T.C.
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

# MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY ROLE OF NATO

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Business Administration

ISTANBUL, 2004

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Date of Approval by the Administrative Council of the Institute 03/03/2004

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| | |
|---|---|
| ACE | Allied Command Europe |
| ACLANT | Allied Command Atlantic |
| ACRS | Arms Control and Regional Security |
| AFSOUTH | Allied Forces Southern Europe |
| AFTA | Arab Free Trade Area |
| AMU | Arab Maghreb Union |
| AWACS | Airborne Warning and Control Systems |
| CBM | Confidence-Building Measure |
| CCMS | Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society |
| CDE | Conference on Disarmament in Europe |
| CFE | Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CJTF | Combined Joint Task Force |
| CSBM | Confidence- and Security-Building Measure |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| CSCM | Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean |
| CSCME | Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty |
| EAPC | Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| ECU | European Currency Unit |
| ED | Error Density |
| EDC | European Defense Community |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EMP | Euro-Mediterranean Partnership |
| ERRF | European Rapid Reaction Force |
| ESA | European Space Agency |
| Euratom | European Atomic Energy Community |
| EUROFOR | European Rapid Operational Force |
| EUROMARFOR | European Maritime Force |
| EuroMeSCo | Euro-Mediterranean Security Cooperation |

| | |
|---|---|
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FIS | Islamic Salvation Front |
| GIA | Algerian Armed Islamic Group |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| HAMAS | The Islamic Resistance Movement |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| IFOR | NATO-led Implementation Force |
| IG | Islamic Group |
| IMS | International Monitoring System |
| INF | Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces |
| IPU | Inter-Parliamentary Union |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| MAROPS | Mid-Atlantic Rail Operations Study |
| MCC | Mediterranean Cooperation Council |
| MCG | Mediterranean Cooperation Group |
| MDP | Mediterranean Dialogue Partnership |
| MENA | Middle East-North Africa |
| MENAFIO | Middle East and North Africa Financial Intermediary Organization |
| MIA | Armed Islamic Movement |
| MRBM | Medium-Range Ballistic Missile |
| MSG | Mediterranean Special Group |
| NAA | North Atlantic Assembly |
| NAC | North Atlantic Council |
| NACC | North Atlantic Cooperation Council |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NEO | Non-combatant Evacuations Operation |
| NGO | Nongovernmental Organization |
| NMD | NATO Mediterranean Dialogue |
| NPA | NATO Parliamentary Assembly |
| NPG | Nuclear Planning Group |
| NPT | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |

| | |
|---|---|
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OCME | Organization for Cooperation in the Middle East |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PBM | Partnership Building Measure |
| PEO | Program Executive Officer |
| PFLP-GC | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace |
| PIJ | Palestinian Islamic Jihad |
| PJC | Permanent Joint Council |
| PKK | Kurdish Workers' Party |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| PSO | Private Service Operator |
| REDWG | Working Group on Regional Economic Development |
| SALT | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks |
| SDI | Strategic Defense Initiative |
| SFOR | NATO Stabilization Force |
| SHAPE | Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe |
| STANAVFORMED | Standby Naval Force Mediterranean |
| START | Strategic Arms Reduction Talks |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| UTA | Unit Training Assembly |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| WW-II | World War-II |

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis advisor Associated Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN for his invaluable comments, his advices and help throughout my study. His knowledge and guiding insights into strategic studies have provided me a new sound perspective. It was a great honor for me to study with him.

I want to thank Mr. Bedrettin DALAN, the founder and the president of the İstanbul Education and Culture Foundation, for establishing opportunities in such a marvelous university with its precious academic personnel, contemporary educational system and modern buildings.

I also would like to express my best regards to Turkish Land Forces Command for providing this chance to future commanders of the Turkish Military Forces. I would thank to Associated Prof. Dr. Abdülkadir VAROĞLU (Colonel, War College) for giving the opportunity to study in Yeditepe University in the context of institutional framework.

I would like to express my best regards to the Prof. Dr. Doğan ALTUNER, the Dean of Yeditepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences, for his support throughout the master of International Security and Intelligence Program, and to the Ret. Maj. Gen. Rıza KÜÇÜKOĞLU, the Secretary General of Yeditepe University, for his help.

I would like to thank to all academic member of the university, Prof. Dr. Haluk ULMAN on Introduction to International Relations and Turkish Foreign Policy, Prof. Dr. Yaşar GÜRBÜZ on International Law, Prof. Dr. Ahmet YÜCEKÖK on National Security Systems, Ret. Gen. Army Teoman KOMAN on National Security and Intelligence, Author Ercan ÇİTLİOĞLU on International Security Systems, Dr. Dilara KANDEMİR on Law of the Sea, Author Cemil TARHAN on American Government. Prof. Dr. Haluk KABAALİOĞLU on European Union and Associated Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN on International Defense Industry and Humanitarian Law & Peacekeeping Operations for their endless desire for sharing the knowledge.

Finally, I would like to thank to my family, my mother and my father, for their understanding, patience, tolerance and unfailing support during the gestation of this thesis.

**ABSTRACT**

In a changing global world, due to the new understanding of security, new threats and their changing importance some regions, which were not of a great deal of importance, has gained interest. Consequently this emerging importance took attraction of the international organizations.

The big threat from the East to Europe was removed after the collapse of Soviet Union. With this development NATO, most of whose members are in Europe has increased its level of relationships with some regions especially to establish stability and peace. Among these regions is the Mediterranean Region. With the rise of threats (terror, migration, weapons of mass destruction, rapid population growth) NATO increased the focus on its perimeters.

Mediterranean has a great importance for NATO. NATO has begun developing new relations with the countries in this region, especially the Middle Eastern and Northern African countries. Moreover it has formed some dialogues with the region.

In this paper Mediterranean identity, the perception of understanding of security in this region, the effects of this security approach on the region and outside the region, especially the elements which could affect the security of the Mediterranean and in this context the Mediterranean dialogue of NATO, the reactions to this dialogue from the region and some measures NATO needs to take are studied.

The purpose of this academic research was to tell the Mediterranean policy of NATO, which Turkey is a member of. Turkey both as a NATO member and a regional country will be affected by any positive or negative development in the area. Any security problem in the region will affect Turkey as well as any other Mediterranean country.

## ÖZET

Değişen global çevrede güvenlik anlayışındaki ve tehdit unsurları ile önemlerindeki değişimlerden dolayı daha önceden ön planda olmayan bazı bölgeler ön planda olmaya başlamış ve bu da uluslararası örgütlerin bu bölgelerle ilgilenmesine sebep olmuştur.

Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasından sonra Avrupa'nın doğu tehdidi kalkmıştır. Bu tehdidin kalkması ile üyelerinin çoğunluğu Avrupa'da olan NATO, özellikle bölgenin istikrarı ve barış içerisinde yaşaması için bazı bölgelerle diyaloglarını arttırmıştır. Bu bölgelerden birisi de Akdeniz'dir. Bölgedeki tehdit unsurlarının (terör, göç, kitle imha silahları, hızlı nüfus artışı gibi) artmasıyla birlikte de NATO özellikle yakın çevresinin emniyetine verdiği önemi arttırmıştır.

NATO için güvenlik anlamında değeri çok büyük olan Akdeniz'le "özellikle Kuzey Afrika ve bazı Orta Doğu ülkeleriyle" ilişkiler arttırılmaya başlanmış ve bu bağlamda bazı diyaloglar oluşturulmuştur.

Bu çalışmada özellikle Akdeniz'in kimliğini, güvenlik anlayışının bu bölgede yaşayan ülkelerce nasıl algılandığını, bölgeye ve bölgenin dışına etkilerini, özellikle Kuzey Afrika ülkelerinin Akdeniz'in güvenliğine negatif yönde etki edebilecek unsurlarını ve bu bağlamda NATO'nun Akdeniz ülkeleriyle diyalogunu, bu diyaloga karşı bölgelerden gelen tepkileri ve NATO'nun Akdeniz'e yönelik geleceğe yönelik alması gereken bazı unsurları anlatmaya çalıştım.

Bu akademik çalışmanın amacı; üyesi bulunduğumuz NATO'nun takip etmeye çalıştığı Akdeniz politikasını, siyasal-askeri yönleri ile analiz edebilmektir. Çünkü aynı zamanda Akdeniz coğrafyasında yaşadığımız için, bu bölgedeki olumlu yada olumsuz değişimler bizi de etkilemektedir. Bölgedeki güvenlik sorunu her Akdeniz ülkesi gibi bizi de etkileyecektir.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

> "I believe that if we think clearly enough, plan carefully enough, and work tirelessly enough, we can both save freedom and secure peace."
>
> Dwight D. EISENHOWER, SHAPE, 1951

As a significant actor of international politics, the drastic changes that the world has undergone since the end of the Cold War brought about a challenge to the importance of the nation-state. The decision makers began to realize that it is no longer in the capacity of a single state to encounter the threats of this system. They began to recognize the importance of cooperation, and furthermore in many policy areas they saw the 'regional integration' as an inevitable means. The general tendency in the international politics shifted towards the prevention of threats and management of conflicts through the use of regional orders. This has been the case in the Mediterranean basin, which is a region characterized by inter-state and intra-state conflicts, and many other sources of instability.

Throughout the Cold War, the Mediterranean region was regarded as the southern flank of Europe. With the dissolution of the Communist bloc, the emphasis has shifted from the center of the continent to the periphery, both east and south. Thus, the Mediterranean has acquired a strategic importance since the end of the Cold War. The geographical proximity between Europe and the Mediterranean, which is an important factor that links the security and stability of the two regions, is one of the essential elements that made the region strategically important.

The insecurity and instability threat the Mediterranean region as a whole. New challenges and risks compel to undertake new approaches and initiatives in the Mediterranean region. Today's security has a multidimensional character; it is not only concerned for politico-military threats, but also for threats emanating from socio-economic, cultural and even environmental factors. This necessitates a comprehensive approach to security, such as the development of a region-wide multilateral dialogue and the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in a progressive way. Unfortunately, most of the efforts to bring peace and cooperation to the Mediterranean failed to go beyond the exchange of

information to the implementation of confidence and peace-building measures in the region.

The term "Mediterranean security" is usually analyzed from a European point of view. It is identified with challenges to the European continent that are originating from the southern Mediterranean. Such as the immigration, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), existence of authoritarian regimes, low-intensity conflicts between the southern Mediterranean countries, and the possibility of them to have a negative influence on the stability of Europe.[1]

Today, NATO looks to the Mediterranean as a region with its own specific dynamics and challenges, and with a still largely untapped potential for dialogue and cooperation in security matters. In this regard, one of the most important facets of NATO's reorientation in the post-Cold War security environment has been the decision adopted by the Alliance Foreign Ministers in December 1994 to establish the Mediterranean Dialogue.

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was launched at the December 1994 Brussels Ministerial meeting and currently involves seven non-NATO nations in the Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

The Dialogue reflects the Allies' view that security in Europe is closely linked to security in the Mediterranean region.

It is an integral part of NATO's external adaptation to the post Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation and of its cooperative approach to security.

The aim of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is to promote a better mutual understanding and confidence, as well as good and friendly relations across the Mediterranean. In addition, it helps correct misperceptions in Mediterranean Dialogue countries on NATO's policies and goals and it represents NATO's contribution to Mediterranean stability and security. Mediterranean Dialogue provides an excellent forum for addressing new security concerns. Mediterranean Dialogue can contribute significantly to peace and security in the

[1] Ormancı, Emriye Bağdagül, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", p.4, Available on Site: http://www.nato.int/acad/

Mediterranean and Middle East and the wider world if only its potential can be tapped. By so doing the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue complements also other international initiatives such as the Barcelona Process and the Middle East Peace Process.[2]

Within this degree of diversity and challenges, there is a clear interrelation among the countries and regions insisting on the Mediterranean, which derives mainly from their growing interdependence. This interrelation suggests the need for a cooperative approach to security, one that privileges dialogue and cooperation.

The further evolution and the success of a Mediterranean security regime will depend on the improvement of NATO-members internal cohesion, the continued willingness of Allies to bear the burden of subscribing the regime and a continued will to strive to make the outreach program relevant to the participating Mediterranean non-NATO members.

## 1.1 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The profound changes in the European security climate over the last decade have also had impact on the Mediterranean Sea region. The increasing strategic importance of the region stems from the growing realization that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean.

For the purpose of this thesis, the main problem is assessed as harmful activities that affect the Mediterranean security, and its possible impacts to the Mediterranean dialogue.

## 1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

A descriptive study is performed in order to highlight the common characteristics of the Mediterranean Region's security and dialogues for creating a stability place in both periphery of Mediterranean. This study is assumed to be an attempt to give the big picture of Mediterranean Region. This thesis can also encourage other researchers studying on the same subject.

[2] NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, Available on Site: http://www.nato.int/med-dial/summary.htm

The main objective of the study is to examine the factor, or factors, that prevents the building of a comprehensive security framework of Mediterranean and NATO's role in the Mediterranean.

## 1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The main scope of this study is to search for characteristics of the Mediterranean Security role of NATO and to assess the possible revolutionary impacts of Mediterranean security role of NATO on the future security dimension. If this is achieved it will be quite easier to do possible steps for Mediterranean basin.

This study consists of seven chapters;

The study starts with an introduction chapter to draw the framework of the study.

In chapter 2, seven sections are presented to solve the cold war changing winds of NATO and European security to Mediterranean. The chapter begins with milestones of NATO and continues with the importance of Mediterranean post-Cold War era, importance of the transatlantic connection, definition of the Mediterranean, and security dimensions of Mediterranean.

Chapter 3 presents the influencing elements of NATO's Mediterranean relation with three major phases, "migration (with the reflection of population increase and economic problems), terrorism (with explanation of each country of the south periphery), and WMD (with countries that capable of)".

Chapter 4 is about initiatives of NATO and other constructions. Also about Mediterranean's increasing importance of NATO and strategies of NATO. In this chapter, it is shown that what has done for Mediterranean security and the concepts of the Mediterranean dialogue.

Chapter 5 tries to explain the how the southern periphery is looking the dialogues. In this chapter, mostly there is the emphasis of the views about the analysis in different ongoing developments.

Chapter 6 outlines the subject of future of initiative. Especially the future prospects is emphasized in a long-term vision inside of the NATO's Mediterranean security policies.

Chapter 7, conclusion summarizes the basic findings of the research.

## 1.4 METHODOLOGY

The study is essentially based on secondary data such as books, articles, various magazines, Internet resources, and unpublished materials as a source of information. Some experts from institutions were also visited to gather information. Gathered data systematically is analyzed to construct the thesis. In this perspective methodology used in the thesis can be described as the combination of different techniques.

# 2 AFTER COLD WAR CHANGING WINDS OF NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY TO MEDITERRANEAN

## 2.1 MILESTONES OF NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance consisting of the United States (US), Canada, and 17 other Western countries .The 17 countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK).[3] The principal purpose of the Alliance is specified in Article 5 which states that " if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked." This is the principle of collective defense.[4]

Figure 2. 1 Map of NATO Members

The first objective of the NATO and its affiliated commands is to deter war, specifically to deter any Soviet attack in Europe and, since Europe is where the war would be won or lost, to make Russian aggression impossible.[5] NATO was established not only to discourage Communist aggression but also to keep the peace among former enemies in Western

[3] 20th Century History Glossary: NATO, Available on site: http://www.dingwall.bc.ca/history/main
[4] What is Article 5, Available on site: http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm
[5] Drew, Middleton, "The Defence of Western Europe", Frederick Muller Ltd. London, 1952, p.73

Europe. In World War II, for example, Italy and Germany had fought most of the other countries that later became NATO members. In forming NATO, each member country agreed to treat an attack on any other member as an attack on itself. Militarily, the US was -and still is- the alliance's most powerful member, in part because of its large supply of nuclear weapons. The NATO countries believed that the Soviet Union would not attack Western Europe if Soviet leaders thought such an attack would trigger war with the US. NATO's policy is known as deterrence because it is designed to deter (discourage) an attack.[6]

Figure 2. 2 Graphic Based on the Official NATO Emblem

On April 4, 1949, in Washington, ten West European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK) and the US and Canada, signed the Washington Treaty. [7]

Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. West Germany joined in 1955. Germany replaced West Germany as a NATO member in 1990, when West Germany and East Germany were united. Spain joined NATO in 1982 and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999.

[6] History of NATO: Information about NATO, Available on site: http://members.tripod.com/more_tra/1e_nato_ txt. htm

[7] NATO Update, Available on site: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/45-49/1945e.htm

NATO Heads of State and Government formally invited seven new countries to join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The invited countries are expected to join NATO in 2004, after they sign and ratify the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding act of NATO, and their accession protocols are ratified by the current 19 member states. This will be the fifth enlargement in the Alliance's history after 1952, 1955, 1982, and 1999.[8]




Table 2. 1 History of NATO (Source: Chicago Tribune "History of NATO" Available on site: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/sns-nato-history.jpg,0,368369.graphic?coll=chi-news-hed)

### 2.1.1 Establishment Trans-Atlantic Security Belt on the European Continent

The NATO Alliance developed in the 1950's. With cooperation between East and West fading, the NATO Member States moved quickly to consolidate stability in Western Europe in order to combat the spread of communism. In 1950 the US took began to solidify the defensive capability of NATO members by authorizing the expenditure of

[8] NATO Expansion, Available on site: http://www.eastlant.nato.int/pfp/members.htm

almost one billion dollars for military upgrades. The French government, still reeling from the devastation of the Nazi occupation, proposed the formation of a single authority to control the production of steel and coal in Europe. France proposed this to ensure that Germany could never again prepare for war. France also went so far as to propose a single European army, which would include Germany. Such a proposal had never been contemplated in Europe before. Towards the end of 1950, the NATO Members named US General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first NATO Supreme Commander. Eisenhower later became the President of the US.



Figure 2. 3 General Dwight Eisenhower, First Supreme Allied Commander, NATO, 1951

In 1951 France hosted a conference to establish a European army in Paris. All European NATO Members attended the conference, however cooperation on such a plan proved to be very difficult. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic (West) Germany formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 18 April 1951. The ECSC would later become the basis for wider European integration. The military structure of NATO also developed in concrete terms in 1951, with the opening of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Roquencourt, near Paris. NATO also began its first round of expansion in 1951, with Greece and Turkey being invited to join the Alliance on 22 October 1951. Greece and Turkey became full members a few months later, on 18 February 1952. The NATO members finalized the permanent structure of NATO on 25 February 1952, agreeing to both the political and military structures.



Figure 2. 4 NATO Members Meet to Finalize Agreements on Staff, NATO 1951

In March 1953 Stalin, who had ruled ruthlessly in Russia for almost thirty years, died. Shortly after his death, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) announced to the world that it had developed the hydrogen bomb. A year later, in May 1954, in the wake of the USSR' continuing tests of the hydrogen bomb, the USSR suggested that it should join NATO in order to preserve peace in Europe. The US and UK soundly rejected the USSR's suggestion. In August 1954 France reversed its previous policy by rejecting the establishment of the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was largely seen as the springboard from which a European army could be formed. Institution building continued well into the later stages of the 1950's for NATO. On 6 May 1955, West Germany, despite strenuous objections from the USSR, joined NATO. As a result, two weeks later In May 1955, the Soviet Union and Communist nations of Eastern Europe formed their own military alliance to oppose NATO. The Soviet-led alliance was called the Warsaw Pact. Warsaw Treaty signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union.[9] In 1957, France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy agreed to establish European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Euratom was established to help monitor the peaceful use of atomic energy as well as fostering joint projects among its members.

[9] NATO Milestones, Available on site: http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/NATO/Natomilestone.html



Figure 2. 5 NATO Headquarters at the Porte Dauphina in Paris, NATO 1959

### 2.1.2 Developments Between the NATO and Warsaw Pact and Affects of Berlin Crisis

The 1960's opened with increased tensions between the US and the USSR. On 1 May 1960, the USSR shot down Gary Powers in his U2 spy plane in Russian airspace. Powers would later be put on trial and convicted of crimes against the USSR. Later that year Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev attended the General Assembly at the United Nations (UN). There, he denounced what he called the threat posed by Western governments. With the superpower rivalry growing, the USSR upped the ante by launching the first man into orbit, Major Yuri Gagarin.[10]



Figure 2. 6 Berlin Prior to the Construction of the Wall, NATO 1960

[10] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Cold War to Present, Available on site: http://www.weblearn. ca/ teachersite/ NATO/Readings/1980shist.htm

Efforts to find an answer to the German question are continued but a solution remains as elusive as ever. President Kennedy meets with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in early June 1961 but the positions of the two leaders, particularly on Berlin, prove irreconcilable. A few days later, Khrushchev announces that he will conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany which would end the West's right of access to Berlin.

The following month, he abandons a projected reduction in Soviet armed forces, and announces a substantial increase in the defense budget. President Kennedy responds by calling for a build-up of NATO forces. The Soviet Union threatens to call up reserves.

The escalating crisis results in large numbers of East Germans fleeing to the West. In the first six months of 1961, the number rises to more than 103,000, mostly young and skilled workers. During the night of 13 August, the East Germans barricade the Soviet sector of Berlin and begin building the Berlin Wall. This wall will divide Germany until it is torn down in 1989. The Berlin Wall became a symbol of the Cold War.[11]

Figure 2. 7 The Berlin Wall, NATO 1962

In 1962, US President John F. Kennedy appealed to the Soviets for a nuclear test ban treaty. During the 1950's, both the United States of America (USA) and USSR conducted hundreds of nuclear blasts. Scientists had begun to caution the US government that such tests were damaging to the environment and should be halted. On 4 May 1962, the NATO Foreign Ministers decide that the Alliance might require access to strategic nuclear arms to defend against aggression from the Warsaw Pact. Up to the 1960's, nuclear weapons for NATO were under the exclusive control of the USA. This was the first time that the

[11] NATO Update, Ibid

deployment of nuclear weapons under NATO auspices had been discussed formally. In June 1962, in order to pool resources on rocketry and other high technologies, ten European countries formed the European Space Agency (ESA). The ten founding members of the ESA were: Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. On 22 October 1962 the world was taken to the brink of nuclear war when the US blockaded Cuba after discovering that intermediate range nuclear weapons had been deployed in Cuba by the USSR. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended on 20 November after the USSR agreed to remove the weapons in exchange for concessions by the USA. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis was the most serious US-Soviet confrontation during the cold war.[12] By the end of 1962, President Kennedy agreed to contribute part of the US nuclear force to NATO.

The tensions that reached a boiling point in 1962 led to a period of detente for the rest of the 1960's. In 1963, the US and USSR agreed to a permanent "hot line" between them so that they could contact each other in the event of an emergency. The US, UK, and USSR agreed to a treaty on 20 June 1963 which banned tests in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater. In late 1963 NATO conducted Operation Big Lift, which saw 14,500 US troops flown from the US to West Germany in order to demonstrate the ability of NATO to reinforce quickly.

Figure 2. 8 Operation Big Lift - US Troops Arrive in Germany, NATO 1963

In 1965, NATO suffered a major internal setback when President Charles de Gaulle of France announced that France would withdraw from the integrated military structure of NATO. The decision was made official in March 1966 and meant that, while France was

[12] Risse, Kappen Thomas, "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics", Colombia University Press, New York, 1996, p.379

part of the decision making, French forces would not be under the operational control of NATO commanders. France also announced that it would pursue its own nuclear deterrent against any possible aggression. German territory became crucial for allied troop deployments, particularly after France withdrew from NATO's military organization in 1966 and asked its allies to remove their armed forces from French territory.[13]

Figure 2. 9 Viewing a Model of the New HQ in Belgium

In 1966 NATO took further steps to develop its nuclear options by establishing the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG later developed a first use policy for nuclear weapons - meaning that if a NATO member were attacked with conventional armed force, NATO reserved the right to reply with a nuclear strike.[14] US officials generally insisted that NATO rely on nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack. Some people in NATO countries, however, opposed the use of these weapons. Also, European countries occasionally doubted that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Europe. Their doubts were based on the fact that the Soviet Union also had a powerful nuclear force. For these reasons, Britain and France built their own nuclear weapons.[15]

[13] Christian, Tuschhoff, "Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space", Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p.143
[14] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Cold War to Present, Ibid
[15] History of NATO: Information about NATO, Ibid



Figure 2. 10 The New NATO Headquarters in Belgium, NATO 1967

Before France withdrew its troops from the military structure NATO decided to move its military and political headquarters from Paris, France. In 1967 NATO's political headquarters opened in Brussels, Belgium and its military headquarters opened in Mons, Belgium. In 1968 tension flared again after troops of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia after the communist government there collapsed. In the wake of the invasion, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. NATO, unwilling to risk a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, denounced the invasion but failed to take any further action.

### 2.1.3 Superpowers' Nuclear Arms Race and Decision on Détente Between the East-West Balances

In the 1970's, relative calm and coexistence replaced the nuclear brinkmanship of the 1960's. The superpowers, forging a detente, began to focus on ways to reduce their nuclear forces and stabilize relations throughout the world. NATO took major steps towards modernization early in the decade. On 20 March 1970, NATO launched its first communication satellite. This satellite allowed NATO to better coordinate its defenses and nuclear planning. On 16 April 1970, in the spirit of closer cooperation, the USSR and the US opened the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The SALT talks were aimed at reducing the number of warheads in the arsenals of the superpowers, as well as curbing the development of anti-ballistic missile systems. In 1970 NATO announced that any reduction in nuclear and conventional force levels would only come if the USSR agrees to reduce its forces. On 5 October 1971 former NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio opened talks with the USSR on conventional force reduction in Europe.

The work of bringing stability continued in earnest into 1972. On 26 May 1972 the US and the Soviet Union signed the SALT Treaty, which obliged both sides to limit development of anti-ballistic missiles and to cap the number of warheads each possessed. While the agreement had no monitoring arrangements, the treaty was major step forward in the cause of disarmament. Four days later the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Conference's primary aim was for a balanced force reduction among NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. On 21 November 1972 the CSCE officially opened in Helsinki, Finland. On that day the USSR and USA also opened a new round of SALT talks (SALT II).



Figure 2. 11 NATO Heads of Government Meeting in Brussels

The remainder of the 1970's passed rather uneventfully for NATO. On 14 August 1974, Greece decided to withdraw from the NATO integrated military structure. The Greek government cited several of the same reasons used by France in the late 1960's including the desire for military independence. On 1 August 1974, the 35 states participating in the CSCE signed the Conference's final act. The final act calls for force reduction in Europe as well as increasing conflict prevention and peaceful dispute settlement. In 1976, several Warsaw Pact countries demanded that NATO abandon its first use nuclear policy in favor of a policy allowing nuclear force only in response to nuclear aggression. Despite the progress in disarmament, NATO rejected the request in December 1976. In 1979 the SALT II process yielded some results with the USSR and US signing another treaty. However, the treaty would never come into force because the US, under President Reagan in the 1980's, failed to ratify it. The cooperation that marked the 1970's would soon end. The

Soviet invasions of Afghanistan in 1979, as well as the election of President Reagan led to renewed tensions in the 1980's.

### 2.1.4 Nuclear Disarmament Efforts and Collapse of the Berlin Wall

The relative peace and calm of the 1970's was soon replaced by a renewal of tensions in the 1980's. Yet, by the end of the 1980's, the world would be a radically different place with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. On 20 October 1980 Greece rejoined the integrated military structure of NATO. This move again left France as the only Member of the Alliance not part of the integrated military structure.

The tragic conflict in the Balkans began early in the 1980's. The President of Yugoslavia, Josef Tito, died on 4 May 1980. Tito had kept the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia in check by unifying them in a common struggle to maintain independence from the Soviet Union. The death of Tito, combined with the end of the Cold War, set the stage for the disintegration and bloodshed in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo in the 1990's.

In 1981, US President Ronald Reagan seemed to be determined to continue the work of negotiating with the USSR on the sensitive subject of disarmament. On 18 November 1981, the US announced it would seek to negotiate new treaties with the USSR on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Twelve days later, the USSR and US met in Geneva to start talks on INF. On 10 December 1981 Spain became the 16$^{th}$ Member of the NATO Alliance. In 1982 the USSR and US continued their disarmament efforts by opening the START negotiations.

The spirit of cooperation on disarmament quickly eroded in early 1983. On 23 March 1983, President Reagan made an announcement that shocked much of the world. He announced that the US would conduct a comprehensive research program aimed at eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. The program, called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and later nicknamed Star Wars, was based on the idea that a missile could be shot down by using a complex set of satellite-based lasers. If successful, the program would have rendered useless the Soviet nuclear force. Needless to the say, the Soviet Union was disturbed by this announcement and made several attempts to dissuade the US government from initiating SDI. In Moscow's calculation, the SDI writ large is a

generic threat to Soviet standing as an essentially military superpower.[16] Tensions continued to rise in September 1983 when the USSR shot down a South Korean passenger jet carrying 269 people. Despite the increase in tension, NATO did unilaterally decide to withdraw 1400 nuclear warheads from Europe in October 1983. However, the following month the US delivered its first wave of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. These weapons were not regulated at the time by any treaty and fell outside of the SALT Treaty signed in the 1970's. On November 1983, the USSR withdrew from both INF and START talks in protest over the deployment of INF weapons in the UK by NATO.

The tension that built up in 1983 was reduced in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev became the head of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was regarded by many as a moderate and a reformer who wanted to modernize the communist party of the Soviet Union. A day after his election he reopened talks with the US on INF, strategic weapons, conventional forces in Europe and space based weapons systems. Meanwhile, on 26 April 1985, the seven members of the Warsaw Pact decided to extend the 1955 treaty by another twenty years. At a summit in Geneva on 21 November 1985 the Soviets and Americans agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons by 50%, and agreed in principle to the elimination of all INF. The drive for peace and stability received an unfortunate boost in mid 1986 when, on 26 April, the number four reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear facility exploded, spewing radioactive dust and debris. The effects continue to scar the republic of the Ukraine today along with other parts of Eastern Europe. According to some reports, the effects of the explosion were felt as far away as Canada.

The remainder of the 1980's was fast paced with changes coming quickly and, in many cases unexpectedly. In late 1986, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) concluded a set of confidence building agreements that included observation of military exercises by Warsaw Pact and NATO observers.

[16] Gray, Colin S., "NATO' s Sixteen Nations: Western Security And The Pacific-A Geopolitical Perspective, April No.2, Vol.32", 1987, p.44

Figure 2. 12 NATO Foreign Ministers Issue the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control

On 17 February 1987, NATO and the Warsaw Pact opened formal talks on the reduction of conventional forces throughout Europe. On 22 July 1987, the USSR announced its readiness to eliminate all of its INF weapons if the US would agree to undertake similar actions. On 30 August 1987, NATO observers attended military maneuvers conducted by the Warsaw Pact. On 7 October 1987, the Soviet's attended military maneuvers conducted by NATO Members in Turkey. On 10 December 1987 the USSR and US announced they had signed a treaty for the elimination of land based INF on a global basis. They also announced an agreement on the mutual monitoring of all nuclear explosions at test sites. Reagan and Gorbachev also pledged to "serious reductions" in strategic forces in line with the 1972 SALT Treaty.[17] For the first time, the US and the Soviet Union agree to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons all land-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles with a range of 500 - 5,500 kilometers. Some 670 deployed Soviet missiles, including 405 SS-20s, each capable of carrying three nuclear warheads will be destroyed, together with about 440 deployed US missiles. Furthermore, the Soviet Union accepts the most comprehensive verification program, including on-site inspections, ever agreed by the superpowers.[18]

By 1989, the new era of peace and cooperation was further accelerated. So much so that by the end of 1989 the Berlin Wall would be torn down and the Soviet Union would be headed for its own demise. On 18 January 1989, the USSR announced that it would reduce spending on its conventional forces by 15%. This was the first reduction of its kind ever

[17] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Cold War to Present, Ibid
[18] NATO update, Ibid

undertaken by the USSR. Every member of the Warsaw Pact eventually announced reductions to their conventional forces. On 11 February 1989, the Hungarian communist party became the first to agree to a phased introduction of a multi-party political system. On 26 March 1989, the USSR held its first multi-candidate elections for the Congress of People's Deputies. On 10 September 1989, Hungary becomes the first Eastern European country to open its borders with the west. Some 20,000 fled from Hungary into Western Europe the first few days. On 7 November, the entire East German Cabinet resigned, calling for free elections and massive reforms including the abolition of the communist party. On 9 November 1989, as the East German government was on the verge of collapse, people begin tearing down the Berlin Wall. West Germans joined the affair prompting calls for the unification of Germany. The 1980's ended with uncertainty and chaos. Protests and riots mixed with anxiety and hope broke out across Eastern Europe as people demanded political reforms.[19]

Figure 2. 13 An East German Security Guard Faces off with West Berliners Sitting atop the Soviets' Infamous Berlin Wall

### 2.1.5 Dissolution of USSR & Warsaw Pact and Transforming Waves of NATO on the Balkan Peninsula

In October 1990, Germany was reunified and eastern Germany came under NATO protection. At European Security Conference summit in Paris, Warsaw Pact and NATO

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Cold War to Present, Ibid

signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and declared that they no longer regarded each other as enemies in November. [20]

In 1991, the movement towards democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe proceeds rapidly but the first indications appear that it will be an uneven process. By May 1991, signs of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the onset of civil war in major parts of the country become unmistakable. Croatia and Slovenia declare their independence but elsewhere conflict flares up. Unprecedented contacts take place between NATO and the representatives of the newly independent states of Eastern Europe to ensure their future cooperation but at the same time as the shadow of the Yugoslavian conflict spreads over Europe, a dark shadow looms over the Soviet Union itself. Autumn 1991, Further-sweeping cuts in nuclear forces are underway, including reductions in NATO's sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe by 80 percent. Allied leaders meeting again at Summit level in Rome issue a new Strategic Concept reflecting their intention to streamline NATO forces, undertake further arms reductions and reorganize NATO's Military Command Structure. The development of cooperation with other countries is a central part of the new concept. Unlike earlier generations of NATO's strategic planning documents, the new concept is made available to the public.[21] The Soviet Union broke apart into a number of independent states. Most of these states -and the Soviet Union's former allies in Eastern Europe- rejected Communism. Some people felt that without its traditional Communist enemies, NATO had lost its purpose and should be dissolved.[22]

In June 1992, NATO foreign ministers, at a meeting in Oslo, agreed that the alliance could take on new peacekeeping missions in post-Cold War era.[23] From 1992 on, intensive contacts and exchanges take place between NATO countries and the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and independent republics that were formally part of the Soviet Union. A work plan for dialogue, partnership and cooperation is drawn up. Cooperation is already up and running in a number of essential practical fields such as the coordination of arrangements for civil and military air traffic control.

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[20] NATO Milestones, Ibid
[21] NATO update, Ibid
[22] History of NATO: Information about NATO, Ibid
[23] NATO Milestones, Ibid

On the wider stage, these countries become members of the CSCE - later to become an organization and to be renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)- and of the UN. Different forms of regional security cooperation are established, for example in the Baltic and in the Black Sea areas.

As 1992 progresses, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia continues to dominate the international agenda. A significant development in NATO policy is announced by Foreign Ministers when the NATO Council meets at Ministerial level in Oslo in June. Under appropriate conditions, NATO will provide assistance for peacekeeping activities undertaken under the responsibility of the CSCE. Soon after, the NATO Council extends its offer of support for peacekeeping activities to the UN.

In another development that will take on greater significance later on, the Western European Union (WEU) establishes a list of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks (the Petersberg Missions) on which it will focus future efforts. The WEU and NATO cooperate in monitoring compliance with UN Resolutions designed to limit the conflict in the former Yugoslavia by checking all shipping in the Adriatic that might be carrying arms.

In a short space of time, a number of further actions are undertaken by NATO to implement decisions of the UN Security Council relating to the Yugoslav conflict.

Escalation of the Yugoslav conflict leads to enforcement measures by NATO and WEU naval forces in the Adriatic towards the end of 1992. Requests from the UN Secretary General give rise to military planning for similar measures by NATO to enforce a no-fly zone and to provide other forms of protection from the air.

By August 1993 air strikes are planned by NATO in order to prevent further human suffering in Bosnia and to stop the strangulation of cities like Sarajevo. But another three years will pass before a peace agreement is reached and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) takes over the command of military operations in Bosnia from the UN. Before this occurs, NATO finds itself taking on increasing responsibility for ending the conflict and for imposing military measures to support the efforts of the UN. In addition to

its primary tasks, IFOR has created a secure environment within which civilian organizations and rebuild the country.[24]

At the Summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994, NATO countries' Heads of State or Government stated that they would welcome the expansion of the Alliance to other European democratic states as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Thus a deliberate, gradual and transparent enlargement process is foreseen which contributes to overall European stability.[25] The meeting in Brussels of a major initiative by NATO called Partnership for Peace (PfP). The launch of the PfP in 1994 added a new dimension to NATO. PfP was a response to the former Warsaw Pact countries that were seeking to join NATO, and it has played an admirable role in helping them reform their societies and their defense structures so as to be ready for Alliance membership.[26] The invitation to join the Partnership is soon accepted by twenty-seven non-NATO countries (Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Seizing the opportunity to develop closer ties with the Alliance, the participating countries prepare Individual Partnership Programs tailored to their specific needs.[27]

A few months later a Partnership Coordination Cell is established at SHAPE, NATO's senior military command headquarters in Europe, and offices for Partner countries are opened at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Meanwhile, efforts to strengthen the coherence of the European security and defense role in NATO are pursued. A concept known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) is endorsed by the NATO Council. It provides for smaller, more mobile and flexible multinational forces adapted to modern needs.

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[24] NATO Review, "IFOR' s Contribution to Rebuilding Bosnia", No.5, September 1996, p.23
[25] NATO Review, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement", No.1, January 1996, p.3
[26] Eekelen, Wim Van, "The Transatlantic Defence Relationship After September 11", NATO Parliamentary Assembly, AV 183, DSC/TC (02) 2, 2001, p.3
[27] NATO Review, "NATO' s Partnership for Peace: A Dynamic Element of European Security", No.4, July 1995, p.13




Figure 2. 14 Map of NATO

In the Russian Federation, multiparty parliamentary elections are held at the end of 1993 - the first since 1917. In January of the next year, the US, Russia and Ukraine sign an agreement and assurances that will enable Ukraine to become a non-nuclear weapons state.

NATO affairs continue to be dominated by the Alliance's increasing role in the efforts of the international community to end the Yugoslav conflict. Its involvement on the side of peace is at the top of its agenda, despite the breadth and depth of the internal changes which NATO itself must undergo. Belgian Foreign Minister Claes takes over as Secretary General following the death in office of his predecessor Manfred Wörner. A year later, Claes' resignation leads to the appointment of Javier Solana, formerly Foreign Minister of Spain, to oversee the further transformation of NATO and the development of its peacekeeping responsibilities.

Some NATO leaders proposed offering membership in NATO to such former Warsaw Pact lands as Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and even Russia. Russia, the largest of the former Soviet states, had proclaimed itself the Soviet Union's successor. Other NATO leaders thought that bringing former enemies into NATO would make the

alliance meaningless. Still others worried that offering membership to former Soviet allies, but not to Russia, might lead to a dangerous conflict with Russia. In an attempt to resolve the uncertainty about NATO's future, the alliance began the PfP program in 1994. More than 20 countries joined the program, including Russia. Most of the other countries that joined were Eastern European nations. The program provides for joint military planning and exercises with NATO members but does not involve formal NATO membership.[28]

At the same time, the importance of Southern Europe within European and transatlantic security organizations has increased. During the Cold War, Mediterranean security issues were defined largely as a function of the Soviet threat and the fact that the Mediterranean region was a secondary theatre in the overall East-West confrontation in Europe. The real business of diplomacy and strategy was focused instead on NATO's Central Region. Mediterranean issues received attention largely as a function of the broader East-West confrontation and competition. Qaddafi's Libya, for example, was worrisome as a possible springboard for Soviet aggression; Morocco's strategic importance flowed from its position as a critical maritime choke point in the naval competition with Moscow; Greece and Turkey were important because they helped control Soviet access to, and influence in, the Aegean, the Balkans and the Middle East.[29] At the end of 1994, initial steps are taken by NATO to improve understanding and to examine scope for future cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean area. In what will become NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, formally instituted in February 1995, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, subsequently joined by Jordan and Algeria, initiate closer contacts with the Alliance.

NATO-Russian relations undergo a significant transformation when Russia joins the PfP Program in May 1995 and simultaneously NATO and Russia institute a more specific program of dialogue and cooperation. After preliminary talks in 1996, negotiations conducted by NATO's Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov in the first five months of 1997 will lead to the signature of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. Signed in Paris at the end of May 1997, the agreement includes the establishment of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint

[28] History of NATO: Information about NATO, Ibid
[29] NATO Review, "Mediterranean Security: New Challenge, New Tasks", No.3, May 1996, p.28

Council (PJC) that has since become the principal forum for cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation. By October of the same year, Russia has appointed a permanent military representative to NATO.

Contacts between NATO and Ukraine lead to the establishment at the end of May 1997 of a special "Charter for a Distinctive Partnership" through which cooperation is intensified and a NATO-Ukraine Commission is created. In the same month the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) takes the place of the former North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and provides a stronger basis for consultation and cooperation for the countries that become participants.

The internal and external adaptation of the Alliance is carried forward at a further Summit Meeting in Madrid, in July 1997. For the first time since the early 1980's, NATO Heads of State and Government invite three countries to begin negotiations for future membership of the Alliance. By their next Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have become members.

In the former Yugoslavia, the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) has been operating since the end of 1996 to continue the work of the former IFOR. Its role is to continue to implement the agreements that ended the conflict and to assist in reestablishing stability and a basis for future peaceful development.

Conflict between the Serbian government and the Kosovar Albanians in the South of the country force international intervention. NATO plays a central role in backing efforts to achieve a peaceful, political settlement by supporting the peace negotiations but undertaking to intervene militarily to impose a peace settlement if the conflict and the humanitarian tragedy it causes do not cease.

In 1998, mounting international concern is voiced over the violent repression and ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serb government against the Kosovar Albanians. Repeated diplomatic initiatives and negotiations fail to persuade the government of President Milosevic to reverse its policies.

In March 1999 the governments of the Alliance conclude that there is no alternative to military action in order to bring the conflict to an end, not only for the sake of the people of Kosovo, but in the interests of peace and stability in the Balkans as a whole and in the wider world.

An air campaign begins on 23 March and continues until 10 June. Agreement is reached on the stationing of an international military presence following the withdrawal of Serb forces. The deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), led by NATO, creates conditions allowing the return of thousands of refugees and the beginning of the process of reconstruction. President Milosevic, indicted as a war criminal, remains in power in Belgrade amid growing criticism of his policies and role in the conflict.[30] On the other hand, the long-term consequences of the largest scale use of force in Europe since Word War II are and will remain a dominant issue in political, diplomatic and military debates on security and stability - not only in the Balkans, but in Europe and beyond.[31]

### 2.1.6 New Century and New Face of NATO

#### 2.1.6.1 Enlargement Process of the NATO and September 11 Attacks Against to USA

September 11 is an important significant milestone for the Alliance that terrorism constituted a "serious threat" to peace, security and stability that threaten the territorial integrity of states in last century. After terrorist attack its territory at New York and the Pentagon, the US decided to use force against the Taliban and Al Qaida terror organizations in Afghanistan lawful under the UN Charter Art.2/4 and Art.51 which related self defense.[32] NATO's response to the September 11 attacks has resolved some of these uncertainties. At the suggestion of Secretary General George Robertson, allies agreed as early as September 12 that the collective defense clause did indeed apply to a terrorist attack on the US: 'If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the

[30] NATO Update, Ibid
[31] Matos, Jerry, "Kosovo: On the Road to Recovery", Insight Turkey, Volume.1, No.3, July-September 1999, p.155
[32] Caşın, M. Hakkı, "Re-Mapping Euro-Atlantic Collective Security Strategy Routes Beyond The September 11 Terrorist Attack", NATO's Security and Cooperation Conference, Antalya, 2002, p.1

US', the allies declared, 'it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty'.[33]

On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks against the US, NATO declared the attacks to be an attack against all the 19 NATO member countries. The Allies - for the first time in NATO's history - invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more NATO member country will be considered an attack against all.

Figure 2. 15-16 Terrorist Attacks Against America

This decision was followed by practical measures aimed at assisting the US. On 4 October 2001, in response to requests by the US, the Allies agreed to take eight measures to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. The measures included:

1. Enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within NATO;

2. Blanket over-flight clearances for US and other NATO aircraft;

[33] Daley, Suzanne, "For First Time, NATO Invokes Joint Defence Pact with US", New York Times, 12 September 2001

3. Assistance to allies and other states that might be subject to terrorist threats as a result of their cooperation with the US;

4. Measures to provide increased security for US facilities in Europe;

5. Backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might be required elsewhere for the campaign against terrorism;

6. Access for the US and other allies to ports and airfields on NATO territory;

7. The deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean;

8. The deployment of NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to US airspace so that American AWACS could be used abroad.[34]

- "Active Endeavor": On 26 October 2001, elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping; To date, more than 16,000 ships have been monitored;

- "Eagle Assist": From mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002, AWACS aircraft were sent to help protect the US; 830 crewmember from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties, over 4000 flight hours;

- NATO's Partners: On 12 September, all of NATO's 27 partner countries condemned the 11 September attacks and offered their support to the US;

- NATO-Russia: 11 September and the common challenge of terrorism have led to a new quality in NATO-Russia cooperation. The new NATO-Russia Council, established in May 2002, identifies terrorism as one of several areas for consultation and co-operation;

- Balkans: NATO forces in the Balkans have acted against terrorist groups with links to the Al-Qaida network. They continue to contribute to the campaign against terrorism by focusing on the illegal movement of people, arms and drugs.

[34] Daley, Suzanne, "Europeans Pledge Troops, if Necessary", New York Times, 9 October 2001

### 2.1.6.2 Operation on Afghanistan and Accelerating Out of Area Arguments

Fourteen NATO Allies have forces directly involved in operation "Enduring Freedom", the ongoing US-led military operation against terrorist targets in Afghanistan. Troops from NATO countries also make up the bulk of the 4,500 strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the UN-mandated international force deployed in and around Kabul to help stabilize the country. Neither are NATO-led operations, but their success depends on the participation of forces from NATO countries, their training and expertise in working together within NATO, as well as with partner countries.




Figure 2. 17 Map of NATO and Partners with Flags

### 2.1.6.3 Prague Summit: Adapting To The Threat Of Terrorism

While NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism has already been significant, efforts are underway to better equip the Alliance and to allow it to play its full part in the long-term effort. In a major speech in Warsaw, Poland on 15 June 2001, Bush asserted that 'all of Europe's new democracies' from the Baltic to the Black Sea should have an equal chance to join Western institutions. He suggested that the failure to allow them to do so would amount to the moral equivalent of 'Yalta' or 'Munich', and appealed to NATO leaders to take a forward-leaning approach to enlargement at their November 2002 summit

in Prague.[35]At NATO's Prague Summit on 21-22 November 2002, Heads of State and Government of NATO member countries will adopt a package of measures that will strengthen NATO's preparedness and ability to take on the full spectrum of security challenges, including terrorism and the spread of WMD.[36]

## 2.2 IMPORTANCE OF MEDITERRANEAN ROLE OF NATO POLICIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

During the Cold War, the attention of Western policymakers was focused primarily on the Central Front. The Mediterranean was regarded as of secondary importance. However, in recent years—and especially since the end of the Cold War—the Mediterranean has assumed new importance as a focal point of Western concern. The renaissance of the Mediterranean in security terms is based on its growing role in the strategic calculus of Europe, the US, and the Middle East. The prosperity and security of key states are increasingly affected by events around the Mediterranean, and this area's capacity for producing crises as well as slow-moving challenges —with potentially far-reaching consequences—has begun to compel the attention of analysts and policymakers. [37]

The extent to which NATO shifted its focus away from the Atlantic was displayed by a comment by then-undersecretary of defense Walter Slocombe. In 1995 Slocombe argued:

> ''Real, immediate challenges to NATO allies have been mounting to the south. Flash points have emerged in the Mediterranean, in Southwest Asia, in the Balkans and in North Africa. The potential spread of instability across the Mediterranean would not only threaten friendly regimes of North Africa and the prospects for peace in the Middle East, it would also threaten, Europe with new social and security problems.''[38]

U.S. policymakers argued that NATO had to prevent instability on Europe's periphery from spilling over and affecting Europe itself. Thus, as Albright put it, the alliance had to

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[35] Bruni, Frank, "President Urging Expansion of NATO to Russia's Border", New York Times, 16 June 2001
[36] NATO- Cold War to Present, http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/Sept11.htm
[37] Larrabee F. Stephen, Green Jerrold, Lesser Ian O., Zanini Michele, "NATO' s Mediterranean Initiative 'Policy Issues and Dilemnas", Rand, 1998, p.1-2
[38] Slocombe, Walter, "Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations," Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, March 2, 1995.

go out of area, because "instability that is dangerous and contagious is best stopped before it reaches NATO's borders."[39] In reinventing the alliance, President Clinton said the US was "building a NATO capable not only of deterring aggression against its own territory, but of meeting challenges to our security beyond its territory.''[40]

The security environment facing the US and NATO in Europe is continuing to change in fundamental ways almost a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. One significant change has been the steady growth of security challenges emanating from Europe 's southern periphery — around the Mediterranean and beyond. The US remains the dominant security actor in this region, and NATO strategy is beginning to look more closely at the management of problems outside the center of Europe. European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security are becoming interdependent as a result of political, economic, and military trends. The evolution of the strategic environment along these lines has important implications for defense planning, including the future of U.S. and allied air power. It also suggests a growing role for key allies in NATO 's south -Spain, Italy, and Turkey-.[41]

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact eliminated the West's singular focus on military threats in considerations of security matters and thereby enabled NATO to develop a broader security concept. Its primary concern is "instability" in and around the European hinterland. In this new post-military threat environment, the risk of instability is generally attributed to the political and economic transition of Eastern European countries. However, somewhat ironically, a transition to a market economy and pluralist politics has taken place in Eastern Europe while the seeds of instability have been bred elsewhere, particularly in the southern Mediterranean countries.

