



KADİR HAS UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

THE CASE OF BA'THIST IRAQ (1968-2003)

ŞÜKRIYE GÖKÇE GEZER

SUPERVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. AHMET SALİH BIÇAKCI

PHD THESIS

ISTANBUL, NOVEMBER, 2018

SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

THE CASE OF BA'THIST IRAQ (1968-2003)

ŞÜKRIYE GÖKÇE GEZER

SUPERVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. AHMET SALİH BIÇAKCI

PHD THESIS


Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the Discipline Area of International Relations under the Program of International Relations.

ISTANBUL, NOVEMBER, 2018

I, ŐUKRIYE GÖKÇE GEZER;

Hereby declare that this PhD Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources.

ŐUKRIYE GÖKÇE GEZER



NOVEMBER 2018

This thesis is supported by TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) 2211-E Direct National Doctorate Scholarship Programme.

Bu tez TÜBİTAK (Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu) 2211-E Doğrudan Yurt İçi Doktora Burs Programı tarafından desteklenmiştir.

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This work entitled **SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE OF BA'THIST IRAQ (1968-2003)** prepared by **ŞÜKRİYE GÖKÇE GEZER** has been judged to be successful at the defense exam held on **11 NOVEMBER 2018** and accepted by our jury as **PHD THESIS**.

Assoc. Prof., Ahmet Salih Bıçakcı (Advisor)

Kadir Has University

Asst. Prof., İbrahim Mazlum

Marmara University

Asst. Prof., Hamid Akın Ünver

Kadir Has University

Prof. Dr., Lerna K. Yanık

Kadir Has University

Asst. Prof., Aslı Çalkıvık

İstanbul Technical University

I certify that the above signatures belong to the faculty members named above.

SIGNATURE

Prof. Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe

Dean/GSSS

DATE OF APPROVAL: 11./11./18

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	VII
ÖZET	VIII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	IX
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE STATE, SOCIETY AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN IRAQ: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE	18
1.1 INTRODUCTION	18
1.2 STATE, SOCIETY AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE CLARIFICATION FOR STUDYING THE MIDDLE EAST AS A NON-WESTERN CASE	20
1.3 THE IDEA OF THE ‘MODERN’ STATE AND POST-COLONIAL ASSESSMENTS	22
1.3.1 Classical Approaches to State.....	22
1.3.2 Understanding State in the Post-Ottoman Middle East	29
1.4 SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND UNITY	38
1.4.1 Formation of Societies and the Role of Societal Groups.....	38
1.4.2 The Problem of the ‘Artificial’: Societies and Division in the Middle East	42
1.5 STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS	45
1.5.1 The State-Society Relations in the Middle East as a Non-Western Context	46
1.5.2 Models of State-Society Relations	54
CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIETY IN SECURITY STUDIES AND SOCIETAL SECURITY THEORY	58
2.1 THE AGENDA OF POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STUDIES	59
2.1.1 Debates on Defining Security	59
2.2 BROADENING/WIDENING AND DEEPENING IN SECURITY STUDIES.....	63
2.3 SOCIETAL SECURITY THEORY AND SECTORAL APPROACH TO SECURITY	66
2.3.1 Societal Security Theory and the Problem of Agency.....	66

2.3.2 A Critical Reassessment of Societal Security Approach	76
2.3.3 Security Sectors and Societal Security	77
CHAPTER THREE BEFORE BA'TH: BUILDING STATE AND SOCIETY AND THE ROOTS OF SOCIETAL INSECURITY IN IRAQ	86
3.1 THE MAKING OF IRAQ AND SOCIETAL SECURITY	86
3.2 LATE OTTOMAN RULE IN BAGHDAD, BASRA AND MOSUL (1840-1918)	89
3.2.1 State-Society Relations in Ottoman Iraq	90
3.2.2 Analysis of Societal Security Dynamics in Iraq (1830s-1918)	94
3.3 STATE AND SOCIETY IN BRITISH IRAQ AND THE MONARCHY (1920-1958)	104
3.3.1 State and Society Under British Mandate (1920-1932).....	105
3.3.2 Societal Security Problems in Mandate Iraq	110
3.3.3 Politics, Security and Society in Iraq after the Independence (1932-1958)	112
3.4 JULY 1958 REVOLUTION AND MILITARY RULE.....	122
3.4.1 1963 Coup and the Beginning of Ba'thist Era.....	127
CHAPTER FOUR DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BA'THIST IRAQ (1968 – 2003)	130
4.1 INTRODUCTION	130
4.2 POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BA'THIST IRAQ	133
4.2.1 Political Activism in Ba'thist Iraq and Political Actors	136
4.2.2 Political Threats to Societal Security under the Ba'th Party in Iraq.....	152
4.3 MILITARY THREATS TO SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BA'THIST IRAQ	153
4.3.1 Who Protects Who? – Militarism of the State vs. Militarization of Society	157
4.3.2 The Societal Repercussions of Military Coercion and Domestic Violence	160
4.4 RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS OF THE SOCIETAL SECURITY	163
4.4.1 The Status of Religious Communities in Ba'thist Iraq.....	165
4.4.2 Religious Threats to the Societal Security.....	167
4.5 CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY	172
4.5.1 Practices of Ba'thification in Cultural Domain	174

4.5.2 Arabization as a Form of Demographic and Cultural Domination.....	176
4.6 ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY	179
4.6.1 Economic Policy and Regional Underdevelopment	180
4.6.2 Societal Implications of Economic Sanctions after the Gulf War	183
CONCLUSIONS	188
REFERENCES	193
APPENDIX	216
ÖZGEÇMİŞ.....	219



ABSTRACT

GEZER, ŞÜKRİYE GÖKÇE. *SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE OF BA'THIST IRAQ (1968-2003)*, PHD THESIS, Istanbul, 2018.

This thesis explores two general research agenda in the field of Security Studies. First, the state-centrism and Euro-centric conceptualizations of Security Studies are problematized in the context of security analysis in the Middle East. Second, the potential explanatory power of societal security framework offered by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies is explored as a non-state-centered security analysis framework in the region, which can set an example for the study of security in other regions as well. With a theoretical twist, sectoral analysis is integrated to societal security framework and applied to the case of Ba'thist Iraq between the periods of 1968 and 2003 as a test case. From these two research agendas, this study has two general arguments. In terms of conceptualizations, it argues that theoretical approaches in the Middle East Security Studies fell short of providing a non-state centered explanation for the underlying societal dynamics of security issues. However, understanding the societal dynamics of security with reference to its actors, referent objects and threats is crucial for a comprehensive security analysis in the region. In terms of analytical approach, this thesis argues that societal security framework with a sectoral approach provides a well-focused explanation to the security dynamics in cases like Iraq. Accordingly, this study offers an alternative explanation for the security issues in Iraq as a non-Western case study from a society-centered perspective. The domestic security issues in Ba'thist Iraq are analyzed under five sectors of security relevant to the case study; political, military, religious, cultural and economic. Within these sectors, actors and referent objects of security is identified as well as the threats emanating from state-society relations.

Keywords: Societal Security, Copenhagen School, Security Sectors, Iraq, Ba'th Party in Iraq

ÖZET

GEZER, ŞÜKRIYE GÖKÇE. *ORTADOĞUDA TOPLUMSAL GÜVENLİK: BAAS DÖNEMİ IRAK ÖRNEĞİ (1968-2003)*, DOKTORA TEZİ, İstanbul, 2018.

Bu tezde Güvenlik Çalışmaları alanında iki genel araştırma konusu ele alınmaktadır. İlk olarak Güvenlik Çalışmalarının devlet merkezli ve Batı odaklı kavramları Batı dışındaki örnek olayların güvenlik analizi bağlamında sorunsallaştırılmaktadır. İkinci olarak da Kopenhag Okulunun öne sürdüğü toplumsal güvenlik kuramının Avrupa dışındaki örnek olayları bağlamında devlet dışı aktörleri merkezine alan güvenlik analizi konusundaki açıklayıcı potansiyeli değerlendirilmiştir. Kuramsal bir katkı olarak sektörel güvenlik analizi toplumsal güvenlik kuramına dahil edilmiş ve 1968-2003 yılları arasında Baas dönemi Irak örneğine uygulanmıştır. Bu iki araştırma alanı altında bu çalışma iki genel sav öne sürmektedir. Kavramsallaştırma bağlamında, Orta Doğu Güvenlik Çalışmalarının kuramsal yaklaşımları güvenlik sorunlarının altında yatan toplumsal dinamikleri açıklayan ve devlet dışı aktörleri konu alan kuramsal bir yaklaşım geliştiremediği öne sürülmektedir. Öte yandan, toplumsal güvenlik dinamiklerini ve güvenliğin toplumsal aktörlerini, referans nesnelere ve tehdit unsurlarını anlamak bölgede kapsamlı bir güvenlik analizi için önem teşkil etmektedir. Analitik bakış açısından ise sektörel bir yaklaşımla ele alınan toplumsal güvenlik kuramı Irak gibi örnek olaylardaki güvenlik dinamiklerini anlamak için güçlü bir teorik alt yapı sağlamaktadır. Bu argümanlar dahilinde bu çalışma Batı dışı bir örnek olay olarak Irak özelinde güvenlik sorunlarının analizi için toplum merkezli alternatif bir bakış açısı önermektedir. Baas dönemi Irak'taki yerel güvenlik sorunları örnek olayla bağlantılı olan beş farklı güvenlik sektörü bağlamında incelenmiştir. Bu sektörler politik, askeri, dini, kültürel ve ekonomik sektörler olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu sektörler, güvenlik aktörleri, referans nesnelere ve devlet-toplum ilişkisi yapısının bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan tehditleri bağlamında incelenmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Toplumsal Güvenlik, Kopenhag Okulu, Güvenlik Sektörleri, Irak, Irak Baas Partisi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I started my PhD, I would not think that my life would be this interesting if this is the correct word to describe. It is not a surprise that I have become very emotional about it. I had ups and downs, but I was always lucky that my path crossed with many great people that deserves acknowledgement. First and more than anyone, I owe a very big thanks to my advisor Assoc. Prof. A. Salih Bıçakcı. From day one, his continuous support and mentorship not only as my dissertation advisor but also as a mentor contributed so much to me as a person, to this study and to my life as an academic to be. Although I have pushed his nerves so many times, he did not give up on me, kept challenging and pushing me towards this end. It is always mind opening to learn from him. Thank you Salih Hocam, it is a privilege to be your student. I hope we will do many great works together. I also thank the members of my dissertation committee, Asst. Prof., İbrahim Mazlum, Asst. Prof., Hamid Akın Ünver, Prof. Dr., Lerna K. Yanık and Asst. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çalkıvık for being a part of this study with their valuable feedbacks and advices that helped me tremendously finish this process.

I feel extremely blessed to be a part of the Department of International Relations at Kadir Has University in my capacity as a student and as an assistant for six years. When I look back, I cannot think of a better place to do my PhD and I will always remember this. It has been a great opportunity to learn from them, to work with them. I cannot thank enough every member of the department for preparing me to my journey in academia. They always treated me as a part of a big family. I thank Dr. Cihan Dizdaroğlu, Prof. Kostas Ifantis, Soli Ozel, Prof. Mitat Çelikpala and Prof. Serhat Güvenç for their support. But most of all, I am grateful to Prof. Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe for her endless support and for pushing me further whenever I got stuck. She has given me so many great opportunities that I could not imagine. She has given me the chance to learn many academic skills and most importantly to build my confidence. Sinem Hocam you are my role model, my heroine! I cannot thank you enough. Moreover, throughout these years, I have the chance to know amazing people in this university, they always believed in me and sometimes put up with me! We laughed, we cried, we celebrated. And we will celebrate many more things together. Emre, Karel, Mehmet, Selin, Seren, Simla, Gül and Burcu thank you very

much for being by my side all the time.

I also would like to thank my new family since the last year, the members of Istanbul Bilgi University International Relations Department. Especially, my colleagues Sernaz, Ozan, Özlem, Tuğçe and Mustafa. Thank you for all the laughs and the pep talks, you are the reason that I kept functioning.

Of course, there are special people who have shared this long and hard journey with me. First, my husband Mehmet deserves a special thank for standing by my side through these years. We faced serious challenges in our lives, but we survived! He made me realize how important to have someone in my life whom I can trust even when I feel lost. I am really blessed with your love. I believe we will achieve great things together. And Rüya, you are the most amazing person that Kadir Has gave me. I do not know what I would do without you. I can write pages about how valuable you are to me but for now, girl thank you very much for being my sister from another mother! I also want to thank Beyza and Faruk who showed me that true friendship is beyond time and place.

Finally, I have the greatest thanks to my tiny little but growing Silman family who supported me endlessly in my life. My mother Seyhan, my sister Seniha, my brother Alican and my grandma Seniha, you are the reason for my being. I love you all so much! Melih and Bilge, thank you for being the joy of my life.

INTRODUCTION

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, 35 years of the Ba’th Party rule ended and Iraqi people in the streets were celebrating the day as the beginning of a new era in Iraq’s history. In July 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the Iraqi Governing Council. The 25 members of group were made up of 13 Shi’a, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Turkmen, and 1 Assyrian Christian. Later, the Interim Government was established in January 2004 by the UN Special Envoy, which marked beginning of rebuilding process in the post-invasion Iraq. This government was also envisioned to be a representative of the ethnic and religious diversity within the Iraqi society. A Sunni president, a Shi’a prime minister, a Kurd as the spokesperson of the Government and the primary posts of ministries were allocated among the various societal groups in Iraq.¹ The ethnic and religious composition of this new government received diverse reactions from the international community, some calling this a project of ‘neo-colonialism’ imposed by the US² while it was also claimed that the new state would be built on the promise of the acknowledgement of diversity in power sharing in post-Ba’thist Iraq as the U.S. president Bush declared.³

The limitations of power vested in the transitional state institutions and the legal framework of the new system was a product of the project of state building created by the

¹ For the full list of governmental posts see, Coalition Provision Authority Regulation No. 10, (CPA/REG/9 June 2004/10).

² “Iraq’s political system under fire” *BBC News*, April 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4359559.stm.

³ “We will persevere,” *The Guardian*, May 25, 2004, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/25/usa.iraq4>.

member countries of coalition forces. Two general themes dominated the process of reconstruction of Iraq: a quota system for the institutionalization process and a relentless de-Ba’thification of the public sphere.⁴ The ethnic and religious identity of the members of this government became the primary denominator rather than reinforcing the idea of citizenship. From this framework, the rise of identity politics became inevitable. At the time of writing, from the urban centers to the rural parts of the country, the combination of a long history of societal grievances and conflict along with the traumatic experiences of societal groups from ISIS to corruption or to economic crisis is still haunting Iraq after 15 years since the end of the Ba’th regime.⁵

The central strategy that shaped the post-invasion reconstruction Iraq was based on de-Ba’thification of Iraq and eradicating Saddam’s legacy in the hearts and minds of Iraqi people. This roadmap seemed to be the perfect formula as the remedy for decades long political and societal problems in Iraq.⁶ However, looking at the ongoing problems of power sharing in the Iraqi state and societal problems, the strategy for reconstructing Iraq from the ashes of Ba’th period became open to scrutiny. What went wrong in Iraq after 2003? Why has identity issues been persistent in the country even after the introduction of federalization in governance system? Why has unity through diversity never been achieved? These questions are still open to debate although serious academic investment has been done with no definitive answer. Because since 2003, the Iraqi society have been ‘fighting’ its way out of the societal disparities to reverse the historical path of conflicts that has prevented an environment for societal cohesion and peaceful relations among the parts. Identity politics is still at the heart of every political process within a system where disparities are yet to be solved. While pluralism was expected to be the new norm in the

⁴ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone* (NY: Vintage Books, 2007).

⁵ Miranda Sissons and Abdulrazzaq al-Saiedi, “Iraq’s de-Baathification still haunts the country,” *Al Jazeera*, March 12, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331055338463426.html>.

⁶ Coalition Provision Authority Regulation No.1 (CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01).

post-2003 period, communitization of Iraqi society thrived as the driving force of the societal dynamics, resulting in high levels of societal polarization.⁷

Under the light of these contextual problems yet to be answered, this research is an attempt to understand the dynamics of societal security in Ba’thist Iraq that shaped the country’s fate in post-2003 period significantly. Societal security theory is contextualized with reference to state-society relations in Iraq in order to identify the actors and referent objects of security. Sectoral approach to security is utilized in order to present a comprehensive assessment of threats to societal security and responses to these threats by societal actors. With this perspective, this research seeks to explore two overarching questions:

- 1) What are the dynamics of state-society relations in Iraq that sit beyond the existing theories on state-society relations? How these dynamics have transformed through different political transformations since the modern foundations of Iraq? What is the societal security agenda in this relationship?
- 2) What are the societal (in)securities that shaped identity politics and societal opposition in Iraq during Ba’thist period? How does the societal security dynamics in Ba’thist Iraq so deeply nested in the ‘collective memories’ of Iraqi society affected the societal dynamics in post-2003 period?

⁷ Communitization means the transfer of authority to societal communities. It has been portrayed as a positive transformation of governance with state delegating its role of policy making to community. However, in the Iraqi context, communitization became a tool of governance by the Coalition powers in negotiating the power sharing mechanisms in post-2003 period, which meant the integration of identity-based group leadership and tribal structures as the political partner for transition rather than trying to establish a cohesive holistic representation for the new order in the country. In the Iraqi case, such decentralization of governance had a negative impact on the Iraqi society and resulted in polarization as well asymmetrical power sharing. For a discussion on the potential problems of this approach in Iraq see, Arthur Quesnay, “Communitisation of Iraqi Society After 2003: Impacts on the political and institutional system?” *Institute for Research and Debate on Governance*, December, 2014, http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/docs/irg_-_gic_-_irak_communitisation_after_2003_en.pdf; Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2014, <https://carnegie-mec.org/publications/55372>.

In order to provide answers to these questions, this research follows two steps; it starts with a theoretical approach and followed by a case-oriented analysis. The theoretical part firstly explores the nature of state, society and state-society relations in Iraq with a critical reference to the existing literature on these concepts and is followed by a theoretical discussion on the constructivist turn in security studies. From this discussion, societal security theory is analyzed with reference to its role within the security studies literature. In the case-oriented part of the research, a sectoral approach to societal security is utilized in analyzing societal security dynamics in Ba’thist Iraq in order to examine perceived and actual threats to societal security from the perspective of each societal group in Iraqi society.

Why Ba’thist Iraq?

Iraqi society, today approximately 38 million, is ethnically and religiously diverse society with majority Shi’a Muslims, and Sunni Muslims, Kurds and Turkmen as the major religious and ethnic minority groups along with a higher number of diverse smaller groups.⁸ Historically, the societal divisions in Iraq is reflected in the geographical concentration of these groups in specific regions within the borders and this hardened the boundaries between the societal groups. The societal diversity in Iraq meets the historic geographical boundaries between these groups where majority Shi’a population located in South, while Kurds and Turkmen groups manly residing in the Northern part of the country. At the center, the capital of the country Baghdad is home for Sunni population though not majority along with the mix of other societal groups, making up a highly

⁸ Ethnologue database reports 16 different languages with multiple dialects spoken in Iraq; World Atlas reports 4 major ethnic groups in the country; in terms of religion, while the Iraqi constitution recognize 4 main religious beliefs, the religious diversity is much more with the addition of multiple denominations in each religion. For the full list of documented ethnicities, languages and denominations and the sources for these lists, see Appendix A.

heterogeneous demographic.⁹ These pseudo boundaries among societal groups are reflected in every aspect of political, economic, cultural and religious institutionalization of the societal values.

Since the independence of Iraq in 1932 after the First World War, the country's history is rather a history of competition for power among societal groups rather than harmony and unity. This competition has been the one of the root causes of political and structural instability that created multiple crises bringing the country to the edge of chaos. While the political instability that raveled for decades came to a halt with the rise of Ba'th party to power in 1968, Iraq drifted into 35 years long authoritarianism until the U.S. incursion in 2003. The reasons behind the perseverance of the conflictual nature of Iraqi society has been approached from various academic perspectives but this research that a societal security perspective is crucial in order to understand the reasons behind this persistence.

The 35 years of the Ba'th Party rule in Iraq deepened the societal tensions as a result of the discriminatory institutionalization of the Ba'thist image favoring the interests of particular societal group, Sunni Muslims and later more selectively, Sunni Muslims with certain tribal affiliations.¹⁰ The history of Iraq is largely represented by the political transformations from monarchy to republic and to one party period of Ba'th Party, while the voices of these distinct societal groups are analyzed through sectarianism and ethnic nationalism. While such narratives explored the underlying reasons of societal conflict, the societal security approach complemented by process-tracing and sectoral approach adopted in this research has not get attention of the studies and commentaries on Iraq. The following section lays out the conceptual and methodological framework of this research.

⁹ Sherko Kirmanj, *Identity and Nation in Iraq* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013), 5.

¹⁰ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, "Sunnis and Shi'is revisited; sectarianism and ethnicity in authoritarian Iraq," in *The Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani*, ed. John P. Spagnolo (Reading, Ithaca Press, 1992), 285.

Methodology of the research:

Societal security framework to comprehend the Ba’thist Iraq¹¹

Today it is a well-established claim in social sciences that state boundaries do not coincide with the societal one.¹² However, this simple idea has manifested itself through various forms specific to each country. The issue has been treated from the perspective of globalization, conflict and many other research areas that seeks to answer the problems of the contemporary world. One of the critical aspects of studying society should be the careful treatment of the concept of identity. There are many examples of scholarship on the Middle East that falls into the trap of reifying the identities in the region and make generalizations.¹³ Some of the most prevalent arguments made about the Middle East are the unstoppable foreign interventions in the region either physical or through political means, or culturalist perspectives that denies the possibilities of establishment of democratic norms in the countries which falls into the notorious category of social science scholarship labeled as ‘orientalism’.¹⁴ While it is not possible to make generalizations on this issue, there is a significant problem that prevails in the IR scholarship and Middle East as an area study in terms of the problem of contextual analysis.¹⁵ The sociological approach to issues at hand has not been a resourceful field on this matter. However,

¹¹ For a more extensive discussion on societal security theory see, Chapter 2.

¹² For a detailed discussion on the study of borders in social sciences see, Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár, “The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 167-195.

¹³ For a compact analysis of Orientalist discourse in the Middle East scholarship as well as Edward Said’s criticism see, Fred Halliday, “Orientalism and Its Critics,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 2 (1993): 145-163.

¹⁴ Samuel L. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* thesis or works of scholars such as Elie Kedouri and Bernard Lewis are well known examples for such perspectives. For a comparative account about perspectives on democracy in the Middle East see, Mehran Kamrava, “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective,” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 6 (2007): 189-213.

¹⁵ Raymond Hinnebusch, “Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East,” *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (2010): 201-216.

societal security offers a good framework for analyzing societal dynamics in cases like Ba’thist Iraq where security is a central element that shape the processes of identity construction and transformation as well as the nature of state-society relations.

Societal security is defined as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.”¹⁶ The agenda of societal (in)security is shaped through the possible and actual threats. While the absence of threat is the ideal state of security for societies, the ways societies cope with or respond to threats to their security in order to survive offer an interesting area of inquiry. As the characteristics or the underlying values or norms that construct *raison d’etre* of each society is unique to itself, the process that lead to societal insecurity and the society’s response to increase its security offers a contextual richness.

In this research, the process of (in)securitization of society through state-society relations and societal response to the threats in Ba’thist Iraq is analyzed from a societal perspective. The level of analysis in this inquiry is the society and relevant groups in society. The state is included in the analysis based on the argument that state in Ba’thist Iraq is a reflection of societal dynamics. Here society is taken as the referent object of security as proposed by Buzan and others, but also society is considered as the actor that provide security for its own in multiple scenarios. In order to establish a practical methodological framework, sectoral approach to security is applied to understand the dynamics of societal security. After the theoretical framework is established a test case will be used in order to prove its utility.

The societal security in Iraq during the Ba’th period (1968-2003) is chosen as the test case. There are two general reasons for this decision. First, the dynamics of Iraqi society is so complex that we can observe multi-layered insecurity patterns among the societal

¹⁶ Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993), 23.

groups in the country thus this makes it a curious case for exploring the dynamics of societal relations and the role of state within this complex web of social structure. Second, the political order that the Ba’th party in Iraq established over the course of more than three decades and its disastrous impacts on societal structure makes it a valid case to test the reliability of societal security theory in a non-western context. While the agenda of security studies field in the post-Cold War scholarship expanded beyond the state and military security concerns, the relationship between the society and security remains as an underexplored phenomenon in the field. Societal Security theory provides a good framework for how to approach this relationship. However, societal security theory does not provide a well-developed methodology to apply in cases where the relationship patterns are very complex and unstable. Before closing the introductory part, the methodology utilized in this study is introduced the next section in order to set the scene for theoretical and conceptual discussion in the following two chapters.

Using Process Tracing and Sectoral Analysis for Studying Societal Security in Ba’thist Iraq

The case analysis in this research is shaped around two methodological frameworks. The method of process tracing as a qualitative research methodology is utilized in order to shape the historical narrative of the processes that led to societal insecurity in the Ba’thist Iraq between the years of 1968 and the fall of the regime in 2003. Process tracing method provides a clear-cut definition of the causal mechanisms in between a social phenomenon that is considered as an outcome of single or multiple independent variables.¹⁷ These causal mechanisms enable a deeper understanding of the processes that lead to the outcome with detailed explanations.

¹⁷ Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013).

Sectoral security analysis is used in order to trace the (in)security problems in Ba’thist Iraq. Sectoral analysis also provides the analytical structure to identify the actor, referent objects and the agenda of societal security. The overall preliminary assumption presented in this research is that as a result of the continuous threats to societal identities through multiple forms and venues, societal (in)security becomes a constant force in determining the relationship among societal groups. In a hierarchical society as in Ba’thist Iraq, the capacity of one or multiple groups (based on the hierarchical position) to generate threat towards other groups defines the conditions of societal (in)security. Accordingly, sectoral analysis of security is utilized as the methodology for identifying the actors, referent objects and the agenda of societal security in Iraqi case by compartmentalizing the security issues in multiple areas where threat perception was present among Iraqis during this period.

Process Tracing and Historical Perspective: Contextualizing Societal Processes

George and Bennett defined that, the process-tracing is essentially “a method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”¹⁸ Process tracing is a frequently used tool in security studies both in qualitative and quantitative as well as mixed studies.¹⁹ Also, process-tracing is considered as an appropriate method for historical analysis for it requires a sense of historicizing by exploring the chain of causality between events and concepts.²⁰

In its basic formula the causality relationship between two social events is documented

¹⁸ Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 206.

¹⁹ For a survey of the method of process-tracing in security studies see, Nina Tannenwald “Process Tracing and Security Studies,” *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): 219-227.

²⁰ Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 76.

through tracing how one factor causes another. A typical formulation would be like “X causes Y” in a methodological language. The traditional approach to causal mechanisms in social sciences focuses on causes and outcomes as the variables for explaining the reasons behind a certain social phenomenon. The main idea behind applying process-tracing methodology in this study is to present the causal mechanisms that produce societal (in)security in the Iraqi case with a structured contextual analysis. However, it is crucial to stress at this point that my contextuality argument does not try to impose Middle East context as another type of creating an ‘other’. Just the opposite, the aim in this study is to offer an encompassing framework to open up security analysis to non-state perception of (in)securities.

Beach and Pedersen identifies three variants of process-tracing methodology based on the conditions that “whether they are theory-centric or case-centric designs, aim to test or build theorized causal mechanisms and their understanding of the generality of causal mechanisms.”²¹ A summary of the variants based on the purpose of using process-tracing is portrayed as the figure below:²²

²¹ Beach and Pedersen, *Process-Tracing*, 13.

²² *Ibid.*, 12.




Fig.1 Variants of process-tracing methods

The main difference between the theory-centric and case-centric uses of the methodology lies at the ontological perspectives adopted in the analysis. Theory-testing and theory-building process-tracing derives its motivation from the established hypotheses of a given theory to explain certain cases where mechanisms are not familiar to the author. Starting point for a case-centric exploration of causal mechanisms is the complexity of social phenomena that deserve a case specific understanding of what produce a certain outcome.²³ In this study, the state of societal (in)security is explored as the outcome and the sectoral analysis aims at tracing the causal mechanisms the produce (in)security for societal groups in question rather than a mere application of societal security theory in order to analyze the case in hand. This reversed perspective enables an assessment of the potential explanatory power of societal security theory in cases such as Ba’thist Iraq. After all case-centered explaining-outcome type of process-tracing “is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case-

²³ Ibid., 12-13.

specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question.”²⁴

From this methodological perspective, this study primarily tries to push the boundaries of security studies literature to develop more attention to the contextual dynamics of security. Especially in cases like Iraq, a societal perspective on security is not adaptable considering the established boundaries of the theory as utilized in the available case studies. On the other hand, the literature on the history of Iraq and its society has flourished especially in the post-2003 years and there are more available resources for a contextual analysis of societal dynamics. This was mainly because the academia became more interested in the way the occupation and the later developments in the country unfolded. Also, the availability of the country for more transparent observation due to the fall of the curtain that Saddam Hussein’s regime managed to keep over the country for so many years and of course both society and the state suffered the consequences of the power vacuum that is left after the fall of the totalitarian regime.

Sectoral Approach in Security Studies and Societal Security

The relationship between the state and the society is a complex web of institutions and networks from the individual to the highest authority in the state.²⁵ In between these two ends, there are multiple levels and means of interaction that constitute state-society relations. Security is one of the central elements for explaining the nature of this relationship. Especially in societies like Iraq where diversification is very high and the complexity of state-society relations is very high as well, specific areas of interaction should be identified and analyzed in order to present a comprehensive picture of the security dynamics within this relationship.

²⁴ Ibid., 19.

²⁵ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies, Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 28-30.

One of the major criticisms towards societal security approach is that the framework fails to approach from a deconstructionist sociological angle, thus fails to comprehend the construction of identities that are taken for granted based on the existing threats to the survival of these identities.²⁶ However, this research integrates the process of the evolution of societal identities to the study of societal security. Based on this concern over the multi-layered concerns of this topic, this research utilizes “a sectoral approach to security” in order to identify the most important areas of state-society relations in Ba’thist Iraq and the societal (in)securities that emerge out of this relationship.

Sectoral approach to security analysis is introduced first by Barry Buzan in his book *People, States and Fear* and later developed in his collaborative works with other scholars, which has resulted in the identification of sectoral approach with Copenhagen School of Security Studies.²⁷ In the first edition of the book, Buzan defined sectors as the types of threats to national security and introduced military, political, social and economic sectors without a clarified categorization. In the second edition of the book, Buzan put more emphasis to sectors and includes ecological sector by responding the developments in the subject of security.²⁸ However, sectoral approach is formulized in order to study the components of national security and Buzan limits his level of analysis only to the national level.

These works utilize the sectoral perspective in order to expand the idea of security not only in its political and military aspects, but also other areas where insecurities can emerge and become threats to national security. Later, with a constructivist twist from the original neo-realist security perspective, they introduced society as the referent object of security by itself opening way for analyzing societal security just as national security. In

²⁶ Bill McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996): 82.

²⁷ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 112-145.

this way, threats to society can be analyzed through other sectors where security of society or threat to society is defined observed in practice. Societal sector of security is developed by Ole Waever et al. in 1993 in a collaborative work on the changing security agenda in Europe. Waever et al. applied Buzan's sectoral approach in societal level of analysis and identified possible security sectors where threats to societal security emerges. While there was departure from Buzan's initial conceptualizations in the national security analysis, the agenda of societal security remained limited to Buzan's sectors.²⁹

These sectors are not completely exclusive from each other as Buzan argued that these "five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematic, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkage."³⁰ This interlinked nature of this conceptualization has implications on how states organize itself within these sectors and interact with society when we conceptualize this framework in the domestic level. From this perspective, these sectors are conceptualized in this research as the areas where states interact with the societies. Along this line, in this study, these sectors are utilized both for examining how state society-relations is established through these sectors as well as the sources of societal insecurities rooted in the formulation of relations through these sectors.

However, as the sectors proposed by these works mainly focus on the European security agenda, the sectors are revised related to the Iraqi case. Based on the preliminary research on societal security agenda in the Ba'thist Iraq, the following revisions have been made. Political sector is incorporated to the military sector because of the inseparable nature of state-military institutions in the authoritarian government structure of the Ba'thist Iraq. Than cultural, economic and religious threats to societal security are analyzed as the other sectors. As the threats to societal security emanates mostly from the nature of state-society

²⁹ Waever et al., *Identity*, especially 42-57.

³⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

relations in Ba’thist Iraq, the sectors are formulized in relation to the securitized issues of identity politics.³¹

While, the diversification of security issues is not a novel discussion in Security Studies literature, the sectoral approach structures the discussions from the diversity of security agenda into issue-oriented perspective.³² This allows a more comprehensive analysis of security, but the contextual revisions are needed as the agenda of societal security does not always follow the line of thought proposed in the literature. In this research, the sectoral approach provides a useful guideline for areas where state-society relation is constructed while at the same time political culture and societal identities are re-constructed around this relationship. However, with the purpose of offering a context sensitive discussion, the societal security sectors are revised and a new sector is introduced.

Organization of the Study

This research explores the central arguments presented in the research agenda in four chapters apart from the introduction and the concluding discussion. The first chapter following this introduction establishes the conceptual and theoretical framework of this study. It problematizes the conceptualizations of state, society and state-society relations in security studies by exploring the evolution of these concepts through an historical analysis. The main argument presented here is that the evolution of these concepts in security studies significantly lacks the contextual sensitivity that hinders the research universe of societal approaches in security studies. Therefore, the chapter introduces the state and society in its accepted forms in the literature through how European focused

³¹ The nature of threats, actors and referent objects of each sector is discussed in chapter 4.

³² Ole Waever, “Securitizing Sectors? A Reply to Eriksson,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 3 (1999): 335.

experiences of (in)security has shaped the prescriptions on security analysis in the field. The discussion on each concept is followed by a comparative evolution of these concepts in the Middle East. Through this comparison, the problems of applying the dominant definitions of state, society and state-society relations in Security Studies to the security issues in non-Western contexts are identified. In addition, security dynamics in the Middle East are redefined within the scope of this research by offering the conceptual clarifications on these concepts.

In the second chapter, the conceptualization of society as an actor and a referent object in security studies is discussed in line with the widening and deepening trends in security studies in the post-Cold War era. Then societal security theory is introduced as a society centered analytical framework and sector-based analytical methodology for the study of societal security is presented. This theoretical discussion will help us to relocate the society in the analytical frameworks of security studies. In general, the chapter outlines the theoretical and methodological framework that are used in the case study. Along with societal security theory, sectoral analysis approach through a case-oriented process-tracing method is introduced to set the analytical framework of this research.

In the following two chapters, the case of Iraq is discussed. First, the emergence of modern state and society as well as the construction of state-society relations in Iraq is explored in order to understand the societal security dynamics in the country before the rise of Ba'th Party to power until 1968. This background chapter assesses the societal security dynamics during the late Ottoman period, the British mandate, monarchical Iraq and the revolutionary Iraq, which ended in 1968 by the Ba'th Party. This part provides a background on the issue to allow the reader to follow the transformation of the societal security dynamics during the Ba'thist period. This historical part aims to present the continuities and transformations within the societal and security dynamics in Iraq that contributed to the rise of Ba'th Party and its evolution into a totalitarian regime.

In the last chapter, societal security in Ba’thist Iraq is analyzed through the sectoral approach to societal security dynamics as offered in this study. Political, military, religious, cultural and economic sectors of societal security are identified as the central focus of security dynamics in Iraq during the Ba’thist period until 2003. These sectors are analyzed through the main (in)security issues by identifying the actors, referent objects and threats for each sector. This analysis offers an encompassing look at how societal perceptions of security is shaped through Ba’thist practices that maximized insecurities. This chapter emphasizes the importance of societal perceptions of how state-society relation can reinforce insecurities in cases like Iraq.

Finally, the importance of historical perspective and process-oriented look on the evolution of state-society relations from a security-oriented analysis will be discussed in the conclusion part. The contribution of the theoretical framework of this study is elaborated and how this perspective can be utilized in the post-2003 Iraq is evaluated.

CHAPTER ONE

STATE, SOCIETY AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN IRAQ: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

“If the emergence of ‘identity politics’ in Europe was seen as a crisis of the nation state, in ‘our region’ -Middle East- it can only be seen as a consequence of the failure of nation-building to start with” Haider Saeed³³

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The analytical focus of this research is societal security. Societal groups defined as society in this theory are the central unit of analysis. One of the objectives of this research is to identify and analyze the possible reconceptualization of societal security theory based on the case of Ba’thist Iraq. This chapter discusses the concepts of state and society and the nature of state-society relations in order to present what the Iraqi case can offer as a *sui generis* case study to the existing literature on these concepts. The evolution of these concepts are unique experiences for each and every state and society in the world and subject to a historical process. The discussion here tries to contextualize the Iraqi experience based on comparative survey of how these concepts have evolved in the literature and based on which assumptions, and how we can situate the case of Iraq in

³³ Haider Saeed, “Identity Politics and the Nation State in a Non-Western World: A Theoretical Essay with Reference to the Case of Iraq,” *Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània Monographies 11: The Arab Transitions in a Changing World* (2016): 185.

these arguments.³⁴

A direct application of societal security framework to Iraqi case will have two problematic consequences. First, approaching the Iraqi case from the lenses of a European centered analysis of society, which feeds the underlying assumptions of societal security theory,³⁵ may lead to a misrepresentation of societal dynamics in Iraq. Second, such a misrepresentation will most likely result in the failure to understand the actors, threats and referent objects or in other words, targets of societal (in)security in Ba’thist Iraq. To rectify the problems of the societal security theory for understanding state-society relations in the Middle East, it requires comparative discussion on state and society with reference to the evolution of these concepts in Europe. The comparative perspective will identify the major differences between the concepts of state and society as presented in the literature on European and in Middle Eastern cases and will provide a basis for defining societal groups, their security and threat perception as well as the issues of societal security with regard to Iraq.

³⁴ My contextuality of the Middle East arguments especially in Security Studies in this study are largely inspired and benefit from Pinar Bilgin’s work on this subject. For some of the primary examples of Bilgin’s contributions on this subject see, Bilgin, *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective* (NY: Routledge, 2005); “The ‘Western-Centrism’ of Security Studies: ‘Blind Spot’ or Constitutive Practice?” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41:6 (2010): 615–622; “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2008): 5-23; “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” *International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2004): 17–33.

³⁵ A brief overview of the literature on societal security reveals the abundance of case studies conducted on societal security in Europe. On the other hand, there are only a few examples of the application of this theoretical framework to non-European case studies and the available ones lack a conceptual discussion on the central assumptions of the theory. For an exception of this argument see, Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is securitization theory useable outside Europe?” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007): 5-25; on Societal Security in Israel see, Ronnie Olesker, “Israel’s Societal Security Dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011): 382-401.

1.2 STATE, SOCIETY AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE CLARIFICATION FOR STUDYING THE MIDDLE EAST AS A NON-WESTERN CASE

State is an evolving concept in the literature since its first appearances in the antiquity in its most primary form. A historiography of state formation would include centuries of wars, peace, agreements that defined and redefined what state is and how it functions.³⁶ The varieties in the structure and the nature of states emerge from the richness of this historical experience unique to the formation of each state. Still, there is no consensus over the definition of state and this leaves state as an ambiguous entity and a living concept. Today, the bedrock of state system, United Nations does not provide any criteria for its main functioning basis or there are no criteria for not being able to become a part of it other than international recognition of a territorial entity with a governing body.³⁷ Rather than opening up this discussion with such an exhausting background and trying to capture all these unique experiences of state building and state formation, this study explores the dynamics of state as a modern reality, the modern state.

With reference to the historical discussions on the emergence of modern state, the discussion here aims to lay out characteristics that define the modern state as generally

³⁶ For an early historiography on state see, Franz Oppenheimer, *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically* (New York, Vanguard Press, 1926); and for a collection of more contemporary views on state from a sociological perspective see, George Steinmetz, *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn* (NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

³⁷ The United Nations Charter mentions statehood in Article 4 as “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other *peace-loving* states which *accept the obligations* contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations” (emphasis added). As Chen argues, the decision-makers have followed a number of criteria and have given a wide variety of meanings to the term based on the political context of membership applications. Primarily, “they have applied a traditional definition of states in international law which regards an entity as a state if it possesses (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states,” based on the definition of Montevideo Convention of 1933 that has transformed into the legal definitions of statehood in time. See Chen Frederick Tse-shyang. "The Meaning of States in the Membership Provisions of the United Nations Charter." *Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.* 12 (2001): 25-51 for a comprehensive survey of UN membership provisions based on the practices of decision-makers.

narrated in social sciences and also how these characteristics can be assessed through the Middle East experience within the rapid transition from the imperial rule to nation state.³⁸ This discussion is followed by an assessment of the similarities and the differences of the transition process in the Middle East to the European cases.³⁹ In this way, it will be possible to offer a better-grounded perspective about the state in the Middle East, and to reach a better understanding about the societies and the dynamics of state-society relations in the region. This discussion also contributes to clarify the theoretical framework of societal security in the region. After all, what state means and how it functions are two of the most crucial factors that determines how security and insecurity of society is defined along with the societal dynamics that determine the nature of state and its relation with its polity.⁴⁰ Because, the traditional role ascribed to states is to provide protection to its society within its boundary from external threats which defines an interdependent relationship between state and society, in other words reifying the role of states as the security provider and society as the legitimizing force for authority.⁴¹ Still, states can become the source of threat to society in cases where the interests of the states and societies are in conflict. In such cases, the interdependency between state and society is disrupted especially in the Middle East context where the boundaries between state and society is being contested continuously.

³⁸ Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (NY: Routledge, 1992) especially chapter 1, 5-22; Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57; Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³⁹ This comparison is not designed to stress the incompatibilities of the state in the Middle East but to emphasize the necessity of a context-sensitive assessment of state formation and state building processes in the region. Indeed, the author acknowledges that the roots of the problems in state-society relations is not limited to this problem but is a consequence of long term structural and ideological problems that has created a pattern distorted relationship between state and society.

