

MİNE NUR KÜÇÜK

THE CONCEPTIONS OF "THE INTERNATIONAL" IN TURKEY

Bilkent University 2018

# THE CONCEPTIONS OF "THE INTERNATIONAL" IN TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Ankara

March 2018



To my father Süleyman Sırrı Küçük (1960-2015)



THE CONCEPTIONS OF “THE INTERNATIONAL” IN TURKEY

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by


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THE DEPARTMENT OF  
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### THE CONCEPTIONS OF “THE INTERNATIONAL” IN TURKEY

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In the last several decades, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has been problematized because of its limitations in engaging with non-core actors. A burgeoning literature in IR has underscored that the prevalent approaches in the discipline have particular understandings of world politics which are based on the experiences of core actors, and ideas and experiences of non-core actors are overlooked in these understandings. This literature has asked what IR would look like if ideas and experiences of non-core actors are also considered. This dissertation’s objective is to contribute to this literature by studying the conceptions of “the international” as found in one of the non-core contexts, namely Turkey. The dissertation develops and offers a novel analytical framework for studying the conceptions of “the international” in any given context. This framework is employed firstly to examine the understandings as found in IR scholarship so as to see what is

available in the literature. Then, the framework is employed for analyzing the conceptions of “the international” in Turkey as one example to non-core actors of world politics. The dissertation discusses what IR scholarship captures and overlooks when the conceptions of “the international” in non-core contexts are taken into account.

Keywords: International Relations Theory, Non-Core Actors, The International, Turkey, Turkish Politics.



## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE’DE “ULUSLARARASI” ANLAYIŞLARI

Küçük, Mine Nur

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Hatice Pınar Bilgin

Mart 2018

Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) disiplini son birkaç on yıldır merkez-dışı aktörleri ele almaktaki kısıtları nedeniyle sorunsallaştırılmaktadır. Uluslararası İlişkiler içerisinde gelişmekte olan bir literatür, disiplin içinde öne çıkan yaklaşımların merkezi aktörlerin deneyimlerine dayanan belirli bir dünya politikası anlayışına sahip olduğunun ve bu anlayışın merkez-dışı aktörlerin düşünce ve tecrübelerini gözden kaçırabildiğinin altını çizmektedir. Bu literatür, merkez-dışı aktörlerin tecrübe ve düşünceleri de dikkate alınırca nasıl bir Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin söz konusu olacağını sormaktadır. Bu tezin amacı, merkez-dışı aktörlerden biri olan Türkiye'deki "uluslararası" anlayışlarını araştırarak bu literatüre katkı sunmaktır. Bu kapsamda, "uluslararası" anlayışlarının araştırılmasına yönelik olarak, verili herhangi bir bağlamda kullanılmaya uygun, özgün bir analitik çerçeve oluşturulmuş ve önerilmiştir. Literatürün mevcut durumunu görebilmek için, bu analitik çerçeve ilk olarak



Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinde halihazırda bulunan anlayışların incelenmesi doğrultusunda uygulanmıştır. Daha sonra aynı çerçevede dünya politikasının merkez-dışı aktörlerine örnek teşkil eden Türkiye'deki "uluslararası" anlayışlarının saptanması için tatbik edilmiştir. Sonuç olarak bu tez, merkez dışı bağlamlardaki "uluslararası" anlayışları dikkate alındığında Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin neleri kavrayıp neleri gözden kaçırdığını tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkezi-Olmayan Aktörler, Türkiye, Türkiye Siyaseti, Uluslararası, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri

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I always pay attention to acknowledgements sections of books that I read. This stems from my view that despite a single name that we see in a book cover, the work itself comes into existence by various forms of contributions from a group of other people. In that sense, this dissertation is not an exception as it would not have been written without the support of the wonderful people in my life.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AKP: Justice and Development Party

ANAP: Motherland Party

AP: Justice Party

AÜSBF: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science

BDP: Peace and Democracy Party

CHP: Republican People's Party

CKMP: Republican Peasant Farmer's Nation Party

DEHAP: Democratic People's Party

DEP: Democracy Party

DP: Democrat Party (2007- )

DP: Democratic Party (1946-60)

DSP: Democratic Left Party

DTP: Democratic Society Party

DYP: True Path Party

EU: European Union

FP: Virtue Party

GP: Young Party

HADEP: People's Democracy Party

HEP: People's Labor Party

HP: Populist Party

IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IR: International Relations

MGB: National Security Studies

MHP: Nationalist Action Party

MNP: National Order Party

MSP: National Salvation Party

NLI: Neoliberal Institutionalism

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

RP: Welfare Party

SHP: Social Democratic Populist Party

SODEP: Social Democracy Party

SP: Felicity Party

USA: United States of America

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

In the last several decades, International Relations (IR) scholars suggest that although all IR scholarship operates on the basis of some notion of “the international”, the notion is seldom discussed openly in the literature (Tickner & Blaney, 2012: 13; also see; Barkawi & Laffey, 2002; Chan, 1993; 2001; Jones, 2003a; Ling, 2014). At the same time it is argued that IR shows little interest on how non-core actors understand “the international” by assuming that its prevalent views on world politics are universally applicable (Bilgin, 2016a; Jabri, 2013; Seth, 2009). The objective of this dissertation is to examine the conceptions of “the international” in Turkey as an example of non-core contexts so as to demonstrate the need for reconsideration of the prevalent views in the discipline. In accomplishing this aim, the dissertation develops and offers a framework for analyzing the conceptions of “the international” in any given context. This framework is utilized to examine the conceptions of “the international” as found in IR scholarship. Then, it is utilized for showing the conceptions of “the international” in Turkey.

Several scholars have problematized the term “international” since they find it to be “too narrow” in defining the subject matter of the discipline regarding the issue areas and actors that the term connotes (Booth, 1991). What these critics challenge is what the mainstream approaches refer to when they utilize the term, such as the inter-state relations (Rosenau, 1990). By underscoring a variety of changing dynamics in the world, then, these scholars offer to utilize alternative terms, such as “world politics” or “global politics” to define the discipline (Smith & Baylis, 2006: 2-3). However, “the international” as it is used throughout the dissertation does not refer to this meaning which critics have problematized. Instead, it follows a definition found in the literature according to which “the international” is a “distinct space of social interaction” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 111) and a “distinct location of politics” (Jabri, 2013: 2). In this literature “the international” is also identified as a distinct “sphere of investigation” which is the main “object of enquiry” for the discipline of IR (Seth, 2013a: 15; 29). Understood as such, throughout the dissertation “the international” refers to this distinct realm of politics that is studied by all IR scholars.

Throughout the dissertation, the term “core” is used with reference to “Western Europe and North America” (Bilgin, 2012a: 43). As it is suggested by Nayak and Selbin (2010: 2) “core” represents itself as “‘universal’, developed and civilized” without acknowledging the processes through which it becomes privileged and the role of others in such processes. In this sense “core” is “where decisions are made, discourses are legitimized, and people and entities are put in positions to further entrench the most privileged ways of thinking about the world” (Nayak & Selbin, 2010: 2-3). “Non-core”, on the other hand, refers to those parts of the world which are “less influential”, “non-dominant” and/or “non-privileged” in world politics (Waever & Tickner, 2009: 1). In the literature, there are other terms that have been utilized for

defining non-core actors. Among those, the terms “non-West” and “South” stand out. The term “non-West” is not employed in this study since there are scholars who find it problematic. For instance, Hutchings (2011) underscores that the term reproduces “West/non-West” binary. Jabri notes that it implies “a negation, or even a ‘not-yet’ aspect” (Jabri, 2013: 16). The term “South” is not utilized since the term is mostly utilized in analyzing economic matters such as where “wealth” is concentrated (Barkawi, 2004: 167). However, in this study the focus is not only on economic inequalities, but also on other types of unequal and non-material power relations that non-core countries face such as the power to shape “their own portrayal in world politics” (Bilgin, 2016a: 1). In this sense, non-core actors are understood as those actors who are portrayed to be “below a certain civilizational or material level, and specifically those below the vital ability of shaping the world according to their own vision” (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2008: 663). Therefore, non-core actors also refer to those who are rendered “marginal to the ‘main story’ of world politics” by the prevalent approaches in IR (Acharya, 2014: 651). Turkey exemplifies a non-core context since, although not formally colonized, it was “nevertheless caught up in hierarchies that were built and sustained during the age of colonialism and beyond” (Bilgin, 2016a: 7-8; see also: Morozov & Rumelili, 2012; Rumelili, 2012; Zarakol, 2011).

Why does the conceptions of “the international” in IR and in non-core contexts remain under-examined subject in the discipline? That is because IR understands “the international” in a particular way and assumes that this understanding is “universal” (Bilgin, 2016a, see also Acharya, 2014; Chan, 1993; Pasha, 2011; Seth, 2009). For this reason, it does not find it necessary to examine the conceptions of “the international” within its borders and discuss whether these conceptions are indeed “universal” (Seth,

2011). Relatedly, neither has it looked at non-core actors' conceptions to examine this assumption (Grovoqui, 2006; Jabri, 2013; Shilliam, 2011a). Yet, as it is suggested by Bilgin, in IR there is a "discrepancy between what IR promises (an explanation or understanding of the international)" on the one hand, and "what mainstream perspectives deliver (a 'particular' perspective on the international that is offered as the 'universal' story)" on the other (Bilgin, 2016a: 45).

According to the assumption of universality, the main concepts, categories, and prevalent understandings of the discipline are "to be found anywhere and everywhere" (Seth, 2013b: 2) in the sense that they are applicable throughout the world (Seth, 2009). However, scholars challenge this assumption by suggesting that the main concepts and categories of the discipline are based on a particular period in history and experiences of core actors (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 110; Seth, 2013b: 2). Put differently, it is suggested that IR "has been formalized to reflect peculiar histories, memories, rationales, values, and interests, all bound by time, space, and specific political languages and values" (Grovoqui, 2006: 16- 17). However, the discipline does not reflect on the particularity of its understandings and it overlooks the experiences of non-core actors (Bilgin, 2016a: 1) in analyzing world politics.

The notion of "sovereignty" can be considered as an example to this point. In mainstream accounts of IR, sovereignty is argued to emerge with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe and then spread to the rest of the world (Seth, 2011: 70). States are then "selected and socialized in accordance with Westphalian sovereignty" which render them as juridically-equal entities (Hobson & Sharman, 2005: 63-64). Barkawi and Laffey challenge this prevalent account on Westphalian sovereignty by underscoring non-core actors' experiences in world politics. By highlighting examples such as "sanctions regime" or "policies and practices of the international financial

institutions” that non-core actors face, they conclude that sovereignty “was not a universal but at best only a regional practice of government and rule” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 123). In other words, in world politics some nations enjoy more sovereignty than others, and those who belong to the latter group do not understand the term as it is conventionally defined in literature, that is sovereignty as having the supreme authority within one’s territory and the recognition of this authority by other entities (Hobson & Sharman, 2005: 65). Instead, they see this recognition as “fragile” and their sovereignty as “limited” (Bilgin, 2008a; Suzuki, 2005). However, such different ways of understanding sovereignty have remained understudied in IR scholarship.

That being said, scholars who underscore this limitation neither suggest that IR is “purely and simply European” and therefore “wrong”, nor one has to dispense already existent concepts and categories, and replace them with different ones derived from non-core contexts (Seth, 2009: 336). The problem is to recognize that the prevalent concepts and categories in the discipline are based on particular understandings since “the heterogeneous social meanings, and the diversity of historical experiences” are overlooked in their construction (Muppidi, 2004: 16). In relation to that, for this literature the point is not to challenge the notion of universalism per se by replacing it with relativism (Tickner & Blaney, 2012: 10-11). Rather, the aim is to rethink “universals” by taking into account the views of non-core actors (Bilgin, 2016a: 50). In other words, for this literature universality “need[s] not rely on hegemony” (Ling, 2014: 3). Universality can “[respect] diversity while seeking common ground” without imposing “particular idea or approach on others” (Acharya, 2016: 5).



## **1.1 Why inquire into the Conceptions of “the international” Beyond the Core?**

Why is it important to study non-core actors' views on world politics? For Kenneth Waltz, who is one of the most prominent scholars in the discipline, “it would be...ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica” (Waltz, 1979: 72). According to this theory, looking at great powers and their experiences within the “anarchical” structure of world politics are sufficient for understanding world politics. The concepts and categories that are derived from this understanding, then, considered to be “applying to all” (Acharya, 2014: 649).

However, a growing body of literature in IR challenges this perspective that non-core actors are inconsequential for theorizing world politics and the prevalent views of the discipline derived from the experiences of core actors are valid across time and space (Bilgin, 2016a; Jabri, 2013; Muppidi, 2004; Seth, 2009, 2013). This literature defines IR as a discipline that should be “devoted to relationship, interconnection, diversity and discontinuity” (Seth, 2013a: 28). This definition points to the importance of and necessity for studying non-core actors' views in IR for rendering it a universal discipline.

According to this definition, first, IR is about “relations” between different core and non-core actors. These relations take diverse forms such as military, economic, political, social as well as cultural ones. In this sense, world politics is not only about “strategic interaction, populated by diplomats, soldiers and capitalists” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 110) which takes place in core contexts. A variety of issues including variety of actors are shaping world politics. As a result, it is necessary to know how different actors being part of these diverse relations understand “the international”, which inform their practices and shape world politics accordingly.

Second, the fact that different actors are “interconnected” and they mutually constitute world politics (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 114; Blaney & Inayatullah, 2008) necessitates an inquiry into how they understand “the international”. Mutual constitution of world politics underscores the role of non-core actors in shaping various aspects of world politics. Yet, although the role of core actors in shaping world politics is well accounted for in the literature, the role non-core in its making of “the international” is seldom discussed (Ling, 2014: 1). What emerges from this lack is in the discipline “the periphery of the international system, and the less powerful more generally, (can) drop out of the analysis of ‘great power’ politics” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 112). Scholars identify and study two types of mutual constitution: first, the mutual constitution of “world politics” (Barkawi, 2004, Hobson, 2004), and second, the mutual constitution of our “knowledge about world politics” (Grovoqui, 2006, Shilliam, 2011a). The former looks at the role of non-core actors in shaping various aspects of world politics from the rise of modern state system to capitalism particularly with reference to the process of colonialism and imperialism. For instance, this literature analyzes the role of slave trade and colonial conquest in the development of capitalism (Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Seth, 2011: 173).

The latter, i.e. the mutual constitution of our knowledge about world politics, is particularly significant for understanding why inquiring into conceptions of “the international” beyond core contexts is necessary for making IR universal. Accordingly, scholars who study the mutual constitution of our knowledge about world politics show how non-core actors’ ideas shape the knowledge about world politics either by contributing or contesting it (Bilgin, 2016b: 174). These scholars challenge the view that the main ideas, concepts, and categories are developed only by

core actors, and demonstrate how not only core but also non-core actors do shape them (Krishna, 2017: 72).

Third, world politics is a realm of “diversity” including different actors having multiple ideas and experiences which inform the way in which they behave. However, IR overlooks this diversity (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). As a result, by “scripting global politics” through excluding the ideas and experiences of non-core actors, IR generates “a conceptual schema” which is “inadequate to the task of understanding the international” (Jabri, 2013: 8-9). In this schema, non-core actors are analyzed through presumably “universal” concepts and categories which are in fact constructed “from the vantage point of the European” (Jabri, 2013: 11). Therefore, their “difference” is mostly understood with reference to their “locality and culture” (Jabri, 2013: 16). This leads to taking non-core actors either as “exotic” (Shilliam, 2011b: 6) or “as source of identifiable threat and future scenarios of risk” (Jabri, 2013: 24) when making sense of their views and behaviors. Bilgin (2016a: 182) underscores that this understanding of “difference”, which she explains “as pre-given and changing, and as yielding insecurities” is a limited one. In order to challenge this state of affairs in the discipline, she underscores the necessity of studying the practices of non-core actors and analyzing how the dynamic relationship between internal and external realms and the ways in which world politics is made sense of by non-core actors explain their decisions and behaviors (Bilgin, 2016a).

Fourth, in world politics there is a “discontinuity” particularly when the “contestations over meanings” (Seth, 2013a: 28) are considered. Put differently, there are no stable meanings in world politics. For Seth (2011: 168), this is what makes “the international” as an “interesting and revealing sphere of investigation”. However, in mainstream IR certain understandings are “naturalized” to such an extent that these are

seen as immutable “facts” of world politics (Seth, 2013a: 28). Therefore, by virtue of being “the agent of such naturalization”, IR “obscures rather than illuminates what is interesting about the international” (Seth, 2011: 168). As an example to this point, consider, Muppidi’s examination of the notion of “development”. For him “development is not necessarily a given desire for many states” (Muppidi, 2004: 11). However, even if it becomes a desire shared by all states in world politics, the term will mean different things for different states. For instance, Muppidi (2004: 11) suggests that “Iran’s conception of what this [development] involves might be strikingly different from that of the United States” and such differences between different actors “have immense consequences for their identities (corporate and social) and the consequent state practices.”

To sum up, the literature suggests that it is important to look at how non-core actors understand world politics since they are part of the relations constituting world politics and the meanings that they attribute to this realm shape, and in turn is shaped by, these relations. In what follows, the existing studies which analyze non-core actors’ ways of understanding world politics are examined. As it will be offered below, despite this common agenda, different scholars engage with non-core actors in different ways.

## **1.2 Existing Studies on Non-core actors’ Understandings on World Politics**

There are two main approaches to the study of non-core actors’ understandings of world politics according to Bilgin (2016a: 84). The first group of studies inquires into how the discipline of IR has been studied in different parts of the world. The idea behind such studies is to find how “differently” IR is studied in places where there are “strong cosmologies, distinct religious-philosophical traditions” (Waeber & Tickner, 2009: 20). The volume *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* edited

by Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever (2009a) constitutes one of the latest and most extensive attempt in this discussion. The volume includes diverse countries and regions, namely Latin America, South Africa, Africa, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Iran, Arab countries, Israel, Turkey, Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Anglo world, and the USA, which makes it “the first truly global survey of the study of the international in different parts of the world” (Bilgin, 2010: 822). Despite such diversity regarding the cases that are examined and the expectations of “difference” in the study of IR in these places, the findings of the project point to “similarity” regarding how IR is studied in different parts of the world (Tickner & Waever, 2009b; Tickner & Blaney, 2012). Accordingly, “throughout the world the discipline shares a surprising number of common traits that could hardly be considered ‘alternative’” (Tickner & Blaney, 2012: 3). The volume reveals that around the world IR tends to be state-centric, focuses on security, lacks normative theorization, and mirrors foreign policy considerations of the states within which it is practiced.

The second group of studies that look at how non-core actors approach world politics focuses on what Bilgin identifies as “texts and contexts outside IR and/or North America and Western Europe” (Bilgin, 2016a: 84). As it will be examined in detail in the second chapter of the dissertation, these studies inquire into the sources beyond the confines of the discipline and discuss different implications of this inquiry for thinking about or studying world politics in non-core contexts and beyond. Different scholars examine different kinds of sources including traditional worldviews, everyday life and rituals of indigenous peoples, the ideas of thinkers and philosophers from the non-core contexts, and practices of the policy makers beyond the core. While doing so, certain scholars point to the “alternative” or “different”

understandings of world politics as found in non-core contexts, while others engage with how already existent conceptions in IR are contributed, articulated, or challenged by non-core actors whose very presence are overlooked by the discipline.

As an example of the former, the studies focusing on “traditional worldviews” can be highlighted. For the scholars who engage with “traditional worldviews”, there are “alternative” approaches to world politics in non-core parts of the world due to the existence of different historical experiences and distinct philosophies in these contexts. Consider, for instance, Yaqing’s article “Why is there no Chinese International Relations Theory” (2007) which examines the characteristics of “traditional Chinese mind” which was practiced in “Tributary System” from 221 BC to 1800s. This system was informed by the worldview “Tianxia”, argues the author, according to which world was a “harmonious whole”. Even though the states constituting this system were not considered as equal members, since China was located at the center, it was a “benign” one in that the relationships within the system was considered as relations between father (China) and sons (others). This worldview and system it generated, argues Yaqing, challenge mainstream IR’s understanding of world politics through presenting “different” views on the notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is such “difference” that renders “Tianxia” as a “potential source” for constructing a national (Chinese) school of IR for the author.

Those studies which analyze how the already existent concepts and categories are viewed in non-core parts of the world do not aim to construct such national IR schools. Instead, they problematize the fact that although in non-core contexts a variety of understandings on world politics exist (which either contributes to or contest with the prevalent views), the discipline of IR overlooks them. In order to challenge this situation, those scholars examine ideas and experiences of non-core philosophers,

intellectuals, and policy makers. The edited volume by Shilliam, namely *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Investigations of Global Modernity* (2011a) is an example to such studies. In the book, the contributors are interested in the contemporary articulations of various notions (such as state, nation, power, sovereignty, cosmopolitanism) that are informing different aspects of world politics by non-core actors. These articulations, argues Shilliam, reflect “situated outlooks on the modern condition” by the “non-Western” philosophers or thinkers (Shilliam, 2011c: 18). In this sense, rather than searching for “alternative” understandings of world politics, the focus is on how already existing notions are viewed from the vantage point of these actors and what this implies about the discipline of IR.

This dissertation follows the latter group of studies according to which studying non-core is “a prerequisite to an adequate understanding of the global and the international” rather than being an attempt on “adding” non-core into the already existing frames (Seth, 2013b: 7). Following this argument, the aim here is not to develop a “non-Western IR” by expecting to find out “different” or “alternative” understandings of “the international” in non-core contexts (Seth, 2013b: 2). This is because:

there may be elements of “non-Western” experiences and ideas built in to those ostensibly “Western” approaches to the study of world politics. The reverse may also be true. What we think of as “non-Western” approaches to world politics may be suffused with “Western” concepts and theories (Bilgin, 2008a: 5-6).

To put it differently, this dissertation is informed by those studies which do not “reify” the “West/non-West” binary through offering national schools, such as Chinese IR or Indian IR, or in this case Turkish IR (Bilgin, 2016a: 182).

### **1.3 Framework and Sources**

In studying the conceptions of “the international” as found in IR scholarship and in a non-core context, the dissertation follows those studies according to which there is “no essential, historically transcendent meaning we can confer upon the space of the international” (Jabri, 2013: 29; also see: Seth 2011; Bilgin 2016a). However, in the literature no framework has hitherto been developed which is dedicated to analyzing different conceptions as found in IR theories or in non-core contexts. This dissertation builds one such analytical framework for studying the conceptions of “the international”. This framework is composed of two parts. Firstly, it breaks down the components of the international into three questions: “what of world politics”, “who of world politics” and “where of world politics”. Secondly, by drawing on Critical Geopolitics literature, this framework identifies where to look at in order to see how “the international” is understood in the context under investigation. Each part of the framework will be treated in turn.

The first part of the framework, by looking at what of, who of and where of world politics aims to understand the main dynamic of world politics, the main actors in world politics, and the location where world politics takes place, respectively. Taken together, these three components show how the “the international” is understood both by IR theories, as well as by non-core actors. By this way, this framework enables to see what is offered in the scholarship and in non-core contexts, respectively.

What is meant by “the main dynamic of world politics” is the “basic ideas” of actors (such as academics, policy makers, thinkers) on “what makes the world go around” (Booth, 2007: 154). This component analyzes actors’ views on the most fundamental mechanism through which world politics unfolds. “The main actors of



world politics” examines the most significant entities whose behaviors shape world politics and the reasons which render them important for world politics in the view of actors. “The location of world politics” aims to reveal the actors’ understandings regarding “whether domestic and foreign affairs are separate or convergent” or “whether any boundaries that differentiate them are firm or porous” (Rosenau, 1997: 32).

The second part of the framework identifies the sources which can be examined for analyzing the conceptions of “the international” as found in the context under investigation. This part draws on the Critical Geopolitics literature. Critical Geopolitics offers to engage with multiple, yet interrelated, sites within which societies’ existing understandings on diverse aspects of world politics can be found. To be more specific, for Critical Geopolitics’ scholars, there are three main sites, namely formal, practical, and popular, in which discourses on world politics are produced and reproduced in the context under examination (O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192). While studies focusing on the formal site look into the “strategic institutes, think tanks, academia”, studies on practical site examine “foreign policy, bureaucracy, political institutions” (O’Tuathail & Dalby, 1998: 5). The popular site, on the other hand, goes “outside of academic and policymaking discourse” (Dittmer & Gray, 2010: 1664) and focuses on “mass media, cinema, novels, or cartoons” for analysis (O’Tuathail & Dalby, 1998: 5). Through defining geopolitics as a “social, cultural, and political practice, rather than as a manifest and legible reality of world politics” (O’Tuathail & Dalby, 1998: 2), Critical Geopolitics scholars focus on discourses as found in these multiple sites. Discourses here refer to “systems of meaning-production” which “enable societies” to “make sense of the world and to act within it” (Dunn & Neumann, 2017: 262).

Following these multiple sites as identified by the Critical Geopolitics literature, this dissertation offers to analyze three different types of sources to tease out how “the international” is understood in a given context. As an example of formal site, it proposes to look at IR scholarship. That is because academia is a significant formal site where people “professionally dedicated to analyzing world politics” (Waeber & Tickner, 2009: 1). Secondly, as an example of practical site, it offers to look at political parties, as they are among the significant actors which contribute “the daily construction” (O’Loughlin et al., 2004a: 6) of world politics. The dissertation also suggests to look at textbooks taught in schools. That is because in the literature education is identified as one of the crucial sites where the knowledge of the world is created and disseminated (Sharp, 1993; 2000). For some, textbooks reflect the understandings found both in formal, practical, and popular sites (Ide, 2017: 46-47). The dissertation does not look at “popular site”. That is because popular culture products consist of a wide range of categories such as films, television, popular magazines, cartoons, music, and internet (Dodds, 2005). Each of these areas alone includes a huge number of products which necessitates an individual analysis with different methods for understanding the meanings that they contain. Additionally, it is also difficult, if not impossible, to select a representative sample which can be utilized for studying how the knowledge of the world is produced in the realm of popular culture at the case at hand.

In order to understand the conceptions of “the international” in Turkey, the dissertation will firstly examine IR scholarship in Turkey as an example of formal site. As an example to practical site, it will look at political parties, and particularly the election manifestos and party programs of the political parties. The significance of political parties stems from their centrality for understanding Turkish politics in that

they are one of the most influential and major actors in Turkey (Frey, 1965; Özbudun, 2000; Sayarı, 2012). The selection of election manifestos and party programs of political parties is related with the 10% election threshold in Turkey, which undermines “the fairness of political representation” regardless of the importance of political parties for understanding Turkish politics (Sayarı, 2012: 187). Accordingly, unlike the sources derived from governmental or parliamentary discussions, the focus on election manifestos and party programs of the political parties opens a space to discuss multiple conceptions of “the international” (if any) in Turkey’s political spectrum. Thirdly, the dissertation will examine the textbooks of one of the high school courses in Turkey, namely “National Security” (*Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi*). The selection of textbooks of “National Security” course is related to two factors. Firstly, from its inception in 1926 to its abolition in 2012, this course was compulsory for all high school students. Secondly, until its abolition this course remained as the only high-school course in which contemporary matters regarding world politics were taught in Turkey (Altınay, 2004a: 186; Bilgin, 2012b: 158). Considering the centralized education system in Turkey, it can be suggested that these textbooks exemplified the official conception of “the international” as it is disseminated by the state.

Regarding the sources analyzed throughout the dissertation, a caveat is in order: this dissertation does not make a claim on whether the views as found in these sources are accepted and internalized by the public. This is because, for instance, it is difficult to know the extent to which the textbooks of “National Security” course is internalized by the students who took the course. Similarly, it is difficult to determine to what extent the political parties’ conceptions of “the international” lead people to support them. In their stead, what this dissertation offers is that regardless of their internalization by the public, these sources are important in themselves by virtue of

being disseminated throughout the society, either to students during their high school educations or to citizens during election debates taking place between politicians belonging to different political parties.

Lastly, the time frame of the dissertation covers the post-Cold War period. In particular, the analysis focuses on the time period spanning from 1990 to 2011. The reasons for this selection is two-fold. The first reason is related with the development of IR discipline in Turkey. Accordingly, the early republican period is left out of the analysis since IR as a discipline did not exist back then. As for the Cold War period, although IR studies was introduced in Turkey in the mid-1950s, it was after the Cold War that IR studies have developed in the country (Bilgin & Tanrıseven, 2009). Although the third chapter of the dissertation, which is on the conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship in Turkey, covers the founding texts of the discipline in Turkey, it primarily concentrates on the post-Cold War period. Secondly, the post-Cold War is an important period as the core parameters in world politics witnessed significant transformations. For Turkey, it was a period where country’s location, role and identity have been subject to intense debates (Öniş, 1995; Bilgin, 2004).

#### **1.4 Outline of the Dissertation**

The dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part, chapter 2 and chapter 3, looks at IR scholarship and examines the conceptions of “the international” in IR theories (Chapter 2) and in sources outside IR as studied by the scholars (Chapter 3). Chapter 2 looks at IR theories’ conceptions of “the international” through identifying their views on the main dynamic of world politics, the main actors of world politics and the location where world politics takes place. The chapter examines the mainstream IR theories (Realism/Neorealism, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, and Post-

internationalism) and the critical IR theories (Frankfurt School IR theory, Neo-Gramscian IR theory, Feminist IR theory, Poststructuralist IR theory and Postcolonial IR theory), respectively.

Chapter 3 examines those studies which is critical of IR for its limitation in engaging with non-core actors' views on world politics, and thus inquire into the sources beyond the confines of the discipline. The chapter classifies the different types of studies utilizing different sources. The first set of studies look at “traditional thinking”, “traditional worldviews”, or “ancient cultures and philosophies”. The second set of studies look at everyday life experiences and rituals of ordinary people in general, and indigenous peoples in particular. The third set of studies look at writings and speeches of thinkers and intellectuals from different non-core contexts. The fourth set of studies look at practices of politicians and policy makers in non-core parts of the world. The chapter will discuss the conceptions of “the international” in each type of sources as identified by the scholars examining them.

Part 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, is structured along the same lines as Part 1. This part examines the case of Turkey. Chapter 4 looks at the conceptions of “the international” as found in IR scholarship in Turkey. In the chapter, the methods for the selection of scholars and their studies are explained. Then, the early IR scholarship is analyzed. Lastly, the contemporary IR scholarship is examined. This chapter investigates the conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship in Turkey by identifying the views of IR scholars on the main dynamic of world politics, the main actors of world politics and the location where world politics takes place.

Chapter 5 inquiries into the conceptions of “the international” beyond IR scholarship in Turkey and looks at the practical and official sites. This chapter firstly analyzes the conceptions of “the international” as found in election manifestos and

party programs of political parties in Turkey. Then, it examines the textbooks of “National Security” course taught in high-schools of Turkey. These documents are analyzed by looking at understandings regarding the main dynamics, the main actors, and the location of world politics. The chapter also attempts to see whether there are multiple conceptions of “the international” in the case of Turkey, and if so to discuss the commonalities and differences between these conceptions.

The concluding chapter will return to the question asked in the introduction: what “the international” looks like if the conceptions of non-core actors are considered? After summing up the main arguments developed throughout the dissertation, this question is answered with reference to the conceptions of “the international” as found in IR scholarship and in the case under investigation, namely Turkey.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **WHAT IS “THE INTERNATIONAL” IN IR?**

The aim of this chapter is to look at the conceptions of “the international” in IR theories. The chapter examines two sets of theories: mainstream theories of IR and critical theories of IR. In the chapter, mainstream theory is defined as the theory which “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized” (Cox, 1981: 128). Critical theory is defined as a theory which “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 1981: 129). Critical theories “begin[s] with the avowed intent of criticizing particular social arrangements and/or outcomes” and look into the ways in which these arrangements and outcomes come into being (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 28).

The first section of the chapter will examine Realism/Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and Post-internationalism, respectively. The second section of the chapter will analyze Frankfurt School IR theory, Neo-Gramscian IR theory, Feminist IR theory, Poststructuralist IR theory, and Postcolonial IR theory. For each theory, two key authors are selected. In selecting the theories and scholars, and classifying them into the theoretical camps, the chapter draws on four IR theory textbooks. These books include *The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations* (Baylis & Smith, 2006), *Theories of International Relations* (Burchill et al., 2009), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2010), and *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes* (Stears et al., 2010). In identifying the studies to be analyzed, google scholar statistics are utilized. Accordingly, the analysis presented throughout the chapter is primarily based on the top-three most-cited studies (articles, chapters and/or books) of the selected scholars according to Google Scholar statistics. In some cases, other studies are also examined for clarification purposes.

The chapter is structured in accordance with the analytical framework presented in the introduction. This framework breaks down the components of the conceptions of “the international” into three: “the main dynamic of world politics”, “the main actors of world politics”, and “the location where world politics takes place”. “The main dynamic of world politics” looks at “what makes the world go around” (Booth, 2007: 154). This component analyzes the most fundamental mechanism through which world politics unfolds for the theories. “The main actors of world politics” looks at how theories understand the most significant entities whose behaviors shape world politics and why they think these actors are important. “The location of world politics” examines theories’ understandings regarding “whether



domestic and foreign affairs are separate or convergent” or “whether any boundaries that differentiate them are firm or porous” (Rosenau, 1997: 32). The selected studies are analyzed with the aim to identify how each theory understands these three components. While reading the selected studies, the quotations related with each component are noted and classified. Then, the recurrent concepts, categories, and arguments are identified. The following sections present the findings of this analysis.

## **2.1 “The international” in the Mainstream Theories of IR**

### **2.1.1 Realism/ Neorealism**

In this section of the chapter, Realist/Neorealist conception of “the international” will be examined through analyzing the works of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Realism is known to be the oldest theory of IR (Donnelly, 2009: 31). For Realist theories (both Classical Realism and Neorealism) world politics “is synonymous with power politics” (Mearsheimer, 2010: 78). The distribution of power among great powers of world politics is a central concern for Realist theory.

#### **2.1.1.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

For Realism/ Neorealism, anarchy, the lack of overarching authority above states, is the main defining characteristic of world politics. This centrality of anarchy has informed the ways in which the main dynamic of world politics is made sense of by the Realist/Neorealist scholars and led them to identify struggle for power as the main mechanism through which world politics unfolds. In his seminal book *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948) Morgenthau suggested that the struggle for power is what dominates world politics. As he stated in his frequently-

cited sentence “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau, 1948: 13). This struggle, argued Morgenthau, is “universal” (applicable to all times and spaces) since “the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men” (Morgenthau, 1948: 17). He justified this argument by referring to human nature. Accordingly, destructive human nature drives people to demand more power in each and every level of human existence including world politics. In explaining how the struggle for power drives world politics, Morgenthau contrasted domestic politics (which he views as hierarchically ordered) with international politics (which is anarchical). Due to their inability to fulfill their desire in hierarchical domestic sphere, suggested Morgenthau, people project their unsatisfied desires onto external realm through nationalism (Morgenthau, 1948: 74). With the effect of this medium, there emerges the notion of “national power” which is defined as the power of a foreign policy of a country (Morgenthau, 1948: 73). This power mostly includes material resources, such as geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, population, military capabilities, which states utilize for making other states do things which they otherwise would not do.

Waltz shared with Morgenthau the understanding that the power struggles are the main dynamics of world politics. However, his analysis differs from Morgenthau by locating the importance of, and reasons for demanding power in a different source. For Waltz, it is not human nature that triggers the demand for power in world politics. For him, the centrality of power struggles stems from the structure of international politics (Waltz, 1979; 2001). This structure is characterized by anarchy, an enduring feature of world politics for Waltz (1979: 66). Anarchy imposes its own rules, or “set of constraining conditions” which foremost include the demand for survival and the necessity of self-help to survive since actors cannot trust one another to secure their

existence (Waltz, 1979: 73). These factors drive actors to gain power, i.e. to develop their military capabilities.

### **2.1.1.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

In Realism/Neorealism, states are identified as the most important actors. States are considered to represent particular nations which leads Realists to use the notions of states and nations interchangeably. For Morgenthau:

nation pursues international policies as a legal organization called a state whose agents act as the representatives of the nation on the international scene... They are the individuals who, when appear as representatives of their nation on the international scene, wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation. It is to them that we refer when we speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign policy of a nation (Morgenthau, 1948: 74).

For Waltz, states “are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (Waltz, 1979: 118). Waltz defined Neorealist theory as a “systemic theory” which is interested in structure and interacting units (i.e. states) as two component of the system. Since structure imposes its own conditions through mechanisms such as socialization and competition, interacting units become “like-units”. Put differently, for Waltz, states’ varieties are diminished to a great extent due to the structural factors. Accordingly, it is only the material capabilities of states that make them different from one another, while their functions remain the same. Although considering state as the actors of world politics, not all states count as important actors in Waltz’s analysis. It is only those states which have the most advanced material capabilities that are counted as actors. These states are referred to as “great powers” by Neorealist theory. “For more than three hundred years”, argued Waltz (1993: 44), “the drama of modern history has turned on the rise

and fall of great powers”. Following this argument, Waltz understood world politics through the prism of great powers. In his own words “theory of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era”, therefore, he continued, “it would be ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia or Costa Rica (Waltz, 1979: 72). In line with the way in which he understood power, Waltz defined the “greatness” of a state in terms of its “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz, 1993: 50).

### **2.1.1.3 The Location of World Politics**

In Realist/ Neorealist analyses, the location of world politics can be identified as interstate relations: it is the relations between states where world politics takes place. This view can be seen in Realist analysis which treats internal and external realms as separate and which considers internal dynamics as having no effect on external politics. For the theory, the domestic realm is hierarchical where one can find ethics and law (Morgenthau, 1948: 209). In this realm, states are “sovereign”, meaning that governments within the territorial boundaries of states are supreme authorities (Morgenthau, 1948: 245). Realists argue that what happens in this realm does not explain how states behave externally (Waltz, 1979: 24-26). That is because state-to-state relations are structured in accordance with “anarchy” without an authority controlling those relations.

The centrality of interstate relations as the location of world politics can be seen in Waltz’s seminal book *Men, the State, and War* ([1959]. 2001). Considered as the one of the most important subject matters for the discipline of IR, Waltz examined

wars, particularly the reasons for the occurrence of wars, in this book. He identified three levels in which reasons of war can be found. In the first level, Waltz analyzed the explanations which base the occurrence of war on human nature. In the second level, Waltz interrogated those explanations which approach the questions of war and peace through analyzing the internal structures of states. In the third level, Waltz examined the systemic cause of wars. This level shows that since there is no any sovereign authority that governs the relations between states, the occurrence of wars between states is always a possibility. Therefore, although underlining the importance of first and second images for explaining particular wars, Waltz highlights the primacy of anarchy as the permissive cause that explains the reoccurrence of wars between states.

That said, one also has to underscore the importance attributed to the relations between great powers in Waltz's analysis for understanding how he makes sense of the location of world politics. Accordingly, since it is the very numbers of great powers in world politics that give way to particular kind of polarities (such as unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity) which in turn determines the likelihood of war in world politics, great power relations are considered as the main location where world politics takes place (Waltz, 1979: 15, 1993).

To summarize, the conception of "the international" as found in Realist/Neorealist theory is focused on the notion of "anarchy". The main dynamic of world politics, i.e. the struggle for power, is caused by the lack of supreme authority in the world which forces states to rely only on themselves in the way of securing their "survival". For the theory, all states has to behave in accordance with this dynamic, no matter what kind of domestic systems they have. Great powers are considered as the primary actors who shape how the world works. What renders states as great powers

is explained with reference to their possession of material resources, particularly their military capabilities. Finally, it is the relations between these great powers where world politics takes place according to Realist/Neorealist theory.

### **2.1.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism**

This section looks at the co-authored studies of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, and the works of Kenneth A. Oye. Neoliberal Institutionalism (NLI) emerged in the 1970s by bringing into an “analytical confrontation” against Neorealism through criticizing the latter’s state-centric focus on the hand, and its pessimist stance for the possibility of cooperation, on the other (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 118). The main focus of the theory in world politics is how to achieve cooperation and what kind of roles international organizations play in the process of cooperation between states (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 117).

#### **2.1.2.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

NLI does not challenge the Neorealist argument that the main defining feature of “the international” is anarchy. For the theory, “nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests” (Oye, 1985: 1). However, how these two theories understand anarchy is different from one another. While for Neorealism anarchy is an enduring characteristic of “the international” which leads to struggles for power, NLI is of the view that anarchy is creating a “vacuum” that can be filled with processes and institutions (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 119). It is through this “vacuum” that possibilities of cooperation occur and, hence, different dynamics in world politics can emerge (Oye, 1985). NLI criticizes

Neorealism for defining the structure too narrowly which leads to the inability of the theory to understand change (Keohane, 1989). For Neorealism, change can only occur through shifts in military capabilities of states, whereas for NLI new actors (institutions) and arrangements (regimes) can initiate new changes that affect how the world works.

Such arguments, in turn, point to a different view on the main dynamic of world politics which NLI names as “complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye, 2001). There are three main characteristics that define complex interdependence. The first one is the emergence of multiple channels that connect societies with each other. These channels can take the form of interstate, trans-governmental or transnational relations (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 21). The second characteristic is the emergence of multiple issues that challenge the primacy of the military issues which are prioritized by Neorealists. The third characteristic is related with the second one in that it underlines the diminishing role of military force in the relations between states. This is because where complex interdependence prevails, as it does amongst advanced countries, which are central actors in NLI’s analysis, other sources of power, such as economic ones, lessen the possibility of usage of military force (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 22). As a result, the notion of complex interdependence is central for understanding the main mechanism through which world politics unfolds for NLI.

