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HUMANITATIAN DIPLOMACY AND MEDIATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY'S DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION IN THE BANGSAMORO PEACE PROCESS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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Yukarıda adı geçen öğrenci tarafından hazırlanan ***Humanitarian Diplomacy and Mediation: The Case of Turkey's Diplomatic Intervention in the Bangsamoro Peace Process in the Philippines*** başlıklı bu çalışma 27/02/2018 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda oybirliği/~~oyçokluğu~~ ile başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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ÖZET

Türk diş politikası insan onurunu referans noktası olarak dikkate alıyor ve bazı Sivil Toplum kuruluşlarına güçlü destek vererek, yardımları teslim etmekle ve uluslararası arabulucuk yapmakla insan diplomasini gerçekleştirmeye çalışmaktadır. Hem Devletin hem de Sivil Toplum Kuruluşların gözetimi altında, Türk insancıllığı Orta Doğu ve Afrika'daki çatışma çözümüne ilgisiyle ortaya koyulmaktadır, bu nedenle, kendini bölgede yükselen insani bir diplomatik aktör ve arabulucu yapıyor. Yakın zamana kadar; Türkiye, Hükümet ile Bangsamoro halkının özerklik hakkı için mücadele eden Moro İslam Kurtuluş Cephesi (MILF) arasındaki uzun zamandır devam eden silahlı çatışmayı sona erdirmeyi amaçlayan ve Filipinler'de devam eden barış sürecine müdahalesi ile Uzak Doğu'ya uzanarak ufuklarını genişletti. Bu çalışma, öncelikle, barış sürecinde uluslararası arabuluculuk yoluyla Türkiye'nin resmi (devlet) ve gayriresmi (STK) diplomatik katılımını, GRP-MILF barış görüşmelerine destek sağlamak için oluşturulan arabuluculuk organlarına temsil edilmesiyle ortaya koyuyor. Bu katılımın Türkiye ile Bangsamoro halkı arasındaki köklü ilişkilerden nasıl kaynaklandığına cevap vermek amacıyla, bu çalışma önde gelen Türk STK'sı olan İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı'nın insani yardımlarını çatışma çözümlemesinde Türk arabuluculuğunu tetikleyen ana faktör olarak görüyor.

Anahtar kelimeleri: Arabuluculuk, İnsan Diplomasi, Diplomasi'nin Rotaları, Bangsamoro, Barış Süreci

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ABSTRACT

The Turkish foreign policy considers human dignity as a point of reference and by means of providing strong backup to some Turkish NGOs, Turkey pursues humanitarian diplomacy through delivering relief assistance and practicing international mediation. Under auspices of both the State and NGOs, Turkish humanitarianism is manifested by its involvement in conflict-resolution in the Middle East and Africa, consequently, making itself as an emerging humanitarian diplomatic actor and mediator in the region. Until recently, Turkey expanded its horizons by reaching out to the Far East with its intervention in the ongoing peace process in the Philippines aimed at ending the long-decade armed conflict between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), who struggles for the right to self-determination of Bangsamoro people. This study primarily discusses the Turkey's official (state) and unofficial (NGO) diplomatic involvement through international mediation in the peace process as manifested by its representation to mediation bodies created to provide backup to GRP-MILF peace talks. In attempt to answer how did such involvement resulted from long-established relations between Turkey and Bangsamoro people, this study takes humanitarian assistance carried by the leading Turkish NGO, the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, as the main factor which triggered Turkish mediation in the conflict resolution.

Key Words: Mediation, humanitarian diplomacy, Tracks of Diplomacy, Bangsamoro, peace process

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List of Abbreviations

GRP	Government of Republic of the Philippines
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MIM	Mindanao Independence Movement
BMLO	Bangsamoro Liberation Organization
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
FPA	Final Peace Agreement
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
FAB	Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
BTC	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
OIC-PCSP	OIC Peace Committee for South Philippines
ICG	International Contact Group
TPMT	Third Party Monitoring Team
IDB	Independent Decommissioning Body
BDA	Bangsamoro Development Agency
BCF	Bangsamoro Coordination Forum
TIKA	Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
IHH	IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation

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PREFACE

This study entitled "Humanitarian Diplomacy and Mediation: The Case of Turkey's Diplomatic Intervention in the Bangsamoro Peace Process in the Philippines" is about Turkish humanitarianism in Mindanao.

This study was conducted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the MA in International Relations (South Asian Studies) program of Necmettin Erbakan University – Social Science Institute. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all the staff of International Relations Department headed by Prof. Dr. Murat Çemrek. I also thank my thesis adviser Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin, whose excellent guidance, suggestions, support and interest during the process provided me the trainings to grow professionally in my academics.

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INTRODUCTION

"Prevention is better than cure."

- Desiderius Erasmus

As conventional diplomatic activities started to diverge and expand from the beginning of the 21th century with the emergence of new fields such as climate change, environment, culture, health and information access as major concerns in international relations, humanitarian issues become a major concern too given the humanitarian plight of the refugees the world has to deal with, thanks to the large of number of people fleeing their homes, crossing the borders and seeking refuge from armed conflicts in their homeland.

Though international armed conflicts between states have become increasingly rare in the recent years, on the contrary, there was a major increase of internal armed conflicts the world has witnessed during the last decade that primarily cause humanitarian crisis. More specifically, in their quest to overcome military inferiority, armed groups seek to employ approaches that often violate international law. There are instances when these groups want to topple the regime and takeover. There are instances when these groups aim to secede from their mother state and establish a new state under their rule.

Nonetheless, the blame cannot only be pointed towards them. It should be noted that not all armed groups commits the violation for no reason. In the interim, governments as well do not necessarily adhere to international law especially the fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law. There are instances when governments failed to deliver the needs of its constituents consequently planting the seed of secessionism in them which grows and spreads as time goes. There are instances also when these armed groups are just fighting for its right to self-determination based on the historical injustices committed to them by the government. There are instances when these armed groups are just fighting against

the human rights violations committed to the people they represent, as in the case of authoritarian governments.

There are always two sides of the story. The consequences of these conflicts, however, are always suffered by the common people. Hostilities often bring mass destruction of cities which also have a long term effect on the economy. Armed conflicts significantly bring damages to infrastructure, health provision and social stability as well. In worst case scenarios, unceasing warfare also becomes the main cause of refugee crisis.

With these variations in the conflict comes not only the humanitarian crisis but also the uncertainty of achieving success in pursuing humanitarian interventions to reach out to ones affected by such conflicts. Nevertheless, in parts where human rights violations are committed, the intervention of international community has been witnessed which are usually expressed in forms of military assistance, economic sanctions, humanitarian assistance and international mediation.

As Desiderius Erasmus puts it "Prevention is better than cure." In one way or another, this norm may be relevant to any intervention targeting to prevent the worse scenario of a particular conflict. In the case of international mediation pursued by international community, for instance, the effort has been apparent in crisis zones worldwide as they tried to arbitrate armed conflicts that mainly cause these humanitarian crises. In this context, it is a complex challenge for the international community to help these societies in their reconstruction process as post-conflict recovery requires a huge amount of resources to build up again these plagued societies. For this reason, the concept of the humanitarian diplomacy also needs strong reemergence from being neglected in the field of international affairs.

Turkey is becoming prominent in terms of practicing humanitarian diplomacy as an active and dynamic actor with its developing democracy, rising economy and active foreign policy on a global scale. Considering human dignity as a point of reference, humanitarian diplomacy is deeply reflected in its foreign policy. According to then Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, humanitarian diplomacy represents the human-oriented nature of Turkish foreign policy, which

merges Turkey's interests with Turkish values. Consequently, Turkey is resolute and committed to use all its capabilities and resources in this pursuit. In this context, Turkey needs to continue implementing humanitarian diplomacy from its neighboring states and beyond, extending from Syria to Afghanistan, and as far as Myanmar to Somalia.

In this pursuit, Turkey has been using development assistance and international mediation to conflicts as instruments of its humanitarian diplomacy. As the aforementioned states are confronted with political flux, for instance, Turkey considers international mediation in regional and international conflict zones as an instrument in achieving its objectives in humanitarian diplomacy beyond just delivering relief assistance. This is evident in its involvement in reconstruction of Somalia and Afghanistan and its effort to bring political stability in countries shaken by the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Balkans and etcetera. Turkish humanitarianism encompasses beyond its nearby neighbors. As far as Far East, for instance, Turkey's presence in peace process in the Philippines is a case worth mentioning. In this context, this discourse details Turkish intervention in the peace process which aim to end the decade-long conflict in the Southern Philippines.

CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1. Context

The religious and ethnic minority group called the Bangsamoro in the Southern Philippines has been fighting for its right to self-determination since mid-20th century. The Bangsamoro struggle has taken several forms – both political and armed struggle – with their aspiration of a separate Islamic State or a genuine regional political autonomy. Historically, their struggle originated since the colonial area of the Spaniards and the Americans persisting up to the present against the Philippine government. In an attempt to solve the quest of the Bangsamoro people for right to self-determination, the Government of Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the secessionist groups representing the Bangsamoro people such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), have been engaged both in the battlefield and in the negotiating table.

The international community, through international mediation, participated the peace talks which aimed at crafting an accord that will end the armed conflict between the parties. As the conflict caused humanitarian crisis as well, the international community delivered reinforcement expressed through humanitarian aid. Turkey is one of these international actors who aside from delivering humanitarian aid in the conflict-affected areas in Bangsamoro region, takes a significant part as well in the peace process en route for bringing political settlement that will conclude the conflict.

1.2. Research Outline

This study is in five parts.

The first chapter details the research design which includes an introductory part on the context, research question, conceptual background and review of related literature, research objectives, hypotheses, significance of the study; and methodology of research, data collection and tools, and analysis of data.

The second chapter starts with a discussion on conflict resolution tools. As one of the pacific means for settlement of conflicts, mediation will be emphasized by providing a general overview on its basic concepts, definition and description. Afterwards, the practice of mediation through the Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD) will then be discussed as the conceptual framework to explain official (state) and unofficial diplomacy (NGO), as apparent in Turkey's mediation. This discussion aims to distinguish the diplomatic intervention to a conflict resolution by official actors like states, and by unofficial actors like NGOs. This chapter also underlines the trust-based mediation role of NGOs in conflicts resolution that is triggered by any past endeavor, say a humanitarian aid. In this case, the pursuit of humanitarian diplomacy will be mentioned as a significant variable and factor for their participation as third party mediators.

As a case for well-comprehension of aforementioned concepts of ToD, the third chapter will provide a discussion on Turkey's diplomacy through state and NGO intervention to international conflicts. This particularly provides general information on Turkey's humanitarian and mediation initiatives in the international arena. This chapter begins by discussing humanitarian diplomacy as a Turkish foreign policy tool, followed by a discussion the evolution of Turkish humanitarianism. Thereafter, a concise narrative on Turkey's past practices of humanitarian diplomacy through development assistance and international mediation under the auspices of the state and Turkish NGOs, will be provided. This will cite cases from selected countries in the Middle East, Europe and Africa. Such cases, however, have not been discussed in full details with an objective to leave the details for further studies. Nevertheless, the citation of these cases sets the stage for the main case of this study, that is, the Turkish diplomatic intervention in the Bagsamoro region. The main discussion of this case will be given emphasis on the succeeding chapters.

A detailed discussion on the Bangsamoro issue will be provided beforehand in the fourth chapter in order to have a better understanding on the subject matter. This will cover the history of the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination. This includes discussions on the advent of Islam in the Philippines,

the Bangsamoro situation (from Spanish and American colonial period to establishment of new Philippine Republic), the birth of Bangsamoro secessionisms, and lastly the Bangsamoro peace process. This chapter will highlight the steps taken towards conflict resolution like the peace process and agreed settlements.

The fifth chapter discusses the preceding and continuing diplomatic efforts of Turkey in the said conflict resolution in the Philippines. Similar to aforementioned cases in the past, this chapter also mentions Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy through development assistance and mediation. This chapter emphasizes its development assistance through its leading NGOs, most especially the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, and its mediation role through its membership in different international mediation parties created to support the peace talks.

1.3. Research Question

During the peace talks, as aforementioned, mediation support has been extended by international actors manifesting the support of the international community whom sympathy was earned after the Bangsamoro struggle and plight was addressed to Islamic states. Thenceforth, Islamic actors have been taking an active role in the peace process. Over and beyond the Organization of Islamic States (OIC), Indonesia and Malaysia who primarily arbitrated the peace process at the outset, Turkey is one of these Islamic states who has been playing significant part during the negotiations and who has been actively delivering humanitarian relief to the conflict-affected areas.

Turkey utilizes the aforesaid humanitarian assistance and mediation as tools for its humanitarian diplomacy in the Bangsamoro region. Both of which are pursued under the auspices of Turkish state and NGOs primarily the IHH. In theory, however, there is no particular prose which directly provides the connection between the concepts of humanitarian diplomacy and mediation, which already evident in Turkish practice. Nonetheless, in the case of Turkish experience it is evident that aside from humanitarian aid, it uses mediation as an instrument in achieving it humanitarian ends. In this context, the Turkish involvement in the Bangsamoro peace process will

be the main case as this discourse tries to provide the missing link between the two concepts, thereby, gives rise to key question:

> *How does the pursuit of humanitarian diplomacy, through humanitarian assistance, triggers mediation?*

With its global status upstretched by its vast experience, knowledge and resources in the context of humanitarian diplomacy, this study will be underlining Turkey's use of development assistance and mediation in pursuing its HD objectives in the Bangsamoro region, as the Philippine government and Moro secessionist groups engage in negotiating table for a political settlement to end their decade-long conflict.

1.4. Conceptual Background and Review of Related Literature

International mediation has been one of the widely used pacific methods of settling disputes. The conduct of which is not just solely done by official through traditional diplomacy but also by unofficial actors like international NGOs through NGO diplomacy. In general, the concept of Tracks of Diplomacy conceptualized the mediation pursued by official and unofficial actors as third parties in conflict resolution like peace process. The Tracks of Diplomacy includes official diplomacy as Track One (T1), and unofficial diplomacy as Track Two (T2) and Track One and a Half (T1.5).

First, in the discussion of the concept of mediation, there are numerous literatures at hand which are being cited in this study.

Barston (2013) provides a comprehensive discussion on the concept of diplomacy including methods and approaches to conflict resolution. "Traditionally, the methods used for the pacific settlement of disputes have included inquiry, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, mediation and judicial settlement." In this case, mediation is one of the methods which was given emphasis.

The work of Woodrow and Moore (2010) provides extensive discussion on the concept of negotiation wherein, accordingly, conflicting parties engage in discussion of issues and develop and reach mutually acceptable agreements.

The work of Moore (2009) provides the best definition and comprehensive definition of mediation, that is, "the intervention in a standard negotiation or conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute". Accordingly, this literature is the most comprehensive book written on the concept of mediation so far. Aside from definition of mediation, Moore also discussed types of mediator and the conditions for third-party's acceptability as mediator.

In this connection, Darby and Mac Ginty (2008) discussed the importance of third party assistance by providing a sound discussion on contemporary peacemaking. Their work initially defines conflict, peace process and post-war reconstruction. They emphasize the necessity of third party assistance in the peace process when negotiations are seen insufficient.

As mediation is conducted by various actors, the Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD) conceptualizes the conduct of mediation by both official actors and non-official actors in international arena. In the discussion of ToD, the work of Böhmelt (2010) focused on the effectiveness of ToD strategies (official and unofficial diplomacy) in third-party interventions. As mentioned beforehand, ToD includes Track One Diplomacy (T1), Track Two Diplomacy (T2), and Track One and a Half (T1.5) Diplomacy. Accordingly, despite the more effective intervention of T1 diplomacy due to its greater leverage and more resources, he argues that "combined mediation efforts of both official and unofficial tracks can be more effective than independent track actions." The interaction of these tracks is called as Multi-track Diplomacy.

Magalhaẽs (1988), Sargsyan (2003) provides a definition of T1 or commonly known as the official diplomacy. Montville (1982) also discusses about the T2 diplomacy, its definition and actors. The complementarity of these tracks was discussed by Gürkaynak (2007), Yapıcı (2003) and Çuhadar and Dayton (2012). The

work of Mapendere (1999) also provides additional discussion on definitions of T1 and T2, and on their strengths and weakness. The relationship and comparative advantages between the two tracks was further elaborated by Hottinger (2005). In his work, he also underlined the wide role played by T2 actors (nongovernmental and unofficial groups and individuals) in peacemaking.

The concept of T1.5 diplomacy was given comprehensive discussion in a separate of work Mapendere (2001). In this work, he emphasizes T1.5 as "hybrid diplomacy" because it cross-fertilizes T1 and T2. Heiling (2008) and Ishikawa (2014) present the case of T1.5 intervention in conflict resolution process. Respectively, they cited the cases of the Aceh conflict in Indonesia and the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines (see also Tabak (2015)).

By laying emphasis on T1.5 and T2 Diplomacy, this study highlights NGO's mediation role as well. In this framework, Peinado (2003) argues that humanitarian workers as international NGOs use mediation in supporting peace initiatives. To further elaborate this, her work provides the case of the role of international NGOs in peace and reconciliation processes during post-conflict situations.

In the context of intra-state conflicts, a detailed discussion is also provided by Maia (1996) regarding the reasons and conditions motivating NGOs to mediate between local government and community based organizations (CBOs) in cases of settling disputes. Branco (2011) also provides as discussion on NGOs' role as mediators in violent intrastate conflicts. Arguing that T1 or official diplomacy still remains the most effective tool for mediating such conflicts, he added that unofficial intervention by NGOs in the peace process, through T1.2 or T2 diplomacy, can also complement and not replace the official diplomacy.

Turner (1988) also underlines the mediation role of NGOs which emanates from the trust of grassroots. This trust may have resulted from NGO's conduct of humanitarian diplomacy. In this framework, the most comprehensive definition on the concept of humanitarian diplomacy is provided by Minear & Smith (2007).

1.5. Research Objectives

There are already a number of literatures at hand with provides a sound discussion on the concept of traditional diplomacy pursued by official actors (as states and international organizations like the UN), as third parties in mediation of conflicts at global scale. In practice, these efforts are also apparent in the number of conflict resolution under the auspices of aforementioned actors.

There are issues, however, which are beyond the reach of official diplomacy and needs a complimentary assistance of other actors like NGOs. Most especially in dealing with intrastate conflicts, where the pursuit of interest by armed groups also brings threat to national security of the mother state, there are instances when NGO involvement and contribution may be necessitated because of their close contact to the grassroots. In scenarios when reaching out to these groups are difficult, NGO has the ability and resources to provide the bridging approaches needed to sustain the communication between them and the party these groups are conflicting with. In this case, the concept NGO diplomacy through mediation is apparent in practice.

The citation of these cases in literatures, however, is very uncommon and limited. It is therefore the prime objective of this study to elaborate further another case of NGO diplomacy through mediation. The discussion of such case aims to elaborate how humanitarian actors also can play mediating roles. In doing so, the case provided in this study will serve as a supplementary case explaining the said concept. Apart from this, this study also aims to emphasize how trust becomes a factor in NGO mediation role. This pertains particularly to the trust earned by NGOs from their humanitarian endeavors in areas of influence of armed groups.

1.6. Hypotheses

In line with the aforementioned objective, this study proposes the following initial assumptions.

Hypothesis 1:

Turkey's diplomacy towards Bangsamoro encompasses humanitarian assistance and mediation.

Hypothesis 2:

The humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs has significant positive impact on the peace process.

1.7. Significance of the Study

By highlighting trust-based mediation which stems from humanitarian endeavor of an NGO, this study would be the first literature ever to discuss any connection between humanitarian diplomacy and mediation. In actual fact, there is no particular text at hand which provides the direct connection between two concepts as they were discussed separately. In practice, however, their relation has been so apparent, thanks to the involvement of humanitarian workers in peacemaking initiatives with an objective to eliminate the causes of humanitarian crisis such as conflicts.

Supplementary information about the Bangsamoro issue will be another significance of this study. Issues like the Kashmir conflict, the Palestine question and such are no new subject in the international arena; thus, topics like these are correspondingly well-cited in texts and other resources. The issue regarding Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination, however, is not as eminent globally as aforementioned issues, possibly due to the fact that there is no amount of work referring the issue. An unfortunate case, for instance, even in the Philippines itself anything about Bangsamoro like the Moro history is not reflected in the education curriculum, thus, precluding national awareness and consciousness about the Bangsamoro issue, consequently causing ignorance and misconception among Filipino people about the Bangsamoro people. In this view, another significance of this discourse is the reference of the Bangsamoro case which would bring both national and international awareness - in the Philippines and in the international

stage. This discourse is expected to be considered an addition to resources authored about the Bangsamoro issue.

1.8. Methodology

As this discourse attempts to connect the concepts of humanitarian diplomacy and mediation by using the Turkish case as a model, the conduct of research will be accompanied with theoretical studies, review of related literature, and conduct of field survey in order to achieve its agenda.

1.8.1. Research Methods

Throughout the research, this study has employed two main approaches in generating data – archival research and survey interview.

The conduct of archival research enabled the generating of important data regarding the concept of mediation particularly the Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD). The result of this review on related literature set the framework that consequently determined the related points on Turkish case. The Turkish case, particularly its humanitarian diplomatic intervention in Africa, the Middle East and Europe, was then used as a reference to further prove the Bangsamoro case in the Far East.

A field survey was also conducted in testing the hypothesis of the research. Correspondents were all asked to provide their opinion and perspective on Turkey's diplomacy in the Bangsamoro region.

1.8.2. Data Collection and Tools

Archival research was able to generate data necessary to discuss the subject matter of the discourse. This type of data collection was based from books and articles that discuss the concept of mediation and sub-topics as Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD). Based on initial resource gathering, there are numerous books and journal articles at hand citing these subjects. Similarly, the same process goes for discussing Turkish case. Numerous articles and dissertations written by prominent Turkish scholars are available and were referred to cite Turkish humanitarian diplomacy and mediation practices. In relation to discussing the Bangsamoro issue, the works

written by Moro authors was considered first to ensure data authenticity most particularly regarding the discussion of Bangsamoro history. Data for other topics like the Bangsamoro peace process were sought from electronic resources like news items from official websites of peace panels, copies of signed peace agreements and Terms of References (TOR), official statements and periodical reports. Since the issue is ongoing, these resources are expected to provide more recent information regarding the issue.

In the conduct of the said field survey, a questionnaire reflecting Turkey's endeavor in the Bangsamoro region through humanitarian assistance and mediation was prepared. The survey was designed to get the views and opinions of correspondents regarding the subject matter. The target correspondents, who are mainly based in the Bangsamoro region, were then inquired within a span of two months through the assistance provided by the SEED Initiative, a consultancy firm based in Cotabato City.