⁴⁰ Barry Buzan refers to the centrality of state-society relations to the perceptions on security in his book, *People, States and Fear*, but from a national security-centered perspective, 21-35.

⁴¹ This perspective is reflected in the traditional understanding of state society relations and foundational assumptions on the role of state as the security provider. See, Thazha Varkey Paul, "States, Security Function, and the New Global Forces," in *The Nation-State in Question*, eds. T.V. Paul et al. (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 139-165.

1.3 THE IDEA OF THE ‘MODERN’ STATE AND POST-COLONIAL ASSESSMENTS

1.3.1 Classical Approaches to State

Scholars writing on the meanings of the modern state usually define states through “approaches” to modern states rather than giving precise definitions.⁴² These works have a variety of origin both in terms of their field (International Relations, Sociology, and Anthropology etc.) and in terms of their theoretical perspectives (realist, liberal, institutionalist, Marxist etc.). Taking diversity rather than unitary notion of society only as a source of legitimacy for state at its center, the sociological perspective adopted in this research mainly focus on the micro level interactions among social groups within the process of state building and a macro level that analyzes how societal dynamics function in relation with state-society relations and resulting security problems.

In this part, the idea of state is elaborated with reference to its conceptualization in dominant Western literature and marginal Middle Eastern one. Here, rather than addressing each state approach, it is more effective to lay out common references made to state in different perspectives that are relevant to a study of societal security framework. Therefore, the discussion below addresses central must-have features of states and its relation with societal dynamics through its institutional mechanisms.

In his seminal work, *the Modern State*, Christopher Pierson outlines nine features that are present in most comprehensive accounts on the modern state that can serve as reference point for evaluating “what should the state be and what should it do?” These features are; (1) (monopoly) control of the means of violence,

⁴² Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” *Comparative Politics* 16, no. 2 (Jan., 1984): 223-246.

- (2) territoriality,
- (3) sovereignty,
- (4) constitutionality,
- (5) impersonal power,
- (6) the public bureaucracy,
- (7) authority/legitimacy,
- (8) citizenship and
- (9) taxation.⁴³

As seen in these characteristics of modern states, it is an idea as much as a physical reality. Beside the necessity of a territorial foundation, each feature points to a different *function* of state performed via its institutions which are relevant to how societal identities are constructed and reproduced, while in many instances create insecurities both in state and societal levels. Therefore, it is possible to talk about state in its territorial as well as institutional and ideational basis which is more linked to its relations with the society.

Territorial, Institutional and Ideational Foundations of State

Territorial definition for a state refers to the basic reality of its presence: the recognized borders of the state as an entity, hence sovereignty. Territoriality in International Relations also assumes societies as fixed entities within the territorial boundaries of state thus making state a ‘container’ of society.⁴⁴ Weberian definition of states on the other hand emphasize the institutional basis of states by underlining governance. In this manner, states are defined as “the administrative apparatus where administration means the extraction of resources, control and coercion, and maintenance of political, legal and

⁴³ For a detailed discussion of each of these characteristics, see Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State*, 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 2004), 5-26.

⁴⁴ John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1994): 53-80.

normative order in society”.⁴⁵ States perform this function through governance mechanisms, which shapes its relations with society with its hierarchical structure that penetrates the society from different levels.

However, these definitions are not clear enough to answer how states emerge in certain forms depending on the difference of context. According to the liberal theory on state formation, state is a construction as the result of a simple barter between society and the ruling elite and it is a product of participatory system.⁴⁶ What makes up this ruling elite becomes the government that holds the control over state mechanisms that provide order in society based on the terms included in the agreement, in other words constitution and legal frameworks. To understand the principle functions and *raison d'état* of the states, one will focus on this legal framework and if there changes in it through time, when and why. The idea of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conceptualization of “Social Contract” provides a good starting point to lay out the foundational dynamics of state and society.⁴⁷ The initiation of such a construction start with a necessity for individuals to create a legal framework that regulate their relationship with other individuals in a specific territory. This territory is also a historical matter as Rousseau points out, the whole structure that define what state is determined by a territorial boundary and a societal one. The relation between this territorial reality that defines the physical existence of a state and the social reality that defines how state-society relation is established manifests itself along with the changes in both.⁴⁸ Therefore, as state boundary changes, its societal configuration transforms into a new structure.

⁴⁵ Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh, “Comparative Perspectives on the State,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 17 (1991): 524.

⁴⁶ Matthias Vom Hau, “State Theory: Four analytical Traditions” in *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State*, eds. Stephen Leibfried et al. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 133.

⁴⁷ Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The Social contract,” trans. by Jonathan Bennett (2010), <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>.

⁴⁸ John Agnew, “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking,” *Ethics & Global Politics* 1, no. 4 (2008): 181.

While the state can be defined as the overall structure that encompass state structure and society, the political structure that shape the states define the way that states exert its regulative and extractive functions. With its regulative role, governments draw the limits of state presence in social life under the legal framework that is created ideally with the consent of society. The dependence of the state on its internal and external security is an important concern in establishing its institutions.⁴⁹ If the rule of law is established and consolidation of state is achieved in relation to the society, the institutional apparatus of states adjust to a more amicable structure. However, if the instability persists states integrate more coercive roles to its regulative capacity.

How states behave on these two sides of the spectrum is of course a historical matter. As Bobbitt argues, the nation-state of our time is a continuation of a long history of state transformation first from a feudal princely state into kingly state, then into a territorial state, later into state-nation. Nation-states are the final product of this process that took more than 400 years of human history.⁵⁰ While this historical evolution transformed the elementary functions of states and the nature of state-society relations, the *raison d'état* also changed. This process witnessed the expansion of state in terms of territory, its societal boundary, and in terms of its functions, which reinforced the centrality of state both in domestic and international system. With wars and technological development, both expectations and requirements of the concept stretched either by governance or by the society. However, it is really critical to keep in mind that the application variation from location to location first depending on the dynamics of state formation (the type of government, the capacities of the state in terms of fiscal and legal terms and the structure of the society) and on later evolution of governance mechanisms and political culture, type of authority and legal framework that establish state's relation with society. The

⁴⁹ Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978): 9.

⁵⁰ Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War Peace and the Course of History* (Anchor Books: 2002), 344.

diversity of state formation is parallel to diversity of governance.⁵¹ Structures of state-society relations was a product of the variance in the unique combination of such dynamics.

One of the central aims of states is to establish and consolidate its regulative role over society in order to secure order in its territory.⁵² This social control is achieved through state's regulative power and this is ideally organized through the legal framework that is created through the social contract. The amount of power granted to state depends on the scale of extraction/distribution balance as population grants more power to states in return for security against growing threats. However, this conceptualization has changed over time. The notion of justice and the role of state as the provider of justice is as important as security. Indeed, the ability of states to provide justice to its citizens is a matter of identity security.⁵³ As the definition of threats expanded overtime, the necessity for a more powerful state increased resulting in the expansion of state domination. In its stretched definition, states are responsible for providing security against economic, social, territorial and other plurality of threats. This brings the question of the coherence of governance mechanisms and effectiveness of it.

The history of modern state in Europe is dated to the transition period from Empires whose territories reach beyond the continent to emergence of Kingdoms. After the fall of the Roman Empire, Kingdoms dominated Europe which consolidated allegiance of neighboring estates and this smaller units of rule laid the foundation of modern state system in Europe.⁵⁴ However, the regulative role of these kingdoms based on loose relation with society mostly based on shelter vs. protection. This in return required the

⁵¹ Mick Moore, "Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries," *International Political Science Review* 25, No. 3 (2004): 297-319

⁵² Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter D. Evans et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1985), 3-43.

⁵³ Nancy Fraser, "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics," in *Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn*, eds. Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer (CA: Sage, 1999), 25-52

⁵⁴ Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37-39.

consolidation of society within the boundaries of states. In its essence, this was creating a model of state that achieved the consolidation of religiously homogeneous groups under a state structure, which also defined the foundations of modern state.⁵⁵ Before the establishment of the Westphalian order, the functions of state and the use of power by the state is minimized because the terms of the original barter between individuals and states limited the role of the state. This process is often referred as the emergence of modern state. Still, some scholars argue that, the modern state as we understand today is a product of 19th century as they labeled the Westphalian state as the ‘absolutist state’.⁵⁶

This second perspective regards the Westphalian state as absolutist state rather than labeling a modern one because while Westphalia peace was crucial for the emergence of state based on territoriality, the inner dynamics of these states lacked necessary conditions for the establishment of state society relations in its modern sense.⁵⁷ The absolutist state is an early form of modern states with limited characteristics we seek in modern states; namely monopoly on the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, bureaucracy and taxation. While the Westphalian state showed a great amount of improvement in these functions, still each characteristic was in an early phase and not completed its evolution. None of these rules of existence were mature enough to perceive states in a bottom up understanding as the modern state presented a strong link with its people to consolidate all its functions, but the Westphalian state was conceptualized through its existence with regard to other states, paying less attention how state-society relations should be built. This contention is an important asset for us to conceptualize the Middle Eastern states to make judgement about whether or how far it is modern. Because this aspect of state conceptualizing is revealing about the nature of its society and state-society relation as

⁵⁵ Jason Farr, “Point: The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-State,” *International Social Science Review* 80, no. 3/4 (2005): 156-159

⁵⁶ Pierson, *The Modern State*, 35-40.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

well.

Apart from the physical and institutional base of the state, Barry Buzan adds the idea of the state to understand the ideational existence of states.⁵⁸ Regardless of its form of governance, states exist in interdependence with society. The key to survival for any state form, not only the government which adheres to a temporal ownership, is the acceptance from the society of the idea of the state, which is also called as legitimacy.⁵⁹ When society loses its ideological attachment to state as citizens the functioning and survival of state is not achievable. Therefore, the nature of state-society relation in a country is central for its ideational existence. Whether societies act in conformity or in reaction to the established rules of states *vis-à-vis* their societies is defined by the nature of this relationship and whether the state rule is consolidated or not.⁶⁰

Theories on the emergence of states are discussed because these theories point to historical processes that reach beyond geographical differences. However, the process of state-formation in the Middle East does not follow similar path with the Western examples partly as a result of the absence of consolidation over defined territory or on the composition of representational bodies of the state. Then, it is more convenient to stress the contextual differences of state formation with attention to specific form of state building mechanisms following the state formation.

The state formation and its consolidation in the Middle East was a different experience than what we observe in the West. First because what triggered these processes was the policy of Britain and France as an external actor with certain interests and agenda for the

⁵⁸ Buzan, *People States and Fear*, 39.

⁵⁹ For a philosophical discussion on state legitimacy and the conditions for a legitimate state see for example, James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd "Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance," *Regional Studies* 33, no. 7 (1999): 3-45.

⁶⁰ In *People, States and Fear*, Buzan offers four models for the structure of state-society relations. These are nation-state, state-nation, part-nation state and multination state. He argues that state-society relations are shaped based on which model a state adopts: 46-50. The relevance of these models is discussed *vis-a-vis* the Middle East experience in the next section.

future of their zones of influence in the region.⁶¹ The length of British and French rule in the region caused certain fallbacks in the process of consolidation.

Another difference that is stressed out in the literature was the artificiality of state building process after state formation to a certain extent and lack of legitimacy building in the post-war state formation period.⁶² This resulted in the lack of long process of consolidation of state system and state-society relations unlike how the same process happened in Europe in general. As Migdal stressed out, the long and problematic period of power transfer to indigenous populations in mandate countries resulted in the weakness of these states⁶³

1.3.2 Understanding State in the Post-Ottoman Middle East

If we take Pierson's eight characteristics for defining the modern state, we can partially date the emergence of modern state institutionalization in the Middle East to the *Tanzimat* reforms in the early 19th century by the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁴ During this period, institutional as well as the ideational foundations of the state transformed to a great extent with the introduction of economic, military, social and legal reforms.⁶⁵ While the early

⁶¹ Louise Fawcett, "States and sovereignty in the Middle East: myths and realities," *International Affairs* 93, no. 4 (2017): 789-807.

⁶² Fawcett warns us about giving too much importance to the artificiality argument. She argues that the complex dynamics of state formation in the region should not be overlooked by superimposing the artificiality argument as there are instances where national cohesion is achieved. However, her perspective is misleading as well. In making this argument, she refers to Fanar Haddad's account on sectarian roots of societal conflict in Iraq while Haddad himself acknowledges that cohesion in terms of sectarian identity was only possible when a certain level of banality of identity (referring to a state of normalization in intra-societal relations) is achieved. Still, the normalized relations among societal groups is a very rare phenomenon. For Fawcett's argument see, *Ibid.*: 797; for Haddad's take on the sectarianism in Iraq see, Fanar Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), especially Chapter 3.

⁶³ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.

⁶⁴ Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East* (NY: I.B. Tauris, 2011), see especially Chapter 2 for a discussion on the institutionalization of modern state mechanisms in Ottoman Iraq.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

modernization process focused on increasing state capacity and ability to rule, the notion of representative politics gained increasing importance in reform agenda that was materialized with constitutional reforms.⁶⁶ However, the structural change that enabled the formation of ‘nation-states’ in the Middle East was the post-war establishment of mandate system imposed by Britain and France as the victors of the First World War. A dominant alternative approach to state in the Middle East falls within the literature on the post-colonial state diverging from the idea of how modern state evolved in the West.

State formation in the Middle East and the Post-Colonial Argument

State formation process in Europe matured through decades of wars and reconstruction that enabled domestic elements in state formation to evolve and mature through consolidation of rule.⁶⁷ In the Middle East, the formation of nation-states was triggered with post-1918 transition from empire to state in the early 20th century within a very short period of time.⁶⁸ Also, this transition process was shaped under the provision of Britain and France with a very limited autonomous local and domestic forces necessary for consolidation of newly established states.⁶⁹ This contextual difference is very critical for comparing state formation in the West and in the Middle East. The contestation of state borders through regional crises in the Middle East is a recurrent phenomenon in the history of the region. There are different arguments on the credibility of nation-state

⁶⁶ For a discussion around representative politics in modernization in the Middle East under the Ottoman rule, see Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Cyril E. Black and L. Carl Brown, eds., *Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and Its Afro-Asian Successors* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992).

⁶⁷ Charles Tilly, “The Long Run of European State Formation,” in *Visions sur le développement des États européens*. Théories et historiographies de l’État moderne. Actes du colloque de Rome (18-31 March 1990).

⁶⁸ Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (Oct., 1987): 1-18

⁶⁹ Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in *The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 75.

borders in the Middle East.⁷⁰ The foundations of modern states in the Middle East is the main focus to understand the possible underlying reasons for this instability. The history of modern state formation in the region that materialized in the post-war transformations of political and societal structures has been considered as the reason for the contemporary regional problems and such narratives are popular in the presentations of current issues in the Middle East.⁷¹ While the link between the early experiences of state formation and societal transformation should not be ignored, we should be cautious about not to fall into a deterministic position.

The long period of Ottoman rule in the Middle East left its political and societal legacy in a number of significant ways. While the idea of state remained marginally dominating because of the dynamics of imperial rule over distant territories, emergence of elite class and transformation of societal structure was dominated by the competition for power over governing mechanisms.⁷² Two main structural changes were introduced in Ottoman Middle East along these lines during the 19th century and the early 20th century. First structural change was introduced by *Tanzimat* reforms which above anything was an attempt to centralize the governance in the Empire. One immediate result of this centralization was the extension of central bureaucracy and related to this governance. This resulted in introduction of modern state institutions through reforms especially in

⁷⁰ Scholars have approached the border issue in the Middle East from different perspectives. For a discussion based on the artificiality argument see for example, Kürşad Turan, "Sources of Conflict in the Middle East: Borders or Stratified Identities?" *The Journal of Defense Sciences* 16, no 1 (May 2017): 85-113; Fred Halliday, "The crisis of the Arab world," in *The Gulf War Reader*, eds. Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf (New York: Times Books, 1991), 395–401.

⁷¹ Similar perspectives have become frequent in media analyses of the subject matter with the increasing intensity of regional issues, for example see, Scott Anderson, "The Disintegration of the Iraqi State Has Its Roots in World War I," *Smithsonian.com*, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/disintegration-iraqi-state-has-its-roots-world-war-i-180951793/>, accessed on 21 March 2017; Tarek Osman, "Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WW1 still rock the Middle East," *BBC News*, December 14, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553>.

⁷² Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 42.

bureaucracy, military and education.⁷³ On the other hand, the old tradition of relation between the local notables and the center where the importance of local power mechanisms was sometimes more important than the interest of the Empire. The tribal and nomadic structure of Mesopotamian population was always a risk for the Ottoman rulers as the allegiance of these groups were not predictable and ungovernable. With the introduction of centralized governance, with structural reforms, the empire tried to change this relative independence with the appointment of powerful figures that would lead reforms in many areas such as land, military, education and infrastructure.⁷⁴

The fall of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War surfaced the already ongoing problems of authority in the Middle East. The reforms and increasing role of Ottoman bureaucrats in the region could not prevent the weakening of Ottoman rule and its ability to create sustainable relations with the local population. During the war, the easy access of the external powers, especially British empire, to the allegiance of regional leaders enabled the fragmentation of society against Ottomans. The spirit of independence from the Ottoman rule and the rise of Arab ethnonational ideology resulted in a large scale revolt against the Ottomans with the leadership of Hashemite family whose spiritual importance for Arabs and Muslims enabled them to appeal support from local populations.⁷⁵ However, the war did not bring the immediate creation of nation-states in the region. Instead, the long period of British and French rule dominated the post-imperial restructuring of the region into creation of the state-system.

The Mandates rule after the war created virtual states with the image of the colonial powers and under the influence of the dominant groups or elites representing the interest

⁷³ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908* (NY: Routledge, 2006).

⁷⁴ Çetinsaya emphasizes the need for changing power balance in favor of the governors appointed in the region by reducing the autonomy and independence of local notables such as tribal and religious leaders.

⁷⁵ Marion Boulby, "Extra-Regional Interests, Authoritarian Elites, and Dependent State Formation in the Arab World," in *State Formation and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa*, eds. Kenneth Christie and Mohammad Masad (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 37-58.

of them. These were not well developed modern states because of the lack of proper state-society relations and falls in the category of more an absolutist one. This was a natural result of the externally imposed not consolidated rules through the most developed parts of the post-Ottoman Arab region. Because of this, the absolutism of the new state under the name of the monarchy both in Iraq and Syria antagonized the claims of the local notables and the intellectuals where ideological awareness was increasing. But above these structural changes that eventually realized after the second world war was the idea of Arab unity that dominated how local powers imagined the region after the first world war.

A critical example of such imagination was apparent within the McMahon-Hussein correspondences where Hussein, Sharif of Mecca did not dream a fragmented Arab society as he pointed to Arab majority populations and he based his territorial demands on this claim.⁷⁶ Just the opposite his claims on the Arab land leaned towards a unified region under his rule. Still the ambiguity of borders among societies did not prevent division of the region into different states. But the imagination of Arab region as a whole became a recurrent theme in regional politics in the following decades after the foundation of territorial states.

The period of state formation in the Middle East after the First World War spans from 1932 with the independence of Kingdom of Iraq under King Faisal through 1970's with the consolidation of Yemen. The long-term dominance of external powers during these political processes, its accompanying societal transformations created a disrupted process of state formation without state consolidation or sustainable governance mechanisms.⁷⁷ The interests of the external powers were primarily of military and economic concern and the concentration of power in the hands of authoritarian leadership created deep

⁷⁶ Elie Kedouri, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914-1939*, 2nd Edition (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

⁷⁷ Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," :16.

legitimacy problems in the region. Instead, the state building period after the independence was dominated for a long time by the power competition among different elite groups and ideological movements without grassroots participation.⁷⁸ The impacts of this problematic state formation period have its roots in today's crises in the region.

Still, a historicized narration of the early phases of modern state system in the Middle East is necessary to understand the unique experience. A combination of the arguments of historicity and contextuality with a non-deterministic perspective can be found in the epistemological contributions of post-colonial literature. While post-colonialism emerged as a critical perspective on the determinism in International Relations scholarship, the contributions of studies under this field focused on the problematization of West-oriented production of knowledge and the claim on the universality of concepts.⁷⁹ With a new outlook for reading the history of the non-Western regions⁸⁰

Foreign occupation after the First World War did not automatically created colonization in the region. On the contrary there were only three major colonies in the region Aden (British), Libya (Italian) and Algeria (French). In the post-Ottoman territories of Iraq, Syria and the rest of zones of influence in the region, mandates were established by the British and French, which eventually turned into territorial states.⁸¹ The idea behind the establishments of mandates instead of colonies was that the design was to be temporary.

⁷⁸ Diane E. King, "Patriline and Modern States in the Middle East," in *State Formations: Global Histories and Cultures of Statehood*, eds. John L. Brooke et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 305–16.

⁷⁹ Sanjay Seth, "Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40, no.1 (2011): 167–183; Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading, Race, Gender and Class* (London: Routledge, 2002), 16.

⁸⁰ Op. cit., 168.

⁸¹ The concept of mandate emerged after the First World War by the allies in order to legitimize the British and French rule in the Middle East. However, the introduction of mandate rule was based on the Wilsonian idea of civilizational duty with a positive connotation rather than imperial practices of colonization. The term differed from colony as the mandate rule was designed to be temporary with the objective of granting independence to the newly established territorial entities under the supervision of the invading powers. See, Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, 6-7; and Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-45* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 44-45.

However, the structural framework imposed by the mandate rule defined the nature of the newly established nation-states. The British and French governments applied different governing methods in their mandates and this deeply affected the creation of domestic political rule in these states. The most important difference was that the British opted for indirect rule in Iraq and delegated the essential responsibilities of governance at the national level without sacrificing its controlling power over the societal actors while the French had to apply a form of direct rule in its mandates, which resulted in deeper penetration of Syrian institutions by the French political and cultural influence.⁸²

Based on the structures established on the terms of the mandates, state building in the Middle East, or more specifically, the post-Ottoman regions after the First World War was an exogenous process controlled by the occupying British and French administrations.⁸³ The images of newly constructed states reflected the strategies of control by these powers and failed to produce stable democratic governance mechanisms. From this perspective, the post-colonial experience and the birth of territorial states in the Middle East has a complex web of underlying causes that ties most countries in the region towards a revolutionary phase during the 19th and 20th century emerging from societal dynamics transformed into structural changes. Hanna Batatu sharply outlines this transition and its results in the Middle East from a sociological perspective:

“To this process, which is still at work, is related in one way or another a series of large facts: among others, the advance in the Arab world of the West's power and capital; the incipient imitation of modern techniques; the diffusion of elements of Western culture; the improvement of health standards and the swift rise in the rates of population growth; the British, French, and Italian

⁸² For a comparison between the British and the French mandates, see Peter Sluglett, “Les mandats/the mandates: Some reflections on the nature of the British presence in Iraq (1914–1932) and the French presence in Syria (1918–1946)” in *The British and French mandates in comparative perspective*, edited by Nadine Méouchy et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 103-128.

⁸³ Toby Dodge, “Iraq: the contradictions of exogenous state-building in historical perspective,” *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 187-200.

conquests; the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the severance of several of its Arab provinces from their natural trading regions; the settlement of French, Spanish, and Italian colons in Algeria, Morocco, and Libya, and of European and Oriental Jews in Palestine; the setting up of dependent monarchies, republics, and shaykhdoms with new standing armies and new administrative machines; the exploitation of the region's oil resources and the sudden explosion in the Arabian Peninsula of the "epidemic of oil money."⁸⁴

From the combination of these elements specific to the Middle East post-war restructuring process defined the type institutionalization of state and its respective societies. Still the main element missing in this design was the consolidation of these transformations among the 'citizens' of these newly formed states. The problems of nation building and societal cohesion dominated the early period of independence. In the Middle East, states emerged from similar needs as Europe but with *sui generis* characteristics. Imperial experiences from the legacy of Ottoman Empire in the region as a whole and following mandate rules by the British and French in the Fertile Crescent determined the course of state formation and creation of modern state mechanisms.⁸⁵ It should be reminded that the region remained as the periphery of the Ottoman Empire still with strategic trade routes and historical importance, and what shaped the transformation of governance structures and development was the decisions made by the *Sublime Porte*. Before the World War I, the region experienced the struggles of the central government both in terms of power politics at the center and the ideological clashes that expanded through the Empire. While the Empire created its ties with the local population through local notables, their socio-political status was dependent on who dominated the politics at the center.

⁸⁴ Hanna Batatu, "The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions: Some Observations on Their Underlying Causes and Social Character," *Center for Contemporary Arab Studies* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University, 1983).

⁸⁵ Ergun Özbudun, "The Ottoman Legacy and the Middle East State Tradition," in *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*. ed. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 133-157.

In the Middle East the process of state formation was a top-down process without the interdependent transformation of state and society. In Iraq, the constitutional monarchy that was established after the First World War was a British design rather than a domestic evolution.⁸⁶ Instead, the modernization in the Ottoman period was state-centered and the society only indirectly benefited from the implications of institutional reform.⁸⁷ Since the societal transformation were not initiated, the society had to adapt to the state reforms and benefited from it where accessible. This was a major problem that distorted the formation of legitimate and stable state institutions but there was no significant societal opposition to challenge this arbitrary process. The society itself was remote from the statehood in terms of participation to governance both because of the traditional role that the society played and because of class-based relationships rooted in the societal structure. Beyond that, the idea of nationhood let alone citizenship was not achieved which jeopardized the state-building mechanisms to a large extent. This is a major difference of state-building process in the Middle East and in Europe.⁸⁸ The role of societal integration and cohesion within these newly established systems determined whether legitimacy could be established or not.⁸⁹ This point is clarified in the following section from the perspective of evolution of society, the idea of nationhood and the limited understanding of citizenship.

⁸⁶ Boulby, 47.

⁸⁷ Mushin Al-Musawi, "Iraq: Cultural Dynamics Since the British Mandate," *Second Annual Wadie Jwaideh Memorial Lecture*, November 13, 2003, http://www.indiana.edu/~nelc/events/documents/Jwaideh/jwaideh_lecture_2003.pdf.

⁸⁸ Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 2nd Edition (UK: Manchester University Press, 2015), 67-68.

⁸⁹ Nicolas Lemay-He'bert, "Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no 1 (2009): 21-45.

1.4 SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND UNITY

1.4.1 Formation of Societies and the Role of Societal Groups

In its contemporary understanding, society has been defined as “any aggregate of individual human beings who interact in a systematic way, so as to determine criteria of membership,”⁹⁰ or as a term to describe “a level of organization of groups that is relatively self-contained.”⁹¹ In the European context, understanding of society evolved in parallel to our earlier discussion of the evolution of modern state. Society as used in this study includes different levels of relationship patterns from society within the boundaries of a state as a whole to particular identity groups within society, which can exceed beyond state borders. The acknowledgement of the existence of these different levels create the basis of a societal security understanding as well.

Diversity is the central element in defining societies. Still, in order to provide clear definitions and typologies for societies, social sciences have offered definitions based on their central concern over the dynamics of human collectivities. Anthropologists defined societies based on their modes of sustenance and categorized societies such as hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agricultural or industrial societies.⁹² Political scientists on the other hand categorized different types of societies based on the structures of groups within the society.⁹³ They start with smaller scale societies like bands, tribes, chiefdoms to the most extended form, nations. In this categorization, the organizing principle defines the scale

⁹⁰ “Society,” in *Palgrave MacMillan dictionary of political thought*, 3rd edition, ed. R. Scruton (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2007).

⁹¹ “Society,” in *Cambridge dictionary of sociology*, ed. B. S. Turner (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁹² Philippe Descola and Gísli Pálsson, *Nature and Society: Anthropological perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1996).

⁹³ Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4, (1982): 777-795.

and the extent of the bonds that create societies. From the sociological perspective, three main theoretical strands, namely symbolic interactionist, functionalist and conflict theory, explain the underlying forces that shape societies and the changes from different point of views.⁹⁴

Any discussion over what society is inevitably touches to the issue of identity. As the cluster of multiple identities make up society, it is important to understand how identities are constructed within societies and by which means. With regard to venues of identity construction, societal institutions are considered as the arena where identities emerge and constructed in time by responding general structural changes.⁹⁵ In a social environment, identities are constructed through social institutions that become a framework for the requirements to be identified with that identity.⁹⁶ The prominent social categories referred in this study include ethnic and religious identities, and the political identities that is shaped around these two identity traits. In the Iraqi case, these different identity categories overlap with each other and create a complex web of identity dynamics, which make it hard to distinguish the problems in it. This is because, collective identity construction is a process of prioritizing one identity from the multiple roles that the individuals play in their lives, one identity that satisfy the urge to be a part of the whole.⁹⁷ Still, to observe each social category is crucial to understand the societal dynamics and its security aspects, which constitute the case-specific part of this study.

Societies emerge and transform based on the changes occurring within the web of interactions among different groups in communication with the structural changes.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, 6th edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 22-26.

⁹⁵ Manuel Castell, *Power of Identity*, 2nd Edition (Singapore: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), 74.

⁹⁶ Seumas Miller, "Social Institutions," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/social-institutions/>.

⁹⁷ Castells ties this prioritization process to the construction of network societies where individuals attribute meanings to their identities within a collective form, *The Power of Identity*, 6-7.

⁹⁸ Gudmund Hernes, "Structural Change in Social Processes," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82, no. 3 (November, 1976): 513-547.

Thus, it is a continuous process as it is in the nature of these interactions. At the center of this process lies the global evolution of political systems and structural changes both geographical and political. With any major historical change on a global scale such as, industrialization, democratization and other changes, the essence of what hold societies together transforms. This result in the emergence of new forms of socialization and collective identity.⁹⁹ This adaptive form of social life enables the reproduction of societies through changes. This might be considered as an explanation to why so many societies (not only territorial, but also societies based on specific meanings such as ethnicity, religion and so on) have been able to survive in a drastically changing world. Today the concepts such as states and nation are challenged under the force of globalization argument, but societies persist regardless of the increasing ambiguity of boundaries.

The definitions of society as presented point to a commonality among individuals that makeup the society. This connection is not necessarily a physical one but the sense of being connected through a variety of social institutions such as culture, values, language, ethnicity and other similar ones is necessary. Many sociologists necessitate interaction among members in a society and language barrier and geographical disconnectedness would easily dismantle societies.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, in order to consider societies an constructed entities as proposed by the argument of imagined communities, we need to take objective characteristics such as language and geography into consideration.¹⁰¹ The use of a single official language in linguistically heterogeneous countries is a move towards assimilating groups with different languages into a unified system in public sphere to breakdown disconnectedness within nations. In many cases, linguistic nationalism is alive and create conflict of interest among different groups in a single

⁹⁹ Robert Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 3–28.

¹⁰⁰ David Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion Society and Difference in the West* (London: Routledge, 1996).

¹⁰¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition (London: Verso, 2006).

country.¹⁰² Therefore, at the national level, language can act as the most trivial characteristic that divide societies among states and within them. The basic tenets societal evolution has undergone particular ways up to their historical evolution. Societies in the West have sub-societies that live up to the boundaries emerging from cultural, religious, geographical and linguistic differences. However, to some extent societies in Europe has been affected by the similar historical milestones.

In terms of security, what is crucial for societies within societal security perspective is the survival of their identity based on the conditions that have been prioritized by its members. When defining existential threats to societies, we should address how threats are perceived and how societies react. This requires a contextual perspective towards threats to societal security as otherwise the discussion leads towards an existentialist attitude. This is considered as a serious problem because it enables the reification of identities according to which the societies are represented as fixed entities.¹⁰³ We can find the traces of such perspectives in the clash of civilization argument offered by Huntington and its current practices of populist politics on a global scale.

The representation of identity politics in the Middle East has been dominated by enforced dichotomies of good and evil because of generalized narratives on the lack of harmony among diverse societal groups in the region. However, the reproduction of such representations of societal conflicts based on the incompatibility for coexistence result in the reified definition of societal concerns and actions. We should acknowledge that the historical construction as well as contextual uniqueness of societal relationships and the

¹⁰² John E. Joseph, “‘The grammatical being called a nation’: history and the construction of political and linguistic nationalism,” in *Language and History: Integrationist Perspectives*, ed. Nigel Love (NY: Routledge, 2006), 120-141. For some examples of the impact of linguistic nationalist tendencies in different regions, see Clare Mar-Molinero “Linguistic nationalism and minority language groups in the ‘New’ Europe,” *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 15, no. 4 (1994): 319-328; Aneesh Aneesh, “Bloody Language: Clashes and Constructions of Linguistic Nationalism in India,” *Sociological Forum*, 25(2010): 86-109.

¹⁰³ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 73-78.

structural formations around them make identities are too fluid to generalize. In addition, what trigger the black and white imagination of Middle East societies are usually imposed categorization of societal dynamics that create distorted perspectives on the dynamics of identity politics. Some of these misrepresentations should be discussed in order to understand the societal dynamics that produce certain insecurities and relationship dynamics.

1.4.2 The Problem of the ‘Artificial’: Societies and Division in the Middle East

The evolution of society in the Middle East present a more different history which fails to fit into the above-mentioned stages of societal evolution. In the region, the societal transformation is late because of the late introduction of events that triggered transformation and it follows a different path.

Making an analysis confined to either of these perspectives would be misleading while studying the origins of modern society in different contexts. For example, if we take industrialization at the necessary condition for the emergence of modern societies, Middle Eastern societies would fall into pre-modern category which is all but correct. Neither industrialization is a mature process in the region nor do the agricultural societies have similar features those of the feudal Europe. However, simply excluding the Middle Eastern societies from this societal evolution would be misleading especially because other social transformations led to revolutionary societal dynamics in the region. Urbanization and intellectual movements are the main driving forces that transformed the societies in the region that laid the foundations of new imaginations of who these people are along with the political transformations mentioned earlier.

Each and every point made in these lines require a deep analysis and their unique experience in each country in the region that went through these changes, but for the

purpose of an introductory part it suffices to say that beyond the external penetrations and elite manipulation, what transformed the Middle East societies was a bottom up change that resulted in and accompanied by structural ones. As discussed before, the problem of artificiality should not be overstated; rather we should acknowledge that the exogenous nature of state formation process and the following phases of legitimacy building deeply affected the nature of society's attachment to the state, either ideologically or structurally from a citizenship perspective.¹⁰⁴

Among these changes, urbanization is an encompassing element that shifted societal dynamics towards a more diversified public sphere. This in turn challenged the power structure and role of elites as a result of multiplied actors began to expand their influence in societal institutions. To give an example, Hannah Batatu portrays the Iraqi society defined by diversity, not only in ethnic, linguistic and religious identities but also with their diversity in legal customs, and economic relations. The urban and rural difference drew boundaries within the Iraqi society as a whole while these boundaries were present among the communities who are themselves societies of Iraq.¹⁰⁵ The transformation from urban and rural under the Ottoman rule into the same difference after the establishment of Monarchy than nation state presents a very complex process for all parts of the society.

Like all social transformations, the legacy of the past practices was not completely abandoned, most significantly within class-based relations, indeed when the nation-state stepped in from above, this complex web of societal relations became even more complex. With the introduction of the image of a nation both identity and institutional wise, all these societal groups tried to reestablish their roles within this new framework. The transition from being the periphery of the empire into a nation state with centralized governance mechanisms, societal connections among groups had to be reformulated

¹⁰⁴ Dodge, "Iraq: the contradictions": especially 189-191.

¹⁰⁵ Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 18-19.

under new power structure of the society.

When we look at the social movements of the early 20th century Middle East, the idea of unity was sought in somewhere else than the state.¹⁰⁶ The main reason was that states were not a part of the imaginations of Arab people, rather societal identities defined the nature of the movements. Considering the heterogeneity of the societies in question, the stress on the ethnic and/or religious identities have become a recurrent theme.¹⁰⁷ The Arab nationalism that preceded the state formation in the post-World War I period that was led by Michel Aflaq, Sati al-Husri aimed at integration through linguistic-cultural bonds among the Arab people while Afghani's religious and moral based nationalism put religion as the integrating factor among societies of the region.¹⁰⁸ Arab nationalism imagined Arab society beyond territorial realities that surfaced in time with the penetrations from the post war settlement schemes in the region. The regional appeal of Arab nationalism as an alternative to the imagination of society under the Ottoman rule was a strong force in shaping the post-war identity construction in Iraq as well. On the other hand, the fact that the majority of people in Iraq (Kurds and Shi'a) did not find Arab nationalist sentiment appealing.¹⁰⁹

At the beginning, the reason behind the variant of Arab centered ideological integration projects was that the borders were already too blurred under Ottoman rule and in reality, boundaries among social groups were mostly solely linguistic (even dialectic) or geographical. For example, when trade routes advanced among the urban centers of the empire, rather cosmopolitan populations became dominating in these centers. People in such places adopted multiple languages and got accustomed to multiple cultures and

¹⁰⁶ Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 36.

¹⁰⁷ Quesnay, "Communitisation of Iraqi Society"; Amatzia Baram, "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 4 (October 1990): 425-48.

¹⁰⁸ Aviel Roshwald, "Nationalism in the Middle East, 1876-1945," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 220-241.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 214.

religious practices. State system in the region was felt to be redundant because of this interconnectedness among societies. Still, this is not to claim that the otherwise did not exist. Indeed, remote groups existed in different parts of the Empire, such as Kurds and Druze people. However, the domination of collective imagination of Arab identity was a result of the lack of intellectual awareness among other groups to challenge this uniform ideology.

Nevertheless, the dominant societal imagination in the region followed a Pan-Arab path with the transition from the Ottoman trans-societal identity to the regional Arab identity.¹¹⁰ The Post-War makeup of the region by the victors of the war fundamentally challenged the idea of Arab unity. Sykes-Picot agreement and the resulting demarcations of borders of a divided fertile crescent triggered new forms of identity building processes that radicalized Arab society and other societal groups in the region in time. Still, Arab nationalism was not supported by the larger society in Iraq because considering the non-Arab elements in society such as Kurds and Turkmens, but also the primacy of the religious identity rather than ethnic Arab identity among the Shi'a population. While the perception towards the Arab nationalist idea was as such from the societal side, the domination of Arab-nationalist sentiment among the powerful Sunni Arab population and their monopolization of power especially after the 1958 revolution led by the military resulted in the domination of Arab nationalist discourse in state institutions and the relation between state and society.

1.5 STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

The historical exploration of state-society relations is closely related to the emergence and early stages of European states and new perspectives has been developed with the

¹¹⁰ Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 104-105.

growing number of developing states.¹¹¹ In this research, state-society relations in Iraq as a non-Western case study is conceptualized based on the argument that state and society are parts of the myriad of institutional networks established from the state formation and state building process. Therefore, there is a departure from the hierarchical (Weberian) conceptualization of this relationship in this research. Instead, society is treated as an agent by itself separate from the state and does not necessarily evolves and transforms with reference to the state. This argument essentially resonates Joel Migdal's state-in-society approach, where he introduces the integrated evolution of states within the societal dynamics rather than as a separate entity.¹¹²

Giving the society a voice in the construction of the rules of interaction between state and society requires a clarification of how society as an agent shapes the boundaries of state and its capacity to rule. In parallel to the emphasis made on the process and social construction in this study, the contextual dynamics of state-society relations comprise a crucial element in the analysis of societal security. Under the light of the discussion on the formation of state and society in the Middle East in the previous sections, state-society relations in the region should be contextualized by addressing the unique elements that has been shaping the nature of the interaction between the states and societies in the region.

1.5.1 The State-Society Relations in the Middle East as a Non-Western Context

The cultural elements and introduction of the concepts has varying up to the geographies.

¹¹¹ For a review of traditional and new perspectives on state-society relations, see Jefferey M. Sellers, "State-Society Relations," in *The SAGE Handbook of Governance*, ed. Mark Bevir (London: Sage Publications, 2011), 124-141.

¹¹² Joel Migdal, *State-in-Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

There are certain patterns that distinguish state and society in Europe and in the Middle East because of different historical experiences through which states and societies emerge and evolve, the relation between state and society should be assessed from a contextualized and historicized perspective. In this part, the evolution of this relation in its generally observed current form is presented with this contextual perspective in mind. Then the institutions through which state and society interact is introduced for a guided analysis of this relation. This exercise aims to show that because of the differences in the nature of state-society relations in Europe and in the Middle East and as a result, the interests, security understanding and threat perception is largely different in each case. The following chapter on societal security elaborates more on this difference that require a reconceptualization of security understanding and societal security perspective.

Theory of Social Contract, the Liberal State and State-Society Relations

In its earliest forms of organization, traced back to the transition from hunter-gatherer social life into agrarian one with strong dependence on land, states were simply structured organizations managing collective affairs and the relations of security and resources. In addition, the link between state and society was not built around rights and duties but based on territory as the property of the ruler. The relationship of this era was built around the simple version of barter between state and society based on protection of land (and the subject who utilize it) in return for resource extracted from the land. What added up to this early form as a result of the evolution of social life with increasing number of collectivities and the changing nature of power over these collectivities and this make up the authority.

While the source of authority in the Medieval Europe was the land ownership, religion became the dominating source of legitimacy with the increasing influence of Church both as a unifying and diverging source of authority. The relation between the church and the state made confessional differences a matter of political identity as the competition

between religious and political authority resulted in long years of war in Europe. The emergence of modern state corresponds with the decline of exclusive religious source of authority with the Reformation movement of 16th century following centuries of wars fought for dominating the church and territory. Reformation was the initial step towards a new conception of what society is and how it interacts with the state because it was a significant move towards elevating ordinary people's role in creating imagined collective identities. At the same time, while Reformation did not result in sudden abandonment of divine rule idea, as the following centuries of wars in the name of religion somehow forced people to seek for other sources for *raison d'état*. This process was accompanied by increasing role of print capitalism and use of vernacular languages that enabled the rise of (linguistic) nationalisms deliberately used by rulers to incite secular sentimental attachment to their states.¹¹³ This period of structural revolutions reached its peak with the French Revolution (1789) following the century of Enlightenment, a period when ideas that empowered the individual *vis-à-vis* their rulers gained wide audiences. Social contract concept was one of such ideas, but the development of it to its modern European form came with the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century.

