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YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**CHANGING USA'S FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION**

by

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
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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AIPAC</b>	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
<b>AWACS</b>	Airborne Warning and Control System
<b>BTU</b>	British Thermal Units
<b>CENTO</b>	Central Treaty Organizations
<b>CFE</b>	Conventional Forces in Europe
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CSP</b>	Center for Security Policy
<b>DOE</b>	Department of Energy
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>eg</b>	For example
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FSU</b>	Former Soviet Union
<b>FTA</b>	Free Trade Agreement
<b>GCC</b>	Gulf Cooperation Council
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>JEDG</b>	Joint Economic Development Group
<b>JINSA</b>	Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
<b>JPMC</b>	Joint Political and Military Group
<b>JSAPG</b>	Joint Security Assistance Planning Group
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum Of Understanding
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament

<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBC</b>	Nuclear Biological Chemical
<b>NPT</b>	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council
<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>OPEC</b>	Organizations of Petroleum Exporting Countries
<b>PAC</b>	Political Action Committee
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organization
<b>SAM</b>	Surface to Air Missiles
<b>SAVAK</b>	Secret Police, Intelligence Agencies (Shah Time)
<b>SCR</b>	Security Council Resolution
<b>SEATO</b>	South East Asian Treaty Organization
<b>TGNA</b>	Turkish Great National Assembly
<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNIKOM</b>	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WWI</b>	World War I
<b>WWII</b>	World War II
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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## **ABSTRACT**

Today the terms called “Near East” and “Middle East” have come to be used interchangeably, but generally the term with Middle East ; considered to states consist of the independent countries of Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, and lying along the coast of Arabian Peninsula. And this area, for American policymakers has often been a headache, sometimes a nightmare, and each president has applied his own policy for the Middle East from Truman to Bush.

The United States has five fundamental interest in the Middle east: Oil of the region, especially the Arabian peninsula; The survival and security of the state of Israel; Preventing the other powers from dominating the area; Preventing, or at least managing, the spread of WMD and the fulfillment, so far as possible, of certain principles, including the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and the right of peoples to self-determination. Each one of these interest, taken alone, gives the United States a vital concern with the future of the Middle East; taken together, and considering as well the extreme volatility of the unresolved Arab-Israel conflict, they make the Middle East the most important single region in the world from the standpoint of American interest- and the most dangerous.

This thesis has sought to understand the complex and, at times, bewildering policy of USA on the Middle East, in particular, towards the policy of Israel, oil and The Gulf War.

## ÖZET

Günümüzde Yakınođu ve Ortadođu terimleri birbirleri yerine kullanıla gelmektedir, fakat genel olarak Ortadođu terimiyle; Türkiye Ürdün, Lübnan, İnan, Irak, İsrail, Yemen, Kuveyt, B.A.E., Mısır, Suudi Arabistan ve Arabistan Yarımadası'ndaki bağımsız diđer devletler dikkate alınmaktadır. Bu bölge Amerikan stratejistleri için çođu zaman bir baş ađrısı bazen de bir kabus olmuştur ve Truman'dan Bush'a kadar bütün Amerikan başkanları kendi politikalarını uygulamışlardır.

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Ortadođu Bölgesi'nde beş temel çıkara sahiptir; Özellikle Arabistan Yarımadası olmak üzere bölgenin petrolü; İsrail Devleti'nin bekası ve güvenliđi; Diđer güçlerin bölgeye hakim olmasının engellenmesi; Kitle imha silahlarının yayılmasının engellenmesi veya en azından yönetilmesi; İmkan dahilinde, güç kullanarak sınırların deđişiminin kabul edilemezliđi, uluslararası antlaşmazlıkların barışçı yollardan çözümü ve self-determinasyon hakkı. Bu çıkarların hepsi, tek başına ele alındığında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne Ortadođu'nun geleceđi ile ilgili hayati endişe vermektedir. Bu sorunlar bir araya getirilir, ve çözölemeyen Arap-İsrail antlaşmazlıđındaki büyük deđişkenlikte düşünölürse, bütün bunlar Ortadođu Bölgesi'ni Amerikan çıkarları göz önüne alındığında, dünyadaki en önemli ve en tehlikeli bölge haline getirmektedir.

Tez özellikle İsrail, petrol ve Körfez Savaşı politikaları olmak üzere Amerika'nın sofistike ve aynı zamanda şaşırtıcı Ortadođu politikasını incelemeye çalışmaktadır.

## INTRODUCTION

Great powers concerned with the Middle East have long formulated foreign policies based on geographical considerations. Even the term “Middle East” was first used in a geostrategic foreign-policy context. In 1902, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote “The Persian Gulf and International Relations.” His Middle East was the area that fanned out from the Persian Gulf; when this usage caught on, a tripartite breakdown of Near, Middle, and Far East prevailed for a time. An American strategist and author of the earlier ‘The Influence on Sea Power Upon History (1890), Mahan insisted that Britain would need strong naval bases in the Persian Gulf in order to fend off a likely land-based push from Russia.<sup>1</sup>

Two years later, Sir Halford John Mackinder presented a paper on “The Geographical Pivot of History” before the Royal Geographical Society in London, in which he maintained that control of the Eurasian “heartland” could lead to world supremacy. Mahan and Mackinder represent opposite poles in the strategic debate over the relative advantages of sea power and control of coastlands, on die one hand, as opposed to land power and control of the “heartland” on the other. Such thinking- to simplify a complex and at times rather occult reasoning-from-geography--has influenced great-power strategic thinking about the Middle East.

Geography, seen from this perspective, has willed that the Middle East, where Europe, Asia, and Africa meet, should become a major hub for world commerce and confrontation. Moreover, the land and sea routes both within and through the Middle East are studded with strategic narrows, control of which decides who has access. For example, the status of the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles- Sea of Marmara -Bosphorus), which controls communication between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, occupied many diplomat and scholar throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Turkish straits resurfaced as a diplomatic flash-point when the end of the Second World War brought Soviet pressure on Turkey to offer the U.S.S.R. major concessions there. That incident, in turn, was a major step toward bringing the Cold War to the Middle East.

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Persian Gulf And International Relations”, National Review, London September, 1902, p.26-45

No less significant in modern history has been the Suez Canal. Britain first opposed the building of the canal, which opened in 1869, then in 1875 became a major share-holder by buying the cash-poor Egyptian khedive's shares in the Suez Canal Company. Britain thereafter moved on—largely from concern about canal security—to occupy Egypt in 1882. British troops were to remain in Egypt until early 1956. Only months later, Britain attempted (with France and Israel) a reoccupation of Egypt in an invasion appropriately dubbed the Suez War.

The “lifeline to India” strategic thinking does, in fact, provide a chronological coherence to Britain's growing Middle Eastern imperial holdings: Malta wrested from the French in 1800 (Napoleon's 1798 occupation of Egypt having stirred Britain to action), Aden taken as early as 1839 (important as a coaling station on the route to India), and Cyprus ceded by the Ottomans to Britain in 1878. Thereafter, and with the Suez Canal built and Britain in control of Egypt after 1882, the long-standing British support of the Ottoman Empire could give way to a strategy of drawing a line farther south to protect imperial communications. After the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury mused that perhaps Britain had backed the wrong horse (the Ottoman Empire). What better replacement horse than Egypt and the immediately surrounding areas? From just such geopolitical thinking emerged Britain's Arab policy, including an interest in Palestine (achieved after the First World War) in order to secure in-depth protection of the canal.

Control of the Middle East, or denying control of this area to the enemy, has, in short, figured prominently in the strategic thinking of the great powers (or since two centuries, and has made its geographical configurations well known to generations of Western strategic planners).

The military history of the Middle East during the two world wars, in an area peripheral in comparison with the European fronts, also demonstrates this geopolitical thinking. During the First World War, for example, Churchill supported the Turkish Straits campaign (1915-1916), a bold and ill-fated Allied effort to knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war and link up with Russia. Then, during the Second World War he defended the strategy of attacking the “soft underbelly” of Axis Europe from the Middle East. To this day some historians single out the 1942 battle of El Alamein (in Egypt, sixty miles west of

Alexandria) as being, along with the Soviet victory over Stalingrad at the same time, the turning point of the Second World War. The battle of El Alamein, important as it was, pales in comparison with the Nazi-Soviet struggle at Stalingrad in terms of deciding the war; but certain military historians argue that Hitler's fatal military mistake was the divert one of his best generals, Rommel, and his Africa Corps to the Middle East. If Rommel and those German troops tied up in Northern Africa had been on the Russian front, the Nazis might have prevailed. In any case, the perception of the Middle East as a critical strategic area has survived to this day, and the Middle East did provide a critical corridor during the Second World War for Allied supplies to reach the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

In short, the actual geographical configuration of the Middle East as conceptualized in ancient great-power thinking about that geography provides a meta-narrative in which strategic control of certain critical spaces determines the fate of nations (Turkish Straits, Suez, the northern tier, to cite only the more prominent). This century has added yet another geographical reality and perception: the Middle East as the world's largest reservoir of petroleum essential to fuel the world's economies. The states that border the Persian Gulf alone (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) possess an estimated two-thirds of the world's proven reserves and account for just under a quarter of world production.

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<sup>2</sup> L. Carl Brown, *Diplomacy in the Middle East*, L.B. Tauris Publishers, London and New York, 2001, p.13-15

# 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF USA FOREIGN POLICY

## 1.1 THE HISTORICAL HORIZONS TO BECOMING A SUPER POWER

### 1.1.1 Exploration and Colonization (Beginnings-1765)

#### 1.1.1.1 The First Americans

A long time ago North America was very different from the way it is today. There were no highways, cars, or cities. There were no schools, malls, or restaurants. But even long, long ago, there were still communities. Communities are where a group of people work, lives, and have fun together. People made their own homes, food, and clothing from the plants and animals they found around them. These first Americans descended, or came, from cave men in Asia. These were the first people to live in North America. That is why we call them Native Americans. These people have lived in North America for thousands of years, and there are still Indian communities today.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 1.1 The first Americans<sup>4</sup>

Excavations under way in the eastern US and throughout South America hint that human's arrival date may have to be pushed back to as far as 20.000 or even 40.000 years ago. Such discoveries may very well do more than just alter our understanding of how long people have lived in the Americas. With every new artifact, researchers like Dillehay are slowly piecing together more about the day-to-day lives of the early Americans: how they hunted,

<sup>3</sup> "The First Americans", Available on site: <http://www.germantown.k12.il.us/html/intro.html>

<sup>4</sup> Image Credit by Pamela Patrick, Available on site: <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?article> and <http://www.germantown.k12.il.us/html/intro.html>

what plants they ate, how they moved across vast stretches of land-in short, what life was really like for those men, women and children who originally settled in the New World.<sup>5</sup>




Figure 1.2 Early sites in the Americas<sup>6</sup>

### 1.1.1.2 Colonial Beginnings and English Colonies

The development of the North American regions which today fall within the territory of Canada is rooted in the era of European colonial expansion into the New World, which began in the late 16th Century, the early course of this development was shaped by a great many different influences, but most of them can be assigned to one or other of two general categories: the natural environment of North America and the policies pursued by European imperial powers in their efforts to exploit that environment to serve their own interests.

By 1621, European navigators had a workable knowledge of most of the east coast of North America and the islands of the Caribbean. They were by then well aware of the fact that a very large land mass obstructed the western route to the riches of Asia which they were still preoccupied with gaining easier access to. There were, however, tantalizing prospects of finding a great waterway leading through the Americas, the fabled ‘North-West Passage.

As explorers made their way inland the basic structure of the southern and central parts of the continent were roughly mapped and by the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century Spain,

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<sup>5</sup> Saha Nemecek, “Who Were the First Americans”, Available on site: <http://www.sciam.com/article>.

<sup>6</sup> Available on site: <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID>



France, and Britain had laid claim to most of the known territory and had established several centers of permanent settlement in the more accessible areas.




Figure 1.3 European territorial claims in North America c. 1700<sup>7</sup>

### 1.1.2 A New Nation (American Revolution and Testing the Republic, 1765-1815)

At the beginning of 1766, as part of a compromise agreement negotiated and supported by Prime Minister William Pitt (the Elder), the British government admits members of each colony into Parliament as voting observers, thus giving “taxation with proper representation”, and diffusing the crisis (the hated “Townsend Acts” never occur). The agreement stipulates that the colonies’ Governors would still be appointed by the Crown, but would also be approved by the Parliament of each Colony. With a thusly united Empire, the British is set to go on to colonize the world, much as they did in our timeline, but with the support of all of North America behind her.

After four years, the American members of Parliament begin to have greater influence in the British Parliament, and are taken more seriously than at first- though most are still considered outsiders.

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<sup>7</sup> Available on site: <http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~reak/hist/naclaim.htm>

The Napoleonic Wars often spilled over into North America from 1800 to 1815. As the British Empire enters the nineteenth century, they control the entire eastern part of North America, the Spanish control the central and southwestern regions (having acquired Louisiana from the French in 1763), and the Russians control the western portion of North America- from “Oregon” to Alaska in 1800. In 1807, As Napoleon invades and conquers Spain; British troops invaded and captured New Orleans, as well as other points on the western bank of the Mississippi River. This effectively begins the North American Napoleonic War, which serves to drain valuable French troops away from the European theatre of the war.

By March 1808, 20,000 French troops land in the Texas region, and, after encountering and defeating a small, largely disorganized army of Spanish Royalists, engage British troops near Lexington City (Houston in our Timeline). The French retreat to the coast, but engage the force again in June. 15,000 more French troops land in Mexico by August. Recovered anti-French Spanish troops and British forces engage the French in central Texas, and rout the entire force of French troops, who surrender in mid-October, and retreat to France before the end of the year.

And then in 1809, an informal agreement between Britain and Royalist Spanish military leaders in North America give Spain control of Mexico, the Caribbean Islands and California. Until the ratification of a formal treaty (pending Napoleon’s defeat) the British gain Louisiana Territory and much of the southwestern section of North America (north of the Rio Grande) and open it for British colonization. One year later, the skillful negotiations of the British Prime Minister with the Russian Empire avert a war over Oregon Territory, and it is purchased by Britain, along with a tract known as “British Pacifica” (British Columbia, Canada in OTL).

In 1811, with the defeat of Napoleon in Spain, the British negotiate with King Carlos IV (1788-1815), the restored Spanish King, concerning the northern border of Spanish America. Controversy soon erupts over the boundaries of Texas, of which is claimed by Spain. October-The Spanish send reinforcements to the troops already in North America.

North American British troops reinforce Texas, defeating Spanish forces in two minor battles after 1811. Spain engages the British at sea, and suffers several humiliating defeats.

Unable to penetrate deeply into Spanish Mexico, the British maintain the border at the Rio Grande throughout the conflict.

Fully defeated on the seas, and weary of a stalemate on the ground in North America in 1814, the boundary of Spanish Mexico is moved to the Rio Grande, yet Spain retains both Mexico and California.<sup>8</sup>




Figure 1.4 North America in 1800 and 1815 (Purple=British; Red=Spanish; Blue=Russian)<sup>9</sup>

### 1.1.3 Expansion and Civil War (1815-1890)

#### 1.1.3.1 Expanding the Nation

The British Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs recommends to the Prime Minister that Britain should begin to groom the North American Colonies for independence in 1818. The Prime Minister and his cabinet agree, and formally approach several North American MPs about the idea.

Three years later, Britain's parliament enacts the "Continental Parliament Act", which establishes a Continental Parliament and "Articles of Government" for North America. The delegates to the parliament are to be selected by the Royal Governors of each Province and

<sup>8</sup>"What if the American Revolution Had Been Avoided", Available on site: <http://users.metro2000.net/>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

they are to meet in Philadelphia the following spring. And then in 1823, The Continental Parliament meets with all 25 Provinces represented (including what we now know as Canada). The Continental Parliament purchases California Territory (CA, NV, AZ) from Spain after one year.

The Continental Parliament adopts the North America Constitution Act to replace the Articles of Government (1821). In 1830, it establishes a House of Commons elected by the legislatures of the Provinces and an Upper House selected by the Governors of each Province from among the landed gentry and titled elite (but also from among prominent citizens and soldiers of the growing “Merchant class”). A Governor-General with a twelve-year term (ineligible for re-appointment) is appointed from the Upper House by a vote of the House of Commons to serve as the Executive power, their choice to be approved by the Parliament in London until the date of final separation.

After these events, the British Parliament approves the North America Constitution Act, granting the North American Colonies Dominion status, and they become the Confederation of British North America. In 1834, upon formal petition of the Continental Parliament, Britain grants independence to the North American Confederation<sup>10</sup>. The U.S., fulfilling the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, goes to war with Mexico and ends up with a third of Mexico’s territory in 1846.

U.S.’s interventions in Nicaragua between 1850 and 1857: These are, in 1855 Tennessee adventurer William Walker and his mercenaries take over Nicaragua, institute forced labor, and legalize slavery.<sup>11</sup>

### **1.1.3.2 Monroe Doctrine**

There is an important subject pertaining to Monroe’s administration which is indissolubly associated with his name. It is an announcement of the policy of the United States in respect to foreign interference in the affairs of this continent. This announcement bears the name of the “Monroe Doctrine”; as such it is discussed in books on public law and in general histories. It is commonly regarded as an epitome of the principles of the United

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<sup>10</sup> “What if the American Revolution Had Been Avoided”, Available on site: <http://users.metro2000.net/>

<sup>11</sup> Mark Rosenfelde, “U.S. Interventions in Latin America”, Available on site: <http://www.zompist.com/latam.html>

States with respect to its attitude toward all the American States in their political relations to the rest of the world.<sup>12</sup> The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823.<sup>13</sup> Pointing out that the political systems of the Americas differ basically from those of Europe, the statement asserted that the Western Hemisphere was not open to further European colonization and that Europe would never again be permitted to threaten the independence of any American power. The United States would neither interfere with existing colonies in north or South America, nor concern itself with Europe's internal affairs or European wars that did not affect the New World.

It was a bold, defiant move, and its full influence would become clear only with passing decades. From the start, it was a declaration not only of hemispheric independence but of isolationism. The young republic was snapping its last political links with Europe. From now on, the nation would look inward, not out, secure behind its continental frontiers.<sup>14</sup>

### 1.1.3.3 Civil War

*"Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history."*<sup>15</sup>

*Abraham Lincoln,*  
Annual Message to Congress,  
December 1862

Prior to and during the Civil War, the North and South differed greatly in the resources that they could use. Documents held by the National Archives can aid in the understanding of the factors that influenced the eventual outcome of the War Between the States.

After the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency in 1860, the states of the southern United States broke away from the Federal Union that had existed since the ratification of the Constitution. Believing that Lincoln would restrict their rights to own slaves, Southerners decided that secession was a better choice than to give up their economic system and their way of life. President Lincoln and the North opposed the South's

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<sup>12</sup> "The Monroe Doctrine", Available on site: <http://www.questia.com/pm.qst>

<sup>13</sup> "The Monroe Doctrine", Available on site: [gopher://ftp.std.com/00/obi/book/History/diplomatic/](http://gopher://ftp.std.com/00/obi/book/History/diplomatic/)

<sup>14</sup> Margaret L. Coit, "The Life History Of the United States: The Growing Years", Volume 3, 1789-1829, Time Incorporated, New York, 1963, p.151

<sup>15</sup> Available on site: <http://sunsite.utk.edu/civil-war/warweb.html#crisis>

withdrawal; the president steadfastly maintained throughout the war that the secession was illegal and that the newly formed Confederate States of America was not valid as a new nation to the world. Despite Lincoln's hopes that the secession would end without conflict, the two regions fought a war that exploited the advantages and opportunities that each held over the other before their differences could be resolved.<sup>16</sup>




Figure 1.5 Compromise of 1850<sup>17</sup>

The North held many advantages over the South during the Civil War. The political, economic, and military strength of the Union was much greater than that of the Confederacy.<sup>18</sup> Its population was several times that of the South, a potential source for military enlistees and civilian manpower. The South lacked the substantial number of factories and industries of the North that produced needed war materials.<sup>19</sup> The Union was far more industrialized than the South. The North possessed 80% of total U.S. industry. In addition, most Confederate industry was located in the Upper South—particularly in

<sup>16</sup> "Historical Background", From: National Archives and Records Administration, Available on site: <http://americancivilwar.com/authors/historical.html>

<sup>17</sup> Available on site: <http://americancivilwar.com/pictures/comp1850.jpg>

<sup>18</sup> Arturo Rivera, "Why the Confederacy Wasn't Ready for War", Available on site: <http://americancivilwar.com/>

<sup>19</sup> "Historical Background", From: National Archives and Records Administration, Available on site: <http://americancivilwar.com/authors/historical.html>

Virginia. The Confederacy lost a great deal of potential industry and manpower when West Virginia, Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland joined the Union instead of the Confederacy. The loss of these states to the Union was as much a testament to shrewd northern politics (Maryland) as it was to opposition within the states (West Virginia). Confederate industry, especially with the loss of these states, was unable to compete with the Union.<sup>20</sup>

The North had a better transportation network, mainly highways, canals, and railroads, which could be easily used to re supply military forces in the field. At sea, the Union navy was more capable and dominant, while the army was better trained and better supplied. The rest of the world also recognized the United States as a legitimate government, allowing U.S. diplomats to obtain loans and other trade concessions.

The South had fewer advantages, but it held several that would pose great threats to attempts by their Northern neighbors to end the rebellion. The South was able to fight on its home terrain, and it could win the war simply by continuing to exist after the hostilities ended later. The South also had a military tradition that encouraged young men to serve in the armed forces or attend a military school; many had served the U.S. military prior to the Civil War, only to resign and fight for their states and family. In addition, the South had the leadership of great commanders, including Robert E. Lee, Joseph Johnston, and “Stonewall” Jackson.<sup>21</sup>

As disadvantages, the South had to worry about its slave population, which posed the threat of rebellion and assistance to the Northern cause. Actions by the North to promote this fear included the Emancipation Proclamation, which ended slavery in all territories held by Union troops, but not in all areas of the North, such as loyal, but slave-owning, states along the borders of the two powers. Had the North tried to free slaves in these areas, more aid would have been generated for the South, and slave-owning Maryland’s secession would leave the U.S. capital in Confederate hands?

In addition, the North suffered because a series of senior generals did not successfully exploit the weaknesses of the South, nor did they act upon the suggestions of their

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<sup>20</sup> Arturo Rivera, “Why the Confederacy Wasn’t Ready for War”, Available on site: [http://americancivilwar.com/authors/arturo\\_rivera.html](http://americancivilwar.com/authors/arturo_rivera.html)

<sup>21</sup> “Historical Background”, From: National Archives and Records Administration, Available on site: <http://americancivilwar.com/authors/historical.html>

commander-in-chief. President Lincoln finally got his desired general in Ulysses S. Grant, who had solidified the Union's control of the West in parts of the Mississippi River Basin.



Figure 1.6 American Civil War<sup>22</sup>

Grant directed the defeat of Southern forces and strongholds and held off determined advances northward by the Confederates on several occasions before the surrender by Lee to Grant took place in 1865.

To defeat the South, the North had to achieve several goals. First, control of the Mississippi River had to be secured to allow unimpeded movement of needed Western goods. Second, the South had to be cut off from international traders and smugglers that could aid the Southern war effort. Third, the Confederate army had to be incapacitated to prevent further northward attacks such as that at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and to ease the battle losses of the North. Fourth, the South's ability to produce needed goods and war materials had to be curtailed. It was these measures that the South had to counter with their own plans to capitalize on early victories that weakened the Northern resolve to fight, to attain international recognition as a sovereign state, and to keep Union forces from seizing Confederate territory.

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<sup>22</sup> Available on site: [http://americancivilwar.com/colored/colored\\_troops.html](http://americancivilwar.com/colored/colored_troops.html)





Figure 1.7 An illustration of a War<sup>23</sup>

The South ultimately did not achieve its goals, and after four years of fighting the North won the war.<sup>24</sup> This war was the first of the modern wars: big, almost total, a war of material and ideologies and unlimited objectives. It witnessed the introduction or the first prominent employment of such instruments of the future as mass armies, breech-loading and repeating rifles, railroads, armored ships, the telegraph, balloons, trenches and wire entanglements.<sup>25</sup> The war would rage on for two more years and claim 620,000 lives.<sup>26</sup> The divisive, destructive conflict cast a shadow on the successes of the United States during the 19th century, however. The country had to find ways to heal the wounds of war during Reconstruction<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Available on site: <http://www.marchthroughtimes.com/>

<sup>24</sup> "Historical Background", From: National Archives and Records Administration, Available on site: <http://americancivilwar.com/authors/historical.html>

<sup>25</sup> T. Harry Williams, "The Life History Of the United States: The Union Restored", Volume 6, 1861-1876, Time Incorporated, New York, 1963, p.7

<sup>26</sup> Arturo Rivera, "Why the Confederacy Wasn't Ready for War", Available on site: [http://americancivilwar.com/authors/arturo\\_rivera.html](http://americancivilwar.com/authors/arturo_rivera.html)

<sup>27</sup> "Historical Background", Ibid



Figure 1.8 A soldier in death<sup>28</sup>

#### 1.1.4 Becoming a World Power (1890-1919)

##### 1.1.4.1 A Force in the World

The decade of the 1890s begins with the emergence of the United States as a world power. It was a world power in some ways throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. At the turn of the century, the US became the pre-eminent power on face of earth.<sup>29</sup> Until the 1890s, the United States showed little interest in foreign affairs. Its army, with just 28,000 soldiers, was one-twentieth the size of France's or Germany's. Its 10,000 man navy was a sixth the size of Britain's and half the size of Spain's.<sup>30</sup>

By 1900, the U.S. was on the verge of becoming a world power. The 4<sup>th</sup> most populous nation, its residents were the most literate and long-lived in the world, the average citizen's

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<sup>28</sup> T. Harry Williams, "The Life History Of the United States: The Union Restored", Volume 6, 1861-1876, Time Incorporated, New York, 1963, p.67

<sup>29</sup> "US Foreign Policy", 1890-1900, Available on site: <http://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php>

<sup>30</sup> "Historical Overview", Available on site: [http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/resource\\_guides/](http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/resource_guides/)

income was on par with that of any of the major European powers, and its government was a relatively stable representative structure. Isolated by two oceans, it had only a small army, but it had built the third largest navy in the world to protect its overseas commerce.

Before 1900, the U.S. had generally been an isolationist power—since the early Federalist period, many had argued that the two oceans were all the protection America needed from any foreign threat, and that the U.S. had no business involving itself in foreign affairs. In the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, America had promised to stay out of European affairs if the Europeans refrained from military intervention in America’s hemisphere. However, by 1900 those favoring overseas expansion, largely for economic reasons, were in the political ascendancy.<sup>31</sup>

Toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, interest in foreign affairs mounted. Some worried that the United States was being left behind in the scramble for territory, markets, raw materials, and outlets for investment. Others, such as the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, believed that national prosperity depended on control of sea lanes. Still others believed that the United States had a special mission to uplift backwards peoples.

Beginning in the late 1880s, a new assertiveness characterized American foreign policy, evident in disputes with Germany, Chile, and Britain. In 1893, Americans in Hawaii forced Queen Liliuokalani to abdicate; the United States annexed Hawaii five years later. War with Spain in 1898 led to the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, where the United States confronted a two-year insurrection.

Fear that the United States was being shut out of trade with China led Secretary of State John Hay to issue the 1899 Open Door Note. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine declared that the United States would exercise “international police power” in the Western Hemisphere. The United States assisted Panama in securing its independence from Columbia, in order to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and occupied Nicaragua for 20 years, Haiti for 19 and the Dominican Republic for 8.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> “Us Expansion In Latin America And Asia”, Available on site: <http://www.loyno.edu/~seduffy/gildedage.html>

<sup>32</sup> “Historical Overview”, Available on site: [http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/resource\\_guides/content.cfm?](http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/resource_guides/content.cfm?)

#### 1.1.4.2 Expanding in Latin America and Asia

In 1898, US declared war on Spain, blaming it for destruction of the Maine. The war enables the US to occupy Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.<sup>33</sup> The US Navy proved its superiority over the Spanish fleet, while American troops led successful ground attacks. Spanish resistance ended with the surrender of the Cuban city of Santiago.<sup>34</sup>

After five years, the Platt Amendment inserted into the Cuban constitution grants the US the right to intervene when it sees fit. At the same year, when negotiations with Colombia break down, the US sends ten warships to back a rebellion in Panama in order to acquire the land for the Panama Canal. The Frenchman Philippe Bunau-Varilla negotiates the Canal Treaty and writes Panama's constitution.<sup>35</sup> The new Panama Canal was opened in 1914. By allowing ships to cut through the middle of the American continent, it eliminated the need for the US to keep two separate navies for each coast, which proved to be a major help in the coming world war.<sup>36</sup>

One year later, US sends customs agents to take over finances of the Dominican Republic to assure payment of its external debt. US Marines help Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz crush a strike in Sonora in 1905. At the same year, US troops land in Honduras for the first of 5 times in next 20 years.

And one year later, Marines occupy Cuba for two years in order to prevent a civil war. Marines intervene in Honduras to settle a war with Nicaragua in 1907. After one year, US troops intervene in Panama for first of 4 times in next decade.

In 1910, US Marines occupy Nicaragua to help support the Diaz regime. The Liberal regime of Miguel Davila in Honduras has irked the State Department by being too friendly with Zelaya and by getting into debt with Britain in 1911. He was overthrown by former president Manuel Bonilla, aided by American banana tycoon Sam Zemurray and American mercenary Lee Christmas, who became commander-in-chief of the Honduran army.

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<sup>33</sup> Mark Rosenfelde, "U.S. Interventions in Latin America", Available on site: <http://www.zompist.com/latam.html>

<sup>34</sup> Available on site: <http://www.glencoe.com/sec/socialstudies/ushistory/tar22003/content.php4/317/1>

<sup>35</sup> Mark Rosenfelde, Ibid

<sup>36</sup> "US Expansion In Latin America And Asia", Available on site: <Http://Www.Loyno.Edu/~Seduffy/Gildedage.Html>

In 1912, US Marines intervene in Cuba to put down a rebellion of sugar workers. At the same year, Nicaragua occupied again by the US, to shore up the inept Diaz government. An election is called to resolve the crisis: there are 4000 eligible voters, and one candidate, Diaz. The U.S. maintains troops and advisors in the country until 1925.

US bombs and then occupies Vera Cruz, in a conflict arising out of a dispute with Mexico's new government. President Victoriana Huerta resigns in 1914. After these events, US Marines occupy Haiti to restore order, and establish a protectorate which lasts till 1934. The president of Haiti is barred from the US Officers' Club in Port-au-Prince, because he is black.

In 1916, Marines occupy the Dominican Republic, staying till 1924. Pancho Villa, in the sole act of Latin American aggression against the U.S, raids the city of Columbus in the same year, New Mexico, killing 17 Americans.

