



ANKARA

HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ

**POLITICS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL
MARKETIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND
POLICY USING THE KARIBA REDD+ PROJECT IN
ZIMBABWE.**

By Dereck Lazarus Hamunakwadi

Supervisor

Associate Professor Özge Çelik Russell

**MASTER'S THESIS
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

September 2019



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INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SEPTEMBER 2019

Approval (Signature) Page of Thesis Board Members.

This thesis study titled: Politics of Global Environmental Governance and Policy: Understanding the global marketization of environmental governance and policy using the Kariba REDD+ project in Zimbabwe. By Hamunakwadi Dereck Lazarus has been accepted with unanimity vote majority as a Master Program thesis of International Public Administration by our Thesis Board.

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Dereck Lazarus HAMUNAKWADI

16/09/2019

ÇEVRESEL YÖNETİŞİM VE POLİTİKA KARİBA REDD + ZİMBABWE'DEKİ PROJEYİ
KULLANARAK ÇEVRESEL YÖNETİŞİM VE POLİTİKANIN KÜRESEL PAZARLAMASINI
ANLAMAK.

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

HAMUNAKWADI DERECK LAZARUS

ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ

Eylül 2019

ÖZET

Bu nitel fenomenolojik çalışma, çevre ve iklimin pazarlanmasını kavrayarak küresel çevre yönetimi ve politikasını anlama üzerine dayanıyor. Araştırma çalışması esas olarak 2011'den beri Zimbabwe'de uygulanmakta olan orman kaybı ve bozulması kaynaklı salınımların azaltılması (REDD+) ve özellikle Kariba REDD+ üzerine odaklanmıştır. Çevresel yönetim ve politikanın pazarlanması, 21. yüzyıldaki neo-liberal ideolojisine sıkıca dayanan uygulama ve kültürdür. Pazarlanma, fiyatlandırma sistemlerinin ve pazar ilişkilerinin tanıtılması yoluyla pazar ticaretinin çevreye ve ekosistemlere yayılmasını içerir. REDD+ programı, küresel ısınma ve iklim değişikliğine karşı mücadelede karbon stoklarının artırılmasının yanı sıra, ormansızlaşma gibi orman bozulmalarından kaynaklanan emisyonların azaltılmasındaki katkılarına katılarak paydaşlarına finansal ödüller sağlamak amacıyla küresel düzeyde müzakere edildi ve kavramsallaştırıldı. Kariba REDD+ projesinden faydalanarak temel amaç serbest piyasa ilkelerinin uygulanmasının iklim değişikliğine tepki vermeyle ilgili geçerli bir seçenek sunup sunmadığını ve bunların çevreye ve Mbire yerel yerli toplumu üzerindeki etkilerini belirlemektir. Verileri toplanırken fenomenolojik bir araştırma tasarımına uygun olan yöntemlerle gerçekleştirildi. Bu yöntemler arasında anahtar bilgi veren görüşmeler, Odak Grup Tartışmaları ve tamamlayıcı anket, katılımcı gözlem ve İkincil kaynaklar bulunmaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları, Kariba REDD+ projesinin tasarım ve uygulamasının kötü yönetim ve demokratik olmayan uygulamalarla birleştirildiğini, projenin Mbire bölgesindeki geçim güvensizliğini sağladığını ve sosyal-kültürel zorluklarını müsaade ettiğini vurguladı. Kariba REDD+ projesi, kendisinin doğrudan yararlanıcılarının geçim güvenliğini olumlu yönde etkilemesine rağmen, çalışma sürecinde bu projenin bir bütün olarak Mbire bölgesindeki doğal kaynakların yönetimini başarıyla merkezleştirdiğini ve geçim güvenliği dinamiklerini değiştirdiğini ortaya koydu. Bu süreç esnasında, önceki arazi ve orman kontrolleri çevre ve iklimin pazarlanması yoluyla pazar ilkeleri tarafından aşıldı. Sonuç olarak, Mbire yerli halk topluluğunun yırtıcı piyasalar ve devletin hiyerarşik yapısı tarafından ihanet edildiğine göre kendileri tarafından kendi sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel yörüngelerini belirlemelerini destekliyor. Bu bulgular göz önüne alındığında, çalışma Kariba REDD+ projesinin meşruiyeti ve dayanıklılığının tehlikeye girdiği sonucuna varmıştır.

Bilimi kodu : 11611
Anahtar : Küresel Çevresel Yönetişim, çevre politikası, çevrenin pazarlanması,
Kelimeler : Neoliberalizm, REDD+, Kariba REDD+, Karbon Politikaları.
Sayfa Adedi : 147
Tez Danışmanı : Prof. Doç Professor Özge ÇELİK RUSSELL

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Master's Thesis

HAMUNAKWADI DERECK LAZARUS

ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELI UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION

SEPTEMBER 2019

ABSTRACT

This qualitative phenomenological study is bent on understanding the politics of global environmental governance and policy by comprehending the marketisation of the environment and climate. The research study primarily focused on the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and particularly the Kariba REDD+ under implementation in Zimbabwe since 2011. The marketisation of environmental governance and policy is the practice and culture dominant in the 21st that is firmly grounded on the neo-liberal ideology. Marketisation involves the extension of market trade to the environment and ecosystems through the introduction of pricing systems and market relations. The REDD+ program was negotiated and conceptualised at the global level in order to provide financial rewards to stakeholders through their participation in the reduction of emissions from deforestation, forest degradation as well as enhancement of carbon stocks in the fight against environmental degradation and climate change. Using the Kariba REDD+ project, the major objective was to determine if the application of free market principles present a viable prescription relevant in responding to climate change and the extent to which they impact on the environment and the Mbire local indigenous community. The collection of data was carried through methods that are embedded on a phenomenological research design. These methods include Key informant interviews, Focus Group Discussions and complementary survey, Participant observation and Secondary sources. The findings of the study highlighted that the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project is riddled with bad governance and undemocratic practices, that the project further entrenches livelihood insecurity in the Mbire district and nurture a plethora of social-cultural challenges. Note withstanding that the Kariba REDD+ project has positively impacted on the livelihood security of direct beneficiaries of the project, the study established that the project on the whole recentralised natural resources governance in the Mbire district. Recentralisation of natural resource governance manifest through the appropriation of land and forest which in turn negatively impact on livelihood security for the broader Mbire local indigenous community. In the process, previous land and forests controls were overrun by market principles through the marketisation of the environment and climate. Resultantly, it inhibits the Mbire local indigenous community to determine their own social, economic and cultural trajectory as they are trapped by the pervasive and predatory markets and the hierarchical structure of the state. Taking into consideration of these findings, the study concluded that the legitimacy and durability of the Kariba REDD+ project is compromised.

Science Code : 11611
Key Words : Global Environmental Governance, Politics of the Environment and Climate Change, Marketization, Neo-liberalism, REDD+, Kariba REDD+, Politics of Carbon.
Page Number : 147
Supervisor : Assoc Professor Özge ÇELİK RUSSELL

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe much gratitude to my supervisor Associate Professor Özge Çelik Russell for her invaluable scholarly guidance and support in this study. Special thanks go to Dr. Petra Cafnik Uludağ, Professor Kıvılcım Ertan and Dr. Recep Demir whose unwavering academic and moral support enabled me to complete this research.

Most importantly, I am grateful to my family and friends who made huge sacrifices so that this study sees the light of day.

Finally, this study couldn't have been possible without all the support and cooperation of research participants who enabled me to capture primary data which forms the cornerstone of this study. The same goes to various authors and sources whose work played a crucial role in enriching this study.

Ndinotenda, Thank You, Teşekkürler.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to the Hamunakwadi family. Your continued steadfast belief in me is second to none. So, thank you for supporting me to pursue my dreams.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ÖZET	IV
ABSTRACT.....	V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	VI
DEDICATION.....	VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	VIII
LIST OF FIGURES	XII
LIST OF TABLES.....	XIII
LIST OF MAPS	XIV
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	XV
CHAPTER I.....	1
1.1 Introduction and Background.....	1
1.2. Marketization of the Environment.	2
1.2.1 The Marketization of the environment: Criticism.....	3
1.2.2. The marketization of the environment and climate as political in nature ..	3
1.2.3. The marketization of the environment and climate as unethical.....	4
1.2.4. The marketization of the environment and climate as ideologically driven.	5
1.3. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)	6
1.3.1. The Kariba REDD+ project in Zimbabwe.	7
1.3.2. REDD+ as a mechanism for the marketization of the environment: Criticism.	8
1.4. Land Governance and administration in Zimbabwe.	10
1.5. Problem Statement	11
1.6. Justification of the study	13
1.7. Research Objectives	14
1.8. Research Questions	14
1.9. Theoretical Framework	14
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	17

2.1. Introduction	17
2.2. Global Environmental Governance	17
2.3. Marketization of environmental governance and policy as Creative Self Destruction.	18
2.4. Functions and significance of creative self-destruction in global environment and climate Governance.	21
2.4.1. Corporate environmentalism as a claimed solution to climate change	22
2.4.2. Corporate omnipotence as a stance that considers corporate authority as the most feasible way to respond to climatic and environmental problems....	23
2.4.3. Corporate citizenship as a way to claim legitimacy and morality in offering solutions to climate and environmental problems.	24
2.5. The History and Evolution of the REDD+ program.	24
2.6. The design and implementation of REDD+	29
2.6.1. The Three Phased REDD+ Readiness Approach	30
2.7. REDD+ and the Carbon trading systems.	31
2.8. REDD+, tenure security and carbon rights.	33
2.9. REDD+ and Governance Values.	38
3. KARIBA REDD+ STUDY AREA, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY	43
3.1. Introduction	43
3.2. Study Area.....	44
3.3. Sampling	45
3.4. Research Design.....	47
3.5. Data Collection Methods.....	49
3.5.1. Key Informant interviews (KIIs).....	49
3.5.2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and complementary Survey	51
3.5.3. Participant Observation.	53
3.6 Data analysis and processing.	54
3.7. Limitations to the study.....	58
3.8. Ethical Considerations.	58

4. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION.....	61
4.1. Introduction	61
4.2. Diverse Actors And Their Interests In The Kariba Redd+ Project.....	61
4.2.1. Carbon Green Africa and other private companies.	62
4.2.2. Mbire Rural District Council	64
4.2.3. Mbire local Indigenous Community (Traditional leadership and Community members).....	67
4.2.4. Forest Commission.....	70
4.2.5. The Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).....	71
4.3. The Power Relations, Ownership And Control Dynamics In The Kariba Redd+ Project.....	74
4.3.1. Information asymmetries in the Kariba REDD+ project.	74
4.3.2. Kariba REDD+ project and the Livelihood of Mbire local indigenous community.....	82
4.4. The Legitimacy And Sustainability Of The Kariba Redd+ Project	89
4.4.1. Governance values in the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project.....	91
4.4.2. Kariba REDD+ and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)	93
4.4.3. Lack of understanding of the Kariba REDD+ project’s benefit structure.	98
5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	103
5.1. Summary of findings.....	103
5.2. Conclusion.....	108
5.3. Recommendations	108
5.3.1. Weak institutions and poor governance challenges	109
5.3.2. Livelihood insecurity challenges.....	110
5.3.3. Socio-cultural challenges	111
BIBLIOGRAPHY	113
APPENDICES	127
Appendix 1: The Ethics Commission Report.....	129

Appendix 2: Key informant Interview Guide for Kariba REDD+ implementation partners.....	133
Appendix 3: Key informant Interview Guide for community and traditional leaders.....	135
Appendix 4: Key informant Interview Guide for Kariba REDD+ Experts	137
Appendix 5: Focus Group Discussions Guide.	139
Appendix 6: Complementary Survey Guide	141
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	145



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2. 1 REDD+ Readiness three phased approach	31
Figure 2. 2 Forest Tenure distribution in Africa, Asia and Latin America.....	35
Figure 2. 3 The hierarchy of power in global environmental governance and policy	39
Figure 2. 4 Model for evaluation of governance values in REDD+	41
Figure 3. 1 Steps for Phenomenological data analysis	56
Figure 5. 1 Kariba REDD+ ownership dynamics	78
Figure 5. 2 Communities' involvement in the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project	80
Figure 5. 3 Communities benefiting from the Kariba REDD+ project	88
Figure 5. 4 The Kariba REDD+ project changed communities' livelihoods.....	89
Figure 6. 1 Communities gave FPIC during the design of the Kariba REDD+ project.	95
Figure 6. 2 Communities' involvement in decision making in the Kariba REDD+ project	97
Figure 6. 3 Integration of community leaders' decisions and views into the project.	98
Figure 6. 4 Knowledge of Kariba REDD+ project's benefit structure	100
Figure 6. 5 Existence of a plan or consensus on use of funds coming out of the Kariba REDD+ project.	101

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2. 1 Functions of corporate political myths on climate change	22
Table 2. 2 REDD+ history and evolution timeline	28



LIST OF MAPS

Map 1.1 Kariba REDD+ project monitoring areas	8
Map 3. 1 Mbire District	45



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resources Management
CCB	Climate Community and Biodiversity
CCBA	Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance
CGA	Carbon Green Africa
CGI	Carbon Green Investments
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CIFOR	Centre for International Forestry Research
COP	Conference of Parties
CPRs	Common Pool Resources
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EA	Environmental Africa
ETS	Emissions Trading Scheme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCPC	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FIP	Forest Investment Program
FPIC	Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Green House Gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
LULUCF	Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
MBIs	Market Based Instruments
MEAs	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MES	Markets for Ecosystem Services
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PES	Payments for Ecosystem Services
RDCs	Rural District Councils
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REDD+ SES	REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards
SEPC	Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria

SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SESA	Environmental and Social Assessment
TI Z	Transparency International Zimbabwe
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNDRIP	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UN- REDD	United Nations -REDD
VCS	Verified Carbon Standard
WB	World Bank
WWF	World Wildlife Fund



CHAPTER I

1.1 Introduction and Background

Under climate and environment governance, there exist deep seated debates regarding the appropriateness, viability and sustainability of mitigation strategies and programs that are facilitated and championed by international and multi-lateral organisations amongst them the World Bank and the United Nations. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) note that environmental governance involves regulatory processes and organisations that are utilised by political actors to influence environmental actions and outcomes. This means that at the centre of environmental governance are political-economic relationships embodied by institutions that help shape identities, actions as well as outcomes. This study uses the Kariba REDD+ project being implemented in Zimbabwe to help comprehend this debate particularly to understand the nature of governance of the project from its design all the way to its implementation.

It is worth noting that politics of climate and environmental governance manifest through a plethora of ways. Amongst them is differences in ideologies, world viewpoints, ethical standing, plurality of values and narratives such as the interpretation of progress. Taking into consideration of these diverse manifestations in the area environment and climate change, this qualitative study analyses the extant common practice where free markets and neo-liberal policies dominate the global climate and environmental policy and governance agenda. The study's main aim is hinged on determining whether free markets present a viable prescription relevant in responding to climate change and the extent to which they impact on the society especially in the context of the developing world. The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) program as a phenomenon of this decade is the primary focus of this study.

Most importantly, the research study is not only critical in nature as it is both normative and empirical in orientation. As underlined by McGregor et al (2014) some view REDD+ as an expression of neoliberal exploitation characterised by the dominance of market logic and distortion of local agency, isolation of local communities culminating in eco-colonialism, 'green grabbing', and a dilution of developed countries responsibility for emission reduction while for others though REDD+ is not perfect, it represents the latest and potentially last hope for the world's forest due to its innovative effort to curb some economic drivers of global deforestation. Essentially, this research study's footing

resonates with the former, but nonetheless acknowledges that critical research should not be distanced from effective change (Hardt 2011).

1.2 Marketization of the Environment.

The study makes an attempt to deeply comprehend fundamental concepts and practices that are relevant in understanding the genesis, state and nature of the REDD+ program across the globe. Amongst these terms is marketization. Grasping the concept of marketization is key as it is associated with climate change, global warming and the conservation of forests than ever before. This makes the term the backbone of the research. In simple terms marketization entails a process where market principles are applied in the realms of environment and climate thereby making neoliberal policies spread tentacles in environment and climate governance and policy across the world. Marketization is a practice that is concomitant to terms such as monetisation, financialisation and commercialisation. The term is located under the broader concept of commodification. Harvey (2004) wittingly defines commodification as a strategy of accumulation by dispossession where states connive with capital to pillage nature and the commons. Gomez-Baggethun and Perez (2011) expand the definition as they define it as a process where market trade is extended to the environment and ecosystems that were previously not connected to such. This is achieved through modification of relationships that were formerly out of reach of commerce into commerce relationships. Hence, commodification entails the introduction of pricing systems and market relations to the ecosystem and the environment mainly through processes such as: appropriation, monetisation, economic framing and commercialisation.

Marketization of the environment is driven by neo-liberal Market Based Instruments (MBIs) that offer real monetary incentives for environmental protection. MBIs are sometimes referred to as ecological modernisation by some scholars. These MBIs include; Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and Markets for Ecosystem Services (MES). MBIs can be best defined as efforts to value the ecosystem services in terms of money and the efforts are subsequently articulated through markets to create incentives for conservation (Gomez-Baggethun and Perez 2011). Corbera (2012) comments that the REDD+ is currently the biggest global experiment that is based on Payments for Ecosystem Services instrument that intentionally replaces the logic of conservation ethics with utilitarian ethos.

The thinking behind MBIs is not detached to the Green Economy mechanism that has become the big idea that is currently driving Sustainable Development at the global level. The mechanism is often associated with the green grabbing and natural climate solutions phenomenon. These instruments are driven by anthropocentric beliefs characterised by a dominant view by humans that they are the masters of nature hence they can exploit the environment for their benefit. MBIs particularly (MES) and (PES) have dominated the environmental policy sphere in recent decades (Neuteleers and Engelen 2014). Bakker (2005) underlines that these instruments became prominent in late 1980s which saw them becoming embedded in the logic of market environmentalism which is considered a brainchild of the neo liberal ideology. Market environmentalism is characterised by well defined (usually private) property rights for ecosystem services, the valuation of environmental externalities and the use of market-based instruments to drive conservation.

1.2.1 The Marketization of the environment: Criticism.

The marketization of environmental governance and policy is a contested terrain both in academic and professional realms. As indicated in the introduction, the debate over the marketization of the environment is fundamentally based on many factors that can be loosely categorised as: differences in ideologies, divergent world viewpoints, contradictory ethical grounding, plurality of values and impasses on narratives such as the interpretation of progress. While some scholars reject the utilitarian rationales that are based on the markets in defence of conservation, some strategically endorse it as a pragmatic tool useful in communicating the value of bio-diversity through use of a language that reflects dominant economic and political views (Daily et al 2009). This study construes the criticism of the pervasion of markets to the environment and climate as largely ethical, political and ideological. Henceforth through the utilisation of those three broad categories, this section discusses the body of literature that criticises the encroachment of market relations into the areas of environment and climate change.

1.2.2. The marketization of the environment and climate as political in nature

Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) define politics as who gets what, when, and how? At the centre of this definition is power. It can be commented that power is used as agency to drive politics hence plays a pivotal role in influencing decisions by determining the way resources are accessed and distributed. Laswell's definition can help understand the extent to which markets affect environmental governance and policy. Thus, marketization of global environmental governance and policy can be interpreted as political in nature as it is

an attestation of ‘who governs, at what scale and at what price’ (Liverman 2004). This is because the pervasion of markets into environmental conservation and climate change mitigation efforts affect equity. Failure to address equity issues breeds social inequality. This scenario shows that market principle-oriented policies lack distributive and procedural equity, yet it is considered a crucial value relevant in eradicating inequality. In light of this, Gomez-Baggethun and Perez (2011) note that marketization and commodification turns the environment that principally was in open access and regarded as public or communal property into commodities to be accessed by use of purchasing power.

To this end, Kopnina (2016) labels the marketization of the environment as economic capture of the environment. The result of which potentially leads to introduction or entrenchment of inequalities through dispossession, exclusion and unfairness especially when it comes to the ability to access common pool or common sink resources. As highlighted by Harvey (2003) commodification of the environment is akin to accumulation by dispossession that result in social inequality and can potentially lead to civil unrest. Similarly, Fairhead et al. (2012) argue that since the marketization of the environment is largely transactional in nature this can potentially neglect societal demands and access. In this sense, citizens and communities can be disempowered. More so, this can hurt the human-nature relationship as this setup contradicts existent relationships that work for indigenous communities. Apart from that, a somewhat radical criticism is echoed by Sagoff (2008) who argues that if nature and the ecosystem start to be valued, there is nothing that can stop the valuation of natural resources such as wind, the sun and gravity. Therefore, some scholars view the marketization of the environment and ecosystem as only serving economic motives and, in the process threatening both the environment and the society.

1.2.3. The marketization of the environment and climate as unethical

Some scholars intuitively argue that it is immoral to attach markets to the environment and ecosystem. This is so because marketization of the environment commands an anthropocentric focus resulting in the exclusion of intrinsic values embedded in diverse entities in nature (Redford and Adams 2009). Further, an anthropocentric focus could cultivate an exploitative human- nature relationship (Raymond et al 2013), culminating in a people that are turned into consumers hence further separating and alienating them from nature (Robertson 2012). This argument depicts humans not as masters of the environment, but as a specie that is part of nature and ecosystem hence need to establish an

interdependent relationship with the environment. Scholars assert that an attitude that is based on anthropocentrism culminate in environmental dystopia, a scenario that is catastrophic for both the society and the environment.

As reiterated by Schroter et al (2014) nature conservation should prioritise intrinsic values as opposed to anthropocentric values such as marketization and commodification related environmental governance and policy tendencies. The major reason behind this position is that studies thus far have showed an inconclusive evidence of a “win-win” outcome between biodiversity and economic logic-oriented initiatives. To this end, there is need to draw a line or set the limits to marketization and commodification of the environment. History has shown that many elements of nature have been commoditised since the genesis of markets hence setting a limit to this is pertinent (Prudham, 2007).

1.2.4. The marketization of the environment and climate as ideologically driven.

The third strand of criticism against the marketization of the environmental governance and policy is based on the Marxist ideology that challenges liberal and neo-liberal ideology. The criticism is rooted in the classic analysis of commodification by Karl Marx. Some scholars identify this criticism as Gramscian. Combined, a Marxist-Gramscian criticism categorically dismisses introduction of markets to the environment as a process that involves disguising critical processes under the production of ecosystem services by introducing homogeneous monetary figures (Gomez-Baggethun and Perez 2011) resulting in commodity fiction (Polanyi 1944). Commodity fiction involves the conversion of the environment and ecosystem from a symbolic value into a complex objective quantifiable relationship. Karl Max referred to this process as ‘commodity fetishism’. By and large, this culminates in the emergence of serious struggles that include interest, class and institutions over wealth, resources, territory and legitimacy. In a similar critic, Kosoy and Corbera (2010) argue that marketization and commodification of the environment conceals the complexity of ecology, non-economic values of the environment and power asymmetries that are at the heart of environmental trade.

Turner et al (1994) note that the neo-liberal ideology believes natural resources that come from the environment (environmental assets and deficits in economic terms) ought to be subjected to monetary pricing, ownership, and exchange. As a result, ecological modernisation supersedes any other model of environment and climate change mitigation strategy. Ecological modernisation (for which the REDD+ program is part of) is the dominant narrative that currently defines sustainable development and it is weaved within

the framework of capitalism (Christoff, 1996a). In line with this, Basili et al (2006) underline that, economist are concerned with the environment largely because of its persistent challenge on the efficiency of competitive markets yet distributional issues have never been given similar attention. In addition, Stern in Benjamin (2007) asserts that climate change is a culmination of the greatest market failure the world has seen. This means that the advent of the marketization of environmental governance and policy is deleterious as the terms, 'marketization' and 'environment' are complete strange bedfellows. For instance, Care (2012), notes that neo-liberalism's dominance both as a discourse and ideology has influenced the context upon which international agreements and collective decisions are made including environmental issues. Consequently, it nurtures a situation where economic rationalism at multi levels actively preys on the environment culminating in primitive accumulation through predatorship to the detriment of the society and environment.

1.3. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)


There are numerous strategies aimed at fighting environmental degradation and climate change in the world. This study focuses on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) because it not only the most ambitious but arguably the widely accepted and implemented program to tackle global warming and climate change. REDD+ is a market-based instrument and policy that is primarily aimed at combating climate change and environmental degradation using market solution principles. The REDD+ program is being implemented in forested countries from the conceptual global south amongst them: Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Papua New Guinea and Cambodia. In Africa some countries where the program is under implementation include Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya among others. UNFCCC (2009) defines REDD+ as a means through which actors such as governments from developing countries, communities and individuals get financial rewards through participation in the reduction of emissions from deforestation, forest degradation as well as enhancement of carbon stock through funding that is sourced from countries and actors from the global north. The program seeks to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests through offering incentives to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths (UN-REDD).

The program is guided by the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). Its major sponsors are the World Bank and the United Nations Environment

Program (UNEP). Put simply, UNEP facilitates the REDD+ program through UN-REDD program whilst the WB does so through multilaterals that include; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and Forest Investment Program (FIP). UN-REDD and FCPF are the two main dominant multilaterals involved in readiness platforms for REDD+. Apart from these two, REDD+ is funded and implementation through other means for instance through the establishment of bilateral arrangements between REDD+ implementing developing countries and developed countries. Lohmann (2010) defines REDD+ as a program that divides the action of polluting the environment into permits that are sold and distributed to large polluters of the environment, which are in turn traded to allow the market to select the emissions reductions and climate benefits that can be achieved most cheaply.

1.3.1. The Kariba REDD+ project in Zimbabwe.

Kariba REDD+ is a carbon-based compensation project being implemented by a private investor known as Carbon Green Africa (CGA) in the rural areas of the North-western parts of Zimbabwe. The Kariba REDD+ project covers an area of 784 987 hectares across four administrative provinces in Zimbabwe. The project fulfilled global certification standards and is considered to be thriving compared to similar projects which commenced at the same time. According to CGA (2012), the Kariba REDD+ project is recognised and thus validated by Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) and Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). In addition, National Carbon Offset Standard (NCOS) endorsed it for use as voluntary offsets by Australian companies. Some of the cited strengths of the Kariba REDD+ include a demonstrable “credibly to mitigate climate change, contribute to the sustainable development of local communities, and conserve biodiversity.”



Map 1.1. Kariba REDD+ project monitoring areas

Source: Kariba REDD+ project monitoring report (2012)

Kariba REDD+ project is currently the only private company led initiative in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the government of Zimbabwe in partnership with World Wildlife Fund (WWF) are currently implementing a national pilot REDD+ project in Ngamo and Sikumi regions in the South Western parts of Zimbabwe. This REDD+ project falls under the broad Hwange-Sanyati Biological Corridor Program. The project is a Global Environmental Facility (GEF) initiative meant to support conservation initiatives. It is facilitated by the World Bank and one of its objectives is to build national capacity on REDD+ in Zimbabwe as part of readiness for REDD+. The project kick-started in 2016 and is currently at the readiness stage. On the same note, experiences from countries that were involved in the readiness stages of REDD+ programs point out that REDD+ readiness is a complex and cumbersome process. Important to note is that this project is outside the scope of this research study.

