six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

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<sup>9</sup> See Dublin European Council, Annex VIII, Declaration on Cyprus, 25-26 June 1990.

According to some analysts, the logic behind Brussel's dropping of 'precondition strategy' was twofold: the first reason was related to Greek threat of vetoing the accession of the former EFTA members (Austria, Finland and Sweden) as well as the conclusion of Customs Union with Turkey, in case the phrase 'settlement as precondition' was included. The second reason was connected with the negative report of EU's neutral monitor of the peace talks who announced that Turkish Cypriots were stumbling blocks on the way to settlement (Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 208). Moreover, a change in the EU's policy was related to linkages forged between Turkish-EU relations on the one hand, and the resolution of Cyprus problem and its accession to the EU without a prior settlement in 1995, on the other. To put it precisely, the Cyprus question has turned out to be a significant EU foreign policy issue due to its inextricable linkage with Turkish-EU relations and the overall enlargement process (Müftüleri-Baç and Güney, 2005: 286-287).

Apparently, in order to overcome Greek opposition to the completion of the Customs Union with Turkey, Greece was persuaded to lift its veto on the customs union with Turkey in return for the persuasion of other member states to set a date for opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus even in the case of no prior political settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Brewin, 1999: 153; Brewin, 2000: 21). Consequently, the decision taken by General Affairs Council on 6 March 1995 dropped the condition of 'prior settlement' and agreed to initiate Cyprus' accession negotiations six months following the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. EU policy had been still based on the idea that Cyprus' accession to the EU would act as catalyst for a negotiated solution but

this time with the abandonment of the condition that the problem should be solved before its accession.

The EU's formula envisaged that the economic and financial benefits of EU membership would be attractive to the Turkish Cypriots and would convince them to give up their objections to the accession process to the EU and join the accession process (Axt, 1999: 191). In July 1997 the Commission announced the "Agenda 2000" in which Cyprus was included among the first group of states to start accession negotiations. Further, at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, the EU declared that accession negotiations with Cyprus would start in March 1998, while excluding Turkey from the list of candidates. As a matter of fact, throughout the process, it has also been claimed that Greece has put his weight on the Eastern enlargement project and asserted that it would only approve the list of first-wave candidates if Cyprus was included and negotiations with it would begin. Along with complex political considerations, European institutional edifice has acted as an additional factor with which Greece used its right of veto successfully as a bargaining card during the whole enlargement process. In brief, Greece's policy in the Union has been one of the most important factors affecting the EU's stance *vis-à-vis* the Cyprus question.

Particularly since the 1990s, Turkish-EU relations have not been able to evolve independently of the problems between Turkey and Greece, including the Cyprus issue. As such, the EU's linkage policy reappeared in decisions taken at the Helsinki European Council in 1999. While granting Turkey candidacy status, the Helsinki European Council reported that the resolution of the Cyprus debacle was not a precondition for accession of Cyprus to the EU, yet it explicitly linked Turkey's pre-accession process to a settlement of its problems with Greece and

Cyprus. This condition was also included in *the 2001 Accession Partnership Document* for Turkey as one of the short-term priorities. The Helsinki Document further underlined that a political settlement would facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the EU and concluded “if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” In fact, the decision to remove conditionality on Greek Cypriots was linked to Greece’s acceptance of Turkey as an EU candidate (Tocci, 2002: 116). The EU also assumed that given the strong possibility of a veto by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to block Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU, Turkey was expected to adopt a more active and conciliatory approach in the dispute before Cyprus’ entry (Tocci 2002: 107-109).

Although the EU explicitly removed the precondition of political settlement before Cyprus’ accession at Helsinki, it reiterated its preference for the accession of a reunited Cyprus and hope for a comprehensive settlement before the conclusion of accession talks on several occasions in the aftermath of the Helsinki meeting, for example in European Council’s decisions taken at Seville (22 June 2002); Brussels (26 November 2002); Copenhagen (16 December 2002); Brussels (12-13 December 2003); and Brussels (25-26 March 2004).

The negotiations with Cyprus were concluded in December 2002 at the Copenhagen European Council meeting and on 16 April 2003 Cyprus signed its Accession Treaty with the EU. On the eve of the accession, however, the prospect of settlement of the dispute before its accession provided an incentive for both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to come to the negotiation table at the end of 2001. Upon direct talks between Denktaş and Clerides under UN auspices in

2001, a new round of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement was initiated between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on 11 November 2002 when the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan presented his plan prior to the Copenhagen summit. In search for a compromise between the parties, the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ has undergone a number of revisions in December 2002 and then in February 2003.<sup>10</sup> The Plan proposed permanent derogations concerning the freedom of EU nationals to acquire property and freedom of residence in Cyprus in case of reunification. Although the EU stated that Cyprus will have to participate in the Council of Ministers with one voice (Romano Prodi, *Cyprus Weekly*, 30 October 2001), it was also said that “the EU can accommodate whatever arrangements the parties themselves agree to in the context of a political settlement”, which meant actually that EU would accept the Cyprus settlement to include exemptions from the implementation of the *acquis* (Prodi, 2001).

Particularly Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession signed with Cyprus on 16 April 2003 has suspended the application of the EU *acquis* in Northern Cyprus until a comprehensive settlement is reached (Article 1). Nonetheless, Article 3 stipulates that “nothing in this Protocol shall preclude measures with a view to promoting the economic development of” Northern Cyprus. To this end, after

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<sup>10</sup> The latest of various UN-sponsored peace plans has been the Annan Plan. Also known as the ‘Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’, the plan, prepared by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, aimed at ending the division of the island before its accession. It was presented on 11 November 2002 and went through four sets of adjustments to take into account both parties’ points. It proposed a Swiss-style confederation and a Belgian-type federation under the name of the United Cyprus Republic, with a rotating presidency and two component states that were to share sovereignty. It also called for a single sovereignty and international legal personality, with partition and secession prohibited. It would have established a limited right to return between the territories of the two communities, and would have allowed Turkey and Greece to each maintain a military presence, though with phased reductions in troop numbers. While the AKP government actively supported the plan, it received criticisms from Eurosceptic wing of the establishment on the grounds that Guarantorship rights of Turkey would be undermined and further, bi-zonal character of the current situation would be eroded.

two days of the referendums, and before the membership of Cyprus on 1 May 2004, the General Affairs Council meeting of the EU had concluded on 26 April 2004 that

The Turkish Cypriot Community have expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot Community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot Community. The Council invited the Commission to bring forward (...) proposals (...) with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island. [T]he Council recommended that the 259 million euro already earmarked for the northern part of Cyprus in the event of a settlement now be used for this purpose (EU General Affairs Council, C/04/115, Luxembourg, 26 April 2004).

In line with the above decision and as a compensation for the rejection of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots, the Commission adopted three different regulations to facilitate the economic development of the Turkish Cypriots so as to achieve unification. Among them, the Green Line Regulation had entered into force on 1 May 2004. The Regulation provided a legal framework for the free movement of goods<sup>11</sup>, services and people comprising Greek and Turkish Cypriots, EU citizens and third country nationals who daily cross the Green Line at the predetermined crossing points. Particularly, in order to facilitate cross-border trade, whilst crossing the border, goods coming from the North will not be subject to customs duty; only a document authorized by Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce will be required. It should be noted that although Turkish Cypriots were given the right to export some of their goods exempted from import duties, so far the EU's effort to relax isolation of Turkish

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<sup>11</sup> Goods trade across the line cover vegetables, raw metal, aluminium/PVC products, building/articles of stone, wooden products, furnitures, potatoes, citrus fruits, fresh fish and honey (although legally allowed, honey trade did not begin yet). Green Line trade as a percentage of overall trade of the Turkish Cypriot Community has reached a level of %12 as of 2008. See Commission's Annual Report to the Council on the Implementation of Green Line Regulation, COM(2009)478, Brussels, 14 September 2009.

Cypriots have not been satisfactory. As the Commission Report of 2007 already revealed, “the overall scale of Green Line trade remains limited due largely to restrictions in the Regulation itself” because it does not allow products brought into the Northern part from other EU Member States or Turkey to cross to Southern part.

The second Commission Regulation on financial aid was approved by the EU on 26 February 2006. The so called ‘Aid Regulation’ proposed to release 259 million euros to the North over five years. Accordingly, over 99 percent of the total amount under the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community has been contracted by the Commission before the deadline of 18 December 2009.<sup>12</sup>

The third Regulation concerns direct trade which establishes rules for trade with other EU countries. Put differently, the regulation offers a preferential trade regime for goods entering into EU Customs Union zone thereby facilitating trade between the Northern part of Cyprus and the EU. As a matter of fact, the regulation promised to (re)operationalize the modus operandi of trade between Northern Cyprus and the EU countries prior to the 1994 decision of European Court of Justice.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, the regulation could not be implemented due to a Greek Cypriot veto on the grounds that this would lead to the implicit recognition of TRNC and that greater economic independence would reduce

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<sup>12</sup> See “Turkish Cypriot Community”, retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish\\_cypriot\\_community/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm). Accession date is 18 March 2009. The assistance shall benefit *inter alia*, local bodies, representatives of civil society especially organisations of social partners, business support organisations, associations, foundations, and non-profit organisations. For a detailed information see Council Regulation No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006, Official Journal of the European Union, 7 March 2006.

<sup>13</sup> This point was raised by a career diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.



Turkish Cypriots' incentives for giving concessions to Greek Cypriots for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Arslan, 2005).

In December 2004, the Brussels European Council decided that Turkey 'sufficiently' fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, and thus it would open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. The Turkish government was also called upon to extend the Ankara Agreement of 1963 (i.e. EU-15 Customs Union) to the EU's ten new members including Cyprus. At the summit, Ankara expressed its will and readiness to sign the Additional Protocol before the opening of the accession negotiations. While the Union's decision to launch accession talks with Turkey enforced the latter to sign the Additional Protocol on 29 October 2005, Ankara simultaneously fell short of expectations with neither its implementation nor its recognition of Cyprus. On 29 July 2005, the Turkish government signed *the Additional Protocol*, but issued a declaration<sup>14</sup> saying that its signature did not denote recognition of Cyprus. Ankara ultimately declined to implement the Protocol by refusing to open its harbors and airports to Cyprus-flagged vessels and aircrafts. In the wake of Turkey's move, the EU adopted a counter-declaration on 21 September 2005 to make it clear that

[D]eclaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol (...) Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States (...) The European Community and its Member States stress that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey's implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations. [R]ecognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States,

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<sup>14</sup>The original text can be found at the official website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

as soon as possible (Council of the EU, 12541/05 [Presse 243], Brussels, 21 September 2005).

As can be seen from the above wording, not only the settlement of Cyprus problem but also the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey has become a condition for the latter's bid for EU membership, thereby setting the stage for current conflict between Brussels and Ankara. Upon a series of debates among the Member States, the European Council on 3 October 2005 decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Under the Negotiating Framework document prepared for Turkey, Ankara's progress in the accession talks will be measured, *inter alia*, by its

continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and (...) to contribute a favourable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.

On 29 November 2006, the Commission recommended the partial suspension of talks on the grounds that Turkey had failed to comply with the Protocol by putting restrictions on direct transport links and thus prevented the free movement of goods. Upon the Commission's recommendation, on 11 December 2006, EU foreign ministers decided to suspend talks with Turkey on eight relevant chapters<sup>15</sup> by declaring that 'no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment.' Moreover, five other chapters have been blocked by France and six chapters have been blocked by Cyprus for political reasons - mostly because of the Cyprus problem.

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<sup>15</sup> Those chapters cover Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.

Currently, the EU admits that the Cyprus issue was mismanaged by Brussels due partly to the threat of a Greek veto (personal interview with the author, Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 29 March 2010, Ankara). To illustrate, the then Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, pointed out that the major failure of the 2004 enlargement was the EU's inability to forge a solution to the Cyprus conflict following the failed referenda on the Greek half of the island and made it clear that "I, at least, did not expect that. I make no secret of the fact that this was one of the greatest political disappointments of my life" (EurActiv.com, 2007).<sup>16</sup> Even after the referenda, however, the dominant rhetoric of the EU was impinged upon the strong expectation that parties would come together, negotiate and reunite the island (personal interview with the author, Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 29 March 2010, Ankara). In this context, the EU tried to boost the process by helping the North via regulations (financial aid, green line and direct trade) to ease their isolation, to encourage them for EU membership as well as to make Turkish Cypriots pressurize their leadership in the direction of settlement. What is more, upon the EU's pressure, the Greek Cypriot Administration granted at least 90.000 Turkish Cypriots the passport of 'Republic of Cyprus', which means that Turkish Cypriots have been in fact accepted 'individually' into the EU, but not in institutional, structural or statist terms.<sup>17</sup>

In addition, rather than being directly involved in the issue, the EU prefers supporting the UN process and UN parameters for solution. Brussels does not want to play a direct and active role knowing that after Cyprus' accession, the

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<sup>16</sup> See "Turkey Accession and Cyprus". Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com>. Accessed on 6 November 2007.

<sup>17</sup> This point was raised by Hüseyin Özgürün, the former Foreign Minister of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in an interview with the author on 25 May 2010 in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus.

Union can hardly be neutral. Thus, it prefers to use second-track diplomacy with secondary interventions in the process (personal interview with the author, Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 29 March 2010, Ankara). The former Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that negotiations for a comprehensive political settlement of Cyprus problem had been going under UN auspices and further underlined the Commission's willingness to contribute to the UN process as a mediator (Rehn, AB Haber, 2009).

In spite of declarations, common positions, statements and presidency conclusions concerning Cyprus issue and its linkage with Turkey's march towards EU membership, the EU does not represent a monolithic unit given member states' different stances *vis-à-vis* Cyprus' membership and its implications on Turkish-EU relations. For example, whereas Britain, Germany and France are the most interested states in the Cyprus dispute, the latecomers of eastern enlargement plus Italy, Spain and Portugal appear to be relatively less interested. It should also be noted that despite Greek pressure, some EU countries such as Germany, France, Italy and Netherlands had warned that there might arise problems if the Greek Cypriot side became a member without a settlement in Cyprus (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, 1998). Besides, member states such as Germany, France and Austria who are more sceptical of Turkey's membership to the Union prefer pushing the ongoing dispute over Cyprus at the forefront on Ankara's quest for EU membership. Joost Lagendijk, member of European Parliament, stated that

some countries like to hide behind the Cyprus problem –for example, the French government and the Austrians. The majority of the EU states who are in favour of Turkish accession should make it clear [t]o

the French, to the Austrians and [t]o the Cypriots that it is in the EU's interest to have this issue solved (Lagendijk, 2007).<sup>18</sup>

Conversely, members who are not against Turkey's membership including Britain, Italy and Spain adopt the position that the Cyprus debacle should not erect a barrier on Turkey's eventual accession to the EU. To exemplify, being one of the Guarantor powers in Cyprus in accordance with 1960 Accords, Britain has been acting as a staunch supporter of Turkey's full and equal membership of the EU. In fact, David Miliband, the then British Foreign Minister stated that "we want to see the Cyprus problem settled as soon as possible and it is an urgent need for the Cypriots. It is also urgent and important in geopolitical terms" (Miliband, 2009). Concerning the suspension of accession talks with Turkey due to the Protocol crises, while calling for "[t]he accession process to get revitalized, not slow down" he reminded the reciprocal responsibilities of both Turkey and the EU, by adding that "[I] want to see an accession process where there is boldness and drive on the part of all parties" (Miliband, 2009).<sup>19</sup>

#### **4.1.2 Turkey's Position**

##### **4.1.2.1 Before the AKP Era (From Early 1950s to 2002)**

The Cyprus impasse has always occupied a central place within Turkish foreign policy, with implications for regional and global security starting from

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<sup>18</sup> See "Turkey Accession and Cyprus". Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com>. Accessed on 6 November 2007.

<sup>19</sup> See Joint Press Meeting of Ahmet Davutoğlu and David Miliband, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 May 2009, Ankara. The full text can be retrieved from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-birlesik-krallik-disisleri-bakani-david-miliband-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi.tr.mfa>. Accessed on 6 June 2009.

the early 1960s, but especially since the 1974 Turkish military intervention. Considering its multidimensional nature involving diplomacy, power politics, law, geopolitics, economy and social dimensions, the Cyprus question is such a controversial issue that no government in Turkey, even if it desired, can go beyond the “national settlement package” that has emerged so far, and which is so powerful in shaping Turkish public opinion.<sup>20</sup> Thus, what the importance of Cyprus in Turkish foreign policy making implies especially for governments’ cost-benefit calculations is that it partly determines the size of adoption costs of any radical retreat from traditional policy position in response to EU adaptational pressures.

As a matter of fact, Turkey’s official position regarding its parameters for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem has evolved over the years, beginning with (between 1964 and 1974) endorsing an equal say for the Turkish Cypriot community in the central administration and special (security) guarantees, to (between 1974 and 1998) favoring federalism (based on geography).<sup>21</sup> Especially after Bülent Ecevit came to power as Turkish Prime Minister, the Turkish thesis based on (between 1998 and 2004) confederation and demand for prior recognition of the TRNC. Since 2004, Turkey has buttressed

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<sup>20</sup> Murat Karayağın, the former Foreign Minister of Turkey, personal interview of the author, 29 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>21</sup> For example, at the Second Geneva Conference held on 12 August 1974, Turkish Cypriots’ representative Rauf Denktaş suggested a geographically based federation in Cyprus in which Turkish Cypriot Federal State should be granted 34% of the total area of the island to the North starting from Limni and Lefke in the west to Northern Nicosia and Magosa in the east. He further put forward that while designating competences of central government, the fact that state is made up of two people should be taken into consideration. Interestingly, no later than a few hours Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş proposed that although Turkey preferred federation on the basis of geography, it would not be insistent on separation of state into two definite regions, rather, for Ankara “cantonal solution” would also be acceptable, implying a cantonal autonomous Turkish Cypriot region covering 34% of the total territory composed of six Turkish Cypriot cantons. Yet, without giving a time to Greek Cypriots and Greeks for discussion of this proposal, Ankara conducted its second military intervention in the island (Firat, 2002: 747).

the Annan Plan's federative solution. During those periods, while pledging support to intercommunal talks under the good offices mission of the UN, Ankara consistently asked that Turkish Cypriots' security needs be met, for preservation of an internal balance between the two communities and an external balance between Turkey and Greece, and for equal participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the central government.

In the early 1950s, bound by the political and military circumstances and alliances of the Cold War, Turkish governments opted for maintenance of the *status-quo* on the island as well as friendship with Greece and Britain and rather confined themselves to British policies. To illustrate, in a speech delivered by then Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak stated on 23 January 1950 that "There is no such thing as a Cyprus question...The British government will not leave Cyprus island to another state" (Firat, 2002: 598). As a corollary to this argument, in the event of a shift in the *status-quo* prevailing in the island, Turkish government declared its willingness to have a say over Cyprus affairs (Firat, 2002: 598).

In order to explain the Turkish policy towards Cyprus, one should first underline how Turkey perceives the conflict. Turkish-Greek relations in general and Cyprus problem<sup>22</sup> in particular has occupied a central place in Turkish foreign policy and its relations with the EU especially following Turkey's 1974 military intervention. In fact, vitality of Cyprus even to name it as a national cause for Turkey emanates from several factors. First of all, as an ancient Ottoman territory, it has a historical significance involving the sense of national

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<sup>22</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the problem see Soysal (2002); Gürel (1993); Aydın (2004); Cem (2004); (2005); Larrabee and Lesser (2002); Dodd (1998); (1999); Diez (2002); Denктаş (2005); Şimşir (2004); Oran (2002); Kramer (2000).

solidarity towards and protection of Turkish Cypriot community (Süvarierol, 2003: 56). Second, the geographical position of the island in the Eastern Mediterranean has an utmost strategic value for Turkey. The Turkish presence on the island serves Turkish security interests and is a key element of the defence of Anatolia (Özkök, 2003).<sup>23</sup> Being only 40 nautical miles away from Anatolian coasts, the Karpaz peninsula of the island would jeopardize the exit from the gulf of Iskenderun and therefore, threatens the nautical manoeuvrability of Turkey (Özkök, 2003; Süvarierol, 2003; Olgun, 1999; Kibaroglu, 2002; 2004; Elekdağ, 1996; Oğuzlu, 2003; Kazan, 2002). Described by some as ‘stationary aircraft carrier’, in the event of the loss of Cyprus to a hostile power like Greece, Anatolian coasts would be encircled by a string of Greek islands, thereby destroying the delicate balance of forces between Greece and Turkey (Süvarierol, 2003). Such a pessimist scenario, therefore, had encouraged Turkey, at any cost, to resist Greek designs on the island since the 1950s (Aydın, 2004). Moreover, *enosis* (union with mainland Greece- then Greek position on the island) has been perceived by many Turks as ‘a first step towards achieving the *Megali Idea* (re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire) thereby making the Cyprus problem as a matter of national pride for Turkey’ (Aydın, 2004) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the island is so strategically located that it protects the Caspian oil flowing through Bakü-Ceyhan pipeline and then transported to Europe (Larrabee and Lesser, 2002). Its significance has further increased after American military intervention in Iraq in 2003.

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<sup>23</sup> Treatment of Cyprus as a strategic asset has been frequently emphasized by Turkish military officials. For example, the then Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök had stated that “Turks would be finally trapped in Anatolia if the solution (to Cyprus problem) threatened Turkey’s security or did not serve Turkey’s vital security needs” (Özkök, 2003).



Following on from the above, for Ankara, the best way to guarantee Turkey's strategic interests in Eastern Mediterranean is to attain a comprehensive solution that would be based on a strict bicommunality; continuation of Turkish effective and actual guarantorship; and preferably maintenance of military presence there. This line of thought was emphasized at the official level by the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1998 that "Cyprus is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey that Ankara would not withdraw its troops even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on the island" (quoted in Süvarierol, 2003).

A strategic element in the formulation of its policy has always been clear in both official documents and decision-makers alike. Indeed, once Greece proposed the independence of Cyprus on the UN agenda during mid-1950s (in 1954 and 1956), the Turkish representative in the UN's Political Committee, found Cyprus "to be part of the Anatolian region" for "historic, ethnic, economic and geographical reasons" (Esche, 1990: 105; Fırat, 2002: 599). By the same token, then Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated as early as 1 September 1955 that

from the military perspective the island of Cyprus has to be in hands of a state, which is concerned in the fate of Turkey and the surrounding Middle Eastern states...The dominant power on the island would have a position of control over Turkey's harbours. If this dominant power is also the same dominant power on the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would be de facto encircled by this power. Turkey thinks that it is convenient to maintain the current status quo of the island. If it is going to be changed, then it must be returned to Turkey...Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is existentially important to the defence of its country (Quoted in Kazan, 2002: 58).

Following the internationalization policy of Greece and its ill-fated resort to UN General Assembly to discuss the self-determination of Cyprus, Ankara

diverged from its prior policy of supporting British grip over and status quo in the island, by declaring that it is content with the *status quo*; however, in case of any change in the existent state of affairs, the island should be returned to its former owner, that is to say, Turkey (Firat, 2002: 602).

Once the level of intercommunal violence stepped up in the island, then PM Adnan Menderes warned on 24 August 1955 that

They declare repeatedly and in a terrorist manner that 28 August will be a day of massacre for our consanguinity in Cyprus...A sudden movement, an irrational and murderous initiative can cause consequences, which are impossible to reverse...I speak with hope that perhaps the current state of affairs could be negotiated rationally before it reaches the point of no return (Quoted in Kazan, 2002: 59).

As seen from the statements above, besides the threat of military intervention, which became actually a reality in 1974, dual elements of Turkish policy towards Cyprus, namely, the geostrategic importance of the island and security of Turkish Cypriots were evident at the outset of the conflict in 1950s. Whereas the proposal for returning the island to Turkey was watered down, a new Turkish thesis known as *taksim* (partition) was put on the table in contrast to Greek policy in favour of *enosis* (union with Greece). Actually, once Britain accepted the idea of self-determination of Cyprus in a speech made by the British Minister of Colonies on 19 December 1956 without denying ‘partition’ (of the island between Turkey and Greece) as an option for Turkish Cypriots, Ankara began to formulate its thesis on the basis of ‘partition’. In fact, it was acknowledged by then PM Adnan Menderes speaking before the Turkish Parliament on 28 December 1956 that

The Turkish government considers the issue of *taksim* as a favourable proposal...The partition of the island will enable our consanguinity to

live under the Turkish flag, and Cyprus will no longer be an area of threat to Turkey (quoted in Kazan, 2002: 59).

As a corollary to this policy, the Turkish Parliament declared partition as the official policy of Turkey on 16 June 1958 (Firat, 2002: 604). However, Turkey retreated from the thesis of *taksim* later on by giving consent to set up an independent 'Republic of Cyprus' embracing two communities and guarantorship of Britain and Greece next to Turkey.

The London Conference convened on 15 January 1964 to discuss the situation on the island. Denktaş put forward the Turkish Cypriot community's view by maintaining that the 1960 solution could not provide for the security of Turkish Cypriots who therefore, were in need of actual assurances. This turned into Turkey's official thesis later. In this context, he proposed a solution that would be based on the establishment of a bi-communal federal state geographically separated and having completed a compulsory population exchange (Firat, 2002: 724). Meanwhile, upon a deteriorating situation in Cyprus, the Turkish Parliament empowered the government on 16 March 1964 to conduct a military intervention if necessary.

Here, it should be pointed out that Turkey managed to get a diplomatic and political success in the Geneva Conference held between its first and second military interventions. The Geneva Protocol coming out of the conference confirmed *inter alia* that Turkey's (first) military intervention was legal and legitimate; approved conditions for withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island; and more importantly, recognized that virtually there were two autonomous administrations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the 'Republic of Cyprus'. Put differently, the last point implied that guarantor powers, for the first time,

officially registered the ‘autonomy’ of Turkish Cypriot administration (Firat, 2002: 744-747).

The official Turkish political discourse asserts that the Turkish military intervention has brought peace and stability to the island. According to one of the leading politicians in Northern Cyprus, thanks to the presence of Turkish troops and its power of deterrence in the island, Cyprus is the only region in the world that has a political problem but remaining free from bloodshed.<sup>24</sup> In fact, since the eruption of the conflict in the beginning of the 1960s, intercommunal negotiations have been held; nevertheless they could not bear fruit.<sup>25</sup> The two sides could not agree on, among others, the extent of local autonomy to be granted to Turkish Cypriots who preferred geographical consolidation and separation and greater autonomy rather than a “minor freedom of manoeuvre in a system of centrally controlled local government” (Dodd, 1998: 32). Even though they recognized the idea of Turkish groups of villages and administrative areas, Greek Cypriots insisted on the bi-communal character of Cyprus “based on the co-existence of the Greek and Turkish communities within a framework of a sovereign, independent and integral republic” (Dodd, 1998: 32). It should also be noted that particularly with Ecevit coming to power in 1974, Ankara began to favour a federal solution vocally (Dodd, 1998: 30; Firat, 2002).

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<sup>24</sup> Serdar Denktaş raised this point in an interview with the author on 24 May 2010 in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus. He is the leader of Democratic Party/National Forces and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. His party registered %22.1 of the votes in the 2013 general elections and became part of a coalition government. Denktaş also maintained that in case of a reduction or withdrawal of Turkish troops in the island before a settlement that would not be a lasting one, a resumption of an armed conflict remains a strong possibility.

<sup>25</sup> More precisely, the UNSC’s Resolution of 186 (1964) agreed to appoint a mediator, yet upon Turkey’s suspicions over impartiality of the mediation efforts, the UN had to undertake ‘good offices’ mission between the two communities on the island since the year 1968.

Since the 1993 Opinion on the application of Cyprus to membership, the EU has insistently stated that Cyprus' accession would act as a catalyst for a resolution of the dispute. For example, Gunter Verheugen, then Enlargement Commissioner, pointed out on 30 June 2001 that EU accession presents the best tool to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the two communities (Tocci, 2002: 105). As opposed to what the EU had hoped for, the smooth accession of Cyprus to the EU without precondition for political settlement was made possible at the expense of: first, unstable relations between Brussels and Ankara; second, hardening of the latter's position on a comprehensive political solution to the Cyprus dispute (at least until 2002); and third, the establishment of even closer relations between Turkey and the TRNC.

Turkish objection was reasserted once the Commission avis for the application of Cyprus declared that it was eligible for membership though with a delay for an exact answer until 1995. In a letter from then Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin to the president of the Council of the EU, Belgian Prime Minister Willy Claes, the Turkish government made it clear that

The Commission's opinion on the Greek Cypriot application for membership in the European Communities contravenes both international law concerning 'Cyprus' as a whole, and the basis of the efforts to reach a settlement of the Cyprus problem (Kramer, 2000: 177).

Concomitantly, strategic considerations with respect to Cyprus involving 'Turkey's own security' gained an upper hand also in political elites in Turkey especially in the face of EU membership prospect given to Greek Cypriots before Turkey and particularly in the absence of a prior political settlement of problem. In March 1995, Greece attempted to use the Customs Union negotiations with

Turkey in order to secure a date for the commencement of accession talks with Cyprus. Athens once again used its veto card to block the conclusion of a Customs Union and accompanying financial aid to Turkey unless Cyprus was given a date for opening accession talks without a prior political settlement of the Cyprus problem (Dodd, 1998: 65; Brewin, 1999: 153). Greece decided not to use its veto to the finalization of Customs Union; in return the Council<sup>26</sup> dropped references to the need for a prior settlement of the issue.

Nevertheless, during visits to European capitals, then Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın was frequently told about EU will for a resolution of the Cyprus problem and the realization of Customs Union between Ankara and Brussels (Karayalçın, personal interview with the author, 29 June 2010, Ankara). In February 1995, in a meeting convened by then British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd with the participation of Italian, German, French, and Turkish foreign ministers in London, Karayalçın had to assert determinedly that Ankara will in no way accept a linkage between the Cyprus question and the issue of Customs Union. He wrote a letter to then French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé once again underlining the same arguments pointed during the meeting (Karayalçın, personal interview with the author, 29 June 2010, Ankara).

Although the Cyprus problem did not even come to the agenda of the 6 March meeting that decided on the Customs Union, in a speech to the EU-Turkish Association Council on 6 March, Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın asserted that Turkey's rights and obligations emanating from the 1960 Treaties were still intact and "Turkey will continue to be politically and legally opposed to EU membership of Cyprus, in whole or in part, before her own

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<sup>26</sup> See Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers, 6 March 1995.

accession to the EU.” He further noted Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the Council’s decision on the membership negotiations with Cyprus which “could lead to the permanent division of the island” and that the EU will be responsible for non-settlement in Cyprus problem (Karayalçın, personal interview with the author, 29 June 2010, Ankara).

Turkey’s position was reiterated in a joint declaration with TRNC on 28 December 1995<sup>27</sup>, three days before implementation of the EC-Turkey Customs Union on 1 January 1996. By recalling Turkey’s pledge for ensuring security of the TRNC against efforts of Greeks/Greek Cypriots for military escalation, the declaration announced the establishment of permanent political consultation mechanism between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and TRNC and put forward that measures will be taken to flourish economic and trade relations and bilateral investments between Turkey and TRNC.

In a similar vein, in December 1996, then Turkish PM Necmettin Erbakan reiterated Turkey’s opposition to what was regarded an ‘illegal’ accession of Cyprus to the EU. He told that “the South of Cyprus cannot join the EU without the permission of Turkey; if it does so, the integration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus into Turkey will be carried out as quickly as possible” (Kramer, 2000: 178).

As already noted before, Ankara attaches Cyprus a paramount importance in terms of security in Turkey’s southern flank as well as the defence of southern Anatolia. Apart from peace, security and wealth in the Eastern Mediterranean and strategic balance between Greece and Turkey in the region, the nautical

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<sup>27</sup> See Joint Declaration: Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 28 December 1995. Full-text of the Declaration was republished in Dodd (1998: 181-183), Appendix 7.

maneuverability of Turkey is of profound significance in terms of security of oil traffic around the Bay of Iskenderun coming from Iraq and the Caspian basin. Indeed only one month following the start of Customs Union on 1 January 1996, did Kardak/Imia crises erupt between Greece and Turkey which led to a decision by the former to block financial protocol due under the Customs Union agreement. What is more, a declaration by the EU dated 15 July 1996 asking for Turkey to submit the issue to International Court of Justice in tandem with Greek demands raised suspicions of detrimental implications of the EU's increased involvement –under Greek pressure- in bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece in the absence of the former's membership. Therefore, Turkey's determined response to Kardak/Imia issue as well as to Greek Cypriot announcement of S-300 missile deal with Russia with a range of 150 km should be read within the context of Turkish fear of encirclement by Greece, who is perceived by Ankara to capitalize on diplomatic and political clout of the EU and Turkey's own membership aspirations. Particularly alarmed by Greek efforts to escalate military tension and to change the balance between Turkey and Greece in the region with the intended installation of S-300 missiles, the Turkish army perceived this move as a direct threat to Turkey's security and determinedly asserted that this will be perceived as *casus belli* and threatened preventive bombing if the missiles were deployed in Cyprus (Süvarierol, 2003: 59).

Against this background, Turkey and TRNC issued a joint declaration on 20 January 1997<sup>28</sup> asserting that developments such as the *de facto* military alliance between Greece and Southern Cyprus in the context of Joint Defence Concept

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<sup>28</sup> See Turkey-TRNC Joint Declaration, 20 January 1997, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara. Full-text can be accessed at the official website of the Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.



launched in December 1993, the S-300 missile deal, joint military exercises such as *Nikiphoros*, and the construction of air and naval bases for Greece in the island threatened the security and stability in Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean. Those endeavours were allegedly directed to “alter the balance between Turkey and Greece, in Cyprus and in the region, and endanger the security of the Turkish Cypriot people.” In the event that those efforts continued, Turkey warned that reciprocal political and military counter measures would be taken, including construction of similar air force and naval facilities in the North as well as the establishment of a joint military concept between Turkey and TRNC. The document also embraces an explicit warning by Turkey that each step to be taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards EU membership “will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the TRNC.” More than that, the document also intended to strengthen the ‘existing solidarity’ between Turkey and TRNC in terms of economic and political relations including defence matters.

Turkey’s reaction to Cyprus’s membership talks without a prior settlement was not only expressed at the Presidential level; the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution on 21 January 1997<sup>29</sup> in support of the Joint Declaration stated above. Indeed, the Cyprus debacle has always been treated in the parliament as a supra-party matter capable of forming almost a national front rallied around a ‘national cause’.

By the same token, Turkey insistently reminded the EU of the significance of honouring the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* concerning the ‘invalid’ Greek

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<sup>29</sup> Resolution of Turkish Grand National Assembly, 21 January 1997. Full-text was republished in Dodd (1998: 187-189), Appendix 8B.

Cypriot application for membership and possible admission into the EU. To that end, for example, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a memorandum to the EU member states on 20 June 1997 by postulating that:

To deny the continuing validity of the London and Zurich Agreements and Treaties in their entirety not only would violate the principles of justice and international law and the commitment to respect obligations arising from treaties as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and specifically endorsed by the European Economic Community in the preamble of its Founding Treaty of 25 March 1957, but could also led to widespread consequences in a region where inter-state relations are mostly governed by international agreements. [I]t is therefore, important that the Members of the EU appreciate the legal significance and binding nature of other instruments described above which exclude the capacity of Cyprus to seek membership of an organization of which Greece and Turkey are not *both* members (...) the Turkish Cypriot Community is opposed to such participation so long as there is no agreed solution to the Cyprus question effectively acknowledging the equal standing within the Republic of Cyprus of both the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Greek Cypriot Community (Memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey to the Member States of the EU, the President of the European Community, and the President of the European Parliament, 20 June 1997).

Prior to the face-to-face talks scheduled to be held between the two Cypriot community leaders in New York on 9-13 July 1997, another joint statement<sup>30</sup> was issued by two leaders Demirel and Denktaş on 4 July 1997. Among other things, the statement put an emphasis on two important points. First, the two leaders acknowledged the 1960 Treaties establishing an internal balance between the two communities of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as an external balance between Turkey and Greece with their respective rights and obligations. It was also reiterated that, according to the 1960 Treaties, “Cyprus cannot join any international political or economic union of which both Turkey and Greece

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<sup>30</sup> See Turkey-TRNC Joint Statement, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 July 1997. The full-text of the document can be retrieved from official website of the Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

are not members.” In view of the determinants of international law and regional peace and stability, hence, Cyprus can only be admitted into the Union after a settlement incorporating these principles and once Turkey becomes a member as well. Here, one can safely construe from the statement an implicit criticism of the EU’s handling of the Cyprus’ application, which could disturb the precarious balance in the island. By reaffirming the explicit warning made in the joint declaration of 20 January 1997 stated above, the two leaders asserted once again that:

each step the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus takes on the road to EU membership, on the basis of unilateral application in contravention of international law, will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the TRNC.

Eventually, Greece got a date in July 1997 when the Commission announced the document titled *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union* in which Cyprus was included among the first group of states to commence accession negotiations. Then Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem criticized the report by declaring that “It is not just and it is not objective” (Kramer, 2000: 194). Turkey’s political reaction to the Agenda 2000 document also found expression in the joint statement between Turkey and TRNC on 20 July 1997<sup>31</sup> which presented measures to be taken towards economic and financial integration, as well as partial integration via partnership in security, defence and foreign policy between the two sides in parallel to the full membership process between Cyprus and the EU.

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<sup>31</sup> See Joint Statement by the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 1997, Ankara. The declaration is also known as ‘Nine-Point Accords’. The full-text of the document is available at the official web-site of the Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

As Greek Cypriots' accession process evolved, Turkey had sought to reinforce its economic and political relations with Turkish Cypriots in order to ease the negative repercussions of the embargoes and political isolation imposed on them. In this regard, a nine-point bilateral accord on closer integration was signed between then Turkish Deputy PM Bülent Ecevit and President Denktaş, which put an emphasis on the rights of Turkish Cypriots, their legal and political equality but also reassured Turkey's guarantorship stemming from the 1960 Accords. Relatedly, it was agreed to conclude a protocol of functional and structural cooperation and forge a 'special relationship' between Turkey and TRNC in foreign policy that would allow Turkish Cypriots' participation in the Turkish delegations in all international meetings concerning Cyprus question. The statement also reiterated the intention to create a joint defence concept between Turkey and TRNC by reiterating that any attack on the TRNC will be deemed an attack on Turkey. Moreover, the statement declared the purpose of a creation of an Association Council between Turkey and TRNC. So as to remedy the negative effects of embargoes and restrictions on Turkish Cypriot economy, the parties expressed their desire to form an economic and financial union with an additional warning that every structural cooperation and harmonization measure to be taken between Cyprus and the EU "will be similarly implemented between the TRNC and Turkey". As already indicated in the statement, the aim of the intended undertakings was to reach an agreement over the Cyprus question, which would maintain Turco-Greek balance over Cyprus; acknowledge the equal standing and sovereignty of the parties; and prevent the hegemony of one party (community) over the other.

In line with the progress of Cyprus' accession to the EU, Turkey thus sought to strengthen the standing of the TRNC on the international platform via reassuring its support to the TRNC and its intention to build closer ties via military commitment, create joint economic area and trade outlets as well as pledging unquestioned political solidarity and massive budgetary support. By the same token, in the Circular Note sent by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 30 June 1997 to the embassies of the EU member states Turkey and Turkish Cypriots raised once again their objection to the Greek Cypriot application to the EU on the account that in the absence of a joint authority competent to act on behalf of the whole island, Greek Cypriots had no legitimate authority to apply for membership.

At the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, the EU announced that accession talks with Cyprus would commence in March 1998. However, it declined to give Turkey a candidacy status to the dismay of Ankara once again. Frustrated, Turkey announced the cut off of all political relations with the EU denying to discuss Cyprus with the EU partners. Denktaş (then President of TRNC) responded by suspending intercommunal talks (to be replaced by state-to-state talks) between Greek Cypriots and their Turkish counterparts on the island. For Turkey, the EU had made a historical mistake. Turkey began to emphasize that Cyprus is a primary security concern and threatened to take steps toward closer integration between Turkey and TRNC and to change the established parameters for a solution agreed on by the parties, in case the EU launched accession negotiations with Cyprus.

Thus, the implication of the EU's decision for Turkey's Cyprus policy was three-fold. First, it marked the beginning of a 'unilateral and illegal' process of

Greek Cypriot accession to the EU. Second, for Turkey, concomitant with the EU's decision to launch accession talks with Cyprus in March 1998, the framework for a federal settlement and the relevant parameters that had accumulated to that point became invalid and inapplicable. Turkey then formulated a Cyprus Confederation thesis, referring to the pre-acceptance by Greek Cypriots of the recognition of the political equality and sovereignty of the TRNC as a basis for resuming any inter-communal negotiations on the island. (shift from bi-communal, bi-zonal federation to confederation thesis). Third, as a result of Cyprus's EU accession process, Turkey sought to strengthen its ties with Turkish side of Cyprus synchronically. For example, Turkish policy-makers harshly criticized the stance displayed by the EU at Luxembourg. Then PM Mesut Yılmaz has declared that

the EU decision had undermined the possibility of a settlement in Cyprus and nobody should expect any improvements unless the EU recognizes the existence of two separate, distinct entities (Financial Times, 6 March 1998, quoted from Müftüler Baç, 1999).

As part of the Turkish reaction, on 13 January 1998, the Protocol on Structural and Functional Cooperation was signed between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and TRNC. The Protocol called for, *inter alia*, establishment of Permanent Consultative Political and Economic Committees within the framework of the political consultation mechanism between the two parties. Additionally, it stipulated that with an objective of ensuring the integration of TRNC into the international community and bolstering its standing on the international platform, it was decided to include representatives of the TRNC in Turkish delegations at all international meetings concerning Cyprus and where Turkish Cypriots do not have right to speak. Furthermore, the protocol

allows the two ministries to exchange personnel and assign them to foreign missions. Yet, it should also be pointed out that steps taken during 1997-1998 for closer integration between Ankara and Northern Lefkoşe could not be sustained, most of them remained on the paper.<sup>32</sup>

As an accompany to Turkish reaction, on 23 April 1998 Turkey and TRNC jointly declared *inter alia*:

By deciding to open accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus, the EU has disregarded international law and the 1959-1960 Agreements on Cyprus, and has dealt a blow to the efforts for a solution... The EU demonstrated that it totally ignores the balance between the two peoples in Cyprus and between Turkey and Greece, which have been guaranteed by the Agreements of 1959-60. It has also destroyed the parameters for a solution established during the Cyprus negotiating process. By [a]ttempting to ascribe minority status to the Turkish Cypriot people, the EU has turned Luxembourg Summit into a historic mistake (...) any negotiation process aimed at finding a solution to the Cyprus question can have a chance of success only if it is conducted between two sovereign equals (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Declaration, Unofficial Translation, 23 April 1998, Ankara).

