

EXPLORING RECIPES  
FOR HIGHER FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION  
IN TURKEY:  
INSIGHTS FROM SOUTHERN EUROPE  
WITH A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Ankara  
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A. ONUR KUTLU      EXPLORING RECIPES FOR HIGHER FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION      Bilkent University 2019  
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To my daughter



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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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
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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE DEPARTMENT OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY  
ANKARA


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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### EXPLORING RECIPES FOR HIGHER FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY: INSIGHTS FROM SOUTHERN EUROPE WITH A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece achieved remarkable increases in their FLFP rates as of the 1980s. Turkey, however, experienced constant decline for decades, and is still featuring sluggish rates. With such sluggish rates, Turkey has by far the lowest FLFP level for a very long time in Europe. Hence, with a configurational comparative analysis and comparative-historical case analysis, I aim to derive lessons for Turkey from other South European countries for the achievement of higher FLFP levels. I do so by relying on traditional common traits shared by these five countries of Southern Europe. Owing to the comparative advantage of exploring multiple configurational causation based on *small-n* comparison with the suitably comparable cases, this dissertation, consequently, unravels the South European pathways for a steeper FLFP rise. Such exploration relies on the application of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a method in this study.

Following the analysis, I show that there exist two causal pathways to rising FLFP in Southern Europe. Either strong left party rule (Pathway I) or increasing childcare enrolment and university education among women and an expanding service sector

(Pathway II) can bring about steeper rise of FLFP in Turkey. This study shows the role of left parties in rising FLFP in Southern Europe, which has been rarely featured in the literature. Additionally, this research, relying an analysis on complex causal conjunctures, also shows the necessity of presence of conditions existing together to pull more women in the labour force.

Keywords: Female Labour Force Participation, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Service Sector Employment, Social Care, Tertiary Education

## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE’DE DAHA FAZLA KADIN İŞGÜCÜ KATILIMINA YÖNELİK ÇÖZÜMLERİ KEŞFETMEK: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI NİTEL ANALİZ İLE GÜNEY AVRUPA’DAN DERSLER

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Portekiz, İspanya, İtalya ve Yunanistan, 1980'lerden itibaren kadınların işgücüne katılım oranlarında kayda değer artışlar sağlamıştır. Ancak Türkiye, on yıllar boyunca sürekli bir düşüş yaşamıştır ve halihazırda ağır ilerleyen oranlar göstermektedir. Söz konusu düşük oranlar ile Türkiye, Avrupa'da çok uzun bir süredir en düşük kadın işgücüne katılım seviyesine sahiptir. Bu nedenle, nitel karşılaştırmalı analiz (QCA) ve karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analiz ile Türkiye’de daha yüksek kadın işgücüne katılım seviyelerinin elde edilmesi için diğer Güney Avrupa ülkelerinden ders çıkarmayı hedeflemekteyim. Bunu, bu beş Güney Avrupa ülkesi tarafından paylaşılan ortak özelliklere dayanarak yapmaktayım. Uygun şekilde karşılaştırılabilir durumlarla az sayıda örnekle yapılan karşılaştırmaya dayanan çoklu konfigürasyon nedenselliklerinin araştırılmasının karşılaştırmalı üstünlüğü nedeniyle, bu tez, sonuç olarak, daha dik bir kadın işgücüne katılım oranı artışına yönelik Güney Avrupa’nın izlediği yolları ortaya koymaktadır. Bu tür araştırma, nitel karşılaştırmalı analiz (QCA) uygulamasının bu çalışmada bir yöntem olarak uygulanmasına dayanmaktadır.

Analizin ardından, Güney Avrupa'da yükselen kadın işgücüne katılım oranında iki nedensel yol olduğunu göstermektedir. Ya güçlü sol parti varlığı (Yol I) ya da erken dönem çocuk bakım kaydının artması ve kadınların üniversite eğitiminde artış ve



geniřleyen bir hizmet sekt6r6 (Yol II), T6rkiye'de kadın iřg6c6ne katılım oranının daha da artmasını saęlayabilir. Bu alıřma, literat6rde yeterince bahsedilmeyen sol partilerin G6ney Avrupa'da kadın iřg6c6ne katılımını artırmadaki rol6n6 g6stermektedir. Ek olarak, karmařık nedensel konjonkt6rler 6zerine yapılan bir analize dayanan bu arařtırma, aynı zamanda iřg6c6ne daha fazla kadın ekmek iin kořulların bir arada varolmasının gereklilięini de g6stermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hizmet Sekt6r6 İstihdamı, Kadınların İřg6c6ne Katılım Oranı, Nitel Karřılařtırmalı Analiz (QCA), Sosyal Bakım, Y6ksek6ęretim

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
csQCA	crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
ECEC	Early Education and Care
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESPN	European Social Policy Network
EU	European Union
FLFP	Female Labour Force Participation
fsQCA	fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INCoDe	Iniciativa Nacional Competência Digitais (National Digital Competence Initiative)
INUS	Insufficient but Necessary part of a Causal Combination which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient in Producing the Outcome
LOGSE	Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo (General Organic Law of the Educational System)
MoLSSF	Ministry of Labour, Social Services and Family
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONMI	National Body for Protection of Motherhood and Childhood
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PCI	Italian Communist Party
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
SESM	South European Social Model

STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics  
UDI Union of Italian Women  
UN United Nations



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This dissertation analyses the driving forces behind rising female labour force participation (FLFP) rates in Southern Europe since the 1980s. There exist unequivocal commonalities in labour market and welfare state regimes among all South European countries. However, while Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece achieved remarkable increases in their FLFP rates as of the 1980s, Turkey experienced constant decline for decades, and is still featuring sluggish rates. In addition, Turkey has by far the lowest FLFP level for a very long time in Europe and among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (OECD, 2018). Turkey also ranks 130 out of 149 countries, and scores lowest in the category of economic participation and opportunity due to its marginally low FLFP (World Economic Forum, 2018). The case in Turkey is particularly puzzling given that such low rates exist in a middle-income country with the 64<sup>th</sup> largest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the world (IMF, 2018).

With a configurational comparative analysis and comparative-historical case analysis, I, in this dissertation, aim to derive lessons for Turkey from other South European countries to achieve higher FLFP levels. I do so by relying on traditional common traits shared by these five countries of Southern Europe. This dissertation, consequently, unravels the conditions behind the South European patterns of FLFP development. Such an analysis also provides accounts on why FLFP in Turkey

remained at strikingly low levels and why a strong bounce-back did not occur with a steeper rise in FLFP rates.

This dissertation shows the comparative advantage of exploring multiple configurational causation based on *small-n* comparison with the suitably comparable cases. The advantage relies majorly on the fact that such an analysis takes into account of interactive nature of the conditions. Following the analysis, I show that there exist two causal pathways to rising FLFP in Southern Europe. Either strong left party rule or increasing childcare enrolment and university education among women and an expanding service sector can bring about steeper rise of FLFP in Turkey.

In this introduction, I, first, portray how this research builds upon the state-of-the-art. Furthermore, I explain the methodology, cases and time frame of the study by also providing accounts on the rationale behind the particular methodological preference.

### **1.1. Emergence of ‘New Welfare States’**

The post-World War II welfare states in advanced industrialised countries had largely been modelled on the male breadwinner-female carer model, which had attributed women the main role of unpaid work in the private domain and men paid labour in public life. In time, this male-breadwinner/female-carer model drastically transformed in the industrialised world (Bradshaw & Finch, 2010). The expansion of the post-industrial economy engendered increased FLFP. These dramatic shifts brought about a host of new social risks. Most of these dramatic changes are rooted in or around the institution of family: changing family structure, increasing levels of FLFP, widespread youth unemployment, and significant entry-barriers to housing markets. Thus, all of these shifts led to new needs for social care arrangements, reconciliation of work and family life and so on. All of these new needs gave also way to transformations in the classic welfare state model (Bradshaw & Finch, 2010).

As the conditions prevalent in post-war societies have now dramatically changed, we have seen the rise of the ‘New Welfare States’. The ‘new’ aspect of these welfare states is the change in the allocation of welfare production, that is, revised division of responsibilities between markets, families and government especially related to

provision of caring (Esping-Andersen, 2002). This was mainly because ‘traditional caring obligations contradict women’s employment abilities’ (Esping-Andersen, 2002:12). ‘New welfare states’, therefore, responded with a set of social care policies. The increasing presence of women in the labour market in tandem with the emergence of feminist movements, discourses, initiatives and policies for gender equality in labour markets and equal sharing of unpaid work in households brought these care policies into the political agenda in virtually all contemporary societies. These policies include reconciliation of work and family life initiatives such as caring arrangements, targeting increased maternal employment, refrainment from relying on family for social provision. In political and public debates, eminent scholars have also been calling for more emphasis on ‘New Welfare State’ (Esping-Andersen, 2002). FLFP, therefore, is at the core of policy developments and political debates surrounding contemporary ‘New Welfare States’. Rising FLFP, therefore, is both a facilitator of the emergence of this new welfare state and constitutes to be its main area of intervention.

## **1.2. FLFP in Context: The ‘Middle-Income Trap’**

Gradually expanding in the post- World War II period, labour in many countries shifted out of agriculture and engaged in wage employment in expanding manufacturing and service sectors (Mehra & Gammage, 1999). The transformation has also been prevalent in terms of FLFP. Although the increase in FLFP is a contemporary worldwide phenomenon with some exceptions (Bishop, Heim & Mihaly, 2009), countries differ with respect to their FLFP levels and characteristics. In high-income countries, women tend to have higher overall levels of education (in particular higher tertiary education levels) and those countries feature low share of agricultural sector and shrinking industrial sector in total output and increasing share of service sector in the economy and high levels of publicly funded caring arrangements. Middle-income countries, however, albeit following a direction towards high-income countries with respect to these features and differentiating themselves from low-income countries, face significant challenges that are popularly summarised as the ‘middle-income trap’. Such ‘middle-income trap’, it is widely argued, stands as a barrier to achieving higher levels of tertiary education attainment,

women's participation in the labour force, and publicly funded childcare. Related to labour markets, middle-income trap signals both quality (low skills level of the labour force and the need for upgrading the quality) and quantity (low levels of participation) problems. Countries that are 'trapped' cannot advance towards becoming high-income countries as they get stuck with traits resembling those in low-income countries. Rising FLFP, hence, is an important facilitator for overcoming such a trap. This dissertation, by seeking to elicit recipe for Turkey (which features to be a trapped middle-income country) for higher FLFP levels, proposes also means to advance towards becoming a high-income country.

### **1.3. Constructing the Puzzle**


While high-income countries gradually become 'new welfare states' in response to new social risks, middle-income countries experiencing the 'middle-income trap' face difficulties in moving forward towards becoming new welfare states. There exist certain factors which enabled high-income countries achieve the transformation towards becoming a 'new welfare state'. Although growing body of literature has investigated new traits associated with the 'new welfare states', more research is needed to unravel those factors influential in achieving such transformation towards becoming a 'new welfare state'. Such research should also draw contextual conclusions with due consideration of context-specific circumstances. With this dissertation, I precisely hope to contribute to such body of scholarly research which seeks to analyse factors bringing about transformation towards high-income status. Transformation towards high-income status, however, necessitates a variety of pull factors. In this dissertation, I pick up and study one, which is the achievement of high FLFP.

Since one of the most salient features of building 'new welfare state' is FLFP rise following socio-economic transformation in society, a trapped middle-income country cannot demonstrate steady increase in its FLFP levels. It cannot achieve high levels of FLFP since this would be expected to occur as a result of a transformation process experienced by high-income countries. Hence, the role of FLFP as a pre-

condition for the transformation towards ‘new welfare states’ justifies my preference for studying FLFP.

In this dissertation, I focus on FLFP patterns in Southern Europe. This is because, while Turkey, in terms of its FLFP levels, has not been successful in moving up the ladder, South Europeans managed to do so a few decades earlier. Turkey also experienced a constant decline of FLFP as of the 1980s as opposed to the trend of increase in other South European countries. It has by far the lowest FLFP level for a very long time in Europe and among OECD countries (OECD, 2018). In the Global Gender Gap Report by World Economic Forum (2018), Turkey ranks 130 out of 149 countries, and scores lowest in the category of economic participation and opportunity due to its marginally low FLFP. Furthermore, among OECD countries, Turkey remains as the country with the largest income loss due to the labour force participation gender gap. Had Turkey had no gender gap in its labour force, its national income per capita would have increased by an enormous magnitude of 25% (Cuberes, Newiak & Teignier, 2017).

The situation in Turkey is puzzling since such low rates exist in a large economy, which ranks as the seventeenth largest in 2017. There are striking contrasts in FLFP between those in Turkey and other members of G20. Second, there exist widespread commonalities in labour market and welfare state regimes in Turkey and other South European countries. However, although traditionally it has had such common traits with South European countries, it is far from the South European patterns of FLFP development in terms of both pace and structure. Third, although structural factors may account for the variation in timing in achieving the increase in FLFP, what remains to be unexplained are observations that decline in Turkey lasted for an extremely long period of time, FLFP remained at strikingly low levels and the bounce-back emerged exceptionally late. Hence, Turkey presents a pattern of *sluggish* FLFP. Figure 1 presents this striking contrast. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that FLFP rates in Turkey conspicuously remained higher than rates in Southern Europe until the 1980s.



Source: OECD.Stat, Dataset: Labour Force Survey - Sex and Age Indicators (OECD, 2018)

**Figure 1 South European female labour force participation rates, 15 to 64**

**Table 1 South European Female Labour Force Participation Rates before the 1990s, 15 to 64**

	1960	1968	1974	1987
<b>Portugal</b>	19.9	26.8	51.2	56.9
<b>Spain</b>	26.0	27.7	33.0	37.7
<b>Italy</b>	38.7	33.0	33.7	42.9
<b>Greece</b>	41.6	33.4	32.6	41.7
<b>Turkey</b>	73.5	61.9	52.0	38.1

Source: OECD historical statistics (OECD, 2002)

The literature on FLFP in Turkey cannot capture this striking divergence. The literature also does not account for why Turkey could not follow the South European trend. Existing studies explain the decreasing FLFP in Turkey by emphasising the role of structural factors. However, they do not explain why the country featured *extremely low levels* lingeringly, why it lasted conspicuously long to attain bounce-back, and why a strong bounce-back, albeit being late, could not occur. Although new body of literature reflected on a couple of policy interventions required such as



care provision, they only picked up a factor, and tried to explain descriptively how FLFP can increase by referring to that factor without necessarily applying causal comparative analysis. Hence, in an overall analysis, the literature related to FLFP in Turkey does not account for the pathway(s), grounded in sound causal comparative analysis, Turkey should direct itself to attain higher levels of FLFP.

#### **1.4. From a Puzzle to Research Questions**

The research questions in this study seek a thorough understanding of the Turkish case with a comparative analysis with other South European countries related to FLFP. The research questions also look for the assessment of the impact of conditions on FLFP with a qualitative comparative analysis of Southern Europe including Turkey. Thus, I intend to explore prospects for Turkey relying on a qualitative comparative analysis. With the consideration of the eminent divergence of Turkey from other countries of Southern Europe concerning FLFP patterns, the first research question of this study is the following: *How do potential determinants of FLFP vary in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey since the early 1980s?*

This question aims at investigating the status of Turkey compared to South European countries on critical conditions, i.e. tertiary education level, share of service sector employment. The comparative case analysis in Chapter 3 as well as raw data pertaining to the conditions in Chapter 4 provide response to this question.

The second research question, which aims at providing explanatory analysis, is: *Under what conditions FLFP rates took-off in these South European countries?*

Associated with the first two questions, the third question is: *What can we learn from rising FLFP rates in Southern Europe for Turkey's sluggish rates?* Lastly, the fourth question is: *Through what kind of policies can Turkey's FLFP take-off?*

The questions are associated with the research puzzle I highlighted above. The first research question, relying mainly on comparative case analysis and collection of raw data pertaining to the conditions, shows whether a country has or had conditions favourably influencing FLFP. Such a descriptive level analysis enables pinpointing how countries diverge or converge related to those conditions. The second, third and

fourth questions, on the other hand, require the results of qualitative comparative analysis although comparative case analysis in Chapter 3 provides contributory accounts especially concerning the question of *What can we learn from rising FLFP rates in Southern Europe for Turkey's sluggish rates?*

### **1.5. Methodology, Case Selection and Timeframe**

This dissertation relies on qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), specifically fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and comparative historical case analysis. Concerning QCA, I adopt inductive mode of reasoning given that I apply fsQCA with five conditions (subsequently decreased to four) that I derive from the existing state-of-the-art. The conditions are *political party commitment*, *political party configuration*, *take-up of childcare facilities*, *share of service sector employment* and *tertiary level education among women*, and the outcome is *FLFP rate*. The number of conditions is suitable for a QCA given that too many conditions result in excessive logical remainders, and also complex solutions which do not enable simple causal inferences. I detail the conceptualisation of the conditions and the outcome as well as their calibration in Chapter 5. Comparative historical case analysis (in Chapter 3), on the other hand, which methodologically puts particular emphasis on process and temporal dimensions (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015), offers, in this dissertation, broader insight on issues surrounding FLFP. Relying on 'within-case method' (Lange, 2012) particularly, I seek to explore peculiar characteristics in each country in more detail.

With respect to case selection, the countries that I included in this study are Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. I selected the cases purposively (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) as required by the methodological and substantive principles of QCA. Given that the number of cases in this research features to be *small-n*, I rely on case-oriented QCA rather than condition oriented QCA. Although condition orientation with large-N analyses is also possible within QCA (Thomann & Maggetti, 2017), case-oriented QCA is more appropriate for this research considering the research questions and scope of this study. This is because, first, I intend to figure out explanatory conditions behind FLFP patterns in South European context to derive

pathways for Turkey. Hence, the cases reflect the entire population of South European countries since I analyse the conditions under which FLFP rises in all countries that make up the South European Social Model (SESM). The rationale behind deriving pathways for Turkey within SESM comparison is because South European countries are the most similar cases which Turkey may take as model. Furthermore, many scholars incline to incorporate Turkey into SESM owing to certain commonalities, which justify the comparison of Turkey with SESM. The case selection, therefore, follows Schmitter's formula (2008) in which he refers to the selection of the cases based on the same level of aggregation and the same formal status within the world social and political system. Given also that social, cultural and institutional factors, including welfare state systems, influence FLFP significantly, cross-country analysis on FLFP among the diverse cases fails to explore the variation (Tzannatos, 1999; Verick, 2014). Lastly, another relevance of within-SESM comparison is that they excellently present features of change, which enable me to analyse the factors behind the change (that is, FLFP increase).

Concerning the time frame of the study, one of the significant features of this research is its being inter-temporal cross-national comparative analysis. The study covers two time periods for all cases. The main determinant of the first period is low FLFP, and high(er) FLFP denotes the second period. Countries of Southern Europe, except Turkey, features post-transitory rates in the second period with high FLFP levels. For the case of Turkey, a 'post-transition' period is not relevant. Hence, I take the first period as the period in which the decrease of FLFP halts. It would not be valid to take Turkey's first period with the same as other four countries (that is, the 1980s) because socio-economic figures in Turkey at that time would not provide meaningful comparison. FLFP was declining up until the early 2000s, thus, the rate for FLFP taken at any time before then would still reflect the influence of high share of agricultural employment among women. The outcome, in that respect, would have been misleading. This is because, although Turkey presents similar rates during the 1980s with some countries of Southern Europe, such rates are not results of a transformation or development achieved in society and economy. Since this study seeks to discern the influential factors behind the FLFP increase, data used should be comparable.

To my knowledge, this research is the first attempt to incorporate a country as two different cases in two different periods in the same QCA. Uniquely, I analyse all countries as two different cases, each embodying two periods rather than conducting two separate QCA for these two periods. In technical terms, with this approach, I treat each country as two distinct countries in the analysis. In doing so, I aim at minimising the period effect on the outcome through integrating in the analysis the scores of a country in two different periods, both of which may potentially vary. The rationale is, in fact, the limitation of QCA in gaining longitudinal inference. Relying on the recent insights from the literature (Rihoux, 2006), accordingly, I incorporated inter-temporality in the analysis stressing also the significance of temporal processes in interpreting complex dynamic phenomena (Hall, 2016).

#### **1.6. Potentials (and Pitfalls) of QCA**

The main rationale for using QCA as a research method for this study relies on both the scope of this research itself, and the merits of QCA as a method. First, I aim to reveal causal pathways and therefore I aim at causal inference. There are two prominent approaches for achieving causal inference. The first is quantitative method seeking ‘net effects’ of variables (Emmenegger, 2011; Ragin, 1987). The second approach, which I adopt in this project, is QCA which aims to reveal configurations producing outcomes. Given my objective of coming up with the recipes for Turkey based on causal comparative analysis, QCA is the most suitable option as opposed to conventional quantitative methods. QCA for this research is more relevant compared to regressions given also that my research question is of the ‘causes-of-effects’ type (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). As scholars argue, QCA functions better when researcher seeks to analyse the main causes of an outcome (Schneider & Eggert, 2014). QCA also offers researchers new causal propositions based on combinations of conditions and, therefore, helps them contribute to existing research (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009; Gjørlberg, 2009).

Second, there may be complex relations among the conditions influencing FLFP. That is, “causal conditions may modify each other's relevance or impact” (Ragin,

2008b: 178). Hence, revealing the *interactive* nature of the conditions is of primary interest to this research. This particular interest stems from the absence of a study in the literature providing an exhaustive account of constellations of conditions bringing about FLFP change. This absence is striking because scholars time and again emphasise that multiple factors collectively (rather than individually) affect rising FLFP. For instance, Thévenon (2013) highlights the interacting effects of institutions and policies and hence emphasises importance of complementarity nature of all these factors. This type of approach by Thévenon (2013), which emphasises interacting pairs of policy instruments, can suitably be analysed with a QCA study. This is because QCA allows for contextual influence to be observed and it is capable of revealing conjunctions of conditions (above and beyond the degree of effect of isolated factors) (Befani, 2013). Despite these arguments for a configurational approach, scholars have yet to empirically explore the complex nature of the causal relationships behind this outcome. Furthermore, QCA allows for analysing necessity and sufficiency of potential conditions for an outcome. This adds another dimension to the analysis by providing deeper causal insight on the influence of the conditions and their interactions. In addition to suggesting pathways to the outcome, therefore, with QCA, it becomes possible to discern ‘necessary’ and/or ‘sufficient’ conditions or combinations of conditions for outcomes of interest.

Third, QCA uniquely enables the study of small number of cases comparatively in a ‘meaningfully comparable’ universe. I explore the conditions that may bring sustainable increases in FLFP in Turkey in comparative South European context. Apart from the design of this study, deriving conclusions for Turkey should be done based on appropriate comparisons. The framework of this study, in this respect, suits well one of the major principles of QCA, which is the selection of ‘meaningfully comparable’ cases (Emmenegger, Kvist & Skaaning, 2013).

Fourth, the dissertation follows Ragin’s approach to causality – that causality is context- and conjuncture-sensitive rather than being permanent (Ragin, 1987). This understanding implies that QCA necessitates in-depth case-based knowledge for revealing the complexity of the cases. Hence, my goal of gathering in-depth case analyses for five countries of Southern Europe together with providing a causal inference, therefore, suits perfectly with this unique feature of QCA. The design of

this study also reflects such an understanding of causality being context- and conjuncture-sensitive since this dissertation seeks recipes for Turkey based on an analysis of suitably comparable cases. Such comparative analysis, in this respect, recognises the importance of contextual knowledge to elicit causal inferences.

Lastly, I am aware that the same set of conditions bringing about rising FLFP in a country may not lead to the same outcome in another. Hence, unfolding the *equifinality* is critical for complete understanding of social phenomena. Configurational research allows identification of possible diverse sets of determinants leading to the outcome. For my research specifically, unravelling *equifinality* is important to discern all possible recipes and also to pinpoint within-model variation. Despite common traits shared by the countries of Southern Europe, within-model variation may be the case concerning the attainment of higher FLFP.

Although QCA offers a variety of merits as I outline above, some scholars argue for certain pitfalls of this method too. First, they perceive the analysis of causal complexity in QCA as deterministic (Liebersson, 1991; Little, 1996). Second, some scholars also argue that dichotomisation of data leads to loss of information. Although introduction of fsQCA, which enables interval scaling, by Ragin served to reduce such loss of information, some still hold that reliability of QCA depends highly on the appropriateness of fuzzy membership scoring (Klir & Yean, 1995). However, despite these criticisms, scholarly research relied on QCA in growing numbers over the years. Many scholars have proposed several recommendations to improve the method and its application. Hence, while applying QCA in my research, I duly considered the criticisms and proposed recommendations to minimise possible fallacies. Respective chapters in the dissertation detail key principles I adhered to and the rationale behind.

## **1.7. Contributions of This Dissertation**

The contributions of this study can be summarised in substantive, theoretical and methodological terms. Substantively, first, the study contributes to the comparative welfare state research by stressing the implications of welfare state policies. I do this with the incorporation of one condition, take-up of childcare services, and this

incorporation enables the observation of a condition, directly associated with welfare state policies, with its influence on FLFP. Furthermore, again substantively, in line with the gendering welfare state literature, this study proves the relevance and importance of looking at welfare state policies through gendered lenses. As I show in the rest of the dissertation, designing policies through gendered lenses plays a remarkable role considering the influence of those policies on women. Therefore, this study has substantive policy-relevant implications for policymakers as well as policy practitioners.

Theoretically, I build on the now-conventional propositions of an emerging body of literature on ‘institutional complementarities’ where interacting institutions are essentially seen as ‘creat[ing] complementarities between policies’. “Policy measures interacting with each other” in a given subject area, this literature suggests, increase (or decrease) their relative efficiency (or inefficiency) (Thévenon, 2016: 482-483). The extent to which policies are complementary also depends on the overall institutional environment as demonstrated very well in sister literatures on ‘welfare state regimes’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990), ‘labour market regimes’ (Esping-Andersen & Kolberg, 1992), ‘production regimes’ (Huber and Stephens, 2001), ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and recently ‘growth regimes’ (Hall, 2015). Hence, my research design relies on two sets of lessons drawn from this literature: (i) there are theoretical grounds for analysing scope conditions when studying developments in policies and structures within a regimes-approach, and (ii) policies and structures have interacting effects which can best be captured by configurational approaches in solid ways.

Second, again theoretically, with respect to the literature on FLFP, this study contributes to the literature by emphasising the coterminous nature of the conditions, which have traditionally been studied in isolation from one another. Hence, in the South European context, this study enables causal inferences in the context of FLFP with due consideration of such nature of the conditions. In doing so, this dissertation reveals the standalone significance of one condition, which is the left party strength. Considering the theoretical arguments on low levels of FLFP in Turkey, and also FLFP rise in other countries of Southern Europe, scholars overlooked the role of left

partisanship. This study, therefore, distinctively stresses the potential role of left parties on FLFP increase. This is another theoretical contribution of this study.

Theoretically, third, with regard to the SESM, this dissertation widens the scope of analysis on the model by presenting an examination on FLFP patterns within the model. To my knowledge, no study yet comparatively analysed the model in the perspective of FLFP developments. In a similar vein, this dissertation provides extensive accounts on political economies of each country with a comparative historical case analysis. Even though attribution of South European countries within a model has long past, the incorporation of gender and discussions on social care policies into the analysis of SESM is new. Hence, although the study focuses on FLFP and factors influencing FLFP in these countries, it also presents analyses on related other areas such as education, defamilisation, welfare state and political party configuration. Such historical comparative analysis that I present in Chapter 3 contributes to the existing state-of-the-art by providing accounts on several other dimensions. Additionally, causal inference based exclusively on SESM is the first attempt in the state-of-the-art, which may facilitate further research on model-specific research. Furthermore, this dissertation theoretically contributes to the analysis of SESM by examining within-model variation as well. I analyse such within-model variation thanks to QCA since the method allows the understanding of all possible pathways leading to the outcome. Hence, this dissertation shows also variation within Southern Europe in achieving higher FLFP by proposing two pathways to the outcome.

Fourth, also theoretically, concerning the studies focusing exclusively on Turkey, this study contributes by offering a distinctive descriptive and explanatory analysis to the discussions on FLFP problem in Turkey. Distinctively, this study, for the first time, includes Turkey in a causal comparative analysis in the context of FLFP. The findings of this study enable causal inferences applicable to Turkey. Moreover, the detailed case studies presented for each country offers a thorough cross-country comparison. This comparison, distinctively, explores the actors and processes behind the developments in other South European countries, for instance, with regard to the introduction of the defamilisation policies. Hence, apart from the outcome, the case studies also provide policy models for Turkey.



Another theoretical contribution is that this research incorporates both FLFP, as the outcome, and childcare, as one of the conditions, into its analysis owing to defamilisation literature. This is unique in the literature focusing on low levels of FLFP in Turkey. Although childcare was pointed as one of the factors which could explain low level of FLFP in Turkey, the concept of defamilisation has not yet been incorporated into comparative empirical research in Turkey. Thus, childcare statistics and conditions were only referred as tools for descriptive analysis to contrast Turkey with other countries including the countries of Southern Europe. However, childcare has not been conceived as an integrated and core element in a research at explanatory level. With this study, it becomes part of the independent variable and constituent element of FLFP analysis. This type of analysis, surely, owes very much to defamilisation literature, and this is the reason why I provide the literature review on defamilisation at length.

However, this study does not just benefit from the defamilisation literature. It also builds on this literature by taking the concept of defamilisation as independent variable and revisiting discussions over conceptualisation and operationalisation. It advances the defamilisation literature by initiating the use of the concept of defamilisation in causal analysis as independent variable (or condition in QCA terms). In so doing, I seek to identify influential conditions and aim at figuring out the conditions for higher FLFP in South European context. Lastly, the study advances the literature on FLFP in Turkey by also situating such area of research into a recent international scholarly debate on defamilisation.

Methodologically, I contribute to the literature in four ways. First, I present a model taking into account the complex causal configurational nature of interacting conditions and treat it with fsQCA. Although applications of fsQCA in social sciences have become more frequent in recent years, deriving a model out of fsQCA is relatively a new approach. Second, I distinctively analyse all countries as two different cases, each representing two periods rather than conducting two separate QCA for these two periods. Technically, in doing so, the analysis conceives each country as two separate countries. I create the truth table in this way to attain an understanding on different cases inter-temporally considering especially the limitations of QCA in producing longitudinal inference (Rihoux, 2006). With this

approach, that is by treating each country as two different cases, I recognise the significance of temporal processes in interpreting complex dynamic phenomena (Hall, 2016). Doing so, I intend to achieve a modest solution to the static nature of QCA and overcome its limitation in interpreting dynamic processes. I, consequently, limit the period effect on the outcome through incorporating in the analysis the scores of all countries in two different periods, all of which may potentially alter. Third, to my knowledge, extant research on FLFP has never applied QCA to make inferences on FLFP. Hence, this study is the first example among both QCA studies, by using the methodology on a FLFP study, and FLFP studies, by designing the research based on QCA. Furthermore, this study is the first QCA application with a particular focus on Turkey. This research contributes to the QCA itself with an application in new subject areas. Fourth, another methodological contribution of this dissertation is its engagement in ‘mixed methods design’, which has increasingly become widespread among scholars conducting QCA (Rihoux, Rezsöhazy, & Bol, 2011). As an example of mixed method design, I advance QCA with a comprehensive comparative case analysis. With this comparative case analysis, I aim, first, to fulfil a protocol suggested by QCA methodologists, which is to gain case-based knowledge in depth (Ragin, 1987). As they argue, case-based knowledge is a “crucial companion to QCA” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2010: 222). This advice relies on the principle that fuzzy-set calibration should be purposeful and thoughtful in light of theoretical and substantive knowledge (Ragin, 2000). Second, by conducting comparative case analysis, I also follow the approach on building analysis by utilising more than one method design when appropriate and possible. Case analysis, in this respect, serves for a deeper analysis on each case by providing insights on country-specific mechanisms such as social drivers of change.

### **1.8. Structure of the Dissertation**

In the following six chapters, I present the state-of-the-art, comparative case analysis on each country case, the calibration of the conditions and the outcome, analysis obtained and conclusions derived. To do so, in Chapter 2, I provide detailed accounts on comparative welfare state literature and international research on FLFP, and also I derive my conditions for the analysis, and I detail how I derived those conditions.

Furthermore, in this chapter, I outline existing research on SESM and Turkey. With this chapter, I incorporate all five conditions in the analysis with an in-depth theoretical understanding on each. Chapter 3 is the section for comparative-historical case analysis on each five country. The purpose of this chapter is to gain analytical knowledge on each case to engage in potent and accurate calibration, as required in fsQCA. This chapter also presents actors behind milestone developments, and in-country particularities. This chapter presents peculiar features of each country related to FLFP patterns additional to the commonalities in the region. Consistent with the argument of this study, this chapter shows the influence of left party rule in pulling more women in the paid labour. It also demonstrates transformation within these societies related to several regime characteristics. In Chapter 4, I display how I conceptualised and operationalised each condition as well as the outcome. This chapter also presents details on the data I used. I also present the calibration in this chapter. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate the qualitative comparative analysis relying on the results. The analysis reveals that the condition of political party configuration, which stands for the membership in the set of countries with the salient presence of left-parties in the party politics or the high share of services, high tertiary education levels among women and high levels of take-up rates of preschool education and care facilities is sufficient for the high FLFP levels. The final chapter, Chapter 6, presents the comparative conclusions, in which I also draw policy framework for Turkey to follow South European pattern of FLFP increase.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONDITIONS FOR HIGH FLFP: THE STATE-OF-THE-ART

This dissertation analyses the conditions for the increase in FLFP rates in Southern Europe. Such an analysis provides recipe for Turkey, which remains to be a ‘trapped’ middle-income country, in comparison to South European pattern of FLFP development. The study relies on qualitative comparative analysis of Turkey and other South European countries given that the literature argues that SESM is the most relevant model to the Turkish case. The research questions in this research are: *How do potential determinants of FLFP vary in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey since the early 1980s?; Under what conditions FLFP rates took-off in these South European countries?; What can we learn from rising FLFP rates in Southern Europe for Turkey’s sluggish rates? Through what kind of policies can Turkey’s FLFP take-off?*

As an initial step to search for answers to the questions above, this chapter presents the state-of-the-art in four bodies of literature: streamlining gender in comparative welfare state research focusing on regimes, research on factors affecting FLFP patterns, comparative research on SESM and research on FLFP patterns in Southern Europe including Turkey. Based on these bodies of literature, I derive the conditions for the qualitative comparative analysis. The chapter is organised in accordance with insights of each of these bodies of literature.

The first section shows how gender has, in time, been incorporated into the welfare state literature since the 1990s. This literature is relevant to this dissertation since the very design of welfare state policies directly influence FLFP patterns, which is the outcome of this study. When scholars aimed at revealing factors behind different welfare state clusters that involve women-friendly policies, they highlighted a set of determinants. The impact of these determinants can be captured by the role of political party configuration, which I identify as the first condition in the QCA. This section also provides clues as to the level of commitment of political parties in providing women-friendly policies. Although this determinant is only implied in the literature, I identify political party commitment here as the second condition in explaining FLFP in Southern Europe. Once these two conditions have been identified, the chapter continues with reviewing the literature on defamilisation, an area that draws attention from comparative welfare state specialists working on women-friendly policies. Based on the insights of defamilisation research, I identify take-up of childcare facilities as a potential determinant of FLFP.

The second section reviews the literature on determinants that bring about rising FLFP as well as others that impede it. It does so by featuring the U-shaped hypothesis, which has been the centre piece of comparative research on FLFP since the 1970s. This hypothesis depicts a curvilinear relationship between sectoral structural change and FLFP in industrialised countries. Only after post-industrial trends kick in after a critical threshold, scholars observed, did women's labour force participation take-off. This comparative literature emphasises the role of expansion of the service sector and increase in tertiary education among women in take-off of FLFP. Therefore, this literature helps me identify the fourth and fifth conditions that may potentially explain rising FLFP in Southern Europe that has now largely completed socio-economic transitions emphasised in this literature: expansion of the service sector and increase in tertiary education among women.

The third section reviews the literature on common features of the SESM and the ways in which Turkey has been incorporated into this model since the 2000s. It presents the key features of this social model through the work of pioneers in this literature as well as the recent transformations the model is undergoing. It also outlines the literature that emphasises the common traits Turkey shares with the

SESM. Based on these common traits, this section shows how and why FLFP question in Turkey should be compared to those in Turkey's South European neighbours.

The fourth section reviews research, which emerged since the 2000s, on FLFP patterns in Southern Europe and Turkey. It emphasises key milestones in the development of FLFP in Southern Europe. The section then presents a set of factors behind Turkey's sluggish FLFP rates scholars have identified.

The chapter concludes by outlining how this dissertation advances the state-of-the-art through comparative case studies and qualitative comparative analysis of South European countries including Turkey.

## **2.1. Streamlining Gender in Comparative Welfare State Regimes**

This section shows how gender has been incorporated into the welfare state literature. It does so by presenting first welfare state regimes debate and its critique. With its critique, the section also presents the state-of-the-art streamlining gender. I then present subsequent studies, which reveal factors behind different welfare state clusters that involve women-friendly policies. In the last part of this section, I also review the literature on defamilisation. Based on the bodies of literature in this section, I identify the following conditions for QCA: political party configuration, political party commitment and take-up of childcare facilities.

### **2.1.1. Welfare State Regimes Debate and Its Critique**

The literature on comparative welfare state regimes is grounded in Esping-Andersen's seminal work, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Esping-Andersen, in this work, argues for grouping welfare states and calls to speak of 'welfare states' ('worlds', 'families' or 'regimes' of welfare states in the plural) rather than the 'welfare state' in the singular. He criticises the welfare state research of the time for its research design which perceived, in his opinion, straightforward relation between social expenditure and welfare stateness.

He also criticises, as he argues, the under-theorisation in the literature. For him, expenditure by itself does not reveal the theoretical substance of welfare states. He instead analyses what the welfare states do and how they do rather than how much they spend. He does so by relying on the concepts of decommodification, public-private mix and stratification<sup>1</sup>.

Theoretically, Esping-Andersen bases his study on power resource theory. Power resource theory argues that distribution of power resources (i.e. nature and levels of power mobilisation, structuration of labour movements, patterns of political coalition-formation in society between major interest groups) explain cross-national variation in welfare state development (Arts & Gelissen, 2010). Moreover, Esping-Andersen also bases his analysis on the path-dependency approach. This approach argues that crystallisation of welfare states into different worlds of welfare capitalism should be viewed as the path-dependent consequence of political struggles and coalition formation at historically decisive critical junctures.

According to Arts and Gelissen (2010), one of the reasons why Esping-Andersen's book had an enormous impact in the literature was because Esping-Andersen showed the persistent divergence of welfare states whereas most other studies of the time argued for the convergence of welfare states under the influence of modernisation theory. Some scholars re-visited Esping-Andersen's typologies of welfare states by using different methods such as cluster analysis (Saint-Arnaud & Bernard, 2003), qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin, 1994) and face value tabular analysis (Bambra, 2006). His work, however, received many criticisms too. Main criticisms concerned the neglect of gender dimension, misspecification of the Mediterranean welfare states, labelling of the antipodean welfare states as 'liberal' and failure to recognise major contribution of employers to welfare state development. In fact, these criticisms, including those related to his methodology, have initiated new strands of literature. Gendering welfare states literature is among them, which emerged in reaction to the neglect of gender dimension.

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<sup>1</sup> For instance, in terms of decommodification, Esping-Andersen is interested in how much a person or a family maintains a livelihood without reliance on the market. Since the concept of decommodification forms the basis of defamilisation as it was developed as an alternative term, Esping-Andersen's understanding behind the formation and the use of decommodification is critical here. Deriving from his reflections on expenditure based analysis, he establishes his study towards outcome-oriented basis owing to the concepts demonstrating mainly the outcomes.

The neglect of the gender dimension, in Sainsbury's words (1996), denotes that comparative studies of welfare states have rarely touched upon the consequences of welfare state policies on women. Criticising this neglect of the gender dimension in Esping-Andersen's analysis, many scholars began *gendering welfare states* by incorporating gender into comparative welfare state analysis. Lewis (1992), as pioneer of the literature, distinguished different male breadwinner models for the first time and classified them as strong male breadwinner model (represented by liberal countries such as Ireland and Britain), a modified male breadwinner model (observed in conservative France) and a weak male breadwinner model (embodied by social democratic Sweden) (Castles, Leibfried, Lewis, Obinger, & Pierson, 2010). Orloff (1993), relying mainly on the power resource school, proposed a conceptual framework for the analysis of gender dimension of social provision. Within this framework, Orloff suggests to extend the analysis on state-market relations by adding family relations into analysis in the pursuit of understanding the ways countries organise provision of welfare through families (1993). She also seeks an insight on the effects of social provision by state on gender relations and implicit assumptions of welfare states about sexual division of caring and domestic labour (1993). Orloff (1993) primarily examines the pattern of gender stratification produced by entitlements by referring to the distinguished concepts of gender differentiation and gender inequality. These two concepts, substantively separated, provide an insight on how gender differentiation in entitlements leads to gender inequality in benefit levels of women and men. Such gender differentiation in entitlements occurs when claims to benefits are presumed with the assumption of traditional division of labour between the sexes.

Sainsbury (1996), in a similar vein, examines welfare state variations through a gendered lens, by looking at several dimensions, i.e. familial ideology, unit of benefit<sup>2</sup> and labour legislation, social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, their coverage of population and the coverage of single mothers. Sainsbury primarily intends to answer the questions as to what differences welfare state variations make for women and how similar or dissimilar the impact of welfare state policies is on women and men in four countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, the

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<sup>2</sup> She looks at whether the unit of benefit is household, which hints the male breadwinner model, or the individual, which signals individual model.



Netherlands and Sweden. Eventually, she proposes two main clusters: the ‘male breadwinner model’ rewarding married couples and penalising single individuals with marital tax relief and the ‘individual model’ that prioritises no family form. In Sainsbury’s analysis, based on several gender relevant dimensions, the policies of the Netherlands and Sweden represent polar extremes, which, in fact, contradicts with the mainstream models ruling out gender-related dimension. Pfau-Effinger (2003: 99), similarly, specifies four gender arrangements: the “family economic model”, the “male-breadwinner/female carer model”, the “dual-breadwinner/state-carer model”, and the “dual-breadwinner/dual-carer model”.

Moreover, several other scholars examined the model transformation with both single-case analyses and comparative analyses of different countries. They also discussed potential conditions which may favour the gender-egalitarian policy change such as public policies and social and economic changes (Morgan, 2009). Scholars examining model change mostly argue that welfare states have significantly shifted away from actively supporting the male breadwinner model (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014). According to Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014), three new developments prove this transformation towards universal breadwinner model: shift from supporting women as full-time caregivers, tightened link between access to social security rights and labour market participation and promotion of formalisation of care work to facilitate FLFP.

Gender specialists studying exclusively the welfare states also investigated whether welfare states promote gender equality or not and they analysed the reciprocal influence between gender relations and welfare states (Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013; Marier, 2007; O’Connor, Orloff & Shaver, 1999; Orloff, 1996; Orloff, 2010; Pascall & Lewis, 2004). Scholars of this body of literature underline that systems of social provision and regulation influence gender relations in society, and, in return, gender relations in society also influence those systems. In light of this view, scholars engaged extensively in examining the conditions under which and the extent to which social politics and policies affect gender relations, and reversely, the conditions under which and the extent to which gender relations affect social politics and policies. Within these studies, both the ‘welfare states’ and ‘gender’ are concepts, in this respect, that alternately emerge as both *explanandum* and *explanans*,

depending on the theoretical and empirical angle of the research (Sainsbury, 1994: 8). To exemplify, Bolzendahl (2009), in the pursuit of incorporating gender dimension in comparative welfare state studies, measures the impact of ‘gender influences’ such as political participation of women and FLFP on social spending in twelve industrialised democracies. In a similar vein, Kofman and Sales (1996) argue that regimes which prioritise services rather than cash benefits are those where women’s equality is more developed by examining the consequences of social policies concerning women.

This literature, building typologies of welfare states based on gendered analysis, however, relied mainly on either policies adopted by the states or their outcomes on women. Scholars used several data, indicators and methods for the assessment of the efforts that states make to deal with new challenges in post-industrial economies. They, for instance, compare overall spending on families with children. Yet, the main puzzle remains to be solved: why is the male-breadwinner-female carer model weakening more in some countries than others? By gendering welfare states, scholars primarily prioritised identifying variations among different welfare states. These studies largely fell short of research explaining the reasons behind those variations. Hence, even though this literature has been highly successful in clustering different regimes and bringing gender into comparative welfare state analysis, it has not been able to identify the *causal conditions* having impact on the variation across-countries.

### **2.1.2. From Regime Diversity to Conditions I and II: Political Party Configuration and Political Party Commitment**

Building upon the state-of-the-art streamlining gender, some scholars engaged in subsequent research to explain the variations across countries as regards different models of welfare states based on gender dimension. This literature offered several conditions which were deemed to bring about women-friendly welfare state policies. Those policies include ones easing women’s labour force participation as well. Since I take FLFP as the outcome in this study, the theoretical arguments for those influential factors on women-friendly welfare state policies are also valid for my

research. However, the major limitation of this literature is that scholars did not seek solid causal analysis at explanatory level to propose conditions for variations among countries. Moreover, another weakness of this literature is that an exclusive analysis on causality related to FLFP is absent.

Among scholars of this literature, one group focused mainly on the role of social agents. Sainsbury (1999), for example, highlights the importance of power mobilisation of social agents, which beget variations in welfare state policies. She argues that in countries with strong unions and/or high collective bargaining rates, male/female wage differentials are smaller for full-time workers since powerful unions, which promote wage equalisation as a general policy, produce less wage dispersion (Sainsbury, 1999). Scholars of this literature studied other conditions as well. Some argued that dominance of social-democratic parties associated with powerful union movements and centralised political systems, in which corporatist bargaining arrangement prevails, gives rise to variation across countries with respect to their policy designs (Morgan, 2009). Additionally, scholars also suggested that those countries which promoted the development of work-family reconciliation policies could do so owing to their largely homogenous and highly secular societies, which could dampen traditional attitudes towards gender roles (Morgan, 2009).

*Political party configuration* stands out as one of the most influential conditions considering its impact on the development of gender equality policies (O'Connor et al., 1999). State-centred institutionalists argue that *left parties* initiate and promote state policies paving the way for women's empowerment, which, in turn, brings about increased presence of women in paid labour (O'Connor et al., 1999). Similarly, power resource theorists advocate that presence and strength of left parties give rise to favourable conditions for the enactment of laws for women (Lambert, 2008; Sainsbury, 1999). Scholars also highlight that whereas right-wing parties are more likely to promote traditional family norms, left-wing parties assist working mothers as well as single mothers more (Bussemaker & Kersbergen, 1999; Ferrarini, 2003; Gornick, Meyers, & Ross 1997; Wennemo, 1994). Furthermore, Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008) emphasise left party strength (the share of seats in the legislature filled by left parties) as a significant condition for female representation in democratic legislatures. Huber and Stephens (2000) also highlight the role of social

democratic governance in translating the interests of working women in public welfare state services. As an actual example, Verge (2013) refers to the South European experience in which quota adoption processes initiated by left-parties by pursuing self-reforms within their structures. Furthermore, just as the welfare state emerged as a power resource in and of itself, increasing FLFP, in turn, strengthened left parties further through leftward shift in female voting (Rosenbluth, Salmond, & Thies, 2006).

Moreover, women's presence in parliament is deemed to favour the expansion of childcare policies and other women-friendly policies (Sainsbury, 1999). Budlender (2006) refers to the example of Uganda and South Africa where gender responsive budgeting initiatives emerged following a significant increase in women's political representation in the national parliaments. The women parliamentarians played substantial roles in establishing and leading gender responsive budgeting. Concerning Europe's success in mainstreaming gender-equality in social policy norms, European women's policy networks, within and outside member states of the Union, mobilisation of feminist and other women's civic organisations, academic women's expert groups, femocrats in government, and elected women representatives in the parliament of the European Union (EU) and of the member states have been instrumental (Gornick & Meyers, 2009).

Some scholars, on the other hand, analysed 'women's choices', that is, their orientations towards motherhood and wage work (Ellingsaeter, 1999). Ellingsaeter states that many explained cross-national differences in the practises of motherhood (related to labour force participation of mothers and childcare arrangements) by referring to differences in welfare state policies. However, for her, this explanation is too limited since it neglects the orientations of women towards motherhood and wage work (Ellingsaeter, 1999). In light of this argument, some scholars measured family behaviour by looking at the indicators of population, total period fertility rate, extramarital births, marriage, divorces, cohabitation, living alone, adult-only households, 2-adult and 2-children households. The dominant theory among those studies has been Hakim's (2007) 'preference theory'. Hakim (2007) suggests that occupational segregation, part-time or non-standard forms of working are not the consequences of the institutional and/or structural disadvantages suffered by women,

but rather, they are the outcome of women's agency and their varying choices. Similarly, Gilbert (2008) suggests four general categories of family, which are traditional, neo-traditional, modern and postmodern. According to Gilbert (2008), those categories mark diverse work-family arrangements, and he questions whether these arrangements, diversely present in each category, reflect women's genuine lifestyle preferences.

Furthermore, some studies associate the level of industrialisation and urbanisation with the particular preferences made for social policy design. However, for Skocpol, industrialisation/urbanisation or working class/trade unions alone cannot explain the development of welfare state policies. Instead, she argues that "governmental institutions, electoral rules, *political parties* and prior public policies and their transformations over time create many of limits and opportunities within which social policies are devised and changed by politically involved actors over the course of a nation's history" (Skocpol, 1992: 527).

Moreover, studies in this literature also highlighted the influence of various other factors concerning the development of welfare state policies. For instance, regarding Sweden, a country which scholars greatly appraise given its generous childcare policies, some scholars refer to the influence of the possibility of influx of immigrants on the design of policies. They argue that Sweden, taking labour shortages into consideration, attempted to encourage women to enter into paid labour because of the fear for the inflow of immigrant workers (Orloff, 2006).

Studies which do not particularly focus on the variation based on gender dimension, yet aim at understanding diversity in welfare state policies and expenditures across countries provide insight on potential influential conditions related to women-friendly policies as well. For example, while trying to explain diverse public social expenditure across countries, Kangas and Palme (2007) argue that party politics, economic structure and institutions determine 'rights' and 'needs', which, in turn, influence public social expenditure. They suggest that the needs variable in societies, which alters according to the structure of the population (i.e. age) is one of the determinants behind the variation in public social expenditure.

Although scholars in this literature tried to eliminate the deficiencies of the studies solely clustering welfare states based on gender dimensions, they, first of all, did not base their explanations for variations on systematic causal analysis which would have enabled us to argue confidently for causality. To be exact, the conditions prevalent in a country have been referred as ‘necessary’ conditions to observe the respective outcome without a causal comparative analysis. For instance, the strength of union movements and dominance of social democratic parties were deemed as explanatory conditions for women-friendly policies based on Swedish case. However, they did not make a causal comparative analysis of the cases to understand the causal influence of those conditions on respective outcomes. Second, the emphasis in the literature has been placed on ‘across model variation’ rather than ‘variations within the same model’. Insight on variations within the same model may, in fact, provide more clues with respect to the influence of conditions on the outcomes since such analysis would be more robust by taking contextual insight into account.

Still, this second wave of literature, by questioning the reasons behind the variation of policies and outcomes, came up with certain suggestions on possible determinants as I detailed above. The asset of this literature, especially for my research, is that scholars proposed causal factors influencing policies concerning primarily women. Although they do not assess such influence based on causal comparative analyses, their contribution has been pinpointing those factors. That is why, I sought possible conditions for my research among the studies of this literature as well. Among the possible conditions I detailed above, I included political party configuration, strength of left parties. I do not analyse women’s presence in parliaments, unions and women’s preference relying on the reasons I mention below.

Concerning women’s presence in parliaments, I did not include as a condition in this research because political party configuration serves for exactly the same purpose since left parties also stimulate discourses and policies to encourage more women to take part in labour force. Hence, in this study, both conditions would have overlapped if I had incorporated two of them in the same analysis. Because of this reason, I left out women’s presence in the parliament and took in political party

configuration. The rationale behind prioritising political party configuration is the prevalence of references to this factor in the literature.