And then in 1917, US troops enter Mexico to pursue Pancho Villa. They can't catch him. Marines intervene again in Cuba, to guarantee sugar exports during WW-I. One year later, US Marines occupy Panamanian province of Chiriqui for two years to maintain public order.<sup>37</sup>

US was also expanding in the Pacific at the turn of the century-they had assumed a major role in the Pacific by 1900, having accumulated a string of islands stretching from the Hawaiian Islands to the Philippines. Like the Cubans, the Filipinos had broken away from Spain in the Spanish-American War, but unlike the Cubans, the US refused to allow the Filipinos independence. In 1899, the Filipinos revolted against US control and began a protracted guerrilla war which resulted in enormous human and economic costs before the US crushed it. After the conclusion of the war, naval bases in the Philippines, along with the main one in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, added to U.S. military strength in the Pacific.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Mark Rosenfelde, "U.S. Interventions in Latin America", Available on site: <http://www.zompist.com/latam.html>

<sup>38</sup> "US Expansion In Latin America And Asia", Available on site: <http://www.loyno.edu/~seduffy/gildedage.Html>




Figure 1.9 U.S involvements in the Caribbean, 1898-1917<sup>39</sup>

## 1.1.5 World Leadership (1920-1945)

### 1.1.5.1 World War-I and USA's Decision for Leave out Impartial Policy

*"The World must be made safe for Democracy"*<sup>40</sup>

*President Wilson*

WW-I. came in 1914. At first, it was called the European War. As, during four years, it involved more and more countries, men came to call it the World War.<sup>41</sup> Few events in world history have had a more profound impact than that of World War One (1914-8).<sup>42</sup> When World War-I broke out, the United States declared its neutrality. After all, it was a European quarrel. Besides, many Americans had emigrated from the nations now at war and taking sides would divide the nation. What would America gain by participation? So when Wilson urged Americans to be "impartial in thought as well as in action," it did not seem unwise.

<sup>39</sup> "World View Social Studies", Available on site: <http://www.worldviewsoftware.com/pdf/>

<sup>40</sup> Temple Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy Today, Bantam Books Inc., New York, 1966, p.11

<sup>41</sup> Charles Burton Marshall, The Cold War, Franklin Watts Inc. Press, New York, 1965, p.16

<sup>42</sup> "The Opening Moves", Available on site: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwone/>

When the Germans decided to sink enemy ships on sight in the war zone, the United States responded with a sharp warning in February 1915. Then the British steamship Lusitania was sunk, with a loss of 1.198 lives, including 128 Americans. American public opinion now began a decided shift against Germany. Not wanting to bring America into the war, the Germans halted unrestricted submarine warfare, concentrating on freighters rather than liners.

Quickly following this event, in March the “Zimmerman Note” a German proposal to Mexico to enter the war and recover Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, was intercepted and deciphered by the British. On April 1, 1917, President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of War, and on April 4 the senate agreed, 82-6, and the House on April 6, by 373-50.<sup>43</sup>

The first three Americans killed in combat died on the evening of Nov. 2, 1917, during a German raid on a trench held by members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 16<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.<sup>44</sup> The US casualty list over the next year was 126.000 dead, 53.402 of them in battle, and 234.300 wounded in 19 months of U.S. belligerency. Prisoners and missing casualties 4.500, and total casualties are 364.800.<sup>45</sup> But this was small in comparison to the millions lost by the other major powers.

Furthermore, the United States was a great continental power, with great population and resources. The war stimulated the US economy, increased employment and wages, and brought great profit to industry. The United States emerged from the war as clearly the greatest power in the world as well as the creditor nation of the world.

These circumstances thrust the United States into a position as world leaders, while the American people still assumed that Europe had little to do with America. President Wilson had a vision that would have involved the United States extensively in world affairs through the League of Nations, but he was unable to find popular support.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.62

<sup>44</sup> Woody West, “The Systemization Of Everything”, Available on site: <http://www.policyreview.org/>

<sup>45</sup> Available on site: <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/>

<sup>46</sup> “Effects of World War I”, Available on site: <http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/>

### 1.1.5.2 Interwar Period

The 1918-35 periods represented an interlude in America's erratic movement toward an increasingly major world role.<sup>47</sup> The First World War established the United States as one of several Great Powers.<sup>48</sup> The European economy was devastated by the war, while the United States economy grew in response to the demands of the war. Economic leadership shifted from the England and London to the United States and New York. The United States became the creditor nation of the world while England, for the first time since the beginning of the industrial revolution, became a debtor nation. The American people, accustomed to isolation, were not prepared to accept the responsibility of world leadership. The United States drew away from Europe, insisting that Europe pay its debts. The United States claimed no reparations and saw no connections between reparations and inter-Allied debts.

The reality, however, was that England and France and other debtor nations could not pay their debts unless they received reparations from Germany. Germany, also devastated by war, could not finance its own recovery and pay reparations too. When Germany defaulted in 1923, and experienced massive inflation, financial reforms had to be introduced to stabilize the German economy. The only way to accomplish that was to create the means by which American investment could be made in German recovery.

Beginning in 1924, under the Dawes Plan, German bonds were sold to American private investors. This enabled the German economy to recover, reparations payments to be made, and inter-Allied debt payments as well. This was a system based upon the economy of the United States. As long as the US economy was prosperous, the system worked. When the US economy failed, the system collapsed. The war had created the circumstances which caused Europe to be helpless before the onslaught of the depression which struck the United States in 1929.

The US economy had been prosperous throughout the 1920s because, at the end of the war, US industry was very productive and wealthy with the capital to finance growth, U.S. consumers had worked and saved during World War-I and they created a demand for the

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<sup>47</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.63

<sup>48</sup> Michael Barone, In *History's Words*, 9/22/2003, Vol. 135 Issue 9, p.34



products of industry. This occurred at a time when new technology added new products and a higher standard of living for most Americans.

However, consumer buying power diminished gradually because the greater proportion of new wealth went to industry and the wealthy. Labor unions were weak and workers wages, though increasing slowly, fell behind relative to the growth of industry. By 1927, demand had leveled off. By 1929, demand was decreasing. The stock market was over-extended with inflated share prices and generous margin requirements. This set the stage for the collapse of the market in the fall of 1929. By the summer of 1932, the market had declined to about 1/10<sup>th</sup> of its value. Americans were no longer buying German bonds, Austrian and German banks had collapsed, and reparations and debt payments had stopped.

Economic nationalism caused world trade to be cut in half, further exacerbating the depression. Widespread unemployment and economic hardship was prevalent throughout the Atlantic world.

A new president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, elected in 1932, had managed to begin a slow recovery by creating an atmosphere of hope, and using the government to stimulate economic activity. This involved defying conventional wisdom by running a deficit. But it was done only on an experimental basis without really understanding why it was desirable to have deficit spending. Therefore, it was not pursued vigorously. When the policy was reversed in 1937, the US economy began to slip back into depression. The New Deal, in the face of fierce opposition from most of the leaders of industry, had turned the depression around and introduced a new era of government involvement in the economy, but had not gone far enough or fast enough to restore prosperity. Only the unlimited expenditures and the huge deficit spending of World War-II would finally and decisively end the depression. The depression in Europe and in Asia created the desperate conditions, the vast insecurity, which enabled Hitler to come to power in Germany, and the Japanese military to seize control in Japan.

As Germany, Italy and Japan armed themselves, jobs were created which helped those economies. This economic improvement coupled with the stimulation of national pride, which is a feature of fascism, ensured mass support and a feeling that the fascist state was the wave of the future. But because fascism also involved a glorification of war, German

and Japanese policies led to World War-II, a war which, in the end, destroyed the fascist regimes which had launched it. World War-I created the conditions which allowed fascism to develop, and which caused the American depression to become a global depression. The depression and the rise of fascism led to World War-II. Thus, it can be said that World War-I created the conditions which caused World War-II.<sup>49</sup>

### **1.1.5.3 USA's Declaration War to against Japan and Impacts of WW-II Emerging as Super Power**

World War-II is the name commonly given to the global conflict of 1939-1945. It was the greatest and most destructive War-In history.<sup>50</sup> It was started nearly 64 years ago, when Germany invaded Poland without warning at 4:45 am on the 1<sup>st</sup> September 1939.<sup>51</sup> Whereas military operations in World War-I were conducted primarily on the European continent, World War-II included gigantic struggles not only in Europe but in Asia, Africa, and the far-flung islands of the Pacific as well. Its conduct strained the economic capabilities of the major nations and left many countries on the edge of collapse.<sup>52</sup> By the evening of the 3<sup>rd</sup> September, Britain and France were at war with Germany<sup>53</sup> and within a week, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa had also joined the conflict. The world had been plunged into a world war for the second time in 25 years. World War-II lasted for 6 long and bloody years and was eventually to involve every major world power and cost the lives of some 60 million people.<sup>54</sup> After the beginnings of the war the President of United State's, Wilson declared U.S. neutrality on August 4.<sup>55</sup>

When Roosevelt, on January 6, 1941, called America to become the "arsenal of democracy" a coherent concept was beginning to emerge. The tone was different from earlier messages. He said "that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors... We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom." On March 11,

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<sup>49</sup> "The European Economy in the Interwar Period", Available on site: <http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/interwareco.html>

<sup>50</sup> "World War-II", Available on site: <http://gi.grolier.com/>

<sup>51</sup> Ernest R. May, "Between the Wars", Available on site: [http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii\\_2.html](http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_2.html)  
<http://www.worldwar-2.net/>

<sup>52</sup> "World War-II", Available on site: <http://gi.grolier.com/>


<sup>53</sup> Ernest R. May, Ibid

<sup>54</sup> Available on site: <http://www.worldwar-2.net/>

<sup>55</sup> "A Brief Chronology of Major Events in the Great War", Available on site: <http://www.emory.edu/>

1941, Congress passed the “Lend-Lease” Act, legislation that was designed to aid a Britain that soon would be unable to finance its purchases. It authorized the president to “sell... exchange, lease lend...any defense article to any country whose defense the President deems vital,” and permitted him to determine what, if anything, was required in exchange. As 1941 continued, concerns became increasingly immediate and concrete. After Japan took control of Indo-China, on July 25, 1941, FDR, who had already cut off war supplies to Japan, froze all assets in the United States. As Japanese oil supplies fell, the die was cast, because Japan would either have to give in or attack.<sup>56</sup>

Japan attacks to Pearl Harbor at December 7-1941, finally forced the United States into the war.<sup>57</sup> And United States declared war on Japan at December 8-1941.<sup>58</sup>



**Figure 1.10 A photo: taken from a Japanese plane during the attack<sup>59</sup> and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the declaration of war against Japan, December 8, 1941.<sup>60</sup>**

During World War-II the democratic and communist countries that faced off in the Cold War were allies in the fight against the Nazis and other Axis nations. In 1945 the United States used the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end WW-II. It was at this time that friction became apparent between the allies. Several nations such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and France, unlike the United States,

<sup>56</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.70

<sup>57</sup> Simon Berthon, *The “Allies at War”*, Available on site: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/> and Vincent J. Esposito, *“The War in Brief”*, Available on site: [http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii\\_1.html](http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_1.html)

<sup>58</sup> *“Timeline of Events”*, Available on site: <http://www.geocities.com/>

<sup>59</sup> *“The History Place”*, Available on site: <http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/>

<sup>60</sup> US National Archives, Available on site: <http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/>

had suffered from terrible losses in the war against Hitler and his allies. This made the U.S. the most powerful nation on Earth. Yet the United States did not want the difficulties which arose from world leadership. So they reduced the strength of their armed forces, unlike the Soviets which kept their vast armies in uniform. The U.S.S.R. then began to ascertain countries in Eastern Europe by forcing them to accept dictators that had been trained in Moscow. Their Soviet Union then created the communist bloc group of nations under the name of the Warsaw Pact. The US alarmed by the growing communist power, created a democratic bloc called N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This intensified the distrust between the East and West.<sup>61</sup>

It is difficult even today to say with confidence what would have happened if the Japanese had not attacked, since antiwar sentiment was still very powerful.<sup>62</sup>

## **1.2 REALIST AND LIBERAL THOUGHT IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

The terms realism and idealism are useful to some extent because they focus attention on certain aspects of foreign policy and act as a kind of shorthand for describing whole sets of beliefs about the nature of international relations and the consequent appropriate guidelines for policy. And whole books have been written in the conviction that the “struggle” between realism and idealism helps to explain the pronounced swings we have already observed in both American opinion and American Foreign Policy.<sup>63</sup>

### **1.2.1 Realism**

The realist paradigm is based on the core assumption that anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system. Anarchy compels states to make security their paramount concern and to seek to increase power as against other values. Power is defined as capability relative to other states.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> “The Cold War Itself”, <http://naalehuel.k12.hi.us/coldwar.html>

<sup>62</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.71

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, p.87

<sup>64</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of the Realism”, *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No:2, Spring 1994, 249-277

Thucydides, the classic founder of realism, developed its core wisdoms. None of the traditional moral norms linking individuals across state boundaries had regular effect, he argued. Interstate relations existed in a condition where War-Is always possible-a state of war such as that 'hard school of danger' he described that persisted between Athens and Sparta during the 'peace' that preceded the actual outbreak of hostilities. To Thucydides, as to later realist, international anarchy excluded the effective escape from the dreary history of war and conflict that was the consequence of competition under anarchy. The 'truest cause' of the great war between Athens and Sparta -the real reason that made it 'inevitable'-'was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta'. States, therefore, had to preserve their security independently.

But, unlike many later realists, Thucydides did not think that states were the only significant actors in international politics. Individuals, such as Alcibiades, played important and sometimes independent roles in the determination of the course of international events. Nor did he think that state interest can or should be defined solely in terms of the rational pursuit of power, or of any other power, or of any other abstract or structurally determined model of political behavior that reduced the variety of ends (security, honor, and self interest) or the significance of differing polities that have characterized the political determination of policy. His work is also a great democratic tragedy, in which Athenian democracy, at the beginning a source of immense strength, becomes by the end-when corrupted-an albatross whose factionalism provokes imprudent aggression (against Sicily) and civil war.

The modern realists have differentiated his heritage. Modern realism's philosophical foundations lie in Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Machiavelli inaugurated an emphasis on the fundamental sources of the realist state of War-In individual human beings. Hobbes refined the structural model of the international system. Rousseau most closely followed the complex heritage of Thucydides, while emphasizing the powerful effects of domestic constitutional differences.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Michael Doyle, "Peace Liberty and Democracy: Realist and Liberals Contents a Legacy", American Democracy Promotion, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.23-24

Modern realism as defined by Machiavelli characterizes all social interaction as rooted in mankind's psychological and material needs that result in a drive for power.<sup>66</sup> State behavior, like all social behavior from the family through all other organizations, can thus best be understood as a reconstruction of interest-oriented, power-seeking activity.<sup>67</sup> The struggle for power changes form but not substance when we move from a consideration of domestic to international politics. The drive for power produces the state of war.

The fundamentalist accepts the anarchy assumption of all realists, but questions the extent of the differentiation between domestic and interstate politics. This means, on the one hand, that fundamentalists leave open whether the state should be assumed to be a rational unitary actor. On the other hand, fundamentalists specify both the means and preferences—both power—left open to variation by the Thucydides core of classical realism. Rooted in human nature itself, the drive for power leaves statesmen no choice other than power politics. Power, moreover, is translatable. Its pursuit in one effort readily translates into resources available for others as—according to Machiavelli—‘good arms make good laws’.<sup>68</sup> But ‘good laws’ also make for ‘good arms’, for liberty, Machiavelli also notes, is one of the key means through which leaders mobilize the energy of the population for security, glory and expansion.<sup>69</sup> Peace, if possible, is a product of empire, as was claimed in their times by the Pax Romana, the Pax Britannica, and the Pax Americana.

Hobbesian structuralism also explains the state of war.<sup>70</sup> Like most of the other forms of realism, structuralism assumes international anarchy and the predominance of state actors. But modern structuralists—like Hobbes—also assume that state actors are ‘functionally similar units’ differing in capabilities but not ends, as Kenneth Waltz notes in the *Theory of International Politics*.<sup>71</sup>

Unitary rational process, translatability of power resources, and a strong preference for power as a means to security form a necessary part of the model.<sup>72</sup> But unlike

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<sup>66</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Knopf Press, New York, 1967, p.4.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p.32

<sup>68</sup> Nicola Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Harvey—Mansfield, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1985, p.48

<sup>69</sup> Nicola Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, trans. Leslie Walker, Penguin, Hannondsworth, Book 2, chapter: 2. 1970

<sup>70</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan 1651*, Penguin, New York, 1980

<sup>71</sup> K. Waltz. *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA, Addison Wesley, 1979, p.96-7

<sup>72</sup> Robert Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, 1986, New York, p.172

fundamentalists; structuralists see these features not as variables derived from assumptions about human nature or social organization, but as derivations from the structure itself. State behavior is homogenized-made rational and power seeking-through competition and socialization.<sup>73</sup> Only the rational and power-seeking will survive the competition to dominate and thus teach their rivals.

Specific structural inferences, such as the hypothesized stability of bipolar world,<sup>74</sup> the instability of multi polarity, and the weaknesses of transnational restraints are deduced from the model, once one specifies the number and capabilities of the states that compose the system. These structures allow for significant periods of peace. Hobbesian statesmen have a duty to try to achieve peace for the sake of the security of their state. They are likely to have some success, it is argued, during periods such as the cold war, when bipolar stability and robust deterrence-such as that offered by nuclear weapons capable of second-strike deterrence-reinforce prudence.

Rousseau's realist constitutionalism, like all forms of realism, describes a world-view or explanation of interstate politics as a 'state of war'.<sup>75</sup> This view, common to a number of writers in the contemporary field, assumes nothing about the rationality of all states, their pursuit of power or the 'national interest', or the way they set their various goals.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, it assumes that the processes and preferences of states vary and are open to choice influenced by both domestic and interstate considerations. This choice includes moral choices, but it assumes that ethical choices cannot be categorical or absolute-that is, that they must necessarily depend upon a prior consideration of strategic security. Given the lack of international security, states seeking to maintain their independence must provide for their own security and this call for an attention to relative power.

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<sup>73</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 75. The structural determination depends, we need to add, on the systemic interaction being sufficiently intense to select very efficiently for appropriate behavior, such as would be observed under the economist's model of perfect competition. See the valuable discussion in Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics*, p.171-5

<sup>74</sup> Bipolarity-the economist's 'bilateral monopoly'-may, however, strain against the assumption of perfect competition

<sup>75</sup> J. J. Rousseau, "State of War", trans. Grace Roosevelt, *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990

<sup>76</sup> For example, this view appears to describe Amold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1962, especially Ch. 1, 2, and 4

The dominant inference of complex realism is the continuity of the state of war. But this allows for strategies to preserve islands of peace, such as those that Rousseau advocated for Corsica, whose simple economy and geographical isolation might reduce both its temptations toward expansion and its attraction to other expansionist powers.

Why do the separate strands all arrive at a state of war? What makes them all realist? Comparing Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau, it appears that whatever the differences in their views of man and the nature of domestic politics, all agree that the prince or state either does or should command all force (Machiavelli and Hobbes) or command all loyalty (Rousseau). Differences in states and personal values are then contained by their similar degree of authority. There is thus no room for other royalties and other interests to acquire sufficient strength to transform relations among states. They remain in a state of war.

The core of realism-to simplify-thus portrayed world politics as a 'state of war' among all states and societies, which is a condition in which war was regarded as a continuous possibility in which each state had to regard every other state as presenting the possibility of this threat. This state of war persisted for several reasons. First, relations among states were anarchic in that they lacked a global state. Trade, cultural contact, even institutions and international law could exist under anarchy, but none altered its anarchic and war-like character.

Second, states were independent units that could be treated as strategic units. The variations in state structure range from the abstractly unitary sovereign rationality of Hobbes to the ideally unitary moral rationality of the general will and sociologically diverse non-ideal states of Rousseau, to the rational princes and imperial republics of Machiavelli, to the diverse states of Thucydides Greece. Despite the variation, each conceptualizes the ideal state-prince, people as a whole, senate, or assembly-as having a monopoly of effective or legitimate power. Not all state authority was legitimate. Rousseau clearly thought monarchies were not. But even if not legitimate, the states that could play a role in international politics were at least effective. (If they were not, the state collapsed or collaborated and became subject to another state, thereby ending anarchy, substituting hierarchy.)



Third, some of these states sought to expand, others merely to survive. None was prepared to engage in long-term accommodation or cooperation.

Fourth, the perception that some societies would have good reasons to want to expand, that the sovereignty similarity of all states made them functionally similar egoists, and the fact that the international system itself lacked a global sovereign: all together, though in various combinations for each theorist, made rational states at least fear each other. They feared each other even if they were not inclined to aggress on each other because they could not be sure that their neighbor was not prepared to aggress on them. Each was in a state of war, which we call a security dilemma. The result was that all international goods have only relative value. They are relative because, as Hobbes opined, 'clubs are trumps'. Games are all zero-sum at the maximum extent. No good has absolute value if some other state can seize it by force. Every good has to be measured first by the extent to which it contributes to security in a world where only self-help secures one's existence. Within an alliance absolute values can be appreciated, but only because they contribute to the relative superiority of the alliance over a rival alliance. And alliances are easy to break.

### **1.2.2 Liberalism**

Liberalism has complicated implications for international relations theory. Defined by the centrality of individual rights, private property, and representative government, it is a domestic theory. Realism, on the other hand, is an international theory, defined by the centrality of the state of war. There appears to be no simple theoretical integration of the two. Realist theory would be falsely portrayed, indeed caricatured, if it were 'domesticized' by limiting it to authoritarian or totalitarian domestic politics or even purely unitary states. Correspondingly, liberal theory too would be caricatured if it were 'internationalized' by limiting it to assertions about the natural harmony of world politics. Some realists are totalitarian; Hobbes justified authoritarian states. Some are democratic communitarians, as was Rousseau and, though less systematically, Thucydides. Machiavelli was a republican realist. Some liberals are homogeneously pacific, such as Bentham or Cobden or Schumpeter. Others, such as John Stuart Mill, justified imperialism under some circumstances and intervention under others. No simplification well represents the actual philosophical and historical richness of their world-views.

Liberals are, indeed, different. World politics for them, rather than being a relatively homogeneous state of war, is at the minimum a heterogeneous state of peace and war, and might become a state of global peace in which the expectation of war disappears. If more than one liberal society coexists in the international system, then-rather than having a security rationale governing all interaction, as it must for realists in a state of war-other criteria of policy come into play. Liberals explain how societies can compete to become rich, glorious, healthy, cultured, all without expecting to have to resolve their competition through war. Formal and informal institutions such as international organization and law take on a greater role in competition with the warriors and diplomats who dominate the realist stage, for several reasons.

First, despite international anarchy, meaning the absence of a global government, states are inherently different 'units', differentiated among other factors by how they relate to individual human rights. Liberals distinguish liberal from non-liberal societies, republican from autocratic or totalitarian states, capitalist from communist, fascist, and corporatist economies. Differences in international behavior then reflect these differences in institutions, interests and ideas.

Second, the aims of the state, as do the aims of the individual, go beyond 'security, honor and interest' to the protection and promotion of individual rights.

Third, for liberal states behave differently and are not homogenized by the international system either by being competed out of existence or socialized into structural strategies. Some liberals argue that liberal states are inherently respectful of international law. Others argue that liberal states are inherently peaceful, while authoritarians are inherently aggressive. And still others argue that liberals are peaceful, but only toward each other.

Fourth, liberals agree with the realists that states exist under anarchy, but their anarchy is different. Rather than being driven into relative contests, zero-sum games, their contest is a positive- or negative-sum game. They can win or lose together. A failure to inform may undermine coordination when liberals are seeking compatible goals. In more competitive situations, a failure to trust may undermine cooperation when each would prefer at least one alternative to a failure to cooperate. This is because their security dilemma can be solved by stable accommodation. They can come to appreciate that the existence of other

liberal states constitutes no threat and instead constitutes an opportunity for mutually beneficial trade and-when needed-alliance against non-liberal states.

Liberals thus differ from the realists. But they also differ from each other, and they do so in systematic ways. Each of the liberal theorists, like the realists, must make some assumptions about international structure, domestic society, and human nature-Kenneth Waltz's three images. Liberals pay more attention to domestic structures and individual differences than do realists. They all think that the international system, or third image, has less than an overriding influence and so distinguish themselves from not only structural realists but also from almost all realists. Still, compared to each other we can identify first Image Lockean (human nature), second image Commercial (society), and third image Kantian (international system) liberals.

Locke's international system, like Hobbes's, is anarchic. His state is based on representation and ultimately on consent: while Hobbes's is indifferent to these matters as long as the state is sovereign. Locke's citizens, like Hobbes's, are rational independent individuals. The difference then lies in the importance Locke attributed to the duties to protect life, liberty, and property that: Locke thought accompanied citizens' rights to the same. It is these duties that lead just commonwealths to maintain peace with each other, provided, that is, their natural partiality and the poorly institutionalized character of world politics do not overcome the duties to accommodate. Locke thus portrayed an international condition of troubled peace, only one step removed from the realist state of war and one fraught with 'inconveniences' that could degenerate into war through the combined effects of bias, partiality, and the absence of a regular and objective system of adjudication and enforcement.

There is much Hobbesian rational unitary egoism in the Lockean 'federative power', with its pursuit of 'national advantage'. In troubling times, Lockean international 'inconveniences' might well approach a nearly general state of war. But we also see one crucial difference. Lockean statespersons like his citizens are governed by the duties of natural law: life, liberty, and property. Lockean states, then, are distinguished, if Locke is correct, by a commitment to mutual trust under the law. In the bargaining literature, trust is crucial for stable agreements, and all rational egoist bargainers will want to cultivate a

reputation for it.<sup>77</sup> But Lockean bargainers, to take a further step, are committed to it by nature (or God).<sup>78</sup>

The commercial pacifists—a second tradition of liberal scholarship—focus on the pacifying international effects of markets and commercial capitalism. The tradition that Albert Hirschman has called *doux commerce* (soothing commerce) originates in the eighteenth-century attack on the realist doctrine of relative economic power then advocated by the mercantilists, who drew on the fundamental insights of Machiavelli, Hobbes and other realist theorists of war and peace.<sup>79</sup>

Although the commercial liberals such as Smith and Schumpeter argued that representative government contributed to peace—when the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible—for them, the deeper cause of peace was commerce. Democracies had been more than war-prone in history. Thucydides' story of democratic Athens was familiar to all with a classical education. Passions could wreak havoc among democrats, too. What was new was manufacturing and commerce: capitalism. Paine, the radical American democrat, announced, 'If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate the-system of war.'<sup>80</sup> Paine built on and contributed to a growing recognition, systematically developed by Enlightenment philosophers, of a powerful insight: war does not pay for commercial manufacturing societies. The great Scottish philosopher-economist Adam Smith articulated that view most comprehensively. The twentieth-century Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter, extended it into a general theory of capitalist pacification.

Both Hobbes and Schumpeter regard the international system as anarchic. Both regard their citizens as individualistic, rational, and egoistic, and usually materialistic. But Schumpeter sees the combination of democracy and capitalism as opening up a revolutionary transformation of domestic state and social structure. These societies are as self-interestedly, deterministically pacific as Hobbes's Leviathans are bell cist. Hobbesian

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<sup>77</sup> Philip Heymann, "The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules", *Harvard Law Review*, 86/5, 1973, p.797-877

<sup>78</sup> John Dunn, "The Concept of Trust in the Politics of John Locke" in *Philosophy in History*, edited by Richard Rorty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.

<sup>79</sup> Albert Hirschman, "Rival interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 20, 1982, p.1463-84

<sup>80</sup> Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man 1791*, New York Oxford University Press, 1995, ch.5

Leviathans, after all, are merely Hobbesian individual's writ large, with all their individual competitiveness and egoism. Schumpeter's state is a structured whole, distinct from its parts, transformed as it were by an 'invisible hand'-to borrow the classic commercial metaphor from Adam Smith. Market capitalism and democratic majoritarianism make individual material egoism and competitiveness into social pacifism. Markets make for collective solutions-equilibrium prices-separate from those of individual producers who seek to sell dear and individual consumers who seek to buy cheap. Majorities constitute a combined interest of the 50 percent plus one or the median voter constructed through log-rolling and least common denominators that are different, too, from individual interests. Democratic capitalism means free trade and a peaceful foreign policy simply because they are, he claims, the first-best solutions for rational majorities in capitalist societies. This is the heart of the contemporary enthusiasm, expressed by many liberal politicians, for global democratization and capitalism as the inevitable and pacific routes to peace at the 'end of history'.<sup>81</sup>

First and second image Liberals also differ from each other. Schumpeter makes the peace, which is a duty of the Lockean liberal statesman, into the structured outcome of capitalist democracy. Both highlight for us powerful elements of liberal world politics. But if there is a long state of peace between liberal republics, Locke offers us a weak explanation for it. (How do they avoid partiality and bias so regularly in these relations?) He also misses the persistent state of war between liberals and non-liberals. (Why are the liberals so regularly more partial here?) Schumpeter misses the liberal sources of war with non-liberals, unless we should blame all these wars on the non-liberals.

Kant and the liberal internationalists try to fill these gaps as they illustrate for us the larger potential of the liberal tradition. Kant's Perpetual Peace offers a coherent explanation of two important regularities in world politics: the tendencies of liberal states simultaneously to be peace-prone in their relations with each other and unusually war-prone in their relations with non liberal states. Republican representation, liberal respect, and transnational interdependence-to re-phrase Kant's three 'definitive articles' of the hypothetical peace treaty he asked states to sign-thus can be seen as three necessary and,

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<sup>81</sup> More sophisticated than it has often been portrayed is Francis Fukuyama's argument in the "End of History", *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, p. 3-18.

together, sufficient causes of the two regularities taken together. Thus, no single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but together-and only together-they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace. Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among liberal and non-liberal states have been broken, economic ties between liberal and non-liberal states have proven fragile, but the political bonds of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.

But in their relations with non-liberal states, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict irrespective of actual threats to national security in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies. And in their relations with all states, liberal states have not solved the problems of international cooperation and competition. Liberal publics can become absorbed in domestic issues, and international liberal respect does not preclude trade rivalries or guarantee far-sighted collective solutions to international security and welfare.