The type of political regime and the form of state-society relationship lie at the heart of the stability-instability problem and determine, to a certain extent, the prospects for international peace. Societies surrounding Western Europe, including those of the Balkans,

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[39] Layne, Christopher "Casualties of War Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War'', Policy Analysis, No: 483, August 13, 2003, p.6

[40] Clinton, Bill, "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," San Francisco, California, February 26, 1999, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1999, Book I-January 1 to June 30, 1999, pp. 271-280.

[41] Lesser Ian O., NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean, Rand Corporation, 2000, p.1

Eastern Europe, and the southern Mediterranean, are particularly susceptible to domestic turmoil and vulnerable to the anomalies of both transition and a failure to adapt and change. There seems to be a need for a broader European organization capable of confronting the challenges of transition, stagnation, and ensuing instability in the region. [42]

The actual number of nations with democratic political systems and market economies (albeit in some cases still emerging and imperfect) has increased substantially since the early 1980s. The result is that there is now a much larger group of nations that, whatever their day-to-day policy differences, are committed to shared fundamental political and economic institutions and practices.

These intellectual and practical trends will likely have a continuing impact and influence on the southern region and make more likely the institutionalization over time of democracy and the market economy. The southern region is of increasing importance and concern to NATO. The Balkans, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf all present opportunities and potential security problems to NATO members. Both Western Europe and the US have a strong interest in the successful integration of the southern region into the Western democratic community of nations. This is clearly a long-term objective and would take decades to mature, if it occurs at all.

The challenge for policymakers will be to implement near-term policies, some of which may even appear counter productive to long-term goals, while taking advantage of whatever opportunities may emerge for encouraging a broader democratic community.

With such an approach, NATO and interested nations in the region can work over the long term for the development of a broad democratic community of nations in a peaceful international environment.[43]

Many developments could still derail this trend toward greater interest in the Mediterranean, including the rise of new tensions with Russia and insecurity in Eastern Europe, not to mention adverse developments further afield (In the event of renewed friction with Russia, it is possible that this strategic competition might be played out

[42] Dağı, İhsan D. "Human Rights and International Security: The Challenge for NATO in the Mediterranean", Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume: 13, No:3, Summer 2002, p.128-129

[43] Weinrod, "Mediterranean Security At The Crossroads: A reader, The U.S., NATO, and the Mediterranean Region", Duke University Press, 1999, p.103-104,

through policies and proxies on the periphery of Europe, including the Mediterranean. For some Turkish observers, the Russian sale of military equipment to Cyprus is an early indication in this regard). For the moment, however, Mediterranean issues have begun to occupy a more prominent place in security debates, and are imposing new intellectual and policy challenges on both sides of the Atlantic, and on both shores of the Mediterranean. Hence new approaches to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean are likely to become an important part of reform and adaptation within the Alliance.[44]

## 2.3 TRANSATLANTIC CONNECTION ON UNITED EUROPEAN

The 1999 enlargement has anchored Central Europe in the West and created the transatlantic connection necessary for the post-communist states in the region to overcome the legacies of World War-II (WW-II) and the Cold War.

NATO membership and the anticipated EU integration have offered a workable framework for the region to do away with its "dual insecurity" dilemma. It has allowed the Central Europeans to tap into pre-existing and tested institutions, providing them with a degree of continuity and stability. NATO enlargement brought the US directly into Central Europe and extended the Western security umbrella to the region, thereby addressing its historical deficit of power. The 1999 NATO enlargement concluded the first phase of building the post-Cold War security architecture. It reaffirmed American commitment to Europe and established NATO as its primary security organization for the foreseeable future, notwithstanding the current disagreement between the U.S. and the Europeans about the structure and mission of the proposed European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The 1999 NATO enlargement has broken the organizational barrier between former communist and non-communist states, in the process enabling the region to begin overcoming its Cold War legacy. Most importantly, it stabilized Central Europe, thus providing the requisite security framework for the three new allies to be brought into the European Union.

The process of NATO enlargement also performed an important domestic normative role by contributing to democratic transitions in the region. Compliance with NATO norms and expectations – from the core assumptions about democratic civil-military relations, through NATO membership goals– have introduced Western practices that often ran counter to the

[44] Larrabee F. Stephen, Green Jerrold, Lesser Ian O., Zanini Michele, p.1-2

region's historical experience. For the poles, NATO standards framed new democratic civil-military relations. For the Czechs and the Hungarians, they encouraged non-antagonistic relations with their neighbors. For all three, NATO membership generated a sense of external security, necessary to proceed with internal reform. These normative and security dimensions are among the reasons why today Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are successful post-communist democracies.[45]

The spirit of transatlantic solidarity, which was so impressively displayed after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, has faded rapidly. The US is disappointed with what it sees as only qualified European support for the war on terror, and it scoffs at European military weakness. Many Europeans, in turn, are disappointed about what they perceive as a US fixation on military responses, and they resent the US approach of casually lumping together the war on terror with issues such as WMD or regime change in Iraq. The effect of the US power was declared by Jan Lodal in his book:

> Virtually no conceivable combination of powers can challenge America's conventional military might. The economic strength of the US touches every corner of the earth. Its veto over almost every major multilateral institution means that no concerted action can be taken without America's agreement.[46]

### 2.3.1 The New Transatlantic Argument

Today's transatlantic security debate is, in essence, the debate that did not take place a little over a decade ago, when the Cold War ended. Since the demise of Europe's Communist states, the USSR' dismemberment, and Germany's reunification, Europe and the US have made strenuous efforts to preserve the vitality of transatlantic ties. Reinventing NATO was central to that effort. The venerable institutional carrier of transatlantic relations is vastly different than it was in 1989. It has, indeed, grown beyond being an alliance in a classical sense. NATO's future may be, according to some observers, "an upgraded type of OSCE, with Russian participation."[47] Back then; a fundamental discussion about the future shape of the transatlantic relationship seemed inevitable. But it

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[45] Michta, Andrew A., "In the Middle or On the Periphery: Central Europe After NATO Enlargement", Available on Site: http://wwics.si.edu/ees/special/2001/

[46] Lodal, Jan, "The Price of Dominance", New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001, p. 119

[47] Moïsi, Dominique, "Toward Harmonious Transatlantic Relations," Financial Times, February 10, 2002.

was put off. There was simply too much unfinished business left over from the Cold War. The transatlantic community could not afford to divert its attention away from the task it still faced together, the task of cleaning up the mess left by the Cold War. That entailed significant challenges:

- To embrace the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, who were craving their share of Europe, including its Atlantic dimension in NATO.

- To associate a Russia that, in a sense, was both an old empire and a new state, still unsure of its European vocation.

- And to address the conflicts in the Balkans, which were making a mockery of the idea of Europe as a zone of peace and shared values.

Meeting these challenges required Europe and North America to work together. Accordingly, NATO reached out to Central and Eastern Europe, through its policy of partnership and through NATO enlargement. The Alliance also played a major role in associating Russia to NATO and, thus, to the emerging new Europe. And NATO played a key role in pacifying the Balkans through its military engagement. NATO has also become active in the security of the Euro-Atlantic region outside of the territory of its member states. The creation of the IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords saw NATO move troops out-of-area for the first time.[48] For the immediate future, then, NATO remains the most important European counter-terrorism instrument, and its most important challenge is arriving at a new military framework for coalition operations. But no matter what the specific outcome, it appears likely that the alliance will become less a military organization and more a military services one, where members can draw from an array of military capabilities according to emerging requirements.[49]

However, this impressive display of transatlantic unity could not hide the fact that eventually the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic was bound to change in the longer run. As early as 1991, the Gulf War raised the question of whether NATO was still in line with the US security agenda after the Cold War. In that conflict, which was

[48] Eekelen, Wim Van, ibid, p.3
[49] Langton, Christopher, "Countering Terror After 11 September: Early Lessons, Future Challenges", The Military Balance: 2002-2003, Oxford University Press, London, 2002, p.238

taking place "out of area" and fought by a "coalition of the willing," NATO played only a supporting role. Also in the early 1990s, the EU started to articulate an ambition to become a military actor in its own right, raising the question of NATO's future. And the initial ambiguity by the US regarding humanitarian intervention in the Balkans signaled a profound uncertainty about how the US viewed its own future role on the European continent. And still, despite these changes, a major debate about the future of transatlantic relations did not occur. Those on both sides of the Atlantic did not want it to occur. And they did well by dodging it—and by keeping their eye on the European ball.

### 2.3.2 The Changing of the Security Perception

The September 11 attacks revealed that countries have security weaknesses, that their territory and inhabitants on both sides of the Atlantic are vulnerable. Now more than ever before, the emergence of these new threats linked to international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD 'which are more scattered and unpredictable' justifies a fresh review and new approach. Instead of being based on a reaction to an outside enemy, this new approach will be based on the need to protect civilians and democratic institutions within the very territory of the member states.[50]

In the US, attitudes toward the world were profoundly affected by September 11. The people of the US found that they were vulnerable – a feeling they had not felt since the Cuban missile crisis and not experienced since Pearl Harbor. Terrorists who used the tools of globalization against the US punctured the optimistic vision of globalization. And the nature of the threat, and the possibility that others would follow the first attack shortly, perhaps even more deadly, imparted a sense of urgency to the need to address the challenge.[51]

After 11 September 2001, however, a fundamental debate about the future transatlantic security relationship could not be dodged any longer. The changes in the international security environment had become too fundamental to allow for business as usual. Both the transatlantic relationship in general and NATO in particular have had to adapt to the

[50] NATO's Foreign Policy: Security, Available on Site: http://www.diplomatie.be/en/policy/
[51] Steinberg, James B., "Re-Founding the Transatlantic Relationship", The Brookings Institution, Available on Site: http://www. aspeninstitute.it/icons/imgAspen/

realization that the immediate post-Cold War period has ended and a new, still undefined era has begun. Three changes, in particular, stand out:

- The first change concerns the new threats of terrorism and WMD. These threats emerge from outside of Europe. Naturally, they draw US attention away from the Old Continent, toward Central Asia and the Middle East. A focus away from Europe, however, also means a focus away from NATO, an institution that is critically dependent on US leadership.

- The second change concerns the strategies with which to respond to the new threats. Simply put, an effective response might require a different team and a different approach than NATO is able to provide. Afghanistan was the first glimpse of that option. Also, NATO might be sidelined by ad hoc coalitions of states more able and perhaps even more willing than the old NATO fogies. Furthermore, NATO might also be sidetracked because of the perception that its consensual decision-making culture is too slow and cumbersome to deliver results in time.

- The third change concerns the military capabilities required to respond to the new threats. Rapid response, force projection, and protection against WMD are at a premium—precisely the areas in which the US is increasingly strong and where Europe's Cold War legacy forces are weak. As a result, US unilateralist impulses are strengthened, and Europeans see whatever influence they hoped to exert on Washington drifting away down the Potomac.

In short, by 12 September 2001, a new debate about the future of the transatlantic security relationship had become inevitable. Dodging it again, as was done in the early 1990s, would not work, not least since Europe today appears "settled."

A deeper question for NATO will be how much the war on terrorism defines its future. Some experts have suggested that NATO prepare to act collectively against out-of-area threats to the security of the Alliance. Most notably, US Sen. Richard Lugar has called NATO "the natural defense arm of the transatlantic community and the institution we should turn to for help in meeting new challenges such as terrorism and WMD." The

NATO Allies must confront the question of whether they want to adapt the Alliance to tackle these new threats.[52]

### 2.3.3 The Lasting Transatlantic Connection

At the end of the Cold War, NATO immediately changed its major defense strategies and Transatlantic-European securities in terms of cross-border movements towards Eastern Europe and Mediterranean links.[53] Despite the fundamental need for change, NATO could take on this reexamination of its internal relationships with considerable self-confidence. After all, 9/11 did not change everything. Despite some American claims that Europe was "fading slowly in the US rearview mirror," there is a transatlantic connection that has become too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned.

A profound impact on transatlantic relations is the evolution of the European Union itself. The closer integration of Europe has had a number of consequences. First, it has focused the energy and attention of key European political and policy leaders on European issues and on each other. The sheer weight of the ever-expanding European agenda and the frequency of high-level meetings crowd out attention to transatlantic issues and institutions. Second, the increasing importance of finding European consensus on issues ranging from trade to agriculture, the environment, and increasingly foreign policy, inevitably reduces the scope for compromise with the US once intra-European consensus is achieved. Third, the mechanisms of European decision-making do not match up well with transatlantic dialogue (the much criticized bilateral US-EU summits are severely hampered by the fact of the rotating EU presidency; while the absence of a single real spokes person for the EU on foreign policy issues also impedes cooperation, both of which might be altered if the proposals put forth in the Draft Constitution come into effect).[54]

First, European stability remains a key US strategic interest. The consolidation of Europe as an undivided, democratic, and market-oriented space remains a major objective of US security policy. Only in NATO, the central legitimizing framework for US power in Europe, can the US play an undisputed leadership role in advancing this strategic

[52] Eekelen, Wim Van, ibid, p.3
[53] Caşın, M. Hakkı, "Re-Thinking European Defense Community and NATO's New Collective Security Strategies from Vancouver to Ankara", NATO's Security and Cooperation Conference, Antalya, 2003, p.1
[54] Steinberg, James B. "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations." Survival, Summer 2003 45 (2): p.113-146.

objective. Thus, the US is not likely to surrender this role. Indeed, many US critics of Europe have yet to grasp the fact that both NATO enlargement and the war on terrorism have actually increased the US' immersion in European security affairs. Consequently, there is no serious political force in the US advocating a withdrawal from Europe.

Second, Europeans remain the key strategic allies for the US. This statement does not exclude a stronger US focus on other regions, nor is it contradicted by the emergence of much wider "coalitions of the willing" along the model provided by the Afghanistan campaign. Europe's military capabilities lag behind the US. Moreover, although the debate preceding the war against Iraq may have suggested otherwise, it is only in Europe where the US finds a milieu of countries predisposed to working with the US. In Asia, by contrast, the US will have to continue to rely on bilateral relationships with politically and culturally very different countries. In short, if the US wants to remain the world's predominant power, it will have to remain a "European power" as well.

Third, the US remains Europe's most important ally. The US continues to play a unique role within the transatlantic relationship, as a political crisis manager as well as a military coalition-builder, both within Europe (e.g., the Balkans) and beyond (e.g., the Persian Gulf). This unique US role is widely accepted by the Europeans, notwithstanding ritualistic European criticism of US arrogance or heavy-handedness. As in the US, there is currently no serious political force in Europe that would advocate a US withdrawal from the continent. On the contrary, with Central and Eastern Europe rejoining the Atlantic community of nations through the enlargement of NATO, the number of countries arguing for a strong US role in Europe has only increased.[55]

### 2.3.4 Recommendations On Transatlantic Foreign And Security Policy

Improve crisis management: A European foreign policy vision is the prerequisite for a common transatlantic response to international crises. It must be recognized that military measures may be necessary, and the corresponding threat situations must be identified. At the same time, political decision-making structures must be created that enhance Europe's ability to react, and to move quickly. Transatlantic engagement in crisis areas should contain aspects of security policy, as well as financial and economic elements designed to

[55] Rühle, Michael, "NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11", Summer 2003, p 90-97

support democratic change and establish enduring societal stability. Closer cooperation between the USA and Europe in the area of post-conflict management also is necessary. In addition to the existing crisis reaction forces, a Transatlantic Peace-Keeping Force should be created that, for example, would correspond to post-conflict management needs, resembling a cross between the police and military.

Develop and implement concepts: The USA and Europe need to develop and implement clear concepts for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Europe must, in the interests of its own security, develop a European Anti-Terror Concept - in addition to the American concept - as a part of its foreign policy strategy. This concept must, for example, include new mechanisms to prevent proliferation of WMD, and it must present potential multilateral agreements for cooperation and control - agreements whose mechanisms for sanctions employ all necessary means to enforce treaty compliance.

International law should fit the new security situation: It is necessary to initiate a common approach to international law. Principals of the ''Prohibition of Force'' and ''Nonintervention'' must take into account the need to respond to new dangers such as transnational terrorism, within a framework of global security. At the same time, decision-making mechanisms that bridge the gap between unilateralizm and multilateralizm and support an international order must be set into motion.

Using resources, creating synergy: The current European shortcomings in foreign and security policy demand an efficient sharing of resources. The European Union must continue to develop and integrate its common security and defense policies as well as its armaments industry. It is not just about more investment, but also about the more efficient use of available resources. Existing national defense structures no longer correspond to the political realities of a united Europe. In such questions of integration the European public is way ahead of European politics. The connection of national defense structures and national weapons industries with the building of a European defense architecture is a central political integration task for Europe in the coming years.

Strengthening new partners: A central element of transatlantic security will be the relationship of Russia to the EU and the USA. To support the idea of Russia as a "Euro-Pacific" country could be decisive for a future global partnership. For the EU, Russia can

be a partner in managing conflicts in crisis regions (for example south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia) and thereby affect the resolution of problems on Europe's borders. For the USA, Russia can be a partner in the fight against terrorism as well as a decisive influence on the relationship with China.

Secure the future of NATO: As a transatlantic platform, NATO still fulfils an important political and strategic role. But NATO's global importance versus its military irrelevance now hangs in the balance. In order to enable the creation of common NATO deployments, weapons systems must be balanced and discrepancies in technological capabilities must be prevented. In addition, the European defense and arms policies need reform. Moreover, an open transfer of technology from the USA is necessary. NATO units in Afghanistan and eventually in Iraq point to a broader spectrum of tasks that should influence planning, decision-making, image and strategy of the military alliance. NATO enlargement as well as the inclusion of Russia in this process is prerequisites for a functioning USA-Europe-Russia-Pacific security axis, offering cooperative answers to the security and political challenges in the crisis regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia.

Support communications: The foundation of transatlantic relations remains, as always, stable. But the crisis in the transatlantic relationship shows that communication between Europe and the USA must be improved significantly in order to support the partnership in the future. Above all, coordinated meetings are needed between the most important decision makers, for example in the form of an annual "Transatlantic Challenges Conference", as well as the creation of an institutional framework for cooperation between the EU and the USA.

### 2.3.5 Recommendations On Transatlantic Economic Policy

Coordinate economy/security: Security and economy are closely intertwined and therefore must not be dealt with separately. It is important in both political areas to consider (a) the integration of Russia and China (b) the inclusion of developing nations in the setting of goals; and (c) conflict management. As a result, the economic agenda could take the lead in some aspects of this closely intertwined security-political and economic agenda, having a positive spillover effect on political relations.

Support bilateral relations: Through the creation of a G2 dialogue between the US and the EU, it might be possible to guide a global concept of economy and security. With the G2 concept, a political and economic framework for bilateral relations could be created, as well as a basis for a stable world order. The G2 would stand in the center of pre-existing multilateral institutions and have an informal function and effect. The goal of the G2 dialogue should be to create new impulses for changing the world order through the common leadership of the USA and the EU. The G2 in this sense would be the conception basis for the transatlantic partnership whose weaknesses are so often mentioned. An existing G2 already has proven feasible in two areas: trade and NATO.

Regional economic cooperation in the Middle East: The regional free trade agreement proposed by the USA and the EU should be augmented by development programs and economic cooperation reflecting the pattern of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The creation of a regional Bank for Construction and Development could target support for macroeconomic reforms and serve to grant loans to regional companies. With the involvement of the G8 and former Arab lenders to Iraq, this could also form an economic political tool that could link a solution to Iraqi national debt with a regional economic development program.

Transatlantic energy politics: On the global oil market, the demand for progressive economic development is growing, while the availability of oil not only decreases but also is more sensitive to negative external effects. A cooperative energy policy pursues the goal of reducing the macroeconomic effect of volatile oil prices through creating an international administration of strategic oil reserves and a clear intervention policy. The specific use of industrial countries' oil reserves in periods of high-demand, together with coordinated reductions in response to overproduction, could stabilize oil prices and minimize economic fluctuations, providing an advantage to both producing and consuming nations.

Common initiatives for the creation of global solutions: Common responses to global migration and climate change are two central future challenges for transatlantic cooperation. Transatlantic environmental cooperation offers numerous possibilities. To this end, environmental standards must become an element of medium-range multilateral trade policy. This would necessitate the creation of an international forum for transatlantic

partners to deal with environmental issues. Cooperative research projects and the international collection of information must serve to transform dissent over causes and indicators of climate change into a common transatlantic stance. This is essential for the improvement of the global environmental situation. The challenges of global migration extend over many political areas, as do the liberalization of services, societal change in industrial nations, as well as development politics and security issues in the fight against terrorism. Answers and suggested solutions reflecting both the interests of countries of origin and the transatlantic destination countries must confront above all questions about recruitment of workers, the flow of remittances back into the countries of origin and the repatriation of immigrants.[56]

## 2.4 WHAT IS THE MAIN DIMENSION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN CONCEPT?

There is a resurgence of interest in the search for a viable form of dialogue to promote cooperation between Mediterranean states on regional concerns affecting the Mediterranean as a whole. With the end of the East-West divide and the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the traditional differentiation between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean has become less clear. It is necessary to consider the Mediterranean as a coherent geopolitical area because of its political, economic and cultural interdependence and, probably even more, because of commonly shared threats of instability. [57]

It is important first to have a clear impression of what one means when referring to the "Mediterranean." As the origin of the name "Mediterranean" suggests, it is located in the middle of lands. These lands were the cradles of human civilization in the past.[58]

What does one mean by the "Mediterranean"? What geographical area should be included? Should other criteria be used in addition to geography to explain what one means by the Mediterranean? Should the so-called Middle East -or, at least, a part of it- be included in the Mediterranean? It is far from clear what area the Mediterranean encompasses. There is also a debate over whether the Mediterranean, however it is depicted, may be regarded as a specific "region." This begs the question, what is a region?

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[56] Transatlantic Strategies for the 21st Century, Available on Site: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/

[57] Jesus, Carlos Echeverria, "European Security and the Mediterranean", 1997 p 54

[58] Nachmani, Amikam, ''Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean'', Friedrich Foundation in co-operation with Ari Movement and Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, International Conference, Istanbul, June 9-10, 1999, p.95

The Mediterranean may be defined in strict geographic terms as consisting of the territories of only those states that have a Mediterranean coastline. This would exclude Jordan and Mauritania, two of the Mediterranean dialogue countries in NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. It has been observed that although the Mediterranean may be regarded as a "geographic entity," this did not make the Mediterranean "a political or strategic whole."[59] States that do not have a Mediterranean coastline have been incorporated in so-called Mediterranean cooperative schemes, in practice.

The Mediterranean is a strategic crossroads where East meets West, and North meets South. In purely geographic terms, the region may be analyzed by subdividing the Mediterranean into sub-areas: Maghreb (AIgeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), and others (Balkans, Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Turkey). The latter is a kind of residual group, having no clear systemic characteristics. These sub-areas share a socio-economic common denominator; the Mediterranean and the Middle East are two regions interrelated in economic, political and strategic terms. The end of the East-West conflict in Europe and the beginning of peace-building in the Middle East have brought the two regions closer to each other.[60]

According to Calleya an analysis of the society of states which are geographically proximate to the Mediterranean basin reveals two prominent international regions: the geographical space which borders the north-west sector of the Mediterranean which is labeled the European Union, and the geographical area covering the south-eastern flank of the basin which is labeled the Middle East. The four sub-regions encompassing the Mediterranean are southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb (AIgeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), and the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria).

Each of the sub-regions continues to follow different evolutionary patterns and there is very little to indicate that any of them will integrate with their counterparts across the Mediterranean any time soon. Relations across Southern Europe are largely cooperative dominant, with this group of countries increasing their intergovernmental and transnational ties with the rest of Europe on a continuous basis. In contrast, conflicting relations have

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[59] Chipman, John, "NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges", Routledge, New York and London, 1988, p.3

[60] Jesus, Carlos Echeverria, Ibid, p 54

consistently hindered closer cooperation between countries in the Balkans, North Africa and the Levant.[61]


Figure 2. 18 North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin

Calleya argues that the Mediterranean encompasses at least two 'international regions' (the EU and the Middle East) and three sub-regional groupings (southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb).[62]

The Mediterranean has been described as a dense network of diversities and dividing lines between different political and socio-economic subsystems, cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religious denominations. For a penetrating understanding of the Mediterranean to be reached, one has to recognize that the region has always been a crossing point for conflict and cooperation, unity and diversity. Current discourses assert that the Mediterranean exists as an 'entity' or 'unity'; in that the Mediterranean formed a large-scale unity, whose history could be understood only by

[61] Calleya, Stephen C., "Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU-Policy in the Mediterranean", p.12, Available on site: http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/

[62] Xenakis, Dimitris K. and Chryssochoou, Dimitris N., Department of Political Studies - University of Catania, Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No: 38, October 2001, p 4

looking at the factors that tied its coastal parts together.[63] But the special bonds of Mediterranean solidarity will continue to form part of an open-ended debate.[64]

According to Roberto Aliboni, in a monograph published in early 1991, in political and geopolitical terms, the Mediterranean covered states of southern Europe, the Maghreb, parts of the Arabized Sahel such as Chad, the Arab Orient, the Gulf countries, and the Horn of Africa, but not the Balkans. The Balkans was omitted on the grounds that it was a "crisis spot" that was distinct from the area to the south of Europe. In Aliboni' s opinion it would be difficult to imagine a connection between crises in the Balkans and tensions in the southern Mediterranean, as they would stem from different political and security issues.[65]

According to NATO officials, therefore, there is in practice an overlap between the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan are clearly part of the Middle East but they may also be regarded as eastern Mediterranean. It has been suggested that according to US strategic thinking, the Mediterranean is "the place where the Persian Gulf begins."[66] A linkage between events in the Gulf and in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean was demonstrated by the extent of the popular reaction in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It appears that one reason for Jordan' s inclusion in the Mediterranean Initiative is Amman's potential positive influence in the Persian Gulf. However, it seems that there is a consensus in NATO circles that the Mediterranean Initiative itself should be perceived as a dialogue that does not intend to include the troubled Gulf in its mandate. There is a concern that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue may be adversely affected by a crisis in the Gulf. In contrast, events in the Horn of Africa have no immediate bearing on the Mediterranean Initiative, while only France and the US have expressed serious concern about past Libyan encroachments in Chad.[67]

May one then speak of a Mediterranean region? According to Louis J. Cantori and Steven

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[63] Olsen J. P., "European Challenges to the Nation State", Arena Reprints, 97/11, 1997, p. 182
[64] Olsen J. P., Ibid, p 175
[65] Aliboni, Roberto, "European Security across the Mediterranean", Paris: Chaillot Papers 2, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 1991, p.2-3
[66] Lesser, Ian O., "Southern Europe and the Maghreb: US Interests and Policy Perspectives", Luso-American Development Foundation, Lisbon, April 28, 1995, p.7-8
[67] Winrow, Gareth M., "Dialogue With The Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Garland Publishing, New York & London, 2000, p 3-4

L. Spiegel, a region:

> "Consists of one state, or two or more prominent and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system."[68]

According to this argument, therefore, a region may form part of one state or cover the territory of two or more presumably neighboring states. States that may form a region should share certain common features. The behavior of states located outside the region - intrusive states," in the words of Cantori and Spiegel- may strengthen the sense of regional identity with regard to the governments and publics of states within the region. One may also add that regions are difficult to delineate. The boundary of one region may overlap with the boundary of another.

Cantori and Spiegel underlined the importance of the intensity of interaction between states or units within a region. These relations could be of a cooperative and/or antagonistic nature.[69] Commentators have also noted the significance of interaction between different units. They have defined regions in systemic terms, analyzing a region as a subsystem of the international system or viewing a region as a system itself. These analysts have also focused more on "security" issues in their explications of what is meant by a region. For example, W. Howard Wriggins has referred to "regional security systems" whose member states interact with each other so intensely that behavior in any one of them "is a necessary element in the calculation of others."[70] This depiction of a regional security system appears to be similar to Barry Buzan's definition of a security complex as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."[71] According to both Wriggins and Buzan, relations between units in their system/complex could be based on different degrees of amity or enmity: Relations could be cooperative or antagonistic. In their

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[68] Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L., "The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach", Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentiee-Hall, 1970, p.6-7

[69] Cantori Louis J. and Spiegel Steven L., Ibid

[70] Wriggins, W. Howard, ed.," Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems of the Indian Ocean Rim", Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, p.6-8

[71] Buzan, Barry, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations", University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1983, p.106

emphasis on the importance of interaction between units, Wriggins and Buzan did not share the viewpoint of Cantori and Spiegel who had stated that the units should also share certain common features. There is no necessary connection between the level and nature of interaction and the degree of social and cultural homogeneity between the units in question.

According to one definition, regionalism consists of a set of policies pursued by one or more states (or units) within a region. These policies are aimed at promoting the emergence of a "cohesive regional unit" where cooperation between states (or units) across a wide range of issues is possible. Here, there is an assumption that states have common interests. Regionalism does not exclude the possibility that states within a region may also have significant relations with states outside the region and with other regions.[72]

In practice, regions may be evolving or "in making." They may be likened to "imagined communities" talked about and written into existence, as in the case of nations. The role of political actors and so-called regional builders is crucial. Moreover, like a nation, a region needs to be recognized and acknowledged by political actors outside of the region.[73]

A sense of regional identity may be shaped by the activities within an area of political elites in key states. Other groups such as businessmen, intellectuals, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may help to promote common interests within an area. Touristic, educational, and cultural exchanges could also foster a regional identity.[74] Governments may not agree about what sort of regional arrangements should be established. Rival region-building projects may exist. The political elites of certain states may compete with one another to present themselves as the core or hub of regional cooperation.[75]

No region may be completely isolated and closed off from the rest of the world. Regions may differ, though, according to the degree of "autonomy" they may have. Here, autonomy refers to "a state or region's ability to keep outsiders from defining the issues that constitute

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[72] Hurrell, Andrew, "Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional Bloc of the Americas", International Affairs 48, 1, January 1992, p.123

[73] Neumann, Iver B., "A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe", Review of International Studies 20, 1, January 1994, p.58-59

[74] Nostalgia, Nordic: "Northern Europe after the Cold War;" International Affairs 68, 1, January 1992

[75] Neumann, Iver B., Ibid, p.66, 69

the local agenda."[76] States beyond the region may positively affect the development of a regional identity. These intrusive states may encourage region building, perhaps in order to promote stability. Autonomy, in this instance, may not be beneficial for the strengthening of a regional identity. Or neighboring states may seek to expand their ties with one another to prevent intrusive states from interfering in their internal and external affairs. Intrusive states or other outside actors (e.g., alliances) may also negatively affect the development of a regional identity. This would likely occur when rival outside states or groupings of states seeking to enhance their geopolitical position are competing for the allegiance of the governments of states within a particular area.

In short, in their efforts to define a region, several commentators have stressed the importance of geographic proximity and underlined that there should be a certain level of interaction between units within the region. This interaction may be cooperative and/or conflictive, though advocates of regionalism focus on positive interactions between states. There may be a degree of social and/or cultural homogeneity between the units in question but this is not essential. The role of outside actors should also be considered. Regions evolve and may develop. They could also in time, in effect, wither away if the interaction between units within the region substantially declines. This could perhaps occur due to a change in the international environment. Competition between outside actors to acquire client states or extend their spheres of influence could also result in a lessening of the sense of a regional identity.[77]

May one then speak of a Mediterranean region? In his classic work, Fernand Braudel observed that four or five centuries ago the Mediterranean was a world in itself. The Mediterranean was a center of influence where peoples interacted through commercial exchanges and other forms of contact. States were in cooperation and conflict with one another.[78] Other analysts also refer to today's Mediterranean as a vital crossroads open to influences and exchanges, but they also tend to stress that the Mediterranean has become a "frontier" separating different worlds. According to one depiction, for example, a largely

[76] Thornton, Thomas P., "The Challenge to US Policy in the Third World: Global Responsibilities and Regional Devolution", Westview, Boulder, Colo., 1986, p.25
[77] Winrow, Gareth M., "Dialogue With The Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.3-4
[78] Braudel, Fernand, "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II", Harper and Row, New York, 1972, p.32

economically and politically developed Judaeo-Christian world to the north of the Mediterranean is separated from an Islamic world to the south that is economically undeveloped and ruled by authoritarian governments.

According to Stephen C. Calleya, the Mediterranean "is a frontier separating different political, economic, military and cultural forces."[79] He strongly argues that there is no Mediterranean region. Rather, there are three sub-regions that cover the Mediterranean area, namely southern Europe, the Levant (eastern Mediterranean), and the Maghreb (southern Mediterranean). Southern Europe is a part of the region of Western Europe, and the Levant and the Maghreb cover part of a separate Middle East region. Although there is some interaction between these three sub-regions, Calleya believes that they are becoming more embroiled in the concerns of their respective regions. As the disparities between the north and south multiply, the Mediterranean is becoming rapidly a "fault-line between two separate and increasingly polarized regions."[80]

On the other hand, according to Fred Tanner, there is an emerging Mediterranean region that is increasingly acquiring its own distinct political identity. There is a trend of regionalization in the Mediterranean area, and this is evident in such initiatives as the Barcelona Process and the attempt to promote cultural and social cooperation through the Mediterranean Forum. In Tanner's opinion, there are political and economic problems in the Mediterranean. However, he believes that a common geography, history, and certain perceptions of togetherness are encouraging the emergence of a Mediterranean region.[81] It is worth noting, though, that texts and communiqués relating to the Barcelona Process refer to a "Euro-Mediterranean area" and not a Euro-Mediterranean region.

Certainly, in practice, there is an increasing interaction between businessmen, politicians, intellectuals, NGOs, and so forth, in the Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean area. It seems to be too early, though, to declare that a Mediterranean region is actually "in making," For example, the aborted attempt to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and the failure of Malta to inaugurate a Council

[79] Calleya, Stephen C., "Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area", Aldershot, Dartmouth, Brookfield, 1997, p.235
[80] Calleya, Stephen C. "Post-Cold War Regional Dynamics in the Mediterranean Area", Mediterranean Quarterly 7, 3, summer 1996, p.44
[81] Tanner, Fred, "The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Cooperation", Perceptions 1, 4, December 1996-February 1997, p.56

of the Mediterranean based on the Council of Europe suggest that any trend toward regionalization in the Mediterranean is far from complete. Arguably, a future Mediterranean region would overlap with regions to its north (Europe), east (the Middle East), and south (the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, the latter if Mauritania is included in a Mediterranean region). In spite of this overlap, a Mediterranean region could exist independently. For this to be the case, a Mediterranean region would need to have its own particular agenda, which would enable the region to have a measure of autonomy.

As already noted, cultural and social homogeneity between units in a region is not necessarily important. A number of commentators have rather placed emphasis on the intensity of interaction between units in order to substantiate whether or not a region may exist. It will be observed that there is a large economic and social disparity and a cultural divide between states north and south of the Mediterranean. But, with the end of the Cold War, there does appear to be an upsurge in contacts between states across the Mediterranean, although not to the extent that the actions of one state are always a necessary element in the calculations of other states in the area. It is important to note that the activities of politicians, businessmen, NGOs, and so on in the Mediterranean area, and the dialogues conducted by various initiatives such as those of the EU, WEU, OSCE, and NATO with regard to the Mediterranean, are not aimed primarily at creating a Mediterranean region. Rather, their objective is to strengthen cooperation and enhance "stability" and "security" in the Mediterranean area. One potential beneficial spin-off from these developments, however, is that the governments and peoples around the Mediterranean may increasingly feel that they do share some sort of common identity, and this may ultimately encourage the pursuit of policies that aim to promote regionalism in the Mediterranean.

Obviously, NATO officials are not engaged in a debate about what is meant by the Mediterranean and whether a Mediterranean region exists or is "in making." They do refer to the Mediterranean as an area where developments may have an impact on the security of Europe, though the boundaries of this Mediterranean area are not defined. As already noted, the Mediterranean Initiative involves non-NATO states along the southern and eastern Mediterranean coastline together with other neighboring states in the Maghreb or Middle East. NATO member states that border the Mediterranean Sea to the north should

also be included as a part of the Mediterranean even though they are also a part of Europe. Turkey is here included as a part of Europe at least with regard to security issues. As regions overlap, states may also be a part of more than one geographical area. The Mediterranean area-and possibly emerging region-as depicted by NATO, therefore, includes states that are a part of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. This is in line with the Euro-Mediterranean area as depicted by the EU's Barcelona Process. It will be seen that the role of the US as an outside/intrusive actor in the Mediterranean has been, and is, of paramount importance. The US is influential in setting many, but by no means all, of the issues that constitute the Mediterranean agenda. For example, the US is not a full party to the EU's Barcelona Process, which is heavily involved in tackling various issues and problems in the Mediterranean.

It is worth noting here that Arab governments and even more So Arab peoples in the southern and eastern Mediterranean tend to regard NATO and the US as one and the same. In practice, of course, NATO is not a monolithic organization totally dominated by the US. The US administration does not necessarily share the same views as its European allies with reference to the Mediterranean. Not always succeeding in convincing its NATO partners to pursue a particular policy, the US at times has also been prepared to accommodate the interests of those NATO member states especially concerned about developments in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.[82]

## 2.5 THE ALTERING MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY AGENDA

### 2.5.1 Mediterranean Security: Thinking Again

Within the broader definition, there is a vast array of potential security problems: disputed boundaries, water shortage, nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation, terrorism, militant fundamentalism and demographic imbalance. In most cases, such concerns spill over national borders and assume regional importance. The problem of international boundaries as a threat to security can be particularly well illustrated within the Mediterranean basin,

[82] Winrow Gareth M., Ibid, p.8-11

where boundary disputes rest on mixtures of security considerations and resource appropriation.[83]

Some Western observers have been openly skeptical of the notion of Mediterranean security, arguing that the Mediterranean is too diverse a region in security terms, with a wide range of serious but highly differentiated sub-regional problems. What, if anything, do the Western Sahara, the Levant, and the Balkans have in common that might suggest a useful "Mediterranean" approach?

Moreover, the traditional intellectual (and bureaucratic) divide between European and Middle Eastern affairs makes the development of a Mediterranean approach difficult, especially from the U.S. perspective. There are, however, compelling reasons to take a broader view. First, the existence of distinctive sub-regional issues does not eliminate the importance of broader, regional—indeed trans-regional—approaches to security problems, many aspects of which cannot be adequately understood by viewing issues and crises in isolation. Western policymakers have no difficulty in accepting that Baltic, Balkan, and Central European issues belong within a European security framework, or those events in North Africa and the Persian Gulf contribute to a wider Middle Eastern security environment. Why not employ a Mediterranean lens when the issues and policy responses warrant it?

Second, and without losing sight of the specifics, it is clear that many of the security challenges around the Mediterranean basin spring from similar trends—from unresolved questions of political legitimacy, relentless urbanization, and slow growth to resurgent nationalism, religious radicalism, and the search for regional "weight."

Third, and above all, the growing interdependence of traditionally separate security environments, as a result of the expanded reach of modern military and information systems, is producing a significant gray area of problems that are neither strictly European nor Middle Eastern. The Mediterranean is at the center of this phenomenon, and Mediterranean security is likely to be an increasingly useful organizing principle for governments and institutions seeking to improve the overall security climate. As NATO

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[83] Anderson, Ewan and Fenech, Dominic, "Mediterranean Politics: Volume: 1, New Dimensions in Mediterranean Security", Wellington House, Great Britain, 1996, p.15

itself becomes more actively engaged in addressing functional security issues (e.g., proliferation, terrorism, crisis management) that cut across traditional geographic divides, the importance of the Mediterranean will be reinforced as a natural sphere for action on Europe's doorstep.

### 2.5.2 The New Mediterranean Security Agenda

Most discussion of the security environment in the region rightly encompasses both "hard" (e.g., proliferation of WMD, and terrorism) as well as "soft" (e.g., political, economic, and social) issues. Indeed, the expansion of the security agenda beyond narrowly defined defense questions has been a leading feature of the post–Cold War scene everywhere, and the Mediterranean is an example of this trend. It has been argued that the definition of some soft issues, especially migration, as security challenges encourages an overheated treatment by publics and policymakers on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Rightly or wrongly, however, migration has emerged as a security issue in European perceptions. Migration and refugee issues are increasingly regarded as security problems. Although the European Commission has expressed its opposition to such an all-embracing view of security, many error density (ED) member states not only do not criticize this tendency but also promote its application. Indeed, migration is listed as a security risk within almost all strategic concepts currently in vogue. At the same time, opinion elites in North Africa are coming to regard the treatment of their compatriots in Europe as part of the foreign and security policy agenda in the broadest sense. [84]

Many analysts of Mediterranean affairs point to the growing gap between a "rich" North and a "poor" and increasingly populous South. The population around the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean is likely to reach 350 million by the end of the century. By contrast, the total population of the current members of the EU will probably not exceed 300 million in the same period. Over the last decade, the countries of the Maghreb, including Egypt, have experienced population growth on the order of 40 percent.

The prospect of 300 million poor people just across the sea, in countries in which problems of economic growth, political development, and cultural roots are deeply interwoven,

[84] Vasconcelos, Alvaro De, "Security as a Component of Comprehensive Policy", Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol.8, No.2, 2003, p.151

creates a potential for mass migration, an issue of great concern for all Europeans, not just Southern Europeans.[85]

Although there is now some indication that these tremendous for rates of growth have slowed, the trend has clearly been toward a growing imbalance of population between the North and South—indeed a virtual reversal of the demographic weight of Europe in relation to North Africa and the Levant. From a social and political viewpoint, it is perhaps more telling that the numbers of people under 15 years of age near the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean will reach some 30 percent by 2025. [86] Demographic pressures of this magnitude are producing relentless urbanization, social and economic strains, and a steady stream of migrants seeking jobs and social services (a process which starts well to the south of the Maghreb and affects societies on both sides of the Mediterranean). Millions of Muslim immigrants have already entered France, Italy and Spain and this continued immigration from the South is an open challenge to the development of the European Union. Movements of labor across the Mediterranean, for long a feature of the economics of the region, have always involved the potential for social problems, but when the migrants are refugees, the situation can be greatly exacerbated.[87]

Needless to say, these pressures, together with more visible divides between the "haves" and the "have-nots," are also threatening the political stability of states around the Southern Mediterranean.

Energy issues have more commonly appeared on "Northern" agendas as a security concern, but with the growth of new lines of communication for energy around the Mediterranean basin, the interest in energy security is now more broadly shared. The discussion of energy as a security issue is also losing some of its traditional North- South character, as South-South energy links expand (e.g., the trans-Maghreb gas pipeline, Iranian-Turkish links, and alternative routes for bringing Caspian oil to Western markets). The development of new energy ties may be seen in some quarters as a source of additional vulnerability to political turmoil beyond national and regional borders. Yet new links are

[85] Ortega, Andres, "Maelstrom: The US, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean", Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, p.32

[86] United Nations World Economic and Social Survey 1995; and Bos, Eduard, "World Population Projections 1994–95", Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994, p.4

[87] McColl, R.W., "The Creation and Consequences of International Refugees: Politics, Military Action and Geography", GeoJournal 31, 2, 1993, p.169-177

just as likely to have a stabilizing effect because of diversification and economic interdependence along both South-South and North-South axes. In this context, it is not surprising that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (also known as the "Barcelona process") has made cooperation on energy issues a focus for early attention. Dialogue on the security dimensions of energy trade and use could emerge as a promising area for NATO in its own Mediterranean Initiative.

| Ten Non EU-Mediterranean Dialogue Partners (plus Libya) in % | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2020 | 2030 |
| Algeria | 22.3 | 30.4 | 39.5 | 43.5 | 51.4 | 57.1 | 62.2 | 67.5 | 71.7 |
| Morocco | 26.2 | 29.2 | 34.6 | 41.3 | 48.4 | 55.5 | 61.7 | 66.7 | 71.0 |
| Tunisia | 31.2 | 36.0 | 44.5 | 51.5 | 57.9 | 65.5 | 71.3 | 75.2 | 78.4 |
| Libya | 18.6 | 22.7 | 45.3 | 69.3 | 81.8 | 87.6 | 89.7 | 90.9 | 92.0 |
| Egypt | 31.9 | 37.9 | 42.2 | 43.8 | 43.6 | 42.7 | 44.0 | 48.2 | 54.4 |
| **Only North Africa** | **24.7** | **30.1** | **36.3** | **40.4** | **44.8** | **48.9** | **53.4** | **58.2** | **63.3** |
| Jordan | 35.9 | 50.9 | 56.0 | 60.2 | 72.2 | 78.7 | 80.1 | 82.2 | 84.4 |
| Israel | 64.6 | 77.0 | 84.2 | 88.6 | 90.3 | 91.6 | 93.0 | 93.9 | 94.6 |
| Palestine Authority | 37.3 | 44.0 | 54.3 | 61.1 | 64.0 | 66.8 | 70.0 | 73.5 | 76.9 |
| Lebanon | 22.7 | 39.6 | 59.4 | 73.7 | 84.2 | 89.7 | 92.1 | 93.1 | 93.9 |
| Syria | 30.6 | 36.8 | 43.3 | 46.7 | 48.9 | 51.4 | 55.4 | 60.6 | 65.6 |
| Turkey | 21.3 | 29.7 | 38.4 | 43.8 | 61.2 | 65.8 | 69.9 | 73.7 | 77.0 |
| **Western Asia** | **26.7** | **35.0** | **44.4** | **51.7** | **62.0** | **64.7** | **67.2** | **69.8** | **72.4** |
| **Urbanization rates for three continents and the world** | | | | | | | | | |
| **Africa** | **14.7** | **18.5** | **23.1** | **27.4** | **31.8** | **37.2** | **42.7** | **47.9** | **52.9** |
| **Asia** | **17.4** | **20.8** | **23.4** | **26.9** | **32.3** | **37.5** | **43.0** | **48.7** | **54.1** |
| **Europe** | **52.4** | **58.0** | **64.6** | **69.4** | **72.1** | **73.4** | **75.1** | **77.6** | **80.5** |
| **World** | **29.8** | **33.7** | **36.8** | **39.6** | **43.5** | **47.2** | **51.5** | **55.9** | **60.2** |

Table 2. 2 Changes in the Urbanization Rates of MENA Countries (1950-2030) (Source: Urbanization and Natural Disasters in the Mediterranean: Population Growth and Climate Change in the 21st Century, p.175, http://www.proventionconsortium.org/files/conference_papers/brauch.pdf)

The softest part of the Mediterranean security agenda, but one arguably increasing in significance, concerns what can be termed "security of identity."[88] Security of identity, or cultural security, is a highly charged issue in many Mediterranean societies and has been prominent in the thinking of secular as well as religious observers in North Africa and the Middle East. It is also implicit in speculation about "civilizational" clashes, with the Mediterranean as a leading fault line between Islam and the West. The widespread availability of Western television and other media has heightened awareness of the identity issue. Migration from South to North has introduced another sort of concern about the meaning of immigration for the cultural security of recipient states. This anxiety has

[88] Faria, Fernanda and Vasconcelos, Alvaro de, "Security in North Africa: Ambiguity and Reality," Chaillot Paper, No. 25, Western European Union (WEU) Institute for Security Studies, September 1996, p.5

contributed to the politicized debate over immigration policy in Mediterranean Europe, reinforcing the economic and security aspects of the issue.

Without judging the validity of cultural anxieties on both sides of the Mediterranean, it is clear that perceptions about security of identity can have a marked effect on the prospects for Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation on other fronts. This issue transcends the well-known problem of the divide between public and elite opinion in North Africa and elsewhere in the "South". Ambivalence toward, or even outright distrust of, Western institutions is observable even among certain Southern Mediterranean elites, a reality reinforced by perceived challenges to identity. Any attempt to deepen NATO's engagement and dialogue across the Mediterranean will need to address issues of identity as part of a broader public information strategy.

"Hard" security problems in the military and defense realm are similarly diverse. These range from political violence and terrorism, to the proliferation of WMD and longer-range weapons delivery systems. Less fashionable, but still central to the Mediterranean security environment, are the sophisticated, large-scale conventional arsenals and the challenges these pose to the territorial status quo.

The most pressing WMD and missile proliferation risks are 'South-South' than 'North-South.' Because in the strategic security understanding of the southern Mediterranean states the acquisition of such weapons is a reflection of regional weight, prestige and power. There are varying but identifiable risks of military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, and Egypt and Sudan. Direct confrontations across the Mediterranean are more difficult to imagine under current political conditions, with the possible but remote exception of a Spanish-Moroccan crisis over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.[89]

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the potential for large-scale armed conflict is more prominent in the current strategic environment. The Arab-Israeli dispute continues to have an important military dimension, both conventional and unconventional. If the Balkans and

[89] Ormancı, Emriye Bağdagül, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", Ibid, p.16

the Black Sea region are included in the equation, the potential for armed conflict in and around the Mediterranean is far from theoretical.

Looking across the Mediterranean security agenda, one point that emerges very strongly is the extent to which individual crises (e.g., in Bosnia, Algeria, Arab-Israeli relations) can influence security perceptions across the region. In addition, deterioration in the climate surrounding political, economic, or even cultural issues could produce an environment in which more-direct security risks increase, crises become more difficult to manage, and initiatives aimed at Mediterranean dialogue become more controversial. Many aspects of the Mediterranean security equation are unrelated to the Arab-Israeli relationship. Nonetheless, it will be impossible to ignore the links between the health of the Middle East peace process and the prospects for deepening security cooperation along Mediterranean North-South lines. In terms of giving NATO's Mediterranean Initiative a true multilateral (as opposed to bilateral or "multi-bilateral") character, the outlook is likely to be heavily influenced by the overall tenor of Arab-Israeli relations.




