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CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS: EUROPEAN UNITY VERSUS TURKEY

MASTER THESIS

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CONTENTS

| 3.2.2 : Long Term Interest Rates | 27 |
|---|----|
| 3.2.3 : Exchange Rates | 28 |
| 3.2.4 : Public Finance | 29 |
| 3.3 : Real Indicators Of Convergence | 29 |
| 3.3.1 : Current GNP Per Capita and Real GDP Per | |
| Capita | 29 |
| 3.3.2 : Unemployment Rates | 30 |
| PART FOUR : TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY | |
| 4.1 : A Historical Outlook | 31 |
| 4.2 : Customs Union And Its Probable Effects On The | |
| Turkish Economy | 33 |
| 4.3 : General Evaluations And Longer Term Prospects | |
| For Turkey | 36 |
| | |
| PART FIVE : THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA IN THE EC AND | |
| TURKEY | |
| 5.1 : Nominal Indicators | 35 |
| 5.2 : Real Indicators | 40 |
| | |
| PART SIX : CONCLUSION | 42 |
| APPENDIX : GRAPHS AND TABLES | 44 |
| SOURCES | 77 |
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PREFACE

The evolution of the European Community is the best example of the concept of economic integration in the world. The experiments and problems of the EC give us chance to observe theoretical and real world issues in both developed and developing countries. Thus, in this study, I intend to focus on the principle of convergence of the European economies which is the key question in the 1990s.

To recognize this, in spite of problems in obtaining full statistical data: for the EC and Turkey, I compare the various indicators of nominal convergence. In terms of economic welfare, however, I use real variables such as income per head or a tolerable level of unemployment.

Finally, Turkey's situation is also mentioned with respect to these requirements. I believe that the study would give us some powerful observations in understanding the problems of economic integration especially in accordance with the less favoured countries.

I particularly want to thank to Prof.Dr. Nejat Erk who encouraged me to focus on this subject and provided critiques of the study and suggested new readings. Once again, my thanks to Prof.Dr. Mahir Fisunoglu who has examined the study and given me the great benefit of his comment, and to my friends for their love and encouragement.

Hüseyin Mualla Yüceol

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

This study aims at examining the theory of economic integration and its problems by taking into the consideration the experiences of the European Community. For this purpose, the study firstly concentrates on the theoretical concepts under the framework of the neoclassical trade theory and then on the practical concepts under the principle of convergence criteria. The principle of convergence is based on the comparision of nominal and real indicators among the member countries.

In the study, main nominal indicators of convergence are inflation rates, long term interest rates, exchange rates and public deficits. Main real indicators of convergence are GNP per capita, real GDP per capita and unemployment level.

In the final analysis, the study evaluates the problems of convergence criteria in the EC in accordance with Turkey which is now at the stage of customs union. Then, same method, that is comparision of nominal and real measures, is also applied to Turkey in order to understand better the present situation.

CALISMANIN DZETI

Bu calışma Avrupa Topluluğu'nun deneyimlerini dikkate alarak ekonomik birlesme teorisini ve onun sorunlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, çalışma öncelikle neo klasik ticaret teorisi cercevesi icindeki teorik düşünceler ve sonrada yakınlaşma prensibi altındaki pratik düsünceler yoğunlaşmaktadır. Yakınlaşma prensibi üye ülkeler arasındaki bazı nominal ve reel göstergelerin karsılaştırılmasına dayanır.

Calışmada, başlıca nominal yakınlaşma göstergeleri enflasyon oranları, uzun dönem faiz oranları, döviz kurları ve kamu açıklarıdır. Başlıca reel göstergeler ise kişi başına Gayri Safi Milli Hasıla, kişi başına Gayri Safi Yurt 1ci Hasıla ve işsizlik düzeyidir.

Son inceleme kısmında, çalışma Avrupa Topluluğu'ndaki yakınlaşma kriteri sorunlarını, şu anda gümrük birliği aşamasında olan Türkiye için değerlendirmektedir. Sonrada, aynı metod yanı reel ve nominal göstergelerin karşılaştırması, bugünkü durumu dana iyi anlamak ıçin Türkiye'ye uygulanmıştır.

INTRODUCTION

Although, the evolution of the European Community covers almost four decades which is a very short time in the history of nations, it allows a prospective view. It means that the European Community is a continuos creation. There need be no resting-place for the European idea.

Therefore, I think the European Community is accepted as one of the best example of economic integration in the world. This is true because of two important facts. First, the European Community has affected the economic, political and military policies of all countries and especially developing countries. Thus, it has induced other countries to try to become part of it as either full or associate members. Second, the experiences of the European Community offer us some sobering lessons about the difficulties of economic integration. These experiences also show us that full harmonization among countries may be unattainable, and perhaps even undesirable.

If we look at the years following the World Wars we see as Western Europe recognized that its economic, political and military position in the world had been greatly weakened, the need for preventing this decline has increased. Then, in order to do this they wanted to improve relations among nations of the So, it thought that an improvement Continent. was relations could be effected by minimizing economic rivalries and tensions that this could be attained if Europe operated as economic unit rather than as a number of independent pieces. Furthermore, there was general aggreement that Western Europe should strengthen itself economically and that this was feasible given the area's resources, manpower, capital, savings techniques.

Then, it was necessary to increase production per capita. One important way of doing this is to create a larger market for European goods — a market that would allow producers to reduce the unit cost of their product by allowing them to increase volume.

Thus, the creation of the European Community has imparted a liberalizing trend on the trade policies of most of its members by lowering tariffs and reducing the nontariff barriers. Under these critical points, the European Community had two dimensions in the early 1960s and since 1990. The deepening of economic and political integration among the members of the European Community, soon to became the European Union, and the enlargement of the community to include new members, first in Western Europe and later in central and Eastern Europe. This was suddenly gathered pace with the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Thus, this study examines the European Economic Integration by taking into the consideration both theoretical concepts under the neo-classical trade theory and practical concepts under the principle of the convergence criteria. The study focuses on the fact that the theory of economic integration promises that the economies of member countries will be close to each other and thus, some economic indicators converge among them. Then, the study concerns the comparative analysis for nominal indicators of convergence such as inflation rates, long term interest rates and public deficit, and real indicators of convergence such as income per head and tolerable level of unemployment, in order to see how much the European Community realizes these ideas since 1960.

I believe that, the study would give us some considerable observations for **Turkey** which has been always considered as a potential member of the European Community and which is now at the stage of Customs Union.

PART ONE : GENERAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EC

1.1 : Historical Background Of The EC

We could say that the history of the European Community was not started only with the years following the world wars. Actually, the concept of European Union goes beyond the eightheenth and nineteenth centuries. The economical, political, social and also technological changes and developments in those periods were important factors in the process of the evolution of the European Community.

However, there was a general agreement that the history of the EC. formally started with the attempts which the early postwar years. When the " Marshall Plan " became a reality on September 22, 1947 we see these efforts were accelerated. The plan provided for the creation of " Organization of European Economic Cooperation " (DEEC) with headquertes in It had the duty of estimating requirements, of serving as house for economic plans so that member national a clearing nations would not work at cross-purposes. Thus, the practically forced its members to engage in some dearee of economic planning and to integrate their plans (Clough, S.B., 1968, p.534).

The other important achievement of the early post-war days was the "European Payments Union" (EPU). From its inception the OEEC attempted to facilitate the multilateral settling of intra-European commercial accounts and after some unsuccessful starts (1948) established the EPU in 1950. The union provided for the fixing of "quotas" between each country and the union. Up to the limit of its quota a country could pay its debits to the union in its own currency, but beyond that amount it had to pay in gold and dollars. Again beyond certain limits, a country had to receive payments for its credits in currencies of member states.

Thus, there were incentives for debtor countries to increase their exports or to decrease their imports and for creditor countries not to exceed given amounts (Clough, S.B., 1968, p.547).

But, because of the limited task of settling of the EPU it was thought that the most realistic approach to economic integration was to achieve it on a commodity basis. Thus, there was created in 1951 the "European Coal and Steel Community" (ECSC) an outgrowth of a plan proposed by Robert Schuman. This institution was to exercise sovereignty over the coal and steel industries of Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy and Luxemburg.

After the failure of the proposed " European Defense Community " in 1954, efforts were again directed toward more limited economic integration, by adding to the Coal and Steel Community a common market for all other goods, the European Economic Community (EEC), and a seperate set of institutions to develop civil uses of nuclear energy (The European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom). The two treaties of Rome adopted the same institutioanal structure as the ECSC, with an assembly, called the European Parliement, and a court of justice. The assemblies and courts of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom were mergered in 1958, as were the three commissions and councils of ministers in 1967. The three treaties plus later amendments including the " Single European Act " (1987), from the conditions of what is now called the European Community and will be further amended by the Maastricht Treaty " in 1992 (Pohl, G. and Sorsa, P., 1992, p.5). We see on january 1, 1993 there was an introduction of the single market and the European Economic Area.

1.2 : Enlargement of The European Community

We see that between the post-war period and the late 1960s,

the EC was performed a successful period in terms of both economical and institutional developments. Thus, this success caused to force the other European countries to join into the EC.

The admission of the UK was the most important step in this enlargement process. Because before the treaties had come into force the UK government provoked within Europe over the best approach to European Economic Integration. The idea of the UK government was to set up a "European Free Trade Area" which involve no sacrifice of national sovereignty. Tariffs between the member countries would be eliminated, but they would retain their freedom of action in respect of trade with nonmembers. Then, these efforts which was made by UK concluded with the creation of "European Free Trade Area" (EFTA) in 1959, comprising the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Ireland and Switzerland, and Finland as an associate members (Borchardt, K.D., 1995, p.14).

However, when the initial successes of the EEC impressed the UK government and also others, they reconsider their refusal to play an active role in the process of European Integration. Because they realized that ramaining outside the community would result with political isolution.

Firstly, when the bargaining became severe accession of the UK was blocked by **De Gaulle** in 1963. Then, the UK's second application for membership in 1967 — with Ireland, Denmark and Norway — also failed. At the end of these negotiations the accession treaties were signed on 22 January 1972. And on 1 January 1973 the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the Community. Norway, however, ended up staying outside after 53.49 % of the voters in its referendum, rejected membership in 1972.

Greece applied for membership of the Community in 1975,

followed by Fortugal and Spain in 1977. For Greece this was very important because they saw this as a way of stabilizing its newly restored democracy and influence on the international stage. In economic terms it was also important for to be able to modernize agriculture and industry and so put the economy back on its feet. Under these conditions on January 1981 Greece became the 10th member of the Community.

The accession of Spain and Portugal also raised many difficulties, but after negotiations and after the signing of the accession treaties in June 1985, they have joined and became 11th and 12th member states of the EC on January 1986.

Nowadays, while the attempts towards political union are gathering pace with the European Union Treaty, other European countries came to feel that it would be better to play an active part in the process of integration. After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty new members would have to join the European Union rather than the EC. Thus, after accession negotiations which were successfuly concluded in 1994, Austria, Finland and Sweden have joined the community and brought the member states to 15 while Norway again voted against membership as in 1972.

1.3 : The Objectives and Motives Of The European Community

It is believed that one of the major developments of the years following the end of World War II was the construction of the European Community. In order to understand how the idea of economic integration finally became a reality we should look at the orign of the Common Market. In the 1960s we see there were four major motives that can be identified as being of major importance in the formation of the Common Market (Krause, L. 1964, p.3-5).

First, it is well known that the six original member countries of Continental Europe had all been defeated in World War II. In order to prevent a reoccurence of this situation, the statesman of Europe wanted to find a way to remove Germany as a political and military threat to her neighbors. So, they believed that this would have been achieved by forming a new institution which would cement the economies of the member countries into an interdependent framework.

Second motive related to the division of postwar Germany into an Eastern and a Western sector which means that this east-west tensions probably will always lead to war. Therefore, it was desirable to find a chanel for German nationalism that did not increase the war danger. This is provided by European Integration. It substitutes European nationalism for German nationalism.

Third motive, which was also political, depended on the necessity to realize the fact that the individual nations would have to combine their power and speak with a unified voice in a world of two giant, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The fourth and last one was economic one which gave promise of an enhanced standard of living for the member countries. The idea of integration mainly depends on the expectation of a higher rate of economic growth .

Under these motives, We see there is a fact that in order to understand the economic and social objectives in the evolution of the EC we should be aware of these political realities. Because economics and politics are the seamy sides of one another, if only in the sense that any distinction between them is a matter of convenience rather than conviction (Mayne, R., 1962, p.53). Moreover, it will be illusory for obtaining powerful

observations. If we look at the economic and social objectives we see the following important points :

Economic Objectives

The basic economic objectives of the EC which have always been the driving force behind the movement towards European Unity were as follows (Ingram, J.C., 1978, p.145):

- To remove tariffs, quotas, and other economic borders which divide Europe into the small markets and to verify the economic integration on the basis of customs unions.
- To establish a common agricultural policy, a common transport policy, and a common policy toward competition and business practices, and to ensure the most efficient use of capacities and resources in the fields of economy and technology.
- To harmonize and coordinate monetary and fiscal policies, social policies, and even to equalize wages for men and women.
- To allow free movement of labor, capital and enterprise within the community.
- To apply policies which increase the level of income, thus raising the living standards.
- To have steady and balanced economic expansion.
- To have a high level of employment

Social Objectives

European integration also includes a social component. Here, the objectives were related to use constructive powers of European people for increasing their living standards and to improve working conditions. Therefore, the basic aim is to achieve social cohesion.

The most important step towards cementing the social dimension came with the Single European Act, which not only give the Community wider powers in the field of social policy but also placed it in the context of the project to complete the single market by the end of 1992. Indeed, the social dimension became a vital part of the overall scheme, for it was not enough simply to boost growth and make European firms more competitive (Borchardt, K.D., 1995, p.26).

PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDER THE NEO-CLASSICAL TRADE THEORY

Before introducing the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and other versions of the neo-classical concepts it should be noted that the demonstration of the welfare proposition that trade is benefical starts with classical economists, especially with Ricardo who has consructed his model on the theory of comparative advantage.