Kant's theory held that a stable expectation of peace among states would be achieved once three conditions were met. Together they constitute a liberal republic. We can rephrase them as:

(1) Representative, republican government, which includes an elected legislative, separation of powers and the rule of law. Kant argued that together those institutional features lead to caution because the government is responsible to its citizens. This, however, does not guarantee peace;

(2) A principled respect for non-discriminatory human rights. This should produce a commitment to respect the rights of fellow liberal republics-because, they represent free citizens, who as individuals have rights that deserve our respect-and a suspicion of non-

republics-because if those governments cannot trust their own citizens, what should lead us to trust them?<sup>82</sup>

(3) Social and economic interdependence. Trade and social interaction generally engender a mix of conflict and cooperation. Liberalism produces special material incentives for cooperation. Among fellow liberals interdependence should not be subject to security-motivated restrictions and, consequently, tends to be more varied, less dependent on single issues and less subject to single conflict.<sup>83</sup>

### 1.3 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN COLD WAR CONSENSUS

#### 1.3.1 In Search Of Consensus

Consensus, like balance of power, national interest, and national security, is a regularly used and much abused term. More than thirty years ago, the sociologist Edward Shils offered a classic definition;

Consensus is a particular state of the belief system of a society. It exists when a large proportion of the adult members of a society, more particularly a large proportion of those concerned with decisions regarding the allocations of authority, status, rights, wealth and income, and other important and scarce values about which conflict might occur, are in approximate agreement in their beliefs about what decisions should be made and have some feeling of unity with each other and with the society as a whole.<sup>84</sup>

To claim that consensus exists whenever interested adults are in approximate agreement about what decisions should be made implies that consensus describes social agreement along a wide spectrum ranging from the general to the specific and from the lofty to the mundane. Even the narrower notion of political consensus embraces a near-universe of

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<sup>82</sup> The individual subjects of autocracies, of course, do not lose their rights. It's just that the autocrats cannot claim legitimately to speak for their subjects. Subjects retain basic human rights, such as the rights of non-combatants in war. The tenor bombing of civilians-as in the bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki-constitute, in this view, violations of these rights and of liberal principles and demonstrate weaknesses of liberal models in these cases.

<sup>83</sup> Michael Doyle, "Peace Liberty and Democracy: Realist and Liberals Contents a Legacy", American Democracy Promotion, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.31-32

<sup>84</sup> Edward Shils, "The Concept of Consensus." In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited by David L. Sills, Crowell, Collier, and Macmillan, New York, 1968

activity. In short, because the word consensus has been used to describe agreement about almost anything, its utility might be suspect.

Yet investigating the domestic dimensions of American foreign policy virtually compels discussion of consensus, if only because presidents, their advisers, members of Congress, and the media routinely do. The term must be taken seriously because of its central role in contemporary American political discourse. And, indeed, if carefully defined and applied, it can provide useful insights into the domestic landscape of American foreign policy.

A brief review of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century should illustrate this point. Serious foreign policy disagreements abounded in the decades before World War-II. The bitter debates over overseas annexations, entry into the Great War, the Treaty of Versailles, and interwar neutrality legislation represent important events in the internal politics of American foreign policy. Some of these struggles involved vital constitutional issues about executive and legislative powers in foreign affairs. Thus Henry Cabot Lodge opposed the Treaty of Versailles, not as an isolationist, but as a senator convinced that the League Covenant would enable presidents to make commitments and wage wars without congressional approval. The Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, Lend Lease, and Franklin Roosevelt's undeclared naval war against Germany in 1941 provoked similarly important constitutional questions about presidential-congressional procedures.

These serious policy and procedural disputes reflected profound disagreements about the requirements of American security. What kinds of international conditions promoted or weakened U.S. security? Should the United States seek merely to protect its physical security, or must it also act to preserve or export its political and economic values and institutions? How best could either of these goals be achieved? These questions yielded a variety of harshly discordant answers in the decades preceding World War-II.<sup>85</sup>

From the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, however, presidents offered foreign policies that enjoyed substantial public and elite support.<sup>86</sup> The apparent demands of the Cold War

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<sup>85</sup> Richard E. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p.3-4

<sup>86</sup> Not everyone would agree with this argument. Ernest R. May and Richard E. Neustadt, for example, discovered "bitter, partisan, and utterly consensus-free" congressional debate about the loss of China, the long term stationing of American troops in Europe, the limiting of warfare in Korea by Truman.



largely overcame the often paralyzing divisiveness of the interwar period and lent a certain coherence, purpose, and predictability to American foreign policy. Some critics, however, have plausibly argued that Cold War presidents, by baldly and simplistically inflating the communist “threat,” manufactured an artificial consensus that stifled domestic dissent, rigidified U.S. foreign policy, and ultimately trapped them in their own rhetoric.<sup>87</sup> In short, the desperate search for consensus encouraged Cold War presidents to present platitudinous, highly symbolic foreign policies embodying vague national, but supposedly universal, values.

But to ask if presidents should try to create domestic foreign policy consensus seems largely irrelevant inasmuch as most presidents-Nixon was a partial exception-have acted on the premise that consensus is both possible and desirable, have worked hard to achieve it, and have done so despite the fact that there exists no generally accepted definition of consensus!

Cold War presidents from Harry S. Truman to Lyndon Johnson shared the conviction that public and elite support for foreign policy could be most effectively built on a framework of global anticommunism. From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, U.S. presidents, haunted and constrained by the legacy of Vietnam, tried to sustain America’s international “relevance” in the face of widespread domestic fears about the costs of military intervention and global activism. These post-Vietnam presidents confronted a public increasingly preoccupied with domestic economic interests but simultaneously demanding that the United States remain a world leader. Presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan attempted to grapple with this post-Vietnam world by unveiling grand designs and foreign policy strategies in conflict with those of their immediate predecessors. These, in turn, provoked vigorous reactions from divided domestic elites now arrayed along ideologically adversarial lines. These presidents, in reaction to such difficult and often contradictory domestic realities, relied heavily on rhetoric, theater, and public relations to mobilize support for their foreign policies, with Ronald Reagan and his “handlers” merely continuing a trend begun by Nixon in 1968. The result was that by the late 1980s, “rhetorical” presidents had further widened the frequently prominent gap between words and deeds in American foreign policy.

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<sup>87</sup> Richard E. Falk, “Lifting the Curse of Bipartisanship”, *World Policy Journal* 1, 1983, p.127-157

There were, of course, several reasons for this disturbing development. The availability of immediate communications, congressional insistence on a central role in foreign policymaking, and the growing cultural diversity of American society since the 1960s conspired to tempt presidents to portray all decisions as “simple and absolute choices between good and evil.” These rhetorical excesses could perhaps be defended as necessary while the Cold War raged, for behind the overheated words laid a reasonable geopolitical analysis that focused on the reality of the Soviet threat. But with the demise of the Soviet Union and with it the central organizing concept of forty plus years of American strategy, post-Cold War presidents have often reached back to the old rhetoric in order to mobilize public support for international undertakings whose strategic rationale has been very difficult to define. Did George Bush really think that Saddam Hussein was “worse than Hitler”? Does Bill Clinton really believe that the United States is the “conscience of the international community?” Or should such statements be dismissed as rhetorical flourishes designed to achieve that elusive public consensus about the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world? The answers are not at all clear.

In sum, the quest for foreign policy consensus has been both an understandable presidential response to a fragmented, sometimes stalemated domestic political system and a dangerous temptation for them to misrepresent their foreign policies. The absence of consensus risks turning every foreign policy issue into a highly politicized domestic dispute, yet the search for consensus has often entailed the articulation of doctrinal, moralistic foreign policies ill suited to serve the interests of the United States. If anything, the geopolitical uncertainties unleashed by the ending of the Cold War have exacerbated this tendency.<sup>88</sup>

### **1.3.2 The Elements of Consensus**

To help clarify the inevitably slippery yet important concept of domestic foreign policy consensus, we disaggregate it into three components: policy, cultural, and procedural. Policy consensus involves substantial public and elite agreement about the grand design, strategy, and tactics of foreign policy. Cultural consensus entails broad, grassroots agreement about an appropriate set of private and public values linked to America’s

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<sup>88</sup> Richard E. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, p.4-5

international role. Procedural consensus refers to presidential-congressional understandings about the respective tasks to be performed by each governmental branch. American foreign policy was characterized by a relatively stable policy, cultural, and procedural domestic consensus.

### **1.3.2.1 Policy Consensus**

During the two decades following World War-II, political elites, most notably the so-called foreign policy establishment, and the wider public, especially the better informed or attentive part of it, subscribed to a set of fundamental propositions about the nature of the international system, the requirements of American security, and the nation's proper orientation to the world. Chief among them were the following:

- Alone among the nations of the free world the United States has both the material power and the moral responsibility to create a just and stable international order.
- In view of the interdependent nature of the world, U.S. security interest must be necessarily global,
- Soviet and Soviet-inspired aggression and subversion constitutes the primary threat to world peace,
- The Policy of Containment represents the best way to stop further Soviet-sponsored expansion,
- The United States must have nuclear weapons in order to help deter a soviet attack on it and its allies,
- A stable, open world economy required American leadership,
- The United States must assume leadership in such organizations as the United Nations.<sup>89</sup>

### **1.3.2.2 Cultural Consensus**

The Cold War cultural Consensus was firmly grounded in a set of values that one recent study has called "cosmopolitan liberalism" According to this definition of national identity, to be an American a person had only on subscribe to such values as liberty, individualism,

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<sup>89</sup> Richard E. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p.6-10

popular sovereignty, and equality of opportunity. One's ethnic origin was much less important in defining "American ness" than allegiance to these liberal ideals. In reality, of course, this definition discriminated against African Americans, Native Americans and women.<sup>90</sup>

### 1.3.2.3 Procedural Consensus

Central to the procedural Cold War consensus was a series of votes in the Congress from 1945 to 1964 highly supportive of major presidential initiatives. U.S. membership in the United Nations, NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO); aid to Greece and Turkey; the Marshall Plan; ratification of the Japan Peace Treaty, the Korea Defense Pact, the Formosa Security Pact and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and regional resolutions covering Formosa, the Middle East, Berlin, Cuba, and Indochina all received at least 70 percent of the vote with several claiming virtually unanimous support. Yet these overwhelming majorities pointed as well to a procedural consensus in executive-congressional relations that had been fostered by Roosevelt, partly threatened by Truman, revived by Eisenhower, and sustained by Kennedy.

At the same time, the strength of this consensus can easily be exaggerated. For example, Congress prevented the State Department from administering Marshall Plan Aid despite Truman's vehement protests; the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was ratified only after many false starts and a great deal of compromise; and the Eisenhower Doctrine (Middle East Resolution) was delayed several months by a Congress that ultimately diluted its contents.<sup>91</sup> The classic example is to refusal of the Senate to give its agreement to the Treaty of Versailles. As a result United States did not join the League of Nations.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>Ibid, p.10

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p.12

<sup>92</sup> Temple Wanamaker, Ibid, p.19

### 1.3.3 After the Cold War

#### 1.3.3.1 Changes in Public Opinion

The public greeted the end of the Cold War with a combination of weariness and relief. Neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor the disintegration of the Soviet Union elicited much interest and certainly no celebratory outpourings in the United States. Indeed, except for the remarkably short-lived euphoria that followed the victory in the Persian Gulf War, the public generally appeared to be angry, impatient, and distracted by domestic economic worries. But the relatively low importance the American people attached to foreign policy issues after the Cold War continued a trend that had been evident since the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. In the early 1990s the public considered the economy, health care, crime, the budget deficit, and education far more significant than foreign policy and defense.<sup>93</sup>

To Assessment by the General Public in the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Surveys in late 1994, asked respondents to rank their foreign policy goals, “protecting the jobs of American workers” (83 percent a “top priority”) easily topped the list. Next in importance were “preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction” (82 percent) and “securing adequate supplies of energy for the U.S.” (62 percent). At the bottom of the public’s foreign policy priorities were “promoting and defending human rights in other countries” (34 percent), “helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations” (25 percent). In other words, issues of economic security dominated both the public’s global and domestic priorities after the Cold War.<sup>94</sup>

#### 1.3.3.2 Parainstitutional Changes

The end of the Cold War had several important parainstitutional consequences. First, it threatened to marginalize those national security experts whose credibility depended heavily on the permanence of a Soviet threat and who failed notably to predict the imminent demise of the Soviet Union. Some members of traditional “politico-military”

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<sup>93</sup> Richard E. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, p.26

<sup>94</sup> Ole R. Hoisti, *Promotion of Democracy as Popular Demand?*, American Democracy Promotion, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenbary and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.159

elite scrambled in different ways to cope with this new international environment. Samuel Huntington discovered a world of clashing civilizations potentially dangerous to the West.<sup>95</sup> Henry Kissinger argued that a new, more mature multipolar balance had emerged and was subject to the same forces present in previous equilibrium.<sup>96</sup> Frank Gaffney and Charles Krauthammer warned of the clear and present dangers posed by outlaw terrorist states whose behavior made the conduct of the Soviet Union appear almost benign in retrospect.<sup>97</sup> Similarly, research and advocacy organizations such as the American Enterprise institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hudson Institute, whose agendas were intertwined with the Cold War, found themselves trying to remain relevant in a world bereft of old verities.

In contrast, the end of the Cold War significantly improved the fortunes of those members of the old foreign policy establishment (and their disciples) who, after Vietnam, had argued for new global U.S. priorities focused on transnational themes such as economic interdependence, the environment, population, and migration. After facing the ridicule of the politico-military elite as Soviet-American relations again worsened by the late 1970s, these experts reemerged after the Cold War as part of a nascent politico-economic elite eager to exert primary influence over American foreign policy. Indeed, members of these new elite-advisers such as Ron Brown and Jeffrey Garten- were to be found at the center of the Clinton's Administration's foreign policy team. At the same time, economics-oriented organizations such as the Economic Strategy Institute and the Institute for International Economics Threatened to eclipse the influence of traditional national security groups. Whether this new elite will constitute the core of a new foreign policy establishment- comparable in unity and authority to its Cold War predecessor- depends in large measure on whether its agenda-trade, open markets, national economics competitiveness-remains relevant in the post-Cold War world or whether more traditional security issues again more.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization", *Foreign Affairs* 70, Spring 1993,

<sup>96</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 56

<sup>97</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment" *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990-1991*, 1991,

<sup>98</sup> Nelson W. Polsby, "Foreign Policy Establishment: Toward Professionalism and Centrism." In *the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994, p.48

Finally, the end of the Cold War gave to the national media additional power to help set the U.S. foreign policy agenda. This development was, of course, not wholly new, for leading print and broadcast journalist had played a major role in shaping foreign policy since at least Vietnam, but the strategic vacuum created by the demise of the containment policy gave to the media an increased opportunity to define American interest.<sup>99</sup>

### **1.3.3.3 The Further Erosion of the Cultural Consensus**

The ending of the Cold War coincided with, but did not cause, the further erosion of the cultural consensus. That consensus had been most evident in the 1950s and early 1960s when a relatively unified America led the “free world” against revolutionary communism. But the divisiveness spawned by the Vietnam War and by social challenges like the civil rights and women’s movements undermined the notion of a rigid “American way of life” By the 1990s an evolving, loosely connected set of beliefs that some commentators called “multiculturalism” had emerged to weaken further the dominance of the old liberal cosmopolitan consensus.<sup>100</sup>

At multiculturalism’s core lies “an insistence of the primacy of ethnicity over the individual’s shared and equal status, as a citizen in shaping... identity and... interests.” Thus racial group identity constitutes “the preferred choice of self-definition and validates the ongoing affirmation of ethnic distinctiveness.” The apparent purpose of multiculturalism is “to justify the claims of subordinate ethnic groups to a larger share of society’s” tangible and intangible goods and to make “communal representation” the ordering principle of public policymaking. Multicultural nationalism, by replacing the symbolic melting pot with a permanent mosaic, conceives of the United States “as a confederation of groups rather than a community of autonomous individuals... and implies that no national creed does, can, or should exist...”<sup>101</sup> And it carries the potential to challenge settled policy on such issues as the religious values in public life, the content of

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<sup>99</sup> Richard E. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, p.30

<sup>100</sup> Jack Citrin, Ernst B. Haas and Christopher Muste, “Is American Nationalism Chancing? Implications for Foreign Policy” *International Studies Quarterly* 38, 1994, p.9

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p.10

school and university curriculums, cultural assimilation, and the symbolic hegemony of the English language.

#### **1.3.3.4 Foreign Policy Legitimation**

At a minimum, domestic consensus describes the condition produced by broad agreement among members of the executive and Congress, political elites, the attentive public, and the mass public about the basic purposes of American foreign policy. Exactly how much agreement must exist before a consensus results remains debatable. Major foreign policy initiatives in the first two postwar decades received more overall support than those undertaken since the Vietnam War and that since the Cold War; the public has largely lost interest in no economic foreign policy issues. Moreover, for a pluralistic polity such as the United States to sustain a coherent, consistent, and reasonably effective long-term foreign policy, a relatively broad and stable domestic consensus is essential, though it hardly guarantees success and can, in fact, prove dangerous. A democratic consensus can impart authority to foreign policy by sharing and supporting its premises, purposes, and values. While consensus can hardly assure steady diplomacy, an effective foreign policy may be impossible without it. Furthermore, in a political system grounded in popular sovereignty consensus usually implies legitimacy. Different kinds of regimes can draw legitimacy from a variety of sources—religion, tradition, the soil, lineage, ethnic identity, revolution, laws, and so on—but in the United States foreign policy legitimacy primarily depends on whether that policy is generally construed to be valued and proper within the overall domestic political context.

At those times when a consensus did exist, it did not “just happen.” Cold War presidents worked diligently to achieve domestic legitimacy for their foreign policies. The role that historical, political, institutional, parainstitutional, and cultural factors have played in facilitating or hampering the achievement of consensus. Equally significant, however, have been the self-conscious efforts of presidents to legitimate—or “sell”—their foreign policies. Indeed, this process of policy legitimation constitutes the primary means presidents employ to construct consensus. Presidents and their foreign policy advisers try to provide interpretive images of the international situation that are compatible with domestic experience to justify the necessity, urgency, and character of their actions. Legitimation



establishes the broad purposes of policy by translating its objectives into an understandable and compelling reflection of the domestic society's dominant norms. As such, it represents a political act within the context of national politics and characteristically relies on politically potent symbols to link foreign policy and these internal norms.<sup>102</sup>

## **1.4 UNITED STATES DEMOCRACY PROMOTION**

What role does or should democracy play in foreign policy? Two answers come from traditional perspectives on American foreign policy. The idealist tradition concludes that democracy should play a big role, such that the purpose of American foreign policy becomes either to perfect democracy at home or stay out of foreign affairs-isolationism-or to promote democracy abroad and transform world affairs-internationalism. The realist tradition, conversely, argues that democracy should play only a minor role, if any. The true purpose of foreign policy, realists say, is to defend the national interest, and that is best done by balancing power among states and preventing the domestic political values of any one state, apparently including democracies, from dominating the values of other states.

The idealist and realist traditions confound the effort to assess the real influence of democracy on American foreign policy. Democracy matters either a lot or not at all, when in fact it probably matters some or most of the time depending on the circumstances. Even in extreme circumstances, such as direct attack, democracy is not irrelevant. The United States seeks to survive as a liberal democratic society, not as a piece of geography that hosts a despotic or democratic society-that is, whatever it takes to survive.

To assess the real influence of democracy on US foreign policy, analysis has to surmount the dualism of the idealist and realist traditions.<sup>103</sup>

### **1.4.1 Realist Reflections**

Some realists, such as Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer, view the 'democratic peace' as little more than a misleading statistical artifact and warn that a US foreign policy

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<sup>102</sup> Richard E. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p.32

<sup>103</sup> Henry R. Nau, *America's Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Interest: Beyond Realism, Beyond Idealism, American Democracy Promotion*, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenbary and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.127

built on the promotion of democracy will lead to a dangerous complacency about future great power challengers, 'disastrous military interventions abroad, strategic overextension, and the relative decline of American power'.<sup>104</sup> In contrast, neoclassical realists, who believe that domestic factors and intentions as well as capabilities shape states' foreign policy, see some merit in the democratic peace argument.<sup>105</sup> Because, threat does not inhere in power alone, the relative distribution of capabilities among states is less important than assessments of others intentions in determining how states interact with each other. Whether, for instance, a state balances against or bandwagons with a more powerful neighbor depends, inter alia, on whether it believes that the latter will use its power advantage to threaten, coerce, manipulate, and destroy it or, conversely, to enable, reassure, and enrich it.<sup>106</sup>

A new school of motivational realists has emerged to challenge the structural and defensive realist view of international politics as a tragedy-one driven by states' search for security in an anarchic world of fear and uncertainty. Instead, motivational realists characterize international relations in terms of 'old style' power politics. Specifically, the binding forces in a system of power politics are competition and conflict among sovereign states, each with a duty not only to defend itself but to increase its power and advance its national interests-by force, if necessary-often at the expense of other states. Given this realist school's emphasis on intentions and goals, the principal benefit of US democracy promotion is the increased transparency of state motivations: 'If a democracy is really a security seeker, the openness of its policy processes will reveal this to the world.'<sup>107</sup> Likewise, if a democracy is not really a security seeker but rather an aggressor, for whatever reason, it will be unable to hide its greedy, non-security aims.

More generally, in a world of uncertainty about others' motivations, security seekers value transparency because they need to know others real motivations and, just as important,

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<sup>104</sup> Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace", In Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (ed.), *The Peril of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, MS: The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.329

<sup>105</sup> Gideon Rose "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, 51/1, 1998, p.144-172

<sup>106</sup> Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing The Revisionist State Back" ,*International Security*, 19/1, 1994, p.104

<sup>107</sup> Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers do Not Fight Each Other", *Security Studies*, 7/1, 1997, p.119

they want others to recognize their own genuinely benign intentions. Among security seekers, transparency enhances conflict avoidance and reassurance. Inasmuch as the spread of liberal democracy creates shared values, common interests, and, most important, greater transparency of state motivations, it should lower threat perceptions and increase cooperation among such states.

Extending the democratic zone will not lead to a perpetual peace among nations. This is because the fundamental causes of international conflict will remain, for they cannot be transcended. The spread of democracy promises to dampen potential conflicts but it will not effect a major 'qualitative change' in international politics, which will remain much as it has always been: a struggle for power and influence in a world of, at a minimum, moderate scarcity.<sup>108</sup>

#### **1.4.2 U.S. Supported Democracy or Not?**

For one of the most debated foreign policy questions, it is remarkable how little agreement there seems to be about the meaning of American democracy promotion in practice. Thus, while some analysts view it as an unnecessary intrusion still championed in to the otherwise normal conduct of diplomatic relations-a position still championed by Henry Kissinger- others regard it as part of a practical strategy designed to advance American national interest.<sup>109</sup>

Indeed, it can be argued that for many parts of the world the US has not historically stood for the promotion of democracy but instead for resistance to it. The two obvious areas of the world are Latin and Central America, and the Middle East. Of course, there are many examples in other parts of the world. For example, US policy towards Nigeria since 1993- but these two regions of the world seems to support the view that the US has been involved in undermining democratic regimes rather than fostering them. And, crucially, the driver for such a policy in both regions has been US economic interests. It is for these reasons that the US undermined democracy in Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, and it is also why

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<sup>108</sup> Randall L. Schweller, U.S. Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections, American Democracy Promotion, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenbary and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.42-43

<sup>109</sup> Michael Cox, G. John Ikenbary and Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.7

the US continues to support autocratic, and decidedly undemocratic, regimes in the Middle East. The US may well have been justified in its policies towards Saddam Hussein at the time of the Gulf War and Iraq War, but there was a certain paradox about US forces physically protecting and supporting some of the richest and most undemocratic regimes in the world like Saudi Arabia.<sup>110</sup>

The distance between the commitment to the promotion of democracy and the reality of US foreign policy is most evident in the case of Latin and Central America, for whom there must be disbelief at the notion that the US has a long-standing commitment to the promotion of democracy. The entire history of US relations with Latin and Central American countries fails to support the notion that the US has sought to promote democracy. Indeed, the opposite case is strongly supported. There are many examples, but the book by William Robinson<sup>111</sup> has powerfully shown just how actively involved the US was in undermining the Allende regime in Chile and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, despite the wishes of the indigenous populations. Interestingly, Robinson points out that US policies towards these countries changed towards the promotion of democracy only when it came to be seen in Washington as a more effective way of furthering US interests. It seems difficult to conclude anything other than that democracy promotion in Latin and Central America has been one tool amongst many in promoting US interests rather than an end in itself in that region.<sup>112</sup>

Throughout the Cold War the policy of promoting democracy was simultaneously supported and undermined by realist considerations of power relations with the Soviet Union. Where it risked undermining geopolitical allies it was opposed by realist, and where the policy sought to undermine communist regimes it was, in the main, supported,<sup>113</sup> but was also equally happy to undermine indigenous democratic regimes when they tilted towards Moscow.

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<sup>110</sup> Steve Smith, U.S. Democracy Promotion: Critical Question, American Democracy Promotion, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenbary and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.65

<sup>111</sup> W Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996

<sup>112</sup> Steve Smith, Ibid, p.65

<sup>113</sup> Jason G. Ralph, High Stakes and Low Intensity Democracy, American Democracy Promotion, Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenbary and Takashi Inoguchi, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.200

Of course, commentators such as Tony Smith know this only too well, and indeed point to it, but none the less there seems to be an underlying assumption that the US has had a mission to promote democracy, as if this was merely an automatic external extension of domestic policy. The record is far more mixed, with the US using democracy promotion as one aspect of its foreign policy, an aspect that was not so much the centerpiece of policy as a tool for furthering US interests. Indeed, it could be argued that the evidence in Smith's survey of US democracy promotion supports the opposite interpretation to the one he puts forward. For Smith, the US promotion of democracy has been a reflection of US domestic political culture and debate. Now, whilst he is surely right to argue that realism is inadequate to explain international relations, since it relies on a rational actor analogy borrowed from economics which stresses the international context as central, his account may be said to overestimate the attractions of liberal democracy for many parts of the world, especially when it is accompanied by the dominance of neo liberal economic regimes. As he notes, the expansion of democracy today to some parts of the world is in the US national interest, but unless we are convinced that liberal democracy is indeed applicable to other social and cultural settings then maybe such an expansion may not be in the interests of other populations.<sup>114</sup>

In other words, democracy promotion has not been a goal, let alone the goal, of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. At times the US has supported democracy, but at other times it has been more suitable for the US to support local despots because they happened to be rather good at opposing the same 'enemy' as did the US. In the immortal words of Henry Kissinger, commenting on the election of Allende in Chile in June 1970, 'I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people'.<sup>115</sup>

The US has played a very decisive role in undermining some democratic regimes, and has done so because the external alignment of the states concerned have been far more important than any notion of democracy enhancement being a primary goal of foreign

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<sup>114</sup> Steve Smith, *Ibid*, p.65-66

<sup>115</sup> W Robinson, *Promoting Polyarcy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996,p.146

policy. Thus, although there have been clear instances of the US furthering democracy in other countries, this has tended to be in support of more important policy goals.

As far as the Clinton administration's policy is concerned, Thomas Carothers has documented a series of weaknesses that make it difficult to support the administration's contention that the policy was indeed at the centre of US foreign policy, let alone its unifying theme. The main problems he cites are that the pro-democracy rhetoric was overused by the administration; that the emphasis on democracy promotion had the unintended effect of calling attention to America's inconsistencies in this regard; that the policy was based on the mistaken notion that the US could easily affect what happened in other countries, with the result that the US often took credit for democratic transitions that were under way for entirely indigenous reasons; and that the US has tended to place too much hope on an individual leader as equaling democracy's hopes, and on putting in place formal institutions rather than dealing with the much thornier problem of the values necessary to underpin democracy.<sup>116</sup>

In this light, the Clinton administration's focus on democratic enlargement<sup>10</sup> now appears to have been more of an attempt to come up with a 'big idea' or overarching theme for US foreign policy after the cold war than any commitment to democracy enlargement as the centerpiece of actual policy. As the overarching theme for foreign policy it had the advantage of being almost impossible to oppose, since any such opposition could be portrayed as an opposition to democracy itself; and in the post-cold war world such a position had clear connotations of sympathy to anti-democratic forces such as communism.

The Clinton administration's policy on democracy promotion as just as subordinated to US economic interests as was all the earlier overarching themes of US foreign policy. It is also a policy that has been applied to varying extents depending on wider US interests. Indeed, as Michael Cox has argued, one of the main features of the Clinton administration was that it saw little distinction between US foreign and domestic

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<sup>116</sup> Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Promotion Under Clinton", *The Washington Quarterly*, 18/4, 1995, p.22-25

policies: the domestic economy required certain international structures and thus geo-economics dominated geopolitics. As he writes,

If America's primary purpose was to win the economic race, then how could this be reconciled with its historic goal of promoting global democracy?... there was bound to be a very real conflict of interest: between promoting American economic objectives on the one hand and supporting the cause of human rights on the other- And one hardly needed a crystal ball to know which one the United States was most likely to sacrifice in an age of geo-economics.

