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ABSTRACT

Psychoanalytic approach to film theory, having been applied by numerous philosophers and film theorists, has a long and rich history; not only by itself as a way of studying film but also as a field that spawned numerous branches of film theory. However, as psychoanalytic film theory has its roots within Freudian concepts, any critical stance against psychoanalysis should also imply a new critical approach to psychoanalytical film theory and the possibility of a new way of approaching cinema in light of this newly developed criticism. One such criticism that has not been fully explored by neither psychoanalysts or film theorists, and that maintains internal consistency was developed by Maria Torok and Nicholas Abraham. Although not a complete departure from Freud's own theory, Abraham and Torok's theory, which can be called cryptoanalysis, expands upon Freud's concepts of mourning and melancholia. This thesis aims to review Abraham and Torok's writings on cryptonymy and the cryptoanalytical method in psychoanalysis. After defining cryptonymy in Abraham and Torok's terms, cinema's relationship with this theory will be established and a method of cryptoanalyzing films will be developed.

ÖZET

Sayısız filozof ve film teorisyeni tarafından katkıda bulunulan sinemaya yönelik psikanalitik yaklaşımlar, yalnızca sinemayı incelemenin bir yolu olarak değil, aynı zamanda pek çok farklı film teorisini doğuran başlı başına bir alan olarak zengin bir geçmişe sahiptir. Ancak psikanalitik film teorisinin köklerinin Freudyen kavramlara dayandığı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, psikanalize yöneltilen herhangi bir eleştirinin hem psikanalitik film teorisine yönelik yeni bir yaklaşımı hem de bu yeni yaklaşım ışığında sinemaya olan yeni bir bakışı beraberinde getireceği söylenebilir. Ne film teorisi ne de psikanaliz alanlarında bütünüyle incelenmemiş ama kendi içinde tutarlılığa sahip olan teorilerden birisi Nicolas Abraham ve Maria Torok tarafından öne sürülmüştür. Freud'un teorisinden kökten bir kopuşu içermemekle birlikte, kriptoanaliz olarak adlandırılabilecek olan bu teori, Freud'un yas ve melankoli kavramlarının genişletilmeleri üzerine kuruludur. Bu tezin amacı Abraham ve Torok'un "kriptonomi" üzerine yazdıklarını ve psikanalizde kriptoanalitik metodu incelemektir. Abraham ve Torok'un çalışmalarına dayanarak kriptonomi açıklandıktan sonra sinemanın bu teori olan ilişkisi kurulacak ve film analizi için bir kriptoanaliz metodu geliştirilecektir.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since its conception, psychoanalysis has been the target of many different criticisms. While some such criticisms aimed to disprove the field of psychoanalysis as a whole, whether it be through an effort to include it under the framework of another field thereby discrediting its status as an independent field on its own, or through aiming to disprove the validity of its methodologies, the continued existence of psychoanalysis today should make its irreducible quality obvious. However, psychoanalytic theory owes much to a second camp of criticism, of those who strive to deepen the field and thus strengthening its position as a specific field of study, for its perseverance. In my thesis, I intend to focus on one such criticism, one that has gone largely unnoticed for the most part, and its potential to change psychoanalysis and through it, psychoanalytic film theory and other ways of reading film that have established psychoanalysis as their foundations.

Throughout this thesis, the discussion will revolve around the theory of "cryptonymy" as put forth by Nicholos Abraham and Maria Torok in their readings of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. The first part will intend to reveal what Abraham and Torok's theory of cryptonymy meant for psychoanalysis. This will show what Abraham and Torok have seen lacking in Freud's theory of psychoanalysis that would have caused the contradiction which beget the need for their new approach. To fully grasp their theory, one first needs to see the origin of this strife. In order to do so, a reading of Freud's *Mourning and Melancholia* will be done. After a reading of Freud's text, the discussion will move on to Abraham and Torok's own concepts of "introjection" and "incorporation" as Torok laid out in her essay *The Ilness of Mourning*. With some support from their other essays, the problem of representation of trauma in Freud's theory of psychoanalysis and the need for a different, patient-specific approach that Abraham and Torok proposed will be looked into. The introductory part of the thesis will be concluded by fleshing out their theory in order to make use of it in the next part.

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In the second part, the effects of psychoanalysis on our approach to film, i.e. psychoanalytic film theory and other theories that have been influenced by psychoanalysis to one degree or other will be reviewed. While an in-depth study of psychoanalytic film theory and its influences will not be included, since the scope of such an inquiry would much exceed the bounds of the topic of this thesis, the survey will serve to give the reader an idea regarding what exactly could change in our reading of film if we follow the same lines of reasoning as Abraham and Torok.

Having established what cryptonymy means, the way it differs from Freudian psychoanalysis and how it could change our approach to reading films, in the third part of the thesis the practical side of cryptoanalysis will be looked into, in order to start developing a cryptoanalytical method of analyzing films. To do that, a reading of Abraham and Torok's *The Wolfman's Magic Word: A Cryptonymy*, where they try to cryptoanalyze Freud's patient Sergei Pankejeff through the records of his sessions of psychoanalysis with Freud himself, will be required. This will allows one to see exactly what approach Abraham and Torok have taken in their cryptoanalysis, and later guide the effort to devise a similar method to cryptoanalyze a film. While the theory of cryptonymy has been introduced to the field of cinema by Alan Cholodenko's writings and Arzu Karaduman's thesis *A Cryptonymy of Cinema: A New Psychoanalytical Approach to the Reading of Films*, the goal of this thesis will be similar to Abraham and Torok's: devising a more specific method, thereby broadening the range of the topic by making it more specific. This will provide the thesis with two avenues that could be taken: one regarding the ontology of cinema and the other regarding how a film can be cryptoanalyzed. What cyptonymy implies for the ontology of cinema will be explored briefly before finishing the second part of the thesis.

Finally, in the last part, after giving a theoretical account on how such an application might be carried out, the method of application will be exemplified with a cryptoanalysis of David Lynch's *Mulholland Drive*.

CHAPTER 1:
CRYPTONYMY: A CRITICISM OF TRAUMA'S PLACEMENT IN FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS

1.1 FREUD'S THEORY

The foundation of Abraham and Torok's critique lie within the concept of trauma. According to Abraham and Torok, the loss of a loved object can result in one of two reactions within the subject: *introjection* and *incorporation,* which are placed against Freud's concepts of *mourning* and *melancholia*. Introjection can be described simply as the assimilation of the lost object to the subject's ego, incorporation is the inclusion of the lost object within the subject's ego as a whole. While the lost object in a way becomes a part of the subject's ego through introjection, incorporation includes the lost object within the subject's psyche as a foreign body with its own unconscious. Moreover, the cryptic incorporation as defined by Abraham and Torok also includes the repression of certain words as the source of the trauma, making resolution of the trauma through psychoanalysis almost impossible. Abraham and Torok's theory will be revisited in order to give a clearer understanding of cryptonymy. However, it will be better to establish the theory from the ground up by first looking into Freud's theory that resulted in the strife argued in Abraham and Torok's writings.

As mentioned previously, before looking into Abraham and Torok's critique of Freud's psychoanalysis, it would be fitting to first explore what exactly in Freud's theory they have constructed their criticism against. In accordance with this, the concepts of *mourning* and *melancholia* as theorized by Freud in his essay *Mourning and Melancholia* need to be explored. There, the two possible reactions to the loss of a loved object and their inner workings can be found.

Loss is a significant and inescapable part of life. Moreover, it is one that will sooner or later extend to almost every object or abstraction we have held dear. Considering the position of loss as a necessary occurrence, humans have naturally adapted to this necessity to ensure survival. Although the loss of a loved

object or idea is always followed by a period of pain for those who have to go through the loss, these painful periods mark a process of accepting and in a way integrating the loss. Through these periods, those who experience the loss learn to keep on living the loss. This process is called "mourning." However, there are important aspects of this process that should be kept in mind such as the fact that it ends or that it exists in order to help the continued survival of the one who goes through it. Indeed, there has been a need to distinguish the process of mourning from one other process; one that is similar in a lot of respects except the two important aspects we have established. "Melancholia", as it is called with reference to the "black bile" of Humorism, excess of which was believed to be the cause of depression and emotional irritability, is the name of this destructive process that follows a loss. While the purpose of mourning is, as we have said, the survival of the loss for the one who experienced it, melancholia seems to accomplish quite the opposite. In *Mourning and Melancholia* the process of melancholia is described by Freud as follows:

> The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. (Freud 244)

Based on this definition, Freud differentiates mourning from melancholia by saying that all these defining attributes of melancholia, with the important exception of "the disturbance of self-regard" are also applicable to mourning too (244). A certain amount of withdrawal from daily life is expected and natural, considering the fact that the loss of something that has been the object of some amount of libidinal energy is necessarily unsettling. The process of mourning serves the exact purpose of withdrawing this investment little by little, eventually letting the mourner integrate back into daily life. As Freud says, "...when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and unhibited again" (245)

After establishing the purpose of mourning clearly, Freud moves on to point to applying his findings to melancholia and makes a staggering point regarding the relationship between the melancholic and the lost object. According to the text, while the mourning person is always clear on what he/she has lost and goes through the process of mourning with this clear idea in mind, we find that it is not so in the case of the melancholic. While "there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious [in mourning]" the melancholic often finds himself/herself oblivious to what has been lost (245). Although the melancholic is aware of the fact that a loss has taken place, it is never clear for him/her the nature of this loss. As Freud explains, "...melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss that is withdrawn from consciousness" (245). This point is not only relevant to the true nature of melancholia but it will also become extremely relevant for our overall topic.

With a brief departure from this point, Freud goes back to a previous discovery regarding the difference between mourning and melancholia. While the process of mourning does entail a withdrawal from daily life, as has been mentioned, it never turns into an act of self-punishment and active aggression towards oneself. This is not so in the case of melancholia. After a diligent examination of the melancholic's self-deprecative attitude, Freud makes an important observation regarding the nature of the accusations the melancholic makes against himself/herself. What this observation reveals is the fact that most of these accusations are not actually applicable to the melancholic but to someone else. This brings us to the ultimate point Freud makes regarding the self-reproach of the melancholic, "...we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted from it on to the patient's own ego." (248) What this tells us is that the melancholic's aggression is actually directed at the lost object, but actually acted out against the melancholic's own self as if the lost object has in some way became a part of the melancholic's own being.

Having established the way Freud differentiates mourning, a regular process that intends to enable one cope with the loss of a loved object he/she experienced,

from melancholia, a pathological state where coping with the loss becomes impossible because of the fact that even though the lost object is somehow internalized in a sense, the loss is not acknowledged, Abraham and Torok's critique of Freud's theory should become easier to understand. However, before doing so, a familiarity with the term "introjection" as was coined by Freud's former associate Sandor Ferenczi should be established.

1.2 ABRAHAM AND TOROK'S CRITIQUE

Maria Torok, in her essay *The Illness of Mourning* endeavours to define introjection by looking into Ferenczi's writings on the concept. Such a need arises from the fact that the term has been blurred through contradictory statements by different authors, i.e. Karl Abraham and Freud. While it is important to note the attention given to the term introjection, it is a shame that the term has been taken far from its original meaning. In order to return the term to its actual usage by Ferenczi, Torok takes to rereading Ferenczi's definition of the term in his book *Final Contributions to the problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis*:

> I described introjection as an extension to the external world of the original autoerotic interests, by including its objects in the ego. I put the emphasis on this "including" and wanted to show thereby that I considered every sort of object love (or transference) both in normal and in neurotic people (and of course also in paranoiacs as far as they are capable of loving) as an extension of the ego, that is as introjection. (Ferenczi 316)

Torok, in her essay *The Illness of Mourning* takes this definition and infers three points that comprises introjection, which are as follows: "(1) the extension of autoerotic interests, (2) the broadening of the ego through the removal of repression, (3) the including of the object in the ego and thereby 'an extension to the external world of the [ego's] original autoerotic interests.'" (Torok 112) According to Torok inference, introjection is what makes one capable of feeling love towards an object through its inclusion into one's ego. Ego seems to be in a

constant process of growth which happens through the taking of foreign objects and introjecting them onto the ego itself. However, it is of utmost importance to note that each newly attained introjection is in fact "one" with the ego; meaning that even though it is the introjection of a foreign object, the virtual membrane of these new grounds is composed of the same material as the ego, so to speak. This is because of one fact that Torok describes as follows: "...introjection is defined as the process of including the Unconscious in the ego through objectal contacts." (113) This is especially important because of a second term that is vital to Abraham and Torok's theory, i.e. "incorporation". Although introjection and incorporation have been used interchangeably by others, Torok makes clear distinctions between the two.

While one tries to introject the unconscious desires related to the object, it is possible for the object to be lost in some way or the other. Naturally this would mean the disruption of the process of introjection of the object; a disruption that is both painful and destructive. Of course the one who has lost its loved object during the process of introjection feels the need to complete this process and include his/her unconscious desires into his/her ego. As a response to the obvious incapability to do so, incorporation appears as a magical reaction that would actually make the impossible possible. The one who has experienced the loss necessarily abandons the process of introjection and instead applies to incorporation, which Torok describes as follows:

> The loss acts as a prohibition and, whatever form it may take, constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to introjection. The prohibited object is settled into ego in order to compensate for the lost pleasure and the failed introjection. This is incorporation in the strict sense of the term. (113)

This "settling of the prohibited object into ego" differs greatly from the process of introjection. While introjection creates new areas within the ego, not by forcing foreign objects within its bounds but by broadening the limits of the ego through the assimilation of desires that previously belonged to the Unconscious,

incorporation is the action of devouring the lost object as a whole. However, this is not the only difference between introjection and incorporation.

