THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: GEZİ PARK
PROTESTS AND 15M MOVEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
ŞEBNEM YARDIMCI GEYİKÇİ

Department of Political Science and Public Administration
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
September 2015

To Adnan Yardımcı

THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: GEZİ PARK
PROTESTS AND 15M MOVEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

ŞEBNEM YARDIMCI GEYİKÇİ

In partial fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degreee of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

September 2015

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope andin quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Ioannis Grigoriadis

Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope andin quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope andin quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Başak İnce

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope andin quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Prof. Dr. Feride Acar

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope andin quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Feyda Sayan Cengiz

Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

----

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel

Director

ABSTRACT

THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: GEZİ PARK
PROTESTS AND 15M MOVEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Yardımcı Geyikçi, Şebnem

Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ioannis Grigoriadis

September 2015

By analysing two different cases of popular movements in Turkey (the
Gezi Park protests) and Spain (the *15M* movement) that received extensive
support from different segments of society in both countries, this research
aims at accounting for the question of what factors brought about popular
disaffection and led to mass mobilisations under different circumstances. The
contention is that one of the central factors behind these mass protests has
been "the crisis of representation" resulting not only from the lack of voter-
party congruence, but also from the failure of political parties to meet the
demands of responsiveness and responsibility – the core requisite of the
party government model.

Key words: Party system, representation, protest movement

ÖZET

GÜNEY AVRUPA'DA TEMSİLİYET KRİZİ: GEZİ PARK PROTESTOLARI VE 15M HAREKETİ'NİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

Yardımcı Geyikçi, Şebnem

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ioannis Grigoriadis

Eylül 2015

Türkiye'de (Gezi Parkı protestoları) ve İspanya'da (15M Hareketi) halkın farklı grupları tarafından desteklenen protesto hareketlerini karşılaştırmalı olarak inceleyen bu tezin amacı hangi faktörlerin toplumsal muhalefete ve protesto hareketlerine yol açtığını araştırmaktır. Tezin temel argümanı protesto hareketlerinin arkasındaki önemli faktörlerden birinin, seçmenler ve partiler arasındaki uyumsuzluktan ve parti hükümeti modelinin temel gerekliliklerinden biri olan partilerin seçmen taleplerine cevap vermek ve kamu yararını sağlamak arasındaki dengeyi kurmakta yaşanan aksaklıklardan kaynaklanan "temsiliyet krizi" olduğudur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Parti sistemleri, temsiliyet, protesto hareketleri

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Coming to the end of long road of my PhD research, I would like to express my gratitude to people who turned this journey into a bearable one. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ioannis Grigoriadis, who has been very considerate and helpful throughout the whole process. Without his constant support and guidance, the journey would be much more troublesome. I am grateful to him. I want also to thank Alev Çınar who reinvigorated my interest into PhD research and has shared her views with me generously both during my board meetings and in our informal chats. I am deeply grateful to Feride Acar who, from the very first moment we met, has been extremely supportive. Her encouragement and support have utmost importance for this research not only academically but also emotionally. I am thankful to my thesis defense jury members Başak İnce and Feyda Sayan Cengiz who accepted to be part of my jury and provided me with helpful feedback. Ayşe Sözen Usluer and Gökhan Güler, have been wonderful friends to share this long journay of PhD. From my undergraduate studies onwards, İkbal Erbay and Nevin İpek have always been great friends with their endless patience for my academic complains. I am thankful to my family; my mother, my sister, my brother and my sister-in-law. I consider myself extremely lucky to have such an awesome family who has always been very special. Particularly, I

v

would like to thank my mom for always believing in me. Last but not least, I am grateful to my husband, Utku, who is the man behind this work and the works to come; he has never given up to encourage me and always kept my hope alive. I also would like to thank my son, who will hopefully join us in December 2015, for giving me hope and also courage to complete this research as soon as possible. Last but not least, I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father who will always remain as the major source of inspiration for me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Following on from the Arab Spring, the contemporary wave of protests and occupy-style mobilisations has been very influential in many parts of the world, from the Mediterranean to Wall Street. Leaving aside the mass protests in the Middle East,[1] following the global economic crisis of 2008, the protests that have spread throughout Europe have pointed to the fact that there are grave shortcomings in the representative democracy of many nations, and citizens are dissatisfied with these prevalent power structures that leave no space for the direct participation of individuals in decision-making processes. As a result, they call for '*real democracy*'.

Long before the occupation of public spaces in Madrid, Athens and Istanbul, several studies had already demonstrated that a certain level of distrust in relation to the principles of representative democracy had been a

---

[1] Although the Arab Spring was the inspiration for many global movements, it has to be analysed within the context of an authoritarian state structure, since the grievances that drove the Arab Spring related more to authoritarianism rather than as a call for greater participation.

prevalent undercurrent among citizens and political elites alike (see Gray and Caul, 2000; Blais, 2000; Wattenberg, 2002). Election turnouts, party membership, party identification and trust in parties have all experienced a steady decline – all of which indicates that there is widespread disaffection with not only the institutions, but also the processes of representative democracy (see Dalton, 2003; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Norris 1999). However, only a small number of these studies have predicted that popular disaffection with parties and elections would lead to anti-system, popular mobilisations in several parts of the world questioning the efficacy of representative politics.

Essentially, as the major slogan of the protests, "They don't represent us" (see Acedo, 2012; Macia, 2013), ably demonstrates, this research contends that one of the central factors behind these mass protests has been the crisis of representation resulting not only from the lack of voter-party congruence, but also from the failure of political parties to meet the demands of responsiveness and responsibility – the core requisite of the party government model. Whilst responsiveness refers to a party's ability to fulfil the demands of the population, particularly their own constituency, responsibility requires acting prudently and consistently in policymaking (Mair, 2009: 11-12). In other words, in responding to the question of what caused mass mobilisations calling for 'real democracy' throughout Europe, this research provides a party politics account and argues that certain

failures in the functioning of party systems have forced people to take the issue onto the streets, in order to make their voices heard.

The logic behind this notion is that since political parties are the key agents of democratic representation, linking citizenry to the state and mediating the processes of accountability and representation (see Thomassen, 1984), understanding the dynamics behind recent deployments requires a careful analysis of the functioning of party systems. The famous proposition of Schattschneider, namely that "*the modern democracy is unthinkable, save in terms of parties*," has been widely employed by party scholars, suggesting that as democracy continues to exist, parties will retain their privileged position on the political scene. However, as Mair (2005) correctly argues, within the framework of the aforementioned discussion, it is also possible to read it as being the other way around, in that the questioning of democracy by social movements should be comprehended by examining the ways in which the most important agents of modern democracy, political parties, function.

By analysing two different cases of popular movements in Turkey (the *Gezi Park* protests) and Spain (the *15M* movement) that received extensive support from different segments of society in both countries, this research aims at accounting for the question of what factors brought about popular disaffection and led to mass mobilisations under different circumstances. Although the outcome has been the same – widespread protests throughout

the country leading to the occupation of public spaces, calling for a greater say in the functioning of the political regime – different types of crisis of representation have brought about these movements.

In this research, representative democracy is defined as a democratic form of representation in which voters choose political parties to represent their interests in a democratic regime, and in return parties as representatives, whether in government or in opposition, provide for both responsiveness and responsibility. From this perspective, we argue that a crisis of representation occurs when (1) *certain segments of society feel unrepresented and lose their trust in political parties' ability to represent their interests* and when *(2) they do not believe that their representatives are acting responsively and responsibly at the same time.* The contention herein is that this is what happened in both cases under examination, albeit with different manifestations.

In the case of Spain, on the one hand, the convergence of two major parties, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialisto Obrero Espanol*, PSOE) and the People's Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), in the ideological spectrum made these parties more and more alike (see Torcal et al., 2002), and they failed to come up with alternative policy proposals. This in turn limited their ability to respond to the diverse demands of the population. On the other hand, the pressures of EU membership as well as globalisation decreased the parties' ability to generate new policies but rather steered

them toward following internationally approved guidelines, and through this process they lost touch with the Spanish electorate and failed to be responsive.

In the case of Turkey, conversely, the major political parties systematically drifted apart from one another, thereby creating a gap in the party system which left certain segments of society unrepresented. Subsequently, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) government failed to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility, by enhancing its responsiveness to its Islamic constituency while disregarding other segments of society.

By analysing the two dissimilar cases of Spain and Turkey, in order to illustrate its claims, this work seeks to enhance the literature in four different ways. First, through providing a party politics account of mass protests in two countries, it links social movements study with that of party politics literature. Until now, most studies have tended to approach these areas as two separate universes. From this point of view, and by relating the emergence of protest movements to failures in the functioning of party systems, and also by discussing the interaction streams between movement and routine politics, this paper bridges the gap between the study of contentious and conventional politics.

Secondly, the thesis conceptualises a 'crisis of representation', defining it on the basis of a lack of voter-party/party system congruence and the simultaneous failure to meet the demands of responsiveness and responsibility. Although several studies to date have underlined certain aspects of the concept, by focusing on disaffection with democracy and political parties, not many of them have managed to establish a clear definition of what is meant by a crisis of representation (see for exception Mainwaring et al., 2006). Furthermore, mostly, these conceptualisation and empirical assessments have remained aloof, and so this research not only clearly defines what is meant by a crisis of representation, but it also applies this meaning to the cases of Turkey and Spain by analysing how different types of crisis were experienced in each case.

Thirdly, the thesis accounts for not only the factors that caused the protest movements in both cases, but it also analyses the aftermath of these factions and discusses cross-country variations in adaptation and change. By analysing two different countries at the same time, the thesis provides a simultaneous explanation of the similarities and differences between two protest movements. In other words, it relates movement politics to that of electoral politics by comparatively analysing the mechanisms of interaction between contentious and conventional politics in Turkey and Spain.

Finally, accounting for the specific and dynamic factors that have widened the gap between representatives and represented in various

circumstances, the research not only demonstrates trends in popular disaffection with party politics in various parts of the world, but it also provides hints about the future of democracy and the party government model in general.

1.1. Turkey and Spain from a Comparative Perspective

Case selection is particularly critical for any comparative research design, not only because the cases to be analysed should respond to the purpose of the research (McLaren, 2008: 270), but also because the validity and reliability of the research should pertain to the logic of the case selection. It is common practice in comparative politics to take regional proximity as a basis for comparison. From this perspective, Southern Europe has also been considered a region wherein countries share a host of common features, in that many studies have analysed the political and economic structures of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece comparatively (see Gunther et al., 1995; Pridham, 1995; Whitehead, 1991). Some studies have also added Turkey to this group of countries, mainly because, in the process of democratic transition and consolidation, the country has also faced a number of problems relating to "frequent resort to repression, excessive centralisation of state power, a heavy reliance of patronage and weak civilian control over the military" (Yardimci-Geyikçi, 2015: 531). It has also been suggested that the state building processes of Southern European cases occurred around

similar times, and during the process of democratic transition Turkey and these countries had similar levels of economic development and industrialisation (McLaren, 2008). Accordingly, most of these studies have employed John Stuart Mill's Method of Difference, or "most similar systems design" (Pzeworski and Teune, 1970), which "seeks to identify the key features that are different among similar countries which account for the observed political outcome" (Landman, 2008: 70). In other words, they have aimed at accounting for why Turkey has failed to become a consolidated democracy while all others have succeeded, even though it shared a host of characteristics with these countries during the process of democratic transition.

However, in this research, rather than explaining a different outcome in otherwise similar cases, we aim to account for the same political outcome, namely mass mobilisation, in otherwise dissimilar cases. Although in the 1980s the Turkish and Southern European cases shared several characteristics with regards to economic development, state-building processes and certain political constraints, as these countries became members of the EU and Turkey could not, Turkey's path in terms of political, social and economic development started to diverge – a process which accelerated throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Particularly when we compare Turkey and Spain on the basis of the most basic political, social and economic indicators, what is observed is that the two countries differ from one another significantly.

According to 2014 OECD data, while GDP per capita was around $33,720 in Spain, which was classified as a 'high-income' economy, in Turkey this figure was $19,054, and so the nation was classified as an 'upper-middle-income' economy. Furthermore, while Spain scored 0.869 on the Human Development Index ranking and found itself at 27th in the world, Turkey's score was as low as 0.759, ranking it 69th on the global stage (UNDP, 2014). More importantly, nowadays, Turkey remains partly free so illiberal democracy, according to major democracy measures (see Freedom in the World, 2014), while Spain has been considered an established consolidated democracy since the end of the 1980s (see Freedom in the World, 1990-2014). In other words, according to macro-level indicators at least, the two cases seem to be strikingly dissimilar to one another.

This dissimilarity also applies to short-term economic trends and more specific social factors. For instance, after the 2008 economic crisis, Spain struggled to cope with an economic downturn, exemplified by an average -0.04% annual growth rate and an average 22.5% unemployment rate from 2009 to 2014 (OECD data, 2009-2014). In the case of Turkey, conversely, albeit lower than its potential, the country experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 3.5% from 2009 to 2014, and it also enjoyed relatively lower levels of debt and unemployment (OECD data, 2009-2014). On the other hand, according to one of the most important social indicators, the World Gender Gap Index 2013, which is based on "four pillars of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health

and survival, and political empowerment", Spain's overall rank was 30th, while Turkey was ranked at a very lowly 120th (Sedghi, 2013).

Despite these striking differences in macro-level and more recent socio-economic indicators, both countries have faced the same phenomenon of popular disaffection from the way politics function, leading to mass mobilisations throughout the countries, i.e. the Gezi movement in Turkey and the 15M movement in Spain. As a result, this research will employ Mill's method of agreement, or the 'most different systems design', which "seeks to identify those features that are the same among different countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome" (Landman, 2008: 70). What is critical in this method is to find out the factor that is common to both cases, which then will be identified as explaining the particular result, even though most features of the two countries differ from one another. The major problem with the 'most different systems design', according to Geddes (1990) and King et al. (1994), is that it runs the risk of "selection bias," which limits researchers' ability to make inferences (Landman, 2008: 72). Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome this problem, especially if the researcher considers the explanatory variable as a necessary rather than a sufficient factor behind the observed outcome (Dion, 1998).

All that said, by employing the comparative method of 'most different systems design', this research compares Turkey and Spain not only based on their regional proximity, but also because despite their striking differences in

socio-economic development both countries have experienced widespread protest movements demanding new ways of doing politics and the provision of a new type of democratic governance. In order to avoid the abovementioned problems with the method, the research does not aim to establish *causality* but rather to highlight possible factors that are shared by the two countries which might play an important role in the emergence of protests and so be considered a 'necessary' but not sufficient or sole explanatory factor behind the observed phenomena. From this perspective, the contention is that regardless of their striking socio-economic differences, both countries have experienced the same political problem with regards to the functioning of the party system – a crisis of representation –, which therefore seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for this type of protest movement to emerge in the name of establishing a real democracy.

1.2. The Gezi Park protests and the 15M movement

The 15M movement in Spain, whose name comes from the date of the first mass demonstrations on 15th May 2011, was one of the first mobilisations in Europe to gain global popularity. The population at large, deeply affected by the financial crisis, organised a mass demonstration against the ineffective two-party system, corruption in the banking sector and incompetent trade unions (Alcaide, 2011). In a very short time, protest movements spread across the country, and increasing popular support for the movement led to

the occupation of *Puerto el Sol*, the central square in Madrid, and *Plaça de Catalunya*, in Barcelona. With the slogans 'Real Democracy Now!' (¡*Democracia Real Ya!*) and 'They don't represent us!' (¡*Que No Nos Representan!*), the 15M movement turned into the symbol of what Della Porta calls "nowadays movements" (Della Porta, 2014). Accordingly, the 15M movement represents a unique case in Spanish modern history, and even global history, mainly because it was the first occupy-style mobilisation on the European continent that showed that not only the authoritarian states of the Middle East, but also advanced democracies could suffer from a lack of political legitimacy. The protest movement was distinguished from its predecessors in terms of its demands for social justice and greater participation in decision-making procedures, its organisational style that used direct forms of democracy, its use of social media tools and the multiple identities of protestors. Perhaps one of the most striking outcomes of the movement was the formation of a brand new political party, Podemos, which aimed at redefining the parameters of Spanish politics shaped by a long-lasting two-party system. The increasing popularity of Podemos in Spain challenged not only Spanish political elite, but also other European democracies facing with the same problem of popular disaffection.

The Gezi protests, conversely, started with small 'sit-ins at the park' protests, organised by a group of environmentalists to rally against a plan to demolish Gezi Park, which then spread across the country and received widespread support from different segments of Turkish society. These

protests unexpectedly became one of the most significant landmarks in Turkish politics, as they represented the most widespread spontaneous civil movement in the history of the nation. The protests were exceptional in terms of the diversity of the participants, the uniqueness of their means of mobilisation, the widespread and effective usage of social media, their creative and humorous slogans and the wide spectrum of activities, ranging from public forums to painting walls. One of the most significant features of the Gezi protests was the ways in which individuals from different backgrounds came together to protest against government policy, regardless of their ideological, political, social or cultural differences.

Although there have been a significant number of scholarly works on both the Gezi Park protests and the 15M movement, almost none of these studies has considered the functioning of the party system as an independent variable. While some of these studies mainly discuss characteristics by focusing on the demands, organisation, motivation and incentives of these movements (see Likki, 2012; Morell, 2012; Tastan, 2013), others have attempted to explain the factors that led to the mass protests.

In the case of the 15M movement, the first set of assessments argues that *Indignados* was questioning neoliberalism, the accumulation of financial capital and free trade that had forced all countries in the world to act in a similar fashion in destructing social rights, increasing inequality and creating enormous levels of unemployment; therefore, it asked for radical

transformation of a political system subordinated to capitalism (Charnock et al., 2012; Pino, 2013). As a result, these assessments provide a Marxist view of the protests, arguing that the 15M movement was part of a global revolt against neoliberal capitalism, the contradictions of which, they argue, became more visible following the advent of the 2008 economic crisis. From this perspective, Castañeda (2012), based on non-participant observation of the 15M movement, also argued that the movement had a direct relationship with the Occupy Wall Street movement, i.e. similar goals, tactics and organisation. Others have looked at domestic factors and tried to locate movement within Spanish political history. These studies assert that Indignados represents popular dislike from consensual characteristic of Spanish democratic transition, which was imposed by elites (Sampedro and Lobera, 2014) and which failed to solve the most inherent problems of social conservatism and did not face the traumas of the Franco regime (Kornetis, 2014). There are also works that have examined the role of communication technologies, particularly the internet and social media tools, in creating "networked citizen politics" (Peña-López et al., 2014).

More elaborate accounts provide a theoretical view of the protests. Lorey (2014), for instance, suggests that the formation and functioning of the assemblies organised during and after the protests actually realised Ranciere's conception of democracy. Based on this realisation, she develops the concept of a "presentist democracy that is inspired by Ranciere's non-

constitutional thinking about democracy and of politics as collective invention by anyone and everyone" (2014: 2).

The Gezi Park protests also received widespread scholarly attention. While some studies, inspired by social movements theory, focus on the meanings, subjects, methods and actions of the protests (Farro and Demirhisar, 2014; Metzger, 2014; Tufekci, 2014), others provide a sociological perspective of the movement, by focusing on the formation of "public space as a way of enhancing and staging democracy as part of everyday practices of ordinary citizens" (Gole, 2013: 8). Others, conversely, establish a Marxian account, arguing that the effects of neoliberalism with an Islamic bias have provided political opportunities for social mobilisation (Gürcan and Peker, 2014). Likewise, Boratav asserted that the Gezi protests represented "a mature class uprising," since its participants were mostly educated and well-skilled proletarians (Boratav, 2013). Contrary to Boratav, post-Marxists have suggested that Gezi should be seen as a "newly emerging middle-class movement," the members of which take ownership of cultural capital and struggle against the dominance of economic and political capital (Keyder, 2013; Tugal, 2013; Wacquant, 2014). Against this background, and based on an analysis of quantitative data composed of three surveys, Yoruk and Yuksel (2014) assert that the Gezi protests should not be seen as a class movement, since multiple layers of social groups existed within the movement, and the distinguishing characteristic of the protesters "was not their class background but their political and cultural orientation" (2014:

122). The most widespread view on the protests sees Gezi as an expression of outrage against not only the government's rising authoritarianism, but also its attempts to redesign the social and cultural lives of citizens through Islamic social engineering (Arat, 2013; Kalaycioglu, 2013).

This research aims to go beyond the existing literature by providing a rather neglected perspective – the party politics view – of protests. Neither the 15M nor the Gezi movement case has been analysed through the lenses of the functioning of party systems, and so it has significant explanatory value. More importantly, there are also almost no studies that provide a comparative analysis of the two cases. The comparison of an electoral democracy, Turkey, with that of a consolidated democracy, Spain, extends the literature also, as the problems of representative politics have been mostly analysed in the context of established democracies. Accordingly, a parallel demonstration of a crisis of democratic representation under different circumstances highlights the real and significant consequences of popular disaffection with representative politics in both advanced and electoral democracies.

1.3. A Brief Literature Review

This research will draw on the literature on political representation, the relationship between representation, democracy and party politics as well as the literature that bridges contentious and conventional politics.

Studies on political representation are mainly composed of two major strands: theoretical and empirical. While theoretical works are concerned more with the question of how to conceptualise representation and representative government through analysing the historical development of the concept and the functions it performs, empirical studies focus on the ways in which representative government works. In his seminal work, Manin (1997), for instance, discusses the meaning of representation and looks at the historical development of representative government, from parliamentarianism to party democracy, and from there to what he calls "audience democracy" (Manin, 1997). Birch (2007), on the other hand, describes the functions of representation as 'political recruitment', providing a series of public competitions, ensuring accountability and working for both responsiveness and responsibility in the conduct of government. What makes Birch's study relevant for this research is that he provides an idealist account of political representation by arguing that one of the major functions of representation is not only to respond to the demands of the population, but also to act in a prudent and a consistent fashion for the sake of the public good (2007: 140). Actually, Manin, Pzeworski and Stokes (1999) also have an

idealist approach similar to that of Birch's and they define representation as "acting in the interest of the represented" or as "acting in the best interest of the public" (1999: 2). In a similar vein, Pitkin asserts that representing refers to "acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them" (1967: 209).

This collection of works is particularly relevant for this research, because while conceptualising the crisis of representation concept, we also adopt an idealist stance and argue that political representation by political parties requires being responsive to the demands of a given constituency while much more importantly providing for the general public good. From this perspective, theoretical research on representation provides this dissertation with tools to define what is meant by not only representation but also its crisis. Rather than readopting already existing definitions, we prefer to opt for idealist stance and define political representation broadly in that providing for wider public is considered one of the central requirements of legitimate representation.

Empirical studies on political representation can be considered under three groups. First, using the trustee-delegates model of representation, the Michigan school analysed to what extent representatives are linked to their own constituencies (see Miller and Stokes, 1963; Barnes, 1977; Converse and Pierce, 1986; McAllister, 1991). The second group is composed of studies on 'party government', which focus on the relationship between voters and

political parties (Rose, 1974; Castles and Wildenmann, 1986; Katz, 1997; Blondel and Cotta, 2001). The third group, conversely, has discussed the degree of parties' ability to genuinely represent the individuals who voted for them (Dalton, Farrell, McAllister, 2011; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Weisberg, 1978, Wessels, 2007).

Both strands of research on representation remain aloof from one another. While theoretical works prefer to stay on the conceptual level and do not apply their conceptualisations to real cases, empirical works do not focus too much on the conceptualisation and all consider voter-party congruence the major indicator demonstrating how democratic governments represent the public interest, and therefore their central concern revolves around explicating voter-party congruence. However, this research applies an idealist conceptualisation of representation empirically. In other words, we not only elaborate on definitions and conceptualisations but also go beyond the existing literature by applying them to actual cases of Turkey and Spain. From this perspective, we broaden the literature by addressing the gap between theory and empirics.

For instance, the core problem of most of the empirical studies is that they all assume that programmatic convergence between voters and legislators indicates that democratic representation functions properly (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 2). In other words, looking at congruence, they conclude that the patterns of representation remain stable over time

(Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Converse, 1969; Lipset and Rokkan, 1990). However, as the recent widespread protests have indicated, the patterns of contemporary political conflict have exceeded the capacities of representative democracy, due to individual and cultural transformations (Warren, 2013: 225). In other words, the demands of individuals have gone further beyond the control of representative democracy in which voter-legislature congruence has lost its relevance, since the voter asks for direct involvement in decision-making processes and their demands are not met within conventional parameters.

However, without elaborating on conceptual approaches to political representation, this problem cannot be observed. In other words, due to the gap between theoretical and empirical studies, empirical studies fail to see current problems political systems face, which go beyond voter-party congruence.

In order to address this problem in the literature, in studying crisis of representation, this research analyses voter-party congruence not only on the basis of the existing parameters of left and right, but also on the basis of the existence of popular demands for new politics, which goes beyond existing parameters, whether defined on the basis of ethnicity and religiosity or left and right, and new cleavages, which would also indicate incongruence between voters and political parties. For instance, as societies of both cases under examination have experienced cognitive revolution or what Warren

(2013) has defined as individual and cultural transformations existing parameters of left and right are unable to respond to these new masses. While in Spain it arises due to party's convergence in the ideological spectrum, in Turkey it is resulted from divergence of political parties. Both instances produce gaps in the system and these gaps are further reinforced by the already present limitations of the left-right spectrum. In the case of Turkey left-right spectrum based on ethnicity and religiosity not only leaves unrepresented the ones who stand at the centre but also the one who demand new ways of doing politics. This also applies to Spain wherein parties' increasing similarity left diversified electorate, the end-product of individual transformations, unrepresented. Both trends cannot be observed if one only checks for the degree of voter-party congruence quantitatively but it also requires a careful look into the demands of protestors which points to need for new cleavages or a new understanding of left and right.

Moreover, representation is understood more than voter-party congruence, in that conceptually the requirements of party government in terms of responsiveness and responsibility are also taken on board when examining the ways in which political representation works or fails to do so. Assessing the degree of responsiveness and responsibility empirically addresses the aforementioned gaps in theoretical and empirical works.

This research also benefits from the literature that lies at the intersection of representation, party politics and democracy. These studies

mostly revolve around the concept of 'party government' and what function it has to perform for political accountability (see Ranney, 1954; Rose, 1974; Katz, 1987; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Rose, 1969; Thomassen, 1994). Needless to say, in order to provide a party political account of popular mobilisations, it is critical to refer to the requirements of party governments, since only then is it possible to pin down party failures. As it will be clarified in the next chapter, what is understood from "party government" determines what is to be expected from parties. It is argued that party government model is legitimised only when parties provide for accountability, responsiveness and responsibility. Henceforth, this research checks for to what extent parties are able to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility not only because it defines representation on an idealist bases but also because it looks closely to the literature on party government and clarifies requirements of this model based on this literature. The literature on party government once again focuses mostly on defining what is expected from parties under party government model and with the exception of Mair (2008, 2013) do not elaborate on under what conditions parties would fail to meet these demands or what are the signs of party failures. Relating crisis of representation to party failures this research addresses this gap and not only analyses protest movements as end-results of parties' failure to meet the demands of party government but also discusses the conditions which led to party failures.

The literature on contentious politics, conversely, not only analyses the political opportunity structures that facilitate the development of protest movements, but it also looks at the relationship between social movements, states and political parties (see Goldstone, 2003; Tarrow, 1994; Tarrow, 2012; Tilly, 2004). These studies are particularly important for this research, because differences between the current wave of protests and their predecessors have to be clarified, to account for the ways in which these protests challenge the conventional understanding of modern democracy, and because they provide significant tools for analysing the culture of protests. Aiming to discuss how movements have interacted with their respective electoral political systems, in the final section we also benefit from studies that bridge the gap between contentious politics and conventional politics. Here, what is observed is that there are different mechanisms of interaction between protest politics and routine politics in two cases under examination. While in the case of Turkey, protest movement has shaped the content of electoral campaigns and influenced existing parties' discourses, in Spain, a brand new party emerged out of the protest movement which is considered the most extreme version of interaction between electoral and contentious politics.

1.4. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

Theoretically, this research relies on historical institutionalism, adherents to which underline the importance of historical conditions and concerns in relation to the ways in which institutions structure and shape behaviour and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 118). According to March and Olsen (1989), institutions are not only expressions of societal interests and cultural patterns, but more so they are also the major actors that influence the workings of political life.

First of all, focusing on the ways in which political parties function in explaining the protest movements in Turkey and Spain, we also consider political institutions as crucial factors that shape the ways in which democracy works or fails to do so. Moreover, the research also highlights the importance of the interaction between sociological factors and the institutional framework. Within this context, it values the ways in which societal cleavages, together with institutional structure, shape the ways in which party politics adopt to the crisis of representation. And from this perspective, it approaches parties not only as critical political institutions with far-reaching implications for how democratic politics function, but also as reflections of institutional constraints and social constellations. In other words, we strengthen the historical institutionalist approach to sociological explanations of party failures (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), by explaining

the degree of change and adaptation in the political structure in order to respond to social movements.

Methodologically, viewing qualitative and quantitative methods as being complementary rather than mutually exclusive (Dick, 1979, see also Webb et al., 1966), this research adopts a convergent methodology, or what has been called 'triangulation', both between methods and within methods (Hussein, 2009). Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods – qualitative and quantitative – in analysing the same phenomenon (Dick, 1979). In this respect, this research employs multiple quantitative and qualitative methods to explicate the causes of protest movements in Turkey and Spain. The rationale behind using triangulation is that this way of researching not only provides a wider and deeper understanding of the question under examination (Hussein, 2009), but also it increases the validity of the research, since "researchers look for convergence among multiple and different sources of information" (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 127, see also Denzin, 1978; Golafshani, 2003; Webb et al., 1966). From this standpoint, this research conducts an extensive review of the literature on political representation and democracy as well as on the roles political parties play in the process of representation. It also draws attention to how the practice of representation varies and how the roles of political parties change across different institutional contexts.

What is meant by democratic representation and the crisis of representation is defined clearly before analysing the cases. Then, each case is examined in detail by referring to the last decade of party system development. Here, it is also important to explain the ways in which we operationalised the concepts of responsiveness and responsibility. In order to measure the degree of responsiveness, the position of parties on the left-right spectrum is checked against distribution of voters on a left-right scale. Data on these are taken from Turkish Election Studies conducted by Kalaycioglu (2012) and from World Values Survey for the case of Turkey and from the Centre for Sociological Research (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas*, CIS) and *Latinobarometer* for Spain. Moreover, this data is supported by an analysis of protestor's demands. For the Turkish case researches conducted by KONDA Research Institute and academics from Bilgi University are used to observe the demands of protestors. KONDA Research Institute conducted a survey in Gezi Park on randomly chosen 4411 protestors between 6 and 8 June 2013 and generated a report on these surveys. Academics from Bilgi University, on the other hand, conducted an online survey which was filled by 3008 respondents 73.2 % of which was from İstanbul (Ercan-Bilgiç and Kafkaslı, 2013). In the case of Spain researches and interviews conducted by respected research organisation, the CIS are used. CIS conducts research by making surveys and generating qualitative data and the organisation published a detailed research on 15M movement titled *"Estudio cualitativo: Representaciones políticas y 15M"* [Qualitative Study: Political Representation and 15 M].

Responsibility, on the other hand, is assessed qualitatively by referring to the certain policies of governing party and the statements of party leaders. Particularly, in the case of Turkey tracing the government's discourse and policies for the last ten years, the extent to which the government attends to the expectations of wider segments of society is analysed. Here, government's response to protest movement both on discursive and attitudinal levels are analysed looking at policy acts and using newspaper resources.

Triangulation is adopted in this dissertation in that we use both quantitative (official data and statistics, together with other datasets) and qualitative (interviews, internet sources, party manifestos, speeches of leaders) data, the former of which are used mainly to complement the thorough examination of political context in each country. Besides above mentioned data sources, as quantitative data, official data and statistics for election results are taken from Turkish Statistical Institute (*Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu*, TÜİK), Turkish Election Studies and "Parties and Elections Database" which "provides a comprehensive overview about the parliamentary elections in the European countries" (Nordsieck, 2015). Moreover, data provided by World Values Survey has been used to check for polarisation levels. In the case of Spain, data from *Latinobarómetro* is used which is an annual public opinion survey conducted by Latinobarómetro Corporation. As for qualitative data, this study used party manifestos, speeches and statements of party leaders as well as newspaper resources.

Interviews are not used for the Turkish case. For the case of Spain, on the other hand, interviews with 15M protestors made based on key informant techniques and reported by the CIS ("*Estudio cualitativo: Representaciones políticas y 15M*") have been used.

Consequently, this study employs a comparative method by systematically analysing a small number of cases, with the goal of examining co-variation among cases and highlighting to what extent cases are different, "thus establishing a framework for interpreting how parallel processes of change are played out in different ways within each context" (Collier, 1993). More specifically, it uses the 'most-different systems design' (Lijphart, 1971) in understanding popular mobilisations and how they interacted with the political structures in both cases.

