

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**  
**YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND APPLIED**  
**SCIENCES**

**HOUSING POLICIES AND DECISION-MAKING**  
**PROCESSES IN URBAN TRANSFORMATION: A**  
**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND RUSSIA**

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MASTER OF SCIENCE THESIS

Department of Urban and Regional Planning

Urban Regeneration and Planning Program

Advisor

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June, 2019

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**HOUSING POLICIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES**  
**IN URBAN TRANSFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**  
**OF TURKEY AND RUSSIA**

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Elmira NIZAMOVA

Signature



*Dedicated to more than 4.1 billion people living in the cities.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Prof. Dr. Asuman TÜRKÜN of the Urban and Regional Planning Department at Yildiz Technical University. The door to Prof. Türkün office was always open whenever I ran into a trouble spot or had a question about my research or writing. She supported me and accepted the fact that I am a foreign student with different background and consistently allowed this paper to be my own work, but steered me in the right direction whenever I needed it. She also helped me to understand the social side of the Urban planning process and local Planning System formed in Turkey and particularly in Istanbul.

I would like to thank Türkiye Scholarships foundation and Yildiz Technical University for the opportunity to make my master's degree in Turkey.

I would also like to acknowledge my supervisors from my previous University in my home city in Russia Prof. Dr. Ramil BAYMURATOV and Assoc. Prof. Svetlana BAYMURATOVA of the Architecture Department at Ufa State Petroleum Technological University who first inspired me for research in Urban Studies field.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my family living in Ufa city in Russia for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my 3 years of study in Turkey and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you, Mama, Papa, Gulnara, Rustam and my nephew Emir.

Elmira NIZAMOVA

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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EU	European Union
HP	Housing Policies
MEU	The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization of Turkey
RP	Renovation Program
TMMOB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği)
UN	United Nations
UP	Urban Planning
UTP	Urban Transformation Projects

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# **Housing Policies and Decision-Making processes in Urban Transformation: A comparative analysis of Turkey and Russia**

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Department of Urban and Regional Planning

Master of Science Thesis

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The research aims to find out similarities and differences between urban planning systems of Turkey and Russia throughout history starting from the beginning of the 20th century up to the present days. The study focuses on the housing problem as an essential part of urban life. The decision-making processes and important actors in housing policies of Turkey and Russia countries are defined for Russia and Turkey in order to determine how these models work within different economic, social and historical contexts. In spite of the fact that the political regimes of Turkey and Russia (USSR) were different, similarities in industrialization and urbanization processes can be compared in those countries. Moreover, a lot of similarities can be traced in the current housing renovation programs which aim to improve the aging and dilapidated housing stock in the cities. The fact requires to take into account the economic and political situation in Turkey and Russia today.

The historical view on housing shortage problems, reasons, and solutions found in the past help us to define weak points of previous housing policies and to

analyze the important impacts of those policies on social life, city fabric, housing itself and housing regulations in a short and long-term perspective. Such an approach also helps to evaluate the current housing policies in order to avoid mistakes in further applications in both countries. The outcome of the research determines a framework of alternative solutions for present housing problems and help to optimize the urban planning decision-making process.

**Keywords:** Housing Policy, Decision-Making Actors, Public Housing, Urban Transformation Programs.





## **Kentsel Dönüşümde Konut Politikaları ve Karar alma süreçleri: Türkiye ve Rusya'nın karşılaştırmalı analizi**

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Danışman: Prof. Dr. Asuman TÜRKÜN

Ampirik araştırma, 20. yüzyılın başından beri günümüze kadar Türkiye ile Rusya'nın kentsel planlama sistemleri arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkları bulmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, kentsel yaşamın önemli bir parçası olarak sosyal konut sorununa odaklanmaktadır. Türkiye ve Rusya ülkelerinin konut politikalarındaki karar alma süreçleri ve öne çıkan aktörler, Rusya ve Türkiye için tanımlanmış ve bu modellerin farklı ekonomik, sosyal ve tarihsel bağlamlar içinde nasıl çalıştığını bulmak karşılaştırılmıştır. Türkiye ve Rusya'nın (SSCB) siyasi rejiminin farklı olmasına rağmen, sanayileşme ve bunun sonucunda kentleşme sürecindeki benzerlikler her iki ülkede de incelemeye değer. Ek olarak, günümüzde Türkiye ve Rusya'daki ekonomik ve politik koşulları da hesaba katmayı gerektiren şehirlerde yaşanan ve yıpranmış, köhneleşmiş konut stoklarını iyileştirmeyi amaçlayan mevcut konut yenileme programlarında birçok benzerlik izlenebilmektedir.

Geçmişte bulunan konut yetersizliği sorunları, nedenleri ve çözümlerine ilişkin tarihsel görüş, önceki konut politikalarının zayıf noktalarını tanımlamamıza ve bu

politikaların sosyal yaşam, şehir dokusu, konut tipolojisine ve konut düzenlemeleri üzerindeki önemli etkilerini hem kısa hem uzun vadeli bir bakış açısıyla analiz etmemize yardımcı olmaktadır. Böyle bir yaklaşım aynı zamanda her iki ülkede daha fazla uygulamada hataları önlemek için mevcut konut politikalarının değerlendirilmesine yardımcı olmaktadır. Araştırmanın sonucunun, mevcut konut sorunları için alternatif çözümler için bir çerçeve belirlemesi ve kentsel planlama karar alma sürecini optimize etmeye yardımcı olması beklenmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Konut Politikaları, Karar Verme Aktörleri, Toplu Konut, Kentsel Dönüşüm Programları.



## **1.1. Literature review**

***“Everything can be perceived through comparison”***

*- Russian proverb*

The housing field and housing policies are being always discussed by the specialists of the urban planning field and adjacent disciplines because of its actuality. The literature review carried out before and during the research defined that the problems of the renovation of housing stock come out with the consequences of the Industrial Revolution which affected cities' shape, infrastructure, and social structure. In fact, these problems took a start for urban sociology by itself developed by Chicago Sociology school in the 1920s. Today the solution of the urban transformation problem can be found on the intersection of different disciplines. The analysis of Turkish and Russian scientific works carried out by different specialists from both countries like I. Tekeli, A. Turkun, A. Bronivitskaya, S. Khan-Magomedov, and others shows that the actuality of researches on urban transformation field can be considered as considerably high. The fact can be explained by the emergence of aging housing stock inside the cities built at previous century during the rapid urbanization caused by the development of industry in the whole world and Turkey and Russia which are being analyzed in this research.

### **1.1.1 Scope of the Thesis**

Housing is one of the basic need of life which forms the basis for the living conditions of citizens. 33% of the urban population (World Bank, 2014), estimated to be 55% of world's population (World Bank, 2017), lives in slums. That is why it is necessary to focus on housing problems in cities and especially on the deteriorating housing stock. From a broader perspective, housing is the

main sector of society that is strongly connected with other sectors, especially in the economy. The state of the housing sector reflects a country's economic situation, social structure, political ideologies, and technological development level. Social housing in this scope is the most straightforward representation of a country's conditions. That is why social housing have been chosen for this research as the most representative part of urban life.

Nowadays a lot of renovation, renewal, regeneration programs are being developed and applied in different countries and deteriorated housing stock located close to the central parts of the cities become a focus of these programs because of a high potential price and investment attractiveness. Some results of such applications are being highly criticized because of the quality of city fabric being created. A speculative orientation of such approaches disregards social problems of a particular place and leads to class segregation, property, and identity loss and what is more crucial is that it breaks the household-job link, sometimes condemning people for even worse life.

Because of the fact that housing and particularly social housing has a complex range of actors and factors in each country, it was decided to start with a historical comparative analysis of housing policies. The development of the housing policies set in the 20th century in Russia and Turkey helps to understand recent renovation applications. Afterward, research moves to a recent Renovation Programs analysis comparing the data collected from both countries. As a result, a framework of measures is proposed to improve the Renovation Programs in both countries.

## **1.2 Objective of the Thesis**

The empirical comparative research aims to find out similarities and differences between urban planning systems of Turkey and Russia throughout history starting from the beginning of the 20th century up to the present days. The study focuses on the recent urban transformation programs and projects of Turkey and Russia. The decision-making processes and prominent actors in determining the housing policies of Turkey and Russia are defined for different periods and compared with European and North American countries' experience in order to find out how these

models work within different economic, social and historical contexts. Moreover, the research aims to evaluate the current housing Renovation Programs in order to avoid mistakes in further applications in both countries. As a result, the research determines a framework of alternative solutions for current housing problems and helps to optimize the urban planning decision-making processes.

Despite the fact of globalization and increasing flow of information provided by the Internet there are still a lot of gaps in Urban Planning Theory because of the lack of sources translated. This is true for the case of Turkey and even more for Russia, which is still very unknown for the rest of the world. This research aims to fill the gaps using the original data from both of the countries by translating and systematizing them into comparable and apprehensible form.

Both Turkey and Russia are considered as countries with upper middle-income economies according to World Bank Country Classifications, with nearly similar GNI per capita estimated as \$10,930 in Turkey and \$9,230 in Russia (World Bank, 2018) and it is reasonable to compare these countries in terms of urban planning and housing policies particularly. In addition, both countries have approximately the same urban population percentage: 72,1% in Turkey, 72,8% in the Russian Federation (Worldometers, 2018). The comparative analysis of housing and social policies helps us to determine the similarities and differences between these two countries to understand the background of the interventions. Moreover, it is important to compare not only present programs related to housing renovation and regeneration but also the programs applied before because they form the inseparable chain of events leading to current problems and achievements in the cities.

### **1.3 Hypothesis and Methodology**

The key issues in the methods of historical comparative research originates from the incomplete nature of historical data, the complexity and scale of the social systems, and the nature of the questions asked (Schutt, 2006). This research considers the use of different types of data and the comparison of two cases by systematizing the historical events, filling the gaps and reconstructing the links

between them. A qualitative and quantitative data, collected from different sources like original researches and books translated from Turkish and Russian languages, recent statistical data, interviews, social media, and newspapers articles, provides a comprehensive database for analyzing. The wide range of data sources provides the understanding of the problem on different levels taking into account different actors' role in Urban Planning Decision-Making process. It is important to understand the correlation between lack of some actors' involvement in the process and the quality of Urban Renewal projects.

The research work assumes that the systematization of two cases with a deep analysis of the reasons that led to the current state will help to provide a proper comparison of two cases. In addition, such an approach considers a wider range of interests and combines the "top-down" and "bottom-up" views.

In the first part of the research, Comparative Historical Research methods are used in order to examine the historical processes so as to find out some similarities in explaining the present day applications. It involves comparisons of social, economic and historical processes of both countries. The second part of the research focuses on recent Renewal Programs, systematizing the data collected. The outcome of the research forms a structured framework of suggestions and may be used by specialists in Urban Planning field not only in Turkey and Russia but also in different countries.

## Development of Housing Policies in Turkey and Russia

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### 2.1 Housing Policies

Housing policy may be defined as government action to achieve housing objectives. These targets could include the improvement of the quality of the housing stock or dealing with homelessness. Another definition of housing policy can be defined as a governmental intervention in the housing sector (Hutchison, 2010). If we have a look at the Theory of Needs introduced by the founder of humanitarian psychology, A. Maslow in 1943, we can find out that there are two levels of basic needs determined as physical requirements including the need for food, water, sleep, and warmth. When these lower-level needs have been met, people can move on to the next level of needs, which are defined as safety and security. As people move forward up the pyramid, needs become more and more psychological and social. After that, the need for love, friendship, and intimacy become important. Then moving further up the pyramid, the need for personal esteem and feelings of accomplishment get priority (Cherry, 2018). Here a need of safety and security can be identified with shelter requirement. Therefore, we can assume that without achieving this objective people cannot achieve higher-level needs which forms their social and psychological integrity. That is why an adequate provision with housing forms a healthy society and contributes to normal functioning of any urban or rural community.

In this scope, it is worth mentioning the statistically-based prediction of the Swedish statistician Hans Rosling who claimed that the world population would stop growing after 11 billion by the end of the century (Rosling et al., 2018). According to other researches the average aggregate population of the world's 101 largest cities is expected to increase from 757 million in 2010 to 2.3 billion in 2100: a three-fold increase in average city size. The "average" large urban area will increase from 7.5 million in 2010 to about 23 million in 2100. Managing these

large megacities, more than 50 of which are in excess of 15 million (while the top 10 are all in excess of 50 million), will place excessive demands on urban managers and citizens (Hornweg et al., 2016). Matching the world population forecasts with the urban population projections gives a hint for urban planners on what to expect in the future and how to determine how many houses will be needed for people in the future. Proper strategic planning for a short and what is more important for a long perspective reduces the mistakes in renovation and regeneration interventions inside the city. If the figures of available world population forecast by the year 2050 (9,8 billion people according to UN report announced in 2017) and urban population projection of 66% (according to UN report introduced in 2014) is being taken into account, the figure of around 6,5 billion people living in the cities can be expected by the year 2050.

In the cities nowadays the housing problem is aggravated mostly with migration and urban sprawl problems; poverty and slums formation and transformation; deterioration of aging building stock; unarticulated urban management and planning system; lack of the link between city management and residents including the lack of motivation to form this link. Some of these problems have been studied in researches all over the world and there are already some solutions developed by specialists. Most of the findings lay between disciplines, therefore, it is important to focus on involving social science, psychology, marketing, economy, law, ecology, and planning specialists into the planning process. However, Urban Renewal Programs and projects being applied nowadays usually do not involve even half of the specialists listed above. Usually, just government, planners, developers and property owners are being involved in the process. When it comes to Regeneration, Renovation, and Renewal Programs applied to the slums transformation, even property owners' interests are often being ignored. Meanwhile, the living conditions of the most insecure habitants of the city living in such territories contribute to the whole urban community wellbeing, safety, mental and physical health. The physical and social environments of urban life can contribute both positively and negatively to mental health and wellbeing.



Cities are associated with higher rates of most mental health problems compared to rural areas: an almost 40% higher risk of depression, over 20% more anxiety, and double the risk of schizophrenia, in addition to more loneliness, isolation, and stress. People with pre-existing risk factors, particularly poverty, minority status, or existing mental health problems often encounter negative disparities in the city. For example, this can involve physical and psychological segregation into neighborhoods that may be characterized by poverty and social challenges, engendering feelings of injustice and hopelessness, and experiences of prejudice and discrimination that may affect mental health (Corcoran et al., 2016). That is why any change in such urban biosphere affects the whole city significantly. This research focuses on Social Housing Policies because it reflects the attitude of the city to the most vulnerable parts of the population. So what is Social Housing?

There is no certain definition of social housing in Urban Planning Theory. Each country or sometimes even local government defines social housing according to particular planning policy. However, some comprehensive researches on this topic summarize definitions which differs according to some criteria like tenure, type of provider, target groups, subsidies etc. (Granath Hansson et al., 2018). Cambridge Dictionary defines social housing as a “Homes provided by the government for people with low incomes to rent cheaply”. Another definition tells that SH is housing that is aimed to house predominantly households in a weak negotiating position in the housing market, such as low-income households, physically and/or mentally handicapped, ethnic minorities, immigrants and asylum seekers. The social housing providers are supposed to give priority to households who are not able to provide housing services for themselves without assistance. In general, there is a public framework in place which governs the position of social housing providers. In general, we observe three main tenures in European countries: owner-occupied housing, commercial-rented housing, and social-rented housing. In some countries, a fourth tenure is also popular: cooperative housing (Premius, 2013). Core elements of social housing according to Housing Europe Federation are affordability, the existence of rules for the allocation of dwellings, a strong

link with public policies at the local level, security of tenure, quality standards and strong involvement of the benefiting households (Housing Europe, 2018). It is important that Social Housing Policies should not just provide affordable homes but a number of other services, such as domiciliary care and support services for residents with specific needs; additional services for tenants (kindergartens, community centers, employment and training services, financial advice); neighborhood services; management of other types of 'sheltered' accommodation; urban development and urban regeneration.

Three breaking points in history could be noted for the development of social housing models and practices. These can be listed as the Industrial Revolution, World War II and the Neoliberal era after the 1970s. A rapid urbanization process was experienced parallel to the industrialization process in developed countries like the United Kingdom or the USA or some EU countries starting from the middle of the 19th century. In Turkey and Russia, these processes appeared later at the beginning of the 20th century. Rapid migration from rural to urbanized territories led to the scarcity of housing in such cities. Originated as a solution to the sheltering needs of low-income groups in the city, social housing can be defined as the sheltering service of governments towards the vulnerable population. Social housing is also described as the houses provided by public institutions or non-profit organizations for low-income people or the citizens that have specific needs (Hazar et al., 2015). In Turkey and Russia, social housing occurs as several different models developed under different conditions: communal housing, company town, council housing, public housing, rental housing, affordable housing. Different actors, economic conditions and practices are being involved in these programs (Hazar et al., 2016). In the next chapter, the parameters of these models are discussed in more detail but before this, it is necessary to compare general profiles of two countries.

## **2.2 General data analysis of Turkey and Russia**

To start with, it is reasonable to compare some general data about the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation and data related to their housing policies.

According to the latest data, Turkey and Russia have some obvious similarities. The table below presents some of the data that help us to understand the present situation in both countries. Both Russia and Turkey have approximately the same urbanization ratio to whole population, quite similar GNI per capita, resembling living cost index and both of the countries according to representatives' claims have a huge amount of dilapidated, risky or low-quality housing stock within cities which has to be demolished and renovated (Moscow Mayor Official Website, 2018; TMMOB, 2017).

	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>Russia</b>
<b>Population</b>	<b>82,374,967</b> (Worldometers, 2018)	<b>143,955,017</b> (Worldometers, 2018)
<b>GNI per capita</b>	<b>10,930</b> (World Bank, 2017)	<b>9,230</b> (World Bank, 2017)
<b>Urbanization</b>	<b>72.1 %</b> 59,060,906 people (Worldometers, 2018)	<b>72,8%</b> 104,741,046 people (Worldometers, 2018)
<b>Urban population growth (annual%)</b>	<b>2,2</b> (2017) ↗	<b>0,3</b> (2017) ↗
<b>Total housing stock</b>	<b>22,206,776 buildings</b> (TurkStat, 2017)	<b>3,724,000,000 m<sup>2</sup></b> (RosStat, 2018)
<b>Unemployment ratio</b>	<b>11.1%</b> ↗ (World Bank, 2018)	<b>4,5%</b> ↘ (World Bank, 2018)
<b>Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population)</b>	<b>1,6%</b> ↗ (UN Data, 2015)	<b>13,2%</b> ↘ (UN Data, 2016)
<b>Cost of living index</b>	<b>35.52</b> (Numbeo, 2018)	<b>36.73</b> (Numbeo, 2018)
<b>Migration rate for year 2017 (x=immigrants-emigrants)</b>	<b>212 693 people</b> ↗ (TurkStat, 2018) <b>0,25%</b>	<b>211 878 people</b> ↘ (RosStat, 2018) <b>0,14%</b>
<b>Risky and dilapidated housing stock</b>	<b>Shanties</b> – approximately <b>12%</b> (World Bank, 2017); <b>Lack of occupancy permit</b> – approximately <b>67%</b> (TOKI, 2018); <b>Risky building</b> – approximately <b>40%</b> (Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 2016) (around 7mln buildings)	<b>Risky and dilapidated</b> – approximately 11,544,400 m <sup>2</sup> <b>3,1%</b> (RIA-Analytics, 2017) <b>Five-floor houses built in 1957-1964 years “khrushchevki”-</b> approximately <b>10%</b> (The Moscow Times, 2017)

**Table 2.1** General comparison of Turkey and Russia

Beyond doubt, there are significant differences between the countries. The unemployment rate in Turkey (11,1%) is more than twice higher than in Russia (4,5%) and tends to rise. The poverty rate of Turkey estimated as only 1,6% is considerably lower than in Russia, however, it is expected to rise in the circumstances of the existing economic situation. On the other hand, despite the fact that the unemployment rate in Russia is lower (4,5%), poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines is significantly higher than in Turkey. This shows

that even though the proportion of employed people in Russia is higher than in Turkey, a higher percentage of the population does not have enough income to live above the poverty line. In addition, the migration rate in Turkey is almost twice higher than in Russia, however the statistical data takes into account only officially registered migrations while the amount of illegal immigrants in Russia counts up to 2,6 million people nowadays and tends to decrease (MVD, 2018) while in Turkey the number of illegal immigrants crossing the country gradually has increased since 2013 (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). Taking into account that most of the immigrants (legal or illegal) prefer to live in central cities like Moscow in Russia and Istanbul in Turkey seeking for better living conditions. This fact adds a considerable extra load on the cities' infrastructure, social stress and also increases the housing problem; in addition, most of the immigrants tend to concentrate in shanties or dilapidated houses due to lower prices.

Both countries have governmentally supported programs of social housing for the citizens. In Russia, the range of vulnerable groups of the population that should be provided with social housing is wider than in Turkey, but even if all the requirements are met and the applicant is put into the list, a waiting period may last up to 70-90 years in some cities. The lack of social housing stock and unequal provision of governmental social programs obstruct such applications. That is why nowadays the government tends to provide social mortgages for particular groups of citizens with special conditions. Housing programs operate within the framework of the "Government Decree of 2014 under the number 404" of Federal regulations however particular applications differ according to local government's arrangements of the budget and programs being applied. (The Russian Government, 2018). In comparison, in Turkey, all the social housing development is being managed by TOKI (Housing Development Administration of Turkey), from a single source since 1984. It continues to perform housing applications together with the contractor companies in the areas of risky housing, urban transformation and development projects for the poor and the lower income groups of the population (Arslan, 2014; Turkun, 2011, 2015).

## **2.3 Development of Housing Policies in Turkey**

The development of housing policies in the Republic of Turkey is usually analyzed by the specialists within 4-5 main periods; however, there are some differences in the periodization of the last two-three periods according to different criteria. The housing policies in five successive periods are summarized below. The periods are 1923-1945, 1945-1960, Planned Period (1960-1980), Neoliberal Period (1980-2002) and Renovation Period (2002 and after) (Bolen, 2004; Engincan, 2008; Isikkaya, 2016, Hazar et al., 2016).

### **2.3.1 The period after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (1923-1945)**

The first period following the establishment of the republic can be defined as a low-rated urbanization period. A new set of ideology and changes in political, social and economic life led to a significant boost of industry and as a consequence urbanization. The Radical Modernity process is coupled with spatial strategies at two different levels: first, it focused on the transformation of the country into a nation-state; second, cities were to become places of modernity (Tekeli, 2010). Thus, the urbanization at that period was concentrated mostly in Ankara which was declared as the capital city. Between 1923 and 1945, firstly, the state gave more importance to produce houses for the employees as Ankara became a city of bureaucracy (Engincan, 2008; Bolen, 2004). At the same time, a flow from rural to urban settlements started to emerge due to the development of worker settlements around new-built factories and the development of the railway system (Isikkaya, 2016). The housing policy was centered around the logic of nationalism rather than the needs of capitalist urbanization. Socialist urban implementations and European countries' experience were used as a design tool of modern, secularist society. Hence in Turkey, new types of residential buildings developed at that period under the influence of foreign experience and new requirements: cooperative municipal houses (council housing), company town models and the state housing or lodging house model which in fact was implemented later in the after-war period. (Hazar et al., 2016).

The model of cooperative municipal housing experienced a leap between 1923 and 1945 and comprises housing units that were organized by the same professional groups together on the lands provided by local and central authorities. The loans were provided by the Emlak Bank which was founded in 1926 for that purpose (Hazar et al., 2016). The housing needs of the middle income were addressed with the low-rise, individual and detached buildings with garden, collective places (kindergartens, recreation areas) (Ex.: Bahcelievler Cooperative Housing, 1935-38, Ankara).

A company town model was designed with dense collective spaces where the workers and public officials could socialize. It was aimed to emphasize the sociocultural development of the individual and modernization of cities by providing collective spaces. The actors of this model can be listed as the central administration, state-owned enterprises, architects, urban planners, some private enterprises and some foreign countries (Ex.: Zonguldak Coal Mine Property, 1935-1945) (Hazar et al., 2016).

The model of state housing or lodging house was provided by public institutions for their workers (bureaucrats and soldiers mostly) for rent or free and were built in a cooperative model with the financial help of the Real Estate Credit Bank (Ex.: Saraçoğlu Neighbourhood, 1946, Ankara) (Hazar et al., 2016). The idea and implementation were close to a cooperative model however the standards were higher. They were designed with the ideas of “garden cities” and included low-rise blocks of apartments, social buildings, schools, shops and open-air spaces (Isikkaya, 2016).

