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**NECMETTİN ERBAKAN ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**İRAN, PAKİSTAN AND SAUDİ ARABİA: THE RİSİNG  
SECTARIANİSİM**

**AFSHEEN FATİMA**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**ADVISOR:**  
**ASST.PROF.DR. MUSTAFA CÜNEYT ÖZŞAHİN**

**KONYA-2018**

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**Sünni Müslümanların çoğunluğu oluşturduğu Pakistan önemli bir Şii Müslüman nüfusa ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Sovyet kuvvetlerinin Afganistan'a gelişi Pakistan'ı mücahitlere ev sahipliği yapan ve sınır ötesine gönderen bir ön cephe müttefiki yaptı. Bunun yanında Sovyet-Afgan savaşı 1979 İran Devrimi ile aynı zamana tekabül etmiştir. Bu iki faktör de komşu devletlerin Pakistan'daki Şii-Sünni ilişkilerine etki etmesi için bir katalizör görevi görüyordu. Bu çalışma, "İç-dış dinamikler" teorik bakış açısı yardımıyla Pakistan'daki Şii-Sünni çatışmasını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede iç dinamiklerin Pakistan'ın yakın çevresine ve bölgesel güçlere yönelik dış politikasını nasıl etkilediğine odaklanmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, Pakistan iç politikasını etkileyen İran ve Suudi Arabistan gibi bölgesel ve bölge dışı güçlerin ve bu ülke için merkezkaç nitelikteki devlet dışı aktörlerin rolünü ayrıntılarıyla ele almaktadır.**

## ABSTRACT

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**Pakistan houses a significant minority of Shia Muslims living alongside majority Sunni Muslims. Arrival of Soviet forces in Afghanistan made Pakistan a front state ally, nurturing and sending mujahedeen cross border for the holy war (Jihad). Moreover, coinciding the Soviet-Afghan war came about Iranian Revolution of 1979. Both of these factors acted as a catalyst to affect the Shia-Sunni relations in their neighbouring state Pakistan. The undertaken study aims to study Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan through theoretical viewpoint of “Internal-external dynamics.” Within this framework it focuses on how internal dynamics effects the foreign policy of Pakistan towards its immediate neighbours and regional powers. It also elaborates upon the role of regional and extra-regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in influencing the domestic policy of Pakistan and their supporting of non-state actors who are acting as centrifugal forces for the country.**

## CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations.....	i
Preface.....	iii
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>

### FIRST CHAPTER

#### HISTORY OF SHIA-SUNNI DISCORD

1.1. Introduction to the conflict.....	12
1.2. Advent of Shia Islam in the Indian Sub-Continent.....	18

### SECOND CHAPTER

#### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction.....	23
2.2. Identity Disparity.....	25
2.3. Ethnic Disparity.....	28
2.4. Pak-Afghan Relations.....	34
2.5. Indo-Pak Relations.....	46
2.6. Pak-Saudi Relations.....	58
2.7. Pak-Iran Relations.....	65

### THIRD CHAPTER

#### NATURE AND VIOLENCE OF TERRORISM

3.1. History of Terrorism.....	77
3.2. Pakistan's Sectarian Entanglement in Syria.....	79
3.3. Local Repercussions of the Syrian War.....	83
3.4. Current Dynamics in Pakistan.....	90
Conclusion.....	103

Bibliography.....107



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AEOI</b>	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
<b>AEOI</b>	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
<b>ANP</b>	Awami National Party
<b>ASSP</b>	Anjuman Sipah Sahaba Pakistan
<b>ASWJ</b>	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat
<b>ATA</b>	Anti-Terrorism Act
<b>BLA</b>	Baloch Liberation Army
<b>BLO</b>	Baloch Liberation Organization
<b>CENTO</b>	Central Treaty Organization
<b>CMLA</b>	Chief Martial Law Administrator
<b>COAS</b>	Chief of Army Staff
<b>CPEC</b>	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
<b>EIU</b>	Economic Intelligence Unit
<b>FATA</b>	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
<b>HEC</b>	Higher Education Commission
<b>HoA</b>	Hearth of Asia Conference
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>IBA</b>	Institute of Business Administration
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>IHC</b>	Islamabad High Court
<b>IRNA</b>	Islamic Republic News Agency
<b>ISI</b>	Inter-Services Intelligence
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
<b>ISO</b>	Imamia Students Organization
<b>JRL</b>	Joint Resistance Leadership
<b>JUD</b>	Jamat-ud-Dawa
<b>KPK</b>	Khyber Pakhtun Khwa
<b>LEA</b>	Law Enforcement Agency
<b>LeJ</b>	Lashkar-e-Tayyaba

<b>MQM</b>	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
<b>NAP</b>	National Action Plan
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NWFP</b>	North West Frontier Pakistan
<b>PDPA</b>	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
<b>PML-N</b>	Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz
<b>PoK</b>	Pakistan occupied Kashmir
<b>PPP</b>	Pakistan's Peoples Party
<b>RAW</b>	Research and Analysis Wing
<b>SIPRI</b>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<b>SSP</b>	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
<b>SSUET</b>	Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology
<b>TJP</b>	Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan
<b>TLYRA</b>	Tehreek-e-Ya Labbaik Rasull Allah
<b>TNFJ</b>	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqha-e-Jafaria
<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCLOS</b>	Convention on the Law of the Sea
<b>US</b>	United States



## PREFACE

This research on “Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: The Rising Sectarianism” is done to fulfil the requirement of South Asian Studies and International Relations at Necmettin Erbakan University (NEU). Research time took 1 year starting from February 2017 to February 2018.

Current internal stability of Pakistan and the unparalleled surge in the extremism in the society prompted me to take up this research topic. Pakistani society has never been so divided on the sectarian fault-line as it is today. A number of research work has been done by different researchers touching upon the different aspects of sectarianism in Pakistan. To better understand this progressive nuisance in a theoretical perspective I used the internal-external dynamics concept given by Simon Mabon in his book Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East.

A special thanks to my thesis advisor Asst.Prof.Dr. Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin for guiding me all through my research with his valuable suggestions and sharing his precious time.

A lot of resource related obstacles came in my way primarily because of language barrier. There, my family stepped in to shoulder the burden. I would be forever beholden to them for sending me loads of related books all the way from Pakistan.

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Lastly, a small note of thanks for Anamta Razzak Awan for checking up on me and helping me stay grounded in difficult times.

Thank you all. Had it not been for your unconditional support, I wouldn't be able to complete this uphill task.

## INTRODUCTION

Muslims of Indian sub-continent are no stranger to the holy lands of present day Saudi Arabia. Since the conversion of a large number of local population to Islam, holy lands of Mecca and Medina are revered by the sub-continental Muslims. This relationship to the holy lands became more prominent as Pakistan came into being in 1947.

As Vatanka writes, Iran on the other hand had always been a neighbour of present day Pakistan and had deep rooted religious, cultural and political ties with the local population of the united India. Historically, Iran was the first country to accept Pakistan as an independent state. Cross-border immigration and trade ties led to the boom of this relationship which received its first major shock when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged and Shah's dynasty was toppled by Khomeini.

Since the start of Afghan-Soviet war things started to change for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan's priorities changed and decided to ally with America. This changed relations vis-à-vis Iran and Pakistan since Iran was clearly anti-American. This war also saw the growing involvement and influence of Saudi Arabia like never before. Saudi funded religious seminaries are no more secret to any Pakistani or to international community.

There are not enough studies done on Pakistan-Iran-Saudi Arabia troika. This study probes reasons why and how things changed for all the three countries involved. It further investigates into the spill over effect of Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan and Saudi sponsorship of religious education Pakistan in the cover of religious seminaries resulting in widespread sectarianism across the country. This growing trend of Shia-Sunni conflict is not a one-day phenomena it took decades for the growing number of seminaries to routinely produce religious fanatics.

Start of Yemen war escalated the situation when Pakistan was expected to side with Saudi Arabia owing to its long time allegiance but the current regional dynamics compounded by the internal ones compelled Pakistan to backtrack. Estimated reasons were over-growing sectarianism in society and energy ties with Iran.

## **RESEARCH TOPIC AND PROBLEM**

Haqqani writes, Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization of late 1970s threatened Shias and at the same time emboldened Sunnis. Demand of protection of religious rights by Shias was seen as an act of sabotage by Zia and Pakistani intelligence. To counter this, Zia welcomed Saudi support for Sunni sectarian outfits whereas, Iranian most probably were helping Pakistani Shias.<sup>1</sup>

One of the important facets of the rise of the militant organizations is the external support and internal stimuli. Things began to change rapidly once Iranian Revolution took place. Sunnis on the eastern flank of Iran felt threatened by the prospect of the spill over of the revolution in their territory Pakistan. Foreign players like Iran, Saudi Arabia and other gulf states entered the stage and from there started the connections and the regular funding of sectarian groups.

In this context, this thesis study places Iran and Saudi Arabia's sectarian politics and its effect in Pakistan in centre with a special reference to Pakistan's anti-terrorism elements and policies.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Sectarianism is an issue which has plagued Pakistan from a long time. It has affected negatively Pakistan on social, cultural and political levels. CIA Factbook puts the population of Shia minority around 10 to 15% in Pakistan. Sunni population makeup is around 85 to 90%.<sup>2</sup>

Shia-Sunni conflict has been a mainstay of Muslim world including Pakistan. Things took a violent turn when Zia began his Islamization of the country. Ahmed enunciates multiple reasons as to why Zia even took the decision of Islamization. First, he himself was a devout Muslim. Second, he wanted to appease those right-wing parties who helped him in bringing down the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his

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<sup>1</sup> Husain Haqqani, **“Weeding Out the Heretics”: Sectarianism in Pakistan,** <https://www.hudson.org/research/9769-weeding-out-the-heretics-sectarianism-in-pakistan>, (31 January, 2017)

<sup>2</sup> CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.

civilian predecessor. Third, Saudi Arabia became one of the reasons because the monarch wanted to inseminate their Wahhabi ideology after coming under pressure of Imam Khomeini.<sup>3</sup>

Khaled writes Saudis funded Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) while Iran funded the Shia militants. US ignored the brewing sectarian conflict in Pakistan because it wanted to control Iran's influence and limit its future political disbursement in Afghanistan. US was already aggrieved by the yearlong embassy siege in Iran along with this Washington froze Iranian assets.<sup>4</sup>

In the year 1985, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi founded Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP) later renamed as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. Since beginning, SSP was cleared in its motive in curbing Shia influence in Pakistan and to stand up for the honour of *Sahabas* (companions of Prophet) and to declare Shias *kafir* (non-Muslim) officially. He brought up the Iran case making a point that if Iran is a Shia state then Pakistan should also be declared a Sunni state because the majority population adheres to Sunni Islam.<sup>5</sup>

Since its inception Pakistan had been closely allied both with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan as an independent state and Shah of Iran was the first head of state to pay a visit to the nascent state.<sup>6</sup> Relations have been based on mutual understanding and cooperation with occasional ups and downs. With the advent of Iranian Islamic revolution relations have taken a tumultuous turn.

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<sup>3</sup> Khaled Ahmed, **Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East**, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, pg.29

<sup>4</sup> Ahmed, **Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East**, pg. 29

<sup>5</sup> Mukhtar Ahmed, **Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jhang**, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 2001, pg.31

<sup>6</sup> Harsh V. Pant, **Pakistan and Iran's Dysfunctional Relationship**, <http://www.meforum.org/2119/pakistan-and-irans-dysfunctional-relationship>, (1 February 2017)

Going back in history gives some startling facts about Iran-Pakistan relations which seemingly seemed very cordial but had its own deep rooted problems.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, relations with Saudi Arabia have been always cordial. Saudis even supported the creation of Pakistan calling it a holy 'jihad'.<sup>8</sup> As aforementioned things began to change with Iranian revolution in 1979 and Shia Sunni tensions started surfacing throwing Pakistan in a perilous state since both were friendly states and politically supportive.

As Halliday says, religion based terrorism is the most dreadful form of terrorism.<sup>9</sup> This heightened sectarianism in Pakistan has caught attention of some scholars. Blatant human rights violation, target killings of Shia intellectuals, demand of declaring Shias constitutionally "Infidel" and banning of their religious rituals and processions sparked interest in the changing minds of the public and political landscape of Pakistan.

What caused such a rise in anti-Shia sentiments? WikiLeaks finds that Saudi Arabia is a huge financier of funding of Madrassas in Pakistan such as Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). Cables of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reads, "More needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qaida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups." She said that, "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Alex Vatanka, **Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence**, I.B.Tauris, London, 2015, pg.12

<sup>8</sup> Mujtaba Razvi, "Pak-Saudi Arabian Relations: An Example of Entente Cordiale," **Pakistan Horizon** 32. no.1, 1981, pg.81.

<sup>9</sup> Fred Halliday, **Terrorism in Historical Perspective**, [http://www.tni.org/detail\\_page.phtml?page=archives\\_halliday\\_terrorism](http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?page=archives_halliday_terrorism), ( 4 February 2017)

<sup>10</sup> Declan Walsh, **WikiLeaks Cables Portray Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for Terrorists**, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding>, ( 4 February 2017)

In the last 15 years, 67,399 Pakistanis have lost their lives in different types of sectarian attacks.<sup>11</sup> Regular funding and a network of leaders from Afghanistan to Pakistan has made recruiting more systemized and easy hence increasing the death toll and destroying the social fabric.

### **PURPOSE OF RESEARCH**

It is already clear that rising sectarianism is a burning phenomenon in the Muslim world. In this context, country like Pakistan which has a sizable Shia minority is already rife with conflict between the two parties. One of the corner stone of Pakistan's foreign policy is having cordial relations with the Muslim states of the world. One of these two states are Saudi Arabia and Iran are of paramount importance. Shia-Sunni conflict between these states and resulting effect on Pakistan are the primary reason for this work.

Literature review showed that Pakistan is a weak state with fragile balance between Shias and Sunnis which got extremely disturbed in post Iranian revolution in Pakistan. Different forces have come into being and gained the status of non-state actors and pressure groups. These groups from both Shia and Sunni sects are organized and carry out their plans in a systematic way and have deeply penetrated the society in ways like never before. This has been linked to the common interest between Pakistani establishment and the militants who not carry out attacks against minorities in Pakistan but also in Indian held Kashmir keeping Indian military engaged.

Today, it has become one of the most important agenda of Pakistan to control these terrorist outfits as they have started attacking military bases also apart from there old targets against minorities. Phenomenon such as identity disparity fortify the idea of purification of the land from the rival sect. In turn, these terror outfits garner financial support from extra-regional powers in order to harness military power inside Pakistan. These militant organizations are now stepping into the political

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<sup>11</sup> Farid Sabri, **67,399 people killed in terror attacks during past 15 years**, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/05/20/67399-people-killed-in-terror-attacks-during-past-15-years/>, ( 6 June 2017)

field, which is setting a dangerous precedent in the country. Although, the fan following is way less than already established decade-old mainstream political parties. This trend can take a lethal turn if these militant political parties are given time and space by the present government as they can freely further their agendas overtly which will consequently increase the curse of sectarianism. Moreover, it will also antagonize Pakistan's neighbours who are already complaining of cross-border attacks master-minded by these militants. This will further increase the pressure of external dynamics for the Pakistan where Neighbouring states make take a hostile stance against Pakistan both at regional level and at international fora. If Pakistan doesn't take timely action against a myriad of terror organizations, other states such as Iran and Pakistan would continue reaping benefits by sponsoring these organizations.

How internal and external discrepancies play out in the political and social arena for Pakistan is the crux of the undertaken study. This study is an effort to study the ever-increasing phenomenon of sectarianism in Pakistan within the purview of theoretical background.

### **IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH**

There have been a number of studies done on the topic of terrorism in general and in Pakistan but most of them are either investigative journalism or historical narratives. This study will give the theoretical perspective to the topic of concern. It is important to reach the logical and accurate conclusion with the help of existing resources to give a conclusive result.

In this context, country like Pakistan whose name is synonymous with terrorism and sectarianism has faced many difficulties in dealing with it. It will be a distinct feature of the study whether the policies adopted by Pakistan are working or not and the role of civil society in mitigating and aggravating the violence against minorities. Terrorist organizations using the name of Islam and inciting violence will be the point often underlined in the study.

## THEORETICAL CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORK

This Shia-Sunni dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be best understood by applying the concept of “internal-external security dilemma.” This concept was first introduced by Simon Mabon in his book *Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East*, wherein he applied this concept to describe Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry in light of their internal and external vulnerabilities.<sup>12</sup>

Mabon argues identity incongruence dilemma exists both in Iran and Saudi Arabia. He argues that these internal discrepancies have evinced themselves into internal security dilemmas for both the states in the form of tribal fights, ethnic conflicts and religious clashes. These internal discrepancies echo to the external sphere of these two states conflicting with their neighbouring states.

Mabon put in use this framework to describe tribal disparity, impaired relations with the Shia community and tensed relationship between the ruling Al-Saud monarchy and the Wahhabi *ulama* class. In Iran’s case, it goes to elaborate upon how Shia Islamic identity have been imposed on non-Shia groups and how a patchwork of different ethnic groups is an internal dilemma for Iran.

Pakistan suffers from a series of incongruence dilemmas both internal and external. Starting with internal dilemmas, Pakistan suffers from identity and ethnic disparities. Pakistan is not a homogenous country, a number of ethnic groups dwell inside the country. Some of the ethnicities are in quite small numbers such as Balochs whereas Punjabis are in the majority. There is a sense of marginalization among ethnic groups.

In identity terms, Pakistan suffers as well as it oscillates between Islamic and secular ideals. The country is divided on which narrative to choose for the future path.

Pakistan has a unique geographical location which leaves it vulnerable to a number of external dilemmas. Pakistan is neighbours to the Iran, Afghanistan, India and

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<sup>12</sup> Simon Mabon, *Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East*, I.B.Tauris, London, 2013, pg. 198.



China. For historical reasons, Pakistan has never been on good terms with India and Afghanistan. In Iran's case, 1979 Islamic revolution changed everything for Pakistan. Another dilemma is Saudi Arabia, the monarchy is greatly involved in Pakistan since the latter's inception.

In Pakistan's case it is imperative to mention that external dilemmas such as earlier toppling of Shah's regime in 1979 resulting in takeover of the leadership by Shia conservatives in Iran which ultimately put the Saudi monarchy in doubt of the intentions of the new ruling elite in Tehran.

Iran's covert funding of Hezbollah and overt support of its likes in the Middle East has raised alarms for the stringent Wahhabi ruling class of Saudi Arabia. Stakes had been raised in the region what initially started as a mass movement against Shah gave the impression that Iranians are taking over the region with their specific brand of Islam.

Iran for its own national interest clandestinely started making contact with notable Shia scholars in Pakistan paving way for a more organized Shia sectarian groups. An example of which is Arif Al Hussein Ameer, a Shia scholar who had spent time with Imam Khomeini in Najaf and represented him in Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>

What can be drawn from this series of events and in the light of security dilemma is the cause and effect relationship. Iranian revolution caused insecurity in Saudi monarchy which feared domino effect might take place in the region if one state falls under Iranian sway. Dominancy of the minority Shia sect was and is unacceptable to Saudis and their allies.

This heightened insecurity led to the arms race between Iran and Saudi Arabia. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from years 2012-2016 Saudi Arabia became the recipient of 28% arms transfer. The same year

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<sup>13</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, **A to Z Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan**, Mashal Books, Lahore, 2004, pg.406.

arms imports to Saudi Arabia increased by 212% comparatively from the previous years of 2007-2011.<sup>14</sup>

Iran's pursue of activating Shias around the globe especially in her neighbourhood which includes Pakistan and Iraq sends signal to the Saudis that their monarchy is under threat. This started another not-so-new phenomenon of proxy war through funding of their respective jihadi organizations in Pakistan. These outfits have claimed thousands of lives of Shia citizens amounting to 23,000 plus according to alternate news source.<sup>15</sup>

Pakistan became entangled in islamization first initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his legacy was continued by infamous General Zia-ul-Haq when he opted for the drafting and implementation of Islamic policies. Policies enacted by him and his aides were obviously in line with the Hanafi Sunni Islam. This threatened the security senses of the Shias which make up about 15% of Pakistani population.

These international changes caused changes in the internal dynamics of Pakistan. Coming in power of the Islamist General Zia-ul-Haq with his seemingly hardliner policies gave way to the "intrastate security dilemma" in Pakistan. Increased Islamization of the society and the state gave a kind of minority complex to the Shias who perceived these changes as a threat to their very existence. Strengthening of the identity of Sunni majority automatically lead to the weakening of the Shia identity and other minorities. From this point, started a downward spiral of Shia-Sunni relation in Pakistan which was quite non-violent in pre-1970's era.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

During the course of this thesis, information will be given about historical Shia-Sunni political conflict and its diffusion in the Muslim world. Sectarianism as identity politics and the institutionalization of religion by the state will be analysed. How sectarian divide plays out in every country will be given in country profiles.

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<sup>14</sup> **Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016**, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf> (7 February 2017)

<sup>15</sup> **Shia Genocide Database: A detailed account of Shia killings in Pakistan from 1963 to 31 May 2015 – by Abdul Nishapuri**, <https://lubpak.com/archives/132675> (7 February 2017)

Policies related to counter-terrorism will be taken into account. Pakistan's internal policies and national and international expectations will be addressed.

Important and up to date such as investigative journalism and scholarly works of eminent scholars and their differing opinions will be included to make the research more plausible and inclusive. Field work is not required for this study as it is more of a qualitative research.

Books, research articles and online resources such as research centers and think tanks reports and news will be used in the making of the literature review and the making up of rational argument.

Data received from the literature review will be analysed and explained what kind of changes took place on the regional level post Iranian revolution that laid the first stone for organized sectarianism. How a third country like Pakistan got entangled in this Shia-Sunni divide and became an active ground for proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia will also be analysed. Working hypothesis will be,

**Iranian revolution of 1979 and the resulting Shia-Sunni crisis led to the security dilemma between Iran and Saudi Arabia which ultimately paved way for the intra-society dilemma in Pakistan.**

## **CHAPTERS**

Introduction gives an overview of Pakistan's geographical realities pertaining to its historical ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Second chapter gives a historical background of the Shia-Sunni conflict which started off as a personal one later morphing into a religio-political discord spanning continents.

Third chapter deals with the theoretical concept and framework of Internal and External Dynamics is used as a lens to better understand the factors behind rising sectarianism in Pakistan and how Outside forces have profound impact on it.

Fourth chapter discusses the brief history of terrorism. It further goes into how and why Pakistan's uses militias as way of gaining military advantage over states such as India and Afghanistan. It highlights the intertwining of Syrian war with Pakistani sectarianism with seemingly no end in sight.

Concluding remarks and a brief summary are discussed in the last chapter.



## **HISTORY OF SHIA-SUNNI DISCORD**

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICT**

It is important to visit Islamic history to better comprehend the causes of sectarianism and how history took the course the way it took. Ali was not only valiant soldier but also a family member of Prophet's family. Prophet Muhammad's speech after three years of secretly practicing Islam gave prominence to Ali's stature and prophesied his succession to the caliphate. This speech was given in a feast thrown by Prophet himself for his relatives to invite them to Islam after the revelation of the verse "Warn thy tribe of near kindred."<sup>16</sup>

Bilingsley writes that Shia-Sunni dispute started off as a personal rivalry among people in the Prophet's circle which later morphed into religious dogma. Shias contend that since Ali was the fittest and had the required political and military acumen, he was the right candidate for the succession to the prophet. Moreover, he belonged the family of the Prophet. On the other side, Prophet's wife Aisha and other candidates strongly opposed, reason being, apart from being fit the leader should be chosen with unanimity of Quraysh tribe.<sup>17</sup>

Shia-Sunni divide can be traced back to time of the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Hazelton writes about post-death scenario in Prophet's house "He was in mourning, he declared, and this was certainly so, but his refusal to come out and pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr was also a clear gesture of defiance, and a major challenge."<sup>18</sup>

In post-Prophet days this power struggle was evident enough when Ali refused to budge from his stance and went into passive-aggressive mode. Omar the upcoming caliph who is famous for his stern and straightforward attitude didn't bother himself with social conventions. Seeing Ali's stubbornness,

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<sup>16</sup> **Quran**, XXVI, 214.

<sup>17</sup> Anthony Bilingsley, **Political Succession in the Arab World: Constitutions, Family Loyalties and Islam**, Routledge, Oxon, 2010, pgs.77-78.

<sup>18</sup> Lesley Hazelton, **After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split**, DoubleDay, US, 2009, pg. 71.

He gathered a group of armed men, led them to Ali's house, stationed them around it, the planted himself right in front of the door. Ali should come out and pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr, he shouted. If not, he and his men would burn down the house<sup>19</sup>

Long story short caliphate landed in the hand of Abu Bakr after long debates with other tribesmen and confrontation with Ali. Those who sided with Abu Bakr and his companions were known as Sunnis and the ones who sided with Ali were called as Shias.