Ricardo claimed that removing protection would increase wealth, with the model which exists in historical time and in terms of timeless equilibrium. According to him, a country exports the commodity which possesses higher comparative productivity of both factors (capital and labor) and imports the commodity where the comparative productivity of both factors is lower than that in the other country (Batra, R., 1973, p.57).

The Ricardian model furnished an explanation for differences in supply and demand conditions in determining trade patterns and distributing the gains from trade and directed our attention to the wage-price adjustments needed to achieve equilibrium in international markets (Kenen, P., 1989, p.51).

2.1. The Heckscher-Ohlin and Factor Price Equalization Theorems

After Ricardo the most important theory which explains the basis of international trade is known as the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem. The theorem was developed by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin in the 1920s. It depends on the differences between countries' labor requirements which is the main cause of trade as in the Ricardian model.

The H-O approach to trade theory, also known as the factor-endowments approach, is based on number of simplifying assumptions (Salvatore, D_{-} , 1990, p.104). These are :

- There are two nations, two commodities and two factors (labor and capital).
- Both nations use the same technology in production.
- Constant returns to scale (production functions are homogenous to the first degree) in the production of both commodities in both nations.
- Incomplete specialization in production in both nations.
- Equal tastes in both nations.
- Ferfect factor mobility within each nation, but no international factor mobility.
- Perfect competition in both commodities and factor markets in both nations.
- There are no impediments to trade which implies that there are no tariffs or quotas or other obstructions to the free flow of international trade, and finally no transportation costs.

With these assumptions we can state that the theory asserts that a country exports the commodity which uses intensively its relatively abundant factor and imports the commodity which is intensive in the use of its relatively scarce factor (Batra, R., 1973, p.58).

2.1.1. The Factor-Price Equalization Theorem

We can also state the H-O theorem by taking into the consideration the effects of international trade on factor prices. This means that the factor-price equalization theorem comes directly from the H-O theorem and holds if the H-O theorem holds. In other words, in a two country, two commodity, two

factor model commodity-price equalization is sufficient to ensure factor-price equalization and factor-price equalization is sufficient to ensure commodity-price equalization (Mundell, R. 1957, p.321).

What this means is that international trade will cause both the wages of homogeneous labor (i.e. labor with the same level of trading, skills and productivity) and the return to homogeneous capital (i.e capital of the same productivity and risks) to be same in all trading nations.

Thus, the theorem states that, given set of assumptions the equalization of commodity prices through trade will result in the equalization of relative factor returns.

2.1.2. Some Other Contributions

The general equilibrium nature of the H-O theory proved and redefined by many economists. The most famous study is made by Paul Samuelson. For this reason it is sometimes referred to as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem (Salvatore, D., 1990, p.118).

Samuelson published a geometrical (1948) and a mathematical proof (1949) to show that on the assumptions of no transportation costs, identical, constant returns to scale production functions and no factor intensity reversals, free trade would equalize not only product prices, but factor prices as well. This is true in all cases except the limiting case of complete specialization between the trading partners.

Same study is made by **Lerner**, and because of this it is sometimes accepted as Lerner was the first who prove the complete equalization of factor prices by free trade in products

(Scitovsky, T., 1984, p.1547). Then, this assumption extended by Tinbergen, Meade and Laursen.

However, these results gave rise some arguments especially about the existing differences with Ricardo. It is believed that in Ricardo and in his comparative theory of costs, the equalization of factor prices by free movement of commodities couldn't achieved except special cases (Haberler, G., 1970, p.43). Thus, it is widely accepted that the Ricardian theory relies on international differences in production functions in order to explain the causality of international trade whereas the H-O theorem explicitly assumes the international similarity of production.

In Addition, while Ricardian formulation assumed the existence of a single factor of production, by contrast the H-O theorem postulates two productive factors, and this along with the inter-commodity dissimilarity of production functions.

2.2. Tests Of The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem And International Factor-Price Differences

Following emprical studies show us that international trade has not equalized the returns to homogenous factors in different nations. These studies also showed us that the H-O theorem is valid only in the highly abstract environment of the two factor, two country model that has been the mainstay of trade theory for half a century (Deardorff, A., 1982, p.683).

The reason for this is that many of the simplifying assumptions of the H-O theory do not hold in the real world. Rather, we see in the real world, for example, nations do not use exactly the same technology, or there exists transportation costs and other trade barriers which prevent the equalization of

relative commodity prices in different nations. It can also noted that other determinants of trade might generate exactly the same observations. If we take into the consideration the model with increasing returns to scale where countries now trade to take the advantage of the increasing returns to scale, the commodity equalization of prices will not result in the equalization of relative factor rewards. Thus, even when an equilibrium trading situation is achieved, factor prices will differ, and this could well result in international factor flows (Markusen, J. and Melvin, J., 1988, p.206).

The first and most important study on the H-O model is made by Wassily Leontief who used trade and factor requirements for the United States and maintained that the United States is labor abundant when labor is measured in productivity-equivalent workers. This means that one person year of U.S. labor with the accompanying technology is equivalent to several person years of foreign labor with inferior technology (Trefler, D., 1993, p.962). Thus, while the United States seemed to export labor intensive commodities and import capital intensive commodities, this was the opposite of what the H-O model predicted.

After these results it is believed that factor-price differentials and international trade that is based on international differences in productivity would became important. It would became important because they are critical to explanations af differing equilibrium growth paths and most important they are also critical to show the failure of factor-price equalization which is driven solely by international productivity differences (Trefler, D., 1993, p. 961).

After Leontief, the new models constructed in the field of human capital. Because they believed that Leontief included in his measure of capital only physical capital (such as machinery,

other equipment, buildings, and so on) and completely ignored human capital which refers to education in workers which increase their productivity. Furthermore, because of a tremendous advance, both in data collection and in computing power, these emprical studies facilitated and sophisticated in recent years.

A pioneering study was made by Baldwin (1971) who used more sophisticated techniques and found some evidence that skill levels, or human capital were positively related to exports which means human capital may be an important determinant of trade volume. Thus, numerous emprical studies concerning the human capital were undertaken by Kravis, Kreesing, Kenen and others. Another important study was made by Harkness (1978). He used regression analysis and factor share variables as a measure of factor intensities. In his model he developes the factor proportions model for a many goods, many factors world in which factor prices are not necessarily equalized (Harkness, J., 1978, p.784). His results showed that for the United States, physical capital was an important and significant determinant of exports.

However after Harkness, J.Anderson (1981) and E.Leamer and H.Bowen (L-B) attempted to demonstrate that Harkness failed in his search because of the missing link in his model.

Especially, Bowen and Leamer used more complete cross-section datas on trade, factor input requirements, and factor endowments in order to examine the relationship between productivity and departures from the H-O theorem.

2.3. Non-Traded Goods And The Concept Of Equalization

We know that in the real world every country produces goods which can not be traded at all because of their nature of the

goods like houses, services, etc. or because of political barriers preventing, for example, the export of certain strategic military equipment, or because of artificial trade barriers like prohibitive tariffs or transportation costs (Batra, R.,1973, p.305). It is also true that although there is no simple relationship between the prices of these non-traded goods in the various countries, the existing of non-traded goods effect the flow of released resources in these countries.

Thus, under these facts, it could be argued that the concept of equalization by taking into the consideration the existing of non-traded goods. If we look at the studies concerning the equalization of the interest rate with non-traded goods through trade on the basis of Samuelson's papers, we see various results. (Burmeister, E., 1978, p.1).

In these studies main argument depends on the fact that when trade in all commodities occurs then the common-price vector in the trading equilibrium must be associated with a unique rate of interest. Thus, the assumptions of incomplete specialization and a common technique of production imply that interest rate must be equalized through trade.

However, it has been shown that it is possible to construct a technique in which a part of the price-vector exists at distinct rates of interest. This implies that if some commodities do not enter into trade, the common vector of prices of traded goods may be associated with more than one interest rate (Mainwairing, L., 1977, p.18).

Another paper which is introduced by R. Batra and F. Casas (B-C) also demonstrates a nontraded intermediate product into the basic H-O trade model where traditionally, intermediate products have for a long time been ignored in trade theory (Schweinberger, A., 1975, p.634).

2.4. The Concept Of Economic Integration

We know that international relations is a subject by itself because of the fact that the world economy is not homogenous. There are lots of national economies which show wide differences in the world. But the interesting point is that, we see these economies are connected to each other and thus there is always a tendency to get close.

Therefore, the idea of economic integration becomes very important in the international relations. Actually it refers to various types of economic integration. Because of this, many economists define this term in a different manners. Jan Tinbergen emphasizes that it is the creation of the most desirable structure of the international economy, removing artificial hindrances to its optimum operation and delibaretely introducing all the desirable elements of coordination or unification (Tinbergen, J., 1965, p.57).

Kindleberger defines the economic integration the equalization of the prices of factors of production (Karluk, R., p.1). Gunner Myrdal believe that the economy integrated unless all avenues are open to everybody and the remunerations paid for productive services are equal, regardless of social, cultural and racial differences (Myrdal, G., 1956, p.11). According to Fritz Machlup every serious discussion of economic integration national, multinational or worldwide, is based on concepts and issues of international trade theory. Trade is usually regarded as the quintessence of economic integration and division of labor in several of its aspects as its underlying principle. This holds for intranational as well as international trade (Machlup, F., 1976, p.70).

As we see there are many definitions of economic integration

according to different economists. But the economic integration whether occurs in the shape of trade integration or factor integration or complete general economic integration, it might be said that economies of countries should get close each other as the theory predicts.

Another critical point is that although the theory of comparative advantages states that the trade of goods and services mostly depends on price differentials, however in the economic integration the main concept depends on specialization. Therefore, even though the prices of factors do not converge or equalize, because of specialization the member countries still continue to trade and to be profitable (Kumbaracıbaşı, O., 1973, p.146).

Under these circumstances we should emphasize that free trade alone can not succeed in having equal factors, orices in all activities in all trading countries. Free trade of products combined with free international movement of might be expected to reduce and eventually remove factors international differences in factor prices. But, for example, we will see in the European experience mobility of factors can not be counted upon to eliminate all wage differentials even for equal labor because of high costs of migration, or of backwash effect and etc. Furthermore, persons are not clobaly mobile member states because of the considerations of between the economics, geography, language and culture.

It is also true for the international capital movements. Some problems arise such as capital controls, or problems of balance of payments, or different levels of economic development in different countries. The widespread use of capital controls

^{1.} Backwash effect is a situation which would drain cheap labour countries of their best workers (Machlup, F., 1976, p.73)

and expectations of changes in exchange rates are more important reasons for the continuing segregation of capital markets. If all controls were dismantled, however, and exchange rates were thouht to be fixed, differences in interest rates would not disappear (Kenen, P., 1976, p.187).

Another consideration for the optimal size of an integrated region concerns the objective of economic stabilization. For a given region, macro-economic disturbances can arise either within the region or from outside it. Hence, it can take steps to compensate for the disturbance with various regional instruments of policy which depends also on the structure of the regional economy (Cooper, R., 1976, p.41).

Thus, these problems may tell us why the EC do not have a full integration in both labor and capital markets.

2.4.1. Stages Of Economic Integration

It is believed that economic integration will supposedly have some immediate (static) effects upon the member countries and will also cause some changes over a longer period of time (dynamic effects). From this point of view we can range the degree of economic integration from preferential trade arrangements to free trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic union (Salvatore, D., 1990, p.287).

A. Preferential Trade Arrangements

It provide lower barriers on trade among participating nations than on trade with nonmember nations. This is the loosest form of economic integration. In this stage, the basic aim is to strengthen trade relations between the member states and to increase trade volume by using the advantages of specialization

and division of labor (Kumbaracibaşı, O., 1973, p.133).

B. Free Trade

In an area of free trade, member countries abolish import duties and other customs barriers to the free movement of products manufactured in the territory of their partners. However each country retains its own external tariffs and its custom policy. Today it is possible to show EFTA (European Free Trade Area) and LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Area) as an example of free trade areas.

C. Customs Unions

It is the one of the most important stage in an economic integration process both in practice and in theory. strange phenomenon which units free-traders and protectionists in the field of commercial policy, and its strangeness suggests that there is something peculiar in the apparent economics of customs unions. The customs union problem is entangled in the whole free-trade protection issue, and it has never yet been properly disentangled (Viner, J., 1972, p.31). The custom unions model first constructed by Jacob Viner and then extended by the contributions of J.E. Meade, Marcus Fleming, H.G. Jhonson, Lipsey and others.

In a custom unions free movement concerns not only products manufactured in the territory of their partners, but all products, situated in the territory of member countries. Furthermore, the latter lose their customs autonomy and apply a common external customs tariff to third countries (Moussis, N., 1993, p.23).

Customs unions have both static and dynamic effects. We

analyze and measure static effects of customs unions in terms of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs when some domestic production in a nation that is a member of the customs unions is replaced by lower-cost imports from another member nation. A trade creating custom unions also increases the welfare of nonmembers because some of the increase in its real income spillover into increased imports from the rest of the world.

Trade diversion occurs when lower cost imports from outside the customs union are replaced by higher cost imports from a union member. This results because of preferential trade treatment given to member nations. Trade diversion reduces the production from welfare because it shifts more efficient producers outside the customs union to less efficient producers inside the union, thus, it worsens the international allocation of resources.

The dynamic effects of a large expansion of the market area can be far more important than the static effects. The basis for dynamic effects is to be found in the increased competition generated by the opening up of new market opportunities (Ellsworth, P.T., 1964, p. 533). In addition, these dynamic benefits are also related to economies of scale, stimulus to investment and better utilitization of economic resources, and more rapid technological advance.

D. Common Market

Establishments of the common market comes true with the elimination of all import and export duties in force between member countries. Here, all goods and services can be offered on the same conditions as an internal market. Moreover, in order to achieve this, the large internal market may function efficiently

and then it may be necessary to have common or community support policies. Thus, a common market goes beyond a customs unions by also allowing the free movements of labor and capital among member countries (Moussis, N., 1993, p.23).