### **2.3.2 Post-war period (1945-1960)**

The post-war period can be described as a starting point of recognizing the housing problems in Turkey. Mechanization and rapid population growth together enforced the migration from rural areas to urban centers, the first squatters were witnessed on the outskirts of big cities, and for the first time in history, housing became the biggest concern to be solved (Bolen, 2004). A number of laws were passed between 1948 and 1949 to prevent squatting by providing social housing

for the urban poor, but they failed at preventing this problem. Following the establishment of the Social Security Authority in 1945, the number of workers' cooperative housing production increased. The Emlak Eytam Bank was renamed as the Turkish Real Estate Credit Bank in 1946 and took part in numerous social housing projects in Turkey (Hazar et al., 2016). During the 1950s, rapid migration, lack of affordable housing, and as a result, squatters turned from the issues of large metropolitan cities into the priority of central government. They focused on transportation, water, and energy infrastructure development. The Ministry of Construction and Settlement which was established in 1958 took the actions to control the growth of urban areas and introduced a Construction Act in 1957. It took the responsibility for the formulation of a general framework of urban planning and housing strategy. This led to a significant transformation of infrastructure in the cities like Istanbul demolishing some historical fabric in favor of roads for vehicles. However, it was not possible to provide serviced land at the same pace as the rate of population increase.

### **2.3.3 Planned development period (1960-1980)**

The devaluation process that took place at the beginning of the 1970s led to a 50% loss in the value of the Turkish Lira. In addition to this, the petrol crises affected Turkey together with the rest of the world. During this period, the high rate of migration from rural areas to large cities combined with the rise in the whole population led to the high demand for new housing units. Consequently, the individual house-building system boosted in an uncontrolled way fulfilling empty lands inside and around the cities. This process resulted in two types of house construction systems: Small Enterprise Constructions (build-and-sell system) and Squatter Housing. The first case was set up with the announcement of the Law of Flat Ownership (Law No: 634) in 1965. The other social housing models, company towns and cooperative models were seen in few cases at that period.

Previously, before the enactment of the Law of Flat Ownership (Law No: 634) in an apartment building with more than one shareholder, the ownership pattern

was determined according to their share of the land. The allocation of flats was determined after construction was completed. However, under this law, it was possible to have a share in an apartment building before it was built. In addition, freehold tenure became possible for independent parts of apartment buildings. Putting up multi-storey apartment buildings with a small amount of capital was made easier leading to high-rise development. This type of residential development became the typical pattern for the middle class in the 1960s and 1970s. Meanwhile, builders and small entrepreneurs participated in the construction process, resulting in the build-and-sell system type of production. In this system the building plot is given to individual builders or small entrepreneurs for construction of an apartment building. The builder is responsible for obtaining land, supplying the required finance, getting the required permits, acquiring the project, and carrying out the construction. In most cases, builders obtain land that they develop by contract with the landowner. After the construction is completed, flats are given to the landowners as reimbursement. Following the completion of construction, the units that are not used as reimbursement are sold at the market price, which is usually at least twice the construction cost. This type of production was the most common one used in authorized housing provision. As a result, density began to increase in the cities rapidly and especially in low-density regular residential areas. (Ozdemir Sari et al., 2019). Squatter housing, on the other hand, was built without any permits on government land with no infrastructure and accessibility thus avoiding government control and official standards (Bolen, 2004).

Although the efforts to intervene in the spatial organization at the national and regional level were not effective, the idea of the need for “top-down” solutions in urban planning was well established in this period and started to be seen as an integral part of urban planning (Tekeli, 2009). Two major events brought about the expansion of housing cooperative development in Turkey: the adoption of the Cooperative Law in 1969 and the encouragement of mass housing projects under the Five Year Development Plan (1967–1972). At that time, housing cooperatives were the only producers of large-scale housing projects in Turkey. These projects



were implemented in collaboration with municipalities (Co-operating Housing International, 2018). In those years, the idea of mass housing was considered as a solution to fight squatters and shanties and there was an attempt to develop and institutionalize it (Engincan, 2008). Governments tried to legitimize informal settlements by giving people plots to build houses, letting people from informal settlements use public services of the city (“A First development plan” 1963; “A shanty law No. 775” 1966). The 775 numbered Shanty (“Gecekondu” in Turkish) Law which came into force in 1966 regulates the rehabilitation of existing slums and can be accepted as the first legal arrangement for urban regeneration.

In this period, that kind of slum legislation interventions turned into an effective tool for pre-election campaigns for the government. In Turkey, like elsewhere, a squatter house is not just a shelter; it provides economic security, and has prospects of speculative gains for the future. Construction of squatter housing was secretly supported by industrialists, landowners, traders and the service sector (because it provided cheap labor, and increased land values parallel to the rate of population increase). Eventually, squatting became an instrument for easy profit making, as well as shelter provision and after the second half of the 1970s 1-2 storey squats, were turned into multi-storey concrete structures (Bolen, 2004). All these processes resulted in “The Mass Housing law” No. 2985 (1981), “Expropriation Law” No. 2942 (1983) and the first “Amnesty law” (1984) which launched a new era of the legalization of squatters and loss of control on the plots, speculation, and also mass housing applications. The “Shanty Law” (1966) was followed by “The Mass Housing law” No. 2985 (1981). The aim of this law is the transformation of slum areas, protection and renewal of the historical fabric and local architecture, and promotion of safe housing in disaster areas, all in the context of urban regeneration (Candas et al., 2016).

Cooperative development model in 1984 gave a start to the establishment of the governmental foundation of the Turkish Mass Housing Administration (TOKI) which accelerated mass housing provision in the country. A key target of the establishment of TOKI and “The Mass Housing law” No. 2985 (1981) was to increase housing availability which government was supposed to produce

especially for low-income groups and overcome urbanization problems at the national level.

#### **2.3.4 Neoliberal period (1980-2002)**

During the 1980s, planned development followed two new courses, both with respect to economic relations and also housing policies of the government. One was the liberal economic program that was put into force after 12 September 1980, with the acceptance of economic growth as the main objective, and the other was the priority given to the housing sector with the aim of solving the unemployment problem and to overcome the economic crises. Liberal economics and recognition of the housing sector as a job-creating sector have been a widespread choice all over the world since the 1980s, as well as in Turkey (similar to the Reagan policy in the USA and the Thatcher policy in the UK). The failure to reduce inflation during the 1980s and the continuing shortage of money in the market led to loosening of interest rates, which in its turn attracted the savings of families with average income from real estate to money markets. At the same time migration from rural areas to large cities increased. The urban population ratio rose from 45.5% in 1980 to 65% in 1997. Every year, 1.2 million people were added to the population in urban areas (Bolen, 2004).

The first “Amnesty Law” (1984) launched a series of laws which enabled a lot of owners of squatter houses to take pre-title deeds that could be converted into official title-deeds after development plans were prepared. But not all residents could afford to pay and make their applications in a correct way to get their pre-title deeds. Therefore, some of the residents ended up with title deeds, others with pre-title deeds and some with no deeds at all (Goksin et al., 2016). Usually, such kind of “Amnesty laws” were announced before the elections to make people loyal to the government. As a matter of fact, this policy strengthened the rent-earning potential of informal housing, and for many of the newly-recognized owners this algorithm began to be an important factor motivating further construction (Turkun, 2011). Squatters owners started to convert their houses into low-quality apartment blocks, knowing that afterwards when the new “Amnesty Law” will be

announced they can get title-deeds and legitimize their property. This way of thinking still forms the mentality of squatter residents and owners leading to the complexity of the property rights. At apartment block level there can be any combination of these flat "ownerships" with different types of property rights and thus an extremely complex pattern of property rights in each block. In addition to this, Turkish inheritance laws determines that owners should divide their estate between all their children. Therefore, a large number of these individual apartments have more than one person with a share in the property - the shareholder living in the apartment may be only one of many shareholders who live elsewhere (Goksin et al., 2016).

The reconsidered version of "The Mass Housing Law", adopted in 1984, was a comprehensive law aimed to encourage large-scale and prefabricated housing construction, and for the first time provided an independent budget, financial support and institutional framework to fulfill its mission. "The Mass Housing law" contributed to a significant increase in cooperative housing development. For example, the annual number of housing cooperatives founded in 1980 was 131 and increased up to 2,613 in 1987. However, from 1993 to 2002, there was a continuous decrease the development of co-operative housing due to major economic issues in Turkey. The state reduced its financial support, housing co-operatives experienced operational deficits, the price of land rose and individual saving opportunities declined. The Housing Development Fund which provided the housing loans for the development of cooperative housing was liquidated in 2001 (Co-operating Housing International, 2018).

By 1990s, subsidized housing production was provided by TOKI. It was considered as part of a solution for more efficient and mass housing development, especially in large cities. In addition to this, it is generally accepted that the mass production of housing and the subsequent revival of the economy were the most significant processes of the 80s - mid 90s. At the same time, a lot of critical comments were made about the role of TOKI in the construction of social or luxury housing and the decision-making system, which was claimed to be considerably market-oriented (Camur, 2007). Although, TOKI houses haven't responded to the needs

of low-income groups, but have given rise to the emergence of a new type of urban housing environment, called as “site” which was new to Turkey. Accordingly, the target group of these gated mass housing neighborhoods was for the high-income groups. The separation of high-income residents in such “sites” amplified social segregation in the cities.

In 1984, two laws related to were passed (No. 3194 “Zoning Law” and 3030 “Law on the Management of Metropolitan Municipalities”) which gave local authorities and municipal administrations the right to develop, approve and implement their own plans, regardless of regional or national planning authorities (Bolen, 2004). The fact abolished the hierarchy of central and local planning applications leading to the spread of the projects detached from the context. Hence, municipalities have transformed into important actors in the de-facto formulation of the housing policy.

### **2.3.5 Renovation period (2002 and after)**

During the early 2000s very important legislations were formulated in order to construct a proper framework for urban regeneration and renovation applications. For a decade, a process that introduced a number of new laws was accompanied by a restructuring of key government institutions. Three major laws were enacted: The Municipality Law (No. 5393), Renewal Areas Law (No. 5366) and Urban Regeneration Law (No. 6306). In 2012, the goal of a national urban regeneration policy which was announced in 2012 was to demolish 6 million poor quality earthquake-vulnerable houses throughout Turkey (Goksin et al., 2016).

The new government which was elected at the end of 2002 have brought a new housing policy that excluded housing cooperatives from the State financial assistance and allocation of public land for development. Hence, parallel to some changes in regulations, TOKI as a central government organization became the main actor in housing provision in the country. In 2003, the government adopted an Emergency Action Plan to solve the housing problems, especially of low- and middle-income groups (Co-operating Housing International, 2018). After numerous legal reforms from 2002 to 2008, the government restructured the

powers and resources of TOKI. This was done to form a sole agency for regulating the zoning and sale of all state-owned urban land, with the exception of the military lands. It was also given the power to build "for-profit" housing on state land either by its own subsidiary firms or through public–private partnerships, in order to raise revenues for subsidized housing construction in Urban Regeneration Areas. Finally, TOKI was granted the right to revise statutory development plans and expropriate property in informal areas (Kuyucu et. al., 2010). Thus through the 2000s most of the neighborhood redevelopment and renewal projects were implemented through a partnership between TOKI and local municipalities.

With “The Municipality Law” No. 5393 and dated 2005, municipalities are authorized to implement urban regeneration and renewal projects in order to develop residential areas, industrial areas, commercial areas, technology parks, public service areas, recreation areas and create all kinds of social reinforcement areas, reconstruct and restore the old parts of the city, protect the historical and cultural parts of the city and take precaution against disaster risk. In 2005 “The Law on the Protection of Deteriorated Historical and Cultural Heritage through Renewal and Re-use” No. 5366 came into force. It aims the reconstruction and restoration of protected areas and their surroundings to develop residential, commercial, cultural, touristic and social reinforcement areas, to take precaution against disaster risk, to renew and protect the historical and cultural heritage and to use them in order to make them live (Candas et al., 2016). In June 2011, the Ministry of Redevelopment and Settlement was reorganized into the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism (MEU). As part of a major centralization process, the new ministry was given powers that originally belonged to local governments, including developing and approving statutory development plans, approving projects, issuing construction and occupancy permits, and expropriating property. Combined with the regular change of legislation the fact complicated the implementation of the projects started before that time (Goksin et al., 2016). For example, this contradiction can be observed in the development of Regeneration area of Sarigol Neighborhood in Gaziosmanpasa which started in 2005 based on the Municipality Law no. 5393., continued in 2007 under the “The Shanty Law

no. 775” and is being developed under the Urban Regeneration Law (No. 6306) since 2013 (Tore et. al., 2017). One of the most important events which affected the planning system in Turkey was the Marmara Earthquake in 1999. It clearly showed that the buildings in the cities were old and vulnerable to the potential disasters. After the earthquake which has damaged 120,000 houses beyond repair, and has heavily damaged around 30,000 houses, the government took serious measures, including new legislative arrangements (Candas et al., 2016). “The Law on the Regeneration of Areas under Disaster Risk” No. 6306, which was put into the force in 2012, has become the preliminary regulation in disaster prevention, and set new standards for construction and urban planning. The fact enforced a new era of renewal oriented development in Turkish cities. Combined with the law introduced in 2005 (“The Law on the Protection of Deteriorated Historical and Cultural Heritage through Renewal and Re-use” No. 5366) this legislation has opened the way to transform risky and informal areas inside the cities and become a pretext for controversial interventions in the urban fabric since then. The fact that “The Law on the Regeneration of Areas under Disaster Risk” No. 6306 is authorized by the MEU makes it possible to develop projects to bypass local authorities thus ignoring local interests and especially the interests of residents in renewal or regeneration areas. Combined with the gradual empowerment of TOKI the fact revealed opportunities to carry out megaprojects on plots including historical, green, and public areas. Such actions lead to the emergence of renovation projects unrelated to the strategic development plan of the city. In addition, they are mostly developed according to the interests of development corporations (Turkun, 2014).

## **2.4 Development of Housing Policies in Russia**

The history of mass housing construction in Russia can be divided into several different periods, each of which manifests itself in its own particular type of residential building. These houses reveal a lifestyle, level of comfort, cost of construction and distinctive features which were considered preferable in particular decade. Each new stage saw its own experiments and had its own

achievements, which together can be viewed as a series of lessons, discoveries and experiences that help to understand the specifics of Russian housing policy.

#### **2.4.1 First experiments: low-rise development model (1917-1930)**

The October Revolution led to a series of changes in Russia's housing policy, which determined its development for many years to come. Two decrees of 1918, "On Abolition of Private Property in Cities" and "On Land Socialization," gave rise to so-called communal apartments. State ownership began to account for a large share of the country's total housing stock and construction projects. The Soviet regime also took on the task of distributing housing among the people.

In the 1920s, a new type of low-cost mass housing began to take shape. The building committee of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was the first in the history of the country to begin developing a model house in accordance with modern requirements and using a scientific approach. At the same time, the authorities held a number of different competitions, and these measures ultimately led to the creation of fundamentally new types of houses which ranged from communal houses to the so-called garden-cities.

70 years of a Soviet Project was a time of massive urbanization and modernization. The October Revolution brought about a number of changes in Russia's housing policies, defining its development for many years to come. Two decrees of 1918, "On Abolition of Private Property in Cities" and "On Land Socialization," gave rise to so-called communal apartments. The private property was abolished. The first step was the redistribution of existing housing. This measure included moving of unprivileged families into apartments of the ex-bourgeoisie. The lack of housing stock led to the situation when several families had to live in one apartment taking one room per family and sharing common rooms. The solution was meant to be temporary but in real life, it turned out into a comprehensive housing policy which was used during the whole Soviet Period in Russia. That is how the phenomenon of communal flats came into reality (Bronovitskaya, 2018).

The housing problem was very serious because of the lack of proper dwelling, high rate of industrialization and urbanization as a result. The Soviet System

Governments took an obligation to provide a dwelling for all of its citizens very seriously. There was a slogan “For every family – separate apartment” which had to be turned into life in order to support the Soviet Regime’s ideology.

However, the fact did not mean that people could choose the place to live, conditions or size of the dwelling they were provided with. In addition, at that time it was thought that government and specialists (researchers and architects mostly) should make a decision on how people should live. In other words, despite the fact that the Communism was meant to rise socially active population, in reality, people had no voice in choosing even their own houses and conditions to live. Taking into the account the rate of urbanization and ideology of that period in the country, most of the people were happy with apartments they got even if it was a communal flat with common facilities. In time the temporary solution of communal living led to changes in the mentality of the Soviet people.

Starting from the October Revolution, the state was aware of the way cities would be transformed in time because of the recent examples of industrial cities of that period from Europe, such as London or Birmingham. The conditions of dense, polluted “modern” cities were not considered to be acceptable for the Soviet Union’s governments. Existing capitalist cities were considered as highly unsatisfactory. So they aimed to avoid that kind of development and started with researches in the city planning field in special research offices which were established for this special purpose in order to develop Soviet city planning theory. The researches and experiments were mostly built in Moscow and spread around the Union in case of success.

There were three basic models of city planning for that period. The first model was more specific for the 1920s when the cooperative property was still allowed, so it was not state-owned yet. The low-rise model or so called “garden city” model have been borrowed by soviet city planners from the UK. It was not very widespread in big cities and was mostly seen in small towns and settlements where people still built houses themselves but in a regulated and planned territory with



a prescribed design. There were several repeatable designs proposed by the State Office that could be built.

Usually, the houses were built with local and inexpensive materials and the costs for the buildings were quite low. The design was quite comfortable to live; small houses had two-three rooms, a kitchen, and indoor toilets. Houses were mostly self-sufficient with water supply but not a centralized sewage and heating systems. It might be one house per one family on a separate plot, but more often it was a house shared between 2, 4 or even 6 families fitted between several plots. There was a place to garden vegetables and fruits for food which is also accepted to be common and had to be shared among cooperatives. Those kinds of settlements were considered as a transitive form because it was not proletarian enough.

Low-rise model had a temporary return after the war also. The houses of that period had rather European-looking design because most of the architects and engineers visited European countries like Germany or Poland taking part in the Second World War as soldiers and were influenced by their designs. But at the same time the lack of money and housing in USSR in the period after the war required the houses to be very cheap and the fact affected firstly the size of the apartments. Plans of the houses of that period show that apartments were very small, usually had only two tiny rooms, kitchen, bathroom and separate toilet. After that period the low rise-model was not very popular and was locally used on the outskirts of the cities or in small towns. The main reason for less-popularity of the low-rise model was the fact that it was considered as not reflecting the socialist ideology in a sufficient way, that is why the mid-rise model considered as more preferable.

#### **2.4.2 Social Realism ideology period: mid-rise development model (1920-1945)**

Mid-rise model comes into life in late 1920's-early 1930's in the context of new socialist housing policy. A new policy designated that housing should be placed close to working places which during intensive industrialization was meant to be factories. The idea of Le Corbusier's Radiant City (1933) was very popular among

soviet architects so all the cities' were planned under a functional zoning influence. Architecture and design of the buildings were also affected by Le Corbusier's ideas. New residential settlements had to be connected with the other parts of the cities with developed public transportation and inside this new worker districts all required facilities like sportsgrounds, schools, kindergartens, markets, hospitals, local worker clubs and even worker canteens had to be in a walking distance. That kind of settlements were called "micro districts" and were meant to make people stay fit and work as productive as they could without wasting their time on transportation or even cooking or baby-care (for women).

The houses of that period were built mostly from brick because of the lack of steel and concrete. This fact limited the height of the houses as 5-8 floors. So the houses and yards were quite comfortable and matched the human scale. The masterplans were usually orthogonal with simple linear blocks placed around micro district's center and were oriented by the insolation rules, forming inner yard near each house where all the required facilities were placed (Bronovitskaya, 2018).

Despite of the fact that the architecture was very simple, architects tried to make it interesting and less monotonous by adding some color or decorative details into typical primitive blocks of houses. This was a trend of avant-garde supremacism embodied even in typical and very simple housing, so even though form followed function, architects tried to add some art and dynamics into design of those houses. The dynamics might be added into the masterplan design also. For that period the high amount of regulations stimulated creativity of soviet architects to find out some really interesting solutions.

Every year the planning office of the Moscow government approved a set of standard apartment layouts which set up the standards for the housing buildings all around the Soviet Union. The block was quite narrow and one apartment was oriented into both sides of the block (street and courtyard) so the cross ventilation and insolation was provided in each flat. There was a considerable effort to make the living area hygienic by itself. Physical condition of working force was very important for a developing and rapidly industrializing country.

The architectural policy also changed in the mid 1930's during the Josef Stalin's government when all the architects were obliged to become a member of the Soviet Union of architects to continue their practice. They had to promote and use the principles of social realism set up by Josef Stalin.

In 1935 a new masterplan of Moscow was announced. The idea was to widen curved and narrow streets turning them into avenues and boulevards with new bigger monumental scale of everything: roadways, buildings etc. There was no intention to preserve old city fabric (except some rare buildings) because all the city had to present a new ideology of social reality. New floors were added to 5-floor buildings (mostly houses) in order to reach a new scale of streets in the city. Most of the main streets were almost rebuilt forming new facades and section of the streets.

The principles presented in the book explaining the reconstruction of Moscow in 1935 were applied in other cities in USSR and still being the form factor of most of the Russian cities. The design of houses was classical because it was meant that soviet people deserve the best of what history of architecture can offer. In this reason new 8, 10, 12-residential buildings had decorations similar to renaissance palaces. But inside they consisted of typical blocks with quite spacious apartments. This policy was held up to mid-1950s (Khan-Magomedov, 1966).

The problem with that kind of residences was that the government could not provide enough housing of that quality and most of the apartments became communal in time so two or three families had to share one apartment. The situation with the lack of housing became the most important problem after the Second World War.

#### **2.4.3 Post-war period: prefabricated mass housing era (1955-1970s)**

1955 was the year when one of the most important changes in housing policy in the Soviet Union took place and this policy caused the biggest problems related to the housing field in Russian cities nowadays. In the Soviet Union, all the policies and decisions were determined by the leader. After the Stalin's death in 1953 it was expected that a new leader will bring a new policy which will be more suitable

for the after-war period in the country. Millions of people still lived in barracks, basements or overcrowded communal apartments. That is why the new policy of Nikita Khrushchev was aimed to provide as much housing as possible in a short time and as cheap as it could be. He demanded the transformation of the construction industry. New factories were built in order to produce prefabricated elements of buildings which may be used to build houses on place rapidly. Architectural offices were ought to invent simple, cheap and functional-typological projects without any decorations. Previously, in 1930-1950s, architecture was considered as the highest level of art but Khrushchev announced that it should be considered as technology only. In 1957, Khrushchev abolished the Academy of Architecture; some architecture schools were closed; and enrollment in others declined. (Meuser, 2015; Andrianova, 2015).

From that time architecture became a technology which might be borrowed from anywhere to be adapted for Soviet reality. Function turned into the main priority for that period. That is why Soviet architects started looking abroad and found out the concept "the existence minimum", carried out by German architects in 1920-30s experimentally. They figured out the minimal measures of a house suitable for a human being. They also visited some European countries and took some inspiration from mass housing units built after the war in France, Holland, and Sweden. After that a new version of mass housing was developed in the Soviet Union. The prefabricated houses were built according to new regulations. Apartments and each room area, window sizes, materials and construction were strictly regulated. Hence, the people were provided with the most compact and cheap houses with the most optimal floor plans. (Bronovitskaya, 2018). At the same time, the principles of micro districts were retained and developed as a city planning policy; the difference was only in the dwelling quality and design. The final product of soviet specialists' findings and developments left rivals impressed. "What the Russians have done," an official from the U.S.'s National Bureau of Standards (now NIST) told the Chicago Tribune in 1967, "is to develop the only technology in the world to produce acceptable, low-cost housing on a large scale." (Byrnes, 2017).

New compact, built-in and transformable furniture was developed for new types of apartments. These houses were thought to be a temporary solution with lifespan around 20-50 years because it was considered that till 1980's the Soviet Union would have enough money and power to provide higher-quality dwellings for its population. The lack of inner space was compensated by outer courtyards where people were expected to spend most of their time. Architects envisioned developed landscape forms outside the house including greenery, playgrounds, resting places and sports activities. In an effort to make up for small apartments, great emphasis was put on spacious yards. These spaces were equipped with special leisure zones, playgrounds, landscaping, carpet-beating areas, and paddling pools. This idea has failed partly because of the lack of maintenance of that outer space (Meuser, 2015). Architectural planning of micro-districts excluded any through-traffic, and each block had its own nursery, kindergarten, school, canteen, shops, cinema, amenity buildings, telephone exchange, and garages.

The level of prefabrication was carried out by experiments and the most optimal solution was to make separate wall panels, floor panels which were brought to the building site by lorries and were installed by regular cranes. Because of rails built for the cranes it was impossible to preserve the existing landscape so people were quite disappointed by new micro districts (however most of them were happy to move into new flats from their barracks) built in the scope of this new policy. However, in time, the system of landscape and infrastructure has developed. But the dead-end driveways around the houses led to lots of parking and accessibility issues in the further decades. It was not considered that those houses would still be used in such a long perspective (Bronovitskaya, 2018).

#### **2.4.4 High-rise development period (1971-1990s)**

The next change in scale and policy was related to the new masterplan of Moscow announced in 1971. The city was crossed by highways because people started to use more and more private transportation means produced in USSR. The city was divided into districts, which were divided into micro districts as well.