Not soon after, this sectarianism slowly and gradually spread through the Muslim world as Islam reached different continents. The only difference is that it was not as pronounced before as it is today but in history instances of Shia-Sunni rivalry can be found. For example, Amir in Shia Muslim history is one of the renowned scholars who was associated with Shah who ordered him to respond tersely to the Ottoman Sultan's question of as why in Shah's territory people are allowed to curse the first three caliphs and why people prostrate themselves before him. Amir's reply was this,

The first three successors to the prophet were the servants of our (Shah's) great grandfather (Prophet Muhammad). As these people bear no relationship to you. Why do you bother to defend them? Secondly, people do not prostrate themselves before us. They prostrate themselves before God, thanking Him for giving them a pro-Shi'i and an anti-Sunni ruler, who is a bulwark of strength to their faith.<sup>20</sup>

Historically, it's not just Muslims who have had sectarian problems, Europe has seen its own fair share of religious wars intertwined with politics. These religious wars were the result of power struggle between Catholics and Protestants; the same thing which Muslims have in the name of Shiism and Sunnism. France, once a

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<sup>19</sup> Hazelton, **After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split**, pg. 71.

<sup>20</sup> Qazi Nurullah Shustari, **Majalisal Mumineen**, Pgs. 351-352.

powerful kingdom at the beginning of 16th century in Europe came tearing down because of the series of civil wars ordinarily known as the French Wars of Religion starting from 1562 lasting till 1598.<sup>21</sup>

Just like in the Muslim world today, politics at that time was heavily braided with the clergy of the time “religion was used by the nobles who fought in the wars as a cloak of respectability for their own selfish aims.”<sup>22</sup> Tightening grip of state was such that from about 1534 onwards, the French crown committed itself to a policy of religious persecution, involving the censorship of books and the punishment, sometimes by death, of religious dissidents<sup>23</sup> This is something which is common in the Muslim world specially the theocratic states. In France, “in 1557 a royal edict mandated the death penalty for heresy, identifying it with sedition.”<sup>24</sup>

This policy reminds one of the current state of the affairs in Pakistan where extremists outfits are demanding death penalty for Shias. SSP leader Azam Tariq once said “If Islam is to be established in Pakistan then Shias must be declared infidels”<sup>25</sup>

When two sides are warring, there is a huge possibility for third parties to jump in and take advantage of the situation or advance their own interests. Example of this in European history is,

In 1574 Governor of Languedoc, Henry de Montmorency-Damville, a powerful Catholic nobleman, turned against the government and reached an understanding with the Huguenots. He issued a manifesto complaining of his treatment by the crown, and other noblemen, known collectively as Malcontents, did likewise. As Henry III tried to negotiate with Damville, the Huguenots in the Midi set up a new

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<sup>21</sup> Robert Knecht, **The French Religious Wars 1562-1598**, Osprey, Oxford, 2002, pg. 10.

<sup>22</sup> Knecht, **The French Religious Wars 1562-1598**, pg. 11.

<sup>23</sup> Knecht, **The French Religious Wars 1562-1598**, pg. 16.

<sup>24</sup> Knecht, **The French Religious Wars 1562-1598**, pg. 16.

<sup>25</sup> Hasan Abbas, **Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, then Army and America's War on Terror**, M.E. Sharpe, London, 2005, pg. 205.

military administration, calling itself ‘the Union’. Its purpose was not to create a separate state, but to reform the existing one.<sup>26</sup>

From the above mentioned incident one can draw the parallel happening in Pakistan. Back in 2007 Head of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Maulana Muhammad Abdul Aziz in capital Islamabad initiated an uprising against the central government and his self-righteous group of students unleashed a wave of terror on the streets of Islamabad enforcing their brand of Sharia.

Baton-wielding men and women took to the streets, forcing video stores they deemed immoral to shut. His brother threatened to throw acid on female students at the Quaid-i-Azam University. The government’s muted response further emboldened the youngsters, who then abducted seven Chinese citizens from an upscale massage parlour that they insisted was a brothel.<sup>27</sup>

All Maulana Aziz wanted was to reform the Pakistani state by bringing Sharia and not to carve out any other state. Maulana is a staunch anti-Shia cleric and is still active in capital in his madrassa.

Government assigned negotiators were in constant contact with the mosque leaders. While negotiating with the government Maulana Abdur Rashid Ghazi expressed his discontent with the Pakistani government through various media outlets and called various local television stations to express his discontentment with the government negotiators who arrived in the premises of his complex.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Knecht, **The French Religious Wars 1562-1598**, pg. 22.

<sup>27</sup> Benazir Shah, Nazrul Islam, **Meeting Pakistan’s Maulana Muhammad Abdul Aziz**, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/01/meeting-pakistan-maulana-mohammad-abdul-aziz-red-mosque-160119120907458.html> (4 February 2017)

<sup>28</sup> Carlotta Gall, Salman Masood, **At Least 40 Militants Dead as Pakistani Military Storms Mosque After Talks Fail**, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/world/asia/10pakistan.html?mcubz=1> (10 July 2017)



Final act of Chinese abductions was a serious blow to Pak-China ties and prompted then President Pervez Musharraf to call upon military commando unit to barge into the mosque.

The 10 day blood-soaked siege ended with troops entering the compound killing 103 people with Maulana Aziz's brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, his mother and son.<sup>29</sup>

Going back to French wars of religion J.H.M. Salmon opines "The very origin of the wars was linked with international dynastic and religious problems."<sup>30</sup> Comparatively for the contemporary Muslim world, there are no dynasties at war now but two modern theocratic states of Iran and Saudi Arabia. During French wars of religion both Catholics and Protestants Huguenots were trying hard to subdue each other. Thompson divides Huguenots "between religious Huguenots who strove to convert all France to their beliefs, and political Huguenots whose energies were directed against the crown."<sup>31</sup>

In modern day scenario, Iran is vying for political sway in countries with Shia population such as Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Pakistan, though the intention is not to convert the local Sunnis to Shiism but to gain political stronghold.

Recent example can be Iraq where Ayatollah Sistani hold the sway both in government and public sphere. Sistani is considered religious leader by majority of the Shia population irrespective of their nationality and personal backgrounds. Interestingly, Sistani didn't champion the very idea of Vilayet-e-Fakih introduced by Khomeini. For this reason, he is not of good use of the Islamic Republic's. While the Iranian government does not seek to replace Sistani, it is attempting to prop up minor local clerics to lessen his influence—part of preparations to fill the

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<sup>29</sup> Gall, Masood, **At Least 40 Militants Dead as Pakistani Military Storms Mosque After Talks Fail**

<sup>30</sup> J.H.M. Salmon, **The French Wars of Religion: How Important were Religious Factors**, D.C.Heath & Company, Massachusetts, 1967, pg. vii.

<sup>31</sup> Salmon, **The French Wars of Religion: How Important were Religious Factors**, pg. 11.

vacuum once the aging ayatollah dies.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, Iran appears to be grooming the 65-year-old Iranian Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi to take over as Najaf's top ayatollah following Sistani's death.<sup>33</sup>

One way to change the internal dynamics of any country is to change the public opinion about the incumbent leadership. Iran did the same thing in Arab world and is somewhat successful in doing so in Pakistan as well. "Arab Street" phrase commonly known as the public opinion of the Arabs is what has been so influenced by the Iran especially in Ahmadinejad's era.

Starting with the January 2005 election for Iraq's interim parliament, Soleimani led the public relations campaign for the pro-Iran bloc, supplying printing presses, political consultants, and broadcast equipment from Iran.<sup>34</sup>

Ayad Allawi's Al-Iraqiyya coalition won a large number of seats in March 2010 parliamentary elections but their attempts at forming a government were thwarted by the opposition of Shia coalition supported by Iran and composed of Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Alliance and Ibrahim al-Jaafari's Iraqi National Alliance. This was Iran's influence at full throttle which changed the future political course of Iraq.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Sam Wyer, **The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq**, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf>, (7 July 2017)

<sup>33</sup> Ali Mamouri, **Najaf, Qom Take Different Approaches in Iraq**, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/iraq-crisis-najaf-qomdifferent-views.html> (4 July 2017)

<sup>34</sup> Hannah Allam, Jonathan S. Landay, Warren P. Strobel, **Iranian Outmanoeuvres U.S. in Iraq**, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/04/28/35146/iranian-outmaneuvers-us-iniraq.html> (12 July 2017)

<sup>35</sup> Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali, **Iran's Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran's Whole-of-Government Approach**, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-influence-in-iraq-countering-tehrans-whole-of-government-approach>, (13 July 2017)

## ADVENT OF SHIA ISLAM IN THE SUB-CONTINENT

Early history of Islam is ambiguous but it can be said certainly Islam arrived with the Arab expeditions. It all started when Alptigin consolidated his power in Ghazna in 352/962 which was seen as an imminent threat by Jayapala of Waihind who took it upon himself to destroy it. He was defeated and agreed to pay war reparation but later defaulted and attacked again and this time was annihilated. This was the start of Ghaznavids and Hindu ruling class of Indian sub-continent.<sup>36</sup>

Later came the era of Mahmud who continued the struggle against Anandapala son of Jayapala at Peshawar in 399/1009. Anandapala was working with a confederacy of Hindu leaders from Ujjayn, Gwalior, Kalinjar, Kannawj, Delhi and Ajmer. In spite of the powerful confederacy tide turned in favour of Mahmud. He later appointed a governor to reside at Lahore and decided to teach a lesson to Hindu Rajas so that they don't think of undertaking any adventure against him like before. He plundered all the riches stored in Hindu temples with his last adventure ending at the Somnath temple in 415/1024.<sup>37</sup>

Mahmud annexed only Punjab since he was preoccupied with central Asia. Rulers after him expanded the empire to different parts of sub-continent but it was only Mughals who consolidated the Muslim rule. Mughal Empire was initiated by Babur who was a descendent of the Timurid prince. After the defeat of Ozbegs by Safavid Babur started off as the vassal of Shah Ismail I in the kingdom of Samarqand after the subjugation and death of Muhammad Shaybani Khan Ozbeg in 917/1511. Post defeat of Safavids in the battle of Ghujduwan, Babur was disappointed and sometime later focused on India.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> I.H. Qureshi, "Muslim India before the Mughuls." **The Cambridge History of Islam**, Ed. P.M.Holt, Cambridge Publications, Cambridge, 2008, pg. 3.

<sup>37</sup> Qureshi, **Muslim India before the Mughuls**, pg. 3.

<sup>38</sup> Qureshi, **Muslim India before the Mughuls**, pg. 35.

Later on, Babur went on to fight with the Sultan of Delhi Ibrahim Lodhi in the historic battle of Panipat in 932/1526. With the defeat of Lodhi started the new chapter of Muslim rule in India.<sup>39</sup>

The Ghurids and Umayyads were at loggerhead because of sectarian differences. Umayyads were bound and determined to subdue Ghurids but were unable to reach the inaccessible mountains of the Ghurids.

Coming to Sindh: Bab-ul-Islam (Gateway of Islam) has a special relationship to Shiism. One of the wives of Shia Imam Zain-ul-Abideen was a native Sindhi.<sup>40</sup> Shiism in Sindh suffered a great deceleration when Hajjaj Bin Yusuf attacked and made his son-in-law Muhammad Bin Qasim the governor of Sindh. With the change in political situation back in Iraq and the subsequent killing of Muhammad Bin Qasim left Sindh in disarray. During his administration Shias were in bad shape. After his death those Shias who were prosecuted left for peripheral regions for shelter.<sup>41</sup>

With leaps and bounds, second century saw the considerable advancement in Shiism. A considerable number of Sindhis were converted at the hands of Zaydiyyas. Some famous transmitters of ahadis of Imam Jafar Sadiq were Aban Sindi, Khalad Sindi and Faraj Sindi.<sup>42</sup>

In 9<sup>th</sup> century A.D., Abu Abdullah Jafar bin Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Umar al Atraf ibn Ali bin Abi Talib left Hijaz and set foot in Multan. He had large number of sons and he got them married to the daughters of the local Hindus Rajas. This gave enough thrust to the movement of Ismailiyya movement.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Qureshi, **Muslim India before the Mughuls**, pg. 35.

<sup>40</sup> Ibn, Qutayda, **Kitab al Marif**, Egypt, pg. 37.

<sup>41</sup> Balazuri, **Futuhul Buldan**, Leiden, 1968, pg. 433-441.

<sup>42</sup> Abdul Hayy, **Nuzhatul Khawatir**, Hyderabad, 1947, pgs. 51-52.

<sup>43</sup> S.A.A. Rizvi, **A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isna Ashari Shi'is in India**, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, pg. 142.

From the onset of Arab rule in Multan, Habbari clan was the strongest and held important positions in the government. Matrimonial alliances with Alids of their time only helped in fostering their social and political position and served as a catalyst in promotion of Shiism.<sup>44</sup>

Ismailiyya movement was going parallel with the spread of Shiism. Unexampled growth of Ismailism took place in 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> century A.D. Ismaili belief holds Ismail son Imam Jafar Sadiq as the seventh Imam. This facet of their belief differs them from the Jafari Shias. Preaching of Ismailism is divided into different ranks. Their missionary is known as Dai's. First and foremost is Imam. There are few other rankings in between Imam and Dais. *Mazuns* (licence preachers) and *Mukasirs* (persuaders) stand below dais. These *dais* were placed in different cities for preaching. They were eloquent and debater of very high calibre.<sup>45</sup>

For centuries Ismailis and Sunnis were involved in prolonged power play with the eventual end of Fatmids at the hands of Sunnis.

Dynasty of Firuz Shah Tughlaq (1351-88) saw a surge in number of Shias. Sultan in his autobiography annotated the reasons why he hated Shias and how he dealt with them. He believed Shias to be *Rawafiz*. He further wrote they vilify Khulafa-e-Rashidin – the first three caliphs and Prophet's wife Ayesha and all the prominent Sufis. They involve in homosexuality and believe Quran was interposed by Caliph Usman. Sultan got them arrested and after finding enough proof of their straying gave them harsh punishments. Extremists were given death penalty while the rest were humiliatingly paraded on streets. Further, their books were burnt in public to weed out the evil of their sect.<sup>46</sup>

A systemic campaign was initiated to spread information about Shia faith to lower whatever sympathies were left in Sunnis for Shias. Classics such as *Sirat-e-Firuz*

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<sup>44</sup> Abu Zafar Nadwi, **Tarikh-i Sindh**, Azamgarh, 1947, pgs. 189-190.

<sup>45</sup> Rizvi, **A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isna Ashari Shi'is in India**, pg. 142.

<sup>46</sup> Firuz Shah Tughlaq, **Futuh-e-Firuz Shahi**, Aligarh. 1954. Pg. 6.

Shahi give panegyric account of the reign of Firuz Shahi including a long section about the negativities of Shiism on the grounds of Sunni literature.<sup>47</sup>

In Indian Shia history, an interesting case of Qazi Nurullah is worth mentioning. He is the famous author the book *Ihqaq al-Haqq*. After Emperors Salim took charge of the throne, hopes increased among Ulamas to revive Sunni Islam. Since Akbar was famous for peace and co-existence, this give enough room for the revival movements.

Since he, Salim was a known rebel to his father, notable Ulama like Shaykh Ahmad Sirhandi sent messages to other notables such as Shaykh Farid Bukhari, Lala Beg Kabuli, Sadr-I Jahan, Mirza Aziz Koka, Muhammad Qulij Khan and Abdur Rahim Khan-I Khanan.<sup>48</sup>

The ardent proponent of such revival Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi. He demanded the reinforcement of Islamic law of Jizya on Hindus. Infidels should be considered unclean as dog and should not be given positions of authority or trust.<sup>49</sup> He further added that Shias are worse than Infidels; their company should be avoided and no respect should be given to them since it will amount to destroying Islam.<sup>50</sup>

Emperor Jahangir wrote in his memoir something which rings true even in this 21<sup>st</sup> century when extremists ask other 'sects' to move to a country whose majority shares 'their' belief:

The professors of various faiths had room in the broad expanse of his incomparable sway. This was different from the practice in other realms,

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<sup>47</sup> **Sirat-e-Firuz Shahi**, KhudaBaksh, Patna, pgs. 122b-130, [http://www.nmlindia.nic.in/nml\\_adm/writereaddata/files/Sirat%20I%20Firuz%20Shahi.pdf](http://www.nmlindia.nic.in/nml_adm/writereaddata/files/Sirat%20I%20Firuz%20Shahi.pdf) (12 August 2017)

<sup>48</sup> S.A.A. Rizvi, **Muslim Revivalist Movements in India: In the Sixteenth and Seven Centuries**, Manohar Lal Publication, New Delhi, 1965.

<sup>49</sup> Rizvi, **Muslim Revivalist Movements in India: In the Sixteenth and Seven Centuries**, pgs. 246-254

<sup>50</sup> Rizvi, **Muslim Revivalist Movements in India: In the Sixteenth and Seven Centuries**, pgs. 255-260

for in Persia there is rooms for Shi'as only, and in Turkey, India, and Turan there is room for Sunnis only.

As in the wide expanse of the Divine compassion there is room for all classes and the followers of all creeds, so on the principle that the shadow must have the same properties as the Light, in his dominions, which on all sides were limited only by the salt sea, there was room for the professors of opposite religions, and for beliefs good and bad, and the road to altercation is closed. Sunnis and Shi'as met in one mosque, and Franks and Jews in one church, and observed in their own forms of worship.<sup>51</sup>

Jahangir gave an idealistic impression in second paragraph of what is morally right and what is supposed to happen in an ideal situation but before admitting so he also gave a harsh reality check of Shia-Sunni existential peaceful coexistence problem. On the ground, Emperor was following a peaceful accord but was not good enough in its implementation.

By the time Akbar died, Qazi Nurullah had no supporter in his court. Arabic quotations from his work *Ihqaq al-Haqq* were translated into Persian by Sunnis and read out to the Emperor. He was ordered to be flogged to death on 1610.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Rogers and Beveridge, **The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri**, London, 1909-14, pgs. 37-38.

<sup>52</sup> Rizvi, **A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isna Ashari Shi'is in India**, pg. 377.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is not a homogenous society like most of the countries in the world. Pakistan has a set of contrasting religions and disparate cultures. These differences pave a way for an environment conducive for everlasting conflicts. Differences in religion and sects and the resultant conflicts make up for internal security dilemmas of Pakistan. Iran and Pakistan also have their fair share of internal security dilemmas but this chapter will focus on Pakistan.

Along with internal incompatibility exists external identity incompatibility manifesting between Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia with Pakistan being an Islamic republic with a majority Sunni population, Iran as a Shia theocratic state and Saudi Arabia as a Wahhabi monarchy.

Pakistan, as a country with dominant Sunni population with an assertive Shia minority has a fragile balance of territorial integrity and domestic security. The concept of territorial integrity is important to Pakistan since it has waged multiple wars with neighbouring India an arch enemy. In addition to this, Pakistan also lost its eastern wing in 1971 which proved to be a fatal blow to its territorial integrity.

Domestic security has been threatened since Pakistan's involvement in Afghan-Soviet war greatly influenced the domestic dynamics and perpetuated the influx of terrorist from across the border. Once the Soviet forces pulled out of Afghanistan, Mujahideens shifted focus to Pakistan for their extremist activities.

The cosmic magnitude of internal security dilemma in Pakistan has given immense opportunity to both Iran and Saudi Arabia to meddle and initiate a proxy war in the name of schism.

This chapter centres on how Iranian and Saudi Arabian rivalry is effecting Pakistan and what are the exact internal dynamics of Pakistan exploited by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Aslan writes in his article Pakistan for decades have walked a



fine line between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's serial military coup d'états changes the course, configuration and path of the foreign policy.<sup>53</sup>

Pakistan has a very high level of identity disparity as compared to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan was carved out of united India in 1947. Area which comprises Pakistan was already home to various ethnic groups and religions. With the arrival of the Muslims from India added to the assortment of ethnicities and religious sects.

Pakistan as a nascent state was already weak with two hostile neighbours on both its eastern and western flank namely, India and Afghanistan. With passing time, relations with neighbouring states went on with ebb and flow.

Gradually, Pakistan's internal challenges increased and displayed with ethnic tensions and sectarian rift started to effect its foreign challenges directly.

National identity is mostly based on the oneness of religion and the efforts to make religion ever more present in society by the state has created more problems than solution the already existing problems. Realistically, religion as a glue didn't offer much help to Pakistan when ethnicity took the front seat and East-Pakistan became a separate state of Bangladesh in 1971.

General Zia-ul-Haq's coming to power in 1979 brought forefront the sectarian fissure which was previously pretty much invisible from the societal fabric.

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<sup>53</sup> Omer Aslan, "Pakistan: Balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia – The Shah, Ayatollah and the Kings," *Al-Sharq Forum*, 2017, pg. 7.

## IDENTITY DISPARITY

The debate of secular and conservative Pakistan is still raging on even after 70 years of independence. Sociologists like Hamza Alavi write that Pakistan was never meant to be conservative Islamic in nature. It was Jamaat-e-Islami fundamentalist right-wing party's slogan that Pakistan came into being to carve out a homeland for Indian Muslims based on Islamic ideals. Jamaat was initially against the partition but once it happened, it took upon itself to make it Islamic.<sup>54</sup>

General Zia-ul-Haq also played well with the Islamic ideology to legitimize his authoritarian rule. Zia claimed he has been ordained with the task of making Pakistan and its society Islamic in his dream.<sup>55</sup> Since Zia had no political legitimacy, bringing Islam in between was a beneficial strategy to gain popular legitimacy.

There are other narratives explaining as to why Pakistan movement came into being. What necessitated the need of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims? One of the narratives is that Pakistan movement came into being as a result of the collective efforts of the landlords from Sindh, Punjab and Bengal. Indian Nationalist and Communist Party historians proposed that this movement was fomented by British to divide the nationalist movement.<sup>56</sup>

Third narrative by Communist Party posits that Pakistan movement came into being as a collective effort of Muslim bourgeoisie. Therefore, it deserves the support of Communism since it is anti-imperialist in nature.<sup>57</sup> This view has been

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<sup>54</sup> Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, Ed. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, Macmillan Education, London, 1988, pg. 64.

<sup>55</sup> Alavi, **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, pg. 64.

<sup>56</sup> R. Palme Dutt, **India Today**, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1940, Pgs. 456-459, [http://digital.slv.vic.gov.au/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1505695355094~392&locale=en\\_US&metadata\\_object\\_ratio=10&show\\_metadata=true&VIEWER\\_URL=/view/action/singleViewer.do?&preferred\\_usage\\_type=VIEW\\_MAIN&DELIVERY\\_RULE\\_ID=10&frameId=1&usePid1=true&usePid2=true](http://digital.slv.vic.gov.au/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1505695355094~392&locale=en_US&metadata_object_ratio=10&show_metadata=true&VIEWER_URL=/view/action/singleViewer.do?&preferred_usage_type=VIEW_MAIN&DELIVERY_RULE_ID=10&frameId=1&usePid1=true&usePid2=true) (12 August 2017)

<sup>57</sup> Gangadhar M. Adhikari, **Pakistan and Indian National Unity**, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1943, pg. 5, <http://www.sacw.net/IMG/pdf/CPI-Adhikari-Pakistan-1942-53pages.pdf> (12 August 2017)

supported by notable Soviet historians such as Yuri Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya.<sup>58</sup>

However, Alavi disagrees with the aforementioned Communist narrative. He mentions the number of Gujarati businessmen was minimal and their participation and influence was negligible. Muslim professionals and salaried class of Biharis, Punjab and northern India was more involved in the movement. Gujaratis were segregated from these other ethnic groups and had no interest in Pakistan movement as it could not serve their class purpose.<sup>59</sup>

Coming back to the Islamic narrative, the narrative that Pakistan was made solely because of irreconcilable differences between Hindus and Muslims is incongruent since every religious organization from the nook and corner of Indian Sub-continent was against the partition of India and vigorously opposed Pakistan movement. Notable among them was Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind.<sup>60</sup>

Another aspect to be noted is the personal leanings of the leaders of the Muslim movement which was a complete antithesis to those of the Islamists. Nationalist movement leaders such as Rafi Ahmed Kidwai were secular.<sup>61</sup> Muhammad Ali Jinnah – founder of Pakistan was also one of them.

On this issue, Mortimer believes that aforementioned aspect of the movement is discounted by the scholars who are enthralled by the idea of the militant Islam commencing throughout the Muslim world.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Y. Gankovsky, Gordon Polanskaya, **A History of Pakistan, 1947-1958**, Nauka Publishing House, Lahore, 1964 quoted in Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, Ed. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, Macmillan Education, London, 1988, pg. 65.

<sup>59</sup> Alavi, **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, pg. 65.

<sup>60</sup> David Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab," **Modern Asian Studies**, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1979, pgs. 485-517.

<sup>61</sup> Alavi, **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, pg. 66.

<sup>62</sup> Edward Mortimer, **Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam**, Random House, London, 1982, quoted in Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, Ed. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, Macmillan Education, London, 1988, pg. 66.