E. Economic Union

It is the last stage of economic integration. In an economic union economies of member states combine each other by harmonizing or even unifying the monetary and fiscal policies. In addition, in this stage it is necessary to harmonize the tax system and to allow free movement of labor and capital in union (Seyidoglu, H., 1993, p.423). Although in a free trade area, customs unions and common market the basic aim is to remove trade barriers, in an economic union the aim is to be able to adjust economic policies in an international level.

The issue of national sovereignty is put in an even sharper focus in the case of an economic union that involves, in addition to trade integration, the co-ordination of economic policy making. The co-ordination of economic policies in turn requires political decisions that would necessitate establishing a common decision making apparatus. The experience of the European Economic Community confirms this conclusion. Recent efforts to achieve monetary integration without the co-ordination of economic policies have proved to be a failure (Balassa, B., 1976, p.29).

Thus, Nowadays, the construction of such an advanced stage is so hard, because of currency fluctuations, the varios rates of taxation and etc.. However, it is sometimes advocated that after these stages and also after economic union there can be the stage of political integration. Here, there would be further trends to have closer cultural, social and political integration of the

member countries.

After these theoretical explanations if we look at the position of the EC we can first say that the most important achivement of the EC has been its creation of a customs unions. But, today it is very hard to say that the EC has been achieved the principles of economic integrations among member countries, especially for less developed countries. Rather, the experiment of the EC shows that, today the EC is positioned in something between the stages of Common Market and Economic Union (Flam, H., 1992, p.10).

PART THREE: CONVERGENCE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE COMMUNITY MEMBERS

3.1 : The Concept Of Convergence

It is obvious that the principle of convergence is very important criteria in understanding or testing the comparative behaviour of member countries which come together in the name of a customs union or an economic union. But the concept of convergence has no simple definition. It means more than the better coordination of economic policies (Mawson, J., 1986, p.372).

It may refer to reducing the differences between the regions and the backwardness of less favoured regions. Then, it may also be accepted as a key word for dealing with the problems of the budget or with the problems of the transfer of resources to produce more consistent standards of living within the Community.

However, whether it depends on social or economic criterias the process of convergence should be promoted in an economic union as the traditional neo-classical trade theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin theory predict. Actually, in practice and thus in the EC this concept is also became a vital part of achieving an Eonomic Union idea.

Because the EC also believes that in order to reach to the Economic and Monetary Union which plays an important role in achieving the idea of Economic Union, it is necessary to promote convergence among the member states. Therefore, the Single European Act in 1987 aims at allowing free movement of labor, capital and goods and services in the Community till 1992. Thus, this idea necessitate the harmonization of economic policies and strengthening the solidarity between the member countries (Kepenek, Y., 1993, p.117).

In the second phase of Economic and Monetary Union, economic policies of the member states shall be coordinated at Community level. To this effect the Council shall formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the member states and of the Community, and shall report its findings to European Council. Furthermore, the Council shall monitor economic developments in each of the member states and in the Community as well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad quidelines (Moussis, N., 1993, p.138).

Thus, the concept of convergence which became main agenda in the EC, especially after the accession of new partners in the 1980s, enable us to see the problems of integration idea. However before introducing the concept of convergence it should be noted that there is a link between convergence and cohesion. Cohesion which is defined in terms of economic welfare only make sense if it refers to convergence in real measures.

The commitment to cohesion is complicated by the lack of precision about what it is required to achieve it. Article 130a of the Maastricht Treaty, echoing the corresponding article in the Single European Act, relates cohesion to the reduction of regional disparities: "In particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions, including rural areas ".

This emphasizes the gap between the regions which lag behind (known in European Commission jargon as Objective 1) and those in the more favoured parts of the Community. It does not, however, make it easy to determine when sufficient cohesion is achieved. For practical purposes, a simple definition is that cohesion is the degree of disparity between different regions or groups within the European Community which is politically and socially

tolerable. If these limits are not respected, the less-favoured will be inclined to opt out (Mawson, J., 1993, p.150).

Therefore, when we examine the European Community we should take into the consideration the concepts of convergence and cohesion.

Under this debate, in the study I intend to analyze the EC with respect to convergence and cohesion aims. Here, the main focus will be on the fact that unless the various indicators of nominal convergence such as inflation rates, interest rates, public deficit and the stability of exchange rates are broadly harmonized within the EC, monetary union would not be sustainable. On the other side, in terms of economic welfare unless real variables such as income per head or tolerable level of unemployment harmonized we can not speak of cohesion.

Various economic tests can be applied to see how much the convergence and cohesion are being realized. Here, in spite of the problems in obtaining full statistical data for Turkey and for the EC Countries, the central focus will be on the comparision of the average of more advanced countries such as Germany, France, Denmark and United Kingdom, with the average of least-favoured countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.

3.2: Nominal Indicators Of Convergence 3.2.1: Inflation Rates

In view of the achievement of the convergence aim one strategic economic variable is the inflation rate. The inflation rate which is defined here as the changes in consumer prices, has a tendency to increase for both country groups in the 1970s. Graph 1 shows us that in this periods of economic crisis and petroluem shocks there is a widening gap between advanced and poorer countries.

Furthermore, after the 1980s although the rates are decreasing, the realized gap has not closed by the least-favoured countries, even after the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EC. Because their structure of economies and also the policies which are introduced to overcome the world economic instability and depression are not sufficient as the advanced countries.

3.2.2 : Long Term Interest Rates

We know that especially during the 1980s, international movements of capital increased at a faster rate than international trade. This growth was fostered by important changes in the structure of financial markets such as increasing liberalization and internationalization owing to the abolition of exchange controls, creation of new financial instruments, new markets and etc.

Under these developments, we can state that long term interest rates which is defined as government bond yield (for Greece it is defined as treasury bill rates) in Graph 2 remained relatively high in the period of 1970-80 for both advanced and poorer countries, then declined after the 1980s. But the member

countries such as Portugal, Greece and Spain are far from achieving the convergence aim. Thus, the gap between advanced and poorer countries is still high in recent years.

3.2.3 : Exchange Rates

As in the Maastricht Treaty one of the important objective for the EC is to have stable exchange rates. The removal of exchange controls between the Community currencies, and the further integration of money and capital markets, are major steps towards monetary union. Therefore, Europe have been strongly influenced by events on the foreign exchange markets.

In the graphical analysis we see there are three main topics with recpect to exchange rates. As a whole, exchange rates are very stable in the 1960s for all of the European countries. But, starting from 1970 the structure and thus stability of exchange rates are distorting. Graph 3 shows that exchange rates in terms of national currency units per SDR (Special Drawing Rights), is fluctuating especially in the period of oil shocks among the member states. Thus there is also distortion after integration for Spain, Portugal and Greece. In Graph 4 we see exchange rates terms of national currency units per US dollars. The percentage changes tell us that exchange rates are more stable in more importantly since 1970 less favoured the 1960s. Then. countries are loosing ground.

For the least favoured countries it is also true that exchange rates in terms of per ECU are not stable as in advanced countries. This can be shown in Graph 5. Thus, exchange rate variations between member states' currencies hinder the interpenetration of capital markets.

3.2.4 : Public Finance

From the point of view of public deficits each country is subject to severe constraints. Public deficit problem became important because there is an increasing levels of public debt. we see in Graph 6 public sector deficits are increasing since 1970. Then, although in several countries the amount of deficit have clearly been restrained, in a number of other countries. mainly in poorer countries. it is still excessive. The rates as percent of GNP range from -5 to -12 in the 1980s for these countries, and then range from -4 to -7 in the 1990s.

We can also see the widening gap in terms of central government deficit (or surplus) which is defined as percent of GDP in Graph 7. It means that the gap between advanced and poorer countries seems to be stay as an important constraint in achieving the convergence criteria.

3.3 : Real Indicators Of Convergence

3.3.1 : Current GNP Per Capita and Real GDP Per Capita

Since 1966 per capita income is steadily increasing for the European Community as a whole. But Graph 8 shows us that the amount of increase in current GNP per capita is much bigger in advanced countries than in poorer countries. In the 1990s, while it reachs as an average to \$ 20000 in more advanced countries, the average rate for less-favoured countries is around \$ 9000.

Real GDP per capita as well as GNP per capita increased in the member states. For both country groups until about the middle of the 1970s, there is a simultaneous increase. Thus, in this period we see there is a process of convergence as a whole for the Community. However, as we see in Graph 9 after the oil shock

the degree of convergence starts to decline, even reversed for the relatively poorest countries.

From different perspective, in Graph 10 we see real GDP per capita as compared to Turkey in order to see when Turkey is 1 how much the European Community achieve per capita increase. Graph 10 shows that advanced countries' real GDP per capita is about 3.5 times as bigger as Turkey. On the other poorer countries are closer to Turkey.

3.3.2 : Unemployment Rates

One of the real indicators of convergence for the EC is to have tolerable levels of unemployment levels. In Graph 11 it is obvious that the gap between two country groups is increasing in the historical perspective. The widening gap is resulted mainly because of two countries. Recently, both in Spain and in Ireland unemployment rates are about 20 %.

PART FOUR : TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

It is widely accepted that in recent years there is a general consensus in Turkey for joining the EC. In order to understand better the present situation and long-term problems of Turkey-EC relations I think it will be useful to look at the economic and political developments in the history. Because the reason for the general belief that Turkey has been always considered as a potential member of the EC. is not due only to the geographic proximity but more importantly due to the historical and political realities (Cankorel, B., 1988, p.6).

4.1 : A Historical Outlook

In the history of Europe we know that Turkey always had played important roles and coexist within the continent of Europe. But more important steps toward Europe started after the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey. We see in the aftermath of the Second World War Turkey was included in all the political, military, cultural and economical organizations set up by the West (Manisalı, E., 1986, p.141).

In 1948 Turkey became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD), and in 1949 joined the Council of Europe, then in 1952 joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

After these institutional developments it was believed that Turkey which sees herself as a part of the Western World, can not remain outside the EEC. Therefore, Turkey applied to the EC to conclude an agreement of association, on 31 July 1959. Then, Turkey signed an association agreement in Ankara in 1963 and put into effect on 1st of December, 1964.

The Ankara Agreement which based on Article 238 of Treaty of Rome, offered customs union with Turkey and the Community. The purpose of the Ankara Agreement was to provide the accelerated development of Turkish economy and improvements of working and living conditions, thus for achieving this, to induce the strengthening of economic and commercial relations through Turkey and the Community (Karluk, R., 1976, p.117).

Under the first preparotory period the EEC unilaterally undertook to give Turkey certain economic and commercial advantages designed to bring Turkey a higher level of economic development. The next stage planned was the "transitional period" which started with the additional protocol signed in 1970. It was foreseen that this would create a customs union based on mutual obligations.

In the early 1970s because of economic and political factors in the international field and of course in Europe and Turkey mainly as a result of the oil crisis, the relationship lost its momentum. Thus, Turkey had to postpone the fulfillment of its obligations toward the customs union in 1977.

Then, in spite of some improvements in the relationships, after the military intervention of 12 September in 1980, the Community imposed a unilateral freeze on the association partnership.

After 1980, for the aim of re-orientating Turkey's development strategy and improving the general economic situation the policy changes introduced. During this period the most important economic development was the austerity programme introduced on 24 January 1980, which radically changed the structure and the orientation of the country's economy (Alpay, A., 1986, p.132). It is important that the economic policies

which Turkey introduced after 1980 were exactly in line with the economic principles of the EC. For example Turkey removed nearly all its price controls, flexible and realistic exchance rates were introduced, banks were allowed to fix their interest rates a step toward a positive interest rate policy, import liberalization and privatization of State Economic Enterprises became important and etc.

As a result of these policy changes and developments the relations between Turkey and the EC gathered pace. So, Turkey made its formal application to the EC for full membership on 14 April, 1987. Then, on 27 April, 1987 the EC Council of Ministers referred Turkey's application to the Commission in order to prepare a report on its views of Turkey's situation. The report announced in 1989 by the Council. In the report, it is stated that it is not possible to start the negotiations for full membership up to 1993, because of economic and political problems in Turkey.

4.2 : Customs Union And Its Probable Effects On The Turkish Economy

On 6 March, 1995 Turkey attempted to join in customs union and it is going to be planned that the transition period will start from January 1, 1996. In fact, customs union is a result of Ankara Agreement in 1964 and of the Additional Protocol in 1973. Customs union means that Turkey should reduce its customs duties and taxes on import and export and then impose common customs duty and common trade policies which introduced by the Community to third countries. In addition, it is necessary for Turkey to apply Customs Law of the EC.

Then, up to January 1, 1996 the effective rates for industrial products on the Community members should be reduced to

zero and for third countries to the rate which the Community apply.

In the shape of import regime in Turkey, the arithmetic mean of the effective rates for the EC is % 18.9 and % 23.7 for the third countries in 1995 (TOBB, 1995, p.102). Thus, the effective rates for the EC should be reduced to zero while for the third countries to % 6.5 the rate which is the arithmetic mean of common effective rate in Union applied for the third countries. This is true except some exclusions determined in customs union. However, customs union necessitates some structural and legal changes in the economic system.

Under these explanations if we look at the probable effects of customs union on the Turkish economy we see the following effects.

INCOME EFFECTS

Removing customs duties first will minimize the income from Turkey impose on the European products. customs duties that facilitation of said that the be contrary it could bureaucratic procedures and of customs law will result ÞΥ reduction in costs for customs (Sen, F., 1995, p.20).

STRUCTURAL EFFECTS AND INVESTMENT EFFECTS

It is believed that the application of customs union and thus removing protection will bring necessary changes for reorganization in the structure of economy. More importantly in this new structure the competitiveness will increase. If we think that the competition will increase, then the argument will be on whether Turkish firms can compete or not with European firms. At this stage it should be noted that increased competitiveness

force firms to use resources more efficiently which means there will be reduction in costs.

In addition, with the realization of customs union there will be more flow of foreign capital and so Turkish firms will be able to make more investment with European firms. Finally, with these investments firms would have chance to transfer and follow new technologies in different branches of industry.

On the contrary, firms which can not compete with Europeans will be out of market or it will be necessary to improve these firms for adapting to this new environment. Under this fact it is true that social problems will get arise.