The city scale grew because of the change in scale of the houses also. During this period, more attention was paid to the construction of multi-storey buildings, as well as the introduction of improved and more variable types of housing. In this era were born apartments with 1-5 separate rooms, in which different types of families could live. New modifications of prefabricated houses were announced annually because it was felt that after-war buildings were too monotonous. The diversity of prefabricated house elements allowed them to be used with different combinations of a wide range of typical apartment plans. Houses became higher and cities become denser. However, strict regulations of house construction provided a comparatively high amount of courtyard space and new norms of inner scales for apartments. For example, the kitchen became 8-10 m<sup>2</sup>, rooms became larger and ceiling height became 2,75 instead of 2,5 meters (Bronovitskaya, 2018).

In the 1970s architects also tried to find new solutions of more comfortable and spacy dwellings for people using the same prefabricated elements, bringing into life some experimental houses with interesting plans. These quarters consisted of 9- and 16-storey residential buildings. In order to ensure the availability of infrastructure and comfort, the architects decided to organize entrances to all customer service facilities in the halls or at least within walking distance. The buildings were connected by ground floor areas; therefore, it was possible to move around almost without leaving the block. Internal passages could be used exclusively for taxi and ambulance. At the same time the parking problem was assumed to emerge in the future. That is why planners and architects started to develop new regulations of parking areas around each house. Experimental houses came with their own underground parking which was uncommon for the Soviet period because of the high cost of underground construction (Andrianova, 2015).

#### **2.4.5 Post-soviet Mass Housing heritage (1991-2000s)**

After the dissolution of USSR (1991) housing development on the former USSR territories retains the urban planning traditions of 1960-1980s but not in such a scale and not in a well-organized way because of privatization and parcellation of

the territories of cities. Many of the houses are built without the public service infrastructure and inhabitants have to use the infrastructure of existing micro districts they were built in. That is the reason why infrastructure (transport, parking, social facilities) are usually overloaded. There are no more restrictions on the new housing appearance but there are still regulations used for urban planning and floor plans. Houses still mostly have sectional structure and floor plans schemes developed in the Soviet period are still improved and used in mass and social housing. Minimum areas are still counted per individual while planning but some of the standards seem inappropriate and outdated. In addition, the maximum areas are not restricted anymore. This fact led to the development of spacious luxurious apartments which were not available before. Thanks to privatization, the Russians regained the right to purchase their own housing. This dramatic change is responsible for an important new trend in the Russian housing market. Today, more than 85% of homes are privately owned. (Archdaily, 2018).

In 1990's, most of the houses were still being built from prefabricated elements; however, the facades and plans of new houses became much more pleasant and comfortable. There was a comeback of both individual development projects and extensive use of decor. The search for the planning of new buildings and apartments (studios, projects with common areas, etc.) continues. Some homes have a free layout, so people can customize their apartments according to their needs. (Archdaily, 2018). Starting from the 2000s most of the houses are built as a monolithic frame system with filled-in walls instead of panel frame systems because it is more profitable in the modern context and provides a higher quality of the houses. New technologies affect the housing industry in Russia (Bronivitskaya, 2018).

In the 1990s, the housing development took rather erratic and unsystematic forms. In the industry dominated by development plans, there was a significant increase in the share of private and elite housing. Then, in the 2000s, during a period of intensive economic growth, several large-scale projects for the complex development of new territories were implemented. There was a twofold decrease in the volume of housing production while a significant increase in the volume of

dilapidated and emergency housing came out. (Ekspert Onilne, 2012). Even though mass housing is not a comprehensive trend for Russia any more, Russian architecture and urban planning is still based on the framework of Soviet planning heritage. Moreover, most of the plans of the new houses traditionally have a sectional structure and typical layouts developed in USSR are still used as a base because they are comfortable to live, tested with time and suitable for Russian people's mentality. In the context of economy and housing market competition, the regulations of minimum area per individual are still used by developers as a guide to build and sell the most profitable housing in Russia. Developers bet on a little bit more spacious courtyard, parking or location, safety guard or eco-friendlier materials in order to attract customers but as a whole, most of the Russian housing retains the traditions set up by Soviet urban planners and architects (Archdaily, 2018).

#### **2.4.6 The crisis of old housing stock in Russia: Renovation Period (2010 and after)**

The problem with housing in Russia nowadays comes from the fact that most of the houses built after the Second World War were considered to have a lifespan of 20-50 years. That means that most of them should be rebuilt immediately. However, experts nowadays claim that some buildings made from a higher quality of concrete or brick may not be rebuilt so soon because in case of proper maintenance their life may be prolonged up to 150 years. And some houses have been already repaired by their owners. Despite the physical deterioration of the housing stock, built in the 1950–1970s, “khrushchevki” houses are still in demand. This is partly due to the popularity of the areas they are located in. (Bronivitskaya, 2018).

The most problematic topic in this scope is the problem of “khrushchevki” because they were designated as a temporary after-war solution but most of them are still being used and what is more important is that they are located in the most expensive and developed central districts of the cities which have expanded in time. The housing stock of five-story apartment buildings built in the 1950–1970s



("khrushchevki") is estimated at 11,15 million square meters throughout Russia (2017) while the whole housing stock in Russian cities is around 3,5 billion square meters. 37.5% of the housing stock was built before the 1970s ("khrushchevki" and earlier types). This means that the amount of risky and dilapidated houses is comparatively high. Moreover, most of the stock of emergency and dilapidated housing is located in attractive and expensive central parts of the city so the attention to these plots is considerably high.

For a particular time, the construction of "khrushchevki" helped to solve the housing problem for millions of people in the country. Now, this type accounts a significant part of the Russian five-story buildings. According to the 2GIS cartographic company (2017), among the cities with a population about million people, amount of 5-floor industrial mass housing stock in Perm is the highest – 54.1 % of the total number of apartment buildings. Omsk ranks the second (41.9 %), Krasnoyarsk is the third (36.9 %). In Moscow, the number of five-story buildings is slightly higher than 30%. The stock of emergency and dilapidated housing increased 3 times for the last 20 years (Ekspert Online, 2012).

The Emergency Housing Resettlement Program began in 2008 and is scheduled for completion in September 2017. In nearly 10 years, more than 860,000 people from 13 million square meters of housing were resettled across the country. 14 regions have completed the Program; in 49 regions of Russia, it is implemented by more than 70%. In 20 regions, resettlement is lagging behind. In the Russian Federation, the house is considered as dilapidated and emergency if its construction is not safe enough. There are several levels of buildings deterioration which is examined by a special commission. The percentage of deterioration of more than 70% (for concrete buildings) is considered as dilapidated and if there is a risk of collapse then it is considered as an emergency. In the first case, the house is declared as not suitable for the living and should be reconstructed or strengthened, in the second, it should be demolished or totally reconstructed (Reforma GKH, 2018).

In the first years, the Resettlement Program 2008 included mostly buildings that had been identified as risky and belonged to the first industrial period (1920-1930's) or before. However, due to the aging of buildings, some buildings of the second industrial period (1950-1970) that were identified as risky or dilapidated after 2012 were added to the Program (Reforma GKH, 2018).






Because the Resettlement Program of 2008 did not achieve its goals in the designated period (even though it have been prolonged till 2018) and because existing housing stock is getting older every year (around 11 millions square meters of housing stock declared risky after the 2012 year and could not be renovated according to the previous Program), a new Program started in 2019 on the previous basis and is still being developed nowadays by the Ministry of Construction of the Russian Federation and the Housing Reform Fund of the Russian Federation. From 2008 to 2017 more than 15 million square meters of emergency housing were resettled. As explained by the Ministry of Construction, according to the national project, until 2024, it is planned to resettle around 12 million square meters. It is expected that new methods will be introduced into the law until the July 2019. (Reforma GKH, 2018; Minstroy, 2018).



In addition to the Resettlement Program, the Renovation Program of Russian Housing Stock is being developed using the precedent of the Renovation Program in Moscow which will be analyzed in the Chapter 3. The fact raises concern about the contradictions between the programs. However, the author of the initiative, the head of the Duma committee on housing policy, housing and communal services, Galina Khovanskaya claims that the Resettlement Program and the Renovation Program will not contradict each other. It is claimed that the first one will affect houses that have not yet been declared as emergency, but the repair of which are ineffective. Renovation Program, thus, is intended to break the "vicious circle" due to the fact that, during the resettlement of some damaged houses, others will have come to an unsuitable state. The problem is aggravated with the fact that in some regions like Vladivostok, due to high humidity and a strong temperature difference, the houses "age" faster than usual during the year (Minstroy, 2018; Bobilev, 2018).

## 2.5 Comparison of the Development of Housing Policies in Turkey and Russia

This chapter focuses on the history of housing policies in the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation (Soviet Union former). Such an approach helps to define the differences in the proportions of risky and dilapidated housing stock and the reasons for its formation in both countries throughout different periods. Table 2.2 summarizes the housing policies developed in both countries starting from the establishment of modern Turkey and the Soviet Union up to the present.

Years	Turkey	Russia
1920	<p>1923 - establishment of the Republic of Turkey → "radical modernity" path of development → <b>rapid change in economic, political, social life</b> (socialist urban implementations as a design tool of modern, secularist society, <b>independent lodgings</b> for high ranking officials and military officers, <b>terraced houses, garden city settlements built by the state building cooperatives</b>; shaping the modern socialist/nationalist city by <b>public building and housing projects</b>.</p> <p>Industrialization and construction of railway system, transportation development → factory (coal/iron and textile) construction in small towns on the railway paths (worker settlements with housing for engineers and workers, social premises) → <b>urbanization and modernization</b>.</p>  <p><b>Co-operative development model emerge → the beginning of mass-housing production with help of bank loans.</b> → Housing units that were organized</p>	<p>1917 - October Revolution → <b>rapid change in economic, political, social life</b> → chaos, economic crisis</p> <p>1922 - USSR was formed → mechanization of rural territories, industrialization around new built factories, etc. → <b>migration from rural to urban settlements starts</b>.</p> <p><b>Property of ex-bourgeoisie become state-owned</b> → 1918 decree "On Abolition of Private Property in Cities" and "On Land Socialization" → state allocates dwelling among citizens → <b>rise of communal apartments</b>.</p> <p><b>Developing a model of a standard house</b> in accordance with modern requirements and with the use of a scientific approach (research offices, contests, projects, experiments).</p> <p><b>The low-rise development model or a "garden city"</b> (UK inspired): Modest but comfortable houses built by several standard projects invented by the State Office, were built from local materials, owned by 1-2-4-6 families, had garden plots. Collectivization → <b>migration from rural to urban settlements for a better life</b>.</p>
1930	<p><b>The model of the company towns</b> was designed with dense public spaces where the workers and public officials could socialize. (Actors: central administration, state-owned enterprises, architects, urban planners, some private enterprises and some foreign countries).</p> <p>It was aimed to emphasize the sociocultural development of the individual and acceleration in the modernization of cities by providing public spaces.</p>	<p>Collectivization → <b>migration from rural to urban settlements for a better life</b>.</p> <p><b>Mid-rise development model</b> → Functional zoning values in urban planning, functionalism in architecture and design (Le Corbusier inspired) → socialist "micro district" development → new standards in urban planning and architecture. Everything was made to make people more productive</p>

Years	Turkey	Russia
1930		<p>→“<b>stalinki</b>” – 5-8 floor blocked mass housing, orthogonal masterplans and classical, simple but detailed architecture, high ceilings, small apartments, facilities (playgrounds, kindergarten etc.) in yards or walking distance, insolation.</p> 
1945	<p>After the Second World War → <b>Rapid after-war industrialization</b> → decline in agriculture → <b>a rapid increase in migration from rural settlements to urban areas</b> → cities were not prepared for such a migration → start of <b>uncontrolled urban sprawl, slums, squatters</b>.</p>	<p>After the Second World War → <b>lack of housing and money, an extreme shortage of dwelling. A short-term of low-rise model return</b> (Germany, Poland inspired, were built on outskirts mostly). Rather European-looking but considerably small flat blocks.</p>
1950	<p><b>Public state housing model</b> → the state or lodging houses provided by public institutions for their workers for rent or free.</p>  <p>1956 - <b>Development Law</b> → common standards were abolished, <b>each city was given the freedom to plan according to its own conditions</b>.</p> <p>Intensive urbanization → a need for urban and regional planning on a higher scale because of transportation and illegal housing, (squatters) problem. → 1958 The <b>ministry of public works and settlements</b> was established. It took responsibility for the <b>formulation of the general framework of urban planning -shaping and housing strategy</b> → Historic buildings were demolished to open roads of 30 and 50 meters wide, some squares turn into roads and pedestrian areas are left to cars.</p>	 <p><b>Prefabricated mass housing</b> → Aim to provide as much housing as possible in a short time and as cheap as it could be → researches, new minimal regulations for housing → “<b>khrushchevki</b>” – 5-floor prefabricated cheap housing with “existence minimum” values (German experiments inspired +France, Holland Sweden after-war mass housing). Houses could be built in 15 days, had tiny apartments, low ceiling, inner yards with all facilities. 20-50-year lifespan.</p> 

Years	Turkey	Russia
1960	<b>A fight to squatters and shanties</b> → The informal settlements, that are rapidly spreading and leading to important economic, social and political problems, have been tried to be legitimized by the governments by giving people plots to build houses, letting people from informal settlements use public services of the city.	1970 - a new masterplan of Moscow was announced → rise in scale (transportation, houses).
1970	1963 - "A First development plan"; 1966 - "A shanty law No. 775" → a start to <b>legislation of squatters</b> .  1965 - the "Law of Flat Ownership" (Law No: 634) - increases speculation on plot by build-and-sell applications.	→ <b>High-rise development model</b> - development and modifications of previous layouts and rise in variety of prefabricated elements, rise in height (9, 16 floors) and comfort of the houses → new more spacious measures of standards → <b>Improved prefabricated mass housing</b> .
1980	1981 - "A Mass Housing law" No. 2985 1983 - "Expropriation Law" No. 2942  1984 - First announcement of " <b>An Amnesty law</b> " → led to <b>legislation of squatters</b> , loss of property control by governments, aimed to incline citizens during pre-election periods.	
1980	1984 - Turkish Mass Housing Administration (TOKI) establishment (a spread of cooperative development model)→ <b>accelerated mass housing provision in the country</b> .	<b>1991 - the collapse of USSR</b> → chaos in legislation, lack of state regulation→ <b>continuation and adaptation of soviet housing regulations to new free market realities</b> .
1990	<b>The 1999 Marmara earthquake</b> - 120,000 houses were damaged beyond repair, 30,000 houses were heavily damaged → 300,000 people were left homeless → new construction standards → a requirement of reconstruction of risky and dilapidated housing and squatters; evacuation zones organization (using open public spaces inside the city) → <b>Regeneration programs</b> .	<b>Privatization</b> → problems in responsibility for infrastructure around new built houses.(state or owners). → many houses are built into existing microdistricts without public services → <b>overload of infrastructure</b> → <b>new improved planning and construction regulations</b> .  Rise of social inequality → <b>Rise of the gap between social and elite housing</b> .
2000	2005 Municipality Law No. 5393 → <b>municipalities are authorized to implement urban regeneration and renewal projects</b> .	<b>New construction systems</b> → <b>variety of housing stock</b> .
2010	After several changes in regulations and laws <b>TOKI as a central government organization became the main actor in the housing sector in Turkey</b> . → social housing can be made only by TOKI.  <b>2012 "The Law on the Regeneration of Areas under Disaster Risk, No. 6306"</b> → the law legislated urban renewal projects. In fact, most of the projects led to poor quality, dense and commercialized mass housing projects in the most profitable areas inside the cities.	Housing stock built in 1940-1970 (mostly "khrushchevki", and dilapidated earlier series) require solutions→ <b>Development and state + developers based investment of the programs of overhaul, renovation, renewal of risky and dilapidated housing stock</b> . ("The housing" federal resettlement program 2002-2017, 2019-...; "The program of Renovation of Moscow" 2017-2022, local resettlement programs) → <b>reconsidering the standards of new-built housing</b> .  
		

**Table 2.2** The development of Housing Policies in Turkey and Russia

As it can be followed from the table, both countries have the same reason of rapid urbanization starting in the beginning of the 20th century with the formation of Soviet Union in 1917 and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. There were significant changes in political, economic, social life. But the most important were the changes in ideology related to the concept of how people should live. Modernization path was considered as the way to introduce new values to society in both countries. However, there is a significant difference in the way governments of Turkey and USSR considered the property rights and provision of houses for their citizens: Turkey operated within the framework of private (individual, shared, local and international companies) and state property, while in the USSR all private property was abolished, and all real estate was managed by the state. Therefore, when the shortage of the housing emerged and reached the peak after the Second World War, each state developed their own models of housing provision for their citizens.

Different actors took decisions on social housing development: state-cooperatives (companies)-banks-specialists in Turkey and state-specialists in USSR (after the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 plus developers and banks). In Turkey “co-operative development model”, “the model of the company towns” and “the model of public state housing” emerged (Hazar, 2016). USSR developed “low-rise”, “mid-rise” and “high-rise” development models (Bronovitskaya, 2018).

What makes these approaches similar is that they were inspired by the modernist views of European city planners and architects. Soviet architects developed their own system of urban planning and design rules, inspired by the ideas of Le Corbusier and some experiments and applications from Germany, Poland, France and the UK. Besides, improved versions of these regulations are still used by Russian specialists. It can be said that housing policy developed in the Soviet Union affected not only the spatial organization but also the mentality of Soviet and Russian people. In Turkey, there was a more flexible approach when architects from European countries, such as Germany and France, were invited to do projects for specific social projects, or local architects worked under the inspiration of

modernist views prevalent in Europe of that period (however some of the projects had an obvious Ottoman Empire-inspired façade design).

Rapid urbanization led to serious problems in both countries and they had to struggle with risky buildings. A comparison of the post-war housing policies of these countries shows that in Turkey the most important issues were related to construction management and control (reduction of squatters, shanties, and illegal construction) and earthquake threat (after the 1999 Marmara earthquake). In Russia, the most problematic issues have arisen because of poor-quality aging housing stock (Housing stock built in 1940-1970, mostly “khrushchevki”) which were considered as a temporary shelter for citizens but still being used. The fact that Russia had state-owned property only for 70 years and then rapidly went through privatization in the 1990s, made it easier for newly established government to control all the property plots and ownership because all of them were already registered during the strict management of Soviet time. In addition, a comprehensive, hierarchically planned urban development, which started from the 1920s in the Soviet Union and developed significantly during the time, set up a foundation for the current urban planning and regulation system in the Russian cities. Whilst in Turkey, “The Development Law” (1956) and later “Municipality Law No. 5393 which let local authorities develop territories according to their specific conditions combined with property ownership complexity (especially on squatted areas) and market-oriented development led to fragmented applications in urban planning. The long history of home ownership has led to a wide variety of types of property in Turkey compared to Russia. However, “The Amnesty law” announced firstly in 1983 and re-announced later several times (the last one was announced in 2017) led to the legislation of squatters and aggravated the loss of property control by governments on squatters’ territories (Cakir, 2011). In addition, the invasion of neoliberalism in Turkey after the 1980s and the transition to a free market in the 1990s in Russia led to such consequences as the acceleration of unemployment and economic segregation between citizens with low and high incomes. Privatization and the creation of real estate in modern Russia have added development companies and banks to the game for the

production of housing, but, nevertheless, citizens did not participate in the decision-making process on housing problems in cities. Passive consumption of what was offered by the market and government programs has been observed until the present days in most Russian cities. Almost the same pattern is traced in Turkish housing policies where most renovation programs provided by TOKI are being criticized by specialists and people for the ignorance of citizens' interests in favor of developers' profit (Cakir, 2011; Turkun, 2015). In addition, a large number of conflicting norms and laws declared after the 2000s, combined with a small number of houses with construction and occupancy permits (only about 33%) complicate and prolong interventions in the existing urban fabric (TOKI, 2018).






**3.1 Renovation Projects in Turkey: the case of Istanbul**

Renewal Projects (RP) or Urban Transformation Projects held primarily by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization aim to transform 6,7 million dwellings across the country (Hurriyet, 2019). According to the production report 2018 of the Mass Housing Administration (TOKI), which is responsible for urban transformation, 837,572 dwellings have been already produced. The amount of social housing is estimated as 86,46% (717,154), 143,021 of which is produced under the scope of Squatters Renovation Programs (17,24% of the whole production) (TOKI, 2018). In the latest talk dated May 2019, the minister said that they have built 840 thousand houses since 2002 with the social housing move. It was also told that there are 250 thousand social housing projects until 2023 and they already have projects for 50 thousand of them across the Turkey (Hurriyet, 2019). Here the contradiction between the definitions of social housing can be observed.

In the announcement dated with March 2019, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization aims to renew 300,000 dwellings in Turkey annually as part of urban transformation projects. Environment and Urbanization Minister Murat Kurum has said they aim to have 6.7 million dwellings renewed within the upcoming 20 years (Hurriyet, 2019). It is told that approximately 10% of the 300,000 houses will be made by the Mass Housing Administration (TOKI). The remaining part will be provided by Iller Bank with up to 50% of interest support (Yeniakit, 2019). In addition, the standardized urban transformation will be renounced and transformations in accordance with the regions' and citizens' needs will be implemented, according to the minister. All municipalities will prepare documents for urban transformation strategies according to citizens' demands in pursuant of building dwellings as needed. "No project will be undertaken apart from the

determined design principles. Beginning and end dates of the urban transformation schedule will be specified,” he said. The Minister also stressed that contractors will be categorized and only those that meet the criteria will undertake the transformation projects (Hurriyet, 2019).



**Figure 3.1** Recent Risky Areas in Istanbul announced in 2019. (Source: The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 2019)

### 3.1.1 Legislation

The legislation of Renovation Programs (RP) in Turkey have been formed since the first attempts to solve the informal settlements problems in the 1970’s. As it can be understood from the analysis of the development of Housing Policies in Turkey the present applications are mostly based on the legislation formulated after 2002’s with the establishment of the new government. The Turkish government has been substantially amending the legislative, regulatory, and administrative frameworks for these projects. Laws have been changed, controls reduced, and consultations forgotten about. The aim has been to speed up the process of urban transformation in a fashion compatible with the government’s

political goals (Pierini, 2013). The present legislation of Regeneration Program consists of a couple equivalent in strength laws which form the framework of Renovation interventions: aims, designation, process, duration and criteria of the renovated areas. The most important of them are listed below:

- Construction Law No. 3194
- Article 7/e of the Law No. 5216 on the Metropolitan Municipality
- Articles 69 and 73 of the Municipality Law No. 5393
- A Shanty Law No. 775
- Article 4 and Annex 7 of the Law No. 2985 on Mass Housing
- Expropriation Law No. 2942
- The Law No. 5366 on Protection of Deteriorating Historic and Cultural Property through Renewal and Re-use
- The Law on the Regeneration of Areas under Disaster Risk No. 6306

*The Construction Law No. 3194* (1985, last changes - 2018) forms the basis of the construction across the Turkey. It ensures that the settlements in these places conform to the requirements of science, health and plan. According to the scope of the law, the plans to be constructed within and outside the boundaries of municipal and contiguous areas and all the structures to be constructed are specified as subject to this law (Seydiogullari, 2016). Important changes were brought about in the context of urban transformation with the Construction Law No. 3194: it provides the authority of making plans to local governments increasing the resources transferred to local administrations. In this way, local administrations can determine the goals and targets within the city and ensure the development and direction of the city. At the same time, it has increased the importance of local political factors in urban and planning processes (Yenice, 2014). The latest change in the law determines the registration procedures of unlicensed structures and structures. In this context, by obtaining the registration certificate, the plot or buildings are sold directly to the related persons by the Ministry. The money collected by the administration in exchange for the building

registration documents should be the source of the urban transformation practices according to the law (the Construction Law No. 3194).

*Article 7/e of the Law No. 5216 on the Metropolitan Municipality (2004)* delivers the power to the metropolitan municipalities: “To act with the powers conferred upon by Articles 69 and 73 of the Municipality Law No. 5393”. According to these provisions, the Metropolitan Municipalities and Municipalities are given wide powers under the name of urban transformation and development projects. In other words, it can be said that the convenience of the municipalities to act like a private person have been provided by this regulation (Seydiogullari. 2016; the Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216).

In its turn, the *articles 69 and 73 of the Municipality Law No. 5393 (2005)* determines the scope of interventions that can be held by the Metropolitan Municipalities and Municipalities “to provide regular urbanization, to meet the needs of the residential, industrial and commercial areas of the municipality, within the boundaries of the municipality and the adjacent area; it has the authority to make housing, mass housing, sell, rent and land for these purposes, expropriation, to swap these plots, to cooperate with other public institutions and institutions and banks in this regard, and to realize joint projects with them when necessary”. In addition, the municipality reconstructs and restores the old parts of the city in accordance with the development of the city; implements urban transformation and development projects in order to create residential areas, industrial and commercial areas, technology parks and social facilities, take measures against earthquake risk or protect the historical and cultural texture of the city” (The Municipality Law No. 5393).