Alavi posits that the movement for Pakistan was neither religious in nature to make an Islamic homeland for Indian Muslims nor was it a movement of feudal landlords, nor again a movement of budding Muslim bourgeoisie.<sup>63</sup>

He furthers his argument by saying there was a special class which played a pivotal role in the movement. He named this class “salarariat” – urban dwellers, educated who are enabled to find a job in a colonial state.<sup>64</sup> He believes Pakistan movement was a group effort of Muslims of different social strata and interests coming from entirely varied backgrounds for material gains.

Islamists always dismiss the idea of segregating the mosque and state. For them, the very belief of separation was impossible since they deem it to be unislamic for the state not to regulate through Islamic principles and conceive laws from Islamic scripture. Those who comply with the Muslims state are more open towards tolerant and multicultural society.

Noted South Asian scholar Stephen P. Cohen gives a clear distinction between an Islamic state and Muslim state:

A Muslim state refers to a state whose citizens are entirely or predominantly Muslims. Islamic, refers to the belief that a Muslim state can be made to follow Islamic guidelines, however defined. Islamist state, and Islamism is an Islamic flavoured version of totalitarianism, seeking to impose a sustained program of various Islamic practices on a society. Secular is used to describe the belief that Muslim states can borrow from other cultures and societies, especially the West and reduce Islam to the private sphere.<sup>65</sup>

The long-standing problem of Islamist vs. Secular has been discussed by Moonis Ahmar in his book *Conflict Management & Vision for a Secular Pakistan: A Comparative Study*. He explains,

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<sup>63</sup> Alavi, **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, pg. 67.

<sup>64</sup> Alavi, **State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan**, pg. 67.

<sup>65</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, **The Idea of Pakistan**, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 2005, pg. 162.

“Islamic state per se refers to when Islam is declared the official religion and all legal practices, laws, rules, and regulations are based on the religion of Islam. Whereas, a Muslim state can be defined as a territory where Muslims form a majority; have a substantial influence in the political discourse and matters related to state craft but state takes a neutral stance on religion. The dilemma faced by Pakistan since the beginning has been related to the terms ‘Islamic and ‘Muslim’.”<sup>66</sup>

The dilemma faced by Pakistan is that it has rich religious and cultural tapestry. Pakistani society is multi-religious and multi-cultural. Being multi-religious and multi-sectarian is an obstacle if it really wants to be an Islamic state. Pakistan is home to around 20% Shia population with a clear division of Twelver Shias, Bohris and Ismailis. Whereas, majority Sunnis are also divided among Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahle-Hadith and Wahabis etc. Alongside different types of Islam, Pakistan has sizeable number of non-Muslims also.

The questions that surfaces is that which ‘brand’ of Islam will be implemented Shia or Sunni? Will the majority give enough space to minorities to practice their belief? How will be minorities represented in state institutions? Unfortunately, answer seems to be in negative as we have seen the implementation of Sunni Islam during Zia’s era and its consequences.

### **ETHNIC DISPARITIES**

According to recent census done by government of Pakistan in the year 2017, population rose to 207.77 million – experiencing a 57% increase since the last census of 1998. <sup>67</sup> Growing overall population is parallel to the increasing population of respective ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier Pakistan is home to various religions, sects and ethnicities which are in stark contrast to each other.

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<sup>66</sup> Moonis. Ahmar, **Conflict Management & Vision for a Secular Pakistan: A Comparative Study**, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2014, pg.46.

<sup>67</sup> **Pakistan's population has ballooned to 207.8m, provisional census results show**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1353867> (20 August 2017)

From demographical point of view, Punjabis had always been in majority making up to 44.7% of the total population.<sup>68</sup> Zia-ul-Haq came into power through a military coup d'état in 1977. Zia's proclivity towards Islam proved to be conducive in the Islamization of the Pakistan army.<sup>69</sup> "Maulvi" was the nickname given to him by army colleagues because of his regular praying and puritanical ways. Zia and his family were closely related to the Jamat-e-Islami. He believed sovereignty lies with Allah and as his vicegerent he has a right to use power. He introduced Nizam-e-Mustafa (Rule of the Prophet) to subdue political parties since Western democracy doesn't sync with Islam.<sup>70</sup>

Zia in his 1984 address to the nation claimed that he believes founding father of the Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah was not secular instead he had an Islamic vision. He further added on, Jinnah initiated the Pakistan movement in order to get a separate homeland for the South Asian Muslims to live their lives according to Islamic injunctions and he strongly believes that Jinnah and handful of his associates were given courage and reasoning by Allah because they were working for the upholding of Islamic values, otherwise in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the miracle of Pakistan would have not happened.<sup>71</sup>

In the same address he boasted about how he has initiated the *Zakat* and *Ushr* (charity taxes) in line with the Islamic teachings and abolished the interest system in economy. He also emphasized on the point that now no Pakistani is hesitant in listening to *Azan* (call for prayer), ashamed to offer *Namaz* (prayers) and are not

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<sup>68</sup> CIA – The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>. (15 October 2017)

<sup>69</sup> Bedenda M. Chengappa, **Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy**, A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2004, pg. 51, [https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/Pakistan\\_Islamisation\\_Army\\_and\\_Foreign\\_P.html?id=iDoMlBd4dYsC&redir\\_esc=y](https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/Pakistan_Islamisation_Army_and_Foreign_P.html?id=iDoMlBd4dYsC&redir_esc=y). (12 October 2017)

<sup>70</sup> Chengappa, **Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy**, pg. 25.

<sup>71</sup> "Shaheed Gen Zia Ul Haq, Address to the Nation (Part 1)." YouTube, uploaded by Shaheed General Zia-ul-Haq, 26 August 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xurg-fTi4FY>, (15 October 2017)

reluctant in being called Pakistani Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy.<sup>72</sup>

Zia's islamization included all spheres of life of Pakistanis which included economics, social, moral and everything around that makes up human lives. His speech was full of grandiloquence – how he managed to include Islam into everything of Pakistanis. It was Zia's thought to open up madrassahs counter Soviets through Afghan jihad sponsored mainly by Saudi Arabia which turned out to be a nightmare in the future.

Pakistani Shias took it as an attempt to mitigate their separate identity by imposing Sunni Islam on them. Shias have a separate system of charity taxes which initially came into collision course with the regime's new rule. Qasim writes, "The government's decision to impose this tax according to the prescriptions of the Hanafi school of Sunni law thus created intense resentment among the Shi'a and proved to be a powerful stimulus toward their political mobilization in Pakistan."<sup>73</sup>

This move of Zia prompted Shias to form their own political organization under the leadership of Mufti Jaffer Hussain by the name of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Jafariya – the Movement for the Implementation of the Jafari System (TNJF) for a substitute jurisprudence and the safeguarding of Shia rights.<sup>74</sup> The name of the organization was later changed to Tehreek-e-Jafariya Pakistan – the Jafari Movement of Pakistan (TJP) when Allama Sajid Naqvi who took charge of the office after the assassination of Mufti Jaffer. The word "implementation" was dropped to make the name less offensive to the Sunnis.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> "Shaheed Gen Zia Ul Haq, Address to the Nation (Part 1)," YouTube.

<sup>73</sup> Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, no. 3, 1998, pg. 693.

<sup>74</sup> Mehtab Ali Shah, "Sectarianism – A Threat to Human Security: A Case Study of Pakistan," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 382, pg. 617.

<sup>75</sup> Hassan Abbas, *Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence*

Since its inception, Pakistan was preoccupied with security threat from India. To this end, government had made financial efforts to strengthen armed forces as much it can. Pakistan had its first war with India in 1947 over Kashmir issue. As a result, subsequent government made a hefty investment of 70% in defence budget.<sup>76</sup>

A large number of officers go for training to US and UK for training and get exposed to liberal and modern society of these countries so it can be safely assumed that not all high ranking officers were impressed by the Islamization of Zia. They were perturbed by the growing Islamization of everything which was supported by Punjabi officers of the middle ranking.<sup>77</sup>

Mukherjee gave his opinion on the Islamization of Pakistan army as this:

The later entrants are distinctively less Westernized. Their traditional values and attitudes explain the more religious milieu of today. Friday prayers at regimental mosques, a matter of individual choice in the past, are now de rigueur. And General Zia's personal touch can be seen in the new dispensation under which the pay and status of maulvis in the services have been raised. Units are now required to take these non-combatants along with them to the front-line.<sup>78</sup>

Siddiqi gives statistics of the ethnic composition of the Pakistani army which is Punjab about 71-75%, Pashtun 15-21%, Mahajir and Sindhis 3-5% and Baloch about 0.3%.<sup>79</sup> Siddiqi further mentions that staggeringly high numbers of Punjabis creates a sense of insecurity among other ethnic groups which underrepresented. She mentioned about the Baloch provincial leader who called Pakistani military

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<sup>76</sup> Abdurrahman Siddiqi, **The Military in Pakistan, Image and Reality**, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, pg. 70.

<sup>77</sup> Jaffrelot, **A History of Pakistan and Its Origins**, pg. 81.

<sup>78</sup> Dilip, Mukherjee, "Zia's Military Legacy," **The Round Table**, Vol. 78, No. 310, 1989, pg. 179-191.

<sup>79</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, **Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy**, Pluto Press, London, 2007, pg. 59.



“not as a national military but a Punjabi force with a mercenary and exploitative force.”<sup>80</sup>

Historically, Punjabis and Pashtuns dominated British military in the Indian Sub-Continent because of the myth circulated in by the British terming them as “Martial Races” compared to other groups in the region hence gaining a loyal bulk of local military support after 1857 rebellion. This became a celebrated military mythology which supported the idea that certain races have greater predilection towards fighting owing to their particular physique and mental make-up.<sup>81</sup>

British in acknowledgement of the services gave lands and other bounties to these two ethnic groups to ensure the constant supply of manpower and loyalty. Hence, in parallel reinforcing the myth of martial races.<sup>82</sup>

Siddiqa elaborates upon the fact stating Pakistan military profited from the continuation of this myth. Firstly, plenty of military inherited at the partition came from the areas which had previously gained from the propagation of this myth under the British. Main recipients were Punjabis, Pashtuns and Mahajirs. Secondly, Pakistan military wanted to continue this tradition because of the financial benefits that comes along with it. He further states that Pakistani officers continue to take advantage of the perks and benefits offered to them since British era.<sup>83</sup>

Since Pakistani military continued with tradition of accolades dominant ethnic groups didn't want to let go of the benefits they were receiving for so long.

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<sup>80</sup> Ayesha, Siddiqa, “Pakistan Military – Ethnic Balance in the Armed Forces and Problems of Federalism.” Strengthening Federal Governance in Pakistan June 2011, **Pakistan Study Group on Federalism**, pg. 11.

<sup>81</sup> Peers, Douglas M. “The Martial Races and the Indian Army in the Victorian Era.” **A Military History of India and South Asia**, Ed. D. Marston and C. Sundaram, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2008, pgs. 34-52.

<sup>82</sup> Peers, **A Military History of India and South Asia**, pg. 34-52.

<sup>83</sup> Siddiqa, **Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy**, pg. 181.

Benefits and influence is seen as the reason Punjabis are bolstering their control over military.<sup>84</sup>

Although, Pakistan is a single state but provincialism is there at its best. There is deep-rooted grudge for Punjabis among other ethnic groups. Harrison mentions Pakistan military suffers from superiority complex which it acquired gradually over a period of time. Punjabi dominance creates an ethnic homogeneity which is disadvantageous in terms of stable democracy and foments ethnic tensions.<sup>85</sup>

The upper-hand of Punjabis led to the internal strife on multiple occasions of Pakistani history. Notably, in the case of East-Pakistan where situation was dealt heavy-handedly. Siddiqa opines, one of the major reason was Punjabi and Mahajir brand of nationalism versus other ethnic groups. Punjabis focused more on a centralized version of statecraft. Not agreeing to their narrative of nationalism was and is still deemed as treason or disloyalty.

Alavi believes “bureaucratic-military oligarchy” arbitrated between the clashing demands of the three prosperous classes, the indigenous bourgeoisie, the neo-colonial metropolitan bourgeoisie and the land owning class. In doing so bureaucratic-military oligarchy presented the relative sovereignty of the post-colonial state of Pakistan.<sup>86</sup> Sociologists like Iftikhar H. Malik further explained this phenomenon in a Pakistani context, saying Pakistani establishment still doesn’t take ethnic fault lines seriously and considers it a work of foreign powers and a disturbed law and order situation.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Mushahid Hussain, **Reforming the Armed Forces**, The Nation, 10 June 2001.

<sup>85</sup> Selig S. Harrison, **Drawn and Quartered**, [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/opinion/01harrison.html?\\_r=1&scp=1&sq=Selig+S.+Harrison&st=nyt](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/opinion/01harrison.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Selig+S.+Harrison&st=nyt) (21 August 2017)

<sup>86</sup> Hamza Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,” **Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia**, Eds. Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, Monthly Review Press, New Delhi, pgs. 159-61

<sup>87</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, **State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity**, MacMillan Press Ltd, Great Britain, 1997, pg. 168.

The existential threat of Indian aggression gave Pakistan military a concrete position in fiscal budgets and on political scene. Just in 2017-2018 budget, Pakistan increased its defence budget by around 7%.<sup>88</sup>

According to Quwa Defence News and Analysis Group, Pakistan army will receive the biggest slice of proceeds measuring up to \$4.17billion/47%. Whereas, Pakistan Air Force will receive \$1.8 billion/20% and Pakistan Navy will receive \$940 million/11%.<sup>89</sup>

The bureaucracy and the ruling aristocracy turned Pakistan into national security state rendered it a dictatorial bent. Ruling class was more interested in assembling together different provinces into one state rather than increasing peoples and provinces shares or interest through social and economic development.<sup>90</sup>

### PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

The two countries have been at loggerheads since times of the British rule in the Indian sub-continent. Pakistan has long had a tensed and volatile relation with Afghanistan with regular ups and downs. The origins of the problem can be found in the territorial tug-of-war between Tsars of Russia and British Empire. As Russian forces moved forward taking down Central Asian Khanates one at a time, it gave British a reason to worry since enemy was inching towards the British border of Pamir.<sup>91</sup>

In order to keep hold on strategic Khyber Pass British sent diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand to demarcate the land between Afghanistan and British India. This so-called Duran Line divided the Pashtuns on both sides of the border breaking the

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<sup>88</sup> Franz Stefan Gady, **Pakistan Raises Defense Spending**, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/pakistan-raises-defense-spending/> (25 August 2017)

<sup>89</sup> “**Pakistan Raises Annual Deffence Budget to \$8.78 Billion US**,” <http://quwa.org/2017/05/28/pakistan-raises-annual-defence-budget-8-78-billion-u-s/> (25 August 2017)

<sup>90</sup> Siddiqa, **Pakistan Military – Ethnic Balance in the Armed Forces and Problems of Federalism**.

<sup>91</sup> Vinay Kaura, **The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations**, <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/durand-line-british-legacy-plaguing-afghan-pakistani-relations> (28 August 2017)

cultural contiguity of the land. Further, it made Afghanistan lose its access to the Arabian Sea after losing Balochistan.<sup>92</sup>

Along with Pashtun irredentist agendas, Baloch insurgency was going parallel with that of Pakhtunistan. Historically, British policies regarding tribal areas sowed the seeds of the Pakhtunistan problem. In 1901, they conceive of an idea of creating a new administrative area by the name of North West Frontier Province – NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) which was divided into Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies. Tribal Agencies were ruled by a British political agent who would directly report to British government in Calcutta.<sup>93</sup>

The foundation of Pak-Afghan relations was set even before the realization of the Pakistani dream in 1947 and the animosity was clearly displayed in September 1947; when Afghanistan became the only country to object to the admission of Pakistan in UN General Assembly. The Afghan representative to UN Abdul Hussein Khan Aziz proclaimed that his country could not:

Recognize the North West Frontier as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North West Frontier have not been given the opportunity free from any kind of influence—and I repeat, free from any kind of influence—to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Pakistan.<sup>94</sup>

The anti-vote was withdrawn a month later but it became a mainstay of Pak-Afghan relations. Pakistan came to believe that India and Afghanistan are working hand in glove. In 1947 Afghan King Zahir Shah's special envoy to Pakistan Sardar Najibullah Khan came with three requests.

1. Tribal areas inhabited by Pashtuns to be given a separate status of province.

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<sup>92</sup> Kaura, **The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguening Afghan-Pakistani Relations.**

<sup>93</sup> Jon Lunn and Ben Smith, **The 'AfPak policy' and the Pashtuns**, pg. 9, <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/rp2010/RP10-045.pdf>

<sup>94</sup> Aparna Pande, **Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India**, Routledge Group, Oxon, 2011, pg. 64, [pg.https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=cegkSmft94C&pg=PR5&source=gbs\\_selected\\_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=cegkSmft94C&pg=PR5&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false)

2. Pakistan ought to help Afghanistan by giving economic zone in Karachi or giving a corridor through Balochistan.

3. Pakistan and Afghanistan ought to sign a treaty whereby both countries would stay neutral if one is under attack.<sup>95</sup>

These demands were never met because of Pakistan's suspicions towards Afghanistan. Pakistan was unwelcoming to the idea of any state interfering in its internal politics.

Keeping in view the importance of border crisis Mehtab Ali Shah establishes since the inception of Pakistan Durand Line has become a longstanding issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Pakistan's foreign policy.<sup>96</sup>

At the outset, Pakistan's sole purpose was to have an Islamabad friendly government so that it doesn't have to bother about security threat from the western flank Afghanistan along with the India on the eastern wing.<sup>97</sup>

Resultantly, Afghanistan became one of the threats faced by Pakistan. Apperceived security risk made security a top priority for the Pakistani establishment since it came into being in 1947. Since then military institution started view itself as the sole guardian of state's frontiers as well as ideological border.<sup>98</sup>

Indian threat overwhelmed the psyche of Pakistani policy makers and the growing ethno-nationalist movements compelled Pakistan to look forward to have a

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<sup>95</sup> I. H. Baqai, 'Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan,' **Pakistan Horizon**, September, 1948. Quoted by S.M. Burke, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis**, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1990, pg.74.

<sup>96</sup> Mehtab Ali Shah, **The Foreign Policy of Pakistan Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1947-1994**, I.B.Tauris, New York, 1997, pg. 181.

<sup>97</sup> Naseem Ahmed, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy: Historical Perspective 1947-1977." **Pakistan Journal of History and Culture**, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2010. pgs. 133-161.

<sup>98</sup> Rizwan Hussain, **Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan**, Ashgate Publishing Limited. London, 2005, pg. 59.

friendly Afghanistan. This was the reason founding father Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah made a speech shortly after independence stating:

I desire that the relationship between these two sister Nations may be the greatest and most lasting friendship, and I hope that the two governments will soon be able to settle and adjust, in a spirit of goodwill for the benefit of both, all those matters which require our immediate attention, and I do trust that the coming negotiations, that may take place, will secure and strengthen all the more the goodwill and friendship between our two countries which already exist.<sup>99</sup>

The speech wasn't reciprocated well by the other side. King Zahir Shah selected seventh Afghan National Assembly on 30th June 1949 as an opportunity to launch an anti-Pakistan tirade. Assembly moved forward passing a bill to rescind any treaties signed between the British and Afghan counterparts before the inception of Pakistan. They rejected the Durand Line as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan media played its own role in anti-Pakistan propaganda along with reports of Afghan raids into Pakistani territory.<sup>100</sup>

Nonetheless, Pakistan was still looking for Pakistan-friendly regime in Kabul. To this end, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's address to the Constituent Assembly on 9<sup>th</sup> January 1950 highlights the predicament faced by Pakistani establishment:

They have, from time to time, offered to discuss with the government of Afghanistan all matters of common interest relating to border areas, such as, schemes of economic, educational and moral uplift of the people on both sides of the borders. From the negative response that this Government have received it can only infer that the Government of Afghanistan is not so much concerned with the moral and material

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<sup>99</sup> Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar, **Selected Documents on Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan 1947-85**, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Islamabad, 1986, Pg. 1.

<sup>100</sup> S.M. Burke, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis**, Oxford University Press. Karachi, 1990, Pg. 74.

welfare of the people of the border areas as with securing for themselves political advantage in their own country or diverting the attention of their own people for the political and economic deterioration in Afghanistan...while the Government of Pakistan is willing to establish friendly relations with the Royal Government of Afghanistan.<sup>101</sup>

Afghanistan's policy was always quarrelsome and Afghan authorities never let go off any opportunity to circulate anti-Pakistan propaganda. After a report of American military aid to Pakistan got out. Afghan embassy reacted sharply from Delhi and issued a statement that this type of support would bolster Pakistan's character "as a 'colonial' power over the freedom-seeking people of Pakhtunistan"<sup>102</sup>

Once Pakistan announced in March 1955 that numerous parts of western Pakistan would be incorporated into single administrative unit, Afghanistan maintained this step would further dilute the Pashtun identity in Pakistan.<sup>103</sup>

All these years, Pakistan's main objective was to determine Durand Line as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and to wrap-up the Pakhtunistan issue at the end. Afghanistan on the other hand, always raised these issues at both regional and international fora.<sup>104</sup>

Looking back into history, Pande writes Pakistan's problem is not only external but is also rooted in internality. During independence, North West Frontier was under Congress led ministry. At the time of partition, Muslim dominated states of Punjab, Bengal and the North West Frontier. The Khan Brothers of North West Frontier supported by Congress were in favour of joining India. Their second

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<sup>101</sup> Dar, **Selected Documents on Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan 1947-85**, Pg. 8.

<sup>102</sup> New York Times, 23 December 1953 quoted in S.M.Burke, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis** Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1990, pg. 205.

<sup>103</sup> Burke, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis**, pg. 205.

<sup>104</sup> Naseem Ahmed, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy: Historical Perspective 1947-1977," **Pakistan Journal of History and Culture**, Vol. 31, No.2, 2010, pg. 138.

option was to go separate ways and establish a new state based on ethno-nationalism – Pashtunistan.<sup>105</sup>

Pande mentions Muslim League at the start was in favour of maximum autonomy to the Muslim provinces versus those of Hindu majority. Once division of Indian sub-continent was declared, Muslim League was averse to the idea of offering full autonomy to the Muslim dominated province as it meant it would minimize whatever territory Pakistan inherited.<sup>106</sup>

A referendum was done and as result North West Frontier became a part of Pakistan which was accepted by Khan Brothers, Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib as that was the reality of the time.<sup>107</sup> Pakistan always remembered that Congress made a botched attempt at giving North West Frontier an independence option.<sup>108</sup>

From the result of the referendum which was held in North West Frontier Province and Balochistan, it is evident that Pashtuns on the Pakistani side of the border were not enthusiastic about the idea of an independent state for themselves. The succeeding governments of Afghanistan though never drop the idea of Pakhtunistan.

Afghan dream of a nation-state is based on their long lasting desire to gain access to the Arabian Sea. This is clearly observed in the writings of the Amir of Afghanistan Abdul Rahman:

Afghanistan ought to secure a footing upon the ocean...the south-western corner of Afghanistan is very close to the corner of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and from this only a small, plain plateau of ground between Kandahar, Baluchistan, Persia, and part of Karachi [sic]...I always had a great fancy for a little piece of this sandy

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<sup>105</sup> Pande, **Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India**, pg. 65, [https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=cegkSmft94C&pg=PA59&source=gbs\\_toc\\_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=cegkSmft94C&pg=PA59&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false)

<sup>106</sup> Pande, **Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India**, pg. 66.

<sup>107</sup> Pande, **Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India**, pg. 66.

<sup>108</sup> Pande, **Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India**, pg. 67.



desert...of great value if annexed to Afghanistan in order to bring the country in touch with the ocean...if Afghanistan had access to the ocean there is no favourable opportunity occurs in my lifetime to bring about this purpose, my sons and successors must always keep their eyes on this corner.<sup>109</sup>

Keeping in view the history of Pashtun ethnic group former NWFP Governor Sir Olef Caroe was unconvinced with the idea of independent Pakhtunistan. He commented on the issue as:

Pathanistan [sic] cannot subsist financially or otherwise on its own legs. The weakness is that the Pathans have hitherto been divided among themselves to set up a stable state, and where they have ruled they have ruled as conquerors of alien populations. They themselves had always been in a state of anarchy right through history until we came and put them into order (Afghanistan is not really a Pathan state at all).<sup>110</sup>

In 1958, President Iskander Mirza brought about military coup d'état abrogating constitution, dissolving National Assembly and disbanded Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon's government. General Ayub Khan was appointed as a Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). With the resignation of Mirza under duress Ayub took charge of the President office.<sup>111</sup>

On the Afghan flank, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan was on the rocks because military arrested weathered Pakhtun leaders Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai. In the wake of this, Afghan Ambassador to United

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<sup>109</sup> Sultan Muhammad Khan, Ed, **Life of Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan**, Oxford University Press, London, 1980, pg. 211-212.