TRADE EFFECTS

Customs union will have trade creation and trade diversion effects on Turkish economy. We know that decrease in the effective rates for the EC and third countries will cause to increase " imports " . This means that there will be direct income transfer from Turkey to Europe. But because αf reasons import increase will be limited. On the one side the scope of " investment incentive products imported in the certificate " such as investment goods, intermediate goods and business materials are exempted from custom taxes and collective housing fund. the other side the raw materials and On intermediate goods which are imported for exporting industrial products also exempted from custom taxes and collective housing funds (TOBB, 1995, P.103).

Then, if we look at the structure of imports in Turkey the 85 % of imports formed by investment and intermediate products. Thus, there will be partial trade creation of customs union from these products. The more important trade creation effect will be

on consumption goods which covers 15 % of imports in Turkey. However, when import demand increases, exchange rates also can increase because of flexible exchange rates, and thus trade creation effect for consumption goods would also be partial.

Trade diversion effects of customs union will arise when Turkish importers start to buy goods from the EC rather than from third countries. But trade diversion can not be occured on the petroluem that Turkey buys from third countries. Trade diversion toward the EC will be also limited on the import of consumption goods. Finally because of the reason that Turkey will follow the preferential trade arrangements which are made between the EC and third countries, from the point of these countries there will be no trade diversion.

Thus, under these headings we can conclude that after customs union while imports increasing if exports do not increase we will face with the problems such as deteriotion on the balance of payments.

4.3 : General Evaluations And Longer-Term Prospects For Turkey

As we see, speaking on the EC and Turkey is not very easy. Turkey's relation with the EC always showed varying dimensions during the last three decades because of economical, political and social issues. It is true that the decision to join Europe is not based only on the economic and political conditions, rather it is also based on long-term considerations taking into account social, historical, geographical and cultural considerations.

During these periods we can note that there are three important and critical points on the process of the membership for Turkey. First the EC in the 1990s is not same as the the

Community which was formed on the initiative of six West European countries in the 1960s. The enlargements of the EC toward both "north" and "south" changed the dimensions of economic and political strategies and objectives for the Community.

Second, there is an argument that the Turkish economy is not ready for integration with the Community. But whether Turkey is ready or not if we look at the long-term strategies and policies of Turkey we see these are exactly oriented toward West. A short description of Turkey's political and economic targets both in domestic and foreign policies is raising the standards of the country. And this will be done on the basis of Western criteria such as a free society, a democratic parlimentary regime, market economy (free Enterprise) etc., which are naturally accompanied by Western institutions such as NATO, the OECD, the Council Of Europe etc. (Cankorel, B., 1988, p.8).

Third critical point is related to the idea that integration with the Community is not benefical , and therefore we should be aware of alternative solutions. Here, it is advocated that first, the competitiveness is not always play as a stimulator in the market economy. Then, it is very hard to have increases from export increase after customs union because of inflation rates and high nominal-real interest rates. fluctuations and uncertainities in exchange rates, and macro economic unstabilities in Turkey (Kazgan, 6., 1994, Finally, there is a belief that it would be better for Turkey to integrate with countries or regions which we share common culture, religion or language.

Thus, altough there are a number of critical factors, it can be observed that it is not realistic to see Europe which have increasingly influence within the international political system, without Turkey. The economic and political realities tell us that

the policies and strategies which Turkey planned to apply are in line with the Western economy. In addition, there are also long term objectives of Turkey which are based on the integration with the EC, whether on the basis of customs union or full membership. For example a major objective of the Turkish economy is to maintain a stable and sufficiently high growth rates to close the development gap between Turkey and the Community. With the growing economy it is hoped that there will be chance to solve unemployment problem as investment increases.

The interesting point is that Turkey's economic conditions would not much play such a definitive role against Turkey's accession to the Community. Countries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland show similarities with Turkey in accordance of realities. Then, of Europe's economic one principle characteristics is that each of its member countries bring their own distinguishing features and discrepancies. This allow to preserve own individuality, but by contributing to the creation of a shared civilization and culture (Akarcalı, 1986, p.140).

PART FIVE: THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA IN THE EC AND TURKEY

Under the principle of convergence with respect to nominal and real indicators examining the Community and Turkey together could be seen unnecessary. But we can observe that several facts tell us why it should be taken into account. First, Turkey is now at that stage of Customs Union, second the half of the foreign trade volume is made by the EC, and finally Turkey is expecting to be as a full member of the Community (Kepenek, Y., 1993, p.122).

Thus, it will be reasonable to analyze Turkey with the least-favoured countries and with advanced countries seperately under the principle of convergence measures in order to see what is the position of Turkey.

5.1 : Nominal Indicators

The most dramatic indicator for Turkey against the EC is inflation rate. In Graph 1-1 we see the inflation rate is so high in Turkey with respect to the both average rates of advanced and poorer countries. More importantly, after the sharp decline in 1982-83 the rates have a tendency to increase in a huge amount since 1985. Thus, there is a widening gap against the EC as a whole.

As in inflation rates the increasing trends are also valid for long term interest rates (the rates are starting from 1972 for Turkey) which is shown in Graphs 2-1 and 2-2. One of the important reason for this increasing trend, is related to a corresponding expansion of public debt which has exerted an upward pressure on interest rates in capital markets.

We know that there is a close relationship between rapid

inflation and a large exchange rate devaluation. People are likely to see a faster devaluation as the precursor of faster inflation, even though this need not be true when a major trade liberalization is being implemented. Furthermore, a big devaluation of the nominal exchange rate tends to raise the domestic price of internationally traded goods relative to the general level of domestic prices.

Thus, as a result of high inflation rate it is clear that there is a weak currency in Turkey. Graphs 3-1 and 3-2 which tell exchange rate in terms of per SDR is not stable as compared to both advanced and poorer countries. In Graphs 4-1 and 4-2 we can also observe that national currency units per US \$ show that there is a huge amount of dispersion from the Community since 1960. While in the 1960s national currency units per US \$ was around 9 TL., in the 1980s it was 70 TL. Then, in the 1990s national currency loose its value more than 70 % as an average which is parallel to the inflation rate.

From the point of public deficit, although against the richest countries there is a wide gap, against the poorer countries this gap is no longer valid. Thus, Turkey and poorer countries have a closer values. Graphs 5-1 and 5-2 show that in recent years the amount of deficit as a percentage of GNP is around -5 %.

Same observation can be seen in Graphs 6-1 and 6-2 which show central government deficit (or surplus) as percent of GDP. It explains that the rates are closer for Turkey to poorer countries than advanced countries.

B.2 Real Indicators

Current GNP per capita which is one of the strategic

indicator of real convergence, is shown in Graphs 7-1 and 7-2. We see GNP per capita is very low for Turkey with recpect to the Community. In a long time period, Turkey could not achieve high per capita income. In the 1990s, it is about 2000 \$ which can not make sense comparing with the EC, even with the least favoured countries in Europe.

It is also true in terms of real GDP per capita. As in graphs 8-1 and 8-2 there is a wide gap between Turkey and the European Community as a whole. When we look at the real GDP per capita in the EC as compared to Turkey we see how the gap between Turkey and the EC is widening.

Speaking on the unemployment levels is much more make sense. Because as we see in Graphs 10-1 and 10-2 the Community countries were faced with serious unemployment problems. Although for poorer countries in Europe the problem is gathering pace, as an average for the Community as a whole the rate is around 7 % which is not so far from Turkey. However, in Turkey high level of population increase remains as a fundemental problem.

PART SIX : CONCLUSION

The neoclassical trade theory postulates that economic integration is benefical to the participating countries. It is also true that the European Community is proving to be good for all of its members. When we look at the evolution of European construction since 1960 we see that the Community economies have strengthened. Maintanence of external openness in the European Community, and continued progress on trade liberalization within a multilateral framework, immediate focus on community activities are other essential complements in this respect for the member countries.

However, European experiments show us that the situation is not so simple. We see several of the least-favoured regions and countries failed to keep pace with their respective member states especially during the 1980s. Coming from the 1960s it can be observed that there are two important features of the process of European integration.

- 1. In the 1960s, there was a process of development of the Common Market, thus the integration promotes convergence among the member states (between original six which are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and Netherlands).
- 2. Throughout the 1970s, overall economic situation is worsening, thus the integration is loosing ground in reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured countries (which are Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland).

In the study, graphical analysis also show us that in terms of both nominal and in particular real variables such as per capita income and tolerable levels of unemployment,

the gap and the imbalances between advanced and less developed countries have not been eliminated.

The results state that although there is a moderate improvements in the economies of the members, there is no sustainable processes of convergence especially for the least-favoured countries, even after accession to the EC. While, in the theoretical concepts we see the theory states that there should be convergency among economies and thus among prices of factors of productions, the comparative analysis shows us that there are a number of economic and political factors which graduate or prevent these ideas.

In conclusion, we have seen the achievement of convergence depends on a number of factors such as on achieving stability and co-ordination in overall economic policy, on pursuing a growth policy, and on organizing a system of financial transfers which is both efficient and of an adequate scale.

In the final analysis, the study has concentrated on the experiences and problems of the EC in accordance with Turkey. From the point of view of the principle of convergence criteria, there is a wide gap between Turkey and more advanced countries. Furthermore, although Turkey and the least-favoured countries who have joined the Community recently show similarities, Turkey is in a worse economic condition than that of the countries, especially in terms of high inflation, high interest, weak currency and per capita income.

Thus, Turkey may find herself unable to achieve high performance to close the development gap against the EC. However, I believe that Turkey which has been oriented her economy toward West by taking into the consideration market rules and competitive conditions since 1980, should always be aware of these realities and criterias in a prospective view.

APPENDIX :

GRAPHS AND TABLES

ABBREVATIONS

BEL : Belgium SPA : Spain

DEN : Denmark NET : Netherland

FRA : France PDR : Portugal

GER : Germany UK : United Kingdom

GRE : Greece LUX : Luxemburg

IRE : Ireland TUR : Turkey

ITA: Italy

n.c. : National Currency

SDR : Special Drawing Rights

GNP : Gross National Product


GDP : Gross Domestic Product

Gov. : Government


Advanced Countries: The average of four advanced countries in the EC (Germany, France, England and Denmark).

Poorer Countries: The average of four poorer countries in the EC (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland).


Graph 1: Inflation Rates




Graph 2: Long Term Interest Rates




☐ Advanced Countries + Poorer Countries






Graph 4: Exchange Rates (% Changes)




Advanced Countries

Graph 5: Exchange Rates (% Changes)




Advanced Countries


Graph 6 : Public Deficit(Surplus)/GNP




Graph 7 :Central Gov. Deficit/Surplus




Graph 8 : Current GNP Per Capita




Graph 9: Real GDP Per Capita



Graph 10 :Real GDP Per Capita In The EC




Graph 11: Unemployment Rates (%)




Advanced Countries

Graph 1−1: Inflation Rates




Graph 1-1: Inflation Rates




Turkey


Graph 2-1: Long Term Interest Rates



Graph 2-2: Long Term Interest Rates




Turkey



Graph 3−2: Exchange Rates (% Changes)

Advanced Countries

Turkey




Value


Poorer Countries

WW Turkey

Graph 4-1: Exchange Rates (% Changes)



Graph 4-2: Exchange Rates (% Changes)




Years


Poorer Countries

Turkey

Graph 5-1: Public Deficit(Surplus)/GNP




Graph 5-2: Public Deficit(Surplus)/GNP




Poorer Countries | Turkey

Graph 6−1 : Central Gov.Deficit/Surplus




Graph 6−2 : Central Gov.Deficit/Surplus




Turkey


Graph 7-1: Current GNP Per Capita




Graph 7-2: Current GNP Per Capita




Graph 8−1 : Real GDP Per Capita




Graph 8-2: Real GDP Per Capita




Graph 9-1:Real GDP Per Capita In The EC




Graph 9-2:Real GDP Per Capita In The EC



Graph 10-1: Unemployment Rates (%)



Graph 10-2: Unemployment Rates (%)



900

Table 1
Inflation Rates (Changes In Consumer Prices)

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|------|-----|----------|--------|-----|------|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|-----|--------|------------|
| 1960 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1961 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | ž | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | ő | 1 |
| 1962 | 1 | ヺ | 5 | Ī | ō | 4 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| 1963 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 1964 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 6 | ż | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 1965 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 3 | 5 | - - | 6 |
| 1966 | 4 | 7 | 3 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| 1967 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 7 |
| 1968 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| 1969 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 8 |
| 1970 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 7 |
| 1971 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 7 | . 9 | 5 | 16 |
| 1972 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 12 |
| 1973 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 16 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 8 | 10 | 9. | 6 | 15 |
| 1974 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 7 | 27 | 17 | 19 | 15 | 10 | 28 | 16 | 9 | 16 |
| 1975 | 13 | 10 | 12 | 6 | 13 | 21 | 17 | 18 | 10 | 20 | 24 | 11 | 19 |
| 1976 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 13 | 18 | 17 | 18 | 9 | 18 | 17 | 10 | 17 |
| 1977 | 7 | 11 | 9 | 4 | 12 | 14 | 18 | 25 | 6 | 27 | 16 | 7 | 27 |
| 1978 | 4 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 13 | 8 | 12 | 20 | 4 | 23 | 8 | 3 | 45 |
| 1979 | 4 | 10 | 11 | 4 | 19 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 4 | 24 | 13 | 5 | 59 |
| 1980 | 7 | 12 | 13 | 5 | . 25 | 18 | 21 | 16 | 7 | 17 | 18 | 6 | 110 |
| 1981 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 6 | 24 | 20 | 20 | 15 | 7 | 20 | 12 | 8 | 37 |
| 1982 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 5 | 21 | 17 | 16 | 1.4 | 6 | 23 | 9 | 9 | 31 |
| 1983 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 3 | 20 | 10 | 15 | 12 | 3 | 25 | 5 | 9 | 31 |
| 1984 | 6 | <u>6</u> | 7 | 2 | 18 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 3 | 29 | 5 | 6 | 48 |
| 1985 | 5 | 5 | ద | 2 | 19 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 2 | 19 | 6 | 4 | 45 |
| 1986 | 1 | 4 | 3 | Ō | 23 | 4 | 6 | 9 | Ò | 12 | 3 | Ö | 35 |
| 1987 | 2 | 4 | 3 | Ò | 16 | 3 | 5 | 5 | i | 9 | 4 | 0 | 39 |
| 1988 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 74 |
| 1989 | 3 | 5 | د | 3 | 14 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 13 | 8 | 3 | 6 3 |
| 1990 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 13 | 9 | 4 | 60 |
| 1991 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 19 | 3 | 6 | 6 4 | 3 | 11 | 6 | 3 | 6 6 |
| 1992 | 2 | 2 | 2 2 | 4 | 16 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 3 | . 9 | 4 | 3 | 7 0 |
| 1993 | 3 | 1 | 44 | 4 | 14 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 66 |

Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1993.