Parallel to the Article 69 of the Municipality Law No. 5393, everyone who meets the requirements of the article 25 of “*A Shanty Law No. 775*” (1966) can also be provided with land and housing. It states that the lands in the prevention zones determined in accordance with Article 7 of the law are given primarily to the residents and other homeless citizens in order to improve and liquidate the slums. The lands that are the property of the municipalities and which are to be

transferred to the ownership of the land according to this law shall be determined by the decision of the City Council and those deemed appropriate by the Ministry of Construction and Housing of Turkey shall be reserved for housing construction under the provisions of this law (Seydiogullari, 2016; A Shanty Law No. 775).

The Law No. 2985 on Mass Housing (1984, changes -2003) regulates the provision of the methods and principles providing the construction of housing needed, the development of industrial construction techniques, tools and equipment suitable for the country's conditions and the support of the State. The Law assigned the Housing Development Administration (TOKI) to provide transformation of the shanty areas, the renewal of the historical texture, and the production of residential and social areas (Seydiogullari, 2016). However, the municipality has no power in the scope of TOKI's applications (Karasu, 2017). Further changes have led to the opening of the mass housing field to the market. In addition, this edition of the Mass Housing Law went far from the social housing approaches providing convenience for market oriented applications. (Turkun, 2014).

*The Expropriation Law No. 2942* (1983, changes - 2001) regulates the mechanism of expropriation of immovable assets and resources from private ownerships for the general public interest. Expropriation Law No. 2942 regulates the conditions of expropriation, how the expropriation procedures will be carried out, the authorities and institutions authorized to expropriation, the determination of the expropriation value, the determination and registration procedures, the methods and principles and methods of expropriation. (Kirmizi, 2011). According to the 27th Article of the Expropriation Law three conditions are reasons for the “urgent expropriation”: if there is a need for homeland defense, if Council of Ministers decides the urgency for the case, if there is an exceptional circumstances provided by special laws (Yalcin, 2017).

*The Law No. 5366 on Protection of Deteriorating Historic and Cultural Property through Renewal and Re-use* (2005) propounds renewal sites in order to consolidate the urban structure for earthquake risk mitigation, and regenerate especially the deprived neighborhoods of historic city centers through the


utilization of mixed-uses. With this law, municipalities were given responsibilities for ‘the conservation and repair of cultural and natural heritage’, for ‘defining the scope of urban regeneration and development projects, for the provision of development land and housing, for the conservation of urban history and cultural heritage’, and for the utilization of ‘special planning tools’ in these areas, including the right for “urgent expropriation”. The Board of Ministers approve the renewal zone decision. The scale of intervention starts from 5000 square meters. There are different implementation and financing authorities and actors; however, the projects are generally managed by a public-oriented implementation model. The responsibilities in planning and conservation are shared between Greater Municipalities and local municipalities at local level, and Supreme Board for the Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism at national level. The Law also propounds the establishment of “Boards of Renewal” authorized to approve the renewal projects. This regularization bypasses “Boards of Protection” which were responsible in the control of conservation status of historic neighborhoods since the enactment of the Law on the Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets in 1983 (Law no. 2863). TOKI is contradictorily the most powerful institution in the implementation of the law along with the corporations of municipalities. The Law No. 5366 has introduced a major challenge for the historic landscapes of Istanbul. 11 historic zones in Istanbul’s Beyoglu, Fatih (in Historic Peninsula), Eyup, Zeytinburnu and Tuzla districts were declared as “renewal sites” between 2006 and 2010. These include 6 historic neighbourhoods in Beyoglu conservation site (such as Tarlabasi, Cezayir Çıkmazi, Tophane, Galata Tower, Municipality Building and environs); and 47 historic neighborhoods in the Historic Peninsula (such as Ayvansaray, Sulukule, Suleymaniye, Yenikapı-Yali, Sultanahmet, Kucuk Ayasofya, Grand Bazaar and environs) mostly with urgent expropriation decisions. The fact enacted a lot of criticisms due to the lack of effective conservation or overuse of renewal policies and practices (Gunay, 2013).

*The Law on the Regeneration of Areas under Disaster Risk No. 6306* (2012) have brought almost all the power of transformation to central governments: to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MEU) and to the Mass Housing Administration (TOKI). Therefore, municipalities and local governments have lost their power in this field (Turkun, 2014). Having issued by the slogan of “making slums history”, this Law covers the areas which could not be covered through the previously mentioned law. It brings forward a definition for risk areas to be transformed as “buildings within or outside risk areas that have completed their economic life, or which are scientifically and technically proven to be at risk of demolition or high damage”. All authorities that are responsible for planning, development and control were collected under one institution, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Through this newly attained responsibility, the Ministry is authorized to expropriate immovable property or exchange it with others; transfer immovable property rights and zoning rights to other areas; divide and place shares constituting immovable property, and establish rights. The minimum size of the transformation area is 50,000 square meters. Ministry is authorized to expropriate the immovable or exchange them with others; to transfer immovable property rights and zoning rights to other areas; to divide and to allocate shares forming the immovable; and to establish rights; which means “everything”.

According to the Law No. 6306, there are three definitions of application. These are the reserve area, the risky building area and the risky area. (Gergerlioglu, 2017). The law gives powers to the MEU to designate “*risky areas*” as Urban Transformation Areas (UTA) in response to applications by metropolitan or district municipalities and subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers. The ministry also now has the power to designate “*reserve areas*” in which new neighborhoods can be developed as transfer areas for re-housing residents from Urban Transformation Areas for whom on-site housing cannot be provided. The third important provision of the legislation is the power to order the demolition of “*risky buildings*” which have been assessed as earthquake-vulnerable (Goksin,

et al.). According to Law, majority decision of shareholders (2/3) is enough for the application for renewal, disregarding the decision of all. Key implementation instrument of RP in Turkey is urgent expropriation to overcome postpone; although it can only be utilized in national security/defense issues according to the Expropriation Law No. 2942. If the risky structures cannot be determined by consensus and the 2/3 ratio stated by the law cannot be reached, the Ministry, TOKI or the Administration is given the right to use the “urgent expropriation”. (Turkun,2014; Gunay, 2013). A licensed institution is authorized to conduct research to determine if the building is risky. The licensing of the responsible institutions by the Ministry creates a threat to independence, since most licensed institutions are also construction firms that will be responsible for renewal projects (Gunay, 2013). The rules also provide opportunities for the transfer of development rights. One of the most important threats caused by law is the definition of reserve zones for a new settlement, which is not clearly defined and can and may be applied to natural protection zones and forests (Turkun, 2014).

### 3.1.2 Actors of Renovation Projects in Istanbul




**Figure 3.2** Actors involved into the Renovation Process in Turkey

Generally, main actors of the urban transformation process are the public sector (centralized and local government), private sector, local residents, non-governmental sector and other relevant groups. In this chapter actors of present



Renovation Programs in Turkey are being studied in order to understand their role and the level of involvement in the decision-making process and the transformation itself.



**Figure 3.3** Current process of the Renovation Projects in Turkey

### 3.1.2.1 Central and local government

As it can be defined from the legislation examined in the previous chapter and from different studies held on the field the main governmental actors of Renovation Programs in Turkey are The Ministry of Environment and Urbanism (MEU), The Turkish Mass Housing Administration (TOKI) and with less powers The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality with its construction organization KIPTAS. Local government has considerably less powers and are represented by Special Provincial Administration, Municipalities and Local headmen on places. The administrative role of the municipalities was revised, so that the actual decision-making powers were transferred to the metropolitan municipalities, the number of which in Turkey increased from sixteen to twenty-five after the law on

municipal municipalities was announced in 2004. This shift has concentrated key decisions in fewer hands (Pierini, 2013).

### **3.1.2.2 Users**

Other group of actors can be defined as Users and is being formed by different types of residents with different property rights. Due to the complexity of the property rights given during the legislation of the squatters the property rights of the users can be defined as: owner-occupiers with full title; absentee owners with full title renting out their apartment(s); "owner" occupiers with pre-title deeds only; absentee "owner" occupiers with pre-title deeds renting out their apartment(s); occupiers with various documents which they believe give them legal property rights such as shared land deeds and zoning status documents to be updated to pre-title deeds (Goksin et al., 2016). The future of the residents therefore can be determined by their property rights. The users of the area can be divided into four main groups: residents who stay within the transformed neighborhood with credits support, residents resettled to other neighborhoods or places with credits support, residents who have to leave the area without resettlement and proper support, and new-comers who can also buy flats in the new built houses. A crucial issue is that, particularly in poorer quality apartment blocks in deteriorating neighborhoods, there are many tenants who have no property rights and many occupants with only informal rights which may not be accepted as legally enforceable. This problem results in various types of neighborhoods categorized above albeit to varying degrees. But, it is at its most challenging in informal areas, both traditional and redeveloped (Goksin et al., 2016).

It should be mentioned that in most cases residents do not have enough power and knowledge to oppose the decision of Risky Area's designation by the MEU. There are few cases in Istanbul when people could appellate and cancel the announcement of their neighborhoods as risky. The precedents emerge as a result of consolidations of citizens in forms like Mahalleler Birliđi organization. For example, the resolutions of Sarıyer Derbent (Çamlıtepe), Gaziosmanpaşa,

Sultangazi and Güngören as risky areas have been canceled by the Council of State. The cancellation decisions for these areas are based on similar reasons; there is not enough information and document to prove that the area carries the risk of loss of life and property due to ground structure and construction, there has not been any evidence that disaster occurred in the area before, the reports prepared by the administrations do not contain quantitative criteria and the information is observational, and the area is declared as risky area. The conditions stipulated by the application regulation are not established by a detailed technical report (TMMOB, 2017). However, in most cases people even do not have enough information about the whole project, because all the process of Urban Transformation is not open for the citizens and have a secret character. Even the negotiations with the citizens are being held tet-a-tet using the mechanisms of persuading and even threaten people. The United Nations Advisory Group on Forced Evictions, which visited 8 regeneration areas in Istanbul in 2009, found that, despite the fact that the law requires the approval of the owners, both owners and tenants experience forced relocation. Participation is limited to negotiations in which owners are given only two options. They can sell their house for the compensation money offered by the municipality and leave it, or they can sign agreements to buy replacement houses in their neighborhood or elsewhere, however, these agreements often put them under significant financial pressure. During negotiations, owners are often intimidated by "urgent expropriation decisions" issued by Municipalities to be used to secure "agreement" from reluctant owners (AGFE, 2009; Goksin et al., 2016).

### **3.1.2.3 Investors and Contractors**

As for investors of the projects it can be said that central government with its organizations acts like investors itself, local governments also put some investments into the projects as well as the local banks which have an agreement with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (İş Bankası, Şekerbank, Halk Bankası, Akbank, Denizbank etc.). These banks provide special credits with lower interest rates to the residents of the Transformation areas (Mert, 2019). As it was announced in April 2019 by Environment and Urbanization Minister Murat

Kurum, the aim to transform 300,000 of dwellings per year will be provided with the support of Ilbank (İller Bankası), which is subordinated to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. So the central government itself acts like an investor during the transformation process (Hurriyet, 2019). The shareholders of the Ilbank are municipalities and provincial special agencies (İÖİ), however after 2011, the directorate consists of members appointed by the MEU (Ilbank, 2019). Ilbank has taken an active role in the Urban Transformation Projects and the Brand Cities Project under the Law No. 6306. In this context, the bank performs both projects and transfers 50% of the profits obtained from the real estate projects that it has realized to the MEU's Special Urban Transformation Account for use in urban transformation projects (Ilbank, 2017).

In addition, the projects are being developed in partnership with local and foreign private organizations (Artuc, 2016; Haksever et al., 2019; Turkun, 2014).

Nowadays, metropolitan cities such as Istanbul where the real estate market is highly active have become the center of attraction for investors. Transformation projects carried out in areas where the cost of land is high are presented as projects that are self-funded and can generate profits with changes in development rights and functions. It can be seen that the organization between the actor's groups and the form of relations develop and become different in the context of unforeseen problems. The public sector which is more powerful legally due to its authority, requires the experience of the private sector in issues such as labor and organization, and the two sectors complement each other and accelerate projects' implementation. However, the planning and precise management of these relationships are the most important criteria for the successful completion of the Renewal Programs (Haksever et al.).

TOKI and KIPTAS also act as a contractor for most applications, however private building contractors are also involved into the process. In Turkey, partnerships made with private sector are mostly seen in areas where the land value is high. The fact that the first announced risky areas were at the historical center of the city (Beyoglu, Fatih) and the content of the legislation developed starting from

the 2002 points to the investment-oriented development of the city and being discussed by the specialists (Haksever et al.).

#### **3.1.2.4 Specialists and Legal Counseling**

Specialists are being involved into the process mostly in a form of non-governmental organizations like the Chamber of Architects, the Chamber of Urban Planners or the Chamber of Constructors etc. These organizations usually oppose to the Central government and municipalities during the Urban Transformation process trying to preserve historical fabric of the city and citizens from the interventions. Traditionally they stand for Strategically Planned development and try to prevent unthoughtful interventions. However, they have lack of legal power because of its concentration at the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and TOKI (Pierini, 2013). NGO's like the Chamber of Architects also take part in residents' solidarity movements during the Transformation process. For instance, TMMOB (The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) participated in the protests against the persecution of the environment and environmentalism, the persecution of "the people", and to prevent governmentally initiated Taksim Project (Koyuncu, 2015). At that period a lot of changes were conducted across Turkey in the name of urban renewal without consulting with TMMOB, despite its role in appraising urban development proposals. Participants stated very firmly: "there are certain living spaces in the city that just shouldn't be touched." They were, therefore, against these urban renewal projects and became a barrier for the government's transformation projects. In July 2013 the AKP (the ruling party) rushed a bill through parliament that removed TMMOB from any planning and approval processes for urban development, interpreted as a response to TMMOB's support of the protests (Koc et al., 2015). Nowadays the organizations under the scope of TMMOB follow the projects defining discrepancies with legal regulations and existing plans, make consultations, make appellations to the Court of Law on the inconsistencies determined by the researches etc. (TMMOB, 2019). However, the NGO's do not have a real power to stop the applications. In fact, they just can slow down the process by the

appellations to the Court of Law but cannot affect the designation directly because they are not involved to the decision-making process.

Legal Counseling is presented by Current Legislation, Court of Yard and Lawyers involved into the process mostly on the objection of the Renovation Area announcement. Within the scope of the urban Transformation Law in force, the stakeholders have the right to appeal to the Municipality of the place where the risky structure is located within 15 days from the notification and to file an appeal for urban transformation. In addition, NGO's and residents' resistance associations also in contact with lawyers while appealing to the Court of Yard in order to protect property rights, natural resources and accordance of the projects to the plans of the higher level (TMMOB, 2019; Goksin et al., 2016. Turkun, 2014).

### **3.1.2.5 Mass Media**

The role of Mass media in Transformation Process of Turkey cannot be underestimated because of the fact that it forms the attitude to particular definitions, social groups, and Urban Transformation Programs themselves. The announcements and discussions on the risky areas are usually made through newspapers. In addition, in time and with the help of mass media the attitude to the definition of squatters "gecekondu" has changed and got more negative tone with the filing of the authorities. The prime minister of that period said that "Eliminating the slums that surround our cities as a tumor was our greatest ideal" (Sabah, 2006). The squatters with their countryside way of living and culture are considered as an obstacle to the modernization in the city. The squatters are usually being described in mass media as unhealthy, without infrastructure, not suitable for the city etc. Therefore, the rest of the city nowadays consider squatters in this way. The high level of criminality combined with low level of education make squatters a frequent topic of criminal news. Therefore, the way the rest of the city perceive squatters and their residents can be defined as absolutely negative, and this makes them loyal to the transformation being held in the areas they do not even visit. Residents of the squatters are stereotyped as "invaders", "deadheads" and "guilty" by default and this make it difficult for them find better

jobs, make a career putting people into the vicious circle and leading to deeper segregation inside the city (Turkun, 2014).

### **3.1.2.6 A special role of TOKI in Urban Transformation practices**

As it can be defined from the analysis of the development of Housing Policies in Turkey and from the analysis of legislation and actors involved into the Urban Transformation process, the Mass Housing Administration TOKI acts as the main actor in the field. 45,55% of the social housing projects realized consists of those for the low and middle-income groups. As to the 18,22% portion of the projects (the lowest 20%-40% income tranche), they consist of projects for the low-income and poor groups. The urban transformation projects which have recently become increasingly significant, have a ratio of 17,15 % (TOKI, 2019).

After the abolishment of the Mass Housing Fund in 2001, the administration's revenues are also reduced and in fact have to be fed by the resources transferred from the budget. However, it is no coincidence that the same year, Emlak Bank's authority to perform banking transactions was abolished and a large portion of the bank's real estates were transferred to TOKI. TOKI has been strengthened suddenly (Engincan, 2016). With the changes announced in 1985 for the Housing Law in 2003, TOKI was authorized to work with the private sector, take a role in projects for profit itself, and even carry out such projects on its own, having an opportunity to carry its actions beyond the borders of the country. Via numerous legal reforms like the ones described above between 2002 and 2008, the government restructured the powers and resources of TOKI. In 2004, TOKI was transferred from the MEU to the Office of the Prime Minister, to whom alone it is directly accountable (Turkun, 2011). It was made the sole agency for regulating the zoning and sale of all state-owned urban land, except military land. It was also given the power to build "for-profit" housing on state land either by its own subsidiary firms or through public-private partnerships, in order to raise revenues for subsidised housing construction in Urban Regeneration Areas. Finally, TOKI was given the power to revise statutory development plans and expropriate

property in gecekondü areas (Kuyucu et al., 2010). The organization aims to provide:

Urban regeneration and transformation of squatter areas and settlements (gecekondü);

- Social housing projects for middle and low-income people;
- Creation of model settlement units in the middle-scale provinces and districts;
- Development of historical fabric and local architecture;
- Educational and social facilities;
- Reconstruction measures and disaster relief (Eskinar, 2012).

TOKİ is not subject to the Turkish Public Financial Management and Control Law Number 5018 in terms of General Budget Applications and has the autonomy of its budget. It has a well-established non-profit business model which avoids many of the common pitfalls of institutionalized bureaucracy. It is told that the latest changes in legislation were made in order to get rid of this bureaucracy and as a result to fasten the process of housing provision. The official report says that TOKİ reports directly to the Prime Minister's Office, rather than being part of the general administrative bureaucracy.

On the surface, TOKİ seems simply to be a public agency. However, it is stated that TOKİ is a not-for-profit entity (TOKİ, 2019). Taking into account that it is administrating USD 35 billion of investments to build half a million units of housing, it could well be also named as a "Public Enterprise in Housing". However, this is only part of the story; reality is far from that. In contrast to the existing state-owned enterprise, TOKİ, in fact, is the second privatization agency managing sales of state-owned facilities and public buildings, which are usually belong to the state, in other words to all its citizens, to private for-profit organizations. While the public economic enterprises are being privatized by the Privatization Administration (OIB), the real estate properties of the state are being sold or appropriated for use by TOKİ or OIB. It should be noted that TOKİ does not receive any allocations from the public budget or any other public resources. That is why



even official representative explains that they have to build commercial projects in order to be able to build social housing (Milliyet, 2009). The Agency uses public lands and other real estate properties as its capital. TOKI has received its “capital” from the National Land Office (under the Ministry of Finance) and has contracted these properties with high market values to private construction groups under highly attractive revenue sharing schemes (Sonmez, 2012). The Ministry therefore can transfer public land like public schools’ land or the State Railways land to Privatization Administration which in its turn can be directly given to TOKI with no fee (Turkun, 2011). This fact threatens the public property which should be used for public benefits.

In other words, nowadays TOKI which works under the Prime Minister’s Office and directly tied with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization have a legal and extensive powers, source of public property and mechanisms to transfer it and use for its own purposes, and what is the most important, TOKI nowadays have a monopoly on developing social projects in Turkey and particularly in Istanbul. At the same time the powers of construction organizations, NGO’s and citizens seem to be weakened and not sufficient to resist decisions and interventions of the MEU and TOKI (Turkun, 2011, Turkun 2014).

No one has an objection to the goal of providing housing to the narrow-earning people who are declared as the purpose of TOKI. However, it is claimed that TOKI has deviated from its goal. In the last five years, TOKI has developed a structure that is very debated with respect to housing, infrastructure investments, the attention given to luxury residences, poor quality housing for the poor, large budget work given to capital groups close to political power, being exempted from supervision, equipping it with indescribable and unlimited authority and unfair competition etc. (Eskinar, 2012). The critiques towards TOKI’s applications will be analyzed further in the study but before that it is reasonable to observe some examples of interventions made in Istanbul in order to understand the real process and the quality of the new-built neighborhoods.

### **3.1.3 Examples of the Urban Transformation Projects in Istanbul**

### 3.1.3.1 Sulukule Urban Transformation Project

Sulukule is an Urban Transformation Project in Neslişah and Hatice Sultan Districts, carried out by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Fatih Municipality and TOKI, accepted in 2005 and based on the Law No. 5366. The urban regeneration project implemented in Istanbul historical Romany neighborhood and the denial of participation of locals in decision making caused the formation of urban social movements (The Sulukule Platform) by locals and independent activists, who tried to stop the transformation (Uysal, 2012). However, their power was not enough to resist the process and most of the people had to leave the area.



**Figure 3.4** Sulukule before and after the Regeneration Project

It is stated by the researchers that the property rights and participation were ignored during the process and the ethnical discrimination took place in Sulukule. Roman people who traditionally lived in the central areas of Istanbul faced forced displacement. In the project, households had only two options. They were either asked to buy a house from Sulukule which was extremely expensive or from TOKI construction area which was 35km away from Sulukule in Tasoluk. In both cases, they had to pay the difference between construction cost and value of their houses. House values were decided by municipality according to its size and the value of the field it was constructed on. To pay this difference, inhabitants were provided with the opportunity of paying a loan up to 15 years. A lot of specialists have criticized the project for allegedly forcing long-standing Roma residents out of their homes, which occupy valuable real estate. The project in the predominantly Roma neighborhood of Sulukule is “not beneficial to the public,” an Istanbul

Administrative court ruled on June 14, 2012, adding that construction of new villas “must be stopped.” However, Fatih Municipality did not revoke its plans and appealed the verdict to the Council of State (Hurriyet, 2013). Government succeeded in the Regeneration Program which in fact was the squatter clearance project with social ethnic displacement purpose. Luxury houses were built, most of which was unaffordable for the former residents. (Cin et al., 2016).



**Figure 3.5** The map of residents’ displacement and TOKI social housing offered for residents in Tasoluk

In 2018 after one more appellation was made by TMMOB to the Court and after the years of high resonance plan was canceled. It was concluded that the approved project is not able to serve the purpose of preserving the Roma culture. In addition, the public interest was ignored by the application. That is why the law the court stopped the implementation of the project. However, a lot of villa houses were completed within the project, citizens living in Sulukule had to move away from the city center towards places like Kayabaşı, Tasoluk (TOKI houses). For the Roma people who used to rent a house in the area, the mass housing was constructed by TOKİ in Tasoluk according to the framework of the Sulukule rescue project. The aim was to make home to the citizens but it was impossible for those people to earn money for their living far away from their former houses area, where they worked as musicians or in self-employed marginal jobs. In the end, the Roma people who could not pay the rents and the loans of these houses had to sell them for the lowest price and returned to the neighborhoods near Sulukule as

tenants. 334 families out of 337 who had moved there left their new accommodation as they were unable to maintain mortgage payments (Dogan, 2018; Goksin, 2016).

### **3.1.3.2 Tarlabasi Urban Transformation Project**

The story of historical Tarlabasi neighborhood likewise the Sulukule represents the example of unsuccessful and unthoughtful attempt to regenerate historical fabric of the city. After 2000's the Tarlabasi neighborhood which is placed close to the one of the most popular touristic area Istiklal Street and Taksim Square turned into an attractive point for investors because of its rent potential. However, the plots at the area were very small and buildings conditions were too deteriorated for investors (Turkun, 2014). Today Tarlabasi is a neighborhood which displays "slum" characteristics where families from the Southeast and Eastern Anatolia are immigrating and holding short term jobs (Onat Hattap, 2018). That is why the aim of the project was to regenerate the area through consolidation of the plots and changing the function of the area into touristic needs.

The neighborhood was announced as Renewal Area in 2006 based on the Transformation Law No. 5366. The local government of Beyoglu municipality announced the renewal project by publishing the project details quickly without the required public comment period. Beyoglu municipality focused on a restoration project plan that promised to protect the original facades of the unique historical buildings by giving them a contemporary and modern appearance. The goal was to create a mixed-used urban development, with ground floor retail and commercial space and high-end residences on upper floors preserving the identity of the buildings. However, both the architectural style and the type of urban development are totally foreign to the historic architectural and social context of Istanbul, Tarlabası and the Turkey (Sakizlioglu, 2007).



