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**THE IMPASSE OF DESCARTES' MODERN SUBJECT AND A
POLITICS OF THE HISTORICITY OF DASEIN IN HEIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY**

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The Impasse of Descartes' Modern Subject and a Politics of the Historicity of Dasein in
Heidegger's Philosophy
Descartes'ın Modern Öznesinin Çıkmazı ve Heidegger'in Felsefesinde Dasein'in
Tarihselliğinin Politikliği

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Abstract

Descartes is recognized as the founder of modern philosophy and its philosophical system has made a lasting impact on following modern philosophers. Especially, the subject-centered understanding which is constituted by Descartes has formed the center of the modern philosophy. Ontology had lost its importance with Descartes and the main issue has been reduced to the ways of knowing of the subject, that means epistemology. Also, Descartes reduces other beings to the category of the object for the sake of constituting the absolute modern subject. One of the most important consequences of this effort is to make the world composed of the sum of material objects. Descartes does it through attributing substances to beings and dividing the being into two as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, which correspond to thinking thing and extended thing. All these reasons caused to expose the Cartesian world and its problems have become impasse. Due to these reasons, Heidegger challenges to Descartes' philosophy in *Being and Time*. Especially, the critique of Heidegger is grounded on subject-centered understanding, substance, and misunderstanding of the concept of the world. However, the main critique of Heidegger is temporality of the subject that Descartes ignores. In contrast to Descartes' philosophy, Heidegger presents us a new ontology which does not depend on the distinction between subject and object. This ontology is depending on the being-in-the-world and the finitude of Dasein. Also, Dasein is not presented as having a particular substance but its existence is problematized. In this context, the main aim of the thesis is to search for a political ground to overcome the impasse of Descartes' modern subject by examining Heidegger's concept of repetition in the historicity of Dasein. Here, repetition is a way for Dasein to project itself to the future by handing down its historicity to its present; and this projection occurs in a particular generation that Dasein is thrown into. Against grasping the modern political subject statically and determining it in compliance with some particular substances, the historicity of Dasein reveals the creative and dynamic characteristics of Dasein. Consequently, it gives a possibility to gain political characteristics for Dasein within its generation.

Özet

Modern felsefenin kurucusu olarak kabul edilen Descartes'ın kurduğu felsefi sistem kendisinden sonra gelen filozoflar üzerinde büyük bir etki yaratmıştır. Özellikle Descartes'ın kurduğu mutlak özne anlayışı felsefenin merkezini oluşturmuştur. Descartes ile birlikte ontoloji önemini yitirmiş ve asıl sorun öznenin bilmesine yani epistemolojiye indirgenmiştir. Descartes, modern özneyi yaratma uğruna geri kalan bütün varolanların nesne kategorisine indirgenmesine neden olan düalizmi literatüre yerleştirmiştir. Bunun en önemli sonucu da dünya fenomeninin maddi nesnelerin toplamından ibaret hale gelmesidir. Descartes bunu da *res cogitans* ile *res extensa* olarak varlığı bölerek onlara düşünen töz ve yer kaplayan şeyler olarak tözsellik atfederek yapmıştır. Bütün bu sebepler Kartezyen dünya dediğimiz olguyu ortaya çıkarmış ve bunun çıkardığı sorunlar içinden çıkılmaz hale gelmiştir. Bütün bu sebeplerden dolayı Heidegger Varlık ve Zaman kitabında doğrudan Descartes'ı hedef alır. Heidegger'in eleştirileri özellikle Descartes'ın özne merkezli anlayışı, tözselliği önceleyen felsefesi ve dünya kavramını yanlış yorumlaması üzerine temellenir. Ancak Heidegger'in en büyük eleştirisi kuşkusuz öznenin yani bir varolan olarak insanın zamansallığının Descartes tarafından dışarıda bırakılmasıdır. Oysa Heidegger bize özne-nesne ayrımına dayanmayan bir ontoloji sunar. Bu ontolojinin temeli, Dasein'in dünyada olma durumu ve onun sonlu zamansallığıdır. Ayrıca Dasein belirli bir töz olarak sunulmaz ve onun varoluşu sorunsallaştırılır. Bu bağlamda, bu tezin ana amacı, Heidegger'in Dasein'in tarihselliğini incelerken kullandığı tekrar kavramına başvurarak Descartes'ın modern öznesinin açmazlarını aşmak adına politik bir zemin aramaktır. Burada, tekrar, Dasein'in tarihselliğini bugününe devralarak kendisini geleceğe doğru tasarlamasının bir yoludur; bu tasarlama da Dasein'in içine doğduğu bir nesil ile birlikte gerçekleşir. Modern politik öznenin statik bir şekilde ele alınmasına ve onun birtakım tözlere uygun olarak belirlenimine karşılık, Dasein'in tarihselliği Dasein'in yaratıcı ve dinamik karakterini ortaya çıkarır. Dolayısıyla, Dasein'in tarihselliği, Dasein'in kendi nesli ile birlikte politik bir karakter kazanması adına bir imkan sağlar.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The construction of the modern subject which depends on the concepts of reason and consciousness has been a continuing issue for philosophy and political science. In this regard, Martin Heidegger is one of the important thinkers who tries to overcome this understanding and makes a new beginning in philosophy by bringing the oblivion of Being into question. In this sense, Heidegger notes that “the essence of human has been decided long ago” (Elden 2006, p. 116). This is important because this understanding presents the idea of substance which shows itself in both our existential life and our political attitudes. In this respect, in the masterpiece of Heidegger, *Being and Time*, it is clear that Heidegger focuses on Descartes. Especially, in *The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology*, Heidegger presents a critique on Descartes. This critique is very important for Heidegger’s philosophy in order to disclose the problem of grasping human being with a particular substance.

As it is known, the establishment of *ego* comes from Descartes. Descartes presents the ego as the founder of knowledge in order to provide a ground for new and radical beginning for philosophy. This ego means that knowledge comes from human’s mind rather than external world. However, the rest of the statement which is given above is that “Namely, man is an 'organism [or creature, *Lebewesen*]' and indeed an 'organism' that can invent, build and make use of machines, an organism that can *reckon* [rechnen] with things, an organism that can put *everything whatever* into its calculation and computation [*Rechnung und Berechnung*], into the *ratio*. Man is the organism with the gift of reason. Therefore, man can demand that everything in the world happen 'logically'” (Elden 2006, p. 116). In this regard, the understanding of Descartes’s dualism, between subject and object, reduces the external world to a matter, and its characteristics depend on their extension. In this way, the world, also body of human, becomes an object that can be calculated. This assertion paves the way for the modern science. With regard to this, the importance of understanding or thinking has lessened for human, rather, human

becomes a being that calculates, organizes, and manipulates everything by calculation. This distinction between subject and object has been a problem that modern world has tried to solve it. There is no longer a possibility to philosophize independently from subject. This is problematized by two modern philosophers. In this regard, Immanuel Kant constitutes its own philosophy remaining faithful to Descartes. However, for Heidegger, Kant realizes the problem in Descartes' philosophy which is the lack of time; and he adds the time to 'I think'. As Heidegger (1965) states that "... in the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, Kant for the first time subjected time and the "I think"; in any case, Kant does not distinguish the time from thought and he recognizes the time as a form of subject" (p. 165). In this regard, Kant grasps the time which is just a form of subject rather than its relation with Being. Also, inasmuch as Kant puts the subject into the center, he cannot see the historical side of the subject because he focuses merely on the way of knowing of subject. In this sense, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is one of the leading philosophers that realizes the historical context of the subject. However, for Heidegger, Hegel also cannot escape from the subject-object duality and he takes the history within the scope of subject-object relationship. Kant represents existentia as actuality in the sense of the objectivity of experience and Hegel defines existentia as the self-knowing idea of absolute subjectivity (Heidegger 1998, p. 248). Therefore, subject has been understood within the tension with object. On the other hand, Kant embraces the subject through reason and Hegel embraces the subject through consciousness. According to Heidegger, this is the sickness of the metaphysics. Metaphysics always thinks human through a particular substance, and it misses its facticity. To think human and the nature within the particular substance is to determine the history and human in the sense of particular telos. This is why progressive history and modern subject have been understood in terms of actualising particular telos in the line of history. At this point, the politics of modern subject reaches a stalemate because embracing primarily human within the substance is to put it into life deterministically. Determinating particular substance is to embrace human isolatedly. This is also the motto of modern world and the Enlightenment. Reason is a substance that is the key of the universe. Especially, it

can be seen in the relationship between reason and technological development. Hence, technological development is the output of human reason and in this way, life and nature could be brought under control and served for humans.

Also, reason as a substance makes human isolated from its ways of being in communal life and its relationship with nature. This also causes inconsistency between theory and practice. Neither the theory of Descartes nor the theory of Kant corresponds to human's factual life because they grasp human within the scope of metaphysics. Subject has been understood as an individual; and it is expected that the ideal of a rational man will make human freer. However, this expectation has ended by the exploitation of nature and alienation of human. Especially, World Wars and destructions of economic depressions had caused to question the domination of reason and the Enlightenment process. In this sense, Heidegger has led to initiate a search for the possibilities of a new philosophy. There is no hope in present conditions for emancipation through social movements of the day and individuality because, for Heidegger, the problem is the way of thinking in the modern world, therefore, he states that "the most thought-provoking thing about our thought-provoking age is that we are still not thinking" (Heidegger 1968, p. 6). The more, humans enters to the circle of domination of reason within the hope for a freer life, the more, humans to lose its freedom. In this context, what I mean by the impasses of the modern political subject is how the subject is determined through reason and consciousness. Because, in the historical process, determining human through reason and consciousness could not provide creative politics and it has caused an alienation for human from itself and the world. Human and the world have been thought in metaphysical terms and this has caused to ignore human condition in factual life. This why humans need a new political perspective which provides a ground in keeping with the factual life of human

As a result of these reasons, Heidegger declares the end of philosophy and he begins to interrogate the possibility of a new philosophy. As he states that "with the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition to another beginning" (Heidegger 2003, p. 96). For this new philosophy, it is necessary to get back to ontology. However, this ontology is different from metaphysics and

Heidegger calls it *fundamental ontology* which aims to disclose the problem of oblivion of Being. In this sense, Heidegger uses the concept of Dasein instead of human in order not to permit the deterministic subject understanding. Dasein is the one being that makes Being issue in its own being. Also, in contrast to Descartes' subject, Dasein is not examined through isolation but it is examined through its factual everydayness. The everydayness of Dasein discloses the thrownness of Dasein. In this sense, Dasein is fallen into the world. It is a being that is tempted by the world and it is trapped into current issues. The domination of the they in the publicness dispossesses the possibility of being oneself of Dasein. The self of Dasein in its everydayness is the they-self and this means that Dasein belongs to the averageness in its everydayness. Therefore, the politics of Dasein can be considered under the domination of the they-self and it does not have its self politics. Despite the fact that *Being and Time* has been considered as non-political work, interpretation of Dasein would give the averageness of everyday politics of Dasein. According to Heidegger, publicness is concealer rather than revealer. In this context, publicness is the area that corresponds to the they which has the characteristic of anonymity. Here, Heidegger does not argue about a particular group or an ideology. Dasein is the one who loses itself into the they regardless of political differentiation. The possibility for Dasein to make its own politics depends on modifying and overcoming its average everydayness.

On the other hand, Heidegger embraces Dasein as a temporal being. Temporality of Dasein is finitude and Dasein is presented as a being who is being-toward-death. The possibility of being free depends on the understanding its own death and by the same token, projecting itself to the future. The point is that death belongs to the own being of Dasein. As it is seen, Heidegger grasps the death at the individual level. Death is my possibility as my own death. Therefore, death does not help us to reveal the political possibility of Dasein in community. Even though Levinas (2000) argues the death as a possibility to understand other's death politically, as he himself argues, Heidegger closes this door. The importance of death over Dasein is that Dasein projects itself existentially to the future by embracing its own death. The main issue makes itself apparent in this point. The

issue is that how Dasein projects itself to the future? What could serve as a ground for Dasein in this projection? As it has been argued before, neither reason nor consciousness can be a ground for the projection of Dasein. In this point, Heidegger brings historicity forward which will reveal the possibility of politics in its life.

According to the vulgar understandings in philosophy, temporality arises from historicity. However, Heidegger reverses this understanding and he argues that Dasein can be historical only through being temporal. In this sense, for Heidegger, historicity is the condition to gain a meaning of something, that is to say, facts can be meaningful in the historicity of Dasein for Dasein. In this regard, Dasein does not start its life from zero point. More precisely, Dasein is thrown into the world which is determined politically and culturally beforehand. This shows that Dasein takes over its *heritage* (Heidegger 1962). This is why history should not be understood something that *fait accompli*. Rather, the past is something that Dasein brings it into its present. Dasein discloses its possibilities by handing down its heritage. Dasein projects both its *fate* and *destiny* -the destiny which comes from its communal characteristic- to the future through its possibilities. This projection depends on *repetition*. Repetition is not a concept that corresponds to mimesis. Dasein discloses its historicity through bringing it into its present and this historicity that is brought by repetition gives a possibility to Dasein in order to create new meanings and senses. In this process, Dasein understands or projects not only itself but also it understands its situation which is to realize being in its *generation* (Heidegger 1962). This also gives a possibility to act politically. In this context, *tradition* is a very important concept. Heidegger does not use the concept of repetition in order to reanimate the past culture or to organize the society accordingly. Repetition also means to overcome the *tradition*, and to hand down its possibility in order to make its own decisions. By handing down its historicity, Dasein can have a guide about making its own decision; this also prevents Dasein to make an arbitrary decision. On the other hand, this gives us the possibility to

overcome both the domination of sciences and foundationalist historical understanding. Society becomes a project that depends on people's choices in order to create a new society. In this regard, repetition is not displayed as an abstract or idealist effort. Handing down the historicity makes Dasein free in its futural being. What the communal organization will be is released to a meaning that is brought from repetition, that is to say *hermeneutic*, by Heidegger. In this way, it is possible to leave behind understanding the subject deterministically and to reveal the creative subject.

Accordingly, in the chapter two, I discuss the Descartes' philosophy through identifying the concepts of cogito, substance and the world. In this regard, I elaborate that how Descartes constitutes its philosophy and how he associates these concepts to each other. In this way, I explain the key concepts in the process of constituting the modern subject. In the following part, I present the critique of Heidegger on the use of these concepts in Descartes' philosophy. In this sense, I explain why Heidegger challenges to Descartes and how he re-interprets these concepts in accordance with his own perspective. Following these discussions, I conclude this chapter by explaining the situation of the modern subject and its impasse. I use the essay of *The Age of The World Picture* in order to explain the situation and problems of the modern world in the perspective of Heidegger. Especially, I elaborate the position of science and its relation with reason. In the chapter three, I problematize the problem of the lack of temporality in the constitution of the modern subject. In this regard, I give an explanation to how Heidegger interprets the relation of Dasein with temporality. It is also a comparison between the vulgar understanding of time which consists of past, present, and future and the primordial temporality which consists of having-been, future, and making present. In this regard, I examine the temporality of Dasein under three categories: *everydayness*, *finitude*, and *historicity*. These refer to temporal unity of Dasein.

Thus, the temporality of Dasein is divided into three phases; everydayness of Dasein and its political situation are primarily analyzed. In this part, I show that Dasein is fallen in its everydayness and it cannot have its understanding and interpretation. For this reason, the everydayness of Dasein cannot give us a possibility to gain political characteristic for Dasein. Then, the finitude of Being of Dasein is examined; it shows that finitude of Being of Dasein comes from its death. Therefore, in this part, death is examined and its possibility to create a new political meaning is interrogated. In this sense, I assert that death is understood at individual level by Heidegger, therefore, Dasein has no possibility to gain its own political characteristics through its death. Following these discussions, I conclude that these temporal characteristics of Dasein -death and everydayness- do not enable us to reveal the political characteristic of Dasein. However, in the following part, it is suggested that historicity of Dasein can give us a ground for the politics of Dasein, as the main argument of this thesis. Historicity is the way that Dasein discloses its possibilities, in this way, Dasein hands down its possibilities into its today in order to project itself to the future. Therefore, Dasein can understand itself and its generation by its historicity. Historicity is a guide that Dasein can make a decision with its generation. In this regard, by explaining the meaning of historicity, I conclude that the concept of repetition, which is the meaning of historicity of Dasein, is a ground where Dasein gains a political agency and engages in politics creatively. In this sense, repetition is the key concept that Dasein can gain political characteristics by it.

CHAPTER TWO: PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES AND ITS CRITICS BY HEIDEGGER

2.1. Cartesian Doubt and Cogito Ergo Sum

The main aim of the philosophy of Descartes is to gain in wisdom which is similar to the traditional philosophy. This wisdom is not for itself but at the same time which is to make a direction of people's life. However, for this, the knowledge should be deprived of any interpretation and comparison; it is necessary to find the basis and the first rule of knowledge because only by this way knowledge can be constituted in certainty. Therefore, naturally, philosophy starts to be identified as to search the basis and the first rule of knowledge. This is the first aim of the philosophy of Descartes.

For Descartes, philosophy is the science of sciences, therefore philosophy is always related to other sciences and it does not refer only to metaphysics. In this sense, he does not aim to engage in pure metaphysics but he aims to disclose the relation of metaphysics with sciences. Descartes explains this situation through the metaphor of a tree;

“Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics, and morals. By ‘morals’ I understand the highest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom” (Descartes 1985, p. 186).

As it has been stated that Descartes aims to reach the knowledge that cannot be doubted. He thinks that the ground of the knowledge has not been interrogated deeply. Therefore, the first duty is to ponder current knowledge and its ground.

“Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. And thus I realized that once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences” (Descartes 1998, p. 17).

As it is seen in this quotation, the method of Descartes is *scepticism*. Examinations that have been done by him could not give an answer to the suspicion of Descartes. But Descartes still thinks that he can reach the basis of knowledge. However, the scepticism as a method of Descartes is different from scepticists’. According to him, scepticists use suspicion as an aim. But suspicion for Descartes is just a method in order to reach knowledge. As Williams states that “by contrast, Descartes treats scepticism as a mere methodological device, to be taken seriously only in the context of inquiries into ‘first philosophy,’ a context in which all practical concerns are temporarily set aside. Freed from practical constraint, Descartes can push scepticism to an unprecedented extreme” (Williams 2010, p. 288).

Before giving explanations about scepticism of Descartes, it is necessary to mention to what Descartes understands from faculties which have important roles for his philosophical method. Accordingly, the knowledge consists of two sides which are knowing and known. Knowing refers to human and known corresponds to objects. Objects which are ready for known by human, therefore the main issue is about how we can know them. In this sense, Descartes remarks that there are four faculties in human mind which are *cognitive, imagination, memory, and sensation*. The important faculty for Descartes is the cognitive one because this faculty has a priority over others. There is no knowledge without cognitive faculty. Besides, the cognitive faculty of human does not need other faculties in order to process itself. It also does not need other subjective faculties that are not included in the category of enabling human to reach clear and distinct knowledge. Therefore, Clarke (2003) asserts that he argues that this cognitive ability is a single power rather than, for

example, a number of distinct faculties. In this context, Descartes notes that cognitive faculty of mind functions with *intuition*. So, how does human use the intuition?

Descartes grounds the intuition through mathematics because human can have clear and distinct knowledge only through mathematics. The data of mathematics is not subjective, and it is not depended on observation and experiment. As Clarke states that "the focus of his remarks is, rather, the problem that is explicitly addressed in the rules by its author-namely, how to devise a method for acquiring scientific knowledge. Descartes suggests that all our knowledge derives from only two sources, intuition and deduction" (Clarke D 2003, p. 161). Therefore, it is also certain and there is no doubt about its exactness. In this sense, Descartes asserts two kinds of method to reach clear and distinct knowledge. One of them is *logic* which provides human to reason. Through reasoning, human can know clear and distinct knowledge and human can derivate other knowledge by knowledge that is already reached. That is the second method which is called *deduction*. Therefore, deduction can be thought of as a transition to derivate knowledge. Here, mathematical intuition, which its correctness straightly has given to the human mind, reaches to explicitness without any further additional effort. On the other hand, human can pass from using clear knowledge to another knowledge through deduction. In this sense, it is safe to assert that Descartes tries to pose a method in which all knowledge can be relational and grounded in certainty. It is possible to observe this in the principles of science such as causality principle, principle of accuracy or principle of noncontradiction.

Here, it is necessary to examine how Descartes applies its suspicion because as he asserts that human can reach clear and distinct knowledge in this way. To do this, Descartes firstly suspects his senses and he asks that can human trust his/her senses? He gives the spoon in the water as an interrogating the trustability of senses. Accordingly, if I throw the spoon into water, it seems to me like bending but when I take out it from water it becomes to be reverted back and it means that my eyes had misguided me. As Harries (1973) explains that in order to doubt we must be able to conceive of the possibility that something may be different from the way it

presents itself to us essential to doubt is the contrast between what is and what appears to be, therefore, if one sense can misguide me, it would misguide me all the time. Then, senses of human cannot be useful to reach clear and distinct knowledge and Descartes begins to suspect his body. He explains the body with the famous dream analysis. Descartes asks this question: how can I understand the difference between reality and dream? It means that if the life that I realize is a dream or if the dream that I have is a reality. I never make away with suspicion in this context. Consequently, human cannot be sure about the external world in the process of reaching certain knowledge. In the rest of meditations, Descartes argues that there is no possibility to dispose of suspicion for the external world, therefore, sciences that are dependent on the knowledge of the external world cannot give us knowledge that cannot be suspected. However, two sciences are important for this issue and they have the precedence toward other sciences, which are mathematics and geometry. Thus, even if I am in a dream, the data of geometry and mathematics would be true. In this sense, Descartes asserts that I cannot be sure whether a reprobate gin tricks me in my dream, or not. As Marjorine Grene concludes that "it has always seemed to me a striking feature of the First Meditation that Descartes can dismiss particulars so much more easily than generals: once the dream argument has allowed him to consider that he may not be sitting by the fire clad in his winter dressing gown, he finds that generally remain, then more generals, and yet more universal matters, like astronomy, and finally only the most general of all, arithmetic and geometry, are left" (Greene M 199, p. 567).