Table 2
Long Term Interest Rates (Government Bond Yield)

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE* | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|------|---------|----------|-------------|-----|------|---------------|--------------|----------|-----|--------|----------|----------|-----|
| | | , | 1 -1 | , | | 10-11- | 11-04 | , | п | ****** | | | |
| 1960 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | | 5 | 5 | <u>6</u> | 4 | 3 | 6 | 5 | |
| 1961 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | <u> </u> | 6 | |
| 1962 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 | |
| 1963 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | | 5 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | |
| 1964 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | | 6 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 5 | |
| 1965 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 6 | |
| 1966 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 8 | | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 7 | |
| 1967 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 7 | | 7 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 7 | á | |
| 1968 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 7 | |
| 1969 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 7 | |
| 1970 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 8 | |
| 1971 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 7 | ර | 9 | 8 | |
| 1972 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 8 | 11 | 9 | フ | 12 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 7 |
| 1973 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 7 | 13 | 8 | 5 | 1 1 | 7 | フ |
| 1974 | 7 | 15 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 17 | 10 | 13 | 10 | 0 | 15 | 7 | 9 |
| 1975 | 9 | 1.3 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 15 | 12 | 14 | 9 | Ō | 14 | 7 | 9 |
| 1976 | 9 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 13 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 14 | 7 | 9 |
| 1977 | 9 | 13 | 10 | 6 | 12 | 11 | 15 | 14 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 7 | 9 |
| 1978 | 9 | 15 | 9 | 6 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 8 | 16 | 12 | 7 | 12 |
| 1979 | 10 | 16 | 9 | 7 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 9 | 17 | 13 | 7 | 20 |
| 1980 | 12 | 18 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 10 | 17 | 14 | 8 | 33 |
| 1981 | 14 | 19 | 16 | 10 | 1.4 | 17 | 21 | 16 | 12 | 17 | 15 | 9 | 50 |
| 1982 | 14 | 20 | 16 | 9 | 15 | 1.7 | 21 | 16 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 11 | 50 |
| 1983 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 8 | 15 | 14 | 18 | 17 | 9 | 19 | 11 | 10 | 45 |
| 1984 | 12 | 14 | 13 | 8 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 8 | 22 | 11 | 10 | 45 |
| 1985 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 7 | 21 | 11 | 10 | 55 |
| 1986 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 6 | 17 | 1. 1 | 11 | 11 | . 6 | 16 | 10 | 9 | 52 |
| 1987 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 6 | 17 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 6 | 15 | 9 | 8 | 46 |
| 1988 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 6 | 16 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 6 | 14 | 9 | 7 | 63 |
| 1989 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 16 | 9 | 1.1 | 14 | 7 | 15 | 10 | 8 | 58 |
| 1990 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 19 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 9 | 15 | 11 | 9 | 51 |
| 1991 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 19 | 9 | 13 | 12 | 9 | 18 | 10 | 8 | 73 |
| 1992 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 18 | 9 | 13 | 12 | 8 | 15 | 9 | 8 | 77 |
| 1993 | 7 | Ź | 7 | 6 | 18 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 94 |

Source: For the EC. IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1993 For Turkey, Sermaye Piyasasi Kurulu, Monthly Bulletin, 1994-95 GRE*: Treasury Bill Rate

Table 3

Exchange Rates (National currency units per SDR)

| | | Excha | nge R | ares | (Natio | onal | CUFFE | ncy c | | m | | , | |
|--------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|----------|-------|-------|--------|------|------|------|-----|
| · ···· · · · · · · · · · | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | FOR | UK | LUX | TUR |
| | , , , , , | * **** **** **** **** ***** * | ,ma (,#+ 1,#+ 1,#+ 1#++ | ***** **** **** ***** ***** | | | | | | | | | |
|) 50 | 52 | 6.5 | 4.4 | 4. | 30 | 0.3 | 621 | 59.1 | | 28.1 | 0.4 | 49.1 | 5 |
| 61 | 53 | 6.5 | 4.5 | 47 | 30 | 0.3 | 621 | 59.4 | | 28.5 | 0.4 | 49.2 | |
| 762 | 53 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 4 | 30 | 0.3 | | 59.5 | | 28.6 | 0.4 | 49.4 | c. |
| 63 | 53 | 6.7 | 4.8 | 4 | 30 | 0.3 | 622 | 59.7 | | 28.6 | 0.4 | 49.5 | • |
| 64 | 53 | 6.8 | 4.8 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 625 | 59.8 | | 28.7 | 0.4 | 49.6 | , |
| 65 65 | 52 | 5.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 625 | 60 | 3.6 | 28.8 | 0.6 | 49.6 | |
| 66 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 624 | 60 | 3.6 | 28.9 | 0.6 | 50 | |
| | 49.6 | 7.4 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | | 69.7 | 3.6 | 28.9 | 0.4 | 49.6 | |
| | 50.1 | 7.5 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | | 69.8 | | 28.8 | 0.4 | 50° | |
| | | 7.5 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 30 | 0.4 | 626 | 70 | | 28.7 | 0.4 | 49.7 | |
| | 49.6 | | 5.6 | 3.6 | 30 | 0.4 | | 69.7 | | 28.8 | 0.4 | 49.7 | 14. |
| | 49.6 | 7.5 | 5.6 | 3.5 | 32 | 0.4 | 645 | 71.7 | | 29.9 | 0.4 | 48.6 | 15. |
| | 48.5 | 7.5 | | | 32.5 | 0.4 | 632 | 69 | 3.5 | 29.3 | 0.4 | 47.8 | 15. |
| | 47.8 | 7.4 | 5.6 | 3.2 | 35.8 | 0.4 | 733 | | | 31 | 0.5 | 49.8 | 17. |
| | 49.8 | 7.6 | 5.7 | | | 0.4 | 795 | 68.7 | | 30 | 0.5 | 44 | 17. |
| | 44.2 | | 5.4 | 2.9 | 41.7 | 0.5 | 800 | 70 | | | 0.5 | 46 | 17. |
| | 46.2 | | 5.2 | | 43 | | 1017 | 79 | | | 0.6 | 42 | 19. |
| | 41.8 | | 5.7 | 2.7 3 | | | 1059 | 98 | | 48 | 0.7 | 40 | 23. |
| 77 | 40 | | 5.7 | | 43 | | 1081 | 91 | | | ő. 7 | 38 | 32. |
| | 37.5 | | 5.4 | and a suit | 47 | | 1059 | 87 | | | 0.7 | 37 | 46 |
| 79 | 37 | | 5.2 | 2.3 | 50 | | | 101 | | | 0.6 | 40 | 1 |
| 980 | 40 | | 5.8 | 2.4 | 59 | | 1187 | | | | 0.6 | 45 | 15 |
| 78 L | 44.7 | | 6.7 | 2.6 | | | 1397 | | | | 0.6 | 52 | 2 |
| 282 | 51.8 | | 7.4 | 2.6 | | | 1511 | 139 | | | 0.6 | 58 | |
| 983 | 58.2 | 10 | 8.7 | 2.9 | | | 1737 | | | | 0.6 | 62 | 4 |
| 284 | 61.8 | 11 | | | | | 1898 | | | | | 55 | 6 |
| 985 | 55.3 | 10 | 8.3 | 2.7 | | | 1844 | | | | 0.7 | | 9 |
| | 49.4 | | 7.9 | 2.4 | | | 1661 | | | | 0.7 | | 14 |
| 787 | 47 | | 7.6 | 2.2 | 179 | | 1659 | | | | 0.7 | 47 | |
| 788 | | | 8.1 | | 199 | | 1757 | | | | | 50 | 24 |
| 989 | | | | | 207 | | 1670 | | | | | 47 | 30 |
| 990 | • | | 7.2 | | | 0.8 | 1608 | | | | | | 41 |
| 991 | 4. | | | | | 0.8 | 1647 | | | | | 45 | 72 |
| 992 | | | | | | 0.8 | 2022 | | | | | | 117 |
| 993 | | | | | | | 2341 | | 5, 2.7 | 243 | 0.9 | 50 | 198 |

Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1993

Table 4 Percentage Change In Exchange Rates (n.c. units per SDR)

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SFA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|------|-----|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1961 | i | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | O | 0 | 0.5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0.2 | ٥ |
| 1962 | Ö | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Q. | 0.2 | 3 | 0.3 | Ō | 0.4 | 0 |
| 1963 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | Ö | 0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2 | O | 0 | 0.2 | 0 |
| 1964 | O | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 3 | 0.3 | O | 0.2 | O |
| 1965 | -2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | o i | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.5 | · 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | -3 | O | 0 | Q | 0 | O | -0.1 | 0 | O | 0.3 | 0 | 0.8 | 0 |
| 1967 | 1 | 7 | ं | 0 | 0 | Q | O | 17 | Q | 0 | -33 | -0.8 | Q |
| 1968 | -3 | 14 | O | 0 | 0 | Q | 0 | 0.2 | 0 | -0.3 | 0 | 0.8 | • 0 |
| 1969 | 1 | -13 | 20 | -0.1 | Q | Q | 0.3 | 0.3 | Q | -0.3 | 0 | -0.6 | Q. |
| 1970 | -3 | O | 2 | O | 0 | O | -0.4 | -0.4 | Q - | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 67 |
| 1971 | -2 | 14 | Q | -3 | 10 | Q | 4 | 3 | -3 | 3 | 0 | -2 | 4 |
| 1972 | -2 | -13 | O | -25 | 2 | O | -2 | -4 | 0 | -3 | 0 | -2 | O |
| 1973 | 4 | 14 | 2 | -6 | 9 | 0 | 15 | -0.4 | -25 | 7 | 25 | 4 | 14 |
| 1974 | -12 | -13 | -17 | -9 | 3 | Q | 9 | 0 | -11 | -3 | 0 | -12 | O |
| 1975 | -5 | 4 | -4 | 3 | 14 | 25 | 0.6 | 2 | 3 | 6 | Q | 5 | 6 |
| 1976 | -9 | -6 | 20 | -0.1 | 3 | 0 | 27 | 13 | -6 | 15 | 20 | -9 | 5 |
| 1977 | -5 | 4 | 0 | 11 | O | 20 | 4 | 24 | -3 | 30 | 17 | -5 | 26 |
| 1978 | -5 | -6 | -17 | -33 | 9 | 0 | 2 | -7 | -4 | 25 | O | -5 | 38 |
| 1979 | -3 | ර | -4 | , O | 6 | 16 | -2 | -4 | -7 | 10 | O | -2 | 42 |
| 1980 | 8 | 14 | 20 | 4 | 18 | 0 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 3 | -14 | 8 | 150 |
| 1981 | 13 | 1.3 | 17 | 50 | 14 | 0 | 18 | 12 | 7 | 12 | , O | 13 | 36 |
| 1982 | 16 | 8 | 10 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 8 | 23 | 0 | 29 | Ũ | 16 | 32 |
| 1983 | 12 | 11 | 29 | 12 | 32 | 29 | 15 | 18 | 10 | 40 | 0 | 12 | 43 |
| 1984 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 3 | 22 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 20 | Q | 7 | 47 |
| 1985 | -11 | -9 | -11 | 1 | 29 | -11 | -3 | -0.5 | -11 | 5 | 17 | -11 | 45 |
| 1986 | -11 | -10 | -4 | -33 | 5 | ٥ | -9 | -4 | -0.1 | 3 | O | -10 | 46 |
| 1987 | -4 | -3 | -4 | -8 | 5 | 42 | -0.1 | 4 | ーフ | 3 | Ō | -5 | 56 |
| 1988 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 13 | 6 | -1 | 8 | 7 | 43 | 6 | 69 |
| 1989 | -6 | ーフ | -6 | -4 | 4 | -11 | -5 | -5 | -33 | O | 14 | -6 | 26 |
| 1990 | -6 | -11 | -13 | -5 | 9 | 0 | -4 | -4 | -4 | -4 | -13 | -6 | 37 |
| 1991 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 12 | 0 | 2 | O | Q | 1 | 14 | 2 | 74 |
| 1992 | 2 | 13 | 12 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 23 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 2 | 62 |
| 1993 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 16 | 13 | 16 | 23 | 50 | 20 | Ö | 9 | 68 |

Table 5
Exchange Rates (National currency units per US \$)