#### **2.1.2.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

For NLI, the central actors in world politics are states (Keohane & Nye, 1971: 342). However, following their definition of “complex interdependence”, NLI also underlines the existence and importance of other actors, particularly formal

intergovernmental organizations (Keohane, 1989). Nevertheless, this argument does not challenge the centrality of states given that the importance of such institutions are explained with reference to how they affect behaviors of states. This idea is related with how in NLI the politics is defined. For NLI politics:

refers to relationships in which at least one actor consciously employs resources, both material and symbolic, including the threat or exercise of punishment, to induce other actors to behave differently than they would otherwise behave. Using this definition of politics, we define world politics as all political interactions between significant actors in a world system in which a significant actor is any somewhat autonomous individual or organization that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with other actors across state lines (Keohane & Nye, 1971: 344-345).

What follows from this definition is that not all states or institutions constitute the main actors of world politics for the theory. Rather, NLI suggests that there are certain “significant actors” that shape world politics. For instance, when scholars explain the centrality of “complex interdependence” as the main dynamic of world politics, they underscore that when they use this concept, they refer to the relationships among “pluralist democracies” which are “information-era democracies bordering the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as among a number of their less wealthy neighbors in Latin America and increasingly in Eastern-Central Europe” (Keohane & Nye, 2000: 116). For them “complex interdependence” does not “characterize relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, nor did it typify the politics of the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, or even parts of Latin America” (Keohane & Nye, 2000: 115). Being the central actor in maintaining such relations (Keohane & Nye, 2000: 200) for NLI, it is particularly the USA and the institutions that are led by this country, such as the IMF or the IBRD, which are considered to be the most important actors of world politics (Keohane & Nye, 1971: 347).



### 2.1.2.3 The Location of World Politics

Concerning the location of world politics, NLI underscores that the centrality of interstate relations are confined to particular issue areas in world politics, such as war. Since economic relations are prioritized over military relations by the theory, it highlights the importance of another location which it names as “transnational interactions”. Transnational interactions refer to the movement of information, physical objects, money, and people (Keohane & Nye, 1971) and they include “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments” (Keohane & Nye, 1971: 331). NLI exclusively points to this location with reference to economic relations such as finance and trade. For instance, Keohane and Nye (1971: 337) suggest that “as the decision domains of business and banking transcend national jurisdiction, small changes in one state’s policies may have large effects on the system”. However, at the same time, it is also possible to observe that these arguments do not lead to a view on the location of world politics which transcends the centrality of interstate relations for the theory. For instance, in explaining the importance of international institutions and regimes, NLI primarily concerns with how these give way to cooperative relations between states. Similarly, by defining hegemony as “[maintaining] the essential rules governing interstate relations” (Keohane & Nye, 2000: 200), the discussions on the role of hegemony in sustaining the world political economy occupy a significant place on the research agenda of the theory (Keohane, 1984).

To summarize, for NLI “the international” is an anarchical realm. The “anarchy” creates “vacuums” that enable cooperation in world politics. By mostly focusing on economy, NLI identifies “complex interdependence” which lessens the

likelihood military conflict, and increases the importance of economic relations, as the main dynamic of world politics. As for the actors of “the international”, NLI is of the view that states, particularly economically-advanced ones, are central actors in world politics. The primacy of economy in NLI analyses results in the view according to which transnational relations are where world politics unfolds, even though state-to-state relations are also considered as significant locations of world politics.

### **2.1.3 Post-internationalism**

This section examines the studies of James N. Rosenau and Jan Aart Scholte. Published in 1990, in his seminal book *Turbulence in World Politics* Rosenau suggested that the world was entering into a new era characterized by profound changes which resulted in “global turbulence” making the former theories of IR inadequate. In particular, those theories that confine themselves to analysis of state behaviors and interstate relations are unable to provide us with the adequate picture of the world, offered Rosenau, since “the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without direct involvement of nations or states” in this new era (Rosenau, 1990: 6). In this sense, Rosenau problematized both Neorealism and NLI for being state-centric theories (Rosenau, 1990: 246) and underscored the necessity for going beyond them by developing “Post-international” theory (Rosenau, 1990: 8). Similar to Rosenau, Scholte problematized the theories which approach world politics through the prism of interstate relations. In this sense, offered Scholte, “a fundamental distinction can be drawn between ‘international relations’ (as exchanges between countries) and ‘global relations’ (as exchanges within a planetary realm)” (Scholte, 2005: 61). What Scholte referred as “global relations” shares similarities with Rosenau’s “post-international politics” in a sense that they both refer to the decreasing importance of, although not a

total disappearance of, territorially-defined locations, distances and borders (Scholte, 2005: 63). Additionally, both Rosenau and Scholte understood the emergent world politics as trans-territorial or supra- territorial (Scholte, 2005: 49). Given these commonalities between two authors, their works are analyzed together in this section.

### **2.1.3.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

In Rosenau's analysis "governance" is understood as the main dynamic of "the international". The centrality of governance can be seen in the way in which Rosenau differentiated it from government. Accordingly, government refers to the "activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the duly constituted implementation of policies" (Rosenau, 1992: 4). Governance, on the other hand, refers to the "activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers" (Rosenau, 1992: 4). For Scholte, governance includes "transworld activities" which consist of communication, movement of people, globalization of production, consumption, money and finance, emergence of multinational corporations, global governance institutions, non-governmental organizations, changes in military activities, environmental concerns and law, increasing the consciousness of people who conceive the planet as a single social unit (Scholte, 2005: 67- 74).

The emergence and centrality of governance is explained with the changes through which the authority shifted "both outward toward supranational entities and inward toward subnational groups" (Rosenau, 1992: 2-3). Accordingly, unlike a governing central authority, governance "may be unfolding in the world as a consequence of wherever authority may be located" (Rosenau, 1997: 10). For Rosenau

(1990: 10-11) “while in the state-centric world the authority is only confined to states, with the emergence of the multi-centric system, non-state collectivities are also becoming the sources of authority”. Such a transformation is related, firstly, with the shift from industrial to post-industrial order which is characterized by advanced technology that increases the interdependent relations by making movement of goods, people, and currencies easier. Secondly, the emergence of “transnational” issues (such as terrorism, pollution, drug trade) increases the interdependence throughout the world. These issues show that states are no longer capable of solving problems by their own. Due to this inability of states, there occurs a tendency for decentralization which challenges the centralizing tendencies of states. Lastly, all these changes are fostered by changes in the level of individuals. Accordingly people become more sensitive and conscious towards the issues of world affairs (Rosenau, 1990: 12-13).

### **2.1.3.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

Both Rosenau and Scholte approached the actors of world politics in a pluralistic way. That is because for the authors it is not only sovereignty or having material resources that turn collectivities into actors. For instance, Rosenau suggested that any collectivities, or “spheres of authority” with his own words, can be considered as actors (Rosenau, 1997: 28). While states are one type of such collectivities whose actorness is highly related with the territoriality, there are other actors such as “multinational corporations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic agencies, political parties, subnational governments, transnational societies, international organizations” which are not defined with reference to particular territory despite being significant actors in world politics (Rosenau, 1990: 36).

Similar to Rosenau's views on actors, Scholte also underscored the multiplicity of actors in world politics. This multiplicity means an end of "statism" meaning that states are no longer the only actors of "the international" (Scholte, 2005: 186). That is because:

governance in the more global world of the twenty-first century has become distinctly multi-layered and trans-scalar. Regulation occurs at – and through interconnections among – municipal, provincial, national, macro-regional and global sites. No single 'level' reigns over the others, as occurred with the primacy of the state over suprastate and substate institutions in territorialist circumstances. Instead, governance tends to be diffuse, emanating from multiple locales at once, with points and lines of authority that are not always clear (Scholte, 2005: 186).

For Scholte, "polycentrism" (a concept that refers to the multiplicity of actors) replaced "statism" since the dispersion of regulation renders substate actors (such as municipalities), suprastate actors (such as the UN or IMF), or private actors (such as NGOs or transnational corporations) significant actors that shape world politics (Scholte, 2005: 141).

### **2.1.3.3 The Location of World Politics**

In Rosenau's analysis, world politics is considered to be located in a place called "the Frontier". In "the Frontier", local, national, international affairs are "woven together" which suggests that the division between domestic and external affairs is no longer explains where world politics takes place. That is because the dynamics of globalization and localization empower multiple actors and shape diverse type of relations taking place between them. These actors and their relations influence the ways in which world politics unfolds.

Scholte concurred with this view and underscored the territorial as well as supraterritorial dimensions of the “social space”. For him:

social space should not be understood as an assemblage of discrete realms, but as an interrelation of spheres within a whole. Events and developments are not global or national or local or some other scale, but an intersection of global and other spatial qualities (Scholte, 2005: 78).

To summarize, for Post-internationalism, the main dynamic of world politics is governance which includes various trans-world activities. These activities transcend traditionally-defined issue areas which are regulated by states. For Post-internationalism besides states, there are other actors (such as substate, suprastate, and private ones) that are shaping world politics. For the theory, world politics takes place in “the Frontier” that connects local, domestic, and external realms.

## **2.2 “The international” in the Critical Theories of IR**

### **2.2.1 Frankfurt School IR Theory**

In this section, Frankfurt School IR theory’s conception of “the international” is analyzed by looking at the works of Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth. Frankfurt School IR opposes the mainstream theories’ view that “the existing structures of the social world are immutable” (Rengger & Thirkell-White, 2007: 6) and instead underscores that laws and regularities that shape world politics are socially constructed. For the theory, IR should reflect this fact and “the possibility of human intervention in the social world in order to modify its nature” (Linklater, 1990a: 11). Frankfurt School IR theory voices an explicit commitment to “emancipatory” goals to be realized in world politics. For Booth (1991: 319) emancipation is “freeing people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop

them carrying out what they would freely choose to do”. The theory aims to “identify” and “eliminate” the “global constraints on humanity’s potential for freedom, equality and self- determination” (Devetak, 2009: 168-169) and “if possible, nurture-tendencies that exist within the present conjuncture that point in the direction of emancipation” (Hobden & Wyn Jones, 2006: 241).

### **2.2.1.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

It is possible to identify two main dynamics of world politics in Frankfurt School IR theory. The first dynamic is the relations of inequality and domination which constrain “human autonomy” (Linklater, 1990b: 2). This dynamic is understood with reference to both material inequalities generated by capitalism that cause “disparities in life chances between the haves and the have-nots” (Booth, 2007: 1) and other “forms of oppression” (Linklater, 1990b: 24) that people experience due to their sexual, ethnic, or racial differences. For the theory “the forces of patriarchy, proselytizing religions, capitalism, sovereign statism/nationalism, race and consumerist democracy” (Booth, 2007: 21) are central for how the world works.

The second dynamic is related with the existence of “powerful positive forces” (Booth, 2007: 26) which can bring an emancipatory change to the enduring inequalities in the world. Writing in 1991, in his seminal article “Security and Emancipation” Booth argued that the world in entering into a new era in which earlier patterns are changing. Calling this era as “interregnum”, Booth underscored how world economy is becoming more complicated, how sovereignty is becoming diffused, how identities are becoming more overlapped.

The centrality of these changes for understanding Frankfurt School IR theory's view on the main dynamic of world politics can particularly be observed in theory's historical analysis. For Linklater, "present structures are not natural and permanent but have a history and are likely to be succeeded by different arrangements in the future" (Linklater, 1998: 3). This means that one era's dynamic may be different from another. Linklater identified three epochs in human history through which he discussed how humans are organized differently to exemplify this point. The first epoch is "tribalism" in which humans were socially organized through kinship. The second epoch is "Westphalian era" which heralded the emergence of citizenship with states becoming the main form of social organization (Linklater, 1998: 28). The third epoch is "humanism", argued Linklater, which is the "final phase in the scale of forms of international relations" and in which people recognize their obligations towards all other people and they "identify with, and have rights in, a properly universal society" (Linklater, 1990a: 198). In this epoch, states are no longer considered as the most satisfactory form of organization due to the "development of the individual's moral relationship with his species" (Linklater, 1990a: 199). This epoch is also named as "post-Westphalian" in which globalization and fragmentation in world politics decrease the efficacy and legitimacy of nation states and their "totalizing project" and open a space for dialogue on the way to construct new political organizations (Linklater, 1998: 31-34).

Linklater examined the emergence of post-Westphalian world politics with reference to the developments in Western Europe (Linklater, 1998: 34). With the emergence of the European Union, the authorities and loyalties become diffused and both minority rights, as well as the notion of transnational citizenship are introduced in the region (Linklater, 1998: 199). According to Linklater, this situation renders



Europe “a model which can be emulated by regions elsewhere” which can lead to a more “humanized” world politics (Linklater, 1998: 204).

To conclude, for Frankfurt School IR theory there are two main dynamics of world politics. The first dynamic is related with the inequalities and dominance that shape various aspects of world politics. The second dynamic is about the existence of “positive forces” that can abolish the inequalities and different forms of domination and bring about emancipatory change in world politics. In the view of the theory, the emergence of the post-Westphalian world politics as a result of globalization and fragmentation exemplify one such force.

#### **2.2.1.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

Frankfurt School IR theory’s understanding of the main actors of world politics is informed by two arguments. Firstly, for the theory states are central in understanding how the world works. However, unlike the mainstream theories which do not question states as the dominant form of social organization in world politics, problematization of states through questioning their ethical basis is central for Frankfurt School IR (Linklater, 1990a). For Linklater, this problematization is a necessity since it is through this critique that theorization of contemporary world politics becomes possible (Linklater, 1990a: 21). Linklater engaged with this critique through pointing to the conflict between the conceptions of men and citizens in his seminal book *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* ([1982].1990a). This conflict stems from the existence of states as the predominant mode of organization since:

As an exclusive moral community, the sovereign state emphasized its liberty to promote its interests without recognizing any fundamental obligations for the welfare of outsiders; the willingness of states to promote their one-sided

interests was in addition a source of their perpetual conflict and the inevitable competition which existed among them (Linklater, 1990a: 25).

States, therefore, are limiting the ability of humans to realize their capacities for collective self-determination (Linklater, 1990a: 36). It is in this sense that Linklater viewed states as “totalizing projects” which “seek to construct homogenous national communities which are sharply distinguished from the world of outsiders” (Linklater, 1998: 16). By imposing “internal obligations” (obligations of people towards the people who are citizens of the same state), states put an obstacle for realization of “external obligations” of people towards whole humankind (Linklater, 1990a: 39- 41). Linklater criticized this “particularistic” understanding of the state, and instead proposed a “universalistic” understanding through which the boundaries of existing political communities can be extended and state-system can be challenged (Linklater, 1990a: 47-54).

For the theory, by virtue of the changing dynamics in world politics other actors do also become significant in shaping world politics. Those actors are located “above and below the level of national governments” (Linklater, 1998: 33) and include “non-governmental associations, social movements and national minorities” that “can enjoy membership of an international society which is not just a society of states but a society of peoples and individuals” (Linklater, 1998: 209). For instance, Booth (1991: 326) underscored the importance of global civil society organizations, such as Green Peace, Amnesty International, and Oxfam, in shaping world politics. These actors heralded the emergence of “new forms of political community” which “ensure that vulnerable persons and groups everywhere have a greater opportunity to influence decisions which harms their vital interests” (Linklater, 2007: 56).

### 2.2.1.3 The Location of World Politics

The first view of Frankfurt School IR theory regarding the location of world politics is informed by the challenge that the theory directs against the distinction made between internal and external realms by mainstream theories. That is because:

it is less and less tenable to see the “external world”- the subject-matter of traditional international politics- as a “domain of its own”. In the interpenetrating world of global politics, economics and cultures, we need better attend to the linkages between “domestic” and “foreign” politics. Frontiers these days do not hold back either “internal” or “external” affairs (Booth, 1991: 322).

By challenging the demarcation lines drawn between internal and external realms in understanding world politics, Frankfurt School IR theory points to the importance of various relations taking place between different political communities at diverse levels. These political communities emerged as a result of the expansion of authority towards sub-state as well as transnational level and they lead to the “post-Westphalian international society” (Linklater, 1998: 8). In underscoring the centrality of the relations between political communities as the location of “the international”, Frankfurt School IR theory also explicitly defines the characteristics that these political communities should possess which in turn leads to the emancipatory transformation in world politics. In this sense, these communities are defined as “emancipatory community” which

recognises that people have multiple identities, that a person’s identity cannot be satisfactorily defined by any single attribution (religion, class, race, etc.), and that people must be allowed to live simultaneously in a variety of communities expressing their multifaceted lives. An emancipatory community is therefore a free association of individuals, recognising their solidarity in relation to common conceptions of what it is to live an ethical life, binding people together with a sense of belonging and a distinctive network of ideas and support (Booth, 2007: 138-139).

Defined as such, the dialogue between these emancipatory political communities facilitate the emergence of what Linklater (1998) called “world citizenship” or “cosmopolitan citizenship”. The notion of world citizenship helps one to transcend the immediate connection made between citizenship and sovereignty, nationality, and territoriality since it alludes the emergence of “diverse loyalties” and “multiple authorities” and “commitments to universality and difference” (Linklater, 1998: 179-181). Through world citizenship, the responsibilities of people are no longer defined with reference to their fellow-citizens within a particular state, but to the human community as a whole (Linklater, 1998: 184). As a result, the location of world politics exceeds relations between states and instead includes various locations in which individuals and communities enter into dialogue in equal basis.

To summarize, for Frankfurt School IR theory, there are two dynamics in world politics. One is the relations of inequality and domination generated by capitalism and other forms of oppressions such as patriarchy or racism. The other one is globalization and fragmentation which lead to the transformation of authority and loyalty relations and bring about emancipation. While considering states as significant for how the world works, the theory problematizes them as it is of the view that states are causing various inclusion/exclusion mechanisms. For the theory, by virtue of the changes taking place as a result of globalization and fragmentation, the actors of world politics become multiplied and include both states and various other entities residing below and above state level. As for the location of world politics, Frankfurt School IR theory challenges the demarcation lines drawn between internal and external realms and points to the importance of various relations taking place between different political communities below and beyond state boundaries.

### **2.2.2 Neo-Gramscian IR Theory**

In order to examine the conception of “the international” in Neo-Gramscian theory, this section looks at the works of Robert W. Cox, and the co-authored studies of Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton. Emerged during the 1980s with the writings of Robert Cox, Neo- Gramscian IR’s main tenets are based on the works of Antonio Gramsci. For Cox, this stemmed from the fact that “a concept, in Gramsci’s thought, is loose and elastic and attains precision only when brought into contact with a particular situation which it helps to explain” (Cox, 1993: 50). What this means is that in Gramsci’s analysis, contextualizing and historicizing the issue at hand hold paramount significance. This makes the application of his ideas to the field of IR important, suggested Cox, since the mainstream theories of the discipline are “ahistorical” (Cox, 1981: 132). By challenging the pre-given assumptions about world politics as found in mainstream theories of IR, Neo-Gramscian IR both points to the changes that shape various aspects of world politics in different historical eras and offers different understandings on the key notions of the discipline.

#### **2.2.2.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

For Neo-Gramscians, the main dynamic that shapes world politics is the structure of the world political economy and particularly the “hegemony” within it. Neo-Gramscians define hegemony not only with reference to coercion but also consent. In this sense, their definition of hegemony is different than the ones as found in mainstream theories of the discipline. While for the mainstream approaches, hegemony refers to the dominance of one state over others with the help of coercive means (such as military capabilities), for Neo-Gramscians, hegemony also contains

consent which is “manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but is then projected outwards on a world scale” (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 87). For Cox (1993: 61), hegemony in world affairs is constituted through processes of expansion and emulation of ideas, modes of production, and institutions of a dominant social class in a particular country towards world scale. As a result of this expansion and emulation, dominant social classes in different countries are connected to each other and constitute a world hegemony which includes social, political and economic structures (Cox, 1993: 62).

In Neo-Gramscian analysis, hegemony is constituted in “three spheres of activity” including social relations of production, forms of state, and world orders. Each sphere of activity is constituted by three elements, namely ideas (intersubjective meanings or collective images), material capabilities, and institutions (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 87-88). Taken together, these three spheres inform the characteristic of the hegemony that prevails in a given historical era and shapes the main dynamic in world politics accordingly.

The way in which Neo-Gramscians understand social relations of production can be considered as a starting point for teasing out their view on hegemony. Neo-Gramscians have a broad definition of social relations of production in a sense that for them these relations go beyond economic activities. For Cox (1989: 39) production relations are “not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed” but they also cover “the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods”. It is through social relations of production that particular social forces in the

domestic realm come together and constitute the basis of power in a state form (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 89). Forms of state are shaped by these very social forces within a particular context. By taking states as historically constructed entities, Neo-Gramscians underscore how through particular social forces distinctive forms of states emerge. In Cox's words, "a particular configuration of social forces defines in practice the limits or parameters of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action, defines, in other words, the *raison d'état* for a particular state" (Cox, 1987: 105). For the theory, this particular configuration of hegemony at the state level expands towards the world and creates a particular world order by connecting "social forces across different countries" (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 93).

#### **2.2.2.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

The first significant point regarding the views of Neo-Gramscians on the actors of world politics is related with the way in which they understand state. For them, the definition of state which only concentrates on "administrative, executive, and coercive apparatus of government" (Cox, 1993: 51) or on government, political parties, and military (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 92) is too narrow to capture what state is and what it does. Take, for instance, Neo-Gramscians account on the state-civil society relations. In mainstream understandings, these two domains are considered as separate, whereas for Neo-Gramscians they are interpenetrated. Civil society includes religious institutions, educational system and media which shape the ways in which people behave in particular ways so that the power of the hegemonic social order is consolidated and reproduced. In this understanding, power is not only viewed with reference to coercion but also to consent which is gained through the mediums of civil society organizations (Cox, 1993: 52). For Cox (1981: 141), power is "emerging from

social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities”.

Given this outlook, it becomes possible to argue that state remains a significant point of departure for understanding how Neo-Gramscian IR makes sense of the actors of world politics. However, their extended definition of state and power, together with their identification of sustaining global capitalist economy as the primary function of states lead them to point to the importance of “social classes” as actors of world politics. Hegemonic social class within a given national context constitute a historical bloc through the utilization of material as well as ideational structures. That is because:

ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible to one to the other. Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances. Material circumstances include both the social relations and the physical means of production. Superstructures of ideology and political organization shape the development of both aspects of production and are shaped by them (Cox, 1993: 56).

Although firstly constituted in national context, historical blocs constituted by hegemonic social classes cut across different nations by expanding towards a world scale and sustaining the global hegemony.

In the view of the theory, “counter-hegemonic movements” are other actors of world politics. Counter-hegemonic movements are “opposed to international capital, and to the state and world order structures most congenial to international capital” and aim to create “an alternative world order” (Cox, 1981: 150). In Neo-Gramscian analysis it is suggested that counter-hegemonic movements might “include Amnesty International, Green parties and ecological groups, socialist think-tanks like the Transnational Institute, peace groups such as European Nuclear Disarmament, development agencies such as Oxfam, and religious organisations such as the World Council of Churches” (Gill & Law, 1993: 122).



### 2.2.2.3 The Location of World Politics

Regarding the location of world politics, Neo-Gramscian IR challenges the view which takes internal and external realms as separate, and instead points to a dialectical relationship between the two. As it is evident in the arguments related with how domestic social forces, forms of states, and world orders are interconnected with one another, the distinction between the inside and the outside of a state is blurred in Neo-Gramscian analysis. That is because, as suggested by Cox, the world hegemony is “in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad” (Cox, 1996: 137).

This view on the location of world politics can be teased out from Cox’s analysis on different world orders that emerged in different time periods. Consider, for instance, his account on the world order namely “Pax Americana”. “Pax Americana” covers the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1970s (Cox 1981; Bieler & Morton, 2004). It is a US-led hegemonic world order which was maintained by fixed exchange rate system offered by Bretton Woods system and by international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The basic principle throughout this period was “embedded liberalism” by which international free trade and government intervention into the economy to provide social security and partial redistribution of wealth to its citizen were ensured. In relation to this, the dominant form of state was Keynesian welfare state and the main social relations of production was based on mass production and consumption, or Fordist accumulation regime (Bieler & Morton, 2004:

94). During “Pax-Americana”, it was the US- based social relations of production and a form of state that was expanded outwards.

The current world order, on the other hand, emerged due to the crises occurred in “Pax-Americana” period. These crises were triggered by two factors: the first one was related with “the internationalization of production” and the second one was related with “the internationalization of state” (Cox, 1981: 144-147). Also framed as the period of globalization, the internationalization of production refers to the “integration of production processes on a transnational scale with Transnational Corporations (TNCs) promoting the operation of different elements of a single process in different territorial locations” (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 94). Such a change in the production relations also influenced the ways in which states are structured. Accordingly, states are also internationalized through “a new axis of influence linked international policy networks with the key central agencies of government and with big business” (Cox, 1981: 146). As a result, the Neo-Gramscian analysis on the phenomenon of internationalization of production and state further challenges the dividing lines between domestic and external realms, and instead points to the intermingled relation between the two.

To summarize, for Neo-Gramscianism, the main dynamic of “the international” is the hegemony which is constituted in the three spheres of activity including social relations of production, forms of state, and world orders. In each sphere, ideas, material capabilities, and institutions interact and together they shape world politics. For Neo-Gramscians, hegemonic social classes which constitute historical blocs and counter-hegemonic blocs are the main actors of world politics. Regarding the location of “the international”, Neo-Gramscian analysis challenges the boundaries between inside and

outside, and shows how “the international” takes place in a realm where internal and external developments are interconnected.

### **2.2.3 Feminist IR Theory**

This section looks at the studies of Cynthia Enloe, and J. Ann Tickner in order to examine how Feminist IR views “the international”. Feminist IR has different variants including Liberal, Radical, Psychoanalytic, Socialist, Standpoint, Postcolonial, Postmodern, or Third World Feminisms. The primary concerns of Feminist IR theories include the subordination of women, the asymmetrical relationship between men and women, and how to overcome this asymmetry, as well as the importance of the category of “gender” in understanding world politics (Tickner, 2001: 11). Being particularly central for Feminist IR theorizing, the notion of gender refers to social constructions about “what it means to be male or female in any particular place or time” (Pettman, 2004: 674). Gender is “socially learned behaviour and expectations that distinguish between masculinity and femininity” (Peterson & Runyan, 1999: 5). Feminist IR scholars suggest that characteristics that are associated with masculinity (such as “strength, rationality, independence, protector, and public”) are prioritized over the ones that are associated with femininity (“weakness, emotionality, relational, protected, and private”) (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2010: 196). They are of the view that world politics is “framed, studied and implemented” (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2010: 210) with reference to such socially constructed understandings. Feminist IR theories aim to deconstruct such understandings and show how they are shaping and also are shaped by world politics.

### 2.2.3.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics

For Feminist IR, the main dynamic of world politics is hierarchical social relations that create “structures of inequality and oppression” (Tickner, 2001: 143). These relations are produced and reproduced in different issue areas including foreign policies of governments, security, and political economy. Feminist IR theories view such relations through the category of gender and argue that since other theories are gender-blind and are reflecting masculinist views only, they are unable to see how gendered social relations are shaping different aspects of world politics (Tickner, 1992). For instance, in her seminal book *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, Enloe (2000: xvii) underscored that relations between governments do not only depend on economy and military, but also “on the control of women as symbols, consumers, workers, and emotional comforters”. As an example to this point, Enloe examined how Carmen Miranda, a famous Brazilian singer, is turned into a Hollywood star in the USA and how this affects foreign policy relations approach of the USA and Latin America: “when President Franklin Roosevelt launched his Latin American ‘Good Neighbor’ policy, the men who ran Hollywood were willing to help the government’s campaign to replace a militaristic, imperial approach to US-Latin America diplomacy with a more ‘cooperative’ strategy” (Enloe, 2000: 125).

In fact, it is through a particular understanding on masculinity and femininity that foreign policy (which itself is a masculine sphere of activity) is conducted, suggested Enloe. For instance, any risk-taking foreign policy decision needs to be justified through the construction of men as “protectors” and women as “grateful” towards their fathers and husbands who are providing the protection (Enloe, 2000: 12).

Hierarchical social relations are not only shaping the realm of foreign policy argue Feminist IR scholars. For example, in *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (1992) Tickner looked at how gendered relations do shape the ways in which the notions of security and economy are made sense of in IR, which in turn, inform the policies conducted in these issue areas. What Tickner suggested is that these understandings themselves are reflective of gendered hierarchies by way of prioritizing masculinist conceptualizations. For instance, Feminists problematize the state-centric and/or militaristic focus of mainstream approaches to security which overlook the security concerns of individuals, particularly women. By challenging such understandings, Feminists offer an individual-centric and non-militaristic definition of security. By looking at security of individuals rather than states, Feminists open a space for an inclusion of non-traditional issues such as “domestic violence” or “structural violence”<sup>1</sup> so that they point to the centrality of gendered relations in making sense of world politics. While doing so, they show how insecurities in different levels (be that individual, domestic or global) are connected with one another which together produce insecurities in the world (Tickner, 2001: 6).

Being another central issue for the discipline of IR, Feminists also approach economy in a different way firstly by problematizing the traditional perspectives on economy including Liberalism (which takes individuals, defined as “rational economic men” as their unit of analysis), Economic Nationalism (which takes states as their main units of analysis), and Marxism (according to which it is the category of class that economic analysis should focus on). Tickner argued that all these perspectives focus

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<sup>1</sup> Structural violence refers to “the economic insecurity of individuals whose life expectancy was reduced, not by direct violence of war but by domestic and international structures of political and economic oppression” (Tickner, 1992: 69).

on systemic level, whether they are concerned with the system of states or world capitalist economy, and underscores the necessity of a “bottom-up” approach which concerns “the standpoint of those at the periphery of the world economy or the international system” (Tickner, 1992: 92). That is because economy is not divorced from the gendered relations that sustain it. For instance, Feminist analysis underlines the importance of reproduction relations for understanding how economy works. Similarly, they point to the centrality of inequality, injustice, marginalization, feminization of poverty in reproducing a particular configuration of economy that prevails in world politics (Tickner, 2001: 4; Enloe, 2000). Put differently, world economy is sustained not only through the global mechanisms but also through the local relations, such as household (Tickner, 2001: 94).

In conclusion, for Feminist IR the main dynamic of world politics is hierarchical social relations that constitute different aspects of world politics from foreign policy to economy. Feminist IR theory view such relations through the category of gender and look at how gendered social relations are shaping those different issue areas in world politics.

### **2.2.3.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

One of the main actors of world politics according to Feminist IR is state. However, unlike the mainstream theories, Feminists view states with a critical lens. Feminists consider states as gendered-constructs since they “promote and support policy practices primarily in the interests of men” and “privilege hegemonic constructions of masculinity” (Tickner, 2001: 21). For example, Tickner challenged the reified Neorealist understanding of states according to which states are “unitary actors whose actions are explained through laws that can be universalized across time and place and

whose internal characteristics are irrelevant to the operation of those laws” (Tickner, 1992: 42). This understanding, continued Tickner, “is grounded in the historical practices of the Western state system” since “characterizations of state behavior, in terms of self-help, autonomy, and power seeking, privilege characteristics associated with the Western construction of masculinity” (Ticker, 1992: 42). Conceiving states through these masculinist characteristics, Neorealists undervalue actors associated with femininity and their constitutive effects on states.

For Feminist IR scholars, states are not the only actors of world politics. That is because:

While international relations has never been just about relations between states, an IR statist focus seems even less justified today than in the past. International politics cannot be restricted to politics between states; politics is involved in relationships between international organizations, social movements and other non-state actors, transnational corporations and international finance, and human-rights organizations, to name a few (Tickner, 2001: 2).

Feminists are critical of those mainstream theories which also point to the importance of actors other than states. These theories, although exceed state-centrism in their analysis, still fail to recognize the gendered construction of other actors that they are analyzing. Take, for instance, NLI which underscores multiplicity of actors emerged as a result of interdependence. For Feminists, NLI considers only those actors which have masculine characteristics and ignores marginalized actors, and how they are affecting and get affected by the relations embedded in interdependence (Tickner, 1992: 74). In this sense, Feminists highlight the importance of unpaid domestic works of women, or their underpaid positions in economy and how these gendered economic relations are produced and are producing interdependent world economy.

Following these problematizations, Feminist IR underlines the role of individuals, in particular marginalized individuals in shaping world politics. In line

with their view that the gendered dynamics of world politics manifest themselves not only in systemic or state level, but also in the micro-level, Feminists focus on the everyday-life of individuals whose experiences “affect and are affected by global politics” (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2010: 197). In other words, although hardly being subjected to a serious attention, these individuals, particularly women, are everywhere in world politics. For instance, Enloe (2000) underscored the roles of “diplomatic wives” in successful conduct of diplomatic relations between “diplomat husbands”. These women, suggested Enloe, provide unpaid service to their husbands and help them to sustain stable marriage life which is considered as an important feature of being a “respectful” diplomat. As another example, Enloe highlighted the significance of sex workers for the continuation of military bases. Sex workers, by making soldiers feel “like a man”, provide motivation for soldiers to continue to their “manly” duties and thereby contribute to the workings of such bases.

### **2.2.3.3 The Location of World Politics**

Feminist IR scholars problematize the distinction made between internal and external realms in mainstream theories. For them, this distinction exemplifies one of the dichotomies prevalent in the mainstream understandings which results in representing some as the actors of world politics, while placing others outside the scope of politics. As opposed to this view, Feminists see world politics “as embedded in the national and the local” (Enloe & Cohn, 2003: 1188). One of the most well-known phrases that catches the way in which Feminists understand such embeddedness is “the personal is international”. “Read forward ‘the personal is international’ insofar as ideas about what it means to be a ‘respectable’ woman or an ‘honorable’ man have been shaped by colonizing policies, trading strategies and military doctrines”, suggested Enloe



(Enloe, 2000: 196). For her, it is also possible to read the phrase the other way around. In this sense, “the international is personal” if one considers how governments are in need of particular private relations in order to be able to conduct their foreign affairs:

Governments need more than secrecy and intelligence agencies; they need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need not only military hardware, but a steady supply of women’s sexual services to convince their soldiers that they are manly. To operate in the international arena governments seek other governments’ recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood (Enloe, 2000: 196-197).

Tickner (1992: 19) argued that the construction of binary oppositions between domestic and foreign, inside and outside, order and anarchy, private and public is central to the IR theorizing. The reason why mainstream theories, particularly Neorealism, find such distinctions plausible and justifiable stems from their focus on great powers as the main actors of “the international”. But once one looks at the other actors, as Feminists do, lines demarking such distinctions get blurred (Tickner, 1992: 52). Therefore, Feminists challenge these distinctions and show how supposedly distinct domains are “permeable” and “interrelated” (Tickner, 1992: 23). For instance, by stressing the actorness of individuals through analyzing world politics from micro to macro levels, Feminists point to the interconnection between different levels of analysis (Tickner, 2001: 2). Thus, for Feminist IR scholars, “the international” takes place in different locations from bodies of women, to household which constitute and in return get constituted by state-level or systemic-level locations.

To summarize, for Feminist IR the main dynamic of world politics is hierarchical social relations that result in different inequalities and injustices in the world. These relations are gendered relations as the practices in world politics are informed by socially-constructed notions of masculinity and femininity. Feminists are

of the view that there are multiple actors in world politics from states to non-state institutions. Feminists also underscore that although their actorness is not recognized in the literature, individuals also shape world politics in various ways. For Feminist IR, the internal and external realms are not separate and relations taking place in different locations from household to local, from national to global, together constitute where world politics unfolds.

#### **2.2.4 Poststructuralist IR Theory**

This section looks at the studies of David Campbell and R. B. J. Walker to understand the conceptions of “the international” as found in Poststructuralist IR theory. Poststructuralist IR challenges the “taken-for-granted” understandings of mainstream theories about the “realities” of world politics (Campbell, 2010: 234). It seeks to “denaturalize” these taken-for-granted assumptions by pointing to the ways in which they are constructed over time (Campbell, 2010: 233). For Poststructuralism, studying discourses is central in this process. Discourse refers to “specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible” (Campbell, 2010: 226). Poststructuralists “deconstruct” the prevalent discourses to “show how discourses construct rather than simply reflect reality” and thus to unsettle taken-for-granted views and pre-given oppositions in making sense of world politics (Der Derian, 1989: 4). Poststructuralist analysis also “explores both the discursive conditions which make regimes of truth possible and the effects of power inseparable from those discursive conditions” (Hutchings, 1997: 104).

#### 2.2.4.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics

For Poststructuralists, power relations are central for how the world works. However, how they understand power is different from the mainstream theories' understandings. In mainstream theories power is understood as resources and material capabilities that actors in world politics possess. In Poststructuralism:

power is not simply *repressive* (i.e. imposing limits and constraints on the infinite possibilities of the world) but is *productive* because of the imposition of limits and constraints. Relations of power establish the limitations of self/other, inside/relation to outside, but without those limitations those notions of self/inside, other/outside would not exist. The limitations are, therefore, productive: we know what that thing *is* by knowing what it is *not* (Campbell, 2010: 225).

For Poststructuralists, power operates through discourses and in this sense there is a mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge. For the theory, objective knowledge is not possible since all knowledge claims are contingent on particular power relations. According to Poststructuralism “power produces discourses of knowledge, which in turn produce regimes of truth, criteria through which to discriminate between true and false or normal and deviant” (Hutchings, 1997: 105). It is through these regimes of truths that practices of inclusion and exclusion in world politics unfold. This argument makes the notion of “discourse” central for Poststructuralist analysis.

In Poststructuralism, discourses refer not only to linguistic sources, but also to social practices and performances. Discourse are not understood something through which objects are described by subjects, but as something by which both subjects and objects are constituted. Campbell (2010: 218) argued that discourses are “inseparable from the world” because all meanings, identities, and relations are produced within them. For Poststructuralism, discourses have material effects in the sense that they

shape the ways in which “realities” are thought and acted upon. This is the reason why discourse is considered as “performative” (Campbell, 2010: 226) or “performative materialization rather than linguistic construction” (Campbell, 2010: 227).

#### **2.2.4.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

For Poststructuralists, states are central to world politics. However, they do not take states as pre-given entities as mainstream theories do. Poststructuralism is interested in practices that render states as actors of world politics. “How state came to be regarded as the most important actor in world politics” (Campbell, 2010: 216) is a central question in Poststructuralist analysis. For instance, for Campbell “states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behavior, political speeches, and economic investments” (Campbell, 2010: 226).

Since Poststructuralism is interested in such cultural, economic, or political practices and processes through which actors are constituted, they also focus on actors other than states. As it is argued by Campbell (2010: 230) Poststructuralism “concern[s] itself with an almost boundless array of actors”. These actors might include international institutions or transnational actors (Campbell, 2010: 227).

By focusing on the practices that render entities as actors, Poststructuralism problematizes those approaches which reify particular actors in analyzing world politics. For instance, Walker in his seminal book *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (1993) challenged the modern theories of IR, particularly Realism, for their reification of states as actors. Walker was also critical of those theories which go beyond state-centrism in their analysis. That is because, suggested

Walker, these theories fail to look into the constitution of these actors and how we end up with the actors that we have in world politics. In that sense, Walker (1993: 7) argued that debates “about whether states are obstinate or obsolete, or whether so-called non-state actors play a significant role in contemporary world politics, or even whether states are becoming caught within networks of interdependence or functional regimes, do not take us very far”.

#### **2.2.4.3 The Location of World Politics**

The problematization of mainstream theories’ understanding of the location of world politics according to which internal and external realms of states are separate is central for Poststructuralism. This stems from the argument that such supposedly distinct realms are constituting one another as boundaries that are constructed to separate these two realms are in fact

both separates and joins, thus making it impossible to conceive of a space which could be traversed by a bridge between independently existing realms. The spaces of inside and outside serve to delineate the rational, ordered polity in which good, sane, sober, modest, and civilized “man” resides from the dangerous, chaotic, and anarchical realm in which the evil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage people are found. The division between inside and outside, and the normative distinctions between the two realms, means that these strategies constitute a world in which sovereign states exist in a condition of anarchy and war (Campbell, 1992: 67-68).

This way of thinking about the location of world politics results in deconstructing the prevalent understandings in IR regarding the boundaries. For Poststructuralists, IR by separating different realms from one another reifies different levels, including individual, state, and systemic ones (Campbell, 1992: 68). For Bigo and Walker (2007: 729) there is a need to go beyond “the presumed naturalness of the boundaries between

internal and external” by re-conceptualizing boundaries “as lines of exclusion” (Bigo & Walker, 2007: 733) and by studying boundary making practices.

One of the notions through which Poststructuralists re-conceptualize boundaries in world politics is the metaphor of “Moebius Strip”. Bigo and Walker (2007) explained the necessity of this metaphor by arguing that in IR boundaries are mostly analyzed through “a topology of a circle”, which affirms strict lines separating inside from outside, or internal from external and which takes borders for granted (Bigo & Walker, 2007: 734-735). According to “Moebius Strip”, on the other hand:

there is no natural necessity in the sovereign decision to draw the line to enclose particular spaces and differentiate these spaces from each other in the manner assumed by popular discourse and academic analyses alike. Depending on the position of the observer the inside looks like the outside, the outside looks like the inside, and any site of differentiation must be an obvious matter of contingency and contestation (Bigo & Walker, 2007: 736).

By introducing of the metaphor of “Moebius Strip” Poststructuralism interrogates the bordering process itself, instead of defining particular locations where world politics unfolds.

To summarize, for Poststructuralism the main dynamic of world politics is power relations which produces discourses, inform “regimes of truth” and create inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in world politics. Since it is through discourses that meanings, identities, and social relations are constituted, the notion of discourse is central in Poststructuralist analysis. Regarding actors, Poststructuralism refrains from identifying specific actors that act on world politics. Instead, they are interested in the practices through which certain entities come to be viewed as actors, particularly states. Concerning the location of world politics, Poststructuralists problematize viewing internal and external realms as separate and taking borders for granted. For them, the process of bordering itself constitutes various relations in world politics.