1.5. Organisation of the Thesis

The thesis first provides a broad picture of representation, party politics and democracy, and then it specifically focuses on the cases of Turkey and Spain, respectively, which is followed up by an analysis of what happened after the protest movements and how politics in each country has interacted with movement politics through adoption and change.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and analytical framework informing the empirical cases. Here, not only are the concepts of representation and party democracy clarified, but also an in-depth analysis of contemporary disaffection with party democracy, referring to both the supply and the demand sides of the story, is provided. Consequently, what is meant by a 'crisis of representation' is defined clearly for the subsequent case study analyses.

Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter and analyses, through the lens of party politics, the widespread the Gezi Park movement protests which took place in Turkey. Looking at the last decade of the Turkish party system, party failures and how these led to a crisis of representation are examined. It is argued that, on the one hand, extreme levels of polarisation left certain social groups unrepresented, and on the other, the AKP government enhanced responsiveness at the expense of responsibility. This chapter ends with a brief discussion on the future of the Turkish party system and democracy in the country.

Chapter 4 is the second empirical chapter, in which the case of 15M movement in Spain is analysed in detail. Here, also referring to the development of party politics since democratic transition, party system-related factors behind the mass protest movement are provided. Once again, party failures created a crisis of representation, forcing the populace to take to the streets in order to make their voices heard. This time, however, the

two mainstream parties' distinct similarities, and their inability to act responsively, created the crisis. In other words, although both cases suffered from a representation crisis, opposite trends were experienced. At the end of the chapter, we offer a brief account of the implications of protest movements for the Spanish party system and democracy across the land.

Chapter 5 discusses the process after the movement, in order to explain the dynamics of interaction between contentious and conventional politics. In this chapter, the cases of Turkey and Spain are analysed comparatively, and how electoral politics in each nation has responded to their own particular protest movement is examined with the aim of observing the ways in which they adopted the crisis of representation. In this chapter, which provides an institutional and sociological analysis, we also account for what factors explain the differences between the two cases. Herein, the ways in which developments after the movement were related to the crisis of representation are also discussed, and it is demonstrated that the terms of adoption change depending on the type of crisis.

Chapter 6, which is the concluding chapter, addresses the broader implications of this study for democratic regimes elsewhere. The overall argument of the dissertation is that in understanding the recent wave of protests, it is critically important to analyse the workings of party systems, as party failure is a major, albeit not the only, factor behind the disaffection of populations. This in turn forces party democracy to adopt and change, in

order to meet the demands of increasing political participation and a new type of politics.

CHAPTER II

PARTY SYSTEMS AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION

This chapter develops the theoretical and analytical framework for the comparative analysis in the following chapters. In this chapter, prior thinking on the question of representation, party government model as well as the notion of crisis of representation will be clarified. Although the framework is developed on the basis of previous theories on representation and party government model, it aims to go beyond existing theories by focusing on the dynamics of representative crisis. So rather than analysing how representation works, this research is concerned with the question of how representation *fails* to work, leading to mass protest movements. The contention is that current mass protests both in Spain and Turkey that calls for "real democracy" are resulted from a *crisis of representation* that occurs not only when certain segments of society feel unrepresented, but also when citizens do not feel represented or are dissatisfied with the representatives and/or when they believe that their representatives fails to act responsively and responsibly at the same time.

Within three sections, this chapter will develop and justify the conceptions, questions and hypotheses that inform the subsequent case studies on Turkey and Spain. First of all, it discusses the notion of representation looking at the sequences and the functions of representative government. In this section, the historical process within which political parties emerge as the key agents of representation is briefly analysed. Secondly, the key role of political parties in the processes of representation will be defined within the framework of party government model. Herein, the relationship between responsibility and responsiveness as one of the major issues of representation based on party government model will be clarified. Finally, we delve into the dynamics of current disaffection with the party democracy both in terms of demand and supply sides, creating a crisis of representation. In this section, contemporary debate on the failure of political parties to function as a linkage between citizens and state will be provided. In the concluding part, we discuss how this research will employ the theories of representation, party government and party decline and define what is meant by representative democracy and its crisis.

2.1. Representation and Democracy

Today, there is a widespread agreement that representative democracy established in the wake of mass parties is in a state of crisis (Manin, 1997: 196). Before discussing how representative democracies are being

challenged due to a myriad of certain macro-political and socio-economic developments, it is important, first, to elaborate on the concept of representation, referring to forms and functions of representative government as well as the definition of the concept and then to look at the ways in which political parties have become the major agents of the processes of representation.

2.1.1. The Notion of Representative Government

The idea of representation is based on a relationship between a principal and an agent in which the principal delegates its rights to an agent in order to undertake a clearly defined task. In a similar vein, representative government refers to a system of governance in which citizens explicitly delegate elites to represent them in government deliberations. In other words, rather than participating in decision-making processes directly as was the case in Greek polis, the Swiss canton or in the New England town meetings (Dalton, Farrell and McAllister, 2011: 22), the public in representative systems chooses legislators to represent their interest in the processes of political decision-making. Particularly with the shift of decision-making to legislatures and the expansion of the electorate, representative government had become an obvious necessity. Furthermore, the limited skills and knowledge of average citizens have also created need for professional politicians who are assumed to be better equipped for governing (Dalton, 2006: 223).

However, at the level of practical politics, the concept of representation has given rise to several disputes predominantly over the questions of which groups should have right to be represented, and how representatives should be chosen (by simple plurality or by proportional representation), and most importantly how representatives should behave (Birch, 2007: 133). While the first question had been resolved by democratization of suffrage and expansion of franchise to previously excluded groups such as working class and women, the latter two questions are still in dispute (2007: 134). Leaving aside the question of electoral system, and rules and regulations, the issue as to whether representatives should favour the policies supported by their constituents or whether they should act in line with general public interest is likely to remain as a major subject of controversy in the literature on representative democracy. Indeed, Pitkin calls this controversy "*the paradox of representation*" (Pitkin, 1967: 38). Before discussing the intricate paradox of representation and how political parties as the major representatives tackle with this critical issue, the forms and functions of representative government should be identified.

According to Manin (1997), there is a sequence of three forms of representative government. He examines the change in representative government in the light of four major principles identified: "election of representatives at regular intervals,[2] the partial independence of

---

[2] Here, it is important to highlight that the status of representatives under any form of representation is established by a certain process of elections. According to Dalton et al, elections perform two critical functions: ensuring accountability and reflection of different

representatives, freedom of public opinion and making of decisions after trial by discussion." (1997: 197) Comparing the ways in which these principles were implemented, he argues that there are three types of representative government emerged in the history of political representation: parliamentarianism, party democracy and audience democracy (1997: 198).

Parliamentarianism as a form of representative government was a dominant paradigm in the 19th century wherein elections were devised to select a particular type of elite: the notables (1997: 203). Under parliamentarianism the representatives (notables) had direct relationship with their constituents; as they were not part of a group or a faction they were free to vote according to their personal judgements; they were more or less free from public opinion since cleavages cut across party lines and finally decisions were taken without any discussion as they were bound by the wishes of their constituents (1997: 202-206). Since there were no party-like institutions, representatives could act individually. Although under this form of representation there has been the risk of representative being more concerned with his own re-election rather than with governing in the interest of the country, the representatives legitimised their positions by claiming to serve for all or for public good (Graham 1993).

---

opinions existent in the electorate (See R.J. Dalton, D. Farrell & I. McAllister (2011) 'The Dynamics of Political Representation' in M.Rosema, B. Dentes and K. Aarts (eds) *How Democracy Works?: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, Amsterdam: Pallas Publications: 34).

Party democracy, on the other hand, which will be discussed more in detail in the next section, refers to a type of representative government that had become dominant in the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century wherein political parties emerged as the key agents of representation. Due to mobilisation of enlarged electorate with the enfranchisement and mass suffrage, public started vote for a party rather than a person, representatives are bound by the party, electoral competition is organised around partisan cleavages and representatives lost their independence in decision-making as they have to follow strict voting discipline (1997: 206-218). Under party democracy, parties rather than individuals have become actors of representation and they emerge as the representative of the relevant segment of society who delegates its rights to political parties in order to represent their particular interest in decision-making processes.

The concept of "audience democracy", conversely, is introduced by Manin, and he argues that it is the most recent type of representation in which people tend to change their votes from one election to another indicating high volatility and low party identification; personal image is valued over party organization; channels of public communication have become non-partisan and parties turn into leader-dominated organizations (1997: 219-231). He suggests that this type of representative government is quite different from that of party democracy in which people identify themselves with a certain political party and vote for that party in each and

every election, party organization has a stronger say in policy-making and parties as organizations were given utmost importance rather than the leaders. He asserts that since mass party loses its viability, we are facing with a crisis of a particular form of representation rather than a crisis of political representation as a whole (1997: 196).

With regard to the functions of representation, Birch (2007: 140-141) suggests that there are four major functions of representation: political recruitment, providing a series of public competition, ensuring accountability, and working for both responsiveness and responsibility in the conduct of government. Indeed, the functions identified by Birch, highly corresponds to the functions of political parties themselves. Accordingly, his definition of representation is based on party democracy model. The last task of balancing the demands of responsiveness and responsibility is a defining function of representation that also lies at the core of this research's understanding of representation. According to Birch, representatives have to be both responsive to the wishes and the interest of the electorate and responsible at the same time. Responsibility, to Birch, means that even if certain policies are popular at the time they are shaped, in case they are imprudent and inconsistent in the long-run for the interests of the public, representatives (herein parties) have to avoid implementing them (2007: 140). Actually, as mentioned before, Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999) also adopts an idealist approach to representation in that they describe representation as "acting in the interest of the represented" or as "acting in

the best interest of the public." (1999: 2) Likewise, according to Pitkin, representing requires "acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them."(Pitkin, 1967: 209)

Although Mainwaring et al argue that defining representation on the basis of "acting in the best interest of the public" is problematic since it involves wide range of actions undertaken on behalf of public good (Mainwaring et al., 2006), they overlook the fact that what makes political parties unique agents of representation is their ability to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility at the same time (see Mair, 2008). Therefore, discussing a crisis of representative democracy based on party government model requires adapting a broader definition of democratic representation.

From this perspective, this research defines representative democracy as *a democratic form of representation in which voter chooses agents (political parties) to represent their interests in a democratic regime* (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 12) and *in return parties as representatives (whether to be in government or in opposition) provide for both responsiveness and responsibility.* In other words, this research also adopts a broader definition of representation based on party democracy model. This definition allows accounting for not only the demand side (voters' involvement in the process) but also the supply side (parties' ability to fulfil their functions).

2.1.2. Emergence of Political Parties as Key Agents of Representation

Not until the 19th century political parties have emerged as "central organising features of many countries politics" (Scarrow , 2006: 16). Throughout the 18th century and well into the 19th century, the term "party" has itself had a pejorative meaning in that legislatures avoided using the label claiming that "the moral high of pursuing the best path for the nation, while deriding their opponents for being 'partisan'." (2006: 16)

The infamous status of parties was rooted in the belief that the role of legislators should be to serve the interest of the whole rather than a particular group in society since this would run the risk of pursuing private ends at the expense of the general good. In other words, equating parties with factions that represent particularised interests, partisan struggles were considered to be antithetical to public interest in the beginning of the 19th century. Burke's definition of party actually reflects these disputes in that he struggled to find a compromise between particularised interests and national ones in defining what party is: "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." (cited in Scarrow, 2006: 16)

However, two interrelated developments by the mid-19th century had brought parties into a prominent position: "the transfer of political power to legislatures and the expansion of the electorate." (2006: 17) Needless to say

parliamentarization had played a key role in this process as many scholars underline when defining the sequence of party development. According to Duverger (1954: xxiv):

> First there is the creation of parliamentary groups, then the appearance of electoral committees and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements.

Sartori also identifies a similar sequence in which first legislatures become more important and responsible than parties emerge which is followed up by the enfranchisement, finally parties need to develop formal organisation to mobilise larger electorate (Sartori, 1976: 23). However, Scarrow (2006) maintains that although both Duverger and Sartori's sequences correspond to the British case, the order of changes in legislative and electoral realms that brought parties into prominent position in legislative and executive around Western Europe have varied broadly. Whether first to be through the transfer of political power or through the enlargement of the electorate, both the enfranchisement and universal suffrage played critical role in the development of modern parties (Epstein, 1980: 23).

Actually, the early development of parties can be better explicated through analysing two historical stages of party organisation: elite parties and mass parties. In the late 19th and the early 20th century the dominant form of party model was elite or cadre parties. Since there was restricted suffrage and party competition was based on ascribed status rather than

representative capacity, parties had small and elitist membership and much more importantly within this era politics was regarded as the process by which government finds and implements so called single national interest (Katz and Mair, 1995: 9). Due to restricted suffrage and highly restricted nature of distribution of politically related resources, parties were composed of elites with limited or no link to civil society; therefore formal and structured organisations were also irrelevant for cadre parties.

However, with industrialisation and urbanisation the amount of people meeting requirement of suffrage had increased and the restrictions on working-class organisation started to be seen inconsistent with the liberal rationale of bourgeois state (1995: 9). So with enfranchisement and mass suffrage, party competition began to take place on the basis of representative capacity, thereby the trustee style of representation is replaced by the delegate model (1995: 18). This is wherein mass parties begun to emerge towards the end of 19th century as the major representative of the disenfranchised segments of civil society whose existence relied on the quantity of its supporters which required a structured and well-based organisation. Under mass party model of democracy, parties have become representative of certain segments of society, creating a clear principal-agent model in representation.

Indeed, elite and mass parties coexisted for a long period of time and in their response to mass party model elite parties had to restructure their

party organisation in order to survive in an electoral environment wherein their constituency is limited to permanent minorities of industrialists, farmers and etc. This search for restructuration led to the development of catch-all style party organisations (1995: 11). Under catchall style party organisation model which begun to emerge after 1945, policy effectiveness turned into the basis of party competition and heterogeneous membership has characterised party organisation (1995: 12-13). This development has been further followed by the emergence of cartel party model after 1970s in which representative style has totally changed, parties turning into agents of state, rather than representatives of people (1995: 13).

Leaving aside all the implications these changes had over the voter-party relationship which will be discussed in the following sections, in sum thanks to several socio-economic developments, political parties, whatever model they sustain, have emerged as the major agents of representation under democratic form of government. According to Bryce (cited in Müller and Narud, 2013: 1); "parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them." Similarly, Kelsen (cited in Sartori 1987: 148) expressed that "Modern democracy is founded entirely on political parties; the greater the application of the democratic principle the more important the parties."

Consequently, as Scarrow argues "the emergence of party-organised politics was an unanticipated and even unwanted side-effect of liberalization and democratisation of politics" (Scarrow 2006: 23) in the 19th century and they have emerged as the major agents of representation, although with cartel party model their representative function begun to erode more and more.

2.2. The Role of Political Parties in Representation

As clarified in the previous section, this research is concerned with representation model based on party democracy in which political parties are the key agents of representation. Before defining crisis of representation leading to mass protests in Turkey and Spain, first and foremost, the expectations from parties under party government model have to be explicated. In other words, aiming to provide a party politics account of contemporary protests in two countries, first, the requirements of a party government model need to be discussed and then we will look into discussions around "the paradox of representation",(Pitkin 1967) acting responsively and responsible at the same time.

2.2.1. Party Government Model

The central theme in this study is that political parties are significantly important for the proper functioning of representative democracy. Although their centrality has been much discussed in recent decades, they continue to play critical roles in the workings of modern democracy. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of current mass protests requires a careful analysis of the degree to which political parties fulfil their functions. In other words, if as Schattschneider (1942: 1) argues that "*the modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties*", then the current unrest with the modern democracies should be comprehended by examining the ways in which the most important agent of modern democracy, political parties, function. But what are the functions of political parties and the conditions for party government?

One of the major scholars of party research King (1969) identifies six core functions of political parties. The first one is structuring the vote which refers to the process by which political parties run in elections. Katz (1980: 1) argues that elections are only meaningful when parties run the campaign, come up with candidates for different offices. The argument here is that by structuring elections parties simplify the alternatives (Schattschneider, 1942: 50), they organise dispersed public views into coherent programmes (Neuman, 1956: 397), and aggregate different proposals into consistent

competition between factions rather than between individual candidates (Ware, 1987: 58), making the process much more efficient.

The second function, according to King, is integration and mobilisation which refer to a process by which parties integrate different demands among population into coherent set of policy proposals in search of mobilising people. The remaining functions actually speak for themselves. While the third function is recruitment of political leaders, the other ones are the organisation of government, policy formation and interest aggregation. Herein, it can be argued that some functions identified by King (1969) overlap with one another such as integration and mobilisation is highly in line with interest aggregation. All in all, according to King, the control of government, through training politicians, deciding public policy and linking citizenry to state (by aggregating interest and mobilising people), is the key function of political parties (King, 1969).

Basedau (2007), conversely, argues that there are two major functions of political parties: efficiency and inclusion. While inclusion refers to the representation of societal groups and their demands as well as the organization of opposition, efficiency involves structuring inter-party competition and elite recruitment. The study of Randall and Svasand (2002) is particularly important since they more or less summarise most of the previous studies on party functions (see for example Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; von Beyme, 1985) and come up with an all-encompassing account.

They identified functions of political parties as representation and integration (oriented towards the electorate), aggregation, recruitment and training (linkage-related) and making government accountable and organising opposition (government-related) (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 4). They argued that as political parties' ability to meet these difficult functions increase their ability to contribute three important pillars of democratic consolidation also grows: conflict resolution, the institutionalisation of democracy and regime legitimacy (2002: 7). In line with Key's famous conceptualisation of party faces; party in the electorate, party as an organisation and party in government (Key, 1964), Randall and Svasand (2002) discussed the functions of parties on three major levels: on the level of society, government and on the level of party organisation as providing linkage between the former two. Similarly, Dalton and Wattenberg (2000: 6-7) also list party functions using Key's tripartite framework. The role of parties in the electorate are listed as "simplifying choices of voters, educating citizens, generating symbols of identification and loyalty and mobilising people to participate". The functions of parties as organisations are to recruit political leadership, train political elites, articulate and aggregate political interests. Parties in government, on the other hand, are required "to create majorities in government, organise the government, implement policy objectives, organise dissent and opposition, ensure responsibility for government actions, control government administration and foster stability in government." (2000: 5)

Indeed the functions of political parties constitute the basis of discussions around party government model (see for instance Ranney, 1954; Rose, 1974; Katz, 1987; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Rose, 1969; Thomassen, 1994) according to which the core role of parties in a representative democracy is to provide a linkage between the public and the political decision-makers (Dalton et al., 2011). In the words of Sartori, "citizens in Western democracies are represented through and by parties. This is inevitable." (Sartori, 1968: 471) However, the concept of party government has not been used in European context until the late 1960s though it has been a central theme within the discussions around the US politics. In 1950 APSA (1950) prepared a report on US politics entitled '*Towards a More Responsible Two-Party Model'.* This report represents an important landmark for political party research basically because in debating American political and institutional reform it defines the parties as the leading actors in governing (1950). The report put great emphasis on the need for political parties in modern democracies as they are the ones that can produce policy programmes through providing policy choices to citizens and that can implement these programmes by being disciplined and cohesive (Dalton et al., 2012: 5). Although this report has been criticised by many due to its overemphasis on the role of political parties in governing (see Ranney, 1954), since it summarises the ways in which government by parties should function, it remains to be an important text (White, 2006).

In the European context, conversely, Rose has been one of the first scholars who elaborated on the notion. Rose (1974: 3) defines political party as "an organization concerned with the expression of popular preferences and contesting control of the chief policy-making offices of government." According to this definition, there are three critical elements that are central to political parties. First, they have organisations so can be differentiated from groups that share same views; second they are concerned with the "expression of popular preferences" so linked to society and the state at the same time; and finally they govern so they have direct access to state power which differentiates them from other organisations such as pressure groups, civil society organisation and etc. (1974: 3). He maintains that party government pertains to the capacity of parties to "translate possession of highest formal offices of a regime into operational control of government" (1969: 413). According to Rose (1974; 1969) the conditions of party government require parties first to come up with clear policy goals and then to have the organisational ability to implement these policies through appointing people for required tasks (Mair 2008: 223). In other words, his understanding of party government focuses on the importance of clearly defined policy proposals provided by parties and to parties' capacity to implement them.

Katz (1989: 43-44), on the other hand, identifies three conditions of party government: first, all main governmental decisions should be taken by the individuals who are chosen through electoral competition conducted

along party lines; second policies are to be determined by the party in the government or if it is a coalition government among the parties that form the coalition; and third, "the highest officials (ministers, prime ministers) were to be selected within parties and to be held responsible for their actions and policies through parties"(Mair, 2008: 224). Clearly, according to Katz, party government requires that parties play central role in each and every step of governmental decision-making by not only controlling the key positions in the government but also by leading the process of policy-making through designing programmes.

Both Rose and Katz have listed alternative forms of government in relation to party government model. Rose identifies other forms as "government by charismatic leadership, traditional government, military government, government by 'inertia' and in particular 'administrative government'" in which "civil servants not only maintain routine services of government, but also try to formulate new policies" (cited in Mair, 2008: 224). Katz, on the other hand, defines other alternatives such as "corporatist or neo-corporatist government, in which policies are set through negotiations between interests,... pluralist democracy, in which each individual candidate and elected official is responsible to his or her own constituency... and direct democracy, in which policies are determined by referendum..." (cited in Mair 2008: 224). For both scholars party government model represents a unique form which is differentiated from all others in which parties provide a linkage between society and governing processes.

Thomassen (1994; see also Thomassen 1976), on the other hand, underlines the electoral component of party government, emphasising on the ways in which elections link citizenry to state as the major mechanism for representation. However, as Mair (2008: 225) correctly argues, Thomassen's party government model is highly in line with that of Katz and Rose. Synthesising all three, Mair (2008: 225) lists five conditions of party government as follows:

> Party government in *democratic polities* will prevail when a party or parties wins control of the executive as a result of competitive elections, when the political leaders in the polity are recruited by and through parties, when the (main) parties or alternatives in competition offer voters clear policy alternatives, when public policy is determined by the party or parties holding executive office, and when that executive is held accountable through parties.

In other words, under party government model, political parties are considered to be the only legitimate agents with direct means to state power in a democratic polity. There are three major reasons behind this assertion (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 30). First, political parties provide voters with information shortcuts which make electoral judgment much easier (Downs, 1957). Secondly, they are crucial for accountability in the sense that political parties are responsible from the successes and/or failures in governing, and therefore they provide more institutionalised mechanism in comparison to a system in which transient individual officeholders would govern. Finally,

distinguished from interest groups, civil society organisations or trade unions, political parties are the only institutions that offer direct means to state power (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 31). From this perspective, a rational citizen tends to give autonomy in decision-making to representatives (parties) on the grounds that representatives have greater expertise on specific issues (Dahl, 1970: 145) in exchange for responsiveness, responsibility and accountability (see Cox et al., 1999; Ferejohn, 1999; Maravall,1999). So although the conditions of party government mainly focus on the ways in which the processes of governmental decision-making function, what makes governing by parties legitimate is conditioned by the extent to which they manage to sustain the demands of responsiveness, responsibility and accountability. While how accountability works has implication on the inclination of parties to be representative and responsible, since it pertains to the fixed intervals through which parties held accountable (Bardi et al., 2014: 237), this research is more concerned with the question of responsiveness and responsibility.

2.2.2. Responsiveness vs. Responsibility

The discussions around responsibility and responsiveness have been one of the dominant themes of representation studies as the major paradox of party government model. Indeed, in responding to the question of how representatives should behave, there has been a dispute over whether

representatives should favour the policies supported by their own specific constituents or whether they should act in line with general public interests. Within this perspective, the general agreement has been that political parties as the agents of representation should balance the demands of both responsibility and responsiveness. Fundamentally, political party is considered to be the only agent capable of aggregating, representing and governing at the same time. Much more importantly, party government is considered legitimate only if it serves responsively and responsibly at the same time. In this section the notions of responsiveness and responsibility will be clarified and a brief look into historical evaluation of how different party organisation models face the challenge of balancing the gap between two requirements will be discussed.

Though what is meant by responsibility and responsiveness have been briefly discussed in the previous sections, here it is important to be clear about both notions. *Responsiveness* refers to the tendency of political leaders or governments first to listen and then to respond the demands and wishes of citizens and groups (Mair, 2009: 140). Bardi et al. (2014: 237) also suggests that responsiveness can be identified as political parties' and leaders' responding to immediate expectations of voters either for "re-election, organisational discipline, and ideological commitment". Accordingly, responsiveness stipulates policy-makers to meet the demands of citizens. Although responsiveness might be comprehended in a broader perspective in that it might refer to responding to the will of general public, here it is

understood as the process by which political parties respond to the demands of their own constituency or to a specific segment/cleavage of society in order to be re-elected and/or to fulfil their political premises.

The term *responsibility*, on the other hand, has been much more controversial and used differently by various scholars. For instance, according to Sartori (1976: 18-20) and for APSA's famous report, "*Towards a More Responsible Two-Party Model"*, responsible party model refers more to the accountability in that they argued governments being accountable to parliament and to people can be considered responsible (Mair, 2009). According to Downs (1957: 105), conversely, responsibility involves predictability and consistency at the same time. In his words, a party is responsible "if its policies in one period are consistent with its actions (or statements) in the preceding period" and so "the absence of responsibility means party behaviour cannot be predicted by consistently projecting what parties have done previously" (cited in Mair, 2009). Rieselbach (1977: 8-10), on the other hand, argues that responsibility involves both efficiency and effectiveness and he expects from a responsible institution to provide successful policies that respond to the problems at hand quickly, efficiently and effectively.

Listing the functions of representation, Birch (2007: 140) claimed that one of the major functions is "providing for both responsibility and responsiveness." Here, he defines responsible government as the

governments acting in prudence and consistency when making decisions. According to Birch, responsibility requires that "those in charge of policy making shall be responsible to the wishes and interest of the *general public*" (2007: 140). He goes on to argue that "…a government will be regarded as irresponsible if its policies, however popular at the time they are formulated, proved to be imprudent or inconsistent in the long-run"(2007: 140).

This research also adapts a similar approach to the concept and maintains a broader understanding of responsibility in that responsible government here refers to the one that acts in a consistent and prudent fashion in public policymaking so responds not only to the demands of their own constituency but also to the needs and demands of general public.

The important question here is how do these two notions interact? As aforementioned discussion on representation has clarified, citizens would delegate their rights to a representative on the condition that representatives act in a manner responsive to their own demands. However, if representatives only meet the demands of their own constituency, this would run the risk of disregarding long-term public interest at the expense of short-term group interests. On the other hand, if political parties act responsibly with clear policy goals serving to general public without responding to their constituency's demand then they might turn into "public utilities" (see van Biezen, 2003) with limited or no link to civil society. As Mair argues this might lead to a democracy without demos wherein political parties become

state apparatus (Mair, 2005). This is why from the very beginning party democracy or party government model of representation is legitimised on the premise that political parties links society to the state, providing for both responsiveness and responsibility. However, balancing the demands of two has been a challenging task for political parties.

According to Bardi et al. (2014) although political parties' role has readopted over time under different periods, the strain between responsiveness and responsibility has remained persistent. Indeed, the phases defined by them correspond to the phases of party organisation that we discussed early. So it can be argued that within the period when elite parties were dominant, responsibility –acting in the interest of all- was underlying theme that shaped party politics, with the emergence of mass parties the emphasis had shifted towards responsiveness in that the extent to which parties respond to certain segment of society determined the terms of representation. Although catch-all party model might be considered most successful one in balancing the demands of both, with increasing dominance of cartel parties in Western Europe "the role of parties has stretched toward the extremes of high responsibility with limited responsiveness" (2014: 244). This is why Mair (2008; 2013) suggests that party government model faces a crisis in Western Europe wherein political parties, though act responsibly, acting in prudence and consistency, fail to engage the ordinary citizen and in turn citizens withdraw from conventional ways of political involvement. However, focusing on European cases predominantly Mair provides one side

of the story wherein responsiveness is sacrificed at the expense of responsibility. The opposite also might lead to a crisis of representation wherein political parties only enhance their representative role at the expense of responsibility.

The contention here is that since representative government based on party government model can only be justified when parties provide for both responsibility and responsiveness, a crisis of representation might occur if parties fail to maintain balance between the two, either leaning towards responsiveness or responsibility. Before discussing the ways in which this research will operationalise the notion of a crisis of representation and how mass protests in Turkey and Spain can be comprehended within this perspective, it is critical first to analyse the dynamics of party decline and the extent of the challenge to party government both in European and non-European contexts, and then to define what is meant by a crisis of representation.

2.3. Decline of Political Parties

Several studies in the literature suggest that a certain level of distrust towards political parties and partisan politics have been present among citizens and political elites alike (Gray and Caul, 2000; Blais, 2000). These studies argue that party decline is being experienced, particularly in advanced industrial democracies, and this decline is resulted from changes

that take place not only on the level of citizens (*demand side*) but also on the level of political parties (*supply side*). Studying current protests in Turkey and Spain from party politics view, this research also maintains that party democracy model is experiencing a crisis, leading to mass protests in each case. On the one hand, each country's major parties fail to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility creating mass disaffection from party democracy. The major force behind these demonstrations, on the other hand, has been sophisticated voters that are end products of social and political modernisation experienced in each case, leading to citizens' withdrawal from the conventional processes of representation.

Needless to say, drawing clear-cut boundaries between two processes – demand and supply sides of party decline- is hardly possible in that most often citizens and parties construct and reconstruct one another. In this section, first, the ways in which the literature on advanced industrial democracies approach party decline will be analysed from citizens' side. Here we will also try to delineate whether similar processes experienced in cases under examination, and then the notion of crisis of representation will be clarified on the basis of party side. In the second part, the ways in which this research will operationalise this notion will also be discussed.

2.3.1. Citizen Disaffection with Party Government

As turnout in elections, party membership, party identification, and trust in parties have all experienced steady decline, several studies argue that there is a widespread disaffection with the processes of representation based on party democracy model and partisan decline is apparent in most of advanced industrial democracies (see Dalton, 2003). The argument is that particularly at the individual level, citizens have clearly demonstrated their disaffection with and expressed their doubts about parties and the party government (Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996). In line with these developments, not only trusts in political parties but also satisfaction with the democratic processes have decreased extensively in almost all advanced industrial democracies (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Norris, 1999).

According to Dalton (2000), the concept of partisanship or party identification has been one of the most important determinants of political behaviour. This is so mainly because citizens tend to associate themselves psychologically with a political party and this association and/or identification in return determines their perceptions about, evaluations of and actions towards political parties and party system (Campbell et al., 1954). Therefore, there are critical functions of partisanship in the working of democratic politics: Partisanship organises mechanism for the voter's political evaluations (see Borre and Katz, 1973, Miller, 1976), provides voters with information short-cuts in understanding functioning of politics (Downs,

1957), mobilises voters and makes it easier for voters to understand political issues and make political judgements (Dalton, 2000).

However, since 1970s the decline in partisanship has started to be observed both among publics of the US and several European countries (see Abramson, 1976; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Beck & Jennings, 1991; Craig, 1985; Crewe& Denver, 1985; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Nie et al., 1993; Wattenberg, 1981). Although in the beginning this trend was associated with specific circumstances of the nation that experiences partisan decline, towards the mid-1980s and in the 1990s it has become clear that partisan dealignment in advanced industrial democracies can be generalised and this development mainly results from social and political modernisation that take place in these democracies (Dalton, 2000; see also Dalton, 1984; Dalton et al., 1984). According to Dalton (2000: 23), "we are witnessing a broad and ongoing decline in the role of political parties for contemporary publics." He maintains that rising education levels, the growth of mass media, and proliferation of non-governmental organisations and interest groups have all challenged the dominant position of parties in democratic politics (2000: 22). While increased education levels have created much sophisticated voters that do not need information short-cuts provided by political parties, mass media has replaced parties as sources of political information. As asserted by Dalton (2000: 29), contemporary electorate has access to all sorts of information and therefore now they are much capable of managing "the complexities of politics on their own, without recourse to the political cues that partisanship

provides." In other words, he claims that cognitive mobilisation which refers to the process by which citizens acquire skills and resources necessary to engage in politics without external cues has replaced party mobilisation (Dalton, 1984). On the other hand, rising number of social and political groups provide new avenues of participation and citizens in advanced industrial democracies find it much easier to engage with non-governmental organisations and/or interests groups that are better equipped to respond diversified and individualised demands of public. Due to the individual and cultural transformations (Warren, 2003: 225), in these societies the individuals have become more reflexive meaning that they are more concerned with life-choices all of which makes demands much more individualised in contrast to collective demands (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1991; Habermas, 1990). Particularly in the OECD countries, for instance, on average, the citizens are;

> more interested in controlling their futures, more attentive to and critical of government performance, less deferential to authority, and more likely to participate in the domains most salient to their life-chances (Warren, 2003: 225; see also Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999).