The Industrial Revolution marked the end of the agrarian society as the dominating form of social relationships and although took decades to affect, it was truly revolutionary in the way it fundamentally changed the interaction between European society and their states. With increasing number of large factories in urban centers created a swift and mass urbanization movement, the life in these urban centers completely changed how people identify themselves within their collectivity. The source of identity in rural life was the immediate environment but in urban centers, people defined themselves with large set of collectivities with different sources such as class. Also, higher levels of productivity led to a search for new sources of raw materials, new consumption patterns, and a revolution

¹¹³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 37-46.

in transportation that allowed raw materials and finished products to be moved quickly around the world. The creation of a wealthy industrial middle class and a huge industrial working class (or proletariat) substantially transformed traditional social relationships and nature of state-society relations.

The developmental benefits of industrial revolution and the growth of capitalist economy made states more dependent to society for the functioning of the economic and political systems. For example, the politics of welfare state emerged for the maintenance of large middle class in industrial urban centers where social inequalities also became an issue.¹¹⁴ States adopted the role of service provider from pensions to healthcare or provisions for maintaining minimum living conditions. So, the standards of political performance changed while society began to influence the state to a greater scale. The interaction between state and society evolved from a strictly hierarchical structure and became more diversified and pluralistic. This process has been a result of first growing population, which requires complex governing mechanisms and the rise of civil society.

Today, the majority of statements, reports, academic works in the West prioritizes economic development/growth, reducing unemployment and social inequality while discussing the problems of state-society relations. While the problems such as social polarization, discrimination has not been eradicated completely, individual and citizenship rights are taken for granted and they are not discussed as a part of fundamental issues of state-society relations. This fact has transformed the nature of social contract between state and society in the West. Human rights are considered as inalienable rights for individuals and states are expected to respect and protect these rights. On the other hand, such perspectives are reflected also in the study of state-society relations in other parts of the world and it results in the ignorance of more acute problems in the way state

¹¹⁴ Matthias Vom Hau, "State Theory", 140-41.

and society interacts with each other. The Middle East has not been an exception to this line of thinking. While, the above-mentioned issues are central problems in the region, the solutions to them as proposed by Western perspectives does not match the realities of Middle East societies as the fundamentals of state-society relations is very different than that of the West. Therefore, a more case-oriented approach should be taken when discussing the state-society relations in the Middle East.

The State-Society Relations in the Middle East

The discussion on state-society relations in the West is relevant for this study in two aspects. First, the Western conceptualization of state-society is important to understand why and how post-World War I Middle East is imagined by Western powers under which conditions. State formation, state building, construction of societies are very late phenomena in the Middle East happening in the first half of the 20th century. In most cases, especially in the post-Ottoman territories in the region, societies that represent collective identities and national boundaries did not exist. While the region witnessed a transition, which initiated with state formation establishing physical boundaries thoroughly, state building that was to establish sustainable relations with the society did not exist or it was partly fulfilled the European model of state and state-society relations. On the other hand, the mandate experience became a process where the external powers exert their imagination of state and society while ensuring the utilization of local resources to its maximum potential. As the state formation and state building in the region went hand in hand with the dynamics of colonial politics, the influence of external powers on the characteristics of these structures was prevalent in the early decades of these states.

This political problem was also accompanied by the lack of understanding the societal dynamics in the region, which resulted in problematic demarcation of territorial boundaries in the region. The recent border challenges with the increasing influence of the transnational terrorism sparked a renewed discussion over the legitimacy of the

borders that divided not only the states but also the inhabitants. Rather, the institutionalization of the mandate rule addressed the possible scenarios where societal problems might surface. For example, French tried to apply a divide and rule policy for the population in the mandate Syria by creating small 'states' of ethnic and religious groups.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, the British in Iraq installed monarchical rule where Faisal tried to create a uniform Iraqi identity out of diversity.¹¹⁶ The imposed nature of these strategic moves towards societal engineering influenced Why there was such a big disparity between European and Middle Eastern experiences of the evolution of state society relations requires a glance to how evolution of this relation as narrated above in the European case was experienced in the Middle East.

The historiography of society in the Middle East is dominated by the Ottoman period whose rule lasted for more than five centuries in the Fertile Crescent until its dissolution with the First World War. The societal fabric in the region was defined by multiculturalism with the religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity. In terms of habitation, sedentism and nomadism went hand in hand while the rise of urban centers like Baghdad escalated the growth of internal migration to such centers and gradually eroded nomadic groups though they did not completely vanish.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, the persistence of traditional identities and communities along with the fragmented nature of the society halted the creation of a collective identity among Iraqis. Especially this was true with the persistence of tribalism, which provided tribes and tribal confederations a highly localized power mechanisms and collective consciousness. The identity differences among tribal groups and the concentration of different groups in specific locations reinforced the sense

¹¹⁵ Daniel Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 30-31.

¹¹⁶ Kirmanj, *Identity and Nation in Iraq*, especially Chapter 3 where he explores Faisal's vision of Iraqi identity.

¹¹⁷ Hosham Dawood, "The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: the Case of Iraq," in *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, ed. Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood (London: Saqi Books, 2003), 113-114.

of societal fragmentation as these newly established states inherited the already fragmented structure of the Ottoman Empire. An important exception to this was observed in the centers such as Baghdad or Damascus where central bureaucracy attracted different groups in urban centers. Still, these cities formed into smaller projections of larger societal structures as concentration of specific groups in different parts of the cities presented.

The absence of mass mobilizing movements as in Europe resulted in the persistence of traditional societal structures. While, ideological and religious movements contested the unifying political role of the church in Europe and resulted in the revolutionary movements that triggered nation-state formations, in the Middle East the power of the Empire was not contested neither ideologically nor politically. Of course, the challenges to the Ottoman rule was present but there were no collective movements that would bring political change. On the other hand, the formation of new economic models and modes of production that would result in the creation of more homogenous economic classes beyond the fragments of ethnic and religious diversity was absent in the Middle East.¹¹⁸ Societal change was mainly limited to political reforms and revolved around the urban elite. The state structures were highly decentralized and powerful social groups in this region acted as the extensions of the central rule. As the societal fabric was highly fragmented, the control of these lands relied on the effectiveness of these local forces. The religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity in Mesopotamia persisted and when the Ottoman Empire introduced political and military modernization, the moves were towards centralization of governance system for better control of these territories by the Ottoman state.

The societal patterns in the region during the aforementioned period did not overlap

¹¹⁸ Dina R. Khoury, "Political Relations Between City and State in the Middle East, 1700–1850," in *The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950*, ed. Peter Sluglett (NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 67-103.

today's societal dynamics within the nation-state structure. While the existence trans-border communities and the overarching Arab identity is still present. A clear example of this can be seen in long-term ethnic and religious conflicts in the region that span across borders. During the Ottoman rule, the municipal borders were only functional demarcations for practical reasons and mainly based on geographical characteristics of the region in order to establish operable governance mechanisms, but more or less matched the concentration of large identity groups. For example, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were separated under the *wilayah* system during the Ottoman rule which consisted majority Kurds, Sunnis and Shi'is respectively.¹¹⁹

When the new states were carved from the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East, state building and state formation processes had significant contradictory components. British and French authorities created these states based on their mutual agreements on the zone of influence to be established in the region and based on bargains with the not-so-local groups (considering that Hashemites were the primary ally for them during these processes) which ultimately resulted in legitimacy crises from the beginning.¹²⁰ These new states were ignorant the concerns and demands of various societal groups, also the newly established structures were exclusive by nature because of the absence of any consolidation and legitimacy mechanisms.

Therefore, the post-independence state formation and construction of state-society relations in the Middle East countries were exclusive to a great extent, only involved the bureaucratic elements remaining from the Ottoman rule.¹²¹ Which resulted in the failure of creating democratic mechanisms that would foster the emergence of civil society. The imagined communities of the Middle East were artificial by creation, which to a certain extent can be observed in any nation-state regardless of any part of the world, but the

¹¹⁹ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908* (NY: Routledge, 2006).

¹²⁰ Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (CO: Westview Press, 2012).

¹²¹ Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq*, 80.

absence of long-term consolidation or legitimization resulted in the persistence of fragmented society and political power became the byproduct of societal competition for power.

1.5.2 Models of State-Society Relations

From this complex account of state-society relations in different political cultures, we need to draw some patterns for creating an analytical tool. The establishment of state-society relations has its foundations in the structural conditions within which state and society is constructed, and the resulting type of governance model that create the boundary between the state and society. In each construct, the resulting equation denotes a role for state and society that would shape the nature of this relation. As a result, the extent to which society controls that state or vice versa is defined and sustained as the political structure. While state and society as concepts have been subjected to long debates over their fluidity and ambiguity, certain patterns of relationship between the two can be extracted from these discussions. This overall helps to explain the core dynamics of state-society relations in different cases.

Among others, two scholars influenced my thinking on state-society relations because of their comparative modeling of state-society relations and their insights on the implications of this relationship on security understanding. Barry Buzan uses the minimal-maximum state spectrum emphasizing the security concerns of the state on the national level.¹²² This perspective can be related to Joel Migdal's conceptualization of weak and strong states.¹²³ However, these two arguments bear essential differences as well. While both conceptualizations are state-centered perspectives and its relative position *vis-à-vis* society, the implications of these arguments on how society is

¹²² Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 21-24

¹²³ Migdal, *Strong Societies, Weak States*, 24-33.

constructed and transform is profound. In this part, these concepts are discussed to draw a portrait of state-society relations in the Middle East by comparing it to the European understanding.

Talking about the transition from the state of nature where individuals are not bound to any rules into state-society structure, achieving security is the primary concern for individuals and it is achieved only by sacrificing their freedom to an 'acceptable' level. This is the foundational principle in creation of the bilateral relation between state and society although what is considered as 'acceptable' is a very ambiguous term, but a good start. The extent to which freedoms are sacrificed is initially a calculated reality depending on the levels of threats that society wants to be secured from. While this also defines the primary function of states, the nature of threats is very relevant for the evolution of the relationship between the two.

From a security centered and state-oriented perspective, Barry Buzan distinguishes two models for state society relations; minimal and the maximal state. Minimal conception of state represents the view that state is dependent on the society from which it seeks consent for its action and remains marginal in terms of its powers towards its citizens. This perspective draws closer to a Lockean understanding of state-society relations where state is not bigger than the sum of its parts and should be responsive to the demands of society. In terms of security, individual or societal security is largely prioritized in conceptualizations of national and international security.

At the other end of the spectrum, maximal state is a separate force that governs through its own interest other than that of society. The boundary between the state and the society is not clear due to high penetration of state mechanisms in people's lives. The fact that state has its own interest, not necessarily in line with societal or individual interests, results in the lack of communication between individual and societal demands which is subordinated under the state agenda. Buzan claims that in this model national security is

prioritized over the lower levels as state interests are highly attached to regional or international security environment. As such states give minimal concern to societal demands and minimize the risk of internal conflict with expanded presence of its control mechanisms, its relation with society is based on obedience rather legitimacy.

Still, Buzan acknowledges the expansionist nature of state even in its minimal form because as soon as an external crisis appears to threaten the position of state in the international arena, states take internal precautions in order to minimize the spillover effect of such crises. Therefore, while this conceptualization of state society relations provides an analytical tool for understanding how states can act upon the argument of 'doing the right thing for the common good'. In cases where states have the ultimate power to define and act upon a common good are the maximal type, while it is expected in a minimal state situation that the common good is a part of the social contract between state and society. However, even in its minimal form it is quite possible that states create their own agenda especially when it comes to regional and international issues.

State in this formulation does not have a uniform structure just as society. Buzan elaborates that state is a combination of its physical (territorial and institutional) and abstract base (the idea of state), its relation to society is not limited to its actions, rather its correspondence with society's mind is a central part of its *raison d'état*. This argument leads us to consider how state and society is constructed with relation to each other. While the most accepted state form today is nation-states, the term state-nation is used by many scholars to explain the cases where state precedes the idea of nation as can be seen in many post-colonial states of 20th century.

We also need to acknowledge that threat is mostly not one sided. Looking at the cases of political instability, internal conflict or civil war, the reasons and implications of any such event to higher levels of security (regional and/or international) or lower (individual) is obvious. Still, in cases where domestic security problems become threatening for the

survival of the whole society or at least a specific part of it, the patterns of state behavior materialized through state institutions is very much telling about the routes of conflict.

Under the lights of the discussion over the nature of state, society and state-society relations, it is clear that the contextuality of how these concepts are constructed is of primary importance. The society and the state are constructions from the combination of the conditions that enable the establishment of these entities. While in some cases societies create states in others the states try to draw the boundaries of their societies and define the laws and regulations that shape their relationship with society as well as ascribing an identity based on the idea of loyalty and patriotism. In the Middle East, most notably the post-colonial lands of the Mesopotamia, state formation in the post-Ottoman territories follow the second pattern.

The population in Iraq before the foundation of Iraqi state under the British protectorate was not a unified entity but rather a mosaic of fragmented parts that comprised of distinct ethnic, religious and linguistic social groups. The boundaries of the new state were drawn because of a post-war agreement, which was based upon the Sykes-Picot plan. With the foundation of state and its institutions after the war the construction of Iraqi nation was a part of state-building project. While the monarchical rule tried to acknowledge the diversity within the Iraqi society, the public perception that the state was ruled by an external power distorted the process of consolidation of power.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIETY IN SECURITY STUDIES AND SOCIETAL SECURITY THEORY

A historiography on the evolution of security studies as an academic field and a complete mapping of the debates around the most important question of the field ‘what is security?’ is beyond the scope of this study. It requires a glance back to the early years of the Cold War and its hand in hand evolution with strategic studies. A significant number of prominent scholars have provided such analyses of the field over the last decades.¹²⁴ However, as this study is primarily based on rethinking the concepts of the field, it is necessary to briefly talk about the academic developments that have enabled bringing society to the center in studying security. This process is a part of a trend in the field that has been labeled as broadening and widening of security studies with the changing agenda of security studies in the post-Cold War era and this chapter begins with a discussion around this development. After that, societal security concept and sectoral approach to security analysis is introduced. The actors, referent objects of societal security are defined and the threats to societal security are identified through the sector-based analysis. The theoretical discussion will continue on which implications from this process of widening

¹²⁴ For some of the extended discussions on the evolution of security studies from different perspectives see; Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, no 2 (1991): 211–239; Michael C. Williams, “The Public, the Private and the Evolution of Security Studies,” *Security Dialogue*, 41 no. 6 (2010): 623-630; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40, no. 2 (1996): 229–254.

and broadening we can trace in studies on Middle East security.

The main purpose in this part is to outline how the literature on security studies have evolved beyond the traditional definitions of security and traditional perspectives on the centrality of Western knowledge production. The debates on the applicability of theories defined within the frame of European experience is ongoing but it is an undeniable fact that the globalization has had a huge impact on knowledge production and sharing knowledge across the world that there is a growing global perspective in academia. Still, when it comes to the issue of security the problems addressed here goes beyond the geospatial realities of the field. It has also political implications. Producing knowledge in security studies is a highly interactive issue with its close relation to policy making.

Here, the discussion on defining security serves two purposes: First, to address the non-state actors in defining what is secure and what is threat as perceived. Second, identifying the actors who provide security under what material and ideological conditions. Both aspects will turn back to the general discussion detailed throughout this study which is how to integrate a non-state centric, non-statist and sociologically driven understanding of security both in defining what is security and who provides security. Furthermore, a perspective on non-Western conceptualization of security will be discussed with reference to the development of security problems in the Middle East and the study of it.

2.1 THE AGENDA OF POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STUDIES

2.1.1 Debates on Defining Security

Different schools of international relations theory conceptualize security in different ways based on the worldview they present. Realists see security as a derivative of power, more power more security. Idealists see security as a consequence of peace. Buzan argues for

a concept of security that would lie between the extremes of power and peace.¹²⁵ And between these extremes, states tend to lean towards acquiring more power for security because of the fact that they have the resource to do so. On the other hand, other actors (mostly the ones who do not have the resource to accumulate power) tend to emphasize the absence of threat to survive peacefully. Between these two extremes, security is defined either as being powerful enough to survive against threats or eliminating the sources of threats in order to live in peace.

Within the academic discussions on security, “what is security?” is the most challenging question we face when trying to identify the determinants of a situation that we observe as having a security aspect in it. There are certain elements in security situations that link that situation to a security perspective drawing from which actors are involved. The questions that Baldwin poses act as identifiers for such cases.¹²⁶ The question of ‘security for whom?’ helps us to identify the actor who is threatened and needs to be protected. In one sense this points to the classical definition of security; existing without the influence of any threat. Studies on the referent object of security expanded much from the classical security frameworks that centers its analysis on state level and national security. Today the referent object of security includes not only state and international level units but sub-national units spanning from societies, human collectivities and individuals. This diversification did not change the basic questions that Baldwin asked because they serve to define the elements of a security issue. However, there is a major gap in his article (and in security studies generally) as he does not address the question of ‘security *by* whom?’ The actors of security, or in other words the provider of security has to be questioned in order to emancipate security from state centric perspectives.

Along with the discussions on the eradication of state as the sole referent object of

¹²⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2.

¹²⁶ David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January, 1997): 5-26.

security, its central role as the security provider has been scrutinized as a result of the rise of non-state and sub-state actors as providers of security. At the same time, according to Spitzer, “there is a current shift towards the commoditization and privatization of security, which coincides with a loss of state control over the provision of protection.”¹²⁷ Still, who is the provider of security depends on the security issue at a specific context and how actors achieve the role of provider. On the one hand, Powell argues that “decisions about who should protect, facilitate and provide are made on a policy level, and informed by political theory. This is determined by one’s theory of rights, not the concept of security.”¹²⁸ On the other hand, in many conflict situations especially in non-Western contexts, security actors emerge out of need and opportunities, not by legal empowerment.

The broadening and widening of security studies emerged as a movement in late 1980’s to expand the scope of security analysis, but the security provider remained as the state in most of these new directions. For example, even critical security studies managed to address this question while remained barren to provide a solid analytical framework for hybrid analysis of both the referent object of security and the security provider. Such framework challenges the assumption of state as the only legitimate security provider without limitation to who is in the need of protection from threat. Even when such entities are brought into question, their link to state is essential.¹²⁹ But how do we analyze situations where state does not have the capacity or the willing to provide security for certain actors? Or could a state, which has to be responsible to protect the citizens, return into a threat for them? Security studies literature ignored this question let alone provide

¹²⁷ Steven Spitzer, “Security and Control in Capitalist Societies: The Fetishism of Security and the Secret Thereof” in *Transcarceration: essays in the sociology of social control*, eds. John Lowman, Robert J. Menzies, and T. S. Palys (England: Gower, 1987), 43-58.

¹²⁸ Rhonda Powell, “Concept of Security,” *University of Oxford Socio-Legal Review*, (June 2012): 1-29.

¹²⁹ Anna Leander, “Globalisation and the State Monopoly on the Legitimate use of Force”, *Syddansk Universitet Political Science Publications*, no. 7/2004, https://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Statskundskab/Skriftserie/04ANL7%20pdf.pdf

an approach.

As Buzan argues security is essentially a binary concept. There is not an easy way to put the security of a unit on a graded scale so as to define whether it is secure or not.¹³⁰ This is why “speech act” concept is much used by scholars in order to define first the issue and how subjects and the referent objects of security define that situation.¹³¹ This is why the concept of securitization has become a popular concept to define security issues. A close look at how securitization occurs and by whom help defining the position of security actor and its object.

However, limiting the identification or the definition of threat to speech act might be misleading in situations where there is a significant asymmetry between the actors who poses the threat and the referent objects (who is threatened). This is crucial in situations where the roles that are attributed to the actors within the security situation is We can build an analogy with War studies where the consequent actions of each side in a way make up the whole process of war itself. It is the process of action-reaction that matters for the evolution of security issue and the solution to it. This is why I claim that in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of security, we need to look beyond the questions of “security for whom?” and provide answer for the question of “security *by* whom?” This is essential in situations where conventional arguments provided by the literature is not giving proper answers. For decades, the definition of security remained constrained by the definition of threat but which and how actors act upon a threat still remains as an important question mark. However, the developments in security studies literature after the Cold War offered new insights about the new actors and referent objects as well as new threats and responses by enlarging the security understanding. These developments are discussed in the new section as a part of the broadening and

¹³⁰ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 217.

¹³¹ Buzan et al., *Security*, especially 27-35.

deepening in security studies.

2.2 BROADENING/WIDENING AND DEEPENING IN SECURITY STUDIES

At the end of the Cold War, the question of ‘on which side you are?’ and the answer to it became much more complicated than simple dichotomies of the Cold War, primarily believing in and fighting for communism or liberal democracy. The Cold War as such did not have a conventional conflict pattern that preceded it. The World Wars were primarily among the nation states and their ideological dynamics did not match that of the Cold War. However, the fall of communism with the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of the global rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union surfaced new conflict patterns that actually were not alien but suppressed for a long time. The encompassing identities of the Cold War period were replaced by more particular ones as the being a part of smaller collectivities became much more relevant in the aftermath of the Cold War. This particularization of identity surfaced many issues that were not of concern in security studies. Ethnicity, religion, gender, class and other such identities came to fore creating an environment of new societal dynamics where reconsolidation was necessary in many cases both in post-Soviet space and other regions such as Middle East. While in almost all parts of the world identity had always been a source of conflict, the sociological analysis was not a part of conventional academic exercise.¹³² This was because military and political security dominated the academic thinking until the end of the Cold War.¹³³ Not surprisingly first identity crises erupted in Eastern Europe where existing societal

¹³² Pinar Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” *International Studies Review* 5 (2003): 207.

¹³³ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”: 212; for an extended discussion on the changing agenda of security studies with the end of the Cold War, see David A. Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” *World Politics* 48, no. 1 (1995): 117-41.

conflicts unleashed serious societal insecurities.¹³⁴ While debates on the definition of security was not a novel thing at the end of the Cold War, the impact of this new thinking flourished in the field once the domination of Cold War thinking in the academia had declined.

Apart from the developments in the academic field of security, the practice of security changed a lot. The most important necessity to depart from the now classical notion of the Westphalian state the sole provider of security to its citizen emerged from the challenges that states face in multiple ways today. First, and maybe the most important one is that there have emerged alternative non-state actors that have the ability and the willing to provide security for individuals who have conflict of interest with their governments that utilize their monopoly on coercive power against society.¹³⁵ This is a result of the transformed nature of contemporary conflicts, where multiplicity of non-state actors in inter or intra-state conflicts has become a vulnerability for the centrality of state as the holder of monopoly on power.

As a response to the changing nature of (in)security issues at hand around the globe, a number of scholars started the discussions around how to reconceptualize security to make the study of security more relevant to such developments.¹³⁶ Copenhagen School includes some of the most prominent scholars elaborating on this issue and their contribution for a wider and deeper understanding of security. Huysman explains the

¹³⁴ Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, "Memory in Post-Communist Europe: Controversies over Identity, Conflicts, and Nostalgia," *East European Politics and Societies* 32, no. 4 (November 2018): 924–35.

¹³⁵ Non-state actors that has been studied in security studies include rebel groups, militias, terrorists, criminal groups, private security companies or more relevant to this study local defense forces etc., see Andreas Kruck and Andrea Schneiker eds. *Researching non-state actors in international security: theory and practice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), especially at 1-13.

¹³⁶ For some of the discussions around widening/deepening security see for example, Ayoob, Mohammed "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in *Critical Security Studies*, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press; 1997), 121-146. Ken Booth, "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist," In *Critical Security Studies*, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 83-120; Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

starting point for understanding the agenda of Copenhagen School with its central question: “how to move security studies beyond a narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states while avoiding ending up with an all-embracing, inflated concept dealing with all kinds of threats to the existence, well-being or development of individuals, social groups, nations and mankind?”¹³⁷

Copenhagen School of security studies conceptualizes security via securitization and this emancipates the concept of security from its state centric conceptualization. The widening of referent objects of security and its actors has been challenged by many scholars, who criticize this widening move as a departure from the essential meaning of security which requires a narrow conceptualization. Buzan et al. criticizes this challenge against their security framework: “If we place the survival of collective units and principles—the politics of existential threat—as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept.”¹³⁸ They claim to offer to establish a framework for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions. They say that there are two general views of security, that of wideners and that of traditionalists. Economic, societal and environmental sectors are primarily non-traditional sectors.

The widening move in security studies has been an inevitable consequence of the changing nature of security issues globally. The decline of military security especially in the West and the increasing influence of non-military threats on states and societies created the incentives for expanding the analytical agenda of security studies. Wide instead of narrow understanding of security became a necessity for analyzing security as a concept and as an experience. Societal security theory is a part of this evolution. With the expansion of the scope of security analysis, society is considered both as an actor and

¹³⁷ Jef Huysmans “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 482.

¹³⁸ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, 27.

a referent object. This research aims to utilize societal security theory within a historical exploration of the dynamics of security problems in Ba’thist Iraq. The next section defines the main arguments of the societal security theory and offers a critical assessment of the uses of this perspective in the literature.

2.3 SOCIETAL SECURITY THEORY AND SECTORAL APPROACH TO SECURITY

2.3.1 Societal Security Theory and the Problem of Agency

With recognition of Buzan’s considerable contribution to the so-called ‘widening’ of international security studies, some scholars nonetheless argued that it was not enough simply to introduce more sectors of state security. Security studies scholarship was beginning to move away from its preoccupation with military issues, but not as yet from its state-centric focus. What was needed, therefore, were other referent objects of security. That security should also be ‘deepened,’ manifested itself in a re-focusing on the individual through to the global level.”¹³⁹

They were concerned that ‘nation’ and ‘state’ do not mean the same thing in a majority of countries around the world and that ‘national security’ is becoming an increasingly irrelevant framework with which to study post-Cold War developments in Europe. Instead, they proposed the term ‘societal security’ and a focus on the insecurities of societies, understood as national, ethnic, or religious communities.¹⁴⁰ Further to this essential contribution of the societal perspective to security, the fact that society and state often are in conflict based in cases where state becomes a reflection of intra-societal

¹³⁹ Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (NY: Routledge, 2005).

¹⁴⁰ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security”: 203–222.

conflicts in a country. This means that while states often threaten their society or a part of it through sectors that represent the viable routes for threat imposition, states can perform as such resulting from the identity conflicts within the society. In such cases an identity group dominate state mechanisms and reinforce threat against subordinate groups. When a specific group grasp means of power through state, societal enmities are reproduced in a larger scale.

Societal security is essentially the security of society and the insecurity of a society is defined by threats to its survival as a society.¹⁴¹ At the center of this definition lies the concept of identity which has been considered as equal to the concept of sovereignty of a state, which is central to its survival. All societies contain a myriad of social groups with their unique identity. While it is possible to talk about different levels of societal identity from occupational or other elements of socio-economic status, societal identity as the referent object in this study is one that is not only robust enough in construction, and comprehensive enough in its reproduction. It is also broad enough in the quality of identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to the state's organizational principle. As Waever et al. acknowledges, “ethno-national and religious identities have acquired particular prominence compared to other social groups because of their historical association with the development of the modern state.”¹⁴² In another work, societal groups as the referent objects are defined limited to largescale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as ethno-national and religious groups.¹⁴³ This reference to the ability to function independent of the state is important for identifying societal groups that are relevant for societal security analysis. In the Iraqi case during the Ba’thist period, the fact that state

¹⁴¹ Waever et al., *Identity, Migration*; Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework*.

¹⁴² Ibid., 23; Branka Panic, “Societal Security: security and identity,” *Western Balkans Security Observer*, no. 13 (2009): 29-38.

¹⁴³ Buzan et al., 22-23.

became the main source of threat against the ethno-national and religious groups within the society and the agency acquired by these groups to confront directly to the state proves that the identity of these groups are independent from the boundaries of state control.

However, claiming that a society is under threat requires more than the identification of these threats. As identities and society are products of a long process of construction and transformation, identifying current threats to a society is not enough to understand the underlying dynamics of that threat. Societal security literature has been inadequate to create an analytical framework for the study of the sources of threat, the threats themselves or how societies respond to these threats.¹⁴⁴ In order to give the proper agency to societal groups in societies, we should observe how societal groups cope with the threats they perceive from an outside force, be it the state, another society or a transnational group that pose threat to the survival mechanisms of societies.

This study is primarily a theoretical exercise for proposing a new framework for studying societal security. At its center lies the reformulation of the sectoral approach as proposed by Buzan into a new understanding under the umbrella of societal security rather than national security. This requires not only a shift in focus in explaining security by whom and security for whom questions and also reconceptualizing the threat perceptions and threats by sectors. In this sense, this discussion is also different than what Ole Weaver et al. presents in their book. Their societal security perspective does not provide a systematic perspective on dynamics of societal security and on purpose their analytical tool is only applicable to the European context.

The relationship between the concept of security, as the most state centered concept that has been formulated in the traditional literature both in International Relations and Security Studies, and the concept of society, whose relations with state has not been

¹⁴⁴ Roe, *Ethnic Conflict*, 53.

reevaluated enough in new contexts, became a particularly problematic one as the political problems of the post-Cold War era required new definitions and perspectives. Critical security studies began to think about the meanings of security as one of the most state centric concepts in IR and challenged the state as the only referent object of security. Societal security argument emerged from these attempts to emancipate security conceptualizations and opened further discussion of non-state agents in shaping both the definitions of security and the security agenda in different layers of the system.

In this part, societal security perspective will be presented in a three-tiered approach. First, the definitions of societal security will be presented and these definitions will be assessed through their possible application in a non-European societal context. In the second part, the dimensions of societal security are discussed in order to draw the methodological foundations of the dissertation while studying the Iraqi society within this framework. Here the possible demarcations of identity boundaries will be defined in terms of the identity expressions of identity groups in Iraqi society.

Defining Societal Security and its Contextuality¹⁴⁵

Introduced by the Copenhagen School, Societal Security brought society to the center of theoretical and methodological scope of Security Studies. While conventional Security studies take national and military aspects of security as the starting point, societal security argues for society as the referent object of security by itself rather than merely as analytical tool to articulate on state security at the top. The inclusion of society as a referent object was not present in Barry Buzan's initial formulation of security sectors

¹⁴⁵ The term "contextuality" is not a widely used terminology in social sciences. Borrowed from quantum physics, contextuality refers to the fact that an outcome one observes in a measurement is dependent upon what other measurements one is trying to make. In this research, contextuality is used as a critical approach to whether a measurement framework proposed by a theory is applicable in multiple contexts with changing dynamics.

elaborated in his book *People, States and Fear*. It was in a later attempt by Waever et al. that theorized society as being a referent object that can be affected by all five sectors of security formulations. While the latter does not reject Buzan's theorizing on 5 sectors, it was a totally different formulation for studying security in the society level.¹⁴⁶

The contributions of constructivist perspectives in security studies enabled the widening (Buzan's sectors are the best example) and deepening (Waever's societal perspective) process in the research agenda as the conventional security understanding could not respond to evolving non-military and non-state threats. While the neo-realist security perspective maintained that states are threatened by societies, the constructivist scholars argued that states threatens societies as well and thus societies should be the referent object in security studies. Still taking societies at the center does not mean that states are irrelevant in security contexts, indeed state-society relations often projected in this literature as state represents or provide the means for security of at least one competing identity in societies in conflict. This duality is crucial to understand the dynamics of security from the perspective of both state and society.

Problematizing society in term of identity and security is the central merit of societal security perspective. Societies are accepted as multiple identity units either with fixed boundaries or constituted by social interaction as argued by Anthony Giddens.¹⁴⁷ Weaver on the other hand differentiates between societies and social groups, the latter being the main referent object limiting the scope of societal security arguments to the domestic level. However, not all social groups are a part of a security projection. Waever include "politically significant ethno national and religious entities" and societal security means the ability of these entities to survive under different and changing conditions.¹⁴⁸ Here the term "politically significant" should be discussed as the reference goes back to

¹⁴⁶ Waever et al., *Identity, Migration*.

¹⁴⁷ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984): 164

¹⁴⁸ Waever et al., 23

politicization and securitization of identity that is a part of a larger discussion of Copenhagen School.

Since its emergence with the Second World War, Security Studies has evolved in response to changing nature of international politics. Societal security as a concept is introduced by Buzan et al. as a part of the debates mainly categorized under the Copenhagen School.¹⁴⁹ Later the concept is developed in a widely acknowledged book by Buzan e. al. as a part of five security sectors approach as a part of a new understanding in security studies.¹⁵⁰ Societal security can be described as the following:

“The state is based on the possession of a fixed territory and formal membership with an administrative body, whereas society on the contrary is about identity, and the way in which communities and individuals identify and perceive themselves. Societal insecurity, therefore, emerges when communities feel that their identity is being targeted or threatened”.¹⁵¹

As a follow up definition, Buzan argues that “the organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community”.¹⁵² Societal security was a part of this widening step in security studies and has been used and challenged in by many scholars. However, the concept of societal security originally introduced for European societies and context by Waever. The concept of societal security is necessitated by the inability of conventional security understanding to explain the different formulations of security in society from the state security. To compensate for the incompatibility of thinking about security only in state level, societal security includes different levels (in this study, different identities) within society and the security

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Buzan et al. *Security*.

¹⁵¹ Alam Saleh “Broadening the Concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security,” *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (2010): 232.

¹⁵² Buzan et al., *Security*, 119.

understanding among them (the case of ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East provides an ideal example for such thinking). Most important contributions by scholars in this field focus on the European challenges towards societal security and thus the conceptualization of concepts is integrated into the European context.

Waever offered a new terminology of securitization in order to explain the changing dynamics of identity within societies.¹⁵³ The securitization approach to security claims that societal communities argue within themselves as to what constitutes a threat to their community. Buzan et al. outlines three types of possible threats for societal security as such: Migration, Horizontal competition and Vertical competition. These three processes are explained as such:

Migration causes a change of population balance as a result of an influx of people into a society with a different identity.

Horizontal competition entails a transformation in the identity of a society due to the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from a neighboring culture

Vertical competition occurs from integration into a wider cultural definition, or disintegration into smaller cultural units. This includes nationalist movements within a society and state-oriented assimilationist policies as well.¹⁵⁴

These three main areas make this concept applicable to different cases with different contexts. While European and Middle Eastern societies have commonalities such as overarching identities or identities that exceed boundaries, one of the most significant differences between the two is visible in vertical competition type of societal security threats.¹⁵⁵ Vertical competition is the most ideal type to apply in the Kurdish case as it

¹⁵³ Waever et al.

¹⁵⁴ Buzan et al., 122

¹⁵⁵ Waever et al., 132.

describes assimilation as a threat to social security by threatening an identity within a society. Although, the explanations offered for these societal security problems are formulated for the European context, Middle Eastern societies, especially the ones that are fragmented like the Iraqi case offers a unique context for the application of these categorizations. Such perspective will provide a rich content both in contextual and theoretical terms.

One of the few scholars who write on ethnic conflicts and societal security, Paul Roe elaborates on Horizontal and Vertical Societal security problems clarifying the analytical value of these arguments. According to Roe, a societal security structure should present the intentions of all identities in a society and understanding of security of their identity by these groups.¹⁵⁶ Intentional security threats to identity is present mostly in vertical competition examples but also it can be hard to identify the horizontal and vertical nature of a given societal security problem without asking basic questions.

On the other hand, identifying the threats in societies is a debatable issue in security studies literature which is addressed within the discussions of relevancy of society as a referent object. To clarify the societal security dynamics in a given context, any study dealing with societal security should ask the following questions: “What is security for A and/or B?” (A and B describes hypothetical two identities in a society that are in competition. While in most cases one of them is dominant identity and the other is minority, this is not a necessary condition for competition), “What are the threats for A and B’s identity, in other words what creates ‘insecurity’ for these groups?” and “What means do A and B have to achieve the state of being secure?”. Especially the second question opens up a new discussion of societal security dilemma that is also a useful analytical tool to track the process of securitization of identities in societies.

¹⁵⁶ Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (NY: Routledge, 2005).

Who we are can change depending on the strategic choices of individuals. For example, if giving up identity claims about Kurdish identity allows a Kurd to achieve social mobility, he/she can choose so. However, in another phase of his life expressing Kurdish identity can be a source of societal security.

The state of insecurity of an identity refers to that identity, not all the individuals that can fall into this category. Being in that category is up to individual's self-conceptualization within the societal reality. There is a high possibility of mobility among different identities which turns us to the point that identity can be an objective category, but being in the influence zone of this category depends on an individual's choice. In this perspective, identities are not fixed and objective societal realities but identity as an actor within the formula of societal relations in fact a fixed unit of analysis for an objective inquiry.

McSweeney's individualist criticism takes the concept of societal security apart from its essential operational motivation. We need to discuss the relative understanding of security and threats posed via material means (such as laws regulations armed forces so on) towards a specific identity group. Therefore, to discuss societal security perception we need to focus on how threats are directed towards and identity and why? Once identity is formed it becomes a category beyond the influence of individual unless there is a mass exodus from that identity or a complete abandoning it as a result of a social contract.¹⁵⁷ Some identities might actually be inherited but as a social category the meaning of an identity may change depending on the structural differences. Collective identity is not out there, waiting to be discovered. What is 'out there' is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating, manipulating or affirming a response to the demand at times

¹⁵⁷ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 76.

urgent, mostly absent for a collective image. Even in times of crisis, this is never more than a provisional and fluid image of ourselves as we want to be, limited by the facts of history.¹⁵⁸

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Iraqi history went through significant transformations that have direct influence over the different layers of relationships among ethno-national and religious identity groups in the country. While there was not an idea or the reality of an Iraqi state at the beginning of this century, within the first two decades, Iraq was constructed as a nation-state, at least the official discourse tried to achieve a sense of collectivity based on the supra-Iraqi identity. After this big structural change, the history of the country witnessed the beginning of an endless cycle of domestic transformations that represented similar processes with different components and outcomes. These transformations were political but reflected the complex societal structure and fragile balance in the relationship among different identity groups. In all these processes, the dominant identity group tried to consolidate its dominance over sociopolitical structures and as a result just in order to achieve state and regime security, societal security has been sacrificed and the identities are redefined under the influence of political changes.

In each structural change (sociopolitical changes driven from mainly political transformations) that I will discuss in this part, this process repeats itself but creating different outcomes as a result in terms of what each identity means within the newly established system. Although the identities that we take for granted and accept the existence in this territory, we need to go back in time to understand the meanings of these identities in specific political contexts that is unique to each political period. In other words, throughout the history where these identities have specific meaning in the political

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 77-78.

realities of these people. This also emancipates the inquiry from fixing identities, which has been one of the major criticisms towards societal security framework. In order to understand the societal security dynamics of Iraq a revisiting to periods of structural political changes is necessary.

Studying identity in Iraq requires a systematic approach to how identity groups constructed and reconstructed their identity as a response to structural shifts in different time periods. The methodology for an examination of societal transformation requires a specific approach to how identity groups are formed and how a societal definition of identity changes along with the balances of societal security. The components of identity should be identified and examined throughout these time periods marking significant political transformations which makes these periods relevant for analyzing the societal changes. In this study, political, economic, military, religious and cultural institutions act as the motor of the large structural changes shifting as a response to changing state-society relations and how societal security is formulated among different identity groups. These components act as the means of identity manifestation as the reflections of societal structure and societal security balance among these groups reveal themselves within these institutions determining the fate of an identity group in Iraq.

2.3.2 A Critical Reassessment of Societal Security Approach

Since its original formulation appeared in Buzan's seminal work on national security, societal security approach has gone through multiple redefinitions and faced criticisms primarily regarding its shaky grounds of what constitutes a societal insecurity or how to achieve societal security.¹⁵⁹ Especially regional studies on societal security that offer

¹⁵⁹ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 85; Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan"; Johan Eriksson, "What Makes a Security Problem? Securitization and Agenda Setting." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Swedish Political Science Association (October 11-13, 1998).

cross-case comparisons on the component of societal security complained about the over stretched conceptualization of security in this approach. Societal security is a highly contextual concept and there is not a single study that can identify a sets of societal security problem that can be applicable in multiple cases. Instead, most studies has tried to construct methodologies or conceptual frameworks to study societal security. This approach is relevant considering the fluid nature of the subject.

2.3.3 Security Sectors and Societal Security

Apart from the central question of what is security, the next step in security requires clarifications on the conditions of being secure. These conditions are relative to each security issue in question, but also limited to certain areas in relation with how the referent object define its own security. Buzan et al. proposes a sectoral approach to security in order to frame the sources of threats to national security at the state level. These sectors are military, political, economic, societal and environmental. However, the sectoral approach has been expanded by consequent security literature as new sources of threat has been identified in security studies.

In this research, a theoretical twist is introduced in order to adapt society as the subject and the referent object of security by integrating the sectoral approach to societal security. To do so, in parallel to the societal security approach, society is treated as the referent object of security in order to address the question of “security *by whom?*” State is treated as the actor who poses threat to society based on the contextual construction of the relationship between the (in)securities of the Iraqi society and the reaction of societal actors against these threats. Within this framework, the boundaries between the state and society is questioned along with the traditional patterns of state-society relations (hierarchical Weberian understanding of state-society dichotomy). Therefore, society is given primacy in terms of defining how (in)securities emerge in the Iraqi case. This

contextual approach requires a redefinition of threats from a sector-oriented perspective also offered by Buzan. Originally, the sectors of security are defined as the following:

Military security: concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and state's perceptions of each other's intentions.

Political security: concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and ideologies that give them legitimacy.

Economic security: concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.

Societal security: concerns the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language culture and religious and national identity and custom.

Environmental security: concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system.¹⁶⁰

While this compartmentalization offers an analytical clarification for each area of security problems, they should not be considered as isolated from each other.¹⁶¹ Central to each sector are the questions of "What is the referent object of security?", and "what are the necessary conditions for security?" Buzan et al. makes clear that sectors give the answer to the second question. Conditions are relevant to how threat is understood by the referent object, this is why sectors should be reformulated in accordance with the referent object in question.

One way, as Buzan argues, is to see them as identifying specific types of interaction. Societal sector is about relationships of collective identity.¹⁶² However, it is the Waever that claimed the possibility of replacing the central role of state in all these sectors with other referent objects, hence societal security.¹⁶³ "If a multi-sectoral approach to security

¹⁶⁰ Buzan, 19-20.

¹⁶¹ Buzan et al., 52 and 63.

¹⁶² Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 19-20.

¹⁶³ Waever et al. *Identity, Migration*, 24-27.

was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than the state had to be allowed into the picture.”¹⁶⁴ In any case, sectors do not operate independently, they are interlinked. The purpose behind them is to simply reduce complexity. “Each is looking at the whole, but is seeing only one dimension of its reality.” However, the cases of societal insecurity such as Iraq show that one area of security can become too complex to understand singlehandedly.