In this context, there is a cancellation of external world and senses for Descartes. Therefore, the rest of it, with no doubt, is my being. So, what is the meaning of my being? Descartes answers to this question as;

“But now what am I, when I suppose that there is some supremely powerful and, if I may be permitted to say so, a malicious deceiver who deliberately tries to fool me in any way he can?...What about thinking? Here I make my discovery: thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am; I exist—this is certain... I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking

thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason—words of whose meanings I was previously ignorant. Yet I am a true thing and am truly existing; but what kind of thing? I have said it already: a thinking thing” (Descartes 1985, p. 65).

Here the motto of the modern world, which is the *cogito ergo sum*, shows up itself. Since thinking is an action and if I want to suspect anything, there should be a being which can suspect. Considering the cancellation of the external world, there is only one kind of being that I cannot suspect from it: my being. I cannot suspect that I can think, hence, *I think therefore I am*. This certain being is called as *ego* by Descartes. In this way, in Descartes philosophy, being subjects to the ego. "I" as an ego can exist as long as I think, and the suspicion method of Descartes reaches its end which is the certain knowledge. As Ricoeur states that "the cogito is without any genuine philosophical signification unless its positing is invested with the ambition of establishing a final, ultimate foundation" (Ricoeur 1992, p. 4). Ego is determined as the basis and first rule of philosophy, and source of knowledge

According to Descartes, the activity of thinking occurs in soul. To think is the work of soul. If it is so, where can I find the concept of God? After the determining the ego as first certain knowledge, Descartes undertakes the demonstrating and proving the existence of God and this effort will make him the founder of modern philosophy. Since, Descartes puts the ego into the center as *thinking thing* and this gives a priority to ego over the concept of God. According to Descartes, the concept of God can be interrogated only by providing the ego as thinking thing because the idea of God comes from the mind of ego and God corresponds the idea of perfection in human mind. In Descartes " the demonstration of Gods existence will allow me to resolve the question. However, this demonstration, as it occurs in the Third Meditation, reverses the order of discovery, or *ordo cognoscendi*, which ought to be the only one, if the cogito were in every respect the first truth, to lead from the "I" to God, then to mathematical essences, then to sensible things and to bodies” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 8). In this sense, for Descartes, God is equal with perfection which exists inborn in human mind because

this idea is put into human mind by God itself. This is the reason why human as having finite substance reaches the God which is the infinite substance.

Descartes explains the activity of thinking through ideas. These ideas exist in human mind and the first idea is given inborn to human mind like as the idea of God. The idea of God already exists in human mind as a perfection. The other idea comes from the external world to human and which are foreign to us. The last idea is fabricated ones by the very human being.

“But this is still not entirely satisfactory. For error is not a pure negation, but rather a privation or lack of some knowledge which somehow should be in me. And when I concentrate on the nature of God, it seems impossible that he should have placed in me a faculty which is not perfect of its kind, or which lacks some perfection which it ought to have” (Descartes 1984, p. 38).

Finally, it is essential to glance what Descartes understands from the concept of substance. The definition of substance for Descartes is that entity which exists in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to exist. Therefore, as it is understood, only God can have this kind of substance. However, although only God has this in a strict sense, there are also two kinds of substances which are created by God. "As Descartes points out, this definition for him literally applies only to God; yet it distinguishes substance from quality in the sense that as opposed to qualities, the substance needs only divine concurrence in order to exist" (Lennon 1974, p. 43). These substances are different from the substance of God in terms of being finite and they do not need each other. These bring themselves into existence through their essential characteristics. The first one of them is *res cogitans* which actualizes the activity of thinking and produces ideas. "Thus the cogito might very well be understood (especially given Descartes' views about the convertibility of all deductions into intuitions) as the inference---(1) if I think, I exist, (2) I think, therefore, (3) I exist--and it is precisely as such that Descartes defends the cogito in his reply to Hobbes' objections" (Lennon 1974, p. 48). The other one is *res extensa*

meaning entities that are extended in space and have an extension. *Res cogitans* which corresponds to thinking substance is in no need of extension to exist, on the other side, *res extensa* which corresponds to the occupant is in no need of thinking to exist. This distinction is explained through the example of the metaphor of wax by Descartes. The wax is a matter that has extension, weight, smell, and form. The mind can know the wax through these characteristics. However, when the wax is burned, it loses its characteristics and in time it disappears. In this context, if the wax disappears in terms of the characteristics of *res extensa*, the mind can still know the wax in terms of *res cogitans*. Therefore, changes that are occurred in *res extensa* do not have effects on *res cogitans*. "Descartes suggests that we, therefore, need a distinction between those features of the wax that can change without the wax ceasing to be wax and those that are so essential that, without them, it would no longer be wax at all" (Clarke 2003, p. 218). This dualism is valid for the relationship between soul and body. Soul corresponds to *res cogitans* which is thinking being and body corresponds to *res extensa* which is extended in space, and they are independent of each other.

2.2. Dualism and the Concept of the World

In the previous section, the method of Descartes has been explained. Accordingly, human can reach clear and distinct knowledge through suspicion and also the basis and first rule of knowledge. The suspicion about the external world does not give us certain knowledge. Then, Descartes concludes that there is the only thing that cannot be suspected about it which is the own being, and this being subjects to the activity of thinking. The thinking thing is identified with the soul. In this sense, making a distinction between soul and body creates the modern subject-object distinction. So, does the subject that is called thinking thing, just a knowing subject? Or, is there something more, is there another ability for the knowing subject?

For Descartes, it is not enough to have a mind for human because human should know how to use it. Ego is where suspicion ends and where human

comprehends its consciousness of its own being. By the same token, reason fulfills the thinking that provides a certain domain that human can be sure about itself. As it is seen, reason is presented the source of knowledge because of being above all suspicion by Descartes. Even though human is created by God, that is to say, the ontological reason of human is God, God gave the reason to human, therefore, human has the responsibility to use it rightly. If it is so, where to find the reason in human? Since the human being is independently divided into two camps by Descartes, reason should belong to the soul. Therefore, the soul is the source of knowledge and knowledge belongs to the soul. Also, the philosophy is fulfilled by the soul. Here, soul is the one that initiates to philosophize and is the one that maintains it. If the thinking thing is the one that initiates the philosophy, it should be the center and the first rule of philosophy. "It is intriguing to find Descartes suggesting that knowledge of God and the soul had prepared the way to knowledge of the foundations of physics. The claim is not entirely surprising, for in the Meditations consideration of God and the soul was closely connected with the solution to the radical doubt, through the cogito and the divine guarantee of intellectual perception" (Hatfield 1989, p. 179). In this sense, this question might be asked as to where the place of the body is in Descartes' philosophy. Body as *res extensa* has no ability to think and it is presented as something mechanical. However, human can reach the knowledge of body through thinking substance. In addition to this, human can reach not only the body but also the knowledge of nature through thinking. In this sense, nature and body come to be the same thing as *res extensa* and they are tied to thinking thing. As Osler states that "it must therefore be concluded with certainty that there is a certain substance, extended in length, breadth, and depth, and possessing all those properties which we clearly conceive to be appropriate to extended things; and it is this extended substance which we call body or matter. (Osler 1994, p. 206). Thus Descartes constitutes the subject-object relation. Although subject as thinking substance has no need another substance to reach its consciousness of being, the object as extended in a space needs object to be known. As it is seen, the subject is where the process of knowledge is initiated and ended. "For apart from the most general notions of being, number, duration,

etc. which apply to everything that we can conceive, we have only the notion of extension that is specifically for the body, and from that follow the notions of shape and movement; and for the soul on its own we have only the concept of thought, which includes perceptions of the understanding and inclinations of the will" (Clarke 2003, p. 38). This causes subject-object dualism which will be strictly problematic in modern metaphysics because, at this point, Descartes puts metaphysics in place because *thinking thing* and *extended thing* can be put in place only through metaphysics. Metaphysics is where Descartes puts the ego in the center. If philosophy cannot create the ego, metaphysics cannot initiate to itself for Descartes. Because metaphysics is the way that can enable to abstract, and it needs a starting point to initiate. Also, metaphysics is the only way for Descartes in order to create a new subject within the scope of substances. At this point, Descartes causes the historic moment for the modern world. Since when metaphysics is initiated by God in medieval metaphysics, after this point, metaphysics is revealed by ego. If ego is the starting point for metaphysics, it means that 'knowing subject' becomes to be converted to epistemological subject. Thus, knowledge seems to be arisen from ego and it comes into existence from this ego.

On the other hand, the mechanical understanding of the universe in Descartes' thought is very important. Before Descartes, the universe was to be conceived organically. In this understanding, the universe is a being that has spirituality and aliveness. However, to determine the universe as *res extensa* causes to make it mechanical and to reduce it to a system that consists of the cause and effect relation. The universe is depicted through mathematical rules and it can be understood through analytical reasoning. Also, the reasoning through mathematics and physics will give us the certain knowledge of the universe. As Osler states that "he regarded these principles as sufficiently powerful to provide demonstrative explanations of all phenomena, once they are known to us" (Osler 1994, p. 218). This also means that if thinking substance can dominate the body, it can dominate nature in the same way. "The mature Descartes, by contrast with the early Descartes, employed skeptical arguments, presented metaphysical arguments for the existence of God and the real distinction between mind and body, claimed to

have discovered the metaphysical foundations of physics, and proposed the remarkable doctrine that the eternal truths are God's free creations" (Hatfield 1989, p. 176).

To sum up, thinking subject is the one that can have clear and distinct knowledge through suspicion. This subject is the constituent of knowledge. However, through reasoning, it is not just the constituent of knowledge, but it is also the one that can know it, in this way it becomes the epistemological subject. It means that the subject can reach all the way that it goes to the knowledge of the universe on the basis of itself. This characteristic makes ego the lord of the universe. As Osler argues that "since his theory of perception was based on the motions of small particles of matter, ultimately even our empirical knowledge of the phenomena could be reduced to the laws of motion, which follow demonstratively from first principles. In this way, the entire physical world would be embraced by Descartes' mechanical philosophy, 'for having accepted these, all the rest, at least the more general things which I have written about the World and the Earth, seem to be scarcely intelligible otherwise than as I have explained them'" (Osler 1994, p. 218-219). Hence, for Descartes, this faculty is given to human by God in order to benefit from nature and to reign over nature. Human is the one that reaches the knowledge of objects through its reason and has the power to manipulate and organize it, because nature is the being that is unconscious for Descartes. In fact, to constitute a subject that reaches the consciousness of its being as *res cogitans*, which reinterprets the nature as *res extensa* and reevaluates the relation between human and nature in the direction of human interest will cause problematics that cannot be overcome for modern philosophy.

2.3. Heidegger's Critiques of Descartes

Descartes has an important position in Being and Time because Descartes' philosophy is a crucial turning point in the history of philosophy. If the critics on Descartes' philosophy can be propounded clearly, it would give us the possibility to move to other problems of modern philosophies. Therefore, the critics on

Descartes is also important for other philosophers, especially for Kant and Hegel, because the legacy of Descartes in the history of philosophy is taken over by the following philosophers. In this way, one can reach the knowledge about political behaviour of the modern subject which has been constituted in Descartes' philosophy. For this, these critics will be examined under two main topics. Firstly, the logical critics of the statement of *cogito ergo sum* by Heidegger will be disclosed, then along with, the concept of substance will be interrogated. Secondly, the concept of the world will be revealed in Descartes' philosophy. In this sense, "the principle which introduces subjectivity into the whole modern philosophy has two characteristics: it claims to bring about an absolutely certain beginning and, at the same time, thinking about being is not to be found there in as much as the *esse* is masked by the *sum* and so remains unthought in the shadow cast by the *ego*, the only thought in evidence" (Marion 1996, p. 75).

2.4. Critique of Cogito Ergo Sum and the Problem of Substance

As it has been examined, the statement of *cogito ergo sum* is the end point of methodological suspicion of Descartes. Through this statement, the absolute domination of the subject has been established for modern philosophy and the problem of subjectivity which is still continuing to be a problem in nowadays has been put into the center of philosophy. Putting the subject into the center of philosophy has caused to reduce the other beings to object because this relation was determined through some principles. The most famous and important one is the statement of *cogito ergo sum*. According to Heidegger, this statement has quite logical problems in itself. First of all, this statement is dependent on the distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. All predicates are laid on the *res cogitans*. The predicate of thinking becomes "I think", the predicate of agreeing becomes "I agree" and goes on (Heidegger 1982). Everything that happened is done by ego as thinking think. In this sense, Heidegger problematizes the use of *cogito*. Accordingly, the use of *cogito* is in darkness in Descartes. Does *cogito* in the statement of *cogito ergo sum* refers to the one that is thought or deed of thinking?

"Proceeding from beings which are known to the knower, the extension of this certainty is only able to satisfy the requirements of a method through the procedure of generalization by leaving indeterminate and in the shade of the question of the meaning of being for the ego" (Marion 1996, p. 77). This is very important because ego reaches self-consciousness in the process of thinking. Therefore, the second one, deed of thinking, seems more logical. However, the proposition of thinking that I think has a problem in itself, because, I may also think that I think that I think, and it can last forever. On the other hand, if the first proposition, which is the one that is thought, is true, we face another problem. Since, the one that is thought comes into existence in the thinking thing and which is the one that is thought, subjects to the one that thinks. This reduces the act of thinking to the category of object. In the end, thinking has appeared as equivocity. Firstly, thinking is a being that constitutes the being of what is thought; secondly, thinking is a being that is thought by reducing it to category of object (Heidegger 1982).

If Descartes puts the thinking as the condition of being, he has to prove its actuality. As it has been explained, the method of Descartes was suspicion and he began with suspecting from the external world. He understood that he cannot reach clear and distinct knowledge from the external world, he reflected its being, and he concluded the ego as the end point of suspicion. Then, he divided the being into two as thinking substance and extended substance. Descartes gave priority to *res cogitans* against *res extensa* and he even determined the *res cogitans* as the source of knowledge by subjecting cognitive faculty to soul. The problem is that Descartes begins with suspecting from the external world, which is *res extensa*, rather than *res cogitans*. In fact, according to Heidegger, it would be more proper to begin *with res cogitans*, because it is necessary to suspect firstly the being that suspects. Because, logically, there should be a being that suspects in order to suspect. This shows that Descartes, necessarily, recognizes the being that suspects as a priori. Suspicion is isolated from the being that suspects. "In condemning such a lack of determinateness, Heidegger is not contesting the certainty of the knowledge of the cogito qua cogito; it is even very remarkable that he does not get involved in the fashionable, though idle and facile, debate about the legitimacy of the reason which

led to a demonstration of the original, absolutely indubitable and necessary, existence of the *ego qua cogito*" (Marion, 1996, p. 77). Consequently, according to Heidegger, the concept of subject is not a concept that is reached, rather it is presupposed and recognized beforehand.

Furthermore, one of the main aims of Heidegger in *Being and Time* is to deconstruct the history of ontology. He does it through the question about Being. Accordingly, the point to interrogate is whether the question of Being has been asked or not. In this interrogation, Descartes is the important point because Heidegger asserts that the question of Being has been forgotten and covered up in the history of philosophy and it is valid for before Descartes, but the privilege point of Descartes in this sense is that he binds the being to subject, and this understanding makes itself apparent all philosophy after Descartes.

In this context, Heidegger focuses on the ontology of Descartes. Remember that Descartes constitutes the presupposition of *cogito ergo sum* in order to provide the new and radical basis for philosophy. However, according to Heidegger, the point that Descartes misses is the meaning of the *sum* as the way of being of *res cogitans* and this means that Descartes disregards the question of Being (Heidegger 1962). He has no doubt about the being of cogito, therefore, he does not have a need for problematizing the meaning of sum. In this sense, Descartes recognizes the *res cogitans* as pre-given without asking its way of being and he takes an entity, *res cogitans*, as equal with Being. On the other hand, there is also another assertion of Heidegger that Descartes remains faithful to ancient and medieval ontology. For medieval ontology, God is expressed as *ens creatum* and God is the one that creates everything, it is also *ens infinitum* that means to have infinite substance. Humans are also beings that are created by God and they have finite substances as objects. In this sense, Descartes inherits and protects these ideas. Also, in this sense, "the debate about the distinction between finite and infinite substance, a debate to which Descartes accords primary importance, only succeeds in reinforcing the basic orientation towards the ontic meaning of the term substance" (Marion 1996, p. 81). Despite the fact that Descartes tries to create a way that goes from subject to God,

this effort is not enough to overcome Medieval ontological understanding (Heidegger 1962).

Cartesian dualism depends on substances and there are three kinds of substance such as God, as infinite substance, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, as finite substances. Human has two of them which are *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. In fact, it causes to divide the being. Instead of interrogating totality of being, Descartes chooses to divide the being without paying attention to its totality. Furthermore, Descartes makes human stabilized into substances by sustaining the tradition of Western philosophy. These substances constitute the meaning of being, in this way, subjecting the being to substances is provided by Descartes. To put a particular substance into the concept of human is a problem that Heidegger argues against. Just because, to stabilize the subject as thinking substance causes to create isolated subject from its factual life. That is to say that "Heidegger pertinently points out that substance is not supposed to affect us directly" (Marion 1996, p. 81). On the other side, Descartes failed to make a connection between substances (Heidegger 1962). For example, Descartes tries to prove the idea of God through the point - described as a concrete one in the brain- that exists inborn in the human mind. This explanation is not enough to interrogate the problem concretely and he falls into speculative philosophy.

The concept of Dasein that Heidegger tries to constitute against Descartes' thinking subject is quite different. "What separates Descartes (and those he made possible) from the question of the meaning of being is what separates the ego cogito from Dasein" (Marion 1996, p. 83). There is no aim to make *Dasein* the meaning of Being or to subject the being to Dasein in Heidegger. The basis of Heidegger depends on ontological differences that refer to make a distinction between Being and entities. Any entity does not correspond to Being. In this sense, Dasein is just a kind of entity in the world among other entities. The other entities are *ready-to-hand* and *presence-to-hand* (Heidegger 1962). Present-at-hand corresponds to things in the world, but ready-to-hand is different from present-to-hand. Ready-to-hand refers to equipment that Dasein uses and they have a unity of meaning in themselves. To understand ready-to-hand, Dasein should use them. Dasein

discloses the world and itself by using them. As it is seen, Dasein has no domination over other entities. Besides, the knowledge or idea of these entities are not given to Dasein inborn or they are not constituted by the mind of Dasein. To understand them, Dasein should encounter with them and it should go into action. "Indeed, Heidegger is constantly telling us that in its circumspect dealings with the world, Dasein is already philosophical; and that "thought" itself is already practical" (Wolin 1990, p. 10). Factual life and agency are important concepts for Dasein. That is to say, Dasein is not an entity that reaches its self-consciousness which is constituted by presupposition about mind. It is rather a being that goes into action, in this way, it becomes to be one that discloses the world and itself, and gains meaning. This is why Heidegger calls Dasein as the shepherd of beings not as the lord of the beings (Heidegger 1993).

In other respect, Descartes determines the thinking as the essence and substance of subject. Heidegger does not recognize this kind of perspective. Of course, Heidegger recognizes the reason as a faculty of Dasein, however, reason is not the center of Dasein for Heidegger. According to Heidegger, if there is something like substance or essence for Dasein it would be its *existence* (Heidegger 1962). Since it is not true to understand the human through reason or as the synthesis of body and spirit. Dasein is nothing more than factually what it does. The choices of Dasein determine the existence of Dasein. In this sense, it is important to understand the action of Dasein for Heidegger. Heidegger criticizes Descartes in terms of its isolated subject, and he tries to embrace human through what it does in its running course.

2.5. Heidegger's Critique on the Concept of the Cartesian World

The dualism in Descartes' philosophy which depends on *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, has had power in modern philosophy. In this dualism, the world is determined as *res extensa* which corresponds to a being that has extension. According to Heidegger, the two sides of dualism are not revealed by Descartes himself and they are still in darkness.

Beings are determined through the concepts of substance by Descartes. Heidegger remarks that the concept of substance refers to two meanings in the works of Descartes. It sometimes means being of being, it sometimes refers to *very being*. Therefore, the meaning of *res corpora* should be disclosed in terms of its relationship with its substance (Heidegger 1962).

Res corpora makes itself apparent through attributes that constitute its substance. According to Heidegger, the world as *res corpora* is defined by Descartes through extension in terms of length (Heidegger 1962). In this definition, *extensio* is more important than others because *extensio* should exist beforehand in order to determine others. The characteristics of others are derived from the determination of *extensio*, therefore, the concept of the world in Descartes is determined through presupposing the *extensio* beforehand. This is why the corporeal being can sustain itself as the same even if it is divided or separated.

The definition of substance is "needs no other entity in order to be". (Heidegger 1962, p. 125). For Descartes, there are three substances which are God, *res cogitans*, and *res extensa*. God as *ens perfectissimum* that creates everything has infinite substance. The other substances that are created by *ens perfectissimum* have finite substance. According to Heidegger, although the distinction between the substance of God and other substances is endless, all of them is called a being. However, we are using the predicate of "is" for all of them, as "God is" and the "world is", this would mean that we are identifying them in the same way. In this way, "this evasion is tantamount to his failure to discuss the meaning of Being which the idea of substantiality embraces, or the character of the 'universality' which belongs to this signification" (Heidegger 1962, p. 126). Therefore, the meaning of division of being in terms of substance, also the ontological meaning of substances, is recognized self evidently by Descartes.

The concept of the world is forced into *res extensa* by Descartes. The problem is that Descartes determines the world as *res extensa* which refers to a being that has extension, it causes to determine substance of being through its very characteristics. If we think about the *ontological differences*, Descartes uses the concept of substance sometimes its ontological meaning and sometimes its ontic

meaning (Heidegger 1962). Here, the characteristic of *res extensa* corresponds to the ontic meaning and the very being of *res extensa* corresponds to the ontological meaning. In this regard, Descartes failed to prove the ontological meaning of substance that he imposes the world. Because he tries to determinate the substance of *res extensa* not through its very being but through its characteristics of its being.

On the other hand, the relation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, becomes to be problematic in this dualism. *Res cogitans* is determined as thinking substance and *res extensa* is determined as having extension. In this respect, for Descartes, thinking thing can reach the knowledge of extended thing through its reason. Therefore, the world is presented as ready to be known by the subject. The main action of the subject is to know. The process of knowing means to know the world through mathematical examination. Descartes puts the mathematics into the knowledge of *res extensa* to reach the absolute knowledge of the world in the relation between subject and object. This means that the knowledge of the world is equal to knowledge of mathematics. According to Heidegger, Descartes dictates the being of the ego to the being of the world. In this way, ontological meaning of the world becomes epistemological meaning of the world. Heidegger identifies this perception as transferring the traditional ontology into modern physics.

“Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp. In this way Descartes explicitly switches over philosophically from the development of traditional ontology to modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations” (Heidegger 1962, p. 129).

The determination of the world is under the initiative of subject by Descartes and he precludes the disclosing the world through other possibilities of subject by reducing the knowledge of the world to mathematical knowledge. This

has been put as a principle by Descartes and the world becomes to be a machine that is the essential ontological constitution and the only way that subject should do is to use its reason which determines the relation ego and the world.

“By taking his basic ontological orientation from traditional sources and not subjecting it to positive criticism, he has made it impossible to lay bare any primordial ontological problematic of Dasein; this has inevitably obstructed his view of the phenomenon of the world, and has made it possible for the ontology of the 'world' to be compressed into that of certain entities within-the-world. The foregoing discussion should have proved this” (Heidegger 1962, p. 131).

On the other hand, the problem of values of things becomes another problem if the knowledge of the world is considered to be under the domination of reason. Descartes determines the things as *res extensa* which has no consciousness and has just extension. This causes to classify innerworldly beings through embracing its qualities. Therefore, these beings gain their values through their usability, efficiency, beneficial for subject. According to Heidegger, this perspective makes the world a being that is constituted like a store that human can use it. This makes nature subjected to subject dogmatically.

“The Cartesian analysis of the 'world' would thus enable us for the first time to build up securely the structure of what is proximally ready-to-hand; all it takes is to round out the Thing of Nature until it becomes a full-fledged Thing of use, and this is easily done” (Heidegger 1962, p. 132).

Hence, what is the difference from Heidegger's assignment of meaning to the concept of the world than Descartes' assignment? What is the relation between Dasein and the world, and what is the place of the world related to the question of the meaning of Being? To answer these questions, we will make the critics of Descartes clearer.

First of all, the main problem of the philosophy of Descartes is his world understanding for Heidegger. The world that Descartes constitutes, makes the world a being that is severely distinctive from human. This distinction destroys the relationship of human with the world in terms of existing in the world. In contrast to this, Dasein is a being that exists in the world which is the basic characteristic of it. As Tonner states that “there is no Dasein without world and no world without Dasein. Dasein is its ‘there’, it is its ‘disclosedness’” (Tonner 2010, p. 73), therefore, Dasein and the world are not independent of each other, for that matter, they complete each other. Being-in-the-world is the ground of existence of Dasein and Dasein discloses its existence through the phenomenon of the world. The world discloses itself phenomenologically in beings that are in the world. Therefore, Heidegger describes the world as “thus, to give a phenomenological description of the 'world' will mean to exhibit Being of those entities which are present-at-hand within the world, and to fix it in concepts which are categorial” (Heidegger 1962, p. 91). Accordingly, if we look at the world, we encounter with beings that are things as things of nature and things invested with value. These things constitute what we call the world. If these things are understood with the Cartesian understanding, substances of these should be recognized and their relation is reduced to their causality which depends on mathematical data. In this way, things are embraced as presupposed, and the possibility of being discovered as their characteristics are destroyed. It would give us just the ontic knowledge of these beings.

“Neither the ontic depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the phenomenon of the world. In both of these ways of Access to Objective Being, the world has already been presupposed, and indeed various ways” (Heidegger 1962, p. 92).

If the concept of the world will be disclosed through entities, it could be explained through the *worldhood* of the world because the world has a

characteristics of the worldhood in itself that makes itself apparent to Dasein. In this sense, the world is not determined in the subjective sense, because the world is one of the existentials of Dasein, it is not a being that is determined by Dasein. From this point of view, the meaning of understanding the world ontically does not arise from a being that is presupposed but the characteristic of Being-in that refers to everydayness of Dasein in the world. This implies to what we call public that is the closest to the world of Dasein in its everydayness which is called as the *environmental world* (Heidegger 1962). On the other hand, the world as an existential of Dasein has the ontological meaning. The characteristic of worldhood signifies the unity of structure of the world which are a priori. The important point about these issues is that the concept of the world is not to be reduced to a being that is in the world, because these beings are in the category of in-the-world (Heidegger 1962). In this sense, the main argument that Heidegger tries to explain is that the world cannot be understood through focusing on beings in the world, because this causes to determinate the world on the basis of an entity in-the-world.

To interpret the world ontically is called as environmental world. Environmental world that Dasein is the part of it in its everydayness is the world that Dasein encounters with entities and establishes a relationship with them. This is the world that is not dependent on theoretical knowledge, and Dasein comes into existence in it. It means that Dasein cannot be isolated from this world, also, it lives factually in this world. Things that are encountered are divided into two as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. Especially, ready-to-hand has a priority and importance over present-at-hand. Since, Dasein does not understand them as extended things or ready to be known, as Descartes understands. Despite the fact that Dasein has theoretical knowledge about them, it understands them through using them. In this regard, "the object of the theoretical attitude is obtained through just such a methodological reduction and abstraction. It does not precede what is utilizable and ready-to-hand but follows it through an impoverishment and elimination. This operation which inverts the phenomenological pre-eminence of the *Zuhandenheit* over the *Vorhandenheit* comes from Descartes" (Marion 1996, p. 79). In addition to this, Cartesian understanding does not give a meaning to things but, for Dasein,

ready-to-hand has a unity of meaning. By using them, Dasein gets in contact with the world, because the sight of Dasein is *circumspection*, and Dasein values and gives meaning to them. According to Heidegger, ready-to-hand, which corresponds to *equipment*, is a topic that Descartes neglects. In fact, it is important because things have a potential in itself to be equipment, which is why Heidegger calls them as *present-at-hand*. This potentiality can be actualized only by Dasein because things need orientation of Dasein in order to be equipment. Dasein converts things to equipment through orienting itself to them and makes them valuable. This shows the difference of the understanding of objects from Descartes, because according to Heidegger (1962), the relation of Dasein with entities is beyond the mathematical knowledge. Besides, Dasein lives in public with other Daseins that uses and consumes ready-to-hand and present-to-hand. This publicness is the area of discovering other beings. As it is seen, while Descartes divides and stabilizes the being as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, Dasein is a being that constitutes its factual life actively and it understands the world as relational.

On the other hand, the ontological interpretation of the world is identified with the worldhood of the world. The world is the ground of encountering with beings shows us the “there” of ready-to-hand. In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 'there' and ready-to-hand discloses itself to Dasein through its very characteristics which are: *usability*, *detrimentality*, and *serviceability-for* (Heidegger 1962). These characteristics are the possibility of ready-to-hand in the world in terms of being disclosed for Dasein.

Why does Dasein need ready-to-hand in its everydayness? Since Dasein provides its daily needs and completes its works through using them. The characteristic of usability of ready-to-hand provides a possibility that Dasein orients towards them. Descartes determines the object through its extension and its characteristics of qualities are determined as modus of extension. However, equipment has its *signs* in itself. These signs evoke Dasein. This evoking is related to practical benefit that Dasein can have if it uses them, that is to say, equipment evokes Dasein through disclosing its characteristic of usability. However, if ready-to-hand is understood in the meaning of usability in order to provide practical

benefit, ready-to-hand could become an object that serves just the purpose of subject. In response to this, Heidegger remarks that the characteristic of 'belong to' is very important as well as usability. The qualities of ready-to-hand should be belong-to in order to determine their being in the world.

Ready-to-hand also has the characteristic of *significance*. Significance provides the possibility to discover the ready-to-hand as being in the world. This significance is related to *involvement* (Heidegger 1962). Significance and involvement imply the unity of meaning that Dasein makes itself apparent in its everydayness. It means that it is not possible to understand the locked door through isolation. Lock signifies protecting something or keeping something out of something. Therefore, the lock has no meaning by itself. That is to say, significance reveals itself as signs. By these signs, Dasein can use ready-to-hand for providing its needs in terms of its usability. In this sense, Karsten Harries asserts that "once again Heidegger resists an interpretation that would give priority to *Vorhandenheit*. He also invites us to reflect on the ontological significance of reliance on the *zunächst*, the first of all (Harries 2014, p. 58). As a result of these, ready-to-hand is comprehended with involvement. Therefore, it is clear that the main issue is to comprehend ready-to-hand through significance and involvement as a unity of meaning in contrast to divide and separate beings by referencing substances to them.

In this context, Heidegger mentions about 'letting something to be involved' in the ontical meaning. What is indicated is to comprehend a being as how it is before or to accept quintessentially. In this sense, the issue is not to let the being to be involved after coming into existence, but the issue is to discover it existingly in its very being ready-to-hand. Thus, it is the way that Dasein can encounter with them and discover them.

“Previously letting something ‘be’ does not mean that we must first bring it into its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an ‘entity’ must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must

thus let the entity which has this Being be encountered” (Heidegger 1962, p. 117).

In fact, involvement is to let something to be involved of readiness-to-hand. If I have involvement as a priori before encountering with a being, this shows that this being is not an object that has just an extension. Because it has been already discovered as an involvement before being encountered. Therefore, the being that is encountered is not firstly a world-stuff for Dasein. “Heidegger thus understands *Bewendenlassen* (involvement) as letting something ready-to-hand be the thing it is. I see a stone as a tool for hammering, as ready-to-hand” (Harries 2014, p. 60).

“To the extent that any entity shows itself to concern – that is, to the extent that is discovered in its Being- it is already something ready-to-hand environmentally, it just is not ‘proximally’ a ‘world-stuff’ that is a merely present-at-hand” (Heidegger 1962, p. 118).

From this point of view, the potentiality of being equipment of ready-to-hand shows itself in the environmental world. The discovery of them by Dasein, in the sense of letting something to be involved, is far away from comprehending them as an object that is encountered. So, the process of converting present-at-hand to ready-to-hand does not refer to shaping them according to some particular ratio and measurement. Because here is where the worldly characteristic of ready-to-hand reveals. Dasein discovers them towards the world because the involvement of ready-to-hand presents itself as with-which and in-which. In fact, these two concepts refer to the characteristic of for-the-sake-of-which. It is also the same for Dasein. Dasein always signifies with reference to the for-the-sake-of-which and it understands ready-to-hand in the characteristic of wherein. By this way, the concept of the world can be reached.

“The wherein of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that

belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world" (Heidegger 1962, p. 119).

Dasein encounters with ready-to-hand within involvements and reaches to them. As long as Dasein exists, it continues to use ready-to-hand. That is to say, for existing of ready-to-hand, equipment should be used by Dasein. The using of equipment is a reflection of the existence of Dasein towards beings that are in the world because the process and shapes of equipment show the characteristics of Dasein. It means that the being-in-the-world of Dasein lies behind the relation of it with the world. This relation reveals what it is called the phenomenon of the worldhood.

"This system of relations, as something constitutive for worldhood, is so far from volatilizing the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are 'substantially' in themselves" (Heidegger 1962, p. 122).

The other important issue related to the concept of the world is space. The basic way of Being of Dasein is defined as *being-in-the-world*. The substance of Dasein is its existence with regard to being-in-the-world. Existence describes Dasein as a dynamic being rather than a static being. Dasein, as a being in the world, shares the world with other beings, therefore, the world of Dasein is with-world. This understanding is beyond the Cartesian world understanding because the world of Dasein factually is dynamic, relational, and alive. Therefore, Dasein is not isolated from this world, also, it makes itself apparent in this world. This is the establishing of spatiality because spatiality is in relation to the world. Spatiality which is inherent in a being is grounded in the worldhood of the world.

Firstly, if we tackle the spatiality of ready-to-hand, we see them in a spatiality. As it is understood by its name, ready-to-hand has the characteristic of

close by (Heidegger 1962). Dasein encounters with them in close by because these are beings that always are close by Dasein. However, this "close by" is not a distance that is determined through measurement. "Every entity that is 'to hand' has a different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring distance. This closeness regulates itself in terms of circumspectively calculative manipulating and using" (Heidegger 1962, p. 135). Closeness is the basic way of being of ready-to-hand. The important matter is that spatiality of ready-to-hand cannot be determined as the position that it has an extension. For example, if we try to fix an electronic machine and we need a screwdriver, we look involvedly at the tool bag. Since the place of the screwdriver is the tool bag and we firstly intend to look at it circumspectively. Here, we encounter with another characteristic of ready-to-hand which is to belong somewhere. They are in their place or not. If we find a screwdriver in the tool bag, we say that it is in its place if it is not there, we say that it is not in its place. This shows the spatiality of ready-to-hand as being there and yonder. This is why we look at the tool bag in order to find a screwdriver. Since screwdriver as equipment that belongs to the unity of hand tools and the place of hand tools is toolbag involvedly. This belonging to somewhere is called *region* in terms of the characteristic of whither of ready-to-hand by Heidegger (Heidegger 1962). Therefore, "regions get their unity through activities: think of a workshop, a kitchen, a village as regions. Things have their proper places or are out of place in such region" (Harries 2014, p. 66-67).

The region does not mean the sum of objects that occupies a commonplace because this understanding could be understood measuring the space. Regions cannot be determined through mathematical data because they are discovered in everyday dealings. They are expressed through directions such as left, right, down or up, rather than their multiple dimensions. There of ready-to-hand can be identified with reference to other ready-to-hand in terms of *directions*. Heidegger gives the movement of the sun as an example. Accordingly, we arrange the rooms of our home with regard to the sunny side of and shady side of buildings (Heidegger 1962). We form the rooms, in order to provide spatiality to ready-to-hand, to use

sunlight efficiently. In this sense, the world can be understood as the region of regions (Harries 2014).

On the other hand, if Dasein cannot find particular equipment in its place, it can discover its *spatiality* because it is not in its place. Here, the familiarity of Dasein shows itself to us. The place of ready-to-hand constitutes the familiarity of Dasein in the world and it shows that ready-to-hand has its specific spatiality. As Heidegger states that "the space which is discovered in circumspective Being-in-the-world as the spatiality of the totality of equipment, always belongs to entities themselves as the place of that totality" (Heidegger 1962, p. 138). However, although ready-to-hand has its own spatiality, Dasein is the main reason of its spatial characteristic. To be in a spatiality is one of the ways of being of Dasein, but spatiality of Dasein is not the same as the spatiality of ready-to-hand. "Dasein is essentially not a Being-present-at-hand, and its "spatiality" cannot signify anything like occurrence at a position in 'world-space', nor can it signify Being-ready-to-hand at some place" (Heidegger 1962). Because they are just beings in the world that are encountered in the world through dealings. Differently, the facts that constitute the spatiality of Dasein are *de-severance* and directionality. De-severance is one of the ways of being of Dasein that means to act. Dasein gets beings close by removing distance and it provides a possibility to encounter also which is the way to have access to worldly beings. "In Dasein, there lies an essential tendency towards closeness" (Heidegger 1962 p. 109). In this context, Heidegger gives technological advance as an example in order to explain the tendency towards de-severance of Dasein. The distance which has worldly meaning can be removed through radio. It also means the removal of the environmental world. In this context, it is important to understand the concept of distance in the sense of how Heidegger uses it differently from Descartes. According to Descartes, object is a being that is an extension and the knowledge of object can be given by mathematical data. Therefore, the distance between Dasein and an entity should be determined by mathematical analysis for Cartesian understanding, because de-severance signifies a particular distance in itself. However, for daily life, mathematical predictions may be changed or differed from. Although it can happen, distance is a particular

determination which can be comprehensible for Dasein. Heidegger makes this issue apparent by giving examples from daily life. "We say that to go over yonder is 'a good walk', 'a stone's throw, or as long as it takes to smoke a pipe. These measures express not only that they are not intended to 'measure' anything but also that the remoteness here estimated belongs to some entity which one goes with concerned circumspection" (Heidegger 1962, p. 140). The important point is that the relation of Dasein with ready-to-hand in the environmental world in terms of spatiality is not a determination that divides as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, because de-severance is a determination that is related to both which gets close and which removes distance. As Heidegger states that "a pathway which is long 'Objectively' can be much shorter than one which is 'Objectively' shorter still but which is perhaps 'hard going' and come before us as interminably long" (Heidegger 1962, p. 140). As it is seen in this explanation, the units of measurements that are objectively calculated may not match up with determinations as distance or closeness where Dasein comprehends in its everydayness. This is also a critique of subject-object relationship because Descartes reduces the object to extended being and he stabilizes it into extension. He ignores the spatiality of ready-to-hand and Dasein, also their relationship between them. Because the main reason why Descartes constitutes these determinations is to sacrifice the object for the sake of establishing the subject.

“When one is oriented beforehand towards 'Nature' and 'Objectively' measured distances of Things, one is inclined to pass off such estimates and interpretations of de-severance as 'subjective'. Yet this 'subjectivity' perhaps uncovers the 'Reality' of the world at its most Real; it has nothing to do with 'subjective' arbitrariness or subjectivistic 'ways of taking' an entity which 'in itself' is otherwise. *The circumspective de-severing of Dasein's everydayness reveals the Being-in-itself of the 'true world'--of that entity which Dasein, as something existing, is already alongside*” (Heidegger 1962, p. 141).

The characteristic of de-severance of Dasein differs its spatiality from spatiality of ready-to-hand. De-severance of Dasein, which is to get something close, is not just dislocation of ready-to-hand. Since Dasein incorporates the ready-to-hand into its circle of circumspective dealings. Therefore, in this sense, the spatiality of Dasein is not just to occupy a place or to have an extension in a place. when something is close by, this means that is within the range of what is proximally ready-to-hand for circumspection. The important point is that close by is not reduced to the mere act of the body because close by is circumspection and circumspection constitutes the existing in the world. Therefore de-severance establishes the spatiality of Dasein in terms of its being-in-the-world. In this being-in-the-world, Dasein has always circumspection about entities in its *environmental world* which makes Dasein as always being there. "In this way, Dasein, in accordance with its spatiality, is proximally never here but yonder; from this 'yonder' it comes back its 'here'; and it comes back its 'here' only in the way in which it interprets its concerned Being-toward in terms of what is ready-to-hand yonder" (Heidegger 1962, p. 142).

Consequently, existing of Dasein as spatially arises from its characteristic of de-severance. Dasein discovers entities within the environmental world with circumspection and in this way, it becomes a being that is in the world and has spatiality.

As it has been explained, the characteristic of de-severance of Dasein has always a direction and its close by acts through direction in its region. Here, the signs of ready-to-hand show the direction of them, therefore, the direction of Dasein towards signs has the whither. "If Dasein is, it already has, as directing and de-severing, its own discovered region. Both directionality and de-severance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern" (Heidegger 1962, p. 143). When one direction is indicated, it generally refers to the concepts of left and right as directions. These directions have been recognized that arise from the body of Dasein. Therefore, a lot of equipment is made in accordance with the body of Dasein, such as making a glove which differs as the right hand and

left hand. However, some of the equipment is made independently of differences of right and left hand. Hammer can be given as an example because there is no difference between right and left. Therefore, the question that is related to subjectivity of the concepts of directions comes to the fore. According to Heidegger, the directions as right and left are not subjective, and they are not feeling of Dasein. Thus, right and left, as directions, are the directions of directedness of Dasein towards ready-to-hand.

In the context of subjectivity of the concepts of directions, Heidegger examines the example of Kant. Accordingly, let's assume that we get into the room which is familiar and dark. Objects that are in the room are carried from right side to left side. If we are not disoriented, we cannot severalize directions just with feelings. To find direction we should embrace an object. According to Heidegger, in this sense, Kant would assume that I should keep the place of object in my memory. On the contrary, Heidegger assumes that I should move in the world which is familiar to me in order to find direction and he remarks "that I am already in a world is no less constitutive for the possibility of orientation than is the feeling for right and left" (Heidegger 1962, p. 144). The point is what Heidegger explains is the concepts of directions arise from the involvement of being-in-the-world rather than subjectivity. Because, especially considering the philosophy of Descartes, object is determined by subject in the dualism of them. Also, subject is considered as thinking thing which has no world in its constitution, therefore, it is expected that directions arose from this subject. However, as Heidegger shows, directions cannot arise from a subject that is recognized a priori and isolated from the world rather they can arise from the characteristic of being-in-the-world of Dasein.

De-severance and directionality constitute the spatiality of Dasein in terms of being-in-the-world. The important point is that neither the spatiality of ready-to-hand nor being-in-the-world can be reduced to mathematical examinations as Descartes asserts. For Heidegger, the concept of spatiality is not to know the world which is determined but to discover it and to exist in it.

Dasein is the one that discovers the world through the worldhood of the world. Discovering is made up of involvement and circumspection. This also

constitutes the spatiality of being-in-the-world. In this sense, Heidegger uses the concept of encountering in order to break the Cartesian subject-object dualism. Encountering refers to the relation between Dasein and other entities. This encountering has occurred in the specific spatiality of ready-to-hand within the environmental world. For Heidegger, this encountering is to 'give them space'. "This 'giving space', which we also call 'making room' for them, consists in freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality" (Heidegger 1962, p. 146). Dasein, in relation to ready-to-hand, is the one who changes their places and locates them. However, Dasein does not do it because of being rational being or dominator of objects; this comes from being-in-the-world of Dasein, and it is the one who discovers ready-to-hand within the environmental world. In other words, to locate ready-to-hand does not depend on the mathematical or geometrical knowledge about them, but to discover them in a spatiality. For this reason, space is neither in the subject nor the world is in space. Space is rather 'in' the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is the constitutive for Dasein (Heidegger 1962 p. 146). As it is seen, to determine the space as *res extensa* or *res cogitans* is incorrect, because Dasein and other entities gain their characteristics of spatiality from being-in-the-world.

Another issue about modern philosophy for Heidegger (1962) is to embrace the world through dimensions; in this way, this embracing destroys the discoverability of the world. Because the object is determined with its extension and other characteristics of objects are modus of extension for Descartes. Therefore, the environmental world and spatiality have no meaning for subject. Modern philosophy ignores the involvement and signs of ready-to-hand. This causes to convert the environmental world into natural world for the modern subject. In this sense, there is no distinction between equipment and objects that are in the world. The world becomes to be a space that consists of the sum of objects in the world. To reduce the characteristics of ready-to-hand into ordinary objects means to examine the Dasein and ready-to-hand without the worldhood of the world. Also,

"world here names not such a logical space, as a space of meanings. Their places in this world give things their meanings" (Harries 2014, p. 69).