The 20 respondents, in particular, included individuals representing the following:

a. The MILF or Moro Islamic Liberation Front (5 respondents)
b. Bangsamoro Development Agency, the MILF development wing (3 respondents)
c. Government officials (1 respondent)
d. NGO workers operating in Bangsamoro region (4 respondents)
e. Aid recipients (3 respondents)
f. Academics (2 respondents)
g. Media (2 respondents)

1.8.3. Data Analysis

As abovementioned, data collection through archival research was expected to produce data like key concepts and other dynamics of mediation. Other topics like Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD) was also considered and referred. In this framework, information relating to Turkish past experiences was used as a model to explain

further the application of such theories. Through conduct of analysis of data sought, the Turkish case provided the study a clear case exemplifying the pursuit of humanitarian diplomacy through mediation.

The data sought from the filed survey were also put into analysis. After conducting analysis, they were considered to prove the aforementioned hypotheses of this study relating to Turkey's diplomacy through humanitarian assistance and mediation and how the former became a factor to the practicality of the latter.

CHAPTER TWO

TRACKS OF DIPLOMACY: STATE AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO) IN MEDIATION OF CONFLICTS

There has been a rapid increase in the numbers of negotiated settlement to armed conflicts after the end of Cold War, thanks to the assistance of international mediation along with several conflict-management tools such as peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.[1]

2.1. Conflict Management and Resolution Approaches

According to Barston (2013), traditional methods of peaceful settlement of conflict or disputes include negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, mediation and judicial settlement.[2] Aside from these, Moore (2014) added that conflict resolution also involves numerous approaches and procedures such as administrative or managerial approaches and procedure, legislative approach and extralegal approaches such as nonviolent action and violence.[3]

Table 2.1 Continuum of Conflict Management and Resolution Approaches and Procedures[4]

Private decision-making by parties	• Conflict avoidance • Informal discussion and problem solving • Negotiation • Mediation	Increased coercion and likelihood of win-lose outcome
Private third party decision-making	• Administrative decision • Arbitration	
Legal (public), authoritative third-party decision-making	• Judicial decision • Legislative decision	
Extralegal coerced decision-making	• Nonviolent direct action • Violence	

[1] International Peace Institute, "Mediation and Peace Processes", **IPI Blue Paper**, No. 8, 2009, p. 6
[2] R.P. Barston, **Modern Diplomacy,** 4th Ed., Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 261
[3] Christopher Moore, **The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict,** 4th Ed., Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 2014, p. 8-14
[4] **Ibid.**, p.7

On the top of the continuum in Table 1 are collaborative, informal and private approaches which only involves the disputing parties or a mediator who does not have the authority in making or imposing decisions to disputants. In between of the continuum are a range of third-party approaches which provide assistance on decision-making of disputants as well. Lastly, the end of the continuum includes approaches wherein disputants resort to use of coercion or violence.

In this chapter, the study concisely explores the basic approaches to conflict resolution namely negotiation and third-party approach of mediation. Other approaches and procedure to conflict management and resolution are left for further studies.

2.1.1. Negotiation

Conflict resolution basically starts with conduct of *negotiation.* Moore (2014) provides an explicit definition of negotiation in terms of exchange of proposals.

> "Negotiation is a structured communication and bargaining process that is commonly used to conduct transactions and reach agreements on issues where serious differences do not exist, or to resolve a dispute or conflict."[5]

Negotiation generally "includes dialogue with problem-solving and discussion on merits, as well as bargaining and the exchange of concessions with the use of competitive tactics".[6] In other words, during negotiation process, conflicting parties engage in discussion of issues and develop and reach mutually acceptable agreements.

There are cases when a negotiation is not enough. Accordingly, there are cases when disputing parties are in need of other's assistance in order to begin, conduct or conclude peace process with success.[7] In cases when negotiations are difficult to initiate or have begun but resulted into a deadlock, conflicting parties may need to use another conflict resolution procedure involving assistance of a third-party

[5] Moore, **The Mediation Process …**, 8.
[6] Peter Woodrow and Christopher Moore, **Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation,** Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 2010, p. 7
[7] John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, Eds., **Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction**, Palgrave Mcmillan, New York, 2008, p. 94

who is not directly involved in the conflict. In this context, the most common form of third-party assistance is *mediation*.

2.1.2. Mediation

According to According to Darby and Mac Ginty (2008), the conflict resolution is bilateral with the conduct of negotiation, and becomes trilateral when mediation is sought as an alternative.

In this view, Moore (2014) defines mediation as:

> "… a conflict resolution process in which a mutually acceptable third party, who has no authority to make binding decisions for disputants, intervenes in a conflict or dispute to assist the parties to improve their relationships, enhance communications, and use effective problem-solving and negotiation procedures to reach a voluntary and mutually acceptable agreement on contested issues."[8]

In another literature, Woodrow and Moore (2010) also provide a similar definition:

> "Mediation is a conflict resolution process that helps negotiators resolve serious differences, disputes, or conflicts in a voluntary and mutually acceptable manner. It involves the assistance of a third party, a mediator, who has no power or authority to make a binding decision or impose any outcome on disputing parties. Mediators help negotiators effectively address contentious and difficult relationship, procedural, substantive, or structural issues."[9]

Considered as an extension of negotiation process, mediation assumes some kind of conflict of parties. It serves an option when conflicting parties aren't able to start talks or have initiated talks but reached a deadlock situation. In practice,

[8] Moore, **The Mediation Process …**, p. 8
[9] Woodrow and Moore, **Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation**, p. 409

mediation "covers a wide variety of activities otherwise labeled informal contacts, conciliation, good offices, brokering, or intermediary initiatives."[10]

Specifically, mediators assist the:

a) opening or improving the communication of disputing parties;
b) establishment of more courteous and productive working interactions;
c) identification, understanding, and consideration of parties' concerns, interests and needs;
d) implementation of a more effective problem-solving or negotiation procedures, and
e) recognition or formulation of mutually acceptable agreements.[11]

2.1.2.1. Third Party's Acceptability as Mediator

The aforesaid definitions mentions that mediation is conducted by a third party who is an individual or a group of people working between conflicting parties, and who does not have the authority in decision-making of disputants. According to Moore (2014), a third party's acceptability as mediator is also determined by three factors.

a) Independence

The third party who serves as mediator are basically independent who should neither a primary party involved in the conflict or dispute, a secondary party supporting either of conflicting parties, nor a party who likely to be affected significantly by the resolution.

b) Impartiality

A mediator should also be impartial or unbiased towards disputed issues and possible outcomes or agreements that may possibly result from the process.

c) Neutrality or Lack of connections

[10] Darby and Mac Ginty, **Contemporary Peacemaking …**, p. 94
[11] Moore, **The Mediation Process …**, p. 8-9

A third party should be neutral or lack any personal connections to one or more parties. In many circumstances, especially in Western models of mediation practiced in many developed countries, independence, neutrality and impartiality are the major factor for the acceptability of a person or group to serve as an intermediary in a conflict. In other circumstances as diplomatic negotiations or mediation, however, a third party's desirable link to one or more disputants is highly desirable. In this context, a disputant may possibly want intermediaries with connection to their counterpart. This is due to their ability to conduct talks, communicate views, and influence a counterpart who may be difficult to persuade.[12]

2.1.2.2. Types of Mediators

Mediators vary according to their relationship with involved parties in a conflict. In Table 2.2 below, Woodrow and Moore (2010) provides the varieties of intercultural mediators.

Table 2.2 Types of Mediators

Social network mediators	Trusted individuals who are part of the parties' social network, who may or may not be totally impartial regarding issues in question, but whom disputants believe can be of help.
Benevolent mediators	Respected high-status and authoritative individuals whom disputants go to for advice and help in developing acceptable Agreements
Administrative or managerial mediators	Persons who occupy formal positions in organizations and have the authority to make decisions about contested issues, but for a variety of reasons prefer to assist disputants to negotiate their own agreements within parameters prescribed by the organization.
Vested interest mediators	Powerful individuals or parties who are not neutral toward disputants or impartial regarding issues in question, have a strong interest in the outcome of a dispute, and encourage, cajole, or coerce parties to agree.

[12] Moore, **The Mediation Process …**, p. 20-21

Independent mediators	Intermediaries who are neutral regarding their relations with parties and impartial regarding issues in dispute, who provide process assistance, and on occasion, at the request of the parties, independent substantive advice.

Source: Peter Woodrow and Christopher Moore, **Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation,** Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 2010, p. 414

2.2. Tracks of Diplomacy

In international arena, mediation is not conducted exclusively by official third party representatives from states and international organizations. According to Barston (2013), international mediation is also apparent in the increasing involvement of third-party mediators in conflicts like non-governmental organizations (NGOs), individuals and informal actors.[13] The Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD) conceptualize both the official and nonofficial intervention. In this context, Böhmelt (2010) provides a comprehensive definition of ToD.

> "ToDs can be defined as diplomatic initiatives by outside state or non-state parties to transform a dispute by communicating information, proposing new solutions, and directly influencing the crisis using carrots and sticks that can help generate movement towards potentially overlapping bargaining positions."[14]

ToD includes Track One Diplomacy (T1), Track Two Diplomacy (T2), and Track One and a Half (T1.5) Diplomacy.

2.2.1. Track One Diplomacy (T1)

Track One Diplomacy (T1) or official diplomacy involves state and official international organizations in mediating conflicts.[15] In particular, official diplomacy is defined by De Magalhaes (1988) as:

[13] Barston, **Modern Diplomacy**, p. 262
[14] Tobias Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions", **SAGE Journal of Peace Research,** Vol. 47, No.2, 2010, p. 167
[15] **Ibid.**, p. 169

> "… [a]n instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties."[16]

According to Sarsgyan (2003), T1 particularly involves aforementioned official actors such as representatives of sovereign states in an official and formal government-to-government negotiation.[17] T1 diplomacy conceptualizes the peacemaking activities of officially appointed individuals (i.e. diplomats), governmental agencies (i.e. diplomatic and defense organizations), and inter-governmental organizations (i.e. UN or NATO)[18] aimed at influencing political power structures.[19]

In the context of conflict resolution, states and official international organizations pursues T1 or diplomatic effort through intervening and mediating conflicts.[20] In 1991, for instance, the UN intervention in Iraq during the crisis is an example of T1 diplomacy.[21] It is also evident in the UK intervention through Lord Carrington in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe negotiations for independence; the UN intervention in Indo-Pakistani war of 1965; and initial mediation efforts in 1994 of Contact Group in Bosnia - composed of USA, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany – and NATO's military intervention after the failure of said mediation efforts.[22]

In their pursuit to influence the political power structures, Mapendere (1999) provides that T1 actors have numerous strengths as it relies primarily on state power. First, T1 actors can influence the course of negotiations and outcomes through use of political power, for instance, threat of military force if parties defy international law and treaties. Second, T1 actors' access to financial and material resources gives them

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[16] Josẽ Calvet de Magalhaẽs, **The Pure Concept of Diplomacy**, Greenwood Press, New York, 1988, p. 17
[17] Irena Sargsyan, **International Mediation in Theory and Practice: Lessons of Nagorno and Karabakh**, Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 2003, p. 10
[18] Jeffrey Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," **Culture of Peace Online Journal**, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1999, p. 67
[19] C. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, "Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish and American Diplomats," **International Negotiation**, Vol. 2, 2007, p. 58
[20] Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies …", p. 169
[21] **Ibid.**, p. 168.
[22] **Ibid.**, p. 170.

flexibility and high leverage in negotiation. Third, their use of various intelligence sources enables T1 actors to employ comprehensive knowledge about the interests of parties. Fourth, T1 actors are competent in using wide-range knowledge on foreign policies of their respective home countries and of conflicting parties as well.[23]

T1, however, has distinct weaknesses despite the aforesaid assets. First, state power corrupts T1 approaches to conflict resolution as, rather a facilitative tool, it can be a liability to durable peace. "Power can suppress underlying issues of weaker parties, thereby undermining the sustainability of a peace agreement." Second, the occasion when diplomatic missions are closed down during peak of conflicts reduces communication at times of its necessity. Third, the inability of officials to speak against their home country may cause delay or rigidity in negotiations as they need consultations with their leaders at home first. Last but not least, electoral cycles affect T1 diplomacy.[24]

2.2.2. Track Two Diplomacy (T2)

In dealing with issues beyond the reach of official diplomacy, Track Two Diplomacy (T2) serves as an innovative method of third-party intervention in international and intra-national conflicts. In 1982, Joseph Montville (1991) created the term "Track Two" by providing its definition.

> "Track Two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. …[It] is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of the public view and without the requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage."[25]

[23] Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks", p. 67
[24] **Ibid.**, p. 68.
[25] Joseph Montville, **The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy**, Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1982, p. 162

T2 is performed by unofficial actors involved in the conflict resolution process which usually includes NGOs, former government officials, former military officials scholars and senior journalists.[26]

T2 is not a substitute or alternative for T1 government-to-government relationships but rather a complement for T1 negotiations. The complementarity of T2 to T1 is clear in the definition provided by Gürkaynak (2007) and Yapıcı (2003). According to Gürkaynak, "[T2] refers to a variety of non-governmental and unofficial forms of conflict resolution activities between the representatives of adversarial groups that aim to de-escalate conflict, improve communication and understanding between the parties, and develop innovative ideas to be used in 'track one.'"[27] Yapıcı also added that "[T2] diplomacy is often needed either to establish the basis for further Track-One activities or to put into practice a former Track-One agreement…Building peace among citizenry is needed for the success of diplomacy at Track One level."[28]

During peace processes, Çuhadar and Dayton (2012) further added that T2 diplomacy offers many advantages. These includes "providing a safe, off-the-record, and sustained venue for dialogue among adversary groups; engaging adversaries in dialogue when official peace processes fail or are not possible; testing out proposals for conflict management prior to the initiation of formal mediation or diplomacy; and empowering citizens as participants in peace processes."[29]

T2 diplomacy has numerous advantages. First, T2 parties are not repressed by political power which consequently permits T2 actors to express opinions on issues which directly affects their communities. Second, T2 actors are the constituency themselves; therefore, they don't fear losing their constituencies. Third, T2 actors "empowers the socially, economically, and politically disenfranchised groups by giving them a platform from which they can air their views on how peace can be

[26] Utku Yapıcı, "Track-Two Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission Example," **The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,** Vol. 44, 2003, p. 151
[27] Gürkaynak, "Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective…", p. 58
[28] Yapıcı, "Track-Two Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign Policy …", p. 152
[29] Esra Çuhadar and Bruce Dayton, "Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy," **Negotiation Journal**, 2012, p. 158

achieved in their own communities or nations." Fourth, T2 diplomacy is effective in terms of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, T2 serves as an effective tool. Fifth, T2 includes individuals who are in directly involved in the conflict such as the grassroots and middle leadership. Lastly, unlike the T1, electoral cycles do not affect T2.[30]

Regardless of its advantages, T2 has quite a few drawbacks as well. First, the lack of political power limits T2 actors to influence structures of political power as well as the foreign policy. Second, T2 interventions consumes amount of time in delivering results. Third, the abilities of T2 actors to influence change during war times are limited. Fourth, they also have rare resources which are needed to sustain leverage during negotiation process and to implement agreements thereafter. Fifth, T2 is ineffective in authoritarian regimes where leaders underestimate lower level leaders. Lastly, the variety or multiplicity of T2 actors or organizations results in lack of coordination between them.[31]

T2 initiatives are apparent in the Israeli-Palestinian context between 1992 and 2004. From 1980s to 1990s, for example, international scholar practitioners from Harvard University and American Psychiatric Association organized conventions between people close to Israeli decision makers and Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLO). In 1993, unofficial peace process also begun with unofficial meetings between Israeli academics and PLO affiliates under the auspices of Norway. Consequently, the process has transformed into an official agreement with the signing of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accord. From 1993 to 2000, Oslo peace process resulted further into proliferation of unofficial peace efforts particularly initiatives involving civil society and grassroots to achieve sustainable peace. Despite the eruption of second Intifada in 2000, these unofficial peace efforts has persisted, continued and contributed to reactivation of T1 level negotiation processes such as the Geneva Initiative and the People's Voice Initiative.[32]

[30] Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks", p. 68
[31] **Ibid.**, p. 68-69
[32] Çuhadar and Dayton, "Oslo and Its Aftermath …" p. 159-160

2.2.3. Comparative Advantages

According to Hottinger (2005), T1 and T2 have distinct advantages and disadvantages in conflict resolution, say, engaging armed groups in a dialogue.

T1 actors have the status and resources which enables them "to intervene militarily, support peace processes/agreements with monitors and peacekeepers, and give or withhold legitimacy, aid, trade or loans, etc." However, there may also be constraints for them to act effectively since they may be "wary of conveying status and legitimacy on 'rebels'" and "compromised by national interest or seen as too partial toward one of the combatants or have too great a stake in the outcome of the process". In addition, legal constraints and complications are possible in instances which draw a great deal of media attention.[33]

T2 actors, on the other hand, are less intimidating to armed groups, thus, "find it easier to work flexibly, unofficially, and off the-record, and have less to be concerned about in terms of conveying official/legal recognition". Their lack of geopolitical interests in the conflict enables them to be more impartial, form relationships with wide range of actors involved in the conflict, and hear the issues and sentiments which official actors do not. However, the lack of capacity to compel parties can prevent T1 actors from entering the conflict resolution process, and cannot provide the same assurances as T1 actors. Lastly, they lack of resources and funding.[34]

2.2.4. Multi-track Diplomacy: T1 and T2 Cooperation

According to Hottinger (2005), there are several cases when T1 and T2 interventions complement each other.

First, T2 can support the procedure of understanding the armed groups. Since armed groups are highly volatile organizations, understanding them requires a huge amount of time. In this gradual process, T2 actors can help by means of "watching

[33] Julian Thomas Hottinger, "The Relationship between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy," **Accord,** Vol. 16, 2005, p. 57
[34] Hottinger, "The Relationship between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy", p. 58

and measuring the phases within an armed group's life, so as to understand its intentions, reasoning, strategy and evolution in such a way as to be in a position to help prevent the situation from deteriorating, or occasionally to help set the venue and agenda within pre-negotiations." This is apparent in the case of Burundi peace process when numerous NGOs continued communication with the Forces for the Defence of Democracy–National Council for the Defence of Democracy (FDD-CNDD). Through conducting discussions and seminars, NGOs assisted the FDD-CNDD in constructing a political agenda that is firm enough to deal with the Burundian government.[35]

Second, T2 can help build the ability and willingness of armed groups to participate effectively in a peace process. At the outset, so called 'shadow diplomats' or professional intermediaries engage, on a regular basis, in informal meetings wherein an anonymous delegation of an armed group participates to learn experiences and speak out ideas. "Where sides participate together, the process of drawing on experiences from elsewhere and studying alternative practice is a way of sounding out what the other is thinking, or gauging reactions." In this meetings, leaders sort outs significant issues to be discussed at a later date in T1 negotiations. In this context, T2 process helps prepare for a T1 process.[36]

Third, T1 and T2 collaborate in keeping the lines of communication with armed groups open. In some cases, T1 formal intermediaries employ T2 actors to maintain informal communication with the armed group with the goal of "following events within the movement, grasping its logic, and letting them know that when they want to sit down and talk there are organizations willing to assist"; and with the anticipation of "sharing and cross-fertilizing each side's perception of events, or to negotiate an exchange of prisoners or the liberation of hostages". In this process, T2 actors keep an eye on events and find some alternate means towards peace, if required. Another reason for the need for constant communication with the armed group is to prevent them from being totally isolated to the point that they seclude

[35] Hottinger, "The Relationship between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy", p. 58
[36] **Ibid.**, p. 58

themselves in their own ideology which makes any form of communication difficult. [37]

Fourth, T2 is dependent on T1's support. "An effective track two actor may have a high level of technical and process expertise, and acquired knowledge of the armed group, but without track one political pressure, help and backing, professional mediators or facilitators would be lost." In this process, armed groups need the assurance that peace process will be backed and results will be implanted and guaranteed by its official representatives and the international community.[38]

In general, ToD interaction or multi-track diplomacy, as some scholars termed it, increase effectiveness and is more likely to create a peace agreement. Accordingly, combined ToDs "can create obligations and expectations that help enforce compliance", which is applied at the grassroots level as well. Furthermore, "interaction increases the likelihood that track parties will pursue shared goals through complementary means". As a key element for resolving collective problems, the link of interest and issues is needed as well to establish trust. Lastly, ToD facilitates communication among the actors involved which, consequently, facilitates coordination and reduces uncertainty. In this context, collaboration of official (T1) and unofficial (T2) diplomacy yields more effective results than independent efforts.[39]

2.2.5. Track One and a Half Diplomacy (T1.5)

The Track One and a Half Diplomacy (T1.5) serves as a bridge between T1 and T2 diplomacy. Mapendere (2001) defines T1.5 emphasizing its difference from other tracks in terms of actors involved.

> "Track One and a Half Diplomacy can be defined as public or private interaction between official representativesof conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organization or institution. The aim of such interaction is to

[37] Hottinger, "The Relationship between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy", p. 58
[38] **Ibid.**, p. 58
[39] Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies …", p. 171

influence attitudinal changes between the parties with the objective of changing the political power structure(s) that caused the conflict."[40]

The aforesaid definition clearly provides the distinction of T1.5 from T1 and T2. The main feature distinguishing T1.5 and T1 is the third party. While T1 diplomacy is mediated by representatives from government or political institutions such as the UN, T1.5 conflict resolution efforts are mediated or facilitated by a third party intermediary who is not a representative of any political institution. The main feature distinguishing T1.5 and T2 is the parties involved in the process. While T2 diplomacy involves influential citizens as participants in the conflict resolution process, T1.5 diplomacy involves official representatives of the conflicting parties.[41] According to Mapendere (2001), these distinctions make T1.5 a "hybrid diplomacy" because it cross-fertilizes T1 and T2 by giving T1.5 the diplomatic agility to utilize T1 and T2 techniques and alternate them according to the situation of conflict.