In the case of security, the key is the pursuit of freedom from threat. When put in international system, it is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their identity and their functional integrity. However, states and societies are sometimes not in harmony in seeking security. The bottom line is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Especially when societal boundaries do not match the political boundaries.¹⁶⁵ Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities (maybe fear of threat).¹⁶⁶ States, based on their capabilities reduce their insecurity either by reducing their vulnerability or by preventing or lessening the threats. Societies in similar situations try to respond to threats as states do especially when their states do not perform its essential role towards the society.

In his arguments, Buzan calls for an integrative security approach even though his initial analysis concentrates on the state level.¹⁶⁷ The inclusion of sub-state dynamics of security to national security opens up the discussion of how important these sectors in studying security. This is why a societal approach to security should also include the interdependent dynamics of other sectors in conceptualizations of the sense of insecurity and the definition of threats as well as the responses to them, material or non-material. In short, there are two significant components of security analysis: the issue of level of

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 8.

¹⁶⁵ Buzan et al., 18-19.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 112.

¹⁶⁷ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 363.

analysis and the issue of threat which is touched upon but not adapted to different levels of analysis in sectoral approach.

Societal security threats can be defined as the changes in societal structure that would influence the conditions of survival of identities in general. Roe also cautions about the natural changes that can change the conditions and the identities within a natural and cohesive process.¹⁶⁸ In such cases, change should not be considered as threat. At this state, we can go back to the difference between horizontal-vertical competition concept. The intentionality element in vertical competitions should be present in order to identify a direct threat to identities. These include assimilationist projects and other attempts that threaten the means of reproduction of identity. The terminology used in the literature of such conflicts include “cultural cleansing” and “culturecide” which occurs as a result of forced assimilation and destruction of cultural symbols.¹⁶⁹

Roe also states that external invasion of a country does not necessarily pose a threat to societal identities as it can also produce a more democratic environment for coexistence of all identities. However, in some cases this is just the opposite. The case of U.S. invasion of Iraq for example altered the societal equilibrium within Iraqi society so deeply that the transformations within the society created new imbalances among different identities that resulted in new societal security threats. The resulting power vacuum in the country after the removal of the regime from the power contributed to this process as well.

As a response to security threats to identities, social groups adopt two strategies to increase security. First, they can securitize their identity at the state level in order to put the problems in political agenda. Alternatively, in more unresolvable contexts or in case of inability to transfer the solutions to the state level, they can defend themselves via non-

¹⁶⁸ Roe, *Ethnic Violence*.

¹⁶⁹ Henry R. Huttenbach, “The Genocide Factor in the Yugoslav Wars of Dismemberment,” in *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia*, eds. Jeffrey S. Morton et al. (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 23-34.

state means. Intrastate ethnic conflicts are relevant examples to such strategies.

Threats by sectors

Military threats are the most crucial threat for states, and for society it is also the major threat factor when targeted by the state. Especially in states with authoritarian tendencies tend to use military or political force against the society in order to maintain order. In cases such as Iraq, where socio-political base of the state relies on the power mechanisms within society, state violence by military means is not an uncommon phenomenon. In many cases in the Middle East Army itself has been the source of political identity and power and military and political sectors have become intermingled so much that military force and its internal and external use became identical to state existence in mind. Buzan partly address this issue from the perspective of weak and strong states. For him, strong states tend to use military force less as it has a great potential for domestic consent for its rule and turn the system into more authoritarian. On the other hand, weak states can resort to military force more easily as they are not concerned about the possibilities of domestic unrest, just the opposite they are afraid that any foreign intrusion might be welcomed by a part of its society.¹⁷⁰

Political threats are categorized by Buzan as threats aimed at the organizational stability of the state. In terms of societal security political threats involve both the associational skills of the society and the representation of its own interests in political institutions of states, both in mind and in practice. Political threats on state level is highly linked to societal reflections of threats as they mostly arise from within the society. Interestingly, in Iraq both domestic and external dynamics of identity politics has been a threat to political stability of the country. As the Iraqi state was acutely weak over decades the

¹⁷⁰ Buzan, *People, States*, 117.

means of instability became rooted in all state and societal institutions.

Internal societal threats are symptomatic of weak states.¹⁷¹ Societal security is the weakest area of national security as formulated by Buzan, but later the development of society into a referent object added on this argument significantly. One of the main problems with societal security is that securitization of a societal issue or the identity of a threat is a complex process. In many cases, societal threats emanating from state action does not have its presence in the political agenda or the actions are concealed by words. It is in the nature of political violence against a society that most of the time words do not match the deeds. Assimilation is never named by the political leaders as assimilation or socio-political or economic discrimination is most of the time is not accepted as formal policy label by politicians. Therefore, what is central for societal security is the actions that state take *vis-à-vis* society as the primary source of societal insecurity is almost always state itself when societal security issues is internal to societal dynamics rather than an external influence as observed in large scale migration. But in the Middle East migration has never been as vital as societal discrimination to different scales against certain societal groups. The main source of societal insecurity in the region stems from such internal dynamics in the post-state building period.

In this research, societal security in Iraq will be analyzed through definitions of identities within political, cultural, religious, economic and military structures of state and its influence on society. These aspects of social identity represent identities in the way that they are able to manifest themselves in societies. For each identity group, there is a specific formulation of these aspects that determines their relationship with other identity groups. They also represent how societal security balance is established and how threats to identities emerge from the manifestations of identities in these identity components.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 123

Political institutions are inevitably at the center of identity manifestation because identity groups depend on a political structure that defines their state of being in a society. Political definition of an identity group also defines the capacity of one group to ensure its survival in a society. In the Iraqi case, political roles attached to an identity determined the capacities of an identity group to control the society at large. Before the establishment of modern Iraqi state, the control over political institutions enabled the identity groups to control other identity components. While the simplicity of political structures of the Ottoman and Mandate periods allowed for a top down definition in which terms identity groups would be a part of political power, the political sphere became more and more complex after the introduction of modern state system with growing ability of political representation. Still in any form, the identity groups tried to establish their domination over political institutions to control other components of identity because the strong central state system from the beginning allowed specific groups to control the societal dynamics mostly through illegitimate and coercive practices.

Culture and educational institutions are of course a vital aspect of an identity to ensure its survival. In all societal structures, education is the most important institution that enables the creation and reproduction of an identity. Be it a group identity or national identity, education is the first and foremost area of a societal design. Nationalism and state building theories have formulated the survivability of a system based on the ability to reproduce the official ideology that establishes the societal structure based on a specific identity for the state and in return for the identity groups present in a societal habitat. While the consolidation of a national identity has been vital for the continuation of a societal system designed around a specific formulation among identity groups, the educational and cultural institutions have been used for indoctrination in many cases (not limited to Middle East) of a dominant identity group and for the legitimization of a specific societal structure that manifest itself mainly within the political structure. When educational and cultural institutions are unavailable or forbidden to an identity group, the survival of this

group becomes threatened by a dominant group that controls these institutions.

The third component is very central to understand the societal relations in the Middle Eastern cases. Military has been the most important area for reinforcing a specific societal structure as it is very open for manipulations by the dominant identity groups. In the Iraqi case, the coercive methods of consolidation by the state and the reactions from the subordinate groups have manifested themselves mostly through armed conflict. This is why either the domination of one identity in military institutions and presence of paramilitary groups representing an identity group is not an unusual phenomenon in the Middle East.

The economic structure of Iraqi society is another important component of societal structure mainly because the societal transformations especially in the last decades of Ottoman rule and during the process of state building, the class system especially among the subordinate groups determined the societal relations before ethno-nationalist or sectarian claims began to dominate the relations among identity groups. The tribal structure and agricultural economic system enabled a class based economic structure where in group identities were defined through economic power allocations. Big landlords, *aghas* in the peripheries of the urban centers of Iraqi provinces controlled the in-group relations and became the access point to the centers.¹⁷² With the establishment of modern state and integration to regional and world economy and with the increasing volume of trade after the beginning of increasing British involvement in late 1890s the class-based system began to deteriorate and transformed. This economic transformation created an intellectual awakening among groups and started the formation of an intellectual elite class representing the claims for identities or redefined the ideological stance of these intellectual groups. Also natural resources and their geographical location

¹⁷² Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books: 1992), 136.

have been a source of identity conflict.

Religion is the last component included in the study of societal security in the Iraqi case. The use of this component might be relevant for specific cases but the religiously defined identities and the use of religion by the state created insecurities among identity groups in Iraq when we consider the numerically dominant but subordinate in all other institutions Shi'a population in Iraq. The Sunni dominant nation-building process in the country marginalized Shi'a groups in state institutions. Also, this continued after the establishment of Iraqi state with the use of religion by especially Ba'th party under Saddam adds up to the existing societal fractions among different sects with the domination of Sunni Arab identity in all state apparatus. As Sunni Arab population have never been the majority identity group in Iraq but dominated the political and intellectual life, the stress on religious identity was paramount to increase the legitimacy and consolidation of power although never fully successful.

The societal dynamics in Iraq has resembled earthquake faults that have been ready to surface with high pressure resulting in disastrous societal conflicts. The main reason for this unstable societal structure is the unbalanced and coercive domination of single identity over all the components of identity outlined above. While the domination of Sunni Arab identity over time was not just a coincidence, the results of the persistent form of societal structure based on Sunni Arab control was challenged whenever possible. From the Shi'a to Kurds these identity groups have tried to topple down the existing political system to end this imbalanced situation. These challenges have been the inevitable result of unconsolidated power of one group over the others and coercive grip over all societal structures around an official ideology that was ignored the possible negative results. Societal security dilemmas arose from these insecurities of non-Arab and non-Sunni identity groups in Sunni-Arab dominant society of Iraq and in order to respond to the threats towards the survival of their identity, these groups challenged to dominant identity group whenever possible.

CHAPTER THREE

BEFORE BA'TH: BUILDING STATE AND SOCIETY AND THE ROOTS OF SOCIETAL INSECURITY IN IRAQ

3.1 THE MAKING OF IRAQ AND SOCIETAL SECURITY

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Iraqi history went through significant transformations that have direct influence over the different layers of relationships among various identity groups in the country. While there was not a unified political entity in what corresponds to today's Iraqi boundaries at the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman defeat in the First World War transformed the whole structure of power in the region. First established as a British mandate in 1920, Iraq became an independent country in 1932 under a monarchy with the continuing protection of the British Empire. In 1958, the opposition to the monarchy and British protectorate resulted in a military coup and the republic of Iraq was established under military rule. However, military itself could not consolidate its power to dominate politics and the civilian rule won over after a series of coups and civilian rule trials until 1968. The post 1968 politics in Iraq carried the conflictual history into a new phase that deepened the societal (in)securities that had been cultivated by the long-term socio-political instability.

Iraqi society is made up of multiple identity groups and these groups have different layers of identities that defined their role in the society. These layers include ethnic, religious, individuals' social base such as clans or tribes, and their occupations that define their

social role.¹⁷³ Also the identities as listed here should not be taken for granted. Just as in any part of the world, identity is fluid which makes one's sense of belonging subjected to change, whether change is imposed from the outside or it is a self-acclaimed change.¹⁷⁴ Identities in Iraq are not fixed and stable and has been subjected to change.

Added to this complex societal structure other societal dynamics defined the early development of state-society relations in Iraq. There are three significant counter-forces in society that defined the societal dynamics in early modern Iraq and any reading should include these in their analysis. The first and the foremost one is the societal structure of the Iraqi society that has been dominated by the dilemma between urbanization and tribalism. With the rise of urban economics and growing bureaucratic class the urban flux challenged the social fabric that had been dominated by traditionalist tribal lifestyle. Tribalism in Iraq regulated social, political and economic relations and this hierarchical structure was reflected in state's tools for penetrating society.¹⁷⁵ The second one is the dilemma between Iraqi nationalism and Arab nationalism. Especially during the post-war nation and state building process after the independence, these two ideologies became the source of instability. While Iraqi nationalism appeared to be an inclusive project for the mixed structure of society, Arab nationalism that won over the other was by definition an exclusionist ideology considering the presence of non-Arab communities such as Kurds and Turkomans in the society. The third one is the economic structure that reflected itself in the class system that manifested itself as a problem with the growing urban middle class. This middle class did not resemble its European counterparts whose emergence was

¹⁷³ The ethnic groups included in this analysis are Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans. The religious groups are Sunni Muslims, Shi'a Muslims and non-Muslim groups. Other societal identities mentioned in this study include tribal identities and class identities such as military or other bureaucratic class identities that are most relevant in the elite formation in Iraq and frequently mentioned in the case study part.

¹⁷⁴ Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

¹⁷⁵ Phebe Marr, "One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?" in *Iraq Between Occupations Perspectives from 1920 to the Present*, eds. Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 19; Amatzia Baram, "Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997), 1-31.

an outcome of the Industrial Revolution and largely dominated by the quick overexpansion of state with its bureaucratic institutions, military being the dominating one.¹⁷⁶ Within this diversity and multi-layered structures of society, Arab Sunnis, the dominant identity group, tried to consolidate its dominance over sociopolitical structures and as a result just in order to achieve state and regime security, societal security has been sacrificed and the societal groups continuously tried to re-position themselves under the influence of political changes.

During the first 50 years of modern Iraqi history an environment of instability dominated politics and society. When the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, ASBP (*Hizb Al-Baath Al-'Arabi Al-Ishtiraki fi Al-'Iraq*) came to power in 1968, the state, society and the relation between the two transformed dramatically. However, ASBP managed to remain in power until its demise in 2003 with American occupation in Iraq, which makes it a curious case as to what and how the party did to stay in power while at the same time the societal insecurities in Iraqi society became deeper. This part starts delving into the dynamics of state and society in Iraq in order to understand the societal security dynamics that preceded the Ba'th rule in Iraq. The timeline in this chapter starts with the late Ottoman rule in Baghdad, Mosul and Basra which make up today's Iraq, and is a survey of societal security dynamics in Iraq until 1968 when Ba'th came to power. The analysis throughout this period captures the emergence of Iraqi society and its insecurities through the lenses of societal groups and their relationship with the state.

¹⁷⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass-producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914," in *Representing the nation: a reader*, eds. David Boswell and Jessica Evans (London New York: Routledge, 1999), 61-86.

3.2 LATE OTTOMAN RULE IN BAGHDAD, BASRA AND MOSUL (1840-1918)

The Ottoman rule in the region that corresponds in today's Iraq started with the conquest of Mosul in early 16th century followed by the capture of Baghdad and Basra. These three provinces were included in the Ottoman governance system as separate *vilayets*.¹⁷⁷ These provinces were considered as important because of their frontier with Iran, which is supported by the extent of military presence in and around Baghdad especially.¹⁷⁸ It is important to note that the borders of these *vilayets*, as titled in the Ottoman governance system, were not stable and were subjected to continuous or temporary changes as a result of clashes with neighboring Iran but these three provinces created the basis of post-war demarcation of Iraq by the British. The distance between Baghdad and İstanbul as portrayed by Ebubekir Ceylan tells a lot about the reach of center in local problems at that time.

In the classical period, the distance between Istanbul and Baghdad took 197 days to traverse during military mobilizations. However, for non-military or civilian purposes the same route was much shorter to travel. In the second half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the steamer services, one could travel from İstanbul to Baghdad or vice versa in only 35–40 days. There is no doubt that the time spent in traveling to Baghdad prevented the Sublime Porte from intervening in provincial politics when necessary. For example, when one of the leading tribal sheikhs, Sufuk al-Faris, opposed Ali Rıza Pasha in 1834, the Porte decided to send Agah Efendi to investigate the situation in the province. However, when Agah Efendi arrived in Baghdad the problem had already been resolved.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ *Vilayet* was the name of the major provincial unit according to the Regulation for Provinces (*Vilâyet Nizâmnâmesi*, 1864). A vilâyet was administered by a governor (*vâli*) appointed by the Sublime Porte. Selçuk Akşin Somel. *The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire* (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2010).

¹⁷⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908* (NY: Routledge, 2006), 4.

¹⁷⁹ Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and*

Although the distance between the center and these three provinces proved to be a disadvantage for establishing sustainable control over governance mechanisms, the Ottoman State transformed and adapted its ruling mechanisms to the changing societal and regional dynamics. From mid-19th century on, reforms under *Tanzimat* period aimed at creating functioning and unified governance that would help the center increase its influence over the society. This process created certain insecurities among the diverse social groups in multiple aspects of social life. The analysis below addresses these problems.

3.2.1 State-Society Relations in Ottoman Iraq

Society in these three provinces had typical characteristics of the region at that time. On the one hand there was a rich diversity of ethnic, linguistic and religious identities and on the other social dynamics such as nomadism, sedentarism, tribalism and urban growth went hand in hand blending the diversity at different levels. Still as also the map below shows population concentration was prominent in all three provinces, except Baghdad's urban center. As it was the heart of economic, political and social activity Baghdad's neighborhoods were more mixed.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, while Basra was more dependent on Baghdad for administration, Mosul was different in this sense as the *Mamluk* rule did not extend to this province. *Jalili* family with Sunni Arab origin ruled the province but shared power with some prominent Kurdish tribes such as *Baban* family while Turkmen and Christian communities were present as well.¹⁸¹ With the exception of *Mamluk* domination over power, social dynamics functioned dominantly under tribal lifestyle where hierarchical relations among societal classes and identity groups were regulated under tribal mechanisms. Still, in the urban centers most notably in Baghdad waves of

Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East (NY: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 27.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 29-37.

¹⁸¹ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 9; Batatu, 214, Ceylan, 48-53.

urban migration and increase in the urban population created a challenge for the traditional codes of tribal social structure. While tribal parts of the society retained its isolated and concentrated social relations mostly defined with traditionally defined rules, the expansion of urban lifestyle was quite different. Hanna Batatu explains this urban-rural difference as such: “In many ways they were very different from each other. The life of the urban Arabs was on the whole governed by Islamic and Ottoman laws, that of the tribal Arabs by Islamically tinged ancient tribal customs. Some of the urban Arabs, in particular the educated stratum, had come under the influence of Turkish—and in Shi’a cities, Persian—culture; tribal Arabs, on the other hand, had escaped that influence altogether. Among urban Arabs class positions were somewhat strongly developed, among the more mobile of the tribesmen relations were still patriarchal in character”.¹⁸²

In terms of administration, the inability of imposing central policies of the state resulted in the rise of local classes with established links to Istanbul. The existence of such local elites that held governance mechanisms at their hand lowered the expenses for the center while maintaining loyalty through enabling continuity in social order in conquered territories. The rule of *Mamluk* pashas in Baghdad and Basra was a result of such policy. Furthermore, in Mosul area significant Sunni Muslim and Kurdish families made up the elite class that controlled the relationship with the center.¹⁸³ As presented in the map below, the domination of tribal societal structure in the region created a fractured administrative organization. Ebubekir Ceylan argues that only after 1831, when the revolt of the last Mamluk pasha in Baghdad Davud Pasha was crushed by the center, could the Ottoman state impose its complete authority in Baghdad and Basra.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand,

¹⁸² Batatu, 14.


¹⁸³ While Hanna Batatu’s *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* is the most extensive source for Iraqi society, for other detailed accounts of ruling classes in each province, see Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq*; Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*. (NY: Facts on File Publishing, 2009); Dina Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

¹⁸⁴ Ceylan, 41.

Çetinsaya argues that the centralization of Ottoman governance in these provinces was realized with a gradual change in the balance of power from local power elites to Ottoman officials that lasted until 1850's.¹⁸⁵ The initiatives for centralization of governance came with the Ottoman reforms in the 19th century aimed at creating a unified rule in these provinces. Land Law and Vilayet Law were introduced in 1958 and 1964 respectively to reinforce the state rule. The main purpose of these laws was to transform the most central governing mechanisms in these provinces (land and administration), also to strengthen the power mechanisms with which the state penetrated the society. Land Law reinforced 'state's legal ownership' on lands previously bound to mixed land administrations and raise tax revenue with better organized system and Vilayet Law aimed to reinforce a hierarchical administrative organization filled by Ottoman officials rather than having localized ruling mechanisms.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Çetinsaya, 5.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 8.



Map 1. Sketch of tribal leagues and principalities in late 18th and early 19th century.
 Source: Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 66.

The analysis below will be organized through how identity groups (Sunni Arab, Shi'a Arab, non-Arab Kurds, Turkmens and other non-Muslim Minorities) were reformulated their status in parallel with the transformations that established new relationships and

created new societal structures. These changes also originated the societal security problems as the more the governance became centralized and involved in local politics, the more identity politics mattered. Within the analysis below, the weight given to each societal group can differ due to the intensity of societal problems faced during this period.

3.2.2 Analysis of Societal Security Dynamics in Iraq (1830s-1918)

Started in 1839, Tanzimat period signified important transformations in the Ottoman Empire. While the reforms were aimed to achieve more functional governance that would initiate change in the central state system in Istanbul it also aimed at reaching the peripheries of the Empire to increase the capacity of the Empire.¹⁸⁷ Some of these reforms were the construction of irrigation canals, creating new arable lands, public works and land tenure.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, he reintroduced the conscription policy to use the human resources in these provinces as well. However, a significant part of this tribal resettlement was accompanied by conscription, which became one of the major factors that led many Sunni tribes to convert to Shi'a belief, which offered a way to escape from the central policies.¹⁸⁹ On the other hand, the Ottomans tried to revert this trend by strengthening control within these territories and by granting land rights to local tribes. The administrative reforms had direct impact over the social dynamics that had been built around tribal social organization that regulated the everyday life and it was hard to transform these dynamics.

Common to all groups in the society tribalism is the most important societal force that determined the identities and resulting political and economic structures in the country. Tribalism card has been played by the external forces depending on their interests.

¹⁸⁷ Ceylan, 110.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 166.

¹⁸⁹ Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 200.

Ottoman Empire starting from *Tanzimat* tried to eliminate tribal structure to build more central governance system in peripheries of the Empire while later British reversed this position and reinforces tribal structure in order to rent the governance responsibilities of the Empire in the mandate when they established indirect rule in the mandate system.

Kurds have a complex history of identity construction. While it would be expected that the ethnic identity of Kurds would be the central one, before nationalist awareness emerged among Kurds, tribal and religious identities were what identified this group. Before an ethnic awareness emerged among Kurds in Iraq, tribal identities and its societal hierarchies were the main feature of this group. Similar to that of Shi'a, religious identities where *sheiks* were considered as the leaders of communities and *aghas* were the owners of the economic production. Located mainly in the Northern part of the country (at least this tribal structure was well established in this zone), Kurds had been an issue of interests for the Ottomans and the British before the independence. On the other hand, when we look at the literature on Kurds in the Ottoman Empire, the accounts mainly focus on Kurds of Anatolia and the amount of available information about Kurdish tribes in Anatolia is much more than the ones in Iraqi territory. One and the most valid reason for this should be the proximity of administrative divisions in Empire and its capacities in each of them is the determinant here.

Tribalism is not limited to the subordinate groups in the society as Arab Sunni population was also regulated largely by tribal system. Still Sunni Arabs became the first elite group in these territories from the Ottoman period mainly because of the sectarian tendencies of the Ottoman system that favored Sunnis and the availability of the opportunities of the education system. While Kurds were mostly Sunni, their remoteness to the early urban centers like Baghdad and the societal culture dominated by the tribal structure limited the number of Kurds entering into these opportunity mechanisms provided by the Ottoman State. The status of Sunni Arabs and their involvement in the emerging bureaucratic and military institutions enabled them to dominate the political structure both during the

Ottoman period and later on. One of the main reasons for Sunni Arabs to act so much protective for their status and their identity as the dominant one was the result of emerging dissent groups from other identity groups in time. The roots of societal threats and societal security dilemmas arise from this very central positioning of Sunni Arabs during the establishment of modern state institutions in Iraq. We see that from the moment the domination of Sunni Arabs was challenged by other groups, they took precautions to establish their roots in these systems and tries to build legitimacy either through manipulation of through coercion.

Political and Societal Structure

In the early years of 1900, a wave of reform movements influenced political directions in Iraq. Young Turk Movement and the government of Committee of Union and Progress in Istanbul started the pan-Turkish policies replacing the pan-Islamist appeal of Abdulhamid II in the Empire. This new ideological stance resulted in a backlash in the Arab territories. While there was already the domination of Turkish in the education and governance mechanisms, CUP expanded this policy. On the one side, with the movement, the influence of constitutionalism, decentralization or secularism ideas expanded to the young Arab intellectuals like Naji Shawkat, Hikmat Sulaiman, Hamdi al-Pachaci, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi (many of whom were among the first statesmen of the Iraqi state after its establishment) who became more and more visible in politics.¹⁹⁰ These figures were the officers of the Ottoman Army and they belonged to the Sunni Arab and Kurdish families. They began their education at the military *Rashidiyya* school in Baghdad, established during Tanzimat period by Midhat Pasha or in Istanbul in the *Harbiye* (Military Academy). Studying at the military academies provided the only opportunities for higher

¹⁹⁰ Tripp, 22.

education for these students, since the Ottoman treasury covered the expenses.¹⁹¹

Batatu explains the rise of modern ideologies among these educated men who had access to the state institutions (mainly the army) was an outcome of the access to education in modern educational institutions in Istanbul, where they were exposed to modern ideas of nationalism or constitutionalism.¹⁹² When they returned to their homelands, they became the primary advocates of such ideologies with a local nuance in it. While officers with Sunni Arab background dominated bureaucratic structure, there were influential figures with Kurdish origin such as Ismail Hakki Baban who was elected as a deputy from Baghdad in CUP government and became the minister of education of a government that promoted Turkism in the education system. Other Kurds also became a part of the Pan-Turkish government such as Sulayman Nazif, who was the *Wāli* (governor) of Mosul and took strong measures against the rebellions by Kurdish tribes. Another was a very prominent intellectual, Ziya Gökalp who is now acknowledged as the founding father of Turkish nationalism.¹⁹³

On the other hand, with the CUP established government, whole political sphere transformed towards strongly centralized and oppressive policies. The first reaction to such attitude was claims on the autonomy by the regional elites most significantly in Basra where the Shi'a sectarian identity and close relationship with the neighboring semi-independent regions of the Persian Gulf area. Sayyid Talib al-Naqib was a prominent figure in this line of politics who was elected to the parliament and later formed the opposition group to the CUP. While his enmity with the ruling party deepened, he found sanctuary from the British as the British forces landed near Basra at the beginning of the war in 1914.

¹⁹¹ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (L.A.: University of California Press, 1997).

¹⁹² Batatu, 23.

¹⁹³ David McDowall, *A Modern History of Kurds*. (Revised Edition) (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 92.

The societal dynamics of the last decades of the Ottoman Empire was dominated by the dichotomies and dilemmas of different ideological waves throughout the Empire. While Abdulhamid II's Pan-Islamic aspirations was a response to the rising nationalist ideas from Europe, later Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government tried to reformulate the society under Turkish nationalism. While there were some resonances of these thoughts in some parts of identity communities, to a larger extent people with distinct identities felt the exclusionist reconstruction of the society and politics. The limitations on the impacts of these ideologies among Kurdish population mainly depended on the societal structure of this group which was another crucial problem that the central government tries to appeal. The domination of Tribalism in today's Iraqi territory is a long-acknowledged factor that affected the course of politics in this period. This tribal structure also reflected in different aspirations of religious and secular, autonomist and secessionist, pro-Turkish and pro-British, independence and unity among leading Kurdish groups depending on what specific period offered them for taking sides. These dilemmas are added to one another in time creating a very complex political and societal structure that would decide the future of Kurds in Iraq from the fall of an Empire to the rise of a new state.

Military and Iraqi Society

Conscription had been the central problem for the Ottoman state to impose its reign over the distant territories of the empire. This attempt for central control was accompanied by policies of conscription and reconstruction of military forces, land reforms and regional development programs that enabled better functioning state control over these territories. This transformation was based on a specific societal formulation that would strategically work for Ottoman benefit. As Çetinsaya argues, administrative control in Iraq required more extended security forces in the country as the diverse nature of the society reduced

the effectiveness of central authority.¹⁹⁴ While governors from Istanbul were from Turkish origin, these bureaucrats naturally collaborated with Sunni Arabs in Baghdad. This was because both Kurdish and Shi'a population was isolated from the bureaucratic class Baghdad, this collaboration remained mostly limited to Sunni Arab elites.¹⁹⁵

Religious and Cultural Issues

Pan-Islamist policies of Abdulhamid II were vital to understand the attempts to appeal to Sunni and Shi'a population as the latter showed great tendency to challenge the centralization program. Added to this tendency were Iranian attempts that targeted the Iraqi Shi'a population as because of the sectarian linkages there was already an organic relationship between the two neighboring community. Pan-Islamism was thought to be an ideal solution for gaining the loyalties of Shi'a population. Abdulhamid II reached Jamal al-Din Afghani, a Pan-Islamist who was expelled from Iran and came to Basra. Al-Afghani was a Muslim Intellectual who promoted the Sunni-Shi'a unity as a part of his pan-Islamist advocacy.¹⁹⁶ Abdulhamid II used his advices and himself as the propagator of this unity. Still the idea of such a unity did not get the result that Abdulhamid II was expecting because the ideas of constitutionalism and political participation attracted more attention and effort by the Shi'a intellectuals in Basra.

Emine Evered claims that the reason why Shi'a families did not send their children to these schools was that these schools offered Ottoman Sunni education, which Shi'a population alienated themselves from.¹⁹⁷ Although in areas like Basra, where the societal

¹⁹⁴ Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration*, 136.

¹⁹⁵ For a detailed discussion on non-Sunni Arab groups in Iraq and problems of conscription, see Ibid., 72-98.

¹⁹⁶ Niki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II," *Middle Eastern Studies* 3 no. 1 (1966): 46-67.

¹⁹⁷ Emine Önhan Evered, *Empire and education under the Ottomans: politics, reform, and resistance from the Tanzimat to the Young Turks* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 163.

structure was not complex with the domination of single figures like al-Naqib, the transformation of the system resulted in political challenges, in Baghdad these transformations had more complex outcomes. The authoritarian government of CUP extended its influence outside the political realm with the introduction of Turkification process that created disturbances among Arab intellectuals. While of course there were groups who supported these policies but to large extent they led to the creation of oppositional societies that emphasized the importance of keeping Arab identity. Muhazim al-Pachaci led the National Scientific Club in Baghdad that promoted Arab language and culture. However, *Al-Ahd* became a more significant actor in shaping the wartime politics in the region.

In general, the most dominant political group in the empire was defined by religious orientation. Sunni Muslim identity of the central government tried to adjust the governance system depended on Sunni groups in the periphery of the empire. In the Arab provinces, this identity corresponded to Sunni Arab population. While to a limited extend Sunni Kurds enjoyed a powerful position when compared to other subordinate groups on the condition that they did not make claims on their ethnic identity, a large scale Kurdish nationalism did not emerge until the beginning of 20th century. Kurdish groups were mostly noted by their religious identities as most Kurdish families belonged to a Sufi order that defined their identity. When this is not possible in regions where other identity groups were dominant sociologically, the state either appointed Sunni Muslim governors and ruling class or it made specific deals with other groups based on tributary system.

The organic ties between Iraqi Shi'a groups with Persian empire was long acknowledged or observed by the Ottoman state. The competition between these two Empires inevitably affected the politics towards these people. The presence of important sacred Shi'a places in Iraq mainly in Basra province made these places more important for Ottoman

Control.¹⁹⁸ After centralization program was started one of the first measures taken in these places was to create strict control mechanisms for religious activities that included high level of *hajj* mobility. Shi'a regions of the southern Iraq enjoyed a larger level of autonomy for a long time and the region was long defined by Ottoman politician as the exile place. The rebellious nature of the Shi'a tribes was mentioned by a number of scholars. The geographical position of Najaf and Karbala, two Shi'a sacred place, close to Baghdad made these cities important for direct control by the Ottoman administration. While these cities were far away from Basra, which was more open to Persian and later external influence, the *hajj* mobility to these cities made them strategic for direct control. The fact that Ottoman army extended its presence in these cities after the reinforcement of the regional army shows how Ottoman Empire wanted to control this region. With the Sunni Arab population at the center in the societal structure, this group enjoyed being a part of the intellectual transformations within the empire as well. Politically the Ottoman Empire relied on this group as an extension of the central state power in the peripheral territories. Also Arabic language was the quasi-official language in the Ottoman Iraq while Turkish was used in governmental interactions, which dominated the public sphere more than ever after the Turkification efforts started with the CUP. The army, the official educational institutions (which were targeted to centralization program as well) were all dominated by Sunni Arab elites.

This heterogeneous society was not always peaceful nor they always challenged the legitimacy of the state. This societal balance was first disrupted with the beginning of *Tanzimat* period when Ottoman state began to exert the dominant identity over cultural, educational institutions of the society. Efforts of centralization was what transformed and destabilized the societal structures in the Ottoman Iraq. The Ottoman state structure had built a specific form of governance in the tribal regions by establishing links with specific

¹⁹⁸ Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 206.

groups among these tribes. While the main means of loyalty was the economic relationship between these subjects via taxes collected by the central government. When the constitutionalism with its liberal understanding of state-society relations began to be imposed by the Young Turk revolution, the nature of the existing relationship between the tribal chiefs and the state was meant to be changed for good.

McDowall explains the different responses of specific tribes towards these transformations were a result of the exclusionist nature of Ottoman governance.¹⁹⁹ While some tribes who were privileged with their links with Istanbul was against the demise of the sultan, the marginalized ones supported the revolutionary ideas and adapted to the new environment. In each case, Kurdish identity was not the primary factor that shaped societal dynamics at that time. While ethnic nationalism among Kurds was not the main concern in the development of demands from the Ottomans or later from the British, a special political structure for the Kurdish areas was always a part of the negotiations. However, what this special position was mainly depended on who represented Kurds. Turkification project of CUP government actually sparked the ethnic discourse among Kurds. While Abdulhamid II's Islamist understanding of society appealed to a larger part of the Ottoman population, Turkification had completely different meaning for ethnic groups of the empire. In other words, during the Tanzimat period and CUP government, the Kurdish mobilization was dominated by reactions against the centralist policies of Istanbul. This was mainly because centralist policies meant to create new governance mechanisms where bureaucrats from Istanbul dominated the economic and political relations. Still Kurdish nationalist mobilization occurred with the beginning of Turkish nationalist policies of the CUP government until the beginning of the first World War.

During the war Russian threat was very important for Istanbul government as the relations

¹⁹⁹ McDowall, 2007.

between Kurds and Russian was alive for a long time. Along with Armenians, Russia wanted to use the Kurdish and Armenian dissident without actually meaning to give independence for neither of them. It should also be noted here that this relation revolved around tribes in Eastern Anatolia rather than Southern Kurdistan region where Russian influence was very weak and the Armenian issue politicized Anatolian Kurds more than the other regions. As McDowall reports the situation in Sulaymaniyah as total disaster which caused drastic decline in population due to hunger and sickness.²⁰⁰ When British forces occupied Mosul and evacuated Ottoman forces from the region in 1918, they came with relief supplies which resulted in easy Kurdish acceptance of British presence.

After the First World War, two external actors had different visions about the future of Iraqi Kurdistan. The British was trying to establish their power over the newly established entity of Iraq with its colonial understanding of long-distance rule, while Mustafa Kemal's Turkey was trying to hold on to the remaining strategic territories of the Ottoman Empire. The future of the Kurdish population in Iraq especially in the Northern part of the country which was also called as the Southern Kurdistan was shaped under the influence of these two actors during the Mandate period.²⁰¹ Between these two external actors, there was an interplay between powerful Kurdish tribes in the region that build their own strategies which they thought as the best option available for them. In order to understand the identity dynamics of Kurds in Iraq we need to look at these two formulations and how the contradiction between them determined the shifting balances in the Iraqi society.

By the time the First World War started, the changes in the Ottoman political system and its reflections on the changing societal dynamics in these provinces became apparent with the growing animosities between the regional power elites and the central state. Still the

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 108; for another account on this period see, Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925* (TX: University of Texas Press, 1989).

²⁰¹ Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 77-86.

multi layered fractures in the society became more and more problematic as the opportunities for challenging the only unifying force among these different groups, the ottoman state, opened up new ways for different groups to shift their loyalties in time. British Empire was the first external power to get involved in regional politics, which was followed by the establishment of French mandate in Syria. Up until the independence of Iraq in 1932, the societal forces evolved around specific strings of opposition that reveals much about the societal dynamics of the period. The first mass societal movement was the 1920 revolt against the British rule that was defined as a tribal uprising rather than a popular one which signaled the clash of interest between the identity groups and the external actor. This revolt resulted in the formation of Iraqi Army due to low British military capacity to control such moves. This in return resulted in the high reliance on Sunni Arab army officers that started the long-lasting domination in the army. Also, the introduction of conscription further antagonized the tribes even more by challenging the inner security structures of the tribal system.²⁰²

3.3 STATE AND SOCIETY IN BRITISH IRAQ AND THE MONARCHY (1920-1958)

The official British presence in Iraq began with the invasion of Basra in 1914. In four years until the end of the war, British forces occupied Mosul ending the Ottoman rule officially. The main concern of the local population was to survive the fight between the two empires and there was not a unified action against neither Ottoman losses nor the British occupation.

The separation of Kurdish dominated areas of Northern Iraq from entire Kurdish regions

²⁰² In 1933, a year after Iraqi independence, according to estimates there were 100,000 rifles in tribal hands and 15,000 in the possession of the government, see Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 19.

of the Ottoman Empire was most clearly made during the negotiations on Mosul question between Turkish Republic and Britain. As the negotiations were made on territorial boundaries, the documentations by both sides to support their claim provides good clarifications over how demographic structure of Mosul. However, there are reasonable claims that the demographic data used during these negotiations are not reliable as they reflected political tendencies. Dündar's²⁰³ research on comparative analysis of demographic statistics used during Mosul question is enlightening because the classifications of identities and their representations draw the early boundaries of Kurdish region in Iraq.

The differences among these statistics represent the inability of collecting a coherent data about the demographic composition of the province. Still, the Kurdish population in each district shows that the number of Kurds are more than the other ethnic groups while the gap is significantly more in Sulaymaniyah district. On the other hand, the tribal composition of these districts is much more complex because of the high number of tribes and sometimes their nomadic nature as well as continuous mergers among tribes under confederations result in inconsistent presentation. Mark Sykes presents a very detailed map of the Kurdish tribes of the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Along with this mapping, he lists the tribes in the region and even the list presents the complex structure of Kurdish tribes and their religious and societal orientation.²⁰⁴

3.3.1 State and Society Under British Mandate (1920-1932)

1920 San Remo Conference confirmed British mandate in Iraq. While this decision legitimized British measures in the Iraqi territory, The British administrative institutions

²⁰³ Fuat Dündar “‘Statistiquo’ British Use of Statistics in the Iraqi Kurdish Question (1919–1932)”, *Crown Paper No 7, Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, 2012 1-64.

²⁰⁴ Sykes, Mark (1908) “Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*. Vol. 38, 451-486.

had already begun infusing their dominance over national politics. The confirmation of mandate in the conference sparked resistance among different groups especially in the Southern parts of the country, as the organization of rebel forces was already ongoing via societies formed during the last decade. Significantly however, when British government secured its position in Iraq, several reactionary forces began to appear among different groups. These groups organized under secret societies²⁰⁵ and generally they were against British occupation. They were the main inciters of the 1920 Revolt against the British occupation. In Mosul Sheikh Mahmoud was not satisfied for the position granted to Kurdish region as promised before the conference and started a resistance movement against the British administration. The hostility of the Shi'a in Iraq was first expressed by a *fatwa* issued in March 1920 by Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, a Shi'a authority, against British control and serving under British rule and his message was broadly circulated. Sunni Arab ex-Ottoman army officials also joined Shi'a revolt as their

²⁰⁵ ***Secret Societies in Iraq (1911-1919):***

Jim'yat al-Basra al-Islahiyya (The Reformist League of Basra) (1911): founded by Taleb al-Naqib (Sunni notable from Basra) advocated independence from Ottoman Empire.

al-Nadi al-Adabi (The Literary Club): formed in Baghdad 1911 and propagated Arab Nationalism

al-'Alam al-Akhdar (The Green Banner): Founded in Istanbul in 1912 by students to "strengthen ties among Arab students and to regenerate the Arab Nation"

al- Yadd al-Sawda (The Black Hand): Founded by a medical student, Arab Nationalism.

al-'Ahd (The Covenant): Ali al-Misri founded al-'Ahd (The Covenant), a compromise party that called for internal Arab autonomy within the framework of a loosely federated Ottoman Empire. Arab army officials serving in the Ottoman army firstly in Damascus formed the main body of the society. In short time, the group, acting more like a secret society began to expand its influence by opening branches in other Arab regions. Their main concern was about the oppressive and discriminative tendencies of the CUP government. Al-Ahd expanded to other provinces as well and opened branches in Mosul and Basra. The prominent figures in the Covenant were among the main actors of Arab Rebellion.

Jim'ya al-Islahiya of Basra (The Reformist League of Basra): Founded by Taleb al-Naqib a leading Sunni notable from Basra in 1911, with its own newspaper *al-Dustur* (The Constitution).

Jim'yat al-Nahda al- Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) It had a large and varied membership that included leading religious figures and many young journalists. This society was apparently involved in the assassination of the Political Officer in Najaf, Captain W. M. Marshall, in the hope of setting off a large-scale rebellion.

al-Jim'ya al-Wataniya al-Islamiya (The Moslem National League): Founded in Karbala. Its objective was to mobilize the population for resistance against the British occupation.

Haras al-Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence): founded in February 1919 in Baghdad, with branch offices in Hilla, Kut, Karbala and Najaf. The *Istiqlal* party represented an uneasy coalition of different groups united in their demand for immediate independence for the country. It was a coalition of Shi'a merchants, Sunni teachers, and civil servants, Sunni and Shi'a ulama, and Iraqi officers. The list of secret societies are drawn from different sources; Tripp 2007, Vinogradov 1972, Batatu 1978.

presence in Syria under Faisal was becoming more problematic.²⁰⁶ Although the revolt attracted high numbers of Iraqis, the scarce resources of the rebel groups as well as high number of casualties in Iraqi side resulted in a quick end to the 1920 revolt.²⁰⁷ When the British Empire understood the impossibilities of direct rule after the emergence of country-wide revolts in 1920 against imperialism with unique collaboration among different groups in the society mainly Shi'a and Kurds, the indirect rule was dominated by the British and the Indian officers until the establishment of Monarchy under Faisal. As Faisal himself did not have an organic support from the society because of the relatively remoteness of his actions in Syria that ended up being a fiasco at the end, he established his rule with the support of mainly exported ex-Ottoman officers who were almost entirely Sunni Arabs and helped Faisal during Arab revolt in the First World War.