**Figure 3.6** Tarlabasi before and after the Regeneration Project (visualization)

Due to the fact that most of the residents of Tarlabası did not own the properties they lacked rights and were forced to leave, or evicted by the local police forces. The landowners were either paid off with negligible prices, of less than fair value. The researches show that the offers during the negotiations with the residents were very unfair and were held face to face in order to persuade people in a more effective way. In fact, three choices were offered to the property owners: on average 100,000 TL for buldings, 50m2 of space from the new-built project or urgent expropriation. That is why most of the owners could not come to the consensus with the contractor. The low-income residents without property rights (around 71% of whole residents were tenants), were offered to take credits and move to the social houses built by TOKI far away from the transformation area. As stated above, it was almost impossible for the low-income residents, who could not afford using credits and moving far away from their workplaces. Therefore, they had to leave their homes without any support. Tarlabası Urban Renewal Project, despite its claims, never intended to benefit the poor and ethnic minority population of the neighbourhood. The actual intention of the project was to evict the poor and powerless so as to favor real estate and construction companies for the wealthy global elites (Turkun, 2014). Thus, a multicultural neighbourhood lost its ethnic composition, diversity and population. The leading construction

company, Calik Holding-Gap Insaat, did not keep their promises to locals to provide replacement housing nearby. Thus, hundreds of families were forced to leave for far distant neighbourhoods though they were employed in the service sector in the city's centre (Turanalp Uysal, 2015).

The project has destroyed a culturally rich and socially diverse community with deep roots in the historic urban texture of Istanbul and destabilized adjacent communities. It has displaced over 4,000 people; added to the homeless population of central Istanbul; and created additional pressure on impoverished areas nearby. The physical transformation of the area will destroy all but the facades of over 210 (of 278) historically registered buildings and completely altered the spatial configuration from a 16th century neighbourhood of two and three story buildings on narrow streets and alleys to a 21st century zone of gleaming glass and steel condominiums (Turanalp Uysal, 2015). In contradiction to its original objectives, the renewal project did not deliver an ecological, economic, cultural, social and even healthier living model for its original citizens. As defined in the renewal mission, social interaction within the community did not increase but actually disappeared as the locals were forced out of the neighbourhood. Another goal of the project was to create a safe and healthy environment for the locals; but Tarlabası renewal project was meant to create such improved neighbourhood not for the original local population but for the new incoming wealthy class. Thus, the housing prices increased over 40 fold, which clearly meant that the original poor locals would not be able to afford and thus would not be able to call Tarlabası their home anymore.



**Figure 3.7** The map of residents' relocation and TOKI social housing offered for residents in Kayabasi

According to the latest news, the Council of State cancelled the expropriations performed based on the renewal law No. 5366 of the Municipality by reason that “the project is not for the public welfare”. Even though many historical artifacts located in Tarlabaşı have already lost their originality and came to a situation posing a danger in terms of materials and static, they should have been preserved without damaging their originality and people living here and engaging in illegal jobs should have been moved away from the region. In addition, it is told that the neighborhood should have been sustained with minimum intervention as much as possible. (Onat Hattap, 2018).

### **3.1.3.3 Sarigol-Yenidogan (Gaziosmanpasa) Urban Transformation Project**


The example of Sarigol-Yenidogan neighborhoods shows controversial process of displacement and relocation of local residents and shifts in regulations according to the newly-announced regulations. There is no assurance that the regulations and the transformation process will not change again. The area started to be transformed in 2005 based on the Municipality Law no. 5393., continued in 2007 under the “The Shanty Law No. 775” and is being developed under the Urban Regeneration Law (No. 6306) since 2013 (Tore et. al., 2017). In 2006, Gaziosmanpasa was designated as a 2nd tier urban center in the Istanbul master plan which provided an incentive for investment. Across the district, increasing

private investment in commercial projects is accompanied by public investment in physical and social infrastructure, together with plans and projects for redevelopment of squatter areas. In 2005, Gaziosmanpasa Municipality started to prepare plans and projects within designated transformation areas. Most recently, 13 areas were designated based on 2012 Urban Regeneration Law no. 6306 (Goksin et al., 2016).

Sarigol-Yenidogan Urban Transformation Area (UTA) is one of the informal settlement areas in the district which covers parts of both Sarigol and Yenidogan Neighborhoods. There are 1488 buildings and 1996 dwellings within the area. The building stock consists of a combination of low-rise squatters with gardens and some old multi-storey apartments, the product of squatters' redevelopment in earlier years. The neighborhood has a criminal reputation related to drug dealing. Unemployment rate is also high. Due to the Amnesty Laws announced since 1980s dwellers in the area were amongst those who gained the right to title deeds. Some of them got their title deeds by paying the necessary fees but some could only get pre-title deeds or just zoning status documents. The low income residents of the neighborhood therefore have a variety of levels of ownership rights (Goksin et al., 2016).

It was announced that the project will be constructed in stages, first stage was expected to be built in the property of the Municipality of Gaziosmanpasa. In further stages, the owners of the property can build their homes either through TOKI or through other contractors. However, in October 2012, the tender for the Municipality Squatters Transformation Area Project was awarded and Acar Construction, a private company, won the tender. In April 2013, the prime minister of the period, said that he would not exceed 5-6 times the dwellings in Sarigol. However, the initial project, known as Sarigol City Houses, was built as 9 blocks with a total of 16 floors. The residence has a swimming pool and monthly payments and it was not explained who and how the neighborhood's original citizens will afford such expenses (Tore et. al., 2017).






**Figure 3.8** Sarigol-Yenidogan before and after the Regeneration Project

In the beginning, it was announced by the Municipality that the replacement housing to be constructed in the Redevelopment Area would be sold to Gaziosmanpaşa residents only. But it was announced in November 2013 that sales would be open to the public (Today's Zaman, 2013). Apparently, this was because owners could not afford and/or did not want to buy the replacement housing. Today, it is stated by the residents participating in the field studies that the residents did not move to the new-built TOKI houses yet. Most of the former inhabitants of this area were determined as not able to be property rights holders because they had only pre-title deeds. Moreover, a lot of the residents of slums had to sell their houses to the municipality very cheaply due to threat of urgent expropriation. As for the tenants, they have no choice but to leave the area.

Nowadays the property rights and the rights are determined according to the mathematical model developed by the municipality. In this model, the ownership of the title deed and pre-title deed, the construction of the existing housing (reinforced concrete or masonry) and the coefficients according to the size were determined. By using these coefficients, the rights to the new-built property are calculated. However, it is told that pre-title deed is accounted as half of the title deed, which decreases the value of the housing units in the area (Tore et. al., 2017). Owners are called to meetings individually and there are suspicions that not every family is offered the same deal. At the meetings, only urban design projects are shared with residents. When they ask about the location of their new house, they get a vague description such as one street up or one street down from

where they live. In this context, residents established a neighborhood association in February 2014. The Association took the designation to Court. The Court decided in their favor and cancelled the designation in December 2014 stating that there had been an inadequate assessment of an earthquake risk (Goksin et al., 2016). According to the news in the area where the 1st stage of the urban transformation project is located, an agreement was reached with 245 of 253 rights holders and 302 of 435 risky units have been already demolished (Haberler, 2017).



**Figure 3.9** Sarigol-Yenidogan Regeneration Project 2013 and 2019 top view



**Figure 3.10** Sarigol-Yenidogan Regeneration Project current photo and the project visualization

In 2017 the construction continued. Contractor of TOKI AHES company is building 12-floor mass housing blocks with 796 apartments on the area adjacent to the Sarigol City Houses. According to the Keym urban transformation center's analysis on the territory, before the area consisted of mostly 1-3 floor houses and the new-built 12 housing blocks are 12-14-16 floor height. The amount of property right


owners originally was 253. 796 new flats have been built therefore it can be assumed that 69% of the new-built flats will be sold to newcomers (Keym, 2019).

#### **3.1.3.4 Basibuyuk Urban Transformation Project**

The Basibuyuk case in Maltepe district is known for the way TOKI has started the transformation there. The former park territory was used to initiate the housing transformation according to the Urban Transformation Project. Basibuyuk neighborhood was announced as the transformation area in 2004. The Project Area is surrounded by forests (Başbüyük State Forest and Sürayyapaşa Special Forest) from three sides. The informal structures built in Basibuyuk Neighborhood within the Project Area were taken under the scope of the Amnesty Laws in 1980s. Some residents got pre-title deeds at that period (Karsli et al., 2018).

After the announcement of this project in Basibuyuk, the adjacent neighborhood (Gulsuyu and Gulensu) could consolidate and appeal and stop the Urban Transformation Projects developed for the whole district. After that the Municipality developed a new plan adding that it will be carried out with residents, specialists and NGO's participation approach. In 2006, the agreement about the Maltepe Urban Transformation Area was signed between the Municipality, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and TOKI. The agreement stated that the Municipality transfers its land to TOKI in order to build social housing for resettlement. However, specialists and residents claimed that the part of National Park included to the plot in fact belongs not to the Municipality but to the Treasury. TMMOB could appellate to the court and stop the intervention. However, after further legitimation actions, the Urban Transformation improvement have been carried out by the Municipality. The citizens resisted the intervention and did not want to leave their houses and move to TOKI houses getting credits of 30,000 TL. In 2007 TOKI with its contractor tried to start the construction however residents resisted the process and did not allow the construction firm to enter the area. There were conflicts with the police polis forces.; however, in 2008 after two months of resistance and the residents' consolidation, Municipality came to the agreement that the construction machines

can enter the area but will not start the building process until the consensus with residents would be found. However, after TOKI entered the area, the building process started immediately (Turkun, 2014).



**Figure 3.11** Basibuyuk Urban Transformation Project's 1'st stage and the whole Project's visualization

A couple of objections were appealed to the court to stop the construction. Only one of them was accepted in 2008, however the construction process was almost finished at that time. 300 apartment units were built within 6 blocks.



**Figure 3.12** Basibuyuk Before and After the 2'nd stage Renovation

The next stage of the Basibuyuk Transformation started in 2013 when a new project was developed for the area adjacent to the previous intervention area. There are 216 independent flats in 80 buildings of 1 to 5 floors constructed informally in the project area. The residents of 40 buildings have title deeds; residents of the 11 buildings have a special voucher of Ziraat Bank providing them property rights; in the remaining 29 buildings, there are no documents related to rights ownership. (Karsli et al., 2018). The TOKI aims to build 305 flats in 4-5 storey apartment blocks. Of the 305 flats built within the scope of the project, 246 are granted to the property right holders, and the remaining 59 flats will be given to the property right holders in the next stages of the Başibuyuk Urban Transformation Project (Karsli, et al., 2018; EmlakDream, 2017). It can be assumed that the consolidated resistance of residents exemplifies a case, which shows the mechanisms of defending the property rights and persuading the government to find a compromise.

### **3.1.4 Critique towards the Urban Transformation Programs**

To start with, it is worth to say that there is a huge amount of criticism towards the Urban Transformation Programs in Turkey. There main sources can be

mentioned in this scope: TMMOB and its departments, citizens and researchers from different local and foreign institutions. Here they were systematized under the several titles listed as follows.

- The criteria and the process of the designation of risky areas and non-strategic development
- Top-down decision making process
- A privileged place of TOKI
- Social Housing understanding by the Authority
- Threat to the property rights and forced evictions
- Loss of identity and traditional way of life
- Rise of the density and the quality of the new-built neighborhoods.

#### **3.1.4.1 The criteria and the process of the designation of risky areas and non-strategic development**


The process of determining the risky area is operated only within the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization without putting in place any supervisory mechanism, and it is seen that the general characteristics of the areas determined in metropolitan cities are areas with significant rent potential or squatter areas. It is not clearly known and publicly shared what risks the risky area contains or which criteria is used to declare risky areas (TMMOB, 2017). In addition, it is highlighted by the specialists that the Regeneration Law No. 6306 is now used to re-designate the existing urban regeneration areas designated under the previous legislation, in order to enable the MEU and the municipalities to use the new powers and resources. It is clear that the areas being designated under the Renovation and Regeneration Laws are either historic areas where construction has been restricted, or informal housing districts that are located in highly valuable urban land (Turkun, 2011). But a major criticism is that the criteria for designation are not transparent. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which has worked on the earthquake risk of Istanbul, identified the risky areas and informed the Metropolitan Municipality. In spite of this report, the

municipality has initiated urban transformation in regions with more rent potential (Cumhuriyet, 2015). The validity of this criticism has been demonstrated by the fact that very few of the first wave of URAs that have been designated are in the high seismic risk areas identified by the JICA study in 2002 (IBB-JICA 2002). Many are in relatively high market demand areas with a potential of very profitable housing development which existing residents cannot afford (Goksin et al., 2016). The risky areas declared by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and the risk areas declared by JICA do not overlap by 72.9 percent (Cumhuriyet, 2015).



**Figure 3.13** Risky Areas Designated by MEU and Earthquake Risk Areas Identified by JICA Study (Source: Cumhuriyet, 2015)

The risky areas designated by the MEU (2019) and the main strategic plan used in Istanbul Environment Plan (CDP 2009) have been combined in order to define if they match each other. And some contradictions can be observed. The areas which are designated by CDP as areas which should be protected due to natural and rural characteristics are included into the risky areas (Figure 3.10).



**Figure 3.14** Risky areas designated by the MEU (Source: MEU, 2019) and the main strategic plan used in Istanbul Environment Development Plan (Source: GDP, 2009)

Such a controversy has the risk of invading natural resources leaving people with less greenery inside their neighborhoods. Moreover, it can be a topic of public property rights' loss because if TOKI makes any application on the plot it is being transferred to its authority thus becomes a private property without any obstacles. One of the examples of such dispossession is Basibuyuk's first stage application where the part of a public park was taken in order to build mass housing (Turkun, 2014). The fact that the two development plans do contradict each other causes a logical question: which of them is superior and which of them should be changed in order to match the other one? The analysis of the cases shows that if the area announced risky it goes under the authority of the Regeneration Law No. 6306 ignoring any other plans developed for the area. The fact leads to the disconnected urban transformation "islands" inside the city not integrated into the whole city fabric. Non-strategic approach in this case so not lead to the unity of the city. In addition, the closed and concealed process of designation and development of the



transformation projects makes it impossible for the specialists in the field to offer any improvement according to other plans developed for the territory. Therefore, the project can cause obstacles for the strategic development of the area (TMMOB, 2015).

Critics mention the lack of a strategic approach which meant that urban regeneration areas were designated outside formal planning processes because the urban regeneration legislation was a separate code and not integrated within the overall Development Law. Throughout the 2000s it was argued that neighborhood redevelopment areas and transfer areas should be identified in the formal master plans so that there is a strategic approach, rather than the areas being designated for different reasons by different municipalities and agencies (Goksin et al., 2016). According to the Strategic Plan for 2018-2022 developed by the MEU the prior aims of the development are determined as follows: the redevelopment of disaster-prone settlements, development of infrastructure, spatial planning, design and urban transformation studies to be able to make cities resistant to earthquakes and disasters, people-oriented, environment-friendly plans which retains the original identity (MEU, 2017). Therefore, all the related plans should correspond to the prior ones and to the Strategic Plan (Goksu, 2010). It is mentioned in the document that the preparation of Strategic Plans of the Municipalities is one of the aims. As for Istanbul, the Strategic Development Plan (SDP) available in the open source nowadays is the one carried out for 2015-2019 years (IBB, 2015). Both of the documents mostly consists of the abstract vision of the environment, aims, departments and managements responsible for each target and their financial provision etc. However, it can be stated that there is no proper short and long perspective vision for Turkey and Istanbul. Moreover, a comprehensive algorithm of the achievement of the targets is not clear enough to accept the Strategic Plan as a ruler for a proper action. Strategic Plans are lacking spatial proposals and remain only as written documents. On the other hand, Environment Plan exists in the hierarchy of Turkish planning system as an upper scale blueprint plan including strict spatial proposals similar to the ones in

each scale of Master Plans and with its policies. Thus, a critique stands as Environment Plan has many problems in terms of its overlapping scale and boundary with municipal Master Plans (Ercetin, 2012).

#### **3.1.4.2 Top-down decision making process**

The analysis of the actors involved into the Urban Transformation Process and cases studied in the chapter show that the Urban Transformation process in Istanbul are being carried out in a top-down management model. Decision making process therefore excludes actors like residents and specialists which are interested in the result most of all. Although the laws of urban transformation have defined social participation as a necessity in project implementation, public participation in decision-making processes has not been provided in practice. This situation was very clear in the Sulukule and Tarlabasi projects, which were first introduced in Istanbul, and this experience has been frequently criticized by the specialists (Kuyucu, 2018). Example of Tarlabasi also represents how easily the NGO can be excluded from the project development process. The legislation works in favor of Central Government. Once the Risky Area is being announced by the MEU, the decision almost cannot be objected by the citizens with the rare exclusions like Gulsuyu and Gulensu neighborhoods consolidation and in Gaziosmanpasa district. In addition, the research carried out in 2008-2010 show that the residents mention the lack information about the Projects as one of the most negative side of the process: in Tarlabasi 13,8% of the residents mentioned it as the negative side of the UTP, 18,8% in Basibuyuk, 45% in Tozkoporan and 44,7% in Derbent neighborhood (Turkun, 2014). Decisions about urban regeneration projects have been left to actors directed by their own short-term interests, excluding most of the citizens affected from the decision-making mechanisms. Thus Istanbul is being developed by a very asymmetrical power relation. The failure in affecting the developments by means of urban movements and protests has also discouraged people in expressing their views and demands (Turkun, 2011).

In order to carry out actions in line with the strategies within the scope of the Strategic Social Plan, the bottom-up approach should be integrated into the planning algorithm used nowadays. The basic principle of the approach should be the creation of cooperative and integrative environments by means of broad participation of municipal actors, investors and residents throughout all stages of these projects. The success rate of the projects depends on increasing the level of participation. The establishment of local-based organizational structure and the creation of local communities to develop the organization potential of the inhabitants of the project area should be provided (Goksu, 2010). Recently some Social Effect Reports (SED) and Social Strategic Plans have been developed in the scope of the Urban Transformation Projects. They are produced in collaboration with Governorates, Development Agencies, Municipalities, Private Sector, Non-Governmental Organizations, Local Organizations (Associations-Cooperatives) and Young Planning and Design Offices, Students, Planners, and occupational groups, such as planners, architects, product designers, graphic designers, sociologists, anthropologists, and legal experts (Kentsel Strateji, 2019). Such a wide specter of actors involved into the process makes these reports a very useful source of actual information during the planning process. They include the social profile, history and identity analysis of the areas, interviews with residents etc. In 2018 the changes into the legislation was offered in order to make the SED reports obligatory for each Transformation Project (Emlakkulisi, 2018). However, such reports should not be perceived as a panacea because it can be one of the tools to develop an effective interaction between the affected and affecting actors of Urban Transformation Projects.

The problem with the participation is aggravated by the fact that in some squatter areas education level of the residents is considerably low. For example, in Basibuyuk the rate of residents who have only primary school education (for the people older than 6 years) is estimated as 40,7%, middle and high school graduates as 17,3%, residents who have graduated from the university with bachelor degree is estimated only as 3,2% (Turkun, 2014). In comparison, the districts without squatters like Besiktas have 41% university graduates (Endeksa,

2018). Therefore, residents of squatters living the Urban Transformation process may not understand their rights and responsibilities and may do not know how to protect their rights operating just with the information provided from governmentally ruled mass media sources, other residents and dozed information provided by the authorities. Residents' participation in the process therefore cannot be effective enough. Consolidations between residents, lawyers, authorities and NGO's specialists can form a basis for the adequate interactions within the whole process.

#### **3.1.4.3 A privileged place of TOKI**

From the early 2000s onwards, TOKI has gained supreme power within a period of 10-15 years. It has been enriched by giving a central institution a commercial enterprise status by equipping it with the authority to make all kinds of structures throughout the country and these rights have been legalized with the Laws. That is, it has a strong, rich and at the same time an untouchable identity (Engincan, 2016).

As this review shows, TOKI today has become the most powerful real-estate 'firm' in Turkey that can determine and shape market dynamics through the vast resources and legal powers it has acquired since 2002. In other words, TOKI has become a public agency (directly tied to the Prime Ministry) that operates much like a private developer in the market. The duality of its practice can be represented by the figures. Between 2002 and 2008, 66 million square meters of state land have been transferred to TOKI at no cost. The agency has either sold this land to private developers or has used it to construct for-profit housing (For the year 2009 in Istanbul almost half of the new-built houses were not sold to the residents of transformed areas), subsidized public apartments and various other urban amenities. The fact that TOKI has such vast powers to intervene into real-estate markets by either building for-profit housing units or by clearing existing low-income neighborhoods is generating strong criticisms among professional chambers, NGOs, academics and also even among private construction firms (AGFA, 2009).

The great actor TOKI is said to have locked the construction system. As TOKI grows and develops, there are those who claim that the construction sector is stagnating in general. The unfair competition environment created by TOKI, which is equipped with many legal and financial privileges, is being criticised. Disputes between TOKI and its contractors are often reflected in the press (Eskinat, 2012; Turkun, 2014).

TOKI being a major authority in the construction sector is claimed to be unsuccessful in targeting its own social oriented aims. More importantly, although TOKI projects have been realized on land and capital owned actually by the public, data and information regarding the returns on these investments are kept strictly implicit. There is a big question mark over whether these investments justify the use of public assets in given projects. There exist no official mechanisms to ensure any accountability on the use of public resources, either. It is worth noting that TOKI is not subject to any of the available public inspection practices and public audits because of its privileged place (Sonmez, 2012). The freedom of the land use of TOKI is disturbing the municipalities. The construction that is initiated on any public land may contradict the plans prepared by district municipalities. The direction of development of the city may change and there are non-account increases in infrastructure and transportation costs. (Eskinat, 2012)

#### **3.1.4.4 Social Housing understanding by the Authority**

Another important problem is the understanding of the social housing itself. Despite the fact that the main Urban Transformation Authority TOKI targets to provide housing for the low and middle-income people who cannot afford a housing unit under the existing market conditions, the contradiction is being observed by the researchers. The production report of TOKI of the year 2018 claims that around 86,5% of the produced housing is a social housing, 17,3% of which have been built under the scope of Urban Transformation projects (TOKI, 2018). However, the examples of Sulukule, Basibuyuk shows that in fact the houses named “social” in fact are being built far away from the places people used to live and what is more important people tend to leave these new houses because

they cannot afford it. At the same time the houses being built in the renovation area are being sold on high prices for new users (Turkun, 2014; Goksin, 2016). It can be defined from the researches that the price and credits being given for the new-built houses cannot be defined as affordable for the low-income squatters' residents. For instance, in Bayrampasa neighborhood people complains that they were given 20.000 TL for their destroyed houses, and after the houses built at the same place are sold to them for 100.000 TL by TOKI (Evrensel, 2014). According to the researches of 2008-2010 years TOKI defined the housing for the lower income group as 65-87m<sup>2</sup> apartment. They have been sold for the price starting with 6000 TL in advance and about 300 TL installments with a 15-year term. A monthly household income had to be maximum 2600 TL (3100 TL for Istanbul) to afford such dwelling. However, the biggest amount of the household income for that period in Basibuyuk, Talabasi, squatter area was under 1500 TL, under 2000 TL for the Derbent squatter area. In other words, the income of lower income group is much lower than the limit put by the TOKI. At the same time the certain parameters of the middle income housing are not defined by the authority. The average housing provided by TOKI considered the monthly payment of around 1500 TL which hardly can be possible for the household with the 1500-2000 TL income. It was rather oriented to the middle income and upper income clients (Turkun, 2014). Nowadays the monthly maximum income of the household to be part of social housing program (Basaksehir, Tuzla, Silivri) is 4500 TL (4800 TL in Istanbul), (maximum income is not restricted for in 3 + 1 apartments' buyers). For the apartments 85m<sup>2</sup> the 23 380 TL should be paid in advance in order to pay 975 TL monthly for 15 years. (Atmaca, 2019). The household average income of the districts mentioned is estimated as 3500-4500 TL per month (Mahallem, 2019). The income of the lower income groups is estimated at around 2000 TL for Istanbul, so the possibility of these people to take a part in the social housing programs provided by TOKI seems unreal. Therefore, the TOKI's social housing definition understanding is being criticized.

#### **3.1.4.5 Threat to the property rights and forced evictions**

Between 1999 and 2012, an increasing number of neighborhood regeneration projects were developed and implemented using the evolving framework. However, most were highly controversial as they resulted in the displacement and dispersal of the residents in a process which came to be called by some specialists as "planned gentrification". The United Nations Advisory Group on Forced Evictions which visited Istanbul's regeneration areas in 2009 reported that approximately 80,000 people were directly affected and 12,730 people had already had their homes destroyed. The group found that although the legislation requires agreement by owners, both property owners and tenants experience displacement and forced relocation (AGFE, 2009; Goksin et al., 2016). Together with displacement the problem of new-built housing distribution methods comes out. The methods are not specified in the Regeneration Law No. 6306 and the legislation, so every municipality can use different methods, even at different neighborhoods of the same district. In one project area flat for flat method is being used as a distribution method, whereas in another area a value based method is being used. One of the most important issue is the "ownership right". In this sense specification of the property-right owners must be more clear. In some cases, occupiers of slums, owners of illegal settlements and property right owners with land registry are put in the same equation (Candas et al., 2016). The analysis of the cases indicates that the former residents are being filtered in order to make people with low incomes leave and people with higher property shares stay at the area. For example, in Tarlabasi case, only the residents with a right of share more than 30m<sup>2</sup> have been offered a property inside the renovated area. People with a right of share below 30m<sup>2</sup>, people demanding social housing, tenants, and transitional residents were faced with the only choice of going to Kayabasi TOKI social houses, which is far away from the renovated area. (kentselstrateji, 2008). The interests of tenants are also not specified in any case or legislation. It is claimed by the TOKI authorities that they aim to transform tenants into the property owners but the observation shows that the conditions of credits provided during the process is not affordable for most of them.