Ironically, on the same date on 30 March 1998 when the Republic of Cyprus began its accession talks with the EU, Ankara and Lefkoşa hold the first meeting of the Association Council (Süvarierol, 2003: 59-60). Later, on 31 August 1998, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denктаş put forward the proposal for a 'Cyprus Confederation' in favour of establishing two equal and sovereign Cypriot states of TRNC and Greek Cypriot Administration strongly tied to their respective motherlands (Turkey and Greece) with special relationship. Apart from asserting the equal status of both Greek Cypriots and their Turkish counterparts as well as

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<sup>32</sup> In fact, this point was confirmed by several eminent Turkish Cypriot politicians including Rauf Denктаş, Serdar Denктаş, Hüseyin Özgürün, Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, personally interviewed in Nicosia as well as by a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara during May and June 2010.

acknowledging the Turkish-Greek balance over Cyprus, the proposal provided that a Cyprus Confederation could become an EU member with the joint agreement of the two parties. Also, Turkey should be furnished with the rights and obligations of an EU member pertaining to Cyprus Confederation by the time of its own accession to the Union. Ankara pledged its full endorsement to the plan with a common declaration of 20 July 1999 (Süvarierol, 2003: 60). No doubt, Greece immediately declined to negotiate the proposal whereas the EU did even refrain from commenting on it (Kramer, 2000: 179).

As a matter of fact, Turkey's proposal for a two-state confederation was not realistic and sustainable, but rather a contextual and reactive policy to the process of Greek Cypriots' membership to the EU. In this regard, the major motivation behind the confederation proposal was in fact twofold: first, to preserve the state of affairs established in 1960 by asserting the equal standing of Turkish Cypriots; and second, to play at domestic politics.<sup>33</sup> According to sources in the Turkish foreign ministry, whether parties opt for federation or confederation does not matter, as long as the source of sovereignty is defined according to one's preference. Indeed, Turkey has always been in favour of the established UN parameters for a just and viable settlement, which are bi-communal and bi-zonal federation based on political equality of the parties though with a reservation that sovereignty should be emanated from the two founding states to be transferred to the central government, not the vice versa.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Interview of the author with a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. June 3, 2010. Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>34</sup> It was argued by a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.



Until Helsinki Summit of December 1999, where Turkey was finally declared to be an official candidate state to join the EU, the alienation and discrimination felt by the former did nothing but further complicated the Cyprus impasse. By declaring Turkey's formal candidacy at Helsinki and giving her a stronger European perspective, the EU assumed that Turkey would adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Cyprus conflict. Given the strong possibility of veto to be enjoyed by Greece-Greek Cyprus to prevent Turkey's eventual accession to the EU, Turkey was expected to consider the high costs involved and launch a more active and problem-solving approach in the dispute before Cyprus's entry into the EU (Tocci, 2002: 107-109).

The Turkish political elite seemed to compromise on the EU's decision at Helsinki that would decide on the accession of Cyprus without a prior settlement, in return for the candidacy offered to Turkey as well as a settlement of Cyprus becoming a condition on its membership (Uslu, 2004). For Turkish decision-making elites, these developments no doubt diminished the perceived objectivity of the EU and the apparent danger of its involvement by becoming a party, let alone its potential to act as a neutral arbiter concerning the Cyprus impasse.

Conversely, in view of the ambivalent jargon of the Helsinki Document, Turkish policy-makers continued to deny the linkage that the EU had constructed between a settlement of the Cyprus problem and Turkey's accession to the EU. In spite of the EU's expectations to the contrary, Turkey did not give a signal in favour of a policy change, thereby insisting on its 'persistent objection' to Cyprus' membership to the EU under the banner of 'Republic of Cyprus' without prior settlement and before Turkey's accession. In other words, the official stance of Ankara over Cyprus remained unchanged, for example, in the aftermath of the

Helsinki summit, then Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem stated that there was no change in Turkey's policy towards Cyprus dispute (*Turkish Daily News*, electronic edition, 14 December 1999, cited from Kazan, 2002: 61).

Likewise, convened for the 25th anniversary of Turkey's 1974 military intervention to the island, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution on 15 July 1999 criticizing Greece and Greek Cypriots for not abandoning the policy of 'enosis' and for inviting third party involvement in the dispute instead of engaging in intercommunal talks, thus further complicating the matter. Also, it was stated that Greek Cypriot accession process had thwarted "the way to a settlement, and opened the door for Greece, through the European Union, to establish its presence in South Cyprus." The resolution determinedly reassured Turkey's "guarantorship rights and strategic interests"; demanded an equal treatment of "two separate states" for a settlement and pledged Turkish Parliament's "unceasing and unconditional" support to the TRNC's statehood and security under any circumstances.<sup>35</sup>

In fact, a careful examination of Turkish officials' speeches and statements during 1990s reveals the continuation of basic elements in Turkey's policy over Cyprus: strategic importance of the island as well as security of Turkish Cypriot community living there. Actually, the bulk of the analysts point to the paramount importance of Cyprus not only in Turkey's security needs but also in what it implies for the Turco-Greek strategic balance in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (see Kibaroglu, 1999; 2002; 2004; Arim, 2009; Elekdağ, 1996; Olgun, 1999; Lindley, 1999). According to this approach, Cyprus problem could

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<sup>35</sup> See Resolution of Turkish Grand National Assembly, 21st Term, 1st Legislation Year, 34th Session, 15 July 1999. English version of the text can be retrieved from the website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

only be settled when the other bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey are solved. Apparently, in tandem with this line of thought, strategic consideration with respect to Cyprus involving ‘Turkey’s own security’ gained an upperhand in political elites in Turkey, too, especially in the face of EU membership prospect given to Greek Cypriots’ (before Turkey) even in the absence of prior political settlement of problem. For example, it has been in this context that the coalition government forged by Mesut Yılmaz and Bülent Ecevit posited in the government programme “Our government is aware of the fact that Cyprus is important not only for the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, but also for the security of Turkey, and that importance is increasing” (Kazan, 2002: 61 quoted in Fırat, 1998: 275). In a similar vein, Ecevit expressed that “We now believe that not only is Turkey a guarantor of the security of the TRNC, but at the same time we consider the existence of the TRNC to be a necessity for the security of Turkey” (Kazan, 2002: 61 quoted in Fırat, 1998: 275).

Indeed membership to the EU has been a central goal and longstanding state policy of Turkey, but not at any cost.<sup>36</sup> In sum, the strategic calculations of decision-makers in Turkey were affected by Turkey’s perception of Greece encircling Turkey and further, linkage policy of the EU which ties Turkey’s quest for EU membership with Cyprus’ accession and expectation from Turkey to solve the problem. Accordingly, Ankara continued to pursue a policy of denial with regard to the linkage between the two, albeit only until the time AKP came into power in November 2002.

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<sup>36</sup> This point was raised during the personal interviews conducted with career diplomats at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for EU Affairs as well as Cyprus. It was also made clear to the EU by the AKP officials via public statements.

For some scholars studying Cyprus, the dilemma following EU's automatic involvement after granting membership to Cyprus, among others, is that while UN resolutions offer bicommunal and bizonal federation, conversely, the EU framework underlines free movement of goods, services and people. Thus, the latter seems to erode the former (for this contradictory situation, see Diez, 2002; Axt, 1999).

Turkey's reactive and hardened official policy in Cyprus as outlined previously began to thaw, once a visible shift was displayed by the European Commission in favour of the idea that a settlement in Cyprus could embrace exemptions from the implementation of the *acquis* and that the EU would accommodate terms of agreement and constitutional arrangement freely negotiated and agreed by the parties on the island. Indeed during his visit to Southern Nicosia, the then President of European Commission, Romano Prodi delivered a speech before the Greek Cypriot Parliament in October 2001, where he asserted that "the EU with its *acquis* will never be an obstacle to finding a solution in Cyprus" (Tocci, 2003: 208). Moreover, the Commission pointed out in Cyprus' progress report of 2001 that "EU membership would not impinge upon the security arrangements freely agreed to by the Cypriots" (Tocci, 2003: 208). The Union's position was also appreciated by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. For example, in a European Parliament meeting in January 2002, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator Ergün Olgun postulated that "the assurance that the terms of the agreement between the two parties would be taken on board by the EU has helped to ease some of the concerns that the Turkish Cypriot party had" (Olgun, 2002 quoted in Tocci, 2003: 202). It was interpreted by Turkish Cypriots to mean that the EU was willing to meet their concerns without forcing on them an

agreement along Greek Cypriot terms rather than using economic leverage and Turkey's accession bid (Tocci, 2003: 202).

Given the looming deadline of Cyprus' accession, Turkish and Greek Cypriots resumed negotiations at the end of 2001. Against this background Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş invited his Greek Cypriot counterpart Clerides to the negotiation table in December 2001. This move paved the way for a preparation process leading to the negotiation of the Annan Plan, and marked a shift in the Turkish position from confederation to two-state federation, as foreseen in the Plan.<sup>37</sup> Put differently, it could be argued that the UNSG Kofi Annan's comprehensive proposal for a solution in Cyprus emerged not only as a 'result' of the EU's willingness to incorporate a 'reunited' Republic of Cyprus as a member, but also as a result of a change in Turkish position in favour of finding a negotiated solution. Therefore, for the Turkish side, what was a *sine qua non* in the intercommunal negotiations under the good offices mission of the UN was to ensure in a peace plan that derogations (i.e. freedom of movement and freedom of settlement, among others) become part of primary law of the EU, because in that case Greek Cypriots would not be able to erode what was achieved by the peace plan through resorting to the European Court of Justice.<sup>38</sup> This meant that any comprehensive plan mutually agreed by the parties would prevail over EU law.

Policy change in Turkey was also accompanied by an increasing realization on the part of both Ankara and the TRNC authority that the prospect of Cyprus'

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<sup>37</sup> This information is based on personal interview of the author with a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>38</sup> This information is based on personal interview of the author with a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

accession to the EU had become an inevitable fact (Tocci, 2003). At this juncture, it should be noted that although the search for a settlement was by and large managed by the UN and its Secretary General Kofi Annan, the UN mediation efforts and the EU's enlargement process with its particular deadlines were inextricably intertwined with each other since the former paid due regard to the schedule for Greek Cypriots' accession to the EU (Tocci, 2003: 210). Hence, although granting Cyprus a membership perspective *per se* did not act as a catalyst for a settlement in contrast to the hopes of many, the looming deadline of Cyprus' accession turned out to be a critical factor, or adaptational pressure, which enticed Turkey and TRNC to prioritize resuming peace talks before Cyprus's entry (for a similar argument see Süvarierol, 2003; Tocci, 2003). In other words, the EU's decision to incorporate Cyprus under the banner 'Republic of Cyprus' before Turkey and without a prior settlement has had a considerable impact on Ankara in forcing it to focus on intercommunal negotiations for arriving at a comprehensive peace plan on the island.<sup>39</sup> Turkey has pledged support for a two-state confederation proposal until 2004 but could not insist on this policy given its longstanding quest for EU membership, realization that Cyprus' inevitable accession to the EU; the Greek factor; and the EU's adaptational pressure in the form of a linkage policy forced it to reconsider the confederation thesis.

Although institutional, legal, and policy Europeanization started with Turkey's candidacy in 1999, the EU accession perspective could not generate a change in Cyprus policy at the governmental level until 2002. Between May 1999 and November 2002, the coalition government of the DSP (Democratic Left

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<sup>39</sup> This point was raised by a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in personal interview with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

Party), the MHP and the ANAP (Motherland Party) led by veteran Bülent Ecevit was in power in Turkey.<sup>40</sup> Despite the mounting EU pressure in 2001 and 2002, intra-coalition dynamics did not allow the expected policy change in Cyprus. Apart from high public support concerning Turkey's EU perspective, domestically empowered liberal reform coalitions, eager to question traditional foreign policy over Cyprus, generally embraced the relatively weak and liberal coalition partner ANAP and business circles. Yet, domestic pro-reformists could not override the conservative impact of the DSP and the nationalist-statist MHP nor the political preferences of the state establishment (Terzi, 2010; Narbonne and Tocci, 2009; Ulusoy and Verney, 2009). The lack of political will and capacity on the part of the government to change the *status-quo* in its Cyprus policy was due largely to the perception of Greece encircling Turkey, the linkage policy of the EU, the ambivalent jargon adopted at Helsinki, EU membership of Cyprus before Turkey, and uncertainties on the way to Turkish membership.

#### **4.1.2.2 The Cyprus Issue During the AKP Era: What Difference?**

The newly emerging international environment of the post-Cold War era offered opportunities as well as risks for countries like Turkey. With the break up of the Soviet Union, Turkey found itself surrounded by trouble spots in the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East. Being no more dependent on Cold War externalities, Turkey has been urged to pursue more flexible and independent policies in such a fluid environment. Concomitant with the external uncertainty

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<sup>40</sup> For intra-coalition political dynamics and discussion of the EU policy of the Ecevit-led coalition government, see also Avcı (2004: 196-203).

exacerbated by the Gulf War in the early 1990s, Turkey felt an increased sense of external ‘threat’ from its neighbours, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, which was linked with domestic challenges related to the maintenance of the secular regime and the territorial integrity of the country, namely Kurdish separatism and political Islam. In fact, during the Cold War, ideological divisions obscured problems related to ethnic and religious identities and the fight against communism occupied a central place in national security considerations (Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2007: 472).

Although the foreign policy of Turkey can be characterized at that time as defensive nationalist and national security centred, being predominantly relied on coercive diplomacy backed up by military power, it has been since transformed into one of a pro-active regional player pursuing a consensual policy of ‘win-win’, ‘zero problem with neighbours’ and ‘constructive engagement’ towards the region. Though starting with the late 1990s via the *rapprochement* with Syria from 1998 onwards, the Turkish foreign policy approach under the rule of AKP since 2002 had been redesigned to embrace an unprecedented combination of multilateralist and multi-dimensional foreign policy approaches based on the utilization of soft power instruments such as the economy, trade, socio-cultural power, and active diplomacy pertaining to the surrounding regions, including the Middle East.<sup>41</sup> Indeed, the new government sought to change some of the perceptions long associated with Turkish foreign policy and some of the tools used in exercising it.

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<sup>41</sup> On the contours of new TFP, see Davutoğlu (2001); Altunışık (2004); Hale and Özbudun (2010); Aydın (2003); Kibaroglu (2008); Kirisci (2006).



Recently, drawing upon securitization theory<sup>42</sup>, there has been an extensive contribution to the state of knowledge about the sources of Turkey's changing foreign policy attitude, particularly toward Syria, Iran and Iraq (for example, see Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2007; 2008). It has been argued that Turkey has undergone a desecuritization process at the domestic level as a result of the EU accession process, attendant democratization steps, and adoption of EU norms and principles in regional politics (Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2008). According to this argument, in order to sustain their power status, a civilian-military bureaucracy in Turkey securitized political issues, such as Kurdish nationalism and political Islam, by presenting them as existential threats to the unitary and secular nature of the state, thereby precluding the emergence of a public debate which would be otherwise portrayed within the 'normal' political realm of minority and human rights (Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2008: 498). Yet, the domestic political contours has changed through Turkey's EU membership process, which led to a process of desecuritization by creating a more open political climate concerning discussions for greater rights for individuals and ethnic groups within Turkey (Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2008: 499).

Although securitization theory has a merit in forging a linkage between domestic transformation and foreign policy attitudes, one may argue that given the recent deterioration of Turkey's relations with Syria, Iraq and Israel, the concept seems to fall short of explaining the recent retreat from the desecuritization process in Turkish foreign policy towards the region.

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<sup>42</sup> From this perspective, "something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so" (Waever, 1995: 47). A particular issue becomes a security issue when it is presented as an existential threat that calls for extraordinary measures outside the boundaries of normal political procedures.

No doubt, the pace of Europeanization was stepped up with the AKP's coming to power in November 2002 with a visible enthusiasm of adopting a conciliatory rhetoric and policy over Cyprus within an overall foreign policy motto of 'win-win', 'being one step further', and 'zero problem with neighbors'.<sup>43</sup> Unlike the former policy stance of 'denial of linkage' displayed by Turkish governments in the past, by grasping and expressing the linkage between Turkey's quest for EU membership and a settlement in Cyprus (at Copenhagen European Council in 2002), the party's leadership believed in the necessity to change the *status-quo* which was actually embodied by then PM Erdoğan's own words: 'non-settlement in Cyprus is not a solution'. The new government indeed was highly willing to reach a settlement before Cyprus' accession with an aim to show the international community that Turkey was eager to find a solution, thereby eradicating one of the most fundamental stumbling blocks on Turkey's road to the EU. The change in Ankara's Cyprus policy – a shift from the confederation proposal made in 1998 to striving for a federalist solution as indicated by the UN-sponsored Annan Plan in 2004 - was facilitated by the AKP government, which adopted a conciliatory rhetoric and a win-win policy in Cyprus.

The preparatory process of the Annan Plan had been performed by the UN since 1996 in consultation with NGOs and politicians. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, however, the majority of the Plan was prepared via contributions (or revisions) of Rauf Denktaş to such an extent that the preferences and reservations of the Turkish side were made directly known to the

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<sup>43</sup> 'The AKP factor' in giving a fresh boost to intercommunal talks on the basis of the Annan Plan was pointed out not only by a former AKP deputy himself but also by diplomats, politicians, and bureaucrats, personally interviewed in Ankara and Northern Nicosia.

UN during the twenty six meetings held at the Ministry.<sup>44</sup> Yet, it was wrongly presumed (by the international community) that since the Plan was the most comprehensive ever formulated, both side would accept it.<sup>45</sup> The idea of pledging support for federation in Cyprus as foreseen in the Annan Plan was considered by Turkish decision-making elites as the most comprehensive peace plan ever, and it was brought to the newly elected government at the appropriate time.<sup>46</sup> As part of a tactical move, it was thought that the Plan should have been given a chance to be negotiated because it had enjoyed the widespread support of major powers and the international community as a whole. Accordingly, Turkish policy was based upon the strong supposition that because Greek Cypriots would likely reject the Plan, Turkey would capitalize on an affirmative approach either way (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

Following from the above, the EU's decision to incorporate Greek Cypriots under the banner of 'Republic of Cyprus' has had a tremendous impact upon Turkey's proactive policy focusing on a settlement on the island. As Cyprus' membership to the EU began to loom large, adaptational pressures on Turkey began to be felt more excessively. Indeed, the Turkish side was certainly aware of the urgency to reach a settlement before Greek Cypriots become an EU member. Therefore, they negotiated the Annan Plan in a constructive spirit. For example, it was upon Turkey's initiative on 13 February 2004 that negotiations over the Annan Plan was given a new boost with the authorization granted to UNSG Kofi Annan for 'filling the blanks' in the plan. Consequently, the apparent

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<sup>44</sup> This information is based on an interview of the author with a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>45</sup> This fact was raised by a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the former AKP Deputy of Çankırı and Deputy Chairman of External Affairs Suat Kınıklıoğlu in interviews with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>46</sup> Serdar Denктаş, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Nicosia, Northern Cyprus.

shift from confederation thesis to federation as indicated by the Annan Plan became possible in the context of Turkey's strong desire in favour of a solution; its absolute willingness to concentrate completely on a settlement and demonstrate its enthusiasm and eagerness to the world. It was also facilitated by the AKP government, which was eager to illustrate to the international community that its foreign policy approach was markedly different from that of its predecessors. The EU's linkage policy was explicitly accepted by the Erdoğan government with a conviction that Turkey's accession would be facilitated.

As will be explained in detail in the next chapter, from the perspective of the Turkish army, there seemed to be a collaboration -notwithstanding caution and reservations attached- with the AKP government particularly during the last phase of negotiations in Bürgenstock (Switzerland) where senior officers had been incorporated in the process alongside diplomats at all stages, most notably during discussions on security as well as the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, TÜSİAD's pro-EU lobbying activities concerning Cyprus issue, acting as a formal facilitating actor, had a direct impact on shaping public opinion in Turkey in favour of reaching an agreement with Greek Cypriots but also an indirect impact on weakening Denktaş's position as a '*pro-status quo* stumbling block on the way to a settlement'.

Indeed, the EU's move was hinged on the assumption that given Turkey's longstanding bid for EU membership, accession of Greek Cypriots to the Union would pressurize Turks to compromise on Cyprus conflict. Unfortunately, the

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<sup>47</sup> This information is based on an interview of the author with a top-level diplomat at the Presidency of TRNC on 24 May 2010 in Northern Nicosia, Northern Cyprus.

presumption was ill-fated from the beginning, thus doomed to fail because it had envisaged that Greek Cypriots were willing to reach a settlement as well.

Notwithstanding a visible shift from confederation thesis to the position of endorsing the Annan Plan was formally adopted at the NSC meeting in 2004, ‘red lines’ of Turkey *vis-à-vis* Cyprus impasse were embedded in the ‘National Programme(s)’ and ‘National Security Council decisions’. For example, in the National Programme of 2001 and 2003, Turkey’s official position pertaining to the Cyprus issue was stated as such:

Turkey will continue to (...) support the efforts of the UN Secretary General [a]iming at a mutually acceptable settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the Island.

Interestingly, the fact that Cyprus issue was included in the ‘Introduction’ instead of ‘political criteria’ in 2001, reflected the presence of misfit between Turkish and EU view points as to how to handle Cyprus. In the National Programme prepared in 2003, although wording concerning parameters of solution was identical to the previous one, the Cyprus problem was put under ‘Preamble’ but was recognized at the same time “as part of enhanced political dialogue”. While its updated version of 2008 set out clearly that any mutually agreed settlement should take into account

the realities of the island, based on the existence of two separate people and democracy, bi-zonal, political equality of both sides, equal status of both founding states and parameters of new partner state. Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance will remain in force. Turkey supports the steps taken by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which will foster an environment of confidence and pave the way for a comprehensive settlement.

By the same token, once the National Security Council (NSC) decisions since the emergence of the Annan Plan were analyzed, those ‘red lines’ can also be observed. To exemplify, via its decision of 23 January 2004, alongside emphasis on the importance of continuation of ‘Turkish presence’, ‘Turkey’s guarantorship’, and undiluted bizonality, the NSC endorsed the Plan as a reference for negotiations, while it was declared at its meeting on 5 April that settlement should certainly be made part of ‘primary law of the EU’. By pointing at the inter-communal negotiation process revitalized on 3 September 2008, the NSC meetings dated 30 December and 24 April 2008, not only supported the new process but reiterated that in tandem with the settled UN parameters established for 40 years, any solution should be based on bizonality; existence of two distinct peoples and democracy in the island; political equality of the two parties; equal status of two founding states; establishment of new partnership state; continuation of Turkey’s effective and virtual guarantees; and the continuation of Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance.

In the midst of intercommunal negotiations with regard to the Annan Plan, on 12 December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council declared that accession talks with Cyprus had been concluded and that the country was to become an EU member on 1 May 2004. At Copenhagen, it was further asserted that unless a solution is arrived until 28 February 2003, shall the application of the *acquis* to the northern part of the island be suspended. It also stated that ‘if the December 2004 European Council [in Brussels] decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the negotiations will be opened without delay’.

For the first time at Copenhagen Summit in 2002, the AKP Government accepted the linkage between Turkey’s accession process and resolution of

Cyprus dispute. Accordingly, the AKP government began to take conciliatory steps toward the solution by encouraging the TRNC's President Denktaş to accept the Annan plan as a basis for negotiations. Yet, the inter-communal talks on the island based upon the Annan Plan could not secure a deal in 2002 due to the strong reservations of the Turkish military and Denktaş concerning security, bizonality, sovereignty, and equality (Ulusoy, 2008). Upon submission of the third version of his settlement plan by UNSG Annan to the parties on 26 February 2003, did he invite Denktaş and Papadopoulos to give their final decision on the Plan at Lahey on 10 March 2003. The parties, however, could not reach a consensus over the Plan, nor over its referendum. In fact, before going to Lahey on 10 March, Denktaş had delivered a speech before Turkish Parliament criticizing the Annan Plan, upon which the Parliament passed a declaration on Cyprus on 6 March 2003.<sup>48</sup> By pledging its uncessant support to TRNC over Cyprus problem which was designated as 'national cause', the Parliament made it clear once again that settlement should be based upon equal status and equality of the parties. Further, it was underlined that guarantorship rights of Turkey emanating from 1960 Treaties as well as Turco-Greek balance over Cyprus should be preserved. The declaration also rejected the efforts of the presentation of settlement in Cyprus as a precondition for Turkey's own EU membership process, by reminding that steps directing at making 'Greek Cypriot Administration' an EU member prior to Turkey means an outright infringement of international agreements. In conformity with Denktaş' reservations over the Annan Plan concerning bi-zonality, the declaration emphasized continuation of

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<sup>48</sup> See Turkish Grand National Parliament Proceedings, 6 March 2003, 42nd Session. The full-text of the declaration can be accessed at [http://www.belgenet.com/2003/tbmm\\_060303.html](http://www.belgenet.com/2003/tbmm_060303.html). Accession date is 28 May 2010.

bi-zonality which was regarded as a chief factor for peace and tranquility that the two communities have enjoyed on the island since 28 years (Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings, 6 March 2003, 42nd Session).

Ankara had always officially backed Northern Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, who was usually regarded as a nationalist hardliner. Yet, there had been a growing tension between Denktaş and the AKP government as the latter adopted a constructive stance towards the Annan Plan. Denktaş' hesitancy to seriously negotiate the Plan was facing strong societal and political pressures from within the TRNC as well. Against the eventual reconfiguration of political forces in Northern Cyprus, pro-EU actors in favor of reunification, led by leftist-unionist Mehmet Ali Talat, gained the upper hand, gradually removing the nationalists from power in parliamentary elections in December 2003 and then in presidential elections in April 2005.

Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots have signed the Accession Treaty under the banner of 'Republic of Cyprus' on 16 April 2003. On the same date, Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement<sup>49</sup> declaring that Northern part of the island had been governed and commanded by TRNC, thus only the 'Greek Cypriot Administration' had become an EU member. In conformity with the policy of 'persistent objection', the declaration continued that ever since 1960 partnership state was destroyed by Greek Cypriots in 1963, there had been no single political authority, a government or a parliament capable of representing the whole island, instead currently, there existed two equal people and state having an equal status with their separate pluralist democracies and legal structures on the island. In the

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<sup>49</sup> See full text of the Statement by the Foreign Ministry of Turkish Republic on the Accession Treaty of Greek Cypriot Administration to the EU, No:66, 16 April 2003. It is available at the official website of the Ministry <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.



official statement of the Ministry, the EU was further criticized for taking unilateral decisions concerning future of the island and creating international obligations via violating international agreements. Therefore, it was announced that Turkey repudiates the Accession Treaty signed by Cyprus and its accompanying Protocol 10 on legal and political grounds. The EU was also accused of its incorporation of an international conflict still being on the agenda of UN Security Council despite opposition by the Turkish side, which was believed by Ankara as incompatible with the constitutive principles of the rule of law and democratic legitimacy that the EU stands for (Foreign Ministry of Turkish Republic, No:66, 16 April 2003).

Yet, both before and after the Copenhagen summit, societal dissent in the form of public demonstrations and business and media pressures in Turkey and the TRNC, indicated an explicit preference for reunification of the island before its EU membership, thereby pushing the Turkish side to negotiate the Annan Plan (Ulusoy, 2008). This time, endorsed by a significant part of civilian and military bureaucracy, the AKP government decided to return the negotiation table. As a matter of fact, it was upon the initiative of the Turkish side that the UN Secretary-General invited parties to New York on 10 February 2004 to resume the negotiations on the basis of draft comprehensive settlement plan. The first phase of negotiations between the parties leading to the Annan Plan was conducted in Nicosia, whereas the second and third phases were conducted in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. During the final round, on 31 March 2004, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted his fourth and final version of the plan<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> The first version of the plan was submitted on 11 November 2002; the second version on 10 December 2002; third version on 26 February 2003; and the fourth and final version on 31 March 2004.

on the comprehensive settlement of Cyprus problem to the parties in Bürgenstock where two sides had agreed to put the Plan to separate and simultaneous referanda scheduled on 24 April 2004, just a week before the formal accession of Greek Cypriots to the EU. Unfortunately, last minute attempt to save a comprehensive settlement plan to bring an end to Cyprus bottleneck was watered down due to its overwhelming rejection (75.83%) by the Greek Cypriot people. This result was in stark contrast to the strong affirmative vote of the Turkish Cypriots (64.91%). Behind the Greek Cypriots' rejectionist stance lay an already guaranteed EU membership on 1 May 2004, and the likelihood of negotiating better terms for Cyprus in the future, and a veto power to defer Turkey's membership (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).<sup>51</sup> Indeed, the rejection of the plan was explicitly called for by the other side's nationalist hardliner leader Tassos Papadopoulos, in a televised address on 7 April 2004, where he asked for a resounding no to the Annan Plan from the Greek Cypriot people.

Following the referandas, given absolute repudiation by Greek Cypriots, for Turkish side not only did comprehensive settlement plan, which was endorsed by the whole international community including the UN and EU, become null and void, but also totally a new state of affairs emerged on the island. Indeed, in a statement of Turkish Foreign Ministry on 1 May 2004, when Greek Cypriots joined the Union, it was acknowledged that the separate simultaneous referanda confirmed the fact that there are "two separate peoples on the island, neither of which represents the other". Hence, claims concerning that the whole island is represented by a single authority disregarded the reality since solution requires

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<sup>51</sup> Indeed, this point was confirmed by the politicians and diplomats during the personal interviews conducted by the author in Turkey and Northern Cyprus alike.

consent of the both sides. Accordingly, the Accession Treaty dated 16 April 2003 does not allow a reunited Cyprus to become a member, given its divided status in legal and political terms, thereby an international issue has been brought into the EU. Lastly, Ankara reiterated that EU membership of “Southern Cyprus” cannot prejudice Turkey’s rights and obligations over Cyprus by no means (Foreign Ministry of Turkish Republic, No:73, 1 May 2004).

Furthermore, from the perspective of Turkey, affirmative vote of Turkish Cypriots as opposed to rejection of the plan by Greek Cypriots explicitly illustrated that it was the former who sincerely desired a settlement of the issue, based on the principles of partnership, bi-zonality and political equality of the two parties. In this regard, one may argue that AKP government’s policy of ‘being one step forward’ seemed to bore fruit, because apart from the UNSG, numerous international organizations and leaders of several states adopted an understanding that ways and means should be found to terminate isolation of Turkish Cypriots, by asking for an end to international restrictions on their direct political, economic, trade and cultural activities. For example, in his statement on the outcome of referanda in Cyprus of 24 April 2004, besides applauding the Turkish Cypriots who approved the plan, Annan pointed out that “the Turkish Cypriots will not equally enjoy the benefits of EU membership as of 1 May 2004” but he hoped that “way will be found to ease the plight in which the people find themselves through no fault of their own.” The Secretary General reiterated in his report to the UN Security Council on 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437)<sup>52</sup> that Turkish Cypriots’ voting “has undone whatever rationale might have existed for

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<sup>52</sup> See full-text of the “Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus”, United Nations Security Council, 28 May 2004, S/2004/437.

pressuring and isolating them". In line with a move that would be regarded consistent with Security Council resolutions of 541 (1983) and 550 (1984),<sup>53</sup> he additionally called for members of the Security Council to encourage:

all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development.

Against this background, significance of referandums also emanates from the fact that it was the first time that Greek Cypriots have voted for a bicomunal and bizonal federal solution embracing two constituent states, political equality and the sharing of power. The most visible difference of the Annan Plan,<sup>54</sup> when compared to the previous proposals for solution of the Cyprus problem such as de Cuellar Peace Plan of 1986, Ghali Set of Ideas of 1992 or Confidence Building Measures of 1994, was that not merely were those plans and proposals rejected by Greek Cypriots 'at the stage of signature',<sup>55</sup> but also the Plan was the first that was signed and brought to the level of referenda, as a result of which rejectionist

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<sup>53</sup> As recalled, in the aftermath of proclamation of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the UNSC, via the resolution of 541 (1983) declared this entity as legally invalid and called upon all states not to recognize it. Through its resolution 550 (1984), the Council rehearsed its call and called upon all states not to facilitate or in any way assist the secessionist entity. However, for Annan, given the affirmative vote of Turkish Cypriots in favour of reunification, steps to be taken to eliminate isolation of them would not be contrary to neither of those resolutions concerning (political) recognition or assisting secessionist entity as opposed to ending i.e. economic isolation via conducting trade. In other words, for him, efforts for eliminating isolation of Turkish Cypriots should not be perceived in the framework of "affording recognition or assisting secession, but as a positive contribution to the goal of reunification." According to a Turkish diplomat, for years, Greek Cypriots played upon those two resolutions, which do not include the word 'embargo', rather only forbid 'assisting secessionist entity', which denotes forbidding 'diplomatic recognition', but not economically assisting it by making trade with it.

<sup>54</sup> During the personal interviews conducted by diplomats and politicians both in Ankara and Lefkoşe, it was pointed out that the other difference of the Annan Plan was its being the most comprehensive peace plan ever since the beginning of Cyprus conflict.

<sup>55</sup> For example, by capitalizing on his mission of 'filling in the blanks' in finalizing the Plan, UNSG Kofi Annan revised seven principles, out of eleven, in favour of Greek Cypriots, and rest of the four in favour of Turkish Cypriots. Despite that, Turkish Cypriots said 'yes' to the plan in the referendum (Interview of the author with a high ranking diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey).

stance of Greek Cypriots was registered by the whole international community including the UN, EU and other great players.<sup>56</sup> In other words, via the ‘no vote to the Annan Plan’, Greek Cypriots for the first time got into an obstructionist position in the eyes of the international community, while Turkish Cypriots showed their readiness for a just and viable solution of the conflict. After referenda of the Annan Plan, by blocking a comprehensive settlement of the dispute in order to protect its advantageous position with the title of ‘Republic of Cyprus’, Greek Cypriot voting was deeply regretted by the international community, including numerous international organizations, UN Secretary General as well as EU officials, among others.<sup>57</sup>

Nevertheless, the report of Secretary General could not be approved by the UN Security Council, a move that paved the way for outright criticisms by Turkish government and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs alike.<sup>58</sup> For both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, as a product of a completed process, any initiative with regard to further amendment to or negotiation of the Annan Plan was not

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<sup>56</sup> This information is articulated by a high ranking diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>57</sup> Contrary view tells that one should approach to the argument that things are going better for Turkish Cypriots following their affirmative vote in the referenda rather cautiously because although on the surface there exist a certain degree of sympathy in the international community towards Turkish Cypriots after referenda, in reality, change has been modest. For example, two Turkish Cypriot representative were sent to the Council of Europe since 2004; TRNC began to be represented under the name of ‘Cyprus Turkish State’ at the Organization of Islamic Conference at an observer status; there has been increase in the number of TRNC’s foreign representations opened such as in the Gulf region, in Central Asian or other Muslim countries; the U.S. made visa regime towards ‘citizens of TRNC’ more easier. Nevertheless, despite their ‘rejectionist’ stance which became more visible after referenda, Greek Cypriots are still recognized as the sole legitimate authority in the island with 3 million tourists, 35.000 U.S. dollar per capita, 48 representation offices abroad, 600.000 Greek Cypriots and 200.000 foreign labour, 35 representation offices of foreign countries, and more importantly, the EU membership. Adaptational pressures and burden on Ankara for agreeing to a comprehensive settlement still could not be relieved. Seen from this light, according to the former Foreign Ministers of TRNC, Hüseyin Özgürkün and Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, who were personally interviewed by the author in Northern Nicosia, those changes are not sufficient since restrictions on direct trade, travel, sports and other cultural activities (simply embargoes and isolations) on TRNC still continue.

<sup>58</sup> According to the former Foreign Minister of TRNC, Hüseyin Özgürkün, the UNSC’s failure to approve the Report would be by and large tied to Russian veto. Personal interview of the author conducted on 25 May 2010 in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus.

acceptable, because Turkish Cypriot side had already displayed an affirmative vote to the Plan within a constructive spirit ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)). Besides, it was argued that following the separate and simultaneous referenda on both side of Cyprus, a new state of affairs emerged and parameters changed accordingly.

Turkish Cypriots, in return for their conciliatory attitude, was promised by the EU to ease their economic conditions and gradual lifting of economic embargoe imposed upon them since 1974. In response to the calls of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with regard to finding ways to ease isolation of Turkish Cypriots, the EU General Affairs Council adopted a decision on 26 April 2004 so as to facilitate reunification of the island by encouraging economic development of the North. As mentioned before, tasked with the Council, the Commission prepared three regulations, namely, the Green Line Regulation, the financial aid regulation, and direct trade regulation. Among them, the first has entered into force on 1 May 2004 and the second on 26 February 2006 after two years of Greek veto. Nevertheless, the last one could not be brought into force.

It should be noted that contrary to Turkish officials, such steps were not considered sufficient for eradicating isolations on Turkish Cypriots by TRNC's officials, since direct trade resolution, even if came into force, would not allow 'direct flights' to be made through Ercan airport (in Northern Nicosia). Nor does it mean the revision of UNSC Resolutions of 186 (1964), 541 (1983), and 550 (1984), which were perceived as root causes of the problem. Some accepted that the Direct Trade Regulation, once it passed, would be beneficial for the economy, though with an attached caution that its probable momentum to the economy of

the North should not be exaggerated.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, it was even posited that even if direct trade regulation came into action, Greek Cypriot government's official permission would be required for Turkish Cypriots to conduct trade with the EU, similar to the case with the release of financial aid in the context of the Financial Aid Regulation (Serdar Denktaş, personal interview with the author, 24 May 2010, Nicosia). Seen from this light, according to Rauf Denktaş, for the very reason that the Regulation would relegate Turkish Cypriots to the position of 'minority', it should be rejected altogether (personal interview with the author, 24 May 2010, Nicosia).

In effect, the direct trade regulation, even if came into force, would not remove the embargoes on Turkish Cypriots, rather it would mark a turning back to the situation existing prior to 1994, a year when the European Court of Justice had decided to bring an end to preferential trade regime in Northern Cyprus. Yet, the importance of the regulation may come from its potential 'psychological effect' on Greek Cypriots, who would become more motivated to arrive at a consensus with Turkish side although this would not guarantee to cut ongoing abeyance off.<sup>60</sup> In brief, being nothing more than a partial relief for the relevant economic backwardness of Turkish Cypriots, the regulation would not override a need for an overall agreement over the Cyprus dispute. In fact, the seaports of Northern Cyprus are already open to trade, however, the actual eradication of restrictions and isolation could only pass through opening of the Ercan Airport

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<sup>59</sup> For example this argument was asserted by Turkish Cypriot politicians such as Serdar Denktaş, Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, and Hüseyin Özgürün in interviews with the author on 24-25 May 2010 in Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.

<sup>60</sup> It was argued by a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a personal interview with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

(in Northern Cyprus) to direct flights and the formal espousal of this move by Greek Cypriots.

From the perspective of Ankara, however, the Direct Trade Regulation was rather conceived as a promise that should be kept by Brussels in order for Turkey to implement the Additional Protocol. While the EU's decision to launch accession talks with Turkey enforced the latter to sign the Additional Protocol on 29 October 2005, Ankara simultaneously fell short of expectations with neither its implementation nor its recognition of Cyprus. The Erdoğan government justified its refusal to implement the Protocol on account of the fact that the EU had not lived up to its promises concerning direct trade and easing of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots on cultural and athletic affairs so far. Although Turkey would prefer opening of seaports and Ercan airport in Northern Cyprus, which was already proposed in 2005 and 2006 in return for opening of Turkey's harbours and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and aircrafts, in the event of the Regulation coming into force, this would be regarded sufficient by Ankara to implement the Additional Protocol, with a view to overcome current bottleneck in accession negotiations.<sup>61</sup>

In order to overcome the difficulties deriving from the bottleneck in Cyprus and to reflect its dedication to comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus impasse, Turkey came forward with two initiatives in 2005 and 2006. As an extension of the policy of 'being one step forward', the AKP government continued to assume a pro-active and facilitating role. These two proposals could also be considered as a corollary to the calls and expectations of international community, particularly

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<sup>61</sup> This judgement was based on an interview of the author with a former AKP Deputy on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.



underlined by the UNSG Annan's report of 24 May 2004; the EU Council of Minister's resolution of 26 April 2004 and various resolutions of the European Parliament, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Council of Europe in the aftermath of the Annan referanda, aiming at integrating Turkish Cypriots with the world.

For example, one of them was made public upon initiative of the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül on 30 May 2005<sup>62</sup>, which called upon all relevant parties to simultaneously lift all kinds of restrictions imposed on both sides around freedom of goods, persons and services concerning the Cyprus issue. More precisely, Ankara proposed to eradicate; all restrictions on the airports and harbours, including those on the direct flights between the North and South and the TRNC; on the third country citizens; and on the participation of Turkish Cypriots' in international sports, cultural and other activities. Lastly, it suggested the practical incorporation of North Cyprus as an economic entity, into the EU's Customs Union area, via a special arrangement. Rather than being a substitute for an overall solution, it was thought that implementation of the proposal would act as an important building block on the way to a comprehensive settlement and political consensus between the parties to the dispute.