After the 1920 revolt, the political structure of the state was to be decided at the Cairo Conference in 1921. The structure was to be a monarchy and the throne was offered to Faisal who fled Syria after French mandate was established. Later with the conference, Faisal became the King of a country where his legitimacy was nowhere to be consolidated, as the society could not relate itself to him at the beginning. His Sunni Arab identity accompanied the already hesitant perception of the other communities, mainly Kurds and Shi'a. Tripp points out the two themes of his rule as the King of Iraq; the independence from British control and integration of different communities within the Iraqi society (unification desire comes from urge to legitimize but reverse results at the end)²⁰⁸ The first theme was inevitably realized mostly because of the reasons exogenous to his rule, but the second one was not more than an illusion because of the exclusionist structure of the system he built from day one. One of the main reasons for this was the centralization of political organization of the new state in Baghdad. Both the periphery of

²⁰⁶ Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 34.

²⁰⁷ Iraqi casualties are reported over 8.450, see P. W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937).

²⁰⁸ Tripp 2007, 48.

the province and the identity politics in other big provinces remained in the local level and did not manifest themselves in the central political hub. So the marginalization of the other communities was reinforced from two ends of societal and political structure. The central political power used also the traditional structure of land ownership by granting leases to local tribes in order to make sure that they keep silent.

Another important point in the Mandate Period started with the discussions over a treaty between British and Iraqi state in order to legitimize the existing domination of British power over governance mechanisms. It was not surprising that Shi'a and Kurdish groups harshly opposed such an agreement which would make their marginal role in the political structure legitimized on paper, but also Faisal was not very enthusiastic about such an attempt as he himself did not want British to overextend their power. While the Electoral Law of 1922 allowed the emergence of two political parties led by Shi'a groups (*Watani* and *Nahda* Parties) their influence over the decision making did not go beyond mobilizing public resentments towards the Treaty.²⁰⁹ During the Mosul crisis especially, Shi'a *mujtahids* publicized their feelings against the ratification of the Treaty. Eventually British commissioner realized the potential fraction among the traditional religious leaders and the emerging generation that realized the reverse effects of the moves against political integration by the clerics of their community. When British offered Shi'a groups 40 percent of seats in the Constituent Assembly (the highest political institution of Iraqi government under Faisal), the influence of *mujtahids* declined rapidly.

Among all these problems going on in different areas of the society, the British passed the treaty by openly threatening the Assembly of taking extraordinary measures if the Treaty was rejected. Following the ratification, the new constitution was accepted which gave the executive great powers and also integrated powerful societal actors within the

²⁰⁹ Adeer Dawisha, *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation* (NJ: Princeton University Press: 2009), 26.

decision making process. Still the provision of the Mandate officers would be privileged and while the king would retain his power over the legislative.

The first major issue for the newly established Assembly was conscription. The issue was very important as the Military Agreements of 1924 gave the provision for the establishment of an Iraqi Army by 1928. However, by 1926 the existing armed forces were still very small in number and weak in capacity.²¹⁰ The security largely depended on British RAF. A universal conscription would address multiple problems of the consolidation period. First, national armed forces were seen as the primary requirement for independence. Second, the peripheral disturbances and revolts gave local tribes the upper hand in these conflicts (especially in the Kurdish areas of the North), which eroded the legitimacy of the central state. Also, it was believed that with universal conscription, different segments of the society would integrate to the system, which as a result would enable the extension of the power of central state. The last aspect of the national army issue created big grievances among the distant groups in the society because the idea of a centrally controlled army automatically challenged the nature of the tribal system, which has its own mechanisms of providing security.

The notorious Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 granted full independence in Iraq ending the mandate rule. Not only the treaty was dominated by the Sunni Arab political elite, who clearly disregarded the interest of marginalized groups (not necessarily minority), but also Kingdom of Iraq legitimized its already established political structure with this treaty. Independence did not create any change towards integration of different identity groups in the society, just the opposite; Sunni Arab elite ossified their status in the system further. This process was a product of disregard towards societal fractures in Iraq although clear signals for disloyalty by the marginalized groups were visible even before the treaty was

²¹⁰ Sluglett, 94-98.

signed.

3.3.2 Societal Security Problems in Mandate Iraq

During the period until the end of the First World War, Kurdish society struggled with changing political structures that directly affected the already built quite decentralized relations with the central state. When ideological and bureaucratic changes directly challenged the societal structures in the region, it resulted in a reactionary attitude by the Kurdish groups. Still their reactions were not unified as already mentioned Kurdish society was too fragmented to organize a general mobilization for their demands. The mandate period created an environment for Kurds where they could find more opportunities to voice their demands and these demands became more and more identity based. Sheikh Mahmoud, son of Sheikh Said a prominent religious figure, was the dominant actor in politicization of Kurdish issue after the war ended. He was the head of Barzinji family and also *sheikh* of the Qadiriyya Sufi Order in Sulaymaniyah where Kurds dominated the population. After the British forces invaded all Iraqi territories, Sheikh Mahmoud established the first government of Sulaymaniyah. While Sheikh Mahmoud had an administrative role in the new establishment, his desire for ruling the Kurdistan as the King region was not welcomed by every Kurdish tribe nor by the British. At the same time Mosul problem was a crucial issue for British to finalize the territorial arrangements of the Mandate. Before the negotiations over Mosul in the League of Nations, British government declared Mosul to be integrated to the Iraqi state in 1920. On the other hand, revolts and open disagreements by Kurds and also Turcoman in Kirkuk area over legitimacy of Faisal pushed British for harder measures against the dissident groups. At the same time, the new government in Ankara pushed towards the Mosul province both by military involvement and by linkages within the region.²¹¹ Up until the resolution of

²¹¹ Sluglett, 80.

Mosul issue in 1926 in British favor, Turkish and Kurdish alliance forced British to take military precautions especially in the area close to Turkish border. The alliance of Kurds with Turks was explained as being a pragmatic decision by both sides and the fact that Kurds were willing to be a part of Turkish state was an open ended claim.

The policy of British mandate regarding the Kurdish areas depended on the visions of two persons, Churchill and Cox.²¹² Documentation of their correspondence and memoirs show that while Churchill wanted Kurdish region as a separate political entity, Cox desired the unification of Kurds in Iraq mainly because of economic concerns and advantage of geographical structure of Kurdish region with its mountainous terrain which would create a buffer zone against possible Turkish offense. The complexity of tribal structure and resulting differences regarding the representation of different communities within Kurdish society surfaced a central problem for the British, which was to find a reliable source of regional power to ensure sustainable British rule.

The establishment of the new system was more problematic and complex for the British. Although to a certain extent Kurdish people joined Shi'a and Sunni groups during the 1920 revolts, the main problem in Mosul remained autonomy for the Kurdistan or even independence rather than becoming a part of the newly established state. The differences among Kurdish tribes in their aspirations worth noting at this stage as each powerful leader (most notably Sheikh Mahmoud) wanted to control the region and thus made their alliances accordingly.

²¹² Warren Dockter, *Churchill and the Islamic World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015)

3.3.3 Politics, Security and Society in Iraq after the Independence (1932-1958)

After its liberation from the Ottoman rule after the British invasion, Iraq has gone through turbulent political transformations that have direct impact on how society evolves politically and economically. In each factor mentioned here we can read construction and transformation of identity for each group in the society. From these three factors within the Iraqi society, it is possible to analyze the societal security in the country not only from the threats emerging out of the dilemmas created by these factors, but also the methods of response by identity groups. Since this study takes ethnic and religious identities as the referent point, through the history of the Iraqi state the Kurdish identity is manifested through tribalism, Iraqi nationalism, separatism. Similar account is valid for the Shi'a as well. As the study will try to show, in many periods more than sectarianism the conflict between Sunni and Shi'a escalated through economic and ideological differences beyond the underlying religious motivations. These layers of identity become vital when discussing the capacities of each identity group within the societal structure.

The administrative organization revolved around the Sunni identity which included Kurds but mainly dominated by Arabs who in return became "natural elite".²¹³ This centralization process inevitably excluded rural tribes and their leaders in the political structure which was the dominating societal structure among Shi'a. Concentrated in the Southern parts of the region, with significant exception of sacred cities of Najaf and Karbala that neighbors Baghdad.²¹⁴ For Shi'a the religious hierarchies are regulating the society along with the tribal mechanisms. For a long time, *Mujtahids* were the leaders of

²¹³ Marr, 7.

²¹⁴ These two cities are considered as sacred by the Shi'a Islam and were centers of pilgrimage that received visitors mainly from Iran. These cities are considered as highly rich in terms of intellectual development of Shiism in Iraq and became centers of political activity representing the Shi'a in Iraq as well.

the Shi'a population and they regulate the everyday life of this group from education to legal issues or economic management. As the Shi'a education remained entirely religious one, the integration of Shi'a to emerging modern bureaucratic institutions was either improbable by this self-exclusion or by *fatwas* from religious authorities against secularization of state structure. This situation endured long into the independence as Shi'a itself perceived the secularist intrusions as a threat their identity.

This military and Sunni Arab elite established their roots in the societal structure in the country very quickly as the natural extension of Sunni Arab support for these bureaucrats enabled them to create the image of the society from their lenses. For example, Sati al-Husri, one of the most prominent figures of this period to the Iraqi state in the next decades, was an educational professional holding important posts in Syria (he was himself a wealthy Syrian educated in Istanbul and appointed to the region by the Empire) both during the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate became one of the most important figures of Arab nationalism in Iraq and founded the basis of Iraqi education system from a very Arab nationalistic underground. The presence of ideologues such as al-Husri enabled the domination of Sunni Arab nationalism in the official ideology of the state that was beginning to take shape in this period. This nationalist and ethnic oriented composition of the elite resulted in the elimination of a civic identity idea for the Iraqi society.

This situation in the ideological creation of Iraqi state was not different in its institutions. When the Iraqi military was established after the Cairo Conference in 1921 along with the Monarchy, it was to be under direct provisions of the British forces in the region (RAF). As Tarbush points out the ex-Sharifian and ex-Ottoman army officers would be best controlled by offering them regular posts with regular salaries. These people were seen as potential threat to British rule because of their nationalist aspirations that could

find roots in the society against British.²¹⁵ We see from Tarbush' statistic that when the first military coup happened 82% of 61 senior army officers were with Ottoman army background while they were unexceptionally all Sunnis. On the other hand, Shi'a conscripts were on purpose excluded from the high ranks of army and after the conscription was introduced, the low ranks of the army were recruited from the Shi'a south.

Another vital institution that reflected the societal realities of the time was the composition of the first parliament. While the first parliament in 1925 had almost equal number of Sunni and Shi'a members, there were also four Jewish and four Christian in the parliament²¹⁶ (their ethnic orientation is not mentioned in the book but required additional review).²¹⁷ Still when we look at the societal orientation of the members the tribal interests dominated political structure in these years as popular representation was not available for a substantial extent.²¹⁸ While the British and the monarchical control over government mechanisms did not allow the parliament to act as a democratic institution in the decision making, the composition is important to see the reflection of societal structure and interest groups in the political system is valuable. On the Kurdish side these years up until the resolution of Mosul question with the newly established Turkish Republic is more complicated than this.

The northern areas of Iraq had been susceptible to external penetrations long before the end of the war. The Kurdish groups in the Iranian side of the border had been an issue of influence that expanded in other territories and Kurdish tribes. After the establishment of

²¹⁵ Mohammad A. Tarbush, *The Role of Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941* (London: KPI, 1982), 77.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-59.

²¹⁷ The only works I encountered about this issue is in one dissertation (Nil Seda Şatana in 2006) where it is mentioned that 6 Kurdish deputies in the parliament made a request for autonomy in 1929. Another is Arthur Campbell Turner's article "Kurdish Nationalism," *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, eds. Peter J. Chelkowski, Robert J. Pranger (UK: Duke University Press, 1988), 379-412.

²¹⁸ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 29.

the British mandate this influence was expected to fade but especially Turkish government began to penetrate the Kurdish areas by actively intervening in the disputed Mosul province. Because of the failure of British to hold their promises for granting autonomy to Kurds, the natural point of opposition for Kurds was against British control similar to Shi'a, the other religious community more than an ethnic awareness. Sheikh Mahmoud, from Kurdish origin, of Suleymania was the main actor played with British interests and he was appointed as the governor of Suleymania who in short time tries to expand his influence beyond this city and tried to eliminate other big tribes such as Barzan from being a part of any political negotiations. He was later toppled down by the British again because his expansionist tendencies. At the same time British used some supporting tribes against others by making them a part of military organizations in the north, the most notable one being Kurdish tribal revolts in the region that was brutally crushed by British air bombings and cooperative Kurds.²¹⁹ Later the resolution of Mosul question on the British interest enabled the mandate government to push for greater measures against Kurdish revolts in the region.

As elaborated by Marr, the discussions in the first parliament revolving around two strands of societal facts.²²⁰ While on the one side the nationalist, mainly urban notables, defended the establishment of political parties and press that would foster public inclusion in the politics, strong Shi'a opposition, who were largely excluded from political mechanisms and decision making, that fostered further alienation of Shi'a from the system with a certain degree of isolationism of religious leadership that closed the ways for political activism by *fatwas*.²²¹ And the third opposition was against the monarchy imposed Anglo-Iraqi treaty that deepened tribal urban dilemma as the monarchy tried to cultivate support for the treaty by granting land rights to tribes at the expense of urban

²¹⁹ McDowall, *A History of Kurds*, 155-163.

²²⁰ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 31-32.

²²¹ Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 55.

political figures.²²²

The presence of British rule in Iraq had negative impacts on the institutionalization of constitutional system which was already dominated by the unbalanced power relationship between the king as the executive and the parliament as the legislative branch. While British dominated both realms, the inability of making autonomous decision for the domestic actors became the reason for the failure of creating a cohesive socio-political structure and culture. This structure was too much infested by the tribal and elite interest and even after the removal of official British control after the independence the influence of it did not diminish. Still the power vacuum created by the removal of British bureaucratic presence left domestic actors with intensifying problems of economy, sectarianism and ethnic problems. Focused very much on their own interests in the system the politicians and the king found it hard to deal with these domestic problems. All the above this incapacity was the result of the absence of legitimacy of these political institutions that lacked popular representation and support from the society.

The founding interest of the dominant Arab nationalists while reconstructing the domestic structures depended on the regional developments with regard to rising Arab nationalism and the growing discussions over Arab unity. This group dominated the ideological interests of the newly independent state and focused largely on these regional developments rather than dealing with the domestic problems. On the other hand, a group of social reformers in the parliament pushed for development oriented agendas to respond popular demands and problems. These two diverging ideas resulted in several coup attempts from 1936-41 that threatened the constitutional structure of the state.²²³ This period of political turmoil ended with the second invasion of British forces that started another problematic period that ended with the 1958 coup that radically transformed the

²²² Marr, 30.

²²³ Stansfield, G. and Liam Anderson, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 18.

country. After the domestic problems surfaced with the first coup by General Bakr Sidqi. 1933 Assyrian Affair that resulted in the complete elimination Iraqi Levies²²⁴ showed the increasing capacity of the Iraqi Army after the introduction of conscription. On the other hand, the renewed conscription bill resulted in tribal revolts especially in the south because of the reasons mentioned before the threat from expansion of state into tribal and religious structure among Shi'a being the primary one.

Another significant societal problem that had a reflection on all identity groups was the land regulations initiated in the early years of the state. After Land Settlement Law was introduced in 1933, the urban migration increased a lot as the law pushed for a more competitive environment for land ownership in which low income peasants were not involved. Still as a precaution for mass migrations to urban centers by these low income peasants, the state introduced another law in 1933 that banned the employment of peasants especially in urban centers if they had debts. The agricultural system itself functioned with seasonal debts and this deteriorated the economic conditions in the urban centers where lack of enough employment opportunities already hardened economic integration of these people. At the same time, conscription challenged the tribal system more than ever expanding the army and increasing the military expenditures. So when the 1936 military coup occurred, it diminished the consolidation of societal transformation especially on the economic aspect.

Still the underlying ideological aspirations behind the coup tells a lot about the mindset of the military elite in the country. The rising dictatorship in Europe in the 30's accompanied by the democratic socialism of the British model created a distinct perspective for the post-coup construction of the society. On the other hand, the country witnessed the transformation of the elite ideology with the increasing presence of British

²²⁴ The army of North established by British and comprised Assyrian immigrants and some Kurdish tribes was called as Iraqi Levies. This army was especially used against Kurdish revolts in the North in the early phase of British occupation.

educated reformist political figures that pushed for Iraqi first ideology leaving Arab nationalism aside to a great extent. One of the most significant results of this shift came in foreign policy as the Sadabad Pact was signed by the government in 1937 which signaled a great shift away from the Arab alliance.

However, domestically Sidqi's identity, being a Kurd but not a Kurdish nationalist, was an issue of contestation among the dominating Arab nationalist in the Army.²²⁵ Also he gained more enemies among the Arab elites that formed *Ahali* group because of his authoritarian tendencies and the lack of trust to him about the social reforms he promised. After the assassination of Sidqi in 1937 and subsequent resignation of Hikmet Suleiman's government (a reformist from *Ahali* Group) resulted in the removal of leftists from political power and replaced again by the Arab nationalists and conservative landlords.²²⁶ However, the clashes between left and conservatives continued for a long time creating more instabilities in the system.

After what happened in 1937, regional and global problems found their ways to infiltrate into the domestic turbulence in Iraq. With the increasing presence of the army in politics after several coup attempts, the balance in the relation between the citizens and the army deteriorated while at the same time the clash between Arab nationalist and pro-British stance became very problematic in the political system. At the same time, the intensifying Palestinian problem and the fact than Amin al-Huseini came to Baghdad after he escaped Palestine pushed the King to adopt a more pro-Arab stance. The Second World War also surfaced the ties with the British and the anti-British opinions along with the domestic problems of military interventions opened the way for British to make the second invasion in 1941.

²²⁵ He was quoted in Tarbush (1982) as being a pure Turk and an admirer of Mustafa Kemal along with Suleiman but in his strict measures in Turkey, not in his reformist policies.

²²⁶ Marr, 49.

This changed a lot on the societal and state level. First, the influence of the army was reduced as well as the numbers. Considering the assistance from Italy and Germany to General al-Gaylani targeting the pro-British government, this move was justified by the invading forces in line with the British interest. Second, national education system, which was increasingly becoming nationalist, was changed. And lastly, the composition of the cabinet was changed and more Shi'i and Kurdish members were included in it. Within all these processes that targeted to the removal of Arab nationalist figures from the system, the left led by the *Ahali* group was encouraged to take part.

The year 1945 experienced the liberalization of the system first by granting certificates to political parties and revised the electoral law. Although five parties were granted permission two of them survived which represented the main diverging forces in the society. *Al-Istiqlal* party represented the anti-British and Pan-Arab ideology and its Shi'a leader was Muhammad Mahdi Kubba. Both Sunni and Shi'a supported the party while there were no Kurds in the party cadre.²²⁷ The other political party was the National Democratic Party led by Kamil al-Chadirci from Ahali group and it represented a more socialist-reformist program. This party was supported by the minority groups and left leaning middle class. On the other hand, Communist party was present as an underground organization while it was organized significantly better than the other two parties.²²⁸ The power of the Iraqi Communist Party became contentious when almost 5000 workers of the Iraqi Petroleum Company started a strike incited and supported by the Communist party in Kirkuk. Police violently crushed the strike leaving at least 10 dead and more than 20 wounded.²²⁹ While it was understood by the British and the monarchy that the Communist Party should be dealt with more carefully, the incident had another result.

When Nuri Al-Said's government resigned after Kirkuk incident (for the 4th time), the

²²⁷ Orit Bashkin, *The Other Iraq* (CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 95.

²²⁸ Marr.

²²⁹ James DeFronzo, *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (PA: Westview Press, 2009), 33.

first Shi'i Prime Minister Sayyid Salih Jabr founded the new cabinet. After his short tenure for almost one year he was to be followed by another Shi'i Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr who would last for only 5 months.²³⁰ Still Jabr managed to convince British to leave the country with a renewal of the notorious Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 which ended up bringing more control by the British with the measures against pro-Axis tendencies within the society and politics. This move by the government sparked the *Wathbah* Uprising in 1948 in Baghdad which was the first student led protest in the country. Both student branches of the Communist and other two parties joined the movement accompanied by the intensifies worker strikes all over the country. The level of foreign resentment became very apparent at the same time the rise of communist and Arab nationalist sentiment spread to the growing number of students in the urban centers as well as the worker and middle class citizens. The impact of these movements remained largely limited to the urban centers where the economic problems were more apparent than the rural areas.

Within all these turbulent times, the account of Jewish Community in Iraq should not be skipped within the domestic arena.²³¹ The impacts of Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine inevitably spread to Iraq where the Arab nationalist sentiment was very high when the conflict escalated into war in 1948. Already labeled as pro-British and alienated from the larger segments of the society, Jewish minority began to witness pressure from other identity groups. The economic status of Jewish community was well established both in financial institutions of the state and industrial sector that was barely emerging at the time. When almost entire Jewish community migrated to Israel.

During 1949, newspapers and politicians increasingly called for the expulsion of the Jews and expropriation of their property. In the summer of 1949, proposals for exchanging

²³⁰ From 1941 to until Qasim came to power under Baath in 1958, 26 prime ministers formed cabinets in the Iraqi parliament which is a signal of political instability. (<http://rulers.org/ruli.html#iraq>)

²³¹ At the end of the Second World War an estimated 88.000 Jews were living in Iraq making up more than 3% of the population, Michael Eppel, *Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam* (FL: University of Florida Press, 2004).

populations were raised. Prime Minister Nuri al-Said proposed that 100,000 Jews would emigrate from Iraq, and in exchange Iraq would absorb 100,000 Palestinian refugees. Such suggestions simultaneously served the pan-Arabic image of Iraq, satisfied nationalist public opinion within Iraq, and addressed the Israeli question, a cause of agitation which was troubling and dangerous to the ruling elite. Proposals for the exchange of populations were also raised as feelers in settling the Israeli-Arab conflict after the end of the 1948 war in Israel.²³²

When Iraqi parliament took a decision to freeze the properties of Jews in the country, the economic presence of the community diminished overnight. From 1950 to 1952, 112,000 Iraqi Jews moved to Israel, leaving behind fewer than 6,000 Jews in Iraq.²³³ More than being a mere demographic change, the migration of Jewish community created a vacuum in the emerging economy of Iraq which was to be filled largely by the Christians and Shi'is.

1950's experienced a rapid integration to oil economy in Iraq as the international and domestic investments increased a lot in the post-war global economy. The high amount of economic input was used by Nuri Al-Said's government for domestic development as high amount of money was invested in agricultural sector with dams in the North and irrigation systems all over the river line. However, this development lead in agriculture was not true for education, healthcare and industrialization areas which remained weak for a long time.

Along with the unstable domestic environment, Nuri's government took bold moves in foreign policy as well. Like the Sadabad pact that was considered as a move against Pan-Arabism, Baghdad pact signed in 1955 reinforced the non-Arab alliance that Nuri Al-Said was supporting against the increasing influence of Nasser in the Arab World. The open

²³² Eppel, 91-92.

²³³ Ibid., 92.

hostility between Nasser and Said escalated into a domestic problem as well. When the Suez Crisis broke out, an immediate domestic uprisings began in especially Shi'a and Kurdish areas because of the anti-British sentiments. Not long after the crisis, al-Said began to work for a federation between Iraq and Jordan as a response to the United Arab Republic that was established between Egypt and Syria in 1958 but it lasted only for months as 14th of July revolution started in the same year by Qasim and Arif ending the Hashemite monarchy.

The era of monarchy can be assessed through the evolution of societal structure under the British influence whose legacy was long felt in the Iraqi politics and society creating serious instabilities in many areas in the country as a result of weak leadership and lack of economic resources for development. On the one hand modern state institutions were established during this period and oil economy began to increase economic development. On the other, the political structure led by the close circle of elites in the tribal and feudal system resulted in the alienation of the emerging middle class in the urban areas from political participation and decision making. As Marr concludes, the interest of the regime clashed with the idea of democratic ideology that would integrate Iraqi society.²³⁴

3.4 JULY 1958 REVOLUTION AND MILITARY RULE

From this socio-political situation, Qasim rose as the leader of military rule that started another period of military in politics that was to become another source of societal threat in Iraq for a long time. His Kurdish background proved to be both a positive and negative for societal development while he turned the regime into a military dictatorship shortly after he became the leader of the country after the revolutionary coup. The central decision-making committee of his free officer movement had no Kurds involved while

²³⁴ Ibid., 94.

all the 14 members were from middle, lower middle and poor families which represented a clear opposition to the elite driven politics of the country so far. Kurdish rights were recognized in the general program while Arab unity was a persistent theme.²³⁵ Also, Qasim's first cabinet included people from nearly all identity groups within the country as well as representing different ideological movements. Apparently, his cabinet was also a mix of different ideological currents in the country mainly drawn from nationalist and left, the constitution blocked democratic process in the government making cabinet a mere institution without any political power. Especially when it comes to military and power structure, Qasim and Arif was very careful not to share the control mechanisms. The political moves towards more integrationist political structure was necessary for Qasim to build legitimacy domestically. The Communist strand in the leftist movement was a significant issue to deal with in the wake of the Cold War and the US backed Qasim for his ability to control the Communists in the country.²³⁶ Qasim was able to control Communist party that was still illegal and powerful by granting political representation in the parliament.

The economic background of the leaders of 1958 coup antagonized the old societal classes who were against the liberal views of Qasim in terms of political participation. With a clear socialist agenda, Qasim acted against the interest of the Arab elite who had been the primary source of political power. This resulted in the Mosul revolt in 1959 incited by the Arab Sunni families (especially Shamar tribe) with the help of the army officers who were against Qasim's moves away from Arab nationalism. This incident was significant as this time Kurds and Communists helped the regime to crush this revolt by wealthy Arab Sunni families and there was a complete chaos in the province as there were lootings and killings targeting these families by these groups. After this incident, Ba'athists seeing this an

²³⁵ McDowall, *The History of Modern Kurds*, 304.

²³⁶ Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Iraq, The Situation, NSC Action 2068. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Symmes and sent through Murphy. June 3, 1959.

opportunity to topple Qasim because of his inefficient governance, this attempt failed while solidified Qasim's hold on power.

Another incident occurred in Kirkuk, an oil-rich city with a mixed demography with strong Turkmen and Kurdish population, during celebrations by the Communist Party for the anniversary of the revolution. The event resulted in conflict between Kurds and Turkmens and the attacks were significantly targeted to Turkmens of the city.²³⁷ While the government made it clear that they were against such attacks against the citizens of the country, first there were no precautions against such an incidents and the Communist party's involvement was not questioned later.

In 1960, Qasim made a move towards promoting political reform by licensing political parties. While no Arab nationalist party got license, a number of parties were able to emerge. The Iraqi Communist Party (the one that supports Qasim) and the National Democratic Party got license. Kurdistan Democratic Party was licensed along with one conservative the Islamic party. Qasim was determined to keep the number of parties limited and without any sectarian tendency. While at the first instance, the Islamic Party led by Shi'as and the Tahrir Party was denied license, the Islamic Party earned its right by appealing to court because of the powerful leader of the party.²³⁸

The next step for Qasim was to intervene the economy and legal system. The whole legal structure was reformed into common and civil law and he removed the notorious Tribes law that privileged tribes in the system. Instead, he introduced more socialist economic regulations like cooperatives as a part of land reforms which actually helped large tribal farmers rather than peasants.

Among all these reforms at the state level, the societal fractions began to go deeper as the

²³⁷ Batatu, 918-19.

²³⁸ Marr, *Modern History of Iraq*, 95-96.

exclusion of Shi'is from the political system (mainly because of the religious orientations of the political activism among Shi'a community) resulted in more religiously motivated activism within the community. Two organizations come forward in emphasizing this tendency. The Society of Ulama was representing the old societal structure of the Shi'a community as the organization was controlled by prominent religious figures especially in holy places like Najaf. The other one *Da'wa* was the younger version of the previous one as it was organized by young clerics with more liberal views about the integration of Shi'a community in the modern state system.²³⁹ *Da'wa* leader Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr was to become an important figure as the opposition to militarist government and later Ba'athists in the years to come.

During the decade of 1960's Iraqi state started the longest offensive against Kurds in the North of Iraq. After Barzani was pardoned and returned from exile after the revolution of 1958, he began to mobilize *peshmerga* forces which signaled the militarization of Kurdish activism from this period on. During this early phase Peshmerga forces increased their number as Qasim frequently made use of these forces against nationalist revolts in the Northern provinces especially in Mosul.²⁴⁰ Also the opening of *Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê* (Kurdistan Democratic Party – KDP) as a political party increased hopes among Kurds under Qasim's rule. KDP became increasingly a party where the ideological composition of the higher party members was of urban intellectuals who supported Kurdish autonomy and anti-imperialism. Barzani on the other hand represented the old societal structure of the North, a highly tribalized society where Barzani could play his cards in his own favor as a result of land reforms that increasingly disturbed landowners in the Kurdish community. Still he became the first leader of KDP owing to his capacity to mobilize support for Kurdish cause.

²³⁹ Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

²⁴⁰ McDowall, *A Modern History of Kurds*.

While Kurds began to be more active part of political life after the revolution, Qasim started to alter his views about Kurds. The more he used them for his own fight against the nationalists, the more Barzani intensified his claims on Kurdish rights and autonomy. When Qasim failed to meet Kurdish demands, Barzani now used his forces against the Iraqi army. This was a battle where Qasim was advantageous due to his large scale control of the army, while Barzani was able to succeed against the national army because of the lack of willingness among army officers to forward the army to the mountainous areas of the North.²⁴¹ During this time *Fursan* was organized among pro-government Kurdish tribes started to confront Barzani directly and at the same time began looting the Barzani villages.²⁴² Until the Ba'athist coup in 1963, the conflict went on in Barzani's favor. Still, the inner conflict within Kurdish community namely between Barzani and Talabani mounted along with Ibrahim Ahmad, whose ideas about the future of Kurds diverged from Barzanis. The main reason behind this split was their different sociopolitical and ideological background. While Barzani being a *Naqshbandiyya* sheikh and a tribal chief acted more conservatively about his views on power. On the other hand, the other two, especially Ibrahim Ahmad was from an urban background and they were intellectuals whose ideology was closer to communist party. This clash resulted in the expulsion of both Talabani and Ahmad from KDP as Barzani was obviously the stronger one to use coercion against them. He was already prepared for any kind of challenge to his monopoly of power over Kurdish movement as he was the one who mobilized Kurds into armed force in the first place. Both Talabani and Ahmad remained second to his authority, a pattern that is valid even today.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 312.

²⁴² *Fursan* (the Fursan Salah al-Din or Salahaddin Knights or Light Brigades) was described as Kurdish tribal troops that supported the Iraqi government against their tribal enemy Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who referred to them by the better known term *josh*, or "little donkeys." According to Michael M. Gunter, "the Fursan played a role similar to the Hamidiye in the Ottoman Empire and the village guards during Turkey's war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the 1980's and 1990's," *The A to Z of Kurds* (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 100.

Before the coup, Kurds began to build alliances against Qasim as Barzani believed that either the communists or the Ba’thist would topple him down because of his relentless precautions against any opposition by either of them. While the communists apparently did not have enough power to incite such move, Kurds made deals with Ba’thists for not to use the weakness of the army in the North while they staged the coup in Baghdad.²⁴³ In return, they hoped to be granted full autonomy. Indeed, after the coup the government made an announcement for the release of prisoners of previous conflicts with the army. The reason behind this Ba’th - Kurdish alliance was obvious as Barzani did not believe that communists were powerful enough to topple Qasim because of their regional establishment and he managed to get promises from them enough to trust them.

It was obvious that on the Kurdish side, the foundations of new activism were being planted after Qasim pardoned Barzani to return Baghdad from exile. While Qasim was expecting Barzani to support him because of his inclusionary moves towards Kurdish identity, Barzani started to seek for his own interests as soon as he got back to the country. During the 60’s he managed to form a coalition with Jalal Talabani whose movement was more a leftist movement that was in conflict with Barzani’s conservative ideology and he managed to form his guerilla forces that was to become *peshmerga* force. Until 1963 Ba’ath Coup, Barzani penetrated the state with continuous revolts with the greater help from Kurdish military officers deserted the army. Still Barzani’s forces was still weak and he relied on his cooperation with Iran. This growing discontent among Kurds in the North became a point of change with the Ba’ath was planning the 1963 Coup.

3.4.1 1963 Coup and the Beginning of Ba’thist Era

Phebe Marr considers 1963 Coup as the beginning of an era where “the foundations of

²⁴³ Ibid, 313.

the state and its collective identity would be further eroded.”²⁴⁴ Indeed, the legacy of militarization that began in late 1930’s deepened the political instability in the country which resulted in further fractionalization in society. There were only two Kurds in the post-coup cabinet and the balance of power in the political system changed drastically giving the National Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC – the core executive body formed by the leader officers of the coup which concentrated the decision-making power in their hands) the upper hand in the political structure. While the Ba’th Party tried to hold its grip to power by turning back again to tribal support. The problems of the Ba’th rule in Iraq faced two problems in this period, one from within and another from outside.

The most important domestic problem was the situation in the Kurdish regions that began to deteriorate even more after the coup. The more Kurds demanded from the party the more offensive the state became towards Kurds. The unrest within Kurdish regions resulted in militarization of Kurdish areas of the North. In order to compensate for their inferior capacity, Kurds turned back to their counterparts in Iran that resulted in the expansion of Kurdish movement across Iranian border with aids and ammunition from Iran. The offensives by the state increased this cooperation to a larger extent and Kurds were successful in defending themselves with the help of these aids. Both with the failure of the regime to deal with Kurdish dissent and the ability of Kurds to create alliances for themselves beyond borders started splits in political and military wings. This was also partly a result of the ruthless treatment of the regime of its own citizens.

The regional problem that Ba’thists faced was Nasser’s increasing power and ownership of Arab Nationalism. The rise of Ba’athism in Syria and Iraq eventually meant for Nasser to share his desired power over Arab community. Also Nasser alienated Iraqi Ba’th because of the domestic problems (especially the Kurdish problem) he did not want to

²⁴⁴ Marr, 58.

share responsibility. On the other hand, Ba'th in Syria was more radical than the Iraqi one as the moderates in Iraq were more powerful for some time. However, post-coup president Abdal Salam Arif was a strong Arab Nationalist and a loyal follower of Nasserism which resulted in the radicalization of Arab Nationalism and socialist economic programs in Iraq as well. In order to avoid the failures of earlier nationalist and military governments, Arif was determined to eliminate all of his opponents and avoid ideological splits in the ruling cadre. But his ambition was a result of the events in 1963 that made him the sole authority in the country.

The rivalry between Qasim and Arif resulted in the execution of Qasim after his denial of Arif's leadership after 1958 coup. In 1963 Arif needed the coalition with non-Ba'thist elements in the country to establish a more permanent rule which also aimed at creating a more heterogeneous political participation. However, as the relations with Nasser failed to maintain an Arab unity scheme, the conflict between Arif, a still strong Nasserist, and Ba'th party escalated. The failure of Ba'thist coup in Syria two months after Iraqi coup weakened the party in Iraq and Arif who continued to follow Nasser despite the failed attempt for Arab unity reformed the government by eliminating almost all Ba'thist elements from the cabinet. This internal conflict among the military elites in the country also resulted in further alienation of Shi'a from the political system as these internal conflicts did not harm the strong Sunni domination among the political and military elite.

CHAPTER FOUR

DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BA'THIST IRAQ

(1968 – 2003)

"The poison of Sunni-Shi'a sectarianism and of Arab-Kurdish bitterness, either one of which is enough to kill Iraq, are today working together to tear the country apart. The division of the country is already being acted out in people's hearts, before it is played out on the ground at the cost of untold numbers of Iraqi dead. No Iraqi is immune any longer, everyone has become infected. Virulent strains of nationalism and sectarianism are more forces for change even the best elements in the Iraqi opposition pretend otherwise. Where do we Iraqis go from here?"²⁴⁵

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The growing popularity of Ba'th Party in Iraq in mid-1960's is an outcome of multiple interconnected societal concerns over state, governance, economy and other issues that deeply affected every segment of the society. The rise the Ba'th Party to power was acclaimed to end the instability in the country that crippled any developmental scheme that was required to strengthen the society and the economy not to mention the state institutions. However, over a very short period of time, the Ba'th party regime proved that it was not the solution for the decades of problems. On the contrary, the societal demands over political rights, welfare and citizenship were challenged by the regime.

²⁴⁵ Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993) quoted in Ahmed Chalabi, "Opposing Saddam Hussein," *The Brown Journal of Foreign Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Winter 1993-1994): 119.

First, because of the increasing authoritarian and party-based policy orientation of the Ba’thist regime which favored Sunni-Arab domination in the overall structural institutions of the country. Second, as a result of the policies initiated by the party which polarized the societal groups and deepened the discontents among non-Sunni and non-Arab groups in society in different levels and by different means.²⁴⁶ While there was a high number of non-Sunni and non-Arab people that were recruited in the civil service or within the Ba’th Party, this was mainly a product of the system or “rewards and punishments” created by Saddam Hussein.²⁴⁷ The process that resulted in the rise of the Ba’th party to power is analyzed here by giving priority to which threats emerged against which societal group during this period from a societal security perspective.

This chapter tries to comprehend the dynamics of societal (in)security in Iraq between the years 1968 and 2003 based on the sectoral analysis of societal security. The socio-political and socio-economic engineering that the Ba’th Party initiated in order to forcefully consolidate its power resulted in the deepening of societal grievances.²⁴⁸ The Iraqi society was not exposed to threats by the regime from a single policy area. Rather, the regime’s execution of its own agenda based on societal identity reached multiple aspects of social life from direct state coercion to economy, education, culture and other areas that makes the analysis of this environment of insecurity significantly complex.

Accordingly, this chapter offers a sectoral perspective on these societal security issues by compartmentalizing the threats to societal security based on five areas: political, military,

²⁴⁶ Nakash, *The Shi’s of Iraq*, 137.

²⁴⁷ While the system of punishment is a recurrent theme in most writings of Iraqi history many of which is cited in this research, for an interesting discussion on the reward system created by the Ba’th Party see, Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ith Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Amatzia Baram describes this policy of rewards and punishment as “stick and carrot” or *al-taghrīb wal-tarḡīb* (attraction and intimidation) with the same emphasis on divide and rule policy of the regime towards the Kurdish and Shi’a community. Amatzia Baram *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'ithist Iraq, 1968-89* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 18-22.

²⁴⁸ Eric Davis, “The Museum and the Politics of Social Control in Modern Iraq”, in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 90-91.

religious, cultural and economic. This sectoral perspective enables a better grasp of the nature of societal dynamics in Iraq as the ethnic and religious groups in society had different agenda for their respective identity *vis-à-vis* the Sunni-Arab core. While the analysis concentrates on the societal insecurities that non-Sunni Arab groups perceived and experienced, it is critical to acknowledge that the Sunni-Arab population is not an exemption in the Ba'th oppression by any means. It was agenda of societal (in)security that changed with respect to the societal groups in question.

While in some cases identity groups in Iraqi society prioritized a specific claim for survival in their relationship with the regime (as in the case of Shi'a Arabs having mainly religious based identity concerns or Kurds being discriminated because of their non-Arab ethnicity), in other cases all non-Sunni and non-Arab societal groups were targeted based on structural violence against societal diversity (such as attempts for cultural homogenization by the center or the use of coercive actions against opposition groups). Therefore, this compartmentalization is necessary in order to present the particularities of the societal engineering of the Ba'th party based on collective identity.

The claim here is not that societal insecurities had not existed before the Ba'th Party came to power. Indeed, to a great extent the acute societal turmoil was among the main reasons which led Ba'th to power in Iraq in 1968. Prior to the Ba'thist rule, the monarchical period was dominated by the tensions emanating from the presence of British control as an external power and rising influence of the Arab nationalist ideology. After the fall of the monarchy, the military dominated the course of politics with continuous coups resulting significant instability in the country. The Ba'th party on the other hand, managed to hold on to power for 35 undisrupted years which was unprecedented in Iraqi history. But at what cost? The Ba'thist period in Iraq deserves a specific attention due to the complexity of the relationship between state and society as well as between security and societal identities. This research looks at these 35 year in the history of Iraq from a societal security-oriented perspective. From this societal lens, the dynamics of state-society

relations and how security is perceived by both the state and the society are analyzed. From this analysis, this chapter seeks to comprehend the societal dynamics of security in Ba’thist Iraq, which has not been covered in an academic research so far.

The analysis in this chapter is presented in the following structure. For each security issue or in other words for each area of societal threat (identified in the context of this study as political, military, religious, cultural and economic), the agenda of societal security will be identified and the actors and the referent objects of each area will be presented. In each security sector covered in this research, the dynamics of how three elements of societal security (threats, actors and referent objects) operated within the case of Ba’thist Iraq will be discussed. From this analysis, the processes that created societal (in)securities in Ba’thist Iraq and the reactions from the actors within the society is presented in order to establish the link between the nature of state-society relations and societal (in)security.

4.2 POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BA’THIST IRAQ

The regime and the army were the core institutions of state formation and state building process after the independence of Iraq in 1932. Still, these processes were top-down, dominated by the bureaucratic and military elite under the control of the British Empire.²⁴⁹ The British established the parliamentary, the judiciary and a modern bureaucratic system, and allowed the establishment of political parties. However, the political sphere was dominated and strictly controlled by the British first and the monarchy second. The system of constitutional monarchy was created under the British model but could not consolidate itself within the society in terms of both quality and

²⁴⁹ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001).

capacity.²⁵⁰ The implications of this failure resulted in an unstable form of state-society relations.