1.3.2. REDD+ as a mechanism for the marketization of the environment: Criticism.

Lohmann (2010) asserts that REDD+ is a bold attempt to ‘privatise the climate itself. Carbon trading which forms the basis for REDD+ is political in nature primarily because of serious struggles it nurtures that include interest, class and institutions over wealth, resources, territory and legitimacy (McAfee 2015). McAfee (ibid) criticises the logic behind REDD+’s ideological standpoint by questioning the integrity of free markets that

sell nature in order to save it. Efficiency is highly regarded in the realms of environmental economics. In this light, REDD+ is a mechanism with a policy framework that shows a deviation from conservation ethics to utilitarian ethos that subsequently stifle conservation motives in the short and long term. More so the multiple win discourse that sustains it in practice suffers from lack of procedural legitimacy in many developing countries resulting in the reproduction of existing inequities and escalates forms of social exclusion. (Gomez-Baggethun and Perez 2011).

According to Hiraldo and Tanner (2011), market liberal approaches pervaded the REDD+ conceptualization because of the need to realise cost effective climate change mitigation mechanisms combined with initiating growth impetus for the nation state. This explains how the power of capitalism found itself embedded within environment and climate governance spheres at the global stage. By and large, since most of the interaction and exchange by nation-states and non-state actors within climate change politics is driven and perpetrated by international institutions that include UNFCCC, it can be noted that the integration of a neoliberal institutionalist framework was imminent. These neo-liberal institutions can be viewed as catalyst for global corporate capitalism more generally. In this light, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is one of such mechanisms where living nature such as forests are being transformed into commodities for capital accumulation.

Notwithstanding the fact that REDD+ is the first real attempt at international level to create a global forest governance system that impacts on national, regional and local scales, the program is associated with controversy and criticism. As underscored by Held in Jean-Paul (2011), humanity lives in a world of overlapping communities of fate and fortunes where actors should accept that their fate and fortunes are bound with those of others. Conversely, the REDD+ program doesn't reflect the above in that it is widely viewed as lacking collective good will and collective interest. In fact, the program is creating clear winners and losers something which is not favourable in the long run as it threatens its durability and overall acceptance by stakeholders. This is majorly reflected in its conceptualisation, negotiation and implementation processes. Researches contacted to analyse the progress of several REDD+ projects across the world raise similar concerns. Although focusing on different issues on the REDD+ program, there is a convergence of research literature that suggest that the program is riddled with inconsistencies, dilemmas and issues that to some extent fail to justify its existence. For instance, Skutsch et al (2013) raise some concerns

with regards to the REDD+ program by highlighting the failure by some of REDD+ projects to effectively and equally distribute proceeds to stakeholders, Phelps et al (2010) underlines that some of the REDD+ programs have adverse effects on livelihoods and social cultural lives of local communities, Kapfuvhuti (2014) emphasise the existence of competing and somewhat divergent interest in the program whilst Dooley et al (2011) zero in on issues to do with how the program is too elitist, technical and complex. More so, it is alleged that the program is riddled with corruption, corporate and elite capture, inequality, unequal sharing of information and decision-making authority (Dzingirai and Mangwanya 2015, Larson 2011). In this regard, such criticism can be summed up by assertions by Dryzek, (1992) assertion that the insufficiency of the dominant neo-capitalist arrangements is well pronounced when it comes to responding to complex ecological problems.

1.4. Land Governance and administration in Zimbabwe.

Land governance and administration in Zimbabwe is characterised by a poor and weak land tenure system. The Zimbabwean land tenure system is clogged with ambiguities that culminate in governance and administration malfunctions as shown by the general struggle for land control and ownership. It can be commented that the weak land tenure system is a result of a colonial legacy that saw land being parcelled out along racial lines which in turn disenfranchised most of the native black Zimbabwean population. This gave birth to the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) of 2000 which was an anti-colonial ideologically driven program focused on the empowerment of native black people in order to address socio-economic injustices of the past. The program consequently changed land rights, the tenure system and land administration in the country. Resultantly, it gave rise to contestations over land rights, tenure security and land ownership (Maguranyanga and Moyo 2006). It can be commented that this largely affects land governance and administration in urban and resettlement areas. More importantly, the FTLRP of 2000 did not affect communal areas governance and administration. However, communal areas are as a result of colonial legacy as they were formed during the formative stages of the colonial era and they were known as black native reserves.

Matondi (2011) underscore that communal land governance in Zimbabwe is problematic due to involvement of many institutions claiming jurisdiction over it. At the heart of this conundrum is that the tenure surrounding communal land governance is difficult since communal lands fall under the customary tenure system where customary law determines

access to and occupation rights. The customary land tenure system vests ownership of communal lands in the State. As a result, this means that local indigenous people are entitled to occupy and use land at the discretion of the president to which the presidential powers are decentralised to RDCs through the Rural District Councils Act.

Matyszak (2010) corroborates this by underlining that communal lands governance is a multi-tiered and hierarchical two strand administrative structure that culminate in emergence of competing and conflicting centers of power. The administrative structure strand comprises of traditional leadership and appointed government officials. This structure is problematic in that it makes local government to have two loci of power running parallel to each other. This problem is a result of that government officials are considered to be democratically appointed and the traditional leadership traditionally appointed. Resultantly, diverse power tentacles from different sources in this system affect and control the lives of local indigenous communities. Therefore, this weak and complex land tenure system threatens the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ since the project becomes the turf upon which power struggles in land governance and administration in Zimbabwe manifest. Poor and weak land governance and administration thus makes REDD+ incompatible with national land policy (Ateta et al 2016) a situation which provides a platform for nation states to have a powerful grip on rural resources (Phelps 2010).

1.5. Problem Statement

Climate change is a reality. The change of climate is caused by global warming epitomised by overall increase of temperatures through the greenhouse effect. According to (IPCCC 2007: 36), “global atmospheric concentrations of (greenhouse gases) CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values”. IPCC (2018), further underline that the world is already experiencing the consequences of 1°C of global warming. These consequences come in various forms amongst them: extreme weather conditions, receding Arctic sea ice, rising sea levels which makes climate change a real common concern for humankind. Therefore, decisive and comprehensive measures to combat climate change are vital in order to augment communities’ livelihoods especially in the developing world. Immediate attention should be given to the climate change issue because of its adverse and devastating effects on the livelihoods of communities. Because of climate change, the environment is changing

rapidly as evidenced by depletion of water sources, unreliable and changing rain patterns and droughts and decline in agriculture production among others.

Amid this threat, societies across the globe especially the ones from developing countries are facing a plethora of challenges emanating from the adoption of neo-liberal and free markets biased initiatives that are meant to fight environmental degradation and climate change. These initiatives come in form of governance decisions and policies at international level and the REDD+ program is one such initiative. In specific, one of the key challenges that comes with introducing neo-liberalism and capitalism biased principles in the area of environment and climate is that it culminates in global environmental governance and policy serving political and economic motives of corporate elites. In its implementation, neo-liberalism pays little attention to environmental and societal issues, yet these matters equally deserve undivided attention considering that they determine the livelihood security of communities and allows for an inclusive and sustainable conservation and protection of natural pool and sink resources. Due to this challenge, developing societies are haunted by a plethora of problems whose effects can be traced back to the application of neo-liberalism principles in the area of environment and climate. These problems include unequal distribution of wealth, poverty, corruption, effects of climate change, failure of local indigenous communities to participate in strategic decision-making processes on matters that affect them, land grabs among others. Yet despite this severity, the global governance and policy panorama is clogged with initiatives that view the environment and climate as commodities to rip out exponential profits at the expense of the environment and third world societies. REDD+ program is thus trapped in the same conundrum.

To provide context to this study and particularly in the case of Zimbabwe, the Kariba REDD+ project was introduced in 2011 by Carbon Green Africa at a time when the government did not have a climate change policy. The government came up with a national climate policy in 2016. Besides that, the government did not have a climate change strategy, it was not capacitated to comprehend REDD+ let alone local indigenous communities where the project is being implemented. It is this lacking REDD+ readiness among other fundamental issues that pose as a risk. In this respect, this provides a fertile grounding for the emergence of private actors dubbed “carbon cowboys”, who use traditional owned and indigenous forests to profit from the value of carbon and carbon market speculation. The private actors implement their program without proper community

consultation, Free, Prior, Informed Consent and weak safeguards culminating in carbon piracy. In the case of Peru as underlined by Llanos and Feather (2011), these ‘carbon pirates’ convinced communities to sign away their land and carbon rights to pursue commercial interest that in turn suffocated their rights. In this respect, REDD+ has the potential to unintentionally provide ‘carbon pirates’ unbridled control over forests and communities’ intellectual property culminating in manipulation of costs and unequal distribution of benefits.

Additionally, Zimbabwe is characterised by 39 years of authoritarianism that was superseded by an illegitimate government that is majorly run by the military since 2017. In such an environment, procedural democratic qualities such as participation, dialogue, transparency and accountability are a mirage. Therefore, besides the probability of the government not prioritising climate and environmental issues as demonstrated by delays in coming up with a climate change response strategy, there is a possibility that the government or government officials can flirt and collude with international capital culminating in plutocracy as witnessed in other sectors such as mining and energy. Hence, the REDD+ program might fall in the same trap where international financial muscle conveniently combines with cohesive and omnipresent state autonomy to the detriment of communities and the environment.

1.6. Justification of the study

While there has been a lot of literature on REDD+ program and commodification of environmental governance, few researches have used an approach that is aimed at understanding the program at multi-scale to purposefully comprehend the marketization of environmental governance and policy. More so, much of the literature on environmental problems is fragmented both in terms of the issues that are raised as well as the levels of analysis of environmental and climate change issues. Firstly, unlike most researches that dwell on analysing marketization of environmental governance and policy at only the global level, this research uses a two-pronged approach. This approach involves a double looped analysis where marketization of the environment and climate change mitigation is understood at both global and local levels. In this vein, the research analyses the relevance and applicability of the carbon market model on local indigenous communities where Kariba REDD+ project is being conducted and at the same juxtaposing its implementation to its underlying and guiding neo-liberal principles at the global level. Secondly most researches on REDD+ at local level are fragmented as they separately speak on diverse

issues that include rights of the marginalised, land rights, exploitation, climate finance and corruption, environmental justice among other issues. Consequently, this research reconciles these fragmented issues by properly framing and understanding them within a comprehensive and well-defined parameter. Above all, since REDD+ is a global phenomenon, this research contextualises REDD+ with respect to Zimbabwe thus adding to the limited body of literature on REDD+ in Zimbabwe.

1.7. Research Objectives

The major research objective is to comprehend the marketization of environmental governance and policy from a macro level (global) to a micro level (local) using the Kariba REDD+ project in Zimbabwe. The supplementary research objectives include: to understand the nature of marketization of environmental governance and the way it functions in REDD+, to understand diverse actors and their interest in the Kariba REDD+ project, to understand the impact of Kariba REDD+ project on local indigenous communities by looking at power relations, ownership and control dynamics of natural resources as well as the benefits accrued by the project to the local indigenous communities and to determine whether the marketization of environmental governance and specifically the Kariba REDD+ project is legitimate and sustainable.

1.8. Research Questions

The research questions that drive this study include: What is marketization of environmental governance? What is its nature and how does it function in REDD+? What are the diverse actors involved in Kariba REDD+ project? And what are their interest? What is the state of power relations, ownership and control dynamics between Kariba REDD+ project and the local indigenous communities? What is the impact of the Kariba REDD+ project on local indigenous communities? And Is the Kariba REDD+ project legitimate and sustainable?

1.9. Theoretical Framework

The study utilised the theory of Political economy. When it is applied in the area of environment, the theory successfully expands the understanding of the current state of environmental politics. Newell, (2008) notes that the theory of Political economy on its own can respond to pertinent governance questions such as What is to be governed and what is not? Who governs and who is governed? How do they govern? On whose behalf? With what implications? Mankoff, (1972) notes that Political economy is a theoretical

perspective hinged on understanding social structure and change. It does so by examining economic class structures and their respective social consequences that include socio-economic and political dynamics. Most significantly the theory crucially emphasises socio-political legitimation and social control of economic activity. Newell, (2008) underscores that a more nuanced and persuasive analysis of Political economy must be grounded on material, organisational and discursive elements of power as well as their interrelationship which have taken root in the contemporary practices of environmental governance. In that respect, Levy and Newell (2005) posit that critical political economy locates global environmental governance within broader patterns of governance which are aimed at promoting and managing the globalisation of the economy.

Hence, the theory enables the study to comprehend more REDD+'s conceptualisation, negotiations and implementation. The theory is significant in understanding the way the program is implemented at multi-levels. In this respect the theory of Political Economy enables the study to effectively respond to pertinent issues raised in the study. The theory successfully gives answers to the study's research questions especially on understanding power relations, ownership and control dynamics as well as on actors' interests in the Kariba REDD+ project. For example, the theory gives a fertile ground for the study to establish the autonomy, ownership and inclusiveness of the Kariba REDD+ project whilst serving the same purpose at the global level.

There are other diverse theories or approaches that the researcher could have utilised to explain REDD+ and the marketisation of environmental governance and policy besides the Political economy theory. Amongst these theories is the Common Pool Resources (CPRs) propounded by Elinor Ostrom and the Multi-Level Governance theory by Gary Marks. The CPRs theory was developed to explain the use of public goods and common pool resources to avoid 'the tragedy of the commons' as previously argued by Hardin that problems facing our natural environment are caused by extravagant use of natural resources because of individual selfish rationality. To counter this argument Ostrom developed a concept which ensures that communities utilise public goods or CPRs in a sustainable manner without making them extinct as argued by Hardin. Her framework was as a result of observations of already existent CPRs that sustainably utilised and conserved common pool resources. In this vein CPRs provides a framework central for "governing the commons" through local indigenous people's autonomous institutions instead of succumbing to privatisation and state control.

Although this theory is central in ensuring that conservation of common pool resources and common sink resources such as the Kariba REDD+ is actualised and perpetuated, the theory is fundamentally contrary to the central tenets of the REDD+ thus would be incompatible with this study. Whereas the CPRs argues for communities to autonomously control and own natural resource projects as opposed to the involvement of the state and markets, REDD+ encourages co-ownership and control of the project. Thus, the theory hardly give direct answers to the research questions in this study particularly on the understanding of power relations, ownership and control dynamics as well as on actors' interests in the Kariba REDD+ project.

In comparison to the CPRs theory, the Multi-Level Governance theory by Gary Marks is better positioned to comprehend this study but nonetheless falls short of explaining fundamental issues relevant in understanding this study the way the Political economy theory does. The theory is driven by the concept that facilitates the comprehension of political processes involving supranational institutions as well as the analysis of decentralised decision-making processes at the lower tiers of governance involving sub-national governments and civil society. At the heart of this theory is the general understanding that global governance has witnessed reconfigurations of relationships and ways of interactions between the state and associated levels of governance that in turn has given rise to the need to come up with new mechanisms of control and accountability amongst different actors involved. In this vein, the theory is in congruence with REDD+ in that its governance involves supranational organisations such as UN-REDD, World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) whereas governments of developing countries at the national level are expected to play a central role in the program.

More importantly the Multi-Level Governance theory speaks to important issues regarding the participation and involvement of non-state actors such as local indigenous communities who are the primary owners of the forests. Thus, theory can help conceptualise governance processes in REDD+. The downside to this theory however is that it fails to respond to some fundamental questions that this study seeks to answer. Essentially, the theory fails to adequately engage with questions to do with the benefit sharing issue in REDD+. More so, the theory shies away from addressing issues to do with land use under the REDD+ program which are relevant in this study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

The chapter opens with a discussion on the political economy of environmental governance. This sets the tone for the subsequent discussions that largely speak to complex issues surrounding the marketization of REDD+. Understanding how politics and economic issues drive and shape environmental policy and governance clears the way for a better grasp of the conceptualisation, negotiation and implementation of REDD+. Thus, the reviewed literature allows the researcher to search for answers coming from research questions meant to understand the marketization of environmental governance, its nature and the way it functions as well as determining whether the REDD+ program is legitimate and sustainable in environmental protection and combating climate change. Additionally, not less important is that such a focus lays a firm foundation for the researcher to comprehend the Kariba REDD+ project since the status of the REDD+ program at the global scale illuminates on individual projects that are implemented on a local scale.

2.2. Global Environmental Governance

A loose definition of environmental governance entails actions or interventions that are aimed at changes on environment-related incentives, institutions, decision-making, knowledge, and behaviours. Lemos and Agrawal (2006:3) define environmental governance as a “set of regulatory processes and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes”. Environmental governance takes place through arrangements which include: international agreements or accords, transnational institutions, national policies and legislation, local decision-making structures and environmental NGOs among others.

According to Lemos and Agrawal (ibid) global environmental governance can be understood in four domains of scholarship which are: globalization, decentralization, market and individual incentives-based governance and cross-scale governance. It can be commented that these mentioned four domains speak to a type of environmental governance that is shy of the nation state’s environmental regulation as the exercise of power and authority is shifted away from national governments to new diverse political actors across the globe. As a result, these domains provide a fertile grounding for political actors to nurture the culture of the marketization of the environment and climate. Falkner (2003) defines this type of governance as private governance which is characterised by

“environmental governance without government”. Falkner’s assertion underlines that private actors are increasingly playing a role in global environmental politics. They do so by lobbying states during environment and climate negotiations on Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) culminating in their omnipresence in the implementation of international accords. Consequently, their involvement enables them to create institutional arrangements that particularly perform environmental governance functions.

According to Baker et al (2005) and Rosenau (2000), when governance is viewed through the lenses of globalisation, there exist diverse competing and overlapping structures of authority that are characterised by interrelationships between a mix of public and private bodies or actors that in some cases do not have hierarchy or command structure. Friedman (2000) and Held et al (2000) underscore that globalisation culminates in decisional, institutional, distributive and structural impact across the world. In this vein, the existence of powerful and influential diverse actors at global level influences the way environmental governance choices and decisions are developed and implemented. Humphreys (2009i) comments that with the retreat of the state, political space at the national and global levels got occupied by actors who wield corporate interest. Neo-Gramscian scholars normally interpret this as corporate tyranny where profits are highly regarded as compared to human, societal and environmental values. Subsequently, this culture culminates in the creation of a global political economy where international capital, development initiatives, and regulatory arrangements favour the interest of the powerful economic elite (Hettne, 1995, Dryzek, 1996a).

2.3. Marketization of environmental governance and policy as Creative Self Destruction.

It can be argued that the REDD+ program is a result of global environmental governance and policy based on creative self-destruction. Creative self-destruction is a strategy used by big corporate companies at the global level in order to retain and perpetuate their influence and control in environmental conservation and climate mitigation matters. It can be argued that corporate elites use this strategy in order to serve their interest. Most importantly, this strategy is essential for corporate elites since it ensures their perpetual dominance hence, they are able to maintain the status quo in the process. Their strategy is premised on directly or indirectly influencing the adoption of market principles and neo-liberal policies through the use of political myths. Myths in their original sense can be construed as widely

held views, beliefs or ideas that are nonetheless false but play a crucial role in propagating a narrative that is normally self-serving.

Thus, political myths are tools that are at the centre of creative self-destruction as they play a pivotal role in sustaining corporate power interest. These political myths include cooperate environmentalism, corporate citizenship and corporate omnipotence. Taken together, these myths perpetuate the common capitalist imaginary of “rationality” and “efficiency” as a means to address societal political conditions (Bottici 2007). From another angle, these political myths act as essential pillars for popular policies that concern the environment such as market environmentalism and the Green Economy. As argued by Bakker (2005) market environmentalism emphasises private property rights for ecosystem services and encourages the evaluation of environmental externalities to drive environmental conservation. As a result, creative self-destruction helps shape the narrative that private actors and markets present the best possible chance for humans to successfully respond to environmental and climate problems as opposed to government regulation and public effort. In the process, decisions and policies that are taken at the global level are driven by market principles.

Not less important is that creative-self destruction is a fluid strategy that relies on criticism that faces capitalism and markets in the area of environment and climate. Essentially, as opposed to completely overhauling the capitalist system and the use of neo-liberal policies, creative self-destruction relies on critics of capitalism and corporate power to incrementally improve the use of markets on environmental and climate issues. This culminates in corporates retaining the imaginary that they are better positioned to come up with most feasible answers to respond to environmental and climate problems (Wright and Nyberg 2013) thus remain socially and politically relevant in the battle for ideas and solutions. Thus, creative self-destruction constantly mutates as corporates try to remain relevant and influential by creating certain self-serving narratives in the area of environment and climate and influencing decisions and policies that are in turn globalised through economic globalisation.

Attached to the above point, the phenomenon of creative self-destruction in environment and climate issues precisely jibe well with Newell (2008) conceptualisation of the Political economy theory. Newell underline that the Political economy theory can respond to pertinent governance questions such as; what is to be governed? (And what is not?) Who governs and who is governed? How do they govern? On whose behalf? With what

implications? In accordance with this conceptualisation, capitalism and the neo-liberal ideology are largely dependent on the reinvention and recuperation of the criticism of its economic system and this interaction culminates in it successfully incorporating and taming its critic. For example, trends such as “ecological modernisation” and “green economy” can be viewed as reactions to ecological critic which resulted in limited adaptation of capitalism in a changing context (Chiapello 2013). As underscored by Wright and Nyberg (2013) in a bid to develop compromises, corporates avoid decreasing profits or company growth through circumventing ecological critic by expanding principles of market in ecological conservation to escape regulation.

According to Willmott (2013:117) “...the most common response to ecological critique—from politicians, media, and corporations—has been to marginalize, obfuscate, trivialize, or simply deny its concerns, and also to develop self-serving remedies (for example carbon trading) that may actually exacerbate the problems”. Hence corporate power criticism has culminated in even more diverse ways of improvising in order to devour the natural environment. For example, with regards to climate change, the myth of corporate omnipotence dictates the pace and shape of global environment and climate governance. This is majorly done through the promotion of expansion of neo-liberal policies and capitalism through the pricing of externalities that include the Green House Gas (GHG) emissions (Spaargaren and Mol 2013), which can be argued to be a self-serving, profit making scheme by the captains of industries. In this respect, a total sum of such decisions and actions amount to the marketization of the environment and climate. As laid out by Newell and Paterson (2010) when “market solutions” were embraced during the late 1980s and 1990s, it reflected hegemonic neoliberal tendencies where markets were considered efficient mechanisms above other solutions.

In relation to the above, it can be commented that the REDD+ program is part and parcel of the ecological modernisation and the Green Economy Agenda facilitated by international and multi-lateral organisations. REDD+ is thus considered a self-serving by-product of hegemonic neoliberal policies that encroached on to the environment and climate frontiers through introduction of carbon markets using international institutions. REDD+'s genesis also serves as a revelation of the omni-presence of corporates as they are able to influence decision making at the highest level through creative self-destruction mechanisms.

To lay bare the self-serving manner in which REDD+ is designed to operate, Newell and Paterson (2010) mention that the specifics of emissions reductions in the Carbon Trading Market are left in the domain of corporations whilst other actors amongst them governments determine the general architecture of the policy. This shows that corporates are in control of an important part of the REDD+ value chain culminating in the private sector profiting from the program in comparison to other stakeholders. More so, the very fact that the REDD+ program let alone the Carbon Trading Market is technical and complex means that many stakeholders are left behind through the process of “natural selection” culminating in unequal distribution of power amongst REDD+ stakeholders in favour of corporates. Therefore, this shows the dynamism and spirit of capitalism where it’s economic system successfully incorporate and tame criticism culminating in realisation of ideological legitimacy in any given period (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). This is despite that the system is widely considered destructive to both the environment and society primarily because of its anthropocentric core attributes.

2.4. Functions and significance of creative self-destruction in global environment and climate Governance.

The political myths that form the basis for creative self-destruction exist particularly to address the political condition of climate change and environmental degradation. Simply put, their existence is based on shaping opinion and policy direction that favour private actors particularly corporations. Although these features are distinct, they don’t work in isolation as they are interdependent and overlap in their functions to support the fiction of corporate capitalism. From an ethical perspective, these myths reinforce the existent human hierarchy that views humans as masters of the environment. Norman and MacDonald (2004) underline that political myths in the area of environment deepen the bifurcation between culture and nature where economy is prioritised over society and environment respectively. Myths therefore largely function as diversion from questioning this hierarchy. It can be highlighted that creative self-destruction feeds on the unequal power structure that characterises the International Political Economy. Therefore, the power of markets through the invisible hand place things in an arguably pre-determined order where capitalist social imaginary remain in the driver’s seat (Wright and Nyberg 2013). Table 2.1 below laconically illustrates the nexus and functions of political myths in the realm of climate change and environmental degradation.

	Corporate Environmentalism	Corporate Citizenship	Corporate Omnipotence
Basic narrative	Corporations as saviours of the environment	Corporations as moral and caring “citizens”	Unquestionable authority of corporations and “market forces”
Objects and practices	“Green” products and innovations	Political activity and lobbying	Calculations and valuation of nature as commodities
Identity projects	Individuals as “green” consumers and employees	Individuals as corporate constituents	Individuals as “ecopreneurs”
Significance	Justifies continuation of consumption and economic growth	Justify the moral legitimacy of corporation	Provides certainty that corporations and markets will “solve” climate change, business as usual will not be threatened.

Table 2. 1 Functions of corporate political myths on climate change

Source: Wright and Nyberg (2013)

2.4.1. Corporate environmentalism as a claimed solution to climate change

The corporate environmentalism myth goes beyond emphasising the voluntary reductions in the GHG emissions as it also focuses on the production of green products. This myth faced serious backlash as it was viewed as “greenwashing” and hypocritical. Due to this backlash, the corporates readapted and re-narrated the environmental mythology through emphasising practices such as improved transparency and accountability (Wright and Nyberg 2013). This response can be considered as well calculated as it presented corporations as better placed to respond to climate change. In the process alternatives such

as government regulation are subdued meaning that marketization of the global environmental governance and policy prevails above other possible alternatives.

Similarly, in the REDD+ program, transparency and accountability are emphasised through the introduction of REDD+ Social and Environmental Safeguards by the UNFCCC and the WB. These safeguards are apparently expected to go beyond the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by responding to potential risks to people and the environment. According to Schlosberg and Rinfret (2008) this response depicts a business as usual attitude where the general belief is that the best way to respond to climate change is not through questioning the capitalistic economic system's logic but by expanding what is currently available. As a result, the myth entrenches itself through incremental means as opposed to completely overhauling the existing economic system. Hamilton (2010) further notes that corporate environmentalism shuts the cognitive dissonance between our beliefs such as our concerns over climate change and our behaviour. This dissonance is characterised by continued production and contributing to the GHG emissions by accentuating that consumption is the solution to a collective problem. Consequently, this arrangement makes the responsibility for climate change to be directed to individuals whilst corporations get presented as value-neutral providers.

2.4.2. Corporate omnipotence as a stance that considers corporate authority as the most feasible way to respond to climatic and environmental problems.

The corporate omnipotence political myth emphasises the view that consider corporations as the principle models and authorities relevant in responding to climate change. The central claim to this political myth is that through principles of rationality and efficiency corporations can tame nature. Wright and Nyberg (2013) note that the logical outcome of this myth is that any initiative responding to climate change should pass the "business case" where those that fail to demonstrate market biased principles get rejected. Therefore, only solutions that are embedded on market principles see the light of the day culminating in them dominating the global environmental governance and policy. This also means that alternative ways of responding to climate change and environmental degradation such as government regulation of GHG emissions and restrictions to the extraction of fossil fuel energy are marginalised in favour of markets.