### 2.2.5 Postcolonial IR theory

In IR, there are multiple “perspectives, traditions, and approaches” (Grovoqui, 2010: 239) that draw on Postcolonial theory. This section examines the studies of L. H. M. Ling and Siba Grovoqui to look at the conception of “the international” as found in such Postcolonial perspectives on world politics. Originating in literary and cultural studies, Postcolonial theory entered the discipline of IR in the 1990s. The term “post” in Postcolonialism suggests that colonialism did not come to an end by the period of decolonization, instead colonialism has continuously and persistently shaped the world in its own image (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002: 11; Seth, 2013: 1). This persistence gives way to unequal relations, both in material as well as in ideational terms, and hinders the role of non-core actors in world politics. These relations and hindrances constitute what Postcolonial IR approaches aims to expose and challenge. For Postcolonial IR scholars, the discipline of IR itself is one realm in which persistence of unequal relations can be observed. For them, IR is predominantly a “Eurocentric” discipline which takes “Europe as sole reference for understanding international existence” (Grovoqui, 2006: ix). The core assumption in “Eurocentrism” is that there is a “European centrality in the human past and present” and Europe is “separate and distinct from the rest of the world” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006: 331). For Postcolonial IR approaches, both mainstream and certain critical IR theories reproduce Eurocentrism since “they have [equally] assumed Western initiation of the original or base ideas and institutions” (Grovoqui, 2006: 30). In the process, the ideas, experiences, and contributions of other actors are overlooked by the discipline (Grovoqui, 2006: 6). When these actors are taken into account, they are represented “from the vantage point of the European” (Jabri, 2013: 11). Postcolonial IR approaches seek to challenge this state of affairs in IR and to interrogate how the relations of race,

class, gender, and culture constitute both the discipline (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004: 32) as well as world politics.

### **2.2.5.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

For Postcolonial IR approaches, the main dynamic of world politics is the enduring colonial relations of power. Postcolonial IR scholars argue that even though the formal colonization came to an end with the decolonization period which started from the mid-20th century, the effects of the colonial power relations have still been continuing. By problematizing IR's disinterest in the enduring effects of colonialism, Postcolonial IR points to the centrality of colonialism in shaping the contemporary world politics by virtue of affecting both "the colonizer" and "the colonized" alike (Ling, 2002a: 69) and producing different inequalities, injustices, and hierarchies.

Postcolonial IR approaches understand power with reference class, gender, race and culture. According to Ling (2002a: 67), although the intersection between these notions in producing diverse power relations has also been central in Feminist IR scholarship, Postcolonialism differs from Feminism since it places this intersection "within a framework of colonialism and imperialism". The emergent power relations informed by the intersection between class, gender, and race can be seen both in material and non-material realms. For instance, regarding the former Ling (2002b: 115) argued that liberal economic order "reflects an openly calculated coordination of institutional interests to sustain Western capitalist hegemony in the global economy". Concerning the latter, Postcolonialism underscores "how colonial representations of the (formerly) colonized are institutionalized as instruments and/or features of cultural dominance" (Grovoqui, 2010: 245). In this sense, Postcolonial IR sees world politics



“as a continuum from macro-structural forces of material production, at one analytical end, to microsocial indicators of meaning, on the other” (Ling, 2002a: 68).

### **2.2.5.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

For Postcolonial IR approaches, states are one of the central actors of world politics. However, they criticize the views which attribute importance only to those core states or great powers in making sense of world politics. Although those states are among the central actors by virtue of their role in the enduring colonial relations of power, “postcolonial states” are also significant in understanding how world politics unfolds. Consider, for instance, how Postcolonial IR understands the role of non-core states in world politics. As opposed to the idea in mainstream theories according to which these states are inconsequential for world politics, Postcolonial IR scholars point to the ways in which non-core states shape world politics. For instance, Grovogui (2010) looked at Egypt’s role in the Suez Canal Crisis and the implications of this role for world politics. Accordingly, suggested Grovogui, Egypt’s behavior challenged “the desire to make permanent Western authority over others based on regimes of truth that legitimized the implied violence and a commandment that legalized the subordination of the native to Western power” (Grovogui, 2010: 249-250). In this way Egypt, by claiming the right to control a canal within its own territory, challenged the prevalent portrayals of non-core actors as not capable enough to govern what is already theirs.

Postcolonial IR approaches also underscore the importance of actors below and beyond state boundaries, such as non-governmental organizations, in shaping different aspects of world politics. However, they analyze these actors in a critical manner by inquiring into their roles in producing or reproducing different hierarchies in world

politics. For instance, Grovogui (2006) criticized Liberal Institutional and Cosmopolitan approaches which underscore the importance of transnational actors. These approaches consider transnational actors as agents that “broaden and institutionalize certain historical norms as universal” (Grovogui, 2006: 74). For Grovogui, the norms that they consider as “universal” are in fact based on particular perspectives. As a result, “Western norms and institutions emerge as central ingredients of international morality and public life” (Grovogui, 2006: 79) and “multiplicity of political languages and ethical idioms from which differently situated individuals and communities derive their notions of the common humanity, social justice” are overlooked (Grovogui, 2006: 83). It is for this reason that according to Grovogui (2006: 84) “the neglect of non-Western traditions hinders the overall capacity of theorists to productively envision different futures”.

### **2.2.5.3 The Location of World Politics**

For Postcolonial IR approaches, internal and external realms of states are not separate and world politics does not only unfold in inter-state relations. That is because, as it is suggested by Grovogui (2006: 21), “the ‘international’ exceeds its current location within spaces between and among states” since “‘international events’- or events of global significance- have occurred mostly within overlapping structures of spaces encompassing not only the state boundaries but also empires, regions, and stateless ‘territories’”. In a similar manner, Ling (2002a: 67) argued that “what pertains within the individual/ household/ nation contributes to the community/ state/ world, just as what happens in the world/state/community affects us as nation/household/individual”.

The notion that Ling (2002a: 66) used for explaining this understanding is “Confucian interrelationality”. This notion explains how prevailing ideologies, rules, rights and duties “relate to one another” and construct a particular world order. As an example of this view, consider Ling’s (2002b) analysis on the events unfolded following the 1997-1998 financial crisis in Asia. Accordingly, at the systemic level, the IMF imposed structural adjustment policies to Asian states following the crisis which initiated a hierarchical relations between the “West” and Asia. In this relation what we see is “Western capital dominating Asian capital” (Ling, 2002b: 129). At the domestic level, financial crisis and impositions of structural adjustment policies on Asian states triggered an oppressive state-society relations and consolidation of coercive powers of states. For Ling, this is an example of “hypermasculine state regulat[ing] hyperfeminized society” (Ling, 2002b: 131). At the individual or local level, the psychological effects of financial crisis on people mostly manifest themselves in victimization of particular individuals such as women and minorities in Asian countries, i.e. “depressed men exploit women and other feminized subjects” (Ling, 2002b: 132). For instance, due to increasing school fees, most parents withdrew their daughters from school and force them to marry because of financial considerations. In another instance, in Indonesia, where Chinese form the three percent of the population, but own seventy percent of the economy, mob violence was conducted against Chinese people.

To summarize, for Postcolonial IR approaches the enduring colonial relations constitute the main dynamic of world politics. As for the actors, the importance of both state and non-state actors are underscored. Yet, they understand these actors in different ways when compared with other theories. For instance, by challenging those views according to which non-core states are inconsequential for understanding “the

international”, Postcolonial IR show how “postcolonial states” shape different aspects of world politics. The location of “the international” is explained with the notion of “interrelationality” according to which world politics is constituted in different levels, including personal, intra-state, and inter-state, which mutually produce the prevalent ideas and practices as found in world politics.

### **2.3 Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to examine the conceptions of “the international” as found in different IR theories by looking at their understandings on the main dynamics of world politics, the main actors of world politics, and the location where world politics takes place. After pointing to the conceptions of “the international” in each theory under consideration, this conclusion part will discuss the main findings of the analysis.

Section 1 looked at the mainstream theories of IR, namely Realism/Neorealism, NLI, and Post-internationalism. The section showed that these theories have divergent understandings about the main dynamic, main actors, and the location of world politics which point to their conceptions of “the international”. However, these theories also share certain views which indicate their similarities in approaching “the international”. One of the central finding regarding their views on the main dynamic of “the international” is the centrality of the notion of “anarchy” in their analysis. Although different theories evaluate the consequence of the lack of central authority in world politics differently (such as conflict and struggle over power for Realists/Neorealists, cooperation and interdependence for NLI, and diffusion of authority as a result of globalization for Post-internationalism), they do not challenge the assumption of anarchy which is considered as the underlying mechanism leading

to different dynamics in world politics. For them, the anarchical structure of world politics and the dynamics (be that struggle for power, complex interdependence, or globalization) emerge out of this structure generate a “universal” condition for each and every actor of world politics.

Regarding the views of the mainstream theories on the main actors of “the international”, two findings can be highlighted. Firstly, Realism/Neorealism and NLI take states as the main actors of world politics. However, for them not every state is counted as actors. Accordingly, for Realism/Neorealism it is the “great powers” (which the theory defines with reference to military capabilities) that matter for world politics. For NLI the actors consist of the economically-developed countries and intergovernmental institutions founded by them. Since these two theories associate actorness with the possession of material resources (either military or economic), their analyses focus only on limited number of entities whose behaviors do shape world politics. Besides, the internal characteristics of states are deemed irrelevant for understanding world politics by these theories, since states are considered as “unitary” actors and “like-units”. As a result, these theories overlook the difference between states and the effects of non-material factors in rendering them “powerful”. Post-internationalism differs from the two in the sense that the theory underscores the existence of multiple actors in world politics. This multiplicity for the theory stems from the diffusion of authority of states as a result of globalization which has “universal” repercussions. In this sense, the multiple actors in Post-internationalism mostly concerns non-territorial aspects of actorness.

As for the location of “the international” the prevalent idea in the mainstream theories points to the primacy of interstate relations in world politics. However, in

accordance with their views regarding the actors, Realism/Neorealism identifies the relations between great powers as the location where world politics takes place. Although underscoring transnational interactions, NLI focuses on the relations between economically-developed states. Put differently, these theories view the relations between “powerful” actors in making sense of “the international”. In this sense, their analyses built on the assumption that the internal and external realms are separate, and the former does not hold significance for understanding the latter. Post-internationalism, on the other hand, challenges this view by underscoring how actors operate across territorial borders as a result of globalization which lead to identify a broader political space where world politics takes place. The theory highlights how this dynamic empowers subnational and transnational actors and as a result renders their relations as significant locations for world politics. Yet, the issue of how different parts of the world globalization is experienced remains under-examined.

To conclude, the mainstream IR approaches theorize world politics exclusively from the vantage point of core actors. Not only those actors and the relations between them are considered to constitute the main entities and locations of world politics respectively, but also the main dynamics (struggle for power, cooperation, or governance) of “the international” is made sense of through their experiences by the mainstream theories.

Section 2 examined the critical theories of IR, namely Frankfurt School IR, Neo-Gramscian IR, Feminist IR, Poststructuralist IR, and Postcolonial IR. The analysis showed how critical theories differ from one another in their views regarding the main dynamic, main actors, and the location of world politics. That being said, the

different conceptions of “the international” as found in these theories do also share certain similarities.

Regarding the main dynamics of world politics, critical theories of IR challenge mainstream theories’ understanding according to which dynamics in world politics are structured by “anarchy”. For them, even though there is no overarching authority in world politics, this fact does not shape how the world works. For critical theories, various inequalities, hierarchies, oppressions, inclusion and exclusion mechanisms constitute the main dynamics of world politics. However, different theories understand these dynamics in different ways, identify different reasons for their emergence and discuss their consequences accordingly. For instance, for Frankfurt School IR theory, inequalities and different forms of oppression which hinder an emancipatory change in world politics constitute one central dynamic of world politics. For Neo-Gramscians, hegemonic structure of world political economy shapes world politics. Feminist IR theories underscore the centrality of hierarchical gendered social relations in world politics. Poststructuralist IR theory points to the importance of inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in world politics which are shaped by regimes of truths. Postcolonial IR approaches are of the view that the enduring effects of colonial relations of power are central for how the world works.

For critical IR theories, power is central for understanding how inequalities, hierarchies, oppressions, and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are constructed in world politics. As explained above, for mainstream theories power refers to material capabilities that are used to control others’ actions. Critical theories argue that the role of power in world politics is more than that. For one thing, power includes both material and non-material capabilities. For instance, in Neo-Gramscian analysis power

does not only refer to the capabilities for coercion. Power is also rooted in ideas which create consent and in this way reproduce hegemony and sustain a particular world order. For Poststructuralists, power is productive. In this view, power operates through discourses and systems of knowledge, it constitutes both subjects and objects, and enables/disables particular practices in world politics. Feminism and Postcolonialism underscore the centrality of the intersection of gender, race, and class in understanding both the power asymmetries in the world and how power is exercised in world politics.

Regarding the main actors of world politics, one significant similarity between different critical theories is that they all problematize the way in which mainstream theories understand states. Although critical theories are of the view that states are central for world politics, they explain what state is and what it does differently. According to critical theories, states are neither like-units nor unitary actors. Instead, they are socially constructed entities. Critical IR theories open the “black box” of states, look into the processes that render states as the main actors of world politics, and problematize states from different angles. For instance, for Frankfurt School IR theory, states are exclusionary communities as they obstruct recognition of any obligations that people have to those who are outsiders. For Neo-Gramscians, states are formed by social classes. In this sense, it is not states per se, but social classes within them that are the actors constituting particular world orders. Feminists see states as gendered constructs since they are based on the prioritization of particular characteristics associated with masculinity and their practices reflect the interests of masculinized subjects. Poststructuralists are critical of taking states as pre-given actors, and they look into the practices which render states as primary actors in world politics. By problematizing mainstream theories’ understandings of world politics only with reference to the experiences of great powers or economically advanced states,



Postcolonial approaches look into the postcolonial states and their role and importance in world politics.

Critical theories also identify other actors below and beyond state boundaries whose practices either shape different aspects of world politics or can bring about changes to the current structures of “the international”. For instance, Feminists inquire into the roles of individuals in making the world go around. Frankfurt School IR theory and Neo-Gramscian IR theory underscore the importance of social movements which can challenge the prevalent relations of power in world politics and can construct alternative world orders. Postcolonial IR approaches, although underscore their importance, inquire into how non-state actors reproduce different hierarchies in world politics. Rather than identifying particular non-state actors as actors of world politics, Poststructuralism is interested in the processes which lead to emergence of certain entities as actors of world politics.

Regarding the location of world politics, all critical IR theories question the prevalent assumption in some of the mainstream theories according to which the internal and external realms are separate and world politics unfolds in inter-state relations. Instead, they show how these presumably separate realms constitute one another and how world politics takes place below and beyond state boundaries. That said, critical theories understand this mutual constitution in different ways. For instance, for Neo-Gramscian IR theory, internal and external realms are convergent because hegemony in world politics is firstly constituted by dominant social classes within a particular national context which is then expand outwards and connect different dominant social classes in different national settings. Postcolonial IR points to a very different take on the convergence of multiple locations including local, national and global ones. By using the notion of “interrelationality”, Postcolonial IR

examines how the prevalent material as well as ideational structures in world politics are constructed through relations taking place between different actors located at different domains. These include the relations between core actors and non-core states, state-society relations or the relations between individuals. These different relations are not separate from one another. Instead, they inform and shape one another and give rise of a particular world politics.

To conclude, critical theories of IR view “the international” as a realm which came into being through particular forms of power relations manifesting themselves in different political, economic, social, and cultural domains. By virtue of focusing on such power relations they identify different inequalities, injustices, exclusions, and hierarchies as central for world politics. As a result, critical theories go beyond mainstream theories’ conceptions of “the international” which are based on experiences of core actors and their relations. That said, not every critical theory examines how these dynamics are understood or experienced in different parts of the world. For instance, Neo-Gramscian analysis focus on how hegemony is constructed in core contexts and how this is “emulated” in contexts beyond core. Similarly, in Frankfurt School IR theory the “positive forces” that might bring an emancipatory change to world politics is argued to emerge in core contexts (particularly Europe) which are then “emulated” in different parts of the world. It is Feminist and Postcolonial IR theories that are particularly interested in experiences of non-core actors (state and non-state) and how these actors make sense of such dynamics of world politics.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **WHAT IS “THE INTERNATIONAL” IN SOURCES OUTSIDE IR**

Chapter 2 looked at the conceptions of “the international” in the theories of IR. Chapter 3 will examine the studies which go beyond IR to understand how world politics is understood by non-core actors. This literature emerged as a result of the discussions in the discipline of IR concerning why and how IR scholarship produces “narrow and increasingly limited discourse about world politics” (Paolini, 1999: 29) particularly when its engagement with and understanding of non-core contexts are considered (Chan, 1993). This criticism is directed not only to mainstream theories of the discipline, but also to certain critical IR theories (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002; Krishna, 1993; Ling, 2002a; Munro & Shilliam, 2011; Shani, 2008). The literature identifies “Westernness” and/or “Eurocentrism” of IR (Bilgin, 2010: 819, 2014: 1099) as the reasons why the discipline “often neglects voices and experiences outside of the West” (Acharya, 2011: 1). Scholars contributing to this discussion suggest that IR “is both too narrow in its sources and too dominant in its influence to be good for the health of

the wider project to understand the social world in which we live” (Acharya & Buzan, 2010: 2) and underscore that the “knowledge of the world can also be found beyond the disciplinary boundaries, in what IR excludes” (Ahluwalia & Sullivan, 2001: 352).

A burgeoning literature in IR emerged as a result of this debate. In order to go beyond the current state of affairs in the discipline by studying how world politics is understood in non-core contexts, this literature has focused on the “texts and contexts outside IR and/or North America and Western Europe” (Bilgin, 2016a: 89) and asked what IR would look like if ideas and experiences of the non-core actors were also considered. However, different scholars answer this question in different ways. As it is pointed out by Acharya, the examination of “the ideas, voices and experiences of the world beyond the West are neither singular nor identical” (Acharya, 2011: 18). For instance, some scholars underscore the need for “greater incorporation of ideas from the non-West and contributions by non-Western scholars from local ‘vantage points’” (Chen, 2011: 1) through establishing “non-Western IR theories” or “National IR schools” (Acharya & Buzan, 2010) such as “IR theory with Chinese characteristics” (Xinning, 2001) or “Islamic IR theories” (Tadjbakhsh, 2010). Some other scholars criticize attempts for the creation of “indigenous” national schools (Bilgin, 2008a) and warn that “non-Western IR must avoid submission to the desire to discover an exportable *national* imaginary in different geo-cultural sites” (original emphasis) (Pasha, 2011: 224). Instead of such attempts of creating national IR theories, those scholars propose to “undermine the security of an epistemological cartography that quarantines legitimate knowledge production of modernity to one (idealized) geo-cultural site” (Shilliam, 2011c: 24) through studying how already existing existent understandings in IR are contributed, articulated, or challenged by non-core actors whose very presence are overlooked by the discipline (Grovoqui, 2006).

This chapter aims to identify the different kinds of sources that are analyzed in this literature so as to overcome the limitations of IR in its engagement with non-core contexts. It also aims to understand the main dynamic, main actors, and location of world politics, i.e. conceptions of “the international”, as found in these studies. This chapter looks at four sets of sources in the literature. The first set of sources consists of “traditional thinking”, “traditional worldviews”, or “ancient cultures and philosophies”. The second set of sources includes everyday life practices or oral traditions of indigenous peoples or ordinary people. The third set of sources looks at the writings of thinkers and philosophers from non-core contexts. The fourth set of sources analyzes practices of policy makers in non-core contexts.

### **3.1 Traditional Worldviews**

One group of scholars, who underscore that one needs to look beyond the discipline of IR in order to see how different actors understand world politics engage with the “traditional thinking” (Xinning, 2001), “traditional worldview” (Yaqing, 2007), or “ancient cultures and philosophies” (Geeraerts & Jing, 2001) in non-core contexts. This literature focuses on Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and Islam for pointing to “distinct” ways of understandings world politics. In this section of the chapter the works of Roland Bleiker, Qing Cao, Xiaoming Huang, L.H.M. Ling, Peter Mandaville, Giorgio Shani, Zhao Tingyang, and Qin Yaqing are examined.

The traditional thinking, traditional worldviews, ancient cultures and philosophies all refer to codified sources, mostly in the form of ancient texts. Since they have been studied and developed for centuries, it is possible to suggest that they are institutionalized worldviews. Although institutionalized as such, these worldviews are mostly overlooked in IR, suggest scholars. For these scholars the reason for that is

related with the origins of the discipline. Accordingly, IR has emerged and developed by taking particular European experiences, such as Industrial and French Revolutions which led to the emergence of state system and world capitalist system, as its only reference points (Geeraerts & Jing, 2001: 262) and in the process it has overlooked other factors, particularly ideational ones. As a result, the discipline does not consider other ways of understanding world politics in different parts of the world where there are multiple ancient worldviews.

The studies examining such ancient philosophies underscore the importance of doing so by two lines of arguments. First, examining these philosophies contributes the growth of knowledge (Geeraerts & Jing, 2001: 251). In particular, they can contribute to the development of IR theory (Xinning, 2001) by offering “alternative and wider conceptual foundations” (Chan & Mandaville, 2001: 2) and “alternative sites of knowledge constructions” (Behera, 2007: 341). Secondly, it promotes the mutual understanding “in a culturally differentiated world arena” (Geeraerts & Jing, 2001: 251). It creates a ground for listening and learning from each other which can lead to a “healthy dialogue” and coexistence between different cultures (Behera, 2007: 363).

In the literature, the studies examining the ancient philosophies exclusively focus on worldviews such as Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and Islam. While Yaqing (2007) analyzes “Tributary System” and the Confucianist worldview that is informing this system, Tingyang (2009) and Cao (2001) focus on “all-under-heaven” as a traditional Chinese concept. Bleiker (2001a) incorporates both Confucianism and Daoism in his analysis, while Huang (2001) engages with Buddhism. Similarly, Ling (2014) examines Daoism, and in particular Ying-Yang dialectics in Daosim. Shani (2008) focuses on Sikhism and specifically the notion of

“khalsa panth”. Mandaville (2001) and Shani (2007, 2008) look at Islam and particularly the notion of “umma”. All of those studies point to the ways in which the world is understood “differently” in these sources.

Yaqing in his article “Why is there no Chinese International Relations Theory” examines the reasons for the lack of Chinese IR theory. In discussing possible reasons, he suggests that in the traditional Chinese mind there

had no room for something similar to the concept of ‘international-ness’, for there was no existence of a structure in which the ego stands against the other. The world or the state in the Chinese culture was not a clearly defined entity with infinite boundary. The Chinese world referred to everything under the heaven and on the earth (Yaqing, 2007: 322).

Yaqing analyzes the “Tributary System” in which this worldview was practiced from 221 BC to 1800s. He suggests that in this system states were considered as people. Therefore, relations between states were understood in a similar manner as relations between people. Due to this understanding, the constituting states of this system were not considered as equal members. On the contrary, China was conceived as located at the center of the system above the others or the “tributaries” such as Vietnam or Korea. Viewing the system as an enlarged family, relationships within the system was considered as relations between father (China) and sons (others).

Even there is such an unequal understanding between the members of the system, the system itself was a “benign” one in which relations between different elements that constituted the system were understood as parts of “harmonious whole”. In relation to that, highlights Yaqing, “the concept of the subjectivity, or the subjective ‘I’, was not conspicuous at all and therefore there existed no dichotomy of the self and the other” (Yaqing, 2007: 330). Such understandings, underscores Yaqing, indicate that “the international” as it is understood in IR and related concepts with it, such as sovereignty or territorial integrity, did not have a place in this worldview. For Yaqing,

this system is informed by the philosophy of “Tianxia” which “takes care of the whole world, believing in and aiming at a harmonious whole. It was the space where human and nature met, where the ideal and the reality met, and where the moral and the material met” (Yaqing, 2007: 330).

Tingyang (2009) also discusses “Tianxia” or “all-under-heaven” as a Confucian Chinese philosophy of world politics. Arguing that “the international” as it is utilized in IR implies the view point of nation states, Tingyang (2009: 7) underscores the need for a more comprehensive analysis in order to find “a solution to the chaotic situation of the world” to which “all-under-heaven” has much to offer. Being one of the most significant concepts of the ancient Chinese philosophy, “all-under-heaven”

is a dense concept meaning ‘world’. It has three meanings: (1) the Earth or all lands under the sky; (2) a common choice made by all peoples in the world, or a universal agreement in the ‘hearts’ of all peoples; (3) a political system for the world with a global institution to ensure universal order (Tingyang, 2009: 9).

Tingyang argues that this concept includes everything and everybody, it considers nothing as “foreign” (Tingyang, 2009: 10) and in it there is no sense of “border” (Cao, 2001).

Tingyang and Cao also compare “internationality” and “all-under-heaven”. For Tingyang (2009: 12) “internationality” is a “specious and misleading concept” since it has always been limited by national concerns. For him, “all-under-heaven”, by going beyond such national considerations and embracing the world as a whole, has much to offer to understand world politics differently. Cao (2001) concurs and suggests that the notions of nationality and ethnicity is lacking in the “all-under-heaven” thinking. Additionally, while “internationality” is derived from European nation-state experience, as it is particularly reflected in the treaties of Westphalia, “all-under-



heaven” is more open to the different experiences due to its all-encompassing approach.

*The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West* (2001) edited by Chan, Mandaville and Bleiker provides other examples on how traditional worldviews from non-core settings inform different understandings of “the international”. Aiming to open up a space for alternative understandings of the world within and beyond IR (Chan & Mandaville, 2001), this edited book engages with different conceptualizations of the main concepts in IR (Bleiker, 2001b: 51). Below, the contributions of Bleiker and Huang to the book are examined.

In his contribution to the volume, Bleiker (2001a) problematizes the dominance of Neorealism in IR by analyzing its propositions from Confucian and Taoist perspectives. He challenges the primacy of “anarchy” in Neorealist analysis by showing the existence of an alternative worldview according to which “a world in which cultures interact without being dominated by the structural features of anarchy” is possible (Bleiker, 2001a: 181). For instance, the belief in Daoism according to which “if the wisest man is chosen as the universal king of all civilisations, peace and global, indivisible love will automatically follow” show “the existence of order in the international system” in this worldview, suggests Bleiker (2001a: 192).

According to Bleiker, the main difference between Neorealism and Chinese philosophies is in Neorealism the world is viewed in terms of opposites, such as war and peace or good and evil. The relationship between these opposites is considered as having hierarchical stances in comparison to one another: one opposite is always superior to the other. Bleiker (2001a: 182) points to the lack of such an understanding in Chinese ancient philosophies, such as in Ying-Yang. On the contrary, in Chinese ancient worldviews, the opposites are considered as being complementary, meaning

that one cannot exist without the other. In this sense, Bleiker maintains, the Neorealist view of world politics which separates structure and agent, and attributes primacy to structure, can be challenged by Ying-Yang that conceives them as mutually constitutive.

According to Bleiker, regarding the actors and the location of “the international”, ancient Chinese worldviews also challenge Neorealist ideas. Accordingly, the idea that takes states as the only actors and relations between them as the constitutive relations of world politics can be problematized through Confucianism. That is because in Confucianism, rather than states, interactions taking place between cultures are the main domain where “the international” takes place.

Huang (2001), on the other hand, underscores potential contribution of the teaching of Zen, one of the Buddhist schools, to the understanding of world politics. By analyzing one of the “the Zen Master’s story”, Huang shows the limitations of the discipline of IR in examining the different aspects of the world that we inhabit. He exemplifies this point by commenting on the debate regarding how scholars should relate themselves to their subject matters. Starting from this debate, Huang challenges not only mainstream theories of IR, but also critical approaches (particularly poststructuralism) and discusses the limitations of IR theories in their attempt to make sense of “the international”.

As for the mainstream theories, Huang criticizes them for being stuck in the “Real World” in which the scholar is detached from his/her subject matter and situates himself/herself as an observer of the things that exists. Critical theories, on the other hand, which are visioning the “Political World”, are aware of the particular motivations and interests in knowledge building and promotion, or the political agenda which is embedded in the process of knowing. Although showing similarities with the

Zen vision in this sense, suggests Huang, the disinterest of critical theories in proposing alternatives differentiates it from Zen view.

For this reason, Huang proposes a third world, “the Cultural World”, informed by Zen, in which questions regarding how we can achieve a better world are integrated.

Huang discusses the contribution of Zen to the study of world politics as follows:

International relations theory operates in this world on the expectation that all individual selves, rather than trying to overcome each other as in the Real World or deny one another, as in the Political World, submit themselves to the common good of the IR community. This, at the personal level, is a progressive process of what Zen calls self-cultivation or “awakening” from a low level of existence to a higher one, and eventually to the highest state of humanity. As for the matters called international relations theory, the notion of the Cultural World opens new space for antagonised IR debaters to think international relations creatively and humanely (Huang, 2001: 224).

L. H. M. Ling (2014) in her book *The Dao of World Politics: Towards a post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations* proposes an alternative way to understand world politics by drawing on “Daoist yin/yang dialectics”. As a traditional worldview Daoist ying/yang

shows two polarities-yin and yang- meeting each other in an S-shaped curve. Black represents yin, white yang. Together, they constitute the whole that is the circle. Each half of the diagram also retains within it an element of the other: a white dot in yin, a black one in yang. Each dot signifies, in postcolonial terms, the Other in the Self (Ling, 2014: 45).

Ling’s engagement with Daoism is somewhat different from other scholars. Whereas the above-mentioned scholars mostly look at the ancient texts, Ling traces the Daoist “international” in multiple other sources besides ancient Daoist texts. For instance, she analyzes topics including food, medicine, spiritual practices, literature, films, songs, plays (that she herself wrote) which are informed by the teachings of this traditional worldview. That is because:

For Daoism’s cultural descendants, yin/yang dialectics represent a living tradition. It does not sit on an esoteric, philosophical shelf, gathering dust, pondered only by Daoist priests chanting mantras in a remote mountain

monastery. Rather, yin/yang dialectics permeate daily life in ways both obvious and opaque (Ling, 2014: 46).

Ling's analysis starts with challenging the representation of what she calls "Westphalian World" as the only world for "the international" by mainstream theories of IR. Instead, Ling underscores the existence of "Multiple Worlds" making "the international" together. Ling argues that the "Westphalian World", which overlooks the existence and contribution of "Multiple Worlds" in the making of "the international", has caused two limitations. First of all, the "Westphalian World" has a hegemonic position which leaves out the existence and experiences of other possible worlds. Drawing merely on the "Western" experiences, imposing particular "norms, institutions and practices" (Ling, 2014: 1) based on these experiences and thus equating "the international" to the "liberal world order", "Westphalian World" overlooks non-core experiences and their ways of being in and understanding of the world. Secondly, "Westphalian World" envisions a world in which notions such territorial sovereignty, interstate commerce, anarchy, self-help shape what "the international" means and it only accepts states, which are conceived as like-units, as the actor of "the international".

The recognition of "Multiple Worlds", suggests Ling, is corrective to these two limitations. Firstly, recognizing the existence of "Multiple Worlds" opens up a space for recognizing how "the international" is not only constituted by the "Westphalian World", but also by other "Multiple Worlds". By this recognition, Ling (2014: 13) suggests, we can "acknowledge the existence and role of Multiple Worlds in making our world politics". Secondly, "Multiple Worlds" problematizes how "Westphalian World" understands world politics. According to the latter, world politics is a struggle for survival and material power has utmost importance. States (which are considered as protectors of a territorially-defined society) are the only actors of "the

international”. Ling (2014: 11) argues that such an understanding downplays the significance of history, culture, language and memory as constitutive parts of “the international”. Considering these limitations, Ling suggests that the recognition of “Multiple Worlds” can transcend “Westphalia’s exaltation of the state as the only venue for world politics” and instead it can offer “alternative ways of relating to and resonating with others” (Ling, 2014: 22). This alternative way for thinking about “the international” is informed by “Daoist ying/yang dialectics” according to which each part of the circle contributes to the whole (Ling, 2014: 17).

Another traditional worldview that is subject to analysis in the literature is Sikhism, which emerged in the 15<sup>th</sup> century in Punjab region of India. According to Shani (2008: 724) Sikhism as a worldview informs distinct “lived, embodied experiences and ritualized, cultural practices” and therefore it offers different discourses on world politics, particularly with regards to the notion of community. Shani (2007; 2008) argues that the understanding of community in Sikhism challenges both mainstream and critical IR theories (particularly Frankfurt School IR theory). As for the former, it goes beyond their state-centrism. As for the latter, it goes beyond their way of imagining alternative communities based on “secular” and “Western” experiences. Accordingly, the distinct community understanding in Sikhism is based on the notion of “Khalsa Panth”. The “khalsa” refers to those Sikhs who are baptized:

Baptized (*amritdhari*) Sikhs following the edicts of the tenth Guru, Gobind Singh, are enjoined to keep their hair, including facial hair, long (*kes*); to carry a comb (*kanga*); to wear knee-length breeches (*kachh*); to wear a steel bracelet on the right hand (*kara*); and to carry a sword or dagger (*kirpan*). Those who embody these five symbols of Sikh identity, known as *Kes-dhari* Sikhs, constitute the Khalsa, or ‘community of the pure’ (Shani, 2007: 428).

The “khalsa panth” refers to the worldwide community of “khalsa”. Shani (2008: 730) suggests that the “khalsa” “was not merely conceived as a spiritual fraternity of orthodox Sikhs, but as a sovereign, political community which could defend itself”.

The “Khalsa Panth” can be understood as a “post-Westphalian” and “the transnational religio-political community” argues Shani, since it has a de-territorialized view on sovereignty (Shani, 2008: 730). In this sense, suggests the author, it helps one to go beyond viewing states as the only actor of “the international”.

Another worldview that has been subject to analysis in the literature is the Islamic worldview. Examining this worldview Mandaville (2001) and Shani (2007, 2008) in their respective studies particularly underscore the importance of the notion of “umma” since for the authors it is mostly through this concept that the prevalent understandings both in mainstream and critical IR theories can be challenged. For Mandaville (2001: 6), “umma” helps one to problematize the mainstream theories’ view which equates nation with state, and associates “the international” with “interstate”. The concept of “umma” refers to “world community of Muslims” (Mandaville, 2001: 2). Although it is possible to “attribute several possible meanings ranging anywhere from Muhammad’s closest followers to all living creatures”, more often than not, it is used as “a central normative concept which appeals for unity across the global Muslim community” (Mandaville, 2001: 71). In this sense, the “umma” challenges mainstream views in IR, suggest the scholars. Because it shows that loyalty to some other community different than state is a possibility. It also goes beyond the idea of a nation “defined in terms of language, ethnicity, race and citizenship” (Shani, 2007: 422). As a result, “umma” provides basis for an “alternative conception of universality” (Shani, 2008: 722) and it opens a space for making “post-statist” analysis in IR.

To summarize, this section of the chapter examined the literature which looks beyond IR towards various “traditional thinking”, “traditional worldviews”, or “ancient cultures or philosophies” with the aim to examine “different” ways of

understanding “the international” as found in non-core contexts. The contours of the conceptions of “the international” as found in these worldviews can be summarized as follows. Scholars mostly point to “harmony” as the main dynamic of world politics in the traditional worldviews that they examine. As it is evident in the studies focusing on “Tianxia” or “Ying-Yanq”, the view according to which each individual part contributes to the constitution of the world as a whole in a harmonious way is central for these worldviews. In that sense, as it is suggested by Bleiker (2001a: 181) in such worldviews relations are not considered to be “dominated by the structural features of anarchy”. Regarding the main actors of world politics, the central theme that can be teased out in these studies is the emphasis put on non-state communities, such as “umma” or “Khalsa Panth”. For the scholars, these notions give way to think about world politics beyond “state sovereignty” or “territorial integrity” and they make it possible to imagine “post-statist” world politics. Regarding the location of world politics, studies emphasize the existence of ideas in traditional worldviews that point to the “transnational” relations which go beyond inter-state relations. For this literature, these worldviews indicate possibilities of “new forms of ‘international’ politics located outside the traditional realm of the state” (Mandaville, 2001: 6). The relations unfolding between “translocal community of believers in which racial, ethnic or national differences are irrelevant” as in the case of “umma” (Mandaville, 2001: 18) exemplify where world politics unfolds according to these worldviews as studied in the literature.

### **3.2 Everyday Life Experiences**

Everyday life experiences constitute the second type of sources that are utilized by scholars who suggest that it is necessary to go beyond IR to examine how world

politics is understood “differently” by non-core actors. The examples studied in the literature include Lakota people of North America, African worldview “ubuntu”, hip-hop artists in Latin America. In this section of the chapter the works of J. Marshall Beier, Karen Smith, and Arlene Tickner are examined.

For Darby (2003) there is a significant relationship between world politics and everyday life. What Darby argues is that it is through the discipline of IR that we are introduced to the realm of “the international” (Darby, 2003: 141). However, he continues, “there are also those knowledges about the international that lie outside the academy and which mostly are not conceptualized in such a way as to find a point of entry into academic discourse” (Darby, 2003: 142). Since these knowledges can be found in “ways of life”, in order to tell “the story of the international... from the ground up”, suggests Darby (2003: 142), one needs to look at everyday life. Such an analysis “by attempting to enter the lifeworlds of ordinary people and discerning a political salience in their anxieties and aspirations” can “lead us to think in new ways about the meaning and location of the international” (Darby, 2003: 158-159).

In the literature, one group of scholars who examine the everyday life experiences in order to reveal “different” understandings on world politics are focusing on indigenous people. Different from the traditional worldviews covered in the first section, indigenous worldviews are not based upon written sources. These worldviews are articulated through rituals and everyday life practices. To study these, scholars mostly look at autoethnographic sources of indigenous people (Beier, 2002: 82) and their oral literatures (Beier, 2005: 74).

This literature considers the examination of everyday life experiences and worldviews of indigenous people important for overcoming the limitations of IR



(Shaw, 2002; Beier, 2005; Picq, 2013). For Beier (2005: 2), the issues of indigenous people are in fact the issues of IR. He exemplifies this argument firstly by underscoring the relationship between the legacies of conquest and lasting effects of colonialism and the discipline of IR. Secondly, he underlines distinct indigenous claims on the notion of sovereignty, which is one of the most significant concepts for IR. Lastly, he points to indigenous people's involvement in and contributions to international forums, such as United Nations (Beier, 2005: 2). As a result, for Beier, what renders indigenous peoples significant for IR stems from the fact that they are affecting, and get affected by, world politics.

Although having such importance for the discipline, as it is suggested by Beier (2002; 2005) and Shaw (2002), experiences of the indigenous people are understudied by IR scholars, both mainstream and critical scholars alike (Beier, 2005:184). This stems from the fact that in the discipline, particularly in mainstream theoretical approaches, there is a "hegemonic Western voice" which through its "universalist pretensions" excludes the other ways of understanding the world (Beier, 2005: 2). This "hegemonic Western voice" has its own cosmological commitments which lead to a particular view on world politics. Beier suggests that the cosmological commitments of IR that lead to the neglect of indigenous worldviews have two characteristics (Beier, 2002: 84). First of all, for IR, the only possible political order is provided by the existence of Westphalian state. Since indigenous people lack such state-based communities, the way in which they get organized are not considered as falling within the scope of IR. Secondly, since in IR "the anarchical state of nature" is taken-for-granted, the core terms within the field (such as security or sovereignty) are understood in a limited way. This limitation does not allow alternative understandings that can be found in indigenous worldviews to be acknowledged in the discipline. Since

indigenous peoples lack state-based organizations, the alternatives offered by their lifeways are rendered irrelevant for understanding world politics by IR. Eventually, this state of affairs in the discipline limits “our imaginings of the international” (Beier, 2005: 4).

Indigenous ways of knowing challenge these limitations and inform different understandings of “the international”. In order to examine these understandings, argues Beier (2005: 4), an analysis on the indigenous cosmologies and how they are articulated in the everyday life practices are necessary. The case of “Lakota traditionalism” exemplifies one such indigenous worldview which is embedded in everyday life practices of indigenous people. Lakota people are indigenous people who inhabit the Northern Great Plains of North America (Beier, 2005). “Lakota traditionalism” or “Lakota cosmology” is informed by sociological, cultural and cosmological contexts of Lakota people (Beier, 2002: 101, 2005).

Lakota worldview and lifeways are based on two interrelated understandings. First of all, in the view of Lakota people, all things, either alive or not, are “interrelated”. This understanding is named as “mitakuye oyasin” which means “all are my relatives” or “we are all related” (Beier, 2002: 104). It is through this understanding that Lakota people embrace “ontological oneness”:

all beings and spirits are persons in the fullest sense of that term: they share inherent worth, integrity, sentience, conscience, power, will, voice, and especially the ability to enter into relationships. Humans, or “two-leggeds” are only one type of person. Humans share their world with Wakan and non-human persons, including human persons, stone persons, four-legged persons, winged-persons, crawling persons, standing persons (plants and trees), fish-persons, among others. These persons have both ontological and moral significance. The category person applies to anything that has being, and who is therefore capable of relating (Detwiler, as cited in Beier, 2005: 102-103).

The second understanding in Lakota worldview emphasizes harmony over struggle. Accordingly, since “existence is expressed as a circle” and “like the tipis that make up

the camp circle, the nation is seen in terms of a hoop wherein no one constituent part is logically or implicitly prior to any other and such that all are equally necessary to complete the unity of the circle” (Beier, 2002: 103), Lakota people do not consider a hierarchy among themselves and other people or other persons.