Concerning trade unions, I intentionally preferred not to include union density as a condition because its prevalence primarily depends on left party strength in a country. This is because, as the comparative-historical case analysis demonstrates in the following chapter, in countries where Unions had role in the enactment of the policies favouring women, this was possible owing to their intertwined relations with the left parties. Above all, some organisations including several women movements appear to be organically associated with left parties.

With respect to women's choices or preference theory, I left out relying on comparative-historical case analysis in Chapter 3. Such an analysis, based on the results of in-country labour force surveys, negates the possibility of women's choices not to work. Even in case of Turkey, women who are non-employed highlight the barriers to the paid labour rather than their own choices while explaining their reasons for leaving the labour market. Chapter 3 provides accounts on a variety of impediments to women's paid labour, which all justify the elimination of this condition in the analysis.

Other arguments I mention above either concern the factors influencing public social expenditure or correspond to in-country situations. I do not consider those factors influential in variation of public social expenditure because I am not interested in exploring the mechanisms or factors leading to variations in social expenditure dispersion. Rather I intend to observe the conditions, i.e. social policies, which bring about FLFP increase whereas those factors explain the dynamics influencing the conditions affecting FLFP. With respect to the possibility of influx of immigrants, for instance, it is a case-based determinant, and not applicable to cross-country comparisons.

### **2.1.3. From Defamilisation Research to Condition III: Take-up of Childcare Facilities**

This body of literature on defamilisation analyses policies that assist families in caring function. These family policies have mainly two aims: one is to enable reconciliation of work and family life for parents and the second is to attain greater gender equality especially through increasing FLFP. This is because, additional to other factors, childcare arrangements and other family policies promote women's presence in the labour market. Along with increasing FLFP, the factors such as expansion of precarious employment, necessity of two household incomes against poverty, declining birth rates and an increasingly tight labour market, especially in the skilled segment, warranted the transformation in the family policy outlook (Morgan, 2013). This is why, scholars argue that de-familising care policies with states and markets absorbing care responsibilities is one of the ways to tackle new social risks (Bradshaw & Finch, 2010; Lewis & Giullari, 2005; Mahon, 2002). However, care responsibilities are not always absorbed by the state or the market. Family, in some cases, serves as the main responsible entity for caring. In such a case, the welfare state relies on the family for caring arrangements and does not actively engage in the expansion of publicly funded caring facilities.

To analyse how welfare state regimes differ based on their caring policies, scholars introduced the concepts of 'familialism' and 'defamilisation'. Scholars often designed their studies based on these two concepts, and these terms became main tools for comparing welfare states based on care dimension. Comparison of welfare states mainly concerned how they facilitate female autonomy and independence from the family (Bambra, 2007). Yet, the literature fell short of inter-temporal analysis to comprehend the changing policies related to care dimension and figure out which conditions brought about change in welfare state policy designs. Even though scholars of this literature argued for a set of conditions for variation concerning defamilisation, they relied on those conditions primarily for classification purposes. They, however, did not seek causal inferences based on those conditions to understand whether those conditions explain variation in welfare state policies related to care dimension. Nevertheless, owing this literature, I identify one condition, which is *take-up of childcare facilities*.



### ***2.1.3.1. Conceptualising and operationalising defamilisation***

One group of scholars focused on how to conceptualise and operationalise the concepts of defamilisation and familisation. A familialistic welfare regime is conceptualised as one that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household (Esping-Andersen, 1999). However, the term, defamilisation is not conceptualised in a way to imply ‘anti-family’, on the contrary, it refers to the degree to which families’ welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed – either via welfare provision, or via market provision (Esping-Andersen, 1999).

With respect to operationalisation of defamilisation, cluster analyses, aiming at classifying countries based on the combination of pre-determined selection criteria, coined as the defamilisation factors, dominate the discussions on operationalisation of defamilisation (Bambra, 2007). The preliminary concern of scholars conducting cluster analyses has been how to measure the degree of ‘defamilisation’ for the classification of countries. Focusing on the dependent variable, these scholars mainly examined policy level efforts. For instance, Esping-Andersen suggests four kinds of indicators to measure defamilisation: “overall servicing commitment, overall commitment to subsidizing child families, the diffusion of public childcare and the supply of care to the aged” (1999: 61). To measure familialism, Esping-Andersen offers the indicators such as time spent on unpaid domestic obligations and the degree to which families absorb social burdens (1999: 62). Bambra (2007), on the other hand, suggests three variables to assess defamilisation, one on female employment and the other two relating to maternity leave. Yet, some scholars, such as Cho (2014), oppose the inclusion of maternity leaves in the analysis as an indicator of defamilisation relying on the empirical studies showing that maternity leave does not always bring commitment to labour markets.

For the comparative analysis of the countries according to the caring function of the family, Leitner (2003) proposes four ideal types of policies: a defamilizing type, an implicitly familialistic, an explicitly familialistic and an optionally familialistic type. The author also criticises indicators used by Esping-Andersen since, she argues, they measure the outcome of familialistic structures but not familialistic structures

themselves such as socio-cultural notions. She proposes the conduct of a more sophisticated analysis relying on these four clusters (Leitner, 2003). She also suggests to distinguish elderly care and childcare and incorporate many other indicators by analysing them in more detail (Leitner, 2003). Leitner's another proposition is also to examine 'gendered' and 'de-gendered' variants of familialism (2003).

Leitner's clustering, in fact, promoted many research in which scholars compared countries based on her categories. However, Leitner suggested that further research should focus more on the development of familialism across time and how countries moved from one type of familialism to another. For that purpose, that is, to analyse the transitions of countries towards 'individualization'<sup>3</sup> or 'familialization', Daly (2011) builds up a framework based on four dimensions: the treatment of people as individuals or family members, favoured location of care and its construction as paid or unpaid, the treatment of family as institution and living arrangement and the treatment of gender (in)equality.

Furthermore, scholars of this strand of literature also engaged in normative discussions on the most appropriate care policies to attain gender equality at greatest extent. These normative discussions, for instance, manifested themselves in the 'capabilities approach'. This approach supports 'genuine choice' between work and care for women and men by offering the parents to choose from wide range of policies including cash for care, services and the regulation of working hours (Lewis & Giullari, 2005). Even though scholars appraise high labour force participation of women and individualisation of welfare state systems, some also highlight that increased FLFP does not necessarily imply better jobs which are secure and well-paid (Lewis & Giullari, 2005). Moreover, although increasing attention has been paid to the necessity of formalisation of care for the promotion of FLFP, scholars argue that equal share of unpaid work among parents also plays significant role in facilitating female participation in labour markets.

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<sup>3</sup> Daly (2011) explicitly states she prefers to use the term, 'individualization' instead of 'defamilisation' since, in her opinion, individualization is 'more appropriate opposing pole to familization' in gender and family analysis. Similarly, Saxonberg (2013) constructs his typologies on terms, 'genderization' and 'degenderization' instead of 'familialization' and 'defamilisation' since he holds that the term 'genderization' is more directly connected to the issues of gender roles and gendered divisions of paid and unpaid labour.

### ***2.1.3.2. The dependent variable problem in defamilisation research***

Comparative welfare state analysis, albeit remarkable increase in the number of research in the field, falls short of a scholarly consensus on how much welfare state change there is, what drives change and how the nature of change should be understood as well as conceptualised (Clasen & Siegel, 2007). According to Clasen and Siegel (2007: 4), lack of progress in describing and explaining welfare state change across time and space is, to a considerable extent, due to a “dependent variable problem”. Such problem, as they state, marks the absence of an insight on how to conceptualise, operationalise and measure change within welfare states (2007).

The dependent variable problem also manifests itself in studies on defamilisation. Because of long-lasting debate over how to conceptualise and operationalise this concept, the literature on defamilisation could not proceed to develop a common approach to explain change and variation across countries and time. Having presented succinct insight on this literature in the previous section, this section discusses the dependent variable problem in defamilisation studies. The problem arises due to dissonance over the conceptualisation and operationalisation of defamilisation as dependent variable. Such disagreement, in turn, leads to diverse analysis based on the same concept. Moreover, since the respective studies are limited to discussions over conceptualisation and operationalisation of defamilisation, progress in applications of the defamilisation as dependent and even independent variable did not take place.

The emergence of the concept of defamilisation, as I mention above, relies on the concept of decommodification to which Esping-Andersen referred to analyse the existence and scope of social rights. Inspired by Marx and Polanyi, who associated the process of human commodification with capitalism (Kröger, 2011), Esping-Andersen developed his concept of decommodification to describe the degree to which social policies permit people to make and maintain their living at a socially acceptable level independent of market forces, without having to sell their labour power on the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Esping-Andersen (2000),

therefore, perceives decommodification as a process in which welfare states reduce citizens' economic dependency on the market, replacing it with a dependency on welfare benefits. He examined three insurance programmes, old-age pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment benefits, with four indicators weighted by take-up rates. He, consequently, came up with various decommodification scores.

Emphasising the neglect of gender dimension, however, many scholars criticised the use of the concept of decommodification. According to them, the primary issue, awaiting to be solved by the welfare state, was dependence of women on family or husband. Thus, the solution is not the decommodification from market forces rather independence from family relationships. Based on this view, welfare states should actively support women's entry into the labour force (Kröger, 2011). This is where the concept of defamilisation<sup>4</sup>, developed by Lister, comes to the forefront.

Scholars, therefore, perceive defamilisation as a more gender-sensitive concept for comparative welfare state research. However, even though defamilisation arose as a concept grounded in the concept of decommodification, substantively, essential differences exist between two concepts. First, contrary to decommodification, defamilisation refers to independence from family relationships either through paid work or through the social security system (Lister, 1994). Defamilisation takes paid work into consideration as a tool for independence, which makes market no longer a source of dependency. In defamilisation, market participation as the source of dependency is replaced by family relationships. Second, unlike Esping-Andersen did by using decommodification, defamilisation has been only applied to individuals and not to the families. However, one can also mention similarities between the concepts of decommodification and defamilisation. First, both Lister and Esping-Andersen seek solutions from the welfare state. Second, they both aim to promote financial autonomy of citizens (Kröger, 2011). As a corollary, following Lister's study, this way of formation of defamilisation as a concept reflecting on the essence and criticism of decommodification is one and first way of conceptualisation of defamilisation.

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<sup>4</sup> Scholars spelt and used this concept in different ways, i.e. as defamilialisation, defamilisation, defamilisation etc. In this dissertation, I prefer to use 'defamilisation', which is the easiest to read and write.

Another group of scholars working on the conceptualisation of defamilisation incorporated 'social care' into analysis. They argue that economic independence alone does not serve for all interests of women (Bussemaker & Kersberger, 1994). For them, both decommodification and defamilisation are primarily centred on social security not on care. The succeeding studies which focused more on the dimensions of care and right to have time for care brought about another definition of defamilisation. For instance, McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) use the term, defamilisation, with a different meaning to express the conditions under which people engage or do not engage in caring. Bamba (2004) also touches upon two distinct conceptualisations of defamilisation in her early works, one related to the extent to which welfare states support the family and the other relating to the extent to which the welfare state promotes women's economic independence. In her words, the "female freedom from the family" and the "freedom of the family" denote two distinct meanings (2004: 204). She bases her study on defamilisation index seeking an insight on female freedom from the family with the use of a new data.

Following McLaughlin and Glendinning's account, Leitner (2003) defined defamilisation as 'taking away care responsibilities from the family' or 'unburdening the family in its caring function'. However, Leitner and Lessenich (2007) criticise the conceptualisations of defamilisation in the literature holding that in addition to its relation with paid work, caring has also social and emotional dimensions which matter in care responsibilities. They suggest two versions of defamilisation, one is economic defamilisation and the other is social defamilisation. Kröger (2011), however, sees this two-sided conceptualisation of defamilisation as complex and reducing conceptual clarity. He develops an alternative concept, dedomestication, instead of defamilisation because of the 'disturbing connotations' of defamilisation, which implies freedom from family. He endorses using the concept of defamilisation solely for the analysis of economic independence and proposes a new term to describe independence from familial care relationships. Dedomestication, in his words, refers to "the degree to which social care policies make it possible for people to participate in society and social life outside their homes and families" (Kröger, 2011: 429). With this concept, he aims to analyse "the role of social care policies in making possible a life outside the domestic sphere for both care givers and care receivers" (Kröger, 2011: 429-430).

By proposing a new concept, Kröger, in fact, aims to diverge his studies from the ambiguity of the concept of defamilisation because of its mixed meanings and references in diverse studies. His objective here is to highlight that some care policies such as parental leave benefits or carers' allowances support domestication of care and materialise people's right to care for close family members. With this approach, he underlines gendered consequences and negative side effects of these care policies, which consequently weaken position of women in paid labour force. He studies exclusively childcare services relying on four indicators (time replacement rate, availability, affordability and quality) since childcare provision and take-up rates, in his view, have true implications for dedomestication and other policies such as maternity leaves might imply domestication of care. As dedomestication shows the degree of people's opportunities to participate in social life and society outside their homes and families, it is especially women, or mothers, whose commodification within the labour market is facilitated by the high level of dedomestication. Thus, the rationale behind Kröger's suggestion for a new concept is to comprehend the degree of independence from domestic responsibilities, which eventually promotes economic independence of women as well.

Moreover, Leitner (2003) also criticises the way Esping-Andersen conceptualises defamilisation. He argues that inclusion of market driven service provision in the assessment of defamilisation makes defamilisation only available to the better-off (Leitner, 2003). Thus, for a more comprehensive and accurate insight on the notions of familisation and defamilisation, he replaces outcome-indicators of familisation, which were used by Esping-Andersen, with a "more predicative instrument of measurement" (Leitner, 2003: 357). He argues that outcome oriented indicators are inadequate for identifying variations of familialism since they do not offer an understanding on the structures and the relations between structures and outcomes. By looking at time rights (i.e. parental leave, care leave), direct and indirect transfers for caring and social rights attached to care giving such as individual pension rights, he suggests four ideal types of familialism: optional familialism, explicit familialism, implicit familialism and de-familialism. Additionally, Leitner (2003) proposes gendered and degendered variants of familialism to provide greater accounts related to gender equality.

Saxonberg is among the scholars who propose to use another concept, which is 'degenderization', instead of defamilisation, for the analysis of gendered dimensions of welfare states. He also criticises, what he calls, regime-type approach, which bases typologies on outcomes. He argues that those scholars mainly fail to analyse how policies influence society and how particular policies have impact on gender roles. Saxonberg (2013) refers back to the initial criticisms on the neglect of gender dimension in Esping-Andersen's study. He reminds that examining genderizing and degenderizing policies rather than defamilializing and familializing policies makes more sense if the goal is to focus on and eliminate gender roles. Degenderizing, in his conceptualisation, denotes 'policies that promote the elimination of gender roles' and genderizing describes 'policies that promote different gender roles for men and women'. Along with its particular focus on gender equality, degenderization, for Saxonberg, also provides insight on wider range of policies including, for instance, an analysis on whether textbooks at schools promote traditional roles between sexes.

Daly also prefers not to use defamilisation as a concept for her studies. Instead she proposes to use "individualization" by arguing that defamilisation leads to negative connotation on family due to its prefix 'de' (2011: 7). Thus, she perceives individualization as a suitable antonym to familisation. She refers to the concepts of individualization and familisation, as antonyms, to analyse change in gender and family models. She also relies on four dimensions: the treatment of people as individuals or family members, the favoured location of care and its construction as paid or unpaid, the treatment of family as institution and living arrangement and the treatment of gender (in)equality and how and whether gender equality is problematised.

Many scholars, however, still rely their analysis on the concept of defamilisation. For them, defamilisation offers assessment of how far welfare states facilitate women's autonomy to take part in labour market and their freedom from family dependency (Bambra, 2007; Cho, 2014; Lister, 1997). Leitner and Lessenich (2007), for example, suggest to revamp defamilisation to be able to account for the effects of policies on economic self-reliance of women. As a criticism of existing conceptualisations of the concept, they state that when referring to defamilisation, the emphasis is given to the care giver only and the consequences of defamilisation for the care receiver are

disregarded (2007). Second, they argue for conceptual reductionism in the debate surrounding defamilisation. They state that independence of care giver is only perceived in the context of financial independence without the consideration of social and emotional aspects of the care giver's liberation from care responsibilities (2007). In that regard, they distinguish economic and social defamilisation (independence). For them, this reductionism leads to another simplification, which is to assume that defamilisation of care giver, social defamilisation, leads to care giver's economic independence. They emphasise, however, that there is no given and pre-determined correlation between defamilisation of care and economic or social independence of women as care giver. Women earn less than men in the labour market and they have less chances of entering into the labour market. While these two are the structural constraints, cultural constraints also impede social and economic independence of women. Hence, due to this complex and ambiguous nature of defamilisation as a concept, Leitner and Lessenich (2007) advise the clarification of the dimensions of defamilisation and facets of female independence.

Additional to the discussions on the conceptualisation of defamilisation, some scholars also focused on the operationalisation of the concept and defamilisation typologies. Bamba (2004), to re-visit Esping-Andersen's typology by incorporating gender dimension, created a defamilisation index. This index included four factors: relative FLFP rate, maternity leave compensation, compensated maternity leave duration and average family wage. This study confirms Esping-Andersen's three worlds typology. However, Bamba (2007), in her later study, finds this operationalisation of defamilisation as 'extremely problematic' as it basically relies on Esping-Andersen's index-based regime construction in spite of its methodological fallacies. She, therefore, conducted another research by using cluster analysis with three variables, one relating to female employment and the other two relating to maternity leave. Based on this analysis, she came up with fivefold typology of defamilisation. Cho (2014), however, re-visited Bamba's operationalisation by ruling maternity leave out from the analysis on the ground that maternity leave may promote familisation. Cho (2014), distinctively, incorporated gender wage gap into the analysis by arguing that economic independence of women through paid work is represented by employment participation and wage. Contrary to Bamba's variables,



Cho (2014) looked at gender-employment gap, gender-wage gap, father specific leave, public spending on childcare and public spending on eldercare.

The dispute as to whether parental or maternity leaves promote women's economic independence is not resolved yet. Such dissonance manifests itself in studies on the operationalisation of defamilisation as well. While some scholars consider long leave as an indicator of defamilisation, others think contrariwise. For instance, Leitner (2003) considers paid parental leave as an indicator of familisation. De Henau, Meulders, & O'Dorchai (2006) make such assessment based on the leave indicator they build based on the length of the qualification period, length of job-protected leave and replacement rate of earnings.

Furthermore, without explicit references to the concept of defamilisation, Thévenon (2009) offers significant accounts, which also provide ways to assess defamilisation. For instance, she perceives decreasing incompatibility between fertility and women's labour participation as an outcome of government reconciliation policies. In light of this view, concomitant increase of fertility and FLFP might signal the effectiveness of defamilisation. De Henau et al. (2006) also suggest that high female employment and high fertility show working women friendliness of welfare states. In a similar vein, Apps and Rees (2001) studied the influence of childcare systems and show that countries that support families by offering alternatives to the domestic childcare are more likely to achieve both higher female labour supply and higher fertility.

Moreover, the studies on the clustering of welfare states based on gender dimensions have also contributed to the operationalisation of defamilisation. For instance, Ciccina and Bleijenbergh (2014) look at the conformity of childcare service provisions to ideal typical models of male breadwinner, caregiver parity, universal breadwinner and universal caregiver by using fuzzy set ideal-type analysis. Ciccina and Bleijenbergh (2014) take childcare service coverage, formal childcare time and public financial support as three dimensions for their analysis. Significantly enough, they, while making their operationalisation, highlight the fact that only considering formal childcare coverage for comparative analysis on social care might lead to erroneous conclusions. This is because, there are certain country-specific care arrangements such as the provision of well-paid leaves, which may potentially influence formal childcare coverage (Ciccina & Bleijenbergh, 2014). In that regard,

they rely on ‘effective childcare coverage’, developed by Plantenga, Remery, Siegel, & Sementini (2008). Effective childcare coverage provides an insight as regards the period between the birth of a child and its third birthday by looking at whether parents receive supports either in the form of services or leave entitlements. In like manner, De Henau et al. (2006) analyse the childcare system with the criteria of proportion of children covered, opening hours, public share in the costs and quality as indicated by the child/staff ratio.

As a corollary, the literature presents diverse accounts on how to conceptualise and operationalise defamilisation. Nevertheless, those accounts enrich the literature in the sense that each of them provides additional insight related to a particular aspect of defamilisation and highlights a peculiar approach. Hence, all these accounts help researchers to determine the most suitable forms of conceptualisation and operationalisation for their research. Before I detail the form of conceptualisation and operationalisation I relied on for this dissertation, I would like to briefly share my own accounts on the discussions in the literature surrounding the concept of defamilisation.

First, since defamilisation owes its existence to the concept of decommodification, a thorough understanding on decommodification is critical. However, the scholars who reflected on decommodification overlook an implicit assumption in this concept. Decommodification requires the precedence of commodification for its existence. While Esping-Andersen refers to the degree of living independent from the market forces with welfare state benefits, he implicitly assumes precedence of commodification. This is because, individuals are entitled to welfare benefits based on their former participation in the labour market and their active search for jobs. Even though countries have started to adopt universal health care benefits, the provision of support for the ‘socially acceptable level of living’, such as unemployment benefits, is dependent on the former occupational status. Hence, even the unemployment benefit itself essentially entails reference to ‘employment’.

Second, with respect to the scholarly debate on whether or not care dimension should be incorporated into the studies on defamilisation, I argue that this depends highly on the scope of the research. If the purpose is to account for FLFP rates, as in this dissertation, then, I argue that care dimension is an indispensable part of a study on

defamilisation. This is because, availability of affordable and high quality care provision, as studies show, promotes women's labour market participation. The analysis on defamilisation without looking at care provision would disregard the influence of childcare on FLFP and correlation between defamilisation and FLFP. However, if the purpose of the research is to reflect on social security policies and family policies based on gender dimension, then, the analysis may not include care dimension. Related to this dissertation particularly, I aim at analysing the influence of a welfare state policy, which is childcare provision, on FLFP. Since I am essentially concerned about the impact on FLFP, analysing the care dimension was sure to happen in this research.

Third, with respect to the discussions on the conceptualisation of defamilisation, Leitner and Lessenich's (2007) references to social and emotional dimensions enrich conceptual understanding of defamilisation. However, if the ultimate purpose is to free the women from their care responsibilities to pave the way for their labour force participation, there is no need for proposing social and emotional dimensions. I believe these dimensions entirely concern parenting and they do not associate with the major concerns in the defamilisation literature. This is because, scholars, by referring to this concept, are mainly interested in observing whether having a child influences FLFP patterns.

Fourth, Kröger, as I mention above, proposes the concept of dedomestication instead of defamilisation. In so doing, Kröger aims at refraining from the conceptual ambiguity of defamilisation since scholars, so far, referred to this concept in a variety of meanings. However, although Kröger emphasises conceptual clarity, he suggests a new concept with almost the same meaning. He defines dedomestication in a different way by emphasising the participation in social life and life outside home. However, substantively, the literature on defamilisation is concerned about the availability of the time for women to allocate for paid labour. Such availability of time, consequently, promotes economic independence of women. Hence, as in the case of Leitner and Lessenich's social and emotional dimensions, dedomestication, developed by Kröger, is also not associated with main area of interest of the literature on defamilisation, which is the promotion of economic independence of women.

Fifth, Kröger and Daly also reflect upon the negative connotations of defamilisation. They argue that the term implies a negative view on family. However, proposing new concepts such as degenderization, dedomestication, individualization begets conceptual ambiguity and restricts the studies in the literature only to the matter of conceptualisation. In fact, scholars who propose new concepts mostly adhere to the core understanding on defamilisation. Since their descriptions do not diverge from such common ground, instead of proposing new concepts, scholars may focus more on how to use defamilisation as dependent variable, and also independent variable. The literature, then, may come up with causal inferences as regards the variation across countries on the matters of reconciliation of work and family life, childcare provision and FLFP. This, surely, does not mean that the scholars should only adopt one single definition of defamilisation. As Leitner and Lessenich (2007) suggest, as long as the researcher clarifies his/her understanding of defamilisation, diverse conceptualisations would still be possible.

Lastly, with regard to the operationalisation of defamilisation, whether or not maternity leave should be incorporated into the analysis is an existing debate in the literature. Relying on the studies which reveal the reverse impacts of some maternity leave policies, omitting maternity leave from an analysis on defamilisation seems to be appropriate. Yet, again such decision depends on the research itself. For clustering purposes, incorporation of leave policies into the analysis may be fruitful. However, while seeking causal inferences, scholars should treat maternity leave meticulously.

### ***2.1.3.3. Identifying conditions affecting defamilisation***

Building upon the studies on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of defamilisation, which I describe above, some scholars also examined factors which may potentially influence defamilisation to account for variation across countries. First, following historical-institutionalist approach, Saxonberg (2014), in his recent study of post-communist states questions why family policies developed differently across those countries with communist past. He also asks why -with the partial exception of Hungary- none of those countries directed themselves in a degenderising direction, but instead developed policies that either implicitly or

explicitly promoted traditional gender roles. Saxonberg (2014) studied, with several independent variables (IVs), the institutionally-based historical roots to explain the possible reasons behind diverse family policy approaches. For instance, while explaining generous publicly funded childcare facilities in Hungary, he refers to the fact that preschool education was perceived as a tool to promote Hungarian nationality and language. He, thus, argues that nationalist ambitions explain diverse trajectory of Hungary (Saxonberg, 2014).

Second, Lambert (2008) also tried to explain variation in policies that support working women and mothers by developing an index of maternal employment policy for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. He argues that political and economic institutions and the percentage of women in parliaments are key factors that determine the degree to which states promote maternal employment based on his bivariate and multivariate analysis. Lambert (2008) taps into the arguments of both power resource theory, which attributes the expansion of benefits to the *presence of strong left parties*, unions, women's movements (or women in government), and institutionalist theory, which highlights the role of interest intermediation and corporatist and centralised bargaining institutions.

Third, even though she does not explicitly mention the concept of defamilisation, Pfau-Effinger (2005) provides a comparative analysis of care policies of European welfare states by investigating development paths of care arrangements. She criticises the argument that the degree to which welfare states facilitate gender equality and labour market participation of women shows also the degree of formalisation of informal care (2005). She also refutes the perception that persistence of informal care marks backwardness of welfare states. In her study, she shows the role of family values and welfare values<sup>5</sup> on care policies (2005). As factors affecting the formalisation of care, she considers cultural foundations, the role of women's movement and women's organisations. She holds that the formalisation of care arrangement depends on the consolidation of respective cultural foundations, which constitute the basis of social actors' behaviour. Based on her analysis, she proposes

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<sup>5</sup> She defines family values as "cultural values and notions with respect to the structure of the family and the gender division of labour" and welfare values as "cultural values and notions with respect to the main sphere for the provision of welfare in society" (Pfau-Effinger, 2005:328).

two different development paths: modernisation of the male breadwinner model and development of dual breadwinner family model. Family and welfare values, in Pfau-Effinger's view, are most influential factors which determine which of these two paths welfare states will follow.

Fourth, De Henau et al. (2006), again by not directly referring to the concept of defamilisation, argue for some factors determining the design of child policies for working mothers. Those are, as they argue, the set of prevailing cultural values, social ideas and historical legacies (2006). They hold that the EU only puts forward certain targets and does not enforce the adoption of particular policies. Thus, each country adopts its unique model of policy, which fits best into its country characteristics.

In an overall analysis, the main contribution of this body of literature has been the identification of factors affecting the development of policies related to defamilisation. Yet, one shortcoming of these studies is that the analyses have been 'static' since they mostly provided snapshots of certain periods in different countries. However, as argued by Leitner as well, inter-temporal analyses are needed to figure out the drivers of change over time. Second, to identify the causal factors behind variation across countries, no prior study conducted a qualitative comparative study, which could provide insight on conjunctural causality related to defamilisation.

Nevertheless, relying on this literature on defamilisation, I identify *take-up of childcare facilities* as a condition for the qualitative comparative analysis. By incorporating take-up of childcare facilities as a condition in this study, I also provide insight on the level of development among the five countries of Southern Europe in terms of defamilisation. Among the studies I reviewed here, I explain above why I did not consider unions and women's movements as conditions for this research. Concerning the role of conservatism, which stands out as a possible condition based on the literature review above, I do not include as a condition because left-party strength also denotes the influence of conservatism. That is because, as widely acknowledged, conservatism does not reveal itself in left party voting.

Additionally, I do not include leave policies as a condition in the analysis because in Southern Europe, informal employment has traditionally been widely prevalent in contrast to Northern Europe (Williams, 2013), and even when parental leave is provided by national legislation, women who are in informal employment would not be protected under this legislation, and they would be deprived of this right. I therefore decided to include the take-up rates of early children education and care (ECEC) centres instead of parental/maternity leave measures which is, in general, available to women who are also in informal employment. I also follow a report by ILO (2013) which suggests that by reversing the negative effects of informality, the expansion of formal childcare arrangements facilitates women's engagement in paid work. In contrast to leaves, childcare also reduces intergenerational poverty, supports the enhancement of disadvantage children's skills and facilitates job creation in the service sector (ILO, 2013). Furthermore, since I am interested in defamilisation, I rely on the literature which specifically recommends promotion of childcare services rather than cash benefits through parental/maternity leaves (Bambra, 2007; Kofman & Sales, 1996; Morgan & Zippel 2003). I also came across scholars who advised to exclude maternity leave policies as an indicator of defamilisation. Cho (2014), for example, shows that maternity leave policy does not ensure commitment to labour markets and hence should not be seen contributing to rising FLFP. I also note that although parental leave opportunities exist, research shows that in many countries men are discouraged to utilise such benefits, which results in, in most cases, low take-up of such rights (although they are available to fathers on paper) (ILO, 2013).

## **2.2. From Literature on FLFP Drivers to Conditions IV and V: Level of Tertiary Education among Women and Share of Service Sector Employment**

Various factors affect FLFP rates in the world. As Rau and Wazienski (1999) outline, literature on FLFP can be categorised into three in terms of how they explain changing FLFP levels: emancipation hypothesis, the U-curve hypothesis and the constancy hypothesis. Considering the theoretical arguments of the scholars in the literature, the U-curve hypothesis stands out as the main reference point. Scholars widely relied on this hypothesis while explaining not only country specific characteristics of FLFP but also cross-national variation in FLFP rates. This theory,

originally developed by Boserup (1970), argues that there is a curvilinear relationship between socio-economic structure and FLFP (Pampel & Tanaka, 1986). At low levels of development when agricultural sector constitutes the highest share in the economy, women take part in the labour force in large numbers albeit mostly as unpaid family workers. Following the increase in the incomes with the expansion of markets and introduction of new technology, however, women's participation rates begin to fall. Once women's education improves and their wages relative to the price of goods rise, their share in the labour market begins to scale up (Çağatay & Özler, 1995). The whole process, eventually, draws a U-shaped curve.

Furthermore, comparative studies on FLFP rates show that the rates are high in low-income countries and highly-developed countries whereas they are relatively low in middle-income countries, which, in fact, validates a U-shaped relationship between national income and FLFP (Fatima & Sultana, 2009). Considering the relationship between economic growth/national income and service sector employment (Mehra & Gammage, 1999), the process along with the U-curve embodies also sectoral change with gradually increasing share of *service sector*, which consequently raises FLFP (Thévenon, 2013). Furthermore, concerning the relationship between FLFP and economic development, female labour supply is both a driver and an outcome of economic development (Verick, 2014). As more women enter into the labour markets, economies expand owing to higher labour inputs. At the same time, as the economy grows, capabilities of women enhance and upgrade, social constraints weaken, which, in turn, enable more women to participate in the paid labour (Thévenon, 2013; Verick, 2014).

Among these theoretical grounds on varying levels of FLFP across countries, the U-shaped curve hypothesis is prevalent in the literature. This hypothesis theoretically has influenced various research. However, even scholars, who endorse the line of thought of this hypothesis, underline the fact that various other dimensions should also be taken into consideration while explaining the diverse FLFP rates across countries. This is because, the factors influencing the supply and demand of women's labour are too diverse and complex. Thus, divergent FLFP rates cannot solely be explained relying on a linear chain of causality. This study, therefore, aims at analysing many other influential factors additional to the influence of structural



changes although I also recognise U-shaped curve hypothesis as a valid proposition. Looking at the FLFP patterns in different regions, Western Europe reached the inflection point (where the decreased FLFP level starts to increase along the U-Curve) earlier compared to, for instance, Southern Europe. However, even though the timing of reaching the inflection point differs across countries, countries mostly present similar patterns in time related to their FLFP rates.

Along with the influence of structural changes, another influential factor on FLFP, as highlighted in the literature, is *education*. Scholars argue that female labour supply is strongly influenced by educational attainment levels, which have consistently affected FLFP positively (Cantillon, Ghysels, Mussche & Van Dam, 2001; Moghadam, 1999; Moghadam, 2003; Pampel & Tanaka, 1986; Vlasblom & Schippers, 2004). Studies also highlight the influence of educational attainment on FLFP through its effect on high opportunity costs of non-participation (André & Feio, 1999; Bettio & Villa, 1999; Blossfeld, 1995; Hill & King, 1995; Lesthaeghe, 1995). Furthermore, while highlighting the particular role of *higher education* in promoting women's employment rates, Rubery, Smith, Anxo and Flood (2001) argue that the gender gap in labour force participation narrows as the level of education among women increases. In addition, research also shows the role of education in economic growth by revealing the correlation between education, particularly tertiary education, and growth (Gemmell, 1996).

As a third factor, another strand of the literature analyses the relation between gender roles, culture, religiosity and FLFP. For instance, Clark, Ramsbey, & Adler et al. (1991) examines the interaction between gender roles and FLFP, and argues that FLFP is likely to be low in Latin America and countries where Islam is dominant. They reflect on the role of Islamic gender segregation (for Islamic culture) and traditional division of labour (for Latin American countries). Again reflecting on the influence of religiosity, Heineck (2004) analyses the effect of religiosity on women's decision to participate in the labour market in Germany. He finds out that women regularly practicing their religious activities are less likely to seek participation (Heineck, 2004). Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) also examine the interaction between religiosity and economic attitudes among Protestants, Jews, Catholics, Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists. They argue that women's likelihood to participate

in the labour markets depends on the level of religiosity, and the most prominent conservative view is observed among Muslims (Guiso et al., 2003). Antecol (2003), on the other hand, focuses on the influence of men's approach to women's role in the economy as a determinant of FLFP by reflecting on the effect of conservatism in society. According to his study, which is grounded on 1994 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), he argues that women are more likely to work if the males in the country approve females' participation to labour. In a similar vein, Knudsen and Waerness (2001) study how society perceives mothers' employment, and argue that younger, better-educated and less religious people tend to approve employment of mothers more. Fortin (2005) also explores the impact of attitudes towards gender roles on female labour market outcomes with a study covering 25 OECD countries by utilising the data from the world value surveys conducted in 1990, 1995 and 1999.

However, I argue that religiosity itself does not account for diverging levels of FLFP as recent studies also highlight. This is because, some countries with Muslim-majority populations also experienced substantial increases in their FLFP levels, and there is a marked divergence among those countries in terms of their FLFP levels as well. Additionally, these studies remain to be restricted to the determinants of labour supply behaviour. Hence, they fall short in understanding patterns of change with a macro-level policy oriented approach. Furthermore, some studies also reveal contrasting results. Haghighat (2005) examines neo-patriarchy, Islam and FLFP, and asserts that Islamic ideology per se is not the only determinant behind FLFP since political atmosphere and economic development are also influential. Similarly, Bayanpourtehrani and Sylwester (2013) argue that the interaction between Islam and FLFP greatly abates once other controls are included in the regression. They argue that once these additional controls are incorporated, Islam poses a similar association as Catholicism does, and the correlation between FLFP and religion is weakening over time (Bayanpourtehrani & Sylwester, 2013).

Fourth, another strand of the literature analyses the influences of GDP per capita and also 'added worker effect' (which manifests, for instance, in the cases of male unemployment) on FLFP. Among those scholars, Van der Lippe, De Ruijter, De Ruijter, & Raub (2011), by analysing the multinational time use survey, reveal that

women with children spend less time in labour markets in countries where the gross national product per inhabitant is relatively higher. They conclude that if they afford, women are less likely to take part in paid labour.

Fifth, in another body of the literature, scholars also examine the role of trade on FLFP. Among those scholars, Meyer (2006) argues that among middle-income countries, trade openness positively affects FLFP. However, the influence is negative in low and high-income countries (Meyer, 2006). Similarly, Bussmann (2009) also analyses the effect of trade openness on FLFP, and concludes that trade openness scales FLFP up in developing countries and lowers in industrialised countries.

Sixth, as I detail in the previous section, recent studies underline the possible impact of reconciliation and defamilisation policies on FLFP. Del Boca and Pasqua (2005) refer to the positive influence of availability of childcare on both decision to work and to have a child, and indicate that with the availability of high quality childcare, the preferences of mothers for time spent on unpaid labour at home relative to time spent at work become weaker. Childcare provision and family policies, in this respect, gain importance in the analysis. Comparative research in the literature, therefore, also examines the historical development of public childcare along with FLFP patterns. In terms of the development of public childcare, scholars refer to two critical junctures in Europe (Bahle, 2009). The first concerned industrialisation and nation-building while the second was related to the transition into service economy and the concurrent rise of female employment (Bahle, 2009). While the first phase was influenced by the conflict between the state and the church and the differences between social classes, the second was affected by the women's movements and reconciliation policies. The first juncture brought about the development of preschools (for children aged 3 to 5) while the second move, which arose about 100 years later, was dominated by family policy and gender issues (Bahle, 2009).

Therefore, with rising FLFP, demand for social care increased significantly in many developed countries (Ungerson, 1997). Rubery et al. (2001), for example, point at the transformation of the outlook of the European employment strategy given that the policy-makers have gradually recognised the need for expansion of childcare provision in response to rising FLFP. However, they emphasise that only an integrated and holistic policy in congruent with the new modes of work and family

arrangements can respond to the needs of working mothers (Rubery et al., 2001). Furthermore, Keck and Saraceno (2013) question whether provision of childcare services serves only for the benefit of certain groups in society. They reveal that provision of such services is the most effective policy to keep women, also those with low education, in paid labour (Keck & Saraceno, 2013).

In an overall analysis, however, the state-of-the-art fell short of an analysis exploring conditions for increase in FLFP rates by drawing models based on regime specific characteristics. Moreover, they vastly studied the net effects of the variables on FLFP. The weakness of studying net effects among cases with different regime characteristics is that it undervalues the regime-specific patterns. However, based on this literature, I identify two conditions: level of tertiary education among women and share of service sector employment. I believe these two conditions best capture most of the factors I can possibly include based on this literature. In doing so, I also bear in mind that the number of conditions one can accommodate in QCA is limited (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). The reason why I do not include economic growth as a condition in the analysis, however, is because research shows that where there is economic growth, there is mostly an expansion of service sector (Breitenfellner & Hildebrandt, 2006; Mehra & Gammage, 1999). Hence, economic growth and expanding service sector should be seen as proxies of one another. I particularly opted for service sector employment since I believe that the relationship between service sector expansion (and in fact service sector employment which I take as condition) and rising FLFP is more direct than that between economic growth and FLFP. I selected expansion of service sector (rather than economic growth) also because the literature highlights the particular role of service sector expansion for explaining rising FLFP. In these studies, economic growth stays in the background as a triggering factor behind the expansion of the service sector. Hence, I considered that expansion of service sector directly influences FLFP whereas economic growth has an indirect influence, especially through the expansion of service sector. I was also interested in assessing the impact of a condition that the literature on Southern Europe particularly emphasises. This is also why I selected expansion of service sector employment as a condition in the analysis.

I do not include GDP per capita or male unemployment as a condition in the analysis because scholars have found no significant effect of male unemployment on FLFP in Turkey. İlkaracan (2010), for example, found that high real wages (for males) may have discouraged women to enter into paid labour. Although, for instance, Başlevent and Onaran (2003) and Ayhan (2018) point to the probability of added worker effect after 1994 and 2008 crisis, they highlight that the effect is only temporary and visible among couples with marginally low income levels. The main reason why there is an absence of a significant effect, this literature shows, is care burdens of Turkish women (Değirmenci & İlkaracan, 2013). Therefore, this literature draws our attention to how care-related constraints in Turkey outweigh the influence of economic necessity in driving FLFP patterns. I thus decided not to include this among the conditions I analyse. Instead I included expansion of care services in my analysis. Considering the prevalent influence of formal childcare services, take-up of ECEC services seem to capture all effects of male unemployment, high real wages and economic necessity on FLFP.

Additionally, I do not consider attitudes towards the employment of mothers with small children as a condition in the analysis because I think these attitudes are captured in the take-up rates of ECEC services, which is a condition in the analysis. Should societies have favourable attitudes towards the employment of women with children (also promoted by the political parties in power), then those attitudes manifest themselves in policies for the expansion of childcare services. In addition, it seems to me that FLFP level is not necessarily the direct outcome of these attitudes. I believe FLFP is more directly influenced by government policies, themselves outcomes of these attitudes.

### **2.3. Research on Common Features of the South European Social Model**

In this section, I analyse the literature on SESM and describe the model by reflecting upon the common traits shared by the members of the model. I also reflect upon, as scholars of this literature argue, the transformation observed within the characteristics of the model. I also present, referring to the related literature, commonalities between Turkey and the SESM. With this section, I aim to

demonstrate the relevance of a comparative analysis among Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey.

### **2.3.1. Emergence of the South European Social Model**

In the pursuit of advancing welfare state typologies initially proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, scholars offered a fourth cluster. This cluster included Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, and it is dubbed as the South European Social Model (SESM) (Amable, 2003; Ferrera, 2016; Matsaganis, Ferrera, Capucha & Moreno, 2003). This clustering relies on several common characteristics shared by these countries. The features that scholars commonly depict are: absence of minimum income programmes, rudimentary safety nets concerning their institutional design, ‘softness’ of state institutions and reliance on family as safety net (Matsaganis et al., 2003). Grütjen (2008), for instance, mentions five traits characterising the SESM: polarised social security system, universalistic and tax funded health system, lack of means-tested social assistance schemes and prevalence of high public-private mix and high degree of decentralisation of social provision and state’s endorsement of the family as the main element in welfare provision. Similarly, with respect to the similarities among SESM countries, Karamessini (2008b) refers to the structure of production, common labour supply characteristics and employment outcomes and pronounced labour market segmentation along a range of divisions. Furthermore, reflecting on the distinctive features of the SESM, Mingione (2002) argues that all four countries feature the same model of capitalist development. The main characteristics of such capitalist development are prevalent economic role of the family and non-proletarianised status of workers. Mingione observes that countries of SESM also feature typical late-industrialised country characteristics given that states in late-industrialised countries have persistently guarded the productive role of small family enterprises by protecting the internal market and tolerating tax evasion. Another characteristic of SESM is very low part-time employment rate among women (Artazcoz, Borrell, Benach, Cortès, & Rohlfs, 2004). Scholars also commonly consider the countries of SESM as ‘traditional societies’ relying on the common features of rare incidence of

cohabitation, low proportion of births outside the marriage, low divorce rate, more extended families and less lone parent families.

Countries of the SESM, however, experienced transformation in time related to some of the traits above. Increases in taxation as percentage of GDP is one instance of this transformation. While in 1965 total tax as percentage of GDP was 19.9% in Greece, 25.5% in Italy, 15.8 in Portugal and 14.7 in Spain, four decades later, in 2005, the percentages reached to 35%, 41%, 34.5% and 35.8% respectively. Karamessini (2008b) also mentions the increased divergence in time among the members of the model due to ‘national differences in the pace and content of institutional change’. However, despite such divergence, she still argues for the unity and peculiarity of the model. She observes that the distinctive features of the model such as labour market segmentation and familialism still remain largely unchallenged (Karamessini, 2008a).

The literature I presented here provides insight on the main features of the SESM. Studies also demonstrate characteristics which diverge countries of SESM from other countries. The consensus on a distinctive model in the Southern Europe also shows the relevance of a comparison related to FLFP among the members of the model.

### **2.3.2. Research on Commonalities of Turkey and SESM**

Relying on the common traits, many scholars classify Turkish welfare regime within SESM (Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Eardley, Bradshaw, Ditch, Gough, & Whiteford, 1996; Gough, 1996). The similarities between Turkey and the countries of the SESM include ‘state-influenced’ ‘Mixed Market Economy’, adversarial industrial relations relying on state controlled wage bargaining, highly fragmented and hierarchical corporatist system, welfare state provision based on employment status, prominence of self-employment, informal employment and unpaid family labour, inadequate social assistance schemes, and centrality of family in the welfare regimes (Bolukbasi, 2012; Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2013; Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2018; Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Gal, 2010; Gough, 1996; Gough, Bradshaw, Ditch, Eardley, & Whiteford, 1997; Grütjen, 2008). Despite some differences between Turkey and the countries of Southern Europe such as mean household size, marriage age of women

(Grütjen, 2008), scholars argue that Turkey resembles mostly to the SESM when compared to other welfare state models.

Furthermore, scholars also identify common characteristics between Turkey and the countries of SESM in the context of family policies. Further research is necessary, however, to provide more insight on within-model variation and the influential factors behind such variation. As an example, a comprehensive comparative analysis of Turkey with the countries of the SESM would enable causal factors behind divergence, i.e. related to FLFP. Hence, to move up the ladder in scholarly research, scholars may seek explanatory analysis to account for within-model variation. In so doing, they can also derive lessons or required set of policies for backward cases to achieve the same level of progress as others in the model.

#### **2.4. Research on FLFP Patterns in Southern Europe and Turkey**

In this section, I present the studies on FLFP patterns in Southern Europe and Turkey. I also explain the contributions of this literature along with its shortcomings in answering the research questions of this study.

##### **2.4.1. Research on FLFP Patterns in Southern Europe**

With the studies analysing the gender dimensions in comparative welfare state literature, scholars studying the SESM also examined the model with respect to gendered welfare state typologies and defamilisation clusters. They argue that the countries of the SESM have experienced transition from the male breadwinner model to the ‘family and kin solidarity’ model. This argument relies on the observation that caring responsibilities have transferred from young parents to other relatives or grandparents (Moreno, 2003). Trifiletti (1999), on the other hand, distinguishes Mediterranean welfare regimes from other traditional breadwinner welfare regimes despite certain similarities. This is because, additional income in a household is necessary in Southern Europe whereas one income is sufficient in male breadwinner regimes (Trifiletti, 1999). Some authors also questioned whether one can mention ‘extended family of Mediterranean welfare states’ with in-depth comparison of the



social policy traits of SESM with other neighbourhood countries such as Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. Gal (2010), for instance, endorses the argument for such extension relying on three common features: religion, family and clientelism/particularism.

One strand of the literature on the family policy in Southern Europe developed surrounding the following question: To what extent can we mention a family policy model for Southern Europe? (Flaquer, 2000). As regards, for instance, child benefits packages, South European countries stand out as the least generous countries among the EU member states (Flaquer, 2000)<sup>6</sup>. Regarding work and family reconciliation policies, for example, debates concerning the caring facilities such as raising coverage for children aged 0-2 years have become more prevalent (Moreno, 2003). Some scholars also aimed at explaining the prominent feature of the model, which is reliance on family. They also analysed the reasons behind the lack of effective policies concerning reconciliation of work and family life. The primary reasons they refer to are male dominance of labour unions, absence of demand for family policy measures and absence of effective women's movement (Flaquer, 2000). Another strand of the literature on the family policy focused on social care in Southern Europe. Those studies analysed the role and influence of foreign workers in domestic services changing traditional arrangement of care in the region (Bettio, Simonazzi & Villa, 2006).

Scholars particularly studying FLFP in Southern Europe, on the other hand, majorly examined the factors behind the increase in rates. In so doing, they also analysed regional diversities and outcomes of rise in FLFP rates in society. Some scholars also studied exclusively the high levels of female participation in Portugal compared to other three countries, and argued for certain factors which were deemed to be influential in such divergence (Vaiou, 1996). The scholars analysing FLFP in South European countries also point at the changing trends with respect to age group differentials as regards FLFP, educational attainment, fertility rates, mean age of women at first child, mean age of child birth, maternity leave and birth leaves outside

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<sup>6</sup> Yet, publicly funded childcare facilities for 3-6-year-olds are comparable with those achieved by the Nordic states (Flaquer, 2000). Although Flaquer states that SESM is a coherent model, he also mentions some incoherent features within the model, i.e. childcare enrolment for both under 3 and 3-5 year-olds.

marriage (Gonzalez, Jurado, & Naldini, 1999). The analyses based on these indicators provide changing characteristics and in-model variation with respect to the aspects of defamilisation. For instance, as recent studies show, FLFP rates are higher among younger age groups in Southern Europe albeit regional differences<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, as another common trait, the decreasing fertility rate is perceived as a sign of a strategy of women for work-life balance. The mean age of women at first child between 1980 and 1995 has also increased in the region (Gonzalez et al., 1999). The maternity leaves are generous in all countries in terms of length and payments (Gonzalez et al., 1999). However, while it was less generous in Portugal compared to other countries, Portugal also scaled the length of the leave up to the level of 14 weeks in 1995. Births outside marriage are also in increase, however, Portugal has always had the highest levels in the region whereas Greece has consistently scored the lowest. In the following chapter, I provide further insight on changing characteristics of the countries of SESM in greater detail.

Although this literature provides insights on the main characteristics of the SESM as well as changing dynamics related to FLFP, they have not yet explored the factors which brought about or triggered those changes related to FLFP. This is because, they have not engaged in causal comparative analysis to scrutinise in-model or across-model variation. The absence of analysis on causal drivers for change restrains the literature only to the points of variation.

#### **2.4.2. Research on FLFP in Turkey**

This section presents existing literature on the main features of FLFP in Turkey. The first strand of studies looks at the decreasing FLFP rate in Turkey. Scholars of this strand mainly studied the structural factors such as gradual dissolution of agricultural employment and urbanisation. The second wave, which emerged during the times the country started to increase its FLFP rates at a slow pace and from a very low level, reflected on the need for policy interventions such as formal care provision.

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<sup>7</sup> The FLFP of the age group between 45-54 is relatively high in Portugal compared to other countries of Southern Europe.

I begin here with the first wave of studies which largely analysed the decline in FLFP rates in Turkey by relying on the structural factors. I divide the review into two by reflecting on demand and supply side analyses separately. Concerning first the demand side, Tansel (2002) examines the correlation between FLFP rates and the level of economic development in Turkey by looking at the econometric estimates for the years of 1980, 1985 and 1990. Relying on the U-shaped curve hypothesis, she argues for the influence of economic growth and education on FLFP in Turkey (2002). Similarly, İnce and Demir (2006), using time-series regression with eight indicators, examine the effects of the level of education, GDP growth rate and several other human development incidies as well as unemployment on FLFP. Based on their analysis, they argue for the positive influence of education on FLFP in Turkey. Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smiths (2008), in their study, also discern positive correlation between women's own education and their involvement in paid labour. However, they also look at the role of the educational level of the husband, and find out that in cases where the husband has a higher educational level, non-employment among women is more likely (Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smiths, 2008). This, as they suggest, implies that some women participate in the labour market due to economic necessity.

Furthermore, Buğra and Özkan (2012) emphasise the timing and society-specific dynamics of industrialisation in Turkey. They argue that such peculiar dynamics of industrialisation largely impeded women to participate in the labour force. According to them, this explains low FLFP rates in Turkey as well as Turkey's divergence from other South European countries in terms of FLFP patterns in the last decades.

Although they concur with the U-shaped curve hypothesis on the basis of Turkish case, they also highlight the influence of political reforms on FLFP patterns as in the case of Spain and Greece (2012). Hence, additional to the factors emphasised by the U-curve hypothesis, they highlight the role of democratisation and the EU accession in two countries which paved the way for cultural transformation and greater gender equality in society.

Similar to Buğra and Özkan's (2012) accounts, Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smiths (2008) also concur that the U-curve hypothesis may explain low FLFP rates in Turkey. They mention that participation rates declined from 45% to 30% between 1985 and 2005

in Turkey. Such decline, in their view, took place as a result of urbanisation process and structural changes in economy, and this decrease could not be absorbed by other sectors (Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smith, 2008). However, they also argue that new job opportunities may arise in the service sector in urban areas, which would potentially increase FLFP rates (Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smith, 2008).