Most important to note is that corporate omnipotence does not sidestep the state but rather depend on the state to create and assist markets to address climate change through corporate activities (Castree 2011). By and large, this political myth has bolstered

corporations to such an extent that they are considered as mythical creatures of utmost importance crucial in creating social value and model for social organisation. As further supported by Beck (1992), the major function of this myth is to depict climate change as an issue that can only be solved through corporate expertise. In this respect, through such a political myth, corporations and their supporters successfully create a future world that permits humans to evade sacrifice.

2.4.3. Corporate citizenship as a way to claim legitimacy and morality in offering solutions to climate and environmental problems.

The primary function of corporate citizenship is to present corporations and private actors as wielding the moral obligation to address climate change and environmental degradation. There exists an ongoing debate as to whether corporations can or should act as “good” citizens or “bad” citizens (Porter and Kramer 2011). Scholars such as Barley (2007) and Banerjee (2008) argue that corporations are by no means “good” citizens. To this end, Wright and Nyberg (2013) emphasise that there is need to scrutinise the ways corporate citizenship incorporate political and social rights in their creative self-destruction approach. Essentially, this myth presents corporations and private actors as legitimate and moral entities in public debate. In fact, corporations are made to appear to speak on behalf of the people therefore subtly aligning their interest with social identities.

In conjunction with the above, Crouch (2004) notes that the importance of corporate citizenship myth is that it provides people with consumption that wields a political identity. Resultantly, citizenship itself is subverted and acts as surrogate for corporate interests that is characterised by profits and shareholder value. This culminates in a scenario where there is growth of an imbalance in political power between corporate interests and other social groups. This strategy provides a grounding for the decline of democracy as corporates are able to determine legislative and social outcomes. In this case, creative self-destruction of the ecological environment is justified on the pretext that what is good for the corporation is good for all the citizens (Wright and Nyberg 2013)

2.5. The History and Evolution of the REDD+ program.

REDD+ is the first initiative crafted in order to integrate avoided deforestation into efforts to tackle climate change at the international level. Deforestation and forest degradation in the tropics region are a significant source of global greenhouse gas emissions after the industry sector (IPCC, 2014). According to FAO (2000), global deforestation was

estimated at 1 million hectares per year from 1990 to 2005. This substantially culminates in reductions in forest carbon stocks and subsequent increase in emissions that cause the warming of the atmosphere. The genesis of the REDD+ program can be traced back to year 2005 when the Coalition of Rainforest Nations came up with the idea of RED (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation) (Osborne et al 2014) as a measure to contain deforestation and its related deleterious effects on the climate and environment. However, the focus of RED was quite narrow as compared to the current REDD+ program of today. Through the Paris Global Climate Agreement Paris, REDD+ was offered a stand-alone article (Article 5) (UNFCCC, 2015) which shows a continued unwavering international support and political backing of the program.

REDD+ negotiations in the UNFCCC were kick-started at the 11th Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC in Montreal in 2005 otherwise known as Conference of Parties 11 (Corbera and Schroeder 2010) and the program immensely evolved and diversified thereafter. However, it can be noted that the seeds of REDD+ were planted through the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 although the formalisation of the program occurred at the 13th Conference of Parties in Bali in 2007. Hence, this shows that the REDD+ program is as a result of an evolution based on a series of negotiations marked by major annual climate change negotiation events. This facilitated its evolution from REDD to REDD+. The program can be argued to have become the full package that we understand it today in 2010 at the 16th Conference of Parties through the Cancun Agreement in Cancun. The Cancun Agreement marked a major shift from the RED program of 2005 that only focused on deforestation. REDD+ is superior to RED as it goes beyond reducing deforestation by its focus on avoiding forest degradation in order to reduce carbon emissions, its focus on the conservation of carbon stocks (carbon that is already trapped by forests and vegetation), and sustainable management of these forests in order to enhance forests carbon stocks (The RED Desk 2016).

Perhaps much more important to note is that Conference of Parties 19, through the Warsaw Framework on REDD+ benefited from the incremental decisions that were undertaken. These decisions made the REDD+ program much diverse as it gave a broad-based approach to the implementation of REDD+ programs. The Warsaw REDD+ Framework is a form of rule book that guides how the program should be implemented (UNFCCC, 2014). This book enshrines decisions that speak to pertinent REDD+ issues that include: finance, coordination of support for implementation, modalities for national forest

monitoring systems, presenting of safeguards, technical assessment of reference levels, modalities for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) and information on addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. An explicit historical panorama of the evolution of REDD+ is illustrated by table 2.2 below.



Date	REDD+ and Climate Change mitigation Events
January 1997	The Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project. The first REDD style project is initiated
December 1997	The Kyoto Protocol. The seeds for REDD are planted under LULUCF
September 2003	COP 7, The Marrakesh Accords. REDD is removed from LULUCF
May 2005	The Coalition for Rainforest Nations is formed
November 2005	The European Commission advises for incentives for developing nations, and halting deforestation
December 2005	COP 11 (Montreal). REDD is back on the agenda
May 2006	Bonn- SBSTA began considering REDD
December 2007	COP 13. The Bali Action Plan
December 2008	SBSTA 29 (Poznan) -The concept of REDD-Plus is introduced
June 2009	2nd Bonn meeting - A negotiating text is presented
September 2009	7th Session of the AWG-LCA (Bangkok)
November 2009	AWG -LCA Non-Paper 39 (Barcelona)
December 2009	COP 15. Copenhagen. Decided to scale up funding for REDD+ for developing countries.

November 2010	COP-16-Cancun. Adopted a phased approach to REDD+ implementation
November 2011	COP-17, Durban. REDD+ outcome focused on financing options, safeguards and reference levels.
December 2012	COP-18, Doha. Debates focused on MRV and REDD+ financing.
June 2013	Bonn Climate Change Conference. Focus was still on MRV and REDD+ financing.
November 2013	COP-19, Warsaw. Adopted the REDD+ Rulebook to guide the full implementation of REDD+.
December 2014	COP-20, Lima. Guidance on safeguards, and decisions on non-carbon benefits and non-market mechanisms were clarified.
March 2015	ADP meeting, Geneva.
June 2015	Bonn Climate Change Conference.
November 2015	COP-21, Paris. REDD+ recognized as an instrument to contribute to reducing emissions and enhancing carbon sinks.
November 2016	COP-22, Marrakesh. Discussions were centred on the need to ensure consistency of REDD+ reported results with the GHG inventory reporting.
November 2017	COP-23, Bonn. The focus was on REDD+ financing and making conditions for results-based payments
November 2018	COP-24, Katowice. Delegates' agreed to put into practice the 2015 Paris agreement "rulebook". The rule book includes how to measure, report on and verify CO2 emissions-cutting efforts.

Table 2.2. REDD+ history and evolution timeline

Sources: Holloway and Giandomenico (2009) and The Red Desk (2016)

2.6. The design and implementation of REDD+

Through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), REDD+ saw its design and implementation taking the form of multi-dimensional and complex negotiations. It can be commented that the program also went through serious political pressure from diverse actors that saw its rules evolving rapidly in a simultaneous manner. These political pressures and negotiations gave birth to three multi-lateral institutions namely: the UN-REDD, the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Investment Program (Global Witness 2010). These multi-laterals provide funds and facilitate the development of national strategies for developing countries in order to reach the REDD+ readiness stage. More so, developing countries directly access REDD+ funding through establishing bilateral relations with developed countries. This form of funding is popularly known as result-based aid. For example, Norway has official REDD+ bilateral relations with REDD+ implementing countries such as Indonesia, Brazil and Guyana and much of the projects (Angelsen 2014). Most notably, these multi-lateral and bilateral sponsored projects have one thing in common, REDD+ readiness and its subsequent implementation is conducted by national governments of developing countries.

The REDD+ program follows two routes meaning that it does not only involve the one discussed above. Besides REDD+ that uses national governments, the other one is implemented through local REDD+ initiatives which can be managed by local governments, charities or private companies (Ball and Makala (2014)). The main difference between the two routes is that the former uses compliance offset markets for carbon trading whilst the latter uses voluntary markets. A compliance offset market is a type of market created by a regulatory act at national and subnational level under the dictates of the Kyoto Protocol or through regional schemes. Conversely, actors in the voluntary market (for which most private actors such as the Carbon Green Africa Company use) buy emission reductions permits otherwise known as carbon credits on the voluntary market for reasons such as personal commitments or social responsibility and public relations. For whatever the reason, these emission reduction permits allow owners to emit certain amount of CO₂ and other atmosphere related pollutants as part of a cap and trade emissions regulatory regime. The voluntary carbon market is a Payments for Ecosystem Services based on the concept of "polluter pays" principle where corporate companies are encouraged to reduce their gas emissions and when they surpass their allowable emissions level are forced to pay

for the surplus through buying carbon credits (World Bank 2016). Carbon credits that operate as offsets are generated in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

2.6.1. The Three Phased REDD+ Readiness Approach

The most critical requirement that developing countries intending to participate in the REDD+ program is required to undergo is a three phased REDD+ readiness phase that prepares it to implement the program. According to Minang et al (2014) the UN REDD and its various agencies as well as the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility immensely support this REDD+ readiness phase across the globe. For instance, as of 2014, FCPF supported 36 countries through partner agencies whilst UN-REDD supported national programs in 48 countries and partners. Countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Vietnam, Indonesia, and Tanzania, receive both UN-REDD and FCPF support. In 2019, the number for countries participating in this process has risen to 47 partner countries for FCPF (World Bank 2019) and 65 partner countries for UN-REDD (UN-REDD 2019).

Important to note is that the three phased REDD+ readiness approach was adopted as a result of the decisions taken at the Conference of Parties 19 (COP 19) in Cancun, Mexico. The approach is clearly spelled out in paragraph 73, Decision 1 of the Cancun Agreement. The first phase requires participating countries to develop a REDD+ strategy. The phase includes actions such as: planning, the establishment of forest reference levels also known as reference emission levels, establishment of MRV and benefit-sharing frameworks and instituting safeguard information system. The second phase involves early implementation whereas performance-based actions characterises the third and final phase. The following phases are a total sum of activities that include institutional and policy developments, capacity building, piloting as well as investments. In overall the process is complicated as it is too technical. Most importantly since this REDD+ readiness phase is implemented by two multi-laterals the phases are in some respects dissimilar. However, the Readiness Package (R-Package) is a key feature of both programs. This feature indicates a transition from development phase towards early implementation phase of the REDD+ program (Kipalu, 2011). In this respect, figure 2.2 below shows the three phased approach that guides UNREDD and FCPC REDD+ program.




Figure 2. 1REDD+ Readiness three phased approach

Sources: FCPF and UNREDD (2012) and FCPF (2013).

2.7. REDD+ and the Carbon trading systems.

Perhaps the politics of REDD+ can be understood more through its carbon trading systems as compared to the other components of the program. According to Lang (2019) from the onset, REDD+ was meant to be a carbon trading mechanism. Thus, the carbon trading systems are at the heart of the REDD+ program as they form the crucial part of the marketization of the environment. The genesis of the carbon trading systems can be attributed to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 which essentially created a political and economic identity for carbon dioxide through integrating it into the global trade networks. Carbon trading is provided for under Article 17 of the Kyoto protocol (Hepburn 2007) and as a result carbon is now regarded as a “property like right” (Christensen et al. 2013). Stephan and Paterson (2012) note that carbon markets form the central rudiments of the Kyoto Protocol and more specific the intergovernmental Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) as well as the European Union ETS. As briefly explained in the above section, there are two types of carbon markets under the carbon trading system. The first one is the regulatory compliance market which is utilised by governments and companies that are required by the law to

account for their Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. Regulatory compliance market is regulated by international, national or regional carbon regimes as laid out in the Kyoto protocol. The voluntary market is the second type of carbon market where the trading of carbon is conducted on a voluntary basis by actors such as private companies, corporate organisations among others.

According to Martin (2013), carbon markets reflect the political contingencies of nation states and supranational agreements as they come in two forms. They are either in form of compliance offset market or voluntary markets and the primary transactions of these carbon instruments are different as well. These instruments are used to either settle GHG liabilities (paying to pollute) or to create carbon assets. Whichever the case, these carbon trading forms reflects the marketization of environment and climate governance and policy. As a result, carbon trading suffers from ethical and moral criticism (Caney and Hepburn 2011). As Lacomelli (2005) puts it, carbon trading is crafted in such a manner that it allocates and exchanges carbon commodities in the most efficient manner in order to solve the climate crisis. This makes the REDD+ program follow rational principles of rationality and efficiency and in overall finds itself being driven by forces of markets. Boyd et al (2011) regards the carbon trading system as “carbon economy” which comprises of several and interconnected carbon markets and although they take different forms across the globe, they all include systems of emissions trading.

Perhaps the most interesting form of carbon trading system is the voluntary offsets as it lays bare the relationship between the state, market and society. This relationship essentially escalates the financialization of nature (Hanna 2016). “Financialization” is a term similar to marketization. The term refers to the manner in which the financial system was made to be the centre for redistributive activity and in the process bringing into financial circulation aspects of life that were previously located outside it (Fairhead et al 2012). The carbon trading system is a version of ‘results-based finance’ principles where finance is considered an ‘ex-post reward’ for reducing forest-based emissions. According to Hanna (2016), most REDD+ projects are traded using voluntary carbon markets and are bought by corporations for public relations purposes, or by conservation charities. Buying carbon credits for public relations essentially signals that the company is interested in maintaining a good public image meant to reiterate that the company is ‘environmentally friendly’ in its operations. Perhaps this can also be construed as another way of creative self-destruction as it probably galvanises the political myths of citizenship,

environmentalism and omnipresence as discussed above. Since 2016, various corporate actors amongst them eBay, Walt Disney, Credit Agricole and Microsoft had participated in the carbon trading system through buying carbon credits. In 2019, Shell an international corporation that specialises in fossil fuel bought US\$300 million worth of carbon credits (Lang 2010).

Besides buying carbon credits for public relations purposes, sometimes offset credits are also bought for speculation. Speculation is considered an obstacle in carbon trading since the practice involves powerful interest groups whose primary aim is to make exponential profits by exaggerating future price moves. Speculation in carbon trading works in the same way the housing markets operated prior to the 2008 financial crisis or how the healthcare market in most western countries operate. Since REDD+ is market driven the inherent defects in the market economy also affects carbon trading the same way it affects other market related businesses. Additionally, REDD+ and its use of voluntary markets in carbon trading often gets criticism that there is an oversupply of projects as compared to offset buyers which culminates in low prices of forests offsets in the global carbon market. Hence, some carbon trading experts and analyst argue that forests conservation efforts are not commensurate with prices of forests offset markets.

2.8. REDD+, tenure security and carbon rights.

According to Larson, Barry and Dahal (2010) tenure security can be understood as the point upon which an individual or a group considers its relationship to land or any other natural resource as safe and far away from being in jeopardy. Thus, tenure rights over land, forest and carbon are central to the REDD+ program as they shape access and decision making on land and forest resources (Larson et al 2011). Taking this view into account, tenure security is at the heart of REDD+ debate and it is important to understand the relationship between REDD+ and local indigenous people as this relationship determines the success or failure of the program (Wright 2011). Tied to this, tenure security is even more important as it ensures the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+ strategies (Hatcher 2009) since it makes it possible to locate the actors that are entitled to carbon rights.

Paramount to note is that tenure rights are not only complex but multi-dimensional. This gives rise to diverse property rights regimes that are usually referred to as “bundle of rights”. Bundle of rights include: rights to access (access right), right to use and withdraw resources (user rights), right to manage the landscape and plan for its future

(management right), right to determine who can and can't use land or forest resources (exclusion right) and the right to sell or transfer these rights (alienation right) (Larson et al 2010). Informed by several REDD+ pilot projects conducted so far, rights to land and forests come in diverse forms. Depending on legislations and policies in places where REDD+ is implemented, natural resources such as land and forests can be state or public owned, they can be regarded as collective or common property or individual or private property.

It can be commented that in developing countries, state or public property and collective or common property are dominant in comparison to individual ownership of natural resources such as land and forests. In the case of the REDD+ program this often causes conflicts. This is largely due to complications and confusion arising from natural resources governance and administration. Figure 2.3 below shows right holder distribution across countries found in the developing world. The figure shows that Africa's forests tenure is largely state or public owned with 97.9 percent, Asia and Pacific has 68 percent whilst Latin America is at 36 percent. Individual ownership is high in Latin America with 7 percent, Asia-Pacific with 3 percent and Africa with 0, 4 percent. Community ownership of land in Latin America and Asia and Pacific is joint at 25 percent whilst in Africa it is almost non-existent. Therefore, tenure security affects the implementation of REDD+ which means that some countries need to institute tenure security reforms in order to ensure the success of REDD+. When property rights that include natural resources such as land and forests are contested, this also means that carbon rights are also contested. Resultantly this endangers the whole project since generation of carbon credits is at the heart of REDD+.




Figure 2. 2. Forest Tenure distribution in Africa, Asia and Latin America

Source: Westholm et al (2011)

Closely attached to the above, Gizachew et al (2017) underlines that most African countries lack clear carbon rights from the forests. This lack of clear carbon rights can be attributed to Africa's forests tenure distribution. Since forest are largely public and administered by the state, this makes African states have interest in the project thus they appropriate REDD+. This appropriation can primarily be attributed to the need to benefit from revenue that is generated by the project at the expense of local indigenous communities where the project is implemented. More so, most REDD+ projects are implemented without the application of safeguards that address tenure issues which provides a platform for tenure security reforms. Thus, local indigenous people are denied carbon rights in the process.

In general, one major issue with tenure rights dynamics is that countries with weak land tenure systems are at risk of facing challenges during the implementation of the REDD+ program. In specific, when tenure security is weak local indigenous people become more vulnerable to exclusion and face negative effects of REDD+ implementation (Brown, Seymour and Peskett, 2008) since they would have less leverage and bargaining power and little to non-influence over the outcome of negotiations with other actors such as the government (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). This can potentially lead to conflicts. According to Sunderlin et al (2009), governments may take control over forest lands with the intention to appropriate the benefits from REDD+ hence applying control and command measures in order to exclude local indigenous communities from forests. Resultantly, local

indigenous communities without adequate legal tenure rights are dispossessed. In the case of Africa as exemplified by figure 2.3 above, much of the land is owned by the state which is more problematic as local indigenous communities are under complex land tenure with the common being customary tenure holding which in most cases clash with the REDD+ program during its implementation.

Barnsley (2009) echoes the above by noting that many governments disregard traditional and customary forest land rights of local indigenous communities when making decisions about land zoning and managing forest. In the worst case, REDD+ leads to displacement of local indigenous communities hence denying them their livelihoods and customary tenure rights. Therefore, securing tenure rights over forestland and carbon are crucial as they form a fertile basis for local indigenous communities to benefit from REDD+ payments. Securing tenure rights can fundamentally induce indigenous communities to be involved in all stages of REDD+ including participatory carbon monitoring and having legal authority to stop illegal forest exploitation by outsiders (Lawlor et al (2010). This means that indigenous communities would effectively participate in the program when they own or have a stake in the REDD+ program the opposite of which might culminate in conflicts, economic inequality, and deprivation of livelihoods and human rights violation (Sunderlin et al 2009). Hence, Ghazoul et al (2010) argue that indigenous communities could become “REDD+ refugees” if they are deprived of access to land they manage and depend on.

In the context of developing countries in Africa, governance of the forest sector is not only clogged with poor institutional capacity, poor performance and weak conservation programs, but is characterised by insecure land and forest tenure by local indigenous communities (Agrawal et al 2011). Forest governance in Africa lacks cross-sectional coordination on REDD+ and the incompatibility of REDD+ and national land and agriculture policy have affected the implementation of the REDD+ program (Atela et al., 2016). In this respect, Gizachew et al (2017) argue that the implementation of REDD+ needs governance reforms amongst them land tenure and institutions that address rights and interests of diverse stakeholders’ local indigenous communities in particular. Because of reasons discussed above, REDD+ is sometimes conceived as an environmental mode of governance in crisis (Thompson et al 2011). Concerns are that REDD+ majorly empowers nation states to control rural resources (Phelps et al 2010). Gizachew et al (2017) reaffirms the same as they note that the introduction of REDD+ in African countries has seen land

tenure representing a serious governance issue as rural land is a crucial resource for development yet in these countries the state claims legal title over forested land when it appears to have weak control over the forests in overall. On top of that, customary institutions involved in forest governance are disregarded in most cases or replaced by “modern” laws that work to exclude local indigenous communities as witnessed in the Congo basin (Acker, 2005).

The land tenure system in most African countries is made in such a manner that even when communities exercise participatory forest management, formal ownership of the forested land remains with the state. As a result, this creates a firm grounding for land grabbing and expropriation with local indigenous communities not compensated at all (Gizachew et al 2017). Owing to this arrangement, African countries have experienced a surge in land grabs by international corporations and corrupt government officials in the name of “Foreign Direct Investment”. As a result, such land deals make the domestic elites as partners and beneficiaries as opposed to local indigenous communities especially in Southern Africa (Hall, 2011). In this respect land tenure in particular ownership, access, use and transfer rights are challenging issues in the implementation of REDD+.

In overall, various studies on REDD+ and its impact on land tenure in countries like Cameroon (Awono et al, 2014), Brazil, Tanzania, Indonesia and Vietnam (Sunderlin et al, 2014, Resosudarmo et al 2014) and Zimbabwe (Kapfuvhuti, 2014, Dzingirai and Mangwanya, 2015) underline that REDD+ projects in these countries are often implemented in an environment where tenure arrangements are either not clearly defined or effectively enforced. Taking the above into consideration, in a bid to make REDD+ benefit local indigenous communities, there is need to ensure that there is meaning participation of local indigenous communities at all levels, that benefits are distributed equally and their rights especially tenure rights are recognised, secured and strengthened (Springate-Baginski and Wollenberg 2010). This is significant since it suffocates the likelihood of REDD+ serving the interests of political institutions among them formal forest agencies, local elites and conservation agencies (Bayrak and Marafa 2016).

Perhaps much more important to note is that weak tenure complicates the benefit sharing mechanisms in REDD+ primarily because it becomes difficult to determine the actors that should be compensated (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). This results in marginalization of local indigenous communities as local and national elites capture benefits which is detrimental since it creates conflicts and protests in the long run (Sunderlin et al., 2009). More so, Vatn

and Vedeld (2011) argue that unclear land tenure can potentially increase inequality as indigenous communities lose both compensation payments and jobs in the forest sector as a result of not having legal tenure stemming from forest use restriction.

2.9. REDD+ and Governance Values.

Governance is defined by Thompson et al (2011) as a structure of decision making and resource management that involves transparency and accountability issues. With regards to the REDD+ program, governance involves critical issues such as land tenure, resource rights, benefit sharing policies as well as forms of forest management (Phelps et al 2010). For the purposes of this study a much more nuanced definition is proffered by Pierre and Guy Peters (2000) who define it as involving structures and processes that are used for the purpose of steering and coordinating interactions. Drawing from this definition, governance is characterized by values that form the cornerstone for steering and coordinating interactions during the implementation of REDD+ projects. These values form an overlapping but cohesive combination necessary to drive the implementation of REDD+ projects. They include: Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), benefit sharing among others and are crucial for REDD+ actor's especially local indigenous communities. These values are embedded on stakeholder interaction, collaboration and networks. Hence, these governance values are crucial not only in determining the success and longevity of REDD+ projects but fundamentally speak to the projects' legitimacy and acceptance by implementation partners.

As Juhola and Westerhoff (2011) put it, the conceptualization of climate governance shows a growing inclination towards social forms of stakeholder interaction characterized by decentralized networks and diverse actors functioning at different levels that also include the private sector and NGOs. This in turn changed the state, society and economic relations but more importantly, the understanding of legitimacy changed as well (Bulkeley 2010). Resultantly, actors that were once located outside the decision-making realm through climate governance can now play a role in formation of public policy, although their participation is a direct challenge to traditional conceptions of power and authority (Cadman and Maraseni 2012). Important to note is that it is through the Kyoto Protocol that climate governance dynamics changed as the protocol embraced market mechanisms that saw the crafting of governance structures underlined by the need for cooperation between state and non-state actors (Andonova et al. 2009).

In this spectrum the REDD+ program largely follows this form of governance where policy making is an institutional complex that involves various intergovernmental and national elements with different levels of collaboration (Lubell, 2015). Owing to this reason, the governance of the REDD+ program should be prioritized and scrutinized and the major focus should be on: representation of interest, accountability and transparency and decision making and implementation since these work as a litmus test necessary to understand REDD+ legitimacy (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). Tied to the above, Gupta (2010) underlines that the REDD+ program is not risk free since its governance arrangements can potentially escalate conflict between the global North and South and even goes further to marginalize local indigenous communities. As a result, this can see the program suffering from the crisis of legitimacy. Figure 2.4 below shows how the hierarchy of power in global climate governance and policy if not properly implemented can produce cascading effects that harm actors that are located at the bottom of “the food chain pyramid”.




Figure 2.3. The hierarchy of power in global environmental governance and policy

Source: Toro (2012)

Having understood this background, the effectiveness of the REDD+ program has received serious criticism that majorly focus on national practices and power dynamics that are involved in its governance. According to Cadman and Maraseni (2012) some NGOs argue that the REDD+ program is riddled with corruption, national and local authorities’ conflicts, insufficient resources and institutional capacity. Nonetheless, it can be argued that great strides have been taken at global level in order to make sure that REDD+ governance values are realized. Although governance values were insignificantly underlined in many UNFCCC conferences, the Cancun Agreements at COP 16 emphasized the need to come up with REDD+ guidance and safeguards that speak to transparent and

effective national forest governance coupled with adequate effective participation of relevant stakeholders especially indigenous and local communities.

The downside to this position is that the agreements didn't specify how such safeguards should be implemented as they only referred to national legislation and sovereignty (Cadman and Maraseni, *ibid*). Article 72 of the same agreement acknowledges the significance of land tenure and forest governance issues as well as gender considerations, but it again lacks clarity on how these issues are supposed to be actualized. Nevertheless, the Cancun Agreements recognize the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which emphasizes the need for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) requisite for Indigenous communities involved in REDD+ (Ruggie 2011). As a result of the Cancun Agreements, voluntary standards that focus on environment and social safeguards such as the Climate Community and Biodiversity (CCB standards) by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (REDD+ SES) and the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria (SEPC) by UN-REDD and the Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) by Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) were introduced. Their main focus is to ensure that REDD+ among other things adhere to democratic governance, uphold stakeholder rights and ensure sustainable livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. More so, these safeguards majorly focus on issues of transparency, participation, inclusivity, effectiveness, and equitable distribution of benefits coming out of the REDD+ program (Chapman et al, 2014). However, since these safeguards are majorly voluntary and that their adoption are left at the whim of national legislation and sovereignty their effectiveness are hugely debatable.