In fact, Turkish and TRNC authorities have already undertaken unilaterally a number of measures for liberalization of visa and trade regime *vis-à-vis* Greek Cypriots since 2003. To illustrate, Turkish Cypriot leadership allowed crossing of people through the border between North and South by a decision taken on 23

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<sup>62</sup> See “*Kıbrıs'taki Kısıtlamaların Kaldırılması Önerisi Hakkında Sayın Bakanımızın Açıklaması*” [Foreign Minister's Statement on the Proposal of Lifting the Restrictions in Cyprus], Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2005, Ankara. The original text can be found at [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris\\_taki-kisitlamalarin-kaldirilmasi-onerisi-hakkinda-sayin-bakanimizin-aciklamasi\\_-30-mayis-2005.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris_taki-kisitlamalarin-kaldirilmasi-onerisi-hakkinda-sayin-bakanimizin-aciklamasi_-30-mayis-2005.tr.mfa). Accession date is 8 September 2009.

April 2003. Likewise, in the same year, Ankara simplified visa regime for Greek Cypriot citizens. Whilst one year later in 2004, TRNC authorities decided to lift passport requirement for Greek Cypriots, who are permitted to travel to North by using only ID's. Finally in the year 2006, visa requirement for Greek Cypriot and Greek citizens and third-country citizens of Greek and Greek Cypriot origin was abolished. Besides, two-way trade between the North and South was fully liberalized via a decision of the Turkish Cypriot authorities removing all limitations on export and import in 2004. Also, as a testament to its readiness for a peaceful co-existence with their Greek Cypriot counterparts, Turkish Cypriot side opened up crossing points of Bostancı and Lokmacı.

Turkey came forward with another initiative called ten points 'Action Plan',<sup>63</sup> which was presented by then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül on 24 January 2006. Building upon the premises laid down by its predecessor in 2005, the plan maintains *inter alia* that Turkish sea ports and airports will be opened to Greek Cypriot sea vessels and air carriers (in accordance with the EC-Turkey Customs Union), in the same vein, the sea ports of Northern Cyprus including Gazimagosa, Girne and Gemikonağı will be opened to international traffic of goods, persons and services and Ercan Airport will be opened for direct flights, both under Turkish Cypriot management. Moreover, the plan envisaged to undertake practical arrangements in order to remove not only all obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons and services, but also restrictions on means of transport and participation of Turkish Cypriots in international sports, cultural and social activities as well. By proposing to embrace the North Cyprus as an

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<sup>63</sup> The document was titled "New Initiative by Turkey on Cyprus". The so-called 'Action Plan' was also circulated as a UN document (A/60/657 and S/2006/48). The original text is available at the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

economic entity into the EC's Customs Union, the plan aimed at an uninterrupted direct trade between both sides of the island and with the outside world, which thus would facilitate economic development, at least until a comprehensive settlement is reached.

What is more, it was particularly emphasized that the proposed plan was not a substitute for a mutually acceptable solution. Instead, it merely intended to bring about an "environment of cooperation and mutual trust" as well as "rapprochement amongst all", thereby laying the ground for an overall settlement through mutual and complementary steps with a view to reactivating the overall settlement process under the UN auspices. In spite of the fact that Turkey's overture was endorsed by the international community including, *inter alia*, the U.S., the European Commission, Britain, Italy, Spain, Germany and Islamic Conference Organization, it was turned down by Greek Cypriot government.

As a matter of fact, the essence of both initiatives undertaken by Turkey in 2005 and 2006 underpinned the importance of economic development of the North by bridging the gap between Northern and Southern parts of the island, via terminating restraints on direct trade with the former. Indeed, the fundamental conviction of Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership underlined that negotiation can only be conducted between equals, yet, one could hardly talk of equality between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, since the former was not recognized and was subject to sanction and isolation. Conversely, the latter enjoyed the legitimacy and benefits of the title 'Republic of Cyprus', who was believed, therefore, to be unwilling to cede its superiority at the negotiation table. Second, the proposed plans made it clear to the EU that Turkey's full implementation of the Additional Protocol, i.e. opening of its harbours and

airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and air carriers, would only be possible if the EU conformed with its own words with regard to ending the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. Third, Turkish seaports have already been open *de facto*, yet, announcing the opening of seaports and airports *de jure* to Greek Cypriot vessels and air carriers in the framework of Additional Protocol could only be possible on the condition that Cypriot government renounces the embargoes on Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, Turkish proposals in 2005 and 2006 were made in relation to these considerations.<sup>64</sup>

Against a nationalist backlash at home, the EU's decision to partially suspend the negotiations and its failure to keep up its promises towards Turkish Cypriots contributed to the government's reluctance to take further action in favor of a solution. Subsequent to a visible inertia between 2005 and 2008 in Turkish-EU relations, the government decided to complete preparations for the remaining chapters regardless of whether they were blocked until 2013 so that until the Cyprus deadlock was overcome Turkey could gain time and the EU would be deprived of any pretext to slow Turkish-EU relations again. The AKP's "rediscovery" of the EU anchor for democratization at home in 2008 coincided with the lawsuit filed for its closure by the Constitutional Court.

Given Turkish Cypriots' longstanding struggle for international legitimacy, being accepted as equal partners with Greek Cypriots at the negotiation table, and removal of embargoes and isolation, Cyprus accession and the EU involvement in the dispute seemed to offer them, almost nothing, at least so far. As a matter of fact, for both communities the EU involvement meant a shift in the political

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<sup>64</sup> This information is based on an interview of the author with a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

balance on the island: whereas Greek Cypriots were content with the increased political power and security that they have been enjoying *vis-à-vis* Turkey in general and Turkish military presence in the northern part in particular; Turkish Cypriots perceived the Cyprus accession as realization of ‘enosis’ through the back door (or indirect enosis), especially in the absence of Turkish membership and further recognized it as a violation of 1959 London and Zurich Agreements (Diez, 2002: 140-141). To illustrate, George Vasiliou, then Cyprus’ chief negotiator with the EU, described membership as the “only way to secure the future of Hellenism” (Athens New Agency, 13 March 1999). While Greek Cypriots capitalized successfully on their EU membership and veto right in getting a settlement of Cyprus problem more favourable to them and generating ‘adaptational pressures’ on Ankara to that end considering Turkey’s own membership aspirations; Turkish Cypriots conceived their compatriots’ membership as contributing to intransigent attitude of Greek Cypriots at the negotiation table because of reluctance to loose their privileged position.<sup>65</sup>

After the failure of the Annan Plan, intercommunal negotiations were given a fresh boost by the UN Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Ghambari in 2006. Hence, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Tassos Papadopoulos met on 8 July 2006, where they agreed to set up Technical Committees affecting daily lives of Cypriots until the end of July and to exchange lists of core issues of Cyprus conflict, which were to be discussed at the Working Groups comprised of experts from both sides. Nevertheless, progress on refreshed UN process could not be moved forward.

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<sup>65</sup> Indeed, this argument was pointed out by several Turkish Cypriot politicians personally interviewed in Northern Lefkoşe in May 2010.

In the meantime, it is of vital importance to note that Ankara continued its efforts to rejuvenate the peace process via a letter sent by PM Erdoğan on 6 March 2008 to the UNSG, President of European Commission, permanent members of the UN Security Council and heads of state of EU members. In the letter, it was pointed out that the year 2008 provided a window of opportunity for a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement and that Turkey was determined to pledge its contribution to the solution to be reached via comprehensive negotiations; to endorse constructive attitude of Turkish Cypriot leader Talat; and looks forward concrete steps towards terminating the isolation of Turkish Cypriots as well. As an extension to its policy of being one step ahead, Turkey's motivation for this initiative was to work out the protocol crises and to detach the Cyprus imbroglio from Turkish-EU relations (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

As a matter of fact, at a meeting on 21 March 2008, Talat and newly elected Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias came to terms with the idea of forming seven technical committees and six working groups as well as starting comprehensive negotiations in the following preparatory period of three months. In this context, working groups were categorized according to the titles of 'Government and Power Sharing', 'EU Affairs', 'Security and Guarantees', 'Land', 'Property', and 'Economic Issues', whereas technical committees were organized in the framework of 'Crime and Crime Related Matters', 'Economic and Commercial Issues', 'Cultural Heritage', 'Crisis Management', 'Humanitarian Issues', 'Health', and 'Environment', all of which began to function on 18 April 2008. Frame of the negotiations are based on the relevant UNSC Resolutions; the reports of UN Secretary Generals submitted to the Security Council; settlement plans proposed so far, i.e. Ghali Set of Ideas, the

Plan of de Cuellar, Denktaş-Makarios and Denktaş-Kiprianou Agreements of 1977 and 1979; the Annan Plan and others; UN Secretary General's opening statements, all constituting 'the UN body of work'.<sup>66</sup>

The intercommunal talks under the UN auspices continued with subsequent meetings at leadership level to evaluate preliminary reports of committees and groups on 23 May and 1 July, where two leaders agreed on the establishment of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation with a single international personality based on political equality of the two sides, as defined by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Particularly at their meeting on 23 May, the leaders settled with the major principles of overall negotiation framework and signed an agreement to document their consensus. Accordingly, this partnership would not only be based on a federal government possessing a single international personality, but it would also be composed of two equal founding states of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Besides, this federation was to possess, albeit in principle, a single sovereignty and a single citizenship, whose details are to be discussed in comprehensive negotiations. The two leaders also compromised on the principles that the prospective settlement would be brought to separate and simultaneous referenda by both parties and that 'nothing would be agreed until everything is agreed'.

Indeed, support given by Turkey to this preparatory process initiated on 21 March 2008 was also made public through a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 May 2008. The Ministry noted the expectation to embark upon direct negotiations under the UN Secretary General's good offices mission as

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<sup>66</sup> This point was raised by a top-level bureaucrat at the Presidency of TRNC in a personal interview with the author on 24 May 2010 in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus.

soon as possible, with a view to setting up a new partnership state that would be based on the established UN parameters of bizonality, political equality and equal status of two founding states. Eventually, upon the last preparatory meeting between the two leaders held on July 25, full-fledged negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus question commenced on 3 September 2008. Generally speaking, what Turkish Cypriots expected from the recent negotiations process was the establishment of a ‘new’ partnership to be based on undiluted bi-zonality, political equality of two peoples, equal status of both Turkish Cypriot Founding State and Greek Cypriot Founding State as well as keeping Turkey’s active and effective guarantorship (i.e. the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance) intact.

Actually, Turkish Cypriots’ sensitivity at the negotiation table were enumerated by the then TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat<sup>67</sup> himself as such: first and foremost, maintaining political equality between two peoples –not between two states- meaning that there should be an effective participation at the state bodies as well as effective representation in the decision-making process. Secondly, bi-zonality and bi-communality should be kept intact, that is to say, two founding states shall be positioned *vis-à-vis* each other bi-zonally, whereby the weighted majority of Turkish Cypriots would live and govern the North; the weighted majority of Greek Cypriots would live and govern the South. Thirdly, following the example of Swiss cantons and their model of conversion, two founding states should have an equal status and ‘new state’ would come forward

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<sup>67</sup> He is the former PM and President of TRNC and former leader of left-wing unionist, Republicanist and pro-solution Republican Turkish Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-CTP*). His party lost elections to the nationalist, right-wing National Union Party (*Ulusal Birlik Partisi-UBP*) which criticized Talat and his party for giving excessive concessions to Greek Cypriots and for not possessing sensitivity over notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘state’. The UBPs former leader and PM Dr. Derviş Eroğlu has been elected as the third President of TRNC on 28 April 2010.



via separate but simultaneous referendums. Fourthly, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, which justify ‘Turkish presence’ on the island, should continue to be in force given that around 400-500 Turkish Cypriots were died of Greek Cypriot attacks in the period of 1963-1974 despite existence of the UN peacekeeping force, UNFICYP. Therefore, mostly deriving from the past memories, Turkish Cypriots’ lack of trust towards the UN, EU and Britain inevitably led them to seek effective and active security guarantees provided by Ankara.<sup>68</sup> Lastly but not leastly, derogations in the comprehensive settlement agreement should become part of the EU’s primary law, thereby preventing the ECJ to dilute them. Related to that, the EU is required to adjust itself to the terms of settlement being arrived at by the two communities, for example by altering Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty of Greek Cypriots.<sup>69</sup>

Conversely, as can be evidenced from statements of Greek Cypriot leader Christofias following meetings dated 21 March and 3 September, instead of creating a ‘new’ partnership, the Greek Cypriot side was of the opinion that negotiations aimed at federalizing the 1960 ‘Republic of Cyprus’ via a constitutional exercise. Nevertheless, it should be reminded that UN Security Council Resolution of 716 (1991) enumerated, *inter alia*, “the establishment of new constitutional arrangement for Cyprus” as one of the fundamental principles of the settlement of Cyprus question. Thus, discrepancy existing at the core of

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<sup>68</sup> The EU’s decision to incorporate Republic of Cyprus (a state having a serious border problem and who claims to have been occupied by a third country), without a prior solution and in the absence of Turkish membership was frequently criticized by Turkish Cypriot politicians. Distrust towards Brussels also stems from the perceived ‘double-standards’ towards Turkey as well as Brussels’ imposition of embargoes and international restrictions on Turkish Cypriots. Unless Turkey became an EU member, a reunified Cyprus was hardly seen as a desirable choice by Turkish Cypriot politicians interviewed in Northern Cyprus.

<sup>69</sup> Those five points have been declared by the then President Talat himself at a seminar titled “*Kıbrıs’ta Son Gelişmeler ve Müzakere Süreci*” [Recent Developments in Cyprus and Negotiation Process) held at Izmir University of Economics, 27 December 2008, Izmir, Turkey.

Cyprus conflict stems from both political and economic entanglements, which are in fact intertwined with each other.

Moreover, Ankara-Northern Nicosia axis insisted on the idea that termination of Turkish Cypriots' isolation by international community was of paramount importance in motivating Greek Cypriots in the direction of a settlement. Besides, removal of restrictions on Turkish Cypriots would no doubt restore inequality of the two parties at negotiation table. What is more, for Turkish side, not only the UNSC's decision of 186 (1964) recognizing the Greek Cypriot administration as the sole legitimate government of Republic of Cyprus, but also its accession to the EU further contributed to the entrenched attitude of Greek Cypriots, thereby impeding attempts towards a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus dispute.<sup>70</sup> According to the sources of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, any peace plan should embrace a 'precarious balance' existing in Cyprus, which is based on the satisfaction of Greek Cypriots concerning the issue of property rights in return of the satisfaction of Turkish Cypriots with regard to having a right of equal say in the administration. More precisely, a lasting, just and viable peace should take cognizance of the injury of Greek Cypriots on property, especially in the aftermath of 1974 Turkish military intervention as well as that of Turkish Cypriots during the period of 1963-1974, notwithstanding a substantial level of amelioration in the property rights of Turks subsequent to Turkish military intervention in 1974.

The EU's decision to incorporate Cyprus as a divided island and its disregard of Turkish Cypriots' support for the Annan Plan by failing to deliver on its

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<sup>70</sup> This argument is almost commonly underlined by politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats interviewed both in Ankara and Northern Cyprus.

promises of terminating their isolation created disappointment in the North, where hardline nationalists led by Derviş Eroğlu eventually displaced Talat in parliamentary elections in April 2009 and then in presidential elections in 2010. Yet, the fact that Eroğlu's leadership did not lead to the collapse of talks shows the continuing commitment of Turkish governing elites to reunification on the basis of the UN body of work (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). Similar to the 2001-2004 period leading to the Annan Plan's referenda, Greek Cypriots are enjoying the legitimacy, the benefits of the title of Republic of Cyprus representing the whole island, and more recently the EU membership leverage, and seem to be unwilling to cede their superiority at the negotiation table (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

In the Turkish general elections held on 12 June 2011, PM Erdoğan won a victory for the third time, raising party votes to 49.9%.<sup>71</sup> The third AKP government chose to visibly adopt a hardline rhetoric not only in domestic politics (i.e. the Kurdish issue) but also in foreign affairs, including Israel, Syria, Armenia, the EU, and the Cyprus issues. As the Erdoğan government consolidated its political power, which was attended by sound economic performance, a more self-confident tone was increasingly noted in its handling of the Cyprus issue and the pattern of Turkish-EU relations (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). For example, in his visit to Northern Cyprus on 20 July 2011 after the elections, Erdoğan warned that if Cyprus assumed presidency of the EU on July 2012 and negotiations on the island were not finalized by then, Turkey would suspend its relations with the EU.<sup>72</sup> In a similar vein, then Turkish President Abdullah Gül

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<sup>71</sup> Votes for the AKP have steadily increased from 34.28% in the November 2002 parliamentary elections to 46.47% in July 2007 and to 49.9% in July 2011 elections.

<sup>72</sup> For example, see 'Erdoğan: "Bıçak Kemiğe Dayanmak Üzere"' [It is no longer tolerable]. *Hürriyet*, 20 July 2011. However, Egemen Bağış, then Minister for EU Affairs, said in an interview with the

said on an official visit to London on November 2011 that when Cyprus took over rotating presidency of the EU on July 2012, it would be a ‘half-country leading a miserable union’ and added that unless the EU persuaded the Greek Cypriots to reach a compromise by July 2012, there would be no reason for the Greek Cypriots to reconcile, and Turkey might consider a two-state solution.<sup>73</sup> As had been frequently pointed out by Turkish leaders in recent years, inter-communal negotiations should not continue indefinitely; for the Turkish side, putting a final date for settlement was seen necessary to compel the Greek Cypriot side to compromise (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). Likewise, Eroğlu acknowledged that negotiations would not continue after 1 July 2012, and that the only chance for settlement would be to convene an international conference; otherwise parameters for solution would have to be revised.<sup>74</sup> Given the split in the UN Security Council and Greek Cypriot objections to the idea of arbitration, scheduling, and international conference, a more likely option seemed to devise a new peace plan (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).<sup>75</sup>

The September 2008 process lasted until 2012 due to looming Presidential elections in Greek Cyprus. Alexander Downer, then special representative of the

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daily *Kıbrıs Gazetesi* that while Ankara will keep relations with the European Commission, European Parliament, and candidate states intact, it will ignore the Greek Cypriot Administration. See the interview with Eylem Eraydın, *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 3 March 2012.

<sup>73</sup> See ‘Half-country to lead miserable union’. *Today’s Zaman*, 22 November 2011; ‘*Sefil Birliğe Yarım Başkan*’ [Half-Country Leading a Miserable Union]. 2011.

<http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/guncel/11/23/sefil.birlige.yarim.baskan/637736.0/index.html>; accessed on 24 November 2011. Bağış went even further, to warn that options of settlement in Cyprus involve reunification, a two-state solution, and annexation of Northern Cyprus into Turkey. *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 3 March 2012.

<sup>74</sup> See Derviş Eroğlu, ‘*Müzakere Süreci Başarısız Oldu*’ [Negotiation Process Has Failed]. 6 April 2012. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25337458/>, accessed on 7 April 2012.

<sup>75</sup> For example, see Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ‘*Kıbrıs’ta Ban Ki Moon Planı Oluşturalım*’ [Let’s Prepare a Ban Ki Moon Plan in Cyprus]. 7 November 2013. <http://www.abhaber.com>, accessed on 13 November 2013; Derviş Eroğlu, ‘*Yıl sonuna kadar ana konularda anlaşma sağlanabilir*’ [Agreement would be reached on basic issues by the end of the year]. 29 September 2013. <http://www.cnnturk.com>, accessed on 10 September 2013.

UNSG to Cyprus, prepared a 77-point report comprising converged positions of the parties, as agreed during the period of 2008-2012, with a hope towards making it a basis of the resumed talks. Following the Greek Cypriot presidential elections in February 2013, Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Anastasiades assumed power and inter-communal peace negotiations in Cyprus resumed on 11 February 2014 after preliminary talks on the drafting of a joint *communiqué*, which outlined the principles of negotiations. Anastasiades declared unilaterally to suspend the negotiations in October 2014 on the ground that Ankara intervened Cyprus' natural gas drilling activities through sending a military vessel to the region.

Concomitantly, as far as the rising strategic importance of Cyprus' location in the context of Baku-Tsiblis-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the East-West energy corridor, and its proximity to the geography of the 'Arab Spring', a Turkish presence in Cyprus is occupying a more noteworthy place in regional leadership calculations and the Turkish government's multidimensional foreign policy (see also Kaliber, 2012). For example, in September 2011, the Greek Cypriots initiated exploratory drilling for natural gas and oil in the Mediterranean with the partnership of an American-Israeli firm. Turkey reacted by signing *the Continental Shelf Limitation Agreement* with Turkish Cypriots and sent the Turkish vessel *Piri Reis* and than *Barbaros Hayrettin* to carry out research in the region. In fact, in the light of its ascending regional role and activism in recent years, Turkey is highly likely to aim to prevent any unilateral advantage by Greek Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean without the Cyprus issue being resolved (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

The most recent tension (October 2014) regarding the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and its possible distribution between Greek Cypriots and Turkish

Cypriots emerged as an additional dimension of the Cyprus dispute, thereby increasingly making it a part of regional energy calculations involving regional (Turkey, Greece, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon) and international actors (Russia, the U.S.A, the EU). Considering the vast energy potential in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, a possible conflict resolution in Cyprus would benefit all the parties: increasing energy security of Turkey, Greece and the EU; contributing Cyprus' future GDP and overcome its economic crises, boosting regional cooperation between Turkey, Cyprus and even Israel via a joint energy infrastructure, and not least removing one of the most formidable barriers on Turkey's smooth functioning of accession negotiations (Grigoriadis, 2014a).

Interestingly, as hopes for a settlement eroded and the government's patience for determining a final date for solution, its post-election discourse on the Cyprus debacle had become considerably closer to the hawkish, *pro-status quo*, security-first policy based on the two-state solution proposed by the former Northern Cypriot leader Denktaş and some Turkish decision-making elites in the late 1990s.<sup>76</sup> It coincided with an increasing impression in the domestic and international circles that Turkey's commitment to the EU membership started to wane. The mostly held conviction underlined that the government no longer needed the EU anchor to consolidate its domestic power and its economic success boosted ambitions for a more independent regional and even global role (Grigoriadis, 2012; 2014a). Notwithstanding initial hopes to influence regional developments in the beginning of the 'Arab Spring', having suffered setbacks in

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<sup>76</sup> For example, see Sami Kohen 'Ankara Denktaş'ın çizgisine geliyor' [Ankara gets closer to Denktaş' line]. *Milliyet*, 17 January 2012; Yalçın Doğan 'Annan gibi müstehcen kelimeleri kullanma' [Do not use nasty words like Annan]. *Hürriyet*, 17 January 2012; Asım Akansoy 'Eski Türk tezlerine dönüş' [Return to the former Turkish thesis]. *Kıbrıs Postası*, 17 January 2011.

Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, Turkey had to come to terms with its own ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Grigoriadis, 2012; 2014b). However, apart from energy calculus and smooth progress of the Turkish-EU relations, a possible resolution in Cyprus would provide a diplomatic success for Davutoğlu government, thereby fulfilling its longstanding commitment to ‘zero problem with neighbours’ (Grigoriadis, 2014a).

In case the most recent attempt (2014 negotiations process) fails to conclude a peace agreement, too, the UN would most probably be announcing the international community the termination of its good offices mission that has been lasting since 1968, in the absence of a will in favour of reunification (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). In fact, this would legitimize a search for alternative parameters of solution other than reunification, including peaceful co-existence of two states as a last resort (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

Be that as it may, apart from a distant possibility of Cypriot government’s decision in favour of terminating embargoes, until a comprehensive settlement was agreed by the parties, an alternative measure for lifting embargoes on Turkish Cypriots would be taken through either a new UNSC resolution, which would reinterpret or clarify the previous resolutions of 541 and 550, or through a new resolution in support of Kofi Annan’s Report dated 28 May 2004.<sup>77</sup> Also, the most radical solution to an almost 50-year impasse in Cyprus for Turkish side would be the abolition of the UNSC resolution of 186 (1964), which called upon the consent of ‘Government of Cyprus’ who had formed solely by Greek Cypriots since then, in order to create the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

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<sup>77</sup> This information relies on the author’s personal interview with a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

Concerning Cyprus-Turkey-EU triangle, according to the sources of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, comprehensive settlement requires either reciprocal recognition (read TRNC and Republic of Cyprus), or a solution based on federation, otherwise, Turkey's accession to the EU would become a distant prospect. Cyprus problem occupied a central place and for some Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials it was even regarded as the most fundamental problem in Ankara-Brussels relations. Because in the absence of a settlement, a cardinal challenge could come out during Turkey's signature of the accession treaty with the EU: an official recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Legally, Turkey cannot put a reservation in the treaty to that effect as opposed to what has happened in implementation of the Additional Protocol.<sup>78</sup> According to this view, non-settlement in Cyprus seemed to surpass the other frequently cited problems pertaining to the Turkish-EU relations and Turkey's march towards the EU membership, such as the Armenian issue (official recognition of the widely disputed 'Armenian genocide' by Turkey) or Kurdish problem (i.e. greater autonomy for cultural and political rights of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin).

As to the potential of Cyprus problem constituting a stumbling block on the way of Turkey's EU membership, one should also point to a contrary view existing in circles of Turkish foreign policy making. According to this argument, "Greek Cypriot government cannot impede Turkey's membership forever" (for example see, interview with Burak Erdenir, Deputy Secretary General for European Union Affairs in Turkey, Haberturk.com, 5 July 2010). This view does not disregard the fact that Cyprus bottleneck should be necessarily overcome for a smooth proceeding of negotiations. Rather, ongoing deadlock in Turkey's

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<sup>78</sup> This point was raised by a high ranking diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview with the author on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.



accession negotiations, due mostly to Greek Cypriot and French blockade, is regarded surmountable since the EU is unlikely to rule out Turkey forever. Accordingly, if Turkey is able to complete all the technical preparations necessary for launching chapters –even if they are circumvented owing to the Cyprus problem- the EU would hardly step back from its commitments towards Turkey, particularly in the event of a settlement in Cyprus. Furthermore, this argument is based on the assumption that the EU and European elites are unlikely to allow Turkey-EU relations and Turkey’s membership to be taken hostage by Cyprus problem, nor will the Greek Cypriot leadership be able to cope with obstructing Turkey’s membership to the EU. As a matter of fact, this outlook has been deeply embedded in current Turkey’s official strategy towards the EU dominated by the AKP government.

This dissertation constitutes an attempt to empirically investigate the Europeanizing effect of EU conditionality during the enlargement process and how EU conditionality in Cyprus case has acted as adaptation pressures on Turkey leading to Europeanization constitutes the basis of the next section.

## **4.2 Adaptational Pressures Through EU Conditionality**

### **4.2.1 Conditionality As a Concept**

Notwithstanding the lack of a mutually agreed definition of conditionality, it can be said that international conditionality mostly involves disbursement of developmental and foreign aid in either bilateral or multilateral form. Political conditionality has generally a dual dimension, first, it refers to:

the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, trade concessions, cooperation agreements, political contracts, or international organization membership), to fulfillment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles (Smith, 1997: 4).

Whereas economic conditionality, the second dimension, basically entails linking the “benefits to the fulfillment of economic conditions, usually involving the introduction of a market economy or specific policies (e.g. structural adjustment)” (Smith, 1997: 4). Likewise, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2007: 88-89) broadly defines conditionality as

policy in which international organizations promise rewards (such as financial assistance or membership) to target states on the condition that the states fulfill one or more conditions (such as policy adjustments or institutional change) set by the international organizations.

Accordingly, one of the defining aspects of (aid) conditionality is its instrumentality in the sense that conditionality is not an end in itself but rather a means to reach other objectives. The other aspect is that especially the aftermath of Second World War has witnessed an evolution of conditionality with an increasing linkage between delivery of aid and conditions attached to it by the donors. It should also be noted that conditionality can be embodied in two forms, positive conditionality, involving rewards in case of compliance and negative conditionality, taking the form of reduction, suspension, or terminating those rewards to punish non-compliance. Another aspect of conditionality is based on the understanding that while donors’ interests are considered primary, beneficiaries’ interests are regarded secondary and subordinated to the interests of the former, thereby signifying the power asymmetry embedded in the aid

givers and takers (for a more detailed information on evolution of international conditionality and European conditionality see Hughes et al., 2004: 10-29).

With respect to historical evolution of aid conditionality, during the early Cold War years of 1940s and 1950s, two dominant elements have entailed first, transfer of the so called ‘superior’ norms of donors to recipients and second, linkage constructed between the aid and economic and security interests of the donor.<sup>79</sup> Particularly, international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and UN were tasked with “management of aid, and new channels for the post-colonial transfer of norms, expertise and technology from the advanced Western states to the Developing World” (Hughes et al., 2004: 14).

During 1970s, international conditionality has rather took the form of economic conditionality, which was mainly performed by the IMF and World Bank through structural adjustment programmes. The conditionality in this regard largely reflected political, economic, cultural, and ideological concerns of the donor because the aid targeted a systemic transformation in line with neoliberal macroeconomic restructuring comprising market liberalization, strict budgetary rules and financial administrative reforms. Along with this economic conditionality, starting from early 1990s onwards, ‘Western’ political norms particularly democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and its linkage with development following the collapse of communism added a ‘political’ dimension to conditionality. The relation between advocacy of neoliberal ideology and democracy would be that while the former necessitates free markets

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<sup>79</sup> For example, the Marshall Plan, through which the US protected its security and economic interests in Europe by providing economic and military aid, was conditional upon receiving states to have open-market economy and acceptance of procurement. It was thought that the Plan constituted a predecessor to conditionality targeting systemic change throughout 1970s (Hughes et al., 2004: 14-15).

devoid of government intervention, the latter would allow a greater room of manoeuvre for market forces since in liberal democracies the state power may be much more exposed to dilution (Hughes et al., 2004: 16).

Lastly but not leastly, one should also keep in mind some elements involving the notion of conditionality: first, there should be a consensus on its substance between the actor(s) applying it and the actor(s) who are supposed to fulfill it. Second, conditionality should have pre-defined and clear-cut criteria having coherency and consistency, fulfilment of which should be subjected to verification. Third, power hierarchy underpinning the process of employment of conditionality as well as requirements of it should be clearly communicated to concerning parties together with possible outcomes, which include either punishment or reward (Hughes et al., 2004: 2-3).

#### **4.2.2 EU Conditionality With Reference to CFSP *Acquis Politique* and Political Criteria and Enhanced Political Dialogue in the EU Documents**

There is a widespread assumption that the EU conditionality has a powerful motivation for and a key factor in shaping policy, ensuring institutional adjustments and normative change in new member states and candidates alike (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier; 2004; 2007; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2004; Smith, 1997; Grabbe, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2006). At the same time, it should be reminded that the EU conditionality is not confined to enlargement *per se* because the Union employs both positive and negative forms of conditionality towards third parties for

benefits including trade concessions, financial and technical aid, institutional ties such as cooperation and association agreements, and political contacts.

As a matter of fact, the phenomenon of conditionality, once considered within the context of the EU's Eastern enlargement, constituted a powerful incentive and disciplining structure for the Central and East European countries (Hughes et al., 2004: 2). It is mainly because the conditions set for Eastern enlargement were the most comprehensive and detailed ever designed. In turn, complexity of accession conditionality served twin purpose: first to minimize the risk of newcomers to bring economic burden and political instability to the Union and ensure that they will be able to take on obligations of membership (i.e. the *acquis communautaire*), thereby overcoming opposition of reluctant member states to Eastward enlargement and second, to prepare and guide the applicant states for accession (Grabbe, 2002: 251). To reiterate, Europeanization in the context of accession rather takes place via the EU conditionality. It is in the context of economic conditionality and political conditionality of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights that the EU conditionality played a leading role, not merely in the transformation of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but also in current candidate states, associates and partners, as an indispensable principle of its external relations.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the EU (then EC) has made financial and technical aid and forging institutional ties conditional on meeting not only human rights and democratic standards but adopting principles of market economy as well. More comprehensive approach towards EU conditionality, consisting of economic and political dimensions, has evolved in the early 1990s through such documents as Europe Agreements between the EC and Central and East

European countries in 1990-91, which granted the latter the association status in return for commitment to democracy, rule of law, free and fair election, multi-party system, human rights and market economy.<sup>80</sup>

At the same time, Luxembourg European Council issued a ‘Declaration on Human Rights’ in June 1991 by stating that parliamentary democracy, primacy of law, and protection of minorities are considered as the basis for equitable development and that clauses on human rights could be included in economic and cooperation agreements with third countries. In a similar vein, the European Council passed a resolution on 28 November 1991 which included a common approach by forging a linkage between good governance with development aid by making it clear that “in the event of grave and persistent human rights violations or serious interruption of democratic processes, the Community and its Member States will consider appropriate responses in the light of the circumstances.” Although not explicitly mentioned, wording of ‘appropriate responses’ is likely to imply suspension or denunciation of trade preferences or aids provided to the other side. Likewise, Council Regulation on 27 February 1992 (No. 443/92) concerning assistance to developing countries in Asia and Latin America asserted that the Community could amend or suspend cooperation with states that violate human rights and democratic principles. These declarations and resolutions, in turn, formed the very basis of the democracy and human rights clauses of the Maastricht Treaty.

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<sup>80</sup> It should be noted, however, that the first three of those agreements concluded by then Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 1991 did not contain any reference to ‘conditionality’ *per se*. Yet, the Europe Agreements signed after 1993 with Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, the three Baltic states and Slovenia embraced a clause that allowed for the immediate suspension of agreement if human rights and democratic principles are not respected. This shift was stemmed from the Council’s decision on 11 May 1992, where it was stated that all cooperation and association agreements with the Central and East European countries should include a clause allowing the suspension of the agreements in case of violations of human rights and democratic principles. The same norm was applied to cooperation and trade agreements concluded with ex-Soviet Republics.

Moreover, culmination of the EU conditionality encompassing economic and political aspects of ‘conditionality’ was reached at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 where member states adopted a declaration famously known as ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. Indeed, it turned out to be a foundation of the EU enlargement by outlining political, economic and administrative expectations from would-be members before accession. As an indispensable political condition of accession to the EU, Copenhagen Criteria basically inspired from the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Paris Charter, the Helsinki Final Act as well as the Europe Agreements. Also, Treaty of Amsterdam Title XX Article 177 (2) stipulated the linkage between development aid and “general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

In sum, political conditionality has become a key feature of all agreements concluded with external countries. Particularly, the Commission has regularly reviewed the political conditions in all candidate countries via first in its 1997 Opinions on the applications as well as its annual Progress Reports since then. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, an explicit linkage was forged between opening accession talks and democracy for the first time, by making it clear that to begin negotiations, a candidate has to have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. In fact, when the accession negotiations sparked, the focus of conditionality was directed towards compliance and transposing of the specific EU rules of the *acquis communautaire* or ‘*acquis conditionality*’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007: 89).

Research agenda of Europeanization in accession countries generally entails the effects of EU conditionality and the conditions under which it has been effective or not, by either pointing to strength and effectiveness of EU conditionality, or to ambiguities and inconsistencies of it in the Eastward enlargement of the EU (see Grabbe, 2001; 2002; 2003; Hughes et al., 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). To exemplify, effectiveness of conditionality can be attributed to asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and then candidates of Central and Eastern European countries which is in favour of the former, and the number of veto players in the latter which is considered small, thereby reducing domestic opposition to EU conditionality. Interdependence is asymmetrical in that economy of candidates are more dependent of the EU market than the vice versa, thus the EU can utilize its relative superiority to attain rule adoption and compliance, mainly in exchange for aid and integration (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007: 90). Also, effectiveness of conditionality increases when it is credible. In turn, credibility of conditionality requires first, superior bargaining power of the EU (power asymmetry in favour of it) in order for threats of withholding the reward is credible. Second, it requires from the view point of candidate states certainty about conditional rewards in order for promises to be credible (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 665).

As far as a distinction between ‘democratic conditionality’ and ‘acquis conditionality’ is concerned, effectiveness of EU conditionality is hinged on two factors. Democratic conditionality is rather related to presence or absence of credible EU membership incentives and domestic political costs of adoption for governments in target countries (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).



Adoption costs may take the form of opportunity cost of forgoing alternative rewards of adopting rules other than that of the EU as well as welfare and power costs that private and public actors would incur in case of compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 666). Since the rules are adopted ultimately by the government, the effectiveness of conditionality is also determined by preferences of the government, and those of the veto players, whose agreement is necessary for change in the status quo (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 666).

As far as *acquis* conditionality is concerned, however, success of Europeanization is highly contingent on whether the EU rules are presented as ‘conditions’ with a credible membership perspective as a reward in which case rule adoption is observed to be on a dramatic rise (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). For example, credibility of EU conditionality, which is established with a clear membership perspective, is boosted with opening of accession talks with then five candidates in 1998, which paved the way for a profound increase in rule adoption, thereby making the conditionality as a key instrument of Europeanization and proving Europeanization itself as the most relevant source for domestic change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007: 92). In other words, rule adoption is heavily impinged on credibility of conditionality which depends particularly on starting of accession talks. Likewise, for another observer, the EU’s most influential political tool is access to different stages in the accession process, especially achieving candidacy status and starting accession negotiations (Grabbe, 2001). Relating to *acquis* conditionality, it was also found out that impact of veto players and adoption costs rather account for variation in speed and timing but not the likelihood of rule adoption, due mainly

to high benefits as well as time pressures of accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007: 98).

In another study, it was argued that only credible membership perspective of the EU can bring about compliance with rules and norms of Western international community (notably, liberalism, democracy and human rights) (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). Yet, credible membership perspective gives way to compliance in case of low domestic costs, which means that if compliance leads to regime change or topple the government, then even membership perspective will not be enough to produce rule conformance, except periods prior to decisions regarding opening or concluding accession negotiations. That is to say, it was the combination of material external political incentives and domestic political cost that emerged as effective conditions in democratic transformation of candidate states. Apart from the cost-benefit calculation of governments, conditionality might also be effective through “transnational channel, that is, via societal actors in non-member countries” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 498). More precisely, conditionality will be more effective if cost-benefit analysis made by societal actors is positive and also if identification of them with Europe is high, that is to say, when they are willing to be recognized as European. Opportunity cost of non-accession will mobilize societal actors in favour of EU conditionality particularly when economic exchange with the EU is intensive. Conditionality through transnational channel might also be effective in the case of high identification of society with European and Western liberal political values, which will expose non-compliant governments to societal pressure (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 500-501). Indeed, this argumentation is noticeably relevant to this dissertation because as will be illustrated in the next chapter, the

TÜSİAD emerged as an active non-governmental organization in the aftermath of Helsinki Summit not only through pushing government for endorsing the Annan Plan for reunification of Cyprus island before its accession so that Turkey is granted a date for accession talks, but also through embarking on a public campaign to manipulate public opinion about necessity of making reforms to attain membership.

Most probably building upon difficulties encountered and experiences gained during the last Eastern enlargement wave, the close linkage between effective conditionality and maintaining a credible membership perspective was reflected in the *2005 Strategy Paper* of the Commission. The paper emphasized that

the effectiveness of conditionality in driving reforms depends on maintaining a credible political perspective for eventual integration into the Union. Aspirant countries can best sustain public support for bold and often painful reforms when the EU supports them, works with them, and keeps its own promises. The perspective of moving to the next stage in relations with the Union is a powerful incentive for countries to transform themselves and to adopt EU standards and values. The journey towards membership has value in itself, even in cases where accession is many years away. This journey is often difficult, so it is essential for the EU to stay engaged throughout the process, and committed to the outcome (European Commission, Brussels, 9 November 2005).

By the same token, the 2008-2009 Strategy Paper asserted that EU enlargement should be based on renewed consensus over fair and rigorous EU conditionality, consolidation of commitments as well as better communication with the public.

In order to induce change, the EU opts for “material reinforcement strategy”, in particular “reinforcement by reward”<sup>81</sup> *vis-à-vis* target states by employing tangible incentives, most notably, financial, technical, economic or military assistance, trade benefits, institutional ties such as trade, cooperation and association agreements, including membership (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). Thus, the EU conditionality works rather as a carrot, not stick, because non-compliance is not punished beyond withholding the reward, which would either embrace denying assistance or the upgrading of institutional ties. As far as the enlargement context is concerned, withholding the reward would denote suspension of negotiations partially or wholly (i.e. partial suspension of negotiating chapters in the case of Turkey), or preventing candidate state from proceeding to subsequent stages of accession (i.e. EU’s objection to allowing Slovakia under Meciar government to open accession talks).

At Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU explicitly made meeting the political conditions of Copenhagen Criteria (relating to achievement of stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities) a prerequisite for starting the accession talks and excluded Turkey on this ground. In addition, in the Regular Reports in October 1999, only Romania and Bulgaria were not allowed to start accession negotiations in 2000 because they were imposed additional specific conditions (Grabbe, 2003: 316; Grabbe, 2002: 262).

On closer inspection, however, the effectiveness of conditionality and thus influence of the EU on candidate states may become limited due to some factors

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<sup>81</sup> For a detailed explanation on reinforcement by reward and how it works see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2003: 496-501).

largely related to specifics of accession process as well as the way conditionality operates (Grabbe, 2001). One of them concerns timing of costs and benefits meaning that despite intermediate rewards such as aid or trade liberalization, ultimate reward of membership is too distant for decision-makers in candidate states compared to adaptation costs instantly to be inflicted (Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 665). Also, there are “complex actor constellations” (Grabbe, 2001) in the accession process which refer to institutions of the EU (European Parliament, Council, Commission), member states, and even different actors in the same institution (such as Commission) who may engender diversified rhetoric about accession requirements and readiness of the candidates. Moreover, conditions have a dynamic dimension meaning that new conditions are added and old ones are modified at European Council meetings held twice a year. This not merely makes the Union “a moving target for candidates” but it also boost power asymmetry further in favour of the Union by making it “a referee as well as a player in the accession process” (Grabbe, 2002: 251).

That being said, the EU fosters institutional and policy change during pre-accession period via a key mechanism comprising of Accession Partnerships (since 1998) and Regular Reports prepared by the Commission (since 1997). Hence, conditionality for aid and other benefits is impinged on performance of candidates in implementing Accession Partnerships, which embrace policy priorities that should be undertaken by a candidate state in the short (one year) or in medium term (usually defined as five years). The Commission closely monitors the process by reporting on the candidate’s progress in adapting

priorities set in Accession Partnership in the autumn of the year and prepares revised version of Accession Partnership for the next year.