The next big difference Torok points out between the two concepts is that while introjection is a process, incorporation is an instantaneous action. In this aspect, Torok likens the function of incorporation to hallucinatory fulfillments (113). Another, and perhaps the most relevant difference between these two concepts lies in the way they are perceived by the subject who has experienced the loss. While introjection is a process that is carried out openly, incorporation again follows the opposite path. Incorporation takes place in order to fulfill the function of the object that has been lost. Any indication that the object has been lost would be disruptive to the efforts of incorporation. Therefore, not only the loss, perhaps not the loss of the object directly but always the loss of the capability to introject certain desires through the lost object, must be kept a secret in order for incorporation to be "successful" (114). Here, Freud's theory regarding melancholia should be brought up once again. While looking into Freud's theory, it has been established that the melancholic person refuses to recognize the loss of the loved object. Even in cases where the patient recognizes the loss of the object, he/she refuses to acknowledge exactly what was lost through the object. The similarity of these aspects of melancholia and incorporation should be clear.

When talking about loss, what is being talked about is a kind of trauma. It has been established that trauma is irrepresentable. Abraham and Torok strengthen this claim in their theory by taking a closer look at the unconscious.

1.3 ABRAHAM AND TOROK'S THEORY

Nicolas Abraham, in his essay *The Shell and the Kernel* makes it his goal to discover the specificity of psychoanalysis as a field on its own. He explains that while there have been efforts to invalidate psychoanalysis, putting it under the rubric of phenomenology, psychoanalysis has shown resistance to this as such an effort renders psychoanalysis empty. Abraham, in his essay, argues that the reason for this is because what psychoanalysis studies is a specific area. This area, while

it is touched upon by other fields of study remains unexplored and also wide enough to need undivided attention. Abraham defines this area as the place between "I" and "Me"; the blank space between the individual and his/her Consciousness (84). He finds the exact reason why psychoanalysis cannot exist within the bounds of phenomenology as follows:

> … psychoanalysis stakes out its domain precisely on this *unthought* ground of phenomenology. To sat this is already to designate, if not to resolve, the problem facing us: how to include in a discourse -in any one whatever- the very thing which, being the precondition of discourse, fundamentally escapes it? (84)

What this means is that when we try to talk about concepts regarding the Unconscious, we take a contradictory way in our discussion. The moment we can talk about a thing that supposedly belongs to the Unconscious, we leave the domain of the Unconscious. As a solution to this predicament, Abraham offers shift in the language we use to discuss psychoanalytical concepts in which the terms will constantly carry the awareness of their shortcomings in representing the concepts they are supposed to represent. He names this mode of use *anasemia*. (85)

What has been discussed regarding the state of psychoanalysis draws a picture of the Unconscious. What we have as the field of psychoanalysis is a region that cannot be charted by our traditional understanding. While this of course could make for a bleak picture regarding the possibility of interacting with the Unconscious in any way, Abraham's suggestion of devising a new kind of language, specific for the purposes of psychoanalysis proposes a very real chance to accomplish this. The intricacies of such a suggestion and the ways devised by Abraham and Torok will be explored in later parts of this thesis but for now the concept of incorporation needs to be revisited before moving on.

Incorporation has been defined as the devouring of the lost object as a whole by the patient. What exactly would this mean according to the Unconscious

Abraham mentioned? It is known that the incorporated object keeps its integrity but remains a secret, an enclosed space within the patient's Unconscious, a *crypt*. This integrity that is kept would suggest that the crypt should have a different topography than that of the analysand's own Unconscious, thus making its language different than that of the Unconscious of the analysand. Another being, grafted within the patient, using his/her mouth but its own words to communicate.

With all these considered, what one ends up having in his/her hands is a crypt (in every sense of the word) that cannot be accessed, located within the Unconscious, which also cannot be accessed by regular language. Although it seems that Abraham and Torok, through their joint efforts have laid out a puzzle that is impossible to solve, they have also devised a way to circumvent the barrier that seems to be impassable. Their long and novel way of dealing with the concept of crypt will be explored in the coming parts. However, before leaving traditional psychoanalytical theory behind one needs to first look into the way it had been applied to film theory. Only after a definite understanding of traditional psychoanalytical theory's impact on film theory can one assess how Abraham and Torok's critique might change it.

CHAPTER 2:
PSYCHOANALYTIC FILM THEORY

2.1 *PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE CINEMA*

While the impact of psychoanalysis on film theory has been tremendous, it would be safe to say that the relationship between these two fields has developed quite late when we consider the fact that cinema and psychoanalysis were born around the same time, at the turn of the century. However, as late as they converged, psychoanalysis has had a great influence on film theory and has been integral in several approaches to cinema. In order to understand traditional applications of psychoanalysis in film theory, one must first look into what these different approaches are, and then see how psychoanalysis is applied to the approaches that are relevant to our discussion.

One article that will be useful in understanding how psychoanalytic film theory was developed is Nasrullah Mambrol's *Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*. Although Mambrol discusses many aspects of the way Lacanian psychoanalysis has shaped psychoanalytic film theory, which will also be discussed at length later in this thesis, he also gives a complete account of different approaches to film theory in which psychoanalysis serves as a foundation.

The first approach Mambrol describes is the study of myths that surround cinema as an industry. While Mambrol exemplifies this type of approach with discussions regarding Hollywood, this approach can be utilized in investigating different studio systems that have been established throughout different localities. Establishing the ways different film industries have been shaped and trying to understand what needs were considered in creating these industries can also be of help in coming to certain conclusions regarding the ontology of cinema.

The second approach Mambrol mentions is one that is built around the filmmaker's own biography. While it is only logical that the relevance of an artist's life to his/her work should be immense, readings of not just films but all works of art that are built with regards to the artists biography are at most as valid

as the comprehensiveness of the biography at hand. Although this issue poses as a potential pitfall for such an approach, a similar method which makes use of a director's complete body of work in order to analyse a specific film can still be applied. However, as Mambrol also addresses in his article, another major issue with such an approach that can also be extended to one that takes a director's filmography instead of his/her biography is that cinema is a collaborative medium and it can be difficult to pinpoint each collaborator's individual contributions to a film.

The third approach mentioned in the article is one that makes use of psychoanalysis in order to analyze the characters of a film. With reference to psychiatrist Glen O. Gabbard, Mambrol goes on to mention that the main problem with this approach is that the characters in a movie are fictitious, and if one wants to psychoanalyse the characters, this should be done through analyzing the filmmaker. While it is true that expecting fictional characters to be as developed as real analysands, trying to analyze characters through their creators brings back the problems already established regarding the second approach. However, this doesn't necessarily mean that trying to psychoanalyse characters of a given film is a fruitless endeavour. How such an analysis can yield valid results will come up later when Mambrol talks about the fifth approach that psychoanalytic film theory takes.

The fourth approach Mambrol mentions is one of the two approaches that will be most helpful in understanding what exactly is meant when one talks about traditional psychoanalytic film theory, as this approach has arguably been the most influential one among the five. This approach, instead of dealing with the film as an object isolated from its audience, focuses more on the role that is given to the spectators by the film. Influenced by the post-structuralist movement, which shifts the focus of criticism from the author to the reader, this approach took Lacanian psychoanalysis as its foundation. While it certainly departed from the then traditional understanding of Freud's theory, Lacanian psychoanalysis is actually a post-structuralist reinterpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis. As

previously established, this approach, and Lacan's theory that it takes as its foundation, will be discussed at length.

The fifth and final approach mentioned in Mambrol's article is a consideration of film as an analogue of dream. Such an approach makes it possible for the critic to analyze a film, or cinema as a whole, as if it were an analysand's dream, making use of Freud's (or later theorists') theories and psychoanalytic devices regarding the interpretation of dreams. Moreover, treating a film as a dream also makes it possible for one to go back to the second approach Mambrol mentions, the one where the critic tries to psychoanalyse each individual character of a movie. While trying to psychoanalyze fictional characters are problematic in ways that have previously been established, when characters are taken as parts of a larger whole from which their psyches are derived, and in turn serve as elements that constitute a larger unconscious system at work.

As Mambrol notes, psychoanalytic film theory started to become dominant during the 70's when the post-structuralist movement was at the peak of its popularity. Critics such as Christian Metz and Laura Mulvey concerned themselves with not only the film itself but where film puts its audience, and how this predetermined role served certain ideologies. Closely related to the apparatus theory, this way of approaching films claimed that the film endows the viewer with an all seeing eye that watches certain events unfold in a way that provides its owner with a sense of omniscience. However, it should be noted that when we talk about an "all seeing eye that watches," the agency is actually given to the eye and not to the body that it is supposedly attached to. This is not a coincidence or a turn of phrase, as what the eye - or rather, the camera - watches is predetermined, making the viewer's perceived omniscience nothing more than an illusion. In truth, the viewer is not much more than a witness, almost put into the same spot as *A Clockwork Orange*'s Alex but not quite, as Alex at least knows that he doesn't really have a say in what unfolds. By placing the viewer in a position where he/she (but generally "he," according to Mulvey in her paper *Visual Pleasure and*

Narrative Cinema) gains a false sense of power that makes him/her complicit in the larger ideology at work.

As has been established previously, psychoanalytic film theory owes much of its basis to Lacanian psychoanalysis. As a result, in order to better understand what Mulvey and Metz theorised in their works, one must first have a basic understanding of Lacan's writings that they allude to. After taking a brief look at Lacan's "mirror stage," I will return back to Mulvey and Metz, and look into their theories with the understanding gathered along the way. Before finishing the second chapter and moving onto cryptoanalysis and the eventual rethinking of psychoanalytic film theory that it brings one to, a criticism of psychoanalytic film theory made from within the confines of Lacanian psychoanalysis will be visited through a review of Todd McGowan's reapplication of Lacanian concepts to film theory.

2.2 LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS

While the term "Lacanian" was coined in order to distinguish Lacan's theory regarding psychoanalysis from the way psychoanalysis was previously understood, Lacan, as a matter of fact, always claimed that his work was "Freudian" in actuality. Lacan, while reinterpreting Freud's works, applied Sausseurean concepts of *signifiers* and *signifieds*, and came up with a triptych of his own: the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic. The relationship between these three orders and the place they hold within an individual's psychosexual development can be found in Lacan's article *The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I.* Possibly his most famous article, it also served as the basis of psychoanalytic film theory. However, a basic understanding of these three orders is required before moving on to Lacan's article. In order to do this, Dino Felluga's article *Modules on Lacan: On the Structure of the Psyche* can be consulted.

Felluga notes that unlike Freud, who possibly have felt the necessity to base the budding field of psychoanalysis more on biological phenomenon in order to

help it attain scientific credibility in the eyes of his peers, Lacan's theory was centered around language and the way it is used to give structure to our conscious and unconscious lives. As a result, while Freud determined the stages of psychosexual development on the grounds of biological facts, Lacan's stages of psychosexual development were based on recognition of signs and eventually language. Lacan maintained that there are three orders a child finds himself/herself during infancy. These orders are the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic.

The Real is the material world to which we are born to and from which we eventually get separated from for the rest of our lives. Between the moment of birth and the first time the child recognizes his/her image in the mirror (the Mirror Stage) the child perceives no boundaries between the physical world and his/her own body. The driving force behind the child's actions during this period is only need. Eventually, social structures begin to impose themselves upon the child's perception of himself/herself and the world around him/her and carries the child from the Real to the Imaginary order.

In *The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I*, Lacan situates the mirror stage between the ages of 6-18 months. (1-2) The infant's recognition of his/her own image causes the child to identify the image as his/herself, creating what Lacan calls the "Ideal-I," which in turn becomes the point of reference for any secondary identifications yet to come. Moreover, this encounter with one's own image also places the individual as a separate entity in the world around him/her. The Ideal-I is created only when its image is ripped apart from the world surrounding it. However, in order to draw the line between himself/herself, the child must first recognize himself/herself as an object. What this entails is that the formation of self-image is built upon an alienating experience. As the distinction between the "inner world" and the "outer world" is established, the child enters the Imaginary order.

Entrance into the Imaginary order replaces the dominance of needs with the dominance of demands. The child who has left the world of the Real demands to

return to his/her primal state where the division between the world and his/her body was nonexistent. In turn, the impossibility of satisfying such a demand starts to create the tension that defines human beings.

With the acquisition of language, the child finally enters the Symbolic order. Language makes it possible for the child to deal with the world and its inhabitants as irreversibly separate entities from himself/herself. However, by gaining this ability, the Real is removed further from the child. As the child becomes seemingly able to articulate his/her demand in the form of desire, his/her articulation can never fully express the demand, which itself is the demand to achieve an impossible return to the Real. Therefore, the tension between the three orders never ceases to exist. Instead, it defines and redefines the individual throughout his/her life. This means that, as Felluga puts it in *Modules on Lacan: On the Structure of the Psyche*, the goal of desire is not to attain what is seemingly desired but to remain self-perpetuating.