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|-----|------|-------|------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------|-------|
| | , | | | | ***** | | | ø .m. | **** | | ,a | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 |
| 1960 | 52 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 30 | 0.3 | 621 | 60 | 3.8 | 29 | 0.3 | 50 | 4.9 |
| 1961 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.3 | 621 | 60 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.3 | 50 50 | 5.1 |
| 1962 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.3 | 621 | 60 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.3 | 50 | 6.5 |
| 1963 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.3 | 622 | 60 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.3 | 50 | 9 |
| 1964 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.3 | 625 | 60 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.3 | 50 | 9 |
| 1965 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 625 | 60 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.4 | 50 | 9 |
| 1966 | 50 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 624 | 60 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.4 | 50 | 9 |
| 1967 | 50 | 7 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 624 | 61 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.4 | 50 | 9 |
| 1968 | 50 | 7.5 | 4.9 | 4 | 30 | 0.4 | 624 | 70 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.4 | 50 | 9 |
| 1969 | 50 | 7.5 | 5.1 | 3.9 | 30 | 0.4 | 626 | 70 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.4 | 50 | 9 |
| 1970 | 50 | 7.5 | 5.6 | 3.7 | 30 | 0.4 | 623 | 70 | 3.6 | 29 | 0.4 | 50 | 15 |
| 1971 | 45 | 7.5 | 5.5 | 3.5 | 30 | 0.4 | 594 | 69 | 3.6 | 28 | 0.4 | 45 | 14 |
| 1972 | 44 | 6.9 | 5 | 3.2 | 30 | 0.4 | 583 | 64 | 3.5 | 27 | 0.4 | 44 | 14 |
| 1973 | 41 | 6 | 5 | 2.7 | 30 | 0.4 | 608 | 57 | 3.2 | 26 | 0.4 | 41 | 14 |
| 1974 | 36 | 6 | 4.5 | 2.6 | 30 | 0.4 | 649 | 56 | 2.8 | 25 | 0.4 | 36 | 14 |
| 1975 | 40 | 5.7 | 4.8 | 2.5 | 36 | 0.4 | 684 | 60 | | 27 | 0.4 | 40 | 15 |
| 1976 | 36 | ద | 4.2 | 2.5 | 37 | 0.5 | 875 | 68 | 2 | 32 | 0.5 | 36 | 17 |
| 1977 | 33 | 6 | 4.7 | 2.3 | 36 | 0.5 | 872 | 81 | 2 | 40 | 0.5 | 33 | 19 |
| 1978 | 29 | 5.5 | 4.9 | 2 | 36 | 0.4 | 830 | 70 | 2 | 46 | 0.4 | 29 | 25 |
| 1979 | 28 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 1.8 | 38 | 0.4 | 804 | 66 | 2 | 50 | 0.4 | 28 | 35 |
| 1980 | 32 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 1.8 | 47 | 0.5 | 931 | 79 | 2 | 53 | 0.4 | 32 | 90 |
| 1981 | 38 | 7.1 | 5.4 | 2.3 | 58 | 0.6 | 1200 | 97 | 2 | 65 | 0.6 | .38 | 134 |
| 1982 | 47 | 8.3 | 6.6 | 2.4 | 71 | 0.6 | 1370 | 126 | 3 | 89 | 0.6 | 47 | 187 |
| 1983 | 56 | 9.1 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 99 | 0.6 | 1660 | 157 | 3 | 131 | 0.6 | 56 | 283 |
| 1984 | 63 | 10.3 | 8.7 | 2.9 | 128 | 0.6 | 1936 | 173 | 4 | 169 | 0.6 | 63 | 445 |
| 1985 | 50 | 10.6 | 8.9 | 2.9 | 148 | | 1679 | 154 | 3 | 157 | 0.6 | 50 | 577 |
| 1986 | 40 | 7 | 6 | 2.8 | 139 | 0.7 | 1358 | 132 | 2 | 146 | 0.7 | 40 | 758 |
| 1987 | 33 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 126 | 0.6 | 1169 | 109 | 2 | 130 | 0.7 | 33 | 1021 |
| 1988 | 37 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 148 | 0.8 | 1306 | 113 | 2 | 146 | 0.6 | 37 | 1815 |
| 1989 | 36 | 7.3 | 6.3 | 1.8 | 158 | 1.1 | 1271 | 110 | 2.1 | 150 | 1.6 | 36 | 2314 |
| 1990 | 31 | 6.2 | 5.5 | 1.6 | 158 | 1.4 | 1130 | 97 | 1.8 | 134 | 1.8 | 31 | 2930 |
| 1991 | 31 | 6.3 | 5.6 | 1.7 | 175 | 1.6 | 1151 | 97 | 1.9 | 134 | 1.8 | 31 | 5080 |
| 1992 | 33 | 6 | 5.3 | 1.6 | 215 | 1.7 | 1471 | 115 | 1.8 | 147 | 1.8 | 33 | 8564 |
| 1993 | 36 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 249 | 1.7 | | 142 | 1.7 | 177 | 1.9 | 36. | 14473 |

Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1993

Table 6 Percentage Change In Exchange Rates (n.c. units per US \$)

| * **** **** **** | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|------------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----------|-----|------|------|-----|----------------|-----|-----|------|-----|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| .961 | 3 | O | O | -5 | O | 0 | 0 | Q | -5 | Q | o | o | 4 |
| .962 | 0 | Ó | Ö | Ō | Ö | Ö | Ö | ō | ō | ō | ō | ō | ż |
| .963 | Q | Q. | 0 | 0 | Ó | Ō | 0.2 | Ō | Ö | Ö | ō | ō | 4 |
| .964 | O | 0 | 0 | Q | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | O | O | 0 | Ö | Ö | Ó |
| .965 | O | O | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0 | Ó | 0 | 0 | 33 | Ö | Ó |
| .966 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -0.1 | 0 | 0 | O | 0 | 0 | Q |
| .967 | O | 1 | 0 | O | O | 0 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | O |
| .968 | O | 14 | O | 0 | 0 | O | 0 | 15 | 0 | O | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| .969 | 0 | -13 | 20 | 3 | O | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | O | O | O | 0 | 0 |
| .970 | 0 | O | 10 | -5 | O | O | -0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ٥ | 66 |
| .971 | -10 | O | -17 | -5 | Q | 0 | -0.5 | -6 | -25 | -3 | 0 | -10 | ーフ |
| .972 | 2 | -8 | c) | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | -3 | -3 | -4 | 0 | -2 | O |
| .973 | -7 | -14 | 0 | -16 | 0 | O | 4 | -10 | ⁽²⁾ | 4 | 0 | -7 | 0 |
| .974 | -12 | 0 | -2 | -4 | Q | O | 7 | -2 | -13 | -4 | 0 | -1 | , Q |
| .975 | 11. | -5 | 7 | -4 | 20 | 0 | ₩ | 7 | 7 | 8 | 0 | 11 | 7 |
| .976 | -10 | 5 | 25 | 0 | 3 | 25 | 3 | 13 | -33 | 19 | 25 | -1 | 13 |
| .977 | -8 | Q | 12 | -8 | -3 | 0 | -0.3 | 19 | 0 | 25 | 0 | -8 | 12 |
| .978 | -12 | -8 | -20 | -13 | Q | -0.2 | -5 | -13 | 0 | 15 | -20 | -1 | 32 |
| .979 | | -5 | -8 | -1 | 6 | 0 | -3 | -6 | 0 | 9 | O | -3 | 40 |
| .980 | 14 | 8 | 25 | 0 | 23 | 0.25 | 16 | 20 | Q | 6 | O | 14 | 157 |
| .981 | 19 | 17 | 3 | 3 | 23 | 0.2 | 29 | 23 | O | 23 | 50 | 19 | 49 |
| .982 | 27 | 14 | 17 | 4 | 22 | 0 | 14 | 30 | 50 | 37 | 0 | . 24 | 40 |
| 983 | 19 | 25 | 14 | 8 | 39 | O | 21 | 25 | Q | 47 | O | 19 | 51 |
| .984 | 13 | 10 | 25 | 12 | 29 | 0 | 17 | 10 | 33 | 29 | 0 | 13 | 57 |
| .985 | -20 | -18 | -20 | 0 | 25 | 16 | -13 | =10 | -25 | -7 | 0 | -20 | 30 |
| .986 | -20 | -22 | -25 | | -6 | 0 | -19 | -14 | | -7 | 17 | -20 | 31 |
| .987 | -18 | -14 | -16 | -3 | -9 | -14 | -14 | -17 | O | -10 | 0 | -18 | 35 |
| .988 | 12 | 17 | 20 | 0 | 17 | 33 | 12 | 4 | O | 12 | -14 | 12 | 78 |
| .989 | -3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 7 | 4 | -3 | -3 | . 5 | 3 | 43 | -3 | 27 |
| .990 | -14 | -14 | -16 | -11 | 0 | 3 | -11 | -11 | -14 | -10 | 13 | -13 | 26 |
| .991 | 0 | - | 4 | 6 | 1.1 | 14 | 2 | . 0 | 5 | O | O. | 0 | 73 |
| .992 | 6 | -4 | 20 | -6 | 23 | 6 | 3 | 19 | -5 | 10 | ٥ | 6 | 69 |
| .993 | 9 | 17 | 13 | 3 | 16 | O | 16 | 23 | -5 | 20 | 6 | 9 | 69 |

Table 7
Exchange Rate (National currency units per ECU)

| *************************************** | | | *************************************** | , pres mins also also | | ***** ***** ***** **** | | , | | | |
|---|--------|-----|---|-----------------------|-----|------------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | BEL/LU | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | POR | NET | UK |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1960 | 52.8 | 7.3 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 32 | 0.4 | 660 | 64 | 30 | 4 | 0.4 |
| 1961 | 53.4 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 32 | 0.4 | 668 | 64 | 31 | 3.9 | 0.4 |
| 1962 | 53.5 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 32 | 0.4 | 669 | 64 | 31 | 3.9 | 0.4 |
| 1963 | 53.5 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 32 | 0.4 | 669 | 64 | 31 | 3.9 | 0.4 |
| 1964 | 53.5 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 32 | 0.4 | 669 | 64 | 31 | 3.9 | 0.4 |
| 1965 | 53.5 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 32 | 0.4 | 669 | 64 | 31 | 3.9 | 0.4 |
| 1966 | 53.5 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 32 | 0.4 | 669 | 64 | 31 | 3.8 | 0.4 |
| 1967 | 53.2 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 4.2 | 32 | 0.4 | 666 | 65 | 31 | 3.8 | 0.4 |
| 1968 | 51.1 | 7.8 | 5.3 | 4.1 | 31 | 0.4 | 643 | 72 | 29 | 3.7 | 0.4 |
| 1969 | 51.1 | 7.7 | 5.7 | 4 | 31 | 0.4 | 639 | 72 | 29 | 3.7 | 0.4 |
| 1970 | 51.1 | 7.7 | 5.7 | 3.7 | 31 | 0.4 | 639 | 71 | 29 | 3.7 | 0.4 |
| 1971 | 50.8 | 7.8 | 5.8 | 3.6 | 32 | 0.4 | 647 | 73 | 30 | 3.7 | 0.4 |
| 1972 | 49.3 | 7.8 | 5.7 | 3.6 | 34 | 0.5 | 654 | 72 | 30 | 3.6 | 0.4 |
| 1973 | 47.8 | 7.4 | 5.5 | 3.3 | 37 | 0.5 | 716 | 72 | 30 | 3.4 | 0.5 |
| 1974 | 46.4 | 7.3 | 5.7 | 3 | 36 | 0.6 | 775 | 69 | 30 | 3.2 | 0.5 |
| 1975 | 45.6 | 7.1 | 5.3 | 2.8 | 40 | 0.6 | 809 | 71 | 32 | 3.1 | 0.6 |
| 1976 | 43.2 | 6.8 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 58 | 0.6 | 930 | 74 | 34 | 3 | 0.6 |
| 1977 | 40.8 | 6.9 | 5.6 | 2.6 | 59 | 0.7 | 1006 | 86 | 44 | 2.8 | 0.6 |
| 1978 | 40 | 7 | 5.7 | 2.5 | 61 | 0.7 | 1080 | 97 | 56 | 2.8 | 0.6 |
| 1979 | 40 | 7.2 | 5.8 | 2.5 | 61 | 0.6 | 1157 | 91 | 67 | 3 | 0.6 |
| 1980 | 41 | 7.8 | 5.9 | 2.5 | 62 | 0.7 | 1215 | 100 | 70 | 2.7 | 0.6 |
| 1981 | 41.3 | 7.9 | 6 | 2.5 | 62 | 0.7 | 1304 | 103 | 68 | 2.8 | 0.6 |
| 1982 | 44.7 | 8.2 | 6.4 | 2.4 | 69 | 0.7 | 1326 | 107 | 78 | 2.8 | 0.6 |
| 1983 | 45.4 | 8.1 | 6.8 | | 82 | 0.7 | 1372 | 128 | 99 | 2.6 | 0.6 |
| 1984 | 45.4 | 8.1 | 6.9 | 2.2 | 91 | 0.7 | 1371 | 127 | 115 | 2.5 | 0.6 |
| 1985 | 45 | 8 | 6.8 | 2.1 | 131 | 0.7 | 1490 | 129 | 130 | 2.5 | 0.6 |
| 1986 | 43 | 7.9 | 6.8 | 2 | 149 | 0.7 | 1446 | 137 | 147 | 2.5 | 0.7 |
| 1987 | 43 | 7.8 | 6.9 | 2 | 164 | 0.8 | 1522 | 143 | 162 | 2.4 | 0.7 |
| 1988 | 44 | 7.8 | 6.9 | 2 | 173 | 0.8 | 1531 | 145 | 171 | 2.3 | 0.7 |
| 1989 | 43 | 7.9 | | 2.1 | 188 | 0.7 | 1518 | 146 | 175 | 2.3 | 0.8 |
| | | 7.7 | 7.2 | 2.4 | 214 | 0.7 | 1540 | 149 | 178 | 2.3 | 0.9 |
| 1990 | 42 | | | | | | | | 182 | 2 | 1 |
| 1991 | 42 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 2.3 | 235 | 1 | 1542 | 154 | | | |
| 1992 | | 7.6 | 7.4 | 2.4 | 260 | 1 | 1787 | 156 | 184 | 2 | 1 |
| 1993 | 40. | 8 | 7.5 | 2.5 | 278 | 1 | 1908 | 160 | 188 | 2 | 1 |