2.6. Construction of the Modern Subject and Society

Descartes is recognized as the founder of modern philosophy. The philosophical system that he constituted is dependent on embracing human as the center of philosophy by suspending God and Being. Thus, he puts the ego into the philosophy that has been creating a problem which is determinative for succeeding in philosophy, therefore, the problem of dualism between subject and object has become one of the important issues that is inextricable.

The most important legacy of Descartes is dualism that is dependent on the distinction between subject and object. In this dualism, subject, which is ego, corresponds to thinking thing, and object is the extended being. The main function of ego is to think or to know. Either knowledge of nature or knowledge of object is dependent on the subject. The concept of modern individual arises from this distinction. Modern individual is assumed as a substance that can make true decision through using its reason. That is to say, modern individual is equal to thinking substance in the society. Therefore, in fact, being modern is to be rational at the same time. The main issue is to use reason, which is inborn for human, but that is also learned through education. Education means to learn how to use reason in modern world. Since modern individual is not a subject that goes into action but is a subject that knows. As Descartes recognizes ego as a priori, modern individual is recognized as a priori in the society. Ego is a political actor that constitutes itself from itself.

Dualism between subject and object causes dichotomies in the relationship of human with society. Hitherto, being is embraced by the means of dichotomy that is put in Descartes' philosophy in order to understand the world and human. It can be observed within Kant's philosophy, making the distinction between the practical and pure reason, or within Hegel's dichotomy of master and slave. Marx can also

be counted as one of the important thinkers who use dichotomy in the explanation of class struggle. In this way, the relation between human and society has not been understood as a whole.

Determining the subject as rational paved the way for grasping society as a rational organization. Therefore, the issue of the modern world turned out to be the relationship between rational subject and rational society. Subject organizes society by using its reason. Here, the concept of subject is ideal. Regarding Descartes, society comes to be an object that consists of subjects. The knowledge of object has been determined through reason which shows itself apparent in mathematical examinations. If society is understood as an object, it becomes the same thing with nature, and knowledge of nature is dependent on mathematics and physics. Therefore, in the historical process, society was embraced like nature which is mechanical. Descartes has already paved the way for modern science through dualism. If the knowledge of society can be calculated, individuals could be organized through it. That is to say, while an individual has been recognized as a subject, it has become the object of itself. Because, despite the fact that subject refers to be rational, it has been confined to be the object of modern science and modern politics. However, the domination of reason on society and modern science has been criticized drastically by Nietzsche, and this has caused a loss of confidence about rationality. The danger of determining the reason as a dominator over society and nature has only been realized after the Second World War.

The other important legacy of Descartes is the concept of substance. Attributing particular substance is to isolate human from the world. Politically, understanding human being in terms of a particular substance is to ignore his/her existence which refers to what he/she does in the world. In this sense, subject loses its dynamics and aliveness. In addition to this, attributing particular substance causes universalizing the particular subject understanding. This is why Descartes and other philosophers who inherited his philosophy have tried to find particular telos for human and nature. Therefore, the understanding of the process has become the telos of the modern world. Also, this can be seen in current political discussions which consist of two sides: progressivist and reactionists. However, if there is one

truth as modern philosophy and modern science assert, that is: individuals should be organized in the concept of the modern self, which means that there is nothing different from geography to another or from a culture to another culture. This also is to reduce humans' relation with nature in the same manner.

Lastly, the Cartesian understanding of the world is one of the important topics which has an influence on a modern political subject. Accordingly, nature is a mechanic, dead, and it has no consciousness. Also, ego is a thinking thing that reaches its own consciousness; it has the right to dominate and reign over nature. In the modern world, the concept of the world, which comes from Descartes, has been inherited by the modern world which presents the world an energy stock. (Heidegger 1993, p. 320). In this sense, how to reach nature? The knowledge of the world, which means the knowledge of the matter, is determined by mathematical data which has created the basis for modern science. Accordingly, the world functions mechanically in the cause and effect relationship. The aim of modern science is to solve this relationship because in this way human can control all the world. Therefore, in the modern sense, the world is presented as not where human dwells but as an epistemological object that is to be solved. This also perpetuates the destructive effects of capitalism and causes today's ecological problems; for these reasons, Cartesian world understanding still poses a problem. With regard to this, the assertion of modern science to make the world a better place for humans has been losing its confidence. The need for a new world understanding is inevitably required.

In this context, in the essay of *The Age of The World Picture*, Heidegger argues the consequences of the modern world understanding. In this regard, as Heidegger states that “one of the essential phenomena of the modern age is science” (Heidegger 1993, p. 116). However, the modern science should be embraced in its relationship with modern metaphysics. Because, especially, technology as an important aspect of the modern science firstly makes itself apparent in metaphysics. For this reason, it is necessary to interrogate the essence of modern science. In this sense, Heidegger asserts that the modern science is different from *episteme* which refers to the science for Greek. Because, for Greeks, science does not aim to reach

exactness. Also they aim to understand things themselves. As Heidegger states that “neither medieval *doctrina* nor Greek *episteme* is science in the sense of research, for these it is never a question of experiment. To be sure, it was Aristotle who first understood what *empeiria* (*experientia*) means; the observation of things themselves their qualities and modifications under changing conditions and consequently the knowledge of the way in which things as a rule behave” (Heidegger 1993, p. 121). Therefore, *episteme* was not understood as a cumulation of knowledge that naturally leads to progression. While in Ancient Greece, *episteme* was to be possessed by means of experience, in the modern age, knowledge becomes a matter of experiment that crosschecks the exactness. That is why mathematics became the most important field of science in regard to the practice of abstraction and verification. Remember that Descartes constitutes its epistemology in metaphysics through mathematics. For Descartes, exactness of the knowledge is dependent on its correlation with mathematics, and everything can be translated into language of mathematics which is numerical. “Only because numbers represent, as it were, the most familiar instance of the mathematical, is ‘mathematical’ promptly reserved as a name for the numerical” (Heidegger 1993, p. 119). In this sense, the main issue is to stabilize the knowledge. This stabilization of knowledge should be in the direction of particular method and this causes the institutionalization of knowledge. This is why researchers become more important than scholars.

“Hence the decisive development of the modern character of science as ongoing activity also forms men of a different stamp. The scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the research man who is engaged in research projects. These, rather than the cultivating of erudition, lend to his work its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man no longer need a library at home” (Heidegger 1993, p. 125).

In this context, calculation is the center of the modern science because research is dependent on calculation. There is nothing that cannot be calculated by

the modern researcher because it is necessary to calculate everything in order to 'set in place'. The ground of this is the metaphysics of Descartes because Descartes reduces the beings to extended things and objects of the sciences. As Heidegger states that "what is to be is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing, and truth is first defined as the certainty of representing, in the metaphysics of Descartes" (Heidegger 1993, p. 127).

On the other hand, the understanding of subject is constituted in metaphysics by abstracting it from the world and it causes the subjectivism. Therefore, the issue of existential side of human has disappeared and the relationship of human with the world has been lost. "This metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to man and none at all to the I" (Heidegger 1993, p. 128). In this sense, the modern subject is abstracted from its factual life and it is determined beforehand. This situation is described as "world picture" by Heidegger. In this regard, world picture does not correspond to a copy of something or an imitation. Also world picture means to get everything into the picture. Here, the world is not a picture but the world is grasped as a picture. Despite Heidegger argues for discovering the world by human, the world is something that can be limited and determined in modern age. If we consider the Descartes' philosophy, the world is presented as *res extensa* which can be known by human through science. Therefore, in the modern age, epistemology is more important than ontology because everything is dependent on knowing. This is why modern age conceives the world as a picture and

CHAPTER THREE: OVERCOMING THE IMPASSE OF MODERN POLITICAL SUBJECT

There is no doubt that modern political subject is dependent on reason. In the process that begins with the presupposition of Descartes which is cogito ergo sum, philosophers and political thinkers have tried to find a way that goes to reach the absolute truth. It is also valid for establishing of the modern political subject. However, the distinction between subject and object which is in the center of modern philosophy has not been overcome, and every effort to overcome it has caused to create the absolute and radical subject understanding which breaks loose from the factual life of human. This made itself apparent especially in the duration of World Wars in which the realization of the absolute and radical subject understanding took place. Despite the fact that democratic regimes and liberal thinking have power in the world system, modern subject understanding has remained inadequate for a better world and politics because it could not break out of the reign of reason. As a solution, Heidegger develops its fundamental ontology against modern philosophy which depends on subject. Heidegger criticizes modern philosophy in terms of its subject-object distinction and of its effort to understand the world and human epistemologically. The main solution is to come back to the roots of philosophy and to ask the question of Being again. In this way, it is possible to overcome the impasse of modern philosophy and modern science; and to gain a new perspective.

3.1. Problem of Modern Subject and the Concept of Dasein

The main issue that Heidegger challenges is the metaphysics because metaphysics remains in a subject-centered understanding. In the history of philosophy, the concept of human has several meanings in itself. For instance, in Aristotelian thought, human is embraced as a political animal whereas, in the Kantian sense, it is embraced as a transcendental subject, and for Descartes, it is ego. Therefore, Heidegger aims to outdistance these subject understandings and to

develop a new perspective with a non-subject centered understanding. To be able to understand in a better way, we should glance at the essays of Heidegger which are "The Origin of The Work of Art" and the "Lecturers on Parmenides". These writings examine the understanding of the ontology of pre-Socratics. Accordingly, subject was understood as a *hypokeimenon*, which means "that lies beneath". *Symbebekos* was used instead of object. *Symbebekos* means "to come together, to occur." For Aristotle, it is a technical term, defined as "that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor for the most part" (Preus 2007, p. 253). Also, in Latin experiences *hypokeimenon* becomes *subiectum* and *symbekos* become *accidens*. Heidegger (1993) points out that this alteration was the constituent of modern subject-object relation. Because, by this understanding, object became the thing that is liable to subject. In the modern age, the object-subject relation was determined in line with subject as dominator over object. However, this understanding cannot assist us in order to understand Dasein or Being, according to Heidegger: "Dasein is not a lord of beings, he is a spherer of beings" (Heidegger 1993, p. 245). The distinctive feature of Dasein is having existence among entities; and the other entities that are unlike Dasein, are called as *presence-at-hand* by Heidegger. In this regard, while existence determines Dasein itself, the other entities that have no existence, just exist. In this context, Dasein is presented as a being among beings that has existence as a substance. This substance does not refer to the stability of Dasein but dynamics of Dasein. Heidegger tries to comprehend being, its functions or events, rather than its stable characteristics.

Human is the entity that understands Being, however, this characteristic does not stem from its own character or its faculties but its mode of existence. Heidegger abstains from reducing human to its mere characteristics as Descartes and modern philosophy have done. Existence refers to going into action in daily life and projecting its own life with its own choices which depend on possibilities. Therefore, the concept of existence is associated with Dasein's activities in the world. In contrast to this, the priority of Dasein toward other beings is to ask the question of the meaning of Being. In this case, the importance of Dasein for

Heidegger is that Dasein is the one being that can be interrogated with the question of Being. However, Heidegger tries to embrace Dasein phenomenologically which means to tackle it through its being-there in the world. In contrast to this, the tradition of modern philosophy has tackled the subject a priori and it has been recognized beforehand. Lawrence Hass explains the state of Dasein in relation to the question of Being as:

"Dasein is at once a being which has Being, and is also a being that has the capacity to understand its own Being. And therefore, Heidegger designates Dasein as "the primary entity to be interrogated. Since Dasein's Being provides the best access to Being, i.e., since Dasein can make Being "transparent" to itself, then elucidating Dasein's Being becomes the first and best step toward understanding the nature of Being in general" (Hass 1988, p. 82).

One of the most important contributions of Heidegger to the literature is the distinction between ontic and ontologic. To grasp being as a being refers to the ontical side, on the other hand, the meaning of Being signifies to the ontological side. This distinction is called as ontological difference by Heidegger and he asserts that metaphysics falls into the grasping the ontic side of beings as the meaning of Being which causes to cover up the question of the meaning of Being. Although ontological differences refer to all history of metaphysics, Descartes is the one who embraces the human which is like the Being itself. Therefore, the root of modern philosophy ignores the ontological differences and it inherits Ancient ontology.

Heidegger discovers a state of Dasein that is "being-in-the-world". The analysis of being-in-the-world presents us a ground which discloses the relation of Dasein with itself and other entities. As Dreyfus states that Heidegger calls the activity of existing, "being-in-the-world" (Dreyfus 1991, p. 40). In this context, being-in-the-world is a priori condition of the state of Being, however, Dasein that is being-in-the-world has different states than other entities which are in-the-world with regard to having existence. Heidegger understands the world differently from

modern philosophy. He asserts that the world as a concept has not been understood already. The world, in terms of Heideggerian interpretation, is not just a space and Dasein does not just occupy a place in-the-world but it dwells on the world. This world understanding stands as a critique of Cartesian world understanding. Descartes determines the world as *res extensa* that means a being that has an extension. In contrast to this, Heidegger embraces the world as a place that Dasein organizes and exists in it. Therefore, the life of Dasein is always related to the world not as an extended being but as a living space.

When the world has been comprehended as a sum of matters, Heidegger argues that the world is more than something material for Dasein. In this sense, especially the environment is the world that we encounter and live in everyday. Dasein always has a dealing with this world in its everydayness. However, this environment is not just a theoretical one which modern philosophy asserts. It is also the world that is experimental which demonstrates that environmentality is something "alive". Dasein always has a *concern* with the world. The concern is one of the kind of *dealing*. In the state of concern, Dasein encounters with a lot of entities. Although these entities which are encountered are called as "object" and Heidegger does not approve this approach; he thinks that these entities are more than objects for Dasein. In this context, the object that modern philosophy understands is called as presence-at-hand by Heidegger.

In this context, it is important to understand what Heidegger means by presence-at-hand because some beings that are unlike Dasein are different from presence-at-hand. These entities that are encountered are expressed as *pragmata* by Greeks (Heidegger 1962). From this point of view, entities that are encountered, during the concerning, are called as *equipment*. Equipment provides a way of connexion with other entities for Dasein, however, one equipment does not exist in oneself. According to Heidegger, each equipment is essentially something "in-order-to" and each equipment signifies another equipment. For example, if there is a key, there must be a lock, and if there is a lock, there must be a door, etc. Every equipment belongs to another equipment. It means that equipment, essentially, has a unity of meaning in itself. The important point, in this case, is that, when Dasein

encounters with equipment, Dasein sees it as how it is, and it seems to Dasein as how it is. For example, when we look at the hammer, the hammer is seen as a hammer, it discloses itself to Dasein. This equipment corresponds to what Heidegger refers to readiness-to-hand. Readiness-to-hand is a kind of being that Descartes did not understand their way of being in the world, therefore, entities which are unlike human has been recognized under one concept which is the object, by modern philosophy. Dan Harnesk and Devinder Thapa argues beings that are encountered by Dasein as: "...three ways of revealing equipment-as experience (Heidegger 1962): first, the present-at-hand mode of using a tool; second, the ready-at-hand mode, in which the equipment explicitly points to a purpose; and third, as human engagement wherein the human is not an observer but an active agent, skilfully coping with the equipment" (Harnesk and Thapa 2016, p. 3). This readiness-to-hand cannot be understood by using a theoretical perspective or just by looking. To understand them, it is necessary to use them. As it is said, dealing belongs to the unity of in-order-to. Dasein mingles with them in-order-to do something. This belonging requires circumspection.

Consequently, Dasein does not correspond to the subject that the modern world created. The subject-centered understanding makes human isolated from the world and also the world has been isolated from human. This distinction creates dualism which causes to misunderstand the human and the world, because, for the modern world, this relation is dependent on causality. Human is a rational being that has a possibility to solve the causality of the world. This also means to calculate the world. While Heidegger criticizes the modern world understanding, he states that the essence of human has been decided long ago. Accordingly, human has been constructed as a being that reckons with a thing and it can convert everything into mathematical calculation through its reason. To calculate does not merely mean to make calculation but also to design and manipulate everything. Therefore, politics becomes calculation politics. Either controlling and using nature or organizing the society is dependent on calculation. As Descartes put the mathematics and physic into clear and distinct knowledge, social science has tried to find the mathematical knowledge of society and human, and this causes the political determinism.

3.2. Lack of Temporality of Modern Subject and Temporality of Dasein

Modern philosophy has depended on the dualism between subject and object. In this dualism, subject is called as ego which has domination over object; also, ego has been interrogated through its mind and its characteristic that is determined through reason. In this examination, Descartes ignores the temporality of subject and this causes to think human without its temporality. Although Kant and Hegel had tried to embrace the human through its temporality, they had failed to solve the problem of subject-object relation. In this sense, Heidegger provides us a ground that can grasp the subject with regard to the temporality and this ground would be a way to overcome the political impasse of the modern subject because temporality is a way that discloses the being of Dasein in the world.

In this context, it is necessary to examine what Heidegger discloses by the temporality of Dasein. Dasein is the one who is projecting and at the same time, is being projected. Dasein discloses itself by itself in terms of authentic potentiality-free-being-a-whole. "That upon which the Being which has been disclosed and is thus constituted has been projected, is that which itself makes possible this Constitution of Being as care" (Heidegger 1962, p. 371). The explanation that is given signifies the upon-which of the primary project of the understanding of being. Concerning about readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, and any ontical experience are built on the ground of projections of beings. These projections contain an upon-which that is the source of the understanding of being. When we say that beings have the meaning that means to be accessible in their being. If this being projects itself through upon-which it can really have a meaning. Therefore, it can be said that the primary project of the understanding of being gives meaning.

Anticipatory resoluteness, which refers to be open to call of conscience, is the being toward one's ownmost, eminent potentiality-of-being. Dasein must come toward itself by letting-come-toward-itself and it should include in itself the possibility of letting-come-toward-itself. This phenomenon of letting-come-toward-itself is based on the primordial phenomenon of the future. Because being-

toward-death, which corresponds to the finitude being of Dasein temporarily, in terms of authentically or inauthentically can be possible by the future. Heidegger states an important point that the future does not mean a now that has not yet become actual or that sometimes will be. Future is to encounter that Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost *potentiality-of-being* (Heidegger 1962). Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its essential being-guilty that means to take over being-guilty to be thrown ground of nullity. Heidegger explains this as:

"Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty. This understanding means that in existing one takes over Being-guilty; it means being the thrown basis of nullity. But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was.¹ Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost 'as-it-already-was'-that is to say, its 'been' [sein "Gewesen"]. Only in so far as Dasein is as an 'I-am-as-having-been', can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back" (Heidegger 1962, p. 299).

In this sense, having-been refers to Dasein is a being that its past is not to be disappeared or destroyed. As long as Dasein exists, it cannot be stabilized into its one historical moment because it continues 'to be'. On the other hand, anticipatory resoluteness discloses the factual things at hand by letting themselves. This encountering with the things at hand can be possible by *making-present*. In this way, resoluteness can be what it is through the present of making present as "letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes upon in taking action" (Heidegger 1962, p. 374). With regard to this, resoluteness brings itself into a situation by futural coming back to itself. Futural having-been sets present free from in itself. This is what Heidegger calls *temporality*: " This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'temporality'" (Heidegger 1962, p. 374). If Dasein is determined as

temporality, temporality makes possible to be authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness.

However, Dasein understands itself inauthentically, therefore, the understanding of time becomes inauthentic. This is the vulgar understanding of time and which includes "past", future" and "present" in itself, it is also valid for concepts of "subjective", "objective", "immanent" and "transcendent". In Heideggerian perspective, these concepts were derived from inauthentic understanding of time. If we tackle the subject in a comprehensive way, being-ahead-of-oneself is grounded in the future and already-being-in discloses itself as having-been. Being-together-with can be possible by making present, therefore, "ahead" in the "ahead-of-itself" and already cannot be grasped by vulgar interpretation of time. In this statement, "the ahead" does not refer "before" with regard to "not-yet-now, but later" and already does not mean "no-longer-now, but earlier". If we embrace the "ahead of" and "already" in the sense of their temporal meaning of the temporality of care becomes something as "earlier", "no longer", "not yet", and "later" at the same time. This means that care is being that occurs in time. In this way, Dasein would turn into something objectively present. However, for Heidegger, the "before" and "ahead of" signify the future, because the future makes possible the fact that Dasein can concern itself in terms of its potentiality-of-being. As Heidegger states that "self-projection upon the 'for-the-sake-of-oneself' is grounded in the future and is an essential characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future" (Heidegger 1962, p. 376). If we come to the concept of "already" it means a being existentially that is thrown in terms of the temporal meaning of being. Dasein can exist as thrown because of *care* is grounded in having-been. Therefore: " 'As long as' Dasein factually exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it always is indeed as already having been, in the sense of the 'I am-as-having-been'. And only as long as Dasein is, can it be as having been" (Heidegger 1962, p. 376). Because, to say that a being is in the past, it should be no longer objectively present. This is the reason of why Dasein in its existence can never stabilize itself as an objectively present fact that comes into being and passes away "with time".

The having-been of Dasein exists constantly. Therefore, the primary meaning of facticity lies in having-been and the expression of "before" and "already" that were used in the formulation of structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of existentiality of facticity. In this context, the unity of facticity, existence and falling prey is made possible by temporality. In this way, temporality constitutes primordially totality of the structure of the care. However, this does not mean that care is made up with pieces that got together cumulatively. It is valid for the temporality. Temporality does not consist of getting together of having-been, future, and making present. As Heidegger mentions that temporality is not a being but rather temporalizes itself. This is the reason of multiplicity of the modes of being of Dasein, that is especially the fundamental possibility of authentic and inauthentic existence (Heidegger 1962).

In this context, "the future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards-oneself', the 'back-to', and the 'letting-oneself-be-encountered-by'." The phenomena of the "towards . . .", the "to . . .", and the "alongside . . .", make temporality manifest as the pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial 'out-side-of-itself' in and for itself" (Heidegger 1962, p. 377). Therefore, the phenomena of future, having-been and present correspond to what Heidegger calls them *ecstasies of temporality*. Temporality is not a being prior to the unification of these ecstasies. Vulgar understanding of time that is understood as without beginning and without end constitutes itself by regulation of ecstasies, but this understanding ascertains the time which is authentic temporality, therefore, the vulgar understanding of time of Dasein does not correspond to the primordial time. For this reason, the understanding of temporality in terms of ecstasies is called *primordial time*. This is why future that is ecstasies of primordial and authentic temporality has priority. However, this does not mean that temporality consists of a cumulative sequence of ecstasies. Temporality temporalizes itself in their equiprimordially, however, modes of temporalizing are different. Temporalizing can be determined primarily by different ecstasies. Primordial temporality temporalizes itself by future because having-been and making-present are grounded in future. This is the reason of the *primary*

phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future (Heidegger 1962, p. 378). On the other hand, the care is determined as being-toward-death and Dasein can exist authentically in *being-toward-the-end* as thrown into death. Thus, as it is seen, Dasein is a being that exists finitely. Authentic future that is constitutive of the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness discloses itself as finite. In this context, there may be objections about the finite character of future in terms of including the unlimited number of things in future itself. Heidegger accepts all these objections, but according to him, these objections do not contradict with the finitude of primordial temporality, because they no longer related to primordial temporality.