As aforementioned, governance and legitimacy have an intricate relationship critical in determining the success or failure of the program. For a system to be legitimate, it must be justifiable particularly in terms of moral principles and social norms. Hence, in order to determine the legitimacy of REDD+, a variety of indicators can be used. Cadman et al (2016) underscore that since governance has everything to do with structures and processes crucial in steering and coordinating interactions, governance values should as such be understood by understanding qualities and characteristics of these structures and processes. These values include transparency, accountability, equity, democracy, equality, resources, agreement, dispute settlement, durability, problem solving and inclusiveness. The values are a total sum of a hierarchical framework of principles, criteria and indicators. As such, a

combination of the variables mentioned above highly impact on the legitimacy of institutions and networks in REDD+. In this respect, institutional legitimacy is not divorced from the quality of governance since they are mutually inclusive. Figure 2.5 below illustrate this relationship.




Figure 2. 4. Model for evaluation of governance values in REDD+

Source: Cadman et al (2016)

To expand the above points, safeguards such as the Climate Community and Biodiversity (CCB standards) and the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards are vital as they directly affect structures and processes that determine the fate of REDD+ projects. This is because they arguably wield some components that speak to governance values. For instance, when actions of institutions and networks are transparent and accountable, they enable constructive deliberation hence providing affected actors with capacity to provide input culminating in effective results (Sampford, 2001). Thus, this framework if abided to can make the implementation of REDD+ projects more fluent hence this improves their sustainability and durability largely because of its inclusive nature.



3. KARIBA REDD+ STUDY AREA, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

In data collection, the study majorly utilised qualitative methods that include Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and a complimentary survey, Participant Observation and secondary sources. The methods were aimed at finding answers to key research questions that are central to this study. These research methods primarily sought to answer the following research questions: What is marketization of environmental governance? What is its nature and how does it function in REDD+? What are the diverse actors involved in Kariba REDD+ project? And what are their interest? What is the state of power relations, ownership and control dynamics between Kariba REDD+ project and the local indigenous communities? What is the impact of the Kariba REDD+ project on local indigenous communities? And Is the Kariba REDD+ project legitimate and sustainable? More importantly, these methods were guided by the qualitative phenomenological research design. A phenomenological design allows for the identification of a shared experience, enables the understanding of the nature of the lived experience and helps locate the essence of a phenomenon. Paramount to note is that phenomenology is both a philosophical discipline and a method of enquiry.

With respect to this study, the phenomenological research design was essential as it allowed the understanding of participant's personal experiences. In specific, the design benefitted the study by enabling a better interpretation and understanding of people's meanings and experiences with respect to the Kariba REDD+ project. Essentially, Phenomenology dwells on understanding human consciousness by comprehending human experience through interpretation and description. More so, the design approaches the study of humans and their culture in a different way from the logical positivist model by arguing that logical positivism fails to address the uniqueness of human life in the study of human beings as much as it does. Logical positivism or logical empiricism emphasises that philosophical problems should be solved using logical analysis. In data analysis and processing the study adhered to eight steps of phenomenological data analysis and processing as outlined by Yüksel and Yıldırım (2015). These eight steps can be further put into three categories namely: phenomenological reduction, imagination variation and essence. More importantly the study also paid attention to ethical issues relevant in the production of valid and relevant research.

3.2. Study Area

The Kariba REDD+ project is under implementation in four Rural District Councils (RDCs) that include Mbire, Binga, Nyaminyami and Hurungwe. Of the four RDCs where Kariba REDD project is under implementation, this study focused on the Mbire RDC. In this district, data was collected in four wards namely; Kanyemba-ward 1, ward 3, Masoka-ward 11 and ward 16. Mbire district is one of the districts to have piloted REDD+ project starting in 2011 and the area has a long history with other Community Based Natural Resource Management models such as Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). CAMPFIRE is a community based natural resources management that was introduced in the 1980s to encourage rural communities to conserve natural resources particularly local wildlife populations in order to create revenue and job opportunities for the local indigenous communities. Mbire is located in the Zambezi Valley north of Guruve district and covers the Dande communal lands (See Map 3.1).

The area is characterized by hot temperatures and is infested with tsetse fly. The district has 15 wards and the area's major forms of economic activity are cotton and maize farming, gold panning, safari hunting, and fishing. Mbire RDC has 46,287 hectares of forested areas and 223,226 hectares of open woodland areas amounting to a total woodland area of 269,513 hectares. In comparison, Binga RDC has a total number of 157 652 hectares of forested area, Hurungwe RDC has 131 480 hectares, and Nyaminyami has a total of 226 341 hectares of forested area (Kariba REDD+ Report 2013). This makes Mbire the biggest district in the project in comparison to other districts in terms of the number of hectares covered by forests expected to capture carbon. The vegetation type in the Mbire district is dominated by miombo woodlands with mopane woodlands occupying some areas (Kariba PDD, 2012).

During the data collection process, purposive sampling played a central role in locating essential respondents that are involved in the project. As underlined by Creswell (2007) a researcher purposely selects people and the location to explore, study or understand a phenomenon. In this respect, purposive sampling enabled the study to approach specific respondents culminating in the inclusion of the views of people of interest in the research. For example, the Mbire district has community members who are directly benefiting from the project through their participation in various projects meant to improve their livelihoods whilst others are not directly benefiting yet they are bound by the same rules and expectations under the Kariba REDD+ project. In this respect, the use of purposive sampling made the study able to be cognisant of these differences whilst selecting the respondents since it was crucial for the study to capture perspectives coming from all sides. Thus, purposive sampling enabled the study to locate respondents with different views and experiences which benefited the study.

More broadly, purposive sampling allowed the researcher to tap information from relevant stakeholders amongst them experts on REDD+ and REDD+ stakeholders. These included notable respondents from the UN-REDD, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Wild life Fund, Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, Ministry of Local Government, the Forestry Commission, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Environment, Water and Climate and the Mbire RDC, civil society officials from organisations such as Transparency International chapters, Environment Africa, Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association, Bio hub Trust, Mukuvisi Woodlands, CAMPFIRE representatives, environmental governance consultants, the Chapoto Community Development Trust, traditional leaders, councillors, private players such as Carbon Green Africa and the academia and media.

In a bid to trace additional respondents, the study made use of snowball sampling. This was done to augment the data from purposive sampling by expanding the data set so as to bolster the validity and reliability of the study. As highlighted by Holloway (1997) snowball sampling technique is fundamental in that it helps in expanding the sample by asking a respondent to recommend other relevant respondents crucial to the study. This was the case in this study as the research took advantage of already established relations of participants who are knowledgeable of the Kariba REDD+ project. More importantly, considering that Mbire district is marginalised hence difficult to access, this helped the study gather rich data that would have been difficult to access had it not been that the study

utilised the snow balling sampling technique. More so, the wards in the Mbire district are quite vast and isolated meaning that navigating from one ward to another was difficult.

The above holds true with regards to wards 1, 3, 11 and 16 which were used as study areas under the Mbire district. Thus, the snowballing sampling technique enabled the research to manoeuvre physical barriers and communication challenges better by way of using references by the research participants otherwise known as gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are study respondents that recommend other respondents to corroborate or expand their views and experiences or offer other perspectives and the respondents that volunteer assistance are referred to as key actors or key insiders. In this vein, the utilisation of snowball sampling benefitted the study as gate keepers gave more access to key insiders with rich information regarding the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project. Key inside information also enabled the study to learn the experiences and perceptions of local indigenous community members regarding the project. These gatekeepers wield formal or informal authority to determine access to a site (Neuman 2000: Greig and Taylor 1999) which proved important in this research.

3.4. Research Design.

A qualitative phenomenological study design was used to comprehend the Kariba REDD+ project largely to make sense of the marketization of environmental governance and policy phenomenon. Cilesiz, (2010) states that qualitative phenomenological research is principally aimed at reaching the essence of individuals lived experience of a phenomenon whilst at the same time comprehending the phenomenon. According to Rieman in Van der Wal (1999) the general guiding question in phenomenological research is: What is the essence of this phenomenon as experienced by these people? The subsequent questions that guide the design are: What is the phenomenon that is experienced and lived? And how does it show itself? In this regard, the qualitative phenomenological design made it possible to understand the diverse actors involved in Kariba REDD+ project and their interest, the comprehension of existent power relations, ownership and control dynamics of the project and the grasping of the impact of Kariba REDD+ project on the Mbire community. This provided a firm grounding that the study used to determine if the project is sustainable and relevant in combating climate change and environmental degradation.

With regards to this study in particular, the phenomenological research design was advantageous in comparison to other qualitative research designs like case studies and ethnography. This is because the design generated rich data that in turn reflected diverse views, beliefs, thoughts and opinions of the respondents better than other qualitative research designs. For example, where as a case study produces in-depth and detailed investigation of a single case over a period of time, phenomenology is more robust when it comes to understanding lived experiences and perspectives of respondents thereby capturing the essence of a phenomenon. In this light, Kariba REDD+ project undoubtedly fitted this design as the researcher focused on describing lived experiences of the Mbire community. The study paid much attention to manifestations, structures and components of respondents' lived experiences with respect to the Kariba REDD+ project and the conservation of the natural environment as a common sink resource. The term 'common sink resource' is in many respects akin to common pool resources. In general, common sink refers to the atmosphere as a 'global common' or a resource that is shared at global level whereas, common pool resources refer to resources that can be collectively owned and used such as fish stock, pastures among others. Therefore, both terms speak to the resources (albeit different) that are supposed to be owned and controlled by the commons to avoid overuse and depletion.

Using KIIs, Participant observation, secondary sources and FGDs in data collection, the research design precisely tapped into household respondents' and stakeholders' views, their experiences and their understanding of and perceptions of the Kariba REDD+ project. In this sense the study sought to purposefully comprehend the lived experiences through understanding the respondent's perceptions and feelings towards the Kariba REDD project. Phenomenological research design fits research problems that require a deep understanding of human experiences common to a group of people (Creswell 1998). Ponce (2014) reiterates that the role of a phenomenological researcher is 'to "construct" the studied object according to its own manifestations, structures and components. Lester (1999) underlines that the major strength of qualitative phenomenological design is that it enables the understanding of people's subjective experience, motivations and actions. Langdrige (2007) further notes that phenomenology focuses much on interpreting people's lived experiences through studying and understanding their perceptions of the world in which they live in and what it means to them. It can also be understood as the study of a phenomenon including its nature and meanings (Finlay 2009). More importantly as

highlighted above, besides phenomenology being a study design, it is also a philosophy that explains being and consciousness in accordance to the analysis of observable phenomena (Litchman, 2006).

3.5. Data Collection Methods.

In line with the dictates of a phenomenological qualitative research design, diverse but mutually reinforcing data collection methods were used. This was crucial for the study since the use of multiple data collection methods enabled the verification and cross-checking of collected data. More importantly, the chosen data collection methods formed a natural fit with the phenomenological research design. Resultantly, this culminated in the collection of data of high quality and provided a firm grounding for realization of reliable and valid research findings. During the data collection process, when one data collection method failed to probe and capture relevant data, other alternative methods were used in order to compensate for that weakness. In some cases, Focus Group Discussions helped fill in the gaps of information gathered through a survey and Key Informant Interviews and vice versa. On the whole, the data collection methods that drove the data collection process include: Key informant interviews, Focus Group Discussions and complementary survey, Participant observation and Secondary sources.

3.5.1. Key Informant interviews (KIIs).

To gather information aimed at understanding the marketisation of environmental governance and policy, the study utilised Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). In specific, KIIs enriched the study through learning diverse actors and their subsequent interests in the Kariba REDD+ project. They also helped the study to ascertain the impact of the project by uncovering the existent power relations, ownership and control dynamics of the Kariba REDD+ project in the Mbire district. Directly attached to this, the KIIs made the researcher fully understand the benefits of the project to diverse actors. Special focus was given to the Mbire community as the primary stockholder of the forests and other natural resources. It can be commented that the study highly prioritised KIIs as they are at the heart of a phenomenological qualitative study. The most appropriate data collection method for a phenomenological study is Key Informant Interviews (Marshall and Rossman, 2010) since they allow the study to understand personal experiences, perceptions, feelings beliefs and convictions regarding the Kariba REDD+ project. In this regard throughout the data collection process the study focused more on absorbing data that reflected the experiences

and perceptions of local indigenous people in the Mbire district with respect to the Kariba REDD+.

In accordance with the prescriptions of a qualitative phenomenological study as emphasised by Bentz and Shapiro (1998) the study made sure that the data emerged since everything under this research design is tied to the need to capture “rich descriptions of phenomena and their settings”. Hence, key informants included; government officials that include; Mbire RDC officials, Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate officials and Forestry Commission officials, REDD+ experts and consultants, civil society leaders, academia, traditional leaders, Chapoto Community Development Trust members, journalist, Carbon Green Africa officials (private company) and community members in the Mbire district. More so, in a bid to get relevant data from KIIs, different interview guides were used. These include: KIIs for REDD+ experts, KIIs for Kariba REDD+ implementation partners and KIIs for community and traditional leaders in the Mbire district. The researcher realized that the interview guides should not only be suitable but relevant to the respondents in order to successfully tap data that would contribute to the understanding of the main research question. Most significantly, the researcher made sure that the questions were directed to the participant’s experiences and perceptions of REDD+ and the Kariba REDD+ project in particular.

More importantly, the interview process was made reciprocal in order to allow both the researcher and the respondents to engage in a dialogue. Tied to this, the study made use of open-ended questions to make sure the dialogue produces as much rich data as possible. In a phenomenological study, interviews should be open or semi-structured so that they provide space for aperture for the respondents so that they express their experiences in detail hence allowing the study to approach reality as accurate as possible (Padilla-Diaz 2015). Most importantly additional KIIs through snowballing sampling were conducted in order to make the study obtain information to verify, corroborate or compare information (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).

The research also benefitted from KIIs that were conducted in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The KIIs consisted of knowledgeable participants and REDD+ experts from the civil society, international organisations involved in REDD+, government officials from the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, RDCs and the Forestry Commission, the academia and key members of the media. The study took advantage of several stakeholder workshops on REDD+ that were organised by Transparency

International Zimbabwe as part of their project on promoting good governance, transparency and accountability in the implementation of REDD+ projects. These KIIs produced rich data as the research managed to grasp REDD+ best practices and experiences in other REDD+ pilot projects across the world. Resultantly this enabled the study to understand the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project relative to best practices and experiences coming out of similar projects being implemented in other African countries, Asia and America.

3.5.2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and complementary Survey

To capture in-depth information on the politics of the Kariba REDD+ project particularly on power relations issues, ownership and control of the project as well as the legitimacy, sustainability and viability of the project, Focus Group Discussions were used by the researcher. This data collection method helped the researcher gain rich information regarding the implementation and governance of the Kariba REDD+ project. Although some scholars argue that FGDs characteristics do not perfectly fit into a phenomenological qualitative study, this study is an exception for several reasons. Most fundamental is that the study area has a history of community-based conservation of common pool resources and recently common sink resources. The Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPIFIRE) which was introduced in 1989 represents the former and the Kariba REDD+ project represents the latter. In this context, FGDs were fundamental in helping respondents reflect the social realities of their history in conservation schemes as a cultural group. This is reiterated by Creswell (2007) who argues that a phenomenological framework involves a reasonably homogeneous group of respondents with similar experiences of a phenomenon.

More importantly, the FGDs were particularly focused on the supposed beneficiaries of the Kariba REDD+ project. This category included community members, councillors, traditional leaders and the Chapoto Community Development Trust in the Mbire district. On this note, a total of five FGDs were conducted in order to get inside information regarding the way Mbire local indigenous people view and perceive the Kariba REDD+ project. The FGDs enabled the researcher to capture sentiments, opinions and views that on the whole reflected the politics of market based environmental governance and administration. About 53 respondents managed to participate in these FGDs and the study benefited from the diverse backgrounds of these respondents. For example, some of the respondents were former CAMPIFIRE committee members, subsistence farmers,

community development leaders, councillors, traditional leaders, scouts and safari guides, entrepreneurs and civil servants. Their broad perspectives meant that their perceptions and understanding of the Kariba REDD+ project was also diverse hence benefitted the research. In specific, the FGDs participants raised cross cutting issues that range from historical, cultural, social, economic, developmental, political and environmental issues that on the whole helped the study grasp the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ better.

Perhaps much more important is that the researcher's decision to use FGDs was inspired by the need to ensure the use of more than one data collection method in order to establish reliability of the study (Higginbottom 1998) hence FGDs played a complimentary role to the KIIs. Further, contrary to a belief by some scholars that a combination of FGDs and phenomenology amounts to a mismatch, Wilkinson (1998) argue that FGDs are instead applicable to a phenomenological study. Her argument is that within the phenomenological framework, apart from capturing people's experiences, meanings and understandings, FGDs allow the researcher to capture their attitudes, opinions, knowledge and beliefs. FGDs have three major components namely; (i) a method devoted to data collection; (ii) interaction as a source of data and (iii) the active role of the researcher in creating group discussion for data collection (Morgan 1996). Therefore, in this case the FGDs came in handy as they increased a sense of cohesiveness of the respondents hence boosted their sense of belonging to a group and consequently made them feel safe to share information (Vaughn, Schumm et al 1996). Similarly, the FGDs allowed the respondents to interact and co-create narratives and opinions (Liamputtong 2011) which was essential for this research. More so as emphasized by Krueger (2000) this method created an environment that is socially oriented which was essential as it enabled the understanding of common denominator issues particularly on lived experiences of individuals who participated in the Focus Groups with respect to REDD+ and the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ in particular. Most importantly, during the focus group discussions, the researcher adhered to professional and neutral conduct that enabled the study to gain rich information.

During the collection of data in wards 1, 3, 11 and 16 wards in the Mbire district FGDs were utilised in a manner that allowed the data collection instrument to become more compatible with a qualitative phenomenological study design. In this vein, in order to avoid making the group the unit of analysis, a survey was used as an attempt to accommodate views of individual respondents. Thus, every respondent that attended FGDs in these wards was made to answer a questionnaire on issues related to the Kariba REDD+

project first before they participated in the FGDs thus, a survey was used to compliment FGDs. As argued by Mathers et al (2007), surveys are useful for no experimental descriptive designs that aim to describe reality especially by establishing the prevalence or incidence of a circumstance. More so, besides that surveys enable the collection of information on attitudes and behaviour of respondents, they are important in establishing internal and external validity something which the research exploited.

3.5.3. Participant Observation.

The study also benefited from the use of participant observation as a data collection method. Participant observation was conducted in two ways: firstly, the research benefited from events such as stakeholder workshops organized by NGOs and institutions working on REDD+ projects, forest conservation initiatives and climate change issues in general. Amongst these events are stakeholder engagement workshops, capacity building workshops and policy dialogues. Secondly, participant observation was made possible through activities undertaken on REDD+ in the study area. During the time of data collection for this study, TI Z was conducting a project in the same area where its major focus was on educating and capacitating local indigenous people, RDC officials and community leaders to improve the implementation of REDD+ through promotion of good governance practices thereby reducing the risk of corruption and mishandling of climate finance funds. Hence, participant observation was made possible through community and public meetings and capacity building workshops convened through this project. According to Patton (1990) data gathered from observation serves a purpose of describing settings under observation, the associated activities, participants involved in those activities and the meanings learned from the observations from the perspectives of the participants under observation

In this vein, participant observation in the Mbire district made it possible to collect data that is difficult to discover unless the researcher was directly involved in the phenomenon. As noted by Farber (2006) participant observation is critical as it helps uncover data that is normally less visible by making it visible and this benefits a research in the process. In specific, observation comes with “aha” moments of noticing” as they are associated with feelings that emerge from inside and are triggered by one’s senses (Farber *ibid*). In addition, through participant observation official documents belonging to traditional leaders, Carbon Green Africa, government officials and other relevant organizations were also scrutinised so that the study could comprehend the implementation of Kariba REDD+

project. Most importantly, through networks facilitated by Participant Observation the study managed to access important documents. Thus, these networks were significant in that they enabled the study to access some documents that were hard to without personal and professional connections. Most significantly, participant observation helped the study get inside knowledge of the state of power relations, ownership, control dynamics and legitimacy issues with regards to the Kariba REDD+ project in the Mbire district.

3.6 Data analysis and processing.

Data generated from data collection instruments which included KIIs, FGDs and survey, secondary sources and Participant Observation was exposed to phenomenological data analysis and processing procedure. Phenomenological data analysis and processing basically involved listening to, comparing transcripts and field notes as well as contrasting descriptions of the Kariba REDD+ project from the standpoint of the respondents. The procedure is a total sum of eight steps that can be compressed into three categories namely: phenomenological reduction, imagination variation and essence. These processes are described in detail below.

Since KIIs are at the heart of the phenomenological research design, it was crucial that data originating from these data collection tools be subjected to phenomenological analysis and processing. More so, the research had different KIIs which were intended for respondents of diverse backgrounds thus data analysis had to be thorough to intelligibly describe and interpret perceptions, experiences and views of respondents regarding the Kariba REDD+ project. For example, KIIs for REDD+ experts, Kariba REDD+ project implementation partners and the community and traditional leaders in the Mbire district had different sets of questions which on the whole enabled the study to deduce implicit and explicit data from the respondents. Consequently, this made a phenomenological type of analysing and processing data the most suitable. Through this process the study managed to understand Kariba REDD+ and the marketisation of environmental governance and policy thus reaching the essence of a phenomenon.

In addition, data produced from the survey was processed by use of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and was significant for triangulation of findings as this complimented data that was produced through FGDs and Participant Observation. As indicated before, the data from the survey complimented the FGDs by shifting the unit of analysis from the group to individuals hence making the produced data to synch with the phenomenological qualitative design. During the analysis of the data, both implicit and

explicit meanings regarding the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project were extracted from all the data instruments. This is mainly because a phenomenological research design deals with personal experiences, perceptions and attitude towards a phenomenon of the respondents. As emphasised by Anderson (2007) qualitative data analysis goes beyond counting explicit words as it is focused on both identifying and describing explicit and implicit ideas.

To fully realize the analysis and processing of qualitative data, strategies of descriptive phenomenological data analysis and processing were applied. The first strategy was intuiting. Intuition involves thinking through the data for accurate comprehension and interpretation of the meaning of a particular description (Streubert and Carpenter 1999). Bracketing was another strategy that was utilised where assumptions and preconceptions of the researcher were thrown out of the data analysis and processing procedures as opposed to concealing them (Holloway and Wheeler 1996). The reason for doing so was to avoid letting preconceptions that might be held by the researcher interfere with the information provided by the respondents. Therefore, the researcher strived to remain neutral regarding his beliefs or disbeliefs in the existence of a phenomenon (Streubert and Carpenter 1999). Figure 3.1 below details the steps and processes that were undertaken during the analysis and processing of data from data collection instruments that included KIIs, FGDs and complementary survey, secondary sources and Participant observation data.




Figure 3.1. Steps for Phenomenological data analysis

Source: Yüksel and Yıldırım (2015)

In accordance with the steps outlined by figure 3.1 above, the first procedure the study conducted was phenomenological reduction. This procedure involved describing individual experiences using textural language. Textural language originating from data that was collected through KIIs and FGDs regarding REDD+ and the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project was described. More so, this procedure saw the research clean and glean raw data captured from transcripts and field notes derived from KIIs and FGDs. At this stage the data processing also involved the removal of vague, overlapping and repetitive expressions derived from transcripts and notes. More importantly, this process saw the study following five individual but mutually reinforcing steps that included horizontalizing or the listing of all relevant expressions, reducing experiences to invariant constituents or units, creating core themes through thematic clustering, comparing other data sources such as secondary data sources, data from participant observation and the survey in a bid to validate invariant constituents or units. These steps in overall facilitated the making of individual textual descriptions of respondents hence the steps enabled the creation of valid and reliable findings in this study.

In addition, the comparison of clustered invariant constituents or units that were put in themes with other multiple data sources used in this research benefitted the research. Thus, experiences tapped through KIIs were verified by comparing them with expressions and experiences coming out of FGDs, Participant Observation and the survey. More importantly, data generated through the survey helped reconcile the views, expressions and experiences shared through KIIs and FGDs by way of understanding these issues from individual perspectives. More so, secondary data sources played a major role by helping the research verify the accuracy of the information generated through phenomenological data reduction. This was also helpful in ensuring a clear presentation of data findings across all data sources. More so, by constructing individual textural descriptions of respondents, the study managed to meticulously identify narratives that helped explain the perceptions and experiences of respondents from their verbatim expressions.

The procedure that followed phenomenological reduction was imagination variation. Imagination variation involved the use of the researchers' imagination as opposed to empirical data. In specific two more steps were conducted under this procedure namely: the crafting of individual structural descriptions and the crafting of merged structural descriptions. On the whole, this procedure saw structural themes get exposed to the imagination variation process through seeking possible meaning by using imagination. Imaginative variation primarily helped the study remove unnecessary features in the gleaned and cleaned data (structural themes) with the intention to find possible meanings and experiences shared by study respondents. This procedure was conducted in order to arrive at structural descriptions of experiences of respondents as far as the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project is concerned. In this respect, imagination variation was repetitively conducted until the shared meaning and experiences of respondents in REDD+ and the Kariba REDD+ project were discovered.

Finally, the study conducted a procedure called essence. The term essence in its original form entails understanding the intrinsic nature or quality of an abstract thing that helps establish its character. In this light, this procedure involved the creation of expressions from texture and structure through their synthesis. Thus, expressions regarding the phenomenon of the Kariba REDD+ project were created in a bid to understand the experiences and perceptions of the respondents in this study. This procedure was essentially done in order to reach the essence of the experience of the marketisation of the environment and climate as witnessed in the Mbire district through the implementation of

the Kariba REDD+ project. Thus, through the utilisation of phenomenological analysis and processing process, the study managed to create a valid and reliable description and interpretation of REDD+ and the Kariba REDD+ project that represented the views of the majority of respondents who participated in this study.

3.7. Limitations to the study.

One major restriction to the study was that Zimbabwe does not have a sound government led REDD+ project at the moment. The Ngamo-Sikumi government led pilot project is in its infancy as the government is still at REDD+ readiness stage. More so, accessing relevant information and documents from Carbon Green Africa proved to be difficult for the researcher. Hence the researcher only relied on documents that the company willingly made public. Apart from that, the research study was affected by the inaccessibility of Mbire as the district is located on the peripheral areas at the boarder of Zimbabwe and Zambia. More so, because of the history of marginalization, community members in the Mbire district often are not willing to communicate with people they don't identify with for the fear of political persecution as politics in Zimbabwe is polarized. For example, besides that the researcher had established personal and official relationships with some of the respondents prior to the data collection process for this research study, the respondents did not consent to have their voices recorded or their pictures taken. The other obvious limitations are that of time and resources constraints. On the whole, this inhibited the conducting of field work in a way that would have benefited the study more. Hence these circumstances posed as realistic barriers to the conducting of the research.

3.8. Ethical Considerations.

Research ethics were religiously followed during the data capturing and analysis process. As highlighted above, this was very important because Mbire district just like any other area in Zimbabwe suffers from the effects of polarization of politics. The district has many political gatekeepers whose sole purpose is to derail any researches and initiatives that seem to threaten the status quo. As underscored by Orb et al (2000), potential ethical conflicts in a qualitative research are much more pronounced when it comes to ways for the researcher to gain access to a community group coupled with the effect the researcher might have on the respondents. Most significantly, research ethics were primarily applied not only during the collection of primary data in the Mbire district and Harare but during the collection of secondary data. For instance, during the data collection process in the field, privacy of the respondents was upheld in a bid to protect them from harm. The same

applies to the secondary data collection process where secondary data sources on the phenomenon of REDD+ and the marketisation of environmental governance and policy were properly cited, and their contributions acknowledged in the study by the researcher.