Finally, democracy has to be firmly rooted in the local and very particular conditions of specific states, and that the success of fledgling democracies depends far more on local factors than on anything that the US can or cannot do.<sup>117</sup>



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<sup>117</sup> Steve Smith, *Ibid*, p.67

## 2. MAIN PARAMETERS OF THE UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICIES

*“The Middle East is an area which the United States has a vital interest. The maintenance of peace in that area, which has so frequently seen disturbances in the past, is of significance to the world as whole.”<sup>118</sup>*

*Franklin Delano Roosevelt  
March 1944*

### 2.1 THE IDEA OF US POLICY IN THE MIND OF WASHINGTON MIDDLE EAST PICTURE

#### 2.1.1 The Term of “Middle East”

The term “Middle East” is not an exact one. Centuries ago Europeans considered as “the East” all lands lying beyond the eastern portals of their then known world. The area bordering the eastern shore of the Mediterranean came to be known as “the Near East” and the area bordering the distant Pacific as “the Far East”. The vast expanse of land lying in between was often referred to as “the Middle East.”<sup>119</sup> This term traditionally applied by western Europeans to the countries of SW Asia and NE Africa lying W of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.<sup>120</sup> Today the terms “Near East” and “Middle east” have come to be used interchangeably. The Middle East is now generally considered to include the independent countries of Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, and lying along the coast of Arabian Peninsula.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> United States Security Strategy for the Middle East, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, May 1995, p.5

<sup>119</sup> Temple Wanamaker, Ibid, p.184

<sup>120</sup> “Middle East”, Available on site: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0833071.html>

<sup>121</sup> Temple Wanamaker, Ibid, p.184






Figure 2.1 Middle East map<sup>122</sup>

### 2.1.2 America's Interests in the Middle East

Throughout recorded history the Middle East has been an area of great significance. Geographically it is the transportation and communication crossroad to Europe, Asia, and Africa. Great empires have fought to dominate the region. Controlling the strategic approaches to three continents, the Middle East has been a highly desirable prize. Because it has the largest concentration of proven oil reserves in the world and is the leading oil-producing region as well, since World War-II its value has been enhanced even further.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> The United States And The Persian Gulf Reshaping Security Strategy For The Post Containment Era, Edited By Richard D. Sokolsky, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2003

<sup>123</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Ibid, p.389

The United States has five fundamental interests in the Middle East: reliable access, on reasonable terms, at tolerable prices, to the oil of the region, especially the Arabian Peninsula; The survival and security of the state of Israel;<sup>124</sup> preventing the Soviet Union (and others) from dominating the area <sup>125</sup> (With the developments of the Cold War that usually meant the Soviets. But the interest is the same whether the adversary is the Soviets or not.);<sup>126</sup> preventing, or at least managing, the spread of WMD (Their spread or use is opposed by the United States more generally, even if they do not pose an immediate threat to U.S. interests. Those weapons in the Gulf region pose a threat to U.S. partners and U.S. forces),<sup>127</sup> and the fulfillment, so far as possible, of certain principles, including the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and the right of peoples to self-determination. Each one of these interest, taken alone, gives the United States a vital concern with the future of the Middle East; taken together, and considering as well the extreme volatility of the unresolved Arab-Israel conflict, they make the Middle East the most important single region in the world from the standpoint of American interest- and the most dangerous.<sup>128</sup>

Middle East; for American Policymakers has often been a headache, sometimes a nightmare, as each president has tried in his own way, to pursue an even-handed policy, if only because he needed both Arab oil and Jewish campaign contributions. Implementation of a strategy to achieve these contradictory goals has traditionally met with a variety of obstacles, not least within the United States itself. Even mindful of its electoral base, any US administration must be sensitive to domestic public opinion, especially during election year. On the one hand, too little emphasis on Israel or too much on the Arabs may invoke the wrath of the legendary Jewish lobby, an electorally small but highly organized and well placed body, on the other hand, too much emphasis on the Israel and too little on the Arabs

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<sup>124</sup> Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East, Interest and Obstacles*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p.50-51

<sup>125</sup> Temple Wanamaker, *Ibid*, p.184

<sup>126</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Harper Collins College Publishers, New York, 1994, p.390

<sup>127</sup> Daniel L. Byman and John R. Wise, *The Persian Gulf in the Coming Decade, Trends, Threats, and Opportunities*, Prepared for the United States Air Force, Rand Press, p.4

<sup>128</sup> Seth P. Tillman, *Ibid*, p.50-51

could trigger an oil price rise. Despite repeated assurances of an even-handed approach, however US policymakers have generally been viewed as favoring Israel.<sup>129</sup>

Briefly, with the end of the Cold War, the Middle East may in fact be the area of the world where U.S. interests are most actively engaged.<sup>130</sup>

## **2.2 OPENING THE DOOR KEY: OIL AND US INTEREST STAKES IN MIDDLE EAST**

In the coming years, energy and resource issues will continue to shape international security. Sufficient energy, metal, and mineral supplies are expected for various reasons: rapid technological change is making available previously uneconomical reserves; more countries are welcoming foreign investment; and, the demand for a greater supply may be limited if slower world economic growth occurs. Yet, this adequacy of aggregate resources may be accompanied by crises over specific issues.

Energy and resource issues will continue to be a factor in U.S. security policy and defense planning. So U.S. forces may be required for broader purposes, as was the case in the Persian Gulf War, 1990–91 and Iraq War, 2003. Some specific energy and resource problems could exacerbate regional political tensions, potentially causing military conflicts in key areas, such as the Persian Gulf.<sup>131</sup> The Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain), Iran, and Iraq jointly possess 64% of the world's proven oil reserves. The most important among Gulf States is Saudi Arabia, which alone controls 27% of the world's oil supplies.<sup>132</sup> In the coming years, 40 to 65 percent of the world's oil will come from the Persian Gulf, a region infected by political instability and anti-Western attitudes.

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<sup>129</sup> Eric Watkins, "The Unfolding U.S. Policy in the Middle East", *International Affairs*, volume: 73, Issue:1 January (1997), p.1-14

<sup>130</sup> John W. Holmes, *US Interest and Policy Options, Maelstrom, the United States, southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean*, edited by John W. Holmes, the World Peace Foundation, 1995, p.217

<sup>131</sup> "Priorities For A Turbulent World", National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, p.39, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html>

<sup>132</sup> "U.S. Oil Policy in the Middle East, Foreign Policy in Focus", *Inter Hemispheric Resource Center*, Vol. 2 No. 4 January 1997, p.1




Figure 2.2 Oil reserves in million barrels, 1997<sup>133</sup>

U.S. forces might be used to ensure adequate supplies for Western democracies. This would include securing lines of communication to key oil and gas fields or protecting vulnerable countries with large resource reserves from attack.<sup>134</sup>

### 2.2.1 Energy, Resources, and Security Affairs

Prior to World War-II, resource security was exemplified by the British Empire's system, in which control over territory was seen as essential to ensuring resource supplies. A more recent concept was that serious energy and resource shortages would pit countries against

<sup>133</sup> Statistical Review of World Energy 1998 (British Petroleum), Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/>

<sup>134</sup> Priorities For A Turbulent World, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, p. 39, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/>

each other, with survival or starvation at stake. Neither concept is applicable in today's international environment. First, global market forces are making access to supplies more reliable. Second, supplies are generally ample to meet the demand. Yet, the relationship between resources and security remains subtle but profound, and capable of producing disintegrative effects.<sup>135</sup>

Key Points of U.S. Oil Policy in the Middle East are:

- Controlling oil access is a cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy. (US's paramount national interest in the Middle East is maintaining the unhindered flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to World Markets at stable prices)<sup>136</sup>
- U.S. reliance on imported oil is very high. (The World will be even more dependent on Persian Gulf oil in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century than it is today).
- Oil from the Persian Gulf accounts for 10% of the oil used in the U.S.
- Dual containment of Iran and Iraq, along with a broader military engagement policy, is key points to U.S. strategy in assuring the flow of oil.<sup>137</sup>

Four types of worrisome interactions are of special concern to the United States:

- Key energy and resource producers lacking powerful military forces or entrenched governments may be vulnerable to aggression. Rogue regimes may be tempted to steal from resource-rich neighbors through blackmail, raids, or territorial conquest. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are obvious candidates.<sup>138</sup> The Gulf War made clear the U.S. commitment to the security of Kuwait and other Gulf states. While Kuwait and the other Gulf mini states provide only a tiny proportion of total U.S. oil imports, those smaller countries are still central to broader U.S. policy objectives in the region.<sup>139</sup> So The United States seeks to ensure the security of friendly regimes. In the last decade, the United States

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<sup>135</sup> Priorities For A Turbulent World, Ibid, p.40

<sup>136</sup> United States Security Strategy for the Middle East, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, May 1995, p.6

<sup>137</sup> "U.S. Oil Policy in the Middle East", Foreign Policy in Focus, Inter Hemispheric Resource Center, Vol. 2 No. 4 January 1997, p.1

<sup>138</sup> Priorities For A Turbulent World, Ibid

<sup>139</sup> "U.S. Oil Policy in the Middle East, Foreign Policy in Focus", Ibid, p.1

has developed strong and close relations to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.<sup>140</sup>

Energy and resource reserves may be located in unstable areas or accessible only through hostile territory. This could lead to conflicts over production facilities and transportation routes, or at least extortion of revenues. The Caspian basin is an example. Shortages could exacerbate underlying political differences and serve as a catalyst for regional conflicts.

If anti-Western regimes can disrupt supplies and threaten economic pain, they might try to coerce the West into supporting their agendas.<sup>141</sup> The most important U.S. interest is ensuring the free flow of oil from the region to world markets. States in the Gulf will remain leading oil exporters in the next decade, although the degree of their dominance will depend heavily on the price of oil.<sup>142</sup> An increase or decrease in oil prices, unless sustained over a long period of time, is unlikely to have a significant impact on the economic woes of any country.<sup>143</sup> A cartel controlling Gulf oil might try to pressure the West into abandoning Israel, for example.

Major Powers dependent on imports, especially from unstable regions, might independently attempt to ensure access to resources rather than participate in a cooperative security effort. Such independence could take the form of policies that work against cooperative security efforts. A potential example would be Chinese military cooperation with Gulf rogues.<sup>144</sup>

The United States must therefore remain engaged in the security of the Middle East diplomatically, economically, and militarily.<sup>145</sup> If we define US's primary interests in the

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<sup>140</sup> Many of these relationships became close well before 1990. The United States established a defense cooperation agreement with Oman in 1980. Well before that, the United States had an unwritten "handshake agreement" with Saudi Arabia, with U.S. forces committed to defending the Kingdom's security.

<sup>141</sup> *Priorities For A Turbulent World*, Ibid, p.40-41

<sup>142</sup> Daniel L. Byman and John R. Wise, *The Persian Gulf in the Coming Decade, Trends, Threats, and Opportunities*, Prepared for the United States Air Force, Rand Press, p.3

<sup>143</sup> Judith S. Yaphe, *The Middle East in 2015: The Impact of Regional Trends on U.S. Strategic Planning*. Ed: Judith S. Yaphe, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2002, p.7

<sup>144</sup> *Priorities For A Turbulent World*, Ibid, p.40-41

<sup>145</sup> "United States Security Strategy for the Middle East", Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, May 1995, p.3

Gulf as safeguarding access to oil, this is a goal not likely to change much in the next 15 years.<sup>146</sup>

### 2.2.2 Plentiful Oil

The world oil market continues to have ample supply and, therefore, low prices. The world oil market experienced drastic price fluctuations during the 1990s, most dramatically at the end of the decade. Oil prices, after falling by more than one-third from 1997 through 1998, nearly quadrupled in 2000.<sup>147</sup> Oil prices rose considerably at the end of the decade and in 2001.<sup>148</sup>

Crude oil prices fell in late 1997 and stabilized in early 1998 at little more than 1986 levels. The average price for other goods rose by about 30 percent from 1986 to 1998, meaning the real price of oil fell significantly over that period. Furthermore, the price of oil in 1986 was only about one-third its 1980 price. Adjusting for inflation using 1997 dollars, the price of a barrel of crude oil fell from \$66 in 1980, to \$14 in 1998. Had the 1998 price been the same as 1980, U.S. consumers would have paid \$340 billion more for oil, plus more for natural gas and coal. At this price, 1980 oil imports alone would have cost \$180 billion more.

The primary reason for lower oil prices is lower oil production costs. The cost of finding oil and gas reserves in the United States dropped from \$22.11 per barrel in 1982 to \$4.49 in 1996. The cost abroad dropped from \$14.35 in 1979 to \$4.49 in 1996. The information revolution has reduced modeling and sensor costs, and a higher proportion of the wells drilled are hitting oil. Additionally, 40 to 50 percent of the oil reserves in a field can be recovered, instead of 30 percent as in the past.

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<sup>146</sup> F. Gregory Gause III and Jill Crystal, "The Arab Gulf: Will Autocracy Define the Social Contract in 2015?" *The Middle East in 2015: The Impact of Regional Trends on U.S. Strategic Planning*. Ed: Judith S. Yaphe, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2002, p. 192

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid*, p. 69

<sup>148</sup> Daniel L. Byman and John R. Wise, *The Persian Gulf in the Coming Decade, Trends, Threats, and Opportunities*, Prepared for the United States Air Force, Rand Press, p.2




Figure 2.3 Cost of finding oil and gas reserves<sup>149</sup>

As costs drop, previously unattractive oil fields, e.g., deep offshore fields in the Gulf of Mexico can be made profitable. After a long slide, U.S. oil production in 1998 was higher than in 1997. The U.S. Department of Energy forecasts that U.S. oil output will remain constant for another decade.

The Persian Gulf will remain vital to world energy supplies. This is a concern, because the Gulf has many security problems. The GCC monarchies face serious domestic problems. Historically, rogue regimes in the region have been inclined to act aggressively toward their neighbors. Growing oil revenues may enable rogue regimes to build weapons of mass destruction and conventional capabilities.

Persian Gulf countries have increased their output sharply in the last decade and may do so in the next. Their ample reserves can sustain a considerable increase in output. Although currently producing about 9 mbd, Saudi Arabia is pursuing a program to raise its capacity from 11 mbd to 14 mbd within the next few years. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates its capacity in 2020 as 18.2 mbd. Other GCC States-Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Oman-are increasing their capacity from 7 mbd to 10 mbd or more.

<sup>149</sup> Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, from data reported in Form EIA-28, "Financial Reporting System.", Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html>






Figure 2.4 Oil output in million barrels per day<sup>150</sup>

Iran is welcoming foreign investment to expand its capacity. The United States has eased its threat of secondary boycotts against foreign firms investing in Iranian oil and gas, although U.S. firms are still banned from such investment. DOE estimates Iranian production capacity at 6.3 mbd in 2020.

<sup>150</sup> Statistical Review of World Energy 1998(British Petroleum), Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/>




Figure 2.5 World oil production capacities (mbd)<sup>151</sup>

If demand rises quickly, then the Persian Gulf share in world oil exports could rise, from the historic low of 36 percent in 1985 to 65 percent by 2020, according to DOE forecasts. This would put the Persian Gulf share back to where it was in the early 1970s, when the Gulf cartel was able to drive oil prices up sharply. But, if demand grows slowly, the Middle East's share in output could stabilize at its current level, according to private-sector forecasters.

<sup>151</sup> International Energy Outlook 1998, Washington: Department of Energy, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html>




Figure 2.6 Persian Gulf share of world oil exports, 1970–2020<sup>152</sup>

DOE forecasts that Persian Gulf production will go increasingly to East Asia. It predicts that, in 2020, 57 percent of Persian Gulf oil will go to the Pacific Rim countries (including northeast Asia). Only 7 percent will go to the United States and 9 percent to Europe. South Asia will receive a big part of the remaining 26 percent. This trend will raise important questions about the role of Asian countries in Gulf security.

<sup>152</sup> International Energy Outlook 1998, Ibid

### 2.2.3 Energy Demand

DOE forecasts that world energy consumption will grow 2.3 percent annually, the same rate since 1970.




Figure 2.7 World energy consumption<sup>153</sup>

At this rate, world consumption in 2020 will be three times that of 1970. Of all energies, natural gas consumption is growing the fastest. Its share of world energy consumption rose from 17.5 percent in 1970 to 21.4 percent in 1995. It is projected to be 27.2 percent in 2020. Eighty percent of natural gas consumption occurs in producing countries, especially the United States and Russia.

<sup>153</sup> International Energy Outlook 1998, Ibid

In 1995, 25 percent of the world's energy came from coal, most of which was consumed by the United States and China. Another 14.6 percent came from nuclear energy, hydropower, and renewable energy sources.

Oil will remain the most important fuel and the principal fuel for energy-poor countries. It constituted 47.3 percent of world energy in 1970 and 39 percent in 1995. It is projected to be 37.1 percent in 2020.




Figure 2.8 World energy consumption by fuel type<sup>154</sup>

The United States remains the world's largest energy consumer, and this consumption is rising. U.S. energy consumption grew 1.2 percent annually from 1970 to 1995 and is projected to grow at the same rate to 2020. However, the U.S. share of global energy is declining: it was 33 percent in 1970 and 25 percent in 1995, and DOE forecasts it to be 19 percent in 2020.

Energy consumption is growing rapidly in developing Asia. In 1970, it consumed 70 percent less energy than did the United States. Developing Asia went from consuming 9 percent of the world's energy in 1970 to 20 percent in 1995 and is projected to consume 31 percent in 2020. Developing Asia accounted for a one-third increase in world consumption

<sup>154</sup> International Energy Outlook 1998, Ibid

from 1970 to 1995 and is expected to retain that share to 2020. By 2020, developing Asia will consume 70 percent more energy than does the United States.

Most of Asia's increase in energy demand will be from China and India. This will be satisfied mostly by domestically produced coal. Nevertheless, the region's demand for oil will increase rapidly. Rising income will lead to more demand for transportation of goods and people. Developing Asia's consumption of oil for transportation is expected to rise from about 4.5 mbd in 1995 to 12.5 mbd in 2020, accounting for most of Asia's increasing oil demand, which will go from 11.3 mbd in 1995 to 28.6 mbd in 2020.

Asia will eventually consume most of the Persian Gulf oil. DOE forecasts that in 2020, Asia will consume 38.4 mbd, including 9.8 mbd in Japan and Australasia. Of this, Asia will produce about 20 percent and import more than 75 percent from the Persian Gulf.

By contrast, the United States will depend less on Persian Gulf oil. Of the 9.9 mbd that the United States imported in 1997, Canada and Latin America (including Mexico) provided 5.5 mbd, while the Persian Gulf only provided 1.8 mbd. Persian Gulf oil was only 10.0 percent of U.S. oil consumption in 1997.

For the United States, imports will become more important. DOE forecasts that U.S. domestic production will satisfy only 35 percent of consumption in 2020. Increased imports will not come from the Gulf. The Gulf share of the U.S. oil market will decline to 8 percent in 2020, according to the DOE. Others forecast a smaller Gulf share. Some industry sources suggest that the Western Hemisphere will become oil independent in Latin American oil output will increase fast enough to meet U.S. oil import needs.

Europe is more dependent on Gulf oil than the United States; however, that is not its main source of oil. In 1997, Western Europe produced 6.9 mbd (87 percent in Norway and the United Kingdom). It imported 9.4 mbd, of which 4.6 mbd came from the FSU and Africa, and 3.8 mbd from the Gulf. DOE forecasts that Western European oil imports will rise little by 2020, and the Gulf's share will stay constant. Many industry sources forecast a declining Gulf share, with more coming from the FSU and Africa. Like the United States, Europe's direct energy needs are not and will not be closely tied to the Gulf. One

reason is that European governments are disinclined to take a strong role in sharing responsibility for Gulf security.

Forecasts for energy demand are sensitive to two major uncertainties: future economic growth rates and trends in energy intensity of output. If the 1998 Asian crisis were to spread and last longer, world energy demand could decline substantially, especially because much of the increased demand is attributed to Asia. According to DOE scenarios, energy growth could be cut in half compared to normal conditions.

Energy intensity is also a major variable. The historic trend is toward less energy per unit of output in the economy. In the United States, energy consumption per dollar of gross domestic product (GDP) (inflation-adjusted) dropped from 20 million British thermal units (BTUs) in 1972, to 13 million BTUs in 1997. One reason is the shift toward industries that use less energy. The information technology companies use less energy to produce a dollar of output than do the auto or steel industries.

Another reason is greater energy efficiency. For example, the average fuel consumption per mile for U.S. vehicles continues to drop. In 1996, the average American vehicle was driven 17 percent more miles than in 1973, but used 18 percent less fuel. Additionally, environmental considerations, especially over global warming, may contribute to even greater efficiency. All this is likely to mean that the trend toward less energy per unit of output will continue. This is true not only in the United States, but globally. For example, China's energy consumption since 1980 has increased at about half the rate that real GDP has grown. That ratio is expected to continue.

## 2.2.4 Strait of Hormuz




Figure 2.9 Strait of Hormuz<sup>155</sup>

The United States seeks to sustain confidence in the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Lying between Oman and Iran, the Strait is about 25 miles wide. Oil tankers prefer to use the deeper water channels, which are less than one-half that wide and lie near the Omani side of the Strait. As tankers proceed up the Persian Gulf after the Strait, they pass through narrower channels lying on both sides of the Islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs, which are occupied by Iranians, but claimed by the United Arab Emirates. The in-bound channel is between the islands and the Iranian mainland.

The Strait of Hormuz is important because it is heavily used by commercial shipping. In 1994, 19,850 ships transited the strait, carrying 1.71 billion deadweight tons. It also provides access to ports useful for surging military personnel and materiel into the region during a crisis. If the Strait were blocked, time-phased force delivery plans could be

<sup>155</sup> Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf*, Free Press, Toronto, 1992, p.254



delayed, providing an aggressor with a window of opportunity.<sup>156</sup> While the presence of a robust U.S. military force obviously limits the ability of potential aggressors to close the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el Mandeb, a reduction in the American military presence would raise the risk of a closure, depending on the attitudes of the states abutting these waterways and the capabilities of U.S. regional partners to keep them open. Even with the current level of U.S. presence, several countries, including Iran, would be able to interfere with shipping with mines, submarines, and anti ship cruise missiles.<sup>157</sup> However, a 1997 study by the Office of Naval Intelligence stated that alternative ports outside the Strait have the capacity to receive forces deploying to the GCC countries. Jeddah on the Red Sea could handle 1 million 20-foot-equivalent-units (TEU) a year, and three ports on the Gulf of Oman Sea-Khor Fakkan and Fujairah in the UAE and Mina Qaboos in Oman-could handle 2.7 million TEU containers, a total capacity of 3.7 million TEU, compared to 4.3 million TEU actually landed within the Persian Gulf in 1996.

Besides its military importance, the Strait has taken on a symbolic significance for world oil markets. One-fifth of the world's oil transits the Strait. However, in a crisis, alternative routes would allow much of the Gulf oil to reach world markets. Two large pipelines cross Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, one of which was built for Iraq. Chemical additives could reduce friction in the pipelines and speed the flow. Gulf oil exports could quickly reach two-thirds their current level without use of the Strait. Additionally, the volume of exports could be restored to near normal levels by adding additional horsepower to pumping stations along those pipelines and by laying a short new pipeline from UAE oilfields to outside the Strait. The cost for such measures could equate to about \$1 per barrel, according to a 1997 study for the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.

The country most dependent on the Strait is Iran. It has no realistic alternatives to the Strait. It would be hard pressed to divert even one-third of its imports to routes outside the Strait.<sup>158</sup> The idea that Iran would seek to "close" the Strait of Hormuz, thereby severely disrupting world oil shipping, also seems unlikely. Such a step would cut off Iran's only

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<sup>156</sup> *Priorities For A Turbulent World*, Ibid

<sup>157</sup> Joseph McMillan, *U.S. Interests and Objectives, The United States and the Persian Gulf; Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Era*, edited by: Richard D. Sokolsky, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2003, p.19

<sup>158</sup> *Priorities For A Turbulent World*, Ibid, p.43-45

outlet for its own oil exports, upon which the regime depends entirely for its economic survival.<sup>159</sup> By contrast, the Gulf country least affected would be Iraq. It could readily trade through Turkey and Jordan, the main trading routes since Desert Storm.<sup>160</sup>

### **2.3 AFTER WW-II US AND FORWARD STATION: SPECIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN USA AND ISRAEL**

*“We have a special relationship with Israel. It’s absolutely crucial that our Number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It’s a special relationship.”*<sup>161</sup>

President Carter  
May 13, 1977

The special relationship between the United States and Israel results from the perception by key American officials that Israel is a strategic asset for the United States in the Middle East and from the impact of the pro-Israeli lobby on foreign policy decision making. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel was generally considered by U.S. administration to be a vital to U.S. security interest in the region because it provided military assets that could be used against both the USSR and radical Arab Nationalism<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Peter Jones, “Iran’s Threat Perceptions And Arms Control Policies”, The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998, p.46

<sup>160</sup> Priorities For A Turbulent World, Ibid , p.46

<sup>161</sup> Middle East, Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, September 1977, p.85

<sup>162</sup> James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, Wesley Longman Press, New York, 1999, p.254

## 2.3.1 The Birth of Israel and Israel Democracy

### 2.3.1.1 Zionism and the Birth of Democratic State of Israel

*“It is my responsibility to see that our policy in Israel fits in with our policy throughout the world; second, it is my desire to help build in Palestine a strong, prosperous, free and independent democratic state. It must be large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure.”*<sup>163</sup>

*President Truman  
(October 28, 1948, campaign speech at Madison Square Garden)*

Although Palestine was their biblical homeland, very few Jews lived in this area until events in Europe forced their migration. A series of pogroms began in Russia in 1881. Within twenty years some six hundred thousand Jews from Eastern Europe fled to America. During the same period, about 25,000 went to Palestine. Among these were the first Zionists. They believed that they never could hope to identify themselves completely with the non-Jewish people among whom they had lived and that the only permanent solution was to create a national homeland for Jews, preferably in Palestine. This movement was known as “Zionism”.

The first of a series of Zionist Congresses was held in 1897 in Basle, Switzerland, under the leadership of Theodore Herzl. The Congress established the World Zionist Organization and declared as its objective “the securing for the Jewish people a home in Palestine guaranteed by public law.” Two financial institutions—the Jewish Colonial Trust and the Jewish National Fund—were established to purchase land in Palestine. Although settlement of Jews in Palestine quietly progressed, the Zionist movement lost much of its vitality, with the death of Herzl in 1904.

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid



**Figure 2. 10 Theodor Herzl, Dr Chaim Weizmann and British Foreign Secretary James Balfour<sup>164</sup>**

World War-I gave the movement new impetus. Ottoman Empires entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In 1917 Arthur James Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, issued a statement on Palestine. Perhaps he was influenced by the hope of swinging full Jewish support, particularly in the United States, behind the Allied cause, and by the nationalist movements of the time. Among those he consulted was Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a distinguished British chemist of Russian origin and a leading Zionist who was later to be the first president of Israel. The Balfour Declaration, which was to have a far-reaching effect on the Zionist movement and on the history of the Middle East, stated.

After World War-I, the League of Nations awarded Great Britain the mandate for Palestine. Jewish immigrants arrived in a steady trickle, constructed towns, and through reclamation of swamplands and irrigation made progress in developing Settlements. Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe caused a fresh flow of immigration to Palestine.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/>, and <http://www.geo.ed.ac.uk/scotgaz/ml>

<sup>165</sup> Temple Wanamaker, Ibid, p.190-191

**Table 2.1 The Various Waves of Jewish Immigration into Palestine (1882-1948)<sup>166</sup>**

Administration	Period	Number of immigrants	Main countries of origin
Turkish(1882-1918)	1882-1903	20,000-30,000	Russia
	1904-14	35,000-40,000	Russia
British(1919-48)	1919-23	35,000	USSR, Poland, Baltic States
	1924-31	82,000	USSR, Poland,
	1932-38	217,000	Poland, Europe, Near East
	1939-45	92,000	Central Europe, Balkans, Near East
	1946-48	61,000	Poland, Central Europe, Balkans

After World War-II, relations between the Arabs and Jews and Between the British and the Jews reached the breaking Point. The British, realizing that governing a million of Arabs and 650,000 Jews was not only a thankless but an impossible task, announced their intention to give up the mandate as of May 15, 1948.<sup>167</sup>

Later, the United States became the chief advocate of the United Nations majority plan for the partitioning of Palestine.<sup>168</sup> In November 1947 the United Nations adopted a plan for the Partition of Palestine into two states-one Arab, one Jewish-politically separate but economically united. Jerusalem was to be a free city administered by the U.N. The Arabs at that time were unwilling to accept the partition plan and no state was willing to commit to the U.N. the forces that would have been needed to enforce partition. On May 14, 1948, the Jews announced the birth of the state of Israel<sup>169</sup>

<sup>166</sup> Gerard Chaliand, *The Palestinian Resistance*, Translated by Michael Perl, Penguin Books, 1972, p.29

<sup>167</sup> Temple Wanamaker, *Ibid*, p.192

<sup>168</sup> Abdeen Jabara and Janice Terry, *The Arab World from Nationalism to Revolution*, The Medina University Pres, Wilmette, Illinois, 1971, p.116

<sup>169</sup> Temple Wanamaker, *Ibid*, p.192

By this time the Jews were in control of most of the areas allocated to them under the United Nations partition agreement of November 1947, with the exception of the Negev Desert in the south. However, they still had to face invasions by small Arab armies, as well as a complex struggle with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a struggle that eventually was to leave what was later to be called the West Bank in Jordanian hands and a divided Jerusalem. By the time the fighting came to an end with the armistice agreements of 1949,<sup>170</sup> the new Jewish State occupied nearly 80 percent of the territory of Palestine, compared with some 55 percent that had been allotted it in Partition Resolution.<sup>171</sup>

**Table 2.2 Arab-Israel War, 1948-1949<sup>172</sup>**

State	Entry	Exit	Combat Forces	Population	Losses
Egypt	1948	1949	300000	35000000	2000
Israel	1948	1949	140000	2200000	6000
Jordan	1948	1949	60000	1000000	1000
Palestine	1948	1949	50000	2250000	3000
Syria	1948	1949	300000	6000000	1000

Between December 1947 and September 1949 over 700.000 Palestinians, or more than half the total population, fled their homes, while 130.000 to 1600.000 remained behind in the new state of Israel. The voluntary or compulsory “transfer” of the Arab population out of the Jewish state, which was a manifest Zionist desire to outside observers as early as 1919 and which had become an integral part of Zionist thinking no later than the 1930s, had been all but accomplished.<sup>173</sup>

<sup>170</sup> Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Second Edition, Routledge Press, London and New York, 2000, p.84

<sup>171</sup> James A. Bill, Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, Wesley Longman Press, New York, 1999, p.229

<sup>172</sup> Available on site: <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/india/israel1948.htm>

<sup>173</sup> James A. Bill, Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, Ibid, p.231




Figure 2.11 Palestine (British Mandated-(1920-1948),UN Partition Plan-1947 and Israel-(1949-1967))<sup>174</sup>

According to the declaration of independence issued by its provisional council, Israel was slated to be a 'Jewish state established by and for the Jewish people'. As Nira Yuval-Davis notes, while this declaration no legal authority, it was of great symbolic value as it represented the widest possible consensus among the different trends and groups within the Zionist movement that had worked to establish just such an entity.<sup>175</sup> Nevertheless, the differences between these same groups were too great to permit agreement on the balance between those religious and secular principles which would have formed the core of a permanent constitution. What happened instead was the creation of a system of government based on an amalgamation of different institutions, laws and practices, some of them based on the Jewish organizations established in independence and the fact that politics continued to be dominated by the Mapai party under its powerful leader and Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.<sup>176</sup>

<sup>174</sup> Library of Utehas Internet Site,

<sup>175</sup> Nira Yuval-Davis, "The Jewish Collectivity", *Khamsin*, 13, Women in the Middle East, Zed Books, London, 1987, p.62-63

<sup>176</sup> E. Roger Owen, "State and Society in the Middle East", *Items*, 44/1, March, 1990, p.10-14

### 2.3.1.2 Illiberal Democracy

In general, the regime, established in Israel in 1948 and lasting substantially until quite recently-when increasing challenges began to emerge-had a number of distinct characteristics:

(1) Although it was generally democratic, its notion of democracy was, and to a large extent remains, rather narrow. For Ben-Gurion and most of his successors, “democracy” meant majoritarian rule via periodic elections, not minority protection and individual rights.<sup>177</sup> Although often not recognized as such, Israel’s traditional democracy has been seen by some observers as “illiberal.”