Table 2. 3 Orientation Tools of NATO

Four orientation axes are susceptible to constitute the basic elements of convergent approach to security in the Mediterranean. These are:

1. Promotion of stability in the Mediterranean through the settlement of pending conflicts in the respect of international legality.

2. Impulse of political dialogue and the fulfillment of cooperation instruments in domains commonly regarded as a priority.

3. Sustained cultures and civilizations dialogue.

4. Achievement of political transitions and economic reforms in the south of the Mediterranean.[90]

### 2.5.3 The Inner Dimension

In terms of purely military security, the Mediterranean region poses many actual and potential problems. If a more broadly based definition of security is used, the Mediterranean emerges with more possible geopolitical flashpoints than any other region of comparable size. The vital question that must then be posed concerns what kind of structure can best be employed to address the issues and reduce the possibility of conflict. This debate is at present in its early stages, if only because until now little headway has been achieved in addressing the Mediterranean basin as a single region, with riparian states acknowledging a common security interest.[91]

For many states around the Mediterranean, security continues to be, above all, a matter of internal security, and many foreign and security policy questions derive importance from their ability to affect the stability of existing regimes. Along the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean, political futures remain unresolved, with many regimes facing significant challenges to their legitimacy. The near–civil war in Algeria provides the most dramatic example of internal insecurity and violent Islamic opposition to the political order.

Whether or not the Algerian regime succeeds in containing the Islamic insurgency, the Algerian crisis is likely to have a profound effect on the security of North Africa as a whole, and the overall perception of risk from the South in Mediterranean Europe.[92] Regardless of the outcome, Algerian society will be profoundly changed, and Algeria's neighbors on both sides of the Mediterranean may face spillovers of terrorism and political extremism for some time to come. The Algerian crisis has thrown the question of political change and the role of Islam along the Southern shores of the Mediterranean into sharp relief. In Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and even Libya, security perceptions will be driven by

[90] Ferdiou, Ouelhadj, "Security Perceptions in the Mediterranean: Which Factors for Change, Perceptions", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.8, No.2, 2003, p.45-46
[91] Anderson, Ewan and Fenech, Dominic, Ibid, p.19
[92] Serfaty, Simon, "Algeria Unhinged," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996–97, p.137-153

the need to preserve political legitimacy and hold violent (or potentially violent) opposition movements at bay.

The problem of political legitimacy and internal stability will be closely tied to demographic and economic trends across the region. The dilemmas posed by expanding and younger populations coupled with slow economic growth have been widely discussed. Attempts at economic reform and the emergence of a more dynamic private sector are widening the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots," with potentially destabilizing consequences. Reforms aimed at promoting longer-term prosperity and encouraging foreign investment may well reinforce stability over the longer term, but the shorter-term political risks are substantial, especially where dissatisfaction with the existing political order is already widespread. Rising expectations will be difficult to meet and could prove to be a powerful source of political change in countries where the established political class proves incapable of promoting a better distribution of wealth and opportunity.

Much of the foregoing discussion has concentrated on the problems of the South. But societies on both sides of the Mediterranean share in a growing perception of declining "personal security." In Southern Europe, and Europe as a whole, the concern about spillovers of political violence from crises across the Mediterranean compels the attention of political leaderships and public opinion because terrorist risks strike at personal security as well as at the security of the state. The terrorist bombings in Paris in 1996 provide a dramatic example. In France and elsewhere, rightwing movements have used the personal security issue (crime, terrorism, drug trafficking), in addition to economic and "identity" arguments in support of their views on immigration policy.

A detailed analysis of the implications of the information revolution for security in the region is beyond the scope of this discussion, but three aspects are worth mentioning. First, the growing ease of telecommunications is likely to bolster the power and flexibility of opposition movements, both violent and nonviolent, within Mediterranean states and in "exile," with implications for the stability of many regimes in North Africa and the Levant. Second, it will facilitate the growth of political networks, including terrorist and criminal networks around the Mediterranean and beyond.[93] As a consequence, the potential for

[93] Braudel, Fernand, Ibid, p.14

spillovers of political violence (e.g., Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) terrorism in France, Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) violence in Turkey) will increase and the decentralized and freelance behavior of "networked" groups will be difficult to monitor and counter. Finally, the widespread availability of European media around the Mediterranean has already had a marked effect on "Southern" images of the rich societies to the North. Muslims as well as many Arab secularists have seized on this phenomenon as a threat to their security of identity.

Each of these information-related trends will reinforce the interdependence of societies around the Mediterranean and elsewhere in security terms and increase the need for dialogue and practical cooperation. The pressures for political and economic change in Mediterranean societies will be accommodated in different ways and with different degrees of success. Given the experience of Algeria and the lower level crises ongoing elsewhere, from the Western Sahara to the Caucasus, however, it is reasonable to expect that the future Mediterranean security environment will be characterized by multiple instances of turmoil within societies, with the attendant risk of spillovers. Whether demographic pressures and internal instability lead to the pattern of chaotic violence and failed states characterized by Robert Kaplan as "the coming anarchy," the Mediterranean basin certainly includes a number of societies where outcomes along these lines are possible. In Algeria, "chaos" is already a reality. Looking further away, two Mediterranean states, Turkey and Egypt, are also experiencing the security consequences of chaos on their borders, the former in the context of turmoil in the Caucasus and Northern Iraq, the latter in relation to conflict and refugee pressures in Sudan.[94]

### 2.5.4 The Regional Dimension

The Mediterranean is littered with regional problems whose roots are earthed deep in history. Although the overshadowing East-West confrontation, no less than, say, nineteenth-century big power rivalries, often became an extremely important variable in such conflicts, its termination did not automatically open the way to their resolution. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cyprus question, the external policies of radical states, terrorism, militant fundamentalism, or South-North emigration -such problems do not owe their

[94] Kaplan, Robert D., "The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century", Random House, New York, 1996, p.73-75

existence to the Cold War. However, what the Cold War did was to render them more intractable through foreign intervention and patronage, or else to contain them and their effects, or indeed simply distract attention away from them. Superpower competition being at once a complicating and a stabilizing factor in these regional issues, its abrupt termination necessarily had an impact, variously destabilizing, conciliatory or provocative of new problems.[95]

The combination of internal political change and the continuing effects of the end of Cold War moorings will have significant consequences for the strategic environment around the Mediterranean, and within key sub-regions. Some broad trends are:

First, unstable societies and changing political orientations will complicate crisis prevention and management. As an example, radical ideology and humanitarian strains in Sudan increase the likelihood of conflict with Egypt over such substantive issues as water. A further key problem with economic, political and social implications is water. With limited areas of drainage basin and dry summers, the Mediterranean is, in general, an area of water shortage. Notable exceptions are France and Turkey, but more than balancing them are Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Libya and Malta, which rank among the countries with the lowest per capita consumption of water in the world.[96] The advent of new Islamic regimes in Algeria, or perhaps a post-Qadhafi Libya, would give an ideological edge to potential frictions with neighboring states over territorial and other issues.

Second, it has become fashionable to see political Islam as a key driver of internal and external challenges around the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Islam is indeed likely to be a continuing and significant force in the political evolution of many states in the region, and a factor in foreign and security policy orientations.[97] But it would be unwise to dismiss the power of nationalism as a key motivating factor in the behavior of states, with or without an Islamist component.

If the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla emerge as a flashpoint in Spanish-Moroccan relations in the future, the driving force is likely to be Moroccan nationalism. So too,

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[95] Anderson, Ewan and Fenech, Dominic, Ibid, p.11
[96] Anderson, Ewan and Fenech, Dominic, ibid, p.16
[97] Fuller, Graham E. and Lesser, Ian O., "A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West", Boulder, Westview, Colo., 1995, p 42

Egyptian nationalism will inevitably be a significant force behind Cairo's attitude toward issues affecting the Mediterranean and the Middle East as a whole.

The potentially destabilizing effects of nationalism are not limited to the Southern Mediterranean. The future security environments in the Balkans, and on Russia's southern periphery will be shaped by the strength of nationalist impulses. Indeed, the character of European policy toward the Mediterranean and the role of extra-Mediterranean powers, such as the US, in Mediterranean security will be strongly influenced by the future balance between national and multilateral approaches. Growing unilateralizm or the re-nationalization of foreign and security policies would surely complicate strategic dialogue and cooperation on Europe's southern periphery. Competing national visions can also influence the way in which the Alliance organizes itself to address security challenges on its periphery, as the political friction between the US and France over control of the Southern Command in Naples illustrates.

In a third trend, much discussion about the emerging strategic environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East focuses on "low" (terrorism, political violence) and "high" (WMD) end threats. There is considerable merit in this approach, but it should not be allowed to obscure the continuing problem of the conventional defense of borders and the preservation of the territorial status quo. This problem—and the tendency to be distracted by other risks—is perhaps most acute in the Persian Gulf. But the Mediterranean basin also provides some important cases in which conventional clashes over territory and resources are possible. Prominent examples include altercations in the Western Sahara, Spain-Morocco (over the enclaves), Morocco-Algeria, Libya-Tunisia, Egypt-Sudan, Israel-Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, and Greece-Turkey. This suggests that quite apart from the important potential for cooperation on counter terrorism and nonproliferation, the Mediterranean is a place where future demands for conventional peacekeeping, CBMs, and security guarantees are likely to be high—a fact that has implications for how NATO structures its Mediterranean Initiative with the countries along the Southern Mediterranean littoral.

A fourth trend involves the end of Cold War alignments and the changing character of the Arab-Israeli dispute. These have opened the way for new security alignments and "geometries." Examples of this new fluidity in regional geopolitics include more overt

Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation and the tendency of smaller Arab states, especially those in the Maghreb, to adopt an independent stance on security issues. Renewed progress in the Middle East peace process would facilitate strategic cooperation between Israel and Jordan, perhaps including Turkey in a trilateral alignment of status quo powers. In an extreme case, the advent of new Islamic regimes could drive secular but "revolutionary" regimes to make strategic agreements with the West, even if this requires a rapid disengagement with Israel.

Emerging links between Mediterranean nonmember states and NATO also suggest the possibility of a future in which European or Mediterranean institutions provide an alternative to security arrangements centered on the Middle East. Whereas European security has an elaborate architecture, entailing multiple institutions—NATO, WEU, and OSCE—North Africa and the Middle East lack effective security institutions. In the Mediterranean setting, at least, some states may prefer to develop ties with existing European or Atlantic institutions based on a sense of affinity or the need for tangible security guarantees. This preference could provide an important incentive for non–NATO member Mediterranean states to explore more active dialogue and cooperation with NATO, as well as the EU.[98]

### 2.5.5 The Trans-Regional Dimension

Around the Mediterranean, but not across it, there is no shortage of organizations experienced in dealing with security issues. The European Mediterranean is represented by at least some member states in five bodies originally constructed within the framework of the Cold War: NATO, EU, WEU, CSCE and NACC. NATO has been described as 'the most successful alliance in history'.[99]

Some of the most striking developments affecting the strategic outlook in the Mediterranean concern the steadily increasing interdependence of the European and Middle Eastern environments. In political, economic, and military terms, the future for both sides of the Mediterranean will be interwoven to a substantial degree. On the political

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[98] Jentleson, Bruce, "The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Talks: Progress, Problems, and Prospects", Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Policy Paper No. 26, San Diego, Calif., September 1996, p.40-44

[99] Kinkel, K., "NATO's Enduring Role in Europe", NATO Review 40, 5, 1992, p.3-7

front, public and official opinion in North Africa and the Levant will be influenced by events in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as by events within Western European societies, that affect the position of Muslim communities. The Bosnian experience has been a watershed in this respect, and has served—rightly or wrongly—to confirm widespread suspicions in North Africa and elsewhere about European policy toward its Muslim periphery.

Even before the current stalemate—or perhaps reversal—in the Middle East peace process, European members of NATO had pressed for a greater role in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and Middle East diplomacy more generally. Lack of progress in the negotiations will tend to encourage even more-active European efforts in this direction, not least because Europe has a great deal at stake, both economically and in terms of stability on the periphery of the continent.[100] Similarly, much of the energy behind EU, NATO, and other initiatives toward North Africa and the Mediterranean has come from Southern European states with a special interest in North Africa and a comparative advantage in North-South diplomacy. This is likely to be an important and continuing factor in shaping a European agenda that might otherwise be devoted almost entirely to challenges in Eastern and Central Europe.

In economic terms, there are many critical trans-regional linkages. Southern Mediterranean states recognize the extraordinarily important role of economic relations with the EU for their future prosperity, even if they are often uncomfortable with the reality of economic dependence.[101] The EMP launched in Barcelona in November 1995 flows from this recognition, coupled with Europe's understanding of the need to foster development and stability across the Mediterranean. New lines of communication, including important new routes for energy transport, are another key point of interdependence. From the Western Mediterranean to the Caspian, the expansion of lines of communication for oil and gas is creating new opportunities for cooperation and conflict, with implications for the security and prosperity of both North and South.

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[100] Steinberg, Gerald M., "European Security and the Middle East Peace Process," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1996, p. 65–80

[101] Joffe, George, "Integration of Peripheral Dependence: The Dilemma Facing the Southern Mediterranean States", Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean After Barcelona, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta, March 22–23, 1996, p. 7

With new pipelines across the Maghreb and across the Mediterranean, and the potential for some part of future Caspian oil production to reach world markets via the Eastern Mediterranean (in addition to existing pipelines from Iraq to the Turkish coast), the Mediterranean region is becoming a focal point for energy trade and energy security concerns. Balkan reconstruction would further reinforce the importance of the Mediterranean as a conduit for oil shipments from the Middle East to Eastern and Central Europe. Further a field, the opening of new transport links between Turkey, Iran, and Central Asia will offer the possibility of economic links to Europe via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, rather than through Russia.

In hard security terms, the era of European sanctuary with regard to instability and conflict across the Mediterranean and beyond is rapidly drawing to a close. As the activities of Palestinian—and more recently Kurdish and Algerian—extremists demonstrate, European societies have long been exposed to the spillover effects of turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, Europe's greater Mediterranean periphery, from Algeria to Pakistan, displays a striking concentration of proliferation risks. The spread of WMD—nuclear, biological, and chemical—coupled with the proliferation of ballistic missile systems of steadily increasing range, is transforming the strategic environment around the Mediterranean. Southern Europe and Turkey will be the first within NATO to feel the existential effects of this exposure (major Turkish population centers are already within range of ballistic missiles deployed in Iran and Syria), but not long after the year 2000, it is likely that every European capital will be within range of such systems.[102]

The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe. For the most part, the quest for regional prestige and "weight" is driving the acquisition of longer-range weapons, rather than the desire to hold European targets at risk. Given the diversity of frictions along South-South lines, it is likely that the Middle Eastern and North African neighbors of proliferators will face the first and most direct threat from WMD. To date, many potential targets of WMD use around the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean have been reluctant to

[102] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., "Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean", RAND, Santa Monica, Calif.,MR-742-A, 1996, p.27

call attention to this risk, perhaps because WMD issues have tended to be seen as part of the strategic competition with Israel rather than a source of trouble in their own right. So too, countries such as Egypt and Israel have developed strong national agendas with regard to nuclear and other WMD matters. For this reason, proliferation questions will be difficult to treat in the context of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, despite strong interest from NATO states. Again, progress on Arab-Israeli negotiations, including arms control, will be a key variable in determining the scope of Mediterranean efforts.

From a European perspective, the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Libya, and arguably Syria. But political circumstances could evolve in ways that would throw the WMD aspirations of other regional actors into sharper relief. Even short of dramatic changes in the political orientation of WMD-capable states, crises around the Mediterranean or in the Persian Gulf could raise the specter of WMD-related threats to European territory. Despite some initial concerns, risks from this quarter did not emerge during the Gulf War. But a future crisis involving Western intervention in the Middle East, if accompanied by more widespread WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, could end differently.

As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans. For the moment, conventionally armed ballistic missiles deployed on Europe's periphery are unlikely to possess the weight or accuracy to constitute a militarily significant threat. As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the NATO decision making during a crisis, their significance could be considerable.

Would Southern European allies have offered the US the same sort of access to facilities and military cooperation as they did during the Gulf War if their population centers were exposed to a credible threat of retaliation? Perhaps, but the deliberations would have been far more difficult, and the demands for defensive arrangements far more serious. As NATO begins to address the challenges of proliferation, and to the extent that the management of crises beyond Europe becomes a more prominent feature of European and transatlantic security cooperation, the Mediterranean and the potential role of a

Mediterranean dialogue in containing proliferation risks will acquire additional significance.[103]

### 2.5.6 The Extra-Regional Dimension

The consequences of trends in the Mediterranean security environment will reach well beyond Mediterranean shores. Under Cold War conditions, the Mediterranean derived its primary strategic significance as an arena for competition between extra-Mediterranean superpowers.

The current environment has gone a considerable distance toward the visions of French (and many nonaligned) observers who called for a "Mediterranean for the Mediterranean Countries". Russia has withdrawn from the Mediterranean in security terms, although it retains a stake in maritime access and Mediterranean political developments, and could play a more active role in the Balkans and on Turkey's borders under certain circumstances. The US remains an overwhelmingly important military and diplomatic presence, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. Challenges in the Aegean, the Balkans, and the Levant, not to mention the logistical tie to the Gulf, suggest that Washington's engagement in the Mediterranean will be durable. To the extent that NATO devotes more energy to the region, this too will tend to encourage a significant U.S. role. But European involvement in Mediterranean security is substantial, and the critical economic and political relationships between the North and South are, first and foremost, a EU responsibility.

In this respect, the situation in the Mediterranean is quite different from that in the Persian Gulf, where the US plays a dominant, and often unilateral, role as security manager. In broad terms, the concerns of Mediterranean states, both North and South, will be difficult to address without the engagement of key non-Mediterranean states and wider European and Atlantic institutions.

The range of hard and soft security issues characteristic of the region—from proliferation to migration—favors multilateral approaches, and many of these issues would cause political discomfort or be too costly to address unilaterally. An effective NATO role in

[103] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., "Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean", Ibid, p.29-31

dialogue and security cooperation around the region will require a minimum consensus on the importance of such a dialogue within the Alliance. The growing recognition that insecurity across the Mediterranean can have implications for Europe as a whole—not simply Mediterranean Europe—is likely to encourage this consensus, as will the growing role of extra-European issues on the transatlantic security agenda.

Whereas for almost half a century the western alliance gave a precise strategic regional definition to the Mediterranean, as Europe' s southern flank within a context of East-West competition, the meaning of the Mediterranean to the West was not so limited and simple. If it had been, the notion of a 'southern flank' would have become meaningless the moment the Soviet threat disappeared.

Similarly, the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership competes for aid and investment resources with demands from Central and Eastern Europe (and from Mediterranean Europe itself), and requires continuing support from non-Mediterranean EU members. As Germany moves toward a more forward-leaning approach to participation in military operations beyond its borders, contingencies on Europe's Mediterranean periphery may be the most likely setting for German involvement. As key Central European states acquire a greater role in crisis management around the Mediterranean basin, there will be greater incentives to support policies aimed at longer-term stabilization and strategic dialogue.

Mediterranean security will also be influenced by actors beyond the European, Atlantic, and Eurasian spheres. The arms and technology transfer practices of China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan will have a bearing on the character and pace of WMD proliferation around the region. Anarchy and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa could produce refugee crises affecting North Africa, along with potentially destabilizing spillovers of political violence. If Europe is increasingly concerned about the risks emanating from the Southern Mediterranean, it should not be forgotten that states across the Mediterranean also face risks flowing from the even poorer and less stable regions to their "South."[104]

[104] Fenech, Dominic, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Prospects", Frank Cass, London, 1997, p.159-162

### 2.5.7 Analysis of Mediterranean Security

The post–Cold War security challenges—broadly defined—are shifting from the center of Europe to the periphery, especially to the South. As a result, the Mediterranean is likely to become more important in the future in security terms. At the same time, traditional geographic distinctions are beginning to break down, and security problems in the Mediterranean region are becoming increasingly interdependent.

Mediterranean security is, above all, a matter of internal security for states facing pressures for political, economic, and social change. These pressures will be especially pronounced in Mediterranean cities, where key political struggles (both violent and nonviolent) will be decided. In this context—and on both sides of the Mediterranean—questions of "personal security" and "security of identity" will play an important role in public opinion and policymaking.

Nationalism and the search for regional power and prestige will compete with Islamic politics as a key driver in the security future of the region. The expression of such rejection, "whether voiced by violence or not, is the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, which has been gaining momentum in recent years. Especially since the Islamic revolution in Iran, fundamentalism has been the spectra of every Muslim state from Turkey to Morocco. More recently, fundamentalism, both Shi'ite and Sunni, has emerged more convincingly as a threat to the established order, most notably in Egypt and Algeria, but also in the incipient state of Palestine. The hostility between the state and fundamentalists in most countries has resulted in more recourse to violence by the latter and increasingly repressive measures by the former, threatening further the stability of the state. From an overall Mediterranean point of view, on account of its rejectionist tendency, it underlines further the division between the European and non-European shores of the Mediterranean.[105] Substantial threats to the territorial status quo, driven by state-to-state frictions unburdened by Cold War constraints, will coexist with threats from WMD or from the spillover of political violence. NATO will have a stake in the political-military consequences of these risks, and North-South dialogue can contribute to understanding and ameliorating them.

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[105] Anderson, Ewan and Fenech, Dominic, ibid, p.18

New security alignments are possible, even likely. These may take the form of a search for more favorable "geometries" on the part of actors around the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean who are interested in ties to a more stable European or Atlantic security order—that is, ties to NATO and the EU.

The transnational dimension of Mediterranean security is becoming more prominent as Europe and the Middle East become more interdependent in political, economic, and military terms. The growing European stake in the Middle East peace process, expanding lines of communication for energy through the Mediterranean and its hinterlands, and the steadily growing "reach" of weapons systems around the Mediterranean basin and beyond—all contribute to this trend. Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory and spillover consequences of developments on its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern periphery.

Extra-regional powers, above all the US, will retain a strong stake and role in Mediterranean security. Hard and soft security challenges facing the region will be difficult or impossible to address without the engagement of non-Mediterranean states and European institutions. As tasks beyond Europe become a more central feature of transatlantic security arrangements, the Mediterranean will be a natural sphere for enhanced cooperation, with direct relevance to European stability. [106]

### 2.5.8 Implications For The Alliance

These trends have several important implications for NATO. First, the Alliance faces an inevitable tension between its desire to address security risks emanating from the South (proliferation, terrorism, threats to friendly regimes) and its dialogue objectives with non–NATO member Mediterranean states. In theory, these aims are reconcilable, since enhanced dialogue should contribute to stability in the broadest sense. NATO, which possesses a long cold war tradition of regarding the Mediterranean as a geo-strategic function of Western Europe's security, officially launched its 'Mediterranean Initiative' in February 1995. In practice, the dialogue partners (which include Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) will view much of the content of NATO policy

[106] Larrabee F. Stephen, Green Jerrold, Lesser Ian O., Zanini Michele, "NATO' s Mediterranean Initiative 'Policy Issues and Dilemnas", Ibid, p.18

toward the South as directed "against them" (with the exception of Israel). At the same time, Southern Mediterranean states may wish to involve NATO more directly in their security problems—primarily through cooperation against internal security risks—and NATO members will have their own concerns about this involvement. Western policies with regard to political reform, human rights, and civil-military relations may severely constrain the scope for cooperation and may make dialogue on these issues difficult.

Second, although bilateral dialogue across the Mediterranean is useful, the real value of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative as a confidence-building device is only likely to be realized in a true multilateral format. As the preceding analysis suggests, most pressing security risks in the region are South-South, notwithstanding their implications for European and Atlantic security. Multilateral talks are necessary to address these problems directly, but the prospects for developing this approach are intimately tied to external variables, above all the Middle East peace process. NATO experience and expertise can play a role in facilitating progress in this sphere, but the Alliance cannot shape the outcome in the way that it might aspire to do in Eastern Europe, for example.

Finally, the very large role of EU policies in shaping the economic and political future of the Mediterranean region is a "permanently operating factor." Whatever the evolution of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, it cannot be considered in isolation from the Barcelona process. To the extent that the complementary nature of NATO and EU initiatives can be made explicit, NATO's own activities in the region may win a better reception in Southern capitals. Moreover, the nature of Mediterranean security—on NATO's geographic periphery, but on Europe's doorstep—makes it an ideal subject for closer cooperation between European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. [107]

[107] Winrow, Gareth M., "A threat From the South? NATO and the Mediterranean", Mediterranean Politics, Vol.1, No.1, 1996, p.45-47

# 3 THE INFLUENCING ELEMENTS OF NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN RELATION

## 3.1 THE PROBLEM OF MIGRATION

At a time when the question of migration is asserting itself as one of the essential structural dimensions of the world situation, Southern Europe, on more grounds than one, finds itself directly affected. Furthermore, Southern Europe, being a frontier area bordering the Mediterranean, beyond which an "other world" begins, is in fact a region where all the essential questions of our times come together.

Indeed, if one looks at it from an economic perspective, the Mediterranean clearly marks the boundary between the North and the South of our world, at a time when the disparities between the two groupings - in favor of the North as all analyses attest-are becoming more strongly accentuated.

If one looks at it from a geopolitical perspective, Southern Europe functions as a component of the European pole in relation to the two other poles, North America and Japan, with which it is in competition.

If one looks at it from a strategic perspective, with the end of the East- West confrontation, the definition 'of a grouping going from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" necessarily makes Southern Europe into a frontier in a new context in which, one way or another, the enemy that has "disappeared" in the East, probably mistakenly, is replaced by one seen as possibly lying to the south.

If one looks at it from a cultural perspective, in a world where, no matter what area of civilization is in question, the dynamic of identification is strengthening (or rather being exacerbated), once again Southern Europe seems to be a frontier since the Mediterranean represents the divide between East and West, or between Islam and Christianity.

It is, therefore, dear that two groupings are facing each other across the Mediterranean that are separated by many characteristics. However, other characteristics unite them. Indeed, the notion of the Mediterranean as a space common to the two shores-like a shared inheritance in terms not only of basic economic, ecological, social, and cultural facts, but also of norms and values - is an undeniable reality that offers the necessary basis for

cordial relations in many fields.

All the more so because movements of population throughout history, and especially in the contemporary period, have indisputably contributed to the birth of powerful links, which currently take the form of the communities on the north side which have their origin to the south of the Mediterranean. The migratory flows that have been the basis for the establishment of these communities, after having for a long time been taken for granted by the partners of the region, are more and more perceived by them-and particularly by those in the North-as disturbing phenomena. In any case it appears that the Mediterranean problem must in the future more and more be structured, other than by the four perspectives to which we have already referred, according to the demographic perspective, which appears to be, "the most serious factor."[108]

### 3.1.1 Population Density on the Mediterranean Region

In the year 1000, the high point of Moslem influence in North Africa and Europe, the populations of the two regions were roughly equal, with a slight advantage on the North African side. By the 13th century, the European population was greater by a 3:1 ratio. This advantage grew to 5:1 by 1850, and between 1850 and 1900, the high point of European colonization, the European countries of the Mediterranean had a combined population of 90 million, compared with 18 million on the North African side. By 1950, population trends began a reversal, a 2:1 ratio (140 million on the European side, 70 million on the North African side) characterizing the age of decolonialization. In 1985 the populations were roughly equal at 180 million, and by 1993 the North African population had grown bigger than the European, 194 million to 184 million. According to UN estimates, by the year 2000 the North African population will exceed that of Mediterranean Europe 270 million to 200 million, and by 2025 the figures will approach a 2:1 ratio in favor of the south, 370 million to 200 million. [109]

[108] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, p.59-60

[109] Carlson, Adolf, "NATO and North Africa: Problems and Prospects", p.7, Available on Site: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98autumn/carlson.htm




Table 3. 1 World Bank Estimate of the Population Growth Rate: 1980-2010 (Source: Cordesman, Anthony H., The Other Side of the Mahgreb: Economics, Structural Change, Productivity, Trade, Population and Energy, CSIS, Washington, 1998, p.45, Available on Site: http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/)

| Country | Annual population Growth | Population below 15 years | Population (July 1998) | Life expectancy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Morocco | 1.89% | 36% | 29 mill. | 68.5 |
| Algeria | 2.14% | 38% | 30.5 mill. | 68.9 |
| Tunisia | 1.43% | 32% | 9.4 mill. | 73.1 |
| Libya | 3.68% | 48% | 5.7 mill. | 65.4 |
| Egypt | 1.86% | 36% | 66 mill. | 62.1 |
| Jordan | 2.54% | 43% | 4.4 mill. | 72.9 |
| Syria | 3.23% | 46% | 16.7 mill. | 67.8 |
| Lebanon | 1.62% | 30% | 3.5 mill. | 70.6 |
| Israel | 1.91% | 28% | 5.64 mill. | 78.4 |

Table 3. 2 Demographic Statistics for the Southern Mediterranean Countries (Source: Lia, Brynjar, 'Security Challenges in Europe's Mediterranean Periphery-Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas,' European Security, Vol. 8, No.4, (Winter 1999), p. 45)

From another source, the demographic characteristics of the region are summarized in Table 3.3. The data give a clear picture of the growing population imbalance that characterizes the region.

Morocco will have a larger population than Spain, while Algeria and Tunisia, taken together, will have a larger population than France.

The situation within the region is all the more noteworthy because it displays some significant differences compared to other parts of the world. Consider that essential indicator, the fertility rate. In 1991 in the US and Mexico (which have their own migration connection) it was 2.0 and 3.3, respectively. In the Mediterranean region it is at the same time higher in the South (ranging from 3.6 to 6.5) and lower in the North (ranging from 1.3 to 1.8).

| | Population (Millions) | | | | Annual Rate of Population Growth | | Fertility rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **1960** | **1991** | **2000** | **2025** | **1960-1991** | **1991-2000** | **(1991)** |
| **Portugal** | 8.8 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.5 |
| **Spain** | 30.5 | 39.0 | 39.6 | 60.8 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
| **France** | 45.7 | 57.0 | 58.8 | 40.6 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.8 |
| **Italy** | 50.2 | 57.7 | 58.1 | 56.2 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 1.3 |
| **Greece** | 8.3 | 10.2 | 10.3 | 10.1 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 1.5 |
| **Total northern shore** | 143.5 | 173.8 | 176.7 | 177.8 | | | |
| **Morocco** | 11.6 | 25.7 | 31.7 | 47.5 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 4.5 |
| **Algeria** | 10.8 | 25.6 | 32.7 | 51.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 5.4 |
| **Tunisia** | 4.2 | 8.2 | 9.8 | 13.4 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 3.6 |
| **Libya** | 1.3 | 4.7 | 6.4 | 12.9 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 6.5 |
| **Egypt** | 25.9 | 53.6 | 64.8 | 93.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 4.2 |
| **Total southern shore** | 53.8 | 117.8 | 145.4 | 219.1 | | | |
| **Southern shore as percent of northern shore** | 37% | 68% | 82% | 123% | | | |

Table 3. 3 Demographic Characteristics of the Mediterranean Region (Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 1993, Oxford University Press, 1993)

| Real population development | | | | | | | Projection Med. var. | changes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1850 | 1900 | 1950 | 1965 | 1980 | 2000 (2000 Rev.) | 2050 (2000 Rev.) | 1950-2050 (2000 | 2000-2050 Rev.) |
| **Five Southern European EU Countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| France | 36.0 | 41.0 | 41.829 | 48.753 | 53.880 | 59.238 | 61.832 | 20.003 | 2.594 |
| Greece | 3.5 | 4.5 | 7.566 | 8.551 | 9.643 | 10.610 | 8.983 | 1.417 | -1.627 |
| Italy | 25.0 | 34.0 | 47.104 | 52.112 | 56.434 | 57.530 | 42.962 | -4.142 | -14.568 |
| Portugal | 3.5 | 5.5 | 8.405 | 9.129 | 9.766 | 10.016 | 9.006 | 601 | -1.010 |
| Spain | 15.0 | 18.5 | 28.009 | 32.065 | 37.542 | 39.910 | 31.282 | 3.273 | -8.628 |
| **Total (5)** | **83.0** | **103.5** | **132.913** | **150.610** | **167.265** | **177.304** | **154.065** | **21.152** | **-23.239** |
| **Two EU Candidates and Dialogue Partner Countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| Cyprus | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.494 | 0.582 | 0.611 | 0.784 | 0.910 | 0.416 | 0.126 |
| Malta | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.312 | 0.305 | 0.324 | 0.390 | 0.400 | 0.088 | 0.010 |
| **Total (Islands)** | **0.28** | **0.42** | **0.806** | **0.887** | **0.935** | **1.174** | **1.310** | **0.504** | **0.136** |
| **Yugoslavia and Albania** | | | | | | | | | |
| Albania | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.215 | | | 3.134 | 3.905 | 2.690 | 0.771 |
| Yugoslavia | 7.25 | 9.5 | 16.345 | | | 23.205 | 20.088 | 3.743 | -3.117 |
| - Bosnia & Herzeg | | | 2.661 | | | 3.977 | 3.458 | | -0.519 |
| - Croatia | | | 3.850 | | | 4.654 | 4.179 | | -0.475 |
| - Macedonia | | | 1.230 | | | 2.034 | 1.894 | | -0.140 |
| - Slovenia | | | 1.473 | | | 1.988 | 1.527 | | -0.461 |
| - FR Yugoslavia | | | 7.131 | | | 10.552 | 9.030 | | -1.522 |
| **Total** | **7.75** | **10.3** | **17.560** | | | **26.339** | **23.993** | **6.433** | **-2.346** |
| **Ten Non EU-Mediterranean Dialogue Partners (plus Libya)** | | | | | | | | | |
| Algeria | 3.0 | 5.0 | 8.753 | 11.823 | 18.740 | 30.291 | 51.180 | 42.427 | 20.889 |
| Morocco | 3.0 | 5.0 | 8.953 | 13.323 | 19.382 | 29.878 | 50.361 | 41.408 | 20.483 |
| Tunisia | 1.0 | 1.5 | 3.530 | 4.630 | 6.448 | 9.459 | 14.076 | 10.546 | 4.617 |
| Libya | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.029 | 1.623 | 3.043 | 5.290 | 9.969 | 8.940 | 4.679 |
| Egypt | 5.5 | 10.0 | 21.834 | 31.563 | 43.749 | 67.884 | 113.840 | 92.006 | 45.956 |
| **Only North Africa** | **13.1** | **22.3** | **44.099** | **62.962** | **91.362** | **142.802** | **239.426** | **195.327** | **96.624** |
| Jordan | 0.25 | 0.3 | 1.237 | 1.962 | 2.923 | 4.913 | 11.709 | 10.472 | 6.796 |
| Israel | | | 1.258 | 2.563 | 3.879 | 6.040 | 10.065 | 8.807 | 4.025 |
| Palestine Authority | 0.35 | 0.5 | 1.005 | ? | ? | 3.191 | 11.821 | 10.816 | 8.630 |
| Lebanon | 0.35 | 0.5 | 1.443 | 2.151 | 2.669 | 3.496 | 5.018 | 3.575 | 1.522 |
| Syria | 1.5 | 1.75 | 3.495 | 5.325 | 8.704 | 16.189 | 36.345 | 32.850 | 20.156 |
| Turkey | 10.0 | 13.0 | 20.809 | 31.151 | 44.438 | 55.668 | 98.818 | 78.009 | 43.150 |
| **Eastern Med.** | **12.45** | **16.05** | **29.247** | **43.152** | **62.613** | **89.497** | **173.776** | **144.529** | **84.279** |
| **10+1 dialogue c.** | **25.55** | **38.35** | **73.346** | **106.114** | **153.975** | **232.299** | **413.202** | **339.856** | **180.903** |
| **Total (12+1)** | **25.83** | **38.77** | **74.152** | **107.001** | **154.910** | **233.473** | **414.512** | **340. 360** | **181.039** |

Table 3. 4 Population Growth of Mediterranean Countries, 1850-2050 (Source: Urbanization and Natural Disasters in the Mediterranean: Population Growth and Climate Change in the 21st Century, p.174, Available on Site: http://www.proventionconsortium.org/files/conference_papers/)

One additional characteristic of these populations should be emphasized, one that points out another very clear imbalance in their structure, In the North the proportion of persons over 60, already high, is destined to grow and reach 26 percent in 2020, with a median age

of 43.9 years (in 1970 it was 32.0), while at the same time in the South it will be only 12 percent, with a heavy proportion of young people.

The forecasts for natural population trends are fairly precise for the simple reason that the number of potential mothers up to the year 2015 is known fairly accurately and nobody really expects any great change in the number of births per woman. For this reason the number of future births can be estimated with reasonable certainty. Life expectation, as the second determinant of the natural population trend, is not likely to bring any surprises either. Everybody agrees that the tendency to increasing life expectancy is going to continue. As regards the forecasts for the number of potential job-seekers, defined as the population between 15 and 65 capable of gainful employment, the risk of error is even lower, because changes in the life expectation affects mainly the over 65s, and until 2010 any variations in birth rates will not affect the total potential active population.[110]




Table 3. 5 Projected Population Growth in Egypt, 1996-2036 (Source: Khalifa, Mona, and DaVanzo, Julie, and Adamson, David M., Population Growth in Egypt: A Continuing Policy Challenge, Available on Site: http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP183/)




Table 3. 6 Additions to Egyptian Population (in selected years) (Source: United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: the 1998 Revision)

[110] Hof, Bernd, "Mediterranean Conference on Population, Migration and Development", Palma de Mallorca, 15-17 October 1996,Strasbourg, 1998, p.144




Table 3. 7 Total Population Growth Less Egypt 1980-2010 (Source: Cordesman, Anthony H., The Other Side of the Mahgreb: Economics, Structural Change, Productivity, Trade, Population and Energy, CSIS, Washington, 1998, p.47, Available on Site: http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/)

### 3.1.2 Economic Prospects

North African countries face huge social problems due to the economic deficiencies coupled with rising unemployment in close parallel to the population explosion. The principal economic and social indicators for the region are summarized in table 3.8. Once more the difference between the two shores of the Mediterranean is clear. In spite of certain strong points, the economies of Maghreb countries are faced with a number of challenges.

In Algeria, more than 20 years of central planning led to a poor distribution of resources. Headlong capitalistic industrialization and uneven growth to the detriment of the rural world created an imbalance that was heightened by an economy over-dependent on hydro/carbons.

The production systems of Morocco and Tunisia, on the other hand, are both marked by the major roles still played by the agricultural sector in economic growth. The unpredictable climate over the last decade has led to a saw-tooth growth curve, particularly in Morocco.

Economic development in the three countries of the Maghreb has thus been subject to considerable instability. The economic crisis of the early 1980s merely deepened the macro-economic imbalances, obliging the governments to borrow money on the international market and to introduce institutional reforms, under the pressure of an acute financial crisis, designed to place more emphasis on market forces in the workings of the economy.

But the results have not always come up to expectations. During the 1980s the real mean per capita growth rate of Gross National Product (GNP) was negative in Algeria (-0.76%), compared with +1.1 % in Tunisia and + 1.6% in Morocco. Only one country in southern Europe (Greece) registered a growth rate lower than that of Morocco (1.1 %), while Spain and Portugal achieved rates 3.1 % and 2.8% respectively. Per capita GNP in the Maghreb is in the region of $1 460 (1993), less than one-tenth of the mean per capita GNP of the European Community ($19 595).

And while this indicator gives an idea of actual growth in production, it does not say how the fruits of this growth are shared between the different sections of the population. In many developing countries there is very little correlation between economic growth and human development. To make up for this shortcoming, the UNDP introduced a new, composite indicator, the Human Development Index, which measures "the level of accomplishment of a country" by a combination of three parameters: life expectancy, level of education and real income.

Based on this index, the "1996 Human Development Report" classifies the three Maghreb countries in the "average human development" category; of a total of 174 countries, Algeria came 69th, Tunisia 78th and Morocco 123rd, largely because of the very high illiteracy level in this country (over 60%). In spite of certain efforts to correct them, inequalities persist and seem to be gaining ground, particularly in Morocco, perhaps, where persistent poverty is a major obstacle to development.

The pauperization of large swaths of the population in all three countries fuels this propensity to emigrate to the European Union.[111]

| | Human development index | | Per capita GNP (Dollars) | Growth rate | Share of Agriculture In GNP (Percent) | Secondary School Enrollment ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **Rank** | **Value** | **1991** | **1989-90** | | |
| **France** | 8 | 0.971 | 20.600 | 1.8 | 3 | 97 |
| **Italy** | 22 | 0.924 | 18.580 | 2.1 | 3 | 78 |
| **Spain** | 23 | 0.923 | 12,460 | 2.9 | 5 | 100 |
| **Greece** | 25 | 0.902 | 6.230 | 1.2 | 17 | 97 |
| **Portugal** | 41 | 0.853 | 5.620 | 2.7 | | 53 |
| **Turkey** | 73 | 0.717 | 1.820 | 2.9 | 18 | 51 |
| **Libya** | 87 | 0.658 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| **Tunisia** | 93 | 0.600 | 1,510 | 1.2 | 18 | 44 |
| **Algeria** | 107 | 0.528 | 2,020 | -0.8 | 13 | 61 |
| **Morocco** | 119 | 0.433 | 1,030 | 1.6 | 19 | 36 |
| **Egypt** | 124 | 0.389 | 620 | 2.0 | 18 | 81 |

Table 3. 8 Social and Economic Indicators for the Mediterranean Region (Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1993, Oxford University Press, 1993)

Both shores are suffering from the current economic downturn. The prospect for the future, however, is that current trends will only be strengthened since, whatever difficulties the north shore will confront, it is the southern shore that will be burdened by the most serious constraints, notably by the growing burden of unemployment. Unemployment is a serious economic, social, and political phenomenon throughout the region. More than 15 percent of the active population is unemployed in the countries of the Maghreb, in Egypt, and in Iran, while in Jordan and in Yemen the unemployment rates exceed 25 percent. The consequences of past demographic growth will continue to show up as extraordinary increases in the working age population during the next 20 years. If the region is to find social stability thanks to the productive employment of those currently unemployed and of the work force that will enter the labor market in the future, the rhythm and the nature of economic growth must develop considerably compared to what they have been in the recent past.[112]

Thus in the case of Algeria the number of new job seekers is estimated at 250,000 a year in

[111] Khachani, Mohamed, "Mediterranean Conference on Population, Migration and Development", Palma de Mallorca, 15-17 October 1996,Strasbourg, 1998, p.44-45

[112] World Bank, Annual Report 1992, Washington, 1992, p.163

the period 1990-95, whereas annual job creation between 1990 and 1992 scarcely exceeded 90,000: a considerable deficit. North Africa's performance has long been one of the worst of any region in the world.




Table 3. 9 The GNP of the Middle East Relative to World Total (1979-1994 in $Current Billions) (Source: Cordesman, Anthony H., The Other Side of the Mahgreb: Economics, Structural Change, Productivity, Trade, Population and Energy, CSIS, Washington, 1998, p.5, Available on Site: http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/)

Consequently the region is destined to suffer from a significant migration problem: given the constraints upon the southern shore, the positive results that can be expected from the processes of adjustment that are underway will make themselves felt only in the long term, and they will certainly not absorb the labor supply destined to enter the market.

The pressures of immigration will continue unless there is development in the South. Economic opportunities -better accesses to global markets and foreign direct investment- have to migrate towards people if people cannot migrate towards economic opportunities.[113]

[113] UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p.58




Table 3. 10 The Comparative GNP and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of MENA Countries Has Grown in Very Different Ways: 1980-1990 versus 1990-1995 (Source: Cordesman, Anthony H., The Other Side of the Mahgreb: Economics, Structural Change, Productivity, Trade, Population and Energy, CSIS, Washington, 1998, p.7, Available on Site: http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/)

This analysis is valid for the Mediterranean more than for any other region of the world, especially because of the intensity of the relations that have so long existed there, and that have created situations that are irreversible.

### 3.1.3 Mediterranean Migration: Former Realities

South-to-North migration has been going on for many years, particularly since the beginning of this century, and especially within the framework of the former colonial

relationship.[114] NATO's leadership recognizes the risk of unregulated immigration. A 16 April 1997 report of NATO's Special Mediterranean Group cites an "immigration explosion" as the "principal fear" among the public in European countries.[115] This report goes on to say:

> The Alliance as such has no means of eliminating the economic and social ills that afflict the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, ills that are among the root causes of the instability in the region. NATO can do no more than provide for responses to the consequences of this instability in terms of operations to evacuate nationals of member nations in the event of escalating violence or anarchy in a particular country, to prevent large-scale influxes of refugees by sea, or emergency aid when groups are endangered.[116]

In fact, of all the countries of Southern Europe, only France was really a country of immigration, which came especially from this region. The other countries of the region were all countries of emigration, including emigration in the direction of France. Starting in the 1960s, the region witnessed a new migration, deriving from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean but moving in the direction of a country of Northern Europe: the migration from Turkey to Germany. Much of the impetus for Western Mediterranean Cooperation (the so-called "five plus five") and the CSCM resides in the developmental and demographic imbalance between north and south and its implications for security not only in southern Europe but also in Europe as a whole.[117]

The trade-off between stability and development is at the heart of European security in the Mediterranean, just as the original CSCE compromise involved the inter-relationship of human rights and security matters.[118]

At present, to differing degrees, the countries on the north share of the Mediterranean all

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[114] International Organization for Migration, Tenth IOM Seminar on Migration, 15-17 September 1992, Geneva, 1992, p.23

[115] Moya, Pedro, "NATO's Role in the Mediterranean" 1997 p.2, Available on Site: http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1997/

[116] Moya, Pedro, Ibid, p 4-5

[117] The "five plus five" refers to Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Malta plus the five members of the Arab Union of the Maghreb: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

[118] Aliboni, Roberto, "European Security Across the Mediterranean", Ibid, p. 34

play host to communities deriving from the south shore, although the only one for which they represent a statistically important reality is France. In France the community of Maghrebian origin is on the order of 1.5 million people, of whom 500,000 are workers. In Spain and Italy communities with origins on the south shore of the Mediterranean (mainly the Maghreb and Egypt) are beginning to take on meaningful size: on the order of 200,000 persons in each country.

Although it is difficult to estimate the size of the migratory flows from the Southern shore in the most recent period, it is clear that since the beginning of the 1990s, faced with the restrictive measures taken by the European governments as well as the difficult economic and social situation that prevails there, they have considerably diminished. Indeed at the present time the migration problem in the region has less and less to do with significant new flows, and more and more to do with the integration into the societies of the North of the immigrants already resident there.

In 1993 the population of legal immigrants from the Maghreb in the countries of the European Union was estimated at 2.1 million; 54.4% were Moroccan, 31.6% Algerian and 14% Tunisian. From this point of view the situation is not identical for the three countries of the northern shore most affected-Spain, Italy, and France. Developments in the first two countries-new destinations for immigrants, particularly from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt-might give the impression that they are playing host to the bulk of the recent migrants.

This form of emigration involves more and more young people, an increasing percentage of who have school, university or vocational training diplomas. The extent of this illegal emigration is difficult to evaluate. Certain observers set the figure at around 536,000 in 1987-1988, with 48% in Italy, 28% in France, 22% in Spain and the remaining 2% in Portugal and Greece. [119]

The countries of Southern Europe are not affected solely by flows coming from the countries bordering on the Mediterranean; it is necessary to mention as well the flows coming from sub-Saharan Africa (especially into France, on the order of 150,000; Italy, around 50,000; and Portugal, around 30,000).

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[119] Khachani, Mohamed, "Mediterranean Conference on Population, Migration and Development", Ibid, p.43

Finally, aside from the number of foreign nationals originating on the southern shore, for obvious historical reasons a significant number (one that is unfortunately hard to quantify) of European citizens, French especially, trace their origins to the southern shore of the Mediterranean, with which they maintain connections, especially cultural ones, that are often complex. Therefore for at least one country-France-immigrant communities deriving from the southern shore of the Mediterranean are not a new phenomenon but, very much to the contrary, well established social realities. This fact raises the following question: Why, for several years now but with a sharpness that grows as time passes, have the phenomena connected to the migration problem become essential elements in the debates going on both within the affected societies and in the relations between the states that are involved?[120]

### 3.1.4 Mediterranean Migration: Some Topics

Three major topics form the structure of the new migration problem in the region.

1. The first relates to the perception of the economic crisis, which, especially since the beginning of the 1980s, has been seen as a durable phenomenon from which the region will not emerge for a long time. It is noteworthy that this perception of the crisis is held by the most diverse groups, and as much in the North as in the South. That is because in the North-where an overall withdrawal reflex is reinforced by the conviction that in the South the necessary conditions for economic growth are not yet all in existence and that, therefore, migratory flows are destined to continue and even to grow-it is no longer a question of taking in all the misery in the world.

2. The second issue concerns the change in the nature of migration. Long tolerated as a transitory phenomenon, it is more and more perceived as a permanent phenomenon that straightforwardly poses the question of the integration of the populations concerned. In the South the dominant perception of migration is of a departure that, if not definitive, is at least likely to be long lasting. All that has been said, as much in the North as in the South, regarding voluntary return or reinsertion is today clearly perceived to be applicable only to a very restricted number of individual cases.

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[120] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Ibid, p.63-64

That is why, in the North, there is a progressive change in attitude. Once an "invited worker", the immigrant has now become the person with whom one is destined to live.

Furthermore, the picture gets more complicated because cohabitation is necessary not just with the worker himself, but also with his family, given that the family reunification policies give him the right to have them come to join him in his adopted land.