In practice, the Carter Center is an example of an organization which practices T1.5 diplomacy. The Carter Center is an NGO founded on 1982 by former US President Jimmy Carter. Since its foundation the center has been mediating numerous international and ethnic conflicts. In 1999, for example, it has mediated between President Omar Hassan Ahmad alBashir of Sudan and President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. In 1995, the center has also negotiated the so-called "Guinea Worm Ceasefire" between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People' Liberation Army with an objective to gain permission to bring treatment to communities affected by Guinea worm disease. In 1994, the center also helped in neutralizing the nuclear tension between the United States and North Korea. In 1996, the center was also successful in preventing military confrontation between the US government and the Haitian military government. Accordingly, these examples depict the extensive approach of Carter Center to conflicts which includes direct mediation, shuttle diplomacy, confidence-building projects and private problem-solving workshops.[42] In addition, Heiling (2008) also mentioned another case of T1.5

[40] Jeffrey Mapendere, **Defining Track One and a Half Diplomacy: Its Complementarity and the Analysis of Factors that Facilitates its Success**, MA Thesis, Royal Roads University, 2001, p. 10
[41] Yapıcı, "Track-Two Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign Policy …", p. 154
[42] Mapendere, **Defining Track One and a Half Diplomacy …,** p. 11-12

diplomacy that is evident in NGO intervention in Aceh conflict in Indonesia. In the conflict resolution process, mediation efforts have been pursued by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue from 1999 until 2003 and the Crisis Management Initiative in 2004 and 2005.[43] In another case, Ishikawa (2014) also cited the case of Japan's International Cooperation Agency's multilateral peace building efforts in Mindanao conflict in the Philippines. These include providing development assistance in conflict-affected areas and supporting Japan's tripartite cooperation mechanisms in Mindanao.[44]

There are numerous strengths T1.5 diplomacy has. First, T1.5 complements T1 and T2 and its actors. T1.5 fills the gap between the two tracks. Second, T1.5 directly influences power structures, although it is not driven by political agendas of government. Despite any antagonistic relations between their government and the other party, T1.5 intermediaries get into conflict situations and pursue peace initiatives. This is evident in the aforementioned case of Carte (caused by US accusations of Sudan supporting terrorism and religious persecution in civil war). Third, T1.5 has the diplomatic agility, as mentioned beforehand. In cases when high-level approaches are not effective, T1.5 actors can use low-level approach to peacemaking, for instance humanitarian interventions to get the trust of the parties. The best example of this is the health program pursued by the Carter Center to eradicate worm disease in Sudan.[45]

The characteristics of T1.5 third parties includes international political visibility, national and international respect, trust, and reasonable resources. The international political visibility enhances the leverage capabilities of a third-party during negotiations. Aside from that, a third party should also command international respect from leaders and constituents as such respect provides the third party an access to world leaders and to those who are involved in the conflict. Related to respect is trust, which according to disputing parties, serves as the cornerstone of any

[43] Robert Heiling, "Conflict Resolution in Aceh in Light of Track One and a Half Diplomacy," **Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2008, p. 1
[44] Sachiko Ishikawa, "The Role of a Development Agency in Peacebuilding: Track One-and-a-Half Mediation in Mindanao," **Asian Journal of Peacebuilding,** Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014, p. 1
[45] Mapendere, **Defining Track One and a Half Diplomacy …**, p. 23

intervention to conflict resolution. For example, the continued intervention of the Carter Center in Sudan portrays the trust between the center and the disputing parties. Lastly, these third parties should also have practical resources to perform peace initiatives.[46]

2.2.5.1. Trust-based NGO Mediation

Unofficial diplomacy through T1.5 and T2 tracks are usually carried out by NGOs, say the Carter Center for instance. NGOs, basically, are formal organizations independent from state and government institutions, non-profit making and self-governing with an independent decision-making body. In the past decades, NGOs have tried to advance their participation in conflict resolution. NGOs' easy access to beneficiaries, power, information, technical expertise and financial institutions are elements giving advantages to NGOs to play a role of mediator between the government and the grassroots.[47]

Through T1.5 or T2 diplomacy, according to Sargsyan (2003), conflict resolutions have been increasingly employing NGOs to deal with issues and problems beyond the reach of official diplomacy.[48] In this context, Peinado (2003) added that international NGOs contribute particularly through "promoting forms of community organization around rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects, which involve vulnerable people that belong to different groups, encouraging dialogue, communication, the coming together of the parties, peaceful resolution of disputes and inter-community relationships based on mutual trust and shared values."[49]

[46] Mapendere, **Defining Track One and a Half Diplomacy …**, p. 13-14
[47] Maria Maia, "NGOs as Mediators: Their Role in Expertise, Language, and Institutional Exemption in Urban Development Planning," **DPU Working Paper**, No. 77, 1996, p. 20
[48] Sargsyan, **International Mediation in Theory and Practice…**, p. 10
[49] Manuela Mesa Peinado, "The Role of NGOs and Civil Society in Peace and Reconciliation Processes," 2003, p. 5



Figure 2.1 *Tracks of Diplomacy in Mediation of Intra-state Conflict*

By nature, NGOs are primarily involved with public interest issues and concerns.[50] The dignity of such undertakings provided NGOs the reliance from the people they are concerned with. In context of conflict resolution, for instance, Turner (1988) stressed that "NGOs are in a far better position to be trusted by those suffering from oppression or poverty...whether foreign or national, NGOs are uniquely placed to act as mediators between sectors that distrust or fear each other and which, coming from different social strata, are often mutually ignorant and hostile."[51] In mediation efforts, this close relation provides NGOs the potentials to bridge gaps between the parties involved in the conflict as shown in Figure 2.1. "The close contact of NGOs with the population they intend to serve … gives them the ability to understand better people's aspirations and needs."[52] For this reason, unofficial T1.5 and T2 actors such as NGOs become less threatening to grassroots groups like community-based organizations (CBOs) or armed groups as exemplified above. Such close relation is enough reason for grassroots groups to ask or grant NGO participation in a negotiation process. According to Maia (1996), "NGOs' close relations with CBOs and their approach to participation would be a consideration

[50] Maia, "NGOs as Mediators…", p. 17
[51] James Turner, "Issues and Conclusions", in B. Turner ed., **Building Community,** 1988, p. 177
[52] Maia, "NGOs as Mediators…", p. 19

which would propel CBOs to invite/accept NGOs to play the role of mediator in their relation with government."[53] As mentioned earlier, this is also due to NGOs' lack of geopolitical interests in the conflict which consequently allows them to be more neutral, develop relationships and connections with wide range of actors involved in the conflict, and hear the issues and opinions.

According to Branco (2011), these relationships or shared connections, in some cases, may be developed from NGO undertakings in conflict zones generally classified into four principal activities such as humanitarian assistance, building democratic and civil society, human rights, and conflict resolution.[54] These undertakings are conceptualized by the concept of humanitarian diplomacy which includes the intiatives performed by humanitarian organizations to gain space from political and military authorities in order to function with honor and integrity. Minear and Smith (2007) defines humanitarian diplomacy as activities comprising "such efforts as arranging for the presence of international humanitarian organizations and personnel in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programmes, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives."[55] In this context, the humanitarian diplomacy of NGOs forms relationship with parties subsequently making NGOs trustworthy enough to be invited to participate in the conflict resolution process as mediator.

Another reason for their involvement in mediation of conflicts is that NGOs have the technical expertise which can be utilized in negotiations and planning that needs specialized language and techniques. "NGOs which are staffed by professionals with background knowledge in planning-related fields, with a good relationship with low-income communities, and with an ability to understand and disentangle the complexity of planning, are likely to be invited by the government to

[53] Maia, "NGOs as Mediators…", p. 20
[54] Carlos Branco, "Non-governmental Organizations in the Mediation of Violent Intra-State Conflict: The Confrontation between Theory and Practice in the Mozambican Peace Process" **JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations**, Vol.2, No.2, 2011, p. 80
[55] Larry Minear & Hazel Smith, **Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners And Their Craft**, United Nations University Press, New York, 2007, p. 1

mediate in a negotiating process."[56] On the side of CBOs or armed groups representing the constituents, such technical expertise provided by NGOs is or crucial importance as well in the understanding, development and implementation of projects produced by agreements between them and the local government.[57]

In summary, NGOs access to power, financial institutions and commercial corporations provide them the leverage perceived by both local government and grassroots groups as a significant consideration to invite NGOs to mediate in their negotiation process.

2.2.5.2. Conditions for NGO Mediation

According to Maia (1996), there are particular conditions under which NGO mediation is put into practice.

a) Social, political and institutional context

First, the existence of a conflict itself between conflicting parties is an essential condition for mediation.[58] The conflict is an important factor for any third party intervention to occur. Basically, conflicts and disputes are the context for mediation which involves "mental or emotional states or interactions of people who disagree, compete, struggle over perceived or actual differences in beliefs or values or to attain status, power or scarce resources."[59]

b) Consent of disputing parties

The consent of parties for a third-party intervention in their negotiation process is essential in order for NGOs to practice mediation. This means NGOs can only interfere as mediator if disputing parties allowed them. For this reason, NGOs need to prove their possession of valued resources which they can offer to both parties. These resources may include technical expertise and access to information. During significant phases of negotiation, parties may request input based on their

[56] Maia, "NGOs as Mediators…", p. 20
[57] **Ibid.**, pp. 20.
[58] **Ibid.**, pp. 21.
[59] Moore, **The Mediation Process …**, p. 23

needs and interest. Furthermore, the international status which NGOs sought from governments and international organizations fosters the acceptance of NGO mediation. The World Bank, for instance, encouraged cooperation with NGOs because of their up-to-date knowledge to the situation on ground and because of their close link with the population. Thus, parties may be prompted to follow the recommendation of IOs and grant their consent for NGO mediation.[60]

c) NGO's interest in Mediation

Once accepted, NGOs must have interest in the resolution of negotiation process. In accepting the role of a mediator, NGOs become a concerned party as well. Their participation opens opportunities and improves their relationship with the parties. Maintaining good relations with the government is significant as it serves as a way of broadening their knowledge, know-how and approaches to development and conflict resolution. Likewise, improving relationship with grassroots groups is of importance as they are primarily concerned with them.[61]

To further analyze the cooperation of tracks of diplomacy, a case of Turkey's diplomacy through state and NGO intervention to conflicts will be rendered on this study. As Turkey faces afflictions of many national and regional conflicts such as the Kurdish issue, the Cyproit conflict, the Balkan turmoil and the Middle East crisis, Turkey was "the subject of numerous unofficial interventions pertaining to these conflicts in the last couple of decades that were carried out either solely by the US or European based organizations and practitioners or by these 'outsiders' in collaboration with local NGOs and practitioners."[62]

[60] Maia, "NGOs as Mediators…", p. 21
[61] **Ibid.**, p. 21
[62] Gürkaynak, "Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective…", p. 61

CHAPTER THREE

TURKEY'S DIPLOMACY THROUGH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

3.1. Turkish Humanitarian Diplomacy

After the mankind had witnessed two World wars and numerous other vast wars, Turkey believes that there is a need for a new language of diplomacy which can move past the realist-idealist rift status quo and 'hard power versus soft power' clash in the world order called the Westphalian system. Such diplomacy, according to Davutoğlu (2013), should be human-oriented, that is, "related to the future of the whole of humankind, ranging from environmental policies to energy policies and food programs, with the understanding that the dignity of each human being is equal to that of the whole of humankind."

In this framework, Turkey adopted humanitarian diplomacy as a foreign policy tool in tackling regional crisis, issues and challenges. As it considers humanitarian diplomacy to be "based on a critical equilibrium between conscience and power", Turkey aims to be a compassionate and powerful state in finding solutions to crises, particularly within its area of influence.[63]

The importance of this perspective in Turkish foreign policy had been articulated with great emphasis during the 2013 Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference with a theme "Humanitarian Diplomacy". According to then Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, humanitarian diplomacy was chosen as a theme because it represents the human-oriented nature of Turkish foreign policy, which combines Turkey's interests with Turkish values. Human dignity is considered to be a point of reference of the Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, Turkey is resolute and committed to use all its capabilities and resources in this pursuit. As a result of the deliberations made in the Conference, Turkey confirmed the necessity to

[63] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects," **Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity**, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2013, p. 866

continue implementing humanitarian diplomacy through decisive and effective means in the forthcoming period.[64] Consequently, Turkey has been becoming prominent in terms of practicing humanitarian diplomacy as an active and dynamic actor with its developing democracy, rising economy and active foreign policy on a global scale.

In this context, this chapter will deal with how Turkey carried out its humanitarian diplomacy in conflict resolution through development and humanitarian assistance and international mediation. These concepts will be elaborated further with cases where the foreign policy tool was put into practice.

3.2. Origin and Evolution of Turkish Humanitarianism

In history, the Turkish humanitarian work has already on track since the end of World War 1 and the Turkish War of Independence. According to Acehan (2015), the history of Turkish humanitarianism is manifested in the humanitarian role of the Turkish Red Crescent Society, who aside from delivering healthcare and assistances to thousands of wounded soldiers during the said wars, had also mobilized humanitarian mission in South America to the Far East. The Ottoman diaspora in the United States and the formation of the Turkish Red Crescent Societies in the US have sent humanitarian contribution to the post-war reconstruction in Turkey after the wars. Such case provides the example of a humanitarian policy in the making.[65]

Gilley (2015) further added that at the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was met by external demands concerning the needs of populations in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. To meet such demands, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992. Furthermore, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, the 1990 Balkan and Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the 2000 US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2010-to date Syrian crisis had led to rising demands for humanitarian assistance.

[64] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Final Declaration of the Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/final_declaration_of_the_fifth_annual_ambassadors_conference.en.mfa, (Accessed 26 October 2016)

[65] Işıl Acehan, "Ottoman Immigrants and the Formation of Turkish Red Crescent Societies in the United States", **PERCEPTIONS**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2015, p. 59-76

Thus, these international armed conflicts have forced Turkey to have an active humanitarian outlook. It was during the second term of AKP government under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when the foreign ministry stressed the rising significance of humanitarian assistance in Turkish foreign policy, thanks to aforementioned international armed disputes taking place around Turkey's borders.[66]

3.3. Scope of Turkey's HD

According to Davutoğlu (2013), the Turkish humanitarian diplomacy is composed of three dimensions. These concerns:

a) the Turkish citizens;
b) the disadvantaged individuals in crisis zones; and
c) the comprehensive humanitarian outlook at the global level (especially in the UN system).[67]

3.4. HD through Development and Humanitarian Assistance

In line with second dimension of its HD objectives concerning those in crisis zones, Turkey "demonstrated that it has a human-oriented political vision extending beyond the limits set by the global system."[68]

This is evident in the development assistance it carried to approximately 131 countries for the last decade. In the recent years, Turkey's efficient and effective responses to humanitarian crisis have acquired itself a good status and gained global attention. For example, in 2012, according to Keyman and Sazak (2014), "…Turkey was among the most generous counties with over USD 1 billion it donated in humanitarian assistance to the countries in need."[69] According to Haşimi (2014), it has become the 4th largest donor in terms of development assistance in the same

[66] Bruce Gilley, "Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism", **PERCEPTIONS**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2015, p. 40
[67] Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy …", p. 867-868
[68] **Ibid.**, 868.
[69] E. Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State'", **POMEAS Policy Paper**, No. 2, 2014, p. 6

year.[70] Gilley (2015) further added that in 2013, Turkey became third largest donor country after US and UK when it gave US$ 1.6 billion of official humanitarian aid[71], thanks to both Turkish government institutions and NGOs who carried humanitarian aid in more than 100 countries to date ranging from Asia to Africa, the Middle East to Europe and America to the Far East.[72]

In terms of aid delivery, Turkey's humanitarian assistance combines both the manpower of both the state and non-state actors as influential NGOS. The main players from the government side include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, Interior and Justice, Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and the Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY). Non-state actors are composed of NGOs like the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, the Cansuyu Foundation, the Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, the Doctors Worldwide: Turkey, the Dost Eli Foundation, the Yardımeli Foundation, and the Deniz Feneri. Most of Turkish NGO aid, accordingly, is primarily delivered in Africa, then Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, Europe and the Far East.[73]

[70] Cemalettin Haşimi, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, p. 127
[71] Gilley, "Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism …", p. 38
[72] Haşimi, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation", p. 129
[73] Keyman and Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State", p. 10



Figure 3.1. Official and Private Turkish Aid Coordination/Provision Agencies[74]

3.4.1. The Somalia Crisis

The Somalian case was considered as the milestone of Turkey's rise as a global humanitarian power. Most especially in Africa, it earned the honor and reputation of a generous and active carrier of rehabilitation of countries in dead end.[75] According to Akpinar (2013) Turkey's intervention in Somalia became remarkable with the fact that its efforts came during a deadlock situation in the country. Given the power clashes, threats of piracy, and religious extremism in the country, Somalia was left in chaos. At the outset, the international community had attempted to lift the country from this commotion through twelve mediation attempts since the start of the conflict in 1991 to 2009. All of which, however, were failure. [76]

With this scenario at hand, Turkey implemented peace-building efforts as an answer to the conflict taking place in the country brought by civil war. After the 2010 Istanbul Conference on Somalia which laid the roadmap for peace and

[74] Source: Keyman and Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State", p. 17
[75] Keyman and Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State", p. 10
[76] Pınar Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy", **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2013, p. 742

development in Somalia, peace-building efforts kicked off following the visit of then Turkish Prime Minister and incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Mogadishu in 2011[77] with over 200 Turkish politicians, journalists, businessmen, celebrities and representatives from aid organizations to deliver aid to Somalia. His visit was considered as the first visit to Somalia of non-African head of state since 1991.[78]

There are five components of Turkey's official policy on Somalia. These include:

a) Elimination of Somalia's international isolation;
b) Provision of intensive and comprehensive development and humanitarian assistance;
c) Rebuilt of infrastructure through implementing medium and long-term development projects;
d) Restoration of security in Somalia through providing support to Somali security forces as well as the African Union Mission in the country;
e) Supporting the political consensus process and state building;
f) Fostering unity in Somalia.[79]

These efforts were realized through development aid, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, state building and mediation. In particular, these crisis interventions were steered through two strategies namely the "Track One" which involved the state and the government, and the "Track Two" which involved non-state actors as civil societies and businesses. Under "Track One", Turkey conducted official diplomacy by launching mediation talks between various parties involved in the conflict, particularly, between the Somalian Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and a religious militia called al-Shabaab, and the self-governing region of Somaliland. Through "Track Two", Turkish NGOs carried out the initiatives that focused on infrastructures, education, medical relief, religious aid and security. These are

[77] Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia …", p. 740
[78] Charles Kagwanja, "Turkey in Somalia: Building Relations using Brotherhood, Aid and Dialogue", **Africa Policy Institute**, 2013, p. 2
[79] Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia …", p. 740

evident in the reconstruction of infrastructure, transportation, construction and establishment of government offices, schools, hospitals, orphanages and businesses in the country.[80]

In sum, these interventions were consequently followed by significant changes in social, political and security aspects of Somalia. From the side of Somali people, they warmly received Turkey in their country and were grateful for Erdoğan's visit and Turkey's aid. According to Kagwanja (2013), "this warm reception can be attributed to the high level of trust established with the government and the notion of "brotherhood" among Muslim people."[81]

3.4.2. Reconstruction of Afghanistan

At the outset, Turkey assumed a most important role in Afghanistan following the international intervention in the country. According to Kardaş (2011), the Turkish government declared foreign policy supporting global effort against terrorism by means, for instance, of provision of logistical assistance to coalition mission ops against the Taliban. This is realized through joining the UN-mandated, but later reassigned to NATO command, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), although over time periods Turkey refrained from sending troops.[82]

Despite its responsibilities in ISAF, Turkey expressed discomfort over the civilian casualties caused by US or NATO offensives against the Taliban. Seeking to maintain brotherly relations with the Afghan people, Turkey redefined its policy in the country. Turkey argues that security and stability cannot be achieved solely by military struggle, but also by focusing on social and cultural fields.[83] In this view, Turkey launched a major reconstruction effort through two Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs) in regions of Wardak and Jawzjan. According to Kaya (2013), Turkey's social and cultural contributions are considered to be more important than

[80] Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia …", p. 743
[81] Kagwanja, "Turkey in Somalia …", p. 3
[82] Şaban Kardaş, "Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters of Partnership?" **PERCEPTIONS**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2011, p. 40
[83] Salih Doğan, "Turkey's Presence and Importance in Afghanistan", **USAK Yearbook**, Vol. 4, 2011, p. 368

its military contributions.[84] Through the PRTs, the TIKA has poured $30 million in reconstruction projects.[85] These projects, accordingly, are generally concentrated on education, health and infrastructures that aimed for development of quality of life of Afghan people. Socio-cultural projects and initiatives wherein people could participate were also included.[86] Table 3.1 below details Turkey's initiatives in Afghanistan.

Objective	*Implementation*
Assisting the Afghan authorities in efforts towards reconstruction and enhancing development and stability.	• Provision of health care, education, police training and alternative methods of farming to local farmers.
Improving the quality of Afghan life through the infrastructure reconstruction	Completed projects include: • Establishment and restoration of 68 schools; • Building and reconstruction of nursing and midwifery and outpatient clinics; • Training of thousands of Afghan police officers and soldiers; • Provision of education programs for judges, prosecutors and district governors; and • Completion of a number of roads, bridges and wells. Approximately worth of $2 billion projects have also been accomplished by Turkish entrepreneurs.

Table 3.1. Turkey's Reconstruction Projects in Afghanistan[87]

Turkey's reconstruction effort in war-torn Afghanistan, according to Davutoğlu (2013), exemplifies the second dimension of its humanitarian diplomacy. Another diplomatic initiative it pursued towards this reconstruction is the conduct of Istanbul Summit on Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia or "Istanbul for Afghanistan" in 2011.[88] This initiative gathered the countries bordering Afghanistan in an aim to involve all these countries in searching for sustainable solutions to peace

[84] Karen Kaya, "Turkey's Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization," **Military Review**, July-August 2013, p. 24
[85] Keyman and Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State", p. 9
[86] Doğan, "Turkey's Presence and Importance in Afghanistan", p. 368
[87] Source: Keyman and Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State", p. 8
[88] Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy …", p. 868

and security problems in Afghanistan.[89] Doğan (2011) also added that these efforts aimed to prevent Afghanistan's isolation in the region and to create long-term multilateral solutions for security and stability in the country.[90]

3.5. HD through International Mediation

Turkey's development and humanitarian assistance, according to Keyman and Sazak (2014), are considered "…as functional conflict resolution, or conflict sensitive development, responses. If there is an ongoing conflict in an aid-receiving country, Turkey adopts a conflict sensitive development approach. A development project is effectively used to bring the conflicting parties together in order to transform the conflict." This is apparent in Turkey's involvement in numerous facilitations in a conflict resolution process. Accordingly, "Turkish strength lies first and foremost with Turkey's historical and social depth in its region, second with its influence over the region, and third, its ability to respond rapidly to the developments within its immediate neighborhood."[91]

According to Binder and Erten (2013), in Turkey's concept of humanitarian assistance, "peace-building is often seen as part of the humanitarian 'portfolio'."[92]

In this connection, Davutoğlu (2013) further added that Turkey "has assumed for itself a central role in regional and international politics, and mediation is a necessary tool for contributing to peace and stability at various levels."[93] In many cases, the use of international mediation in attempt to settle international armed conflicts which primarily causes the humanitarian crisis is evident. This is also parallel to the second dimension of its humanitarian diplomacy. As its neighboring states are confronted with political flux, for instance, Turkey considers international mediation in regional and international conflict zones. As the new foreign policy

[89] Kaya, "Turkey's Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization …", p. 27
[90] Doğan, "Turkey's Presence and Importance in Afghanistan", p. 368
[91] Keyman and Sazak, "Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State", p. 8
[92] Andrea Binder and Ceyda Erten, "From Dwarf to Giant – Turkey's Contemporary Humanitarian Assistance," **Paper Presented at the World Conference on Humanitarian Studies: Human Security --Humanitarian Perspectives**, October 2013, p. 7
[93] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections from the Field," **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, p. 90

framework, the growing mediation efforts of Turkey outside its borders manifest this ambitious goal to acquire a new status as an international mediator.