The ontological structure of the being that "I myself am" is centered in the self-constancy of existence. The reason of it was to the undeterminable structure of existence as a substance or subject. Therefore, the analysis of the they-self is left in the part of falling of Dasein. However, Dasein has gained the characteristic of care, selfhood, and temporality. Therefore, the temporal interpretation of self-constancy and lack of self constancy can be examined through temporality. At this point, Heidegger states that we needed a new theme to examine this in order to gain more clear insight into the structure of the temporalizing of temporality. In this sense, the occurrence of Dasein in time is called as the *historicity* of Dasein by Heidegger (1962) and the statement that Dasein is historical provides us an existential ontological fundamental proposition. In addition to this, Heidegger claims that the temporal interpretation of everydayness and historicity strengthen the view of primordial time and, by this way, it is disclosed that it is the condition of the possibility and necessity of the everyday experience of time. Dasein finds itself as "uses itself up" while it makes an effort for itself. In this point, Dasein needs itself that means its time and Dasein measures its time. Taking care of things which is dependent on circumspection, firstly discovers time and develops the measurement of time. In this sense, to measure with time constitutes being-in-the-world. By this way, the discovering of circumspection which takes care of things lets what it discovers at hand objectively present be encountered in time. This shows us that beings can be accessible as "existing in time".

3.3. Everydayness of Dasein and Its Politics in Publicness

Dasein is a temporal being that its temporality refers to the life of Dasein which is between its birth and death. This betweenness signifies its everydayness which discloses 'the self of everyday Dasein'. Embracing Dasein in terms of its everydayness allows us to tackle it with its factual life. The self of subject is already determined by modern philosophy through some ways but it gives us a subject that is isolated. Also, everydayness of Dasein gives us a possibility to see it how it is without any determination.

As it has been explained, the being of Dasein is different from being of unlike Dasein, therefore the question of Dasein is the "who" of Dasein rather than "what" is Dasein. Generally, the question of who is answered by stemming from subject understanding. Dasein is to be "I myself". Heidegger sees that this understanding comes from subjectum unavoidably. In this regard, "I" is comprehended as a "substance" or "spirit" (as a synthesis of soul and body). However, Heidegger asserts that the substance of human is his/her existence and existence embraces human as s/he is. For this reason, when it is said "not-I", it does not mean to be deprived without "I-hood" in terms of Heideggerian perspective. The point is, there is a loss of the characteristic of "I". So, it is necessary to reveal a valid ontological structure of Dasein in everydayness which Dasein encounters with. This analysis will give us the possibilities of Dasein in everydayness in terms of being-one's-self or not (Heidegger 1962). '*Being-with*' and '*Dasein-with*' are the ontological structures of Dasein in everydayness. Essentially, these states refer to 'encounter with' in everyday. In this context, 'encounter with', aforementioned, occurs in the environment. We analyzed the encounter of Dasein with entities that are unlike Dasein. In fact, this case is related to the encounter of Dasein with other Daseins and it is an entity that lives with others. Dasein shares his world with others and Heidegger calls this state as being-with. In this sense, the world becomes with-world and their Being in themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with.

In this context, it is necessary to disclose the concept of *care* in order to explain being-with of Dasein. Heidegger uses the concept of solicitude as a kind of

care. It has already been said that Dasein always has a concern about environmental. However, in this case, Heidegger uses the term solicitude instead of concern, because the relation of Dasein with others does not simply correspond to having a relationship with ready-to-hand or present-at-hand (in terms of having existence). The concern is the forms of solicitude. Therefore, the essential characteristic of Dasein, in terms of relationships with others, is to "care". In this context, Heidegger exemplifies this state from "welfare work". The reason why welfare work exists has been underlying in the characteristic of Dasein that is being-with and for-the-sake-of. As Dasein does not think only itself, it also takes care of others. Therefore, Dasein as solicitude can be in some modes such as being for, against, passing one another by, 'not mattering' to another.

The answer to everyday Dasein is quite certain for Heidegger: Dasein is not itself in its everydayness. Every Dasein has been living on the basis of a certain mode of Being. Even just standing around is one of the existentialite of Dasein as a mode of Being. Dasein is concerned about these modes of Being because of the possibility of an existing distance with others. Dasein wants to get ahead of others and it causes to lead to disturbance. This state is what Heidegger calls *distantiality*.

"Being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality" (Heidegger 1962, p. 164). Distantiality is one of the kinds of Being of Dasein. This distantiality has an influence on everyday Dasein in terms of subjecting to the others. In the state of being-with-one-another, Dasein subjects to others, however, others do not refer to some certain subjects, because everyone can take over anyone in the state of being-with-one-another. Dasein is subjected to others regardless of being aware or not. In this sense, others are called as *the they (das Man)*. The they is always already 'there' in everyday life and it cannot be shown like that one or these ones; also it is not Dasein itself.

"This distantiality of Being-with means that Dasein 'itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others'". In other words, Heidegger is telling us that everyday Dasein as fundamentally Being-with others entails that

Dasein's Being is constituted by distances to and from others that are beyond its control; Dasein is subjected to others" (Hass 1988, p. 86).

The they is that Dasein loses itself and subjects to it. Dasein is the one who has lost itself and behaves like everybody. It reads books which are read by everyone, it criticizes like everyone does. "The 'they' that Dasein is essentially subjected to is a nondistinguishable, yet ever present feature of our daily lives; it is the 'who' of everyday Dasein" (Hass 1988, p. 86).

The they cannot recognize someone who is different from it. If the they experiences something a new, the they converts it to something average. If it is necessary to make a decision about something, it will be done by the they. However, if that decision causes trouble, the they does not take any responsibility. For this reason, the decision that is taken is taken by both everyone and no one. These behaviors that occur in everyday life signifies the *averageness*. Dasein has always a tendency towards averageness. In this regard, distanciality is the ground of averageness. Averageness is the existentiality of Dasein and everydayness is being average. In this averageness, Dasein hands its own possibilities of Being over to the they. Heidegger calls this state as *leveling down*. Also, distanciality, averageness and leveling down constitute what is called as *publicness*. Publicness means the sphere of the they. Publicness regulates and controls understanding of Dasein and the world, and it makes itself appear as always being right in this situation. The way of publicness is to cover up everything even though it presents everything as available to everyone.

"...Everyone is other, no one is himself. The 'they', which supplies the answer to the question of the "who" of everyday Dasein, is the nobody to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another..." (Heidegger 1962, p. 165-166).

The they is an existantiale; and a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. And also, the relation of Dasein with the they, losing

oneself into the they, shows itself as they-self. Dasein as they-self, means to lose its own possibilities, which is to be oneself, and it has to find itself. So, the they-self has a priority in the face of being-oneself. Shortly, Dasein initially is to be they-self and it has to struggle against they-self to find the possibility of the authentic self, being-one's-self. Authentic Being-one's-self depends on existentiell modification of the they.

"Moreover, Heidegger tells us that because everyday Dasein is dispersed into and lost among the 'they' it becomes a 'they-self' (167), i.e., it is inauthentic Dasein. Inauthentic Dasein, for Heidegger, just is everyday Dasein precisely because it has the 'they' as an essential structure of its Being. The 'they' makes Dasein's Being inauthentic because the 'they' and Dasein's theyself obscures Dasein's nature as Being-in-the-world, and importantly obscures that Dasein as Being-in-the-world fundamentally is the projects and concerns it takes up for itself. Insofar as authentic Dasein is possible" (Hass 1988, p. 86).

Dasein is the one that is thrown into the world, also into a particular publicness. The acting of Dasein in this publicness would give us its relationship with itself. In this sense, politics of subject in publicness has an important role in order to understand the impasse of the modern subject because Dasein is fallen into the public. This fallingness makes itself apparent through three phenomena which are *idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity*.

Dasein is the one who understands itself and the world. The word of understanding means actually to understand the being in *discourse* that corresponds to a word. However, in daily life, it does not happen. During the discourse, what is understood is just discourse itself rather than being that is in the discourse. For this reason, discourse refers to specific ones in public space. This referring was determined by the they. This understanding corresponds to the *average understanding of Dasein*.

"... What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. We have the same thing in view, because it is in the same averagness that we have a common understanding of what is said..." (Heidegger 1962, p. 212).

Being-with is the essential existantiale of Dasein and Dasein functions the understanding and discourse, it has happened within Being-with-one-another. Therefore, the discourse that is said is said together and is listened together. Discourse that is said in terms of Being-with-one-another uprooted from its ground and lost its essential ground. This discourse that is uprooted from its ground is appropriated for being is called as *idle talk* by Heidegger.

"However, complicating the function of language to Dasein is the existence of idle talk, as well as the problems posed by Dasein's relationship to the entity which Heidegger terms the 'They'. Experience is not common, but language is, and because language falls between Dasein and the 'They'. Dasein does not have a monopoly on the meanings implied within language. Even the meanings Dasein intends cannot always hold up to the interpretive appropriation of another Dasein" (Cloninger 2012, p. 53).

The basic notion is the they, because, it is said by everyone. This is exactly what Heidegger mentions about idle talk. Idle talk is the founder of groundless of discourse. Dasein that is in the idle talk cannot interpret itself by itself. It takes the interpretation from the they. It is important that what the they presents is the possibility of Dasein. Taking interpretation from the they is easier than making interpretation by itself because, for Dasein, idle talk is something everyone can do and understand. However, at this point, idle talk conceals the relation between being-in-the-world and Dasein. This is because idle talk as average understanding closes the possibility of a new perspective or inquiry. What Dasein should do or should not do is determined, prior to Dasein, by the public and also everyone already knows what should do or not. Karsten Harries explains this situation as;

"But let us begin by looking at different types of Gerede: take the example of reading a newspaper — it is always the same old story. Consider the speed with which we read. We want to be informed. Had not Aristotle said: All men desire to know. Seeing and knowing are not subordinated here to some other project which they serve. There is a sense in which language and understanding here go on a holiday" (Harries 2014, p. 91).

However, idle talk is not something that occurs by itself, which also causes another thing, which is curiosity. Concerning is as an existentialia of Dasein and Dasein concerns the world through a *sight*. The essence of this sight is *seeing*. Seeing has a connection with curiosity. *Curiosity* is a tendency of everyday Dasein in terms of the kind of concerns. Since Dasein gets closer to ready-to-hand through concerning, however, when concern converts to curiosity, this conversion corresponds to what Heidegger called *falling of everyday Dasein*. This is because, for Heidegger, curiosity is to move away from the ready-to-hand that is nearest, to another ready-to-hand which is far. In that sense, seeing is not an essential function. When Dasein is in curiosity, it is far away from understanding what is seen. It wants to see merely in order to see it. The reason of that kind of behavior is to move away from ready-to-hand to feel comfortable itself. For this reason, Dasein always has a tendency to what is new. However, it does not stop when it finds a new one since it immediately starts to search for another one. In this situation, Dasein escapes from itself through letting itself go to the world. For this reason, Dasein is in a state of tarrying. In that sense, Dasein looks for unrest and excitement and these result in the state of distraction. The knowledge that Dasein gets through distraction is simply just knowledge. The basic characteristic of curiosity is being everywhere and nowhere, and this characteristic of curiosity is identified as never dwelling anywhere. Therefore, curiosity has the characteristic that removes distance. There isn't any border for curiosity. In that situation, Dasein cannot understand where it is, so curiosity makes Dasein uprooted from its ground.

Idle talk that is in everydayness provokes curiosity. Especially the discourse that is produced through idle talk arouses curiosity for Dasein. These two phenomena provide the possibility to Dasein as a distraction and lively life. Consequently, Dasein moves away from itself and it finds itself in the situation that being thrown from somewhere to somewhere.

“Curiosity deepens our immersion in idle talk. Curiosity, rooted in our fascination with the world, emerges in the possibility of seeing the ‘world’ merely as it looks while one tarries and takes a rest” . . .” (Blattner 2016, p. 135).

Thrown into public has been demonstrated as one of the ontological existantiale of Dasein. The public that Dasein is thrown into, it seems like transparent. The public is understood as open to everyone and everyone can say what they want, for this reason, Dasein cannot understand what is authentic or inauthentic in everydayness. This situation refers to be in *ambiguity* for Dasein. This ambiguity takes hold of Dasein itself and being-with-one-another (Heidegger 1962). Generally, ambiguity is related to the possibility. Everyone has an opinion about what should be done or not and to understand something or to think about something are mostly the same in public. This causes the disappearance of possibilities, and further, these possibilities can disappear before Dasein realizes them, because prejudice on ambiguity enures to possibilities that Dasein itself has.

Let us suppose that what has assumed in public by Dasein have happened, in this case, Dasein is forced to come back to itself by the public. Since it is already guessed by everyone, so, Dasein passed to another ambiguity."Ambiguity is thus defined as not discerning between that which is genuine and that which is not. Furthermore, ‘this ambiguity extends not only to the world... but even to Dasein's being-toward-itself’” (Dix 2004, p. 36). When Dasein creates a new thing in the public, ambiguity appears again, because the public has the characteristic that turns new one into an old one. In this case, ambiguity is helped by idle talk. What is new reaches to everyone, and it is consumed already by everyone. For this reason, what

Dasein did has already become old. In this point, Dasein wanders from its authentic possibilities, because Dasein, as having the possibility of authentic Being, is always "there" as in ambiguity. However, idle talk and curiosity which exist in public take Dasein from 'there' and they lead Dasein into ambiguity. Also, they always hold Dasein under the name of "things moving". The other is also there as who has talked about and are known. In this case, the first task belongs to idle talk. Idle talk goes to someone before someone who is talked. In public space everyone spies and follows others. For this reason, while being-with-one-another is being side-by-side-ness, at that time it becomes watching of one another. Normally although publicness presents itself as 'for-one-another' it shows the characteristic of "against-one-another" (Heidegger 1962)

The three ways of Being, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, are called falling of Dasein by Heidegger. "Falling and inauthenticity are derivatives modes of interaction. One can either choose to interpret the world in an individual manner or follow the public conscience- that of Das Man in Heideggerian terms. Das Man, also referred to as "the one" by Dreyfus and "the they" in the Macquarrie-Robinson translation, is the entity that creates, maintains and demands conformity to social norms" (Dix 2004, p. 42). Dasein mostly belongs to the world which is concerned, the concerned world consists of the they, and it is what Dasein is fallen everyday. In this sense, fallenness has priority which means that Dasein is always far away from the possibilities of Being-one's-self. The reason of that is falling of Dasein, who is in Being-with-one-another through idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. This demonstrates the *inauthenticity* of Dasein. However, inauthenticity does not refer to breaking loose from the Being or losing of Being. Inauthenticity is just a kind of state of being-in-the-world. The point that is mentioned means transformation of the possibility of Dasein itself to the public. Dasein is the one who forgets the possibility of being-one's-self. But this forgetting does not mean that it does not exist. Falling of Dasein belongs to Dasein itself, therefore, fallingness is an existantiale that stems from being-in-the-world. Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity do not break Dasein off from its Being. They present an inauthentic understanding of Being to Dasein and this shows the groundlessness of Dasein. Also, Dasein as

the transferer of its possibility to the public is, at the same time, itself ground of itself. However, it is *tempted* by the being-in-the-world. So, Heidegger states that Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting. However, the world is not the reason of temptation of being-in-the-world because essentially Dasein tempts itself by itself. Dasein, who is tempted, thinks that everything is going well. At this point, tempting becomes *tranquilizing* for Dasein. Tranquilizing present that every door is open for Dasein in its life (Heidegger 1962). Dasein, who is tempted, tries to feel itself enlightened from the point of interpretation by trying to convert its concern to synthesize its culture with foreign culture. Dasein who is fallen always has a concern to a foreign culture. However, in this concern, what is heard is not determined and questioned. Dasein begins to compare everything with itself and this causes the *alienating* for Dasein. However, alienation makes Dasein's life inauthentic, it does not turn away from itself. Dasein runs away from itself but when Dasein escapes from itself, it gets *entangled* in itself (Heidegger 1962). These four phenomena: temptation, tranquilized, alienation and self-entangling are the specific characteristics of Dasein that belongs to being fallen. In this sense, Dasein feels itself in authentic life. However, it is in the situation that always scuds from somewhere to somewhere. This state is called turbulence by Heidegger. Turbulence is related to thrownness, because thrownness is not a fact that has ended for Dasein. It is always continuing. Dasein lives in the state of turbulence in the they. Dasein's fundamental mood of being, being-in-the-world, which, presupposes interaction with things and other Dasein that "the one" can easily take over, thus creates an environment conducive to falling. Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to write, "Being-in-the-world is always fallen" (Dix 2004, p. 33-34).

The self has been determined by Descartes as to reach its own consciousness of ego. Therefore, the self is related to thinking substance which means that it is not related to the world. Thinking constitutes the self for Descartes' ego. In this sense, Heidegger tackles this problem through Kant, but it is obviously clear that Kant inherits its understanding of the self by Descartes. Heidegger reveals the question of the self not through tackling the subject which is isolated but through its everydayness.

Existentiality, facticity and falling prey are presented as a unity of constitutive moments of care. Heidegger formulates the care as: "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-being-in (a world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered). It can be seen that the structure of care is as 'articulated'" (Heidegger 1962, p. 293). However, as it was seen, this articulated structure of care does not prevent being totality but is a condition of the possibility in terms of existentiell potentiality-of-being. Thus, how are we to grasp this unity? Heidegger answers to this question as "I". "I" hold together the totality of being. This is the reason of why this being is grasped as a ground of 'I-hood' and "self-hood" ontologically (as substance or subject). In this context, it has been asked the question of who of Dasein and it has been showed that Dasein does not exist initially and most part of as being itself, but not-itself and lost itself in the they-self. However, this statement does not give us the ontological constitution of the self. It just has been said that Dasein is existence, therefore, the self should be grasped existentially.

"How then are we to think this unity? Heidegger takes for his point of departure the everyday interpretation of the self. When 'I', I mean myself, this entity I happen to be, an entity among entities, in the world, but not just another entity, but a being that experiences these other things, that endures through time" (Harries 2014, p. 133).

With regard to everyday self-interpretation of Dasein everyday self-interpretation of Dasein, Dasein expresses itself in "saying-I". This "I" corresponds to being because when Dasein says "I", it means only I and "I" is not a definition of other things. It is not a predicate but the absolute subject. In this context, the connection between saying-I and being a self should be disclosed. In line with this, Heidegger explains Kantian expression about "saying-I" and being a self. The "I" is a bare consciousness that accompanies all concepts. In the "I", nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts.

"Consciousness in itself (is) not a representation..., but a form of representation in general". The 'I think' is the form of apperception that adheres to every experiences and precedes it" (Heidegger 1962, p. 294).

As Heidegger argues, in Kantian sense, that expression of the saying-I corresponds to "I think". It means that Kant makes stable the phenomenal content of the I as *res cogitans*. In this context, if Kant determines the I as a logical subject it does not mean that "I" in general gained merely by logical means. Since "I" is the subject of logical behavior and it is rather binding together. Every binding together is I bind together. Therefore, any binding together belongs to the ground of an "I" hypokeimenon. In this sense, subject cannot be consciousness in itself or representation but rather the form of representation (Heidegger 1962). Heidegger draws two conclusions from findings that are given above. Firstly, it is impossible to reduce the "I" to a substance, ontically. The other one is that Kant fixes the I as an "I think". However, this is not appropriate ontologically for Heidegger: "For the ontological concept of the subject does not characterize the selfhood of the I qua self, but the sameness and constancy of something always already objectively present" (Heidegger 1962, p. 295).

To determine the "I" ontologically as a subject is to fix it already as something always already objectively present. In this context, being of the "I" is understood as the reality of *res cogitans*. In fact, "I" is not only "I think" but also an "I think something". Kant could not show the characteristic of accompanying and connecting of representation. Whereas these show the kind of being in terms of the constant objective presence of the "I" together with its representation. In this sense, the argument made by Heidegger against Kant is that Kant did not see the "I think" something like an ontological condition of the "I" because he did not want to cut off the relationship between "I" and "I think". In the statement of "I think something", something remains indefinite. If it refers to being that is in the world it shows presupposition of the world beforehand. In this regard, Kant could not see the phenomenon of the world, therefore, he pushed the "I" into the subject that is isolated. Also, saying-I belongs to a being that means I always am as "I-am-in-a-

world". Saying-I expresses itself as being-in-the-world. In this context, for everyday Dasein, does Dasein refer itself as being-in-the-world in everyday? With regard to this, it is certain that Dasein signifies itself in saying-I, however, everyday self-interpretation of Dasein tends to understand itself by the world taken care of. In this point, Dasein optically cannot see itself in terms of a kind of being. The characteristic of fleeting saying-I derives from its falling. Dasein throws itself into the they in order to escape from itself. Hence saying-I refers to the they-self in everyday that "I am not" authentically (Heidegger 1962). "I" shows itself as the self of the self-forgetful because of everyday multiplicity and rapid succession of what is taken care of although "I" supposes itself as what it is.

On the other hand, saying-I puts itself into words as care. It occurs mostly as a fleeting. Mostly and loudly saying-I belongs to the they-self because of inauthentic self of the they-self. The authenticity of saying-I is the authentic possibility of potentiality-of-being that is equal with authentic care. Also, authentic potentiality-of-being has the characteristic of the constancy of the self with regard to its having gained a stand. The constancy of the self provides an authentic possibility to Dasein against the lack of constancy of irresolute falling prey. The constancy of the self means just anticipatory resoluteness existentially.