<sup>110</sup> Sir O. Caroe (North West Frontier Province) to Sir J. Colville (Extract). L/P&J/224: f 45.22 May 1947, quoted in Hussain, **Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan**, pgs. 43-44.

<sup>111</sup> Jahan Dad Khan, **Pakistan Leadership Challenge**, Oxford University Press, 1999, pg.38.

States Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal lodged a complaint about the arrests since US hold sway in Pakistani decision making.<sup>112</sup>

Ayub Khan was looking forward to peaceful resolution of the problem. To this end, he held a prolonged meeting with Afghan Foreign Minister Sardar Naim in June 1960. He solicited Afghan support in this matter and suggest to live as friendly neighbours for the mutual benefit. Nonetheless, talks failed and Afghanistan sent 70,000 of its reservist army to raid on Pakistani territories. Huge fight broke out in 1961 in the Bajaur area with constant border skirmishes.<sup>113</sup>

Things escalated quickly compelling Pakistan to close its trade agencies and consulates. Further, Pakistan discharged Afghan diplomatic mission. Afghanistan reciprocated by suspending diplomatic ties with Pakistan and closing the border in 1961.<sup>114</sup>

For the moment, Daud's government was disbanded for two key reasons. First, Afghanistan wanted to enhance relations with Pakistan which were negatively affected because of his ardent support for Pashtunistan cause. Second, because of his leaning towards Soviet Union.<sup>115</sup>

After Daud's departure – relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were rebuilt through mediatory efforts of Shah of Iran on 26 May, 1963 whereby, Pakistani and Afghan vicegerents agreed to re-establish ties. In any event, the Afghan Minister, Sayed Qasim Rishiya, is reported to reiterate the fact that Pakhtunistan issue is still a major handicap between Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Department of State, Washington D.C., 13 October, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XV, pgs. 240-241

<sup>113</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, **Friends, Not Masters: A Political Biography**, London, 1967, pgs. 175-76.

<sup>114</sup> K. Arif, ed. **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives**, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1984, pgs.322-323.

<sup>115</sup> Ahmed, **Pakistan's Afghan Policy: Historical Perspective 1947-1977**, pg. 148.

<sup>116</sup> S.M.M. Qureshi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan," **Pacific Affairs** Vol. 39, No. 1 & 2, 1966, 99-114.

Pakistan and Afghanistan improved relations when President Ayub paid a visit to Afghanistan in 1964 and 1966. He floated the idea of common political platform for Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. On 26 August, 1965 instruments of ratification of transit trade were exchanged in Rawalpindi between two states. During 1965 war Afghanistan's stance was non-confrontational towards Pakistan. On 1 January, 1968 visited Kabul for a short visit and thanked Kabul for their understanding during war.<sup>117</sup>

During Ayub's era, a positive development took place where Pashtuns experienced more integration into the Pakistani society and military-bureaucratic establishment. During his rule, a large number of Pashtun were holding high offices and positions. Ayub himself had a Pashtun background. He belong to non-Pashto speaking ethnic Pashtun belong to the Tarin sub-tribe of the Hazara district of the Frontier province.<sup>118</sup>

Hussain points out relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan was not as cordial as it was supposed to be but still they had a working relationship. Successive Afghan governments continued to harp on the Pakhtunistan issue but this didn't take place as a focal foreign policy towards Pakistan.<sup>119</sup>

Bhutto's era marked the on-set of 'Forward Policy' in respect to Afghanistan.<sup>120</sup> In 1970 elections, the Pashtun nationalist party led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan had a clean sweep victory in NWFP and Balochistan. The then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto disbanded the National Awami Party (NAP) on the charges of colluding against the federal government. A stash of arms were found in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad and according to the reports of the intelligence, they were to be used against Bhutto's government.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Ahmed, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives**, pgs. 148-149.

<sup>118</sup> Rizwan Hussain, **Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan**, Ashgate Publishing Limited, London, 2005, pg.74.

<sup>119</sup> Hussain, **Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan**, pg. 74.

<sup>120</sup> Ahmed, **Pakistan's Afghan Policy: Historical Perspective 1947-1977**, pg. 151.

<sup>121</sup> Pande, **Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India**, pg. 68.

Under the ambit of 'Forward Policy' an Afghan Cell was established. This cell was tasked with formulating policies regarding Afghanistan. They were to contain Afghanistan's role in Pashtun and Baloch insurgency.<sup>122</sup>

In 1973, Sardar Daud came into power after overthrowing monarchy. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan hit the rocks again as Daud started supporting Pashtun and Baloch irredentist agendas. Earlier, Afghan monarchs weren't under the Soviet sway but after Daud took the charge, Kabul became a part of Soviet stratagem.<sup>123</sup>

Because of Daud's consistency in pursuance of Pashtunistan and Durand Line. Bhutto came up with a counter strategy. Bhutto invited anti-Daud groups to Pakistan and offered them guerrilla warfare training. Bhutto went on to encourage Islamist Movements in Afghanistan. This Islamist policy was imitated once again two decades later in the shape of supporting Taliban.<sup>124</sup>

Bhutto's policy was double-pleated. First, creating pressure groups within Afghanistan would distract Daud from pursuing Pakhtunistan and Durand Line issues. Second, religious opposition would have huge appeal in a Muslim majority country. Eminent leaders such as Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masud were acquainted to US by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The year 1974, witnessed a failed attempt at coup by the Islamists. Daud's regime foiled the plot the leaders who were not able to make it to Pakistan.<sup>125</sup>

The next year, witnessed a botched rebellion in Panjsher Valley. Organizers fled to Pakistan this time again. Providing support to Afghan Islamist gave Pakistan a pro tempore advantage against Daud. In the long haul, advantage was to stop Kabul from challenging Islamabad. In this time period of 1970's, both Americans and

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<sup>122</sup> Ahmed, **Pakistan's Afghan Policy: Historical Perspective 1947-1977**, pg. 154.

<sup>123</sup> See S. Tahir-Kheli, **Pakistani Elites and Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union, Iran and Afghanistan** London: University Microfilms, London, 1972.

<sup>124</sup> Barnett Rubin, **The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State**, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 1995, pg.82.

<sup>125</sup> Rubin, **The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State**, pg. 82.

Russians worked diligently with Afghanistan through aid. During the same time, Pakistan with the help of Saudi Arabia commenced its relationship with the Islamist opposition in Afghanistan.<sup>126</sup>

The sole purpose of Islamabad's policy was to contain Kabul's Pakhtunistan ambition and the amicable settlement of Durand Line. Facing internal threats, Daud took a U-turn in his policy towards Pakistan. Daud was unable to garner support from Soviets since Moscow was looking forward to develop relations with Islamabad.<sup>127</sup>

Soviets had their own agenda for Afghanistan which was realized by Daud in 1976. "They had penetrated the internal politics of the country, providing support and assistance to the revolutionary People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)."<sup>128</sup>

Daud was candid about Russian interests in Pak-Afghan conflict. He elaborated upon economic concerns of Afghanistan. He further mentioned that Kabul has no intention of damaging Pakistan. Lastly, he aired his concerns about the plight of Pashtuns and the war in Balochistan since Balochs are their fellow countrymen.<sup>129</sup>

Before anything could move forward in favour of Pakistan that is official recognition of the Durand Line. A surprise was given to the Bhutto by the military who overthrew him in July 1977 and later executed.<sup>130</sup> Later on Daud's regime

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<sup>126</sup> Rubin, **The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State**, pg. 82.

<sup>127</sup> Rizwan Hussain, **Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan**, Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 2005, pg. 80.

<sup>128</sup> Abdul Sattar, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History**, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, pg. 154.

<sup>129</sup> Abdul Samad Ghaus, **The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account**, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Washington D.C., 1988, pgs. 127-128.

<sup>130</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zulfikar-Ali-Bhutto> (2 December, 2017).

also got overthrown in the year 1978 and he was killed along with his family members.<sup>131</sup>

Along the lines of these events, Pakistan and Afghanistan lost their leaders who were after much painstaking efforts were almost near to the point of defusing mutual tensions. Since then, relations went off track. In 2017, Pakistan unilaterally closed the border causing colossal damage of \$90 million trade loss to Afghanistan. Pakistan closed off the border on 17 February onwards stating the influx of the Afghan terrorists using Afghanistan's territory against Pakistan. Initially, the closure was for indefinite time period but the border opened on 21 March.<sup>132</sup> As a rebuttal, Afghan President issued a statement saying Afghanistan has other options in case enemy continues the barricade.<sup>133</sup>

With so much happenings between the states in 2017, the recent development took place in October when Pakistani Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Qamar Javed Bajwa visited Kabul to meet Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in an attempt to repair the growing trust deficiency between the two countries. Topics of concern were trade, long-term peace, collaboration against common hazards, intelligence-sharing and people-to-people contact. Pakistani delegation assured Kabul of their support.<sup>134</sup>

In December 2017, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani issued a statement at the seventh Heart of Asia Conference (HoA) in Azerbaijan saying, "We remain committed as a partner to counter terrorist threats in the region and are ready to expand our cooperation with all countries." He further elaborated "We all have

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<sup>131</sup> Carlotta Gall, **An Afghan Secret Revealed Brings An Era**, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/world/asia/01afghan.html> (25 February 2017)

<sup>132</sup> Sheerupa Mitra, **Pakistan closes Durand Line, causes \$90 mn trade loss for Afghanistan**, <http://www.firstpost.com/world/pakistan-closes-durand-line-causes-90-mn-trade-loss-for-afghanistan-3381260.html> (21 November 2017)

<sup>133</sup> **Afghanistan has optional sources if enemy blocks trade routes: Ghani**, <http://dunyanews.tv/en/World/380816-Afghanistan-has-optional-sources-if-enemy-blocks-t> (21 November 2017)

<sup>134</sup> **Bajwa meets Ghani, offers support to Afghanistan**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1361348/bajwa-meets-ghani-offers-support-to-afghanistan> (4 October 2017)

shared responsibilities and Afghanistan is ready to cooperate with all stakeholders in this arena.” In the same conference he also mentioned that he is ready for government-to-government talks with Pakistan.<sup>135</sup>

As of now, relations are getting back on track but we don't know what the future holds for these two states as there have been negotiations on and off previously but the end result wasn't so productive.

### **INDO-PAK RELATIONS**

The departure of British from Indian sub-continent marked the change in the geographical boundaries of the region. India and Pakistan came into being on the eve of 1947. Since then there is no turning back to the peaceful and harmonious relations between different religious groups.

Creation of India and Pakistan saw a gory and barbarous sides of both the Hindu and Muslim communities. The religious bloodshed took around 2 million Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. According to an approximate 12-15 million people were uprooted and migrated between the two countries. Around 75,000 women were raped.<sup>136</sup>

Historically, British followed the “divide and rule policy” as a means to mitigate the tenacity of the joint Hindu-Muslim efforts against British imperialism especially with the surge of Hindu nationalism in 1900s. As an act to outweigh the growing influence of Hindu nationalism, British threw their weight behind Muslim League. Muslim league was headed by the Muhammad Ali Jinnah who aimed to represent Indian sub-continental Muslims. Both Hindus and Muslims were set against each other which eventually led to the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims. Muslim representatives felt that in a Hindu majority Muslims would not be represented. Things got escalated after the publication of the Nehru report in

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<sup>135</sup> **Kabul ready to hold talks with Pakistan: Afghan president**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1374083/kabul-ready-to-hold-talks-with-pakistan-afghan-president> (3 December 2017)

<sup>136</sup> Urvashi Butalia, **The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India**, Hurst & Company, London, 2000, pg. 3.

1928. Report met with negative opinions and amendments were proposed which were later rejected. This prompted Jinnah to go separate way from Congress.<sup>137</sup>

As a result Pakistan came into being on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947. Other small states were given three options to choose from. First, they can join Indian dominion. Second, they can go for Pakistan. Third, they can choose to be independent.<sup>138</sup>

Three states of Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir became disputed in the wake of the partition. Junagarh had a Muslim ruler with a predominantly Hindu population. Although, the ruler was in favour of joining Pakistan his people forced him to make quick exit. After plebiscite in February 1948, results came in favour of India. Another state was of Hyderabad with the same problem of a Muslim ruler and Hindu majority. Hyderabad was one of the largest states. The ruler wanted to a standstill agreement with India because the ruler sought to have an independent state. With a surge in internal instability and paramilitary domination, Indian troops came in to the state for a 'police action' to revive law and order. Later, Hyderabad became a part of India.<sup>139</sup>

Kashmir's situation was different than those of Junagarh and Hyderabad. Kashmir's ruler was a Hindu Maharaja and the majority population was Muslim. According to the Treaty of Amritsar signed in 1846, the Hindu ruler had an option to join Pakistan, India or seek independence.<sup>140</sup>

Maharaja Hari Singh was dejected and didn't take decision of accession immediately. He sent same telegram to the governments of both India and Pakistan offering a standstill agreement. This offer was accepted by Pakistan but

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<sup>137</sup> Vivek sankaran and Ramit Sethi, **India Pakistan and Kashmir conflict toward solution**, <https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/India,%20Pakistan,%20and%20the%20Kashmirk.pdf> ( 5 October 2017)

<sup>138</sup> G.H.Khan, **Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir**, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2011, 14-15.

<sup>139</sup> Dr. B.L. Fadia, **Indian Government and Politics**, Sahitya Bhawan, Agra, 2011, pg. 62.

<sup>140</sup> G.W, Choudhry, **Pakistan relations with India**, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1971, pg. 55.



government of India looked forward to a negotiable standstill agreement with Jammu and Kashmir in Delhi. Nonetheless India failed to sign the agreement.<sup>141</sup>

Maharaja's strategy of delay and time buying for declaring Jammu and Kashmir an independent state backfired. This delay brought about Poonch Revolt. All this was followed by the raids from Pakistani tribesmen on 22 October, 1947. The aim of these raids was to reach the capital and occupy it.<sup>142</sup>

On 25 October 1947, Maharaja left the valley amidst growing instability. Next day on 26 October 1947, he wrote a letter to Indian Governor General of India stating his compelling circumstances to ask for help from Indian authorities. The response was straight forward, unless Maharaja accepts the instrument of accession there will be no help from Indian side.<sup>143</sup>

Pakistani authorities took notice of the issue and declared it a conspiracy of the Maharaja to create domestic instability in order to invite Indian troops for occupation against the common will of the local population. Whereas, for Indians the accession was legal and constitutional.<sup>144</sup>

Pakistan strongly reacted to the accession "the Maharaja of Kashmir had no authority to sign the instrument of accession as he had lost the confidence of his people."<sup>145</sup>

Territorial disputes such as Kashmir and Sir Creek have marred the relations even more. Both Pakistan and India have fought numerous wars in the years 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Mushtaq Ahmad Mir, "India-Pakistan; The History of Unsolved Conflicts," **Journal of Humanities and Social Science**, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2014, pg. 105.

<sup>142</sup> Khan, **Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir**, pg.18.

<sup>143</sup> Suddepto Adikhari and Mukkul Kamie, "Kashmir the Unsolved Dispute between India and Pakistan," **Geopolitics Quarterly**, Vol. 6, No.4, 2010, pg. 19.

<sup>144</sup> Khan, **Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir**, pg. 19.

<sup>145</sup> Adhikari and Kamie, **Kashmir the Unsolved Dispute between India and Pakistan**, pg. 74.

<sup>146</sup> Subrata K. Mitra, "War and peace in South Asia: A revisionist view of India-Pakistan Relations," **Contemporary South Asia**, Vol. 10, No.2, 2001, pg. 361.

Another issue as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan is Siachen glacier. Siachen is famous for its severe weather and unfavourable terrain. According to the UN demarcation in line with the Karachi Agreement of 1949, ceasefire line was drawn up to the edge of the glacier. Accepted international practice was applied from Siachen to Karakoram pass. This state of affairs was not changed even in the wars of 1965 and 1971.<sup>147</sup>

The race to conquer the inhabitable glacier started when India fell to the suspicion in the year 1980 when an American map displayed Lyogme and Lagongma as part of Pakistan. Later, Japanese mountaineering team was seeking to take permission from Pakistan for their mountaineering expedition. India swung into action, launched Operation Maghdoot on 13 April 1984 with Indian army and air force going straight to glacier. Pakistan didn't stay back and deployed its own troops. Within a short time period, most of the glacier was Indian control and Pakistan was limited to the Saltoro high ground in 1987. Pakistan under the leadership of General Pervez Musharraf undertook expeditions to take control of the glacier with no gain.<sup>148</sup>

Since 1978, Pakistan has undertaken numerous excursions to claim its de facto jurisdiction. India didn't sit back, responded with the same military excursions. Pakistan's cartographic excursion looked forward to push back Indians beyond the NJ9842 point and claimed the "thence North" advance of the LOC. India stated that Pakistan is intruding into India territory. India occupied two key positions of the glacier namely Saltoro Ridge and Sia Land Bilafond La. Occupation of these two meant India had the control over Siachen and can avert any future incursion. Pakistani military Operation Ababeel was launched with no success. Pakistani

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<sup>147</sup> P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, **The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise**, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 2001, pg. 168.

<sup>148</sup> Kuldip Nayar, **Wall at Wagah: India-Pakistan Relations**, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003, pg. 232.

troops are stationed west to the Saltaro ridge with Indian troops controlling the ridge.<sup>149</sup>

Pakistan had undertaken operations to access the glacier between the years 1974-1980. Pakistan has maintained tensed environment by occasional use of heavy artillery. Pakistan's aim to establish military outpost in the region has violated the Simla Agreement that states that both the countries can't take action that will change the ground situation.<sup>150</sup>

Another land dispute which has impaired the Indo-Pak relations is Sir Creek conflict. Although on a low priority in negotiation agenda, it still has its role in derailing the peace process.

Pre-independence era f 1908 witnessed the conflict between the rulers of Kutch and Sind over a pile of firewood lying on the margins of the creek partitioning the two principalities. Government of the Bombay state looked into the matter in 1914 which took the help of the Map Number B44 and B74 to solve the matter.<sup>151</sup>

Sir Creek is a 60 miles waterway separating Pakistani Sindh from Indian Gujarat in aftermath of 1965 war, Pakistan claimed half of the Rann along the 24<sup>th</sup> Parallel Line belongs to her. India counterclaimed. Case was forwarded for arbitration namely Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunals. In 1968 arbitration resulted in favour of India giving it 90% of the territory and Pakistan received small sectors.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Ashutosh Misra, **India Pakistan Coming to Terms**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2010, pg. 111.

<sup>150</sup> Misra, **India Pakistan Coming to Terms**, pg. 112.

<sup>151</sup> K. Palash, **Sir Creek Row Began Over Pile of Fire Wood**, Asian Age, 10 November 1998.

<sup>152</sup> Ashutosh Misra, **The Sir Creek Boundary Dispute: A Victim of India-Pakistan Linkage Politics**, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238744314\\_THE\\_SIR\\_CREEK\\_BOUNDARY\\_DISPUTE\\_A\\_Victim\\_of\\_India-Pakistan\\_Linkage\\_Politics](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238744314_THE_SIR_CREEK_BOUNDARY_DISPUTE_A_Victim_of_India-Pakistan_Linkage_Politics) (10 October 2017)

Both the countries have held six conferences on this dispute. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India's annual report 1992-1993, talks were not successful.

Pakistan asserts that the line rests on the eastern bank whereas, India makes claim that line runs along the middle of the creek. Another problem is related to the maritime boundary. Pakistan wants the boundary of the creek to be defined first and then maritime boundary whereas India wants contrariwise.<sup>153</sup>

According to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS), if both the states fail to come with concrete solution to the dispute UN would declare the maritime area as international waters by May 2009. The deadline has passed but UN hasn't given any signal yet to declare it international waters, apparently because India and Pakistan's joint survey of the maritime boundary done in March 2007.<sup>154</sup>

Another legacy of the partition came in the form of water dispute. Another in the series of the conflict is Tulbul navigation project which has been the reason of conflict since 1984. This project is located on the Jhelum River. India introduced a project of making a barrage at the mouth of the Wullar Lake nearby Sapore town

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<sup>153</sup> A.G. Noorani, "CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage," in **Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia**, Ed. M. Krepon and A. Sevak, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pg. 100, quoted in Ashutosh Misra, *The Sir Creek Boundary Dispute: A Victim of India-Pakistan Linkage Politics*, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238744314\\_THE\\_SIR\\_CREEK\\_BOUNDARY\\_DISPUTE\\_A\\_Victim\\_of\\_India-Pakistan\\_Linkage\\_Politics](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238744314_THE_SIR_CREEK_BOUNDARY_DISPUTE_A_Victim_of_India-Pakistan_Linkage_Politics) (10 October 2017)

<sup>154</sup> Misra, **India and Pakistan Coming to Terms**, pg. 142.

in the valley. Pakistan asserted that such a project will obstruct water flow to Pakistan.<sup>155</sup>

Pakistan considered it a violation of the Indus Water Treaty signed in 1960. India rejected Pakistani claims and stated the reason for building the barrage is to turn the river navigable in summer season. India went on to make the barrage successfully once verdict came in favour of India by the Indus Water Commission in 1986. This quarrel is all about whether India is making this barrage for the navigation work or for storing water.<sup>156</sup>

Coming to present era, for several years Pakistan has been accusing India of meddling in Balochistan with the help of its intelligence agencies. Pakistani intelligence agencies and government circle put Baloch Liberation Army's (BLA) monthly expenditure at 40 to 90 million rupees.<sup>157</sup>

It is commonly believed foreign hands are behind Balochistan insurgency, who have benefits from the turmoil.<sup>158</sup>

Mazari writes, a clear cut pattern in attacks is visible. Earlier targets were soft such as civil society. Now, it's targeting military installations and communication links. These attacks are pre-empted to disturbing the country nationwide. Moreover, the use of refined arms signals these are not unplanned acts but are pre-planned. All-inclusive with the financial facet proves external connection in Balochistan.<sup>159</sup>

Siddiq opines, things can be stirred up by Indians and Iranians. American intelligence is also said to be active in Balochistan.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Samarjit Ghosh, "Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue-2008," **Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies** No.65, 2009, pgs. 1-7.

<sup>156</sup> Misra, **India and Pakistan Coming to Terms**, pg. 161.

<sup>157</sup> M. Ilyas Khan, **Back to the Hills**, The Herald, 2003, pgs. 50-59.

<sup>158</sup> Moed Yusuf, **Use of Force will Worsen the Situation in Balochistan**, The Friday Times, 2005, pgs. 21-26.

<sup>159</sup> Shireen Mazari, **Balochistan and the "Great Power Games**, The International News, February 2, 2005

<sup>160</sup> Dr Ayesha Siddiq, **The Cost of Conflict in Balochistan**, The Friday Times, 2005, pgs. 21-26.

Rahman comes up with an argument that on 17<sup>th</sup> March 2015 attack, insurgents turned down the offers of ceasefire proving they had enough arms and ammunitions cache. Rahman opines Afghanistan is a plausible source of arms supply. During 1970's when Bhutto launched a military operation against insurgents, Afghanistan was the only source of ammunitions. Be that as it may, Afghan President Hamid Karzai doesn't have any reasoning or assets to support insurgents. Plus, Americans wouldn't allow Afghanistan to go against its policies.<sup>161</sup>

Pakistan has faith that Iran is not comfortable with the Gwadar Deep Sea Port because it will undermine the newly built Chahbahar on Balochistan coast.<sup>162</sup> Pakistani intelligence also believes that separatists are given financial and arms support from Iran and India because of Gwadar Port.<sup>163</sup>

Bansal in his article seeks to explain this as incorrect on part of Pakistanis. He takes it as an implausible because Iran also has a significant Baloch population in Seistan province. Any insurgency that upholds Baloch liberation will stoke fire in Seistan also. This is the reason why Shah supported Pakistan in his efforts to curb the last insurgency.<sup>164</sup>

Balochistan Chief Minister asserts Research and Development Wing (RAW) is responsible for at least 40 camps in the troubled province. Indian presence in Zahidan and Pak-Afghan border gives enough convenience for causing low intensity conflict in Pakistan.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Mir Jamilur Rahman, **Balochistan in Turmoil**, The International News, 2005.

<sup>162</sup> Khan, **Back to the Hills**, pg. 58.

<sup>163</sup> Zahid Hussain, **Gathering Storm**, Newslite, 2005, pgs. 21–25.

<sup>164</sup> Alok Bansal, "Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol.19, No. 2, 2008, pg. 193.