Halai (2006) notes that research is both a moral and ethical endeavour and should highly regard the interest of respondents so that they are not harmed. Further, Ramos (1989) underscores three types of qualitative research related problems that can potentially affect the study and they include: the researcher-participant relationship, the researcher's subjective interpretations of data, and the design itself. In this regard, the data collection methods that received the much-needed attention when it came to adhering to ethical procedures include KIIs, and observation. More so, the researcher made sure that FGDs met all the other ethical considerations but not so much on privacy as the process is not private. As underscored by Orb et al (2000) qualitative research is embedded with concepts of relationships and power between the researcher and the respondents. Therefore, the researcher made sure that research ethics that include; informed and voluntary consent, confidentiality of information shared, anonymity of research participants, no harm to participants and reciprocity were prioritized throughout the data collection and analysis stages.



4. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Introduction

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present and analyse a broad range of research findings. These findings are categorised in accordance with the nature and scope of research questions that guided this research. The chapters pay attention to recurrent themes coming out of the research and data is presented in a manner that supports the discussion of research findings. In particular, the chapters largely speak to the marketisation of the Kariba REDD+ project by dwelling on specific issues that include: the understanding of the diverse actors and their interests in the Kariba REDD+ project, the state of power relations, ownership and control dynamics amongst the project's stakeholders and the subsequent impact of such dynamics on local indigenous communities particularly looking at their livelihood security. Resultantly, these discussions lay a firm foundation to understand the durability or sustainability of the project much in the same way they establish the legitimacy of the project relative to the findings.

4.2. Diverse Actors And Their Interests In The Kariba Redd+ Project

This chapter discusses the issues to do with the marketisation of environmental governance and policy using the Kariba REDD+ project. By focusing on diverse interests wielded by stakeholders involved in the project, the chapter fully comprehends the politics behind the marketisation of environment and climate as a new phenomenon in the Mbire district. Since REDD+ is a culmination of vast incremental and ongoing negotiations at international level, its conceptualization and implementation involve actors or stakeholders wielding different interests. Similarly, the Kariba REDD+ project involves diverse stakeholders who wield different interest resulting in them attaching different meanings to the project. Worth to mention from the onset is that the governance and implementation arrangements that are conceptualized, negotiated and agreed upon at the global level have a direct effect on local REDD+ projects across the world and amongst them is the Kariba REDD+. Stakeholders in this project include Carbon Green Africa and other private companies, government institutions that include: the Mbire Rural District Council (RDC) and the Forest Commission, NGOs that include Environment Africa and Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) and most importantly the Mbire community made up of the traditional leadership and the local indigenous community members. Although these stakeholders are all involved in the project, their interest are not only diverse but divergent in many respects. The divergence of their interest is mainly as a result of the way they

attach meaning to the Kariba REDD+ project. In this light this scenario can be argued to reflect complexities arising from marrying market principles and environmental conservation as it culminates in the reordering of the state, market and society relations.

4.2.1. Carbon Green Africa and other private companies.

The Carbon Green Africa (CGA) is the Kariba REDD+ project proponent. It is a Zimbabwe based company that facilitates the generation of carbon credits through validating REDD+ projects (CGA 2019). The private company prides itself on being competent by having the capacity to implement conservation projects in line with rules of Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Community, Climate and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) at Gold level whilst at the same time ensuring the project is financially viable for all stakeholders involved. According to the Kariba REDD+ Project Description Document (2012) the major role of CGA is to help in the generation of carbon credits. It majorly does so through certifying REDD+ projects through its network partners that include South Pole and Black Crystal that are central in conducting technical aspects of the project. South Pole specialises in the development of carbon strategies and the reduction of greenhouse gases whilst Black Crystal offers services in environmental and socio-economic consultancy services. In simple terms the two companies play a central role in the Monitoring and Measurement, Reporting and Verification of the Kariba REDD+ project.

It is worth noting that CGA's like any other private company is majorly interested in making profits. Being a subsidiary of the project proponent Carbon Green Investment (CGI), no private company would embark on a project that guarantees losses. Therefore, by taking a leading role in a project that uses market principles to conserve forests through reducing carbon emissions the proponents should have seen this as a lucrative opportunity. In this light, it can be commented that the major meaning the CGA Company attaches to the project is that of generating profits through accumulation. As noted by Dodescu (2010) markets have inherent allocation, distribution and regulating dysfunctions. Henceforth, it is difficult for private entities that are concerned with making profits to perform allocative and distributive functions. The same applies to the Kariba REDD+ project where the company finds itself not completely invested in playing an allocative and redistributive function to ensure that all the stakeholders involved in the project equally benefit. Kapfuvhuti (2014) echoes similar views by noting that CGA depicts a picture of a company that maintains the integrity of the environment through forests conservation yet investments and profit-making is at the core of its existence.

The company is also believed to be in the habit of using quasi and questionable consultants in order to get the project funded and secure profits thereby furthering the company's interests (Dzingirai and Mangwanya 2015). These consultant companies are alleged to be in the habit of generating reports that are packaged with information and narratives that are biased towards Carbon Green Africa. In the process, these narratives subtly play a fundamental role in determining losers and winners in the project. Taking this into consideration, the narrative that CGA is heavily invested in the conservation of the forest is just but a veil that is used by the company in order to realise social legitimacy. Conversely, some stakeholders believe that CGA is sincere in its implementation of the project and that it is a progressive company interested in making all stakeholders involved in the project to equally benefit. These stakeholders are part of the Kariba REDD+ project implementation partners. For instance, one Mbire RDC official highlighted that, *"CGA is central to this project, in fact the company has performed well so far. It is no secret that the company fulfilled Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Community, Climate and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) thus the project is legit. These requirements are recognised at international level and should CGA fail to meet one of these requirements the involved regulators will notice it"*. In a similar stance, another responded who is a direct beneficiary of the Kariba REDD+ project maintained that, *"since the inception of the project, I've seen the project benefit some people in the area and lives of many households have substantially improved thus the Kariba REDD+ project is benefiting us"*. This shows that the project has to some extent benefitted some project stakeholders in this case the Mbire RDC and some local indigenous communities in the district. Nevertheless, it can be commented that it is not that simple as being suggested by these views as some of the issues related to REDD+ are complex and technical thus might be difficult for a layman to grasp the broader picture. Simply put, it can be argued that the nature and extent of their benefits are not commensurate with the rights and privileges they were made to forego in order to pave way for the implementation of the project in their district. Therefore, the contentment of some stakeholders in the project doesn't automatically mean that the project is being implemented in a manner that satisfies all stakeholders particularly when it comes to benefit sharing.

More so, CGA is clogged in some controversy that involves its parent company Carbon Green Investments. According to Lang (2018) whilst CGA claims to be a Zimbabwean based company focused on conservation and reduction of the global GHG emissions to

tackle climate change, it is in fact a wholly owned subsidiary of Carbon Green Investments Guernsey Limited registered in the tax haven of Guernsey in 2010. This arrangement can be construed as a measure by the company to hide profits from public scrutiny in as much as it can be taken as a measure to avoid paying high taxes. More so, another possible reason CGA prefer to be viewed as a local Zimbabwean company might be that during the time the project was introduced, the political economy of Zimbabwe was marred by national policies that were not compatible with international capital. Through the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2008 international companies were required to cede 51 % of their shares to local indigenous people and retain 49 % in order to empower Zimbabweans. However, the policy is no longer functional as it was scrapped in 2018.

In addition, another reason that shows CGA is interested in maximising profits is that it is currently diversifying in ways that can extend the divergence of interest of the company and those of other stakeholders involved in the project. In 2017 Carbon Green Investments, the Kariba REDD+ proponent and CGA's parent company decided to invest in block chain through the use of EARTH Token (Lang, *ibid*). This means that the project will now be selling carbon credits through block chain technology. The EARTH Tokens can also be bought using Bitcoin or Ether crypto currencies. This diversification into crypto currency makes the Kariba REDD+ project complex for other stakeholders amongst them the Mbire local indigenous community and the Rural District Council. These stakeholders neither have the capacity nor the resources to comprehend it. This shows that decisions that can potentially determine the success or failure of the project are now vested in one stakeholder making CGA more powerful than the other stakeholders involved in the project. More so, local indigenous communities in the Global South, Kariba REDD+ project area included are likely not able to buy EARTH Tokens because of the digital and technological barrier. As a result, local indigenous communities are left at the mercy of the markets meaning that their power is stripped, the outcome of which is entrenchment of marginalisation, exclusion and disempowerment.

4.2.2. Mbire Rural District Council

The Mbire Rural District Council is another stakeholder that is involved in the Kariba REDD+ project. The council just like other rural councils came into existence through the Rural District Councils Act. The act empowers councils in the rural areas to act on behalf of the community in developmental issues thus play a central role in the control and

conservation of natural resources. This also means the council enjoys legal authority over Mbire local indigenous community as it wields the power to act on their behalf. According to Mawere et al, (2014) the Act confers powers to RDCs to sign contracts and agreements with project developers and since RDCs are constantly run on a limited budget the councils are encouraged to utilise natural resources under their jurisdiction to provide better services to local indigenous communities. However, communal land governance in Zimbabwe is problematic in that it involves many institutions claiming jurisdiction over it. For example, the Rural District Councils Act clashes with the Traditional Leaders Act since the latter also empowers traditional leadership the same way it does to the councils in line with customary law. Thus, before the advent of the Kariba REDD+ project, communal land governance and administration was already clogged in power struggles making it complex and weak. This also affected prior community based natural resources management schemes such as CAMPFIRE.

Regarding the Kariba REDD+ project, it can be commented that the Mbire RDC has two main interests; the conservation of natural resources (in this case forest) and the generation of profits to fund its operations. Hence, the council supports the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project through a plethora of projects that are meant to give Mbire local indigenous community's alternatives to augment their livelihoods. This is because these projects relieve the forests from overuse and over reliance by the local indigenous community members. As stipulated in the Kariba REDD+ project design, the local indigenous community are expected to benefit from projects such as beekeeping, community gardens, conservation farming as a way to combat deforestation and forest degradation. One RDC official commented that, *"we can't force people to desist from deforestation and degradation of forests without providing them with alternatives. What we can do to make them not cut down trees and avoid the use of practices that destroy vegetation is to introduce projects and then capacitate them so that their livelihoods are improved in a sustainable manner. These projects are meant to give communities alternatives so that they don't over-rely on the forest which means they would use the forest sparingly"*. Attached to this, information gathered through KIIs and FGDs showed that several projects that are being implemented in their area through the Kariba REDD+ project are more of a means to an end. This is because in reality these projects don't hold the same weight in terms of importance and value when one compares them to the "real work of conserving forest" that the project implementation partners are doing. In this

regard, one Mbire RDC official noted that, *“the end game here is to conserve our natural resources particularly the forest in the area, it is as simple as that. So, failing to conserve trees and vegetation will result in the failure of the project”*. Faced with this, it can be commented that the successful conservation of forests in the district is one indicator that is largely used by the council to determine the success of the project.

Besides Mbire RDC’s interest in conservation of forests, profit making is also another interest that drives the council’s participation in the project. Since RDCs in Zimbabwe are underfunded by the central government as noted above, the Kariba REDD+ project was timely as it complemented the needs of the council much in the same way it addressed areas where the council felt vulnerable. In this vein, one councillor from the FGDs whose primary role is to represent the community members by working with the Mbire RDC in community development projects noted that, *“the community projects that are being implemented by the beneficiaries are a means to an end, otherwise the council’s main interest is funding their own administrative operations.”* This bold claim was corroborated by views of another respondent from the Mbire RDC who was commenting on how the project is benefiting REDD+ implementation partners. The respondent mentioned that, *“The Kariba REDD+ project is not only helping the local indigenous community households, but it is helping the council as well. The council is functioning better now that we have this project (the Kariba REDD+)”*. In accordance with the project’s benefit structure, the council is expected to get 30% of the revenue from the selling of carbon credits, local communities 30% (10% for funding projects and 20% as cash deposit for the Sustainability Fund) whilst Carbon Green Africa gets 40%. More so, another respondent from the Mbire RDC presented similar views by broadly emphasising that, *“One reason I view this project to be useful and advantageous is that everybody wins, the community, the council and Carbon Green Africa, so all the stakeholders should play their role in order to benefit”*. On the whole, the above views point out that the council is majorly interested in making profits by ensuring that the conservation of forests is successful regardless of the fact that the livelihood security of local indigenous community members might be threatened in the process.

To further enunciate the point above, it can be commented that the interests of the Mbire RDC and those of the local indigenous community are not in perfect synch. This is because the two stakeholders interpret the conservation of natural resources through the Kariba REDD+ project differently. For the Mbire RDC, the Kariba REDD+ project is an

opportunity to make money for the council. Thus, although the council is keen on conserving forests, they seem to disregard the possible adverse effects the Kariba REDD+ project might have on local indigenous people especially on their livelihood. In this regard, by turning a blind eye to the livelihood security paradoxes in their area, this goes against the dictates of REDD+. This is because the credibility to mitigate climate change through projects such as Kariba REDD+ is hinged on satisfying the rights of local indigenous people and showing the commitment to improve their livelihoods for them to buy into the project. More so, Mbire local indigenous community essentially depend on the forests for their daily livelihoods hence any new project should not fundamentally change the way they lead their lives. In this respect, the council should be cognisant of these issues since they significantly contribute to the success or failure of the project.

4.2.3. Mbire local Indigenous Community (Traditional leadership and Community members).

The Mbire local indigenous community is another stakeholder that is central to the success of the Kariba REDD+ project. The community consists of community members and the traditional leadership. It can be commented that their interests in the project are the same since they are complimentary. Local indigenous communities are important especially in projects that concern their natural resources since they are likely to face direct negative or positive effects coming out of the project. In this regard, with the traditional leadership their major interest is to control and conserve natural resources in their area as they are by law the primary custodians of natural resources that fall under their jurisdiction. This means that the Kariba REDD+ project should complement their role and interests since they have everything to gain or lose by virtue of them being the primary custodians of their forest which they depend on for their daily livelihood. More so, conservation of their natural resources and biodiversity is in their gene since they rely on traditional practices, values and knowledge that enabled them to conserve their natural resources for centuries. Natural resources such as forests, land and animals are part of their heritage thus any meaningful project that involves natural resources and biodiversity conservation should take the Mbire local indigenous community seriously.

Essentially, forests and biodiversity galvanise the socio-cultural aspect of the Mbire local indigenous community. This was corroborated by one KII responded who is one of the senior traditional leaders in the area who underlined that, *“we would like to get involved and play an effective role in Kariba REDD+ because we have a lot to offer when it comes*

to conserving our forests and biodiversity, as traditional leaders we have led in the conservation of our natural resources for centuries.....and for decades we have participated in similar projects that came to our area. All these projects benefitted from our traditional knowledge and values”. The traditional leadership also acknowledge the importance of projects that are intended to fight poverty in their area since they believe that poverty and insecure livelihood put a strain the community. On top of that, the traditional leadership view the conservation of forest in their area as a natural practice that is central to their livelihood as community members depend on forests for daily household use such as collection of traditional medicine, building houses, fuel use, hunting among others. More so, they are also interested in seeing their local communities benefit from the funds accrued from selling carbon credits. One traditional leader commented that, *“since it is in our DNA to conserve natural resources such as forests and wildlife, we think that this project (Kariba REDD+ project) should award us fairly for the job we have been doing for a long time by providing us with money that our people can use to build schools, clinics, roads and boreholes”* . To them livelihood security is hugely depended on the culture of conservation of forests and other natural resources in their area. Thus, they believe that efforts to conserve natural resources such as the Kariba REDD+ need to positively change their lives.

The Mbire local indigenous community members have even higher expectations for the project. They view the Kariba REDD+ project as an opportunity for the community to fight poverty, enhance food security and realise community infrastructure development through the revenue generated from the selling of carbon credits. Most importantly, the local indigenous communities are also interested in conserving forests and biodiversity since they rely on them for their daily household needs. Although the concept of REDD+ is new to them, they have been involved in Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) projects before hence they understand the benefits that come with conserving their natural resources. In overall, the local indigenous community members are interested in benefiting from the process of selling carbon the same way they expect to benefit from non-carbon benefits coming out of the Kariba REDD+ project. One REDD+ expert from a renowned international organisation that works on REDD+ issues noted that, *“local indigenous people are key to REDD+, they should be treated as equal partners in REDD+ projects because their buy into the project is critical and that heavily impact the*

implementation of REDD+ projects". This means that failure to make the project benefit local indigenous communities would make the project illegitimate.

In essence, the lack of recognition of the importance of local indigenous community would translate to lack of community buy-in which is sacrosanct in natural resources conservation schemes that involve the public. In this respect, one former CAMPFIRE committee member who was part of the FGDs commented that, *"as a community that has been conserving natural resources for more than two decades, we understand that projects such as the Kariba REDD+ should benefit us, we learnt that through CAMPFIRE.... since forests in our area belong to us, we are expecting to get some kind of financial reward for the air the forest is producing in line with the project"*. Another responded who is a community leader shared similar views to the one cited above by noting that, *"our district is need of infrastructure such as schools, boreholes, roads and clinics, we expect a project like the Kariba REDD+ to improve our community by attending to these issues"*. In this vein, the Mbire local indigenous community's interests in the Kariba REDD+ project lie in securing their livelihood, enhance food security and developing their community.

In addition, the community members believe that the council is enjoying the benefits coming out of the project in comparison to what they are getting. They feel that the revenue generated from the project is being gobbled up by bureaucratic processes in the council thereby leaving the council better off and communities' worse off. One community leader who attended the FGDs noted that, *"In our area they (Mbire RDC and CGA) organised one meeting and there was no feedback after that. We strongly suspect there is some level of corruption going on in the council.....we haven't seen anything tangible that we (community members) can proudly associate ourselves with the Kariba REDD+ project"* Such views show that the council is primarily concerned with pursuing their interest despite that they are legally expected to protect the interest of local indigenous people as expected of them through the Rural District Councils Act. It also goes contrary to the contents of the Kariba REDD+ Project Document of 2011 where the project proponents explicitly guaranteed all stakeholders would equally participate and benefit in the project. More so, the council together with CGA are expected to prioritise the livelihoods of local indigenous community. It should be commented that these requirements are premised on CBBS standards that all private company led REDD+ projects are supposed to abide to during their design and implementation. Conversely, a closer look at the reality in the project shows that the council seems to have joined forces with the markets to exclude

local indigenous communities from using and controlling their natural resources through the combination use of a hierarchical structure and market principles. Essentially, CGA seems to have taken advantage of the complex legal and administrative framework in Zimbabwe by signing a contract with the Mbire RDC as opposed to directly dealing with local indigenous community members themselves. This is because dealing with the RDC is less tedious and less expensive than to directly deal with the local indigenous community. Consequently, Mbire RDC acts as a buffer to shield CGA from directly reporting to the local indigenous community. Similarly, the same council blocks the efforts by local indigenous community through their representatives from getting enough information that would see them benefit equally from the project.

4.2.4. Forest Commission

The Forest Commission is another government institution that is involved in the Kariba REDD+ project. Through the Forestry Act and the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act the commission is empowered to administer, manage and regulate state forests and ultimately play a crucial role in the sustainable management of forests and its expansion. However, the Forest Commission's role in the Kariba REDD+ project is not as clear-cut compared to the Mbire RDC. One reason for this is that Zimbabwe has no National Forest Policy and neither did the country had a National Climate Policy at the time the project was introduced. Resultantly, the commission was not part of the stakeholders that participated in the signing of the Kariba REDD+ project hence does not wholly understand the role it should play.

This means that the Kariba REDD+ project operates in an environment without proper national legal framework to customise the REDD+ international framework in accordance to national laws and practices in the process clearly defining roles of all the stakeholders. In support of this view one field officer from the commission noted that *“as district officers, even if we are told about the Kariba REDD+ project, we don't understand the concept.... the role we are supposed to play is not clear and this is not good considering that we are the people on the ground who should implement the project”*. Ideally, the Forestry Commission should play a central role in Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Carbon Stocks the same way their equivalent institutions in REDD+ projects across Africa do. In fact, they should be the ones from the government side with the technical understanding of the project so that they work closely with Carbon Green Africa in MRV of carbon stocks processes.

As mentioned earlier on, it is worth noting that when the Kariba REDD+ project was introduced, Zimbabwe was not REDD+ ready to and the country was not a member of UN-REDD yet. In contrast, with the Ngamo-Sikumi REDD+ pilot project that is being conducted by the Government of Zimbabwe in partnership with WWF, the Forest Commission is playing a central role in the technical aspect of the project. Be that as it is, drawing from the pieces of legislation that guide the operations of the Forest Commission, the commission's primary role and thus its interests in the Kariba REDD+ project is to conserve and expand forests. One government official under the Forest Commission underlined that, *"note withstanding that the Kariba REDD projects is complex and has a carbon reduction twist to it, the project is a natural fit with the objectives of the Forest Commission since it assists us to make rural communities conserve forests, so the project compliments the work we have been doing in the past"*. This shows that the commission is interested in the conservation of forests s compared to CGA and it does so by limiting cultivation and the clearance of forest in the project area.

4.2.5. The Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

In the Kariba REDD+ project Environment Africa and Transparency International Zimbabwe are the two most visible organisations associated with the project. Civil society organisations are crucial in the public sphere since they play an essential role of protecting fundamental freedoms and ensuring the development of democratic governance (Fern, 2014a). Generally civil society organisations across the globe work as independent watchdogs, some work as advocates of Human Rights and some play the role of service providers through responding to the needs of communities at local level (McKeown and Mulbah, 2007).

Environmental Africa (EA) is an environmental organisation that works on environmental and developmental challenges by collaborating with communities to achieve sustainable development in Africa. In this regard, EA's role in the Kariba REDD+ project was to help stakeholders in the implementation of community development projects as well as creating awareness on forests management. Therefore, EA is the pioneer organisation that led and capacitated local indigenous community beneficiaries to successfully take part in projects that include; Conservation Farming, Beekeeping, Community nutrition gardens, moringa farming, road maintenance, fire management among others. More so, the organisation's interests were expressed through raising awareness of effects of land degradation, stream bank cultivation and the reduction of carbon emissions. The study further observed that the

organisation also played a crucial role in protecting the rights of local indigenous communities. EA's mission as an organisation is the conservation of the environment in a way that benefits local communities and, in the REDD+ project it was the organisation's role to ensure that the project followed Community, Climate and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) standards.

It can be commented that unlike other stakeholders, EA was more of an all-rounder implementation partner that was concerned with both forest and biodiversity conservation and alleviating the livelihoods of local indigenous communities. It carried out the latter by capacitating project beneficiaries. Therefore, the organisation played a leading role in projects that were focused on fighting poverty in the Mbire district. To reaffirm the organisation's role, one officer from EA highlighted that, *"Our primary role was mainly focused on improving the livelihoods of local indigenous communities and we did that through capacity building and giving expert knowledge to project beneficiaries in order for them to excel in projects such as beekeeping, Conservation Farming and community nutrition gardens. The major objective was to help them fight poverty in the process securing their livelihoods in line with SDG number 1"*. With regards to the protection of the rights of local indigenous communities another respondent from the same organisation noted that, *"we also championed the rights of local communities in the project area. We were focused on holding those in authority to account as we recognised that the success of the project was hinged on making community members embrace the project.....we knew that the only way to ensure their buy in was by recognising that they are equal partners in the project and their concerns were equally important"*. Drawing from the stance taken by EA, it can be commented that the organisation did not only construe the Kariba REDD+ project as an opportunity to generate profits through the conservation of forests and biodiversity, but as an opportunity for local indigenous communities to benefit as a way to secure their livelihoods and in the process making the project a success.

Nevertheless, EA, pulled out of the project under unclear circumstances but allegations were that they ran out of favour with Carbon Green Africa. This breakup confirms the politics involved in REDD+. As argued by McAfee (2015) carbon trading is political in nature because it involves serious struggles amongst them; interests, class and institutions over wealth, resources, territory and legitimacy. Clearly, the interests of CGA and EA seemed irreconcilable which resulted in the former replacing the latter with an organisation called Sustainable Agriculture Technology.

Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) is another civil society organisation that has been playing a watchdog role in the project area since 2014. Through its independent REDD+ Integrity Project, TI Z's role is to capacitate stakeholders in the Kariba REDD+ project to engage in REDD+ policy development, implementation and monitoring process with the end game being to empower communities to demand public accountability. Paramount to note is that TI Z plays an independent role hence is not a direct partner with project implementation partners as was the case with EA. The organisation signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Mbire RDC so that they operate in the area. Essentially TI Z is mainly focused on improving the governance of the Kariba REDD+ project and it does so by sensitising local indigenous communities to demand for transparency and accountability from the Kariba REDD+ partners.

By sensitising the communities, the organisation believes that it closes avenues for possible corruption and unfair practices that exclude local indigenous communities from participating in crucial project decisions and deny them the opportunity to benefit from their forests and biodiversity. In respect to this, one officer from TI Z noted that, *“Our role in REDD+ is two pronged; at national level we conduct policy dialogues and capacity building workshops with relevant authorities to influence national policy that would see that future REDD+ projects in Zimbabwe are conducted in a manner that satisfies forest governance standards and that there is a framework to steer REDD+ locally. At community level we raise awareness and sensitize community members on ethos of transparency, accountability and integrity to empower them to demand for transparency and accountability from RDCs and CGA in accordance with the REDD+ safeguards and standards”*. This shows that TI Z attaches democratic governance to the Kariba REDD+ project. On one hand the organisation is interested in addressing weak land and forests tenure issues by working to improve their governance and administration by influencing policy. On the other hand, the organisation recognises that local indigenous people are key to the success of the Kariba REDD+ project hence believe that democratic governance should be sacrosanct during the design and implementation of the project. To complement this view, one responded from the same organisation emphasised that, *“as long as there are no platforms that allow the local communities to participate in the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project, then there is every reason for the local people to complain about how the project is being implemented....so these are the issues we (TI Z) intend to eradicate in the project”*

Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that EA and TI Z are not also interested in striking financial gains considering that these organisations present a humanistic picture where their primary focus is fighting for local indigenous communities' rights and improving their livelihood in the Mbire district. According to Hermansen et al (2017) funding seems to have a big influence on civil society organisations as they are calculative when it comes to their possible operating space thus, they act in a strategic and pragmatic manner. In other words, civil society organisations often pursue their goals in an entrepreneurial way. In the grand scheme of things, funding determines what, when and how to criticise and approach issues for civil society organisations.

4.3. The Power Relations, Ownership And Control Dynamics In The Kariba Redd+ Project

This chapter particularly focuses on the politics of REDD+ by trying to understand the nature of power relations, ownership and ownership issues in the Kariba REDD+ project. It is worth noting that understanding the power relations, ownership and control dynamics during the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project is significant since it helps determine the winners and losers in the project. To further comprehend this subject, the chapter also focuses on issues to do with the livelihood of Mbire local indigenous community. This is because power relations, control and ownership issues have a direct effect on the state of livelihood of Mbire local indigenous community.