If we consider the temporality of the everydayness of Dasein, temporal interpretation of everyday Dasein must be started from the structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself. These were understanding, attunement, entanglement, and discourse. These phenomena give us the ground of determination of temporality of being-in-the-world. This analysis discloses the temporal meaning of initially and most part that is used in everydayness. The authentic disclosedness of Dasein is represented as resoluteness in terms of its temporal meaning. This disclosedness constitutes a being as "there". To reveals the concrete temporal meaning of care means to interpret its temporally in its individual structural moments. Every understanding has its mood and every attunement understands. Attuned understanding has the characteristic of entanglement and understanding that derives from entangled mood, expresses itself by discourse. These phenomena take us away to one temporality that is the unity of understanding, attunement,

falling, and discourse. In this context, when we use 'understanding' in the sense of fundamental existential, it means neither a definite kind of something nor to grasp something thematically. *Understanding* is defined primordially and authentically by Heidegger as: "Understanding means; to be projecting toward a potentiality-of-being for the sake of which Dasein always exists"(Heidegger 1962, p. 385). Understanding makes Dasein a being who somehow understands what is going on with itself. This knowing does not mean to discover one fact but to stand itself in an existentiell possibility. Also, this knowing is not a kind of knowing that does not mean to be a failure to understand, it is rather as a deficient mode of the projectedness of one's potentiality-of-being.

In this context, the ground of understanding itself in the existential possibility lies in the future. The future makes possible a being that it can exist understandingly in its potentiality-of-being. The projection that is ground in the future cannot be grasped thematically but throws itself into it as a possibility. Although resoluteness is expressed as primarily and authentically existence, Dasein initially and for the most part of remains in irresoluteness. More precisely, Dasein remains closed to its ownmost potentiality-of-being toward which it always brings itself only in individuation. It means that temporality does not temporalize itself constantly from authentic future. However, this inconstancy does not mean that temporality lacks the future. It is something that has the quality of changeable. In this sense, Heidegger presents the concept of anticipation for the terminological characterization of the authentic future. He explains anticipation as: " This indicates that Dasein, existing authentic- ally, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being- that the future itself must first win itself, not from a Present, but from the inauthentic future" (Heidegger 1962, p. 386). Dasein gains its authentic temporality that is futural through *anticipation*.

It has been said that Dasein initially and for the most part understands itself by taking care of things in its everydayness and that has happened inauthentically. Therefore, inauthentic understanding projects itself in terms of what is urgent or indispensable in the business of everyday activity. This causes that Dasein comes

toward itself through what is taken care of things. It means that Dasein does not come toward itself by itself to primarily in its ownmost, nonrelational potentiality-of-being. Conversely "it awaits this concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern" (Heidegger 1962, p. 386). Therefore, inauthentic future has the characteristic of *awaiting*, because Dasein comes toward itself through what is taken care of. Therefore, awaiting must already have disclosed the horizon and scope with regard to which something can be expected because "*expecting is founded upon awaiting, and is a mode of that future which temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation*" (Heidegger 1962, p. 387).

In this context, the difference between "moment" and "now" is very important for the temporality of everydayness. *Moment* refers to the present that held in authentic temporality. This term should be understood as an ecstasy. It means that Dasein gives itself to its possibilities encountered that is yet held in resoluteness. In contrast to this, now is a temporal term that belongs to within-timeness. *Now* is something that something comes into existing or is destroyed in it. Conversely, there is nothing existing in moment. It provides the possibility to Dasein that is to encounter for the first time. In this context, Heidegger calls the encounter for the first time as making present in order to make a distinction inauthentically. Formally, every present makes present, but every present does not be "in the moment" (Heidegger 1962). Making present always refers to which is irresolute and lacking the Moment, authentically. Making present discloses itself by temporal interpretation of falling prey to the world care of. In contrast to this, Moment temporalizes itself through authentic future. Ricoeur interprets the concept of now as;

“The time it measures is that in which it is time to do something (Zeitzu), where ‘now’ means ‘now that’; it is the time of labors and days. It is therefore important to see the shift in meaning that distinguishes the "now" belonging to this time of preoccupation from ‘now’ in the sense of an abstract instant, which as part of a series

defines the line of ordinary time. The existential now is determined by the present preoccupation, what is 'making present', inseparable from awaiting and retaining. It is because, in preoccupation, concern tends to contact itself into this making-present and to obliterate its dependency with regard to awaiting and retaining that the now isolated in this way can fall prey to the representation of the now as an abstract instant" (Ricoeur 2002, p. 39).

Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting that makes present, therefore, having-been should belong to its ecstatic unity. The authentic coming-toward-itself of anticipatory resoluteness means to a coming back to ownmost self thrown into its individuation. This ecstasy makes it possible to take over resolutely being as what it already is. That makes Dasein bring forth toward its ownmost potentiality-of-being. This authentic having-been is called as *repetition* by Heidegger. Inauthentic projection of Dasein derives from forgetting itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-of-being. Heidegger remarks that this forgotten does not refer anything or a failure to remember. It is rather a positive ecstatic mode of having-been. *Forgetting* means backing away from one's having-been by closing off itself. Therefore: " This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a 'positive' ecstatic mode of one's having been-a mode with a character of its own" (Heidegger 1962, p. 388). Also, remembering can be possible on the ground of forgetting. Having-been primarily discloses the possibility that Dasein, who lost itself in the superficiality, can remember in the forgottenness. " Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained [behalten] by the concerned making-present which awaits; and what are thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962, p. 389). This unity of ecstasies does not only close off authentic potentiality-of-being but also is existential condition of the possibility of irresoluteness.

Understanding occurs in attuned and 'there' is disclosed or closed off by *mood*. Attunement brings Dasein to confront itself with its thrownness, therefore, attunement is grounded on thrownness which means that mood presents the way that I always am primarily the being that has been thrown. Dasein should exist as constantly having-been because mood discloses thrownness of Dasein itself existentially, however, it does not mean to bring one face to face with the thrownness of its being, it is rather an ecstasy of having-been that makes possible finding oneself in the mood of how-I-find-myself. While understanding is primarily grounded in the future, On the other hand, attunement is grounded in the having-been. Mood temporalizes itself that means its specific ecstasy belongs to a future and a present, but in such a way that having-been modifies the equiprimordial ecstasies (Heidegger 1962). In this sense, we do not know the mood which is not known in terms of its existential function. It has been shown as fleeting experiences and occurring in time. So, it is necessary to reveal the statement of "attunement is primarily grounded in having-been". According to Heidegger, this statement means "a bringing back to..." (Heidegger 1962). That is the existential fundamental nature of mood. In addition to this, this shows us that attunement is always a mode of having-been. Therefore, temporal interpretation of attunement does not mean to understand attunement in terms of temporality but to show attunement can be possible only on the basis of temporality.

In this context, the temporal meaning of fear and Angst is very important. *Fear* is presented as an inauthentic attunement and is to fear from fearsome. To fear is to disclose something threatening in the mode of everyday circumspection and it is related to "something futural". In addition to this, this relatedness itself is temporal. Therefore, fear has a characteristic of awaiting as the existential and temporal constitution of itself. This brings initially us the statement that temporality of fear is inauthentic, but fear does not always refer to expect something bad; also, this is not fear because there is a lack of specific mood of fear.

On the other hand, the temporality of fear is constituted by self-forgetting that means being confused in terms of backing away one's own factual potentiality-of-being. In this sense, Heidegger refers to Aristotle. Aristotle defines fear as

depression or confusion. Depression pushes Dasein to back to its thrownness and thrownness closes off itself. Confusion is grounded on forgetting. Forgetting refers to back away from factual and resolute potentiality-of-being and to keep possibilities of self-preservation and envision that have already been circumspectly discovered. Taking care of things in fear leaps from a possibility to another because it forgets itself, therefore, it cannot grasp any definite possibility. Dasein who fears does not cognize its world because of confusing. " This bewildered making-present of the first thing that comes into one's head, is something that belongs with forgetting oneself in fear" (Heidegger 1962, p. 392). The ecstatic unity that makes fear possible existentially can be temporalized by forgetting. Forgetting as a mood of having-been modifies its present and its future in their temporalizing. Heidegger states that temporality of fear is just a forgetting that awaits and makes present.

Another phenomenon is *Angst*. *Angst* has been presented as fundamental attunement. *Angst* is to disclose uncanny of everyday being-in-the-world and also to confront with its ownmost thrownness. Although fear and *Angst* have some similar characteristics such as in the face of and about, this does not mean that their structural characteristics are fused. It just means that these are grounded in the same being which is Dasein itself. *Angst* makes something at hand and objectively present voiceless toward Dasein. Dasein grasps the nothingness of the world. Therefore, understanding that is alone with the world confronts with being-in-the-world. In this sense, what *Angst* is is the same as what *Angst* is about. Being anxious has neither the characteristics of expectation nor awaiting, because, *Angst* is always related to "there" that is Dasein itself. Therefore, the statement that *Angst* is constituted by a future becomes true.

The insignificance of the world that is disclosed by *Angst* shows us the nullity of taking care of. In other words, the impossibility of projection of potentiality-of-being is disclosed in this way. To disclose this impossibility makes the authentic potentiality-of-being apparent. Therefore, *Angst* means to back to thrownness as something to be possibly retrieved. It takes us to the possibility of disclosing the authentic potentiality-of-being. Consequently, Heidegger concludes

as "the character of having been is constitutive for the state-of- mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatic mode of this character" (Heidegger 1962, p. 394). This is the meaning of temporality of disclosing of impossibility.

Forgetting that constitutes the fear throws Dasein from one possibility to another possibility among worldly possibilities, that means to confuse Dasein. This shows us the frantic making present character of fear. In contrast to this, Angst has the character of holding. Dasein in Angst does not lose itself in taking care of things. If Dasein lost itself that refers to the fear, not Angst. However everyday understanding mixes up each other. On the other hand, the ownmost temporality of Angst is primordially grounded in having-been also making present and future temporalizes itself by Angst. Fear and Angst bring the understanding attunement and they determine itself by it.

If considering the analysis of everyday Dasein of Heidegger, human is thrown into the world, is also thrown into a particular world. Modern philosophy has tried to isolate the subject from its factual life and subject has been presented abstractly. In contrast to this, Heidegger argues that human should be embraced through its everydayness because in this way human can be analyzed as how it is. In its everydayness, Dasein is fallen in the they and it is far away from having its understanding and interpretation because Dasein initially and firstly understands the world and itself in publicness. Therefore, the examination of everydayness cannot give us the political aspect of Dasein. Hence, Dasein is not itself in the they and it belongs to the they-self. The they controls Dasein in the public and Dasein cannot make its own decision. However, examining everydayness gives us a perspective that embracing human through abstracting cannot help us in order to understand human and Heidegger gives us approachment about the concept of the self. Especially, after the second world war, the relation between human and publicness has been problematized in philosophy and political science.

3.4. Finitude of Dasein and Politics of Death

As it has been argued, the concept of the subject is not interrogated explicitly within the scope of relationship between Being and time. Especially, the constitution of the modern subject is thought without time by Descartes. The ego which Descartes propounds is far away from temporality. In contrast to this, Heidegger brings forward an idea that being discloses itself in time. Therefore, Dasein is a temporal being which is different from ego. In this sense, death is a phenomenon of life that determines the temporality of Dasein.

The aim of Heidegger is to grasp Dasein as a being in its totality. Totality temporally means the life of Dasein between its birth and death. In this sense, death seems to be the end point of the temporality of Dasein. Therefore, as Heidegger argues, the time of Dasein is limited in the world and Dasein completes its life or its existence with its death. With regard to this, the existence of Dasein makes itself apparent between the birth and death of Dasein. At this point, Heidegger remarks that if existence is related to possibilities of Dasein, Dasein is always "not yet be". As long as Dasein exists, it can be and will be. Therefore, there is always something *outstanding* for Dasein, because outstanding belongs to the *end*. The end of being-in-the-world is death. Death threatens the possibility of the totality of Dasein. So, the understanding of Dasein becomes *being-toward-death*.

In fact, Dasein is familiar to death in its life because Dasein shares its world with other Daseins and it exposes the death of other Daseins. The death of others can influence Dasein itself. The death of others has a characteristic of permeative. So, death is understood as an objective phenomenon. Especially, it can be clearly seen in terms of being-with which was the existantiale of Dasein. Even so, when Dasein is dead, Dasein becomes to be *no-longer-being-there* because death is always my own death. It is a possibility that no one can take it from me. Despite the fact that death is the own possibility of Dasein, it can be an object of others in terms of concerning, because, those remaining behind concern with Dasein, such as funeral rites, burial etc. Those remaining behind mourn or memorializes. This situation shows that concerning about Dasein is not equal with concerning ready-

to-hand and those remaining behind, became just to be with it just as standing by the grave. However, this state does not mean to have an experience of the death of Dasein, it is just being there. It means that in daily life, one Dasein can take over another Dasein. Someone can act for somebody. However, it does not happen in death. Of course, it is possible to die for someone. Essentiality of death does not include that kind of replacing. Since it means just to be a victim for in a defining matter; therefore, "dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all" (Heidegger 1962, p. 284).

In this regard, the modes of ending do not characterize the death in terms of Dasein's end, because the ending can correspond to presence-at-hand. But the death of Dasein does not refer to be fulfilled or disappeared or finished. To say more clearly, death is a phenomenon of life. Life should be understood with regard to the being-in-the-world. The relation between death and life becomes a question. According to Heidegger, death of Dasein is different from the death of unlike Dasein. As unlike Dasein perishes through dying but Dasein never *perishes*, despite the fact that it is same biologically. Thereby, Heidegger calls dying of Dasein as *demise*.

In this sense, Dasein always relates to the *most extreme not-yet*, because, end is something that Dasein will encounter. At this point, Dasein has no control over this end as to make its effect minimum or to reduce. Since death is presented by Heidegger as imminent for Dasein. However, a lot of things can be imminent for Dasein such as legacy, natural disasters, lottery etc. Death is different from all of them. Death is something that Dasein takes over it by itself. Dasein encounters with its ownmost potentiality-of-being with death. This possibility makes Dasein in concerning on its being-in-the-world. Death means the possibility of *no-longer-being-able-to-be-there* for Dasein. At this point, Dasein becomes completely alone with the potentiality-of-being. This alone refers to being far from other Daseins. This moment is the most extreme possibility of Dasein. Dasein cannot *bypass* the

possibility of death. In this regard, "death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962, p. 294).

Everything can be explained by calculation in the modern world. Phenomena should be put into the mathematical language in order to understand what it is, therefore, the modern world takes phenomena theoretically. Theoretical knowledge has a priority; however, death is a phenomenon of life which is not something like that. Death has started with thrown into the world as a possibility for Dasein. However, death cannot be understood authentically by Dasein and there is no theoretical knowledge about it. In Heideggerian thought, Dasein is thrown into the death, and thrownness into the death reveals itself in the attunement of Angst. In this sense, being-toward-the-end belongs essentially to the thrownness of Dasein. Knowledge or lack of knowledge about death just refers to the possibilities that are related to existence. Lack of knowledge should not be understood as death does not belong to Dasein. It just shows that fleeing from death of Dasein signs to the covering of being-toward-the-end. The covering of being-toward-the-death discloses the falling prey of Dasein. Dasein flees from uncanny that means to flee from its ownmost potentiality-of-being.

If we interrogate the death, understanding of average being-toward-death in everyday is the understanding of Dasein who is fallen. Death is known as a "case of death" by the publicness of everyday being-with-one-another. Someone dies in everyday. Public represents the death as familiar occurring. In this sense, death becomes to be in the inconspicuousness. According to Heidegger, this word discloses the fleeing from death; "one dies too, sometimes, but not right away" (Heidegger 1962, p. 299). Heidegger points out the word of "one dies". "One dies" represents a kind of being of everyday being-toward-death. These kinds of words make death ambiguous. Also, death is not yet objectively present for oneself right now and so it does not threaten. Therefore "one dies" comes to mean someone will die but it is not us. Death is represented as a case by the public. Therefore, death is imaged as something "real", in this way, it conceals the characteristics of death, which are *nonrelational* and not to be bypassed. In this context, Dasein loses its potentiality-of-being in the they, because of being represented by idle talk and

ambiguity. This situation increases the temptation of concealing the ownmost possibility of Dasein in terms of being-toward-death. Heidegger gives the example of "dying person" about covering over death. When someone is dying, his relatives say to him that he will come back to his everyday life; their aim is to comfort him. However, essentially, this comforting is not only towards to dying person but also to those who comforts him. According to Heidegger, in this way, "the they" provides [besorgt] a constant tranquillization about death" (Heidegger 1962, p. 298). Also, in the situation of dying someone, this presents as unpleasant. The they tries to make public which is prevented by disturbing or uneasy. The public should be defended by the effects of someone dying in terms of the they. While the public tries to make Dasein far away from its death it paves the way for the norm in the face of "case of death". Likewise, to think about death means to be a coward and to escape from the world in the eyes of the they. At this point, Heidegger states that: "The 'they' does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death" (Heidegger 1962, p. 298). This statement shows us that the position of Dasein toward death is already determined. To feel Angst is the possibility for Dasein but the they reverse it. In this reversing, Angst becomes fear for Dasein and it seems a weakness in the eyes of the they. Dasein should be tranquilized about its death and this estranges Dasein from its ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being.

It has been said that everyday Dasein covers its ownmost potentiality-of-Being not-to-be-bypassed and it is opened to idle talk which becomes concrete in daily talk. Related to the sentence of "one dies too but not right away", Heidegger pointed out the first part of the sentence which is "one dies", this time, Heidegger focuses on the rest of sentence, which is "but not right away". According to Heidegger, everydayness recognizes the certainty of death in this sentence. No one can doubt that everyone will die. However, "no doubt" cannot correspond to the certainty of death as a possibility, because, everydayness acknowledges the certainty of death ambiguously and it stands at that point. This ambiguity makes understanding of Dasein about death inauthentic. The *certainty* of death is related to the relationship between truth and certainty.

" To be certain of an entity means to hold it for true as something true.¹ But 'truth' signifies the uncoveredness of some entity, and all uncovered-ness is grounded ontologically in the most primordial truth, the disclosed-ness of Dasein. As an entity which is both disclosed and disclosing, and one which uncovers, Dasein is essentially 'in the truth'. But certainty is grounded in the truth, or belongs to it equiprimordially" (Heidegger 1962, p. 300).

Especially, the statement that Dasein is "in truth" is an important point to understand the relationship between the they and Dasein in terms of being-toward-death. Since everyday Dasein mostly covers over its own most nonrelational possibility of being not-to-be-bypassed. This covering over shows us that Dasein factually is in "untruth". Of course, Dasein knows the certainty of death, but this knowing does not correspond to the certainty of death in the sense of being-toward-death. The average being-toward-death just becomes subject that we convince each other inauthentically, because, Dasein understands the death as a case that is encountered like the they does. At this point, death is embraced empirically. However, the certainty of death is empirical that does not make us who makes a decision about the certainty of death. Since, in this sense, Dasein acknowledges death as a certain rather in its truth. Everyone knows the certainty of death, but no one is in being-certain and also everyone flights from that. However, this flighting from presents a new possibility to us that is the certainty of death. Everyone says that death certainly comes but not right now. This word of "but" refers to deny the certainty of death. Death is something "sometime later". This statement covers up the characteristic of death which is possible at every moment. In this sense, the indefiniteness of death comes together with the certainty of death. Everyday being-toward-death endeavors to make death definite to flee from indefiniteness. However, this does not mean to calculate the death as when it will come. Dasein flees from this characteristic of death, again. To flee from death in everyday refers

essentially to inauthentic being toward it. However, being inauthentic is grounded in being authentic in itself.

In this context, death as a possibility of Dasein, inauthentic being-toward-death is explained. According to this statement, the question of how to convert inauthentic being-toward-death to authentic being-toward-death should be disclosed. Dasein is constituted by disclosedness which is attuned understanding. However, Dasein factually is in the state of inauthentic being-toward-death. To understand authentic being-toward-death, Heidegger focuses again on the possibility of Dasein. Being toward a possibility can be the meaning of making something actual which is possible. To concern with ready-to-hand and present-at-hand includes that kind of relationship. This relationship contains *accessibility*, *manageability*, *viability* etc. However, this relation also includes the annihilation of possibility in itself. But that kind of relationship needs theoretical perspective (because of in-order-to which is the character of that kind of relation). According to Heidegger, we should concern about our perspective circumspectly to what it is possible for. Hence, Dasein cannot concern with death like ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. On the other hand, death is a different kind of possibility that cannot be actualized, because, it means the death of Dasein and this destroys the ground for an existing being-toward-death. Therefore being-toward-death does not have the characteristic of actualization of death. In addition to this, being-toward-death does not mean to "think about death" (Heidegger, 1962). Generally, think about death is to think about how and when death will happen. This causes to make a calculation about death. By this way, it aims to establish power over death. This approach makes death something different from death itself.

In this context, expecting is a phenomenon that Dasein approaches its possibility by *expecting*. The phenomenon of death embraced its possibility, death, in a different way rather than others. Expecting focuses on a possibility in terms of when and how and whether it will be objectively present. In this sense, expecting "has" its possibility. Therefore, expecting is not to look away from the possible to its possible actualization, but also essentially awaiting for that actualization. However, Dasein should relate not only toward its possibility but also toward itself

in order to reveal its possibility as a possibility. This being-toward possibility is called as anticipation of this possibility by Heidegger. The anticipation of possibility does not occur in terms of concerning but also it occurs in the act of nearer understanding. Therefore, this possibility does not have the characteristic which forgets its possibility. This possibility always is in the expectancy about its possibility. Being-toward-death as anticipation of possibility makes this possibility possible and sets it free. Consequently, the anticipation of the possibility is the anticipation of being-of-potentiality. In this anticipation, Dasein reveals itself to itself in terms of its most extreme possibility. To project itself to ownmost potentiality-of-being means to understand the being of the being that means "to exist". To understand itself means to understand itself in its revealing of potentiality-of-being in the project. On the other hand, in Angst, Dasein finds itself in the face of the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence. By this way, Angst reveals the most extreme possibility of Dasein. Individualized Dasein builds its own self-understanding on the ground of Angst. Therefore, being-toward-death essentially discloses itself as Angst.

In conclusion, death as a possibility of Dasein has an important role in Heidegger's philosophy because, before Heidegger, human has been embraced mostly without its finite being; in contrast to this, Heidegger reveals the death as a finitude of Dasein in the world. In this sense, death is presented as a phenomenon that every Dasein has it as its own possibility; death is used in individual aspect and it has been divided from the community. As Levinas (2000) argues, the death of others is certainly distinguished from the death of Dasein and the concept of death, as Dasein's own death, does not give a possibility to provide a ground for the relationship between Dasein and community. This is why the death of Dasein cannot give a political way out to us.