Additionally, scholars also examined the urbanisation process to explain low FLFP rates in Turkey (Biçerli & Gündoğan, 2009; Dayioglu & Kirdar, 2010). As they mention, although Turkey had similar rates with other European countries in the 1970s, rates in Turkey decreased sharply following urbanisation and mass domestic migration. This led to substantial loss in agricultural employment in which women vastly had taken part. Although such decrease in FLFP rates during the early phase of industrialisation is not peculiar to Turkey (Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos, 1989), the country, in contrast to many other countries, failed to scale up rates despite some favourable developments. These developments include changing social attitudes towards women's working, increasing levels of educational attainment among women, getting married at a later age and declining fertility rates (World Bank, 2009). Despite these favourable conditions, the decline in Turkey has been constant, and occurred for a very long time. Scholars also mentioned that Turkish case is indeed puzzling when it is compared with the emerging economies relying on export-led growth (Toksöz, 2012). While, in the majority of developing world, export-led industrialisation fostered female employment, Turkey did not experience similar pattern despite its expanding export-led industrialisation especially in the textile sector (Toksöz, 2012).

Furthermore, scholars also highlight the low capacity of the Turkish economy to create employment. 'Growth without employment' has caused low level of demand for women's labour in Turkey, and scholars refer to this as a factor behind decreasing rates of FLFP (Toksöz, 2012). Although, for instance, the rapidly growing non-agricultural employment could integrate male employment during import substitution period, the rise in FLFP almost stabilised, and it lagged significantly behind the increase of female population in urban areas (İlkkaracan, 2010). As a consequence of the import substitution model itself, the non-agricultural labour markets have become male-dominated, as in other developing countries (İlkkaracan, 2010). Although the

objective to protect the national capital from international competition brought about high-income levels, this approach also consolidated male breadwinner model (İlkkaracan, 2010). Moreover, the sectors supported by import substitution models were capital intensive, which vastly employed men rather than women. Historically, import substitution model is considered as the first phase of transition from an economy based on agriculture to the one based on industrialisation. Women, during this period, as full-time housewives, were better-off given that they had once worked unpaid in the agricultural sector. However, the export-oriented growth model, in general, is expected to favour FLFP. Relying on export-oriented growth model, scholars also mention the feminisation of labour force in Turkey. They, however, argue for relative feminisation since feminisation occurs only when more than half of that particular sector employs women (İlkkaracan, 2010). Hence, export-oriented growth strategies brought about only relative feminisation in Turkish labour markets (İlkkaracan, 2010).

On the other side, the first wave of the literature also has studies which reflect primarily on supply side factors. For example, while examining low FLFP rates in Turkey, Urla-Zeytinoğlu (1998) highlights the following factors: low investment in women's education and training, cultural prejudices and sex discrimination against women and inadequate legal protection against discrimination. These factors, in Urla-Zeytinoğlu's view, impede the increase in participation levels. Moreover, Urla-Zeytinoğlu (1998) also emphasises that Turkey has not yet pursued gender equality measures for working women including expansion of formal childcare services.

Some scholars also argue for the influence of high real wages, compared to other countries especially between 1960 and 1993, on FLFP in Turkey. They believe that high real wages do not create an incentive for women to take part in the paid labour (İlkkaracan, 2010). For example, İnce and Demir (2006) highlight that while the total FLFP rates were declining in Turkey, rates decreased by all age groups. They suggest that this occurred due to relatively higher income distribution and higher GDP per capita (İnce & Demir, 2006). Beşpınar (2010) also studied the role of economic need on labour supply behaviour especially among working class women. She argues that women value domestic labour more compared to paid work given that jobs available to them are largely low-paid and insecure (2010).

Furthermore, some scholars also identify common influential factors in Turkey and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries concerning low FLFP rates. They also highlight the supply side factors, particularly the role of Islamic culture. However, Moghadam and Karshenas (2001) distinguish Muslim-majority societies. They argue that the relative high level of income supported by oil revenues enables preservation of patriarchal family structures in some countries. In their view, because of that reason, Morocco and Tunisia have higher female presence in the labour market compared to others since they have restricted oil revenues and have adopted export-led industrialisation, which brought about relatively increased female participation. Therefore, one would expect to see higher FLFP rates in Turkey considering the lack of natural resources in the country.

O'Neil and Bilgin (2013) also study the role of Islam on FLFP in Turkey. They argue that traditionalism and women's traditional role as caregivers are the main determinants behind low FLFP rates whereas Islam does not constitute a direct influence on participation. However, they argue that Islam has an indirect influence by reinforcing patriarchy (O'Neil & Bilgin, 2013). Dildar (2015) also argues that patriarchal norms, family conservatism and Islam have a negative effect on FLFP. Similarly, Atasoy (2017), relying on the diverse trajectories among the countries with Muslim-majority populations, argues that Islam cannot be the sole determinant of low FLFP in Turkey. Atasoy (2017), acknowledging its diverging points from Islamic culture, conducts a quantitative study on Turkey to understand the role of conservatism/traditionalism. Pointing at the difference between the urban and rural samples, Atasoy (2017) argues for the role of conservatism/traditionalism in reducing FLFP rates in urban settings. Similarly, Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008) and İlkaracan (2012) also highlight the influence of social norms and patriarchy on women's work.

Some scholars also associated FLFP in urban setting in Turkey with economic hardship. They argue that for women especially living in gecekondu, participation in labour markets occurred with economic hardship of the family (Dedeoglu, 2000). However, field studies in Turkey, especially based on interviews with women working at factories, also show that family or husband has a direct influence on FLFP since women need their approval to work (Dedeoglu, 2000).

In the second wave of the literature, scholars began focusing on policy-related factors. For example, concerning the role of care burden on women's employment, Toksöz (2014) reflects on the findings of a labour force survey in Turkey. This survey shows that married women aged 25-49 with children take part in the labour market at lowest levels. Women who are not in the labour force primarily point at high costs of care services. These results eminently reveal the role of affordable childcare services on FLFP in Turkey (Toksöz, 2014). In Turkey specifically, negative influence of having young children on the participation decision of women is evident (Dayioglu, 2000). Atasoy (2017) also points at the number of children, being pregnant, breastfeeding, wealth and housework as the most important determinants of FLFP in Turkey based on a quantitative analysis.

Limited number of studies in Turkey, influenced by international defamilisation literature and studies on gendering welfare states, also examined how Turkey positions in terms of familialism and individualism. In that regard, Kılıç (2010) argues that there has been a move toward the individualisation of several benefits which, were previously gained through male family members. Kılıç (2010) also identifies gender neutralisation of welfare benefits in some areas such as healthcare system<sup>8</sup>. For her, reform also signals a transition from familialism to individualism given that the country proposed a non-contributory scheme for children by preventing their dependence on family and the market. However, one strand of the literature examining solely the Turkish case also scrutinises the Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s (the party in government since 2002) social service programs and discerns the increasing emphasis on the family-centred social policy approach in many respects, i.e. encouraging adult children to care for their elderly parents, reinforcing central role of the family in the protection of children, 'back to the family' program, lack of interest in increasing the provision of childcare services etc. (Kılıç, 2010).

With respect to policy-related factors, some scholars also questioned entrepreneurship strategies in Turkey, which have been proposed to tackle low participation levels of women through creating new employment opportunities. For

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<sup>8</sup> The reform cancelled the entitlements of dependent daughters to lifelong health insurance by limiting entitlement to maximum 25 years of age based on their educational and marital status and obligating them to pay healthcare premiums (Kılıç, 2010).

instance, Toksöz (2007: 52) states that “own account working is only a form of employment and in present day Turkey, it is one of the forms that is accorded the least protection, remuneration and stability”. Promoting entrepreneurship is deemed as the most effective way to increase female employment since it creates new jobs in a context where there is a significant problem of labour demand. However, Toksöz (2007) argues that the policies aiming at increasing FLFP rates should not be limited to the promotion of female entrepreneurship since this type of employment has significant drawbacks.

In an overall analysis of the literature on FLFP patterns in Turkey, I note that they do not explain why Turkey featured marginally low levels lingeringly, why it lasted conspicuously long to attain bounce-back, and why a strong bounce-back, albeit being late, could not occur. In fact, no study focused on these questions. Instead, the scholars pick up a factor, and try to explain *descriptively* how FLFP can increase with reference to that factor without necessarily applying causal comparative analysis. When they seek an explanatory analysis, they conduct quantitative statistical analysis solely on Turkey, which only provides the degree of effects of the variables included in the analysis. Hence, the literature on FLFP in Turkey does not account for the pathway(s) Turkey should direct itself to attain higher levels of FLFP.

The international literature, on the other hand, either conducts descriptive analysis over limited number of cases, or looks at the net effects of variables. This literature, mainly covering developed nations of Western Europe or Northern America, does not provide account for other regions or developing countries, and neither do they explore constellations of conditions leading to higher FLFP.

## **2.5. Beyond the State-of-the-Art: Explaining Patterns of FLFP in Southern Europe**

In this section, I present how this study advances the state-of-the-art which I reviewed above. First, the literature which aimed at incorporating gender into the comparative welfare state research has been successful in bringing gender in welfare state research. The succeeding research, including this dissertation, has followed the



line of thought of this literature. The main success of these studies, therefore, has been turning scholarly attention to the gender dimension of the social policy provision. Following discussions in this literature focused on identifying variations across countries within gendered lenses by relying on certain typologies. Even though this literature has been very successful in clustering different regimes, it fell short of identifying causal conditions having impact on varying outcomes. Hence, future research needs to focus more on the explanation of variations relying on causal analysis. The necessity for this type of research arises when one intends to account for the divergent Turkish case compared to South European countries concerning FLFP levels. In fact, that is why, in this study I seek to shed light upon a divergent case among most similar cases. The way to analyse this divergent case, which is Turkey, is entirely distinct from the common approaches in the literature. I aim at understanding the conditions influential on a social phenomenon, rising FLFP, through an inter-temporal cross-national analysis.

Second, some studies compared Turkey with South European countries with respect to their FLFP patterns. They were, however, all descriptive studies relying on some available statistical data. This study distinctively aims at providing an explanatory analysis. Third, this research, by building on defamilisation literature, incorporates FLFP as the outcome and childcare services as one of the conditions into the analysis. Analysis of availability of formal childcare services on FLFP with a causal comparative analysis is also new in the literature on FLFP in Turkey. Even though childcare has been pointed as one of the influential factors on FLFP in Turkey, it has not yet been studied with a comparative empirical research. Childcare statistics was utilised for descriptive analysis to compare Turkey with other countries. However, childcare has not been conceived as an integrated and core element in a research at explanatory level. With this study, it becomes an independent variable and constituent element of FLFP analysis. This type of analysis, surely, owes very much to defamilisation literature, and this is the reason why this dissertation provides a detailed literature review on defamilisation research.

This study, however, does not just benefit from the defamilisation literature. It also builds on this literature by taking the concept of defamilisation as an independent variable and revisiting discussions over conceptualisation and operationalisation of

defamilisation. It advances the defamilisation literature by initiating the use of defamilisation in a causal analysis as an independent variable (or condition in QCA terms). Lastly, this study advances the literature on FLFP in Turkey by also situating such line of research into a recent international scholarly debate on defamilisation.



## CHAPTER 3

### **SOUTH EUROPEAN PATTERNS OF FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND ASSOCIATED REGIMES**

In the preceding chapter, I presented the current state-of-the-art on gendering welfare state research, common FLFP patterns, SESM and FLFP patterns in Southern Europe and Turkey. The preceding chapter also identified the determinants of rising FLFP. In this chapter, I provide comparative-historical case analysis for all five South European countries that make up the universe of this research. In this chapter, I also present regime features and transformations associated with FLFP in all countries.

Since the methodologists of QCA consider case-based knowledge as a “crucial companion to QCA” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2010: 222), before conducting QCA, it is strongly advised to gain familiarity with the relevant cases under study (Ragin, 1987). This advice stems from the imperative that fuzzy-set calibration should be purposeful and thoughtful by relying on theoretical and substantive knowledge (Ragin, 2000). In-depth case analysis is particularly necessary for this study given its case-orientation with small number of cases rather than being condition oriented.

The necessity of case-based knowledge within QCA, especially in a type of QCA as in this dissertation, relies on several factors, which also show why I included this chapter in this dissertation. First, thorough case-based knowledge minimises coding errors during calibration process. This is why, the analyses in this chapter guide the calibration in the following chapter. Without a proper knowledge on cases,

researcher would be highly likely to assign incorrect scores since the calibration would lack guidance of the critical elements to be considered during that process. As an example, it may be the case that two countries present similar data for the same period. However, the data pertaining to that period particularly may not represent well the context, and the country may display a contrasting feature once the period of consideration is expanded. Second, although I derived the conditions from the literature, case study within this chapter also enables the validation of the suitability of the conditions. It may be the case that the conditions may not be relevant for cross-comparative analysis considering the contextual circumstances. Third, quite importantly, case knowledge stimulates internal validity and the outcome of the QCA. It allows robust inferences supported with the additional dimensions gained through the case knowledge.

I, therefore, present an in-depth inter-temporal analysis for each case which I utilise extensively while executing calibration and QCA. This chapter also provides detailed insights on prominent developments, achievements and constraints related to FLFP. I provide such analysis by looking at welfare state, education, defamilisation, production and labour market regimes and left party strength for each country. All these dimensions correspond to the conditions and the outcome in this study. First, welfare state regime reflects policies which may hamper or promote FLFP. Review of welfare state regime also demonstrates the role of left parties in initiation and reinforcement of women-friendly policies. The study on welfare state regime also provides accounts on the conditions of political party commitment and take-up of ECEC. Second, education regime explains how education, particularly tertiary education, was promoted in each country. Third, defamilisation regime demonstrates the extent to which countries adopted policies for ECEC expansion and reconciliation of work and family life. Defamilisation regime also demonstrates whether or not the governments in these countries have been committed to increase FLFP. Detailed historical analysis on this regime also shows the actors behind the development of defamilisation policies. Fourth, production regime provides relevant insights related to the condition, service sector expansion. The study on this regime reveals the transformation with regard to sectoral dimension, and changing share of employment in each sector. Fifth, labour market regime provides insights related to the outcome, and offers accounts on the characteristics of female labour force in each

country relying on the dimensions of age, education, marital status and having children. Hence, analysis of labour market regime pinpoints the triggering factors behind the levels of FLFP descriptively. Lastly, left party strength provides insights related to the condition of political party configuration, and demonstrates strength of the left parties per their share of seats in the parliaments upon each election within the periods under analysis.

In addition to providing insights related to the conditions and the outcome of this study, the regimes I present here also make up the *political economy* in a country. They provide clues as to how the domestic political economies evolve to allow rising FLFP. Political economy refers to “the institutional matrices that structure the organisational relationships among economic actors in production and distribution, which are supported by domestic and international policy regimes” (Bolukbasi, 2012: 341). In line with Bolukbasi’s (2012) description of political economy, I conceive the regimes under study here as what constitute institutional matrices, that is domestic political economies, in these societies. These institutional matrices, however, embody also the complex constellations of circumstances, some of which serve to rise FLFP while others hinder. Tracing continuity and change with respect to these regimes, in this respect, provides significant clues as to the prospects of FLFP. In so doing, this Chapter also provides insights, based on Southern European experiences, on conditions which pave the way for Southern European developments favourable for FLFP.

### **3.0. Introduction**

Before embarking on case analysis, in this introductory section, I elaborate on the implications of the regime characteristics related to FLFP. I intend to account for how specific features within a regime encourage or hinder FLFP in a country by relying on the arguments in the state-of-the-art. To begin with the welfare state regime, as scholars argue, the welfare state characteristics in a country play a critical role in encouraging or hindering FLFP.

First, while responding to the new social risks, budgetary constraints are more apparent in corporatist welfare states in contrast to social-democratic and liberal

states (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Martin & Palier, 2007). Consequently, corporatist welfare states are less likely to transform family policies (Naldini & Saraceno, 2008). Furthermore, pension-heavy systems, which emerged during the golden age, encounter financial problems in retaining those systems. Political problems occur when they try to modify these systems due to vested interests. As a result, protection against 'old' social risks hamper the emergence of schemes targeting 'new' ones (Bonoli, 2007). Therefore, welfare state characteristics of each case, as I present below, reveal the capacity of the countries to respond to new social risks, which, in turn, influences the formation of the policies favouring FLFP. Pension-heaviness, characterised by corporatist welfare state features and reliance on family, appears to restrict facilitation of policies responding to new social risks such as expansion of ECEC services.

Second, market failures and policy distortions resulting from welfare state policies may restrain FLFP considerably (Jaumotte, 2004). For instance, taxation systems also appear to influence female supply. While household-based systems lead to lower participation rates, individual-based systems, as in Sweden, encourages FLFP (Gustafsson, 1992). This is because, since the tax system is progressive, and, when a couple is taxed jointly, they generally experience an increased tax rate for the sum of their earnings, in contrast to cases where their earnings are taxed individually (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005). Various scholars, therefore, studied how variations in tax systems influence female participation (Marques & Pereira, 1999). A more neutral tax treatment of second earners, compared to single individuals, tax incentives to share market work between spouses, subsidies for childcare as well as paid parental leave, as scholars argue, reinforce FLFP (Jaumotte, 2004). Furthermore, taxation systems also appear to influence post-birth employment of women (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005). However, because of the income effect, child benefits, in contrast to childcare subsidies, lead to a negative impact on women's employment (Jaumotte, 2004). Hence, gender neutral tax treatment within a case implies supportive conditions for women's employment. However, in case provision of benefits rather than subsidies is prevalent in a given case, this should be interpreted as a factor hindering FLFP.

Third, welfare states of the SESM traditionally feature reliance on family although transformation occurred in recent decades. The implication of prominence of the role of the family has been the underdevelopment of external care services or subsidies for families. Such underdevelopment evidently hampers maternal employment. Case analyses in the following pages show the variation among countries in their direction towards defamilisation. This, in fact, provides significant insights related to the progress made to stimulate FLFP. Furthermore, social expenditure on family is also an important indicator. High expenditure on family demonstrates greater assistance provided to the families and also less reliance on them by the welfare state. This, consequently, supports FLFP because such expenditure results in greater leave opportunities, expanded care arrangements and promoted gender equality.

Fourth, under-provision of services and over-provision of transfers in a welfare regime also have implications for working women. This is because, expansion of services rather than reliance on transfers ease the market access of women. This is because, services provide greater opportunities for reconciliation of work and family life.

Fifth, labour market segmentation in a country creates dualistic conditions in which only some can utilise the benefits. Hence, lack of universal assistance combined with the division between well-protected workers and those in the unregulated grey economy stimulates vulnerability and volatility in terms of women's presence in the labour market. Under such circumstances, it becomes more likely that higher levels of FLFP cannot be attained because of the large share of the informal economy in a country.

With respect to the education regime, in the preceding chapter, I explain how the state-of-the-art points at the positive correlation between educational attainment levels of women and their participation in the paid labour force. Hence, the initiatives in the countries to increase educational attainment levels of women show also their progress towards pulling more women in the labour force. Furthermore, education is also influential in re-entrance and exit patterns of women. However, as I explain below, country specific features are also influential particularly concerning the participation of women with lower education levels. I also provide accounts on the implications of such differences below.

Concerning defamilisation regime, first, perception towards ECEC is influential on FLFP patterns. If a welfare state regime prioritises education aspects, and dismisses aspects related to care and work-life balance, then, the expansion of those services cannot promote FLFP as expected. This occurs because of the restricted hours and low availability of care for children aged 0-3. Second, aside from the availability, quality and affordability of the care arrangements is also important for rising FLFP. In case of problems related to those, women tend to rely on family for caring arrangements or exit the labour market. Furthermore, migrant care work also creates a relief for the welfare states since those work provided by the migrants serve for the need for caring arrangements. Hence, the availability of migrant work for childcare may also stimulate FLFP.

With respect to the production regime, expansion of employment in service sector is an important indicator for FLFP. Hence, a comparative analysis on the scale of service sector provides accounts on the opportunities for female labour. Furthermore, sectoral employment patterns of women may differ across countries. Industrial employment may provide a room for higher FLFP in a country as well. Hence, the overview on production regime in the following pages should also shed light on all these aspects related to FLFP.

With respect to the labour market regime, first, self-employment, which is also a distinctive feature of the region, comes to the foreground. Despite being considered as a sign of backwardness and traditionalism for a long-time, interest is now placed on self-employment considering its potential role in tackling unemployment problem and job-creating ability of small and very small firms (Barbieri, 2001). Second, the EU has also been calling for encouraging part-time employment opportunities within member states. One of the reasons behind this policy is the role of part-time employment on increasing FLFP and reconciliation of work and family life. For instance, in Southern Europe specifically, low FLFP compared to other European countries is attributed to the low occurrence of part-time work (Karamessini, 2008b). Hence, insight on each case concerning the conditions on part-time work provides clues on the opportunities pertinent to the female paid labour. However, part-time employment may also trigger precariousness, which influences FLFP negatively. This is because, research shows that women with less secure jobs re-enter the labour



markets less frequently (Saurel-Cubizolles, Romito, Escribà-Agüir, Lelong, Pons, & Ancel, 1999). Third, elaboration on the potential influence or presence of added worker effect or discouraged worker effect also reveals country specific characteristics on FLFP. A high female unemployment rate may discourage female participation, which is called as ‘discouraged worker effect’. On the other hand, a high male unemployment rate may encourage female participation. This is because, women may try to offset for the loss of family revenue, which is the so-called ‘added worker’ effect (Jaumotte, 2004).

Finally, concerning left party strength, the state-of-the-art emphasises the role of left parties in developing women-friendly policies. Hence, left party strength may explain high FLFP in a country. Additionally, tracing the processes in which policies towards gender equality are attained also reveal the role of a left party as I do in this chapter.

### **3.1. Italy**

To capture fundamental regime characteristics, this part provides an overview of welfare state regime in Italy. I also provide a brief overview on the regimes concerning the conditions and outcome of the study. Such an overview forms the basis for calibrating data on Italy.

#### **3.1.1. Welfare State Regime**

I analyse here the welfare state regime in Italy reflecting first on its historical evolution and then its main characteristic features. To begin with, from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, Italy developed a welfare system relying on male breadwinner model mainly characterised by generous protection for the formal beneficiaries of the system (Ferrera & Gualmini, 2000). The design process of the social insurance system was nearly completed by the end of the 1960s with the further expansion of coverage and increase of benefit levels (Ferrera & Gualmini, 2000). However, the economic crisis taking place during the mid-1970s led to a shift from expansion to retrenchment of welfare expenditures. In the 1980s, only minor actions were taken

towards pension, health care and social assistance (Maino & Neri, 2011). Major reforms emerged again during the 1990s although the ultimate rationale behind the reforms in this period was to recalibrate the system without expanding the overall public expenditure on welfare policies (Graziano, 2009). However, the 1990s could still be considered as a turning point in the development of the welfare state in Italy. Between 1992 and 1998, reforms were initiated to amend pension calculation mechanisms and re-design the system of seniority pensions (Ferrera & Gualmini, 2000). During again the 1990s, collective bargaining and employment regulation also signalled shifts in regulations and, in fact, a new era (Molina & Rhodes, 2007). Furthermore, the health care reforms of 1992–93 and 1999 reflected the progress towards decentralisation of the Italian health care system. Moreover, in 2000, framework law on social assistance was adopted with some principles and guidelines aiming to promote integrated system of interventions and social services (Maino & Neri, 2011).

With respect to the prevalent features of Italian welfare state and its changing characteristics over time, first, Italian welfare state, especially in gender dimension, is characterised by the under-provision of services and over-provision of transfers (Addis, 1999). The ratio between cash transfers and GDP in Italy has been higher than those in other European countries. Over-provision of transfers and under-provision of services in Italy have evidently burdened women with more unpaid labour at home (Addis, 1999).

Second, another distinctive feature of Italian welfare state is the strong segmentation between well-protected workers and those in the unregulated grey economy. Such segmentation has led to labour market duality in the country (Ferrera, 1997). Even though the employees in the regular institutionalised labour market, such as civil servants, white collar workers and wage earners in medium and large enterprises working on a full contract with job security, tap into generous protection, a marked share of the population in labour market remains unprotected. Consequently, also triggered by the lack of universal safety nets, the only way to protect oneself (and one's family members) is to obtain a standard employment contract in the public sector or in a medium-large firm (Simonazzi & Villa, 2010). Hence, the unprotected segments of the labour force had to and still have to depend on their families for

protection (Simonazzi & Villa, 2010). The historically dominant labour market segmentation in Italy causes also volatility in women's presence in the labour market. Moreover, duality became prevalent in the welfare benefits in Italy also due to uneven distribution among social groups, inefficiency of the welfare system and exploitation on both financing and benefit sides (Ferrera, 1997).


Third, Italian welfare state is rudimentary in terms of its capacity for promoting social investment. Concerning Italian welfare state regime, European Social Policy Network (ESPN) thematic report on social investment (European Commission, 2015a) pointed at serious deficiencies concerning various policy areas and minimum income scheme. Consequently, ESPN refers to the lack of social investment strategy to protect the rights of people experiencing poverty and social exclusion. With this lack of capability in social investment, Italy may encounter problems related to care provision for children and promotion of maternal employment.

Fourth, Italy has featured a pension heavy system, and hence, experienced greater difficulties in responding to new social risks, such as responding to the needs of dual-earner parents. Distinctively, the country has had very high spending on old age and survivors' pensions: 14% of GDP in 2010 against 12.6% in Austria, 12.4% in France, 11.5% in Greece, 11.4% in Germany and 8.1% in Spain (Da Roit & Sabatinelli, 2013). On the other hand, expenditure on family policies constitutes 1.4% of GDP in Italy against 1.8% in Germany, 2.6% in Austria and 3% in France (Da Roit & Sabatinelli, 2013). Although Italy started to launch reforms on old-age pension system as of the 1990s with a new major reform passed at the end of 2011, the goal of releasing resources does not seem to be achieved extensively. In the context of relieving care burden of women, pension-heaviness appears to have constituted a significant impediment in Italy by restricting the capacity of Italian welfare state for the expansion of care services.

Fifth, in Italy, the role of the family has been critical as it provides a safety net against poverty and social exclusion, and welfare state has traditionally been dependent on the family. Nevertheless, as a positive consequence of the role of the family in Italian society, as research focusing on the situation of lone mothers in Italy compared to other countries shows, protection against poverty has been built relying on personal connections, affective networks and a non-cash economy (Ruspini,

1999). This, as an implication of the welfare state characteristics of Italy and other South European countries, resonates the fact that female poverty cannot be solely handled by monetary transfers (Ruspini, 1999). Reliance on family with low provision of external care services, consequently, hinders maternal employment as well.

Although Italian welfare state has traditionally featured a familialist character and strong reliance on family, social expenditure on family as percentage of its GDP has remained below the OECD average. Figure 2 below demonstrates the data retrieved from OECD database (OECD, 2016b). Italy, when compared with other South European countries, can be considered as an ‘early bird’ in achieving a relatively higher expenditure on family. However, the OECD average, early achievement of high expenditures on family and rate of increase in other countries also imply stagnation of respective expenditures in Italy. This stagnation, aside from the impact of policy priorities, relies also on the legacy of Italian welfare state regime, which features a pension-heavy system and reliance on transfers rather than services and also family. These institutional characteristics have for a long time impeded expansion of family policies including ECEC services in the country.



Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD, 2016b)

### Figure 2 Social Expenditure on Family, in percentage of GDP

Finally, concerning taxation, Italy launched separate taxation in 1977, however, until that time the country had implemented joint taxation (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005).

Hence, in the context of the possible negative influence of taxation on FLFP, Italy does not present a discriminatory approach, which would hinder the rise of FLFP.

In summary, review of Italian welfare state shows that although Italy presents to be an ‘early bird’ with respect to the development of the welfare state in Southern Europe, it failed to sustain expansion with similar pace as in other South European countries. Considering its limited capacity to expand welfare state services especially with respect to services provision, welfare state commitment for rising FLFP appears to be nearly absent in Italy. Take-up rates of ECEC also demonstrate limited capacity of expansion in Italy compared to Spain and Portugal. Italy could only attain 4% increase in take-up rates within almost 30 years. Lagging welfare state capacity is also reflected in the data for the condition, political party commitment. This is why, I confidently assign non-membership to Italy in terms of political party commitment for both periods. Case study here demonstrates that pension-heaviness, reliance on family for some segments of welfare state provision and limited political willingness after the 1970s explain the limited expansion of welfare state provision in Italy. Duality in term of the entitlement for the welfare state provision further hampers the effectiveness of the welfare state policies in the country.


### **3.1.2. Education Regime**

I analyse here the education regime in Italy by reflecting on the major problems and the progress achieved over the years. I also look at the education system in gender dimension, and present an insight in terms of segregation in education. Lastly, this section provides accounts on how education regime in Italy appears to influence the participation of women in the labour markets.

First, among major problems historically prevalent, one would be comparatively high drop-out rate in Italy, especially at higher education level (Bettio & Villa, 1999). Scholars explain the reasons by referring to the relatively long bachelor degree courses before the introduction of shorter diploma courses in the 1990s (Bettio & Villa, 1999). As a reason behind high drop-out rates, scholars also point at the enrolment without an entry test with a few exceptions (Bettio & Villa, 1999). Although progress has been achieved in tackling high drop-out in Italy, the country

still ranks at the bottom, 34<sup>th</sup> among 37 OECD countries, in terms of the percentage of the population aged 25–34 attaining tertiary education (OECD, 2014).

Comparatively lower attainment levels in tertiary education in Italy in fact denotes also the high share of micro firms (1–9 employees) (Kazepov & Ranci, 2017). Figure 3 below demonstrates changing levels of tertiary schooling among population aged 25-29. As Figure shows, Italy, in contrast to its comparatively early processes of urbanisation, industrialisation and economic growth, strikingly features low educational attainment levels despite increases over the years. Compared to Spain and Greece, the country could only attain slight increases rather than major shifts in tertiary schooling. Considering the role of tertiary schooling on FLFP, Italy recently demonstrates restricted capacity to rise FLFP further.




Source: World Bank databank, education statistics - all indicators (World Bank, 2018)

**Figure 3 Percentage of population aged 25-29 with tertiary schooling. Completed tertiary.**

Second, with respect to gender equality in education, one of the major developments in the Italian society in the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been the gradual increase of women’s education attainment levels. Women increasingly acquired higher education, and this brought about major changes in socio-economic structures in the country. Increase in women’s education attainment levels in Italy was also prevalent at higher education levels. While the percentage of women population with tertiary schooling was 4.43% in 1985, it scaled up to the level of 26.18% in 2010. The Figure 4 below illustrates


gradual increase in tertiary schooling among women aged 15 and above. However, the rates in Italy are comparatively lower.



Source: World Bank data from the database, education statistics - all indicators (World Bank, 2018)

**Figure 4 Percentage of female population age 15+ with tertiary schooling. Completed tertiary.**

Furthermore, in Italy, the proportion of female students balanced with that of male students in 1989-90, and after that, female university students aged 19 to 24 always exceeded male students of the same age in each year. (Moscati & Rostan, 2000). The Figure below demonstrates gender parity index in tertiary education between 1975 and 2015. Concerning the gender segregation in educational programmes at tertiary level, the progress in Italy in terms of tackling concentration of female graduates in certain subject areas has been notable (Bettio & Villa, 1999).



Source: World Bank data from the database, education statistics - all indicators (World Bank, 2018)  
 Note: Due to missing data for some years, I used the 1991 data for Portugal in 1990, 2001 for Turkey in 2000 and 2014 for Greece in 2015.

**Figure 5 Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, gender parity index (GPI)**

Third, looking at the relationship between education levels and labour force participation, research shows that increasing education levels among women encouraged entry to labour market in Italy and discouraged exit from the paid labour (Bettio & Villa, 1999). Thus, education in Italy has had twofold positive impact on women's presence in paid labour. Furthermore, as revealed by the research, education weakens the impact of motherhood in Italy in terms of their participation in the labour force (Bratti, 2006; Simonazzi & Villa, 2010). Similarly, female participation in the paid labour seems to respond to education more than motherhood, and Italy presents notable low rates among low educated women (Bettio & Villa, 1999). However, study also suggests that the gains achieved by women in education have not been fulfilled by equivalent gains in the labour force (Bettio & Villa, 1999). On that point particularly, the low capacity of Italian economy to create additional employment prevails since educated women and men encounter challenges in finding jobs. This implies a need for a shift of focus from supply-side to demand-side in Italy (Bettio & Villa, 1999).



Furthermore, one of the characteristics of women's employment in Italy is that the least educated women are under-represented and those highly educated are over-represented, which is more prevalent among the younger cohorts (Simonazzi & Villa, 2010). Compared to the other EU countries, the share of poorly educated women among the working female population has been lower. This situation is reflective of the lack of job opportunities, greater difficulties in reconciliation and low economic incentives for second earners (Simonazzi & Villa, 2010). Research also demonstrates that tertiary-educated women in Italy are more likely to consider having a child if they are employed (Matysiak & Vignoli, 2010). Their re-entrance to the labour market is more likely and occurs more quickly compared to low- and medium-level educated women (Matysiak & Vignoli, 2010). Similarly, having a prior work experience also influences the re-entrance to the labour market as women with no working experience prior to the first conception are more likely to remain out of the labour market after becoming mothers (Matysiak & Vignoli, 2010).

Study of the education regime within the framework of FLFP shows first that Italian labour market opportunities are restricted for women with low-level education. Although women with tertiary education would be expected to participate in paid labour in largest shares, the share of participation with low-level education in Italy is marginally low. Aside from reflecting restricted job opportunities for women, this also demonstrates limited care services and welfare state family assistance considering their influence in pulling women with low education in labour force. Moreover, the study of education regime provides an in-depth insight on comparatively low tertiary schooling in Italy, which is one of the conditions in this research. Hence, such review enabled an insight on the explanatory factors, namely high drop-out rates and high share of micro firms, behind the data of a condition by also validating the membership scores assigned.

### **3.1.3. Defamilisation Regime**

While describing the developments in Italy with regard to its defamilisation regime, I divide the review into four. First part presents the gradual development of ECEC services with references to the prominent actors and driving forces. Second, with an

inter-temporal analysis, following part provides accounts on the family policies including leaves and related family assistance schemes. Third section describes the progress towards reconciliation of work and family life and respective policies. Last section explains the achievements towards attaining greater gender equality in society.

### ***Early Children Education and Care Services***

To begin with the evolution of ECEC services in Italy, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and during the Fascist regime in the country, childcare was deemed necessary only for the children whose family was absent or unable to take care of them (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004). Only after the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation, the first childcare services, factory kindergartens and breast-feeding rooms, emerged in the pursuit of enabling workers to keep working (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004). In the post-war period, as a step-forward, the Republican constitution explicitly recognised children's right to upbringing and education, to health and to be protected at work although these principles were not put into practise for some time (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004). Nevertheless, during the post-war period, it was still possible to point at increased attention paid to the out-of-home experiences of preschool-aged children, particularly in the industrial settings in the northern part of the country.

However, as of the early 1960s, the central government started to pursue greater responsibility in social service provision, which was previously offered by private or charity organisations, especially by the Catholic Church (Saraceno, 1984). The National Body for Protection of Motherhood and Childhood (ONMI) arranged limited custodial care services for childcare with the purpose of decreasing infant mortality and supporting mothers at or below the poverty line. Additionally, some local administrative bodies began the development of municipality sponsored childcare for pre-primary children (OECD, 2001). Especially, the cities in the prosperous region of Emilia Romagna, including Bologna, Parma and Modena paid greater attention to the provision and development of pre-primary schools for young children. Importantly, the achievements owing to these local practices brought about increasing public sympathy for high quality public day care, especially for the children of working mothers (OECD, 2001).

In 1968, as another step forward, the government enacted *Law 444* to provide national funds for pre-primary schools by recognising the right of Italian children to pre-primary education (OECD, 2001). Following this legal act, state infant schools were set up for children aged 3 to 6. This paved the way for almost universal coverage of children aged 3-6 in the following two decades (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004). With this legislation, marked public financing was allocated for the preschool education, which also included subsidies to non-state preschools, including those operated by the Church, parishes and religious congregations. All these developments resulted in considerable increase in the number of voluntary preschools (Hohnerlein, 2015). Hence, this law, dubbed as the Act on Establishing Maternal Schools, was a turning point towards the development of preschools in Italy, transforming the welfare intervention for children into a universal one through conceiving childcare institutions as places of education and instruction (Scheiwe & Willekens, 2009). The factors bringing about this law in 1968 were the changing power relations in the political system and a consensus on the need for modernisation of society (Scheiwe & Willekens, 2009). Political power held by the *centre-left government* and the reform ideas that the Socialist Party brought into the governing coalition to modernise the education system as part of a general process of modernising the Italian economy and society were influential (Hohnerlein, 2009). In addition, some scandals concerning child abuse and maltreatment within Church-run childcare institutions had also an impact (Hohnerlein, 2009). This law, hence, was not prompted by conventional factors such as pronatalist policies to support families in raising their children or by demands created by women's increased labour market participation (Hohnerlein, 2009). On the contrary, at the time when this legislation was passed, women's labour market activity in the country was actually decreasing (Hohnerlein, 2009).

As of the early 1970s, with increasing women's employment, high birth rates, changes in family structure and also workers', women's and youth movements, social policies towards promotion of childcare services expanded. During this period, the old childcare structures were closed down, and the responsibility for social provision was devolved to the municipalities (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004; Kuronen et al., 2015). As an example, in 1971, heavily influenced by a women's movement, municipal crèches law was enacted for the care and education of children

below 3 through the support provided to the municipal structures. The particular campaign was initiated by labour union confederations and the *Unione Donne Italiane (Union of Italian Women)* (UDI) to establish state funded day care. UDI, with close links to the Italian Communist Party, grounded its claims at that time on ‘women’s double identity, both as workers and as mothers’, and defended childcare policy as part of the improvement of women’s workplace rights and program for the socialisation of care (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). As part of its campaigns, UDI, as a primary actor behind the initiation of 1971 childcare legislation, arranged a demonstration in Rome where women took to the streets by ‘invading Rome with their children in their prams’ (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). The 1971 law entailed two specific aims. First aim was associated with the principle of socialisation of care, which held that work outside home was a necessary condition for women’s emancipation. The second concerned the availability of publicly funded and controlled day care to increase the enrolment of the children of working mothers (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). However, the discretionary feature of 1971 Law resulted in significant regional variation. This is because, the regions were given responsibility to initiate plans and apply for funding. Consequently, mainly the regions and municipalities governed by the left facilitated the establishment of day care, and mainly they provided extensive, high quality and affordable day care (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012).

Following the 1971 Municipal Day-care Act, a moderate increase occurred in public provision for children under 3 years old. Coverage rate, however, was only around 5.8% for this age group by the early 1990s (Kuronen et al., 2015). Owing to the gradual increase in women’s employment, the provision levels scaled up albeit slowly during the 1990s and 2000s. However, in the early 2010s, only 48% of Italian municipalities had at least one public crèche or provided financial support to assist attendance to a private one, with a national public coverage of barely 12% (Kuronen et al., 2015). Hence, conceived as a social assistance measure in accordance with the residual and subsidiarity-based Italian social policy stance, access to services for children under 3 was regulated by locally defined hierarchies of ‘need’, which, due to scarce resources, led to the problem of availability for working mothers (Knijn & Saraceno, 2010).

Furthermore, in 1977, competencies for public benefits were transferred from central government to regions and municipalities. Since this was put into practise without a proposition of nation-wide common standards, it resulted in diversity of local policies (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004). The number of crèches, as targeted by the law, could not be attained by due time. By the mid-1980s, publicly funded *asili nidi* were only available for 5% of under 3-year olds in Italy, with around 20% coverage in Emilia Romagna. Piemonte, and Lombardia cover around 10% of eligible children, whereas coverage rate was less than 2% in the southern regions (European Commission, 1990). By 1995, Emilia Romagna has had a coverage of almost 30%, other northern regions reached close to 15%, and the numbers for Calabria and Campania remained low (both at around 1%) (Oliver & Mätzke, 2014). Nevertheless, this ‘modernisation from below’ approach, which devoted responsibility in tackling family issues through a decentralisation process, fostered partnerships with the third sector and other private providers (Andreotti, Mingione, & Polizzi, 2012). This was because, in Italy, aside from for-profit establishments, non-profit organisations working either directly for the market or for the municipalities through outsourcing and contracting, or by managing company crèches also expanded (Kuronen et al., 2015).

As of the 1990s, demand for children services increased in the country primarily as a result of increasing FLFP (Da Roit & Sabatinelli, 2013). As a reflection of such demand, in 1999 and 2000, the country experienced two legislative enactments by *Ullivo*, the centre-left government (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). In 1999, the government enacted a bill indicating that ‘childcare is both an important part of education and socialisation of children and a service that facilitates women’s access to labour markets’ (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). In 2000, *Ullivo* passed a parity law which had implications for childcare services through the promotion of in-house company day care (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). Furthermore, in 2001, social policy planning was prominently regionalised. However, while the central government had the mandate to determine the minimum levels of provision, this has not notably occurred, which ultimately led to major regional disparities (Kazepov, 2008).

In 2001, the new center-right coalition led by Berlusconi’s Forza Italia took office, and cut the regional funding on social policies, and launched controversial new

initiatives for funding childcare through company nurseries (*micro-nidi aziendali*) (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). The governance by the centre-right government lasted most of the decade as the centre-left government ruled only for around one year and a half between 2006 and 2008. The intervention in family policies by the Berlusconi government took place only in two ways in 2002 and 2003 (León & Pavolini, 2014). First, the government decreased the threshold for entering kindergarten with bill no. 53 to enable children aged two years and a half to enter kindergarten (León & Pavolini, 2014). The purpose here was to increase statutory coverage in the 0–3 age range without investing in early childcare facilities (León & Pavolini, 2014). Second, the 2002 and 2003 budget laws (448/2001, 289/2002) included a fund under the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy to finance employer-constructed and managed childcare services, which constituted 300 million Euro over a 3-year period (Giaccone, 2007).

The centre-left government, on the other hand, during its short governing period, aimed at building up formal childcare facilities with an investment of approximately 800 million Euro with partial co-financing by regional authorities within the framework of a National Extraordinary Crèches Plan (León & Pavolini, 2014). In 2006, the Prodi centre-left government scaled up childcare spending substantially to meet the 33% Lisbon target and established a new Ministry of Family Policy through which the national funding would be distributed (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). The budget for 2007 allocated 300 million Euro for childcare as 100 million Euro for each year between 2007 and 2009 (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). Furthermore, in 2008, the centre-left government affirmed its commitment to the expansion of childcare in 2008-2009 with budget increase to lower regional variation in childcare and with new reward mechanisms to encourage lagging regions to meet targets (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). Regional diversity, however, continued despite these efforts put forward. The centre-left government also launched ‘Spring Sections’ project (2007-2013), as a part of its ‘Lisbon Strategy National Reform Program’ through an agreement with regions and municipalities (Mätzke & Oliver, 2012). 30 million Euro was allocated for the provision of twenty thousand new places for children between 24 and 36 months (CIACE, 2008). Furthermore, in 2002 and 2009, as an approach for long-term care policy, illegal foreign care workers were also regularised and yearly quotas for migrant flows for care work were set (Costa, 2012). Finally, aside

from the parents' need for receiving assistance in their parental function, their awareness on children's need for out-of-home social experiences also facilitated ECEC expansion in Italy (Musatti & Picchio, 2010). As a response to such a demand, in various Italian provinces, both *Spazio bambini*, which catered for children from 18 to 36 months, for a maximum of 5 hours daily, and *Centri per bambini e genitori*, which were addressed both to children and their parents emerged and started to function (Musatti & Picchio, 2010). The latter enabled parents discuss among themselves their parental experiences (Musatti & Picchio, 2010).

Having provided historical evolution of ECEC in Italy by referring to the legislative acts and driving forces, I will now briefly mention the key characteristics and prominent problems related to ECEC in Italy. First, in Italy, foreign carers constitute essential part of caring services. According to the estimates of the research institute IRES in Italy, there are 700,000 foreigner caregivers in Italy, mainly concentrated in the northern part of the country (Andreotti & Mingione, 2012). This new category of paid foreign care emerged in the second half of the 1990s. The reasons for the development of private care sector in Italy were the lack of informal resources, the availability of monetary resources and the reduced cost of services (Da Roit, 2007). The growth of unprotected female labour force was argued to have facilitated the emancipation of middle-class women from unpaid care as well (Da Roit, 2007).

Second, municipalities have historically enjoyed great autonomy in the provision of primary care for children given that they were able to decide levels of provision, access rules and fee schedules (Buccioli, Cavalli, Pertile, Polin, & Sommacal, 2016). Third, ECEC services have always been more prevalent in the North than in the South (Da Roit & Sabatinelli, 2013). Fourth, another problem related to children services in Italy has been the so-called mismatch between the features of the system and the demands of paid employment since Italian public sector childcare provides very limited hours of operation (Del Boca & Vuri, 2007). Even though the quality of publicly-provided childcare services is high in many regions of Italy, the number of slots available is highly restricted, and the hours of childcare are not compatible with full-time working hours (Del Boca, 2002). However, although the childcare services are rigid in terms of the number of weekly hours available, they are argued to be inexpensive and highly subsidised (Del Boca, 2002). This alters though according to

the age-group the facility serves for. The ratio of children who are under public care is quite low compared to the percentage for those who are aged 3 and above. One of the reasons behind this is that public childcare for children before 3 is quite expensive while the care facilities for children after 3 are highly subsidised (Del Boca, 2002). Additionally, the private market childcare is less widespread and their costs are relatively much higher (Del Boca & Vuri, 2007). Hence, the so-called 'mismatch' can also be argued between changing social practices, considering the length of waiting lists for care services, the high level of unsatisfied demand and the expansion of private solutions and political representation, that is non-representation of the needs and resources in the political arena (Da Roit & Sabatinelli, 2013).

In an overall analysis, although Italy is considered as an 'early bird' in adjusting family law and in facilitating childcare policies, innovation for such policies when the economic and social context has changed did not take place (Knijn & Saraceno, 2010). Compared to other countries such as the Netherlands in which the main focus was placed on work-family reconciliation, the major rationale for children services Italy embodied an education and a social assistance approach (Knijn & Saraceno, 2010). In line with the power resource theories of the welfare state, Italian case, together with Spain, reflects key role of left parties in promoting protected leave and childcare policies given also that the Right or Center-Right parties have, for a long time, been tied to Catholic ideology and tradition (Blofield & Lambert, 2008). The impact of national feminist movements in both countries, however, has been limited (Blofield & Lambert, 2008).

In the context of FLFP, studies, specifically focusing on Italy, demonstrate the positive impact of childcare availability on maternal employment. They show that a percentage change in public childcare coverage scales up working probability of the mothers by 1.3 percentage points (Brilli, Del Boca & Pronzato, 2016). Studies on Italy also reveal that women who are able to rely on their parents' support, monetary and non-monetary, are more likely to take part in the labour market (Chiuri, 2000; Del Boca, 2002; Marenzi & Pagani, 2008). Additionally, grandparents' support also increases the probability of having children, which seems to be more influential compared to formal childcare availability (Del Boca, 2002).



In Italy, over the years, an awareness concerning the importance of early education has expanded. The development of this culture is attributed to the fact that all ECEC services for under 3 year olds, and also *scuole dell'infanzia*, have been governed by local governments (Musatti & Picchio, 2010). However, ESPN thematic report on social investment in Italy (European Commission, 2015a), related to defamilisation regime in the country, noted the decline in the number of children below the age of 3 attending formal ECEC services. According to this report, policies in Italy for early childhood development are not well integrated due to fragmented legislation and insufficient coordination between institutional levels and financial funds. This report also pointed out that the lack of affordable public ECEC services forces families to burden the role of first safety net and social services supplier. On the other hand, as opposed to the low enrolment ratio among children younger than 3, as noted in the European Commission's report titled as 'Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015' (European Commission, 2015b), Italy together with Belgium, Denmark, Spain and France, has been a top performer.

### ***Family Policies***

As a second dimension within the framework of defamilisation review, here, I touch upon the family policies in Italy. In Italy, during the pre-Fascist period, 'Maternity Insurance Act of 1910' was the first effective national welfare provision (Bock & Thane, 1991). As another development during this period, the *Cassa Nazionale di Maternita* (National Maternity Fund), which was accepted on 17 July 1910 by the Italian Parliament, obliged women factory workers to stop working during the first month after childbirth (Buttafuoco, 1991). In the Fascist period, between 1922 and 1945, Italy witnessed introduction of series of policies for families, mothers and children, such as factory kindergartens, tax relief for large families, birth and marriage premiums and loans, taxes on unmarried people, maternity and breast-feeding leaves and benefits in the pursuit of promoting authoritarian structure of the family and safeguarding the birth rate (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004:6). During the 1930s, crèches were also established, which formed the basis of new childcare services in the 1970s.

Taxes on bachelors (introduced in 1927) and tax exemptions according to family size (1933), child allowances (1936) and fertility bonuses (1939) were all put in force during the Fascist period (Buttafuoco, 1991). One of the regime's most ambitious action, which penetrated into the areas of motherhood and childcare, was the initiation of the *Opera Nazionale Maternità E Infanzia*<sup>9</sup> (ONMI). This was introduced by a law of 10 December 1925, amended in 1933 and 1934. With ONMI, the regime aimed to “promote, by acting to integrate the activities of other public and private institutions, the defence and physical and moral improvement of the race” (Buttafuoco, 1991: 205). ONMI, as a semi-governmental body, with a complex structure of central and peripheral agencies and offices in every province, was initiated for coordinating and supervising the whole range of activities and measures targeting mothers and the young – from the operation of *casse di maternità* to the establishment of the paternity of illegitimate children, to the placing of minors in institutions and up to supervision of juvenile delinquents (Buttafuoco, 1991: 205-206). Additional to the activities related to supervision and control, ONMI also served for the assistance of pregnant women, women in childbed and the new-born up to the age of three (Buttafuoco, 1991: 206). ONMI mechanism and structure lasted until the 1970s when ONMI crèches were transformed into municipal crèches, and consultant obstetricians and paediatricians were incorporated into the USSL (local health centres) (Buttafuoco, 1991: 206).

In the post-Fascist era, due to massive family policies developed during the Fascist period, Republican governments refrained considerably from developing family policies to avoid being accused of Fascist heritage. This, in fact, could be considered as one of the reasons why Italy lagged behind most EU countries on family support services (Andreotti & Sabatinelli, 2004).

However, during the 1990s, certain actions were taken within the framework of family policies. Two family-related cash transfers were among them: one applied to any citizen who presented an income declaration and had a dependant. The other was available for those who were employed and had a dependant (Addis, 1999). The first one was tax credit. Every individual was eligible for tax deduction for the dependent

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<sup>9</sup> Opera Nazionale Maternità E Infanzia stands for National Opera for the protection of Maternity and Child.

spouse and one for each child or other dependant. The second was *assegni familiari*, family allowances, which were provided to the workers and paid out by the fund of the National Institute for Social Provision. *Assegni familiari* were funded by the contributions from all employers and all employees according to wage. They were means-tested and paid based on a family income threshold. The amount was provided for the dependent spouse and each child. However, this amount varied with the number of dependant. Initiation of *assegni* as primary family policy in Italy dated back to 1934. However, budget allocated for *assegni* altered over time because of changing approaches of parties in power and some socio-economic factors. In the mid-1990s, *assegni familiari* was perceived as an effective family policy by Olive Tree coalition against the fertility crisis. Therefore, allowance levels were increased substantially. Yet, these types of family allowances were criticised due to certain reasons (Addis, 1999). First, until the 1990s, the system discriminated single parents adopting a ‘bi-parental’ view of families. Second, as the system was job-based, unemployed people could not receive any support. Third, apart from being job-based, the system was patriarchal since there was the assumption that the amount would be fairly distributed to the members of the family by the head of the family (Addis, 1999).