According to Cevik (2013), Turkey has been able to create a sense of trust and brotherhood in the Middle East and Africa through its "value-based and humanitarian political narrative that has an Islamic tone". Thus, Turkey has committed to become a key player as mediator in conflict resolutions process such as Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Syrian-Israeli peace talks, the Somalia crisis, the Iranian nuclear talks and the recent Syrian civil war.[94] This is one of the reasons why Turkey has been so active in taking part in conflict-resolutions and humanitarian crisis in the region. In this context, the following sections will deal with some of significant cases of Turkish efforts in mediating international conflicts.

3.5.1. The Israel – Palestinian Conflict

According to Altunışık (2008), Turkey's third party involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is apparent in several ways including structural prevention and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians.[95]

First, an example of its role in structural prevention is the attempt to increase resources and capacity building. This is realized through Ankara Forum which was represented by Chambers of Commerce of Turkey, Israel and Palestine. The said forum paved way for the establishment of Erez Industrial Zone, a project which recognizes close link between economic growth and peace. The project is considered as a win-win project as it attempts to boost Palestinian economy by creating 7,000 jobs, profit for Turkish companies and security for the borders of Israel.[96]

Second, the Palestinians have been recipients of Turkish development and humanitarian aid. Following the 1994 Paris Protocol[97], a total of 10 million USD was

[94] Senem Cevik, **An Emerging Actor in Humanitarian Diplomacy**, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/emerging-actor-humanitarian-diplomacy, (Accessed in 25 December 2017)
[95] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 51
[96] **Ibid.**, p. 51
[97] Signed as part of the 1994 Oslo peace negotiations, the Paris Protocol (also known as the Protocal on Economic Relations between the Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) who

provided by Turkey to Palestinian education, health, security, agriculture, tourism, institutionalization and public administration. In terms of development, Turkey had been part of the constitutional and administrative reform process as it had supported political reforms as well.

Aside from this, Turkey correspondingly:

a) organized Young Palestinian Diplomats' Training Program through the Turkish Foreign Ministry;
b) was represented in the Mitchell Commission following the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000;
c) formed the Jerusalem Technical Committee that was tasked to conduct investigation on the excavation works by Israel which might be detrimental to Haram al-Sharif; and
d) participated in the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, formed in 1997.[98]

In her separate work, Altunışık (2010) also mentioned that despite these mediation efforts, however, Turkey's third-party role in the conflict was defied by the breakout of war in Gaza in 2008. The Israeli attacks in Gaza consequently created disappointment from Turkey who conveyed harsh responses. Then Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan paid visits in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Turkish diplomats were also involved in a shuttle diplomacy to reach a ceasefire. In general, Turkey's response and attitude towards the Gaza crisis tarnished its image as an honest mediator in the conflict. Turkey's sympathetic stance towards Gaza created tensions on its relations with Israel.[99]

According to Sümer (2013), relations with Israel was further severed by the Flotilla Crisis when the Mavi Marmara flotilla ship, which was carrying tons of

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represents the Palestinian people), aims to "formalize the economic relations that had previously been unilaterally determined by Israel and to establish a bilateral agreement for the five-year interim period by the end of which a comprehensive peace agreement between the two conflict parties was to be gradually reached." Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung **, The Paris Protocol – Historical Classification**, http://www.kas.de/palaestinensische-gebiete/en/pages/11895/, (Accessed in 25 December 2017)

[98] Altunışık, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East", p. 51

[99] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Changing Middle East Policy", **UNISCI Discussion Papers**, No. 23, 2010, p. 160

humanitarian aid of Turkish charity group called the IHH to besieged Gaza, was raged by fully equipped Israeli soldiers. The crisis resulted into 9 casualties (8 of whom were Turkish), and wounded 30 activists.[100]

Consequently, the crises also shifted the Turkish foreign policy in favor of the Palestinian cause. According to Cevik (2013), Turkey had also used its temporary seat in the UN Security Council (2009-2010) and has been actively promoting the Palestinian cause and supporting its UN application for a non-member observer status. The present political situation with Israel, however, hinders Turkey from pursuing mediation during negotiations.[101]

3.5.2. The Arab Spring

Akpınar (2015) provided the case of Arab Spring wherein Turkey had used mediation as a foreign policy tool. During the Arab Spring, accordingly, Turkey attempted to preserve and institute regional order by shifting itself as a peacemaker through mediating the conflicts that took place in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

a) *Bahrain:* To end the crisis in 2011, Turkey initiated communication among the parties involved (Saudi Arabia, Iran and United Arab Emirates) and among the Bahraini state and the opposition groups. In particular, Turkey called to the parties for the prevention of sectarian conflict, to the Bahraini government for consideration of reforms, and to the opposition groups for renouncement of use of violence. Accordingly, the case of Bahrain demonstrated Turkey's neutrality during the Arab Spring.[102]

b) *Libya:* In this case, Turkish mediation was apparent in three circumstances. First, after the USA and UK recalled their respective diplomatic missions in Libya for security reasons, they summoned Turkey's mediation for the

[100] Fahrettin Sümer, "Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring", **The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal**, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2013, p. 16
[101] Senem Cevik, **An Emerging Actor in Humanitarian Diplomacy**
[102] Pınar Akpınar, "Mediation as Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran," **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, 2015, p. 3

release of detained American journalist and British journalist who were both detained for a short period of time by the Qaddafi forces and Libyan authorities. Thereafter, Turkey pursued mediation and was successful in arbitrating the release of journalists.[103]

Second, Turkey had also interceded between the Qaddafi government and the Transitional National Council in Libya by presenting a proposal which entailed threefold approach to conflict resolution in Libya. The proposal included a ceasefire, initiation of political dialogues between disputing parties, and conduct of democratic election.[104]

Third, to prevent Libya from becoming 'another Afghanistan' or 'second Iraq' or, Turkey tried to prevent the military campaign ensued by NATO. However, this prevention attempt was criticized of supporting both the Libyan government and the opposition. Later on, its mediation roles were affected when Turkey changed its position by closing its embassy in Tripoli for security reasons, and by calling for the resignation of Gaddafi. Consequently, Turkey's intervention in Libya received criticisms from its Western allies, the Libyan government and the opposition.[105]

c) *Iraq*: Meeting seasons between the Sunni and Shia leaders were organized resulting into an accord under the facilitation of Turkey.[106]

d) *Yemen*: Turkey contributed to the peaceful transition in Yemen through supporting the National Dialogue Conference initiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Turkey also co-founded the Friends of Yemen group created to provide development and humanitarian assistance to the country.[107]

[103] Akpınar, "Mediation as Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring …," p. 3
[104] **Ibid.**, p. 3
[105] **Ibid.**, p. 3-4
[106] **Ibid.**, p. 4
[107] **Ibid.**, p. 4-5

e) *Syria*: Turkey's mediation proposal, however, was rejected by the Assad regime which opted the use of force to destabilize the opposition in the country. Consequently, Turkey shifted in supporting the Syrian opposition instead and co-founded the Friends of Syria Group created to exert pressure on the Assad regime, to support the opposition and to organize delivery of international aid to Syria. In line with the Syrian agenda, Turkey hosted the UNHCR meeting in January 2014 to discuss the refugee situation. Turkey is also a member of the Syrian Contact Group created to deliver international aid to Syria. Majority of these aid passes through the Turkey's border. Furthermore, a remarkable humanitarian effort pursued by Turkey in this context is the absorption of 2 million Syrian refugees in its borders.[108]

Despite these mediation efforts, however, Turkey was criticized for pursuing its interest in the region, that is, mediation is used as its foreign policy tool aimed to provide itself an expanding role from regional power to an international key player. For Turkey, however, it considers its mediator role as a means to bring stability and order in its area of influence. It considers mediation as a component of its "zero-problems with neighbor's" policy that uses political, economic and social relations to increase dialogue thereby normalize relations with its neighbors. In this context, Turkey filled the need for effective mediation to bring peace to region when traditional Arab powers declining due to uprisings.[109]

3.5.3. The Balkans

Accordıng to Akın (2014), Turkey had been a key player in bringing stability in Southeastern Europe particularly in Balkan countries of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The signing of *Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans* was considered as the most important mediation success by Turkey in this case.

Furthermore, Turkey's mediation role in the Balkans has continued in two trilateral cooperation processes namely The Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia

[108] Akpınar, "Mediation as Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring …," p. 4
[109] **Ibid.**, p. 5-6

Trilateral Summit and The Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia Trilateral Summit. In these two separate processes, Turkey facilitated high-level summits which resolved the existing issues and problems concerning the three Balkan countries and underlined bilateral cooperation especially economic cooperation. Accordingly, these trilateral dialogue efforts exemplify Turkey's inclusive efforts in its foreign policy of bringing together involved parties to resolve their disparities in a comprehensive manner.[110]

3.5.4. Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summit

The Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summit is a trilateral mechanism initiated by Turkey to improve ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan whose relations are severed due to disputes over Taliban's bases in Pakistani territory.[111] In particular, Afghanistan believes that Pakistan is supporting the Taliban and that its fighters use Pakistan's northwestern tribal regions as a base while pursuing to overthrow the Afghan government.[112]

In resolution, there were seven summits have taken place at the presidential level from 2007 to 2012. According to Kaya (2013), the summit meetings generally involved dialogues with agenda focused on cooperation on economy, on fighting terrorism, in fields of intelligence, politics and military, and on training and security. The most remarkable breakthrough came out after the fifth summit in 2010 when the three countries agreed on the conduct of a joint military exercises. In 2011, the said exercise was conducted in Turkey with a main goal to establish close military ties between the countries.[113]

3.5.5. The UN Friends of Mediation Initiative

In line with the third dimension of the Turkish humanitarian diplomacy that is "inclusive humanitarian perspective at the global level, most importantly in the UN

[110] Hasan Akın, **Turkey and Mediation**, MA thesis, George Mason University, 2014, p. 85-87
[111] Rudolf Šulík, "Mediation Capacity of Turkey as a Regional Power," Matej Bel University, p. 10
[112] Kaya, "Turkey's Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization …", p. 25
[113] **Ibid.**, 25.

system.",[114] and in addition to aforementioned mediation efforts, Turkey also attempted to develop new tools to support its multidimensional foreign policy agenda. This is realized by co-chairing with Finland the establishment of the Friends of Mediation Initiative.

The Friends of Mediation Initiative aims to highlight mediation as the powerful tool in conflict-resolutions. Turkey and Finland both proposed the concept to provide backing to the UN mechanisms of mediation, particularly, support and guidance for experts on mediation. According to Aras (2012), the Friends of Mediation Initiative aims to "develop a new consciousness of the importance of mediation and to provide support to the development of mediation capabilities at the domestic, regional and international levels." The group aims to push for enhanced use of mediation and to bring together the various actors involved in mediation. To this end, it mobilizes UN system to support the propagation of global consciousness of the initiative. It also created a platform incorporating a number of states and international organizations active in mediation efforts. Turkey and Finland saw the inadequacy of sole role of UN as international mediator, thus, the need for a collective effort in addressing such problems, thanks to the increasing number of security problems worldwide.[115]

Specifically, the Friends of Mediation initiative aims the:

a) Increase the awareness of international community regarding the significance of mediation as an instrument of both conflict prevention and conflict resolution;
b) Building up of mediation capacity both within the United Nations as well as in regional organizations;
c) Enhancement of level of coordination amongst different actors of mediation to reduce unnecessary complications and duplications.[116]

[114] Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy …", p. 868
[115] Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative", **SAM Papers**, No. 4, 2012, p. 5
[116] Ahmet Davutoğlu and Erkki Tuomioja, **Mediation for Peace: A Means toward a Better World**, Hürriyet Daily News, February 25, 2012

In this pursuit, Turkey hosted the 2012 Istanbul Conference on Mediation which gathered NGO representatives, experts and officials from countries. According to Davutoğlu (2013), Turkey will "continue to promote this platform in order to contribute to greater international convergence on this issue."[117] Among the action plan of this initiative also is the establishment of the UN Mediation Center in Istanbul which would make the city as the center of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy[118] and mediation for solving international crises.[119]

3.6. NGO Diplomacy: The Case of the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation

3.6.1. Overview on the IHH

The IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, a leading Turkish humanitarian organization, is considered as the leading Turkish NGO that deals with humanitarian diplomacy practices.[120] It has been provided with strong backing from the government and has been trusted with discharging Turkey's humanitarian diplomatic goals. It was established with a vision to restore bonds most particularly with Muslim communities worldwide through humanitarian means.[121]

Historically, the IHH started with a humanitarian aid to fatal miseries and bloodshed of Yugoslavian Muslim people during the dissolution of former Yoguslavia after the break out of Bosnian War in 1992.[122] Aside from that, similar humanitarian efforts were also taken during the wars in Chechnya and Kosovo. Consequently, these efforts led to the formal establishment of the IHH in Istanbul.[123] "IHH's voluntary relief activities have evolved to an official organization in 1995

[117] Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections from the Field", p. 84
[118] Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy …", p. 868
[119] Hurriyet Daily News, **Istanbul to be Hub of Global Mediation Efforts, Says FM Davutoğlu**, November 07 2013
[120] Ahmet Emin Dağ, "Moro Peace Monitoring Mission: A Humanitarian Diplomacy Experience", **Analiz**, Vol. 13, 2006, p. 2
[121] Hüsrev Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission: The IHH and Mediation", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2015, p. 199
[122] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Institutional: Our History**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/history, (Accessed in 22 January 2018)
[123] Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission …", p. 200

and spread around five continents as it established a bridge of goodwill stretching from Turkey to 135 countries and territories."[124]

In extending its humanitarian mission and agenda, the IHH runs four sets of activities. Generally, these include (a) protection of life and human rights from terrorism in conflict-zones, (b) prevention of deportation of asylum seekers, (c) advocating for release of prisoners and victims of abduction in war zones; and (d) mediation.[125]

3.6.2. The IHH's Development Assistance

Since its establishment in 1992, the IHH has been active in delivering aid to disadvantaged people or victims of natural calamities, war, or any form of catastrophes. Generally, the IHH has alleviated poverty and hunger, established schools and offered education opportunities to students, provided vocational education programs to women, opened medical clinics, built water systems, build orphanages, provided psychological care to orphans left by war, provided the basic needs of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) worldwide.[126]

Among the first of its accomplishments are listed in Table 3.3 below.

IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation	
"First" Accomplishments	• The first NGO that broke the siege in Sarajevo to deliver aid and to raise awareness about the horrible things happening to Bosnians during Bosnian War. • The first Turkey based NGO that delivers relief aid to 135 countries and territories across five continents. • The first NGO in Turkey that carried out international Eid al-Fitr charity campaigns. • One of the first relief organizations that entered Gaza following the fall of the wall built on Egypt-Gaza border. • The first charity organization from Turkey that delivered aid to

[124] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Institutional: About Us**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/about-us, (Accessed in 22 January 2018)
[125] Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission …", p. 199
[126] **Ibid.**, p. 200

	Kosovo. • The first charity organization in the world that delivered aid to Chechen people. • The NGO in Turkey that launched a nationwide campaign for Africa (2006 Africa Emergency Aid Campaign). • Kosovo government named IHH among the top three organizations that delivered the greatest amount of aid to the country. • As a Turkey-based NGO IHH launched the biggest healthcare campaign in Africa with its "Cataract Project" • The first NGO in the Islamic world that carries out humanitarian diplomacy. • The IHH organized an international humanitarian aid flotilla headed to Gaza in 2009 by land and in 2010 by sea. • The IHH carried out the greatest humanitarian diplomatic operation since WWII in the world by facilitating the release of over two thousand captives and prisoners in Syria in 2013. • The IHH established Independent Monitoring Council of five members including one IHH representative to supervise and monitor Philippines-Bangsamoro peace process in 2013. • The IHH proposed World Orphan Day to OIC which endorsed it and announced 15th of Ramadan every year as such in 2013. • The IHH organized "Open the Road to Aleppo" convoy of 5.000 vehicles with over 40.000 participants that drove from Istanbul to Antioch in an effort to open safe passage for civilians in besieged Aleppo in 2016. As a result of its humanitarian efforts 45.000 civilians were evacuated from Aleppo to safe zone

Table 3.2 Facts on the IHH's First Accomplishments[127]

3.6.3. The IHH's Mediation

According to Tabak (2015), the IHH is broadening its practice of humanitarian diplomacy beyond delivering humanitarian aid through practicing mediation. Beyond relief operations, it envisions to determine and eradicate the

[127] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Institutional: Our History**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/history, (Accessed in 22 January 2018)

causes of people's impoverishment. From the aforementioned sets of activities it steers, it considers mediation as one of the ways to realize this challenging mission by taking part in conflict-resolution as a mediator. Seeing armed-conflicts and wars as the usual cause of humanitarian crisis, the IHH considers mediation as a key solution beyond just simply delivering humanitarian relief. "The IHH views mediation in specific and humanitarian diplomacy in general as a domain of compulsory practices for minimizing destruction and bringing conflicting parties to accord."[128]

In this context, several mediatory practices had been launched by IHH in pursuing humanitarian diplomacy.

a) *Palestine*: Under the auspices of the IHH, the Fatah and Hamas convened to end their tensions. This was done with an expectation to help reverse the demotion and radicalization of Palestinian side.[129]

b) *Chechnya*: The IHH bridged the gap between Sufis and Salafists who were ideologically conflicting to the extent of declaring one another as unbelievers, consequently, fighting each other.[130]

c) *Syria*: Since the start of the civil war in 2012, the IHH conducted arbitration and mediation among belligerent warring parties to release prisoners and tortured civilians. For instance, the IHH had actively collaborated with involved parties in Syria (i.e. the Assad regime, Syrian opposition, and Turkish and Iranian government) for the release of two Turkish journalists from detention of Syrian intelligence in 2012, the release of 70 Iranian citizens in 2012 and 2013, and the release of release of 2,137 Syrian citizens and six Western correspondents in 2013.[131]

[128] Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission …", p. 201
[129] **Ibid.**, p. 202
[130] **Ibid.**, p. 202
[131] **Ibid.**, p. 202-203

d) *Egypt*: The IHH mediated between the Muslim Brotherhood and the coup-committers by coming up with ten themes which would have ended the coup and would have founded a civilian rule in the country. At the outset, the flow of negotiations was positive with the cooperative participation of Sisi's representative. After weeks of negotiations, however, the negotiation process was interrupted by the change of attitude consequently terminating the process. Notwithstanding, this case depicted an increase of mediation capacity of the IHH.[132]

e) *Pakistan*: Upon invitation, the IHH initiated negotiations amongst the Pakistani state and the Taliban to bring a close to their conflict. In another instance, the IHH also lead a negotiation for the release of two Czech women from two-year abduction by an al-Qaeda-linked armed group.[133]

These activities reflect the new guiding principle of IHH which is the consideration for the necessity of mediation as a preventive humanitarian diplomatic action in crises.

3.6.4. Trust-based Mediation

The IHH's has earned a good reputation with its effort in "discharging the 'historical responsibility' Turkey has assumed toward Muslim communities worldwide, and envisions eventually restoring Turkey's bonds with the global *ummah* through humanitarian means." Beyond aid delivery, however, the IHH also aims to determine and eliminate the causes of people's distress. From its viewpoint, the IHH calls this pursuit as humanitarian diplomacy and considers mediation and advocacy as a tool in achieving it. In this context, Tabak (2015) emphasized the importance of *trust* as a significant factor in mediation role of the IHH. This is apparent in the aforesaid cases wherein the IHH has proven its trustworthiness as a third party most especially in the Muslim world.

[132] Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission …", p. 204
[133] **Ibid.**, p. 205

During the Flotilla Crisis, for example, the IHH considered its humanitarian aid as a campaign to expose Israel's hard policies and humanitarian annihilation in Gaza. Following the crisis, the Turkey's government also shifted its foreign policy in favor of Palestinian people, consequently, making itself an assertive ally in the Middle East for the Palestinian cause. This circumstance further provided the IHH and Turkey in general, the invitation to negotiate. This is apparent in the aforementioned cases of Chechnya, Syria, Egypt, and in Pakistan wherein the IHH mediated the warring parties, the release of prisoners of war, the release of captured journalists and etcetera.

In addition to these cases depicting a mediation role emanating from trustworthiness of a third party, the fifth chapter of this discourse will discuss Turkey's and the IHH's pursuit of humanitarian diplomacy through mediation in the Philippines. In this context, the Turkish humanitarian assistance that has been initiated in the past is considered as a factor which developed trust from Bangsamoro recipients and consequently bidding Turkish mediation in the conflict resolution in Southern Philippines.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BANGSAMORO STRUGGLE FOR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

4.1. Bangsamoro Identity and Homeland

Bangsamoro refers to traditional Muslims inhabitants of Mindanao, the islands of Basilan and Palawan, and the archipelago of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in Southern Philippines. The etymology of the term came from *Bangsa*, a Malay word which means 'nation', and *Moro*, a name given by the Spanish colonists to the Muslims in Mindanao whom upon their first encounter found out that these people practice the same religion and customs with that of 'Moors' in North Africa.[134]

Demographically, Bangsamoro people are composed of thirteen ethno-linguistic groups namely Maguindanaon, Meranao, Iranun, Tausug, Kalagan, Yakan, Sama, Jama Mapun, Kalibugan, Sangil, Molbog, Jama Mapun, and Badjao.[135]

4.2. History of Bangsamoro Struggle

4.2.1. Advent and Expansion of Islam in the Philippines

According to Lingga (2004), the Bangsamoro people and homeland are parts of the *Dunia Melayu* or Malay world wherein they share commonalities in religion and cultural practices with the Muslims in Southeast Asia. International trade had played an important part in development of ties with the Muslim world. Even before Manila was founded by the Spanish colonizers, Jolo of Sulu was already a busy trading center. The geographical location of Mindanao and Sulu, where Bangsamoro people are dominant, is located strategically along the trade route consequently facilitating communication and developing close relations with other Muslim principalities in Southeast Asia. Through this close contact the Bangsamoro people

[134] Abhoud Syed Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", in EACSN Conference 2004: Issues and Challenges for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia, Malaysia, pp. 2

[135] Abhoud Syed Lingga, Understanding the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination, **The Moro Reader: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People**, Bobby M. Tuazon Ed., CenPEG Books, Philippines, 2008, p. 98

then developed ties with the Muslim world, particularly with Arab, Persian and Indian Muslims, limited to traders and missionaries.[136]

According to Majul (1976), the Islamization of the Malay world in Southeast Asia resulted to arrival and spread of Islam in the Philippines as well. In Sulu, a colony or settlement of foreign Muslims were founded by and composed of families of traders and missionaries who settled by marrying local women and few converts. "During the last quarter of the thirteenth century, simultaneous with the birth of Muslim principality in the north of Sumatra, Sulu had its share of Muslim settlers. In less than a century, Sulu as well as parts of North Borneo became the center of activity of Muslim missionaries who were, in all probability, Sufi-oriented."[137] Although there is no exact date as to actual arrival of Islam in Mindanao and Sulu, a number of narrations say that "its expansion happened after members of ruling families in Sumatra and Johore arrived and founded political institutions that facilitated conversion of large population."[138] In Mindanao, for instance, a descendant of Johoro aristocracy arrived in the eastern Mindanao around 1520. "Coming with a group of sea-faring people from the straits, this redoubtable prince created a principality and, by means of a few marriage alliances, he was able to introduce Islam in Mindanao."[139]

4.2.2. Bangsamoro during the Spanish and American Colonialism

Even before the arrival of Spanish colonists and before the Philippine state came into being after colonial period, the Muslims in Southern Philippines have already established their own states and governments exercising jurisdiction over their homeland.