Therefore, not only in the US but also in Europe non-party social and political organisations representing particularised interests such as women's movement, consumer groups, environmental movements, and human rights movements have all challenged the prioritised position of political parties in the processes of political participation (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).

Indeed, several studies track trends in party decline among citizenry through looking at data on party identification, the party membership scores, turnout levels and the levels of trust in political parties all of which experiencing decline in advanced industrial democracies (see 2000). However, although these scores might be useful for measuring partisan disaffection in these democracies such as Britain, Denmark, Germany, the US or Canada, wherein socio-economic development has started to take place much earlier, downward trend in these scores might not be experienced at the same pace in relatively new democracies such as Turkey and Spain. Accordingly, when we analyse the same data on Turkey and Spain what is observed is that contrary to advanced industrial democracies, these scores remains to be relatively high. For instance, party membership scores are still moderately high in that the membership density, indicating parties' capacity to penetrate its own electorate, in both countries is around 7% and the party identification scores are on average higher than 60% (Yardimci-Geyikci, 2015). Moreover, turnout in elections is on average around 70% in Spain and more than 80% in Turkey for the last ten years (2015).

However, though there is certain level of persistent interest in party politics, at the subjective and behavioural levels citizenry has started to demonstrate their dissatisfaction from representative politics. Similar processes of social and political modernisation together with cognitive mobilisation also take place in newer democracies. In both cases, for instance, trust in political parties is very low and majority of people have low

trust in political parties (64% in Turkey and 52% in Spain).[3] Much more importantly, in each case widespread protests and popular mobilisations throughout the country leading to the occupation of public spaces calling for direct democracy have indicated at the behavioural level that there is a clear disaffection with the conventional processes of representative politics. In these protests majority of protestors are actually better-educated and politically sophisticated as it is the case in advanced industrial democracies. Therefore, it can be argued that though the data on party identification or party membership remains high, there are sufficient subjective and behavioural indicators that give first signs of citizen disaffection from politics. However, the contention here is that although cognitive mobilisation has played a role in creating dissatisfied public with politics, major factor behind disaffection, according to this research, is the crisis of representation resulted from party failures rather than partisan dealignment which is not experienced at the same pace with that of advanced industrial democracies in cases under examination.

2.3.2. Crisis of Representation

As is discussed above, the decline of partisanship has also been related to party failures to fulfil their critical functions. Providing the party-side of the

---

[3] In the survey, the respondents were asked 'How much do you personally trust in political parties?' Low trust refers to the total percentage of respondents who chose from 0 to 3 on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (complete trust).

story, Mair argues that the failings of political parties play the key role in the process of citizens' withdrawal from political processes (Mair, 2005; 2002; 2013). Here we will first look at the ways in which party failings are explicated in the literature and then this conceptualisation will be readapted in order to account for the rising mass disaffection among publics of Turkey and Spain.

Several studies have argued that the rising levels of professionalization in contemporary parties (see Katz and Mair, 1995; Scarrow, 1999) have detached parties from civil society turning them into a state apparatus. Actually, tracing historical stages of party organisational change and its implications on party democracy, Katz and Mair (1995) argued that after 1970s cartel parties emerged as the key model of party organisation and this model have had detrimental effects on the functioning of party democracy. Cartel party, different from its predecessors, is characterised by the interpenetration of party and state in that parties are extremely reliant on public funding. Moreover, party competition is based on managerial skills and efficiency, election campaigns are capital-intensive and professionalised and much importantly party membership has lost its privileged status: members and non-members have similar rights with limited or no obligations, and party members are considered individuals rather than organised body with only function of legitimation (1995). They define representation style under cartel parties as "agents of states". Katz and Mair (1995) argue that the problem with cartel party model is that the

parties have lost their link with society and therefore decisions are taken by elites with limited or no public involvement in policy-making processes. Consequently,

> …democracy ceases to be seen as a process by which limitations or controls are imposed on the state by civil society, becoming instead a service provided by the state for civil society (1995: 22).

As discussed in the previous sections, the major function of political parties is to link society to state and to carry society's demands to governmental decision-making and their representative role is legitimised as long as they fulfil this function. When they turn into agents of state, they fail to perform their core role in the functioning of democracy.

Mair maintains that the problem goes beyond cartel party model in that in contemporary Europe the party government model as a whole is under challenge (Mair, 2008). He suggests that due to convergence of political parties in ideological terms, declining electoral cohesion and failure of parties to bridge the gap between responsiveness and responsibility, citizens have withdrawn from traditional forms of representation (Mair, 2005; 2008; 2013). The ideological polarisation has decreased and parties have reached a kind of centrist consensus since more or less they start to realise that they are bound by the same parameters of policy-making and they have similar commitments in government (Mair, 2008: 216). In other words, the difference between left and right has lost its salience in terms of

policy proposals with the end of embedded liberalism (Scharpf, 2000) and more importantly governments lost their control over the economy with a view of redistribution (Scharphf, 1997). Therefore, political parties converged in the ideological spectrum and they all become alike with almost no difference with regards to policy proposals. This is particularly problematic in today's world wherein citizen demands are highly individualised and fragmented (Franklin et al., 1992).

Under these circumstances, when citizens look at the party system, they could not see any alternatives which could transfer their demands to policy-making processes. Moreover, since traditional cleavages that are based on class divisions lost their salience, political preferences have experienced further diversification, leading to decline in class voting around Western Europe (Knutsen, 2006). According to Mair (2008), subsequently decline in electoral cohesion has also made it much difficult for parties to aggregate and mobilise different interests in society.

All these developments in return have meant that parties today are unable to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility. Although they might be considered responsible in the sense that they are extremely professionalised and try to govern under constrained circumstances thanks to globalisation and Europeanisation processes, they lost their responsiveness. In other words, as responsibility has become much complicated thanks to the commitment of governments to international and

global constraints, acting responsive to public opinion has become all the more challenging (Mair, 2009). As Mair (2009: 16) suggests,

> ...the constraints on government have become much greater, the ability to respond to voters has been much curtailed, and the parties' capacity to use their political and organisational resources to bridge or even manage the resulting gap [between responsiveness and responsibility] has become severely limited.

Analysing only Western European party systems, Mair provides only one-side of the story. So he problematizes party failures to act responsively to the demands of population in advanced industrial democracies which in turn results in a democracy lacking popular component. However, he disregards that crisis of representation might occur not only when parties cease to be responsive but also when they fail to act responsible.

Accordingly, defining representative democracy as a democratic form of representation in which voter chooses agents (political parties) to represent their interests in a democratic regime and in return parties as representatives (whether to be in government or in opposition) provide for both responsiveness and responsibility, the contention is that crisis of representation occurs when

> *1. Certain segments of society feel unrepresented and lose their trust in agents (political parties) in representing their interests*

2. They do not believe that their representatives are acting responsive and responsible at the same time.

Therefore, they negate the role of intermediates in policy-making processes and search for new ways of political participation such as mass demonstrations. This is what has happened in both cases under examination. On the one hand, in Spain according to the majority of the population, elections have failed to function as a mechanism for inclusive democratic representation which in turn has made people search for other ways of making their voices heard (Kselman, 2013). The disaffection with party system is mainly resulted from the prevalent two-party system in the country in which the PSOE and the PP are the key political players since the end of 1980s (see Hanley and Loughlin, 2006). Converging in the ideological spectrum towards the centre, it has become very difficult to distinguish the socialist PSOE from that of the right wing PP, and thus according to population at large two parties are alike (see Torcal et al., 2002), and therefore are unable to come up with alternative policy proposals. Moreover, due to accelerating processes of globalisation and Europeanisation, particularly after mid-1980s Spanish party governments failed to act responsive to public opinion but to broader commitments in global world. So parties enhance their responsible role neglecting responsiveness.

The case of Turkey, conversely, is profoundly different from that of Spain. The current structure of the party system suffers from high levels of

party system polarization. The ideological distance between the governing and the main opposition parties has been considerably wide, and since 2002 this gap has increased dramatically (Kalaycioglu, 2012; see also Baslevent 2009). In other words, voters systematically locate the CHP on the left of the spectrum and the AKP on the right and the gap between two parties are continuously expanding, creating an 'ideological abyss' in the party system (Kalaycioglu, 2012). In highly polarised party systems the electoral choices are limited to two poles of the political spectrum. When certain segments of the electorate are located at the centre or when they do not conform to existing parameters of party competition, they feel unrepresented and start to search for alternative ways of making their voices heard. Moreover, particularly in its third term, the AKP government has ceased to act responsible disregarding the demands of significant portion of population.

Consequently, while in Spain convergence of parties in ideological spectrum together with parties' enhancement of their responsible role at the expense of responsiveness have created a crisis of representation, in Turkey it is the opposite in that divergence of parties in ideological spectrum and enhancement of responsiveness led to a crisis. The argument here is that the popular protests in Turkey and Spain can be explicated within the framework of party failures. In both cases under examination a crisis of representation is experienced wherein important segment of society feel unrepresented, lose trust in political parties and cease to believe that parties are able to meet the

demands of responsiveness and responsibility at the same time so they search for new ways of making their voice heard at the governmental level.

2.4. Concluding remarks:

Throughout this chapter, the analytic framework of this research has been outlined. The research primarily deals with the question of why popular protests that received the support of significant portions of society both in Turkey and Spain take place. It conceives that the failure of political parties to meet the demands of democratic representation has made people search for other ways of making their voices heard and claims that crisis of representation is the major, if not the only, factor behind mass protests.

First of all, this chapter discussed the relationship between representation and democracy, referring to the notion of representation and the ways in which political parties are emerged as the key agents of representation. Herein, the forms and sequences of representation are identified as well as the processes of party domination over representative government have clarified. What is meant by democratic representation is clearly defined. Then, what kind of roles parties play in representative democracy is delineated and most importantly the paradox of representation under party government model is discussed through notions of responsibility and responsiveness. Following that, the processes of party decline both from

demand (citizens) and supply (political parties) sides are examined, referring to the literature on advanced industrial democracies. Here, a discussion on the extent to which same processes are experienced in newer democracies is also provided. Finally, the way this research conceptualises the concept of crisis of representation has been presented, suggesting that crisis of representation occurs not only when citizens feel unrepresented and lose their trust in parties but also when they do not believe that parties act in accordance with the demands of their constituents and/or on behalf of the general public interest.

To sum up, this research aims to provide a party politics account of mass protests in Turkey and Spain. Since I aim at analysing two dissimilar cases experiencing same political phenomenon, this research employ 'most-different systems design'. In the following chapters, first two cases will be examined separately providing a party politics' account of protests in each case and then we analyse two cases concurrently, discussing the implications of these protests on the future of democracy.

CHAPTER III

GEZI PARK PROTESTS: A PARTY POLITICS VIEW[4]

The widespread protests that shook Turkey in summer 2013 have prompted one central question: why did such small protests against the building of a shopping mall on Gezi Park in the centre of İstanbul turn into the biggest example of mass civil movement in the republic's history? There are several possible explanations behind these demonstrations. Some scholars have underlined Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's authoritarian policies, which aim at reshaping Turkish society on Islamic values and beliefs: such fears were further stoked by Erdoğan's election to the newly created presidency in August 2014 (Acemoglu, 2013; Eligur, 2013; İdem, 2013). Others have provided a post-Marxist view, arguing that the communal life created in "Gezi Park" has threatened not only the very neoliberal identity of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*, AKP) but also the government's heavy emphasis on "development" at the expense of

---

[4] An earlier version of this chapter has been published in *The Political Quarterly* Vol. 85(4), pp.445-453 under the title "Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: A Party Politics View".

everything else; consequently, the protests should be seen as part of a global revolt against commodification and authoritarianism (Gambetti, 2013; Igsız, 2013; Tugal, 2013). Less elaborate accounts, which have received widespread recognition among government circles, have approached the protests as an "international plot" against Erdoğan's government, whose economic successes are envied by foreign actors.

As it has been clarified in the previous chapter, this research links popular discontent to party failures, therefore, we suggest that following an analysis of the last decade of the Turkish party system, one can easily detect the signals of instability and social unrest in the country – long before these mass demonstrations took place. The contention is that the current political upheaval in the country results mainly from a crisis of representation experienced at two levels: on the one hand, a high degree of polarisation has left certain segments of society unrepresented, while on the other, since the AKP government has ceased to maintain the balance between responsiveness and responsibility, citizens lost their belief the government acts on behalf of the common or public good. In other words, this chapter is the first empirical chapter which not only provides a historical picture that led to a crisis of representation in the country but also applies the theoretical and analytical framework designed in the second chapter to the case of Turkey, demonstrating how this crisis experienced at two different levels actually takes place in the real cases.

A Brief Look into Gezi Park Protests

Everything started with small "sit-in at the park" protests organised by a group of environmentalists against a plan to demolish Gezi Park, one of the few remaining green areas in the city centre of İstanbul. On May 31st, 2013 the heavy-handed police pre-dawn crackdown on the protestors, deploying tear gas and water cannon as well as setting fire to the protestors' encampment, created huge popular outrage. In just a few hours the pictures and scenes of the police's excessive use of force against peaceful protestors were spread to the world through social media. In the following morning, thousands of people marched to Taksim Square to protest against the AKP-backed police violence, and these groups also faced brutal repression meted out by the police, who once again employed tear gas and water cannon.

Following these developments, on June 1st, millions of people throughout the country, including in major cities such as Ankara, İzmir, Bursa and Eskişehir, spontaneously gathered to protest not only against police violence but also against the AKP government's rising authoritarianism, which found expression through the prime minister's statement regarding his commitment to demolishing the park: "Whatever you do, we've made our decision and we will implement it". In the following days protestors took to the streets and called on the government to resign. From the 31st May several mass demonstrations took place in most of Turkey's 81 provinces which have involved more than two and a half million people. The police have continued

to use excessive force, which has led to the deaths of six civilians and one police officer, over 8,000 injuries and more than 3,000 arrests since the protests began (Amnesty International, 2013). After the protests, protestors continued to meet in parks to organise public forums through which they can discuss the way forward for these mass demonstrations.

The Gezi Park protests represent the most widespread spontaneous civil movement in the history of the country, and therefore analysing the major dynamics behind the protests is warranted, particularly because Turkey is portrayed as a model for democratic development in the region (see Aydınlı, 2013) and the troubles relating to this democracy illustrate the prospects and challenges for democracy in the Middle East as a whole. Moreover, placing aspects of this civil movement into a framework which suggests links between the protests and party politics has the potential to hint about the intricate relationship between old and new forms of political participation or between "normal and extraordinary forms of political action." (Isaac, 2013)

3.1. Party System in Turkey
3.1.1. The Last Decade under AKP Rule

In order to locate these protests in the context of party politics, it is first helpful to provide a brief synopsis of AKP rule over the last decade. The

elections of 2002, which marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics, created a political earthquake in the country (Carkoglu, 2002; Cagaptay, 2013). Turkish society at large punished the poor performance of the previous ruling and opposition parties by leaving them out of the game. Three parties in the coalition government, together with two opposition parties in Parliament, failed to pass the 10% threshold. As such, only two parties managed to enter Parliament: the AKP (see Tepe, 2005 for an analysis of the AKP) and the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP). While the AKP, under the leadership of Erdoğan, benefited from having a new and cleaner name aligned with a strong will to solve the problems of Turkey, the CHP made the most of its failure to pass the threshold in the previous General Election, as it turned out to be a chance for the party to escape responsibility for the 2001 economic crisis that affected all established political parties adversely.

Owing to the election threshold, the AKP managed to gain 66% of seats in Parliament with only 34% of the votes, and the CHP had 32% of seats with 19% of the total votes. Notwithstanding the election threshold, the results clarified that people were in search of new political options. Moreover, it became obvious that the electorate held centre-right parties, which more or less had ruled the country during the 1980s and '90s, responsible for political incompetence, social unrest and economic failure (se Carkoglu, 2002). Furthermore, the people at large believed in and were impressed by the transformation of political Islam into a conservative

democracy. Henceforth, while the AKP filled the vacuum that emerged in centre-right political practice, the CHP reserved the secular and leftist vote.

Following the election of the AKP, the European integration process gained fresh momentum. The new government managed to take advantage of windows of opportunity opened by the European integration process in two ways. First of all, there were high levels of public support for EU membership, so sustaining the pace of the reform process, the party succeeded in satisfying its electoral constituency and guaranteed staying in power. Secondly, a commitment to EU membership was more or less the survival strategy of the party in a hostile secular environment. Due to its Islamist background, the party had to prove that it did not have any covert agenda and support the further democratisation of the country in line with the long-lasting 'Westernisation' aspirations emanating from within Kemalist circles. In other words, the AKP government worked hard on the country's EU project, in order to secure its position domestically – and at pretty much any cost (Avcı, 2011; see also Cınar, 2006).

In order to fulfil EU requirements, from 2002 to 2005 the AKP government adopted various political reform packages which increased legal protection of the social, cultural and political rights of all Turkish citizens, irrespective of religious and ethnic origin, decreased the role of the military in Turkish politics and increased respect for the freedom of expression in the country (Muftuler-Bac, 2005; see also Gursoy, 2012). Accordingly, in 2004

the Commission recommended preliminary negotiations with Turkey, and in October 2005 official entry talks were finally launched between the EU and Turkey. However, after 2005 it became apparent that the AKP government had lost its initial enthusiasm and reformist zeal. Both endogenous and exogenous factors have triggered this shift in government's approach to the EU (see Avci, 2011; Duran, 2007; Ugur, 2010). Moreover, the legal reforms passed by the government stayed on paper and backup clauses remained in effect, limiting particularly the freedom of expression. This is why the major democracy reports still underline certain violations in Turkey of the freedom of expression, leading to self-censorship both within the media and academic world (Policy IV, 2010; Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2012; Freedom House, 2012).

In the early elections of 2007, the AKP enjoyed another landslide victory by garnering 47% of the entire vote. The CHP, on the other hand, received 21% of the vote, but this time two other parties also managed to enter Parliament: the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetci Hareket Partisi*, MHP), with 14% of the vote, and the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP), which bypassed the election threshold by nominating its candidates as independents.

In its second term, the AKP government became less concerned about the democratisation of the country and, according to Kalaycıoğlu (2011: 274), its focus turned inwards and towards consolidating its power via

"establishing full-scale control of all the autonomous agencies of the state, from the Central Bank, Radio and Television Supreme Council to the Council of Higher of Education and the rectors of public universities." Moreover, some have also argued that as the membership perspective lost its viability, the AKP government, which lacked a practical democratisation agenda independent of EU membership requirements, lost direction (Cinar, 2007).

In the 2011 General Election, defying the incumbency curse, the AKP once again managed to garner almost 50% of the vote, winning the elections for a third time in a row. Nevertheless, in its third term, and leaving aside any democratisation prospects, the AKP is now increasingly focused on consolidating its power, silencing any opposition and becoming extremely intolerant to any kind of dissent. According to many observers, Erdogan has a majoritarian understanding of democracy, in that he regards it solely in terms of an electoral mechanism which, he believes, gives him the right to rule in the name of the majority and do anything he likes, without any checks or balances (The Economist, 2013a). This is the reason why, since winning a third term in office, Erdogan has become much more authoritarian and autocratic – traits manifested in his explicit search for a way to redesign Turkish society in line with his Sunni Islamic beliefs (Jenkins, 2013).

For instance, within this period the government has introduced Koran classes for primary school pupils, revitalised Islamic clerical education in high schools and most recently restricted the sale of alcoholic beverages in

shops between 10pm and 6am and the advertisement of these products.

Moreover, through his domination of the political landscape, Erdogan has

indicated on several occasions his intentions to change the parliamentary

system and replace it with a presidential model, in which he will become the

president. Today, not only does the party, thanks to several constitutional

changes, manage to monopolise executive and legislative functions but AKP

nominees also fill the judiciary, the provinces are run by AKP people, big

state contracts are given to close AKP friends and associates and the media is

either controlled by obvious friends of the party or is too scared to express

independent views,[5] the result of which is pervasive self-censorship (The

Economist, 2013b). According to the most recent Committee to Protect

Journalists report, there are more correspondents in jail in Turkey than in

Iran and China, respectively (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013).

Conversely, within this period of time, the opposition party has been

relatively ineffectual. Since the 2002 General Election the CHP has been the

main opposition party (see Ayata and Ayata, 2011 for a detailed analysis of

the CHP), coming second after the AKP in three consecutive elections.

Particularly from 2002 to 2010, suspecting the AKP's Islamist pedigree and

as the founder of the republic, the CHP assumed a kind of guardianship role

and throughout this time sided with the forces of the establishment, namely

the military, the president and the Constitutional Court. Concerned with

---

[5] Most recently, leaked voice records between Erdogan and a top manager of a news channel showed "the reality of cencorship calls from the prime minister's office". See Gursel "Erdogan's Heavy Hand"

keeping the problem-ridden principle of "assertive secularism" (Kuru, 2006) intact, the party predicated its opposition on the regime question. Thus, the leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, did not refrain from siding with the military at critical junctures. Baykal's attitude played a critical role in polarising society between secularists and AKP supporters, particularly because he preferred to play identity politics. However, in 2010 the ultra-Kemalist Baykal was ousted and replaced by a social democratic figure, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Although Kılıçdaroğlu has also failed to combine the existing dissent from AKP rule into any form of united and effective opposition, under his leadership several changes have been experienced inside the party. For instance, most of the significant social democratic figures that were excluded under Baykal have returned to the CHP, and many important personalities that have the trust of the population have also joined the ranks.[6] Moreover, according to Finkel (2012), Kılıçdaroğlu has been struggling to change the CHP from a party that preoccupied with internal power struggles into one that now seeks to become a government through formulating practical policies and programs as well as addressing to the socio-economic problems county is facing. However, although the social-democratic strand headed by Kılıçdaroğlu himself currently controls the leadership of the party, the CHP still appears chaotic thanks to the persistence of several different factions within the party, including Kemalists, social democrats and liberals.

---

[6] Among these figures we can name Safak Pavey, İlhan Cihaner, Rıza Türmen, Sezgin Tanrıkulu as examples.

The other two opposition parties that found representation in Parliament in the second and third periods of AKP rule are the MHP (the Turkish Nationalist Party) and the Peace and Democracy Party (*Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP), the Kurdish Nationalist Party. For the last two elections, the vote share between the MHP and BDP has more or less stabilised, forcing them to play mainly a balancing role in relation to one another. Whilst the MHP appeals to anti-EU and anti-Kurdish nationalist sentiments, the BDP has turned into the major representative of the Kurdish population in the country.[7] However, since both parties' support is based on the nationalist votes, they have also fallen short of moulding social dissent into vigorous opposition to the government through effective alternative policy proposals.

In short, on the opposition front, while the CHP could not go beyond defending the nationalist secularist ideology of the Turkish state particularly from 2002 to 2010, the MHP and the BDP have been trapped into ethnic politics. Accordingly, the failure of opposition parties to provide reliable alternatives has turned the AKP into the major political force within the country. Although this trend has started to reverse in the presidential elections of 2014 and general elections of 2015 as the People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), a sprinter of Kurdish movement

---

[7] Although the AKP also manages to appeal to the Kurdish population, receiving a considerable amount of votes from the southeast region (Polat, 2008), in both the 2009 local elections and the 2011 General Elections, the BDP succeeded in surpassing the votes of the AKP. Particularly in 2011, the BDP received 50.8% of the votes cast in 12 southeast provinces, whereas the AKP only garnered 37.37% of the vote in the same region (Satana, 2012).

with national focus, has increased its appeal, the party was not a critical actor of the political opposition before the Gezi protests.

Before analysing how high levels of polarisation, together with a lack of a plausible opposition and the government's inability to act responsibly, created the crisis of representation in the country, which has been one of the central reasons behind the recent upheaval, it is necessary to delineate the Turkish party system in the 2000s.

3.1.2. Turkish Party System in the 2000s

Since the 2002 elections, the moderate pluralism of the 1980s and '90s, in which each major tendency was represented by two parties, has shifted into a predominant party system in which the AKP is stronger than all other parties. Sartori defines dominant party systems as those in which one party is capable of winning three consecutive elections with a 10 percentage point spread between the leading and the other parties in the system (Sartori, 1976). Winning the last three elections in a row by outscoring all the other parties, the AKP qualifies as the dominant party and makes the country's political landscape a predominant party system (see Carkoglu, 2012; Gumuscu, 2013). Within this system, each ideological grouping is represented only by one party – the centre-right is represented by the AKP,

the centre-left by the CHP, the extreme right by the MHP and the extreme left by the BDP.

High volatility and high fragmentation have been the major features of electoral politics in Turkey since the 1970s (Tursan, 2004). Particularly during the 1990s, according to Sayari (2007: 204), party system fragmentation, unstable electoral bases and power struggles between and within parties, together with incapable coalitional governments, created a more or less scattered party system wherein political power was significantly dispersed. In this sense, the landslide election victory of the one-year-old AKP in 2002 gave the first sign of the crystallisation of ideological groupings.

Table 3.1: Programmatic/ Policy Platforms (2002-2011)*

BDP	CHP	AKP	MHP
Ethnic Kurdish Nationalist	(Strictly) Secularist	Passive Secularist	Ethnic Turkish Nationalist
Strong Support for the EU	Qualified Support for the EU	Qualified Support for the EU	Euro-sceptic
East and South-eastern Anatolia	Western and coastal provinces	Whole country but coastal provinces	Central Anatolia

*This classification is based on Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2007)'s work but has been readapted.

Since then, these four political parties have consolidated their positions in the political system in terms of both programmatic/policy platforms and electoral support (Table 3.1). Analysing the election results from 2002 onwards, this trend can clearly be observed. Table 3.2 shows the main

indicators of election results for the four parties[8] for the last three elections. Looking at sheer numbers, three conclusions can be drawn: increasing turnout levels, a rise in the AKP and CHP's number of votes, together with vote shares, and the stabilisation of votes for the MHP and the BDP, especially in the last two elections. The first remarkable observation is the relatively high turnout levels, which dropped to 79% in 2002 but gradually rose to 83%, which points to the resilient interest in politics, even in times of disaffection in European democracies. Another striking point is the steady increase in the raw number of votes for the AKP and the CHP, both of which have almost doubled their vote counts. One of the reasons behind this development is the natural increase in the number of registered voters; however, much more importantly, as Carkoglu (2012: 48) correctly argues, this rise can be attributed to the steady meltdown of electoral support for the previous centre-right parties. Finally, for the last two elections the vote share for both the MHP and BDP has more or less stabilised in the sense that both parties managed to garner similar amounts of votes in two consecutive elections.

---

[8] For the case of the BDP, votes won by independents refer to the party's votes, since in order to escape the high 10% election threshold level in the 2007 and 2011 General Elections, the party nominated its candidates as independents. Whilst for the 1999 elections we provide the HADEP's votes, for the 2002 elections independents refer to the DTP's votes, both of which were predecessors of the BDP.

Table 3.2: Results of the General Election of Representatives 1999-2011

		1999	2002	2007	2011
Participation rate (%)		87.1	79.1	84.2	83.2
Adalet ve KalkınmaPartisi Justice and Development Party	A	-	10 808 229	16 327 291	21 399 082
	B	-	34.3	46.6	49.8
	C	-	363	341	327
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Republican People's Party	A	2 716 094	6 113 352	7 317 808	11 155 972
	B	8.7	19.4	20.9	26.0
	C	-	178	112	135
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Movement Party	A	5 606 583	2 635 787	5 001 869	5 585 513
	B	18.0	8.4	14.3	13.0
	C	129	-	71	53
Bağımsızlar Independents	A	1 482 196	1 960 660	1 835 486	2 819 917
	B	4.7	6.2	5.2	6.6
	C	-	-	26	35

A. Votes received B. Rate of vote C. Number of representatives

Source: Turkish Statistical Institution (TUIK)

Accordingly, in the past decade, all four main parties have more or less stabilised their positions. Although one may argue that 10 years is hardly sufficient time to come to the conclusion that these parties have managed to entrench their places in the system, keeping in mind the fact that they represent the major socio-cultural and political tendencies rooted in the 1960s, and that they are the end results of enduring political experiences, the implications are clear. Looking at the results of the last three General Elections, the AKP managed to win three consecutive times by increasing its vote share extensively. The CHP, on the other hand, has strengthened its position as the main opposition party. Whilst the MHP has Turkish nationalist sentiments, the BDP has been the major representative of the

Kurdish population. Consequently, each faction in the longstanding socio-cultural cleavages of Turkish politics has finally found representation via a single political party for the first time in Turkish political history.

Figure 3.1: Fractionalization and Volatility of Electoral Support in Turkey Source: Author's calculation; for measuring fractionalisation we use Rae's (1967) fractionalisation index; for electoral volatility Pedersen's (1979) index has been employed; and for the effective number of parliamentary parties are measured by using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) method in which the proportion of seats for each party is squared and then summed, and the inverse of this provides the effective number of parties.

Needless to say, this development has served to diminish the high levels of fragmentation in the system. Moreover, since 2002, electoral volatility scores, which show the electorate's tendency to stick with the same party or move to another (Pedersen, 1979), have also experienced a steady decline, together with fractionalisation (Figure 3,1). Besides these factors, especially for the last three elections, the number of effective parties has also stabilised.

Accordingly, two of "the three maladies of the Turkish party system", (Ozbudun, 1981: 74; see also Ozbudun, 2000) namely volatility and fragmentation, have finally been cured, which has assisted the stabilisation of the parties in the system but not the system as a whole.

There are two major reasons behind this result; on the one hand, as political parties have entrenched their position as representatives of particular social groups with a focus on particular issue dimension, the third malady, polarisation, has deepened significantly and has ultimately created a huge gap in the party system. On the other hand, particularly from 2002 to 2010, the party leadership preferred to follow a political strategy based on ossifying constituencies through polarising discourse and by delegitimising the opposition. Both factors have led to unprecedented levels of polarisation.

3.2. Crisis of Representation in Turkey and Gezi Protests
3.2.1. Identifying the Gap in Turkish Politics: Polarised Competition

From the early years of the republic, the major socio-cultural cleavages of Turkish politics have been determined by attitudes towards religion (Sunni-Islam versus secularism) and ethnicity (Kurdish versus Turkish ethnicity), which in turn have also described left-right self-placements (Kalaycioglu, 2010 :31). Whilst secularists tend to place themselves on the left, Sunnis have placed themselves on the right of the political spectrum (Kalaycioglu, 2008:

308-312). On the other hand, Kurdish ethnic nationalists tend to place themselves on the extreme left and Turkish nationalists on the extreme right (2008: 309). In other words, not only economic divisions but also socio-cultural cleavages determined by attitudes towards religion and ethnicity tend to determine the self-placement of the voters on a left-right dimension. Therefore, the left-right continuum denotes more than economic cleavages and has strong explanatory power in understanding the nature of party system competition in Turkey. Figure 3.2 presents the overall left-right self-placement of the voters between 2002 and 2010.

Figure 3.2: Placement of the Political Parties on the Left-Right Spectrum by the Turkish Voters (2002-2010) (Source: Kalaycioglu, 2012)

As can be seen from Figure 3.2, the ideological distance between the governing and the main opposition party, CHP, is noticeably wide, and since 2002 this gap has increased dramatically 3.8 to 5.8, indicating a rising level of polarisation. In other words, voters systematically locate the CHP on the left of the spectrum and the AKP on the right and the gap between the two parties is continuously expanding, creating an "ideological abyss" in the party system (Kalaycioglu, 2012). Similarly, although it is more stable, even the distance between the MHP and the BDP is widening. This data can also be supported by a recent study which has also indicated that high levels of polarisation has been the defining characteristic of Turkish electorate (see Baslevent, 2009), and there is a highly polarised and widening ideological spread along both religious and ethnic dimensions in the Turkish party system. Consequently, although after 2002 the fragmentation of the party system diminished, owing to enduring structural problems within the regime, the crystallisation of party politics did not end polarisation but actually raised it to new heights.

Figure 3.3: Placement on Turkey's Left-Right Spectrum, World Values Survey 1990-2007

Source: Tepe 2013, World Values Survey 1990-2007

Although polarisation between parties has always been a facet of Turkish politics, never before the 2002 elections had the boundaries between different ideological groups been so sharp and severe. A closer look at overall trends in the 1990-2007 World Values Survey Data also demonstrates the peculiarity of Turkey's current polarisation levels (Figure 3.3). While in 1990, 40% of respondents placed themselves at the political centre, this score dropped to as low as 13% in 2007, while the percentage of those who placed themselves to the right increased from 16% to 36% (Tepe, 2013). Much more interestingly, World Values Survey shows that total percentage of those who chose 1 and 10, the most extreme positions, has increased from 12% in 1990 to 24% in 2007, so almost one fourth of the electorate is located at the extremes (World Values Survey, 1990-2007). Moreover, with the exception of the 1960s and 1970s, when high levels of polarisation brought the country to

the brink of civil war, the party leadership had always found ways of reconciliation under critical circumstances – the DYP-SHP coalition in 1991, the DYP-RP coalition in 1996 and the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition after the 1999 general elections exemplify this trend. In other words, the centrifugal driver that defines mass population was never reflected at the elite level as much as today. This is mainly because both Erdoğan and Baykal had a political strategy based on ossifying their constituency through polarising and dividing the electorate based on political expediency.