<sup>165</sup> Mazari, **Balochistan and the "Great Power Games."**

Rahman wrote not a single dispatch of arms or agent was ever caught in Balochistan. Moreover, Indian border is not contiguous with Balochistan which makes it virtually impossible to transfer heavy arms use by BLA.<sup>166</sup>

Rahman's point proved false on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2006 when Pakistani forces arrested an Indian national Kulbhushan Jadhav on Iran border. Pakistan claimed Jadhav is a spy involved in sabotage and terror acts.<sup>167</sup>

Pakistan claims Jadhav to be a serving Indian Navy officer working for RAW entering Pakistan from Iran.<sup>168</sup> Whereas, India denied saying Jadhav retired back in 2002.<sup>169</sup> On 10<sup>th</sup> April 2017, Pakistan's military court announced death penalty which further tensed relations between the two states. The case was taken up by the International Court of justice (ICJ) on the request of India. Under ICJ's order Jadhav's execution has been halted under further notice.<sup>170</sup>

Latest in the row is that on 13<sup>th</sup> December 2017, Pakistan submitted pleading before the ICJ. Earlier, India accused Pakistan of restricting consular access to Jadhav breaching Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 contending convention rules apply to spies also.<sup>171</sup>

Independence Day speech of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 15<sup>th</sup> August 2017 made the Indian stance on Kashmir clearer than ever before. Addressing the nation, Modi said:

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<sup>166</sup> Rahman, **Balochistan in Turmoil**.

<sup>167</sup> **Kulbhushan Jadhav case: A timeline**, Times of India, 2013, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kulbhushan-jadhav-case-a-timeline/articleshow/58609227.cms> (22 November 2017)

<sup>168</sup> Khalid Hameed Farooqi, **Pakistan submits reply to ICJ, dismisses India's stance on Kulbhushan Jadhav**, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/172018-kulbhushan-jadhav-case-pakistan-to-submit-its-reply-to-icj-today> (22 November 2017)

<sup>169</sup> **Kulbhushan Jadhav case: A timeline**

<sup>170</sup> **Kulbhushan Jadhav case: A timeline**

<sup>171</sup> Naveed Siddiqui, **Pakistan submits pleadings before International Court of Justice in Kulbhushan Jadhav case**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1376394/pakistan-submits-pleadings-before-international-court-of-justice-in-kulbhushan-jadhav-case> (30 November 2017)

Today, I want to especially honour and thank some people from the ramparts of the Red Fort. For the past few days, the people of Balochistan, people of Gilgit, people of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the way their citizens have heartily thanked me, the way they have acknowledged me, the goodwill they have shown towards me, people settled far across, the land which I have not seen, people I have not met ever, but people settled far across acknowledge the Prime Minister of India, they honour him, so it is an honour of my 125 crore countrymen, it is respect of my 125 crore countrymen, and that is why, owing to the feeling of this honour, I want to heartily thank the people of Balochistan, people of Gilgit, people of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for having an expression of thankfulness.<sup>172</sup>

He continued his tirade against Pakistan:

What kind of people are those who get drive from humanity and, what kind are those who reward terrorism? I want to place two pictures before this world, and I say to the world, I say to those who believe in humanity... when terrorists brutally killed innocent children in a school at Peshawar... Hindustan, Parliament had tears... every Indian school was in tears... this is our humanity.<sup>173</sup>

Pakistan didn't hold back and Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan Prime Minister's Adviser on Foreign Affairs stated that India is just trying to deflect the attention from the unravelling catastrophe in Kashmir.<sup>174</sup>

In the year 2005-2006, India made two public statements about Balochistan situation condemning violence against Balochs. Former Foreign Secretary, Kanwal

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<sup>172</sup> Shubhajit Roy and Anand Mishra, **Narendra Modi's Independence Day speech: PM throws down Balochistan gauntlet**, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-narendra-modi-balochistan-independence-day-congress-pakistan-salman-khurshid-2977554/> (16 August 2017)

<sup>173</sup> **Narendra Modi's Independence Day speech: PM throws down Balochistan gauntlet.**

<sup>174</sup> **Narendra Modi's Independence Day speech: PM throws down Balochistan gauntlet.**



Sibal opined “By raising the Balochistan issue, he (Modi) has changed the rules of the game. From the PM’s point of view, this is a warning signal to Pakistan.”<sup>175</sup>

Back in the year 2015, Baloch Liberation Organization (BLO) confirmed about its political representative in Delhi. BLO representative, Balaach Pardili called a press conference in New Delhi reading out a statement of the organization exiled leader Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri. The statement read out as, “We wish that India, the largest democracy, have a clear policy about Balochistan. If Pakistani officials can openly meet the Kashmiri leadership, why shouldn’t India do the same? The Red Cross does not have a hotline on Balochistan despite our repeated pleas. I want India’s help to start a crisis hotline with the Red Cross.”<sup>176</sup>

BLO representative further explained their grievances with the Pakistani government saying:

Balochistan is divided among three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. But the atrocities are taking place inside Pakistan which has conducted five military operations against the Baloch people and the last campaign that they began in 2004 has left 19,000 dead and many more displaced and missing. Pakistan also encourages the Taliban to torture the Baloch inside Afghanistan.<sup>177</sup>

In the year 2006, Mushahid Hussain Sayed an eminent Pakistani politician who is widely believed to be the right-hand man of the former dictator Pervez Musharraf in his interview with Mariana Baabar claimed India is responsible for training 600 Balochis in Afghanistan.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> **Narendra Modi’s Independence Day speech: PM throws down Balochistan gauntlet**

<sup>176</sup> Kallol Bhattacharjee and Suhasini Haidar, **After PoK, India turns focus on Balochistan**, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/after-pok-india-turns-focus-on-balochistan/article7735545.ece> (8 October 2017)

<sup>177</sup> **After PoK, India turns focus on Balochistan**

<sup>178</sup> Mariana Baabar, **RAW Is Training 600 Balochis in Afghanistan**, <https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/raw-is-training-600-balochis-in-afghanistan/231032>. (21 October 2017)

Professor Ashok Swain of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University seeks to explain why engaging in Balochistan is not a feasible idea for India. He opines that if Prime Minister Modi thinks that fomenting conflict in Balochistan will divert attention of Pakistan from Kashmir, then it's a blunder. Founding of Bangladesh with the open help of India resulted in increased derangement of Pakistan towards India.<sup>179</sup>

He goes on to say that Balochistan is not an easy one for India like East Pakistan because with Balochistan it doesn't share an adjoining border. This is the reason India is dependent on Afghanistan for its covert operations. It is more difficult now for India to protect its own assets as Afghanistan's position is crumbling.<sup>180</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Iran has stakes in Balochistan and can't afford to have independent Balochistan because Iran itself has significant Sunni-Muslim Baloch population. Involving in Balochistan would cost India its budding relations with Iran.<sup>181</sup>

Swain further goes on to discuss about the role of the super power. Earlier, in 1971 India had covert support but now things have changed. Pakistan will receive support from China because of its heavy investment in the country. Both USA and Russia have side stepped from the Balochistan issue and there's no chance that they will change their stand on this.<sup>182</sup>

Relations with India has always been tensed one way or the other. There have been series of accusations on both sides. At times relations do improve through bilateral talks and other times animosity continues.

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<sup>179</sup> Ashok Swain, **India must remember that Balochistan is not Bangladesh**, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2016/09/05/india-must-remember-that-balochistan-is-not-bangladesh/> (22 October 2017)

<sup>180</sup> Swain, **India must remember that Balochistan is not Bangladesh**.

<sup>181</sup> Swain, **India must remember that Balochistan is not Bangladesh**.

<sup>182</sup> Swain, **India must remember that Balochistan is not Bangladesh**.

## PAK-SAUDI RELATIONS

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has one of the distinct and rare kind of relations observed in the international politics. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are tied together with string of the common religion. Presence of the two holiest sites of Muslims in Saudi Arabia makes it an everlasting connection between the two states.

Weinbaum and Sen wrote in their article that Saudi Arabia has a significant position in Pakistan as it looks for economic patron along with being the spiritual leader. Saudis hold sway in Pakistan's domestic policies and regional politics as well. This and relations with other Muslim countries gives Pakistan from its perceived Indian predominance.<sup>183</sup>

As a non-regional partner of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan's relationship is different because it cannot act as regional rival like Egypt or Iraq. Other than this, Saudi Arabia is taking advantage of Pakistan's strong military since 1960's in terms getting its own military security better.<sup>184</sup>

Moving closer to the western side, in the mid-1950's Pakistan's compulsion made it sign the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) earlier known as Baghdad Pact. As a reaction, Saudi Embassy in Islamabad issued a statement calling it "stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states."<sup>185</sup>

But in the 1960's both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia found common ground for getting closer. As a pre-emptive measure against Gamal Abd al-Nasser's growing socialist regime who came to power after overthrowing monarchy and helped in dethroning of the Yemen's monarchy, Saudis sent their military personnel to Pakistan for

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<sup>183</sup> M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," *Orbis*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1978, pgs. 595–612 quoted in M.G. Weinbaum and Abdullah B. Khurram, "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2014, pg. 211.

<sup>184</sup> Madawi Al-Rasheed, **Saudi Strategy Includes Alliance with Pakistan**, [www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/saudi-pakistan-investment-alliance-cooperation-military.html](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/saudi-pakistan-investment-alliance-cooperation-military.html). (25 October 2017)

<sup>185</sup> Dawn, September 26, 1955; quoted in, S.M. Burke, **Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis** Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1973, pg. 204.

training.<sup>186</sup> In 1967, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's defence agreement was spelled out which further cemented Pakistan's role in Saudi military.<sup>187</sup>

Some of the Pakistani military advisors piloted the Royal Saudi Air Force fighter jets which were used against Yemeni incursion from Southern border. This continued till 1970's with Pakistani pilot flying Saudi fighter planes and a Pakistani battalion was also placed along Saudi-Yemen border. All through the 1970's, around 15,000 troops were placed near Israeli-Jordan-Syrian border.<sup>188</sup> Pakistan also complied with Saudi request by sending 5,000 troops to the kingdom in the background of the Kuwait's invasion of Iraq.<sup>189</sup>

Later, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's national interest once again on the same page again. In mid-1990s, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE, initiated diplomatic ties and gave material support to the Taliban regime. Grateful Taliban regime was a suitable one for Pakistan as it was looking for strategic depth against India and easy access to Central Asia. To keep Iran at bay, Sunni Pakistani neighbour was ideal for Saudi Arabia. When Mullah Omar contracted relations with the Saudi monarchy-hating Al-Qaida, Saudis severed ties. Pakistan went ahead with the relations until September 2001.<sup>190</sup>

Previously, both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had a goal of including Taliban into the political framework. Pakistan wanted a regime that is Islamabad-friendly to stop Kabul getting used by India against Pakistan. Getting Taliban engaged with other

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<sup>186</sup> Zulfkar A. Khalid, "Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Relationship, 1947–1990: Military Security and Economic Factors," **Strategic Studies**, Vol.13, No. 1, 1989, pg. 66.

<sup>187</sup> Carol Honsa, **Pakistan Boosting Its Gulf Security Force**, <http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0305/030541.html>. (27 October 2017)

<sup>188</sup> Khalid, **Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Relationship, 1947–1990**, pg. 66.

<sup>189</sup> Barbara Crossette, **Confrontation in the Gulf; Pakistan Agrees to Join Defense of Saudi Arabia**, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/14/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-pakistanis-agree-to-join-defense-of-saudi-arabia.html>. (29 October 2017)

<sup>190</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum and Abdullah B. Khurram, "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence," **The Middle East Journal**, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2014, pg. 214.

political groups through power sharing would also mean it will not get enough space to export its ideology.<sup>191</sup>

There are some areas where Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were at odds and unable to cooperate as happened in 1981. Zia's regime declined to support Iraqi war on Iran trampling Saudi wishes. In 2012 also, Pakistan maintained a distance in indulging and declined from participating in any action against Iranian-supported Syrian regime. Despite the fact, Pakistan did train a small number of Salafi fighters and kept a low key profile.<sup>192</sup>

Concurrently, according to WikiLeaks, Saudi regime is amenable to the idea of military aggression against Iran's nuclear sites something which Pakistan vehemently opposes as destabilizing factor for the region.<sup>193</sup>

India has been a dominant concern for Pakistan. Pakistan is afraid that India making ingress in Afghanistan would stir up insurgency in Pashtun and Baloch areas. Saudi regimes stays away from Indo-Pak conflict, since it tough to deal with it. Recently, Saudi along with other Middle Eastern states have warming up to India because of its booming economy.<sup>194</sup> In the year 2016, Saudi regime conferred highest Saudi civilian honour to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.<sup>195</sup>

Anti-Shia stance of Zia was in full sync with the Saudi agenda. Coming to the sectarian menace in Pakistan, Saudi regime began being gracious to the anti-Shia groups in Pakistan. Large sums of money were channelled to madrassahs and

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<sup>191</sup> Weinbaum and Khurram, **Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence**, pg. 214.

<sup>192</sup> David Kenner, **Saudi Arabia's Shadow War**, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/06/articles/saudi\\_arabias\\_shadow\\_war](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/06/articles/saudi_arabias_shadow_war). (30 October 2017)

<sup>193</sup> Ian Black and Simon Tisdall, **The US Embassy Cables: Saudi Arabia Urges US Attack on Iran to Stop Nuclear Programme**, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran>. (28 November 2017)

<sup>194</sup> Weinbaum and Khurram, "**Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence**," pg. 216.

<sup>195</sup> **Modi Conferred Highest Saudi Civilian Honour**, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-conferred-highest-saudi-civilian-honour/story-bwZOeS1MJFw7QigfOEeFnI.html> (1 November 2017)

building of mosques to reduce Shia influence and local Sufi groups.<sup>196</sup> The emblem of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia relation is Faisal Mosque in Islamabad which was financed by the Royal family.<sup>197</sup>

Sponsoring madrassas and educational institutions worldwide through institutions such as Rabitah Alam-e-Islami (Islamic World League) help accomplish the Saudi agenda to control the Islamic intelligentsia and cultural life of the Muslim world at large. It implied, recipient Sunni madrassas would help in furthering anti-Iran regional policy.<sup>198</sup>

For instance in Pakistan's case, Saudi princes coming to South Punjab for hunting excursions were crucial in financing the Sunni madrassas in the region.<sup>199</sup>

Saudi Arabia is one of the top countries responsible for the flow of remittances to Pakistan which helps the economy stay afloat. It is the most dependable source of foreign income for Pakistan. According to data released by the State Bank of Pakistan in 2016, remittances sent by overseas Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia stood at \$5.9 billion in 2015-16 with an increase of 6% from the last year.<sup>200</sup>

When it comes to trade between the two states, it suffers from disequilibrium. Saudi Arabia imports less goods and exports more to Pakistan. Total of %3.3 billion trade takes place annually between the two states.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Qasim A. Moini, **Pakistan's Saudi-Iran Balancing Act**, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1082736/pakistans-saudi-iran-balancing-act>. (1 November 2017)

<sup>197</sup> **Pakistan Declares Seven Days of Mourning over Saudi King Fahd's Death**, <http://www.lebanonwire.com/0805/05080129AFP.asp> (2 November 2017)

<sup>198</sup> S.V.R.Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," **Modern Asian Studies**, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, pg. 144.

<sup>199</sup> Ayesha Siddiqa, **Sipah Sahaba and Taliban: Brothers in Arms**, <https://lubpak.com/archives/19450> (15 November 2017)

<sup>200</sup> Kazim Alam, **Saudi Arabia Remains Largest Source of Remittances for Pakistan**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1142758/saudi-arabia-remains-largest-source-remittances/>. (2 November 2017)

<sup>201</sup> Noman, **Major Exports of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia and Other Arab Countries**, [http://pakbiz.com/articles/Major-Exports-of-Pakistan-to-the-Saudi-Arabia-andother-Arab-Countries\\_AID9.html](http://pakbiz.com/articles/Major-Exports-of-Pakistan-to-the-Saudi-Arabia-andother-Arab-Countries_AID9.html). (3 November 2017)

Comparatively, investments made by the Saudis and Gulf countries is larger than other but is not extraordinary and is dropping significantly.<sup>202</sup> Era of the 1970's saw the inflow of financial aid by US, Iran, China, the Soviet Union and a number of Western European countries. Saudi aid fell short in terms of amount comparatively in terms of the amount, although largest from the Middle East countries but still less.<sup>203</sup>

The scale of Saudi involvement in Pakistan can be detected by this statement of Adel Al-Jubeir, a former Saudi Ambassador to the United States, "We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants."<sup>204</sup> Saudis have been greatly involved in the internal politics of Pakistan. During 1999 military coup when Nawaz Sharif was ousted, it was Saudis who negotiated the bargain deal and accepted him as their guest for a long time till 2007.<sup>205</sup>

Saudis weren't very appreciative of Zardari coming to power in 2008 after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto. According to WikiLeaks, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia characterized Zardari as a hurdle for the advancement of the country. He said, "When the head is rotten, it affects the whole body." President Zardari's spokesman came with a quick rebuttal, "The so called leaks are attempt to create misperceptions between two brotherly Islamic countries." He also said that President considers King Abdullah as his "elder brother."<sup>206</sup>

During Zardari's tenure government was cautious about Saudi entanglement in Pakistani domestic scene. WikiLeaks revealed in 2008, Rahman Malik, Zardari's

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<sup>202</sup> Azizullah Khattak et al., **Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2005**, State Bank of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2005, pg. 412.

<sup>203</sup> M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," **Orbis**, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1978, pg. 603.

<sup>204</sup> Saba Imtiaz, **External Actors: Saudi Arabia's Covert Role in Pakistan**, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/87373/external-actors-saudi-arabias-covert-role-in-pakistan/>. (3 November 2017)

<sup>205</sup> Weinbaum and Khurram, **Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence**, pg. 223.

<sup>206</sup> **Saudi King calls Zardari rotten head**, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/Saudi-King-calls-Zardari-rotten-head/articleshow/7010639.cms>. (3 November 2017)

Interior Minister, “Particularly concerned about the role of the Saudi Ambassador in funding religious schools and mosques.” Saudis took comfort in the fact that its army who is pulling the strings behind the scene and the elected government has no say in foreign policy. One more cable reveals the then Saudi deputy interior minister, Prince Muhammad Bin Nayif mentioned Pakistani army as Saudi’s “winning horse.” Keeping in view of King’s outlook, Americans came to the conclusion that the Saudis “Appear to be looking for ‘another’ Musharraf: a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust.”<sup>207</sup>

Nawaz Sharif has been a favourite Saudi candidate for protecting their interests in Pakistan. Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal remarked, “Nawaz Sharif . . . is Saudi Arabia’s man in Pakistan.”<sup>208</sup> Nawaz Sharif reportedly has set up steel mills in Jeddah with the interest-free sponsorship of the regime.<sup>209</sup>

The year 2013 witnessed the rise of Sharif back to power after successfully winning the elections. The first country to send its ambassador to see the newly elected Prime Minister was Saudi Arabia. Later, in a private meeting with the King Abdullah, Nawaz Sharif was quoted as saying that this two-sided relations between the states is “etched in the heart of every Pakistani and Saudi national” and not based on “political expediency.”<sup>210</sup>

Under the direction of US authorities, Saudi has curb the transfer of funds from Gulf to Pakistan but little breakthrough has been made to stop the cash inflow of wealthy Saudis to Islamic groups supporting Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. Saudi

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<sup>207</sup> Declan Walsh, **WikiLeaks Cables: Saudi Arabia wants Military Rule in Pakistan**, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/saudis-distrust-pakistan-embassy-cables>. (4 November 2017)

<sup>208</sup> Matthew Kaminski, **Prince Alwaleed bin Talal: An Ally Frets About American Retreat**, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579211742820387758> (5 November 2017)

<sup>209</sup> Ashraf Mumtaz, **Media’s Role in Future Pak-Saudi relations**, <http://www.nation.com.pk/editors-picks/05-Jul-2013/media-s-role-in-future-pak-saudi-relations> (5 November 2017)

<sup>210</sup> **Private Visit: PM Nawaz Meets Saudi King, Crown Prince**, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/586206/private-visit-pm-nawaz-meets-saudi-king-crown-prince/> (6 November 2017)



regime is also not satisfied with the Pakistani intelligence leniency in dealing with anti-Saudi and Al-Qaida operatives.<sup>211</sup>

In 2011, Prince Bandar Bin Abbas requested Pakistani army in quelling popular anti-government unrest in Saudi Arabia's crucial ally Bahrain. Recruitment efforts were made to make Pakistanis member of Bahraini National Guard and it's reported there services were used when Saudis began entering Bahrain.<sup>212</sup>

There is some speculation that these military contracts and supports are more than what meets the eye. Riedel write that this close defence ties encompass tacit understanding or even a formal agreement to provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear deterrent.<sup>213</sup>

In this regard, President Barack Obama's counter-proliferation advisor Gary Samore until March 2013 said, "I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan." In 2012, Saudi official told the Times journalist, "It would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom." In response to the speculation that Pakistan has a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, "speculative, mischievous and baseless."<sup>214</sup>

Relations with Saudi Arabia so far have been cordial and symbiotic. Unfortunately, for Pakistan the deal is lopsided with more to lose on home-front than to gain. Saudi involvement has played a pivotal role in the upsurge of sectarianism in Pakistan.

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<sup>211</sup> Ahmed Rashid, **Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan and Afghanistan**, Viking Press, New York, 2012, pg. 127.

<sup>212</sup> **Al Khalifah Seeking Legitimacy from Pakistani Citizens**, <http://www.islamtimes.org/vdcev78p.jh8neik1bj.html>. (7 November 2017)

<sup>213</sup> Bruce Riedel, **Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan**, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/01/28-saudi-arabia-riedel>. (7 November 2017)

<sup>214</sup> Mark Urban, **Saudi nuclear weapons 'on order' from Pakistan**, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846> (9 November 2017)

## PAK-IRAN RELATIONS

Pakistan's relationship with Iran is identified with shared culture, common religion, loan words from Persian to Urdu, trade connections, shared border and history. This relationship was cemented when united India broke and Pakistan came into being. Iran was the first country to accept Pakistan as an independent state. Pakistan also reciprocated by recognizing Iranian revolution of 1979.<sup>215</sup>

Formation of Bangladesh as an independent state struck hard the "two nation theory" and gave way to the query if the remaining Pakistan would further disintegrate or not. At this time, Iran was sure that country on its east should be stable.<sup>216</sup>

Both the countries have been on a stable path with occasional ups and downs related to security and regional politics. For Iran, security means to conserve its ideological basis on which modern day Iran stands. Security entails survival of the state and sovereignty.<sup>217</sup> Once upon a time, both countries were members of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) as well from 1955 to 1979.<sup>218</sup>

Pakistan's security involvement is mostly India-centric and then with Afghanistan. Iran is mostly concerned with West Asia and countries located on its eastern and northern flanks. Any kind of development in South Asia or Persian Gulf means engagement for both Iran and Pakistan. Security has an important role in creation of the alliances which are not permanent and damage-free.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> **Pakistan-Iran Relations: Challenges & Prospects**, <http://cpakgulf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Pakistan-Iran-Roundtable.pdf>. (10 November 2017)

<sup>216</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, "Indo-Iranian Relations: Strategic, Political and Economic Dimensions," **India Quarterly**, Vol. 33, No.1, 1977, pg. 9-12.

<sup>217</sup> Barry Buzan, "Security of the States, the New World Order and Beyond," **On Security**, Ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pg. 188.

<sup>218</sup> Central Treaty Organization, **Encyclopedia Britannica**, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Central-Treaty-Organization> (2 March 2017)

<sup>219</sup> Barry Buzan, **People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era**, ECPR Press, Colchester, 2007, pgs. 193-200.

The breakdown of Indo-Pak talks climaxed into a full-fledged war in 1965. Shah of Iran helped Pakistan in moral, political and material terms but refrained from getting engaged directly in unstable South Asian political environment.<sup>220</sup>

During 1960's both Iran and Pakistan aimed towards having better and meaningful relations with Arab states. Objectives of both Tehran and Islamabad were different. Pakistan needed Arab support in countering India whereas Shah wanted to counter the influence of Arab revolutionary leaders in the Persian Gulf.<sup>221</sup>

Interestingly, the Shah never used "Shia card" to influence the Shia population of Pakistan to advance Iran's interests. The "Shia card" was pulled out only once he was toppled and Islamists came to rule the country.<sup>222</sup>

Era of 1970's also saw a drastic change for both Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as a frontline state working side by side US in containing Soviet Union. Whereas, Iran turned out to be breaker of the existing conditions in the region.<sup>223</sup>

Pakistan became the first country to recognize the Islamic revolution in Iran although the establishment was against it. Prior to revolution, Zia-ul-Haq's cabinet Minister Khurshid Ahmed paid a visit to Imam Khomeini in Paris in January 1979 while the former was in exile. The purpose of the meeting was to deliver the message that Pakistan is ready to build a relationship with the Islamic leader. Domestically, Pakistan was divided on opinions. Initially, Shias supported the Shah and the Sunnis supported the Islamic leader Khomeini.<sup>224</sup>

In 1984, General Zia and Vice President George Bush met at the Murree Government House where VP. Bush recommended a plan of training Afghan

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<sup>220</sup> Safdar Mahmood, **A Political Study of Pakistan**, Mohammed Ashraf, Lahore, 1972, pg. 272.

<sup>221</sup> Weinbaum and Sen, **Pakistan Enters the Middle East**, pg. 595-612.