According to Lingga (2014), "the historical experience of the Bangsamoro people in statehood and governance started as early as the middle of the 15th century when Sultan Shariff ul-Hashim established the Sulu Sultanate. This was

[136] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 3
[137] Cesar Adib Majul, "An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of Islam and Christianity in Southeast Asia", **Islam and Philippine Society: The Writings of Cesar Adib Majul**, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1976, p. 36
[138] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 4
[139] Majul, "An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of …", p. 38

followed by the establishment of the Magindanaw Sultanate in the early part of the 16th century by Shariff Muhammad Kabungsuwan. The Sultanate of Buayan and the Confederation of the Four Lake-based Emirates and later other political subdivisions were also organized."[140]

In his separate work, Lingga (2008) mentioned that after the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521, and subsequently conquering the northern islands of Luzon and Visayas, for centuries their colonial government attempted to conquer also the territories belonging to Bangsamoro sultanates with an objective to add them to the Spanish colonies.[141] However, the effective administrative and political systems of the Bangsamoro people enabled them to withstand the military campaigns by the Spaniards during the so-called *Moro Wars*. The Bangsamoro sultanates had succeed in preserving their independence by defending their territories through organized naval armies and forces.[142] Therefore, as far as history is concerned, this means that the Spanish colonial government was not able to conquer these areas and exercise sovereignty over them.

In the Spanish-American War, the Spain was defeated ceding all its colonies to the Americans. In the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Spanish colonial government was officially ended and consequently turning over the Philippines to the Americans along with Cuba, Puerto Rico and Guam.[143] As a result, the Philippines became under the rule of the Americans.

From 1898 to 1946, the Bangsamoro continued their armed struggle. They initiated guerrilla attacks and martyrdom operation against the Americans presence in Mindanao and Sulu. They also expressed their objection not to be part of the Philippines when the United States granted full independence to the Philippines in July 4, 1946. Nevertheless, their objection was overlooked by the Americans when it restored political independence to the Filipino people. According to Kamlian (2003),

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[140] Abhoud Syed Lingga, "Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as a Mode of Self-Determination", **Mindanao Journal**, Vol. 27, 2004, p. 4-5
[141] Lingga, Understanding the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination, p. 100
[142] **Ibid.**, p. 100
[143] **Treaty of Paris**, Encyclopedia Britanicca, http://global.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Paris-1898, (Accessed in viewed 9 April 2016)

"the incorporation of the two sultanates in southern Philippines into the Philippine Republic was done without the benefit of democratic consultation on whether or not the majority of the Bangsamoro people would want to join the new republic as individual citizens or as sultanates. This was arbitrarily imposed upon them despite the repeated calls of some Bangsamoro leaders to oppose the incorporation of their homeland into the Philippine territory and sovereignty."[144] Consequently, the Bangsamoro territories became part of the Philippines with the government considering Bangsamoro people as Filipino citizens, including those who are opposing with the government.[145]

4.2.3. Bangsamoro under the new Philippine Republic

After the Philippines gained its independence from the Americans, the government opened Mindanao to resettlements and corporate investments. According to McKenna (2007), the "independence brought a tremendous expansion of government-sponsored Christian Filipino immigration from northern provinces to the Muslim South, especially to the broad lowlands of Muslim Mindanao"[146], through state policies on land ownership and resettlement programs which resulted to Bangsamoro becoming minorities in their traditional homeland. From 1954 to 1958, for instance, the established National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) promoted programs resettling Christian Filipino communities to Cotabato.[147] Tremendous demographic shift throughout Mindanao caused inevitable dislocations.

The dislocation caused by immigration was further followed unfair delivery of government services. The Bangsamoros received less support from the government as successive administrations delivered more opportunities and support to Christian settlers. "By contrast, the government services available to Muslims

[144] Jamail Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self - Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution", Islam and Human Rights Fellow Lecture, Islam and Human Rights Project, Emory University - School of Law, Atlanta, 2003, p. 3
[145] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 6
[146] Thomas McKenna, "Governing Muslims in the Philippines", **Harvard Asia Pacific Review**, Vol. 9, No.1, 2007, p. 6
[147] Lingga, "Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as a Mode of Self-Determination …", p. 105

were not only meager compared to those obtained by immigrant Christians but were also fewer than they had received under the colonial regime."[148]

This resulted further into social and economic problems. According to Majul (1976), "in the last so many decades, the Muslims, as a group, have lagged behind most of the other Filipinos in their educational background and economic progress. Their provinces have the lowest literacy rates."[149] As to comparing the both Muslim and Christian areas, the Christian Filipinos have improved infrastructures such as roads, schools, irrigation systems and marketing facilities.[150]

As early as 1954, these gaps between Bangsamoro and Christian Filipinos that is caused primarily by Christian migration to the Muslim South had become very evident.[151] By late 1960s, according to McKenna (2002), Bangsamoro people have found themselves as a relatively disadvantaged minority in their own homeland.[152]

4.3. Bangsamoro Secessionist Movements

The Bangsamoro believed that the incorporation of their territories was an illegal and unethical act. Aside from the fact that they were not conquered by any colonial powers, their consent was not also sought during the said inclusion. Thus, they took various approaches to pursue their legitimate rights. They continue to assert for their independence in many forms – both in aggressive and in peaceful means. According to Lingga (2004), for example, armed resistance of Jikiri, Kamlon and Tawan-Tawan were signs of disapproval to be part of the newly founded Philippine Republic. On the other hand, others envisions of regaining independence by using the new political system they accepted through joining the government.[153]

Macasalong (2014) referred that when peaceful means produced no good output as the government promoted assimilation and ethnic cleansing instead like the

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[148] McKenna, "Governing Muslims in the Philippines", p. 5
[149] Cesar Adib Majul, "Some Social and Cultural Problems of Muslims in the Philippines," **Islam and Philippine Society: The Writings of Cesar Adib Majul**, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1976, p. 60
[150] **Ibid.**, p. 61
[151] McKenna, "Governing Muslims in the Philippines", 5
[152] Thomas McKenna, "Saints, Scholars and the Idealist Past in the Philippine Muslim Separatism", **SEARC Working Papers**, No. 23, 2002, p. 6
[153] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 8

1968 Jabidah massacre, these events triggered the Bangsamoros to struggle for safeguard of their lives from government's "neo-colonialism", through forming liberation movement.[154] As the massacre which claimed the lives of 64 young Bangsamoros served as the most triggering event portraying the aggressive treatment of government to Bangsamoros, liberation fronts were then formed and lead an armed struggle as an option towards independence.

4.3.1. Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM)

In 1968, the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM)[155] was formed by former Cotabato governor Datu Udtog Matalam two months after the Jabidah massacre occurred. As an immediate response to the massacre, the MIM calls for a complete secession of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions from the control of the Philippine government.[156]

Kamlian (2003) mentioned some of the following reasons for secession:

1. "The establishment of the provincial and municipal governments undermined the status of the traditional leaders, dislocated the authority and communications set up, and negated the existing coalition formation patterns, so necessary in the cooperative and communal ventures that the Muslims were accustomed to. In operation, these governments were disruptive and not functional.
2. "The imposition of a new legal system negated the judicial functions of the village elders. This caused a breakdown in social order and give rise to a lot of social problems which exist up to this day."
3. "It was in the field of education where irreparable dislocations were created. The public school organization systematically alienated the school children. They were forced to learn new sets of values that put down the cultural milieu in which they grew;" and

[154] Marjanie Salic Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao: Islam As A Thrusting Force", **IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science**, Volume 19, Issue 4, 2014, p. 1
[155] Formerly named as the 'Muslim Independence Movement'. 'Muslim' was later changed to 'Mindanao' to accommodate the non-Muslim inhabitants in Southern Philippines.
[156] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 5

4. "The transportation of settlers and land grabbers to Muslim provinces and the creation of agricultural colonies out of Muslim lands caused a lot of resentment in Muslim circles. In effect, this reduced the economic base of the Moroland."[157]

In its manifesto, according to Macasalong (2014), the MIM stated that the Moro inhabitants in these regions "…make manifestation to the whole world its desire to secede from the Republic of the Philippines, in order to establish an Islamic State that shall embody their ideals and aspirations…"[158] This manifesto clearly stated the MIM's main objective to have an Islamic and independent State.

However, the movement was not able to provoke the whole of the Bagsamoros in Mindanao and Sulu and ended in 1971. Nevertheless, the MIM left a significant legacy, that is, the revival of Bangsamoro spirit to aspire for an Islamic an fully independent state. According to Macasalong (2014), "...the professionals and students in Manila, who latter formed the MNLF, and the first batch of trainees to undergo guerrilla training in a nearby state, were all moved by the spirit and tutelage of the MIM."[159]

4.3.2. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

In 1969, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was secretly founded by Nur Misuari together with other Muslim youth leaders. For some strategic reason, particularly to strengthen the newly founded group initially known to be as the Unified Muslim Command[160], Misuari decided to continue its operations under the umbrella of Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO), an organization of Moro aristocrats and politicians tasked with arrangement and sending of Bangsamoro to

[157] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 5
[158] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 3
[159] **Ibid.**, p. 3
[160] Lualhati Abreu, 40 Years of Revolutionary Struggles, **History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People**, Bobby M. Tuazon Ed., CenPEG Books, Philippines, 2008, p. 133

gueriall training abroad.[161] However, the BMLO was dissolved due to generational differences among its members.[162]

In 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) officially surfaced as a separate organization guided by the Islamic norm that injustices and oppression should be resisted.[163] The MNLF released a manifesto in 1974 expressing its goals for the establishment of an Independent Bangsa Moro Republik.[164]

According to Macasalong (2014), Misuari observed the economic gaps between Manila and Sulu, and the deterioration of Mindanao and Sulu from their glorious era before European conquests. Inspired by the Qur'an which says oppression and injustice should be combated, Misuari became more resolute to fight the neocolonial government. Later on, the occurrence of the Jabidah massacre supplemented further his verdict to fight. Fueled with religious motivations, the grievances, oppressions and injustices towards the Bangsamoros became the reasons to aim for the establishment of an Independent Bangsa Moro Republik, as stated in the MNLF Manifesto:[165]

> *"We, the five million oppressed Bangsamoro people, wishing to free ourselves from the terror, oppression, and tyranny of Filipino colonialism, that had caused us untold sufferings and miseries by criminally usurping our land, by threatening Islam through wholesale desecration of its places of worship and its Holy Book, And murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude…Aspiring to have the sole prerogative of defining and chartering our national destiny in accordance with our own free will in order to ensure our future*

[161] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 4
[162] Stanford University**, Mapping Militant Organizations: Moro National Liberation Front**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/379, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)
[163] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 3
[164] Stanford University**, Mapping Militant Organizations: Moro National Liberation Front**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/379, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)
[165] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 3

and that of our children…"(Official Manifesto of Moro National Liberation Front, April 28, 1974)[166]

In pursuit of its goals of secession from the Philippines by creating an independent Bangsamoro state, the MNLF had pursued both armed struggle and diplomacy since its formation in 1972. According to Fitrah (2012), the use of force through launch of military attacks was extensive at the beginning of its struggle and after the failure of 1976 Tripoli Agreement, as will be discussed on succeeding sections.[167]

The MNLF emerged as the strongest organization in Mindanao. Macasalong (2014) cited that one reason of its emerging strength is the support of the OIC, particularly Libya, Sabah (Malaysia), Iran and Saudi Arabia through monetary assistance and arm shipments. As the MNLF succeeded in making the Muslim nations aware of the Moro plight particularly the genocidal campaign of the government, the OIC granted MNLF with an observer status in recognition to MNLF as the sole and legitimate representative of the Bagsamoro people, consequently, giving Misuari special access to Muslim world.[168]

Meanwhile, the armed attacks launched by the MNLF were retaliated by the government declaring Martial law in the whole Philippines to fight the secessionist group with military measures.[169]

4.3.3. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

In 1977, the signing of the Tripoli Agreement lead to a serious split in the MNLF leadership in terms of ideologies and principles consequently causing its fragmentation and birth of a breakaway group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), led by Hashim Salamat.

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[166] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 6
[167] Donna Isyrina Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, MA Thesis, Leiden University, Holland, 2012, pp. 13
[168] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 4-5
[169] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 1

According to Kamlian (2003), the MILF leadership mentioned the following reasons of its separation from the MNLF:

1. "The MNLF leadership was being manipulated away from the Islamic basis, methodologies, objectives and fast evolving towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.
2. The Central Committee has evolved into mysterious, exclusive, secretive and monolithic body whose policies, plans and decisions-political, financial or strategic, become and exclusive preserve of Chairman Nur Misuari.
3. The mysterious exclusive and arrogant of the MNLF leadership resulted in confusion, suspicion and disappointment among members."[170]

In 1984, the MILF officially declared itself as a separate organization calling for the establishment of a Bangsamoro Islamic State, as an original MNLF objective, but this time only in Muslim-dominated areas.[171]

"While the MNLF is more nationalist in pursuing a separation of Moro from the Philippines, MILF is more Islamic-oriented."[172] According to Fitrah (2012), the MILF laid emphasis on Islam as the official ideology which accordingly would guide all the MILF's undertakings. The MILF, apart from being a liberation movement propagating armed-struggle, served as an organization aiming to revive Islam in all aspects of life in Mindanao. In this pursuit, MILF leader Salamat defined four-point programs in a 50-year time frame. These are:

- Islamization of the Bangsamoro people in all aspects of life;
- Reinforcement and development of MILF's organizational and administrative proficiency;
- Military expansion; and

[170] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 7
[171] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 8
[172] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 22

- Self-reliance.[173]

Initially, the MILF called for a complete secession from the Philippines. In 1985, however, the MILF stated its minimum objective for autonomy. According to Salamat:

> *"...Our concept of self-determination is complete independence, or at least, a meaningful autonomous government embracing the traditional homeland of the Bangsamoro, namely, Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi."*[174]

4.4. Bangsamoro Peace Process

At the outset, the Philippine government tried to neutralize the insurgency by resilient military strategies against the secessionist groups. In response, it was confronted by a strong resistance by these groups resulting into a full-scale war in Mindanao.[175] In an attempt to solve the quest of the Bangsamoro people for right to self-determination, the Government of Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the secessionist groups representing the Bangsamoro people, the MNLF and MILF, have been engaged both in the battlefields and in the negotiating table.

4.4.1. The GRP-MNLF Peace Talks and the ARMM

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Libya and later Indonesia participated in, brokered, mediated, facilitated and coordinated all peace talks and negotiations between the GRP and MNLF. The OIC established a special committee called Peace Committee for the Southern Philippines (PCSP) to mediate the peace talks.[176]

4.4.1.1. 1976 Tripoli Agreement

Series of negotiations were initiated between the government and the MNLF. At the outset, the objective was a complete secession from the Philippine Republic

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[173] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 8
[174] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 7
[175] **Ibid.**, p. 8
[176] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 2

through establishing a Bangsamoro Republic as the only mean "to regain the full expression of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence." By signing a peace accord with the government, the MNLF, however, lowered this claim to a genuine political autonomy in Mindanao under the Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity.[177] In 1976, the MNLF was urged to sign the Tripoli Agreement with the Philippine government reducing its demand to a genuine political autonomy in Mindanao under the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. According to Lingga (2004), "the MNLF objective then was for separate state but upon the prodding of the Organization of Islamic Conference it signed the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976 that binds it to accept autonomy within the framework of Philippine territory."[178]

Through granting political autonomy within its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the agreement marked the beginning of nonviolent initiatives of GRP in resolving the conflict in the South. The agreement signed in Tripoli, Libya called for the creation of autonomy in 13 provinces and 9 cities in the south.[179] The proposed areas, in particular, would include the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Davao del sur, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan, as well as cities and villages situated in these areas.[180]

Nonetheless, the Tripoli Agreement was not fully implemented. According to Fitrah (2012), both parties failed to reach a decision on the mechanics of the implementation of the Agreement, particularly, on the subject of plebiscite with GRP insisting for a referendum as a requirement to legalize the autonomy[181], and with the MNLF considering it unnecessary thereby rejecting it. In spite of that, the GRP proceeded with the plebiscite without the MNLF's consent, instead, and unilaterally implemented the Tripoli Agreement by establishing provisionally autonomous governments in 2 regions which covers the provinces and cities under the

[177] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 6
[178] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 8
[179] USIP, "The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines", **Special Report 131**, 2005, p. 4
[180] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 8
[181] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 15

agreement.[182] These Autonomous Governments are Region IX and XII. The MNLF, however, rejected the institution of these two autonomous governments, accused the GRP of violating the Tripoli Agreement and continued their armed struggle. According to Kamlian (2003), the MNLF perceived and felt that the so-called autonomous governments are not actually autonomous in nature.[183]

The failure of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement was a setback in the peace process, consequently, triggering reoccurrence of violent conflicts. Fitrah (2012) noted that "the high escalation of conflict during 1977-1983 exhausted both GRP and MNLF, also leading them to sign a ceasefire agreement on 5 September 1986."[184] Furthermore, the failure caused a division in the MNLF leadership and formation of a separate group, the MILF.[185]

4.4.1.1.1. The ARMM

The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the creation of autonomous regions in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao. Pursuant to this, the GRP created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) under Republic Act 6734. AS Lingga (2004) noted, "in a plebiscite conducted on November 19, 1989, four provinces out of the thirteen provinces mentioned in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement voted to constitute the autonomous region. Later, amendments were introduced in the ARMM Organic Act to accommodate provisions of the final agreement and one province joined the autonomous region."[186]

The official establishment of ARMM in 1989 was considered by GRP as an implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. The ARMM consists of five provinces of Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao del Sur, and the City of Marawi. According to Kamlian (2003), the MNLF, on the contrary, rejected the political initiative and returned to armed struggle. The OIC, also rejecting the

[182] USIP, "The Mindanao Peace Talks …", p. 4
[183] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 8
[184] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 16
[185] **Ibid.**, p. 15
[186] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 10

ARMM, sided with the MNLF and urged the GRP to implement the Tripoli Agreement.[187]

4.4.1.2. 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA)

After more or less four years of interim ceasefire and negotiations,[188] the 1996 Final Peace Agreement was signed between GRP and MNLF serving as a final agreement between the parties on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.[189]

The 1996 FPA created the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) as a provisional autonomous government in the ARMM region covering the 13 provinces initially agreed under the 1976 Tripoli Agreement[190], and which was also created "to provide basic services, adequate infrastructure facilities, entrepreneurial support, capability-building assistance to local government units, and to promote investment and trade in the areas covered…"[191] Consequently, MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari became the head of the SPCPD and the first Governor of the ARMM.[192]

On the contrary, the ARMM did not bring substantive changes on the socio-economic life of the constituents fairly because the conflict continues between the GRP and other Bangsamoro groups as the MILF. Kamlian (2003) mentioned that the MNLF leadership was not successful of delivering basic services.[193] Abuza (2003) added that the region remained impoverished, war-torn and the poorest region in the Philippines.[194]

In 2001, Misuari renewed his insurgence through commanding attacks on military camps in Sulu. After abandoning his post as ARMM Governor, escaping to

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[187] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 8
[188] **Ibid.**, p. 9
[189] Lingga, "Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as a Mode of Self-Determination …", p. 101
[190] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 17
[191] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 10
[192] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 9
[193] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 9
[194] Zachary Abuza, "Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror", **Journal of East Asian Studies,** Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003 , p. 42

Malaysia, he was arrested with rebellion charges.[195] From 2001 to 2004, the GRP practically ignored MNLF because of its internal problems. According to East (2006), "internal bickering saw the MNLF divide into two groups, with one group remaining loyal to Nur Misuari and the other group giving loyalty to Parouk Hussin who was then Governor of the ARMM. Eventually the MNLF did heal its internal division, and in February 2006 re-installed Misuari as its chairman."[196]

4.4.2. The GRP-MILF Peace Talks and the new "Bangsamoro"

During its first thirteen years of existence, the MILF was ignored intensely by the GRP who decided to negotiate only with the main secessionist group at that time, the MNLF, also because Misuari was the signatory to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.[197] In response, during the GRP-MNLF peace talks and even before the signing of the 1996 FPA, the MILF intensified its activities to assert its presence and to prepare for a new war in Mindanao.[198]

Finally, the conclusion of 1996 FPA with the MNLF set the stage for initiation of formal negotiations with the MILF. In fact, the GRP was inspired by the FPA to pursue peace settlement with the MILF. According to Bacani (2006), the GRP also desired to make the 1996 FPA as a model of autonomy arrangement and settlement with the MILF in the future. However, the political autonomy provided by the said agreement is considered as insufficient and unresponsive to the root causes of the conflict.[199] Fitrah (2012) added that the MILF stayed firm in its goal for a complete secession and establishment of an independent Islamic state. [200]

According to Bacani (2006), the peace talks between GRP and MILF may be divided into two stages: domestic stage (1996-2000) and diplomatic stage (2001-present). During the domestic stage, negotiations were held in the Philippines without the assistance of a third-party mediator; during the diplomatic stage,

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[195] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 9
[196] Bob East, "Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): A Profile of Determination", **In Proceedings Social Change in the 21st Century Conference 2006,** Queensland University of Technology, p. 7
[197] McKenna, "Governing Muslims in the Philippines", p. 6
[198] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 9
[199] Benedicto Bacani, "Peace with the Moros of the Philippines: An Independent Assessment", **Asia Treat**, 2006, p. 47
[200] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 22

negotiations included international players including the third-party facilitation of Malaysia.[201]

During initial years of negotiations, the GRP and the MILF managed to conduct peace talks which resulted into signing of ceasefire agreements, like the 1997 Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities and similar agreements and joint statements in 1999. However, the MILF declared infinite suspension of negotiation with the GRP after the later declared an "All-out-war" against the former.[202] The said war resulted into a great deal of displacements among Bangsamoro people. Lingga (2004) cited that war had caused around 932,000 displacements.[203]

In 2001, after a breakout of the war in Mindanao, the diplomatic stage of peace talks began as Malaysia initiated mediation of peace talks. The International Contact Group (ICG) was later created in 2009 to support Malaysia in facilitating the peace talks.[204] From then on, all peace talks and negotiations are participated in, brokered, mediated, facilitated and coordinated by Malaysia and the ICG.