Together, these two understandings offer an alternative understanding of “the international” (Beier, 2005: 222). This alternative understanding shows how the everyday life of indigenous people can inform and be informed by “the international” on the one hand, and it challenges the orthodox idea which views indigeneity as stateless and thus orderless condition on the other. On the contrary, Lakota people’s non-state mechanisms, which are shaped by the ideas of interrelatedness and harmony, exemplify conducting balanced relations with other peoples if any conflictual situation arises without the existence of a state (Beier, 2005: 106).

Another example of an alternative conception of “the international” which is embedded in everyday life practices of local actors is “ubuntu”. As with the case of other African traditional views, “ubuntu” is under-examined concept since “it is oral rather than written, lived rather than communicated in books of journals” (Nussbaum, 2003: 1). “Ubuntu” is defined as a philosophy of humanism which views humanness by “linking individual to the collective through brotherhood of sisterhood (Swanson, 2007: 55). “Ubuntu” refers to the idea that “people are people through other people” (Smith, 2012: 311). It is also a “way of knowing and being” and “an expression of daily living” (Swanson, 2007: 55). Nussbaum (2003) suggests that there are four main principles of “ubuntu” which informs the hallmarks of this worldview. The first principle aims to create relationships which are based on “trust, fairness, shared understanding, dignity and harmony”. The second principle intends to build a community, whether in the form of company, state, or global society, which is caring

and sustainable. According to the third principle, “ubuntu” desires to recreate a world in which “people, businesses and countries would relearn how to live together with respect, compassion and dignity and justice and to re-organize resources accordingly” (Nussbaum, 2003: 3). The fourth principle asks for sharing wealth and making the basic needs, such as food, shelter, health care, or education, accessible to everyone.

According to Smith (2012: 310) “ubuntu” is representing “uniquely African conception of the international” which, rather than focusing on individual persons, underscores the importance of a “collective personhood” and values interdependence over independence. Viewed as such, according to Smith (2012: 312) “ubuntu suggests the possibility of a different kind of relationship from the friend enemy dichotomy so prevalent in IR”, since it defines different obligations towards “the other” through embracing the interconnection between people. In this sense, “ubuntu” offers an alternative to the prevalent views on IR:

By drawing on African and other non-Western interpretations of what constitutes the international and refocusing our attention on the impact of history and culture on the way in which the world is perceived and acted upon, existing understandings of the international relations can be broadened (Smith, 2012: 315-316).

Viewed from the prism of “ubuntu”, underscores Smith (2017), states and the relations between them looks different. In this view, states are not considered as “independent” or “egoistical actors” but rather they are “collectivist societies where group membership and obligations are paramount” (Smith, 2017: 7). Besides, “ubuntu” can explain relations between states in Africa. “Ubuntu”, notes Smith, could

offer an alternative explanation for why multiculturalism seems to be African states’ preferred strategy. South Africa’s penchant for it is normally explained on the basis of middle power theory...Perhaps we might consider the possibility that it is also due, at least partially, to a deep-seated belief in the intrinsic value of collective, of the interconnectedness of individuals and states in the global system, and therefore of the need to cooperate with others in addressing global issues (Smith, 2012: 313).

Somewhat different from the other studies, another example that examines everyday life practices of local actors looks at the cultural expressions as found in non-core contexts. In such analysis, it is argued that “knowledge of the world is a product of individual and group experience in everyday life” (Tickner, 2003: 307). Arlene Tickner’s article “Aqui en el Ghetto: Hip-Hop in Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico” (2008) is an example to this literature. In the article, the author analyzes hip-hop music for examining how world politics is made sense of by local actors. Taking Colombia, Cuba and Mexico as her case studies, Tickner looks at how hip-hop music, although emerged in 1970s in the ghettos of the USA and become a “global commodity” afterwards, is appropriated in different local settings. This appropriation, argues Tickner (2008: 122), is related with “how specific social actors, primarily marginal youth, experience the world and to the places they occupy in it”. When analyzed, such local artistic expressions offer “a unique way of representing everyday problems that is radically different from dominant actor interpretations” (Tickner, 2008: 123). The lyrics found in hip-hop songs, and other related activities with hip-hop such as graffiti-making, reflect the “life on the outskirts of the global economy, where exile, unemployment, despair, drug addiction, brutality, and violence constitute the daily landscape”, suggests Tickner (2008: 135). For the author, such experiences and practices indicate different conceptions of world politics:

Stories such as the ones described in the song lyrics constitute a way of thinking about and gaining control over life on the margins. At the simplest level, rapping, breakdancing, and graffiti allow dispossessed youth to vent and act out their frustration, anger, and disillusionment with their personal situation and the plight of their respective countries and, in doing so, to build a positive sense of identity. Then again, by creating alternative narratives and privileging problems considered relevant to everyday experience, hip-hop lyrics also portray social reality in a distinct fashion, eventually operating as hidden transcripts that upset dominant public discourses. It is interesting that a member of the Colombian group Asilo 38 describes hip-hop as the act of interpreting a

reality that is invisible to the privileged, or telling a story of a world that has yet to be written by those in power (Tickner, 2008: 141).

To summarize, cultural expressions and indigenous worldviews which are embedded in everyday life experiences of local actors constitute another source through which conceptions on world politics in non-core contexts are studied by the scholars. Regarding the main dynamic of world politics, two views can be identified in this literature. One group of scholars underscore “interrelatedness” and “interdependence” as significant notions for understanding how the world works for indigenous peoples or ordinary people. Found both in Lakota cosmology and “ubuntu” worldview, these notions suggest that rather than being “independent”, the constituting parts of the whole are “interdependent” to one another without a “hierarchy” ordering their relations (Beier, 2005: 192). Such understandings point to the possibility of thinking about relations in world politics through notions such as “shared humanity”, “cooperation”, “mutual understanding” and “responsibility towards a collective well-being” (Smith, 2012: 313). Different from such views, some scholars also identify poverty or violence as the main dynamic of world politics in the view of non-core actors (Tickner, 2008). Concerning the actors of world politics, some scholars focusing on everyday life experiences underscore the importance of these experiences in showing the possibilities of viewing “the international” beyond the confines of states. In this sense, they point to the significance of non-state communities in understanding how the world works according to indigenous or ordinary peoples. For instance, for Beier (2005), indigenous peoples’ practices help one to see how order can be established within non-state communities. Some other scholars also underscore the importance of states, yet point to the ways in which the term is understood differently by non-core actors especially when compared with the prevalent views as found in IR. As for the location of world politics, the scholars suggest that everyday life practices

of indigenous peoples or ordinary people challenge the idea according to which internal and external realms of states are separate and world politics takes place between state-to-state relations. For instance, Beier argues that since in Lakota traditionalism the “existence is expressed as a circle” there is considered to be “essential continuity from individual, through nation, to all elements of the cosmos” and “no one of these can be separated out from the others, since together they constitute a single totality” (Beier, 2005: 100-101).

### **3.3 Writings of Thinkers and Philosophers**

The ideas of thinkers and philosophers from non-core parts of the world is another source that IR scholars examine to see how world politics is understood in contexts beyond core. This literature analyzes the writings and speeches of the contemporary political thinkers and philosophers from distinct countries and regions, including Africa, the Middle East, Caribbean, China, Japan, India, and Russia. In this section, the studies of Priya Chacko, Siba Grovogui, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Christopher Jones, Rana Mitter, Martin Munro and Robbie Shilliam, and Andrei Tsygankov are examined.

This literature is interested in the “contemporary” articulations of various notions by non-core thinkers. “Contemporary” here refers to the debates which emerge in the context of modernity. As such, in Shilliam (2011c: 18) words, these debates reflect “situated outlooks on the modern condition”. In this sense, rather than searching for “different” conceptions of “the international”, these studies look at how already existing concepts and categories in IR are rearticulated by actors beyond core based on their experiences. For this literature, such non-core explorations are either overlooked by the discipline or are not considered as IR (Shilliam, 2011c).

For this literature, one reason for such an engagement is to challenge one of the prevalent understandings in social science which attributes the condition of being “modern” to some parts of the world, while other ways of existence are portrayed as “traditional” or “primitive” (Shilliam, 2011c: 12). This results in considering only some actors as agents of “modernity”. In the process, the contributions of other actors to this “global context of modernity” is overlooked. In challenging this disinterest, this literature examines intellectual engagements which are “often generating novel meanings of ‘modern’ categories and concepts” as found in non-core contexts (Shilliam, 2011c: 20). These concepts and categories include state, nation, power, sovereignty, cosmopolitanism. The sources that are utilized by scholars consist of writings of thinkers and philosophers in books, journals, or newspapers on the one hand, and their speeches, on the other.

Robbie Shilliam’s edited book *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity* (2011a) provides an example to such kind of analysis. For instance, in her contribution to the volume, Chacko (2011) analyses the views of Jawaharlal Nehru, who was the first prime minister of India. Chacko argues that Nehru’s political thoughts are mostly overlooked in IR. When Nehru is mentioned in the literature, his ideas are reduced to Realism or Liberalism, which according to Chacko is a misrepresentation. The author underscores that Nehru’s views neither exemplify “realpolitik” aspirations for regional hegemony aiming to increase the relative gains of India through “non-alignment” nor idealist or liberal internationalist conceptions on world politics (Chacko, 2011: 179). Instead, the political understanding of Nehru is “Internationalist Nationalism” which highlights his novel vision on “post-sovereign state world community” (Chacko, 2011: 189). The author argues that different from Liberal or Realist understandings, Nehru



did not equate nation with state. Besides, the way in which he understood nation is different from dominant understandings. Accordingly, unlike the dominant views which conceive nation as a “mechanical organization”, Nehru viewed it as a community. These understandings render his ideas on nationalism different from statist nationalism which, by virtue of prioritizing self-interest of states, leads to exploitative relations between different actors. Viewed as such, one’s national affiliation is not considered as an obstacle for envisioning universalism and universal commitments in Nehru’s thought, suggests Chacko. In turn, this idea, together with his emphasis on the notions of co-existence and interdependence indicate a significant contribution for rethinking the prevalent views in IR.

The concept of cosmopolitanism as it is utilized in IR literature (particularly in critical IR theories) is also problematized through examining various political thinkers in several chapters of the book. For instance, Gruffydd Jones (2011) looks at the ideas of Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, who participated in the liberation movements against Portuguese colonial rule in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century in Africa, and highlights their contributions to the notion of cosmopolitanism. Similarly, Munro and Shilliam (2011) challenge the ways in which critical IR theories understand cosmopolitanism, which, according to authors, reflect exclusively “Western” ideas and experiences. As a corrective to this limitation, they focus on the ideas of Francophone Caribbean thinkers as significant sources for rendering cosmopolitanism more inclusive. For the authors, those thinkers contribute to the notion of cosmopolitanism firstly by underscoring the importance of recognizing oppressive imperial, colonial and capitalist structures and conceptualizing cosmopolitanism accordingly (Munro & Shilliam, 2011: 160-161). Secondly, they extended the concept of humanity as found in cosmopolitanism by overcoming

“notions of race, religion and essentialized culture” and instead offering a “common, shared human condition” (Gruffydd Jones, 2011: 61).

Another example on how thinkers in non-core contexts rearticulate the core notions of IR is provided by Mitter (2003). Mitter analyzes the works of Zou Taofen, who is considered as one of the most important Chinese intellectuals of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. For Mitter, Taofen’s ideas are significant since they exemplify the hybridity of existent conceptualizations in non-core contexts. Accordingly, Taofen’s views are informed both by traditional Confucian ideas and “imported” Western understandings. For instance, the core subject matter in Taofen’s analysis is the notion of power. His approach towards power incorporates the Confucian notions of morality and individualistic voluntarism with the military and economic aspects of the term which are mostly borrowed from “Western-derived” understandings.

Due to such characteristics of Taofen’s writings, Mitter suggests that his thinking provides an “alternative path” for thinking about world politics. In particular, Taofen’s focus on the “explicit link between the personal behaviour of the individual (*xiushen*, or ‘cultivating the person’) and the fate of both the state and the nation (as separately identified entities) in their encounter with other states and nations” exemplifies this path (Mitter, 2003: 126). “This strand of thought”, suggests Mitter, “made the ‘I’ of the individual actor a more important element of the international system in Chinese eyes” than it is allowed in IR (Mitter, 2003: 126).

Jones (2003b), on the other hand, focuses on the works of Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) who is a Japanese philosopher. Jones starts his analysis by suggesting that the potential within the concept of “the international” has not been realized by IR since the term is reduced to the relations between different national units. In order to mean something more comprehensive than this understanding, Jones (2003b: 135) suggests

that “the international” should be conceptualized as “a space which encompasses the constituent nations and the manner of their relations” in a way that it “acts to unify particular nations into a common ‘international’ ”. This unity implies a dialectical relationship between “the national” and “the international”.

In order to show how such a conceptualization can be reached, Jones emphasizes Watsuji’s notion of “ningen.” Ningen” literally means “interman”. In everyday usage of the term, “ningen” refers to human beings. Since human being is understood as an “interman”, individual herself/himself becomes an example of a “dialectical unity”. For Watsuji, this unity stems from the individual’s relation with the collective. Rather than isolating the individual from the collectivities, such as family, nation, and “the international”, Watsuji situated the individual within them. This individual level understanding also informs how Watsuji viewed world politics. Accordingly, for him understanding “the international” as “interstate” is inadequate. Instead, “the international” should be viewed as a space in itself, a unified whole which cannot be thought independently from other collectivities such as family or nation.

Tsygankov’s (2008) analysis on the debates amongst Russian thinkers on “self-other” relations and “civilizations” is another example from the literature focusing on individual thinkers and philosophers in contexts beyond core. Tsygankov starts his analysis by problematizing IR which he argues to reflect the cultural biases of the “West”. In such biases, suggests the author, “the self” is considered as “superior” and it refuses to recognize “the other” by expecting the latter to merely follow its lead (Tsygankov, 2008: 762). When “the other” is recognized, it is represented as “threat”, and therefore “the self” is recommended to be defensive against “the dangers” that “the other” poses (Tsygankov, 2008: 765). For Tsygankov this understanding prevents the recognition of “the other” as a potential source for

learning. It further constitutes an “obstacle for establishing robust institutions of world peace” (Tsygankov, 2008: 765).

Tsygankov argues that the civilizational debates in Russia offer a venue in which such characteristics of IR can be challenged. By defining civilization as an “idea-based community that extends beyond a nation”, Tsygankov traces the evolution of debates about civilization in Russia starting from the 19<sup>th</sup> century by looking at various thinkers and politicians (Tsygankov, 2008: 765). What he suggests is that during the pre-Soviet, the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods there have been two main groups representing essentialist perspectives in civilizational debates. The first group is “Westernizers” (who claim that Russia belongs to the “West” and refuse to recognize the “non-Western” other), and the second one is “Eurasianists” (who support closer relations with the “non-Western” nations and represent “the West” as a threat). Tsygankov (2008: 771) suggests that there is another perspective in Russia which challenges these two extremes. According to this third perspective, there is no such “zero-sum dichotomy” between different civilizations. The former presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich for whom Russia is a “cultural bridge between Europe and Asia” exemplifies this point, suggests the author. Accordingly, Stankevich is

insisting, for example, on defending the rights of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics and reactivating special relations with Muslim countries. In arguing the notion of Russia’s special “civilizational status,” Stankevich and those who shared this perspective have been critical of many of the West’s characteristics, such as individualism and consumerism, and do not view western civilization as universal. Yet, they have also fought against Neo-Eurasianist attempts to present Russia as culturally superior, insisting on learning from the West skills of free enterprise and political liberty (Tsygankov, 2008: 771).

As a result, Tsygankov underscores that it is possible to construct a self-other relationship which is based on equality and which is more open to mutual engagement

and learning. For him, this conclusion also shows one way of transcending IR's limitation in its engagement with non-core actors.

Siba Grovogui's book *Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Order and Institutions* (2006) is another example to this literature. Grovogui starts his analysis by suggesting that "IR accounts are founded upon incomplete archives and/or dubious recollections of international events, contestable classifications of international reality, and less than transparent understandings of international morality" (Grovogui, 2006: 6). This stems from the fact the sources that IR is built upon take their roots from "Western" archives (Grovogui, 2006: 71). Grovogui suggests that in IR, theory is conceived as "the vessel for Western rationality" which renders other ways of knowing originated in the "non-Western" contexts as "mythical- religious oriental forms of knowledge" (Grovogui, 2006: 69-70) and thus not legitimate sources for theorizing world politics. Grovogui offers to look at non-core thinkers as a way to challenge this limitation and go beyond it.

Grovogui examines the ideas of three thinkers and policy makers, namely Felix Adolphe Sylvestre Eboué, Gabriel d'Arboussier, and Daniel Ouezzin Coulibaly, who were from French Equatorial Africa. Grovogui uses the term "évolués" to describe these politicians. "Evolués" refer to "cultural and intellectual hybrid entities" who were native Africans and who had received French education (Grovogui, 2006:10). These thinkers articulate main concepts of IR from their "subject position as colonized" and from other diverse cultural, political, and intellectual angles. Their importance stems from their success to mobilize Africans and other colonial entities and the influence that they had during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. According to Grovogui (2006: 9) this period is particularly significant since it exemplifies one of the most plural and open periods in which "multiple political

horizons could be envisaged” in former colonies of France in Africa due to the conditions caused by the war, and in particular the collapse of France before Nazis.

Felix Adolphe Sylvestre Eboué is one thinker and policy maker that Grovogui focuses on. Eboué was a black colonial administrator who had provided France with the independent space after the collapse of the country before Nazis. For Grovogui, his ideas about the state and the republic helped French resistance to overcome the moral confusion caused by this collapse (Grovogui, 2006: 12). Eboué distinguished French state, which was representing the colonial oppression, from French nation, which in Eboué’s view deserved support. He redefined patriotism as loyalty to the nation rather than loyalty to the state (Grovogui, 2006: 15). This notion of the nation was inclusive of all constituting parts of the republic, including those who were marginalized and oppressed in racial, cultural, economic and social terms (Grovogui, 2006: 142). By rethinking the republic from a humanist perspective, Eboué offered a new definition for a post-war republic. This republic was founded upon solidarity, generosity, and justice to account for the sacrifice and collective spirit of colonized and colonizers alike (Grovogui, 2006: 139). Grovogui suggests that these ideas of Eboué on state, nation, and republic challenge the mainstream understandings of world politics according to which nation and state refer to same thing and the relations between territorially-defined sovereign nation-states are identified as the main location in which world politics takes place.

To summarize, this section of the chapter examines the studies which focus on the views of thinkers and philosophers from non-core contexts. These views, even though overlooked by the discipline of IR, show how already existing concepts and categories look like when non-core actors’ views are taken into consideration. They are informed by the ways in which these actors experience “modern” world politics

and accordingly think about notions such as nationalism, cosmopolitanism, civilization, actors of world politics, and inside/outside dynamics. In this sense, rather than aiming to point to radically “different” or “alternative” understandings emerging from non-core contexts, these studies engage with how already existing views are rearticulated. This literature offers to examine such rearticulations as a way to go beyond IR’s limitations in its engagement with non-core ideas and experiences.

Rather than one particular conception of “the international”, the studies point to multiple conceptions as they focus on different thinkers from different parts of the world. That said, it is also possible to identify certain common themes in these studies. Regarding the main dynamics of world politics, the inequalities in world politics and the material and ideational exclusions that they give way to is central for the non-core thinkers. However, this dynamic is not the only reference points for thinkers covered in the literature in making sense of what makes the world go around as they also identify significant ways through which such dynamics can be altered. In this sense, for instance, going beyond essentialist self/other relations by recognizing “the forces of identity and diversity” (Tsygankov, 2008: 765) or drawing on “morality” as a source of power in the face of inequalities regarding material and economic power (Mitter, 2003: 133), expanding the definition of humanity as basis for cosmopolitan change (Gruffydd Jones, 2011) constitute other significant dynamics in world politics. As for the actors of world politics, some examples in this literature focus on states. However, they do so by problematizing the way in which states are treated in mainstream IR by showing how thinkers understand the notion of state in different ways. For instance, Chacko (2011: 180) underscores that Nehru’s view on state “rejects the fundamental assumption of the equivalence of the ‘nation’ and ‘state’ that underpins both ‘realism’ and ‘liberalism’”. Regarding the location of world politics, the thinkers subject to

analysis in this literature do not consider internal and external realms as separate or inter-state relations as central for how the world works. As opposed to that, they see world politics as taking place in different realms which affect one another. For instance, Jones (2003b: 136) argue that “distinctions between the ‘levels of analysis’ that have come to dominate social science” are challenged once the connections made between “interpersonal, intercommunity, and international relations” (Jones, 2003b: 149) by thinkers are considered.

### **3.4 Practices of Policy-Makers**

The last group of studies which focus on how non-core actors understand world politics focuses on practices of policy makers in contexts beyond core. Here the section looks at the studies of Pinar Bilgin, Shampa Biswas and Vivienne Jabri. These studies do not aim to find “different” understandings about world politics. Instead, they analyze the already existing views of policy makers about “the international”. That is because there is a need

to consider the possibility that one’s efforts to think past “Western” IR are not guaranteed to get one to a place where “different” ways of thinking about and doing world politics preside. This is because “Western” and “non-Western” dynamics as well as their interpretations have, over the years, clashed and fused in far too many different ways—ways that are not always acknowledged (Bilgin, 2008a: 7).

This “seemingly ‘similar’” views and practices, argues Bilgin, point to “unexpectedly ‘different’” ways of “thinking and doing world politics” (Bilgin, 2008a: 5). What the author suggests to focus on, then, is the dynamics in world politics and how these dynamics are made sense of by non-core actors (Bilgin, 2012a). That is because the conceptions of “the international” as found in non-core are produced and reproduced always in relation to the dynamics in world politics. Accordingly, non-core actors



either reproduce the dominant understandings or challenge them, based on how they understand world politics and their own place therein. For this reason, there is a need to inquire into others' conceptions of "the international" in a way to see the connections between "ideas and experiences of humankind" and the role of politics in the process (Bilgin, 2016a: 177).

As an example to this point, consider Jabri's analysis on the Arab Spring. What Jabri suggests in her book *The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity* (2013) is that "both local as well as global structures of domination and control and their complex and contingent intersections" (Jabri, 2013: 1) explain the unfolding of Arab Spring. For this reason, argues the author, one needs to examine how the actors in the Middle East understand the dynamics in world politics and their place within such dynamics. This understanding, Jabri suggests, "is already prescribed and shaped by coloniality and the continued desire to resist its continued economic, social, political, and epistemological domination" (Jabri, 2013: 11).

In order to tease out non-core actors views on world politics and while doing so, bringing "international politics back into" the analysis (Bilgin, 2012a: 27), scholars contributing to this literature focus on practices of the policy makers. As an example to such analysis, consider Bilgin's examination of Turkey's early Republican leaders' decision to secularize the country. Bilgin offers a corrective to the prevalent analysis in the literature which either explain this decision as a part of "universal" story which is derived from European experiences (in the sense that secularization is considered as an important aspect of the process of modernization) or as stemming from "particular" features of domestic politics in Turkey. Although not overlooking the importance of domestic factors in making sense of secularization of Turkey, Bilgin also draws attention to the dynamics in the realm of "the international", how this realm shapes

and is shaped by domestic politics, and how decision makers' understandings of this very realm explain their decisions. By examining the policy makers' "discourses of danger", Bilgin teases out their conception of "the international" and analyzes how this conception informs the decision to secularize the country. She concludes by suggesting that "secularism was in part a response to the international society's ambivalence towards Turkey's 'difference' and the insecurities this entailed, as viewed by Turkey's leaders at the time" (Bilgin, 2016a: 139). By enquiring into the conception of "the international" of Turkey's founding leaders, Bilgin finds out that this conception is "hierarchy in anarchical society" which reveals the hierarchical, anarchical, and societal aspects in their views on international politics.

Another example that could be given to this literature is Shampa Biswas's analysis on India's decision to nuclearize the country in the 1998. In her article "Nuclear Apartheid' as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource" (2001), Biswas problematizes the prevalent Neorealist accounts which explain India's decision to be a nuclear-weapons state with reference to "external threats" emanating from other states. Biswas underscores the importance of "hierarchies" in world politics and how these hierarchies are understood by the Indian decision makers in following and justifying their nuclear policy.

Biswas (2001: 486) argues that there is a "racially institutionalized global hierarchy" in world politics. In the case of nuclear weapons this global hierarchy led the policy makers in India to argue that there is a "nuclear apartheid" regime. "Nuclear apartheid" refers

to the material inequities in the distribution of global nuclear resources—inequities that are written into, institutionalized, and legitimized through some of the major arms-control treaties, creating an elite club of nuclear "haves" with exclusive rights to maintain nuclear arsenals that are to be denied to the vast majority of nuclear "have-nots" (Biswas, 2001: 486).

For Biswas, treaties such as “The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty” and “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” contributed to the construction of this hierarchy by virtue of giving the right of possessing nuclear weapons only to specific countries. In the view of the author this reflects the “deep-seated prejudices about the ‘irrationality’ of barbaric peoples in the Third World” (Biswas, 2001: 496). This hierarchy, argues Biswas (2001: 487), helped Indian government to justify its nuclear policy through claiming that nuclearizing India challenges the “racialized inequitable global order”.

Biswas (2001: 497) also discusses how this “undemocratic character of international relations” does enable the construction of other hierarchies within domestic politics. The author suggests that the discourse of “nuclear apartheid” utilized by the nationalist Indian government is based on the claim of protecting the “Indian nation”. Yet, the way in which “Indian nation” is defined by the policy makers of the time is an exclusionary one, argues Biswas. The definition of “Indian nation” is informed by “Hindu nationalism” which renders only particular segments of the society as belonging to the nation. In the process, some other groups in India (particularly Muslims) are represented as “others”. For Biswas (2001: 509), this case shows the “mutually constitutive co-construction of racialized domestic and international hierarchical orders”.

What is the conception of “the international” informing the practices of policy makers in non-core contexts as identified by scholars? This literature suggests that the main dynamic of world politics as viewed by the policy makers point to the centrality of “inequality” and “hierarchy” in world politics. Bilgin (2016a) identifies this conception as “hierarchy in anarchical society”. According to this view, the inequalities or “hierarchies in anarchical society” do not only stem from material (such as military or economic) differences between actors. They are also related with non-

material factors such as the dominant ideas in world politics including who is “civilized” or not or who is capable to “rule” (Bilgin, 2008b). The main actors of world politics in the view of policy makers is states, suggests this literature. For Jabri (2013: 11), this is related with the fact that “modern international...historically confers legitimacy to the limits of the national state as political community”. Since this literature is interested in how the dynamics of world politics shape, and is shaped by, the views of non-core actors, it is interested in “the limits of political community” and “how these limits are historically defined, pre-determined, naturalized, and ultimately complicit in the practices and discourses of inclusion and exclusion” (Jabri, 2013: 61). Concerning the location of world politics, the views of the non-core actors as identified by the scholars point to the “interplay” between internal and external realms. Accordingly, practices of those actors are informed both by their concerns in domestic politics as well as how they make sense of world politics.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

This chapter examined the literature according to which IR has limitations in theorizing world politics which stems from its disinterest in the views and experiences existing in different parts of the world. In order to transcend this situation, this literature offers to analyze sources beyond IR and to see how world politics is understood by non-core actors. The chapter looked at four types of sources that are examined by the scholars. These include traditional worldviews, everyday life experiences, writings of thinkers and philosophers, and practices of policy makers.

The chapter discussed the conceptions of “the international” the scholars point to in their analysis on these sources. Accordingly, the scholars who examine traditional

worldviews and everyday life experiences mostly underline the existence of “alternative” understandings in such sources regarding the main dynamics of world politics such as “harmony”. The scholars who focus on thinkers point to two views. One is informed by the centrality of colonial relations that shape relations between different actors and the other one is the mechanisms through which such relations can be transformed. For instance, regarding the latter, the scholars underscore how thinkers in non-core contexts think about the role of morality as a source of power in world politics, civilizational relations which are based on coexistence, or definitions on humanity which might lead to transformation of the structures leading to inequalities in world politics. The scholars who focus on the practices of policy makers underscore the centrality of material and non-material “inequalities” and “hierarchies” in making the world go around in the view of the policy makers in contexts beyond core.

Concerning the actors of world politics two observations can be made. Firstly, particularly evident in studies focusing on traditional worldviews, everyday life experiences, and some of the works focusing on thinkers, scholars highlight the existence of ideas in these sources regarding the importance of non-state actors. The particular emphasis is put on the communities, such as “umma”, as alternative forms of organization which challenge those views according to which states constitute the only actors of world politics. The second line of argument as found in these sources according to scholars is related with the centrality of states for world politics. However, the way in which the notion of “state” is understood in these sources indicate differences when the prevalent views on “states” in IR are considered, suggest the authors. For instance, while mainstream theories of the discipline use “state” and “nation” interchangeably, the difference between the two are central for some actors that are examined in the literature. The studies which examine the practices of policy

makers underline the centrality of states for policy makers and discuss the reasons for this centrality with reference to the dynamics in world politics.

Regarding the location of world politics, there is one commonality between different studies covered in the chapter. Accordingly, they all suggest that the external and internal realms are not considered as separate and the location of world politics is not only understood with reference to inter-state relations in the sources that they analyze. However, how different studies explain this understanding varies. For instance, some analyses explain this view with reference to non-state communities and the interactions taking place between people in these communities unfolding below and beyond state boundaries. For some others, ideas such as “interrelatedness” as found in indigenous or traditional worldviews suggest that individual, national, and global levels are not considered as separate. The literature which focuses on practices of policy makers challenge the demarcation line between internal and external realms by revealing how domestic and foreign policy developments together inform the ways in which policy makers understand world politics.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **WHAT IS “THE INTERNATIONAL” IN IR SCHOLARSHIP IN TURKEY?**

This chapter aims to analyze the conceptions of “the international” as found in the studies of IR scholars in Turkey. The chapter falls into three sections. In Section 1, the methods used for the selection of IR scholars and their studies under consideration are explained. In Section 2, the conceptions of “the international” as found in the early IR texts in Turkey is examined. Section 3 looks at the contemporary IR literature in Turkey in order to find out how they understand “the international”. The second and third sections of this chapter analyze the conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship in Turkey by identifying its three components, namely the main dynamic of world politics, the main actors of world politics, and the location of world politics.

#### 4.1 Methods for the Selection of Scholars and Their Studies

For identifying the scholars and their studies that will be subject to analysis throughout the chapter, “purposive sampling” technique is utilized. In purposive sampling (also known as “judgemental sampling” or “expert sampling”) the main aim is to

produce a sample that can be logically assumed to be representative of the population. This is often accomplished by applying expert knowledge of the population to select in a nonrandom manner a sample of elements that represents a cross-section of the population (Battaglia, 2008: 645).

Purposive sampling is particularly helpful in those situations where the selection is made from small population which has “a restricted population definition”.

The studies of the scholars that are subject to analysis in the chapter are identified by using purposive sampling since “IR scholars in Turkey” is a restricted population. In selecting the scholars, the analysis draws on the expert knowledge in the field by looking at two sources. For identifying the early IR scholars in Turkey, the minutes of “The Workshop on the Studies and Education of International Relations in Turkey” (*Türkiye’de Uluslararası İlişkiler Çalışmaları ve Eğitimi Çalıştayı*) were examined. This workshop was co-organized by the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University and International Relations Council and it took place in 16-17 April 2005 in Ilgaz. The minutes of the workshop were published in the journal “Journal of International Relations” (*Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*).<sup>2</sup> This workshop was followed by a roundtable “International Relations Studies and Education in Turkey” which took place in 30 June 2005 in the fourth Middle East Technical University Conference on International Relations, namely “Neighborhood: Past, Present, and Future”.<sup>3</sup> Both

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<sup>2</sup> See: <http://www.uidergisi.com.tr/p/710/cilt-2-sayi-6-yaz-2005>.

<sup>3</sup> For the minutes of the roundtable see:



meetings are important for bringing numerous IR scholars in Turkey for discussing a variety of aspects and the state of IR in Turkey, including the historical evolution of the discipline in the country. For selecting the contemporary IR scholars in Turkey, three surveys conducted by the International Relations Council of Turkey in the years 2007, 2009, and 2011 on IR scholars in Turkey are examined (Aydın, 2007; Aydın & Yazgan, 2009; 2013). These surveys are the first and the only surveys which aim to explain and understand the state of IR discipline in Turkey by analyzing respondents who are members of IR faculties across Turkey.

Since examining the conceptions of “the international” in IR studies in Turkey necessitates a qualitative examination on each source individually, a selection among a wide range of studies is made. This is done as follows. For the early IR studies in Turkey, the minutes of the above-mentioned workshops are examined. Following these minutes, the first IR scholars in Turkey are identified as Suat Bilge, Mehmet Gönlübol, and Türkkaya Ataöv (Sezer, 2005). During the 1960s, these scholars produced the earliest examples of IR studies in Turkey and their works had remained as the only academic sources in the field for a long time. For this reason, these works are considered as the early IR texts in Turkey. These early IR texts include Suat Bilge’s *Milletlerarası Politika* (International Politics) (1966), Mehmet Gönlübol’s *Milletlerarası Siyasi Teşkilatlanma* (International Political Institutions) (1964) and *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy Through Events) (1967) which was written by Mehmet Gönlübol, Cem Sar, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Oral Sander, Haluk Ülman, Suat Bilge, and Duygu Sezer (Aydın, 2005a, Karaosmanoğlu, 2005; Sezer, 2005).

Beside these books, the articles published by Türkkaya Ataöv during the 1960s regarding the teaching of IR in Turkey in the very first IR journals, namely *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (Ankara University the Journal of the Faculty of Political Sciences) and *Milletlerarası Münasabetler Türk Yıllığı* (Turkish Yearbook of International Relations) are also analyzed. These articles are amongst the first studies which discussed how to shape IR discipline in Turkey (Bilgin, 2005; Bilgin & Tanrısever, 2009). The articles consist of “Milletlerarası Münasebetler Nedir, Üniversitelerde Nasıl Okutulabilir?” (What is International Relations and how can it be taught in Universities?) (1960), “Symposium on the Teaching of International Politics in Turkey” (1961a), “Milletlerarası Politika Öğretiminin Muhtevası” (The content of International Relations Teaching) (1961b), and “The Teaching of International Relations in Turkey” (1967). The chapter also examines the minutes of the first IR symposium in Turkey namely *Milletlerarası Politika Öğretimi Sempozyumu* (Symposium on the Teaching of International Relations) (1961). This symposium aimed to define the content, purpose, methods, means, and ways of developing the discipline of IR in Turkey. The minutes of the symposium are considered as another early IR text in Turkey (Aydın, 2005a; 2005b; Bilgin, 2005; Dedeoğlu, 2005).

For the selection of contemporary IR scholars in Turkey, three surveys conducted by the International Relations Council of Turkey in the years of 2007, 2009, and 2011 among IR scholars in Turkey are examined (Aydın, 2007; Aydın & Yazgan, 2009; 2013). In each of the consecutive surveys one particular question is looked at. This question is:

Except from you, who do you think conduct the most important/ influential/ interesting studies in the field of IR in Turkey in recent years? (Aydın, 2007: 16; Aydın & Yazgan, 2009: 23; 2013: 29).

By combining information from these three surveys the contemporary IR scholars whose works are to be subject to analysis are identified. Based on the total numbers of respondents who stated their names, fourteen scholars are selected. These scholars are Fuat Keyman, Mustafa Aydın, Pınar Bilgin, Ziya Öniş, Nuri Yurdusev, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Kemal Kirişçi, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Ersel Aydınli, Atila Eralp, Bahar Rumelili, Baskın Oran, Çağrı Erhan, and İhsan Dağı. The details regarding the selection process based on the data on the surveys are provided in the Appendix.

To identify the studies to be analyzed in the chapter Google Scholar citation statistics is used. The articles, book chapters, and/or books<sup>4</sup> of the above-mentioned scholars which are most-cited by other Turkish IR scholars are identified, and top-three most-cited studies are listed. Additionally, to better grasp the conceptions of the scholars subject to this analysis, the list is extended by including other studies of these scholars which received the most citations in general.

As a result of this analysis, fifty-two studies are identified: forty-two articles and/or book chapters (Aydın, 1999, 2004a, 2004b; Aydın & Açıkmeşe, 2007; Aydın & Keyman, 2004; Aydınli & Mathews, 2000; Aydınli, 2002, 2009; Aydınli et.al., 2006; Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Bilgin, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008a; Dağı, 1996, 2004, 2006; Davutoğlu, 2008, 2010; Eralp, 1993, 2002, 2009; Erhan, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Keyman & Heper, 1998; Keyman & İçduygu, 2003; Keyman & Öniş, 2003; Kirişçi, 2000, 2003, 2006; Öniş, 1991, 1997, 2003; Öniş & Şenses, 2005; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009; Rumelili, 2003, 2004, 2005; Yurdusev, 1993, 1996, 1997), and ten books (Davutoğlu, 2014; Erhan, 2001; Oran, 1999, 2001, 2005; Rumelili, 2007; Sönmezoğlu, 2000a, 2000b, 2006; Yurdusev, 2003).

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<sup>4</sup> The studies in which these scholars are editors are excluded from the list since their editorial introductions may not include their conceptions of “the international”.

The selected studies are examined with the aim to see how the main dynamic of world politics, main actors of world politics, and the location of world politics are understood in these studies. The chapter will firstly look at the conceptions of “the international” in the early IR texts and then in contemporary IR texts in Turkey.

## **4.2 “The international” in the Early Texts of IR Scholarship in Turkey**

### **4.2.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

In the early IR texts, “anarchy” constitutes the central concept through which world politics is made sense of. Anarchy is understood as the lack of overarching authority which provides protection for states in world politics. This lack of central authority makes struggle for power as the central mechanism through which world politics unfolds. For Bilge (1966: 59), anarchy and in relation to it the struggle for power have been existent in every epoch of human history. Anarchy makes states to rely only on themselves in order to maintain their existence. States, in order to protect their integrity and independence and to survive, have to act in a way to protect their national interests (Gönlübol et.al., 1967: 613). Protection of national interest necessitates the possession of power. “In world politics, no matter what the ultimate aims are, it is the power that constitutes the primary purpose”, suggested Bilge (1966: 20). Ataöv (1960: 182) concurred that “the reality” of world politics is power politics.

The notion of power is understood as states’ ability to influence or control other states for their interests (Ataöv, 1960: 194). For Bilge (1966: 60) power includes three elements: military, economic, and political. The power of states depends on a combination of their geographical locations, size and shape of their territory, their

natural resources, population, the stability and efficiency of the government, and the capacity of their leaders. Similarly, for Ataöv (1960: 194) power is a combination of nuclear capacity, geography, natural resources, military preparedness, industrial situation, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, the support of the public opinion to the government, the quality of life and culture, economic condition, and alliances. That said, according to these texts it is material power (military and economic) that has the central importance for states in world politics.

In making the point of the centrality of power politics, the early IR texts underscore how the primacy of power politics renders the emergence of other dynamics in world politics difficult. The discussions on international law and international organizations exemplify this point. For instance, Ataöv (1967; AÜSBF, 1961:56) suggested that even though international law and organizations might limit the effects of power politics and lead to different dynamics in world politics, their influence remain limited. Bilge (1966: 31-32) proposed that one of the most important reasons why international law does not shape world politics is because of the primacy of national interest. For him, states comply with international law as long as doing so serves their national interests. Similarly, the effects of international organizations on making states to cooperate are very limited. This is because, as suggested by (Gönlübol, 1964: 1), states cooperate in accordance with their short term and long term interests, not in accordance with the rules and regulations of international organizations. As a result, the primacy of power politics and relatedly national interests is the main reason why international organizations remain relatively insignificant in world politics.

According to the early IR texts, the notions of power and interest should also be at the core of IR discipline. For instance, in his book *Milletlerarası Politika* (International Politics) (1966), Suat Bilge highlighted the importance of analysis on power struggles for IR. By examining the ten books published in the United States, which were back then the most recently published books, Bilge identified the main subjects in the discipline (Bilge, 1966: 9). These subjects include the characteristics of international society, power relations, foreign policies of states, foreign policies of great powers, the role played by the international organizations in international politics, and obtaining common security and peace. Among these subjects, Bilge identified power relations as the most important one. For him, exceeding the statue of being one of the subject matters among others in the discipline, power relations and struggles are the focal points of IR. In this sense, the focus on power is what differentiates IR from other fields such as diplomatic history, international organizations, and international law, argued Bilge (1966: 12). Similarly, Ataöv (1961a: 190) argued that “a course in international politics ought to begin with the teaching of principles of political realism such as objectivity, the concept of power and the superiority of national interest”. This point was also underlined in the conclusion part of the first symposium on the teaching of IR in Turkey: the role of power politics in world affairs has a central importance for IR courses (AÜSBF, 1962: 129).

To summarize, in the early IR scholarship in Turkey world politics is considered as an “anarchical” realm which makes power politics as the main dynamic of world politics. Power is defined with reference to possession of military and economic resources. This centrality makes other mechanisms (such as international law or organizations) which might lead to different dynamics as rather inconsequential for world politics.

#### 4.2.2 The Main Actors of World Politics

In the early IR texts, states are identified as the main actors of world politics. In these texts, it is argued that states are the most “powerful” and “excellent” form of societal organization (Gönlübol, 1964: 1). For Gönlübol (1964: 15) states became the main actors in world politics with the treaty of Westphalia (1648). For him, “in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the main unit of the international society is sovereign states” (Gönlübol, 1964: 25).

Bilge (1966: 25) defined states as units which encompass people, territory, government, and sovereignty. The most significant characteristic of states is their being “sovereign” in the view of the author. Sovereignty renders each and every state in the world as “equal” to one another in legal terms. What differentiates states in world politics is related with how much power they possess (Bilge, 1966: 23-24). Since great powers are the most powerful actors by virtue of their military and economic capabilities, they are considered as the most significant actors shaping different aspects of world politics. For instance, writing in the midst of the Cold War, Bilge (1966: 52) suggested that it is the nuclear balance established between the USA and the USSR that created the space for other states to follow independent and impartial foreign policies. Similarly, it is great powers and their interests that allow international organizations to be active players in resolving conflicts in world politics. For instance, Bilge (1966: 56) argued that the United Nations’ capability to act in resolving conflicts depends on whether these conflicts are related with the interests of great powers.