(2) The overall design of the regime has been ethnic. The Israeli sociologist Sammy Smooha coined the term “ethnic democracy” in describing the regime. The meaning of ethnic democracy Israel-style has been that the state has defined itself as Jewish, has given Jews some exclusive legal rights (e.g., immigration, citizenship, and land purchase), and has discriminated against Arabs in numerous areas.<sup>178</sup>

(3) While the fundamental democratic order has been enhanced through the years-via legislation (e.g., two important basic laws in 1992), supreme court rulings (on freedom of expression, religious equality, and recently even equality in land allocation) and practice-a full-fledged constitution or a bill of rights, instruments that could have improved significantly the conditions of the Arabs, have not been enacted to date.

(4) In general, the Israeli system has traditionally emphasized the rights of the collective over those of the individual, the prerogative of the state over that of private interests, and the centrality of the core nation over any other group. The dominance of that collective-ethnic-statist approach resulted in the absence of civil rights as a fundamental element of

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<sup>177</sup> Michal Shamir and John Sullivan, “The Political Context of Tolerance: The U.S. and Israel”, *American Political Science Review*, 73, 1983, p.92-106

<sup>178</sup> Sammy Smooha, “Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, No.3, 1990, p.389-413



Israeli political life, culture, and institutionalized system, a condition that may have begun to change in recent years.<sup>179</sup>

### 2.3.2 Israel in US Imagination

Israel has always held a special place in the US imagination. From the moment that the Arabella dropped anchor in Massachusetts Bay in 1630, the Puritans identified themselves as citizens of God's American Israel, destined for greatness "as a City upon a Hill."<sup>180</sup> Herman Melville updated those words two centuries later in one of his first novels. "We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our time," he wrote in 1849, echoing his Puritan ancestors. "We bear the ark of the liberties of the world."<sup>181</sup> Although twentieth-century isolationists and anti-Semites dismissed Zionism as "messianic glob-alone" many Americans saw religious significance in the Jews reclaiming their ancient home in Palestine, and most would confess at some time that Israel was one of their favorite nations.

Yet US's special relationship with the Jewish state could not claim pride of place, nor was Israel the first foreign nation ever to win kindness in American eyes. Those honors fell to France, which had helped Britain's American colonies win their independence after 1776. Once Paris was shocked by revolution, however, George Washington feared that the French connection would draw America into the expanding wars that plagued Europe, polarizing politics and weakening the foundations of stable government.<sup>182</sup> As he prepared to leave office America's first president discreetly outlined his concerns regarding overly close ties with France. In a valedictory message that has come to be known as his "Farewell Address," Washington warned the American public in May 1796 that "a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils" and cautioned against forming "a habitual fondness" for any foreign country. Washington's successors

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<sup>179</sup> Ilan Peleg, *Israel Enters the Twenty-first Century, in the Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.119-120

<sup>180</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United States and The Middle East*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2002, p.79

<sup>181</sup> Herman Melville, *The White Jacket or the World in a Many of War*, 1849, Reprint London, 1922, p.189

<sup>182</sup> Marvin Zahniser, *Uncertain Friendship. American- French Relations Trough the Cold War*, New York, 1964, p.17-53

heeded his warning, dismantled the alliance, and concluded that the French were really not very special at all.<sup>183</sup>

Indeed, 150 years later the United States maintained a special relationship with only one nation: Great Britain. Because they spoke the same language and shared many cultural and political values, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill managed to bury the hatchet during the Second World War, raising hopes on both sides of the Atlantic that the mutual trust and affection spawned by the Grand Alliance would be long lasting.<sup>184</sup>

Among the most controversial matters confronting US and UK policymakers was how to handle Palestine, which had been a British mandate for a quarter-century. Although Chaim Weizmann was pressing Whitehall in early 1945 to rescind the ban on Jewish immigration imposed by the White Paper six years earlier, Churchill seemed more determined than ever to keep the door to the Holy Land closed. Across the Atlantic, on the other hand, FDR seemed more receptive to Zionist aspirations, notwithstanding bitter recriminations from Arab leaders such as Saudi Arabia's King Ibn Saud. On 12 April, four weeks after he issued a carefully worded statement endorsing a Jewish state in the Holy Land, Roosevelt died of a massive stroke, leaving Harry Truman to decide whether his predecessor's ambiguous commitments regarding Palestine should be transformed into a special relationship with Israel despite Arab objections and British Reservations.<sup>185</sup>

### **2.3.3 America and Israel**

While the lure of oil always loomed large in the eyes of the business leaders and diplomats who shaped U.S. policy toward the Middle East during the decades after the Second World War, the vision of a stable and secure Jewish state in the Holy Land loomed even larger in the eyes of other Americans. During the mid-1940s non-Jews appalled by Washington's do nothing response to the Holocaust joined forces with Jewish Americans all too familiar with anti-Semitism in a campaign to win U.S. support for Zionist aspirations in Palestine. Despite some ferocious bureaucratic infighting among his top advisers, President Harry

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<sup>183</sup> Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations* 5th ed. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2000, p.74-76

<sup>184</sup> Robert M. Hathaway, *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations Since World War II*, Thayne, Boston, 1990, p.1-8

<sup>185</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.79-80

Truman gave Israel America's blessing by recognizing the new nation just a few minutes after its birth on 15 May 1948.<sup>186</sup>

At the outset of the Cold War, American officials were often eager to keep their distance from Israel, and there was even serious dissent when President Harry S. Truman rushed to recognize Israel in 1948. Secretary of State George Marshall, among others, thought it was a great blunder to become identified with a state that was so widely disliked by its neighbors. Some thought that American support for Israel would inevitably drive the Arabs into the arms of Moscow.<sup>187</sup>

Long before the establishment of Israel, Palestine was present in American consciousness. The Old Testament aroused strong sympathy for the Jewish people among early political leaders. John Adams wrote, "I will insist that the Hebrew have done more to civilize men than any other nation."<sup>188</sup> Decades before Israel existed, U.S. government officials proclaimed their backing for a Jewish state in Palestine, perceiving the country as an empty wasteland waiting for the return of the Jews. Following World War-I, President Wilson assured American Zionists of his support, promising that "in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Common-wealth."<sup>189</sup> This cultural closeness with the Old Testament and the "Hebrew people" has been a leading element in formation of American policy toward Israel. "As members of a biblically-based religion, Christians appreciate that Israel was promised-and given-to Jews as the physical center of the covenant between them and God. Many Christians support the State of Israel for reasons far more profound than mere politics."<sup>190</sup> The antithesis of this perspective has been American ignorance of Palestine's role in Arab and Islamic consciousness, resulting in policies that over-looked their claims in the Holy Land.<sup>191</sup>

Other important elements in forming American policy toward Israel in the late twentieth century include Western reaction to the Holocaust, the Cold War between the United States

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid, p.77-78

<sup>187</sup> William B. Quandt, *America and The Middle East, Diplomacy in the Middle East*, Edited by: L. Carl Brown, L.B. Tauris &Co Ltd., London, 2001, p.61

<sup>188</sup> Michael Novak, *New York Times*, October 4 2000

<sup>189</sup> Lawrence Davidson, "historical Ignorance and Popular Perception" , *Middle East Policy*, November2, 1994, p.145

<sup>190</sup> *New York Times*, September 10, 2000

<sup>191</sup> Kathleen Christian, "Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy," *U.S. Policy in the Gulf*, University of California Press, 1999

and the Soviet Union, the rise of Jewish influence in American politics, and emergence of a strong pro-Israel lobby that include a variety of interest groups such as Christian fundamentalist, both liberal and Right-wing political factions, and labor unions.<sup>192</sup>

During the following half-century Israel and the United States became evermore deeply involved in a complicated “special relationship” that some observers have compared to a durable but informal alliance and that others have likened to an unstable common-law marriage. Although Washington formalized relations by opening an embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel’s administrative capital, in early 1949, the honeymoon between the two governments was short lived. The Truman administration tangled repeatedly with Prime Minister David Ben Gurion over Israeli territorial ambitions, and Dwight Eisenhower very nearly imposed sanctions on the Jewish state in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis.

By the late 1950s, however, a mutual desire to contain radical Arab nationalism led Israel and the United States to edge closer together, a process that accelerated after John E Kennedy moved into the White House in 1961. U.S. military and diplomatic support for the Jewish state during the Johnson and Nixon years convinced many on Main Street and Capitol Hill that Israel would serve as America’s strategic asset during the 1970s. After running cold under Ford and Carter, hot under Reagan, and then cold again during the early 1990s, the special relationship between Israel and the United States seemed by the Clinton years to have become a permanent fixture of U.S. foreign policy.

For more than a generation scholars have sought to identify the mainspring of Israeli-American relations. Critics of the special relationship have attributed its persistence to election-year arithmetic and domestic politics. Although their numbers have always been relatively small in absolute terms and although their views on many issues have been relatively diverse, Jewish voters have been quite sympathetic to Israel, and their ballots have been important in key states such as New York, Illinois, and California.<sup>193</sup> Moreover, the rise of powerful lobbying groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Center for

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<sup>192</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.267-268

<sup>193</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p. 77-78

Security Policy (CSP) since the 1960s has enhanced the influence of both Jewish voters, the Jewish state on Capitol Hill at the White House and US foreign policy.<sup>194</sup>

Supporters of the Israeli-American special relationship, on the other hand, have insisted that the calculus of Cold War and geopolitics has always been more important than ballot counting on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Indeed, U.S. officials determined to contain the Soviets without blundering into another Vietnam frequently regarded Israel, with its democratic tradition and its military prowess, as an attractive partner in the Middle East. Moreover, many analysts in Washington hoped that diplomatic support and conventional military hardware would make Israel more likely to accept territorial compromise with its Arab neighbors and less likely to develop a nuclear arsenal. A careful examination of the ambivalent and informal alliance that emerged between the United States and Israel during the fifty years after 1945 reveals that, more often than not, both simple arithmetic and differential calculus were at work.<sup>195</sup>

### 2.3.4 The Strategic Relationship with Major Ally

*“Since the rebirth of the State of Israel, there has been an ironclad bond between that democracy and this one.”<sup>196</sup>*

*President Ronald Reagan, September 3, 1980*

Historically the United States has always considered the security of Israel to be major American goal in the Middle East. Close strategic ties with Israel have in fact assured that.<sup>197</sup> The strategic relationship between Israel and the United States developed over time as a result of the Cold War, the decrease of Western influence in the Arab world, the emergence of militant anti-Western nationalist movements in the Middle East, and Israel’s increasing influence among varied U.S. constituencies.

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<sup>194</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, “Irak Üzerindeki İsrail Planları ve Kürt Yahudileri”, Available on site: <http://www.netpano.com/irak1402.html>

<sup>195</sup> Douglas Little, Ibid, p.77-78

<sup>196</sup> Mitchell G. Bard, “Myths & Facts Online, U.S. Middle East Policy”, available on site: <http://www.usisrael.org/jsource/myths/mf21.html> 2003

<sup>197</sup> Graham E. Fuller, Interest in the Middle East, Maelstrom, the United States, southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean, edited by John W. Holmes, the World Peace Foundation, 1995, p.89

After the Korean War Prime Minister Ben-Gurion concluded that Israel's future depended on close ties with a strong Western power.<sup>198</sup> Israel increasingly cast its UN votes with the West against the Soviet Union and the Third World bloc. While Israel drew closer to the United States, nationalist revolutions in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and growing hostility to the West in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran resulted in closure of British bases and the rise of anti colonial movements. American policy based on containment of the Soviet Union through treaties like the Baghdad Pact collapsed; instead, Moscow succeeded in establishing quasi-alliances with Arab states surrounding Israel. Anti-Western fervor in the region corresponded with deep hostility to Israel pervading the Islamic world and the Arab states in particular. Throughout much of the Third World Israel was perceived as a Western intrusion, a last fortress of colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East. The result in the United States was growing perceptions that only Israel could be relied on to defend American interests in the region. Anti-Communist organizations, including labor unions, both liberal and conservative political factions, and Protestant fundamentalist groups regarded Israel as an "outpost of democracy" in a region of the world hostile to the United States.

Both Republican and Democratic politicians competed with each other in assertions of support for the Jewish State. Numerous pro-Israeli political action committees (PACs) raised funds for senators and congressmen who supported recommendations of one of Washington's most powerful lobbies, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).<sup>199</sup> While public opinion strongly favored Israel and Congress generally supported AIPAC recommendations, diplomats concerned about wider US interests in the Middle East and the importance of the region as a whole in the scheme of American policy urged caution or restraint in Washington's dealings with Israel.

Following the 1967 War, Israel demonstrated its potential as a strategic ally by shipping quantities of Soviet-made weapons to the United States for close analysis. During the 1969-70 War, Soviet-made artillery, antitank and antiaircraft guns and missiles were also provided to American intelligence. Israel's potential as an ally was improved following

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<sup>198</sup> Zach Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers, 1952-1960*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1997

<sup>199</sup> Shai Feldman, *The Future of US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation*, Washington, D.C., Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996

Syria's invasion of northern Jordan in 1970. In response to appeals from President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger, Israeli forces were put on alert and moved toward Jordan's border, resulting in Syria's withdrawal. Washington responded with a promise to deter any Soviet retaliation.<sup>200</sup>

#### **2.3.4.1 The Strategic Pact and Agreements between the USA and Israel**

The first formal strategic pact was the United States-Israel Memorandum of Agreement on defense cooperation signed in 1979 between Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. It provided for cooperative research and development and authorized Israeli military exports to the United States. The Carter administration also designated Israel as a non-NATO country eligible for U.S. technology transfers.<sup>201</sup>

A closer and more formal agreement was signed during the Reagan years. In 1980 the Republican Party platform underscored Israel's deterrent role in the Middle East and the value of its armed forces in the East-West military equation. At the convention candidate Reagan declared Israel "an important ally of the United States as well as a major strategic asset." Reagan's secretary of state, Alexander Haig, created a new scheme for regional security through a "strategic consensus" based on an alliance of anti-Communist nations in the Middle East. Because of Arab hostility, it was decided to formulate a separate memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Israel. The pact signed in November 1981 called for cooperation to "deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region" and for "consultation and cooperation to enhance their national security by deterring such threats to the whole region." The pact provided for joint military exercises and working groups to develop cooperation in research and development and in defense trade.<sup>202</sup>

Israel's Labor opposition feared that the MOU imposed obligations far beyond Israel's own defense requirements while exempting the United States from assisting it in the event of Arab aggression. Three weeks after signing the MOU, Reagan suspended implementation because Israel imposed its legal jurisdiction on the Golan Heights, a

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<sup>200</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, p.277

<sup>201</sup> Shai Feldman, *The Future of U.S.-Israeli Strategic Cooperation*, Washington, D.C., Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996

<sup>202</sup> Stephan Zunes, "The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel." *Middle East Policy* 4, no:4, October 1996, p.92-93

measure regarded tantamount to annexation. Relations were further strained during the next two years because of US AWACS aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia and concerns about the violence in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Strategic cooperation was revived in 1983 with establishment of a Joint Political and Military Group (JPMG) of high-level defense officials from both countries. A new MOU was signed in 1984 to facilitate joint military planning and exercises and to preposition arms and ammunition in Israel for use by American forces. The agreement included joint exercises in antisubmarine warfare, U.S. leasing of Israeli-made Kfir aircraft, and training of U.S. forces in the Negev.<sup>203</sup>

In 1987 Congress formally designated Israel a "Major Non-NATO Ally." As a result terms of the original 1979 agreement were expanded into a detailed Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Principles Governing Mutual Cooperation in Research and Development, Scientist and Engineer Exchange, Procurement and Logistic Support of Defense Equipment. In addition to the JPMG, a Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAPG) and a Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) were formed resulting in even closer cooperation between military and naval forces. The agreement greatly facilitated technology transfer and U.S. assistance in development of diverse Israeli weapons systems. Israeli and American defense industries began joint competition for U.S. and international weapons contracts.<sup>204</sup> In 1988, the United States and Israel signed a memorandum of agreement on strategic cooperation that reflected, as the White House spokesman said at the time, "the enduring commitment to Israel's security." United States and Israel also have extensive technology-sharing arrangement, such as cooperative research and development programs, in which Israel is eligible to participate as a designated non-NATO ally.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.278

<sup>204</sup> Stephan Zunes, "The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel." *Middle East Policy* 4, no:4, October 1996, p.92-93

<sup>205</sup> *United States Security Strategy for the Middle East*, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, May 1995, p.24



Under the 1983 MOU Israel asked the United States to finance development of a new fighter jet, the Lavi, a controversial project that strained relations between the two countries. After investing half a billion dollars in development, it was discovered that the project would cost far more than anticipated and deliver much less than promised. Pressure from the U.S. Defense Department and sharp disagreement among Israeli officials finally led to cancellation, but not without bitter regrets among both Americans and Israelis who had supported the Lavi.<sup>206</sup>

#### **2.3.4.2 Nuclear Power & Israel**

America's experience in dealing with the Israeli nuclear program was critical to both the discovery of the problem and its solution. Israel was a powerful testimony to the Eisenhower administration's failure to come to grips with the reality of nuclear proliferation. Although the Israeli nuclear project had been conceived in 1955-57 and its physical construction initiated in early 1958, only in December 1960 did the departing Eisenhower administration determine that Israel was in fact building a major nuclear facility in the Negev desert aimed at establishing a nuclear weapons capability.

The challenge of how to apply the American opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons to the complexity of the Israeli case was left to the incoming Kennedy administration. President Kennedy was by far the most forceful American president in dealing with the Israeli problem. He recognized that the consequences of U.S. efforts to stem Israeli proliferation went far beyond U.S. policy towards Israel and even beyond American interests in the region. While he was committed to the security of Israel, he was also concerned about nuclear proliferation. In the spring and summer of 1963, these two interests came to a head on collision as Kennedy made his last ditch effort to curb Israel's nuclear ambitions. Three months later, he was assassinated and the torch was passed on to President Johnson. It was under Johnson, who in his first two years had other priorities than nonproliferation, that a special arrangement was crafted: Israel pledged not to be the

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<sup>206</sup> Dov S. Zakheim, *Flight of the Lavi: Inside a U.S.- Israeli Crisis*, Brasey Press, Washington D.C., 1996

first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East, and, in return, the United States provided Israel with weapons to maintain Israel's security (tanks and planes).<sup>207</sup>

Despite American efforts to curb the expansion of nuclear powers, Israel was considered a special case, a country that could be trusted to handle its nuclear potential responsibly. Although Washington sought universal adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and requested Israel to sign it, the United States was reluctant to use pressure until a comprehensive Middle East peace could be attained. U.S. tolerance of Israel's nuclear development was conditioned by a tacit agreement that Israel would refrain from taking an overt nuclear posture, openly conducting tests, or transferring nuclear technology to a third party. When Israel took unilateral action to undermine Iraq's nuclear capacity by bombing its Osiraq reactor near Baghdad in June 7, 1981<sup>208</sup>, Secretary of State Haig seemed quite pleased. During the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign, Republican vice presidential candidate Richard Cheney thanked Israel "for the outstanding job you did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981, which made our job much easier in Desert Storm."<sup>209</sup>

U.S.-Israeli strategic agreements received little if any publicity until 1989 lest the publicity further alienate American's Arab friends in the region. However, in September of that year, the agreements were publicized to increase the deterrent effect; then Defense Minister Rabin revealed that some twenty-seven joint military exercises with the United States had been conducted in recent years.

#### **2.3.4.3 Gulf Crisis and Israel Factor in USA Defense Policies**

During the 1990-91 Gulf Crises, direct contact was established between the Israeli defense minister and the American defense secretary through a communication system code-named "Hammer Rock." An American major general was seconded to Israeli military headquarters, facilitating communications and liaison between the two armies. During Operation Desert Storm the United States airlifted Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to Israel accompanied by American military personnel. This marked only the second time

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<sup>207</sup> Avner Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy: The Critical Decade 1958-1968", *Nonproliferation Review*, CNS, Vol. 5.2., 1 January 1998,

<sup>208</sup> William P. Hoar, "Making of a Monster: How the U.S. Helped Build Iraq's War Machine", *The New American*, Vol. 8, No. 18, September 7, 1992 and "The Iraq Crisis Timeline", Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>209</sup> *New York Times*, September 18, 2000

foreign forces played an active role in Israel's defense. The first time was during the 1956 Suez War when French air squadrons were sent to Israel.

Strategic cooperation also involved joint development of military industries and export of Israeli weapons systems to the United States. As sophistication and production costs rose, Israel had to expand overseas markets to pay for weapons required by its own forces, resulting in frequent competition for customers with American military contractors. By the 1990s Israel was the fifth largest arms exporter; Israel Aircraft industries were the country's major exporter based on its military sales.<sup>210</sup>

#### **2.3.4.4 Diplomatic Support in the U.N.**

Israel and the United States vote together more frequently in the United Nations General Assembly than does the United States with almost any other country. In 1986, they voted together 91.5 percent of the time. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, by contrast, voted with the United States on only 15.3 percent, 14.2 percent, and 13.6 percent of occasions, respectively.<sup>211</sup> This coincidence of votes is due largely to the fact that the United States has become one of Israel's few supporters (in some cases its sole supporter) in that body. Israel and the United States, for example, were outvoted 151 to 2 in November 1988 on a resolution deploring the U.S. decision to refuse Yasser Arafat a visa so that he could address the UN. Between 1981 and 1986, the Reagan administration used its veto in the Security Council against resolutions critical of Israel thirteen times, almost twice the seven vetoes cast by the United States from 1948 to 1981.

America's UN ambassador during the Carter administration voted in favor of a resolution condemning Israel's treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories as being in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The response by the pro-Israeli lobby was so intense that the president ordered the vote changed, explaining the original vote as the result of an error in communication. President Carter's previous UN ambassador had been forced to resign because he met with the PLO's UN representative, even though he did so in his capacity as chairman of the Security Council rather than as US ambassador to the

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<sup>210</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.279-280

<sup>211</sup> AIPAC Policy Statement, 1987, *Journal of Palestine Studies* 64, Summer 1987, p.113

UN By 1989, the United States had used its Security Council veto twenty-three times to block resolutions critical of Israel. In 1983, Congress passed a law that requires the United States to renounce its membership in the UN General Assembly if Israel were to be expelled from that body. In September 1991, President Bush, in an address to the UN, General Assembly, called for repeal of the “Zionism is racism” resolution that the assembly had adopted in November 1975. Before the end of the year, the US delegation to the UN had successfully steered such a motion through the General Assembly. Following Israel’s deportation of 417 Palestinians in December 1992, the United States blocked efforts in the Security Council to force Israel to allow them to return. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has used its veto in the Security Council three times, all of which have been to support Israel’s unilateral action in Jerusalem.<sup>212</sup>

#### **2.3.4.5 Military Sales to China from Israel and Crisis in Relations**

After the Cold War world arms markets shrank. This resulted in greater international competition and a crisis in relations with the United States during 1999-2000. Israel contracted with China to supply the Phalcon, a \$250 million early-warning radar and communications system mounted on refurbished Ilyushin aircraft. Washington objected to the sale, claiming that it could be used against Taiwan, an American protege in the Pacific. The projected sale greatly angered several influential members of Congress who threatened to punish Israel by cutting its military aid. Under pressure by the U.S. Defense Department and President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak canceled the sale in July 2000. Following the Phalcon incident and other military sales to China totaling several billion dollars, the State Department requested formal consultations prior to future Israeli weapons sales. The United States presented a list of twenty-seven “countries of concern,” including several of Israel’s important arms clients, where consultation was considered vital.<sup>213</sup>

The United States promised to reward Israel with a new strategic agreement, upgrading its status to “strategic ally” as compensation for giving up the Phalcon contract. The accord would supersede the 1988 Memorandum of Agreement and would provide Israel with additional military assistance, including compensation for withdrawal from Lebanon in

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<sup>212</sup> James A. Bill, Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, Wesley Longman Press, New York, 1999, p.259

<sup>213</sup> New York Times, July 12, 2000

May 2000. However, to prevent another Phalcon incident, Israel would be required to consult the United States on military deals with four “states of concern”-India, Pakistan, China, and Russia. Mention was also made of the 1998 plan finalized by Congress with the previous Netanyahu government to reduce economic aid by \$120 million a year, transferring half that amount, or \$60 million a year, to military assistance, which would thus be increased to \$2.4 billion a year within a decade.

Israel’s former defense minister, Moshe Arens, criticized Israel’s over-dependence on American military assistance and questioned the value of the strategic alliance. He argued that an agreement giving the United States veto rights over Israel’s exports would be “disastrous” to its defense industries and “severely damage Israel’s defense capability.” Additional aid to purchase American weapons, he said, “is likely to further throttle Israel’s defense industry.” The new plan “by any Israeli measure ... is a substantial downgrading of this relationship.” Zeev Schiff, Israel’s leading military correspondent, observed that some high-ranking Israeli officers complained that if “the upgrading [‘strategic relationship’] also entails threats to down-scale foreign aid or humiliating forms of punishment, perhaps the whole idea of upgrading can be dispensed with.... The Sino-Israeli spy plane deal has reminded many that the American-Israeli partnership is asymmetrical. One partner is a superpower while the other is a small country, one the giver, the other the taker...This partnership,” he cautioned, “had led to the situation where the taker, Israel, has, in recent years gotten into the habit of utilizing every opportunity, even when there is no need to do so, to ask for additional cash or additional compensation for various things, Israel’s position as the side that always takes can undermine its own sense of integrity and could weaken its backbone. Israel must do a lot of soul-searching as to how it can gradually reduce its dependence on American financial aid.”<sup>214</sup>

## **2.4 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE ROLE OF USA**

The net effect on American Policy of the Special Relationship with Israel was to lead successive American presidents to try to find some way to broker an end to the Arab-

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<sup>214</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.280-281

Israeli conflict. For as long as the conflict endured, there would be tension between the American interesting nurturing Israel and in protecting its oil and other security concerns in surrounding Arab countries. And the existence of the conflict might provide openings for the Soviet Union to advance its influence by selling arms and by providing diplomatic support for the Arabs. With varying degrees of imagination and commitment, each American administration tried to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>215</sup>

Since the beginning of the struggle between Israel and the Arab states, the United States has been a principal intermediary aspiration to resolve the disputed issues-the refugee problem, borders, Jerusalem, and Israel's security concerns. Every American President or Secretary of State since 1948 has offered his own peace plan based on compromise over these items. Each president has sent his own emissary to devise proposals for ending the conflict. Proposals have included President Eisenhower's to Johnston scheme for regional economic development, Kennedy's plan for resolving the Arab refugee problem, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's disengagement agreements during the Nixon and Ford administrations, Carter's intervention leading to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Reagan's attempt to end the Lebanon confusion, Bush's official beginnings of the Madrid Middle East peace conference, and Clinton's various proposals and interventions between Israel, the PLO, and Syria.

U.S.A. policy in the peace process resulted from Washington's reaction to a variety of interests. Before Israel was perceived as a regional ally, Washington frequently pressured it to admit on issues such as permitting return of Arab refugees or surrendering territory beyond the partition borders. As Israel gained military power, ironically through large-scale U.S. assistance, pressures diminished and Washington became far less demanding. US policy on Jerusalem characterized the transition, often reflecting general American policy and efforts to resolve the conflict.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> William B. Quandt, *America and The Middle East, Diplomacy in the Middle East*, edited by: L. Carl Brown, L.B. Tauris &Co Ltd., London, 2001, p.61

<sup>216</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.269

### 2.4.1 Beginnings to 1967 Arab-Israel Wars

Despite to the claims of each president that his Jerusalem policy represented continuation of his predecessor's policy, there have been major changes from one administration to the next. In 1947-48 the United States backed the UN partition plan designating Jerusalem as an international city, removing it from the claims of both Arabs and Jews. With division of the city between Israel and Jordan as a result of the 1948 war, the United States abandoned support for territorial internationalization in favor of functional internationalization; that is, administrative jurisdiction of the city would be left to Israel and Jordan, with holy sites controlled by the respective faiths. Although Israel moved its capital to Jerusalem in 1949, Washington rejected suggestions to follow suit by transferring the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Until 1967 the status of Jerusalem was considered *sui generis* and the American consul general there still reports directly to Washington rather than to the embassy in Tel Aviv.<sup>217</sup>




Figure 2.12 UN Partition Plan<sup>218</sup>

<sup>217</sup> Ibid, p.269-270

<sup>218</sup> Library of UTexas Internet Site

#### 2.4.2 From 1967 War to Clinton Administration

Following Israel's capture of Arab East Jerusalem in the June 1967 war, questions about the city's status came back to life. The issue of whether the city was part of Israel had been left in abeyance. The Johnson administration took the position that "a just settlement of the status of Jerusalem is inseparably connected with other aspects of the (Arab-Israeli) problems which still challenge solution." The United States "does not believe that the problem of Jerusalem can be realistically solved apart from other aspects of the situation in the Middle East ... all aspects of the Middle East problem, including Jerusalem, must be achieved by an agreed and accepted peaceful settlement."<sup>219</sup> This formulation has remained the basis of American policy since Israel's conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967.

With Nixon's assumption of office in 1969, for the first time the United States declared East Jerusalem subject to the 1949 Geneva Convention on Occupied Territory, which proscribed changes by an occupying power. Nevertheless, no strenuous objections were raised by Washington to the extensive construction of new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem or to Israel's extension of the city's borders well into the West Bank. In December 1969 Nixon's secretary of state, William P. Rogers, proposed return to the "approximate" borders existing before the 1967 war but recommended that Israel and Jordan settle the problem of Jerusalem "recognizing that the city should be unified, with both countries sharing the civic and economic responsibilities of city government."<sup>220</sup>

Although President Carter opposed establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, he generally avoided including Jerusalem in his objections. Carter explained that the single instance when the United States supported a Security Council Resolution bracketing Jerusalem with the territories was a mistake. "Jerusalem and the territories were not the same, and U.S. condemnation of settlements applied exclusively to the territories."<sup>221</sup> The Jerusalem issue was bypassed in the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel. In a letter from Carter to Sadat at the conclusion of negotiations, Carter

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<sup>219</sup> U.S. Official Statements: U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992, p.182

<sup>220</sup> Shlomo Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, 1847-1997*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International Press, 1998, p.362

<sup>221</sup> William Quandt, *Peace Process*, Washington, Brookings Press, 1993, p.455



simply declared that U.S. policy conformed to that enunciated above at the UN by former U.S. ambassadors Goldberg and Yost.

President Reagan revised Carter's policy by rejecting the view that settlements in the occupied territories were illegal and that East Jerusalem was occupied territory. Although the Reagan administration believed that Jewish settlements in the territories, including Jerusalem, "did not help the peace process," it refrained from labeling them illegal or calling East Jerusalem "occupied territory." No steps were taken to oppose the right of Jews "to settle in any part of the Land of Israel."