<sup>222</sup> Alex Vatanka, **Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence**, pg. 70

<sup>223</sup> Shah Alam, "Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions," **Strategic Analysis** Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, pg. 530

<sup>224</sup> Alam, **Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions**, pg. 531

Mujahideen with the help of US in Balochistan to stir up instability inside Iran.<sup>225</sup> The plan was outrightly rejected by the Zia regime and Bush was distressed at a press conference in Lahore before leaving Pakistan.<sup>226</sup>

The circumstances back then were more complex for Pakistan and despite continued pressure from US and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan continued its support for Iran revolution. Pakistan went ahead by not supporting Iraq covertly in Iran-Iraq war.<sup>227</sup>

Policies regarding dealing with the Gulf became dissimilar between Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan is a supporter of Gulf regimes whereas Iran looks forward to change the status quo in the region.<sup>228</sup>

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the dynamics of Pak-Iran relations. With the takeover of Kabul by Taliban in Afghanistan in September 1996 Iran and Pakistan's relations went out of sync. Pakistan's support for Taliban emerged from the "strategic depth" notion which was possible through Taliban. Further, both Iran and Pakistan looked forward to seeking increased influence in Central Asia. Iran longed to increase its security and augment its political and economic power which would help coming out of its isolation period. Pakistan, on the other hand, wanted to boost its influence in the region.<sup>229</sup>

Nine Shia groups emerged on Afghan political scene between the years 1978-1986. All except Shura-ye Ittefaq (Unity Council) were formed in Afghanistan. From ethnic point of view, mostly were Hazara; Harakat-e Islami (Islamic Movement) being the only non-Hazara consisting mostly of Qizilbash and Sayyids. Seven of these groups accredited to Khomeini's brand of political Islam. Organizations like

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<sup>225</sup> Tarik Jan et. al, "**Foreign Policy Debate: The Years Ahead**," Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1993, pg. 216

<sup>226</sup> Alam, **Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions**, pg. 531

<sup>227</sup> Alam, **Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions**, pg. 224

<sup>228</sup> Shirin Tahir-Kheli and William Staudenmaier, "Saudi-Pakistan Military Relations," **Orbis**, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1982, pgs. 155-171.

<sup>229</sup> Alam, **Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions**, pgs. 532-533.

Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami (Guardians of the Islamic Jihad) and Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organization) were sponsored and trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “to export their style of revolution towards Muslim countries such as Afghanistan.”<sup>230</sup>

Iran supported different Afghan Shia groups to look for political solution rather than the military one from 1987 to 1989. End of Iran-Iraq war paved way for a more tenacious under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani moving towards the establishment of multi-ethnic government of composed of both Shia and Sunni representatives.<sup>231</sup>

Peshawar Alliance - group of seven Sunni mujahedeen groups favoured by Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia prepared itself for the interim government after the departure of Soviet Union. In 1988-1989. Since Iran was not on good terms with US and Saudi Arabia, Iran started taking on board both non-Sunni and non-Pashtun groups the time period of 1989-1992.<sup>232</sup>

A “government-in-exile” was announced by the Peshawar Alliance in 1988 solely comprised of Sunnis.<sup>233</sup> Iran challenge Pakistan by giving response that Hazaras were among the first ones to strongly resist the Communist onslaught. Iran intensified its support for the political representation of the Shias in Afghanistan. In 1989, all the Khomeinist parties came under the umbrella of Hezb-e-Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party) under the leadership of a Nasr commander Ali Mazari which was supported by Iran.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Niamatullah Ibrahim, “**At the Sources of Factionalism and Civil War in Hazarajat,**” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.600.516&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (10 March 2017)

<sup>231</sup> Bruce Koepke, “**Iran’s Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism,**” <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRI13wcaBK.pdf> (21 March 2017)

<sup>232</sup> Koepke, **Iran’s Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism**

<sup>233</sup> Asta Olesen, **Islam and Politics in Afghanistan**, Curzon Press, London, 1995, pg. 291

<sup>234</sup> Koepke, **Iran’s Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism**

Alongside this, Iran also started supporting groups such as Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society), Junbish-e Melli (National Islamic Movement) and Ismaili Shia groups. These groups were Dari-speaking and Sunni non-Pashtun. Hence, in north, west and central Afghanistan common language of Farsi-Dari became a uniting factor.<sup>235</sup>

Following Soviet departure in April 1992, Sebghatullah Mujadidi of the Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli (National Liberation Front) was chosen as interim Afghan president until June 1992 by the Peshawar parties. Iranian perseverance paid off in July 1992 when Wahdat was included in the Leadership Council of the new government. With the deeper engagement of Afghanistan in armed conflict; treasured proxies were given favour by next-door neighbours. Iran supported Shia factions, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Sunni groups, Uzbekistan backed Junbish and Tajikistan supported Jamiat. Later on, India also started supporting Jamiat.<sup>236</sup>

Koepke writes from mid-1990s Iran preferred to be balanced and cooperative. Iran even contacted US in order to crush Taliban. It called for the disengagement of foreign troops and termination of the conflict. Keeping in view the increasing Pashtun insurgency and its effects on drug trafficking, population influx and national security, Iran accepted the admittance of Islamist Sunni Pashtuns in the government of Afghanistan.<sup>237</sup>

He further writes, Iran has no desire to convert Afghanistan into Shia-dominated country. Instead, it prefers Sunni Pashtun leader for the inhabitants but will continue supporting those with whom it has cultural, religious and linguistic ties.<sup>238</sup>

Pakistan's support of Taliban in Afghanistan in conjunction with the US support compelled Iran to start giving support to Afghan Shia groups and Northern Alliance. Iran collaborated with Russia, India and Central Asian states to hinder

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<sup>235</sup> Koepke, *Iran's Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism*

<sup>236</sup> William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, pgs.168-172

<sup>237</sup> Koepke, *Iran's Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism*

<sup>238</sup> Koepke, *Iran's Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism*

Pakistani acts in Afghanistan. Getting involved in Afghanistan ran parallel to Pakistan's interest and "turned into direct conflict with Pakistan."<sup>239</sup>

Iranian involvement wasn't just limited to influencing Afghanistan. Iranian revolution gave the impetus to Pakistani Shias for mobilization. In 1979, Imamia Students Organization (ISO) became the first Shia one to accept Khomeini as *marja-e-taqlid* (source of emulation). Back then, Iraqi Ayatollah Al Khoi was followed by Pakistani Shias as their *marja*. This was a landmark, as Iran moved ahead supporting Shia groups in South Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf.<sup>240</sup>

*Khana-e-Farhang* (Iranian cultural centers) became the conduit for disbursing works of Iranian *ulama* among Pakistani Shias and offered scholarships for those who are interested in seeking religious studies in Qom city and other centers in Iran. An estimate says around 4,000 Pakistani Shia students earned this scholarship and were introduced to the radical concept of *Vilayet-e-Fakih* (rule of the jurisprudent).<sup>241</sup>

Disenchanted by the Tehreek-e-Jafariya Pakistan's (TJP) role in securing the lives and interests of Shias in Pakistan. A group of staunch Shias who wanted to counter militant Sunnis in quid pro quo manner organized and formed Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP) - Army of Muhammad. The organization was spearheaded by Ghulam Raza

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<sup>239</sup> Nazir Hussain, "Pak-Iran Relations in Post-9/11 Period: Regional and Global Impact", **Regional Studies** Vol. XX, No. 4, 2002, pg. 57.

<sup>240</sup> Hassan Abbas, "**Shiism and Sectarian Politics in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence**," <https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwivktuZ9vjZAhVqwqYKHS4VC9wQFggTMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fctc.usma.edu%2Fapp%2Fuploads%2F2011%2F05%2FCTC-OP-Abbas-21-September.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1DANuhFUD2uz9BHtEK8sQb> (12 November 2018)

<sup>241</sup> Mariam Abou-Zahab, "The Politicization of the Shia Community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s," **The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia**, Eds. Alessandro Monsutti, Silvia Naef and Farian Sabahi, Peter Lang, Bern, 2007, pg. 101.

Naqvi and Murid Abbas Yazdani.<sup>242</sup> Iranian sponsorship was available and scores of ISO members joined its ranks.<sup>243</sup>

Iranian support was essential for the sustenance of the group as a vindictive attempt. In December 1990, Iran's Council General was gunned down and attacked on the Iranian Cultural Center in Lahore. As soon as law enforcement agencies started hunting down SMP members in early 1990s, several members of the group shifted to neighbouring Iran.<sup>244</sup>

As per the claims of the Punjab Police, Iran provided political asylum to a lot of Shia militants. A few of them were even on the list of "most wanted" terrorist list.<sup>245</sup>

Zahab writes, in order to avoid Pakistani Sunni extremists counteraction in Iranian Balochistan – Iran stopped funding of SMP in 1996.<sup>246</sup>

Syrian war energized again the relation between Pakistani Shias and Iran. Alfoneh penned an article detailing the composition of the recruited members. Apart from doctrinal students in Qom, Pakistanis deported from UAE and others from the country volunteered for the Syrian war.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> Mariam Abou-Zahab, "The Politicization of the Shia Community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s," pg. 109

<sup>243</sup> Amir Rana, **A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan**, Mashal Press, Lahore, 2004, pgs. 414-417

<sup>244</sup> Interview with S.M. Ali, a former activist of SMP, Lahore, July 2008, in Hassan Abbas, **Shiism and Sectarian Politics in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence**

<sup>245</sup> Interview with a retired Pakistani police officer who profiled Shia militants in 1990s, Lahore, 18 July 2009. For details of official most-wanted lists, see [http://www.punjabpolice.gov.pk/most\\_wanted/?id=155](http://www.punjabpolice.gov.pk/most_wanted/?id=155), in Hassan Abbas, **Shiism and Sectarian Politics in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence**

<sup>246</sup> Mariam Abou-Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan," **Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation**, Ed. Christophe Jaffrelot, Zed Books, Delhi, 2002, pg. 117

<sup>247</sup> Ali Alfoneh, "Shia Pakistani Fighters in Syria," <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/shia-pakistani-fighters-in-syria> (21 November 2017)



Going back to the 90s a number of Iranians were targeted inside Pakistan. Back in 1998, nine Iranian diplomats were killed in Afghanistan which was blamed by Iranian authorities on Taliban and partly on Pakistan. Earlier on the day of the attack Pakistani authorities communicated to Iranian authorities guaranteeing the safety of the diplomats and Iranian consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif.<sup>248</sup>

Alam writes that scores of Shias and Iranian citizens were targeted in Pakistan. Sectarianism exacerbated at unprecedented levels which was a direct result of Afghan conflict. An Iranian diplomat Sadiq Ganji was gunned down in Lahore which threw the Pak-Iran relations in turmoil. Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan claimed a significant number of Iranian officials and Pakistani Shias from start to the finish of the 1990s.<sup>249</sup>

As a goodwill gesture former President Pervez Musharraf visited Iran for two days in 1999. President Khatami said both Pakistan and Iran have to ward off any “divisive conspiracies” that are directed towards destroying the peaceful relations between the two countries. He added, Pakistani government should ensure the culprits behind the killings of the Iranian nationals would be brought to book.<sup>250</sup>

In spite of differing regional interests and sectarian conflict Iran stood by Pakistan when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Just after tests, Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi was the first foreign official to visit Pakistan on 1<sup>st</sup> June 1998. He lauded Pakistan by saying, “now, they (Muslims) feel confident, because a fellow Islamic nation possesses the knowhow to build nuclear weapons.”<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Douglas Jehl, “**Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for 9 Diplomats’ Death,**” <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/11/world/iran-holds-taliban-responsible-for-9-diplomats-deaths.html> (12 November 2017)

<sup>249</sup> Alam, **Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions**, pg. 533.

<sup>250</sup> **Khatami, Musharraf Discuss Problems Between Iran and Pakistan,** <https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=1046250&language=en> (22 November 2017)

<sup>251</sup> Asian Recorder, Vol. 44, No. 28, July 9-15, 1998, 27417.

Indian nuclear tests worried Iran, West Asian countries and various other regional states.<sup>252</sup> Iran's UN Envoy in Geneva stated, "India's blasts disrupted the strategic balance in the subcontinent...as a result of Pakistan following suite."<sup>253</sup>

In the face of all odds, Pakistan continued its defence cooperation with Iran. In July 1989, both countries signed the Pakistan-Iran Defence Agreement. Iran and Pakistan both are working together in production of the Pakistani furnished Al-Khalid tanks. Helicopters, commercial vehicles and APCs are also being looked at for further joint cooperation.<sup>254</sup>

In the year 2003, Indo-Iran relations saw a different light since President Khatami signed numerous agreements incorporating defence agreement as well. Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and Iranian President Muhammad Khatami inked "The New Delhi Declaration" on 25<sup>th</sup> January 2003. This agreement entail, "India and Iran also agreed to explore opportunities for cooperation in defence in agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits."<sup>255</sup>

For all that, Iran's growing closeness with India didn't go undiscovered by Pakistan. Chief of Indian Navy, Admiral Madhavendra Singh and Chairman of Chief of the Staff Committee paid a visit to Tehran in 2003. Iranian Defence Minister signed Indo-Iran Defence Agreement with Indian Admiral on 19<sup>th</sup> January 2009.<sup>256</sup>

Alam stresses on the fact that nuclear cooperation between Iran and Pakistan is an outgrowth of the mutual relation these two states share. This nuclear exchange program was initiated during Zia era and continued till the early years of President

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<sup>252</sup> BBC, **Summary of World Broadcast**, May 15, 1998, ME/3227.

<sup>253</sup> BBC, **Summary of World Broadcast**, May 30, 1998, ME/3240.

<sup>254</sup> Nasim Zehra, "Pakistan-Iran Relations: Compulsions and Conditions for a Strategic Relationship", **Strategic Studies**, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2003, pg. 84, quoted in Shah Alam Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions, **Strategic Analysis**, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, pg. 540.

<sup>255</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, website <http://meadev.nic.in> (23 November 2017)

<sup>256</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, website <http://meadev.nic.in> (23 November 2017)

Musharraf's era, not getting interrupted even during civil rule of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto.<sup>257</sup>

Most of the transfer job was done in the early 1980s. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered similar types of centrifuges in Iran which were achieved by Pakistan in 1970s. Apparently, Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI was involved in the trade. Pakistan's nuclear program pioneer Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan visited Iran in 1991 and 1992 respectively to conduct meetings with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) officials. ISI Chief in the initial years of 1990s Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani was well-aware of Khan's visit.<sup>258</sup>

The then former Pakistani Cabinet Minister, Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan also made a clear statement that Gen. Beg bargained a deal with Iran and mentioned that, "Iran is willing to give whatever it takes, \$6 billion, \$10 billion. We can sell to Iran at any price."<sup>259</sup>

Rashid enunciates factors as to why Pakistan was welcoming to the idea of joining of Iran's in nuclear club. Firstly, both Iran and Pakistan by acquiring nuclear power can maintain balance of power in the region. Secondly, nuclear Iran would halt any external influence of extra-regional powers in shaping regional dynamic in their favour. Thirdly, monetary assistance from Iran would lessen the burden on Pakistani nuclear program. Fourthly, emergence of more Muslim nation with nuclear power would distract US and Western powers and give Pakistan enough space to operate its own nuclear program. Lastly, transfer of nuclear technology meant that Iran would not get close to India.<sup>260</sup>

Border security issues have also marred the relations between the two neighbouring states. In the last few years, Iran has publicly threatened Pakistan with surgical

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<sup>257</sup> Alam, **Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions**, pg. 540

<sup>258</sup> Nucleonics Week, Vol. 32, No. 18, May 2, 1991, pg. 17

<sup>259</sup> Wilson John, **Iran, Pakistan, and Nukes**, <http://www.observerindia.com/analysis> (24 November 2017)

<sup>260</sup> Ahmed Rashid, "The Bomb Traders," **Far Eastern Economic Review**, Vol. 167, No. 6, 2004, pg. 15.

strikes. The years 2014,<sup>261</sup> 2015,<sup>262</sup> 2016<sup>263</sup> and 2017<sup>264</sup> has witnessed cross-border attacks from Iran into Pakistan.

In the year 2014, both Iran and Pakistan went ahead with the strict border control consultations. Official statement read, “The two sides reviewed the recent border incidents and reiterated their firm resolve to maintain a tranquil Pakistan-Iran border.” Meeting covered the topics of Joint Border Commission, continual meetings for discussing mechanism and heightened communication and coordination between the relevant authorities on both sides of the border.<sup>265</sup>

Meeting didn’t help enough and the cross-border attacks continued. Iranian news agency (IRNA) quoted Major General Mohammed Baqeri as saying that "unless Pakistan control(s) the borders, arrest(s) the terrorist and shut(s) down their bases... we will hit their safe havens and cells wherever they are." Meanwhile, Pakistani Advisor on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz commented, most of the Jaish-e-Adl members are present on the Iranian side of the border.<sup>266</sup>

Iran isn’t contended by the Pakistani performance in controlling cross-border attacks and is active again in recruiting Pakistani Shias for Syrian war. Alfoneh cautions that Iran’s calculated move of recruiting and training of embittered Shia minority of Pakistan is a deterrence policy. It’s a kind of signal that if Pakistan doesn’t take enough action against Sunni Iranian militants who are engage in Pak-

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<sup>261</sup> Shezad Baloch, **Iranian Border Guards Fire Mortar Shells into Pakistan**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/777477/iranian-border-guards-fire-mortar-shells-into-pakistan/> (24 November 2017)

<sup>262</sup> Syed Ali Shah, **Iranian Forces Fire Eight Mortar Shells into Pakistani Territory**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1213742> (25 November 2017)

<sup>263</sup> **Pakistani Killed in Iran Mortar Attacks**, <http://www.bexpress.com.pk/2016/12/pakistani-killed-in-iran-mortar-attacks/> (25 November 2017)

<sup>264</sup> **Five Mortar Shells Fired from Iran Land in Chaghai**, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/142737-five-mortar-shells-fired-from-iran-land-in-chaghai> (25 November 2017)

<sup>265</sup> Baqir Sajjad Syed, **Pakistan, Iran to Strengthen Border Control**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1140773> (25 November 2017)

<sup>266</sup> **Pakistan, Iran Set Up Joint Border Commission Amid Tensions**, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-iran-set-up-joint-border-commission-amid-tensions/articleshow/58623877.cms> (25 November 2017)

Iran border areas, Iran would upgrade its efforts of Mobilizing Pakistani Shias which would be detrimental to Pakistan.<sup>267</sup>

Trade relation between the Iran and Pakistan is not satisfactory. Economic ties between the two states dates back to centuries but now hampered because of politics and security issues. Pakistan's trade with Iran slumped around 26% in the year 2012-2013. Issues such as smuggling, trafficking and usurping of border areas by non-state actors are the obstacle to the better trade between the two countries.<sup>268</sup>

In the year 2016, both the states committed to increase mutual trade to \$5 billion by 2021. At Pakistan-Iran Business Forum, President Rouhani said, "Iran has the capability to help the development of the economic infrastructure of Pakistan including roads, railways dams and others area."<sup>269</sup>

Iran is keen about Pakistani agricultural products, textiles, sports goods and surgical goods. Pakistan has a proposal of establishing industrial sites in the destitute border areas with special regards to petrochemical storage. It plans to connect this infrastructure to \$46 billion project of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.<sup>270</sup>

In the present circumstances, relation with Iran is sensitive as ever which needs calibrated foreign policy for Pakistan in order to maintain peace between the two countries.

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<sup>267</sup> Ali Alfoneh, **Shia Pakistani Fighters in Syria**, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/shia-pakistani-fighters-in-syria> (27 November 2017)

<sup>268</sup> **Pak-Iran Trade Relation**, The Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry

<sup>269</sup> Mehreen Zahra-Malik, **Pakistan, Iran Aim to Boost Trade to \$5 Billion**, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-iran/pakistan-iran-aim-to-boost-trade-to-5-billion-idUSKCN0WS0F5> (27 November 2017)

<sup>270</sup> Malik, **Pakistan, Iran Aim to Boost Trade to \$5 Billion**.

## THE NATURE AND VIOLENCE OF TERRORISM

### HISTORY OF TERRORISM

The use of word “terrorism” dates back to the French Revolution of 1789 as a defining terms for describing the deeds of revolutionaries.<sup>271</sup> It has various definitions given by different scholars such as Rosie who describes it as, “Use and/or threat of repeated violence in support of or in opposition to some authority, where violence is employed to induce fear of similar attack in as many non-immediate victims as possible so that those so threatened accept and comply with the demands of the terrorist.”<sup>272</sup> Terrorism usually brings negative connotations to the mind. It is associated with evil, wrong and unlawful. However the portrayal of terrorists can change over time. For instance, Yasser Arafat and Nelson Mandela both were designated terrorists, once upon a time by US. Later, both were awarded Nobel Peace Prize.<sup>273</sup>

Hoffman went ahead in describing the outlook of terrorists by saying that they “live” in future with a firm belief that they will acquire their objective by crushing their enemies.<sup>274</sup> Boaz explains that terror attacks are carried out to benefit a specific extreme ideology such as fascism, communism and anarchism. What makes terrorism in the name of a religion is that it calls for a full-fledged war on their opponents. This leaves little space for negotiations, even if they negotiate it doesn’t last long.<sup>275</sup>

New-age terrorism has witnessed the surge of terrorist outfits with different political objectives and geographic locations. The common characteristic is that they all use

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<sup>271</sup> Berg, **Terrorism: The New International Challenge**, (paper presented at the public workshop, How Should Fiji Respond to the Threat of Terrorism?, Citizens’ Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Commission, Suva, Fiji, 17 July 2004)

<sup>272</sup> G. Rosie, **The Dictionary of International Terrorism**, Paragon House, New York, 1987, pg. 7

<sup>273</sup> This list is maintained by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and may be accessed online: <http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/fugitives.htm>. (27 November 2017)

<sup>274</sup> B. Hoffman, **Inside Terrorism**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988, pg. 169

<sup>275</sup> Boaz Ganor, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” **Essentials of Terror Medicine**, Eds. Shmuel Shapira, Jeffrey Hammond and Leonard Cole, Springer, New York, 2009, pg. 169

violence against civilians as a means to their end. Their decision are a result of rational thinking, after analysing pros and cons of their deeds. They are not abnormal, they are people who carry out their actions after cost-effective analysis.<sup>276</sup>

Garrison in his article delivers a method of assessing terrorism in terms of the damage caused by it to the society at large. He classified the weapons used in the terror attacks into three forms of attack:

1. Weapons of mass destruction
2. Weapons of mass casualty
3. Weapons of mass disruption.

The first category talks about weapons used for targeting dams, roads, bridges, water treatment plants, computer systems and other types of structures. Types of disruption include magnetic pulse weapons to disrupt computer activity, cyber-terrorism which includes hacking into computers in order to destroy government records or bank records, last one is agro-terrorism which includes disturbing of food supply and manufacture.<sup>277</sup>

Although, terrorists involved in sectarianism haven't get their hands on weapons of mass destruction which can cause damage to society's infrastructure. The second point of mass casualty fits in this sectarian scenario. Terrorists have been on a mission of raising the number with each carried-out attack.