In an overall analysis regarding the period from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s, two distinct approaches can be discerned in Italy based on the stance of the political parties in power (Riva, 2013). The focus of the centre-left coalition governments during the periods 1996-2001 and 2006-2008 has been on the regulation of maternity and parental leave, an expansion in public childcare provision and the implementation, through negotiation, of ‘positive’ flexibility (Riva, 2013). Hence, the approach by the left parties in Italy in term of conceiving family policies in the context of emancipating women and fostering FLFP is evident. This reflects an association between the left parties and promotion of FLFP in the country.

The right-wing governments during 2001-2006 and 2008-2011, on the other hand, considered work-family policies in the context of labour market reforms (Law 30/2003) and welfare state restructuring (Riva, 2013). What stood out in conservative governance was ‘welfare community’ approach which embodied transformation in the social policy reform with ‘neo-familialist and liberal orientation’ through

conceiving work-family reconciliation primarily as an individual/private responsibility (Riva, 2013). The prominent feature of this ‘neo-familialist welfare community’ approach was leaving work-family issues mainly to negotiations between employers and employees (Riva, 2013). Although certain measures have been taken to foster collective bargaining and workplace work-family provision such as Law 69/2009 (Art. 38), which revamped the mechanisms for the fund allocation concerning the implementation of workplace work-family arrangements by granting tax breaks for employers negotiating work-family policies, companies did not engage in work-family arrangements and collective bargaining did not look after work-family issues as expected (Riva, 2013).

Italy, in fact, distinguishes itself also with its long-standing parental leave policy (Law 1204, passed in 1971). For instance, parental leave was introduced in Spain only in the 1990s (Blofield & Lambert, 2008). However, in Italy and also in other South European countries, irregular workers (such as temporary workers) have not been entitled to parental leave. This is why, a significant proportion of women could not utilise such a leave opportunity. The table below summarises leave and childcare policies in Italy between 1985 and the early 2000s (Blofield & Lambert, 2008):

**Table 2 Maternity Leave, Parental Leave and Childcare Policies in Italy, 1985-2003**

	1985	1995	2001-2003
Maternity leave	20 weeks, 80%	22 weeks, 80%	22 weeks, 80%
Parental leave	26 weeks, 30%	26 weeks, 30%	10 months, 30%
Childcare 0-2 years old	5%	6%	7.4%
Childcare/preschool 3-5 years old	85%	91%	More than 95%

*Sources: Gonzalez-Lopez, 2003; European Commission Network on Childcare, 1996; Saraceno, 2003:160 in Blofield & Lambert, 2008*

Furthermore, the tables below provide recent information on paid leave entitlements available to mothers and fathers in South European countries including Italy. Thanks to the availability of paid parental and home care leave, Italy provides the most

generous total paid leave available to mothers. However, concerning leave entitlements available for fathers, Italy is among the least generous countries with Greece.

**Table 3 Paid Leave Entitlements Available to Mothers, 2016**

	<b>Paid maternity leave, Full-rate equivalent, in weeks</b>	<b>Paid parental and home care leave available to mothers, Full-rate equivalent, in weeks</b>	<b>Total paid leave available to mothers, Full-rate equivalent, in weeks</b>
Greece	23,3	0,0	23,3
Italy	17,4	7,8	25,2
Portugal	6,0	14,4	20,4
Spain	16,0	0,0	16,0
Turkey	10,6	0,0	10,6

*Source: OECD (2016c)*

**Table 4 Paid Leave Entitlements for Fathers, 2016**

	<b>Paid paternity leave, Full-rate equivalent, in weeks</b>	<b>Paid parental and home care leave reserved for fathers, Full-rate equivalent, in weeks</b>	<b>Total paid leave reserved for fathers, Full-rate equivalent, in weeks</b>
Greece	0,4	0,0	0,4
Italy	0,4	0,0	0,4
Portugal	5,0	7,5	12,5
Spain	2,1	0,0	2,1
Turkey	1,0	0,0	1,0

*Source: OECD (2016c)*

Furthermore, the table below shows historical evolution of leave policies in South European countries. Earlier attempts in Italy compared to other South European countries are notable; however, compared with the EU average, the pace of development in Italy appears to be insufficient.

**Table 5 Length of Paid Maternity, Parental and Home Care Leave Available to Mothers, in Weeks, 1970, 1990, and 2016**

Country	1970	1990	2016
EU average	25,0	56,2	63,4
Italy	14,0	47,7	47,7
Greece	12,0	15,0	43,0
Portugal	9,0	12,9	30,1
Spain	12,0	16,0	16,0
Turkey	12,0	12,0	16,0

*Source: OECD (2016c)*

Historically for working mothers, family has been the main care provider for children in Italy. A national survey of births and caring responsibilities focusing specifically on working mothers with children between six months and three years finds out that parents and parents in law are primary carers for 55% of working women (Andreotti & Mingione, 2012). While the percentage of women using public collective services is 15%, only 12% of women choose private services (Andreotti & Mingione, 2012). The contrast between the North and South of Italy is also evident in childcare services. While childcare services for 0-2 years are scarce all over the country, there is also territorial uneven distribution and an enormous divide between the North and South (Andreotti & Mingione, 2012).

Concerning also elderly care, social norms as regards women's roles in the households for the provision of unpaid care have also changed. For instance, in Italy, the elderly with incapability mainly generally live closer to relatives or vice versa (Zechner, 2004). However, as a recent development, the commercial care services in the grey market provided by migrant women has compensated the decline of informal care and lack of sufficient formal services (Da Roit, 2007). Relying on these

changes, even though intergenerational solidarity is still prevalent in Italy, it is realised less through direct provision of care and more through supervision of paid services (Da Roit, 2007). Cash allowances has been persistent concerning welfare state provision for elderly care. The national allowance, *Indennità di accompagnamento*, paid to disabled people who constantly need help with their daily activities, has been the primary social policy measure for dependent elderly people in Italy (Da Roit, 2007). Qualitative research shows that women belonging to poorer social and economic strata adopt a conventional interpretation of intergenerational solidarities within the family and more traditional views on filial responsibilities compared to middle class women (Da Roit, 2007).

### ***Reconciliation of Work and Family Life***

With respect to the developments of reconciliation policies in Italy, the roles of several actors come to the foreground. In this regard, Italian unions have not been very much interested in matters of reconciliation of work and family life. Unions in Italy have been mostly influenced by male-dominated sectors where the expansion of part-time employment has been opposed due to its effects on hourly wage rates (Andreotti & Mingione, 2012). Moreover, the union movement as a whole has not sufficiently pursued reconciliation policies such as compulsory paternity leave (Andreotti & Mingione, 2012). On the other hand, with regard to the lack of family policies in Italy, three factors stand out: existence of reaction to fascism, which produced explicit pronatalist family policies and categorical policies for single mothers, support of family care for children and relatives by the welfare state and hegemony of a cultural model which favours continuing significance of family ties (Bimbi, 1999).

Research also shows that Italian women are not interested in joining unions. They do not believe that unions are able to represent their needs through collective bargaining (Ponzellini, 2006). Furthermore, unions are less present in Italy in sectors where women are more present in changing labour market structures. This is why wages still constitute the major issue for the unions, whereas work/family reconciliation issues are not equally included in the union agendas (Ponzellini, 2006). Moreover, in Italy, work organisation cultures appear to be decisive in the fathers' work-family balance endeavours (Musumeci & Santero, 2018). Italian workplace cultures,

however, are not supportive for fathers taking parental leave as they encounter various critical discourses and behaviours at the workplace when they take parental leaves (Musumeci & Santero, 2018).

In general, despite legislative progress in promoting gender equality at work and caring responsibilities, combination of work and family life persists to be a problem for the families in Italy. This is first due to the fact that family members with non-standard work contracts do not have access to reconciliation assistance (Santero & Naldini, 2017). Second, since many employees attain their entitlements for reconciliation policies based on the negotiations with their employers, those with less negotiating power with their employers become unable to obtain certain rights (Santero & Naldini, 2017). Third, provisions do not cover and respond to the peculiar necessities of those working in sectors which have atypical working hours (Santero & Naldini, 2017).

### ***Legislative Acts towards Gender Equality***

With respect to the legislative developments to attain greater gender equality in the areas related to FLFP, women's rights in Italy from the end of the Second World War to the 1990s have been supported mostly by the left-wing parties and trade unions including Catholic trade unions (Bimbi, 1993). However, in the 1970s, a split came into foreground between extra parliamentary groups and trade unions involved in the struggle to exercise workers' political power and the other group, consisting of student and feminist movements, engaged in the struggle against authoritarianism and patriarchy in education and family life (Bimbi, 1993). The prime developments in the 1960s and 1970s within this framework were as the following (Bimbi, 1999): the equal pay agreements (1962-63), introduction of state-day schools (1968), publicly funded crèches (1971), new maternity leave (1971) and law on parity (1977).

It is worth noting that legislation on equal pay in Italy was enacted much earlier than in other EU member states (Del Re, 2000). The equal pay legislation and other policies were in fact results of new demand for social welfare alongside economic, industrial and urban development (Bimbi, 1999). However, the policies mentioned above could not achieve the transformation of gender roles and division of labour



within the family (Bimbi, 1999). The political presumption that childcare was under the responsibility of the family and the care of the family was the responsibility of women, which is named by some scholars as “family paradigm”, was not challenged until the late 1980s and 1990s (Bimbi, 1999:73). Thus, Italy, experiencing extensive welfare policy changes without major challenges to the family paradigm, presented an “enigma” (Bimbi, 1999:73). To account for the long-lasting prevalence of family paradigm in Italy, it is of utmost importance to examine the political structure and developments in the country as well as the position of Catholic doctrine.

Catholic ideology perceived family as a social unit. It defended its moral, legal and social regulation and prioritised women’s roles as mothers and wives. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), on the other hand, defended equal rights for women such as equal pay and job security. The party, however, could not challenge the family paradigm because of its legitimacy concerns (Bimbi, 1999). The party, at these early stages of Italian Republic, was much more concerned about consolidating Italian democracy. The PCI also adopted a pro-family line with the rationale of fulfilling its patriarchal working-class constituency and refraining from possible conflict with the Catholic Church. This was because, the Church had powerful popular force in society back then. Moreover, concerning the matters of family and gender roles within the family, the Italian left was quite attentive to the stance of the Catholic Church. Consequently, the Italian constitution maintained a perception of women as wives and mothers for a long time (Bimbi, 1999).

However, the compromise in Italian politics concerning family definitions started to change as of the 1970s. The reforms initiated in the 1970s were accomplished mostly with the advent of feminism in the country. Feminism markedly influenced the relations between the three main forces in Italian politics: The Catholics, the Communists and the Secular-Liberals (Bimbi, 1999). For instance, the divorce vote in 1974 referendum was considered as a success of feminist movement (Bimbi, 1999). Coming to the law on abortion in 1978, it was seen that feminism could also penetrate into the PCI as communist women and feminists marched together in favour of abortion law in the large demonstrations (Bimbi, 1999).

Following the adoption of the new family law (1970) and abortion law (1978), the debate shifted from perception of women and the family to the issues concerning

equal opportunities in the labour markets. However, women's rights for work and welfare, social citizenship rights, were not central to the feminism of the 1970s (Bimbi, 1999). However, feminist trade unionists and women within the political parties took up these issues in the late 1970s. Yet, since the beginning of the 1980s, financial difficulties brought about new emphasis on social solidarity and family ties. This redefinition of social solidarity had the expectation that families, mostly women, should take the responsibility for the care of children and elderly (Bimbi, 1999).

Even though children's citizenship law (1997) seemed to be a challenge to family paradigm, the Italian welfare state, still in the late 1990s, had the notions of male-breadwinner model (Bimbi, 1999). The purpose of complying with the EU-legislation also constituted one of the driving forces for the adoption of policies for gender equality at work and societal level. One of them was passing, in 1991, the Positive Action for Achieving Equality between Women and Men at Work 125/91 in response to Council's Recommendation 84/635/EEC. Italy also led some EU-level policy proposals for the promotion of mothers' employment. For instance, the Italian government, for its part, exerted pressure at European level to introduce a legislation for the protection of working mothers (Del Re, 2000). They also supported Council Directive 92/85/EEC for the alignment of other EU member states with Italian law and practice (Del Re, 2000).

In addition to the EU, the international organisations such as United Nations and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) have also driven change in the country for greater equality with the support of their standards. Italian government, with an aim of bringing national equality legislation in line with these standards, set up various organisations such as *Comitato Nazionale di Parita* (1983) and *Commissione Nazionale per le pari opportunità tra uomo e donna* (1984). The aim of *Comitato Nazionale di Parita*, under Ministry of Labour, was to remove discrimination and the obstacles preventing effective equality between citizens in access to work and in employment (Del Re, 2000). Moreover, in 1996, the country appointed a Minister for equal opportunities.

Lastly, in spite of significant steps taken in terms of provision of childcare facilities and attaining gender equality at work, some structural problems still persist in Italy.

For instance, since the Italian labour markets have had twofold characteristics differing among registered and unregistered employees, statutory provisions, such as work-family arrangements, are not equally accessible (Dulk, 2001). In addition, relatively low levels of FLFP rate in Italy is attributed to the social norms, mainly women's responsibility for caring for children or older family members (OECD, 2015). OECD Economic Surveys on Italy in 2015 suggests that 8% of women leave labour markets for family care reasons (OECD, 2015).

To sum up, review of defamilisation regime above presents first that Italy is an 'early bird' in the expansion of ECEC policies as well, yet it lags behind in the following decades. Despite the outstanding progress achieved by the mid-1980s with respect to the take-up rates for children aged 3-6, ECEC participation stagnates, and expected provision cannot be achieved for children aged 0-3. Hence, the study here provides accounts on the data for Italy on take-up rates of ECEC. Furthermore, this study also provides accounts on why the country could not expand ECEC provision further, which points at the restrictive conditions on FLFP. Historical evolution of ECEC in Italy shows that it has always been considered within the context of an education policy rather than a care policy. This is why, provision for children aged 0-3 lags far behind the provision for those aged 3-6, and those services are not compatible with the working hours. This perception appears to be highly associated with longstanding reliance on family by the welfare state. Such reliance is also intertwined with the cultural norms in society which attributes caring roles primarily to the family. Nevertheless, the role of the left is evident in Italy in early expansion of caring policies and conceiving care provision in the context of FLFP and work and family reconciliation policies. Hence, this cautious left interference, particularly by PCI, brings about divergence from Catholic ideology and fascist legacy. However, in general, Italy has not yet achieved to challenge 'family paradigm' since the welfare state still resorts to family or foreign domestic care work for the provision of care rather than expanding publicly funded services. The stagnation in the family policies and also the provision of care services together with other contributory policies for FLFP points at the vanishing left party presence and dominating neo-familialist approach by the right parties in government.

### 3.1.4. Production Regime

Here, I present the changing dynamics of production regime in Italy with a focus on the service sector and its association with FLFP. To begin with, the boom in the Italian economy took place during 1950-1963 as the country achieved significant progress in several industries including furniture, fashion clothing and white goods stemming from artisan workshops of the country (King, 1992). This brought about the achievement of virtually full employment and then increasing pressure for excessive wage demands (Del Boca, 1998). An indicator of Italian success in economic progress could be transition from being a country of emigration to immigration status, which emerged during the early 1970s (King, 1992). This migration shift occurred with both return migration of Italians who had migrated before, and immigration mainly from Africa and Asia (King, 1992). This progress in economic development also resulted in job creation, which also favoured FLFP.

With respect to the developments related to FLFP, in Italy, the patterns of female employment verify the U-shaped curve hypothesis along with the structural developments country experienced. While the female employment fell to its lowest level in the early 1970s, it began to increase, albeit with some fluctuations due to changes in the general level of economic activity. The increase of FLFP levels in Italy starting with the 1970s was mainly attributed to expansion of service sector (Cousins, 2000). Moreover, the diverse patterns of female employment in northern and southern parts of Italy also showed the impact of general economic conditions, sectoral composition of labour markets and economic development as argued in U-shaped curve hypothesis. However, until the 1990s, the service sector, the facilitator for the female employment, could not develop in Italy as extensively as in other countries such as France, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, the share of women in service sector was historically higher in Italy compared to Spain and Greece. Hence, in the South European context, peculiarity of Italy was the early growth of service sector. Employment in service sector in Italy, in contrast with Greece, Portugal and Spain, exceeded the level of 50% in the early 1980s, and it increased to the level of 68.5% in 2012. The table below presents employment figures by sectors in all countries in the Southern Europe. As Table 6 reveals, although Italy is an 'early bird' again in service sector expansion, the Italian

economy could not sustain these early increases in this sector. Consequently, Greece and Spain outstripped these rising levels in Italy in recent years. This implies the decreasing availability for FLFP in Italy in contrast to increasing opportunities in others with expanding service sector.

**Table 6 Employment by Sectors, Total**

Series Name	Country	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)	Turkey	45.00	46.90	43.4	36.0	25.7	23.7	20.4
	Greece	28.90	23.90	20.4	17.4	12.2	12.4	12.9
	Italy	11.00	8.80	6.6	5.2	4.2	3.8	3.8
	Spain	18.30	11.80	9.0	6.7	5.3	4.2	4.1
	Portugal	23.80	17.90	11.5	12.7	12.1	11.2	7.5
Employment in industry (% of total employment)	Turkey	20.00	20.70	22.3	24.0	26.3	26.2	27.2
	Greece	27.40	27.70	23.2	22.6	22.4	19.6	14.9
	Italy	33.00	31.90	33.7	31.8	30.7	28.6	26.6
	Spain	31.70	33.40	30.2	30.8	29.6	23.0	19.9
	Portugal	33.80	34.40	32.2	34.8	30.4	27.3	24.3
Employment in services (% of total employment)	Turkey	35.00	32.40	34.3	40.0	48.0	50.1	52.4
	Greece	43.70	48.30	56.4	60.0	65.4	68.0	72.2
	Italy	56.00	59.30	59.8	63.0	65.1	67.6	69.6
	Spain	49.80	54.80	60.8	62.5	65.1	72.8	76.0
	Portugal	42.40	47.60	56.3	52.5	57.6	61.5	68.1

*Source: World Bank, International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, World Bank databank (World Bank, 2018)*

Finally, as another feature, Italian economy has been mostly specialised in the most traditional service industries, which also hampered the utilisation from the influence of innovation on employment in services (Evangelista & Savona, 2002). The share of innovating firms in services (31%) in Italy is below the EU average, given also that

vast majority of Italian service sector jobs are in traditional branches such as trade, hotel and restaurants and community and social services (Evangelista & Savona, 2002). This implies the limited expansion capacity of the service sector in Italy, which would again stagnate the FLFP in the country.

In summary, production regime nicely presents the early economic development process in Italy, which also explains how the country could attain high FLFP earlier compared to Spain, Greece and Turkey in the 1980s. However, as the service sector expansion slows down, so does the FLFP. This confirms the correlation between the service sector and FLFP in Italy. Furthermore, the review of the production regime shows the peculiar characteristics of Italian service sector, which constitute to be restrictive in the expansion process.

### **3.1.5. Labour Market Regime**

I scrutinise here the aspects related to the labour market in Italy, and its implications for FLFP, and then analyse the features of FLFP pattern. Starting with the social dialogue mechanisms, in the aftermath of World War II, unions in Italy have been politically divided and weak while bargaining was prominently centralised and unionisation rates has been dramatically decreasing (Karamessini, 2008b). Due to fascist legal past, until the early 1960s, persecution of union activists, imposing sanctions on strikers and rendering collective agreements unenforceable were rather easy to realise (Locke & Baccaro, 1999). During the so-called 'Hot-Autumn' (1969–70), the country experienced reactive acts by the unions and workers with extensive strike activity and industrial conflict, which, in return, resulted in the achievements in workers' individual and collective rights, social reforms and a transformation in industrial relations (Ferner & Hyman, 1992).

With respect to the rigidity of labour markets, Italy has had one of the most rigid labour markets of Europe in the formal segment of the dual economy. According to OECD Employment Protection Database (OECD, 2013), Italy is the third most rigid country among OECD members in terms of protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals. The country is also the fifth most rigid with respect to the protection of permanent workers against individual dismissal (OECD,

2013). Thus, one of the prevalent traits of labour markets in Italy has been the overregulation. The reason behind this situation is attributed to the influence of strong unions in the 1970s, which led to a comprehensive job security system with many regulations on recruitment and dismissal (Dulk, 2001). Even though the recent developments such as technological change, competition, privatisation processes and migration have pushed for more flexible systems in European labour markets, the process in Italy has been much slower and more contradictory than in other EU countries (Del Boca, 1998). However, considering also its influence on persistent unemployment, flexibilisation of employment protection legislation attracted greater attention in Italy over the years. Yet, Italy majorly adopted partial de-regulation, which targeted the de-regulation of mainly atypical labour relations concerning particular groups (Barbieri & Scherer, 2009). This partial de-regulation, however, led to further segmentation of the labour markets in Italy. In times when the European Commission boldly advocated comprehensive strategies around the late 2000s for a flexicurity-based reform programmes for the employment of older workers and women, the right coalition in government focused primarily on re-introducing more flexible job contracts (Gwiazda, 2011). Nevertheless, flexibility in a segmented economy and within a corporatist welfare state influences FLFP negatively. This is because, those women who do not have access to welfare state entitlements such as care provision, maternity leaves are more inclined to exit the labour force upon having a child and do not re-enter. Hence, in the context of supporting FLFP, eligibility for entitlements should be expanded or the services should be more universalised so that those women within temporary contracts or other forms of flexibility employment could also utilise assistance to secure their presence in the paid labour.

Concerning part-time work opportunities, although initial regulation of part-time work dated back to the early 1980s in Italy, improvement of opportunities took place only in 1987 with the law implementing the 'Treu Package' (Karamessini, 2008b). This law stipulated the collective agreements for the extent of part-time work (Karamessini, 2008b). In 2002, with the transposition of the EU Directive on part-time work, the principle of non-discrimination between part-time and full-time workers was adopted by repealing prior legislative provisions restrictive on part-time work practices (Karamessini, 2008b). With this law, extra hours, not to exceed 10%

of weekly part-time hours over a period of maximum one month, were paid at the same level up to the standard working week, part-timers were given precedence when they applied for full-time jobs and employers were granted incentives in return for the recruitment of permanent part-time employees in the form of relief from social security contributions over three years (Karamessini, 2008b). Furthermore, in 2003, the so-called 'Biagi Law' enabled the employers to unilaterally scale up working time of part-timers and amend their working schedules.

With respect to the working hours, in Italy, industry and company collective agreements have been decisive in the regulation of the working time, and firms benefited flexibility for themselves in the organisation of working time (Karamessini, 2008b). In 1997, the 'Treu Package' launched incentives to decrease working time in the form of graduated cuts in employer social security contributions, while, in 1998, a decree law initiated quarterly and annual upper limits for overtime hours in industries where collective agreements did not regulate overtime (Karamessini, 2008b). The trend towards more flexibility in working time organisation started at the company level as early as in the mid-1980s in Italy, and by the end of the 1990s, increased majority of collective agreements incorporated innovative provisions on flexible working time arrangements (Karamessini, 2008b).

Concerning self-employment, it arose as a prevalent type of employment in Italy, which was one of the highest in Europe. Self-employment in Italy did not seem to be related to the labour market rigidity in the sense that its rise coincided with the demise of mass production as a different form of economic and productive labour (Barbieri, 2001). Looking at the characteristic of the Italian self-employment, it has been clearly male dominated, much more than dependent employment (Barbieri, 2001). Prevalence of self-employment also implies the high share of small firms in the economy. To be exact, the average size of Italian firms is far smaller than in the rest of the European countries (Del Boca, 1998).

Another prevalent feature of Italian labour market is the high proportion of public employment, which has steadily scaled up since the 1950s, increasing from 10% to around 20% of total employment (Pagani, 2008). Furthermore, the share of public sector employment is especially high in the South where the average unemployment rate is also particularly high (Pagani, 2008). In a specific analysis of Italy, public



sector employment is an important facilitator with respect to the women's career continuity (Solera & Bettio, 2013).

Secondly, looking at the FLFP pattern in Italy in historical manner, the six censuses taken in Italy between 1881 and 1951 provide province level information on the employment of women, showing that women's employment has decreased substantially in all regions between 1881 and 1951: 40.1% in 1881, 32.3% in 1901, 29.0% in 1911, 26.7% in 1921, 18.5% in 1931 and 20.2% in 1951 (Bandettini, 1960). Such decrease can be attributed to the decline in manufacturing employment with the technical progress achieved in the country.

In an overall analysis, it is possible to discern unique traits related to FLFP in Italy. As an example, participation rate of women is much lower than in countries with a similar per capital income (Addis, 1999). Second, the difference between men's and women's unemployment rates are one of the greatest in Italy compared to other countries (Addis, 1999). Two main reasons in terms of low FLFP rates are the underdevelopment of tertiary sector and 'handicap-privileges' meaning labour markets policies, which impede hiring of women in the private sector such as long maternity leave, a mandatory retirement age set at 55 for women in the private sector and weekly working hours mandated by national labour contracts (Addis, 1999). Since the tertiary sector serves as the main source of FLFP, the underdevelopment of both public and private tertiary sector is reflected in the unemployment difference between the sexes.

Looking at the FLFP with respect to maternal employment, study shows that pre-marital job characteristics influence employment status of the mother after first child (Bratti, Bono, & Vuri, 2005). Those who worked without a contract are less likely to re-enter the labour markets whereas the likelihood is higher for women who worked in the public sector or in a large private firms, which implies the role of job protection and employment stability on maternal employment (Bratti et al., 2005). Furthermore, in Italy, low labour market participation rates of married women and low birth rates exist together (Del Boca, 2002). The reasons relate to the Italian institutional structure such as rigidities, i.e. hiring system, high entry wage, strict firing rules, and imperfections in the labour market and characteristics of publicly funded childcare system. These rigidities increase the cost of having children, which

consequently discourage women from labour force participation (Del Boca, 2002). However, the ‘anomaly’ in Italy is that the country experienced decrease in fertility with modest increase in FLFP. The labour market regulations and wage policies implemented during the 1970s and 1980s led to increased job security for full-time labour market participants; however, this caused lower probabilities for finding work for new entrants and individuals looking for temporary or part-time employment. Labour force participation and fertility decisions in Italy are both affected by similar forces, which are mainly availability of supply of public childcare and availability of part-time jobs. Such availability, both in the form of presence of parents and transfers, increases probability of labour force participation and having children.

Looking at the age-based patterns in Italy, Italy demonstrates U-shaped trend as being clearly influenced by child-bearing (Colombino & De Stavola, 1985). The below table demonstrates the participation rates among women within different age groups:


**Table 7 Labour Force Participation Rates among Women within Different Age Groups, in 1960, 1970 and 1980**

Age Groups	1960	1970	1980
20-24	48.6	43.2	50.6
25-29	36.5	33.3	47.2
30-34	34.4	29.7	42.7
35-39	34.3	29.8	38.8
40-44	33.5	30.9	36.7
45-49	32.0	29.2	33.7
50-54	29.8	25.9	28.0
55-59	23.7	18.3	16.8

*Source: Colombino & De Stavola, 1985*

Furthermore, the Figure below demonstrates the employment rates of mothers with at last one child under 15 in all South European countries. As Figure illustrates Italy

maintains similar levels in contrast to the high level in Portugal and notable increase in Spain.



Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD, 2016b)

**Figure 6 Employment Rates (%) among Women (15-64 year olds) with at least One Child under 15**

Finally looking at the FLFP pattern with education dimension, the Tables below provide characteristics of female labour force. In Italy, the share of women with tertiary education in the labour force increases whereas those with secondary education remained at similar levels between 2000 and 2014. Women with primary education, on the other hand, decreased by approximately 11% in the country. However, in comparative analysis, female labour force in Italy was not tertiarised since the country has the lowest ranking concerning the share of women in the labour force with tertiary education.

**Table 8 Labour Force with Tertiary Education, Female (% of Female Labour Force)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2014</b>
Turkey	14.2	15	20.4	25.1
Greece	21.4	26.7	31.4	35.1
Spain	31.5	37.1	38.2	41.5
Italy	13.4	17.9	21.8	24.3
Portugal	12	16.8	20.5	29.1

*Source: World Bank data, education statistics - all indicators (World Bank, 2018)*

**Table 9 Labour Force with Secondary Education, Female (% of Female Labour Force)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2014</b>
Turkey	18.5	17.2	17	16.7
Greece	41.4	44.4	43.5	42.5
Spain	21.1	24.6	24.5	23.9
Italy	48.2	49.3	50.2	48.9
Portugal	13.4	15.5	19	25.6

*Source: World Bank data, education statistics - all indicators (World Bank, 2018)*

**Table 10 Labour Force with Primary Education, Female (% of Female Labour Force)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2014</b>
Turkey	67.4	47.9	44.9	58.1
Greece	37.3	28.4	24.3	22.4
Spain	47.5	38	36.8	34.7
Italy	37.3	32.1	27.3	26.8
Portugal	74.7	60.5	56.1	45.4

*Source: World Bank data, education statistics - all indicators (World Bank, 2018)*

To sum up, labour market regime shows that labour market in Italy possesses certain characteristics which restrain further rise in FLFP. Segmented labour market in tandem with non-universalised welfare state provision leaves out some segments of women, which consequently hampers continuity in their employment. Furthermore, analysis on features of FLFP in Italy, particularly age-group analysis, demonstrates that employment of women has been highly influenced by child-bearing. In an overall analysis, study of labour market regime reflects the necessity of welfare state expansion and increasing take-up rates of ECEC for attaining further rise in FLFP. Otherwise, stagnation in FLFP, and divergence from the countries with similar per capita income with respect to FLFP levels would continue.

### 3.1.6. Left Party Strength

This section provides an overview of the strength of left parties in Italian politics. In line with the data I use for calibration in Chapter 4, I present the information relying on Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a). This is also the case for the analysis I make for other countries in the following pages. Relying on this dataset, this section also portrays the ideological stance of the political parties. As I also mention in Chapter 4, the project follows the below categorisation (Volkens et al. 2018b):

**Table 11 Party Groups and Their Codes**

<b>parfam</b>	<b>Party Groups</b>
<b>codes</b>	
10	ECO Ecological parties
20	LEF Socialist or other left parties
30	SOC Social democratic parties
40	LIB Liberal parties
50	CHR Christian democratic parties
60	CON Conservative parties

**Table 11 (cont'd)**

70	NAT Nationalist parties
80	AGR Agrarian parties
90	ETH Ethnic and regional parties
95	SIP Special issue parties
98	DIV Electoral alliances of diverse origin without dominant party
999	MI Missing information

The parties are categorised based on parfam codes as shown above. In line with the proposition of this dataset, I consider left parties as parties coded as '20' and '30'. Here below, the parties are listed which gained seats in Italian parliament between the elections of 1976 and 2013, the number of seats they gained together with the total number of seats in the parliament based on the information I extracted from the dataset.

**Table 12 Number of Seats Gained by the Political Parties in Italy, between 1976 and 2013**

<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Parfam code</b>	<b>#of seats gained</b>	<b>#of total seats</b>
<b>06/1976</b>	Proletarian Unity Party for Communism (The Manifesto + Proletarian Unity Party)	20	3	630
	Italian Communist Party	20	227	630
	Radical Party	30	4	630
	Italian Socialist Party	30	57	630
	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	30	15	630

**Table 12 (cont'd)**

	Italian Republican Party	40	14	630
	Italian Liberal Party	40	5	630
	Christian Democrats	50	263	630
	Italian Social Movement-National Right	70	35	630
<b>06/1979</b>	Proletarian Unity Party for Communism (The Manifesto + Proletarian Unity Party)	20	6	630
	Italian Communist Party	20	201	630
	Radical Party	30	18	630
	Italian Socialist Party	30	62	630
	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	30	21	630
	Italian Republican Party	40	15	630
	Italian Liberal Party	40	9	630
	Christian Democrats	50	261	630
	Italian Social Movement-National Right	70	31	630
<b>06/1983</b>	Proletarian Unity Party for Communism (The Manifesto + Proletarian Unity Party)	20	6	630
	Proletarian Democracy	20	7	630
	Italian Communist Party	20	192	630
	Radical Party	30	11	630
	Italian Socialist Party	30	73	630

**Table 12 (cont'd)**

	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	30	23	630
	Italian Republican Party	40	29	630
	Italian Liberal Party	40	16	630
	Christian Democrats	50	225	630
	Italian Social Movement-National Right	70	42	630
<b>06/1987</b>	Green Federation	10	13	630
	Proletarian Democracy	20	8	630
	Italian Communist Party	20	177	630
	Radical Party	30	13	630
	Italian Socialist Party	30	94	630
	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	30	17	630
	Italian Republican Party	40	21	630
	Italian Liberal Party	40	11	630
	Christian Democrats	50	234	630
	Italian Social Movement-National Right	70	35	630
<b>04/1992</b>	Green Federation	10	16	630
	Communist Refoundation Party	20	35	630
	Democratic Party of the Left	20	107	630
	Pannella List	30	7	630
	Italian Socialist Party	30	92	630
	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	30	16	630



**Table 12 (cont'd)**

	Italian Republican Party	40	27	630
	Italian Liberal Party	40	17	630
	Christian Democrats	50	206	630
	Italian Social Movement-National Right	70	34	630
	Northern League	70	55	630
	The Network/Movement for Democracy	95	12	630
<b>03/1994</b>	Green Federation	10	11	630
	Communist Refoundation Party	20	39	630
	Democratic Party of the Left	20	109	630
	Pannella-Riformatori List	30	6	630
	Italian Socialist Party	30	14	630
	Italian Popular Party	50	33	630
	Pact for Italy	50	13	630
	Democratic Alliance	50	18	630
	Go Italy	60	99	630
	National Alliance	70	109	630
	Northern League	70	117	630
	The Network/Movement for Democracy	95	6	630
<b>04/1996</b>	Green Federation	10	13	630
	Communist Refoundation Party	20	35	630
	Democratic Party of the Left	20	172	630

**Table 12 (cont'd)**

	Pannella-Sgarbi List	30	0	630
	Italian Renewal	30	26	630
	Italian Popular Party	50	67	630
	Christian Democratic Centre	50	0	630
	Democratic Alliance	50	30	630
	Go Italy	60	123	630
	National Alliance	70	92	630
	Northern League	70	59	630
<b>05/2001</b>	The Girasole ('Sunflower')	10	17	609
	Communist Refoundation Party	20	11	609
	Party of Italian Communists	20	9	609
	Democrats of the Left	20	138	609
	Olive Tree	30	0	609
	Daisy - Democracy is Freedom	40	80	609
	White Flower	50	40	609
	Go Italy	60	178	609
	New Italian Socialist Party	60	3	609
	House of Freedom	60	0	609
	National Alliance	70	99	609
	Northern League	70	30	609
	European Democracy	95	0	609
	List Di Pietro - Italy of Values	40	0	609
<b>04/2006</b>	Green Federation	10	15	630

**Table 12 (cont'd)**

	Communist Refoundation Party	20	41	630
	Party of Italian Communists	20	16	630
	Rose in the Fist	20	18	630
	Olive Tree	30	220	630
	Union for Christian and Center Democrats	50	39	630
	Go Italy	60	140	630
	New Italian Socialist Party	60	4	630
	National Alliance	70	71	630
	Northern League	70	26	630
	List Di Pietro - Italy of Values	40	17	630
	Autonomy Liberty Democracy (Aosta Valley)	90	1	630
	South Tyrolean People's Party	90	4	630
	Italy in the World	95	1	630
	Popular Democratic Union for Europe	95	10	630
	The Union – Prodi	95	6	630
<b>04/2008</b>	People of Freedom	60	276	630
	Democratic Party	40	217	630
	Union of the Center	50	36	630
	Northern League	70	60	630
	List Di Pietro - Italy of Values	40	29	630
<b>02/2013</b>	Civil Revolution	20	0	630

**Table 12 (cont'd)**

People of Freedom	60	97	630
Left Ecology Freedom	20	37	630
Democratic Party	40	292	630
Democratic Centre	40	6	630
Civic Choice	40	37	630
Union of the Center	50	8	630
Brothers of Italy - National	60	9	630
Centre-right			
Labour and Freedom List	60	1	630
Northern League	70	17	630
South Tyrolean People's Party	90	5	630
Autonomy Progress Federalism	90	1	630
Aosta Valley			
Five Star Movement	95	108	630

*Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a)*

As also the table above demonstrates, between the 1970s and 1990s, left parties accomplished to gain around half of the seats in the parliament. Hence, they featured salience during these decades, which also enabled them opportunities to direct country's policy programmes to rise FLFP. However, except 2006 election, which brought about a parliament term of only 2 years, the salience of left parties in the country deteriorated significantly as of the 1990s. First time in Italian history in recent decades, the left could only fill 5% of total seats in the parliament following 2013 election. Vanishing left party is also reflected in the data for the condition of left party strength, and therefore, I assign non-membership score to Italy in the second period. The analysis here also validates the periodisation in the following chapter in the sense that the periodisation permits the reflection of contrast between two periods in Italy within the analysis, one with left party salience and the other

with diminished strength of left parties. This allows to observe changing power of left in Italy on FLFP. Both descriptive review in this chapter and causal inference obtained in Chapter 5, therefore, reveal the role of left party strength on FLFP in Italy.

## **3.2. Spain**

This part provides an overview of welfare state regime in Spain to better comprehend the institutional set-up and its formation. This part also includes a brief summary of the regimes concerning the conditions and outcome of this study to present a background on the data calibrated in the following section.

### **3.2.1. Welfare State Regime**

This section presents an overview of the evolution of the welfare state in Spain with references to its certain characteristic features, particularly those influencing FLFP. To begin with, since the 1960s, with also the influence of international economic integration and rapid urbanisation, Spanish welfare state emerged, yet displayed the characteristics of the authoritarian regime. In comparative terms, the period between 1960 and 1975 could be considered as Bismarckian type of social protection system (Cabrero, 2011). During this period, the first social security act was introduced in 1963 and a peculiar social security system was implemented until 1972. The type of social security in this period was characterised by low level of protection and partial cover of the population (Cabrero, 2011).

Nevertheless, the Spanish welfare state witnessed profound transformation in post-Franco period. In the evolution of Spanish welfare state and expansion of social policies, the following factors were effective: legitimisation needs of governments in the transition to democracy, experienced from the mid-1970s onwards and *permanence of left-wing parties* in office for long periods and influence of EU recommendations (Guillén & Matsaganis, 2000). To exemplify, public spending in the country grew from 26% of GDP in 1975 to over 47% in 1995 (Moreno, 2000). This was the highest increase in public spending for that period among all OECD

countries. Particularly, expenditure on family also increased as Figure 2 demonstrates. While expenditure on family constituted 0.5% of GDP in 1980, it scaled up to the level of 1.2% in 2005, 1.5% in 2010 and 1.3% in 2013 (OECD, 2016b). In addition to the increase in public spending, Spain also succeeded in attaining substantial economic growth. While the Spanish GDP per person amounted to 57.2% of the EU15 average in 1960, it reached to 69.8% in 1985 and 95.2% in 2009 (Salido & Moreno, 2012:33). Furthermore, social expenditure on family also expanded substantially in Spain as Figure 2 demonstrates. While it was 0.5% as percentage of GDP in 1980, it scaled up to 1.5% in 2010. In fact, with this share, Spain had the highest spending levels concerning social expenditure on family in the South European context.

During political transition from dictatorship to democracy, however, the number of unemployed increased considerably. One of the reasons behind this increase was that companies declared bankruptcy to avoid paying high indemnities required in case of dismissals (Andreotti et al., 2001). Moreover, during this transition period, the pressure coming from the trade unions for the increase of wages and increased tax pressure on companies triggered the loss of jobs as well (Andreotti et al., 2001). This considerable increase in the transition period stood as a challenge in terms of welfare state expansion in the country.

As regards the factors easing the consolidation of Spanish welfare state, four ‘driving forces’ stood out: the establishment of political democracy, the social-democratisation of a significant range of social policies, particularly education and health in the 1980s, the increasing decentralisation of social policies and the growing Europeanisation of social policies (Cabrero, 2011). Some also point at the impact of consensual politics in Spain which provided low level of political disputes over welfare reforms (Moreno, 2005). Looking at the developments in Spanish welfare state since the 1980s, decentralisation of health, educational and social services prevailed while only public pensions and unemployment systems remained centralised as parts of the social security system (Cabrero, 2011). Thus, decentralisation of welfare state provision has been significant phenomenon in Spain since the 1980s. While decentralisation provided service delivery close to citizens

and innovations in the design, production and management of services, it also led to growing territorial imbalances (Cabrero, 2011).

To provide a more detailed account on post-Franco welfare state in Spain, it is possible to distinguish four stages of development (Cabrero, 2011): expansion (1975-85), consolidation (1986-95), Europeanisation (1996-2005) and recalibration (2006-2010). In the expansion period, social spending on social security benefits such as pension and unemployment benefits rose sharply. Especially social expenditure reached its highest levels between 1976 and 1978. Health coverage also widened rapidly. Universal social rights to housing, education, health and pensions were incorporated into the Constitution of 1978 (León, 2011). With the transformation of industrial sector, social budget also increased. This was the era when this Bismarckian model came into being and became consolidated. Furthermore, the Moncloa Pact of 1977 provided full support to political democracy and ensured the enlargement of the welfare state.

Since the mid-1980s, flexibility measures were introduced into Spanish labour market, however, they were mainly oriented towards reducing the high rates of unemployment rather than reconciliation of labour and family life (Salido, 2002). Nevertheless, in the following years, several initiatives aiming at reconciliation of family and work life took place. For instance, the Law of 39/99 introduced possibility of reducing the labour-day, between a third and a half with proportional reduction of salary, to care for children younger than six years old (Salido, 2002).

Consolidation period was the period of socialist governments. It was when the social democratic model of welfare state expanded based on subjective rights to health and education. Non-contributory pensions and benefits act of 1990 were passed, and health and pensions were universalised in this period. Furthermore, this period, the period of the 1990s, was considered as regaining of family given that the second equal opportunities plan (1993-1995), for the first time, touched upon the impact of the double burden on FLFP (León, 2011). It was also the second plan which acknowledged the importance of a work-family balance and the need to increase childcare services for children under school age (Leon, 2011). The rigidities on part-time employment regarding maximum daily and weekly hours and the absolute ceiling of two-thirds of standard full-time hours were also eliminated by labour

reform in 1994, which aimed at encouraging labour market flexibility (Moreno, 2005). In 1998, the central government and the main trade unions signed an agreement for the promotion of stable part-time employment, following the consensual practices of *dialogo social* (Moreno, 2005). This agreement encompassed regulations to facilitate permanent intermittent employment and replacement contracts combined with early retirement, however, the employers' association (CEOE) refused to sign the agreement, which explained why the part time employment have remained stagnant in the country (Moreno, 2005).

In an overall analysis, the Spanish welfare state demonstrates elements of both Bismarckian and Beveridgean traditions, and resembles a combination of breadwinner 'continental' and citizenship-centred 'liberal' models (Moreno, 2000). This is termed as '*via media*' meaning middle road (Salido and Moreno, 2012:19). Spanish welfare state also reflects weak corporatist arrangements and conservative-familialist character in Spain (Guillén & León, 2011). While weak corporatist arrangements generally paved the way for the paradigmatic reforms towards universalism of the health care and education services in the 1980s and recalibration in the 1990s, the conservative-familialist character impeded major expansion of care and family policies and social assistance (Guillén & León, 2011). As regards the family policies in the country, low public spending on family benefits is evident as it is below the EU average. As opposed to Greece and Portugal, health care in Spain is universalised not merely in legal terms but also in practise (Guillén & Matsaganis, 2000).

Furthermore, ESPN thematic report on social investment in Spain (European Commission, 2015c) indicated that the Spanish welfare system has traditionally had a very weak performance in addressing poverty and social exclusion. As evident in South European welfare states in general, Spain also relies on the family as the main safety net. The household micro-solidarity through intra-familial pooling of resources and mutual support and care between family members lowers the rates of absolute poverty in Spain compared to other EU countries (Moreno, 2005). However, on the other side of the coin, this characteristic of the Spanish welfare state impedes the further development of defamilisation especially in the context of provision of care services for children aged 0-3.



Another distinctive characteristics of the Spanish welfare state is its reliance on monetary transfers rather than care services besides the areas of health and education services (Valiente, 2000). Concerning the defamilisation policies, the tendency has generally been towards the expansion of monetary benefits, for instance maternity, rather than establishment of care services for a period of time. Immigration also features to be an important relief for the welfare state in Spain. Despite the concerns related to the fairness and sustainability, immigration constitutes a significant substitute to publicly provided welfare services (Barone & Mocetti, 2011).

Finally, Spain implemented the joint tax assessment until 1989, at a time when the discriminatory nature of joint taxation was recognised (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005). However, Spanish couples can now choose either individual or accrued joint tax assessment (Warnecke, 2008). Hence, in the context of FLFP, the required policy was initiated with respect to gender neutral taxation. However, single mothers are still discriminated in Spain with a smaller deduction compared to two-parent families (Warnecke, 2008).

In summary, review on welfare state regime in Spain demonstrates that welfare state expansion with gender sensitivity towards unburdening family, especially women, starts to take place with the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, despite its latecomer status, Spain succeeds reforms in a short period of time with a particular influence of the left parties. However, conservative-familialist legacy in the country maintains its influence for a long time, which is revealed by the longstanding role of family especially for the care of children aged 0-3. Nevertheless, this conservative-familialist character within the welfare state is less pronounced compared to Italy, which has allowed greater room for FLFP rise in Spain.

### **3.2.2. Education Regime**

This section provides accounts on the major policy developments in recent decades, which constitute the backbone of the educational system in the country. Moreover, it describes the expansion of tertiary schooling and particularities in the country. To begin with the major education policies influencing the education system, the reforms of the Socialist Party in the 1980s and 1990s stood out. With its electoral

victory in 1982, the Socialist Party began forming the *Ley Orgánica del Derecho a la Educación* (the Organic Law of the Right to Education), and in 1990, started a new modernisation process for the Spanish educational system, which was the first instance since the reform of 1970 (Pereyra, Faraco, Luzón, & Torres, 2009).

Legalisation of the reform process came with the enactment of the Law of General Planning of the Education System (Pereyra et al., 2009). With this law, obligatory schooling was extended to the age of 16 and a variety of changes in the curriculum were initiated (Pereyra et al., 2009). OECD Education at a Glance Country Note on Spain (OECD, 2012) also indicates that attainment levels for tertiary education, including both theory-based and technical programmes as well as advanced research programmes, have increased over the years. Consequently, Spain reaches the rate of 39% for 25-34 year-olds, which is slightly above the OECD average (38%).

Influenced heavily with these reform processes, women in Spain have also increased their overall educational attainment level over the years. As revealed by the relevant statistics, the tertiary schooling among Spanish women has also substantially increased. As Figure 1 demonstrates, while the percentage of female population aged 15 and above was 1.39 in 1970, it increased to 3.27% in 1980, 3.59% in 1990, 9.95% in Spain and 14.31% in 2010. Spain scores second best rate of increase in terms of the female tertiary education attainment levels in South European context. This is also reflected in the gender parity index related to tertiary education. In the 1980s, Spain achieved gender balance in tertiary schooling, which gradually expanded in favour of women. The influence of tertiary education in pulling more women in the labour markets in Spain was evident given that Spain also has one of the highest female active population with tertiary schooling.

Consequently, Spain is among the top ten countries with the highest levels of upward intergenerational mobility in education. Young people, (25-34 year-old non-students) from families with low levels of education and who did not attain an upper secondary education, attain a tertiary degree. To be exact, in Spain, 45% of young people have attained a higher educational level than their parents (compared with 37% for the OECD average) and only 6% have attained a lower educational level than their parents, compared with 13% for the OECD average (OECD, 2012). Furthermore, this positive intergenerational mobility is even greater for Spanish young women. Young

women in Spain are at least 10 percentage more likely than young men to attain a higher educational level than their parents did (OECD, 2012). However, in Spain, over-education, which presents itself when investment in human capital is excessive for the job currently carried out by the individual, seem to be the case. This is because, the marked growth in human capital investment is not accompanied by a parallel increase in labour productivity (Ortiz, 2010).

In a nutshell, considering the scholarly acknowledged role of education on FLFP, Spain achieves substantial progress in the educational attainment levels as of the 1980s, which has also influenced FLFP in the country positively. Review of the education regime in Spain reveals the role of governance by the left parties during the 1980s and 1990s. The type of policies and strategies adopted succeed in bringing about the societal change in education in a very short period of time. Consequently, Spain attains striking increase in tertiary education levels among women and highest levels of upward intergenerational mobility in education with also the achievement of gender balance in tertiary education in the 1980s.

### **3.2.3. Defamilisation Regime**

While describing the developments in Spain with regard to its defamilisation regime, I divide the section into four. I first analyse the gradual development of ECEC services by also reflecting on the prominent actors and driving forces. Second, with an inter-temporal analysis, I provide accounts on the family policies including leaves and related family assistance schemes. Third section describes the progress towards reconciliation of work and family life and respective policies. Fourth part shows the achievements towards attaining greater gender equality in society.

#### ***Early Children Education and Care***

The initial establishment period of the preschools in Spain dated back to 1838–1874 when the first public *escuela de párvulos* were opened with the advent of industrialisation and the State education system. These schools, however, focused on poor children whose working mothers could not look after them (Sanchidrián, 2015). When the monarchy was restored in 1874 at a time of contentious discussions

between liberals and conservatives concerning education, new endeavours influenced by Froebel's pedagogy emerged in the country (Sanchidrián, 2015).

During Franco's regime, it is possible to point at three major legislative reforms with regard to preschool policies. In July 1945, the government issued a new act on pre and primary schooling that differentiated two types of preschools: maternal schools (*escuelas maternas*) for children up to four years of age and infants' schools (*escuelas de parvulos*) for children aged four and five<sup>10</sup> (Valiente, 2011). In contrast to the reform of 1945, the Education Act of December 1965 with the Article 18, stipulated that the state would establish preschool centers according to its ability. With this article, the government recognised for the first time the need to extend its preschool offerings. Nonetheless, with the General Education Act of 1970, preschool policy underwent a more fundamental transformation as this act not only mandated that preschooling was henceforth to be free of charge in public preschools, but also changed the name of preschools for children up to four years of age from maternal schools (*escuelas maternas*) to kindergartens (*jardines de infancia*) (Valiente, 2011).

As of the 1960s, demand for preschool education increased substantially (Sanchidrián, 2015). Yet, under Franco regime, the provision of preschool education was never a major objective of education policy (Valiente, 2011). This was mainly because Spain was primarily an agricultural country until the 1960s, and politicians did not perceive the need to develop early childhood education as a mean of fostering economic development (Valiente, 2011). However, as of the 1960s and 1970s, with the influence of European-wide debate about education reform, this policy started to change (Valiente, 2011).

In the aftermath of Franco regime, the context became favourable for the increase in public preschool provision with the interest of the Catholic Church in the expansion of preschooling (Valiente, 2009). In 1971-1972, only 12% of three year olds, 42% of four year olds, and 60% of five year olds were enrolled in a preschool program, and most of these existing preschools were private and required parents to pay to enrol their children (Valiente, 2011). In 1975-1976, only 38% of all preschool students

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<sup>10</sup> As Valiente (2011:225) notes, the act of 1945 had precise gendered nature as only in cases where the number of children was too small could boys and girls attend the same classes.

were enrolled in a public center, however, by 2007-2008, this proportion scaled up to the level of 64% (Valiente, 2011). The increase in preschool programs, starting with especially the 1960s, can be attributed to the increased participation of women in political parties, trade unions, civil society organisations, and the growing women's movement (Valiente, 2011).

Since the 1990s, the prominent feature of formal childcare services in Spain, similar to Italy, has been the focus on the educational needs of children rather than on the needs of working parents (León, 2007). In the pursuit of increasing the enrolment rates and catching up with the countries advanced in this area such as Italy, the school entrance age was lowered to children of three years of age in 1990. This decision reflected pursued state responsibility for the three years of preschool in 1968 (with Law 1444) (León & Pavolini, 2014). Parallel to the rapid economic growth and increasing FLFP levels, as of the mid-1990s until the outbreak of the financial crisis and the advent of the housing bubble, increase in the enrolment rates remained with the continual support from both conservative and socialist central governments as well as regional governments (León & Pavolini, 2014). This advancement, however, was not related to the motives for reconciliation of work and family life, but rather concerned objectives of education policy (Meil, 2006). This act brought about substantial increase in the entrance of children at this age group, which rose from 71% in 1988 to 97% in 2005 (Meil, 2006).