Another monitoring tool of the Commission is Regular Reports which encompass general assessment of a candidate's performance in complying with Copenhagen conditionality as well as particular sections concerning a candidate's level of progress in fulfilling Accession Partnership of the previous year. They cover all areas of the conditions in the sense that Commission's evaluation of candidates is divided into sections on the political and economic conditions as well as "other obligations of membership," the latter containing implementation of EU legislation and preparations to join EU structures, such as monetary union or Schengen agreement.

In fact, Regular Reports prepared by the Commission may perform a profound role because they are utilized by the European Council to decide whether to allow candidate state to proceed to further stages in the accession process. Thus, Regular Reports and Accession Partnerships not merely act as key monitoring and regular assessment mechanism of the Commission, but they can also act as effective leverage through which EU conditionality is promoted to affect institutional and policy change. Indeed, candidates are expected to adopt the whole *acquis communautaire*, and accession negotiations are confined to deciding how much of it should be implemented before accession and which parts of it will be subject to transition periods following membership, though candidates' ability to negotiate concessions, transition periods and derogations are reduced compared to previous enlargements (Grabbe, 2003: 304-305).

More specifically, during the pre-accession period, EU foreign policy conditionality is embodied by Negotiation Framework Document, Accession Partnerships, Regular Reports as well as Strategy Papers. Moreover, these documents constitute significant embodiment of tools of political dialogue between the EU and candidates during pre-accession period by not only determining obligations of candidates but also acting as a monitoring mechanism. That is to say, until accession, they are monitored by the EU under the subsection of enhanced political dialogue and political criteria through Accession Partnerships, Negotiation Framework Documents, Regular Reports as well as Strategy Papers.

Nevertheless, there is also an informal element in EU conditionality, as effective on Turkish decision-making elites as formal conditionality, thereby constituting 'indirect pressures' that are inflicted on candidate such as individual member states' statements, recommendations and applications, for example, a decision by France and Netherlands to put Turkey's accession into the Union to referendums. In fact, informal aspect of EU conditionality towards Turkey formed the non-contractual, declaratory and highly politicized part of EU-Turkey relations and seemingly paves the way for ambiguity on the part of Turkey. Furthermore, it creates mistrust and scepticism particularly in respect of Turkish perceptions as to sincerity and credibility of the EU's contractual obligations with an unfortunate side-effect of making conditionality inconsistent and ineffective, thus diminishing its overall influence. Due to its direct connection with the credibility of EU rewards, informal aspect of conditionality entails potential to legitimize rhetoric of veto players, but it would also influence cost-benefit calculation by the government.

In this respect, the legal and political ground of the EU's expectations from Turkey are predominantly embodied by Ankara Agreement (Association Agreement) and its Additional Protocol, Accession Partnership(s), Negotiation Framework Document, Enlargement Strategy Paper(s), European Council Presidency Conclusions as well as Regular Reports. Also, Turkey is expected to adopt and implement the 'CFSP *acquis*' embracing joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within the legal framework of the CFSP.

As far as settlement of the Cyprus dispute is concerned, EU conditionality (in foreign policy) can be considered part of the CFSP *acquis* (the third Copenhagen criterion), relating to the Union's common positions, declarations, and statements on the Cyprus issue or, alternatively, as part of "enhanced political dialogue and political criteria"<sup>82</sup>. The EU tends to handle the Cyprus problem as part of the latter,<sup>83</sup> namely, enhanced political dialogue and political criteria, 'sufficient' fulfillment of which is regarded *sine qua non* for any candidate to embark upon accession talks, and non-compliance of which may result in suspension of talks.

Although not formally uttered as part of the Copenhagen political criteria or as a precondition for membership by either Brussels or Ankara, the Cyprus issue has become a 'non-Copenhagen benchmark' at the rhetorical and political level that has been determining the pace and extent of Turkish-EU relations, particularly after Helsinki. Moreover, since 2006, the EU has treated the dispute not merely as a bilateral problem, dealing a blow to Turkish-EU relations in the

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<sup>82</sup> The enhanced political dialogue covers key issues for EU-Turkey relations such as human rights, Cyprus, the peaceful settlement of disputes (read problems with Greece), ESDP and wider issues such as the fight against terrorism, regional issues embracing Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Middle East Peace Process), the Balkans, Afghanistan etc.

<sup>83</sup> Most probably owing to the EU membership of Greece and Cyprus.



political domain, but also as a legal and contractual issue, which further reduces room for bargaining and negotiation (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

While in the Regular Reports of 1998, 1999, 2000 Cyprus was tackled in the sub-section of 'Political Criteria' under heading of 'Criteria for Membership' as part of Copenhagen Criteria. In 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, Cyprus problem was dealt with by the EU under 'Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria' again as part of 'Criteria for Membership', and in 2005 with a nuance by putting it as a 'regional issue' under the section of 'Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria'. Yet, an observable difference was entailed beginning with the Regular Report and Accession Partnership of 2006, where the EU began to handle Cyprus under the sub-section of 'regional issues and international obligations' (again as part of enhanced political dialogue and political criteria). For example, Regular Report of 2006 criticized statements of the then Turkish PM and Foreign Minister that the Additional Protocol would not be implemented as long as the isolation of Turkish Cypriot community continued. An "Action Plan on Cyprus" proposed by Turkey was also resented on the ground of the EU's new approach. Accordingly, Turkish government was reminded that implementing the Protocol was a 'legal obligation', which must not be linked to the situation of the Turkish Cypriot community. Additionally, the fact that no progress was achieved on any aspects of normalizing bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus was also criticized. Hence, Turkish government's non-fulfillment of its full implementation of Additional Protocol on the grounds that Turkish Cypriots' isolations were not removed, was regarded by the EU as a breach of international obligations.

Likewise, Accession Partnership(s), as another instrument regulating Turkish-EU relations, adopted an almost similar wording as Regular Reports. For example, Accession Partnership documents of 2001 and 2003 handled the Cyprus problem as a short-term priority (one to two years) within the framework of enhanced political dialogue and political criteria. Just as in Regular Reports from 2006 onwards, the EU's legalization of its Cyprus approach was reflected in Accession Partnerships of 2006 and 2008, respectively, where it was treated as a short term priority under the heading of 'regional issues and international obligations', though with a slight difference in the latter, which treated the issue also as part of Political dialogue.

If one goes beyond the orthodox and stereotyped understanding of conditionality involving mere power asymmetry between the parties, then complexity entailed in the application of conditionality would be unveiled. Because the nature and effectiveness of conditionality may be affected by a more complicated interactive pattern involving multi-level actors (governments, local authorities, Commission, Parliament, Council, civil society etc.), perceptions (sincerity of the EU *vis-à-vis* candidate in question), interests (whether policy change encompasses high stakes in terms of national security or domestic political cost), rewards and sanctions (suspension of talks), and temporal factors (uncertainty in terms of timing of ultimate reward, i.e. membership). Indeed such a broader understanding of EU conditionality is in tandem with the conceptual framework of this dissertation, which underpins the idea that Europeanization process involves an inherent variance of (policy) impact and outcomes because European impact on national policy varies not only with the level of European

adaptational pressure but also with the extent to which domestic factors facilitates or hinders adjustments and change in policy.

Overall, in the post-Helsinki period, adaptational pressures -in the form of conditionality and linkage policy- led to misfit between Turkish and EU positions. To reiterate, under the Negotiating Framework Document and the Accession Partnership, Turkey was expected to ensure continued support for efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded, contribute to a better climate for a comprehensive settlement; implement fully the Protocol adapting the Ankara Agreement to the accession of the 10 new EU Member States including Cyprus; and take concrete steps for the normalization of bilateral relations with all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, as soon as possible.

In an effort to explain how the EU has affected Turkey's policy change in Cyprus, from postulating a solution to be based on confederation and existence of two separate states from 1998 onwards, to endorsement of the Annan Plan as a basis for comprehensive settlement along the lines of federalism after AKP's coming to power in 2002, the conceptual framework of Europeanization tells that whether misfit leads to change depends on mediating factors. In the post-Helsinki period, domestic political scene in Turkey has witnessed realignment of political actors as a result of redistribution of resources provided by EU's accession perspective. While looking at Europeanization as a non-linear and context-dependent process in Turkish-EU relations and examining endogenous sources of change, the next chapter seeks to address the complex interactive pattern between

the EU and domestic levels, which in fact lies at the heart of more recent Europeanization studies.

## CHAPTER V

### TURKEY'S CYPRUS POLICY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS

#### 5.1 Mechanisms of Rule Adoption: Mediating Factors in Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy

With a view to understanding how Europeanization has or has not taken place in Turkish context, this section seeks to explain the mechanisms of rule adoption or how mediating factors acted concerning change in Turkey's Cyprus policy. It is based on the widely-held conviction in the literature that a misfit *per se* is not sufficient for leading to domestic change. Therefore, mediating factors through mechanisms of Europeanization should also be underlined.

This dissertation departs from the axiomatic point that the EU asks from candidates to meet the Copenhagen Criteria as well as to complete a transfer of the *acquis communautaire* including 'acquis politique' of the CFSP, even before membership takes place. Particularly from 1999 onwards, drastic political restructuring in Turkey through various legal and constitutional changes adopted by Parliament (when negotiations had not yet began) has been indicative of the potentially transformative impact of the EU on candidate states like Turkey. Even

in the foreign policy area, the win-win approach adopted by Turkey towards the Cyprus problem at a given period, as well as the rapprochement with Greece would have been almost unthinkable without a credible conditionality and membership perspective for Turkey, which was concretized by European decisions to grant first a candidacy status and then open accession talks. Therefore, it is difficult to analyze the pro-reform changes of an earlier period independent of the EU pressure and prospect for membership given to Turkey.

There is wide agreement in the Europeanization literature that a precondition for any adaptation process to take place is the existence of a “misfit” (Börzel, 1999), incompatibility or “mismatch” (Héritier, 1996: 149-76) between EU requirements and the domestic situation. Put simply, a misfit creates adaptational pressures which in turn induce domestic change. It is also accepted that a “misfit is necessary but not a sufficient condition for domestic change”: “Whether misfits produce a substantial effect at the domestic level depends on the presence of various factors facilitating adaptation and serving as catalysts for domestic change”, as well as an absence of veto players hindering change (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 63). Alongside the existence of a misfit as a necessary condition, the possibility for any domestic (policy) change to occur hinges on the capacity of actors to exploit new opportunities and avoid constraints which in turn are affected by two ‘mediating factors’: *multiple veto points* and *formal facilitating institutions* (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58). The existence of the former in a state’s domestic political and institutional structure can empower different actors with divergent interests who resist pressures coming from the EU to avoid constraints and to exert influence, thereby hindering national adaptation and change. The latter provides actors with material and ideational resources to benefit from new

opportunities, thus inducing national adaptation and change. Consequently, whether or not misfit leads to a redistribution of resources among domestic actors and their differential empowerment, as well as domestic change, is determined by “a low number of veto points and the existence of facilitating formal institutions” (Börzel, 2003: 9).

By the same token, the EU accession process generates misfit in acceding countries and may bring about new resources such as money, expertise, ideas and legitimacy which empower some domestic actors *vis-à-vis* others to overcome opposition and manage the transition process (Grabbe, 2003). These factors are commonly named as mediating or intervening factors which may be facilitating or constraining domestic change. Mediating factors are important for this study as they enable one to account for variation across countries and between members and candidates.

As a corollary to what Börzel and Risse’s model offer, this dissertation also benefits from the ‘external incentives model’<sup>1</sup> developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 10-17). It is assumed to be a rationalist bargaining and actor-centred model which is based upon the logic of consequence borrowing from New Institutionalism. In this model, the EU sets the adoption of rules as conditions to non-members in return for rewards in the form of assistance and institutional ties, including membership. The analytical starting point here is the domestic status quo or ‘domestic equilibrium’, which refers to the existing distribution of bargaining power and preferences in society. Yet, EU

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, they formulate a three-fold model consisting of social-learning model and lesson-drawing model together with the external incentives model. However, for the purpose of this study, only the ‘external incentives model’ is explored here.

conditionality damages this balance by introducing rules to be complied. Conditionality takes place in two different ways: intergovernmental bargaining (direct and formal conditionality) and the differential empowerment of domestic actors (indirect conditionality). The former concerns the cost-benefit assessment of the target government calculating benefits of complying with EU rules *vis-à-vis* domestic costs for their adoption. Whether or not rule adoption is achieved as a result of effective conditionality not depends only on governmental preferences but also on the existence of veto players which refer to group of domestic actors for whom the conditionality and domestic adoption costs are disadvantageous for their relative power position. It also refers to “actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo” (Tsebelis, 2002).

In the case of differential empowerment of actors, conditionality works indirectly by solving some policy problems in favour of certain domestic actors, generally by increasing their influence in the political system. On the other hand, the adoption of EU rules may produce “welfare or power costs” or losses for some actors who would like to obstruct the process. In other words, conditionality changes domestic opportunity structures via producing benefits for some actors and costs for others. It seems that the two factors of conditionality, namely, cost-benefit assessment of the government and differential empowerment of actors are already intertwined in the sense that the lower the number of veto players, the higher will be the influence of government in complying with EU conditionality. In the final analysis, since rule adoption has to be performed and implemented by the government itself, rule adoption in the face of effective conditionality hinges upon the cost-benefit analysis of the government who tries to balance domestic, EU and international pressures to



maximize its own benefit. According to the model, the balancing act of government in turn depends upon four factors: the determinacy of conditions; the size and speed of rewards; the credibility of threats and promises (conditionality); and lastly, veto players and the size of adoption costs (for details see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 661-679; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 12-17). Contrary to arguments neglecting the impact of the EU on national policies, the merit of the external incentives model springs from the primacy it gives to domestic actors' capability –in the form of domestic opportunity structures and veto players- which is likely to modify or limit European signals thereby setting the pace and degree of Europeanization.

By drawing upon the “external incentives model”, this study attempts to underline to what extent the ‘EU anchor’ impacts on Turkey’s Cyprus policy as a candidate and to what extent change (if any) in Turkey’s Cyprus policy is influenced by the quality and nature of Turkish-EU relations. All in all, the relevance of the external incentives model comes from the fact that it takes up the issue of ‘domestic change’ in the sense of actor’s strategic interests and preferences (cost-benefit analysis) as well as the redistribution of resources as - opportunities and constraints- across domestic actors by taking into account the existence of veto players. Also, it provides a comprehensive understanding of conditionality between EU and candidate states which affect the government’s calculation of adoption costs and its ultimate decision in favour of policy change in the end.

From Turkey’s declared candidacy at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 onwards, the European accession process has disturbed the domestic equilibrium or *status-quo ante* in Turkey’s political landscape by not only boosting the power

and influence in favour of some domestic actors over others, but also by leading to the emergence of a plurality of actors in Turkish foreign policy making. Adaptational pressures resulting from a misfit took the form of EU conditionality and led to the redistribution of resources between domestic actors through the simultaneous flourishing of two opposing coalitions and their power struggles in Turkey. Precisely, *veto players* include the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF); the main opposition party, Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi-CHP*) at least the period until 2011, as well as another opposition party Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP*). *Facilitating institutions* acting as rather pro-European catalyzers include the government of Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP*) until 2011 as well as increasing participation of the NGOs, particularly the most eminent and effective one in terms of lobbying activities on the Ankara-Brussels axis, the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (*Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği- TÜSİAD*). We will analyze how the redistribution of domestic power among those actors as a result of Turkey's EU candidacy has affected Turkey's Cyprus policy during the period 1999-2014. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy to underline that the ability of 'veto-players' and 'facilitating players' to dominate each other is determined by the change of actor opportunities and constraints as well as the redistribution of resources generated by their interaction with the EU.


Accordingly, the conceptual part of this dissertation is structured around a set of mediating factors, namely domestic structures, in an attempt to conceptualize the mechanisms with which the EU induces rule adoption and to explain processes of change in Turkey's Cyprus policy by focusing on the period

between 1999 and 2014. In fact, it embraces the two main pillars upon which Turkey's adaptation process is based, namely, the '*differential empowerment of actors*' on the one hand and the '*cost-benefit calculation by AKP government in changing Cyprus policy*' on the other.

While the first pillar encompasses the domestic realignment of actors, in the sense of veto players and facilitating player/institutions as underlined above, the second pillar concerns a '*cost-benefit calculation by AKP government in changing Turkey's Cyprus policy*'<sup>2</sup> referring to the set of factors seemingly affecting the AKP's formulation of its Cyprus policy. Against this background, we suggest that in deciding a partial change in Turkey's conventional policy stance on Cyprus during 2002-2004, the AKP's cost-benefit analysis as a government in power is affected by four related sets of factors: first, the support pledged by Turkish society to accession process to the EU (due mostly to expected economic gains and an increase in general life standards); second, EU membership as a long-standing state policy in Turkey for over fifty years; third, EU-related factors such as the presence and/or absence of credible EU membership perspective and asymmetrical relationship with the EU during pre-accession period bolstered by both conditionality and the EU's linkage policy; fourth, the effects and influence of veto players.

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<sup>2</sup> Detailed explanation with regard to cost-benefit calculation by the government will be provided at the end of this Chapter.



**1. Differential empowerment of actors**

- **Veto Players**

- Turkish military
- CHP
- MHP

- **Facilitating Players/Instruments**

- AKP government
- TŪSİAD

**2. Cost-benefit calculation by AKP**

- support pledged by Turkish society to accession process to the EU
- EU membership as a long-standing state policy in Turkey for almost fifty years
- presence and/or absence of credible EU membership perspective
- asymmetrical relationship with the EU during pre-accession period bolstered by both conditionality and linkage policy of the EU
- the effects of veto players

**Figure 3: Conceptualization of mechanisms of rule adoption and process of change in Turkey's Cyprus policy with dual mediating factors.**

The merit of the explanation involving dual mediating factors above emanates from the fact that it pays due regard to the domestic political context in terms of actors and particularly their capabilities in responding to EU adaptational pressures. Because it is based on the realization that in order for the Europeanization process to take place, particular conditions at the national level (meaning domestic opportunity structures) should be regarded as important as particular EU input in manipulating patterns of persistence and/or adaptation. Put

differently, while the EU's requirements (conditionality, transposition and implementation of the *acquis* etc.) from national level to produce policy change would be more or less identical across member states, the impact of it at domestic level would be differential across those countries owing in part to their various institutional and legal structures, state-society relations, market traditions, and governmental preferences, all of which would affect the potential for policy change, or inertia.

### **5.1.1 Redistribution of Resources and Realignment of Domestic Actors**

#### **5.1.1.1 Background of Cleavages**

As far as Turkey is concerned, the accession process had initially created an unprecedented momentum in reforming constitutional, legal, political, policy and administrative aspects of Turkish politics. As a result, the domestic scene seems no longer a monolithic unit in Turkey. Indeed, there seems almost a consensus about the idea that Turkey's accession process to the EU has potentially unleashed an environment for democratization and liberalization of the political regime in which new actors have risen who aspired to challenge existing approaches (such as national sovereignty, multiculturalism, linguistic rights, national security) regarded as 'untouchable or unquestionable' by some in Turkey until recently (for details see Bilgin, 2005; for a similar argument see Öniş, 2002; Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006).

All in all, the accession process has changed the contours of domestic power struggles in Turkey by relocating domestic actors, some acting as veto players and others acting as formal facilitators. More precisely, as opposed to and alongside secular, nationalist and pro-status quo outlook of the traditional actors of foreign policy of Turkey, most notably, the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK*), the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Armed Forces, one can observe growing ‘domestic actor constellations’ (Knill, 2001) and their effective input into foreign policy formulation particularly since 1999, for example NGO’s (i.e. associations of business community, among others) or executive branch (i.e. government in power) who appear to be in favour of policy change in compliance with EU criteria.

It is of vital importance to note that the major demarcation line across veto players versus formal facilitators is that while the former favoured the EU membership ‘in principle’ or as an ‘abstract idea’, the latter not only adopted EU membership as an abstract idea but was strongly committed to undertake all necessary reforms to achieve the reality of membership. The paradox entailing a struggle between the two is that for the founders of Turkish Republic (mostly military and civil bureaucracy), Westernization and modernization had been used interchangeably and Europeanization has been a natural corollary to this ambitious Project. Thus for the Republican elites –as vanguards of Atatürk’s Westernization project- developing close relations with Europe and full membership of the then European Community had been the ultimate goal. The military-led secular establishment in Turkey has long seen Western orientation of Turkey, its inclusion of Western security systems and in this regard the EU membership as a guarantee for secularism in Turkey (Robins, 2003: 553). However, the same

actors also were sceptical vis-à-vis the EU process to the extent that pluralism, a human rights discourse and individual freedoms would endanger unitary and secular characteristics of state.

To recap, veto players are not completely against the idea of membership; in fact, some of them have overtime substantially modified their stance, as in the case of CHP post-2011. However, they are distrustful particularly for the political conditions of full membership. They are skeptical of the ‘road’ towards the EU, rather than the ultimate end of ‘EU membership’. More recently, they have also disagreed with what they consider the ‘unfair’ terms of the negotiations, including open-endedness, long-term membership prospects, and the ambiguous mix of the conditions and incentives set by the EU. Therefore, they would like to see the terms changed to reflect their thinking, especially pertaining to the political criteria regarding the ‘security risks’ involved. Also, as part of their prevalent state-centric and security-oriented state of mind, they are reluctant to delegate national sovereignty to a supranational authority like the EU or to local authorities in the event of membership because both cases would undermine Turkey’s centralized political and administrative structure.

In a similar vein, the Islamist-conservative actors who used to consider the EU a “Zionist conspiracy” and detrimental to Turkish society’s values moved to abandon their rejectionist stance and emerged, at least up to a certain point in time, as the vanguard of a Euroenthusiastic coalition championing democracy, pluralism and capitalism. This they thought at the time, legitimized and empowered them against the secular/nationalist Republican elites.

To put simply, the centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin, 1973) today transformed into a broader dichotomy between Eurosceptics -led by the military, parts of the CHP, and MHP- as well as Euroenthusiasts -comprising the AKP government, at least until recently, and much of the civil society represented by TÜSİAD. Put differently, while the veto players are sceptical of the ‘road’ towards the EU, rather than the ultimate end of ‘EU membership’, facilitating players (especially NGOs) are in favour of the ‘process’ itself, since that process would put Turkey on an irreversible track of democracy and economic neoliberalism.

It should be noted that even though the dichotomization of center-periphery or Euroenthusiastic versus Eurosceptic may be of some analytical value, at least on the surface, it ought to be used vigilantly. Being the vanguard of Westernization and at the same time the watchdog of secularism and national sovereignty in Turkey, it would be misleading to suggest that the security establishment has totally a negative view of the EU membership since this would mean an anti-Western stance which contradicts with founding principles of the Republic (Öniş, 2007). Notwithstanding the dilemma faced by the military, it may be safely asserted that the Turkish military is not so comfortable with many of the EU demanded reforms and would like to retain a strong position due mainly to their guardianship role and security risks involved in the accession process. A similar line of thought would also be valid for the CHP who designated itself as statist-nationalist and Republican party, but at the same time accept that membership of the EU has been a state policy and corollary of Turkey’s longstanding Westernization project. Its changed stance since 2011 vis-



à-vis the EU testifies to the fact, not least in the context of an increasingly polarized political atmosphere in Turkey.

Against this background, three elements played a part in placing the Cyprus imbroglio at the center of the political domain and public debate, which had been traditionally reserved for nationalist-statist and *pro-status quo* military and civil establishment (meaning Foreign Ministry): the landslide election victory of the AKP in November 2002; the EU's linkage policy of offering accession talks and resolution of Cyprus problem by Turkey; and the emergence of the Annan Plan (see also Verney and Ulusoy, 2009; Kaliber, 2005).

#### **5.1.1.2 Veto Players**

##### **5.1.1.2.1 Turkish Military**

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have historically been decisive in Turkey's relations with Europe. It was the military who led the identity-building process that created a Turkish national identity from the multi-ethnic subjects of the former Ottoman Empire. Following the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the military's political legacy was defined as the guardianship of Kemalist principles, which include republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism and reformism-revolutionism. These principles form the core of new Westernization project, which was driven by the military and further augmented its power (Tank, 2001: 218-219). Insofar as Europe was identified with 'civilization', this desire for progress and modernization effectively translated

itself into the attraction of Europe. As Europe began reorganizing itself into a Common Market, the Turkish civil and military establishment translated their goal of Europeanization into the policy of integrating Turkey into this new European structure (Aydınlı and Waxman, 2001: 382).

In this process the military emerged as the fundamental driving force behind the Westernization project in modern Turkish Republic. This role stems largely from the fact that the military considers itself as the guardian of the state, founded and maintained in accordance with Atatürk's Republican and secularist principles. Accordingly, the task of the armed forces is to protect the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as its secular character not only against external foes but also against internal enemies.<sup>3</sup> Although the end of the Cold War made Soviet military threat redundant, Turkey was increasingly exposed to a more complex security environment with both external and domestic security dimensions (Özcan, 2001: 13). Accordingly, during the 1990s the TAF identified two fundamental internal foes: one is the 'reactionary Islamist movements' that threaten the 'secular character of the state'; the other is the Kurdish separatist movement represented by the PKK (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 213; Cizre, 2008: 132). Particularly the clout and position of the Turkish military rose sharply in the aftermath of its (indirect) intervention in civilian politics on 28 February 28 1997 (Cizre, 2003: 215).<sup>4</sup> Since then, its expanded influence over the political

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<sup>3</sup> For the military's role in politics and civil-military relations in Turkey see Hale (1994); Özbudun, (1999); Cizre (1997; 2000; 2003; 2004; 2008); Aydınli et. al (2006); Terzi (2010); Özcan (2001); Demirel (2003); Rouleau (2000); Tank (2001); Salt (1999); Kösebalan (2002); Özel (2003); Robins (2003); Heper (2005a; 2005b); Duman and Tsarouhas (2006).

<sup>4</sup> From 1960 to present day, the Turkish military has taken the power into its own hands three times: 1960-61, 1971-73 and 1980-83. In 1997, it obliged the government to step down. During the so-called February 28 process of 1997, the military-dominated National Security Council pressured the democratically elected Islamist government led by Necmettin Erbakan to resign. Lastly, during the controversial first round of presidential elections, the so-called Internet Memorandum was put on the general staff's website on 27 April 2007 as a midnight statement, which made an explicit warning to

developments; its autonomy from civilian counterparts as well as its tightened grip on monitoring the National Security Council decisions became evident through the redefinition and broadening of the “national security concept” so as to include “Islamist reactionism” and “Kurdish separatism” as significant internal threats which gained primacy over external ones (Cizre, 2004: 108). In other words, internal but serious political discord has been reinterpreted and problematized in the language of internal security threat (Cizre, 2004: 108). Thus, redefined and intensified nature of the military’s guardianship mission tilted the balance of civil-military relations in Turkey further into the latter (Cizre, 2008: 132).

As a matter of fact, the army is able to legitimize its guardianship both through its unique position in society as its most trusted institution and because there is a formal legal foundation for intervention (Tank, 2001).<sup>5</sup> Cizre (1997) points out that the prerogatives and autonomy of the military elites in defining strategic dimension of foreign policy making in Turkey have been entertained through a number of channels.<sup>6</sup> For example, the legal basis for the role of guardianship relies upon Article 35 of the Internal Services Act (1961) which states that “the duty of the armed forces is to safeguard and defend Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the constitution”. Likewise, Article 85

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the AKP government: “[T]he TAF maintains its firm determination to carry out its legally specified duties” to protect the secular republic and that “...the TAF is a side in this debate and a staunch defender of secularism” (Cizre, 2008: 13). Thus the military had implicitly involved in choosing a candidate for president by signaling that the military might act against the government if Abdullah Gül (the then Foreign Minister and the AKP’s presidential candidate) was insisted as the presidential candidate (Cizre, 2008: 13).

<sup>5</sup> For the comprehensive account of the reasons of the unique position of the Turkish army in society see Hale (1994, 327-329).

<sup>6</sup> Other than NSC, Cizre (1997, 157-162) further points out the areas through which the military exercises its political autonomy: the Presidency, organization of defense, military budgets, arms production, procurement, military modernization, internal security, intelligence gathering, and senior promotions.

asserts that “the Turkish armed forces shall defend the country against internal as well as external threats, if necessary by force”.<sup>7</sup>

The sole constitutional tool through which the military expresses its views is the National Security Council (NSC henceforth) which was established in 1961<sup>8</sup> as an advisory body to the government.<sup>9</sup> The reason for the establishment of this body stemmed from the inability of the military to make their views known to the politicians and their sense of alienation from the political process, factors which led to the 1960 military coup (Hale, 1994: 163). Membership of this Council was composed of the president of the Republic, prime minister, ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and interior affairs as well as the the chief of staff, the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and the gendarmerie. The power of this body has been expanded incrementally via constitutional amendment in 1973 as well as the 1982 constitution.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, the NSC has been granted the responsibility not merely to define the internal and external threats to the existence of the republic but also to preserve the official ideology of the state (Kemalism). Believing that it was the most effective and legitimate platform in which to shape security-related policies, overtime, the NSC has become a major institutional leverage through which the military influences and competes with civilian decision makers (Aydinli et al., 2006: 5; Özcan, 2001: 14). In addition, the NSC Secretariat which was chaired by a top military brass until October 2004 (to comply with the EU demands) had the mission to set the agenda of the NSC

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<sup>7</sup> Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act, Law No. 211, passed on 4 January 1961.

<sup>8</sup> In fact, it was established in 1933 but it gained a constitutional status in 1961.

<sup>9</sup> According to Article 118 of 1982 Constitution, NSC is authorized to prepare recommendations concerning the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the state and submit it to the Council of Ministers.

<sup>10</sup> While following the 1960 military intervention, the NSC was confined to “offer information to government”, in the wake of the 1971-73 intervention it “recommended measures”, and in the aftermath of the 1980-83 intervention, “the government had to give top priority” to those recommendations provided by the NSC (Heper, 2005a: 36).

meetings and coordinates “the government’s efforts to implement NSC decisions”. Meanwhile, it is uncommon for any government not to implement or publicly criticize decisions taken by the NSC.

Another instrument of the military elites through which they can insert their power and authority in foreign and security policy domain is the ‘National Security Policy Document’ (NSPD). The document enlists domestic and external threats to national security, sets out priorities and policy guidelines as well as provides a detailed framework of foreign and security policies (Özcan, 2001). Governments are expected to comply with the document which is prepared by the Cabinet but approved and finalized by the NSC without a parliamentary debate and stamped as ‘top secret’ (Özcan, 2001). The document is updated if necessary (generally every five years) and the military plays a key role in the revisions (Özcan, 2001: 20; Cizre, 2008: 139). The document which came out in October 2005 did not embrace a radical change from its predecessors, which cited religious reactionism, separatism and the extreme left as the key security threats while withdrawing the extreme right from its agenda (Cizre, 2008: 139). Conversely, the NSPD that came in October 2010 was reported to remove religious reactionism as an internal threat to security, which signifies a civilian input in terms of the AKP government’s particular efforts to prevent political Islamists from being identified as internal threat (*Hürriyet Daily*, 13 October 2014).

Especially following its 12 September 1980 coup, the military establishment started to possess more sophisticated institutional channels to oversee civilian bureaucracy and daily politics (Özcan, 2001: 15). It enjoyed a considerable degree of administrative, judiciary and financial autonomy (see Özcan, 2001: 15;

Rouleau, 2000). To give some examples, the Supreme Military Council, founded in 1972, acts as an advisory body and is confined ordinarily to regularly present to the government the National Military Strategic Concept, which identifies the military's ability to meet Turkey's security objectives (Aydinli et al., 2006: 3-4). Besides, at the Council's annual meetings, the military traditionally determines promotions, nominations, extension of offices, retirements, disciplinary penalties and dismissal of officers often without the input from civilian authorities and those rulings are beyond judicial review thus cannot be appealed (Özcan, 2001: 16).

Throughout the 1980s, it has been witnessed that the Turkish military's unusual prerogatives in civilian institutions have been expanded. For example, the rationale behind the establishment of the Council on Higher Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu-YÖK*) by the military and placing on it a supervisory military representative was to oversee universities, which were seen as centers of ideological cleavages and subsequent street violence that paved the way for 1980 coup d'état (Aydinli et al., 2006: 5). Also, the creation of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (*Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK*) and installing a military representative on it was served to a similar rationale: monitoring and retaining a foothold in media operations (Aydinli et al., 2006: 5).

Moreover, preparations of national defence budget, annual budget of the armed forces and other financial allocations mostly take place in line with the suggestions and preferences of the general staff and are subsequently approved by Parliament, without any civilian questioning or debate. Furthermore, despite the fact that Parliament has a legal right to audit the amount of money allocated to the military, traditionally it refrains from using this jurisdiction. What is more,

the placement of the chief of the staff in state protocol hints at the military's power. According to Article 117 of the constitution, he is responsible only to the Prime Minister. The chief of staff comes after the President, President of the Parliament and the Prime Minister but before the ministers (including Minister for Defence thus making the chief of staff equal to cabinet ministers) in protocol (Özcan, 2001: 16).

During the 1990s, the military developed a practice of direct appeal to public opinion on foreign policy matters (Özcan, 2001: 21). Among sources of direct influence of the military establishment over foreign affairs encompass briefings given by the military to high-ranking bureaucrats, prominent political figures, academics and the media as well as politically assertive public statements and speeches delivered to the press over issues such as Cyprus, relations with Greece, Northern Iraq and Israel (Kaliber, 2005: 332; Özcan, 2001: 21).

Generally, foreign-policy making and particularly the Cyprus problem have long been claimed by the military establishment (together with the Foreign Ministry) as their *domaine réservé* requiring speciality, competence and technical knowledge. Therefore, it should be insulated from inputs of both daily party politics and civil society (Kaliber, 2005). To put it more concretely, since the foundation of the Republic, foreign policy making has been thought of as a bureaucratic priority. Thus, the cleavage between state elites versus politicians representing the 'national will' was not so much observable, nor was the questioning of hegemonic role and impact of the military on foreign-policy issues (Kaliber, 2005). Especially once a policy was termed as 'state policy' or 'national cause' by the security and civilian establishment, governments were supposed to conform (Kaliber, 2005). To exemplify, relative sidelining of governments as

extension of popular will *vis-à-vis* predetermined ‘state policies’, including Cyprus has been succinctly put by then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Haluk Bayülken that “[G]overnments have changed, and may change but policy of Turkey on Cyprus does not change” (quoted in Kaliber, 2005: 329).

In the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU, civil-military relations in Turkey appeared as one of the most controversial areas subjecting to the EU’s criticisms and demands for reforms. Accordingly, the fulfillment of Copenhagen political criteria required the diminishing of the military’ role and influence in politics and greater civilian oversight of the military, which specifically denoted civilian participation in the formulation of security policies and parliamentary scrutiny over military expenditures (Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006). The EU demands particularly centered on the shifting of the balance of power in the NSC in favor of civilian members; full exercise of supervisory functions of civilian authorities over the formulation and implementation of national security strategy; giving civilian authorities supervisory power over the defense budget, promotions, and dismissals in the military; removing military representatives from non-military bodies; subjecting military judicial institutions to civilian oversight; revising Articles 35 and 85/1 of the TAF Internal Service Act which define the duties of the Armed Forces as the protection of territorial integrity and secularism of the republic; and changing the Law on NSC Secretariat which defines national security in broader terms (see Cizre, 2008; Aydinli *et al.*, 2006).

Since 2001, numerous packages of political reforms have been enacted to align Turkey’s law and norms with the EU.<sup>11</sup> In 2001, the number of civilian

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<sup>11</sup> See Political Reforms-I, No:4, pages, 16-20, Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs (available at [www.ab.gov.tr](http://www.ab.gov.tr)), accessed on 10 October 2014.



members of the NSC was increased from five to nine by incorporating the minister of justice and deputies of prime minister as members (thereby increasing civilian members to a majority position), the wording of Article 118 of the constitution was changed stressing the NSC's role in making recommendations and conveying its views, where now government was only required to 'evaluate' the recommendations rather than give 'priority consideration'. Also, the democratization package introduced on 30 July 2003 deserves special attention in terms of curbing the power and influence of the military in politics. Accordingly, the military courts' competence to try civilians for offences related to criticizing the military have been curtailed, it reduced the NSC Secretary General's role by abolishing the provision that ministries, public institutions, organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, classified or non-classified information and documents demanded by the Secretariat, reduced the frequency of NSC meetings from monthly to bimonthly, allowed greater control of the Court of Auditors over and parliamentary scrutiny of the military budget, revised the appointment procedure of the NSC Secretary General making it subject to the approval of the President on the proposal of the prime minister, thereby paving the way for an appointment of a civilian as the NSC Secretary General. On 8 January 2004, the NSC's department of 'Relations with Society', which was frequently criticized due to its mandate to carry out psychological operations, was abolished (Cizre, 2008: 138). Besides, through a package of constitutional amendments passed on 21 May 2004, the State Security Courts have been abolished and turned into Penalty Courts (Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006). The military representatives were removed from the Council on Higher Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu - YÖK*) and the Supreme Board of Radio and

Television (*Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu* - RTÜK). In order to eradicate the legal basis of the military's involvement in politics, the *EMASYA* Protocol (Turkish acronym of the Protocol of Security, Order and Assistance), which enables the military to use force in cities, was abolished on February 2010. A new law passed on April 2010 made civilian judicial review possible for the Supreme Military Council's decisions for dismissals from the army (cnnturk.com, 24 April 2010). Likewise, in 2012, the relevant articles of the TAF Internal Service Act (2 and 35 and) which define, among others, duties of the Armed Forces as the protection of the Turkish Republic were revised, while the old stipulations of articles 85 and 86/a of the TAF Internal Service Statute which render the military responsible for defending both the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic against 'internal threats, if necessary by force', were eliminated.

Before proceeding with the attitude of Turkish military establishment *vis-à-vis* Cyprus dispute and policy change occurred in 2002-2004, its general outlook towards relations with the EU is worth mentioning. Despite being the vanguard of Westernization and holding a longstanding aim of membership in European institutions (including the EU), the Turkish army is believed by many to be involved in the country's anti-EU coalition and a leading veto player on the path toward the EU, largely because of its guardianship role and focus on securing a secular and unitary state. Accordingly, the primary concern of the TAF arises from the fact that complying with the Copenhagen political criteria would induce a process of political liberalization in which Kurds and political Islamists freely express themselves. Therefore, it was considered to be detrimental to the secular and unitary characteristics of Turkish state. Ironically, the TAF endorsed EU membership because the only true alternative to it was to confront those

challenges alone which might lead to reversal of social, economic and political progress of the country achieved so far (Aydinli *et al*, 2006: 6). As implied before, the military is the sole guardian of secular democratic Turkish Republic, based on the idea of Atatürkist nationalism, which means that the Turkish Republic is an indivisible entity with its territory, nation, language, and culture. To illustrate, then Chief of Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt argued that “entry into the EU is a geopolitical and geostrategic necessity to realize the objective of modernisation as set out by Atatürk. No one should doubt that”, however, he also added that “Turkey should preserve its unitary and secular structure during its efforts to become an EU member, and it is Turkey’s natural right to take appropriate measures to that effect” (*Turkish Daily News*, electronic edition, 10 October 2000).

Especially during the post-Helsinki reform process, in spite of reservations about the EU-demanded reforms in civil-military relations as well as individual rights, the army hesitated to act as a vocal opposition; rather, it preferred to share those reservations with the government in the NSC and then go along with the government’s policy (Heper, 2005a: 38). For example then Deputy Chief of Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt postulated that

During the deliberations on ...[last] reform package, we conveyed our views to the government. Some were accepted, others were not. Now that Parliament enacted them into law, it is our duty to comply with them. We only hope that our concerns and worries prove to be groundless” (*Milliyet*, 11 August 2003 cited in Heper, 2005a: 38).

At the same time, especially the top brass rejected accusations of being stumbling blocks on Turkey’s bid for EU membership. For example, then Commander of Land Forces General Aytaç Yalman insisted that “Turkish Armed

Forces had played a pioneering role in the integration of Turkey to the West, and therefore nobody should think that the TAF could be against the EU and democracy” (*Milliyet*, 29 September 2003 quoted from Heper, 2005a: 39). In a similar vein, then Chief of Staff General Özkök articulated that “...TAF had played a pioneering role in the modernization of Turkey. Thus the TAF always favours Turkey’s becoming an EU member” (*Milliyet*, 10 January 2003). For them, membership to the EU is seen as the ultimate solidification of Turkey’s modernization project, as General Büyükanıt defined the stance of the Turkish military as “an unyielding defender of ... a secular and democratic state” and is “[in] full concert of the EU world view” (*Sabah*, 30 May 2003 quoted in Heper, 2005a: 41).

Notwithstanding the military viewpoint concerning the security risks of pre-accession process of EU membership, Turkey’s march towards complying with the EU conditionality, the pace of which accelerated since AKP government came to power and up until recently, was based upon a ‘grand consensus’ within the higher echelons of the security and political elite embodied by the NSC. It should be reminded that the candidacy status in 1999 was attained during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government led by veteran Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. Moreover, broad consensus with regard to Turkey’s bid for the EU membership continued and in fact contributed to the Erdoğan-led EU campaign after he assumed power in 2002. Even prior to the November 2002 elections, the NSC on 30 May 2002 had adopted critical recommendations so as to lay the ground for a favourable decision to be taken at Copenhagen European Council on December 2002. Those recommendations concerned the abolition of death penalty on the one hand and the termination of the state of emergency in South-

East Turkey, on the other. Since then several EU harmonization packages ranging from legal, constitutional, political and administrative aspects of the state with practical implications for the lives of Turkish citizens have been passed by the Turkish Parliament. This unprecedented reform pace and horizon in Turkey was reciprocated by the EU's decision of starting accession talks on 3 October 2005.