Even the property rights of owners are being discriminated by the rule of 2/3 majority introduced in the Regeneration Law No. 6306. There was a requirement before to have approval of 100% of the title deed holders for applications to be made on apartment block basis. But after the 2/3 majority was considered acceptable, it became possible to sell the rights of the remaining 1/3 to the other residents of the same block. This omnibus bill paved the way for permitting the sale of the rights of 1/3rd of the title holders, which was an important development that expedited the process (Haksever et al., 2019). If people do not want to leave their houses their experience the outside pressure: the gas, electricity and water is cut off. The threat of urgent expropriation forces people to sell their houses at minimum price and get long term credits and join the Renovation Program (Turkun, 2014; Goksin et al., 2016).

#### **3.1.4.6 Loss of identity and traditional way of life**

Most of the studies focusing on social issues caused by the interventions argues that Urban Transformation Projects and especially TOKI applications do not satisfy people with a traditional way of living due to the site and flat plans. The issue of creating spaces with identity is one of the most fundamental principles for the realization of urban transformation. Today, the public housing is the only type of public housing that has been produced all over the country and has become the face of urban transformation in cities. The original morphology of Turkish houses is being lost forever.



**Figure 3.15** Informal house and new-built TOKI mass housing in Sarigol Gaziosmanpasa (Source: Goksin et al., 2016)



The traditional street based way of living and neighbor relations and social interactions are being cut off by the resettlement. Some people have to move from their private house with a small garden into the 16 floor blocks. Traditions of local communities do not match to the morphology of blocked mass housing. For example, people in resettled Ayazma-Bezirganbahce area tell some of the daily life practices do not fit the conditions of apartment life. Especially the wedding, funeral and special days of the guests coming (140Journos, 2015).

Specialists state that the examples produced today as urban transformation projects are produced without reference to the architectural and urban identities and that these new spaces must be critical for the alienation of the spirit and space of the city, especially for the suitability of human/user requirements and the identity of the cities. The example, of Tarlabasi renovation which was started under the scope of The Law No. 5366 on Protection of Deteriorating Historic and Cultural Property through Renewal and Re-use in fact destroyed the historical identity of the city area, which have been identified with traditional small manufactures making and selling clothing, iron and steel products (Turkun, 2014). There could be a place for workshop areas representing this kind of traditional production preserving the culture and atmosphere of the place, however, instead of this the area is being transformed in favor of touristic needs only (hotels, cafes etc.). When it comes to the appearance, the project where the original buildings' facades are being left and fulfilled with new construction is being criticized for a bad way of copying. Colorful and traditionally combined patchy street view left only on the photographs (TMMOB, 2017). The projects developed on the places are being highly criticized for lack of identity and bad quality of performance.



**Figure 3.16** Tarlabasi before and after the Regeneration Project (visualization)

### 3.1.4.7 Rise of the density and the quality of the new-built neighborhoods

One of the concerns is the rise of the density in the areas being transformed. TOKI plans to build mass housing blocks of 10-floor instead of the 1-4-floor housing blocks being demolished. But the density rises not only in the center of the city: there are areas on the city's periphery designated as new housing centers like Tuzla Aydınlı, Basaksehir Ayazma, Silivri Alipasa, Basaksehir Hosdere, Basaksehir Kayabası.



**Figure 3.17** Fikirtepe Urban Transformation Project Before and Planned visualization comparison (Source: Haksever et al., 2019)

The maximum height of the buildings is not restricted by the Renovation Law. In fact, no regulation controls the appearance or the standards of the neighborhoods being built. So the rise in density and as the result infrastructure overloading is not predictable at the renovation areas. At the same time the infrastructure of some districts is simply not accounted for such loading. The asymmetry in the loading to the Istanbul's transportation system and infrastructure therefore is dictated by the Urban transformation Projects developed separately from the Metropolitan Municipality's plans.



**Figure 3.18** Kayabasi and Silivri TOKI social houses

Another problem is the quality of the houses itself. According to the satisfaction survey carried out in 2014 where 5000 people was asked, every third resident of TOKI apartment is not satisfied with its quality. 72% mentioned that the quality of materials used is not good enough; 63% stated that the toilet, bathroom and kitchen are not appropriate in terms of availability and quality.




**Figure 3.19** TOKI social houses in Ayazma-Tepeusru and the cracking wall photographed by the users (Source: IMO, 2009)

According to the statistical information about those who purchased housing from TOKI, in 2009-5645 houses, in 2010-4822 houses, in 2011-3181 houses were returned to TOKI (Evrensel, 2014). A lot of the people who receive housing from TOKI projects are unfortunately unable to use the housing and have to apply to the Court of Law. The lawsuits are mostly based on the quality of electrical installations, plumbing and natural gas installations, poor quality of floor coverings and bathroom decoration (Yigit, 2017).

### **3.2 Renovation Programs in Russia: a case of Moscow**

Renovation of the housing stock in the city of Moscow has a set of measures aimed at updating the living environment and creating comfortable living conditions for citizens and public space in order to prevent the growth of emergency housing stock in the city of Moscow, to ensure the development of residential areas and their landscaping. The Renovation Program is planned for the period from 2017 up to 2032 and will eliminate the imbalance in the development of the urban environment accumulated over the past decades and prevent mass emergence of dilapidated and risky housing in the city of Moscow in the next 10-15 years. It is planned to Renovate the existing housing stock in an amount of 16 million square meters (more than 5000 houses) in different parts of the Moscow and the New Moscow Area. The program of replacing almost all five-storey buildings of Moscow (10% of all housing stock of Moscow) with new buildings claims the status of the largest urban planning project in post-Soviet Russia (Mogzoyev, 2017; The Housing Renovation Program in Moscow, 2017).

The Comprehensive Resettlement and Demolition of five-story buildings from the period of early mass housing construction was started by the Mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov in the 1990's and was carried out as part of the "Program for the comprehensive reconstruction of 5-storey houses of the first period of industrial housing construction". As part of the Luzhkov program until 2010, it was planned to resettle and demolish 1,722 houses. However, due to some financial, administrative and legislative obstacles the program was not very successful (Kommersant, 2017; Andreev, 2018).



**Figure 3.20** The Map of the Moscow Renovation Program

The interest to the problem of the continuation of the demolition of dilapidated panel mass housing was again raised in February 2017 at a meeting of the Moscow Municipal Council with the participation of the Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin. The Mayor pointed out that the possibilities of the city budget allow the city to start a new program, taking into account the difficulties that the city authorities faced when implementing the Luzhkov's program. The mayor noted that the current civil and town-planning legislation limited the possibility of resettlement of emergency houses of later industrialization period and asked the president of Russian Federation to assist in changing the regulatory framework TASS, 2017).


On March 10, 2017, a Draft Law No. 120505-7 and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation identifying features of housing renovation in the capital of the Russian Federation - Moscow city was introduced to the lower house of parliament, which was called "Law on Renovation" by the citizens. The draft of the Law was highly criticized by the Head of the Institute for the Economics of Transport and Transport Policy, the Public Advisory Council at the Moscow City Council, lawyers, urban planners and specialists in the field and had a big resonance in Mass Media. In addition, a high wave of protests was launched in Moscow (Borushkina, 2018). Therefore, the document was improved by a team

led by G. Khovanskaya, head of the Duma Committee on Housing Policy and Housing and Public Utilities. A working group which included representatives of deputies' fractions and citizens, including critics of the renovation improved the draft during parliamentary hearings in the Duma. 144 amendments were proposed to the document, 90% were adopted, about 20 were rejected. From the first reading to the third the bill doubled in volume, its text was supplemented with social guarantees for the citizens, proper mechanisms on voting for inclusion and exclusion from the program. On June 28 2017, the draft law was considered and approved by the Federation Council and afterwards was signed by the President of Russian Federation (TASS, 2017, Gazeta, 2017).

From the beginning the Renovation Program considered to renovate 7934 homes defined according to the year of the construction, its type and dilapidated condition of the house. The Renovation Program includes apartment buildings of the first period of industrial housing construction (1957-1968) so called "khrushchevki" and apartment buildings with similar structural elements characteristics (9 storey panel blocks) in which homeowners and citizens are eligible to use state or municipal housing stock on social rentals supported the inclusion of these apartment buildings in the Renovation Program (The Housing Renovation Program in Moscow, 2017). But afterwards based on the results of consultations with municipal deputies and houses' representatives, apartment-based telephone surveys and monitoring of protest activity, houses in 40 districts of old Moscow and 15 settlements in the territories included in Moscow were excluded from the list. In addition, the list of houses supposed to be included in the renovation program was compiled with the participation of the scientific council of the Department of Cultural Heritage of the city of Moscow and the public movement Arhnadzor, which excluded the historical monuments without protective status from the program. Thus, houses in 40 working quarters of the 1920s-1930s were excluded from the program. In addition to the buildings of the first industrial period, the list included around 100 buildings of other years, including pre-revolutionary, houses of the period of the architectural avant-garde, "stalinki" and some houses built according to individual projects finish the

sentence. The preliminary lists did not include panel 9-storey houses, but mayor's office considered the possibility of their demolition with the consent of residents in case of their dilapidated condition. As a result, the renovation program included about 100 9-story houses. Citizens could give their votes through the Active Citizen app, the My Documents Governmental center of state services, or at live meetings of owners, whose decisions took precedence over other means of expression of will. To include a house in the program, it was necessary to collect 2/3 votes "for", for exclusion – 1/3 plus 1 vote "against", the votes of those who refused to participate in the voting were proportionally distributed among supporters and opponents of participation in the program (Kommersant, 2017; TASS, 2017).


The program considers the resettlement within the district (except two regions, where relocation is possible within the administrative district). The first 323 starting sites where the high-rise buildings will appear have been already designated by the Moscow authorities. This is approximately 3.5 million square meters of living space (Renovation Fund, 2019). In addition, some building contractors provide the existing buildings which have not been built under the scope of the Renovation Program to the Moscow Municipality on special agreements to use them as the starting sites. They are being adapted according to the standards of Renovation. First housing blocks are being resettled into these blocks the number of which in 2019 is estimated as 35. By the end of 2019, 59 new housing blocks will be built, due to which the second wave resettlement will begin in 2020–2021 (TASS, 2018; The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019).



**Figure 3.21** The Map of the launching sites of the Moscow Renovation Program (Source: The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019)

The Moscow Renovation Program put several requirements to the neighborhoods to be developed: application of the predominantly quarter development principle for renovation areas and improvement of the planning organization of quarters; development of comfortable public spaces, natural and green areas around each house; formation of the road network, parking, house surrounding areas; increasing the availability of infrastructure facilities through the formation of a system of public spaces - boulevards, recreational areas, streets and driveways; playgrounds, quiet recreation sites, sports grounds, areas for dog walking, etc. within the boundaries of neighborhoods; formation of courtyards as private areas with landscaping, areas for quiet rest and fire passes, the transit will be closed by the configuration of residential houses; construction of monolithic (prefabricated-monolithic) houses with a high degree of energy efficiency; first floors of apartment buildings will be considered for trade and service facilities; the use of new standards for finishing of the apartments. In addition, the Renovation Program considers construction of new social infrastructure facilities in areas where old houses are being demolished: schools, kindergartens, polyclinics, and leisure facilities. (The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019).





**Figure 3.22** The envisioned urban planning development of the Moscow Renovation Program: from micro-district into quarter (Source: The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019)

First houses have been resettled into the houses adapted to the standards of renovation. The projects of the quarters and houses to be built are being developed nowadays by different contractors. The first wave of public discussions on the projects of urban planning of the quarters was carried out in March-April 2019. The first public discussions took place in six districts of Moscow. Their participants discussed the plans for the renovation of neighborhoods in Solntsevo, Ochakovo-Matveeskoe, Ivanovo, Metrogorodok, Northern Tushino and Mitino districts. All suggestions and comments from residents will be given to architects and designers. (RIA News, 2019).

### **3.2.1 Legislation**

The legislation of the Moscow renovation program is based on the general legislation regulating the provision of the citizens with housing and federal program of dilapidated houses resettlement. Here it is worth mentioning that each subject of Russian Federation has its own regional legislation that can differ from place to place according to the type of the subject (republics, krais, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs) works under its own budget sometimes supported by the federal programs. Moscow is a federal city; therefore, it has own legislation acts which follow the federal ones but have been adapted to its realities. Being a federal city the Moscow Municipality corresponded directly to the central government in order to make changes in prior legislation to overcome the obstacles which obstructed the previous Luzhkov's

Renovation Program. Therefore, some changes into the Housing Code and Federal Laws were introduced. Currently, the Moscow Renovation Program is based on following legislation acts:

- The Housing Code of Russian Federation (2005)
- Federal Law 185-FZ on the Housing and Fund of Assistance to Reforming Housing and Communal Services (2007)
- The Resolution No. 47 of Russian Federation (2006)
- Urban Planning Code of the City of Moscow (2008)
- Decree of the Government of Moscow No. 454-PP “On Approval of the State Program of the City of Moscow called “Housing” works under the scope of the Federal Target Program “Housing” (2015-2020)
- Federal Law of July 1, 2017 No. 141-FZ “On Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of the Capital of the Russian Federation” and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation regarding the establishment of peculiarities of regulation of certain legal relations in order to renovate the housing stock in a constituent entity of the Russian Federation - the city federal significance Moscow”.
- Decree of the Government of Moscow (2017, edited - 2019) No. 497-PP “On the Housing Stock Renovation Program in the City of Moscow” (Moscow Renovation Program)
- Decree of the Government of Moscow No. 517-PP “On the Establishment of the Moscow Fund for the Renovation of Residential Development” (2017)
- A couple of other decrees of the Government of Moscow defining the different adjacent aspects related to the Moscow Renovation Program (The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019).

*The Housing Code of Russian Federation* enacted in 2005 (edited - 2019) is the basic law that regulates the procedure for the resettlement of citizens from unfit or dilapidated housing, as well as the procedure for providing them with other, more comfortable housing under the scope of its regulatory function of residential

and non-residential premises, their use, and housing rights of citizens of the Russian Federation (Consultant, 2019).

*Federal Law 185-FZ on the Housing and Fund of Assistance to Reforming Housing and Communal Services* (enacted in 2007, edited - 2018) - determines the vector of housing development in Russia, and also contains the goals and objectives of the reforms related to the housing provision, the main provisions on regional programs. It indicates the main points of the Fund of assistance to reforming housing and communal services, whose activities are aimed at supporting and controlling the reforming housing and communal services in Russia (Consultant, 2019).

*The Resolution No. 47 of Russian Federation* (2006, edited - 2018). This document specifies the types of housing that are subject to resettlement in accordance with state programs, according to priority. The legislation provides a procedure for recognizing a dwelling as unfit for habitation: "Recognition of a premise as living space suitable (or unsuitable) for citizens, as well as of an apartment building as an emergency and subject to demolition or reconstruction, is carried out by an interdepartmental commission established for this purpose (hereinafter referred to as the commission), based on the conformity assessment of the indicated room and house. The fact that the building's technical or sanitary conditions are deteriorated or risky must be proved by the inhabitants of the house. The Technical Deterioration Rate is calculated automatically at the beginning of each year. The program takes three parameters: the year of construction, the number of floors and the type of structure. The third parameter is an aggregate feature that includes engineering considerations. The percentage of wear increases from 0.2 to 1 per year. For example, the Deterioration Rate of residential buildings of Khrushchev's period grows by 1% every year (Consultant, 2019).

*Urban Planning Code of the City of Moscow* (2008, edited - 2018) – specifies the terms according to Moscow city. The Code combines the scattered regulatory legal acts in the field of urban planning and regulates relations on territorial planning,

urban zoning, territorial planning, architectural and construction design, construction, reconstruction and major repairs of capital construction projects in Moscow (Garant, 2019).

*Decree of the Government of Moscow No. 454-PP “On Approval of the State Program of the City of Moscow called “Housing” works under the scope of the Federal Target Program “Housing” (2015-2020)* aims to provide creation of a system of improving living conditions for residents of the city of Moscow, according to tasks and resources, taking into account their needs, property security and existing state obligations; improving the comfort and safety of living conditions in the city of Moscow, improving the quality of the housing stock, developing the housing management system in the city of Moscow; the annual provision of residential housing for Muscovites dwelling and social benefits for the purchase of housing in the amounts excluding the increase in the number of families consisting in housing in the city of Moscow (The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019).

*Federal Law of July 1, 2017 No. 141-FZ “On Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of the Capital of the Russian Federation” and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation* regarding the establishment of peculiarities of regulation of certain legal relations in order to renovate the housing stock in a constituent entity of the Russian Federation - the city federal significance Moscow" introduce the particular changes into the previous legislation in order to make the Housing Stock Renovation Program in the City of Moscow possible to be implemented.

*Decree of the Government of Moscow (2017, edited - 2019) No. 497-PP “On the Housing Stock Renovation Program in the City of Moscow”* (Moscow Renovation Program) is the document consists all the aspects regulating the Housing Stock Renovation Program in the City of Moscow. The document includes the aims, actuality, approaches, guarantees, standards and the accordance of the projects with prior planning strategies and comprehensive planning.


The document guarantees to the residents a flat of equal or bigger area (bigger due to the bigger rooms of common using: kitchen, hall, bathroom and toilets etc.) with the same number of rooms. Apartments of the renovation program should meet the standards of landscape and have an improved quality of finishing in accordance with the requirements established by the laws of the city of Moscow. Resettlement is provided within the neighborhood or district. Renovation Program participants whose houses are located in Zelenogradsk, Troitsk and Novomoskovsk administrative districts receive equivalent residential premises within the borders of their administrative district. To the citizens who are owners, the apartment is provided as the property; to the social tenants and their family members equal housing is provided under a social rental contract or can be provided on the basis of ownership if being stated by them.

It is stated by the law that only the houses included to the program at the period of May 15-June 15 2017 can be transformed. No new houses can be included into the program within the stated period till 2032. However, the houses can be excluded by the majority of voters (2/3) until the first signed agreement with owner. Once the program is included to the program and the first agreement is signed it cannot be excluded from the program. (the Moscow Renovation Fund, 2017).

It is followed by the Decree of the Government of Moscow (2017) No. 517-PP “On the Establishment of the Moscow Fund for the Renovation of Residential Development”. The decree introduced the Moscow Fund for the Renovation of Residential Development (Renovation Fund) responsible for the implementation of the Moscow Renovation Program. (Consultant, 2018; Moscow Renovation Program, 2017). Also several decrees related to the different aspects regulating the Moscow renovation program were enacted in order to define the requirements for landscaping residential areas; the procedure for considering applications for the exclusion of apartment buildings from the Renovation Program; approval of the address list of quarters (territories) within which the existing land plots intended for the design and construction of starting houses during 2017–2021;


procedure for the purchase of new apartments etc. (The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019).

### 3.2.2 Actors of the Moscow Renovation Program



**Figure 3.23** Actors of the Moscow Renovation program

The actors of the Moscow Renovation program are the Central and Local government initiated the process, users (citizens), investors and contractors, specialists involved into the process, legal counselling and mass media in all its forms. Here the actors of current Renovation Program of Moscow are being studied in order to understand their role and the level of involvement into the decision-making process and the urban transformation itself.



**Figure 3.24** The process of Moscow Renovation Program

### 3.2.2.1 Central and local government

The central government taking a part in Renovation of Moscow represented by the President of Russian Federation, Ministry of Construction and Housing and Communal Services of the Russian Federation, State Duma of the Russian Federation on the Federal level and by the Mayor of Moscow and the Moscow Government (City Hall) and the Moscow Fund for the Renovation of Residential Development.

The Mayor of Moscow initiated the program in 2017, the President of Russian Federation supported and approved the start of the program. Ministry of Construction and Housing and Communal Services of the Russian Federation and the State Duma of the Russian Federation acts rather like a legislation developing and decision-making actors. The foundation of the Renovation fund provided it with the authority to carry out the Renovation Program so currently it can be defined as the main actor representing the central government (Renovar, 2018; The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019).

All rights and obligations to monitor the execution of the project for the relocation of citizens of the capital are assigned to the Moscow Fund for the Renovation of Residential Development (Renovation Fund). Renovation Fund owns all the functions of managing the renovation program for residential buildings: it has the right to offer houses for liquidation, approve development projects, monitor the work, open and close bank accounts to carry out its tasks. It is important to understand that the enterprise is a unitary non-profit. It does not have the right of ownership to the property assigned to it (Renovar, 2018). It has the authority to: control every step of developers; monitor the accuracy and timing of the work performed by contractors; address issues of specific citizens related to resettlement; make changes and additions to the proposed plans for the infrastructure of the areas under construction; control the purchase of building materials for interior decoration; attract experts to organize additional control; attract investors to the project, if needed; inform the population about the possibilities of large-scale resettlement throughout Moscow. None of the members of the Council of the Renovation Fund can make unanimous decisions on any matter relating to renovation, all opinions are subject to discussion, including public (The Moscow Renovation Fund, 2017).

#### **3.2.2.2 Users**

The Users of the Renovated Areas can be determined according to their ownership rights as follows: homeowner (here: flat owner) or owners of non-residential premises, tenants of social recruitment (social tenants - those who did not privatized the flat since 1991 or special social groups of citizens (around 25% in Russia)), commercial tenants. The last group do not have a right to vote for the inclusion of the house into the program and in fact have to leave their rented homes.

The Renovation Program guarantees the equal property according to the type of ownership rights. The owners can get the equal or bigger flat or monetary compensation. In addition, they can buy a bigger flat paying the price gap by themselves or using the maternal capital if they apply. Recently a new change was



made to allow ownerships to move to other district they prefer only if they state this in a written form. Ownerships who had a mortgage or any restrictions to the former flat preserve all the terms automatically but cannot get a monetary compensation. Social tenants can get a flat the equal or more area flat on the social rent agreement or get a flat on ownership conditions if they apply. The special social groups citizens who is in the que for improvement of the living conditions can get the flat according to the stated living area accounted per person. Ownership of rooms in communal flats have a right to get a flat per each owner. Those who share a room can get a flat with the same proportion of share. Owners of non-residential premises get an equal non-residential premises or get a monetary compensation (Realtyurist, 2018).

The main reason people support the program is because of the bad state of their flats and housing blocks. A lot of people who live in these houses are poor and cannot afford to pay for renovation themselves. They have been living in such conditions for years, if not decades. The residents who support the program view it as a means of improving their livelihood without having to pay for it themselves. Afterwards, they will get to move into a brand new flats, slightly bigger than the current one they live in, without any payment. The fact they may be moved to a housing block slightly further from the metro, or in a neighborhood not as nice as their current one matters little to them. They are more concerned with improving the living conditions within their flats.

The people against the program tend to be newcomers. They are people who took out a mortgage and bought a home specifically because they wanted to live in a “khrushchevka” for particular reasons: investment, location, abundance of greenery, low density of the neighborhood etc. Often, they spent money to renovate the flat before moving in. Long-term residents who took it on their own initiative to improve their livelihood also tend to vote for exclusion of their house, while people who did nothing to improve their flats for years are going to receive free new apartments (Slavictravels, 2018).

### **3.2.2.3 Investors and Contractors**

Moscow Government allocated around 400 billion rubles (over 6 billion USD) for the Renovation Program from the city's budget which are considered to be spent in 4 years (The Official Website of Mayor of Moscow). However, it was stated by the head of the Ministry of Construction and by different specialists that the Renovation Program can be implemented exclusively through public-private partnership (Vesti Moskvi, 2018). "The participation of construction companies in the program - both contractors and investors for individual projects - will give the market higher development rates" said the Deputy of Mayor of Moscow Marat Husnullin. In addition, banks also got involved into the program providing the mortgages for people who want to get flats buying additional square meters. It is expected that the mortgage market of Moscow will be doubled due to Renovation Program. The reduced discount rate will make loans available to a wider range of Muscovites (Banki.ru News Agency, 2017).

The city can use the lands of private investors - in those areas where the city does not have its own land or a launching site for renovation. At the same time, there is no "common formula" according to which private investors will be involved in the Renovation Program, there are several options: buying land, exchanging land for another, and in some cases investors are ready to transfer part of the land free of charge. The prior parameter to be discussed is the cost of construction, the city will buy flats on special prices lower than the market ones (RBC, 2018). Decisions on 25 projects of investors have already been taken, for which apartments are planned to be built for an area of 586 thousand square meters. The Moscow city program of housing renovation includes projects of nine construction companies. Among them are MIT GC, Capital Group, RG-Development, Barkli Corporation, INGRAD GC, Coalco, PIK GC, Pioneer GC and INTECO GC (ERZRF, 2018). Developers and investors have a number of benefits (for example, exemption from land tax, profit tax reduction) (Krapin, 2017).