In the 1990s, transformation was also obtained through the acts for the compliance with the EU directives including the Directive 92/85/EEC. *Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo* (General Organic Law of the Educational System) (LOGSE), the new legal framework for the regulation of the national education system, adopted in 1990, included, for the first time, the education of children under the age of six within the national education system. This was considered as influential in increasing the schooling rates of children although it did not initiate mandatory attendance. LOGSE categorised preschool into two levels: the first level covered children up to 3 years old, and the second level encompassed children 3 to 5 years old. With LOGSE, free universal preschool education, which was hitherto only been offered to children 4 to 5 years old, places for 3-year-olds were provided as well within the premises of primary schools (Nollenberger & Rodríguez-Planas, 2015). From the academic year

1990/91 to 1997/98, the enrolment among 3-year olds was scaled up from 33,128 to 154,063, and federal funding for preschool and primary education went up from an average expenditure of EUR 1,769 per child in 1990/91 to EUR 2,405 per child in 1996/97, equalling to 35.9% increase in education expenditures per child (Nollenberger & Rodríguez-Planas, 2015).

Decentralisation policy has been the case in Spain as in Italy, which led to high regional and local disparity in childcare coverage for under 3-year-olds (Kuronen et al., 2015). Nevertheless, for children aged 3 and over, central government has been more active, which enabled almost a universal coverage since the mid-1990s (Valiente, 2003). To exemplify regional endeavours for the expansion for childcare provision, in 2004, the left-wing alliance in the regional government embarked a programme to establish 30,000 new childcare places over the period 2004–2008 covering whole region of Catalonia to respond to the burgeoning demand (Kuronen et al., 2015). In 2008, again the left-wing central government initiated a programme to support the extension of public early education (Educa3 -childcare for children under the age of three- programme 2008–2012) providing extra (50%) funding from central government for the construction of new early education facilities, with the aim of establishing 25.000 new childcare places per year in Spain (Kuronen et al., 2015). However, on the public supply side, as of 2011, with new governance by new centre and right-wing parties at the regional and state levels, severe budget cuts took place (Kuronen et al., 2015).

Particularly, as indicated in ESPN's report (European Commission, 2015c), the 'Educa3' programme established by the Central Government in 2008 to boost educational success among children, and facilitate parent's conciliation of professional and family life (by supporting the early schooling of children aged 0-3), was clearly framed in a social investment logic. However, this initiative was cancelled due to fiscal consolidation policies. In this respect, the implementation of the aforementioned 'Educa3' programme targeting the expansion of ECEC provision for 0-3 year olds was strongly influenced by the fiscal consolidation measures adopted in response to the economic crisis. As reported by ESPN (European Commission, 2015c), only 400 million of the planned €1,087 million budget was spent by the Central Government for this programme.

In an overall analysis, the coverage goal targeted by the Barcelona Summit of the European Council was fulfilled in Spain. As reflected in ESPN's thematic report on social investment in Spain (European Commission, 2015c), the Spanish education system made significant progress in particular in early inclusion in school. Almost 100% of children between 3 and 5 were enrolled at school in Spain and the enrolment rates for children under 3 significantly increased during the 2000s. This success owes very much to a series of legislative measures enacted in the domain of childcare, as I detail above. However, considering the role of childcare facilities on reconciliation of work and family life, working hours of childcare facilities also matter. However, in Spain, more than half of the care service for the children under three is provided for less than 30 hours a week, which does not necessarily enable parents to work full time (Salido, 2011). Moreover, in addition to the working hours, affordability of these facilities is also significant for the families. Concerning this, the childcare services seem to be unaffordable for most parents since one third of them are provided on a private funding basis (Salido, 2011).

Concerning childcare in Spain, another point would be that granny-mothers actually serve as 'surrogate mothers' (Moreno, 2005). Statistics of the 2000s show that three-quarters of the working mothers have a close relative living in the same town, and in more than half of the cases the caring is provided by their own mothers (Moreno, 2005). Moreover, scholars point at the prevailing societal views about childrearing which emphasise the value of the care provided by mothers and family members and demonstrate mistrust against public childcare centres for very young children (Valiente, 2000). Furthermore, in Spain, today, the Church administers a similar number of preschool places as it did in the 1970s despite the substantial increase in public education. As the Church in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the Church in Spain has historically defended the extension of public all day schools and childcare (Valiente, 2011).

However, even though Spain has put great efforts for education and increased its spending on education considerably, sufficient attention has not been paid to care facilities for the children below 3 (Tobio, 2001b). In addition, in the Spanish case, childcare has not been a top priority for the feminist movement through the whole post authoritarian period (Valiente, 2009). Furthermore, it is generally argued that

even though public preschool programmes have continuously expanded in Spain since the 1970s, this was merely an education policy, and did not correspond to the care needs of families, especially for children who are aged 3 and below (Valiente, 2003). This was because, these programmes were offered with short hours and long holidays (Valiente, 2003). Furthermore, scholars argue that there are two major factors which will hinder the expansion of childcare services in the near future for the under-threes in Spain: widespread assumptions regarding the centrality of mother carer for small children and an important number of grandmothers and immigrants who can offer childcare (Valiente, 2009).

### *Family policies*

A substantial reform process related to family policies was undertaken in Spain with the establishment of 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic in 1931. Following the downfall of the monarchy and foundation of 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic, a new Republican constitution was accepted, which introduced a clear separation between the Church and the State and proposed progressive reforms in terms of family policies and women's rights. These included establishing obligatory civil marriage, possibility of divorce by consent, equality of spouses, equality of children born within wedlock and those born outside wedlock as well as regulation of legal abortion (Meil, 2006). However, the Church and some other groups considered these reforms as the limitation of political and social influence of the Church, started social mobilisation and direct reaction to 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic, which led to civil war between 1936 and 1939 (Meil, 2006).

In the aftermath of the civil war, Franco took over the governing power in the country. The Franco rule in Spain between 1939 and 1975, which lasted over 40 years, had a traditional perception towards women in society. A notion of a common female destiny based on their reproductive capacities was constructed, and women were politicised through this notion (Nash, 1991). The regime perceived women as mothers and homemakers and reinforced male-breadwinner model with a strong gender division of labour inside the household (Salido & Moreno, 2012). Concerning Franco period and its policies towards women and family, the role of ideologies of pronatalism and national Catholicism in the promotion of familialism, motherhood and endeavours for the restoration of the family as the primary social unit of Spanish Society prevailed (Nash, 1991). Measures were adopted to curtail women's activities



outside the home. To exemplify, adultery and use of contraception were prohibited and permission from husbands to work outside was necessitated for women (León, 2011). Consequently, female presence in the labour markets during this period remained at very low levels with an ‘early entry-early exit’ pattern associated with the household economic situation and the transition from single to married status (Salido & Moreno, 2012).

During the Franco era, it is possible to mention social provision to the families to a certain extent. Formed by a highly familialist Welfare State, two of these provisions for the families in the form of family allowances were *subsidio familiar* (1938), and family bonuses, *plus de cargas familiares* (1945), which affected a much wider section of the population (Nash, 1991). However, as expected, these family allowances represented an explicitly support of the paternity and a supplement paid directly to the *jefe de familia*, the male breadwinner (Nash, 1991). Mothers could benefit these allowances only under very exceptional circumstances. The *plus de cargas familiares* was in fact an extra wage for the worker and was provided to the married workers according to the number of children they have. Married couples were awarded 5 points on a sliding scale which ranged from 6 points for one child to 30 points for ten children and 5 points more for eleven children or over (Nash, 1991). Working mothers were penalised due to the fact that the couple did not receive any monetary compensation for marriage (Nash, 1991). From a different angle, these provisions were not universal on the ground that they were conditional on employment, and in the case of the *plus de cargas familiares*, it was only included in the pay check (Nash, 1991). Between years 1963 and 1975, the Francoist family policy development was no longer under the influence of the Falange, and the technocrats became more salient in policy making (Pérez-Caramés, 2014). For instance, in 1963, with the *Act Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social de 1963*, the family bonus was eliminated although wife assistance scheme was maintained (Pérez-Caramés, 2014).

In an overall analysis, during the Franco regime, during which such familialist and pronatalist policies were adopted, and allowances were provided accordingly, outputs did not take place as the regime expected. For instance, one cannot mention a ‘baby boom’ in Spain in the early 1940s, and demographic data point to the following facts:

previous rhythm of population growth was maintained, birth-rates steadily declined in the first decade of the Franco regime, demographic patterns did not alter until the mid-1950s when an upward fertility trend could be observed in the decade between 1955 and 1965 (Nash, 1991). However, socio-political context started to change in that period, and the regime desisted its pronatalist policies of the immediate post-war years (Nash, 1991).

In the aftermath of the Franco regime, the first significant change occurred with the establishment of a new democratic Constitutional Law in 1978. With the Constitutional Law, a new marriage model was formed based on equality of spouses' rights and obligations and spouses' full autonomy. However, women's politics apart from pronatalist ones devoted to women as mothers and wives were not salient during early democratic governments in the late 1970s (Salido, 2002). In Spain, women could not attain even basic social and political rights such as right to vote or work without the husband's permission or abortion and divorce rights until the late 1970s and early 1980s (Salido, 2002).

In Spain, fertility decline as of the 1990s attracted the attention of both politicians and mass media, which was reinforced by the Center-Right government during the early 2000s through 'pro-family' policies with the support of the Catholic Church (Blofield & Lambert, 2008). These policies included tax deductions, cash transfers, and prizes for large families (Blofield & Lambert, 2008). Furthermore, changing demographic behaviour also reflected the changing socio-economic and cultural features in Spain. For instance, as an indicator of erosion of male-breadwinner model, young women changed their demographic behaviour with delayed marriages when two periods, 1965-1974 and 1981-1990, are contrasted (Luxán, Miret, & Treviño, 1999). Although this does not indicate the full disappearance of male-provider model, it shows changing dynamics which would also trigger changes in policy outlook.

In 1997, the first parliamentary debate was held on family policies, which, after four years, brought about National Plan for Family Support (Salido, 2011). The enactment of law in 1999 was an important step for the reconciliation between family and working life as it encompassed changes in relation to leave arising from maternity, paternity and care of dependent relatives and it provided breastfeeding mothers the

right to working breaks. However, with the influence of the crisis in 2008, gender equality policies and family policies were curtailed and the expenditures were scaled down (León & Pavolini, 2014). As an example, the labour market reform (Law 3/2012, July 6) constrained the rights to time off work for reconciliation reasons, and also cuts were introduced in childcare and long-term care (León & Pavolini, 2014). The 2012 budget, as another example, did not incorporate the financial investment in the Educa3 programme and the long-term care system (León & Pavolini, 2014).

With respect to the leave provisions in Spain, since 1980, the leave legislation was revised on three occasions, in 1989, 1995 and 1999, mostly as a consequence of the EU recommendations or directives (Meil, 2006). Coverage for the leave was extended in 1989 by incorporating leave for adopted or foster children. In 1989, maternity leave was also extended to 16 weeks and parental leave was lengthened up to three 3 years. In 1999, fathers were given the possibility of taking up to four weeks of maternity leave. For a historical review of the leave policies and the expansion of childcare services in Spain, the table below provides historical snapshots:

**Table 13 Maternity Leave, Parental Leave and Childcare Policies in Spain, 1985-2002**

	1985	1995	2001-2003
Maternity leave	14 weeks, 75%	16 weeks, 100%	16 weeks, 100%
Parental leave	NA	52 weeks unpaid	104 weeks unpaid
Childcare 0-2 years old	Less than 5%	2%	4.6%
Childcare/preschool 3-5 years old	65%	84%	More than 90%

*Sources: Gonzalez-Lopez, 2003; European Commission Network on Childcare, 1996; Saraceno, 2003:160 in Blofield & Lambert, 2008*

However, despite the legislative progress taken, as I illustrate above, parental leave scheme in Spain entail certain pitfalls. First, since the most vulnerable employees leave the labour market either during pregnancy or just before giving birth,

significant proportion cannot become entitled at all (Lapuerta, Baizán, & González, 2011). As an example, only 48% of Spanish women with children below 3 years of age were entitled to parental leave in 2006 (Lapuerta et al., 2011). Second, Spain does not have a paid parental leave scheme, which distinguishes the country from Italy and Portugal. Furthermore, influenced by the gender norms in society, fathers are less likely to take parental leave, which reinforces gender and social inequalities (Lapuerta et al., 2011).

### ***Reconciliation of Work and Family Life***

Until the 2000s, the reconciliation policies and acts for the promotion for mothers' employment could not reach fulfilling levels in Spain. Several related issues can be raised here. One is that the Spanish labour market has always had labour surpluses (Valiente, 2000). Therefore, within a strict economic perception, policies were not needed to enable women to participate in the workforce (Valiente, 2000). This account holds that labour shortage is the main rationale and motive for defamilisation and reconciliation policies. The European countries which extended childcare provision and introduced other reconciliation policies had experienced labour shortages and needed women in labour markets to tackle supply problem.

However, certain job re-entry measures have been taken since the early 2000s. In 2001, 'Program of Promotion of Employment' was initiated in order to facilitate the re-entry of women into labour markets after pregnancy or maternal leave. Moreover, the Integral Plan of Support to the Family (2001-2004), *Plan Integral de Apoyo a la Familia*, initiated series of measures including improvement of services for the attention to first infancy and other dependent persons, fiscal discounts for kindergarten fees (Salido, 2002). Some actions taken during this period also concerned obtaining greater equality in labour markets and reconciliation of work and family life, which can also be considered within the scope of defamilisation policies. One of them was *Ley de Dependencia*, Dependency law, introduced in 2006. Before the dependency law, long-term care needs were basically covered by a combination of contributory social security benefits and means-tested benefits provided by the autonomous regions (Sarasa, 2011). The main rationale behind the

enactment of this law was in fact to tackle the increasing need for long-term care caused by the ageing process. The law recognised the universal right of dependent individuals to long-term care. Three degrees of dependency were determined by dependency law, which were moderate, severe and great, and each degree was divided into two levels of severity. For instance, the applicant was assessed as moderately dependent when he or she was in need of assistance with basic activities of daily life at least once a day or intermittent support for personal autonomy (Sarasa, 2011). The dependency law also referred to the provision of universal preschool education and several other measures (León, 2011). Moreover, in 2007, a child benefit of EUR 2,500 for birth or adoption was proposed, however, it was cancelled in 2010 as an anti-crisis measure (Salido, 2011). Furthermore, another significant action was the establishment of *Instituto de la Mujer*. However, the institution did not consider reconciliation policies as top priority, yet perceived them as an issue of moderate importance (Valiente, 2000). Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some impact of the institution on reconciliation measures such as maternity and parental leaves even though it could not affect the provision of services such as childcare (Valiente, 2000).

Coming to the actors behind the development of reconciliation policies, feminist activists in Spain have seen the combination of paid work and family responsibilities as an important problem that many women encountered. However, during the 1970s despite their awareness, the Spanish feminist groups did not prioritise reconciliation policies in their actions (Valiente, 2000). The reason behind the undervaluation of defamilisation might be correlated to urgency of acts for democratic consolidation in the country. Moreover, the feminist movement and feminists in trade unions, which voiced their demands for childcare services, have been too weak to influence the policy process in Spain (Valiente, 2000). First of all, the feminist movement in Spain has been divided along two lines. One, representing the minority view, has been reluctant to cooperate with formal institutions as its members perceived the state as patriarchal (Valiente, 2000). The other branch, representing the majority, has been willing to collaborate with state institutions, and their programmes encompassed reconciliation policies, yet the priority for mobilisation was given to other policies (Valiente, 2000).

One of the eras when the feminists gained influence in Spanish policy making process was the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) government period. In 1976, a women's caucus, *Mujer y Socialismo*, was formed within the party, and in 1981, a member of the caucus was elected to the PSOE's executive committee. In December 1984, the women's caucus was raised by the party to the status of a women's secretariat at federal executive level (Valiente, 2000). Concerning the steps for defamilisation, the feminist socialists were able to voice their demands for public childcare services (and other reconciliation programmes) within PSOE policy documents, however, they did not have the sufficient power to convince PSOE policy-makers for implementation of these measures (Valiente, 2000). Thus, the commitment of the party was only in rhetorical level. As opposed to PSOE, neither the Union of Democratic Centre nor the conservative People's Party had an organised group of feminist women members. Furthermore, concerning the trade unions, *Union General de Trabajadores* and *Comisiones Obreras* stood out in Spain as major unions. They both have had sections dedicated to women's affairs, and voiced their concerns about problems women face while trying to paid work and unpaid domestic and caring duties (Valiente, 2000). However, the position of these departments for women's affairs within the unions has always been very ineffective (Valiente, 2000).

### ***Legislative Acts towards Gender Equality***

Since the 2000s, significant steps have been taken with the aim of pursuing gender equality in Spain. During 2000-2004, re-elected centre-right Popular Party government continued its commitment to support families. The National Plan for Family Support, approved in 2000, sought to promote FLFP. The enacted laws included the following measures: tax breaks worth EUR 100 per month for all working mothers with children under three years of age, passed in 2002 and the subsidies to firms employing women for social security contributions, passed in 2003 (León, 2011). Moreover, the issue of gender equality has been brought into the national education as well. For instance, a one-term course on 'education for equality and against gender violence' was made compulsory in secondary education (León, 2011).

During 2004 and 2010, the Acts concerning gender equality were the law of 2004 against domestic violence, law of 2005 on same-sex marriage, law of 2006 (dependency law) on long term care, equality act of 2007 to comply with the Directives of 2002/73/CE and 2004/113/CE and new abortion law of 2010. Law on gender equality enacted in 2007 forbid political parties contesting in national or local elections from fielding more than 60% of their candidates from one sex. Consequently, this brought 40% rule of political representation. The government which was formed after the general elections of 2008 was the first European government with more women than men. In 2008, the Ministry for Equality was established; however, it was abolished two years later and downgraded and headed by a Secretary of State.

Aside from the legislative acts towards gender equality, the change in perceptions and attitudes at the societal level also matters. A recent study by Moreno and Mari-Klose (2013) examines attitudes of Mediterranean countries based on value survey by questioning whether or not the unique features, attitudes, expectations and practices of South European countries are changing. The study reveals that Spain stands out as a country in Southern Europe with the percentage of people who find divorce and cohabitation acceptable (Moreno & Mari-Klose, 2013). Additionally, compared to Portugal, Greece and Italy, fewer people in Spain think that it is a duty to have children and women need children to be fulfilled. Last but not least, more people in Spain than other three Southern countries agree that men should take the same responsibility for home and children (Moreno & Mari-Klose, 2013). Furthermore, recent data reveals that social perceptions in Spain towards cohabitation are quite positive (Tobio, 2001a).

In summary, study of defamilisation regime in Spain reveals that Spain did not start from the scratch in the post-Franco era in terms of establishing ECEC centres. This explains the second highest take-up rate in Spain during the 1980s in Southern Europe. However, it is evident that Spanish governments in power accelerated the provision of ECEC in post-Franco period, which brought about almost universal coverage for children aged 3-6 by the 2000s. Having a prior policy setting for the establishment of ECEC is critical especially when Spain is compared with Turkey in which such initiatives have always been very immature. However, compared with

Italy, ECEC is not a prevalent policy area before the 1980s given also that Franco regime did not pursue education as a primary policy intervention area. This analysis provides accounts on the positioning of Spain in terms of defamilisation in the 1980s. ECEC becomes a target intervention area, yet with an emphasis on the education side. This, though, contributes expansion of the ECEC during the 1990s. Hence, considering the substantial increase of FLFP in Spain, the role of increased availability of ECEC services in similar pace has been critical and favourable. This is reflected in remarkable increase in both take-up rates and FLFP as I present in Chapter 4.

The study here describes also the conditions which brought about the change in take-up rates of ECEC, which is one of the conditions in this research. The decentralisation policy serves expectedly in the expansion of services for children aged 3 to 6. Split from the Franco's pronatalist legacy and male breadwinner model has been achieved successfully, with also the influence of persistent left party strength in the country, especially during PSOE governance during the 1980s until the mid-1990s. The defamilisation endeavours are externally supported by the EU integration process as well. Conservative policy setting, therefore, has no longer been prevalent in the country, which increased favourable conditions for FLFP. Furthermore, the left party governance by PSOE changed social norms in Spain significantly paving the way for gender equality at different layers in society. Such change in perceptions promoted women's participation in paid labour, and turned FLFP into an acknowledged social norm. This social environment created by the left party strength in Spain has been a significant facilitator for substantial rise in FLFP.

#### **3.2.4. Production Regime**

Similar to other South European countries, Spain rapidly progressed towards post-industrial economic structure in the aftermath of World War II. This post-industrial transformation brought about the increase in the share of employment in service sector, which, eventually, favoured the advancement in FLFP. As an example, as Table 6 shows, employment in agriculture represented 18.3% of total employment in 1985 in Spain, however, its share decreased to 9% in 1995, 5.3% in 2005 and 4.1%



in 2015. With this share, Spain now has the lowest agricultural employment following Italy in the Southern Europe. Employment in industry has greater share in the economy compared to agriculture, however, employment levels industry also declined over the years. In 1985, employment in industry was 31.7% in Spain, and it decreased to 30.8% in 2000, and 19.9% in 2015. However, employment in services increased steadily in the country. Its share in the employment went up from 49.8% in 1985 to 76.0% in 2015. Furthermore, services in Spain, compared to other South European countries, has the highest employment share in the economy.

Production regime in Spain reveals substantial evolution of the service sector employment in a relatively short period of time. The remarkable expansion of the service sector in Spain opened up greater opportunities for women's employment, which is also reflected in the outstanding rise of FLFP in the country.

### **3.2.5. Labour Market Regime**

This section presents the aspects related to the labour market in Spain, and its implications for FLFP. It also describes the features of FLFP pattern. To begin with the features related to unemployment, since the early 1970s, Spain featured high unemployment levels. To be exact, the unemployment rate increased from 3.6% in 1975 to 22.4% in 1993 (Marimon & Zilibotti, 1998). The high rate of unemployment peculiar to the Spanish case also signalled the negative influence of unemployment benefits in the country with high coverage ratio (Bover, García-Perea, & Portugal, 2000). Especially compared with Portugal where the unemployment rate was considerably lower, wage setting was more rigid in Spain, and did not enable flexibility for the employers as those in Portugal benefitted (Bover et al., 2000). Another reason behind the high rates of unemployment was the enormous pace of expansion of labour force in Spain, which outstripped the economic growth (Lopes, 2003). Moreover, the exit rates out of unemployment was also comparatively lower in Spain (Bover et al., 2000). A gendered perspective to unemployment in Spain shows that as of the 1990s, unemployment has become increasingly feminised in Spain (Cousins, 2000). The economic recovery since 1994 had scarcely any impact on women unemployment due to increased participation of women in the labour

market. Even though unemployment has fallen by 1998 for both men and women, the gender gap widened (Cousins, 2000). Between 2001 and 2007, the country experienced significant employment growth owing to, first, a relaxation in the conditions of access to credit, and second, large immigration inflow parallel to the expansion of the economy in low value added and highly and labour-intensive sectors (Bentolila, Dolado, & Jimeno, 2012). However, this growth could not be sustained.

Second, with respect to the part-time employment, traditionally, it has been low compared to the levels in northern Europe (Cousins, 1999). In Spain, as in Italy, part-time work was first regulated by law in 1984, which provided the same rights as their full-time counterparts (Toharia & Malo, 2000). Furthermore, in 1994, a legislation was introduced to eliminate the legal barriers to part-time employment, which contributed significantly to the increase from 11.2% of female employment in 1991 to 16.6% in 1995 (Cousins, 1999). The law in 1994, however, infringing the equal treatment principle, turned part-time work particularly unattractive considering that part-timers working below 12 hours a week or 48 hours a month were not entitled to social security benefits, such as unemployment, sickness and maternity benefits (Karamessini, 2008b). Additionally, due to the excessive number of years necessitated, part-timers encountered difficulty in qualifying for pensions. In 1998, with a labour market reform grounded on a mutual agreement between the government and the trade unions, this discrimination against part-timers was eliminated and part-timers were granted entitlement to retirement pensions, unemployment benefit, sick leave and other benefits on the same terms as full-timers (Karamessini, 2008b). This 1998 law also stipulated firm limitations to the working time arrangements (Karamessini, 2008b).

Third, concerning informal working, Spain has consistently featured high levels of informal work, which was also triggered by the incentives imposed by the regulations (Cousins, 1999). As an example, given that married women could access to health insurance through their husbands, they became discouraged to seek paid labour in which social security taxes were paid (Cousins, 1999). Considering the demand-side, on the other hand, high social security payments for employers, which almost equalled to 30% of wage costs, accelerated the search for going underground

(Cousins, 1999). Such situation eventually led to highly segmented labour market in Spain.

Fourth, with respect to labour market rigidity, the country has historically displayed tradition of highly rigid labour market. The country also inherited from Franco's regime a very rigid labour market (Bentolila & Dolado, 1994). Until the early 1980s, permanent work contracts, which were open-ended contracts subject to mandatory severance payments, constituted more than 90% of all contracts in Spain (Dolado, Garcetza-Serrano, & Jimeno, 2002). In 1984, an imperative, driven mainly by the high unemployment rate, occurred to introduce fixed-term labour contracts with low hiring costs (Bentolila & Dolado, 1994). The liberalisation of temporary contracts was initiated through extending their use and entailing much lower dismissal costs compared to the regular permanent contracts (Dolado et al., 2002). This was also supported by the fact that especially since the late 1970s, employers were increasingly in demand of the reforms in industrial relations to be able to hire and fire freely, and to utilise new forms of fixed term contracts (Cousins, 1999). Following such demand and many other necessities, the country has pursued several reforms to lower the level of rigidity as of 1984.

Fifth, with regard to self-employment, different than other South European countries, self-employment has not been salient in Spain (Karamessini, 2008b). Concerning fixed-term contracts, the high proportion of fixed-term contracts has been a prominent feature. In 2006, the salaried workers having fixed-term contracts were 34%, and temporariness has risen since the flexibility was introduced in Spain (Martínez-Pastor & Bernardi, 2011). The precedence of fixed-term contracts by the employers has been the fact that it costs less to fire a temporary worker (Martínez-Pastor & Bernardi, 2011). Although OECD categorises Spain as one of the least flexible ones, looking beyond the formal criteria used by OECD, the impact of flexible type of employment is very high in Spain (Martínez-Pastor & Bernardi, 2011). Given the high rates of temporary contracts among women, labour rotation particularly among women has been prevalent (Adam, 1996). Given this situation, a labour reform in 2006 targeted minimising the rate of fixed-term contracts by putting in force certain limits (Martínez-Pastor & Bernardi, 2011).

Sixth, domestic work consisting mainly of care services is an important part of employment in Spain. The country has the highest figures of registered household employees in the EU in 2005, and the persons employed in private households account for 3.6% of total employment (León, 2010). Migration is one of the factors which paved the way for low cost domestic labour and increases the share of domestic work in the employment. While the number of domestic workers was 221,500 in 1996, it rose to over 500,000 in 2009. Yet, this steady increase took place with the incorporation of foreign female workers into the sector. The number of foreign domestic workers increased from 15.500 in 1996 to 320.700 in 2009 (León, 2010). In that regard, Spain also experienced a significant transformation in its labour markets. While it has one of the lowest participation rates of foreigners in the labour markets at the beginning of the 1990s, the country has now one of the highest (León, 2010). Spain, considering these new developments and increasing presence of domestic labour in private households, initiated policies for the insurance system to register those employed. Moreover, these new forms of care work through migrated foreigners and domestic work also challenges the familialistic practices in the countries of Southern Europe (León, 2010). Furthermore, state itself has also been actively involved in the promotion of the supply of domestic care workers by adapting foreigners' law and incorporating migrants through quota systems implemented to respond to the demographic, labour and economic needs (Peterson, 2007). In 2005, within the scope of the regularisation process, 32% of the applications received by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs corresponded to the employment in the domestic service sector, and among them, 83% of the workers were women (Peterson, 2007).

Having provided accounts on the prominent features of the labour market in Spain, I will now describe the aspects related to FLFP. To begin with the FLFP patterns historically, the table below presents the information from census data between 1900 and 1960. As the table reveals, FLFP pattern in Spain verifies the U-curve hypothesis as well. While the participation levels tended to decline up to the 1950s, over time, it moved to the upswing part of the U-curve.

**Table 14 Labour Force Participation of Women in Spain, All Sectors, All Ages**

<b>Year</b>	<b>FLFP, %</b>
1900	14.49
1910	9.97
1920	9.37
1930	9.16
1940	8.35
1950	11.78
1960	15.14

*Source: Census data in Iglesias & Riboud, 1985*

Second, concerning the influence of child on women's employment in Spain, in the 1990s, FLFP appeared to peak in the 25 to 29 age category and then declined as women have their first child (Hantrais & Letablier, 1996). Considering the figures in the 1990s, children were clearly the major reason of mothers' withdrawal from the labour force, however, children did not appear to have substantial influence on women's entry or re-entry since married women's labour force entry seemed actually correlated to husbands' employment uncertainty (i.e. labour transitions and unemployment) (Adam, 1996). As a peculiar case, women in Spain, once they exit the labour market, tend to remain outside the labour force although their childcare reach school age (Adam, 1996). However, in Spain over time, mothers increased their probability of post-birth employment (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005). The table below demonstrates the patterns of FLFP according to different age groups:

**Table 15 Female Labour Force Participation in Spain in 1976, 1985 and 1998, In Different Age Groups**

Age Groups	1976	1985	1998
16-19	48,3	32,1	20,4
20-24	55,1	54,5	55,8
25-29	36,9	53,0	75,1
30-34	27,7	40,3	67,0
35-39	27,3	32,9	62,4
40-44	28,9	31,2	58,7
45-49	28,9	26,8	48,8
50-54	28,2	24,6	38,4
55-59	25,8	23,3	27,6
60-64	21,4	16,0	15,9

*Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey, in Rica & Ferrero, 2003*

As the table above demonstrates, FLFP in almost all age groups scaled up in Spain. This was also the case for the period after the 2000s. Historically speaking, looking at the data above, Spain achieved a very significant level of increase in its FLFP levels. The country apparently portrays a variation in women's life-cycle behaviour as reflected in postponed entry into the labour market because of human capital investment, in increased participation rates after marriage and childbirth, and in decreasing fertility (Adam, 1996). However, what does the country owe this success to? Among other factors, the large increase in female participation in the 1980s can be attributed to the structural change in the demand for labour which favoured women's employment (Adam, 1996).

However, in Spain as opposed to the other EU countries, a negative correlation between female participation in the labour market and fertility rates has been prevalent (Moreno, 2005). The trend of early age at marriage and at first birth reversed in the 1970s in many European countries, yet the reversal took place in Spain a decade later, as in Italy (Perez & Livi-Bacci, 1992). For the Mediterranean

countries, marriage was an intermediate variable of fertility since births out of wedlock increased the fertility in other countries while the decline in nuptiality also affected fertility in Southern Europe. In the context of fertility, increased participation of women in the labour markets affected maternity in the country. To be exact, the average age of having their first child among women increased from 25 years in 1980 to 31 years in 2006, slightly higher than the European average (Miguelez & Recio, 2010). The fertility rate has fallen from 1.64 children per woman in 1985 to 1.25 in 2010, below almost all countries in the EU (Miguelez & Recio, 2010). Moreover, as in Italy, study shows that working hours of women lower the birth likelihood unless families are assisted by sources of care (Cooke, 2009).

Third, concerning the influence of education on FLFP in Spain, the level of educational attainment has been a significant determinant for women's behaviour towards employment in Spain as well. Tertiary level of education appears to increase the possibilities of being involved in labour market. However, in Spain, the participation rates of female high school graduates have been increasing as well (Salido & Moreno, 2012). As Table 8 presents, share of women with tertiary education in the labour force was 31.5% in 2000 in Spain, and it increased to 41.5% in 2014. With this rate, Spain was the South European country in which women with tertiary educations constituted the highest share in the female labour force. Furthermore, according to Table 9, share of women with secondary education increased from 21.1% in 2000 to 23.9% in 2014. The share of female labour force with primary education, on the other hand, decreased from 47.5% in 2000 to 34.7% in 2014. However, although shares according to the education levels changed over the years, an increase was evident among all education groups.

Fourth, another characteristic among Spanish women in the past was the traditional intermittent and early exit participation pattern. Even though it has been the rule in Spain for a long time, it has in fact been replaced among the new cohorts of women by a new pattern, which was much more similar to the age-curved male profile with higher and more stable rates of activity in the central ages (Salido & Moreno, 2012). To capture the changes in FLFP patterns in the country over time, it is also important to look at the patterns of participation among married women as I present information above. This essentially also signals the impact of defamilisation process.

In that regard, in Spain, while only minor changes occurred concerning single women since the 1990s, the labour force participation patterns of married women through their life cycles altered drastically (Salido, 2011). This change in the behaviour, evidently, owes also to the increased availability for childcare services in the country. Result shows that two mothers entered paid employment for each ten additional children enrolled in public children services (Nollenberger & Rodríguez-Planas, 2015). Furthermore, Spanish women's employment and labour force participation after first birth was also influenced by prior working experience and occupational status, and women with fixed-term contracts appear to less likely to re-enter the labour market (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2002).

Fifth, looking at the impact of economic hardship on FLFP in Spain, even during the recession periods in the country, 1976-85, 1993-95, and since 2008, women's demand for employment did not decrease. On the contrary, it continued to increase causing high rates of female unemployment (Salido, 2011).

Finally, household context was also influential in women's decision to leave or re-enter the labour market. In the Spanish context, research shows that male partners' earnings have a negative effect on female labour market withdrawal (Herrarte, Moral-Carcedo, & Sáez, 2012). Possible explanation for this would be that when the husband's wages are high, the household income would scale up and the couple would be able to pay for childcare services more easily (Herrarte et al., 2012).

In summary, labour market regime in Spain in the context of FLFP draws significant conclusions for this research. The review provides accounts on the opportunities and impediments caused by the labour market characteristics for FLFP in the country. First, as a country with highest share of women employment with tertiary education, Spanish labour market could adopt the changing characteristics of the labour supply, which is also reflected in the highest share in services employment in Southern Europe. Moreover, another supportive development has been the progress in defamilisation regime, which is reflected in the mothers' changing post-birth employment behaviour. This, in fact, validates the influence of defamilisation, particularly the condition of take-up of ECEC services, on FLFP in Spain. However, descriptive review also provides accounts on the impediments concerning FLFP,



which are high unemployment rates, low part-time opportunities and segmented labour market.

### 3.2.6. Left Party Strength

In the aftermath of Franco's death, an election was held in 1977, which resulted in the victory of center-right and preceded a reform process. Although the country had been ruled by a Fascist dictatorship for decades, and the right-wing party included figures from the prior regime, and it was the centre-right which began to rule the country following the election. This can be explained by the fact that it was a process of 'reform' in Spain, whereas, for instance, in Portugal, the pattern of transformation was considered as rupture (Bermeo, 1987).

The Table 15 below presents the parties which gained seats after the elections held between 1977 and 2015. It is noted that for the vast majority of the elections, left parties could secure around half of the seats in the parliament, and this trend did not appear to change as in Italy. As an example, while left parties gained around 46.48% of the seats between 1977 and 1982, the average percentage was 46% between 1986 and 2015. The figures suggest the steady left party strength in the country in the last decades, which also manifests itself in policy making favourable for increasing FLFP.

**Table 16 Number of Seats Gained by the Political Parties in Spain, between 1977 and 2015**

<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Parfam code</b>	<b>#of seats gained</b>	<b>#of total seats</b>
06/1977	Communist Party of Spain	20	20	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	118	350
	Union of the Democratic Centre/Centrist Bloc	40	165	350
	Popular Alliance	60	16	350
	Basque Left	90	1	350

**Table 16 (cont'd)**

	Basque Nationalist Party	90	8	350
	Aragonese Regionalist Party	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	1	350
	Andalusian Party	90	1	350
03/1979	Communist Party of Spain	20	23	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	121	350
	Union of the Democratic Centre/Centrist Bloc	40	168	350
	Popular Alliance	60	9	350
	Convergence and Union	90	8	350
	Basque Left	90	1	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	7	350
	Aragonese Regionalist Party	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	1	350
	Andalusian Party	90	5	350
10/1982	Communist Party of Spain	20	4	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	202	350
	Union of the Democratic Centre/Centrist Bloc	40	12	350
	Popular Democratic Party	40	24	350
	Centre Democrats	50	2	350
	Popular Alliance	60	82	350
	Convergence and Union	90	12	350

**Table 16 (cont'd)**

	Basque Left	90	1	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	8	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	1	350
06/1986	United Left	20	7	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	184	350
	Popular Democratic Party	40	21	350
	Liberal Party	40	11	350
	Centre Democrats	50	19	350
	Popular Alliance	60	73	350
	Convergence and Union	90	18	350
	Basque Left	90	2	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	6	350
	Aragonese Regionalist Party	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	0	350
10/1989	United Left	20	17	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	175	350
	Centre Democrats	50	14	350
	People's Party	60	107	350
	Convergence and Union	90	18	350
	Basque Left	90	2	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	5	350
	Basque Solidarity	90	2	350
	Aragonese Regionalist Party	90	1	350

**Table 16 (cont'd)**

	Catalan Republican Left	90	0	350
	Andalusian Party	90	2	350
06/1993	United Left	20	18	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	159	350
	Centre Democrats	50	0	350
	People's Party	60	141	350
	Convergence and Union	90	17	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	5	350
	Basque Solidarity	90	1	350
	Aragonese Party	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	1	350
	Andalusian Party	90	0	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	4	350
03/1996	United Left	20	21	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	141	350
	People's Party	60	156	350
	Convergence and Union	90	16	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	5	350
	Basque Solidarity	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	1	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	4	350
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	90	2	350
03/2000	United Left	20	8	350

**Table 16 (cont'd)**

	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	125	350
	People's Party	60	183	350
	Convergence and Union	90	15	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	7	350
	Basque Solidarity	90	1	350
	Aragonese Party	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	1	350
	Andalusian Party	90	1	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	4	350
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	90	3	350
03/2004	United Left	20	5	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	164	350
	People's Party	60	148	350
	Convergence and Union	90	10	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	7	350
	Basque Solidarity	90	1	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	8	350
	Andalusian Party	90	0	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	3	350
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	90	2	350
	Aragonist Council	90	1	350
	Navarrese People's Union	90	0	350
03/2008	United Left	20	2	350

**Table 16 (cont'd)**

	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	169	350
	People's Party	60	153	350
	Convergence and Union	90	11	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	6	350
	Basque Solidarity	90	0	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	3	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	2	350
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	90	2	350
	Aragonist Council	90	0	350
	Navarrese People's Union	90	0	350
11/2011	Future Yes	90	1	350
	Amaiur	95	7	350
	Commitment-Q	95	1	350
	United Left	20	11	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	110	350
	Union, Progress and Democracy	40	5	350
	People's Party	60	186	350
	Convergence and Union	90	16	350
	Forum Asturias	90	1	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	5	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	3	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	2	350
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	90	2	350

**Table 16 (cont'd)**

12/2015	Popular Unity	20	2	350
	Basque Country Unite	90	2	350
	In Common We Can	90	12	350
	In Tide	90	6	350
	Commitment-We can-It is time	90	9	350
	Democracy and Freedom	90	8	350
	We can	20	42	350
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30	90	350
	Citizens	40	40	350
	People's Party	60	123	350
	Basque Nationalist Party	90	6	350
	Catalan Republican Left	90	9	350
	Canarian Coalition	90	1	350

*Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a)*

### **3.3. Portugal**

This part provides an overview of welfare state regime in Portugal to better comprehend the institutional set-up and its formation. I also present a brief summary of the regimes concerning the conditions and outcome of this study to provide a background on the data calibrated in the following section and outcomes of the analysis.

### 3.3.1. Welfare State Regime

I present here first historical evolution of the welfare state in Portugal, and then describe its general characteristics with also its implications for the FLFP. To begin with a historical overview, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Portugal experienced intense developments and drastic transformations. In the second half of the century, the primary developments were long-lasting colonial war (1961-74), emigration process (1960s), revolution (1974) and entry into European Community (1986). The Salazar regime, which adopted strong Catholicism, impeded women's emancipation as well (André, 1996). The country started to experience change only after the 1960s with the impact of migration, industrialisation and Colonial war (André, 1996). The industrialisation process, triggered by entry into European Free Trade Association (EFTA), transformed society, including the family structure. Families gradually moved away from extended to nuclear type. The persistence of dictatorial regime until the second half of twentieth century, however, delayed the modernisation of administrative apparatus and development of citizenship rights (Portugal, 1999). In addition, in Portugal, deruralisation, and therefore, industrialisation, urbanisation and expansion of service sector took place later compared to other European countries (Portugal, 1999).

Portugal is a latecomer in welfare state development (Alves, 2015). Looking at the emergence and evolution of the welfare state, it is noted that the social security structuring in Portugal has been influenced by British and German examples. Portugal has been characterised by a fragmented and corporatist benefit system, a universalist national health system, a low degree of state welfare penetration and the persistence of clientelism in access to welfare (Portugal, 1999). During Salazar's rule, *Estado Novo*, familism was prevalent with a conservative ideology supported by large rural part of the population, which enabled the maintenance of social support based on family and community solidarity and on low expectations with regard to the quality of life (Portugal, 1999). In the 1960s, the prominent development was the introduction of the 1962 Social Welfare Reform which targeted a unified social welfare scheme (Carolo & Pereirinha, 2010). Consequently, institutional re-structuring for welfare state provision took place in the country. During this period,



the provisions, mainly responding to classic social risks, encompassed old age, incapacity and survival income transfers relying on corporative grounds (Carolo & Pereirinha, 2010).

Following the establishment of the democratic regime in 1974, moves began to establish a structured welfare state in Portugal. However, due to international economic crisis, the welfare state developments in the country experienced restrictive measures for a certain period of time (Portugal, 1999). In the 1990s, Portugal again adopted restrictive measures without actually a consolidated welfare state system. These measures included: privatisation of state social services, private management of public services, de-institutionalisation of state welfare provision, shared accountability of citizens in social spending and revitalisation of civil society support systems (Portugal, 1999). Nevertheless, during the period in the 1990s, Portugal also achieved important reforms in pensions and social security issues as a result of 'competitive corporatism', and consequently, benefits and tax regimes were modified (Rhodes, 1996).

Looking at the recent prominent characteristics of welfare state in Portugal compared with other South European welfare states, Portugal presents a less occupationally fragmented social security system, and it has an institutional structure resembling more a universalistic model (Ferreira, 2005). Furthermore, in a comparative analysis with other South European countries, the universal family allowances and benefits for young unemployed persons living alone are distinctive features of Portuguese welfare state (Garcia & Karakatsanis, 2006). As Figure 2 shows, social expenditure on family as percentage of GDP gradually increased in Portugal. While spending on family constituted 0.6% of GDP in 1980, it reached to the level of 1.4% in 2010 and 1.2% in 2013. However, Portugal offers restricted unemployment benefit since a significant portion of unemployed people are not entitled to unemployment benefits (Alves, 2015). This is mainly due to the entitlement criterion on having a record of being employed prior to becoming unemployed (Alves, 2015). Furthermore, the amount of benefit has also been comparatively low since the replacement rate is fixed at 65% of the previous salary (Alves, 2015).

Furthermore, albeit historically high levels of FLFP, Portuguese welfare state has preserved its familialistic characteristics, especially apparent in care arrangements

and continuity of traditional gender values (Tavora, 2012a). In contrast to Pfau-Effinger's argument (1998), who proposes that female employment integration brings about changes in the gender culture followed by the welfare state policies supportive of female employment, Portugal continued to reinforce gender inequalities in wages and in work opportunities during the times of FLFP increase, and female integration in the country actually preceded the emergence of supportive welfare policies (Tavora & Rubery, 2013). Although Portugal caught up with Italy in the 2000s as regards its expenditure on family, it remained at low levels in contrast to the OECD average, as in the case of Spain and Greece (OECD, 2016b). This expansion also signalled increased commitment to the care provision and assistance to working mothers.

Relief by the migrants has also been the case in Portugal. There has been a marked growth in the foreign resident population, to an estimated 440,000 in 2008, which corresponded to almost 5% of the total population, and Brazil, Ukraine and Cape Verde constituted the top three national groups of foreigners (Wall & Nunes, 2010). The feminisation of immigration in Portugal displayed the features of the distinctive South European immigration pattern (also called as 'migrant-in-the-family' care model), which emerged in a familialistic Welfare State dependent on family-based care rather than external services (Wall & Nunes, 2010). Yet, Portugal portrayed both commonalities and differences in relation to South European pattern. As a prominent commonality, Portugal has also been featured by a strong commitment to the family, and especially in relation to the elderly care, keeping the dependent elderly person at home is considered as the best option with some assistance from services, day centres or domestic employees (Wall & Nunes, 2010). Concerning the major difference, in Portugal, live-in or full-time household and care services from migrants are generally preferred by the upper-income families (Wall & Nunes, 2010).

ESPN thematic report on social investment in Portugal (European Commission, 2015d) asserts that the design and implementation of social policies in the country in recent years could not respond to the reconciliation between social and economic goals. The report also points at that despite significant progress in social investment-

related policies, such as childhood development, family support policies, restrictions imposed by new policy developments are also notable.

Lastly, with respect to the influence of taxation system on FLFP, the simulations for different taxation regimes in Portugal show that the responses of the female labour supply are minor in contrast to other countries given that Portugal has low per capita income, and thus, the impact of the changes in the fiscal systems on after-tax earnings is smaller (Marques & Pereira, 1999). This suggests that the tax system is not a determinant factor in explaining high FLFP in Portugal.

In summary, welfare state regime in Portugal shows that Portugal is a divergent case in Southern Europe given that the country could accomplish high FLFP quite earlier despite the lack of welfare state assistance such as family policies and ECEC services. Women in Portugal participated in labour force in large numbers before the erosion of the familialistic welfare state. Hence, the case analysis here validates the statistical information in the following chapter and also the outcome of the QCA in Chapter 5. Different from other South European patterns, high rates of FLFP in Portugal did not necessarily required welfare state expansion.

### **3.3.2. Education Regime**

I briefly present here the major progresses in tertiary education in Portugal by referring to the main policies initiated. I then touch upon how historically women's tertiary education developed. To begin with, educational enrolment and literacy rates have been substantially low in Portugal compared to other European countries. The authoritarian regime did not attach importance to the education as a source of growth (Pereira & Lains, 2011). Furthermore, until 1974, only the upper classes primarily attended universities in Portugal, where the higher education system was considered as elite and re-producing inequality in society (Cabrito, 2001). With the democratic revolution in 1974, whole educational system was transformed towards a mass education system by stressing a more equal society based on democratic ideals with various measures including the development of a compulsory school for all children under 16 years old (Cabrito, 2001). To catch up with Europe, substantial public

resources were devoted to education as evident in the increase in percentage of GDP allocated for education (Pereira & Lains, 2011).

With respect to higher education until the mid-1980s, the State pursued the sole responsibility with the exception of the Catholic University, yet once state universities began encountering difficulties in responding to the increasing social demand, some administrative constraints in the access to higher education were initiated by the government (Cabrito, 2001). Private sector was also allowed to establish universities to be able to respond to this demand, which now encompassed around one third of all the students enrolled at this educational level (Cabrito, 2001). However, tertiary schooling among the population in Portugal progressed late and slowly improved. Prevalent problem remained to be high school drop-out rate, which was the highest following Mexico and Turkey among OECD countries. As Figure 3 demonstrates, percentage of population aged 25-29 with tertiary schooling was 1.05 in 1970, which was the lowest among all five countries. The percentage increased only slightly to 2.85 in 1980, 3.92 1990, 6.41 in 2000 and 5.75 in 2010. Women population also portrayed similar figures. For example, looking at the data based on percentage of female population aged 25-29 with tertiary schooling, while the percentage was 3.85% in 1985, it scaled up only to the level of 10.57% in 2010. In fact, looking at the gender parity index, Portugal does not display gender inequality in tertiary schooling as levels are equally low for both sexes.

Portugal recently introduced the 'Portugal INCoDe (National Digital Competence Initiative) 2030' in the pursuit of expanding access to technology and promoting digital competencies within its population by 2030. In fact, the good performance of Portugal in increasing tertiary graduates in the areas of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields has been notable. While, for instance, the OECD average is 23%, 28% of tertiary graduates gains a degree in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields in Portugal (OECD, 2017a). However, graduates of information and communication technologies constitutes only 1% whereas the OECD average is 4% (OECD, 2017a). In gender perspective, in contrast to general OECD figures, gap is less pronounced in Portugal in terms of enrolment levels of men and women in STEM fields (OECD, 2017a). However, Portugal is characterised by low upper secondary attainment rate since

around 31% of 25-34 year-olds in Portugal have not attained upper secondary education (OECD, 2017a). This doubles the OECD average, and Portugal ranks one of the highest among OECD countries. The major reason behind this figure appears to be high drop-outs rather than entrance as over 96% of 15-17 year-olds are actually enrolled in secondary education (OECD, 2017a).

The education regime in Portugal provides accounts on the data for tertiary education levels among women in Portugal. The review explains why it has been lower in Portugal, and shows significantly that low tertiary education levels among women are not associated with gender norms. Because, otherwise, it would be striking to observe high rates of FLFP. In fact, on the contrary, Portugal, unraveling the insignificance of tertiary education among women to rise FLFP in its country context, displays also the importance of presence of gender equality and acceptable social norms to have high FLFP. This is because, Portugal ranks well in terms of gender parity index in education.

### **3.3.3. Defamilisation Regime**

While describing the developments in Portugal with regard to its defamilisation regime, I divide the overview into three. The first section explains the gradual development of ECEC services with references to the prominent actors and driving forces. Second section, with an inter-temporal analysis, provides accounts on the family policies including leaves and related family assistance schemes. Third part shows the achievements towards attaining greater gender equality in society.

#### ***Early Children Education and Care***

I divide here the review on ECEC based on three periods; before, during and post Salazar's rule. Before Salazar's rule (1932–68), the family and education policy of the democratic era incorporated the formal childcare, and a couple of kindergartens were built in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Varga, 2014). In 1926, when the military coup took place, only 1% of children were enrolled in preschool education, which was only available for children aged 4–7 years (Varga, 2014).

During the Salazar's rule, between 1926 and 1974, early childhood care and education was perceived as a private affair, which concerned only the family. However, as of the 1950s, different segments of the society began reacting to this view, and as a result, private preschool teacher education colleges, mostly with catholic affiliation, were established (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In the 1960s, industrialisation and urbanisation processes, and social change triggered by these developments brought about the creation crèches and kindergarten in urban areas by the Ministry of Health and Assistance (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In 1973, on the eve of the overthrow of the authoritarian regime, a reformation process in the education system started, which created preschool education as an integral part of the Portuguese education system (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008).

In the aftermath of the authoritarian regime, social issues and public expectations gained increased visibility, which included the demand for preschool education (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In 1978, the first official kindergarten, *jardins-de-infancia*, was established under the Ministry of Education, and from 1978 to 1989, preschool education was expanded to the rural areas by the State (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). As an example, the average district-level enrolment rate among 3–5 year-olds increased from 4% in 1970 to 36% in 1990 (Varga, 2014). Additional to the public provision, measures such as conditional fee reductions and free school meals were also initiated (Varga, 2014). In 1986, a framework law created a National Advisory Board for Education, *Conselho nacional de Educação*, as a consultative body of the Ministry of Education. In 1994, this Board produced a report, namely National Advisory Board for Education Report on Preschool Education, on the status of preschool education (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In 1995, following the recommendations of the National Advisory Board, the newly appointed government made education and particularly preschool education an electoral issue (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). They produced a framework law for preschool education and developed a plan to widen the network of preschool centres to scale up the number of children enrolled in preschool centres (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In 1996, the Government launched a Preschool Education Expansion and Development Plan, and in 1997, published a Framework Law for Preschool Education, perceiving preschool education as the first step of basic education.