Coming to the military elites' attitude *vis-à-vis* Cyprus dispute, it should be noted that Cyprus has always been of paramount importance in Turkey's defence and security policy. Geopolitical centrality and the strategic element in the formulation of Cyprus policy has been clear in both official documents and speeches of decision-makers alike ever since emergence of the Cyprus problem from the mid-1950s onwards (Kazan, 2002: 58). Apart from historical reasons and a normative element in terms of solidarity with Turkish Cypriots, the strategic element that was embedded in the understanding of Cyprus as a security concern for Turkey has two aspects: first, as a source of threat and fear of containment and second, as an integral part of Turkish security and defence (for a similar point see Kaliber, 2005). How the Turkish elites portray the nature of the Cyprus question is vividly exemplified in a statement by Turan Güneş, then Foreign Minister at the time of 1974 military intervention:

Cyprus is a precious arm of a country which cares for her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbours any...the actual problem is the security of 45 million Turks in the motherland together with the Turks in the island and the maintenance of the balance of the Middle East" (*Hürriyet*, 1980 cited in Kaliber, 2005: 326-327).

Likewise, the coalition government forged by Mesut Yılmaz and Bülent Ecevit (June 1997-January 1999) posited in its government programme that we are "aware of the fact that Cyprus is important not only for the Turkish Republic

of North Cyprus, but also for the security of Turkey, and that importance is increasing” (quoted in Kazan, 2002: 61). In a similar vein, Ecevit expressed that “We now believe that not only is Turkey guarantor of the security of the TRNC, but at the same time we consider the existence of the TRNC to be a necessity for the security of Turkey” (quoted in Kazan, 2002: 61).

The fear of entrapment also shapes policy formulations of Turkey considering its geographical affinity to the heartland of Anatolia, being only 40 nautical miles away from Anatolian coasts. For example, the then Turkish Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök revealed that

Turkey has already some problems on its Western front, therefore, Cyprus problem could not be solved through neglecting security sensitivities, otherwise, Turkey would inevitably be trapped within Anatolia. [I]n case hostile elements position their air forces in Northern Cyprus, Turkey would be threatened (Interview with Özkök, *Radikal*, 9 November 2003).

General Özkök also points out that in case of a political formation in Northern Cyprus over which Turkey does not have any influence and does regard it as hostile, several disputes pertaining to territorial waters, continental shelves and subsequently economic zones and fishing areas would arise. Thus, “Cyprus would turn out to be a place from where we could not move towards Turkey, so we would be encircled and trapped within Anatolia” (Özkök, 2003). Hence, for the Turkish army, the best way to guarantee Turkey’s strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean is to attain a comprehensive settlement that would guarantee bi-communality and Turkey’s active and effective guarantee with military presence there. This line of thought was also emphasized at the official level by the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1998 “Cyprus is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey that Ankara would not

withdraw its troops even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on the island” (quoted in Süvarierol, 2003).

For the Turkish military, Turkey’s military interventions in 1974 in Cyprus – stemming from a Guarantee Treaty- was a source of paramount prestige which enabled Turkey to have a firm military presence with a garrison of 40.000 troops in the Northern part of the island (Robins, 2003; 2007). The Turkish military intervention and subsequent presence there is regarded by the army as an ultimate guarantee for peace and stability on the island. As noted above, the mainstream Turkish policy discourse -together with geopolitical/security considerations- had defined the Cyprus problem in the framework of vulnerability of Turkish Cypriots in case of an attack by Greek Cypriots. According to this argument, the problem has been solved via the 1974 military intervention which brought relative security, stability and peace to the island. The Turkish official stance further relied on the conviction that in the aftermath of 1974 military intervention, a totally new situation was created on the island. Thus, any solution should take into account new ‘realities’ (read as Turkish state in Northern part claiming to be sovereign and independent as well as the presence of Turkish military as a ‘guarantee’ for peace), that is to say, a new status quo. Moreover, for the military, the need for a presence on the northern part of the island has been accompanied by a strategic dimension especially since the mid-1990s, with the looming prospect of Cyprus becoming an EU member before Turkey; what is worse, this could occur in the absence of settlement thereby allowing Greek Cyprus to claim to be representing the ‘whole island’. Thus it is believed that Greek Cypriots’ accession to the EU has shaken the *status-quo ante* both between the two communities as well as between Turkey and Greece.

Strategic calculations of decision-makers in Turkey were affected by Turkey's perception of Greece attempting to encircle Turkey. Further, the linkage policy of the EU which ties Turkey's quest for EU membership with Cyprus' accession and expectation from Turkey to solve the Cyprus problem and settle its disputes with Greece was of great concern; finally, Greek Cypriots' looming prospect of EU membership without a condition of settlement of the problem; and its pressure on Turkey to accept the Annan Plan and relegating it as a part of political criteria for Turkey's membership were important. All these factors have raised doubts in the military bureaucracy, thereby contributing to its sense of distrust towards actual intention and sincerity of the EU and to Turkey's dominant rhetoric of entrapment as well.

It has been underlined on several occasions by the military officials that the Turkish Armed Forces is not against the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Given their emphasis on the island's geographical proximity and the strategic importance of defending Turkey's southern borders on the one hand, and the freedoms and lives of Turkish Cypriots on the other, the military elites are wary of the EU's stance on the grounds that the latter has failed to stand at an equal distance from the parties to the dispute, not least after Cypriot accession in 2004. The importance of the EU's sincerity in giving Turkey a credible membership perspective can be observed in what is an interesting remark by General Özkök: "when the accession of Turkey to the EU takes place, problems of Cyprus and Aegean Sea could be solved within a week" (Özkök, *Radikal*, 9 November 2003; for a similar argument see Erdoğan's speech at Oxford University, 28 May 2004). Furthermore, it is believed that an enforced peace (by the EU) could not be permanent and viable. On many occasions it was reiterated by high-ranking



commanders that Turkey is strongly determined to preserve its rights and obligations stemming from international agreements and to fulfill its obligations *vis-à-vis* Turkish Cypriots.<sup>12</sup>

Concomitantly, during the negotiations of the Annan Plan between 2002 and 2003, the military elite backed Denктаş' leadership in contrast to the dissociation of the AKP government from his negotiating position. One of the major faultlines between the military and the government concerned the former's opposition to Erdoğan's view that the Annan Plan could be accepted as it was. As opposed to the position of the AKP government, the military communicated its reservations on the Plan to the government through the NSC.<sup>13</sup> For instance, the territorial readjustments required by the Plan involved returning strategically important areas of Karpaz and Güzelyurt including Geçitkale Airport to Greek Cypriots. For the military, if those territories are restituted, Turkey's security in Eastern Mediterranean would be at stake and the pre-1974 borders revived. According to the Plan, the fact that numbers of Turkish troops could not exceed 9.999, could put the security of Turkish Cypriots into jeopardy. Besides, while the Plan obliges 80.000 Turkish Cypriots to leave their hometowns by making them immigrants, it allows at least 60.000 Greek Cypriots to go back their homes in Northern part in 20 years of time, and this would lead to social unrest in the medium to longer term, thereby giving harm to the social and economic structure of the island.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, upon a technical overview of the Plan by the military, it was pointed out that the guarantorship rights of Turkey would be diluted

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<sup>12</sup> For the speech of the then Chief of Air Forces General İbrahim Fırtına in the 20th Anniversary of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, see Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, "*Kıbrıs Gerçekleri*" [Facts about Cyprus], *Radikal*, 20 November 2003.

<sup>13</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 2002; *Cumhuriyet*, 28 November 2002.

<sup>14</sup> As seen 'bizonality' is a vital element in security considerations of the military.

(especially due to substantial reductions in the Turkish military presence). Seen from this light, the ‘red lines’ of military establishment in a comprehensive settlement of Cyprus problem involves that first, guarantorship of Turkey (thus presence of Turkish troops on the island) should be preserved; and second, the two communities living on the island should be maintained as geographically based separate entities (see Özkök, 2003).

In line with the military’s reservations, in the NSC meeting on 29 November 2003, Denktaş’s negotiation position (which conformed with the military’s position) was buttressed. Once intercommunal negotiations collapsed in March 2003, the government began to realize that revisions to the Plan would be necessary (Akşit and Melakopides, 2008: 9). Hence, despite an initial veto, the military establishment reluctantly endorsed the Annan Plan as a reference for negotiations and paved the way for a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy at the subsequent NSC meeting on 23 January 2004. After the meeting a new policy line, which is in tandem with the pro-reform and pro-Annan stance of the AKP government, was declared as such:

Turkey continues to support the U.N. Secretary General’s mission of good offices and has renewed its political determination to rapidly reach a solution that takes the Annan Plan as a reference.

Subsequently, the ‘red lines’ of the military concerning undiluted bizonality, maintenance of Turkey’s guarantorship rights, and ensuring in a peace plan that derogations (i.e. freedom of movement and freedom of settlement, among others) become part of EU primary law, were articulated in the NSC’s meeting on 5 April 2004. Even though it was pointed out that some of the reservations of Turkey were not fulfilled in the Plan, it put emphasis on the Government’s

ultimate authority to decide on the final version of the Plan who was expected to pay utmost attention during the negotiations not to weaken both Turkish guarantorship rights and the principle of bizonality.

During the post-Helsinki reform process, rather than acting as a totally rejectionist veto player vocally opposing the idea of a settlement in Cyprus altogether, the military acknowledged the primacy of civilian authorities and political responsibility on Cyprus, and preferred to share its reservations about the Annan Plan with the government through the NSC. In spite of reservations of the military as the prominent element of veto players, the AKP government pledged its support to the Annan Plan and made efforts to have it adopted at the NSC. The military establishment's consent to that change was only materialized in view of its sensitivity over the prospect of long-term political stability and fulfillment of long-term foreign policy goals (Akşit and Melakopides, 2008).

The Turkish military's reticence *vis-à-vis* the curtailment of the NSC's role and functions in conformity with the EU political criteria is explained by Cizre through the "survival instinct at play in the calculations of the military" (Cizre, 2008: 141-142). Accordingly, the driving force behind the reconfiguration of civil-military equilibrium in Turkey was a favourable "interplay of domestic and external dynamics" in which the military's choices were confined to either confrontation with a government with a popular support and its widely-backed EU project, or the acceptance of curbing its own power (Cizre, 2008: 141). Paradoxically, the TAF's guardianship role of securing the Republic against what it defines as threats of 'Islamic activism' and 'Kurdish separatism' increasingly outweighed its vanguard role as Europeanizer in the last two decades, the latter being enthusiastically driven by the AKP government for up to recently (Cizre,

2008: 142). International political conjuncture was also feasible concerning the AKP's bid for reducing the overt political role of the military since it garnered support of the Western alliance with its reformist, EU-friendly, conservative and moderate Islamic credentials in a region where the fight against radical Islamic political forces gained prominence in the post-September 11 era (Cizre, 2008: 160).

Although EU-demanded legal and institutional reforms managed to strengthen civilian control of the military (European Commission's Progress Report of Turkey, 2004) and launched a trend of civilianizing security policy making, it could not lead to an all-out disengagement of the military from politics.<sup>15</sup> After 2005, the Turkish political landscape was increasingly characterized by criticisms directed against the AKP government as being reform-fatigue, its conservative-nationalist instincts coming to the fore, and the military moving back to its traditional role of guardian of the secular republic against reactionary and separatist activities (Cizre, 2008: 145). For example, the TAF have displayed a high profile political role on the eve of the presidential elections in May 2007 in trying to block the AKP government's candidate, Abdullah Gül, to become the president through a website memorandum of the General Staff in April 2007. Instead of yielding, the government called for early elections and won by a landslide.

The decisive moment in civilian-military relations came in 2008 with the trial of the alleged criminal network Ergenekon.<sup>16</sup> It lasted five years growing to

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<sup>15</sup> For example, the TAF started to compensate its loss of political influence by creating alternative instruments such as monthly held press briefings by the general staff headquarters and the usage of the Supreme Military Council as a platform to convey its views about internal threats (Cizre, 2008: 147).

<sup>16</sup> Accused of being part of a deep state in Turkey, Ergenekon is an alleged clandestine, ultranationalist and criminal network which consisted of members of the armed forces and civilians in

include 275 defendants. Charges included attempting to overthrow the government and to instigate armed riots and only 21 defendants were acquitted. In December 2010, the Sledgehammer (*Balyoz*- the name of an alleged Turkish military coup plan claimed to have been produced in 2003) trial began on charges of attempting to remove or prevent the functioning of the government through force and violence.<sup>17</sup> Yet, on June 19 2014, all the accused were released from prison, pending a retrial, after a finding by the Constitutional Court that their rights had been violated. The former chief of staff, General İlker Başbuğ, was arrested in January 2012 on charges of attempting to overthrow the government and of a membership of a terrorist organization, sentenced to life imprisonment, but later released by decision of the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile, the trial of the 1980 coup perpetrators was initiated in April 2012 which was followed by judicial investigations of the 28 February postmodern coup of 1997. In June 2014, the surviving leaders of the 1980 coup received life imprisonment. The Ergenekon and Balyoz trials implied a clear sign that for the first time in Turkey, a democratically elected government with a popular backing, had managed to abandon the military's predominance to make sure the military never thinks about intervening in civilian politics again.

Apart from the broad electorate mandate entertained by the AKP government, change may also be partly attributed to military's respect for constitutional order, increasing trust in the judgement of the people as well as the perception of the good performance of the government concerning key challenges that the country faced (Robins, 2007: 298; Heper, 2005b: 230). Notwithstanding sceptical

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the academia, media, opposition political parties, NGOs and bureaucracy. The Ergenekon trial is the first case in Turkey investigating a coup attempt.

<sup>17</sup> In the Sledgehammer trial, 323 retired and active duty military personel, including three former army commanders, were found guilty by a first instance court.

attitude; expression of their reservations through legal-institutional channels (mostly NSC); and incomplete internalization of EU-triggered reform process owing largely to security risks involved, the military has come to realize that if Turkey wishes to become an EU member, it has to comply strictly with the EU acquis. For a leading scholar, this cautious attitude stems from the “Turkish military’s conviction that at least in principle the last word belongs to civilians and its ability to learn from the past experience, and the relatively responsible and effective governments that Turkey has had since 1999” (Heper, 2005a; Heper, 2005b). Also, owing in part to the endurance of an unsettled dispute and EU membership of Greek Cypriots, the strategic advantage entertained since 1974 intervention began to be challenged. What is more, a settlement of Cyprus imbroglio was put as a political condition for Turkey’s quest for membership. Hence, despite vetoing initially, the military establishment has reluctantly endorsed the Annan Plan and paved the way for a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in 2003 and 2004. Another solid explanation of the military emerging as ‘veto player’ in accession process to the EU is that the Turkish Armed Forces has been historically the ‘subject’ of westernization, modernization and Europeanization that went hand in hand for almost two centuries, but they have turned out to be the ‘object’ of the process itself, the pace of which has accelerated particularly after 1999 (for this argument see Heper, 2005b).

In addition, the candidacy status granted to Turkey in the wake of the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 and accompanying reforms adopted thereafter led to an erosion of the boundaries between ‘foreign policy’ devoid of public discussion and political input on the one hand and ‘politicians representing the national will’ on the other. Turkish military elites’ privileged and exceptional

*domaine réservé* in determining high politics have begun to be challenged by a combination of ‘the executive and civil society’ whose eagerness to question the traditional mainstream foreign policy over Cyprus pursued until 2002 have made a shift in favour of pro-Annan solution possible. The post-Helsinki era has thus witnessed the moving of a foreign policy matter such as Cyprus out of the bureaucratic domain and into the public debate (Kaliber, 2005: 334).

Increasingly devoid of its policy-shaping power in line with the political transformation induced by the EU accession process, particularly since 2005, the military has adopted a relatively low-profile position and even reconciled itself with the government over its determination to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in international fora including the Islamic Conference Organization and the Arab League, denouncing the EU for its failure to reward Turkish Cypriots’ consensual attitude towards the Annan Plan (Robins, 2007: 298), pledging support to the new negotiation process for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem revitalized after 21 March 2008 by the Turkish PM Erdoğan’s letter in 2008,<sup>18</sup> and supporting the government’s post-2011 election rhetoric that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would go their own way in case of a non-solution in 2012.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> For example, the NSC meetings dated 30 December and 24 April 2008 buttressed the new process but reiterated that any solution should be based on bizonality; existence of two distinct peoples; political equality of the two parties; equal status of two founding states; establishment of a new partnership state; and continuation of Turkey’s effective and virtual guarantees.

<sup>19</sup> Exceptions to the compatible attitude of the military included the government’s Action Plan in January 2006 to open Turkey’s harbours and airports to Greek Cypriot sea vessels and aircrafts in return for opening the Northern Cypriot sea ports of Gazimagosa, Girne and Gemikonağı to international traffic, and Ercan Airport to direct flights. Yaşar Büyükanıt, then Chief of General Staff, portrayed the government’s decision as ‘a departure from the state’s official policy’ and a ‘surprise’ (Akşit and Melakopides, 2008: 10). The military also openly criticized Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat’s initiative to open up the intersection of Lokmacı/Ledra Street in Lefkoşa in 2007, which was located in the forbidden military zone, on the grounds that such steps should be taken reciprocally (Akşit and Melakopides, 2008: 10).

The parameters for a solution of the military and civilian wings of the establishment seem to be converging as evidenced by the Turkish National Program of 2008 and the NSC declarations dated 20 June 2007, 24 April 2008, 30 December 2008, and 30 June 2009. The predominant discourse in those documents points to finding a mutually acceptable settlement standing on the realities of the island to be “based on the existence of two separate people and democracy, bi-zonality, political equality of both sides, equal status of both founding states and acceptance of parameters of new partner state” and the continuation of Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.

#### **5.1.1.2.2 CHP (Republican People’s Party –*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)**

The CHP is the first political party of the Turkish Republic founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Formed as an establishment party, it is strongly attached to the preservation of Republican principles, which include republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism and reformism-revolutionism, being represented by the party’s emblem with six arrows.<sup>20</sup> The Party had a pioneering role in the Westernization efforts of the newly emerged Republic in the form of “state-centric modernization and its top-down attempt to create an economically advanced and culturally secular nation” (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 214).

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<sup>20</sup> In the party programme adopted in 2008, “adamant guardianship of Atatürk’s principles and reforms” has been stated as the CHP’s priority.



According to Ayata and Güneş-Ayata (2007: 214), the CHP has, however, a paradoxical perception of the West. On the one hand, it has a strong inclination towards Western values and institutions; on the other, it endorsed the political and economic independence of Turkey from the West. Put differently, it has been both “pro-Western and anti-imperialist” (Celep, 2011: 423) since the latter signifies that modern Turkey emerged out of a war that had been fought against the Western powers during the Turkish War of Independence as well as the impositions of the Sevres Treaty after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Hence, concepts such as territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty are defined as red lines that should definitely be defended against any Western intrusions.

The CHP actively ruled the country with a single party government until 1946 when Turkey decided to move to the multiparty system through the establishment of Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP). In 1950, it lost the elections to the DP and served as an opposition party for a decade. Having succeeded to win elections in 1973 and 1977, CHP was closed down after the 1980 military intervention, together with other political parties. In the post-1980 coup period, its political legacy had been represented by new left parties such as the Social Democratic People’s Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halk Partisi*, SHP) and the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP). Closed for eleven years, the CHP was reopened by Deniz Baykal in 1992. In the 1999 general elections, by registering 8.7 percent of the votes, the CHP failed to pass the 10 percent of electoral threshold to enter Parliament. Yet, in the November 2002 elections it received 19.4 percent of the vote and became the second largest party in Parliament after the AKP. In the 22 July 2007 general elections, the CHP led by Deniz Baykal,

finished the elections with 20.9 percent of vote and 112 seats in 550 seat assembly thus becoming the main opposition party. In the June 2011 general elections, the CHP under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu registered 25.94 percent of the votes and remained the main opposition party.

While for some, the CHP comes from social democratic tradition, others would like to see it as a nationalist, populist and etatist party (for an elaborate discussion see Ayata, 2003; Açıkel, 2003; Gülmez, 2008; 2013). Notwithstanding differences regarding its exact ideology, it has been commonly argued that the CHP is a centre-left party. What is more, the party ideologically claims to be a social democratic party and is a member of the Socialist International and an associate of the Party of European Socialists (see CHP Party Programme, adopted on 21 December 2008).

The CHP has traditionally adopted a favourable attitude towards Turkey's European vocation and its eventual EU membership since this objective was regarded as a 'state policy', which is compatible with the Westernization and modernization project of the Republic underpinned by Atatürkist principles. After all, it was İsmet İnönü, the CHP leader and PM at the time, who signed the Association Agreement with the then EEC in 1963. By the same token, and as a Turkish Foreign Minister for a brief period, Deniz Baykal, the then CHP leader, spent considerable efforts for the completion of the Customs Union with the EU in the early 1990s (Ayata and Güneş-Ayata, 2007: 223).

Yet, it should also be stated that the party has undergone a shift in its views (for example see Güneş-Ayata, 2003; Gülmez, 2013). Until the 1980 military coup, being enthusiastic supporter of democracy, Westernization and

secularization, the CHP adopted a ‘soft Euro-sceptic’<sup>21</sup> stance (Ayata, 2003: 213). In principle, CHP cadres believed in the necessity of integration with the then EC but only as a long-term political, economic and social goal. They pointed to the adverse effects of a swift integration on the structure of the Turkish economy, infant industry and vulnerable agriculture. In much of the 1970s when the CHP was in power as a coalition partner, difficulties in getting access to funds and aids promised by the EC, economic difficulties and crisis, and international pressures led the CHP (particularly the Ecevit government) to distance Turkey from the Common Market by unilaterally freezing some of the items in the Additional Protocol on 25 December 1979. At that point, apart from much of the bureaucracy (such as the State Planning Organization), leftist parties, labour unions and business organizations too, argued in favour of such a move (Ayata, 2003). At that time, many European social democratic parties were also opposed to the Common Market.

In the wake of the 1980 military coup, however, the CHP has adopted a more favourable stance towards the EU mainly because the latter was undergoing a transformation with an increasing emphasis on principles of individual rights, democracy and multiculturalism. As a party closed down by the junta regime during the period of 1980-1983, it was reasonable for the CHP to adopt a more positive outlook *vis-à-vis* the idea of EU membership, since membership would

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<sup>21</sup> According to Paul Taggart (1998: 366), Euroscepticism refers to “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” Later, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) presented a typology of hard Euroscepticism and soft Euroscepticism. While hard Euroscepticism is defined as the outright and unqualified rejection of the idea of European integration, both in political and economic terms, and EU membership. Conversely, soft Euroscepticism denotes contingent and qualified opposition to European integration, implying opposition to a certain policy within the integration process such as the Economic and Monetary Union. While endorsing the general idea of European integration, soft Eurosceptic policies could also be adopted with the motivation to preserve national interest.

imply a guarantee for individual rights and freedoms as well as prevent military intrusions into politics (Ayata, 2003: 213).

Although the CHP's sociological origins<sup>22</sup> make it a pro-EU party (Celep, 2011: 425), during the 2000s and particularly after becoming the main opposition party in 2002, developments in Turkey's accession process and its own concerns over 'sovereignty and national interest' have paved the way for a sceptical and reactive rhetoric towards both the EU and the AKP government. While some argued that the critical stance adopted by the party towards Turkey's EU membership in the last decade has stemmed from it being an opposition party in parliament and therefore, shaped by its opposition to and competition with the AKP both politically and electorally (Celep, 2011). In other words, the CHP criticized the way the AKP has been managing Turkey's accession process and implementing the reform process rather than the idea of membership itself.

For others, however, what conditioned the CHP's soft Euroscepticism in the form of reactive attitude towards the EU and Turkey's EU membership have been rather shaped by a more complex juxtaposition of internal and external factors, such as the motivation to protect Republican values including a centralized state, secularism, sovereignty, national interest and identity against the Copenhagen criteria; the AKP's 'submissive' policies on Cyprus, its acceptance of the Annan Plan and the 'sacrificing' of Cyprus for the sake of an 'unclear' EU membership; its signing of the Additional Protocol, and its failing to take a resolute action against anti-Turkish statements of European politicians.

The other internal factors related to the AKP's use of EU-related reforms to

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<sup>22</sup> For example, according to Şerif Mardin (1973), the CHP represents interests of the center, who refers to urban, relatively wealthy and well-educated people having a secular, modern and western lifestyles, including military and civil establishment controlling the state apparatus.

redefine the secularism principle, to facilitate religious way of life over Turkish society, to gain political leverage against state establishment such as the judiciary and the army, and the AKP's 'abusing' the accession process for strengthening its own authority rather than empowering democracy thus jeopardizing Turkey's own membership prospects.

External factors are related predominantly to the CHP's opposition to the EU's additional (non-Copenhagen) preconditions, including the link between the Cyprus stalemate and Turkey's EU membership process, the imposition of the Annan Plan and allowing the Protocol crisis to interrupt Turkish-EU relations, indecisiveness within the EU against Turkey's full membership as shown by the provisions of 'absorption capacity', 'open-ended negotiations', 'permanent safeguard clauses' in areas such as free movement of persons, structural policies and agricultural subsidies, and Turco-sceptic statements of leading EU statesmen against Turkey's European credentials and its membership, which provided evidence of EU's reluctance towards Turkey's full membership and its intention to convince Turkey for a kind of 'privileged partnership', or 'second-class membership' (Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez, 2008; Gülmez, 2008; 2013a; 2013b). That is to say, the CHP claimed that it was not against Turkey's EU membership but given the EU's 'unfair treatment of Turkey' during the negotiations underpinned by 'unclear' membership perspective, the CHP leadership questioned the EU's policy toward Turkey and its 'sincerity' on the one hand, and the AKP's conduct of EU policy, on the other, since both served to slow down the enlargement process and derail Turkey's membership path.

Besides, the CHP has been criticized for not having a clear vision as to Turkey's role in the EU, the nature and extent of Turkish-EU relations and the

future trajectory of European integration project (Güneş-Ayata, 2002; Terzi, 2010). It must be noted, however, that notwithstanding its voiced concerns about or opposition to certain EU-related policies and course of Turkish-EU relations in recent years, CHP cadres have always been careful to distance the party from an ‘anti-EU’ label overall, since they believe that Turkey’s political and economic destiny lies in Europe.

After assuming power, the AKP government enacted a series of harmonization packages comprising legislative and constitutional reforms in order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. The CHP generally pledged a support to those reforms at the national legislature, such as the abolishment of the State Security Courts and death penalty, the removal of military representatives from the YÖK and the RTÜK, and amendments in the civil code and penal code. However, during this process, the party leadership criticized the EU and the government on certain issues by giving the impression that it selectively approved EU requirements (Balkır, 2007).

Particularly under Baykal’s leadership, and after the 2002 elections, the CHP’s critical tone *vis-à-vis* various EU-sponsored reforms was precipitated by two factors: first was related to the “Republican reflexes to secure national sovereignty and protect key principles of the Republic such as nationalism and secularism against both the EU and the pro-Islamic AKP government” (Gülmez, 2013a: 6). For example, the CHP objected to the EU-led reform for the abolition of the Article 301 of the Penal Code, which punishes those who ‘insult Turkishness’, claiming that the article protected the dignity and honor of the Turkish nation (Gülmez, 2013a: 6). Moreover, amendments with regard to the issue of minority rights were also opposed by the Party since they would

undermine the Lausanne Treaty (the founding document of Turkish Republic). The Treaty merely considers non-Muslims as minority; the CHP opposed the EU political criteria on the account that they widened the scope of minorities to incorporate other communities on the basis of ethnic or religious lines, for example, Kurds and Alevis. Likewise, party officials reacted to the EU-led reform on the restitution of the property rights of minority associations since that contravened the reciprocity principle of the Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty (Gülmez, 2013a: 6). Again, reform on the establishment of ombudsmanship was denounced by the CHP because the AKP would misuse it to boost its political authority (Gülmez, 2013a: 7).

The second factor originates from a disillusionment with the EU's 'additional conditionality' towards Turkey, as specified by the terms of negotiations such as the open-endedness of the accession process, absorption capacity, permanent safeguard clauses and the EU's 'double standard' policy over Cyprus on the one hand, and Turkey-sceptic discourse in major EU member states, on the other (Gülmez, 2013a: 6-8).

As a corollary to what is argued above, at first glance, the Party programme<sup>23</sup> shows a strong and positive inclination towards Turkey's bid for EU membership, which is regarded as a "natural extension of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's modernization reforms and societal change." Nevertheless, support for EU membership is not unconditional. The 'yes but' attitude of the CHP has been reflected in the Party manifesto: "our condition for relations with the EU involves

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<sup>23</sup> See "*Çağdaş Türkiye İçin Değişim: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı*" [Change for Modern Turkey: Republican People's Party Programme]. Available at <http://www.chp.org.tr/Files/chpprogram.indd.pdf>. The Programme was adopted on 21 December 2008 replacing the older one dated back to 1992.

to be conducted under fair conditions, being respectful for the founding principles of the Republic as well as for full and honourable membership.” In this regard, special or privileged status, instead of full membership have been totally rejected. For example, in the 2007 election manifesto, the AKP government was accused of consenting to the ‘open-endedness of negotiations’ as indicated in the Negotiation Framework Document, thereby giving an impression that Turkey would accept a status short of full membership. The sensitivity of the Party leadership regarding attachment to the ‘full membership’ has been decisively expressed:

(...) the EU should understand one thing: Turkey will either become a member or a serious rival to the EU. There is no option like making use of Turkey's opportunities in the Customs Union and security but excluding it from decision-making (Öymen, *The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

The Party leadership believed that Turkey should join the EU under the exact same criteria with other candidates, i.e. without being exposed to any extra conditionality in the form of a unilateral concession, which would be entirely antithetical to the Copenhagen criteria.

Thus, the CHP has been vocally emphasized the need to reverse permanent derogations on such areas as free movement of persons, agricultural subsidies and regional development (cohesion and structural funds) that the EU presented in the official documents. For example, Baykal’s hardline stance over the EU even led him to call on Erdoğan to freeze negotiations (*Hürriyet*, 17 December 2004). Also, the CHP denounced the efforts of some EU members to exclude or question Turkey’s eventual membership or granting it a special status. According to the Party Programme, in case the policy of granting Turkey a status short of



full membership was adopted officially by the EU, Turkey's existent commitments to the EU, including the Customs Union, should be resolutely revised. Hence, only getting an exact date for Turkey's membership would serve as a remedy for the EU's ambiguity about Turkey's eventual accession. For example, Onur Öymen, then Deputy Chairman of the Party, asked the AKP government to develop a Plan-B in case Turkey's EU membership process comes to a dead end in the near future (Öymen, *The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006). As put by him:

If we were in power today, we would have had high-level, open and frank discussions with the European leaders. We would have told them, 'Let's not waste our time, if you don't want our membership, tell us this openly now.' It is not possible for us to accept something short of membership after completing a decade-long difficult accession talks. [W]e can't wait in the EU's waiting room forever (...) After all, [i]f our bid to join the EU is turned down, Turkey is not without options. As former Turkish president and Commander İsmet İnönü once said, a new world will emerge and Turkey will find a new position there (*The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

Regarding the Cyprus question, during negotiations over the Annan Plan between 2002 and 2004, by adopting a state-centered and security-first platform the CHP carried out a massive rejectionist campaign against a change in Turkey's Cyprus policy (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). In essence, the CHP's critical stance on the Cyprus issue was based on three major counts: First, the CHP reacted strongly to the EU's linkage policy of tying Turkey's membership to the Cyprus question, as Baykal argued that this linkage would force Turkey to officially recognize the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus to become an EU member. Second, the CHP expressed concerns over the content of the Annan Plan, which was regarded as disadvantageous both for Turkey and TRNC. Third, the CHP denounced the

consensual attitude of the AKP government on Cyprus and changing the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey (Gülmez, 2007: 129-132).

Indeed, on every occasion, CHP officials harshly criticized the AKP's commitment to the Annan Plan as a basis for a settlement by pointing to its shortcomings concerning bizonality, territorial adjustments, and Turkey's guarantorship rights (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). Security considerations and the strategic importance of the island for Turkey provide the basis for the CHP's approach towards the Cyprus problem. As explicitly stated by Öymen, then Deputy Chairman of CHP:

(...)If you dominate Cyprus, it means that you dominate that region, the oil beds of the region and the routes for reaching the oil. Four thousand oil tankers pass every month from the waters of Cyprus (*Güneş Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

Accordingly, the Annan Plan would undermine bizonality by allowing the creation of cantons such as Karpaz and a return of 55.000 Greek Cypriots to the Northern part. In addition, from a strategic point of view, territorial adjustments overseen by the Plan would favour the Greek Cypriots because not only would they dilute Turkey's guarantorship rights emanating from 1960 Treaties by remarkably reducing the number and competences of the troops, but also it introduce unacceptable territorial adjustments, including the restitution of Karpaz to the Greek Cypriot side (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 January 2003).

Moreover, pertaining to the drawbacks of the Annan Plan, Öymen added that the demilitarization of the island as foreseen by the Plan does not guarantee that it would not be militarized in the future, especially given the 'illegal' militarization of the Aegean islands and Cyprus by the Greek and Greek Cypriot

governments. Thus, a solution of the Cyprus question should take into account Turkey's long-term strategic interests (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 January 2003). Likewise, in an interview with *Cumhuriyet* daily on 24 January 2003, Öymen reiterated that the Annan Plan could only be accepted if bizonality is preserved; improvements pertaining to issues of migration and property are made; and the security interests and guarantorships rights of Turkey are kept intact (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 January 2003). Other members of the CHP have made critical remarks on the Annan Plan as well. For example, Şükrü Elekdağ, the former ambassador and then Istanbul Deputy of the CHP, stated that

The Annan Plan, which was imposed on the Turkish Cypriots by the pressures of the AKP government, proposed turning the TRNC into a heterogenously populated province being devoid of sovereignty in a united Cyprus dominated by Greek Cypriots; restitution of 52 village and city including Güzelyurt and Karpaz to Greek Cypriots; obliging 100.000 Turkish Cypriots to leave their homes; sending Turkish troops out of the island thereby making the efficient and virtual guarantee of Turkey inoperative (Elekdağ, *Yankı Journal*, 15 May 2009).

As for the parameters of the settlement of Cyprus question, what the CHP programme particularly prescribes is identical to the 'official policy' rhetoric of Turkey, notably, lasting peace can only be attained through the preservation of vested interests of the TRNC and Turkish Cypriots and maintaining the sovereign equality of the two parties. After all, former top officials of CHP, such as İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit,<sup>24</sup> both as Prime Ministers and CHP leaders, had been

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<sup>24</sup> Under the premiership of İnönü, Turkish jets had staged a limited air bombardment in Cyprus on 8-9 August 1964. Yet, Turkey's planned military intervention to the Cyprus island, upon aggravation of intercommunal strife in 1964, was by and large prevented by the then U.S. President Johnson's letter to İnönü. While he was in opposition, İnönü had objected to the London and Zurich accords concluded by the Democrat Party government, and favoured the idea of partition. When returned to power in 1960s, however, he had to act in conformity with the London and Zurich Accords. Besides, the 1974 military intervention of Turkey was conducted during the former CHP leader and PM Bülent Ecevit's tenure.

actively involved in formulation of the basic tenets of Turkey's traditional Cyprus policy (Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez, 2008: 24). For party officials, negotiations for a settlement should be conducted on the basis of equality and mutual respect of the two sides. For a settlement, there should be sovereignty for both sides; a weak central government to be built upon the equality of the parties; and a central government, conferring Turkish Cypriots a right to say on their local affairs but and on the whole island (*Sabah*, 22 July 2008). It was argued that the CHP is in favour of a just and viable peace to be attained through negotiations. However, if the 'sovereign equality'<sup>25</sup> of the sides was not assured in the peace plan, this would risk turning Turkish Cypriots into a second-class minority (Öymen, 20 July 2009, [www.gundem.info](http://www.gundem.info); Öymen, *Sabah*, 22 July 2008). It can be observed that sensitivity over bizonality and sovereign equality have emerged as a mutually shared ground between the CHP and the Turkish military. In tandem with official policy of the state establishment albeit until 2004, an overemphasis on 'sovereign equality' as part of settlement signifies that the CHP seems to be favouring a confederal solution between two sovereign and equal parties as opposed to the federal-based Annan Plan.

In addition, as was underlined in the Party manifesto, the CHP displayed a paramount discontent of the current pattern of relations between Brussels and Ankara and the linkage policy of the EU, which associates Turkey's own membership with a settlement of the Cyprus question. The CHP vocally opposed the EU's decision to allow Cyprus' full membership before Turkey and without

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<sup>25</sup> In fact, demand for a 'sovereign equality' of parties resembles the pre-2003 official rhetoric of Ankara in the framework of 'confederation proposal'. The current approach involves such wording as 'political equality of two peoples' and 'equal status of two founding states', rather than 'sovereign equality' of parties.

settlement of its problems by reiterating Turkey's 'official' policy stance on the issue:

The EU made a big mistake on the Cyprus problem by admitting the Greek Cypriots before a solution on the island. This violates international law. The founding treaties of the Cypriot state openly say that it can't become a member of any international organization unless both of the guarantor states of Turkey and Greece are members. It is unfair for the EU now to couple Turkey's membership process with the Cyprus problem (Interview with Onur Öymen, *The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

In a similar vein, the former CHP leader, Deniz Baykal, denounced the EU's Cyprus policy by saying that "the bankruptcy of the EU's policy is testified by the fact that it has come to incorporate an incomplete geography as a member with its legal problems unsettled" (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 April 2003). Hence, the EU's decision to allow Greek Cypriot membership is regarded as a violation of international law by the Party leadership with a detrimental effect that it would put peace negotiations on the island into jeopardy (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 April 2003). By rejecting legitimacy of the claim that Greek Cypriots represent the whole island, the Party's manifesto further underlined necessity of the efforts to facilitate international recognition of the TRNC and to eradicate embargoes and isolations imposed on the Turkish Cypriots.

The CHP's opposition to the EU's policy towards Turkey has been hardened upon the EU's allowing the Cyprus question to derail the Turkey-EU relations via the decision to suspend talks on eight chapters in December 2006, on the account that Turkey did not fully implement the Additional Protocol. The AKP government was immediately called upon by the party leadership to make a swift response to the EU's move

[by] refusing to meet EU's expectations on the chapters suspended by the EU (...) And Turkish government should also turn down without a second thought the unfair and political impositions of the EU, such as opening our ports to the Greek Cypriot administration (Öymen, *The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

While favouring a Plan-B in case Turkey's membership was deferred by the EU, the CHP dismissed the idea of Ankara's unilateral move to stop the accession process. Rather, with the exception of suspended chapters, "Turkey should continue progress in technical fields, areas where reforms will introduce European standards" because these reforms "are for the well-being of the Turkish people, no matter if they are demanded by the EU or not, no matter if we have the EU accession process or not" (Öymen, *The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

As regards changing policy of Turkey on Cyprus, the CHP criticized the AKP government for giving concessions for a distant prospect of membership because:

[W]hen we look at the Turkey-sceptic leaders like Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy and others, their opposition to Turkey's membership is not due to the Cyprus problem. It is clear that they will not change their minds, even if Turkey makes big concessions on Cyprus, which is totally unacceptable for us. The Cyprus problem is just a pretext for these leaders. They are hiding behind the Cyprus problem. Without disclosing their ideas against Turkey's EU membership, they are using the Cyprus problem as a tool to block Turkey's EU accession process (Öymen, *The New Anatolian Newspaper*, 20 December 2006).

In a similar vein, the then CHP Deputy of Istanbul, Şükrü Elekdağ, pointed to the risks in giving concessions on Cyprus in the face of the EU's unwillingness for Turkey's accession:

(...) What are we giving these concessions for? The EU's extremely negative attitude towards Turkey is evident (...) Under today's conditions, even if Turkey gives these concessions, there will not be any slightest shift in the EU's stance *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Neither of the

EU member state told us that if you step back in Cyprus, your membership will be guaranteed (Turkish Grand National Assembly, Proceedings, 16 July 2008).

At this juncture, it is even suggested by the party programme that:

as long as the parties could not arrive at a lasting, just and honorable peace being based on sovereign equality in a reasonable course of time, it is essential that Turkey strive to assure peaceful co-existence of two independent states on the island and to get international society stood for this reality (CHP Party Programme, 2008).

The CHP have pledged support to the hardline Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş and criticized PM Erdoğan for his unyielding attitude towards him, particularly on the eve of the Annan referanda (Gülmez, 2007: 132). Hence, a rejection of the Plan by the Greek Cypriots provided Turkey with an opportunity to seek the recognition of TRNC and Baykal invited PM Erdoğan to work towards this end (Gülmez, 2007: 133). Although in the immediate aftermath of the referanda there had been a rhetorical convergence between the AKP government and the CHP on such grounds as the EU's perceived unwillingness towards Turkey's accession, accusation towards the EU of playing the Cyprus card to hamper Turkey's membership, calling for the EU to respect the principles of *pacta sunt servanda*, and working for the abandonment of embargoes and recognition of TRNC, differences surfaced soon. For example, the CHP was not satisfied with the AKP government-sponsored Action Plan issued in 2006, which called for the international community to terminate the embargoes and isolation of the Northern Cypriots, in return for the opening of Turkish harbours and airports to the Greek Cypriots. For Baykal, Turkey already enjoyed a right to demand the dismantling of sanctions without having to offer any further concession, since the U.S. and the EU had already promised to eradicate the

Turkish Cypriots' isolations if they would accept the Annan Plan (Gülmez, 2007: 135).

By the same token, the then Istanbul Deputy of CHP, Şükrü Elekdağ<sup>26</sup> criticized the intercommunal negotiation process launched in 2008 to reunify the Cyprus island. According to him, the basic parameters of the 2008 process, such as single sovereignty and single citizenship are unacceptable, since they are worse than the terms of the Annan Plan in terms of depriving further the rights and status of Turkish Cypriots.