One important thing to note regarding demand, which in turn creates desire, is that it is narcissistic. The child demands to become his/her ideal self that is one with the world around it. This narcissistic demand to reconnect with the Real determines the individual's every eventual desire. If the previous discussion of Abraham and Torok's concept of introjection is revisited, it can be seen that their definition of the need to introject matches up with the way Lacan defines desire. Any love belonging to the individual that is seemingly directed to an outside object is in actuality directed to the individual's own introjection of the object. Love that is supposedly directed at an object is always relayed through the ego. This issue will be further discussed in the next chapter, when a review of Abraham and Torok's theory will be made. For now, as Lacan's theory on psychosexual development is established, the theory's connection to film studies can be explored.

2.3 APPLICATION OF LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS TO FILM THEORY

The area of intersection that brings Lacanian psychoanalysis and film theory is mainly concerned with the formation of the subject in terms that Lacan has established. While the main theorists that will be talked about regarding psychoanalytic film theory will be Metz and Mulvey, who will be followed by Todd McGowan with his reinterpretation of Lacanian concepts, Jean-Louis Baudry's article *Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus* should first be reviewed. Although the terms under which Lacanian concepts and film theory come together are in a much rougher state where much of the discussion revolves around the technique that produces film, it will serve as a simple introduction to what will be discussed at length when talking about Metz.

Baudry includes Lacan in his article with a comparison between the experience of watching a film and Lacan's mirror stage. After giving a brief account of the mirror stage, Baudry points out certain preconditions for the mirror stage to have its formative effect on the individual:

> But for this imaginary constitution of the self to be possible, there must be-Lacan strongly emphasizes this point-two complementary conditions: immature powers of mobility and a precocious maturation of visual organization (apparent in the first few days of life). (45)

By "immature powers of mobility", Baudry alludes to the infant's inability to move on his/her own before the mirror. Conditions provided by a movie theatre puts the audience in an obviously similar spot. Moreover, "precocious maturation of visual organization" implies a dominance of visual stimuli, which again can be found in the movie theatre. So, it could be said that the experience of watching a film in a movie theatre is captivating to the point that the audience returns to the state where they first attained the impression of themselves as subjects. While these attributes make the two experiences similar, a key difference emerges when Baudry talks about identification. During the mirror stage, what the child observes in the mirror is his/her own reflection. However, the audience is seemingly absent

from the screen. According to Baudry, this does not prevent identifications from taking place, albeit different from those that take place during the mirror stage:

> …one can distinguish two levels of identification. The first, attached to the image itself, derives from the character portrayed as a center of secondary identifications, carrying an identity which constantly must be seized and reestablished. (45)

As has been established when talking about the mirror stage, the primary identification that occurs during the formation of the Ideal-I is with one's own image, and this primary identification becomes the point of reference for any secondary identifications that will occur throughout one's life. This means that any secondary identifications established with the characters of a film will take the audience's primary identifications as its point of reference. However, Baudry's claim regarding the second level of identification that goes on during the film also implies a deviation from the individual's usual point of reference:

The second level permits the appearance of the first and places it "in action"-this is the transcendental subject whose place is taken by the camera which constitutes and rules the objects in this "world." Thus the spectator identifies less with what is represented, the spectacle itself, than with what stages the spectacle, makes it seen, obliging him to see what it sees; this is exactly the function taken over by the camera as a sort of relay. Just as the mirror assembles the fragmented body in a sort of imaginary integration of the self, the transcendental self unites the discontinuous fragments of phenomena, of lived experience, into unifying meaning. (45-46)

The audience unknowingly identifies with the camera for which the events of the film unfold in a specific way. The film world is not only comprised in a certain way through techniques used in filming but it also exists only for the camera to view it in that certain way. Thus, identification with the omniscient vision of the camera makes the audience complicit with the film whether they like it or not. As Baudry stated, this also makes secondary identifications with

characters within the film easier as the secondary identifications need a primary identification as their point of reference and identification with the camera can serve as this primary identification, at least throughout the duration of the film.

While Baudry's article describes how films establish dominance over the audience's psyches by mimicking the conditions of the mirror stage, it does not delve into the way this dominance can be used to convey a specific ideology or its relationship with desire, which has already been established as the driving force for the individual who has entered the symbolic order. To see these points elaborated upon, one needs to look at Mulvey and Metz respectively.

In *Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier*, Metz starts building the relationship between Lacanian psychoanalysis and cinema by pointing out the same similarities between the mirror stage and the experience of watching a film as Baudry did in his article. However, he does mention one important aspect that was left out of Baudry's article:

> The cinema spectator is not a child and the child really at the mirror stage (from around six to around eighteen months) would certainly be incapable of 'following' the simplest of films. Thus, what *makes possible* the spectator's absence from the screen - or rather the intelligible unfolding of the film despite that absence - is the fact that the spectator has already known the experience of the mirror (of the true mirror), and is thus able to constitute a world of objects without having first to recognize himself within it. In this respect, the cinema is already on the side of the symbolic … (46)

Although this wouldn't necessarily negate the effects of the similarities Baudry pointed out between the two experiences, it does mean that the audience, regardless of the almost regressed state they are in, are actually individuals whose egos have already been formed. They have already entered the Symbolic order and they have been introduced to the ever elusive desire that always alludes to a 'lack' of its object. When writing about the relationship between cinema and the desire that perpetuates itself by always leaving an absence after it is seemingly attained, Metz points out two attributes of cinema that makes use of the concept of

lack. In order to make his first point, he utilizes a comparison between watching a film and voyeurism as the role of desire and the effort to satiate it are quite similar in both activities:

> The voyeur is very careful to maintain a gulf, an empty space between the object and the eye, the object and his own body: his look fastens the object at the right distance, as with those cinema spectators who take care to avoid being too close to or too far from the screen. The voyeur represents in space the fracture which forever separates him from the object; he represents his very dissatisfaction (which is precisely what he needs as a voyeur), and thus also his 'satisfaction' insofar as it is of a specifically voyeuristic type. (60)

This gap between the spectator and the spectacle is indeed similar to the working of desire during voyeuristic attainment of pleasure. However, it is also not unique to cinema as all arts that concern themselves with sight or hearing as Metz also notes. Here, Metz locates a second lack that he regards as unique to cinema: "What defines the specifically cinematic *scopic regime* is not so much the distance kept, the 'keeping' itself, as the absence of the object seen." (61) He elaborates further as follows:

> …in the cinema, the actor was present when the spectator was not (= shooting), and the spectator is present when the actor is no longer (= projection): a failure to meet of the voyeur and the exhibitionist whose approaches no longer coincide (they have missed one another). (63)

Metz describes this as a "double withdrawal" of the object from the spectator. (61) Although this attribute also is not one that is unique to cinema since the same comparison can be made between listening to an audio recording and acousticophilia, it is one that is nonetheless valid. The lack that is needed for desire to perpetuate itself is very pronounced. The spectator's desire will always be out of reach.

On the other hand, just like Baudry, Metz too recognizes the sense of mastery given by the identification with the camera, thus becoming "all perceiving." (48) This, coupled with the 'actual' workings of desire going on

during the act of watching a film, make the medium duplicitous by its nature. Spectators are not all perceiving, they are shown that they are stuck in an endless chase after desire. However, the main problem that arises because of this duplicitousness is not the duplicitousness itself but how this attribute puts the spectator in a place where he/she can easily be manipulated. Mulvey exemplifies this in her paper *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.*

Mulvey, like Metz, touches upon the similarities between scopophilia and the pleasure provided by cinema. However, unlike Metz, she delves further into the power dynamic at work in voyeurism as follows: "At this point [Freud] associated scopophilia with taking other people as objects, subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze." (57) Here, the word that is important to our discussion is *controlling*. The subject's sense of mastery over the object being looked at is already mentioned in our reading of Metz. Mulvey goes on to describe the similarity between the pleasure conveyed during the mirror stage and the experience of watching a film, which we have already discussed and determined that a process of identification lies at its core. At this point, Mulvey references the contradiction that can be found in this activity which gives both scopophilic pleasure and the pleasure of identification:

> During its history, the cinema seems to have evolved a particular illusion of reality in which this contradiction between libido and ego has found a beautifully complementary fantasy world. In *reality* the fantasy world of the screen is subject to the law which produces it. (61)

Mulvey alludes to the contradiction that has just been pointed out when she mentions the contradiction between libido and ego. What she argues regarding cinema is that the fantasy world she mentions that is developed for and through cinema lets these contradictory pleasures to coexist. From this point, she eventually moves on to the way female form is objectified in cinema and how this objectification is dictated upon the spectator. However, before moving on to this issue, she continues as follows:

> Sexual instincts and identification processes have a meaning within the symbolic order which articulates desire. Desire, born with language, allows the possibility of transcending the instinctual and the imaginary, but its point of reference continually returns to the traumatic moment of its birth: the castration complex. (61-62)

By pointing out desire's continuous reference to the traumatic moment of its birth Mulvey actually proposes a fracture within the fantasy world created by cinema. While her reference to the castration complex is specific to the subject of her paper, desire always references the Real. Although Mulvey does not develop how this fracture can be utilized, this point she makes should be noted as the way it can be developed will be seen when discussing McGowan.

Mulvey defines two specific modes of objectification of women in cinema. The first one of which is the objectification of the female form as a source of visual pleasure. She further divides this mode of objectification into two categories:

> Traditionally, the women displayed has functioned on two levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen story, and as erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium, with a shifting tension between the looks on either side of the screen. For instance, the device of the showgirl allows the two looks to be unified technically without any apparent break in the diegesis. A woman performs within the narrative, the gaze of the spectator and that of the male characters in the film are neatly combined without breaking narrative verisimilitude. (62)

While the spectator of the film watches the film's story unfold, the sudden appearance of a female character's body in an eroticized fashion would undoubtedly cause a break in the sense of mastery conveyed by the film since, as has already been mentioned, the spectator would move from the thought "I am watching" to the thought "I am being shown a film". Here, Mulvey locates the device that allows the film to circumvent such a possibility by making the gazes of an on-screen male character and of the spectator merge together. This device also helps establish the second mode of objectification that Mulvey writes about:

> This is made possible through the process set in motion by structuring the film around a main controlling figure with whom the spectator can identify. As the spectator identifies with the main protagonist, he projects his look on to that of his like, his screen surrogate, so that the power of the male protagonist as he controls events coincides with the active power of the erotic look, both giving a satisfying sense of omnipotence. (63)

This second mode of objectification seems to be less about the objectification of the female than it is about the empowerment of the male. As the spectator identifies with the male protagonist, he/she wants the power fantasy to take place in a way that leaves the spectator and the protagonist as the master of the film world. The spectator is promised that the fulfillment of his/her desire where the protagonist emerges victorious. Here, subjugation of the female is both a goal of the ideology that is being relayed, and a tool to bring this about. However, the castration complex does pose a challenge for attaining mastery through looking. Although Mulvey defines two ways by which this challenge is overcome, namely "the re-enactment of the original trauma counterbalanced by devaluation" and fetishization of the object (64), she doesn't explore how castration complex in this instance can be used as a subversive tool. In order to explore this possibility, there is a number of theoreticians that can be consulted. One such exploration, which can also be tied to the subject of cryptoanalysis through its placement of the Lacanian Real within film is Todd McGowan's article *Looking for the Gaze: Lacanian Film Theory and Its Vicissitudes*.

McGowan's article is meant to be a defense of Lacanian film theory against criticisms claiming that it relies too much on theory and lacks empirical evidence to support its claims. As McGowan himself points out, the basis for criticisms against Lacanian film theory is that it makes too broad claims for wide range of spectators. However, McGowan proposes that traditional Lacanian film theory, until that point in time, has left out critical tenets of Lacan's theory, therefore making it less ambitious in its scope than it needs to be. At this point, McGowan's argument coincides with what we have determined when we were reading Laura

Mulvey's writings on the disruptive effects of the castration complex on visual pleasure cinema tries to attain for its spectators.