In a general overview, looking at the organisation of early childhood until 1995, formal early childhood care and education, regulated by the Ministry of Work and Social Solidarity, offered the following alternatives: registered nannies, family crèches, mini-crèches and crèches (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). Furthermore, until 1995, for early childhood care and education, there were mainly three types of networks – private solidarity care oriented network, private educational network and State preschools network. In the private solidarity care oriented network, kindergartens operated under the authority of the Ministry of Social Welfare/Solidarity (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In private educational network, preschools centres could be owned by religious associations with religious affiliation or being owned by private companies whereas in State educational network, kindergartens were run under the authority of the Ministry of Education.

However, the Preschool Education Expansion and Development Plan, launched in 1996, can be considered as a milestone in the country. Since the opening times of State preschools were much restricted than parents' usual working hours, families, when both parents were employed, were not able to enrol their children in public preschools. With the new legal framework, the problem of limited opening times was tried to be solved through incorporating the 'care component' of 3 hours to be paid by the family. However, during the 1990s, the extent of formal provision for children under three received no attention in policies and priorities for day-care, which implies that childcare was envisaged as children's educational development rather than as a strategy to reconcile work and family life (Portugal, 1999).

However, since 2006, there has been also a determinate effort to improve early childhood provision for children under 3 years in the country. Under the special program, namely (*Programa de Alagamento da Rede de Equipamentos Sociais – PARES*), the establishment of crèches and other related social institutions were supported to increase the state of crèche provision by 50% in three years (2006-09) from 23,5% (2006) to 35% (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). In 2011, the Portuguese *Conselho Nacional de Educação* (National Council of Education), which was a consultative council, functioning under the *Assembleia da República* (National Parliament), declared a public statement with a 'historical' set of recommendations to the Government (specifically to the Ministries of Education and Social Affairs)

concerning the education of children aged below 3 years (Vasconcelos, 2013). However, immediately after the presentation of the 2011 public statement to parliament and the government, elections took place, and the newly elected government enacted a new legislation detailing the criteria for the installation and operation of crèches, and this new legislation was a step back from the recommendations in the 2011 statement (Vasconcelos, 2013).

Examining the enrolment rates of children in public day care centres, in 1996, almost 88% of children from the 0 to 3 years were cared by their families or within informal care arrangements while the percentage was below 80% in 2003 (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008). The rate of enrolment in formal care, on the other hand, was 12.5% in 1996, 21.5% in 2003 and 23.5% in 2006. The enrolment rates for the children aged 3 to 6 years was 29% in 1985-86; 53% in 1991-92; 76% in 2000-01 and 78.4% in 2006-7 (Formosinho & Formosinho, 2008).

As a recent account, ESPN's thematic study (European Commission, 2015d) reports that, with the establishment of the universal preschool education and its compulsory character within the Portuguese education system in 2009, enrolment rates have consistently scaled up. As an example, while in 2002-2003, the preschooling (among five-year-old age group) enrolment rate was 8.9%, it rose to 97.2% by 2012-2013. Together with this positive evolution, Portugal, with the rate of 94.8%, became very close to achieving the EU goal within the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training, which defines a rate of 95% of preschooling for children aged 4-5. Nevertheless, a room for development especially for the under 3 age group is evident in Portugal given that parents often bear the costs for care on a full-time basis, the costs of private services are high compared to the levels of wages, public providers often operate in shorter hours (Nicholls, 2013). All these circumstances reflect that childcare in Portugal has not yet achieved to be a matter of reconciliation of working and family life (Nicholls, 2013).

### ***Family Policies***

Coming to the overview of the family policies in the country, first, maternity leave was started to be implemented in the 1960s, and since its introduction, it has always been fully paid (Torres, 2008). In 1963, women, who were registered in the *Caixa de*



*previdência*, were entitled to 60 days of maternity leave paid with a rate of 100%, and in 1996, with a decree law on individual labour contract regulation, dismissal during pregnancy and for one year after childbirth was forbidden and mothers were entitled to a daily one-hour period for breastfeeding (OECD, 2016c). In 1976, the maternity leave was extended to 90 days at 100% of earnings (OECD, 2016c).

Between 1980 and 1982, it is possible to notice a strong commitment to implement a prominent family policy in Portugal. During the sixth, seventh and eighth governments of the Democratic Alliance (a centre-right coalition), a strongly familialist discourse was prevalent in government programmes and some structural acts to respond more efficiently to the family question. In 1980, the State Office of the Family (*Secretaria de Estado da Família*) and the Interministerial Commission of the Family (*Comissão Interministerial da Família*) were established with Law 202/80, and in 1982, the Organic Structure of the Ministry of Social Affairs for Family Affairs (*Estrutura Orgânica do Ministério dos Assuntos Sociais para os Assuntos da Família*) was founded (Portugal, 1999). The Organic Structure of the Ministry of Social Affairs for Family Affairs encompassed the Interministerial Commission of the Family (*Comissão Interministerial da Família*), the Advisory Council of Family Affairs (*Conselho Consultivo dos Assuntos da Família*), the Cabinet of Studies and Projects for Family Affairs (*Gabinete de Estudos e Projectos dos Assuntos da Família*) and the General Office of the Family (*Direção-Geral da Família*). In spite of these institutional attempts, practical results were not as expected since policies were not subsequently developed (Portugal, 1999). In 1983, the State Office of the Family was abolished; the Interministerial Commission and the Advisory Council did not function fully albeit several attempts to reactivate them (Portugal, 1999). After 1982, stepping back from the idea of family policy became evident in Portugal (Portugal, 1999). In 1995, the opportunity was introduced which enabled fathers and mothers to share maternity leave, however, mothers were always obliged to take the initial six weeks (Torres, 2008). In 1999, the Socialist Party in government, introduced a major reform concerning the leave regime with the establishment of individual entitlement to three-month unpaid parental leave for each parent, five working days of fully paid paternity leave to be used following the birth of the child and an additional 15 daddy days of fully paid parental leave to be utilised following paternity or maternity leave (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). Additionally, in the

context of the same reform process, work-time was reduced by two hours per day until the child's first birthday, to be utilised by either parent or shared and entitlement to 30 days of paid leave to care for a sick child was also maintained (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). During this period, family policies also encompassed child benefits, tax incentives for individuals or family units with dependents, tax-free allowance for single parents with low-income, and tax reductions for certain types of expenditures related to health care, education etc. (Torres, 2008).

In 2002, when short-lived right-wing government came to power, the duration of the maternity leave was increased with the labour code adopted in 2003 reflecting an outlook of woman's work as a caring mother (Guerreiro, 2014). With this regulation, an option between 4 months' leave with 100% pay and 5 months with 80% was offered, the 3-month subsequent unpaid parental leave was maintained, and the possibility for parents of children aged under 6 to work half-time was lengthened to 12 months (Guerreiro, 2014). Once this right-wing government lost its power in 2005, the Labour Code was revised again in a way to favour shared parenthood and offer a payment to the parents upon birth, who were not in the labour force (Guerreiro, 2014). In 2009, further revisions to the Labour Code were made to stimulate shared parenthood recognising father's right to be more present and to care for the child (Guerreiro, 2014). This new set of reforms, highly inspired by the Swedish system of one main type of parental leave, was initiated by the Socialist Party in government (Escobedo and Wall, 2015). With the amendments in 2009, maternity leave is now called as 'initial parental leave' which entails 5 months with 100% pay or 6 months with 83% if shared by both parents (Guerreiro, 2014). In case only the mother utilises, it is reduced by 30 days. The mother must take 6 weeks which is considered as the mother's exclusive initial parental leave whereas father's exclusive initial parental leave is 20 days (Guerreiro, 2014). As of 2011, however, major cutbacks were put in place in family benefits and other related allowances, and also the expansion of services was halted by permitting more children per room in crèches (Escobedo & Wall, 2015).

As Table 5 demonstrates, current entitlement in Portugal is 6 weeks paid maternity leave as full-rate equivalent and 14.4 weeks paid parental and home care leave available to mothers as full-rate equivalent. The particularity of the entitlements in

Portugal is that it provides entitlement by expanding parental leave and restricting maternity leave. The particular emphasis on parental leave and expansion of schemes particularly through parental leaves denotes the prioritisation of gender equality in caring arrangements. Furthermore, Portugal is also the only country in the Southern Europe, which entitles paid parental leave reserved only for fathers.

### ***Legislative Acts towards Gender Equality***

Since the 1970s, Portuguese governments have supported the participation of women in social, economic and political life through equal opportunities policies (Hantrais & Letablier, 1996). The principles of equality and non-discrimination not only at work and in education but also between spouses are laid down in the Portuguese Constitution. The guarantee of main principles for gender equality in social and economic life in Portugal, however, could be partially translated into substantive measures, which would enable women easily to combine employment and family life as a result of restricted resources (Hantrais & Letablier, 1996).

In summary, the analysis on defamilisation regime in Portugal shows that the country substantially lagged behind in contrast to Italy and Spain concerning the provision of ECEC services. Nevertheless, as of the 1990s, ECEC services started to expand, which consequently enabled catching up with Italy and Spain in the 2010s.

Strikingly, Portugal has always had high rates of FLFP compared to Italy and Spain despite being a latecomer in the initiation of those social care policies. This suggests that women in Portugal conceived participation in paid labour as a necessity, and engaged in informal caring arrangements to secure their labour market positions. The review in this section also provides accounts why the country had low take-up rates of ECEC. Furthermore, the analysis here demonstrates that policies in the country, albeit being late, were neatly designed with gender sensitivity since the family policy prioritises shared parenthood and promotes paid father's leave. Influenced by the dominance of left party governance in the country, family policies adopted and their design reflect the recognition of role of those policies on FLFP.

### 3.3.4. Production Regime

Until the 1960s, Portugal was essentially an agricultural country. Half of its active population worked in primary sector (44%) while 29% worked in secondary sector, and 27% was employed in tertiary sector (Alves, 2015). During this period, consequently, Portugal had one of the lowest urbanisation levels in Europe (Alves, 2015). Nevertheless, since the 1960s, Portuguese production regime experienced marked transformation. In a relatively short period of time, Portugal moved from a low-growth and an agrarian-based economy to a largely high-growth, and industrial economy with high-openness (Pereira & Lains, 2011). While agriculture has had relatively more significance in the economy, the service sector gained the primary position in time. Expansion of service sector owed very much to the economic growth achieved during the mid-1980s with the influence of membership to the EU, which promoted the tertiarisation predominantly with financial, trade, tourism and enterprise support service sectors (André & Feio, 1999). As an example, while the share of employment in agriculture was 23.8% in 1985, it declined to 7.5% in 2015. Although it was not large as in agricultural employment, employment in industry also decreased from 33.8% in 1985 to 24.3% in 2015. As in other South European countries, a marked increase in services employment occurred in Portugal as well. While its share was 42.4% in 1985, it increased to 68.1% in 2015. This, eventually, paved the way for employment opportunities for more women.

However, despite this structural change, as the Table 6 presents above, the striking success of Portugal was its capability in expanding total employment during the period between 1974 and 1991 despite significant loss in agricultural sector, which owed very much to the positive net creation of employment in manufacturing and the expansion of employment in services (Marimon & Zilibotti, 1998). On the contrary, for example in Spain, during the same period, total employment fell down (Marimon & Zilibotti, 1998).

The development process of Portugal, particularly through labour intensive industries like textiles, rested in the competitive advantage gained through low labour costs (Tomé, 2007). Owing to the sustainability of the pattern of economic development by the low skills, the country was capable of keeping the unemployment rate at minimum while the employment rate was high (Tomé, 2007). Another driving force

in its development was its entering the EFTA in 1960, which brought about expansion of its export base (Pereira & Lains, 2011). Furthermore, women, employed in industry, have also been historically higher in Portugal compared to other European countries where FLFP was also high, and self-employment among women has also been comparatively higher in the country (Guerreiro & Rodrigues, 2006). Since the early 2000s, however, China, India and the Eastern European countries started to challenge traditional model of exports in Portugal, and, consequently, unemployment went up from 4% in 2001 to 8% in 2005 (Tomé, 2007).

In a nutshell, study of production regime in Portugal demonstrates the opportunities for FLFP. The country absorbed successfully the loss of agricultural employment with first the job creation in manufacturing and then increased self-employment and service sector employment. Major structural changes in the economy have been replaced by the new conditions also favourable for FLFP. For instance, export oriented manufacturing meant new opportunities for women to participate in paid labour. When the industry sector narrowed, women could utilise self-employment opportunities and new opportunities in service sector. Hence, in contrast to Turkey for instance, Portugal's success in experiencing structural changes with concomitant job creation brought about preserved and even increased FLFP.

### **3.3.5. Labour Market Regime**

I scrutinise here the aspects related to the labour market in Portugal, and its implications for FLFP, and then analyse the features of FLFP pattern. To begin with the feature of the labour market in general, first, I will reflect on part-time work. In the country, first regulation of part-time work took place in 1999 with the law defining part-time work, eliminating collectively agreed restrictions on its usage, proposing the right of full-time employees who opted for working part-time temporarily to return back to full-time employment and granting to the part-timers the unemployment benefits (Karamessini, 2008b). Furthermore, incentives for the encouragement of part-time employment were also proposed. Yet, part-time work has always been low in Portugal. High rates of female full-time work have been maintained, especially as of the early 1980s, without prominent assistance for

families from the state (Nicholls, 2013). In contrast to the countries of Europe such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom where part-time work is common among particularly mothers over the age of 25, it is particularly the elderly population who engages in part-time work in Portugal (André, 1996).

Second, with respect to horizontal segregation, it is actually salient in the Portuguese labour market given that women work disproportionately in specific areas of the service sector, particularly, personal and administrative services, and women are unlikely to work as managers and professionals and more in elementary occupations (Guerreiro & Rodrigues, 2006). Third, concerning fixed-term contracts, they are comparatively high in Portugal, and especially among women, and it is more common reflecting the negative implications such as low-qualification and precarious jobs (Guerreiro & Rodrigues, 2006).

Fourth, with regard to the unemployment, between 1974 and 1978, the unemployment rates in Portugal increased significantly, from 1.7% to 7.9%. Although oil price shock had adverse effects in the country too, the influence of revolutionary period of 1974-75 and the influx of more than 700,000 refugees from the former colonies of Angola and Mozambique have also been prevalent in influencing such an increase (Lopes, 2003). Consequently, by 1978, Portugal had one of the highest rates of unemployment, even higher than Spain at that time. Nevertheless, in a longitudinal analysis, Portugal performed better than Spain as regards tackling unemployment, which implies also that Portugal achieved a more labour-intensive economic growth (Glatzer, 1999; Lopes, 2003). Fifth, during the second half of the 1990s particularly following the process of European monetary convergence after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, self-employment began rising in the country whereas wage labour experienced decreasing trend (Cabral, 1999). Mainly as a result of the processes of privatisation and increasing de-industrialisation, many of former wage workers lost their jobs and opened up their small businesses as self-employed (Cabral, 1999).

Having provided accounts on the general characteristics, I will now present features related to FLFP. First, looking at the FLFP pattern, from the 1960s onwards, Portugal experienced massive entry of women into the labour force (André & Feio, 1999). The country passed through processes of political liberalisation, economic

modernisation and secularisation. Tertiary education increased markedly in the country, which contributed to the increasing trend of FLFP. These factors all together contributed to the greater equality of opportunities between men and women (André & Feio, 1999). By the beginning of the 1970s, female participation in Portuguese labour markets was higher even compared to the levels in more developed countries (André & Feio, 1999). Significantly, this was also the case in some sectors demanding more qualifications.

During the labour shortage of the 1960s, along with the feminisation of agricultural wage employment, export-oriented industries also rapidly developed (Tavora & Rubery, 2013). One of the triggering factors behind the large number of entrance by women was the absence of male breadwinner wages (Tavora & Rubery, 2013). Hence, unlike Western European countries, women's mass labour integration occurred before the expansion of the service sector (Tavora & Rubery, 2013). During the post-revolutionary growth period, women's employment levels further increased owing to the developments in education and health services and increasing employment opportunities for women in the private sector.

FLFP in Portugal has certain peculiarities. Among them, high maternal employment for a long period of time stands out. Portugal, within the EU, has one of the highest rates of mothers working full time, and the age of youngest child seem to have little influence on maternal employment rates (Pessanha, Aguiar, & Bairrao, 2007). Hence, uniquely in Portugal, the impact of motherhood on employment has been positive (Tavora, 2012a). As Figure 1 presents, Portugal has historically had by far the highest employment rate among women with at least one child. In 2013, the employment rate of women with one child is 73.4% in Portugal whereas it is 57.5% in Spain, 54.5% in Italy and 51% in Greece. Additional to the child, marriage also does not seem to impede the access of women to employment in any region of the country (André & Feio, 1999).

Another peculiar FLFP characteristic in Portugal, as I mentioned above, is that FLFP has been distinctively higher compared to other South European countries. This peculiarity attracted scholarly attention as well. Several factors are argued to be affecting the high levels of FLFP in Portugal compared to other South European countries. First, during the 1960s, the war in three separate fronts led to deficit of

male labour, which, consequently, brought about increased female presence in the labour markets (André & Feio, 1999). Thus, as result of both colonial war and male-dominated emigration in the 1960s, women who stayed behind in Portugal embrace the whole responsibility for managing both family and the farm (André, 1996). This, as result, pulls the women into the labour markets. Second, tertiary level educational attainment arises as one of major factors behind increasing trend of FLFP. Third, increasing trend in FLFP levels in Portugal is attributed to the expansion of public services as well (Vaiou, 1996).

Some also point at the structure of the Portuguese labour market where wages are very low and additional income to the household is very important in order to meet consumption needs (Garcia & Karakatsanis, 2006). Moreover, formal employment in Portugal offers some unemployment benefits in case of dismissal, which encourages entrance into the labour market (Garcia & Karakatsanis, 2006). It is also argued that Portugal could maintain its comparative advantage in low cost/low productivity activities, which enabled the absorption of persons displaced from agriculture (Cousins, 2000). Questioning the possibility of the EU influence on FLFP, scholars state that massive entry into the labour markets by Portuguese women took place long before the EU membership, and major legislative acts towards favouring conditions for women also preceded EU membership (Tavora, 2012b).

Furthermore, Portugal is also a distinctive case considering the South European context given its high employment rates for low-educated women (Tavora, 2012b). As Table 10 presents, the share of female labour force with primary education in 2014 was 45.4% in Portugal while it was 29% for active female population with tertiary education. One of the driving forces behind high FLFP among low educated women was obviously the economic need. Second factor is that in Portugal manufacturing sector exceptionally constituted an important portion of the employment, which also stimulated low-cost female labour (Tavora, 2012b). Although formal care provision has not been at levels consistent with the high rates of FLFP, still the country has had advantageous policies towards the access to childcare by low-income families, which facilitated women's entry into the labour force (Tavora, 2012b).



In summary, labour market regime in Portugal portrays several distinctive features related to FLFP, which include high maternal employment without proper family assistance and high employment among women with low education. In fact, favourably for FLFP, production regime in the country with manufacturing orientation enabled extensive job opportunities for women with low education at times when the level of education in society was low. In addition, FLFP in Portugal, where the wages are too low, has been highly associated with the economic need, that is, the necessity of the additional income in the household. Hence, distinctively, Portugal embodies an example which shows that a country in South European context can achieve high FLFP in the absence of service sector expansion, increased tertiary education and also expanded ECEC services. Yet, looking at the recent figures, with the changing production regime, Portugal also shows that it could further rise its FLFP levels with the presence of three conditions, which validates the influence of these conditions on rising FLFP in Portuguese context.

### **3.3.6. Left Party Strength**

Portuguese politics, in the aftermath of the authoritarian rule, has primarily reflected the role and dominance of left parties. The table below presents the number of seats gained by political parties in Portugal following each election between 1975 and 2015. The figures reveal the particularity of Portugal as regards the strength of left parties in the country. This is because, the parliament has largely been dominated by the left parties, and the left party rule never lost its prominence in the party politics and pursuing governing role. As an example, the average share of number of seats gained by left parties in Portugal was 54.0% between 1975 and 1983. Between 1985 and 2015, the average percentage increased to the level of 50.4%. This distinctive strength of left parties in Portugal functioned well in directing social change, which facilitated FLFP as a socially and politically recognised norm in society.

**Table 17 Number of Seats Gained by the Political Parties in Portugal, between 1975 and 2015**

<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Parfam code</b>	<b>#of seats gained</b>	<b>#of total seats</b>
04/1975	Popular Democratic Union	20	1	250
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	30	250
	Popular Democratic Movement	30	5	250
	Socialist Party	30	116	250
	Popular Democratic Party	60	81	250
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	16	250
04/1976	Popular Democratic Union	20	1	263
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	40	263
	Socialist Party	30	107	263
	Popular Democratic Party	60	73	263
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	42	263
	Popular Monarchist Party	70	0	263
12/1979	Popular Democratic Union	20	1	250
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	44	250
	Popular Democratic Movement	30	3	250
	Socialist Party	30	74	250
	Social Democratic Party	60	76	250
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	42	250
	Popular Monarchist Party	70	5	250
10/1980	Popular Democratic Union	20	1	250
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	39	250

**Table 17 (cont'd)**

	Popular Democratic Movement	30	2	250
	Socialist Party	30	66	250
	Social Democratic Party	60	82	250
	Association of Independent Social Democrats	30	4	250
	Leftwing Union for the Socialist Democracy	30	4	250
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	46	250
	Popular Monarchist Party	70	6	250
04/1983	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	1	250
	Popular Democratic Union	20	0	250
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	40	250
	Popular Democratic Movement	30	3	250
	Socialist Party	30	101	250
	Social Democratic Party	60	75	250
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	30	250
	Popular Monarchist Party	70	0	250
10/1985	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	1	250
	Popular Democratic Union	20	0	250
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	34	250
	Popular Democratic Movement	30	3	250
	Socialist Party	30	57	250
	Democratic Renewal Party	30	45	250

**Table 17 (cont'd)**

	Social Democratic Party	60	88	250
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	22	250
07/1987	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	1	250
	Popular Democratic Union	20	0	250
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	28	250
	Socialist Party	30	60	250
	Democratic Renewal Party	30	7	250
	Social Democratic Party	60	148	250
	Democratic Intervention	30	2	250
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	4	250
10/1991	Portuguese Communist Party	20	0	226
	Unified Democratic Coalition	20	17	226
	Socialist Party	30	71	226
	Social Democratic Party	60	132	226
	Social Democratic Center Party	50	5	226
	National Solidarity Party	95	1	226
10/1995	Portuguese Communist Party	20	0	230
	Unified Democratic Coalition	20	15	230
	Socialist Party	30	112	230
	Social Democratic Party	60	88	230
	Social Democratic Center- Popular Party	50	15	230
10/1999	Left Bloc	20	2	230

**Table 17 (cont'd)**

	Portuguese Communist Party	20	0	230
	Unified Democratic Coalition	20	17	230
	Socialist Party	30	115	230
	Social Democratic Party	60	81	230
	Social Democratic Center- Popular Party	50	15	230
03/2002	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	2	230
	Left Bloc	20	3	230
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	10	230
	Unified Democratic Coalition	20	0	230
	Socialist Party	30	96	230
	Social Democratic Party	60	105	230
	Social Democratic Center- Popular Party	50	14	230
02/2005	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	2	230
	Left Bloc	20	8	230
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	12	230
	Unified Democratic Coalition	20	0	230
	Socialist Party	30	121	230
	Social Democratic Party	60	75	230
	Social Democratic Center- Popular Party	50	12	230
09/2009	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	2	230
	Left Bloc	20	16	230

**Table 17 (cont'd)**

	Portuguese Communist Party	20	13	230
	Socialist Party	30	97	230
	Social Democratic Party	60	81	230
	Social Democratic Center- Popular Party	50	21	230
06/2011	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	2	230
	Left Bloc	20	8	230
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	14	230
	Socialist Party	30	74	230
	Social Democratic Party	60	108	230
	Social Democratic Center- Popular Party	50	24	230
10/2015	Portugal Ahead	60	107	230
	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	10	2	230
	People-Animals_Nature	10	1	230
	Left Bloc	20	19	230
	Portuguese Communist Party	20	15	230
	Socialist Party	30	86	230

*Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a)*

### 3.4. Greece

This part provides an overview of welfare state regime in Greece to better comprehend the institutional set-up and its formation. This part also includes a brief summary of the regimes concerning the conditions and outcome of this study to present a background on the data calibrated in the following section.

### **3.4.1. Welfare State Regime**

I present here first an overview on the historical evolution of the Greek welfare state, and then describe its general characteristics. To begin with, the emergence of Greek welfare state dated back to the 1920s as the introduction of compulsory social insurance for all wage earners against old age, invalidity and sickness took place during this period (Ferrera, 2005). The expansion of the Greek welfare state occurred after the 1980s when new social insurance services were established (Kotroyannos, Lavdas, Tzagkarakis, Kamekis, & Chourdakis, 2013). During the 1980s, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) governments enhanced the Greek welfare state further by implementing reforms, covering especially the socially vulnerable groups. This included the creation of the National Health System and the institutionalisation of the minimum pension for all citizens (Kotroyannos et al., 2013). Another prominent intervention during the 1980s took place in setting minimum wages. However, such intervention was not congruent with productivity or levels of employment, which resulted consequently in higher unemployment especially among women and the young (Zartaloudis, 2014).

With regard to overall welfare state features in the country, first, although social spending has become gradually equalised to the European levels, welfare system has been heavily diverse with relatively higher spending in some areas (Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Spending on health care, for instance, is low (Taylor-Gooby, 2006). However, in a comparative analysis with other South European countries, old-age pension system is very generous, which has been for a long time a distinctive characteristic of Greek welfare state. However, income maintenance system has also been highly polarised since certain groups, such as civil servants under some categories, workers in the utilities and the financial sector, the liberal professions and others are granted highly generous benefits (Matsaganis, 2005). Second, concerning social spending, the country increased its percentage substantially over the years. While, in the 1980s, spending on social protection was less than 17% in Greece, compared to over 24% for the EC-12, the marked increase occurred between 1980 and 1982 and the expansion between 1982 and 1987 scaled social expenditure up to around 23% (Guillén & Matsaganis, 2000). Yet, increasing social spending did not account for

country's welfare effort and impact of welfare programmes since the low effectiveness of social transfers was notable in Greece (Guillén & Matsaganis, 2000).

Third, as a peculiar characteristic in Southern Europe, Greek welfare state has also relied heavily on family as a provider for care and social support for its members (Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Furthermore, with respect to social expenditure on family, as Figure 2 shows, while its share as percentage of GDP was 0.3 in 1980, it went up to the level of 1.0 in 1995, and 1.4 in 2010. Fourth, contributory social insurance has been the norm in Greece, which excludes non-standard workers and their families (Matsaganis, 2011). However, employment trends in the recent decades increased the share of working population with atypical forms of employment, thus, those unable to meet Fordist norms expected by the welfare state (Ferrera, 2005). Hence, especially in the post-crisis period, segmentation of Greek labour markets exacerbated the level of social vulnerability in the country (Matsaganis, 2011).

Furthermore, in the 1990s, when FLFP levels increased substantially, Greece also experienced exogenous mass arrival of immigrants due to upheavals in Albania and the former Soviet Union in 1992 and in the Balkans (Lyberaki, 2011). Therefore, following the influx of women immigrants, care arrangements in Greece transformed from unpaid family provision to a mixed example of the 'migrant in the family model' prevalent elsewhere in the European South. While even higher middle-class families in the 1980s could not afford the care services, the women immigrants reduced the cost of childcare. In the 2001 Census, the recorded number of foreigners living in Greece was 762,200, amounting to approximately 7% of the total population of the Greece, and they accounted for 9.5% of employed workers in Greece (Lyberaki, 2011). Contrasting the attitudes of women living in the 1950s and 1960s and the period after the 1990s, it is also possible to discern an important difference. While, in the 1950s and 1960s, middle class families employed domestic helpers (internal migrant women from rural Greece), these paid care workers were not employed by women to enable their own entry into paid labour (Lyberaki, 2011). In a comparative analysis with other countries, it is also possible to state that share of migrants working in the provision of services to households is very high in Greece, which is 20.5% in total, while it is less than 2% in the United Kingdom and 1.2% in the United States for rural and urban households (Lyberaki, 2011).



In the evolution of Greek welfare states and expansion of social policies, in a similar vein with Spain, the following factors were effective: legitimization needs of governments in the transition to democracy, experienced from the mid-1970s onwards, *permanence of left-wing parties* in office for long periods and influence of EU recommendations (Guillén & Matsaganis, 2000). Hence, for instance, gender settlement in the welfare state changed owing to EU pressures and women's increased presence in the labour markets (Taylor-Gooby, 2006).

Finally, ESPN thematic report on social investment in Greece (European Commission, 2015e) asserts that due to the outbreak of the economic crisis and focus on public debt requirements, social investment approach has not yet been incorporated into the government's social policy agenda. However, the report points at the emphasis put on the provision of ECEC in the pursuit of supporting parents. The report, however, highlights that affordable ECEC services are still not widely available in the country, and the income maintenance and in-kind support targeted at assisting parents are very limited.

In summary, study of welfare state regime in Greece reveals the legacy of reliance on family, which reflects itself in lagging significantly behind in the expansion of ECEC services and depending foreign domestic carers as a welfare state relief. In the aftermath of the authoritarian regime, welfare state could not accomplish rapid progress, and this is why, I assigned lowest score to Greece with respect to the condition of political party commitment in the first period in Chapter 4.

### **3.4.2. Education Regime**

I touch here upon the transformation in education regime in Greece with reference to its gradual progress. I also briefly mention the major educational indicators to show prominent strengths and weaknesses. To begin with, Greece experienced a radical transformation in the area of education, which also demonstrated a progress towards gender equality. While percentage of population aged 25-29 with tertiary schooling was 6.55% in 1970, which was the highest percentage among South European countries, it increased to 13.59% in 1980, 19.29% in 1990, 21.74% in 2000 and 42.93% in 2010. The percentage of female population aged 15 and above with

tertiary schooling, as Figure 4 illustrates, was 2.12% in 1970, and it scaled up to 3.66% in 1980, 9.88% in 1990, 11.13% in 2000 and 22.4% in 2010. Looking at the gender parity index in tertiary schooling, it is also noted that gender balance was attained in the early 1980s. As a result, compared to other South European countries, Greece has the first rank concerning attainment of tertiary education among women. Despite its late economic development and urbanisation process, Greece presents successful figures in tertiary education levels.

Furthermore, in Greece, employment opportunities widen with educational attainment and continue to expand with further levels of tertiary education (OECD, 2017b). In general, prominent challenge in education regime in Greece appears to be upward educational mobility. This is because, in 2015, over three-quarters (76%) of the population aged 30-44 without a tertiary-educated parent did not attain tertiary education themselves while the OECD average is 69% (OECD, 2017b). Hence, priority should be directed towards providing equal opportunities for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Currently, drop-out rates are low in the country, however, the educational system is highly centralised, and educational outcomes appear to be weak (OECD, 2017b). Moreover, with the advent of the economic crisis, public funding for education declines (OECD, 2017b).

Education regime in Greece, in a nutshell, shows that the country experienced a major shift in tertiary schooling among women, which also supported positively FLFP increase. In a comparative analysis, Greek education regime diverges from other South European countries given that it could achieve much higher levels in tertiary schooling among women. Nevertheless, the country does not appear to utilise such educated human resources considering its relatively lower levels of FLFP. As revealed by the QCA outcome in Chapter 5, since the increase in FLFP requires increased tertiary schooling to be combined with the conditions of increase of take-up rates of children in ECEC services and service sector expansion, comparatively lower take-up rates appear to hamper further FLFP increase.

### **3.4.3. Defamilisation Regime**

While describing the developments in Greece with regard to its defamilisation regime, I divide the review into four. I first demonstrate the gradual development of ECEC services by also reflecting on the prominent actors and driving forces. Second, with an inter-temporal analysis, I provide accounts on the family policies including leaves and related family assistance schemes. Third section describes the progress towards reconciliation of work and family life and respective policies. Fourth part explains the achievements towards attaining greater gender equality in society.

#### ***Early Children Education and Care***

The emergence of nurseries dated back to the 1830s in Greece in the form of charitable orphanages (Petrogiannis, 2013). However, the new era started only in 1997, and gradually expanded until 2004 when the former state nurseries and all operating public nurseries were transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare to local authorities (municipalities) with the purpose of decentralising the administrative system and delegating responsibilities to the local communities (Petrogiannis, 2013). However, decentralisation led to variation in the provision of public childcare in terms of both levels of fees, access conditions and service quality (Karamessini, 2013).

Currently, a dichotomous system is prevalent in Greece which distinguishes care and education services for children according to primarily an aged based category (Kelesidou et al., 2017). In the context of care, infant centers (6 months to 2,5 years), child centers (2,5 years to 5 years) and infant/child centers (6 months to 5 years) serve. The participation below the aged group of 5 is not compulsory, and the emphasis is placed on children's care and nurturance (Rentzou, 2018). For these 'care' services, a national curriculum is absent, and each municipality is able to arrange an internal regulation of operation (Rentzou, 2018). In the context of 'education' services, kindergarten schools operate as half-day classes and full-day classes for children aged 4 to 6 (Rentzou, 2018). The enrolment is compulsory for children aged 5 to 6 years, and a national curriculum is implemented with an emphasis on children's education and preparation for the primary level of education (Rentzou, 2018). However, congruent with the recommendations of the EU special

committees, a move towards a system with an integrated approach to both education and care is in progress.

The low coverage of children in Greece by formal childcare services implies that the majority of care needs are covered by informal care (Karamessini, 2013). In 2006, 41% of the children aged 0-2 and 18% of those aged 3-6 are cared by their parents while 54% of the former group and 40% of the latter group are cared by grandparents, relatives, friends and childminders (Karamessini, 2013). Family, therefore, has been the main caring agency in Greece, similar to the rest of Southern Europe (Kyriazis, 1999). Furthermore, short and strict opening hours of crèches, nurseries and kindergartens and extended closure during holidays also necessitate grandparents' assistance (Karamessini, 2013). Concerning low coverage and take-up rates of childcare, public opinion in Greek society seems to have a role as well. This is because, a child's age of attendance of a crèche still remains to be an ethical issue as European Value Survey reveals that majority of respondents in 2008 agrees with the statement that 'a preschool child suffers with a working mother' (Moreno & Mari-Klose, 2013). In the interviews conducted by working mothers, they mention that they feel at peace at work since their children are cared by their relatives not strangers (Kyriazis, 1999). Therefore, it is suggested that the scarce availability of care services for children aged 0-2 cannot only be explained by the insufficient responsiveness of policy-makers but also equally by unfavourable social attitudes (Petrogiannis, 2013).

As a provision for caring, a voucher system has been implemented in Greece. Since 2008, many employed and unemployed women in active labour market schemes whose income is below a certain ceiling are granted childcare vouchers. These vouchers can be used to have free access to the accredited crèche, nursery or KDAP (Creative Occupation Centres for Children) of their choice, either private or public (Karamessini, 2013).

According to ESPN's Social Investment report (European Commission, 2015e), with the EU co-funded programme 'Reconciliation of family and professional life', important initiatives have been launched in recent years to provide open care services for the elderly, namely the Day Care Centres for the elderly (KIFI) and the 'Help at Home' programme. In addition, concerning childcare, as the report points out, an

increase becomes apparent in the preschool and care facilities for children as a response to the need for facilitation of FLFP (European Commission, 2015e). These services have been heavily financed under EU Structural Funds, especially since 2011, within the framework of the ‘reconciliation of family and professional life’ programme. However, ESPN’s Social Investment report (European Commission, 2015e) notes that the provision of welfare pre-compulsory care has deteriorated since 2010 due to budgetary cuts. Hence, despite the defamilisation initiatives, reconciliation of work and family life has been more difficult in Greece compared to other European countries (Karamessini, 2013). With the advent of crisis in the country, parenting becomes a more difficult task, which is reflected in the decline of fertility rate that reversed the upward trend in the pre-crisis period (Karamessini, 2013). The austerity measures led to closing down of some childcare facilities and understaffing of many services (Karamessini, 2013:6). Furthermore, compared to recent past, fewer families can now continue paying migrant women for provision of care (Karamessini, 2013). This means that women will increasingly burden the responsibility for child and elderly care. Crisis leads to restructuring of the General Secretariat of Gender Equality in March 2013 by reducing the units and departments, closing down some Directorates and abolishing the post of the Director General (Karamessini, 2013).

### ***Family Policies***

Related to the scope of this research, historically speaking, there has been gradual advancement in the area of child benefits, policy reforms and rights for working women in Greece. Looking at the historical background, state intervened in the protection of children only in the absence of the father or both parents and in case of poverty and child benefits were very low and paid to working parents by the employer or social security (Karamessini, 2012). Furthermore, leave policies and regulations in the country relied heavily on collective bargaining and employers’ funding, creating a segregated public and private sector leave system (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). Consequently, while the public was more developed and generous, the private lagged behind and arranged moves following public acts (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). As a policy background, in 1910, pregnant women were not allowed to work, and no payment was provided. Yet, in 1921, ratification of the ILO Convention No. 3

of 1919 was put into force, and provided certain rights for working women such as compulsory leave of no less than six weeks after childbirth, ceasing working six weeks before the presumed date of childbirth, two half-hour nursing breaks (Wikander, Kessler-Harris, & Lewis, 1995).

In 1969, four fully paid weeks and eight flat rate weeks of job-protected maternity leave (12 weeks in total) was introduced, and in 1977, it was made fully paid for all 12 weeks. In 1982, Greece ratified the ILO Convention on maternal job-protection. In 1984, the maternity leave was extended to 14 weeks, and three months of unpaid job-protected leave for each parent were introduced. In 1989, with the national general collective labour agreement, maternity leave was scaled up to 15 weeks. In 1993, the National General Collective Agreement increased the duration of unpaid job-protected parental leave from 3 to 3.5 months, and maternity leave was extended to 16 weeks.

To exemplify more recent leave reforms, the paternity leave, two days paid by the employer, was introduced in 2000 in the private sector in Greece, and paid maternity leave was increased to 17 weeks (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). While it was initially the mother's entitlement transferable to the father, it became in 2014 a family entitlement that the father can use on the condition that the mother works (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). Currently, as Table 5 demonstrates, paid maternity leave is 23.3 weeks as full-rate equivalent in Greece whereas paid parental and home care leave available to mothers is none. Furthermore, Greece does not entitle fathers reserved paid leaves as in Italy, Spain and Turkey.

Looking at the family policies in Greece from gender perspective, even though the strong male breadwinner character in Greek welfare state erodes, it remains corporatist and perpetuates existing inequalities (Davaki, 2006). This is because, the family in Greece is still the main agent in the provision of welfare. However, the new family arrangements and economic and labour market trends and also intentions to keep pace with the developments within the EU still constitute important facilitators for the promotion of women-friendlier family policies.

### ***Reconciliation of Work and Family Life***

In Greece, reconciliation of work and family life came into the policy agenda after the 1980s with the initiation of several measures. These measures included the extension of the duration of maternity leave, provision of new leaves, reduction of daily working hours in the public sector for mothers with children less than four years old, provision of the leave for school visits for all working parents with children up to 16 years old, introduction of child credits in taxation and expansion of public childcare services (Karamessini, 2010). In the 1990s and 2000s, the leave regimes were further improved through extending the duration of maternity leave, introducing a fully paid but short paternity leave and granting the mothers working in the private sector the right to reduced daily working hours for 30 months after the expiration of maternity leave (Karamessini, 2010). In 1999, with the revision of the Civil Servants' Code, a nine-month paid maternal child-minding leave after maternity leave was introduced as an alternative to the entitlement of mothers to reduced daily working time (Karamessini, 2010). In 2008, the new law granted the working mothers in the private sector the entitlement to a fully insured six-month child-minding leave after the maternity leave. With this leave, mothers were also entitled to receive a monthly benefit equal to the minimum salary set by the National General Collective Agreement (Karamessini, 2010).

### ***Legislative Acts towards Gender Equality***

With the purpose of protecting working mothers, legislation dating back to 1920 prohibited dismissal during maternity leave, however, the bans on dismissal of a woman during pregnancy (1980) and on refusal to hire women due to pregnancy or dismissal after confinement (1984) were not produced until the 1980s (Karamessini, 2012). Maternity leave, on the other hand, was partially compensated in the private sector, and full pay was provided after 1977 (Karamessini, 2012). Moreover, the family law reform of 1983 was also considered as a landmark in the evolution of gender equality legislation (Davaki, 2013). Respective Article determined that women were obliged to keep their maiden name after marriage and abolished the Civil Code provision that the legal residence of women was that of their spouses (Davaki, 2013). Following this legislation, the surname of the children was determined by common declaration by both parents, and the surname of the child

could be either or both of parents (Davaki, 2013). The Law 1469/84 enabled the divorced wives and widows to benefit from health insurance through their husband.

The first pieces of national legislation concerning gender equality in employment relations were Greek Constitution of 1975 and Law 1414 of 1984 (Karamessini, 2006). Directive 75/117 on equal pay and Directive 76/207 on equal treatment influenced the formation of these two pieces. The 1975 Constitution, with an aim of promoting equal pay for equal work, incorporated a clause stipulating that ‘all workers, independently of gender or other discrimination, have a right to equal payment for work of equal value’ (Nicolitsas, 2006). To safeguard the implementation of anti-discrimination and facilitate equality, the General Secretariat for Equality was established in 1985. With the same purpose, a Centre for Research on Equality Issues (KETHI) in 1989 and Bureaux and Committees at the regional level were set up. Additionally, equality sections in trade unions and employers’ associations, women’s sections in parties were formed (Lyberaki, 2010). Following the adoption of the European Employment Strategy and of a policy coordination process at the EU level during 1994-1997, the integration of gender into employment policy gained momentum in Greece (Karamessini, 2006).

In the 2000s, three EU anti-discrimination Directives, 86/378/EC, 96/97/EC and 97/80/EC, were transposed into national law. The Directives, 86/378/EC and 96/97/EC, concerned the equal treatment of men and women in occupational social security schemes. The other Directive, 97/80/EC, concerned the transfer to the accused of the burden of proof in cases of gender discrimination. As the national body to handle complaints including gender related ones, the Greek Ombudsman was established in 2005. With the purpose of attaining equal participation in decision-making for greater gender equality, Law 2839/2000 was introduced, which stipulated that 1/3 of all employees in the public sector, local authorities and related institutions and enterprises had to be women (Karamessini, 2013). Moreover, Law 2910/2001 stipulated that 1/3 of all electoral lists at the national and local elections had to be women (Karamessini, 2013). Furthermore, the reforms in the Greek Constitution in 2001 promoting governmental actions targeting ‘the adoption of positive measures for the promotion of equality between men and women’, Article 116 of the Greek Constitution, had significant positive implications for female employment (Livanos,



Yalkin, & Nuñez, 2009). In an overall assessment of anti-discrimination legislation, no significant differences exist in Greece and the EU. However, since some countries have adopted those laws much earlier, they could have witnessed more of an impact (Nicolitsas, 2006).

Women's movement in Greece has also been successful in the enactment of reforms for the attainment of greater gender equality in society. The feminist and women's movement contributed to the evolution of gender equality legislation and policy in Greece. Even though the radical feminist movement of the 1970s and 1980s inspired feminist members of left-wing parties, those members were not capable of overcoming patriarchal barriers within their parties. Nevertheless, the socialist party, PASOK, which came to power in 1981, institutionalised the feminist movement owing to women's organisations within the party (Davaki, 2013). This collaboration brought about series of equality policies in the 1980s including the establishment of a General Secretariat for Gender Equality in 1985. However, Greek women's movement has neglected gender equality in the field of employment (Karamessini, 2006). This neglect has been mainly compensated by the EU in the context of policy measures targeting equality in employment.

In summary, a review of defamilisation regime in Greece shows that no major intervention took place before the 1980s towards the development of ECEC services in the country. Such absence of initiatives in Greece caused late development of childcare services especially compared to Spain and Italy. This is also reflected in the raw data and fuzzy scores for the Period I as I display in Chapter 4. Defamilisation regime in Greece also shows that legacies matter in the context of FLFP increases and the development of favourable policies for working women. In this respect, family was and still is the main caring agency in Greece, and majority of care needs are compensated by informal care arrangements. Furthermore, social prejudices against early childcare still persist in the country. Although several legislative acts, such as the initiation of the quotas, were pursued with especially the influence of the EU, more progress should be achieved for attaining gender equality in caring arrangements such as initiation of reserved paid leaves for fathers. In an overall analysis, defamilisation regime in Greece with the consideration of rudimentary care

services and persistent societal norms towards caring of the child constitutes a major impediment to further rise in FLFP as in Spain and Portugal.

#### **3.4.4. Production Regime**

Compared to other South European countries, the dominance of agriculture in the Greek economy lasted long. Greek society remained to be heavily agricultural until the 1970s, and the economy was featured by low productivity and low labour costs (Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Small family enterprises, both farms and small businesses, played major role and position in the economy (Lyberaki, 2010). Hence, the development of industrialisation and service sector took place later. However, currently, the primary sector in Greek economy is service sector, and in comparison with other South European countries, the employment in service sector is quite high. To illustrate the changing sectoral change in the labour markets, Table 6 provides figures in employment in three sectors. For instance, while employment in agriculture was 28.9% in Greece in 1985, which was the highest at that time in the Southern Europe following Turkey, it decreased to 20.4% in 1995, 12.4% in 2005 and 12.9% in 2015. Employment in industry, on the other hand, has always been lower in Greece compared to the levels in Portugal, Spain and Italy. While it was 27.4% in 1985, it declined to 14.9% in 2015. Employment in services, however, has an increasing trend as in other countries, and it increased from 43.7% in 1985 to 72.2% in 2015.

Review of production regime provides an important inference. Agriculture dominated the economy for a longer period of time compared to other South European countries except Turkey. Hence, in Chapter 4, although Greece had 41.4% of service sector employment, I assigned non-membership to Greece, and membership to Spain which had 47.7% service sector employment in the same year. The rationale is to reflect the enduring dominance of agricultural sector in the economy. Yet, the country achieved rapid progress in expanding service sector economy, and that is why, it had membership score in the second period.

### **3.4.5. Labour Market Regime**

I scrutinise here the aspects related to the labour market in Greece, and its implications for FLFP, and then analyse the features of FLFP pattern. As a brief historical overview, labour markets in Greece had agrarian character in the 1950s. Until the 1960s, women participated in the labour markets as unpaid supporters in the family businesses (Freris, 1986). In the 1960s, urbanisation began in the country. Due to harsh economic conditions and mass unemployment during post-World War II period, emigration was perceived as a solution. As a result, between 1956 and 1975, one and a half million Greeks left the country (Karamessini, 2006).

Coming to the recent decades, I would like to touch upon the features of the labour market, particularly after the 1980s. First, with respect to the labour market rigidity, Greece, in the period before the crisis, had one of the most restrictive employment protection legislation among OECD countries (OECD, 2013). This restrictiveness arose due to long notice periods, large severance payments and restrictions to collective dismissals, which affected hiring and firing rates and therefore the job reallocation and job creation processes (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, framework for the wage bargaining, especially the automatic extension of collective agreements, turned wages particularly rigid to respond to the firm-specific needs and less aligned with productivity developments (Daude, 2016). Following the crisis, many of those restrictions were removed except those related to the public sector, however, in an overall analysis, proximity with the average OECD performance in terms of employment protection legislation is evident (Daude, 2016).

Second, concerning part-time work, initial regulation took place in Greece in 1990, with the law defining the features of this type of contract and the rights of part-timers (Karamessini, 2008b). The new legislation in 1998 broadened the definition of part-time work, consolidated the social rights of part-timers, provided them precedence in hiring by the same employer in case of vacancies and widened its use to public entities and also banks (Karamessini, 2008b). In 2000, another law entitled a wage premium to part-timers working fewer than four hours a day and whose wages were set as a proportion of the national minimum wage to facilitate the preferences for part-time work (Karamessini, 2008b). In 2003 and 2004, with two new laws, legal entities that were engaged in certain social services were enabled to mobilise

unemployed persons on a part-time basis and under fixed-term contracts from certain difficult-to-place groups (Karamessini, 2008b). However, traditionally, flexible forms of work, such as part-time, seasonal work, and work from home are not very usual forms of work in Greece, which is primarily due to the high level of non-wage costs and administrative constraints (Livanos et al., 2009; Nicolitsas, 2006). Looking at the preference of women working part-time, significant proportion of them would actually prefer to work for the full-time rather than part-time (Daude, 2016).

Third, with respect to self-employment and informal working, one distinctiveness of Greek labour market is that only just half are employees due to significant percentage of self-employed and unpaid family workers (Cousins, 2000). Informal sector in Greece is estimated to be larger than Spain, Italy and Portugal, which is affected by large number of illegal immigrants earning low wages (nearly 20% of employment), prevalence of second jobs and high levels of social security contributions (Cousins, 2000). Furthermore, female self-employment in Greece is primarily characterised by unskilled occupations, in which women with low levels of qualifications usually work, which also implies the precariousness of female self-employment in Greece (Livanos et al., 2009).

Fourth, concerning the working hours, the achievement of the 40-hour week in Greece owes merely to collective bargaining following a period of gradual reduction from 48 to 40 hours between 1975 and 1983 (Karamessini, 2008b). However, companies widely resort to overtime given that the first five to eight hours are paid at the normal hourly rate, or it is entirely unpaid (Karamessini, 2008b). In 2000, with the purpose of tackling unemployment through working time reduction, the legal working week was scaled down from 48 to 40 hours and the overtime hour premium was increased, from the 40<sup>th</sup> hour, instead of after the 48<sup>th</sup> as before (Karamessini, 2008b). However, due to the firm opposition by the employers, the prior overtime regulations were modified in 2004 (Karamessini, 2008b). As in Italy, it has been actually the left-wing governments which produced legislative initiatives to reduce overtime in Greece (Karamessini, 2008b).

Fifth, another trait of labour markets in Greece is that long job tenure is high, which shows job stability, along with Italy, Portugal, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands (Karamessini, 2010). However, this is mostly due to deficiencies of the

unemployment compensation system and the low penetration of active labour market policy schemes among the unemployed (Karamessini, 2010). Other factors bringing about high job tenure in Greece are as the following: the underdevelopment of vocational education, the importance of informal apprenticeships in small and medium-sized enterprises and of on-the-job training in large firms for the acquisition of vocational skills and the high propensity for skilled manual employees to enter self-employment or start their own business (Karamessini, 2010).

Having provided succinct accounts on the labour market characteristics in Greece, I will now mention the features related to FLFP. First, to provide a historical overview, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, women in Greece who opted for working outside their homes did so for mostly because of their economic need. Looking at the working patterns of Greek women in this period, it is seen that it was mostly the case for women of poor social origin on the ground that working outside did not conflict with their roles as wives and mothers (Karamessini, 2012). This, therefore, was an option considered before marriage and when widowed. In this era, some educated middle-class women also took part in paid labour, yet only as teachers, since this was the first and only public sector occupation they could pursue (Karamessini, 2012). However, in the first decades of the twentieth century, new white-collar occupations emerged for educated women in the private and public sector, yet those were either low-skilled or considered as auxiliary (Karamessini, 2012).

In 1912, women were given right to public employment and the first protective measures on female pay and working time are introduced (Koskina, 2009). Between 1936 and 1951, the legal framework of the day did not allow women to work in the public sector (Koskina, 2009). Following Greece's ratification of the United Nations (UN) Convention of Human Rights in 1952, discriminatory legislation on the basis of gender was abolished. In 1984, with the influence of EU pressure, the first legislation (Law 1414/1984) on equal pay and employment was introduced to align with the EU Directive No.75/117 on equal pay and EU Directive No. 76/206 on equality in employment relations (Koskina, 2009).

Second, with respect to the FLFP pattern, it featured U-shaped curve in Greece demonstrating curvilinear relationship between economic development and

participation levels (Karamessini, 2012). Greece experienced a decline in female employment along with a fall in total agricultural employment between 1960 and the mid-1970s (Buğra, 2012). Restructuring of production and loss of agricultural jobs caused job losses for a large number of low skilled farm workers, most of whom were women (Cousins, 2000). After the mid-1970s, a sustained increase took place in the country. This mainly reflected the effects of structural changes which transformed a rural economy into a newly industrialised and then into a service economy (Karamessini, 2012).