The 1958 revolution was a product of growing resentment within the society and especially among the military officers, who were the strongest bureaucratic class, about the reliance of the monarchy to the British agenda on regional politics. For Hanna Batatu, the main reason behind the revolution was this “irreconcilable conflict existed between the monarchy and the needs of Iraq” from the perspective of military officers.²⁵¹ When the Ba’th Party came to power in 1968, after a decade of military rule, the success of the establishment of the new regime was also secured with the help of the significant portion of the military officers.²⁵² Without the democratic values that would flourish liberal ideas within the society, Iraq was not an exception in the concentration of power in the hands of a leader or ‘hypermilitarization’²⁵³ that defined state-society relations under the control of the Ba’th regime. The political position of the regime defined the relationship between the state and society. This relationship was constructed upon the Ba’th Party’s intelligent combination of the use of violence and rewarding mechanisms at the same time. While from the political terminology this system was authoritarianism, what the society experienced during this period was labeled by Kanan Makiya as the ‘republic of fear’.²⁵⁴

The type of political system established in Iraq and its transformation from the initial British controlled monarchy to the republic was shaped under the fear-oriented relationship was established in the post-independence period. Before Ba’th regime came to power in 1968, the army was the uncontested source of political power which caused

²⁵⁰ Ahmed S. Hashim, “Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq,” *Middle East Policy* 10, no.4 (2003): 30.

²⁵¹ Hanna Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 767.

²⁵² Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq’s Armed Forces: An analytical history* (London: Routledge, 2008), 112.

²⁵³ Isam al-Khafaji, “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: The Case of Ba’thist Iraq” in *War, Institutions and Social Change*, ed. Steven Heydemann, 258-291.

²⁵⁴ Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

series of military coups rather than creating a sustained military rule because of the attraction of power among the contesting factions in the Iraqi military representing different interest groups.²⁵⁵ The transition of power from military to Ba’th party was indeed a bloody one as it was backed by a sector of military officers who eventually crushed all possible opposition both in the military and within the society.²⁵⁶ After the 1968 takeover, the party absorbed all the power capacity of the military as a part of its governance mechanism. Above all, this relationship brought about significant insecurities within the society and this part tries to understand the military and political sources of societal insecurity in Iraq through the political oppression of Ba’th party against opposing societal groups in Iraq and the use of army as a tool for domestic violence against these groups.²⁵⁷

Political and military structures in the Ba’thist Iraq should be assessed to understand the societal dynamics that shape the institutional image of identity politics in Iraq. Aside from the party structure of Ba’th, opposition and minority parties are discussed and possibilities for collective movements through political parties. The political and military dynamics of societal security has been dominated by the interplay between the state interest and societal interests that established a specific structure of security dynamics based on the parameters of societal control. The political dynamics of societal (in)securities are discussed in this part reflecting the oppressive regime structure and political activism within in Iraqi society.

²⁵⁵ From the independence until 1968, praetorianism defined the role of military in Iraq meaning that the military was capable of being a threat to political authorities and replaced civilian governments seeking for their own interest rather than motivated by humanitarian concerns, see Al-Marashi and Salama, 4.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, 111-112.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, 176.

4.2.1 Political Activism in Ba’thist Iraq and Political Actors

While Communist Party in Iraq oldest active political party in Iraq, a significant number of political parties have been established from the early years of the republic. Indeed, the number of political parties have gone so far that today the elections are run based on coalitions rather than single parties.²⁵⁸ Still, within the period between 1958 and 2003, party politics was very limited and political representation of distinct voices and demands in society was highly restricted. Also, the notion of mass party was not a frequent case in the history of Iraq. The closest political establishments that achieved a sort of mass support was the Communist Party and the Ba’th Party. Other political establishments however, represented the interests of specific ideological ethnic and religious groups in Iraq rather than appealing the larger segments of society beyond the identity boundaries. These political establishments are crucial elements of societal security in Iraq because they were the primary agents in relationship between the state and society. The central political actors in Ba’thist Iraq are presented below in order to understand the power dynamics based on political activism and competition for power and security.

The Rise of Ba’th Party in Iraq

To grasp how the power shift in Iraq in 1968 shaped the societal security dynamics, it is critical to understand the rise of the Ba’th Party as a societal force in Iraq. Although there had been societal insecurities in Iraq before the Ba’th, the role of the party in the societal trauma that lasted for more than 30 years and the unchallenged domination of the party

²⁵⁸ In 2018 Iraqi elections, there were 320 political parties, coalitions, and electoral entities with around 7000 candidates running for a seat in Iraq’s Parliament. As a result of the complex party affiliations in Iraqi society, the coalitions that mainly concentrated around the ethnic and religious identities in the country. For an excellent analysis of 2018 Federal election results see, Renad Mansour and Christine van den Toorn, “The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections: A Population in Transition?” *LSE Middle East Centre Report* (July 2018).

in Iraqi politics and society prove its authenticity for a test bed. Popular views on Ba’thist Iraq refer to the anti-Shi’ite and anti-Kurdish stance of the party as a given factor behind the societal repression of the period.²⁵⁹ Still the impact of Ba’th Party in Iraq cannot be isolated to the ideological basis of the movement. As the party consolidated its control over the state Saddam Hussein’s departure from the Ba’thist ideology and shifting the party-centered structure to a leader-centered one defined the course Ba’thism in Iraq and as a result the dynamics of state-society relations. In all these various explanations on the Ba’thist phenomenon, one line of argument on the rise of Ba’th in Iraq is present; the ascent of the Ba’th Party, five years after its first brief interlude in power in 1963, was the result of a combination of historical, economic, and social factors that had led to instability and repeated power vacuums in the decades leading up to July 1968.²⁶⁰

The Ba’th Party was founded in 1944 by Michel Aflaq, Salah ad-Din al-Bitar and Zaki al-Arsuzi²⁶¹, three Syrian intellectuals with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Aflaq was a Greek Orthodox Christian, Bitar was a Sunni Muslim and Arsuzi was an Alawite.²⁶² As declared official party motto ‘unity, freedom and socialism’, uniting Arab nations under the leadership of the movement was central for the movement.²⁶³ However, it did not take long for this project to shatter under the power politics in the region. The Ba’th movement in the Middle East transformed significantly with the failed attempts to create unified Arab nation representing the true interests of all Arabs in the region.²⁶⁴ The

²⁵⁹ Robert D. Kaplan, “Baathism Caused the Chaos in Iraq and Syria,” *Foreign Policy* (March 7, 2018), <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/baathism-caused-the-chaos-in-iraq-and-syria/>.

²⁶⁰ Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ith Party*, 16.

²⁶¹ For the role of Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din al-Bitar on the foundation of Ba’th Party, see Sylvia Kedourie, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (LA: University of California Press, 1962), 233-241 and 242-250. For a comprehensive analysis on Zaki al-Arsuzi’s contribution to Ba’thist Ideology, see Hirouki Aoyama et al., “Spiritual Father of the Ba’th: The Ideological and Political Significance of Zaki al-Arsuzi in Arab Nationalist Movements,” *IDE-JETRO: M.E.S. Series No. 49*, Available online at <<https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Mes/49.html>> (Accessed on 21 Dec 2018).

²⁶² Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 87-88.

²⁶³ Sassoon, 9-10.

²⁶⁴ For a detailed discussion on Iraq’s involvement in the United Arab Republic see, Elia Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic* (London: Sussex Academic Press, 1999); Batatu, 808-860.

post-revolutionary government of Iraq did not join the short lived United Arab Republic (1958-61), the project initiated by Nasser and was unsustainable because national interests proved to be more important than Nasser's ambitions in the region. After this and a short-lived government in 1963 (February-November) with the cooperation of Arab nationalist officers in the Iraqi army, the Ba'th party split in 1966 between Syrian and Iraqi dominated factions. The fracture in the party structure resulted in the transformation of the party ideology, more leaning towards the national interests and Arab nationalism without the aspiration for unity, rather based on the leadership of Iraq over the Arab cause.²⁶⁵

The Ba'th party was the first civilian organization in Iraq that was able to compete for political power after the monarchy. After the independence, military officers dominated politics which resulted in the demise of the monarchy. And with the rise of Ba'th Party in Iraq as a separate entity free from the influence of Syrian Ba'th, the party dominated Iraqi politics gradually to the level of totalitarian dictatorship under Saddam Hussein. Compared to the Ba'th, the Communist Party in Iraq was the only political party that could achieve widespread support from the society, but it failed to transform its support from the society into political leadership.²⁶⁶ With the concentration of power in the hands of the Ba'th party from 1968 onwards, the opposition parties lost their political significance with increasingly coercive pressures on any societal opposition under the Ba'th and the personalized totalitarianism of Saddam Hussein in the second phase of the Ba'th rule from 1979.²⁶⁷ However, the fact that Ba'th party was unable to cultivate support from all parts of the society and the coercive methods it used for support brings out the question of how the party managed to sustain its grip over politics for such a long

²⁶⁵ Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History*, 13-17.

²⁶⁶ Sluglett and Sluglett, 41-42.

²⁶⁷ Hamit Bozarslan, "Rethinking the Ba'thist Period", in *Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges*, eds. Jordi Tejel et al. (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012), 146-147.

time.

While the Ba’th party did not have a remarkable popular support for its claim to power in its first experience in 1963,²⁶⁸ the party became the core institution that controlled every aspect of the social and political life in Iraq with the consolidation of Ba’th rule in Iraq in 1968.²⁶⁹ This was not only a matter of luck for the Ba’th ruling cadre. Just the opposite, the party managed to utilize the popular dissent against the military that dominated the politics for the last decade that created instability in every corner of political and societal structure.²⁷⁰ Moreover, the domination of the Ba’th party became so powerful that any political opposition that would infiltrate in political system was impossible.²⁷¹ The role of military in politics diminished quite swiftly with the militarization of society by Ba’th via popular armed forces which became the backbone of social control of the party and its protector from internal enemies.²⁷² Aside from the military, the party absorbed all civil society organizations that could produce collective action so there was no civil society in its normal meaning.²⁷³

The organizational structure of the party aimed at enlisting citizens into the wide range of party membership hierarchy where individuals start from the lowest rank of being a ‘sympathizer’ to the higher levels (Figure 1). In this structure, the main function of each member is to act as an organic extension of the party within the society. In addition to their unquestionably loyalty, members of the party have to be active agents of the national intelligence apparatus.²⁷⁴ Under the Ba’th rule, the intelligence services were divided into

²⁶⁸ The party membership was significantly lower in 1963 than the second time the Ba’th in Iraq came to power in 1969.

²⁶⁹ Aaron M. Faust, *The Ba’thification of Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism* (University of Texas Press, 1991).

²⁷⁰ Uriel Dann, *Iraq under Qassem: a political history, 1958-1963* (F. A. Praeger, New York, 1969).

²⁷¹ Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear*, 126.

²⁷² The military organization of the party is discussed in the next section in more detail. It suffices here to mention the use of National Guard (*Al-Haras Al-Kawmi*) from the early days of party’s rule against domestic opposition was one of the initial moves for party domination of society by empowerment.

²⁷³ Ofra Bengio, “How Does Saddam Hold On?” *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2000, p. 94.

²⁷⁴ Although the organizational structure of intelligence services under the umbrella of *Al-Mukhabarat al-*

two categories; *Mukhabarat* (Party intelligence) and *Al-Istikhbarat* (Military intelligence). Party members were actively used in *Mukhabarat* to collect information about the other supporters of the party or on non-members. The organization itself had a very complex structure of hierarchy and granted members domestic and external responsibilities to spy on Iraqi citizens at home and in other countries, and foreigners in Iraq among others.²⁷⁵




Figure 1 The Ba'th Party Membership Hierarchy. **Source:** Sassoon, 46.

The membership was never restricted to only Sunni Arabs as there were members from other societal groups such as Kurds or Turkmens,²⁷⁶ which in many occasions became a

Iraqiyya (The Iraqi Intelligence) is much more complex, Makiya use this general differentiation for an easier understanding in Republic of Fear. For a more detailed analysis see, Ibrahim al-Marashi "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6, No. 3 (September, 2002): 1-13.

²⁷⁵ Faust, *The Ba'thification of Iraq*, 153; al-Marashi, 6.

²⁷⁶ During my research on the topic, I did not encounter any record on the ethnic distribution of party membership, but the historical account of party collaborators against non-collaborating members of

source of inner group conflict within these societal groups.²⁷⁷ Fear and violence in terms of being subjected to state repression is closely related to whether an individual is a part of the party organization and this became the main negative motivation for becoming a part of the party organization in different levels. On the other hand, reward mechanisms such as access to job and welfare elements were used for popular support for the party was not an uncommon exercise. This was especially crucial for getting support from Kurds. From the beginning, Ba’th party tried to fractionalize the Kurdish movement by approaching Jalal Talabani by rewarding his loyalty with economic and military incentives.²⁷⁸ Sami Zubaida defines this process as the *authoritarian étatisation* of the civil society.²⁷⁹ This fragmented management of society provided Ba’th Party with secured political position while it could not eliminate social resentment towards the party especially after Saddam Hussein applied more sophisticated methods of indoctrination and societal transformation.

Along with the appointments to important positions in the civil service motivated by personal loyalty and co-optation, a third basis for recruitment into the public sector is “ethnic bargaining.” This standard involves a special sort of co-optation, based on group identity. Cynthia H. Enloe underlines that appointments based on ethnicity have been used to divide potentially threatening concentrations of power and to bind critical elements of the population to the state “by bonds stronger than simply fear or legalistic

minority groups proves that party membership is a source of conflict and insecurity. In other words, citizens who were not a part of party organization within the above specified levels of membership were subjected to state oppression and state violence more frequently. On the other hand, Ba’th party kept record of the ethnic composition in cities where non-Arab societal groups which are used during the Arabization process in 1980’s. Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, 82 and 235.

²⁷⁷ While the emergence of such conflicts was a result of polarization among different groups within Kurdish, Shi’a or other societal communities, the source of such conflicts was based on whether a part of the ethnic or religious community acted along with the divide and rule strategies of the regime. For an extended discussion on this issue, see section 1.2.2.

²⁷⁸ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, 324-27.

²⁷⁹ Sami Zubaida, “The rise and fall of civil society in Iraq,” *Open Security*, February 2003. https://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraqwarquestions/article_953.jsp

compliance.”²⁸⁰ The recruitment strategy of the Ba’th Party in Iraq significantly showed parallels with this sort of bargaining. The definitions of state interest (mainly concerned about strengthening the hand of the regime in all control mechanisms) based on the Ba’th Party doctrine was fortified with establishing ethnic and tribal lineages of the leadership.

Arabization was the most effective policy that the party used for controlling the society by eliminating the risks of possible Kurdish rebellion. Primarily aimed at economic restructuring of Iraqi society by reallocating the resources among the Sunni Arab population, Arabization policies of the Ba’th Party also aimed at reshaping the societal balance by infiltrating into minority-dominated parts of the country.²⁸¹ The Arabization process worked in two ways for the benefit of the Ba’th, first by extending the party presence in the peripheries of Bagdad, the stronghold of Ba’th and by rewarding its constituency with economic benefits.

The Ba’th Party rule in Iraq for 35 years escalated with the worsening of political, economic and social conditions with continuous war making by the regime. The Iran-Iraq war and later the invasion of Kuwait resulted in an internal turmoil with the increasing involvement of external powers. The ramifications of the intensified conflict with embargoes deepened the societal insecurities emerging from resource scarcity, highly deteriorating war economy with high inflation along with the regime’s active punishment to the Kurds in the North and Shiites in the south. Especially non-Sunni Arab groups in the society began to seek for precautionary action to mend insecurity issues by exploiting the disarray political system. For the Sunni-Arab population the party membership and its direct link to social welfare created the main source of insecurity for the Sunni-Arab population in Iraq. The Ba’th party however, managed to hold its narrow popular support

²⁸⁰ Cynthia H. Enloe, *Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 7.

²⁸¹ Faust mentions that the Arabization policies were concentrated along the Iranian border and oil-rich areas, *The Ba’thification of Iraq*, 162

by creating a rhetoric based on the internal enemies that the regime itself created with its policies.²⁸² All other societal groups suffered from this party centered political system and the background of political opposition to the Ba'th party was built around these insecurities.

The Rise and Demise of the Communist Party in Iraq

Since the literature about the political parties in Iraq mostly focused on the Ba'th, it is possible to have an impression that there was no other political party. However, there has been a remarkable number of political parties in Iraq since the independence of the country which enabled political mobilization within the society. Iraqi Communist Party was an important political actor first because of the regional and global implications of being in an organic relationship with the communist movement in the Post-World War II era, and second because of its domestic role as a representative power for Iraqi society. Tariq Ismael defines the role of the Communist Party in the political history of Iraq as the 'only voice of the masses' and set the agenda for the other parties to follow because it had the power to raise the issue in public although did not have the political power to legislate or execute on them.²⁸³ The long presence of the Communist Party in the Middle East politics on a regional basis was linked to the influence of the Soviet Union on the expansion of the Communist Party in the region and its fall was related to the great power politics during the Cold War as well.

Domestically, the Communist Party in Iraq (CPI) became the first mass party whose ideology transcended the dominant nationalist-liberal political movements and that achieve support from the low-income level strata in the society because it addressed the

²⁸² Ofra Bengio, *Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 96-97.

²⁸³ Tareq Y. Ismael, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), x.

issues of poverty and social justice.²⁸⁴ The CPI was very different in terms of the popular support it achieved in the country. As McDowall argues, the Communist Party (CP) in the Middle East was associated with the Kurdish movement in both Syria and Iraq, but in Iraq, CP was indeed a threat for the regime because of its wider appeal in the society, whereas Communist Party never achieved a popular support that would grant it the label of mass party in Syria.²⁸⁵ However, this support failed to become a long term political success for the CPI although it remained as a powerful political actor in the country representing a powerful oppositional force in Iraqi politics. On the other hand, the limited political success of the CPI would rely on the support from the state bureaucratic class. After the 1958 revolution, the CPI failed to get support from the military which was crucial for political survival in the post-revolutionary Iraq.²⁸⁶ During the decade of military regimes, communist movement in Iraq was largely crushed as a result of the violent purges against the leadership of the ICP.

The reasons for the demise of the Communist Party in Iraq was not isolated from the regional and international influences. When the Ba'th Party held on to power in 1968, the socialist ideological basis of the party created a potential alliance between the Ba'thist and the communist. Indeed, the Ba'thists were interested in cooperation due to its attempts for further domestic support. However, this support was felt to be compulsory for the now largely fractured Communist movement. The popularity of CPI diminished after the recognition of Israel by the Soviet Union which enabled the Ba'th Party to appeal more support with its emphasis on the Arab nationalist sentiments.²⁸⁷ The centrality of Arabism in Ba'th ideology corresponded with the regional trend in similar tendency because of Arab-Israeli issue. While Qasim's regime started the purge against the communists in Iraq began before the 1963 Ba'th coup, the Ba'thist leadership publicly declared a war against

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 320.

²⁸⁵ McDowall, 472-473.

²⁸⁶ Ismael, 205-209.

²⁸⁷ Sassoon, 19.

all the Communists in the country and this damaged the party base significantly.²⁸⁸ The rivalry between the US and Soviet Union affected the power of the CP in the Middle East in general both in positive and negative terms.²⁸⁹ After the Ba'th Party came to power in 1963 for a short period of time, a purge against the communist party and its members in the parliament, army and other bureaucratic institutions has executed, which significantly diminished CP's presence in Iraqi politics to a irreparable level. After this period and later in the second and lasting Ba'th rule, regional parties representing Shi'a, Kurdish and Turkmen interests increased their role as opposition in Iraq, though not in their capacity to change political dynamics, but to create possibilities for collective action.

The Political Activism among Iraqi Shiites

After 70 years of the Sunni-Arab domination of modern state of Iraq, today Iraqi Shiites leads the politics in the country. This transformation came after the toppling down of the Ba'th regime with US invasion in 2003 and as a result of the elimination of existing state institutions and bureaucracy. This political transformation went hand in hand with the changing dynamics of the society. During the reconstruction process under the provision of the US, political mobilization among Shi'a community achieved great success in filling the power vacuum. Nonetheless, political mobilization among the Shi'a is not a recent phenomenon in Iraqi history. Claim for political influence and participation started in the early years of the independent Iraq and significant numbers of Shi'a politicians increased their role in the political structure with increasing numbers of governors, parliament members and other bureaucratic ranks.²⁹⁰ The Shi'a community in Iraq has a religion-dominated societal fabric and the religious leadership has a long history dating before the

²⁸⁸ Ismael, 107; al-Marashi and Salama, 93.

²⁸⁹ Batatu, 479.

²⁹⁰ For a concise history of political activism among Shi'a, see. Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* especially Chapter 4.

independence of Iraq. The fact that Shi'a holy sites are located in Najaf and Karbala districts in south Iraq earned the Iraqi Shi'a community a specific role in the region.²⁹¹ These sites has been central to religious education among the Shi'a with the presence of a prominent *Hawza* school in Najaf where Shi'a clerics are educated. Shia religious celebrations or commemorations such as Arba'een Pilgrimage²⁹² to Karbala every year has made the city of Karbala a cultural, tourism and religious center.²⁹³ However, the political activism among the Shi'as have not been as powerful as counterparts in Iran or Lebanon. The structural and socio-economic reasons are discussed below.

Rodger Shanahan categorizes the contemporary political dynamics among Shi'a communities in the Middle East by three models. First wing of political representation is the Iranian model under the clerical political leadership. The second model represents the non-clerical leadership that is present in Lebanon and the third is the "participation in secular parties advocating radical changes to the political and economic status quo, often represented by leftist groups such as the communist party."²⁹⁴ Although there has been a strong religious *ulema* class that regulates social life, the fact politicization of Shi'a community under the Ba'th regime was a gradual process. For a long time in Iraq's modern history, the political organizations representing Shi'a population was not present or appealing for the Shi'a population.²⁹⁵ In Iraq, the political dynamics of Shi'a

²⁹¹ Baram, *Culture, History*, 3; Joyce Wiley, *The Islamic Movements of Iraqi Shi'as* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 7-30.

²⁹² *Arba'een* is the Arabic name for the Shia Muslim religious observance that occurs forty days after the Day of *Ashura* the date of the martyrdom of Husain ibn Ali, the grandson of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, who was killed on the 10th day of the month of Muharram. Husain and 72 of his companions were killed by Yazid's army in the Battle of Karbala in 61 AH (680 AD). In this day, Shi'i Muslims both from other cities of Iraq and from Iran visits Hussein's Shrine in Karbala.

²⁹³ For the importance of the city of Karbala in Shia Islam, see Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004). For an interesting take on the sociological inclusion of women in Karbala as a part of religious practices see, Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).

²⁹⁴ Rodger Shanahan, "Shi'a political development in Iraq: the case of the Islamic Dawa Party," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 5, (2004): 943-944.

²⁹⁵ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, 136.

community is very heterogeneous and there have been examples from all three models. However, it is an undeniable fact that the Iraqi Shi'a predominantly relied on the traditional societal structure that is shaped around the religious hierarchy. Still, we should be cautious in using these models in the current state of Shi'a politics in the Middle East in the post-2003 period. The political gains by the Shi'a community in Iraq transformed the movement significantly.

Religion has been the most significant element of the relations within the state and there was an isolation of Shi'i community from the politicization trends in Iraqi society after the fall of the monarchy. While there were politicians with Shi'a origin, these political figures did not create a political movement that would shape political activism among the Shi'as. *Al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah* (the Islamic Call, Da'wa Party) is the oldest political organization among the Shi'ites of Iraq and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was the leader of the party. The party was established in late 1950's as a response to the rise of the Communist Party as the major oppositional force in Iraqi politics.²⁹⁶ He was a widely acknowledged intellectual and became the leader of Da'wa Party with the aim of organizing believers to seize power and establish an Islamic regime in Iraq.²⁹⁷

The critical milestone for the political activism among the Shi'a community in Iraq was the 1979 revolution in Iran, which changed the Shah regime into an Islamic Republic ruled by the religious teachings of the Shi'a. The societal repercussions of this move were the immediate conflict escalation by the Saddam regime under the fear of a spillover in Iraq that would create a societal backlash among the southern Shi'a community. Although the political organization of Iraqi Shi'a was not successful, the religious and symbolic ties with the Iranian state was not something that Saddam would overlook.²⁹⁸ However, the

²⁹⁶ Ghareeb, 60

²⁹⁷ T. M. Aziz, "The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, No. 2 (May, 1993): 209.

²⁹⁸ Nakash, 137.

influence of Da'wa Party suffered from this potential threat perspective by the regime and Baqir al-Sadr was executed by the regime in 1980.

With regard to political threats targeting the Shi'a population, the strategies of the regime were ambiguous but systematic. On the one hand, the attachment to the religious societal order among the Shi'a of Iraq was the main reason of the failure to create a mass opposition movement against the Ba'th regime; the regime did not recognize the increasing activism. On the other hand, the Shi'a political movements in Iraq were never defined by separationist ideas or alliance with Iranian counterparts by the religious or intellectual leaders, the discourse of these movements was mainly shaped by the religious claims on identity. In the eyes of the regime, Shi'a community in Iraq was defined by its Arabness and religious sectarianism was not a part of Saddam's societal engineering, but until 1991 social uprisings that radicalized the social control of the party. Accordingly, any kind of political unrest or opposition under the leadership of Shi'a intellectuals was brutally crushed by the regime.²⁹⁹

Political Activism and Militarization of Kurdish Movement

Today, the Kurdish region in the Northern Iraq emerged as a regional political actor that enjoys a great deal of autonomy from the central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish political movement and its evolution as a main opposition power against the Ba'thist regime dates back to the regional rise of Kurdish movement. During the same period Iran-Iraq dispute over Shatt al-Arab region in the Gulf created the environment for greater Iranian support for Kurdish dissident. Barzani compensated the splits in the Kurdish movement by using Iranian support to build up his military capacity. On the other hand, Iraqi government escalated military attacks towards Kurds that created tragic outcomes.

²⁹⁹ Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq* (London: Saqi Books, 2003).

When the agreement was reached in 1970 between the Iraqi government and Kurds, the war cost over 60.000 casualties and 3000 destroyed villages creating a mass resettlement of Kurdish population. Then Saddam negotiated with Mustafa Barzani the conditions of a peace agreement, which notoriously collapsed in a short time.

The March 1970 Peace Accord was a significant shift in government's stance in dealing with the Kurdish dissent. The conditions laid out by Barzani covered only cultural and political matters that demanded more participation in the central politics and local regulations that would enable a more Kurdish centered administration. There was no popular demand about the legitimization of Peshmerga forces while the government made clear that Barzani would halt his efforts in building up his own army in the north. The conditions of the agreement as offered by Kurds covered a wide range of issues from cultural rights to provisions that would provide greater autonomy in the Kurdish region and more participation in the central political system in Baghdad.³⁰⁰ The most disputed issue in the long term (meaning only one year) was the disputed areas in the Kurdish region that was not recognized by the government as Kurdish majority but promised a

³⁰⁰Essential Articles of 1970 Accord:

1. The Kurdish language shall be, alongside the Arabic language, the official language in areas with a Kurdish majority; and will be the language of instruction in those areas and taught throughout Iraq as a second language.
2. Kurds will participate fully in government, including senior and sensitive posts in the cabinet and the army.
3. Kurdish education and culture will be reinforced.
4. All officials in Kurdish majority areas shall be Kurds or at least Kurdish-speaking.
5. Kurds shall be free to establish student, youth, women' and teachers' organizations of their own.
6. Funds will be set aside for the development of Kurdistan.
7. Pensions and assistance will be provided for the families of martyrs and others stricken by poverty, unemployment or homelessness.
8. Kurds and Arabs will be restored to their former place of habitation
9. The Agrarian Reform will be implemented.
10. The Constitution will be amended to read 'the Iraqi people is made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality.'
11. The broadcasting station and heavy weapons will be returned to the Government.
12. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents.
13. The Governorates (provincial) Law shall be amended in a manner conforming with the substance of this declaration.
14. Unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit.
15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population in Iraq. McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, 327-28.

census to draw clearer boundaries for the application of the Accord. Especially in Kirkuk Barzani blamed government for resettling Arabs to the province in order to change the balance of population to Arabs favor. While the high percentage of Turkoman population in the province, there was a large community of *Faili* (also referred as Feyli) Kurds who arguably had an Iranian origin for the government and Shite religious orientation. The government expelled 50.000 of them from Iraq in late 1970's.³⁰¹

From 1972 onwards, the failure of the Accord was sealed with the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Agreement that brought Shah back in the game. Barzani used his pro-American network to build up his arsenal and clashed began especially in the disputed areas later in the same year. Additionally, the recognition of Kurds as an actor by the US and Iran moved Barzani away from negotiating with the government. On the other hand, from 1974 onwards the Ba'th party used splits among Kurds to deal with Barzani's increasing power.

In 1974, the central government started a wave of development program in the Kurdish region with the support of Kurdish leaders who were against Barzani's policies. One of the most important part of this investment was spent in oil sector by increasing the industrial oil production capacity in the region and also the government invested in infrastructure.³⁰² At the same time, the government continued to use militia groups such as *Fursan* against *Peshmerga* and allowed local *aghas* and *sheikhs* to benefit from loosened land regulations in return while Arabization was increasing in mixed Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen provinces such as Sinjar, Khanaqin, and Kirkuk.³⁰³

In the meantime, opposition to Barzani's ownership to KDP became more politicized with

³⁰¹ It was only in 2009 that Faili Kurds could regain their Iraqi nationality after the fall of the Ba'thist regime. Ibid., 327-335; Michael M. Gunter, *Historical Dictionary of the Kurds*, Third Edition (Maryland: The Rowman and Littlefield, 2018), 111; Ismet Cheriff Vanly, "The Forgotten Faili Kurds of Iraq," in *Kurdish Exodus: From Internal Displacement to Diaspora*, eds. Mohammed Ahmed and Michael Gunter (MA: Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies, 2002), 43-48.

³⁰² Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History*.

³⁰³ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 115.

the establishment of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) by Talabani and later in 1978, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan by Sheikh Othman Abd al-Aziz, a respected religious figure who was close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement.³⁰⁴ The emergence of three politicized fractions among Kurds challenged the idea of a unified Kurdish opposition against the Ba'ath Party. The central aim regarding the status of Kurds in Iraq was similar in all these separate movements but their ideologies and method differed significantly, which made them vulnerable to manipulation by the government and external actors. Considering the relative power of these Kurdish groups compared to that of central government, Barzani's reliance on Iran and the United States and other's cooperation with the Ba'ath Party was understandable. This was because the scarcity of material resources during the politicization and militarization of Kurdish movement pushed the Kurdish actors seek search for alternative opportunity mechanisms and Iran as well as the U.S. were willing to cooperate with the Kurds in order to weaken the regime's grip over the northern territory.³⁰⁵ The societal security implications of such path became evident as these fault line deepened with the escalation of conflict between Iran and Iraq. While the state considered the assistance of foreign powers to the Kurdish cause not only politically but also with military resources as a threat to regime security and intrusion to domestic politics, the Kurdish actors acted upon the available opportunities based on the threats emanating from state action.

KDP and PUK that represented the Kurdish population just to give examples. With the exception of the Communist Party in Iraq, all the other parties acted as the representatives of their communal interests. There was no other nationwide political party that would alter the Ba'ath regime or the increasingly repressive state control over the society.

³⁰⁴ Sheikh Othman is one of the leading figures of Islamic movement in Kurdish community, who in fact was a presidential candidate in the elections of 1992 in Kurdish region, Martin van Bruinessen, *Mullas, Sufis and Heretics: The Role of Religion in Kurdish Society* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000), 55.

³⁰⁵ Hanna Yousif Freij, "Alliance patterns of a secessionist movement: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (1998): 23-26.

Although there were representatives from other parties in Iraqi parliament, the role of other parties diminished first because of the domination of the Ba'th members in the ministerial positions, and second the extraordinary measures that defined the Ba'th rule especially after the beginning of militarization of political rule. First by internal coercion against any opposition and second as a result of Hussein's lust for war making from 1980's onwards that left any room for ordinary politics in the country.

4.2.2 Political Threats to Societal Security under the Ba'th Party in Iraq

The political structures in Iraqi state during the Ba'thist period was dominated by the Arab Sunnis first as a result of the legacy of state formation and institutional makeup of the Iraqi state and second of being the central players of Ba'thization of the Iraqi state due to Saddam Hussein's attachment to his tribal and ethnic network. However, the threat perception from the other societal groups never eradicated from the official discourse and resulting state actions. The ideological principles of the Ba'th Party required unquestioned and full loyalty to the party and its imagination of Iraqi society. While, other identities are recognized in multiple stages in different times on paper and the regime used recognition as a part of its reward mechanism to cultivate legitimacy from the society, non-Arabs and non-Sunni Arab social groups were perceived as potential threats to regime all the time. The most important sign for this attitude was the prohibitions against any institutionalization of collective action by these groups and periodical purges against the leaders of minority political parties or community leadership.

The role of identity in political and military dynamics of societal (in)security in Ba'thist Iraq proves to be significant for its implication on how societal hierarchies are established among the societal groups and how inter-group competitions are constructed. In terms of political sector, key issues of societal security are identified as the following: The one of

the most critical practices of the societal insecurity in Ba’thist Iraq emerged from the non-democratic practices of the regime that targeted the whole society. This fundamental problem resulted in the erosion of organized political activism and limited the boundaries of political life under the Ba’th Party. However, in reaction to this, political parties that represented the interests of societal groups such as Kurds, Shi’as and Turkmens persisted in the system though deemed illegal. The oppression of the Ba’th party was not limited to political activism but any organized collective action except the ones initiated by the party itself. The political structure in the country did not cultivate democratic structures from the beginning and the fact that multiple political parties representing different ideologies and societal groups existed in the country did not mean that the participatory political system was established. Moreover, the ideological contradictions posed by Arab nationalism of the Ba’thist movement with the resentment from non-Arab societal groups became a source of insecurity for Kurds and Turkmens that escalated as the party gained more and more power and resource.

While political participation or opposition was one side of the political oppression under Ba’th, the party created a political structure based on reward and punishment. The possibility of living a decent life in Ba’thist Iraq increasingly depended on the party lineages. The extensive recruitment to the complex web of party establishments created an environment where the enemies of the state were defined based on their active support to the Ba’thist party not specifically for non-Sunni and non-Arab citizens, but for the whole society.

4.3 MILITARY THREATS TO SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BA’THIST IRAQ

The rise of military power in Iraq from the early 1930’s created a deep impact upon the societal structure in Iraq as well. Traditionally, tribal structure dominated the political and

other areas of societal control in Iraq.³⁰⁶ However, as the monarchy understood the potential of the army in controlling the society, the balance of power shifted in favor of the central bureaucracy, especially military officers who at that time were able to influence policymaking. This political and military empowerment is crucial to understand the demise of the monarchical rule with the 1958 revolution. The military coup that ended the monarchical rule and installed the republic of Iraq had been presented by Free Officers group within the army as an attempt for transition of power from monarchy to civilians. However, army stayed in power from 1958 to 1968 changing its role from just a protector of a well-planned establishment of the new government into the monopoly over political structure.³⁰⁷ Led by Abd al-Karim Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif, both of whom were a part of the rising opposition movement called the Free Officers.

Overall, the relationship between the military and societal security in Iraq under Ba'th is two folded. First, after the Ba'th Party came to power, the total control and infusion over the military enabled its utilization as the main source of social control and state coercion. Second, the correlation between the efforts to enlarge the security forces as well as the military and the economic burdens on society's shoulder became unbearable not to mention that the impacts of the long decades of wars that the regime tried to sustain at the expense of societal degradation. These two factors together made military a direct threat to society and also the militarization of the state resulted in coercive oppression of the society and created militarism among the oppressed groups.

The relationship of military sector to societal one is generally formulated around the conception of external threat and state's role in providing security for its people in traditional security conceptualization. However, the conditions of the domestic side of this relationship depends on the nature of state-society relations. While it is the undeniable

³⁰⁶ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 289.

³⁰⁷ Majid Khadduri, "Iraq, 1958 and 1963," in *The Politics of the Coup d'Etat: five case studies*, ed. William Andrews and Uri Ra'anani (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969): 65–88.

responsibility of states to protect its citizen from external or internal threats, the definition of threat determines the behavior of state with regard to its citizens. In Ba’thist Iraq, the political dynamics of the regime’s hold on to power created an environment where favoring one societal group over the others became the source of defining who the enemy of the state is during the Ba’thist period. The regime utilized the military to secure its power from the threats that the regime perceived from Iraqi society. The Ba’thist regime was continuously alerted against the societal opposition to its legitimacy as the ruler of the country and the notion of domestic threat was kept alive in order to keep the society in check. Al-Marashi and Salama summarize the role of military in Iraq as the following:

“Despite the tumultuous military history of Iraq, there are some consistent trends in the relationship between the Iraqi armed forces and the political center. Historically, the Iraqi military maintained internal security in Iraq, policing the threats posed by tribal uprisings, sectarian revolts and Kurdish militias. Unlike conventional militaries confined to barracks and prepared to defend their nation’s interest in the face of external threats, the Iraqi military served as an institution of domestic security, helping the state secure legitimacy through a gun barrel. In this capacity, the military became a central institution in domestic politics and instrument of repression that increased with intensity the accession of power of Saddam Hussein.”³⁰⁸

The higher-ranking officers of the Iraqi army were the primary actors of the revolutionary transition from the monarchy and the British domination and became the sole political power between 1958 and 1968. However, during the Ba’thist period, the role of military in Ba’thist Iraq transformed significantly. While, it is a recurring argument that Iraqi military is at the center of Iraqi political and social life being a potent actor to determine

³⁰⁸ Al-Marashi and Salama. *Iraq’s Armed Forces*, 3.

the course of events in the country, the conditions and impacts of this centrality is a debatable issue.³⁰⁹ While it is true that military dominated Iraqi politics and bureaucracy until 1968 mostly because of the traditional class relationship within the bureaucracy from the time of early independence to the initial trials of republic in 1950's,³¹⁰ the Ba'th rule transformed this reality by extending its civilian roots of power into state institutions. This transformation can be traced through attempts by the Ba'th party to decrease the role of military as a political actor while centralizing the party as the main actor and thus shifting the dynamics of military-society dynamics. The central role of the party in shaping the state structure was also enabled by manipulating the military rhetoric in order to act against its constructed 'enemies of the country'.

From a state level perspective, Buzan et al. explains military security agenda as primarily "the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against nonmilitary threats to their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies".³¹¹ Military security agenda primarily concerns state's survival as a whole and maintain its sovereignty as a main principle. Governments or regimes are conceptualized as the main security actor because of their prescribed ability of the legitimate use of violence by military power. However, Buzan et al. also acknowledges the existence of non-state referent objects and actors in contexts where this legitimacy is challenged.³¹² The agenda of military security in the Iraqi context is highly indistinguishable from political security agenda from the state perspective since it has been the regime that politicized the military issues and the military forces themselves in Iraq. Therefore, it shows the typical authoritarian tendency of absorbing the security sector under the regime's image just as

³⁰⁹ Mark Heller, "Iraq's army: military weakness, political utility," in *Iraq's Road to War*, eds. Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994): 37-50.

³¹⁰ Nazih Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 256.

³¹¹ Buzan et al., *Security*, 52.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 49.

any other public institution.

The role of military threats in constructing societal (in)securities in Ba’thist Iraq accounts for not only the overexpansion of military with allocation of majority state revenues in military establishments, but also its function within the state-society relations. Military security is essentially about civil military relations and the source of insecurity in this sector comes from the use of military violence against societal groups by labeling them as a threat based on their identity). Moreover, state’s inability to preforms its duty both because of the lack of capacity or willingness is considered is included in analysis of military dynamics of societal (in)security in Iraq.

4.3.1 Who Protects Who? – Militarism of the State vs. Militarization of Society

Military power is always vital for a newly founded state to protect the fragile process of state building and state formation from outside threats.³¹³ During the period when Iraqi state was established, regional countries experienced the post-Ottoman resettlement process especially with Britain and France acting as protectorate. The newly established monarchy believed that the first could only be dealt with a strong army, which would eventually increase Iraq’s power against the second.³¹⁴

Al-Khafaji explains the relationship between militarization of everyday life Ba’thist Iraq and militarism of the state with “hyper-militarism”³¹⁵ which refers to not only material

³¹³ Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); for similar arguments on the Iraqi case see, Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951) and Samira Haj, *The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power and Ideology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

³¹⁴ Jafar Al-Askari, *A Soldier’s Story: from Ottoman rule to independent Iraq, the memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askari*, translated by Mustafa Tariq Al-Askari, edited by William Facey and Najdat Fathi Safwat (London: Arabian Publishing, 2003), 243.

³¹⁵ Hyper-militarism can be defined as the reshaping domestic relations between state and subject and international relations between states with practices by the states that moves away from human rights and

military buildup of the state and the discourse framing of the regime by elevating the sense of insecurity. Militarization in both senses not only blurred internal and external security distinction but also created a legitimacy basis for the regime by coercion directed to its own society with constant waves of militarization.³¹⁶ The securitization of everyday life in Iraq through the infusion of regional and internal threats was the main source of societal insecurity for the citizens and the individual's safety relied on whether s/he become a part of the military machine.

On the institutional basis, the militarization of social life was made possible with the introduction of a system of popularizing the armed and security forces in Iraq by the regime. Ofra Bengio describes this process as *Askarat Al-Tarbiya* (the militarization of education), *Askarat Al-Shab* (the militarization of the people), *taslih al-shab* (arming the people), and creating *Al-Shab Al-Musallah* (the armed people).³¹⁷ The most effective method for the regime was to establish popular security forces to integrate the society (especially the youth) into security structure. The main idea behind this was to “coup proof the regime” with party strategy³¹⁸ and with the party strategy of transforming the military from being a state apparatus into a party apparatus, Saddam Hussein tried to make sure that “there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the government.”³¹⁹

First, the party established the Military Bureau (*Al-Makatib al-‘Askariyya*) composed of

civil liberties toward coercive state activities is a manifestation of the repressive political program. Woodiwiss, M., & Bewley-Taylor, D. “The global fix: The construction of a global enforcement regime.” Paper presented at TNI Crime and Globalization seminar, Amsterdam, 28-29 April 2005.