> The problem with this theoretical program is not its unquestioning allegiance to the precepts of Lacan but, on the contrary, its failure to integrate fully the different elements of Lacan's thought. By focusing entirely on the relationship between the imaginary and the symbolic order, Lacanian film theory overlooks the role of the Real—the third register of Lacan's triadic division of human experience—in the functioning of the gaze and in the filmic experience. This omission is crucial, because the Real provides the key to understanding the radical role that the gaze plays within filmic experience. (28)

In the case of Mulvey's paper, castration complex stands out as an example of the Real, trying to make its way into the spectator's field of vision, threatening to disrupt the cycle of desire that is designed by cinema and operates within the symbolic order. Ruling out the possibility of the Real managing to disrupt the status quo established by cinema would also mean that duplicitousness is integral to cinema's nature, making it an irredeemable tool for manipulation of the spectator. When faced with individual experiences with cinema, such an assessment is bound to be refuted, through the outright denial of Lacanian film theory if not through a reassessment. McGowan begins his reassessment by looking into the possible roles the Real might find itself within the cinema. For that, he first looks at the *gaze.*

While discussing Baudry, Metz and Mulvey, ownership of the mastering gaze has appeared as a gift given to the spectator by the cinema. This appearance has been due to the spectator's position in the movie theater being like that of the infant looking at his/her reflection in the mirror. However, as McGowan also mentions, Lacan's concept of the gaze has changed throughout his years of study. While the mastering gaze does serve the child looking at the mirror in the instance of the mirror stage, Lacan later defined another Gaze: that of the object looking back. McGowan informs the reader about the concept of the Gaze as follows:

In Seminar XI, Lacan's example of the gaze is Hans Holbein's *The Ambassadors* (1533). This painting depicts two world travelers and the riches they have accumulated during their journeys. But at the bottom of the painting, a distorted, seemingly unrecognizable figure disrupts the portrait. The figure is anamorphic: looking directly at it, one sees nothing discernible, but looking at the figure downward and from the left, one sees a skull. Not only does the skull indicate the hidden, spectral presence of death haunting the two wealthy ambassadors—a *memento mori*—but, even more important for Lacan, it marks the site of the gaze. The figure is a blank spot in the image, the point at which the spectator loses her/his distance from the painting and becomes involved in what she/he sees, because the very form of the figure changes on the basis of the spectator's position. The gaze exists in the way that the spectator's perspective distorts the field of the visible, thereby indicating the spectator's involvement in a scene from which she/he seems excluded. (29)

Although the act of watching a film differs from looking at a painting in its similarity to the mirror stage, looking at a painting does convey a sense of mastery over the object being looked at, namely the painting. However, in the case of Holbein's painting, the existence of a spot that only gets a meaning if the spectator looks at it from a specific angle reminds the spectator of his/her position relative to the painting. This shatters the illusion of mastery as the existence of such a reminder makes the spectator suddenly realize that his/her position is too included within the painting. The painting is aware of the spectator, it is aware of his/her gaze upon it, and it knows how to manipulate that gaze in order to let him/her know of the painting's awareness. The painting tells the spectator, "I know you are looking, because *I see* that you are looking." While the fact that the reminder of the spectator's existence is also a reminder of death also serves to make the point stronger, the sheer fact that the painting is aware of the spectator's gaze means that there is something that defies the false sense of mastery the spectator has. The painting is within the order of the Real, it cannot be controlled through the Gaze and the spectator is under control of the Gaze as much as the painting is. McGowan gives an example of such a relationship that is established between a film and its spectators when he writes about David Lynch's 1986 film *Blue Velvet*.

Blue Velvet, like a good deal of David Lynch's films and his television series *Twin Peaks*, depicts a dark underbelly that lies under the facade of a small, peaceful town. While this contrast is widely interpreted as the main dichotomy built by David Lynch in his work, McGowan argues that the real dichotomy can be found between the fantasy world that includes both the peaceful town and the criminal underworld, and the world of the Real that can be found in the character of Dorothy (Isabella Rossellini). For understanding this dichotomy, we can see that desire still serves a key function. Jeffrey Beaumont (Kyle McLaughlan), the protagonist of the film finds a severed ear and wants to understand the mystery behind it. Throughout the film, we do see a resolution to that mystery. When taken by itself, it makes the film seem as if it provides the audience with a fantasmatic resolution to their desire to master the film through the attainment of knowledge. However, the story of the ear completely takes place within the order of the Symbolic. Here, McGowan locates a second desire, one that is found in Dorothy. Throughout the film, Jeffrey, along with the audience, desires to understand Dorothy and her desire. Unlike the mystery of the ear however, Dorothy's desire remains ever elusive. This makes the real dichotomy of the film even clearer as it places the mystery of the ear, which ends up being explored on the one side and Dorothy's unresolved desire on the other. The ear is of the world of the Symbolic, Dorothy is of the Real. (40-43)

While this would be enough to place *Blue Velvet* in a different place with regards to its work on the spectator's desire, from that of classical Hollywood cinema where wish fulfillment dominates, Lynch actually takes the position of the Real a step forward from being an itch that the spectator cannot scratch to being a disruptive force in the fantasy world created by the film. McGowan writes the following:

> Toward the end of Blue Velvet, Dorothy, her body naked and beaten, appears in the fantasmatic public world of Lumberton … She seems to appear out of thin air, and at first no one notices her. When the other characters do notice her, however, they become completely disoriented

> … The fantasy screen suddenly breaks down because Dorothy's body has no place within the fantasmatic public world. The form in which she appears—publicly naked and begging for Jeffrey's help—reveals the spectator's investment in the fantasy and demands that the spectator confront Dorothy as object-gaze. She does not fit in the picture, which is why the spectator becomes so uncomfortable watching her naked body in the middle of the suburban neighborhood. (42-43)

Dorothy, with her own desire whose nature remains completely unknown to both the characters and the audience, gains an agency that places her in a similar position to that of the spectator. Her out of place appearance in the fantasy world reminds the audience of the existence of the unattainable Real, during the climax of the story no less. The audience witnesses the flow of the story shattered by an outside force that is alien and as powerful in its agency as much as the audience if not more.

So, Lacanian psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic film theory, which we can call Lacanian film theory at this point, tell that cinema puts the spectator in a state similar to that of the mirror stage. However, the fact that the spectator is not present on the screen as object but as an all perceiving eye creates a false sense of mastery over the film world where a fantasmatic resolution to his/her endless chase after desire seems possible. Moreover, while thinking that he/she has mastery over the Real, the spectator is actually being shown what he/she is watching. On the other hand, this understanding of cinema doesn't explain where the Real actually is. A film can also lead the spectator to the Real and disrupt the illusion of mastery.

What has been established about Lacanian film theory should be sufficient enough to move on to Abraham and Torok's theory of cryptonymy. In the next part, how Abraham and Torok explain the formation of the ego and how it differs from that of Lacan will be explored. Once the differences are found, Lacanian concepts will be replaced with those of Abraham and Torok's so we can see how Lacanian film theory holds up and what modifications can be made in order to see what a completely cryptoanalytical film theory would look like.

CHAPTER 3:
CRYPTOANALYTIC FILM THEORY

3.1 *THE WOLF MAN'S MAGIC WORD: A CRYPTONYMY*

The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A Cryptonymy is the name of the book which collects Abraham and Torok's analysis of Freud's, Ruth Mack Brunswick's, Muriel Gardiner's and Sergei Pankejeff's notes regarding the psychoanalysis of Sergei Pankejeff. Arguably Freud's most famous case, the Wolf Man's analysis had been the subject of *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis* and played a substantial role in Freud's theory of psychosexual development. However, even though he went through psychotherapy for nearly 70 years, he never considered himself cured. Regardless of Pankejeff's own experience, Freud's analysis and theories on the origins of his symptoms has widely been considered valid.

In the introductory part of the thesis, Abraham and Torok's concepts of *introjection* and *incorporation* have been explained. In *The Wolf Man's Magic Word* Abraham and Torok write that during their study of the Wolf Man's case notes they noticed multiple people speaking through Pankejeff during his analyses:

> The person in despair who, rendered helpless by depression, consulted Freud in 1910 was not quiet the same as the one who lay on his couch a few days later. They appeared to be two separate people in one, without either of them representing the basic identity of the Wolf Man. Although often having the same desires as he, they remained nevertheless distinct from him. As a result, a paradox emerged in which the sexual license loudly claimed by one would only reinforce repression in the other. We suspected the existence of a cohabitation, at the core of the same person, involving his elder sister's image and his own. (3)

This discovery beget others; laying bare the existence of other incorporations speaking through Pankejeff. When Abraham and Torok's concept of incorporation is assumed to be valid, such a result is only natural as the existence of two conflicting personalities in one body will make it only harder for

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the individual to introject others that leave his/her life. As the number of incorporations increase, the likelihood of successful introjections decrease, eventually leaving the individual with no room to breathe. Such was the case of Sergei Pankejeff according to Abraham and Torok.

Before going on with the reading of *The Wolf Man's Magic Word,* it is important to establish some background information about Sergei Pankejeff. Pankejeff was born in Russia to a wealthy family of three: his mother, his father and his sister Anna who was two years older than him. In *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis* Freud relays Pankejeff's description of himself as a child. While he appeared to be a "very good-natured, tractable, and even quiet child, so that they used to say of him that he ought to have been the girl and his elder sister the boy" (14-15), he went through a major transformation after spending a summer with a quarrelsome English governess and his sister, away from their parents. Suddenly, the boy became irate and violent. Although this change in the boy was ascribed to some unknown mistreatment on the English governess' part by his mother, Pankejeff's troubling behaviour continued after the governess was sent away. Years later, during the time when he was being analysed by Freud, Pankejeff recalled that his sister "had seduced him into sexual practices." (20) Pankejeff elaborated upon the seduction as follows:

> [She] had taken hold of his penis and played with it, at the same time telling him incomprehensible stories about his Nania [the children's nurse], as though by way of explanation. His Nania, she said, used to do the same thing with all kinds of people—for instance, with the gardener: she used to stand him on his head, and then take hold of his genitals. (20)

Years later, in 1906, his sister committed suicide. Although he didn't remember experiencing any grief at the time, he and his father both started showing signs of a serious depression a year later. In 1907, his father too committed suicide while Pankejeff was seeking treatment in Munich for his

depression. His search for an ailment eventually brought him to Freud in 1910 and nearly 70 years of psychotherapy with different doctors began.

One of the dreams he had can be found at the core of Pankejeff's psychoanalysis, and the nickname *the Wolf Man*. We can find a transcript of his recollection of the dream in Abraham and Torok's *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*:

> *I dreamed that it was night and that I was lying in my bed. (My bed stood with its foot toward the window; in front of the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I know it was winter when I had the dream, and nighttime.) Suddenly the window opened by itself, and I was terrified to see that some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. The wolves were quiet white, and looked more like foxes or sheepdogs, for they had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked up like dogs when they pay attention to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I cried out and* I woke up. (33)

Both Freud and Pankejeff believed that this dream, shared by Pankejeff at a very early stage of the analysis, was concealing the actual cause of Pankejeff's neurosis (Freud 33). Freud eventually inferred that the dream was referencing the primal scene. According to Freud, Pankejeff, when he was around 18 months of age, woke up, possibly at 5 o'clock which later became the hour of the day when his depression would be at its strongest, and witnessed his parents having sex "from behind." (Freud 37) This was a brilliant explanation as it also supported Freud's theory regarding the primal scene[1]. It would have been even better if it was actually supported by any form of evidence, whether it be in the form of a recollection, another dream that did not require stretches of imagination to support Freud's theory, or even an eventual alleviation of Pankejeff's symptoms. Unfortunately, this wasn't the case.

As previously mentioned, Pankejeff spent almost 70 years of his life being analysed and helped the establishment of many psychoanalytic theories. Even

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[1] The primal scene is the child's initial traumatizing witnessing of a sex act, generally between parents.

though this was the case with the continuous analysis of Pankejeff, he never actually recovered from his symptoms. While the establishment of theories that served as cornerstones for psychoanalysis is significant, it is difficult not to question their validity in the face of such a fact. In the end, this difficulty was what pushed Abraham and Torok to start searching for answers in 70 years worth of case notes and possibly find out what actually ailed Pankejeff.

When going back to *The Wolf Man's Magic Word,* it is important to look at the results yielded by Abraham and Torok's analysis before moving on to the actual analysis itself, so that the relationships drawn out by Abraham and Torok become easier to comprehend. Instead of a single traumatic event, they define four stages in which the trauma occurred. The first of these moments is as follows:

> 1. *The "seduction" of the younger brother by the older sister.* The term "seduction" might seem somewhat excessive to describe, as Freud did, sexual play among little children. For such games to take on the magnitude we know they can, an adult must be implicated. (20)

As Abraham and Torok note, Freud's establishment of the sister's seduction of his younger brother falls short when it comes to explaining the years of torment Pankejeff went through. It has been noted that the sister was only two years older than Pankejeff. If one assumes that this seduction occurred when Pankejeff was around four years of age, during the summer when his violent outbreaks started, it would mean that the sister was six years old. Sexual play among children of these ages are common and they are not known to cause such devastation. With this in mind, Abraham and Torok define the second stage as follows:

> 2. *The alleged seduction of the daughter by the father.* The sister would have boasted about the privilege she had over her little brother, and in the process would have threatened him with castration at the moment of the pleasure. Now, in light of the cryptonymic procedure, we abandon the idea stated at the beginning of this work of such a threat of castration. We now in fact know that the terms that in the material seemed to evoke castration are simply the cryptonyms of repressed pleasure-words. (20)

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Abraham and Torok, in their extensive review of the Wolf Man's case notes found out that the words Pankejeff used were not important by themselves but by what they intended to obfuscate. Certain words that expressed desire were deemed to be "*generators of a situation that must be avoided and voided retroactively,*" by Pankejeff were replaced by their "cryptonyms": the words that Pankejeff used during his sessions, which both concealed the actual words that were repressed and alluded to them in hope that the secret would somehow be dragged out of him at the same time. (20) How cryptonyms operate will be revisited in a little while. But first, the last two stages Abraham and Torok define are as follows:

> 3. *The boy's verification with adults of the allegations made by the sister,* at first with Nania or the English governess, then with his mother back from a trip, finally with his father - then stage
> 4. *The outbreak of a scandal,* with an investigation as regards the meaning of the words *tieret, natieret* indicating the father. (21)

What the words *tieret* and *natieret* mean in Abraham and Torok's cryptoanalysis will eventually be explored. However, more piece of information is needed in order to fully understand what the crypt is in Pankejeff's case before moving on to the way Abraham and Torok decipher it. The information needed can be found in Abraham and Torok's *The Shell and the Kernel:*

> Recently we felt that it was necessary to violate with impious hands the hypothetical "grave" the Wolf Man carried within him. We did so in order to uncover - behind the utterable memory of the Wolf Man's seduction by his sister - the memory of an earlier, secret seduction to which his sister herself must have been subjected by their father. To be sure, the Wolf Man was only vicariously a melancholic. His crypt did not in fact contain *his own* illegitimate object (as would be the case with a genuine "melancholic"), but someone else's: his father's daughter. The Wolf Man's wound does not seem to be - as Freud was inclined to think - the loss of his own object, the sister, but that he was unable to participate in the initial scene of seduction (which, we believe was narrated and relived with him by his sister), and could not tell anyone about it, so as to legitimize it. (148-149)

What can be gathered from Abraham and Torok's writings up to this point is that Pankejeff's sister was sexually abused by her father. Later, she repeated the same event with her brother and told him that she had done the same with her father. This caused jealousy in Pankejeff. Moreover, when Pankejeff talked to the governess or Nania about what he had learned, the adult shared what Pankejeff told her with the mother. Although it is unclear whether the father learned that Pankejeff knew about what transpired between him and his daughter, in the end it was decided that the secret should be kept buried. The fact that Pankejeff was denied voicing this knowledge laid the groundwork for the formation of the crypt. The crypt was completed once the sister and the father both committed suicide, destroying all hope of resolution on Pankejeff's part. Now that the events Abraham and Torok uncovered from Pankejeff's case notes, it will be easier to understand how Abraham and Torok uncovered these events.