High levels of party system polarisation have already been problematised in the literature, arguing that polarisation might intensify ideological debates, impair the legitimacy of the regime and destabilise the party system (Dalton, 2008: 902). Moreover, high polarisation might also increase further radicalisation over time among leaders and supporters alike, which is detrimental to democratic consolidation (Morlino, 1998: 349; Yardimci-Geyikci, 2015). However, although the negative effects of extreme polarisation for party systems – and thus for democracy – have been underlined, limited attention has been paid to the problems that arise as a result of the electorate losing faith in processes of representation in polarised party systems.

3.2.2. Unrepresented Citizens: Responsiveness Overriding Responsibility

As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, the party government model suggests that political parties are the key agents of representation which provide a linkage between public and political decision-makers (Dalton et al., 2011; see also Katz, 1987; Ranney, 1954); therefore, representation is one of the most critical functions of political parties oriented towards the electorate, and it is the key way through which people's demands find expression (Randall and Svasand, 2002). However, as clarified in the theoretical framework, representation involves not only popular control of the government through periodic and competitive elections but also requires providing "for both responsiveness and responsibility in the conduct of government" (Birch, 2007: 140). In other words, defined as "acting in the best interest of the public" (Manin et al., 1999: 2) or as "acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin, 1967), political representation involves the requirement not only to satisfy supporters of the party in government but also to act in a consistent and prudent fashion in public policymaking. As a result, ensuring responsible government requires addressing the wishes and interests of the general public (Birch, 2007: 140). Essentially, according to Mair, the key to legitimising a representative government in a democratic political system is that the representative and governing functions should develop within one agency, namely a political party (Mair, 2008). In other words, in order to legitimise their position, parties are required to balance the demands of responsiveness and

responsibility. Therefore, as argued before, when assessing whether representative democracy works properly, it is important to analyse both voter-party congruence looking at whether parties provide policy alternatives in a wider ideological spectrum and the extent to which all groups in society are represented and to discuss whether the government is acting both responsively and responsibly in its approach to public policy-making. Only then can the viability of representative politics be judged.

However, particularly in unconsolidated democracies, high levels of polarisation among elites and masses alike can lead to a crisis of representation on two levels. On the one hand, in highly polarised party systems the electoral choices are limited to two poles of the political spectrum, creating a huge gap in the ideological spectrum. From this perspective, a high degree of party system polarisation might leave unrepresented certain segments of the electorate that are located at the centre and conform to neither pole of the party system, or the ones that are not satisfied with the existing parameters of politics. Conversely, when polarisation among the general public is manifested at the elite level leading to uncompromising attitudes, the divisions in society also become more pronounced, which in turn forces political parties – whether in office or in opposition – to respond only to their own constituencies. However, it should be the role of party government to preserve a balance between the demands of responsiveness and responsibility (2008: 10). As clarified before, the contention of this research is that crisis of representation occurs not only

when certain segments of society feel unrepresented, but also when citizens do not believe that their representatives are acting on behalf of the common or public good.

Fundamentally, this is what has happened in Turkey. On the one hand, severe polarisation has created a huge gap in the party system, and this gap has left unrepresented certain segments of society some of which identify themselves with centre politics while others are not satisfied at all with the ethnically and religiously defined parameters of left-right spectrum, particularly better-educated, politically sophisticated and economically sustainable voters. In other words, recent economic growth and development over the last eleven years have created new electoral constituencies, the urban middle-class, which cut across existing ethnic and religious cleavage structures. The major characteristics of this group are high educational status, relative economic security and stable employment, and they do not anymore feel to be represented by politics based on ethnicity and religiosity.

The preponderance of Gezi activists sharing these characteristics was well-documented by a research project conducted among the protesters during the early days of demonstrations.[9] According to this research, 35% of the protestors were high school graduates, 43% had university degrees and 13% had post-graduate degrees, while the population averages for Turkey

---

[9] Although the KONDA survey is by no means a perfect data, it is still one of the very few research conducted during the protests. Therefore it provides an important instrument to understand the profile and demands of the protestors.

are 25%, 13% and 1%, respectively. Moreover, 52% of the protestors enjoyed stable employment. Here it has to be acknowledged that the Gezi protests were first initiated by students along with elements from other groups with which the middle classes form alliances. Most important among them are university students (37%), retired people (3%), housewives (2%) and unemployed youth (6%), who are identified as "peripheral or decommodified groups" (Offe, 1985: 834). According to an online survey conducted by two academics from Bilgi University, 81.2% of protestors define themselves as "libertarian" and 64.5 % as "secular" (Taraf, 2013). Similar to new social movements of the late 1960s,[10] this new middle class is concerned more with individual autonomy, freedom of expression, pluralism, respect and basic rights and liberties than with economic development. According to the KONDA survey, when the protestors were asked what their demands were, 34.1% stated freedom, 18.4% suggested that they were there for their rights, 9.7% were against dictatorship and 8% wished for democracy and peace.

Accordingly, their political alternatives conform neither to the Kemalist strand of the CHP nor to the Islamic AKP or nationalist MHP but instead link to individual autonomy. In other words, this new urban educated mass is simultaneously fed up with the AKP's authoritarianism and with inefficient opposition forces. Ethnic and religious politics do not respond to the demands of this new constituency, which falls in the centre of the party

---

[10] See Offe "New Social Movements"

system both in terms of economic and socio-cultural cleavages, and therefore none of the existing parties are capable of representing it accordingly.

Conversely, particularly since the 2011 General Election, the focus of government in its third term has turned inwards and it appears to be preoccupied with satisfying its Islamic constituency at the expense of the general public. Although in its first term the government's representativeness was questionable (after the 2002 General Election the AKP controlled 66% of seats in Parliament with only a 34% share of the vote), by acting responsibly – namely by maintaining the EU process at pace, achieving macroeconomic stability with low inflation, a low budget deficit and stable exchange rates, and by sustaining economic development – the AKP government managed to appeal to a broader segment of society, the centre-right, the centre and the Islamic constituency. Within this period, by applying prudent and consistent political and economic policies,[11] the AKP government managed to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility. This was one of the major reasons behind the consolidation of AKP's predominant position (Gumuscu, 2013).

---

[11] Here it has to be acknowledged that several scholars argue that the AKP government's democratization agenda was more of a survival strategy against hostile secular establishment, lacking genuine commitment to democratization (Cizre "Understand Erdogan"). This also applies to the economy. According to Gurkaynak and Boke (2013) the AKP government's success in economic policy was related to government's strict commitment to IMF programme and there is no consistent economic policy developed by the AKP independent of the IMF programme.

However, in its current third term, the government has started to show signs of losing its command over the cross-ideological coalition. Relations with the EU have reached stalemate, and almost no progress has been made since the opening of accession negotiations (see Ugur, 2010). As for the economy, the average growth rate of Turkish output, which had been 7.2% in the 2002-2006 periods, decreased to 3.5% between 2007 and 2012, thus highlighting a serious shortcoming (Gurkaynak and Boke, 2013). Much more importantly, Prime Minister Erdogan's statements and the policies followed by the government have clearly demonstrated the government's intentions toward Islamic social engineering. For instance, at the beginning of 2012, Erdogan stated clearly that "we want to raise a religious youth" (Hurriyet, 2012).

During this period, he has asked families to have at least three children, spoken out against abortion, reprimanded TV series for insulting Ottoman history and publically announced that anyone who drinks alcohol is a "drunkard" (Karaveli, 2013). In practice, the AKP government under Erdoğan has not refrained from introducing policies that invade people's privacy, such as prohibiting the sale of alcohol, introducing Koran classes for primary school pupils and the revitalisation of Islamic clerical education in high schools. Even after the Gezi protests, during which social disaffection with the government's social engineering became apparent, Erdoğan made a statement about his distaste for student homes where male and female students live together, instructing authorities to inspect these houses

(Radikal, 2013). Aiming to enhance his vote share, Erdoğan has also continued to use a polarising discourse, referring to his own constituency as "we" and others as "they", the most apparent example of which is his statement during the Gezi Park protests directed at the protestors and warning them against taking political dispute onto the streets: "There is 50 per cent and we can barely keep them at home. But we have called on them to calm down" (The Guardian, 2013b). All in all, the government has started to ignore the demands of an important segment of society which tends to define itself as libertarian and secular, not only by attacking lifestyles and impoverishing social life but also by neglecting these demands when making policy. In other words, by excluding the "other" half of the population who do not vote for the AKP, the government has moved from its responsible governing role and instead enhanced its representative role, particularly for the Islamic community. This also explains why the protests happened then and not earlier.

Although very little is known about how protestors approach political parties, a few surveys hint at the crisis of representation – or at least signs heading in that direction – and a demand for new politics. According to the results of polls conducted by Konda and the Istanbul Bilgi University with Gezi Park protesters, more than half of the respondents are either indecisive regarding which party to vote for or do not intend to vote (KONDA, 2013) and 70% of protestors do not feel close to any political party (Taraf, 2013). A significant proportion of respondents (37%) indicate their demands for the

establishment of a new political party. Moreover, the protests have spawned a new party: the Gezi Party (Kazim, 2013). Although the success of the party has no stake in the political structure whatsoever, attempts to establish a new political party clearly indicated strong disaffection with the existing parties. The long-term impact of the movement on Turkish politics at large, in particular on electoral politics, will be discussed in the fourth chapter. But here it is sufficient to note that before the Gezi Park protests there had been growing dissatisfaction from the ways in which politics function in Turkey, particularly among the educated, politically sophisticated and economically sustainable voters. And this disaffection found expression in the Gezi Park protests.

Subsequently, the contention is that accounting for the sources of the Gezi protests also requires a careful analysis of the party system of the last decade, which has significant explanatory power. From this perspective, one of the root causes of recent events is the current structure of the party system, which suffers from a high degree of polarisation which in turn leads to a crisis of representation at two levels. On the one hand, no party is capable of filling the acutely growing gap in the Turkish party system, thus leaving an important segment of society unrepresented. Conversely, by responding to only one pole of the political spectrum in its third term, the AKP government has failed to maintain the balance between responsiveness and responsibility, therefore losing prudence and consistency in governing the country.

3.3. Implications for Party System and Democracy in Turkey

The Gezi protests, in which individuals from different backgrounds – anti-capitalist Muslims, hard-line secularists, Kurdish nationalists, Turkish nationalists, Alevis, environmentalists, gay and lesbian groups – stood against the government, side by side and regardless of their identity, have highlighted the first signs of the transformation of Turkish politics formerly shaped dominantly by ethnic and religious cleavages. These groups, composed mostly of the urban educated masses, are no longer satisfied with an ethnically and religiously polarised party system and they demand new politics that evolve around greater democratisation of the country with respect to individual freedoms and civil rights rather than identity. Furthermore, they ask for a government that is capable of maintaining 'responsibility' in governing. Even just after the protests it has become clear that Gezi will have significant repercussions for the future of both the party system and democratic politics at large. In this section rather than focusing on the actual impact of Gezi on Turkish party system and politics at large which will be examined in chapter four, we provide a picture of Turkish party system back then and discuss the direction that Gezi movement has pointed for the future of Turkish democracy.

3.3.1. Turkish Party System

First of all, the inability of political parties to represent the urban educated mass, and the failure of government to act responsibly, have signified the urgent need either for a new opposition party or effective policy changes in the existing ones. Clearly, existing parameters of Turkish politics do not respond to the demands of this politically sophisticated, economically sustainable urban group. The prospects of a new political party seemed to be low thanks to strict electoral rules and regulations, most important of which is the 10% electoral threshold.

On the other hand, just after the protests the prospects of change in the existing parties also had very low probability. First, the AKP's reaction was extremely harsh and the party denied any link with the movement. The reaction of Erdogan to the Gezi protestors, insisting that their actions were instigated by foreign forces that envy the "Turkish economic miracle," and naming them as terrorists and/or traitors (Bloomberg, 2013), demonstrated the clear inability of the AKP to hear the voices of the disaffected population, let alone respond to their demands. As for the MHP and the BDP, both parties were stuck in ethnic politics. In the first days of the protests, the leader of the MHP, Bahceli, did not refrain from forming a direct link between the Gezi protests, the PKK and the Kurdish opening process (Haber 7, 2013). Although later he changed his tone and criticised the government for not hearing the demands of the masses and for using excessive police force, he continued to

express his disapproval of the demonstrations, claiming that MHP youth did not participate in the protests and will not do so (Milliyet, 2013a). The reaction of the party clearly indicates the limits of the MHP in going beyond ethnicity-based politics (see Onis, 2003 for a detailed analysis of the MHP). The BDP, on the other hand, is ostensibly the representative of the Kurdish population in Turkey and is concerned more with the civil and political rights of Kurdish people. Although a prominent figure from the party, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, played a leading role in the first days of the Gezi Park protests by publicising the issue, as they became nationwide and attracted millions of people, the BDP preferred to remain aloof from the protests, suspecting that they would jeopardise peace talks launched between Abdullah Öcalan and the government. From this perspective, the BDP was also unable to respond the Gezi protests. The CHP's major predicament, on the other hand, was the strong hold of Kemalists, some of whom insist on old-style politics based on the regime question.

Although this was the general picture of political environment back then, things have changed in time. Particularly, the sprinter of the BDP, the HDP has turned into one of the main actors that try to capitalise the Gezi Park protests in that the party has built the foundation of its presidential and general election campaigns on the demands and expectations of Gezi movement. With the aim of turning into a party of Turkey and widening their electorate, the HDP has targeted disaffected voters of the Gezi protests and in doing so they adapted the discourse of Gezi which provided the HDP with

perfect means to become more than a regional actor. Conversely, the CHP has also interacted with the movement in that the party tried to go beyond ethnically and religiously polarised politics and also increase the participatory mechanisms in decision-making procedures inside the party. The ways in which Gezi movement has interacted with electoral politics will be discussed more in detail in chapter four.

3.3.2. Future of Democracy

Conversely, although many commentators have been rather quick to question the viability of Turkish democracy and the portrayal of the country as a model for the Middle East (see Al Arabiya, 2013; Sallam, 2013), it can be argued that the Gezi protests have marked a new threshold for democratic politics in the country (see also Gole, 2013). First of all, the emergence of a new generation of political activists, who take the initiative to express discontent and frustration with the government, is a highly favourable development for Turkish democracy which has been punctuated previously by several military interventions. Essentially, this has been a call for new forms of active citizenship and participatory democracy. Accordingly, the organisation of forums in the parks all around the country after the protests indicates very ably the inadequacy of electoral democracy in meeting the demands of a population which calls for greater participation. Secondly, the Turkish party system has suffered for a long period of time from ethnic and religious politics as a result of deep-seated socio-cultural divisions within

society. For the first time in republican history, society has clearly demonstrated its distaste for old-style politics, and this call from the population has the ability to heal the long-lasting malady of the Turkish party system: polarisation. Overall, although in the beginning the government's response to the protests has increased qualms about the quality of democracy in the country, just in two years of time Gezi protests have already started to redefine the parameters of Turkish politics. The very fact that the population at large has finally discovered active citizenship and is ready to question, oppose and criticise their political elites – both of which are major attributes of an advanced democracy- has gave positive signs about the future of Turkish democracy.

3.4. Conclusion:

This chapter has provided the first case study analysis of the research in that it accounted for Gezi Park protests in Turkey within the framework of party politics. In the first section, the dynamics of party system in Turkey has been discussed. Herein, a picture of Turkish party system in the last decade was delineated, arguing that party system has reached certain level of entrenchment. However, thanks to high levels of polarisation party system leaves certain segments of society unrepresented. Then, the nature of crisis of representation that takes place in Turkey is clarified. The large gap in Turkish politics leaving important portion of society unrepresented and the

ways in which the AKP government fails to meet the demands of responsibility were discussed, referring to the major events happened in recent years. Finally, the implications of the protest movement on Turkish party system and democracy have been discussed. The contention is that population at large tried to make their voices heard through unconventional means not only because they lost trust in representatives – political parties- and feel unrepresented but also because party in government has failed to fulfil its major function of providing for both responsiveness and responsibility in public policy-making, creating a crisis of representation in the country. The detailed analysis of the ways in which the Gezi movement has interacted with conventional politics will be provided in chapter four.

CHAPTER IV

15M MOVEMENT: A PARTY POLITICS VIEW

The *Indignados* movement or better known as *15M movement*[12] in Spain has been one of the first occupy-style mobilizations in Europe that has gained global visibility. Though several studies focused on the 15M movement as the leading protests that initiated many others, they tend to comprehend these protests within the confines of global economic crisis of 2008 which had significant repercussions on Spanish economy.

However, this research seeks to locate these protests within a wider party politics' view and to provide a political account of the protests. We argue that, as was the case in Turkey, in Spain the failure of parties to fulfil their role of balancing the demands of responsiveness and responsibility at the same time has been one of the major factors, if not the only one, behind the emergence of mass protests in the country. Following the general premises of this research, the contention is that political unrest and

---

[12] Name 15M comes from the date of first mass demonstrations, 15th of May 2011, which was followed up by occupation of Puerto del Sol.

widespread protests in Spain result mainly from a crisis of representation experienced at two different levels: on the one hand, convergence of political parties in the ideological spectrum has turned political contenders alike which in turn reduced their ability to respond wider segments of society, while on the other due to the pressures of globalization the governments' space of manoeuvre, whether to be led by the PSOE or the PP, has become limited, and therefore they lost touch with the electorate and become incapable of giving voice to the people, thus failing to fulfil their fundamental function of representation. This second empirical chapter also, first, provides the historical background and then demonstrates how crisis of representation occurs in actual case of Spain.

A Brief Look into 15M Movement

The *Indignados* movement or better known as *15M movement* in Spain has had important implications on the ways in which Spanish politics develop since then. Before discussing the factors behind these mass protests, a brief account of what happened in Spain will make it easier to comprehend the complex processes behind these mass protests.

In Spain particularly after 2008 global financial crisis, the population were largely affected by the housing bubble (Knight, 2012).[13] Suffering from a highly indebted banking sector, huge unemployment rate (rising up to 51.5% among youth), and high level of total deficit corresponding to 8.5% of the GDP (BBC, 2012) together with the failure of party system to respond the economic crisis effectively have created widespread popular disaffection in the country. In February 2011, university collectives were organised around a forum called "Youth without Future" (*Juventud Sin Futuro*) through social media outlets. On the other hand, in March 2011 an organization named "Real Democracy Now" (*Democracia Real Ya*) was founded by young people, who have proper jobs but also not sure about their future. Unsatisfied with the failure of democratic politics in including wider segments of population in decision-making processes, these two groups have organized a mass demonstration on 15th of May 2011 against the ineffective two party system, the corruption in the banking sector, and incapable trade unions (El Pais, 2011).

With the slogans "Real Democracy Now!" (¡*Democracia Real Ya!*), "They don't represent us!" (¡*Que No Nos Representan!*) and "We are not the puppets of politicians and bankers" (*No somos marionetas / mercancía en manos de políticos y banqueros),* the demonstrations received widespread popular support. The protests took place in several cities all around Spain

---

[13] Housing bubble refers to massive growth of real estate prices observed. Between 1996 and 2007, the prices of property tripled and after the bubble was popped they experienced steady decline leaving millions of over-indebted home-owners.

and more than six million people joined demonstrations (RTVE, 2011). Although the triggering factor behind the demonstrations seems to be the economic turbulence the country has been experiencing for the last couple of years and many analyses approach the question on the basis of the economic crisis, the underlying motive of protestors is also related to the long-lasting disaffection with the electoral politics. Basically, according to the majority of the population, elections have failed to function as a mechanism for inclusive democratic representation which in turn has made people search for other ways of making their voices heard (Kselman, 2013). Therefore, as the slogans of these protests such as '*no nos representa'* ('you don't represent us'), '*la lucha esta en la calle*' ('the struggle is in the street') and '*democracia real ya'* ('real democracy now') point, the political roots of the protests needs to be contextualised.

4.1. Party System in Spain

4.1.1. Politics in Spain since Transition

In order to understand the process by which mainstream political parties fail to fulfil their role of responding the demands of population at large, it is important to provide a brief look into the development of Spanish politics from democratic transition onwards.

With the end of the period of the Franco dictatorship in 1975, the process of democratic transition began in Spain. The process of democratic

transition in the country is defined as an elite-led transition which is mostly shaped by negotiation and consensus rather than intense competition and conflict (see Chari and Heywood, 2008; McLaren, 2008). The wide agreement on the rules of the game among different groups in Spain and high levels of political consensus in the absence of anti-system parties made constitutional settlement a smooth process (Pridham, 1990). Although the role of Juan Carlos, the King of Spain, should not be underestimated who has been an ardent supporter of the development of constitutional monarchy, the key actor of settlement was the governing party, the Union of Democratic Centre (*Union de Centro Democratico,* UCD) who led the country from 1977 to 1982. In the beginning, the UCD was an electoral coalition of the Christian democratic, social democratic, and liberal parties which in time evolved into a political party in the eve of 1977 elections. The UCD was led by Adolfo Suarez, a political figure with high levels of popularity among Spanish voters, who successfully managed to dismantle Franco's authoritarian regime. The UCD was "ideologically heterogeneous: its leaders included social democrats of the centre-left, Christian democrats of the centre-right and right, liberals advocating free-market economics and liberal social values, as well as others with more eclectic ideological predispositions" (Gunther and Hopkin, 2002: 201).

Suarez's major strategy for transition process was to form a broadest coalition possible and to pursue reform process by a centrist party. Besides the UCD, there were three other parties in the system: Spanish Socialist

Worker's Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol*, PSOE), Communist Party of Spain (*Partido Comunista Espanol*, PCE), and Popular Alliance (*Alianza Popular,* AP). However, the UCD managed to lead the system thanks to its ability to appeal different segments of population at the same time until its demise in 1982. Throughout this process, the UCD played a major role in designing the constitution on the basis of a national reconciliation between left and right. According to Eddles (1998), the major goal for political elites was to avoid the recurrence of a Civil War experienced in 1930s wherein high levels of polarization had created massive radicalization over time and led to one of the worst civil wars in the European continent.

However, following the outstanding electoral defeat in 1982 general elections, the UCD collapsed and the party was disbanded in 1983. According to Gunther and Hopkin, the failure of party can be explained on the basis of two fundamental problems that were inherent to the UCD from the very beginning (Gunther and Hopkin, 2002: 202-203). First, aiming to appeal broader segments of the electorate, they failed to form their own electoral constituency and to create a political identity for the party. Accordingly, in time it became more and more difficult for the party organization to keep different factions under a vaguely defined identity (Gunther et al., 1988). Secondly, the UCD was a leader-dominated one and Suarez himself was keen to create a highly centralized party but this in turn hampered party's ability to survive in the absence of Suarez.

Another important development in the Spanish party system that challenged the dominant position of the UCD was the shift in the PSOE's ideological position from rigid Marxism into moderate centre-left thanks to which the PSOE managed to attract the UCD electorate, centre-oriented voters, as well as leftist ones in 1982 general elections (Pollack, 1983; Bernardo, 1984).

Winning absolute majority in parliament in 1982 and 1986 and half of the seats in 1989, the PSOE managed to occupy central place in Spanish political landscape for more than a decade. Accordingly, the PSOE led the country from 1982 to 1996 until when they were defeated to the PP. Throughout this period of time, Spain entered the European Economic Community in 1986 and Spanish democracy consolidated due to stability achieved under single-party government of the PSOE for relatively long period of time (Holman, 1996). Although the PSOE portrayed itself as a centre-left party, they mainly followed a neoliberal path in that the PSOE governments adopted austerity measures and monetarist policies which are mostly followed by parties of the centre-right (McLaren, 2008).

The People's Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), the forerunner of the People's Alliance (*Alianza Popular*, AP), managed to win 1996 elections and formed a minority government. In the process of the democratic transition, the AP was one of the major forces in Spanish political landscape. However, since leading figures of Francoist regime were members of the party, it was

generally perceived as the representative of former authoritarian regime (Pollack and Hunter, 1987). Fed up with dictatorship under Franco, the electoral support of the AP in the first democratic elections of 1977 and 1979 was 8.8% and 9% respectively. However, in 1979 the party had entered a process of change and transformation. The demise of the UCD was also a positive development for the AP since in the absence of the UCD, the political landscape suffered from a lack of viable alternative in the centre-right of the political spectrum.

With the rise of a new leader, Jose Maria Aznar, after some trials and mergers, the party's name was changed and became the People's Party (PP) in 1989. The major success of Aznar was to transform the PP from a party of former authoritarian regime into a catch-all centre-right party which would offer a credible alternative to the already discredited Socialist government led by the PSOE (Woodworth, 2004). Starting from 1989 elections the PP has moderated its tone on advocating a unitary conception of Spain, introduced a programme with a better welfare approach, and even respected the de-penalisation of abortion which was a critical move for a strongly conservative party like the PP (Magone, 2009). Although the party managed to win the 1996 elections (see Balfour, 1996 for a detailed analysis of 1996 elections), it could not get absolute majority and this forced Aznar to moderate party's stance further, particularly with regards to its position on the state of autonomies (Magone, 2009). This was also because in order to form a government, the PP "had to rely on parliamentary support from Catalan,

Canary and (for a while) the Basque nationalist parties" (Colomer, 2001: 490) which in turn automatically forced party to follow a moderate position. According to Tussell, from 1993 to 2000 the PP has moved from an almost extreme right wing political party into a democratic, centrist and Christian democratic one and this was a great achievement for a political force that represented rigid conservative subculture of Spain (cited in Colomer 2001: 153). Moreover, within the same period of time the PP has also become an integral part of European People's Party in the European Parliament which also manifests the degree of transformation the party has experienced.

Table 4.1: General Election Results and Distribution of Seats in Spain

		1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008
UCD	Vote	34,6	35	6,5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Seat	166	168	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSOE	Vote	29,3	30,5	48,4	44,1	39,9	38,7	37,5	34,1	42,6	43,5
	Seat	118	121	202	184	175	175	141	125	164	169
AP/PP	Vote	8,8	6,1	26,5	26	25,9	34,8	38,9	44,6	37,6	40,1
	Seat	16	9	106	105	107	157	157	183	148	153
PCE/IU/IU-ICV	Vote	9,4	10,8	4	4,61	9,1	9,57	10,6	5,5	5,0	3,8
	Seat	20	23	4	7	17	18	21	8	5	2

From 1996 until the historical elections of 2000 when the PP won the absolute majority, the PP enjoyed a successful governing period due to "the positive management of the economy, the restoration of social dialogue and the further development of the state of autonomies" all of which demonstrated that the PP is a trustworthy political alternative that can respond centrist electoral constituency in Spain (2001: 154). Under the PP

government, Spain was further liberalized and the country managed to enter the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU in 1999 which was a significant step for further integration of Spain to the club of developed countries (Magone, 2003). Gilmour (2005) argues that the success of the PP lies in its ability to combine centrist ideology as well as Christian overtones with that of economic liberalism. Accordingly, the party has entered 2000 general elections within this positive environment and under the leadership of Aznar it has also become a party which can appeal young voters, and therefore were confident to use the slogan "*Espana va bien!*" (Spain is doing well!) (Roller, 2001: 220).

From the first elections onwards, the only significant party in the system, besides two major parties of the PSOE and the PP, was the United Left (*Izquierda Unida*, IU) which was established as an electoral coalition of the PCE and smaller leftist factions. But later on particularly with the fall of communism in 1990s, the IU emerged as a separate political identity. From the end of 1970s to the beginning of 2000s the party's vote share on average remained around 6-7%, reaching up to a maximum of 10% in 1996. Analysing the distribution of the votes, it is observed that the IU has increased its vote share particularly when the popularity of the PSOE decreases and vice versa. However, the party never managed to stand as a viable alternative for the centrist voters; therefore besides their success in 2000 elections to form an electoral coalition with the PSOE, the IU was mainly left in margins of Spanish political landscape.

The major political actors of the process of democratic consolidation from 1986 to 2000s have been the PSOE and the PP, and throughout this period party system in Spain is stabilised and consolidated as a moderate two-party system wherein the political competition is mostly centripetal. Here, the position of regionalist-nationalist parties also needs to be clarified. One of the greatest achievements of Spanish democracy has been its ability to contain regionalist-nationalist parties in the political system (Pallares and Keaten, 2003). Although total vote share of two major parties is around 75-80% in general elections, around 10 to 12% of total vote is received by several regionalist parties whose votes are concentrated in regional strongholds (Magone, 2009: 149).

All that is said, smooth transition to democracy has facilitated consolidation process in Spain and party system which was previously defined by extremism and polarization has become a symbol of political moderation in the post-Franco period. According to Encarnacion (2008: 51), three factors account for the transformation of Spanish party system from contention to moderation. First, past experiences of extreme polarization made party leaders from both left and right stay away from ideological rigidity. Secondly, the transformation of Spanish left from rigid Marxism into what is called Euro-communism or social democracy made it easier for socialist party to appeal wider segments of population. Finally, troubled by the civil war and its devastating consequences, from the very beginning of democratic transition Spanish electorate has demanded the moderation in

politics as well as pragmatist politics and denied radicalization and radical changes.

4.1.2. Spanish Party System in the 2000s

In this section, the last decade of Spanish politics will be discussed briefly and we depict the major dynamics of political competition in Spain. Understanding the maladies of Spanish politics require a careful examination of the 2000s when the seeds of social and political unrest have been planted and the inability of two major parties in responding the demands of population became evident leading to mass public withdrawal from conventional political structures.

As briefly discussed above, the 2000s began with the PP's electoral success who managed to gain absolute majority of seats in the parliament in the 2000 general elections. According to Colomer, three major factors account for the PP's success: "the governing record of the PP, the disproportionality in representation produced by the electoral system,[14] and strategic mistakes by the main opposition party, the PSOE" (Colomer, 2001: 490). First, as discussed in the previous section, following an economic policy of liberalization, under the PP government, Spain enjoyed sustainable growth levels together with lower unemployment rates all of which facilitated the

---

[14] The electoral system in Spain will be discussed more in detail in the following sections.

process of joining the euro in 1999 (see Powell, 2003). Accordingly, the macroeconomic success achieved under Aznar paid off with substantial electoral support for the PP. Moreover, despite its vigorous nationalist identity, the PP government also formed better relations with regionalist-nationalist parties and particularly the tense relations with ETA were appeased and ETA "maintained a cease-fire lasting fourteen months, the longest period without political killings in recent Spanish history" (Colomer, 2001: 491). This in return demonstrated that the PP denied its Francoist past and adopted a moderate centre right position.

Conversely, two major issues challenged the position of the PSOE as a credible alternative in the 2000 elections. First, the party failed to select a widely supported and credible leader (2001: 491). Although Joaquin Almunia failed to win primary elections, he became the PSOE's prime ministerial candidate due to corruption scandal that forced Jose Borrell, winner of primaries, to resign (2001: 491). Secondly and much importantly, just before the elections the PSOE formed an electoral coalition with the IU that affected the PSOE's electoral fortunes adversely. Coalition with the IU was regarded as a shift in PSOE's ideological position from centre, centre-left towards radical left and this in turn alienated centrist voters who voted for the PSOE in the previous elections and these voters switched to the PP (Magone, 2009).

However, all these votes and even more returned to the PSOE in 2004 general elections. According to elections results the PSOE emerged victorious

receiving 42.59% of the votes and the PP garnered 37.71% of total votes. Although many claims that the major factor behind the historic electoral defeat of the PP in 2004 was the Madrid bombings occurred on the 11 March just three days before the elections, Blakeley (2006) rightfully argues that the change of government was resulted from a myriad of political developments though the bombings acted as a catalyst. He relates the PP's electoral defeat to two factors: "a growing disdain for public opinion and an increase in manipulation" by the PP government (2006: 332). While "by disdain for public opinion" Blakeley points to the PP government's disregard of popular opposition particularly to the Spanish involvement in Iraq War, manipulation refers to the ways in which the government manipulated information about certain events (such as the Iraq War and Madrid bombings) and instead preferred to follow a strategy of providing disinformation in order to delegitimize opposition by using state television channel (2006: 332).