As of the 1980s, a steady increase in FLFP took place. The increase in FLFP levels in Greece in the 1980s can be mostly attributed to the entrance of women into labour markets as white-collar workers, particularly in public sector jobs with job security (Cousins, 2000). The research suggests that the participation of women in Greek labour market has undergone qualitative and quantitative change over time (Nicolitsas, 2006). An analysis of participation rates of different age cohorts shows an increase in the participation of all age groups except those aged 15-19 and 60-64 (Nicolitsas, 2006). The lower increase in the participation rates of women over 44, however, can partially be explained by the establishment of special provisions for the early retirement of certain groups of workers (Nicolitsas, 2006). Moreover, the retirement age in Greece is lower compared to most other European countries. The retirement age is 60 for women and 65 for men. However, the effective retirement age is determined by the retirement eligibility criteria for certain groups (Nicolitsas, 2006). Concerning the FLFP levels, the gap between the EU and Greece appears to be increasing with age (Nicolitsas, 2006). To be exact, while the gap is only one percentage point for women aged 25-29, it rises to 17 percentage points for women between 50 and 59 years old (Nicolitsas, 2006). This is because, for older age groups, the gap is influenced by both a cohort effect and lower effective retirement age in Greece (Nicolitsas, 2006).

Third, concerning gender pay gap, between the 1960s and 1980s, such gap in Greece was wide, with women earning on average 33% less than their male counterparts. In 1985, the gender pay gap narrowed to 22% owing to centralised pay bargaining which secured a 40% increase of the national minimum wage. The gender pay gap in Greece is among the lowest in Europe and it is below the EU average (Koskina,

2009). Concerning the period, which was between 1961 and 1981, it is also noted that the secondary sector could not absorb the women who left the primary sector (Nicolitsas, 2006).

With regard to gender equality in terms of homosexuality in Greek labour markets, as a first study which implements a field experiment in the subject area, Drydakis (2011) questions the relationship between women being lesbian and their hiring prospects in Greece. The study, focusing on the years of 2007 and 2008, finds out that lesbians in Greece are treated differently in the hiring process from equally qualified heterosexual women. To be exact, according to the results, the estimated probability of lesbian applicants receiving an invitation for an interview is 27.7 percentage points lower than for heterosexual women who apply for the same job (Drydakis, 2011).

Fourth, education also appears to influence the labour force participation of women. Consequently, in Greece, women with tertiary education have a higher probability of being in the labour force (Livanos et al., 2009). Similarly, holding a higher education degree is also important for being placed in a job. Looking at the figures in Table 8, female labour force with tertiary education increased over the years. While it was 21.4% in 2000, it increased to 35.1% in 2014. The female labour force with secondary education remained almost the same. Those women in the labour force with primary level of education, on the other hand, decreased since composition encompassed more educated women over the years.

However, Greek labour market is also characterised by high levels of graduate unemployment in the sense that graduates encounter higher chances of unemployment than females (Livanos et al., 2009). As of the 2000s, unemployment problem worsened especially for women. In the 2000s, the very high unemployment rate amongst women, which was more than double the male unemployment rate, was salient (Nicolitsas, 2006). This, in fact, signals a problem in the demand side.

In an overall analysis, even though the level is low compared to other European countries, Greece experienced substantial increase in FLFP rates since especially the 1970s. The rise in female activity and employment rates in Greece was influenced by both demand and supply-side factors (Karamessini, 2012). From the demand side,

the quick tertiarisation of the Greek economy produced a net growth of more than one million jobs for women and was accompanied by a further feminisation of the tertiary sector (Karamessini, 2012).

In summary, labour market regime shows the constraints in Greece related to FLFP. The problem of unemployment especially among women, which reveals here with the analysis on labour market regime, is very much associated with production regime and education regime. Production regime has recently been heavily based on service sector. Furthermore, Greek education regime is distinctively characterised by very high tertiary schooling among women. These two characteristics can complement each other only if service sector expansion can produce sufficient jobs for women with tertiary education. The review here demonstrates that this is not the case especially after the 2000s since the country has been experiencing high graduate unemployment among women.

#### **3.4.6. Left Party Strength**

Left parties in Greek politics became salient over the years, which influenced the policy making processes for women as well. The table below demonstrates the number of seats gained by the political parties in Greece following each election between 1974 and 2015. According to these figures, left parties gained particular strength as of the 1980s while their position was limited in the second half of the 1970s. However, with their increased power in 1980s, they could maintain their position in the parliament. That is, while, for instance, the average share of seats gained by left parties was 39.9% between 1974 and 1985, it increased to 54.2% between 1989 and 2015.

With the study of left party strength here, I assign membership score to Greece in the first period although its raw data is 39.9%. This is because, considering the following years of the period I consider for period I and also the PASOK influence and strength at different layers in society during the 1980s until the mid-1990s, left party strength in Greece at that time should be considered in a similar manner as with Italy and Spain, which have also scores of 0.67.



**Table 18 Number of Seats Gained by the Political Parties in Greece, between 1974 and 2015**

<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Parfam code</b>	<b>#of seats gained</b>	<b>#of total seats</b>
11/1974	Communist Party of Greece	20	5	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	12	300
	Centre Union	50	60	300
	New Democracy	50	220	300
11/1977	Communist Party of Greece	20	11	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	93	300
	Union of the Democratic Centre	50	16	300
	New Democracy	50	171	300
	National Alignment	60	5	300
10/1981	Communist Party of Greece	20	13	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	172	300
	New Democracy	50	115	300
06/1985	Communist Party of Greece	20	12	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	161	300
	New Democracy	50	126	300
06/1989	Progressive Left Coalition	20	28	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	125	300
	New Democracy	50	145	300
11/1989	Progressive Left Coalition	20	21	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	128	300
	New Democracy	50	148	300

**Table 18 (cont'd)**

04/1990	Progressive Left Coalition	20	19	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	123	300
	New Democracy	50	150	300
10/1993	Communist Party of Greece	20	9	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	170	300
	New Democracy	50	111	300
	Political Spring	50	10	300
09/1996	Communist Party of Greece	20	11	300
	Progressive Left Coalition	20	10	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	162	300
	Democratic Social Movement	30	9	300
	New Democracy	50	108	300
	Political Spring	50	0	300
04/2000	Communist Party of Greece	20	11	300
	Progressive Left Coalition	20	6	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	158	300
	New Democracy	50	125	300
03/2004	Coalition of the Radical Left	20	6	300
	Communist Party of Greece	20	12	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	117	300
	New Democracy	50	165	300
09/2007	Coalition of the Radical Left	20	14	300
	Communist Party of Greece	20	22	300

**Table 18 (cont'd)**

	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	102	300
	New Democracy	50	152	300
	Popular Orthodox Rally	70	10	300
10/2009	Coalition of the Radical Left	20	13	300
	Communist Party of Greece	20	21	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	160	300
	New Democracy	50	91	300
	Popular Orthodox Rally	70	15	300
05/2012	Coalition of the Radical Left	20	52	300
	Communist Party of Greece	20	26	300
	Democratic Left	20	19	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	41	300
	New Democracy	50	108	300
	Popular Orthodox Rally	70	0	300
	Golden Dawn	70	21	300
	Independent Greeks	70	33	300
06/2012	Coalition of the Radical Left	20	71	300
	Communist Party of Greece	20	12	300
	Democratic Left	20	17	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	33	300
	New Democracy	50	129	300
	Golden Dawn	70	18	300
	Independent Greeks	70	20	300

**Table 18 (cont'd)**

01/2015	Communist Party of Greece	20	15	300
	Coalition of the Radical Left - Unionist Social Front	20	149	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	13	300
	The River	30	17	300
	New Democracy	50	76	300
	Golden Dawn	70	17	300
	Independent Greeks	70	13	300
09/2015	Communist Party of Greece	20	15	300
	Coalition of the Radical Left - Unionist Social Front	20	145	300
	Democratic Left	20	2	300
	Popular Unity	20	0	300
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30	15	300
	The River	30	11	300
	Union of Centrists	40	9	300
	New Democracy	50	75	300
	Golden Dawn	70	18	300
	Independent Greeks	70	10	300

*Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a)*

### 3.5. Turkey

This part provides an overview of welfare state regime in Turkey to better comprehend the institutional set-up and its formation. This part also includes a brief

summary on the regimes concerning the conditions and outcome of this study to present a background on the data calibrated in the following section and outcomes of the analysis.

### **3.5.1. Welfare State Regime**

I present here first an overview on historical evolution of the welfare state in Turkey, and then describe its general characteristics. To begin with, origins of welfare policies in Turkey were highly associated with the nation-building and development programme incorporating populist economic and social policies (Boratav & Ozugurlu, 2006). In the aftermath of the independence war, the utmost priority of the Republic was achieving economic growth and the relief of the population (Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010). Moreover, distinctive from European counterparts, the concept of class differences was refused, and, as a result, the first major legislation on labour issues, the 1936 labour law, forbid the formation of trade unions as well as strikes and lockouts (Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010). However, this law also formed the principles of the social insurance funds that began functioning in the post-war era (Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010). However, coverage of social security initiatives remained highly restricted (Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010). In line with the corporatist notions, social benefits including health and pension were arranged in accordance with the sectors, which consequently privileged formal employees in the public and private sectors (Tuğal, 2012).

Coming to the general characteristics, as I mention earlier, Turkish welfare regime has many similarities with South European type of welfare state, which led scholars to classify it within the same family. For instance, similar to South European welfare regimes, health and pension benefits have been provided to formally employed heads of the household, mostly men, according to their status at work (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Since self-employment, unpaid family labour and informal employment practices were prevalent among this type of welfare states, the formal social security systems remained to be inadequate (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Hence, the welfare system was considered as ‘minimalist welfare state’ given that significant portion of

the population had no access to the welfare benefits and its protection considering system's reliance on contributions (Arın, 2002).

However, as in the case of South European countries, Turkish welfare regime has also transformed involving a change from an inegalitarian corporatism which excluded both the rural population and urban informal sector employees from the formal social security system (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). The influencing factors determining the direction of change for Turkish welfare state have been the historical legacy of state-society relations, conservative liberalism of the last decade, the influence of international financial institutions forcing budgetary discipline, the necessity for more universalist approaches to deal with new forms of poverty and social exclusion and the relation of Turkey with the EU (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Signs of slight move towards an egalitarian character were provision of unemployment benefits and a state controlled cash or in-kind assistance to tackle poverty although social assistance concentrated on informal networks such as family and clientelistic practices was notable (Dedeoglu, 2013).

The past inegalitarian corporatist character of Turkish welfare state was also salient among South European welfare states, however, they also moved towards more universalist and redistributive direction (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). With respect to taxation, Turkey, as Greece does, has long been treating second earners and single individuals equally (Jaumotte, 2004). However, as noted by ESPN's Thematic Report on Social Investment (European Commission, 2015f), social investment is not at the centre of social policy discussions in Turkey. Even though certain initiatives exist on active labour market policies and extending compulsory education to pre-primary schooling, achievements have been rather limited thus far.

Furthermore, another characteristic of Turkish welfare state is its reliance on family and the perception of women as mothers and wives (Dedeoglu, 2012). Exacerbated by low levels of FLFP in the country, the outcome is women's low involvement in formal social provisions and being excluded from the formal health and social security systems as independent citizens (Dedeoglu, 2012). Looking at the recent family policies under the AKP rule, it is recognised that family still plays a prominent role in provision of care. Although Turkish welfare state has traditionally had a familialist character, under the AKP governance, role assigned to women as

care providers is stimulated (Akkan, 2018). However, under economically liberal politics, the market is considered as the main actor in care provision (Akkan, 2018). Hence, preserving and stimulating its familialistic character, new policy initiatives were introduced and supported to address the need for care under the framework of 'sacred familialism' (Akkan, 2018). With respect to social expenditure on family, Turkey is a significant outlier compared with other four South European countries. As Figure 2 shows, social expenditure on family constitutes 0.6% of GDP in 1980. However, as opposed to the trends in South European countries, it fluctuated over the years. For instance, while the share was 0.9 in 1990, it decreased to 0.2% in 1995. In 2010 and 2013, it constituted only 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively, of country's GDP.

In summary, in contrast to her South European neighbours, Turkish welfare state has stimulated its familialist character considering especially rudimentary initiatives towards ECEC, re-emphasising caring responsibilities of women in recent years and directing the policies accordingly. This persistent familialism in Turkish welfare state is reflected in several dimensions including the strikingly low take-up rates of ECEC in Turkey. Descriptive analysis also reveals that although level of social spending in Turkey increased over the years, what is critical to consider disaggregated data in the context of FLFP. In this respect, for instance, Turkey appears to be an outlier concerning social spending on family, which demonstrates that Turkish welfare state does not undertake required responsibility for its caring function. This consequently hampers steady rise in FLFP.

### **3.5.2. Education Regime**

This section shows the transformation in education regime in Turkey. I also briefly mention the major educational indicators to show prominent strengths and weaknesses in the country. In Turkey, enrolment levels in high school education remained at low levels for a long period of time. Tertiary level education remained also low among both men and women. Looking at various education indicators at all levels of education, Turkey stood out as a late comer and an outlier when compared with other four South European countries. Especially the prevalent divergence of Turkey is related to achieving gender equality in education, which appears to be

resolved much earlier in other countries. To exemplify, as Figure 4 illustrates, percentage of female population aged 15 and above with tertiary schooling was 1.35 in 1970, and it increased to 3.49 in 1980, 10.59 in 1990, 9.22 in 2000 and 10.26 in 2010. With regard to this indicator, Turkey presents better outcome compared to Portugal, and similar pattern with Italy. Yet, while all countries achieved gender equality in tertiary schooling by 1990s, Turkey still could not according to most recent figures.

Furthermore, although graduates of tertiary education still have greater chances to be employed and receive higher earnings, the influence of educational attainment is decreasing (OECD, 2017c). In gender perspective, Turkey features more equal enrolment rates among male and female students in terms of fields of studies. As an example, while 29% of new entrants to tertiary degrees on information and communication technologies are women in Turkey, the OECD average is 19%. Moreover, while the share of women in other fields such as social sciences, journalism and information (52%), business, administration and law (44%), and health and welfare (67%), the OECD averages are 64%, 54%, and 76% respectively (OECD, 2017c).

In summary, although Turkey achieved significant increase in its education levels, including tertiary schooling among women, gender norms are still present concerning access to education. Although all other four countries achieved gender balance in tertiary schooling much earlier, Turkey still expects to attain such progress. Experiences from Southern Europe show that the country cannot achieve a steep rise in its FLFP without the achievement of gender balance in education. To follow a similar pattern with Spain, Italy and Greece, Turkey should tackle conservative notions influencing access to education and increase tertiary schooling among women.

### **3.5.3. Defamilisation Regime**

While describing the developments in Turkey with regard to its defamilisation regime, I divide the review into three. I first analyse the gradual development of ECEC services by also reflecting on the prominent actors and driving forces. Second



section, with an inter-temporal analysis, provides accounts on the family policies including leaves and related family assistance schemes. Third part explains the achievements towards attaining greater gender equality in society.

### *Early Children Education and Care*

In Turkey, establishment of initial instances of formal preschool education services dated back to the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Oktay & Zembat, 1995). These arrangements mainly targeted, at that time, providing accommodation for orphans and establishing charity foundations (Oktay & Zembat, 1995). As a target towards education of the children, a school of kindergarten teachers, which delivered a two-year programme, was established in Ankara in 1927 (Ahi & Kildan, 2013). In 1930, this school was transferred to the Istanbul School of Female Teachers, and the school operated until 1933 (Ural & Ramazan, 2007). However, with two circular notes on 25<sup>th</sup> October 1925 and 29<sup>th</sup> January 1930 issued by the Ministry, budget of the kindergartens was transferred to primary schools in the pursuit of improving primary education (Ural & Ramazan, 2007). Consequently, following these circulars, few kindergartens in the major provinces were closed down (Ural & Ramazan, 2007). In 1961, the Basic Law of National Education No. 1739 and the Primary Teaching and Education Law No. 222 was adopted, which concerned preschool education, and in 1962, the 'Regulation on Kindergartens and Nursery Classes' was issued (Ural & Ramazan, 2007). Yet, the provision of services remained to be limited.

During the 2000s, a progress has been achieved in scaling up the enrolment rates for preschool services for children aged 3-5. To be exact, while the take-up was 5.4% among this age group in 2001, it increased to 4.61% for 3 year-olds, 19.23% for 4 year-olds, and 65.69% for 5 year-olds (Niron, 2013). However, although rates have been increased, they were still marginally low and inequitably distributed, even compared to countries with similar per capita incomes (Niron, 2013). Furthermore, service provision was largely dependent on the public sector. According to 2015 figures, the total number of schools and care centers are in operation in Turkey is 26,972, 83.8% of these centres belong to public providers, and around 75% of the services are delivered within the classrooms located within public facilities (World Bank, 2015). With respect to private facilities, they provide higher quality services

especially with respect to infrastructure and materials, however, there is a notable under-utilisation of capacity due to high costs (World Bank, 2015).

Looking at the current structure of ECEC service provision in Turkey, such services in Turkey are provided by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the Ministry of Labour, Social Services and Family (MoLSSF), or private institutions accredited by one of these two Ministries. Hence, a split system of ECEC services is in operation dividing care and education. MoNE accreditation covers the providers for children aged 3 to 5 years (36–66 months) while MoLSSF accreditation entails the providers on children aged 0 to 36 months although, in practice, most MoLSSF centers encompass a wider age range (0–66 months). However, childcare centers rarely exist and serve children aged 0 to 3 years in Turkey (Aran, Munoz Boudet, & Aktakke, 2016).

In an overall analysis, formal childcare has been historically limited in Turkey, and especially for those aged below 3. In fact, public services in the context of ECEC only become available once the children are 5 years old (World Bank, 2015). For this age group, it is not even possible to mention availability of formal care facilities. There is also a lack of political interest in defamilisation policies towards provision of childcare facilities with the purpose of enabling preschool education and promoting reconciliation. Consequently, only around 25% of providers deliver full day services (World Bank, 2015). Critically enough, the Directorate General of Child Services's duty to increase the number of facilities for child and elderly care which appeared in the 2006 Programme was eliminated from the 2007 Programme (Toksöz, 2007). Furthermore, even though private sector companies employing at least 150 female employees are obliged to open up or provide access to a childcare facility according to Article 88 of labour law, the practices are rudimentary. No official or any kind of data is available in Turkey, which shows whether companies in private sector fulfil their duties to establish childcare facilities (İlkkaracan, 2010). The figure for the top 100 employers demonstrate that only 21% possess any day-care options, half of those providing day care options offer on-site day-care facilities whereas the remaining half either outsource or provide part-time services (Zahidi & Ibarra, 2010). In fact, the Article itself reflects patriarchal logic behind its design given that it

perceives childcare as the responsibility of mothers by referring to the number of female employees rather than total employees (Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2011).

In recent years, the government in Turkey enacted legislation to offer incentives additional to the existing ones and promote childcare and preschool investments by the private sector (World Bank, 2015). For a long time, private preschools that were accredited by MoNE have been exempt from corporate income tax and personal income tax for a period of 5 years (World Bank, 2015). However, recently, government has launched new regulations such as including private investments regarding private preschools and private investments regarding day care centers and crèches within the list of priority investment topics (World Bank, 2015).

Additionally, some pilot programmes were also initiated and implemented such as the provision of subsidy for children attending private schools.

According to the Hacettepe Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 2009, only 12% of all preschool-age children of working mothers were either enrolled in kindergarten (7%) or cared for by a paid caretaker (5%) while the remaining 88% were cared by extended family members (Çarkoğlu & Kafescioğlu, 2014). When the family has limited finances and no family members to take care of the child, the mother exits the labour force (Çarkoğlu & Kafescioğlu, 2014). In the households in the bottom per capita income level, only 16.8% of the children aged 3–5 years enrol in childcare and preschool services whereas it is 60.0% for the wealthiest group (Aran et al., 2016).

In Turkey social norms are also influential in enrolment rates in ECEC facilities. Research shows that the accepted norm for earliest age for enrolling children in preschool is age 3, however, perspectives change among fathers and mothers and depending on the working status of mothers (World Bank, 2015).

OECD Economic Surveys Overview on Turkey (Turkey, 2016), recommends the improvement of childcare facilities throughout the country to tackle low levels of women's participation in international comparison (OECD, 2016a). Preschool enrolment rates of three-, four- and five-year olds have risen in the 2010s (reaching 43% for the four-five year olds in 2016) but remain below OECD averages. Furthermore, ESPN's Thematic Report on Social Investment (European

Commission, 2015f) also notes that efforts to improve enrolment in pre-primary education have been significantly slowed in Turkey after the reforms extending compulsory education from 8 to 12 years in 2012 and pre-primary education has not been incorporated into the compulsory education. Furthermore, ESPN's Thematic Report on Social Investment in Turkey refers to the problem of child-to-staff ratio as well, which is around 20. Despite the intention to increase coverage, adequate resources are not allocated early childcare and education, instead, the attempt is to increase coverage by switching from full-day to half-day pre-primary education. As indicated in this report, a communiqué in 2012 by Ministry of National Education (MoNE) declared a commitment to an enrolment target of 100% for preschool education for the year 2023 (targeting 48-60 months-old children). Another communiqué declared in 2014 mentioned the target of 70% (the target was also mentioned in the 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan). To progress towards this target, MoNE instructed public primary schools to switch to half-day education in pre-primary classes in order to serve a larger quantity of students.

### ***Family Policies***

To provide policy background, the Labour Law adopted in 1936, introduced a six-week period of maternity leave paid at 50% of previous earnings. In 1945, maternity insurance was integrated into the Turkish social law, and the maternity allowance was extended to 70% of the daily wage to be paid for the first six weeks after childbirth (Grütjen, 2008). In 1950, healthcare benefits for pregnancy and delivery were incorporated into the insurance, and the duration of paid leave was increased to 9 weeks. In 1967, based on the Labour Law (no. 931) and Social Insurances Law (SSK - no.506, 1964), maternity leave, to be paid at 66% of previous earnings, was extended to 12 weeks. In 1983, with the amendment to the Labour Law, unpaid job-protected maternity leave was introduced for up to six months following the paid maternity leave.

Current maternity leave policies, amended in 2003, stipulate that within the course of the pregnancy, all employed women are eligible for leave of absences for prenatal visits. The total duration of paid maternity leave was extended to 16 weeks, 8 weeks before and 8 weeks after birth. In case the mother chooses and her medical conditions allow to work, she can work up to 3 weeks prior to birth and utilise the

remaining 5 weeks after the birth. Additionally, they are entitled to use up to 6 months of unpaid maternity leave, and upon the return to the work, they can have nursing leaves for 1,5 hours daily. With the new law (Law 657, Article 104), men working for the public sector have been entitled a paternity leave of 10 days.

Considering the lack of the legal provision until 2015, the large companies in the country offered more opportunities to fathers, i.e. 62 % of the 100 largest corporate employers in Turkey offered birth leave to both parents; 33% offer this leave for up to 6 months; however, it is uncommon that fathers utilise these opportunities signalling the influence of gender norms (Çarkoğlu & Kafescioğlu, 2014). In 2015, statutory paid paternity leave for private sector employees was introduced, which is paid at 100% of earnings by the employer.

### ***Legislative Acts towards Gender Equality***

In the Republican era, in line with the processes of secularisation both legally and culturally, a new Civil Code, inspired heavily by the Swiss Civil Code was adopted. This new Civil Code liberated women from the restrictions unlike any other Muslim country (Arat, 2010).

In 1985, Turkey became a State Party to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Turkey also undersigned the Beijing Declaration and Action Platform adopted by the 4<sup>th</sup> World Women's Conference (Beijing). Furthermore, Turkey is also a State Party to various ILO Conventions on gender equality in working life including on Equal Pay to Equal Work (No.100), on Discrimination in Jobs and Occupations (No.111), on Employment Policy (No.122), on Human Resources Development (No.142) and on Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour (No.182) (Toksöz, 2007).

In 1987, to promote gender mainstreaming in public policies, for the first time, a separate unit within the State Planning Organization was established, which was Advisory Board for policies with regards to Women. Moreover, following the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the General Directorate of Women's Status was established in 1990. Although it was initially tied to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, in 1991, it was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. The main mission of this

Directorate was to advance gender equality in the country by developing programs and policies to eliminate all forms of gender based discrimination. Although the Ministry for Women and Family Affairs was initially established, it was later dubbed as the Ministry for Family and Social Policies in 2011 with a broadened scope, yet by omitting 'women'.

In 2001, Article 41 of the Constitution was amended in the pursuit of forming the principle of equality between spouses as a basis for the family (Süral, 2007). In the same year, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security established a commission consisting of nine university professors, three appointed by the Government, three by the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Association and one by each of three labour confederations (the Confederation of Turkish, the Confederation of Righteous Trade Unions and the Confederation of Reformatory Trade Unions). The rationale behind the formation of this Commission was to design the new Labour Act (Süral, 2007). The new Labour Act, which was adopted on 22 May 2003, demonstrated Turkey's efforts to tackle sex discrimination and sexual harassment at the workplace (Süral, 2007). Another progress in Turkey in terms of legislative acts was Article 10 of the 2004 Constitutional amendment which deemed the state as liable for both ensuring non-discrimination between women and men and taking the necessary measures for equality (Dedeoglu, 2013). Furthermore, the new Civil Law in 2001 annulled the 'head of the family' reference in the pursuit of equalising the status of husband and wife before the Law. The Law also introduced a new property regime through proposing an equal division for the property acquired during marriage (Dedeoglu, 2013). Furthermore, concerning the health and social security systems, the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law of 2006 abolished various entitlements enjoyed by women and introduced the equalisation of welfare policies for women and men. Reform of 2006, however, did not alter the gendered treatment of orphans (Kılıç, 2008).

Although progress was achieved towards gendering the welfare state in Turkey and Europeanisation in legal terms, women in Turkey could not yet gain the practical consequences, as it was the case in labour markets. Research in Turkey also reveals that while higher levels of education among women affects FLFP positively, it, in fact, decreases fertility rates (İnce & Demir, 2006). Such a negative influence of

education on fertility, as the trajectories in Europe demonstrate, implies the need for assistance on childbearing.

In summary, defamilisation regime in Turkey presents three divergent points when the country is compared with other four countries in Southern Europe. First, as Chapter 4 presents, take-up of ECEC has been excessively low in Turkey. The analysis here also shows that ECEC services were almost absent before the 2000s. The main reason, as the study of welfare state regime presents, lies in the familialist character of the welfare state. The erosion of the familialist character in Turkish welfare state has been almost absent in contrast to her South European neighbours. In the absence of proper welfare state involvement, extended family members and informal networks serve as welfare state relief in caring function. Lack of left parties hinders the possibilities for defamilisation development in the country. Hence, after the 2000s, moves towards ECEC expansion took place, yet with no proper defamilisation direction. As the analysis above shows, Turkey lacks investment in ECEC. The increase after the 2000s owes very much to the enrolment rates of children aged 5 and the kindergartens which were opened at already existing buildings of the public schools. In so far as private early care services are concerned, incentives provided by the government have not been effective given that the number of private entities has been very limited. Second, another divergent point is that no firm gender equality act, such as provision of quotas, took place in Turkey. Third, leave entitlements are least generous in comparison to other four. However, in a country where half of women work informally, expansion of leave entitlements would not be very effective to ensure continuity in FLFP.

#### **3.5.4. Production Regime**

Even though industrial and service sector have gained importance in the Turkish economy, agriculture has never lost its strong presence. Therefore, in contrast with South European countries, employment in agriculture is still high in Turkey. In recent years, however, statistics demonstrate that employment in service sector has the highest share compared to other sectors. As Table 6 presents, employment in agriculture was 45% in Turkey in 1985, which was the highest among South

European countries, and decreased to 20.4% in 2015. This share in agricultural employment is still high compared to the recent figures in other countries. Turkey, together with Italy, had the highest share in industrial employment in the 2010s, and its share gradually increased in Turkey looking at the figures between 1985 and 2015. Employment in services, on the other hand, constituted 50% of the total employment in the 2010s whereas it was only 35% in 1985.

In so far as the FLFP is concerned, relatively low levels of services employment in Turkey in comparison with Southern Europe hinder the possibilities for pulling more women in the labour force. Hence, in comparison with Southern Europe, existing low levels of service sector employment constitute to be another divergence point of Turkey.

### **3.5.5. Labour Market Regime**

Looking at the modernisation process in Turkey, it is observed that modernisation attempts during Committee of Union and Progress and early Republican era did not pursue the transformation of traditional gender relations. While examining the period of early Republican era, as regards the gender parity of economic and political participation, women's labour participation was not considered as an essential part of modernisation and Republication policy makers perceived women as 'modern housewives' (Buğra & Özkan, 2012).

With respect to the features related to the FLFP, considering the fact that it has been historically low, first, I will reflect on the age-related pattern. In Turkey, when FLFP patterns are examined based on age, an M-curve is identified. Single women aged between 12 and 19 participate in labour markets, and the participation levels peak at the age group between 20 and 24. In fact, more than half of the women work before marriage and having children. However, when women get married and have children, participation levels decrease. The fact that the market wage does not exceed reservation wage level of women in Turkey also accelerates this situation (Kasnakoglu & Dayioglu, 2002). Once children get older, women enter into labour markets again in the age group between 35 and 44. Age group 50 and over, the



participation levels again decrease (Dedeoglu, 2000). It is also noted that the average working duration in the paid work for women is 8 years.

Women labour force experience is an alternative indicator to FLFP, which reveals highly important points. As regards Turkey, according to 2008 household labour force survey, while participation level in urban areas was 20.8%, female labour force experience was actually 43.7%, which reveals the fact that, as I mention above, even though half of women enter into labour force, only half of them can remain the labour markets (İlkkaracan, 2010). Official data shows that the main factors behind the exit of women from the labour force are the family responsibilities, care work, disapproval of their husband. The extremely low levels of female employment and labour force participation in Turkey are also burden on pensions and health coverage since low levels imply a higher dependency ratio (Buğra & Keyder, 2006).

As a second feature, in Turkey, added worker effect by married women is limited in scope mainly because of the structural constraints (Değirmenci & İlkkaracan, 2013). The marginal effects change substantially according to age, rural or urban residence, and education, and research shows that a household unemployment shock increases by up to 34% the likelihood that a university graduate homemaker in the 20–45 age group will enter the paid labour force; for a high school graduate the probability declines to 17%, whereas for a secondary education graduate, it drops to 7% (Değirmenci & İlkkaracan, 2013).

Third, women with primary education still constitute the highest share in Turkey, which is 58.1% according to the figure in 2014. The high share of low-educated women in the labour force is due to still high levels of agricultural employment among women and high number of industrial jobs which require low skills and education. The share of active women with tertiary education gradually increases over the years. However, the prominent divergence of Turkey manifests itself in the participation ratio of women with secondary education, which is by far the lowest in the Southern Europe.

Finally, compared to men, women in Turkey have a lower chance of finding a job and exiting unemployment, and, again for women, marriage decreases the probability of leaving unemployment in contrast to the situation for men (Tansel & Taşçı, 2010).

In summary, labour market regime, as I present above, provides contributory accounts to the arguments in this research. The age-related pattern in Turkey reveals the care burden experienced by the women in labour force. This influence reveals how low take-up rates hinder the FLFP in Turkey. Furthermore, market wage does not exceed reservation wage level in Turkey. If it had been the case, Turkey could have experienced higher FLFP levels albeit lack of formal care services as in Portugal. Moreover, Turkey is also a divergent case in Southern Europe with respect to the share of women in the labour force with secondary education level. This divergence also signals the limitedness of job opportunities for women.

### 3.5.6. Left Party Strength

Role and position of left parties in Turkey is almost non-existent. This feature, in fact, is another divergence point for Turkey, which appears to influence the FLFP pattern in the country. The table below presents the number of seats gained by the political parties in Turkey following each election between 1987 and 2015. As table reveals, the average percentage of seats gained by left parties in Turkey was 24.6% between 1987 and 2002 whereas it increased only to 30.1% looking at the average after the elections held in 2007 and 2015.

**Table 19 Number of Seats Gained by the Political Parties in Turkey, between 1987 and 2015**

<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Parfam code</b>	<b>#of seats gained</b>	<b>#of total seats</b>
11/1987	Social Democratic Populist Party	30	99	450
	Motherland Party	60	292	450
	True Path Party	60	59	450
	Welfare Party	70	0	450
10/1991	Social Democratic Populist Party	30	88	450
	Democratic Left Party	30	7	450

**Table 19 (cont'd)**

	Motherland Party	60	115	450
	True Path Party	60	178	450
	Welfare Party	70	62	450
12/1995	Republican People's Party	30	49	550
	Democratic Left Party	30	76	550
	Motherland Party	60	132	550
	True Path Party	60	135	550
	National Action Party	70	0	550
	Welfare Party	70	158	550
04/1999	Republican People's Party	30	0	550
	Democratic Left Party	30	136	550
	Motherland Party	60	86	550
	True Path Party	60	85	550
	Grand Unity Party	60	0	550
	Democratic Turkey Party	60	0	550
	National Action Party	70	129	550
	Virtue Party	70	111	550
11/2002	Republican People's Party	30	179	550
	Justice and Development Party	60	361	550
	National Action Party	70	0	550
07/2007	Republican People's Party	30	111	550
	Democratic Society Party	30	23	550
	Justice and Development Party	60	341	550

**Table 19 (cont'd)**

	National Action Party	70	70	550
06/2011	Republican People's Party	30	135	550
	Peace and Democracy Party	30	35	550
	Justice and Development Party	60	327	550
	National Action Party	70	53	550
06/2015	Peoples' Democratic Party	20	80	550
	Republican People's Party	30	132	550
	Justice and Development Party	60	258	550
	National Action Party	70	80	550
11/2015	Peoples' Democratic Party	20	59	550
	Republican People's Party	30	134	550
	Justice and Development Party	60	317	550
	National Action Party	70	40	550

*Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a)*

## CHAPTER 4.

### DATA ANALYSIS AND CALIBRATION

To clarify the calibration and analysis in the following pages, I will briefly elaborate on distinctive features and methodological logic of QCA. QCA, initially developed by Charles Ragin, provides an in-depth analysis of how combinations of causal conditions produce an outcome. QCA relies on a case-oriented approach that “does not disaggregate cases into independent, analytically separate aspects but instead treats configurations as different types of cases” (Fiss, 2010: 758). The original form of QCA was crisp-sets (csQCA) in which conditions and outcomes were coded in dichotomous terms as 1 (fully-in) and 0 (fully-out). Ragin, considering the limitations of csQCA, developed fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA). With fsQCA, assignment of multiple scores within the scale between 0 and 1 has become possible. The fuzziness in this methodology relies on the fact that the boundaries of membership are imprecise. Compared to other forms of QCA, the particular merit of fuzzy-sets is that it enables partial membership in sets. Regardless of whether one is using csQCA or fsQCA, the method sees the relations within social phenomena as set relations based on the membership scores of cases in sets (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Researcher determines the membership scores of cases (which is called calibration) by asking questions such as ‘does the country score high or low on Y’? (Hancké 2009). Therefore, QCA is grounded in the analysis of set relations rather than correlations. For instance, while regression analysis investigates ‘tendential

relationships or net effects', in QCA, researcher is concerned with which conditions bring about the outcome (Emmenegger, 2011).

Following the membership scoring, researcher attains the so-called truth table. The truth table presents the scores for cases and the logical possibilities (Hancké, 2009). For the next step, researcher utilises the software programme. The programme produces Boolean equations based on the combinations (logical possibilities) (Ragin, 1987). Production of equations comes through logical minimisation, which the software executes. Upon the process of logical minimisation, the software enables the researcher to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions (Schneider & Wagemann 2012). In QCA, necessity and sufficiency are descriptions of the conditions in the pathway(s). A condition is sufficient for an outcome, if whenever the condition is present, the outcome is also present. A condition is necessary if, whenever the outcome is present, the condition is also present. The outcome cannot be achieved without the condition.

QCA also reveals complex causality owing to its unique feature in identifying INUS conditions. An 'INUS' condition is the condition that is insufficient but necessary part of a causal combination which is itself unnecessary but sufficient in producing the outcome. Hence, this method is particularly "suitable for analysing situations of causal complexity, that is, situations in which an outcome may result from several different combinations of causal conditions" (Fiss, 2010: 758). In so doing, QCA offers an understanding of complex causal conjunctures in real world.

Concerning this study, regression analysis would not be suitable because the relatively small number of cases would produce unreliable results and would not enable an incorporation of more complex interaction effects to examine the various multi-causal hypotheses in the state-of-the-art. Since QCA was developed mainly for research studies with a small and medium number of cases, and for the exploration of causal interactions, rather than the net effects of individual variables, it does not produce the same problem (Avdagic, 2011).

Furthermore, the ultimate purpose of this study is to compare Turkey with other South European countries to explain the divergence of Turkey. Hence, I do not aim at deriving conclusions valid for other countries and regions. This is also the reason

why the selection of QCA, which enables research on few number of cases, has been plausible. As I reflected in Chapter 3 on South European Patterns, QCA enabled the reflection of comprehensive case analyses of South European countries and Turkey as well.

The conduct of this research has been possible with thorough knowledge on QCA method and how it should be executed. I relied upon widely-accepted procedures by the methodologists of QCA. First, while applying the QCA in this study, I used QCA with the help of specialised computer software, namely fsQCA software, version 3.0. I selected fsQCA software rather than other software packages including tosmata because other software packages are mostly used for crisp-set QCA and multi-value QCA and fsQCA software is the most widely preferred option while applying fsQCA (Legewie, 2013). Therefore, I followed the common approach in QCA studies while opting for the software to use. Second, as recommended, I refrained from assigning the anchor score, 0.5, to any of the cases since this would have implied that it was not possible to argue that whether an individual case was more a member of the set or more a non-member. Third, methodologists also do not advise a calibration by simply looking at the distance between the index scores. Following this approach, I also refrained from calibration based on the mean calculation. Fourth, Schneider and Wagemann (2010: 2) suggest that “QCA has to be understood both as a research approach in a broad sense and as an analytical technique in a more narrow sense”. Relying on their emphasis on the ‘qualitative roots’ of QCA, I paid particular attention to this approach, and provided detailed case analysis in Chapter 3. I also explained in detail the conditions, outcome, raw data, truth table and my interpretations relying on QCA results. Fifth, following Schneider and Grofman’s (2006) suggestion, I presented the truth table to allow replicability. Sixth, I also duly considered the following criterion proposed by Schneider and Wagemann (2010): “Every QCA must contain the solution formula(s); the consistency and coverage measures should always be reported and the appropriate QCA terminology should be followed”. Seventh, the QCA methodologists also strongly advise the presentation of the calibration as transparent as possible and the provision of all data necessary to enable replication of the analysis (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). In addition to complying with this principle, I also considered the following requirements of calibration to produce an analytically fruitful research: a careful definition of the relevant

population of the cases, a precise definition of the meaning of all concepts (both the conditions and outcome) used in the analysis, a decision on where the point of maximum indifference about membership versus non-membership is located (signified by the 0.5 anchor in fuzzy sets), a decision on the definition of full membership and full-non membership and a decision about the graded membership in between the qualitative anchors.

Throughout the design and application processes of QCA, I followed all these principles. I adopted fsQCA among various other QCA forms considering the nature of the inquiry in this research. The main advantage of fsQCA compared to crisp set QCA (csQCA) is that conditions and outcomes are no longer binary, and it enables ‘degrees of membership’ (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013). This reduces the coding errors, provides greater precision to the analysis and promotes the analytical leverage of the results (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013).

Having provided accounts on the distinctive methodological features of QCA and the principles I followed, here below, I first present how I determined the periodisation, and then I describe data pertaining to the conditions and outcome, and provide detailed information and insight on the calibration process. With the purpose of presenting the data accurately, I provide the accounts on calibration for each condition and the outcome separately.

#### **4.1. Determination of Periods**

Before proceeding with the presentation of raw data extracted and calibration of those data for the purposes of this study, I first explain how I decide the two periods for each specific case. As I previously mentioned, the comparative analysis in this research relies upon two periods. In the first period, I examine the ‘successful examples’ of the Southern Europe at a time when their FLFP rate is at the lowest levels. In the second period, I examine the countries based on the recent figures at a time when they are in their post-transition period in terms of their FLFP levels. Concerning Turkey, since it is not possible to mention significant increase in FLFP, I divide periods by taking the time where the employment rate for women, particularly in non-agricultural sector, starts to increase as the breaking point.



In Turkey, increase in FLFP emerges in 2004, which, constitutes the breaking point in the research for this case. Relying on the literature, particularly U-shaped curve thesis, the relatively high participation rates in Turkey in the years of 1980 and 1985, as I discuss above, shows that the country was in the pre-transition period. This is because, the higher rates in Turkey, compared to recent figures, reflects the high share of agriculture and unpaid labour in rural areas.

Relying on this rationale, I consider the early 1980s as Period I for Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece since these countries, at this time, had started to attain upward trend in FLFP levels. I analyse Period II with recent figures because, relying also on the literature, I consider the most recent period, as also the figures reveal, as the most successful era. The increased importance attached to reconciliation policies, childcare and women's empowerment through their employment are all more salient in this period.

Coming to Turkey, up until the early 2000s, the country displays downward trend in FLFP levels, thus, presents a case still under the influence of urbanisation and changing economic structures. Only after the 2000s (2004 in particular), it reveals an increasing pattern owing to non-agricultural sector expansion and other factors such as increased tertiary level education among women. That is why, I consider the Period I for Turkey as the 2000s and the 2010s as the Period II.

Furthermore, I design this research based on six-value fuzzy set, by taking the following scores into consideration: 0, 0.17, 0.33, 0.67, 0.83 and 1. This is because six-value fuzzy set represents well the required intervals given the total number of cases (10 cases in total) and variation in the raw scores for each condition and the outcome. The below table shows the verbal labels and fuzzy membership scores which correspond to each label:

**Table 20 Verbal Labels of Fuzzy Membership Scores**

<b>Verbal Labels</b>	<b>Fuzzy membership scores</b>
Fully in	1
Almost fully in	0.83
Fairly in	0.67
cross over point	0.5
Fairly out	0.33
Almost fully out	0.17
Fully out	0

## **4.2. Presentation of Raw Data and Their Calibration**

I present here the data that I utilise for the QCA individually for each condition and outcome. And, under each title, I map out the stages of calibration and display calibrated results.

### **4.2.1. Political Party Configuration**

As I extensively presented in the literature review section of this thesis, scholars acknowledge the role of left parties, including social democratic parties, in initiating and promoting policies paving the way for women's empowerment and defamilisation including increased presence of women in paid labour. Scholars, in the literature, suggest that the presence and strength of left parties in a country bring about favourable conditions for women through the enactment of related laws. This is why, in this study, I take political party configuration as one of the conditions.

I conceptualise political party configuration as the level of presence of left parties in the national parliaments. Hence, I do not look at the share of seats of left parties

within the governments. The main rationale for this preference is that I simply seek to figure out the *strength* of left parties in the parliaments and party politics. In this respect, voter behaviour, reflected as shares of parliaments upon the elections, denotes very well resilience of left parties within party politics. I also acknowledge that even in the opposition role, left parties may influence the direction of politics. Hence, my purpose here is not to relate the relevant enactments with the ideological stance of the political parties, yet to observe whether left parties, following the elections in the governing period, can gain significant number of seats, which enable them to form or direct country agenda, either as a governing party or opposition party. Additionally, in contrast to the share of seats, the share within the governments is exposed to abrupt changes. Once the governments are formed, they can be abolished in a short period of time, and the share gained by a party can alter drastically. Considering all these aspects, I conduct the analysis by looking at the share of seats of left parties in all five countries in two periods.

For this purpose, I utilise the data that I extracted from the Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset version 2018b (Volkens et al., 2018a)<sup>11</sup>. The Comparative Manifesto Project assembles political parties and party alliances into party families, which denote the ideological stance of the political parties<sup>12</sup>. The variable is constant over time and does not account for possible changes of party family. Nevertheless, such categorisation enables the researcher to discern the left parties. The Comparative Manifesto Project conducts the grouping as in Table 11 above (Volkens et al, 2018b). The advantage of this dataset in identifying left parties is first that researcher relies on a standardised approach based on unified principles. Second, the dataset is grounded on a thorough examination of the party manifestos, which manifest the ideological stance of the political parties much more objectively.

Based on the list in Table 11, I consider in the analysis the parties which correspond to the parfam codes of 20 and 30 as left. Therefore, while looking at the share of left parties within the parliaments after each election, I take into consideration of the

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<sup>11</sup> The data is accessible online at: <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>

<sup>12</sup> Identification variable used for this grouping is parfam. More details can be found on the Manifesto Project Dataset Codebook, which is accessible online at: <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>

shares of parties coded as 20 and 30. Here below I list the parties I considered while counting the number of seats in each country:

**Table 21 Left Parties in Southern Europe**

<b>Party Names - Portugal</b>	<b>Parfam codes</b>
ASDI Association of Independent Social Democrats	30
BE Left Bloc	20
CDU Unified Democratic Coalition	20
ID Democratic Intervention	30
MDP Popular Democratic Movement	30
PCP Portuguese Communist Party	20
PRD Democratic Renewal Party	30
PS Socialist Party	30
UDP Popular Democratic Union	20
UEDS Leftwing Union for the Socialist Democracy	30
<b>Party Names - Spain</b>	<b>Parfam codes</b>
IU United Left	20
PCE Communist Party of Spain	20
PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	30
UP Popular Unity	20
We can	20

**Table 21 (cont'd)**

<b>Party Names - Italy</b>	<b>Parfam codes</b>
DP Proletarian Democracy	20
DS Democrats of the Left	20
LP Pannella List	30
Olive Tree	30
Pannella-Riformatori List	30
Pannella-Sgarbi List	30
PCI Italian Communist Party	20
PdCI Party of Italian Communists	20
PDS Democratic Party of the Left	20
PdUP Proletarian Unity Party for Communism (The Manifesto + Proletarian Unity Party)	20
PR Radical Party	30
PRC Communist Refoundation Party	20
PSDI Italian Democratic Socialist Party	30
PSI Italian Socialist Party	30
RC Civil Revolution	20
RI Italian Renewal	30
RnP Rose in the Fist	20
SEL Left Ecology Freedom	20
<b>Party Names - Greece</b>	<b>Parfam codes</b>
DIKKI Democratic Social Movement	30

**Table 21 (cont'd)**

DIMAR Democratic Left	20
KKE Communist Party of Greece	20
LAE Popular Unity	20
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement	30
SYN Progressive Left Coalition	20
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left	20
The River	30
<b>Party Names - Turkey</b>	<b>Parfam codes</b>
BDP Peace and Democracy Party	30
CHP Republican People's Party	30
DSP Democratic Left Party	30
DTP Democratic Society Party	30
HDP Peoples' Democratic Party	30
SHP Social Democratic Populist Party	30

The influence of parties over the party politics in the countries and policy agendas gradually evolve, and it cannot be understood with the analysis of restricted period of time. Hence, here, for this condition, I consider the longest time period as possible. Based on this approach, I adopt the following periodisation for this condition:

**Table 22 Years of Analysis per Each Country and Period**

<b>Cases</b>	<b>Years for Period I</b>	<b>Years for Period II</b>
<b>Italy</b>	1976-1983	1987-2013
<b>Spain</b>	1977-1982	1986-2015
<b>Portugal</b>	1975-1983	1985-2015
<b>Greece</b>	1974-1985	1989-2015
<b>Turkey</b>	1987-2002	2007-2015

I take the mid-1980s as the breaking point for the periods in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece congruent with the common approach for other conditions and the outcome. I need to maintain similar periodisation for all conditions and the outcome as much as possible.

In addition, since three cases of this study, namely Spain, Portugal and Greece, experienced democratic and free elections only after the mid-1970s, the years I consider for all South European countries correspond to the period in the aftermath of the authoritarian regimes. Even though Italy had elections before 1976, I, on purpose, did not consider the period before 1976 to be able to look at the same years with other South European countries<sup>13</sup>. Another note concerns the re-elections. In case a country experienced a re-election, I considered the second election, that is the re-election results, in the analysis.

Relying on the information Comparative Manifesto Project dataset provides, including the years of elections, the number of seats gained by each party and the total number of seats for those periods in each country, I calculated the percentages of the left party seats in the parliaments. For this calculation, I applied the below formula:

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<sup>13</sup> To cross check, the raw data has been obtained for Italy for both periods of 1946-1983 and 1976-1983. The average scores have been quite similar, which would provide the same fuzzy membership score. That is why, to be consistent with other South European countries and also the periods of other conditions, the years between 1976 and 1983 can be confidently taken into consideration for Italy.

*=Total number of seats gained by the Left parties/*

*Total number of seats in the parliament*

Based on this formula, the table below demonstrates how I obtained the raw data for each different case:

**Table 23 Raw Data for Political Party Configuration**

Period I				Period II			
Country	No. of seats of left parties	No. of seats in the parliament	Ratio	Country	No. of seats of left parties	No. of seats in the parliament	Ratio
<b>Portugal</b>	152	250	60.8%	<b>Portugal</b>	139	250	55.6%
	148	263	56.3%		97	250	38.8%
	122	250	48.8%		88	226	38.9%
	116	250	46.4%		127	230	55.2%
	144	250	57.6%		134	230	58.3%
			<b>54.0%</b>		109	230	47.4%
					141	230	61.3%
					126	230	54.8%
					96	230	41.7%
					120	230	52.2%
							<b>50.4%</b>



**Table 23 (cont'd)**

<b>Spain</b>	138	350	39.4%	<b>Spain</b>	191	350	54.6%
	144	350	41.1%		192	350	54.9%
	206	350	58.9%		177	350	50.6%
			<b>46.5%</b>		162	350	46.3%
					133	350	38.0%
					169	350	48.3%
					171	350	48.9%
					121	350	34.6%
					134	350	38.3%
							<b>46.0%</b>
<b>Italy</b>	306	630	48.6%	<b>Italy</b>	309	630	49.0%
	308	630	48.9%		257	630	40.8%
	312	630	49.5%		168	630	26.7%
			<b>49.0%</b>		233	630	37.0%
					158	609	25.9%
					295	630	46.8%
					0	630	0.0%
					37	630	5.9%
							<b>29.0%</b>
<b>Greece</b>	17	300	5.7%	<b>Greece</b>	149	300	49.7%
	104	300	34.7%		142	300	47.3%
	185	300	61.7%		179	300	59.7%
	173	300	57.7%		192	300	64.0%

**Table 23 (cont'd)**

			<b>39.9%</b>		175	300	58.3%
					135	300	45.0%
					138	300	46.0%
					194	300	64.7%
					133	300	44.3%
					188	300	62.7%
							<b>54.2%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	99	450	22.0%	<b>Turkey</b>	134	550	24.4%
	95	450	21.1%		170	550	30.9%
	125	550	22.7%		193	550	35.1%
	136	550	24.7%				<b>30.1%</b>
	179	550	32.5%				
			<b>24.6%</b>				

Following the calculation of the raw data based on the averages of the elections per each case, the table below illustrates the raw data of each for each period, and the fuzzy membership scores I assigned:

**Table 24 Fuzzy Membership Scores for Political Party Configuration**

Cases	Years	Fuzzy Membership		Years	Fuzzy Membership	
		Raw data	Score for Period I		Raw data	Score for Period II
<b>Italy</b>	1976-1983	49.0%	0.83	1987-2013	29.0%	0.33 <sup>14</sup>
<b>Spain</b>	1977-1982	46.5%	0.67	1986-2015	46.0%	0.67
<b>Portugal</b>	1975-1983	54.0%	1	1985-2015	50.4%	1
<b>Greece</b>	1974-1985	39.9%	0.67	1989-2015	54.2%	1
<b>Turkey</b>	1987-2002	24.6%	0.17	2007-2015	30.1%	0.17

For this condition, the set can be titled as ‘*the countries where Left parties are dominant*’. I determined the threshold<sup>15</sup> for the membership of this set as 38%. Based on the raw data and the fuzzy membership scores I assigned, Portugal, within both periods, has full membership. Portugal diverges apparently from most other countries with its level of left party share in its parliament. Since a certain degree of party presence with other ideological affiliations is inevitable, I attribute full membership score to Portugal. Related to the calibration of Italy, Spain and Greece in the first period, even though the average percentage of seats of left parties is less than half, with the consideration of usual dominance of right parties almost applicable anywhere, these percentages are not in fact low. Therefore, I assigned membership scores to all three in the first period.