3. The third issue regards the redefinition of the relations prevailing in the region. Like all other regions, the Mediterranean is affected by the new world situation, dominated by the end of the East- West confrontation. Looked at this way, the question of migration is directly relevant, especially to the new European situation, which makes Central and Eastern Europe, one way or another, a "natural extension" of the structure that is being built in the West. Long the principal reservoir of potential migration, the southern shore of the Mediterranean is now squarely confronted by the "competition" from Eastern Europe, which benefits in addition from a "cultural proximity premium."These new considerations all contribute to redefining very clearly the problem of migration in the region as a new phase in its history. The events are analyzable in terms of a transition dominated by three major themes: those of identity, security, and cooperation.[121]

### 3.1.5 Effects Of Identity On Migration

The debate in the North about the question of migration is also, one way or another, a debate regarding the relations that Europe ought to maintain with Islam. It is clearly perceived that the extra-European flows of immigrants, whether, they come from the southern shore of the Mediterranean or from sub-Saharan Africa, come from Muslim societies. They therefore pose the question of relations with the culture of the host countries.

In essence, not only Islamic fundamentalism but all sorts of religious fundamentalism may pose threat to stability, since it weaken democracy and the creation of a more open, liberal and secular environment. The Islamization of the southern society and politics is considered to be the most dangerous development that the Mediterranean region may

[121] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Ibid, p.64-65

witness in the near future.[122]

The presence of Muslim communities on European soil, which has long been a fact, makes European Islam a tangible reality: currently it ranks as the second most widespread religion in three important countries of the European Community: France, Germany, and the UK. The number of Muslims in all of the countries of the EU combined is currently estimated at around 8 million. An important proportion of these are citizens of the member states, and therefore, on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, of the EU.

Given the worldwide context of growing emphasis on identity, it is evident that Europe cannot help being concerned, as is shown by the more and more open manifestations of xenophobia and racism. The social strata affected by the economic recession constitute an especially favorable environment for the incubation and development of these feelings, for which immigrants in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular, constitute preferred targets.

In such a context migratory flows deriving from the southern shore of the Mediterranean are obviously very much at risk because they run into active resistance in the societies concerned. The resistance is all the stronger because it is manipulated by political forces that often have extremist agendas and for which immigration is an "easy" issue that can be exploited to yield immediate results.

The new European situation created by the Maastricht Treaty poses the question of European identity. This has never been envisaged as being of a religious nature, for example "Christian". If the Maastricht Treaty makes reference to "common values" (notably in title V, article J. 1, point 2, regarding the objectives of the common foreign and security policy), the concept appears to be sufficiently broad that the followers of a spiritual doctrine like Islam can quite fully accept it.

That said the dominant perception of Islam in Europe is often of an essentialist and static nature. It does not sufficiently take into account the dynamics of Islam as a spiritual message and the sum of individual and collective practices-nor, especially, does it take into account the Muslim communities. These communities in Europe are inserted into a new

[122] Ormancı, Emriye Bağdagül, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", Ibid, p.12-13

context of developed industrial societies, which cannot help but directly influence all their perceptions and attitudes.

| | Ethnic | Religious | Labor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mauritania | 40% Maur/Black<br>30% Maur<br>30% Black<br>(Hassaniya Arabic,<br>Pular, Soninke, Wolof | 100% Muslim | 47% Agriculture<br>29% Services<br>14% Indust & Comm<br>10% Government |
| Western Sahara | 99.8% Arab-Berber<br>(Hassaniya Arabic)<br>(Moroccan Arabic) | 100% Muslim | 50% Animal husbandry and farming |
| Morocco | 99.1% Arab/Berber<br>0.7% Non-Moroccan<br>0.1% Jewish<br>(Arabic, Berber dialects) | 98.7% Muslim<br>1.1% Christian<br>0.2% Jewish | 50% Agriculture<br>26% Services<br>15% Indust & Comm<br>9% Other |
| Algeria | 99.1% Arab/Berber<br>0.90% Other<br>(Arabic, Berber,<br>French) | 99% Islam<br>1% Christian & Jewish | 24% Agriculture<br>10% Services<br>40% Indust & Comm<br>17% Government |
| Libya | 97% Arab & Berber<br>3% Other<br>(Arabic, English,<br>Italian) | 97% Sunni Islam | 18% Agriculture<br>27% Services<br>31% Indust & Comm<br>24% Government |
| Tunisia | 98% Arab & Berber<br>1% European<br>0.8% Jewish<br>(Arabic/French) | 98% Muslim<br>1% Christian<br>0.8% Jewish | 32% Agriculture |

Table 3. 11 Ethnic and Religious Divisions in the Maghreb (Source: Cordesman, Anthony H., The Other Side of the Mahgreb: Economics, Structural Change, Productivity, Trade, Population and Energy, CSIS, Washington, 1998, p.42, Available on Site: http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/)

In this regard it is worth noting how very poorly understood at present are both the developments within the Muslim communities established in Europe and the influence that these developments can have on their countries of origin. Quite obviously the "model" functioning in Europe and dominated (whatever its various national particulars) by two major facts, religious pluralism and secularism, will in the end necessarily influence the societies on the southern shore. Going in the opposite direction, developments within the societies on the southern shore also spread within the communities established in Europe; however, all available evidence leads one to think that here, as in other domains, the

relations between the two shores will in the end, one way or another, bear the stamp of the dynamic at work in the North, as the dominant cultural model.

In any case, if the question of identity is important in and of itself, it is also important from another perspective, that of security. This issue is frequently brought up, often in an implicit but more and more in an explicit way, in connection with the question of migration.[123]

### 3.1.6 Effects Of Security On Migration

Over the course of the passing years, the question of migration has progressively become part of a new field of discussion that related to security. First there were the problems of internal security as seen by the host countries. Then -and this was an essential turning point- emphasis shifted to the problems of security in a broader sense, implying a set of problems in terms of international relations. The notion of an emerging "threat from the south," widely discussed in southern Europe, is, with some prominent exceptions, unrelated to the security of territory in the traditional sense. In many quarters, and most notably on the political right, the issue is the threat to the "fabric" of European societies posed by the scale of economic migration, particularly from the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa. This evolution, extremely important for its consequences, direct and indirect, immediate and distant, derives fundamentally from a new understanding of the concept of security, which broadens its meaning in two directions:

1. It can no longer be limited to the military field alone and now necessarily involves such other fields such as the economy, ecology, and culture, to mention only the most important.

2. It can no longer be limited to the state alone as principal and often sole operator, since civil society more and more considers itself as the party that has to pay the bill.

As a result of this new double connotation, migration immediately becomes an issue, first of all because it is seen as involved in the problem of identity.

In this regard, voices are raised on the northern shore of the Mediterranean denouncing

[123] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, p.65-67

immigration as an "invasion" especially because the actual or potential flows come from Muslim countries, and thus raise the issue of the nation's identity, both in and of itself and as component of the general perception of security. [124]

There is also another perception on the northern shore of immigration in terms of security, one that proceeds from a more restricted and traditional meaning of the concept, and that makes immigration at worst a source of threats, at best a source of risks.

In reality the links between the communities originating on the southern shore and their countries of origin are far from being as strong and open to exploitation as such perceptions suggest In fact it increasingly appears that the migratory processes are escaping the control of the sending countries, particularly in the context of political crisis and of the growing strength of the informal economy, whose dominant principles are also at work in the migratory process. Under such conditions it is difficult to imagine that, as a rule, the migrant could be transformed into an agent He would be operating for the account of a state with which he has less and less connection, and from whose policies, plainly, he has often fled.

So it is clear that in the end the communities originating on the southern shore and living in Europe can constitute pressure groups acting to defend their specific interests, especially in the areas of religion and culture. In so doing they would not diverge very much from the practice of other communities that are particularly active from this point of view. Each of them, in its own fashion, exercises its democratic rights, particularly in a context in which the principles of identity are gaining ground. The emphasis on identity reinforces the legitimacy of such practices, which are not the work of immigrants alone, whatever their origins.[125]

Nevertheless, reductive perceptions of the immigrant exist, and it is thus that, in an analysis that may be marginal but which has the merit of frankness, it is written that "the twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not as armies. Indeed, massive Islamic immigration into France may already

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[124] Lesser, Ian O., "Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for US Policy", Rand, Santa Monica, 1992, p.21

[125] Huntington, Samuel P., "Defending Western Culture, The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p.22-49

have reversed Charles Martel's victory in 732 at the Battle of tours."[126] The hierarchy introduced by the author is highly significant because it postulates a neat gradation from the immigrant to the terrorist to the soldier of an enemy.

Such attitudes exist in certain milieus on the northern shore, even if often they are not made explicit with the same clarity. They too contribute to the emergence of tensions in the region. Fundamentally they stem from analyses of a mare general character. These, in their turn, have their origin in new evaluations of the world strategic situation in the aftermath of the end of the East-West confrontation.

The fact is that the new strategic space ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok is, with the exception of its American portion, flanked to the south, for the most part, by the Islamic civilization. Many of that area's tendencies are perceived as disturbing, particularly since the change of regime in Iran and the recovery of dynamism by the Islamic movements.[127]

Aside from factors of a purely political and security nature, social and economic factors-especially the enormous and inverted differences in demographic and economic potential-are involved in the perception of the area of Islamic civilization. In fact the real problems on the southern shore of the Mediterranean at this level of economic and social conditions, as the Communiqué of the Atlantic Council held in Rome in November 1991 recognized. In its analysis they are the sources of Islamic radicalism. That is why the problems of security are always closely connected to those of cooperation in all the approaches being made at the regional level and, above all, the proposal for a CSCM, as well the so-called "Five plus Five" framework, both still in an embryonic stage.

It appears that hereafter in these approaches to cooperation the migratory phenomenon will constitute all essential dimensions, in a way a passage oblige.[128]

### 3.1.7 Effects Of Cooperation On Migration

Aside from events at the regional level, it is by now agreed at the world level that only policies that get to the root of the problem are capable of coping with the migratory logic

[126] Lind, William S., "Defending Western Culture", Foreign Policy, No. 84, Fall 1991, p.45
[127] Gasteyger, Curt, "European Security and the New Arc of Crisis: Paper II", New Dimensions in International Security, Adelphi Paper 265, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p.69
[128] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Ibid, p.68-69

like if the wealth does not go where men are, men will go where the wealth is. This key idea is very widely shared within the region, in the North as much as in the South, but without so far having produced particularly tangible results in terms of cooperation. Indeed, the gaps in development and in living standards between the two sides of the Mediterranean -which in the opinion of all experts are still growing- by now are clearly perceived, in the North and the South, as no longer susceptible to "routine management," which would certainly lead to serious tensions.[129]

Thus, among other illustrations of this new awareness at the European level, the Renewed Mediterranean Policy has been developed. It has as its starting point a perception expressed repeatedly in significant language. The pressure of migration will be all the more massive and uncontrollable if the European Community does not establish new and more equitable trade relations with Mediterranean third parties, and does not institute cooperation that is quantitatively and qualitatively different from that of the past in order to contribute to the development and growth of these countries.

In addition the theme of migration is, at the highest level, assuming a growing importance in the European institutional vision. Among them is a point entitled, "to act on the migratory pressure: to take migration into account in the foreign policy of the Community," which includes the following recommendation: "That is why the Community should make explicit in its future cooperation agreements where it is clearly necessary, the dimension of migration, dealing with aspects such as: The examination in each of the countries involved of the questions relating to the maintenance in its zone of origin of the population that might potentially emigrate."

On the one hand, immigration into the industrialized countries of Europe is considered to be a contribution to sustainable development, but on the other this immigration is rejected because European labor markets are at present in imbalance and are under great pressure to adjust.[130]

It appears, therefore, that on the European side at the level of positions of principle, an overall vision is in the process of being born, of emerging progressively, despite

[129] UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, Ibid, p.58
[130] Hof, Bernd, Mediterranean Conference on Population, Migration and Development, Ibid, p.144

difficulties inherent in the process of European construction and especially those deriving from the Maastricht Treaty. As for the South, taken as a whole, it is clear that there is no common perception of the problems connected with migration, whether in general or in connection with the prospects for cooperation between the two sides. It is as if only national interests were involved, despite efforts to develop common positions.

From this point of view the serious crisis that the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is experiencing has obvious repercussions for the question of migration, even though it should be a priority theme as regards both cooperation between the member states and that to be promoted with Europe.

That is why, at the multilateral level, no notable action deserves to be singled out. The rare actions actually undertaken are only in their beginning stages, with no real prospects for cooperation taking shape. This is true even though all the countries on the southern shore are experiencing serious economic difficulties in a context constrained by structural adjustment programs, with social consequences that are difficult to cope with, much less manage, because they involve a growing number of persons who are left out and who are therefore tempted by any adventure, even the most destabilizing. In this situation, in concrete economic reality the only forces operating are the harsh demands of the market, whose logic prevails; the principal index is the flow of direct investments.

From this point of view the performances of the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean are, in comparison with those of the rest of the world, exceedingly modest. For example, over the four years 1987-90, Egypt, with investments amounting to $4.375 billion, attracted less capital than Portugal ($4.795 billion), Argentina ($4.792 billion), Malaysia ($5.972 billion), and Thailand ($5.389 billion). A European source sums up the situation well in the following words: "I draw your attention to the miraculous performance of tiny Asian countries like Singapore and even Malaysia, which in the past ten years have been able to attract more private investment than all the Mediterranean countries combined".

By now the figures speak for themselves. It is clear that without an overall, long-term vision, necessarily involving a sharpened awareness on the part of all the partners of their real common interests, the risks of regional disaster are great. However important the

processes of the world economy, it is not sufficient to submit passively to them. The result might be negative. An overall and coherent approach to the problems of the region, especially the economic and social problems, is indispensable. [131]

### 3.1.8 Regional Outlooks on Migration

Migration is now an active issue in the Mediterranean. It has already been established that it will continue to be one for a long time to come, thus becoming a structural dimension of the regional problem. In the North, four key ideas are destined to influence the prospects of the countries involved:

1. The difficulties connected with the necessary adaptations to the worldwide changes that their economies will experience, with all their consequences for society. Although these adaptations will cause difficulties in the short and medium terms, it is possible that in the long run a recovery will take place, resulting especially from the beneficial effects expected of the process of integration. It is, however, appropriate to note-and this is a new and important fact that a resumption of growth does not necessarily imply a sharp reduction in the rate of unemployment. [132] Therefore tensions will persist because of trends in the labor market. These will continue to have a negative impact on the view held in the North of migratory flows, whether actual or potential.

2. The pursuit of the process of European construction initiated by the Maastricht Treaty. In this regard it is appropriate to ask oneself what real significance to attach to the concept of Southern Europe, inasmuch as important issues, and the question of migration in particular, are more and more being raised at the EU level.[133]

Making the Southern European countries the designated interlocutors with the southern shore may be an approach subject to debate given the current primacy of a common European vision in which the countries of Northern Europe also have their piece to speak.

It is nevertheless clear, however, that the countries of Southern Europe will continue to

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[131] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Ibid, p.69-71

[132] UNDP, Human Development Report 1993, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p.3

[133] The Treaty on European Union, the so-called Maastricht Treaty, places migration among the subjects of "common interest" in article K. 1, points 1-3.

enjoy considerable autonomy, permitting them to define their own positions with regard to the relations they intend to maintain with their neighbors on the southern shore. It is just as clear that this autonomy must necessarily be redefined within the European institutional framework, which will progressively assert itself despite its current stammering.

3. The growing emergence of Europe as a worldwide pole, in competition with the two other poles (American and Asiatic), forming what is now called "the Triad."

The political as well as economic prospects opened up by the Treaty on European Union should produce a general dynamic that will benefit Europe but that might turn sour in a context in which internationalization imposes its norms and the two other competing poles are very energetic. The policies that these two poles follow with regard to their immediate neighbors constitute for Europe an index of their will to deal in a dynamic manner with constraints that are just as complex as those that confront Europe. As for the countries of Southern Europe, despite the strong solidarity that ties them to the other European countries within the framework of the European Union, they nonetheless remain subject to the rigors of European and worldwide competition, in which they are not always the strongest performers.

4. The persistence of European demographic decline with acute problems especially in matters of social welfare, given the growing aging of the population. The demographic projections, which show clearly the aging as well as the very weak growth of the population, do not automatically lead to the conclusion that it will be necessary to draw on the population sources outside Europe. However, it is generally agreed that for particular segments of the population, especially skilled labor, Europe will have need of external resources. Due to the demographic process in Europe and due to the urgent need for human resources in the next century, the EC will have to compete worldwide for mobile professionals, highly qualified workers, and specialists. Racism and xenophobia are definitely self-defeating, because they repulse the kind of (complementary) human resources Europe will desperately need.[134]

[134] Zimmermann, K. F. and Straubhaar, T., "Immigration and the European Community," Eurostat, Luxembourg, 1992, p.43

The problem in the South has three key components:

1. The economic difficulties being encountered in one form or another by all of the countries will persist and probably be aggravated. The most disturbing problem will be that of unemployment. In no significant case will the unemployment rate be held to levels compatible with managing society without major dysfunction. The structural adjustment programs that are being implemented, leading to the spread of the market economy, imply changes that will be difficult to effect, particularly in the context of a reduction in available financial resources.

2. Demographic growth will continue at relatively elevated rates, despite the discernible downward trend. The fundamental process of demographic transition, generally begun on the southern shore in different degrees depending on the country, does not eliminate the extremely severe constraints that already exist. Thus the annual rate of growth of the active population should be in the neighborhood of 4 percent This would require a rate of economic growth so high as to be inconceivable, given existing structural constraints, if unemployment is to be held to current levels. Under these circumstances, there is every reason to believe that the migratory potential of the southern shore will continue to be very high and directed toward the nearest rich countries, that is, those of Southern Europe.

3. A context of political crisis with serious risks of instability could trigger explosions in certain countries. This is a direct consequence of the two series of phenomena already cited, of an economic and a demographic nature, as well as other political factors tied in a more specific manner to the histories of the different countries. The profound crisis of legitimacy that the political elites are experiencing, especially as a result of the clear failures of the development policies they have followed, is leading in certain cases to a true crisis of the state, which is incapable of accepting the need for a new division of economic and political powers after a long period in which nothing changed.

If one combines all of the key ideas that form the structure of the regional problem, it is quite obvious that the migration issue pervades all of them. Aside from all the potential economic migrants (and they are numerous) the prevalent instability on the southern shore can lead to migration in response to other motivations, but a migration whose effect will be the same: to reinforce the pressure on Europe.

In this regard, it is best not to exaggerate excessively the possible impact, in terms of massive migration, of the political changes that could take place in certain countries of the southern shore. In reality it is as if the process of migration had already begun and was taking place drop by drop, especially in the milieus that consider that a political explosion, for example, of the "Islamic Republic" type, would damage their interests or lead to practices contrary to their principles.

In any case, it seems difficult to imagine massive migrations from the southern to the northern shore because they would pose extremely complex, if not insurmountable, problems in the context of the European societies.

A less concentrated and more continuous increase of the pressure of migration on Europe seems more plausible. In fact such an increase would pose a serious problem for the southern shore, for it might be made up of the most dynamic elements in its societies, those who often have a combination of skills, a spirit of enterprise, and capital. This loss of resources would be extremely prejudicial for the southern shore. It would aggravate the crisis, generating new migratory pressures. The South might find itself in a time vicious circle, with dramatic consequences.

Since the question of migration is destined to remain, for a very long time, one of the fundamental elements of the Mediterranean problem, it is appropriate to understand its new significance.[135]

### 3.2 TERRORISM

In NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO leaders recognized that "Alliance security must also take account of the global context" and that "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of WMD, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage." The 1999 Strategic Concept reiterated this recognition, noting, "New risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability were becoming clearer -oppression, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of WMD, and the global spread of weapons technology and terrorism." Thus alliance moved, this time to "acts of

[135] Safir, Nadji, "Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of Mediterranean", Ibid, p.73-75

terrorism" to the top of the list of "other risks" in its agenda.[136]

Before discussing the issue of potential or actual threats of sub-state violence within the Mediterranean region, there are some fundamental problems of definition with respect to the terms used to describe modes of violence below the level of intensity of modern warfare that must be addressed. First, such definitions tend to be distorted in common - and even official - usage into political propaganda and, second, these patterns of violence cover a wide and heterogeneous range of different circumstances and situations such that simple definitions are often not possible. The phenomenon of terrorism provides a good example of the first case, for it is a term which has been subject to considerable and consistent misuse. As Gearty points out, the essential component of terrorism originally was that it promoted the use of terror to achieve specifically political ends; today, however, the term has become a convenient label by which governments lambaste their opponents in any violent confrontation.[137] Indeed, 'for many governments the word "terrorism" in general means any form of violent activity with which that particular government happens to disagree'.[138]

Political motivation is persuasively argued by Paul R. Pillar to be a prerequisite of terrorism, although he concedes that criminal activity is not only often undertaken by terrorists, but can often have political repercussions of its own. As Pillar states:

> Terrorism is fundamentally different from these other forms of violence, however, in what gives rise to it and in how it must be countered, beyond simple physical security and police techniques. Terrorists' concerns are macro-concerns about changing a larger order; other violent criminals are focused on the micro-level of pecuniary gain and personal relationships. 'Political' in this regard encompasses not just traditional left-right politics but also what are frequently described as religious motivations or social issues.[139]

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[136] Caşın, M. Hakkı, "Re-Mapping Euro-Atlantic Collective Security Strategy Routes Beyond The September 11 Terrorist Attack", Ibid, p.14
[137] Gearty, C. "Terror", Faber & Faber, London, 1991, p.8-16, 44
[138] Aaronson, M., "International Terrorism as a Political Weapon", Den Norske Atlanterhavs Komite, Oslo, 1988, p.29
[139] Pillar, Raul R., "Terrorism and US Foreign Policy", Brooking Institution Press, 2001, p.13-14

Since the 1980s, US military strategists have defined three levels of conflict when determining what military threats the US might face in the future: high intensity, such as nuclear war; medium intensity, such as conventional and inter-state wars; and low intensity, such as irregular, guerrilla and unconventional conflicts.[140] Halliday argues that the concept of low intensity conflict is simply a modernized version of 1960s US counter-insurgency doctrine, combined with British concepts of low intensity operations, largely developed from British experience in Northern Ireland.[141] Of course, this classification of violence has been designed for the purposes of formal military strategic analysis and, indeed, US strategists have defined six areas for which responses would be required, ranging from counter- and pro-insurgency, through terrorism to peacekeeping.[142]

### 3.2.1 Definition Of Terrorism

The question of a definition of terrorism has haunted the debate among states for decades. A first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations, but the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The UN Member States still have no agreed-upon definition. Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on terrorism, which some countries favor in place of the present 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols.

The lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism has been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. Cynics have often commented that one state's "terrorist" is another state's "freedom fighter".

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) further describes terrorism as either domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorists:

• Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the US or its territories without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

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[140] Freysinger, R. C.,"US Military and Economic Intervention in an International Context of Low-intensity Conflict", Political Studies, 39, 1991, p. 322-333

[141] Halliday, F., "Cold War. Third World: All Essay 011 US-Soviet Relations", Hutchinson-Radius, London, 1989, p.70-71

[142] Freysinger, R. C, Ibid, p.324

• International terrorism involves violent acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the US or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the US or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrations operate or seek asylum.[143]

| Agency | Definition |
|---|---|
| **League of Nations Convention (1937)** | All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public. |
| **UN Resolution Language (1999)** | 1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;<br>2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them. |
| **Academic Consensus Definition** | Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. |

Table 3. 12 Proposed Definitions of Terrorism (Source: Definitions of Terrorism, Available on Site: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html)

[143] Definition of Terrorism, Available on Site: http://www.terrorismfiles.org/encyclopaedia/terrorism.html

| Agency | Definition |
|---|---|
| **Department of Defense** | The calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.[144] |
| **FBI** | The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.[145] |
| **State Department** | Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.[146] |

Table 3. 13 Definitions of Terrorism Adopted by Various U.S. Agencies

The dictionary meaning of the terrorism is "unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons."[147]

The most generally accepted definition of terrorism is that proposed by Paul Wilkinson: 'Political terrorism may be briefly described as coercive intimidation. It is the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction in order to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorists' political demands.'[148]

Other forms of terrorism, of course, will also fit inside this definition, since the ultimate demands will simply cease to be political and will correspond, instead, to the terrorists' real aims. It might be added, that, unlike other forms of violence, terrorism is non-specific in its targets, in that the persons, groups or organizations that are targeted do not have to have any connection with the aims expressed. A more explicit definition of terrorism might then be: 'Terrorism is, therefore, the use of violence, or the threat of violence, to achieve specifically political ends against a target or victim who has no necessary correlation with

[144] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Available on Site: http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
[145] US 1999: 30 Years of Terrorism – A Special Retrospective Edition, Available on Site: http:/www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/
[146] Patterns of Global Terrorism, Available on Site: http:/www.state.gov/documents/organizations/20177.pdf
[147] The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Houghton Mifflin Company, Fourth Edition, 2000
[148] Wilkinson, P., Terrorism and the Liberal State, Macmillan, London, 1986, p.51

the factor exciting the terrorist activity originally and the primary means for achieving the desired end is fear.'[149]

Wilkinson, however, also provides a useful typology of terrorism, which can be applied to the modern situation. He generates four categories: sub-revolutionary terrorism which has objectives which stop short of trying to create fundamental revolutionary change; revolutionary terrorism which is directed towards outright revolutionary change; repressive terrorism which seeks to coerce individuals or groups to alter behavior which the terrorist finds undesirable; and epiphenomenal terrorism which has no specific political aim but is a by-product of a wider situation of violence. Interestingly enough, the definitions given above do not preclude states from being terrorist themselves, either by giving material support to terrorist groups or by acting in ways designed to achieve their objectives through the use of indiscriminate threat and fear. It is also worth noting that, although these definitions and typologies were constructed to describe the situation in Europe and the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s - in the context of the Cold War, where the Soviet Union was seen as being one of the major factors encouraging the use of terrorist violence - they would fit the situation today equally well. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the causes and explanations of low-level violence are therefore the same today as they were then.[150]

### 3.2.2 The Speculative Background

The concept of terrorism is relatively new, for although terror has long played a part in warfare, hostilities and other forms of social violence, terrorism as a definable concept, with a theoretical rationale and a specific purpose, has not. Even though there are clear examples of terrorism' throughout history, such as the Sicarii in the first century AD and the Assassins who operated between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, they tended to be isolated over time. There was no systematic use of terrorism as part of a program of hostilities designed to achieve a specific set of political objectives until the nineteenth century at the earliest.[151]

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[149] Joffe G., "Conflict and Consensus in South-North Security", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.161

[150] P. Wilkinson, Ibid, p.58

[151] Wardlaw, G., "Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics all Counter-measures" Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.18




Figure 3. 1 International Terrorist Incidents, 1999 (Source: Available on Site: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/)




Table 3. 14 Trends of Terrorism between 1980-1999 (Source: Available on Site: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/p5.gif)

The first recorded use of "terrorism" and "terrorist" was in 1795, relating to the Reign of Terror instituted by the French government. Of course, the Jacobins, who led the

government at the time, were also revolutionaries and gradually "terrorism" came to be applied to violent revolutionary activity in general. But the use of "terrorist" in an anti-government sense is not recorded until 1866 (referring to Ireland) and 1883 (referring to Russia).[152]

In fact, modern terrorism really only started at the end of the nineteenth century and depended heavily then for its theoretical justification on the violent Russian anarchist and nihilist traditions.[153] This was supplemented in the mid-twentieth century by the argument that terrorism had a liberating and cleansing effect on communities under repression, thus reinforcing other aspects of their struggles for liberation. The major theoreticians in this regard who were primarily concerned with the use of terrorism within the anti-colonialist struggle were lean-Paul Sartre and Franz Fanon.[154] To some extent, they mirrored the national liberationalist views of the Irish Republican Brotherhood which despite its commitment to mass action, nonetheless also invoked terrorism as a technique through its shadowy offshoot, the invincible.[155]




Table 3. 15 Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1980-1999 (Source: Available on Site: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/)

[152] Guardian Unlimited, World dispatch, The definition of terrorism, Available on Site: http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,487098,00.html
[153] Wardlaw, G., Ibid, p.19-24
[154] Wardlaw, G., p. 40-1; Wilkinson, P., Ibid, p.71-80
[155] Gearty, C., Ibid, p.22-23

Apart from this psychological role for terrorism within the anti-colonial struggle, Sartre and Fanon also drew on other political traditions connected with Marxist socialism, for both Leninism and Maoism advocated the use of terror in their overall prescriptions for the seizure of power. This was, however, only one element in the armory available to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist fighter. In reality, both Leninism and Maoism stimulated another form of low-level violence - guerrilla warfare.[156] Leninism has tended to stimulate urban guerrilla activities, whilst Maoism has been the preserve of the rural guerrilla and has given rise to the concept of "revolutionary warfare" which was further developed by Che Guevara and the Vietnamese leader, General Giap.[157] It is, in fact, important to distinguish between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, for the former has the characteristic, which it shares with conventional warfare, of having a defined enemy and of (usually) engaging in operations directed solely against that enemy whereas, as we have seen, terrorism is by definition indiscriminate. Nonetheless, as Wilkinson points out, guerrilla action, particularly urban guerrilla warfare has ". . . a far higher terrorism potential than any other mode of unconventional warfare".[158]

[156] Gearty, C., Ibid, p.28-32
[157] Wardlaw, G., Ibid, p.46-7
[158] Wilkinson, P., Ibid, p. 59.

### 3.2.3 Terrorism in The Middle East and North Africa




Table 3. 16 Total International Attacks by Region, 1994-1999
(Source: Available on Site: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/)

#### 3.2.3.1 Algeria

The toll exacted by terrorism in Algeria, estimated to be more than 100,000 dead and one million victims by the end of the year 2000, can on its own adequately indicate the extent of the drama that has affected the Algerian people. But mere statistics do not reveal the full horror of the reality: a terrorism in which the darkest and most barbaric compulsions of armed violence have been taken to their utmost limits. It is a movement that is genocidal in character, with no equivalent in Africa or the world, except perhaps the disastrous toll of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

A religious political movement, whose roots go deep down into the contemporary history of Algeria since independence, embodies this terrorist violence. If endogenous and exogenous factors that gave birth to it are excluded, attempts to gain a non-exhaustive comprehension of this phenomenon in Algeria leads to a political and subversive movement that became the repository of this violence, which is the Islamic Salvation Front, known as the FIS (a political party dissolved on 14 March 1992).

Simplistic analyses place the onset of this terrorist violence at the interruption of the electoral process in January 1992, but the beginning and development of terrorism in Algeria precede this date.

As early as 27 November 1991, about ten soldiers of the Algerian army were savagely massacred in Guemmar (in south east Algeria) by an Islamic terrorist group, practically all of whose members had received training in camps in Afghanistan. This attack, the first of its kind, launched the terrorist campaign in Algeria and revealed to national public opinion the existence of groups structured, armed, trained and organized with the aim of seizing power to install a theocratic state. These groups called themselves the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), with reference to a terrorist movement that had appeared in 1981, led by Mustapha Bouyali. At the political and ideological level, this movement was based on and inspired by a document called 'Jihad in Algeria', comprising 22 items of instruction to terrorist groups. It was written by the two principal leaders and founders of the FIS, Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj.

The GIA was created in the same period, with the aim of taking control of the organizational structure of the MIA and extending areas of terrorist activity to the whole of the national territory. The institution of a military command (Imarat), a political structure (Madliss echourra) and terrorists brigades and sections (katiba and serya) are the main forms adopted by the GIA groups that have planned to install an Islamic state (Khalifat) in Algeria.

It was as a result of this organization that terrorism was able to develop so speedily and violently. Between 1992 and 1997, the GIA conducted a series of violent campaigns against an unarmed population and a security service that had never faced such a phenomenon. Their actions included bombings, purposeful criminal acts, massacre of

isolated citizens, sabotage, rape, mutilation, torture and the systematic liquidation of any Algerian citizen who refused to support the extremist fundamentalist solution.

A bomb exploded in a cemetery on 1 November1994, killing four young scouts and seriously wounding seven others, who had to have limbs amputated. The violence would escalate to a state of total, absolute terror, with no discernment, as even children were regarded as legitimate targets.

Thus factories, bridges, railways, schools and cultural centers have been systematically destroyed and burned, causing losses of over $20 billion in 10 years. All those with a different religious view—including administrative officials, artists, journalists, working group of women (who were asked to stop working), doctors, teachers, farmers, and men of religion have been systematically eliminated.

Through the assassination of foreigners, the terrorists have also targeted women and men of religions other than Islam, even those that preach tolerance and forgiveness. Catholics, Protestants, both monks (seven of whom belonged to the Trappist Order) and high dignitaries of the church, have been killed, such as Bishop Claverie, who was killed in a bomb attack in Oran in August 1995.

The criminal logic of terrorism has also been directed against foreign interests in Algeria—more than 120 foreign citizens were killed in the early stages of the campaign. This wave of assassinations provoked the departure of many foreigners, as well as many airlines and foreign companies. This has to a certain extent achieved its aim: that of weakening the country economically and sustaining the mistrust of foreign partners.

In January 1995, the GIA also launched a campaign of bomb attacks in main cities. That was when a suicide bomber drove a car containing explosives into the headquarters of the national police on Amirouche Boulevard, killing 42 Algerians and wounding 265. Thousands of other attacks would follow, with an ever-increasing list of victims.

The circumstances that led to the formation of the GIA are to be found in the availability of a large fringe of Algerian terrorists in Afghanistan. Experts estimate that the GIA was created in the house of the Muhajirin in 1989 in Peshawar. It was from this town, located

on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, that the first hard core of "Algerian Afghans" launched their terrorist campaign against Algeria.[159]

### 3.2.3.2 Egypt

The brutal massacre of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor, Egypt, in November 1997 has brought the issue of Islamic extremism in Egypt to the fora once again. Islamic extremism in Egypt is predicated on a rejection of the West and Egypt's Western-oriented regime. The movement's political agenda is to topple the government of President Hosni Mubarak and establish an Islamic theocracy. The most significant terror organization in Egypt is the Gama'at al-Islamiyya or Islamic Group (IG), responsible for the Luxor tragedy.

The IG is an indigenous Egyptian Islamic extremist movement founded in the late 1970s by a group of radical Islamic theologians, led by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and former army intelligence officers and lawyers. Sheikh Rahman is currently serving a life sentence in New York for his role in inciting his followers to bomb the World Trade Center in February 1993. The original core of former army officers and lawyers are all serving life sentences in Egypt.

Today, the group comprises a loosely organized underground of terror cells. There is currently no known single operational leader while Sheikh Rahman remains the group's spiritual leader.

Believed to have several hundred armed operatives, several thousand members and an additional several thousand sympathizers, the IG is centered primarily in the poor provinces of upper, or southern, Egypt. It also enjoys support, however, in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban areas, primarily among students and unemployed university graduates. Banned from participating in Egyptian elections, Islamic radicals took control of trade unions and professional associations. They established a network of charities, businesses, schools and hospitals and gained adherents between Egypt's poor and disadvantaged.

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[159] Africa and Terrorism, Joining the Global Campaign, Available on Site: http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/MONOGRAPHS/No74/Chap6.html

Islamic extremists have sought to destabilize Egypt by destroying its tourism industry, the mainstay of Egypt's economy. Before the November massacre, with some 4.2 million visitors, the tourism industry was set to generate in 1997 nearly $4 billion in revenue for Egypt, making tourism the country's most important source of foreign exchange.

IG first gained notoriety for its assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981. Over the years, it has engaged in attacks against Egyptian security and government officials, Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals and, since 1992, foreign tourists in Egypt. Its attacks include the 1992 assassination of secularist commentator Farag Foda, the 1994 assassination attempt against Nobel literature laureate Naguib Mahfouz, the June 1995 assassination attempt against President Mubarak and the April 1996 shooting deaths of 18 Greek tourists outside a Cairo hotel.

While the two brothers convicted and sentenced to death for the September 1997 attack on a bus outside Cairo's Egyptian museum in which nine German tourists and their Egyptian driver were killed denied affiliation with the IG, they did admit sympathies with IG ideology. IG issued a statement in October 1997 hailing the two men and warning tourists not to come to Egypt.

Despite a harsh government crackdown and the imprisonment and exile of its senior leaders, IG remains Egypt's most active extremist organization. Prior to the Luxor attack, Cairo had declared a victory in its war against Islamic radicals. The Luxor attack was the group's deadliest and came on the heels of repeated appeals by the six imprisoned founders of IG, starting in July 1997, for an end to the violence. Since 1992, nearly 1,200 people, including 92 foreigners, have been killed in Islamic extremist violence, including many attacks claimed by the Gama'a.

IG leaders have been arrested and imprisoned by the government while others are living in exile in Europe and Afghanistan. Exiled leaders are suspected of providing support for terrorist activities within Egypt and statements in the name of the IG have been issued from outside Egypt. In April 1996, for example, a senior IG leader, speaking from Afghanistan, publicly threatened to kidnap U.S. citizens in retaliation for the life imprisonment sentence of Sheikh Rahman, handed down in January 1996. An IG leaflet left at the Luxor massacre site claimed that the attack was carried out as a gesture to

Mustafa Hamza, an exiled IG leader suspected of having masterminded the assassination attempt on President Mubarak and believed to be in Pakistan.

Most recently, exiled leaders have expressed sharp differences over the wisdom of continued violence and the best course for the terrorist group. In December 1997, one IG faction issued a statement saying that it had decided, "to stop targeting either the tourism industry or foreign tourists" while another faction issued a statement denying the vow. Apparently the statement vowing to end such attacks was issued by Yasser el-Serri, an Islamic radical leader in London while the denial issued the next day emanated from Refaei Ahmed Taha, a senior IG leader living in Afghanistan. Both leaders are on the run from death sentences and appeared on a list that Cairo issued shortly after the Luxor attack of 14 fugitive militants Egypt says mastermind and finance attacks from abroad.

In October 1997, the U.S. State Department designated the IG as one of 30 foreign terrorist organizations who are banned from fund-raising in the U.S. and whose members and representatives are ineligible for visas to enter the U.S. and are subject to exclusion. It is now a Federal crime to provide funds, weapons or other types of material support to the IG.

IG prospects for the future remain unclear. On the one hand, the IG is currently experiencing a popular backlash from the Egyptian public. The severe blow dealt to the tourism industry as a result of the Luxor massacre has angered the Egyptian people who are the ones suffering from the decline in tourist revenues. On the other hand, the Luxor attack represents a more brazen approach on the part of IG militants who contradicted calls for a cease-fire from senior leaders of the movement. This, analysts have speculated, may portend the perpetuation of more independent, splintered and violent IG cells.[160]

### 3.2.3.3 Libya

Libya is concerned, the primary motivation has been two fold: on the one hand to support Palestinian aspirations as part of Libya's Arab nationalist responsibilities, which the Qadhafi regime has until recently made a central feature of its ideology; and on the other to destroy its opposition abroad. Both aspects are also derived from the fundamental

[160] Terror in Egypt, Available on Site: http://www.adl.org/terror/focus/12_focus.asp

principles of the political doctrines developed by Colonel Qadhafi.

The Palestinian struggle is one aspect of this basic issue and Libyan dissidents, who by their opposition have placed themselves beyond the revolutionary pale and thus may be exterminated, form the other. It should also be borne in mind that many of the groups labeled by the west as terrorists are, within this doctrinal definition, concerned with national liberation and thus Libyan support for them has never been construed as support for terrorism by Tripoli. This was certainly the case with Libyan support for the IRA in the 1970s and for Palestinian movements in the 1970s and 1980s.

The elimination of Libyan dissidents began in 1980, after Colonel Qadhafi, addressing a Revolutionary Committee congress in February 1980, called on them to '. . . exterminate the stray dogs of the revolution'. For a period of four years there were regular attacks on Libyan dissidents in Britain, Italy, Greece and the US.

Despite the opening of the so-called Libyan 'charm offensive' in 1987, in the wake of the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, the incidence of Libyan involvement in terrorism thereafter actually increased rather than decreased. According to the State Department's own statistics, before the bombing, only two incidents apart from support for the Palestinians and attacks on Libyan dissidents abroad, were unambiguous Libyan attempts at terrorism. Immediately afterwards, there were fourteen such incidents and a new era in Libyan support for and sponsorship of terrorism - used for revenge opened. This was undoubtedly the motive behind Libyan material support to the IRA once again, which began in 1987. It is also the adduced motive for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 and of a Unit Training Assembly (UTA) aircraft over Chad in September 1989, if, in fact, either or both incidents were carried out at the instigation of the Libyan regime.[161]

### 3.2.3.4 Syria

Terrorism constitutes a source of friction in the Mediterranean. Syria and Libya are the two Mediterranean states, which are cited in the American list of state-sponsored terrorism. These states considered to be terrorist states and left out of any multilateral initiative to

[161] Joffe, George, "Security Challenges In The Med Region", Frank Cass, Great Britain, 1996, p.148-149

bring stability and peace to the region. The existence of these states in the Mediterranean constitutes an important factor for instability.[162]

Syrian involvement in state-sponsored terrorism has long formed a clandestine element of its policy towards the Palestinian issue, particularly as far as Syrian ambitions to control the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are concerned. For the past two decades, Palestinian factions opposed to Yasir Arafat and his Fatah movement has received support from the Syrian authorities. Specific instances of Syrian-sponsored terrorism, however, have not always been attributable to the direct instigation of the Assad regime. The Syrian security services also have a tradition of autonomous behavior since they often form part of the personal clientage groups of leading Syrian political figures and thus articulate the specific policy interests of their patrons, rather than those of the regime itself.[163] In any case, with the Syrian decision to abandon its links with the now-defunct Soviet Union in 1989 (when the Gorbachev regime made it clear that it would not support Syrian ambitions for 'strategic parity' with Israel) and to participate in the Multinational Coalition against Iraq, Syrian interest in sponsoring terrorism has declined. Today, Syria's only interests in this regard seem to be to offer moral support to the Palestinian rejectionist groups based in Damascus (without allowing them any freedom of action, however) and to continue to permit Iranian contacts with Hizbullah in Lebanon, as well as allowing Hizbullah to prosecute its own war of retaliation against Israel for actions taken against it in Lebanon.[164]

### 3.2.3.5 Lebanon

Security conditions in Lebanon continued to improve in 1999 despite a series of terrorist-related activities. The government's continued lack of control in parts of the country, however--including portions of the Bekaa Valley, Beirut's southern suburbs, Palestinian refugee camps, and south Lebanon--and easy access to arms and explosives throughout much of the country contributed to an environment with the potential for acts of violence. The Lebanese Government did not exert full control over militia groups engaged in fighting in and near the so-called security zone occupied by Israel and its proxy militia, the Army of South Lebanon.

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[162] Ormancı, Emriye Bağdagül, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", Ibid, p.14
[163] Arendt, H., "The Origins of Totalitarianism", Faber & Faber, London, 1961, p.22-37
[164] Joffe, George, "Security Challenges In The Med Region", Ibid, p 149-150

A variety of terrorist groups continued to operate with relative impunity in those areas, conducting terrorist training and other operational activities. The groups include Hizballah, The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Abu Nidal organization, Asbat al-Ansar, and several local extremist organizations. Hizballah represents the most potent threat to U.S. interests in Lebanon by an organized group. Although Hizballah has not attacked US targets in Lebanon since 1991, its animosity toward the US has not abated, and the group continued to monitor the U.S. Embassy and its personnel in the country. Hizballah leaders routinely denounced US policies in the region and continued to condemn the peace process.

Lebanon suffered several terrorist attacks in 1999 involving local actors and victims. On 8 September, for example, a bomb exploded at the Customs Department office in Sidon, causing no injuries. Unidentified gunmen on 8 June shot and killed four judges at a courthouse in Sidon. Although Lebanese authorities had not apprehended the assailants, they believed the Palestinian extremist group Asbat al-Ansar was responsible. Moreover, a previously unknown group, the Liberation Army of Veneration, on 28 June issued a communiqué containing a death threat to the U.S. Ambassador in Lebanon. Local authorities speculated that the Asbat al-Ansar was behind the threat.

The Lebanese Government continued to support international counter-terrorist initiatives. It agreed in principle to examine a Japanese request to take custody of five Japanese Red Army members whose jail sentences in Lebanon end in March 2000. The Lebanese Government, however, did not act on repeated US requests to turn over Lebanese terrorists involved in the hijacking in 1985 of Trans World Airlines flight 847 and in the abduction, torture, and--in some cases--murders of US hostages from 1984 to 1991.[165]

### 3.2.3.6 Israel

Israel's involvement in terrorism has been quite explicitly linked to its struggle with the PLO. Quite apart from actions by Mossad and associated agencies directed against Palestinian groups, leaders and activists in Europe and the Middle East throughout the

[165] 1999 Global Terrorism Middle East Overview, Available on Site: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/

1960s, 1970s and 1980s.[166] The Israeli armed forces have engaged in operations in Lebanon explicitly designed to be indiscriminate and to cause terror in order to coerce their opponents.[167] The latest stage of these operations, which go back to the early 1960s, began in 1982 with Operation Peace-for-Galilee, the invasion of Lebanon which brought the Israeli army to the outskirts of Beirut and which began in response to the near-fatal wounding of Israeli Ambassador Orlov in London by the Abu Nidal group.[168] After the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, indiscriminate air and ground strikes were used to intimidate Palestinian and Lebanese guerrillas after every incident in which Israel itself was attacked. The process still continues today, as the shelling of southern Lebanon in July 1993 and the revenge attacks on southern Lebanon after bombings of Israeli-occupied buildings in Buenos Aires and London in June and July 1994 demonstrate.

Figure 3. 2 Vehicle Destroyed in Premature Explosion in Haifa

It is a tragic irony that, far from achieving their object of deterring attack on Israel, these actions have created a far more resolute and intransigent Lebanese opponent - Hizbullah - which is quite prepared to use terrorism and guerrilla techniques against Israeli interests worldwide. Indeed, Israel's actions in this regard, when coupled with the effects of American-sponsored Islamist resistance in Afghanistan, have produced a new type of terrorist threat to Israeli, Jewish and western targets worldwide. At least one terrorist network deriving from the Afghan Islamist experience has been identified in the Philippines where its leader, who is now in American custody, is said to have masterminded the World Trade Center bombing in New York in 1993. Indeed, this

[166] Seale, P., "Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire" Hutchinson, London, 1992, p.32
[167] Fiske, R., "Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War", Andre Deutsch, London, 1990, p.27
[168] Gearty, C., Ibid, p.58-62

particular network, which is also claimed to be linked to Egyptian Islamists, demonstrates a new feature of modern terrorism: its ability to be global in its scope both through the exploitation of modern means of communication and through its use of the world's travel and transport networks with the associated increasing porosity of national borders.

Another important terrorist group is the al-Qaida. Al-Qaida is not alone in its tendency towards mass murder - groups such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, which perpetrated the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS and PIJ - appear equally willing to engage in mass terrorist activities. Palestinian terrorists are now targeting Israeli civilians, and in the month of March 2002 alone Israel lost a greater percentage of its population to terrorism than the US lost on September 11.[169]

### 3.2.3.7 Effects of Usama Bin Ladin in the Region

The bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August 1998 underscored the global reach of Usama Bin Ladin--a longtime sponsor and financier of extremist causes--and brought to full public awareness his transition from sponsor to terrorist. A series of public threats to drive the US and its allies out of Muslim countries foreshadowed the attacks, including what was presented as a fatwa (Muslim legal opinion) published on 23 February 1998 by Bin Ladin and allied groups under the name "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders." The statement asserted it was a religious duty for all Muslims to wage war on US citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the world.

The 17th son of Saudi construction magnate Muhammad Bin Ladin, Usama joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He played a significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Ladin founded al-Qaida (the Base) to serve as an operational hub for like-minded extremists. The Saudi Government revoked his citizenship in 1994, and his family officially disowned him. He moved to Sudan in 1991, but international pressure on Khartoum forced him to move to Afghanistan in 1996.

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[169] Lellouche, Pierre, "Defending Democracies: Homeland Defence, Non-Profilaration and Euro-Atlantic Security", NATO Parliamentary Assembly, AV 180, DSC (02) 14, , 2002, p.3



Figure 3. 3 Picture of Usama Bin Ladin

Bin Ladin has stated publicly that terrorism is a tool to achieve the group's goal of bringing Islamic rule to Muslim lands and "cleanse" them of Western influence and corruption. To this end, Bin Ladin in 1999 led a broad-based, versatile organization. Suspects named in the wake of the Embassy bombings--Egyptians, one Comoran, one Palestinian, one Saudi, and U.S. citizens--reflect the range of al-Qaida operatives. The diverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Ladin resources beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from sympathizers in various countries, and support from close allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to extremists not directly affiliated with his organization. He seeks to aid those who support his primary goals--driving US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the Saudi ruling family from power, and "liberating Palestine"--or his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented governments in predominantly Muslim countries. His organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen and has trained fighters from numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea.

Using the ties al-Qaida has developed; Bin Ladin believes he can call upon individuals and groups virtually worldwide to conduct terrorist attacks. In December 1998, Bin Ladin gave a series of interviews in which he denied involvement in the East Africa bombings but said he "instigated" them and called for attacks on US citizens worldwide in retaliation for the strikes against Iraq. Bin Ladin's public statements then ceased under increased pressure from his Taliban hosts. Nonetheless, in 1999, Bin Ladin continued to influence like-

minded extremists to his cause, and his organization continued to engage in terrorist planning. His Egyptian and South Asian allies, for example, continued publicly to threaten US interests. Bin Ladin's public remarks also underscored his expanding interests, including a desire to obtain a capability to deploy WMD.[170]

On September 11, al-Qaida terrorists committed an act of war against the innocent. Two hijacked airliners crashed into the World Trade Center Towers in New York City. Because of this attack:

- More than 3,000 people died or remain missing following the attacks. They came from more than 80 different nations, from many different races and religions.
- 343 firefighters and paramedics perished at the World Trade Center.
- 23 police officers and 37 Port Authority police officers died at the World Trade Center.
- Approximately 2,000 children lost a parent on September 11, including 146 children who lost a parent in the Pentagon attacks.
- One business alone lost more than 700 employees, leaving at least 50 pregnant widows.[171]

### 3.2.4 Terrorist Threat of the Region

From the foregoing, it is clear that a Potential terrorist threat to the South Mediterranean rim states comes from three sources: the spillover of the domestic power struggle in Iran; the failure of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians under occupation; and the struggle between regimes and Sunni Islamist oppositions in countries such as Egypt and Algeria. However, compared with the situation in the 1980s, the threat is far less severe and is closely connected with the clash between legal and moral legitimating of the states in this area. To a large extent, too, the existence of such tensions is a testament to the continuing economic and demographic crisis facing the region and their removal will require a concomitant solution of the economic dilemma of achieving effective and egalitarian economic development.