Here, the impact of Aznar's decision to join Iraq War next to American forces, in particular, played a significant role (see Rigo, 2005; Chari, 2004). While population at large (around 90%) was against military intervention in Iraq and sending of Spanish troops to Iraq (Blakeley, 2006), Aznar insisted on Atlanticist foreign policy and sided with the US, leaving aside traditional European Union foreign policy stance of Spain (Woodworth, 2004). Essentially, this was one of the major points upon which the PSOE built its electoral campaign. With a new programme named 'Spain in the world', "a key pledge of the PSOE, which was popular amongst voters, was to withdraw

Spanish troops from Iraq" (Blakeley, 2006: 338). Needless to say, the role of Madrid bombings should not be underestimated which reinforced and intensified already existent uneasiness with Spanish intervention in Iraq and therefore had enormous impact on the election results (Colomer, 2005: 152). Moreover, the PP government's way of dealing with bombings, which insisted that the ETA was behind the disaster without any evidence that points to that direction, also created further outrage and decreased credibility of the PP government in the eyes of people (Blakeley, 2006). The outcome was a clear electoral victory for the PSOE led by a new leader, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.

Table 4.2: Concentration of Vote Share in the Spanish Party System

The first striking move of the PSOE government was to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq rapidly which cost a clear electoral defeat to Aznar. In his

first term, Zapatero initiated an ambitious progressive reform programme (Field and Botti, 2013). First, the government introduced a gender equality act, same-sex marriages are legalized (Encarnacion, 2009), autonomy of political regions has been expanded (Field and Botti, 2013), historical memory of Republican side during the Civil War was acknowledged (Martín and Urquizu-Sancho, 2012), and various social policies were introduced (Field, 2009). All these developments received substantive support from population at large. Several commentators have argued that Spain has experienced 'second transition' under Zapatero (see Encarnacion, 2009; see Field, 2009 for opposite view). But with regards to economy, though Zapatero government was aware of the problems with Spanish economy which is mainly based on consumption and construction, the Socialist government was reluctant to act on these problems and rather "preferred to prolong the period of economic expansion" (Field and Botti, 2013: 2). Accordingly, economic success together with better social policies increased government's approval rates.

Within this positive environment, the PSOE enjoyed another election victory in 2008 and managed to form a minority government once again. The results of 2008 elections were particularly important in the sense that both the PSOE and the PP increased their vote share, and therefore highest vote concentration was achieved since transition to democracy (2013: 3; see also Torcal and Lago, 2008). This suggests that two-party system in Spain was further entrenched by the 2008 elections and two centrist parties have

dominated Spanish political landscape which demonstrates the extent to which Spanish politics is cartelized. In its second term the PSOE government faced with the worst economic crisis of last 80 years which adversely affected international economy as a whole. Spanish economy was one of those economies that have been challenged most because of the country's structural economic weaknesses, such as low productivity and competitiveness, and also because of the economic model followed for the last decades mainly based on construction and consumption (see Royo, 2009; Molina and Godino, 2013). All in all, Spanish economy has almost collapsed leading to high levels of unemployment and economic recession. Most strikingly, youth unemployment rate in Spain has increased enormously since 2008 reaching up to 56.40% in 2013 (Ottaviani, 2014).

Though the PSOE was in power during the economic crisis and Zapatero has been criticized for his failure to respond the crisis on time and for underestimating its impact, Field and Botti suggest that Spain's economic model was not the invention of the PSOE only but both the PP and the PSOE were behind this policy and therefore have equal responsibility (Field and Botti, 2013: 5). This was also general sentiment among population that started to perceive two major parties as incompetent and incapable of representing public's interests. The best behavioural demonstration of disaffection with politics was the emergence of 15M movement in March 2011, four months before the general elections. Normally elections were planned to occur in March 2012 but Zapatero decided to call for an early

elections in July 2011 not only because economic problems forced government to take an action, but also because the decreasing popularity of Zapatero extremely harmed the PSOE therefore the best move for the party was to enter the elections as soon as possible with a new and more popular party leader, Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba – the Interior Minister of the PSOE government (Chari, 2013).

Table 4.3: 2011 Election Results

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number of Votes	%	± %	Won	+/-
PP	10.866.566	44,6	+4.69	186	+32
PSOE	7.003.511	28,8	-15.11	110	-69
IU-LV	1.686.040	6,92	+3.15	11	+9
UpyD	1.143.225	4,7	+3.51	5	+4
Amaiur	334.498	1,37	New	7	+7
Compromís-Q	125.306	0,51	+0.39	1	+1

Needless to say, the key issue that dominated 2011 elections was the severe economic crisis the country has been experiencing. Although after two elections losses in 2004 and 2008 the PP under Mariona Rajoy was the favourite, starting from 2011 high levels of distrust and disaffection with both parties were apparent among general public. However, leading the country for the last 7 years the PSOE was the major actor at the forefront of criticisms and electorate lost their confidence to the party. The PP, on the other hand, was seen as a relatively credible alternative having side-lined from governing in the previous period. Nevertheless, it has to be underlined that though Rajoy built his electoral campaign on the promise of solving the

problem of economic crisis, he was also unable to state how the PP would manage to do this and preferred not to respond important issues such as "how the PP was going to attain its promised levels of public spending without raising taxes" (2013: 378). The PSOE, conversely, focused on defending government's take on the crisis and accused the PP for having a secret agenda aimed at cutting social spending (2013: 379).

In the elections the PP received 44.6% of votes while the PSOE's vote share decreased down to 28.7%, the worst result the party has experienced since transition to democracy. Although looking at results one might suggest that electorate continued to rely on mainstream parties in the sense that the PP, one of two major parties, managed to win majority, the very fact that smaller parties such as the IU, Union Progress and Democracy (*Union Progreso y Democracia*, UPyD), Amaiur, and Commitment Coalition (Coalicio Compromis, COMPROMIS-Q) also received unexpected support indicates that electorate started to search for other alternatives. Accordingly, the decrease in vote concentration also manifests dissatisfaction with two-party system. While the rise of the IU is not so unexpected keeping in mind that the party has always increased its vote share whenever the PSOE's vote percentage decreases, the UPyD's success, a progressive party which denied to place itself on either left or right, particularly points to electorate's cry for different actors. Moreover, the turnout level was 71.7% which also suggests that an important portion of voters preferred to stay away from the ballot box.

Accordingly, several scholars suggested that the PP did not win the elections but the PSOE lost in that the PP managed to get around 500.000 more votes than previous elections while the PSOE lost half of its votes corresponding to approximately 4.300.000 votes (Martin and Urquizu Sancho, 2012). In other words, while one of the major parties is rejected, the other one could not receive all of the gains (Chari, 2013: 378) and this signifies that two-party system is not able to respond the demands of population anymore. Even the PP's success should be analysed by keeping in mind the electoral rules and regulations in Spain which favour larger parties and were designed to prevent fragmentation with closed D'Hondt, low district magnitude and 3% electoral threshold and thereby limit the role of new actors in political landscape.

The major actors of Spanish political scene were the PP and the PSOE which led the processes of social and economic change throughout 2000s. However, the failure of two parties to respond one of the worst economic crises the country has experienced created popular unrest and disaffection with mainstream politics.

4.2. Crisis of Representation: *No Los Representan*

The focus of this research is to reveal party-related factors behind mass protests in Turkey and Spain and to understand party failures which created

a crisis of representation. As discussed in the previous section, towards the end of 2000s, in Spain both subjective and behavioural components of citizen disaffection from politics has become apparent, on the one hand, large number of citizens were unhappy with the existing political parties and they lost their belief that representatives are acting on behalf of their constituents (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 33), and on the other, they started to withdraw from participation, voted for new parties (for instance UPyD or Podemos in European elections), and organised popular mobilisation.

The contention here is that the major factor, if not the only one, behind citizen disaffection and follow-up mass protests is crisis of representation experienced in Spanish politics at two levels: first, convergence of political parties in the ideological spectrum left individualized voters with diversified and complex demands unrepresented, and second as parties lost their control over policy-making due to the forces of globalisation they lost contact with the electorate further and have failed to act responsive.

Essentially, the case of Spain is the opposite of Turkey in the sense that although both cases suffer from a crisis of representation, in Turkey divergence of parties together with the lack of responsibility on the side of government led to a crisis. As follows, first, the gradual convergence of political parties in the ideological spectrum in Spain and the difficulty parties face in responding diversified electorate will be discussed, and then we will

examine the dynamics of party failures in balancing the demands of responsibility and responsiveness at the same time.

4.2.1. Identifying the Gap in Spanish Politics: All Parties Alike

From the early years of democratic transition onwards, Spanish politics is largely shaped by politics of consensus wherein the centripetal competition has been a defining feature of party system. Gunther et.al. (1988: 390) argue that six factors characterise the Spanish party system:

> (1) the interaction of voters' attitudinal predispositions with their perceptions of each parties' ideological stance; (2) voters feelings towards party leaders; (3) the effects of electoral laws; (4) the effects of each party's infrastructural organization; (5) the nature of the post-Franco transition to democracy; and (6) the advantages of incumbency and the politics of consensus.

Particularly, voters' attitudinal predispositions, the effects of electoral laws and the nature of the post-Franco transition to democracy seem be the major factors behind high levels of centrism in Spanish politics. Keeping in mind that the electoral laws are designed during transition, we can analyse three factors under two major headings: institutional design and public demands. On the one hand, during the transition to democracy, with horrors of the Civil War in mind elites aimed to create a system based on compromise and

consensus. Conversely, the Spanish public has always yearned for consensual politics, supported centre politics and denied any form of radicalism.

The process of democratic transition in Spain was particularly important to understand current outcome. After all, the founding moments of the party system formation have been critically important for the type of party system to emerge (Van Biezen, 2005).

Several scholars of democratization also argue that institutional design constitutes the most appropriate tool for managing existing social divisions (see Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Lijphart and Waisman, 1996; Robinson and White, 1998; Power and Gasiorowski, 1997). As discussed previously, in the case of Spain elites played the key role in the democratic transition and they were determined to consolidate the power of executive in order to prevent any possibility of fractionalisation (Blakeley, 2006: 331). Therefore, in the process of transition designers of the electoral system sought to prevent fraction and contention in society by limiting proportionality of the system. As d'Hondt system becomes less proportional the smaller the constituency, they managed to decrease proportionality of the system through creating smaller electoral constituencies based on fifty provinces of Spain plus North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Magone, 2009: 134). Accordingly, although the electoral system of the new Spanish democracy is based on proportional representation, thanks to low district magnitude, closed list d'Hondt, high levels of over-representation of rural

provinces and 3% threshold for each magnitude, it is "one of less proportional electoral systems in Europe" (Chari, 2013: 378). Needless to say, while this electoral system favours larger parties such as the PSOE and the PP as well as regionalist-nationalist ones, it adversely affects smaller nation-wide parties like the IU (Magone, 2009). In other words, the institutional system itself has reinforced less fragmented system and therefore played a key role in the creation of two-party system.

Table 4.4: Distribution of the PP and the PSOE Voters on a Left-Right Scale in 2000

Source: J.M. Magone (2009) *Contemporary Spanish Politics*

However, this institutional explanation needs to be supported with sociological approach mainly because movement toward the centre among the PSOE and the PP cannot only be understood by looking at the institutional structure. Experiencing one of the worst civil wars of the

European continent, Spanish public has always been apprehensive of any kind of extremism and this embraced consensual politics. That is why high levels of centre tendency among the population have also pushed parties towards centrism. Accordingly, when we look at the data on the distribution of the PP voters together with the data on the distribution of the PSOE voters, what we see is that in 2000 almost 90% of the PP voters are centre-centre right and more than 85% of the PSOE voters belong to centre-centre left of the political spectrum. This data can also be supported by the European Social Survey data according to which average ideological position among Spanish public is 4.55 (on a scale from 1 to 10) in 2008 (ESS 2008). Furthermore, as Figure 4.1 demonstrates, according to Latinobarometer from 1996 to 2010 on average more than 40% of Spanish electorate can be defined as centre voters. All these data demonstrate that the demand for centrism was quite strong among Spanish public and this fact has also played a key role in the emergence of centripetal political competition in the country.


Figure 4.1: Placement of Voters on Spain's Left-Right Spectrum

Source: Latinobarometro 1996-2010

Here it is also important to refer the limited impact of social cleavages on voting behaviour in Spain (see Barnes et al., 1985; Gunther et al., 1986). Although Chhibber and Torcal (1997) argued that this has changed and the PSOE managed to turn social class into a salient political division towards the end of 1980s, when we analyse the general trend in Spanish politics throughout 1990s and 2000s what we see is that social cleavages do not have significant effect on party politics and both the PP and the PSOE managed to attract voters across social divisions (Magone, 2009: 47-48). Accordingly, within this period of time, centre turned into a position where most voters stand and both parties compete for (2009: 181).

As aforementioned discussion clarified, both institutional and sociological factors account for the PSOE's and the PP's race to the centre wherein it becomes more and more difficult to differentiate main contenders from one another. However, this type of politics which is named as "adulterated party system" by Hopkin (2005: 13) leads to two major problems. On the one hand, since they consider all parties alike voters systematically drift apart from political parties and political processes (Torcal et al., 2002). On the other hand, as this trend has further entrenched due to cognitive mobilisation, parties become less capable of responding diverse demands and expectations of population.

According to Dalton (1984) cognitive mobilisation involves two developments: first, the abilities of individual citizens in processing political

information increases thanks to higher levels of education and political sophistication, and second the cost of political information decreases. Both developments create individualised society whose demands and expectations are much complex than before and therefore it becomes extremely difficult for parties to respond population. Magone (2009) argues that Spain actually constitutes a perfect example wherein high levels of cognitive mobilisation led to growing individualisation of society as well as growing dissatisfaction from politics, and therefore one stagnant point on conventional left-right ideological spectrum is not capable of responding this diversified electorate. The words of one of the 15M activists, interviewed by the Centre for Sociological Investigations (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas,* CIS) in Spain, affirm the situation:

> *Well I think that politicians should be trustworthy... and I wish that any party would be brave enough to analyse what we are asking for and that they would realize that many of the things we are asking are feasible... political parties nowadays have a new public to nurture and besides it is very clear to them what they want.* (Male 25-35 years, 15M activist, Madrid) (CIS, 2011)

Table 4.5: Confidence in political parties (15M Participants and General Public)

Source: CIS 2012, cited in J.M. Sarciat Marcia (2013) *15M, Made in Spain: El 15M: un movimiento social de vocacion politica*, Universidad Internacionale de Rioja.

Looking at the most widely used placards in the 15M protests, discomfort with convergence of parties becomes explicit: "PPSOE= PP + PSOE", "None, neither PP nor PSOE" "[*Nini (Ni PP, ni PSOE)*]" and "Neither A nor B we want to change the platform" "[*Ni cara A, ni cara B, queremos cambiar de disco*]". These slogans clearly manifest dissatisfaction with two-party system. Moreover, comparing the data on trust in party among 15M participants with population averages also shows that 15M protestors have greater disdain from existent political contenders: 72% of protestors gave less than 5 to political parties (Table 4.5). Likewise, confidence in Spanish parliament is also much lower among 15M participants (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Confidence in Spanish parliament (15M Participants and General Public)

Source: CIS 2012, cited in J.M. Sarciat Marcia (2013) *15M, Made in Spain: El 15M: un movimiento social de vocacion politica*, Universidad Internacionale de Rioja.

Interviews with protestors conducted by CIS, renowned research institution in Spain, also point to similar direction:

> *Politicians... well I don't know because I have no idea, but from what I see, I don't know what they do because I don't see it. They fight against each other. I know they are fighting against each other but afterwards they are good friends and they go together for a drink in one's or the other's place. I don't know what they do but this is the situation* (he is referring to the budget cuts in health and education services) (Male 45-55 years, supporter of 15M, Barcelona) (CIS 2011)

Needless to say, he is not happy with the fact that although in front of public several discussions between the PP and the PSOE occur on certain policy issues such as budget cuts in health and in education services, these discussions do not seem to be real. Actually, he tries to point to cartelisation of political parties in Spain which is characterised by "the interpenetration of political parties and state and also by a pattern of interparty collusion" (Katz and Mair, 1995: 17). Katz and Mair (1995) argue that particularly in party systems wherein a tradition of inter-party competition goes hand in hand with state support for political parties, the emergence of cartel parties is more likely.

This is also the case in Spain where party competition, since transition, has been characterised by high levels of inter-party cooperation and accommodation and also where state subvention has been the major source of party funding (van Biezen, 2003). In these party systems party programmes becomes dissimilar so voters are forced to elect from a list of similar political factions; and as parties turn into partnership of professionals, politicians start to see "their political opponents as fellow professionals" (Katz and Mair, 1995: 23). The problem with the cartelisation of politics is that in cartel model "democracy ceases to be seen as a process by which limitations or controls are imposed on the state by civil society, becoming instead a service provided by the state for civil society"(1995: 22). Since the act of representation and the role of political parties as representatives is legitimized only when political parties link state to civil

society, the extent of crisis of representation under these circumstances becomes palpable.

However, it is particularly important to note that the convergence and cartelisation of political parties are not peculiar to Spain. In most of the advanced democracies the forces of globalisation have limited parties' space of manoeuvre; and therefore party failures also needs to be contextualised within the framework of globalisation which has also curbed party's ability to meet the demands of responsibility and responsiveness at the same time.

4.2.2. Responsible but not Responsive

While discussing the case of Turkey, it was observed that as the AKP government fail to act responsible in governing, the crisis of representation has deepened, in the case of Spain, it seems to be the other way around in that as a member of the European Union, Spanish politics has become less and less capable of responding electorate though certain level of consistence in policy making exists. Constrained by the demands of globalisation and Europeanisation the Spanish political parties have lost their control over public policy-making which is largely designed and forced by global actors and in that sense the policy differences between political parties particularly with regards to economy have disappeared. This situation, common to most advanced democracies, is described by Mair (2008: 227) as follows:

Whether circumscribed by global and European constraints, or whether limited by the inability to identify any clear constituency within the electorate that is sufficiently large and cohesive to offer a mandate for action, parties increasingly tend to echo one another and to blur what might otherwise be clear policy choices… [so] there is less and less choice in policy terms, suggesting that political competition is drifting towards an opposition of form rather than of content.

Essentially, as the process of European integration has accelerated and deepened the policy-making processes have started to operate within the framework of 'multi-level governance' (see Hooghe and Marks, 2001) which means that now in the EU policy-making is determined through cooperation between distinct governmental levels (local, subnational/regional, national, European, transnational) (Papadopoulos, 2007). However, within this complex network of public-policy making, the national governments' capability to shape policies has declined extremely which in turn had detrimental effects on democratic accountability and responsiveness. Accordingly, the question of who is to blame or reward for policy-outcomes is not easy to answer anymore as parties or party governments are not the only actors of decision-making procedures even though they are the only ones who are authorised by people as such (Papadopoulos, 2010).

Therefore, although multi-level governance through policy networks can enhance inclusiveness and pluralism, it certainly creates an

accountability gap and according to Papadopoulos leads to a divorce between "the sphere of '*politique des problemes*' (dominated by problem-solving governance arrangements) and the sphere of '*politique d'opinion*' (the arena of party competition)" (2010: 1034). This is wherein the root causes of problem lies: as discussed in the first chapter the party government model requires that parties to be the only actors behind public-policy making and political parties' representativeness is legitimised only when they provide for responsiveness and responsibility at the same time.

Under these circumstances, though parties might be considered responsible, if responsibility is defined as acting in prudence and consistency over time, they certainly cannot be responsive to national public demands as various other (local, regional, international transnational as well as public and private) actors involve in policy-making processes and their control over decision-making is limited. Needless to say, this leads to a "loosening grip of representative democracy on acts of governing" (Bekkers et al., 2007: 308) and thereby citizens/principals withdraw from conventional political practice as parties/agents are not representing them anymore; thus the contract of representation between citizens and political parties which constitutes the basis of representative democracy is dissolved, thereby creating a crisis of representation.

Likewise, in Spain since the country integrated in the EU more and more, governments' ability to shape public policy has decreased. Although

with regards to social and cultural policies, member states' capabilities are not exhausted and they still have certain degree of control over them, economic policies are largely shaped and imposed by the EU particularly in times of crisis.

Accordingly, when the economic crisis erupted, the Zapatero government was slow to respond but in time the government began to take action and initially came up with Keynesian policies, trying to adapt moderate counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus measures (Field and Botti, 2013: 5). However, in 2010 the crisis was deepened with detrimental effects on European and international markets as a whole and the fears of default led to the euro sovereign debt crisis (see Aleksi and McBride, 2015). This development in turn forced European institutions to take action and impose certain policies to countries with problematic fiscal positions (Field and Botti, 2013). Accordingly, in May 2010, in the Eurogroup and Ecofin meetings, as one of the most affected member states Spanish government was forced to implement strict austerity-based adjustment measures such as "a 5 % reduction of the salaries of civil servants and a freeze on wage increases in the forthcoming years; non-application of the cost-of-living indexation of pensions; the ending of the cheque bebe (an allowance of 2500 euros to families with newborn children), and a significant reduction of public works and investment" (Molino and Godina, 2013: 112). These changes have created high levels of resentment among population, particularly among the

disadvantaged ones and young people who now have to struggle with enormous levels of unemployment.

In short, in an era of neoliberalism as a member of the EU, Spain was under extreme pressure from the European institutions and international markets to adopt austerity measures based on social spending cuts and the decrease of public employees' salaries (Field and Botti, 2013: 6). Needless to say, the very fact that the EU and international organisations were behind these reforms has demonstrated the incapability of national governments in shaping public policy and intensified the view that executives are not accounted to people but to some kind of international or supranational interests. Although the Spanish population at large have always been supportive of the European integration, they were irritated by the fact that national executive is overseen and monitored by supranational institutions (Molina and Godino, 2013: 113-114). Particularly the idea that Spanish economic policy is run by Germany and France who have been the leading powers of the Union, or the so-called *Mercozy*,[15] was unacceptable to Spanish public (Field and Botti, 2013: 9). This, in turn, has deepened already existent disaffection with party politics and led to the questioning of Spanish government's democratic legitimacy.

The 15M Movement emerged under these circumstances and protestors were also reacting to the limited responsiveness of government to

---

[15] The term Merkozy refers to the duo of Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, and Nicholas Sarkozy, the president of France until 2012.

public demands as they observed that Zapatero government accepted all policy changes designed by unaccountable technocrats of the EU at the expense of people. Several scholars also argue that the emergence of the Indignados or 15M movement was a response to this context. In other words, the economic crisis has revealed incompetence of the governments and signified that party democracy is not working anymore since constrained by broader commitments parties fail to act responsive to public demands, leading to a crisis of representation.

4.3. Implications for Party System and Democracy in Spain

4.3.1. A New Actor in the Party System?

The convergence of the PSOE and the PP and the failure of the government to act responsive have led to a crisis of representation in Spain and this has been one of the major reasons, if not the only one, behind the emergence of mass protests. Therefore, needless to say, these protests have also called for a change in the party system.

The fact that even after the economic crisis, the PP, one of the two major parties in the system managed to garner significant amount of vote indicates that the Spanish population still possesses high levels of trust towards mainstream parties. Therefore, if the mainstream parties of the PSOE and the PP manage to respond diversified demands of the population

and increase people's involvement through guaranteeing internal party democracy, there is still a high probability that they will continue to play major role in the functioning of the party system. However, one possible challenge to two parties is the emergence of new political parties that can replace their position in the party system.

Actually, the PSOE has already been challenged by a brand new political party "Podemos" (We can) which was spawned by the protests. As party appeals to the left and centre-left voters, it mainly targets the PSOE's constituency. In 2014 European elections the Podemos received unexpected support attracting 1.2 million votes and won five seats in the European parliament. The party continue to appeal Spanish population and in the next general elections it stands as a viable alternative to existing mainstream political parties and even more the latest polls suggest that the party would emerge as one of the major parties in the upcoming elections (Buck, 2014).

So the *Indignados* or the 15M movement in Spain have already started to affect the functioning of the party system by triggering foundation of a new political party that challenges the existing positions of major parties in the system. The fortunes of Podemos still remain to be seen but recent successes of the party signal a likely change in the direction of Spanish politics. The impact of Podemos will be discussed further in the following chapter when we analyse what happened after the protest movements and how movement politics have interacted with electoral politics.

4.3.2. The Implications on Democracy

The first signs of change in the functioning of the party politics in Spain may have significant repercussions for the future of democracy. Actually, as discussed before, the problem is not unique to Spain but several other advanced democracies are also facing with distrust towards the principles of representative democracy as well as the political parties (Blais, 2000; Gray and Miki, 2000). Therefore, the solutions also need to be all-encompassing in that the EU as a supranational institution that limits national governments' space for policy manoeuvre has a duty to come up with tools that would fill the gap between policy-makers and people. Although there are several initiatives that try to link European population to the European institutions, they are still unable to respond this challenging issue. If the involvement of European people in the decision-making procedures could be enhanced, then it might also be possible to increase the legitimacy of decision-making processes at the European level.

Conversely, the mainstream parties of advanced democracies have to find ways to respond diversified demands in the age of cognitive mobilisation, if party democracy aims to survive. The major side-effect of party failures to respond people is the emergence of anti-system parties such as the *UKIP* in the UK, *Die Alternative* in Germany or *Syriza* in Greece.[16] What

---

[16] One can also name Podemos among these parties but different than all these parties the Podemos is a direct outcome of the protest movement and organised different than the above mentioned parties, using several participatory methods in order to enhance the internal democracy and increase the participation of members.

is common to all these niche parties is their ability to touch upon and respond societies' demands through populist discourses even though none of them can be considered responsible as "to act responsibly means to effect changes according to accepted procedures and to avoid random, reckless, or illegal decision-making" (Mair, 2009: 11). In other words, although these parties can be responsive they cannot be considered responsible and this might have detrimental effects on the future of democracy. After all, it has to be noted that the failure of responsible political actors to respond people ended up with the rise of fascism during the inter-war years. The implications of these protest movements on the electoral politics of both countries will be further evaluated in the next chapter but here it has to be acknowledged that development of democracy has been a contingent outcome of contentious politics (Tilly, 2004) and therefore understanding the fortunes of modern democracy also requires careful analysis of contemporary contention.

CHAPTER V

AFTER THE MOVEMENTS: TURKEY AND SPAIN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In the previous two empirical chapters, the crisis of representation was discussed as the central factor behind the mass protests in Turkey and Spain and this was done by referring to the development of Turkish and Spanish political structures. Providing a party politics account of these protest movements, it is also critically important to analyse how these movements shape the party system of each country since then. The point is that as these movements are resulted from general disaffection from the way politics is conducted, to what extent they managed to influence conventional or electoral politics is particularly warranted as this would not only demonstrate whether the crisis of representation has been overcome or deepened in two countries but also highlight the link between the mobilisation of social movements and politics of parliamentary arenas of Turkey and Spain.

From this perspective, this chapter looks at the question of what happened after these mass protest movements and more specifically analyses the impact of Gezi protests and 15M movement on conventional politics in each context. Although these two movements had peculiar demands, they also had common purposes in that they both mainly aimed at, first, redefining the terms of political arena in search of new ways of doing politics, and secondly, they asked for a greater say in decision-making processes. In this regard, although contexts and conjunctures are different both movements have similar demands with that of the new social movements of 1960s and 1970s such as "decentralised and participatory organisational structures, defence of interpersonal solidarity against great bureaucracies; and the reclamation of autonomous spaces rather than material advantages."(Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 9). Herein we will delineate the extent to which these movements manage to create issue salience with regards to new politics and what impact the movements had on electoral politics of each country. What is observed is that both movements have had a significant impact on the ways politics is conducted since then though different mechanisms were at work in each case. Therefore, it is also extremely important to understand and explain the cross-national variations regarding the terms of interaction between contentious and conventional politics and analysing the specific and dynamic factors that have resulted in different types of adaptation and change.

This chapter is organised in four sections. In the first section, we provide a general overview of how contentious politics might interact with electoral politics by referring to the relevant literature on social movements and briefly discuss the cases at hand. In the second and third sections how the political structures of Turkey and Spain have responded to protest movements and whether new political actors have emerged as a result of these movements will be analysed, respectively. Finally, we look into the question of what accounts for the differences between the two cases. Here, we focus on both institutional and social factors in understanding the ways in which democratic politics adopt and change in order to respond the existing crises.

5.1. Relationship between Contentious and Conventional Politics: Gezi and 15M in Comparative Perspective

5.1.1. How Contentious Politics Interacts with Conventional Politics?

In the literature on social movements, limited attention has been paid to the interaction between contentious and conventional politics (Malone and Frederiks, 2012). Contrary to that the major focus of social movement studies has been on the factors whether to be social, cultural, psychological or political which trigger collective action. Within this perspective, the study of social movements has evolved in several phases of conceptual development. While before the 1970s the collective behaviour theory

dominated the literature (see Blumer, 1951; 1971; Smelser, 1962), in the post-1970s period resource mobilisation theory (see Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Jenkins, 1983) along with political process theory (see Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; McAdam,1982; Tarrow, 1998) and European new social movement theory (see Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1996) have challenged the previous accounts (Edwards 2014). In the 1980s and 1990s, framing and culture (see Eder, 1993), in other words constructivist approaches, have provided a new perspective on the emergence of social movements and protest.

Most recently, previous political process theorists have readapted their accounts which led to the critical development of contentious politics. Contentious politics approach has differentiated from preceding perspectives in two respects. First, it adopts a broader scope of social movements which includes not only social movements but also revolutions, strike waves, nationalism, democratization and so on (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2004). Secondly, in trying to identify recurrent mechanisms and processes that led to social movement mobilisation they combine structural, cognitive and political explanations and define contentious politics on the basis of environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms (see McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2004). Although these approaches have differed from one another on several respects, according to Edwards (2014: 4-5), it is possible to define four points accepted by all theories in the field:

1. "Social movements are collective, organised efforts at social change, rather than individual efforts at social change."

2. "Social movements exist over a 'period of time' by engaging in a 'conflictual issue' with a 'powerful opponent', rather than being 'one-off' events."

3. "The members of a social movement are not just working together, but share a 'collective identity'"

4. "Social movements actively pursue a change by employing protest"

The final point is the one that interests this study most, particularly in terms of the political change these movements have initiated. It has to be kept in mind that throughout history, social and political change has been mainly triggered by collective action of masses. In this sense, one of the key purposes in studying social movements should be to delineate the ways in which movements shape and redefine the conventional ways of doing politics. Although some changes can only be observed in the long-run, even in the short-run movements can introduce new actors, new issues, new methods, and new discourses to the disposal of conventional politics (Tilly, 2003).

However, as mentioned before, the relationship between contentious and conventional politics has been a neglected one in the literature on social movements, though there are some studies that tried to pin down the mechanisms through which contentious politics interacts with routine politics.

Goldstone (2003: 2), for instance, argues that workings of not only party politics but also courts and legislatures cannot be analysed without referring to the constant impact of social movements. From this perspective, he tries to bridge the gap between what he calls institutionalised and noninstitutionalised politics, challenging conventional view which suggests that there are only two possible ways states might interact with social movements: repression or reluctant co-optation (2003: 20). Contrary to that he suggests that there are several ways states might respond to social movements: "repression with institutional change", "repression without institutional change", "toleration and encouragement", "influence with institutional change", "influence through ongoing alliance", and "influence through movement spin-off political parties". (2003: 21-23) However, with the exception of final mechanism Goldstone provides a general account of how states might respond to social movements rather than how movements might redefine the terms of routine politics. Accordingly, he seems to be missing short term impacts of movements on electoral politics and focusing too much on the state side of story.

At this point, McAdam and Tarrow's (2010) study shows an important pathway to follow in order to discern the ways in which movement might shape electoral politics. They argue that movements can exert influence over political actors in several ways (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). First, they can "introduce new forms of collective action that influence election campaigns" (2010: 533). With the first mechanism they refer to the possibility that

certain parties can adapt the innovative methods used by movements in their campaign organisations. Secondly, protest movements might "join electoral coalitions or, in extreme cases, turn into parties themselves" (2010: 533). This second example occurs when movements take the electoral option, meaning that this is the point at which they decide to form a political party. According to McAdam and Tarrow, although this option happens in extreme cases, there are nevertheless several examples of movements following conventional forms of electoral mobilisation through party formation (2010: 533). Conversely, they can either initiate "proactive electoral mobilisation" or "reactive electoral mobilisation" (2010: 533). Whilst proactive electoral mobilisation occurs when certain elements of movement groups take part in electoral campaigns, reactive electoral mobilisation means "escalating protest in the wake of an election" (2010: 554). The final mechanism works when discontented segments of the electorate separate from their parties and either form a new political movement or carry their message to other forms of politics.

Malone and Fredericks (2012) also discuss how movement politics might interact with electoral politics by analysing the Occupy Wall Street in relation to US electoral politics. They argue that the movement's energy and attention have already transformed the political arena by generating a new market for political actors. They identify two major possibilities of how political elites might respond the movement: either they adapt the movement

and its message, or they might embrace the message without forming a relationship with movement (2012: 208).