The centrality of great powers for world politics in the early IR texts can also be observed from the ways in which other actors of world politics are discussed in

those texts. For instance, discussions on whether international organizations are actors in themselves or not occupy a significant place in the early IR texts. Consider, for instance, the views of Gönlübol on the subject. In his book *Milletlerlerarası Siyasi Teşkilatlanma* (International Political Institutions) (1964) Gönlübol was particularly interested in the factors that prevents international organizations to become independent actors in world politics. According to the author, one significant factor is the lack of authority and resources in international organizations to challenge powerful states. This results in international organizations being subjected to the authority of great powers (Gönlübol, 1964: 4, also see Ataöv, 1960; Bilge, 1966).

To summarize, states are identified as the main actors of world politics in the early IR texts in Turkey. States are viewed as equal entities in legal terms by virtue of being “sovereign”. However, great powers, due to their material power, can shape world politics in accordance with their interests more than other states in world politics.

#### **4.2.3 The Location of World Politics**

The published minutes of the *Symposium on the Teaching of International Politics in Turkey* (AÜSBF, 1962) show that the issue of the location of world politics was subjected to debates in the early IR community in Turkey. While for some scholars world politics takes place only between states, some others world politics exceeds the relations between states and encompasses the relations between different units (Ataöv, 1960: 181). However, the later works of the early IR scholars indicate the prevalence of the idea according to which world politics unfolds in inter-state relations. In this view, domestic politics and foreign policy are considered as two separate realms.



Unat's statements in the symposium exemplify the view according to which inter-state relations is the only realm where world politics takes place. In his speech, Unat suggested that world politics occur only between states, not between nations, or any other units (AÜSBF, 1962: 97). Ataöv (AÜSBF, 1962: 98) and Gönlübol (AÜSBF, 1962: 100) disagreed with this statement and instead underscored that the discipline has to focus not only on the relations between states, but also the alliances between governments, regions, citizens, industrial and religious groups.

Although pointing to a location that goes beyond inter-state relations, an examination on Gönlübol's later studies show that in his analysis inter-state relations are understood as the location of "the international" (Gönlübol, 1964). Inter-state relations are considered to take place between "sovereign" states and might take the form of cooperation or conflict. A similar understanding is also evident in Bilge, particularly in his views on the discipline of IR. Bilge (1966: 5) suggested that IR, as a field of study, is about examining the conditions and elements of rivalry and relations between states. Therefore, what he offered is that the discipline should be built upon the examination of the relations between states (Bilge, 1966: 16). In this understanding, internal characteristics of states do not matter, instead the relations between states are shaped by how much power they have relative to each other.

To summarize, in the early IR studies in Turkey, the issue of the location of "the international" had been subjected to debates. While some scholars put forward the idea that it is only inter-state relations that could be considered as the space where "the international" takes place, some others pointed out to the different locations. Despite these debates, inter-state relations appear as the primary location of world politics in the writings of early IR scholars. According to this view, the internal and external realms of states are considered as two separate domains.

Section 2 analyzed the conception of “the international” as found in the early IR texts. The analysis showed that there is one prevalent conception of “the international” in these texts. According to this conception, anarchy and in relation to that power politics are understood as the main dynamic of world politics. Sovereign states, especially great powers, are considered as the actors of world politics. Inter-state relations are viewed as the realm where “the international” takes place. Taken together, these understandings indicate a similarity between the conception of “the international” in the early IR scholarship in Turkey and the conception of “the international” as found in Realist IR theory which was discussed in Chapter 1. In early IR texts in Turkey, world politics is studied by utilizing the core concepts, categories, and understandings as found in Realist theory.

### **4.3 “The international” in the Contemporary Texts of IR Scholarship in Turkey**

#### **4.3.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

As a result of the analysis on the writings of the contemporary IR scholars, five main views regarding the main dynamic of world politics are identified. These consist of the dynamics based on interest and power under anarchy, dynamics based on geopolitics, dynamics based on civilizations, dynamics based on globalization, and dynamics based on politics of difference in world politics. Each understanding will be treated in turn.

According to the view which identifies *interest and power under anarchy* as the main dynamic of world politics, the anarchical world politics render power politics as central for how the world works. This understanding has a material conception of power, i.e. power is understood in military and economic terms. For instance

Sönmezoğlu (2000a: 160-161) suggested that the core components of power are military and economic power. For him, power is both “possessional” and “relational” meaning that power is not only about possessing material resources, but it is also about control and impact of one actor have upon others in making them do things which they do not do otherwise (Sönmezoğlu, 2000a: 157-159).

In this understanding, the notion of “balance of power” has a central importance. As it is argued by Sönmezoğlu, there are three mechanisms providing a certain amount of “order” in “anarchical” world politics. These mechanisms include balance of power, international law, and international organizations (Sönmezoğlu, 2000a: 624). Within these mechanisms balance of power is the most important one to such an extent that for Sönmezoğlu (2000a: 70) despite all the criticisms it received in the literature, balance of power approach in world politics can be considered as the “grand theory” of IR. That is because, balance of power, and the desire and the effort of achieving and enhancing power are the central mechanisms through which world politics unfolds (Sönmezoğlu, 2000a: 722).

Another view on the main dynamic of world politics points to the centrality of *geopolitics* as shaping how the world works. In this view, concepts such as “national interest” and “national security” are prioritized with a reference to geography. The examples of this view can be found in the studies of Çağrı Erhan and Mustafa Aydın. Consider, for instance, Erhan’s (2003b) article where he analyzed the US’s policy towards Central Asia. In the article, Erhan underscored the importance of geopolitical views as developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by geographers such as Halford Mackinder in understanding the significance of the Central Asia for world politics, specifically when the interests of great powers are considered. Erhan defined the interests of great powers (primarily the USA, Russia and China) with reference to the energy resources and the

economic benefits that can be gained through these resources. For the author, these render the Central Asia as “geopolitically important” region in world politics. In a similar manner, in discussing the importance of the Black Sea region for the EU, Aydın (2004a) identified one of the central reasons as follows:

rivalry over the Caspian Basin energy resources, transport routes through and around the Black Sea, interaction with many regional conflicts in the South Caucasus, and international involvement in these conflicts, confer on the region a unique geopolitical interest, harboring various threats to regional and international peace and stability (Aydın, 2004a: 7).

In another article where he discussed the factors that shape Turkey’s foreign policy, Aydın (1999) suggested that the “geopolitical reality” of Turkey stemming from its “geostrategic location” (alongside with the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the founder of the Republic, Atatürk’s “ideological framework”) constitutes one of the pillars of Turkish foreign policy. For the author, the “geopolitical location” of the country not only affect its foreign policy, but also render it as a significant actor of world politics. Accordingly, although “Turkey is not one of the great powers of the twentieth century”, argued Aydın, “its geopolitical location [however] has enabled it to play a potentially higher role in world politics than would have been otherwise possible” (Aydın, 1999: 152).

Another view identifies *civilizational relations* as the central mechanism through which world politics unfolds. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s studies exemplify this view. In his book *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth) (2014) Davutoğlu underscored the centrality of civilizations (which are informed by history and geography) in shaping the way in which states behave in world politics. For the author civilizations provide fixed parameters for states to develop their strategies and to conduct their foreign policies (Davutoğlu, 2014: 29). Civilizations are also important, suggested Davutoğlu, because they also shape how a state is conceived by other states (Davutoğlu, 2014:

560). For these reasons, in order to understand world politics one needs to understand civilizational relations between states in the view of the author (Davutoğlu, 2014: 6).

The centrality of civilizational relations as the central mechanisms through which world politics unfolds can also be found in Nuri Yurdusev's analysis, particularly in his book *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach* (2003). For Yurdusev, civilizational identities are one of the most significant collective identities which shape the interactions taking place in world politics (Yurdusev 1997, 2003). The author defined collective identity as having two elements: objective elements (such as history, customs, institutions, religion, myths) and subjective elements (consciousness on having a particular identity) (Yurdusev, 2003: 78-79). Yurdusev viewed civilizations as "large-scale collectivities" in terms of "their spatial coverage and temporal extensions" which render them "wider and broader and more durable and long-lived than other collective identifications in human history" (Yurdusev, 2003: 82). Individual and collective actions are affected by such civilizational identities, suggested the author (2003: 97). For instance:

That there is an increasing identification of the masses and some elites in Muslim countries with a wider entity which is basically defined by Islam and Islamic civilization, and that a degree of collective rallying on the basis of religious (civilizational) identity in Muslim countries is possible, have been starkly demonstrated by the Gulf War of 1991 and the Bosnian War after the disintegration of Yugoslavia...As is well-known, even Iran, the fiercest enemy of the secularist regime of Iraq, gave indirect support to Iraq in the name of Islam and against the United States. In Turkey, the majority of public opinion including a considerable number of the traditional Westernized elite opposed the governmental policy of providing the allied forces with facilities that were to be used against Iraq (Yurdusev, 2003: 152).

In some other studies subject to analysis, the central mechanism shaping how the world works is *the process of globalization*. However, scholars sharing this view do not define the notion of globalization in the same way. Accordingly, one group of scholars understand globalization as "westernization" meaning that globalization is a "dynamic

whereby the social structures of modernity (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, individualism, and so on) are spread the world over” (Scholte, 2005: 16). In this view, the focus is either on the dominance of the “West” and how it shapes world politics which results in a number of “inequalities” (mostly in economic terms) for the rest of the world (Oran, 2001) or how the spread of “Western” political values (such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law) result in positive developments in different parts of the world (Dağı, 1996, 2004, 2006).

Baskın Oran’s studies exemplify the former understanding as he defined globalization as “the expansion of the Western system, carrying with it both its infrastructure (capitalism) and superstructure (rationalism, secularism, human and minority rights, democracy etc.)” (Oran, 2004: 128). Oran (2001) argued that rather than being a recent phenomenon, the emergence of globalization, and the “inequalities” that it generates, can be traced back to the much earlier periods. He categorized the evolution of globalization in three stages. The first stage, suggested Oran, started with the discovery of the overseas land in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and led to the emergence of “colonialism”. The second one took place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the help of the technological advancement introduced by the industrial revolution. This period resulted in “imperialism”. The last wave of globalization has started with the 1990s as a result of three preceding developments, argued Oran. These developments include the advent of multinational corporations in the world economy starting from the 1970s, the technological advancements that led to communication revolution starting from the 1980s, and finally the dissolution of the USSR (Oran, 2001: 5-12). For Oran:

The first development enlarged the marketplace to embrace the whole globe now (hence, “globalization”). The second development made it possible to conquer the minds of people instead of their country (and that made it very

difficult to challenge the conquest this time). The third practically gives the West monopolistic control over international developments, political as well as economic (Oran, 2004: 128).

Another group of scholars, who also identify the dynamics caused by globalization as the main dynamic of world politics, have a broader definition of the term. These scholars focus on both economic as well as cultural aspects of globalization and identify their multiple consequences (both negative and positive) in domestic contexts and beyond (Keyman & İçduygu 2003; Kirişçi, 2003, 2006; Öniş, 1997). These scholars define globalization as a process in which there is an “intensification of economic, political and cultural relations across borders” that makes it hard to “think of politics without situating it into the global–national–local context” (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003: 224).

Consider, for instance, Ziya Öniş’s studies in which globalization is considered as a phenomenon which is affecting different dimensions of world politics including the organization of world political economy, state sovereignty, and culture (Öniş, 1997: 745-747; Öniş & Şenses, 2005). For him, globalization leads to paradoxical results. For instance, the process of cultural globalization gives way both to “homogenization” as well as “fragmentation”:

At one level, we observe cultural forces or signals that have the effect of pulling societies together in terms of forming common tastes or values. These common elements include the increasing emphasis on individualism, material values and consumerism, forces that are progressively homogenizing tastes, values or behavioural norms across highly diverse societies around the globe...It is also interesting and paradoxical, however, that the cultural impulses transmitted to many societies in the postmodern age are also producing a strong tendency towards cultural relativism. A striking trend associated with the “postmodern condition” is the acceptance of diversity, the recognition of local and traditional cultures including religion, and the right for multiple perspectives or paths to modernity to co-exist as opposed to a single, unilinear conception of modernity associated with the West and the tradition of the Enlightenment (Öniş, 1997: 747).

Another view identified in the writings of IR scholars in Turkey concerning the main dynamic of world politics points to *politics of difference*, how these differences cause various inequalities, and how these differences and inequalities shape, and shaped by, practices of actors in world politics. These scholars' analyses are not based on a pre-defined and essentialized understanding of "difference" as unchanging and "natural" characteristics of actors. Instead, they look at how differences are constructed in world politics and analyze their consequences. The scholars focusing on such dynamics focus on ideational aspects of differences and inequalities, such as non-military insecurities as experienced by non-core actors of world politics (Bilgin, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008a) or the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in world politics stemming from relations of identity (Rumelili, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007).

Pınar Bilgin explained the centrality of difference and the inequalities that these differences cause in world politics with reference to notion of "security". Bilgin's analysis is based on the problematization of the "state-based and external-directed conception of security" which "has prevailed and shapes the practices of governments" (2003: 203) and which caused various insecurities for different actors. For Bilgin, security in world politics is not only about military insecurities since there is a "dynamic relationship between the social-political-economic-environmental as well as military dimensions of security" (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 69). Also, it is not only states that are agents or referents of security but there are different agents (such as non-state actors) and referent objects (such as individuals) of security in world politics (Bilgin, 2003).

Defining security as such, Bilgin looked at how insecurities of non-core actors of world politics are informed by, and inform, various dynamics in world politics. In her article "Thinking past 'Western' IR" (2008a), Bilgin (2008a: 5) problematized the



prevalent assumption in the discipline of IR that in non-core parts of the world, there are “radically ‘different’” ways of “thinking about and doing world politics”. By underscoring how insecurities experienced in such contexts “did not evolve in a vacuum” but instead emerge as a result of “the web of relationships between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’” (Bilgin, 2008a: 10), she explained how “seemingly ‘similar’” ways of “thinking about and doing world politics” existing in non-core contexts emerge as responses to such relationships. By looking at the nuclear policy of India, Turkey’s early Republican leaders’ decision to secularize the country, and Asian states’ integration with liberal world economy, Bilgin analyzed how insecurities of those actors informed their “policies of survival shaped in an international political context characterised by an unequal division of labour and distribution of power” (Bilgin, 2008a: 19). Accordingly, by becoming “similar”, suggested the author, non-core actors attempt to “remove[s] the ground for the ‘West’ to claim the capacity and the right to better rule” (Bilgin, 2008a: 14).

Bahar Rumelili analyzed the centrality of “difference” in world politics with reference to the notion of “identity”. As opposed to those views which approach identities as unchanging, Rumelili defined identities as socially-constructed. She is interested in how identities are constructed in relation to “difference”. For instance, in her book *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and South Asia* (2007) Rumelili examined the regional organizations which “construct, promote, sustain a sense of collective identity among their member states” (Rumelili, 2007: 1). These organizations and the collective identities that they generate have an impact on regional orders on the one hand, and on the global order, on the other since “relations of identity and difference among states...shape relations of conflict and cooperation” (Rumelili, 2007: 3). By going beyond the already-existent analyses which focus on

how collective identities constructed in communities yield to peace and cooperation, Rumelili questioned the ways in which such identities produce differences with states outside those communities (Rumelili, 2004, 2007: 6). Accordingly, while collective identities can generate peaceful relations among community members, they can also cause conflicts with non-community members (Rumelili, 2007: 7). Rumelili's analysis (2004) on identity and difference constructions shaping the relations between the EU and Central/Eastern European states, Morocco, and Turkey exemplified how identities constructed in relation to difference constitute a dynamic in world politics.

To summarize, five views are identified regarding the main dynamics of world politics in the writings of IR scholars in Turkey. These dynamics include power politics, geopolitics, identity, globalization, and politics of difference. There are also differences among scholars in their definitions of the central concepts informing their analysis, such as "globalization". This diversity also manifests itself in the ways in which IR scholars in Turkey understand the main actors of world politics, a subject that will be examined in the following section.

#### **4.3.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

As a result of the analysis on the writings of the contemporary IR scholars, three main views regarding the actors of world politics are identified. Accordingly, for all scholars, states are the main actors of world politics. However, while some studies prioritize "great powers" as significant actors of world politics (Aydın, 2004a; Erhan, 2003b; Sönmezoğlu, 2000b), some others challenge this primacy by underscoring the ways in which multiple actors (state and non-state alike) do also shape world politics in various ways (Bilgin, 2003; Keyman & İçduygu, 2003; Oran, 2001; Öniş, 1997).

States are the main actors in world politics according to IR scholars in Turkey, although the definitions of states vary among them. For instance, Sönmezoğlu (2000a: 721) defined states as entities having the “monopoly of the legitimate use of force”. The most important characteristics of states, which render them as the actors of world politics, is that they are “sovereign”, suggested Sönmezoğlu. Sovereignty has two dimensions: internal and external. For the author internal sovereignty means that states are the supreme authorities in their territories. External sovereignty refers to the right of a state to freely determine its relations with other states without the pressure, interference, or intervention of other actors (Sönmezoğlu, 2000a: 28). Bilgin, in a co-authored article with Morton, challenged this definition of state and underscored that the state is not only “the apparatus of government operating within the ‘public’ sphere (government, political parties, military) but also as part of the ‘private’ sphere of civil society (church, media, education)” (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 71). For the authors states are “constituted and reproduced” within particular “socio-historical contexts” (2002: 63) meaning that they are not timeless identities and they are not identical. The authors also argued that the category of “sovereignty” is not a “fixed” in world politics. Instead it is “a relational or social construct that is the product of particular practices” (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 74). As in the case of states, sovereignty is not a “natural” principle that applies similarly to every state in world politics.

While taking states as the main actors of world politics, one group of studies that are subject to analysis points to the primacy of great powers in shaping world politics. For instance, in his book *Türkiye- Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler: Kıbrıs, Ege, ve Diğer Sorunlar* (Turkey-Greece Relations and Great Powers: Cyprus, Aegean and Other Problems) (2000b), Sönmezoğlu underscored the importance of studying the policies and approaches of great powers for understanding various events

in world politics, including the bilateral relations between individual states which are not great powers. Similarly, Erhan's studies point to the centrality of great powers in understanding world politics. For instance, he identified the great power competition during the Cold War era as the primary force shaping world politics by virtue of determining the individual country's foreign policy approaches, in this case Turkey's relations with the USA and the NATO (Erhan, 2003a). In his article entitled "The USA's policy towards the Central Asia and new openings after 9/11" (2003b), Erhan studied the Central Asia with a particular reference to how interests and policies of great powers shape the politics of the region.

Aydın is also among the scholars for whom great powers are the main actors of "the international". In his article where he analyzed the determining factors of the Turkish foreign policy, Aydın started his analysis by underscoring the importance of studying Turkish foreign policy despite the fact that Turkey is not one of the great powers of world politics (Aydın, 1999: 152). Turkish foreign policy is important, argued the author, due to country's "unique" characteristics which increase its significance in world politics even though it is a "medium power" (Aydın, 1999: 152).

Some other scholars are of the view that world politics is not only composed of great powers, but also other states as well as non-state actors. For instance, Bilgin criticized the prevalent idea in the mainstream theories of IR according to which "small states are of little consequence to world politics" (Bilgin, 2008a: 6) and underscored the importance of studying the policies of non-core actors as they also shape different aspects of world politics. The scholars also highlight that besides states there are also non-state actors who influence how world politics unfolds. According to this view, states are relatively losing their control over multiple issue areas and supra-state or sub-state actors are gaining significance as a result of globalization.

Keyman and İçduygu argued that the multiplicity of actors that emerged as a result of globalization makes it difficult to understand world politics with reference only to the states. For the authors:

we are no longer able to think of politics as a purely national in terms of its actors and its boundaries. Whereas the boundaries and the parameters of politics are being extended to global and local flows/interactions, its actors multiply to the extent that they include inter-, intra-national and global organizations, and their role and activities in solving problems related to the human condition (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003: 220).

A similar line of argument is also put forward by Oran (2001). For him, although states remain crucial actors of world politics, globalization has decreased their power to a considerable extent. For this author, this decline manifests itself in three directions: “upward” direction (e.g. supranational organizations), “downward” direction (e.g. municipalities) and “sideward” direction (e.g. non-governmental institutions) (Oran, 2001: 53-54). In return, these different actors gain capabilities to shape world politics in different ways.

For instance, the decrease of the power of states towards upwards results in analysis which looks at regional organizations as actors of world politics. These organizations are understood as more than the sum of their parts, namely states that constitute them. For instance, by recognizing regional organizations “as actors in their own right” which “embody and represent the sense of collectivity among their members” Rumelili (2007: 2) underscored the ways in which different regional organizations shape different dynamics of world politics. Regional organizations, such as the EU, rather than being the sum of its individual members, are actors in themselves by virtue of constructing “regional orders” which in turn affect the “global order” itself (Rumelili, 2007: 1).

To summarize, in the writings of contemporary IR scholars, states are identified as the main actors of world politics. However, for some, not every state matters in world politics and for this reason one needs to focus on great powers. Some others challenge this primacy attributed to great powers by underscoring the importance of other actors, including non-core states, and non-state actors, in shaping how the world works.

### **4.3.3 The Location of World Politics**

There are a number of contemporary IR scholars for whom world politics takes place between states. For instance, Sönmezoğlu (2000a: 12) suggested that although it is inaccurate to understand the discipline of IR as the sum of foreign affairs of sovereign states, he still underscored the prevalence of external relations of states as they constitute the most important subject matter for the discipline. A similar view can also be seen in the empirical studies of the scholars. Consider, for instance the large number of studies focusing on Turkish foreign policy, and in particular Turkey's bilateral relations with great powers such as the USA (Davutoğlu, 2008, 2010; Erhan, 2001, 2003a) or with neighboring states (Sönmezoğlu, 2000b; Aydın, 2004b). Besides Turkey's foreign affairs, several other inter-state relations, such as the USA's policies towards Central Asian countries (Erhan, 2003b), are also subject to analysis. The reason for identifying inter-state relations as the location of world politics in these studies is not related with their subject matters, i.e. foreign policies of states. Instead, the point is while they are analyzing these relations, their main focus is on the "external" aspects of those relations, meaning that the domestic politics and foreign affairs are considered as separate in these studies.

The understandings which go beyond the idea of world politics as taking place between states point to the convergent relationship between domestic politics and foreign affairs (Bilgin, 2007; Eralp, 2009; Kirişçi, 2006). In line with the idea according to which the actors of world politics exceed states and include a number of non-state actors, multiple interactions in global and local levels are identified as where world politics unfolds, as these interactions shapes various aspects of world politics. Consider, for instance, the analyses on civil society organizations (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003; Rumelili, 2005; Kirişçi, 2006). In such studies, the ways in which the interactions occurring below and beyond state boundaries shape different aspects of world politics, including foreign policy, are examined. Similarly, those studies which focus on the role of transnational corporations in world economy (Oran, 2001; Öniş & Şenses, 2005) point to a shift in the location of world politics beyond state to state relations.

To summarize, there are two main views regarding the location of world politics in IR scholarship in Turkey. In one group of studies inter-state relations are identified as the place where world politics unfolds. In this understanding, domestic and external realms are considered as separate. Another group of studies underscores the intertwined relationship between domestic politics and foreign affairs. These studies examine the interactions taking place below and beyond state boundaries. In this second type of studies, the internal and external affairs of states are understood as “convergent” and boundaries differentiate these affairs as “porous” (Rosenau, 1997: 32).

Section 3 examined the conceptions of “the international” in the contemporary IR scholarship in Turkey. It was showed that there are five main views concerning the main dynamics of world politics: interest and power under anarchy, dynamics based on geopolitics, dynamics based on civilizations, dynamics based on globalization, and dynamics based on politics of difference in world politics. Regarding the actors of world politics, states are identified as the main actors of world politics. However, while some scholars are of the view that it is great powers which are the primary actors, some others challenge this view by showing how other states as well as non-state actors are important in shaping world politics. In relation to location of world politics, two main understandings were identified. Accordingly, one group of scholars view internal and external relations as separate and world politics as taking place in inter-state relations, another group of scholars underscore the convergent relation between domestic and foreign policy and world politics as unfolding below and beyond state boundaries.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

This chapter examined how the realm of “the international” is made sense of in the writings of IR scholars in Turkey. In this conclusion section, the main findings of the chapter are discussed with a particular reference to how the main concepts and categories in IR scholarship as examined in Chapter 1 are understood in the texts which are subject to analysis throughout the chapter. Also, how these texts study Turkey is elaborated on.

As it is suggested earlier, there are multiple conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship in Turkey. Some of these conceptions are informed by the concepts, categories, and prevalent views as found in the discipline of IR, such as in the case of the early texts of the discipline. This is particularly evident in the conception of “the



international” viewing world politics as a realm of anarchy in which power politics constitute the main dynamic of world politics. In this conception, states are considered “sovereign” actors, meaning that they are juridically equal entities. What differentiates states is explained with reference to their material power. Accordingly, those states which are powerful, i.e. great powers, are considered as the primary actors of world politics. In this conception domestic and foreign domains of states are considered as separate, and the ways in which states behave are explained with reference to the distribution of power in world politics. This conception is similar with the one as found in Realist/Neorealist theory as discussed in the Chapter 1. When the texts that take Turkey as their case studies are considered, the same concepts, categories, and understandings adopted. This indicates that according to this conception, non-core experiences do not differ from the experiences of core actors.

The other types of studies utilize similar concepts and categories as found in Realism/Neorealism. However, they define these concepts and categories in different ways. For instance, those texts which identify geopolitics as the main dynamic of world politics put emphasis on how geostrategic and geoeconomic factors shape the behaviors of states (the main actors of world politics according to these texts) and in this way constitute the main mechanism through which world politics unfolds. However, as it is discussed in Chapter 1, in Realist/Neorealist conception of “the international” geography does not have this central role. This point is also highlighted by scholars in the literature. For instance, Dalby suggested that much of the discussions of Realism “does not explicitly engage the geographic arrangements of international affairs” (Dalby, 2013, also see Guzzini, 2012). Given these arguments found in the literature together with the analysis conducted in Chapter 1 it can be suggested that the analyses based on the centrality of geopolitics indicate a different conception of “the

international” when compared with Realism/Neorealism. These texts study the case of Turkey with reference to the “geopolitical importance” of the country and suggest that the country constitutes an “exceptional” case. This view indicates similarities with the conception of “the international” which identify civilizational relations as the main dynamic of world politics. In this conception, states remain as the central actors and the relations between different states are identified as the location of world politics. Particularly evident in Davutoğlu’s studies, Turkey’s civilizational identity render it as an “exceptional” case as it considered as the “central country” in its “civilizational basin” (Davutoğlu, 2014).

For another group of studies, globalization dynamic shapes the realm of “the international”, as well as its actors, and locations. Scholars focusing on globalization underscore the importance of non-actors besides states as significant actors of world politics. Besides, they are of the view that world politics takes place below and beyond state boundaries and in this sense the boundaries separating internal and external realms are porous. However, the question of what kind of results the globalization dynamic generates is answered in different ways. For instance, for some scholars (Oran, 2001; Dağı, 1996, 2004, 2006) globalization refers to “westernization”, i.e. diffusion of economic (capitalism) and political (democracy) rules and norms of the “West” to different parts of the world. For others, globalization does not refer to “westernization” as it gives way to different dynamics in different contexts (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003; Kirişçi, 2003, 2006; Öniş, 1997). For instance, Keyman and İçduygu in their co-authored article “Globalization, Civil Society, and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries, and Discourses” (2003) challenged the widely shared idea that the existence of civil society organizations throughout the world would lead to “a better and humane world” (2003: 219). Although not overlooking the importance of this

argument and underscoring the importance of civil society for the development of democracy, the authors warn against such generalizations. That is because civil society “involves not only democratic discourses, but also essentialist identity claims, voiced by religious and ethnic fundamentalism, and arguing for reconstructing the state–society/individual relations in a communitarian basis” (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003: 221). The authors, by looking at the case of Turkey, showed that the civil society organizations as defined in the literature (being “issue-specific organizations” and not being “interested in creating or supporting ideological societal visions”) do not coincide with the ways in which civil society organizations in Turkey define themselves (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003: 228).

The studies according to which politics of difference is the main dynamic of world politics focus on how differences cause inequalities and how these shape and are shaped by practices of actors in world politics (Bilgin, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008a; Rumelili, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007). Both state and non-state actors are identified as actors of world politics in this conception as the differences yielding inequalities are produced and reproduced by different actors of world politics. In this conception, internal and external realms are not considered as separate as there is a mutually constitutive relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. By virtue of identifying politics of difference as the central mechanism through which world politics unfolds, in these studies the usage of concepts and categories in analyzing non-core contexts (including Turkey) is questioned. Bilgin (2008a) problematized the fact that the mainstream theories overlook the ideas and experiences of non-core actors in theorizing world politics, even they assume their concepts and categories are “universally” applicable. She also challenged “expectations of finding ‘difference’” in “thinking about and doing world politics” in non-core contexts (Bilgin,

2008a: 10). What the author argued is the necessity to study the “web of relationships” in world politics so as to understand how the concepts and categories are used in different parts of the world and why. This analysis suggests to go beyond studying non-core contexts (including Turkey) with concepts and categories which are argued to be “universal” but in fact reflect the experiences of particular actors. It also suggests to go beyond thinking non-core experiences as constituting “exceptional” or “unique” cases.



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **WHAT IS “THE INTERNATIONAL” IN SOURCES OUTSIDE IR SCHOLARSHIP IN TURKEY?**

As it is explained in the Introduction, the dissertation follows Critical Geopolitics literature in order to identify the sources for analysis. It was underlined that Critical Geopolitics looks at multiple sites where the understandings on world politics in a given context can be found. The dissertation looks at formal site, practical site and official site. In Chapter 4, the formal site was examined through analyzing IR scholarship in Turkey. The practical (political parties) and official (education) sites will be the subjects of this chapter. The chapter falls into two sections. Section 1 examines the conceptions of “the international” as found in the election manifestos and party programs of the political parties in Turkey. Section 2 analyzes the conceptions of “the international” as found in the “National Security” course textbooks. In each section, the selection processes of the respective sources are explained. In the conclusion section of the chapter, the differences and similarities

between different conceptions of “the international” as found in these different sources are discussed.

The analysis is based on the sources produced in the post-Cold War period. In order to analyze the sources, this chapter employs discourse analysis as the method of analysis. In the literature, it is argued that there are different definitions of discourse (Wodak, 2008: 4) and many versions of discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003; Gill, 2000). For this reason, suggested Wodak (2008: 6), among different definitions of discourse, the researcher has to decide his/her definition depending on the context and theoretical approach of the research. The definition that is employed in this study is based on the Critical Geopolitics literature. In this definition discourses are understood “as sets of capabilities people have, as sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities” and as “a set of capacities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct it into an organized meaningful whole” (O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192-193).

The research follows the “interpretive-explanatory form” of discourse analysis, which is one analytic form of analysis found in Critical Geopolitics literature (Müller, 2010: 16). Müller (2008, 2010) argued that this form of analysis in Critical Geopolitics is interested in the interpretation of meanings in texts and the content of discourses. This approach examines the actors by taking them as the producers of meanings (Müller, 2010: 16) and attempts to see how various aspects of world politics, including “its constituent locations, defining dramas and leading protagonists” (O’Tuathail, 2002: 607) are understood and represented by them. In employing discourse analysis, the aim of the research is limited to examine how “the international” is understood in Turkey by studying how “the world has been and is being interpreted (judged, enacted)

in different ways in a routine and regular fashion by various groups” (Milliken, 1999: 243-244). The research does neither trace back the historical formation of the discourses nor discuss the contextual factors that lead to their emergence.

Despite being the central method in Critical Geopolitics literature, “there is no agreed and paradigmatic ‘discourse analysis’”, suggested O’Tuathail (2002: 605), but “a heterogeneous mix of approaches, perspectives and strategies”. One of the common strategy employed by Critical Geopolitics scholars is to identify recurring and common themes in texts under investigation and interpret the implications of these themes for their research questions (Sharp, 1993; Weldes, 1999; Dodds, 2008). For instance, in their seminal article “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy” (1992), O’Tuathail and Agnew analyzed Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and “Mr. X” articles with the aim to show the ways in which the USSR was represented as “the other” of the USA in these texts. The authors identified three core themes through which the USSR was rendered as the “other”: the USSR as the “oriental”, the USSR as a “potential rapist” and the USSR as a “red flood”. Similarly, Sharp in her book *Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American Identity* (2000) analyzed the articles published in the magazine “Reader’s Digest” between 1922-1994 to examine how the US identity was constructed and represented. In her analysis, Sharp grouped the articles under three themes: threats to the USA, the role of the USA in world politics and what it means to be a good American citizen. Then, she collected the quotes dealing with each theme, summarized the content of articles in accordance with their topics, and examined the structure of the discourses employed in the articles.

The following analysis draws on such studies as found in Critical Geopolitics literature. The election manifestos, party programs, and National Security textbooks

are examined with reference to three main themes: the main dynamic of world politics, the main actors of world politics, and the location where world politics takes place. For doing so, firstly, the documents are subjected to in-depth reading. While reading, the quotations that fall in the scope of each theme are noted. Then, the regularities and repetitions regarding phrases, sentences, and views in each quotation are identified and grouped. The analysis is based on the interpretation of these regularities and repetitions which point to the prevalent views in the documents regarding the main dynamic, main actor, and the location of world politics, i.e. the conceptions of “the international”.

### **5.1 The Conceptions of “the international” in Political Parties in Turkey**

In Critical Geopolitics literature, different sources are identified for examining the practical site. These sources include speeches or statements of policy makers and/or politicians (O’Loughlin, 2001; O’Loughlin et.al., 2004a, 2004b; O’Tuathail, 2002; Kolossov & O’Tuathail, 2007); parliamentary debates and speeches (Van Dijk, 2000, 2003); and election manifestos and party programs (Yanık, 2012).

In this section, party programs and election manifestos will be examined. The selection of political parties is related with their being one of the most influential and major actors in Turkey (Frey, 1965; Özbudun, 2000; Sayarı, 2012). The reason for selecting election manifestos and party programs instead of speeches of policy-makers/politicians or parliamentary debates stems from two reasons. Firstly, those studies focusing on the speeches of policy-makers/politicians are analyzing the people in power, such as presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers or the members of the parliament. The same also applies to those studies examining parliamentary debates. Given the 10% threshold in Turkey’s election system, governmental or parliamentary



level analysis might delimit the analysis. That is because the analysis here aims to study the conceptions of “the international” as found in Turkey’s political spectrum, not only the conceptions of people in power. Secondly, the access to the speeches and statements of politicians are not uniform across different political parties. While some parties publish the speeches delivered by their party leaders regularly in their websites, this is not the case with every political party. On the contrary to this situation, the party programs and election manifestos for each political party under consideration are available.

The political parties that are subject to analysis include those which gained at least one million votes in the general elections held in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, and 2011. This decision is related with the 10% election threshold in Turkey, which renders certain political parties’ participation in the parliament difficult, even though they are important to understand the conceptions of “the international” in Turkey’s political spectrum. Therefore, focusing on parties received at least one million votes in general elections helps to build a more representative sample. Consider, for instance, 2002 general elections. In the election, only two parties passed the 10% election threshold (AKP and CHP). The total votes that they received correspond to 53.4% of the overall votes. However, the percentage of the votes gained by parties received at least one million votes (AKP, CHP, DYP, MHP, GP, DEHAP, ANAP) correspond to 90.1% of the overall votes.<sup>5</sup> Similar results are also evident in other elections.<sup>6</sup>

The parties which qualified this criterion and are covered in the analysis include Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP*), Democratic People’s Party

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<sup>5</sup> The data is accessed from the website of Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute): <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/>.

<sup>6</sup> 1991 election: 99%, 1995 election 97%, 1999 election 94%, 2002 election 90%, 2007 election 95%, 2011 election 95%.

(*Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP*), Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*), Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi, ANAP*), Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP*), People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP*), Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP*), Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP*), True Path Party/Democrat Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi/Demokrat Parti, DYP/DP*), Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi, FP*), Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi, RP*), and Young Party (*Genç Parti, GP*).<sup>7</sup>

**Table 1: The Political Parties Received at Least One Million Votes in Six General Elections**

Name of the political party	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011
ANAP	*	*	*	*		
SHP	*					
DYP- DP	*	*	*	*	*	
DSP	*	*	*			
RP	*	*				
CHP		*	*	*	*	*
MHP		*	*	*	*	*
HADEP		*	*			
FP			*			
AKP				*	*	*
GP				*	*	
DEHAP				*		

<sup>7</sup> Throughout the chapter, the Turkish abbreviations of the political parties are used.

The programs and manifestos are reached through Grand National Assembly's open access website (<http://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/>) and library and archive website (<https://kutuphane.tbmm.gov.tr>). In the cases where the documents cannot be reached in these sites, the individual websites of the political parties are also utilized.

**Table 2: The Numbers and Years of the Election Manifestos and Party Programs**

Name of the political party	Number of election manifestos and their publication years	Number of party programs and their publication years
1.ANAP	3 (1991, 1999, 2002)	1 (1998)
2.SHP	1 (1991)	2 (1990, 1993)
3.DYP-DP	2 (1991, 2007)	1 (1991)
4.DSP	3 (1991, 1995, 1999)	1 (2003)
5.RP	2 (1991, 1995)	1 (1994)
6.CHP	4 (1999, 2002, 2007, 2011)	3 (1994, 2004, 2008)
7.MHP	5 (1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011)	2 (2000, 2009)
8.HADEP	1 (1995)	1 (1994)
9.FP	1 (1999)	1 (1998)
10.AKP	3 (2002, 2007, 2011)	2 (2002, 2006)
11.GP	1 (2007)	1 (2007)
12.DEHAP	1 (2002)	1 (2003)
Total	27	17

Even though there is a difference in terms of the number of documents analyzed for each party depending on their election successes, this does not affect the conclusions of the analysis across political parties because each document is subject to in-depth reading and qualitative analysis.

This section examines the conceptions of “the international” as found in the party programs and election manifestos of the political parties in Turkey. By drawing on those studies focusing on the party system in Turkey (Heper, 2008; Özbudun, 2006; Sayarı, 2002, 2007) the political parties under investigation are grouped into five: “nationalist-right” (MHP), “center-right” (ANAP, DYP/DP, GP), “Islamist-right” (RP, FP, AKP) , “center-left” (SHP, DSP, CHP) and “pro-Kurdish” (HADEP, DEHAP). After briefly introducing each party under examination in their respective sub-sections, their conceptions of “the international” as found in their party programs and election manifestos are discussed by looking at their views on the main dynamic, the main actors, and the location of world politics.

### **5.1.1 The Conception of “the international” in Nationalist-right Political parties- Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP*)**

In the literature, it is suggested that MHP is the largest and the most significant representative political party of the nationalist-right in Turkey (Arıkan, 2002; Çarkoğlu, 2007; Çınar & Arıkan, 2002: 25; Landau, 2008: 189; Sayarı, 2012: 188). MHP is the successor of the Republican Peasant Farmer’s Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-CKMP*) (1948-69) which was the first nationalist-right party in Turkey (Arıkan, 1998: 123). The party was named as MHP in 1969 and from then on up to the present it has been one of the significant political parties in Turkey.

For MHP, there are two *main dynamics of world politics*. The first dynamic is the “double standards and hypocrisy” of the powerful actors. MHP claims that the main aim of these actors is to protect the status quo in world politics which serves their interests. For maintaining this status quo, powerful actors apply different standards

toward different actors, particularly to the less powerful ones. For MHP, this dynamic results in “bandit law” in world politics (MHP, 1995: 2). The “bandit law” refers to the powerful actors’ hypocritical ways of acting in world politics at the expense of less powerful actors, which results in various problems for the latter. This view of the party is well reflected in the preface of the 1999 election manifesto written by the party leader, Devlet Bahçeli. In the manifesto, Bahçeli explained his take on the developments in world politics as follows:

Established by the “Cold War”, the status quo marking the 20<sup>th</sup> century is gone forever. The Cold War’s bipolar international system which was based on “terror balance” collapsed through the downfall of the “established orders” one by one in the communist bloc. After the end of the Cold War, chaos and uncertainty have prevailed in Eurasia, which was at times become a cause for a longing for the “Cold War” period. The “new world order”, which was presented as an alternative to the whole humanity with the termination of the process of the Cold War, made people highly hopeful. With the broadcasting of the Gulf War, the dream of peace and freedom that the whole world was getting ready to see turned into a “nightmare”: it appeared that the structure named as the “new world order” is nothing but a “global nonsense”. In a short time, it was revealed that the Western countries controlling the Security Council of the United Nations did not have any fundamental aims except to guarantee their interests regarding oil (MHP, 1999: 8).

For MHP, the “bandit law” leads to a situation in which powerful actors take advantages from the current features of world politics, while “oppressed nations” (*mazlum milletler*), which refers to the Turkic and Muslim nations around the world in the view of the party, are negatively affected from it (MHP, 2011: 9). It is these “oppressed nations” who are subject to the “double standards” in world politics:

The Western countries, which shielded the sovereignty rights of Slovenia and Croatia like a guardian angel after their declarations of independence with the split of the former Yugoslavia, saw no harm in being a long-time onlooker at the violence when it comes to Azerbaijan, Chechenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The great powers of the world also remained silent on the Russian-backed Armenian invasion of the twenty percent of the Azerbaijani lands. The genocide which has been implemented for years by the People’s Republic of China in the East Turkestan proceeded to a new and even more violent stage in recent years. The attitudes of the great and influential powers of the world towards this atrocity are as well dolorous and worrisome. On one side of the

new age we are about to enter, there are the claims of the “new world order” in which such double standards are abundant (MHP, 1999: 9).