Source : IMF. International Financial Statistics, 1993

Table 8
Percentage Change In Exchange Rate (n.c. units per ECU)

| **** | *************************************** | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|------|---|-------------|
| | BEL/LU | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK |
| *************************************** | | | · ···· ···· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· | ·*** **** **** **** **** **** | *************************************** | ···· ···· ···· ···· ···· ···· | **** **** **** **** | Men July 20-10 19-10 19-10 1821 | | . Sealer states artists object objects before | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1961 | 1 | 1 | 2 | -2 | o | 0 | 1 | 0 | -3 | 3 | -3 |
| 1962 | 2 | 0 | O | 0 | Q | Q | 0.1 | 0 | Ö | Ö | Ō |
| 1963 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | O | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Q | 0 |
| 1964 | 0 | 0 | O | 0 | O | 0 | 0 | 0 | O | . 0 | Ō |
| 1965 | O | O | 0 | 0 | O | O | O | O | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | O | . 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | O | -3 | 0 | -3 |
| 1967 | O | Ö | 0 | -2 | O | 0 | -0.1 | 15 | O | Q · | Q |
| 1968 | -5 | 5 | 0 | -2 | -3 | 0 | -3 | 10 | -3 | -6 | -3 |
| 1969 | 0 | 14 | 8 | -2 | 0 | Q | -0.6 | Q | O | 0 | 0 |
| 1970 | O | O | 20 | -7 | 0 | O | 0 | -1 | O | 0 | O |
| 1971 | 0 | 1 | 2 | -3 | 3 | O | 1 | 3 | O | 3 | O |
| 1972 | | O | -2 | O | ద | 25 | 1 | -1 | 3 | O | -3 |
| 1973 | 4 | -12 | -16 | -25 | 9 | Q | 9 | Q | -5 | Q | -5 |
| 1974 | | -1 | 20 | -5 | -3 | 0.2 | 8 | -4 | -25 | 0 | -25 |
| 1975 | -2 | -3 | -16 | -6 | 11 | 0 | 4 | 3 | -3 | 7 | -3 |
| 1976 | -2 | -4 | O | -7 | 45 | 0 | 15 | 4 | -3 | 6 | -3 |
| 1977 | 3 | 1 | 6 | O | 2 | 16 | 8 | 16 | -6 | 3 | -6 |
| 1978 | 3 | 14 | 20 | -4 | 3 | ٥ | 7 | 13 | O | 3 | 0 |
| 1979 | 0 | 3 | 2 | O | O | -14 | 7 | -6 | 7 | 2 | 7 |
| 1980 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 16 | 5 | 10 | -0.1 | 4 | -0.1 |
| 1981 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | Q | Q | 7 | 3 | 4 | -3 | 4 |
| 1982 | 7 | 4 | 17 | -33 | 1 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 15 | 0 |
| 1983 | 2 | 1 | 6 | -4 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 20 | -7 | 27 | -7 |
| 1984 | -2 | O | 1 | -4 | 11 | 0 | 0 | -0.7 | -4 | 16 | -3 |
| 1985 | Q | -1 | -1 | -5 | 44 | Q | 9 | 2 | -33 | 13 | -33 |
| 1986 | -4 | -1 | O | -5 | 14 | 0 | -3 | 6 | Q | 13 | 0 |
| 1987 | 0 | -1 | 1 | Ö | 10 | 14 | 5 | 4 | -4 | 10 | -4 |
| 1988 | 2 | 3 | 0 | O | 5 | 0 | 0.5 | 1 | -4 | 56 | -4 |
| 1989 | -2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 25 | -0.8 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| 1990 | -2 | -2 | 1 | 14 | 14 | 29 | 1 | 2 | -13 | 2 | -13 |
| 1991 | O | -6 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 11 | 1 | 3 | O | 2 | 0 |
| 1992 | -4 | ద | 1 | 4 | 11 | 0 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 1. | 0 |
| 1993 | 0 | 5 | 1. | 4 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 |

Table 9
Deficit (or Surplus) / GNP *

| | ,w | **** **** **** **** **** | | *** **** **** **** | | | | | | ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | | | |
|------------|----------|---------------------------------------|----------|--------------------|------------|------------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|--|------------|-------------|------------|
| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
| n e .n | п | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 | | , | t | . | | | | 4 | | |
| 760 761 | -4 -3 | 2 -1 | -1 -1 | -1 0 | -2 -2 | -5 - 5 | -2 -1 | | 1 O | | -1 -1 | | $-1 \\ -1$ |
| 762 762 | -2 | 1 1 | -2 | 0 | -2 | -5 | -2 | o | -1 | | Ō | | 0.2 |
| 763 | -3 | 2 | -2 | -i | <u> </u> | -5 | -2 | -1 | Ô | | Õ | | 0.3 |
| 764 | -2 | 2 | 0 | Ō | -2 | -5 | -2 | -2 | -1 | | -1 | | -1 |
| 765 | -3 | 2 | ŏ | ŏ | -2 | -7 | -4 | -2 | -2 | | -2 | | -1 |
| 766 766 | | 2 | Ö | -1 | 1 | -5 | -4 | -2 | -2 | | -1 | | -1 |
| 767 | -2 | Ô | -1 | -2 | -2 | -4 | -3 | -2 | -3 | | -3 | | -1 |
| 768 | -3 | 1 | -2 | -1 | -2 | -6 | -4 | -2 | -2 | | - <u>2</u> | | -2 |
| 769 | -2 | Ô | ō | Ō | -2 | _ <u></u> _ ტ | -3 | -2 | -2 | | 2 | | -:3 |
| 770 | -2 | 2 | ŏ | 1 | -2 | -6 | -5 | -1 | $-\overline{1}$ | -2 | 2 | | |
| 771 | -3 | 3 | Õ | 1 | -2 | -5 | -7 | $-\overline{2}$ | -1 | -1 | -1 | | |
| 772 | -4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | -3 | -6 | -7 | -1 | ō | -2 | - <u>2</u> | | -3 |
| 773 | -3 | 4 | Õ | 1 | - <u>2</u> | -6 | -8 | Ö | O | -1 | -3 | 3 | -: |
| 974 | -2 | 1 | 0 | -1 | -3 | -12 | -7 | -1 | 0 | -3 | -4 | 4 | -: |
| 775 | 5 | -2 | -3 | -4 | -4 | -13 | -12 | -2 | -3 | -8 | -6 | ï | 1 |
| 776 | -6 | 0 | -1 | -3 | -4 | -11 | -9 | -1 | 0 | -12 | -5 | O | 2 |
| 777 | -6 | -1 | - 1 | -2 | -4 | -10 | -11 | -2 | -3 | -7 | -3 | 1 | -6 |
| 778 | -7 | 0 | 1 | -2 | -4 | -13 | -14 | -2 | -3 | -12 | -4 | 3 | |
| 779 | 8 | -1 | -1 | 2 | | -13 | -10 | -4 | -5 | -10 | -5 | 0 | (|
| 780 | -8 | -3 | 0 | -2 | 3 | -14 | -10 | -4 | -5 | -10 | -4 | 1 | |
| 781 | -13 | -6 | -2 | | -8 | -16 | -12 | -5 | -7 | -12 | -4 | -2 | '. |
| 782 | -11 | -8 | -3 | -2 | -7 | -16 | -13 | -6 | -8 | -11 | -3 | 1 | |
| 783 | -13 | -7 | -4 | -2 | -9 | -13 | -14 | -6 | -8 | -10 | -4 | | |
| 784 | -14 | -4 | -3 | -2 | -9 | -12 | -13 | -9 | -7 | -10 | -3 | | -1 |
| 985 | -12 | -1 | -3 | -1 | -13 | -13 | -15 | -7 | -5 | -16 | -3 | | |
| 986 | -10 | 5 | -3 | -1 | -10 | -12 | -12 | -5 | -2 | -13 | 0 | | **** |
| 987 | -7 | 4 | -1 | - 1 | -11 | -10 | -12 | -4 | -3 | -11 | -1 | | |
| 988 | -7 | 2 | | | -14 | -3 | -12 | -4 | -4 | -9 | 1 | | |
| 989 | -7 | 1 | -2 | O | -18 | -2 | -11 | -2 | -4 | -2 | 1 | | |
| 990 | -6 | -1 | -2 | -2 | -17 | -2 | -11 | -3 | -5 | -3 | 1 | | **** |
| 991 | -7 | 1 | -1 | -3 | -14 | 1. | -11 | -4 | -3 | 4 | 0 | | *** |
| 992 | | -2 | -4 | -3 | -9 | -3 | | -5 | -3 | -3 | 0 | | - |
| 993 | | -2 | -3 | -2 | -8 | -1 | | -4 | | -4 | -1 | | |

Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics, 1993

* The Deficit (or Surplus) is defined as the total of revenue and grants minus the total of expenditure and lending minus repayments.

Table 10
Central Government Deficit/Surplus (As Percent Of GDP)

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| 1975 1976 1977 1978 | -4.7 -5.6 -5.9 -6.8 | -1.9 -0.2 -0.9 -0.3 | -2.6 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 | -3.6 -2.7 -2.1 -2.0 | -3.8 -3.9 -4.9 -4.2 | -12. -10. -7.3 -11. | -17. -12. -12. -8.3 | -1.7 -0.9 -2.1 -2.3 | -2.8 -2.4 -3.0 -3.1 | -8.4 -11. -6.5 -11. | -7.3 -5.7 -3.5 -5.2 | 1.04 0.28 0.6 3.39 | -1.73 -1.29 -1.92 -5.76 -3.85 -5.45 |
| 1980 1981 1982 1983 | -8.1 -12. -11. -12. | -2.6 -6.0 -8.0 -6.8 | -0.0 -2.3 -3.3 -3.5 | -1.8 -2.3 -2.0 -1.9 | -5 -10. -18. -5.2 | -13. -14. -14. -12. | -10. -11. -0.9 -11. | -4.1 -5.1 -5.5 -6.2 | -4.6 -6.5 -7.6 -7.7 | -9.6 -11. -10. -9.5 | -4.6 -4.7 -3.4 -4.3 | 1.5 -1.8 0.75 -2.0 | -3.45 -1.73 -2.5 -4.19 |
| 1985 1986 1987 1988 | -11. -9.9 -7.7 -6.5 | -0.6 4.51 3.92 2.2 | -2.7 -3.3 -1.2 -2.3 | -1.1 -0.9 -1.0 -1.7 | -14. -10. -13. -15. | -11. -10. -9.2 -4.2 | -13. -14. -14. -10. | -6.9 -4.5 -3.8 -3.5 | -5.4 -1.8 -3.1 -4.2 | -14. -12. -10. -8.7 | -2.8 -2.3 -0.6 1.55 | 10.4 7.34 3.55 3.04 | -9.97 -7.44 -3.21 -4.02 -3.83 |
| 1990 1991 | -5.6 -6.8 -7.0 | -0.6 -1.0 -1.5 | -2.1 -1.2 | -1.6 -2.3 | -28. -18. -11. | -0.6 | -10. -9.9 | -3.2 -3.6 | -4.7 -2.7 | -5.2 | 0.73 -0.9 | 5.63 -11. | -4.47 -4.17 -5.5 -6.1 -5.8 |

Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1995

Table 11
Current GNP Per Capita (U.S \$)

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------------|
| | | | | | | | | |
| 1966 | 1870 | 2250 | 2210 | 2060 | 780 | 990 | 1510 | 79 0 |
| 1967 | 2000 | 2440 | 2360 | 2100 | 840 | 1070 | 1650 | 870 |
| 1968 | 2180 | 2660 | 2550 | 2290 | 930 | 1160 | 1810 | 950 |
| 1969 | 2420 | 2950 | 2820 | 2550 | 1060 | 1230 | 1980 | 1040 |
| 1970 | 2670 | 3130 | 3000 | 2860 | 1170 | 1290 | 2160 | 1080 |
| 1971 | 2910 | 3450 | 3200 | 3240 | 1300 | 1420 | 2150 | 1190 |
| 1972 | 3330 | 3990 | 3560 | 3840 | 1460 | 1680 | 2380 | 1410 |
| 1973 | 4080 | 4180 | 4210 | 4750 | 1720 | 2090 | 2840 | 1810 |
| 1974 | 5080 | 5760 | 5060 | 5710 | 1940 | 2370 | 3370 | 2310 |
| 1975 | 5950 | 6910 | 5970 | 6670 | 2370 | 2650 | 3690 | 2780 |
| 1976 | 6830 | 8030 | -6690 | 7460 | 2650 | 2680 | 4030 | 3090 |
| 1977 | 7600 | 8930 | 7490 | 8230 | 2850 | 3000 | 4390 | 3370 |
| 1978 | 8760 | 10010 | 8400 | 9460 | 3270 | 3430 | 4890 | 3700 |
| 1979 | 10420 | 11880 | 10010 | 11540 | 3860 | 4120 | 6080 | 4430 |
| 1980 | 12140 | 13130 | 11850 | 13270 | 4370 | 5050 | 7480 | 5390 |
| 1981 | 11770 | 12840 | 12420 | 13230 | 4470 | 5590 | 8010 | 5670 |
| 1982 | 10490 | 12120 | 11890 | 12220 | 4320 | 5530 | 7900 | 5370 |
| 1983 | 9120 | 11390 | 10630 | 11400 | 3950 | 5120 | 7540 | 4730 |
| 1984 | 8490 | 11350 | 9950 | 11170 | 3810 | 4980 | 7590 | 4440 |
| 1985 | 8230 | 11310 | 9750 | 10920 | 3610 | 4910 | 7700 | 4330 |
| 1986 | 9080 | 12640 | 10780 | 11920 | 3670 | 5280 | 8580 | 4890 |
| 1987 | 11090 | 15120 | 12970 | 14280 | 3980 | 6480 | 10450 | 6090 |
| 1988 | 14200 | 18860 | 16240 | 18320 | 4780 | 7920 | 13420 | 7880 |
| 1989 | 15890 | 20740 | 17910 | 20520 | 5380 | 8890 | 15180 | 9360 |
| 1990 | 17580 | 22440 | 19420 | 22360 | 5980 | 10390 | 16940 | 11010 |
| 1991 | 18950 | 23700 | 20380 | 23650 | 6340 | 11120 | 18520 | 12450 |

Source : The World Bank, World Tables 1987, 1993 DÎE, Türkiye İstatistiği Yilligi, 1994