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[170] 1999 Global Terrorism Middle East Overview, Ibid
[171] The Global War on Terrorism, Available on Site: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/

Unfortunately, the current patterns of economic restructuring are likely, in the short term at least, to worsen living standards and thus will also intensify political tensions. There is likelihood that guerrilla action and terrorism linked to radical Islam will increase in the near future. This will be intensified by the extension of the western culture associated with the global economy that is currently being constructed. Elite groups in the Middle East are likely to embrace such a culture, as they benefit from economic restructuring. The mass of the populations, however, who will be excluded - in the short term at least - from such benefits, will also reject the western cultural counterpart, turning instead towards Islam and increasingly treating governing elites as examples of jahiliyya. This, in turn, will intensify the struggle.

The outlook is thus bleak far the region as a whole and it could well be worsened if western states continue to follow diplomatic patterns which are likely to intensify the confrontation. It is not clear that isolating Iran encourages a reduction in support for state-sponsored terrorism. Indeed, it might even make it more likely. Similarly, treating Libya as a pariah state merely persuades public opinion in the Arab World of the essential hostility of the west towards them. That, in turn, increases support for radical Islam and for violent confrontation with Middle Eastern and North African governments, which are increasingly seen as western allies and surrogates. In this connection, failure in the peace processes between Israel and the Arab world or between Israel and the Palestinians will intensify such a reaction.

The situation in the north Mediterranean region is quite different, for the threat of terrorism and low-level violence arises essentially from the growth of crime and the development of new patterns of political articulation. It seems unlikely that these two sources will ever constitute anything more than a minor irritation to the governments involved, particularly as the old, irredentist political disputes associated with Ireland and the Basque Country seem about to be resolved. Nor is there much danger of the political struggles along the south Mediterranean rim being transferred northwards.




Table 3. 17 Total International Casualties by Region, 1994-1999 (Source: Available on Site: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/)

The greatest danger seems to be that Europe will increasingly isolate itself from the problems of the Middle East and North Africa just at a time when greater economic integration is about to be introduced. The free trade areas now proposed between the European Union, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia are only intended to be the precursors of a more extensive arrangement involving all the states of the southern Mediterranean rim, and that, in turn, will have significant political and security implications. Europe cannot, in short, ignore the fact of the potential for terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the south Mediterranean region if its economic and security proposals are to bear fruit. It must, instead, seek solutions with the states concerned to the underlying problems from which the terrorism and guerrilla warfare stems. That, in turn, may require new and imaginative approaches towards the Arab world and the Gulf from European statesmen, although there

is no evidence at present that this will be forthcoming.[172]

## 3.3 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

There is, however, an emerging risk in the Mediterranean in which US and European interests are clearly aligned, and in response to which the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty would undoubtedly apply, and that is the proliferation of WMD and their long-range delivery systems. Within ten years, it is possible that every southern European capital will be within range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa or the Levant.[173]

Israel has acquired Jericho 2 missiles, which has a range of 1,500 km, Syria, Libya and Egypt dispose Scud missiles with short range, and Iran has a substantial chemical weapon's capability and an active long-range missile development program. Egypt has active chemical weapons and long-range ballistic missile development program. Both Libya and Syria have chemical weapons and Algeria has been pushing ahead with development of a nuclear infrastructure.[174]

| STATE | NUCLEAR | CHEMICAL | BIOLOGICAL | MISSILE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LIBYA | - | + | + | + |
| EGYPT | - | + | + | + |
| ISRAEL | + | + | + | + |

Table 3. 18 Mediterranean Countries with Weapons of Mass Destruction (Source: States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, Available on Site: http://fas.org/irp/threat/wmd_state.htm)

### 3.3.1 Libya

In 1975 Libya had ratified the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed by the Idris regime in 1969. In 1980 an agreement was reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) placing all of Libya's nuclear installations under international inspection. Despite these steps, in the mid- and late 1970s, Qadhafi repeatedly proclaimed

[172] Joffe, George, "Security Challenges In The Med Region", Ibid, p 154-157
[173] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., "Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean", RAND, Santa Monica, 1996, p.x
[174] Ormancı, Emriye Bağdagül, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", Ibid, p.15-16

his country's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because he was convinced that his archenemy, Israel, had achieved such a military capability.[175]

In the area of ballistic missile development, Libya currently leads the countries of North Africa, a possible recognition that Libya's conventional military potential falls short of Qadhafi's aspirations. Libya leads the region in ballistic missiles deployed, chiefly in the form of 80 Scud-Bs, with a 300-km range.[176] . Libya's Scuds may be equipped with chemical warheads developed in Libya with North Korean and Iranian assistance. Libya also possesses an unknown number of North Korean-supplied Scud Cs with a range of 550 km. Libya's Scud B inventory gives it a tactical strike capability that can threaten substantial areas of Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Sudan as well as offshore islands in the Mediterranean. Libyan Scud Bs cannot currently threaten the mainland of Southern Europe from launch sites within Libya. Launch sites in Tunisia would however allow Libya to target parts of Sicily and Sardinia. If Libya does indeed possess Scud Cs, it would possess the ability to target Sicily, Crete and parts of the extreme South of Greece.

In the 1980s, Libya unsuccessfully attempted to purchase obsolete 900 km-range SS-12 Scaleboard MRBMs that had been outlawed under the INF Treaty, as well as SS-23 Spider SRBMs (range 500 km), from the Soviet Union. Approaches were also made to China to purchase CSS-2 IRBMs (range 2,800 km). The acquisition of the CSS-2, which China has exported to Saudi Arabia, would have allowed Libya to target all of Italy and much of France, including Paris.

Libya also attempted to obtain longer-range TBMs from Brazil. In the mid-1980s, the Brazilian Orbitas consortium developed a solid-fuelled, road-mobile SRBM, the MB/EE 150, utilizing technology derived from civilian rocket programs. A 600 km-range version of the system may also have been under development. In 1988 an MB/EE-type system was tested over a range of 650 km in the Libya desert, and it was also believed that an unconsummated agreement was also reached between Libya and Brazil for Libya to acquire this system.[177]

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[175] Libya Special Weapons, Available on Site: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/index.html
[176] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98, Oxford Univ. Press, London: 1997, p.133
[177] National Briefings Libya, Available on Site: http://www.cdiss.org/libya_b.htm




Table 3. 19 Libya's Chemical Weapons Program (Source: Foreign Suppliers to Libya's Chemical Weapons Program-Steps to Chemical Weapon Acquisition, Available on Site: http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/flow/libya/index.htm)

Of particular concern is the Libyan effort to develop a longer-range (950 km) missile known as "Al Fatah."[178] Libya's parallel 13 years program to establish an autonomous missile development and production capability has not been marked by conspicuous success. However Libya's Al Fatah (or Ittisslat) program suggest that determined efforts are being made to acquire a credible longer-range delivery system. The Al Fatah appears to be a 950 km-range Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) capable of delivering a 500 kg payload. Foreign assistance has played a vital role in this program, and at one time or another Libya has received assistance from German, Brazilian and Chinese technicians. In 1989 about 100 German engineers were reported to be working in a facility near Sebha, in central Libya, on the Al Fatah program. The al-Fatah project is a research and development effort to develop a ballistic missile with a range of 950 kilometers, although the missile is not yet operational.[179] Israeli intelligence sources added that the Al-Fatah was being developed under the management of "a number of foreign experts, some of whom have been identified by Israel as having worked on a Libyan missile program in the 1970s." In November 1996, a leaked Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report claimed that Libya had also concluded a $30 million deal with a Serbian arms company, JPL Systems, to provide assistance for the Al Fatah program. [180]

[178] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., Ibid, p. 55
[179] Spector, Leonard S., "Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995", Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C., 1995, p.141
[180] National Briefings Libya, Ibid

Libya has also shown a willingness to use ballistic missiles against Western targets. In 1986, in response to the US bombing of Tripoli, Libya launched two Scuds in an unsuccessful strike against a US Coast Guard facility at Lampedusa, an Italian island located midway between the Tunisian coast and the island of Malta.[181]

| System | Alternative Name | Missile Type | Supplier | Range (km) Max | Payload (kg) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SS-21 SCARAB** | Tochka | BSRBM | Russia | 120 | 480 | In Service |
| **SS-1 SCUD B** | R-17 | SRBM | Russia | 300 | 985 | In Service |
| **SCUD C** | | SRBM | N. Korea | 550 | 500 | In Service |
| **AL FATTAH** | Ittisalt | MRBM | Domestic | 950 | 500 | Development |

Table 3. 20 Libyan Ballistic Missile Capabilities (Source: Available on Site: http://www.cdiss.org/libya_t.htm)

Furthermore, Libya is also the North African country most heavily committed to the acquisition of WMD. Libya's nuclear aspirations have a long, well-documented history. Though Libya has no known uranium, it has since the 1970s attempted to purchase the materials required for nuclear weapons from China, Pakistan, India, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil. Qadhafi has called upon Arab states to acquire nuclear weapons, despite Libya's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [182] In addition to its efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, Libya has developed a successful chemical weapons program. The chemical weapons production facility at Rabta is believed to be one of the world's largest, capable of producing 1.2 metric tons a day of mustard and nerve gases. Poison gas is believed to be stockpiled near Tripoli and at Sabha, 750 km to the south. Libya reportedly used chemical weapons during its 1986-87 war against Chad. [183]

[181] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., Ibid, p. 54.
[182] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., Ibid, p. 51.
[183] Lesser, Ian O. and Tellis, Ashley J., Ibid, p. 52.

| | | LIBYA | EGYPT | SYRIA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTERNATIONAL & REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS | United Nations (UN) | Member | Member | Member |
| | Conference on Disarmament (CD) | Observer | Member | Member |
| | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | Member | Member | Member |
| NUCLEAR | Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) | State Party | State Party | State Party |
| | Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) | Signatory | Signatory | --------- |
| | Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) | State Party | State Party | State Party |
| | IAEA Safeguards Agreement | Yes (INFCIRC 282) | Yes (INFCIRC 302) | Yes (INFCIRC 407) |
| | Nuclear Safety Convention | --------- | Signatory | Signatory |
| | Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material | State Party | --------- | --------- |
| | African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) | Signatory | Signatory | |
| CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL | Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) | State Party | Signatory | Signatory |
| | BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) | Not Submitted | --------- | --------- |
| | Geneva Protocol | State Party | State Party | State Party |
| WMD DELIVERY SYSTEMS | International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile | Signatory | Signatory | --------- |

Table 3. 21 Treaties and Organizations of Libya, Egypt, Syria (Source: Composed from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles /Libya/, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/, and http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/)

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has deposited its instrument of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[184] with the UN Secretary-General

[184] The 109 States that have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,

on 6 January 2004. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment. Libya's ratification brings the total number of Treaty ratifications to 109. Of the 53 States in the Africa geographical region, 20 have now ratified the Treaty.

Under the terms of the Treaty, Libya hosts a radionuclide station, RN41, at Misratah. This station is part of the 337-facility International Monitoring System (IMS), which is being established to verify compliance with the terms of the Treaty.[185]

On 19 December 2003 Libya has disclosed to the US and UK significant information on its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as on its biological and ballistic missile-related activities: Libya has also pledged to:

- Eliminate all elements of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs;
- Declare all nuclear activities to the IAEA;
- Eliminate ballistic missiles beyond 300 km range, with a payload of 500kg;
- Accept international inspections to ensure Libya's complete adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and sign the Additional Protocol;
- Eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions, and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- Allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify all of these actions.[186]

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Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Venezuela.

[185] Libya ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Available on Site: http://www.fas.org/irp /news / 2004/01/ctbtlibya.html

[186] The President's National Security Strategy to Combat WMD, Available on Site: http://fas.org/nuke/guide /libya/

### 3.3.2 Algeria

While Libya's ballistic missiles and WMD may pose an immediate threat, Algeria may be the greatest potential threat over the long term. Algeria today is the country faced with the most serious prospects of anti-Western instability driven by Islamic fundamentalism. In the short term this instability has caused Algeria, once noted for its assertiveness in international affairs, to turn its attention inward. If Islamic forces rise to clear dominance, however, Algeria has the potential to become a leading source of concern for the security of the Mediterranean region, from the North African and the Southern European perspectives.[187]

The first French nuclear weapons tests were conducted in Algeria between 1960 and 1965. The first test took place on February 13, 1960 at Reggan. A total of 14 nuclear weapons tests, four atmospheric and 10 underground, were conducted at two Algerian locations.

Algeria has no history of chemical warfare or ballistic missile research, but since 1989 it has been involved in nuclear research in collaboration with China. Algeria operates two reactors, one developed in conjunction with the Argentines called "ARR-1," and the other, designated Es SALAM, in conjunction with China. The CIA has estimated that these reactors give Algeria the capability to produce three to five kilograms of plutonium every year.[188] In 1991 the US concerned that Algeria might be developing a nuclear weapons program with the help of the Chinese government. The El Salam nuclear reactor is located near Birine, some 250 kilometers south of Algiers. The 15 MW thermal heavy water moderated reactor uses low enriched uranium fuel, and has a theoretical capacity to produce from three to five kilograms of plutonium a year (approximately equivalent to one nuclear weapon). The facility includes a hot cell that can be used to separate plutonium on a small scale. A large heavy walled building nearby has no announced function, but is believed to have been intended to be a full-scale plutonium plant. A key indicator of the military nature of the nuclear facility was the discovery of a Soviet-made SA-5 surface-to-air missile battery nearby, which signaled an apparent defense against aircraft or missiles.

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[187] Lesser, Ian O., "Security in North Africa, Internal and External Challenges", RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., 1993, p.39

[188] Lesser, Ian O., "Security in North Africa, Internal and External Challenges", Ibid, p.45

Algerians asserted that the reactor was intended to produce only radioactive isotopes for medical research and to generate electric power. However, the secrecy surrounding the program, which had been initiated in 1986, raised suspicions. Algeria was not a signatory to the NPT; having rejected it on the principle that Algeria should not have to renounce a nuclear weapons program when other nations could continue with theirs.

The Algerian government established the Commissariat for New Energy in 1982 to develop nuclear energy, solar energy, and other potential sources of power. Whereas solar power proved to have considerable potential, particularly in desert locations, nuclear power became a casualty of international concerns and allegations that it could be used for military purposes.

Algeria was thought to want nuclear weapons to counter a perceived threat from the radical regime of Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi. It is reported that secret agreements were signed by Algeria with China and Argentina at the beginning of the 1980s to produce weapons grade plutonium. Under a secret 1983 agreement the Chinese government provided the nuclear reactor to Algeria, which along with a related research facility could form the central components of a weapons program. In 1984 Algeria purchased 150 tons of uranium concentrate from Niger. It was reported that Iraq had sent scientists and some uranium to Algeria.

Algeria's efforts to reform one of the most centrally planned economies in the Arab world began after the 1986 collapse of world oil prices plunged the country into a severe recession. In 1989, the government launched a comprehensive program to introduce market mechanisms into the economy. Despite substantial progress toward economic adjustment, in 1992 the reform drive stalled as Algiers became embroiled in political turmoil, and in September 1993, a new government was formed.

Under pressure from the US, Algeria accepted IAEA safeguards in February 1992. The El Salam reactor began operating in late 1993. Algeria joined the NPT in January 1995, and agreed to inspection of the site by the IAEA. The IAEA inspections discovered that three

kilograms of enriched uranium, several liters of heavy water, and several pellets of natural uranium supplied by China had not been declared to the IAEA.[189]

### 3.3.3 Egypt

In firing a number of SS-1 Scud B missiles at Israeli targets in the October 1973 war, Egypt became both the first developing nation to fire ballistic missiles offensively and the first nation to fire the Scud SRBM in anger.

Given the security problems in the Middle East, and the potential hostility of both Libya and Israel and latterly Sudan, Egypt has sought to establish an indigenous missile manufacturing capability since the 1950s. In the early 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser embarked upon a crash missile development program at a facility known as pursued a crash missile production program at "Factory 333". With extensive West German assistance, three missiles were developed: the 375 km-range al Zafar, the 600 km-range al Kahir, and the 1,000 km-range al Raid. Development of the Al Zafir and Al Kahir SRBMs was near completion when the West German government halted the cooperation in 1966. Unable to find replacement foreign assistance, all three programs were subsequently terminated.

| System | Alt Name | Missile Type | Supplier | Range (Km) Max | Payload (kg) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SS-1 SCUD B | | SRBM | Russia | 300 | 985 | In Service |
| PROJECT-T | | SRBM | Domestic N. Korea | 450 | | In Service |
| **VECTOR** | Condor 2 | MRBM | With Egypt & Iraq | 900 | 450 | Terminated |

Table 3. 22 Egyptian Ballistic Missile Capabilities (Source: Available on Site: http://www.cdiss.org/egypt_t.htm)

[189] Algeria Special Weapons, Available on Site: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/algeria/index.html

In place of these indigenous systems, a number of Scud SRBMs and Transporter-Erector-Launcher vehicles (TELs) were purchased from Russia, which is deployed in two specialist regiments of the Egyptian Army. These Scuds allow Egypt to target most of Israel.

| | |
|---|---|
| **Nuclear** | • No evidence of a weapons program, however:<br>• 22MW and 2MW research reactors at Inshas, both under IAEA safeguards.<br>• Has engaged only in basic scientific research since the 1960s.<br>• Acceded to the NPT on 2/26/81; signed the CTBT on 10/14/96. |
| **Chemical** | • Used mustard gas in Yemeni civil war, 1963-1967.<br>• Supplied Syria with chemical weapons (CW) in early 1970s.<br>• Supplied Iraq with CW agents and technology during the 1980s.<br>• Unconfirmed reports of developing nerve agent feed stock plants.<br>• Stockpile of chemical agents (mustard and nerve agents).<br>• Not a signatory of the CWC. |
| **Biological** | • May have a biological weapons program, though not large in scale.<br>• Signed the BTWC on 4/10/72, but has not ratified it. |
| **Ballistic missiles** | • 100+ SS-1 (Scud-B) with 300km range and 985kg payload.<br>• Approximately 90 Project T missiles with 450km range and 985kg payload.<br>• Developing Scud-C variant production capability with DPRK assistance, with 550km range and 500kg payload.<br>• Developing Vector missile with 800km to 1,200km range and 450-1,000kg payloads.<br>• U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources allege that Egyptian-government-owned companies are obtaining and exporting US and Western technology to Pyongyang, for modification, and returned to Egypt as advanced missile components.<br>• Arab British Dynamics, Helwan Machinery and Equipment Company, and Kader Factory Development Industries are companies sanctioned by the US government for exporting dual-use technology to DPRK, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.<br>• Egypt allegedly working covertly with DPRK and China to develop missiles and non-conventional weapons. |
| **Cruise missiles** | • AS-5 Kelt with 400km range and 1,000kg payload.<br>• Harpoon with 120km range and 220kg payload.<br>• AS-1 Kennel with 100km range and 1,000kg payload.<br>• HY-2 Silkworm with 95km range and 513kg payload.<br>• Otomat Mk1 with 80km range and 210kg payload.<br>• FL-1 with 50km range and 513kg payload.<br>• Exocet (AM-39) with 50km range and 165kg payload.<br>• SS-N-2a Styx with 43km range and 513kg payload. |

Table 3. 23 General View of the Egypt's WMD (Source: Available on Site: http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/egypt.htm )

In the 1980s, Egypt unsuccessfully sought to obtain a MRBM system through the Condor 2 project in which Egypt was involved with Argentina and Iraq. In late September 1989, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified to the House Foreign Affairs Middle East

Subcommittee that Egypt had terminated its cooperation with Iraq on the Condor II.[190] Although the Condor II cancellation was a severe set-back to the Egyptian missile program, the collaboration did enhance indigenous capabilities - as did North Korean and other assistance - and provided considerable missile-related technology that undoubtedly has been applied to the Scud improvement program.[191] Had the project produced working MRBMs, the Vector would have given Egypt the ability to target many of the major capitals in the Middle East, including Tripoli, Damascus, Baghdad and Riyadh.

More recently, Egypt has sought help from North Korea, to whom it supplied a small number of Soviet-sourced Scud B in 1981, in developing an indigenous Scud production capability, the Project-T. This is a domestically produced version of the Scud with range increased to 450 km (presumably at the expense of payload), believed to have entered service in 1993. China has signed a protocol with Egypt in June 1990 to help modernize the Sakr missile factory, "enabling it to produce a newer version of Soviet antiaircraft missiles, the surface-to-surface Scud-B and Silkworm and the Egyptian Sakr rockets".[192] The deal will reportedly enable Egypt to produce reverse-engineered Russian SAMs, Silkworm ASCMs and Scud Bs, and is thus a prime candidate for the location of the Project-T production facility.[193]

Egypt has also been busy surveying its uranium ore resources. Cairo would like to develop its own ability to make uranium fuel for nuclear reactors. Egypt's Nuclear Materials Authority has directed uranium exploration to concentrate on four areas in the eastern desert: Gabal Gattar, El Missikat, El Erediya and Um Ara. A new uranium-bearing area, Gabal Kadabora, has been discovered in the central eastern desert and is now under evaluation. In addition, the Nuclear Materials Authority is constructing a pilot scale plant to extract uranium from phosphoric acid. Cairo has reportedly signed contracts with Australia, Canada and Niger to buy mining technology and for help in processing uranium ore. [194]

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[190] Ottaway, David B.,"Egypt drops out of missile project", Washington Post, 20 Sept 89, p.A32
[191] Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., Jane's Intelligence Review - Middle East, Oct 92, p. 452-458
[192] Darwish, Adel,"China to update Egypt's missiles", Independent, 14 June 90, p.2
[193] National Briefings Egypt, Available on Site: http://www.cdiss.org/egypt_b.htm
[194] Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program, Available on Site: http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/nuke .html




Table 3. 24 Uranium Deposits in Egypt (Source: Monterey Institute of International Studies 2003)

### 3.3.4 Israel

In early 1968, the CIA issued a report concluding that Israel had successfully started production of nuclear weapons. This estimate, however, was based on an informal conversation between Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, and Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out.

CIA estimates of the Israeli arsenal's size did not improve with time. In 1974, Duckett estimated that Israel had between ten and twenty nuclear weapons. The upper bound was derived from CIA speculation regarding the number of possible Israeli targets, and not

from any specific intelligence. Because this target list was presumed to be relatively static, this remained the official American estimate until the early 1980s.

| Designation | Stages | Propellant | Range | IOC | Inventory | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lance | 1 | Solid | 130 km | 1975 | | |
| Jericho 1 | 1 | Solid | 500 km | 1970 | ? 50-100 | |
| Jericho 2 | 2 | Solid | 1,500-4,000 km | 1990 | Some | Shavit space launcher |
| Popeye Turbo | 1 | Turbo-jet | 200 - km | 2000 | 12 | Submarine-launched |

Table 3. 25 Israel Ballistic Missile Capabilities (Source: Available on Site: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/missile/index.html)

The actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile is uncertain, and is the subject of various estimates and reports. Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War. It is also reported that, fearing defeat in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs.

Israel could potentially have produced a few dozen nuclear warheads in the period 1970-1980, and might have possessed 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s. In 1986 descriptions and photographs of Israeli nuclear warheads were published in the London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory. The photographs were taken by Mordechai Vanunu, a dismissed Israeli nuclear technician. His information led some experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices at that time.

By the late 1990s the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated that Israel possessed between 75-130 weapons, based on production estimates. The stockpile would certainly include warheads for mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles, as well as bombs for Israeli aircraft, and may include other tactical nuclear weapons of various types. Some published estimates even claimed that Israel might have as many as 400 nuclear weapons by the late 1990s. The Dimona nuclear reactor may have operated an average of between 200 and 300 days annually, and produced approximately 0.9 to 1.0 grams of plutonium for each thermal megawatt day. Israel may use between 4 and 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon. Based

on plausible upper and lower bounds of the operating practices at the reactor, Israel could have thus produced enough plutonium for at least 100 nuclear weapons, but probably not significantly more than 200 weapons.[195]



Figure 3. 4 Jericho-1 (Luz YA-1) SRBM

As of 2000, Israel had not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968). It was, however, a party to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (1963).

It would be wrong, of course, to characterize the entire North African region as uniformly hostile to the West. Instability and proliferation threaten Western-oriented North African countries even more than they threaten European countries. Two countries in particular, Morocco and Tunisia, find themselves caught in the middle. Both run risks because of their economic ties and political dialogue with the West. The last traditional monarchy in the region, Morocco relies on Europe for roughly 65 percent of its trade. Morocco is pursuing cooperative agreements with southern European governments concerning access to markets in exchange for controls on the movement of labor. [196] Tunisia, the most

[195] Nuclear Weapons – Israel, Available on Site: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html
[196] Lesser, Ian O., "Security in North Africa, Internal and External Challenges", Ibid, p.27

westernized and developed country in the region, does about 75 percent of its trade with Europe, and some 500,000 Tunisians work abroad, most in France.[197]

| | |
|---|---|
| **Nuclear** | • Sophisticated nuclear weapons program with an estimated 100-200 weapons, which can be delivered by ballistic missiles or aircraft.<br>• Nuclear arsenal may include thermonuclear weapons.<br>• 150MW heavy water reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility at Dimona, which are not under IAEA safeguards.<br>• IRR-1 5MW research reactor at Soreq, under IAEA safeguards.<br>• Not a signatory of the NPT; signed the CTBT on 9/25/96. |
| **Chemical** | • Active weapons program, but not believed to have deployed chemical warheads on ballistic missiles.<br>• Production capability for mustard and nerve agents.<br>• Signed the CWC on 1/13/93, currently debating its ratification. |
| **Biological** | • Production capability and extensive research reportedly conducted at the Biological Research Institute in Ness Ziona.<br>• No publicly confirmed evidence of production.<br>• Not a signatory of the BTWC. |
| **Ballistic missiles** | • Approximately 50 Jericho-2 missiles with 1,500km range and 1,000kg payload, nuclear warheads may be stored in close proximity.<br>• Approximately 50 Jericho-1 missiles with 500km range and 500kg payload.<br>• MGM-52 Lance missiles with 130km range and 450kg payload..<br>• Shavit space launch vehicle (SLV) with 4,500km range and 150kg to 250kg payload.<br>• Unconfirmed reports of Jericho-3 program under development using Shavit technologies, with a range up to 4,800km and 1000kg payload.<br>• Developing Next (Shavit upgrade) SLV with unknown range and 300-500kg payloads. |
| **Cruise missiles** | • Harpy lethal unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with 500km range and unknown payload.<br>• Delilah/STAR-1 UAV with 400km range and 50kg payload.<br>• Gabriel-4 anti-ship cruise missile with 200km range and 500kg payload.<br>• Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile with 120km range and 220kg payload. |

Table 3. 26 General View of the Israel's WMD (Source: Available on Site: http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm)

Both Morocco and Tunisia are justifiably worried about growing European animosity deriving from cultural prejudice compounded by resentment toward immigrants. Morocco has expressed its concern about European xenophobia toward the nations of the Maghreb, and the mistreatment of Tunisian immigrants in Europe is a recurring theme in the Tunisian press.[198]

[197] Lesser, Ian O., Ibid, p.61
[198] Lesser, Ian O., Ibid, p.64

# 4 TRANSFORMING NATO AND MEDITERRANEAN ROLE

## 4.1 NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE

The Cold War parameters overshadowed the importance of the Mediterranean region for the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout the Cold War the emphasis of NATO's policy was mainly concentrated on the Central and Eastern Europe. During the years of enduring rivalry between the West and the Communist bloc, the Mediterranean remained to be seen as the 'southern flank' of NATO. However the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, which opened the way for a new world order, brought to the scene new forms of threats and risks. The region in Europe's periphery began to gain strategic importance.[199]

The NATO-Mediterranean dialogue commenced when there was still talk among leading Western officials of risks, challenges, and even threats to NATO members from the south. Quite clearly, then, in these circumstances it was not going to be easy to win over the confidence and trust of the Mediterranean countries that entered the dialogue. From the very outset, therefore, there were serious questions concerning just how far the dialogue could develop.

As Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs of NATO addresses "we believe the Alliance may want to begin discussing security issues with key nations and regions outside of Europe. Istanbul, as the site for NATO's next summit – which President Bush looks forward to attending – affords a symbolic opportunity for NATO to reach out to the greater Middle East. We should expand cooperation with our Mediterranean partners. We should think ambitiously about how to engage more seriously with these countries".[200]

NATO officials use the phrase "Mediterranean dialogue partners" when referring to the seven states involved in NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. Evidently, originally, NATO members were reluctant to employ the term "partner" as this may have implied-wrongly-that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue was somehow comparable to the PfP program with states of Central and Eastern Europe. In reality, there is no partnership between the Atlantic Alliance and the Mediterranean dialogue countries or "partners." The seven non-

[199] Ormancı, Emriye Bağdagül, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", Ibid, p.26

[200] Caşın, M. Hakkı, "New Horizons NATO's Collective Security Strategies at The Prague – Kabul – Baghdad Crossroad", NATO's Security and Cooperation Conference, Antalya, 2004, p.29

NATO Mediterranean countries do not regard themselves as partners. Moreover, certainly with reference to the six Arab countries, they do not want to be considered partners. There is still a deep-rooted suspicion of the West and of NATO, in particular, in the Arab world, and Arab governments, thus, do not want to be perceived as working too closely with NATO.

NATO-Mediterranean dialogue has evolved its beginnings in February 1995. In line with the suggestions made at the beginning of this study, the nature of the parties involved in the dialogue, and the type and range of issues discussed, the level at which the dialogue is conducted and the procedures adopted will be analyzed. In the period in question the dialogue has developed in three separate phases. The initial, exploratory phase was between February and November 1995. Officials from NATO's International Staff held preliminary discussions with representatives from five non-NATO Mediterranean countries. In the second phase, between November 1995 and spring 2000, the dialogue was broadened with the addition of a sixth country, Jordan and seventh country Algeria. There was also a deepening of the dialogue concerning the type and range of issues that were discussed. The scope of the dialogue was widened with the introduction of practical programs of cooperation. In the third phase, from spring 1997 to early 1999, there was a further deepening and widening of the dialogue. The dialogue has been elevated to a higher level and given a more visible political profile with discussions largely conducted by the newly established body, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). The procedures have also been altered with the adoption of a "16+ 1" format. The practical programs of cooperation now include limited activities in the military field. It will be observed that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue has continued to be strengthened in spite of serious difficulties in the Middle East peace process.

The nineteen members of NATO do not share identical viewpoints on all issues. NATO is not a monolithic organization. A so-called Club Med grouping of states within NATO-Italy, Portugal, and Spain-has been identified. These states are especially interested in expanding ties with Arab states to their immediate south. The US has played a major role in the Mediterranean since 1945 and its views remain of paramount importance. Canada and the northern European members of NATO appear to be less enthusiastic about the Atlantic Alliance bolstering its ties with the Mediterranean dialogue countries. It will be

seen that France, too, in spite of its traditional interest in the Mediterranean, is not keen on promoting the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. The seven Mediterranean dialogue countries each also have different perspectives on their relations with NATO. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue has only been able to evolve gradually and incrementally. But progress has been made as will be observed. How far the dialogue will continue to develop as a confidence-building process, and to what extent more military-type CBMs will be introduced and implemented within the practical programs of cooperation linked with the dialogue, remain open questions.[201]

### 4.1.1 Membership Of The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue

The Mediterranean dialogue was announced on 8 February 1995 to include Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. As of early 1999 six Mediterranean dialogue countries -Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and plus Algeria in 2000- were engaged in discussions and participating in practical programs of cooperation with NATO. This looks like a motley grouping of states. In strictly geographic terms, Jordan and Mauritania are not Mediterranean countries. Perhaps what is most striking is the inclusion of Israel in the same grouping with six Arab countries. There is a mixture of states from the western and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. There is also a definite Middle East component. The seven Mediterranean dialogue countries differ in the nature of their political systems and in the condition of their economies. As well as certain tensions between the Arab countries and Israel, there have also been problems in relations between Mauritania and Morocco. [202]

On closer inspection, though, there are certain criteria that each of these states satisfies. Each was invited to join the dialogue after a consensus had been agreed on among NATO members. Each Mediterranean dialogue country accepted the invitation. Clearly, before invitations were formally extended, NATO officials had sounded out the state in question and had ensured that their invitation would not be rejected. It appears that Jordan was especially eager to be invited. In part, at least, this was probably because of its exclusion from the first wave of states invited to join the dialogue. Each of the six states has a reasonably stable government, unlike, for example, Algeria. The leadership of each of the

[201] Winrow, Gareth M., "Dialogue With The Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.167-168
[202] Larrabee F. Stephen, "NATO' s Mediterranean Initiative 'Policy Issues and Dilemnas", Ibid, p.46

seven states has some claim to legitimacy. Mauritania was also included because of its geostrategic importance for Portugal and Spain. Each of the seven states is, in general, pro-Western. The Mediterranean "rogue" states of Libya and Syria, and Syria's client state Lebanon, have not been invited to participate in the dialogue. They would probably have refused the offer. Each of the seven states has normalized their relations with each other, including with Israel. However, with problems in the Middle East peace process following the formation of a Likud-led coalition government in 1996, some Arab states decided to freeze their relations with Israel in protest.




Figure 4. 1 Map of the Mediterranean

Initially, it seemed that only three Mediterranean states would be invited to participate in a NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. These states were Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Apparently, as the US gradually warmed to the idea of the dialogue, the Clinton administration strongly advocated that Israel also be invited. One may assume that the US insisted that the inclusion of Israel only proceed on the condition that there be no interference in the ongoing Middle East peace process. Concerned about the security of Madeira and the Canary Islands, Portugal and Spain promoted the cause of Mauritania. The unsubstantiated reports that Iraq might have deployed or attempted to deploy SCUD missiles in Mauritania in 1991 at the time of the Gulf Crisis might have made Portugal and

Spain more eager to lobby for Mauritania. Once a member of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, the Mauritanian government would less likely be tempted by Iraqi offers of military weaponry. The governments in Lisbon and Madrid have fostered close relations with the administration in Nouakchott. The democratization process that commenced in Mauritania in 1992 would have encouraged officials in Spain and Portugal. As a consequence, by February 1995, what had originally been envisioned as the three had become the five when NATO's Mediterranean Initiative was formally announced.[203]

At the very beginning of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, it was declared that other states could later join the dialogue:

> This is a progressive initiative and an extension of the dialogue to other Mediterranean countries, which are willing and able to contribute to the peace and security of the region, will be envisaged after the initial round of dialogue.[204]

The NAC Ministerial Meeting at Noordwijk at the end of May 1995 noted that it hoped that further discussions would lead to the establishment of a fruitful dialogue "with these and other Mediterranean countries."[205]

In November 1995 Jordan joined the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. Jordanian officials may have argued that their country deserved to be invited because of its contribution to peace and security in the region, having earlier concluded a peace treaty with Israel. In January 1996 Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, the highest ranking Arab leader to do so, visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Given its close interest in NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, it seems surprising that Jordan was not invited to join the dialogue in February 1995. Perhaps certain NATO members had held a lingering suspicion of Jordan, remembering that King Hussein had publicly supported Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf crisis.

No other Mediterranean countries have been added to the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. Algeria appears to have become a particularly controversial case. Algeria is included in other dialogues and initiatives concerning the Mediterranean and so it may seem that the

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[203] Winrow, Gareth M., "Dialogue With The Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.169-170

[204] Press Release (95), 12-February 8, 1995, Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATO' s Mediterranean Initiative

[205] Press Communiqué M-NAC-l (95) 48, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Noordwijk Aan Zee, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995, paragraph 11

exclusion of Algeria from NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is somewhat odd. Spain, with the backing of Italy and Portugal, had pressed for NATO to invite to talks all states involved in the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue; this would have included Algeria. It seems, however, that French officials were opposed to the admission of Algeria on the grounds that this would only complicate an already complex situation in Algeria. Also, it has been argued that the French authorities were not keen for NATO to assume an active involvement in Algeria, a country that had close political, economic, and military ties with France.[206] NATO allies were certainly divided over how to tackle the Algerian problem. The French were willing to maintain close ties with the military rulers while the US was more in favor of entering into discussions with moderate Islamists active in Algeria. By early 1995, with the worsening domestic situation in Algeria it is understandable that NATO officials would not have wanted to take Algeria on board at the start of their Mediterranean Initiative. The Atlantic Alliance would not have wished to be perceived as giving support to the military-backed regime in Algiers. However, not only the Algerian authorities, but also some elements in the local media felt victimized by NATO's position. For example, it was reported that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue was directed against Algeria and against "Islamization" in general. Then in March 2000, the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic became the seventh participant in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.[207]

Without a change in leadership and a dramatic turn about in their foreign policies, it is exceedingly unlikely that Lebanon, Libya, or Syria would be invited to participate in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. As part of their interest in strengthening connections between Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf, Jordanian officials have expressed a tentative desire to include Gulf States in the dialogue.[208] For many in NATO this would probably be perceived as stretching the definition of the Mediterranean too far. Most probably, NATO members would want to keep the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue separate from the turbulent Gulf area. Key NATO countries already have their own bilateral security agreements with various Gulf States.

A further broadening of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue in terms of the admission of

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[206] Pierre, Andrew J. and Quandt, William B., "The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West", The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1996, p.45
[207] Boumendif M. A., Tribune, February 12, 1995
[208] Talal, EI Hassan bin, the Mediterranean Charter Convention, Madrid, January 10, 1997

new Mediterranean dialogue countries is thus very unlikely for the foreseeable future. Bearing in mind the potential problems the broad-based CSCM may have encountered because of the diverse nature of its many anticipated members, and given the difficulties the Barcelona Process is experiencing between the EU and its twelve Mediterranean partners, it is perhaps sensible for NATO officials to restrict the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue to a relatively small but more manageable number of states.[209]

### 4.1.2 The First Phase

It seems that officials in Italy and Spain were disappointed with the initial low-key nature of the dialogue. The Spanish authorities had pressed for the immediate inclusion of what would have been sensitive military issues. They were in favor of inviting to NATO headquarters military officers from the Mediterranean dialogue countries. Joint military exercises with the dialogue countries were also envisioned. Italian officials had argued that the dialogue should not only be conducted with governmental representatives from the Mediterranean dialogue countries. From the outset, for example, they had wanted to hold talks in workshops and seminars with journalists and academics. Originally, both Italy and Spain were in favor of the involvement of NATO's International Staff in the planning of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, and the participation of the more high level Political Committee of NATO in the actual discussions. An arrangement along these lines would only eventually emerge in the third phase of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue.

The official announcement of the start of the dialogue in February 1995 had stated that this was a "direct dialogue" whose aims were "to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole, to achieve a better mutual understanding and to correct any misunderstandings of the Alliance's purposes that could lead to a perception of threat."[210] The speeches of leading Western officials, including one by NATO Secretary-General Claes, had contributed to the confusion by spreading the notion that the north was fearful of an imminent threat of some sort from the south. In turn, this had led many in the south to conclude that the north was using such arguments as a pretext to threaten to intervene in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Quite clearly, there was much need for mutual confidence building. Contrary to the wishes, if not expectations, of officials from Italy and

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[209] Winrow, Gareth M., "Dialogue With The Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.171-172

[210] Press Release (95), 12-February 8, 1995, Ibid

Spain, the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue would be conducted at a relatively low level. Talks were to be held at NATO Headquarters on a bilateral basis between officials from the Political Affairs Division of NATO's International Staff and representatives from the embassies in Brussels of the Mediterranean dialogue countries. However, NATO's International Staff would work on instructions from the NAC and NATO's Political Committee. In effect, five separate dialogues would commence between the International Staff and each of the Mediterranean dialogue countries. At this initial phase, there was no intention of multilateralizing the talks by encouraging the five Mediterranean countries to hold talks with NATO officials in a single group. Differences and divisions between the five Mediterranean dialogue countries, and especially between the Arab states and Israel precluded such an option. As the head of NATO Multinational and Regional Affairs in the Political Affairs Division at the time noted, any real multilateralization of the dialogue would make it much more vulnerable to political developments in the region.[211]

From the very beginning of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, however, there was speculative talk about what the dialogue might eventually lead to. Perhaps the most exaggerated of these speeches was the one made by Joseph Kruzel, then US deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO Affairs, at Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) headquarters in Naples on February 27,1995. In a declaration that was clearly not representative of the US official line, while referring to threats from the south, Kruzel spoke of the possibility of deepening cooperation with the dialogue countries. He referred to future regular visits of defense ministers and the involvement of military officers in seminars and exercises. In turn, Kruzel remarked, PfP-type arrangements for the Mediterranean could emerge. Even the possibility of eventual membership of NATO was mentioned.[212] Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty would have to be amended before any Mediterranean dialogue country could join the Atlantic Alliance. According to the article, "other European" states could be invited to accede to the treaty.

Interestingly, Kruzel had not imagined that a threat to NATO could stem from Mediterranean dialogue countries themselves. Presumably he had in mind rogue states

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[211] Nordam, Jette, "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence", NATO Review 45, 4, July-August 1997, p.27

[212] Rato, Rodrigo de, NAA, Political Committee, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report, AM 106 PC/SR (95) 1, May 1995, p.7

such as Libya when referring to threats from the south. Apparently, Qadhafi reacted vehemently to the announcement of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. Reportedly, he called for the launching of a jihad should NATO attempt to expand its influence in Africa. The Libyan authorities warned ambassadors from Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia that as a result of the launching of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, there was a danger of increased interference in the internal affairs of Arab states.[213]

The dialogue commenced with a number of courtesy calls on NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes. Starting on February 24, Claes began to receive individually the ambassadors of the Mediterranean dialogue countries based in Brussels.[214] The dialogue would become truly operational on May 15, when NATO's International Staff held their first meeting with one of the dialogue countries, in this case Mauritania. Why the three months delay? Technical reasons have been suggested. Or was it that the Mediterranean dialogue countries were hesitant to begin the dialogue because of the earlier remarks of Claes with regard to the radical Islamic threat? In the spring and summer of 1995 two rounds of bilateral talks were concluded between NATO's International Staff and four of the five dialogue countries. Morocco had refused to participate, in protest of the comments made by Claes. The first meetings between officials from NATO and Morocco would only take place after November 8, 1995, when the second phase of the dialogue had commenced.[215]

These first rounds of talks were simply exploratory in nature. NATO officials explained the nature and purpose of the Atlantic Alliance and sounded out the concerns of the Mediterranean dialogue countries. Taking into account how the dialogue countries responded, the NAC would then decide whether to proceed further with the dialogue. Nevertheless, it seems that there were attempts even at this initial phase to include issues of military significance in the discussions. For example, the NAC meeting in Noordwijk in May 1995 stated that NATO should inform the Mediterranean dialogue countries of the Atlantic Alliance's "new missions of peacekeeping under the authority of the UN or the responsibility of the OSCE."[216] Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco would later participate with NATO units in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia as part of IFOR and SFOR. Although this

[213] Turkish Daily News, February 27, 1995; February 21, 1995
[214] Rato, Rodrigo de, NAA, Political Committee, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report, Ibid, p.6
[215] Rato, Rodrigo de, NAA, Civilian Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, Draft Interim Report-Cooperation for Security in the Mediterranean, AM 83 CC/MB (96) 1, May 1996, p.2
[216] Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (95) 48, Ibid, paragraph 11

participation was not directly related to developments in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, nonetheless it could have future beneficial consequences for the possible strengthening of the dialogue.

In mid-1995, NATO's director for nuclear planning argued that the Atlantic Alliance should inform the Mediterranean dialogue countries about NATO's Policy Framework on the Proliferation of WMD.[217] The NAC, however, has not given the MCG a mandate to discuss the proliferation issue with dialogue countries. NATO officials may only give briefings on this topic. They may not enter into a debate. Clearly, the proliferation issue is a highly sensitive one, and NATO officials do not want the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue to suffer the same fate as Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security when a clash of opinions between Egypt and Israel on this topic led to the collapse of talks. It has also been suggested that the Arab countries in the dialogue might feel particularly aggrieved if, in the context of possible discussions with

NATO on the proliferation issue, they believe that the Atlantic Alliance is attempting to divest them of particular weaponry. The military balance in the Mediterranean region already weighs heavily in favor of states to the north.[218]

In practice, therefore, sensitive military issues were not discussed in the initial phase of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. NATO officials were aware that much work needed to be done to build confidence and trust with the Mediterranean dialogue countries. In mid-October 1995, speaking at a seminar organized by the RAND Corporation, the deputy secretary-general of NATO, Sergio Balanzino, proclaimed that the initiative "still has some way to go" before the participants reach a degree of understanding satisfactory to him.

In spite of some difficulties, enough progress had been made for the NAC to decide on November 8, 1995, to pursue the dialogue further by entering into what amounted to a new, second phase. The scope of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative would be widened. The Mediterranean dialogue countries would be provided an opportunity to participate in certain cooperative activities with NATO members. The membership of the dialogue was broadened. Jordan and Algeria were invited to enter the talks. These decisions, for some reason, were only made public in a communiqué released by the NAC on December 5,

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[217] Schulte, Gregory L., "Responding to Proliferation-NATO's Role"; NATO Review 43,4, July 1995, p.17
[218] Moya, Pedro, NAA, Civilian Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, Report-Frameworks for Cooperation in the Mediterranean, AM 259 CC/MB (95) 7, October 1995, p.13

1995.[219]

### 4.1.3 The Second Phase

Interestingly, the communiqué of the NAC meeting in Brussels in December 1995 implied that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue was still not fully established, as it stipulated that the NAC was exploring "the possibilities for a permanent dialogue with countries in the region."[220] However, by the end of the second phase of the dialogue in spring 1997 the talks between NATO officials and the Mediterranean-dialogue countries were clearly based on a much more established footing.

Discussions continued to proceed on the basis-in theory at least-of two rounds of talks each year between NATO's International Staff and each of the Mediterranean dialogue countries. In this phase further sessions could be requested by any of the dialogue countries. But attendance at these sessions was not guaranteed. Apparently, for example, in 1996 some of the Mediterranean dialogue countries participated in only one session. One country did not hold any discussions with NATO's International Staff in 1996. Nonattendance may have been in reaction to problems in the Middle East peace process, or, quite simply, it may have been due to a lack of interest or understanding of the dialogue on the part of the dialogue countries concerned. Talks were no longer merely exploratory. Topics discussed included political, social, and economic developments in the Mediterranean and the prospects for regional cooperation. More sensitive issues, particularly those related to military security matters were carefully avoided-for the same reasons that prevented an open discussion of the proliferation question. Thus, limits were placed on the type and range of issues that could be talked about.

A novel feature of this second phase of the dialogue was the introduction of an element of multilateralization. For instance, in June and December 1996 the six Mediterranean dialogue countries were invited to attend as a group briefings related to the recently concluded meetings of the NAC. Again, evidently, there were some absentees on each of these occasions. But all six-dialogue countries attended a civil-emergency planning briefing organized by NATO officials in September 1996. An unofficial Non-Paper on the

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[219] Moya, Pedro, NAA, Civilian Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, Report-Frameworks for Cooperation in the Mediterranean, AM 83 CC/MB (96) 7, May 1996, p.5

[220] Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (95) 118-Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, December 5,1995, paragraph 12

NATO-Mediterranean dialogue produced by NATO at the end of 1996 recommended that further multilateral briefings be held on a regular basis after NAC meetings and other major events. It is important to note that only "briefings" were referred to here. There was no intention of holding discussions and debates with the six Mediterranean dialogue countries as a group. Israel and the Arab states in question did not want to be seen as a definite grouping. Discussions within the dialogue remained strictly bilateral. Both NATO officials and representatives of the dialogue countries favored continuing this arrangement.

More important, in this second phase the scope of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue was widened through NATO offering the dialogue countries various cooperative activities. Contacts would no longer be solely with diplomatic officials. These cooperative activities covered the fields of information and science. With regard to information, NATO tentatively began to establish contacts with so-called opinion leaders from the dialogue countries in order to explain the aims and objectives of the Atlantic Alliance. It appears that NATO officials were considering initiating and developing links with certain groups such as academics, parliamentarians, journalists, and religious leaders. In October and November 1996 two conferences were held in Rome devoted to security issues in the Mediterranean to which academics from the dialogue countries were invited. In November 1996 certain "opinion leaders" from these countries were received at NATO Headquarters. It appears, though, that it was eventually decided not to invite representatives from the media. Hosting journalists from the Mediterranean dialogue countries would entail certain risks. Which reporters from which newspapers should be invited? And there would be no guarantee that these journalists would write favorable reviews on NATO for their domestic audiences.

In the field of science, NATO officials were able to exploit the work of the Science Committee and the Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society (CCMS). These are products of NATO's so-called Third Dimension. The Third Dimension was developed in the late 1950s with the purpose of demonstrating that NATO was not simply a political and military organization. In November 1995 the Mediterranean dialogue countries were requested to nominate certain "contact points" to receive and disseminate information relating to NATO's scientific activities. In the same month, NATO decided that the dialogue countries could send their scientists on a self-funded basis to attend scientific meetings organized by the Science Committee. In December 1996 it was agreed that the

dialogue countries could work together with the CCMS on certain pilot studies. However, in early 1997 NATO officials were expressing their disappointment at the lack of interest shown by the dialogue countries in NATO's scientific work. It seems that in 1996 the dialogue countries produced no concrete proposals concerning possible joint scientific work with NATO. This lack of interest was all the more surprising as apparently considerable sums of money were potentially available for cooperative work in certain fields. In contrast, in this period there was a serious shortage of money to fund cooperative activities in the information sphere. The program of activities in information was basically self-funding. Mediterranean dialogue countries complained of the expenses involved in participating in such activities.