Following Baykal's resignation, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu assumed the party's leadership in May 2010. Rather than overemphasizing the protection of Republican values such as secularism and nationalism, Kılıçdaroğlu sought to redesign the CHP's discourse along the lines of universal norms of social democracy through the prioritization of domestic economic problems, the fight against poverty and corruption, introducing intra-party democracy, empowering the CHP's women and youth branches and dismantling the ten percent national threshold in parliamentary elections (Gülmez, 2013a: 5-6; Gülmez, 2013b: 12; Celep, 2010:3). Unlike the conservative Republicanism of Baykal, Kılıçdaroğlu adopted a more liberal rhetoric on the controversial issue of expanding the rights of Kurds and facilitated the liberation of headscarves in Turkish universities (Gülmez, 2013a: 5). Having admitted that the CHP's image in the EU was overwhelmingly negative due to the hardline stance over the years, Kılıçdaroğlu promised "a new and vigorous beginning with the EU" (BBC Turkish, 2 July 2010). As opposed to his predecessor, Kılıçdaroğlu garnered support from the social democrat politicians in the EU as well (Gülmez, 2013a: 9). For example,

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<sup>26</sup> In a speech in the plenary session of the Turkish Parliament on 16 July 2008.



Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the leader of the Party of European Socialists asserted that Kılıçdaroğlu's election had signified a promising start for Turkish politics and the reform process directed at the EU membership (www.euractiv.com, 17 September 2010). Likewise, Martin Schulz, the leader of the European Parliament Socialist Group and today President of the European Parliament declared after meeting Kılıçdaroğlu in Brussels that he would like to see Turkey's EU membership under the premiership of Kılıçdaroğlu (www.euractiv.com, 16 September 2010).

Notwithstanding the renewed eagerness towards Turkey's EU membership process and softened and compromising EU rhetoric, Kılıçdaroğlu inherited several red lines from Baykal (Gülmez, 2013b: 13). For example, the new leader adopted a rejectionist stance over 25 Constitutional amendments during the referendum campaign in 2011 on the grounds that three of them<sup>27</sup> would undermine the rule of law and democracy in Turkey, with the result of boosting AKP's authoritarianism and jeopardizing Turkey's eventual EU membership (Gülmez, 2013a: 9). He also criticized the EU for pledging support to those amendments and underestimating the imminent dangers they would pose to Turkish democracy. Moreover, unlike the EU's appreciation of the Ergenekon trials as an opportunity for strengthening democracy and the rule of law in Turkey, Kılıçdaroğlu denounced the Ergenekon trials for being politically motivated and nominated two suspects as parliamentary candidates in the 2011 general elections.

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<sup>27</sup> Those controversial provisions embraced the changes in the number and election procedures of members of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, which would render the justice system dependent on the political authority of the AKP. The third one included the new arrangements regarding the party closures by making it more difficult.

Just like during Baykal's leadership, the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu continued to denounce the EU's additional terms of negotiations such as permanent safeguard clauses. Kılıçdaroğlu shared the concerns of Baykal about the principles of Turkey's accession including fair membership negotiations with no double standards and full membership having equal rights with other member states (CHP's 2011 Election Manifesto). Akin to his predecessor's era, Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP accused the AKP government and Turko-skeptic politicians in the EU for the present impasse in Turkey-EU relations (CHP's 2011 Election Manifesto).

The new leadership's stance on Cyprus remained unchanged. To give an example, Kılıçdaroğlu followed Baykal in blaming the EU for treating Turkey unfairly in the Cyprus problem through introducing the solution of the Cyprus question as a membership conditionality for Turkey, but not for Cyprus (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2010: 25). Kılıçdaroğlu defined the Cyprus issue as a "national cause for Turkey" (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2010: 25). He further noted that the Cyprus problem has become more complicated during AKP government's tenure and has to be solved sooner rather than later (*Hürriyet*, 20 July 2011). Kılıçdaroğlu believed that "The Cyprus issue cannot be solved with one-sided concessions nor can the status quo continue indefinitely" (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2010: 26) As such, he reiterated that the founding parameters of a solution had long been established by the UN's proposed formula of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation composed of two founding states with political equality (*Hürriyet*, 20 July 2011). As agreed by the two Cypriot leaders on 23 May 2008, the core of this founding parameter is a "Federal partnership formed by two constituent states, based on the political equality of the two peoples of the island" (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2010: 26)

All in all, after 2002, to a great extent facilitated by the EU's perceived ambiguity towards Turkey's membership, the AKP government's handling of the accession process and by capitalizing on its negative effect on domestic public opinion in Turkey, "the party's nationalistic reflexes came progressively to the fore, in such a way that the CHP has (...) become virtually indistinguishable from Turkey's major ultranationalist party, the MHP" (Öniş, 2007: 257; Avcı, 2004; Celep, 2011). Despite being at the center-left of the political spectrum, in recent years (at least until Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu assumed the party leadership in May 2010 with a strong social democratic rhetoric), the CHP had paradoxically acted as one of the strongest veto players in the Turkish domestic political landscape, with its continuous effort to boost its electoral base by capitalizing on rising nationalist and anti-EU feelings. After Kılıçdaroğlu's election, the party's nationalist rhetoric was significantly toned down, but its overall stance on the Cyprus problem has not changed substantially.

#### **5.1.1.2.3 MHP (Nationalist Action Party- *Milliyetçi Hareket***

##### ***Partisi***

Despite different claims concerning the ideological and political position of the MHP such as 'extreme rightist' (Balkır, 2007), 'far right' (Yavuz, 2002) or 'ultra-nationalist' (Başkan, 2006), it can be safely argued that since its inception in 1969, the MHP monopolizes the right wing nationalist end of the political spectrum in Turkey.

The genesis of the party can be traced back to the establishment of the conservative nationalist Republican Peasants Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, CKMP) in 1948 (Avcı, 2011: 437). The MHP movement started under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, who served as the unchallenged longtime leader and founder of the organizational structure and ideology of the Party until his death in 1997. He was a colonel in the army during the 1960 military intervention and served as spokesperson of the National Unity Committee, which ruled the country for 15 months following the coup d'état. The MHP's ideological roots had been formulated by Türkeş with a new program which is based on a specific ideological premise of the "Nine Lights Doctrine" (*Dokuz Işık Doktrini*) comprising nationalism, idealism, moralism, societalism, positivism, ruralism, independentism, progressivism and industrialism. The new party program was accepted at the party congress in 1967. Two years later the party was renamed as 'Nationalist Action Party'. The 1980 military intervention banned all parties, including the MHP. Many of its supporters and leading members were prisoned, tortured and even nine of them were executed alongside leftists (Başkan, 2006: 92). The party was re-established in 1983 as the Conservative Party (*Muhafazakar Parti*, MP), then changed its name to the Nationalist Task Party (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*, MÇP) and was renamed again as MHP in 1993. Following Türkeş' death in 1997, the party leadership was assumed by a former academic, Devlet Bahçeli.

After the coup in 1980, the MHP returned to electoral politics under Türkeş in 1987. In the 1987 elections the MHP only registered 2.9 percent of votes. It then forged an election coalition with the pro Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) in 1991 elections and managed to receive 17 percent of electoral support

(Avcı, 2011: 438). In the 1995 elections, the party remained below the 10 percent national threshold by receiving 8.2 percent of votes.

As a party on the fringes of the political spectrum, the MHP has managed to establish itself as the second major party by dramatically increasing its votes in the general elections of April 1999 by registering 17.9 percent of the votes with 129 seats out of 550 in the parliament. The MHP remained in power between the 1999 and 2002 general elections as the second major party (after the DSP) and as part of the coalition government forged between the center-left DSP and center-right ANAP (Motherland Party). After a five-year absence following the November 2002 elections, it became the third-largest party in both the July 2007 and June 2011 general elections with 14.3 percent and 13 percent of electoral support, respectively.

The basic ideological tenets of the MHP is built around the principles of idealism (*ülküculük*), nationalism, and particularly during the 1980s it also embraced the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In order to understand the pro-state and pro-system orientation of the MHP, the specific meaning of the concept 'idealism' as the backbone of the Party's ideology should be underlined. Idealism denotes the love and ideal of serving and sacrificing everything for the state as well as the guiding precept of national existence in the sense that the MHP does not see any difference between the party and the state; whoever was the enemy of the state was declared to be an enemy of the party. Put differently, the MHP's idiosyncratic vision regarded the party and the nationalist movement as strongly attached to the state and its further empowerment (Avcı, 2011: 438). According to Yavuz (2002), the otherness is a critical issue for the extreme right, and it also played a prominent role in the expression of the MHP's identity by portraying the

other as enemies of the state and the Turkish nation. Indeed the MHP's 'other' has changed over time (Avcı, 2011: 437; Başkan, 2006). In this regard, for the party activists, enemies of the Turkish state was communists and Marxists during 1970s when the followers of the party did not avoid armed clashes with those groups. Likewise, Kurdish separatists represented by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan*, PKK) during the 1980s until today were perceived as enemies of the party. In the 1990s the enemy became political Islam and nowadays it is the EU (Arıkan, 1998: 37). Such a strict identification with the state suffered a setback for a while owing to the 1980 military intervention (Başkan, 2006: 92; Avcı, 2011: 437-438) with a consequence that for the first time, the idealists (*ülküçüüler*)<sup>28</sup> came to question their unconditional allegiance to the state.<sup>29</sup>

Tension between the state institutions and the MHP was relaxed and official discourses of the state and the party began to converge in the 1990s due to two developments: first, with the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the Turkish state launched a more activist foreign policy devoid of the Cold War's ideological restraints and wanted to forge closer relations with the newly independent Turkic Republics. In this regard, the state needed to capitalize on expertise and links that the MHP activists had developed with the region (Öniş, 2003: 40; Başkan, 2006: 92). Second, as a result of the mounting

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<sup>28</sup> Principle of idealism has been identified with the MHP in Turkish political context since 1968 when university students started to establish idealist hearths (*ülkü ocakları*) to fight against communist groups (Başkan, 2006; Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26).

<sup>29</sup> At that time one of the prominent figures of the party, Agah Oktay Güner, posited "We are in prison, yet our ideology is in power", which became a famous slogan in the party circles (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002). As an antidote to communist threat, the 1980 coup institutionalized Turkish-Islamist synthesis as a state ideology and eradicated all forms of leftist thoughts from the universities and introduced compulsory religious course in the secondary schools. Therefore, it would be fairly argued that the coup had brought MHP-based ideas to the power (Yavuz, 2002: 206).

struggle against Kurdish separatism and the PKK, the state asked for help from the MHP activists, who were either doing military service in the Southeast, or working in public offices, in violent confrontations with the PKK (Öniş, 2003; Başkan, 2006). The latter helped forge an alliance between the military and the MHP on the common understanding that no solution other than the use of force could put an end to the Kurdish problem. Alternative proposals for solution were perceived detrimental since it could lead to fragmentation of Turkish state (Öniş, 2003: 40).

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis promoted by the MHP since its inception was in conformity with the post-1980 discourse of the military at a time when the main threat was coming from the left. The MHP was caught up in a dilemma between preserving its appeal to conservative Islamic electorates at one level, and serving the interests of the state, at other. The tension finally ended with Türkiye's conscious effort to prioritize concerns of the state by softening the Party's Islamic ideology. In effect, the cautious approach of not overtly challenging sensitivities of the official Republican state ideology continues under the current leadership of Devlet Bahçeli (Başkan, 2006; Öniş, 2003).<sup>30</sup> He is known to be devoted primarily to serving the interests of the state, even if these interests conflict with particular party interests. The idea is embodied in his slogan "*Önce ülkem, sonra partim, sonra ben*" [First my country, then my party, then myself] (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 32). Nonetheless, Bahçeli strived to create a centrist image by downplaying the ultranationalist and extremist views as well as

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<sup>30</sup> The MHP established itself as a pro-systemic political actor. Although it was vigilant not to condone the state repression of the Islamists in 28 February process, the MHP differentiated itself from Islamists on the grounds that they are anti-systemic and exploit religion for political purposes (Öniş, 2003: 33).

distancing the party from the legacy of violent acts (Avcı, 2011: 438; Canefe and Bora, 2003).

Despite the MHP's refusal to surrender national sovereignty to a supranational EU bureaucracy, it cannot be considered as a single-issue party that is explicitly racist and xenophobic (Öniş, 2003: 39). Nevertheless, the party embraces hierarchical arrangements, a limitation of diversity and individual autonomy but no longer opposes free market economy, which indicates the party's tolerant attitude towards the EU's economic criteria (Öniş, 2003).

The MHP has displayed a tough-patriotic and hardline stance *vis-à-vis* Turkey's bid to join the EU although it did not consistently reject EU membership. It has emerged in the post-Helsinki era as a party reluctant to pool national sovereignty with the EU on key issues of national interest most notably, the extension of civil and human rights or giving concessions over the Cyprus issue. At a superficial level, the MHP cadres keep their European vocation by believing in the necessity of Turkey's accession as a natural corollary of Westernization, which has been itself fundamental goal of the Turkish state from its inception. At a deeper level, however, MHP officials pledge conditional support to Turkey's EU bid since they are highly critical of the conditions attached to membership with the motivation of preserving Turkey's national interests.

While in power as a senior coalition partner from 1999 to November 2002, in response to adaptational pressures of the EU especially in complying with the political component of Copenhagen criteria for full membership, the MHP acted as a vocal veto player in passing or blocking reforms in the National Assembly.



Only after long deliberations and much struggle in Parliament did the coalition government finally declare on 18 November 2000 that they had agreed on the necessary commitments Turkey would make in order to qualify for membership (Avcı, 2011: 439). It has been even claimed that during the preparations of Turkey's National Programme (in response to the Accession Partnership Document of the EU) in 2000-2001, the MHP, together with the military, succeeded in modifying certain aspects of the document, which has been criticized later by the EU for falling short of meeting conditions in the Accession Partnership (Öniş, 2003: 45; Avcı, 2004; 2011). Although the document maintained that "The Turkish Government regards EU membership as a new step forward, a milestone confirming the founding philosophy of, and Atatürk's vision for the Republic," many of the reforms required by the EU were either diluted or handled in an ambiguous manner. Notwithstanding commitments, progress was often hampered by the MHP in such problematic areas as freedom of speech, minority rights, and the abolition of the death penalty, thereby leading to deadlocks in the coalition (Avcı, 2011: 440).

A central issue of contention for the MHP was the Greek Cypriots' accession to the EU. For Bahçeli, the EU would lead to a *fait accompli* in the Cyprus issue through its backing of Greek and Greek Cypriot policies (Avcı, 2004: 199). Seeing the Cyprus question as a national cause, he also made it clear that there will be no concessions over the Cyprus issue and that the MHP will endorse Denktaş until the end (Avcı, 2004: 199). For instance, the parameters of a settlement in the Cyprus dispute as stipulated by the National Programme was profoundly reflecting the Turkish official rhetoric, which was indeed in conformity with the MHP's own policy position:

Turkey will continue to (...) support the efforts of the UN Secretary General (...) aiming at a mutually acceptable settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the island.

Another key issue of concern for the MHP was the abolition of the death penalty due to its direct relevance to Abdullah Öcalan, the former leader of PKK, who was sentenced to death penalty following his capture in 1999. The MHP cadres insisted on carrying out the execution of Öcalan since one of the election pledges of the MHP in 1999 was ensuring his execution in case the party came to power (Avcı, 2011: 440). In October 2001, capital punishment was abrogated except in time of war, under the imminent threat of war and for terrorist crimes. Bahçeli was of the view that there should be no bargaining with the EU regarding Öcalan (Avcı, 2011: 440). In a similar vein, MHP officials harshly reacted to extending rights to the Kurdish minority by allowing the use of Kurdish in education and on television. The party leadership claimed that given the violent struggle of the Turkish army with Kurdish separatism, extending cultural and ethnic rights would facilitate Kurdish separatism. On this issue, Bahçeli condemned the EU's stance on terrorism for being double-faced and not serious and claimed that "most European countries continue to embrace terrorists who are enemies of Turkey" (*Cumhuriyet*, 21 November 2001, cited in Avcı, 2011: 441). Likewise, the MHP objected to the amendment of article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prohibits the inciting of hatred on religious or ethnic grounds (Avcı, 2004: 201). With a hope towards paving the way for EU membership, the Turkish Parliament eventually passed a comprehensive reform package on 3 August 2002 despite the MHP's rejection *en bloc*. The package embraced the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime and was replaced with life

imprisonment with no possibility of parole; the legalization of broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish, i.e. Kurdish; the elimination of the ban on criticizing state institutions, including the military; loosened limitations on demonstrations and associations; and permitted non-Muslim religious foundations to buy and sell real estate (*Milliyet*, 3 August 2002). The MHP appealed to the Constitutional Court to compel Parliament to revoke its decision concerning the death penalty and minority rights; nevertheless, the Court rejected the application (Avcı, 2011: 441).

Once in government between 1999-2002, the MHP did not exhibit a totally rejectionist outlook; it rather adopted a cautious and sceptical attitude towards Turkey's European vocation. In effect, party cadres pledged a conditional support to Turkey's EU membership. To illustrate, Bahçeli underlined that Turkey should become a member of global and regional organizations on the condition that "Turkey's national unity and integrity, the supremacy of democracy and national sovereignty, and the national values necessary for the formation of a Turkish national identity will not be damaged" (Bahçeli's speech before the Turkish Parliament, 2 November 1999 cited in Başkan, 2006: 99). In a similar vein, he stated that "we want to take part in this Union" but he also added that "this participation should be in compliance with the magnitude, history and potential of our country" (Bahçeli, 2002 cited in Avcı, 2004: 199). Likewise, the election manifesto of 2002 emphasized the MHP's support for Turkey's EU membership as one of Turkey's basic political targets and asserted that it would like to reform the domestic and legal system and adopt EU and international legal norms but without harming national unity (MHP, 2002). Indeed, by claiming that Turkey's march towards full membership to the EU could continue as long as it does not

challenge Turkey's external and internal security, the MHP seemed to prioritize Turkey's security problems at the expense of its commitment to the EU (Balkır, 2007: 421).

Having suffered a massive electoral loss in 2002, the MHP's Eurosceptic rhetoric hardened dramatically. Specifically, the terms of the EU accession talks, the EU's favorable attitude towards Greek Cypriots as opposed to its perceived discrimination against Turkey, and the AKP's handling of the Cyprus question elicited hawkish reactions from the MHP officials. Thus the MHP's strong criticisms were directed against the AKP and the EU simultaneously. As such, the Party has been harshly criticizing the AKP government, *inter alia*, for trying to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria at the expense of eroding national unity and for behaving submissively towards the EU. The AKP is particularly frowned upon for being the EU's political subcontractor and for ignoring the threats Turkey faced especially regarding Cyprus and the Lausanne Treaty (Avcı, 2011: 442). Bahçeli also denounced the EU's reform packages by renaming them as demolition packages and further claimed that 3 October 2005<sup>31</sup> had been acquired by sacrificing Cyprus (Avcı, 2011: 442).

An overview of the Party programme, publications of the party and speeches of its leading figures lead us to suggest that the MHP displays an extremely sceptical attitude *vis-à-vis* the nature and terms of ongoing relations with the EU on various accounts including national sovereignty, national unity, decision-making autonomy, *status-quo* established by the Lausanne Treaty, the relations with Armenia, and Cyprus question. As such, the MHP even proposed a

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<sup>31</sup> A date for commencement of Turkey's accession talks with the EU.

redefinition of the relations.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, the Party expressed concerns over the terms of accession negotiations with the EU. According to the MHP, the recent past of Turkey's relations with the EU is "a story of disappointment full of blackmail, preconditions, impositions, unjust demands and pressure" (MHP's Election Manifesto, 22 July 2007: 52). Especially after the declaration of terms of accession talks by the EU in the Negotiating Framework Document in 2005, the MHP maintained that EU-Turkey relations reached a stalemate and turned out to be a kind of trusteeship. Therefore, it is urgent that the nature and ground of those relations be reconsidered. The party is of the view that "Turkey is so powerful a country that it can portray problems and resolve them on its own", for this reason, "(...) relations with the EU should neither be perceived as fate nor a matter of identity" (MHP's Election Manifesto, 2007: 53; 2011: 188). The manifesto further made it clear that "Turkey is not bound to be dragged along the orbit of the EU at any cost" (MHP, 2007: 53).

The MHP's immensely unfavourable approach towards the current terms and model of relationship with the EU can be construed from elaborations made by the Party leadership following the signing of the Framework Document. Accordingly, the MHP claimed that the EU lacks a clear political will to include Turkey as an equal member with others because the EU strategy locates Turkish-EU relations in a 'center-periphery' framework, which would like to guarantee that Turkey is anchored within its orbit. The road map defined by the Framework Document is thus believed to be an "address of dead-end street" which would put

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<sup>32</sup> The suggestion for a redefinition of the nature, the framework and the ground of relations with the EU has been made in several official documents of the party such as "*İşte! AKP'nin AB Yol Haritası: Çıkılmaz Sokak*" [At a Dead End: The AKP's EU Road Map], MHP Araştırma ve Geliştirme Merkezi, Ankara, 2005; "*MHP Seçim Beyannamesi*" [The MHP's Election Manifesto], 22 July 2007, mhp.org.tr.; "*MHP Parti Programı*" [The MHP's Party Programme], 8 November 2009, Ankara; "*MHP Seçim Bildirgesi*" [The MHP's Party Programme], 2011, Ankara.

Turkey off with an imaginery and open-ended negotiation process, whose ultimate goal does not even embrace full membership (Bahçeli, 2009; MHP Araştırma Geliştirme Merkezi, 2005: 41). Hence, reflecting Turkey's official stance and sharing a common concern with the CHP, the MHP rejected any status short of full membership for Turkey as well (Election Manifesto of the MHP, 2007; 2011). The MHP's criticisms also centered on overemphasis of the absorption capacity by Brussels, which was believed to turn into an additional criteria for Turkey's membership.

All in all, the essence of the MHP's EU policy was based on the conviction that negotiations with the EU should carry on, provided that the EU's stance on matters such as Turkey's national unity and integrity, terrorism and separatism, Cyprus, Greece and Armenia would not impair Turkey's national interests (MHP Election Manifesto, 22 July 2007). The MHP even urged that "a period of strategic thinking" is required for both the EU and Turkey so as to make a straightforward reevaluation concerning the future course of relations (MHP, 2007: 53). The MHP's hardened rhetoric towards the Turkey-EU relations continued following its 2007 election success.

Indeed, there has been an observable shift in the MHP's rhetoric and intensity of criticisms, once the party's hawkish and explicitly hostile stance to the extent of demanding a redefinition of the nature of Turkey-EU relations in the aftermath of 2002 elections is compared to its moderate and cool-headed approach while in government between 1999-2002 (Avcı, 2011). A number of factors underpinning such disparity would include a general disillusionment with the curtailment of Turkey's accession talks due to the Cyprus problem; declining public support for the EU; the "mainstreaming effect of being in government" (Avcı, 2004: 198), in

contrast to being in opposition; and the rising tide of nationalism (also see Öniş, 2003 and Avcı, 2011).

Alongside its reservations pertaining to relations with the EU, the MHP has seriously opposed the EU's handling of the Cyprus problem, the AKP's blind eyed enthusiasm for Europe and its support for the Annan Plan. From the very beginning, the MHP resisted any kind of compromise solution on the Cyprus issue. Instead, it preferred the continuation of independence of the TRNC with closer links with Turkey (Öniş, 2003). The MHP endorses the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey and its official position conceives Cyprus as the most important national cause of Turkey. The party also maintains the view that Turkey enjoys indispensable and undisputable legal rights and obligations over Cyprus stemming from the founding treaties of London and Zurich and that Cyprus' EU membership is in contravention of these treaties.

The MHP's election manifesto of 2007 maintained that Turkey's guarantorship rights over Cyprus should not be diluted or damaged under any conditions for the sake of a political settlement of the issue. In addition, the parameters for the solution of the Cyprus dispute should be based on a bi-zonal, bi-national (not 'bi-communal') partnership composed of two states (Bahçeli, 2009; MHP Election Manifesto, 2007; MHP Party Programme, 8 November 2009). Thus, it would be apt to argue that the MHP is in favor of the *status quo* in Cyprus but does not reject a confederal solution based on the existence of two separate states, as has been propounded by the former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş and some Turkish state officials since 1998.

For instance, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli termed the EU ‘the main stumbling block for the settlement’ because they allowed Cyprus to join the Union in 2004 in contravention of international law, and concomitantly discouraged Greek Cypriots from settling the problem (Bahçeli 2002).<sup>33</sup> In fact, the MHP even claimed that the Greek Cypriots have indirectly achieved *enosis* through their EU membership (MHP, 2003: 9; MHP, 2009: 1).<sup>34</sup> Besides, the stipulations of the Framework Document concerning Cyprus were denounced on the account that a solution of Cyprus dispute has been moved to the EU platform alongside the UN, because the former stated that a solution had to be in conformity with the UN parameters and the principles upon which the EU is founded. For the MHP, this would invalidate the London and Zurich Treaties which laid down the legal ground of Turkish and Turkish Cypriots’ presence on the island (MHP Araştırma ve Geliştirme Merkezi, 2005).

Furthermore, the Party opposed paragraph 7 of the document as it would pave the way for an eventual membership of Cyprus to NATO. Turkey was:

required to progressively align its policies (...) and its positions within international organizations (including in relation to the membership by all EU Member States of those organizations and arrangements) with the policies and positions adopted by the Union and its Member States.

Although the Presidency of EU Council at the time had declared that this paragraph shall not be interpreted as a hinderance for Turkey’s decision making

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<sup>33</sup> In 2002 (Copenhagen European Council), the EU agreed to make Cyprus an EU member in 2004 even in the absence of a final settlement.

<sup>34</sup> “*Haysiyet ile Teslimiyetçiliğin Mücadelesi: Kıbrıs Gerçeği ve Annan Planı*” [Struggle Between Honor and Submissiveness: Reality of Cyprus and the Annan Plan], MHP ARGE Merkezi, February 2003, Ankara. Available at [http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr\\_img/\\_mhp2007/files/raporlar/kibris/kibrisraporu.pdf](http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/files/raporlar/kibris/kibrisraporu.pdf). Accessed on 7 December 2014; “*Kıbrıs*” [Cyprus], MHP ARGE Merkezi, 9 February 2009, Ankara. Available at [www.mhp.org.tr](http://www.mhp.org.tr). Accessed on 7 December 2014.



autonomy and rights, for the MHP, the legality and binding nature of this Presidential declaration was questionable since it lacked a consensus among the EU's 25 members, including the Greek Cypriots (MHP Arařtırma ve Geliřtirme Merkezi, 2005).

The MHP highly resented the AKP's policies over Cyprus in the sense that "submissive attitudes and concessions of the government" would trigger a politically and legally dangerous process for the future of Turkish Cypriots and the prospects for settlement (Bahçeli, 2009: 33-35). In the aftermath of the Annan referenda, the MHP leader blamed the government for coercing the Turkish Cypriots to vote in favor of the plan so as to remove the Cyprus hurdle from Turkey's EU membership path (Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez, 2008: 27). Besides, Bahçeli denounced the government's policy of relegating the framework of the solution to the EU (i.e. essentially making it a party to the conflict) because it would put the solution advocating a bi-communal and bi-zonal partnership structure composed of the two states, as well as Turkey's guarantorship rights, in jeopardy. If this process were to continue, he warned, "our national survival will suffer" (Bahçeli 2009, 33-35). In paralel to this view, then MHP Ankara Deputy and retired ambassador, Deniz Bölükbaşı asserted, "despite the fact that it put an end to the false impression that the Turks are against a solution, the government's swift acceptance of the Annan Plan has become a paramount obstacle for Turkey in the long run." He reiterated that the MHP saw Turkey's EU membership as a state policy but reminded that because the EU is composed of Christian states,

cultural and religious differences with Turkey constitute a formidable barrier on Turkey's EU membership (Bölükbaşı, 18 March 2010).<sup>35</sup>

In the post-Helsinki period, the prospect of eventual membership unleashed a process which activated powerful forces in favour of change. In such an atmosphere, the MHP as a hardline veto playing actor seemed unable to reverse or block, even though it can slow down the process by capitalizing on rising nationalist sentiments in Turkish society, as a response largely to perceived vagueness and double standards of the EU *vis-à-vis* Turkish membership and Cyprus problem. Basically, for the MHP, Turkey should enter into the EU as an 'honourable and respected member' not as a 'handicapped' one (MHP, 2007). After all, the party endorsed the idea of full membership but criticized the terms of the negotiations; 'unfair' conditions; and side effects of this process on the national unity, sovereignty and other national interests of Turkey concerning Cyprus, Armenia and Greece.

Overall, having secured itself as pro-establishment with its aggressive Euro-skeptic, 'security and state-first' tone, the MHP balances the government's pro-change and pro-EU policies. In fact, it does so in tandem with the EU's own ambiguity over Turkey's eventual membership and Cyprus policy.

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<sup>35</sup> The text of his speech delivered at the Conference Organized by USAK (*Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu*-Institution of International Strategical Researches) can be found at <http://www.usak.org.tr/haber.asp?id=344>. Accession date is 7 May 2010.

### 5.1.1.3 Facilitating Players

#### 5.1.1.3.1 TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association- *Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*)

Benefiting from liberal democratic atmosphere provided by EU after declaring Turkey as a candidate in 1999, civil society organizations<sup>36</sup> in Turkey have become increasingly vocal in the quest for EU membership and the associated reform process (Terzi, 2010; Öner, 2012). Put differently, formal candidate status granted to Turkey at Helsinki has boosted the credibility of the EU conditionality both in the minds of political elites and the public alike (Öniş, 2006: 282-283). Credible membership perspective in the aftermath of 1999, in turn, contributed to a process of emergence and consolidation of a collectivity of formal facilitating actors in Turkish political landscape who ardently advocated the EU membership with a powerful commitment to undertake related reforms.

Indeed, the EU has played a key role in strengthening civil society actors through providing financial opportunities and EU-wide networks which allowed participation in EU projects and intensified links with European counterparts (Öner, 2012; Terzi, 2012). Above all, the EU has played a central role in inducing legislative reform process in Turkey through its application of conditionality, namely, the Copenhagen criteria. The EU harmonization packages adopted at the Turkish Parliament during the period of 2001-2004, and particularly the introduction of a new Law on Associations in 2004 have

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<sup>36</sup> They can be defined as organizations, generally based on voluntary membership, that strive to influence politics at global, supranational, national or local contexts (Öner, 2012: 99). During the 1990s, not only the numbers of those organizations increased in Turkey, but their capacity and influence started to improve as well (Öner, 2012: 99).

diminished limitations on civil society in Turkey, thereby widening their space for activities in various policy fields, including foreign policy (Öner, 2012: 99-100; Kirişçi, 2006). What is more, in 2005, the European Commission adopted a Communication that specified objectives and priorities for the development of a civil society dialogue between the EU and candidate states (Öner, 2012: 106). The Commission's undertaking intended to improve mutual knowledge and facilitate a debate on societal perceptions and political issues on both sides, which would step up bilateral exchanges and contribute to increased involvement of civil society in political, cultural and economic development of the candidate states (Öner, 2012: 106).

Notwithstanding the economic programme backed by the IMF, it should also be noted that the economic crisis in November 2000 and February 2001, unprecedented in Turkish history since 1923, have contributed to the proliferation of pro-EU groups. Because "transnational business elites" which include "domestic business and the external investor community with an interest in the Turkish economy" started to see credible EU membership perspective as an essential "double anchor" in locking-in the reform process pushed by the IMF, which is conceived beneficial to their long term interests (Öniş, 2002: 14-16). Additionally, the harsh economic crisis has played a key role in garnering support by the public for the reform process as well.

Actually, the pace and extent of the Europeanization of Turkey impinges largely on the development of a fully fledged coalition of facilitating players (Bayer and Öniş, 2010). Ascending influential ingredients of such a coalition comprise civil society organizations, particularly the ones embracing the representatives of big business such as TÜSİAD, which has emerged as a

strongly organized pressure group and is increasingly manifesting itself on the political scene by pushing democratization in Turkish context (Terzi, 2010; Öner, 2012; Ugur and Yankaya, 2008; Bayer and Öniş, 2010; Öniş and Türem, 2002).

TÜSİAD is a voluntary based civil society organisation founded by a group of (twelve) leading Turkish industrialists and businessmen in 1971 with the objective of representing the business world. TÜSİAD has continued to grow within the formal economy and the number of companies, corporate groups or holding companies represented by TÜSİAD members is about 2500 ([www.tusiad.org.tr](http://www.tusiad.org.tr)). As stipulated by the Article 2 of its Charter, the objective of TÜSİAD is:

to contribute to the formation and development of a social order wherein the institutions and rules of the universal principles of human rights, freedom of thought, belief and enterprise, a secular state of law, understanding of participatory democracy, liberal economy, competitive market economy as well as a sustainable environmental balance are adopted. TÜSİAD holds activities; in line with the targets and principles foreseen by Atatürk, in the understanding of Turkey catching and surpassing the modern civilisation level and according to the belief that the business people taking into consideration the equality between women and men in terms of politics, economy and education are the pioneer and entrepreneur group of the society, with the aim of fulfilling the main objective stated above. TÜSİAD aims to establish a unity of thought and action along the lines of the objectives stated above by communicating, on behalf of the Turkish business world, the opinions and recommendations formed within this framework to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the government, other states, international bodies and the public opinion either directly or indirectly via the media or other instruments.

The underlying reasons for business groups in pushing for democratization in international and Turkish context is widely discussed elsewhere<sup>37</sup> and lies beyond the confines of this study. Building upon the relevant literature, Bayer

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<sup>37</sup> For example, see Öniş and Türem (2001); (2002); Bayer and Öniş (2010).

and Öniş (2010) assert that in Western Europe, the material interests of the bourgeoisie led them to challenge the existing state establishment and caused parliamentary democracy to take place. Research pertaining to late-industrialising countries, on the other hand, especially the case of Latin America, suggests that business opted for authoritarianism because of links with foreign capital and concern for stability (Bayer and Öniş, 2010).

It would suffice here to say that collapse of communism meant the end of U.S. support for authoritarian regimes to curb communism. Also by the help of advancements in media and communications sector, the legitimacy of authoritarian governments was highly undermined. Proliferation of the process of market-driven neoliberal economic agenda created further pressures for democratization through its emphasis on ‘better governance’, denoting smaller, accountable and law-abiding states, as an essential factor for attaining global competitiveness (Öniş and Türem, 2001). Thus increased interdependence required conformance to global norms as a requisite for foreign direct investment (Öniş and Türem, 2002). Such a linkage between democracy, better governance and competitiveness was underpinned by the IMF and the World Bank as well. The dissemination of neoliberalism is also related to democracy in terms of the urgency to conform to norms of civil and human rights. In this context, societies entering into direct relationship with the EU to become a member and extract material benefits from it, were also exposed to the democratic part of EU conditionality. Thus, particularly business groups, among them externally-oriented ones, as winners of economic globalization, have come into direct relationship with these global pressures (Öniş and Türem, 2001).

According to Öniş and Türem (2001), domestic factors behind a campaign for democratization underpins the fact that in late-industrializing countries business groups emerge as a key agent for industrialization and capital accumulation which has been stimulated by centralized state. Businessmen in this context have come into direct and personalized contact with the state so as to preserve their interests thereby entrapping into highly clientalistic pattern of relationship. If a stable and predictable macro-economic environment is created by authoritarian state, it is highly unlikely that they will challenge the established state and state-society relations by emerging as pro-democracy forces (Öniş and Türem, 2001). Nonetheless, once capital accumulation reaches a point of maturity and business become globally competitive, it becomes less dependent on state resources in a more liberal context, where it can obtain international financial opportunities via borrowing from international banks or forging strategic partnerships with transnational corporations. As a result, reduced economic dependence on the state generates pressures for democratization (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 97; Öniş and Türem, 2002).

As a corollary to this background, business associations have pushed for democratization particularly in the 1990s to varying degrees. It is in this particular environment that TÜSİAD emerged as an association which vocally stresses the urgency of democratic reforms, protection of the individual *vis-à-vis* the state and the process of Turkey's European vocation more than any other in Turkey (Öniş and Türem, 2002). Likewise, TÜSİAD differs from other associations with regard to its global reach of activities because its lobbying capabilities extend beyond Turkey to influence key governments and entities such as the United States and the EU. TÜSİAD strengthened its international

representation by the establishment of offices first in Brussels (in 1995) and then in Washington, Berlin, Paris and Beijing, among others, which exemplifies its command of an intensive network activity ([www.tusiad.org.tr](http://www.tusiad.org.tr)). Its membership to EU-wide business organizations such as *BusinessEurope* has enabled TÜSİAD to lobby the EU in Brussels, but also to lobby Turkish decision-makers through Brussels (Terzi, 2010: 69). TÜSİAD is perhaps the most vocal facilitating player within civil society in its plea for the extension of civil and human rights as well as the establishment of a transparent and accountable state. Its influence comes from its financial resources and superior organizational and mobilizational capacities when compared to other business associations and groups within civil society (Öniş and Türem, 2002: 450).

In effect, the bulk of TÜSİAD's work involves dissemination of information to shape public opinion (Özbudun, 1999: 134). Its views are predominantly communicated through its monthly bulletin, *Görüş*, and the English version, *Private view*, in addition to research-based reports on the economic situation, government policies as well as other social and political problems identified in its Charter.

During the first two decades after its foundation, the association focused on economic issues by publishing regular reports with the aim of improving economic policy at macro and structural levels and influencing the direction of neo-liberal policies implemented after 1980. In the early 1990s, TÜSİAD pushed for legal and institutional reforms with the objective of improving the institutional capacity of the Turkish economy (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 588). The push for policy reform was justified with an image of defending the 'public



interest': what was good for business interest could also be beneficial for the country at large (Öniş and Türem, 2002).

A discernable shift came in the late 1990s when TÜSİAD started to have a particular interest over the issue of democratization and foreign policy and endeavoured to publicize its views on a wide variety of related fields such as good governance, election system, human rights, rule of law, independence of judiciary, Turkey's membership to the EU and Cyprus issue, mostly via sponsoring reports commissioned by academicians. The widening of TÜSİAD's vision to embrace democratization and political reforms coincided with the conclusion of the EU-Turkey customs union at the end of 1995 (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 588). No doubt, TÜSİAD's studies signified its willingness to redesign its pattern of relations with the state in order to terminate what is regarded discriminatory and individualized access to state resources.<sup>38</sup> Evidently, TÜSİAD highlighted its desire in favour of a smaller, more accountable and neutral state, what is called 'optimal state', as well as the implementation of the rule of law as a means of accomplishing a stable and predictable environment in which a competitive market system and private capital could flourish. Also, the 'optimal state' was considered essential for the association, in order to protect itself from arbitrary and discriminatory behavior of the state as well as from the distributional pressures and populist demands of labour, farmers and other parts of society (Öniş and Türem, 2002: 446).

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<sup>38</sup> Yet, it should not be taken to mean that TÜSİAD's dependence on the state is totally eliminated. In fact, large-scale business in Turkey continues to have asymmetrical access to state resources, particularly in terms of its ability to get subsidies and borrow from public banks. Also they are significant lender to the state with a high-interest lending to the Treasury. Since the military is an important economic player in Turkey, linkages between the activities of the military and those of a number of large private firms should also be taken into account (Öniş and Türem, 2002).

The *modus operandi* of the TÜSİAD was aptly described by its former president, Sahap Kocatopçu:

TÜSİAD, in carrying out its activities, will be close to the governments according to the degree of their loyalty to a free market economy and [a] mixed economy. But this does not entail being close to a [political] party...If we wish the dialogue with the government to continue, TÜSİAD should take up problems instead of discussing them in the open....Many persons who are in fierce competition with each other in many fields of business have agreed on a common denominator in TÜSİAD. The points that are agreed upon are: (1) Defending democracy; (2) staying outside the orbit of a political party; (3) giving priority to the country's interests (Özbudun, 1999: 134).

TÜSİAD also actively buttressed Republican principles, most notably secularism (Bayer and Öniş, 2010). Apparently, in striking contrast to its highly liberal approach towards the issue of ethnicity and minority rights, the association is rather conservative concerning attempts to question the boundaries of the secular state. For example, it was willing to stand behind the 28 February process owing to its preference for a secular system and the promise of political stability (Patton, 2007: 342). For example, TÜSİAD did not oppose the banning of the Islamist Welfare Party in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court on the account that it was incompatible with the principles of liberal democracy (Öniş and Türem, 2002: 451).

TÜSİAD's efforts in promoting civil and human rights preceded the Helsinki Summit. Indeed, TÜSİAD started to construct a linkage between EU membership and political reform in late 1990s (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008). Its controversial and influential report, *Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey*<sup>39</sup>, published in 1997, outlined a series of democratic reforms particularly concerning the

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<sup>39</sup> The full-text can be found at <http://www.tusiad.org/english/rapor/demokratik/index.html>

extention of minority rights, constitutional reform, reform of the party system and establishing civilian control over the military. The report explicitly took the prospect of EU membership as a reference point and justified its reform proposals on that ground. Hence, it was widely discussed in the public and garnered resentment not only from the military, public and other segments of the establishment but from inside as well (Öniş, 2002; 2006; Öniş and Türem, 2001; Ugur and Yankaya, 2008). For instance, a panel debate on human rights organized by TÜSİAD in 1998 tied Turkey's exclusion from EU's Eastward Enlargement (at Luxembourg summit in 1997) to successive governments' failures to adequately address human rights, minority rights and freedom of expression, and an inability to eliminate torture and ill-treatment (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 589).

In parallel to its push for democratization in the domestic political sphere, TÜSİAD has also conducted Brussels-based lobbying activities in order to facilitate a favourable outcome at Helsinki and its aftermath. For instance, Öniş argues that TÜSİAD's active lobbying efforts in Germany and Greece, in addition to Brussels, have been influential in reversing the EU's Luxembourg decision of excluding Turkey from the enlargement process (Öniş, 2000: 474).

With the official candidacy status granted to Turkey at the Helsinki summit of 1999, TÜSİAD started to construct a more explicit linkage between EU conditionality and democratization efforts, hoping that political reforms can be facilitated and made irrevocable through Turkey's EU accession process (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 589). Besides, TÜSİAD was of the opinion that Turkey's EU membership prospect and EU conditionality ensured a sense of legitimacy that would diminish resistance to reforms. Additionally, TÜSİAD's pro-EU stance

primarily rests on the assumption that a strong economic structure can only be established in a politically stable environment. Therefore, Turkey's EU accession is perceived as an anchor for stability in Turkish politics as well as a lever for increased access to European markets (Terzi, 2010: 72; Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 187). Thus, for TÜSİAD, Turkey's full membership to the EU implied modernization and progress on both the economic and political spheres in tandem with Western norms (Bayer and Öniş, 2010:186). By improving the institutional power of Turkish economy and democracy, EU membership would lead to a stable economic and political order which would in turn promote domestic and foreign direct investment and high rates of economic growth (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 186).