Contemporary terrorism became commonplace at the end of the twentieth century with the invention of state-of-the-art weapons and post-World War II actions of some governments in the world. Era of Cold War and nuclear deterrence gave birth

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<sup>276</sup> J. Post, "Terrorism on Trial: The Context of Political Crime," **Political Terrorism – Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century**, Ed. HW Kushner, Gordian Knot Books—University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln N.E., 2002, pg. 46

<sup>277</sup> Arthur Garrison, "Terrorism: The nature of its history," **Criminal Justice Studies**, Vol.16, No.1, 2003, pg. 41

to the aspect of state sponsored terrorism. At the end of twentieth century, the use state sponsored terrorism increased by Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>278</sup>

### PAKISTAN'S SECTARIAN ENTANGLEMENT IN SYRIA

Syrian war as opened up new avenues of sectarian violence in the Middle-East with ramifications reaching to Pakistan as well. An advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on national security and foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, told the National Assembly, "We strongly reject the speculations surfaced in the media regarding change in Pakistan's policy on Syria and linking it with the visit of Saudi crown prince."<sup>279</sup>

He went ahead clarifying Pakistani government's position, "This impression is baseless and misleading that there has been a policy shift regarding Syria. Pakistan fully honours national and international laws in its agreements and sale of arms." He added, "We are not going to provide arms or assist anybody. It is our clear policy not to interfere."<sup>280</sup>

Former BBC journalist and educationist Nauman Naqvi commented that Pakistani reject about its involvement in Syrian conflict but everybody is cognizant of the fact. Pakistan is catering to the needs of Saudi Arabia in South Asia for a long time and in doing so has damaged relations with Iran. Relations with Iran were different back then in 1970's and has deteriorated in the final stage of the Cold War. He mentioned the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Jundullah, which Iran considers a proxy used by its enemies.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Ganor, **Essentials of Terror Medicine**, pg. 15

<sup>279</sup> **Sartaj dispels impression of 'Syria policy shift'**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1089405> (3 December 2017)

<sup>280</sup> **Sartaj dispels impression of 'Syria policy shift'**

<sup>281</sup> Shamil Shams, **Is Pakistan aiding Syrian rebels?**, <http://www.dw.com/en/is-pakistan-aiding-syrian-rebels/a-17528187> (3 December 2017)



Previously, Pakistan received \$1.5 billion by “friendly countries” as a “gift for the people of Pakistan.”<sup>282</sup> Reuters, reported that Saudi Arabia “loaned” the amount to help Pakistan in strengthening its economy.<sup>283</sup> Federal Minister for Finance Ishaq Dar cleared the air of rumour by stating that the gift is neither loan nor the charges of any services rendered by Pakistan. He also said, the gift should be accepted with gratitude instead of making it controversial.<sup>284</sup>

A London-based researcher and counter-terrorism expert, Ghaffar Husain commented on the use of this loan, “The expertise, weapons and fighters for the Syrian war, and Saudi Arabia has the cash that Pakistan desperately needs right now.”<sup>285</sup>

Analyst Asad Memon comments, purportedly both Shia and Sunni militants have travelled to Syria. Iran-Saudi proxy war is being fought in several parts of Pakistan including Parachinar.<sup>286</sup> Parachinar is principally a Shia dominated area – capital of Kurram district of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan.<sup>287</sup>

There have been attacks in Parachinar against the local Shia population. A number of experts believe that it is Pakistan’s policy makers recognize Shia populations as a “hindrance” in their pursuit of “deep state.” The purpose of this policy is to hold

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<sup>282</sup> **Dar terms \$1.5bn donation a ‘gift from friends’**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1093342> (3 December 2017)

<sup>283</sup> **Saudi Arabia loaned Pakistan \$1.5bn to shore up economy**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1092913/saudi-arabia-loaned-pakistan-15bn-to-shore-up-economy> (4 December 2017)

<sup>284</sup> **Dar Terms \$1.5bn Donation a ‘Gift From Friends’**

<sup>285</sup> **Shams, Is Pakistan Aiding Syrian Rebels?**

<sup>286</sup> **Shamil Shams, Shias in Pakistan's Parachinar Caught In the Middle of Proxy Wars**, <http://www.dw.com/en/shias-in-pakistans-parachinar-caught-in-the-middle-of-proxy-wars/a-39419646> (4 December 2017)

<sup>287</sup> **Shah, Shias in Pakistan's Parachinar Caught in the Middle of Proxy Wars**

sway in Kabul by backing Sunni extremists and to offset Indian influence. Islamabad repudiates this policy.<sup>288</sup>

According to Malik Siraj Akbar, Balochistan expert in Washington comments that groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which has killed scores of Shias in the past supposedly receives funding from Pakistani intelligence agencies.<sup>289</sup>

Communication expert in Islamabad Nahyan Mirza gives his opinion in this matter as, "Pakistani Shiites have close ties with Iran. On the other hand, Baloch separatists prefer to be with Tehran rather than Islamabad. This makes both the Shiites and Balochs suspicious in the eyes of the various stakeholders in the establishment. It is certainly not acceptable to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other regional powers."<sup>290</sup>

Development worker and political activist like Maqsood Ahmad Jan believes Nawaz Sharif's persistence on conducting peace talk will only encourage terrorists.<sup>291</sup>

Iran is actively involved in recruiting Afghan and Pakistani Shia youths for its Syrian cause. Pakistani were late arrivals in the Syrian battleground. They began coming to the Syrian theatre in 2013 when holy site of shrine of Zainab in Damascus was attacked by Salafi militias. The eventful attack precipitated the creation of the Zainabiyoun Brigade with Iranian support.<sup>292</sup>

Zainabiyoun Brigade has its own Facebook page. Prerequisites for the volunteers are physical fitness and the age bracket of 18 to 35 years of age. Expected monthly

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<sup>288</sup> Shah, **Shias in Pakistan's Parachinar Caught in the Middle of Proxy Wars**

<sup>289</sup> Shamil Shams, **Attacks on Shiites Intensify in Pakistan**, <http://www.dw.com/en/attacks-on-shiites-intensify-in-pakistan/a-17379670> (8 December 2017)

<sup>290</sup> Shams, **Attacks on Shiites Intensify in Pakistan.**

<sup>291</sup> Shams, **Attacks on Shiites Intensify in Pakistan.**

<sup>292</sup> Farhan Zahid, "The Zainabiyoun Brigade: A Pakistani Shiite Militia Amid the Syrian Conflict," **Terrorism Monitor**, Vol. 14, No. 11, 2016, pgs. 5-6.

salaries are up to Rs. 120,000 (\$1200) with 15 days holidays after every three months. The prevailing number of the fighter is 1,000.<sup>293</sup>

Philip Smyth, researcher at the University of Maryland adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy states, “The Zeinabiyoun are a Pakistani Shias’ outfit that’s run by the IRGC.” He added, “They’ve put together their own imagery, their own recruitment type material. They really became more of a marketable element toward the end of the summer of 2015. That’s when they became more of a centred group.”<sup>294</sup>

According to Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington points out, “There is a large pool to draw from.” He adds, “There are pockets within that Shia community that have been willing to pick up arms to fight for their Shia identity, their sectarian identity. And that’s what the IRGC is tapping into.”<sup>295</sup>

Vatanka comes with a caveat, “The message Iran is recruiting with, like it or not, is a sectarian message,” Adding further that, “That is a message that is inherently dangerous and can get out of hand.” Further clearing about Iranian involvement he said, “Given the limitations of how much it can recruit at home, the Revolutionary Guard needs to shore up support in like-minded communities, which they have been pretty good at in the course of the Islamic Republic’s history.”<sup>296</sup>

### **LOCAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SYRIAN WAR**

A bomb went off in Parachinar on 13<sup>th</sup> December 2015, killing 30 people and afflicting injuries to more than 30 people. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami, a sectarian organization claimed the responsibility of the attack. Their spokesperson Abu Ali Sufyan issued a statement, “We claim responsibility for the Eidgah Bazar,

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<sup>293</sup> **Iran Recruits Pakistani Shias for Combat in Syria**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1007694/iran-recruits-pakistani-shias-for-combat-in-syria/> (8 December 2017)

<sup>294</sup> Shams, **Attacks on Shiites Intensify in Pakistan.**

<sup>295</sup> Shams, **Attacks on Shiites Intensify in Pakistan**

<sup>296</sup> Shams, **Attacks on Shiites Intensify in Pakistan.**

Parachinar bomb blast. It was a revenge of the crimes against Syrian Muslims by Iran and Bashar al Assad.” The spokesperson cautioned about further attacks, “If the people in Parachinar did not stop sending people to take part in Syrian war.”<sup>297</sup>

In January 2016, Rana Sanaullah, Pakistani law minister issued a statement detailing about the arrests of 42 suspected militants with supposed links to ISIS group. Conducted raids recovered ISIS literature and weapons. Suspected militants were entrusted with the task of establishing sleeper cells for the group.<sup>298</sup>

Along the same lines, Rana Sanaullah said around 100 Pakistanis including women left for Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. Minister further added, government is trying its level best to control commissioning of militants.<sup>299</sup>

Farhan Zahid writes, ISIS is well-aware of the fact by trumpeting its anti-Shia stance, it will be able to garner local support of local outfits in Pakistan and abroad. Existence of ISIS has been actively contradicted by the Pakistani government but the continued sectarian violence translates increase membership of Zainabiyoun Brigade.<sup>300</sup>

IS has found partner in Pakistan in the form of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami – faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). At the core LeJ is an extremist Sunni organization who wants to establish caliphate in Pakistan. Their goals are not broad-based like those of Taliban and Al-Qaeda instead they more concentrated on the regional level.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> Mehdi Hussain and Tahir Khan, **At Least 23 Killed, 30 Injured in Parachinar Blast**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1009233/four-dead-several-wounded-in-parachinar-blast/> (12 December 2017)

<sup>298</sup> **Dozens Accused of Trying to Set Up ISIS Sleeper Cells Arrested in Pakistan**, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/01/04/officials-pakistan-arrests-42-alleged-islamic-state-supporters-seizes-weapons.html> (12 December 2017)

<sup>299</sup> **100 Pakistanis Left For Syria, Iraq To Join ISIS**, <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/100-pakistanis-left-for-syria-iraq-to-join-isis-1262380> (13 December 2017)

<sup>300</sup> Farhan Zahid, **The Zainabiyoun Brigade: A Pakistani Shiite Militia amid the Syrian Conflict**, pg. 6

<sup>301</sup> Farhan Zahid, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State,” **Terrorism Monitor** Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017, pg. 5

LeJ is an offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) came on ground as a consolidated groups after the assassination of founding father Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in 1991. Leaders such as Akram Lahori, Riaz Basra and Malik Ishaq established LeJ and based it in Punjab. They carried out operations against prominent Shia personalities and attacked their religious processions.<sup>302</sup>

The year 2016 saw the wrath of the IS in Pakistan in three attacks. LeJ al-Alami claimed responsibilities for the mentioned attacks. In October 2016, Quetta Police Academy was attacked in which 61 people died with 170 wounded. Later, al-Alami group claimed the responsibility of attacking the academy because it was a soft target. It is reported that this specific group is quite strong in Balochistan and are involved in sectarian attacks.<sup>303</sup>

A senior military commander in Balochistan, General Sher Afgun stated, "We came to know from the communication intercepts that there were three militants who were getting instructions from Afghanistan."<sup>304</sup>

November 2016, Balochistan witnessed another deadly attack on Sufi shrine of Shah Noorani in Khuzdar. The attack claimed 52 lives and wounded more than 105 people. Expert on militancy, Amir Rana said, "It seems that IS has found an ally in Pakistan, which is probably the al Alami faction Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The group is organising the scattered factions of sectarian outfits and Taliban factions, across the country, but it is much organised in Balochistan and Sindh."<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Zahid, **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State.**

<sup>303</sup> **Pakistan: LeJ Behind Police Academy Attack in Quetta,**  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/pakistan-lej-police-academy-attack-quetta-161025160102452.html> (15 December 2017)

<sup>304</sup> **Pakistan: LeJ Behind Police Academy Attack in Quetta.**

<sup>305</sup> **Families Ripped Apart in Khuzdar Shrine Attack,**  
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1229650/families-ripped-apart-khuzdar-shrine-attack/> (17 December 2017)

This LeJ al-Alami claimed the responsibility of altogether three bloody attacks in Balochistan, one in Khuzdar and two in Quetta.<sup>306</sup>

A very famous firebrand anti-Shia chief cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz of Lal Mosque in Islamabad came into news again in the year 2014. Earlier, his female students of Jamia Hafsa released a video in Arabic inviting ISIS to Pakistan and asking militants to cooperate with them. Maulana acknowledged that his students made the video with his consent. He further said that his students wanted to take out a rally in support of the ISIS but he didn't give them permission.<sup>307</sup>

Maulana Aziz warned the authorities should they try to trace the girls in the video, "I am warning the authorities to refrain from committing another misadventure under the garb of the video which is harmless and only expresses support for Baghdadi and his organization. Authorities will have to face the consequences if an operation is carried out against the students of the Jamia Hafsa."<sup>308</sup>

In the wake of the attack on Masjid-e-Nabwi – Muslim's second holiest sites in Saudi Arabia prompted the leader of notorious Jamia Masjid Abu Bakar Siddique made a public call to slaughter Shias. He made clear to his audience that the supposed attacker of the mosque is Iranian and the Shias are trying to get hold of Saudi Arabia.<sup>309</sup> It was later revealed that the attacker was a 26 year old Saudi citizen with a track record of drug abuse.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>306</sup> Azaz Syed, **Rebirth of Banned LJ in the Name of LJA**, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/117059-Rebirth-of-banned-LJ-in-the-name-of-LJA> (17 December 2017)

<sup>307</sup> Azam Khan, **No Regret over Supporting IS, Says Lal Masjid Cleric**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/806711/no-regret-over-supporting-is-says-lal-masjid-cleric/> (18 December 2017)

<sup>308</sup> Khan, **No Regret Over Supporting IS, Says Lal Masjid Cleric**.

<sup>309</sup> Faraz Husain, **Why is Pakistan Allowing an Imam to Call for Jihad Against our Shia Community?**, <https://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/36846/why-is-pakistan-allowing-an-imam-to-call-for-jihad-against-our-shia-community/>. (18 December 2017)

<sup>310</sup> **Jeddah Suicide Bomber Proves to be Indian Instead of Pakistani**, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/133615-Jeddah-suicide-bomber-proves-to-be-Indian-instead-of-Pakistani> (19 December 2017)

The so-called scholar proceeded to advise his audience to donate their money to organizations like Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) to further their cause of annihilation of Shias.<sup>311</sup>

In the year 2015, a prayer leader Abubakar was arrested in Kasur, Punjab for giving hate speeches against Shia group. He was awarded five year imprisonment. His prosecutor said, “The Imam was found guilty of inciting hatred against Shia [people] and raised slogans during his sermon that Shias were infidels.” The action came in the wake of National Action Plan (NAP) which was promulgated after the APS tragedy.<sup>312</sup>

These arrests don’t help much as we have the example of Malik Ishaq from 2011 as he was released on bail by the court. According to an internal report provided by the law enforcement department of the Punjab government, Ishaq has been allegedly involved in the killing of 70 people, mostly Shia. Ishaq again started what he had been doing that is giving hate speeches.<sup>313</sup>

The document’s title is “Highly objectionable activities of Malik Ishaq” reads “Please find enclosed herewith four vernacular reports regarding some highly objectionable activities of Malik Ishaq whose name has also been placed in the fourth schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) for information and appropriate legal action.”<sup>314</sup>

Ishaq made inflammatory speeches and said, “All those against Sahaba, are not our personal enemies, but the enemies of Islam. And we will fight them ... we cannot tolerate these elements at any cost.” Ishaq went ahead attending a conference by the name of Difa-e-Sahaba conference held at Madrasa Qasamul Uloom where he made

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<sup>311</sup> Husain, **Why is Pakistan Allowing an Imam to Call for Jihad Against our Shia Community?**

<sup>312</sup> **Pakistani Imam Jailed for Five Years for Anti-Shia Sermons**,  
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/889374/pakistani-imam-jailed-for-five-years-for-hate-speech/> (20 December 2017)

<sup>313</sup> Asad Kharal, **LeJ Leader Continues to Preach Violence**,  
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/254851/lej-leader-continues-to-preach-violence/> (21 December 2017)

<sup>314</sup> Kharal, **LeJ leader continues to preach violence**.

incendiary speech, killings of the enemies of Sahaba would continue”. Adding, “Prisons will not stop our mission. The LeJ is not a terrorist outfit. It was set up to ensure proper respect for the companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).”<sup>315</sup>

News reports suggest that despite being announced as a terrorist outfit, policeman stand guard outside his residence in Mohallah Islam Nagar.<sup>316</sup>

Another long-standing rabble-rouser is Aurangzeb Farooqi of Ahle Sunnat wal Jama‘at organization formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan which was banned by former dictator Pervez Musharraf. He was attacked in 2013 in Karachi, where his six bodyguard died but he survived with a bullet in his thigh. During recovery from the injuries in hospital, he addressed his people, “Enemies should listen to this: my task now is Sunni awakening.” Adding, “I will make Sunnis so powerful against Shi‘ites that no Sunni will even want to shake hands with a Shi‘ite.” He didn’t stop there further issuing threatening statement, “They will die their own deaths, we won’t have to kill them.”<sup>317</sup>

LeJ is responsible for inciting hatred in economic hub of Karachi which is widening the sectarian gap in the country. There is a suspicion by police that LeJ is responsible for the targeted killings of more than 80 Shias in Karachi in last six months including bankers, doctors and teachers. LeJ has already claimed responsibility for Quetta blasts.<sup>318</sup>

Violence is going on a quid pro quo basis in Karachi. Detectives make a guess work that a Shia militant force known as Mehdi Force is behind drive-by shootings of the likes of Farooqi.<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> Kharal, **LeJ Leader Continues to Preach Violence.**

<sup>316</sup> Kharal, **LeJ Leader Continues to Preach Violence.**

<sup>317</sup> Matthew Green, **Insight: Spiral of Karachi Killings Widens Pakistan's Sectarian Divide**, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-sectarian/insight-spiral-of-karachi-killings-widens-pakistans-sectarian-divide-idUSBRE91N00G20130224> (21 December 2017)

<sup>318</sup> Green, **Insight: Spiral of Karachi Killings Widens Pakistan's Sectarian Divide**

<sup>319</sup> Green, **Insight: Spiral of Karachi Killings Widens Pakistan's Sectarian Divide**



Over the last 15 years 7,000+ Shia have been killed and wounded in different incidents - a figure given by South Asian Terrorism Portal.<sup>320</sup> In the year 2013, a Shia doctor Syed Ali Haider and his 12 year son were killed in broad daylight in Lahore by unknown assailants. His family member said, “There is no doubt that this assassination is motivated by the sectarian prejudices as Dr Haider Ali like his parents-in-law believed in Fiqah Jafria.”<sup>321</sup>

In the same year, a Shia scholar Allama Alim Al-Musvi was gunned down in Peshawar on his way to the mosque.<sup>322</sup> In Karachi, Sindh High Court lawyer Kausar Saqlain was shot dead along with his two sons Owais Abbas and Muhammad Abbas when they were going to his children’s school to drop him.<sup>323</sup>

Syed Shabir Hussain Shah, Shia Director of the Student Affairs, Gujrat University in Punjab was shot dead along with his driver by gunmen riding motorbike when his vehicle was just about to reach the university. A spokesperson of the university Sheikh Abdul Rashid remarked, “He was a Shia by sect, but a very progressive official of the campus.” A professor on the condition of anonymity said, “He had been threatened by unknown people in the past.”<sup>324</sup>

In 2016, Khurram Zaki, a vocal peace activist was killed in Karachi. Zaki was the renowned activist who led a rally against Maulana Abdul Aziz demanding his arrest for hate speech and justification of APS attack in 2014 which killed 134 children.

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<sup>320</sup> **Shias Killed in Pakistan Since 2001,**

[http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/pakistan/database/Shias\\_killed\\_Pakistan.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/pakistan/database/Shias_killed_Pakistan.htm) (22 December 2017)

<sup>321</sup> Imran Chaudhry, **Targeted Attack: Shia Doctor, Son Killed in Lahore,**

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/509345/targeted-attack-shia-doctor-son-killed-in-lahore/> (23 December 2017)

<sup>322</sup> **Shia Scholar Killed in Peshawar,** <http://newsweekpakistan.com/shia-scholar-killed-in-peshawar/> (23 December 2017)

<sup>323</sup> **Sectarian Violence: Shia SHC Lawyer, Sons Shot Dead in Karachi,**

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/555425/sectarian-violence-shc-lawyer-sons-shot-dead-in-karachi/> (24 December 2017)

<sup>324</sup> **Gunmen Kill Shia Director of Pakistan University,**

<http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/2013/11/19/gunmen-kill-shia-director-of-pakistan-university/> (24 December 2017)

Hakeemullah group, a branch of Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility of killing him saying he was target because of his protest against Maulana Abdul Aziz.<sup>325</sup>

Delegation of the European Union issued a statement calling on government of Pakistan to bring the culprits to book. Statement further read that Pakistan should enhance its protective measures for rights activists and ensure all its citizens get their constitutional rights to freedom of expression and religion.<sup>326</sup>

These above mentioned high profile cases suggests that there is an ongoing movement of wiping out Shias from Pakistan. In 2015, Jundullah – an anti-Shia terror group and ISIS attacked Ismaili Shia Muslims killing 45 people and injuring 13 in a bus in Karachi. Jundullah spokesperson issued a statement saying that victims of the attack are infidels and they will carry out more attacks in future against Shias, Ismailis and Christians.<sup>327</sup>

What is concerning in this regard is that despite Jundullah's act of owning responsibility Pakistan's foreign secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry blamed Indian agency RAW for the attacks. Top brass of military had also put the responsibility on their nemesis RAW by saying, "whipping up terrorism."<sup>328</sup>

Akbar in his article points out, blame game has always been a part of Pakistan since its inception. With time, this blaming tactic has given a leverage to every civilian politician, military and religious leaders to cover up their blunders. He blames

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<sup>325</sup> Faraz Khan, **Taliban Faction Claims Killing Khurram Zaki in Karachi**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1099371/taliban-faction-claim-killing-anti-militant-activist-in-karachi/> (25 December 2017)

<sup>326</sup> **EU Team Condemns HR Activist's Killing**, <https://fp.brecorder.com/2016/05/2016050944305/> (25 December 2017)

<sup>327</sup> **Pakistan Gunmen Kill 45 on Karachi Ismaili Shia Bus**, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32717321> (25 December 2017)

<sup>328</sup> Kamran Yousaf, **Corps Commanders' Conference: 'RAW Whipping Up Terrorism in Pakistan'**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/881162/corps-commanders-conference-under-way-to-discuss-national-security/> (25 December 2017)

Pakistani government for overlooking the local terrorists and putting the onus on foreign entities.<sup>329</sup>

Pakistani authorities need to accept the fact that there is a serious problem across ethnic, religious and economic spectrums. Recognizing the problem is the first step towards solving it.

Pakistan needs to view ethnic problems seriously post-Dhaka debacle. It was the unjust treatment of Bengalis that led to the foundation of the Bangladesh and the loss of its eastern flank. It was supposed to be lesson learnt the hard way but unfortunately, respective leaders haven't learned their lesson.

### **CURRENT DYNAMICS IN PAKISTAN**

'Development' is a word that is not seen practically and evenly distributed in provinces of Pakistan. Balochistan remains the largest province with the scarce population and one of the most neglected one. Former President Asif Ali Zardari initiated the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan in 2009. Under the umbrella of this initiative, he tried to allay the concerns of Balochis and kick-start the development work.<sup>330</sup>

Fast forward to 2012, National Assembly saw a heated debate on the disturbances in Balochistan. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Senator Mir Lashkari Raisani said even after 27 months, 19 crucial proposals after the revelation of the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan program.<sup>331</sup>

Unimplemented crucial projects includes the special quota in Higher Education Commission (HEC) scholarships, launching a probe into the killing of Nawab

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<sup>329</sup> Malik Siraj Akbar, **How Pakistan Hurts Its People By Blaming India**, [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/how-pakistan-hurts-its-pe\\_b\\_7289882.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/how-pakistan-hurts-its-pe_b_7289882.html) (27 December 2017)

<sup>330</sup> **Asif Ali Zardari**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/598378> (25 December 2017)

<sup>331</sup> Zahid Gishkori, **Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan: Lawmakers Begin to Question Govt's Sincerity**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/335609/aghaz-e-haqooq-e-balochistan-lawmakers-begin-to-question-govts-sincerity/> ( 26 December 2017)

Akbar Bugti and other political leaders, fulfilment of assembly resolution and the return of exiled Baloch leaders who weren't involved in terrorism.<sup>332</sup>

If Pakistan continues with the previous trends, situation can blow up like previous incidents. Perpetual neglect can lead to further strengthened attempts at insurgency. Separatist organizations like BLA gain ground because they can capitalize on the grievances of the masses.

Balochistan has a strategic location bordering Iran and as well as a very critical second functioning sea port of Gwadar. Balochistan's Sui region is also the provider of the natural gas for the rest of the Pakistan. Any instability can lead to the disruption of the gas flow, lead to Pakistan and China relation meltdown dealing a heavy blow to the booming CPEC. Hurting Chinese sentiments would cost Pakistan a fortune since China is heavily involved in Pakistan's different sectors as a major investor. Separation of Balochistan also means that Pakistan would lose contact with one of its neighbours Iran which will drastically change the relation between the two states.

If Balochistan separatist movement gains momentum it would give impetus to other long forgotten irredentist movements of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh. Pakistan mulled over the idea of declaring Gilgit-Baltistan fifth province. The decision was taken by the committee spearheaded by advisor of foreign affairs Sartaj Aziz who put forward the idea of making a new province. To this end, a constitutional modification would be made so that \$46 billion CPEC passes.<sup>333</sup>

Pakistan's attempt at merging Gilgit-Baltistan with the mainland also met with the backlash from Jammu Kashmir leadership. Joint Resistance Leadership (JRL) issued a statement, "Kashmir, Ladakh, Jammu, Azad Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit Baltistan comprise a single entity. The political destiny of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be decided. The proposal to declare Gilgit-Baltistan as the fifth province of

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<sup>332</sup> Gishkori, **Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan: Lawmakers Begin to Question Govt's Sincerity.**

<sup>333</sup> **Pakistan Set to Declare Gilgit-Baltistan as Fifth Province,**  
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-set-to-declare-gilgit-baltistan-as-fifth-province/articleshow/57647939.cms> (28 December 2017)

Pakistan will have a damaging impact on the disputed status of state.” He added, “However, any step that may hamper the disputed status of Kashmir is unacceptable.”<sup>334</sup>

It should be noted here that any forced changes in the country would lead to exacerbation of already festering nationalistic wounds of different ethnic groups. Extra-regional powers and vested interests can take advantage of the instability opening avenues for further instability.