4.3.1. Information asymmetries in the Kariba REDD+ project.

The study particularly focused on the information flow during the design and implementation of the project. Information is a form of power and at the centre of it is knowledge (Foucault, 1979) a lack of which negatively affects social and economic relations. In this respect, access to information is crucial as it empowers Kariba REDD+ stakeholders not to be kept in the dark in relation to crucial decisions that determine the success of the project. With this background in mind, the data collected in this study established that there exists power asymmetry in the way the Kariba REDD+ project is implemented. This situation is nurtured and perpetrated by information asymmetries that exist within the project. Information asymmetry entails a scenario where one party does not have adequate information to make informed decisions or to have the capacity to keep the other party in check in case a situation that endangers the interests of one party arises. As a result, it can be argued that this scenario disenfranchises the Mbire local indigenous community. Access to information is essential as it creates platforms that guarantee that local indigenous community benefits from the proceeds coming out of the project.

The flow of information is essential for vertical accountability (Relly, 2011). This becomes even more important in projects that involve the public and, in this case Mbire local indigenous community. Principally, access to information plays an influential role in promoting good governance and deep democracy by promoting transparency and accountability. The study found that this is lacking in the Kariba REDD+ project. With regards to REDD+, information disclosure is crucial since the program is a marriage of diverse stakeholders that do not have similar interests. As emphasised by Klitgaard (1998) bad governance and corruption manifest in an environment where agents (office holders) and in this case the Carbon Green Africa and Mbire Rural District Council have discretion plus monopoly minus accountability. This explanation resonates with the Principle-agent theory where the Mbire local indigenous community is regarded as the principle and Mbire RDC and Carbon Green Africa as the agent. Carbon Green Africa and the Mbire RDC as the agent are expected to disclose information regarding the design and implementation of the project to the Mbire community in order to ensure transparency and accountability prevails. Failure to disclose information is tantamount to disempowerment of the local indigenous community since they are unable to inject decisions that take into consideration of their priorities and livelihoods as primary custodians of the land and forests in their area.

It can be commented that information asymmetry in the Kariba REDD+ project is both horizontal and vertical. While vertical information asymmetry manifest through the nature of relations and interaction amongst involved stakeholders in the Kariba REDD+ project, horizontal information asymmetry involves lack of information disclosure internally in the Mbire RDC as an institution. Hence information asymmetry is a recipe for bad governance that translate to lack of deep democracy due to absence of ethos of transparency, accountability and integrity. In this respect, the study established that councillors in the Mbire RDC have not accessed the contract agreements between the Carbon Green Africa and the Mbire RDC. The respondents from the KIIs highlighted that the agreements are only known by the Mbire CEO and a few other executives. Their attempts to access the contracts so that they get the whole picture of the Kariba REDD+ project was blocked on several occasions. One councillor noted, *“We realised that the money that was allocated to us to repair boreholes came from the Carbon Green Africa, but when we requested to see the contract in order to understand the contents of the agreement, we never got a response from the CEO”*. Traditional and community leaders who sit in council meetings attempted the same but were not successful. One notable community leader shared similar views as

raised by councillors by noting that, “*we tried but in vain on many occasions to access the contract that was signed by the council, we then tried to gather as much information as possible from them but it was a futile exercise so we don’t understand the project well*”. Hence this scenario shows that Kariba REDD+ project implementation is riddled by opaqueness and secrecy.

This is despite that councillors have a primary role to represent people who reside in their wards in order to bridge the gap between communities and councils. In fact, councillors are expected to perform a tripartite role in local government that include representing their wards, having an oversight role in the business of the Council and pushing development initiatives for their wards. This means that without essential information on the Kariba REDD+ project, the councillors cannot carry out their duties effectively. In this respect their failure to access Kariba REDD+ contract is bound to create some conflicts and distrust within the council and between councillors and communities. For instance, with the advent of the Kariba REDD+ project, information asymmetry has escalated negative perception of the councillors by community members. This is because community members perceive councillors to be conniving with the Mbire RDC to hide information about the project whilst the same is true for the councillors with regards to how they view the relationship between the Mbire RDC and the Carbon Green Africa. One public official who is native to the Mbire district articulated that; “*we think our Councillor is conniving with the RDC, when we voted him into power, he was one of us, but now with this Kariba REDD+ project, he is no longer representing our interests, he is telling us what Kariba REDD+ project expects of us at the same time disregarding what we need.... this is different from how the CAMPFIRE project was conducted in this area*”. Hence this proves that the project is clouded by discord and the major factor contributing to this plight is the existence of secrecy and opaqueness that surrounds the implementation of the project.

To further explain the above view, this study established that the Kariba REDD+ project’s implementation comprises of a makeshift marriage between the Mbire RDC and Carbon Green Africa with the two actors seeming to be imposing their will on the powerless Mbire local indigenous community. For instance, the 2016 Kariba REDD+ Project Monitoring and Implementation Report regards RDCs participating in the project as the landowners and not the local community members. This is despite the fact that RDCs in the Kariba REDD+ project are in fact more of sleeping partners as they wield little knowledge about the project thus have no voice to determine its direction (Dzingirai and Mangwanya 2015).

This means that the council does not have the capacity to protect the interest of local indigenous communities. To cement this view, the Herald (2016) underline that RDCs signed contracts with Carbon Green Africa without the expert assistance from the government hence exposed the councils to predatory, manipulative and greed of the private sector. Thus, it can be argued that the Carbon Green Africa took advantage of the weak land governance and administration in Zimbabwe by taking a most cost-effective route in conducting the project through rural councils and not local indigenous communities. Thus, this arrangement enables a win-win relationship between pervasive and predatory markets and the hierarchical structure of the nation state to the detriment of society and local indigenous communities in particular

Taking the above into consideration, Mbire local indigenous community seem to be on the receiving end of conflicts, economic inequality and loss of livelihoods. Data from the survey also corroborates with this view as it showed that the community members perceive themselves as disempowered as they don't feel attached to the project. This sense of disempowerment comes from the fact that the local indigenous communities are excluded from participating and deciding on issues that affect them. Figure 5.1 below illustrate the respondents' perceptions with regards to the ownership of the Kariba REDD+ project where 77% of the respondents pointed out that Carbon Green Africa and Mbire rural district own the project. Conversely, only 24% of the respondents felt that the Kariba REDD+ project is owned by a network of implementation partners that include the Mbire local indigenous community.




Figure 4.1. Kariba REDD+ ownership dynamics

Source: Fieldwork data 2019

It is essential to note that the ability to own and control the Kariba REDD+ project is hugely determined by the degree of access to information. This means stakeholders that lack adequate information are at a disadvantage. In this vein, the study established that the Mbire local indigenous communities vaguely understood the Kariba REDD+ project as they lack adequate information to comprehend it. For instance, the respondents who participated in the complimentary survey failed to define the project, its aims and how it's supposed to be implemented. More so, the study observed that during the inception meetings of the project, facilitators could not articulate well the intentions and objectives of Kariba REDD+ and the community members who attended some of the meetings were apparently told that the project is too scientific hence difficult for them to understand. One respondent who is a safari tour guide by profession noted that one facilitator defined REDD+ as, *'we will extract air from trees, sell it, after which we will give you some money, so you should tell us what you want so that you don't cut trees. They also promised they will build schools, dams and clinics to benefit our community'*. On the whole communities couldn't wrap their heads around the project's intention to *'sell air'* which signals that the project is complex and technical for the Mbire community unlike previous CBNRM schemes they participated in such as the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). In this vein, the study observed that the Kariba

REDD+ project is a prime example of corporate and elite capture of the environment and climate primarily due to the complex and technical nature of the project on top of the existence of horizontal and vertical information asymmetry. This works to the advantage of markets and to some degree the hierarchical structure of the state as it allows for recentralization of power and authority.

Due to a combination of information asymmetry, the complexity and the technical nature of the Kariba REDD+ project, the Mbire local indigenous community ends up not having a chance and ability to make informed key decisions on crucial areas of the project's implementation. In this regard, one community leader interviewed through KIIs highlighted that, *“we don't have any idea of what is being sold by Carbon Green Africa, we were told not to cut down trees so that we sell the air (carbon credits) that these trees produce yet we are not able to verify that because what they are selling is not tangible, when we ask for our promised ward money, we are told we haven't sold the carbon yet because of prices on the carbon market, how do we then know that they are not harvesting our air and they are not selling it. With CAMPFIRE it was better, once a hunter killed an animal it was easy to know and verify”*. This reflects the existent power asymmetries that reinforce the prospects of CGA having a strong grip on the implementation of the project at the expense of local indigenous community. Consequently, it allows CGA to profit more by its ability to make unilateral decisions such as diversifying and investing in block chain technology and crypto-currency business. This attests to the skewed power distribution between CGA as a private player and other stakeholders involved in the project.

Furthermore, to demonstrate the amount of control that CGA enjoys as a result of unequal power relations in the project, one councillor from one ward in the Mbire district noted that, *“When Carbon Green Africa came, we all thought they were a donor organisation because they came in and gave a few farmers some few inputs to do conservation agriculture. Of the 450 households in this ward, only 30 farmers got the 2kgs of cow peas, 6 kgs maize seed, and 25kgs top fertilizer per family, we were not aware that the money that was used to repair a few boreholes in our ward came from Carbon Green Africa and not the RDC”*. The fact that the Mbire community construed Carbon Green Africa as a disaster and aid relief organisation akin to USAID or Red Cross points to the fact that they are not equal partners in the project. Hence this forms the basis for their lack of essential information yet, it is the only way that would empower them to make decisions on issues that affect them in the project.

To complement the above views, findings coming out of the survey entails the same scenario. As shown by Figure 5.2 below 92% of the respondents believe that local indigenous communities are not involved in the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project. This perception is a reflection of the existence of horizontal and vertical information asymmetry which denies them an opportunity to make crucial and informed decisions during the design and implementation of the project. At the same time, it also paints a picture of corporate capture of the project where only those found on the top of the pyramid wield power to determine the ‘who get what, when and how’ aspect of the project. Their power is galvanised by having adequate information and knowledge on top of their ability to grasp complex and technical aspects of the project such as Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of greenhouse gas emissions and the Carbon Trading and Pricing Systems. Yet other project implementing partners not have knowledge and enough information that would see them benefiting through infrastructure development and livelihood security.




Figure 4.2. Communities' involvement in the implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project

Source: Fieldwork data 2019

Worthy to note is that this situation was exacerbated because when the Kariba REDD+ project was introduced, Zimbabwe was neither REDD+ ready nor did the country had a Climate Change Policy. The government of Zimbabwe managed to come up with a Climate Change Response Strategy in year 2015, four years after the Kariba REDD+ project commenced. On top of that, the country also joined UN-REDD in 2013 whilst the

Kariba REDD+ project was first implemented in 2011. These unfavourable circumstances did not stop government institutions particularly the RDCs and the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate to agree to a 30-year contract with Carbon Green Africa. Of great importance to note is that the Government of Zimbabwe by then didn't have the capacity to comprehend the REDD+ program let alone participate in it. Therefore, the decision they took to participate in the project can be viewed as risky. In fact, it was an unwise thing to do especially when one considers that government institutions are expected to represent the interest of its citizens in order to provide them with services. In the midst of service provision, government institutions are also expected to be accountable to its citizens.

In this light, one key responded from the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate maintained that, *“Although we knew little to nothing about the REDD+ program, when Carbon Green Africa approached us we couldn't turn them down because we thought it unwise to deny an investor the chance to implement a project that would benefit our rural communities”*. In this vein, when strategic government institutions are not knowledgeable of a project under their jurisdiction, it then means that it's even more difficult for inferior institutions that fall under it to understand the project. In the grand scheme of things, it's difficult to understand the grounds upon which the Mbire RDC agreed to sign a 30-year contract with Carbon Green Africa taking into consideration of the limited knowledge the council wielded. The resultant scenario is that it becomes difficult for public institutions to hold Carbon Green Africa to account as a means to even the scales of power and realise a win-win situation for all stakeholders involved in the project. Clearly, the stakeholders in the Kariba REDD+ project are not equal partners as private companies easily impose their will on other stakeholders by virtue of them having the ability to understand the project more than other stakeholders. As a result, it puts local indigenous community's livelihoods at risk since private companies are majorly interested in making profits. As indicated before, private companies are normally less concerned with distribution of wealth but the accumulation of it. Closely attached to this point, one REDD+ expert noted that, *“ while weak land and forest tenure system is the common denominator issue across many African countries when it comes to the implementation of REDD+, circumstances upon which the Kariba REDD+ project was introduced makes the project problematic....it is clear that other stakeholders involved in the project understand the project less which put CGA at an unfair advantage....yet one of the important factors that determine the success of REDD+*

is the ability to forge common goodwill as a means to reconcile stark differences and divergent interest REDD+ stakeholders wield". Therefore, it can be commented that the Kariba REDD+ project is clogged with unequal power relations which are tied to information asymmetry amongst Kariba REDD+ implementation partners.

The study also established the existent political landscape makes it difficult to address the concerns of Mbire local indigenous community. Of the three arms of the state in Zimbabwe, the parliament of Zimbabwe can be considered the poor cousin of the other two branches. This is because the parliament's oversight role is perpetually trounced by the executive arm. More so, the legislative branch is under-resourced which makes it ineffective when it comes to holding institutions and stakeholders accountable. With regards to the Kariba REDD+ project, since executive decisions override the legislative branch it is difficult to hold Carbon Green Africa and Mbire RDCs accountable. One respondent from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Environment, Water and Climate raised the same issue by noting that, *"without workshops on REDD+ one organisation (an NGO) is giving us, we wouldn't have known that there is a REDD+ project being implemented in Zimbabwe that can potentially threaten the livelihood of our rural communities..... sadly, the only determining factor as to whether we will continue pursuing this issue in the manner we would like is their budget (of the NGO) ...as a committee we are not able to make field visits to the project sites on our own"*. This is an attestation that national policy and national politics also affect the implementation of REDD+. An unhealthy political landscape clogged with inconsistent and weak policies combined with toxic politics does not help matters in the implementation of REDD+. In this vein, the success of the Kariba REDD+ project depends on the existence of healthy national policy and politics since REDD+ on its own is complex and heavily contested. Therefore, the project requires strong national policy and sound politics to sanitise potential conflicts coming out of the project. Existence of such gives a fertile ground for reforming land and forest governance and securing land and forests rights in Zimbabwe.

4.3.2. Kariba REDD+ project and the Livelihood of Mbire local indigenous community.

This section looks at how livelihoods are positively and negatively affected by the Kariba REDD+ project in the Mbire district. Livelihood is defined by Bayrak and Marafa (2017) as a way of securing a living based on the interaction between capabilities (tangible natural, physical and financial capital) and intangible assets (human, social and cultural

capitals). In this vein, sustainable livelihood is one that copes with and recover from stresses and shocks and successfully maintain its capabilities and assets (Carney, 1998). As emphasised by Bayrak and Marafa (2016) REDD+ can alleviate poverty for local indigenous communities, provide them with extra income from carbon credits payments and make them realise other co-benefits such as carbon ownership and improved land tenure. Conversely, the program can also harm communities through inhibiting communities to access their forest or through unequal benefit sharing of revenue from the project. Therefore, this section is intended to decipher the manner in which Carbon Green Africa investments restructure and interact with the Mbire local indigenous community's livelihoods. To comprehend this, the section is devoted to discussing livelihood implications and consequent local indigenous community's perception towards the Kariba REDD+ project. Thus, indicators that help to ascertain this approach include; assessing the project's ability or prospects to alleviate poverty, how the project affect income distribution and equity as well as how the project affect food security in the area.

Most significantly, livelihoods in REDD+ speak to benefit sharing amongst stakeholders. The distribution of benefits is one of the challenging problems facing REDD+ (Costenbader 2011). Benefit sharing is important as it determines how livelihoods are secured for local indigenous communities as it creates incentives and measures that are necessary to reduce carbon emissions in the project. Thus, benefit sharing should be perceived by stakeholders as fair or else it can potentially threaten the legitimacy and support of the project.

To fully comprehend the above, it is worth to understand how the Mbire local indigenous community fared before the introduction of the Kariba REDD+ project. In this respect, prior to the advent of the project, the community depended on their land and forest for basic household needs and small-scale farming purposes. In specific, the local indigenous community depended on the forest for food, fuel wood, building of shelter and homes and for crop and animal farming. The crop that the community majorly grow to sustain their livelihood is cotton which was introduced to this area in the 1980s as a result of collective efforts by the government and international institutions (Baudron, 2011). Thus, cotton farming among other crops is the primary source of income for the Mbire community. More so, their livelihood is augmented by activities such as beekeeping that is embedded on their culture. It shows that the community is heavily dependent on their land and forest thus any project that involves their natural resources should be designed and implemented

with these factors in mind. Nevertheless, despite that the Mbire local indigenous community depends on its natural resources does not imply that their livelihood is secure as the district is one of the most underdeveloped and marginalised.

According to the Herald (2016) between 2014 and 2016, the Kariba REDD+ project sold 1, 5 million credits and fetched over \$2 million with community members earning \$1, 6 million from the total offsets. 20 percent of the revenues is said to have been used for Carbon Green Africa operations. However, the \$1, 6 million is shared amongst 4 councils depending on each council's shareholding and the Mbire council holds 34 percent share in this shareholding arrangement. Through the Kariba REDD+ project the Mbire district has seen several projects being implemented. These include; the resuscitation and maintenance of boreholes, Conservation Farming, introduction of nutritional gardening project, introduction of the beekeeping project, fire management and road maintenance activities and moringa farming. These activities are meant to impact positively on local indigenous people's livelihoods at the same time improving forests conservation and forests carbon storage.

Carbon Green Africa (2019) note that between 2014 and 2016, conservation farming benefited 342 community members in Mbire where they grow crops such as maize, sorghum and cowpeas. In the district, 134 boreholes were resuscitated and maintained thus providing local indigenous communities with clean and safe water. In a bid to enhance food security and local indigenous communities' nutrition in Mbire, 446 beneficiaries were involved in nutritional gardening projects that generated an income sale of produce \$9,750 between 2014 to June 2016. With regards to the beekeeping project which is also meant to augment livelihoods and generate income for local people, a total of 90 community members benefitted and harvested 2,078 kgs of honey amounting to \$1,496. As a way to provide local indigenous communities with an alternative cash crop the project introduced the growing of the Moringa. More so, the project also introduced 16 firefighting committees and about 594 km of roads maintenance. According to Carbon Green Africa, several capacity building workshops, community meetings were conducted to empower the beneficiaries to be competent in their respective projects.

Paramount to note is that there are conflicting views by stakeholders participating in the Kariba REDD+ project with regards to benefit sharing and livelihood security issues in the project as a whole. This reflects the existence of politics of access and control over forests and carbon in the Kariba REDD+ project. As observed by Lang (2018) Carbon Green

Africa and local indigenous community are not on the same page with regards to what is actually transpiring in the project. For example, the Kariba REDD+ Project Monitoring and Implementation Report of 2016 through the consulting firm South Pole concluded that partners in the project are satisfied or very satisfied with the project with only 3.5% reported not to be satisfied. The report went on to underline that for employees and direct beneficiaries, the project is impacting their lives positively thereby ensuring food security, providing education and healthcare. Furthermore, the report underscored that there are no complaints that local indigenous people are restricted from using the forest for basic livelihood or cultural needs. On the contrary, the Kariba REDD+ Project Verification Report of 2017 produced by the same consultant company established that poaching and illegal logging remain the only 'illegal activities' taking place in the project. This shows two conflicting positions coming from the same stakeholder. More importantly, the 2017 Kariba REDD+ Project Verification report also shows that the project criminalises community members for trying to access the forests for their daily livelihoods. This is majorly highlighted by Dzingirai and Mangwanya (2015) that in practice the Kariba REDD+ project undermines livelihoods, forbid access to foraging, agriculture and hunting in areas that were traditionally used for such. Further, there are local indigenous people who need to use the land for petty commodity production and women and hunters who depend on the forests for household food security. There are also some members of people in the community who are not interested in being tied to the power of the state and the private sector.

In relation to the above the study established that although some sections of the Mbire local indigenous community can be viewed to be benefiting from the project, it is not simple as it looks. The fact of the matter is that the project is generally not viewed positively due to its failure to implement projects that directly impact on the majority of the local indigenous people in the Mbire district. Besides that, several experts on REDD+ that were interviewed in this study emphasized that it is not safe to accede to the claim that local indigenous community is benefitting relative to the amount of revenue that is potentially being accrued by the council and Carbon Green Africa. In the grand scheme of things, it seems like the projects that were undertaken for local indigenous people to address poverty and improve their livelihood are not commensurate with the amount of power and self-determination that local indigenous people were made to relinquish through

arguably covert ways. Consequently, it blocks their ability to secure livelihoods using their own natural resources as they did before the introduction of the Kariba REDD+ project.

Through document analysis, the study observed that the project seems to be focused on 'low hanging fruits' kind of projects such as beekeeping, moringa farming, road maintenance (although important) among others as discussed above. However, the project remains mum on the Community Project and Sustainability Fund that amounts to 20 percent net profit of the 30 percent that local indigenous communities are supposed to get. As noted by the 2011 Kariba REDD+ Project Document, the Community and Project Sustainability fund is the most important for the local indigenous community since it is primarily focused on kick starting major projects meant to improve health and education in the area. Nevertheless, it is these major projects that are lacking, yet they have the potential to positively impact local indigenous people on a larger scale. Clearly, this is the elephant in the room that needs to be addressed lest it becomes the straw that broke the camel's back. After all, all the local indigenous community members in the district are bound by the same Kariba REDD+ project rules despite that others are directly benefiting from the projects whilst others are not. As highlighted in other sections, the project has made it impossible for the local indigenous community to pursue other forms of income generation as they might be considered 'harmful' to the Kariba REDD+ project thus act as a subtle form of disempowerment through criminalization.

Perhaps one of the reasons major projects such as building clinics and schools have not seen the light of day is because the project proponents have a firm grip on the fund hence the buck stops with them. In specific, the use of revenue from this fund is determined by a board which is expected to make decisions on how the revenue intended for the community is supposed to be used. The board is composed of Carbon Green Africa Trust members in conjunction with the community and council members. Carbon Green Investments as the project proponent is expected to give overall oversight. It can be argued that this arrangement takes the power away from the local indigenous community and potentially culminate in social engineering by the economic elites. Thus, a closer look at the Kariba REDD+ project shows that this fund's prospects are dampened by community's failure to make independent decisions that take into consideration of their priorities as they understand their livelihood vulnerabilities better than any other stakeholder.

In connection with the above point, the study established that the Mbire local indigenous community focuses on direct and tangible benefits as a measure of project performance.

Thus, the absence of such projects in their minds is problematic. One community development leader who was part of the FGDs underscored that, *“Our clinic is far, and we need one close by. We put our request but there was never any response. They told us that they will do class A (whole community) and B (ward level). At ward level, we have since compiled our wishes, but we have not been funded yet except for the Bee Keeping project”*. Another respondent who was part of the community leadership in the district who participated in KIIs commented that *“we wrote proposals in 2013 but nothing has been done by Carbon Green.... they only gave us seedlings to start gardens, but nothing has been done concerning the building of schools and clinics as was promised”*. This shows that Mbire local indigenous people have different priorities of projects that they expect to be implemented. Considering the views of respondents from KIIs and FGDs, the Mbire local indigenous community is not excited about projects they consider minor such as beekeeping. Conclusion drawn from this is that the Mbire community is interested in projects that matter to them and these include building schools, dams and clinics primarily because these projects address areas where they feel more vulnerable.

The above views of discontent were also reflected in the complimentary survey conducted in the research. As shown by figure 5.3 below, 82% of the respondents who participated in the survey believe that Mbire local indigenous community is not benefiting from the Kariba REDD+ project whilst just 18% think that it is somewhat benefiting the community. Tied to this point, 92% of the respondents indicated that they are not satisfied at all with the Kariba REDD+ project as compared to 8% that noted that they are somewhat satisfied. Most importantly, all the respondents that participated in the complimentary survey noted that they are not satisfied with the Kariba REDD+ project in comparison to the CAMPFIRE project. Taken into perspective, this might be an indication that the Kariba REDD+ project has set the bar low as compared to CAMPFIRE.




Figure 4.3. Communities benefiting from the Kariba REDD+ project

Source: Field work 2019

Based on the findings under discussion, the study acknowledges that the phenomenon of the Kariba REDD+ project has culminated in the restructuring of forests governance and community livelihood in the Mbire district. Using marketisation of the environment narratives and power of markets, the project seems to have appropriated natural resources in particular land and forest to the detriment of local indigenous community livelihoods (Kapfuvhuti, 2014; Dzingirai and Mangwanya, 2015). Principally, the Kariba REDD+ project initiatives' affect local livelihoods as the project successfully revised access and control to land and forest. The project also redefined labour processes in the district. Paramount to note is that these new arrangements occur in subtle ways so much in fact it is not easy to notice using a naked eye. Resultantly, this has seen a general disempowerment of local indigenous community members and perhaps worsened livelihood insecurity in the Mbire district. Furthermore, through new projects that were introduced by Kariba REDD+, this has in turn seen the introduction of new farming and working practices and new general ways of doing things for project beneficiaries. These include the farming of new crops, undertaking new labour processes and new objectives that were somewhat alien to the area before Kariba REDD+. In this vein, this saw previous land and forest controls being overrun by market principles.

In addition, this subtle appropriation and recentralisation of forest and land in the Mbire district through the Kariba REDD+ project is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of

local indigenous people feel that their livelihoods have not changed since the project was introduced in their area. This is supported by the data generated from the complimentary survey. As demonstrated by figure 5.4 below, 77% of the respondents from the complimentary survey feel that the project has not changed livelihoods of Mbire local indigenous community members, 21% of the respondents believe that the project has somewhat changed their livelihood whilst just 3% view the Kariba REDD+ project to have changed their livelihood. Attached to this, the same survey painted a gloomy picture of the project as 76% believe that the project is not meeting its goals, 21% are not certain of its performance whilst just 3% feel that the project is meeting its goals. This shows that the project has had limited success in changing their perspectives in terms of the project's ability to respond to livelihood insecurity issues particularly on food security, infrastructure development and fighting poverty in the area.

Communities' livelihoods changed through the Kariba REDD+ project




Figure 4. 4. The Kariba REDD+ project changed communities' livelihoods

Source: Field work data 2019.

4.4. The Legitimacy And Sustainability Of The Kariba Redd+ Project

The legitimacy and sustainability of REDD+ projects across the globe is determined by the manner which these projects are designed and implemented at the local level. This study interprets legitimacy and sustainability of the Kariba REDD+ project from the UNDPs definition of human development. This definition views the source of legitimacy and sustainability as coming from: mechanisms, processes and institutions pivotal in

determining the nature in which power is exercised, the manner in which citizens air their grievances, how they exercise their rights, the way decisions are made, how stakeholders meet their obligations and the ability to mediate their differences (Davis 2010). This definition essentially focuses on the value of democracy where good governance is equated to democratic governance (Institute of Development Studies 2010) a situation considered a prerequisite to attain legitimacy and ensure the durability of programs or projects. In this vein, such a conceptualization of governance and democracy issues enables the study to learn whether the Kariba REDD+ project is embraced by stakeholders. In the process, it also helps the study determine the project's durability and sustainability in the Mbire district.