President George Bush introduced a dramatic change in American policy. He was the first president to endorse UN Resolutions declaring East Jerusalem "occupied Palestinian territory." His condemnation of Jewish construction in East Jerusalem conformed to the declaration of Israel's West Bank settlement as illegal. This stance inevitably led to confrontation with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his nationalist Likud government.<sup>222</sup>

#### **2.4.3 Clinton Administration**

President Clinton again reversed American policy, introducing substantive changes. Although the new administration still designated East Jerusalem as occupied territory, it refrained from condemning Israel's construction projects there. Like Carter, Clinton tolerated but did not welcome Israel's construction program in East Jerusalem.<sup>223</sup> To prevent any question about U.S. recognition of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem, Clinton refused to allow Mayor Ehud Olmert to accompany him on a tour of the Old City. The State Department also refused to permit attendance by the U.S. ambassador at opening night of celebrations commemorating the 3,000th anniversary of the city's founding, according to Israel's version of history.

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<sup>222</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.270

<sup>223</sup> Shlomo Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, 1847-1997*, The Hague, Kluwer, Law International Press, 1998, p.364-368

### 2.4.3.1 From Oslo to Camp David

In negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, questions about the future of Jerusalem were deferred from the Oslo agreement in 1993 until the final-status summit at Camp David in July 2000. Although tentative agreement was reached under President Clinton's supervision on most other issues, Jerusalem was the stumbling block causing collapse of negotiations and postponement of further summit meetings. Prime Minister Barak and Palestine Authority President Arafat reached what each considered the limits of compromise acceptable to their respective constituencies. Clinton and his staff offered a variety of "bridging" proposals that would have given the Palestinians authority in the Temple Mount, known to them as Haram al-Sharif, an area also considered sacred to Jews as the site of their ancient temples. According to the Clinton plan, the area within the walls of the Old City would be divided between Israel and the Palestinians but sovereignty would remain Israeli.<sup>224</sup> Although the U.S. "bridging" proposals required Israel to relinquish more than any Israeli government since 1967 had considered viable, Arafat felt that he could not abandon his claim to East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian State. The enthusiastic reception he received upon his return from the failed Camp David negotiations indicated the extent to which his constituency and the larger Arab/Islamic world considered Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem as nonnegotiable.<sup>225</sup>

President Clinton's advisers claimed that the Camp David negotiations were a major success despite failure to reach a final accord. "Before Camp David, there was a huge iceberg," said National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. "We sent an icebreaker through it, and we cracked it open 100 different ways-refugees, Jerusalem, security, borders. The good news is that this is no longer an iceberg. It is 100 pieces of ice. Can this be reassembled into something like a bridge? I don't know."<sup>226</sup>

Shortly after the Camp David meetings, violent altercations erupted between Israelis and Palestinians sparked by a visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif by Likud leader Ariel Sharon. His stated purpose was to demonstrate Jewish rights in the area. However, the visit

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<sup>224</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, p.270-271

<sup>225</sup> Hilal Khashan, "Arab Attitudes toward Israel and Peace", The Washington Institute Policy Focus (WINEP), Research Memorandum, no:40, August 2000

<sup>226</sup> New York Times, September 8, 2000

was particularly provocative because Sharon was accompanied by a retinue of fellow Likud leaders and hundreds of Israeli armed police. Furthermore, Sharon was perceived by most Palestinians as one of the Israeli leaders most hostile to their aspirations. The violence quickly spread throughout the country and was labeled the Haram al-Sharif or al-Aqsa intifada, totally disrupting the peace negotiations.

The conflict soon became an issue in American politics. Hours after Clinton called on Palestine Authority President Arafat to reduce the level of violence; the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution of support for Israel and condemning Palestinian leaders for the violence. The measure was passed by a vote of 365 to 30. The conflict also became an issue in the New York election campaign when the Republican Senate candidate announced his opposition to a Palestinian state and denounced Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton for her pro-Palestinian sympathies.<sup>227</sup>

#### **2.4.3.2 The Problem of Embassy Transfer**

Transfer of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has been considered emblematic of American policy toward Israel since the 1960s. Although some Israeli supporters demanded transfer as early as 1950, momentum for the move gathered after Israel's conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967. Prior to their election each president either supported or was ambivalent about the move. However, after assuming office they were more cautious, supporting the move "in principle" but deferring action until an "appropriate" time. Caution was advised because the move might "disrupt the peace process" or alienate other U.S. friends such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, transfer of the embassy has acquired domestic political significance. Republican and Democratic candidates for office—both local and national—frequently compete to determine who the more ardent Israeli supporter is, the criterion being who most favors transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem. The 2000 Republican Middle East platform stated that the United States "has a moral and legal obligation to maintain its ambassador in Jerusalem. Immediately upon taking office, the next Republican president

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<sup>227</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, p.272-273

will begin the process of moving the U.S. embassy from Tel-Aviv to Israel's capital, Jerusalem.”<sup>228</sup>

The embassy transfer became an issue in the race for New York's U.S. Senate seat between Hillary Rodham Clinton and Rick A. Lazio during the 2000 election. When Clinton called for the move “before the end of the year,” Republican candidate Lazio accused her of flip-flopping and demanded that the move be made immediately.<sup>229</sup>

In 1995 the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act recognizing a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and demanding removal of the embassy to Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999. The law called for money to construct embassy facilities there and threatened punishment of the State Department by withholding funds for “Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad” should the secretary of state be unable to report that the New Jerusalem embassy “has officially opened.” However, the law included a waiver authorizing the president to suspend implementation “to protect national security interests of the United States.”<sup>230</sup>

When President Clinton used the waiver to defer implementation because moving the embassy might “undermine the peace process,” the issue was raised in both houses of Congress. Several prominent senators, including Robert Dole (soon to be a presidential candidate) and Joseph Lieberman (later to become a candidate for vice president) attacked the State Department for US abstention on a UN General Assembly resolution declaring Israel's 1967 reunification of Jerusalem null and void and calling for removal of foreign embassies from the city. The senators declared that the United States should have voted against the resolution because “it stands in direct contradiction to the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act of 1995.”<sup>231</sup>

Following collapse of the July 2000 Camp David negotiations, President Clinton again raised the issue, asserting that he “always wanted to move our embassy to West Jerusalem” but postponed action because “I didn't want to undermine our ability to help broker a

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p.272-273

<sup>229</sup> New York Times, July 30, 2000

<sup>230</sup> Shlomo Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, 1847-1997*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International Press, 1998, p.377

<sup>231</sup> Washington Jewish Week, April 11, 1996

secure and lasting peace.” However, “in light of what happened, I’ve taken that decision under review and I’ll make a decision” before the end of the year.<sup>232</sup> Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush responded by stating his commitment to move the embassy, although not immediately because many details have to be worked out.

Not all Israelis were enthusiastic about Clinton’s threat to “reassess” the U.S. position. Akiva Eldar, writing in Ha’aretz, observed that a promise to reconsider the move was “music to the ears of the anti-peaceniks among both the Palestinians and the Israelis.” The Arab demand for restoration of the status quo existing in Jerusalem before June 4, 1967, would be no less legitimate than an Israeli demand to annex 10 percent of the West Bank, Eldar observed. “Any Israeli Prime Minister genuinely interested in advancing the peace process should never have taken the unfortunate step of asking America, the honest broker, to play with fire by tossing the ‘embassy in Jerusalem’ idea into the air. Clinton should have flatly refused the request at the time instead of threatening the Palestinians with a review of American relations,” Eldar cautioned.<sup>233</sup>

#### **2.4.4 Bush Administration**

##### **2.4.4.1 First Concerns to the Problem**

Given President Clinton’s record of failure despite his major personal involvement, it is not surprising that President Bush, who came into office with a weak political mandate and with other political priorities, was initially wary of getting heavily involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush’s position, as articulated by Secretary of State Powell, was that the two sides should settle the conflict themselves, with the United States assisting, not insisting. Perhaps to the surprise of many Arab observers, Bush also tilted toward the Israeli side, calling for an end to the violence before substantive negotiations could begin. As the United States adopted a hands-off attitude, violence mounted, and the United States warmly endorsed the May 2001 Mitchell Report as a way to stop the violence and return to negotiations.

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<sup>232</sup> New York Times, July 29, 2000

<sup>233</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, p.274

While Israeli Prime Minister Sharon proved willing to have a cease-fire, Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat was not, until June 2001. Under heavy pressure from both Bush and German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, Arafat acceded to the cease-fire but proved unwilling or unable to enforce it as both Hamas and Arafat's own Tanzim militia refused to agree to stop fighting. In an effort to salvage the situation, Bush sent first CIA director George Tenet and then Colin Powell to resuscitate the cease-fire, to no avail. Consequently, having gotten heavily involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite his initial reluctance to do so, and having had no more success in stopping the violence than President Clinton had had, Bush pulled back. With the United States moving into the background, the European Union stepped forward to try to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, but its efforts proved no more successful than those of the United States, and by September 10, the day before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, violence between Israelis and Palestinians had risen sharply.<sup>234</sup>

#### **2.4.4.2 After The Attacks of September 11**

Following the terrorist attacks, the United States became reengaged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this time appearing to tilt to the Palestinian side as the United States sought to build a Muslim and Arab-supported coalition against Osama Bin Laden and his charges that the United States was waging war against Islam. Thus high-ranking American officials began to talk about a Palestinian state, and the United States initially refused to put Hamas and Islamic Jihad-deemed to be terrorist organizations by Israel but "national liberation movements" by the Arabs - on the new US terror list.

However, US policy changed once the United States, beginning to win the War-In Afghanistan militarily in November, observed that the Muslim world was not heeding Bin Laden's call to join his jihad against the United States and saw the at best tepid support by most Arab regimes (Jordan a conspicuous exception) for the US antiterrorist effort. Thus Hamas and Islamic Jihad were placed on the new terrorist list along with Hizbullah, and while still calling for a Palestinian state, US officials began to demand more aggressively that Arafat crack down on Palestinian terrorism. Thus President Bush, speaking at the

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<sup>234</sup> Robert O. Freedman, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.362


United Nations, called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with “two states-Israel and Palestine-living peacefully together within secure and recognized boundaries.” Bush followed up this statement by denouncing terrorism as he asserted “there is no such thing as a good terrorist” and conspicuously refrained from meeting Arafat at the United Nations because the Palestinian leader, in the words of Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was still hugging Hizbullah and Hamas, despite denouncing al-Qaeda. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in an impassioned speech on November 19, echoed the twofold message of President Bush, calling for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while demanding an end to terrorist attacks on Israel. Powell also announced the dispatch of a special assistant, former marine general Anthony Zinni, to the Middle East to work out a cease-fire, and President Bush put his prestige on the line as well by asking five Arab leaders, including Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah II of Jordan, and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah, to persuade Arafat to end the violence.

Unfortunately for both Zinni and Bush, the American special representative’s trip to the Middle East proved to be a disaster as a series of Palestinian terrorist attacks made a mockery of the visit, attacks that Arafat either could not or would not prevent. By mid-December, not only the United States but also the European Union had lost faith in Arafat. To prevent him from being totally isolated, the Palestinian leader belatedly denounced terrorism on December 16 and announced yet another cease-fire. Yet, by negotiating an agreement with Hamas and Islamic Jihad which left them able to strike in the future, instead of destroying the two organizations and cracking down on his own Tanzim militia as well, Arafat left himself open to the Israeli charge that he was not serious about fighting terrorism.<sup>235</sup> After that, Israeli tanks and military vehicles entered the West Bank city of Ramallah, surrounded the compound of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat there and declared him to be “irrelevant” to the peace process.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid

<sup>236</sup> “Israeli Troops Surround Arafat’s Compound in Ramallah”, Available on site: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/>



**Figure 2. 13 Compound of Palestine leader Yasser Arafat in Ramallah<sup>237</sup>**



**Figure 2.14 Palestinian youths battling Israeli Army Forces with stone<sup>238</sup>**

In sum, while U.S. military and diplomatic power had succeeded in destroying both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the al-Oaeda terrorist network based there, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proved to be a much more difficult problem to resolve, despite President Bush's major efforts. Whether President Bush and US diplomacy, with or without the cooperation of the

<sup>237</sup> Available on site: <http://www.polarisimages.com/>

<sup>238</sup> Newsweek, October 23, 2000, p.36



European Union, will be any more successful in Bush's remaining time in office is a question that only the future can resolve.<sup>239</sup>

#### **2.4.5 U.S. and U.N. About Palestine Question**

Fluctuations in US policy toward Jerusalem have paralleled policy changes on other critical items. As ties became more intimate following the 1967 war, US criticism of Israel at the United Nations lessened. Since 1967 the United States has used its Security Council veto or abstained in voting on most of the more than forty resolutions condemning Israeli occupation of territory seized in the Six Day War.<sup>240</sup> Jewish settlements in the West Bank that were called "illegal" by President Carter became "an obstacle to peace" under Reagan and Bush, while Clinton declared them "unhelpful."

On the other hand, the United States voted for several Security Council resolutions declaring annexation of the Golan Heights null and void, deploring "Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied (Golan) territories, and destruction of the Syrian (Golan) city of Quneitra."<sup>241</sup> From year to year Israel has been cited in the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for actions contrary to the "1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." The citations included deportation of civilians from the occupied territories, including journalists and labor leaders, transfer of detainees from the territories to Israeli prisons, punishments such as demolition of civilian homes, and lengthy administrative detention without trial. In its 2000 annual report, the State Department's Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Division criticized Israel for unfair treatment of Arabs, vandalism and discrimination against Christian groups and non-Orthodox Jewish factions, and sanctions against Muslim citizens desiring to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>242</sup>

In policy statements and UN discussions on the peace process, the United States has deemphasized UN General Assembly Resolution 194 calling for return of the Palestine refugees. Instead, Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 became the basis for

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<sup>239</sup> Robert O. Freedman, *Ibid*, p.362

<sup>240</sup> Honest Broker, "U.S. Policy and the Middle East Peace Process", Washington, D.C., Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, April 1997, p.12

<sup>241</sup> U.S. Official Statements: Israeli Settlement-The Fourth Geneva Convention, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C., 1992, p.132-133

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid*

American policy. As Resolution 242 was deliberately ambiguous, calling for Israeli withdrawal “from territories” rather than “the” territories occupied in 1967, American negotiators believed this wording provided room for maneuver in seeking an exchange of “land for peace.” State Department officials argued that their position at the United Nations was required to win Israel’s confidence and reassure its supporters that the United States had not abandoned the Jewish state and would remain its loyal ally.<sup>243</sup>

#### **2.4.6 America and PLO**

A major change in policy was the US decision to open negotiations with the PLO in 1988. Until the 1970s the Palestinian problem was perceived as a refugee rather than a political/national issue. The PLO was regarded as a terrorist organization and an agent of the Soviet Union. Although Secretary Kissinger began to pay attention to the Palestine issue after the 1973 war, his approach was similar to Israel’s, that is, denial of Palestinian national identity. In 1975 Israel won a commitment from Kissinger not to “recognize or negotiate” with the PLO unless it recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted UN Resolution 242, a restriction that was codified in US law in 1985.<sup>244</sup>

The Carter administration was the first to accept the idea of a Palestinian homeland and to contact the PLO despite Israel’s vehement opposition. At the 1978 Camp David summit, Carter persuaded Israel’s Prime Minister Begin to include establishment of a Palestinian “self-governing authority” in the final accords. For the first time “Palestinian homeland” and “Palestinian rights” were accepted as legitimate concepts by the U.S. government.

Although Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, accepted the need to include Palestinians in the peace process, he regarded the PLO as a terrorist organization and refused to deal with it. The intifada in 1988 stimulated new thinking about the Palestinians in both the United States and Israel and within the PLO itself. By the end of the year the PLO revised its political platform by recognizing a two-state solution (Israel and a Palestinian State), recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted UN Resolution 242, and renounced terrorism. This led to Shultz’s reevaluation and to the Bush administration’s

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<sup>243</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, p.275

<sup>244</sup> K. Christison, “U.S. Policy toward the Palestinians,” *Encyclopedia of the Palestinians*, ed. Philip Mattar, p.415-421

recognition and direct negotiations with the PLO. President Clinton became directly involved in negotiations with Israel and the PLO after he hosted the first meeting between an Israeli prime minister (Rabin) and PLO leader Arafat.<sup>245</sup>

Despite Clinton's role as "honest broker," too close an association with Arafat remained anathema in American politics. In the previously mentioned 2000 New York Senate race, Republican and Democratic candidates castigated each other for either shaking hands with Arafat, or calling for establishment of a Palestinian state.<sup>246</sup>

After Oslo, the United States became the principal intermediary in the series of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians from 1993 until the 2000 Camp David summit. Despite Arab skepticism about the American role of honest broker, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians all considered the United States the most viable intermediary. They believed that only the United States, by virtue of its economic, military, and political ties, could persuade Israel to make even minimal concessions. In addition, because of the Israeli lobby's perceived influence in US politics, other states frequently approach it to act as intermediary with the US government. When Poland sought US approval for joining NATO, for example, its emissaries sought assistance from American organizations affiliated with the Israeli lobby.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, p.275-276

<sup>246</sup> New York Times, September 11, 2000

<sup>247</sup> Don Peretz, *Ibid*, , p.276

### 3. COLD WAR AND DYNAMICS OF US DIPLOMACY

*“As every president since World War-II has learned, no region of the world presents America with more difficult, more frustrating, or more convoluted problems than the Middle East”<sup>248</sup>*

*Ronald Reagan*

#### 3.1 SUPER POWER COMPETITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CONTAINMENT SOVIET THREAT

##### 3.1.1 U.S. National Security, the Soviet Threat, and the Middle East

Although the promise of Israel as America’s strategic asset was never quite fulfilled, Washington’s pursuit of such a relationship was part of a more ambitious quest to promote regional defense and prevent communist inroads in the Middle East after 1945. Wedded to an evolving doctrine of national security that defined the Soviet Union as a mortal threat to the United States and that dictated global vigilance against Russian-backed communist subversion, US policymakers from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter waged a Cold War against the Kremlin from the sun-drenched shores of the Eastern Mediterranean to the snow-capped mountains of Afghanistan.<sup>249</sup> The United States perceived a direct Soviet Challenge almost immediately after the end of World War-II. Soviet troops refused to leave Iran on schedule in 1946, and the U.S.S.R. made threats against the Turkish government, raising alarms in Washington.<sup>250</sup>

Some historians point to the Red Army’s belated departure from Iran in early 1946 and to its sudden arrival in Kabul in late 1979 as proof of Moscow’s unwavering drive to dominate the Middle East. Other scholars, however, argue that US leaders overreacted to Russian diplomatic pressure during the late 1940s and overestimated Soviet responsibility for the anti-Western upheavals that rocked the Muslim world during the decades that followed. While definitive answers regarding Soviet motivation must await further

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<sup>248</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.423

<sup>249</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United states and the Middle East since 1945*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2002, p.117

<sup>250</sup> William B. Quandt, *America and The Middle East, Diplomacy in the Middle East*, edited by: L. Carl Brown, L.B. Tauris &Co Ltd., London, 2001, p.61

revelations from the Russian archives, a careful examination of the U.S. documentary record confirms that U.S.'s reliance on doctrinal prescriptions to cure diplomatic insecurity has deep roots in the American past.<sup>251</sup>

A fragile republic in a world dominated by imperial powers such as Great Britain, the newly independent United States relied more on geographic remoteness than military preparedness to defend itself well into the nineteenth century. But in December 1823 the specter of European aggrandizement from the Pacific Northwest to Cape Horn prompted President James Monroe to stake America's claim to a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere in a doctrine that bears his name. Proclaiming that the independent nations of the New World were "henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers," Monroe declared that the United States would regard "any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and security." The most formidable challenge to the Monroe Doctrine came from the British, whose designs on Texas, Cuba, and Venezuela triggered periodic clashes with the United States through the 1890s. By the turn of the century, however, Britain had lost interest in the Western Hemisphere and turned its attention to matters both more pressing and more profitable, such as the acquisition of oil concessions in the Persian Gulf and imperial lines of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>252</sup>

Among the first Americans to appreciate the strategic importance of the Middle East for the British was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval historian whose books on sea power had become Gilded Age best-sellers. Indeed, Mahan inadvertently provided the region with its modern name. "The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will some day need its Malta as well as its Gibraltar," Mahan prophesied in a 1902 essay detailing Britain's ceaseless efforts to keep Russia out of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. He expected the British to expand their naval base in Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea and to establish new outposts in the tiny sheikdoms that rimmed the Persian Gulf. Whitehall's most important regional stronghold, however, was certain to be the isthmus of Suez, bisected by a British-controlled canal whose commercial and military significance was, in Mahan's eyes, unsurpassed in the entire Eastern Hemisphere. Although Whitehall

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<sup>251</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.117-118

<sup>252</sup> Crabb, Cecil V. Jr., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p.37-38

managed to fulfill most of Mahan's prophecy during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Second World War badly damaged the British Empire and fundamentally altered the balance of power in the Middle East.

Having served as the cornerstone for U.S. diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere for more than 100 years, the Monroe Doctrine seems subconsciously to have become an intellectual lodestone for U.S. policymakers seeking to stabilize the Middle East after 1945. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a region whose strategic importance was fast becoming unparalleled, the White House agreed in March 1947 to assume Britain's long-standing commitments in Greece and Turkey under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine, with the understanding that Whitehall would retain primary responsibility for the defense of the Arab world. Following a decade of ugly Anglo-Arab confrontations that undermined regional security and invited Soviet meddling, in 1957 U.S. policymakers unveiled the Eisenhower Doctrine, which made Washington the senior member of the Anglo-American partnership in the Middle East. When Britain's deepening financial woes eventually forced Whitehall to liquidate its last imperial outposts in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s, US officials edged toward what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which envisioned regional proxies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia serving as junior partners against the Kremlin.

When events in Iran and Afghanistan showed that America's proxies simply could not do the job, Jimmy Carter promulgated his own doctrine and, with a bow to Harry Truman, informed the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interests in the Middle East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.118-119

### 3.1.2 To the Truman Doctrine and Beyond, 1941-1952

*“Force is the only thing the Russian understand”<sup>254</sup>*

*Harry S. Truman*

When Harry Truman took the oath of office, he hoped that the British would remain reliable partners in the Middle East. Throughout the early 1940s the Roosevelt administration had assumed that postwar Britain would continue to play its historic role as the chief guarantor of security in the region. “The Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Libya and the Mediterranean,” had cabled Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a March 1942 recap of the Anglo-American plan of battle against the Axis “would fall directly under British responsibility.<sup>255</sup> But Hitler made Churchill’s task as difficult as possible, and U.S. officials soon questioned whether Whitehall was capable of fulfilling its regional duties.

As early as the spring of 1944 U.S. observers were reporting that “Soviet policy in the Arab world appears to be aimed at the reduction of British influence in that area and the acquisition of the balance of power.” By V-E Day, State Department experts had concluded that if Britain could no longer prevent the Soviet Union from fishing in troubled waters, the United States might have to assume responsibility for “fostering the economic advancement of the Middle East peoples” and “facilitating freedom from external interference and exploitation.”<sup>256</sup>

#### 3.1.2.1 Soviet Invasion in the Middle East

It did not take long for a consensus to emerge in Washington that the United States must establish a national security state capable of preventing Soviet encroachments in the Middle East and other parts of the world. The Truman administration’s most pressing concern was the situation in Iran, where despite the Kremlin’s assurances to the contrary, the Red Army was tightening its grip on Azerbaijan province, 200 miles northwest of

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<sup>254</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.17

<sup>255</sup> Warren F. Kimball, ed. *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p.399

<sup>256</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.119-120

Tehran. When Stalin failed to fulfill his wartime pledge to withdraw his troops from Iran no later than 2 March, the State Department fired off a blistering protest condemning the prolonged Soviet occupation as a “gross violation” of Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity that held “many dangerous implications.

Washington’s point man during the Iranian crisis was James E Byrnes, South Carolina Democrat who had headed Roosevelt’s Office of War Mobilization until Truman named him secretary of state shortly after V-E Day. Once it was clear that the Soviets had ignored the U.S. protest and were reinforcing the Red Army and encouraging a left-wing separatist movement in Azerbaijan,<sup>257</sup> so George F. Kennan and Byrnes gave a note from the United States to the Soviet Union:

It will be recalled that in reply to a note addressed on November 24, 1945 by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union suggesting the immediate withdrawal of a foreign troops from Iran, the Soviet Government on November 29 stated that the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran was governed by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942. The Government of the United States understood from this statement that it was the intention of the Government of the Soviet Union that al Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946, six months after the date of the signing of the instrument of surrender with Japan on September 2, 1945. This understanding was based upon Article Five of the Tripartite Treaty referer to above which states:

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.

So far as the Government of the United States is aware, this commitment was not questioned at the recent meeting of the Security Council in London which agreed that the Soviet Union and Iran should seek a solution of their differences by direct negotiation.

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<sup>257</sup> Ibid, p.121



The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Declaration Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, can not remain indifferent. That Declaration announced to the world that the Governments of the United States, the Union Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom were 'at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran'. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the maintenance of troops in Iranian territory by any one of the three signatories to that Declaration, without the consent and against the wishes of the Government of Iran, is contrary to the assurances contained in that Declaration. Furthermore it was generally accepted during the various discussions which took place at the meeting of the Security Council in London that the retention by a member of the United Nations of its troops in the territory of a country which is also a member of the United Nations, without the consent of the Government of that country, is not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that the withdrawal of such troops should not be made contingent upon other issues.<sup>258</sup>

In the event, this Note proved less effective than the single-minded diplomatic horse-trading of Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, who flew to Moscow in mid-March and persuaded the Kremlin to withdraw all of its troops from Azerbaijan in return for assurances of Soviet access to Iranian oil reserves.<sup>259</sup>

Although many scholars have recently interpreted the Soviet withdrawal on 6 May 1946 as evidence that the Kremlin's objectives were relatively limited, Truman and his senior advisers regarded the Red Army's prolonged presence in northern Iran as a probing action that presaged a more general Russian offensive in the Middle East. As the Soviet-American confrontation in Iran had moved toward its climax, George Kennan, the insightful U.S. charge affairs in Moscow, had warned Washington on 22 February in his famous "Long Telegram" that the "Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs" and its 'traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity' were likely to spell serious trouble for other neighboring states such as Turkey. Six months later Stalin unveiled a proposal

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<sup>258</sup> A Decade of American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1941-1949, Department of State, Washington, 1985, p.582-583

<sup>259</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.121

calling for joint Soviet and Turkish control of the Turkish Straits. Fearing that Moscow was ready to resort to armed force if the straits remained closed, the Turks sought help from Britain and the United States.<sup>260</sup>

### 3.1.2.2 Soviet Demands on Turkish Straits

Since the end of World War-II, Turkey has been most concerned about Soviet expansionism, which appeared directly to threaten Turkish sovereignty, indeed, Stalin's 'grab for the Straits' was one of the chief causes of the Cold War-in 1947.<sup>261</sup>




Figure 3.1 Turkish Straits

Soviet Government proposed to establish for the straits a new regime, proceeding from the following principles;

\*The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

\*The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.

\*Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

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<sup>260</sup>George F. Kennan, . Memoirs, 1925-1950,, Little, Brown, Boston: Atlantic 1967, p.290-307

<sup>261</sup> Philip Robins, "Turkey and the Middle East", Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, p.12

\*The establishment of a regime of Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers.

\*Turkey and Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits, for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers.

\*The Convention regarding the Straits, concluded in Montreux, should be revised.<sup>262</sup>

The traditional and instinctive American sense of insecurity helped ensure that U.S. policymakers adopted a worst-case scenario in dealing with the Turkish request. During an Oval Office meeting on 15 August, Truman and his top advisers concluded that “the primary objective of the Soviet Union is to obtain control of Turkey.” Dismissing the possibility that the Kremlin would limit itself to securing safe and unimpeded passage through the Turkish Straits, U.S. officials worried that a Russian triumph in Turkey would make it “extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East.” UK policymakers were as determined as their US counterparts to prevent Soviet inroads into Turkey and elsewhere in the region. Coordinating their actions, Whitehall and the White House privately advised the Turks to reject the Kremlin’s unilateral power play and publicly suggested that the fate of the Turkish straits be resolved by an international conference to be attended by all maritime powers, including Britain and the United States.

However the apocalyptic scenarios popular on both sides of the Atlantic, the Turk - Soviet crisis ended with a whimper rather than a bang. Although Moscow continued to harass Ankara diplomatically, Stalin never tried to force his way through the Turkish Straits, nor did the Red Army occupy eastern Turkey. Moreover, Stalin expressed no interest in attending an international conference on the Turkish straits, where he was certain to be outvoted by the United States and Great Britain, as the year drew to a close, a combination of US diplomatic and economic support and British military aid seemed to have assuaged

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<sup>262</sup> A Decade of American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1941-1949, Department of State, Washington, 1985, p. 614

Turkish anxieties. Yet the Truman administration was well aware that its policy in Turkey and in the region as a whole, hinged on help from Washington's faltering partner in London. "If a case should arise where Britain is not in a position to furnish the necessary arms and military equipment" to the Turks or their neighbors, the State Department observed on 21 October 1946, the United States would have to "consider furnishing certain supplies direct."<sup>263</sup>

### 3.1.2.3 Truman Doctrine

*"The course we have chosen... involves building military strength, but it requires no less the buttressing of all other forms of power- economic, political, social and moral."*<sup>264</sup>

*Dean Acheson*

On the afternoon of 12 March 1947 Truman delivered a momentous eighteen-minute address to a joint session of Congress declaring that U.S. national security required the containment of the Soviet Union<sup>265</sup> and to defend nations against communist aggression.<sup>266</sup> Promulgating what soon became known as the Truman Doctrine, the president pledged that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted conquer by armed minorities or by outside pressures" and won swift congressional approval for a \$400 million military and economic aid package to shore up anticommunist forces in Turkey and Greece<sup>267</sup> (250 million for Greece, 150 million for Turkey).<sup>268</sup>

The Truman administration broadened the agenda in early June by proposing a multi-billion-dollar European Recovery Program that eventually became the Marshall Plan to

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<sup>263</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.122

<sup>264</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, 1994, p.15

<sup>265</sup> Raymond G. O'Connor, *Powers of the President in Foreign Affairs*, Lederer Street-Zeus Co. Press, 1966, p.41, and President Harry S Truman's Address Before A Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm>


<sup>266</sup> Michael Barone, *In History's Words*, 9/22/2003, Vol. 135 Issue 9, p34, 3p

<sup>267</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, *Dünyaya Açılım, 1938'den Günümüze Amerikan Dış Politikası*, Translated by Rucihan Tul, Foreign Policy Institute Press, Ankara, 1992, p.62 and Duygu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası*, İmge Press, Ankara, 1999, p.242-244

<sup>268</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.211

rebuild the shattered European economies and stabilize their political systems.<sup>269</sup> Secretary of State George Marshall's speech on June 5, 1947, incorporated these ideas. He said that "before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation... there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part these countries themselves will take..." He added that it would be "neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally" such a program.