The 2001 TÜSİAD report drew a clear connection between economic instability and Turkey's problems in democratization, relating the economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001 to the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government's lack of political determination and its economic and financial mismanagement (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 590; Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 187). The report criticized the National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis*, prepared by the government, for failing to meet the EU's political criteria and called for particular legal amendments pertaining to political parties, the death penalty and individual freedoms (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 187-188).

In a similar vein, during the course of 2002, TÜSİAD played an increasingly salient role in highlighting the urgency of reforms so as to advance on critical areas such as extension of cultural rights as well as finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. For instance, TÜSİAD's 2002 report maintained that the death penalty, cultural rights and personal freedoms constitute major

stumbling blocks on the way to the EU membership (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 188). In an effort to influence policy makers and public opinion alike, it has embarked upon an extensive media campaign and endeavoured to build a mass support for EU membership and attract attention to the concrete material benefits associated with EU membership for the population. That is to say, the association has stressed the necessity of political reforms and settlement of the Cyprus issue as essential building blocks to take advantage of economic gains from accession to the Union (Öniş, 2002: 13).

As a corollary to adaptational pressures coming from the EU in the course of 2001 and 2002 that mutually agreed settlement on Cyprus would facilitate Turkey's own bid for membership, TÜSİAD has exerted an increased pressure on the government to revise its official policy stance. Through adopting a clear instrumentalist approach and making frequent public statements, the association tried to draw public's attention to the significance of reaching a mutually agreed solution in Cyprus dispute. Hence, it can be safely argued that TÜSİAD has a high but instrumentalist commitment to the EU, by conceiving membership as a means to achieve economic benefits (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 107-109).

Following the November 2002 elections, the AKP government's firm commitment to fiscal discipline, economic and political reforms and determination to maintain the EU perspective helped to dismiss TÜSİAD's initial doubts concerning the AKP's secularist and reformist credentials, and brought it into close alliance with the latter (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 188; Uğur and Yankaya, 2008: 590-594). Indeed, TÜSİAD even described the AKP government as an opportunity for economic and political stability and for economic and social transformation that Turkey has long desired (Uğur and Yankaya, 2008: 593).

Likewise, the then TÜSİAD Chairman, Ömer Sabancı, depicted the AKP as a conservative democrat party rather than Islamist, while criticizing the CHP for being behind the time (*Milliyet*, 1 March 2004). Nevertheless, he also maintained that TÜSİAD's two main priorities were the economy and the EU but it would challenge backpedalling concerning democracy and secularism (*Milliyet*, 1 March 2004).

After 2005, TÜSİAD started to raise growing concerns over the loss of momentum in Turkey's progress towards EU membership, slowdown in the pace of reforms, inefficient response to economic problems, and perceived anti-secular policies of the government. For instance, the EU's decision to partially suspend negotiations with Turkey was described by the then TÜSİAD Chairman, Ömer Sabancı, as being unfair, claiming that the EU wanted Turkey to accept a status short of full membership (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 190).

Moreover, divergence of opinion with the governing party began to surface as TÜSİAD has consistently called for reforms in areas including limiting the President's responsibilities, lowering the national voting threshold to five per cent, the sharp curtailment of Islamic clerical schools (*İmam Hatip Lisesi- İHL*) by converting them into vocational schools, thereby making it difficult for their graduates to enter universities (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 191).

TÜSİAD indicated further its concerns over secularism when the AKP attempted to permit the wearing of headscarves in universities and public offices as well as to enable İHL graduates to enter universities by assigning a higher coefficient to their entrance exam grades. The association voiced opposition to the former arguing that the issue of headscarves cannot be tied to discussions of

women's rights and was not among the country's priorities (Bayer and Öniş, 2010: 192). Concerning the latter, TÜSİAD argued that political tension fostered by the AKP's proposals was only serving to deaden the real issue of the modernization of the education system in Turkey (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 596).

In a vocal opposition to EU's policy on Cyprus, hostility toward perceived AKP concessions to the Kurdish population, and through a fear of perceived anti-secular policies of the government, the Eurosceptic veto playing coalition, composed of the military, CHP and MHP, began to capitalize on a nationalist backlash. As a result, the AKP choose to truncate its support to EU process and adopted state-centric and security-oriented policies in areas of minority rights and democratization (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 595). Despite its criticisms, TÜSİAD continuously urged the government to maintain the reform momentum and revitalize the EU accession process.

For instance, the then TÜSİAD Chairwoman, Arzuhan Doğan-Yalçındağ, has made it clear that the association's priority for the recent years is the EU process and economic reforms (*Milliyet*, 18 January 2010). Nonetheless, she lamented that these issues have dropped from the AKP government's agenda after 2007 which in turn led to weakening of TÜSİAD's prior ties with the government. Recently, TÜSİAD renewed its interest over the Cyprus problem as well. During a visit to the TRNC on 5 March 2010, the then TÜSİAD Chairwoman, Ümit Boyner, has declared the association's support to the ongoing negotiations on the island with a view that political solution of the problem is seen as essential for the economic development of the TRNC ([www.trthaber.com](http://www.trthaber.com), 5 March 2010). Besides, she pointed to the fact that an improvement of investment opportunities

in Northern Cyprus is heavily dependent upon the political conjuncture, more precisely, a continuation of negotiations.

By the same token, as part of its external lobbying activities in the EU member states, TÜSİAD has also intensified its efforts to accelerate the pace of negotiations between Turkey and the EU. For example, in a visit to Spain during the latter's EU Presidency, it not only asked for a support for opening four chapters during Spanish Presidency but also emphasized that the implementation of the Direct Trade Regulation as promised by the EU would be an important building block for settlement of the dispute.

Another example to its recent active involvement in the Cyprus dispute would be the comprehensive report prepared by TÜSİAD in 2009 (TÜSİAD-T/2009-03/483, March 2009). The report emphasizes the economic potential to be produced by a probable settlement; provides suggestions to endemic structural problems of the TRNC; and proposes policy options in the event that a negotiated settlement is arrived.

It needs to be underlined that the strength of the contribution that TÜSİAD, as a vocal component of facilitating players in Turkey, can make to the Europeanization process hinges considerably on the continuation of a credible membership perspective given by the EU. This argument becomes especially relevant in the aftermath of 2005 when accession talks with Turkey opened. Mixed signals as to the indefinite membership of Turkey, the negative public opinion in European countries nurtured by some EU leaders, perceived double standards as to negotiation terms, the failure of the EU to hold to its promise *vis-à-vis* Turkish Cypriots, the deadlock in the negotiations due to Cyprus issue, all



weaken the hands and weight, if not commitment, of TÜSİAD in pushing for compliance with EU conditionality in public. Put differently, the current deadlock in the relations with the EU over Cyprus as well as the EU's ambiguous promise of rewards seemingly display a setback for TÜSİAD in making the public believe in the need for reforms and solution in Cyprus.

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to suggest that the current stalemate in negotiations over Cyprus undermined the commitment of the association in pushing for a Europeanization agenda in Turkey. Rather, bearing in mind the widespread resentment in both the government and public at large *vis-à-vis* what could be regarded as ill-treatment of Turkish Cypriots by the EU, TÜSİAD concentrates its efforts on three interrelated issues: urging the EU to fulfill its promises (for example, Direct Trade Regulation); highlighting its strong preference for the endurance of recent negotiations between two communities on the island (2008-2012 and 2013-2014 processes); and disseminating information about possible economic gains as well as investment and employment opportunities to emerge in the North out of a final settlement. Thus, it would be apt to suggest that being cognizant of the fact that the Cyprus impasse is a formidable barrier to Turkey's accession to the EU, TÜSİAD, with its considerable clout in Turkish politics, command of vast resources and high public visibility, still continues to act as the most enthusiastic facilitating player in favour of the solution of the Cyprus dispute, even more so than the government.

### **5.1.1.3.2 AKP (Justice and Development Party- *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)**

Although the pro-EU reforms in Turkey goes back to the period just before 1999 when Turkey was formally granted a candidacy status by the EU, when coming to power in 2002, the AKP government prioritized Turkey's accession to the EU as a foreign policy goal and took steps towards fulfilling the accession criteria. Indeed, following the 3 November 2002 parliamentary elections in Turkey, the AKP won a landslide victory in subsequent elections. By immediately establishing itself as one of the most vocal facilitating player in Turkey with its pro-EU and pro-Western outlook and neoliberal economic policies, the AKP, as a ruling party, became an ardent supporter of Turkey's membership to the EU.

As already emphasized by the party leader and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan "Turkey's EU accession process is the country's indispensable foreign policy target and that Turkey continues to take required steps for full membership" (TNN Haber, 2008 quoted in Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 68). In order to illustrate the commitment of the new AKP government to the quest for EU membership, Erdoğan himself embarked upon a high profile EU campaign in European capitals to acquire a date to be fixed for the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey in the forthcoming Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, though at the summit Turkey could not get what it wanted because it was only offered 'a date for a date'. In spite of a change in Turkey's rhetoric over Cyprus on the one hand, and British (and American) keen efforts in favour of fixing a firm date for Turkey, on the other, the EU Council declared that Turkish

accession talks would start “as soon as possible” after a review of its progress on democracy and human rights at the Brussels European Council in December 2004.<sup>40</sup>

As a matter of fact, until December 2002, Turkish-EU relations with regard to Cyprus can be best portrayed as a ‘dialogue of deafs’. While the EU insisted that the pre-accession strategy for Turkey is linked with improvement of its relations with Greece and its contribution to the Cyprus dispute, Turkey for its part, denied the linkage strategy of EU and argued that a solution to the Cyprus problem belongs to the two communities on the island; therefore they should solve it. With the newly elected Turkish government in December 2002, some aspects of Turkish Cyprus policy were redesigned. To exemplify, for the first time at the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, the AKP government accepted that Turkey’s accession process and resolution of Cyprus dispute is inextricably intertwined. The same summit guaranteed Cyprus membership in 2004.

The party’s approach to the EU should not be evaluated simply as a ‘foreign policy’ issue but should also be understood in the context of its domestic political concerns. As already known, apart from economic benefits, the official rhetoric of Turkish Republic concerning EU membership process would imply not solely the importance of becoming part of a prestigious club but also the confirmation of Republican ideals such as Westernization and modernization. For the AKP, however, it is not understood in such an ideological perspective; instead, its outlook is based on both instrumental and in many areas internalized considerations (personal interview with a former AKP deputy, 3 June 2010, Ankara). In other words, the idea of Turkey’s accession to the EU is significant

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<sup>40</sup> For the reasons of failure see Robins (2003: 555-556).

for the AKP in terms of both as a ‘target’ (a strategic priority) and as having ‘an end in itself’, though the latter is more prioritized due to transformative and ‘beneficial’ effects for Turkey (personal interview with a former AKP deputy, 3 June 2010, Ankara).

The AKP government’s energetic drive towards political and economic liberalization and EU membership was based upon several convictions. One of them relates to the idea that if Turkey is to avoid the security risks and challenges (dismemberment and fragmentation) of the globalization process, it needs to be integrated with the global community through EU accession process by evolving into a liberal-pluralistic democracy (Kirişçi, 2004). It is believed that the idea of granting more individual freedoms and sharing more portions of sovereignty with non-state actors is also embedded within the EU so that via the accession to the EU, most of the security threats that Turkey faced will be handled. Thus, the AKP enthusiastically adopted a pursuit of EU membership by introducing constitutional amendments and successive reform bills in the Turkish Parliament and it profoundly altered Turkey’s policy towards the Cyprus dispute.

Indeed, the AKP’s ideology hinged on the assumption that Turkey’s current problems stem from its inefficient state organization, bureaucracy, judiciary and malfunctioning liberal democracy. Therefore, only if state structure was to be reformed and a well-functioning liberal economy created would the solution of all other problems of Turkey, including the public role of Islam, be addressed (Tepe, 2005).

In terms of its political identity and ideology, the party presented itself as ‘Conservative Democratic’ according to which Islam is replaced by the more

ambiguous rhetoric of ‘common values’. The party had a self-designated “ambition and determination to endow Turkey with a first-class democracy” in which elected people would be more dominant and respectable *vis-à-vis* the “appointed ones”<sup>41</sup> (personal interview with a former AKP deputy, 3 June 2010, Ankara).

Similarly, pertaining to political considerations, the government’s expectation was to be rewarded with a clear accession perspective which would facilitate the party’s efforts to consolidate Turkish democracy particularly the normalization of civil-military relations (Güvenç, 2006: 54; Ayata, 2002: 272; Robins, 2003; Robins, 2007; Patton, 2007; for an analysis of the AKP’s relations with the military in Turkey see Heper, 2005). To put it more precisely, due to the legacy of the 28 February process, the AKP leaders recognized that their policies would be restricted by a suspicious secular elite, the mass media (controlled by big business) as well as state institutions such as the military and to a large extent the judiciary (i.e. Supreme Court and Constitutional Court) (Ayata, 2002: 272). After all, the two influential domestic players in politics, big business community, who controls the majority of mass media, and the military, had already problematic attitude towards Islamist parties in the past, particularly during the 28 February process. Not surprisingly, in its efforts to demilitarize politics<sup>42</sup>, the AKP has found a natural ally, the EU, whose political accession criteria encompass, *inter alia*, the civilian control of the military. As pointed out by the former AKP Deputy, owing largely to failure of the EU to keep its promises dated 26 April 2004 towards ending isolations of Turkish Cypriots as well as the European

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<sup>41</sup> Meaning ‘office holders’ or ‘government employees’ including military, judicial and foreign policy bureaucracy.

<sup>42</sup> The term ‘demilitarization of politics’ is actually used by Robins (2003).

Council's decision in November 2006 to partially suspend accession talks with Turkey on the account of Ankara's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol, allegations were directed at the AKP for being 'reform fatigue'. An apparent slowing down of reform process in the face of 'unjust' EU policies in Cyprus was also nurtured by the opposition of veto players such as the CHP, MHP and the military, who managed to enjoy increased nationalist sentiments in the public. Therefore, covering the period between 2005 when negotiations were launched, until March 2008, when the AKP was brought to the edge of closing down because of the lawsuit filed by the Supreme Court, the pace of reform process seemed to have slowed down, if not downplayed. Upon the Supreme Court's action brought against the party in power elected by %47 of the votes, the AKP leadership rediscovered the vitality of the 'EU anchor' in the 'normalization of Turkey' once again, especially in view of the 'Venice Criteria' applied in the EU member states regulating closing down of political parties (personal interview with a former AKP deputy, 3 June 2010, Ankara).

Secondly, the AKP government has an economic interest in membership to EU in that Turkey would attract more foreign investment if it is grasped to be a stable democracy participating in Western community of nations (Oğuzlu, 2005: 93; Tocci, 2005; Güvenç, 2006: 53; Ayata, 2002: 273; Patton, 2007). Specifically, a clear membership perspective to be given by the Commission would lead to an influx of foreign direct investment that the Turkish economy needs. In addition to foreign investment, two other economic considerations for the AKP are postulated: first a well-functioning economy would help the AKP government retain political support and second, newly emerging Islamic bourgeoisie (mostly Anatolian-based), constituting the most powerful group in

the Party itself, is eager to establish economic relations with the West (Ayata, 2002: 273). In other words, the prioritization of EU membership (together with commitment to liberal economy) would engulf the AKP with strategic endorsement of business community who would like to strengthen their commercial and financial ties with Europe (Ayata, 2002: 272-273). In turn, the new Party's embracement of free market economy, eagerness to make structural reforms in order to attain transparency and accountability and to attract foreign investment as well as its promise of political stability boosted business confidence in favour of the government (Patton, 2007: 342). As mentioned before, although being supportive of 28 February measures due to its secular political credentials, the TÜSİAD, big business community who suffered from failure of the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government (1999-2002) to address structural economic reforms, corruption and economic stagnation and economic crisis of 2000-2001, had come to pledge a cautious endorsement to the AKP government (Patton, 2007: 342). Behind the Euro-enthusiasm of the AKP laid mutually reinforcing economic and political considerations.

The third consideration is connected with the 'war on terror' to which Turkey's membership would contribute both hard and soft security sources for the Union. The attractiveness of Turkey as a model of a working democracy in the Muslim world would be augmented with the EU-driven reforms in pre-accession period. The argument that Turkey as a modernized and democratic Islamic country would be an asset for the EU has also been exemplified by then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in an interview to the BBC "to modernize an Islamic country [Turkey] based on the shared values of Europe,

would be almost a D-Day in the war against terror” (Güvenç, 2006: 49).<sup>43</sup> Thought this way, further democratization and liberalization through the EU accession process would be important tools to combat religious extremism. In other words, the AKP’s approach underpins that “for Turkey’s secular democracy to be attractive for others, it needs to be reconstituted within a liberal-pluralistic framework” (Oğuzlu, 2005).

Fourthly, a strong motivation behind the AKP’s pro-EU and pro-reformist orientation was to boost its legitimacy and to allay concerns about its Islamic past and ‘hidden Islamic agenda’ in the eyes of both the international community and the secular establishment in Turkey. As the 28 February measures unleashed the vulnerability of Islamist movements *vis-à-vis* the military-led secular establishment in Turkey, a reconsideration of Islamist identity and politics in the form of political moderation and a reduced emphasis on a distinctive Islamic identity in domestic and foreign policy was prioritized (Ayata, 2002: 272). In effect, the coalition government of Welfare-True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP*) and its veteran Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan had been removed from power by a successful campaign led by the military establishment in 1997 (the 28 February process). What is more, in the mid 1990s, the Islamist parties (Welfare Party and its successor Virtue Party) had been both closed down by the Constitutional Court. Apart from forcing the Erbakan-led government to resign, the 28 February measures reinforced the state’s ability to combat ‘religious reactionism and ethnic separatism’ as well. At that time, the identity oriented discourse adopted by the Welfare Party emphasized rather the Christian

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<sup>43</sup> The term ‘D-Day’ refers to the day when German occupation in the European continent was terminated by the allied landing in Normandy. The analogy mentions the possibility of putting an end to international terror and clash of civilizations through Turkey’s EU membership.



nature of the EU and defined the Party's mission as the protection of Turkish society's values against those of the EU (Interview with Abdullah Gül, 23 December 1994, quoted from Robins, 2007: 292).

However, learning from the experience of 28 February, a younger and modernized generation of political figures differentiated their views from their traditionalist pupils and established the AKP in 2001. Unlike its predecessor, the AKP initially rejected the pursuit of identity politics by moderating the political Islamist movement with a vigilant avoidance of explicit ideological confrontation with Kemalist establishment, due to a combination of generational, instrumental, pragmatic and strategic considerations. Thus, the political survival of this fledgling party was seen by the AKP leadership as lying in the political discourse of democracy, pluralism, human rights, the prevention of military's encroachment to politics on which the EU is based and would like to have Turkey fully adopted (Robins, 2003: 553; for a more deliberate discussion on AKP's ideology see Jenkins, 2003). The European orientation of the new government had to do with its political ideology in the sense that by using a discourse that downplayed religious roots and refusing to be named an 'Islamist' party, the AKP's political discourse is based upon achieving greater religious 'freedoms' (i.e. use of headscarves in official buildings and universities, among others). That is to say, instrumentally, democratic freedoms that would be attained during the EU accession process would safeguard Islamist lifestyles. This in turn would satisfy the electoral constituency of the party, including both conservatives and liberals.

According to Tocci (2005), to carry a consistent political message, the AKP advocated individual freedoms in areas such as freedom of speech,

multiculturalism and linguistic spheres which could be easily accommodated within Western values and democracy. Indeed, the pragmatic approach of the AKP, as a vanguard of liberal democracy and EU membership bid as well as its ideologically detached discourse positioned it in the center-right of the political spectrum thereby allowing it to appeal to a broader electorate base as opposed to its Islamist predecessors (Patton, 2007: 343).

Therefore, the unprecedented reform process that Turkey had been undergoing since 2001 (in fact 1999) had an end in itself. In other words, the political objectives to be attained during the pre-accession period is regarded more important than the membership itself.<sup>44</sup> AKP officials have repeatedly emphasized this point by renaming the Copenhagen criteria ‘Ankara criteria’. Evidentially, Erdoğan himself made it clear concerning Turkey’s relations with the EU that “we are aware that we shall have a long way to go. And I am not totally unhappy with this fact. For I attach importance to the quality involved in this road, rather than the distance” (Erdoğan, 2004).

As indicated in the sixtieth government programme prepared by the AKP in 2007, the European accession process is treated not solely as a matter of integration but rather as an all-encompassing process of restructuring that would upgrade Turkey’s political, economic, social and legal standards. In tandem with this approach, the AKP government announced a decision in 2007 to rapidly move forward with the reform process in a wide range of areas, regardless of whether chapters are opened in the negotiations (60th Government Programme of the AKP, Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic).

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<sup>44</sup> This point was confirmed by a former AKP deputy in an interview with the author conducted at the Turkish Parliament on 3 June 2010 in Ankara, Turkey.

As a matter of fact, the AKP's party programme of 2007<sup>45</sup> stressed that Turkey had long been in close relationship with Europe in both geographical and historical perspectives. Therefore, relations with European countries occupied a predominant place on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. As far as relations with the EU is concerned, it was postulated that Turkey would immediately fulfill its commitments and conditions demanded from other candidates too, thereby preventing artificial problems from occupying the agenda.

Regarding a settlement of the Cyprus problem, the approach of the AKP –as emphasized in the Programme- did reflect the conventional Turkish foreign policy stance over the issue. It was based on the argument that the Turkish Cypriots' presence on the island with their identity and right to self-determination could not be disregarded. Thus any possible solution should be based on a consensus to be reached by the two 'states' present on the island. It was also stressed in conformity with traditional Turkish policy that the EU decision to allow Greek Cyprus to accede made the problem even more complex.

The foreign policy orientation of the Erdoğan government<sup>46</sup> aspires to make Turkey a regional power and an effective global actor pursuing a proactive and dynamic foreign policy. Concomitantly, rather than treating relations with Brussels in simplistic bilateral relations, Turkish-EU dialogue is located within the broader regional and global context of Turkish foreign policy. To put it more precisely, Turkish-EU relations is given a considerable importance in eradication of tensions that threaten global peace and in mushrooming international cooperation concerning key areas such as international terrorism, cultural

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<sup>45</sup> See AK PARTİ Programı [The AK Party Programme]. The document can be accessed at [http://web.akparti.org.tr/disiliskiler/vi-dis-politika-\\_79.html?pID=50](http://web.akparti.org.tr/disiliskiler/vi-dis-politika-_79.html?pID=50). Accessed on 7 September 2009.

<sup>46</sup> For a detailed elaboration on foreign policy orientation of the AKP, see Ayata (2004); Murinson (2006); Patton (2007); Robins (2007).

conflicts and energy security (60th Government Programme of the AKP, Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic, 2007).

What is more, relations with the EU are not regarded by the Party as one and only, or a *sine qua non* element of Turkish foreign policy, but rather as a subset of a broader foreign policy outlook alongside different regions around Turkey such as the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Caucasus. To a large extent influenced and directed by the former foreign policy advisor of PM Erdoğan, the former Foreign Minister and current PM, Ahmet Davutoğlu, it is basically believed that Turkey enjoys ‘strategical depth’ due to its historical, geographical, cultural, ethnical and religious links with those regions where she could assert its influence. According to this view, in stark contrast to 1970s and 1980s when Ankara used to act as the watchhouse of the West, now it is located at the epicenter of those regions stated above, whereas Cyprus lies at the center of Eastern Mediterranean. In this regard, the Party’s overall policy of the EU, Cyprus and its domestic political ideology and considerations should be analyzed together, rather than separately (personal interview with a former AKP deputy, 3 June 2010, Ankara).

Undoubtedly, the 17 December 2004 decision of the EU to open accession talks with Turkey ushered a new era in Turkish-EU relations. The AKP government claimed the decision served a dual function: first, it gave a fresh impetus to almost 50 year efforts of integration with the EU and second, it added an institutional dimension to Turkey’s willingness to become a regional and global actor (60th Government Programme of the AKP, Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic, 2007). Concerning Cyprus, the AKP government admitted that Turkey’s Cyprus policy is based on two strategic pillars: to increase the

international ‘effectiveness’ (not recognition) of the TRNC at every area on the one hand, and to preserve the balance and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the other (60th Government Programme of the AKP, Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic).

That being said, the AKP government had previously challenged the *status-quo* on the island since 1974 by advocating a policy change in Cyprus with a policy statement that “no solution in Cyprus is not a solution” as can be exemplified in Erdoğan’s own words “Let us stop burying our heads in the sand. Hawkish policies will get us nowhere” (Erdoğan, 25 November 2002 quoted in Robins, 2003: 558). Apparently, the newly formed AKP government perceived the Cyprus problem as its foreign policy priority and as a stumbling block on the way towards EU membership (Robins, 2007: 297). By endorsing the Annan Plan’s vision of a single state with two self-governing zones, the new government’s *anti-status quo* and ‘win-win’ stance over Cyprus had marked a drastic departure from the previous Turkish policy of pledging passive support for the negotiations towards a settlement in Cyprus on a confederal basis (Süvarierol, 2003: 70).

Another aspect of the then new policy was to reverse the longstanding perception that Turks had been the reluctant and obstructionist party in the peace talks over the Cyprus impasse. Instead, the attempt was to give the message that Turkish side should always keep a psychological superiority over Greek Cypriots by being receptive to new peace proposals as well as by throwing the matter into the court of Greek Cypriots (Robins, 2007: 297). The new stance in fact was uttered by Abdullah Gül as “We will always be one step ahead. We will not walk away” (quoted in Robins, 2007: 297).

By grasping the link between Turkey's Cyprus policy –contrary to the previous official position which refused such a linkage, Prime Minister Erdoğan thought that the Cyprus policy should be changed to reach a settlement if Turkey's bid for membership was to be realized. To that end, he tried to persuade European leaders with a person-to-person diplomacy, to the dislike of the Turkish Foreign Ministry,<sup>47</sup> that granting Turkey a date for negotiations with the EU would certainly facilitate a solution in Cyprus (Erdoğan, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 November 2002). The AKP government, for its part, made Turkey's possible active contribution to the settlement (ending the division of island before its accession) as conditional upon Turkey's own membership aspirations.<sup>48</sup> Accordingly, the AKP government began to take conciliatory steps toward the solution by encouraging the TRNC's President Denktaş as well as the state establishment in Turkey to accept the Annan plan as a basis for negotiations.

As opposed to what they regarded as the 'statist', 'nationalist' and 'uncompromising' policies of their predecessors, the AKP government's pro-active and pro-solution approach towards Cyprus problem was defended by Erdoğan

thanks to our dynamic Cyprus policy (...), Turkey has not only gained a tremendous psychological superiority but it has also augmented international legitimacy and effectiveness of TRNC (60th Government Programme of AKP, 2007).

Erdoğan defended his government's 'active' Cyprus policy on the account that "Turkey (...) has earned a remarkable capability of maneuver at the

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<sup>47</sup> For example, at a weekly Press briefing, the Ministry made it clear with a tacid reaction that Cyprus problem is a state policy and naturally, state policies require continuity.

<sup>48</sup> For example see "Önce tarih, sonra Kıbrıs", [First date, then Cyprus], *Türkiye*, 8 December 2002; "Kıbrıs yolu tarihten geçer", [The Road to Cyprus passes through the date], *Radikal*, 8 December 2002.

international arena without giving even the slightest concession from our national interests” (60th Government Programme of AKP, *the author’s translation*, Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic, 2007). In a speech delivered at Oxford University on 28 May 2004<sup>49</sup>, he blamed the EU for its decision to allow Greek Cypriots becoming an EU member without a solution:

since the 1994 Corfu European Council, we have drawn attention to the EU’s erroneous decision to accept the Greek Cypriots unilaterally. [R]egretfully, the side that did not show the same will power, conscience and responsible attitude has become an EU member. The Union has thus imported an international issue.

Upon Cyprus’ membership to the EU on 1 May 2004, Erdoğan hinted at Turkey’s policy response and priority to ensure “that the Turkish Cypriots, who voted for a solution, should no longer be punished” and called for the international community to take “effective and bold steps” to end their isolation (Erdoğan, 2004). With regard to the Cyprus problem’s repercussions on Turkish-EU relations he maintained that “we cannot accept Turkey-EU relations to be over-shadowed by the Cyprus issue any more” (Erdoğan, 2004). Obviously, the latter point represents a back-peddalling from his prior position based on the acknowledgement of the linkage between the two.

Erdoğan’s messages in fact were directed to the international community, to Greek Cypriots and to the EU that inter-communal peace negotiations in Cyprus could not continue forever. Thus, the previous Cyprus peace process started at 3 September 2008 had been seen as the last opportunity for reaching a comprehensive settlement. For Erdoğan, unless an agreement was reached by the end of 2010, there would be no justification for the international community in

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<sup>49</sup> See the speech by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan titled “Why the EU Needs Turkey” delivered in Oxford on 28 May 2004.

punishing Turkish Cypriots with the result that Turkey would pledge to eradicate those sanctions. For AKP officials, Erdoğan's messages targeted predominantly the Greek Cypriots, encouraging them to continue inter-communal negotiations. Secondly, his speech involved a warning to the international community that this is the last chance for a negotiated settlement and therefore, external actors are expected to pressurize the Greek Cypriot leadership for a compromise. Lastly, his remarks aimed at preparing the ground for subsequent steps of Turkey in case negotiations failed to bear fruit.<sup>50</sup>

Overall, the AKP government had actively endorsed peace negotiations in Cyprus and "carried on the process of Turkey's accession but at the same time, by adopting an instrumentalist approach, it had cleaned up its home" (i.e., democratization and normalization of civil-military relations, among others) (personal interview with a former AKP deputy, 3 June 2010, Ankara). While doing this, its multi-dimensional foreign policy stance allowed the government to capitalize on Turkey's geostrategical location as well as its geographical and historical links with her neighborhood. Against this backdrop, the EU is considered to be a subset, occupying a single but an important strategical and instrumental aspect in the multi-dimensional foreign policy outlook of the AKP. As already revealed by a former AKP deputy, starting from 2003 onwards, the EU anchor has assumed a paramount role in Turkey in legitimizing the 'change' (personal interview with the author, 3 June 2010, Ankara).

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<sup>50</sup> As of the time of writing, it is still unclear whether or how the Plan-B, with regard to 'peaceful co-existence' of two communities, is going to be implemented by Turkey. Besides, 'Taiwan model' is frequently referred to by officials and bureaucrats as the most feasible solution. However, based on personal interviews at least, what is certain is that AKP is determined to conclude an agreement and equally determined not to leave the table before Greek Cypriots, too.



Hence, by making use of and contributing to the post-1999 pro-EU liberal political environment, the empowered AKP government has made serious efforts to shake *status-quo* in Turkey's Cyprus policy during the period 2002 and 2005. Therefore, it has acted as a facilitating institution in favour of furthering Europeanization process of Turkey's Cyprus policy.

Starting from 2010 onwards, the AKP government has been criticized for its undermined commitment to the EU accession process, detaching from its reformist path and showing authoritarian tendency at home, by the EU institutions (for example, the Commission), domestic pro-EU circles (such as TÜSİAD and opposition parties), and academics. A more self-confident tone has been observed concerning the relations with the EU as well, which was reflected: “the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU” (for example, see Grigoriadis, 2014a:1). At the domestic front, the government's strong reaction to what was to become the anti-government protests (the so-called *Gezi Parki* events) in May-June 2013, corruption charges against government ministers, recent claims of weakening judicial independence and restriction of freedom of expression and freedom of media, have become an increasing concern (Özbudun, 2014). For example, criticisms were directed against the AKP government over whether it has been heading towards an “excessively majoritarian conception of democracy”, or even an “electoral authoritarianism” of an Islamic character (Özbudun, 2014: 155).

Turkey's solid economic performance, democratic consolidation and diplomatic clout have been grown under the AKP governments in the last decade. Behind mutually reinforcing trend of political and economic activism, Turkey's EU accession process emerged as both an anchor of the economic stability and an

impetus for the completion of the democratic consolidation process during 1999-2005 (Grigoriadis, 2014b). Nevertheless, the analysts also point out that Turkey would soon encounter the risk of overstretching its strategical goal to become a 'central power' (for example, see Grigoriadis, 2014b). Even though post-2011 anti-Western/EU rhetoric of the AKP leadership may prove to be fruitful concerning Turkey's domestic political landscape or popularity in the Arab public opinion in the short-term, it may undermine its long-term strategical potential and goals (Grigoriadis, 2014b).

Notwithstanding the anti-EU rhetoric, 2014 witnessed a revival of Turkey's EU accession process with the adoption of the "Turkey's New EU Strategy" in order to ensure that the EU membership retains its significance for Turkey. Moreover, the new PM Davutoğlu appointed two pro-EU figures as EU minister, Volkan Bozkır, and foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. In the shadow of upcoming general elections in June 2015, however, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent a renewed attention to EU accession process will be used as a 'tactical move' by the government, without serious intention of respecting the EU values such as the Copenhagen criteria, pluralism, rule of law, transparency and accountability. Not only to fulfill its declared goal to become a central power but also to retain and improve foreign policy activism and credibility, as potential role model for other Muslim countries, the AKP government needs the EU anchor to ensure the perpetuation of sound economic performance and political reform drive.

Period	Outcome	Policy: Substance (core features)	Policy: Rhetoric
1999-2002	Inertia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Non-recognition of Republic of Cyprus</li> <li>- Continuation of Turkey's security guarantees and military presence (London-Zurich Agreements)</li> <li>- Support to TRNC, demand for political equality and equal status of parties in a prospective settlement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pro-<i>status quo</i></li> <li>- Hardline</li> <li>- Continuation of TRNC, close integration between Turkey and TRNC</li> <li>- Support for confederation-based solution</li> <li>- Denial of EU's linkage policy</li> </ul>
2002-2005	Accommodation (Partial change)	No change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Anti-<i>status quo</i></li> <li>- Win-win/consensual</li> <li>- Pro-active policy of being one step ahead</li> <li>- Solution-based: ('non solution is not a solution')</li> <li>- Support to the Annan Plan (emphasis on bi-communal and bi-zonal federation)</li> <li>- Acceptance of EU's linkage policy</li> </ul>
2005-2011	Inertia	No change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pro-active (Action plans of 2005 and 2006)</li> <li>- Solution-based (Support to 2008 negotiation process)</li> <li>- Critical of the EU's Cyprus policy</li> </ul>
2011-2014	Retrenchment	No change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pro-<i>status quo</i></li> <li>- Hardline/assertive</li> <li>- Frequent emphasis on two-state solution</li> <li>- Re-strategization; security-oriented</li> <li>- Denial of EU's linkage policy</li> <li>- Support to 2008 and 2014 negotiation processes</li> </ul>

**Table 1: The temporal processes and the extent of change in Turkey's Cyprus policy since 1999.**

### 5.1.2 The AKP Government's Cost-Benefit Calculation

Apart from indirect operation of conditionality leading to the differential empowering of domestic actors, policy change required by EU conditionality is ultimately decided and implemented by a country's government, which evaluates the benefits of complying with EU rules *vis-à-vis* the domestic costs of their adoption by taking into account domestic and EU-related pressures and the maximization of its political advantages (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).

The structure of the accession process, strictly underpinned by demands through negotiations, requires the involvement of national executives who are considered to have a "privilege over legislature and judiciary in terms of political attention and commitment of resources, both human and financial" (Grabbe, 2001: 1016). The Turkish political system does not constitute an exception in that regard; the executive branch - especially when holding the majority in Parliament - is afforded considerable power and influence in the decision-making process, including in matters of foreign policy.

This dissertation suggests that in deciding to change Turkey's conventional stance on its Cyprus policy, the AKP's cost-benefit analysis appeared to be affected by four related sets of factors: first, support pledged by Turkish society to the EU accession process; second, EU membership as a state policy for over fifty years; third, EU-related factors, such as the presence and/or absence of a credible EU membership perspective and the asymmetrical relationship with the EU during the pre-accession period, bolstered by both the conditionality and the linkage policy of the EU; and fourth, the effects of veto players.

The first factor relates to domestic public opinion with regards to the EU and its support of membership, mostly due to expected material benefits and a better standard of living.<sup>51</sup> This support is accompanied by - somewhat ironically - fears, skepticism, and mistrust of the Union. In fact, fluctuations in public support of Brussels stem from various factors, including unfavorable statements by politicians in member states regarding Turkey's European credentials and eventual membership<sup>52</sup>; perceived double standards for Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue (i.e. the EU's linkage policy and its decision to admit Cyprus after Turkey had backed the Annan Plan) and additional conditionality especially in the face of the principles laid down in the Negotiating Framework document and other declarations and reports. The level of support is also related to the historical factor of the 'Sevres trauma', denoting the emergence of the modern Turkish Republic following the anti-imperialist war waged against European powers. Together, these factors incite skepticism towards the so-called 'Western powers'. According to Eurobarometer polls, the percentage of Turkish people who think that 'membership to the EU is a good thing' has varied between 55% in the autumn of 2005 and 42% in the spring of 2008, with a rise to 48% in the spring of 2009 and drop to 42% in the autumn of 2010. A Eurobarometer poll in September 2013 showed that 43% of Turks viewed the EU positively, as compared with 60% six months previously. As long as support to the EU accession process in Turkey is identified with economic welfare, one may expect

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<sup>51</sup>Eurobarometer National Reports on Turkey confirm that "For Turks, the EU means, first and foremost, economic welfare."

<sup>52</sup> Scepticism towards Turkey's distinct identity and idea of its eventual membership has also to do with the ongoing intra-EU discussion regarding 'EU's own identity' as to where the borders of Europe would end and which common values would bind the community together.

further erosion to the enthusiasm for membership to the Union given the recent economic and political turmoil in the Eurozone.

Such public anxiety may occasionally give rise to nationalism, which is partly boosted by the perceived psyche of being discriminated against by the EU. Given the general support of Turkish society towards the idea of EU membership, however, steps aiming at bringing Turkey closer to the EU at home would raise the AKP's share of the votes, and boost its domestic legitimacy as a pro-EU, liberal, and democratic mass party in the eyes of broader electorate and in the establishment, thereby further consolidating its power in the case of a settlement in Cyprus. Similarly, in the face of a good deal of sympathy and solidarity registered by the Turkish people towards Turkish Cypriots, the termination of their isolation and embargo in the event of a solution, would no doubt lead to the development of the northern part of the island, which would in turn increase the domestic popularity the AKP enjoys.

Conversely, public opinion in the sense of rising nationalism (partly as a result of the EU's perceived discriminatory policy), also acts as an important factor in the AKP government's care to not alienate its electoral constituency, especially since 2005, in the face of opposition by veto players. The AKP government took a political risk by supporting the Annan Plan, because the Cyprus issue, for the most part, acts like a barometer in terms of directing incitement of nationalistic impulses and fluctuations in Turkish societal support for EU membership. Although the AKP emerged stronger after the June 2011 general elections, it is well aware of the need to sustain as much public support as possible (including from the nationalists), for the upcoming new constitution and discussion for introduction of a presidential system.

Since 2005, the decline in domestic support for the EU due largely to factors such as the Greek Cypriot membership to the EU; Brussels' demand from Turkey to normalize relations with the Republic of Cyprus; and more importantly, the failure of the Union to keep its promise for ending the isolations of Turkish Cypriots, prepared the ground susceptible to exploitation by nationalist rhetoric of the veto players. Hence, the AKP's attempt to keep its broad electorate intact, partially explains the 'standstill' in Turkish-EU relations after 2005 and 'nationally directed' Europeanization through its rejection of complying with EU requirements concerning 'Republic of Cyprus'. In the face of the AKP's hawkish and self-confident tone after the June 2011 elections both at the domestic and EU level, it was observed that those EU-related variables are attended by domestic ones, such as power consolidation of the AKP government *vis-à-vis* veto players, a well-performing economy, and an expanding regional role and foreign policy activism.

The second factor concerns EU membership as a long-standing state policy in Turkey (over 50 years), which means that 'becoming European' and 'being involved in European structures', have been long-pursued goals, and can even be traced back to the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). If the AKP aspired to be a mass party of national standing, it could not merely pay lip service to the goal of EU membership; in Turkey, Westernization, Europeanization, and modernization have long been used interchangeably. This factor signifies the possible domestic and international prestige and credibility that the AKP would garner by bringing Turkey one step closer to the EU. The AKP felt that in the event of a settlement on the island, the international embargo and isolation of the Turkish Cypriots

would be increasingly difficult to sustain. Furthermore, an eventual settlement backed up by the AKP's foreign policy motto of being one step forward, would shatter the false presumption in the international community that 'Turks are intransigent'. More importantly, Turkey would dissolve perhaps one of the most significant barriers on its journey towards EU accession. On a broader scale, by playing a vanguard role in the solution of such a protracted dispute towards which Turkey's energy in terms of economics, military, diplomatic, political, and human resources have been channelled for years, the government thought that Turkey's room of manoeuvre at international politics would be widened.<sup>53</sup>

Although Turkey's relations with the EU are at their lowest point since 2005, the AKP continues to pursue reforms to align its legislation with the EU *acquis*. Ankara's long-awaited dream of joining the EU club has been mirrored recently by the words of the former Turkish president Gül 'Turkish-EU relations are not contingent on conjunctural fluctuations of economic life. Membership to the EU is a strategic goal that Turkey has declared' (Abdullah Gül, 16 September 2011, <http://www.euractiv.com>).

Overall, both first and second factors are based upon the realization by the AKP government that there would be high stakes in giving up the bid for EU membership in terms of domestic political risks of losing power and credibility contrary to the likelihood of political gains to be garnered in case of bringing Turkey one step further to the EU.