The transfer of part of the apartments to Renovation Fund is, of course, an additional burden for the developer. But on the other hand, developer gets the opportunity to build within the borders of Moscow, and in areas where all the necessary infrastructure already exists, and besides, good transport accessibility.

There are almost no vacant sites left for construction in the capital. The vacant areas left are located in former industrial zones which have to be provided by proper infrastructure causing more investment. Thus, before building, a plenty of side problems have to be solved (Banki.ru News Agency, 2017).

Some of these private construction organizations also act as the building contractors for the Moscow Renovation Program. The Deputy of Mayor told that they already have signed agreements with 20-30 large companies. However, this amount is not enough for the construction in the designated rates. Most likely, contractors from all over the Moscow region will participate in the program. The meetings and search for the contractors is still in the process. Experience of the company, its financial position, loans, as well as possible comments on the quality of construction at previous sites and the amount of the finished constructions are being taken into account while choosing the contractors (The Official Website of the Moscow Renovation Fund, 2019).

#### **3.2.2.4 Specialists and Legal Counseling**

Specialists who are involved in the Renovation of the housing stock in the city of Moscow played an important role in the process of the Program's Legislation development within the working group which developed the Law during parliamentary discussions in the Duma. Public movement Archnadzor together with state organizations provided the exclusion of historical heritage which do not have official status from the preliminary list of houses presented at the first Draft of the Renovation Law (TASS, 2018). In addition, there are different social movements like "Muscovites against demolition", "Moscow Activist", "Our Home" which also try to affect governmental decisions taking part in public discussions, launching protests and streaming as much real information about the Renovation program as possible to make citizens aware of the recent changes and decisions.

Further, Archnazor together with citizens identified a large number of valuable and interesting buildings included into the Renovation Program. Some of the buildings were identified by appeals of the residents. It was discovered that the renovation program included plenty of the architectural works of the author's

(pre-industrial) periods - the buildings of the Stalinist period, avant-garde, modernist and of the XIX century. In the summer of 2017, after checking more than 6,000 addresses, a list of outstanding or non-standard houses was announced by Archnadzor offering to save more than 600 buildings. The City Hall developed a compromising decision: a list of "renovation without demolition", in which houses with architectural, town-planning or memorial value were selected.



**Figure 3.25** Buildings to be preserved due to Archnadzor's activity (Source: Archnadzor, 2018)

Moscow government formed a working group with the participation of the leaders of the Moscow Architecture Department (Y. Knyazhevskaya), Moscow City Heritage Department (A. Emelyanov), representatives of the Public Chamber of the City and Archnadzor. The list of buildings proposed by the Government of Moscow for preservation based on the results of this work was published at the end of January 2018. It includes 218 addresses - and another 22, the decision on which was postponed and still being discussed and checked. All the residents of the buildings considered valuable for their historical and architectural meaning will be resettled. The city will provide residents with new apartments, and the buildings will be restored. After restoration, these houses will be adapted for public use. The decision on their further functional assignment will be made taking into account the opinions of citizens, proposals of local deputies and based on the needs of a particular area. The buildings can accommodate kindergartens, cultural centers, sports or medical centers (The Official website of the Mayor of Moscow, 2019; Archnadzor; 2018).

### **3.2.2.5 Mass Media**

Mass Media cannot be considered as the most important but affecting actor of the Moscow renovation Program. All the news starting with the launching of the draft law in 2017 and further discussions about it is being translated in The Internet, Social Media, TV etc. News on official websites and national TV are representing the current Renovation Program as the one and only solution for the housing stock persuading people and mostly elder generation who watch such kind of sources to support the program. In the public space, the dialogue is still excluded: the city media are proactively covering protests, but they report on tens of thousands of Muscovites who vote for renovation (Novayagazeta. 2018). Independents sources provide critical views on the Program, there are lot of video in Youtube representing the reality of the houses provided, citizens' and specialists' opinions. Even the governmental representatives have some critical statements announced via interviews and video content available in the Internet. It should be mentioned that some of the negative videos on Youtube have been deleted while the research was carried out. The fact may point out to the censorship of the protest activity existing in the Internet.


### **3.2.3 Examples of the Urban Transformation Projects in Moscow**

#### **3.2.3.1 The Northern Izmailovo (5<sup>th</sup> Parkovaya - Fedina streets neighborhood)**

In November 2018, the construction of seven houses under the Renovation Program began in Moscow. One of them is a 31-storey house for 1,000 apartments on Fedina Street which is being built instead of 4 5-storey houses demolished before. The project outraged residents and municipal deputies of Northern Izmailovo. They refer to the words of the mayor of Moscow, Sergey Sobyenin, and the chief architect of the city, Sergey Kuznetsov, who have repeatedly said that the height of new houses under the renovation program will not exceed 7-14 floors (Baranovsky, 2018). One of the local municipal deputies Dmitry Baranovsky, wrote a letter to the mayor's office. The answer was that “when developing projects of territory planning, it is possible to increase the height of buildings in order to shape the modern look of the city due to architectural dominants”

(Varlamov, 2018). The chief architect in his interview argued that only the first house should be higher, otherwise the first wave resettlement residents will not receive apartments. However, it is not the first house in the district, there are already three buildings adapted for the resettlement, one of which was resettled in 2018. Therefore, the district is full of areas for the resettlement of the residents. Kuznetsov's words that the first house on the 31st floor is needed for the speedy settlement of houses makes no sense in this scope and is being highly criticized. There is no need to build the first houses on the 31st floor, as there are enough sites for the construction of 6-14-storey houses, as the Mayor promised. Building density on this site after the construction of the house will be 71 thousand square meters per hectare. This is almost three times of the maximum building density allowed in Moscow (25 thousand square meters per hectare), which the authorities promised to provide. In addition, there will be less than 300 parking places per one thousand apartments in the house - 265 underground and 26 in the yard what also contradicts with the Urban Planning regulations of Russia. Baranovsky considers a violation of the guarantees about "creating a comfortable living environment" that the Renovation program should provide. On average, houses are built on 19 floors with a density of 30 thousand square meters - this is five floors above and 5 thousand square meters denser than was promised. (Varlamov, 2018; Baranovsky, 2018).

In 2018 the first two houses from 5<sup>th</sup> Parkovaya street were resettled into the 18-storey building with 340 flats close to their original houses. It was built on another program but it is told that it was adapted to the Moscow Renovation standards. Houses on Konstantin Fedina Street were included in the renovation program as a result of voting in the public service centers "My Documents" and in the project "Active Citizen". During the relocation, 95% of the inhabitants of the house 3 and 90% of the house 5 voted for the inclusion into the program. Most of the residents are satisfied with their new flats the area of which is 1,5 bigger than the former ones. Residents were offered 2-3 alternatives according to the reports (Newsvostok, 2018).



**Figure 3.26** The first houses resettled by the Renovation program from 5<sup>th</sup> Parkovaya to the Fedina Street

The fact that the resettlement is provided within the distance of 300m make people keep their social links, use the same schools, metro stations, markets etc. However, what will be built in the former place is not clear. So the concerns about the higher density still take place among residents. The activist of the public movement opposing the renovation argues that house on Parkovaya street is of a relatively good quality, so it is quite suitable for being a “flagship”, she guesses that it is rather a window dressing from the Renovation Fund (CIAN, 2018). However, some people stated that the quality of the house seems to be not appropriate: some of the apartments are smaller than the former apartments, there are some problems with finishing and plumbing equipment (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).

### 3.2.3.2 The Beskudnikova neighborhood

In Beskudnikova neighborhood the Renovation was highly supported by the residents at the beginning. Around 91% of the residents from 37 houses voted for the demolition of their houses. Most of the residents were satisfied with the houses provided, however after some apartments’ keys were returned and a lot of lawsuits

were launched. The reason was that the houses provided had bigger common area but less living area contradicting to the Moscow Renovation guarantees. In addition, the parking areas around the houses were not enough and estimated only 25% of minimum parking number accounted for the number of flats (CIAN, 2018). The problem with parking areas is crucial for all the projects already launched in 2018-2019.




**Figure 3.27** The Beskudnikova neighborhood's Renovation project

### 3.2.3.3 Some of the projects presented on the Public Discussions carried out in April-March in the six districts of Moscow

The Northern Tushino district located in North-West Administrative District of Moscow is expected to have the implies the greatest compaction. According to the project presented during the public discussions, Northern Tushino can grow more than three times (for example in one quarter instead of 161 thousand square meters will 494 thousand is planned). According to the project the promised maximum number of floors in buildings – 24. Residents are worried about the density. During the discussions a lot of questions about the fact were asked however no proper answers were given by the authorities (Meduza, 2019; Kommersant, 2019).





**Figure 3.28** The Northern Tushino district's Renovation project

In Western Administrative District of Moscow part of the Solntsevo neighborhood is going to be transformed. Instead of eight houses to be demolished (34.6 thousand sq. m.) 129 thousand sq.m. of housing will be built (Kommersant, 2019). In this case also a more than 3 times increase in building density is planned. Even if we assume that new apartments are by 5% more than the original, then a threefold increase in the area cannot be explained.



**Figure 3.29** The Solntsevo neighborhood's Renovation project

The most large-scale reconstruction is planned in the Metrogorodok neighbourhood located in the Eastern Administrative District: demolishing 74 houses (428 thousand sq. m.), 30 residential complexes with an area of almost 1.23 million square meters will be built. The number of floors of houses and the number of apartments inside is not specified in the project documentation. But in the Metrogorodok houses with a permitted height of 70–85 meters and an area of 40–50 thousand square meters prevail (there are even houses 81 meters' height). (Kommersant, 2019).



**Figure 3.30** The Metrogorodok neighborhood's Renovation project

### **3.2.4 Critique towards the program**

Starting from 2017 the Moscow renovation program is being highly criticized by the residents, specialists in the field, lawyers and governmental representatives who point out some significant weaknesses of the Program:

- Top-down decision making process and profit-oriented development.
- Inconsistency of the Renovation Program and its Legislation
- Threat to the property rights
- Loss of identity and historical fabric of the city
- Rise of the density and the quality of the new-built neighborhoods.

#### **3.2.4.1 Top-down decision making process and profit-oriented development**

While the governments argued that the program addresses citizens' needs, the announcement immediately provoked speculation about its true goals. Many observers argued that the Mayor of Moscow and the City Council will use the program to generate elite support through the distribution of rent streams. Moscow construction is notoriously corrupt, creating revenue through preferential

contracting, kickbacks, and bribes at all stages. In 2017 VCIOM poll demonstrated that many Muscovites believed that corruption is a plausible motivation for the project. Government got from the citizens a highly demanded land providing the people with cheaper and more compact houses, governmentally supported developers in their turn got the chance to build on these plots with less taxes and also benefit from the extra apartments being sold on a market price, banks benefit from the higher amount of governmentally secured mortgages. Each affecting actor has its piece of pie. A more nuanced version of this argument stresses the effects of economic crisis - falling prices and low demand - suggesting that the program constitutes an industry bailout. If the goal is to maximize rents, one would expect renovation to be concentrated in good neighborhoods where apartments command higher sale prices (TASS, 2019; Smyth, 2018). That is why the controversial decision of such a comprehensive and resonating program worth all risks for the government and make them put all their efforts on launching a pseudo-participatory process. S. Levkin, head of the city's urban planning department, said that the targeted list of launch sites for building houses under the Renovation Program was approved at a Moscow government meeting. At the same time, public discussions on the approval of the list and were not held to take into account the opinions of the citizens living in these areas (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).

Moreover, the process of voting could also be used as the tool to manage the voices. The participant of the public movement "Our Home" argues that the Renovation is not a social program. This is a commercial program that we are rather clumsily trying to pass off as a social program. From the very beginning, it was invented not for our own good, but for the good of those construction companies that would break some houses and build others in their place. For them, this is a very profitable business. Of course, companies want to build their homes as high and denser as possible. Because all the "extra" apartments in these houses (not occupied by residents of demolished houses) will be sold on the housing market. And the more they make such apartments, the more profit they

will receive. And they also want construction to be as cheap as possible (Noviyelzvestiya, 2018).

#### **3.2.4.2 Inconsistency of the Renovation Program and its Legislation**

The legislation from the beginning of the Program caused a lot of questions from the citizens, lawyers and specialists. The legislation of the Program at the time of its announcement was not prepared yet and a lot of changes were done on the spot. Voting procedure is also being criticized because it took place before the Program's Final legislation was formulated. Therefore, residents did not know properly all the aspects of the Renovation Program at the moment of voting (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).

Muscovites, deputies, the president were misled by the Mayor about the state of the Moscow five-story building and the lack of an alternative to demolition. The real risky and dilapidated houses have been left to be demolished under the previously launched federal "Housing" program providing the house for insecure and special groups of population. However, there are some representatives of these groups in the Moscow Renovation Program too. There are intersections between the scopes of the different programs working within the same city. These facts can be a reason for repealing Law No. 141-FZ or bringing it in line with law and common sense (Echin, 2018). Lawyers point out that the fact obstructs the appellations to the Court. There are some cases when houses should have been reconstructed or demolished under the scope of previous programs and then was took under the scope of the Moscow Renovation Program but currently is being resettled on the terms of the previous program. In addition, the lawyers argue that there is a misunderstanding of equal housing definition, because Tehe Renovation Program does not provide land plots under apartment houses built for resettlement, the property of the resettled citizens, and the houses themselves will be built exclusively on urban land. This, in turn, makes it impossible to provide an "equivalent" apartment within the framework of the Renovation Program, since the common share property of such a "renovation" house will not include the land under it (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).

Moreover, the current legislation does not include particular numerical measures of the so-called “better standards” of living, therefore residents do not know what to wait from the projects. Developers may speculate on this gap providing their own definitions of comfortable living. The example of the construction density represents the fact in a very clear way: it is not restricted and being increased up to critical amounts if we look at the projects presented at the recent public discussions.

Residents of first houses to be resettled complain that the schedule of the resettlement is still not available. People have a right to know when they need to leave their houses. The lack of information about demolition and relocation schedules is a big problem for those who are “being renovated”. The Member of the working group at the State Duma claims that they are sending dozens of requests for the order of demolition to the authorities, but response they receive tells that the documentation will be ready only by the end of the 2019 although the resettlement is already in progress (Kommersant, 2019).

#### **3.2.4.3 Threat to the property rights**

The rights of the 1/3 minority of the houses included into the program seems to be ignored (Leslie, 2018). One of the consequences of the privatization of the state housing sector started in 1990s was that individuals became responsible for the repair and maintenance of their apartments. Therefore, people who had an opportunity to repair and improve the condition of their homes invested their money. Also people have a monthly capital repair taxes under the scope of the overhaul federal program. One of the resident’s claims: “Two years ago politicians obliged me to pay into a capital repair fund for the overhaul of our housing that was scheduled to be completed by 2030. They told us that the houses are strong. And then this year the same politicians tell us that our homes are in an emergency condition and need to be demolished?”. One of the concerning fact is that the capital repair money collected for last years was collected for particular purpose and should be refunded if the house is being demolished. Instead of this, the Program just stops further payments and use the money in its own interests.

Another problem hides in the terms of equal size flat to be given instead of former apartment. The residents of the demolished dwelling will not receive apartments of equal value, but merely of equal size (Pertsev, 2017). So people will lose in cost of their property. For example, the current cost of a part of the demolished housing in houses located near recreation facilities, metro stations on the banks of rivers can be 10-40% higher than the cost provided by the housing renovation program being developed in the capital (Krapin, 2017).

A very common situation: you bought or mortgage an apartment in a low-rise, brick building for 120 years. You made a repair, and if you have high ceilings, ordered furniture for this height. And suddenly your neighbors decided that it was time to go into renovation. At the same time, you are automatically excluded from the overhaul program, your house will not be repaired, and the funds already collected will be collected by the Renovation Fund. Furthermore, the federal legislation to give the Moscow city government power to knock down entire neighborhoods has worrying implications for the rights of residents and small-business owners. Residents who do not sign an agreement to transfer ownership of their flat within two months will be taken to court (Luhn, 2017). At the same time, lawmakers seem to forget about the ownership right to common property, which in Russia is inextricably linked to the right of ownership of a dwelling in an apartment house, and the land under the house, the territory around it, and the elements of gardening are in the apartment house. A lot of residents still do not perceive the land under their home as their property and, as a result, are not ready to defend their right to it. People are really hard to protect what they once got for free. In turn, the authorities are trying to take advantage of this passive attitude of citizens to their unformed property and take it away before people realize that the land under the houses belongs to them. Only the registration of ownership of land under the house can drastically change the situation with the renovation in Moscow, however most of the people did not do this in time. (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).

The lawyers state that the current law does not tell the number of proposals (apartment options), the timing of these proposals. Now the main problem lies in

the fact that those who agreed to renovate receive a proposal for some kind of apartment. The owner does not understand when a new offer comes if he does not agree. And abuses are born right here. The owner may begin to be persuaded to agree (Info24ru, 2019). There are complains in the social media that some of the residents who did not agree with the construction quality of the houses offered to them had an outer pressure came out as the cut of Internet, water and gas supply (The Insider, 2018). And if we look at the lawsuit there is a clause stating that when a contract for the purchase and relocation to a new dwelling is not concluded, the eviction is forced by the court.

#### **3.2.4.4 Loss of identity and historical fabric of the city**

The efforts of the public movements and Archnadzor forced the City Government to preserve at least small part of the houses from the total demolition. However, the houses will be resettled and used in a different way, so the way of preservation of historical heritage seems not fair enough and profit oriented again. It is important to understand that the phenomenon of “khrushchevka” in time turned into a common mental code throughout the Russia. There were a lot of projects and researches and contests on preserving this heritage but the most disrespectful method have been chosen for Moscow Renovation program and is going to be applied in all Russia soon.

The resident of the first built “khrushchevka” argues that the Moscow Renovation Program is just another example of profit taking precedent over the heritage. “This is the first housing block that Khrushchev has built. They don’t have any regard for this now,” he said of his home (Luhn, 2017). Soviet mass housing was not just machinery to roof people, it was part of culture. Whenever you go to Russia and talk about housing, 90 percent of the people there can tell you their own stories because they’ve lived in them. They understand it is not just about the technological aspect. There is culture and a spirit inside these places (Byrnes,2017). These neighborhoods are the greenest neighborhoods of Moscow. They are where neighbors have lived side by side for decades. They used to form close communities with a strong sense of history and belonging (Leslie, 2018).



The formation of such strong social relations is barely possible in the terms of 18-24 housing blocks and plastic facades.

#### **3.2.4.5 Rise of the density and the quality of the new-built neighborhoods**

The precedents of high-rise houses being built in several districts causes the concerns about the rise of density and overcrowding, overloading of the districts. The Law on Renovation says nothing about the height restrictions for the new buildings, or about parking spaces, or about the density of buildings. The concept of a comfortable environment is fixed there, but there are no concrete figures. The deputy of the Northern Izmailovo argues that this is done so that this term can be interpreted in favor of profit. (Baranovsky, 2018). The Law includes possibility of deviation from environmental, sanitary and fire regulations of Russian Federation. This means that such houses can be built close to a large road, or not receive sunlight, or stand on a former landfill, or stand too close to each other. The Mayor of Moscow claimed that the density will increase three times instead of promised 1,4-2,5. However the facts and examples presents that that the area will be built up with an increase in the density and height of buildings, with an increase in population density in the range from 2.5 to 4 times sometimes leading to incredible disproportions in the city fabric. The devil will be in the detail, and specifically in what kind of housing is built and where; new residential towers in Moscow are often as tall as 25 storeys, leading to less personable neighbourhoods and more traffic congestion. Already, Moscow traffic jams are among the worst in the world. Housing density will almost certainly increase (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).)

Both resettlement examples analyzed shows that there is a particular amount of the residents who do not satisfied with the quality of housing being provided. They argue that the houses lack of higher standards promised by the Program. In some other districts the same situation emerged. For instance, in Konkovo, dozens of Muscovites who had already moved under the program applied to the Moscow City Court, claiming that the new building on Profsoyuznaya Street (96, bld. 1)

was built with numerous violations of fire and construction standards. The house at Vernadskogo prospect is the house that caused a wave of criticism, even among supporters of renovation, starting with the quality of the apartments and ending with the location. It is located a kilometer away from the metro and far from the park areas. However, the house is given for the residents whose former houses stands near the metro and with a park under the windows are moved there. The residents of Zhukov Street 22 had even more problems because of the low quality of the apartments offered to them. People complain about the poor quality of the houses: the sockets fall out of the walls, the door jambs are skewed, the plaster falls off, the soundproofing is no good. Most of them refused the offers and applied to the City Court claiming that they were punished for their decision by cutting off the internet, water supply etc. (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018).

### **3.3 A comparison of current Renovation programs applied in Turkey and Russia**

This chapter compares Renovation Programs (RP) that are being held in Turkey and Russia at present. As it has been told before, in Turkey the only authority providing RP is TOKI working under state legislation (since the 2000s). In the Russian Federation, there is no general authority responsible for renovation program; each federal subject's government provides its own program for the renewal of risky and dilapidated housing stock under the federal framework. What is worth attention is that both countries nowadays tend to apply on-site transformation in their latest RP (Istanbul: Sarigol-Yenidogan, Basibuyuk; Moscow: The Renovation Program). The fact may be explained by unsuccessful interventions as in case of Tarlabasi in Istanbul or local resettlement programs carried out in Russian cities, when people are being sent from central districts to new-built districts far away from their usual place of living, favoring developers' benefits. Such interventions have led to social problems, loss of identity instead of improving citizens' life (Turkun et al., 2014; Borushkina, 2018).

While the Moscow renovation program draws on components from the obsolete housing renovation programs adopted by Turkey, it also has its own traits that



make the direct comparison impossible. The core idea of such programs is to redistribute poverty from depressed neighborhoods (squatters, informal settlements). The similar relocation was implemented during European and American neighborhood re-planning, mostly aiming to alter the spatial distribution of the disadvantaged residents (Miltenburg et al., 2018). This was not the issue for Moscow: in Moscow, the inhabitants of renovated houses are a complex social mix; they belong to a variety of social groups of various education, professions, age, ethnicity, degrees of welfare, etc. Therefore, the Moscow renovation program mostly aims to solve the technical and infrastructural problem rather than economic or social ones. (Borushkina, 2018).

In order to understand similarities and differences between Renovation Programs carried out in Istanbul and Moscow a comparative table was prepared. It includes the main parameters of the recent applications observed in the previous parts.