This unequal treatment or indifference towards the problems of the Turkic or Muslim communities throughout the world shows the “hypocrisy” of the “Western” actors for MHP. This “hypocrisy” is particularly evident in these actors’ attitudes and policies towards Turkey:

The West, while officially advocating the globalization theses, covertly provokes every kind of ethnic separatism and even terror. The most compelling evidence of this is the support given to the PKK for years by the EU countries, those who target the “united and one Europe” goal as they progressed beyond the regional cooperation after the Maastricht Agreement. There is no other explanation for the so-called “hospitality” of Italy for the *divisive ringleader*<sup>8</sup> while at the same time it is working on a visa requirement even for the Turkish MPs. The dominating actors of the international politics, who remain silent on the genocidal terror which has been carried out against Turkish and Muslim communities from China to the Balkan Peninsula, support the treacherous attacks directed against our country’s unity and integrity. They did so through utilizing the notion of “human rights” which was all cleared out from its humane and legal aspects and becomes solely a “political tool” (MHP, 1999: 9-10).

This argument brings us to the second dynamic of world politics as identified by MHP. This dynamic is informed by the belief that Turkey is central for how the world works. For MHP, Turkey is a “central country” firstly because it is where the activities of the powerful actors for protecting their interests are concentrated on (MHP, 1995: 2, 2007: 113). This idea can be teased out from the claims of the party according to which there are “plots” played upon Turkey by “external powers” (MHP, 1995 Preface, 2007: 2) and Turkey is surrounded by a “circle of fire” and “belt of political plots” (MHP, 1999: 8). Consider, for instance, the self-proclaimed “mission” of the party: “break the treacherous siege around Turkey” and to deter “exploitation and derogation in the hands of global powers” (MHP, 2007: 4). Thus, the party called for those who are against Turkey’s potential future as a “bait for global powers” to vote for itself (MHP,

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<sup>8</sup> A frequently used derogatory nickname for PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

2011 Preface). Secondly, Turkey is central for world politics because of its ability to prevent “blood and tears” of Turkic and Islamic communities and help them to recover their “dignity” (MHP, 1995: 2, 2009: 131, 2011: 9). The party explains this central role with reference to the historical and cultural “realities” of Turkey (MHP, 2009: 131). However, MHP does not express clearly what these “realities” are. Instead the party just implies the existence of earlier polities, such as Ottoman Empire, in these parts of the world.

Regarding the *actors of world politics*, two understandings can be found in the party documents. Firstly, for MHP nation-states are the main actors of world politics. The party explains the importance of nation states not only with reference to the fact that it is their behaviors that shape world politics, but also with reference to the belief that the existence of states makes people “secure”. Related with this latter point, consider MHP’s view on globalization, which is framed as a process diminishing the power and capability of states. “The loss of power by the states”, claims MHP, “does not bring more freedom for individuals” (MHP, 2002: 2). On the contrary, by accessing the power and authority of states, actors such as “global economic empires” or “international civil society organizations”, “whose participatory properties are questionable” (MHP, 2002: 2) are causing more problems for people. Making the things worse, maintains MHP, the emerging power vacuum has also been filled with terrorist and criminal organizations. In the view of the party, the only way to cope with such problems is to strengthen the nation states by respecting their independence and territorial integrity on the one hand, and by truly applying the principle of “non-intervention” in world politics, on the other (MHP, 2000: 95, 2009: 126).

The second view of MHP on the actors of world politics suggests that there are certain actors who are more influential in shaping world politics than others. These

actors are named as “external powers” (*dış güçler*) (MHP, 1995: 1), “global actors” (*küresel aktörler*) (MHP, 2007: preface), or “dominant powers” (*egemen güçler*) (MHP, 2011: 1). Such terms are utilized interchangeably in the party documents, all referring to the same actors: actors whose interests and behaviors shape the realm of “the international”. Although the party attributes such a central role to them, it is not always explicit on the question of who exactly constitutes these actors. In other words, there is an ambiguity in the party’s identification of the most important actors of “the international”. For instance, at certain points the party refers to the “Western countries controlling the Security Council of the United Nations” (MHP, 1999: 8) as the dominant powers, while at other times other ambiguous references such as “global economic empires” or “international civil society organizations” (MHP, 2002: 2) constitute these actors in the view of the party.

MHP understands power as “identifiable resources that are controlled and intentionally deployed by actors” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 49). Power is utilized by states for advancing their “interests in direct opposition to the interests of another state” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 50). This understanding of power as a means to coercion does include references to both material and non-material resources (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 50, Bilgin & Eliş, 2008: 10). For the party, material resources include economic, technologic, demographic, as well as military elements (MHP, 1995: 24). For instance, MHP underscores the necessity to “modernize” Turkey’s armed forces so as to catch up with the most “developed armies in the world” (MHP, 2002: 122, 2007: 24). The party considers “strong and modern Turkish Armed Forces” as “indispensable condition for an efficient foreign policy” (MHP, 1999: 60).

Non-material elements are viewed as “the ability to shape or change what passes for normal” in world politics (Manners, 2002: 32). For MHP, those actors who



are powerful are the ones who prioritize certain notions over others in a way to serve their own purposes. “Human rights” is one such term that the party underlines for understanding how powerful actors take advantage of certain notions:

[In the process of globalization] the dominant powers, whose fundamental strategies are determined by the global capital, through trying to ignore or annihilate the national and humane rules, have aimed to enlarge their networks of privilege. While doing so, they become banner-bearers of “human rights” in a targeted country by utilizing non-governmental civil society organizations, ethnic and religious elements as their most significant tools or collaborators (MHP, 2011: 1-2).

Although non-material power as utilized by the “dominant powers” is problematized by the party as such, it still highlights the importance of utilization of similar non-material forms of power to render Turkey as a “leader country” in world politics. For instance, the ideational factors derived from “nationalism”, which is believed to constitute the “mental foundation and driving force” for achieving non-material power (MHP, 2000: 5), is offered by the party as an alternative to the current formulations of the ethical claims of the “external powers” on world politics. By utilizing such non-material power, “a new, Turkey-centered civilization project” which will be a “hope for the humanity” (MHP, 2011: 3) will be created, claims the party. However, MHP is not explicit on the alternative ethics that it offers within this new “civilization project”, except pointing to the “Turkishness” and “Islam” in an ambiguous manner (MHP, 2007: 95).

As for the *location of world politics*, MHP focuses on the realm of inter-state relations. That said, MHP has an inward-oriented view in that it emphasizes how inter-state relations affect domestic politics, and not vice versa. What is meant by an inward-oriented understanding of inter-state relations is the contradictory idea which, although views the internal and external realms of states as separate, nevertheless believes that the external realm shapes the domestic politics of a given country. This relationship is

understood in negative terms, i.e. the aim is to destabilize, weaken and/or dismantle the targeted country by controlling its domestic policies. In this view, the question of whether domestic politics within a given country has any impact on the external realm remains unanswered.

This view is evident in MHP's argument that the so-called powerful actors' presumed "hostility" to Turkey mostly manifests itself in Turkey's internal affairs. Consider, for example, the preface of the 2007 election manifesto of the party. In this document, it is claimed that "Turkey has been experiencing the darkest and the most dangerous period of the contemporary history". This "darkness" or "danger" manifests itself in the internal and external security threats that Turkey faces. These threats are named as "traitorous siege" which make Turkey a "toy in the hands of global powers". This situation is understood as a result of domestic politicians who "search for legitimacy in the doors of interest lobbies and foreign centers' dark corridors".

This inward-oriented view is voiced with regards to the Kurdish problem and Turkey's EU membership process. Regarding the former, in the party documents where Kurdish problem is discussed, MHP underlines "the external dimension of terrorism" (MHP, 2007: 29-30) and calls for a "prevention of international support for terrorism" (MHP, 2009: 122-123). Regarding the latter, while MHP states its support for Turkey's membership to the EU, it immediately underscores the overlaps between the demanded EU reforms and aims of "divisive elements" in the country:

As a necessity of our understanding of the national responsibility, we did not support the last harmonization package that is imposed by the administration of the EU that includes regulations corresponding to the expectations of the divisive elements, such as abolition of death penalty, education and broadcasting in native language which threaten our national unity and integrity (MHP, 2002: 13).

To summarize, the analysis on the conception of “the international” in the documents of MHP shows that for the party the main dynamic of world politics is the “double standards and hypocrisy” of the powerful actors which foremost threaten Turkic and Islamic communities. Turkey is considered as the “central” country where this dynamic manifests itself. As for the actors of world politics, the party believes in the centrality of nation states. However, some actors, who mostly remain unspecified, are viewed as more significant than others. These actors’ powers stem from their possession of both material as well as non-material elements. Lastly, for MHP, world politics takes place in the realm of inter-state relations. Yet, the party has an inward-oriented outlook in that it focuses on the effects of inter-state relations on domestic politics, not vice versa.

### **5.1.2 The Conception of “the international” in Center-right Political Parties (ANAP, DYP/DP, GP)**

#### **5.1.2.1 Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*- ANAP)**

Founded in 1983 by Turgut Özal, ANAP is categorized as a “center-right” (Heper, 2008: 172), “right-of-center” or “moderate right” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 51) political party in the literature. From 1983 up until 1991, the party controlled the government single-handedly. The leader of the party, Turgut Özal was elected as the president in 1989. Yıldırım Akbulut and then Mesut Yılmaz became the chairperson of the party. Throughout the 1990s, the party had formed several multi-coalition governments. In 2009, ANAP, as a result of mergence with DP, was closed down.

The *main dynamic of world politics* is understood as the neoliberal economy by ANAP. For the party, neoliberal economy provides “limitless opportunities”

(ANAP, 1999: 28) for those actors who can comply with its rules. The centrality of neoliberal economy for the party can be observed in its 1999 election manifesto where it is argued that there are two main dynamics shaping the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: globalization and “new industrialization wave” (ANAP, 1999: 5). ANAP understands “globalization as liberalization” which means that when making sense of globalization, the emphasis of the party is on the “neoliberalist macroeconomic policies” that are believed to result in “worldwide liberalization, privatization, deregulation and fiscal restraint” and bring “prosperity, freedom, peace and democracy for all” (Scholte, 2005: 56).

For ANAP, the “new industrial revolution” refers to the wave which started in the 1980s and brought developed countries to their “peak points” regarding the pace of their development. It is suggested that within the upcoming years, those countries that catch this wave will be differentiated from those who do not, and there will occur new groupings between states in accordance with their performances on adjusting to neoliberal economy (ANAP, 1999: 5). ANAP names these groupings as “winners and losers” of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (ANAP, 1999: 5). While the former group includes states that are “rich”, “independent”, “peaceful”, and “powerful”; the latter group, “third world states” as they are named by the party, consists of those states which are “conflictual”, “poor”, and “undemocratic” (ANAP, 2002: 1). European states are among the first group, while it is possible to see the examples of the latter in the Middle East in the view of the party.

This understanding of ANAP can also be found in the parts of documents where the party discussed its own performance as a government. For instance, in its 1991 election manifesto, while listing its achievements, the party points to the transformation “that occurred in Turkey’s mindset regarding how it approaches to its

own problems and how it views the world” as its most significant success (ANAP, 1991: 18). This transformation is understood with reference to adapting to the neo-liberal economic system. This adaptation, asserts the party, rendered Turkey as a “developed country” and thus made it to prevail in the “competition among states” (ANAP, 1991: 30). According to ANAP, “Turkey, which was named as the sick man of the world in the beginning of this century, has gained the chance to be one of the most important countries in the world” (ANAP, 1991: 5).

Regarding the *actors of world politics*, the party considers states as the main actors. However, since the party differentiates states on the basis of their development levels, it views those developed, mostly “Western”, states as the main actors of world politics. In the party documents notions such as “advanced countries” (ANAP, 1991: 21) or the “advanced Western countries” (ANAP, 1991: 12) are frequently utilized to refer to the most significant actors of “the international”. These countries are also considered to be the representatives of “contemporary civilizations” whose level Turkey should attain if it is to be an influential and powerful country in the world (ANAP, 1996: 8).

The notion of “power”, on the other hand, is mostly understood with reference to economic capabilities. However, when the party explains the potential of Turkey to become a powerful actor in world politics, certain non-material forms of power are also underscored. For instance, alongside with being competitive economically (ANAP, 1991: 7), advanced industrially (ANAP, 1991: 39), developed technologically (ANAP, 1991: 44), the party also highlighted the necessity for Turkey to be “an example to the Balkans, the Central Asia and the Middle East with its democracy”, to utilize its “historical experience and contemporary dynamism” in the way to establish “stability” in its region, to enrich the culture of humanity “with its national cultural

heritage” (ANAP, 1991: 8). The party specifically pointed to the protection of “national and moral values”, albeit not specifying what constitutes these, and how these values strengthen Turkey (ANAP, 1996: 5). It is for this reason that the party, while supporting full adjustment with economic globalization, warned against cultural side of it: “globalization, which entered on our agenda in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, has revealed a risk in which the cultural values of the developed states as ‘dominant culture’ push aside the local cultural values” (ANAP, 2002: 25).

As for the *location of world politics*, ANAP points to the inter-state relations, despite its emphasis on globalization. That is because the party understands “globalization as internationalization”. In this particular understanding of globalization “‘global’ is simply another adjective to describe cross-border relations between countries, and ‘globalization’ designates a growth of international exchange and interdependence” (Scholte, 2005: 16). Thus, for the party even though the world is witnessing an intensification of neoliberal economic relations within the context of globalization, this relations are confined to inter-state level, without necessarily shifting where world politics unfolds. ANAP has a positive understanding of the increased level of state interactions and a favorable approach towards “interdependent” relations between countries (Keohane & Nye, 2001).

#### **5.1.2.2 The True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP*)/The Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti-DP*)**

DYP was a successor of Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti-DP*) (1946-60) and Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*) (1961-80), the former significant representatives of the center-right in Turkey (Heper, 2008; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996). Following the closure

of the AP after the 1980 military coup, which also banned the leader of the party Süleyman Demirel from politics, DYP was established in 1983. After his political ban was removed in 1987, Süleyman Demirel, became the chairperson of the party. After Demirel's election as the president in 1993, Tansu Çiller became the new chairperson of the party. Throughout the 1990s, the party had formed several multi-coalition governments. In 2007, DYP renamed as the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti-DP*) and Mehmet Ağar became the leader.

Within the process of DYP's evolution, two contradictory views regarding the *main dynamic of world politics* emerged. The first view, especially evident in the early 1990s, is very similar to ANAP's conception of the main dynamic of world politics. In this understanding, economic globalization and the opportunities it provides are considered as the main dynamic of "the international". The later periods, particularly starting from the mid-1990s, indicate an existence of two contradictory views. Accordingly, in the party documents the idea that the main dynamic of world politics is shaped by the "hypocritical" policies of powerful actors (similar to MHP's conception) coexist with the view pointing to the primacy of economic liberalism (similar to ANAP's conception).

The examples for the former view can be seen in the 1991 election manifesto of DYP. In the manifesto, it is argued that a "new world" emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union which led to "prosperity within democracy" (DYP, 1991:1). The party understands democracy as choosing the principles of negotiation and cooperation over force and threat, and protecting human freedoms and rights in accordance with the "universal" rules (DYP, 1991: 1). "Global prosperity", on the other hand, necessitates the selection of free market economy as an economic model (DYP, 1991: 2).

Similar to ANAP, for DYP the process of globalization, which is understood with reference to neoliberal economy, is central for how the world works. In line with this view, in DYP's documents arguments underscoring the existence of developed and underdeveloped countries in the world, and how a state has to act in order to be amongst the developed countries find extensive place. Accordingly, the party prescribes complying with the principles of "globalization, integration, liberalization, and decreasing the role of state in the economy" (DYP, 1991: 108) as a necessary way forward for states to be the part of the developed world. Relatedly, "integrating with the world", i.e. with the developed, and mostly the "Western" world, becomes an incessantly repeated view in the documents (DYP, 1991: 2, 1991: 28). For instance, in the case of Turkey, which was categorized as a developing country by the party (DYP, 1991: 156), it is suggested that the country should integrate with Europe since:

the cooperation with the European Economic Community is considered as a driving force behind our object of development, a tool for rationalization of industrial and agricultural production, a decision of Turkey for increasingly participate in the world trade (DYP, 1990: 110).

This idea and similar others suggesting that the standards for development, for that matter being "civilized", have to be derived from "free and democratic Western states" (DYP, 1990: 94) make the "West" as an ideal to catch, mostly in economic terms for the party (DYP, 1991: 316). DYP argues that the reason why Turkey could not have yet reached this ideal is related with the "ineffective" politicians whose policies rendered Turkey's economic performance similar with "non-Western" countries such as "Indonesia, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Bolivia" (DYP, 1991: 58). In fact, the party makes sense of problems that Turkey, or any other country, experiences with reference to the mistakes of individuals. Consider, for instance, the party's understanding of the issue of "poverty" in the world. Identified as one of the most significant problems in the world, poverty is considered to be caused by "rapid



increase in the world's population" which "stimulates misery and obstruct the prevention of hunger" by the party (DYP, 1991: 3).

Concerning the *actors of world politics*, DYP is of the view that states are the main actors. However, since states are categorized based on their economic levels, it is those developed (mostly "Western") states and the institutions that they established that are considered as the main actors of "the international". The party points to the European countries and the USA together with the institutions, such as the European Community/Union and NATO, as belonging to this group of actors (DYP, 1991: 252-253, 1991: 263-264).

Being powerful is equated with being economically developed by the party. For instance, although the importance of military capabilities is highlighted, military power is not considered as the most important form of power in world politics. Instead, the central resources of power for states come from their level of economy, industrialization, and development (DYP, 1991: 321). Besides economic power, the party also underlines the significance of complying with certain norms and values which further countries' positions in world politics. For instance, the position of Turkey in the world depends on "the existence of completely democratic constitution" and "a governing regime that is working in accordance with this constitution" for DYP (DYP, 1991: 264).

Considering the *location of world politics*, similar to ANAP, DYP's views are shaped in accordance with its take on globalization. By understanding "globalization as internationalization", the party highlights the importance of "interdependence" between states which gives way to "dependent economy, dependent environment, dependent security, and dependent coexistence" (DYP, 1991: 259). For this reason,

suggests the party, “from now on, states have to solve a number of domestic issues and problems with international institutions and foreign countries” (DYP, 1991: 259).

This conception of “the international” is replaced by a different one in the later periods of the party. In this conception, the *main dynamic of world politics* is identified as the “hypocritical” actions of “powerful states”. Consider, for instance, the 2007 election manifesto of DP and how it makes sense of Turkey’s international relations. Regarding Turkey’s EU membership, for example, the party is of the view that the EU process is “full of mines” (DP, 2007: 98). That is because of the “impositions” of the EU upon Turkey which are believed to damage Turkey’s “independence, national sovereignty, unity and integrity, the border security” (DP, 2007: 97). DP also points to other types of “pressures” coming from the “external centers” (*diş odaklar*) with reference to Turkey’s economic and financial policies (DP, 2007: 21), its foreign affairs (DP 2007: 94), and even its culture and art sector (DP, 2007: 80).

Regarding the views of the party on the *actors of world politics*, two observations can be made. Firstly, as mentioned above, in the party documents there are some ambiguous references to “external centers” which are believed to shape the world in accordance with their interests. Secondly, states, particularly “developed Western states”, are also considered to be the main actors of world politics:

The majority of states which give direction to the 21<sup>st</sup> century have followed a stable process of development starting from the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Those states which have been the global powers in the last two centuries are the states that experienced mercantile revolution in the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries and industrial revolution in the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries (DYP, 2007: 42).

Regarding the *location of world politics* the party has an inward oriented view of inter-state relations. Accordingly, the “external” realm is believed to shape the “internal” realm, and not vice versa. Relatedly, the party explains Turkey’s problems with

reference to this “external” realm. For instance, DP draws attention to the “external dimension of terrorism” (DP, 2007: 103). For the party:

Just like yesterday, today, within the international area the struggles over power, interest, and influence occur in a merciless way. It should not be forgotten that the plots played yesterday upon Arabs and Armenians, which were known as the ‘loyal nation’ (*millet-i sadıka*) during the times of the Ottoman State, are also tried to be played today (DP, 2007: 104).

To summarize, two, and somewhat contradictory, conceptions of “the international” coexist in the documents of DYP/DP. On the one hand, the world is considered as a “hostile” place where Turkey is targeted by some unspecified actors, who are viewed as the main actors of world politics. On the other hand, neoliberal economy is understood as the main dynamic of world politics and economically developed countries as the most significant actors. Although the location of world politics is identified as inter-state relations in both understandings, the latter views the intensification of economic interactions between states as a positive phenomenon, whereas the former has a negative and inward-oriented outlook.

### **5.1.2.3 The Young Party (*Genç Parti-GP*)**

GP was founded in 2002 by a businessman, Cem Uzan. In the literature the party is categorized as a “center right” party (Sayarı, 2007: 198). However, Bahadır Türk in his book on GP argues that the party lacked a “substantial” ideology and program (Türk, 2008). In fact, when compared with the other political parties’ programs and election manifestos, GP’s some 25 page-long program, and its 4 page-long election manifesto point to this shortcoming. The party participated in the 2002 and the 2007 general elections, yet it could not pass the election threshold.

GP's documents indicate two contradictory conceptions on the *main dynamic of world politics*. On the one hand, similar to the other center-right parties, GP incessantly underscores the centrality of neoliberal economy in world politics. For that reason, the focus of the party documents is on integrating Turkey with the world through implementing neo-liberal economic policies in the country. For instance, the very first point in the party's 2007 election manifesto (consisting of twelve brief points responding to the question of what Turkey should be like) it is suggested that "Turkey should reject isolationism in the sense that it should be open to the industrial, commercial, social, and cultural exchanges with the world". In relation to that, the party also opposes any restrictions or regulations upon the flow of global capital: "Foreign investment, by being exempt from any authorization, should become operative in any field" (GP, 2007: 9). These ideas are supported with an idea that neo-liberal economic policies provide diverse opportunities for the actors.

This view of "the international" as a realm providing diverse opportunities for those who comply with neo-liberal economic policies becomes contradictory when one notes the ideas of the party upon the *actors of world politics*. For instance, on the one hand, the party highlights the necessity of a limited role of states, particularly in the field of economy:

the state should immediately withdraw from every area of economic activity; it should be structured not as an executor, but only as a coordinator and as an advisor. The state should not operate in any economic field (GP, 2007: 7).

Yet at the same time, the party also asserts that there is a need for a "strong state" (GP, 2007: 5). This view specifically emerges in those parts of party documents where GP explained its take on the IMF and the World Bank. Albeit claiming that it is a supporter of neo-liberalism, and despite the fact that these two institutions are among the most

significant actors whose policies are informed by neo-liberal principles, the party approaches them negatively and thought that they “harm” Turkey (GP, 2007: 3).

Regarding the *location of world politics*, following the example of the IMF and the World Bank, it can be suggested that the party shares the inward-oriented view of inter-state relations according to which “external” actors are the main reasons for the “domestic” developments, mostly for the negative ones.

To summarize, the center-right parties’ conceptions of “the international” indicate the existence of two contradictory views. On the one hand, neo-liberal economy is considered as the main dynamic of world politics. This understanding leads the parties to underscore the existence of developed and developing/underdeveloped states in world politics and the necessity for the latter for “catching up” with the former. In line with this, while states are considered as the main actors of world politics, the economically developed states are identified as the most significant actors. Regarding the location of world politics, the parties are of the view that the inter-state relations, understood through the notion of “interdependence”, is where world politics takes place. On the other hand, there is another conception which is similar to the one found in MHP. According to this conception, “the international” is considered as a realm which is shaped by the “hypocritical” policies of some powerful actors. These actors are believed to play “plots” and cause numerous problems both in world politics, as well as in Turkey.

### **5.1.3 The Conception of “the international” in Islamist-right Political Parties (RP, FP, AKP)**

#### **5.1.3.1 The Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi-RP*)**

RP was a successor of two previously established Islamist parties namely the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi –MNP*) (1970-1971) and the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP*) (1972-1980). As a result of the closure of MSP by the 1980 military coup, RP was established in 1983. Necmettin Erbakan was the chairperson in each party. Until its closure on the grounds of violating secularism in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, RP remained as the most significant party of the Islamist-right in Turkey (Landau, 2008).

For RP the *main dynamic of world politics* is “Zionist conspiracies”. The primacy attributed to Zionism stems from the belief that it is the main force in world politics which has the ability to control powerful countries, such as the United States, and widespread ideologies, such as capitalism and communism. RP claimed that the sole aim of Zionism is to establish “the Greater Israel” through weakening all the forces that might resist against this, in particular Muslims. This aim, so the argument goes, turns “world order” into a “slavery order” (RP, 1991: 75).

This view is expressed in those parts of documents where RP explains its take on the developments in world politics. For instance, regarding the process of the demise of the Soviet Union RP claims that:

In world politics, Communism, the Soviet Union, had been the paramount obstacle for Zionism in establishing the Greater Israel by taking the USA and other imperialist countries under its control. On the one hand, Zionism could not make two-million Jews in the Soviet Union to migrate to Israel at an intended speed; on the other it was anxious about the population growth and increase of consciousness among the Muslim population in the Soviet Union.

For this reason, it paved the way for and encouraged the Soviet Union's rape of Afghanistan. It should not be forgotten that Communism, exactly the same as Capitalism, is just another face of Zionism and thus Zionism has always had the power to influence internal structure of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries (RP, 1991: 9-10).

The primacy of Zionism in world politics is also explained with reference to the end of the Cold War by the party. Accordingly, RP claims that the "New World Order" is nothing but a "Zionist" plan which aims:

to represent the USA as the sole authority in the world. It made the economic aid to the USSR contingent on two conditions: a. migration of two million Jews to Israel without any obstacles, b. Soviet Union's adaptation to the interest-based capitalist order, smooth exploitation of 300 million Soviet people and Russia's wealth by Zionism and Imperialism through the usurious credits from the Zionists banks. To demolish and crush the Muslim Iraq completely which did not submit to the US's commands and was seen as a threat to Israel. To amend the aim of NATO by turning it into a gendarme for the continuation of the unjust rape in Muslim countries and the creation of the Greater Israel. To intensely continue the diplomatic activities for keeping the Western European states, the European Community, the Western European Union communities, Eastern European states and the Soviet Union under the control of the USA. To keep the Muslim countries messy, divided, and hostile towards one another and to keep them under the influence of Zionism, Imperialism and the USA. To use Turkey as a tool to realize the Zionist plans through ANAP [the Motherland Party] and other figurant political parties. All those events that we have been witnessing has one aim which is to establish "the Greater Israel" (RP, 1991: 11-12).

RP also understands all these developments as an indication of a "civilizational race" (RP, 1986: 31). In fact, for the party, the whole history can be understood as a history of clashes taking place between two types of civilizations that are presumed to exist: a civilization which "prioritizes the brute force" (*Kuvveti Üstün Tutan*) on the one hand, and a civilization which "prioritizes the truth" (*Hakki Üstün Tutan*), on the other. The former is claimed to be established by "the West", and in particular by the "Zionist mindset" (RP, 1991: 10) principles of which can be found both in capitalism and communism. Those principles consist of "force, majority, privilege, and interest" (RP, 1991: 4) which have brought nothing but oppression to people, particularly to Muslims (RP, 1991: 64). The opposite civilization, namely the one "prioritizing the truth" is

believed to belong to Muslims. On the contrary to the former, this civilization is claimed to be based on the “basic human rights, labor, consensus, and justice” (RP, 1991: 6). Turkey is believed to be the leader of this civilization (RP, 1991: 78-79).

As for the *actors of world politics*, although states are considered as the actors by the party, it is the “external powers” (*dış güçler*) that have the dominance in shaping the main dynamics of world politics. In line with the idea pointing to the primacy of “Zionism”, “external powers”, refers to Israel, the United States, and Western European states in the party documents. These states also control international institutions, such as World Bank or IMF in the view of the party (RP, 1991: 46). Together, these actors shape world politics, suggested RP, particularly through “conspiring” against Muslims and “plotting” against Turkey, as the “leader” of Muslims.

In the view of the party, the power of these actors stems from two resources: one material and the other is non-material. Concerning the former, the emphasis of the party on how “Zionists” realize their aims in world politics through using their economic capabilities is informative (RP, 1991:11-12). Regarding the latter, RP is also of the view that “Zionists” empower their position in the world by representing their culture as superior than others. Consider, for instance, the claims of RP on “Zionist” activities in Turkey. Accordingly, “Zionists”: “injected us the mentality of imitation. By mobilizing every opportunity of ‘cultural imperialism’, they created the disease of thinking of the West, which ‘prioritize the force’, as superior in the minds of some of the children of this country” (RP, 1991: 14).

Regarding to the *location of world politics*, the party’s understanding points to inter-state relations, albeit in an inward-oriented manner. According to this view, what



happens domestically is a direct result of the activities of the powerful actors of world politics. This understanding is especially voiced in explaining Turkey's problems. That is because RP believes that Turkey is the "main target" of Zionism (RP, 1991: 14) by virtue of being the "leader" of the Muslim world.

RP claims that the "external powers" interfered directly into Turkey's domestic affairs, which resulted in multiple events from the multi-party politics to coup d'etats, from the creation of "guided-democracy" to the establishment of "imitator" political parties (RP, 1991: 115). These "external powers" also "manipulated" Turkey's foreign affairs. For instance, the party argues that the USA manipulated Turkey so that it could convince other Muslim countries to accept the Israeli demands in world politics (RP, 1991: 20-22). "External powers" controlled Turkey as such due to the existence and help of the "domestic collaborators" inside the country. For RP, "domestic collaborators" are the "internal enemies" who together with "external powers" "want to distract the nation of Turkey from its true self" (RP, 1991: 12-13) so as to prevent the creation of a "better world" under the leadership of Turkey.

Consider, for instance, RP's opinion regarding the European Community/Union. According to RP, the European Community/Union is an institution that damages states' sovereignties and independence (RP, 1991: 59). For Turkey, the membership to this institution will result in the "partition" of the country by "melting within the Christian pot" (RP, 1991: 173). That is because for the party more than anything else, the European Community/Union is a "Christian Club" (RP, 1995: 29) which still holds on to the "crusader mindset" (RP, 1991: 63). Viewed as such, the whole process of EU-Turkey relations is understood as a reflection of Europe's demand for dividing the territory of Turkey and handing its parts over to the "enemies"

of Turkey. With this aim, so the argument goes, the EU incessantly interferes in Turkey's domestic politics.

### **5.1.3.2 The Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi- FP*)**

FP was established in the late 1997 with the cadres of the closed RP. Thus, the party is considered as a successor of RP, and therefore classified as an Islamist party (Yeşilada, 2002a, 2002b; Hale & Özbudun, 2010) despite Recai Kutan's, the leader of FP, argument that the "Virtue was not just the Welfare Party under a new name, but a new party with an essentially democratic agenda" (cited in Mecham, 2004: 345). Similar to RP, FP was also closed down by the Constitutional Court on account of being focal point of anti-secular activities in 2001.

There are two *main dynamics of world politics* according to FP. The first one is explained with reference to economy, and the other with civilization. Regarding the former, the party's opinions show similarities with the center-right parties' views on the neo-liberal economy and the necessity to comply with its dynamics. Accordingly, FP argues that there is an "international race" (FP, 1998: 6-7) in world politics in which countries try to increase their levels of development. The success of a country in this race depends on its ability to integrate with the world in economic terms. Free market economy, which is the basis of the party's economic policy (FP, 1998: 15), is identified as a way to benefit from the opportunities that neo-liberal economic system offers. Therefore, the party supports "full integration" with the world through implementing neoliberal economic policies such as privatization and support for foreign investment (FP, 1998: 17-19).

In the view of the party, “civilizations” are also central for how the world works. FP understands civilization as “an entity with a determinate essence, including firm geographical borders and a distinct cultural content” (Jackson, 1999: 152). The party is of the view that in world politics there are “civilizational ‘spheres of influence’ each dominated by a ‘core state’” (Jackson, 1999: 143-144) and it is the civilization a state belongs to that determines the way in which it behaves (Huntington, 1993, 1996; O’Hagan, 1995: 21; Jackson, 1999: 143). Different than the view of RP (which claims that the “clash” between different civilizations is inevitable), for FP the relations between civilizations do not necessarily have to be conflictual and civilizations can coexist peacefully. However, similar to RP’s understanding, FP defines civilizations in line with religions, which are approached as “unified entities” (Bilgin, 2012c: 1106) holding unchanging essence.

The centrality of civilizational relations in world politics is made sense of by the party with reference to Turkey. Accordingly, FP argues that the world has witnessed a number of problems after the end of the Cold War and within the context of the “new world order”. The global problems caused by these developments increase the importance of Turkey since these problems are particularly happening in a region where Turkey is located at the “center” (FP, 1999: 48). Yet, Turkey’s role is not only confined to this for the party. Beyond that, for FP, Turkey is a “central country” in its “civilizational basin” (FP, 1999: 43). This “civilizational basin” of Turkey is comprised of the Balkans, the Central Asia (in particular “Turkish World” in there), and the Middle East (FP, 1999: 43) in the view of the party.

Regarding the *actors of world politics*, two views can be identified in the party documents. Firstly, in line with the above-mentioned views on civilizations, states are considered as the main actors of world politics. In this understanding, Turkey is

identified as one of the most significant actors of world politics. Secondly, informed by the views on the centrality of neoliberal economy for world politics, the party underscores the importance of “global power centers” (FP, 1999: 44). “Global power centers” refer to the EU, the NATO, and the USA (FP, 1999: 45-46).

For FP, what renders a state or an institution powerful is related with its ability to shape the behaviors of other actors. For instance, for the party:

Turkey had been among the leading countries of the world for over six hundred years when the other countries had arranged their policies in accordance with the policies of the Turkish State. Having such a history, our country has to regain its position among the developed countries of the world (FP, 1998: 1).

This ability depends on the possession of two types of resources: one being material and the other non-material. As for the material power, the party points to the importance of science and technology alongside with economic development: “it is a reality that in international race science and technology are exceptionally important” (FP, 1998: 6-7). Regarding the non-material sources of power, the party points to the importance of two sets of “values”. The first type includes notions such as human rights and democracy (FP, 1999: 1) which constitute “global” values that should be adhered if a state wants to be a powerful player in world politics. The second type of values, on the other hand, stems from country’s “own” characteristics and experiences.

For instance, regarding Turkey, the party suggests that:

Turkey has the potential to be amongst the exceptional countries in the world, as it was in the past, thanks to its historical and cultural accumulation, the strong foundations that the society is based on, the moral values universality of which have been proven for thousands of years, the dynamic and young population, and Turkish people who have entrepreneurial spirit (FP, 1998: 1).

Concerning the *location of world politics* the party’s understanding points to inter-state relations. This understanding can be observed firstly from the ways in which the party views civilizational relations which are viewed as inter-state relations. Secondly, the

increasing level of economic interactions and “interdependent” relations between states constitute one of the central arguments in the party documents (FP, 1999: 43).

### **5.1.3.3 The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*)**

The closure of FP gave way to the emergence of two Islamist parties in Turkey: AKP and the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi-SP*). In the literature, the former group is named as the “modernist” wing of the Islamist movement (*yenilikçiler*), and the latter is named as “traditionalists” (*gelenekçiler*) (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 5). AKP was founded in 2001, and from 2002 general elections on, it has ruled Turkey as a “single-party majority government” (Sayarı, 2016).

The analysis on the party documents indicates that in this rather long period of time of being in power, there emerged divergent conceptions of “the international” in AKP. To start with the views of the party on the *main dynamic of world politics*, until 2007, the party’s understanding indicates similarities with the center-right parties, in the sense that the main dynamic of world politics is mostly understood with reference to neoliberal economy. However, the analysis on the documents between the years 2007 to 2011 shows that the primacy attributed to the neoliberalism is replaced with the primacy of “civilizational relations”. At this point, it is necessary to underscore that the notion of “civilization” does also exist in the earlier documents of the party. However, it is in the later periods of AKP that it becomes more central notion for understanding how the world works for the party.

The former understanding on the main dynamic of world politics is based on the understanding of “globalization as liberalization”. For AKP, globalization, in particular economic globalization, is a process causing both uncertainties as well as

opportunities for the states, particularly for the developing countries (AKP, 2002a: 13, 2002: 43). This process is shaped by the developed countries and what is necessary for the rest of the world is to cope with it through “integrating” with the neoliberal economy. This integration is significant for being successful in “the international race” that takes place between different countries (AKP, 2002b: 115). In other words, for AKP, in order not to fall behind the “race”, developing states should adopt the standards put by the developed ones. These standards include, in the view of the party, minimizing the role of state in the field of economy, applying privatization policies, allowing the free flow of foreign capital, and establishing good relations with the institutions such as the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF (AKP, 2002b: 33-34).

For AKP, while in the Cold War period there was a “conflict-based understanding of the two-polar world”, the end of the Cold War brought “the regional economic and political integration movements which project the free movement of goods, services, knowledge, labor and capital” (AKP, 2002a: 7). In this process, “supranational judicial institutions” become more significant for world politics over national judiciary and the “field of activity of states has constantly been narrowed” due to “the increase of efficiency of private sector and civil society organizations” (AKP, 2002a: 7). These developments, argues AKP, brought different criteria for actors of world politics for being an “honorable member of the international society” (AKP, 2002a: 7). These include the necessity to adopt to the values of the “civilized world” which consist of protection of human rights and freedoms (AKP, 2002b: 13). In this understanding, the “civilized world” refers to European actors and institutions (AKP, 2002b: 18). This understanding can particularly be observed in the focus of the party on the importance of the “Copenhagen criteria” of the EU (AKP, 2002a, 2002b, 2006).

In the post-2007 documents of AKP, civilizational relations are represented as central mechanisms through which world politics unfolds. In these documents, different than the earlier ones, civilization is understood as a reflection of being a part of a particular culture and religion. Civilization is also thought to be an unchanging characteristic of a state which informs its “national identity”. Similar with the understanding of civilization as found in FP, AKP views civilizations “as religiously autochthonous entities” (Bilgin, 2012c: 1107). Again similar with FP, and different from RP, AKP is of the view that it is possible to develop peaceful relations between different civilizations.

This view of civilization manifested itself in different sections of party documents. For instance, in 2007 election manifesto’s section titled “Culture and Art”, AKP suggests that “carrying Turkish culture and art to the universal platforms by preserving their national identity is among our primary goals” (AKP, 2007: 195). Despite rare instances in which party implies that culture is not an unchanging phenomena, such changes are nevertheless believed to occur through preserving the “core identity” (AKP, 2007: 196). In other words, there is thought to be an essential “historical and cultural heritage” that “makes us who we are, that differentiates us from others” for the party (AKP, 2011: 86). In the party documents, expressions such as “the climate of spirit and sense of the civilization that we belong to” (AKP, 2011: 90) are utilized for explaining its policy visions in different areas.

The importance of civilization, which is made sense of with reference to history, geography, and culture, especially becomes a central theme in the foreign policy (Bilgin, 2007, 2009; Altunışık, 2009) sections of the party documents in the post-2007 period. For instance, in the 2011 election manifesto, the party claims that the “civilizational basin” of Turkey is the main pillar for its foreign policy (AKP, 2011:

150). This is “natural”, offered the party, since it “looks into the foreign policy and world events through the perspective of civilizations” (AKP, 2011: 150). In this sense, the initiative of “Alliance of Civilizations”, which was developed with Spain under the roof of the United Nations, is given as an example: “with this civilizational perspective, the AK Party proved that differences in the world are not a reason for conflict; a world which is based on virtue, justice, and respect is possible” (AKP, 2011: 150).

As a reflection of this perspective, AKP also specifies its “civilization basin” and how it understands the regions constituting this basin: “as a part of our foreign policy vision we do not conceive the Middle East as a center of conflicts, wars, backwardness, poverty, bad administrations; but rather as a center of peace, stability, welfare, culture and civilization” (AKP, 2011: 153). It is argued that the taboos that were existent in Turkey upon Middle East were left, and a new period of friendship was established and this approach “will be maintained and the artificial borders and pseudo walls between the geography and peoples of Turkey and the Middle East will be abolished” (AKP, 2011: 153). The same emphasis is also put upon “siblings” living in the Balkans (AKP, 2011: 154), the Caucasus, the Central Asia and the Turkic Republics (AKP, 2011: 155). This region, or Turkey’s “civilizational basin” is also named as the “wider Turkish geography” which “extends from the Balkans to the Central Asia” (AKP, 2011: 156-158).

It is this particular understanding of civilization that informs AKP’s conception of “the international” in its later periods. The ways in which the EU is engaged with in the party documents exemplify the change in the party’s conception of “the international”. Accordingly, in its initial years, the party identified the rules and the values of the EU as central in world politics. These rules and values were represented



as the “ideals” to catch either by developing economically or by consolidating democracy in Turkey (AKP, 2002a: 44). However, starting from the 2007 election manifesto, the relations between the EU and Turkey are represented as a “partnership” which can facilitate “a moderation against global tensions threatening peace, a cooperation in risky issue areas such as international terror, cultural conflicts, energy security” (AKP, 2007: 245). In other words, the “idealization” of the EU is replaced with an understanding of “equal” partnership. This is related with the belief of the party that Turkey became the “leader” of a civilization which the country “inherited from its history and geography”. For AKP, this civilization is a “decisive color in today’s world” (AKP, 2011: 87).<sup>9</sup> In this understanding, the EU is considered as one of the representatives of the “Western civilization”, whereas Turkey is claimed to be the “leader” for its own civilization, representing Turkic and Muslim communities. For that, the earlier emphasis on the necessity to comply with the EU standards were replaced with the “strategic significance” of the EU for Turkey (AKP, 2011: 151).