In the same vein it is pertinent to discuss about Karachi which has become a hotbed of violence since past few decades. In the year 2017, DG Rangers Sindh Maj. General Muhammad Saeed gave a speech on the occasion of 14<sup>th</sup> August independence day celebrations in Karachi.<sup>335</sup> He vowed for the security of the country’s largest city which is riddled with political and sectarian assassinations. Karachi is the city which houses every ethnic group with hence, a microcosm of Pakistan. His speech went fine until he questioned the Muhajir (Urdu-speaking population) community about their loyalties towards the homeland. His speech drew ire from the Muhajirs who demographically dominate Karachi.

People holding sensitive position like DG Rangers shouldn’t give inflammatory speeches which can hurt the sensitivities of a certain section of the society. People like him are supposed to be upholders of the national values of Pakistan. Statement like these from higher-ups can reinforce the idea of alienation and pushing against the wall. Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) are supposed to glue together different fragments of society.

There are number of ethnic based political parties in Pakistan which are at daggers drawn accusing each other of encroaching upon their rights. For instance, Awami National Party (ANP) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) are two political

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<sup>334</sup> **Separatists Oppose Pak Plan to Annex Gilgit Baltistan,**

<http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-separatists-oppose-pak-plan-to-annex-gilgit-baltistan-2357361> (29 December 2017)

<sup>335</sup> News Updates, **DG Rangers Sindh Speech 14 AUGUST 2017**, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3tnVDeSEAw>. (29 December 2017)

parties. ANP is a Pashtun political party whereas MQM has changed overtime and has expanded its reach beyond Muhajir community. Both vie for power and in the year 2010 alone, 30 people died in five days. Both parties traded barbs and accuse each other of land mafia and target killings.<sup>336</sup>

In the year 2017, Karachi was ranked one of the most dangerous cities of the world. The research was conducted by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), the research and analysis division of The Economist Group. Karachi ranked 134<sup>th</sup> in a total of 140 cities.<sup>337</sup> What is needed here is the deweaponization of Karachi to get rid of the menace of ethnic and sectarian terrorism. All political parties should be taken into account to undertake such a humungous task. It includes the disbanding of militant wings of all parties who are active in violence.

Robotka in her article gives another suggestion of introducing “Charter of Karachi” that entails certain rules and regulations. The idea includes some specific rules for the new comers to the city for temporary basis or permanent settlement. Promoting trade and economic activity with relaxed rules of taxation. To realize this dream a potent local government and a stable infrastructure is needed.<sup>338</sup>

Education is another dilemma faced by Pakistan. Unfortunately, it has its own role in the rising sectarianism in the country. In the year 2017, literacy rate dropped by 2%. Urban-rural divide and gender discrimination in the pursuit of education is glaring. Urban rate of education stood at 74% and 49% for the rural areas. Male literacy graph stood at 81% and the female one took a staggering low at 68%.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> **MQM-ANP Slugfest Goes Public Over Target Killings,**

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/30857/mqm-anp-slugfest-goes-public-over-target-killings/> (30 December 2017)

<sup>337</sup> **Karachi Ranked Among Worst Cities of the World to Live In,**

<https://www.dawn.com/news/1352353>, (25 January 2017)

<sup>338</sup> Bettina Robotka, Political Turmoil in a Megacity: The Role of Karachi for the Stability of Pakistan and South Asia, **Pakistan Vision** Vol. 14, No.2, 2013, pg. 22-23.

<sup>339</sup> Riazul Haq, **Literacy Rate in Pakistan Slips by 2%,**

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1419396/economic-survey-literacy-rate-pakistan-slips-2/> (25 January 2017)

Other than the overall dismal education situation we have madrasa education - religious seminary also. Ahmad notes that majority of the students comes from lower income strata of the population. Reason behind, most of the modern education imparting schools are either expensive, not at reachable distance or overcrowded. KPK takes most of the share of student supply. Second comes Azad Kashmir and economically down-trodden areas of Punjab.<sup>340</sup>

Ahmad contends that madrasas are not source of the evil. Had they been the reason of the chaos perpetrated now, it would have started before 1990s. Curriculum can be sectarian or highly literalist but it doesn't promote the violence instead it's been pacifist at most. A huge number of madrasas are not involved in promoting violence in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed everything for the traditional madrasa education. Many of the madrasa associated with terrorism were originally militant training camps where some level of religious education was imparted. They were given the façade of madrasas to seek funding.<sup>341</sup>

Qadri builds on Ahmad's argument writing prudish forms of madrasas boomed during Zia-ul-Haq's era that accompanied Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These madrasas received benevolent funding from Zia, Arab states specially Saudi Arabia to instil Salafist ideology.<sup>342</sup>

In 2015, a report prepared by KPK provincial government acknowledged that 145 madrasas make it the list of "highly sensitive" category. The report says that 26% are unregistered that is 3,010 madrasas. KPK Information Minister Mushtaq Ahmed

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<sup>340</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrasa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh," **Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia**, Ed. Satu P. Limaye, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawaii, 2004, pg. 108.

<sup>341</sup> Ahmed, **Madrasa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh**

<sup>342</sup> Mustafa Qadri, **Fixing Pakistan's Madrasas**, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/15/pakistan-madrasa-islam-reform> (25 January 2017)

Ghani stated only foreign students with proper documents would be allowed to stay and action would be taken against the illegal ones.<sup>343</sup>

The same year, Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan said, “Some madrassas are receiving financial support from Muslim countries. However, it is often difficult to trace the transaction of such remittances.”<sup>344</sup>

The year 2015 saw the deadliest attack on Ismaili community claiming 43 people and injuring 13. One of the attackers Hafiz Nasir had a Master’s degree of Islamic Studies from University of Karachi. Second one, Saad Aziz was a graduate of Institute of Business Administration (IBA). Third one Muhammad Azhar Arshad was the graduate of Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology (SSUET) from Electronic Engineer department – an expert in making time bombs. Only the last one Tahir Minhas is not as educated as the others and just did Matriculation.<sup>345</sup>

One has to bear in mind, IBA is the same institute which has a distinguished alumni of people such as former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, former Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan Dr. Ishrat Hussain and the present President Mamnoon Hussain.

Another recent case is of Noreen Laghari who was second year Medical student at Liaquat Medical College. She left her city by her choice to join ISIS and carry out a

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<sup>343</sup> Ali Akbar, **145 KP Seminaries Classified 'Highly Sensitive' in Govt Report**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1166902/145-kp-seminaries-classified-highly-sensitive-in-govt-report> (25 January 2017)

<sup>344</sup> Akbar, **145 KP Seminaries Classified 'Highly Sensitive' in Govt Report**.

<sup>345</sup> Hafeez Tunio, **Arrested Safoora Attack Mastermind Behind Sabeen's Murder: Sindh CM**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/889452/arrested-safoora-attack-mastermind-confesses-to-sabeen-mahmuds-murder/> (25 January 2017)



suicide attack on Easter at church.<sup>346</sup> Noreen was arrested by the LEAs but was later released on grounds of raising awareness among youths, parents and institutions.<sup>347</sup>

Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani born naturalized American involved in an attempted attack on New York's Time Square was also a graduate of one of the American university.<sup>348</sup> This goes on to show the extent of extremism that has seeped into the Pakistani society.

In recent developments, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed announced his decision of making his party Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) compete in next general elections. In his statement he said his struggle is to "highlight the Kashmir cause internationally." Further adding "This is the right time to enter the country's politics to persuade the world community by establishing an independent foreign desk to highlight the Kashmir cause."<sup>349</sup>

Saeed has a bounty of \$10 million on accounts of his involvement in Mumbai attack. Saeed is clearly against making peace with India and said Nawaz Sharif deserves to be ousted because of his friendly gesture towards India.<sup>350</sup>

Another latest development is the coming of Tehreek-e-ya-Labbaik Rasool Allah (TLYRA) to the political scene. The newly formed religious party acting as a pressure group turned to Islamabad when its protestors marched from Lahore to Islamabad in what was their way of protesting against the unintended "clerical

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<sup>346</sup> **Noreen Laghari Says She Was Going To Be Used As Suicide Bomber**, <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/04/noreen-laghari-says-she-was-going-to-be-used-as-suicide-bomber/> (25 January 2017)

<sup>347</sup> **DG ISPR Explains Why Noreen Laghari Was Released**, <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/05/dg-ispr-explains-why-noreen-laghari-was-released/> (25 January 2017)

<sup>348</sup> Chris Cuomo and Chris Vlasto; **A Life Thrown Away: Faisal Shahzad Went From MBA to Alleged Terrorist**, <http://abcnews.go.com/WN/TheLaw/shahzad-leaves-traces-life-thrown/story?id=10555970> (25 January 2017)

<sup>349</sup> **Hafiz Saeed 'To Take Part in 2018 Elections'**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1574650/1-hafiz-saeed-take-part-2018-elections/> (25 January 2017)

<sup>350</sup> **Hafiz Saeed Calls Nawaz Sharif a 'Traitor' for Seeking Peace with India**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1567324/1-hafiz-saeed-calls-nawaz-sharif-traitor-seeking-peace-india/> (25 January 2017)

error” related to the finality of the prophet-hood in the form of the applicants contesting for the elections. The group was able to take hostage the city for a total of 21 days demanding resignation of Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah and Federal Law Minister Zahid Hamid along with the restoration of Khatm-e-Nabuwat (finality of the prophet-hood).<sup>351</sup>

Islamabad High Court (IHC) asked protestors to end their protest at Faizabad intersection connecting the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. On 25<sup>th</sup> November, Police and Frontier Corps launched an operation against the protestors but withdrew in few hours.<sup>352</sup> Later, a deal was brokered by the army between government and the protestors. In accordance with the deal damage money for the properties would be paid by the federal and provincial government and protestors would be released from the police custody. Moreover, resignation of Zahid Hamid. A committee led by Raza Zafarul Haq was formed to investigate the person behind the clerical error of Khatm-e-Nabuwat clause the new election law that started off the fiasco in the capital city. The intended committee was supposed to give its final report within 30 days.<sup>353</sup>

Apparent surrender by the government to the religious goons is not a positive precedent for the future. Political analyst Hasan Askari-Rizvi commented that if the government was already willing to make Zahid Hamid then why they didn't do it earlier, why so late after the loss of property and lives. He added to his comment, “The use of force did not work, because it was not properly planned, nor did the government realise the nationwide repercussions of the operation.”<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> Fawad Hasan, **Faizabad Sit-In: The Trail of 21 Days**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1569778/1-faizabad-sit-trail-21-days/> (25 January 2017)

<sup>352</sup> Hasan, **Faizabad Sit-In: The Trail of 21 Days**

<sup>353</sup> Arsalan Altaf, **Tehreek-e-Labbaik Calls Off Islamabad Sit-In After Govt Accepts Demands**, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1569581/1-khadim-hussain-rizvi-calls-off-faizabad-sit-law-minister-resigns/> (26 January 2017)

<sup>354</sup> Hamid Khan Wazir, **Opp Flays Govt Over Faizabad Fiasco, Civil Society Calls Agreement with TLYR a Surrender to Extremism**, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/27/political-parties-intelligentsia-divided-over-sit-ins-end/> (26 January 2017)

Eminent human rights activist and Quaid-e-Azam University professor Farzana Bari said, “The extremist proved their power by forcing the government to give in.” Adding, “The secular, democratic forces were on the sidelines, watching helplessly as the country fell into an abyss.”<sup>355</sup>

With the start of the New Year another religious group leader Pir Sialvi demanded *Sharia* (Islamic law) to be implemented within 7 days or they will take out protest rallies all around the country. Sialvi guided his followers not to vote for PML-N because the ruling party had failed to bring the culprit to book who was responsible for altered text in form related to the finality of prophet.<sup>356</sup>

To what extent bigotry and monomaniacs have infiltrated our society in large one has to see this recent incident in Pakistan. In Charsadda, a 12<sup>th</sup> class student at a private college shot dead his principal after being reprimanded for skipping schools to attend the protest organized by TYLRA. Student justified the murder by accusing the principal of blasphemy. He went on to say, "I am not afraid to kill." He further said that he has been taught to kill anyone who commits blasphemy.<sup>357</sup>

A very high profile blasphemy case took place in 2017. A Mass Communication student of Abdul Wali Khan University in Mardan was beaten and shot dead on the university premises by the vigilante group of students. He was charged with posting blasphemous content on Facebook. The number of charged students is astounding. Hostel Warden claimed the number to be around 3,000 to 4,000.<sup>358</sup>

The year 2017 was a happening one for Pakistani activists also. At least five activists have been disappeared by unknown abductors. The most famous case is of Salman Haidar who was an academic, poet and human rights activist. He was very

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<sup>355</sup> Wazir, **Opp Flays Govt Over Faizabad Fiasco, Civil Society Calls Agreement with TLYR a Surrender to Extremism.**

<sup>356</sup> **Sialvi Demands Shariah in Seven Days**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1384229/sialvi-demands-shariah-in-seven-days> (26 January 2017)

<sup>357</sup> Ali Akbar, **Rebuked for skipping classes, student kills college principal, accuses him of blasphemy.**

<sup>358</sup> Ali Akbar and Hassan Farhan, **Mardan university student lynched by mob over alleged blasphemy: police**, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1326729> (26 January 2017)

vocal against religious extremism and forced disappearances of Baloch rights activist.<sup>359</sup>

It has become a trend, of abducting activists who may or may not post blasphemous content. Anyone who is seen to digress from the set norm of debate is seen as an anti-Islam, anti-Pakistani military or a propagator of Ahmadi sect and an agent on foreign pay roll.

Moreover right-wing groups have started their venomous campaign against the activists accusing them of blasphemy and anti-Islam propaganda. The five activists who disappeared close to each other's disappearances. No group or security agency has claimed the responsibility of their disappearances.<sup>360</sup>

Their disappearances point out to the repressive introduction of the cybercrime law in 2016. Pakistani National Assembly passed the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill 2015 which gives unprecedented powers to LEAs to nab anyone who is deemed anti-state. Government officials maintain, introduced laws are mean to curtail the menace of terrorism. Whereas, rights activist assert that this could mean decrease in freedom of expression and unfair court actions.<sup>361</sup>

Blasphemy laws and the surrounding sacrosanctity around the issue makes it difficult to tackle because of the repercussions.

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<sup>359</sup> Farooq Yousaf, **Pakistan's Missing Human Rights Activists**, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistans-missing-human-rights-activists/> (26 January 2017)

<sup>360</sup> Issam Ahmed and Gohar Abbas, **Pakistani Right Cries 'Blasphemy' to Muzzle Progressives**, [https://finance.yahoo.com/news/pakistani-cries-blasphemy-muzzle-progressives-044842744.html?soc\\_src=social-sh&soc\\_trk=tw](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/pakistani-cries-blasphemy-muzzle-progressives-044842744.html?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=tw) (25 January 2017)

<sup>361</sup> Mehreen Zahra-Malik, **Pakistan Passes Controversial Cyber-Crime Law**, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-internet/pakistan-passes-controversial-cyber-crime-law-idUSKCN10N0ST> (26 January 2017)

What KPK has done should be emulated by all other remaining provinces. Federal government should come up with a comprehensive curriculum for madrassas with English, Science and Mathematics to create a new generation which is well-equipped for the challenges of the job market. Moreover, religious texts should be monitored and carefully selected so that the violent elements such as jihad are not over-emphasized.

Madrassa registration and regulation ordinance of 2001 should be implemented earnestly to count the exact number of madrassas does Pakistan have on its soil.

Across the urban-rural divide, schools, colleges and university students' till undergraduate level should be comparative religious studies to impart the basic knowledge of both Shia and Sunni Islam in order to clear the misconception both have for each other. This will help in building a new generation which would not believe in hearsay and lead to an overall better environment in the society.

A law should be passed for both Shia and Sunni construction of mosques and madrassas. Mosques and madrassa constructed on illegal land should be demolished so as to send a message that illegal activity would not be tolerated by the government even if it is done in the garb of Islam.

All religious scholars of both sides should be registered and their speeches and Friday sermons be monitored to curtail hate speech against any sect or minority.

All madrassas should be made accountable and made to reveal their sources of income. Any sort of foreign sponsorship must be halted immediately.

Government schools should be at accessible distance in every town and district so that even students who want to go to school don't end up in madrassas. Government schools shouldn't be made a privilege afforded just by lower-upper class. It should be made accessible to all strata of the society specially lower-lower class so that they can move-up the vertical ladder of economic progress.

Militants ready to give up arms should be rehabilitated back into society with the help of the state institutions.

Those militants who are involved in violence should be dealt with iron fists with quick court procedures so that they don't get enough time to organize prison break and organize further attacks.

Blasphemy laws should be repealed as it has no place in a civilized world. The law has already been used against minorities for personal reasons rather than actual blasphemy. Repealing it would yield a severe backlash from the clergy and their supporters but now the time has come that these right-wing hate mongers are dealt with and the blasphemy law gets done with it for once and all.

“Mainstreaming” of jihadi parties should not be encouraged by the establishment as they will bring their violent political culture into the politics and masses much more easily than before. It is very easy to use religion card and increase the vote bank. Furthermore, it will mar Pakistan's relation with neighbouring countries specially India and Iran who want these organizations disbanded and rendered powerless. Pakistan can't afford to have two hostile neighbours on its peripheries. Giving free hand to militants would result in more influx of Jihadis both to and from Afghanistan hence more damage to the already Pak-Afghan relations where already Afghan government blames Pakistan for stirring trouble on its soil.

Social media hate campaigns have proved fatal in recent times. Religious gung-hoes are active day and night in smearing minorities, human rights activists and peace makers as foreign paid anti-Pakistan, anti-Islam and anti-Pakistan military agents. They openly call them names and look forward to their violent deaths. A lot of these social media pages especially on Facebook were actually celebrating by posting vulgar and crude memes when a number of these activists were abducted in broad day light. Enactment of Cyber Crime law is futile if these mass hate campaigns are not being noticed by the authorities.

Foreign policy should be made keeping in view the pragmatism required for such a job. Religion should not be emphasized as more than needed. Pakistan should focus on have mutual beneficial relations with all its neighbours specifically.

Besides, measure should be taken to strengthen civil society to create awareness for the masses. Active participants should be given legal protection from the rogue elements of the society who constantly malign them on social media and attack them when opportunity rises.



## CONCLUSION

To conclude, Shia-Sunni enmity is what defines current relations among different Muslim dominated states in the present era. Regrettably, this discord has permeated South Asia also specially Pakistan which has a unique composition of both Shia and Sunni population. The country has a chequered past marred with military coups and instable democracies with instances of foreign influences.

First, Pakistani authorities need to accept the fact that there is a serious problem across ethnic, religious and economic spectrums. Recognizing the problem is the first step towards solving it.

As aforementioned Pakistan is deeply entangled between the Saudi and Iranian competition for a long time. Swift regional changes in the 1970s with the rise of Khomeini to power and the Soviet aggression towards Afghanistan brought brusque changes for the Pakistan.

Things took a gloomy turn when US initiated the efforts to counter the Soviet influence in Afghanistan and made Pakistan its ally in countering the perceived menace of Red Army. Saudi Arabia also entered the scenario and shouldered the burden of financial sponsorship. Pakistan was given the task of training and supplying of the militants to be sent to Afghanistan to fight off the Soviets.

In the same vein, ran Zia-ul-Haq's islamization policy of Pakistan. This policy of making Sunni Islam a dominant narrative in the political and personal sphere of the citizens had a boomerang effect. This initiative polarized the once united society of Pakistan. Shias of Pakistan came out stronger and organized as never before. They put up a strong resistance.

Iran joined the arena and came out as a patronizing force of Pakistani Shias. Parallel to the Saudi efforts to arms Sunni militants, Iran started building, organizing and sponsoring armed Shia militants.

In truth, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have historical ties with Pakistan dating back to its birth. Ironically, the two states which are mostly responsible for sectarianism in



Pakistan are the ones that helped Pakistan in times of national crisis such as wars against India.

External stimuli of Soviet-Afghan war along with Iranian Revolution and Pakistan's participation in the efforts against Soviets at the behest of the Americans inadvertently brought about domestic changes for Pakistan.

Pakistan's internal dynamics includes two of the main components: identity and ethnic disparity. The reason why Pakistan came into being has different perspectives. Religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami which were previously against the very creation of the country later took it upon themselves to make Pakistan "Islamic" free of any western influences. A common narrative is that Pakistan was made as an effort to give a separate homeland for Indian Muslims.

Unfortunately, military rulers such as Haq used Islam as a legitimizing device to prolong and strengthen his rule. It was him who precipitated the sectarian conflict in Pakistan.

The on-going debate of Islamic and secular debate is still raging on. Pakistan inherited multiple cultures and number of religions apart from Islam. Within Islam also Pakistan is a home of different sub-sects of both Shias and Sunnis. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Islamic policy of getting declared Ahmadis kafir by the parliament paved way for the military general Zia's further Islamization.

Foreign dynamics such as Pakistan's relations with its immediate neighbours is a part of the study of external influences. Both India and Pakistan got independence from the British Empire and shared the same history up until 1947. Bruised by the partition and the lingering historical baggage of Kashmir and other disputed territories has affected the relationship so bad that they have had multiple wars.

As aforesaid in previous chapter, Pakistan has used militias against India since its inception. These militias were used as a way to augment the power of the conventional armed forces. The same type of militias were used in Afghanistan as well against the Soviets. This has been a long standing issue between the two combative states. India turned the tables and embraced the cause of Balochistan's

irredentist agenda. This irks the Pakistani authorities who blame India for both ethnic and sectarian unrest in the country, trying its best to exploit the fault lines in its favour. Following sectarian attacks, numerous times references have been made directly and indirectly towards the foreign hand i.e. RAW.

Apart from India, Afghanistan is a long lost brother country who despite sharing common religion and culture has had territorial issues like India with Pakistan. Both the states have traded barbs time and again. Afghanistan regularly accuses Pakistan of meddling in its internal affairs and responsible for terror attacks inside its territory. Whereas, Pakistan has its own reservations about Afghanistan. Pakistan has regularly criticized Afghanistan and issued statement regarding terrorists entering Pakistan from cross border.

The border shared with Iran is also restive because of continuous infiltration of the terrorists from Pakistani side as claimed by the Iranian authorities. Consequently, Iranians have attacked on Pakistani border numerous times. This has created a tense environment between both the states.

Lastly, Saudi Arabia – a monarch state has been close to Pakistanis since the country came into being. Saudi monarchs came as a rescuers of Pakistan in times of financial need but with unsaid conditions. Historically, Saudis helped Pakistan in training of militants by financial aid. Lately, this has been extended to lending a helping hand in quashing Yemeni crisis which was politely declined by Pakistan. Although, Soviets have withdrew from Afghanistan, Saudis continue funding extremist elements who are mostly sectarian perpetuating a violent cycle of assassinations and bombing in the society.

External factors discussed in prior paragraphs makeup for a very potent external catalyst for internal dynamics. Pakistani authorities have routinely put the blame on India and Afghanistan for instigating trouble on its soil. In case of Iran, there is no overt blame game but continuous influx of terrorists and Iranian aggressive reaction has change the character of the relations between the two bordering states.

Saudi funding of hardliner Sunnis begets Iranian endowment towards propagating militant ideas among Shia minority. Both of the communities have become hardened towards each other over time. Sunni hardliners funded by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States run amok all over the country vowing to kill every Shia citizens, Shias on the other hand have a different object and modus operandi. Shia militias have been incriminated in cases of assassinating leading hard-core anti-Shia scholars. They are not targeting Sunnis indiscriminately and have apparently no ambition to wipe out the majority from Pakistan, their only intent is to kill those who are responsible for their killings that is to say; firebrand Maulvis issuing fatwas (religious decree) for their killings.

Militant outfits are now organizing and coming into mainstream politics with their sectarian agendas. If given power these religious parties will further provoke external influences which in turn would exacerbate internal issues.

It's high time for Pakistan to formulate foreign policy in light of its national interest and curtail the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran and promote forces of civil society which act as glue to hold together different segment of society.

Social media has become another ground for sectarian duels in the past few years. There are pages and groups run by extremists who openly call for jihad against Shias and propagate anti-Iran messages and pictures in vernacular language. These pages have thousands of following and have become a modern day tool for spreading hate and recruiting new militants.

In all likelihood, social media has not been spared of sectarian venom that is damaging the roots of the Pakistani society and has become the tool of extremists to further step up their game by attacking their rival sect and its so-called affiliated state. Identity politics is played well behind the screens in the name of Islam.

All in all, the vigour of external dynamics is directly proportional the heightened internal dynamics of Pakistan. The more the external stimuli increases, the more the intra-society fissures deepen.

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