³¹⁶ Isam al-Khafaji uses the concept of hyper-militarism to explain the constant war making in Ba’thist Iraq as “a principal mechanism of mobilization and control, of regime legitimation and rent seeking.” See, “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: The Case of Ba’thist Iraq,” in *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*, edited by Steven Heydemann (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): 259.

³¹⁷ Bengio, 148.

³¹⁸ Al-Hashimi and Salama, 125; For a comparative perspective on similar methods used in the Middle East see, James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East” *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall, 1999): 131-165.

³¹⁹ David Hirst, “The Terror from Tikrit,” *Guardian* (November 26, 1971), quoted in Sassoon, 129.

party members and had the right to intervene in the functioning of the army. There were also a set of special armies which were more in the shape of paramilitary entities established by the Party and responsible solely to the Party such as the Popular Army (*Al-Jaysh Al-Shaabi*), Jerusalem Army (*Jaysh al-Quds*) and Saddam's Fedayeen (*Fida'iyyu Saddam*)³²⁰ and the Special Republican Guard (*Al-Haras al-Jumhuri al-Khass*) which was considered to be the elite forces under the command of Saddam Hussein.³²¹ These establishments directly challenged the institutional mechanism of the Iraqi military as there were countless accounts of the problematic relationship between these forces and military operations.³²²

There were two layered consequences of this strategy. First, the party would infiltrate into the society to a greater extent with delegating the role of security provision to volunteer participation from the society itself. Second, a parallel security apparatus would secure possible threat from the ranks of the military establishment, which was a lesson learned from the notorious years of military rule that preceded the Ba'th regime. The establishment of paramilitary forces and a parallel military hierarchy depending on party affiliation, the Ba'th regime tried to ensure its control over the mechanisms of social surveillance and effective intimidation over any possible societal unrest against the regime. On the societal side, the unparalleled expansion of state security mechanisms and the continuous targeting of identity groups even in times of peace created an environment of fear and insecurity. The next section analyzes the societal impacts of militarization of the regime accompanied by the frequent use of violence and the integration of individuals in society within intelligence.

³²⁰ Roughly translated as bodyguards of Saddam Hussein, based on volunteer participation Ibrahim al-Marashi, "The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7, no. 2 (June 2003): 1–10.

³²¹ Sassoon, 129-152; Al-Marashi and Salama, 124-126.

³²² Ahmad Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power," *Middle East Journal* 57, No. 1 (Winter, 2003): 23-25.

4.3.2 The Societal Repercussions of Military Coercion and Domestic Violence

The army is the most crucial institution for a coercive regime for strict societal control³²³ and indeed the Ba'th party managed to increase its military capacity against both external and internal enemies that the regime itself reproduced over time. However, as discussed in political security sector as well, the problem of duality was present in the establishment of military security sector. The army in Iraq was not constrained by the conventional definition of state security forces behind the barracks and against the external threats, but it was an active part of the regime's agenda on societal control which involved frequent coercion against not only organized militant opposition groups but also the civilians.³²⁴ While the regime had its own agenda and security issues for survival, the society was highly militarized against threats from the regime as well considering the recruitment of large segments of society within the policing and other security apparatus with constant indoctrination.

The society had also its own military security agenda because of the threat to its survival by the regime itself.³²⁵ The militarization of minority movements and armed clashes among various identity groups added to the already coercive methods of the state to sustain the domestic order and suppress any opposition. The major familiar case for such militarization in Iraq is the Kurdish case. The militarization of Kurdish movement dates back to the establishment of *Hamidiya* cavalries under the Ottoman rule, an attempt to curb rebellions by Kurds against the Sultanate by incorporating the Kurdish fighting

³²³ Keith Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 342; Andrew Parasiliti and Sinan Antoon, "Friends in Need, Foes to Heed: the Iraqi Military in Politics," *Middle East Policy* 7, no. 4 (October 2000): 131-140.

³²⁴ Hashim: 6.

³²⁵ Oren Barak, "Dilemmas of Security in Iraq," *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (December 2007): 455-75. In parallel to Barak's observation, society in Iraq looked for alternative security mechanisms when the responsibility to protect its citizens was denied by the regime.

groups into the Ottoman army.³²⁶ While these armed groups were not integrated the national army after the independence, the Kurdish movement sustained the military basis of the movement locally. These forces are considered as a part of the historical evolution of Peshmerga forces that was established in 1946 as the official army of Mahabad Republic. Another interesting example for such militarization is the establishment of “*Akıncılar Grubu*” among Turkmens in 1996 with the active support of Turkish government.³²⁷ These armed groups were established to secure protection among the Iraqi Turkmen population with the training and equipment support by Turkey after the establishment of no-fly zone by the US over Northern Iraq, which created a vacuum of power in the region and enabled possible clashes among minority groups residing in the region.

The transformation of state military apparatus into a more complex structure combining state and regime controlled the popular security forces (as explained within the party organization above) was accompanied by the increasing capacity of non-state military establishments of the minority groups. This duality resulted in the rise of societal groups as security actors (with the increasing armed factions and aggravated tensions with the regime) that have the motivations (state coercion) and the means (support for their military establishments) to act upon the projected threats emanating from the presentation of these groups as the enemy of the state.

The volume of state violence against the minority groups escalated with the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. As discussed in the military sector, the collaboration of Kurds with Iranian forces in the north in the early phases of war resulted in strict measures by the regime targeting the Northern areas. Especially 1983 onwards, rebellions in the Kurdish region was met with heavy military intervention by the regime as the tension

³²⁶ McDowall, 59; Arshak Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: The Harvill Press, 1948)

³²⁷ Ferhat Güngör, Ortadoğu Denklemine Irak Türkmenleri ve Geleceği,” *Uluslararası Sosyal ve Eğitim Bilimleri Dergisi* 1, no. 2 (2014): 33.

between the regime and the Kurds increased with the cooperation between Iran and Kurds. While the rebellion was led by the Peshmerga forces under the leadership of KDP and PUK organizations, the regime's response to the internal clash was asymmetrical. In order to curb Kurdish advances in the region, the regime initiated the Al-Anfal Campaign (four waves of attacks in 1988) under state of emergency regulations which included chemical attacks in March 1988 in Halabja. The estimates regarding the casualties of this Anfal Campaign varies from 50.000 to 100.000 civilians.³²⁸

Targeted attacks in Iraq during this period and high number of casualties were not limited to the North. Investigations after the occupation of Iraq in 2003 both by various agencies of the coalition forces and international organizations revealed mass graves in the Southern provinces.³²⁹ The estimation number of bodies found in these mass graves range from 250.000 to 290.000 in total including the sites in the Northern provinces.³³⁰ Majority of these graves are located around Karbala and Al-Hillah, where the population is Shi'a in majority and where the uprisings in 1991 revolts against the regime after the Gulf War were highly intense. These graves are considered to be the remnants of this period as a result of the regime's mass killings of Shi'a population in these regions.

The security of societal groups who were targeted by the state for being considered as a threat to the security of the regime diminished to a great extent as a result of the direct military action against the society. While any military action to the society would create such insecurities, the systematic violence exercised against societal groups that were discriminated in the political discourse makes this issue relevant to the societal security.

³²⁸ Lisa Blaydes, *State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 148-160.

³²⁹ Mass graves are defined as any site consisting of three or more bodies in a single grave in the reports published by US Department of State - Humanitarian Information Unit in 2003-04. According to various resources from the CPA, more than 24 grave sites were discovered and around 240 graves were reported during the investigation. See, "Iraq: State of Evidence," *Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch* Vol. 16, No. 7 (November 2004);

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 22; Brendan O'Neill, "Unrecorded victims," *Guardian*, July 21 2004, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/21/iraq.guardiananalysispage>.

Because while regimes harsh actions against Kurds, Shi'is, Turkmen or other societal groups targeted the physical wellbeing of these groups, the identity element in these actions were present throughout this period.

So far, regime's policies regarding the non-Sunni and non-Arab population in political and military sectors have been discussed with reference to how the Ba'thist regime exercised its control over society. However, military as well as political dynamics of societal security do not suffice to present a complete picture of the societal (in)securities in Iraq under the Ba'th rule. Beyond the most apparent threats under military and political issues, the societal communities in Iraq were exposed to the regime's oppression through culturally identified components of identity. In the following section, religious dynamics of societal security in Iraq is discussed by introducing the factors that emerged as a source of threat to societal security through the issues of religion which has been one of the central breaking points of conflict in Iraqi history.

4.4 RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS OF THE SOCIETAL SECURITY

Within the context of societal security discussions, religion is a disputed concept as to how to integrate threats to religious identity to the study of societal (in)securities.³³¹ It seems that within the literature on societal security by the pioneer scholars, the issue of religion has been handled in various ways, which complicates how we should treat religious threats. Buzan et al. described religion as a part of identity to be sustained by the society, which makes it as a part of a societal security agenda or in their terminology, a referent object.³³² In the general discussions on security sectors and on the agenda of security, religion is considered as a potential or proto-sector of societal security where it is treated solely as another identity community along with ethnic and linguistic

³³¹ Panic, "Societal Security": 34.

³³² Buzan et al., *Security*, 53 and 119-126.

communities relevant for security analysis. In this case, religious communities are treated as referent objects of security and in this research (in)securities of religious communities in Iraq is included alongside with ethnic and linguistic communities. A second way of integrating religion in security analysis is through threats to the survival of a religion as a belief system rather than a religious community.³³³ This type of insecurity issues emerges in cases of radicalism which render religious security beyond the scope of societal security as analyzed in this research.

In the analysis of societal (in)security dynamics, religion has two complementary roles in identifying societal (in)securities in Iraq. First, societal groups with strong religious identification are treated as the referent object of security who are targets of threats from multiple areas included in the analysis (political, military, religious, cultural and economic). Second, religion itself is treated as a part of the security agenda within the whole set of dynamics that create societal insecurity in the case of Ba’thist Iraq. These two perspectives complement each other because the religious communities did not exclusively experience threats to the survival of their religion as described in the second form of religious insecurity above. The religious communities in Ba’thist Iraq were subject to other forms of insecurities such as discrimination in social, political spheres and also threats to the reproduction of religious practices as a part of their cultural identity. At the same time, these threats were not exclusive to communities that are identified primarily with their religious identities but other societal groups were subjected to various types of societal security threats.

Within the context of societal security theory, religion is considered as a potential rival identity to nationalism. Waeber et al. acknowledges that “the only rival to nationalism as a social identity comprehensive enough and robust enough to support governing

³³³ Ole Waeber, “The Changing Agenda of Societal Security,” in *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, eds. Hans Günter Brauch et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 587-588.

machinery is religion. Like nationalism, religion has the political advantage of reproducing the religiously associated 'we' identity across generations in a more or less automatic manner.”³³⁴ In Ba’thist Iraq, the duality of societal attachment regarding religious vs. national identity was an important societal force in determining state policy and discourse towards religious diversity and religious authority which eventually became a source of threat for religious identity groups in society. In this part, religious denominators of the societal security in Ba’thist Iraq is assessed through the issues of clashes between religious actors in the society and the regime, religious freedom and sectarianism within the official discourse of the regime. These factors together created insecurities among the religious groups also religion was used as a part of societal oppression.

4.4.1 The Status of Religious Communities in Ba’thist Iraq

Religion has been a powerful source of societal identity in the Iraqi society.³³⁵ The historical representation of Iraqi society is dominated by the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide. However, the religious diversity in Iraq goes beyond this binary definition. There are Christians (including Assyrians, Chaldeans and Syriacs), Jews and other religious groups such as Yazidis, Mandeans, and Shabaks in Iraqi society. Moreover, as the identities in a complex society like the Iraqi society easily overlap on each other, the religious identities in Iraq presents a very complex picture. Neither the Sunni or the Shi’a population are homogenous societies. There are Kurds who are Sunni or Shi’a just as there are Shi’a and Sunni Turkmens. On the other hand, this diversity has also been a source of conflict because of the highly polarized representations of religious identity as a result of its

³³⁴ Waever et al., 22

³³⁵ For an extended discussion on the history of Iraq through the evolution of religious communities, see Faleh A. Jabar (ed.) *Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq* (London: Saqi Books, 2002)

central position with regard to the identity politics. The Ba’thist period was not an exception to this. The regime manipulated and exaggerated the religious differences in its official and non-official discourse and action, while at the same time the leadership tried to frame the religious identity of the Iraqi society for its own benefit.³³⁶ In some cases, the threats towards religious communities went to the degree of internal displacements and forced migration that also targeted the physical securities of these groups. The most significant example of such large-scale internal displacements and deportations can be seen during the Iran-Iraq War and following the 1991 uprisings. During these periods, not only the religious leaders of Shi’a community (Arab and non-Arab) was targeted, thousands of people were either displaced or deported.³³⁷

As described earlier, the largest societal group that can be categorized primarily with religious identity in Iraq is the Shi’ites. Shi’ites in Iraq has a remarkable role in the historical construction of society and the Iraqi identity. The socio-economic dynamics of the Shi’a population concentrated in the Southern part of the country created a sense of detachment from the center, but throughout the 20th century, the rise of political organizations among the Shi’a groups with various political lineages enabled them to compete for political power.³³⁸ The political system created under Ba’th and state institutions that shaped the state-society relations during this period discriminated against the Shi’i population and sustained the image that represents Sunni Islam. This is why, the Shi’a-Sunni divide was at the center of religious dynamics of security in Iraq mainly as a result of the fact that the Shi’a community was in fact had the potential to form a sustainable opposition that would threaten the regime’s survival. Beyond the political and military consequences of such approach to state identity, the religious symbolism of

³³⁶ Bengio, *Saddam’s Word*, 15; for a detailed assessment on how Saddam Hussein used religion in creating the official discourse, see 176-191.

³³⁷ John Fawcett and Victor Tanner, “The Internally Displaced People of Iraq,” *Brookings Institution Occasional Paper* (2002).

³³⁸ Shanahan, “Shi’a political development in Iraq”: 952.

deepened the polarization among these groups.

While the clash between the Shi'i population and the regime has been the center of attention in terms of religious dynamics in Iraq, smaller religious groups were also very vulnerable during the Ba'thist period. While the majority of the Jewish community left Iraq in the early 1950's³³⁹ The Shi'a was at the center of state oppression because of the potential challenge that the Shi'a community could pose to the regime's security and means of social order. With the intensification of religious symbolism in regime's rhetoric, the religious freedom of non-Sunni groups in society exacerbated. We can observe that neither the Jewish community nor the Christians were the subjects of physical and symbolic coercion as they were prior to this period or after it.

4.4.2 Religious Threats to the Societal Security

While ideological foundations of Ba'th Party in Iraq was associated with secular nationalism,³⁴⁰ the religious composition of the Iraqi society and the attachment to the religious leadership among the Shi'a turned religion into a sensitive issue in the state-society relations in this period. There are two fundamental reasons for this. First, attachment to religious identity among the Shi'a in Iraq has been significant and the political mobilization among Shi'ites have been based on the religious identity. Second, the fact that religion dominated the political developments in neighboring Iran converted Shi'a community into a potential rival with demographic majority to Sunni-Arab based institutionalization of the Ba'th Party in Iraq and its regional politics. This environment intensified especially after the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-88. As a result of these dynamics, the relationship between the regime and the Shi'a population was shaped

³³⁹ Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services* (NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 86-95

³⁴⁰ On the secular roots of Ba'thist ideology, see Paul Salem, "The Rise and Fall of Secularism in the Arab World," *Middle East Policy* 4, no. 3: 147-160.

around the politics of exclusion without necessarily adhering to a forthright sectarian conflict.

In terms of discourse, religious identity was at the core of identity politics mainly based on the use of religious symbolism that is reproduced within the political discourse. However, as the following analysis will show, religious identity was incorporated to Pan-Arab nationalist identity by the regime. However, the religious symbolism maintained within the official discourse of the Ba'th regime created negative impact upon the recognized identities and practices of the religious communities in the Iraqi society. However, as the radicalization of Ba'thist regime towards opposition within the society intensified, the repression of Shi'a in Iraq became central to the regime's societal engineering and politics of exclusion.

On the other hand, as a result of the religious ties with Iran, Shi'a population have been constantly perceived as a factor of the foreign policy and therefore deeply affected by the bilateral conflicts. Especially with the Iran-Iraq war that started in 1980, the insecurities of Shi'a population in Iraq deepened to a great extent partly due to regime's malign attitude towards the Shi'ites by treating them as the potential collaborators, or physical degradation of the religious sacred places to punish the religious authority.³⁴¹

Another recurrent issue in Ba'thist Iraq within the religious affairs is sectarianism which is a vital component of religious dynamics in the country although the dictionary meaning of the word did not apply to the rivalry between both communities at all times. Sectarianism or sectarian conflict is one of the most prevalent conflict present in the narratives of the history of Iraq, probably second to the ethnic conflicts among Arab and non-Arab societal groups, both has been persistent with changing degrees of violence.³⁴²

³⁴¹ Blaydes, *State of Repression*, 237-266.

³⁴² Khalil F. Osman, *Sectarianism in Iraq: The Making of State and Nation since 1920* (NY: Routledge, 2015).

But it is a gradual process rather than being a constant element in defining the relationship between two communities. As the Shi'a-Sunni tension had a long legacy from the Ottoman period whose political system was based on Sunni Arab elite in the region, the fact that institutionalization of the Ba'th Party and growth of public sector followed a line of sectarian tendencies was not surprising. As the identity discourse is the most powerful tool for Ba'th Party's social engineering and considering the domination of Arab-Sunni identity in the political discourse, Shi'a as well as other societal groups had been subjected to various forms of threats to their religious identity both on the physical and symbolic nature. However, the role of Shi'a in shaping the official discourse of the Ba'thist Party was also instrumental rather than targeting the belief system of the Shi'a community.

Therefore, the issue of sectarianism should be approached with caution in the Iraqi case, especially during the Ba'thist period.³⁴³ The primary reason for this is that the role of religion and the insecurities of religious communities in Iraq cannot be limited to the constraints of sectarian politics because the underlying factors was deeper than the issue of religious discrimination. The source of regime's threats towards Shi'a in Iraq was primarily based on the political discourse. In the first place, the religious dynamics of political establishment had long favored the Sunni identity more than the Shi'i identity. The elite formation since the independence of Iraq or even before had been Sunni-oriented. However, the level of religious orientation towards Sunni identity had not been always transformed into explicit political discourse. The religious symbolism in political discourse of the Ba'th Party escalated with the Iran-Iraq war, but the regime did not employ sectarian policies especially before the 1991 uprisings along with the invasion of Kuwait. Instead, the regime exploited the power of religious symbolism in order to feed the mechanisms of fear within the society. Religion was only another tool for the regime to manipulate the societal differences by imposing a negative image through words.

³⁴³ Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq*, 31-32.

While there was no apparent clash among the religious communities in Iraq on the societal level, the regime kept the religious references alive while cultivating loyalty to the party and support for its war mongering regional politics based on the premise of Sunni-centered identity. The most apparent reason for such attitude towards society comes from the established societal based for the party among Sunni-Arab population and its close proximity to the zone of influence at the center. The physical oppression such as direct interference of the functioning of everyday life towards Shiites also escalated and military attacks to their sacred places in Iraq by the regime in early 1990's was a direct example of it. As the societal uprising emerged after the beginning of the invasion of Kuwait with its economic and societal burdens, the holy places in Najaf and Karbala was attacked by the regime on the false accusation of being a sanctuary for the rebels. The testimonies by the residents of the city falsified these accusations.³⁴⁴

The societal dilemma between secular and religious nationalism became one of the driving forces of social control for the Ba'athist regime.³⁴⁵ As a result of shifting alliances of the regime with different segments of society or in many occasions as a response to changing geopolitical concerns based on the threat perception from neighboring countries, the regime adopted a more religious nationalist discourse opposed to the strictly secular nationalist ideology in the foundational principles of the party.³⁴⁶ One of the most striking examples of regime's policies that shaped the religious discourse was the Faith Campaign initiated in 1993 by the regime. The policy was created to cultivate public support based on the religious sentiments as the pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric was deeply damaged with the degrading state control over the society as a whole and degraded notion of Iraqi nation as a result of wars and internal conflicts. The campaign backlashed in terms

³⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch Report, "Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And Its Aftermath," (1992). Available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm>.

³⁴⁵ Amatzia Baram, *Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968–2003: Ba'athi Iraq from Secularism to Faith* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 215.

of polarization among religious groups in society because as Fanar Haddas puts it “state-sponsored religion almost inevitably increases sectarian tension, or at least awareness of sectarian identity, simply because the state was obliged to follow a sect’s teachings or emphasize the teachings of a sect at the expense of the other.”³⁴⁷

This shift in official discourse and regime’s policies towards religion deeply affected the religious boundaries within the society both positively and negatively at the same time. On the negative side, regime’s policies ignored the religious diversity in Iraq and deprived the religious groups in society from their basic rights to perform their religious rituals created a direct challenge against the sustainability of religious identities. On the positive side, the politicization of religious identities resulted in increasing collectiveness among the religious groups that were disorganized and were in rivalry. While the regime’s attitude towards religious identity that is centered around the Sunni sect transformed into actual policies that harmed the religious texture of non-Sunni religious group. While Shi’a population comes forward as the main religious group that rivalled the regime in this sense, the Sunni-oriented imposition of religious identities harmed the freedom of faith for other religious groups such as Christians and Yazidis.

Considering the dynamics of religious insecurities in Iraq, religion plays a significant role both in terms of identification with religion as a part of the reproduction of identity and also as a source of mobilization in times of conflict with the regime from a societal perspective. Especially religious sect as a form of social identity has been used to make claims on social and political rights and as a dynamic of constructing identity boundaries. On the political level, secular and religious nationalism acted as rival forces in Iraqi socio-political structure to a level that this competition became a source of conflict.³⁴⁸ But as the regime intensified the use of religion in order to cultivate public support at the expense

³⁴⁷ Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq*, 112.

³⁴⁸ Samuel Helfont, *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

of symbolically and physically degrading the identity security of Shi'a community as we have seen in the Faith Campaign discussed above. This discussion about religious identity should be supported by a cultural assessment of security dynamics as both religious is closely linked to the cultural components of identity and reinforce each other in Iraq.

The next section analyzes cultural dynamics of societal security in Ba'thist Iraq in the context of cultural, educational policies and linguistic issues as well as material imposition of regime's ideology through various social engineering methodologies. It will be shown that the reproduction of the regime's ideology with the imposition of social engineering based on the idea of keeping the society at order was problematic because of the persistence of micro cultural practices of non-dominant identity groups as a form of opposition. However, the regime's actions to reconstruct the Iraqi identity based on sidelining the diverse cultural plurality were challenged the perseverance of the cultural diversity while increasing the level of insecurity among the marginalized groups in society.

4.5 CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY

Cultural symbols are important means of reproduction of identity for societies. These symbols span from concrete expressions of a culture such as artifacts, buildings and museums to the practices unique to each culture as language, traditions and other values that are attached to communities. The social identity is formed through the consumption and reproduction of these symbols in a collective environment.³⁴⁹ As the reproduction of culture is vital for the survival of an identity, the vulnerability against possible threats to

³⁴⁹ Joane Nagel makes a similar case for the cultural base for ethnic identities by arguing that culture provides the content and meaning of ethnicity by providing a history, ideology, symbolic universe where identity reproduced through a framework of identity. "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," *Social Problems*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February, 1994): 162.

these cultural institutions is important to observe and understand the societal insecurities.

The most recent and radical form of cultural threat in Iraq occurred after the emergence of ISIS in the region. There have been multiple instances where the cultural heritages of various communities in Iraq and Syria was targeted and destroyed with the purpose of eradicating the cultural heritage.³⁵⁰ However, Iraq experienced this kind of cultural eradication in previous periods, first through the practices of the Ba’thist regime and second through the de-Ba’thification of Iraq after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The major differences between these periods were the actors that impose threats to cultural reproduction of society (by the regime, occupying countries and radical group), the targeted cultural cosmos (micro cultures within the society, dominant culture, national culture), and the means of threats (official policies, radical transformation of socio-political institutions, direct destruction of cultural symbols) to eradicate the cultural institutions. The different forms of cultural threats to societal security in Iraq in these different periods show that threats do not emerge only from the physical interventions to the reproduction of culture, other symbolic and systematic threats should be discussed under cultural threats to the societal security.

In the Iraqi case, the challenge of national identity production was a continuous struggle between the dominant regime culture and the minority identities. During the Ba’thist rule, the reconstruction of national identity within the context of the ideological constraints of Ba’thism became problematic, as it tried to homogenize the Iraqi identity scripted under the influence of gradual militarization of everyday life.³⁵¹ The Ba’thist ideology is

³⁵⁰ Benjamin Isakhan and Jose A. G. Zarandona, “Erasing history: why Islamic State is blowing up ancient artefacts,” *The Conversation* (2017), <http://theconversation.com/erasing-history-why-islamic-state-is-blowing-up-ancient-artefacts-78667>; Andrew Curry, “Ancient Sites Damaged and Destroyed by ISIS,” *National Geographic* (2017), <https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/history-and-civilisation/2017/11/ancient-sites-damaged-and-destroyed-isis>.

³⁵¹ Faust calls process as the Ba’thification of Iraq and the central party organization responsible for executing this policy is the “Professional and Mass Organizations” (*Al-munazzamat al-mihniyya wal-jamahtriyya*). This organization coordinates and supervise the party activities in civil society institutions. Faust, 85 and 91-97. Achim Rohde, *State-Society Relations in Ba’thist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship* (London:

originally dominated by Pan-Arab definitions of nation posing a quite exclusivist perception towards multi-culturalism. However, immediately after Saddam Hussein monopolized his power in 1979, he transformed the cultural representation of the Ba’thist movement in Iraq under his own image with the enabling impact of the decline of Pan-Arab ideology in the Middle East.³⁵² Especially after 1979, when Saddam Hussein fully controlled the political system, the control of the regime over the means of cultural reproduction became excessive through policies of education, by controlling the media and by framing the cultural practices.³⁵³ While this primarily challenged the diverse nature of Iraqi society, at the same time reinforced the regime’s hand to identify the dissent within the society.

4.5.1 Practices of Ba’thification in Cultural Domain

Waever et al. categorize the strategies against societal insecurity in two forms: defensive or offensive. On the offensive side, violent means are employed as discussed in the military sector. The cultural strategies usually fall into the defensive approach to societal identity, where societal (in)security problems are addressed by reinforcing the boundaries of identity.³⁵⁴ The duality between regime’s vision of homogenized national identity that led to Ba’thification (dominantly Pan-Arab and Sunni centered) and the resulting threat perception by the societal groups shaped the cultural politics during this period. The cultural element in the formation of Ba’thist identity in Iraq represents the dichotomy of the regime’s effort to homogenize the Iraqi identity by redefining the diversities within the Iraqi society (by stressing the unity in Iraqi identity) and the extent to which the societal acceptance of this top-down homogenization of culture (dominated by the

Routledge, 2010) 123, 173.

³⁵² Bengio, 71.

³⁵³ Faust, *Ba’thification of Iraq*, 117.

³⁵⁴ Waever et al., 191-192.

Ba’thist imagination) is achieved among various societal groups in Iraq during Ba’thist rule.

At the national level, major Ba’thification process of Iraqi society practiced in the educational system. The main strategy was to integrate the educational institutions within the highly complex structure of the party and create *homo baathicus*. In addition to the controls on the teaching academies, the Ba’thification of education prioritized integrating schools to the party system as we have seen in the military structure.³⁵⁵ The party created organizations to operate within schools as extensions of the party in public institutions. In 1989, the Party Secretariat issued instructions for how lower party organizations should establish cells within schools and appointment of party members from each school as the party administrator to oversee the compliance of instructors to party rules and ideology.³⁵⁶ This included compulsory membership for teachers and detailed background checks to make sure that they do not have any affiliation with opposition. With regard to the indoctrination of the youth, just like in the military academies, the civic educational system was dominated by complex sets of rules that dictates the conditions of being a good citizen. Most importantly, the loyalty and adherence to the Ba’thist ideology was at the center of educational program.³⁵⁷ From the early years of their educational life, the children in Iraq were prepared for being the good soldiers of the Ba’thist cause and way of life under the image of “*baba Saddam*” (daddy Saddam).³⁵⁸ The implications of this type of party domination over the educational system and the youth is exerting the party ideology and leadership image to the identities of young people.

Apart from the direct over-extension of party mechanism within the society, the Ba’th party regulated the means of collective action. As the party adopted a Soviet model for

³⁵⁵ In 1976, acceptance to teaching academies was restricted to party members only. Bengio, 57. For discussion on the infiltration of party organizations in the military, see section 4.3.

³⁵⁶ Faust, 110.

³⁵⁷ Sassoon, 271-72.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 181; Bengio, 78. For an example of such representations, see Appendix B.

party organization, an important part of the regime's efforts to control society was exercised through monopolization of civil society organizations. The major targets in this issue was the Women's organizations, Student and Youth organizations, Peasant and Worker Unions as well as Teacher's Union.³⁵⁹ The control over mass organizations provided the party with human resource for the Popular Army as the members of these organizations were acculturated into the party ideology and identity.³⁶⁰

The implications of these indoctrination attempts on the non-Arab and non-Sunni communities in Iraq violated several basic rights from rights to speak and education in mother tongue to the changing the historically established demographic structures in regions where these communities live in majority. The totality of such practices by the regime is discussed under label of Arabization which refers to the regime's policies of social engineering with regard to the most non-Arab communities such as Kurds and Turkmen especially in the northern region.

4.5.2 Arabization as a Form of Demographic and Cultural Domination

The Arabization of regions with dominantly non-Arab populations in Iraq during the Ba'thist period is quite a disputed issue as the Arabization process in Iraq under Ba'th was a complex and wide-ranging compilation of state policies in the country. The studies produced on this issue remain unfocused and does not cover these policies systematically. The narratives from Kurdish or Turkmen perspectives as the largest non-Arab communities in Iraq offer different perceptions regarding the regime's policies in Northern Iraq. The most important factor of these different narratives is again related to the regime's manipulation of reward and punishment system and the absence of a legal

³⁵⁹ These mass organizations were listed in the Mission Statement of Ba'thification Committee estimated to be released in 1988, see Sassoon, 196-197. For an extended discussion of such union activities, see Ibid., 249-273.

³⁶⁰ Bengio, 59.

framework to protect the rights of the minority groups within the society. This resulted in the contradiction between the official discourse of the regime that grants certain rights to non-Arab groups within the society and the local practices that denies these rights all together. The Arabization policies referred in this part should be considered as parts of the overall attempts of the regime to manipulate the demographic and cultural balance among the various communities within the society in favor of the Arab-Sunni dominance.

Kirkuk region is the one of historically competed are as in Iraq due to claimed attachment of both Kurdish and Turkmen communities. With rich oil reserves, the area has been subjected to active strife by the regime and the competing Kurdish and Turkmen communities in the region to secure the control of the economic resources as well as the human capital.³⁶¹The Arabization policies intensified after the failure of 1970 Accords between the Kurds and the regime.³⁶² Around 45.000 Kurds were deported and replaced with Arab families in this period.³⁶³ By 1978, the number of people replaced in this process was reported to exceed 600.000. The replacement was accompanied by the confiscation of properties as well. In another wave of displacement in 1997, report by the United Nations Secretary General stated that more than 500,000 Kurds were "internally displaced in the three northern Kurdish provinces."³⁶⁴ Kirkuk represents another example for demographic manipulation by the regime to as a part of Arabization program. When we compare the 1957 and 1987 census, the percentage of Arabs in the Kirkuk Governorate has increased from 28.2% to 44.41% while the percentage for Turkmen population has decreased from 21.4% to 16.31%. the percentages for Kurdish population is 48.3% and

³⁶¹ Most of the resources regarding Arabization policies in Iraq refers to the Kirkuk and Mosul area where the population is majority Turkmen and Kurdish. Both Turkmen and Kurdish narratives are included in this discussion but official reports are also included.

³⁶² The process of 1970 agreements is discussed under the political sector.

³⁶³ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 152.

³⁶⁴ *Iraq Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998*, sect. 1.9 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Feb. 26, 1996); *The Report of the U.N. Secretary General* (New York: United Nations, 1997), S/1997/685.

37.53% respectively.³⁶⁵

The population displacement and demographic manipulation of northern region was a part of the social engineering that the Ba'th regime executed with varying strategies in relation to which segment of population is targeted. While party indoctrination is the primary concern for Sunni-Arab and Shi'a population, societal groups with non-Arab backgrounds were subjected to this kind of demographic manipulation and marginalization.

Considering the use of indigenous languages, another critical issue to the reproduction of minority cultures in Ba'thist Iraq, contradicting narratives are prevalent. On the one hand, the official history shows that the Ba'thist state officially recognized the Kurdish language with the 1970 Accords and granted Turkmen the right to education in mother tongue with governmental decree.³⁶⁶ However, Kerkuklu documented the systematic closing of Turkmen schools and other official party documents that prove the denial of education in mother tongue and reallocation of available Turkmen speaking teachers to other regions.³⁶⁷ The Arabization of the education and the social space was not limited to this. Regime change the Kurdish and Turkmen names of cities, villages, As the educational system and curricula was created and controlled by the regime, the content of especially history and geography courses was Arabized. A different form of control over the cultural reproduction of non-dominant societal groups can be seen in the challenges regarding to the regime's influence to *Hawza* (Shi'a religious schools), using them as tools for the regime.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁵ Nouri Talabany, *Arabization of the Kirkuk Regions* (Sweden: Kurdish Studies Press, 2001).

³⁶⁶ Kelsey Shanks, *Education and Ethno-Politics: Defending Identity in Iraq* (NY: Routledge, 2016), 42-43.

³⁶⁷ Mofak Selman Kerkuklu, *Turkmen of Iraq* (Dublin, 1997, online) available at http://www.turkmenarsivi.com/dosya/kitaplar/combinepdf_1_1529.pdf. (Accessed on 15 August 2018).

³⁶⁸ Faust, 136. The challenges posed by the regime against the religious education and leadership among Shi'a is discussed in the previous section.

The cultural practices of the Ba’th party mainly targeted effective societal control over Iraqi people through indoctrination, monopolization, manipulation or marginalization. While these practices were not exclusively created against the minority groups within the society, the influences of these practices were felt by these groups mostly. This was because of the fact that the party’s main aim was indoctrination and social control of the masses and this became most challenging in cases where non-Arab and non-Sunni communities. Therefore, the regime’s policies towards these communities intensified to the level of displacement and deportations as a part of the Arabization process. The Arabization process is critical part of the *homo baathicus* goal. To raise regime servants without distinguishing their ethnic, cultural and political standing is also relevant to form the prospective bureaucracy class of Iraq. The financial positions of the new elite would be secured as a loyal servant of the regime. Their economic participation would be higher than other groups. These *homo baathicus* elite would also position in the center of politics as well as economics.

4.6 ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY

Interrelationship between economy and societal security in societal security theory is conceptualized through the functioning of capitalist system. The source of arising insecurities from the economic sector results the globalization effect of capitalism primarily. According to Waever et al. self-referential nature of social identity can be threatened by the “homogenizing, atomizing and class generating qualities of capitalism.”³⁶⁹ However, in this research this relationship is conceptualized through the economic consequences of the nature of relationship between the state and society in times of war and crisis. As there is no form of economic integration to global economic system in Iraq apart from the oil as an important export item, the identity issues as stated

³⁶⁹ Waever et al., 51-52.

by Waeber does not apply to the Iraqi society. While Waeber based his arguments on economic sources of societal insecurities to capitalist economic model, the problem in Iraq stemmed from the scarcity of resources and continuous state of war economy, which resulted in even more economic deprivation. Added to this, regime's control over the already scarce economic resources and selective redistribution reflected the identity discourse of the regime expressed also in other sectors.

In the previous sections, the Ba'thist regime's excessive ability and willingness to control all state resources is presented in several domains that created (in)securities within the society. The discussion here elaborates on how the regime used its power to channel its resources to cultivate the social support, how it monopolized the national economic resources for its own good and how the disproportional increase in the rates of military spending during decades of war economy created deprivation within the society. These problems were accompanied by a system dominated by corruption, rentierism and domestic projects that favored certain segments of society while discriminating against the others.

4.6.1 Economic Policy and Regional Underdevelopment

“...The peasant families living in the Saddam irrigation project are now living a new life abounding with hope, optimism and love.. Aside from the method of irrigation it employs and the crops it contains, the project will add an aesthetic touch to the city of Kirkuk..”³⁷⁰

These lines were published in *Al-Thawrah*, the daily newspaper published by the Ba'thist regime promoting the Kirkuk irrigation project (renamed as Saddam Irrigation Project

³⁷⁰ Qasim Mahdi, “Saddam Irrigation Project: Beating Nature's Contours,” *Al-Thawrah* (12 Dec 1984)

after 1979) that was initiated in Kirkuk. Beside the romantic portrayal of the regional development schemes that were initiated by the Ba’th regime, the regional policies were designed to create a much deeper impact on the Iraqi society, first by controlling the access to the economic resources and second by creating exclusionary mechanisms for the economic incentives.

As mentioned in the ecological structure of Iraq previously, the country is largely depended on effective use of irrigation infrastructure for agricultural productivity.³⁷¹ The agricultural usage of Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their unstable flow during the year had been an issue of infrastructure development and investment. At the same time, especially Tigris river acted as a natural boundary between the demographic regions of the North.³⁷² Not surprisingly, the regime prioritized agricultural projects in the North to this end. The irrigation projects were initiated to regulate the irrigation infrastructure of the region, the project became a part of the regime’s Arabization policies causing the resettlement of thousands of Kurds and Turkmens replaced by Arab families.³⁷³ While the irrigation projects consumed much of the investments in the region, they were also accompanied by policies to manipulate the demographic structure in these regions.

One striking example of such state manipulation of demography and economic activities related to the geographical structure of the society occurred in the marshlands (*al-ahwar*) of Iraq, which covered a vast area in the southern flank of the Euphrates and Tigris basin. Originally habited by the *Ma’dan* people who are from various Shi’a tribes had been an

³⁷¹ Robert Springborg, “Baathism in practice: agriculture, politics, and political culture in Syria and Iraq,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, 2 (1981): 191-209.

³⁷² For a comprehensive discussion of regional importance of Euphrates-Tigris river basin, see Ibrahim Mazlum, “Transboundary Management of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin: Dynamics of Regional Cooperation, Sustainability and Governance,” in *Jordan River and Dead Sea Basin: Cooperation Amid Conflict*, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, eds. Clive Lipchin et al. (Netherlands: Springer, 2007): 139-164.

³⁷³ Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Forcible Expulsion of Ethnic Minorities,” (15 March 2003) Available online at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e807ce29.html> (accessed on 11 October 2018); Chris Dammers, “Iraq,” in *Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey* ed. Janie Hampton (London, Earthscan 1998.): 180-185.

economically active area with large volume of rice and other agricultural products.³⁷⁴ The projects for agricultural planning in these lands began in the 1950s with the initiation of the project of Third River, which aimed at creating arable land in the area by creating a canal that would result in the drainage of the marsh area.³⁷⁵ The project was later renamed as the Saddam River but was not announced officially until 1992. During the Iran-Iraq War, the area proved to be very vital for government to control, as it was a center for the military operations of the Iraqi Army and logistical center as well. The agricultural project turned in to a grand resettlement program aimed at removing the inhabitants of the region namely based on development concerns. However, the real aim of the regime was to alter the demographic structure just as how the resettlement program in the North resulted; the area was considered by the regime as a safe zone for army deserters and opposition groups among the Shi'a during the war and later during the 1991 uprisings. As a result, not only the economic securities of the marsh Arabs were jeopardized, but they were also targeted to series of state-led forced migration. Human Rights Watch reported the killing of 2.500 villagers in 1992 with the claim of housing insurgency groups.³⁷⁶ As a result of these campaigns more than 200.000 people in the marshlands were deserted the area either through internal resettlement or migrating to neighboring Iran.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ The estimations on the population of Marsh Arabs range from 400.000 highest to 200.000 in various resources and they are Shi'a by origin from various large tribes in the south such as Bani Asad, Bani Tamim, Albu-Hassan, Albu-Muhammad, and Bani Lam, see Nakash, *Shi'is of Iraq*. For various sociological and anthropological accounts on Marsh Arabs see, Gavin Maxwell, *A Reed Shaken by the Wind* (NY: Longmans, 1957); Shakir M. Salim, *Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta* (London: Berg Publishers, 1962); Wilfred Thesiger, *The Marsh Arabs* (London: Penguin Classics, 1964); and Gavin Young, *Return to the Marshes: Life with the Marsh Arabs of Iraq* (London: Collins, 1977).

³⁷⁵ "The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs," *A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper* (January 2003). Available online at <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounders/mena/marsharabs1.pdf>. Accessed on August 2019.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁷⁷ Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi, "The Marshlands of Southern Iraq: A Very Humanitarian Dilemma," *Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (UNLP) Working Paper* (2000). Online at http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/10915/41162/Documento_completo.pdf?sequence=1. (Accessed on August 2019).

4.6.2 Societal Implications of Economic Sanctions after the Gulf War

Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, United Nations imposed a financial and trade embargo on Iraq with the purpose of pressuring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The content of the sanctions was enlarged to include eliminating all weapons of mass destruction that the Ba'thist regime was accused to use during the invasion. The sanctions were not lifted after the invasion of Kuwait ended and were extended until the invasion of Iraq 2003.³⁷⁸ These sanctions were targeted to weaken the hand of the regime after the Ba'th party showed its eagerness to escalate its aggression in the region after the Iran-Iraq War. However, the implications of sanctions for society and regime's mechanisms for social control created deep problems in state's handling its citizenry. On the one hand, the sanctions intensified the sectarianism in after 1990. On the other hand, the Oil-For-Food program, initiated in 1995 by the UN to ease the economic burdens of sanctions on Iraqi citizens turned into a twisted form of government policy of discrimination and control. These two factors increased the societal marginalization of the underprivileged groups especially in the North and South as a result of selective distribution of resources.