To meet governance values in REDD+ projects, they need to be embedded on deep democracy since good governance values are often associated with good democratic values. In this sense, this chapter discusses mechanisms, processes and institutions that are central in influencing how power is exercised and the manner in which decisions are made in the Kariba REDD+ project, the manner in which local indigenous community's grievances and views are handled, the extent to which stakeholders are able to meet their obligations and the ability to implement the project without major complications that would jeopardize the project in overall. As maintained by Pierre and Guy Peters (2000) governance values are expressed through the adoption of structures and processes that are central in steering and coordinating interactions and networks (stakeholders) during the implementation of the program. In this regard, it can be commented that governance values in REDD+ projects heavily rely on the implementation and adoption of safeguards or standards that are crafted at the global level.

As pointed out above, a plethora of REDD+ safeguards were crafted to improve the design and implementation of REDD+ across the world. These safeguards were crafted as a result of decisions taken through the Cancun Agreements at COP-16 in 2010. They include; the Climate Community and Biodiversity (CCB standards) by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance, the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (REDD+ SES) and the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria (SEPC) by UN-REDD and the Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) by Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). These safeguards are majorly focused on ensuring that REDD+ program is designed and implemented in a manner that ensures the application of democratic governance, the upholding of stakeholder rights, realization of sustainable livelihoods and

biodiversity conservation among other things. Of great importance to note is that REDD+ (SES) and Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria (SEPC) apply to national or sub-national REDD+ programs whilst Climate Community and Biodiversity (CCB standards) particularly apply to individual projects such as the Kariba REDD+ project.

To help understand whether good governance values were adopted during the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project, this study utilised the forest governance framework conceptualised by Cadman (2011a, 2012, and 2016). The framework primarily focuses on the design and implementation of the REDD+ program across the globe and it is quite holistic in the way it deals with governance values issues as well as practical issues coming out of REDD+. The forest governance framework thus act as a comprehensive theory useful in comprehending the governance of REDD+ by focusing on governance values. The forest governance framework also speaks to the importance of the value of democracy by regarding democratic governance as the source for legitimacy and sustainability of programs. According to Streck et al. (2009) although concerns on REDD+ often focus on institutional or technical aspects amongst stakeholders from developing countries, gaps in legitimacy are an equally significant issue to give attention to.

In this vein, Cadman's forest governance framework emphasises the importance of understanding people's perceptions and attitudes in order to understand the quality of the program's governance. This is crucial because it gives a firm grounding to measure and evaluate the institutional legitimacy and durability of the Kariba REDD+ project. Hence legitimacy and durability in the project is judged against values that include transparency, accountability, equity, democracy, equality, resources, agreement, dispute settlement, problem solving and inclusiveness among others. These values branch from the conditions or requirements that are expected to be met during the design and implementation of REDD+. In particular the values are embedded on: structure (which needs to be participative in nature), interaction (which should be collaborative) and processes (which is expected to be deliberative in nature). This means that the legitimacy and sustainability of the Kariba REDD+ project is judged by the quality and characteristics of structure, interaction and processes that underpin the development and implementation of the project.

4.4.1. Governance values in the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project.

Drawing from the forest governance framework by Cadman, the study established that the Kariba REDD+ project largely fails to satisfy or conform to governance values. This is

majorly because the project's structure, interactions and processes are flawed. Although Zimbabwe was not REDD+ ready at the time the project was introduced, it was the responsibility of the project proponents and CGA to design and implement the project according to rules and procedures that guide private players. Although the project claims to be adhering to Climate Community and Biodiversity (CCB standards), the data generated from KIIs, FGDs, Participant Observation and a complementary survey points to the opposite. For instance, CCB standards are clear that projects such as the Kariba REDD+ should *“address climate change, support local communities and smallholders, and conserve biodiversity”*. However, although the project addresses climate change through the creation of carbon stocks as well as the conservation of biodiversity, the flawed structure, interactions and processes make it difficult for the project to adequately support local communities. As a result, governance values that include transparency, accountability, problem solving and inclusiveness, equity, democracy, equality, agreement and dispute settlement are heavily contested in the area. Taken into perspective, this suggests that the use of market principles in the conservation of environmental degradation and climate change mitigation is problematic culminating in the project suffering from legitimacy issues. Resultantly, it hurts the sustainability of the project in the long run.

Structure is an essential requirement in environment and climate change initiatives as this condition lays a firm foundation for participation of stakeholders on an equal footing. Thus, projects such as the Kariba REDD+ need to ensure that all stakeholders participate in the project meaningfully. Using the lenses of both the Climate Community and Biodiversity standards and CAMPFIRE as another familiar CBNRM project, the study established that the participation of stakeholders in the Kariba REDD+ project is limited. This lack of meaningful participation was observable during the design of the project as respondents from KIIs, the complimentary survey and FGDs consistently mentioned that the local indigenous community was not involved. This was best described by one community development leader who commented that, *“with CAMPFIRE, Murphree and his team used to come and would explain to community members and community leadership about the project. They would take time with us and as a result we all understood that we were the owners of wildlife resources in our area: with this one (Kariba REDD+), we don't know anything, we are literally not involved”*. Another responded from KIIs, a public employee native to the Mbire district is reaffirmed this view by noting that, *“what we need is meaningful participation and consultation, we don't want*

a situation where we receive instructions from the people from higher offices. As you all know we are used to being on top of things in community related projects as was the case with CAMPFIRE". Consequently, local indigenous communities are not able to hold Carbon Green Africa and Mbire RDC to account due to their lack of involvement and information asymmetry. Further, this is an attestation that the project is not transparent enough since it is characterised by a structure that suffocates accountability and nurture a culture of exclusion, a situation that breeds inequality. As underlined by Sunderlin et al (2009) indigenous communities would effectively participate in REDD+ when they feel that they own, or they have a stake in the program the opposite of which sow seeds for conflicts, economic inequality and deprivation of livelihoods and human rights violations.

Essentially, meaningful participation of stakeholders in REDD+ allows the project to integrate values such as inclusiveness, equality, resources, accountability and transparency. Conversely, the study noted these values are lacking in the Kariba REDD+ project. In light of this, with the project failing to craft a good structure that ensures meaningful participation, it also poses as a direct attack on interest representation and organisational responsibility of stakeholders involved in the project. Resultantly, this acts as a recipe for conflicts, distrust and unwillingness to participate in the project by some stakeholders. Anderson (2011) shares similar views by noting that in as much as REDD+ may generate benefits for local indigenous communities, serious social and environmental risks are imminent. These risks include; customary land rights violations, marginalization through new land-use zoning practices, exploitative carbon contracts, separating forest carbon rights from forest management and or ownership rights, elite capture and livelihood insecurity. Having taken everything into consideration, the study observed that the Kariba REDD+ project is embroiled in the same conundrum.

4.4.2. Kariba REDD+ and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)

In addition, worth to note is that the situation surrounding the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project goes against the dictates of the rights-based approach of the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). The FPIC and UN-REDD define FPIC as "the right of indigenous people to give or withhold their (indigenous people) free, prior, and informed consent to actions by others, that affect their land, territories, and natural resources" (UN-REDD, 2013). FPIC in REDD+ is given clout by legal mechanisms which include; The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the

Convention on Biological Diversity, International Labour Organization Convention No. 169, the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and Forest Investment Program (FIP), Voluntary carbon market standards particularly the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards (CCB) and the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards. With regards to the Kariba REDD+ project FPIC is recognised through the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards (CCB) that Carbon Green Africa is expected to use to implement the project. Therefore, FPIC should be prioritised in the project as it is an important component that ensures the success and goes further to improve its durability and legitimacy.

With that in mind, findings coming from the survey corroborates with the views shared by interviewed respondents that Mbire local indigenous community did not participate in the design of the project. This means that Carbon Green Africa as a private actor did not adhere to FPIC according to the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards (CCB) standards as expected of them. In this vein, the private player imposed their will on the local indigenous communities the same way they did to government ministries and Mbire RDC. The respondents emphasised their non-participation as none of them gave Free, Prior and Informed Consent during the design of the project hence justifies their continued misunderstanding of the project 8 years into the project. As shown by figure 6.5 below, 100% of the respondents noted that they never exercised their FPIC rights in the Kariba REDD+ project. Similarly, 100% of the respondents in the survey responded that they did not participate in the design of the project hence denying the community the opportunity to exercise their FPIC as required in REDD+.

Communities gave FPIC to to the establishment of the Kariba REDD+ project




Figure 4.5. Communities gave FPIC during the design of the Kariba REDD+ project.

Source: Field work data 2019

In essence, FPIC provides a ticket for local indigenous communities' right to participate in initiatives that directly affect them. As underlined by Bayrak and Marafa (2016) through their participation, local indigenous communities are not only awarded the right to decide whether they are interested in joining REDD+ but also provides them a chance to take charge in the local management, monitoring and enforcement processes including receiving REDD+ revenue coming from carbon stocks they protect. Therefore, FPIC should be regarded as a standard in the dialogue on local indigenous communities' rights. Not less important is that FPIC is a catalyst pertinent in making local indigenous communities determine the outcome of issues that affect them on the basis of the decisions they would have made and not merely based on the right to be involved. Thus, FPIC is central for the Mbire local indigenous community since it acts as a highway that allows them to realise the right to self-determination over their resources that include, territory, land and forests coupled with the right to freely follow their social, economic and cultural development trajectory. Conversely, the study learned that this is not the case with the Kariba REDD+ project as only the Carbon Green Africa and Mbire RDC seem to be on the driving seat although to varying degrees. Hence, it comes as no surprise that 77% of the respondents thought that the project was owned by Carbon Green Africa and the Mbire RDC. Drawing from these perceptions, the study established that the project is controlled by the elite particularly corporate capture at the detriment of livelihoods and rights of the Mbire local indigenous community.

Furthermore, the study observed that processes surrounding the Kariba REDD+ project's implementation are compromised. In overall, the study recognised that the process in the Kariba REDD+ project is not deliberative enough. This directly impact on decision making and the general implementation of the project as some stakeholder interests are neither represented nor met. In modern environmental policy practice inclusive and participatory decision-making enhances acceptance for policy decisions and strengthen the knowledge base for implementation (Bäckstrand et al 2010). Therefore, due to lack of deliberation in the Kariba REDD+ project, the study established that decision making is not inclusive yet at the heart of deliberation is the belief that stakeholders should be included and engaged as equals to nurture collective decision making.

Baber and Bartlett (2005) concur with the above by noting that deliberate models of democracy promote values of public justification and political equality by way of cultivating open and reasoned argument that is divorced from manipulation and the exercise of power as a basis to come up with legitimate decisions. Thus, with respect to the Kariba REDD+ project, decisions are normally unilaterally taken by Carbon Green Africa and the Mbire RDC and these decisions are unpopular with the local indigenous community. Principally, the decisions don't address priorities with respect to activities that are meant to address livelihood insecurities in the community. To support this, findings from the survey confirm that local indigenous communities are not involved in decision making. Figure 6.6 below shows that 92% of the respondents indicated that local indigenous communities are not involved in decision making in the project. This proves that deliberation in the Kariba REDD+ project is low as one superior camp makes decisions on behalf of the weaker camp culminating in lack of collective decision making. The downside to this plight is that where values such as agreement, dispute settlement, problem solving and democracy is non-existent, the governance of community pool and or sink resources are more likely to fail in the long run.

Communities' involvement in decision making during the Kariba REDD+'s implementation




Figure 4.6. Communities' involvement in decision making in the Kariba REDD+ project

Source: Field Work 2019

As mentioned in other sections, what makes the Mbire district council unique is that the community has previous experiences in participating in CBNRM projects thus they have a better understanding of how such projects work. This means that the Kariba REDD+ project is judged by communities using their twenty years experiences with CAMPFIRE which arguably benefitted them notwithstanding the fact that the project had its problems. Therefore, since the Mbire local indigenous community fully comprehends democratic governance processes the Kariba REDD+ project has proven to be a diversion from the norm they had become accustomed to. For instance, on top of local indigenous people not being involved in crucial decision making as highlighted above, it is the same with the traditional leadership in the project, yet they are the primary custodians of the resources in their area. In this regard, as indicated by figure 6.7 below findings coming out of the survey indicated that 82% of the respondents believe that views and decisions of the community leadership are not integrated into the project with just 3% noting that they are somewhat involved. This results in loss of traditional or indigenous ecological knowledge and the endangering of indigenous forest management practices that have existed for centuries as they are replaced by the marketisation and commodification of nature practices.

Integration of community leaders' views and decisions into the Kariba REDD+ project




Figure 4.7. Integration of community leaders' decisions and views into the project.

Source: Field Work 2019

4.4.3. Lack of understanding of the Kariba REDD+ project's benefit structure.

Furthermore, the study observed that lack of collective decision making creates a long chain of problems that endanger the integrity of the project in overall. In particular, the local indigenous communities do not understand the benefit structure of the Kariba REDD+ project hence they don't fully understand the revenue the community is supposed to get out of the project. Of the respondents interviewed and those who participated in the survey, few of them had informed knowledge about the benefit structure thus this is problematic. One entrepreneur who attended FGDs noted that, *"when they called us (Mbire RDC and Carbon Green Africa) for a meeting they told us that they would give 30% of the revenue to the community with 10% to be used for funding projects and 20% as cash deposit, 30% would go to the council and 40 % to Carbon Green Africa. The problem is that tracking or receiving this money is hard for us...at one point we were told that the prices at the carbon market were low so they were not able to sell the air (carbon credits)"* Another respondent who is a traditional leader in the area further mentioned that, *"without our consent, CGA with the council's approval came in our area and are profiting from our resources... we don't fully understand what they are doing and how we should benefit."* This shows that lack of participation set in motion a range of issues that arguably puts the project in disrepute as some stakeholders lack a basic understanding of how the project is run.

The above views were further supported by one REDD+ expert from the academia who commented that, *“one fundamental pillar central to the implementation of REDD+ is collaboration, through collaboration people are able to deliberate on fundamental issues and the noise that is normally created through lack of collaboration is quelled. This nurtures transparency and accountability in the process”* Attached to this, the study observed that this problem originates from the fact that the local indigenous community was not involved in the design of the project and don't have access to significant information of the project contained in the contract that was signed between the council and Carbon Green Africa. One KII respondent who is a community development leader underlined that, *“As far as we are concerned, we only have a verbal agreement about what we would benefit from CGA and the REDD+ project and much of the issues that we need to know are out of our reach”*. This shows that collective decision making through deliberative platforms is important since it acts as a catalyst for a democratic REDD+ project that is able to solve problems, make stakeholders agree on pertinent issues, which enable amicable settling of disputes thus guaranteeing durability and legitimacy of the project.

To support the above, findings from the complimentary survey concurred with the views of the respondents who were interviewed as 89% professed ignorance of the Kariba REDD+ project's benefit structure with just 11% noting that they somewhat understand it as illustrated by figure 6.8 below. This means that the local indigenous community was not afforded the chance to deliberate on this benefit structure as they learnt about it through community meetings. In this respect, bearing in mind that these meetings are construed by this study as symbolic and tokenistic, not much was done to make sure that the community understood revenue benefit arrangements. Therefore, this leaves the Kariba REDD+ project on shaky grounds when it comes to its legitimacy and sustainability.

Knowledge of Kariba REDD+ project's benefit structure




Figure 4.7. Knowledge of Kariba REDD+ project's benefit structure

Source: Field work 2019

Conversely, with the CAMPFIRE project the benefit structure was clearly known in comparison to the Kariba REDD+ project. Resultantly, it makes local indigenous communities have a difficult time to figure out how funds from the project are supposed to be used in community developmental projects 6.9 below attest to this by illustrating that 97% of the respondents do not believe that there is a clear plan or consensus on how to use funds coming out of the project. It therefore raises a red flag because what majorly keeps a community together in CBNRM program is the collectiveness of the decisions they make on common sink or pool resources. This lack of collective decision making makes the Kariba REDD+ project contested in many respects as communities are not able to determine their economic, social and cultural developmental trajectory as they are expected to.

Existence of a clear plan or consensus on Kariba REDD+ funds usage




Figure 4.8. Existence of a plan or consensus on use of funds coming out of the Kariba REDD+ project.

Source: Field data 2019

The same applies to interaction in the Kariba REDD+ project. As emphasised by Cadman and Maraseni (2012) structures and processes are essential to comprehending the interactions between stakeholders in contemporary forest governance. In this vein, since structure and processes in the project seem to be crippled, it consequently means that the quality of interactions amongst Kariba REDD+ project stakeholders is poor as well. In other words, in a situation where structure and processes are not adhered to as they should, it creates non-collaboration amongst stakeholders in the Kariba REDD+ project. This non-collaboration thrives in an environment where there are unequal power relations amongst stakeholder thus creating tension, non-compliance and distrust. As a result, loss of legitimacy in the project is imminent thus this endangers its durability in the process.

On the other end of the spectrum, Carbon Green Africa seems to be singing from a different hymn book as compared to the Mbire local indigenous community. The study established that the private company is peddling a perspective that makes the project to be viewed as all-inclusive and successful both during its design and implementation. In specific, the private company believes that the Kariba REDD+ project's governance framework is intact and flourishing and that stakeholder participation, collaboration and deliberation are being met. For instance, the Kariba REDD+ Verification Report of 2017 that assessed the project's compliance with VCS and CCB standards and rules certified that the project was doing well as it ticked all the required boxes. The audit was done by

SCS Global Services (SCS) Company. More so, the Kariba REDD+ Project Monitoring and Implementation Report that was prepared by the South Pole Group in 2016 more or less took a similar stance.

Nevertheless, these Kariba REDD+ report findings should be taken with a pinch of salt for various reasons. In the grand scheme of things, it is worth noting that CGA depicts a picture of a company that maintains the integrity of the environment through forests conservation yet investments and profit-making is at the core of its existence. The study established that these reports might not be that reliable as it is Carbon Green Africa through its parent company and proponent Carbon Green Investments Guernsey (CGI) that select audit companies and the other project stakeholders play no part in this process. Nevertheless, it is only Carbon Green Africa that can lead in these processes by virtue of them having the capacity and technical knowhow of the project as compared to the other project stakeholders. Yet, taking this position also reflects the amount of monopoly that CGA enjoys in the project which might give them leverage to do as they please hence hiring quasi and questionable consultants to protect their interest is not a far-fetched point. After all, the Voluntary Carbon Market Carbon Green Africa operate in is riddled with fraud and scams epitomised by “the gaming of carbon markets” and carbon piracy (Llanos and Feather 2012) that threatens the livelihood security of local indigenous communities.

5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summary of findings

Guided by the Political Economy Theory, the study discussed the marketisation of environmental governance and policy using the Kariba REDD+ project. The study particularly made use of the conceptualisation of the Political economy by Newell (2008) in order to grasp the design and implementation of the project. Essentially, the Political economy theory played a crucial role by acting as an anchor central in comprehending the marketisation of environmental governance and policy in REDD+. Furthermore, the analysis took advantage of the pillars of the theory expressed through questions such as: what is governed and what is not? Who governs and who is governed? How do they govern and on whose behalf? And with what implications? Consequently, the study came up with findings hinged on research questions that sought to answer distinct issues that fundamentally contributed to the understanding of the phenomenon of the marketisation of the Kariba REDD+ project. In this respect, the findings discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are summarised below.

Chapter 4 discussed the diverse interest of stakeholders who are involved the Kariba REDD+ project. This discussion enabled the understanding the politics of REDD+ particularly at issues that come with the introduction of markets in environment and climate governance and policy. The chapter discussed the start differences wielded by diverse actors involved in the Kariba REDD+ project especially the implementation partners. These differences resonate from the position that the implementation partners involved in the project attach different meanings to the project. The stakeholders that were discussed in this chapter include Carbon Green Africa and other private companies, the Mbire local indigenous community, the Mbire RDC, the Forest Commission and civil society organisations involved in the project.

In this respect, the study highlighted that CGA is mainly interested in maximising profits through accumulation. Since CGA utilises market principles to conserve forests and reducing GHG emissions, the company is majorly not invested in playing an allocative and redistributive role to ensure that all the stakeholders in the project equally benefit. Hence, the chapter concluded that the depiction of a company interested in maintaining the integrity of the environment through forests and biodiversity conservation as shown by CGA is just but a smokescreen. However, the private company introduced projects that are

intended to improve the local indigenous community's livelihoods in the area although their effectiveness is contested.

The chapter established the Mbire RDC is another stakeholder that is heavily invested in the project. In this vein the chapter discussed that the council is interested in the conservation of forest in the area. Notwithstanding its interest in forest conservation, the chapter concluded that the council is also interested in making profits to supplement the meagre budget they have. The budget hardly fund their activities and functions hence the Kariba REDD+ project serves their interest. Thus, the study noted that the council's interest in conserving forests and biodiversity is self-serving as they consider it to be a means to an end as the project to some degree enables them to become self-reliant. In the process, they do not pay attention to the rights and livelihood of the Mbire local indigenous community. In this regard, just like CGA, the chapter highlighted that council is mainly interested in maximising profits at the expense of other stakeholders which goes against the framework of REDD+.

The Mbire local indigenous community characterised by the traditional leadership and community is another equally important stakeholder in the Kariba REDD+ project. The local indigenous community is interested in both conserving the forests and the fighting of poverty in the area through accessing revenues accrued from the selling of carbon. In specific, the chapter underlined that the Mbire local indigenous community view the Kariba REDD+ project as a platform to conserve forests as well as the chance to improve their livelihood through benefiting in community projects. The community also expects the project to benefit them through infrastructure development through projects such as the building of schools, dams and clinics. It can be commented that their interest and the manner they construe the project are not exactly in synch with those of CGA and the Mbire RDC.

The study also found out that the role of Forests Commission as a stakeholder in the project is to conserve and expand forests. Be that as it is, the study further observed that the institution's role in the project is not clear in comparison to its counterparts in other African countries where REDD+ projects are being implemented. This is mainly because the Kariba REDD+ project operates in an environment without proper national legal framework to customise the REDD+ international framework with national laws and practices as a basis for them to have well spelt out roles in the project. However, besides that their role in the project is unclear, the commission's major interest is helping local

indigenous people in the area to conserve forests and the vegetation through practices such as sustainable agriculture among other practices.

With regards to NGO stakeholders, the study recognised Environment Africa to have played a pivotal role in both encouraging the conservation of forests and biodiversity and protecting the rights of local indigenous community and their livelihood. Thus, the NGO's interest in the project was to capacitate project beneficiaries to successfully take part in the project's income generation activities such as CF, beekeeping among others. The environmental organisation also played a pivotal role in ensuring that conservation of forests and biodiversity in the area is done in ways that benefit local community members. In this respect, the organisation had a different meaning to the project. This resulted in Environment Africa allegedly falling out of favour with CGA and the probable reason was the irreconcilable interest between the two partner organisations. In addition, the study noted that Transparency International Zimbabwe is an anti-corruption NGO that plays a watchdog role in the project. TI Z's interest in the project is to promote transparency and accountability through influencing national policies on one hand and on the other sensitising communities to demand for transparency and accountability to hold those in authority to account. On the whole the chapter observed that TIZ 's and Environment Africa's interest and roles fundamentally complimented each other.

Chapter 5 discussed findings on the power relations and control dynamics in the Kariba REDD+ project. This chapter was also focused on comprehending more the phenomenon of marketisation of the environment and climate intended projects. In this vein, the study underscored that the project is characterised by unequal power relations epitomised by horizontal and vertical information asymmetry. The information asymmetry is caused by lack of information disclosure amongst the project stakeholders that include: CGA (the project proponents) Mbire RDC and the Mbire local indigenous community. Resultantly, information asymmetry translates to bad governance as the design and implementation of the project is riddled with opaqueness and secrecy. The findings highlighted that CGA and the Mbire RDC deny the Mbire local indigenous community the chance to participate in key decisions, yet they depend on the forest and biodiversity for their daily household livelihoods. This is despite that the ability to own and control the project hugely depends on accessing information hence this arrangement makes the Mbire local indigenous community fail to hold CGA and the Mbire RDC to account. More so, the study highlighted that unequal power relations in the project are as a result of the complex and

poor land tenure system that translates to weak land governance and administration in Zimbabwe.

In addition, the chapter underscored that the public policy making and political landscape in Zimbabwe is toxic rendering important institutions such as the parliament ineffective thus are not able to play an oversight role. This directly affects the way the Kariba REDD+ project is implemented. Due to these reasons, the study argued that it culminated in CGA taking advantage of the plight by utilising the most cost-effective route rooted in implementing the project through RDCs without proper attention being given to local indigenous communities. Therefore, the study observed that the local indigenous community are not considered as equal partners in this project. More so, RDCs are construed as sleeping partners in the project meaning they are incapacitated when it comes to steering the project in a direction that would benefit all stakeholders. Resultantly, the local indigenous community is left powerless and disempowered.

Chapter 5 also discussed the extent to which livelihoods in the Mbire local indigenous community were positively or negatively affected by the introduction of the Kariba REDD+ project in their area. This analysis was based on the understanding that REDD+ has the potential to fight poverty and generate income through the selling of carbon credits but can also harm communities through denying local indigenous community's access to their forests or through unequal benefit sharing of revenue. Therefore, the study established that CGA through the REDD+ contributed positively to the livelihood of project beneficiaries to some extent through projects such as CF, beekeeping, moringa farming, community gardens among other projects and these projects were supported by revenue generated from the selling of carbon credits. However, the study argued that these benefits are overstated by CGA and are tantamount to greenwashing as local indigenous communities do not think that the project has adequately responded to their livelihood insecurities.

More so, the study observed that project has not developed infrastructure that satisfy the community's priorities such as building schools, clinics and dams as opposed to 'minor projects' being contacted in the area. In fact, the chapter established that the Kariba REDD+ project undermines livelihoods by forbidding access to foraging, agriculture and hunting. More so, the project has inhibited the use of land and forests for petty commodity production especially for women and hunters who depend on the forests for household food security. Thus, this has culminated in the revision of access and control to land and

forests coupled with the redefinition of labour processes in the Mbire district. In comparison to the CAMPFIRE program, the chapter argued that the Kariba REDD+ project plays second fiddle in terms of changing community livelihoods and fighting poverty. In overall, the benefits that were brought through the project are not commensurate with the amount of power and self-determination that the communities were forced to forego.

Chapter 6 focused on the legitimacy and sustainability of the Kariba REDD+ project. The discussion was premised on the forest governance framework by Cadman. The chapter observed that the legitimacy and durability of the Kariba REDD+ project is compromised. This is primarily because the project fails to satisfy conditions that ensure that the project's design and implementation meets governance values. These conditions include structure, process and interaction. Most importantly, the chapter noted that governance values also speak to deep democracy issues since these values are inseparable from democratic values. These values include transparency, accountability, problem solving and inclusiveness, equity, democracy, equality, agreement and dispute settlement. Laconically, the chapter established that the project is not participative enough and that the process is not deliberative hence falls short of democratic governance which is essentially the life blood of projects that are involved in forest governance. Also, the chapter underlined that due to the absence of the implementation of a participative and deliberative framework, interaction of stakeholders is compromised which endangers the sustainability and legitimacy of the project.