The program began with these words. Sixteen European states (all of noncommunist Europe except Spain, but including Iceland and Turkey) did prepare a plan, and Congress approved US participation in the Economic Cooperation Act of April 3, 1948.<sup>270</sup>




**Figure 3.2 Secretary of State Marshall walking in the commencement procession at Harvard University prior to announcing his plan for European economic recovery, June 5, 1947**<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake, *Our worst Enemy*, Simon and Schuster Press, New York, 1984, p.16

<sup>270</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.212

<sup>271</sup> *A Decade of American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1941-1949*, Department of State, Washington, 1985, p.744



**Figure 3.3 President Truman, surrounded by Congressmen and Cabinet members, signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 which enacted the Marshall Plan, April 3, 1948<sup>272</sup>**

On 25 July Congress passed the National Security Act, landmark legislation that established both the NSC and the CIA and that laid the ground-work for the creation of a single unified Department of Defense. By the autumn of 1947 the Truman Doctrine and other key components of America's Cold War national security state were in place.<sup>273</sup>

### **3.1.3 The Baghdad Pact and Defense of the Middle East**

In attempting to protect the Middle East against direct Communist aggression, the United States has used these methods:

**Direct military and economic assistance**, such as that extended to Greece and Turkey in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine

**The Baghdad Pact** of 1955 brought together in a defensive alliance Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. In 1958 Iraq withdrew, and the name was changed to the central Treaty organization (CENTO). Although the prime mover of the pact, the United States, believed it wisest not to become a full member. The United States is, however a

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<sup>272</sup> Ibid, p.744

<sup>273</sup> Lefler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power: National Security. The Truman Administration and the Cold War Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p.142-164,174-179

member of CENTO'S working committees and has bilateral security agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.<sup>274</sup> But for Kissinger, Pakistan's motive for obtaining US arms was not security against a Communist attack but protection against India, and the Arab members of CENTO armed not against the USSR, but against Israel.<sup>275</sup>

**The Eisenhower Doctrine**, embodied in a resolution passed by Congress in 1957, states that the United States is prepared to use its armed forces to assist, on request, any Middle Eastern state subjected to overt attack by a state controlled by international communism. In 1958 civil war broke out in Lebanon, and the President of Lebanon asked the United States for help on the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine. US forces landed in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, and; remained until October 25 when order had been restored.<sup>276</sup>

**Defense Agreement of 1959** - Pursuant to the declaration of 28 July 1958 the governments of Iran and the United States concluded an agreement of 5 March 1959. By the agreement, the United States regarded as "vital to its national interest" the independence and integrity of Iran. Under the agreement, the United States provided Iran with increasing military and economic aid. Previously, American aid had been based on the agreements on 1943 and 1947 as confirmed by the Mutual Defense Agreement of 1950. Prior to 1947, all American aid had been technical and advisory in nature. Since then Iran has received military equipment as well.

From 1953 onward Iran received substantial amounts of assistance from the United States. "Between" 1949-52, total American assistance had amounted to \$16.7 million in military and \$16.5 million in economic aid. However, between 1953 and 1961, military aid rose to \$463 million, and economic aid totaled \$611 million; of the latter, \$345 million was in outright grants.<sup>277</sup>

A Middle Eastern nation desiring US protection through one of these methods is forced to stand up and be counted on the side of the West. Few governments have the internal strength to be able to do so. Turkey and Iran, independent for centuries, do not have the fear of Western imperialism held by the Arab states and accordingly have been able to

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<sup>274</sup> Temple Wanamaker, *Ibid*, p.199-200

<sup>275</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, W.W. Norton Company Inc. Press, New York, 1974, p.66

<sup>276</sup> Temple Wanamaker, *Ibid*, p.199-200

<sup>277</sup> "Iran's Policy towards the United States" Available on site: <http://www.sedona.net/pahlavi/forough4.html>

enter into and maintain defensive alliances with the West. Other governments have found that too close identification with the West can cause their downfall. Many Iraqis bitterly opposed their country's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and one of the causes of the revolution in 1958 was Iraq's close identification with the West. The new revolutionary government promptly announced Iraq's withdrawal from that alliance. In 1956 King Hussein of Jordan almost lost his throne as riots raged in the capital city of Amman in protest against the apparent intention of the government to join the Baghdad.<sup>278</sup>

### **3.1.4 Cyprus, Johnson Letter and Embargo to the Turkey**

This was the nature of the Turkish-American relations in the 1950s and even in the early 1960s. Then, in 1964 came the Johnson letter. Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus were harassed and massacred in the name of Enosis (annexation of Cyprus by Greece). When Turkey decided to intervene, it was reminded by the U.S. President Johnson that it should think twice before doing so, for if the Turkish intervention triggered a Russian involvement, the U.S. and its allies might not be willing to come to the assistance of Turkey. Johnson's letter compelled the Turkish government and the Turkish public to take a closer look at the very nature of the Turkish-American relations. It triggered a widespread resentment in the Turkish public opinion throughout the 1960s.

Following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975, which lasted until 1978 and caused considerable damage to Turkish-US relations.

The impact of the arms embargo between 1975-1978 on Turkish-American relations was to be felt throughout the 1980s and paved the way for the machinations of certain ethnic lobbies in the U.S. Congress that proved to be powerful enough to cast undue shadow on Turkish-American bilateral relations from time to time by working against overall national interests of both countries.

The nature of the Turkish-American relations during the entire Cold War period was such that they were almost exclusively based on military cooperation, although there was some economic assistance along the way as well. Military cooperation was almost exclusively in

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<sup>278</sup> Temple Wanamaker, *Ibid*, p.199-200



the form of U.S. security assistance. Turkey found security in the Turkish-U.S. partnership and within NATO, whereas the U.S. found a staunch ally in NATO's southern flank.<sup>279</sup>

## **3.2 ARAB-ISRAELI WARS AND U.S.A. POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

### **3.2.1 Suez Crisis and US Role**

In October 1956 the British and French, along with Israel, invaded Egypt in response to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.<sup>280</sup> Israel would invade the canal and seize it for their own and France & Britain would intervene under the auspices of "restoring order". Since the United States was a demonstrated ally of the Israelis, the plan was nearly foolproof in that the US would come to their aid and effectively crush any Egyptian motivation to resist (considering that there was a civil war ensuing at the time). The Egyptians, however, counted among their allies the Soviet Union, and the US was hesitant to play into the hands of the "Communist threat". 27 days later, the invasion of the Suez Canal came to a close after the US appealed to the UN to intervene and eject the forces of Israel, Britain, and France. This was an especially harsh blow considering that the balance of power in the Middle East was extremely delicate, and resulted in more hatred and tensions because of the mission's botched nature.<sup>281</sup>

### **3.2.2 Arab-Israeli Wars and U.S.**

#### **3.2.2.1 Six-Day War**

In 1967 Egypt, Syria, and Jordan massed their armies on Israel's borders, and several Arab states called for war. Assuming the Arabs would attack; Israel struck first, in June 1967, and caught the Arabs by surprise. In the Six-Day War that followed, Israel demolished the armies and air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. It also gained control of the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights region of southwestern Syria, and all

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<sup>279</sup> "Turkish - U.S. Relation", Available on site: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ab/>

<sup>280</sup> Irene Gendzier, "Oil Iraq And Us Foreign Policy in the Middle East", Situation Analysis, March 2003, p.21, Available on site: <http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/>, and Alex Morrison, International Action and National Sovereignty: Adjusting to New Realities, Peace in the Midst of War, edited by David Carment and Patrick James, University of South Carolina Press, South Carolina, 1998, p.280

<sup>281</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.ibiblio.org/kelly/writings/>

of Jerusalem.<sup>282</sup> From its beginning to the end, the war lasted 132 hours and 30 minutes (less than 6 days). But the duration was shorter on 2 of the 3 fronts: on the Egyptian side only 4 days, and on the Jordanian side only 3 days. It was only on the Syrian side that the war lasted the whole 6 days.<sup>283</sup> A second wave of Palestinian refugees fled the fighting, worsening the problem created by the first exodus in 1948. With the armies of its enemies crushed, Israel felt it could wait for the Arab states to offer peace on terms it found comfortable. Many UN members were less confident that peace would follow and generally did not approve of Israel's territorial gains. In late November the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, which called for an exchange of territory for peace and for a resettling of the Palestinian refugees.

Arabs and Israelis both rejected Resolution 242. The Arab states continued to call for the destruction of Israel, while Israel for its part, refused to withdraw from the territories it occupied. The Arabs increasingly threw their support behind the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a political body that had been formed in 1964 to create a Palestinian state. Using terrorism, the PLO attacked Israel from their bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; attacks by Palestinian Arabs came from within the Gaza Strip and West Bank as well. Israel's position hardened, and little progress toward achieving peace was made in the late 1960s or early 1970s.<sup>284</sup> The Six Day War was important because it demonstrated yet again that Israel had sufficiently mobilized its troops, and its people to fight for their young homeland.<sup>285</sup>

As a result of the Six-Day War, Israel traded the precarious 1948 boundaries for new lines that offered all that a military planner could wish. Earlier, the ten-mile waist between the Jordanian-held West Bank and the Mediterranean and the thirty miles of barbed wire along the Gaza Strip had made Israel vulnerable to bisection in any military offensive and to constant guerrilla infiltration even in times of alleged peace. Now the Dead Sea, the Jordan River, the Golan Heights, and the Suez Canal provided a set of ideal defenses, whether against infantry, tanks, or nighttime guerrillas. Above all, Israeli occupation of the Sinai

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<sup>282</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>283</sup> "Six-Day War" Available on site: <http://i-cias.com/e.o/sixdaywr.htm>

<sup>284</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>285</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.ibiblio.org/kelly/>

Peninsula put Egyptian jet planes over one hundred miles farther from targets in Israel-and, conversely, Israeli planes at half their previous distance from Cairo or Alexandria.<sup>286</sup>




Figure 3. 4 The Six-Day War (Golan Hights)<sup>287</sup>

Table 3.1 Six-Day War Armed Conflict Events Data<sup>288</sup>

State	Entry	Exit	Combat Forces	Population	Losses
Egypt	1967	1967	400000	40000000	10000
Iraq	1967	1967	250000	10000000	2000
Israel	1967	1967	200000	3800000	2000
Jordan	1967	1967	60000	1500000	5000
Syria	1967	1967	300000	8000000	10000

<sup>286</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, Oil and Turmoil, W.W. Norton Company, New York And London, 1982, p.125

<sup>287</sup>“The Six Day War” Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/>

<sup>288</sup> “Six-Day War” Available on site: <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/9999/6day1967.htm>




Figure 3.5 Israel after 1967 War<sup>289</sup>

The Arab-Israeli Wars, in particular the 1967 Six-Day War played a major role in spurring the American Jewish community to pro-Israeli political action. The 1967 War, as many historians suggest, “Zionized” the American Jewish community and helped to turn Israel into the “new religion” of its members.<sup>290</sup>

### 3.2.2.2 1973 War

Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat reconstructed the Egyptian army in the early 1970s. Syria also prepared for war and received weapons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Israel, in turn, fortified its forward positions and was supplied with

<sup>289</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann, *The New Age of American Foreign Policy*, The Macmillan Company Press, New York, 1970, p.350

<sup>290</sup> Leon T. Hadar, *Quagmire America in the Middle East*, Cato Institute, Washington D.C. 1992, p.36

weapons by the United States.<sup>291</sup> The outbreak of War-In the Middle East on October 6 (the Jewish Day of Atonement) was a strategic surprise to Israel, whose military establishment had adhered to its estimation that Egypt was not prepared for war and hence did not intend to wage it.<sup>292</sup> Egypt and Syria pushed across the armistice lines established after the Six-Day War, which had kept Egyptian troops west of the Suez Canal and Syrian troops northeast of the Golan Heights. The Arab advances greatly restored Arab confidence. Israel, however, quickly recovered from the surprise and again pushed into Arab territory, surrounding or destroying the bulk of the Egyptian and Syrian forces. Nevertheless, Israel suffered greatly in the three-week war, especially from the injuries, deaths, and massive physical destruction of the war's first two days. Moreover, Israel's confidence was shaken, and the euphoria that followed the country's victory in the Six-Day War was lost. In Israel and among most Western countries, the conflict came to be known as the Arab-Israeli War of 1973; Arabs call it the October War or Ramadan War.<sup>293</sup>

### **3.2.2.3 Kissinger Shuttle Diplomacy and Sinai-II Agreement**

After the 1973 war, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy<sup>294</sup> (labeled shuttle diplomacy because he flew back and forth between the capitals of the warring countries, which refused to meet with one another) had led to partial disengagements between the Israelis and Egypt and Syria, most of the territorial issues resulting from Israel's victory in 1967 remained unresolved.<sup>295</sup> Kissinger's work did little to change the prewar status quo, and the countries were technically still at war. Even so, the agreements did reverse the military buildup and achieved a relatively peaceful, if tense, stalemate.<sup>296</sup> The agreement represented a breakthrough in Israel-Egypt relations because it included essential political elements. The agreement was to remain in force until superseded by a new one; the signatories undertook not to use force to resolve their differences; and non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel were permitted through the Suez Canal. Israel agreed to a further pullback in Sinai; to the east of the Mitla and Gidi passes- and to handing over the Abu

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<sup>291</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>292</sup> Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1998, p.145

<sup>293</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>294</sup> Shuttle diplomacy: International negotiations conducted by a mediator who frequently flies back and forth between the negotiating parties

<sup>295</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.294

<sup>296</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

Rudais oil fields. The agreement entailed secret U.S. guarantees on generous financial and military aid to Israel and a pledge not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist, accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced Terrorism.<sup>297</sup> This Accord of 1975 in Ford's presidency was the decisive step on the path that culminated in a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in March 1979.<sup>298</sup>



Figure 3.6 An illustration of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy (The Louisville Courier Journal, 1975)<sup>299</sup>

<sup>297</sup> Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1998, p.164

<sup>298</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, Simon & Schuster Press, New York, 1999, p.347

<sup>299</sup> L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and The Middle East*, I.B. Tauris & C.L. Press, London, 1984, p.189




Figure 3.7 Sinai II Agreement of September 1, 1975<sup>300</sup>

<sup>300</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, Ibid, p.423

### 3.2.3 Camp David Accords

*“We offer our good offices. I think it’s accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that’s most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also by Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we’ll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.”<sup>301</sup>*

*Jimmy Carter*

*“The man who performed the miracle was President Carter. Without any exaggeration, what he did constitutes one of the greatest achievements of our time... There came certain moments when hope was eroding and retreating in the face of pride. However, President Carter remained unshaken in his confidence and determination... Before anything else, the signing of the peace treaty and exchange of letters is a tribute to the spirit and ability of Jimmy Carter.”<sup>302</sup>*

*President Sadat*

Watergate, not the Middle East, was the decisive issue during the 1976 presidential campaign. One week before Election Day, however, candidate Carter received an 11,000-word foreign policy game plan touching on everything from Argentina to Zaire. The report was prepared by Cyrus Vance, the Yale Educated Washington insider who would become secretary of state in the new administration. In just five brief paragraphs on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Vance confirmed that the peace-for-land formula was the key to any lasting settlement, reminded Carter of the domestic political considerations involved, and urged him not to take any strong initiative” but, rather, to “nudge the situation along “During the days after his narrow victory at the polls on 2 November, the president-elect became convinced that the complicated dispute between Arab and Jew boiled down to three simple issues: “Israeli security; who owned the land; and Palestinian rights.”<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.337

<sup>302</sup> Treaty Signing Ceremony, *Weekly Compilation of President Documents*, 15(13), p.518-522

<sup>303</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United states and the Middle East since 1945*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2002, p.289



In the late 1970s Egypt's military expenses caused it increasing economic hardship and social unrest, prompting Sadat to initiate negotiations with Israel in 1977. Sadat hoped to end the military buildup and regain the Sinai Peninsula. Israelis greeted Sadat's visit to Jerusalem enthusiastically. United States president Jimmy Carter facilitated the negotiations between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The agreements came to be known as the Camp David Accords after the Maryland retreat where Carter hosted some of the negotiations.<sup>304</sup>


The terms of the "Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and State of Israel" signed in Washington on March 26, 1979,<sup>305</sup> by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and by President Carter as "witness" were remarkable. Usually peace treaties codify the results of war, giving international legitimacy to control over territory established by battle, attempting to give de jure durability to the new de facto situation and to resolving marginal issues not settled by war that could provoke new hostilities. The Egyptian-Israeli treaty, by contrast, substantially changed territorial dispositions established twelve years previously by war, and instituted a fundamentally new status qua, effecting a revolutionary change in the thirty-year-old situation in the Middle East in which the lading Arab country, among others, had refused to grant legitimacy to the State of Israel. As anticipated in the Camp David framework, Israel agreed to evacuate its military forces and civilians from the Sinai Peninsula in a phased withdrawal over a three-year period; the state of war between Egypt and Israel was terminated; and the parties agreed to established normal and full diplomatic relations after the initial nine months of Israeli ships were accorded the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches, and all normal international navigational rights through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Agaba. The parties agree to negotiate special security arrangements, including the deployment of United Nations forces to monitor the implementations of the peace treaty. They also agreed "not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this treaty".<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>305</sup> L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and The Middle East*, I.B. Tauris&C.L. Press, London, 1984, p.190

<sup>306</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.350



**Figure 3.8 President Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at the signing of the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (Wide world Photos)<sup>307</sup>**

On the controversial issue of the linkage of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to the negotiations on the regime for the West Bank and Gaza, as provided for in the Camp David framework, the text of the treaty itself was mute, except for a vague clause in the preamble committing the parties to continue “the search for a comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli in all aspects.” The Israelis won their determined fight to keep all clauses out of the treaty that might make its implementation conditional on the settlement of the Palestinian problem. Sadat’s need to demonstrate to the other Arab countries and the Palestinians that his peace with Israel was only the opening move in a larger strategy of getting the Israelis to give back all of the territories conquered in 1967 was catered to, on the insistence of President Carter signed by Begin and Sadat in which they agreed to continue good faith negotiations according to the Camp David framework for the “establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.”<sup>308</sup> For its part, Israel achieved peace with what had been its largest enemy at the cost of evacuating Israeli settlers from the Sinai and losing some investment in the area’s infrastructure, such as

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<sup>307</sup> L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and The Middle East*, I.B. Tauris&C.L. Press, London, 1984, p.242

<sup>308</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.350-351

roads and housing. The Camp David Accords, however, did nothing for Syria and only advanced the Palestinian cause in the vaguest of terms. For these reasons, the Arab League expelled Egypt and the rest of the Arab world widely condemned the accords.<sup>309</sup> Iraq and Syria moved to mobilize an Arab boycott of President Sadat's regime.<sup>310</sup> The division of the Arab states was even greater after Sadat recognized Israel as sovereign, and on 6 October 1981, he was assassinated by a group of Islamic fundamentalists within the Egyptian army.<sup>311</sup>

Despite his role in masterminding the Syria-Egyptian attack on Israel in October 1973, by the end of the decade Sadat was regarded by most Americans and by many Israelis as the quintessential "good Arab." in Egyptian-Israeli disengagement parleys extending through three U.S. administrations, Sadat struck American policy-makers as shrewd, pragmatic, and willing to take enormous risks for peace. Nixon praised Sadat's "great subtlety and sophistication" and called him "a constructive and essential influence for any future Middle East negotiations."<sup>312</sup> Gerald Ford, who had once inadvertently toasted Sadat as the leader of "the great people of the Government of Israel" appreciated the Egyptian president's sense of humor, his straightforward manner, and his diplomatic flexibility.<sup>313</sup> Jimmy Carter, who without Sadat's help could never have launched the Camp David peace process in September 1978, came to admire his Egyptian friend" more than any other leader" and called him "a man who would change history"<sup>314</sup> Egypt continued to maintain relations with Israel after Sadat's death.

Following Camp David, Syria maintained its warlike posture and demanded the unconditional surrender of the Golan Heights, and the PLO continued its terrorist assaults on Israel. In 1982 Israel tried to wipe out the PLO by attacking its bases in Lebanon, which had been plunged into its own civil War in 1975. The assault on the PLO, which Israel called Operation Peace for Galilee, quickly escalated into ground battles in Lebanon and

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<sup>309</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>310</sup> F. Gregorry Gause III, *The Arabian Peninsula Monarchies from Camp David I, The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.64

<sup>311</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism*, Ibid, p.34, and "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.ibiblio.org/kelly/>

<sup>312</sup> Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memories of Richard Nixon*, Grosset and Dunlap Press, New York, 1978, p.1011-1012

<sup>313</sup> Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal*, Harper and Row Press, New York, 1979, p.290-291

<sup>314</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith, Memories of President*, Bantam Press, New York, 1982, p.328

full-scale engagements between the Israeli and Syrian air forces. After a siege on Beirut the PLO leadership evacuated from Lebanon and relocated to Tunisia. Arabs were frustrated that Israel had occupied an Arab capital with little intervention from the rest of the world, and the Palestinians of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip felt more isolated and abandoned than ever. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon by 1985, though it continued to maintain a self-declared security zone inside Lebanon along the Israeli border.<sup>315</sup>

### **3.2.4 Economic and Military Assistances to Israeli**

Like political support for Israel increased, economic and military assistance were joined and grew geometrically. From 1948 until 1967 economic and military assistance to Israel compared to aid received by other countries was relatively small. However, following 1967 War when Israel demonstrated military superiority, aid increased by 450 percent.<sup>316</sup>

In the wake of the first deliveries of Phantom Jets to Israel in late 1969, fulfilling President Johnson's 1968 decision to sell such aircraft, a second increment of F-4 plus additional A-4 Sky Hawks was requested by Israel in the fall of 1969. News of this request spread rapidly and became a cause celebre in the Middle East and within the United States government until well into 1971 when the government of Israel publicly it would no longer cooperates with American peace initiatives until it received more jets. For Arabs, the supersonic Phantom jet was a symbol of powerful American support for Israel against the Arab world; for Israelis, the aircraft had deep emotional significance, representing Israel's reluctant but necessary reliance on the United States as its only great power patron.<sup>317</sup>

During Nixon's administration aid greatly increased because Israel was regarded as a key element in containing the Soviet Union. According to Kissinger, when confronted with the realities of power in the Middle East, Nixon decided to continue a strategy "to reduce Soviet influence, weaken the position of the Arab radicals, encourage Arab moderates, and assure Israel's security." When Israel was confronted with the danger of defeat in the 1973

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<sup>315</sup> "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Available on site: <http://hometown.aol.com/>

<sup>316</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.281

<sup>317</sup> Robert J. Pranger, *American Policy for Peace in the Middle East 1969-1971*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Press, Washington, 1971, p.23

war, Nixon ordered all-out military assistance with the largest U.S. airlift in history and an 800 percent increase in military assistance totaling over \$2 billion.<sup>318</sup>

The 1973 Yom War polarized the Soviet and American positions in the Middle East more than ever. By the end of the War-Israel was a firmly licensed Cold War ally of the United States and was rewarded with increasingly generous economic packages. U.S. aid grew from \$93.6 million in fiscal 1970 to \$2,646.3 million in 1974. Substantial increases in economic and military assistance to Egypt and Israel were integral components in the peace agreements engineered by President Carter in 1978-79. By the 1980s Israel was receiving an annual allocation of \$3 billion, all of it in grants that would not have to be repaid. By now Israel had become the largest single recipient of American aid; in per capita terms it also received more than any other beneficiary. In addition to the more-or-less-fixed annual allocation of some \$3 billion, several other programs totaling tens of millions of dollars included items such as participation in financing schools and hospitals, joint research and development of the Arrow antimissile project, establishment of a major petroleum reserve available for emergencies by Israel, and improvement of Haifa port for U.S. military use. Unlike other recipients of military assistance, Israel was permitted to use a portion it received to purchase local Israeli rather than American manufactured items.<sup>319</sup> In most other instances the United States closely monitored distribution of economic and military assistance; Israel, however, was not required to line-item funds it received. In 1992 Democratic senator Robert V. Byrd of West Virginia observed that “we have poured foreign aid into Israel for decades at rates and terms given to no other nation on earth. . . . Beyond the massive economic and military aid, however, in our so-called strategic relations with Israel, we have served as a protector almost in the same sense as the government of the United States would protect one of our 50 states.”<sup>320</sup>

There has been little controversy about maintaining the level of economic aid to Israel in Congress despite recent cuts in overall foreign assistance. Congress usually accepts executive branch proposals for funds to Israel although it frequently slashes allocations

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<sup>318</sup> Stephen Junes, “The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel”, *Middle East Policy* 4, no:4, October 1996, p.96

<sup>319</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.282

<sup>320</sup> Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars, U.S. Policy toward Palestine and Israel since 1945*, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C., 1995, p.179

proposed for other countries. A rule of thumb is that Israel should receive funding sufficient to maintain a military force equal or superior to the combined forces of the surrounding Arab states. When seventy-eight senators demanded that President Carter continue existing levels of aid to Israel in 1978, they justified amounts requested to balance the massive arms procurement by Arab states, 80 percent of which were of U.S. origin.<sup>321</sup>

Since 1974 a substantial portion of funds Israel receives from the United States has been used to finance interest and principal owed American banks. A large part of the \$1 billion received in Economic Support Funds covered repayment on previous loans to finance arms purchased in the United States. Much of the more than \$1 billion in military assistance is a credit line to American arms suppliers to Israel.

In 1985 when Israel was in the sufferings of a major economic recession, the United States assisted with a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) eliminating American tariffs on most of its imports; today Israel is only one of four countries with a U.S. FTA (the others are Canada, Jordan, and Mexico) as well as being the recipient of a special \$1.5 billion grant. By 2000 the United States was Israel's largest trade partner, importing more than a third of its exports while the United States provided the lion's share of Israeli imports, about 23 percent. Because of attractive tax policies, between 85 and 90 percent of Israeli high-tech companies have been registered in the United States. In 1999-2000, 60 to 70 percent of Israeli high-tech firms were registered in the state of Delaware.<sup>322</sup>

### 3.3 U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS AND IRAN REVOLUTION

*"I don't know what historical assumptions guided Carter's or Vance's approach... but I assumed that their assumptions were different from mine and involved a somewhat different scheme of the world. To me, principled commitment to a more decent world order did not preclude the use of power to protect our most immediate interests."*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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<sup>321</sup> Stephen Junes, Ibid, p.97

<sup>322</sup> Don Peretz, Ibid, p.282-283

### 3.3.1 U.S.-Iran Relation under Shah Administration

The Carter administration inherited the dominant view in the policy establishment of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. "Under the Shah's leadership," recalls Kissinger, "the land bridge between Asia and Europe, so often the hinge of world history, was pro-American and pro-West beyond any challenge... The Shah's view of the realities of world politics paralleled our own... Iran under the Shah, in short, was one of America's best, most important and most loyal friends in the world."<sup>323</sup>

Nixon and Kissinger had themselves built upon the legacy of U.S.-Iranian relations that went back to World War-II and that had been elaborated during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson administrations. President Roosevelt perceived it to be the American mission to prevent the USSR and Britain from transforming their wartime zones of military occupation in Iran into a permanent postwar partition of the country. It was on U. S. insistence that the two occupying powers signed a treaty with Iran in January 1942 to withdraw their troops from Iranian territory within six months after the end of the war. Roosevelt was concerned, with Britain no longer able to perform her historic geopolitical role of containing Russian expansion into the oil-rich Persian Gulf, to solidify a posture of determined independence within Iran—a substitute, as it were, for the traditional British presence.<sup>324</sup> In any event, by being in favor of an independent Iran, the United States would not have to assume an anti-Soviet posture.

The geopolitical, rather than the idealistic, basis for US attempts to assure Iranian independence took over US diplomacy during the first year of the Truman administration when, in the first major US-Soviet altercation of the postwar period, the United States brought maximum diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to get Stalin to honor his commitment to withdraw Russian occupation troops from northern Iran after the cessation of hostilities. The geopolitical considerations henceforth dominated US policies toward Iran; but the assessments of the best means for keeping Iran out of the Soviet sphere kept fluctuating between efforts to induce the Shah to liberalize his regime and efforts to bolster

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<sup>323</sup> Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Little Brown, Boston, 1979, p.1262

<sup>324</sup> For U.S. policies toward Iran during World War II See Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origin of the cold War in the Near East: Great Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.130-208

his internal and external power by aiding him to build up his security forces and his military establishment.

The larger movement of US policy was toward catering to the Shah's preference for a powerful military establishment and other trappings of monarchic, even imperial, grandeur and for glamorous industrialization projects and away from insistence on basic socioeconomic and political reforms.<sup>325</sup>

The Truman-Acheson policy of trying to convince the Shah that he needed to modernize and democratize Iran lest it suffer a fate analogous to Chiang's China and of making loans and arms transfers at least partly contingent upon a sincere effort by the Shah to institute domestic reforms, gave way to the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of relying on the Shah to make Iran the centerpiece of the US anti-Communist alliance system in the Middle East and of intervening to help the Shah combat his domestic enemies.<sup>326</sup> The Eisenhower administration feared that Mohammed Mossadegh, the nationalistic Prime Minister appointed by the Shah in 1951, was by 1953 demagogically catering to extremist and pro-Soviet elements, especially the Marxist Tudeh Party, and that Mossadegh's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was only the first step toward a complete radicalization of Iran's political economy and a turn toward alignment with the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration felt justified in authorizing the CIA to proceed with its plan to topple Mossadegh and reinstate the Shah, who already had fled to Italy. Although, at the time, the overthrow of Mossadegh and the restoration of the Shah was more popular than unpopular in Iran, the recollection by Iranians of the CIA engineered coup, more than any event in the relationship between the two countries, provided the source of the hysterical charges during the 1979-1980 hostage crisis that the United States was a Cull accomplice in all of the crimes committed by the Shah against his countrymen.

While the restoration of the Shah in 1953 hardly produced the reign of terror that the 1978 revolutionary leaders would allege was the immediate result, and while many participants in the Mossadegh government willingly went to work for the Shah, the 1953 coup decimated the sociopolitical infrastructure that was gradually maturing in Iran, and which,

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<sup>325</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.352-353

<sup>326</sup> Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p.29-30



given time and encouragement, might have provided a stable structure for a moderate democracy. In the post- Mossadegh period all political authority was concentrated in the monarchy; the bureaucracy and Parliament became rubber stamps for the Shah's decrees, and in the name of securing the regime against a resurgence of Tudeh radicalism from the left and Muslim fundamentalism from the right, the Shah delegated more and more enforcement powers to the armed forces and police. With the Shah less inclined than ever to accept foreign advice on the basic structure of his regime, the bargaining between Washington and Teheran tended to concentrate during the remaining years of the Eisenhower administration on the material inputs and technical assistance the United States could contribute to Iran's economic, administrative, and military modernization and on the role Iran should play in the regional "mutual security" network being constructed in the Near East by John Poster Dulles. The Shah shrewdly calculated, as did other leading US clients in the Third World, that by catering to Dulles' preoccupation with the US-Soviet rivalry he could get maximum support from the United States for building up his own domestic and regional power, even though this was targeted more against the Shah's local adversaries than against hypothetical Soviet aggression.<sup>327</sup>


The Eisenhower administration was not at all sanguine about Iran's future stability and pro-Western orientation; in the White House there was particular concern that the Shah's emphasis on expensive military projects was dangerously retarding the evolution of a balanced domestic economy capable of supporting his attempts to rapidly industrialize the country. But Eisenhower and Dulles were loath to threaten a reduction in military or economic assistance as a lever on Iranian domestic reform for (car of undercutting the Shah's authority and stimulating the anti-Shah groups.