Accordingly, the contention herein is that some form of adaption, change and co-optation in conventional forms of politics is expected to happen, one way or another – as the literature on social movements also suggests (Malone and Frederiks, 2012). Even in the short-run it is valid to discuss and observe how these demands from the wider population have unfolded and to establish whether there has been any interaction between these movements and democratic politics at large.

5.1.2. What Changes Gezi and 15M brought in the Short-run?

Following the premises of above mentioned discussion, here we concern with the question of how Gezi protests and 15M movement have interacted with their respective electoral arenas. Although it is still too soon to discuss the outcomes of these protests, looking at some follow-up trends we can come up with early observations about what changes these two protests have provided.

While it has only been two years since the Gezi Park protests, Turkey has since experienced three elections (local, presidential and general) in all of which, one way or another, the protest movement itself has remained on the

agenda. Keeping in mind that elections are major opportunities for observing the impact of social movements (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010: 533), the validity of discussing the changes, or lack thereof, made as a result of the Gezi movement still holds true. The 15M movement, conversely, occurred four years ago, and the political party that emerged out of the protests, Podemos, has turned into one of the major forces on the Spanish political scene. Most recent opinion polls suggest that Podemos is the third party behind the two mainstream parties, the PP and the PSOE, in Spain (NC Report, 2015).

Here the goal is to define which mechanisms, if at all, were at work in the two cases under examination, which will be achieved by referring to major political events experienced in the light of protest movements. Although the degree of change differs, in both cases the national political structure was affected by these mass protests. In the case of Turkey, the Gezi Park protests were quite influential in providing a number of parties with a new discourse of politics as well as innovative methods of campaigning and in designing the content of these electoral campaigns. Looking at the results of the 2015 general elections, one may also claim that the movement has played a role in shifting electoral loyalties through mobilising certain groups from one party to another. In the Spanish case particularly, the movement not only led to the establishment of a brand new political party, but also led to realignment along the lines of previous smaller political parties which appeal to discontented segments of the population.

5.2. Turkey: Interaction through Election Campaigns

Since the Gezi Park protests Turkey has been through three critical elections: local, presidential and general. As the AKP emerged victorious in the local elections of March 2014, garnering around 43% of total votes, and in August 2014 Erdoğan has won the first direct presidential elections, some observers argued that the protests were ineffective in shifting votes from the AKP to opposition parties (see Carkoglu, 2014). This line of argument follows that Gezi protestors were mainly composed of liberal and left-leaning social groups who are already part of opposition and therefore they do not represent a group of swing voters (Carkoglu, 2014). Consequently, they argued that the movement and protestors failed to change the electoral balance of power in the country and to introduce a new political actor. However, although the Gezi protests neither spawn the birth of a new political party, as was the case for the Spanish 15M movement, nor led to significant changes in electoral balance it has nevertheless influenced the way politics has conducted since.

First, in all elections that have followed, the Gezi protests have remained on the agenda of main political contenders, and so as a result they shape the content of the electoral campaign (proactive electoral mobilisation). While some parties such as the CHP try to appeal to Gezi protestors, others like the AKP build its campaign by taking a stance against the movement, while others, for instance, the HDP, employed the discourse of

the protests in their electoral campaign, especially in Western part of the country. Secondly, some of the innovative methods like mobilisation through social media, or humorous language employed by the protests have been used in party campaigns in all three elections. Adaption of innovative methods introduced by social movements by political parties has been one of the central ways through which contentious politics affects and changes electoral politics. The energy and dynamism of movement find expression through these innovative methods and parties take advantage of already sold tactics. Moreover, particularly in the most recent general elections a certain degree of realignment has been observed in that a group of voters separated from their parties and voted for the party that formed its electoral campaign on the discourse and demands of Gezi movement.

Accordingly, Gezi protests have interacted with electoral politics in several ways. In what follows, this section initially discusses the reactions of major political factions to the Gezi protests and how the major political parties prefer to frame the protest movement. Then, events in the background that shaped political processes after the movement will be discussed. Finally, in the light of three electoral campaigns, we will look into the mechanisms at work that link protest movements to conventional political agents.

5.2.1. How did Political Parties Frame the Protests?

As the AKP government was the major target of the protests, the party was extremely keen to distance itself and its constituency from the movement. Accordingly, although originally some leading figures in the party criticised the disproportionate and extreme use of force by police against the environmentalist protests (BBC, 2013), as support for the protests from national and international actors grew, they reset the tone and differentiated between the initial and the subsequent phases of the protests. The argument was that in the beginning the protestors mobilised themselves based on an environmental agenda, but later on it turned into a 'political' movement which aimed to "limit the authority of Erdoğan, to isolate and weaken him, to convince him to cooperate, to force him to negotiate; in brief, to exercise control over him prior to the Presidential elections" (Ete and Tastan, 2013).

According to this reading, these were all done in order to harm Turkey's economic performance and undermine its international credibility. Erdoğan himself also followed this line and claimed that his government was facing a trial coup, initiated by national and international enemies, which aimed at ousting the AKP government as well as him. In other words, for the AKP government the Gezi Park protests were an international conspiracy organised by a vaguely-defined "interest-rate lobby" and its national allies, and subsequently supported by international media corporations. This confrontational stance taken by Erdoğan aimed at consolidating the AKP's

hold on power by demarcating lines between supporters of the AKP and its opponents, between friends and foes, and between us and them. Accordingly, since the protests mainly targeted the AKP government and its policies, the party defined itself as the opposite of the Gezi movement and preferred to remain aloof in relation to anything connected to the protests. Nonetheless, this very attitude of the party demonstrated how movements can shape the ways in which a party defines its position. So, though not positively, the party's discourse has been highly affected from the protests leading to a change in party's political messages.

The main opposition party, the CHP, conversely, took a totally different approach to the protests and considered these groups of protestors as being part of its own constituency. According to the party, the Gezi movement demonstrated that Turkey had developed a democratic culture and the protestors were struggling for a liberal, pluralistic and participatory democracy against the government's rising authoritarianism. From this perspective, the CHP asserted that the Gezi movement and the CHP shared common values such as freedom, human rights, gender equality, pluralism, tolerance and democracy (CHP Gezi Report, 2014). Moreover, in the party's report on the protests, it is suggested that the demands of the movement overlapped with the party's policies and programmes, in that similar to the Gezi movement, the CHP also supported "the right to the city", thereby increasing participatory mechanisms in decision-making processes,

particularly at the local level, and fighting against the government's authoritarian practices (2014: 37).

In general terms, the CHP sided with the movement. Accordingly, during the protests, the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu visited Gezi Park, and CHP parliamentarians tried to negotiate with police in order to prevent the extreme use of force. In addition, they provided legal assistance to those who were detained, and the CHP as a political party took this issue on board as one of the most significant sociological developments in the country (Türmen, 2013), and therefore aimed at promoting these new demands. However, here it has to be noted that although the protests' major target was the AKP government, as was also argued before, these protests manifested a general disaffection with all major political parties in Turkey, since they all seemingly failed to represent the electorate. From this perspective, the CHP was also part and parcel of the problem, though it preferred to stand by the Gezi movement.

In the initial phase of the protests, the MHP took a careful approach, in that the leader of the party, Bahçeli, referring to Sırrı Süreyya Önder, stated that the MHP would never involve itself in a protest which was led by the postman of the PKK (Vatan, 2013). Later on, though, as the protests expanded and the anti-government stance of the movement transpired, he changed his tone and stated that these protests, triggered by environmental concerns, were a cry for individual autonomy, democratic rights and freedom (Radikal,

2013a). He asserted that the Gezi protests were directed against the government's increasing authoritarianism and Erdoğan's continuous scorn for youth (Haberturk, 2013). However, Bahçeli also warned that illegal organisations, marginal groups and the PKK might capitalise and hijack the movement for their own ends; therefore, he asserted that the protestors had to be alerted to these groups (2013). Moreover, he also suggested that the right way to topple the AKP government passes from the ballot box not from the streets (Ersay, 2013). Clearly, the MHP's statist approach also found expression in their perception of the Gezi protests. Although they supported the idea that the AKP government's increasing authoritarianism was unacceptable – and therefore the protests had a point – the party was against taking the fight to the streets.

The BDP also approached protests cautiously in the beginning. Although one of the BDP parliamentarians, Önder, played a key role in publicising the protests in the very early days, as the protests grew the party withdrew its support and the leader of the BDP, Demirtas, stated that they would not act together with nationalists and fascists who were trying to hijack the protests in order to cease peace talks launched between Öcalan and the government (Milliyet, 2013b). From this point of view, he also suggested that the movement had the potential to turn into a coup against the government (Cumhuriyet, 2013a), though later on, as the protests spread throughout the country, he also reset his tone and first recapped on Önder's role at the beginning of the protests, before then asserting that they were the

result of the government ignoring the 50% of the population which did not vote for the AKP (Radikal, 2013b). However, he was also attentive to the survival of peace talks and called for the protestors to adopt the discourse of peace and resolution (2013b).

Although their motivations were different, both the MHP and the BDP, in the early days, framed the protests in relation to the Kurdish issue. Here, it has to be noted that although the MHP had never supported the idea of protesting in the streets, this method had been employed by elements of the BDP and its predecessors for several years. Consequently, the HDP, the party founded by constituents of the Kurdish movement and a fraternal party to the BDP, turned into the main political force into which the messages of the Gezi protests were received.

In a nutshell, looking at immediate responses of major political factions, it can be suggested that the Gezi protests, one way or other, have affected all major political parties in the system forcing them first to respond the movement and then to readapt their positions in relation to the demands of protest movement.

5.2.2. Political Developments in the Post-Gezi Process

Just after the Gezi Park protests, Turkey was hit by a corruption scandal, known as the '17-25 December Operations', which emerged due to the conflict between the government and the Gülen movement, one of the strongest religious communities in the country. The scandal occurred when draft allegations were disclosed in December 2013 involving important AKP Cabinet members. Prosecutors accused significant numbers of important figures from the government, including sons of three Cabinet members as well as the general manager of a state bank and a young Iranian business man, of bribery, fraud and corruption (Hurriyet , 2013a; Letsch,

2013), and 14 of them, including sons of ministers, were arrested (Aydın, 2013). This scandal was the worst crisis to hit the government since they came to power, and it was one of the biggest corruption scandals in the history of Turkey. Erdoğan, once again, related these allegations to the same "axis of evil" that had initiated the Gezi protests and was composed of internal and external enemies, but this time one culprit was clearly identified, namely the Gülen movement, which had been one of the collaborators of the AKP government since 2002 but with whom relations had started to deteriorate from 2012 onwards. The government was rather quick to put the blame on the Gülen movement, arguing that police officers and public prosecutors were all members of the movement, and Erdoğan named the movement as a "parallel state" with the aim of toppling the existing order by using deep state connections (Lowen, 2014). With the goal of covering draft

allegations, Erdoğan projected himself as the last man standing for the project of great Turkey.

At the same time, the AKP government also increased its control over all aspects of social and political life. Erdoğan claimed that the parallel state's moves were an extension of the Gezi protests, in that they both had the same goal of preventing Turkey becoming an important world power. Consequently, he broadened the struggle and waged open war against the "axis of evil". Several operations were conducted against both Gezi protestors and the Gülen movement by the government.

The components of Gezi protests such as the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (*Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği*, TMMOB), Turkish Medical Association (*Türk Tabipler Birliği*, TTB), football fan groups, and individual protestors as well as some business groups who were claimed to support movement were all faced with harsh government retaliation. For instance, through a motion, the TMMOB's, a member of Taksim Solidarity Network which is one of the major groups that initiated the protests, powers and revenues were transferred to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning which meant the loss of group's financial resources and autonomy (Pamuk, 2013). The Ministry of Health initiated an investigation against the TTB which provided Gezi participants with medical support during protests (Amnesty International, 2014); the Ministry of Education opened numerous investigations against high school teachers and

students (Hurriyet, 2013b); Koç group which owned Divan Hotel that provided protestors with safe haven during protests was faced with unannounced inspection from the Ministry of Finance (Cumhuriyet, 2013b); in the media significant number of journalists that supported the protests were fired or forced to resign; and several lawsuits were filed against football fan club, Çarşı on charges of "attempting to overthrow the government" (Hurriyet Daily, 2014) and against Gezi protestors on charges of "opposing the law on meetings and demonstrations," "causing damage to public property," "ignoring the security chief's demand for dispersal" and "resisting to prevent one from doing his duty" (Benli, 2015). Moreover, a new security law was passed by parliament that has increased the police powers, opened the way for the use of firearms against protestors by police forces, and stipulated five years of imprisonment for covering faces during protests (Hogg and Solaker, 2015). In other words, government has increased its grip on social and political opposition which also indicated rising authoritarianism in the country.

All that said, it can be argued that the state's response to movement was total "repression with institutional change" (see Goldstone, 2003). However the interaction streams between the movement, on the one hand, and the government and opposition on the other, go beyond the sole repression by state and observing other mechanisms requires a deeper look into electoral processes.

5.2.3. Elections and Gezi

The March 2014 local elections took place against this backdrop. The central gist of the AKP's local election campaign was that conservative groups and the AKP were under attack from liberal left-wing Gezi protestors allied with the West and the Gülen movement, in order to undermine the AKP government and to prevent Turkey's rise on the international stage (Carkoglu, 2014b: 171). From this perspective, the AKP asked the electorate to back it against what it saw as its national and international enemies. Though the party's share of the vote decreased in comparison to previous general elections, the AKP still won the election, garnering 42.89% of the vote. Looking at these results, it seems that Erdoğan was successful in convincing his electorate about foreign conspiracies and mobilising the party's supporters against an outside attack. The election campaign of the AKP shows clearly the impact of the Gezi protests on electoral politics, albeit negatively, based on the fact that the foundation of the AKP's electoral campaign was grounded on its response to the Gezi protests.

The interaction between the movement and electoral politics can be better described by analysing the presidential election campaign process. Following the local elections, in August 2014, for the first time Turkey went to the polls to elect its president. Although Erdoğan received 51.79% of the total vote, won the election and moved to the presidential office, one of the surprises was the success of Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the HDP, who

came third in the polling by garnering 9.76% of the vote which is way above the average votes received by precedent political parties of Kurdish movement. Demirtaş was the rising star of the Kurdish political movement, and his decision to run for presidency was positively received by leftist and liberal groups in Turkey. When his campaign organisation is analysed in terms of its proposals, slogans, campaign materials and collective action methods, the influence of the Gezi movement can be seen clearly.

First of all, coming from the ranks of Kurdish movement, Demirtaş was very careful in appealing to the wider electorate, including leftists, social democrats and liberals, besides the Kurdish minority, and in this respect his campaign focused on the questions of democratisation, human rights and rule of law (Grigoriadis, 2015; see also Kalaycioglu, 2015). Although the HDP's project of becoming a party goes back to times before the Gezi movement, Demirtaş's presidential candidacy benefited from the discourse, messages and methods of the Gezi movement significantly. Clearly, Demirtaş recognised the gap in Turkish politics and aimed to go beyond the identity politics for which the Gezi protestors had shown disdain. Moreover, one of the major proposals of Demirtaş as a presidential candidate was to form "People's Parliaments" (*cumhur meclisleri*), designed to increase the active participation of young people in decision-making procedures (Sozcu, 2014). Keeping in mind that one of the major demands of the Gezi movement was participatory democracy, which would increase the involvement of citizens in decision-making, Demirtaş seemed to receive the message. Furthermore,

throughout his campaign Demirtaş underlined the importance of radical democracy, by going beyond the liberal definition of democracy and including the concept of difference in terms of opinions, races, ethnicities, classes, genders, sexual orientations and worldviews (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Accordingly, his slogans were "Democratic Change and Peaceful Turkey" and "*Imagine a president who does not discriminate, is a democrat to everyone, who unites and reconciles…*". He formed the foundation of his electoral campaign on the concept of a "call for a new life," in which there would be no ethnic, religious, gender or class discrimination. The Gezi movement's call for a new public culture respectful of the other (Gole, 2013), its pluralistic character and its plea for a new democracy evidently influenced Demirtaş's election campaign.

As mentioned before, one of the ways in which movements can interact with conventional politics transpires when the innovative methods of collective action are adopted within an electoral campaign. Here, social media, which was the main tool used to mobilise people during the Gezi protests, was widely used by Demirtaş. Likewise, one of the songs of the Gezi protests, "Sound of Pots and Pans" (*Tencere Tava Havası*) with lyrics "*Enough with inconsistent remarks and bans; enough with headstrong decrees and commands; we've had enough; we're really fed up; what arrogance what hatred*", was used as a campaign song for Demirtaş, albeit with a few minor changes. Moreover, some of his campaign pictures were taken in Gezi Park,

indicating the extent to which Demirtaş wanted to link its electoral campaign to the protests.

The 2015 general election was also critical moment to trace the impact of the protest movement on electoral politics. Throughout the election campaign, the AKP continued to portray the Gezi movement as its opposite and to hold on to the international conspiracy discourse; albeit negatively, the movement was still influencing the content of the AKP's electoral campaign. Conversely, the movement had a more aligning impact on both the CHP and the HDP's campaigns.

Though indirectly, one might claim that there were two ways in which the CHP interacted with the movement. First of all, for the first time in 34 years, the CHP decided to determine a significant portion of its candidates (55 cities, including the major cities out of 81 provinces) through party primaries. More importantly, all party members – not only delegates – had the right to cast their votes in order to choose the candidates that would best represent the party in parliament (Benli, 2015). Although it is hardly possible to claim that the party's adoption of party primaries was a direct impact of the Gezi protests, keeping in mind the CHP's claim to represent its constituency, the influence of the movement should not be undermined. It can therefore be argued that this was an indirect response to the demands of the Gezi protestors, who asked for a more inclusive democracy wherein citizens would be part of the decision-making process. Secondly, the CHP

aimed to go beyond ethnic and religious politics through basing the foundation of its electoral campaign on economic questions. Here, once again, this move had deeper roots going back to 2010 and to the change of leadership, though the discovery of its constituency's dislike of identity politics might have facilitated the process of reform in the party and forced it to redefine its position on the political spectrum.

The movement's influence is much more visible in the HDP's election campaign. With the aim of becoming a national rather than a regional party in Turkey, which was a different approach to the previous elections, the HDP, the sprinter of the Kurdish movement, decided to contest the elections through party candidates rather than through independents. This move was also related to Demirtaş's success in the presidential elections, which demonstrated that a pro-democracy and human rights alliance between the Kurdish movement and social democrats and liberals could pass the 10% election threshold (Grigoriadis, 2015: 109-110). From its emblem to its slogans and campaign methods, once again the HDP was the main party to capitalise on the Gezi movement, which was the best way to appeal to non-Kurdish, disaffected leftist and liberal voters.

The party's foundation of the electoral campaign was based on the idea of radical democracy, which can be best observed from the campaign slogan "*We are Alevites, we are environmentalists, we are disabled, we are youth, we are women, we are workers, we are for free world, we are LGBT…*". In

the HDP's election manifesto, besides common political issues such as economic development, democratisation, a new constitution, the Kurdish question and democratic autonomy, the questions of ecology, the rights of women and LGBT, gender equality and animal rights were also included (HDP Manifesto, 2015). The underlying themes of the campaign, such as pluralism, radical democracy and participation as well as emphasis on post-materialist rights, overlapped with those of the Gezi protesters.

The success of the party, which received 13.1% of the total vote and secured 80 seats in parliament, highlights that the HDP managed to go beyond its original regional presence and managed to convince large cities that it was the right choice. Research on election results signifies that most of the new votes for the HDP came from previous AKP voters, so in that respect a part of the Kurdish electorate who had formerly supported the AKP turned to the HDP this time (KONDA, 2013). That said, around 1,000,000 votes and around 15% of HDP votes seemed to come from non-Kurdish and mostly previous CHP voters (KONDA, 2013; see also Cilekagaci, 2015). This number is particularly important, as it might indicate that the HDP's focus on new politics and a new life, and its struggle to overcome the existing parameters of politics, found support amongst the disenfranchised segments of society, while the ideas and methods seen at Gezi Park provided the party with the perfect tools to reach these people. In this sense, it can also be claimed that the involvement of Gezi in the content of elections led to a realignment and a shift in the electoral regime.

However, it has to be noted that most of the significant figures of the HDP comes from the ranks of Kurdish movement and the core constituency of the party is composed of members of Kurdish ethnic minority. Therefore, although party's connection to Kurdish political movement is advantageous for stabilising its vote share and its position in the political arena, it obstructs party's ability to appeal broader segments of society, particularly non-Kurdish left-wing liberal groups. After the elections with the relapse of the conflict between the PKK and the state this limitation has come to the fore. From this perspective, it still remains to be seen to what extent and how long the HDP will be able to hold on to radical democracy discourse and so to keep pro-democracy left-wing alliance under its roof.

All in all, looking at election results from the Gezi movement onwards one might suggest that the protests have been ineffective in changing the electoral balance of power (see Carkoglu, 2014) and therefore the interaction between the movement and conventional politics has been rather limited in the case of Turkey. However, it still had an impact on institutionalised politics, as the Gezi movement not only provided parties with a discourse of new politics and with innovative methods of campaigning but also it gave some parties the courage to adopt this new discourse and made them aware of a different type of constituency. Needless to say, it also has to be kept in mind that it is still too early to assess the genuine impact of Gezi on electoral politics, as is a significant sociological development whose influence will be better observed over time.

The main contention of this research is that one of the major factors behind the Gezi movement was a crisis of representation experienced at two levels: on the one hand, the ideological abyss in the political spectrum and the politics solely based on ethnicity and religiosity left certain segments of society unrepresented; on the other hand the government ceased to maintained the balance between responsiveness and responsibility. While the first level is related to all major political parties in the system, the latter level mostly pertains to the act of governing. In the light of aforementioned discussions from the side of government the problem seems to be deepened as the AKP has continued to adapt exclusionary discourse aiming to consolidate its own constituency at the expense of larger public so the government still fails to act responsible thereby worsening the crisis. However, opposition forces, particularly the CHP and the HDP, have seemed to receive the message of the movement as both parties try to go beyond ethnic and religious politics which has potential to redefine the parameters of Turkish politics and so to attend the crisis. However, it has to be kept in mind that opposition parties' ability to go beyond ethnic politics is highly dependent on how the Kurdish question will be resolved. Acceleration of conflict in the region might force these parties, particularly the HDP, to adopt ethnic political discourse which in turn would reinforce ethnic cleavages and make it extremely difficult for parties to hold on to the premises of Gezi Park protests.

5.3. Spain: the Rise of New Politics

As the previous discussion clarified, there are several ways through which protest movements can interact with conventional politics. The most extreme or advanced type of interaction occurs when the movement itself turns into a political party, which is what happened in Spain. The Indignados movement that emerged out of a collective anger against the political class and its austerity measures evolved into a political party: *Podemos* (We can). Interestingly enough, since its foundation in January 2014, Podemos has become one of the central actors on the political scene and is trying to challenge and redefine the parameters of the Spanish two-party system, the roots of which go back to the 1970s.

In this section, in order to track the impact of the 15M movement on electoral politics of Spain, we look into the development of Podemos. As the Spanish case exemplifies evolution from a movement into a political party, looking at the process of party formation and the ways in which this new party challenged the existing political structure would better demonstrate the interaction between movement and electoral politics. First, we scrutinise the process that gave birth to the new political party. Here mobilisation, organisation and leadership of a political movement will be discussed. Next, how Podemos interacts with the political structure and how it tries to redefine Spanish politics will be analysed. Finally, we examine the party's performance in the European and regional elections and what these results

say about the future of Spanish politics and here we also discuss how these changes relate to crisis of representation. The story of 15M and Podemos is one of the best cases for observing the relationship between contentious and conventional politics.

5.3.1. Birth of a New Political Party

The 2008 economic crisis brought to the fore the growing problems of European politics. In several European countries popular resentment against the political class's failure to respond to the crisis effectively led to the strengthening of anti-establishment and anti-austerity parties against the established political order. Most of these parties were already in the system and had tried to capitalise on societal resentment. In Spain, conversely, an anti-austerity party was established from scratch, by turning widespread protests in May 2011 into a new body. Needless to say, this was a challenging process, and when Podemos was founded in January 2014 it was the end result of a well-thought political project.

As argued before, the 15M movement resulted from a crisis of representation in two respects. First, the convergence of political parties in the ideological spectrum left individualised voters with a number of unrepresented, diverse and complex demands, and second, as parties lost control over policymaking, due to the forces of globalisation, they lost contact

with the electorate and failed to react accordingly. In these circumstances, the most expected result was the emergence of a new political actor which would represent a disenchanted population. Podemos emerged within this context. Pablo Iglesias (2015: 10), the leader of the party, argues that economic crisis that entrapped Eurozone countries, particularly Spain, has led to a political crisis and in the case of Spain this crisis itself has exhausted the political and social system which dominated the post-Franco era. According to Iglesiad (2015: 10), the end-result of this crisis was the emergence of 15M movement which led to the formation of Podemos, the principal political expression of protest movement.

This concise story of Podemos begs the question as to how come, in such a short time, could a movement turn into one of the major political actors within a long-established and institutionalised Spanish party system? In order to answer this question, it is orderly to analyse the mobilisation process, the organisation, and party's leadership.

During and after the protests of 2011, as part of the 15M movement, neighbourhood assemblies were formed in towns and cities across Spain. The major goal of these assemblies, organised around certain issues, was to discuss the way ahead for the movement and to come up with proposals for political action (Salutin, 2012). Although over time participation in the assemblies decreased, this mode of organising support formed the cornerstone of the Podemos ethos (Tremlett, 2015), and these grassroots

assemblies played a key role in the establishment of "circles," which were the central organisational units of Podemos. At the beginning of 2014, the common view shared by elements of the 15M movement was that they should organise themselves around a political movement.

In January 2014, the political leadership of Podemos was composed of a group of academics from Complutense University of Madrid in association with activists from Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth without a Future), student associations, several other political and social organisations and notable members of 15M (Iglesias, 2015). Using social networks, TV shows, public events, propaganda and momentum gained within 15M, the group called for the establishment of "Podemos circles" throughout the country. In a very short time the participation rate in these circles increased extensively, and the leadership published a manifesto entitled "*Making a Move: Turning Indignation into Political Change*," which called for taking the issue into the political arena (Seguin and Faber, 2015). With this manifesto, Iglesias, the leader of the movement who was a hands-on activist and a political scientist from Complutense, asked members to sign a petition if they agreed that this initiative would survive and turn into a political party; members voted 'yes', with more than 50,000 signatures received in less than a day (2015). As a result, they decided to take part in the European Parliament elections, in which Podemos received around 1.2 million votes and gained five seats.

Besides these circles, the party also made active use of social networks, mass media and a charismatic leadership. It is a well-known phenomenon that most recent protest movements across the world have benefited from social media. In this respect, the 15M movement was not an exception, as the majority of the protestors mostly composed of younger generations were very experienced in the use of digital tools. Therefore, it is not surprising that Podemos as a political party effectively adopted social media tools in its campaigning and mobilisation. The numbers support this claim. As of today, while Podemos has 977,055 likes on Facebook, both the PSOE and the PP have 96,000 likes. Similarly, on Twitter, Podemos has 635,000 followers while the PP has 349,000 and the PSOE 264,000. This also applies to the leaders of the parties: Pablo Iglesias has 1,120,000 followers while the leader of PSOE, Pedro Sanchez, has 166,000 and Rajoy (the PP) 879,000. Although numbers alone do not say much about the extent of usage, they are suggestive. Moreover, in order to increase citizen participation, social media tools such as Reddit, Appgree and Loomio have also been actively used by the party as forums wherein members discuss certain issues. On the Subreddit platform, for instance, Podemos members propose, debate and amend political positions of the party, which led *The New Yorker* to name Podemos as "the world's first Reddit Party" (2015; see also Blitzer, 2014).

The fact that the party also used these tools in the process of political party formation indicates the extent to which the organisation embraces social media. In September 2014, it initiated a two-month Constituent

Congress, in which more than a thousand circle meetings, broad online debates and electronic elections took place (Seguin and Faber, 2015). A mass meeting in the Palacio Vistalegre in Madrid was also organised, and more than 100,000 people participated in the process, at the end of which the organisational structure and the principles of the party were designed. Iglesias was chosen as the secretary general of the party. All of these processes highlighted that Podemos as a political organisation was determined to embrace direct democracy at all levels of the decision-making process.

In a similar vein, mass media is very professionally used by the Podemos, and television particularly has been conceived as one of the major means through which public opinion is shaped. Iglesias (2015: 93) suggests that television is one of the main means that conditions and shapes the way people think and it also constructs social values "at a much higher level of intensity than the traditional sites of ideological production: family, school and religio".

Actually, Iglesias was very well aware of the importance of mass media before the formation of his political movement, as he and a group of academics from Complutense, on an alternative television channel, produced and directed the discussion programmes *La Tuerka*, *Fort Apache* and *Tertulia Politica de Resistancia* with the aim of gaining experience and also dominating television media in order develop tools for political

communication (Pavia et al., 2015). This experiment and experience opened the way for Iglesias to participate in discussion programmes on Spain's mainstream channels, which needless to say increased his popularity. The TV appearances of Iglesias and other leading figures in Podemos were given the utmost importance and played a key role in the process of campaigning.

Iglesias, as a political figure, also widely benefited from his TV appearances, as he demonstrated his vision, skills and leadership. The image of a pony-tailed professor who was young, self-confident and assertive worked for Iglesias, who, in a very short time, turned into a media star with strong political ideas (Tremlett, 2015). His popularity and charisma were employed by the party effectively, in that it decided to print his image on the ballot papers for the European elections, as his face was better known than the party emblem (Pavia et al., 2015).

While most of the 'Occupy' mobilisations have defined themselves as leaderless and have opposed conventional politics, the 15M movement's story of party formation involved a strong leader and someone who played a key role in publicising the movement, increasing its popularity and convincing voters to vote for Podemos. However, although the leadership, as a conventional method, has been used effectively in order to increase party's appeal, the party also benefited from 21st century tools. Particularly, the extreme use of social media tools in order to increase participants and members' say in decision-making procedures has not only attended the 15M

movement's demands for greater participation and new ways of doing politics but also constituted a good example of how political parties in advanced democracies suffering from high levels of disaffection and distrust might respond to cognitively mobilised voters.

5.3.2. Interactions with the Political Structure

Here we will examine the ways in which Podemos, through a new discourse based on radical democracy, tries to redefine existing parameters of Spanish party system and discuss how the party interacts with other political actors in the system. Actually, the story of the development of Podemos's political ideology goes back to the early 2000s so years before the 15M movement, when a group of young academics from *Universidad Complutense de Madrid* and from the *Centro de Estudios Politicos y Sociales (CEPS)* started to question the established rules of the Spanish political system (Reyes, 2012). Long before the mass protests that followed the global economic crisis and subsequent disillusionment in 2008, this group, influenced by Gramsci, acknowledged the centrality of discourse in the formation of political identity and started to challenge the hegemonic discourse in Spain which was inherited mainly from transition and reproduced by two main parties (Pavia et al., 2015). Their contention was that there was a need to develop a new collective vision for Spanish politics which would put people in the centre, not the political elites and their global allies.

From this point of view, they followed Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxist views and their concept of radical democracy, according to which there are multiple identities and therefore multiple grievances in modern societies, and so this requires democracy to be built around difference and dissent (Mouffe, 1996). The role of socialists within this picture was to bring together disgruntled groups such as LGBT, the unemployed, feminists and environmentalists against the establishment (Trenlett, 2015). More importantly, Laclau's views on populism particularly influenced the political ideas of Iglesias and his friends. Laclau suggested that populism should be understood through its form, not its content, because only then will its ability to differentiate the social between "people" and "the dominant ideology" or "the dominant bloc" transpire – a notion critical to developing a vision for the people (Laclau, 1977). In other words, Laclau considered populism as an important way to redefine the terms of democracy and for radical democracy to prevail within the established political system. Iglesias himself also wrote years before the advent of 15M that when citizens are not satisfied with the ways in which democracy functions, then it is time for a form of populism that provides a new and dichotomous division within society: the people against the elite, the poor against the rich, the radical democracy against the liberal democracy (cited in Pavia et al, 2015; see also Iglesias, 2005). In other words, Iglesias and this group of young academics as well as activists have discussed and wrote heavily on how Spanish politics should be redesigned on the basis of radical democracy.