	<b>TOKI social housing and Renovation applications</b>	<b>A program of the Renovation of Moscow</b>
<b>Legislation</b>	<p><b>Construction Law No. 3194 Article 7 / e of the Law No. 5216 on the Metropolitan Municipality</b></p> <p><b>Article 73 of the Municipality Law No. 5393</b></p> <p><b>Article 4 and Annex 7 of the Law No. 2985 on Mass Housing</b></p> <p><b>“A Shanty Law No. 775”</b></p> <p><b>“Expropriation Law” No. 2942</b></p> <p><b>“The Law No. 5366 The Law No. 5366 on Protection of Deteriorating Historic and Cultural Property through Renewal and Re-use”</b></p> <p><b>“The Law on the Regeneration of Areas under Disaster Risk, No. 6306”</b> - defines the procedures and principles on rehabilitation, clearance and renewal of risky areas and risky buildings</p>	<p><b>Housing Code of Russian Federation</b></p> <p><b>Federal Law 185-FZ on the Housing and Fund of assistance to reforming housing and communal services</b></p> <p><b>Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 47</b></p> <p><b>Urban Planning Code of the City of Moscow</b></p> <p><b>Decree of the Government of Moscow No. 454-PP “On Approval of the State Program of the City of Moscow called “Housing “.</b></p> <p><b>Federal Law No. 141-FZ “On Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of the Capital of the RF”</b></p> <p>and certain legislative acts of the RF regarding the establishment of peculiarities of regulation of certain legal relations in order to renovate the housing stock in a constituent entity of the Russian Federation - the city federal significance Moscow"</p>

	<b>TOKI social housing and Renovation applications</b>	<b>A program of the Renovation of Moscow</b>
<b>Legislation</b>		<b>“On the Housing Renovation Program in the City of Moscow”</b> – detailed framework and standards and framework of the process.
<b>Main actors</b>	<b>Government – Developers – Citizens - Specialists</b>	<b>Government – Developers - Citizens - Specialists</b>
<b>Form of implementation</b>	<b>Public-private partnership Private financing</b>	<b>Public-private partnership Public-private financing</b>
<b>Citizens’ participation form</b>	Do not vote	<b>Citizens</b> (property owners only) <b>were required to vote for/against renovation of their house</b> (Governmental public services website, meetings of each house)
<b>Scope</b>	<b>Differs according to the area being transformed</b> (ex.: Basibuyuk - 1.6 million sq.m. Tarlabasi - 0.02 million sq.m., Sarigol – Yenidogan – 2,2 million sq.m)	<b>Overall 5173 houses - 16 million sq. m</b>
<b>Aims</b>	<p><b>1) to increase the quality of life in housing areas</b></p> <p><b>2) to take measures due to the threat of earthquake</b></p> <p><b>3) to transform squatter housing with the aim of planned development</b></p> <p><b>4) to solve the complexity of ownership rights by regularization</b></p> <p><b>3) to provide affordable housing for low-income people</b></p>	<p><b>1) Better quality of life for the inhabitants of demolished obsolete houses</b></p> <p><b>2) Better urban environment</b></p> <p><b>3) Preventing the problem of emerge of risky and dilapidated housing in the future</b></p>
<b>Mechanism to enter and quit the program/participation</b>	<p>The area of renovation is designated by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.</p> <p>No residents’ or citizens’ participation is provided during the decision-making process.</p>	<p>The preliminary list is designated by Municipality.</p> <p>The list is checked by the working group including representatives of deputies’ fractions and citizens, including critics.</p>

	<b>TOKI social housing and Renovation applications</b>	<b>A program of the Renovation of Moscow</b>
<b>Mechanism to enter and quit the program/participation</b>	<p>If any recently built building located inside the renovation area, it may be resettled by the special commission decision in order to keep the integrity of the project.</p> <p>The approval of 2/3 of the house residents should be provided in order to declare house as risky. However, the MEU and TOKI have a right of urgent expropriation in order to provide public benefit.</p> <p>The protest activity is being held by residents' consolidations supported by TMMOB non-governmental union.</p>	<p>The residents' voting is carried out in order to include/exclude the house in the program:</p> <p>If a house was on the renovation list: up to 1/3 of the total number of owners and tenants voted against the exclusion of their house from the program.</p> <p>If a house was not on the renovation list: over 2/3 of the total number of owners and tenants voted for the inclusion of their house in the program (for houses of later series).</p> <p>The house can be excluded from the program until the first agreement is being signed within the house block. After this the house cannot be excluded.</p> <p>The protest activity is being held mostly by residents' consolidations in forms of social movements.</p>
<b>Territories/houses being renovated</b>	<p>Areas in the historic parts of the city designated by the municipality to protect the historical and cultural fabric of the city or to take measures against the earthquake risk (<b>squatters, informal settlements, risky or dilapidated housing areas</b>)</p>	<p><b>"Khrushchevkas"</b> (1956-1967), as well as <b>some other types of houses with similar construction structure</b> (including those of historical value <u>to be restored</u>), houses built in later periods.</p>
<b>Standards and opportunities</b>	<p><b>Equivalent housing</b> for property owners (within new project). Housing for vulnerable social groups is being sold by price lower than market prices.</p> <p>People living in informal houses without permission can be added to the program by taking a loan for a new house.</p> <p>After distribution of the newly built houses to the property-right owners on the area, the tenants and limited right owners who resided in the area for more than one year can be offered to have a right for a house</p>	<p><b>Equivalent housing</b> (the same living space and number of rooms, but bigger hall, kitchen, bathrooms) within a micro district (or neighborhood in some cases). Higher material and neighborhood quality standards (not quantitatively expressed though)</p> <p>People have an opportunity to pay the needed cost to improve their living conditions by buying a bigger apartment in new-built houses with 10% discount.</p> <p>People have an opportunity to take a monetary compensation equivalent for their present apartment cost.</p>

	<b>TOKI social housing and Renovation applications</b>	<b>A program of the Renovation of Moscow</b>
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	<p>High-rise mass housing with improved infrastructure. Mostly monotonous architecture. Sometimes lack of greenery, and public spaces. Most of the ex-residents of the squatters who can not afford to join to the program have to move to other squatters. Extra housing is sold.</p> 	<p>High-rise mass housing with improved infrastructure. Better quality of buildings, heterogeneous architecture of the districts. All the residents are expecting to be resettled within the same district, extra housing is sold.</p> 

**Table 3.1** Renovation Programs held in Turkey (the case of Istanbul) and Russia (the case of Moscow) in present time

The analysis of laws in both countries revealed that both Turkey and Russia are striving to create special conditions for conducting Renovation Programs. In Turkey, the process of granting special powers to TOKI lasted for a decade starting from 2002 via the enactment of several laws. In Russia, the process started not so long time ago in 2017 and in fact consists of lawsuit introducing changes to the federal regulations and of the Moscow Renovation Law which were improved during the last two years. In both cases, we can see authorities were empowered to implement the RP by providing special legislation to create a kind of monopoly in the field: the TOKI and the Moscow Renovation Fund. However, the first one appeal directly to the Prime Minister and MEU (central government level), while the second one appeal to the Moscow Government (municipal level).

In addition, there is a difference in the type of organizations: the TOKI acts like a private company with public privileges; the Moscow Renovation Fund can act as a public organization only. Therefore, the range of actions and possibilities of TOKI is comparatively wider. For instance, TOKI can transfer the public property into the private status, while the Moscow Renovation Fund can only buy the property of private owners and built on it.

Both of the programs in time succeeded into public-private partnership form of arrangement. In spite of this, the particular form of the private sector's involvement differs from case to case and do not have any legislatively stated participation framework. It is clear that investors are interested in the development of the profitable areas inside the cities, but the analysis shows that the share of the profit is not restricted by the legislation in both of the countries. Combined with the fact of the absence of density regulations, speculative applications, enormous and impermissible density rise can be observed in Istanbul and Moscow. The standards of new-built housing are also debatable in both cases. Despite the fact that in Moscow government promises to build the houses of improved quality of construction, materials and more comfortable neighborhoods, it is not defined in the legislation in a quantitative way. Therefore, even the quality of the first houses caused a lot of questions and discrepancies. Russian urban planning standards are also being violated: according to Urban Planning Code regulations of the Russian Federation the number of parking areas, playgrounds, and other household areas are being calculated for each house. However, these areas of new-built houses do not match the standards accepted all over Russia, the story about better quality cannot be even considered in this scope. The changes of the Federal Laws which were introduced together with the Renovation Law made it possible for the Renovation Program in Moscow to ignore some of the regulations operating in the country. In Turkey, the standards of new-built houses differ from case to case and were not formulated by the authority. In addition, the applications do not have to match the urban planning development plans prepared by Municipalities. That is why the quality of the houses and neighborhoods are totally depended on the consciousness of developers and TOKI.

What is for participation and actors involved in the renovation process, it can be assumed that actors in Moscow Renovation Program are more into the program compared to Istanbul's applications. The mechanism set in a program of the Renovation of Moscow is developed differently from previous applications by including the participation of citizens in the decision-making process, by adding more flexible mechanisms of implementation, partly governmental financing and


as a result, higher quality of space was achieved (Potapenko, 2017; The official website of the Mayor of Moscow). In the beginning, the government of Moscow City was criticized for the choice of locations with higher profit. The program included some housing blocks which was in a good condition because they have been totally overhauled by their residents before. In addition, people were concerned about the destruction of the historical fabric of the city. However, after consultations with citizens and with the scientific council of the Department of Cultural Heritage of the city of Moscow and the public movement Arhnadzor, some districts, houses, historical heritage buildings were excluded from the program. Citizens could give their votes through the Active Citizen app, My Documents Governmental center of state services (Gosuslugi), or at live meetings of owners. The program is being held in a more open way compared to previous interventions in order to prevent protests (the protest activity was very high at the beginning and slowed down significantly since the first announcement in May 2017) (Borushkina, 2018). However, some sources mention that the second wave of protests can take place after the public discussions of the projects presented due to the inconsistency and concerns about the quality of the neighborhoods, and density rise (Noviye Izvestiya, 2018). But overall, mostly loyal reactions of people who were settled into the launching houses (independent interviews and reaction in social media) show that this approach results in a higher level of trust among relocatees. Even though there are statements about corruptive intentions of the Program, for most of the low-income residents the Program seems to be a good way of improvement of their living conditions.

In Istanbul, TOKI in official statements also tends to improve the living conditions of the low-income residents, but in fact, the profit-oriented development took place according to the cases and critique towards the interventions. The designation of the areas often done in a closed way. Thus, it is not clear which parameters were used to define the risky area to be renovated. While in Russia the predictable lifespan of the buildings and the current condition of the structure is being taken into account, in Turkey, the way of designation seems to be not clear enough and differs from place to place. Disagreement with risky area designations



and the inability to participate in decision-making processes makes residents unite and carry on protest activities to protect their rights. Nongovernmental organizations sometimes help them to carry out the consolidation and provide awareness of the residents about the project, its details and most importantly about their rights. Protests in Moscow mostly carried out by the residents themselves or by public movements.

When the actors of Renovation Process of Istanbul and Moscow are compared, it can be assumed that more participative mechanisms are applied in Moscow Renovation Program. In Istanbul, most stages are carried out by the central government and particularly by TOKI authority, whereas in Moscow more stages include a range of different actors, which affects the final result. In Istanbul, TOKI aims to increase the quality of life in urban projects, to balance the increasing economic imbalances and to eliminate social inequality and housing problems (Isikkaya, 2016). However, the analysis of this approach shows that despite the fact that interventions aim to solve social issues as well as spatial and technical ones, residents' participation is not considered as an important factor in giving decisions. The situation is aggravated by the low level of education in the areas to be transformed and complex property system. In addition, the low level of incomes leads to the inability of paying the loans to the banks, which in turn results in loss of properties and housing rights (Turkun, 2014). Turkey has a comprehensive legislative base related to RP, but some of the laws have clauses, considered to be contradictory to each other by local specialists. In this scope, Russian lawyers also mention that "On the Housing Renovation Program in the City of Moscow" regulations are inconsistent with superior legislation clauses which cause difficulties during the appellations (Potapenko, 2017).



**Figure 3.31** Comparison of the actors involved in the RP in Istanbul and Moscow

One of the most crucial disadvantages of RP both in Turkey and Russia is that tenants are being ignored, while in Moscow their proportion was up to 15% at the beginning of the program (inclined twice in 2017), and in Istanbul the proportion of tenants was around 46% (Cumhuriyet, 2.08.18; Vesti, 2.05.17). The situation in Istanbul is obstructed by the complicated mix of property ownership within renovation areas, while in Moscow the property ownership types are defined and clear. In Moscow, some of the tenants of old 5-storey buildings have already invested a lot of money for repairs. But in Turkey, not only tenants' but also property owners' interests can be oppressed while even new-built and not risky houses may be demolished if they are considered violating the integrity of the project. In Turkey, the integrity of the project is prior to the condition of the building and the lifespan of the structure is not considered as the factor for renewal. Thus, even a comparatively new building can be renovated under the scope of the Renewal Project and its owners do not have any tools to quit the process. The cases of forced evictions are being observed both in Turkey and Russia. However, in Turkey, the process has more critical scales even studied by foreign researches. As it was noted above, tenants and low-income people usually cannot afford loans to join the RP and have to relocate in other places according to their income.

When it comes to the outcome, the critiques for the TOKI's applications cannot be ignored. Designing high density urban areas and using the same typology on every

site are the main source of the problems in TOKI housing projects which are triggering the low profiled design and uniformity of Turkish cities. Regional features such as urbanity and urban morphology, topography, climate, cultural or regional differences are ignored by the organization (Isikkaya, 2016). For Russia, where the pattern of high-rise model has been used since the 1980s, the standards have been developed in such a way that people feel comfortable in 9-15-floor buildings by providing public services, which are being strictly regulated by Urban planning standards of Russian Federation and by leaving enough space between buildings. However, the fact that some projects include 16-24-storey houses should be considered as critical for resettlement, because the residents do not want to live in such houses. In addition, the fact that the Renovation Law allows not to follow the Urban Planning Code of RF in special cases makes it possible to use this by the interested authorities in order to gain profit. The projects offered for the Moscow Renovation program required to be diverse and multi-level that is why it is expected that the appearance of Moscow will be less monotonous compared to Soviet mass housing heritage. (Moscow Mayor Official Website, 2018).

## Conclusions and Recommendations

### 4.1 Evaluation and the Framework of Improvements

The framework of improvements based on the research includes different types of measures can be applied in both countries. They can be divided into four main groups: Strategic Vision Improvements, Management Improvements, Legislative Improvements and Urban planning and Architectural Standards Improvements. The table above includes the framework and the priority level of the particular improvement for Turkey and Russia according to the findings of the research.

GROUP OF MEASURES	MEASURES	RECCOMENDED TO	
		Turkey	Russia
Strategic Vision Improvements	The coherence of RP with the Country-Metropolitan Municipality-Municipality Strategic Vision in a short, medium and long term perspective	High priority	High priority
	A shift to sustainable and human-oriented development	High priority	High priority
	A real in situ transformation	Medium priority	Medium priority
	A partly budget-based Urban Transformation Applications	Medium priority	Medium priority
Management Improvements	Providing the algorithms of Renovation Projects Development and Implementation that involve all actors.	High priority	Medium priority
	Developing the mechanisms of integration of the poor and violated groups of the residents into the program through social integration and education, workplaces, jobs assistance.	High priority	Low priority

GROUP OF MEASURES	MEASURES	RECCOMENDED TO	
		Turkey	Russia
Management Improvements	The procedure of negotiations should be reconsidered according to the human rights.	High priority	High priority
	The social, environmental effect of the RP should be monitored.	High priority	High priority
	Social integration and rediscovering the areas to the rest of the city.	High priority	Low priority
Legislative Improvements	The legislation of the RP should match superior state legislation or if required changes into superior laws should be done in order to provide adequate support for RP interventions.	High priority	High priority
	The clear mechanism of the approval of the RP and the Legislation related to it.	High priority	Medium priority
	The legislation and the Program itself after the public discussions should be improved and announced before any implementation process starts.	High priority	Medium priority
	The legislation and framework of measures should be developed in order to resettle citizens of Renovation Areas according to existing property rights including those who do not have proper registration or full property rights.	High priority	Medium priority
	The rights of tenants should be taken into account.	High priority	High priority
Urban Planning and Architectural Standards' Improvements	The provision of diverse and multi-level design (reflecting local identity) with adequate public services by the RP.	High priority	High priority
	The urban planning, construction standards should be reconsidered and set up for the whole country consistent with daily needs and human-oriented values.	High priority	High priority
	The rise in density should be regulated by superior strategic development plans of the city to avoid further mismatches and overload of city infrastructure.	High priority	High priority

**Table 4.1** The framework of improvements

#### **4.1.1 Strategic Vision Improvements**

One of the main point for the Urban Transformation Programs should be their coherence with the Country-Metropolitan Municipality-Municipality Strategic Vision in a short, medium and long term perspective. Each lower level should follow the prior vision in order to provide effective development. Therefore, special conditions for RP and for the responsible authorities should not be provided in order to prevent bypass applications and detached from the whole urban planning development course interventions. There is a difference between the Urban Transformation applications in both countries: in Turkey the applications have rather local, detached character; in Russia the projects are developed under the scope of comprehensive Renovation Program which have been developed under the scope of strategic vision on the whole metropolitan area and even country. Projects in Turkey sometimes even do not match with the prior development plans. The fact leads to unthoughtful and non-strategic results. In addition, the designation of the areas to be Renovated should also match the Strategic Vision on the particular place, city and the country. The designation should have multi-level structure in order to avoid renewal of the buildings which do not have a real need for this.

The second point is a shift to sustainable and human-oriented development. This point in fact should follow strategic visions as well as the acknowledged livable cities in the world like Vienna, Vancouver, Copenhagen, etc. have adapted the sustainability values through long-term educational, popularization and technological measures (EIU, 2018). They are recognized as livable because they had this shift to sustainable values 20-30 years ago and reached the designated condition at the present days. The aim can be achieved only through the well-constructed interactions between all the actors involved in the Transformation Process. The trust between affecting and affected actors should be reached long before the Project Applications through these interactions. Residents' awareness can be provided through collaborations of actors on multi-level, local educational or entertainment events, etc. The result of such interactions should be the

transformation of the residents from passive into active and conscious participants of the Urban Transformation Process.

The third point is can be formulated as a shift to a real in situ transformation. Even though both of the countries represents a trend to make in place transformations, most of the cases shows resettlement within the neighborhood, district or sometimes even more long distance resettlement mechanisms. The real in situ transformation makes it possible to preserve the social, cultural and historical value of the area.

The fourth point is a shift to a partly budget-based Urban Transformation Applications. The restriction of the number of private investments and profits' share will lead to a more balanced development because of its governmentally supported and secured source of provision. In addition, the public-private partnership is not the only mechanism to provide RP. For example, Singapore adapted special financial schemes where people make insurance payments during the life part of which can be used for a property in public housing. Originally the program was developed for the squatters' clearance but nowadays 82% of Singaporeans live in public housing provided by the HDB and it is not considered as social housing, however, it provides social housing programs too (HDB, 2019).

#### **4.1.2 Management Improvements**

The first point is to provide algorithms of Renovation Projects Development and Implementation that involve all actors in the planning and implementation process in order to make it more open and clear. There should be a clear and open link between decision making actors (government, citizens, developers, specialists) during the RP development, application and further observation of the outcome. It may be provided by the governmental state of services (ex.: e-devlet, gosuslugi), special websites having all the information about RP with regular updates, and personal meetings with housing representatives and owners. This link will reduce the number of possible misunderstandings and protests. The models should be formed under the leadership of the public sector and engagement of all relevant actors in the transformation process should be ensured.

The primary role of the public sector should be to guide, supervise and regulate. A multi-actor partnership approach should be adopted with participation of private sector, voluntary sector and local community along with the public sector. As actors take more roles in urban transformation projects, economic, social and managerial aspects will develop. To incorporate the private sector in urban transformation projects, some of the incentives expected by the private sector should be given and attractive terms should be provided. Local community should be incorporated in the transformation process at the planning phase and must be informed about updates at each stage of the process and their engagement should be ensured (Haksever, 2019).

The second point is to develop mechanisms of integration of the poor and unsecured groups of the residents into the program not only through the mortgage system but first of all through social integration and education, workplaces, jobs assistance to make people able to improve their living conditions in time. What is the most important the measures should be long-termed: the time for adaptation of such groups to an economically sustainable way of life should be considered and monitored. This point is crucial for RP in Turkey and Istanbul because of the high proportion of such residents within the project.

The next recommendation is to clarify the designation process of the Renovation Areas because it is the most contradictory point of all the cases studied. In addition, it should be discussed publicly and reconsiderations should be made according to public opinions and views.

Another point is related to the way negotiations being held. The cases show the presence of pressure, threat and misleading from the contractors and governments during the negotiation process. Therefore, the procedure of negotiation should be reconsidered according to human rights.

The next point is to develop mechanisms which will analyze the outcomes of each application. The social, environmental effect of the RP should be monitored not only during but what is more important after the application. The practice nowadays is held just by the nongovernmental organizations and researchers and



do not have any response. The feedback is important and it should be taken into account in order to provide further improvement. Thus, a long-term monitoring mechanism can prevent the aggravation of mistakes or misbalance which can take place in any application.

The last recommendation in this group in fact is related to the social integration within the city. Such metropolitan cities like Istanbul and Moscow have been always a target for new-comers. Therefore, these cities are full of emigrants which tend to consolidate in particular neighborhoods. The fact leads to segregation and stigmatization of the particular areas. The world practice shows that these issues can be solved via educational, sports, cultural and social events which can open these areas to the rest of the city. This can be achieved through the popularization of the cultural aspects of the area in the city during the Renovation Programs. In time these measures can also lead to the mixing of population in of the city balancing the segregation. On the other side, the number of new-comers to the renovated area should be controlled in order to prevent loss of identity and gentrification.

#### **4.1.3 Legislative Improvements**

The first and the most important point is that the legislation of the RP should match superior state legislation or if required changes into superior laws should be done in order to provide adequate support for RP interventions. However, it does not mean that the standards stated in superior laws should be violated like it was made in Moscow case. In addition, the scope of the Program should not contradict with the scopes of other programs applied on the area.

The next point is related to the approval of the RP. It is reasonable to prepare a draft project on the Legislation related to the Program and to make related changes after the public discussions including feedback from lawyers, specialists, residents, investors and contractors. The combination of top-down and bottom-up view will be achieving in this way and the Legislation of the Project will reflect the interests of all actors involved.

In addition, the renovation program legislation should form the basis for its further application. Therefore, the legislation and the Program itself after the public discussions should be improved and announced before any implementation process starts.

The third point should protect property rights. The legislation and framework of measures (algorithms) should be developed by the state in order to resettle citizens of Renovation Areas according to existing property rights including those who do not have proper registration or full property rights (help in the registration process), workplace, income, social status in order to prevent deprivation of their living conditions. The priority of improvement of living conditions of the residents should be put to the first place. The forced eviction precedents and expropriation threat during the negotiations should be tracked and analyzed in order to develop legislative protection of the residents.

The rights of tenants should be reconsidered in both countries. The Laws related to Renovation do not include any clause related to the commercial tenants. That is why currently, both Turkey and Russia show zero tolerance to the commercial tenants in rare cases providing just the support for a moving. However, some tenants live for years and decades at their houses and even make a considerable investment in their living places. Nowadays all of them have to leave the area transformed without any sufficient support.

#### **4.1.4 Urban Planning and Architectural Standards' Improvements**

The first point can be defined as the provision of diverse and multi-level design (reflecting local identity) with adequate public services to provide social tolerance in a neighborhood attracting people with different income levels and from different social groups by the Renovation Projects. The measure will provide sustainability of the area.

The second point corresponds to the urban planning and construction standards. The urban planning, construction standards should be reconsidered and set up for the whole country consistent with daily needs and human-oriented values, rather

than market-oriented ones. It should be clear for the residents what quality they can expect instead of their former dwelling.

And the last recommendation addresses the density regulations. The rise in density should be regulated by superior strategic development plans of the city to avoid further mismatches and overload of city infrastructure. Both of the cases represent an impermissible and non-sustainable target of density increasing within the areas renovated.

## **4.2 Conclusions**

The comparative analysis of housing policies history in Turkey and Russia related to social housing and Renovation Programs pursued in those countries displays some similarities and differences. Both of the countries went through significant ideological, social, and political changes at the beginning of the 20th century which were followed by rapid industrialization and urbanization consequently. Migration from rural to urban areas led to some governmental measures, which resulted in different social housing models inspired by modernistic ideas from Europe and developed in Turkey and USSR. Present problems related to housing originates from that period: illegal housing problem in Turkey, and aging after-war housing stock in Russia. Both countries' RP is being held under state management. However, the recent program of Renovation of Moscow looks more effective because of the collaborative approach for the decision-making process. The fact that Russia has rather technical and infrastructural problems, not economic or social ones, proves that the long-time application of heterogeneous high-rise model of social housing coupled with adequate urban planning and construction standards provides social inclusion within the city and prevent social segregation.

The second part of the research defines the weak points of the Renovation Programs of Turkey and Russia based on the study of Istanbul and Moscow cases. The legislation, actors, examples, and critiques are being analyzed in order to offer a comprehensive framework to improve Renovation programs in both countries. It is important to state that overall the Renovation applied in Turkey presented in

a form of rather separate projects than a unified program, while in Russia the Renovation Program has a comprehensive and strategic approach. In addition, it is considered to be spread across the country in case of success in Moscow and has own regulatory base developed directly for the program. The second point to be mentioned is that the understanding of areas and buildings to be renovated is different in both countries. The parameters for designation should be more clear and open for all the actors. In Russia, the areas to be renovated are designated according to the lifespan of the aging housing stock while in Turkey, the lifespan of the structure do not play such an important role in the designation of risky areas. Thus, even comparatively new structures can be renovated if they are included in the Urban Transformation Project area in Turkey. The residents' opinions in these cases do not take into account. At the same time, the example of Moscow Renovation Program shows that the inclusion of such actors like residents, specialists and legal counseling to the decision-making process can provide the protection of the property rights and lead to more successful results. It is worth noting that the participation of the residents and specialists (NGO's) should be considered as one of the most important points of the programs because it leads to a higher level of compromise between all actors and restrains the profit-oriented intentions of investing actors. In addition, the participatory approach leads to a higher quality of the areas and, as a result, reduces the protest activity and increases residents' satisfaction with the project.

To sum up, the critique towards the Renewal Projects and Renovation Programs studied in the research mostly addresses lack of strategic vision; gaps, and inconsistency of current legislation; management issues; and the quality of the renovated areas. That is why the framework of improvements is divided to the four groups mentioned above and aims to fill the gaps in current Urban Transformation Projects. The framework of improvements based on the findings of the research is formulated in the last part of the research and aims to make the cities in the Republic of Turkey and Russian Federation more livable, comfortable and sustainable.

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## Publications from the thesis

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### Conference Papers

1. Elmira Nizamova, Asuman Türkün (2019). *Housing Policies and Decision-Making in Urban Planning Process of Turkey and Russia*. ICOAEF'18 IV. International Conference on Applied Economics and Finance & Extended with Social Sciences FULL PAPER PROCEEDING. ISBN 978-605-68187-8-3, pages 173-185.