Regarding the *actors of world politics*, in the initial years of the party there was an emphasis upon different state and non-state actors. In the account of the party, this stems from the relative decline of the importance of states and instead the diffusion of state authority towards local and supranational actors (AKP, 2002a: 33). The party suggested that while the states’ ability to control different issue areas is decreasing, the importance of private sector and civil society organizations are increasing. In particular, supra-state courts and organizations become much more significant: “the

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<sup>9</sup> This idea of equality is also reinforced by the visual materials. For instance, the 2011 election manifesto’s foreign policy section is named as the “Leader Country” near which there is a picture of then Prime-Minister Erdoğan shaking hands with the US President Obama. Additionally, a Palestinian women carrying a photo of Erdoğan, together with a picture of Erdoğan talking at the UN meeting might also be considered as representations of Turkey’s “equal partnership” with the “West”, and its “leadership” in its civilization. Also see Yanık (2012) on the importance of this visual materials.

developments regarding globalization and information society have substantially rendered traditional state and administration understandings ineffective. The traditional control and interference of state upon people has decreased, and multi-actor policies in local and supranational levels have been formed” (AKP, 2002a: 33).

However, this understanding which somewhat attributes a much minimal role for state also dropped by the party in its later years. For instance, the 2007 election manifesto starts with the sentence of “one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state understanding is the essence of our politics” (AKP, 2007: 11). In particular, the emphasis is put to the importance of national unity and integrity of Turkey: “Justice and Development Party considers our national unity and solidarity, our country’s indivisible unity, continuation of our state and protection of our unitary structure as the top precedence” (AKP, 2007: 32). Additionally, the emphasis on the significance of supra-national and international organizations in world politics is also amended. Accordingly, their importance is merely explained in their “utility” for Turkey to be more active in world politics (AKP, 2007: 247-248). Such ideas show that the importance attributed to the non-state actors in the earlier periods of the party is replaced with a state-based view on the actors of world politics.

In line with the party’s increasing emphasis on civilizations, and its consideration of itself as the “leader” of the civilization that it represents, AKP starts to centralize the role of great powers in world politics. This shift reflects how the party makes sense of great powers. While in the earlier documents great powers referred to the EU and the USA, the subsequent documents claim a centrality of Turkey for and its great power status in world politics.

This view is also related with the way in which the party understands the notion of power. For AKP, there are two types of resources that render states powerful in

world politics: one material and the other non-material. In the initial years of the party, economic power was considered as the most significant material resource while democracy and human rights constituted the non-material resources. For instance, the party underlined that the protection of human rights, democratization, or respecting the law increases the prestige of a given country, and thereby renders it as a powerful actor in world politics (AKP, 2002a:25, 2002b:21). In its later years, on the other hand, AKP makes sense of non-material resources of power with reference to “civilizational characteristics”, i.e. country’s historical and cultural heritage, “deep-rooted” state tradition, societal solidarity which is a reflection of “national and religious characteristics” of the country, and its historical “successes” (AKP, 2006: 6).

The views of the party regarding the *location of world politics* also changed in line with its understanding on the main dynamics and actors of world politics. In the pre-2007 documents of the party, internal and external realms are viewed as “convergent” and boundaries between them were understood as “porous” (Rosenau, 1997: 32). For instance, the party suggested that the process of globalization has not only affected the foreign policies of countries, but it has also influenced the domestic affairs of states. In that sense, it was emphasized that domestic system of a country is no more merely influencing what happens “inside”, but it is also shaping the position of a country in world politics. For example, for AKP the basic rights and freedoms exceeded the borders of states and they became subjects for “world public” (AKP, 2002a: 17). Similarly, being a democratic country is no more just a concern of a domestic society, but it is also a dynamic in world politics that might increase the respectfulness, influence, and bargaining power of states (AKP, 2002a: 21).

However, this view was also replaced with an understanding according to which world politics primarily takes place in inter-state relations, particularly in the

relations between “great powers” by the post-2007 AKP. This shift is informed by the changing ideas on the actors of world politics and how Turkey’s position in world politics is understood by the party. Since Turkey is now considered as one of the “great powers” of world politics, it is the very relations between Turkey and other great powers that indicate the location of world politics.

To sum up the section on the Islamist-right parties in Turkey, while RP’s conception is shaped by the idea of “Zionist conspiracies”, FP and AKP understand “the international” through the prism of economic globalization and civilization. Regarding the actors of world politics, the focus of the Islamist-right parties changes from Israel to sub-state and supra-state actors and to great powers. Concerning the location of world politics, an inward-oriented view on inter-state relations, the idea that world politics takes place below and beyond state boundaries, and the primacy of relations between great powers coexist in Islamist-right parties.

#### **5.1.4 The Conception of “the international” in Center-left Political Parties (SHP, DSP, CHP)**

##### **5.1.4.1 The Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti-SHP*)**

SHP was established in 1985 as a result of the merger of the two parties, namely the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti-HP*) (1983-1985) and the Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi-SODEP*) (1983-1985). These political parties, and SHP, were successors of CHP, which was closed down by the 1980 military coup (Mango, 1991; Ayata & Ayata, 2007: 212; Heper, 2008: 155-156). In 1994, SHP was also closed down and merged with CHP. In the literature it is suggested that SHP, particularly in its

initial years, harbored different political ideologies of the left including Marxism and social democracy, as well as pro-Kurdish politicians (Mango, 1991; Kömürçü, 2009). However, starting from the late 1980s, the party liquidated Marxist and pro-Kurdish politicians, and become a center-left party (Kömürçü, 2009: 22).

For SHP, liberal economy and the inequalities that it causes are the *main dynamics of world politics*. The party was critical of liberal economy that “enriches particular people in narrow circles” through prescribing unregulated economic policies (SHP, 1991: 10). This economic system was believed to create inequalities and system of injustices specifically for the underdeveloped or developing countries. This is the reason why in the party documents “being against to all sorts of exploitation” and “to help the quests for finding new economic policies in order to change the current world economic order which works against the developing countries” are identified as among the party’s priorities (SHP, 1990: 167).

The necessity to challenge the inequality caused by liberal economy is explained with reference to the effects of these inequalities on the independence and sovereignty of developing or underdeveloped states by the party. That is because liberal economy is seen as a challenge for some states to maintain their sovereignty, while others are not under such threat. This makes protection of one’s independence and respecting other states’ independences as central themes in the party documents (SHP, 1990: 99). For this reason, the party underscored the need for being “open to the world, but not leaving development, security, and defense to the control of others” (SHP, 1991: 19). In particular, since “an independence of any country is closely related with its economic independence” (SHP, 1990: 121), SHP emphasized that: “development and industrialization is not any choice among other choices for a country to make; but a compulsory way to solve country’s problems, protection of its

independence and national existence given the political and economic circumstances of the world” (SHP, 1990: 126). Similar views are also relevant for the area of military. For the party, a country should not depend on other countries with regards to its military capabilities if it wanted to sustain its independence (SHP, 1990: 169-170).

The party viewed states as the *main actors of world politics*. However, for SHP those states who are the members of “contemporary civilization” are more central in shaping world politics. SHP understood the notion of civilization in a singular term, i.e. there is one “universal” civilization possessing values such as development, technology, democracy, and human rights (Bowden, 2010). In other words, the party viewed civilization in “evaluative-normative” terms in a sense that for them “the world [is] divided into ‘civilized’ and ‘less-than-civilized’ categories” (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011: 180-181). The opinions of the party regarding Turkey’s foreign policy pointed to the “Western” states as the members of this “contemporary civilization”. It is in this sense that SHP identified NATO membership (SHP, 1990: 165), alongside with the membership to the “European Economic Community” (SHP, 1990: 167) as the “right” pathways for Turkey if it were to be a powerful actor in world politics. In accordance with this view, it is possible to find various references in the party documents to the necessity to lift Turkey to the level of these actors, i.e. “contemporary civilization” (SHP, 1990: 96).

The main dynamic and main actors viewed by SHP as such makes the approach of the party towards powerful actors “ambivalent”. “Ambivalence” is defined in the literature as being “inspired by the West yet anxious about it all the same” (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2012: 112). SHP’s understanding is ambivalent because it was both critical of the powerful actors of world politics because of their dominance which threaten the sovereignty of less powerful actors (including Turkey) and it also believed that Turkey

has to catch up with their levels both materially (i.e. economically and militarily) as well as ideationally.

In line with the view according to which the main actors of world politics consist of states, SHP understood inter-state relations as the location of world politics. The party underscored the necessity of developing cooperative relations between states since “international disputes, balances, and relations has no more allow individual nations to solve their societal, economic, political, and cultural problems alone” (SHP, 1990: 166).

#### **5.1.4.2 The Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP*)**

DSP was founded in 1985 by Bülent Ecevit. Ecevit was the leader of CHP in the 1970s. Following the 1980 military coup, which banned Ecevit from politics along with the other political party leaders of the time, Ecevit founded a new party, DSP in 1985. Throughout the 1990s, the party had been a part of several multi-coalition governments. The party is considered as a “moderate left” (Heper, 2008: 157; Yeşilada, 2002b: 164) or “center-left” political party (Kınıkoğlu, 2002; Sayarı, 2002; 2007). The party, itself, declared its approach as “nationalist left” (Heper, 2008: 157).

For DSP, economic liberalism which causes various inequalities and injustices in the world is the *main dynamic of world politics*. According to the party, the unregulated economy and “invisible hand” principle of the liberal economic doctrine create a “contradiction” from which those actors who take advantage from the current system is responsible. The party proposed that beneath the idea of “unregulated economy” lies a system which is controlled by the powerful actors. What these actors try to achieve is “an order in which participatory democracy does not work, that way

labor is easily exploited, distribution of resources becomes widely unjust, and major actors oppress and absorb the minor ones” (DSP, 2003: 86). This economic order is sustained domestically by the local actors and it results in a number of internal problems, such as inflation and political instability (DSP, 2003: 86). The external actors, who support the dissemination of liberal economy in domestic contexts, also spread this economic order on a world scale. As a result, world politics becomes the realm of “injustice and exploitation” which foremost affect developing countries (DSP, 2003: 87).

According to DSP, states are the *main actors of world politics*. However, as it is evident in the foreign policy sections of the party documents, the party views some states as more significant than others in shaping world politics. There are two views regarding those actors. Firstly, by naming them as “influential political powers in the world” (DSP, 2003: 99), DSP highlights the centrality of the USA (DSP, 1995: 90) and Russia (DSP, 1995: 92) for world politics. Secondly, the party, without identifying what the term refers to, utilizes the vague notion of “external powers” (*dış güçler*) in explaining the centrality of some other actors in world politics (DSP, 2003: 70). As it will be examined in detail below, the significance of “external actors” is made sense of with reference to their influence upon Turkey.

These views on the powerful states are informed by the party’s understanding of the notion of power, which includes both material and non-material elements. As for the material power, DSP underlines the importance of economic, technological, military, and demographic power. Regarding the non-material power, consider the views of DSP on Russia and why it is a significant actor in world politics. Accordingly, Russia “dominates” the region which includes the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Balkans. The party claims that this dominance is not only about material capabilities



of Russia but also its ability to create a “Slavic-Orthodox solidarity circle” which is based on notions of “Pan-Slavism” and “Orthodox Christianity” in this part of the world (DSP, 1995: 92).

Regarding the *location of world politics*, DSP is of the view that inter-state relations is the realm where world politics unfolds. That being said, the party has an inward-oriented view on inter-state relations. DSP believes that the domestic developments are shaped by the external realm, and not vice versa. In that sense, for DSP, the problems that Turkey experiences are caused by the activities of the “external powers”. Consider, for instance, DSP’s problematization of the primacy of military in Turkish politics. In the view of the party, such primacy is not related with the Turkish Military Forces, but with “external powers” and their “collaborators”, who albeit residing within, having their “roots” in the “outside” (DSP, 1991: 4, 1995: 2, 1999: 7). These two actors distract the focus of military forces through triggering internal problems. As a result, these intense problems cause military to take an active part in politics and thereby weaken the democracy in Turkey (DSP, 2003: 72-73).

The other problems, identified as religious fundamentalism and Kurdish problem by the party, are also believed to be triggered by the activities of “external powers”. For instance, DSP claims that there are certain countries in the Middle East (which are “backward, fundamentalist, and oppressive”) that aim to “penetrate and destruct” the democratic and secular regime in Turkey (DSP, 1995: 93) so that they can disseminate their religion-based regimes in the country. According to the party the Kurdish problem is also engendered by “those foreigners” who are longing for the “Sèvres Treaty”<sup>10</sup> and the division of Turkey (DSP, 1991: 5, 1995: 3, 1999:8). It is due to such

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<sup>10</sup> The treaty of Sèvres was a post-World War One pact between Allied powers and Ottoman Empire. Although they were never implemented, the terms of the treaty provided the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies and the establishment of new Kurdish and Armenian states.

views that the party asserts that “Turkey’s foreign affairs cannot be thought separately from its internal regime” (DSP, 2003: 77).

#### **5.1.4.3 The Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP*)**

CHP was established in 1923 by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The party identified itself as “the left of the center” starting from the mid-1960s (Heper, 2008: 153). The 1980 military coup closed down the party, and banned Bülent Ecevit, then the leader of CHP, from active politics. In 1992, the party was reopened again, under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. This led scholars to name CHP as the “new CHP” so as to underline the differences of the party from its earlier versions (Heper, 2008: 159). CHP is considered to be located in the center-left of the political spectrum in Turkey (Ayata, 2002; Ayata & Ayata, 2007; Ciddi, 2008).

For CHP, the *main dynamic of world politics* is shaped by the rules and norms of “contemporary civilization”. CHP (similar to SHP) is of the view that there is one “universal” civilization which is “superior” both materially as well as ideationally (Bowden, 2010) in world politics. In other words, the world consists of those who are “civilized” and those who are “less-than-civilised” (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011: 180-181) in the view of the party. It is the “civilized” world who shapes the dynamics of world politics. For instance according to CHP:

The criteria for prestige in the world is the commitment to democracy, respect for human rights, and economic development. Instead of a world divided by the conditions of the Cold War, a new world, based on the collaboration between countries which can comply with these criteria for prestige, is emerging (CHP, 1994: 227).

Given this understanding, terms such as “attaining the level of contemporary civilization” or “to be contemporaneous” become incessantly repeated themes in the party documents. An analysis on how the “contemporary civilizations” is made sense

of by CHP suggests that the party associates the term with the “Western civilization” in general, and with Europe, in particular. CHP views the values of this civilization as consisting of knowledge, development, industrialization, and technology together with democracy, human rights, and social state (CHP, 2011: 123-124). For CHP, these values are “universal” and all states should act in a way to attain them.

For instance, in the case of Turkey, if the country wants to be a part of this “Western civilization” or to the “contemporary civilization”, suggests the party, it should become a part of the EU (CHP, 2002: 92) and should “catch up” with the development level of the members of the EU (CHP, 1994: 118, 2002: 27). For this reason, the policies of the “Western countries” from energy (CHP, 2002: 57) to education (CHP, 2002: 74) are identified as the “right” policies to be followed by Turkey to be in “the league of leader countries” in the world (CHP, 2002: 28). For CHP, Turkey has two options: either being open to the world by becoming an EU member and being a leader of its region or being “inward-oriented”, “third world state”, and “lonely” (CHP, 2002: 7).

In a rather contradictory manner, CHP also views the members of the “contemporary civilization” as initiating various obstacles and problems for those actors who are yet to be “civilized”. Consider, for instance, the ideas of the party regarding peace and security in the world:

In the two-polar world regional conflicts and oppositions were prevented and controlled due to their global repercussions most of the time. However, now the circumstances that can prevent such conflicts are no more evident. One should not expect too much from international organizations, such as the UN, for provision of international peace and security. Because, these organizations are not able to play a role in the provision of peace and security independent from the countries that direct them. Additionally, weapon production and trade do still provide “developed” economies with vital resources, and thereby continue to be an element for the incitement of regional conflicts (CHP, 1994: 229).

In line with this centrality of civilization in making sense of the main dynamic of world politics, the party understands those developed, mostly “Western”, states as the *main actors of world politics* by virtue of their ability to shape the prevalent rules and norms in world affairs. As it is also suggested above, for CHP those actors are both “examples” to be followed, yet at the same time they are the reasons for various problems in other parts of the world, including Turkey. In the party documents the USA is associated with the latter. For instance, CHP, through opposing certain policies of the USA, such as its Iraqi policy (CHP, 2008: 127) or its “Greater Middle East Project” (CHP, 2008: 127-128), points to the dominance of the country in world politics, and highlights the negative consequences of this dominance. Besides these overt references to the most significant actors of world politics, in the party documents there are also ambiguous references such as “external circles” (*dış çevreler*), who cause several problems for the less powerful states of the world (CHP, 2008: 21).

For CHP, to be a powerful country necessitates having both material capabilities as well as non-material ones. While the former is associated with economy and technology by the party (CHP, 1994: 224, 2008.121), the latter refers to being a democratic country and respecting human rights (CHP, 1994: 227). CHP’s approach towards “secularism” and how it becomes a source of power for Turkey in the view of the party is also crucial for understanding how CHP makes sense of the non-material aspect of power.

For the party, one reason for Turkey to be a part of the “contemporary civilization” stems from its ability to reconcile “Muslim society” with “secular state structure, pluralistic democracy, universal human rights, and market economy” (CHP, 2002: 89). The party suggests that the 9/11 attacks which resulted in a tension between the “Islamic world” and the “Western world”, render these characteristics of Turkey

much more significant since it becomes an example for the “peaceful coexistence” of these “two worlds” (CHP, 2002: 89). In order to preserve this exemplary situation, argued CHP, Turkey has to protect its secularity (CHP, 2008: 50). This primacy is made sense of through understanding secularism as:

the cornerstone for the Republic, democracy, national integrity, and domestic peace; the essence of contemporary and civilized state order and way of life; the way to institutionalize peace, mutual understanding, and tolerance; the assurance for the freedom of religion and consciousness; the prerequisite for scientificity, innovation, and change (CHP, 2002: 81).

The party understands inter-state relations as the *location of world politics*. However, two (and somewhat contradictory) understandings regarding inter-state relations exist in the party documents. Firstly, CHP underscores the importance of establishing cooperative relations between states because:

In our era, a nation’s living in peace cannot be isolated from the world peace. Indeed, a conflict in one part of the world has directly influenced other wide range of circles. The end of the Cold War did not reduce the extent of external security problems, on the contrary, it strengthened terrorist acts and engendered new elements of threat stemming from extreme nationalism and movements depending on ethnic sensitivity (CHP, 2008: 120).

At the same time, CHP has an inward-oriented view on inter-state relations. This understanding is evident within the assessments of the party regarding the problems that Turkey is experiencing. These problems are believed to be directed, influenced, or “conspired” by the actors residing outside. It is for this reason that the party identifies “the struggle with the internal and external circles intending to divide and dismantle our country” as its priority (CHP, 2008: 21). For CHP, these intensions are tried to be realized either by triggering terrorism or by attacking secularity in Turkey. By terrorism, CHP mostly refers to the Kurdish problem. In addition to pointing out to the domestic actors engaged with the acts of terrorism, CHP also emphasizes the external actors “facilitating” such acts. For CHP, terror is utilized as “a covert and asymmetrical tool in international relations” (CHP, 2007: 7). The reason for this

utilization is related with “the struggles over energy and water resources in our region” (CHP, 2007: 7). In order to take advantage from these resources, Turkey is destabilized and ethnic identities are abused by the “external actors” according to the party.

A similar understanding can also be found in the party’s views regarding secularism. CHP believes that there is “an international strategy against secularism” which targets Turkey (CHP, 1994: 32). For this reason, protecting Turkey from such “conspiracies” is claimed to be one of the central missions of the party (CHP, 2007: 17). Although not giving explicit references to the actors generating such “conspiracies”, the party documents imply that it is particularly the Middle Eastern and Islamic states that should be cautious of. Consider, for instance, the foreign policy section of the 1994 party program. In this section it is stated that CHP is in favor of establishing friendly relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. However, a caveat is immediately mentioned: these relations can only be established if those states act in a sensible manner regarding the issues of secularism and terrorism in Turkey (CHP, 1994: 232, 2008: 131).

To summarize, the center-left parties view “the international” as a realm in which actors are differentiated based on two criteria: economy and/or civilization. The views on the actors point to two, somewhat contradictory, ideas. Firstly, states belonging to the “contemporary civilization” are considered as the most important actors. Secondly, there are ambiguous references towards “external powers,” which include, but are not limited to, the very actors belonging to the “contemporary civilization”. Regarding the location of world politics, an inward-oriented and cooperation-based inter-state relations understandings exist in the documents of different parties.

### 5.1.5 The Conception of “the international” in Pro-Kurdish Political Parties- People’s Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP*) and Democratic People’s Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi- DEHAP*)

HADEP was established in 1994, as a successor of the People’s Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi-HEP*) (1990-1993) and the Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi-DEP*) (1993-1994) which were closed down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the parties engage with separatist activities and the members of the parties “had made provocative statements against the Turkish Republic” (Güney, 2002: 125). HADEP was also closed down on the grounds that it had connections with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym-*PKK*) in 2003 and replaced with DEHAP. DEHAP was formed in 1997 and existed until 2005 when it merged with the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi-DTP*) (2005-2009).<sup>11</sup> Due to this continuity between the two parties, their documents are analyzed together in this section.

The literature argues that these parties have two main characteristics. Firstly, ideologically they are considered as leftist, and secondly their main agenda is identified as the Kurdish problem in Turkey. For instance, Landau (2008: 188) categorized HADEP as belonging to the “Leftist Radicalism” in Turkey and as a representative of “Kurdish nationalist grouping”. Watts (1999) named the party as “pro-Kurdish political party”. For him, the term “pro-Kurdish” refers to a political instead of an ethnic identity, since although Kurdish problem is the primary focus of the party, there are non-Kurdish members of the party (Watts, 1999: 651). Barkey (1998:134) suggested that the party was then “the strongest political party claiming to represent Kurds in Turkey”. Güney (2002: 123) named HADEP as a “Kurdish-oriented

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<sup>11</sup> In the 2007 general elections, the pro-Kurdish DTP candidates run as independents due to the 10% election threshold. Similarly, in the 2011 elections, then the pro-Kurdish party, namely the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP*) candidates run as independents in the elections.

political party”, while Özbudun (2006: 129) called both HADEP and DEHAP as “Kurdish nationalist-oriented” political parties. The parties, on the other hand, name their political orientation as “democratic-left” (HADEP, 1994: 4, DEHAP 2003: 7).

In the party documents two views point to the ways in which these parties understand the *main dynamics of world politics*. Firstly, world politics is considered as a realm of inequalities and injustices due to the neoliberal economic order that prevails in the world. Secondly, the parties are of the view that due to globalization, there occurs a diffusion of state authorities towards inwards and outwards which challenges the already existing order in world politics. While criticizing the neoliberal economic globalization which is believed to cause inequalities, this latter aspect of globalization is considered as a positive dynamic in world politics by the parties. In this sense, it can be suggested that the pro-Kurdish political parties share significant similarities with “alter-globalization movements” emerged throughout the world (Scholte, 2005: 56-56; Steger & Wilson, 2012),

The former understanding according to which “the international” is a realm of inequalities appears in the parties’ views on capitalism. Accordingly, the parties point to “the economic gap between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres” (DEHAP, 2003: 67) as the most important determinant in world politics:

Today, the world is experiencing a dramatic contradiction between information societies providing welfare to their citizens and states in which people die of hunger. Due to their scientific and technological backwardness, underdeveloped countries transfer their resources to the high-tech countries and they become even more impoverished as a result this (HADEP, 1994: 3).

For the parties, this division between developed and underdeveloped countries was deepened and resulted in other problems after the end of the Cold War:

The development and income-based differences between the countries and regions expanded in favor of the “West”. As a result of resource transfers from



Africa, Central and South America and Asia to the “West”, the people in those countries have been daily impoverished. In this Western-centric world, regional wars and armament has increasingly been continuing, and great amount of resources has been transferred for such wars and weapons. This situation has fed the racist, chauvinist, and authoritarian understandings which threaten the world peace (HADEP, 1994: 4-5).

The parties conceive that this economic system resulted in three main “contradictions” in the world: a contraction between a limited number of rich people versus the whole humanity, a contradiction stemming from patriarchy, and a contradiction between people and nature due to the culture of consumption (DEHAP, 2003: 9-10). The first contradiction manifested itself in the capitalist economic relations as explained above. The second contradiction, namely patriarchy and “silencing” of women, resulted in a “global culture” which produces “competition, inequality, exploitation, and violence” and deepens “conflicts and contradictions” globally (DEHAP, 2003: 18-19). The third contradiction emerged because of the “greed” of capitalism which instrumentalizes and deteriorates nature for its interest (DEHAP, 2003: 21).

This view on “the international” pointing to the problems related with neo-liberal globalization coexist with a positive approach towards other aspects of globalization in the documents of the parties. Among those positive sides of globalization, the parties emphasize the importance of the decentralization of state and diffusion of its authority both towards supra-state as well as intra-state levels. Consider, for instance, the arguments of the parties on human rights. It is suggested that the issue of human rights is no longer a matter in domestic politics of states, but rather it is a global issue. Relatedly, for the parties the “anti-democratic” events which damage human rights in individual countries become issues to which all humanity seeks solutions for (HADEP, 1994: 5). “The rise of the activities of international and supra-national institutions and civil society organizations” and “the strengthening of local parliaments and administrations” (HADEP, 1994: 5) are also believed to be

significant achievements in this process. The parties also consider the emergent “supremacy” of international law over domestic law, and of international organizations over national institutions as positive developments. Additionally, they underscore the importance of the pressures put by the “world public” to those states who violate human rights (HADEP, 1994: 5-6).

As for the *actors of world politics*, HADEP and DEHAP underline the centrality of states in world politics. However, they are critical of this centrality since they believe that states are the “root cause of problems” in the world (DEHAP, 2003:

6). For instance, in line with its critical approach towards neoliberal economic order HADEP suggests that:

With the downfall of real socialism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact great changes occurred in world’s political setting. The values created by the “two-polar world” shattered, the USA strengthened politically and militarily, and become the power center of the world. In the field of economy, the competition between the USA, Western Europe, and Japan escalated (HADEP, 1994: 4).

This critical take on states, together with the belief that globalization gives way to a diffusion of the authorities of states, lead parties to conclude that in world politics there is a necessity to further empower supra-state or sub-state actors.

These ideas of the parties on the main dynamic and main actors of world politics also demonstrate how they understand power. First, the significance of economic and military resources for rendering an actor a crucial one in world politics is highlighted by the parties. Secondly, given the importance attributed to the increasing consciousness on human rights and how actors’ legitimacy depends on the respect for such rights, the parties also emphasize the significance of non-material forms of power in world politics.

Regarding the *location of world politics* the parties are of the view that the internal and external domains are “convergent” or that the “boundaries that differentiate them” are “porous” (Rosenau, 1997: 32). This view can be seen in party documents where the decreasing importance of state borders as a result of globalization is highlighted. For the parties, the effects of this development manifested themselves in number of issue areas and generated both negative and positive results. Regarding the positive results, consider the argument according to which states’ human rights violations go beyond the borders of states and become a concern for the world public. Concerning the negative results, consider the arguments of the parties on the neoliberal world economy and how it influences domestic economies. For instance, HADEP suggests that the interconnection between the “external monopolies” and their “local counterparts” is decisive for the economic problems in Turkey (HADEP, 1994: 13-14). The views of the parties regarding the solutions of global problems also point to a similar understanding on the location of “the international”:

Today, the global properties of the problems such as underdevelopment, severe foreign debts, poverty, impoverishment, droughts, hunger, epidemics, migration, regional conflicts, armament, racism, xenophobia, deterioration of the balance of nature, problems regarding human rights have come to forefront and they can only be resolved with joint efforts in the international realm (HADEP, 1994: 5).

To summarize, the conception of “the international” of the pro-Kurdish political parties is informed by their understandings of globalization. In this conception, neoliberal economic order (which is viewed as causing inequalities and injustices throughout the world) and the diffusion of state authorities below and beyond state boundaries (which is understood as a positive phenomenon) are considered to be two significant dynamics of world politics. Regarding the actors of “the international”, although they think states are central in world politics, the pro-Kurdish parties are critical of states as they are of the view that states are causing various problems both

for their own citizens and for the people living in under-developed countries. For this reason, the parties underscore the necessity of increasing the role of non-state actors in world politics. Concerning the location of “the international”, the parties highlight the convergence between the internal and external realms. This convergence is either explained with reference to the alliances made between internal and external capitalist groups or with the diffusion of ideas related with human rights or democracy below and beyond state boundaries.

To summarize Section 2, the analysis on the election manifestos and party programs of political parties, including nationalist-right (MHP), center-right (ANAP, DYP, GP), Islamist-right (RP, FP, AKP), center-left (SHP, DSP, CHP), and pro-Kurdish (HADEP, DEHAP) in Turkey suggests that in the political spectrum of Turkey, there is no one particular conception of “the international” but instead multiple conceptions. For instance, the nationalist-right and certain Islamist-right parties identify the main dynamic of world politics as “double standards” and “hypocrisy” of powerful actors or “Zionist conspiracies”. For some others neoliberal economic order shapes the main dynamic of world politics. While certain center-left and pro-Kurdish political parties are critical of this order and emphasize the problems that it causes, some others (center-right and some Islamist-right political parties) do not problematize neoliberalism, and instead underscore the necessity to comply with it. Regarding the main actors of world politics, the focus changes from the primacy of economically advanced countries to great powers; from some unspecified “external powers” to sub-state and supranational institutions. Similarly, although the location of world politics is mostly identified as

inter-state relations, certain center-right parties understand inter-state relations with reference to the notion of “interdependence” and underscore the importance of economic cooperation between different states, others view inter-state relations in an inward-oriented manner in that for them, domestic politics is shaped by the external realm. Although not constitute a widely shared idea, for some political parties world politics exceeds inter-state relations and the boundaries separating internal and external realms are blurred in world politics. That said, there are also significant similarities between different political parties’ conceptions of “the international”. The details of such similarities, as well as differences will be discussed in the conclusion section of the chapter.

## **5.2 The Conception of “the international” in National Security Textbooks**

In Critical Geopolitics literature, education is identified as one of the sites in which the knowledge of the world is created and disseminated within a society (Sharp, 1993, 2000). In line with this argument, the chapter looks at the textbooks of National Security course (*Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi-MGB*) which was taught in high schools in Turkey from 1926 until 2012. In accordance with the research conducted in the National Library in Ankara and the decrees<sup>12</sup> of the Board of Education (*Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu*), three different textbooks taught in high schools during the time period under consideration in this study (1991-2011) were identified. The textbooks were approved and started to be used in the schools in the years of 1993, 1998, and 2006, respectively. The remaining textbooks taught in other academic years between these dates were the same textbooks with little or no revisions included. Therefore, the

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<sup>12</sup> (<http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/www/gecmisten-gunumuze-kurul-kararlari/icerik/152>)

data for analysis were extracted from these three versions. The editions of the textbooks that are examined in this study were published in 1994, 1999, 2011(henceforth MGB 1994, MGB 1999; MGB 2011) respectively.

National Security course was introduced to the curriculum in 1926 and until its abolition in 2012<sup>13</sup> it had remained compulsory for all high school students. The course had been taught by active or retired military officers, who were “‘appointed’ by the most senior commander of the nearest garrison” (Altınay, 2004b: 79). In this rather long period of existence, the name and content of the course had been subject to change. For instance, the course had different names such as Military Service, Preparation for Military Service, National Defense Studies, and National Security Studies in different periods (Kancı & Altınay, 2007: 57).

Regarding the changes in the content of the course, Altınay (2009: 153) pointed to the importance of the one adopted by the National Education Ministry in 1998. This change, suggested Altınay, indicated a paradigmatic change for the course. Accordingly, from its inception in 1926 up until 1998, the course had mostly been related with the Turkish Armed Forces and military service. However, with the changes introduced in 1998, the course started to focus on subjects related with international relations of Turkey through the inclusion of subjects of national unity and solidarity, Turkey’s location in the world, or Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and international organizations (Altınay, 2009; Bilgin, 2012b: 158).

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<sup>13</sup> <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/01/20120125-6.htm>.

**Table 3: Subject Headings in the Textbooks**

<b>1993-1998</b>	<b>1998-2006</b>	<b>2006-2012</b>
History of Armed Forces	Definition of national security	Definition of national security
Organization of Turkish Armed Forces	National security strategy	National security strategy
Mobilization	Organization of Turkish Armed Forces	Organization of Turkish Armed Forces
Civil Defense	Turkish Armed Forces and its private regulations	Organization of Security Forces
Turkey's geographical location, its politic-strategic importance, and its neighbors	The Duties of the Turkish Armed Forces within our country	Mobilization
Important International Institutions in the world and in Europe in which Turkey participates	Atatürk's principals and national unity and integrity	Civil defense organization
Admission Requirements to military schools	The plots played upon Turkey	Atatürkism and the principles of Atatürk
Organization and duties of Security Forces	Important international institutions in which Turkey participates	National unity and integrity
Atatürk and Turkish youth, principles of Atatürk	Mobilization	Turkey's location and threats against Turkey
Basic knowledge upon military service	Civil Defense	Relations with surrounding countries
Trip to big headquarters, garrisons, and Security Forces	Organization and duties of Security Forces	Relations with International Institutions

The reason for selecting to examine this course and textbooks used in it stems from two factors. First of all, since in Turkey education is highly centralized and strictly controlled by the state, a compulsory course constitutes an informative source through

which one can examine how “the international” is understood and disseminated officially by the state (Kancı & Altınay, 2007: 52). Secondly, National Security course had remained as the only high-school course in which contemporary matters regarding world politics were discussed in the high school curriculum in Turkey (Altınay, 2009; Altınay & Bora, 2008; Bilgin, 2012b: 158).

This section looks at the conceptions of “the international” as found in the National Security textbooks. In the literature, it is possible to find a number of studies analyzing different aspects of the National Security course and its textbooks (Altınay, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; Altınay & Bora, 2008; Bilgin, 2007, 2012b; Bora, 2004; Kancı & Altınay, 2007). For instance, Altınay (2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2009) discussed the role of the course in militarization of the society and construction of gendered and discriminatory citizenship in Turkey. Bilgin (2012b: 151, 2007) examined the role and the importance of the course for disseminating the “geopolitical assumptions and language to Turkey’s security imaginary”. Bora (2004: 66) analyzed the centrality of the “social Darwinist mentality according to which human societies are subjected to a struggle of survival” in the textbooks. This chapter is informed by these earlier studies. However, by specifically focusing the conception of “the international” as found in the textbooks by examining the main dynamics, main actors and the location of world politics, it attempts to show the additional aspects that might complement these already existing accounts.

### **5.2.1 The Main Dynamic of World Politics**

There are two understandings that can be identified in the textbooks of National Security course which inform the ways in which the main dynamic of world politics is made sense of. According to the first understanding, the world is a “hostile” place



(Kancı & Altınay, 2007: 60) in which war is “inescapable” (Altınay, 2009: 152) and “the struggle for survival” is a constant (Bora, 2004: 66). According to this view, “the international” is a realm where the territorial integrity and sovereignty of some states in world politics are incessantly threatened by some other states. The second understanding points to the “primacy of geography as a factor shaping world politics” (Bilgin, 2012b: 154). For the textbooks, geography is central in world politics because it shapes where the “hostility” or “struggles” unfold. Related to this point, the textbooks claim that Turkey is a “central” country because of its “unique” geographical location (Bilgin, 2007, 2012b). This claim results in understanding the main dynamics of world politics, (but also, as explained below, the main actors and location of world politics) with reference to Turkey.

For the textbooks, the main reason for the “hostility” and “struggle” in world politics is the limited resources upon which states have to compete. This view is evident in the very opening remarks of the textbook (MGB, 2011: 6). According to these remarks, in order to obtain the most out of the limited resources in the world states “threaten” their “rivals” through various means. This makes it necessary for every state in the world to be ready for the “total war” (*Topyekün Savaş*) by developing different strategies so as to ensure their “survival”. In the view of the textbooks, such “continuous efforts to create a potential threat” against one’s rivals and being ready to deter the threats coming from other states constitute a “universal” and a “constant” dynamic in world politics (MGB, 1999: 17, MGB, 2011: 6).

This view is expressed in those parts of the textbooks where an answer to the question of “why do states need armed forces?” is sought. The textbooks answer this question by suggesting how the development of methods and weapons for defense purposes has been central for people from the early centuries on. Although in the

earlier periods, so the argument goes, people defended themselves against nature and animals, in the contemporary world defense becomes necessary against other “rival” human groups, i.e. states (MGB, 1999: 51). As a result, war becomes a “constant” in world politics:

Up until now, people have been struggling with one another about numerous issues. These struggles can take place either between states, as well as within nations. The most important reason for these clashes is related with states’ longing to possess other states’ natural richness once their underground and over-ground resources fall short in time. Sometimes leaders’ passions also cause clashes. Whatever the reason, human history has not yet had the conditions of a war-free environment. At any time and in any place in the world a war in which thousands of people can die might break out (MGB, 2011: 26).

The textbooks represent “war” and “politics” as two highly interrelated phenomena by asserting that “war is politics with arms and politics is war without arms” (MGB, 1999: 27). It is for this reason that for the textbooks the preparation for war should be extended to the times of peace (MGB, 1994: 141). This makes it necessary for states not only to develop their military capabilities (although these capabilities are viewed as having primary importance) but also to have non-military power.

For the textbooks in the case of Turkey this non-military power can only be possessed by attaining the level of “contemporary civilization” as it “ensures” Turkey’s readiness for coping up with the dynamics in world politics. According to textbooks, there are two civilizations in the world. The first one is the “contemporary civilization” which textbooks associate with “Western civilization”, while the second one is the “Eastern civilization” (MGB, 2011: 101). The textbooks represent belonging to the “Eastern civilization” as “weakness” since this civilization, so the argument goes, does not include “rational principles” which can help states to ensure their existence in world politics (MGB, 2011: 100-101).

The second understanding found in the textbooks regarding the main dynamic of world politics points to the centrality of “geography” (Bilgin, 2007, 2012b) in

making the world go around. Geography is central for world politics because it is believed that where the “struggles” of world politics emerge and what kind of policies they lead to are shaped by “geography”. Based on this belief, textbooks claim that Turkey, by virtue of its “geopolitical location”, is the central country in the world. This centrality makes Turkey as the main place where struggles and hostilities in world politics manifest themselves. According to this view, the “geostrategic” importance of Turkey’s location is “envied” by states which do not want Turkey to be a powerful country (Altınay, 2004a, 2004b; Bilgin, 2012b; Kancı & Altınay, 2007). For that, those states, with the aim to further their interests, target the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey.

The textbooks define geopolitical location as the totality of advantages and disadvantages stemming from the location of a state within the world geography (MGB, 2011: 134). Turkey’s “central” geopolitical location is assumed to provide benefits and causes troubles for the country:

It has to be accepted that the territory where Turkey is located is one of the most significant geographical regions in the world. Besides the richness of its underground and over ground resources, Turkey also has a young and dynamic society with high cultural values. With these advantages, it is obvious that our country will be socially, culturally, politically and economically a significant state in the future both in its region and in the world. For this reason, our country is faced with many internal and external threats which are either overt or covert (MGB, 2011: 22).

The textbooks define “geostrategic location” as the military advantages and disadvantages that a geography of a country leads to (MGB, 2011: 136). Turkey is also considered as having a crucial geostrategic location. For the textbooks, that is because Turkey is a “bridge” that connects the “East” and the “West”, the “North” and the “South”. Due to this position:

physical, social, cultural, and economic interests of European, Asian, and African states, which otherwise have different characteristics, overlap within

our country. In other words, interests of world powers in any kind of conflict pass through Turkey (MGB, 2011: 136). For the textbooks, it is for these reasons that Turkey has been considered as a “target that should be captured and kept on hand” throughout the world history (MGB, 1994: 66). As a result, the territorial integrity, national unity, independence, national sovereignty of Turkey are believed to be constantly “threatened” by various other actors in world politics (MGB, 2011: 20-22).

To conclude, in the National Security textbooks “the international” is understood as a realm where there are constant “struggles” for limited resources between different actors. Where these struggles mainly occur and what kind of results they generate are shaped by “geography” for the textbooks. Turkey, by virtue of its geographical location, is assumed to be the “central” country where “struggles” and “hostilities” of world politics manifest themselves.

### **5.2.2 The Main Actors of World Politics**

There are two main views that show how the actors of world politics are understood in National Security textbooks. Firstly, nation states are considered as the main actors of world politics. Secondly, in line with the idea according to which Turkey is a “central” country in the world, the textbooks consider certain actors as more important than others. The term that is utilized to define these actors are “external powers” which refers to two sets of actors. Firstly, it refers to some unspecified actors who for “taking advantage” from Turkey “conspire” against the country. Secondly, “external powers” refers to the neighbors of Turkey who are significant according to the textbooks by virtue of their geographical closeness to the country.

The centrality of nation states for the National Security textbooks has been discussed in the literature. For instance Altınay (2009) underscored that in these

textbooks nation states are represented as the only “agents” of politics, both historically, as well as contemporarily. For Bora, the term “state” is understood “as a transcendental concept” (Bora, 2004: 67) in the textbooks where “the national objectives and the subject of the national force crystallize”.

Textbooks make the claim for the centrality of nation states by suggesting that it is only through the protection provided by nation states that people can continue their existence and enjoy happiness and welfare. “Nature’s eternal and infinite laws of struggle” (MGB, 2011: 113) can only be tackled with the existence of nation states in the view of the textbooks. For this reason, protecting the national integrity and unity of a nation state is identified as the prime duty of a society. The textbooks are of the view that those societies who failed to protect their integrity and unity collapsed throughout the history and this collapse brought nothing but “great disasters” to people (MGB, 2011: 115). Besides, although not clarify why this is the case so, the textbooks also assert that the existence and protection of nation states are the only ways of attaining “universal peace” (MGB, 1994: 124).