The third factor corresponds to EU-related factors, such as the presence and/or absence of a credible EU membership perspective and an asymmetrical

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<sup>53</sup> The analysis made in this paragraph was also reaffirmed by the former AKP Deputy, personally interviewed in Ankara on 3 June 2010.



relationship with the EU during the pre-accession period, bolstered by both conditionality and the EU linkage policy. Basically, this factor is related to the transformative power of the EU vis-à-vis the candidate state Turkey.

In fact, the EU's most influential political tool is 'gate-keeping' which means that through conditionality, it provides access to different stages in accession process, especially granting candidacy status and later starting negotiations. More practically, it denotes that the EU provides rewards (financial aids, offering candidacy or opening up accession negotiations) in the case of rule compliance and withholds rewards (i.e. suspension of negotiations) in the case of noncompliance (see Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2006; Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006).

The case of Turkey's Cyprus policy suggests that once a state achieved candidacy, rule adoption becomes more unlikely in the absence of conditionality, the credibility of which is most effectively achieved with the start of accession negotiations. Later, however, credibility necessitates perpetuating the ultimate membership perspective, marked by a reasonable and pre-determined period of time for accession.<sup>54</sup>

In practice, by offering Turkey a formal candidate status at Helsinki, the EU hoped that Turkey would adopt a more consensual, instead of confrontational, tone especially in endorsing EU's policies with respect to the solution of Cyprus dispute (Oğuzlu, 2004). Despite the insistence of Turkey's officials in 'de-linking' Cyprus from Turkey's EU bid, what followed indeed was an apparent

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<sup>54</sup> For example the Strategy Paper (2008-2009) states that "Accession negotiations with Turkey are a long-term process". Likewise, the Negotiation Framework Document stipulates that "With a view to establishment of Financial Framework, negotiations could not be concluded for the period from 2014".

shift towards a more win-win discourse in Turkish foreign policy towards a solution of the Cyprus problem, particularly after the coming of AKP government to power. AKP's Cyprus policy was shaped by an explicit support given to Annan Plan for unification of the island, as well as by its strong encouragement of Turkish Cypriots for securing a 'Yes vote' in the referendum on the plan in 2004. No doubt, the EU had conveyed the message that Turkey's consensual attitude towards reunification of Cyprus would facilitate Ankara's chance in getting a date for commencement of negotiations, thereby boosting the credibility of EU accession process provided to Turkey. Thus, in July 2005, Turkey adopted the Additional Protocol, in return, in October 2005, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey's insistence on non-implementation led to the EU decision to suspend eight relevant chapters from opening which reflects a vivid example of EU withholding the reward in case of non-compliance.

In the Turkish case, there has been too much emphasis on the 'open-ended' nature of the talks, on the EU's 'absorption capacity' and on the possibility of 'permanent derogations' in key areas such as free movement of persons, structural funds, and agriculture. There have also been various factors adversely affecting the credibility of the EU membership perspective and thus the EU's capacity and potential to influence Turkey's Cyprus policy. Those factors embrace both circumstantial and deep-rooted troubles, stemming from the EU's institutional structure (complex political bargaining and veto politics); economic and political crises; prominence of debates (focusing more on pressing and existential matters such as deepening rather than widening) involving the Union's future political and institutional vision; a return to discussions of the 'multi-speed

Europe' of the early 1990s; the apparent political unwillingness in Europe regarding Turkey's membership; and the Cyprus question becoming complicated following Cyprus' membership.

The European Union conditionality's transformative power has an unwritten aspect that affects Turkey's position, particularly its perception regarding the benefits of Turkey's EU membership (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). Notwithstanding the EU's decision to launch negotiations, the perceived unjust aspects of the negotiating terms and other factors relate to the overall pattern of Turkish-EU relations<sup>55</sup> have raised serious suspicions on the Turkish side with regard to the EU's sincerity, political will, and credibility. For example, in late 2011, the former Turkish president, Abdullah Gül commented that "the failure to open new chapters in Turkey's negotiating process is harming the 27-nation bloc's reputation and it could suffer its biggest loss of credibility in 2012 when Cyprus takes over the rotating EU presidency in July."<sup>56</sup> The skeptical and somehow hostile statements by European leaders as to Turkey's European credentials and membership prospects consolidate these suspicions. For example, Nicolas Sarkozy, the former French President, asserted that

I am in favor of signing a contract with Turkey. I am in favor of a joint market with Turkey. But I am against Turkey's integration into Europe. Turkey is a small Asia. And there is no reason for it to be a part of Europe...Turkey is a great civilization; but not a European one (quoted in Müftüler-Baç 2008, 66).

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<sup>55</sup> This includes, among others, Cyprus' EU accession without prior settlement; linking Turkey's bid for membership to the solution of Cyprus by allowing the problem to curtail relations between the EU and Turkey; and failure of the EU to hold its promises to Turkish Cypriots in return for their backing of Annan Plan.

<sup>56</sup> *Sefil Birliğe Yarım Başkan* [Half-Country Leading a Miserable Union], <http://www.cnnurk.com/2011/guncel/11/23/sefil.birlige.yarim.baskan/637736.0/index.html>; accessed on 24 November 2011.

A quite similar questioning of Turkey's European credentials came from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president and then chair of European Convention. In an interview with *Le Monde* published on 9 November 2002, he articulated that "Turkey is a country close to Europe, an important country, but it is not a European country. Its capital is not in Europe, it has 95 percent of its population outside Europe" (Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 67). He even went beyond to declare supporters of Turkey's EU membership as adversaries of the EU who would thwart the EU project. Further, statements in some EU circles (led by France) as to the 'need to redefine EU's borders', or that 'absorption capacity' should be taken into account in future enlargements fuelled already existing sensitivities in Turkish public opinion. The credibility of EU conditionality for Turkey is most likely to be affected by the increasing tendency of some EU members, foremost France and Austria, towards basing a decision about Turkey's EU membership on the results of national referenda, and by letting arguments against Turkey's membership overly occupy the agenda during national and EU Parliament election campaigns. Moreover, the political discourse of some countries, such as Germany and Austria, that it is better to offer a 'Special Status' to Turkey than full membership leads many to the impression that even if Turkey fully complies with the accession criteria, it would still not be offered full membership. Against this background, the former EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (2007) stated that

there often seems to be an assumption that there is no cost to questioning the commitments that the EU has made. Unfortunately, this is not true. Every time that countries gain the impression that the process may not lead to membership, it diminishes the power of our conditionality (Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 67).

That being said, the objective credibility of EU conditionality has also impacted upon its subjective assessment by various domestic actors –apart from cost-benefit calculations by the government- in their pursuit of power struggles within the confines of domestic relocation of power positions in Europeanization process of Turkey. For example, a more credible conditionality of the EU would no doubt allow civil society actors, most notably TÜSIAD to defend their cause in a more legitimate and vocal manner. Again, a more credible and clear EU accession period would step up the process of demilitarization of politics which would in turn pave the way for an overall change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Furthermore, in case the EU succeeds to preserve a delicate balance among conditionality, rewards and credibility of its accession strategy, changing domestic opportunity structure induced by Europeanization process in Turkey would no doubt tip the balance between veto players and facilitating players in favour of more progressive forces.

That the relationship between Turkey and the EU is still laden with ambiguities undermines the perceived benefits of EU membership (for the government). These developments also pave the way for resentment in a public susceptible to inducements of the Euroskeptic and conservative veto playing wing in Turkey, with the implication of jeopardizing the legitimacy of the reforms and change. Hence, it can be argued that the perceived costs and benefits of rule compliance as well as the timing and credibility of conditionality which are highly determined by and contributed to persistent uncertainty/ambiguity in the overall relations between Turkey and the EU have an explanatory power in understanding Turkish-EU relations in the post Helsinki period.

The asymmetrical relationship between Turkey and the EU since 1999 denotes that neither temporal factors (only a decade-long and limited participation in the EU as a candidate) nor the EU's decision-making system (allowing candidates little room to maneuver) can endow Ankara with an opportunity to upload or gradually transform its foreign policy via socialization the way a member state can. The nature of this relationship is asymmetrical in that candidate states do not have enough power to influence the decision-making of the EU from the inside (Grabbe, 2003). The tight conditions for accession and close monitoring by the European Commission for the transfer and implementation of EU policies through cycles of Accession Partnerships, and annual Progress Reports, underpin this highly coercive nature of the accession process for candidates by determining their obligations. Indeed, building upon the Commission's Progress Reports, the European Council decides whether to admit each candidate country to further stages in the accession process; thus they can be a powerful tool. Also, the relationship with the EU is asymmetrical in the sense that 'would-be members' –like Turkey- do not have so much discretionary power at hand to question, negotiate or defer existing European positions and policies, which are being formulated without input from candidates (Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006). Until accession, each candidate is invited to coordinate their foreign policy with the EU's partners by aligning itself with EU declarations and political demarches, and joining EU common positions on a 'take it or leave-it' basis. By capitalizing on the EU's institutional structure and complicated political bargaining as members of the Union, both Greece and Cyprus have a strong lever by which to defend their strategic positions in the Cyprus dispute. This situation increased the degree of asymmetry already embedded in Turkish-EU relations.

Evidently, the major mechanism of Europeanization process in Turkey's Cyprus policy is rather vertical and top-down once taking into account Cyprus' membership in the EU (right of veto) as well as several official documents of the EU which link closely Turkey's accession process with the reuniting of the island under acceptable terms to both parties. Indeed, at Helsinki, an observable linkage had been forged between Turkey's EU perspective and a solution of Cyprus problem (the roots of the EU's linkage policy can even be traced back to the Commission Avis on Turkey's application and the Dublin European Council in 1990). Thus, cognizant of the unequal nature of the relationship with the EU boosted by its linkage policy in Cyprus dispute, the AKP government had to take into account the clear message given by the EU that finding a solution in Cyprus would facilitate Turkey's accession process.

So far, the linkage policy of the EU did not bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cyprus dispute as the EU and Greece had hoped from the beginning. Yet, it led to change (though limited) in Turkey's official stance in favour of a proactive, conciliatory and 'win-win' policy rhetoric, which culminated in her support for the Annan Plan as well as for negotiation process between two community leaders during September 2008-March 2012 and for the most recent process resumed on February 2014 (though interrupted in October 2014) under the UN's good offices mission, despite the absence of real prospect for accepting Turkey into the EU.

A fourth factor involving the government's cost-benefit calculations relates to the effect of veto players. That is, the relevance of veto players for government decision-making emanates from first, their capability to block, retard, or slow the process of change, and second, the necessity of their ultimate agreement or

consent to change the *status-quo ante*. As a result of the indirect operation of Europeanization in the post-Helsinki period, different actors have played a part in affecting the government's decision - in interaction with the EU - concerning change in the period between 2002-2005 and in persistence with and current standstill in Turkish-EU relations since then. Further, the Cyprus problem emerged as a salient and even realigning issue of contestation in Turkey's domestic political landscape.

Developing close relations with Europe and full membership in the EU has been long seen as an ultimate goal by the veto players led by the CHP, MHP, and the military in Turkey. Ironically, they fear that the EU process of ensuring the country's democracy, pluralism, human rights, and individual freedoms standards might endanger the unitary and secular characteristics of the Turkish state. Hence, the veto players are skeptical of the 'road' towards the EU, rather than the ultimate end of 'EU membership'.

To reiterate, during its first three years in office, AKP government worked hard to obtain a clear date for commencement of accession talks with the EU by swiftly pushing for major constitutional amendments and legislation packages through parliament as well as endorsing the Annan Plan in Cyprus for that goal. From 2005 onwards, a noticeable loss of enthusiasm was observed in Turkey's governing party when it was squeezed between the EU's failure to act credibly and rise of nationalism and anti-EU sentiments at home (Patton, 2007: 344). In fact, facing a nationalist backlash at home and frustrated by the EU's handling of Cyprus issue, the AKP government was caught by a paradox, on the one hand it has to preserve its electoral dominance by slowing down the EU reform



momentum, but on the other hand, placate the EU so as not to lose popularity of EU membership (and related reforms) that it had enjoyed before.

The EU's 'carrot' of granting date for accession talks was accompanied with a 'stick' of the possibility of suspending talks; the open-ended process of accession; and the possibility of permanent derogations in some areas. Apart from the uncertainty about and politicized nature of accession perspective as well as the scepticism of mainly Christian Democrats towards Turkey's membership, evidenced by their offer of privileged partnership status, the AKP government resented the EU's failure to act even-handedly in the Cyprus problem, which paved the way for Greek Cypriots' accession under the title of 'Republic of Cyprus' despite their rejection of the Annan Plan. At the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, the EU declared that Cyprus will become member in 2004 in the absence of settlement. Moreover, the EU's failure to hold its promise towards Turkish Cypriots for easing their isolation proved highly counterproductive for the government. The fact that the uncompromising party was seen as rewarded with accession but the compromising party (Turkish Cypriots) still continues to be punished by isolation and embargoes, further added to inaction by the government. For the government, the responsibility of solving the Cyprus problem is perceived to be unjustly falling on Turkey, thus creating the perception that Cyprus issue is a zero-sum game because a political solution to Cyprus imbroglio requires a compromise of both sides to the dispute.

Since 2005, the EU's treatment of Turkey in the Cyprus problem has not only dampened enthusiasm for accession but also spurred anti-EU nationalist sentiments in Turkey by preventing the AKP government from taking bold steps towards implementing the Additional Protocol. Apparently, the decline in

domestic support for the EU prepared a base susceptible to exploitation by the veto players' statist-nationalist rhetoric. The fact that the EU demanded high compliance costs in return for few immediate and tangible rewards has strengthened the hands of EU sceptic veto players led by the CHP and MHP in Turkey. Evidently, the Erdoğan government has been blamed by the opposition parties for its pro-EU policies on the grounds that the EU is a Christian Club (especially by the MHP); that the accession process to EU is a dead-end; and that the EU pursues a double standard policy *vis-à-vis* Turkey.

Although they seemed unable to reverse or block the processes of change, the MHP, the CHP, and to a lesser extent the military, could slow it by playing on the rising nationalist sentiments in Turkish society largely as a response to the perceived vagueness and double standards of the EU *vis-à-vis* Turkish membership and the Cyprus problem (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). The current standstill between Turkey and the EU resulted from the partial suspension of talks; due to the resentment it created in the public and veto players alike, the AKP government declined to implement the Additional Protocol because the adaptation cost for full compliance would alienate its electoral constituency (i.e. too much opposition from the veto players). Ironically, when the government's re-strategization of the Cyprus issue (a return to the two state solution offered by Denktaş), and its message to the EU that relations would be suspended in the event of Cyprus' EU presidency are considered together, it can be argued that the rhetorical disparity between the government and the veto players diminished substantially (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014). Although the AKP apparently consolidated its domestic political power *vis-à-vis* its opponents in the post-2011 election period, the upcoming agenda of drafting a new constitution and thus the need for

a compromise with the nationalist veto-playing wing, still emerges as a non-negligible political consideration (Ulug-Eryilmaz, 2014).

Against this background, one cannot easily dismiss the fact that all four factors contributing to cost-benefit calculations of the AKP government discussed above not only have an explanatory power concerning the effect of the EU on Turkey's Cyprus policy and domestic power reconfiguration over Turkey's Cyprus policy but also they seem to be mutually reinforcing.

This chapter showed that apart from effective conditionality and credible EU accession perspective as the EU level factors, domestic sources of change such as capacity, willingness, political and ideological preferences of the government, pressure groups, public opinion, and political parties, and differential empowerment of them as constraining or facilitating factors need to be considered. The AKP government's cost-benefit calculation was not anathema to the HI framework which does not reject the rational choice idea that actors are utility maximizers acting in accordance with their strategies and interests. But it goes beyond that to know why a certain choice was made (which might be a product of either rule-following or interest-maximizing behavior, or, alternatively the both) and why a certain outcome occurred by building on historical evidence (Steinmo, 2008: 126). Besides, the discussion in this chapter validated the role of human agency in the HI perspective which underlined that actors perceive and interpret what is possible and desirable, which in turn are influenced both by their institutional environment and existing policy paradigms and worldviews (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956-957).

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

#### 6.1 Research Statement and Hypothesis

This thesis sought to illuminate how the Europeanization process takes place, in the context of enlargement by providing empirical findings regarding the EU's potential to impact on the foreign policies of candidate countries. This dissertation particularly asked the questions of 'how' and 'to what extent' the EU generates changes in the foreign policies of accession states. This dissertation is not only concerned with the EU impact on Turkey's foreign policy *per se*, but also tackles the EU's influence on power distribution in domestic context plus the cost-benefit calculation of the government in power in deciding a policy change, as endogenous sources of change. By placing Turkish-EU relations and the Cyprus dispute within a theoretical framework of Europeanization, with particular emphasis on the Historical Institutionalist strand of new institutionalism, this dissertation examined how the EU

impacted on Turkey's Cyprus policy between 1999 and 2014. To what extent can the 'EU anchor' lead to change in Turkey's Cyprus policy, concerning its candidacy dating from 1999 and the ongoing accession talks since 2005? Moreover, how do dynamics of domestic politics –in interaction with the EU- play a part in changing Turkey's Cyprus policy?

This dissertation argued that apart from effective conditionality and credible EU accession perspective as the EU level factors, domestic sources of change in the form of capacity, willingness, political and ideological preferences of the government, pressure groups, public opinion, and political parties, and differential empowerment of them as constraining or facilitating factors need to be considered, and affect policy outcomes. The analysis of this relationship suggests that the EU's potential in transforming the foreign policy of EU candidate countries is both context-dependent and questionable. Alongside EU-related factors such as the credibility of both EU conditionality and accession perspective, what accounts for change is predominantly determined by how domestic actors perceive it, and the extent to which domestic power struggles are affected by it.

## **6.2 Executive Summary**

The introductory chapter of this dissertation put forward the research statement and main arguments of the thesis; the analytical framework of Europeanization with particular reference to its various definitions, the measurement of EU's impact, the intellectual origins and evolution of the Europeanization, the directions of domestic

change implying how European-level developments feed back into domestic level as a result of pressure from the EU, the mechanisms of Europeanization explaining how the EU impact occurs, the theory of new institutionalism and its particular variant of HI, the relevance of the research topic to Europeanization, new institutionalism and HI; the research challenges faced; the reasons for choosing Cyprus as a case study; the methodology of this thesis and its research design.

The second chapter discussed the application of Europeanization as a research agenda to the area of foreign policy by reflecting on its conceptual and empirical implications. It particularly asked through which processes and mechanisms does the EU affect the domestic level and produce change? Which mechanisms seem more appropriate with regard to foreign policy field and why? Could the same mechanism(s) be applied both to current members and candidates as well? Does Turkey constitute an exception in this regard? Overview of studies on foreign policy Europeanization in member states revealed that Europeanization occurs predominantly through voluntary policy convergence (top-down), bottom-up projection of national policy, socialization and learning, rather than through forced adaptation to European requirements, which is frequently seen in first-pillar policy areas. Yet, candidate countries, including Turkey, are exposed to a more coercive pattern and top-down dimension of Europeanization through accession negotiations and the principle of conditionality and they are required to adopt and implement the *acquis politique* of the CFSP. In Turkish case, however, despite coercive pressures, the EU could only promote a partial and limited change during the course of 2002-2005. That is, existing Europeanization scholarship does not not fully account for the

Turkish case. Then the chapter provided a comparative perspective on Europeanization of national foreign policies by illustrating the cases of UK and Poland, as member state examples. It showed that geographical factors and historical experiences may act as structural factors in determining security perceptions, alliance preferences and approaches to European integration, thus accounting for continuities in actors' foreign policy choices. For example, the historical determinants of Poland's attachment to national sovereignty, its pro-Atlanticism, scepticism towards Russia on one hand, and Britain's pro-Atlanticism but also its strong tendency towards intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty could well be explained by the conceptual lenses of the historical institutionalism. Further, the selected cases present a visible example for top-down mechanism of Europeanization with a complementary process of bottom-up version, thereby exemplifying the argument that Europeanization usually occurs in a two-way process particularly in member states. Also, Polish case demonstrated that Warsaw experienced a process of policy-learning in terms of the value of extensive consultation with the partners and coalition-building.

The third chapter provided a brief overview of Turkey-EU relations starting from Turkey's application to the EEC for Association status in the early 1960s onwards. Next, the evolution of those relations was discussed in relation to the genesis and developments of the Cyprus dispute with a particular focus on Cyprus' EU accession process. Thus, the chapter shed light on how the Cyprus problem moved from being a bilateral Turkish-Greek problem to a trilateral one with direct repercussions on Turkish-EU relations.

The fourth chapter was devoted to a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's Cyprus policy since the 1950s and the EU's position regarding the Cyprus issue. As far as EU is conceived as a structural feedback mechanism, both at economic, ideological, cultural and organizational levels, it showed that the nature of Turkish-EU relations, evolving in a particular path, impacted on government's action/behavior/policies on Cyprus, thereby accounting for path-dependent institutional inertia, accommodation, and retrenchment. The chapter also demonstrated that it is very difficult to isolate Turkey's Cyprus policy, from the extent and quality of its relations with the EU. Especially during the late 1990s, correlation has been observed between the degree of Turkey's contribution to a settlement in the form of giving tacid support to inter-communal talks or terminating the support and intensifying financial, economic, security and institutional ties with TRNC and the nature of its relations with the EU. As such, it validated the Historical Institutionalist argument that there is a reciprocal influence between institutional constraints and political strategies. In fact, the discussion in the chapter served two purposes: on the one hand, it clarified the misfit/incompatibility between Turkish and the EU's respective positions over the Cyprus question, thereby accounting for the extent of EU pressures in the form of conditionality leading to a partial policy change in Turkey in 2002-2005. On the other hand, in accordance with the HI framework, social reality can best be understood as tracing temporal processes and sequences and unfolding of processes over time (Pierson, 2000: 264; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 698-99; also see Steinmo, 2008: 127-28).



The fifth chapter elaborated on indirect Europeanization operating through disturbing the domestic status quo in Turkey and redistributing resources across domestic actors as either facilitators or barriers in response to European requirements (or conditionality). The Cyprus problem emerged as a salient and even realigning issue of contestation in Turkey's domestic political landscape. The chapter argued that in the post-Helsinki period, different actors have played a part in affecting the government's decision - in interaction with the EU - concerning change in the period between 2002-2005 and in persistence with and current standstill in Turkish-EU relations since then. Then the chapter explored temporal processes, and the extent of EU impact (i.e. inertia, accommodation and retrenchment) on Turkey's Cyprus policy, especially in different periods of time starting from 1999 onwards. Finally, the chapter provided an analysis of different factors affecting the cost-benefit calculation by the AKP government in implementing Cyprus policy leading to a partial policy change in 2002-2005. Such a discussion was thought to have an explanatory power concerning the effect of the EU conditionality, domestic power reconfiguration, Turkey-EU relations as the structural constraint and/or opportunity on government choices/preferences on Turkey's Cyprus policy.

### **6.3 Theoretical and Empirical Work, Main Findings and Implications for the Discipline**

This thesis utilized Europeanization as its conceptual framework and the HI strand of new institutionalism as a theoretical tool to analyze the EU's impact on

domestic level by laying out the framework of how multilateral cooperation and institutions can influence national policy preferences. Europeanization as an analytical toolkit was employed in gauging not only domestic change itself, but also the process and mechanism of adjustment, namely how change takes place. Thus, Europeanization provided a framework for this dissertation by highlighting the significance of endogenous factors and their capacity to adapt, resist or produce change. The importance of Europeanization as a research agenda for this thesis stems from the fact that it addresses the process of ‘the EU impact, domestic factors, and resulting domestic change’ through taking into account the interaction between sub-national (interest groups, business associations and opposition parties), national (government and other domestic decision-making circles) and EU levels (member states, technocrats in Brussels, requirements of candidacy in general and CFSP/ESDP in particular) to account for domestic change.

This thesis resorted to the new institutionalist perspective to understand how domestic adaptation and processes of rule transfer, namely, ‘change’ can occur. New institutionalism is useful in the sense that it accounts for actor behavior in the context of its interaction with institutional settings. Institutions are viewed as a result of human action at the same time being a constraining factor for the latter (Peters, 2012). ‘Processes of change’ with regard to the Europeanization process underpin the new institutionalism, thereby providing a very fertile theoretical ground for this dissertation. Since institutions, both at national and European level, lie at the heart of this research, processes of change can be conceptualized through new institutionalist tools.

Historical institutionalism's analytical tool of path-dependency and a process-tracing methodology was applied to the analysis of how the process of evolution and/or continuity in Turkey's Cyprus policy has been affected by the interaction between domestic factors/actors and exogenous factors at the EU level.

This study assumed that HI provides a more coherent approach than other variants of institutional analysis in transcending a dichotomy of structure (context and circumstances) and agency (see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Hay and Wincott, 1998). HI scholars emphasize reciprocal influence between institutional constraints and political strategies on the one hand, and interaction of ideas, interests and institutions, on the other (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Historical institutionalists bring temporality and timing in politics and embrace institutions as the legacy of historical processes emerging from particular historical conflicts and constellations (Thelen, 1999: 382). HI allows room for agency and ideas in that actors perceive and interpret what is possible, legitimate and desirable, which is shaped "both by the institutional environment in which they find themselves and existing policy paradigms and worldviews" (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956-957). It was assumed that how one behaves hinges on the individual, on the context and the rules (Steinmo, 2008: 126). This assumption accounts for explaining continuity and variations in the AKP's policy preferences over Cyprus issue in 2002-2005; 2005-2011; and 2011-2014.

Also, history is central to HI since "political events happen within a historical context" and "behavior, attitudes and strategic choices take place inside particular social, political, economic and even cultural contexts" which has a direct

consequence for the decisions or events (Steinmo, 2008: 127; see also Harmsen, 2000: 60-61). Historical institutionalists' analytical tool of path-dependency implies that earlier policy and institutional choices made at specific point in time trigger a path of development or trajectory which are likely to impact on subsequent choices and outcomes of a sequence of events. When policy is deemed an informal institution, and once designed, brings about self-reinforcing processes, by locking actors into a current option and making reversals of course increasingly unattractive overtime due to dramatically high cost of exist (Pierson, 2000: 259; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 710). As such, path dependency well accounts for the continuity and partial change in Turkey's Cyprus policy since 2002.

Seen from the empirical implication of HI ontology, the Helsinki decision of December 1999 granting Turkey a candidacy status to the EU was assumed to be a significant evolutionary point with essential feedback effects along the same path, i.e., Turkey's longstanding European vocation. Moreover, the launching of accession negotiations in October 2005, which embraced benchmarking in the negotiations of individual chapters, strived to put Turkey along a membership path.

This thesis illustrated that the established characteristics of Turkey's Cyprus policy has its own imprint on the policy processes and outcomes, which in turn constrain Turkish policy makers' current preferences and choices. 'Policy' is treated in this study as an informal institution. Having explained the origins and evolution of the Cyprus conflict, we traced the self-reinforcing dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus policy. Turkish case confirmed an historical institutionalist approach that once established, policies become a structuring of rules for both decision-making elites

and the general public alike, since a specific policy design may constrain enormously the resources and strategies available to political actors and they, therefore, become important in shaping political processes and outcomes (such as the partial suspension of Turkey's negotiation process due to the crisis over the Additional protocol).

Once tracing the path of Turkey's Cyprus policy, this dissertation argued that policy persistence in Turkey's Cyprus policy can best be captured by the HI framework. The AKP government could not transform Turkey's Cyprus policy; instead, a 'limited and partial change' occurred in the course of 2002-2004. Turkey's Cyprus policy has become entrenched and locked-in overtime, making it difficult to reverse for government elites who have been constrained by the initial formulators' prior choices (evolved from 1960 to 1974 and from 1998 to 2004). Indeed, the institutional, ideational, and historical aspects of the particular path chosen by Turkey on its Cyprus policy were constituted by the overwhelming role of the ideas of the security-oriented military and civilian bureaucracy, as initial formulators of Turkey's Cyprus policy and the particular historical context (1963-1967 experience of inter-communal violence leading to Turkish military intervention in 1974) within which policy was formulated. HI implies a course of evolution rather than a complete following of the initial pattern (Peters, 2005: 74). Yet, it is also true that the range of possibilities involving alternative choices of change and evolution (for example, reunification, two-state solution, continuation of the *status-quo*, or annexation of TRNC into Turkey) have been constrained by the formative period of policy.

This dissertation treated the EU's relations with Turkey as both a structural and exogenous constraint. Apart from Turkey's persistent bid for EU accession; the credibility of accession perspective provided to Turkey, the effectiveness of EU conditionality; Cyprus' application and its eventual EU membership; EU's linkage policy in Cyprus problem and compliance procedures of Copenhagen criteria, all emerged as exogenous institutional factors for the AKP government since 2002. Hence, the specific pattern and nature of the Turkish-EU relations was regarded as part of an important structural consideration for Turkey's Cyprus policy.

Also, endogenous dynamics were observed in constraining the policy choices of the government. While it was the AKP government who decided a policy change in Cyprus by actively endorsing the UN-sponsored peace plan for the reunification of the island, the capabilities of domestic actors as veto players and facilitating actors should not be overlooked. This is because those actors influence the government's decision to facilitate, retard or reject policy change, particularly once the cabinet became reluctant after 2005 to take radical steps to transform Cyprus policy to comply with the EU conditionality. This highlights the fact that the pace and extent of Europeanization is not linear, unidirectional and homogenous but it is rather context-dependent. This dissertation argued that the cost-benefit calculation by the AKP government in formulating its Cyprus policy was largely affected by a dynamic combination of EU-related and domestic factors, such as the prevalent desire for EU membership in society and the state establishment, the ability of the EU to provide a credible membership perspective backed up by an even-handed approach to the

Cyprus problem and the strong resistance of anti-reformist domestic circles in their struggle with pro-EU forces.

Dwelling upon Turkey's Cyprus policy in the accession process, and by building on the HI perspective, this dissertation provided a critical analysis of the EU's potential for inducing change in the foreign policies of 'candidate' nations. By building on the premises and insights of the HI framework, the EU's insufficiency as an exogenous/structural constraint, is particularly reviewed with regard to Turkey's credibility of membership perspective, the EU's institutional structure and political will (or lack of it), by paying additional attention to the repercussions on, and interaction with, Turkey's domestic political settings embedded in certain historical and institutional structures.

This thesis contributed to an emerging literature on Turkish Europeanization addressing the limits of the EU's transformative power. This thesis concentrated on the role of domestic actors and/or factors in relation to conditionality and accession process in inducing domestic change by addressing the complex interactive pattern between the EU and domestic levels. Besides, this thesis made a contribution to little scholarly engagement with the HI as an analytical tool to investigate Turkey's relationship with the EU (but see Camyar and Tagma, 2010; İcoz, 2011), let alone its Cyprus policy.

Once the implications of EU conditionality for Turkey's Cyprus policy case are analyzed, the 'Europeanizing' potential of the EU seems questionable. Notwithstanding the Cyprus issue being nearly a political condition, Greek and

Greek Cypriot pressures, and Turkey's 50-year bid for membership, one can observe that the EU has not been able to transform the policy but only managed to generate a 'limited, superficial, and short-lived' change between 2002 and 2005 on an issue predominantly characterized by strategical priority, solidarity, and nationalist sentiments. To reiterate, the nature and extent of change has been confined to support for a federalist solution that was crystallized by the Annan Plan and obtained acceptance at the level of the Turkish NSC and the Turkish Cypriot leadership; and to pursuing a win-win and consensual foreign policy to show the international community that Turks are not intransigent. During that period, the EU's linkage policy, the enthusiasm of the Erdoğan government in getting a date from Brussels for accession talks, and the desire to solve the Cyprus problem prior to Cyprus' EU membership were responsible for a change in the Cyprus policy. From the perspective of the Turkish army, there seemed to be a reluctant collaboration - notwithstanding the caution and reservations attached - with the AKP government. Particularly during the last phase of the Cyprus negotiations in Bürgenstock (Switzerland), senior military officers were incorporated in the process alongside diplomats at all stages, but most notably during discussions on security and on the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance. Moreover, as a facilitating actor, TÜSİAD's pro-EU lobbying activities concerning the Cyprus issue had a direct impact on shaping public opinion in Turkey in favor of reaching an agreement with Greek Cypriots. TÜSİAD also had an indirect impact by weakening Denktaş' position by claiming him to be a '*pro-status quo* stumbling block on the way to a settlement'.



Hence, as far as the Turkey's Cyprus policy between 2002 and 2004 is concerned, this dissertation confirms the argument in the literature that whether or not misfit leads to redistribution of resources among domestic actors, their differential empowerment, and a resulting policy change is determined by "a low number of veto points and the existence of facilitating formal institutions" (Börzel, 2003: 9). Besides, Turkish case confirms particularities of "accession Europeanization", which underlines that candidates are not in a strong position to 'upload' or project their national preferences onto the EU level because formal accession process involves highly 'asymmetrical power relations' due to strict accession conditions and the membership carrot being at the EU's disposal. This gives a 'top-down' and vertical character to Europeanization process as opposed to more voluntary and horizontal processes of Europeanization in member states.

Conversely, since 2005, it has been recognized that EU-related factors more intensively interacted with Turkey's domestic factors, and that domestic considerations have played a dominant role in circumventing the AKP government, as a 'political' actor, from making a radical change in Cyprus policy. At the same time, the Turkish case suggests that, unless accompanied by a credible membership perspective and even-handed policies towards the parties to a dispute, the EU's ability to change policy in the pre-accession period, which is underpinned by the very coercive nature of Europeanization, is eroded. It has been observed that the EU's credibility was undermined in domestic public opinion with two consequences building on each other: triggering skepticism towards the EU in public and playing into veto players' hands. The government was thus barred from implementing the

Additional Protocol in full, from agreeing swiftly to a settlement plan in concurrence with Greek Cypriot demands in the rejuvenated intercommunal talks on the island since 2008, and from recognizing Cyprus to comply with EU conditionality. In the latter period, the politicization of the problem by the EU has been attended by ‘legalization’ involving ‘contractual obligations’ on Turkey’s part. Despite coercive top-down pressures from the EU, the pace and extent of Europeanization has been relatively determined by endogenous factors, thereby signifying ‘nationally directed and limited Europeanization’ in the Turkish case. Put differently, the EU-dominated factors, emanating mostly from its institutional structure and lack of political will, have been largely overridden by domestic considerations, which in turn appear to be responsible for the current standstill in Turkish-EU relations. Also, it shows that the pattern of EU’s impact in the framework of Europeanization is not unidimensional and homogeneous. Although governments are the key actors in deciding ultimate policy changes, variables including the unfavorable domestic political atmosphere, shifting attitudes of the electoral constituency, and increasing opposition of the plurality of actors in government foreign policy may well create a contextual political risk for governments at home. As such, this thesis confirms the argument made in the literature that Europeanization helps gauge not only domestic changes themselves, but also the processes of change by giving primacy to endogenous factors in terms of the state actors’ capacity to modify or limit European signals, thereby setting the pace and degree of Europeanization.

Regarding Turkish-EU relations in the context of the Cyprus issue, it can be argued that since 2005, and continuing with the AKP’s self-confident tone after the

June 2011 elections, the leverage and Europeanizing impact of the EU on Turkey has seemed to diminish. This has especially been the case in accession negotiations coming to a deadlock, candidate state perceptions of a lack of EU credibility, epidemic economic and political crises in many member states, financial problems in the Eurozone, enduring political disinclination in Brussels to revitalize Turkish-EU relations, and the eclipsing of the enlargement debate by the EU's more immediate internal problems. Viewed in this light, it may appear that the more the pace of accession negotiations between the EU and the candidate state slows and relations worsen, the more the latter tends to show nationalist reflexes and pursue independent policies. In Turkey, those EU-related variables are accompanied by post-2011 domestic ones, such as power consolidation of the AKP government *vis-à-vis* veto players, a well-performing economy, and an expanding regional role and foreign policy activism. Turkish-EU relations have certainly been nebulous since 2005, but what we have observed that relations pass through a 'circumstantial' crisis period. The fact that Turkish-EU relations did not experience an all-out derailment despite ongoing problems in the negotiation process, validates the argument that nature of those relations have been path-dependent. The Turkish government needs wide societal consensus to change policy, including consensus from the veto-playing Euro-skeptics and those in pro-EU circles, as well as a persistent democratization process and EU-induced reforms not only for the sake of the domestic political calculations of new constitution and introduction of a presidential system but also to retain its sphere of influence and attractiveness as a regional power. It is at this juncture that attachment to the EU anchor and continuation of a credible membership perspective are key in fulfilling those ends. Moreover, EU-originating investments

play a significant role behind Turkey's breathtaking economic growth in recent years. Thus, the hardline rhetoric used by the Turkish government towards the EU should be perceived as a circumstantial reaction to the dietician, not to her prescription. It is most likely that the Cyprus problem and Turkey's accession to the EU will be viewed together in the foreseeable future, continuing to determine one another.

#### **6.4 The Added Value of This Thesis**

By defining and delimiting the concept of Europeanization and applying its mechanisms to Turkish case, this thesis strived to introduce further empirical evidence to the existing –limited- literature on Europeanization of foreign policy in terms of processes and outcomes.

By building upon the HI version of 'New Institutionalism', this thesis constituted a further attempt to highlight the mechanisms of Europeanization particularly in the foreign policy domain during the accession process and to underline whether pre-defined mechanisms in the literature can be applied and explain the process in the Turkish case. Since the Europeanization framework highlights the interaction of the EU's impact with domestic factors, the EU's transformative power has its limits; the domestic impact of the EU has been differential, showing significant variation across policies and institutions (Börzel, 2012). Thus, to explain variation in domestic change, the Europeanization scholarship has increasingly focused on factors moderating the EU's transformative power and the conditions under which domestic

change occurs. This thesis strived to account for the EU's differential domestic impact looking through the Turkey's Cyprus policy as a case.

Moreover, since this research attempted to specify process of rule adoption as well as how 'conditionality' works in national foreign policies by examining the Turkish case, by the findings of this study, one could judge better whether EU conditionality is a random factor in national realm of candidates or a regime in itself; whether it is a fixed phenomenon or a contextual factor for domestic change having peculiar spatial and temporal implications. Also, laying out the possible impacts of the EU's foreign policy setup would shed a new light on the EU's influence beyond its borders even in the policy domain where it is purely intergovernmental in nature and therefore, not binding on member states when compared to communitized policy areas.

Also, given the accession negotiation between Turkey and the EU has just begun in October 2005, the time is ripe more than ever for a closer investigation of the extent of how the EU's aspirations for enlargement and candidate states like Turkey will be impacted by foreign policy machinery of the EU. This study is highly relevant and scholarly attractive considering the lively intra-European debate over identity issues, the EU's ultimate borders and its aspiration to become a truly international political actor via the CFSP and ESDP projects. Evidently, as an applicant country aspired to join the EU, Turkey with its (growing) demographic size, economic situation and structure, Muslim population, geostrategical position, and increasing foreign policy activism has been brought forefront of the EU agenda itself. That is to say, the pro-EU behavior of Turkey as a candidate state has not only

implications for Turkey's aspirations for membership, but also for the EU who endeavours to become a truly global political actor having vested interests around Turkey's neighbourhood.

## **6.5 Research Challenges**

Throughout the whole process of researching and writing this dissertation, the most important constraint was one related to qualitative study limitations, particularly by virtue of the possible practical realities pertaining to the ongoing Cyprus dispute. The high level of dynamism and overwhelming ambiguity involving the nature of peace talks presented a challenge for researching Cyprus dispute by making it a moving target. We tried to overcome this challenge by limiting the temporal boundary of empirical analysis to 2014.

For the sake of impartiality, we tried to conduct as many elite interviews as possible to incorporate the views from Ankara, Northern Cyprus and Brussels into the analysis. For example, we travelled to Northern Cyprus and conducted face to face interviews with leading political figures, diplomats, bureaucrats and journalists. Although paying a visit to Brussels to complete the field study seemed necessary, it could not be realized due mostly to financial constraints. Therefore, analysis of the EU's position had to be confined predominantly to primary official documents of the EU, statements and speeches of policy-makers and diplomats of the EU as well as views and interviews obtained from the Delegation of the European Union to Turkey.

## **6.6 Direction and Areas For Future Research**

The EU's differential impact on candidate states requires further empirical research because domestic actors/factors' roles are still regarded as underspecified and ambiguous in the literature (see Börzel, 2012: 12). Therefore, more attention should be devoted to devising a compelling and explicit theorizing of dynamics inducing domestic change and the complex interactive pattern between the EU and domestic levels. Further case studies on the EU's candidate states may lead to a more sophisticated understanding of mediating factors.

No doubt, understanding whether and 'how' the EU has changed the foreign policy processes and outcomes in Turkey requires further systematic studies employing the tools of Europeanization. The more holistic picture would also emerge through either scrutiny of other foreign policy issues in Turkey or comparing a case from Turkey with one from another acceding state. For example, further research on other themes of TFP such as policy towards Armenia or security relations with the EU in terms of the ESDP would provide better insight to see whether there is variation in policy issues and whether Europeanization approach needs additional qualification when meeting the Turkish case.

Again, although it goes beyond the confines of this dissertation, further studies should examine the EU potential for Europeanization of foreign policies of its candidates in the context of the Union being identified as soft power or normative power. If observance of common rules, legitimacy, high resonance with legality and diplomacy are predominantly considered among the components of 'soft power', the

EU's record in the Turkish case displays rather mixed results. Apart from having incorporated an international problem on the agenda of the UN, the fact that a country with serious border disputes and, more importantly claiming that its territories are under occupation, has become a member of the EU through a 'political' decision without any pressure on that country (Cyprus) for settlement, as opposed to continuing pressures on Turkey, has incredibly undermined the perceived 'objectivity' and 'credibility' of the EU, thereby eroding its power of attraction and magnetism *vis-à-vis* its candidate. At least for one of the parties to the dispute, the Union's management of the Cyprus impasse rendered diplomacy (on the island) ineffective, if not meaningless, since it reinforced an already existent asymmetry at the negotiation table between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Paradoxically, it appears that the success of the EU's 'coercive' political conditionality to transform a candidate's foreign policy apparently impinges on the sustainability of its 'normative' appeal as well.



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