<sup>14</sup> Even though the raw score for Italy in Period II is almost the same with that of Turkey, I assigned the score of 0.33 to Italy. This is because, when I exclude the last two elections in Italy, in one of which left parties gained no seat, the average share of left party parliamentary seats is above 37%. Thus, including the year whereby the left share is 0% disproportionately skews the overall average for the country, which underrepresents the average left party share therein. Therefore, I assigned a higher score for Italy (0.33) than for Turkey (0.17). In any case, both scores denote non-membership.

<sup>15</sup> The thresholds for set membership are supposed to be uniquely determined for each condition and the outcome. This is why the thresholds differ across conditions and the outcome. The common QCA protocol is that they are determined by the researcher on the basis of conceptual knowledge, theoretical depth and variation in raw data. The thresholds denote the crossover point (0.5): under 0.5 denotes non-member, over 0.5 denotes member. For example, if the raw data belonging to a case is under the threshold, then, a non-member fuzzy-score (0, 0.17, 0.33) is assigned to that case.

#### 4.2.2. Political Party Commitment

As I detailed in previous sections, another condition included in the analysis in this study is *political party commitment*. Here, I follow the argument that the commitment of the political parties enables the enactment of laws and regulations for the way towards increasing FLFP. Therefore, the overall commitment of the political parties or their level of commitment determine the status of the countries in terms of their policies for reconciliation of work and family life, preschool arrangements for women's access to labour markets etc. That is why, in this study, I incorporate the condition of political party commitment to related policy areas relying on the dataset of Comparative Manifesto project.

The Manifesto Project, additional to the information as I mention above, also demonstrates parties' policy positions derived from a content analysis of parties' electoral manifestos. It covers over 1,000 parties from 1945 until today in over 50 countries on five continents. Rationale for the examination of manifestos for this study and for this condition particularly is that manifestos demonstrate the *issues* of political parties. These issues are determined or formed based on the demand of the electorate. Therefore, manifestos, in a way, mirror the demand of the electorate and also the priorities of the political parties in the party system in a country. Given the scope of this study, the condition of political party commitment –with the examination of party manifestos- enables us to observe the level of absorption of certain policies by a country to pave the way for higher FLFP. Hence, I question, with this condition, whether the cases with high commitment are also the cases where FLFP is high.

Considering the framework of this study, I take into consideration of the categories of per504, welfare state expansion, and per506, education expansion. As explained in the codebook, the category of per504, excluding education, incorporates favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. These include government funding of health care, childcare, elder care and pensions and also social housing. The category of per506, on the other hand, refers to education expansion, which encompasses the statements related to need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels.

However, here, the categories I consider here do not exclusively correspond to the specific research area of this study. Although I intend to analyse only the weight of statements concerning childcare, the category of per504, for instance, incorporates other areas of welfare state expansion as well. This is also true for the category of per506. This implies the necessity of the provision of further sub-categories under the coded categories of the Project. Furthermore, since all the coded manifestos are not publicly available and it is not possible to obtain the coded examinations of sub-categories, it is inevitable to rely on the categories as provided by the dataset.

However, still, the consideration of categories rather than the sub-categories does not seem to mislead the inference. While the political parties incorporate statements in their election manifestos related to welfare state expansion, this shows also their overall tendency for the initiation of several kinds of welfare state policies, which also include the policies of defamilisation, namely provision of childcare benefits and arrangements. Hence, I maintain taking into account of the categories of per 504 and per506. In this regard, I consider the political party commitment as the salience of references to the welfare state expansion and education expansion in the election manifestos of the political parties in five countries. Here below, I provide the shares of two categories per each category for two different periods. The numbers given below constitute the relative share of statements for each category in relation to all statements in the manifesto<sup>16</sup>.

**Table 25 Raw Data for Political Party Commitment**

Cases	Period I	PI	PI	Period II	PII	PII
		per504	per506		per504	per506
<b>Italy</b>	1976-1983	5.6	3.3	1987-2013	4.6	3.3
<b>Spain</b>	1977-1982	9.5	3.9	1986-2015	8.2	3.4
<b>Portugal</b>	1975-1983	4.4	3.4	1985-2015	8.4	4.6
<b>Greece</b>	1974-1985	3.1	2.4	1989-2015	7.9	3.9
<b>Turkey</b>	1987-2002	5.5	3.8	2007-2015	7.7	4.5

<sup>16</sup> To exemplify, '0.35' means that 0.35% of the manifesto is devoted to that category. The scale can run between zero (no statement at all) and 100 (the whole manifesto would be about this category).

The manifesto project dataset provides the shares of each category per each election manifesto and political party. I calculate figures for the countries by taking the average of the scores of each political party for that period. I determined the periods for this condition in the same way as in the political party configuration. For the determination of the fuzzy set membership scores, I weighted the shares of each category as below:

$$\text{Fuzzy set membership score per case} = (\text{share of per504}) * 0.9 + (\text{share of per506}) * 0.1$$

Based on the above formula, I attained the following composite raw data as I illustrate in the table below:

**Table 26 Fuzzy Membership Scores for Political Party Commitment**

<b>Cases</b>	<b>Composite Raw Data for Period I</b>	<b>Fuzzy Membership Scores</b>	<b>Composite Raw Data for Period II</b>	<b>Fuzzy Membership Scores</b>
<b>Italy</b>	5.4	0.33	4.4	0.33
<b>Spain</b>	8.9	1	7.8	0.83
<b>Portugal</b>	4.3	0.33	8.0	0.83
<b>Greece</b>	3.0	0.17	7.5	0.83
<b>Turkey</b>	5.3	0.33	7.4	0.83

The table above also shows the fuzzy membership scores per each case for two different periods. For period I, I did not assign a full membership score to any case given that all countries score apparently low. I determined the threshold for the membership of this set as 6. I allocated the scores with respect to the shares of each country calculated based on the above mentioned weighting formula.

### **4.2.3. Take-up of Childcare Facilities**

Scholars, for many years, have been interested in understanding the factors influencing the female labour force patterns. As I detail in the state-of-the-art, many scholars study this subject area with different approaches and methods. Recently, as I presented previously, with the introduction of the concept of defamilisation, women's presence in paid labour force has been associated very much with the availability of affordable and qualified care arrangements for children under school age. Following the increased FLFP rates, governments and political parties started to pay more attention to the promotion of caring arrangements and related welfare state benefits such as tax reduction, allocation of funding etc.

I take the concept of defamilisation as the core of the analysis in this study, and consider caring arrangements as expected precondition for women's involvement in labour markets. Hence, I determine one of the conditions as 'take-up of childcare facilities'. Rather than the number of available caring or preschool education arrangements, I opted for take-up rates in this study. The reason is to follow the general tendency in welfare state research, which also takes 'take-up' as the main indicator. Second, (this is also why the literature vastly takes 'take-up' as indicator) take-up rates enable the researcher to discern the actual situation. Even though arrangements are available, parents might not prefer to enrol their children in these facilities due to the quality problems and other issues. Third, considering the complexity of childcare systems due to differentiation based on their quality, accessibility and affordability, number of institutions per child may not reflect the actual circumstances. The services might not be preferred or utilised because of the quality, accessibility and affordability problems (Kuronen et al., 2015). Therefore, the most reliable and actual status is provided by the enrolment rates of the children under school age.

As another note, the problem of availability of reliable data has been an important impediment for this condition. While I initially intended to pick up data on childcare and preschool services for children under 3 starting from the years of the 1980s, I could not discern any reliable data showing the enrolment levels for children under 3 years of age for those years. That is why, I selected the raw data for the calibration of

this condition among the data on childcare and preschool education services for children aged 3, 4 and 5.

The table below summarises the data I obtained for each case for two different periods. The raw data denotes the enrolment rates for childcare aged 3 to 5 years within the indicated years.

**Table 27 Raw Data for Take-up Rates**

Cases	Years (Period I)	Raw Data	Years (Period II)	Raw Data <sup>17</sup>
Italy	1986	87.8 <sup>18</sup>	2012	95.1
Spain	1987	68.3 <sup>19</sup>	2012	96.6
Portugal	1986	29.0 <sup>20</sup>	2012	89.4
Greece	1987	37.5 <sup>21</sup>	2012	48
Turkey	2004	10.5 <sup>22</sup>	2012	30.9

<sup>17</sup> All data for Period II derived from OECD Family Database (OECD, 2016c), accessible online at <http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm>

<sup>18</sup> Data obtained from Hohnerlein, E. M. (2015) 'Development and Diffusion of Early Childhood Education in Italy: Reflections on the Role of the Church from a Historical Perspective (1830-2010)', in Willekens, H., Scheiwe, K. and K. Nawrotzki (eds.) in *The Development of Early Childhood Education in Europe and North America, The Development of Early Childhood Education in Europe and North America Historical and Comparative Perspectives*. The data this source utilised obtained from the Italian National Institute of Statistics 2011, pp.355-356; Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione 2000, pp.18, 20, 27; MIUR 2011, pp. 17, 55; Di Pol 2005, p. 242; Catarsi 1985, p. 33. Data accessible online at

<https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=n1UMCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT106&lpg=PT106&dq=italy+pre+school+education&source=bl&ots=0sZ8QQjTpi&sig=CV3X5ZCsI5hZLF-LHQGjKuxYR9w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q6AEwATgKahUKEwizrZrNjd3IAhVHnBoKHRdVceA#v=onepage&q=italy%20pre%20school%20education&f=true>

<sup>19</sup> OECD (1989) *Education in OECD Countries, 1986-87*, OECD, Paris, 1989. Accessible online at <http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/4343133.pdf>. Note to the raw data presented for Spain in Period I: the rate of 68.3% is the mean of enrolment rates for 3, 4 and 5 year olds in the same year.

<sup>20</sup> Formosinho, João and Júlia Formosinho (2008). *System of early education/care and professionalisation in Portugal*. Report commissioned by the State Institute of Early Childhood Research (IFP) Munich, Germany in 2008. The report is accessible online at [https://www.ifp.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/stmas/ifp/commissioned\\_report\\_portugal.pdf](https://www.ifp.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/stmas/ifp/commissioned_report_portugal.pdf) The ratio denotes enrolment of 3 to 6 year olds.

<sup>21</sup> Data accessible online at <http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/4343133.pdf>. This chapter was drafted by Ms Helene Goulet, consultant to the OECD, Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education. Note to the raw data presented: this rate is the mean of enrolment rates for 3, 4 and 5 year olds.

<sup>22</sup> Data derived from OECD Family Database (OECD, 2016c), accessible online at <http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm>.



Concerning the above table, I determined the years for Period I based on the data availability. I adopted the approach to take the oldest data available for the 1980s for the respective cases, and, I could obtain the data for the years indicated above. Nevertheless, childcare enrolment is not a type of indicator which changes drastically over 2 to 3 years. In case, for instance, the data had belonged to the years of 1980-1981, the rates would not alter much. That is also the reason why, for this condition specifically, I did not build raw data by calculating the averages of years within a certain period. I rather picked up the data from selected years.

For the periodisation of Turkey, I adopted a similar approach, and included the data belonging to the year of 2004. Because at that time the country was at the bottom of the U-curve, that is, experiencing, the lowest female employment levels.

Additionally, at this period, the influence of agricultural employment among women employment levels diminishes, which enables a comparison with the statuses of other countries under Period I.

Following the calculation of the raw data based on the enrolment rates of preschool children over 3, the table below illustrates the raw data of each for each period, and the assigned fuzzy membership score:

**Table 28 Fuzzy Membership Scores for Take-up Rates**

Cases	Years	Raw data	Fuzzy Membership Score for		Raw data	Fuzzy Membership Score for	
			Period I	Years		Period II	Years
<b>Italy</b>	1986	87.8	1	2012	95.1	1	
<b>Spain</b>	1987	68.3	0.83	2012	96.6	1	
<b>Portugal</b>	1986	29.0	0.17	2012	89.4	1	
<b>Greece</b>	1987	37.5	0.33	2012	48	0.33	
<b>Turkey</b>	2004	10.5	0	2012	30.9	0.17	

With respect to this condition, I dub the set as the ‘*countries where children over 3 enrol in preschool education facilities*’. The threshold I determined for the membership in this set is 55%. According to the raw data for the first period, the

rates in Italy and Spain are distinctively high. However, compared among themselves, the rate in Italy is also quite higher as opposed to Spain. Therefore, I assigned the full membership score to Italy. On the other hand, I considered the countries where less than half of the population of children over 3 is enrolled in preschool education arrangements as ‘non-members’ with varying membership scores. These countries are Portugal, Greece and Turkey.

In Period II, Italy, Spain and Portugal appear as holding membership in this set with high enrolment rates for preschool children. However, Greece and Turkey could not be members with their low scores. Considering the EU average and the high rates in these countries, I assigned full membership to Italy, Spain and Portugal although their rates differ among themselves.

#### **4.2.4. Level of Tertiary Education among Women**

Another condition I include in the analysis in this study is the level of tertiary education among women. I selected this condition for this study because of the emphasis placed on this condition in the state-of-the-art. Individual country studies in the literature as well as large scale quantitative research examining the impact of education on FLFP mostly refer to the favourable effect of tertiary education. That is why, I incorporate this condition to observe its role on the outcome for different cases.

What I refer as level of tertiary education among women is the ‘percentage of female population aged 25-29 with tertiary schooling, completed tertiary’. There were many similar indicators I could utilise for understanding the status of the cases in terms of the tertiary educational level of their female population. This indicator, derived from World Bank (2018)<sup>23</sup>, denotes, on the other hand, the current status of a case by referring to the specific age group, which is 25-29. Since this is the age group, which is expected to hold tertiary level educational attainment, the rate discerns very well

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<sup>23</sup> World Bank, Education Statistics, All Indicators, Barro-Lee: Percentage of female population age 25-29 with tertiary schooling, Completed Tertiary.

whether or not the country achieved high rates of tertiary level educational attainment among its female population at that particular time.

For the periodisation of the countries, I adopted a similar approach and looked at the rates of the 1980s for Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, and the early 2000s for Turkey. For the second period, for all cases under study, I considered the latest data available. For this indicator, the latest available data pertains to 2010.

In the table below, I present the raw data based on the percentage of female population aged 25-29 with tertiary schooling per case. I determined the threshold for the set-membership as 17%.

**Table 29 Raw Data and Fuzzy Membership Scores for Tertiary Education among Women**

Cases	Years	Raw	Period	Years	Raw	Period
		Data	I		Data	II
<b>Italy</b>	1985	2.64	0	2010	17.44	0.67
<b>Spain</b>	1985	10.39	0.17	2010	29.03	0.67
<b>Portugal</b>	1985	3.85	0	2010	10.57	0.17
<b>Greece</b>	1985	16.76	0.33	2010	53.62	1
<b>Turkey</b>	2000	7.54	0.17	2010	10.23	0.17

Greece has highest percentage in the first period, hence, I assigned the highest score. However, the score I assigned is still a non-member score because of the high level percentages countries reach in the second period. Other countries have lower levels compared to Greece in the first period, and I determined their membership scores based on their position. For the second period, even though the percentages for all countries increased, substantial differences remain. Still, Greece has the highest score with the percentage of 53.62 in 2010. Therefore, I assigned full membership score to Greece.

#### 4.2.5. Share of Service Sector Employment

Service sector, as argued in the state-of-the-art, paved the way for access of women to labour markets. Owing to increased opportunities in the service sector, women gained comparative advantage over men in holding the positions in this sector. Hence, increased share of service sector employment in the economy could be argued as a factor favouring the status of women in the labour markets. Hence, relying on the state-of-the-art, I select the last condition under this study as the share of service sector employment. My purpose here is to comprehend the role of the service sector on women's status in labour markets in the South European context. Considering the relationship between the service sector expansion and economic growth, as I explain in Chapter 2, the condition, the share of service sector employment, is also a proxy of economic growth. That is the reason why, I, purposefully, did not include GDP per capita as an additional condition. Here, what I refer to by share of service sector employment is 'employment in services, % of total employment'<sup>24</sup>, and the data, belonging to ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, is derived from World Bank databank.

With respect to this condition, I dub the set as the '*countries where employment is primarily based upon service sector*'. The membership scores, among the population of five countries, demonstrate their membership status for this set. I determined the threshold for the set-membership as 45%. The table below illustrates the related raw data per case for two different periods as well as the membership scores:

**Table 30 Raw Data and Fuzzy Scores for Service Sector Employment**

Cases	Years	Raw Data	Period I	Years	Raw Data	Period II
<b>Italy</b>	1983	52.3%	0.67	2014	69,4%	0.83
<b>Spain</b>	1983	47.7%	0.67	2014	76,3%	1
<b>Portugal</b>	1983	41.0%	0.33	2014	67,4%	0.83
<b>Greece</b>	1983	41.4%	0.33	2014	71,4%	0.83
<b>Turkey</b>	2000	40.0%	0.33	2014	51%	0.67

<sup>24</sup> Employees are people who work for a public or private employer and receive remuneration in wages, salary, commission, tips, piece rates, or pay in kind. Services correspond to divisions 6-9 (ISIC revision 2) or tabulation categories G-P (ISIC revision 3) and include wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services.

According to the table above, the percentage of employment in services, for the first period, is 52.3 in Italy, 47.7 in Spain, 41 in Portugal, 41.4 in Greece and 40 in Turkey. All countries increase their percentage in 2014, in period II, however, substantial differences persist among the cases. While Spain and Greece have the highest percentages, 76.3 and 71.4 consecutively, the percentage is only 51 in Turkey where agricultural sector still has a high share.

For the membership scoring of Period I, even though Italy's more than half employment belongs to services, the percentage is still low, and this is why, I did not assign the full membership score of 1 to Italy. Concerning Period II, differences across cases widen, which enable allocation of full membership score of 1. This is also because, for Spain which obtained full membership score, the percentage is above 75%. Lastly, although Turkey has more than half of its employment in services in 2014, still, the percentage is low, which is 51, and the gap is prodigious looking at the figures of other countries. That is why, I purposefully assigned 0.67 to Turkey.

#### **4.2.6. Outcome**

The outcome in this study is labour force participation rate of women. The outcome is commensurate with the purpose of this study, which is to comprehend the set of determinants bringing about higher FLFP in Southern Europe. I preferred FLFP rather than women's employment rate as the outcome indicator because FLFP provides how active women are in the labour market and incorporates those women who are unemployed and actively searching for a job (Pfau-Effinger & Schwindt, 2015). In this study, I am interested to observe factors influencing activity of women and pulling them in the labour market rather than those affecting their success in finding a job, which would be revealed by employment rate indicator.

I operationalise the outcome of this study as labour force participation of women between the ages of 15 and 64<sup>25</sup>. Table below illustrates the labour force

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<sup>25</sup> Data belongs to OECD, Labour Force Survey - Sex and Age Indicators, available online at <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

participation rates per case within two periods. The threshold I determined for the set membership is 50%.

**Table 31 Raw Data and Fuzzy Membership Scores for FLFP**

<b>Cases</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Raw Data</b>	<b>Period I</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Raw Data</b>	<b>Period II</b>
<b>Italy</b>	1983	39.3%	0.33	2014	54.4%	0.67
<b>Spain</b>	1983	34.1%	0.33	2014	69.8%	1
<b>Portugal</b>	1983	56.5%	0.67	2014	70.0%	1
<b>Greece</b>	1983	39.2%	0.33	2014	59.0%	0.83
<b>Turkey</b>	2004	25.2%	0.17	2014	33.6%	0.33

I selected the years for two periods based on the patterns of the labour force participation of women. For the first period, the years embody the points when the decreasing pattern for a country ends. This is because, while the decreasing trend continues, this signals the impact of the unpaid agricultural labour of women. This is important because the higher rate of women’s participation in the labour force due to unpaid agricultural labour does not provide accounts on the post-transition period. Therefore, I place the focus on the years when the countries have the ‘starting points’ for the increase of participation levels owing to transitory patterns. For the second period, since my purpose is to look at the most successful stage, the recent data has been taken into account in parallel to what has been done for the conditions.

Coming to the calibration of the raw data, Turkey has the lowest levels within two periods while Portugal has the highest levels. Considering the high levels of participation in Portugal and also its status within Europe and countries with high FLFP levels, I assigned a membership score (0.67) to Portugal in the first period and the full membership score in the second period. In the second period, Spain has also the same participation level with Portugal. Therefore, I assign the full membership score to Spain as well. I denote the fuzzy set membership scores of other countries considering their varying raw data.

## CHAPTER 5.

### QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the previous section, I presented the conditions and the outcome, explained their operationalisation, provided the relevant index scores and raw data, assigned the fuzzy set membership scores. In this section, I conduct the fsQCA set-by-step. The cases double in the analysis because, as I explain above, I consider the countries as different cases for the second period. Hence, rather than conducting two separate QCA for two periods, I analyse the countries as two different cases under two periods, which is also one of the distinctive features of this study. This is also a plausible option given that five cases would not be sufficient to conduct QCA.

I execute the QCA analysis with the use of fsQCA software version 3.0 developed by Ragin and Davey (2016)<sup>26</sup>, as I further explain below. Furthermore, I intentionally refrained from data-driven calibration strategy since scholars argue that such approach is mostly flawed. Therefore, as I presented in the previous section, I preferred and applied theory guided calibration by recognising the importance of imposing thresholds external to the data. The preference is also relies on the fact that the conditions examined under this study have quite distinctive values.

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<sup>26</sup> The software can be downloaded at <http://www.fsqca.com>

Coming to the QCA of this research, I present below the fuzzy values data matrix. The values rely on the calibration, translation of raw data (index scores) into fuzzy membership scores, which I conducted in the previous chapter.

**Table 32 Fuzzy Values Data Matrix**

<b>Cases<sup>28</sup></b>	<b>Conditions<sup>27</sup></b>					<b>Outcome</b>
	<b>LEFT</b>	<b>COM</b>	<b>TAKEUP</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>SER</b>	<b>FLFP</b>
<b>PT</b>	1	0.33	0.17	0	0.33	0.67
<b>IT</b>	0.83	0.33	1	0	0.67	0.33
<b>ES</b>	0.67	1	0.83	0.17	0.67	0.33
<b>GR</b>	0.67	0.17	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
<b>TR</b>	0.17	0.33	0	0.17	0.33	0.17
<b>PT2</b>	1	0.83	1	0.17	0.83	1
<b>IT2</b>	0.33	0.33	1	0.67	0.83	0.67
<b>ES2</b>	0.67	0.83	1	0.67	1	1
<b>GR2</b>	1	0.83	0.33	1	0.83	0.83
<b>TR2</b>	0.17	0.83	0.17	0.17	0.67	0.33

I entered these fuzzy set membership scores in the fsQCA software (Step I). First, for a detailed analysis on the status of each case per condition and outcome comparatively, I examined the descriptive statistics. As Schmitter suggests (2008), having first idea of patterns in the data is a critical and required step. What descriptive statistics provides is that if mean membership in the outcome is very

<sup>27</sup> The abbreviations used in this chapter for the conditions are as follows: LEFT for Political Party Configuration, COM for Political Party Commitment, TAKEUP for Take-up of Childcare Facilities, EDU for Level of Tertiary Education among Women and SER for Share of Service Sector Employment in Total Employment. FLFP will be used to denote the outcome of Labour Force Participation Rate of Women.

<sup>28</sup> The abbreviations used in this chapter for the cases are as follows: PT for Portugal, IT for Italy, ES for Spain, GR for Greece and TR for Turkey. For the second periods, the number of 2 are added to the cases.




high, then, it is relatively easy for the single conditions to be consistent with sufficiency, which would, on the other hand, imply the lack of necessary conditions.

**Table 33 Descriptive Statistics of the Outcome and the Conditions**

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum	N	Missing Cases
LEFT	0.651	0.3105302	0.17	1	10	0
COM	0.581	0.2906011	0.17	1	10	0
TAKEUP	0.583	0.3956779	0	1	10	0
EDU	0.335	0.3162357	0	1	10	0
SER	0.649	0.2298021	0.33	1	10	0
FLFP	0.566	0.2911426	0.17	1	10	0

As the table above demonstrates, the mean membership of the outcome is 0.566, which is not, in fact, high. In fact, the mean membership of all conditions except EDU (level of tertiary education among women) is higher than the mean membership of the outcome.

Following Schmitter's proposition, I also made XY plot analysis as I present in the table below. XY plot enables the researcher to discern relations of sufficiency and necessity for all cases. In case all or almost all cases fall above the main diagonal, this indicates a sufficient relation. If all or almost all cases fall below the main diagonal, this suggests a relation of necessity. As indicated by Ragin (2008b:60), XY plots also visualise coverage in a way that the more cases fall away from the main diagonal, the lower the coverage is. However, coverage is only examined for consistent results since coverage for inconsistent results would not be a meaningful indicator (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007).



**Figure 7 XY plot analysis**

I conducted XY plot analysis for all conditions. However, as an example, I present here XY Plot for the outcome and condition of LEFT, political party configuration as the window above demonstrates. In addition to the XY plot analysis, I also utilised the function of fsQCA software for the analysis of necessary conditions to identify the necessity status of single conditions by looking at their consistency and coverage. As I present below, while conditions LEFT, political party configuration, and SER, share of service sector employment, reveal high consistency in terms of their necessity, the necessity score is lower for other conditions.

**Table 34 Analysis of Necessary Conditions**

	Consistency	Coverage
LEFT	0.853357	0.741935
COM	0.791519	0.771084
TAKEUP	0.765018	0.742710
EDU	0.561837	0.949254
SER	0.909894	0.793529

As Step II, I analysed the data, and attained the below truth table. The software I utilised for this study relies on ‘truth table algorithm’ rather than ‘inclusion algorithm’ since the ‘inclusion algorithm’ is only available in older version, and truth table algorithm is recently preferred updated version.

**Table 245 Truth Table**

<b>LEFT</b>	<b>COM</b>	<b>TAKEUP</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>SER</b>	<b>number</b>	<b>FLFP</b>	<b>raw consist.</b>	<b>PRI consist.</b>	<b>SYM consist</b>
1	1	1	0	1	2		0.8866	0.7733	0.7733
							67	33	33
1	0	0	0	0	2		0.7976	0.5	0.5
							19		
1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	1		1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	1		0.8308	0.5	0.5
							46		
0	1	0	0	1	1		0.6268	0	0
							66		
0	0	0	0	0	1		0.5726	0	0
							5		
1	1	0	0	0	0				
1	0	1	0	0	0				
1	1	1	0	0	0				
1	0	0	1	0	0				
1	1	0	1	0	0				
1	0	1	1	0	0				

**Table 35 (cont'd)**

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1	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	1	1	0

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The table above illustrates all possible combinations for the conditions incorporated into analysis. As a golden rule of fuzzy sets, since this study has five conditions, the logically possible combinations are  $2^k$ , that is  $2^5$ , which equals to 32. However, as the table above shows, most of the combinations has no corresponding case, which are named as ‘logical remainders’. Logical remainders imply ‘limited diversity’, which

implies the situations in which logically possible combinations have no empirical evidence within respective population (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). The table above demonstrates the number of cases corresponding to each combination in the number column. Hence, here, I determined the number of cases (frequency) threshold to delete the rows which have the number of cases below the threshold. While setting the frequency threshold, I adopted the following criteria, which are also proposed by Ragin (2008a),: (i) the investigator must reflect the nature of the evidence and the character of the study, (ii) total number of cases included in the study and (iii) the number of causal conditions, the degree of familiarity of the researcher with each case, the degree of precision that is possible in the calibration of fuzzy sets, the extent of measurement and assignment error, whether the researcher is interested in coarse versus fine-grained patterns in the results, and so on.

Relying upon the abovementioned considerations, I determined the frequency threshold as one. Therefore, I deleted the rows having number of cases below one as seen in the table below. The rationale for the frequency threshold determined is the fact that the total number of cases in this study is not high, which is 10. Therefore, it would not be logical to delete the rows with one case. Furthermore, relying on various applications of fsQCA, I note that it is also a common approach to set the threshold as one.

Having applied the frequency threshold, the following procedure would be the determination of consistency threshold. For that purpose, I sorted the raw consistency column in descending order to figure out the rows with low consistency levels. Concerning the consistency, the general presumption, as followed by Ragin (2008a), is that the values below 0.75 indicate substantial inconsistency. Secondly, as present in many applications, the common approach for setting the consistency threshold is to discern first where natural breaking point, where the biggest gap, is identical. Looking at the raw consistency levels, I noted that the greatest gap occurs between 0.79 and 0.62 where 0.75, as a threshold, lies just in between. Therefore, in this study, I chose 0.75 as consistency threshold, and deleted the rows under this threshold as I show below. The table below also demonstrates outcome values:

**Table 36 Truth Table following the Deletion of Rows under Frequency and Consistency Thresholds**

LEFT	COM	TAKEUP	EDU	SER	number	FLFP	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	2	1	0.88666 7	0.77333 3	0.77333 3
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.83084 6	0.5	0.5
1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0.79761 9	0.5	0.5
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.62686 6	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.57265	0	0

The truth table above demonstrates patterns in the data. Additionally, the table provides three major interpretations. First, the table shows that three combinations, demonstrated in rows 1-3, reveal perfect consistency for the outcome. This suggests that these combinations are perfectly sufficient in bringing about the outcome. Second, the truth table in the analysis does not have a combination populated with large number of cases. This implies the presence of diverse patterns leading to the outcome. Third, the condition, take-up rates of ECEC services (TAKEUP), has a membership score in period I for Spain and Italy. This is striking given that in Period I FLFP was lower in both countries. As Chapter 3 in this dissertation shows, the reason seems to be that governments in both countries recognised the role of early education in educating society. Furthermore, the table also shows that all countries

including Turkey have a membership score in service sector employment (SER) in period II. However, although this condition appears to be a significant factor in rising FLFP, the table provides that, on the basis of Turkish case in period II, it cannot singularly lead to the outcome. Hence, we note that we need to further analyse all the conditions across all cases through the software programme.

As the next step, I initiated the fuzzy-set QCA analysis as standard analysis via fsQCA software. First, prime implicant chart appeared, which enabled me to keep the selected prime implicants. Here, I chose to keep all prime implicants, which were TAKEUP, EDU, com\*SER. Second, the alert, showing the intermediate solution assumptions, appeared on the screen. These assumptions enable the researcher to use counterfactuals to simplify the complex solution. Here, I reflected the assumption that each condition would contribute to the outcome when they are individually present. This argument relies on the review of the state-of-the-art I conducted.

Having made this selection, the software presented the truth table analysis as complex solution, parsimonious solution and intermediate solution as I present below:

Model: FLFP = f (LEFT, COM, TAKEUP, EDU, SER)

### COMPLEX SOLUTION

**frequency cutoff:** 1  
**consistency cutoff:** 0.797619

	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
LEFT*TAKEUP*~EDU*SER	0.498233	0.20318	0.805714
LEFT*COM*EDU*SER	0.473498	0.206714	1
LEFT*~COM*~TAKEUP*~EDU*~SER	0.236749	0.0883393	0.797619
~LEFT*~COM*TAKEUP*EDU*SER	0.236749	0.0600706	1
<b>solution coverage</b>	0.883392		
<b>solution consistency</b>	0.830565		

## PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION

**frequency cutoff:** 1  
**consistency cutoff:** 0.797619

	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
LEFT	0.853357	0.0600707	0.741935
TAKEUP	0.765018	0.0583039	0.74271
EDU	0.561837	0	0.949254
~COM*SER	0.443463	0	0.833887
<b>solution coverage</b>	0.971731		
<b>solution consistency</b>	0.6875		

## INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION

**frequency cutoff:** 1  
**consistency cutoff:** 0.797619

**Assumptions:** LEFT (present); COM (present); TAKEUP (present); EDU (present); SER (present)

	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
LEFT	0.853357	0.469965	0.741935
TAKEUP*EDU*SER	0.443463	0.0600707	1
<b>solution coverage</b>	0.913428		
<b>solution consistency</b>	0.754744		

As the methodologists of QCA indicate, since the complex solution does not allow for any simplifying assumptions, the solution term is hardly reduced in complexity. This is also the case for the parsimonious solution. The intermediate solution, on the



other hand, enables the incorporation of simplifying assumptions. The viability of the intermediate solution relies on the quality of the counterfactuals, that is the incorporation of easy counterfactuals, employed in the minimisation process (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). On the condition that simplifying assumptions are diligently used, Ragin (2008b) recommends the intermediate solution as the main point of reference for interpreting QCA results. This is because, complex solution is too complicated for theoretically meaningful inference, and parsimonious solution carries the disadvantage of relying largely on assumptions (since parsimonious solutions encompass all counterfactuals irrespective of their plausibility) about logical remainders (Greckhamer, 2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). Following this common approach, in this study, I take into account of the output produced by the intermediate solution. This is also because it is only the intermediate solution which provides a satisfactory and rather simple output.

Furthermore, concerning the intermediate solution, I note that the solution omits the condition, COM, namely political party commitment. This implies the irrelevance of this condition in possible set of combinations leading to the outcome. In QCA terms, this condition is dubbed as ‘unnecessary’ given that its presence or absence within a configuration does not have an influence on the outcome (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2008). The pathways towards higher FLFP, therefore, incorporate other four conditions, as I detail below.

As shown in the output above, the intermediate solution provides the following result:

#### **LEFT + TAKEUP\*EDU\*SER → FLFP**

As a reflection to the QCA results, first of all, the result responds to the research question in this study, which is *Under what conditions FLFP rates took-off in these South European countries?* The result suggests two pathways leading to higher FLFP, which I explain in detail below. The result also accounts for the other question, which is *How do potential determinants of FLFP vary in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey since the early 1980s?* In fact, the combinations of conditions which explain the higher FLFP in other South European countries

correspond, based on the analysis, also to the points of divergence in the context Turkey.

Furthermore, I note that *equifinality* is present in this result since there is more than one pathway to the outcome. This is also named as multiple causation. In addition, the solution also presents the *conjunctural* character of causal complexity since, as the second pathway, TAKEUP\*EDU\*SER jointly lead to the outcome.

Second, this solution enables a reliable analysis highly contributing to the existing literature. Based on the intermediate solution, I, first of all, derive that, the condition LEFT OR the combination of the conditions, TAKEUP, EDU and SER are sufficient for the outcome. That is, the condition of political party configuration, LEFT, which denotes the membership in the set of countries with the salient presence of left-parties in the party politics OR the high share of services (INUS condition), high tertiary education levels among women (INUS condition) and high levels of take-up rates of preschool education and care facilities (INUS condition) is sufficient for the high FLFP levels.

Third, the solution is congruent with the propositions of the state-of-the-art. However, this study and the QCA conducted adds to the existing arguments. The solution, distinctively, emphasises the significance of the left parties for higher FLFP since this condition arises as ‘singularly sufficient’ (Ragin, 2000). Even though the solution term also incorporates the pathway of TAKEUP\*EDU\*SER, the raw coverage of the combination of these conditions is low compared to the raw coverage and unique coverage of the single condition of political party configuration, LEFT. Each condition of the second configuration is an *INUS* condition, which means that they are insufficient but necessary part of a combination which is itself unnecessary but sufficient.

Fourth, I conducted a further analysis of the necessary conditions to be able to rely confidently on the intermediate solution obtained. I present here below the analysis of the necessary conditions by testing the necessity of the combinations which the intermediate solution proposes:

**Table 257 Analysis of Necessity for the Solution**

	Consistency	Coverage
LEFT	0.853357	0.741935
TAKEUP+EDU+SER	0.939929	0.710280
LEFT+ TAKEUP+EDU+SER	1.000000	0.665882

The analysis of necessary conditions presents that the consistency scores of the single condition of LEFT, and the combination of the conditions of TAKEUP, EDU and SER are high as they are above 0.80. Furthermore, the combination of four conditions reveals perfect consistency for the sufficiency for the outcome.

Fifth, to test the solution obtained, I conducted a subset/superset analysis by dismissing the condition COM. The methodologists of QCA consider the subset/superset analysis as an important indicator of sufficiency of conditions or combinations of the conditions. The table below presents the analysis:

**Table 26 Subset/Superset Analysis**

Terms	consistency	coverage	combined
LEFT*TAKEUP*EDU*SER	1.000000	0.383392	0.616083
LEFT*TAKEUP*EDU	1.000000	0.383392	0.616083
LEFT*TAKEUP*SER	0.836930	0.616608	0.732427
TAKEUP*EDU*SER	1.000.000	0.443463	0.662592
LEFT*EDU*SER	1.000.000	0.501767	0.704804
LEFT*TAKEUP	0.813333	0.646643	0.732608
TAKEUP*EDU	1.000000	0.443463	0.662592
TAKEUP*SER	0.832000	0.734982	0.799647
LEFT*EDU	0.943522	0.501767	0.701236

**Table 38 (cont'd)**

LEFT*SER	0.864000	0.763251	0.837968
EDU*SER	1.000000	0.561837	0.745801
TAKEUP	0.742710	0.765018	0.694234
LEFT	0.741935	0.853357	0.733222
EDU	0.949254	0.561837	0.742025
SER	0.793529	0.909894	0.842447

Furthermore, as I highlighted in various sections of this dissertation, this study adopts a unique approach for the conduct of the QCA by looking at two different periods of the same case. In so doing, the study doubles the cases for a country. This unique approach incorporates, to a certain extent, inter-temporality in the analysis. This is because, owing to such an approach, I discern that increases in the fuzzy membership scores of conditions TAKEUP, EDU and SER coincide with the relative increases in the outcome scores per each case. However, this is not the case for the condition of LEFT. This, in fact, enables a further elaboration.

First, with the intermediate solution of the truth table analysis and the subset/super set analysis I show above, the set of countries with salient presence of left parties in party politics reflect also higher scores on FLFP. However, it is not possible to argue that the change in the level of the membership leads to significant change on the FLFP. Therefore, this condition does not account for a cross-time variation even though it gives a significant correlational relation with the outcome of FLFP.

On the other hand, the combination of conditions, which is present in the intermediate solution albeit with a low consistency score, TAKEUP, EDU and SER reveal the influence of change in the conditions between two periods on the outcome per each case. What this accounts for is that joint increase in the share of service sector employment, tertiary level of education and take-up rates causes further increase in FLFP. However, the condition of LEFT, albeit high consistency score,

does not reveal such influence on the outcome as cross-time analysis on the fuzzy values data matrix shows. Therefore, although membership in this variable would be sufficient for the membership in the outcome, it is not a factor which would constantly increase the FLFP with the increase in its level. Relying on that, I argue that to increase the potency of the causal arguments made with QCA, researchers may incorporate cross-time aspects into their research.



## CHAPTER 6.

### COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS

In this section, I intend to present the potential contributions of this study to the state-of-the-art together with an overview of its major findings, the distinctive features of this study and my own accounts on QCA as a research methodology.

#### 6.1. Overview of the Study

I sought to draw ‘lessons’ in this dissertation. This is how I frame it: countries of Southern Europe (except Turkey) have shown substantial progress in pulling more women into the labour force especially in the last three decades. Turkey aspires higher rates of FLFP and this is where South European transitions, with a set of lessons learnt, are illuminating. Additionally, I relied on the traditions in comparative public policy/welfare states/labour markets that see social reality through the prism of regimes. Based on the richly diverse literature, scholars suggest that Turkey shares welfare states and labour market regime characteristics with those in Southern Europe the most.

In such comparative analysis of South European countries including Turkey, I aimed at proposing the conditions or combinations of conditions for higher FLFP. In so

doing, I also tried to explain the divergence of Turkish case compared to South European countries concerning FLFP levels, and also the determinants behind the achievement in recent decades in the SESM. I expected that such an analysis would explain why Turkey could not keep pace with other South European countries.

The existing studies emphasise the role of structural factors while explaining low FLFP in Turkey. However, decline in Turkey lasted for an excessively long period of time, FLFP fluctuated at strikingly low levels and the bounce-back emerged exceptionally late. Such a situation, in fact, implies a divergence which Turkey features. Although scholars pointed at areas of divergence, they did so by picking up a factor, and trying to explain descriptively how FLFP can increase with reference to that factor without necessarily applying causal empirical analysis. Hence, in an overall analysis, the state-of-the-art related to FLFP in Turkey does not account for the pathway(s), grounded in sound causal comparative analysis, Turkey should direct itself to attain higher levels of FLFP. The international literature, on the other hand, either conducts descriptive analysis over limited number of cases, or looks at the net effects of variables. This literature, mainly covering developed nations of Western Europe or Northern America, does not provide account for particularities of other group of countries, and neither do they explore constellations of conditions leading to higher FLFP.

In this respect, with this study, I intended to grasp, based on the comparative insights from the Southern Europe, the factors which brought about South European success, and aimed at proposing a pathway or pathways for Turkey to follow South European trend. Such an analysis also provided clues as to the areas Turkey was divergent and was in need of development.

For that purpose, I conducted fsQCA. I applied fsQCA with five conditions (political party configuration, political party commitment, take-up of childcare facilities, share of service sector employment and tertiary level education among women) and one outcome (FLFP). I selected QCA as the research method for this study because I sought making causal inferences. However, my purpose was not to gauge the degree of effects, rather, to come up with the determinants on higher FLFP. QCA, in this respect, was the best option, as opposed to conventional quantitative methods, since my ultimate goal was to come up with the recipes for Turkey based on causal

comparative analysis. I detail further reasons for the particular selection of QCA in Chapter 1.

I included Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey as cases in the analysis and incorporated two time periods for all cases. The main determinant of the first period was low FLFP, and high(er) FLFP denoted the second period.

## **6.2. Findings of the Study and Its Contribution to the State-of-the-Art**

The QCA I conducted in this study points at two possible pathways for higher FLFP in Southern Europe. Based on the analysis, I derived that the condition of political party configuration, LEFT, which denotes the membership in the set of countries with the salient presence of left-parties in the party politics OR the high share of services, high tertiary education levels among women and high levels of take-up rates of preschool education and care facilities is sufficient for the high FLFP levels.

The first pathway consisting of the salient presence of left-parties is consistent with the case analysis I provided in Chapter 3. Such analysis provides detailed accounts on the prominent role of left parties in four South European countries in paving the way for higher FLFP. They first actively engaged in women-friendly policies through expanding childcare arrangements, reconciliation and gender equality policies and tackling the unfavourable conditions such as long hours of work or policy distortions in the context of welfare state policies. Second, they were active in modernising and secularising society through investing in education and changing traditional attitudes including those against working women. Third, they extensively worked on promoting gender equality policies in tandem with the feminists. Hence, the comparative-historical case analysis and also QCA highlight the role of the left parties as the main agencies in increasing FLFP in Southern Europe. With such an account, I shift the emphasis in the state-of-the-art from structural factors to parties and policies. To derive a lesson for Turkey, the political parties in South European countries reflect in their policies the recognition of the necessity for putting forward necessary measures to ease women's access to paid labour. When I compare the policies, targets and achievements of political parties, variance across countries is prevalent as I present in Chapter 3. However, Turkey apparently arises as a divergent



case in terms of proposing quotas to attain gender equality in many spheres of socio-economic and political life. The country also lagged behind in implementing necessary measures to decrease weekly working hours and to promote reconciliation of work and family life. Thus, defamilisation process is rudimentary in Turkey, which arises as one of the barriers in scaling up the rates of employment among women. In an overall argument, I can reliably indicate that the left parties in four South European countries achieved to make the paid labour of women a politically recognised *social norm*. I also note that norms and culture in a society can in general shape agendas of political parties as well. However, this study shows that political parties in Southern Europe could serve as pioneers of change by pursuing roles in modernising and secularising the society, which eventually changed social attitudes considerably. Hence, this pathway implies the significance of pioneering initiatives promoted by the left parties in these countries. Further research may also investigate whether local governance by left parties had any impact on FLFP given that left parties governed some municipalities for long periods of time.

Second, the literature on gendering welfare states emphasises the positive impact of the left parties on the development of favourable policies for women. Looking at the truth table, the set-relation between the salience of left parties in party politics and FLFP levels is evident. This is also supported by the sufficiency analysis as the condition on left-parties demonstrated high level of sufficiency. Furthermore, case analysis in Chapter 3 also support this positive influence. Therefore, this study validates the argument in the state-of-the-art also in the context of South European countries. However, I came up with an analysis which highlights the role of left parties much firmly. This, in fact, demonstrates that the emphasis placed on this determinant in the state-of-the-art remains to be much weaker.

Third, concerning the influence of the policies which favour the educational expansion and welfare states expansion, I aimed at tapping into the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset, and used the scores of the countries on per504 and per506 (welfare state expansion and educational expansion). However, I depicted an important constraint with respect to Comparative Manifesto Project dataset. This was the lack of sub-categories in the dataset. To be exact, welfare state expansion incorporated also the health policies, pensions etc. Hence, the score of the categories

corresponds to more comprehensive expansion policies, which disrupts the analysis of certain specific policies such as childcare policies. In this regard, another contribution of this study has been to demonstrate the need of sub-categorisation of categories of prolific Comparative Manifesto Project dataset. The formation of sub-categories would promote the conduct of more research with the use of such prolific dataset.

Fourth, I took the take-up rates of preschool childcare facilities as another condition of this study. Initially, I intended to look at the take-up rates among the children aged 0-school age, however, I depicted a data availability problem concerning children aged 0-3 for the 1980s. Although reliable data has recently emerged extensively on the take-up rates and also family policies internationally, the data for childcare provision targeting 0-3 is still limited. Hence, this study also points at the necessity of formation of internationally reliable data for this age group starting with the 1980s.

Fifth, I recognise that even though the share of service sector employment has increased in Turkey, women have not been able to utilise the increase in the employment opportunities in service sector as much as women did in Southern Europe. Strikingly, men have higher participation rates in service sector in Turkey while in all countries in Southern Europe, women have higher shares. This situation again implies the necessity of coordinated and complementary policy measures. As the QCA suggests, increase in service sector alone would not lead to higher FLFP. Above all, as the truth table reveals, Turkey's divergence still remains in terms of the comparatively lower levels of service sector share in the economy. QCA shows with the sufficiency score that this condition has considerable sufficiency score, and therefore, important for the outcome set.

In terms of periodical change, all countries have experienced significant changes favouring the status of women in labour markets. Yet, Turkey remains to be an outlier in terms of tertiary education level of women as well. This is a significant point of divergence from Southern Europe, and needs to be dealt with to keep pace with South European countries in term of FLFP levels.

Sixth, owing to the studies on gendering the welfare states and defamilisation research, I incorporated the condition of take-up rates in the analysis. By incorporating this condition, I could demonstrate that Turkey is identified as an outlier with respect to its defamilisation process. This leads the conclusion that Turkey needs to focus more on the preschool education and care to ease women's access to paid labour. I derive the conclusion on Turkey's divergence in this respect and the influence of this condition on FLFP in Southern Europe based also on the case analysis in Chapter 3.

Seventh, in the context of SESM, this study enables causal inferences in the context of FLFP based on solid empirical ground. Furthermore, the study provides further accounts on the model with its particular focus on FLFP patterns and characteristics in education, defamilisation, welfare state and political party configuration. With respect to the FLFP studies in Turkey, on the other hand, this study uniquely provides an explanatory analysis to the discussions on FLFP problem in Turkey. Utilising the international debates and the state-of-the-art, the study incorporates childcare in the analysis as a determinant.

Lastly, the study also contributes to the debates and studies on 'new welfare state' and 'middle-income trap'. As I mention in the Chapter 1, FLFP constitutes a significant dimension for both body of literature. This study, by proposing pathways to increase FLFP, in fact, also sheds light upon conditions to shift to the 'new welfare state' stage and overcome the 'middle-income trap'. Furthermore, this study also contributes to the comparative welfare state research by stressing the implications of welfare state policies and to the gendering welfare state literature by highlighting the relevance and importance of looking at welfare state policies through gendered lenses.

### **6.3. Distinctive Features of This Study**

The peculiarity of this research has been looking at this problem through different as well as recently-adopted research lenses. This is, first of all, accomplished through incorporating the concept and perspective of defamilisation into the analysis. Even though many studies exist in the literature which focus on the reasons behind the low

levels of FLFP in Turkey, emphasis upon defamilisation, which has wide acceptance in relevant international studies, is new to the state-of-the-art in Turkey.

Second, apart from incorporating defamilisation into the research, this study has taken a step forward by seeking a causal inference. No study focusing on FLFP in Turkey or in Southern Europe attempted for a causal comparative explanation. The studies I referred to while reviewing the state-of-the-art point at the divergence from Southern Europe, however, they have not yet engaged in conducting a comparative study with a sound methodological approach to account for this divergence. I, therefore, conducted a research which was called out in the state-of-the-art, but never applied.

Third, as another distinctive feature of this study, I applied QCA in a study on FLFP. To my knowledge, this study is the first instance in both QCA applications in terms of using the methodology on an FLFP study and FLFP studies in terms of conducting the research incorporating QCA. Furthermore, this study is the first QCA application focusing particularly on Turkey.

Fourth, applying QCA, I also aimed at contributing to the QCA methodologically. With the purpose of contributing to the literature, I uniquely incorporated the same country as two different cases within two different periods. In so doing, taking the same country as two cases in two different periods, I could observe the across-time changes among the sample countries. In addition, being quite suitable for the scope of this research, such approach leads to a more potent output given that cross-time changes for a country are also reflected in the analysis. Furthermore, with this approach, the output of the QCA of this study revealed that although there is a strong *set-relation* between the countries with salience of left parties in Southern Europe and the countries with high FLFP, the conditions of tertiary education among women, take-up rates and share of service sector employment have *increasing* impact on the outcome of FLFP. If the study had only looked at one period, it would not be possible to derive such conclusion.

#### **6.4. Policy Implications for Turkey**

QCA as well as the case analysis on South European patterns of FLFP provide significant policy implications for Turkey. First, concerning the implications of the QCA result, it is important to highlight that since our analysis is based on configurational methods, all conditions specified in the second path should co-exist at the same time to bring about higher FLFP. This suggests the necessity for coordinated policy interventions in Turkey. Turkey, therefore, should expand ECEC facilities for children. The expansion, as the South European experience reveals, should be formed and developed in the context of promoting reconciliation of work and family life. Evolution of defamilisation regime in Southern Europe demonstrates the significance of affordable and quality services with working hours enabling dual-earner model. The expansion of services, therefore, can be developed in accordance with the social investment approach increasingly featuring in the EU's policy agenda. Another lesson from Southern Europe for Turkey is expanding the services with greater involvement of sub-national authorities. However, research shows that expansion of services would not suffice. The government should encourage take-up of these services through emphasising the importance of ECEC.

Second, with respect to increasing tertiary education attainment among women, Turkey should, first of all, tackle the drop-out problem among women in secondary education. Additionally, the quality of tertiary education should be increased in the pursuit of increasing employability of women in the labour markets. Again, increased emphasis should be placed on eradicating the segregation in education.

Third, although service sector employment has been expanding in Turkey, in contrast to the South European experience, men constitute higher share compared to women. This figure implies the impediments encountered by women such as lack of childcare services. Hence, measures should be adopted towards attaining defamilisation, reconciliation of work and family life and also gender equality at work.

The implication based upon the first pathway for Turkey is the importance of turning FLFP a social norm. That is, by deviating from conservative and familialist policy practices affecting FLFP, a social environment may be promoted by political parties in a way that each segment of society acknowledges and demands that women should

have equal opportunities to work. This eventually turns their participation in labour force an accepted social norm. In this way, the influence of conservative and patriarchal norms affecting FLFP negatively can be restrained. In this respect, considering also the analysis on South European patterns in Chapter 3, Turkey, as practiced mostly by the left parties in other countries, may promote policies towards attaining gender equality in all spheres of life. In the political sphere, quotas can be implemented to enable representation of more women in the parliament and also in the local governance. Furthermore, gender equality bodies can be stimulated and their effectiveness can be increased. In the economic sphere, practices favourable for women can be advanced. Incentives can be provided to the private sector as well to promote such favourable conditions. These include provision of vouchers for childcare arrangements, arrangements for enabling reconciliation of work and family life, granting parental leaves to the fathers etc. In the social and cultural sphere, awareness can be raised to turn FLFP a socially accepted norm. All of these policies, on the other hand, necessitate a re-orientation in strategic programming of a variety of interventions and a solid planning for their effective implementation.

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