The same group also played an active role in the 15M movement and tried to translate these political ideas into collective political action in the process of party formation. Accordingly, Podemos was affected considerably by Laclau's views and the party was very successful in building its political vision on the ideals of radical democracy. From the very beginning, Iglesias used the concept of "*la casta*" when referring to corrupt political elites from the two major parties (PSOE and PP) as well as business elites who were responsible for the current ills of Spanish politics, the economy and society at large. By employing the degrading notion of "*la casta*" he aimed at developing a new populist discourse and introducing a new division in Spanish politics between "*la gente*" (the people), represented by Podemos, and "*la casta,*" represented by the mainstream parties, particularly the PSOE and the PP (Pavia et al., 2015). This discourse adopted by Podemos was a very strategic move aiming at reframing Spanish politics previously shaped by left-right and centre-periphery cleavages along the lines of populism. What is more interesting here is that both the PSOE and the PP blamed Podemos for acting in a populist manner, but the party up to that point had managed to define the terms of populism in its own right.

Besides introducing a new way forward, Podemos also affected other political parties and the political system as a whole, in that it forced other factions to change their discourse, tactics and even leadership (Seguin and Faber, 2015). The IU, for instance, changed its leader with Alberto Garzon, a young economist who had a positive relationship with Iglesias, while the

governing party, PP, was forced to introduce anti-corruption laws and the PSOE also replaced its old secretary general with Pedro Sanchez, a young and charismatic figure who dressed like Iglesias (2015). In other words, although the success of Podemos in general elections remained to be seen, it had already shattered the parameters of the established system by reframing the dynamics of political practice.

5.3.3. Elections and Podemos: A New Party System?

Since its inception, Podemos has taken part in the European elections in May 2014, the Andalusian parliamentary elections in January 2015 and regional elections in May 2015. After its surprising success in the European elections, in which it gained around 8% of the national vote and won five seats out of 54 Spanish seats in the European Parliament, the party continued to spread its appeal to wider segments of society. In the European election manifesto, Podemos's pledges included nationalising the private banking sector, decent wages and pensions, the right to decent housing, the rejection of privatising public services and common goods, ecological reconversion of the economy, food sovereignty, a rejection of international military interventions and the introduction of an open participatory process for citizens (The Socialist Network, 2015). All in all, Podemos's manifesto was in line with the concerns and demands of the 15M movement, and as such it aimed at responding not only to immediate economic issues, but also to the diverse expectations of a diversified electorate with alternative policy proposals. Needless to say, most

of the promises were products of populism, and the question of how to put these into practice was left unanswered, but nevertheless the party managed to reach disaffected segments of society and in its first elections became the third most popular faction in the country.

In the Andalusian parliamentary elections, it once again came third, behind the PSOE and the PP, but this time it received 15% of the vote in a region which had been a stronghold of the PSOE since 1977 (Kassam, 2015). Winning 15 seats in parliament, for the first time Podemos started to turn into a genuine political force in regional politics, and many therefore interpreted this development as a sign of change in the Spanish party system. Another important result of the election was the rise of *Ciudadanos* (Citizens), a liberal faction founded in 2006 in the Catalan region, which received 9.3% of the vote and gained nine seats in the Andalusian elections. The Ciudadanos also aimed at capitalising on the existing dissent thrown at mainstream parties and to that end frame itself as a national party. However, different to Podemos, the Ciudadanos was a liberal party in that rather than challenging the existing system as a whole, they proposed revisions and reforms in economic and social policy, thereby providing a safe haven for those scared by Podemos's radical stance (Ciudadanos, 2015).

In May 2015, Podemos had its first experience of regional elections, which are considered a good marker for the upcoming general elections. Once again Podemos came third, this time winning 119 seats in total in

regional parliaments. Although the party did not perform as well as foreseen by the opinion polls, it still managed to challenge the position of the PP, which lost 2,500,000 votes, and the PSOE, which lost 700,000 votes compared to the municipal elections four years previously (Hedgecoe, 2015). As a result of the elections, the PP lost its majority in every region, including Valencia, Madrid and Zaragoza, which were previously traditional strongholds (Global Times, 2015). What is also critical here is that although the PP held its position as the largest party nationally, and the PSOE remained the second party, Podemos received sufficient support to determine the conditions for coalition politics for most of Spain's largest cities and regions (The Irish Times, 2015).


Figure 5.1: Opinion polling, Source: The Spain Report

Analysing election trends from the European elections onwards, and looking at the results of opinion polls, in the coming general elections Podemos,

together with Ciudadanos, might break the two-party dominance of the Spanish party system. However, rather than totally crushing the mainstream parties, which was the case in Greece, the Spanish case will most probably experience a change whereby the mainstream parties continue to receive around 50% of the vote in total, but they are unable to form a majority government unless it is with the support of young parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos (Casal Bértoa, 2015).

Consequently, and different to the case of Turkey, interaction between a protest movement and electoral politics ended up with the formation of a brand new political party in Spain. The success of the party demonstrates the extent to which movements can redefine and influence conventional politics. What happened after the 15M movement – formation of a new party and strengthening of other smaller parties- also confirms our contention that the crisis of representation, resulted from mainstream parties' becoming alike and their failure to act responsive, was the major factor, if not the only one, behind the mass protests. On the one hand, a brand new party, the Podemos, and a relative newer political party, the Ciudadanos, have gained unexpected strength in the political system so two alternative forces increased their appeal and challenged the position of mainstream parties who fail to come up with alternative discourses. From this perspective, new political actors emerged in order to resolve the deadlock of the political system. The Podemos, conversely, adopted the discourse of populism and mainly aimed at acting responsive to the demands of population even at certain times at the

expense of responsibility. To this end, the party has been very careful in framing its position on the side of "people" against the elites. In other words, the party has targeted the resentment of population against political elite responsible to international forces by strengthening its responsiveness to population. However, it has to be noted that this carries the risk of enhancing responsiveness while degrading responsibility which would again lead to a crisis of representation. On the other hand, as the case of Syriza has demonstrated in Greece, when these populist parties came to power, they are mostly forced to readapt their position as the current realities of European economy limits not only mainstream but also these parties' space for maneuver.

All in all, the interaction stream between contentious and conventional politics in the case of Spain reaffirms the contention of this study since as expected the party system has responded the crisis of representation through new actors and new agendas.

5.4. What Explains Differences?

Throughout this chapter, we decipher the ways in which social movements have interacted with the routine politics in Turkey and Spain in the aftermath of protests and analysed the terms of adaption and change in each political

system. Consequently, we also looked at how this interaction has related to the crisis of representation in both cases.

What is observed is that in both cases movements had clear influence over the way politics is conducted since; however, the mechanisms of interaction have varied. While in the case of Turkey already existing political actors have adopted their discourse and tactics and no sharp changes is experienced in electoral balance of power, in Spain a new political force emerged out of the movement, other small parties strengthen their positions and the electoral strength of mainstream parties has extremely declined to the extent that long-lasting two party system in the country seems to come to an end.

Here it is also vehemently important to explain cross-country variation in the ways in which contentious politics interact with conventional politics. As discussed in the first section, there are several ways through which movements can influence the functioning of political system. But depending on the social and institutional constrains of a given country the mechanism of interaction might differ. The question here is why Spanish politics has experienced the formation of a new party and a party system change, whilst in the case of Turkey the change occurred mostly in the discourse and campaigning tactics of existing political forces without leading to a clear party system change.

As in the literature on party politics suggests that institutional and social factors determine the functioning of political systems, looking at the institutional system and sociological conditions, the reasons of why the terms of interaction between protests movements and electoral politics have been different in Turkey and Spain can be discerned. While the institutional factors draw the boundaries of political practice (see Lijphart, 1999; Sartori, 1994; Shugart, and Carey, 1992; Linz, 1994), the sociological factors account for the demand side of story as they determine the type of cleavages in society (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Chibber, 2001; Desai, 2002; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986).

5.4.1. Institutional and Social Constraints in Turkey

The design of political institutions has been considered one of the fundamental determinants of political system in any country (see March and Olsen, 1984). The constitutional design in Turkey was mainly constructed by military leaders following limited or no consultation with other political elites and mainly aimed at preventing small groups from gaining political representation (McLaren, 2008). Therefore, the electoral rules such as 10% election threshold, provisions and eligibility criteria for public funding and requirements of party formation were all introduced to serve this goal. From this perspective, it has been a challenging task to establish a new political party if there is no significant amount of support from the society.

As discussed previously, the Gezi movement has never been strong enough to challenge the electoral balance of power since the proportion of people joined or supported the protests constituted minority, mostly based in large cities. This can also be grasped by looking at the educational level of protestors which is way above the population averages. Carkoglu also argues that as these people are mostly composed of liberal left leaning and mostly young people, they are already voting for the opposition and so unable to challenge the AKP's continued electoral strength which prevents a party system change. Consequently, lacking the support of sufficient proportion of population and required financial sources, under these electoral rules and regulations the best options for Gezi movement were either to ally with existing political parties and or movements which already developed strong roots in society or to stay as a civil society organisation.

In sociological terms, as discussed before, from the early years of the republic, the major socio-cultural cleavages of Turkish politics have been determined by attitudes towards religion (Sunni-Islam versus secularism) and ethnicity (Kurdish versus Turkish ethnics), which in turn have also described left-right self-placements (Kalaycioglu, 2010). Whilst secularists tend to place themselves on the left, Sunnis have placed themselves on the right of the political spectrum (Kalaycioglu, 2008). On the other hand, Kurdish ethnic nationalists tend to place themselves on the extreme left and Turkish nationalists on the extreme right (2008: 309). When the voting behaviour in Turkey is analysed what is seen is that majority of population

tend to identify themselves with right-wing politics. Checking the electoral trends from 1983 onwards whist the right wing votes account for around 60% of total votes, the centre-left and left wing votes remain around 30 to 40%. Therefore, there has been a strong right-wing leaning in Turkish politics. As the right is defined on the basis of religiosity and ethnic nationalism and Gezi protestors are mostly composed of liberal and left-leaning social groups (Carkoglu, 2015), the difficulty for the Gezi movement to reach this well-positioned right-wing electorate transpires. Although Gezi protestors also aimed at challenging existing parameters of left-right spectrum and asked for new politics, current sociological realities of the country make it very difficult for movement to expand its appeal.

5.4.2. Politics, Society and Movement Politics in Spain

In the case Spain as well institutional rules have been mostly restrictive though not as much as the Turkish case. During the democratic transition Spanish political elites were attentive to avoid fragmentation and political instability and therefore in designing the electoral system they limited the proportionality of the system which makes it extremely difficult for small parties to increase their appeal. Through using, low district magnitude, closed list d'Hondt, high levels of over-representation of rural provinces and 3% threshold for each magnitude, the proportionality of the system has been decreased which has supported the mainstream parties (Chari, 2013: 378).

In sociological terms, the major advantage of the 15M movement has been the significant degree of cognitive mobilisation in Spanish society which led to growing individualisation of society as well as growing dissatisfaction from politics (Magone, 2009). This individualised population hit by the economic crisis has been more and more critical towards existing parameters of political practice. This enabled both Podemos and the Ciudadanos to increase their appeal. As the population at large started to question definition of existing left-right spectrum, introduction of a new cleavage into politics by Podemos, between the people and *la casta*, worked extremely well under current sociological conditions. Moreover, the 15M movement received widespread support among Spanish public which can be mainly defined as left-leaning and this makes it easier for Podemos to change the electoral balance of power.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Understanding the factors behind the emergence of protest movements has been one of the major concerns of both social studies and comparative politics not only because throughout the history social movements have been the main forces of social and political change but also because they reveal the dynamics of complicated relationship between human action and social as well as political structures. This study maintains this search and rather than considering protest movements as the irrational expression of social dissent, it attempts to explain the emergence and influence of mass mobilisations in relation to the functioning of political systems and to locate protests within the political context of a given country.

Analysing the Gezi movement in Turkey and the 15M movement in Spain comparatively, our findings suggest that one of the major factors behind the current wave of protests has been the crisis of representation experienced at two different levels. On the one hand, diversified voters have

been left unrepresented not only due to convergence or divergence of political parties in the political spectrum but also because of parties' inability to satisfy people's search for new politics that go beyond conventional forms of political action in each country. The parties in government, conversely, have failed to act responsible and responsive at the same time, either enhancing responsiveness at the expense of responsibility (as was the case in Turkey) or vice versa (which was what happened in Spain). In other words, when people cannot find political contenders to represent their demands and expectations, and when parties in government fail to fulfil the requirements of party government model, then crisis of representation is experienced, which in turn makes people search for other ways of expressing their views.

Besides accounting for the question of what explains protest movements in otherwise two dissimilar cases, this research also looked at what happens after the protests movements and how movement politics interact with electoral politics. According to our findings, although the interaction streams differ depending on the social and institutional structure of a given country, in both cases under examination protest movements affect the functioning of politics and the ways in which routine politics have adopted to movement politics is highly determined by the type of crisis of representation the country experiences.

While in the case of Turkey, parties have to adopt their discourses and tactics in line with the concerns of protest movement, in Spain a new political

actor emerged out of the 15M movement. In responding representation crisis, on the one hand, in both cases existing or new opposition parties have attempted to widen the political spectrum through changing their ways of doing politics. On the other hand, in Turkey they have started to underline importance of responsibility in governing as both the CHP and the HDP, two major parties that aligned with the movement, have tried to present themselves as parties for all. In Spain the focus has been more on responsiveness best expression of which is the Podemos's way of presenting itself as the party of people, '*la gente*', against the parties of elites, '*la casta*'. Accordingly, the very fact that the type of crisis has determined parties' way of responding protest movements has verified the central argument of the research which is that crisis of representation is the main factor behind the rise of protest movements, if not the only one.

6.1. Summary of Findings

This research mainly examines the questions as to what explains the emergence of contemporary mass protests, and what the impact of these protests on routine politics is. Analysing two dissimilar cases of Turkey and Spain, first, the dynamics of current disaffection from party democracy have been clarified in order to define what is meant by a crisis of representation. Herein, both supply and demand side of story have been clearly examined

with the aim of developing theoretical and analytical framework for the following empirical chapters.

Then two cases, Turkey and Spain, have been analysed respectively and how a crisis of representation materialised in real cases is demonstrated empirically. In the case of Turkey, both increasing polarisation that has created huge gap in the political spectrum, and parties' inability to go beyond ethnic and religious politics have left important segments of society unrepresented. Conversely, the AKP government has lost its command over a cross-ideological coalition and began to respond to its own Islamic constituency at the expense of wider population, which in turn decreased party's ability to serve for public good, in other words to act responsible.

In the Spanish case, lasting two-party system that dominated politics from democratic transition onwards has started to lose its appeal as two major parties, the PSOE and the PP, have become alike. The convergence of two parties in the political spectrum, once again, has left certain segments of society unrepresented mainly because these parties have failed to come up with alternative policy proposal for meeting the demands of diversified electorate. On the other hand, forces of Europeanisation and globalisation have limited parties' ability to control policy-making, particularly in economic policy, and this in turn has further alienated voters as parties have neglected responsiveness. The contention was that understanding the current wave of protests requires careful analysis of party systems as crisis

of representation resulted from party failures is the major factor behind the protest movements.

Furthermore, this research has provided an analysis of what happened after the movements in two cases under examination in order to discern the dynamics of interaction between contentious and conventional politics. What is observed is that different types of adoption and change took place in Turkey and Spain. In the case of Turkey, while the governing party, the AKP, position itself to the opposite of what the Gezi protests represents, the opposition front has formed more aligning relationship with the movement. The CHP, for instance, has acknowledged the demands of movement and not only reformed its candidate selection procedure, leaving more say to party members in the process, but also has attempted to go beyond the existing parameters of party politics, previously shaped by ethnicity and religiosity. Although it is difficult to claim that these moves are directly resulted from the Gezi Park protests, the movement's demands for increasing participation in decision-making procedures and its call for new politics have certainly affected the CHP. After all, the protestors were considered to be discontented CHP electorate and this has forced party to listen to the demands of Gezi movement. The HDP, conversely, has become the major party to capitalise the movement politics in that the party has not only adopted innovative methods and slogans of the Gezi, but also changed its discourse in line with Gezi movement's demands – increasing its focus on radical democracy and trying to go beyond regional politics.

In the Spanish case a brand new political party, the Podemos, emerged out of protest movement which has managed to become the third party after the PSOE and the PP in all elections it participated. The formation of a political party from a social movement is actually the most extreme way of interaction between movement politics and electoral politics. The Podemos reflects the 15M movement in terms of its ideology, organisation, leadership style and decision-making procedures. From this perspective, popular mobilisation has introduced a new actor into the Spanish political system that has already started to change the way politics is conducted in accordance with the expectations of the movement.

Herein, the research also noted how the developments after the protests movements in both cases relate to the type of crisis of representation each country has experienced. In Turkey even though opposition parties have attempted to go beyond politics of ethnicity and religiosity, crisis of representation is likely to endure on the governing side, as the AKP government continues to disregard responsibility. In the Spanish case, on the one hand, two new political actors, the Podemos and the Ciudadanos, have managed to increase their appeal and challenge the dominant position of two mainstream parties. In this respect, alternatives to the PSOE and the PP are existent now which have potential to relieve the crisis. On the other hand, the problems as to governing persist not only because the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation remains constant

but also because the Podemos's populist position runs the risk of enhancing responsiveness, but this time, at the expense of responsibility.

This research also provided sociological and institutional account of why different kinds of adoption have taken place in two cases under examination. In the case of Turkey both the institutional constrains such as election threshold and limited party funding for small parties and social limitations such as the lack of congruence between Gezi protest's demands and that of population at large have worked against the emergence of a political force out of protests, though movement politics could influence the existing actors' campaign methods, discourses and policies. Institutional and social structure in Spain – less restrictive rules on the emergence and survival of small parties- and more aligning society with movement, conversely, have allowed the formation of a brand new political party which could also challenge the conventional politics. Consequently, it is argued that the way of interaction between contentious and conventional politics is highly depended on the institutional and social features of a given country.

6.2. Significance of the Research

As indicated in the introduction, there are several reasons why this study would be of interest to students of comparative politics, party politics and social movements. First, though social movements have been the major forces that affect the behaviours of political parties, interestingly enough not

many studies to date analyse protest movements in relation to party politics. Looking at not only the role played by parties and party systems in the emergence of movements but also the ways in which movements shape the electoral politics, this research provides a concurrent analysis of cause and effect of movement politics in relation to party politics. Essentially, this research follows the agendas Tilly (2003: 254) recommended to social movement analysts to go beyond general movement models, to check for comparative politics of the features of movements, and to observe the relationship between movement politics and other types of politics comparatively. From this perspective, the very attempt to address social movements with a comparative politics view and to relate movement politics to that of routine politics without using general movement models extend the literature on social movements as well as comparative politics.

In the political party scholarship, conversely, although crisis as to the functioning of party systems has been highlighted for a while (see Dalton, 2008, Dalton and Watteberg, 2000; Mair, 2008; 2009; 2013), the actual results of these party failures or how these results, in turn, influence and shape parties' behaviours, political tactics, organisation and ideology have been a rather neglected topic. However, analysis of interaction between contentious and conventional politics together with simultaneous observation of similarity and/or difference in adoption and change say a lot about not only the future of party politics but arguably democracy. As a

result, students of party politics might find this study useful in explaining the evolution of democracy.

Moreover, through comparing Turkey, an electoral democracy, with that of Spain, a consolidated democracy, this research shows that regardless of their democratic quality countries might face with the same problem of crisis of representation but with different trajectories. This finding is particularly relevant for democratisation studies as it gives important hints about weaknesses of party government model which might require a renewed approach to institutional architecture in the process of transition and consolidation, particularly with regards to the types of capacities parties should develop in representing extremely diverse voters of the 21st century.

Furthermore, the literature on populism and future of party democracy might also benefit highly from this research in the sense that the research has demonstrated the characteristics of current disaffection with democratic politics and related to that features of party failures. This is particularly important for understanding the rise of populist movements in Western Europe that challenge the mainstream parties significantly from Germany, the UK to France. A thorough analysis of identity, organisational structure, and decision-making processes of current wave of protests and how these have been adopted by their parties might provide a guideline for reform in democratic regimes. So, for instance, the Podemos's way of employing direct democracy such as organisation through internet,

formation of regional circles as central organisational structure, establishment of citizen assemblies, funding through members and election of party leader through online procedures, has a lot to offer mainstream parties that try to increase their political legitimacy. Therefore, studying the 21st century democracy, one needs to pay careful attention not only to the demands of "nowadays movements" such as increasing participation in decision-making processes but also how these protests themselves tackle with these questions as it would show possible directions of democratic reform in Western Europe and beyond.

6.3. Future Research

There are several aspects of social movements study. Though this research has emphasised on the party side of the story, many other interesting features of current mass mobilisations such as the use of social media, transnational connections, the identity of protestors, their social base, their response to varied political opportunity structures, organisational style, and prospects for institutional survival need to be analysed carefully as these protest movements have potential to challenge existing parameters of democratic practice. In this research, though we referred to the identity of protestors, and how they use communication technologies, limited attention was devoted to most of these features as the focus was on the party-related factors. However, analysing the other side of the story based on these

characteristics of current mobilisations would, for sure, make important contributions.

In the future, the approach and method adopted in this study might be expanded with other cases. Particularly, these protest movements might be studied in relation to Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests as the US political structure significantly differ from the cases analysed here. The dominant two-party system in the US, due to restricted electoral arrangements, gives almost no chance to a third party challenge, and therefore the party system provides a totally different political opportunity structure for the movements. Even under these circumstances, the OWS has many similarities to other mass mobilisations in terms of their demands and mobilisation tactics. Therefore, adding OWS to this comparative research using same method would make better equipped to deal with the causes and effects of "nowadays movements". One can also think of similar mobilisation in other parts of the world such as V for Vinegar in Brazil or the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong.

Moreover, another important task to be done as part of future research is to broaden the analysis of the relationship between contentious and conventional politics. Keeping in mind that social movements have been the major forces that initiate political and social reforms, this endeavour would display how the 21st century democracy might look like and what kind of a role political parties play within this new democracy. The rise of protest

movements in several parts of the world as well as the increasing appeal of populist parties have already forced established political forces to redefine their positions and attitudes, and knowing more about what went wrong would also provide policy-makers with important tools for tackling with all-embracing problem of social discontent.

Keeping in mind that political parties remain essential actors in democratic politics, understanding the failure of parties and party systems as well as how they interact with movements that challenge their position is a crucial task. Within this context, examining the ways in which parties and party systems function in relation to the emergence and outcomes of protest movements in different parts of the world has the potential not only to test the widely shared view that democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties, but also to explicate the complex relationship between democracy and parties in general. This is why a great deal of exciting work remains to be done.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramson, P.R. 1976. "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952-1974" *The American Political Science Review*, 70(2): 469-478

Abramson, P.R. and J. H. Aldrich. 1982. "The Decline of Electoral Participation in America", *The American Political Science Review*, 76(3): 502-521

Acedo, P.V. 2012. *No nos representan: el manifesto de los indignados en 25 propuestas (*They don't represent us: Manifesto of Indignados in 25 propositions*)*. Ediciones Temas de Hoy.

Acemoglu, Daron. 2013. "Development Won't Ensure Democracy in Turkey", *The New York Time*s, June 5.

Al Arabiya. 2013. "Mursi ouster in Egypt dents Turkey role model claims", July 6.

Alcaide, S. 2011. "Movimiento 15-M: los ciudadanos exigen reconstruir la política" (15M Movement: Citizens demand rebuilding of politics) *El Pais*, May 17.

Alessi, Christopher and James McBride. 2015. "The Eurozone in Crisis". Council on Foreign Relations February 11.

Amnesty International. 2014. "Gezi trials target health workers", May 6.

Anderson, Leslie E. 2009. "The Problem of Single Party Predominance in an Unconsolidated Democracy: The Example of Argentina" *Perspectives on Politics* 7(4): 767-784.

Arat, Yeşim. 2013. "Gezi Parkı Direnişi: Demokrasi Açığı, Demokrasi Gücü" (Gezi Park Protests: Democratic Gap and the Power of Democracy) *Bilim Akademisi*, August 1.

Avci, Gamze. 2011. "The Justice and Development Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment" *South European Society and Politics* 16(3): 409-421.

Ayata, Sencer and Ayse Gunes-Ayata. 2007."The Centre Left Parties in Turkey" *Turkish Studies* 8(2): 211-232.

Aydın, Ç. 2013. "İstanbul'da yolsuzluk ve rüşvet operasyonu" (Operation of Corruption and Bribery in İstanbul) *Hurriyet*, December 17.

Aydinli, Ersel. 2013. "The reform-security dilemma in democratic transitions: the Turkish experience as model?" *Democratization* 20(6): 1144-1164.

Baslevent, Cem (2009) "Evidence of polarisation in Turkish politics from survey data", http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1384590.

Balfour, S. 1996. "Bitter Victory, Sweet Defeat.' The March 1996 General Elections and the New Government in Spain" *Government and Opposition* 31(3): 275-287.

Bardi, L., S. Bartolini & A.H. Trechsel. 2014. "Responsive and Responsible? The Role of Parties in Twenty-First Century Politics" *West European Politics*, 37(2): 235-252.

Barnes, S. 1977. *Representation in Italy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. 1990. *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Basedau, M. 2007. "Do party systems matter for democracy". *Votes, money and violence. Political parties and elections in Africa, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute,* 105-143.

Barnes Samuel, Peter McDonough and Antonio Lopez Pina. 1985. "The Development of Partisanship in new democracies: The case of Spain" *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 (4): 695-720.

Bastian, Sunil and Robin Luckham. 2003. *Can Democracy be Designed?: The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn societies.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

BBC. 2012. "Eurozone Crisis Explained: Spain in Numbers", July 25.

BBC. 2013. "Turkey Deputy PM apologises to Gezi Park protesters", June 4.

Beck, P.A. & Jennings, M. K. 1991. "Family traditions, political periods, and the development of partisan orientations", *The Journal of Politics*, *53* (3): 742-763.

Beck, U. 1997. *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order,* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bekkers, V., Geske Dijkstra, and Arthur Edwards. 2007. "Governance and the Democratic Deficit: An Evaluation". In V. Bekkers et.al., eds., *Governance and Democratic Deficit*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 295-312.

Bernardo, J.M. 1984. "Monitoring the 1982 Spanish Socialist Victory: A Bayesian Analysis*" Journal of the American Statistical Institution*, 79 (387): 510-515.

Benli, Mesut H. 2015. "New case opened into 87 suspects for protests on Gezi Park's first anniversary in Ankara" *Hurriyet Daily News,* June 1.

Birch, Anthony. 2007. *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, London: Routledge.

Blais, André. 2000. *To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Blakeley, G. 2006. "'It's politics, stupid!' The Spanish General Election of 2004" *Parliamentary Affairs*, 59(2): 331-349.

Blitzer, Jonathan. 2014. "In Spain, Politics via Reddit" *The New Yorker,* October 7.

Blondel, J. and M. Cotta (eds) 2001. *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Blumer, H. 1951. "Soial Movements". In A. McClung Lee, ed., Principles of Sociology (2nd Edition). New York: Barnes and Noble.

Blumer, H. 1971. "Social Problems as Collective Behaviour" Social Problems 18: 298-306.

Boratav, Korkut. 2013. "Olgunlaşmış bir sınıfsal başkaldırı", *Sendika*, June 22.

Borre O. and D. Katz. 1973. "Party identification and its motivational base in a multiparty system" *Scandinavian Political Studies* 8: 69–111.

Buck, Tobias. 2014. "Leftwing Party Podemos surges to lead Spanish Polls" *Financial Times*, November 3.

Cagaptay, Soner. 2002. "The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era". *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6(4): 42- 48.

Cagaptay, Soner.2013. "The Middle Class Strike Back", *The New York Times*, June 5.

Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. Evanston, IL: Row.

Casal Bértoa, F. 2015. "Shake-up in Spain: Reform parties have broken the old two-party cartel", *Washington Post*, June 19.

Castañeda, Ernesto. 2012. "The Indignados of Spain: A Precedent to Occupy Wall Street" *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, 11(3-4): 309-319.

Castles, F. and Wildenmann, R. (eds) 1986. *Visions and Realities of Party Government* Berlin: Gruyter.

Chari, R. 2004. "The 2004 Spanish Election: Terrorism as a Catalyst for Change?" *West European Politics*, 27 (5): 954-63.

Chari, R. 2013. "The Parliamentary Elections in Spain, November 2011", Electoral Studies 32: 377-378.

Chari, R. and P.M. Heywood. 2008. "Institutitons, European Integration, and the Policy Process in Contemporary Spain". In B. H. Field and K. Hamnn, eds, *Democracy and Institutional Development: Spain in Comparative Theoretical Perspective.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Charnock, Greig, Thomas Purcell and Ramon Ribera-Fumaz.. 2012,
"¡Indígnate!: The 2011 popular protests and the limits to democracy
in Spain" *Capital & Class* 36 (1): 3-11.

Chibber, P.K. 2001. *Democracy without associations: Transformation of the
party system and social cleavages in India,* Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.

Chibber, P. and M. Torcal. 1997. "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party
Systems in A New Democracy" *Comparative Political Studies* 30(1):
27-54.

CHP Election Manifesto. 2015. *Yaşanacak Bir Türkiye* (A Turkey to live in).

CHP Gezi Raporu (Gezi Report). 2014. *Bilim Yönetim ve Kültür Platformu.*

Cilekagaci. 2015. *2011-2015 Genel Seçimleri Karşılaştırması* (A Comparison of
2011 and 2015 General Elections), June 18.

Ciudadanos Election Manifesto. 2015. *Empleo y reactivación económica*
(Employment and Economic Recovery).

Craig, S.C. 1985. "The decline of partisanship in the United States: A
reexamination of the neutrality hypothesis" *Political Behaviour* 7(1):
57-78

Cinar, Menderes. 2002. "Turkey's Transformation under the AKP rule."
Muslim World 96(3): 469-486.

Cinar, Menderes. 2007. "The Justice and Development Party and the Kemalist
Establishment in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey". In Umit
Cizre, ed, *The Making of the Justice and Development Party,* New York:
Routledge, 109-131.

Cizre, Umit. 2014. "Understanding Erdoğan's toxic recrimination in Turkey".
Open Democracy, February 13.

Collier, D. 1993. "The Comparative Method". In Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political
Science: The State of the Discipline II,* Washington, D.C.: American
Political Science Association.

Collier, David. 1993. "The Comparative Method". In Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II,* Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Colomer, J.M. 2001. "The 2000 general election in Spain" *Electoral Studies* 20: 463-501.

Colomer, J.M. 2005. "The General Elections in Spain, March 2004", *Electoral Studies* 24: 123-160.

Converse, P. 1969. "Of Time and Stability" *Comparative Political Studies* 2: 139-171.

Converse, P. and Pierce, R. 1986. *Political Representation in France*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Coskun, Mustafa K. 2013. "Gezi Parkı'nın Bileşenleri" (Components of Gezi Park), *Radikal 2*, June 30.

Cox and McCubbins J. Fearon. 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance". In Przeworski et al, eds, *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55-97.

Crewe, I. & Denver, D. T. 1985. *Electoral change in Western democracies: Patterns and sources of electoral volatility*. Croom Helm.

Cumhuriyet. 2013a. "Demirtaş'tan Gezi Parkı direniş yorumu" (An Interpretation of Gezi Park Protests from Demirtaş) *Cumhuriyet*, June 1.

Cumhuriyet. 2013b. "TÜPRAŞ hakkında soruşturma başladı" (A Case Opened against TÜPRAŞ), *Cumhuriyet,* December 26.

Cumhuriyet. 2015. "İşte HDP'nin yaptırdığı son anket" (Here is the last survey conducted by the HDP), July 28.

Çarkoglu, Ali. 2002. "Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?". *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6(4): 30-41.

Çarkoglu, Ali. 2012. "Turkey's 2011 Elections: Towards a Dominant Party System?" *Insight Turkey* 13(3): 43-62.

Çarkoglu, Ali & Ersin Kalaycioglu. 2007. *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society.* London: I.B. Tauris.

Çarkoglu, Ali. 2014. "Electoral Constellations Towards the August 2014 Presidential Elections in Turkey" *Global Turkey in Europe Policy Brief* 17.

Çarkoglu, Ali. 2014. "Plus ça Change Plus C'est la Meme Chose: Consolidation of the AKP's Predominance in the March 2014 Local Elections in Turkey" *South European Society and Politics* 19(2): 169-192.

Çarkoğlu, Ali. 2009. "The March 2009 Local Elections in Turkey: A Signal for Takers or the Inevitable Beginning of the End for AKP?" *South European Society and Politics* 14(3): 295-316.

Dagi, Ihsan. 2006. "The Justice and Development Party: identity, politics and human rights discourse in the search for security and legitimacy". In Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,* Utah: University of Utah Press, 88-106.

Dahl, R. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dalay, G. (2013) 'Why Turkey needs a better opposition?', *Al Jazeera*, July 15.

Dalton, R. 1984. "Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies" *The Journal of Politics* 46 (1): 264-284.

Dalton, R. 1999. "Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies". In Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R. J. 1984. "Cognitive mobilization and partisan dealignment in advanced industrial democracies" *The Journal of Politics*, 46(01): 264-284.