4.4.2.1. Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001

The Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001 basically called for peace talks focusing on security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain. In view of that, rounds of peace talks were hosted by Malaysia and resulted into signing of following arrangements:

1. On security: the Implementing Guidelines of the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Peace Agreement, which led to the formation of Malaysia-led International Monitoring Team (IMT) operating under the auspices of the OIC, particularly, in charge of monitoring the parties 'adherence to ceasefire;

[201] Bacani, "Peace with the Moros of the Philippines …", p. 48
[202] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 23
[203] Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", p. 11
[204] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 2

2. On rehabilitation: the Implementing Guidelines of the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Peace Agreement, which provided that the MILF would "determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas through a project implementing body, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA)".[205]

In 2003, peace talks were temporarily suspended after government troops conducted military offensives to a key MILF headquarter in Maguindanao. The MILF only agreed to return to peace talks after the withdrawal of government troops from the MILF territory. In response to GRP's demand for MILF to denounce terrorism, the MILF Chairman Salamat also made public statements expressing MILF's rejection of terrorism and denying the front's connection to any terrorist organization. The GRP then lifted arrest warrants against MILF leaders and withdrew it troops out of MILF territory. These developments set the stage for the resumption of peace talks.[206] In the same year, Murad Ibrahim was named as the new MILF Chairman after Hashim Salamat's demise.[207]

4.4.2.2. Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)

Bacani (2006) noted that the MILF's claim for the return and recognition of Bangsamoro ancestral domain is considered to be the heart of GRP-MILF peace talks.[208] In 2005, the parties resumed the peace talks with ancestral domain as the main agenda. According to MILF's draft proposal, the Bangsamoro ancestral domain refers to "all lands and areas, including the environment and natural resources therein of the Bangsamoro people, established through occupation, possession, and dominion since time immemorial by cultural bond, customary law, historic rights, and legal titles."[209] These include most parts of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan.[210]

[205] Bacani, "Peace with the Moros of the Philippines …", p. 47
[206] USIP, "The Mindanao Peace Talks …", p. 6
[207] Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements In Mindanao …", p. 11
[208] Bacani, "Peace with the Moros of the Philippines …", p. 47
[209] USIP, "The Mindanao Peace Talks …", p. 6

In 2008, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was drafted. The said agreement would have created a sub-state within the Philippine sovereignty. However, it was not signed per decision of the Philippine Supreme Court that it was against the Philippine Constitution.[211] Consequently, the junking of the MOA-AD made another setback in the peace process and resulted into an armed conflict that broke out between the parties again.

In 2009, peace talks were resumed with the creation of the ICG which was mandated to support Malaysia in facilitating the negotiations.[212]

4.4.2.3. Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)

In 2012, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) was signed serving a historic breakthrough in the peace process.

4.4.2.3.1. "Bangsamoro", the New Political Entity

Basically, the FAB provides for the establishment of Bangsamoro as a new political entity that will replace the ARMM, as both parties agreed that the status quo is unacceptable (FAB Art. 1, Sec. 1).[213]

As provided in the FAB, the Bangsamoro:

1. shall have a ministerial form of government with an asymmetric relationship with the Central Government;
2. shall be governed by a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL);
3. shall have exclusive powers and concurrent powers shared with the Central Government;
4. shall have a revenue generation and sourcing;
5. its core territories shall be composed present geographical area of ARMM, cities of Cotabato and Isabela, six municipalities that voted for

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[210] Bacani, "Peace with the Moros of the Philippines …", p. 47
[211] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 26
[212] **Ibid.**, p. 26
[213] **Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro**, Government of the Republic of the Philippines – Moro Islamic Liberation Front, signed 12 October 2012, art 1, s 1

inclusion on ARMM during 2001 plebiscite, and other contiguous areas.[214]

4.4.2.3.2. Proposed Bangsamoro Core Territory

After replacing the ARMM, the new Bangsamoro will be the new self-governing unit while concurrently expanding its geographical coverage.[215] Figure 4.1 below shows the proposed core territories that would constitute the new political entity.



Figure 4.1 Map of the proposed Bangsamoro region[216]

The FAB only provides an outline on a political settlement between GRP and MILF and not a final peace agreement between the parties. With the facilitation of Malaysia and support of ICG, the parties continued to the negotiations on detailing the FAB and its annexes on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, normalization and

[214] **Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro**, art 1-5
[215] Veronica Taylor and Imelda Dienla, "Towards Peace: Rethinking Justice and Legal Pluralism in the Bangsamoro", **RegNet Research Papers**, No. 63, 2015, p. 5
[216] MindaNews, **Proposed Bangsamoro Core Territory**, http://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2012/10/graphics-proposed-bangsamoro-core-territory/, (Accessed in 21 September 2017)

transitional mechanisms. Accordingly, the FAB and the Annexes would constitute a comprehensive agreement.[217]

4.4.2.4. Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)

In 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed integrating the FAB and its Annexes. The CAB served as the integration of all signed peace agreements between the Bangsamoro and the Philippine Government.[218] The CAB also introduces ways for the establishment of Bangsamoro Government, including socio-economic programs and transitional justice mechanisms, eventually, transform conflict areas into zones of peace and development.

4.4.2.4.1. Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)

For the CAB to be fully implemented, the passage of the drafted Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is needed to legally create the Bangsamoro political entity. The BBL is "a certified urgent bill proposed to the Congress by the President to be the Basic Law of the new Bangsamoro political entity that will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). When approved into law, the proposed BBL will implement the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and its Annexes entered into between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)."[219]

The proposed BBL was crafted by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) composed by representatives from both the GRP and the MILF. In January

[217] Republic of the Philippines. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, **FAQs on the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro**, http://www.opapp.gov.ph/milf/faqs-framework-agreement-bangsamoro, (Accessed in 17 April 2016)
[218] Al Iskandar, **MILF appeals to OIC to sustain and strengthen the support to peace efforts in Southern Philippines**, http://www.luwaran.net/home/index.php/news/76-international/684-milf-appeals-to-oic-to-sustain-and-strengthen-the-support-to-peace-efforts-in-southern-philippines, (Accessed in 18 April 2016)
[219] **Primer on the Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law**, p. 8

2016, however, the 16th Congress of the Philippines failed to approve the BBL threatening a setback on the peace process again.[220]

There are numerous whys and wherefores for this setback.

First, the "unconstitutionality" of the said bill was emphasized on the initial debates with Senators pointing out that "the parliamentary form of government proposed in the law, which grants exclusive powers for the Bangsamoro autonomous region, constitutes an illegal sub-state."[221] Lawmakers put the blame to the peace panels who they claimed to be responsible for the unconstitutional provisions of the BBL specifically the ambiguous self-determination which they fear "may lead to either external self-determination or declaration of full independence."[222]

Second, the BBL would have been passed as well if not because of the Mamasapano incident. After a military operation called "Oplan Exodus" in the Moro-controlled town to arrests two Malaysian terrorist and their Filipino associate, a gun battle occurred thereafter between the Philippine National Police Special Action Force (SAF) and the MILF and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), resulting into casualty of 44 SAF soldiers, 17 MILF combatants, and 5 civilians.[223] The Aquino administration is being blamed for the "uncoordinated" operation. Meanwhile, the said incident caused the loss of public support for the BBL, thus, influencing the deliberations as well.[224]

Despite the controversies raised by the Mamasapano incident and the delays in the Congressional deliberations, those in the core territories are still hopeful with the passage of the BBL on the next administration. The GRP clarified that the

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[220] Mong Palatino, **Violence in the Philippines Feared After Peace Deal Setback**, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/violence-in-the-philippines-feared-after-peace-deal-setback/, 20 (Accessed in April, 2016)
[221] Angela Casauay, **12 senators: Bangsamoro bill unconstitutional**, http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/mindanao/94480-bbl-senate-deadline, (Accessed in 3 November 2016)
[222] ABS-CBN News, **Who's to blame over BBL failure? Not congress, says lawmaker**, http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/v1/02/04/16/whos-to-blame-over-bbl-failure-not-congress-says-lawmaker, (Accessed in 3 November 2016)
[223] INQUIRER.NET, **WHAT WENT BEFORE: Mamasapano clash**, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/752860/what-went-before-mamasapano-clash, (Accessed in 3 November 2016)
[224] ABS-CBN News, **How Mamasapano tragedy affected BBL**, http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/05/15/15/how-mamasapano-tragedy-affected-bbl, (Accessed in 3 November 2016)

framework of the peace agreement remains in effect and the MILF also assured its continuing commitment to the peace process as well. With FAB at hand, Both the GRP and MILF agrees that the establishment of Bangsamoro entity will correct the historical injustices committed against the Bangsamoro people.

4.4.3. Recent Developments

4.4.3.1. Bangsamoro, A Case towards Federalism in the Philippines

The new administration under the recently-elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte considers that federalism in the country would empower local governments and would certainly pave way for the prosperity in Mindanao, including the Bangsamoro region.[225] On the other hand, the MILF views it as an alternative which may solve just the general problem of the country disregarding the problem in the Bangsamoro homeland.[226] Accordingly, the MILF considers the creation of Bangsamoro entity should be the priority as it could be a pilot case study in the efforts towards the establishment of federal system of government in the Philippines later.

> *"If one reads carefully through the pages of the CAB (Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro), then, one cannot but reach the conclusion that powers between Central and the Bangsamoro Governments are meaningfully shared and delegated properly – a future which is very prominent, it already established federal governments."*[227]

To this end, a new Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) was reconstituted to draft an enabling Bangsamoro law, and to recommend amendments

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[225] Nestor Corrales, **Duterte: Federalism as an alternative to BBL**, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/767040/duterte-federalism-an-alternative-to-bbl, (Accessed in 3 November 2016)

[226] Virgil Lopez, **MILF: Duterte's federalism may not solve Bangsamoro problem**, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/572145/news/nation/milf-duterte-s-federalism-may-not-solve-bangsamoro-problem#sthash.157Yonz9.dpuf, (Accessed in 3 November 2016)

[227] Republic of the Philippines. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, **Federalism to Help Correct Historical Injustices**, https://peace.gov.ph/2016/10/federalism-to-help-correct-historical-injustices/, (Accessed in 7 November 2016)

to the 1987 Philippine Constitution to shift the current unitary system to a federal structure.[228]

The said enabling law will be drawn from the proposed BBL (which failed in 16th Congress) and the major provisions of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement. In this context, the MNLF will be represented along with other stakeholders (like Indigenous People and Sultanates) in the new BTC. [229] This means that while the new administration is pushing for a federal system of government, it also looks forward for a more inclusive peace process by bringing particularly the MNLF back to the table for a broader settlement. Inclusivity is given an importance to assure the success in the implementation of the signed peace agreements between the GRP and the Bangsamoro groups. In this case, the peace process will continue and may possibly be welcomed and challenged further by new initiatives under the new administration, with new actors included.

In July 2017, the BTC submitted a new draft of the BBL to the Malacanang Palace and to the Congress a month after. The MILF believes that the new BBL "new proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) reflects the diversity of interests of the Bangsamoro people, non-Bangsamoro indigenous people and settler communities; yet, these interests are all united under one goal of establishing a just, dignified and lasting peace in the Bangsamoro, in Mindanao and the country in general."[230] In this context, the BBL will outline the basic structure of the proposed new political entity Bangsamoro, that is a significant feature to a move to a federal

[228] Republic of the Philippines. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, **EO Activates Enhanced BTC; Seeks Inclusivity in Bangsamoro Peace Process**, https://peace.gov.ph/2016/11/eo-activates-enhanced-btc-seeks-inclusivity-bangsamoro-peace-process/, (Accessed in 9 November 2016)

[229] Leila Salaverria, **Peace process 'on track' with MNLF on Board**, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/841210/peace-process-on-track-with-mnlf-on-board#ixzz4PKAl8mAa, (Accessed in 7 November 2016)

[230] Ghazali Jaafar, **PEACETALK: This Bangsamoro Basic Law is Our New Formula for the Very Elusive Peace in Mindanao**, http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2017/07/peacetalk-this-bangsamoro-basic-law-is-our-new-formula-for-the-very-elusive-peace-in-mindanao/, (Accessed in 23 September 2017)

form of government being pursued by the GRP under the current Duterte administration.[231]

4.4.3.2. Recurrent Rise of Extremism of other Moro Groups

The optimism of advocates for peace in the South, however, appears to be defied by the continued rise of extremism with new armed groups either formed in opposition to the peace talks or formed in pursuit of their own ideologies. Even though some of the groups opted the use of diplomacy and signed peace accords with the Philippine government, the MNLF and MILF case for instance, other Moro groups still pursue the use of violence. These are the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Maute Group (or IS Ranao).

4.4.3.2.1. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Literally means the "Bearer of the Sword", the ASG was founded in early 1990s with a principal objective of creation of an independent Islamic state, similar to the MILF goal. According to Kamlian (2003), the ASG pursues its objectives through use of violence such as intensified conduct of lawless and criminal activities as series of kidnapping and hostage taking.[232]

In early 2000s, for instance, the ASG conducted "kidnapping of school children, teachers, school principal and Fr. Rhoel Gallardo, CMF, Director of the Claret High School in Basilan; the hostage-taking of foreign tourists in Sipadan, Sabah in Malaysia; and the Dos Palmas Resort of Western Palawan where 20 hostages including foreigners were taken." As a result, the ASG was labeled as an international terrorist group. The ASG was also considered by former US President George Bush linked to Alqaeda International Terrorist Network, which is allegedly responsible for the 9/11 attack in the US that ruined the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Accordingly, these allegation is based on

[231] Philip Tubeza, **Duterte Vows Bangsamoro 'Homeland' in 3 Years**, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/907592/duterte-vows-bangsamoro-homeland-in-3-years, (Accessed in 23 September 2017)
[232] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 10

the suspicion that ASG leader Abdurajak Janjalani received training in the Middle East military camp and assistance from Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.[233]

The similar aspiration on the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao with the ASG made the MILF and the MNLF both suspected as linked with the ASG. The MILF and the MNLF, however, denied this accusation. "The leadership of both secessionist groups especially the religious ones, have openly condemned the lawlessness and the criminal activities of the ASG such as kidnapping and hostage-taking. They considered these activities as 'un-Islamic' and 'disservice' to Islam.'"[234]

4.4.3.2.2. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)

The BIFF is a splinter group of the MILF formed by former MILF Commander Ameril Umbra Kato after the junking of the MOA-AD, a settlement that would have created a sub-state in the Philippines but ruled as unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court however. In protest to this decision, the chief of the MILF's 105th Base Command without the MILF leadership's permission led a violent campaign against non-Muslim villages. The splinter group conducted raid operations, destroying of properties, and execution of civilians for six months, which consequently provoked aggressive response from the Philippine military that in turn caused displacement of six million people.[235] According to Samuel (2016), the series of attacks in August and in September 2008 aimed at Christian-infested towns in Mindanao which resulted into 100 casualties, was condemned by the MILF who denied any involvement. [236]

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[233] Stanford University, **Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)

[234] Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines …", p. 11

[235] Stanford University, **Mapping Militant Organizations: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/601, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)

[236] Thomas Koruth Samuel, **Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines**, The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Malaysia, 2016, p. 84-85

The said splinter group, which mostly included members of the MILF's 105th Base Command operating mainly in the province of Maguindanao under the leadership of MILF Commaner Kato, officially left the MILF and established the BIFF.[237] Samuel (2016) referred that this formal separation followed the resumption of peace talks between the GRP and the MILF "when the MILF leadership indicated it would be prepared to accept autonomy for Mindanao, rather than full independence".[238] In other words, the BIFF was formed in response to MILF's acceptance of autonomy during the negotiations with GRP, rather than asserting full independence. The BIFF then launched attacks to undermine the GRP - MILF peace talks. In 2012, for instance, the BIFF launched a violent campaign in 11 villages in the province of Maguindanao that resulted into displacement of 24,000 residents.[239]

These instances made the BIFF became one of the prominent separatist groups, while the MILF and the MNLF have pursued diplomatic means to achieve their goals. In 2014, the GRP responded and conducted the major offensive against the BIFF, the Operation Darkhorse, which resulted into significant losses to the BIFF and displacement of 35,000 residents in provinces of Cotabato and Maguindanao. Despite the BIFF's willingness to engage in peace talks, thereafter, the GRP did not initiate negotiations with the group. Later on, the BIFF declared allegiance to the ISIS and continued its violence through bomb attacks targeting civilians and attacks on government military.[240]

4.4.3.2.3. The Maute Group or "IS Ranao"

The Maute Group is an ISIS inspired armed group founded by Omarkhayyam and Abdullah Maute who both belong to a political family who actively deploy

[237] Stanford University, **Mapping Militant Organizations: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/601, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)
[238] Samuel, **Radicalisation in Southeast Asia** …, p. 85
[239] Stanford University, **Mapping Militant Organizations: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/601, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)
[240] Stanford University, **Mapping Militant Organizations: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters**, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/601, (Accessed in 25 September 2017)

candidates for local government elections.[241] According to Franco (2017), before their pledge to the ISIS, the brothers headed a private armed group[242] that targeted sawmill operator and rural electrical infrastructure for extortion.[243]

The Maute brothers started displaying extremism through violence in 2012.[244] In 2015, the Maute Group pledged allegiance to ISIS in line with its attempt to project a fiercer image and attempt to claim more power by use of public perception.[245] It also calls itself as the "IS Ranao".[246]

The Maute group was responsible for several attacks. The most notable is the Davao market bombing in September 2016 which resulted into 15 casualties. [247] The emergence of Maute Group was highlighted during Marawi crisis in May 2017.[248] In the said crisis, the government forces clashed with the rebel group when the former was conducting a raid in the hideout of ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon[249] in Marawi city.[250] The crisis, which caused displacement of 200,000 residents, has been responded with declaration of martial law in all over Mindanao.[251]

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[241] Joseph Franco, The Maute Group: New Vanguard of IS in Southeast Asia?, RSIS Commentary, No. 107, 2017, p. 2

[242] Joseph Franco, Francis Domingo and Kathline Anne Tolosa, **Maute Group: What You Need to Know**, Security Reform Initiative, 201, p. 1

[243] Franco, The Maute Group: New Vanguard of IS in Southeast Asia?, p. 2

[244] Carmela Fonbuena, **Terror in Mindanao: The Mautes of Marawi**, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/173697-terrorism-mindanao-maute-family-marawi-city, (Accessed in 27 September 2017)

[245] Jennifer Santiago Oreta, **Briefer: Maute Group and ISIS**, Security Reform Initiative, p. 1

[246] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia", **IPAC Report,** No. 33, p. 15

[247] Amita Legaspi, **3 Members of Maute Group Arrested Over Davao City Bombing – DND Chief**, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/584197/3-members-of-maute-group-arrested-over-davao-city-bombing-dnd-chief/story/, (Accessed in 27 September 2017)

[248] Ver Marcelo, **Gov't Forces, Maute Group Clash in Marawi City**, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/23/marawi-city-clash.html, (Accessed in 27 September 2017

[249] Hapilon is a leader of an ASG faction in Basilan and considered by the ISIS as its 'emir' in Southeast Asia to lead the ISIS inspired militants. (Franco, Domingo and Tolosa, **Maute Group: What You Need to Know**, p. 2)

[250] Philippine Star Global, **Marawi Crisis: What we know—and don't know—so far**, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/29/1703153/marawi-crisis-what-we-know-and-dont-know-so-far, (Accessed in 28 September 2017)

[251] Greanne Mendoza, **Duterte declares Martial Law in Mindanao**, http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/23/17/duterte-declares-martial-law-in-mindanao, (Accessed in 28 September 2017)

CHAPTER FIVE

TURKEY IN THE BANGSAMORO PEACE PROCESS

5.1. Bilateral Relations between Turkey and the Philippines

5.1.1. Diplomatic Relations

The formal diplomatic relations between the two countries was established since June 13, 1949. In October 17, 1990, the Turkish Embassy was officially opened in Manila.[252]According to Sevilla (2013), at the outset, the Philippines had not pursued a deep bilateral partnership with Turkey for years despite the Turkey's blooming economy and geostrategic location in Europe and the Middle East. This is attributable to difference of their respective focus of interests. Philippine interaction has been mainly steered with Arab countries on the subject of oil, Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) and procurement of an OIC observer status; Turkey, on the other hand, is focused more on American and European politics and economics.[253]

Until 2005, the relations between two countries had entered a new phase, this time, with coinciding political interests, thanks to the abrupt emergence of Turkish cultural and business communities who then became involved in the field of education, religion, culture and economy of Filipino society. These are evident in the initiatives pursued by the Turkish government in line with its cultural diplomacy in the Philippines, which includes (a) opening of Turkish schools in Manila and Zamboanga City, (b) formation of Pacific Dialogue Foundation in the Philippines, and (c) establishment of Turkish Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines.[254]

In recent years, relations between Turkey and the Philippines have developed remarkably in wide range of areas including politics, socio-economy, and security.

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[252] Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Relations between Turkey and the Philippines**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-philippines_.en.mfa, (Accessed in 1 January 2018)

[253] Henelito Sevilla, "Turkish Cultural Diplomacy in the Philippines," **Middle East Institute**, 2013, http://www.mei.edu/content/turkish-cultural-diplomacy-philippines

[254] **Ibid.**

The visit of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in Manila in November 17, 2014 is considered as the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to the Philippines and marks the 65th anniversary of the establishment of Turkey – Philippine bilateral relations.[255] One of the outcomes of the said visit was the signing an Air Services Agreement which aims to strengthen tourism, trade and economic ties between the two countries.[256] So, in March 2015, the Turkish Airlines officially launched direct flights to Manila, consequently, providing an opportunity to link closer Turkish and Filipino community. Furthermore, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) opened its Manila office in April 2015 with an aim to provide a significant link between the two countries in the field of socio-economic development cooperation. On security issues, Turkey has been supporting the peace process between the Government of the Philippines and Bansamoro secessionist groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).[257]

5.1.2. Economic and Trade Relations

Turkey and the Philippines have been expanding their economic and commercial relations in the recent years. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 below shows the total of Turkey's import to and export from the Philippines for all products.