3.5. Historicity and Possibility of Politics of Dasein with the Concept of Repetition

Dasein has two kinds of ways of being that are: authentic and inauthentic. These two ways of existence have a significance for Heidegger's philosophy. This interrogation, being authentic or inauthentic, corresponds to the self of Dasein. In this regard, authenticity is a mode of existence of Dasein means that Dasein hands its self-individualization in itself. This also refers to potentiality-of-being of Dasein. Authentic being is that Dasein takes its possibilities on its own hand and understands them. On the other hand, as it has been argued in previous chapters, it is important to note that the self of Dasein in its everydayness is described as not-itself. Dasein is thrown into the they and it belongs to the they-self rather than oneself. Here, there is an important point that should be elaborated. The they corresponds to the tradition for Heidegger. Dasein lives in the world which consists of values. Dasein is tempted through these values in order to comfort itself. Therefore, as Crotty states, "Dasein, Heidegger warns us, 'falls prey' to the tradition in which it stands" (Crotty 1997, p. 90). Tradition seems like an obstacle for Dasein in terms of its understanding about itself and the world. Because tradition prevents Dasein to interpret its world and itself and it tries to compel Dasein to recognize its predetermined values by concealing the existential possibilities of Dasein. Therefore, the values of tradition are presented as just comforting and seducing Dasein and there is no assistance for Dasein in an authentic sense.

As it has been noticed, the temporality of Dasein reveals the structure of Dasein. The temporality of Dasein has been identified through its future (its death) and its everydayness (its fallingness). In this sense, it seems that there is no possibility of Dasein in order to gain political character in its life in the view of death and everydayness. In contrast to this, Dasein has the potential to overcome current issues in its life, that is to say, concealing of publicness. It can move beyond to average understandings and gain new meanings for its existence. For this, it is required to find a way which makes Dasein dynamic and makes Dasein being part

of its community in an authentic sense. The historicity of Dasein is the phenomenon that gives us a possibility to solve this problem with the concept of repetition.

The death refers to the end of Dasein in the world and everydayness signifies to the temporality of Dasein. Everydayness is the temporality of Dasein and the death of Dasein refers to future of Dasein as being-toward-death. Also, the past of Dasein is also important and it implies the thrownness of Dasein. In this sense, Dasein is thrown into a particular world which has been determined beforehand. Therefore, Dasein has not started to live from zero point. It inherits the world which has been already there before Dasein. This situation reveals the historicity of Dasein. Dasein gains its meaning of life over the course of its life through its historicity because Dasein is the one who carries its past and future. In this way, happening is being of Dasein in the world because the historicity of Dasein arises from its temporality, that is to say, historicity of Dasein is dependent on its being temporal being in itself. However, the historicity of Dasein does not merely consist of what is going on its life. The historicity of Dasein is examined through existential analysis by Heidegger. This is the way that how Dasein can hand down its past into the present and it can be in the present. Therefore, Dasein is the one that is primarily historical. In addition to this, being-in-the-world is the main characteristic of being of Dasein, therefore, being-in-the-world of Dasein also becomes historical. In the world, Dasein has its *fate*. Besides the phenomenon of the world has been presented through sharing the world with other entities. In this sense, Dasein is a being that shares its world and also its historicity with other Daseins. This is called as *destiny* by Heidegger. This is where Dasein has a possibility to gain its political character because Dasein has a possibility to understand its historicity through *repetition*. In this context, Dasein understands not only its historicity but also its communal historicity which corresponds to its *generation*. In this sense, Dasein can be a being that creates new meanings and movement accommodatingly with its generation. For this, first of all, it is necessary to give the critique of Heidegger on the vulgar understanding of history; also, to show that Dasein is primarily historical.

Generally, life is something in time and it consists of a succession of experiences. This succession refers to a succession of nows, therefore, only nows

can be real rather than something that happened or will happen. However, the temporality of Dasein does not depend on nows, but it depends on the betweenness of birth and death because birth is not something that is no longer real. In this sense, "The original structure of temporality was manifested as being the original condition of possibility of care as well as the question of Dasein's dependence as an ontological problem on its happening" (Javorská 2016, p. 131). The constitutions of the unity of care should lay in the ground of totality of time. Therefore, the temporality of Dasein cannot mean the succession of nows, because the movement of existence is not like the movement of something objectively present.

In this context, it is important to compare Dasein's historicity and vulgar understanding of history. Because, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, firstly explains a concept in the general meaning and then interprets it, by purpose. This is also valid for the concept of historicity. That's why Heidegger firstly points out how history has been affected by positivism. Science always inclines to depict its object; it can constitute itself by determining its object. In this sense, the science of history which is called *historiography* aims to objectivize an origin point for the start of history. This objectivization or determination is a matter of limiting. Another characteristic of historiography is that it is interdisciplinary. In this regard, historiography is an object of every scientific field. "How history can become a possible object for historiography can be gathered only from the kind of being of what is historical, from historicity and its rootedness in temporality" (Heidegger 1962, p. 427). On the other hand, it is important to point out where the historical characteristic of Dasein comes from. The essence of Dasein is its existence and its structure of existence comes from care.

Care reveals itself in the temporality of Dasein. Meaning that, if Dasein is embraced existentially, then its historicity is an existential history. "As philosophy of existence this means that the drama of being human - not only occurs in history, but is itself historical. 'Historicity' is the term Heidegger coins to describe the intrinsically historical character of human Being-in-the-world" (Wolin 1990, p. 10). However, as it has been argued in the previous chapters, the structural moments of Dasein depend on temporality. Therefore, Dasein's characteristic of historicity

arises from its temporality. In other words, Dasein is not temporal because of the fact that it is historical; to the contrary, Dasein can be historical because of the fact that it is temporal. For this reason, Dasein has the possibility to understand and disclose its historicity. In Heidegger's word: "In analysing the historicity of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history', but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being (Heidegger 1962, p. 428). Driving from this point, it is safe to assert that what is historical is primarily Dasein and we can talk about historicity by the virtue of the fact that Dasein exists.

Here, there is a need to elaborate on the vulgar understanding of history. Accordingly, history is grasped as a past. This understanding reveals itself within the sentence of "already belongs to history" (Heidegger 1962, p. 430). For Heidegger, this sentence connotes two things. Firstly, what is historical no longer objectively present; thus, it is a fact that has ended and a past. Secondly, what is historical has still an effect on today; so, history besides of being past is affecting today. Heidegger focuses on the movement of history. History is related to current becoming. History, by moving in time in a certain way, affects the future. That is why, what we call history covers both past, present, and future. History also examines the changes as a process that being experience in time. Consequently, history has a say about the institutions and cultures that human beings have built. It reveals the common life in a timely framework. "If we take these four significations together, the upshot is that history is that specific historizing of existent Dasein which comes to pass in time, so that the historizing which is 'past' in our Being-with-one-another, and which at the same time has been 'handed down to us' and is continually effective, is regarded as "history" in the sense that gets emphasized " (Heidegger 1962, p. 431).

As noted, the science of history constructs itself through objectivization. In this regard, what the object and subject of history are becomes problematic. By relying on what can history reveal itself? Heidegger demonstrates this problem by giving the example of antiquities in museums. Think of useful things or household materials in museums, even though they belong to the past, they still exist today.

Therefore, they belong to both past and present. So, if they exist today, how can they have a historical characteristic? It is possible to assert that they are out of use and they are useless for human beings because they might have been damaged or altered in time. At this point, their historicity comes from their innerworldly characteristic. Although they keep existing in another age, they still belong to Dasein's world. This means that the historicity of antiquities does not come from its existence in another age in the world, but from its belonging to the very world of Dasein. Here, we can draw the conclusion that historicity of something based on the historicity of Dasein. They can be historical, because of the fact that Dasein is historical. "Has-been-the-world of Dasein that is has-been-there. This is why "what is primarily historical is Dasein" (Heidegger 1962, p. 433).

The statement of "everything is historical" is valid since everything occurs and appears in a historical moment. However, the matter is not whether something is historical or not, but it is where its historicity comes from. The historicity of Dasein endangers the historicity of all other things. If Dasein does not exist, the pieces in the museum would not be historical. This also can be interpreted as what is historical can be historical just because it falls into Dasein's temporality. As it is seen, historicity arises from Dasein's temporality.

Dasein's existence constitutes its life. For this reason, Dasein's historicity is related closely to its existence. That is why the science of history which grasps history in a deterministic relation of cause and effect does not coincide with Dasein's historicity. Dasein's historicity is existential historicity. Therefore, here, the main argument is that, "in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factually projects itself" (Heidegger 1962, p. 434). In other words, the issue is to interrogate the basis of possibilities of Dasein which projects itself to the future. In this sense, Dasein is the one who takes over its historicity into its existence. Thus, anticipation resoluteness gives Dasein a possibility to apprehend its historicity. What does this mean? Dasein as a finite being projects on its future. Death is a possibility for Dasein that is not to be bypassed and also its future. Dasein realizes its finite being by the virtue of the death and it projects itself by anticipation. In this regard, Dasein's projection on its future is related to

understanding. Dasein understands its possibilities in its factual life; within the bounds of these possibilities, Dasein projects itself by making decisions. These possibilities are already there for Dasein. As noted before, Dasein is fallen in its everydayness and it lost itself in the averageness of publicness. However, Dasein comes back to itself via resoluteness and realizes its possibilities. These possibilities arises from the past of Dasein which is also called as *heritage*. "Heidegger's conception of the heritage, *Erbe*, is necessary to a full account of resoluteness. Dasein is resolute only when it is able to make particular decisions" (Harries 2014, p. 163). The heritage of Dasein refers to what Dasein has its past. Dasein is thrown into the world which is determined culturally and politically beforehand; Dasein inherits the heritage of the world before it. As against the claims of modern philosophy, subject cannot isolate itself from the society, subject cannot be considered regardless of its relationship with society, and subject cannot describe itself without being affected by the world's heritage. Therefore, each and every subject has a heritage and they have to project on their future selves within this heritage. Heritage as the past of Dasein enables Dasein to carry its past to its present. As Heidegger notes: " The resolute taking over of one's factual 'there', signifies, at the same time, that the Situation is one which has been resolved upon" (Heidegger 1962, pg. 434). Dasein is open to what may happen to, because it discloses itself as a being-in-the-world for the coming of fortunate circumstances. It means that Dasein exists in resoluteness as an opening to its fate. Dasein while existing in a world that is already full of values, it has its fate in the face of everything that may happen in this world and it can exist by undertaking its fate.

In this context, Heidegger gives goodness as an example. If "good" is a matter of heritage and the characteristic of goodness is grounded on authentic existence, resoluteness should include the effect of handing down. The resoluteness of Dasein makes Dasein far away from arbitrary and misunderstanding because resoluteness discloses the anticipating death, which is being free for death; and, according to Heidegger, only being free for death can put chances and provisional possibility away. Dasein can determinate absolute goal and pushing its existence into its finitude being only by being free for death. In this way, Dasein can save

itself from the endless multiplicity of possibilities that are comforting, shirking and taking things easy and it can come back to the simplicity of its fate. "This is how we designate the primordial occurrence of Dasein that lies in authentic resoluteness in which it hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility that it inherited and yet has chosen" (Heidegger 1962, p. 435). Dasein is open to what may happen to, because it discloses itself as a being-in-the-world for the coming of fortunate circumstances. It means that Dasein exists in resoluteness as an opening to its fate.

On the other hand, when Dasein lets its death as a dominator on its life, it begins to understand itself in terms of the power of its finite freedom. By this way, it confronts with its powerlessness about the chance elements in a situation that is disclosed. Dasein's taking its death as its finitude provides Dasein a free space to understand itself. By this way, Dasein has the possibility to understand what is possible or not. But, Dasein's life has the characteristic of being-with. Dasein shares its world with other Daseins. For this reason, every occurrence of Dasein is actually an occurrence-with. Consequently, Dasein has a fate alongside a *destiny* that comes from being-with. This destiny refers to the occurrence of the community, of a people. However, at the same time, destiny does not mean composing of individual fate or being-with-one-another with regard to the mutual occurrences of several subjects. This is where there is a possibility to pass from individual Dasein to communal Dasein. Also, Heidegger states " only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962, p. 436). "This would seem to mean that Dasein can be authentic only when with others, communicating with them, battling with them. Dasein becomes authentic by accepting its *Geschick* as member of its generation" (Harries 2014, p. 163). The concept of *generation* is one of the novel contributions of Heidegger to the literature. Because Heidegger does not tackle the problem of subject merely through its historicity. Dasein is the one who shares its world and understands with its generation. The explanations that are made above show us that the ontological condition of destiny is the constitution of care, that means temporality. This being includes equiprimordially death, guilt, conscience,

freedom, and finitude in itself. Therefore, Dasein can exist in the mode of fate; it means that Dasein can be historical in the ground of its existence.

In this sense, the question of how Dasein hands down its heritage becomes problematic. Heidegger states that it is not necessary that the resoluteness explicitly knows the provenance of its possibility which Dasein projects itself on it. However, the temporality of Dasein takes out the possibilities of potentiality-of-being that Dasein projects itself from the traditional understanding of Dasein. Resoluteness retrieves the possibility of existence that has been handed down. Heidegger says that "Repeating is handing down explicitly-that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. Repetition is grounded on the anticipatory resoluteness, since, only this way, "for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated" (Heidegger 1962, p. 437). However, this repetition does not mean to bring back "what is past" or to take what is present to what is outdated. Repetition does not ground on the past in terms of actualizing of what is past. "Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there" (Heidegger 1962, p. 438). Also, resoluteness removes the past that is understood something as an effect on today, because of the characteristic of resoluteness as in the Moment. Heidegger states that repetition neither grounds on the past nor aims at progress. Repetition is something different from both. Repetition is presented as a mode of resoluteness and Dasein can exist within its fate in authentic sense. However, Heidegger asserts that if fate constitutes the primordial historicity of Dasein, the essential weight of history does not ground on what is past, what is present and the relation between them. Authentic occurrence of Dasein arises from its future. Since, in this way, Dasein can anticipate itself as having-been in what is historical. Heidegger notices that "authentic being-toward-death, that is, the finitude of temporality, is the concealed ground of historicity of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962, p. 438). It comes to mean that Dasein is not historical because of its repetition, it is historical because of its temporality and in this way, it can take itself over in its history. As Heidegger states that " That

which we have hitherto been characterizing as "historicality" to conform with the kind of historizing which lies in anticipatory resoluteness, we now designate as Dasein's "authentic historicality"" (Heidegger 1962, p. 438).

On the other hand, as much as Dasein has its authentic historicity, it has inauthentic historicity in itself. It has been argued that Dasein, initially and most part of, understands itself by the world that is concerned. Understanding is to project itself through possibilities, that is, to exist as that possibility. Understanding, regarding common sense, also constitutes the inauthentic existence of the they. Dasein encounters with not only equipment and works but also what is going on with them such as affairs, undertakings, accidents etc. In this sense, the world belongs to what they are in it and what they happen in it, also the others are encountered in public, in the they. In line with this, Karsten Harries points out the differentiation of authentic understanding of history from the inauthentic understanding of history:

"Heidegger here distinguishes an authentic from an inauthentic understanding of history. Once again *Wiederholung* (repetition) is said to be characteristic of the authentic understanding of history. I relate to history in such a way that through it I gain my place: *Gechick* is *Schicksal*. This, however, is not true of inauthentic Dasein: History to it is first of all what is past and done with" (Harries 2014, p. 167).

Dasein's historicity does not mean that beings in nature do not have a history. In this context, in a countryside where lands have been inhabited, cultic sites that are thought as part of nature can also be recognized as historical. Because nature itself with remnants of Dasein's past reflects a historical background. Therefore, these innerworldly beings as such are historical, and their history does not signify something "external" that simply accompanies the "inner" history of "soul". The historicity of these beings is called: "world-historical (Heidegger 1962, p. 440). Here we need to elaborate on the notion of "world history" in terms of its

ontological meaning. Accordingly, "world history" has two meanings in itself. Firstly, it means the occurrence of the world in terms of existential and essential unity with Dasein. The second meaning is that occurrence of what is at hand and objectively present in terms of characteristic of innerworldly because being that are innerworldly are always discovered within the factual world. At this point, Heidegger states that the occurrence of equipment and works remain in darkness. He gives the example of a ring that is given as a present. According to Heidegger, this ring does not simply mean a change of location. The movement of this occurrence, that is "something happened to it", cannot be embraced by the term of a change of location. Heidegger remarks that this is valid for all historical process and events (Heidegger 1962).

If we talk about the historicity of Dasein, the phenomenon of Dasein should be attached to the subject. Accordingly, what is historical is always already there in terms of the state of being-in-the-world, without being grasped historiographically. In this sense, Heidegger points out an important matter that: Factual Dasein initially understands its historicity as world history because of being absorbed and entangled in what is taken care of. This understanding enures the understanding of being of Dasein, and vulgar understanding of being understands being as objective presence without discriminating, therefore, the being of what is historical is interpreted and understood something that comes along, present, and disappears (Heidegger 1962).

On the other hand, everyday Dasein is dispersed in events that are in what is going on in everyday. Fate comes to exist with regard to the possibilities and circumstances that mean something tactical rather than concerning. Therefore, inauthentic Dasein, firstly, calculates its historicity through what is taken for and Dasein forgets its authentic historicity in everydayness because of its dispersion and disconnectedness. Also, lostness in the they and in the world history were to flee from death. This fleeing from discloses the being-toward-death as a fundamental determination of care. Dasein as being-toward-death was brought in its authentic existence through its resoluteness and the occurrence of this resoluteness (repetition and handing down) was defined as authentic historicity. In this context, Dasein, in

the fateful repetition of possibilities, brings itself immediately to what has already been before. By this way, Dasein takes its heritage over itself and it comes back itself that is the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, that is death, through taking birth into its existence. At the end of this, Dasein acknowledges the thrownness of its own there. Heidegger states that resoluteness constitutes the loyalty that is towards its existence to the self. Loyalty requires the authority and this authority is the possibility of repetition that belongs to the free existence. Resoluteness includes itself existentiell constancy that already anticipated each possibility. At the same time, Heidegger asserts that resoluteness as fate involves the freedom to give up a determined decision; that enables us to understand Dasein's existence in terms of constancy rather than inconstancy because constancy does not consist of a succession of Moments but temporality which is already stretched along. Conversely, stretching of fate is remained hidden in the authentic historicity. Dasein, in the inconstancy of the they, makes its "today". It has a tendency to forget what is past in front of what is present, because, the they is blind toward possibilities and it is deprived of retrieving of having-been. Therefore, the they goes into the world-historical that has-been wholeheartedly because the they avoids making a decision. This is why the they understands history through today.

" On the other hand, the temporality of authentic historicity, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition, deprives the 'today' of its character as present, and weans one from the conventionalities of the 'they' (Heidegger 1962, p. 443-444).

On the other hand, inauthentic historical existence noses around for something modern because history becomes unrecognizable with regard to its fullness with what is past. Dasein's characteristic of being-with-others or the they drives it to contemplate on what is modern since the past is heavy to comprehend and the modern presents always, so to say, the new. Conversely, authentic historicity understands history, something as recurrence of what is possible and this

makes possibilities something that will be back to Dasein itself in terms of retrieving of existence. Therefore, unlike the constant search for the new of modern that is substantially blind to Dasein's heritage, Dasein's understanding of history yields on possibilities of its projection on future by retrieving. "That is, 'historicity' is not merely a quality of Being-in-the-world that reveals itself ex post to the detached and objective observer... Rather it characterizes the facticity of human Dasein itself, which takes the form of an active mediation of a given past in light of a self-chosen, future-oriented potentiality-for-Being (Seinskönnen)" (Wolin 1990, p. 23).

Thereafter, it is safe to claim that the concept of repetition or retrieval is the key concept of Dasein's authentic historicity. I will try to ponder on the concept of repetition or retrieval in order to understand Dasein politically.

As it has been argued, Heidegger tries to understand historicity in contrast to understanding history through the scientific and speculative method. Because if we consider the statement that "Dasein is the primarily historical", the problem of history should be understood as an existential problem. History is not something that is past as a fact, but also it is happening of Dasein. In contrast to this, history has been examined in relation to self-consciousness and progression. However, Dasein gains its meaning through its historicity and history does not mean what just happened for Dasein. As Heidegger argues that Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does (Heidegger 1962). This is why history is related to the existence of Dasein because Dasein moves between past and future, and this refers to the unity for Dasein. In this sense, possibilities that Dasein encounters with are the heritage for Dasein. This heritage comes from the characteristic of being-with of Dasein. Previous chapters, Dasein has been elaborated at the individual level and the community of Dasein is presented equally with the falling of Dasein, but here, there is a possibility to understand a possible engagement of Dasein with the community. Hence, Dasein has not only its fate but it also has its destiny which arises from communal life. This could be a way to overcome modern subjectivity which Heidegger is against. As Harries quotes from Heidegger; "... and consider that society today is only the absolutization of modern subjectivity and that from this

perspective a philosophy which has overcome the stand-point of subjectivity is not even permitted to participate in the discussion" (Harries 1973, p. 642). In this sense, how does Dasein understand its historicity?

Repetition is a concept that is firstly used by Kierkegaard in his book named *Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology*, in the philosophical sense. The important aspect of the concept of repetition is that it is interpretable. This is why especially existential philosophers are interested in the concept of repetition. In this regard, Heidegger uses the repetition in the part of the hermeneutic of Dasein in *Being and Time*. Because hermeneutics on repetition unlike using deterministic methods to examine history may enable us to disclose more of possibilities to project on future.