Going back to *The Wolf Man's Magic Word,* as stated previously, once a word itself has been repressed, resolution through expression becomes impossible. According to Abraham and Torok, this is what brings psychoanalysis to a dead lock. This is where cryptonyms that replace the repressed word start to arise. Abraham and Torok relay the act of crypting that took place in Pankejeff's case as follows:

> This fourth stage [the outbreak of the scandal] is postulated as having the mark of a real experience and can in no way be merged with fantasy. This is what explains, to our mind, the uniqueness of the Wolf Man's case: the radical exclusion of the words of desire. The excluded *words* work as if they were representations of repressed *things.* They seem to have migrated from the Preconscious to the Unconscious. They have taken with them the very possibility of remembering the trauma. (21)

Although uncovering these events under such circumstances seem out of the question, Abraham and Torok discovered that certain words, images, fetishes and symptoms actually serve as symbols for these repressed word-objects. Moreover, while locating these cryptonyms could have been possible for any one of Pankejeff's analysts, the fact that Pankejeff grew up speaking three languages

added another layer of difficulty to their work. However, once this fact was taken into account by Abraham and Torok, things started to fall into place as everything Pankejeff shared during his sessions revealed that they were actually referring to the word-object that was being repressed. (lxxi) Cryptoanalysis of certain words that kept coming up in Pankejeff's analyses are as follows:

> Initially, the authors had wanted to be certain there was no hidden ambiguity behind the repeated retraction of the number that first appeared in the principal dream. The original number given is six, immediately corrected to seven, whereas on the well-known drawing [of the wolves perched on the tree] is reduced to five. Six in Russian, SHIEST, also means perch, mast and probably genitals, at least symbolically. This could have satisfied an ill-formed psychoanalytic mind. Fortunately, the authors' eyes fell on the neighboring words: SHIESTIERO and SHIESTORKA, meaning six or a lot of six people. Contaminated by the German *Schwester* (sister), they could not help checking the word sister as wee, and there they discovered, to their amusement and confirming their suspicion, the words SIESTRA and its diminutive SIESTORKA. It became clear that the "pack of six wolves" did not contain the idea of multiplicity, but of the sister instead. (17)

Another instance of seemingly unrelated nightmares, fetishes and deliriums joining together in referring to a completely different word can be found in the way Abraham and Torok arrived at the words *tieret* and *natieret*. The first material used is a recollection of Pankejeff, relayed by Freud in *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis* is as follows:

> Another attack of falling in love, dating from a few years earlier, shows even more clearly the compelling influence of the Grusha scene. A young peasant girl, who was a servant in the house, had long attracted him, but he succeeded in keeping himself from approaching her. One day, when he came upon her in a room by herself, he was overwhelmed by his love. He found her kneeling on the floor and engaged in scrubbing it, with a pail and a broom beside her—in fact, exactly as he had seen the girl in his childhood. (93)

A childhood hallucination that Freud includes in his book is also used by Abraham and Torok. Freud's account of the hallucination is as follows:

"When I was five years old, I was playing in the garden near my nurse, and was carving with my pocketknife in the bark of one of the walnut-trees that come into my dream as well. Suddenly, to my unspeakable terror, I noticed that I had cut through the little finger of my (right or left?) hand, so that it was only hanging on by its skin. I felt no pain, but great fear. I did not venture to say anything to my nurse, who was only a few paces distant, but I sank down on the nearest seat and sat there incapable of casting another glance at my finger. At last I calmed down, took a look at the finger, and saw that it was entirely uninjured." (84)

Another material used by Abraham and Torok is a nightmare, taken from R. M. Brunswick's notes and included in *The Wolf Man's Magic Word* is as follows: "I am lying at your feet. I am with you in a skyscraper where the only way out is a window. A ladder from this window extends down to uncanny depths. To get out I must go through the window." (70) Other than the nightmare, the fact that Pankejeff experienced a long state of delirium during which he was convinced that a dermatologist he had previously visited had wounded him and left a horrible scar on his nose is also utilized by Abraham and Torok. How all of these are brought together in their referral to the words *tieret* and *natieret* by Abraham and Torok is told as follows:

> … we turned to the privileged libidinal moment, Grusha, the floor scrubber with her bucket and broom. A rather problematic scene as to its historical truth but nonetheless significant -we thought- for its erogenous value. How to link it to the seduction by the sister? Would she have touched him in a way that the child could have called "polish" as one also says "polish" a wooden floor? … The French-Russian dictionary gives TIERET, NATIERET. Let's go to the Russian-French dictionary; it will tell us whether the meaning "polish" coexists with others like scratch, scrape and so forth, a necessary condition for the cryptonymic displacement just conjectured. … we then turned to the word *tieret* and read: (1) to rub; (2)to grind, to crunch; (3) to wound; (4) to polish. The second word *natieret*, of the same root, did not disappoint us either. It exhibits a comparable semantic variety, going from (1) to rub down, rub; through (2) to rub, scrub, wax; to finally (3) to scrape or wound oneself. … With all the necessary substitutions, the solution is simple: It concerns the association of the wolf with sexual pleasure obtained by rubbing. (18)

Other than being an example of how phonetics are used in cryptoanalysis, this also serves as an example of the ways the crypt can manifest itself. Since this thesis is concerned with the relationship between cryptonymy and film theory, examples that belong to the visual workings of the crypt should also be established. To do that, looking at how the roman numerals "IV" come up in Pankejeff's case will be helpful.

In *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*, Freud notes certain contradictions in Pankejeff's behaviour as a child, which also caused Abraham and Torok started looking into the possibility of incorporations affecting Pankejeff's psyche. One such contradiction was Pankejeff's attitude towards animals. Freud writes on this contradiction as follows:

> … he was also frightened at other animals as well, big and little. Once he was running after a beautiful big butterfly, with striped yellow wings which ended in points, in the hope of catching it. (It was no doubt a 'swallow-tail'.) He was suddenly seized with a terrible fear of the creature, and, screaming, gave up the chase. (16)

Other than the fact that the butterfly was a *swallow-tail*, which brings to mind the act of swallowing that is integral to the act of incorporation as mentioned previously on the introduction to this thesis, image of the butterfly is also quite important. Later, Freud mentions the memory of the butterfly once again, with the images it reminds Pankejeff of included in the recollection this time:

> Many months later, in quite another connection, the patient remarked that the open and shutting of the butterfly's wings while it was settled on the flower had given him an uncanny feeling. It had looked, so he said, like a woman opening her legs, and the legs then made the shape of a Roman *V*, which as we know, was the hour at which, in his boyhood, and even up to the time of the treatment, he used to fall into a depressed state of mind. (90)

While Freud inferred that Pankejeff's troubles with the number five stemmed from his witnessing of the primal scene at five o'clock, (94) even the existence of this primal scene is already up to question as a result of Abraham and

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Torok's theory. Instead of explaining this issue with regards to the primal scene, Abraham and Torok investigate another instance that the letters 'I' and 'V' showed themselves as a "slip of the pen" in *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*:

> At times fragments of the initial traumatic dialogue become symptoms instead of being dreamed about. The slip of the pen during a Latin lesson is an example. Sergei rather curiously replaces the word *filivs* by the French *fils* (son) in a piece of Latin translation. He omits the letters *iv*. (43-44)

Assuming that the seduction that took place between Pankejeff and the Sister mirrored another instance of seduction that took place between the Sister and the Father, (rubbing of the erect penis through the open fly) it is easy for Abraham and Torok to come to the following conclusion:

> There is yet another way of interpreting the omission of *iv* that confirms our previous reading. This is a visual representation of the Wolf Man's repudiated desire: V equals "open fly" and I the "erect penis." We must recall here one of the Wolf Man's first sessions with Freud: When the clock's hand (I) is showing five o'clock (V), and as it enters the V of five o'clock, the Wolf Man turns around with a *look* of supplication in his eyes. This *look* means: **I looked and saw.** What? **The open fly** (in V) **with the erection** (in I). For Freud the supplication meant: "You are not going to eat me, are you?" and referred to the primal scene. However, if there is a "primal scene" (that is, a return of the libido), it is the erotic scene of the V of the fly and of the clock hand I that emerges in an erect state. And if there is phobia, it is related to a second scene that has nothing to do with the first one: the scene of the *traumatic condemnation* of the erotic scene observed previously and not at all this first scene. (44)

Although words are deemed to be the generators of what needs to be repressed, and therefore they themselves are repressed in the formation of crypts, words and images that serve as cryptonyms cannot be taken as literal representations of the contents of the crypt. In order to get a glimpse of the contents of the crypts, cryptonyms must be treated as symbols and the points of convergence of what they might symbolise must be investigated. This means that when a film is to be cryptoanalysed, the images themselves should be treated as

symbols, their literal meanings establishing only a secondary narrative. While the crypt is what symbols allude to similar to the Lacanian Real, unlike the Real McGowan defines, the crypt cannot be represented. Of course this knowledge of the nature of the crypt is only pertinent if one decides to place the crypt where the Real is for Lacanian film theorists. To make such a decision, one must first accept that cinema is actually of the order of the crypt. Now that a preliminary knowledge of the crypt has been attained, cinema's suitability for such an endeavour must be determined.

3.2 HAUNTOLOGY OF CINEMA

The case that will be made here is that cinema belongs to the order of the crypt and a cryptoanalytical reading of films and cinema in general is not only possible but also needed as such an understanding of cinema may very well be *the* way to explain the experience it lets its audience go through. Luckily, this case has already been made by Alan Cholodenko in several of his papers. Throughout the ones that will be used here, Cholodenko makes the argument that all film is animation and all animation is cryptical. This argument will be traced starting from his 2004 paper *The Crypt, the Haunted House, of Cinema.*

Cholodenko's article starts with a quote by Maxim Gorky, to which he will keep going back to in all of his work that will be included here. The quotation is as follows:

> Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows.
> If you only knew how strange it is to be there. It is a world without sound, without colour. Everything there—the earth, the trees, the people, the water and the air—is dipped in monotonous grey. Grey rays of the sun across the grey sky, grey eyes in grey faces, and the leaves of the trees are ashen grey. It is not life but its shadow, it is not motion but its soundless spectre.
> Here I shall try to explain myself, lest I be suspected of madness or indulgence in symbolism. I was at Aumont's and saw Lumière's cinématograph—moving photography. (Gorky, 1896, as cited in Cholodenko, 2004, p. 99)

The operative word in this quote that continuously haunts Cholodenko's papers is *spectre*. Cholodenko starts *The Crypt, the Haunted House, of Cinema* by giving an account of the crypt from Derrida's perspective. Since the meaning of the crypt has already been established, most of Cholodenko's explanation will be omitted. However, it is important to remember certain qualities of the crypt in order to better understand the connection Cholodenko makes between it and the *spectre*.

As previously established, loss of a loved object incites one of two reactions: introjection and incorporation. While introjection is an act of inclusion and assimilation that takes the mental imprint of the object and makes it a part of the subject's ego, incorporation is the inclusion of the object without assimilation. With incorporation, the object's imprint is taken as a whole and included within the psyche of the subject without affecting it's otherness. In a way, the incorporated object is taken 'inside' as a fragment of the 'outside'. This disrupts the regular topography of the subject's unconscious, creating an unexplored and unexplorable are within the topography of the unconscious. As a fantasy of introjection, incorporation makes introjection impossible as it would mean a *true death* for the object. The crypt keeps the subject safe from the possibility of facing its inhabitant while also keeping the inhabitant from being digested by the subject. Cholodenko quotes Derrida's *Fors*, the foreword Derrida wrote for *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*, in order to explain what the crypt is:

> The crypt is always an internalization, an inclusion intended as a compromise, but since it is a parasitic inclusion, an inside heterogeneous to the inside of the Self, an outcast in the domain of general introjection within which it violently takes its place, the cryptic safe can only maintain in a state of repetition the mortal conflict it is impotent to resolve. (xvi)

Derrida describes a thing that was once alive but now is frozen in time, playing out the same scenario over and over again. This is one of the calling cards of trauma: the endless repetition of the traumatic scene with the hopes that

somehow the results will be different, although in a careful way so that a different result, one that will offer resolution and put an end to the play is never achieved. Basically, this is the definition of a ghost, playing out its own death again and again.