Dalton, R.J., S.C. Flanagan & P.A. Beck. 1984. *Electoral change in advanced industrial democracies: realignment or dealignment?*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dalton, R. and Wattenberg, M. 2000. "Partisan Change and Democratic Process". In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 276-299.

Dalton, R. 2003. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Decline in Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R., Farrell, D.M., McAllister, I. 2011. *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, Russell J., 2008. "The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarisation, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences". *Comparative Political Studies* 41(7): 899-920.

Dalton, Russell, David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister. 2011. "The Dynamics of Political Representation". In Rosema et al, eds., *How Democracy Work: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011, 21-38.

Dalton, R.J., D. Farrell & I. McAllister. 2011. "The Dynamics of Political Representation". In M.Rosema, B. Dentes and K. Aarts, eds., *How Democracy Works?: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, Amsterdam: Pallas Publications.

Dalton, R.J. 2006. *Citizen politics: public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies*. Washington DC: CQ.

Dalton, R. and Wattenberg, M. 2000. "Unthinkable Democracy: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies". In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2-18.

Dalton, R. 2003. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Decline in Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R. 2000. "The Decline of Party Identifications". In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dahl, R. 1970. *After the Revolution?.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Debouf, K. 2013. "Is Taksim Turkish Tahrir?". *Al-Monitor*, June 3.

Della Porta, Donetalla. 2015. *Social Movements in Times of Austerity*. London: Polity Press.

Della Porta, D. and Mario Diani. 2006. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Desai, Manali. 2002. "The relative autonomy of party practices: A counterfactual analysis of left party ascendancy in Kerala, India, 1934-1940" *American Journal of Sociology*, 108: 616-657.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1990. "Parliaments, consolidation, institutionalisation: a minimalist view". In: Liebert U and Cotta M, eds., *Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey.* London: Pinter, 31-49.

Dion, Douglas. 1998. "Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study" *Comparative Politics*, 30(2): 127–145.

Dix, Robert H. 1989. "Cleavage structures and party systems in Latin America" *Comparative Politics*, 22: 23-37.

Dogan, E. 2005. "The historical and discoursive roots of the Justice and Development Party's EU stance" *Turkish Studies* 6(3): 421-37.

Downs, A. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row

Duran, Burhanettin. 2007. "The Justice and Development Party's "New Politics": steering towards conservative democracy, a revived Islamic agenda or management of new crises". In Umit Cizre, ed., *The Making of the Justice and Development Party,* New York: Routledge, 80-106.

Duverger, M. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State*, New York: Wiley.

Eddles, Laura Desfor. 1998. *Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain. The Transition to Democracy after Franco*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eder, Klaus. 1993. *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies*. London: SAGE.

Eligur, Banu.2013. "Gezi Park protests: The AKP's battle with Turkish society", *The Jerusalem Post*, June 17.

Encarnacion, O. 2008. *Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Encarnacion, O. 2009. "Spain's New Left Turn: Society Driven or Party Instigated?" *South European Society and Politics*, 14 (4): 399-415.

Epstein L. 1980. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, New Brunswich: Transaction.

Ercan Bilgiç, E. and Z. Kafkasli (2013). *Gencim, Özgürlükçüyüm, Ne İstiyorum?* (I am young, libertarian, what do I want?). İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Ersay, Sami O. 2013. "Gezi Parkı Eylemleri, Devlet Bahçeli ve "Devlet Ciddiyeti" (Gezi Park Protests, Devlet Bahçeli and "The Seriousness of State"), *SETAV Atölye*, Temmuz 5.

Ete, H. and Tastan, C. 2013. "Political Roadmap after Gezi park protests" *SETAV Opinion*, October 8.

Farrell, D.M. & Webb, P. 2000. "Political parties as campaign organizations". In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 102-28.

Farro, Antimo L. & Deniz Günce Demirhisar. 2014. "The Gezi Park movement: a Turkish experience of the twenty-first-century collective movements" *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 24 (1):176-189.

Ferejohn, J. 1999. "Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability". In Przeworski et al, eds., *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131-153.

Field, B. N. and A. Botti. 2013. "Introduction: Political Change in Spain, from Zapatero to Rajoy". In B. N. Field and A. Botti, eds., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to Rajoy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Field, B. 2009. "Minority Government and Legislative Politics in a Multilevel State: Spain under Zapatero", *South European Society and Politics*, 14 (4): 417-434.

Finkel, Andrew.2012. "Turkey's Energizing Opposition" *The New York Times*, July 27.

Fiorina, M.P. 1990. "The Electorate in the Voting Booth". In L. Sandy Maisel, ed., *The Parties Respond*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Franklin, M.N., Thomas T. Mackie, and Henry Valen. 1992. *Electoral Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Freedom in the World. 2014. The Democratic Leadership Gap. *Freedom House*.

Gambetti, Zeynep. 2013. "The Gezi Resistance as Surplus Value" *Jadaliyya*, 5 June.

Geddes, B. 1990. "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics" *Political Analysis*, 2: 131–150.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.* Stanford: Stanford University

Gilmour, J. 2005. "Losing its soul: the changing role of christian democracy in the development of Spain's new right" *South European Society and Politics*, 10 (3): 411–31.

Giliomee, Hermann and Charles Simkins. (eds) 1999. *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publisher.

Global Times. 2015. "Popular party loses its shine as spanish voters turn to newly-fledged parties", May 29.

Graham, B.D. 1993. *Representation and Party Politics.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Grigoriadis, I. 2015. "The Turkish Presidential Elections of 10 August 2014". *Mediterranean Politics* 20(1): 105-110.

Goldstone, J. (ed) 2003. *States, Parties and Social Movements*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldstone, J. and Tilly, C. 2001. "Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Collective Action". In R. Aminzade, J.A. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E.J. Perry, W.H. Sewell; S. Tarrow and C. Tilly, eds., *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Göle, Nilufer. 2013. "Gezi- Anatomy of a Public Square Movement" *Insight Turkey* 15(3): 7-14.

Gray M. and and Caul, Miki. 2000. "Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies: 1950–1997" *Comparative Political Studies*, 33: 1091–122.

Gumuscu, Sebnem.2013. "The Emerging Predominant Party System in Turkey" *Government and Opposition* 48(2): 223-44.

Gunes-Ayata, Ayse. 2002. "The Republican People's Party" *Turkish Studies*, 3(1): 102-121.

Gunther, R. and J. Hopkin. 2002. "A crisis of institutionalization: The Collapse of the UCD in Spain". In R. Gunther et.al., eds., *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gunther, R., Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad. 1988. *Spain after Franco. The Making of a Competitive Party System*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N., & Puhle, H. J. (eds.) 1995. *The politics of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective.* Baltimore: JHU Press.

Gurkaynak, Refet and Selin S Boke. 2013. "AKP döneminde Türkiye Ekonomisi" (Turkish Economy under AKP Rule) *Birikim* 296: 64-69.

Gursel, Kadri. 2014. "Erdogan's Heavy Hand in Turkish Media", *Al Monitor*, February.

Gursoy, Yaprak. 2012. "The Changing Role of Military in Turkish Politics: democratization through coup plots?" *Democratization* 19(4): 735-760.

Gürcan, Efe Can & Efe Peker. 2014. "Turkey's Gezi Park Demonstrations of 2013: A Marxian Analysis of the Political Moment" *Socialism and Democracy*, 28(1):70-89.

Haber 7. 2013. "Devlet Bahçeli: Gezi'nin arkasında PKK var" (Devlet Bahçeli: There is PKK behind Gezi), June 7.

Habermas, J. 1981. "New Social Movements". *Telos* 49: 33-7.

Habermas, J. 1990. *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Haberturk. 2013. "Devlet Bahçeli'den Gezi Parkı açıklaması" (Gezi Statement from Devlet Bahçeli) *Haberturk*, Haziran 7.

Hanley, D. and Loughlin, J. (eds.) 2006. *Spanish political parties.* Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Harmel, R. and Janda, K. 1982. *Parties and Their Environments*, New York: Longman

HDP Election Manifesto. 2015. *Büyük İnsanlık* (Great Humanity).

Hedgecoe, G. 2015. "Political transformation of Spain likely to be driven by Podemos as PP loses out; Austerity policies and claims of fraud have steered voters towards the new" *The Irish Times*, May 26.

Heper, Metin. 2005. "The Justice and Development Party government and the Military in Turkey" *Turkish Studies* 6(2): 215-231.

Hinich, M. and M. Munger (1994) *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*, Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press.

Hogg, Jonny and Gulsen Solaker. 2015. "Turkey passes tough new security law, raising fears of election crackdowns" *Reuters*, March 27.

Holman, Otto. 1996. *Integrating Southern Europe: EC Expansion and the Transnationalism of Spain*, London: Routledge.

Hooghe, L. & G. Marks. 2001. *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration,* Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Hopkin, J. 2005. "From census to competition: the changing nature of democracy in the spanish Transition". In Sebastian Balfour, ed., *Contemporary Politics of Spain.* Basingstroke: Palgrave.

Hurriyet. 2013a. "2 Bakan oğlu ile Reza Zarrab tutuklandı" (Sons of two ministers and Reza Zarrab are arrested), December 21.

Hurriyet. 2013b. "Gezi parkı eylemlerine katılan 13 öğretmene soruşturma" (Investigation against 13 teachers who participated in Gezi Park protests), September 16.

Hurriyet Daily News. 2014. "Protests, solidarity mark beginning of coup-plot case against Turkish fan group çArşı", December 16.

Iglesias, P. 2005. "Un nuevo poder en las calles. Repertorios de acción colectiva del Movimiento global en Europa. De Seattle a Madrid" (A new power in the streets. Global Movements' Repertoires of collective action in Europe. Seattle to Madrid) *Política y Sociedad*, 42 (2): 63–93.

Iglesias, Pablo. 2015. "Understanding Podemos" *New Left Review* 93: 7-22.

Igsız, Asli. 2013. "Brand Turkey and Gezi Protests: Authoritarianism, Law and Neoliberalism". *Jadaliyya*, July 12.

Inglehart, R. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. 1999. "Postmodernism Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy". In Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Isaac, Jeffrey C. 2013. "The Rule of Law, Democracy and Intelligence". *Perspectives on Politics* 11(4): 1007-1010.

İdem, Şadi. 2013. "Gezi nereye? Türkiye nereye?" (Where Gezi is heading? Where Turkey is heading?). *Bianet,* July 23.

Jenkins, Gareth. 2013. "The Turkish Protests and Erdogan's Disappearing Dreams". *The Turkey Analyst*, June 9.

Jenkins, J.C. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protest". *Social Problems* 42: 493-512.

Jenkins, J.C. and Perrow, C. 1977. "Insurgency of the Powerless: The Farmer Worker Movements 1946-1972". *American Sociological Review* 42: 249-68.

Kalaycıoglu, Ersin. 2008. "Attitudinal Orientation to Party Organisations in Turkey in the 2000s" *Turkish Studies*, 9(2): 297-316.

Kalaycioglu, Ersin. 2010. "Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Centre Predominant Party?'" *Turkish Studies* 11 (1): 29-44.

Kalaycioglu, Ersin. 2011. "The Turkish-EU Odyssey and Political Regime Change" *South European Society and Politics* 16(2): 265-278.

Kalaycioglu, Ersin. 2012. "Turkey at the Polls: Democratization, Economic Liberalization and Islam in Turkish Politics", paper presented at *International Studies Association (ISA)'s Annual Conference*. San Diego, April 1-4.

Kalaycioglu, E. 2013. "Siyasal Katılmanın Anatomisi" (The Anatomy of Political Participation) *Bilim Akademisi*, August 1.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2015. "Turkish Popular Presidential Elections: Deepening Legitimacy Issues and Looming Regime Change" *South European Society and Politics*, 20(2): 157-179.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1996. *The rise of Christian democracy in Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Karaveli, Halil M. 2013. "Erdogan and the Challenge of Coping with Change". *The Turkey Analyst*, November 20.

Kassam, A. 2015. "Spanish anti-austerity party Podemos wins 15 seats in Andalusia" *The Guardian*, March 23.

Katz, R.S. 1986. "Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception". In Francis G. Castles and Rudolf Wildenmann, eds., *Visions and Realities of Party Government*. Florence: EUI, and Berlin: de Gruyter.

Katz R. S. 1980. *A Theory of parties and electoral systems.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Katz, Richard. 1987. *Party Government: European and American Experiences*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Katz, R. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization: The Emergence of Cartel Party" *Party Politics*, 1(5): 5-28.

Kazim, Hassain. 2013. "Turkish Discontent: Gezi Protests Spawn New Party", *Spiegel Online International*, November 15.

Key, V. O. 1964. *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, New York: Crowell.

Keyder, Çağlar. 2014 "The New Middle Class", *Bilim Akademisi*, August 1.

King, A. 1969. "Political Parties in Western Democracies", *Polity*, 2(2): 120-140.

King, G., Keohane, R.O., and Verba, S. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Knutsen, O. 2006. *Class Voting in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

KONDA Araştırma. 2013. "Gezi Parkı Araştırması: Kimler, Neden Oradalar ve Ne İstiyorlar?" (Gezi Park Research: Who is There, Why They are There and What They Want?) *KONDA Araştırma*.

KONDA. 2015. *7 Haziran Sandık ve Seçmen Analizi*. (June 7 Ballot and Voter
   Analsis) KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık.

Kornetis, Kostis. 2014. "Is there a future in this past?" Analyzing 15M's
   intricate relation to the Transición" *Journal of Spanish Cultural
   Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/14636204.2014.938432.

Kselman, D. 2013. "Protest and Democracy in Turkey". *infoLibre*, June 6.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2006. "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of
   the Justice and Development Party". In Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The
   Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,* Utah:
   University of Utah Press, 136-159.

Laakso, Markku and Taagepera, Rein. 1979 ''Effective' Number of Parties: A
   Measure with Application to West Europe' *Comparative Political
   Studies* 12 (1): 3-27.

Laclau, E and Mouffe, C. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
   Radical Democratic Politics.* Verso: London.

Laclau, E. 1977. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism,
   Populism*. London: Verso.

Landman, Todd. 2008. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An
   Introduction*. (3rd Edition) London: Routledge.

Letsch, C. 2013. "Turkish ministers' sons arrested in corruption and bribery
   investigation" The Guardian, December 17.

Lijphart, Arendt. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and
   Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.* New Haven, CT: Yale University
   Press.

Lijphart, Arendt and Carlos H. Waisman. 1996. *Institutional design in new
   democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America.* London: Westview
   Press.

Likki, Tiina. 2012. "15M Revisited: A Diverse Movement United for Change"
   Zoom Politico 11: 1-15.

Linz, Juan J. 1994. "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?". In Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1–72.

Linz, Juan José and Stepan, Alfred C. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: JHU Press.

Lipset, S.M. and Stein Rokkan. 1990. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments". In P. Mair, ed., *The West European Party Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lorey, Isabell. 2014. "The 2011 Occupy Movements: Rancière and the Crisis of Democracy" *Theory Culture Society,* published online 7 October 2014, DOI: 10.1177/0263276414550835.

Lowen, M. 2014. "Turkey's Erdogan battles 'parallel state'" *BBC News,* December 17.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The new institutionalism: organisational factors in political life" *The American Political Science Review*: 734-749.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering institutions: The organisational basis of politics.* New York: Free Press.

Martín, Irene & Ignacio Urquizu-Sancho. 2012 "The 2011 General Election in Spain: The Collapse of the Socialist Party" *South European Society and Politics* 17 (2): 347-363.

Magone, J.M. 2003. *The Politics of Southern Europe: Integration into the European Union.* New York: Preager.

Magone, J.M. 2009. *Contemporary Spanish Politics.* New York: Routledge.

Mainwaring, S., A. M. Bejarano, and E.P. Leongomez. 2006. "The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Anders: An Overview". In S. Mainwaring, A. M. Bejarano, and E.P. Leongomez, eds., *Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mair, P. 2002. "Populist Democracy vs Party Democracy". In Y. Meny & Y. Surel, eds., *Democracies and a Populist Challenge*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mair, P. 2005. "Democracy Beyond Parties" *Center for Study of Democracy Working Paper.*

Mair, Peter. 2008. "The Challenge to Party Government". *West European Politics* 31(1-2): 211-234.

Mair, P. 2009. "Representative versus Responsible Government", *MPIfG Working Paper,* 09/8: 11.

Mair, P. 2013. *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*. London: Verso Books.

Maravall, J.M. 1999. "Accountability and Manipulation". In Przeworski et al, eds., *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 154-196.

Manin, B. 1997. *The Principles of Representative Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..

Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes. 1999. "Introduction". In Bernard Manin, , Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, eds., *Democracy, Accountability and Representation,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-26.

McAdam, D. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

McAllister, I. 1991 "Party Elites, Voters and Political Attitudes: testing three explanations for mass elite differences" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24: 237-268.

McLaren, Lauren. 2008. *Constructing democracy in Southern Europe: a comparative analysis of Italy, Spain, and Turkey.* London: Routledge.

Melucci, A. 1996. *Challenging Codes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metzger, Megan. 2014. "Dynamics of Influence in Online Protest Networks: Evidence from the 2013 Turkish Protests", Paper Prepared for MPSA Conference 2014.

Miller, W.E. 1976. "The Cross-national Use of Party Identification as a Stimulus to Political Inquiry." In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds., *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*. New York: Wiley.

Miller, W. and D. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress" *American Political Science Review*, 57: 45-56.

Milliyet. 2013a. "Bahçeli Gezi parkındaki gençlere seslendi" (Bahçeli's Call to Youth in the Gezi Park), June 13.

Milliyet. 2013b. "Demirtaş: Süreci baltalamak isteyenlerle yanyana olmayız" (Demirtaş: We cannot stand by the ones who want to hinder the process), June 1.

Molina, Óscar and Alejandro Godino. 2013. "Economic Reforms and the Labor Market: Zapatero's Endless Period in the Wilderness". In B. N. Field and A. Botti, eds., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to Rajoy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Morlino, L. 2010. "Authoritarian Legacies, Politics of the Past and the Quality of Democracy in Southern Europe: Open Conclusions" *South European Society and Politics* , 15 (3): 507-529.

Morlino, Leonardo.1998. *Democracy between consolidation and crisis: parties, groups, and citizens in Southern Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morell, Mayo Fuster. 2012. "The Free Culture and 15M Movements in Spain: Composition- Social Networks and Synergies" *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, 11:3-4, 386-392.

Mouffe, C. 1996. *Democracy, Power, and the 'Political'*. In S. Benhabib, ed., *Democracy and Difference,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 245-255.

Muftuler Bac, Meltem. 2005. "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union" *South European Society and Politics* 10(1): 16-30.

Muller, W. and Hanne M. Narud (2013) "Party Governance and Party Democracy". In W.C. Müller and H. M. Narud, eds, *Party Governance and Party Democracy:* 1-18.

Neuman, S. 1956. "Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties". In S. Neuman,ed., *Modern Political Parties*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Nie, N. H., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. R. 1993. "The decline of partisanship". In Richard G Niemi, Herbert Weisberg, eds., *Classics in Voting Behavior,* Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 235-246

Norris, P. 1999. "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?". In Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. (ed.) 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (ed.) 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

OECD Data. 2009-2014. Spain. OECD.org.

OECD Data. 2009-2014. Turkey. OECD.org.

Offe, Claus. 1985. "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics" *Social Research* 52(4): 817-868.

On Islam. 2013. "Turkey unrest trouble Arab Islamists", June 9.

Onis, Ziya. 2003. "Globalization, Democratization and the Far Right: Turkey's Nationalist Action Party in Critical Perspective" *Democratization* 10(1): 27-52.

Ottaviani, Jacobo. 2014. "Crowdsourcing youth migration from southern Europe to the UK", The Guardian, October 2.

Ozbudun, Ergun. 1981. "The Turkish party system: institutionalization, polarization, and fragmentation" *Middle Eastern Studies* 17(2): 228-240.

Ozbudun, Ergun. 2000. *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Pamuk, 2013. "Turkey curbs power of architect group involved in protests" *Reuters*, July 10.

Papadopoulos, Y. 2007. "Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel Governance" *European Law Journal* 13(4): 469-486.

Papadopoulos, Y. 2010. "Accountability and Multi-level governance: more accountability, less democracy" *West European Politics*, 33 (5): 1030-49.

Pateman, C. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pallares,F. and M. Keating. 2003. "Multi-Level Electoral Competition Regional Elections and Party Systems in Spain" *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 10 (3): 239-255.

Pavia, Jose M., Bodoque, A. and Martin, J. 2015. "Podemos, a hurricane in the Spanish crisis of trust. Analysis and Characterization". Paper presented at Nottingham Trent University "Citizens, Parties and Political Action: Political Participation and the General Election 2015 Conference". Nottingham, February 2.

Peña-López, Ismael, Mariluz Congosto & Pablo Aragón. 2014. "Spanish Indignados and the evolution of the 15M movement on Twitter: towards networked para-institutions" *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 15(1-2): 189-216.

Pedersen M. 1979. "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: changing patterns of electoral volatility" *European Journal of Political Research* 7: 1-26.

Pharr, Susan J. and Putnam, Robert D. (eds.) (2000). *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pino, Mario Espinoza. 2013. "Politics of Indignation: Radical Democracy and Class Struggle beyond Postmodernity" *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society*, 25(2): 228-241.

Pitkin, H.F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Poguntke, T. and S.E. Scarrow. 1996. "The politics of anti-party sentiment: Introduction" *European Journal of Political Research*, 29 (3): 257-262.

Pollack, Benny. 1983. "The 1982 Spanish General Election and Beyond". *Parliamentary Affairs*, 36 (1): 201-217.

Pollack, B. and G. Hunter. 1987. "Spanish Democracy after Four General Elections", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 40(3): 357-373.

Polat, Rabia Karakaya. 2008. "The AKP and the Kurdish Issue: What Went Wrong?" *SETA Policy Brief* 14.

Powell, C. 2003. "Spanish Membership of the European Union Revisited" *South European Society and Politics*, 8 (1-2): 147-168.

Power, Timothy J. and Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1997. "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World", *Comparative Political Studies*, 30: 123-155.

Pridham, G. 1990. "Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the role of political parties". In G. Pridham, ed., *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe.* New York: Routledge.

Pridham, Geoffrey. 1995. "The international context of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective." In Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.) *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective.* Baltimore : JHU Press, 166-203.

Pridham, Geoffrey. 2000. *The Dynamics of Democratisation: A Comparative Approach.* London: Continuum.

Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper stones: A history of electoral socialism,* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, New York: Wiley.

Radikal. 2013a. "Devlet Bahçeli: Gezi Parkı bir çığlıktır" (Devlet Bahçeli: Gezi Park is a Cry), June 12.

Radikal. 2013b. "Demirtaş: Halkın öfkesini anketlerle ölçemezsiniz" (Demirtaş: You cannot measure people's anger through surveys) *Radikal*, Haziran 4.

Rae, D.W. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Randall Vicky & Lars Svasand. 2002. "Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation" *Democratization* 9(3): 1-10.

Ranney, A. 1954. *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Goverment, its origin and Present State*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Reyes, Oscar. 2012. "Rooted in the neighbourhood: what happened to Spain's assemblies?" *Red Pepper*, October.

Rieselbach, L.N. (1977) *Congressional Reform in the Seventies.* Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Rigo, I.O. 2005. "Aznar's Political Failure or Punishment for Supporting the Iraq War? Hypotheses About the Causes of the 2004 Spanish Election Results", *American Behavioural Scientist,* 49(4): 610-615.

Roller, E. 2001. "The March 2000 general election in Spain" *Government and Opposition,* 36 (2): 209-229.

Royo, S. 2009. "After the Fiesta: The Spanish Economy Meets the Global Financial Crisis", *South European Society and Politics* 14 (1): 19-34.

Rose, R. 1974. *The Problem of Party Government*, London: Macmillan.

Rose, R. 1969. "The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique" *Political Studies*, 14: 413-45.

RTVE. 2011. "Más de seis millones de españoles han participado en el Movimiento 15M" (More than six million Spaniards have participated in 15M Movement), August 8.

Ruggie, J.G. 1997. "Globalization and the Embedded Liberalism Compromise: The End of an Era?" *MPIfG Working Paper* 97/1.

Sampedro, Víctor & Josep Lobera. 2014. "The Spanish 15-M Movement: a consensual dissent?" *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies,* DOI: 0.1080/14636204.2014.938466.

Sallam, H. 2013. "Obsessed with Turkish models in Egypt", *Jadaliyya*, June 30.

Salutin, Rick. 2012. "Rethinking democracy, part three: Spain's 15M movement links assemblies to politics" *Rabble.Ca*, July 23.

Sartori, G. 1969. "From the sociology of politics to political sociology". In Seymour M. Lipset, ed., *Politics and the social sciences*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 65-100.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. New York: New York University Press.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Satana, Nil. 2012. "The Kurdish Issue in June 2011 Elections: Continuity or Change in Turkey's Democratization" Turkish Studies 13(2): 169-189.

Sayari, Sabri. 2007. "Towards a New Turkish Party System?" *Turkish Studies* 8(2): 197-210.

Sarciat Macia, J.M. 2013. "El 15M: Un Movimiento Social de Vocacion Politica." (A Social Movement of Political Mission) *Unpublished master's thesis*, Universidad Internacional de la Rioja.

Sartori, G. 1973. *Democratic Theory.* Westport: Greenwood Press.

Sartori, G. 1987. *The theory of party revisited*. Chatham: Chatham House.

Sartori, G. 1968. "Representational Systems" *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* 13: 470-475.

Scarrow, S.E. 1999. "Parties and the Expansion of Direct Democracy Who Benefits?" *Party Politics*, 5(3): 341-362.

Scarrow, S.E. 2006. "The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties". In R.S. Katz & William J. Crotty, eds, *Handbook of Party Politics*, London: Sage.

Scharpf, F.W. 2000. "Economic Changes, Vulnerabilities, and Institutional Capabilities". In Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt, eds., *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol.1: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 21–124

Scharpf, F.W. 1997. "Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state" *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(1): 18-36.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government: American Government in Action.* New York: Rinehart and Co.

Schmitt, H. and Holmberg, Sören. 1995. *Political parties in decline?* In Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the state.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95-133

Schmitt, H. and Thomassen, J. 1999. *Political Representation and Legitimacy in The European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sedghi, Ami. 2013. World gender gap index 2013: see how countries compare" *The Guardian*, October 25.

Seguín, Bécquer and Sebastiaan Faber .2015. "Can Podemos win in Spain?" *The Nation*, January 14.

Sencar, Özer, İhsan Dagı, Dogu Ergil, Vahap Coskun.2013. "Aralık 2013-Türkiye'nin Nabzı: 2013 Türkiye Değerlendirmesi", *Metropoll Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştımalar*.

Seymour, R. 2013. "Istanbul park protests sow the seeds of Turkish spring" *The Guardian,* May 31.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smelser, N. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behaviour*. New York: Free Press.

Sozcu. 2014. "Demirtaş'tan Türk bayrağı mesajı", July 15.

Taraf. 2013. "Yüzde 92 Erdoğan'a kızdığı için sokakta", June 9,

Tarrow, S. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. 1998. *Power in movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. 2012. *Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tastan, C. 2013. "The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: A Qualitative Field Research" *Insight Turkey*, 15 (3): 27-38.

Tepe, Sultan.2005. "Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim Democratic" Party?". *Journal of Democracy* 16(3): 69-82.

Tepe, Sultan.2013. "The perils of polarization and religious parties: the democratic challenges of political fragmentation in Israel and Turkey". *Democratization* 20(5): 831-856.

The Irish Times. 2015. "First Greece, now Spain; Spanish elections", May 26.

The Socialist Network. 2015. *The PODEMOS 'Phenomenon' and its Manifesto.*

Thomassen, J.J.A. 1994. "Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models". In M. Kent Jennings and T.E. Mann, eds, *Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honour of Warren Miller*, Ann Arbour: Michigan University Press, 237-65.

Thomassen, J.J.A. 1994. "Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models?". In M. Kent Jennings and T.E. Mann, eds., *Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren Miller*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press: 237–65.

Thomassen, J.J.A. 1976. "Party Identification as a Cross-National Concept: Its Meaning in the Netherlands." In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds., *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*. New York: Wiley.

Thomassen, J.J.A. 1984. "Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models". In MK Jennings and TK Mann, eds, *Elections at Home and Abroad; Essays in Honour of Warren Miller*. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press.

Tilly, C. 2004. *Contention and Democracy in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Torcal, Mariano & Guillem Rico. 2004. "The 2004 Spanish General Election: In the Shadow of Al Quaeda" *South European Society and Politics*, 9(3): 107-121.

Torcal, M. and I. Lago. 2008 "Electoral Coordination Strikes Again: The 2008 General Elections in Spain", *South European Society and Politics*, 13 (3): 363-375.

Torcal, M., R. Gunther and J.R. Montero. 2002. "Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe". In R. Gunther et.al., eds., *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 257-290.

Torcal, M., Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero. 2002. "Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe". In R. Gunther et al, eds. *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Touraine, A. 1981. *The Voive and the Eye : An Analysis of Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties" 1950. *American Political Science Review*. APSR 44 (3).

Tremlett, Giles. 2015. "The Podemos revolution: how a small group of radical academics changed European politics" *The Guardian*, March 31.

Tugal, Cihan. 2013. "Occupy Gezi: The Limits of Turkey's Neoliberal Success" *Jadaliyya*, June 4.

Tursan, Huri. 2004. *Democratization in Turkey: The Role of Political Parties*. Brussels: Peter Lang.

Tufekci, Zeynep. 2014. "The Medium and the Movement: Digital Tools, Social Movement Politics, and the End of the Free Rider Problem" *Policy & Internet*, 6(2): 202-208.

Tuğal, Cihan. 2013. ""Resistance everywhere": The Gezi revolt in global Perspective" *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 49: 157-172.

Türmen, Rıza. 2013. "Aftermath: Turkish Government's Retailation to Gezi"
    CHP Report.

Ugur, Mehmet. 1999. *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility
    Dilemma*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Ugur, Mehmet. 2010. "Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment
    Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU–Turkey Accession
    Negotiations". *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(4): 967-
    991.

UNDP. 2014. *Human Development Reports.*

Van Biezen, I. 2003. *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization
    in Southern and East-Central Europe*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Biezen, Ingrid. 2003. *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party
    Organisation in Southern Europe and East-Central Europe*. New York:
    Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Biezen, Ingrid. 2005. "On the theory and practice of party formation and
    adaptation in new democracies" *European Journal of Political
    Research*, 44 (1): 147–174.

Vatan. 2013. "Vekillere Gözdağı" (A Threat against Parliamentarians) *Vatan
    Gazete*, Haziran 5.

Von Beyme, K. 1985. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, New York: St
    Martin's Press.

Wacquant, Loïc. 2014. "Urban Inequality, Marginality and Social Justice",
    Speech delivered at the Bosphorus University, January 17 2014,
    available at Istifhanem.com.

Ware, A. 1987. *Citizens, Parties and State: A Reappraisal*, Cambridge: Polity
    Press.

Wattenberg, M.P. 1981. "The Decline of Political Partisanship in the United
    States: Negativity or Neutrality?" *The American Political Science
    Review*, 75(4): 941-950.

Wattenberg, M. 2002. *Where Have All the Voters Gone?* Cambridge, MA:
    Harvard University Press.

Warren, M. 2003. "A Second Transformation of Democracy?". In B.E. Cain, R. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow, eds., *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Warren, M. 2003. "A Second Transformation of Democracy?". In B.E. Cain, R. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow, eds., *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weisberg, R. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic representation in Congress" *American Political Science Review* 72: 535-542.

Wessels, B. 2007. "Representation and Democracy". In R. Dalton, H.D. Klingemann, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

White, J.K. 2006. "What is a political party?". In R.S. Katz & William J. Crotty, eds, *Handbook of Party Politics*, London: Sage.

Whitehead, Laurence. 1991. "Democracy by convergence and Southern Europe: a comparative politics perspective." *Encouraging democracy: The international context of regime transition in Southern Europe,* London: St. Martin's Press, 45-61.

Wlezien, C. and Soroka, S.N. 2007. 'The Relationship between Public Opinion and Policy". In R. Dalton, H.D. Klingemann, eds, T*he Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Woodworth, P. 2004. "Spain Changes Course: Aznar's Legacy, Zapatero's Prospects" *World Policy Journal*, 21 (2): 7-26

Yardimci-Geyikci, Sebnem. 2015. "Party Institutionalisation and Democratic Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective" *Party Politics,* 21 (4): 527-538.

Yetkin, M. 2015. "Why did only the opposition CHP have primary elections in Turkey?" *Hurriyet Daily News*, March 31.

Yoruk , E. and Yuksel, M. 2014. "Class and Politics in Turkey's Gezi Protests", New Left Review 89: 103-123.