The unofficial Non-Paper recommended the expansion of cooperative activities in the fields of information and science. Moreover, significantly, the Non-Paper also proposed the introduction of cooperative activities in the military sphere. The first briefing on civil-emergency planning had been an initial step toward developing civil-military cooperation. The Non-Paper suggested that courses on civil-military cooperation should be offered to representatives from the Mediterranean dialogue countries. More ambitiously, the Non-Paper proposed that other cooperative activities in the military domain should be considered. Courses and sessions on peacekeeping, arms control, and verification could be organized. A workshop on data management in support of arms control was recommended with the proviso that this should not duplicate ongoing work in the Barcelona Process or interfere with current activities related to the Middle East peace process. Briefings on crisis management were also to be considered.

There was now a real prospect of military officers from the Mediterranean dialogue countries attending various courses at the NATO school at Oberammegau or at the NATO Defense College in Rome. In 1996 the Defense College's commandant for curriculum planning visited defense colleges in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Tunisia to explore areas of possible cooperation.

In November 1996 NATO's Council in Permanent Session conducted a brainstorming session to examine how the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue could be further pursued. The following month the NAC declared that the dialogue would be enhanced in a "progressive way." The NAC tasked the Council in Permanent Session to report at the next NAC

meeting on the implementation of activities foreseen in an earlier report prepared by the same Council.[221] As a result, the decisions taken at the Sintra meeting of the NAC in spring 1997 heralded the commencement of a third phase of the dialogue.

By the end of 1996 the dialogue was well established. However, there were still a number of problems. For example, the representatives of certain Arab countries complained that Israeli military officials were allowed to participate in the dialogue. Arab officials also protested that NATO was not informing them of the content of the dialogue between the International Staff and Israel. There was a call for more "transparency" in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. Quite clearly, more work still needed to be done to build further confidence and trust.[222]

### 4.1.4 The Third Phase

The scope of the dialogue had widened, though, to include more cooperative activities, particularly in the military field. Also, significantly, the dialogue was elevated to a higher level with the formation of the MCG. As a consequence, there were alterations in the procedures involved in the conduct of the dialogue.

In May 1997, at Sintra, the NAC declared: "We want to further enhance this dialogue and improve its overall political visibility as an effort of confidence-building and cooperation that contributes to stability." The ministers recommended that the upcoming meeting of heads of state and government in Madrid in July 1997 should establish under the authority of the NAC a new committee that would have overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue.[223] This was the first occasion an official NATO text referred to the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue in terms of "confidence-building." The Madrid Declaration of the NATO heads of state and government would again mention confidence building. In line with the recommendations made at Sintra, the Madrid meeting agreed to form the MCG with a mandate to manage the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue.[224]

The MCG replaced the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. The Expert Working Group on the Middle East and the Maghreb continued to the function. The chairperson of NATO's

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[221] Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, December 10,1996, paragraph 12
[222] Winrow, Gareth M., "Dialogue With The Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.175-178
[223] Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Sintra, Portugal, paragraph 6
[224] Press Communiqué M-1 (97) 81-July 8,1997-"Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation", July 8,1997, paragraph 13

Political Committee could also chair meetings of the MCG. The MCG would normally meet at the level of political advisers from each of the sixteen national delegations at NATO headquarters. There was also the possibility of holding "reinforced" meetings with representatives from the capitals of the NATO member states. Clearly, the MCG was a much more politically influential body than its predecessor, the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. The MCG could meet as a group of sixteen. It would also gather to meet separately once every twelve months with representatives of the Mediterranean dialogue countries in a "16+ 1" format. If necessary, additional ad hoc "16+1" meetings could also be convened.[225] The International Staff of NATO could also continue to meet officials from the six dialogue countries on an individual basis, although now on a once-a-year basis. The first "16+1" meetings were held on November 20-21, 1997.

According to the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) Rapporteur, Pedro Moya, the establishment of the MCG raised the level of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue from one at an administrative level to one that had a much more visible political profile: "This is, therefore, a significant qualitative development in Mediterranean partnership." With the formation of the MCG, according to Moya, Mediterranean issues would become a permanent item on the agenda of the Political Committee. Moya believed that this should enable a real Mediterranean policy to emerge progressively. Unlike the previous Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean, the MCG could make recommendations to the Political Committee and by extension to the NAC. In the words of Moya, dialogue countries were no longer restricted to contacts with NATO officials whose room for maneuver were limited, but were in direct touch with representatives from the national delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.[226]

In practice, in spite of the creation of the MCG, NATO officials and representatives of the Mediterranean dialogue countries continued to discuss more or less the same issues that had been previously raised in the second phase of the dialogue with the International Staff of NATO. For example, there was still no mandate to talk in detail about the proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean. Only briefings could be given on this issue. It seems that both NATO officials and the dialogue countries were not prepared to deepen the dialogue

[225] Nordam, Jette, "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence", Ibid, p.28

[226] Moya, Pedro , NAA, Mediterranean Special Group, Draft General Report-NATO's Role in the Mediterranean, AP 245 GSM (97) 9, August 1997, p.8-12

by tackling issues that were perceived to be more politically sensitive. More emphasis and importance was thus placed on the cooperative activities between NATO and dialogue countries.

By the end of 1997 the first of what seems to have become an annual Work Program of Cooperation had been prepared by the Atlantic Alliance. The program referred to cooperation in the fields of science, information, and civil-emergency planning. Significantly, limited cooperation in the military sphere was also now included. In the science field, a new feature was that experts from the dialogue countries could be invited as key speakers to participate in NATO-sponsored advanced research workshops or could be invited to attend lectures in NATO-sponsored advanced study institutes. Courses on civil-emergency planning and civil-military cooperation would include medical evacuation workshops and civil protection seminars. Another new feature was the linkage between these cooperative activities and the PfP program with Central and Eastern European states. For instance, in 1998 the six Mediterranean dialogue countries were invited to participate in a number of PfP activities concerning civil-emergency planning, although this would be on a self-funding basis.

In the information field, for the first time in October 1997 a group of high-level parliamentarians from the dialogue countries visited NATO Headquarters. NATO Secretary-General Solana referred to the meeting as an important contribution to confidence building. In November 1997 NATO helped sponsor two academic conferences in Rome that analyzed Mediterranean security issues. One of these was organized with the support of the RAND Corporation and focused specifically on the progress and prospects for the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue. In December 1997 another international seminar on security issues in the Mediterranean was convened in Ebenhausen, Germany, with NATO support. In 1998 NATO officials gave briefings in Brussels to academics and journalists, and also to parliamentarians from the foreign affairs and defense committees of the Mediterranean dialogue countries. NATO also awarded its first Institutional Scholarships to scholars from the dialogue countries. Also, in May 1998 NATO officials agreed to establish contact points in the embassy of a NATO member state in each of the capitals of the Mediterranean dialogue countries. These contact points would be a source of

information on NATO activities for the general public in the dialogue countries.[227]

A tentative start was made for cooperating in military activities. Potentially, there was much expertise that NATO could offer the Mediterranean dialogue countries. The Atlantic Alliance could also draw on the experience and make use of some of the resources available for the PfP programs. Between September and December 1997 courses on peacekeeping, military forces and environmental problems, European security cooperation and also on civil-emergency planning and civil-military cooperation were opened to Mediterranean dialogue countries at the NATO School at Oberammergau. In the same period the NATO Military Committee organized a number of conferences, seminars, symposia, and visits. Military officers from the dialogue countries could learn, for example, about the PfP work programs, maritime peace-support operations, air operations and humanitarian aid, maritime safety, mine warfare, and maritime counter-terrorism. Further courses were held at Oberammergau in 1998 covering such issues as arms control and European security. In April 1998 the first course for military officers from the dialogue countries was opened at the NATO Defense School in Rome. Perhaps surprisingly, however, Morocco did not send officers. Only an observer from the Moroccan embassy in Rome participated. The aim of the course was for each participant to develop a mutual understanding of the 'others' security concerns. A major drawback, however, was that most of these courses and activities were meant to operate on a self-funding basis. It seems, though, that in certain cases money could be provided to assist the Mediterranean dialogue countries.[228]

Concerned not to stir up public opinion at home, it appears that the governments of the Mediterranean dialogue countries were slow to cooperate more extensively with NATO in the military field. Eventually, however, in 1998, military officers from the dialogue countries agreed to observe PfP activities in the fields of search and rescue, maritime safety and medical evacuation, and exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief. Port visits to the dialogue countries by Standby Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) were also planned.[229] Joint participation in military exercises,

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[227] Bin, Alberto, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: NATO's Contribution", NATO Review 46,4, winter 1998 p.25-26

[228] NATO Press Release (98) 44-April20, 1998-"First Course for Mediterranean Partners at the NATO Defence College"

[229] Bin, Alberto, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: NATO's Contribution", Ibid, p.26-27

though, is unlikely for the foreseeable future. This is in spite of the involvement of units from Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. In these operations the armed forces of the three Arab countries were adopting NATO operational procedures and familiarizing themselves with rules of engagement and the practice of command and control. Close personal links were being established with NATO officers. It should also be remembered that the armed forces of the Mediterranean dialogue countries have already been involved in bilateral and multilateral programs of military cooperation with various NATO member states. It appears that cooperating in the military field with one or several NATO member states is far less problematic politically for Arab governments than coordinating activities with NATO as an organization. The suspicion remains among Arabs generally that NATO is seeking to interfere in their internal affairs. NATO officials, therefore, will have to proceed especially carefully when attempting to explain to dialogue countries the role of NATO in crisis management. Arab officials and Arab publics alike suspect that NATO intends to "manage" future crises in their part of the world as a pretext for the Atlantic Alliance's possible expansionist aims.

For information and science activities, and for joint work associated with civil-emergency planning, up to three times more funding was made available for 1998 in comparison to 1997. But this was still an insignificant amount compared to the expenditure for the PfP programs. The Mediterranean dialogue countries were fully aware of this situation and the Arab states have complained that this was evidence that NATO was not taking the Mediterranean Initiative seriously enough.

As the dialogue has progressed it appears that each Mediterranean dialogue country has certain particular issues they wish to discuss with NATO officials. The Atlantic Alliance is engaged in six different dialogues in the "16+1" format. Each dialogue country has also chosen to participate or not in various cooperative activities. One may presume that a shortage of funds has prevented certain states from participating in particular activities. It would seem, for example, that Israel has the resources and expertise to join more cooperative activities than Mauritania. One may also safely assume that the nature of discussions between Israeli representatives and NATO officials differs in substance and content from talks between the MCG and Mauritania. Speaking in Rome in November 1997, Secretary-General Solana emphasized that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue was "a dialogue of variable geometry." Mediterranean countries would be able to structure the

dialogue according to their particular needs. It is not clear, though, how far NATO officials are prepared to allow each of the seven separate dialogues to diverge. NATO officials have also argued that the Mediterranean Initiative is based on the principle of nondiscrimination, and that "what is offered to one dialogue partner is offered to all the others in the dialogue." As the separate dialogues presumably continue to further diverge, it will become increasingly difficult if not impossible to offer the same to all dialogue countries. And in that event, accusations of discrimination in favor of one dialogue country over another are more likely to ensue.

There is certainly a need to build more confidence between NATO and the Arab members of the Mediterranean dialogue. More information and transparency is required. The so-called El Mundo incident is a striking case in point. The meeting of the NAC in Defense Ministers session in Brussels on December 2, 1997, addressed the issue of the new command structures for NATO in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Three days later an article appeared in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo. The report referred to the role of Spanish armed forces in possible future military operations in the Maghreb "in support of peace." The article stated that NATO could deploy an army corps of between twenty and fifty thousand troops in North Africa. The publication of this report triggered a wave of protests in the Maghreb stirred up by Qadhafi' s accusations that a NATO attack on North Africa was imminent. Spanish and other NATO officials immediately sought to stabilize the situation by explaining that the newspaper report had misinterpreted the results of the NAC meeting. However, several weeks after the incident Arab officials were still raising the issue and speculating about what contingency plans NATO actually possessed concerning a possible armed intervention in North Africa. [230]

## 4.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OTHER MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUES AND NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE

NATO officials have often emphasized the need for their Mediterranean Initiative to "complement" but not "duplicate" other ongoing Mediterranean dialogues, and they argue that this objective is being accomplished.[231] Duplication would be pointless and would lead to a considerable waste of resources, time, and energy. Complementing other initiatives

[230] Nordam, Jette, "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence", Ibid, p.27
[231] Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (95) 118-Ibid

sounds much more reasonable, but begs the question as to how NATO might complement the activities of other institutions and forums.

Officials at NATO have noted that the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue "complements" the efforts of the EU' s Barcelona Process, the OSCE, and WEU "without creating any division of labor."[232] Although there was some "overlap" of the different Mediterranean initiatives, a "comprehensive strategy" for the Mediterranean clearly required that all institutions share responsibility in a "complementary way." Overlap, therefore, was unavoidable and inevitable. In practice, this would entail a measure of duplication. Presumably, it was believed that this would not create difficulties, as each dialogue would remain separate and distinct. A rigid division of labor would have avoided overlap. However, one may assume that NATO officials were opposed to such a division of labor because it would set limits on their freedom of maneuver. NATO policy-makers would not have warmed to the idea of being instructed by an outside party as to what areas NATO's Mediterranean Initiative mayor may not apply.

Bearing in mind their close links, the coordination of activities of NATO and the NAA was the least problematic. The NAA has continued with its own Mediterranean dialogue, which was launched at a seminar in Paris in March 1995. At the second NAA Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar, held in Lisbon in December 1996, delegates from Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, and Tunisia participated. A third Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar, organized in Istanbul in November 1997, and a fourth in Cairo in December 1998 were also well attended. Because of the increasing importance of the Mediterranean, in May 1996 the NAA replaced its Sub-Committee of the Mediterranean Basin with a new Mediterranean Special Group (MSG). The purpose of the MSG was to improve coordination of the NAA's activities in the Mediterranean. The MSG was composed of representatives from the NAA's Civilian Affairs, Political, and Defense and Security Committees.

The NAA has been attempting to coordinate its activities with NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. The MSG held a brainstorming session immediately before the NAA's Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar in Lisbon. In the seminar it was agreed that the priority

[232] Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, December 10,1996, Ibid.

should be to oversee and accompany NATO's efforts to redefine its role in the Mediterranean. The MSG decided to produce a document that, would explain to the Mediterranean dialogue countries of the NAA the roles and functions of NATO.[233] Earlier in 1996, NAA circles had suggested that the Mediterranean dialogues of the NAA and NATO could be more closely clinked by offering permanent observer status in the NAA to those NATO Mediterranean dialogue (NMD) countries that did not have such status. Jordan, Mauritania, and Tunisia were the countries concerned. According to criteria previously agreed to by NAA officials, one may presume that a case could be argued that each of these states were "emerging as democracies." However, apparently, Tunisia in particular expressed little interest.[234]

NATO officials clearly believe that there is room for closer cooperation with other institutions and forums concerning the Mediterranean. The importance of complementing other initiatives in the area is continually referred to in NATO texts. But, NATO officials have no formal mandate to coordinate their activities involving the Mediterranean with other organizations or bodies. They are aware that NATO's Mediterranean Initiative may only operate within certain bounds. Secretary-General Solana has admitted that the EU is the key player in the Mediterranean given that most of the security challenges in the area stem from deteriorating social and economic conditions. The EU's Barcelona Process is the central multilateral initiative involving the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the actual and potential role of NATO in the Mediterranean, and the possibilities for NATO to complement effectively the activities of other institutions and forums, should not be downplayed.

### 4.2.1 The WEU Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO's Mediterranean Initiative

In May 1998 Jordan became a party to the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue. Apparently, Greece, in particular, had lobbied for Jordan's inclusion. The presidency and secretariat of WEU continues to meet regularly with the ambassadors in Brussels of the non-WEU Mediterranean countries. This dialogue is still basically limited to the seven principles previously agreed on, which focus exclusively on military/defense aspects of security. In

[233] NAA, Mediterranean Special Group, Chairman's Conclusions and 1997 Work Program, 4 December 1996, Lisbon, Portugal, AN 319 GSM (96) 1, December 1996, p.1-3
[234] Moya, Pedro, NAA, Standing Committee, Restructuring NAA Mediterranean Activities, AN 33 SC (96) 9, March 1996, p.3

these discussions WEU officials also talk of the significance for the Mediterranean of WEU's so-called Petersberg tasks-humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping missions, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. The ambassadors are also briefed on the latest WEU Ministerial Meeting.

However, the dialogue with experts of the non-WEU Mediterranean countries that was launched by the WEU Mediterranean Group in fall 1994 had come to a halt after a final meeting in October 1995. Thus, Israeli experts had only participated in one of these gatherings. Meetings were terminated because little had been achieved. Issues discussed in meetings with experts had already previously been handled in the ambassadors' dialogue. The WEU Mediterranean Group continues to function.

The WEU's Institute for Security Studies based in Paris has been more successful. The Institute organizes an annual Mediterranean seminar that is attended by representatives from the non- WEU Mediterranean countries. The seminar held in June 1997 was titled "National and International Approaches to Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Countries." Officials and military officers from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia participated. At the seminar the North Africans approved of Anglo-French and EU/WEU proposals for assisting the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its peacekeeping missions. The representatives from North Africa, though, stressed that the UN should remain the most important body, and they also underlined the need for noninterference in the internal affairs or the work of regional bodies.[235]

The WEU Assembly -a body of deputies from WEU member countries that makes recommendations and supervises the work of the WEU Ministerial Council- has failed to build ties with parliamentarians from the Mediterranean. It is an associate participant to the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which organized inter-parliamentary conferences on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean at Malaga in 1992 and Valletta in 1995. In spite of the recommendations of a WEU Report published in 1995, the WEU Assembly has been unable to grant guest or observer status to parliamentarians of non-WEU Mediterranean countries. Apparently, the subject is still under review. A major problem, though, is the lack of available resources at the disposal of the WEU Assembly.

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[235] Institute for Security Studies, WEU Newsletter, 21, October 1997, p.2

Overall, little progress has been achieved in the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue. Unlike its NATO counterpart, the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue has failed to develop practical programs of cooperation with Mediterranean countries. WEU is not able to benefit from the experience and make use of the resources of NATO PfP-type programs. In the second half of 1997, under the presidency of Germany, WEU did organize a visit for representatives of non- WEU Mediterranean countries to WEU's satellite center at Torrejon in Spain -but this appeared to be a one- off event. Egypt's requests for WEU assistance in defining stretches of the Egyptian desert have been turned down. As in the case of NATO, there are divisions in WEU between the Club Med grouping -in WEU's case, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain- and the northern Europeans who are more in favor of consolidating ties with WEU's Associate Partners in Central and Eastern Europe. In a rather pessimistic assessment, a WEU report issued in November 1996 noted that "given the WEU has not become involved in the political aspects, the limited dialogue on which it has embarked with these (Mediterranean) countries has not produced any tangible results." The Report added that the WEU's involvement in the Mediterranean was welcomed by Morocco, but was a disappointment for Egypt and Turkey (an Associate Member).[236]

A major problem for WEU in general, is the continued uncertainty with regard to the future of the WEU-ED relationship. The ED Amsterdam Summit in mid-1997 revealed once again that a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe would not be realized in the short or even medium term. It was decided at Amsterdam to develop further the security and defense dimension of the ED. The Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the Treaty on EU, and it was noted that WEU could be made use of for the preparation and implementation of these tasks. There were also references to building up WEU in stages as the defense component of the ED.[237] However unanimity was still required for decisions having military or defense implications. And in the WEU-ED relationship it was clear that WEU remained subordinate. There are many references in WEU and EU official texts that speak of occasions when the EU might choose to "avail itself of WEU." The ED mayor may not choose to make use of WEU with regard to future policies that may have security and defense implications. The announcement made by British and French ministers in St.

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[236] Assembly of Western European Union, Proceedings, 42nd Session, December 1996, I Assembly Documents (Paris: WEU), Doc.1543, November 4, 1996, "Security in the Mediterranean Region, p.57-58

[237] WEU, Ministerial Council, WEU Council of Ministers, Declaration of WEU on the Role of WEU and Its Relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance, Amsterdam, 22 July 1997, paragraph 14

Malo in late 1998 that the EU should in future have credible military forces, cast into further doubt the future of WEU and its relationship with the EU.

The WEU-Mediterranean dialogue does not appear to have benefited from the EU's Barcelona Process. It seems that WEU has largely assumed the role of a passive bystander as the Barcelona Process evolves. WEU Ministerial Council Communiqués have declared "the WEU Mediterranean Group will contribute its expertise within the framework of its general mandate in response to requests from EU."[238] Again, there is no obligation for the EU to make such requests. Indeed, WEU failed to secure a seat at the inaugural Barcelona Conference in November 1995. It has been suggested that this was because if WEU had participated the Arab League would have pressed to be accorded the same status. Some observers feel that the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process is being developed at the expense of the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue.[239] Will the further evolution of the Barcelona Process make the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue redundant? Apparently, when EU delegations visit non-WEU Mediterranean countries, they do not include WEU officials in their ranks as participants or observers. As a reaction to this turn of events, in 1998 officials of WEU openly declared their readiness to offer their expertise to the EU to help develop the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process.[240]

In general, WEU and NATO have been increasingly coordinating their activities since the first formal meeting of high-level WEU officials and the NAC in Brussels in May 1992. Naval vessels of WEU and NATO operated together in the Adriatic during the crisis in Bosnia. At Maastricht in 1991 there had been much talk of the need for WEU and NATO to build up their relations on the basis of "transparency and complementarily." The two bodies were encouraged to coordinate in areas of common interest. Much time and energy has been consumed attempting to work out how NATO assets might be employed for future possible WEU-led CJTFs. This type of CJTF could involve the implementation of a Petersberg task in territory traditionally regarded as out-of-area.

Both WEU and NATO officials have also referred to the need to coordinate their

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[238] WEU, Ministerial Council, WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, Paris, 13 May 1997, paragraph 41;

[239] Tanner, Fred, "The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Cooperation", Ibid, p.65

[240] Echeverria, Carlos, "Cooperation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces", Paris: Chaillot Papers 35, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 1999, p.32

Mediterranean dialogues. In May 1996, in Birmingham, WEU Ministers welcomed the fact that WEU and NATO were holding joint meetings to discuss the Mediterranean.[241] One year later in Paris WEU Ministers agreed to keep the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue under review and to take into account the role of other initiatives such as the Barcelona Process and NATO's Mediterranean dialogue.[242] Similar words were used by WEU Ministers in Rhodes in May 1998. The Communiqué of the NAC meeting in Berlin in June 1996 spoke of identifying additional areas of "focused NATO-WEU cooperation" including joint meetings of their respective dialogues. [243] Contrary to the text of the meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council in Birmingham, it seemed that according to the NAC as of June 1996, no joint meeting between NATO and WEU on their respective Mediterranean dialogues had taken place.

Concerning the Mediterranean dialogues of WEU and NATO it is also important to note the roles of European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) and European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). The announcement that these Euro forces were to be established was issued at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Lisbon in May 1995. They were referred to as "forces answerable to WEU." These forces were to consist of units provided by France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, although in theory other WEU states could join and allocate troops and equipment to the Euro forces if the four founding members agreed this to.[244] These were to be non-standing forces. It was envisioned that EUROFOR would be a rapid-reaction force of ten to fifteen thousand troops, and EUROMARFOR would be a joint naval force with aero naval and amphibious elements. Both forces could be deployed to implement the so-called Petersberg tasks. In 1996 the Euro forces were declared operational. EUROFOR was allocated a headquarters in Florence with a multinational staff working on planning and eventual command and control. The use of either of the Euro forces would need the consent of all four contributing states. The Euro forces could be deployed separately, or combined. They could be called upon by WEU, or by other bodies such as NATO, the OSCE, or the UN. In November 1997 WEU ministers meeting at Erfurt stated that Italy and Spain had decided to establish a joint Amphibious Force that would be

[241] WEU, Ministerial Council, WEU Council of Ministers, Birmingham Declaration, Birmingham, 7 May 1996, paragraph 18
[242] WEU, Ministerial Council, WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, 13 May 1997, Ibid
[243] Press Communiqué-Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Berlin, June 3, 1996, paragraph 20
[244] WEU, Council of Ministers, Lisbon Declaration, Lisbon, 15 May 1995, Doc. 1455, paragraph 5

answerable to WEU. This force could also be used by NATO.[245]

In spite of the close connections between WEU and the Euro forces, it seems that basic coordination is lacking. On May 13, 1997, WEU officials decided that the Euro forces could assume responsibility for those parts of the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue that concentrated on crisis management and early warning. Occasional meetings are thus held at WEU Headquarters in Brussels between representatives of the Euro forces and diplomats from the non-WEU Mediterranean countries. However, it seems that in practice these meetings are conducted outside the framework of the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue, as WEU officials are not well informed about conclusions reached at these meetings. Is there a danger that the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue will become even more insignificant as a consequence of the discussions conducted by officials of the Euro forces?

Initially, NATO policy-makers reacted somewhat coldly to the announcement of the future establishment of the Euro forces. On May 30, 1995, the NAC noted at Noordwijk: "We look forward with interest to a high-level briefing on this initiative and to the expeditious definition of the relationship of these forces with WEU and NATO." It seems that NATO officials had not been properly consulted. Officials at NATO were anxious to ensure that possible future operations carried out by the Euro forces would not prejudice the participation of these units in missions to defend NATO territory. NATO wanted first call on the Euro forces in the event that territory of the Atlantic Alliance was threatened or attacked. The Lisbon Declaration had stated rather equivocally that the Euro forces, in addition to being forces answerable to WEU, could also be employed in the framework of NATO. Eventually, NATO officials were assured that if required they could have first call on units allocated to EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.[246]

The Arab world reacted harshly to the announcement of the establishment of the Euro forces and to news of the opening of the EUROFOR headquarters in Florence. It seems that WEU officials had not adequately consulted beforehand with representatives of the non-WEU Mediterranean countries.[247] The Palestinian newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi

[245] WEU, Ministerial Council, WEU Council of Ministers, Erfurt Declaration, Erfurt, 18 November 1997, paragraph 36
[246] Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (95) 48-, Ibid, paragraph 8
[247] Spencer, Claire, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", Mediterranean Politics 2, 2, Autumn 1997 p.36

speculated that the "prime task" of EUROFOR was to intervene in Libya. The Libyan news agency JANA said that the existence of EUROFOR was a "flagrant violation of the sovereignty of southern Mediterranean states." The Libyan leader, Qadhafi, declared that the opening of the EUROFOR Headquarters was a "declaration of war against the Arab states south of the Mediterranean," was tantamount to a "terrorist attack," and was a "threat to peace in the Mediterranean region." Then Tunisian Defense Minister Habib Ben Yahia stated that the creation of EUROFOR was "incompatible with the traditions of dialogue and talks which Tunisia is seeking to establish between the two sides of the Mediterranean." Referring generally to the Euro forces, Egyptian President Mubarak commented: "the issue needs explanations," and added, "I fear that it opens the way to interference in other states' internal affairs."

Such statements must have a negative impact on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, especially when bearing in mind that Arab officials tend to link the Euro forces with NATO and not WEU even though the forces are technically answerable to WEU. There is a general Arab concern that NATO might use the Euro forces as instruments to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states. This fear is understandable given that the Euro forces are equipped to implement the Petersberg tasks. Arab reaction to the now infamous article published in December 1997 in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo has been discussed. With regard to the Euro forces, there is little NATO officials may do directly to assuage Arab anxieties. They can encourage the Euro forces to continue to attempt to improve their public image. The Euro forces do have their own dialogue with non-WEU Mediterranean countries. Arab experts have been invited to observe WEU military exercises -apparently Morocco took up the invitation- and visit the EUROFOR headquarters in Florence. In a declaration issued as early as May 1997, the defense and foreign ministers of the member states of the Euro forces announced that the Euro forces were prepared to cooperate in future with other Mediterranean countries to implement any of the Petersberg tasks in the Mediterranean. Cooperation was thus envisioned in such areas as human and natural disasters, maritime policing, the protection of sea-lanes and merchant shipping, minesweeping.[248]

[248] Echeverria, Carlos, "Cooperation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces", Ibid, p.35

### 4.2.2 The OSCE-Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO's Mediterranean Initiative

There have been no dramatic developments in the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue since the landmark Budapest Summit in December 1994. However, Jordan was admitted as a new member to the dialogue in May 1998. In November 1995 the OSCE secretary-general had suggested that Jordan and Mauritania -both parties to the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue by that time- be included in the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue.[249] As envisioned at Budapest, there have been ministerial-level meetings between representatives of the original five nonparticipating Mediterranean states and the OSCE troika and secretary-general. The first of these was held in July 1995 in Vienna. There have also been regular, more informal meetings of the OSCE Contact Group and representatives of the Mediterranean states as outlined at Budapest. In this format, for example, participants have discussed how the OSCE's work on a Comprehensive Security Model for the twenty first century would not be complete without the full integration of the Mediterranean dimension. In April 1997 a briefing was given to Mediterranean officials by the OSCE chairman-in-office. As well as describing current OSCE activities, the briefing also covered the topic: "Military Aspects of Security; How to Promote Confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)."[250] Annual OSCE Seminars on Mediterranean issues have been organized. The first seminar, held in Cairo in September 1995, focused on the OSCE experience in confidence building. The second, convened in Tel Aviv in June 1996, discussed the role of the OSCE as a platform for dialogue and the fostering of norms of behavior. In September 1997 a third seminar, again held in Cairo, examined the implications for the Mediterranean of the OSCE' s Comprehensive Security Model. A fourth seminar, convened in Valletta in October 1998, discussed the human dimension of security.

Again, in line with the decisions agreed upon at Budapest in December 1994, the representatives of the nonparticipating Mediterranean states have been invited to attend other meetings in which issues pertaining to the Mediterranean are discussed. Thus, in June 1995 the five contributed to the third meeting of the OSCE' s Economic Forum, which met in Prague. "Regional" economic cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, and

[249] OSCE Ref.MC/11/95 30 November 1995-0SCE-The Secretary General, Annual Report 1995 on OSCE Activities, V. Relations with Non-Participating
[250] OSCE Newsletter, 3, 10 October 1996, p.2

infrastructures was analyzed. The five were invited to attend meetings of the Economic Forum on a regular basis. They also participated in OSCE Ministerial Meetings. For example, at the Ministerial Meeting in Budapest in December 1995, the Egyptian delegate suggested that the OSCE embark on a program of cultural CBMs in order to prevent cultural misunderstandings that could hinder attempts to enhance security in the Mediterranean area.[251]




Table 4.1 European and NATO Organizations (Source: Strategic Assessment 1999, Institute for National Strategic Studies, p.71)

At the December 1995 Plenary Meeting of the Permanent Council in Budapest, it was decided that the five Mediterranean states would henceforth be referred to as "Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation." This sounded better than the much less flattering previous designation "nonparticipating Mediterranean states." The change in title was most probably on account of pressure from the five Mediterranean states. They had

[251] OSCE Ref. MC/22/95 7 December 1995-Statement of Egypt presented to the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE, Budapest, 7-8 December 1995

been seeking to enhance their relationship with the OSCE. A special meeting of the OSCE Council devoted to Mediterranean issues had been held in November 1995 with the participation of the North Africans and Israel. In practice, though, nothing substantive had been achieved with the change of title. Indeed, the Budapest Plenary had stated: "These changes in name do not alter the specific relationships between these states and the OSCE set out in previous OSCE decisions."[252] There was no upgrading of the dialogue, although the issue was apparently raised again just before the OSCE Lisbon Summit in December 1996. In June 1998, though, the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation were invited to send observers in future to elections monitored by the OSCE. They were also encouraged to send visitors to OSCE missions.[253] However, it still seems that the priorities of the OSCE lie elsewhere, in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, and even in Central Asia. The OSCE tends to put the Mediterranean on the same level of importance as Japan and South Korea.[254]

The purpose of the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue is far from clear. Is the OSCE seeking to develop a "regional" initiative for the Mediterranean within the framework of the OSCE? This could assume the form of a Mediterranean regional roundtable, for example. Or, rather, is the OSCE attempting to present itself -and its predecessor, the CSCE- as some sort of model that the southern Mediterranean states can emulate? The emphasis here would be on encouraging the improvement of interstate relations in the southern Mediterranean and providing more stability and security within these states. In this case the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation would remain outside of the OSCE framework. At the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting held in Copenhagen in December 1997, when agreeing to the guidelines for a new OSCE Charter for European Security, ministers declared that they would consider cooperation with all partners "in order to promote the norms and values shared by the OSCE participating states. They will also encourage partners to draw on OSCE expertise."[255] This leads one back to the question of how relevant are particular principles and norms, developed in Europe, for the Southern and

[252] OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/94 5 December 1995-49th Plenary Meeting. PC Journal 49, Agenda item 4, Decision 94
[253] OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/233 11 June 1998-172nd Plenary Meeting. PC Journal 172, Agenda item 7, Decision 233
[254] Fenech, Dominic, "The Relevance of European Security Structures to the Mediterranean", Mediterranean Politics 2, 1, Summer 1997, p.172
[255] OSCE Ref. MC (6) DEC/5 19 December 1997-MC (6) Journal 2, Agenda item 8, Decision 5, Guidelines on an OSCE Document, Charter on European Security, 4, paragraph 5 G

Eastern Mediterranean. One might contend that the OSCE experience is of value for the Mediterranean area where the Arab states and Israel could also make use of certain institutions modeled on OSCE practice.

If the OSCE was to serve as some sort of inspirational model for the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states, OSCE officials could place emphasis on the relevance for the Mediterranean of the original Declaration of Principles of the then CSCE. Military CBMs concerned with preventing a surprise attack are more relevant for interstate relations in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean than for a north-south framework. In the current circumstances it is exceedingly unlikely that any state in the southern Mediterranean would launch a surprise attack against its neighbors to the north, or vice versa. The experience of the CSCE in fostering cooperation between European states in the Cold War period by focusing on three baskets of cooperation was envisioned by the stillborn CSCM and is being applied by the EU' s Barcelona Process in its trans-Mediterranean cooperation initiative. Conflict prevention mechanisms along the lines of the OSCE' s Conflict Prevention Center and the Forum for Security Cooperation could be employed within a north-south framework in the Mediterranean, and/or could be applied along a south-south/Arab-Israeli dimension.

These mechanisms, for instance, could help promote transparency by encouraging the exchange of information, could provide a forum for negotiation in order to tackle problems, and could handle the issue of unusual military activities. But if the troubled Gulf area is excluded, actual conflict is more likely to erupt between states in the Southern or Eastern Mediterranean. The OSCE' s Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is not likely to appeal to the Arab states, in particular, because of the Code's stress on the need for the civilian control of military, paramilitary, and other security forces.

Since the beginning of the Middle East peace process, certain "regional" initiatives for the "Middle East" have been floated. Article Four of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty of 1994 committed both parties to setting up a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME).[256] A CSCME could be modeled on the CSCE experience and would presumably be exclusively concerned with the states of the Middle East-unlike the

[256] Peters, Joel, "Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, p.73-74

earlier envisioned CSCM. There has also been talk of a possible Organization for Cooperation in the Middle East (OCME), which could also be modeled on the CSCE/OSCE experience, and which again would presumably only incorporate states in the Middle East. The possible establishment of an OCME was raised by British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind on his visit to the United Arab Emirates in November 1996. According to Rifkind, an OCME would gradually evolve to include all states in the Middle East, including "pariah" states such as Iraq and Iran. Diplomats admitted that it would be difficult to establish cooperation on issues like human rights, frontier disputes, and national minorities.[257]

The OSCE in its Mediterranean dialogue has not attempted to make use of the CSCE/OSCE experience in Europe and apply it to the Mediterranean. Rather Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) and then the EU' s Barcelona Process have attempted to employ elements of the CSCE/OSCE approach in Europe to the Mediterranean in a north-south and south-south interstate dimension, with possible implications for the intrastate relations in the south. In these circumstances, it appears that there is little scope for the further development of the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue. This perhaps explains why NATO officials have not paid much attention to this dialogue. Coordination would anyway be difficult because of the exclusion of Mauritania from the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue. If, in future, the OSCE' s Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation were somehow incorporated more fully within the OSCE framework, NATO officials would most probably be interested in coordinating activities. However, it seems unlikely that the OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue will evolve along these lines. NATO officials are thus much more interested in the progress of the Barcelona Process. In particular, they are closely following the military/political chapter of the Barcelona Process that is attempting to draw on CSCE/OSCE experiences. Given the commencement of NATO's cooperative activities in the military field with its Mediterranean dialogue countries, it would seem that there is an increasing need for NATO and the EU to coordinate their policies in the Mediterranean.

[257] Guardian Weekly, November 10,1996

### 4.2.3 The Barcelona Process and NATO's Mediterranean Initiative

Following the decisions taken at the meeting of the European Council in Essen in December 1994, the Barcelona Conference was eventually held on November 27-28, 1995. Foreign ministers of the fifteen member states of the EU and of the twelve invited Mediterranean non-community countries participated. Most significantly, in contrast to their boycott of the multilateral talks in the Middle East peace process, Lebanon and Syria had agreed to attend in spite of the presence of Israel. Mauritania and the US attended as observers. Despite lobbying from the AMU, Britain and France refused to allow Libya to participate. The Libyans then withdrew their request to join the conference and accused the organizers of "high treason." The Barcelona Conference spoke of an EMP. The Barcelona Declaration issued at the end of the conference declared that the objective was to turn the Mediterranean basin into "an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity." The need to respect various principles such as human rights, democracy, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes was emphasized. Along the lines of the CSCE and the aborted CSCM, the participants agreed to concentrate their future cooperation in three broad areas or "chapters" -namely, politics and security; economics and finance; and social, cultural, and human relations. [258]

The Barcelona Declaration adopted in 1995 contains three main chapters or 'baskets': the first relating to political and security questions, the second to economic and financial ones and the third to social, cultural and human affairs. The first chapter contains issues that have come to be designated as 'soft security' such as respect of human rights and democratic principles, as well as other issues that were traditionally considered as elements of security but that are now put under the label of 'hard security'; these include acquisition of conventional weapons, the spread of WMD, disarmament and adherence to arms control and non-proliferation regimes. The same chapter also calls for the adoption of a "pact" of peace and stability, although the term pact was later replaced by "Charter."[259]

The Barcelona Conference set in motion the so-called Barcelona Process. A follow-up

[258] Barbe, Esther, "The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process", Mediterranean Politics 1, 1 Summer 1996, p.34

[259] Chourou, Bechir, "The Irrelevance of Security Issues in Euro-Mediterranean Relations, Available on Site: http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/

work program was outlined. Future meetings were to be held at ministerial and senior-officials level. This would lead to intergovernmental discussions on issues such as water resources, energy policy, industry, tourism, and environment. More informal gatherings of NGOs representing civil society were encouraged. The Barcelona Process was to be monitored by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process that consisted of officials of the current EU troika and representatives of the twelve Mediterranean non-Community countries. The Committee would meet every three months and report to the foreign ministers. The European Parliament also initiated contacts with deputies of Mediterranean-partner assemblies and thereby launched an inter-parliamentary dialogue with the support of the IPU.

The second chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, which focused on economic and financial partnership, referred to the aim of creating a free trade zone in the Euro-Mediterranean area by the year 2010. In order to further this goal, the EU would continue to conclude new association agreements with its Mediterranean partners.[260] Immediately prior to the Barcelona Conference the EU had negotiated agreements with Morocco and Tunisia. Similar agreements with Israel and Jordan were later concluded. Here, the EU was seeking to consolidate its bilateral ties with Mediterranean partners and thereby also strengthen and develop multilateral cooperation with regard to free trade. Economic and financial cooperation between states North and South of the Mediterranean would also be boosted by the decision of the European Council at Cannes in June 1995 to provide Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states European Currency Unit (ECU) 4.68 billion in support for the period 1996-2000. The Barcelona Declaration also underlined the need for "regional" cooperation between the Mediterranean partners themselves that would help to create a free-trade area for the Mediterranean as a whole. The attempts by the AMU to foster regional cooperation and the later Arab Free Trade Area (AFTA) initiative have been noted. Enhanced cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area in the fields of trade and investment was also recommended in the Declaration. The EU could attempt to make use of its coordination of Working Group on Regional Economic Development (REDWG), one of the five working groups set up in the multilateral framework of the Middle East peace process. Agreements concluded at the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) economic

[260] Calleya, Stephen C., "The Euro-Mediterranean Process after Malta: What Prospects?" Mediterranean Politics 2, 2, Autumn 1997, p.11

conferences could also have had beneficial consequences for the second chapter of the Barcelona Process. But problems in the Middle East led to the suspension of the work of REDWG and prevented the holding of a MENA economic conference in 1998.

However, the Barcelona Declaration only referred to a free trade area in the Euro-Mediterranean area with regard to industrial goods and services. Concerning agricultural products, preferential and reciprocal access was envisioned. The Mediterranean partners were encouraged to promote free trade among them. The non-EU twelve had pushed for a genuine free trade area throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area that would have enabled their agricultural products to enter the EU without restrictions.[261] Under the arrangement that was agreed upon, the Mediterranean partners will be disadvantaged. They will have to lower tariff barriers that provide protection for local manufacturing companies and thus be exposed to fierce competition from Europe.[262] There appears to be a general hope that in the interim twelve-year period investment will flow southward and help to create jobs and boost private enterprise. This would require economic reforms and political and social stability in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states. But the prospects for further political and economic development in North Africa are uncertain at best. It has been suggested that a compensation fund could be created to assist those who suffer most as reforms are implemented.[263] Some studies suggest that up to 40 percent of existing jobs may be lost in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Local companies, unable to attract foreign investment and failing to modernize, may be forced to close.[264]

It does not seem likely that in the foreseeable future a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank will be established as a result of progress in the Barcelona Process. The US was frustrated by one delay after another in its efforts to make use of the MENA economic conferences to set up Middle East Development Bank in Cairo. The Americans have also encountered opposition from the EU that has preferred to lobby for the creation of a so-called Middle East and North Africa Financial Intermediary Organization (MENAFIO). According to EU officials, MENAFIO would focus on mobilizing private sector financing

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[261] Spencer, Claire, "A Tale of Two Cities", The World Today 53, 3, March 1997, p. 80
[262] Marks, Jon, "High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative", Mediterranean Politics 1, 1, Summer 1996, p.2
[263] Calleya, "The Euro- Mediterranean Process after Malta", Ibid, p.10
[264] Kienle, Eberhard, "Destabilization through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Barcelona Declaration", Mediterranean Politics 3, 2, Autumn 1998, p.7-8

for investment projects and infra structural development-assuming that investors are prepared to part with their money. These officials have argued that there are already a number of development banks in the "region" willing to lend financial support.[265]

The third chapter of the Euro- Mediterranean partnership initiative is titled: "Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs: Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding between Cultures and Exchanges between Civil Societies." In this chapter the Barcelona Declaration stressed the importance of cooperation between states North and South of the Mediterranean in such areas as educational and cultural programs, activities covering the mass media, and exchange schemes involving the leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious worlds, universities, trade unions, the business community, and so forth. Here, use could be made of cooperative programs the EU had established earlier with the Mediterranean, such as MED-CAMPUS, MED-MEDIA. Other issues are such as terrorism, drug trafficking, crime and corruption, migration, and the need to promote democratic institutions and strengthen the rule of law.

The Euro-Med Civic Forum has come to play an active role in establishing links between civil societies across the Mediterranean. The first meeting of the Civic Forum, held immediately after the Barcelona Conference in Barcelona, which was attended by over one thousand participants, established eleven parallel working forums. The Euro-Med Civic Forum has continued to meet. The topics that were discussed at its session in Naples in December 1997 included: the Mediterranean area and globalization; value and culture as resources; relations and communications strategies; and economic and social interrelationships. Also, as a part of the Barcelona Process, but separate from the Euro-Med Civic Forum, a Workshop on the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations was held in Stockholm in April 1998. In order to develop the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process, a Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum held its first meeting in Brussels in October 1998. By early 1999 a Euro-Med Youth Program had also been launched.[266]

It will not be easy to bridge the cultural divide across the Mediterranean. But increased exchange of information and expertise could help to overcome certain misperceptions and prejudices that individuals and groups may hold vis-a-vis their counterparts North or South

[265] Marks, John, "High Hopes and Low Motives", Ibid, p.17
[266] Barbe, Esther, "The Barcelona Conference", Ibid, p.41-42

of the Mediterranean. Bearing in mind the political, social, and economic problems of states in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, the development of a more confident and mature civil society willing to persuade governments to introduce or implement certain reforms could be encouraged. There has been vague talk of reducing migratory pressure by forming training programs and job creation schemes.[267] However, the Mediterranean partners prefer the freer movement of peoples. They are not keen on EU attempts to impose tighter immigration controls.[268] There are also problems, once again, over differing interpretations concerning human rights and democratic norms. And the distinction between terrorist groups and those fighting for liberation and independence has also proven to be a bone of contention.

Within the Greater Middle East circle, the Near Eastern and North African areas, i.e. the Mediterranean, look particularly exposed to this sweeping trend of Islamist feelings and terrorist warfare. This is due to two main reasons: In the terrorists' eyes, a significant shift towards Islamism in the regional balance of power would open the way to the shift in the global balance of power they are seemingly seeking. The Near East and North Africa are of great cultural and political significance for the Muslim world. A change there would be bound to have far more decisive repercussions throughout the whole of that world than any change in Central Asia.

At the same time, the Mediterranean is close to Europe. Since the 1970s, Europe has served as a logistical platform for expatriated political activities aimed at North Africa and the Middle East. [269]

The Mediterranean Forum could help the consolidation of the third chapter of the Barcelona Process even though the EU appears to have picked up many of the educational, cultural, and social themes that the Forum had intended to develop. The Mediterranean Forum has continued to hold annual ministerial meetings. Malta was admitted as a new member at the meeting in Sainte-Maxime in southern France in April 1995. Other states such as Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, Israel, Libya, Mauritania, Slovenia, and also Jordan and

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[267] Collinson, Sarah," Shore to Shore-The Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations", The Brookings Institution, London, and Washington, 1996, p.79

[268] Barbe, Esther, "The Barcelona Conference", Ibid, p.36-38

[269] Aliboni, Roberto, "From Dialogue to Partnership. Security in the Mediterranean and NATO: Future Prospects", Strengthening NATO-Mediterranean Relations: A Transition to Partnership, International Seminar, 30 September 2002, p.7, Available on Site: http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/NATO/

Russia (the latter two, geographically, not Mediterranean states) have pressed to join. One of the strengths of the Mediterranean Forum is the informal nature of its proceedings. A report of the session at Sainte-Maxime noted that the Mediterranean Forum was "an exercise avoiding overlapping with other already existing institutions."[270]

At Sainte-Maxime, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe declared that the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Forum were two independent but complementary exercises, although the latter was less ambitious and more modest. Interestingly, the draft RAND Report on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative released in September 1997 suggested that because of the informal nature of the Mediterranean Forum, issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD could be discussed more freely in the Forum than within the framework of the Barcelona Process. In future, therefore, it is possible that the EU's Barcelona Process may attempt to build up closer working relations with the Mediterranean Forum.

The first chapter of the EMP initiative is titled: "Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability." In this chapter, the Barcelona Declaration referred to the problems of the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. The Declaration stipulated that one aim was to secure "a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of WMD, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems." Parties were encouraged to refrain from developing their military capacity beyond "legitimate defense requirements" and to reduce their amounts of troops and weaponry to the lowest possible limits. The parties also undertook to consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean," including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end. Clearly, this was a highly ambitious menu of CBMs, CSBMs, arms limitations measures, and weapons free zones.

The second meeting of foreign ministers Foreign Ministers met in Malta in April 1997 (Barcelona II) few concrete measures could be reported aside from the establishment (in June 1996) of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission or Euro-Mediterranean Security

[270] Mediterranean Forum Summary Report-Meetings of High Officials, Sainte-Maxime, 8-9 April 1995

Cooperation (EuroMeSCo), which is a network of foreign policy institutes. In the meantime preparatory work on a Charter for peace and stability had started and the Malta meeting instructed senior officials to continue that work. It should be noted that the breakdown of the Middle East peace process had made it difficult to discuss security issues and threatened to stall the entire Euro-Med process.[271] The Malta meeting failed to agree to guidelines and principles for this Charter. An Arab position paper indicated that because of current difficulties in the Middle East peace process the Charter could not be adopted. Arab delegates could see little sense in agreeing to a Charter that sought to prevent future conflicts but avoided tackling ongoing disputes.[272] Arab representatives also wanted the Charter to focus on issues such as the proliferation of WMD, and socioeconomic problems including the issues of migration and debt.[273] The security concerns of Arab governments were clearly in evidence here. The Arab parties wanted the Mediterranean Charter to address the question of Israeli nuclear weapons. They were also eager to consolidate their governments at home by securing political support and economic backing from Europe. The Mediterranean partners were opposed to the idea of modeling the Mediterranean Charter on the Pact on Stability in Europe that had been adopted by European states in March 1995.