Attached to the above, chapter 6 established that the Kariba REDD+ project goes against the conditions of rights-based approach in form Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). FPIC is considered sacrosanct in projects that involve the community as it gives local indigenous community the rights to meaningfully participate and make decisions on issues that directly affect them. As a result, the chapter concluded that the project does not adequately adhere to CCB Standards as expected of private sector led REDD+ projects. With the project failing to meet democratic governance the study observed that it erodes the legitimacy and sustainability of the project. In overall, the chapter wrapped up by pointing that the Kariba REDD+ project is clogged with dominant pervasive market principles and culture that denies Mbire local indigenous community the chance to freely follow their social, economic and cultural development trajectory.

5.2. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Kariba REDD+ project reflects the challenges that come with the utilisation of market principles and a culture of economic rationalism in the area of environment and climate. The study established that the use of market principles has adverse effects on the state and society. In particular the study discussed how the design and implementation of the Kariba REDD+ project is clogged with bad governance and undemocratic practices the results of which are: institutional and governance challenges epitomised by information asymmetry and CGA's monopoly and grip on the project, poor forest governance arrangements, lack of participation and exclusion of Mbire local indigenous people on crucial decision making: livelihood insecurity in form of unequal distribution of income, loss of access to forests, lack of forest tenure carbon rights, food insecurity and inter and intra community tensions: and social-cultural challenges characterised by neglect of traditional practices and knowledge and deterioration of the social and cultural fabric in the Mbire district. Thus, the Kariba REDD+ project has managed to restructure forests governance and livelihoods of the Mbire community through appropriation of land and forest resources and recentralisation of natural resources governance. In fact, it, can be concluded that the project has successfully revised access and control to land and forests and managed to introduce new crops, redefined labour processes and objectives in the Mbire district. As a result, previous land and forests controls have been subdued by market principles through the marketisation of the environment and climate. On the whole, this incapacitates the Mbire local indigenous community's ability to pen out their own social, economic and cultural trajectory as they are trapped in a set of alien rules and culture that is incompatible with their priorities. Taking these issues into consideration, the study highlighted that the legitimacy and durability of the project is compromised.

5.3. Recommendations

To respond to issues discussed in the above chapters and summarised in this chapter, it is significant for the Kariba REDD+ project stakeholders to make some changes to some arrangements and practices that directly affect the project. This include addressing key challenges that include weak institutional arrangements and poor governance challenges, livelihood insecurity and socio-cultural issues. This might plug some avenues that are being exploited by private companies using market power which is expressed through their principles and practices in forest governance and climate change mitigation initiatives. As

a result, these changes address the legitimacy challenge in the project thus improve the prospects for the project's durability and sustainability. In this vein, the following paragraphs highlight the issues or problems that come with the adoption of market principles in the efforts to address environmental degradation and climate change through REDD+. Recommendations that are intended to help address these problems are proffered as well.

5.3.1. Weak institutions and poor governance challenges

As discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6 Kariba REDD+ project is associated with weak institutions and poor governance practices. They reflect themselves through conditions such as CGA's monopoly and grip on the project, poor forest governance arrangements and lack of participation and exclusion of local indigenous people in crucial decision making. To address these challenges, a plethora of measures need to be adopted. These include enacting national legislation and policies on forest governance that emphasise Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) to comprehensively customise the REDD+ international framework in Zimbabwe. Attached to this, there is need to capacitate and strengthen national and local institutions such as the Ministries of Environment, Water and Climate, the Forestry Commission, traditional leadership and RDCs so that they pull in the same direction during the implementation of REDD+ projects.

At the community and district levels, there is need to decentralise the management of forest and related natural resources by empowering the traditional leadership in the Mbire district to play a pivotal in the project. More so, the Mbire local indigenous community should be treated as equal partners by CGA and the Mbire RDC in the project. To augment the livelihoods of Mbire local indigenous community, stronger social safeguards and standards that are premised on REDD+ should be instituted.

More so, these safeguards and standards should be constantly monitored and evaluated by reputable consultant companies to avoid the current situation where the application of safeguards and standards are heavily disputed. In this respect, the project should utilise the services of civil society organisations such as TI Z by making them become part of the third-party grievance mechanism network. Also, in order to ensure that local indigenous community members participate in the project and thus embrace it more, they need to be included in Kariba REDD+ implementation activities such as carbon monitoring so that they understand MRV processes and consequently feel included in the project.

5.3.2. Livelihood insecurity challenges

Livelihood security challenges were exhaustively discussed in this study as they are central to the success of the Kariba REDD+ project. Livelihood insecurity issues in the project manifest through factors that include the unequal distribution of income, loss of access to forests by forest dependent local indigenous community members in the project, lack of forest tenure carbon rights, food insecurity and emergence of inter and intra community tensions in the area.

It is thus important that these issues are addressed at policy level and during the implementation of the project. At project level, there is need for the Kariba REDD+ implementation partners to ensure equal distribution of revenue coming out of the selling of carbon credits and this can be done through making the project more transparent and inclusive. This should start by making the signed contract between CGA and the Mbire RDC accessible to other stakeholders since it legitimises the project in the process. Through such arrangements, all stakeholders that are involved are able to track and confirm whether they are receiving their full share of revenue generated from the selling of carbon credits in line with the agreed benefit sharing structure. This will go a long way in addressing information asymmetry issues and at the same time addresses the problem of exclusion of local indigenous community members on making key decisions regarding the project.

At policy level as indicated above, there is need to enact national legislation and policies on forest governance so that they address and secure land-forest tenure and carbon rights for Mbire local indigenous community. Equally important, one of the issues that haunt REDD+ projects is that of unreasonable expectations. Thus, in order to contain the expectations of local indigenous community members, the implementation partners should work with local community members so that they view REDD+ as an opportunity to diversify income and not a platform to erase all the poverty in the district. This can only be solved through following procedures and guidelines of REDD+ such as FPIC, ensuring the participation of communities as well as making them participate in key decision-making platforms. As highlighted in the study, these procedures and guidelines are lacking in the project.

5.3.3. Socio-cultural challenges

The Kariba REDD+ has seen contestations over social and cultural matters as it is viewed to be overlooking traditional institutions that have helped in the conservation and protection of natural resources such as wild animals and forest for centuries. Thus, traditional practices and knowledge is omitted during the implementation of the project culminating in the deterioration of social and cultural fabric in the area. In this regard, the Kariba REDD+ should adopt Community Based Natural Resources Management practices as was the case with CAMPFIRE. If adopted well, this does not only ensure that the project benefits from the knowledge of local community members, but it will make the project less foreign as it implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Mbire district traditional practices and knowledge. Resultantly, this makes the project be customised to prevailing norms, practices and lifestyle of the Mbire local indigenous community.

More importantly, the project needs to embrace the views of traditional leadership and traditional forest management practices since respecting traditional institutions go a long way in making the project be embraced by the Mbire district. Traditional institutions are recognised and respected by the local indigenous community members hence it is unwise to bypass them. In this respect, the Kariba REDD+ project should take advantage of traditional institutions since they have been the de jure influential and leading institution in the district for centuries. In order to do so, the project implementation partners need to open platforms that ensure that traditional leaders and their institutions are consulted so that they participate in crucial decisions on issues that affect their area. It should be commented that the conceptualisation and negotiations of REDD+ at the global level highly regards the need to respect livelihoods and rights of indigenous communities where REDD+ projects are implemented.

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APPENDICES



Appendix 1: The Ethics Commission Report

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 13/06/2019-E.17013



T.C.
ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ
ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Etik Komisyonu



Sayı : 11054618-302.08.01-
Konu : Bilimsel ve Eğitim Amaçlı

LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

İlgi : 08.05.2019 tarih ve E.14075 sayılı yazı.

İlgi yazınız ile göndermiş olduğunuz, Enstitünüz Amme İdaresi Anabilim Dalı, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bilim Dalı tezli **Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Hamunakwadi Dereck LAZARUS, Doç.Dr. Özge ÇELİK RUSSEL**'in danışmanlığında yürüttüğü "*Çevresel Yönetişim ve Politika: Kariba REDD + Zimbabwe'deki Projeyi Kullanarak Çevresel Yönetişim ve Politikanın Küresel Pazarlamasını Anlamak*" adlı tez çalışması ile ilgili konu Komisyonumuzun 30.05.2019 tarih ve 09 sayılı toplantısında görüşülmüş olup,

Etik Komisyonunca onaylanan ilgilinin çalışmasının, ekte gönderilen Başvuru Değerlendirme Raporunda önerilen görüş doğrultusunda yapılması planlanan yerlerden izin alınması koşuluyla yapılmasında etik açıdan bir sakınca bulunmadığına oybirliği ile karar verilmiş; karara ilişkin imza listesi ve onaylanan çalışmalar ekte gönderilmiştir.

Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini rica ederim.

e-İmzalıdır
Prof. Dr. Aydın KARAPINAR
Komisyon Başkanı

Araştırma Kod No: 2019/119

Ek:
1- İmza Listesi
2- Başvuru Değerlendirme Raporu
3- Onaylı Çalışma

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Yücetepe Mahallesi 85. Cadde No 8 06570 Çankaya /
Ankara
Tel: +90 (312) 231 73 60








Bilgi için :Saliha GEMALMAZ
Genel Evrak Sorumlusu

Bu belge 5070 sayılı Elektronik İmza Kanununun 5. Maddesi gereğince güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
ETİK KOMİSYONU KATILIM LİSTESİ

TOPLANTI TARİHİ :30.05.2019

TOPLANTI SAYISI : 09

ADI-SOYADI	İMZA
Prof.Dr.Aydın KARAPINAR BAŞKAN	
Prof.Dr.M.Fadıl YILDIRIM Başkan Yrd.	
Prof.Dr.Mustafa EKİNCİKLİ	
Prof.Dr.Yıldız AYANOĞLU	KATILMADI
Prof.Dr.Bekir ESKİCİ	
Prof.Dr.Ramazan Pars ŞAHBAZ	
Prof.Dr.Neşe Yaşar ÇEĞİNDİR	
Prof.Dr.Bilgehan GÜLCAN	
Prof.Dr.Funda YURDAKUL	KATILMADI



T.C.
ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
ETİK KOMİSYONU
BAŞVURU DEĞERLENDİRME RAPORU

Sorumlu Araştırmacının Adı Soyadı: DERECK LAZARUS HAMUNAKWADI

Değerlendirilecek Araştırmanın Adı: Çevresel Yönetişim ve Politika : Kariba REDD+Zimbabve'deki Projeyi Kullanarak Çevresel Yönetişim ve Politikanın Küresel Pazarlamasını Anlamak

Tarih:

Evet **Hayır**

- X Başvuru Formu eksiksiz ve uygun olarak doldurulmuş mu?
 X Araştırma ve veri toplama araçları (Anket, ölçek, testvb) ilgili etik kurallara uygun mu?
 X Kontrol listesinde işaretlenen evraklar eksiksiz olarak sunulmuş mu?

Değerlendirme Sonucu

	Uygundur
X <input type="checkbox"/>	Düzeltilme gereklidir (Açıklayınız) <input type="checkbox"/> Düzeltmeleri görmek istiyorum <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Düzeltmeleri görmeme gerek yok
<input type="checkbox"/>	Uygun değildir (Açıklayınız)
Açıklama	Form 4'de, Dereck Lazarus Hamunakwadi'nin özgeçmiş formunda "Yayınlar " kısmı boş bırakılmıştır.

Değerlendirmeyi yapan Etik Komisyon Üyesi bu formu doldurduktan sonra, kendisine gönderilen başvuru dosyasının tamamıyla birlikte üzerinde "GİZLİ" ibaresiyle kapalı zarf içerisinde Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Etik Komisyonu'na gönderecektir.



Appendix 2: Key informant Interview Guide for Kariba REDD+ implementation partners.

KII code.....



REDD+ KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW FORM FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

Thank you for meeting with me today. I would like to speak with you about REDD+ in general and the Kariba REDD project in specific. Firstly, I will introduce myself (Introduction to Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University and the research study on REDD+).

Date of Interview _____
Location _____
Time of Interview _____

1. In brief how did the Kariba REDD project come about?
2. Has the project design been discussed with stakeholders through consultation?
3. How well known is the project to people in the area?
4. Do you think stakeholder consultations were adequately carried out or planned?
5. Have indigenous people given their consent for proposed activities, e.g. through a Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) process?
6. What are the specific activities proposed for the project?
7. What is expected to be done in the area to meet the goals of the forest carbon project?
8. Who negotiated the conditions of the project? Who signed a contract for approval of the project? Was there a consultation process?
9. What other legal documents have been signed during the project development process and by whom?
10. How is the Kariba REDD project managed? What is its organisational and managerial structure like?
11. In what way has the Kariba REDD project changed lives and livelihood of communities?
12. How are the communities expected to benefit and what are their benefits so far?
13. Has forests density improved since the Kariba REDD project was introduced, and if so what do you attribute to that change?
14. Has the Kariba REDD project been a success, how is it performing and was it well received by all the stakeholders?
15. Is the Kariba REDD project sustainable? What is its future like?

Name of Interviewee _____
Designation _____
Contact details _____





Appendix 3: Key informant Interview Guide for community and traditional leaders.

KII code.....



REDD+ KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW FORM FOR COMMUNITY AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS.

In English

Thank you for meeting with me today. I would like to speak with you about the Kariba REDD+ project that is being implemented in your area. Firstly, I will introduce myself (Introduction to Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University and the research study on REDD+).

Mururimi rwunonzi Shona

Maita zvenyu nekundipa nzeve uye nekuuya kwamaita pazuva ranhasi. Ndoda kutaura nemi nezvenyaya yechirongwa che Kariba REDD+ chirikuitwa munharaunda yenyu. Asi chekutanga regai nditange ndakuudzai zita rangu, kwandinobva pamusoro pe Ankara Haci Bayram Veli yunivhesiti inovwe yunivhesiti iri kunyika inonzi Turkey kwandinodzidza ndozopedzisira nekutaura nemi maererano nezvechirongwa che Kariba REDD+.

Date of Interview _____
Location _____
Time of Interview _____

Name of Interviewee _____
Designation _____
Contact details _____

1. What is your understanding of REDD?
2. Do you feel that the project design was a discussed with community leaders through consultation?
3. In your opinion do you think the Kariba REDD project is known by the people in the area?
4. Do you think that the community and traditional leadership was adequately consulted by Kariba REDD implementation partners?
5. Do you consider your working relationship with Mbire RDC to be sincere and reciprocal?
6. Do you think other Kariba REDD project implementation partners consider community leaders as equal partners in this project?
7. Do you think community leaders consented to this project through a Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) process?
8. Do you think community leaders are well informed about activities that were proposed for the project?
9. Do you have any idea about what is expected to be done in the area to meet the goals of the project?
10. In which ways were the community leaders involved in the negotiation of the conditions of the project? Were you involved in the signing of the contract for approval of the project?
11. Do you know any other legal documents that were signed during the project development process and by whom?
12. Do you think traditional and community leader's input is valued in this project? Do you participate in decision making processes and if yes to what extend are you involved?
13. Do you consider the Kariba REDD project to have changed/is changing people's lives and livelihood?
14. What are the community leaderships' expectations as far as the Kariba REDD project is concerned?
15. In comparison to CAMPFIRE do you think the Kariba REDD project is beneficial to the communities?





Appendix 4: Key informant Interview Guide for Kariba REDD+ Experts

KII code.....



REDD+ KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW FORM FOR REDD+ EXPERTS

Thank you for meeting with me today. I would like to speak with you about REDD+ in general and the Kariba REDD project in specific. Firstly, I will introduce myself (Introduction to Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University and the research study on REDD+).

Date of Interview _____
Location _____
Time of Interview _____

1. From a global perspective, what is your understanding of REDD+?
2. Which stakeholders do you consider to be central to REDD+?
3. How are these stakeholders expected to contribute to the success of REDD+?
4. In your opinion, what are the possible primary interests of REDD+ stakeholders?
5. In which ways are these stakeholders expected to relate to and interact with each other for the benefit of REDD+?
6. What are the possible ways these stakeholders can work with communities?
7. Does REDD+ have measures to protect communities in areas where REDD+ projects are conducted and are these measures prioritised?
8. Could you explain the relationship between forests conservation, climate change and poverty alleviation?
9. Do you consider REDD+ as a meaningful conservation scheme that can successfully reduce forest deforestation, alleviate poverty and check climate change through increasing carbon stocks?
10. What is the difference between a governments led REDD+ project and a private company led REDD+ project?
11. And what are the possible opportunities and challenges strictly looking at these two kinds of projects?
12. Do you think Zimbabwe is ready for any kind of REDD+ project considering that it is still at REDD+ readiness stage?
13. Do you believe that the Climate Change Policy strategy that was formulated in 2016 by the government of Zimbabwe has any effect on the Kariba REDD project?

Name of Interviewee _____
Designation _____
Contact details _____





Appendix 5: Focus Group Discussions Guide.

FGD Code.....



REDD+ FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION FORM

In English

Thank you for meeting with me today. I would like to speak with you about the Kariba REDD+ project that is being implemented in your area. Firstly, I will introduce myself (Introduction to Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University and the research study on REDD+).

Mururimi rwunonzi Shona

Maita zvenyu nekundipa nzeve uye nekuuya kwamaita pazuva ranhasi. Ndoda kutaura nemi nezvenyaya yechirongwa che Kariba REDD+ chirikuitwa munharaunda yenyu. Asi chekutanga regai nditange ndakuudzai zita rangu, kwandinobva, pamusoro pe Ankara Haci Bayram Veli yunivhesiti inove yunivhesiti iri kunyika inonzi Turkey kwandinodzidza ndozopedzisira nekutaura nemi maererano nezvechirongwa che Kariba REDD+.

Date of Interview _____

Location _____

Time of Interview _____

Qn1. In your opinion, how do you construe the Kariba REDD project (General understanding of Kariba REDD+ project)? Probe the following;

- *CAMPFIRE and forests conservation issues.
- * Kariba REDD+ project implementation partners.
- * Expected roles of community members.
- * Non-Carbon benefits of REDD+ to communities.

Q2. How would you describe your working relationship with Kariba REDD implementation partners? (Design and implementation of Kariba REDD; Power relations, control dynamics and legitimacy). Probe the following.

- *with Mbire Rural District Council officials.
- *With Carbon Green Africa officials.
- *With other actors/stakeholders



FGD Code.....

*Nature of consultations with community structures; any workshops, public meetings, campaigns

*Communication structure and management.

Q3: Would you say you are privy to information on the management of funds and the benefit sharing structure of Kariba REDD project? (Management of Funds, Equity, decision making and participation, control, impact). Probe the following.

*Location of funds and the benefit sharing structure.

*Availability of the information to the local community members.

*What the funds are used for.

Q4: Do you have expectations or vested interests with regards to the implementation of the Kariba REDD project? (Control dynamics, power relations and impact, sustainability issues). Probe the following.

* Realisation/non realisation of the interest or expectations.

*possible challenges blocking the realisation of these interests or expectations.

Q5: Would you say that the Kariba REDD project has changed your livelihood? (Impact of the project and the prospect of Kariba REDD project becoming a success). Probe the following

* Kariba REDD project successfully meeting its goals or not.

* If possible compare its success to CAMPFIRE.

Q6: Do you think the Kariba REDD project's implementation needs some improvement? If yes participants should give suggestions. (Legitimacy and sustainability issues)

Q7: Which improvements do you think should be undertaken? If yes participants should give suggestions. (Legitimacy and sustainability issues)



Appendix 6: Complementary Survey Guide



In English

Thank you for meeting with me today. I would like to speak to you about the Kariba REDD+ project that is being implemented in your area. Firstly, I will introduce myself (Introduction to Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University and the research study on REDD+).

Mururimi rwunonzi Shona

Maita zvenyu nekundipa nzeve uye nekuuya kwamaita pazuva ranhasi. Ndoda kutaura nemi nezvenyaya yechirongwa che Kariba REDD+ chirikuitwa munharaunda yenyu. Asi chekutanga regai nditange ndakuudzai zita rangu, kwandinobva, pamusoro pe Ankara Haci Bayram Veli yunivhesiti inove yunivhesiti iri kunyika inonzi Turkey kwandinodzidza ndozopedzisira nekutaura nemi maererano nezvechirongwa che Kariba REDD+.

1. Gender
 - Male
 - Female

2. Age
 - 20-39
 - 40-59
 - 60+

3. Occupation
 - Farmer
 - Public Employee
 - Entrepreneur
 - Safari tour Guide
 - Other

4. Level of Education
 - Primary level
 - Secondary
 - Tertiary

5. Leadership position.
 - Traditional leader
 - Community Development leader
 - Councillor
 - Current/former CAMPFIRE committee member
 - Other

6. Location/area of residence.
 - Ward 1
 - Ward 3



- Ward 11
- Ward 16

7. How much money are you able to save a month?

- Less than US\$1
- Between US\$2-US\$ 10
- Between US\$11- US\$30
- Between US\$31- US\$49
- US\$50+

8. Do you know any program that manages natural resources and pays the dividends back to your community?

- Yes
- No

9. If yes, which one of the following do you know?

- CAMPFIRE
- Kariba REDD+
- CAMPFIRE and Kariba REDD+
- Other

10. Who do you think owns the Kariba REDD project?

- Mbire Community
- Carbon Green Africa
- Mbire Rural District Council
- Kariba REDD+ Implementation Partners.
- Other

11. Do you have any idea if community members were involved in the development of the Kariba REDD project?

- Involved
- Somewhat involved
- Not involved

12. If yes, if you were to rate what number would you assign to their level of involvement? With one as 'Not Involved at all' and 5 as Very much involved.

- 1. 2 3 4 5

13. In your own opinion, did the Mbire community give Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) to the establishment of the Kariba REDD project?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

14. Would you say that community members are involved in making crucial decisions in the implementation of the Kariba REDD project?

- Involved
- Somewhat involved
- Not involved

15. Would you say decisions or views of community leaders are integrated/taken seriously in the implementation of the Kariba REDD project?

- Yes
- Somewhat
- No



16. Has anyone/stakeholder shared with you information on the mechanism for managing funds under the Kariba REDD project?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
17. Do you have any knowledge about the Kariba REDD project's benefit structure?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
18. Is the information regarding the Kariba REDD project's benefit structure readily accessible?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
19. Do you think there is a clear plan or consensus with regards to how the funds coming out of the Kariba REDD project are supposed to be used?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
20. Would you say that the communities are benefiting from the Kariba REDD project?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
21. In comparison to the CAMPFIRE project, would you say you are satisfied or content with the benefits coming out of the Kariba REDD project?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
22. If you were to rate what number would you allocate to the community's level of contentment or satisfaction with the Kariba REDD+ project? With one as 'Not at all' and 5 as 'Very much satisfied'.
1. 2 3 4 5
23. Would you say that the Kariba REDD project has changed the livelihood of local communities?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
24. Do you think the Kariba REDD+ project is managing to meet its goals?
- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
25. Which mechanisms do you think are effective in improving the Kariba REDD project?
- Improve community participation and consultation in REDD+ process by implementation stakeholders.
 - Increase awareness of the project at local level.
 - Establish local grievance handling mechanisms.
 - Others





CURRICULUM VITAE

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: Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University, 85. Cade Yucetepe, Cankaya,
Ankara, Turkey

Email Address: hamunakwadi@gmail.com derekwadi@yahoo.com

Nationality: Zimbabwean
Gender: Male
Date of Birth: 27 May 1991

Education

- Master of Arts Degree in International Public Administration. (Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University: 2017-2019)
- MSc Degree in Development Studies. (Women's University in Africa: 2014-2016)
- Bachelor of Science Honours Degree in Political Science. (University of Zimbabwe: 2010-2013)

Professional Qualifications

2016- National Strategy and Policy Making for Anti-Corruption Certificate: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

2015- Climate Governance Integrity Program Certificate: Transparency International Secretariat

2014- Executive Certificate in Program, Project Monitoring and Evaluation: University of Zimbabwe

Key Areas of Expertise

- Research, analysis and advocacy on corruption, justice, gender and women's rights, human rights, environmental and natural resources, legal, policy and institutional frameworks.
- Program, Project Monitoring and Evaluation.
- Project planning and implementation and management.
- Training and capacity building of Communities, Legislators, Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Government and Business actors on transparency and accountability, corruption risk assessment, governance and natural resources governance.
- Maintaining a strategic engagement regime with key constituencies, including government, private sector, media, academic community, political and human rights community, civil society, individual rights holders and communities.

Organizational and communication skills

- I am proactive, flexible and adaptive to any environment and a team player who can excel under competitive and high-pressure environment.
- Possess excellent analytical, oral and written skills that enable me to effectively communicate, network and engage strategic stakeholders.
- Able to analyse qualitative and quantitative data using statistical tools such as SPSS and Excel.
- Ability to design and implement research and advocacy projects.
- Wield substantial skills in strategic planning, implementation and evaluation strategies.
- Competent in crafting and analysing background papers such as concept notes and proposals

Professional Experience

Organization: Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z):

January 2014 to September 2016

Position: Research and Advocacy Officer- Anti-corruption and Governance

Duties:

- Conducted research on the State of Corruption in key sectors in Zimbabwe's political economy.
- Participated in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of projects.
- Participated in the development and production of key research reports, publications and proposals.
- Convened and facilitated project workshops, trainings, seminars and meetings.
- Produced policy notes, Info graphs and research materials.
- Engaged stakeholders and provided expert training to key actors in the anti-corruption value chain.
- Represented the organization at various policy platforms, dialogues and networking events.
- Provided expert support and training to project key stakeholders.

Summary of projects and studies.

- Participated in the capacity building exercises of state institutions on ethos of Transparency, Accountability and Integrity. They include the Parliament of Zimbabwe, the Anti-Corruption Commission, Local Governments among other institutions
- Participated in project planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.
- Conducted a study on Women, Land and Corruption in 2016.
- Participated in Annual State of Corruption Study Series (ASCRs) of 2015, 2016 and 2017. The ASCR study of 2015 focused on Corruption in State Owned Enterprises in Zimbabwe and the 2016 ASCR was on the Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe. The latest 2017 ASCR focused on conceptualizing corruption as a culture in Zimbabwe.

- Conducted community anti-corruption advocacy and education on health, education and local government sectors in Zimbabwe
- Co-authored a Climate Finance Governance Study on Reducing Emissions, Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) and Corruption in 2016
- Participated in the United Kingdom Transparency International (UK-TI) coordinated research study on military spending and budgeting in Zimbabwe in 2015.
- Wrote advocacy materials for use by TI Z Team leaders such as Policy and Community engagement handbooks on anti-corruption work.
- Wrote articles, policy briefs and newsletters responding to particular corruption issues that usually came out of community outreaches and research findings.
- Conducted a Land and Corruption in Zimbabwe Study in 2015
- Carried out National Corruption Barometer Series of 2014 and 2015 that focused on Daily Lives and Corruption in Zimbabwe and Young People and Corruption Experiences in Zimbabwe respectively.
- Formulated a Transparency International (TI) Strategic Regional Plan: Youth and Anti-Corruption Advocacy that was adopted by several TI African countries in 2014.
-

Organization: Amalgamated Student's Association of Zimbabwe (ASAZ): February 2011-December 2013

Position: National Secretary General-Voluntary

Duties:

- Student's day to day activity coordination
- Lobbied for students' rights and privileges
- Brought to fore issues affecting female students in tertiary institutions.
- Lobbied for basic general citizenry rights.
- Represented the students at national and international Platforms.
- Actively participated at the 2nd COPAC All Stakeholder Conference during the constitution making process in 2012.





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