According to the first perspective, economic sanctions intensified sectarianism. The effects of sanctions on incomes, human deprivation and society, which paved the way for the emergence of sectarian politics and reinforced sectarian solidarity.³⁷⁹ Reduced incomes as a result of declining economic conditions and increased human deprivation did not automatically a sectarian conflict, but the regime targeted the South dominated by the Shi'a demographically.³⁸⁰ After the sanctions started following the invasion of

³⁷⁸ For the details of sanctions imposed through the Security Council, see UN Security Council Resolution 661 and the extensions of sanctions in Resolution 687.

³⁷⁹ See, Abbas Alnasrawi, *The economy of Iraq: oil, wars, destruction of development and prospects, 1950-2010* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994); Sarah Graham-Brown, *Sanctioning Saddam: The Intervention Politics in Iraq* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1999).

³⁸⁰ Yousif Bassam, "The political economy of sectarianism in Iraq," *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*, Vol. 4, 3, (December 2010): 357-367.

Kuwait, Alnasrawi defines the state of economic affairs in Basra, which was the second largest city in Iraq with deprivation. As a result of the regime's neglect and discriminatory treatment, water resources were contaminated due to uneducated agricultural production, unable to access cash money, deprived of basic infrastructure such as clean water, sewage etc. this situation did not change even after the UN sanctions were eased and aid programs were initiated.³⁸¹

Albeit later revised to take into consideration imports of nourishment, medication and basic supplies, the monetary authorizations forced by the United Nations on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (and the sanctions stayed until 2003) are significant as far as their length and scope. According to Alnasrawi, the war turned Iraq to the pre-modern age, however with every one of the incapacities of post-mechanical reliance on a concentrated utilization of vitality and innovation."³⁸² Approvals confined prices of oil (Iraq's crucial asset) and consequently blocked adjustments.

So as to avert mass starvation, the Iraqi government initiated a sustenance rationing scheme. Month to month assignments included basic needs like flour, rice, sugar, oil, tea, and soap. This framework was organized through a system of government stockrooms, storehouses, and appropriation points. Blaydes claims that, apart from its problems, the proportioning framework "was totally incompatible for the survival of the Iraqi population."³⁸³ While the scarcity of resources under the food rationing program was a fact, the organization of state structure was unable to apply an effective program. It is credited with effectively keeping away from a much increasingly extreme compassionate emergency. Be that as it may, the apportioning framework was additionally a profoundly viable "instrument of control" for the Ba'thist regime and used for political purposes. One consequence of native dependence on proportions as an essential provision of basic

³⁸¹ Alnasrawi, 162.

³⁸² Ibid, 60.

³⁸³ Blaydes, 118.

sustenance was that the system turned into a significant part of society. Rohde claims that the increasing reliance of most Iraqis on a state-run rationing framework really reinforced state control just the opposite of the initial intention and the decapitated the Iraqi society while creating a breathing space for the regime.³⁸⁴

Some portion of the motivation behind why the system appreciated expanded political control identified with the strategy by which apportion cards were dispersed. Graham-Brown claims that when applying for an apportion card every individual or family is required to deliver a common status personality card, and affirmation of habitation, supported by the area supervisor of the party, in addition to a card containing security information.³⁸⁵ These checks of security administration status and living arrangement made troubles for families who had individuals in opposition to the Ba'th Party or who did not finish their compulsory military administration. These conditional allowances to use the rationing system became a type of weight on families to do what the administration wants.³⁸⁶

The apportioning framework ended up in creating an effective instrument of control in the hands of the regime. It was an integral part of a more extensive arrangement of benefits and advantages attached to conventionalist operation that the Ba'thist state used consistently, however whose viability as an instrument of administration expanded significantly during the embargo period. Access to basic needs was constrained by loyal system figures, the Ba'th party and different intermediaries like ancestral sheikhs and affluent agents, whose positions at last relied upon Saddam Hussain. By allowing the Iraqi system to deal with the assets collected through the Oil-for-Food program, the program's presentation further cemented the existing force structure. It was a bitter fact

³⁸⁴ Rohde, *State-Society Relations in Ba'thist Iraq*, 65-66.

³⁸⁵ Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a Future Denied* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 160.

³⁸⁶ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, 243.

that the small number of citizens who were close to the regime and the party structure benefited largely from the incentives enabled through this program while this nature of the system underprivileged the other segments of the society creating deep deprivation. Disregarding the program's guidelines, the system relentlessly diminished the assets apportioned for compassionate purposes, along these lines dragging out the helpful emergency and the society's reliance on the legislature. Subsequently, Iraqi sources have written about an intentional system strategy of accumulating prescription, while Iraqi emergency clinics were in urgent need of even the most essential supplies.

Since the regime had the option to execute an arrangement of sustenance proportioning and related political support that turned into a life saver for common Iraqis, his populace came to all the while rely on the regime's plans to share the scarce resources. Undoubtedly, Arnove contends that while the economic embargo was planned to debilitate the decision ruling class, the outcome solidified the "political hegemony" of the regime.³⁸⁷ This also reflects Niblock's observation that economic sanctions weakened the Iraqi regime but weakened society even more.³⁸⁸ In other words, the regime became more rather than less powerful with respect to its citizens.

In conclusion, sanctions created different impacts on different groups of the population, as well as on different parts of the country. While the northern part of the country is still subjected to the internal embargo, thus aggravating its economic problems, the south was made to suffer through neglect and underdevelopment. Notwithstanding the impacts of political flimsiness, the commitment of the military in a crusade to put down the Kurdish revolt during the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had its very own devastating impact on the economy as military spending for such warfare takes point of reference over all other

³⁸⁷ Anthony Arnove, *Iraq under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War*. (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002).

³⁸⁸ Tim Niblock, *"Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 185.

financial, political, and social needs. Among the losses of this endeavor was the decrease in rural agricultural production and the resulting economic deprivation.



CONCLUSIONS

This research explores the dynamics of (in)societal security in Iraq between 1968 and 2003 under Ba’th Party rule. This inquiry is conducted under two general themes. In the first two chapters, the societal security approach is explored based on this definition to assess its potential to explain the security dynamics in the Middle East. In the following parts, the evolution of societal security agenda as well as the actors and referent objects of societal security in Iraq during the Ba’thist period is analyzed.

Societal security is essentially defined by the pioneers of the theory as “sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and customs.”³⁸⁹ However, the definition of societal security is this does not elaborate on the agenda, the actors and referent objects of as the theory has been developed based on the societal security concerns specific to the European experiences. In the conceptual part of the study, the societal security theory is deconstructed and from the existing literature on the theory, a new perspective is introduced in order to apply it to diverse contexts. This part addresses the problems of agency and referent object as currently developed by the approach and a new framework is introduced.

The main argument presented in this first part is that in order to offer a context sensitive analysis of societal security, the actors and referent objects as well as the threats should be identified specific to the case that is in question. In other words, there should be some

³⁸⁹ Ole Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*.

flexibility in defining the dynamics of societal (in)securities. When constrained to the experiences of a specific part of the world, the agenda of societal security remains detached from the concerns of societies living under different conditions that define their sense of security. So far, the literature on societal security stick to the definitions offered by the pioneering works of Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in their collaborative works that are discussed before. This research intends to contribute to the discussions to enrich the compatibility of the theory and make it more relevant in different contexts.

In order to operationalize the societal security approach in Iraq which is a particular case that cited in the literature, two lines of inquiry have been presented in the previous chapters. First, the formation of state and society as well as the nature of state-society relations in Iraq, which is a total *sui generis* for the formation of borders and nation building process, is analyzed in order to situate the case study within the existing theoretical literature on societal security. Second, an issue-based approach to security is applied in order to compartmentalize the (in)security issues to present multiple dimensions of societal security. The conceptual discussion around the formation of state, society and state-society relations in Iraq is designed as a contribution to security studies literature by stressing the importance of contextuality in the assessment of the security dynamics in different levels of analysis. While the security studies literature has acknowledged the value of incorporating contextual differences in security analysis, the societal security approach has fallen short of exploring the richness of alternative explanations. One of the main reasons for such negligence is the complexity of society as a concept by itself. Any security analysis on societal level should include various denominators of what constitute the meaning of security and insecurity for a society. This research starts exploring the possible explanations on the central questions of security with analyzing the unique constitution of state, society and state society relations largely in the Middle East particularly in Iraq as well as the various dynamics of societal security from an issue-based compartmentalized analysis. The uniqueness of the region is not

perceived as an exclusive condition only true for the region, but as an unexplored phenomenon that can feed much into the contextual understanding of security in societal security analysis.

Studying the underlying causes for societal insecurity in Ba’thist Iraq has to handle a very central problem, which proves to be a very hard task. In this research, it is argued that the regime oriented (in)securities defined the processes for the evolution of alternative agencies within the societal groups as a response to the threats to their survival as a community. However, an alternative view remains unanswered whether the societal insecurities in Iraq would persist throughout the 35 years of the Ba’thist regime without the militarization of minority groups or foreign assistance to these movements against the regime. Alternatively, whether the Iraqi society would feel secure, if there was full compliance to the regime’s policies of assimilation and discrimination along with the constant reproduction of fear everyday life. We can produce many other scenarios as such where the dynamics of state-society relations would be different so the cycle of threat/(in)security would be different. However, within the 35 years of Ba’thist rule in Iraq, the societal groups analyzed in this research experienced different and changing degrees of societal (in)securities that are regime-oriented. While the complex structure of Iraqi society with multiple actors and competing interests outside the state-society relations produced other insecurities among various societal groups, the regime has been the central actor shaping the security agenda. Therefore, the societal security dynamics originating from the relationship between the regime and the society is at the center of the discussion offered here.

The contextual approach to societal security dynamics offered in this research can offer a potential contribution to the study of societal security not only in Middle Eastern societies, but also in cases that have been addressed in the literature so far. The primary benefit of contextual identification of the components of societal security is that rather than exposing the case with established frameworks, a context-based analysis would

prioritize the experiences of societal groups in terms of the sources of threats, the nature of these threats and the target groups respond in order to regain their security. Apart from the potential theoretical contributions of a contextual approach to societal security dynamics, there is the need to include the perspectives from the society in order to understand it. The sector-based approach introduced in this research presents the wide-ranging agenda of societal security in the Iraqi case, rather than limiting the discussion to horizontal-vertical competition axis as done by the existing literature on societal security. The analysis in each sector reinforce the need to reformulate the actor-referent object structure in the existing explanations on societal security by introducing societal groups as security provider for its own security concerns. In the literature, state remains the sole provider of security for the society against external threats but it does not speaks to the cases where state itself becomes a source of insecurity for the society.

In order to understand the (in)securities of Iraqi society during Ba’thist rule between 1968 and 2003, this research analyzes the societal security dynamics in Iraq is analyzed under five sections that outlines the actors, the referent objects and the threats in each sector of security. Accordingly, political, military, religious, cultural and economic dynamics of societal security in Iraq during this period is narrated through how the regime created threats that would diminish the perception of security among the communities that are identified as the potential enemies of the state. The sector-based analysis shows that the nature of relationship between the state and the society in Ba’thist Iraq directly affects the dynamics of societal (in)securities.

As a conclusion, the sectoral analysis presented in this research shows that explaining societal dynamics of security requires a multi-dimensional and compartmentalized approach. Sectoral analysis provides a comprehensive analytical for understanding various dimensions of state-society relations that translates into insecurities as we see in the Iraqi case. Analyzing security through a single or a limited number of sectors would present an incomplete narrative of how insecurities emerge and through which

mechanisms. Therefore, the identification of the issues that define the dynamics of societal (in)securities in a case study is the most vital element of a complete analysis. The contextual differences in each society and culture requires case-oriented perspective, which sectoral approach can provide with its flexibility to adapt.

The next step to be taken from this study is to drive some conclusions about the post-Ba’thist transformation in Iraq with the toppling down of the regime in 2003 after the US invasion. How has this environment constant cycle of (in)securities rooted in the Ba’thist rule evolved after the invasion while the societal (in)securities exacerbated during this period became so deeply engraved for the non-Sunni or non-Arab groups within the society? Have the societal insecurities of the Iraqi people continued to be reproduced after the invasion? Have these societal insecurities, which is closely tied to the regime’s penetrations into the society, been transformed positively as the regime factor is removed from the equation or same problems persisted as the new political system has not addressed these problems? These question needs to be addressed in further research on this topic in order to understand the impact of the conditions leading to societal insecurities in similar contexts.

This exercise would provide a good understanding of the nature of the societal security. As of writing this conclusion, the rise of radicalism in Iraq closely related to the societal traumas linked to the Ba’thist period and the humanitarian consequences of it has proved that the regime change did not automatically resulted in creating a more secure society. On the other hand, growing popular unrest against the government both in Iraq and in Kurdish Region shows a continuous trend in terms of how everyday lives of Iraqi citizens are still filled with various insecurities. With a deeper understanding of societal dynamics that produce and reproduce insecurities within the society should be treated as the lessons of the past in order to avoid similar results. The analytical framework of this research can be a guiding tool to understand changing and persistent issues in societal security agenda.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Coalition Provision Authority Regulation, CPA/ORD/ and CPA/REG in 2003-2004.

Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, *Iraq, The Situation*, NSC Action 2068.
Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Symmes and sent through Murphy.
June 3, 1959.

Secondary Sources

“Iraq: Forcible Expulsion of Ethnic Minorities.” *Human Rights Watch*. March 15, 2003.
Available online at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e807ce29.html>.
Accessed on 11 October 2018.

“Iraq: State of Evidence.” *Human Rights Watch*. Vol. 16, No. 7. November 2004.
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq1104.pdf>.

“Iraq's political system under fire.” *BBC News*, 11 April 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4359559.stm. Accessed on October
29, 2018.

“Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And Its Aftermath.” *Human Rights Watch
Report*. 1992. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm>.

“The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs.” *A Human Rights Watch Briefing
Paper*. January, 2003. Available at
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/marsharabs1.pdf>. Accessed
on August 2019.

“We will persevere.” *The Guardian*, 25 May 2004,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/25/usa.iraq4>. Accessed on October 29, 2018.

Aghaie, Kamran Scot. *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004.

Aghaie, Kamran Scot. *The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.

Agnew, John. "Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking." *Ethics & Global Politics* 1, no. 4 (2008): 175-191.

Agnew, John. "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory." *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (Spring, 1994): 53-80.

Al-Askari, Jafar. *A Soldier's Story: from Ottoman rule to independent Iraq, the memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askari*. Translated by Mustafa Tariq Al-Askari. Edited by William Facey and Najdat Fathi Safwat. London: Arabian Publishing, 2003.

Al-Khafaji, Isam. "War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: The Case of Ba'athist Iraq." In *War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East*, edited by Steven Heydemann, 258-291. LA: University of California Press, 2000.

Al-Marashi, Ibrahim and Sammy Salama. *Iraq's Armed Forces: An analytical history*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6, no. 3 (September, 2002): 1-13.

Al-Musawi, Mushin. "Iraq: Cultural Dynamics Since the British Mandate." *Second Annual Wadie Jwaideh Memorial Lecture* (13 November 2003). Available online at http://www.indiana.edu/~nelc/events/documents/Jwaideh/jwaideh_lecture_2003.pdf. Accessed on 21 July 2018.

- Alnasrawi, Abbas. *The economy of Iraq : oil, wars, destruction of development and prospects, 1950-2010*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994.
- Al-Qarawee, Harith Hasan. "Iraq's Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2014.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition*. London: Verso, 2006.
- Anderson, James and Liam O'Dowd. "Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance." *Regional Studies* 33, no. 7 (1999): 3-45.
- Anderson, Lisa. "The State in the Middle East and North Africa." *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (Oct., 1987): 1-18.
- Anderson, Scott. "The Disintegration of the Iraqi State Has Its Roots in World War I," *Smithsonian.com*. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/disintegration-iraqi-state-has-its-roots-world-war-i-180951793/>. Accessed on 28 December 2016.
- Aneesh, Aneesh. "Bloody Language: Clashes and Constructions of Linguistic Nationalism in India." *Sociological Forum*, 25(2010): 86-109.
- Aoyama, Hirouki et al. "Spiritual Father of the Ba'th: The Ideological and Political Significance of Zaki al-Arsüzi in Arab Nationalist Movements," *IDE-JETRO: M.E.S. Series No. 49*. Online <https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Mes/49.html> (Accessed on 21 Dec 2018).
- Arnove, Anthony. *Iraq under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War*. Cambridge: South End Press, 2002.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective". In *Critical Security Studies*, edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 121-146. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press; 1997.

- Ayubi, Nazih. *Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009.
- Aziz, Tareq M. "The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 2 (May, 1993): 207-222.
- Baldwin, David A. "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War." *World Politics* 48, no. 1 (1995): 117-41.
- Baldwin, David. "The Concept of Security." *Review of International Studies* 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1997): 5-26.
- Barak, Oren. "Dilemmas of Security in Iraq." *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (December 2007): 455–75.
- Baram, Amatzia. "Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29, no. 1 (1997): 1-31.
- Baram, Amatzia. *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
- Baram, Amatzia. *Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968–2003. Ba'thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith*. Baltimore. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
- Baram, Amatzia. "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 26, no. 4 (October 1990): 425-48.
- Barkey, Karen and Sunita Parikh. "Comparative Perspectives on the State." *Annual Review of Sociology* 17 (1991): 524.
- Bashkin, Orit. *The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq*. CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Bassam, Yousif. "The political economy of sectarianism in Iraq." *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*. Vol. 4, no. 3 (December 2010): 357-367.

- Batatu, Hanna. *The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions Some Observations on Their Underlying Causes and Social Character*. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University, 1983.
- Batatu, Hanna. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
- Beach, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013.
- Bellin, Eva. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57.
- Bengio, Ofra. "How Does Saddam Hold On?" *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 4 (July–August 2000): 90-103.
- Bengio, Ofra. *Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq*. NY: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Bilgin, Pinar. "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security." *International Studies Review* 5, (2003): 203–222.
- Bilgin, Pinar. *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*. NY: Routledge, 2005.
- Bilgin, Pinar. "The 'Western-Centrism' of Security Studies: 'Blind Spot' or Constitutive Practice?" *Security Dialogue*. 41, no. 6 (2010): 615–622.
- Bilgin, Pinar. "Thinking past 'Western' IR?" *Third World Quarterly*. 29, no. 1 (2008): 5-23.
- Bilgin, Pinar. "Whose 'Middle East'? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security." *International Relations*. 18, no. 1 (2004): 17–33.

- Black, Cyril E. and L. Carl Brown, eds.. *Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and Its Afro-Asian Successors*. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992.
- Black, Ian and Benny Morris. *Israel's secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services*. NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.
- Blaydes, Lisa. *State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bobbitt, Philip. *The Shield of Achilles: War Peace and the Course of History*. Anchor Books: 2002.
- Booth, Ken. "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist." In *Critical Security Studies*, edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 83-120. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Boulby, Marion. "Extra-Regional Interests, Authoritarian Elites, and Dependent State Formation in the Arab World." In *State Formation and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa*, edited by Kenneth Christie and Mohammad Masad, 37-58. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Bozarslan, Hamit. "Rethinking the Ba'athist Period." in *Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges*, edited by Jordi Tejel, Peter Sluglett, Ricardo Bocco and Hamit Bozarslan, 143-152. Singapore: World Scientific, 2012.
- Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear*. 2nd Edition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991.
- Cambridge dictionary of sociology*. Edited by B. S. Turner. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

- Castells, Manuel. *Power of Identity*. 2nd Edition, Singapore: Wiley Blackwell, 2010.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908*. NY: Routledge, 2006.
- Ceylan, Ebubekir. *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East*. NY: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
- Chalabi, Ahmed. "Opposing Saddam Hussein." *The Brown Journal of Foreign Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Winter 1993-1994): 119-130.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone* NY: Vintage Books, 2007.
- Chowdhry, Geeta and Sheila Nair. *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading, Race, Gender and Class*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Cox, Robert. "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 3–28.
- Curry, Andrew. "Ancient Sites Damaged and Destroyed by ISIS," *National Geographic* (2017).<https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/history-and-civilisation/2017/11/ancient-sites-damaged-and-destroyed-isis>.
- Dammers, Chris. "Iraq." In *Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey*. Edited by Janie Hampton. London, Earthscan 1998. 180-185.
- Dann, Uriel. *Iraq under Qassem: a political history, 1958-1963*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1969.
- Dawisha, Adeed. *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation*. NJ: Princeton University Press: 2009.
- Dawood, Hosham. "The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: the Case of Iraq." In *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, ed. Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood, 113-114. London: Saqi Books, 2003.

- Davis, Eric. "The Museum and the Politics of Social Control in Modern Iraq." In *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, edited by John R. Gillis, 91-104. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- DeFronzo, James. *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences*. PA: Westview Press, 2009.
- Descola, Philippe and Gísli Pálsson. *Nature and Society: Anthropological perspectives*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Dockter, Warren. *Churchill and the Islamic World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015.
- Dodge, Toby. *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a Future Denied*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
- Dodge, Toby. "Iraq: the contradictions of exogenous state-building in historical perspective." *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 187-200.
- Dündar, Fuat. "'Statisquo' British Use of Statistics in the Iraqi Kurdish Question 1919–1932." *Crown Paper No 7*, Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies (2012): 1-64.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. *Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980.
- Eppel, Michael. *Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam*. FL: University of Florida Press, 2004.
- Eriksson, Johan. "What Makes a Security Problem? Securitization and Agenda Setting." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Swedish Political Science Association (October 11-13, 1998).
- Ertman, Thomas. *Birth of the Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Peter Sluglett. "Sunnis and Shi'is revisited; sectarianism and ethnicity in authoritarian Iraq." in *The Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani*, edited by John P.

- Spagnolo. Reading, Ithaca Press, 1992: 279–294.
- Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Peter Sluglett. *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001.
- Farr, Jason. “Point: The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-State.” *International Social Science Review* 80, no. 3/4 (2005): 156-159.
- Fattah, Hala and Frank Caso. *A Brief History of Iraq*. NY: Facts on File Publishing, 2009.
- Faust, Aaron M. *The Ba'thification of Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Totalitarianism*. Texas: University of Texas Press, 1991.
- Fawcett, Louise. “States and sovereignty in the Middle East: myths and realities.” *International Affairs* 93, no. 4 (2017): 789-807.
- Fawcett, John and Victor Tanner. “The Internally Displaced People of Iraq.” *Brookings Institution Occasional Paper* (2002).
- Foucault, Michel. “The Subject and Power.” *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-795.
- Fraser, Nancy “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics”, in *Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn*, edited by Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer, 25-52, CA: Sage, 1999.
- Freij, Hanna Yousif. “Alliance patterns of a secessionist movement: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (1998): 19-37.
- George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Giddens, Anthony. *Sociology*, 6th edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

- Głowacka-Grajper, Małgorzata. "Memory in Post-Communist Europe: Controversies over Identity, Conflicts, and Nostalgia." *East European Politics and Societies* 32, no. 4 (November 2018): 924–35.
- Graham-Brown, Sarah. *Sanctioning Saddam: The Intervention Politics in Iraq*. London: I.B. Taurus, 1999.
- Gunter, Michael M. *The A to Z of Kurds*. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2009.
- Güngör, Ferhat. "Ortadoğu Denkleminde Irak Türkmenleri ve Geleceği," *Uluslararası Sosyal ve Eğitim Bilimleri Dergisi*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2014): 14-43.
- Haddad, Fanar. *Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity*. NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Haj, Samira. *The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power and Ideology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- Halliday, Fred. "Orientalism' and Its Critics," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993):145-163.
- Halliday, Fred. "The crisis of the Arab world." In *The Gulf War Reader*. Edited by Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf. New York: Times Books, 1991. 395–401.
- Hansen, Lene and Helen Nissenbaum. "Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School." *International Studies Quarterly*, 53 (2009): 1155-1175.
- Hashim, Ahmad S. "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power." *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 1 (Winter, 2003): 9-41.
- Hashim, Ahmed S. "Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq." *Middle East Policy*, 10, no.4 (2003): 29-47.
- Helfont, Samuel. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Heller, Mark. "Iraq's army: military weakness, political utility." In *Iraq's Road to War*.

Edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, 37-50. New York: St. Martins Press, 1994.

Hernes, Gudmund. "Structural Change in Social Processes." *American Journal of Sociology*. 82, no. 3 (Nov., 1976): 513-547.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East," *Middle East Critique*, 19:3(2010): 201-216.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. *The International Politics of the Middle East*. 2nd Edition. UK: Manchester University Press, 2015.

Hirst, David. "The Terror from Tikrit." *Guardian* (November 26, 1971).

Hobsbawm, Eric "Mass-producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914", in *Representing the nation: a reader*. Edited by David Boswell and Jessica Evans, 61-86. London: Routledge, 1999.

Hourani, Albert. "Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, edited by William R. Polk and Richard L.Chambers, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Huttenbach, Henry R. "The Genocide Factor in the Yugoslav Wars of Dismemberment." In *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia*. Edited by, Jeffrey S. Morton, R. Craig Nation, Paul Forage, Stefano Bianchini. 23-34. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Huysmans, Jef. "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe." *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4, (1998): 479-505.

Iraq Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State. February 26, 1996.

- Ireland, Philip W. *Iraq, A Study in Political Development*. London, Jonathan Cape, 1937.
- Isakhan, Benjamin and Jose A. G. Zarandona, “Erasing history: why Islamic State is blowing up ancient artefacts,” *The Conversation* (2017). <http://theconversation.com/erasing-history-why-islamic-state-is-blowing-up-ancient-artefacts-78667>.
- Isakhan, Benjamin, Shamiran Mako and Fadi Dawood. *State and Society in Iraq: Citizenship under Occupation, Dictatorship and Democratisation*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2017.
- Ismael, Tareq Y. *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Izady, Michael. *Atlas of the Islamic World and Vicinity* (Columbia University Gulf2000 project, 2006-present).
- Jabar, Faleh A. (ed.) *Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq*. London: Saqi Books, 2002.
- Jabar, Faleh A. *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq*. London: Saqi Books, 2003.
- Joseph, John E. “‘The grammatical being called a nation’: history and the construction of political and linguistic nationalism.” In *Language and History: Integrationist Perspectives*. Edited by Nigel Love, 120-141. NY: Routledge, 2006.
- Kamrava, Mehran. “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective.” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 6 (2007): 189-213.
- Kaplan, Robert D. “Baathism Caused the Chaos in Iraq and Syria.” *Foreign Policy* (March 7, 2018). <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/baathism-caused-the-chaos-in-iraq-and-syria/>. Last accessed on 29 September 2018.
- Karpat, Kemal. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. NY: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Kayali, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the*

Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918. L.A.: University of California Press, 1997.

Kazmi, Sayyed Nadeem. “The Marshlands of Southern Iraq: A Very Humanitarian Dilemma.” *Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (UNLP) Working Paper* (2000). Online at http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/10915/41162/Documento_completo.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed on August 2019.

Keddie, Niki R. “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, (1966): 46-67.

Kedouri, Elie. *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914-1939*. 2nd Edition, London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Kedourie, Sylvia. *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*. LA: University of California Press, 1962.

Kerkuklu, Mofak Selmán. *Turkmen of Iraq*. Dublin, 1997, online. Available at http://www.turkmenarsivi.com/dosya/kitaplar/combinepdf__1__1529.pdf. Last accessed on 15 August 2018.

Khadduri, Majid. *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Khadduri, Majid. “Iraq, 1958 and 1963.” In *The Politics of the Coup d’Etat: five case studies*. Edited by William Andrews and Uri Ra’anan, 65-88. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969.

Khoury, Dina. *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Khoury, Dina R. “Political Relations Between City and State in the Middle East, 1700–1850.” In *The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950*. Edited by Peter Sluglett, 67-103. NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008.

Khoury, Philip S. *Syria and the French Mandate: The politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-*

45. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

King, Diane E. "Patriliney and Modern States in the Middle East." *In State Formations: Global Histories and Cultures of Statehood*. Edited by John L. Brooke, Julia C. Strauss, and Greg Anderson, 305–16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Kirmanj, Sherko. *Identity and Nation in Iraq*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013.

Krasner, Stephen D. "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics." *Comparative Politics*. 16, no. 2 (Jan., 1984): 223-246.

Krause, Keith. "Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case." *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 319–54.

Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 229–254.

Kruck, Andreas and Andrea Schneiker. *Researching non-state actors in international security: theory and practice*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.

Lamont, Michèle and Virág Molnár, "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences," *Annual Review of Sociology*. 28 (2002): 167-195.

Leander, Anna. "Globalisation and the State Monopoly on the Legitimate use of Force." *Syddansk Universitet Political Science Publications*, no. 7 (2004): 1-27

Lemay-He'bert, Nicolas. "Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no 1 (2009): 21–45.

Mahdi, Qasim. "Saddam Irrigation Project: Beating Nature's Contours." *Al-Thawrah*. December 12, 1984.

Makiya, Kanan. *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*. Updated edition with new

- Introduction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Makiya, Kanan. *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993.
- Mansour, Renad and Christine van den Toorn. "The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections: A Population in Transition?" *LSE Middle East Centre Report* (July 2018).
- Marr, Phebe. "One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?" In *Iraq Between Occupations Perspectives from 1920 to the Present*. Edited by Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel, 15-41. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Marr, Phebe. *The Modern History of Iraq*. CO: Westview Press, 2012.
- Maxwell, Gavin. *A Reed Shaken by the Wind*. NY: Longmans, 1957.
- Mazlum, İbrahim. "Transboundary Management of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin: Dynamics of Regional Cooperation, Sustainability and Governance." In *Jordan River and Dead Sea Basin: Cooperation Amid Conflict*, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series. Edited by Clive Lipchin et al. Netherlands: Springer, 2007. 139-164.
- McDowall, David. *A Modern History of Kurds*. Revised Edition NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- McSweeney, Bill. *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- McSweeney, Bill. "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School." *Review of International Studies* 2, no. 1 (1996): 81-89.
- Migdal, Joel. *State-in-Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Migdal, Joel. *Strong Societies, Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

- Miller, Seumas. "Social Institutions." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2014 Edition. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/social-institutions/>>. Last accessed on 28 September 2018.
- Mitchell, Timothy. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (1991): 77-96.
- Mar-Molinero, Clare. "Linguistic nationalism and minority language groups in the 'New' Europe." *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 15, no. 4 (1994): 319-328.
- Moore, Mick. "Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries." *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 3 (2004): 297-319.
- Moore Henry, Clement and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Nagel, Joane. "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture." *Social Problems* 41, no. 1 (Feb., 1994):152-176.
- Nakash, Yitzhak. *The Shi'is of Iraq*. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Neep, Daniel. *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Niblock, Tim. *"Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
- O'Neill, Brendan. "Unrecorded victims," *Guardian*, July 21, 2004. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/21/iraq.guardiananalysispage>.
- Olesker, Ronnie. "Israel's Societal Security Dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011): 382-401.
- Olson, Robert. *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion*,

1880–1925. TX: University of Texas Press, 1989.

Önhan Evered, Emine. *Empire and Education under the Ottomans: politics, reform, and resistance from the Tanzimat to the Young Turks*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012.

Oppenheimer, Franz. *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically*. New York, Vanguard Press, 1926.

Osman, Khalil F. *Sectarianism in Iraq The Making of State and Nation since 1920*. NY: Routledge, 2015.

Osman, Tarek. “Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WW1 still rock the Middle East.” *BBC News* (14 December 2013) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553>. Accessed on 29 September 2018

Owen, Roger. *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. NY: Routledge, 1992.

Oxford Online Dictionary, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/society>

Özbudun, Ergun “The Ottoman Legacy and the Middle East State Tradition,” *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*. Edited by L. Carl Brown, 133-157. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Palgrave MacMillan dictionary of political thought, 3rd edition. Edited by R. Scruton. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2007.

Panic, Branka. “Societal Security: security and identity.” *Western Balkans Security Observer*. no. 13 (2009): 29-38.

Parasiliti, Andrew and Sinan Antoon, "Friends in Need, Foes to Heed: the Iraqi Military in Politics." *Middle East Policy* 7, no. 4 (October 2000): 131-140.

Paul, Thazha Varkey. “States, Security Function, and the New Global Forces,” in *The Nation-State in Question*. Edited by T.V. Paul et al. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, 139-165.

- Pierson, Christopher. *The Modern State*. 2nd Edition, London: Routledge, 2004.
- Podeh, Elia. *The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic*. London: Sussex Academic Press, 1999.
- Poggi, Gianfranco. *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978.
- Pouliot, Vincent. *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Powell, Rhonda. “Concept of Security.” *University of Oxford Socio-Legal Review* (June 2012): 1-29.
- Quesnay, Arthur. “Communitisation of Iraqi Society After 2003: Impacts on the political and institutional system?” *Institute for Research and Debate on Governance*, December 2014.
- Quinlivan, James T. “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.” *International Security*. 24, no. 2 (Fall, 1999): 131-165.
- Roe, Paul. *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma*. NY: Routledge, 2005.
- Rohde, Achim. *State-Society Relations in Ba’thist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship*, London: Routledge, 2010.
- Roshwald, Aviel. “Nationalism in the Middle East, 1876–1945.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*. Edited by John Breuilly, 220-241. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques. “The Social contract,” translated by Jonathan Bennett (2010) <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>. Accessed on 13 May 2017.
- Saeed, Haider. “Identity Politics and the Nation State in a Non-Western World: A Theoretical Essay with Reference to the Case of Iraq.” *Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània Monographies 11: The Arab Transitions in a Changing World*

(2016): 184-197.

- Safrastian, Arshak. *Kurds and Kurdistan*. London: The Harvill Press, 1948.
- Saleh, Alam. "Broadening the Concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security." *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (2010): 228-241.
- Salem, Paul. "The Rise and Fall of Secularism in the Arab World." *Middle East Policy*. 4, no. 3: 147–160.
- Salim, Shakir M. *Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta*. London: Berg Publishers, 1962.
- Sassoon, Joseph. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Sellers, Jefferey M. "State-Society Relations." in *The SAGE Handbook of Governance*, edited by Mark Bevir. 124-141. London: Sage Publications, 2011.
- Seth, Sanjay. "Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 40, no.1 (2011): 167–183.
- Shanahan, Rodger. "Shi'a political development in Iraq: the case of the Islamic Dawa Party." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 5 (2004): 943-954.
- Shanks, Kelsey. *Education and Ethno-Politics: Defending Identity in Iraq*. NY: Routledge, 2016.
- Sibley, David. *Geographies of Exclusion Society and Difference in the West*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Simons, Gary F. and Charles D. Fennig (eds.). *Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 21st edition*. Texas: SIL International, 2018. Also available at <https://www.ethnologue.com/>
- Sissons, Miranda and Abdulrazzaq al-Saiedi, "Iraq's de-Baathification still haunts the country," *Al Jazeera*, 12 March 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331055338463426>.

html. Accessed on October 29 2018.

Skocpol, Theda. "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", in *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter D. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, 3-43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Sluglett, Peter. *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

Sluglett, Peter. "Les mandats/the mandates: Some reflections on the nature of the British presence in Iraq (1914–1932) and the French presence in Syria (1918–1946)" in *The British and French mandates in comparative perspective*, edited by Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett, with Gérard Houry and Geoffrey Schad, 103-128. Leiden: Brill, 2004..

Somel, Selçuk Akşin. *The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire*. Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2010.

Spitzer, Steven. "Security and Control in Capitalist Societies: the Fetishism of Security and the Secret Thereof." in *Transcarceration: essays in the sociology of social control*, edited by John Lowman, Robert J. Menzies and T. S. Palys, 43-58. England: Gower, 1987.

Springborg, Robert. "Baathism in practice: agriculture, politics, and political culture in Syria and Iraq," *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 17, 2 (1981): 191-209.

Stansfield, Gareth and Liam Anderson. *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?* NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Steinmetz, George. *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn*. NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Sykes, Mark. "Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 38 (1908): 451-486.

Talabany, Nouri. *Arabization of the Kirkuk Regions*. Sweden: Kurdish Studies Press,

2001.

Tannenwald, Nina "Process Tracing and Security Studies." *Security Studies* 24, no 2 (2015): 219-227.

Tarbush, Mohammad A. *The Role of Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941*. London: KPI, 1982.

The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2018.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

The Report of the U.N. Secretary General. New York: United Nations, 1997. S/1997/685.

Thesiger, Wilfred. *The Marsh Arabs*. London: Penguin Classics, 1964.

Tilly, Charles. "The Long Run of European State Formation." In *Visions sur le développement des États européens. Théories et historiographies de l'État moderne*. Actes du colloque de Rome. March 18-31, 1990.

Tilly, Charles. "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in *The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe*. Edited by Charles Tilly. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Tripp, Charles. *A History of Iraq*, 3rd Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Tse-shyang. Chen Frederick. "The Meaning of States in the Membership Provisions of the United Nations Charter." *Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.* 12 (2001): 25-51.

Turan, Kürşad. "Sources of Conflict in the Middle East: Borders or Stratified Identities?" *The Journal of Defense Sciences* 16, no 1 (May 2017): 85-113.

Turner, Arthur C. "Kurdish Nationalism." In *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*. Edited by Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, 379-412. UK: Duke University Press, 1988

Van Bruinessen, Martin. *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of*

Kurdistan. London: Zed Books: 1992.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. *Mullas, Sufis and Heretics: The Role of Religion in Kurdish Society*. Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000.

Vanly, Ismet C. "The Forgotten Faili Kurds of Iraq." In *Kurdish Exodus: From Internal Displacement to Diaspora*. Edited by Mohammed Ahmed and Michael Gunter. 43-48. MA: Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies, 2002.

Vinogradov, Amal. "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 2 (1972): 123-39

Vom Hau, Matthias. "State Theory: Four analytical Traditions" in *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State*. Edited by Stephen Leibfried, Evelyn Huber, Jonah D. Levy, Frank Nullmeier and John D. Stephens, 131-151. NY: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Waever, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1993.

Waever, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In *On Security*. Edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46-87. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Waever, Ole. "Securitizing Sectors? A Reply to Eriksson." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34, no. 3 (1999): 334-340.

Waever, Ole. "The Changing Agenda of Societal Security." In *Globalization and Environmental Challenges Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*. Edited by Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, P. H. Liotta. 581-594. Berlin: Springer, 2008.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no 2 (1991): 211-239.

- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, NY: University of California Press, 1978.
- Wiley, Joyce. *The Islamic Movements of Iraqi Shi'as*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- Wilkinson, Claire. "The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is securitization theory useable outside Europe?" *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007): 5-25.
- Williams, Michael C. "The Public, the Private and the Evolution of Security Studies." *Security Dialogue* 41 no. 6 (2010): 623-630.
- Woodiwiss, M., & Bewley-Taylor, D. "The global fix: The construction of a global enforcement regime." Paper presented at TNI Crime and Globalization seminar, Amsterdam, 28-29 April 2005. Online at <https://www.tni.org/files/download/crime2.pdf>. Accessed on 25 July 2018.
- Young, Gavin. *Return to the Marshes: Life with the Marsh Arabs of Iraq*. London: Collins, 1977.
- Zubaida, Sami. "The rise and fall of civil society in Iraq." *Open Security* (February 2003). https://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraqwarquestions/article_953. Accessed on 2 April 2018.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A – Statistical Information about Iraq’s Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Composition

Iraq Country Demographic Profile³⁹⁰

40,194,216 (July 2018 est.)

Ethnic Share of the Total Estimated Iraqi Population Based on the 2015 Demographic Data (34,587,943)

Shi’as (Arabic Speaking) 57.0 %

Kurd 19.6 %

Arab (Sunni Muslims) 18.0 %

Turkoman 2.5 %

Christians 2.2 %

Mandian 0.1 %

Others (Inc. Circassian, Lur, Gypsie, Iranian etc.) 1.0 %³⁹¹

³⁹⁰ The demographic shift between the years are double-checked from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017), World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision (custom data acquired via website <https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/>.)


³⁹¹ The demographic distribution is adapted to a total population of 34,567,643 based on the available 2015. All the demographic data is drawn from Michael Izady, *Atlas of the Islamic World and Vicinity* (Columbia University Gulf2000 project, 2006-present).

Ethnologue – Iraq Linguistic Profile³⁹²

Arabic, Standard (Total)	27,000,000
Arabic, Gulf Spoken	67,000
Arabic, Mesopotamian Spoken	13,400,000
Arabic, Najdi Spoken	1,470,000
Arabic, North Mesopotamian Spoken	7,570,000
Armenian	60,000
Assyrian	152,000
Azerbaijani, South (Turkmen)	2,040,000
Kurdish (Total)	25,010,300
Kurdish (Central)	4,000,000
Kurdish (Northern)	3,440,000
Persian	408,000
Syriac	774,770

³⁹² Only major languages spoken in Iraq are listed here and the reason that the total numbers differ from the population figure is the bilingual or multilingual nature of Iraqi society, for the full list of languages of Iraq, see Gary F. Simons and Charles D. Fennig (eds.), *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, 21st edition. (Texas: SIL International, 2018). Also available at <https://www.ethnologue.com/country/IQ/languages>.

APPENDIX B – An Example of Cultural Glorification of Saddam Hussein through Art



“From Nebuchadnezzar to Saddam Hussain, Babylon is rising again,” by Mahmud Hamad, *al-Thawra*, 20 September 1987

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Kişisel Bilgiler

Adı Soyadı : Şükriye Gökçe Gezer
Doğum Yeri ve Tarihi : Üsküdar, 21.05.1988

Eğitim Durumu

Lisans Öğrenimi : İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Üniversitesi – İnsani Bilimler ve Edebiyat Fakültesi – Amerikan Kültürü ve Edebiyatı (2006-2010)

Yüksek Lisans Öğrenimi : Koç Üniversitesi – Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü – Uluslararası İlişkiler Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı (2010-2012)

Bildiği Yabancı Diller : İngilizce (Profesyonel Seviye), Kürtçe (Başlangıç Seviyesi)

İş Deneyimi

Çalıştığı Kurumlar ve Tarihleri:

(Eylül 2018-halen) İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü – Araştırma Görevlisi

(Ocak 2016-Haziran 2016) Koç Üniversitesi, İnsani Bilimler ve Edebiyat Fakültesi – Yarı Zamanlı Öğretim Görevlisi

(Eylül 2012-Eylül 2018) Kadir Has Üniversitesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü – Burslu Lisansüstü Asistan

İletişim

Telefon : +90 506 230 1619
E-posta Adresi : gokce.gezer@bilgi.edu.tr