After defining the crypt as best as possible, Cholodenko moves on to Gunning's take on Gorky's experience. According to Cholodenko, what Gunning finds in Gorky's account is a sophisticated, distant spectator that is the complete opposite of Metz's naive and passive one. While Cholodenko praises Gunning's recognition of incredulity, he still finds Gunning falling to the same trap as Metz did, this time making Gorky out to be completely detached from the experience. (106) Against the 'either/or' binary proposed by the comparison between Metz's spectator and Gunning's, Cholodenko proposes the following way of interpreting Gorky's account:

> I believe Gorky offers us not only a complex range of contradictory, irreconcilable senses arising from his immersion in the experience but an account of the unaccountable as the experience of cinema. His 'account' canvasses all the features that would make his experience 'ur' scene and 'ur' sense of cinema—the uncanny experience of cinema—with its simultaneous thrills and chills, delights and frights, attractions and repulsions—indeed, the thrills of the chills, the delights of the frights, the attractions of the repulsions, and vice versa—with its making of the strange (Gorky's 'If you only knew how strange it is to be there') familiar and the familiar strange at the same time, and with its terrifying return of death, returning in the form of the ghost, the spectre — and with it of necessity the return of the experiences of mourning and melancholia and of cryptic incorporation. (107)

According Cholodenko, while Gorky is far from Metz's childlike spectator, he also is not completely detached from the cinematic experience. Gorky *is* taken aghast, he *is* observant of the strangeness of the sights he faces. Gorky is *both* incredulous *and* in awe. Although the familiarity of the images before Gorky does help him maintain a certain amount of incredulity, he is nonetheless alienated by the strangeness of the experience. This experience is the uncanny, and according to Cholodenko, this is both the 'ur' experience of cinema and of the spectre.

Cholodenko takes his view of the relationship between the spectator and the cinematic crypt a step forward, maintaining that as much as cinema spectres the spectator, the spectator also spectres the cinema. His case can be viewed in the following passage:

> Of course, to 'discover' that when you are in the cinema, you are in the Kingdom of Shadows, to 'discover' that when you are in the cinema, your world and you have died and been resurrected as shadow, as spectre, that even as cinema has become the spectre of your world and you, your world and you have become the spectres of cinema, that even as cinema has cryptically incorporated your world and you, your world and you have cryptically incorporated cinema, that there is a stranger, a spectre, encrypted in your world and you such that your world and you are forever strangers to themselves, never able to touch, close upon and secure themselves—this return of death and the indeterminacy and emotions that arrive in its wake would be terrifying. (108)

Here, Cholodenko touches upon an extremely interesting point. Film encapsulates a fragment of the world within itself, albeit as a spectre. However, the fact that its spectre is the spectre of the world the spectator is a part of makes film itself a spectre for the spectator whose world it turns into a spectre. To put it more simply, we are the crypt of film just like the film is the crypt of us. The screen is a mirror but it shows us a part of us that had previously died. The familiarity of the ghost makes Cholodenko's case regarding the uncanny being the 'ur' experience of cinema even stronger.

It had been mentioned that Cholodenko regarded all film to be animation. This point by itself doesn't necessitate further explanation since the possibility to define cinema as 'animate images' should be explanation enough. However, Cholodenko does not stop at viewing all film as a form of animation but also views photography as a sort of animation. He starts elaborating upon this point in his 2005 paper *Still Photography?* by writing " … for me, not only does animation have to do with bringing to life and motion, it has to do with bringing to death and nonmotion …" Here, he places photography in the second category; the one that is endowed with death and nonmotion.

The life of the photograph as of cinema is lifedeath: at once the life of death and the death of life, life and death co-implicated inextricably, each haunting and cryptically incorporating the other, even as the photograph haunts and cryptically incorporates the world and the subject – photographer, viewer, analyst – in its lifedeath, making every analysis of it the ghost and crypt of an analysis. We could put it thus: every photo is an animate, animated and animating "drive," one moving at once forward and backward, as if every photo were a kind of side-view rear-view mirror on a vehicle in motion. Every photo is a leave-taking, a taking leave, of something that at the same time will not simply and totally leave. (Cholodenko)

According to Cholodenko's passage, each photograph documents the death of its subject in the instant the photograph was taken. Moreover, the documented death is stretched to eternity, making the death repeat itself over and over again. Thus, death animates the photograph.

What has been discussed up to this point with regards to the ontology of cinema should be sufficient for one to at least consider the possibility that cinema is in fact hauntological by its very nature. But how does this knowledge would affect one's analysis of a certain film, if this is in fact assumed to be the case?

At this point, workings of the crypt, its methods of communication, how to possibly interpret its cryptonyms and how the crypt lies at the heart of cinema has been established. Now, in order to better understand how cryptoanalysis can be utilized in reading a given film, a cryptoanalysis of *Mulholland Drive* will be made.

CHAPTER 4:

CRYPTOANALYZING *MULHOLLAND DRIVE*

4.1 CRYPTOANALYZING FILM

Having established the paths Lacanian film theory takes in its effort to analyze films, one can be assumed to have eliminated the need to build a new theory of analysis from the ground up. Instead, it is possible and logical to peruse what has been established with regards to Lacanian film theory and locate the point where cryptonymy diverges from the Lacanian understanding of film and start a process of re-evaluation of Lacanian concepts in an effort to understand how cyrytoanalytical concepts can take the place of their Lacanian counterparts in film theory. Luckily, Cholodenko has already laid the groundwork of such an endeavour in his 2008 article *The Spectre in the Screen.*

Cholodenko opens his article by alluding to his previous articles he wrote on the subject. One important point to take note here is his definition of *psuché*, which is clarified further in his 2007 article *(The) Death (of) the Animator, or: The Felicity of Felix.* In *The Spectre in the Screen* Cholodenko begins to trace *psuché* from Homer. According to Homer, *psuché* is the essence that leaves the human body at the point of death, and goes on to roam Hades as a *shade*. Later on, Plato ontologizes *psuché* as the soul which later turns into the Latin *anima*, meaning air, breathe, soul, spirit and mind. What this tracing of the *psuché* that lies in the heart of *anima* means to Cholodenko is that the *psuché*, the one that gives *animation* to photography is essentially hauntological. *Psuché* becomes interchangeable with the spectre. (42-43)

After establishing *psuché* as the spectre of cinema, Cholodenko asks whether the brand of analysis the spectre calls for has been applied to film, albeit under a different name. That is the point he shifts his focus to Lacan. (43) Like McGowan, Cholodenko also looks into the Lacanian Real, only this time, searching for the *psuché*. He starts out by defining the object *petit a* as the

Lacanian Real. It is what our comprehension of reality lacks when compared to the Real. It cannot be held onto, grasped or most importantly, *represented*. (43)

Moreover, again similar to what McGowan did, Cholodenko spots *psuché* in Holbein's *The Ambassadors* as the image of the skull and writes, "So Lacan had found the spectres traced in the Holbein long before I had, the *psuché* and the psuché of the *psuché*, the *psuché* 'as such'. His psychoanalysis is *psuché*-'analysis'." (44) What this would mean is that Lacan's Real is the same as the crypt and that McGowan's analysis is what cryptoanalysis is.

Although such a deduction would nullify the need for any further effort to tie cryptoanalysis to psychoanalytic film theory, unfortunately this is not the case. Because once the Real McGowan places within *Blue Velvet* or *The Duel* is deemed to be the same as the spectre, any subsequent analysis would need to build on the assumption that the spectre is represented within the film. However, as has been established previously, the spectre cannot be represented. *Psuché* cannot be represented. However, what can be given in their stead are cryptonyms. What McGowan finds as the Real, in any of the movies he mentions in his article, is the outer (or inner, in another manner of speaking) crypt and the cryptonyms it uses to communicate. More importantly, even the castration complex (or any similar possible representation of the Real) Mulvey talked about in her paper *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema* as being avoided is too a cryptonym, just like in Pankejeff's inner crypt.

According to Cholodenko, the spectre is at the core of cinema. So, it can be deduced that methods similar to the ones utilized by Abraham and Torok in Pankejeff's cryptoanalysis can also reveal something essential when used during the analysis of a film. However, how this method can be applied to a film is better shown and not told.

4.2 CHOOSING A FILM FOR CRYPTOANALYSIS

Although taking a cryptoanalytical approach to analyzing any film should give results with varying degrees of significance, there are two main parameters

that must be observed in order to make the analysis all the more fruitful. These are *readability* and *subject matter*. Before starting to cryptoanalyze David Lynch's 2001 film *Mulholland Drive*, it is better to clarify how the film fares with regards to the said parameters.

The first parameter, ironically called *readibility*, concerns how much the given film opens itself up to cryptoanalysis. As previously established, cryptoanalysis is the analysis of cryptonyms in order to unearth the deliberately hidden contents of the crypt. When considered in terms of cryptonymy, *readability* takes on the meaning of *unreadability*. Although cryptoanalysis could help discovers certain secrets that are not apparent in the first glance, a film which would deceive its audience into thinking that there are no secrets to be found would make any effort to cryptoanalyze it seem far-fetched or unnecessary. However, if a film blatantly uses cryptonyms in its imagery, sounds and dialogues even though it makes the plot harder to define, it would, by the very virtue of its narrative, invite cryptoanalysis from its audience, whether the audience calls the process of decipher symbols cryptoanalysis or not. In such a case, cryptoanalysis would not only seem more plausible but the results it yields would also be more satisfactory.

The second parameter that must be considered is the *subject matter*. There is no reason for a film that has no apparent connection to the concepts and conditions discussed throughout this thesis to be unfit for cryptoanalysis since it has already been established that the crypt operates in a way that is designed to hide its very existence. However, the fact that Abraham and Torok developed their theory when faced with Pankejeff, a man who was overwhelmed by his cryptic incorporations, should also be remembered. While such is not the precondition for a subject to be able to respond to cryptoanalysis, it certainly does make it easier by continually providing the analyst with evidence that he/she is on the right track. Similarly, a film that deals with the subject of cryptonymy, albeit under a different name, would make the effort to display an example of cryptoanalysis easier. It must be obvious that how well a film in which the

protagonist keeps her traumatic secret literally in a locked box, fulfills this criteria.

Before moving on to the actual analysis, one more thing to define is the road map that will be followed throughout the analysis, which will be comprised of two steps. The first step in cryptoanalyzing *Mulholland Drive* is unravelling the plot by using the methods that were displayed in Abraham and Torok's analysis of Pankejeff on the protagonist whose story is the apparent plot of the film. However, this is easier said than done since Abraham and Torok have not left a guide that details how images and sounds can be cryptoanalyzed. Here, Pankejeff's aversion to the Roman numeral 'V' will serve as inspiration. The second step of the analysis will be to cryptoanalyze the analysis by going over the cryptonyms the first step of the analysis revealed, and seeing if any larger body hides under the film as a whole. While this might sound excessively abstract at this point, what the second step entails should make itself apparent once the first step is completed. With the method established, it is time to move on to the actual analysis.

4.3 ANALYZING THE PLOT

In order to make the analysis cleared, its results are better to be given before the actual analysis. So, as it will be clearly established by the end of this part, it can be said that *Mulholland Drive* tells the story of Diane Selwyn (Naomi Watts) whose dream makes up the first part of the movie, while the reality of her condition makes up the second and last part. Throughout the dream sequence, which lasts for about two hours, the audience doesn't meet Diane as a person, but her psyche is given in the form of a fantasy/dream that is designed as an escape from the reality that torments her. The reality, as the audience finds out near the end of the film, is that she is a failed actress who is in a relationship with Camilla Rhodes, (Laura Elena Harring) who has had a much more successful career as an actress than Diane. While Diane is hopelessly in love with Camilla, Camilla leaves her for the young, successful director Adam Kesher, (Justin Theroux)

possibly in order to further her career. Diane, jealous of Camilla, hires a hitman to kill her. However, she soon gets overtaken by guilt and kills herself. Before her death, she dreams of another reality where she is innocent and everything is fine.

What is shown throughout most of the film is Diane's fantasy. Here, having defined cryptic incorporation previously, one can easily make the false assumption that the appearances of characters from Diane's reality are actually incorporations of their real world counterparts. It has already been established that incorporation of an object cannot manifest itself as it is. Instead, the encrypted other can only communicate through cryptonyms. This eliminates the possibility that, for example, Rita (Laura Elena Harring) is the incorporated Camilla. While Diane's cryptic incorporation is there indeed, the characters of the fantasy world are actually symbolic of how Diane would like to see their real world counterparts. Although the characters that appear in the fantasy world mirror how Diane would rather perceive them, the cryptic incorporation that took place after she orders the hit on Camilla doesn't leave any avenues open for the fantasy's continued existence.