At the ad hoc Ministerial meeting held in Palermo in June 1998 it was decided to use Partnership Building Measures (PBMs) instead of CSBMs and senior officials were instructed to hold a special ad hoc meeting to prepare a draft version of the charter to be submitted to the Stuttgart Conference (Barcelona III). When this conference convened in April 1999 the peace process was still in stalemate. Participants, according to the Presidency's Formal Conclusions, "expressed growing concern" about that and, with regard to the charter, declared their satisfaction with "the progress achieved since the Palermo meeting." An informal document called "Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter" was adopted to "provide the basis for the future work of senior

[271] Chourou, Bechir, "The Irrelevance of Security Issues in Euro-Mediterranean Relations", Ibid
[272] Spencer, Claire, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", Ibid, p.44
[273] Tanner, Fred, "The Euro-Med Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitations and Confidence Building after Malta", The International Spectator 32, 2, April-June 1997, p.6

officials."[274] The intention is for ministers to approve the charter "as soon as political circumstances allow."[275]

The second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference at Malta was unable to endorse two other key documents relevant to the first chapter of the Barcelona Process. One of these was a Plan of Action that covered six areas-the strengthening of democracy, preventive diplomacy, security and CBMs, disarmament, terrorism, and organized crime. In an effort to obtain EU funds, Egypt had also raised the issue once again of mine clearance.[276] Reference to the need to strengthen democracy probably aroused some concern among the Mediterranean partners. It was not clear what this would entail. Could some form of mechanism be adopted that could enable parties to intervene in the internal affairs of other states?[277] In those circumstances would not Arab governments perceive that the Europeans were attempting to impose upon them certain norms and values? The Plan of Action's reference to the need to strengthen democracy throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area certainly challenged the notion that the status quo should be respected and maintained in certain states. No mention was made of a Plan of Action in the text of the Conclusions of the third Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference at Stuttgart in April 1999.

The foreign ministers at Malta also failed to agree to draw up an inventory of CSBMs. The intention of establishing a conflict-prevention center was put on hold. However, the setting up of a mechanism for cooperation in the event of natural and human disasters was agreed upon in principle. At Stuttgart, progress toward establishing a Euro-Mediterranean system of disaster prevention, mitigation, and management was noted as an example of a partnership-building measure. Various CBMs in the areas of information exchange and increased transparency were already in place before the Malta conference. ED-sponsored diplomatic seminars have been organized. Contact points among the twenty-seven partner states have been erected for exchange of information on political and security matters. Also, a network of international affairs and strategic studies institutes in the region, known as EuroMeSCo, has been established. An informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials seminar

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[274] Chourou, Bechir, "The Irrelevance of Security Issues in Euro-Mediterranean Relations", Ibid
[275] Chairman's Formal Conclusions of the Third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Stuttgart, 15-16 April 1999 Stuttgart: 1999, paragraphs 10-12
[276] Tanner, Fred, "The Euro-Med Partnership", Ibid, p.4-5, 19
[277] Aliboni, Roberto, "Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", Perceptions 2, 4, December 1997-February 1998, p.80

titled the "Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue" was held in Bonn in March 1999.

What are the prospects for the further development of the political-military chapter of the Barcelona Process? It has been suggested that the parties could implement measures that ACRS had been in the process of introducing-such as the installation of an effective communication network that could help prevent future conflicts in the region. More developed CBMs may then follow. With regard to interstate relations in the south in particular, these may include the formation of demilitarized zones and areas in which military activities are limited. States in the south may agree to adopt non-offensive military postures. They may also promise not to deploy new weapons systems that could destabilize regional security.[278] In the more immediate term, a Euro-Mediterranean maritime coast guard could be formed to deal with narcotics trafficking, the transport of illegal migrants, and maritime pollution.[279]

There are a number of problems relating to the Barcelona Process as a whole. It is extremely difficult to secure a consensus among the twenty-seven parties. In spite of the size of membership, certain key states are not included. Without the inclusion of Libya, Iran, and Iraq, it will not be possible to create a Middle East zone free of WMD.[280] It is important to note, though, that a Libyan delegation was invited to attend the third Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference at Stuttgart as a guest of the presidency. It was declared that Libya could become a full member of the Barcelona Process as soon as UN sanctions were lifted and after Libya had accepted the whole of the Barcelona acquits. [281]

The Barcelona Process has also been criticized because of its overemphasis on north-south issues at the expense of tackling problems related to interstate and intrastate relations in the south. However, the Barcelona Declaration did stress the need to develop regional cooperation between the southern partners. And, as already indicated, with regard to developments within a state, Mediterranean partners are not enthusiastic about being told how to reform their systems of government.[282]

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[278] Tanner, Fred, "The Euro-Med Partnership", Ibid, p.11,22
[279] Calleya, Stephen C., "The Euro-Mediterranean Process after Malta", Ibid, p.6
[280] Tanner, Fred, "The Euro-Med Partnership", Ibid, p.22-23
[281] Chairman's Formal Conclusions of the Third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Ibid, paragraph 37.
[282] Aliboni, Roberto, "Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", Ibid, p.79

It appears that there will be no dramatic progress in the political-security chapter of the Barcelona Process while serious problems remain in the Middle East. Arab states will not agree to a comprehensive package of CBMs in the Euro-Mediterranean area until a final Arab-Israeli peace settlement has been concluded according to the formula of "land for peace." The Barcelona Declaration had envisioned that confidence building would occur in incremental stages. Arab governments are opposed to implementing more advanced CBMs out of a concern that this would freeze the current status quo, which is perceived to be in Israel's favor. The major differences of opinion between the Arab states and Israel are concerning the proliferation of WMD.[283]

The failure of the EU to agree to a CFSP is another general problem for the Barcelona Process. It is not always possible to secure a consensus among the EU members on certain issues. The EU has attempted to coordinate policy in the Middle East with the onset of the peace process. The EU has offered extensive financial aid to the Palestinians. Much Arab capital is invested in EU member states.[284] The groundbreaking visit of French President Jacques Chirac to the area in October 1996 led to the appointment of a EU envoy to the Middle East. However, the role and responsibility of this envoy is not clear. There is a limit to what the EU is able to accomplish in the Middle East without the backing of the US, which is not a full party to the Barcelona Process. One may assume that the Americans are in favor of the Barcelona Process provided that it does not complicate and pose problems for the Middle East peace process. In the Barcelona Declaration and the Conclusions of the Malta and Stuttgart meetings the Euro-Mediterranean partners have openly declared that the Barcelona Process is not intended to replace "the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interest of peace, stability and development in the region." It seems that this so-called self-denying ordinance was intended to assure the Americans. In practice, the Israelis and many Arabs would not be prepared to embark on new policies in the Middle East without consulting beforehand with the US administration.[285]

How might NATO's Mediterranean Initiative be coordinated with the EU's Barcelona Process? There are already apparently many informal links between officials of NATO and

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[283] Tanner, Fred, "The Euro-Med Partnership", Ibid, p.14.
[284] Hollis, Rosemary, "Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?" International Affairs 73, 1, January 1997, p.21-23
[285] Spencer, Claire, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", Ibid, p.39

the EU based in Brussels. Speaking in Valencia in February 1999 Secretary-General Solana declared that NATO and the EU could achieve more in the Mediterranean if there was "more coherence between their policies." Activities organized as a part of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue appear to complement the work of the second and third chapters of the Barcelona Process. There would seem to be more overlap concerning the political-military chapter. However, duplication is not possible because of the absence of the US in the Barcelona Process. Writing in 1996, Tanner suggested that a possible Euro-Mediterranean pact dealing with abstract norms building could co-exist with NATO PfP-type activities in the Mediterranean. Tanner also proposed links with the WEU-Mediterranean dialogue and possibly with the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna. There is thus much potential for coordination between the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue and the EU's Barcelona Process. With regard to other initiatives and dialogues concerning the Mediterranean, NATO and the NAA are likely to continue to closely cooperate.[286]

## 4.3 NATO' S MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGIES

### 4.3.1 NATO and Its Neighbors in the Post-Bipolar Era

NATO has in the past decade undertaken various internal reforms to fit the new security landscape. While retaining its basic collective defense function, the Alliance has added a range of new missions to stay relevant for its members in the changing international security context. One of the more intriguing facets of the 'new' NATO is that it has throughout the last decade consistently reached out in different ways to its non-member neighbors with the view to create security and stability in the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic region. The Atlantic Alliance's ambition during the 1990s to be an "agent for change" has not only targeted the restructuring of security relations in central and eastern Europe, but also, on a more modest scale, with selected Mediterranean countries. The Alliance's attempt to build security with its neighbors has largely been based on three pillars: enlargement, special bilateral accords (Russia and Ukraine) and the creation of partnership initiatives such as the 1992 NACC, the 1994 PfP, the 1995 Mediterranean Dialogue and the EAPC, which in 1997 replaced the NACC. These partnership initiatives, or outreach programs, have become the centerpiece of the Alliance's intent to create new

[286] Tanner, Fred, "The Euro-Med Partnership", Ibid, p.66-67

security architecture for Europe and beyond for the 21st century, based on the notion cooperative security.

Today, the Southern approaches to Europe are perhaps the most important source of instability for that continent and the West in general. Instability has increased as a result of the West's failed attempts to curb it in the 1990s and solve the conflicts that nurture it. As a result of this failure, frustration and interdependence - as opposed to integration- have increased regionally and globally so that Southern instability now generates larger and more diffuse spillovers than a decade ago.

The situation has changed with respect to the NATO strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999. In them, Western security was supposed to be essentially affected by external risks, that is the impact of external instabilities and the involvement of vital interests outside the Alliance area. By contrast, it was supposed to be unaffected by "calculated aggression".[287] Such an aggression, however, took place on 11 September 2001 against NATO's leading nation, the US, and was perceived by the US and NATO allies as an act of war.[288]

Neighboring countries in NATO's periphery have become the prime security concern for the Alliance in the post-bipolar era for a number of reasons. In the early 1990s outreach programs would come as a reaction to the pronounced fear of that the renationalization of the Warsaw Pact armed forces would cause a security vacuum around the integrated Europe. Moreover, the tragic consequences of the Balkan conflict would also leave a clear imprint of the policies, which the Alliance was about to embark upon. These concerns would soon be joined by others; such as the proliferation of conventional arms as well as WMD especially affecting the 'arc of crisis' i.e. southern Mediterranean, through the Middle East and into the Persian Gulf region.

For the partnership to work, Europeans too, must be prepared to adjust their approach to conform to the present realities. The world does remain a dangerous place, and in particular, the cataclysmic dangers associated with the conjunction of terrorism and WMD makes it imperative that Europeans avoid a slavish commitment to "international law" at the expense of national survival. As in the case of Kosovo, under appropriate

[287] NATO Handbook , Part I, point 10 of "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991", Brussels 1995

[288] Aliboni, Roberto, "From Dialogue to Partnership. Security in the Mediterranean and NATO, Ibid, p.13

circumstances, European governments (including France) were prepared to dispense with the necessity of an explicit UN authorization in using force even without a convincing Article 51 self-defense rationale.[289]

These destabilizing elements and the general uncertainty felt in the North Atlantic community, would take its first expression in the reformulated Strategic Concept adopted 1991 in Rome, which in effect signaled a broadened security agenda for the Alliance. The Strategic Concept listed a host of 'new' risks to the Alliance and its members, although the NATO members recognized that the new insecurities rising in the 1990s were not linked with any country or entity in particular, but rather they are 'multidirectional and difficult to predict.'[290] This notwithstanding, it was evident to NATO member countries that the internal weaknesses afflicting many of the Alliance's neighbors made them more prone to instability.

Coming out of the Cold War the U.S. would push hard for NATO to exert a positive influence in the rapidly changing international security context and to be an active agent confronting the 'new' security concerns. This led to that the Alliance began adapting itself in various ways to the new security environment, by adopting a series of internal reform measures, such as for example, gradually adding new instruments and mandates in order for the organization to be able to meet the new demands of the post-Cold War era (e.g. crisis management, 'out-of-area' missions, peace support, common joint task forces (CJTFs) etc.). Moreover, NATO also aspired to play a stabilizing role in reference to non-member countries in Europe and in the Mediterranean through concrete peace building programs, in that "looking south as well as east is also part of the (post- Cold War) transformation of this Alliance."[291] This ambition took its first concrete form in 1992 when the Alliance invited former Warsaw Pact Conference members to form part of the NACC, which before long was complemented by the 1994 PfP.[292] In 1995 a modest dialogue

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[289] Charter of the United Nations, Available on Site: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

[290] NATO Key Policy Documents, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991

[291] Claes, Willy, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Architecture," NATO Review 42 (6), December 1994, p.4

[292] 19 NATO allies and 26 partners form the PfP: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan.

between the Alliance and selected Mediterranean countries was launched.[293] Subsequently, in 1997, the EAPC would replace the NACC, and the same year special bilateral agreements with Russia and Ukraine were concluded.[294] Finally, the 1999 enlargement to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic as members of the Alliance must also been seen as an integral part of the Allies' aspiration to stabilize its immediate neighborhood.

The manifold different strategies by which NATO relate to its neighboring non-members (partnership, special bilateral agreements and enlargement processes) have at times seemed haphazard, short-termed and fortuitous. However, over time these initiatives have admittedly consolidated to integrate the majority of the non-member countries in the periphery of the Alliance into different frameworks for confidence building, dialogue and practical cooperation.[295] The objective of the dialogue and collaboration between Allies and non-NATO members is that "the Allies believe that such efforts contribute usefully to the wider process of integration and participation – that is, the enhancement of stability in ever-increasing circles through new patterns of cooperative security not only in the Euro-Atlantic region but also in the Southern Mediterranean.[296]

The Mediterranean Dialogue is thus one of the facets of NATO's aspiration to foment cooperative security regimes in nearby geographical areas.[297] The notion of cooperative security bridges two of the fundamental schools of thought theorizing about NATO in the post-bipolar era. Some scholars have argued that the Alliance is pursuing the creation of collective security in Europe through the EAPC/PfP outreach programs, and they are concerned because this is fundamentally at odds with the collective defense purpose of NATO.[298] Pointing to failed attempts at creating collective security (ex. League of Nations), they fear the fundamental drift, fragmentation and eventual destruction of the Alliance. However, the epitaph of collective security seems unfitting to describe an Alliance that at the present time is increasingly looking to play a role beyond the Treaty area and is thus not the inward looking organization you would expect from a collective

[293] Mediterranean Dialogue countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
[294] 19 NATO allies and 27 partners are EAPC members, i.e. all PfP participants plus Tajikistan.
[295] NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Washington 23-24 April 1999, pt. 38
[296] NATO Key Policy Documents, "Speech by the Deputy Secretary General to a NAFDECOL Group," Brussels, 7 November 1997
[297] Yost, David S., "The New NATO and Collective Security", Survival 40 (2), Summer, 1998, p.135-160
[298] Brenner, Michael, "NATO and Collective Security", Macmillan, London, 1998, p.43

security arrangement. Other analysts hold that the advent of the EAPC/PfP outreach programs signals the Western European and American ambitions to extend their security community inherent in NATO in order to provide stability in its periphery, which also is a source of possible dilution and disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance.[299] I will hold here that NATO in the early 21st century remains a collective defense organization as well as a consolidated pluralistic security community, where "North America and Europe share common values, interests and principles...such as to contribute to peace and security by safeguarding freedom, the rule of law and our democratic way of life."[300] However, NATO countries' essential security interdependence with non-member neighboring countries, as well as the desire to steer the development of security relations in the Alliance's periphery, has led NATO to create programs, such as for example, the PfP/EAPC and the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Alliance, one might infer, is thus styling itself as the core of a multi-layered security architecture, where a number of non-member countries in Europe and in the Mediterranean interact with NATO via cooperative security regimes of different levels of engagement. Perhaps NATO's outreach programs also reveal the profound wish among NATO members to escape traditional power balancing in favor of a new sort of security architecture.[301] Notwithstanding NATO, in creating these regimes, does not have in mind neither diluting the Alliance's defense commitment nor necessarily extending the Atlantic security community. The Allies' principal goal with these regimes is simply to attain stability in its periphery through security cooperation.

The notion of 'cooperative security' counts its origins from the then CSCE, which aimed to further economic, security and political as well as cultural cooperation between Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand, and Western Europe and North America on the other, with the ultimate goal of preventing a nuclear war. This concept lives on in the post-Cold War security environment, referring to a model of intrastate relations that seeks to promote collaborative rather than confrontational relations between states by engaging heterogeneous actors in dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of security issues and regulating the interaction by a set of rules and procedures. The participants in a cooperative

[299] Hallenberg, Jan, "The Extension of the European Security Community to the Periphery: France in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Countries," NATO Fellowship Final Report, June 2000
[300] Solana, Javier, "NATO: Ready to Meet the Challenges Ahead", Speech at the Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, Columbia International Affairs Online, p.9
[301] Morgan, Patrick M., "Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World", Pennsylvania State University Press, PA, 1997, p.36

security regime are often too diverse to be able to ever aspire to create a security community, perhaps even in the long run. However, their common aim is diffuse actual or potential friction/conflict among participants by political dialogue, information sharing and transparency. "While tolerating diversity and even animosity among disparate governments and cultures, this kind of international system allows for conflicts to be resolved without recourse to mass violence."[302]

Cooperative security holds certain similarities with collective security, however, while the latter is designed to manage a joint response toward aggression, the former is designed to prevent conflict in long term. Cooperative security wants to diffuse tension, which may escalate into armed strife, at an early stage and seeks to accomplish its objectives through the voluntary consent of the contracting parties. Collective security in contrast is fundamentally an agreement to deter aggression through military preparedness and defeating it when and if it occurs, and relies on a threat of material or physical coercion to make parties comply. While these two forms of security systems are different, they are not mutually exclusive and may even coexist within (parts of) a security regime. Indeed a collective security joint response (or a military alliance) may function as the ultimate resort to deal with an armed attack if all preventive cooperative security measures have failed. Notwithstanding, the development of a cooperative security regime does not hold any normative or 'messianic' aspiration for international organization to eliminate war and all forms of violence, nor does it provide us with insights into the underlying causes of conflict. It is more a practical and pragmatic recognition that although armed conflict is likely to be a continued feature of the international system also in the future, concrete measures can be taken to limit the scale and maybe even the number of conflicts.

NATO cooperative security approach is designed to contribute to security and stability through political dialogue, transparency, information and confidence building, through specific security cooperation. For example, the EAPC/PfP initiatives focus on reforms in partner countries to adopt transparency in national defense planning and military expenditure; ensuring democratic control of national armed forces; capability and readiness for peace support operations; development of cooperative military relations with the Alliance (joint planning, peacekeeping, training and exercise, search and rescue,

[302] Nolan, Janne E., "Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century", Brookings Institution, Washington, 1994, p.5

humanitarian operations and others); as well as inter-operability with NATO forces. Moreover, the Allies and partners collaborate on aspects of science and technology, environmental issues and education. The scope and ambitiousness of EAPC/PfP have even led to an advanced degree of integration of interested partners into the relevant planning and there is an ongoing discussion about including partners also in NATO decision making bodies dealing with peace support missions etc[303].

### 4.3.2 NATO's Strategic Concept

Generally speaking, the post-Cold War strategic thinking of NATO countries has evolved from the pre-eminence of territorial defence to the predominance of security interests. Concomitantly, the dominant concern is the management of crises and conflicts that are deemed to put at stake relevant security interests within the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO's 50th anniversary Washington Summit approved a new strategic document which enumerates the potential risks the Alliance should brace itself to confront in the coming years. The Mediterranean, or at least parts of it, is undoubtedly among the "peripheral regions" where potential risks to NATO's security are bound to originate. There is no common definition of the Mediterranean among NATO members, however. While for Europeans the Mediterranean means the Maghreb, primarily, and the Middle East (the Near East, rather), the US have a broader notion that extends to the Middle East and the Gulf, and the Maghreb is seen as a sort of pathway to that core region. Security concerns in such "peripheral regions" include proliferation of WMD, delivery means and warheads alike, terrorism, and the disruption of energy flows. Instability caused by the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of displaced persons (i.e. refugees and illegal migrants) is also included. In the specific context of the Mediterranean, concerns with the rise of radical political Islamism, although not specifically mentioned, are obviously implicit as an aggravating factor of any such potential risks. After September 11, the US defined terrorism not only as a core threat to theirs and their allies domestic and external security, but also as the organizing factor of the international order. Many southern countries, that not only consider political Islamism as their main threat, also tend to confound a significant part of the opposition with terrorist groups, welcomed this definition. A

[303] Nolan, Janne E., "Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century", Ibid, p.8

dangerous amalgam also presents in several western capitals. The most recent and complete example of the risks underpinning this is Sharon's policy.

In recent years terrorist acts have caused victims on both shores of the Mediterranean. Although terrorism is a grave threat, as it was made clear with the September 11 attacks, its effects are also felt strongly within the countries of South.

Similarly, proliferation is primarily linked to attempts at regional hegemony and existing Arab-Israeli tensions. Aside from Israel, it is thought that Libya's missiles could be launched at a maximum range of some 550 km, which puts their Southern neighbors primarily within range.[304]

Disruption of energy flows could indeed affect Europe. If in the case of oil supplies channeled through the Mediterranean basin, including from the Gulf, alternative sources could be found, and the impact would primarily be felt rather on the price of oil than on its availability. Gas poses a different problem in countries that rely primarily on pipeline supplies. France and Italy rely heavily on gas supplies from Algeria, and so do Spain and Portugal. In all, North African gas accounts for some 25% of the EU's present gas consumption, a proportion likely to increase in the near future. Algeria is one of the main suppliers, linked to Southern Europe through two main pipelines (respectively through Tunisia in the case of Italy, and Morocco in the case of Spain and Portugal). Sabotage attempts of both these pipelines by armed Islamist insurgents have been reported in 1996 and 1997. Currently, the main vulnerability of gas supplies to Europe is primarily a result of the open confrontation between radical Islamist factions and the military power in Algeria. The threat of disruption of gas supplies should not be over emphasized, however. Any Algerian government, whatever its political allegiance, has a major interest in securing the undisrupted flow of energy which is by far its main source of revenue. And Libya's rogue state' status has certainly not stopped the continuous flow of its gas and oil supplies mainly into Europe.

The root causes of the major problems confronting southern countries are mainly domestic. They result from the failure to address the situation that permits radical Islamism to flourish as the sole apparent alternative to the military-backed regime.

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[304] Strategic Exposure: Proliferation around the Mediterranean, Rand, Santa Monica, 1998, p.13

Although in varying, less acute degrees this same pattern – the stifling of pro-democracy, non-violent political opponents – exists in other countries of the South.

As a result, the most extreme forms of opposition, including the wholesale recourse to violence and terrorism, tend to prevail. It should be borne in mind that political Islamism is an identity-based nationalistic current. It emerged towards the end of the 1980s against the backdrop of a perceived loss of political legitimacy of existing regimes in the face of mounting economic and social crises that they had failed to prevent or to adequately address. And if the rejection of 'western' values consistent with their unquestionably totalitarian character of its radical varieties is obvious, it would be a mistake to see such movements as some kind of new 'anti-western international'. Radical Islamist movements are first and foremost nationalistic. This is clearly illustrated; for example, by the uncompromising pro-Morocco attitude of Moroccan Islamists as far as the Western Sahara question is concerned. The totalitarian leanings of radical Islamist movements constitute first and foremost a threat against the societies that they wish to control through the power of the (theocratic) state. It is not possible to counter their influence unless economic measures are combined with political reform that will allow for better governance. In particular, through freedom of thought and expression, and encouraging civil societies to freely and actively participate in the political life of their countries.[305]

### 4.3.3 The Mediterranean Dialogue

During the Cold War the Mediterranean would almost be exclusively thought of in NATO circles in terms of a relatively unimportant secondary front (the 'Southern Flank'). The only causes for the Alliance's concern would be the USSR presence in and posture on Greece and Turkey (USSR containment) and the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel (the Middle East conflict). Notwithstanding, due to the fact that most Mediterranean countries were non-aligned and relatively stable, the area would only receive the Alliance's limited and sporadic attention during the bipolar years. However, in the new context in the early 1990s, with the removal of the superpower overlay and the seeming withdrawal of Western political presence and lessening economical interests (except for energy), and with a grim socioeconomic prognosis facing the area in the coming years, the Mediterranean has become victim of a general destabilization.

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[305] Vasconcelos, Alvaro de, "Europe's Mediterranean Strategy, An asymmetric equation", 06/2002, IEEI, Lisbon, Available on Site: http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/

The early 1990s saw a rise in fundamentalist violence in Algeria, and an increasing proliferation of conventional arms and WMD, which have given cause for alarm both in southern Mediterranean as well as in Europe. Moreover, the already precarious situation in both Maghreb and Mashreq was further exacerbated by an acceleration of the world economy (leaving most of the southern Mediterranean countries at the sideline), by rapid demographic growth and by a growing ineptness of many southern Mediterranean states to provide needed public goods for their populations.

This led to that in the early 1990s a host of different European security providing organizations began launching different Mediterranean Initiatives. Italy and Spain, perceiving that the Alliance needed a counterweight to its focus on Central and Eastern European security issues, lobbied hard for the NATO to become more involved in Mediterranean security. As a result, a political dialogue with selected countries in the Mediterranean basin was opened in February 1995, thus acknowledging tentatively that security in Europe was also linked with the security and stability in the Mediterranean.

Five countries joined the Dialogue initially: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Jordan joined in November 1995 and Algeria in February 2000. The Mediterranean Dialogue started off with the limited objective "to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability."[306] This unassuming objective was both a reflection of the realization that many security problems inherent to the area could not be resolved within the framework of the Dialogue (ex. the Arab-Israeli conflict, non-proliferation etc.), or a recognition that the southern Mediterranean socioeconomic insecurities would be better addressed by more adequate institutions (e.g. the European Union). Moreover, without organizational experience in dealing with this particular set of Mediterranean non-member countries, the Alliance could not set more ambitious objectives for the Dialogue in that it first needed to explore the basis for possible security cooperation between the transatlantic community and selected countries Northern Africa and the Middle East.

[306] NATO Press Release, North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 1 December 1994



Figure 4. 2 Map of the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries

The Secretary General of NATO has recently recognized the new relevance of the Mediterranean for Western security. He identified five concerns that make the Mediterranean increasingly important: its potential for instability; terrorism; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and related Arab-Israeli disputes; WMD and missiles proliferation; energy. NATO and Western governments feel that the Southern Mediterranean countries face the same threats and risks they do. Thus they believe that the scope for security and political cooperation is even greater than before and look for chances to enhance existing frameworks of cooperation, such as the NMD.

Despite the convergence of interests in and challenges to national security, common ground in North-South security across the Mediterranean remains subject to limits. To understand how security cooperation can nevertheless be concretely advanced in the new situation, these limits have to be kept in mind.

The first limit regards the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and the state of tension that prevails in the region as a result of it. The conflict prevents Israel and the Arab countries from cooperating –even indirectly – in the field of security, that is in the framework of collective security organizations such as the NMD or the EMP. Furthermore, while Southern security depends to a large extent on the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is no apparent functional link between the chances for solving that conflict and North-South cooperation in the framework of collective security bodies. As a consequence, while bilateral military cooperation is more often than not welcome, collective cooperation may be accepted in principle but never becomes truly operational and constructive.

The second limit is the widespread perception of Western interference in the Arab world. Colonial legacies are far from being superseded. In the broad Arab and Muslim perception, Western interference is first of all attested to by the state of Israel, the poisonous tail of colonization. According to Arab public opinion and domestic opposition groups, largely shaped by nationalist and Islamist trends, interference is also attested to by the economic, cultural and political influence the West allegedly exercises on their countries and governments. With regard to governments, Western interference concerns domestic affairs - pressures relating to human rights abuses, political reform, economic conditionality etc. - as well as regional politics - political and military interventions in the region. Governments are affected not only by interference in itself but also by the negative impact such interference has on their public opinion. Security cooperation with the West cuts two ways for Arab governments: it reinforces governments in many respects, but at the same time, it may weaken them in many others. If mismanaged, relations with the West may destabilize rather than stabilize governments and countries.

Finally, this ambiguity in security relations with the West is reflected in the fact that whatever the security cooperation offered by the West to the Arabs, it is never fully inclusive. For sure, the agendas proposed by the West, such as the EMP and the NMD, are intended to avoid a sense of exclusion and to create, instead, a sense of inclusion. They are meant to provide the Southern countries with a say. They also provide some transparency. Still, they exclude all Arab influence on assessments and decisions. In fact, they fall short of a real partnership in the true sense.

However, in the presence of such stumbling blocks on the road to security cooperation, there are also a number of building blocks.

The first such building block is the danger for both the North and the South of the Mediterranean constituted by global terrorism. Until recently, terrorism used to attack Southern governments and generate spillovers in the North. Today, it attacks both Northern and Southern governments. Cooperation against a common enemy is needed. As NATO Secretary General noted in the statement mentioned above, "without a coherent strategy to combat terrorism, neither the NATO Allies nor their Mediterranean neighbours can be truly secure".

Second, cooperation against global terrorism cannot remain without effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Global terrorism draws large consensus in the Arab-Muslim world by construing its struggle as a contribution to Palestine's liberation from Israeli occupation. A renewed joint political effort by the West and the moderate forces in the South to provide a two-state solution is bound to undermine global terrorist claims. It is surely a cornerstone in the fight against it.

On the other hand, if the Western countries were to accept Al Qaeda's identification with the Palestinian national struggle this would play into the hands of global terrorism. A response of this kind would weaken moderate forces in the Arab and Muslim world and prevent any North-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

Third, security dialogue in the EMP and NMD may be limited in its effectiveness, but it has generated an important set of CBMs and the habit of cooperation, which could constitute a good platform for moving ahead.[307]

The Dialogue is largely bilateral (NATO – Dialogue country) in character, encompassing political dialogue and practical cooperation. The political dialogue is used to inform the southern Mediterranean partners about NATO, thus "achieving a better understanding and correcting any misperceptions about the Atlantic Alliance." The Dialogue also expects the Mediterranean partners to share with NATO their views on stability and security in the Mediterranean area. Up until the NATO Madrid Summit 1997 the political dialogue was conducted on an ad-hoc basis, while since, institutionalized periodic meetings between the Alliance and Mediterranean partners take place. The Madrid Summit also created the MCG, which now constitute the driving force behind the Dialogue, where the short term objectives for the Dialogue are set between Allies and Dialogue country (meeting in a 19+1 formula).

In terms of practical cooperation in security and defense-related areas, the focus of the Mediterranean Dialogue has mostly been on information, civil emergency planning and science. Participants from Dialogue countries have been invited to take part in courses at the NATO School in Germany and the NATO Defense College in Rome.[308] Moreover, in

[307] Aliboni, Roberto, "From Dialogue to Partnership. Security in the Mediterranean and NATO", Ibid, p.5-8
[308] NATO Fact Sheets, "The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue", Available on Site: http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/

1999 for example, NATO's two major commands (Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)) organized 49 specific military activities involving participation by Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This included the observation of PfP activities in the fields of search and rescue, maritime safety and medical evacuation, as well as exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief.[309] Another example of practical cooperation is the Sixth Fleet's regular West African Training Cruises that bring Navy-Marine amphibious ships and even Coast Guard cutters to various Dialogue country ports for teaching and training purposes.[310]

In spite of the Dialogue's predominant bilateral character, individual initiatives to expand activities between NATO and Dialogue countries at a multilateral level have been attempted. In order to enhance confidence levels among Mediterranean neighbors on the northern and southern shores, initiatives for multilateral political dialogue have been launched, inviting the Allies, Dialogue Partners as well as experts and analysts. A positive step forward was, for example, the initiative to hold a conference in Valencia 1999, organized by the Spanish government in cooperation with NATO. The Valencia meeting would endorse the concrete proposal to enhance the Dialogue's practical cooperation in terms of for example, civil emergency planning.

The Mediterranean Dialogue is thus, as we have seen, much more modest in extent compared to the EAPC/PfP; the main emphasis of the Mediterranean Dialogue being so far on political dialogue, diplomatic exchange and briefing sessions, while the practical cooperation facet of the Dialogue has until present been rather limited.

### 4.3.4 Towards Cooperative Security In The Mediterranean

The different outreach programs that have been created by the Alliance in the past decade are testament to the changed and changing nature of NATO in the 21st century. In the past decade NATO's member states have converted the Alliance into an instrument of cooperative security, intent on drawing its non-member neighbors into different mechanisms of engagement and cooperation. However, while the intention behind the creation of these cooperative security regimes has been laudable, how efficient have they been in achieving their objectives? In particular, how successful has NATO been in

[309] NATO Press Release "A reader's guide to the NATO Summit in Washington" 23-25 April 1999
[310] Kitfield, James, "Danger Zone", National Journal 29, May 10, 1997, p.25

fulfilling the objective of the Mediterranean Dialogue: to create "good relations and better mutual understanding throughout the Mediterranean, as well as promoting regional security and stability"?[311]

The West's interest in strengthening security ties with the Southern Mediterranean countries is clearly motivated in terms of stability, international governance, domestic and international security.

To be attractive, the prospect of NATO partnership should bring similar benefits to the Southern countries. For that purpose, the partnership should embrace three broad objectives:

1. An enhanced political dialogue that would give the Partners the chance to debate not only Mediterranean but also international trends broadly affecting regional and respective national security;

2. This political dialogue would serve to broadly strengthen joint assessment and action capabilities for managing international instability; on the other hand, enhanced operational cooperation in the military as well as civilian fields within the Partnership would serve to reinforce their joint crisis management capabilities. Both the political dialogue and their enhanced capabilities to participate in international crisis management would contribute to reinforcing Southern Mediterranean nations' international status;

3. Political dialogue and operational security cooperation would contribute to consolidating the Partners' domestic security and their capabilities for combating terrorism.

The achievement of these objectives requires institutional as well as operational measures of cooperation.

As far as institutional mechanisms are concerned, two main measures should be implemented. First, NATO should consider "involving interested Dialogue countries more closely in some activities of the EAPC". This involvement would give the Dialogue countries the chance to assess international security trends alongside Western countries in a

[311] NATO Fact Sheets, "The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue", Ibid

partnership role. It would begin to ensure the inclusiveness that Mediterranean relations lack today.

Second, a Mediterranean Dialogue Partnership (MDP) should be developed, drawing from the PfP experience and cooperative activities but specifically tailored to the realities of Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

To set this MDP in motion, there should be periodical meetings at ambassadorial level to consider a common enlarged agenda to be implemented by joint actions and measures. "The ambassadors should meet periodically (3-4 times a year) in a kind of 19+7 "Mediterranean Cooperation Council (MCC)", which, by its very denomination, would represent a regular political partnership between NATO and non-NATO Mediterranean countries".[312] This should include a meeting of the MCC at Foreign Ministers level, at least once a year. The MCC should also consider in the next three years to hold meetings at Defense Ministers level.

The NATO MCG should prepare the deliberations of the MCC. The latter would be committed to generating an agenda to be submitted to and jointly considered by the MCC. In doing so, it should keep in touch with the Dialogue countries' representatives in more or less formal or informal ways (seminars, routine diplomatic contacts and so forth).[313]

The relative success of NATO's flexible outreach programs in the post-bipolar era has been that "for the first time non-aligned countries have been able to institutionalize their relations with NATO countries without risking to be engulfed in Cold War rivalries."[314] The flexibility and inclusiveness of the Alliance's approach have thus enabled selected southern Mediterranean countries to, for the first time, formalize security ties with the North Atlantic community. Moreover, the Mediterranean Dialogue, similarly to the EAPC/PfP, has endowed NATO with a unique opportunity to mold the behavior of its neighbors at a bilateral or multilateral level, which in theory would allow the Alliance to exert a measure of positive influence on the development of the Mediterranean non-

[312] Aliboni, Roberto, "Between Dialogue and Partnership: What North-South Relationship Across the Mediterranean?" paper presented to the international conference on "Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: A Transatlantic Perspective", IAI, Rome, 21-23 March 2002, p.21-25
[313] Aliboni, Roberto, "From Dialogue to Partnership. Security in the Mediterranean and NATO, Ibid, p.18
[314] Guzzone, Laura, "Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?" International Spectator 35 (1), January-March 2000, p.91

members' foreign and security policy. Another isolated (but not conclusive) success of the NATO's outreach programs is that they have allowed for concerted efforts of the Alliance and non-members in the crisis management and peace support missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo. As it would appear, Allies together with European and Mediterranean non-member partners have converged on a commonly held aversion to the humanitarian costs of armed conflict and the need for peace support missions to intervene, whenever sanctioned by an international body such as the UN or the OSCE. And indeed, the Alliance has manifested great satisfaction over the fact that so many non-member countries sent troops to collaborate in the SFOR and KFOR missions, for example Egyptian, Jordan and Moroccan units participated in these missions.

Figure 4. 3 Egyptian SFOR Soldiers with Kosovo Refugees in Sarajevo

The practical cooperation initiatives proposed by NATO, in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue, have met a varied, but in general a reputedly fair reception among the Dialogue countries. Nevertheless, until recently southern Mediterranean countries' participation in practical cooperation activities open to them has been relatively low and varied greatly from one Dialogue country to another, due to the stipulation that all Dialogue activities are to take place on a self-funding basis. This has to some extent been remedied in the past few years, in that individual NATO members have taken upon

themselves to provide extra-official financial assistance to enable the Dialogue countries to participate. Another thorny issue between the NATO and Dialogue countries has been the differing and somewhat divergent north-south cooperation agendas. Finding common cooperation projects has thus been difficult, in that NATO's broader security agenda in the Mediterranean includes non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, while the broader security agenda of the southern Mediterranean countries involves migration and cultural security and economic problems.[315]

However, a much more important problem with the Mediterranean Dialogue has been its political dialogue. An integral part of the Alliance's cooperative security approach in the Mediterranean has been the intent to reduce feelings of threat and risks between the militarily superior Alliance and its militarily weaker neighbors through political dialogue, information and confidence building, i.e. thus 'achieving better understanding' and 'correcting misperceptions' about the nature and aims of the 'new' NATO in the post-Cold War era. The Alliance, however, has not managed to communicate to the Dialogue countries that it is today a fundamentally changed organization. The prevailing notion among Arab countries continues to be that the Alliance is a 'Cold War relic,' and the Dialogue an instrument that is currently used to subjugate security necessities in Northern Africa and in the Middle East to a European greater good. Southern Mediterranean preoccupations stem from what they see as apparent contradictions in NATO words and deeds. While the Alliance in the Dialogue professes friendship and a benevolent interest in the security and stability of its Dialogue partners, internal reform and isolated activities undertaken by the NATO or NATO countries seems to prove otherwise. A clear example is the NATO reform of its military command in mid- to late 1990s, which perceptively strengthened NATO presence in the northern Mediterranean. The fact that Mediterranean NATO countries (France, Spain and Italy) are strengthening their capacity for rapid intervention forces, monitoring and reconnaissance and in general the reinforcement of air-naval capacity in AFSOUTH have not been interpreted lightly by the Arab neighbors, who feel themselves being the target of these reforms.[316] The creation of the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR forces also gave credence to this feeling of being targeted. Moreover, NATO's ambition to undertake further out-of-area activities apart from the Balkans,

[315] Larrabee, Stephen, "NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas", Ibid, p. xiii
[316] Aliboni, Roberto, "Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Perceptions and Notions in Mediterranean Arab Countries", Columbia International Affairs Online 1/00, 1998, p.4

humanitarian missions as well as the list of risks for the Alliance mentioned in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept (WMDs, migration, drugs, organized crime and terrorism), are interpreted by the Mediterranean Dialogue partners as well as other southern Mediterranean countries as measures undertaken to justify any future potential transatlantic military intervention in the Maghreb or Mashreq, which would in effect mean an infringement on their national sovereignties.

# 5 VIEWS AND PERSPECTIVES FROM THE DIALOGUE COUNTRIES

## 5.1 SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COMPREHENSIONS OF SECURITY CO-OPERATION

The Dialogue countries still have considerable interest in building a more constructive relationship with NATO and in exploring opportunities offered within the framework of the initiative. But attitudes remain mixed, especially among the Arab members of the dialogue. The perceptions of the dialogue countries are shaped by two long-standing concerns: the Arab-Israeli dispute, and frictions in the broader north-south relationship. These concerns are reinforced by uncertainties surrounding the future role and missions of the Alliance as seen from across the Mediterranean. This last consideration is set to grow in significance, and could ultimately give the dialogue countries a stronger stake in the initiative.

"NATO has a negative image in the Southern Mediterranean" is another perception. NATO was established within the framework of the Cold War and was widely perceived as a military instrument of the West to suppress national liberation movements. The widely held belief in the Arab world that NATO was supporting France against the Algerians during the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962) reinforced this image. These images were outlined in a monograph issued 1957 by Boutros Ghali, the then Assistant Professor at Cairo University and later on the Secretary General of the UN. In this monograph he criticized NATO on grounds that it had reinforced the global bipolar division, provided a momentum to the process of armament, and weakened the UN. He hoped that NATO would disappear thereby enabling the UN to play a more active role in peace making. Abdullah Saaf warned that the negative perceptions of NATO resulting from the experience of the Algerian War are still high in the minds of the Southern peoples.[317]

After the end of the Cold War, these negative perceptions persisted as a result of four major developments: First, NATO's expansion of membership which was viewed as an attempt to perpetuate Cold War policies and reinforce Western strategic global control. The real objectives behind NATO's expansion were to contain Russia and Iran, to control

[317] Saaf, Abdullah, "Towards a Partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean Region", Konrad Stiftung, Cairo, 1996, p.76

the oil rich areas in the Caucasus and Central Asia, to contain China and" to prevent the potential emergence of a Sino-Russian alliance in the future. These objectives were viewed as detrimental to the ability of the Arabs to achieve a strategic equilibrium in the future. NATO's expansion will lead to a confrontation with the emerging Asian powers. These views are widely shared by Arab intellectuals that view NATO's expansion as a threat to Arab security.

Secondly, the establishment of the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR forces by four NATO members occurred without consultation with Southern Mediterranean states. Major-General Fakhr, a top Egyptian strategist, reflected the perceptions of the Egyptian strategic community when he argued that he is really worried about what was said regarding the extension of NATO membership and partnership.

Saaf expressed a similar opinion when he argued that the European policy of building forces for the purpose of military intervention in the Southern Mediterranean "has no future in the Mediterranean region. It will not be accepted by the public opinion in the area".

The third major development, which influenced the perceptions of Southern Mediterranean peoples were the statements of former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes suggesting that Islam had replaced Marxism-Leninism as the main alliance concern in the post Cold War world. These statements were articulated in conjunction with the debate triggered by Huntington on the dash between civilizations with special emphasis on the emerging confrontation between Islam and West. Claes statements were viewed as confirming Huntington's arguments and were widely used by Islamists in the Middle East to prove that the West was out to subjugate the Islamic world. The establishment of the European rapid intervention forces in the Mediterranean gave them an additional proof. Finally, the passive role of NATO in the early stages of the Bosnian conflict (1991-94), where NATO failed to protect Bosnian Muslims from the atrocities committed against them by the Serbs and at the same time prevented Muslim countries from supporting them.

As a result, the NATO-Mediterranean initiative was widely criticized by the majority of Arab strategic communities. In Egypt, Mustafa Elwi Saif criticized the initiative as (1) lacking a clear concept of Mediterranean security; and (2) being selective by including

only six countries thereby leaving other actors such as Syria, Lebanon, and Libya.[318] Another study on NATO's new roles was quite critical of NATO's Mediterranean policy arguing that:

> The main objective of NATO is to reach a specific agreement with some Arab countries which would secure the access of the CJTF to the military infrastructure of these countries ... and to monitor the flow of missile technology to Southern Mediterranean states which could threaten Northern Mediterranean countries, and to monitor also the possession of some of the Southern Mediterranean countries of WMD.[319]

However, a minority of Arab analysts contended that NATO's Mediterranean policy did not represent a threat to Arab security and it provided certain opportunities for future co-operation between Arab countries and the European Union. In July 1997, Boutros Ghali dismissed the argument that the objective of NATO's new policy towards some Mediterranean countries was to dominate them because these countries, in his opinion, do not constitute a real military threat to NATO.

Ahmad Nafeh argued that there were new forms of complementarity between NATO's new agenda and Arab interests. For example, NATO's new agenda focuses on combating terrorism and organized crime. These issues were of the concern of NATO and Arab countries alike. According to Nafeh, this requires a new Arab approach toward NATO. Such an approach would focus on maximizing the areas of complementarity and minimizing the negative aspects of this policy, if they existed.[320]

General Mohammed Shiyyab of Jordan also argued that NATO can play a positive role in stabilizing North-South relations across the Mediterranean, bringing expertise and credibility to bear in confidence building between the Arabs and the Israelis, and providing a link to a wider transatlantic security system spanning old regional boundaries thereby

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[318] Selim, Mohammed El-Sayed, "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century", St. Martin's Press, USA, 2000, p.140-141

[319] Gad, Emad, "The Impact of the Global System on International Alliances: A Study of NATO", Cairo, 1998, p.176

[320] Selim, Mohammed El-Sayed, "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century", Ibid, p.142

making an Israeli-Syrian peace more attractive.[321]

In Israel, the perception of NATO's role is quite different from the mainstream of Arab perceptions. Israeli strategic thinkers are more supportive of NATO's new role in the Mediterranean. Ambassador Hanan Bar On contended that the transatlantic component of Mediterranean security must and should not be ignored. Mediterranean security cannot be realized without a NATO role. He went on to argue that Turkey being a NATO member and at the same time a member in the Mediterranean co-operation could serve as a link between both worlds. This is the view articulated as well by the Israeli government. Israel views its inclusion in NATO's Med Initiative with six other Arab countries as a symbol of its regional acceptance and integration and finds some positive elements in NATO's designs in the Southern Mediterranean.[322] However, according to some RAND analysts:

> Israel is hardly enthusiastic about NATO's Mediterranean role. It will make no sacrifices to enhance the dialogue, will risk nothing and use few resources on its behalf ... it will support any dimension of the dialogue as long as it does not interfere with Israel's broader regional and extra-regional ties or relations.[323]

In Arab participating countries one can detect an asymmetry between governmental approaches and the majority views of NATO's Mediterranean role. The participation of six Arab governments in the dialogue is a strong indication that these governments perceive it in a positive framework. These governments view the NMD as a mechanism to secure the continued interest of the West in their economic prosperity.

Although the Jordanian, and Egyptian governments subscribe to this view, their perceptions of the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue have other dimensions. The Jordanians view the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue as a mechanism to boost their security in an environment ridden with multiple sources of threat. The Egyptians approach the dialogue within the context of its impact on their regional role, its relationship with the Arab-Israeli

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[321] Shiyyab, Mohammed, "Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East", Konrad Stiftung, Cairo, 1998, p.52

[322] Scheben, Thomas, "Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East", Konrad Stiftung, Cairo, 1998, p.82

[323] Larrabee F. Stephen, Green Jerrold, Lesser Ian O., Zanini Michele, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps", RAND, California, 2000, p.36

peace process and inter-Arab relations. The Egyptian government contends that any NATO-Mediterranean security co-operation involving the Arabs and the Israelis must be preceded by a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. They are critical of NATO's neglect of the pertinent territorial and economic concerns of Southern Mediterranean countries, emphasis on soft security issues, and exclusion of other Arab Mediterranean actors such as Libya and Syria. Such an approach derives for a strong perception of Egypt's regional leading role, and hence responsibility to articulate Arab views the projects designed to create a new regional order. Such articulation is viewed as essential if Egypt's traditional leading role was to continue. The Egyptians also call for a balanced and mutually beneficial dialogue. They contend that NATO should listen to proposals from the Mediterranean countries and make sure they are harvesting concrete benefits from it.

Despite the overall positive perceptions of the Arab governments participating in the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue, they kept the dialogue at a low profile and insulated it from the public debate. This is quite different from the experience of the EMP which was deliberately turned by most participating Arab governments into a public issue. The different approaches to the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue and the EMP reflect the mostly negative perceptions of NATO among Arab intellectuals and public opinion.[324]

## 5.2 POLITICAL OBSTRUCTIONS

The political impediments to a more active and effective dialogue are well known, and continue to emerge in official and unofficial discussions. The troubled status of the Middle East peace process has clearly been obstacle number one. It has made participation in the dialogue difficult—although not impossible—for Arab members in fora with Israeli counterparts. As a result, the confidence-building aspect of the initiative is not fully developed, and lacks a multilateral dimension—a key drawback, given the predominance of south-south risks in the Mediterranean security environment. The results of the 1999 Israeli elections, and promising indications on the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian tracks, hold the potential for change in the climate for all Mediterranean initiatives.

Lack of progress in the peace process also complicated north-south relations in a broader sense. Critics in the south often ascribed the stalemate in the peace process, especially on

[324] Larrabee F. Stephen, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.63-71

the Palestinian track, to lack of European and American pressure on Israel. NATO can be portrayed, however incorrectly, as a club of Western countries who have not done enough to foster resolution of the dispute.

In more specific terms, Arab-Israeli tensions also constrain the agenda for north-south security dialogue. The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles should, by any measure, be among the central issues for discussion in a Mediterranean setting. But WMD issues, for Egypt and other Arab dialogue states, are seen first and foremost through the lens of the strategic competition with Israel. European and American WMD concerns, by contrast, rarely focus on Israeli programs, concentrating instead on the risky combination of proliferation and unstable or aggressive regimes. Israel's unconventional capabilities are no more of a concern to most Western observers and policymakers than the nuclear arsenals of Britain or France. Many in the dialogue states view this as evidence of a double standard. The result continues to be a difficult dialogue on this important issue.

This is a strong perception among Arab elites that the West is pursuing Middle Eastern and Mediterranean policies which favor Israel. These perceptions are derived from a declared American commitment to Israel's superiority, and the EU' s two-fold policy in the EMP. Nassif Hitti has noted the imbalances in the European approach in two main areas, (1) while the North is telling the South to open up its markets for Northern industrial goods, it is telling the same South that it cannot open its own markets for the Southern agricultural products; and (2) the North calls for the barriers in the South to be brought down, but it acts as a fortress against human movement from the South by means of active discrimination permitting travel.[325] Egypt's Foreign Minister Amr Moussa criticized the EU for granting Israel a preferential treatment in its association agreement which it was not willing to provide to other Mediterranean partners claiming that Israel was a "special case". These perceptions are widely shared by most Southern Mediterranean intellectuals and political elites. It has led them to conclude that Europe was not concerned with establishing a genuine security system, but mainly interested in creating institutions to monitor the South, and that Europe's security policy carries little weight compared with its

[325] Hitti, Nassif, "Egyptian and German Perspectives on Security in the Mediterranean", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Cairo, 1998, p.39

economic concerns.[326]

The possible re-opening of Israeli-Syrian negotiations could change the landscape in the peace process. Movement toward a comprehensive peace would transform the outlook for the initiative. Under these conditions, the dialogue could even come to play a useful role as part of the peace process. Conditions that would allow for a full resumption of the peace process, including negotiations with Syria and Lebanon, might also allow for consideration of their membership in the NATO dialogue.