In Thousand US$	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Import	122,311.39	157,737.50	181,168.59	113,986.51	115,774.07	122,374.78
Export	100,612.18	144,196.32	135,609.63	138,095.21	103,873.81	106,682.65

Table 5.1 Turkey Import[258] and Export[259] for all products from Philippines between 2011 and 2016

[255] Republic of the Philippines. Department of Foreign Affairs, **Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu Undertakes Official Visit to the Philippines**, https://www.dfa.gov.ph/dfa-releases/4644-turkish-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-undertakes-official-visit-to-the-philippines, (Accessed in 1 January 2018)

[256] Natashya Gutierrez, **Turkey, Philippines sign air services agreement**, https://www.rappler.com/nation/75289-turkey-philippines-visit-talks, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

[257] Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Relations between Turkey and the Philippines**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-philippines_.en.mfa, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

[258] World Bank - Integrated Trade Solutions, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/StartYear/2011/EndYear/2016/TradeFlow/Import/Indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/PHL/Product/all-groups#, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

[259] World Bank - Integrated Trade Solutions, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/StartYear/2011/EndYear/2016/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/PHL/Product/all-groups, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)



Figure 5.1 Turkey Import[260] and Export[261] for all products from Philippines between 2011 and 2016

Turkey's export to the Philippines includes milling products, malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten; Ores, slag and ash; dairy products, eggs, honey, animal food products; and pharmaceutical products. Imports from the Philippines include Electrical, electronic equipment; machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc.; fruits, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons; rubber and articles thereof.[262]

In March 8, 2011, the foundation agreement of the Turkey – Philippines Business Council was signed in Istanbul. The main objective of the Business Council is "to provide an effective mechanism for the business communities of the both countries helping them to raise awareness about each other, and to follow up business opportunities and partnerships."[263]

[260] World Bank - Integrated Trade Solutions, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/StartYear/2011/EndYear/2016/TradeFlow/Import/Indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/PHL/Product/all-groups#, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[261] World Bank - Integrated Trade Solutions, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/StartYear/2011/EndYear/2016/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/PHL/Product/all-groups, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[262] Republic of Turkey. **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey-Philippines Economic and Trade Relations**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economical-relations-with-philippines.en.mfa, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[263] Republic of Turkey. Foreign Economic Relations Board, **Profile: Turkey – Philippines Business Council**, https://www.deik.org.tr/asia-pacific-business-councils-turkey-philippines-business-council, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

In November 2013, the Philippines was struck by one of the world's strongest tropical cyclones on record, Super Typhoon Yolanda (international code name: Haiyan).[264] According to Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), the typhoon caused $184 million cost of damage to houses, bridges, roads and other infrastructure in the areas it crossed and left a total of 6,340 casualties.[265] Together with international community who pledged to relieve the Philippines from the devastation caused by Yolanda, Turkey donated 469,914.07 USD[266] and sent search and rescue personnel and a plane carrying relief goods.[267]

5.2. Turkey in the Bangsamoro Peace Process

This disruption of peace and order in Mindanao became an opportunity for more engagement between two countries on security aspect. In this context, Turkey has been involved in the peace process between the Philippine government and Bangsamoro secessionist groups as the MNLF and the MILF.

The presence of prominent Turkish leaders during the important events of the peace process clearly demonstrated the commitment of Turkey in supporting the peace process in Southern Philippines. At the Ministerial Meeting Preparatory to the 12th Islamic Summit Conference of the OIC in Cairo this February 2013, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu welcomed the FAB, congratulated Malaysia for it, and supported the pending application for observer status of the Philippines.[268] For instance, during his visit to the Philippines last 2014, Davutoğlu

[264] INQUIRER.NET, **One of world's strongest typhoons lashes Philippines**, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/523635/yolanda-one-of-worlds-strongest-typhoons-blasts-philippines, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[265] ABS-CBN News, **Philippines remembers super typhoon 'Yolanda' disaster**, http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/08/16/philippines-remembers-super-typhoon-yolanda-disaster, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[266] Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Turkey-Philippines Economic and Trade Relations**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economical-relations-with-philippines.en.mfa, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[267] Rappler, **Yolanda (Typhoon Haiyan): Aid, donations from int'l community**, https://www.rappler.com/nation/43310-yolanda-international-community, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[268] Soliman Santos, **The Role of Islamic Diplomacy in the Mindanao Peace Process**, Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, http://peacebuilding.asia/the-role-of-islamic-diplomacy-in-the-mindanao-peace-process/, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

further assured the full-support of Turkey to the ongoing peace plan that envisions a close to the decade-long armed conflict in Mindanao.[269] During the momentous singing of the CAB in 2014, Turkey was also represented by Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Naci Koru.[270]

Turkish commitment and support has already been evident at the outset. Even before the aforementioned historical events, Turkey has been part of the numerous mediation groups that are formed to deliver essential backing to the peace process. During the GRP-MNLF peace talks, Turkey has been a member of the OIC Peace Committee for South Philippines (OIC-PCSP). For the GRP-MILF peace talks, Turkey serves as a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) and the chair of the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB). Through the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Turkey also takes part in the delivery of social and economic development through humanitarian aid to conflict-affected area in the Bangsamoro region. Aside from its humanitarian missions, the IHH also represents Turkey in the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) signifying its capacity in mediation as well.

5.2.1. Turkey in Multiparty Mediation Bodies

The breakthroughs in the peace process would not be achieved as well if not because of participation of international community in the negotiation process through multiparty mediation. The formation of these mediation bodies are basically in answer to the necessity of the parties for third-party assistance during peace talks. As mentioned earlier, Turkey has been part of these mediation bodies.

5.2.1.1. Turkey in the OIC Peace Committee for South Philippines

After its successful mediation in the GRP-MNLF peace talks with the conclusion of 1996 Final Peace Agreement, the Organization of Islamic Conference

[269] Serdar Karagöz, **Davutoğlu stresses Turkey's full support in Philippine peace process**, Daily Sabah, viewed 30 March 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/11/17/turkey-pledges-to-support-philippine-peace-process, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

[270] Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Deputy Foreign Minister Attends the Signing Ceremony of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/deputy-foreign-minister-attends-the-signing-ceremony-of-the-comprehensive-agreement-on-bangsamoro.en.mfa, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)

(OIC) continued to its mediation efforts by creating the OIC Peace Committee for South Philippines (OIC-PCSP). The main purpose of the committee, according to Fitrah (2012), is to guarantee the full implementation of 1996 Final Peace Agreement towards the making of peace in the South. Lead by Indonesia as the chair of the committee since 2017, the OIC-PCSP member states include Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Indonesia, Libya, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia and Turkey, as well as two ex-officio members consisting of the host countries for the Summit and Foreign Ministers Council meeting.[271]

In 2014, another breakthrough was achieved by the PCSP, that is, the activation and operationalization of the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum (BCF)[272] which provides a platform for both the MNLF and the MILF to "coordinate their movements toward achieving the aspiration of the Bangsamoro people towards just and lasting peace, and peaceful resolution of their problems."[273] In particular, the BCF provides the groups a venue wherein they can coordinate and discuss the concerns confronting the Bangsamoro people such as finding common grounds among three peace agreements they signed with the GRP namely the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, 1996 Final Peace Agreement and the recently-signed CAB.[274] Through this initiative, the OIC aims to narrow the gap between the two Bangsamoro groups and, if merging them will not be possible, unite them at most.[275]

5.2.1.2. Turkey in the International Contact Group (ICG)

The International Contact Group (ICG) is an ad-hoc group created primarily to support Malaysia in the facilitation of peace talks. The formation of the ICG in

[271] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 19
[272] Republic of the Philippines. Office of the President - Office of the Presidential Adviser for Peace Process, **OIC makes historic step towards peace in Southern Philippines**, http://archive.peace.gov.ph/features/oic-makes-historic-step-towards-peace-southern-philippines, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[273] GMA News Online, **MNLF, MILF agree to coordinate on Bangsamoro issues – OPAPP**, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/383916/mnlf-milf-agree-to-coordinate-on-bangsamoro-issues-opapp/story/, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[274] Republic of the Philippines. Office of the President - Office of the Presidential Adviser for Peace Process, **OIC makes historic step towards peace in Southern Philippines**, http://archive.peace.gov.ph/features/oic-makes-historic-step-towards-peace-southern-philippines, (Accessed in 5 January 2018)
[275] Santos, **The Role of Islamic Diplomacy in the Mindanao Peace Process**

2009 serves a compromise to MILF's enthusiasm to internationalize the negotiation process and GRP's opposition to external intervention to its domestic affairs[276], following the breakdown of MOA-AD which resulted into breakout of war in Mindanao in 2008. According to Fitrah (2012), the ICG was formed due to the demand of the MILF for a multiparty mediation to overcome the ordeal of the MOA-AD failure and to raise the influence and leverage of the mediator over GRP.[277]

The main purpose of the creation of ICG has been to complement and mobilize international support of international community to the peace process and to "exert proper leverage and sustain the interests of the parties as well as maintain a level of comfort that restores mutual trust".[278]

As agreed by both parties, the selection of members of ICG is defined by following key considerations:

a. The strength of support given by the state and relevant experience of the international NGO to peace in Mindanao
b. Recognized expertise in the field of conflict transformation
c. The desire on inclusion of both Western and Muslim participants
d. The Government's hesitation to include big powers and multilaterals
e. The MILF's hesitation to consider countries that provided military aid to the Philippines Armed Forces (i.e. US and Australia).[279]

Out of these considerations, the ICG was decided to be composed by four states - Turkey, Japan, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom - and four international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) namely Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Asian Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah. From this structure, ICG is considered as a "hybrid body" composed of both states and INGOs, hence, signifying an innovation in the peace process support.

[276] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 2
[277] **Ibid.**, p. 26
[278] Democratic Progress Institute, **Briefing: International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines Peace Process**, 2014, p. 7
[279] Kristian Herbolzheimer and Emma Leslie, **Innovation in mediation support: The International Contact Group in Mindanao**, Practice Paper, Conciliation Resources

The ICG functions are:

> "To attend and observe the face-to-face negotiations upon invitation by the Parties with the concurrence of the Facilitator;
>
> To conduct visits, exchange views, and give advice on discreet basis in coordination with the Parties and the Facilitator;
>
> To seek out the assistance of recognized experts, resource persons or groups on specific issues in order to support the Parties; and
>
> To meet upon request by any of the Parties at various levels to help resolve substantive issues based on agreed agenda."[280]

In 2012, the FAB was signed between GRP and MILF. In this context, the role of ICG is worth mentioning as it contributed to the historical signing of the agreement that ended four decades of conflict and 15 years of negotiation. The ICG played an important role during the peace talks. In particular, it has functioned in a communication-facilitation strategy during peace talks meetings[281] which was held mostly in Kuala Lumpur. Per mandate, ICG attended and observed the negotiations, provided discreet advices, and provided expert assistance on the substantive issues, thereby, acting as a bridge between the parties during rounds of meetings.[282]

As one of the member states in the ICG, Turkey has been part of this process. Accordingly, Turkey has delegated most of the peace talks meetings through its embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In spite of insufficiency in human resources, the Turkish embassy in Manila has also attended ICG meetings in the capital.[283]

5.2.1.3. Turkey in Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT)

The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) was created based on one of the provisions of the FAB which states that,

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[280] **Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process**, Government of the Republic of the Philippines – Moro Islamic Liberation Front, signed 15 September 2009, s 3.
[281] Fitrah, **Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict**, p. 27
[282] Democratic Progress Institute, **Briefing: International Contact Group …**, p. 9-10
[283] Santos, **The Role of Islamic Diplomacy in the Mindanao Peace Process**

> "There will be created a third party monitoring team to be composed of international bodies, as well as domestic groups to monitor the implementation of all agreements."[284]

Consequently, this laid the foundation of the creation of the TPMT in 2013, an independent body composed by local NGOs and international NGOs tasked in monitoring the implementation phase of the peace process. Specifically, its mandate is to monitor, review and assess the implementation of all signed peace agreements, especially the FAB and its Annexes.[285] According to their Terms of Reference (TOR), the basic functions of TPMT are to:

> "Monitor and evaluate the implementation of all Agreements.
>
> Review and assess the implementation of commitments by both Parties under the Agreements. Towards this end, it shall submit comprehensive periodic reports and updates to both Parties for their appropriate action.
>
> Communicate to the public the progress and developments in the implementation of the Agreements of the Parties."[286]

In discharging its mandate, the TPMT has functioned in various ways. One of these is the conduct of consultation with concerned stakeholders in the peace process. In September 2013, the international body had its first visit to the Philippines. During the said visit, the TPMT members consulted several key actors and civil society representatives regarding the implementation of FAB and the success of peace process as a whole.[287] In continuation of discharging its mandate, the TPMT had conducted 22 consultations further; the latest was in July 2017.[288]

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[284] **Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro**, art 7 s 11
[285] **The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) and its Terms of Reference***,* Government of the Republic of the Philippines – Moro Islamic Liberation Front, signed 25 January 2013, art 1
[286] **Ibid.**, art 3.1.
[287] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Independent Third Party Monitoring Team visits Philippines**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/independent-third-party-monitoring-team-visits-philippines-1894, (Accessed 5 January 2018)
[288] Philippines, **Consultations: Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT)**, http://tpmt.ph/news/consultations, (Accessed 5 January 2018)

Furthermore, as mentioned above, TPMT are also expected to submit reports to the Parties for deliberation, and afterwards to the public for their information about the progress of the implementation process. To this end, the TPMT has been submitting written reports to the Parties on a quarter basis, and publishing public reports annually. As far as this, TPMT Public Reports had been released on February 2014, February 2015 and February 2016.[289] The annual public reports contain TPMT activities, key development in the implementation of Agreements, and other observations and recommendations of the body.

Taking into consideration the important role of international community as well as local groups in the peace process, the GRP and the MILF agreed that the composition of TPMT shall be comprised by a jointly-nominated Chair, who is an eminent international person, and four representatives from local and international NGOs (two GRP-nominated and two MILF-nominated).[290] Currently, the TMPT was chaired by Former EU Ambassador to the Philippines Alistair MacDonald (but now retired), and composed by representatives from two local NGOs: Karen Tañada (Gaston Z Ortigas Peace Institute), Rahib Kudto (United Youth for Peace and Development), and from two international NGOs: Huseyin Oruç (The IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation), and another GRP-nominated international NGO which has yet to be replaced.[291]

According to FAB and TPMT's Terms of Reference, the TPMT will continue to function until the end of the transition period when Parties, the Malaysian facilitator, and also the TPMT itself will organize an assembly to review, assess or evaluate the implementation of all agreements and the progress and development of the transition.[292] When all agreements have been fully implemented, an Exit

[289] Republic of the Philippines, **Background: Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT),** http://tpmt.ph/background, (Accessed 5 January 2018)
[290] **The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) and its Terms of Reference**, art 2
[291] Republic of the Philippines, **Background: Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT**), http://tpmt.ph/background, (Accessed 5 January 2018)
[292] **The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) and its Terms of Reference**, art 3.2 and art 9.

Document will be crafted and signed by the Parties signifying an official end of the peace negotiations.[293]

5.2.2. Turkey in the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB)

Normalization serves as one of the important components of CAB. This pertains to the decommissioning of the combatants and transforming them into productive civilians. The Annex on Normalization of the CAB "paves the way for the laying down of weapons of MILF members and their transition to civilian life."[294] During the normalization process, the communities affected by the conflict are anticipated to pursue sustainable livelihood and return to peaceful life.

To realize this, a seven-man Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) was created. Turkey contributes to the normalization process by serving as a Chair of the IDB. It is basically formed to supervise the decommissioning process of the MILF forces and weapons so that they are put beyond use. Specifically, the IDB is responsible for conducting inventory, verification and validation of the MILF combatants and weapons. It is also in charge of developing decommissioning schedule and implementing it thereafter.[295]

In July 2015, another breakthrough in the peace process was achieved with the decommissioning of 145 combatants through the turnover of the 75 high-powered weapons from the MILF's armed wing called Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) to the custody of IDB.[296] During the turnover ceremony, Turkish Ambassador Haydar Berk, then IDB Chairperson, applauded both parties.

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[293] **Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro**, art 7 s 12

[294] Kristine Angeli Sabilo, **What is Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro**, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/589245/what-is-the-comprehensive-agreement-on-the-bangsamoro, (Accessed 6 January 2018)

[295] Office of the President – Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, **Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB)**, http://www.opapp.gov.ph/media/infographic/independent-decommissioning-body-idb, (Accessed 6 January 2018)

[296] Office of the President – Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, **MILF starts decommissioning of weapons, combatants despite delay in *BBL***, http://www.opapp.gov.ph/milf/news/milf-starts-decommissioning-weapons-combatants-despite-delay-bbl, (Accessed 6 January 2018)

"We are proud to be part of this historic, courageous peace process. I have doubt that not only the present generation but future generations would admire your visionary statesmanship."[297]

Considering the decommissioning process is among the most important aspect of the peace process in general, the takeoff of this method through the initial turnover is a proof of the strong commitment of the MILF to end the armed conflict in the South and pursue political goals through nonviolent means, in return for the Philippine government to rebuild the self-governance of the Bangsamoro people so they can represent greater political and economic powers for the new autonomous entity, to be called Bangsamoro.

His successor as the new IDB Chairperson, Turkish Ambassador Mustafa Pulat, will finalize the work included in the continuation of the first phase of decommissioning process.[298] In October 2016, Ambassador Pulat led the IDB visit in the Camp Darapanan where MILF headquarters is located.[299] Citing Pulat's assignment as the new IDB chair, the Turkish embassy in Manila expressed its support to the peace process.

"The Government of the Republic of Turkey supports the efforts of the Philippine Government in bringing a lasting peace to Mindanao and thus, is committed to its work within the IDB. We believe that Ambassador Mustafa Pulat, as a qualified and able diplomat, will continue contributing to the work of the IDB,"[300]

As agreed upon, the decommissioning process will be fully implemented with the passage of the BBL. The panels consider the decommissioning as a significant

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[297] Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ankara, **Positive Developments in the Decommissioning Process in the Philippines**, http://www.norway.org.tr/News_and_events/News-from-Norway/Current-Affairs/Positive-developments-in-the-decommissioning-process-in-the-Philippines/#.WBYAOPl97Dc, (Accessed 6 January 2018)

[298] Hader Glang, **Turkey appoints Pulat to Philippines decommissioning**, http://aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkey-appoints-pulat-to-philippines-decommissioning/454143, (Accessed 6 January 2018)

[299] Jad'dah Deeya, **MILF Chair receives Independent Decommissioning Body in Camp Darapanan**, http://www.luwaran.net/home/index.php/news/20-central-mindanao/915-milf-chair-receives-independent-decommissioning-body-in-camp-darapanan (Accessed 26 January 2018)

[300] **Independent decommissioning body convenes anew in anticipation of BBL passage**, https://www.radyonatin.com/story.php?storyid=9030 (Accessed 26 January 2018)

part of the CAB and thus the peace process as a whole. Hence, the leading role Turkey plays in this part is very substantial.

5.2.3. Turkey's Humanitarianism in the Bangsamoro

At the outset, Turkey has been delivering humanitarian aid to the war-torn areas in Mindanao. Its humanitarian relief is mainly carried out by the IHH, a conservative Turkish non-government organization established in 1992 to provide humanitarian relief in areas of war, earthquake, hunger and conflict.[301] Since 1996, the Bangsamoro people have been one of IHH's beneficiaries. According to IHH Vice President and TPMT member Huseyin Oruç:

> *"Our first visit took place in 1996 for a humanitarian relief operation. We never stepped back after this date from the Moro region. We have shown that Turkish people have been standing with the Muslims there with the means of humanitarian assistance. Especially, after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, Islamic organizations operating in the region were forced to stop all their works and projects due to the pressure present. We have never stopped our work. With us staying within the region, especially in its most difficult times had put us in a special place among the local people and the organizations.""*[302]

According to Tabak (2015), the Turkish humanitarian assistance later developed a close and strong relationship between Turkey and the Bangsamoro people to the extent that the MILF, who represent the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination, believes that Turkey would best support the best interests of the Muslims in the country, thus, insisted the nomination of the IHH to be part of the TPMT.[303]

Dağ (2006) added that the IHH representation in the TPMT was out of MILF's insistence of IHH inclusion to the monitoring body. The MILF has strong beliefs and trust in Turkey's mediation capabilities and the IHH's upkeep for the

[301] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **About Us: Humanitarian Relief Foundation**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/about-us, (Accessed 6 January 2018)
[302] Dağ, "Moro Peace Monitoring Mission …", p. 8
[303] Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission …", p. 208-209

interest of the Muslims in the Philippines, particularly the Bangsamoro people. "[The] MILF had requested IHH to be present in this process and to stand next to them because of trust in the Foundation specifically in addition to the general trust present for Turkish people." This insistence is motivated by the long-established relations of Turkish people and the Muslims in the Philippines since the time when IHH started reaching the Bangsamoro people for humanitarian assistance.

In actuality, Turkish humanitarianism is evident in the charitable works carried out by IHH in the Bangsamoro region. Most of this assistance is delivered in collaboration with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), the MILF's development wing. Under the social welfare program of BDA, IHH is supporting the delivery of assistance in forms of relief goods and annual Qurbani and Ramadan aid. The recipients are generally those who are affected by conflict and/or natural calamities. Aside from IHH, this initiative is also supported by another Turkish NGO, the Turkish Religious Foundation (Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi or TDV). In 2015, approximately 3,360 households in the province of Maguindanao and North Cotabato were provided with relief assistance.[304]

In conjunction with its representation in the TPMPT, the IHH has also begun expanding its initiatives through increasing of projects which are designed "to build trust and confidence on the one hand, and to support the normalization of domestic processes on the other… [Through these projects,] the IHH has interacted with conflict-affected communities, state and non-state groups."[305] For instance, the foundation has been supporting the establishment of school buildings and orphanage centers in the region to sustain the accommodation and primary education of children who were left orphaned and uneducated by the conflict. The most noteworthy is the establishment of the Moro Orphanage Center in 2015 in cooperation again with

[304] Bangsamoro Development Agency, **Humanitarian Program**, http://bangsamorodevelopment.org/humanitarian-program/, (Accessed 6 January 2018)
[305] Dağ, "Moro Peace Monitoring Mission …", p. 9

BDA. The said center currently houses a number of orphans through in-house service and delivers a distant service to the other registered orphans in the region.[306]

Per record, other IHH activities in the Bansamoro region are as follows:

- Distribution of Eid clothes to orphans in Eid al-Adha 2009[307] (along with orphans in Palestine, Arakan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Darfur, Pakistan, Tatarstan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Kosovo Macedonia and Turkey itself)[308]
- Delivery of aid during Ramadan 2011 through Iftar programs and distribution of food packs (along with Pakistan, Kashmir, Arakanese refugee camps in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Aceh, Japan and Vietnam.)[309]
- Distribution of emergency food aid and supplies to 400 families who were affected by fire disaster in Cotabato in October 2012[310]
- Donation of 20,000 Euros for provision of food and temporary accommodation for those who are affected by Hurricane Pablo in December 2012[311]
- Delivery of food relief to people affected by the Zamboanga crisis in 2013[312]
- Provision of relief packs to internally displaced civilians who fled during the Marawi crisis in May 2017[313]

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[306] Bangsamoro Development Agency, **Orphanage Care**, http://bangsamorodevelopment.org/orphanage-care/, (Accessed 6 January 2018)
[307] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Clothing aid at Eid**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/clothing-aid-at-eid-594, (Accessed 26 January 2008)
[308] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Orphans receive wide support from IHH**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/orphans-receive-wide-support-from-ihh-1283, (Accessed 26 January 2008)
[309] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **IHH to send help to South Asia in Ramadan**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/ihh-to-send-help-to-south-asia-in-ramadan-1041, (Accessed 26 January 2008)
[310] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Response to fire disaster in Philippines**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/response-to-fire-disaster-in-philippines-810, (Accessed 26 January 2008)
[311] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **IHH takes emergency relief to Philippines**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/ihh-takes-emergency-relief-to-philippines-1515, (Accessed 26 January 2008)
[312] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **Food aid to Philippines**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/food-aid-to-philippines-1921, (Accessed 26 January 2008)

In an objective to further measure the impact of Turkish humanitarian endeavors in the Bangsamoro peace process, a survey had been conducted to prove the aforementioned hypothesis of this study. During the conduct of said survey, a questionnaire reflecting Turkey's endeavor in the Bangsamoro region through humanitarian assistance and mediation was designed to get the views and opinions of correspondents regarding the subject matter. The target correspondents, who are mainly based in the Bangsamoro region, were then inquired within a span of two months. Below is the result of the said survey conducted with the assistance of SEED Initiative, a consultancy firm based in Cotabato City, Philippines.