This view on the primacy of nation states can be seen in different parts of the textbooks. There are even sections in the textbooks which are allocated to criticisms against those views discussing the possibility of other forms of communities rather than nation states. Consider, for example, one of the reading texts named “homeland”. In this text, the author criticizes those ideas which call for establishing a supra-national community for people. The author finds such views “unacceptable” and reminds students the soldiers who lost their lives for the “homeland”. The text asserts that removing the “love for homeland” from the hearts of peoples is similar “to deprive people from firearms which are the most effective tools of defending one’s own rights” (MGB, 2011: 73). In addition to being “unacceptable”, such kind of ideas are also

considered to be “utopian”. For instance, in the text one of the well-known poets in Turkey, Tevfik Fikret’s words “my nation is humanity, my homeland is earth” are quoted and it is claimed that this idea is similar with “killing oneself by hoping for a rest in afterlife” (MGB, 2011: 73).

This view on nation states leads textbooks to suggest that nation states should be rendered powerful. “Power” is understood as resources that can be utilized for attaining the goals of a given nation state, and as capacities of a state to realize its demands against other states (MGB, 1999: 26). In the view of the textbooks, power includes both material and non-material elements such as political, economic, demographic, geographical, scientific and technological, socio-psychological, and cultural ones (MGB, 2011: 12).

Military power is considered as the most significant form of material power. That is because, assert the textbooks, “national security is mostly about the existence of military power” (MGB, 1999; 39, MGB, 2011: 27). This is especially the case so for those countries having significant “strategic locations”. Those countries need to have strong military power so that they can deter potential attacks (MGB, 1999: 27) and prevent “both open and covert plots” of other actors (MGB, 1999: 33). Turkey is one such country which should develop its military capabilities and its Armed Forces for ensuring the continuity of its territorial integrity, the protection of its rights in world politics, and the prevention of any attacks against its borders (MGB, 2011: 27).

The textbooks are also of the view that the military power should be supplemented with other types of power. “Socio-psychological and cultural power” is identified as one such power resource for countries. “Socio-psychological and cultural power” is defined as society’s “urge for unconditional support for the cause of state”

and “putting state’s interests ahead of one’s own individual interests” (MGB, 2011: 18):

Socio-psychological and cultural power is the power of a society which is the sum of material and moral values coming from its history. (For example, the resistance of Nene Hatun during the Ottoman-Russo War in Erzurum, Veteran Osman Pasha’s fighting back against Russian Army of 200.000 soldiers with his army of 32.000 soldiers in Plevna, Sergeant Ali Corporal’s carriage of a 240-kilogram cannon ball during the Battle of Dardanelles, and the preference of a Turkish woman carrying bullets to the front in the War of Independence to cover ammunition instead of her child (MGB, 2011: 19).

Nene Hatun is a historical figure known for her contributions to the popular resistance against Russian forces during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Osman Pasha is an Ottoman Marshall known for his contributions to the Siege of Plevna occurred during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. Corporal Seyit is an Ottoman soldier who fought in the Battle of Dardanelles that took place during the First World War. These examples suggest that the non-material elements (which is associated with the citizens’ “devotion” of their lives to their own countries in this case) are significant components making states “powerful” in world politics.

The second aspect of the textbooks’ views on the actors of world politics is related with how the “powerful” actors are made sense of. The textbooks are of the view that there are some actors who are more significant than others in world politics. For instance, the textbooks underscore the “necessity” to make Turkey as one such actors so that it could influence world politics (MGB, 1999: 28) rather than being a “simple actor” which “plays the role” assigned by the powerful states (MGB, 2011: 137).

The textbooks do not identify openly which states are the most powerful actors. For instance, the textbooks do not include any references to the US and its role in world politics. Instead of engaging with powerful actors in an open manner, the textbooks prioritize two types of actors in world politics, importance of which are explained with

reference to the centrality of Turkey in world politics. These actors are named as “external powers” by the textbooks. The term “external powers” is utilized in two senses. Firstly, “external powers” is utilized in a vague manner and it refers those unspecified actors in world politics that have “insidious intentions” against Turkey (Bilgin, 2007: 746). The textbooks claim that these actors, with the aim to take advantage from Turkey’s “geopolitical location”, “conspire” against Turkey so as to weaken the country. Secondly, “external powers” refer to the neighbors of Turkey. The significance of the neighbors of Turkey can be observed from the devotion of special chapters for them in each of the textbooks under investigation in here. These chapters focus on the “objectives” of those states. Those objectives are framed in negative terms and the majority of the neighboring countries of Turkey are represented as posing either direct or indirect “threat” to Turkey.

Consider, for instance, the case of Greece. The textbook claims that Greece has a “Turkish complex” (MGB, 1999: 92). Due to this “complex” and in order to realize its “Megali Idea”, Greece tries to weaken Turkey both internally and externally, claim the textbooks. “The Megali Idea” is defined as the ideal to revive Byzantine Empire with Istanbul being its capital and to create “the Greater Greece” in the territories of Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Trace, Aegean Islands, Western Anatolia, the Marmara Region, Cyprus, Trabzon (MGB, 1999: 92). By underscoring these aims and emphasizing the problematic relationship between Turkey and Greece (such as problems about the Aegean Islands, continental shelf, and Cyprus) the textbooks “warn” the Turkish youth: “today, the only thing Turkish youth should know for becoming conscious about the objectives of Greece is that they need to work hard for strong, stable Turkey which is powerful in its region” (MGB, 1999: 92).



Similar ideas are also voiced for other neighboring countries. For instance, in the view of the textbooks, in order to weaken Turkey so as to export its theocratic system to the country, Iran supports religious fundamentalist groups within the country. Syria, on the other hand, contributes to the efforts of weakening Turkey since it wants to “seize” the city of Hatay, which is currently located within the borders of Turkey. Iraq, although does not have a particular aim upon Turkey, helps and supports “plots” played upon Turkey since it does not want a strong neighbor for the textbooks (MGB, 1999: 94-96).

To summarize, in the National Security textbooks nation states are considered as the most significant actors of world politics. For the textbooks, in order to maintain their existence nation states have to be powerful. Power is understood both with reference to material capabilities (primarily military) as well as non-material characteristics (such as the “sacrifices” by the citizens). Informed by the centrality they attribute to Turkey, the textbooks view “external powers” as the most significant actors of world politics. “External powers” refer either to some unspecified actors or the neighbors of Turkey. The textbooks claim that these actors “conspire” against Turkey so as to “take advantage” from the country’s geopolitical location.

### **5.2.3 The Location of World Politics**

Inter-state relations are viewed as the location where world politics takes place in the textbooks of National Security. However, inter-state relations are understood in an inward-oriented manner in that what happens within Turkey is made sense of with reference to the activities of those actors who reside outside of the country and their “collaborators” inside Turkey.

An inward-oriented view on inter-state relations suggests that what happens inside a country is shaped by the external actors and their behaviors. Consider, the take of the textbooks on Turkey: “even though there are internal conditions that lead to events taking place within a country, when we look at the Turkish history, it is seen that such conditions are mostly created by external interventions” (MGB, 1999:96). According to this inward-oriented view, while inter-state relations affect domestic politics, the reverse is not the case: that whether domestic politics affect the way in which inter-state relations are conducted is not elaborated upon.

This view on the location of world politics can be found in those parts of the textbooks where historical examples are provided to students. These examples underscore the role of “external powers” and their “domestic collaborators” in weakening various Turkish states existed in different eras. Consider, for example, the section which is titled as the “plots played upon Anatolia” (MGB, 1999: 96). This section explains the demise of the Ottoman Empire with reference to the policies followed by the “external powers”. Accordingly, the problems that the Ottomans experienced, such as internal rebellions, the decrease of the authority of state, weakening of the army, and societal unrest, were caused by the activities of “external powers”. In explaining the role of these powers in weakening the Empire, the textbooks point to the importance of the “Eastern Question”. The “Eastern Question” is defined as the 19<sup>th</sup> century foreign policy of powerful states, such as England, Germany, France, and Russia, against the Ottoman Empire. It is argued that these states with the pretext of protecting non-Muslim minorities within the Empire, tried to take advantage from the Ottoman lands. It is further suggested that the minorities also helped these foreign powers by creating problems within the Empire so as to trigger their intervention (MGB, 1999: 98).

Such policies of “external powers” did not only result in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In fact for the textbooks, the activities of the “Western” actors started in the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries are the root causes of Turkey’s contemporary problems (MGB, 2011: 138-139). For the textbooks, the most crucial problems of Turkey include “cultural degeneration”, “terrorism”, and “Islamic obscurantism”. The textbooks are of the view that all these problems are triggered by the “external” actors. Regarding “cultural degeneration”, the textbooks point to the globalization (which is considered as a process “controlled” by foreign states) that results in new “plots” played on Turkey. One of such “plots” can be seen in the attempts of the “erosion of language and culture” in Turkey, claim the textbooks. The actors playing these “plots” are defined as the “so-called intellectuals” who try to inject foreign words and linguistic styles into the vocabulary of Turkish youth so as to erode the Turkish culture (MGB, 2011: 137). These “so-called intellectuals” residing within the domestic sphere are thought to have connections with the “outside”.

Identified as another significant problem for Turkey, “religious obscurantism” is also considered to be triggered by the “external powers”. The textbooks explain this problem and why it is “used” by “external powers” as follows. Turkey is the only secular country with a Muslim population in the Middle East. Historically, this is “envied” by a number of Islamic countries within which Islam and secularism fail to coexist. Since the “success” of the Turkish case might help societies in the Middle East to question the ruling Islamic regimes, the leaders of those regimes (with the aim to protect their positions) attempt to damage Turkey’s secularism (MGB, 1999: 99). For the textbooks, Turkey’s secularism is also attacked by some other “powerful countries” having interests upon the Middle East. Those countries do not want Turkey to be an

example for the Middle East because this can bring an end to the “exploitative system” that they established in the region (MGB, 1999: 100).

To summarize, the National Security textbooks understand the location of world politics as taking place in state-to-state relations. However, inter-state relations are mostly understood in an inward-oriented manner in the sense that what happens in the “external affairs” is considered to shape the developments in the “domestic affairs”.

To summarize Section 3, an analysis on the conception of “the international” as found in the textbooks of National Security course indicates that “the international” is understood as a realm where there are various “hostilities” and where states “struggle” for their “survival”. This stems from the limited resources in the world. According to the textbooks, where and how this dynamic manifests itself is shaped by the geographical factors. In relation to that, Turkey, by virtue of its “unique” geographical position, is considered as “central” for how the world works. Nation states are considered as the main actors of “the international” by the textbooks. However, there are some nation states which are more important than others. These states are named as “external powers” which “conspire” against Turkey. Given such “bad intentions” that other actors of world politics have against Turkey, the textbooks suggest that the country should be strengthened both materially (i.e. militarily) as well as non-materially (i.e. through the “sacrifices” of its citizens). Lastly, the inter-state relations is identified as the location of “the international”. Yet, the demarcating lines between the internal and the external realms are not crystal clear for the textbooks in that what

happens domestically is almost always explained with reference to the policies of the “external” actors.

### 5.3 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the party programs and election manifestos of the various political parties from nationalist-right (MHP), center-right (ANAP, DYP, GP), Islamist-right (RP, FP, AKP), center-left (SHP, DSP, CHP), and pro-Kurdish (HADEP, DEHAP) and the textbooks of National Security courses in Turkey. The aim throughout the chapter was to examine the conceptions of “the international” as found in these sources. The documents were examined to see how the main dynamic of world politics, main actors of world politics, and the location of world politics are understood. In this conclusion, the commonalities and differences between different political parties’ conceptions of “the international” and the conception of “the international” as found in National Security textbooks are identified. The aim of this conclusion is to discuss the contours of the conceptions of “the international” in sources beyond IR in the context of Turkey.

To begin with the *main dynamic of world politics*, one significant similarity between different texts subject to analysis here is that they all identify “hierarchy” in world politics. Here, the term “hierarchy” broadly refers to “any system through which actors are organized into vertical relations of super-and subordination” (Zarakol, 2017:1). That said, the ways in which they define this hierarchy and understand the reasons for its emergence vary. For instance, for some of the political parties the source of such hierarchy is material. Certain center-left and pro-Kurdish parties emphasize the “inequalities” stemming from the structure of the world economy (Wallerstein, 1979; Hinnebusch, 2011) as the main cause of hierarchy. However, the majority of the

parties do not have proper definition of “hierarchy” or “inequality”, such as “political-military inequality” (Wendt & Friedheim, 1995) or “formal inequalities” which result in the loss of “juridical authority” of states (Hobson & Sharman, 2005; Donnelly, 2006, 2009). Instead their understandings are informed by the belief that the “double standards”, “hypocrisy”, “bad intentions” of the “powerful actors” shape what makes the world go around. This view is evident in nationalist-right, certain center-right, Islamist-right parties as well as in National Security textbooks. On the other hand, in some texts (in the documents of certain center-right and Islamist right political parties) although the fact that not every actor in world politics does have the equal opportunity to shape world politics by their own rules and norms is recognized, this point is not problematized. Instead, they underscore the necessity to follow those very rules and norms through various mechanisms, such as integrating with the neo-liberal world economy.

Another source of hierarchy is explained with reference to non-material factors, particularly with “civilization”. Some parties, as well as National Security textbooks, view civilization as a singular term, i.e. for them there is only one “universal” civilization (which renders others as “less-than-civilized”) (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011: 180-181), while others are of the view that there are multiple civilizations which either clash or coexist peacefully. In those texts where civilization is understood in a singular sense, the necessity to be a part of this civilization by “catching up with” its standards are underscored. In other texts where it is suggested that there are multiple civilizations in the world, the primacy of the “Western civilization” is problematized and the need for making other civilizations (particularly the “Islamic civilization”) powerful is emphasized.

That said, the prevalence of this idea which points to the existence of hierarchies in world politics stemming from various material and non-material factors does not mean that the texts do not view “the international” as an anarchical realm. The lack of central authority that regulates relations between different states, i.e. anarchy, is recognized by them in a sense that they are not equating “hierarchy” with a “global government” (Lake, 2007: 48) or “empire” (Donnelly, 2006: 143-144). For the actors in Turkey, even though the realm of “the international” is anarchical, the relations taking place in this realm are nevertheless hierarchical (Bilgin, 2016a; Donnelly, 2006; Hobson & Sharman, 2005; Lake, 2007; Wendt & Friedheim, 1995).

Regarding the second component of “the international”, i.e. the *main actors of world politics*, one common characteristic shared by all political parties and National Security textbooks is the centrality of states in world politics. That said, in all documents analyzed throughout the chapter, there is prevalent idea according to which there is a “diversity” between states in world politics. Similar to the first finding on hierarchy, this diversity is not only understood with reference to material power, but also to non-material factors. Accordingly, what makes some states more important than others in world politics is not only related with their material capabilities (such as economy, military, technology, population) but also with their non-material characteristics (such as civilizational identities or their abilities to influence and shape dominant ideas and representations in world politics). Sharing similar views on material forms of power, regarding the non-material power, parties’ understandings show differences. Consider, for instance, the power stems from belonging to a particular “civilization” whose strength in world politics is related with determining the prevalent norms and values. The parties of the center-right or center-left mostly associate this civilization with “Western civilization” and notions such as democracy,

human rights, and rule of law with it. In these texts it is argued that actors belonging to the “Western civilization” are the most significant actors in world politics not only because they possess material resources, but also they hold these values. On the other hand, the nationalist-right and Islamist-right parties suggest that there is another “civilization” which is “led” by Turkey. These parties believe that Turkey will be among the powerful actors of world politics by virtue of holding “unique” civilizational values, based either on Islam or the history and experiences of Turks and sometimes on both.

The second point regarding the views on the actors of world politics is that when making sense of the powerful actors, a majority of the political parties as well as National Security textbooks utilize vague notions, such as “external powers.” Keeping in mind that in conspiracy theories the actors often remain ambiguous in a sense that they are understood as a “secret, omnipotent individual or group covertly controls the political and social order” (Fenster, 2008: 1) or as “shadowy bosses who communicate behind the scenes to pull the world’s strings” (Nelson, 2003: 499), the usage of “external powers” in certain texts under analysis indicates the existence of conspiratorial thinking. This notion attributes the responsibility of the challenges both Turkey as well as other states face to these “external powers” (Aslandaş & Bıçakçı, 1995: 72-73; Bali, 1996, 2016). As a result, although the term “conspiracy” does not often appear in the documents under investigation, a conspiratorial understanding which relates “everything to a single subterranean plot, promising a comfortingly totalizing allegory that leave nothing to chance” (Boym as cited in Gray, 2010: 4; Gray, 2010: 8) is evident.

When in election manifestos, party programs, and textbooks the question of who constitutes the most important actors of world politics is openly defined, two



prevalent understandings emerge. First, powerful actors do not only refer to those “great powers” as they are conventionally understood in the literature. Accordingly, in the documents various references are made to certain “middle powers”, such as Israel, Iran, and Greece. The importance of these states stems from their relations with Turkey. In this sense, it can be argued that their significance is made sense of through the primacy that is attributed to the role of Turkey in world politics, i.e. Turkey’s being a “central” country either “geopolitically” or in civilizational terms by the political parties or by the National Security textbooks. Second, some of those important actors are considered both as “ideals” which Turkey should catch up with, yet at the same time they are also believed to be “conspirators” that Turkey should be cautious of. This view indicates an “ambivalence” towards these actors (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2012).

Finally, Turkey’s political parties and National Security textbooks view inter-state relations as the main *location of world politics*. For them, domestic and foreign realms are separate. Yet, the majority of the political parties, as well as National Security textbooks view inter-state relations in an inward-oriented manner. That is to say, they are primarily concerned with the incessant influence (understood mostly in negative terms) of the external realm on shaping the dynamics within the internal realm. That is to say in Turkey the dominant idea associates domestic developments, both in Turkey and elsewhere, with the activities of those actors residing “outside.” In fact, there is a widespread view shared by a majority of the documents analyzed throughout the chapter that world politics mostly manifests itself within a country, in this case Turkey.

The other view on the location of world politics understands inter-state relations with reference to the notion “interdependence” (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Particularly found in center-right political parties, this view has a positive take on the

increasing level of economic relations between countries. The last understanding, which sees the internal and external realms as convergent and their boundaries as “porous”, remains an exception and can only be observed in the pre-2007 documents of AKP and in pro-Kurdish parties’ election manifestos and party programs. Putting these exceptions aside, despite their ideological differences, the majority of the political parties in Turkey see the world in a way that overlooks the complex web of relations constituting world politics insofar as even globalization is understood through inter-state dynamics.



## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

The main aim of this dissertation was to seek answer to a question of how does “the international” look like when we examine the conceptions of “the international” in non-core contexts. As an example to non-core contexts, the dissertation focused on Turkey. In the dissertation it was argued that addressing this question is important for two reasons. Firstly, “the international” as a “distinct location of politics” (Jabri, 2013: 2) is central for IR by virtue of being the main “object of enquiry” for the discipline (Seth, 2013a: 29). Secondly, a burgeoning literature in IR suggests that the main concepts, categories, and understandings in IR do not reflect how world politics is experienced and understood in contexts beyond core (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002; Bilgin, 2016a; Grovogui, 2006; Jabri, 2013; Muppidi, 2004; Seth, 2011; Shilliam, 2011a). This literature argues that there is a necessity to go beyond this situation as non-core actors are not inconsequential for understanding world politics. In order to show this necessity, the dissertation started by looking at what is available in the literature: in IR

theories and in studies which engage with sources beyond IR to see how world politics is understood beyond core.

Building on these discussions, this dissertation examined the conceptions of “the international” in the context of Turkey by offering a novel analytical framework. It was underscored that in the literature no such framework has hitherto been developed. The proposed framework composed of two parts. The first part broke down the components of the conceptions of “the international” into three questions: what is the main dynamic of world politics, who are the main actors of world politics, and where does world politics take place? Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyzed the conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship by using these three questions. The second part of framework aimed to identify where to look at in order to see how “the international” is understood in a given context. By drawing on Critical Geopolitics literature, the dissertation offered to look at different sites including formal, practical, and official ones. As an example of formal site the dissertation looked at IR scholarship where “codified system of ideas and principals” (O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 194) about world politics are produced (Chapter 4). As an example to practical site, the dissertation analyzed party programs and election manifestos of political parties to see “the daily construction” of world politics (O’Loughlin et al., 2004a: 6) and as an example to official site, the dissertation examined textbooks through which the prevalent ideas of states are disseminated to the society (Chapter 5). The dissertation discussed how the main dynamics, main actors, and location of world politics were understood in these different sources. Below, firstly the summaries of each chapter is provided. Then, the conclusions derived from the chapters are discussed.

Following the Introduction, Part 1 (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) examined IR scholarship. Chapter 2 looked at the conceptions of “the international” as found in

mainstream and critical theories of IR. The analysis presented throughout the chapter aimed to see what is available in the literature and to provide basis for the discussions in the subsequent chapters. Two main findings emerged from this analysis. The first one is about the mainstream theories. An analysis on the mainstream theories showed that “anarchy” is central for their conceptions of “the international”. For these theories, the main dynamics of world politics (whether it is struggle for power, cooperation, or globalization) are shaped by anarchy. Since mainstream theories understand world politics from the vantage point of core actors (either great powers, economically advanced countries, or entities empowered as a result of globalization) the question whether such dynamics are experienced and understood in the same way in different parts of the world remains an under-examined subject in these theories. Relatedly, core actors are viewed as the main actors of world politics as they are the ones “powerful” enough to shape world politics. Mainstream theories have material conception of power in that power is understood with reference to military or economic capabilities. The relations taking place between these powerful actors are identified as the location of world politics. For instance, for Realism/Neorealism and NLI, inter-state relations between core states are viewed as where world politics unfolds. These states are considered as juridically equal actors by virtue of being sovereign. For those theories, states are like-units and unitary actors. For that reason what is happening within the borders of states are not central for understanding world politics. In this sense, for these two theories the boundaries separating internal and external realms are separate.

The second finding of Chapter 2 concerns critical theories of IR. The analysis on critical theories in the discipline showed that these theories challenge the primacy attributed to anarchy and the dynamics that it yields to by the mainstream theories in explaining how the world works. Although each theory defines the terms in different

ways, all critical theories see inequalities, hierarchies, oppressions, inclusion-exclusion mechanisms as central dynamics in world politics. In explaining these dynamics, critical theories focus on different forms of relations of power. “Power” is conceptualized in a broader way by critical theories (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Accordingly, power does not only refer to material capabilities of actors, but also includes various non-material means such as the ability to generate consent, create regimes of truth, or construct particular identities based on race, class, and gender, which all enable particular practices in world politics and lead to unequal or hierarchical relations. Although states remain as the central actors of world politics for critical theories, they do not take states either as like-units or unitary actors. Instead, they consider states as socially constructed entities which are autonomous neither from domestic nor global power structures. Critical theories do also problematize states from different perspectives and interrogate their role in the production and reproduction of hierarchies and inequalities in world politics. That said, some critical theories (such as Frankfurt School and Neo-Gramscian IR theories) also point to the importance of non-state actors, such as social movements, as they are of the view that these actors can bring about changes to the current configurations of power in world politics. Regarding the location of world politics, notwithstanding their differences, one significant similarity between critical theories is that they all problematize mainstream theories’ treatment of internal and external realms as separate domains. Albeit they explain the convergence between these two realms in different ways, critical theories agree on the idea that internal and external spheres are mutually constitutive. In relation to this, they go beyond identifying inter-state relations as the only location where world politics takes place.

Chapter 3 looked at the literature which criticizes IR's (both mainstream and certain critical theories) limitation in its engagement with non-core actors and contexts. In order to go beyond this situation, this literature analyzes sources beyond IR so as to see how world politics is understood in contexts beyond core. The chapter identified four types of sources utilized by scholars with this aim: traditional worldviews, everyday life experiences, writings of thinkers, and practices of policy makers. This chapter argued that there are two types of studies in this literature: one aims to find "alternative" conceptions of world politics (traditional worldviews and everyday life experiences) and the other aims to understand how already existing concepts and categories are understood and rearticulated in non-core contexts (thinkers and policy makers).

The chapter found out that the studies which are interested in "alternative" views point to the centrality of harmony over conflict, peaceful relations between different actors as opposed to struggle for power in the sources that they analyze. These constitute alternative dynamics through which a different world politics can be envisioned for this literature. Discussing the possibilities of constructing non-state communities by drawing on traditional worldviews (such as "Umma" in Islam or "Khalsa Panth" in Sikhism) is also central for this literature. By criticizing states for being an exclusionary form of communities, it is suggested that such alternatives might open up space for more inclusionary world politics. This view also led scholars to argue for thinking the location of world politics beyond inter-state relations. Through engaging with notions such as "Tianxia" (all under heaven) or "Mitakuye Oyasin" (all are my relatives) in the worldviews that they analyze, these scholars underscore the possibility to view "the international" as a realm in which actors in different domains are "interrelated" rather than separated.

The other strand in this literature does not aim to find such “alternative” conceptions of world politics in non-core contexts. Instead, it analyzes how existing concepts and categories are understood and rearticulated by thinkers or policy makers in non-core contexts. The chapter argued that this literature points to the centrality of hierarchies or inequalities in shaping different economic, political, and social relations in world politics. It also showed that the studies focusing on thinkers are particularly interested in novel meanings that non-core thinkers offer as a way to go beyond such unequal or exclusionary mechanisms. For instance, these studies underscore how the thinkers understand nation and state as two different entities, and define the former in a more inclusive way so as to overcome the exclusions caused by latter. This literature also suggests that for non-core thinkers, the internal and external realms are not separate from each other. They explain the porousness of boundaries with reference to how different thinkers envision world politics beyond the confines of their respective states and how they see individual, national, and global levels as interconnected.

The chapter also showed that somewhat different from the studies inquiring into writings of thinkers, the analysis on the practices of policy makers questions how and why “seemingly ‘similar’” ways of doing world politics exist in non-core contexts, what these practices tell us about the nature of inequalities and hierarchies in the world as viewed by policy makers, and their ways to cope up with such dynamics (Bilgin, 2016a; Biswas, 2011; Jabri, 2013). For instance, these studies examine the reasons for the enduring centrality of states in non-core actors’ views on world politics. Regarding the location of world politics, these studies show how practices of non-core actors are informed by both the dynamics within domestic politics, as well as within world politics.



Part 2 (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) examined the case of Turkey. Chapter 4 looked at the conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship in Turkey by examining the ways in which the main dynamics, main actors, and location of world politics are understood in the scholarly writings. Regarding the main dynamics of world politics different views were identified: the centrality of struggle for power, geopolitics, civilizations, globalization, and politics of difference. In the studies which view struggle for power, geopolitics, and civilizations as the main dynamics; states, and in particular great powers are understood as the main actors of world politics. The location of world politics is viewed as inter-state relations and internal and external relations are considered as separate in such studies. In the studies in which globalization and politics of difference are identified as the main dynamic of world politics, states as well as non-state actors are understood as central for how the world works. These studies point to the porousness of boundaries and analyze how domestic and world politics are convergent and how world politics takes place below and beyond state boundaries. This chapter also argued that in different studies even though similar terms (such as state, sovereignty, or globalization) are employed, these terms are understood in different ways which result in different conceptions of “the international”.

Chapter 5 looked at the election manifestos and party programs of political parties in Turkey and the textbooks of National Security courses. The chapter argued that although there are multiple conceptions of “the international” that can be found in these sources, there are also certain shared understandings. The main finding of this chapter was that the relations taking place in world politics are viewed as “hierarchical” in sources under analysis. In this respect, it is suggested that the main dynamic of world politics is understood as “hierarchy” and “inequality” even though

world politics is also considered as anarchical, in the sense that there is no “empire” or “world government” in world politics. Albeit some actors make sense of these dynamics in line with the definitions provided in the literature (such as the inequalities stemming from world political economy), some of the documents do not have such proper definitions on hierarchies or inequalities as they are of the view that these dynamics are caused by “conspiracies”, “hypocrisies”, “double standards” of certain powerful actors in world politics. Besides, it was argued that while some problematize inequalities and hierarchies in world politics, some believe that actors have to cope with them.

Concerning the actors of world politics, the analysis pointed to the centrality of states in world politics in sources under examination. The reason for this centrality stems from the belief that states are the only political communities which protect people from the effects of inequalities and hierarchies in the world. Since different states are affected differently from such inequalities and hierarchies in different ways, the actors are also of the view that there is a “diversity” between states, and only certain states can shape world politics, while others cannot. These states consist of not only from the ones possessing material (military or economic) capabilities, but also include those who shape the prevalent rules and norms in world politics and have certain characteristics, such as “civilizational” ones.

In the analysis it was also found out that powerful states of world politics are understood in different ways by different actors. For instance, in some documents these states are defined in a vogue and conspiratorial way by utilizing terms such as “external powers”. In those instances when powerful states are defined in an open manner, different states are pointed to. One finding in this regard is that the most significant actors as defined in these documents do not always coincide with the ways in which

powerful actors are understood by the mainstream theories of IR. For example, by virtue of considering Turkey as the “central” actor of world politics (either with reference to its “geopolitical position” or “civilizational identity”), significant states of world politics are assumed to be either Turkey’s neighbors, or states that Turkey has bilateral relations. In accordance with this view, certain “middle powers” (which according to mainstream theories are not so significant in shaping world politics) are considered as central for how the world works for the actors in Turkey.

As for the location of world politics, the chapter argued that the majority of the documents suggest that world politics unfolds in inter-state relations. However, inter-state relations are understood in an inward-oriented manner in that what happens inside Turkey is believed to be shaped by the external actors and their behaviors. In relation to viewing Turkey as “central” for world politics, there is also a prevalent view that the main dynamics of world politics manifest themselves within Turkish politics. In that sense, the discussions such as the effects of globalization in changing the locations where world politics takes place do not resonate with the understandings as found in the majority of the documents.

What are the conclusions that can be derived when the findings on the conceptions of the “international” in IR scholarship and in the case of Turkey are considered? One of the central conclusions derived from the findings is related with the conceptions as found in *mainstream IR theories and political parties and textbooks in Turkey*. This conclusion indicates that the conceptions of “the international” as found in mainstream approaches are not “universal”, but they only capture “particular” experiences of core actors. That is because, mainstream theories overlook the ideas and experiences of non-core actors. However, as shown in the case of Turkey, the ideas and experiences inform the way in which non-core actors make sense of the main

dynamic, main actors, and location of world politics. Accordingly, rather than viewing “the international” as an anarchical realm in which juridically equal sovereign states interact with one another (the prevalent view in mainstream theories), the actors in Turkey see “the international” as a realm in which certain powerful actors shape the main dynamics of world politics which negatively affect some others, particularly their independence and sovereignty. This finding reaffirms the argument that has already been existent in the literature. According to this argument non-core actors’ understandings of “the international” are informed by the “hierarchies” that they experience (Bilgin, 2016a).

Mainstream theories have also limitations when the views on the main actors of world politics in non-core contexts are considered. Accordingly, the way in which the main actors of world politics is made sense of depends on the experience of non-core actors, how they see their place in world politics, how they define their own problems, who they think trigger or can provide solutions to such problems, and what renders some actors as powerful in world politics as opposed to others. In this way, the prevalent idea in mainstreams theories according to which states are like-units and only some pre-defined actors are the main entities who shape the main dynamics of world politics is challenged by the findings in the case of Turkey. The way in which the location of world politics is understood also depends on similar ideas and experiences. For instance, the argument suggesting that globalization transformed the location of world politics below and beyond state boundaries (Rosenau, 1997; Scholte, 2005) do not resonate with how globalization is made sense of in the majority of the documents subject to analysis. In the texts that were analyzed globalization is viewed as a process which intensifies the division between actors who reside in the upper and lower strata of world hierarchies. As a result, resisting the changes brought by

globalization is considered as one way to cope up with unjust structure of world politics. Similarly, an inward-oriented conception of inter-state relations goes beyond mainstream theories' view on the location of world politics. While mainstream theories view internal and external realms as separate from one another, in the case of Turkey the prevalent understanding points a unidirectional view according to which the external realm shapes the internal realm, and not vice versa.

The second set of conclusions derived from the analysis concerns *critical IR theories and political parties and textbooks in Turkey*. By going beyond the centrality attributed to anarchy by the mainstream theories and underscoring the importance of inequalities, hierarchies, dominations, inclusion-exclusion mechanisms in world politics, critical theories provide grounds to go beyond seeing “the international” from the vantage point of core actors and to engage with experiences of actors beyond core. However, despite underscoring the centrality of hierarchies, inequalities, inclusion/exclusion mechanisms in making the world go around, not every critical theory analyzes how these mechanisms are understood or experienced in different parts of the world. For instance, Neo-Gramscian IR focuses on the centrality of core actors in shaping world politics and argues that the hegemony constructed in core contexts are then “emulated” in other parts of the world (Cox, 1993; Bieler & Morton, 2004; on this point also see Ling, 2002a: 57 and Hobson, 2007). It is particularly Postcolonial IR theories that one can find insights on how non-core actors experience and understand world politics. For one thing, Postcolonial IR captures both material as well as non-material hierarchies, inequalities, and injustices in world politics which stem from colonial relations of power. Postcolonial IR examines how non-core actors respond to such inequalities and thereby opens up spaces for studying the conceptions of “the international” in non-core contexts, the reasons for the emergence of such

conceptions, and their consequences for world politics. For instance, when the case of Turkey is considered, Postcolonial approaches help us to understand why and how actors in Turkey are both inspired by and at the same time suspicious of powerful actors in world politics (Ling, 2002a; Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2012).

Concerning the literature which analyzes *sources beyond IR and conceptions of “the international” in Turkey* two conclusions can be highlighted. Firstly, the findings suggest that “alternative” ways of seeing world politics, either in the sense that envisioning world politics based on “harmony” between different actors or going beyond states by forming post-statist communities, do not coincide with the views as found in Turkey. Neither in IR scholarship of Turkey nor in sources beyond IR, such engagements with “alternative” worldviews are evident. The second conclusion derived from this literature concerns those studies which focus on the already-existing views, particularly, those which analyze practices of policy-makers. These analyses, by identifying “hierarchy in anarchical society” (Bilgin, 2016a) as non-core actors’ conception of “the international”, highlighting the enduring centrality of states in world politics (Jabri, 2013) for non-core actors’ understandings of “the international”, and discussing the interplay between internal and external realms shaping the policy choices of non-core actors (Biswas, 2001) capture how “the international” is made sense of by actors beyond core. In this regard, it might be argued that practices of policy makers constitute one of the significant sources through which one can understand how “the international” is viewed in non-core contexts.

Regarding the *conceptions of “the international” in IR scholarship in Turkey*, one of the most significant conclusion is related with how scholarly writings in Turkey engage with IR scholarship in general and use concepts and categories as found in the discipline, particularly when examining the case of Turkey. What we see in certain

texts in IR scholarship in Turkey is the existence of the conceptions of “the international” as found in IR scholarship, particularly in mainstream theories. In this conception the main dynamics, actors, and locations of world politics are identified in a way to suggest that “the international” as found in the mainstream approaches in the discipline are relevant in different parts of the world, including Turkey. One can argue that the implicit assumption in such studies is the applicability of prevalent views in the discipline to different parts of the world, as experiences of all actors are considered to be similar in different contexts. Such an approach can be observed in those conceptions which views world politics through the prism of struggle of power, as evident in the early texts of IR or certain contemporary IR texts (Sönmezoğlu, 2000a) or certain analyses which identify globalization as the diffusion of “Western” economic or political models (Oran, 2001). Some other studies recognize that different actors, particularly Turkey, might have different experiences. These studies explain such experiences with reference to the “geopolitical location” of Turkey or its “civilizational identity” (Aydın, 1999; Erhan, 2003a; Davutoğlu, 2014). In such analyses, Turkey is deemed to be an “exceptional” case. When some of the prevalent views in sources beyond IR in Turkey are considered, one can suggest that these analyses help to reproduce the idea according to which Turkey is a “central country” where dynamics of world politics manifest themselves. Although remains limited in number, another group of studies argue that Turkey (as every other actor in the world) does have specific characteristics. Yet these characteristics do not emerge in a vacuum in the sense that they are not independent from the dynamics in world politics. Put differently, the contextual factors and the developments in world politics are not separate from one another in this view. For this reason, when analyzing Turkey both factors need to be taken into account without rendering Turkey as an example of

“universal” or “exceptional” case (Bilgin, 2004, 2005b, 2007; Rumelili, 2003, 2005, 2007). This type of studies opens space for studying the understandings as found in the context of Turkey, why these understandings emerge, and with what consequences. In this sense, it might be suggested that this kind of studies needs to be furthered as they offer correctives to the limitations of IR discipline in its engagement with non-core actors.





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## APPENDIX

Roberts and Binder (2009: 2139) suggest that in order to combine similar information from multiple surveys, first of all, the types of quantities of interest should be determined. In this case in hand, the type is “simple descriptive” since the characteristic of the quantities of interest is a single finite target population (IR scholars in Turkey). Secondly, the approach to estimation has to be assessed (Roberts and Binder 2009: 2140). One of the approaches is “separate approach” in which “one could compute separate estimates for each cycle and combine them afterwards by some sort of weighted average” (Wendt 2007). The data from the survey question that is subjected to the analysis is identified by utilizing this approach. This question is “except from you, who do you think conduct the most important/ influential/ interesting studies in the field of IR in Turkey in recent years?”

In the below-mentioned table, the number of votes given to each scholar in three different surveys is shown:



**Table 4: The Number of Votes Given to Each Scholar**

No	Scholar	Survey 1 (2007)	Survey 2 (2009)	Survey 3 (2011)	Total
1	Fuat Keyman	20	27	22	69
2	Mustafa Aydın	17	20	18	55
3	Pınar Bilgin	8	16	30	54
4	Ziya Öniş	2	11	20	33
5	Nuri Yurdusev	8	11	9	28
6	Ahmet Davutoğlu	6	11	10	27
7	Kemal Kirişçi	1	7	19	27
8	Faruk Sönmezoğlu	9	9	8	26
9	Ersel Aydınli	2	6	9	17
10	Atilla Eralp	5	11	0	16
11	Bahar Rumelili	1	4	11	16
12	Baskın Oran	5	9	0	14
13	Çağrı Erhan	3	7	0	10
14	İhsan Dağı	0	9	0	9
15	Mustafa Türkeş	3	0	0	3

**Explanations:**

1. At the initial stage, by combining data from three surveys, the top-ten names were identified.
2. The question that was analyzed for forming the above-mentioned table was taken from surveys which were conducted in different time periods (2007; 2009; 2011). Since the names of the respondents were not mentioned in the surveys, the possibility of participation of respondents more than one survey is

left out of the analysis. Besides, even a respondent participated more than one survey, it is possible for him/her to give different answers to this same question in different times. Therefore, again, this consideration is left out of the analysis.

3. The green boxes indicate the number of votes received by the scholars who were not on the top-ten list in the first and the second surveys. These numbers were provided by the pollsters as footnotes for the 2007 and 2009 surveys. However, as for the 2011 survey, pollsters did not provide the votes given to the scholars who were not listed in the top-ten. Therefore, in the initial stage, the scholars who were not listed in the top-ten of the 2011 survey were given “0” as it is shown in the orange boxes.
4. In order to be in the top-ten list in the above-mentioned table, scholars should at least have “16” votes. In this case, Atila Eralp and Bahar Rumelili, by receiving 16 votes, became the 10<sup>th</sup> scholars.
5. In the 2011 survey, Faruk Sönmezoğlu received “8” votes and became the 10<sup>th</sup> scholar. This shows us that the scholar who is in the 11<sup>th</sup> row could have received “7” votes, at best.

At this stage, in order to control the table, all the orange boxes were filled with the number of “7”.

**Table 5: Controlling the Number of Votes Given to Each Scholar**

No	Scholar	Survey 1 (2007)	Survey 2 (2009)	Survey 3 (2011)	Total
1	Fuat Keyman	20	27	22	69
2	Mustafa Aydın	17	20	18	55
3	Pınar Bilgin	8	16	30	54
4	Ziya Öniş	2	11	20	33
5	Nuri Yurdusev	8	11	9	28
6	Ahmet Davutoğlu	6	11	10	27
7	Kemal Kirişçi	1	7	19	27
8	Faruk Sönmezoğlu	9	9	8	26
10	Atila Eralp	5	11	7	23
12	Baskın Oran	5	9	7	21
9	Ersel Aydınli	2	6	9	17
13	Çağrı Erhan	3	7	7	17
11	Bahar Rumelili	1	4	11	16
14	İhsan Dağı	0	9	7	16
15	Mustafa Türkeş	3	0	7	10

As it can be seen in the table, even the scholars who were not listed in the top-ten in 2011 survey would have received the highest vote (7) that they could have received:

- The names in the top-eight are not changing.
- Mustafa Türkeş, even he would have received “7” votes, could not be in the top-ten.
- Without knowing the number of votes received by Atila Eralp, Baskın Oran, Çağrı Erhan, and İhsan Dağı in the 2011 survey; we could not know which 2 of the 6 scholars (Atila Eralp, Baskın Oran, Ersel

Aydınlı, Çağrı Erhan, Bahar Rumelili, İhsan Dağı) could be in the top-ten.

6. Depending on the above-mentioned information, rather than the top-ten, the top-eight can be determined.
7. However, in order to increase the representativeness of the sample, rather than analyzing the top-eight scholars in the list, the top-fourteen names (for whom there is a possibility to be in the top-ten if the 2011 survey's results were published) were all analyzed.