The effects of the hidden crypt are disruptive of the fantasy Diane constructed. Its ghosts, accumulating around the image of the blue box, continually remind them of the existence of the crypt. In accordance with the definition of the crypt, the box covets to be found and opened, even while it hides itself. However, even though the audience does witness the opening of the box, the contents are never revealed, as they are by definition irrepresentable. If the audience takes McGowan's position, this would actually mean that the Real is left unrepresented. While this position is in accordance with McGowan's placement of the Real in his paper, it would also put *Mulholland Drive* in a similar position to the instances Mulvey exemplified with an avoidance of the castration complex. Although the difference between McGowan's Real and the crypt can be subtle because certain inexplicable qualities of the Real might appear similar to the irrepresentability of the crypt's contents, the difference is actually quite significant. According to one definition, the Real can be encountered but cannot

be mastered while according to the other, the Real cannot even be encountered while it exerts its own mastery over its host.

When Diane's fantasy is examined, three layers can be defined: Diane's construct, the crypt's outer surface and the crypt's contents. Diane's construct makes up the bulk of the fantasy world, as built by Diane's Unconscious. The fantasy itself is *not* the Unconscious, as its representation would also be problematic. However, as it is continually reinforced by the Unconscious, the cryptonyms that make their way inside the fantasy do open a path to the outer shell of the crypt.

The second layer that can be found is the crypt itself. Each cryptonym that disrupt the peace maintained by Diane in her fantasy world can (and will) be traced to the blue box. While the idea of a locked box is reminiscent of a crypt, the fact that the audience never sees its contents, differentiates it from the third layer, which is the incorporated secret. Moreover, Diane's encounter with the content of the crypt not only ends the fantasy but also destroys her being as well. Cryptoanalysis is the analysis of cryptonyms. So, anyone undertaking the task of deciphering cryptonyms would first need to know how to differentiate them from aspects of the fantasy they are spread around in. This requires a knowledge of the fantasy land before starting to spot the cryptonyms by their inconsistencies with the world they are situated in.

4.3.1 Diane's Fantasy

A good way to explore the fantasy world is through characters as the differences between them and their real world counterparts are the centerpieces of the fantasy. The first character that needs to be explored is Betty (Naomi Watts), who deceptively appears to be the protagonist throughout the fantasy. This is mainly because she is meant to represent Diane's ideal for herself. While she has the makings of a cliché as the innocent young woman coming to Hollywood, her innocence never turns into naivety. She is talented, loved and most importantly, in complete control over Rita, who herself stands in for Camilla. If one were to

define Diane, she would then stand in complete opposition to these qualities. Diane's acting abilities are never displayed. However, it would be safe to assume that they are nowhere near Betty's effortless brilliance. She has everything that it takes for her to make it in Hollywood as an actress. Any reason for her failure as an actress is transferred to outside factors, namely a large conspiracy that surrounds Hollywood. It is best to discuss this conspiracy separately since it does involve more aspects than just those that have to do with Diane's acting.

As for Betty being loved unlike Diane, the first sign of this difference is her relationship with her aunt. Betty's aunt Ruth, (Maya Bond) also a woman in show business, lets Betty stay at her house while she is in Canada for a film shoot. Meanwhile, Diane reveals that *her* aunt left her some money when she died, which Diane later used to move to Los Angeles. While both Ruth's facilitate their nieces' stay in Los Angeles, Betty is the one who actually has a relationship with her aunt. In Diane's case, there are no implications that a relationship was ever present between her and her aunt. It is entirely possible that they were completely estranged.

While differences between Betty and Diane regarding love and talent are important, Betty's control over Rita seems to be the centerpiece of the fantasy world. Camilla, unlike Rita, not only left Diane for Adam but she has also surpassed Diane as an actress. The implication is that Camilla has no qualms about using her sex appeal to support her acting capabilities, even though she might very well be in love with Adam. This gives Camilla a cunning quality, to which amnesiac Rita cannot even come close to. During the dinner scene in Adam's house, Diane tells that Camilla had been helping her get parts in her movies. Besides the fact that Diane casts Camilla as Rita in her fantasy, the fantasy world sees Rita completely lost and dependent on Betty for directions.

Adam of the fantasy on the other hand is similar to Rita in his helplessness. His creative control over "Silvia North Story," which is also the name of the film for which Camilla got the leading role instead of Diane, is snatched away by a shadowy organization that is seemingly led by Mr. Roque (Michael J. Anderson).

The symbolism should be clear: Mr. Roque is undefeatable and immovable like a rock or perhaps a castle. There is nothing Adam, or anyone else, can do to undermine Roque's will. Roque's power is exaggerated to a point where he seems almost godlike. This comparison is invited especially when his agent the Cowboy (Lafayette Montgomery), who comes and goes with the light, calls *Adam* up to a hill so they could meet. Betty's failure is literally an act of god. In fact, Diane's partiality to blame external forces for her failure as an actress is repeated when she meets Bob Booker (Wayne Grace), who was the director of the real "Sylvia North Story." While Diane says that Bob Booker did not think much of her and gave the part to Camilla instead, Bob in the fantasy does not seem all that competent with the vague and seemingly unnecessary directions he spurts out.

When Adam is investigated further, it can be seen that his victimhood is underlined, possibly as an act of revenge for stealing Camilla from Diane, when he finds out that his wife has been cheating on him with Gene (Billy Ray Cyrus), a pool cleaner. During the dinner scene Adam mentions his ex-wife by saying, "So I got the pool, and she got the pool man." (Mulholland Drive) Having heard the giddiness with which Adam utters this line, Diane creates a different story for Adam where the pool man is actually a pretty likable guy who also throws Adam out of his own house.

While Betty, Rita and Adam to an extent are central to the narrative, the discrepancies between the fantasy and cryptonyms start to show themselves with minor characters. Although similar wish fulfillments also surround them, they also display certain qualities that lead directly to the crypt.

As Diane hiring a hitman to kill Camilla is the main reason why the fantasy was created in the first place, one of the more important characters would have to be Joe (Mark Pellegrino), the hitman. While his conversation with Diane only consists of Diane hiring him to kill Camilla and Joe showing her a blue key and saying that he will leave the key for her to find once Camilla is dead, Joe of the fantasy world gets a much greater role. Of course it shouldn't be surprising that Joe, who had a great impact on Diane, to get such a large role in the fantasy,

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regardless of the duration of their meeting. In the fantasy, Joe, who is hired to kill Rita this time, appears to be completely incompetent. If this is the case with actual Joe, it would mean that the murder of Camilla could have very well failed. While this explains the almost slapstick mood, one detail that can easily be missed is his mismatched eyes in this scene. While the real Joe's eyes are both blue, fantasy Joe's right eye is brown. What significance this bears will be explained later on.

Coco (Ann Miller) also seems to have some importance as a comforting and maternal figure. The real Coco, Adam's mother, does show some sympathy towards Diane when she mentions her not too great career as an actress. While her understanding demeanor does not necessarily comfort Diane during dinner, her intentions are not gone unnoticed by Diane as she casts her as the matronly manager of Ruth's apartment complex in her fantasy. Her maternal side is especially underlined following an encounter between Betty and one of her neighbours, Louise Bonner (Lee Grant). Although it is better to discuss the details of the encounter when going through the cryptonyms, it should still be mentioned as it reveals Coco's protective instincts. This maternal drive also ties in neatly with Diane's aunt Ruth who, unlike Betty's aunt, is not mentioned as a caring or close relative. Here, there is something to be found that Diane craves for.

What has been established so far should be enough to determine that the fantasy's main purpose is to present a world where Betty, who shows none of Diane's negative qualities, gets what Diane wants. Love, either from Rita or others; talent, which is not enough to become a success but exists nonetheless; innocence, which was lost the moment she hired Joe to kill Camilla. Every aspect of the fantasy is made to serve Diane's wishes. While anything that is profoundly hurtful should have no place in the fantasy, this is not the case in actuality. Things that endanger both Diane and the integrity of the fantasy do exist, and more importantly, they all lead back to the same place.

4.3.2 The Crypt

While any effort to locate the crypt has does necessitate deciphering of the cryptonyms as it has been established earlier, Diane's crypt can easily be identified as the blue box. This gives a chance to spot cryptonyms not only through their discrepancies with the fantasy but also through their relationship with the box. This is one of the reasons why *Mulholland Drive* is a great example on which cryptoanalysis can be tested. In any case, the search for cryptonyms can begin with the physical properties of the box.


Betty finds the box.

Although the box does not really have much in the way of distinguishing features, its eye catching color plays a prominent role throughout the film. Where can the same color can be found? A blue lamp shade in Mr. Roque's chamber is one of the examples. Another one is the key Joe left for Diane once Camilla was dead. Club Silencio, a place that needs to be discussed at length is another. What the color blue signifies in general will need exploring.

What disrupts the fantasy Diane created? What is the precise moment the fantasy begins to collapse? It is the moment the box is found. Once the key, which was in Rita's purse, and the box, which was found in Betty's purse all of a sudden, come together, Betty ceases to exist and Rita is all that is left. Not for long though, since when the box is open Rita also disappears and the fantasy ends.

And how did they find the box? What are the steps that actually led the couple to Club Silencio and their eventual discovery of the box?

Betty and Rita start searching for Rita's actual identity by calling the police to find out whether there was an accident on Mulholland Drive or not. Although the existence of the accident is confirmed by the police, this doesn't really help their search in any way. However, immediately following Betty's conversation with the police, they get coffee at Winkie's. There, Rita sees the waitress, Diane, with whom the actual Diane seems to have switched names with as the actual waitress' name is Betty. After seeing the name tag, Rita remembers the name Diane Selwyn, although she remains unsure as to what it signifies. Rita's recollection of the name leads them to Diane Selwyn's apartment, but before moving on to that one has to ask, what is the significance of the waitress as she triggers the recollection? Perhaps there is none to be found because where she works is important enough. Winkie's is actually so important that it is seen in a sequence that is seemingly unrelated to the rest of the movie, even before the audience meets Betty.

The first time Winkie's is seen, Dan (Patrick Wischler) is talking to his therapist Herb (Michael Cooke) about a recurring nightmare he has about a man who is in the back of Winkie's. After Dan's done talking about his dream, he and Herb go to see if the man is there. Dan finds the Bum (Bonny Aarons) and then dies from terror. One thing to notice is that the Bum is actually a woman. She is later seen at the end of the film, holding the blue box in her hands before putting it in a paper bag and throwing the bag on the ground. Following this, Irene (Jeanne Bates) and her companion (Dan Birnbaum) walk out of the paper bag and go to Diane's house. But before talking more about Irene and her companion, it would be better to finish looking at the Bum.

The Bum holding the box.

The fact that the Bum is connected to the blue box is established. So, her appearances can be considered as instances where the spectres emerge. And when is she seen? The first one is in the Winkie's sequence with Dan. Why is she living in the back of the Winkie's? Well, Winkie's is where Diane hired Joe to kill Camilla. If that is where the event that caused the cryptic incorporation to occur, it should be expected for the location to be involved with the actual crypt. And Dan? Dan is seen only once more throughout the film. Diane, during her meeting with Joe in the Winkie's, lock gazes with Dan for a moment. Dan becomes one of the bearers of Diane's secret. In fact, when Dan's conversation with Herb is reviewed, it can easily be realized that the one speaking is Diane, telling about the time she hired a hitman and has seen Dan, staring at her from the counter. In Dan's recollection, Dan is Diane and Herb is Dan. The one who gets terrified enough to die when she sees the Bum is Diane. This is because of the Bum's association with the crypt.

Dan sees Herb standing by the counter, looking back at him.

Diane sees Dan standing by the counter, looking back at her.

An encounter between Diane and her neighbour Louise has been mentioned when talking about Coco's maternal demeanor towards Betty. While Betty and Rita are looking at the map to find where Diane Selwyn lives, Louise knocks on their door, claiming that there is someone in trouble in Betty's house. When Betty tells Louise her name, she exclaims "No, it's not!" (Mulholland Drive) After a brief conversation with Betty, Coco comes and takes Louise away. But before they leave, Louise tells Coco that someone is in her room and she won't leave.

Louise asks Coco to get this mysterious "her" out of Louise's room. The last thing Louise says before going back to her apartment is, "No, she said it was someone else who was in trouble." (Mulholland Drive) Although the audience is never explicitly told who Louise is referring to, it has already been established that the Bum is actually a woman. If Louise is talking about someone who is actually seen in the movie, the only sensible character that might appear at Louise's house giving ominous warnings can very well be the Bum.

While going through the instances where the colour blue stood apart one way or another, Mr. Roque's chamber has been mentioned. The first time his room, and thus the blue lamp was seen is when Mr. Roque calls someone to probably remind them that Rita, who was supposed to be killed, is still missing. The conversation ends with Mr. Roque ordering "the same." What this would mean is that Rita renews his orders to have Rita killed for an unknown reason. A chain of phone calls carry the order to another phone that stands beside a red lamp and an ashtray. The phone's owner is later revealed to be Diane in the real world. This is a great demonstration of how Diane, having paid for Camilla's murder in the real world, actually sees herself.

Mr. Roque's chamber and his blue lamp.

Chain of phone calls leads to Diane's phone.

One other thing that was postponed to be discussed later was Joe's eyes. Two possible explanations can be given here. The first one is that Joe actually has both Camilla's and Diane's eye colours at the same time. What this would mean is that Diane still harbors some resentment towards Camilla and partly blames her death on her own actions. This would also be fitting as Joe's own actions in the triple murder scene cause himself quite a lot of grief, which can also be said about both Rita and Diane. The second explanation for Joe's mismatched eyes is that he is actually meant to represent both him and Diane during the scene. Either way, Diane is certainly there, which would also support Diane's view of herself.