Do you think Turkey is an exceptional actor in Bangsamoro peace process?	**AGREE:** 15 **DISAGREE:** 4 ***NO ANSWER:** 1
What makes Turkey different in the mediation process compared to other actors involved in peace process?	Turkey has a good reputation as a mediator in global scale: **7** Turkey has both the capacity and experience in mediation: **6** Turkey is also an active humanitarian actor in Bangsamoro region: **15** Turkey shares religious similarity with Bangsamoro people: **8** Others: **1**
Do you trust Turkey's capacity as a mediator in the Bangsamoro peace process?	YES (Turkey has both the capacity and resources to contribute to the conflict resolution): **18** NO (Turkey lacks mediating experience): 0 OTHERS: **2**
Turkey is a leading actor when it comes to responding humanitarian crisis in global scale.	YES (Turkey's humanitarian effort is well-acknowledged in Bangsamoro region): **20** NO (Turkey may have other interests in the region): 0

[313] IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, **IHH Sends Food Aid to Philippines Under Martial Law**, https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/news/ihh-sends-food-aid-to-philippines-under-martial-law, (Accessed 26 January 2008)

Are you in favor of its humanitarian assistance in conflict afflicted areas in Bangsamoro region as well?	OTHERS (please specify): **1**
Do you trust Turkey's capacity as a humanitarian actor? Do you think it can contribute to the development and rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas in the Bangsamoro region?	YES (Turkey can contribute to the development of Bangsamoro region): **20** NO (Turkey cannot cater the humanitarian needs of Bangsamoro people): **0** OTHERS: **0**
Which Turkish institution or NGOs do you think are operating in the Bangsamoro region?	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA): **10** IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation: **17** Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılay): **0** Cansuyu: **4** Others: **4**
Since late 90's, Turkey has been active in delivering humanitarian assistance to the Bangsamoro region through a leading Turkish NGO, the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. Do you think such historical experience built a strong relationship between Turkey and Bangsamoro people?	AGREE (Turkish humanitarianism strengthened the brotherhood of Turks and the Bangsamoro people): **19** DISAGREE (Turkish humanitarianism did not build or improve any relations.): **0** OTHERS: **0**
Do you think religious similarity primarily influences Turkey's humanitarian effort in Muslim-populated Bangsamoro region?	AGREE (Turkey is a Muslim country. As it helps other Muslims in the world, Turkey helps Bangsamoro people as well): **17** DISAGREE (Religious similarity is not a factor for Turkey's humanitarian effort in Bangsamoro region): **2** OTHERS: **2**
Do you think past Turkey's humanitarian effort triggered its mediating role in the peace process? Do you think aforementioned historical experience affected current membership of Turkey in mediation parties (such as International Contact Group (ICG) and Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT))?	YES (Turkey's humanitarian effort in Bangsamoro region resulted into MILF to trust Turkey, consequently, insisting Turkey's participation as mediator in peace process as well): **17** NO (Turkey's humanitarian effort did not trigger its current mediator role in any way.): **2** OTHERS: **2**

With aforementioned historical experience and religious similarities between the Turkey and the Bangsamoro people, do you think Turkey's involvement in the peace process serves the interests of the Muslims in the Philippines more?	AGREE (Turkey supports the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination.): **18** DISAGREE (Turkey is neutral): **2**
Turkey has been leading the decommissioning process of the MILF combatants as well. How do you think this will bring a significant impact to the peace process?	It will transform their lives as combatants into lives as normal citizens: **12** It will promote peace and stability in the region: **12** Others: **3**
Aside from humanitarian assistance and international mediation, in what other ways do you think Turkey can contribute to the conflict resolution in Bangsamoro?	Social reconstruction (e.g. building infrastructures, provision of health care, education programs, capacity-building trainings, etc.): **14** Boosting of Moro economy (e.g. opening of business, provision of job opportunities, conduct of international trade, introduction of unconventional agrarian methods, etc.): **12** Others: **Additional 8 entries**

Table 5.2 Raw data of survey on Turkey's humanitarian assistance and mediation in Bangsamoro

Based on the data gathered from the said survey, majority of the respondents agree that Turkey plays an exceptional role in the peace process.

Turkey's being an active humanitarian actor in the Bangsamoro region, according to almost 50% of respondents, is what distinguishes Turkey from other actors involved in the peace process.

Majority of them also trusts Turkey's capacity as a mediator in the Bangsamoro peace process. One respondent, who is a high ranking official of BDA, says that Turkey is very helpful to the plight of the Bangsamoro. It is also active in providing humanitarian and social services support to the vulnerable groups of the Bangsamoro. He said, however, Turkey is not yet officially acting as a mediator.

In terms of Turkey's aid delivery, majority of respondents are in favor of its humanitarian assistance in conflict afflicted areas in Bangsamoro region. In this connection, all of respondents trust Turkey's capacity as a humanitarian actor and

believes that it can contribute to the development and rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas in the Bangsamoro region. The IHH, for most of respondents, leads the delivery of Turkish humanitarian relief in the region. They are also familiar of other humanitarian efforts by other Turkish agencies or NGOs such as the TIKA, TDV and Sadaka Taşi. They also believe that Turkish humanitarianism, which has a history with IHH humanitarian missions since late 90's, built a strong relationship between Turkey and Bangsamoro recipients, consequently, strengthening the brotherhood of Turks and the Bangsamoro people.

Religious similarity primarily influences Turkey's humanitarian effort in Muslim-populated Bangsamoro region, according to most of the respondents. They believe that as a Muslim country, Turkey aids other Muslims in the world especially those are in need, including Bangsamoro. They said this religious similitary is accompanied by social responsibility. Although they are few respondents who believe that religious similarity is not a factor for Turkey's humanitarian effort in Bangsamoro region by saying that it is political as it is an active OIC member.

For most of the respondents, Turkey's humanitarian effort in the past has triggered its mediating role in the peace process. As it humanitarianism developed close relations with the Bangsamoro people, it also gained the trust of the MILF consequently insisting Turkey's participation as mediator in peace process especially its TPMT membership. One respondent also added that the MILF, for a long time, tried to establish line with Turkey first through OIC-Secretary General Iksan Oglu and later to other personalities connected to its government. Despite these, however, few respondents think that humanitarian effort did not trigger its current mediator role in any way.

Majority also thinks that think Turkey's involvement in the peace process serves the interests of the Muslims in the Philippines more as both shared historical experience and religious similarities.

Regarding Turkey's leadership decommissioning process of the MILF combatants as the IDB chair, all respondents believe that this will bring important impact to the peace process as normalization will transform their lives as combatants

into lives as normal citizens, will provide harmonious relations between and among the Bangsamoro people, IP and the settlers, bring peace and stability in the region on conditions that a CAB-Compliant BBL is passed into law. One respondent further added that decommissioning has existing mechanism and Turkey shall be proactive to make it truly functional to attain its goal and target.

Aside from humanitarian assistance and international mediation, the respondents also conveyed their ideas about other aspects where Turkey can also contribute. They have suggested Turkey to help assist social reconstruction and boost the Bangsamoro economy. They also added Halal industry, Shari'ah-compliant finance, social enterprise development, tourism, renewable energy, governance, communication, food security and child protection, where Turkey can also give significant contribution.

In general, Turkey's role during the peace process was influential. According to BDA Deputy Executive Director Windel Diangcalan,

> *"The presence of Turkey is instrumental to push the peace process forward. He adds that there shall be a concerted effort among the international (third party) actors to help the Bangsamoro attain its quest for self-determination."*

MILF Chairman Murad Ibrahim also perceived Turkey's role as complimentary.

> *"Turkey was very much helpful in the building of the peace process… I talked to Ahmet Davutoğlu three times by phone. He gave great support. Whenever a difficulty appeared, he immediately stepped into the process. The Turkish Ambassador [to the Philippines] joined us at the signature ceremony. Turkey [the Turkish government] runs the political side of the [mediation] process, while the IHH runs the humanitarian."*[314]

[314] Tabak, "Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission …", p. 210

CONCLUSION

International mediation, along with several conflict-management tools such as peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, has been an effective tool in conflict resolution process as evident in the rapid increase in the numbers of negotiated settlement to armed conflicts after the end of Cold War. This study has highlighted the actors involved in mediation through discussion on the concept of Tracks of Diplomacy. The Tracks of Diplomacy (ToD) conceptualize both the official and nonofficial intervention to conflict resolution process. Official intervention, known as Track One Diplomacy (T1) or official diplomacy, is conducted basically by official third party representatives from states and international organizations like United Nations. Unofficial intervention, which includes Track One and Half Diplomacy (T1.5) and Track Two Diplomacy (T2), conceptualizes the increasing involvement of third-party mediators in conflicts like non-governmental organizations (NGOs), individuals and informal actors. Multitrack diplomacy refers to the complementary interaction of these tracks which is considered more effective in bringing settlement to conflicting parties.

Through giving emphasis on unofficial diplomacy, this study has explored the increasing role of NGOs in conflict resolution initiatives. NGOs' easy access to beneficiaries, power, information, financial institutions and technical expertise are what provides them the leverage to play mediating roles especially in cases of intrastate conflicts. In dealing with problems beyond the reach of official diplomacy wherein political actors are involved, NGOs complements by acting as more "trusted" intermediary between the government and the armed groups. NGOs, which are in a far better position to be trusted by armed groups representing the grassroots, are entrusted to mediate the conflicting parties. In cases when high-level approaches are not effective, T1.5 actors like NGOs uses low-level approach to peacemaking such as humanitarian interventions to get the trust of the conflicting parties. Such humanitarian interventions are then conceptualized by humanitarian diplomacy. The Carter Center is an example of an NGO practicing unofficial diplomatic intervention

to international conflicts. The Carter Center case manifested an example of an NGO which pursued humanitarian intervention in order to get the trust of parties (i.e. health program to eradicate worm disease in Sudan).

In further exploring the concept of Tracks of Diplomacy, this study has used the Turkish case as the main model for official and non-official intervention in a conflict resolution. Indeed, Turkey is considered an emerging actor in the field of international mediation as well as humanitarian diplomacy. Beyond doubt, it had proven itself a credible actor with its mediatory practices and humanitarian efforts from the Asia to Africa, the Middle East to Europe and America to the Far East. Through state and NGO intervention to conflicts occurring near its borders and beyond, Turkey has acquired good status and experiences as both mediator and humanitarian actor. In terms of aid delivery, Turkey's humanitarian assistance combines both the manpower of both the state and non-state actors as influential NGOS.

One of Turkish NGOs which has been receiving strong back up from the Turkish government is the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. The organization has been on track since its establishment in 1992 through active delivering aid to disadvantaged people or victims of natural calamities, war, or any form of catastrophes. In the recent years, the IHH is broadening its practice of humanitarian diplomacy beyond delivering humanitarian aid through practicing mediation. Beyond relief operations, it envisions to determine and eradicate the causes of people's impoverishment. Considering armed-conflicts and wars as the usual cause of humanitarian crisis, the IHH considers mediation as a key solution beyond just simply delivering humanitarian relief. It has mediated conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Syria, Egypt and Pakistan. Thus, the IHH case is an example of T1.5 diplomacy, that is, non-official intervention in conflicts.

Multi-track diplomacy, that is the interaction of aforementioned diplomacy tracks, is also evident in Turkey's diplomatic intervention in Bangsamoro peace process in the Philippines. The Bangsamoro case, accordingly, had been used by this

study as an example in further explaining the complementarity of diplomacy tracks in conflict resolution process.

Turkey and Philippines had already established bilateral relations 65 years ago. With the establishment of Turkish schools and business and social development operations of TIKA in the country, Turkey has been pursuing cultural diplomacy ever since. With conflict in the Southern Philippines at hand, the search for the lasting peace had opened doors for two countries for more engagements. For this reason, Turkey started pursuing initiatives with humanitarian ends in the Bangsamoro region by delivering relief assistance to the conflict-affected areas under the lead of IHH. Since 1996, Turkish humanitarianism is evident in IHH's aid delivery and programs in the region. Consequently, this has stemmed the close relations between Turkey and the Bangsamoro people. To the extent that, when peace talks had come to the stage where an impartial international body is needed for monitoring the process, the IHH was chosen by the MILF to represent the Bangsamoro side in the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT). This, accordingly, was out of MILF"s trust to the IHH, and Turkey in general, that it would best represent the interests of Bangsamoro people in the peace table. Hence, the IHH case is similar to Carter Center's case wherein a T1.5 actor uses humanitarian intervention to get the trust of parties to conflict resolution process.

In general, the trust of Bangsamoro people to Turkey is huge as evidenced by the survey conducted by this study regarding Turkey's humanitarianism in the region. The historical experience of the IHH in the region became a significant factor as to why the MILF have entrusted the interests of Muslims to the IHH to represent them in the TPMT. As discussed earlier, Turkey's intervention is also favored by majority of the respondents who represented different sectors. In this context, the IHH case is an example wherein NGO's humanitarian assistance has significant positive impact on the peace process, as hypothesized by this study.

Aside from the IHH humanitarian intervention and mediation, Turkey has been on track ever since the early stages of peace process. Turkish commitment and support has already been evident at the outset. Turkey has been part of the numerous

mediation groups that are formed to deliver essential backing to the peace process. During the GRP-MNLF peace talks, Turkey has been a member of the OIC-PCSP. For the GRP-MILF peace talks, Turkey serves as a member of the ICG and the chair of the IDB. In this context, Turkey membership in the said mediation bodies signifies its contribution to the other aspects of the peace process. Basically, the formation of these mediation bodies is basically in answer to the necessity of the parties for third-party assistance during peace talks. Hence, the participation of international community in the negotiation process through multiparty mediation, in general, had played a massive importance in achieving the breakthroughs in the peace process. This case is an example of T1 diplomacy wherein official (state) actors are involved in conflict resolution process.

In sum, Turkey believes that human dignity can only be preserved with the absence of any form of violence. Taking lessons from its past humanitarian diplomatic experiences and mediatory practice, Turkey has been taking a significant part in the peace process in Mindanao by serving as a member of the aforementioned multiparty mediation parties and by continued delivery of relief to Bangasmoro region. As hypothesized by this study, Turkey's uses both international mediation and humanitarian assistance as tools for its diplomatic intervention in the peace process. In this framework, Turkey considers mediation beyond aid delivery, as a compulsory option in ending violence which threatens human security. It believes that political settlement through negotiation and mediation will end conflicts consequently hindering humanitarian crisis. It believes that human dignity and security can only be achieved with sustainable peace in the setting. Without which, any form of humanitarian aid is futile. This also reflects the continued humanitarian support of IHH while at the same time taking a mediating role in the peace process. The IHH considers conflict-resolution through mediation as means to pursue its humanitarian diplomatic objectives. IHH believes that by bringing the conflicting parties into compromise say a political settlement, the turmoil that threatens human security and crisis will be eliminated and consequently the sustainability of peace and development follows thereafter. This continues to be the guiding principle of

IHH, and Turkey in general, for its intervention in the search for lasting peace in Mindanao.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Survey Questionnaire

Appendix 2 List of Respondents

Humanitarian Diplomacy and Mediation:
The Case of Turkey's Diplomatic Intervention in
Bangsamoro Peace Process in the Philippines
(MA Thesis)

SURVEY QUESTIONNARE

Respondent's Name: _____
Designation: _____
Office: _____

1. Do you think Turkey is an exceptional actor in Bangsamoro peace process?

   - AGREE
   - DISAGREE

   What makes Turkey different in the mediation process compared to other actors involving in peace process?

   - Turkey has a good reputation as a mediator in global scale.
   - Turkey has both the capacity and experience in mediation.
   - Turkey is also an active humanitarian actor in Bangsamoro region.
   - Turkey shares religious similarity with Bangsamoro people.
   - Others (please specify):
     _____
     _____
     _____

2. Do you trust Turkey's capacity as a mediator in the Bangsamoro peace process?

   - YES: Turkey has both the capacity and resources to contribute to the conflict resolution.
   - NO: Turkey lacks mediating experience.
   - Others (please specify):
     _____
     _____
     _____

3. Turkey is a leading actor when it comes to responding humanitarian crisis in global scale.

   Are you in favor of its humanitarian assistance in conflict afflicted areas in Bangsamoro region as well?

   - YES: Turkey's humanitarian effort is well-acknowledged in Bangsamoro region.
   - NO: Turkey may have other interests in the region.
   - Others (please specify):

     _____

     _____

     _____

4. Do you trust Turkey's capacity as a humanitarian actor?

   Do you think it can contribute to the development and rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas in the Bangsamoro region?

   - YES: Turkey can contribute to the development of Bangsamoro region.
   - NO: Turkey cannot cater the humanitarian needs of Bangsamoro people.
   - Others (please specify):

     _____

     _____

     _____

5. Which Turkish institution or NGOs do you think are operating in the Bangsamoro region?
   - Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)
   - IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation
   - Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılay)
   - Cansuyu
   - Others (please specify):

     _____

     _____

     _____

6. Since late 90's, Turkey has been active in delivering humanitarian assistance to the Bangsamoro region through a leading Turkish NGO, the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. Do you think such historical experience built a strong relationship between Turkey and Bangsamoro people?

    - AGREE: Turkish humanitarianism strengthened the brotherhood of Turks and the Bangsamoro people.
    - DISAGREE: Turkish humanitarianism did not build or improve any relations.
    - Others (please specify):
      _____
      _____
      _____

7. Do you think religious similarity primarily influences Turkey's humanitarian effort in Muslim-populated Bangsamoro region?

    - AGREE: Turkey is a Muslim country. As it helps other Muslims in the world, Turkey helps Bangsamoro people as well.
    - DISAGREE: Religious similarity is not a factor for Turkey's humanitarian effort in Bangsamoro region.
    - Others (please specify):
      _____
      _____
      _____

8. Do you think past Turkey's humanitarian effort triggered its mediating role in the peace process?
   Do you think aforementioned historical experience affected current membership of Turkey in mediation parties (such as International Contact Group (ICG) and Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT))?

    - YES: Turkey's humanitarian effort in Bangsamoro region resulted into MILF to trust Turkey, consequently, insisting Turkey's participation as mediator in peace process as well.
    - NO: Turkey's humanitarian effort did not trigger its current mediator role in any way.

- Others (please specify):

  _____
  _____
  _____

9. With aforementioned historical experience and religious similarities between the Turkey and the Bangsamoro people, do you think Turkey's involvement in the peace process serves the interests of the Muslims in the Philippines more?

   - AGREE: Turkey supports the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination.
   - DISAGREE: Turkey is neutral.
   - Others (please specify):

     _____
     _____
     _____

10. Turkey has been leading the decommissioning process of the MILF combatants as well.
    How do you think this will bring a significant impact to the peace process?

    - It will transform their lives as combatants into lives as normal citizens.
    - It will promote peace and stability in the region.
    - Others (please specify):

      _____
      _____
      _____

11. Aside from humanitarian assistance and international mediation, in what other ways do you think Turkey can contribute to the conflict resolution in Bangsamoro?

    - Social reconstruction (e.g. building infrastructures, provision of health care, education programs, capacity-building trainings, etc.)
    - Boosting of Moro economy (e.g. opening of business, provision of job opportunities, conduct of international trade, introduction of unconventional agrarian methods, etc.)

    Others (please specify):

    - _____

List of Survey Respondents

Name	Designation	Office
Mohagher Iqbal	*Chairman*	MILF Peace Implementing Panel
	Commissioner	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
Muhammad Ameen	*Chairman of Secretariat*	MILF Central Committee
Raissa Jajurie	*Member*	MILF Board of Consultants
	Commissioner	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
Prof. Abdullah Adam	*Executive Assistant to Chairman*	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
Samaon Ebrahim	*Peace Program Officer II*	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
Windel Diangcalan	*Deputy Executive Director*	Bangsamoro Development Agency
Rhadzni Taalim	*Head of Program and Operations*	Bangsamoro Development Agency
Juhaina Cadon	*Finance Head*	Bangsamoro Development Agency
Hashim Manticayan	*President*	League of Bangsamoro Organizations
Dr. Rahib Kudto	*President*	United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc.
Jordan Talusob	*Project Officer*	Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
Lyla Hadji Ampat	*Member*	Ittihadun Nisa Foundation, Inc.
Dr. Danda Juanday	*City Administrator*	Local Government Unit - Cotabato City
Dr. Tomanda Antok	*Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs*	Mindanao State University - Maguindanao
Prof. Raby Angkal	*Director*	Shariff Kabunsuan College, Inc.
Dr. Taugan Kikay	*Chairman of Board of Directors*	Homeland Producers Cooperative
Engr. Ali Alatas Biao	*Office Staff*	Tabun Halal Multipurpose Cooperative
Abul Ala Solaiman Jabir Bin Abdulmannan Gayak	*Office Staff*	Tabun Halal Multi-purpose Cooperative
Ali Anso	*Program Director*	DXUP Teleradyo
Nasser Pulindao	*Anchor, BTC on the Air*	Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

T.C.
NECMETTİN ERBAKAN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü

CURRICULUM VITAE

MOHAMAD ABDULFARID DELNA

Home Address : National Highway, Poblacion Datu Paglas, Maguindanao, Philippines
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Telephone No. : (+90) 553 034 3956
Nationality: Filipino
Civil Status: Single
Date of Birth: June 7, 1991
Place of Birth: Datu Paglas, Maguindanao
Activities and Fields of Interest: Foreign Language, Photography, Social Media
Foreign Languages: English, Tagalog, Turkish
Other Local Dialects: Maguindanaon, Meranao, Ilonggo, Visayan

He was born in Maguindanao, Philippines. In 2013, he finished his secondary education with a degree Bachelor of Science in International Relations in Mindanao State University, Marawi City.

With regards to his prior work experience, he had his internship at a prestigious department of the Philippine government, the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2012 in Manila. Apart from that, he had been a Customer Service Representative at the Synnex – Concentrix Corporation last 2013 in Cagayan de Oro, Philippines. In 2014, he also served as a Research Assistant at the Bangsamoro Development Agency in Cotabato City. At the same office, he got a promotion as an Information, Communication and Learning Officer.

During college years, he had been an active officer of numerous organizations and held significant positions on administrative and clerical tasks. The skills he acquired from these affiliations then delegated him to some programs in regional, national, and international level. The most prominent one was being part of the Philippine delegation to JENESYS Programme 2009 (Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths), as a Student Ambassador.