The concept of repetition is very important for Heidegger because he thinks that it is a way of disclosing historicity. In German, repetition corresponds to the *Wiederholung* that is translated as reiteration or replay into English. If we consider the literal meaning of this concept, it is possible to understand it as a kind of mimesis. However, the use of repetition is very different from mimesis in Heidegger's philosophy. Repetition is more about interpretation rather than mere replication. Through repetition, Dasein hands over its possibilities which are in its has-been, into the present. It opens up a possibility to prevent to understand history as merely what is past. The past is taken by Dasein in order to gain new meaning by interpreting it. Since understanding is a constitutive characteristic of Dasein, Dasein is the being that projects itself to the future within the understanding. Repetition is a way that makes historicity of Dasein meaningful in the process of projecting itself to the future. As it is understood, repetition is not merely handing down its history into the present, but it is to take over its history in order to make its actions meaningful. By this way, Dasein becomes a subject that has the possibility to understand its culture and what is handed down rather than being a subject that is poised and groundless. So, it is necessary to understand why repetition is important for everyday Dasein. According to Harries, Heidegger recognizes the need for authority to prevent Dasein to make a decision arbitrary (Harries 1976). In this sense, Heidegger finds this authority in history that gives a

possibility to Dasein to understand itself in the process of projecting itself. This is the way that Dasein can go into action in an authentic sense. "Authentic action is repetition, where repetition should be thought of not as a mechanical reenactment of what has been, but as a response which does forsake the present for the past" (Harries 1976, p. 649). In this context, Heidegger does not argue the specific authority, but he mentions to choose its own hero. However, while writing on 'choosing its hero' Heidegger does not identify a hero and he does not give an example of it. Although choosing its hero is not explained by Heidegger, it would be considered as archetypal significance for repetition. Especially, a hero would be used in the meaning of a route in the process of disclosing the historicity.

In this context, handing down of its own history of Dasein should not be understood as creating a new situation. Hence, handing down refers to modify the current situation. In fact, modifying is to escape itself from average everydayness because in publicness Dasein understands its time through the present. However, Dasein has to gain its characteristic of has-been in order to understand the moment of vision. In fact, it can be possible through disclosing its own historicity and handing down its heritage. By this way, the retentive characteristic of repetition is disclosed, because the temporality of Dasein is grounded in its future as a being-toward-death. Therefore, repetition firstly is directed forward than backward. Hence, the historicity of Dasein can be meaningful only through its projection to the future. Dasein discloses its history by repetition in order to actualize its own purpose and goals, and it projects itself to the future by a meaning which is gained through repetition. In this sense, Dasein gains its creative feature because Dasein saves itself from the domination of its average everydayness. On the other hand, the historical understanding of Dasein is a response. Dasein responses its characteristic of has-been according to its existential possibilities. That is to say, it is a response of Dasein to its historicity. Dasein reaches its own possibility of has-been by responding. However, as it has been argued, this is not mimesis. Here, Dasein cannot hand down its heritage into the present directly, in this way it has a possibility to interpret its own historicity. This is how historicity can be a way that gives a possibility to project its future creatively. Therefore, "historicity is a mode

of authentic, past-directed temporalization; Dasein situates itself in relation to a meaningful historical continuum, and this act endows its projection toward the future with content and direction (Wolin 1990, p. 60).

It has been argued that tradition is used by Heidegger in negative sense because tradition tempts Dasein. However, Dasein has its destiny which comes from its communal life alongside its fate. Here, Heidegger contributes to the literature in the sense of overcoming an abstract subject understanding. According to him, Dasein is thrown into its generation. Through repetition, Dasein understands not only its history but also its generation regarding what it inherits from its history. While Dasein projects itself to the future, it also has a possibility to project its society to the future by participating in its generation. Politically, Dasein creates its possibility of being oneself by handing down its historicity, also it gains political character. "Authentic Selfhood is thus only fully actualized within a historically given 'collectivity'" (Wolin 1990, p. 61). That is to say, the political character of Dasein is grounded in sharing the same historicity with its generation which also means to share a common destiny. "Heidegger, at least within the confines of the project of Being and Time, has no interest in formulating a speculative view on the origin and goal of the historical process, the nature of its development, and the unified meaning of its cultural contents" (Schrug 1970, p. 287). In this way, this discloses a way to discover a new meaning socially. This releasement of new meanings cannot be discovered through spirit or consciousness or reason as modern philosophy asserts, this can be done only by handing down its history as heritage with its generation. This reveals the historical distance that Schrag argues. The hermeneutic of Dasein shows us that "it is not at all an unfortunate state of affairs that one is removed from one's personal and social past. Historical distance allows for the play of possibilities through which new perspectives can be opened up and new meaning released" (Schrug 1970, p. 292). Here, by providing an area of interpretation for Dasein, history is purged from the understanding of progressive history or reaching its own conscience which implies a particular telos. History is a field of discovering new meanings rather than a determination on Dasein. In this way, politically, determinism which is presented by the modern world can be

overcome. Neither metaphysical determinism nor sciences can provide a creative role for the political subject. The subject should be understood through projecting its own existence to the future by handing down its historicity and by understanding repetition, rather than actualizing a particular telos.

As a conclusion, the examination of historicity of Dasein shows that temporality does not arise from history; in contrast to this understanding, history arises from the temporality of Dasein. In order to comprehend this, it is necessary to move beyond the historiography because historiography is a science of history that aims to determinate the facts by stabilizing them into one historical moment. However, this causes to miss the historicity of Dasein. On the other hand, in the examination on the relation of time to history, it is explained that Dasein is a being that is primarily historical. Therefore, history is not only related to facts that are happened in the history, but also related to existence of Dasein; and history should be understood as an existential history because the other beings that are in the world gain their historical characteristics by the historicity of Dasein. In this regard, historicity of Dasein reveals itself as occurrence of Dasein. In this occurrence, Dasein has not only its fate, which refers to being open to what may happen, but also its destiny which comes from its characteristic of being-with-one-another. In this sense, destiny and fate disclose the factual situation of Dasein that Dasein takes over its heritage. Additionally, Dasein is not alone while taking its heritage; it takes over its heritage with its generation. Generation is the phenomenon that Dasein is thrown into it and Dasein exists in it. In this regard, Heidegger offers that Dasein has a possibility to hand down its historicity with generation in order to project itself to the future by disclosing its historicity. Therefore, repetition is a key concept that Dasein can be with its community and gain political character in it because repetition provides a ground for Dasein to make itself apparent in society, also with society. However, repetition is not a mimesis or mere repeating, it means that Dasein can rescue itself in current issues in the publicness because Dasein is thrown into the world which is determined politically and culturally beforehand. Therefore, repetition is a way that Dasein can overcome the world, which is determined culturally and politically, and engage in politics creatively.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the main argument is that modern political subject, which is grounded on Descartes' philosophy, has its impasse. The reflection of the deterministic understanding of subject and its relations by accepting reason as a virtue or consciousness as the ultimate telos, on politics constitutes the basis of the impasse. In parallel to this, subject-centered understanding has led to understand nature as an object of science which is an extension of the manifestation of calculative thinking. As Francis Bacon said: "Knowledge is power". If we annotate this sentence by referring to Descartes' philosophy, knowledge as the virtue of the modern rational man became the power itself, therefore, the political is understood only through the acquirement of knowledge. However, because the measure of this knowledge is dependent on subject itself, the modern philosophies persisted a contradiction that also worked as limiting the radius of creative action. These impasses have not been solved in the history of modern philosophy, even after the Second World War. Hereby, there is still a need to search for a new political understanding that is not dependent on metaphysics and the dualistic understanding of the subject-object relationship. Considering Heidegger's critique on Descartes' philosophy, in this thesis, Heidegger's philosophy is considered as an opportunity to search for a possibility to overcome these impasses on the ground of historicity of Dasein. After examining the basis of Descartes' philosophy and Heidegger's critique on it, by accounting on Heidegger's emphasis on temporality, I have tried to examine the historicity of Dasein which derives from temporality. I reached the conclusion that understanding the historicity of Dasein through its temporality, unlike the modern understanding of history, may enable us to think of politics without taking reason and consciousness as the bases. The historicity of Dasein is examined by operationalizing the concept of repetition by Heidegger. Repetition is not reanimating a tradition, but an opportunity for interpretation of the past to gain a new meaning. Therefore the main argument of the thesis is that understanding historicity of Dasein through repetition provides a possibility to Dasein to project on its future in a creative way within its generation and this creative action may be

a way to overcome the impasse of the modern political subject understanding because "if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-others, its historicizing is a co-historicizing and is determinative for it as destiny, this is how we designate the historicizing of a community, a Volk" (Wolin 1990, p. 61).

Descartes' philosophy depends on the establishment of ego which makes itself apparent in the famous statement of cogito ergo sum. In this sense, Descartes embraces the subject epistemologically. Ego is presented as the source and the basis of knowledge. When Descartes establishes the ego metaphysically, he divides the being into two which have their own substances. Accordingly, ego corresponds to *res cogitans* which is the thinking thing substantially, on the other hand, the other beings are presented as *res extensa* which are the extended beings that have extension substantially. This causes the emerging of modern subject-object dualism. In this respect, for Descartes, object is liable to subject and ego becomes absolute toward the object. All the process of knowing starts in the mind of ego and it ends in mind of ego. Therefore, the knowledge of objects can be known by subject. This knowledge can be provided through mathematics. In Descartes' philosophy, mathematics can give us true knowledge of objects. In this way, object becomes unconsciousness being and this paves the way for modern science. The world as a concept becomes a being that is designated for humans' use. In this sense, politically, epistemology has gained power over ontology and politics is understood through the substance. Following philosophers, such as Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, have tried to find true epistemology for humans and society. This caused the rise of the ideas of rational individual and rational society. These definitions have been constituted through abstraction, that is to say, the connection of human with life has been broken off.

In addition to this, human cognizes nature as resources that can be exploited because the world has been understood through Cartesian world understanding in modern philosophy. This has helped to the rise of capitalism and alienation of human from the world. Because, the world has been reduced to an object that consists of sum of resources and the world has been put into the service of human.

In this regard, we have a concern about the world, but this concern is not related to understand it or dwell in it. It is also related to know or manipulate it. The reason lies under this understanding is that the relation of human with the world is not constituted ontologically, but epistemologically; and this understanding is dependent on being rational and having consciousness. On the other side, the world is grasped as it has no reason and consciousness. Instead of disclosing the relation between human and the world, human chooses to struggle against it and “for the sake of this struggle of world views and in keeping with its meaning, man brings into play his unlimited power of the calculation, planning, and molding of all things” (Heidegger 1977, p. 134). Being rational makes human the superior being among beings in the world because reason provides human to calculate, organize, manipulate, and control. This power causes to struggle against world and human against each other in order to satisfy his needs, therefore, the world becomes unlimited resources for providing unlimited wants and needs of human. At the end of this struggle, the world is not sphere in which human dwells, but human struggles in it.

Heidegger's critiques on Descartes can be categorized under three concepts: cogito, substance and the world. First of all, the establishment of cogito is interrogated logically; Heidegger argues that the meaning of the verb of I think is not clear in Descartes. It can refer to being that thinks or the very deed of thinking. Descartes does not make this point clear. On the other hand, in the statement of cogito ergo sum, the meaning of sum has been ignored by Descartes. The reason of this is that Descartes had no doubt about the absolute subject. Ego is presented by Descartes as the endpoint that doubt reached. However, As Heidegger notices that the being of ego is recognized beforehand by Descartes. Therefore, the problem of the modern subject makes itself apparent in its establishment process. Secondly, Descartes attributes particular substances to the being. In this regard, the substance of ego comes from thinking, reason. On the other hand, the substance of other beings is identified with the extension by Descartes. For Heidegger, the substance is the sickness of the metaphysics and it is to grasp human in abstraction not in terms of his factual life. In this way, the modern subject does not correspond to the

human being. This causes the domination of theory over practical life. Therefore, the modern world has been projected abstractly. On the other side, Descartes reduces the knowledge of *res extensa* to mathematics. The world has been presented as a mechanic system which is dependent on the cause and effect relation. In this way, the basic characteristic of human has been missed, which is the being-in-the-world. Although the world is the main condition of human being, it has become a system that consists of sum of matters.

While knowing is centered in the modern subject understanding, understanding in Heideggerian sense is undermined. Understanding refers to Dasein's understanding of its possibilities. The idealization of knowledge resulted in a strictly limited way of interpretation. For this reason, understanding provides a nourishing ground for interpretation and creative action. The over-emphasis on the possibility of knowing reduced the possibility of understanding. So, from where we can find a better way of understanding which may lead to a new politics? According to Heidegger, in the process of establishment of the modern subject, temporality has been missed by modern philosophy. For him, temporality and being determine each other equiprimordially. For the very reason, the examination of the temporality of Dasein is a way to investigate its possibility of understanding. Understanding can be in a both authentic and inauthentic way. In life Dasein has a possibility to be itself or not itself; the understanding of self depends on decisions of Dasein which are made whether by very Dasein or not. Dasein usually understands its possibilities through the they, rather than through itself and this drives it to inauthenticity.

The meaning of Being discloses itself in the light of temporality. The temporality of Dasein, different from the vulgar understanding of time, is understood through consisting of past, present, and future. This understanding is embraced primarily in the publicness for Dasein. However, this understanding is not enough in order to reveal the temporality phenomenologically. Dasein has three temporal ecstasies which are has-been, making present and future. In this context, future is more important than others because Dasein initially understands itself through future. Here, the important point is that temporality is not a being. Temporality temporalizes itself. Therefore, the understanding of Dasein is

dependent on its projection which is direct to the future. Politically, projection on future is a possibility to take out Dasein from the understanding temporality in terms of present and from clamps of the present and the business of today.

Heidegger does not aim to embrace the human abstractly as metaphysics does, therefore, in order to prevent this, he focuses on the everydayness of Dasein. Because, Descartes' subject disregards the place of it in the world and it is completely homeless in the world. The only way that it can exist is in thinking. It has neither values nor political view. This is why Descartes' subject is stabilized and it has no need to get into act since it cannot come into existence by taking action; it is presumed that subject already exists in the thinking. Therefore, it is clear that Descartes' subject cannot give us a possibility to take political action. In contrast to this, Heidegger provides a way that can move beyond this subject understanding by focusing on its factual life. In this sense, if politics is a matter of our everyday life, can we find a new way to engage in politics in everydayness? The answer is no because, in everydayness, Dasein belongs to the they-self rather than itself. The they is the phenomenon that Dasein falls into and loses itself in. This fallingness is interrogated through the three phenomena which are *idle talk*, *curiosity*, and *ambiguity*. Dasein is tempted and tranquilized through these phenomena in its everydayness. Therefore, it is not possible to create new and genuine way of engaging in politics in everydayness for Dasein. Everydayness is to be the average; and Dasein is the one who has to modify its everydayness in order to overcome and surpass the domination of the they. For these reasons, it is necessary to find a path that takes Dasein out of its fallingness and reveals the political characteristics of Dasein.

Can death be a reference point to think of a new politics for Dasein? Everydayness is the temporality of Dasein, however, the life of Dasein consists of its birth and its death. Everydayness corresponds to betweenness of them. Therefore, analyzing the end of Dasein takes us to the death of Dasein. Heidegger embraces the human as finitude being in terms of being-in-the-world. In this regard, Dasein is the one who is being-toward-death. Death is the end of Dasein that has determinative power on future of Dasein. That is to say, future of Dasein is its death.

However, death is embraced by Heidegger in individuality. Death that is a phenomenon of life is always my own death. Therefore, although Dasein always encounters with other's death, it does not show the death of Dasein. Dasein should face only its death. This is why death cannot be a point that creates politics of Dasein. But, death can give a possibility to understand Dasein as a futural being in a temporal sense.

Hereby, the betweenness of birth and death is everydayness and it does not provide a new way of politics since it results with fallingness rather than understanding; future corresponds to death and death is Dasein's own possibility; what about the birth of Dasein in its temporality? The birth corresponds to the past and history. Can we reach an understanding through the last temporal aspect of Dasein: its historicity? The historical characteristic of Dasein is the way that goes to its creative feature.

Current vulgar historical understanding is based on historiography. Historiography has been constituted in scientific grounds and sciences assert that history can be understood by objectifying what is past. For this reason, historiography as a science aims to objectify everything in the history and this perspective cannot give us a historical understanding of Dasein. In contrast to this objectivization, history is the occurrence of things and the way of the possibility of gaining new meanings. In this regard, I argue that Dasein is primarily historical and the other historicalities arise from its historical characteristic. I conclude that other beings (such as antiquities) gain their historical characteristic from being a part of Dasein's life. Because, historicity arises from the temporality of Dasein, that is to say, the temporality of Dasein makes the historicity possible. Then, the authentic historicity of Dasein is given by its hermeneutics. Accordingly, Dasein has its fate, and alongside its fate, it has a destiny which comes from its communal life. This is where Dasein reveals the characteristic of being-with. Dasein is the one that shares its life and historicity with others. Therefore, Dasein understands its historicity along with its *generation* since Dasein also shares the communal history. On the other hand, Dasein does not start from zero point to its life. The world that Dasein is thrown into is determined politically and culturally before Dasein. In this sense,

Dasein is the one that takes over its heritage. Consequently, the main issues are how Dasein discloses its heritage and what heritage means for Dasein.

If we consider the modern subject which is constituted in Descartes' philosophy, it is determined and limited by reason and consciousness. Its relation with time and being is not interrogated explicitly, therefore, it is essentially thought independent from time, history, and the world. However, in factual life, human is a temporal being and it has its own history; also, it is thrown into somewhere in the world and it dwells in there. Descartes failed to notice all these facts, although human comes into existence within the scope of these facts. Here, I assert that the concept of repetition gives us a possibility to disclose the human within these facts in the historicity of Dasein, and it also gives a way to gain political characteristics. It is possible to reveal the historicity of Dasein which includes its fate, destiny, and heritage, by the concept of repetition. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the concept of repetition. In this context, repetition means handing down Dasein's past into its today, in this way, it has a possibility to project itself to the future within the scope of possibilities which comes from the characteristic of having-been of Dasein. Therefore, historicity can be thought as an authority in the process of making decision for Dasein.

In this context, I assert that the concept of repetition provides a ground for solving these problems because as Heidegger states that "by repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest" (Heidegger 1962, p. 438). In this regard, I would like to refer to Slavoj Žižek. In the book of *The Thickless Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology*, he examines the relation of ontology of Heidegger with politics. He states that "Heidegger's ontology is thus in fact 'political' (to refer to the title of Bourdieu's book on Heidegger): his endeavour to break through traditional ontology, and to assert as the key to the 'sense of being' man's decision to adopt a 'project' by means of which he actively assumes his 'thrownness' into a finite historical situation, locates the historico-political act of decision in the very heart of ontology itself: the very choice of the historical form of Dasein is in a sense 'political', it consists in an abyssal decision not grounded in any universal ontological structure" (Žižek 2000, p. 20). If we consider Žižek's emphasis on the

historicity of Dasein, we can support his argument only in the light of the concept of repetition.

Firstly, the historicity of Dasein reveals the thrownness of Dasein. Thrownness of Dasein is not a fact that is ended by thrown into the world, also, Dasein throws itself from somewhere to somewhere in its life. This situation, for Dasein, conceals its thrownness. Therefore, historicity of Dasein shows us that Dasein is thrown in a finite historical situation. This historical situation refers to possibilities of Dasein which are taken over as heritage and Dasein has to project itself and make decisions about itself in this historical situation. This prevents Dasein to lose itself in the current issues and gives a guide about what Dasein can do or not. Therefore, repetition reveals the possibilities of Dasein and its thrownness in accordance with in a finite historical situation and Dasein takes over its thrownness in its life.

Secondly, repetition is for overcoming the tradition rather than reanimating it. Because tradition determines a framework in which Dasein's understanding is shaped and this framework is reproduced in the public sphere while encountering with the they. Therefore, tradition is what drives Dasein to fall in the they and inauthenticity. It also detains Dasein from understanding its historicity since tradition also provides a readymade framework. In this sense, tradition is not a matter of taking new political behavior but of articulating Dasein into something already framed. In contrast to this, the concept of repetition gives a possibility to respond to Dasein's mode of existence that has-been. By repetition, Dasein escapes itself from the decision that is already guided by tradition and repetition provides Dasein a ground without determination.

Thirdly, as this thesis suggests, understanding is the condition of Dasein to project on its future in a creative way, as for a new politics. While modern philosophy and politics depend on an understanding based on reason and consciousness as a universalistic tradition which actually provides a limited set of possibilities for Dasein, understanding Dasein's historicity and heritage with its generation through repetition provides a larger set of possibilities. In this regard, unlike the universalistic claims of modern philosophy, Dasein is tied to other

Daseins who share a destiny together. Dasein's fate cannot be considered regardless of its destiny shared with its people. Repetition enables us to interpret how to relate the understandings of fate and destiny. Interpreting Dasein's historicity through repetition gives a possibility to project on the future of individual and society without breaking off its relationship with its historicity, but at the same time, human becomes free in the face of its past, present, and future. By repetition, it is possible to emancipate political subject from the determination of reason and consciousness. Consequently, politics can be rescued from the domination of the concept reason

Lastly, Heidegger puts the concept of decision into the ontology of Dasein. Descartes' subject does not need to make a decision in order to exist because it is already determined by substance. In contrast to this, Dasein determines its life, that means its existence, by making its own decisions. In this sense, Dasein is not recognized as an authentic or inauthentic being, its decisions determine its life as an authentic or inauthentic. Therefore, decision is the most important concept in political sense in Heidegger's philosophy. However, in modern thought, decision is dependent on reason and consciousness. Also, reason and consciousness aims to reach human to universality. In this sense, subject loses its own 'being-there'. The possibilities that Dasein has are lost by Dasein for the sake of universality. Therefore, the politics of subject focuses on the universality rather than its own possibilities and its generation. In contrast to this, Heidegger rejects any universal ontological structure because Dasein is thrown into a particular society and it takes over its possibilities from this particular society. This shows that Dasein is the one that actualizes its fate and destiny in a particular society. As Wolin argues that "the 'ethicopolitical' axis described by Bourdieu proves crucial insofar as Heidegger, along with many of the thinkers and polemicists named by Bourdieu, embraced a quasi-Nietzschean approach to ethics, a valorization of "radical will" or heroic self-assertion commonly known as "decisionism" (Wolin 1990, p. 29). Therefore, Dasein has a possibility to overcome not only tradition but also universality which have an influence on its decision. Because historicity reveals the possibilities to Dasein; and, for Dasein, repetition is a way that creates new meaning from these possibilities in order to project itself to the future by making decision.

In conclusion, the impasse of the modern subject that is constituted on the basis of reason and consciousness in Descartes' philosophy has been argued. In this regard, this thesis tries to search a way that can overcome this understanding by examining Heidegger's philosophy and critique on Descartes. At the end of the examination, this thesis concludes that the historicity of Dasein which manifests itself in the concept of repetition gives us a political ground in order to overcome the impasse of the modern subject.



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