Joe's mismatched eyes.

Possibly the most important instance where the colour blue dominates the dream comes during Rita and Betty's visit to Club Silencio. During her sleep, Rita begins to talk in Spanish, continuously saying the lines which will later be repeated by the Magician (Richard Green). After being woken up by Betty, Rita takes Betty to Club Silencio. Their entry through the blue doors of the club that is at the end of an alley washed in blue light is indicative of where Diane actually is: the periphery of the crypt. The second sign that indicates Club Silencio as the crypt, other than the fact that the blue box is found inside the club, is hidden in the word "box." The Magician speaks three languages while he is on stage: English, Spanish and French. English is Diane's language while Spanish is Camilla's, as she is revealed to be Spanish speaker during Adam's dinner party. Who could French belong to? Perhaps Ruth, who is shooting a film in Canada is more important than one is led to believe. In any case, the word for box in French is "boîte" which also means "nightclub." Club Silencio is the incorporated object and inside, it is riddled with spectres that haunt Diane.

Two more instances that contain the colour blue are witnessed inside Club Silencio. One of them is the blue haired older woman watching the Magician's show from a lodge. The second one is seen right after the first appearance of the

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blue haired woman. The Magician tells the audience to listen which is immediately followed by blue flashes of lightning that occur while Betty shakes incontrollably. If one actually follows the Magician's command and starts to listen carefully, he/she can hear muffled moans of a man that end in a grunt. After that, the Magician disappears smiling, leaving only a soft blue light that blankets the stage. These all need to be revisited for the analysis.

The Magician asks the audience to "Listen," while the blue haired woman watches.

The same flashes of lightning repeat themselves in the last scene where Diane kills herself. However, Irene and her companion accompany the flashes this time. They chase Diane to her bed while laughing and holding out their hands as if they are trying to claw at her. This couple, about whom the audience is shown so little, is directly included in Diane's suicide and the crypt.

Although it would not be surprising if there were more to be found with regards to cryptonyms, what has been gathered up to this point is actually enough to start shaping what Diane holds within the crypt. Of course it should be noted that any reconstruction is bound to be vague and shifting. However, this is the nature of the crypt as its contents can never be represented in full and as a result can never be truly comprehended.

4.3.3 The Contents of the Crypt

Search for the crypt's contents should begin with a question: where is Ruth? She is dead, at least in the real world. Does her death go beyond signifying that Diane and her aunt were estranged? Evidence that supports Diane's incorporation including something to do with her aunt can be found in a parallel between the scene where she hires Joe and where she first enters her aunt's house with Coco. After Joe was hired to kill Camilla, the key Diane found somewhere unspecified was left on the coffee table in her apartment, probably by Diane herself. After Coco hands Betty the key to Ruth's apartment, the first thing Betty does is leave the key on the coffee table that is vaguely similar to the one that belongs to Diane. The inclusion of this detail in the fantasy goes to show that her aunt's death haunts Diane for an undetermined reason.

During the audition where Betty shows what a great actress she is should also be looked at with Ruth in mind. During the audition Linney James (Rita Taggart), a successful cast director watches Betty play out a scene where she acts the part of a girl who has a relationship with a much older man. Linney's appearance is similar to that of Ruth when she is first seen in the fantasy. The scene includes the girl threatening the man with exposing him to the world but they end up kissing passionately. There is an abusive undertone to the scene, from the way the actor carries himself to the name of the project, "Daddy's Friend Goes to Work."

Going back to Club Silencio, a new understanding of the moans that can be heard emerges. The moans sound sexual but only seem to include the voice of a man. What is happening during the moans and flashes of lightning seems to be directed by the Magician while Betty trembles violently, completely at his will. Rita, who actually has the same hairdo as Betty, holds onto Betty, trying to comfort her. During all of this, as shown right when the Magician told them to listen, the blue haired lady watches the scene unfold. And what is the last thing

the film shows its audience? The blue haired lady, repeating the line "Silencio." meaning silence (Mulholland Drive).

The closing shot of the film is the blue haired woman saying "Silencio."

Although the details aren't laid out, certain things can be inferred from the scene. Diane, prior to the events shown in the film was sexually assaulted by an elder man who may or may not have been related to her. An older woman, perhaps Diane's aunt, was privy to this knowledge but decided to keep silent. The colour blue has previously been associated with the keeping of secrets when the box was examined. As for more on the identity of the abuser and the witness, one has to look at the lines delivered by the Magician.

> [Spanish] There is no band. [English] There is no band. [French] There is no orchestra. [English] This is all a tape recording. [Spanish] There is no band, [English] and yet we hear a band. If we want to hear a clarinet, listen... [French] A slide-trombone. [French] A muted trombone... [French] I love the sound of a muted trombone. (Mulholland Drive)

While the Magician's love of "a muted trombone" can be tied to the abuser's desire for Diane to keep quiet and his whole speech can be related to the fact that the whole story up to that point being a fantasy, there is one more thing the speech alludes to. The first time we see Betty is with Irene and her companion.

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The fact that their conversation was dubbed is made blatantly obvious. The way the lines are delivered do not seem to match very well with what is seen. What we are hearing is just a recording. The joyous farewells that are being exchanged are all an illusion.

Irene and her companion haunt Diane in her last moments. However, that is not the only time they appear. They are seen, under a spotlight, hugging Diane in joy after a display of the jitterbug contest that Diane won before she came to Hollywood. This is the first thing the audience sees as the film begins. This image of happiness is that important.

The following sequence of events can be deduced as a result: Diane was abused by an older man, who was possibly related to her. Her aunt knew about this, but chose to keep quiet and probably urged Diane to do so as well. Later, Diane won a jitterbug contest and that led to her wanting to act. Once her aunt died, taking her secret to the grave, she left Diane a sum of money enough for her to set up in Los Angeles. There, she met Camilla, who in a way replaced Ruth as the caring, loving woman Diane wanted her aunt to be. However, Camilla abandoned Diane for Adam. Diane's fixation on Camilla led her to have Camilla's murder arranged. Having killed the replacement for her secret's keeper, Diane pushed herself to making up a fantasy where everything was the way she desired them to be. However, the fantasy did not hold under the pressure exerted by her secret, the crypt got opened and she ended up killing herself. It is entirely possible that Irene was Diane's aunt and Aunt Ruth was just a part of the fantasy as the name Ruth is not said even once during any conversation that takes place in the real world. This makes her companion Diane's abuser.

This story that can be traced through the cryptonyms found in Diane's fantasy and hallucinations is another aspect of *Mulholland Drive* that makes it extremely suitable for trying to establish a method devised from the cryptoanalysis of Sergei Pankejeff. However, the analysis of Diane's story is not the cryptoanalysis of the film, it is the cryptoanalysis of Diane's fantasy. In a way, it is how Lynch giving a description of cryptoanalysis, even though he probably

doesn't call it that. This description should not satiate the analyst as it is only a guide that can help someone trying to cryptoanalyse the film. With the analysis of the plot done, it is time to move on to the analysis of the film.

4.4 CRYPTOANALYSIS OF *MULHOLLAND DRIVE*

What is meant by cryptoanalysis of the film? The analysis of the plot was built on the understanding that the film presented its viewers with two settings: Diane's fantasy and reality. Looking at the first part of the film as Diane's fantasy revealed Diane's crypt. If one takes the whole of the film as a fantasy, it can be said that the film itself is built around a crypt separate from Diane's. A film does not need to include the same duality *Mulholland Drive* has in order to be treated as a fantasy. However, as has been said before, *Mulholland Drive* makes such a treatment easier as it invites the viewer to analyze the fantasy in a certain way. The method that was followed while analyzing Diane's fantasy can also be utilized while treating the whole film as fantasy. While one of the things that *Mulholland Drive* is famous for is the obscurity of its story, the distinction it makes between the fantasy and reality makes it actually easier to cryptoanalyze as how the film can be interpreted is already given within the film.

Going back to the analysis of the film, Club Silencio has been defined as representative of the blue box. However, this can also be thought of in reverse: the blue box is representative of Club Silencio. If the blue box is Diane's crypt, whose crypt is Club Silencio? It is where the narrative shifts dramatically from Diane's fantasy to Diane's reality. Its disruptive effect is on the way the narrative is perceived. It is the moment where all hope for a linear and traditional storyline goes out the window. Club Silencio is the crypt's direct communication with the viewer.

Entrance of Club Silencio.

It has been repeatedly said that the crypt's inhabitants cannot be represented. While this forces everything that occurs during the Club Silencio scene to be related to the film's crypt without making them representative of the crypt. The Magician's lines during the scene seem to be in reference to Diane's situation. However, when taken as cryptonyms related to the film's inner crypt, they become references to the film itself.

The Magician talked about a "slide-trombone." While "trombone à coulisse" can be translated as a slide-trombone, the word slide is actually redundant as there are no slideless trombones. A slideless instrument that is similar to a trombone could be the trumpet. Interestingly, while the Magician talks about a trombone, the musician that enters the stage actually holds a trumpet. Why is the Magician talking about a trumpet then? Both "trombone" and "trumpet"'s etymologies can be traced back to the French word "tromper" which means "to deceive." The Magician is still on the same topic.

What is the Magician's monologue in reference to? Where does the scene take place? In a theater. Movie theater comes to mind. "This is all a tape recording." (Mulholland Drive) What is? A play is live. What about a film? The deceptive nature of cinema is underlined incessantly. *Deception*: the word hidden

deep within the *instrument*. It does have a sinister feel to it as to deceive is associated with false representations of the truth. Could the opposite effect be achieved through deception? Can deception lead one to some truth? Such a truth needs to transcend representation. It needs to be the kind of knowledge that has been talked about throughout this thesis. One that is beyond representation and can only be described in abstractions.

All films are deceptive by virtue of their nature to some extent. And *Mulholland Drive* both embraces and points out the tools of deception the medium provides. All information on Diane's story has been gathered through plays on words, repeating images, discrepancies in the film's form. Every aspect of the film is mobilised in order to point out a truth that needs to remain ambiguous at its core: cinema is revealing in its obscuring nature. Cryptonymy, even though it has not been called exactly that for a very long time, is the language of cinema. Cholodenko maintained this position through the connection between *psuché* and animation. His claim is similar to McGowan's, in the sense that the Lacanian Real had been left out of the discussion in traditional psychoanalytic film theory. However, while Cholodenko did not fully explore the implications introduced by the irrepresentability of the Real, an actual cryptoanalysis of *Mulholland Drive* with this aspect of the spectre in mind resulted in a unique way of interpreting the film's crypt and its *psuché*. So, if Abraham and Torok's theory of cryptonymy is actually valid, the changes to psychoanalytic film theory proposed in this thesis could only be the beginning of a whole new way of analyzing films and cinema as a medium.

CONCLUSION

When comparing the theory of cryptonymy to Freud's work, especially to one that has been filtered through Lacan's reading of Freud, several key differences come up. The first of these is the need for a subject specific approach in psychoanalysis. As the cryptic incorporation is defined by the repression of certain words which are deemed to be the originators of the traumatic experience, the trauma's representation through the very words that caused it in the first place becomes impossible. Instead, incongruities in the language must be located and analysed in order to reveal what the repressed words are so that the traumatic experience can be arrived at. While what this would entail for the therapeutic measures that need to be taken are subjects of psychotherapy, the approach does lend itself well for a novel way of analyzing works of fiction. Moreover, when talking about cinema specifically, the effect of cryptonymy is multiplied since the idea of the spectre as the *psuché* of animation places the crypt at the core of cinema as a medium. The world of the audience, independent of the spectator's individual composition, is encapsulated within the film. A piece of the world is killed in order to be reanimated and eternally kept alive. This piece of the world which was once alive is the crypt of the film and the film itself is the crypt of the world in which it exists. The Real is what was once alive and the crypt encapsulates the subject's loss of the Real. While even the representation of the loss is impossible, it would be absurd to place the Real anywhere on screen. However, the loss as such can and must be alluded to by the subject through the use of cryptonyms. As a result, while an encounter with the Real is out of the question, cinema, by its very nature, always refers to the loss of contact with the Real.

Although the primary focus of this thesis was to create a method of analysis based on Abraham and Torok's theory, there are certainly more avenues to explore with cryptonymy's relationship with cinema. Representations of trauma in cinema by itself is a topic to which a tremendous amount of literature is dedicated to. Cryptonymy, as a theory that includes both additions to the definition of trauma and a specific way of looking at cinema's relationship to cryptic incorporations, should prove fruitful in discovering new ways to read said literature while also contributing to it. Moreover, one other thing that has not been mentioned in this thesis but needs to be brought up nonetheless is the workings of

the analyst's own crypt during analysis. Since concealing itself is one of the primary functions of the crypt, every analysis is further complicated by the role the analyst's undiscovered incorporations play. Considering how much the universal spectator of psychoanalytic film theory has been a target for criticism, a theory that makes it impossible to attribute universality to any spectator should be reviewed further. All in all, while this thesis bears significance for being a meager contribution to a theory that is yet to receive the attention it deserves, in the end it could only be called a preliminary study of cryptonymy, which is sure to yield findings of great importance after further study.

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