GNP Per Capita (continued)

| | | | , | | |
|------|---|------|-------|-------|------|
| | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
| | *************************************** | | , | | |
| 1966 | 1710 | 440 | 1940 | 2200 | 310 |
| 1967 | 1870 | 500 | 2050 | 2260 | 330 |
| 1968 | 2080 | 570 | 2120 | 2440 | 370 |
| 1969 | 2330 | 610 | 2140 | 2800 | 400 |
| 1970 | 2560 | 700 | 2210 | 3170 | 400 |
| 1971 | 2850 | 790 | 2430 | 3440 | 400 |
| 1972 | 3250 | 910 | 2860 | 4070 | 410 |
| 1973 | 4030 | 1200 | 3220 | 4980 | 470 |
| 1974 | 5080 | 1430 | 3480 | 6420 | 630 |
| 1975 | 6010 | 1540 | 3890 | 7470 | 830 |
| 1976 | 6870 | 1700 | 4230 | 8440 | 1000 |
| 1977 | 7760 | 1830 | 4620 | 9240 | 1110 |
| 1978 | 8890 | 1890 | 5200 | 10750 | 1220 |
| 1979 | 10570 | 2090 | 6470 | 12710 | 1370 |
| 1980 | 12010 | 2370 | 8020 | 14920 | 1410 |
| 1981 | 11800 | 2490 | 9360 | 15540 | 1450 |
| 1982 | 10930 | 2500 | 9800 | 15570 | 1300 |
| 1983 | 10070 | 2250 | 9280 | 14660 | 1180 |
| 1984 | 9690 | 1990 | 8650 | 14070 | 1100 |
| 1985 | 9360 | 1970 | 8450 | 14000 | 1080 |
| 1986 | 9990 | 2270 | 9010 | 15290 | 1110 |
| 1987 | 11560 | 2830 | 10500 | 17740 | 1220 |
| 1988 | 14420 | 3650 | 12790 | 22840 | 1200 |
| 1989 | 16030 | 4250 | 14500 | 26210 | 1370 |
| 1990 | 17850 | 5190 | 16020 | 29460 | 1640 |
| 1991 | 18780 | 5930 | 16550 | 31780 | 1780 |

Table 12 Real GDP Per Capita (\$) PURCHASING POWER PARITY

| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | | | |
| 1970 | 2952 | 3439 | 3274 | 3380 | 1540 | 1777 | 2848 | 2203 |
| 1971 | 3210 | 3686 | 3573 | 3619 | 1726 | 1915 | 3022 | 2399 |
| 1972 | 3521 | 4035 | 3869 | 3919 | 1953 | 2100 | 3223 | 2687 |
| 1973 | 3965 | 4433 | 4316 | 4354 | 2225 | 2308 | 3656 | 3058 |
| 1974 | 4488 | 4768 | 4822 | 4756 | 2330 | 2582 | 4178 | 3479 |
| 1975 | 4844 | 5188 | 5259 | 5161 | 2690 | 2947 | 4443 | 3803 |
| 1976 | 5424 | 5854 | 5802 | 5808 | 2999 | 3124 | 5008 | 4124 |
| 1977 | 5811 | 6332 | 6364 | 6397 | 3261 | 3561 | 5523 | 4480 |
| 1978 | 6401 | 6873 | 7026 | 7069 | 3685 | 4043 | 6101 | 4822 |
| 1979 | 7116 | 7732 | 7868 | 8015 | 4111 | 4466 | 7023 | 5199 |
| 1980 | 8094 | 8389 | 8683 | 8838 | 4522 | 4977 | 7973 | 5702 |
| 1981 | 8762 | 9107 | 9563 | 9673 | 4907 | 5560 | 8797 | 6166 |
| 1982 | 9468 | 9993 | 10382 | 10238 | 5213 | 5990 | 9373 | 6607 |
| 1983 | 9827 | 10602 | 10759 | 10781 | 5379 | 6133 | 9767 | 6914 |
| 1984 | 10397 | 11468 | 11246 | 11528 | 5695 | 6586 | 10393 | 7260 |
| 1985 | 10768 | 12279 | 11720 | 12105 | 6010 | 6901 | 10927 | 7597 |
| 1986 | 11212 | 13027 | 12240 | 12690 | 6188 | 7049 | 11467 | 8008 |
| 1987 | 11751 | 13309 | 12791 | 13298 | 6347 | 7608 | 12133 | 8665 |
| 1988 | 12623 | 13682 | 13603 | 14161 | 6799 | 8146 | 12985 | 9343 |
| 1989 | 13675 | 14373 | 14627 | 15261 | 7296 | 8831 | 13923 | 10171 |
| 1990 | 16405 | 16765 | 17431 | 18291 | 7349 | 10659 | 16021 | 11792 |
| 1991 | 17144 | 17501 | 18164 | 15800 | 5654 | 11907 | 17226 | 12771 |
| 1992 | 18087 | 17609 | 18510 | 16363 | 8286 | 12775 | 17685 | 12760 |
| 1993 | 18377 | 18238 | 18724 | 16376 | 8415 | 13318 | 17950 | 12962 |

Source: OECD, National Accounts, Volume 1, 1988-89
DİE, Türkiye İstatistiği Yilligi, 1994

Real GDP Per Capita (Continued)

| | **** | | | | |
|------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|
| | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
| | | | | | |
| 1970 | 3456 | 1458 | 3236 | 3676 | 945 |
| 1971 | 3742 | 1645 | 3453 | 3944 | 1055 |
| 1972 | 4002 | 1862 | 3425 | 4334 | 1146 |
| 1973 | 4431 | 2207 | 4249 | 4949 | 1245 |
| 1974 | 4986 | 2402 | 4553 | 5562 | 1438 |
| 1975 | 5424 | 2451 | 4964 | 5645 | 1658 |
| 1976 | 6011 | 2720 | 5421 | 6116 | 1888 |
| 1977 | 6526 | 3031 | 5924 | 6631 | 2056 |
| 1978 | 7130 | 3321 | 6588 | 7384 | 2219 |
| 1979 | 7896 | 3787 | 7370 | 8210 | 2343 |
| 1980 | 8624 | 4277 | 7852 | 9012 | 2482 |
| 1981 | 9316 | 4722 | 8475 | 9783 | 2766 |
| 1982 | 9730 | 5096 | 9185 | 10504 | 3015 |
| 1983 | 10159 | 5219 | 9826 | 11183 | 3153 |
| 1984 | 10811 | 5262 | 10373 | 12301 | 3369 |
| 1985 | 11339 | 5516 | 11020 | 13003 | 3547 |
| 1986 | 11790 | 5847 | 11659 | 13841 | 3857 |
| 1987 | 12183 | 6309 | 12533 | 14534 | 4171 |
| 1988 | 12832 | 6750 | 13428 | 15558 | 4353 |
| 1989 | 13840 | 7392 | 14268 | 16683 | 4514 |
| 1990 | 15766 | 8389 | 15720 | 19340 | 4696 |
| 1991 | 12085 | 9137 | 15578 | 20612 | 4907 |
| 1992 | 16933 | 9771 | 16242 | 21900 | 5290 |
| 1993 | 17269 | 9941 | 17000 | 23163 | 5881 |
| | | | | | |

Table 13
Real GDP Per Capita In The EC As Compared To Turkey (Turkey=1.00)

| | | | | ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· | , | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|-----|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|---|--|-----|-----|
| | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SPA | NET | POR | UK I | LUX | TUR |
| · ••••• •••• •••• •••• • | | | | | 1000 1000 1000 1000 Lune | *** **** **** **** | | | | *************************************** | ************************************** | | |
| 970 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 3 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 1 |
| 971 | 3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 3.5 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 1 |
| 972 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 1 |
| 973 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 3 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 1.8 | 3.4 | 4 | 1 |
| 974 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 3.2 | 3,9 | 1 |
| 975 | 3 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 3 : | 3.4 | 1 |
| 976 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 1.4 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 1 |
| 977 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 1.5 | | 3.2 | 1 |
| 978 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 3 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 3 | 3.3 | 1 |
| 979 | 3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 1 |
| 980 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 1.8 | 2 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 1 |
| 981 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.8 | 2 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 1 |
| 982 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 2 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 1.7 | | 3.5 | 1 |
| 983 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 1.7 | 3.1 | | 1 |
| 984 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 2 | 3 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 3.1 | | 1 |
| 985 | 7 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 3.1 | | 1. |
| 986 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 3 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 1.5 | | 3.6 | 1 |
| 987 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 1.5 | | 3.5 | 1 |
| 988 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 3 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 3.1 | | 1 |
| 989 | | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 2 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 3.2 | | 1 |

Source : DECD, National Accounts, Volume 1, 1988-1989 DİE, Temmuz 1991 de Türkiye Ekonomisi İstatistik ve Yorumlar,1992

Table 14
Unemployment Rates (%)

| | | BEL | DEN | FRA | GER | GRE | IRE | ITA | SFA | NET | POR | UK | LUX | TUR |
|--------|-----|------|------|------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----------|------------------|------|
| : 1 | 965 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 2.4 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 1.4 | · | 9.7 |
| | 966 | 2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 5.5 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 1.4 | | 9.8 |
| | 967 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 5.4 | 5 | 5.3 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 2.1 | | $0.\overline{1}$ | |
| | 968 | 2.9 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 1.2 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.1^{-} | 0.1 | 10.4 |
| 1 | 969 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 5.3 | 5 | 5.6 | 2.4 | 1 | 3.1 | 2 | Ö | 11 |
| | 970 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 2.4 | 0.6 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 1 | 3.8 | 2.2 | - | 12.1 |
| - (| 971 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 3.1 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 3,3 | 1.3 | 3,5 | 2.9 | | 11.9 |
| 1 | 972 | 2.2 | 0.9 | 2.7 | 0.9 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 3.2 | | 11.7 |
| 1 | 973 | 2.2 | 0.9 | 2.6 | 1 | 2 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.3 | | 12.2 |
| 1 | 974 | 2.4 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 3 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 | Ö | 12.8 |
| 1 | 975 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 2.3 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 4.3 | 4 | 5.5 | | | 13.5 |
| 1 | 976 | 5.6 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 7 | 4.9 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 0.3 | 13.6 |
| 1 | 977 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 4). | 1.7 | 7.6 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 7.4 | 5.5 | 0.5 | 13.7 |
| 1 | 978 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 5.2 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 4.2 | 8 | 5.5 | 0.8 | 13.9 |
| 1 | 979 | 7.1 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 3.3 | 1.9 | 6.1 | 7.4 | 9.3 | 4.2 | 8.1 | 5.1 | 0.7 | 14.2 |
| 1 | 980 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 6.3 | 3.3 | 3 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 12.3 | 4.9 | 7.6 | 6.3 | 0.7 | 14.5 |
| 1 | 981 | 10 | 10.3 | 7.4 | 3.2 | 4. | 9.9 | | 13.8 | 8.5 | 7.4 | 9 | 1 | 14.8 |
| 1 | 982 | 11.7 | 1 1 | 8.1 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 11.4 | | 15.6 | | | 10.4 | | 15.1 |
| 1 | 983 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 6.4 | 7.9 | 14 | | 17 | | 7.8 | 11.2 | 1.6 | 15.7 |
| 1 | 984 | 13.2 | 8.5 | 9.7 | 7.9 | 8.1 | 15.6 | | 19.7 | | 8.4 | 11.1 | 1.8 | 11.4 |
| 1 | 985 | 12.3 | 7.3 | 10.2 | 8 | 7.8 | 17.4 | 10.1 | 21.1 | 10.9 | 8.5 | 11.5 | | 11.4 |
| 1 | 986 | 11.6 | 5.5 | 10.4 | 7.6 | | 17.4 | | 20.8 | 10.3 | 8.5 | 11.6 | 1.5 | 10.2 |
| ļī | 987 | 11.3 | 5.4 | 10.5 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 17.6 | 11.8 | 20.1 | 9.6 | 7 | 10.4 | | 9.2 |
| 1 | 988 | 10.3 | 6.5 | 10 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 16.7 | 11.8 | 19.1 | 9.2 | 5.7 | 8.3 | | 7.8 |
| 1 | 989 | 9.3 | 8.1 | 9.4 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 15.6 | 11.8 | 16.9 | 8.3 | 5 | 6.1 | 1.2 | 8.1 |
| 1 | 990 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 9 | 6.2 | 7.2 | | 10.8 | 15.9 | 7.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 1.2 | 7.4 |
| 1 | 991 | 9.3 | 7.2 | 9.5 | 6.7 | 7.7 | 14 | 1.1 | 16.3 | 7 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 1.1 | 7.8 |
| ī | 992 | 10.3 | 6.5 | 9.4 | 7.7 | 8.7 | 14.2 | | 18.4 | 6.7 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 1.2 | 8.2 |
| 1 | 993 | 11.9 | 5.4 | 10.8 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 15 | 10.4 | 22.7 | 8.1 | 5.5 | 4.2 | 1.1 | 9.1 |

Source: DECD Economic Outlook, Historical Statistics 1960-90 OECD Economic Outlook, June 1994, OECD For Luxemburg, Commission of the European Communities, Annual Economic Report, no.34, 1988.

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UZGECMIS

20.02.1971 tarihinde Adana'da doğdum. İlkokul eğitimimi Adana Bahçelievler İlkokulunda tamamladıktan sonra yine Adana'da 1985 yılında Hürriyet Ortaokulunu. 1988 yılında ise Anafartalar Lisesini bitirdim.

1989 yılında Cukurova üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi İktisat bölümünü kazandım. Burada bir yıllık İngilizce hazırlık eğitiminden sonra üniversite hayatına devam ederek 1994 yılında bu fakülteden mezun oldum. Aynı yıl mastır sınavını kazanarak iki yıllık yüksek lisans eğitimine başladım. Su anda tezimi bitirerek yüksek lisans proğramını tamamlama aşamasındayım. Bu aşamadan sonra aynı doğrultadaki çalışmalarımı devam ettirerek doktora ve sonrası akademik kariyer yolundaki hedeflerimi gerçekleştirmek ümidi ve çabası içerisindeyim.

Bilimsel bir kurumda bu yöndeki çabalarımın arkasında yatan en önemli etken okumayı ve bilimsel araştırmalar yapmayı çok seviyor olmamdır. Yeterli bir ingilizce ile beraber, bilgisar programları alanındaki bilgilerimin bu konuda bana yardımcı olacağı inancındayım.

Hüseyin Mualla Yüceol