Apart from criticism arising from the peace process, NATO remains a controversial topic in most dialogue countries. Suspicion of an organization composed, as Middle Eastern critics might say, of former colonial powers and a leading actor in the Cold War, is not limited to uninformed public opinion. Many knowledgeable observers, including some political elites in the southern Mediterranean, remain skeptical of NATO as an institution. The Alliance role in defense of Muslim communities in Bosnia and Kosovo has not gone unnoticed. But many regret the delay in Western action in the former Yugoslavia. The active Western debate on international security sometimes produces analyses that overstate risks emanating from the Mediterranean, and may seem to imply the rise of a new Cold War along north-south lines.

Another perception was reinforced when Europe created the EUROFOR and the EUROMARFOR without consultation with the Southern governments. In fact, this has led a top Egyptian strategist to conclude that "the presence of foreign naval power in the Mediterranean constitutes a threat to Egypt's national security in the light of Western support to Israel".[327]

As the earlier discussion emphasizes, the question of how NATO is perceived is becoming more troubling as the Alliance evolves and takes on new functional missions. Differences within the Alliance may exist over such issues as the proper geographical extent of NATO responsibilities and international mandates, but to observers on the geographic periphery of the Alliance there appears little doubt that one way or another NATO will be playing a more active role outside the treaty area. Europe has elaborate security architecture and few

[326] Joffe, George, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Perspectives", Frank Cass, London, 1997, p.18-19

[327] Abdel-Halim, Ahmad, "Egyptian and German Perspectives on Security in the Mediterranean", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Cairo, 1998, p.22-23

threats. The southern Mediterranean has many security challenges and no functioning security architecture. For countries such as Israel, at one extreme, cooperation within a transatlantic security framework may be more attractive than participation in regionally based arrangements. For others—Egypt seems the exemplar—regional arrangements are attractive and a natural outlet for a very capable multilateral diplomacy. Smaller states in North Africa may wish to balance the public acceptance problems of ties to NATO with the desire for closer relations as a hedge against regional instability.

Southern attitudes toward membership in the dialogue are evolving. With the exception of Israel, there is a general sense that a more inclusive approach would be more natural in terms of Mediterranean geopolitics, and might also give additional weight to the southern side of the dialogue. As it stands, the initiative is of necessity a multi-bilateral discussion between a highly organized and capable Western institution and a group of states—some regionally powerful, others not—on the other side of the Mediterranean. The lack of a concerted approach, and the absence of some key regional states, is a source of reservation for some dialogue participants. Under current conditions, the inclusion of Libya, Syria, and Lebanon is probably impossible and unwarranted. As political circumstances evolve and with movement in the peace process the question of some form of participation for the Palestinians is almost certain to arise.[328]

## 5.3 PRACTICAL OBSTRUCTIONS

Comments from dialogue states reveal some further practical concerns.

First, as often noted, there has been no shortage of Mediterranean initiatives, including several with a security component. When unofficial, "second track" meetings are included, the variety of north-south in the Mediterranean is impressive. As most observers on both sides of the Mediterranean would agree, this level of activity is preferable to the strategic neglect of previous decades. But it does give rise to mounting confusion about roles and agendas, and as some frequent participants describe it, "dialogue fatigue."

Moreover, disenchantment with aspects of cooperation in one for a (e.g., the Euro-Mediterranean partnership) can easily affect the climate in other settings, including the NATO Initiative. Thus, discussions about regional peacekeeping may be influenced by the state of trade negotiations: both are part of the complex of north-south relations in the

[328] Larrabee F. Stephen, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p 29-31

Mediterranean, and both have consequences for security, broadly defined. Greater emphasis on practical cooperation in the defense area—a core competence for the Alliance—can help to differentiate the NATO Initiative from other activities.

Second, there is a perception, especially among the smaller dialogue states, that some exceptions to the self-funding principle must be made if the Alliance is serious about promoting the initiative. Participation by dialogue countries in programs at the NATO Defense College and Oberamergau has been good. But not all available places have been filled. Jordan, Egypt, and Israel were the only dialogue countries participating in courses at Oberamergau.

Third, there is some concern that dialogue countries have not been involved early or actively enough in the development of the initiative's work plan by the MCG. For example, some dialogue members were apparently unaware of details surrounding the establishment of NATO contact embassies in their countries. Greater dialogue-country involvement in the design of initiative activities would be welcomed and could generate additional interest in participation.

Fourth, some participants have raised the question of the appropriate level for the dialogue. Several among the dialogue countries feel that the symbolism of meetings at the Council level, at least on occasion, would make a difference in how the dialogue with NATO is received. At the same time, they are aware that an upgraded dialogue along these lines may only make sense in a true multilateral context (i.e., with both Arab and Israeli participation). Multi-bilateral meetings at this level are likely to prove impractical, given competing demands at NATO.[329]

## 5.4 BASES OF A SUSTAINABLE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND THE MENA REGION

### 5.4.1 Good Governance

#### 5.4.1.1 Arab States

Adopt reforms aiming at instituting:

- Freedom of expression and association;
- Separation of powers;

[329] Larrabee F. Stephen, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p 25-32

- An independent judiciary;
- An autonomous and representative legislative branch;
- Non-interference of the executive branch in the activities of civil society (including trade unions, political parties, NGOs…).

Those reforms must have concrete manifestations in the form of:

- An open debate of all public issues, including foreign policy, defence and internal security issues;
- Public scrutiny of the activities of all public institutions and personalities;
- Refrain from harassing citizens for their opinions, beliefs, and religious/racial/political affiliations.

#### 5.4.1.2 European Union

Not accept at face value reforms that are not effectively implemented.

Refrain from giving direct or indirect support to regimes that do not have practices compatible with good governance.

Keep in mind that a partnership implies that partners have the right to interfere in each other's affairs to the extent allowed by the partnership and that this principle must function as a two-way street.

To avoid the impression that one is being presumptuous, one may simply allude to the well-known and long-practiced principles of democracy, including:

- Accepting the universality of democracy;
- Abiding by the verdict of the ballot-box;
- Accept the supremacy of principles over egotistical interests.

Co-ordinate and harmonize social, economic and fiscal policies.

Co-ordinate foreign and defence policies with a view to:

- Achieve a peaceful and permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
- Reduce defence spending;

- Better protect Arab interests;
- Give greater weight to Arabs in regional and global organizations;

De-emphasize hard security and give greater attention to more serious threats and risks confronting the region, particularly water scarcity, food security, ignorance, poverty, social inequality, pollution, scientific and technological dependency…

### 5.4.2 Intra-Arab Partnership as a Step Towards a Euro-MENA Partnership

#### 5.4.2.1 Arab States

Activate instruments of Arab integration in various fields.

De-emphasize the role of territorial boundaries as an essential element of national sovereignty, thereby favoring:

- The resolution of intra-Arab territorial disputes;
- Freedom of movement of goods, capital and men;
- Making the Arab market more attractive to Arab and foreign investors.

Anticipate great foreign resistance to any move towards integration and unification.

Prepare for sacrifices should there be retaliation against such a move.

Make it clear that an eventual Arab CFSP is 'aimed at no one'.

Actively seek a genuine partnership between equals with any State or group of States willing to deal with Arab States as a group.

#### 5.4.2.2 European Union

Revise current membership in the EMP.

Liberalize the movement of all goods (including agricultural goods) and all factors of production (including labor). Invest in regional infrastructure (highways, railroads, telecommunications…).

Supply know-how as required.

Encourage Israel to revise its policy of forceful occupation of Arab lands.

Signify to Israel that it cannot expect unconditional support of its policies.

Reduce arms sales in the region to reduce tensions and eliminate the use of force as an alternative to peaceful negotiations.

Work towards convincing NATO allies to adopt similar policies.

Dismantle EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.

Play down/phase out/avoid contacts with military establishments that are not under the strict and effective control of democratically chosen civilian authorities.

Refrain from blocking Arab integration should it threaten to materialize.

Accept that the Arabs are entitled to bargain hard for achieving their interests.

Avoid actions and positions that may give the 'West' a negative image.

Actively encourage the merger of the Intra-Arab partnership and the EMP into a EURO-MENA Partnership.[330]

[330] Chourou, Bechir, "The Irrelevance of Security Issues in Euro-Mediterranean Relations", Ibid, p.10-17

# 6 FUTURE PROSPECTS

## 6.1 THE FUTURE OF THE INITIATIVE

Despite significant political impediments and a continuing degree of ambivalence on the part of participants, NATO's Mediterranean Initiative has served some very useful purposes. First, it has been a key vehicle for information sharing and dialogue with Mediterranean partners on the nature of the Alliance. This communication is especially important at a time when NATO is changing in ways that directly affect the Mediterranean security environment. The task of dispelling misperceptions regarding the Alliance is essential, and this information dimension—including the task of understanding strategic perceptions in the south—should remain a priority as the Initiative evolves. The establishment of Contact Point Embassies can make a special contribution in this regard. Second, the Dialogue provides a framework for confidence building that can be given additional substance, including a true multilateral form, as political circumstances permit. Third, the Dialogue has opened the possibility of moving from discussion to practical cooperation in areas of comparative advantage for the Alliance, and with interested partners.

Finally—and perhaps most important—the Initiative, including the establishment of the MCG, has encouraged Alliance members themselves to focus on Mediterranean security issues. The question of NATO's strategy toward the south is acquiring greater importance, and is reflected in the new Strategic Concept and post-Kosovo debates about the future of the Alliance.[331]

### 6.1.1 Longer-Term Vision

The core objective of political dialogue retains its importance, but the Initiative is now at a stage where further development is required if Alliance and Dialogue countries are to remain actively engaged. Defining a longer-term vision for the Initiative is essential. This vision should have the following components:

• Make the Initiative an integral part of NATO's own strategy toward the south. The new Strategic Concept places greater emphasis on new functional missions oriented toward the defense of common interests, as well as the defense of member territory. These new

[331] Larrabee F. Stephen, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.43

missions will be most relevant and most likely to be performed on Europe's southern periphery. The Initiative can play an integral part in assuring that NATO can perform these missions in a cooperative climate. This approach can parallel in some (although not all) ways the role of PfP and the EAPC in NATO strategy toward Europe and Eurasia.

• The military factor will have to be conceived on the basis of an aim to settle the conflict politically, whether it involves providing a military presence for a settlement negotiated in a pre-existing context (the peace process in the Middle East) or simultaneously negotiating the cessation of hostilities and the procedures for civilian and institutional reconstruction in the country concerned (the Bosniac and Albanian scenarios to some extent). The military engagement will vary in intensity from one situation to another: peacekeeping in the former case, a priori without the use of force; and in the latter restoring peace by coercive action at the outset, then peacekeeping afterwards. [332]

• Acknowledge the key role of the EU in the longer-term evolution of relations around the Mediterranean. Regardless of shortcomings, EU policies toward the Mediterranean will play a vital role in shaping the security environment—broadly defined—in a region where social and economic challenges predominate. A specific NATO-EU mechanism for coordination on Mediterranean issues may not be practical. The larger problem concerns the absence of formal mechanisms for NATO-EU coordination generally. A more active role for the EU in foreign and security policy will require (and probably encourage) closer coordination between the two institutions. It is essential that Mediterranean policy be made part of this larger NATO-EU agenda.

• Focus on areas of comparative advantage for the Alliance. The Initiative can usefully address "soft" security issues, i.e., nonmilitary risks. But these should not be confused with the broad gauge social and economic questions such as migration, trade, and unemployment that are more properly handled by the EU.

As the Initiative evolves, however, it can and should begin to foster practical cooperation in areas where the Alliance has a comparative advantage, from crisis management to civil emergency planning and defense. Military cooperation, including training and joint exercises where appropriate, will offer tangible benefits. It will help the Alliance to operate effectively in the south and contribute to regional security and confidence building.

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[332] Moya, Pedro, "NATO's Role In The Mediterranean", Ibid, p.10

Not least, it will also give key Alliance members, including the US, a greater stake in the future of the Initiative.

• Base future activities on a "cooperative security" model for the Mediterranean. After decades of neglect, the Mediterranean is becoming more central to strategic debates and defense planning.

It will serve the interests of NATO and its Dialogue partners to ensure that the Mediterranean is seen as more than simply Europe's "near abroad" or a logistical way. Most of the new risks in the Mediterranean are trans-regional and the stakes in addressing them are shared. A north-south dialogue about security should pave the way for more active cooperation.[333]

### 6.1.2 Policy Recommendations and Next Steps

• Reinforce the nongovernmental dimension. Resources devoted to information activities and outreach are well spent in an area where NATO is often misperceived, especially as the Alliance itself continues to change. Given the political climate in the Middle East, unofficial or "second track" meetings make a special contribution to a dialogue that can be difficult to conduct on a multilateral basis at the official level. Consideration should be given to establishing a "Mediterranean defense studies" network, bringing together experts from security institutes in Dialogue countries and on both sides of the Atlantic. The effect of this would be to give a transatlantic (and NATO focused) dimension to the existing and very useful EuroMeSCo network.

• Reinforce the Dialogue by making it more region-specific. General discussion about NATO and its role remains important. But Dialogue-country interests and NATO's own growing attention to the Mediterranean point to the need for a more region-specific agenda. This recognition implies a focus on key issues where concern is shared—even if perspectives may differ sharply: terrorism, energy security, refugee flows (rather than the more general issue of economic migration), civil emergency planning, and the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. A more region-specific approach would be encouraged by giving Dialogue countries a larger role in development of the MCG work plan.

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[333] Larrabee F. Stephen, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.43-45

• Provide for "variable geometry" in dialogue and cooperation. As the Initiative continues to evolve there will be differences in interest and enthusiasm among the Dialogue countries. This disparity is already evident. Countries with an interest in more active engagement should be able to pursue the Initiative within a more flexible framework. In short, cooperation should be developed on a case-by-case basis. Some countries such as Egypt and Israel may be ready for limited military cooperation, but others may not—and some may never be. Obviously, the desire to foster multilateral approaches will place limits on this differentiation, but the Initiative should not be a lowest common denominator for cooperation.

• Move toward to practical and defense-related activities. This is a leading opportunity for reinvigorating the Initiative with Dialogue countries as well as key Alliance members. The idea of a PfP for the Mediterranean is probably premature, and in any case some of the objectives of PfP in Europe do not apply in the Mediterranean. NATO membership is not on the agenda in the south. But PfP-like cooperative activities concerning defense can contribute to strengthening the Initiative.

Interested Dialogue partners could participate directly in training and exercise programs for peace support. This involvement would build on the experience of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Moroccan participation in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. In this context, the military activities conducted by ACE and ACLANT with Dialogue countries could be enhanced to include exercises with interested participants.[334] Air and maritime search and rescue would be a good starting point, together with noncombatant evacuation and refugee-control operations. Ultimately, it may be useful to establish more formal arrangements for the participation of Dialogue countries in regional peace support operations through CJTFs.

In this same vein, NATO should explore ways of applying its military expertise to the security problems of Dialogue countries in ways that are visible to public opinion. NATO could coordinate the mine-clearing efforts of member countries in Egypt as an activity undertaken within—or in the spirit of—the Mediterranean Initiative.

• Give the Initiative a parliamentary dimension. NATO's problem of public acceptance in the south extends, in many cases, to political elites. In several Dialogue countries,

[334] Bin, Alberto, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean", Ibid, p.27

parliaments now play a serious and legitimate political role. The debate on foreign and security policy, including relations with NATO, is also becoming more active.

The Initiative can engage these elites effectively by embracing the well-established Mediterranean Dialogue organized by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA).[335] Making this NPA activity a formal part of the Initiative would also contribute to rationalizing the many ongoing fora and would provide a coordinated framework for discussion of NATO-related issues in the south.

• Increase resources and make exceptions to the self-funding principle where necessary. Enlargement, Balkan operations, and an active PfP program place substantial pressures on NATO budgets.

But given the growing, functional focus on NATO missions oriented toward the south, additional resources for the Initiative would pay dividends in helping to shape the Mediterranean security environment. In particular, the MCG should consider establishing guidelines to determine when and how costs for Dialogue-country participation in Initiative activities can be covered by NATO. Exceptions to the self-funding principle will be necessary if the Alliance is serious about a more active program of Mediterranean cooperation.

• NATO's initiative aims at the outset to allay the suspicions of the southern countries regarding the Alliance's intentions. These suspicions spring from the military activities of NATO. Therefore they will not be removed by civilian co-operation only (information seminars, seminars on civil emergency operations, scientific co-operation, etc.) or diplomatic discussions, but by transparency and military co-operation. The NAC approved the study of such measures in the autumn of 1996, but the projects beginning to emerge in the summer of 1997 still seem very modest: with the exception of courses, little more is under consideration than inviting southern partners to send observers - but not participants - to PfP exercises.[336]

• Where possible, embrace existing bilateral (and multilateral) defense exercises. Alliance members already have an extensive and, in some cases, longstanding network of bilateral

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[335] Lunn , Simon, "NATO's Parliamentary Arm Helps Further the Aims of the Alliance," NATO Review, Winter 1998, p.22-28

[336] Defense News, "Spain Pushes Outreach to North Africa", 5-11 June 1997

defense cooperation in the Mediterranean. In many cases, multilateralizing these activities will be appropriate. But where expedient, consideration should be given to "capturing" joint exercises, exchanges, and other activities for the Initiative—in other words, giving them a NATO hat. Overall, this inclusion would be a very cost-effective way of giving substance to a cooperative security strategy in the south. Israel and Egypt would be central actors in this approach, but others, including Tunisia and Morocco, participate in bilateral programs that could be given a NATO dimension. At a minimum, much existing bilateral cooperation could be described as in the spirit of NATO's Initiative, along the lines of the practice in PfP.

• Resist the nationalistic reactions in negotiations on restructuring NATO forces in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, they must ensure that NATO is given structures enabling it to respond as effectively as possible to collectively identified risks.

• Combine new diplomatic efforts and specific measures by way of a process of military transparency. Further efforts by the Alliance are required to dispel the ambiguity affecting its Mediterranean policy; this takes the form of a contradiction, as it appears to the southern countries, between the dialogue in progress and other measures which seem threatening such as the reconfiguration of NATO forces in the Mediterranean theatre or NATO's non-proliferation strategy.

• Incorporate in its operational scenarios the planning of civilian assistance measures and procedures for restoring internal order in peacekeeping operations or peace enforcement. It should also involve in this planning both the signatories to the PfP and the Mediterranean countries likely to wish to participate in such operations under the aegis of NATO.[337]

• Keep a lookout for other security problems that might arise in the Mediterranean region and call for action on its part. The present absence of open military conflicts does not exclude the subsequent escalation of violence, as we have seen in Bosnia or as we might have seen in Albania in the absence of early international action. In addition, a worsening in the Middle East situation might well find expression in an outbreak of terrorism at the expense of NATO military installations in the Mediterranean.[338]

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[337] Moya, Pedro, "NATO's Role In The Mediterranean", Ibid, p.13
[338] Moya, Pedro, Ibid, p.8-9

• Consider establishing a crisis prevention and confidence building network for the Mediterranean. The rise of trans-regional security challenges, together with the fragmented nature of security cooperation in the region, argues for the creation of a communications network taking advantage of new information technologies.

• Equipment could be lodged in participating ministries, or in national security studies institutes. The purposes of the network could range from the dissemination of invitations for expert seminars to the pre-notification of military activities and coordination of civil emergency response.

• Make an enhanced Mediterranean Initiative part of the post-Washington Summit agenda. The Summit and the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept have been followed with keen interest by southern Mediterranean states. It is therefora a propitious time to pursue new steps aimed at reinforcing cooperation with Dialogue countries. Post-Summit outreach should highlight the development of a region-specific agenda and prospective PfP like defense cooperation activities. Above all, NATO should stress the importance of a practical, cooperative-security approach to the Mediterranean as an area of growing interest for the Alliance.[339]

## 6 2 ATTACHMENT

NATO and its Mediterranean Partners should consider adapting the following PfP activities to the MDP, which would be promoted through the MCC. [340]

### 6.2.1 Political and Security Related Matters

1. Specific political and security related matters, including regional security issues;

2. Conceptual approaches to international terrorism, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, including transparency;

3. Strengthening the consultative and cooperation process "19+1" and "19+7".

4. Consultations at Ambassadorial level on general and specific issues, including in "19+7" brainstorming format;

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[339] Larrabee F. Stephen, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Ibid, p.45-50
[340] Aliboni, Roberto, "From Dialogue to Partnership. Security in the Mediterranean and NATO", Ibid, p.7-9

5. Early consultations, particularly on regional tensions with a potential to grow into crisis;

6. Informal political consultations between NATO and individual Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries, as appropriate;

7. Meetings of Regional Experts Groups with experts from Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries once a year;

8. Briefing of Mediterranean Dialogue partners, including at the partner's request when possible, on decisions taken by the NAC and other important developments in the Alliance having direct bearing on security and stability.

**6.2.2 Education and Training**:

1. Establishment of a baseline of common knowledge, skills and experience for enhancing cooperative military relations;

2. Familiarization with and harmonization of armed forces' concepts, doctrines, procedures and structures, including the military's role in an democratic society;

3. Improvement of capabilities for the development and application of common doctrines and procedures for education and training, including fields such as language training, communications, crisis management and environmental issues.

4. Promotion of mutual understanding, interoperability and cooperation among Allied and Med Dialogue nation forces.

**6.2.3 Peacekeeping Activities**

1. Development of a common understanding of concepts and requirements for peacekeeping:

- Continue exchanges of views on concepts, terminology and national doctrines on peacekeeping within the NACC/PfP framework. Specifically:

- Discuss and exchange views on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping, including civil-military relations;

- Examine concrete lessons learned from peacekeeping operations.

- Promote contacts with the UN and OSCE on peacekeeping issues, and encourage exchanges of information on this subject with other international concerned bodies;

2. Cooperation in planning for peacekeeping activities

- Command and control: expert seminar, plus further development of the topic based on conceptual and practical experience.

3. Development of a common technical basis in peacekeeping

- Communications: Further discussion on the development of a peacekeeping communications concept and the possible implementation of a communications database.

4. Peacekeeping training, education and exercises

- Training Course Handbook:

- Training Standardization Pamphlet:

- Exercises: Consideration of lessons learned, based on after-action reports of NATO/PfP exercises and on national inputs on bilateral, multilateral and NATO/PfP exercises; and application in other areas of practical cooperation;

- Briefings by nations on national peacekeeping training.

5. Logistics aspects of peacekeeping

- Discuss the Compendium of lessons learned, based on national inputs;

- Discuss logistic peacekeeping issues in Senior NATO Logisticians Conference with Mediterranean Dialogue Countries;

- Organize a logistics peacekeeping exercise/seminar.

### 6.2.4 Defense Expenditures/Defense Budgets and Their Relationship with the Economy

1. Defense Planning and Budgeting;
2. Defense policy implementation in an open market economy;
3. Financing of defense;
4. Best practices in military budgeting;
5. Economic problems of long-term defense budget planning;
6. Defense policy/strategy/military doctrine;
7. Connections between Energy Supplies and State Security;
8. Economic implications of migration and refugees affecting security and stability;
9. Consequences of UN mandated economic sanctions on socio-economic aspects on socio-economic aspects of regional stability.

#### 6.2.4.1 Enhanced Military Cooperation

1. Defense Structures:

- The structure, organization and roles of Defense Ministries;
- The structure and organization of the armed forces including command structure;
- Reserve forces and mobilization;
- Personnel issues.

2. Military Reform:

- Promotion of civil-military relations in a democratic society;

- Legal framework for military forces.

3. Crisis Management;

4. Planning, organization and management of national defense procurement programs:

- Governmental organization for defense equipment procurement;
- Defense procurement planning systems and project management concepts;
- Defense procurement policy and procedures, to include legal framework, contracting methods and government/ industry relations.

5. Air Defense related matters:

- Air Defense concepts, procedures and terminology;
- Air emergency and cross-border air movements;
- Air Defense training concepts.

6. Air traffic management/control:

- Civil-military airspace coordination;
- Coordination of airspace requirements for multinational air exercises.

7. Standardization and interoperability:

- Material and technical aspects of standardization and interoperability;
- Procedures and in-service equipment in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other agreed exercises and operations;
- Military medicine.

### 6.2.4.2 Possible Military Exercises And Related Activities To Be Organized With Mediterranean Dialogue Countries

- Humanitarian Aid Operations;
- Disaster Relief Operations;
- Maritime Embargo Operations;
- Peacekeeping Operations;
- Peace Support Operations;
- Peace Enforcement Operations;
- Search And Rescue;
- Air delivery of Humanitarian Aid;
- Develop common understanding on Mid-Atlantic Rail Operations Study (MAROPS) and Exercise on Non-combatant Evacuations Operations (NEO);
- Develop common understanding on doctrine of military contribution to PKG and humanitarian aid operations;
- Familiarize Mediterranean Dialogue countries with and develop necessary background for exercising multinational PKG operations;
- Familiarize Med Dialogue countries with NATO maritime concept of embargo operations;
- Introduce Med Dialogue countries naval officers in NATO procedures for naval control of shipping;
- Promote forms of cooperation for river operations in PKG, humanitarian and Search And Rescue in the field of monitoring the embargo conditions;

- Maritime Exercise on Sanctions Enforcement, Search and Rescue, Embargo Operations, Convoy Operations;
- Multinational Medical Exercise Focused on Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Aid;
- Develop Joint Staff Procedures for a Joint Task Foce HQs, UN Mandated in a PKG Operations Out of Area and Studying practicalities and limitations of such an operation;
- Legal and Public Information Issues;
- Political-military issues;
- NATO Concept of Medical Operations and Terminology;
- Familiarize Med Dialogue Countries with NATO Staff Procedures;
- Logistics and communications for interoperability;
- Familiarize Med Dialogue countries on procedures in decision-making process activity related to Program Executive Officer (PEO) and Private Service Operator (PSO);
- Prepare Med Dialogue countries in Staff procedures related to the decision-making process on operational issues and military activities related to hypothetical PKG, PEO and PSO.

## 7. CONCLUSION

Is there a need for a new Mediterranean security strategy? The question is posed primarily by the end of the Cold War, during which Western NATO forces dominated the region, but did so primarily with a view of reducing Soviet pressure and influence. The profound changes in the European security climate over the last decade have also had impact on the Mediterranean Sea region. The increasing strategic importance of the region stems from the growing realization that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean.

However, to take a closer look at the Mediterranean is also to acknowledge that this region is currently facing a multitude of problems and challenges, which include socio-economic disparities, migration, terrorism, conflicts, and arms proliferation. The nature of the issues that characterize the Mediterranean security environment is by no means exclusive to the region. The specific geo-political and socio-cultural context, however, give the Mediterranean a particularly complex security identity.

Within this degree of diversity and challenges, there is a clear interrelation among the countries and regions insisting on the Mediterranean, which derives mainly from their growing interdependence. This interrelation suggests the need for a cooperative approach to security, one that privileges dialogue and cooperation. In fact, attempts at generating a dialogue in the region date back to the early 1970s, but these were relatively ineffective due to the conditions prevailing at the time of the East-West confrontation. The end of the Cold War, though, has lifted many of the constraints on the type of regional co-operation that can effectively address these challenges in the Mediterranean.

Since the end of the Second World War, and the emergence of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation thereafter, security in the Mediterranean region was too often perceived as an extension of the East-West standoff that divided the European continent. This region was seen as a perimeter to the Atlantic Alliance, a fact reflected by the Mediterranean being portrayed as NATO's "Southern Flank".

In recent years, a fundamental transformation in the Mediterranean security environment has occurred. The end of the Cold War and progress - albeit slow and uneven - in the

Middle East Peace Process have provided an auspicious environment for the promotion of new relations in the Mediterranean region. As a result, the Mediterranean has finally come to be regarded as a security region on its own merit, to be approached without intellectual or ideological barriers.

NATO's main task in the Mediterranean during the Cold War years was to contain the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. However, in 1990, with the end of the ideological differences between the East and West and after the Gulf War, NATO redefined and broadened its security concept.

1. Today, NATO looks to the Mediterranean as a region with its own specific dynamics and challenges, and with a still largely untapped potential for dialogue and cooperation in security matters. In this regard, one of the most important facets of NATO's reorientation in the post-Cold War security environment has been the decision adopted by the Alliance Foreign Ministers in December 1994 to establish the Mediterranean Dialogue.

2. The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue with seven non-NATO Mediterranean countries -Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria-is not a reaction to any particular event or threat but rather is part of NATO's overall cooperative approach to security. It stems from the realization that security in the whole of Europe is linked to the security and stability in the Mediterranean. As such, it is an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation.

3. The Washington Summit and the Kosovo experience have brought new attention to risks emerging from NATO's southern periphery. The new Strategic Concept identified the Mediterranean as an area of security concern, and the Alliance has reaffirmed its commitment to the existing Mediterranean Initiative. That said, the thrust of Alliance strategy toward the south would be defined in functional rather than geographic terms, with an emphasis on new missions—from countering proliferation risks to migration—that are more likely to be performed in the south than elsewhere.

4. As the Alliance moves to concentrate more on the defense of common interests and power-projection missions, it will naturally focus additional attention on the south—the Southern Region members, the Mediterranean states involved in partnership and dialogue

with NATO, and the wider region where developments can affect transatlantic security interests.

Key security relationships around the Mediterranean, both bilateral and through NATO, have not adjusted to reflect post–Cold War realities. These relationships require redefinition to provide a predictable basis for cooperation in addressing post–Cold War problems. NATO's new Strategic Concept will be helpful in defining a new agenda for defense cooperation.

An important problem for NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is that the Alliance operates on the principle of unanimity and there are still differences of opinion among NATO members on the security issues in the Mediterranean. While some of NATO's Mediterranean members - Spain, Italy and Portugal - are actively supporting a strong role for NATO in the Mediterranean, others interested more in the East and believe that there is no direct or clearly defined threat from the South.

NATO has taken steps to integrate Mediterranean security concerns and initiatives in its broader strategy. Given the security demands emanating from the region, a more focused strategy toward the south is called for. Such a strategy can be outlined in two dimensions: shaping the security environment, and hedging against regional uncertainty.

NATO strategy needs to address security problems around the Mediterranean in a proactive manner. Key tasks in this regard include the prevention and management of regional crises. Similarly, the Alliance needs to contain new security risks, especially those of a trans-regional character such as WMD and missile proliferation, spillovers of terrorism and political violence, and threats to energy security. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative can play a vital role in environment shaping by promoting security dialogue and engaging nonmember states in North Africa and the Middle East in defense cooperation, training, and crisis management activities.

The Mediterranean Initiative is first and fore-mostly political. It reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is indivisible, and that NATO can play a constructive part in enhancing security and stability more widely in Europe and its neighboring regions through programs of outreach, cooperation and partnership.

## APPENDIX A-THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY[341]

*Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949*

*The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.*

*They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.*

*They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :*

**Article 1**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**Article 2**

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**Article 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

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[341] NATO Handbook Documentation, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999, p.35-39

**Article 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

**Article 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security1.

**Article 6**

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

**Article 7**

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Article 8**

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

**Article 9**

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

**Article 10**

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

**Article 11**

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

**Article 12**

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including

the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Article 13**

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

**Article 14**

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

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**Footnotes:**

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey and by the Protocols signed on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Spain.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in cooperation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the ''Algerian departments of France'' no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing. Following this statement the council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

## APPENDIX B - 5TH HIGH LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN UN AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS[342]

### 29-30 JULY 2003, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

### NATO'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

### INTRODUCTION

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, all 19 NATO Allies have shown a strong determination to play their part in the fight against terrorism. They have demonstrated political solidarity, made concrete military and other practical contributions, and engaged NATO's 27 EAPC Partner countries and 7 Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The successful removal of Afghanistan's Taliban regime, the effective campaign against the Al-Qaida terrorist network, and the generally improved security situation in Afghanistan, are all due in no small measure to this support. Continued success in the fight against terrorism will be possible only through a sustained, co-operative effort by the broader international community, in which NATO will continue to play an important role as a platform for political support and multinational military action.

**Article 5:** On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks, and for the first time in NATO's history, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty declaring the attack against the United States as an attack against all 19 allies. Accordingly, each Ally committed itself to assisting the United States by taking such actions as each deemed necessary.

**Initial Support:** On 4 October 2001, in response to requests by the United States, the Allies agreed to take eight measures to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. These initial measures included enhanced intelligence sharing, blanket overflight rights and access to ports and airfields, assistance to states threatened as a result of their support for coalition efforts, as well as the deployment of NATO naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean and Airborne Early Warning aircraft to patrol US airspace.

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[342] NATO's Contribution To The Fight Against Terrorism, Available on Site: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/nato_contribution.doc

**"Active Endeavour":** Under this continuing maritime operation, underway since 26 October 2001, elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor merchant shipping. To date, more than 25,000 ships have been monitored, and those that raised suspicion have been signalled, shadowed and documented. In February 2003, the NATO Allies decided to extend the operation to include the escort of civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar and compliant boardings of suspicious vessels.

**"Eagle Assist":** From mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002, NATO AWACS aircraft helped protect the US homeland. 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO countries flew nearly 4300 hours and over 360 operational sorties. The operation was concluded by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of material improvements to the US air defence posture and enhanced cooperation between civil and military authorities, and following a US evaluation of homeland security requirements.

**NATO's Partners:** On 12 September 2001, all 27 of NATO's Partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council condemned the attacks of 11 September, offered their support to the United States and "pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism". NATO continues to engage its EAPC Partners in its response to terrorism, and is working to enhance its dialogue with 7 southern Mediterranean nations.

**NATO-Russia:** 11 September and the common challenge of terrorism have led to a new quality in NATO-Russia cooperation. The NATO-Russia Council launched in May 2002 identifies terrorism as one of several areas for NATO-Russia consultation and practical cooperation, such as developing joint terrorist threat assessments and analysing proliferation risks and possible counter-measures. Important achievements include two high-level conferences on the role of the military in fighting terrorism, and a disaster response exercise with several Allies and Partners held in Noginsk, Russian Federation, in September 2002.

**Balkan Terrorism:** NATO member forces in the Balkans have acted against terrorist groups with links to the Al-Qaida network. They continue to contribute to the campaign against terrorism by focusing on the illegal movement of people, arms and drugs, and by working with the authorities throughout the region on border security issues.

## STABILISING AFGHANISTAN: 'ENDURING FREEDOM' AND ISAF

A considerable number of forces from many NATO member countries have been involved in two concurrent operations: "Enduring Freedom", the US-led military operation in Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated multinational force deployed in and around Kabul to help stabilise the country and create the conditions for self-sustaining peace. The success of these operations depends critically on the participating Alliance member forces, and their training and experience in working together effectively within NATO, as well as with Partner countries.

**ISAF:** On 11 August 2003, NATO will take on the command, co-ordination and planning of the International Security Assistance Force ISAF IV, with Canada as a lead nation. Since the deployment of ISAF, in January 2002, it has been under the command of NATO members United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany and The Netherlands. NATO Allies provided 95% of the more than 5000 personnel in ISAF III. NATO, as an organisation, provided essential operational planning, intelligence and other support to ISAF III.

**"Enduring Freedom":** Most of the 19 NATO Allies have had forces directly involved in operation "Enduring Freedom". For example, special forces teams from the UK, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Canada have worked closely together with US teams. Planes and ships from Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK have conducted surveillance, interdiction and interception operations.

**NATO's Partners:** The efforts made by NATO over the past decade to engage its Partner countries, and the practical experience of Partner participation in Balkans peacekeeping, have contributed significantly to the success of the operations in Afghanistan. For example, NATO's Partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia have provided crucial basing and overflight. Romania has made available infantry, military police, NBC and transportation assets. Russia and Slovakia have been lending essential engineering support. And Sweden deployed an intelligence unit to ISAF headquarters.

## NATO'S PRAGUE SUMMIT

While NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism has already been significant, efforts are also underway to enable the Alliance to play its full part in what will inevitably be a long-term effort. NATO's Prague Summit on 21 November 2002 set the stage for an

Alliance with new members, enhanced relations with Partners, and improved capabilities. NATO Heads of State and Government also adopted a comprehensive package of measures that underline NATO's preparedness and ability to take on the challenges of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

**Military Concept:** NATO's new military concept for defence against terrorism underlines the Alliance's readiness: to act against terrorist attacks, or the threat of such attacks, directed from abroad against our populations, territory, infrastructure and forces; to provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks; to support operations by the European Union or other international organisations or coalitions involving Allies; and to deploy forces as and where required to carry out such missions. These activities will be supported by measures to further improve intelligence sharing among Allies.

**NATO Response Force:** Bringing together elite forces from both sides of the Atlantic, the NRF will be a technologically advanced and highly flexible force, ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the NATO Council. It will have initial operating capability at the latest by October 2004, and probably sooner, and full operating capability no later than October 2006. The NRF and the European Union's "Headline Goal" of creating a EU rapid reaction capability will be mutually reinforcing, while respecting the autonomy of both organisations.

**NATO's Military Command Arrangements:** NATO is making its military command arrangements leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable, with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions, including the fight against terrorism.

**The Prague Capabilities Commitment:** The PCC is part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. It sets out specific capability improvements relevant to all of NATO's missions, including the struggle against terrorism, and contains firm national commitments to acquire them. This effort will also benefit EU efforts to enhance European capabilities.

**Defence Against Weapons of Mass Destruction:** The Alliance's capabilities effort includes a focus on defence against biological and chemical weapons. Specifically, NATO has five concrete initiatives underway: a deployable nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) analytical laboratory; an NBC event response team; a virtual centre of excellence for NBC weapons defence; a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile; and a disease surveillance system.

**Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism:** The PAP-T provides a framework document for NATO-Partner cooperation on terrorism, defining partnership roles as well as instruments for fighting terrorism and managing its consequences. NATO's 7 Mediterranean Dialogue partners participate in activities under the PAP-T on a case-by-case basis.

**Protection of Civilian Populations:** NATO Allies and Partners are working together to improve civil preparedness against, and manage the consequences of, possible terrorist attacks with chemical, biological and radiological agents. They have, as a first step, established an inventory of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available to assist stricken nations.

**Missile Defence:** Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence.

**Cyber-defence:** Efforts are also underway within the Alliance to better protect against and otherwise prepare for a possible disruption of NATO and national critical infrastructure assets, including information and communications systems.

## COOPERATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Terrorism epitomises the new security threats we face. Like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime and trafficking, the new threats respect no borders. In order to fight these transnational threat effectively, there is no alternative to deeper international cooperation, including, crucially, between international organisations.

NATO is keen to deepen its relations with other international organisations so that information is shared and appropriate action taken more effectively in our common fight

against terrorism and other threats and challenges. The Alliance and the European Union are considering ways to improve co-operation in these areas. NATO contributes actively to the work of the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee, and works closely with the UN in the Balkans. There are regular consultations between the Alliance and the OSCE. And NATO works together with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to improve civil-military co-ordination in air traffic control.

These are steps in the right direction. The cooperation in the Balkans over the past eight years, between the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE and many non-governmental organisations, has delivered concrete results to the countries of that troubled region: growing peace and prosperity, and the prospect of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. That success must serve as a model, and an inspiration, for more, better and deeper cooperation between international organisations as we face new challenges to our common peace and security.

## APPENDIX C - THE BARCELONA DECLARATION[343]

## ADOPTED AT THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE

## (27 AND 28 NOVEMBER 1995)

The Council of the European Union, represented by its President, Mr Javier SOLANA, Minister [or Foreign Affairs of Spain,

The European Commission, represented by Mr Manuel MARIN, Vice-President,

Germany, represented by Mr Klaus KINKEL, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Algeria, represented by Mr Mohamed Salah DEMBRI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Austria, represented by Mrs Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Belgium, represented by Mr Erik DERYCKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Cyprus, represented by Mr Alecos MICHAELIDES, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Denmark, represented by Mr Ole Loensmann POULSEN, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Egypt, represented by Mr Amr MOUSSA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Spain, represented by Mr Carlos WESTENDORP, State Secretary for Relations with the European Community,

Finland, represented by Mrs Tarja HALONEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

France, represented by Mr Herve de CHARETTE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Greece, represented by Mr Karolos PAPOULIAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

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[343] Gillespie, Richard, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Perspectives", Frank Cass, London, p.177-187

Ireland, represented by Mr Dick SPRING, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Israel, represented by Mr Ehud BARAK, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Italy, represented by Mrs Susanna AGNELLI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Jordan, represented by Mr Abdel-Karim KABARITI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Lebanon, represented by Mr Fares BOUEZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Luxembourg, represented by Mr Jacques F. POOS, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Cooperation,

Malta, represented by Prof. Guido DE MARCO, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Morocco, represented by Mr Abdellatif FILALI, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

the Netherlands, represented by Mr Hans van MIERLO, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Portugal, represented by Mr Jaime GAMA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

the United Kingdom, represented by Mr Malcolm RIFKIND QC MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,

Syria, represented by Mr Farouk AL-SHARAA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Sweden, represented by Mrs Lena HJELM-WALLEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Tunisia, represented by Mr Habib Ben YAHIA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Turkey, represented by Mr Deniz BAYKAL, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

the Palestinian Authority, represented by Mr Yassir ARAFAT, President of the Palestinian Authority, taking part in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona:

- stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighborhood and history;

- aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response;

- resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants;

- regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their specific nature;

- stressing that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success. The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this implies;

- convinced that the general ohjective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership,

hereby agree to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants - the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social,

cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

## POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: ESTABLISHING A COMMON AREA OF PEACE AND STABILITY

The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability.

In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of principles to:

- act in accordance with the United Nations Chm1er and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party;

- develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system;

- respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex; give favourable consideration, through dialogue between the parties, to exchanges of information on matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia;

- respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance,

racism and xenophobia. The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

- respect their sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty, and fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under international law;

- respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States, as reflected in agreements between relevant parties;

- refrain, in accordance with the rules of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another partner; respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;

- settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law;

- strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure;

- fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects;

- promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favor of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non--proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

- Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.

- Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW.

- Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation

- Consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

**ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PARTNERSHIP: CREATING AN AREA OF SHARED PROSPERITY**

The participants emphasize the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity.

The partners acknowledge the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region. They agree, in view of the importance of their relations, to continue the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent fora.

Noting that the partners have to take up common challenges, albeit to varying degrees, the participants set themselves the following long-term objectives:

- acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development;

- improvement of the living conditions of their populations, increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region;

- encouragement of regional cooperation and integration.

With a view to achieving these objectives, the participants agree to establish an economic and financial partnership which, taking into account the different degrees of development, will be based on:

- the progressive establishment of a free-trade area;

- the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas;

- a substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners.

**A. FREE-TRADE AREA**

The free-trade area will be established through the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and free-trade agreements between partners of the European Union. The parties have set 2010 as the target date for the gradual establishment of this area which will cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the WTO.

With a view to developing gradual free trade in this area: tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be progressively eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners; taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural policies allow and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotiations, trade in agricultural products will be progressively liberalized through reciprocal preferential access among the parties; trade in services including right of establishment will be progressively liberalized having due regard to the GATS agreement.

The participants decide to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through

- the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition; the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development;

- the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. They will likewise endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the neediest populations;

- the promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology.

## B. ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND CONCERTED ACTION

Cooperation will be developed in particular in the areas listed below and in this respect the participants:

- acknowledge that economic development must be supported both by internal savings, the basis of investment, and by direct foreign investment. They stress the importance of creating an environment conducive to investment, in particular by the progressive elimination of obstacles to such investment which could lead to the transfer of technology and increase production and exports;

- affirm that regional cooperation on a voluntary basis, particularly with a view to developing trade between the partners themselves, is a key factor in promoting the creation of a free trade area;

- encourage enterprises to enter into agreements with each other and undertake to promote such cooperation and industrial modernization by providing a favourable environment and regulatory framework. They consider it necessary to adopt and to implement a technical support programme for SMEs;

- emphasize their interdependence with regard to the environment, which necessitates a regional approach and increased cooperation, as well as better coordination of existing multilateral programmes, while confirming their attachment to the Barcelona Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan. They recognize the importance of reconciling economic development with environmental protection, of integrating environmental concerns into the relevant aspects of economic policy and of mitigating the negative environmental consequences which might result. They undertake to establish a short and medium-term priority action programme, including in connection with combating desertification, and to concentrate appropriate technical and financial support on those actions;

- recognize the key role of women in development and undertake to promote their active participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment;

- stress the importance of the conservation and rational management of fish stocks and of the improvement of cooperation on research into stocks, including aquaculture, and undertake to facilitate scientific training and research and to envisage creating joint instruments;

- acknowledge the pivotal role of the energy sector in the economic Euro-Mediterranean partnership and decide to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies. They also decide to create the appropriate framework conditions for investments and the activities of energy companies, cooperating in creating the conditions enabling such companies to extend energy networks and promote link-ups;

- recognize that water supply together with suitable management and development of resources are priority issues for all Mediterranean partners and that cooperation should be developed in these areas;

- agree to cooperate in modernizing and restructuring agriculture and in promoting integrated rural development. This cooperation will focus in particular on technical assistance and training, on support for policies implemented by the partners to diversify production, on the reduction of food dependency and on the promotion of environment-

friendly agriculture. They also agree to cooperate in the eradication of illicit crops and the development of any regions affected.

The participants also agree to cooperate in other areas and, to that effect:

- stress the importance of developing and improving infrastructures, including through the establishment of an efficient transport system, the development of information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. They agree to draw up a programme of priorities for that purpose;

- undertake to respect the principles of international maritime law, in particular freedom to provide services in international transport and free access to international cargoes. The results of the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations on maritime transport services being conducted within the WTO will be taken into account when agreed;

- undertake to encourage cooperation between local authorities and in support of regional planning;

- recognizing that science and technology have a significant influence on socio-economic development, agree to strengthen scientific research capacity and development, contribute to the training of scientific and technical staff and promote participation in joint research projects based on the creation of scientific networks;

- agree to promote cooperation on statistics in order to hannonize methods and exchange data.

## C. FINANCIAL COOPERATION

The participants consider that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership require a substantial increase in financial assistance, which must above all encourage sustainable indigenous development and the mobilization of local economic operators. They note in this connection that:

- the Cannes European Council agreed to set aside ECU 4.685 million for this financial assistance in the form of available Community budget funds for the period 1995-1999.

This will be supplemented by EIB assistance in the form of increased loans and the bilateral financial contributions from the Member States;

- effective financial cooperation managed in the framework of a multiannual programme, taking into account the special (characteristics of each of the partners is necessary;

- sound macro-economic management is of fundamental importance in ensuring the success of the partnership. To this end they agree to promote dialogue on their respective economic policies and on the method of optimizing financial cooperation.

**PARTNERSHIP IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN AFFAIRS: DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCES, PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CULTURES AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETIES**

The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.

In this spirit, the participants agree to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. To this end:

- they reaffirm that dialogue and respect between cultures and religions are a necessary precondition for bringing the peoples closer. In this connection they stress the importance of the role the mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment;

- they stress the essential nature of the development of human resources, both as regards the education and training of young people in particular and in the area of culture. They express their intent to promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respecting the cultural identity of each partner, and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes; in this context, the partners undertake to adopt measures to facilitate human exchanges, in particular by improving administrative procedures;

- they underline the importance of the health sector for sustainable development and express their intention of promoting the effective pallicipation of the community in operations to improve health and well-being;

- they recognize the importance of social development which, in their view, must go hand in hand with any economic development. They attach particular importance to respect for fundamental social rights, including the right to development;

- they recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples; they accordingly agree to strengthen and/or introduce the necessary instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in development within the framework of national laws: leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, the trade unions and public and private enterprises;

- on this basis, they recognize the importance of encouraging contacts and exchanges between young people in the context of programmes for decentralized cooperation;

- they will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society;

- they recognize that current population trends represent a priority challenge which must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic take-off;

- they acknowledge the importance of the role played by migration in their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognized under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective territories;

- in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation. In this context, the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in

order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of the European Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes;

- they agree to strengthen cooperation by means of various measures to prevent terrorism and fight it more effectively together;

- by the same token they consider it necessary to fight jointly and effectively against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption; they underline the importance of waging a determined campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to cooperate to that end.

**FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE**

The participants:

- considering that the Barcelona Conference provides the basis for a process, which is open and should develop;

- reaffirming their will to establish a partnership based on the principles and objectives defined in this Declaration;

- resolved to give practical expression to this Euro-Mediterranean Partnership;

- convinced that, in order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to continue the comprehensive dialogue thus initiated and to carry out a series of specific actions;

hereby adopt the attached work programme:

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs will meet periodically in order to monitor the application of this Declaration and define actions enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved.

The various activities will be followed by ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts, exchanges of experience and information, contacts between those active in civil society and by any other appropriate means.

Contacts between parliamentarians, regional authorities, local authorities and the social partners will be encouraged.

A "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" at senior-official level, consisting of the European Union Troika and one representative of each Mediterranean partner, will hold regular meetings to prepare the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, take stock of and evaluate the follow-up to the Barcelona process" and all its components and update the work programme.

Appropriate preparatory and follow-up work for the meetings resulting from the Barcelona work programme and from the conclusions of the "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" will be undertaken by the Commission departments.

The next meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs will be held in the first semester of 1997 in one of the twelve Mediterranean partners of the European Union, to be determined through further consultations.

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