Iran's economic and military programs went even more against the grain of the economic development philosophies influential among John F. Kennedy's New Frontiersmen in the White House and in the Agency for international Development, as did the Shah's reputation as a ruthless autocrat. The President's own determination to move away from the previous administration's policy of deference to the Shah was apparently crystallized by Khrushchev's prediction at the 1961 Vienna summit that the Shah would fall victim to a popular uprising. In 1962 the Kennedy administration conditioned its contributions to

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<sup>327</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.353-354

Iran's economic plan and military modernization upon the Shah's agreement to reduce his army from 240,000 to 150,000 men and to institute various economic and political reforms. Displeased with such meddling, the Shah nevertheless went along with most of the new U. S. insistences, meanwhile attempting to increase his bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States by accepting Soviet economic and military aid, and by attempting to exploit the increasing dependence of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan on Iranian oil.<sup>328</sup>



**Figure 3.9 President John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran on an inspection trip to Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, during the Shah's April 1962 visit to the United States. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson is pictured following the two leaders.<sup>329</sup>**

During the Johnson administration the Shah, perhaps sensing the opportunity arising out of the US preoccupation with Vietnam, became increasingly manipulative of his US patrons. US financial aid was being rapidly phased out due to Iran's soaring oil revenues, and therefore provided virtually no leverage by the late 1960s. The Shah's main requests now were that he be permitted to purchase the most sophisticated military equipment: ground-to-air missile systems and radars, supersonic aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles. The Shah perceived that many top US officials, alarmed at Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq and

<sup>328</sup> Ibid, p.355

<sup>329</sup> James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1988, p. 316

Egypt, were ready to support his requests before congressional committees and within the bureaucracy despite growing skepticism about the Shah's purported needs and worries about the distortions the arms transfers would produce in Iran's economic and social system. Whatever opportunities there might have been for US officials to capitalize on the divisions in Washington by way of hard bargaining with the Shah were bypassed in the latter years of the Johnson administration; instead the President and Secretary of State followed the counsel of under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow that the Shah not be "alienated," lest he turn to the Soviets.<sup>330</sup>

The Shah's star reached its zenith in Washington during the Nixon-Kissinger years. The "Nixon Doctrine"-devolving frontline containment and regional stabilization tasks to selected US allies who would be well supplied with US military equipment was precisely suited to the role of Iran as conceived of by the Shah. In the wake of the British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf at the end of 1971, Kissinger recalls that "there was no possibility of assigning any American military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam war and its attendant trauma." But with Iran as a willing military client, "the vacuum left by British withdrawal now menaced by Soviet intrusion and radical momentum, would be filled by a local power friendly to us.... And all of this was achieved without any American resources, since the Shah was willing to pay for the equipment out of his oil revenues."<sup>331</sup>

Despite this mutuality of interests between Washington and Teheran, the Shah was not averse to playing hardball diplomacy to extract the maximum possible out of the American arsenal. In 1971 he indicated a willingness to join with the Arab majority in OPEC in its threat to use the oil cartel as an instrument of international leverage against Israel unless the United States was fully responsive to Iran's security needs. The result was Nixon's promise in Teheran in May 1972 to allow the Shah to buy virtually any and all no nuclear weapons he wanted.<sup>332</sup> Kissinger objects to journalistic characterizations of the 1972 arms transfer agreement as "open ended" branding these accounts "hyperbole."<sup>333</sup> But the fact of

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
<sup>330</sup> Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p.116-123

<sup>331</sup> Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Little Brown, Boston, 1979, p.1264


<sup>332</sup> Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, *The American Failure in Iran*, Knopf Press, New York, 1981, p.51

<sup>333</sup> Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, *Ibid*, p.1264

a nearly totally open spigot on the American arms pipeline to Iran after 1972 is indisputable.



**Figure 3.10** President Richard M. Nixon and the shah of Iran at the White House in July 1973 during the Shah's tenth visit to the United States.<sup>334</sup>



**Figure 3.11** The shah of Iran confers with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the shah's summer palace at Noshahr on the Caspian Sea, August 1976.<sup>335</sup>

From 1973 to 1977 more than a third of all U.S. military sales were to Iran, whose military budget rose fourfold during this period consuming over a quarter of the Iranian

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<sup>334</sup> James A. Bill, *Ibid*, p. 316

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid*, p. 316

government's expenditures. The increase in the value of arms exports from \$1 billion annually in the early 1970s to \$10 billion annually in the mid-1970s was attributable in large part to the Shah's insatiable appetite for new weapons.<sup>336</sup>

### 3.3.2 Carter Administration and Revolution

The public face of United States policy toward Iran throughout Jimmy Carter's first presidential year was one of unwavering support for the Shah, despite growing concern within the administration and in Congress over the vulnerability of the Shah's regime and his use of his secret police, SAVAK, to brutally suppress political opposition. On November 15, 1977, the President and the Shah stood together on the White House south lawn, exchanging expressions of mutual admiration. And on January 2, 1978, U. S. news media carried reports of Carter's New Year's Eve toast in Teheran to the Shah's regime as "an island of stability" in one of the more troubled areas of the world. "This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership and the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you."<sup>337</sup>



**Figure 3.12 President Jimmy Carter and the shah on the White House lawn during the shah's last official visit to the United States in November 1977.<sup>338</sup>**

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<sup>336</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.356-357

<sup>337</sup> *New York Times*, January 2, 1978

<sup>338</sup> James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1988, p.316

Critics of the policy of continuing to support the Shah and lavish arms sales wondered how an administration professing dedication to human rights and arms control could justify these actions. However, the reasons for special support of the Shah, especially during his time of troubles, were convincing to the new President, just as they had been convincing to Carter's predecessors. The Shah's Iran had become the most important of the "regional influential" (Brzezinski's phrase) upon which the United States had to rely, particularly in the post-Vietnam era of opposition to overseas US military deployments, to provide an adequate forward defense against Soviet impulses to expand the USSR's sphere of control. Both the human rights and the conventional arms transfer policies of the Carter administration provided explicitly for geopolitically determined exceptions such as this. The legacy of past commitments and the lack of current alternatives to the Shah continued to tilt sentiment in the administration, including Carter's, in favor of supporting the Shah until the foundational premises of the policy had already crumbled beyond repair.

The Carter administration inherited more than the arms sales contracts of its predecessors; it also inherited career bureaucrats in the departments of State and Defense who, in approving the sales, had made judgments about the basic viability of the Shah's rule, and about his regime's suppression of political opposition. The prevailing consensus among the careerists was that the Shah was without peer among Middle Eastern leaders in his ability to maintain domestic order while instituting major socioeconomic reform of a traditional society, and that the draconian measures he sometimes used were hardly unusual among regimes in the region or indeed throughout the Third World. The careerists had to contend against Carter appointees who were committed to helping the President implement his campaign promises to reduce arms sales and promote human rights, but the old hands found a powerful ally in Zbigniew Brzezinski, who accepted the Kissingerian argument that a constriction of weapons transfers to Iran, especially if it were an expression of discontent with the monarchy's human rights record, would be against US interests, since it could only alienate the Shah and turn him toward other arms suppliers.<sup>339</sup>

In the fall of 1978, when it began to be evident that the growing instability in Iran was more serious than anything that had been seen since the Mossadegh period, Brzezinski himself began to argue that the overthrow of the Shah was a real possibility. Strikes were

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<sup>339</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, 1994, p.357-358

endemic in essential public service industries; the economy was near collapse; wealthy Iranians were sending their money out of the country; and Ruhollah Khomeini was calling from exile in Paris for civil war. Carter's national security adviser's response to the impending crisis was predictable: back the Shah all the way and let him and his opponents know that this was US policy.<sup>340</sup>

The view from the American Embassy in Teheran was quite different. Ambassador William Sullivan sent a message to Washington on November 9, 1978, recommending that since the Shah's regime might collapse, the United States should begin to look for alternative means to preserve its interests. The unity of the armed forces and their willingness to support a post-Shah regime would be crucial to preserving the territorial integrity and independence of Iran, and therefore the United States should attempt to use its influence to "broker an arrangement" between the Khomeini group and the leading military officers about the makeup of the new regime and on the role of the armed forces under it. Receiving no reply to his message, and believing his views were no longer welcome at the White House, Ambassador Sullivan, through talks on his own with the revolutionary leaders and the military, began to explore the possibility of acceptable post-Shah arrangements.

By the end of the first week of December 1978, reports reaching the White House on the disastrous crumbling of the Shah's support in Iran moved Carter to publicly urge the Shah to broaden the base of his government in an effort to restore its legitimacy. And the President, in response to questioning by the press, allowed himself to express some doubt about the Shah's ability to hang on to power unless he instituted a major effort to transform his regime into a constitutional monarchy with free elections and a decentralization of power.

Behind the scenes, a fierce debate raged among Carter's inner council of top foreign policy and national security advisers.

Brzezinski and James Schlesinger (Carter's Energy Secretary, and formerly Secretary of Defense under Nixon and Ford) wanted the President to make clear to the Shah that the

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<sup>340</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memories of the National Security Adviser 1977-81*, New York, Farrarand Strauss Press, 1983, p.358-378

United States encouraged and would back him in a major mobilization of the Iranian armed forces to put down civil disturbances, take over the provision of essential services, and root out and incarcerate subversive groups-in short, anything that was necessary to decisively smash the revolution.

Secretary Vance, on the other hand, felt the time had come for the President to distance the United States from the Shah. There was no saving him anymore, and he should be urged to leave the country. The United States should back a transition government that would be supported by the armed forces and could rely on them to restore public order and establish procedures for instituting a constitutional, popularly legitimized regime.

By the end of December, events in Iran appeared to validate the Vance approach. The Shah appointed Shahpour Bakhtiar, an opposition leader and former deputy minister in the Mossadegh government, to the post of Prime Minister. Bakhtiar's conditions were that he be allowed to release political prisoners, dissolve SAVAK, and reinstitute freedom of the press-and that the Shah should leave the country.

The announcement on December 29, 1978, of the Shah's appointment of Bakhtiar as Prime Minister was followed by great confusion and near chaos. The militant National Front, heady with the developing revolutionary situation, expelled Bakhtiar for being too willing to compromise. The Shah's spokesman denied that Reza Pahlevi had actually consented to leave Iran. Seemingly credible rumors were rife about coups being hatched by the right, the left, and various factions of the armed forces. And increasing attention-Iranian and international-was focused on the charismatic Khomeini to determine to whom he might throw his support. Ambassador Sullivan urged a meeting between U.S. officials and Khomeini, but Brzezinski vetoed the idea. Khomeini rejected the Bakhtiar government and himself named a shadow government with a religiously oriented leader of the National Front, Mehdi Bazargan, as its Prime Minister. Meanwhile the United States government had declared its support for Bakhtiar. Finally, on January 16, 1979, the Shah left for Egypt, telling Bakhtiar that his departure would result in a worsening of the situation and that the people would soon call him back to rule.

The White House, taking up some of the suggestions made by Ambassador Sullivan, appointed its own emissary to the Iranian military to negotiate their cooperation with the



new Bakhtiar regime. Brzezinski's designee for this mission was General Robert Huyserin deputy to General Alexander Haig, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who knew little about Iran. Ambassador Sullivan, however, continued to urge to no avail that Bakhtiar was despised by the Khomeini group, and that the crucial negotiations should be with them.

In the midst of this crumbling of the Bakhtiar regime, the Ayatollah Khomeini finally landed in Iran on February 1, 1979, and appointed Medhi Bazargan his Prime Minister. On February 11, the Army declared itself neutral. As revolutionary machine gunners began to close in around the prime ministerial office, Bakhtiar made good his escape and soon afterward fled the country. The Khomeinists were exultant, but obsessed with the idea that the United States was yet plotting a counter revolution to reinstall the Shah.<sup>341</sup> This Revolt Of 1979 was the Middle East's first, most important manifestation of this new challenge to both the traditional social elite and the West.<sup>342</sup>




Figure 3.13 Ayatollah Khomeini's arrival on February 1 and his first speech to the Iranian people.<sup>343</sup>

### 3.3.3 Hostage Crisis

#### 3.3.3.1 Events and Iranian Demands

The Iran hostage crisis was the events following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, a crisis that lasted over a year until January 20, 1981.

<sup>341</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.359-361

<sup>342</sup> David Wurmser, *Tyranny's Ally, America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*, The AEI Press, Washington DC., 1999, p.67

<sup>343</sup> James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1988, p.317

Iran's new dictator, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini instigated the crisis when on November 1, 1979 he urged his people to demonstrate on November 4 and to expand attacks on United States and Israeli interests. The embassy was seized by a mob of around 500 Iranian students, calling themselves the Imam's Disciples, part of a crowd of thousands gathered around the embassy in protest. The 90 occupants of the embassy were held and the 66 Americans were made prisoners. During the riot, six Americans escaped and fled to the Canadian Embassy in Iran. Mark Lijek, Cora Amburn Lijek, Joseph Stafford, Kathleen Stafford, Robert Anders and Henry Lee Schatz were then given take Canadian passports so they were able to leave the Canadian Embassy without being identified as Americans, after it had closed.<sup>344</sup>

This terrorist act triggered the most profound crisis of the Carter presidency and began a personal ordeal for Jimmy Carter and the American people that lasted 444 days.<sup>345</sup> Nineteen hostages were released within a few weeks; (the women and African-Americans amongst the group) the remaining fifty-two were held for 444 days.<sup>346</sup>



**Figure 3.14 Hostages in Iran<sup>347</sup>**

<sup>344</sup> Available on site: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran\\_hostage\\_crisis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis)

<sup>345</sup> "The Hostage Crisis in Iran", Available on site: <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/>

<sup>346</sup> "Iran Hostage Crisis", Available on site: <http://college.hmco.com/>

<sup>347</sup> Available on site: [http://www.specialoperations.com/Operations/Eagle\\_Claw/Default.htm](http://www.specialoperations.com/Operations/Eagle_Claw/Default.htm)

The students justified taking the hostages by claiming it was retaliation for the admission of Iran's deposed Shah, Pahlavi into the United States for Cancer treatments back in October. However, in actuality the hostage taking was less based around one specific event and was instead largely indicative of a more general decline in relations between the two countries following the February 1979 revolution. Khomeini was viciously anti-American in his rhetoric, denouncing the nation as the "Great Satan" and Americans as "infidels" and "enemies of Islam." The embassy had in fact been briefly seized once prior during the revolution.

The US President, Jimmy Carter, immediately applied economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran; he declares an embargo on imports of oil from Iran. All Iranian assets in the U.S. are frozen (11/12/1979).<sup>348</sup> Carter pledged himself to preserving the lives of the hostages but beyond the initial measures he could do little. Ruhollah Khomeini did, however, order the release of 13 female and black Americans on November 17, 1979.

In February 1980 the Iranian government issued a set of demands in return for freeing the hostages, they demanded the return of the shah to Iran and certain diplomatic gestures including an apology for prior American actions in Iran and a promise not to interfere in the future.<sup>349</sup>

### 3.3.3.2 Operation Eagle Claw

Political and economic pressure applied to both the Soviets and Iranians produced no results. On April 24, 1980, the United States finally attempted a hostage rescue mission. (*Operation Eagle Claw*)<sup>350</sup> On the night April 24-25, 1980, as the first part of the operation, a number of C-130 transporters rendezvoused with nine RH-53 helicopters at an airstrip in the Great Salt Desert of south-eastern Iran. Two helicopters broke down in a sandstorm and a third was damaged on landing. The mission was aborted but as the aircraft took off again one helicopter clipped a C-130 and crashed, killed eight US servicemen and

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<sup>348</sup> Available on site: <http://www.decades.com/>

<sup>349</sup> Available on site: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran\\_hostage\\_crisis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis)

<sup>350</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Ibid, p.296

injuring four or more. In the evacuation sufficient mission material was left behind for the Iranians to discover and later display to the world's media.<sup>351</sup>

Insufficient information and bad planning played a key role in the failure of the rescue. The planners had calculated that it would take the eight RC-53's four hours and twenty minutes to make the flight; it had taken five hours twenty minutes. The Air Weather Service had not been able to predict the low level dust storms that hampered the mission. If they had, some more low-level bad weather flight training might have made the flight easier and have prevented the fatal crash that killed eight people.

Also, the helicopter crews had been thrown together at the last minute after it was discovered that many of the Marine pilots lacked the skills necessary to complete the mission. It was a combination of Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots who flew the mission. In one case, unfamiliarity with the aircraft caused one pilot to ground the aircraft when it could have flown the mission.<sup>352</sup>



**Figure 3.15 Rescue Operation<sup>353</sup>**

<sup>351</sup> Available on site: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran\\_hostage\\_crisis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis)

<sup>352</sup> "Lessons Learned", Available on site: <http://www.specwarnet.com/miscinfo/eagleclaw.htm>

<sup>353</sup> Available on site: [http://www.specialoperations.com/Operations/Eagle\\_Claw/Default.htm](http://www.specialoperations.com/Operations/Eagle_Claw/Default.htm)

### 3.3.3 Resolving the Hostage Crisis

Near the end of the year, with Iran now fully engaged in a bitter war with Iraq, Teheran became more willing to end the hostage affair.<sup>354</sup> In the United States, failure to resolve the crisis contributed to Ronald Reagan's defeat of Carter in the presidential election. After the election, with the assistance of Algerian intermediaries, successful negotiations began. On Jan. 20, 1981, the day of President Reagan's inauguration, the United States released almost \$8 billion in Iranian assets and the hostages were freed after 444 days in Iranian detention; the agreement gave Iran immunity from lawsuits arising from the incident.<sup>355</sup>

### 3.4 IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES

*"I hope they kill each other. Too bad they both can't lose"*<sup>356</sup>

*Henry Kissinger*

The Iran-Iraq war was fought for nearly nine years, during which time both countries suffered millions of casualties and billions of dollars in damage. The collateral damage to the economies of other nations was also immense. The war was one of the most strategically important conflicts of modern times because it involved two major oil producers and the region where more than half the world's reserves are located.<sup>357</sup> It officially began on Sept. 22, 1980, with an Iraqi land and air invasion of western Iran, although Iraqi spokespersons maintained that Iran had been engaging in artillery attacks on Iraqi towns since Sept. 4. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein claimed as the reason for his attack on Iran a territorial dispute over the Shatt al Arab, a waterway that empties into the Persian Gulf and forms the boundary between Iran and Iraq. In 1975, a militarily weaker Iraq had by treaty signed over to Iran partial control of the waterway,<sup>358</sup> but after Iranian Revolution, Saddam primarily wanted to take advantage of Iranian military weakness and

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<sup>354</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Ibid, p.296

<sup>355</sup> The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition.2001, Available on site: <http://www.bartleby.com/65/ir/Iranhost.html>

<sup>356</sup> "Sanctions in Iraq and Genocide", Available on site: <http://www.dhushara.com/book/death/clark.htm>

<sup>357</sup> "The Iran-Iraq War, The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/>

<sup>358</sup> "Iran Iraq War", Available on site: <http://www.infoplease.com/>

political disarray to regain territory conceded to the Shah in the 1975.<sup>359</sup> Iraq also hoped to seize the western Iranian region of Khuzestan, an area known for its extensive oil fields. The Iraqi offensive was initially successful, capturing the port city of Khorramshahr by the end of 1980. Iranian resistance proved strong, however, and Iraqi troops had withdrawn from the occupied portions of Iran by early 1982. Nevertheless, Iranian leader Ruhollah Khomeini declared that Iran would not cease fighting until Saddam's regime was toppled. Iran began a series of offensives, which proved successful enough to cause Iraq to resort to the use of chemical weapons, a tactic reviled by the international community. Khomeini's troops captured the oil-rich Majnoon Islands from Iraq in Feb., 1984, and southern Iraq's Fao peninsula in early 1986. Sporadic air and missile attacks on cities and military installations were common throughout the war, and in 1985 both sides began to strike their opponent's capital. The United States and several Western European nations became involved in the War-In 1987, in response to Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers traveling in the Persian Gulf. These attacks sullied Iran's international reputation considerably, making it difficult for Khomeini to obtain arms. Finally, in July, 1988, Iran was forced to accept a United Nations-mandated cease-fire. Estimates of the number of dead ranged up to 1.5 million. In its war effort, Iran was supported by Syria and Libya, and received much of its weaponry from North Korea and China, as well as from covert arms transactions from the United States. Iraq enjoyed much wider support, both among Arab and Western nations: the Soviet Union was its largest supplier of arms. In 1990 Iraq, concerned with securing its forcible annexation of Kuwait, agreed to accept the terms of the 1975 treaty with Iran and withdraw its troops from Iranian territory as well as exchange all prisoners of war. An agreement was not signed, however, and both sides held thousands of POWs for many years. Several prisoner exchanges and releases occurred after 1988; the final exchange took place in 2003.<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>359</sup> Judith Yaphe, *The Legacy of Iraq's Past and the Promise of Its Future, The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.18

<sup>360</sup> "Iran-Iraq War", Available on site: <http://reference.allrefer.com/encyclopedia/>




Figure 3.16 Iran-Iraq War (Iraq and Iran front)<sup>361</sup>

### 3.4.1 Background

The Arabs and Persians (natives of Persia, mostly descendants from places other than Arabia) have been historical rivals dating back centuries. Iran and Iraq, while under British and Turkish rule, also had a number of border disputes. In particular, the two have disputed control of the Shatt al-Arab, the major waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan, and the Iraqi port of Basra.<sup>362</sup>

The borderlands between Iran and Iraq have never made any sense. Rather than defining any real ethnic homeland, the border merely marks where two expanding imperial dynasties - the Ottomans and Persians - ran into each other in the Sixteenth Century.<sup>363</sup> The first recorded treaty that involved the Shatt-al-Arab was The Peace Treaty of 1639 between the Persian and Ottoman Empires. This treaty established a border lacking in detail and conforming in large part to tribal loyalties. While this arrangement proved sufficient in most areas, this was not the case in the Shatt-al-Arab region. From the Persian perspective the waterway served as a natural border. However, the tribes on both sides were Arabs and thus the Turks viewed the entire area (both sides) as belonging to them. This led to the outbreak of hostilities in the 1800s and eventually yielded The Second Erzurum Treaty of 1847.<sup>364</sup> Even the break-up of the Ottoman Empire after World War One didn't improve matters much, as the non-Turkish provinces were turned over to the British and French as

<sup>361</sup> Available on site: <http://i-cias.com/e.o/iranirqw.htm>, Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2003, and Available on site: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/>

<sup>362</sup> "The Iran-Iraq War: The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>363</sup> "First Gulf War", Available on site: <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/iraniraq.htm>

<sup>364</sup> Brad Martsching, "Iran-Iraq War and Waterway Claims", Available on site: <http://www.american.edu/>

mandates under the League of Nations rather than formed into logical nation-states.<sup>365</sup> The dispute was not completely settled and disagreements continued over the next several decades. In 1975, a new agreement was reached whereby the midpoint of the Shatt was determined to be the boundary between the countries. By the end of the 1970's, both nations had reduced their dependence on the Shatt. Iraq had built new pipelines through Turkey and Syria, and it developed a new port and offshore oil-loading terminals in the Persian Gulf. Iran had built new oil facilities on Kharg Island in the Gulf. Still, key oil facilities of both nations were within artillery range of each other's armies.<sup>366</sup>

### 3.4.2 Muslim versus Muslim

A more important issue than geography was religion. Both nations are Muslim, with the leaders of Iraq primarily from the Sunni branch, and the Iranians, the Shiite. Prior to the Iranian revolution, the distinction between the countries was less religious than ideological. The ruling Ba'ath Party in Iraq was socialist and pro-Soviet, whereas the Iranian shah was anti-socialist (though certainly not democratic) and pro-Western.

The essentially secular Iraqi leadership became more of an issue after the Iranian revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini, who had spent part of his exile in Iraq (he was expelled in October 1978), began encouraging his former colleagues to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq because his regime was anti-Islamic. This was part of Khomeini's broader strategy of spreading the Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East. Saddam responded as he did to any challenge by a ruthless crackdown on Shiite fundamentalists and by sending aid to Arab separatists in Iran.<sup>367</sup>

### 3.4.3 Rivals for Power

Looking around the region at the end of the 1970s, Saddam also saw an opportunity to establish himself as the leader of the Arab world. The historic leader was the ruler of Egypt, but Anwar Sadat had been ostracized for making peace with Israel. The Gulf States had money, but were militarily weak. Syria was militarily strong, but financially weak.

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<sup>365</sup> "First Gulf War", Ibid

<sup>366</sup> "The Iran-Iraq War: The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>367</sup> Ibid



Iraq's primary competition for regional dominance was its neighbor Iran, and Iran seemed vulnerable because the revolution there had not yet ended. Khomeini was still in the process of becoming the unchallenged Iranian leader, but he had not solidified his power. The Iranian army was still in disarray and radical Marxists were still battling the religious fundamentalists in parts of the country. From Saddam's vantage point, the timing seemed right to make a move.

The exact beginning of the war and its cause is difficult to pinpoint. One of the earliest clashes occurred in June 1979, when Iraqi aircraft attacked Iranian villages that were believed to be supporting Khomeini-backed Kurdish rebels.

For the next several months, Iran sought to undermine Saddam by encouraging protests by Shiites. Both countries supported rebel movements against the other, and the Iranian-backed rebel group Al Dawaa attempted to assassinate the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on April 1, 1980. Saddam outlawed the group, deported large numbers of Iraqis who'd been born in Iran, and executed one of the Shiite clerics who'd led the protests against his regime. Khomeini then began to publicly call for the overthrow of Saddam. Finally, in June 1980, the two nations severed relations.

Between June and September 1980, 193 clashes occurred along the Iran-Iraq border. On September 17, Iraq abrogated the 1975 treaty and proclaimed the Shatt "a national river." As Iraq mobilized Arab allies, Iran warned the Gulf States they would be overthrown if they supported Saddam. Tensions built, until a series of clashes occurred in early September along the border near Qasr e-Shirin. Each nation blamed the other for the fighting. Saddam threatened to seize territory he said Iran was supposed to transfer to Iraq under an earlier agreement, but Khomeini refused to give up the disputed lands. Sporadic fighting finally culminated in Iraq's invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980.<sup>368</sup>

#### **3.4.4 Allies Choose Sides**

Given the perceived importance of the outcome, third parties aligned with one or the other in hopes of influencing the fighting. Iran's principal ally was Syria, which used its military to periodically divert Iraqi forces from the Iranian front. Syrian President Hafez Assad also

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<sup>368</sup> Ibid

closed a key Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean that affected Saddam Hussein's income. Libya, China, and North Korea all sent weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran.




Figure 3.17 Supporters of the war<sup>369</sup>

The most unlikely country to support Iran was Israel, given that the revolutionary government had replaced the country's longstanding alliance with an obsessive and hostile anti-Zionism. Still, the Israelis did provide some arms to their Iranian enemies. Why?

Two main reasons:

- One is that Israel often subscribes to the Middle East dictum, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” and Iraq was viewed as a more immediate danger.
- A large number of Jews remained in Iran, and the Israelis hoped to essentially buy their safety while covert and not-so-covert efforts were undertaken throughout the war to get Iranian Jews out of the country.

Iraq's support came primarily from the Gulf States, which that viewed Iran as the greater danger to their security.<sup>370</sup> The need for arms and money would make Baghdad more dependent on the conservative Gulf States and Egypt, thereby moderating Iraq's policies

<sup>369</sup> “First Gulf War”, Available on site: <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/iraniraq.htm>

<sup>370</sup> Ibid

and helping to repair ties between Cairo and the other Arab states.<sup>371</sup> Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, closest to the battlefield, were the most involved in providing immediate material support to Baghdad,<sup>372</sup> Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each provided billions of dollars in loans and grants. Egypt and Jordan provided some weapons and supplies. The United States, France, and the Soviet Union also sided with the Iraqis.<sup>373</sup>

When the war first broke out, the Soviet Union turned back its arms ships en route to Iraq, and for the next year and a half, while Iraq was on the offensive, Moscow did not provide weapons to Baghdad.<sup>374</sup> In March 1981, the Iraqi Communist Party, repressed by Saddam Hussein, beamed broadcasts from the Soviet Union calling for an end to the war and the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. That same month U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he saw the possibility of improved ties with Baghdad and approvingly noted that Iraq was concerned by “the behavior of Soviet imperialism in the Middle Eastern area.” The U.S. then approved the sale to Iraq of five Boeing jetliners, and sent a deputy assistant secretary of state to Baghdad for talks.<sup>375</sup> In 1982 the United States had removed Iraq from its list of countries considered supportive of international terrorism.<sup>376</sup> (Despite the fact that terrorist Abu Nidal was based in the country)<sup>377</sup> High-level American officials began to visit Baghdad in late 1983<sup>378</sup> and Washington extended a \$400 million credit guarantee for U.S. exports to Iraq.<sup>379</sup> In

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<sup>371</sup> Stephen R. Shalom, “The United States And The Iran-Iraq War”, Available on site: <http://www.zmag.org/>

<sup>372</sup> F. Gregor Gause III, *The Arabian Peninsula Monarchies from Camp David I, The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.66

<sup>373</sup> “The Iran-Iraq War: The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Middle East Conflict”, Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>374</sup> John W. Amos II, “The Iraq-Iran War: Conflict, Linkage, and Spillover in the Middle East,” in *Gulf Security into the 1980s: Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions*, ed. Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, Ralph H. Magnus, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1984, p.65.

<sup>375</sup> Robert O. Freedman, “Soviet Policy Toward the Persian Gulf from the Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War to the Death of Konstantin Chernenko,” in *U.S. Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region*, ed. Wm. J. Olson, Boulder: West view, 1987, p.55

<sup>376</sup> James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1988, p.306

<sup>377</sup> Freedman, *Soviet Policy*, p.63, and *New York Times*, 10 Nov. 1982, p.5.

<sup>378</sup> James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1988, p.306

<sup>379</sup> Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, U.S. Ready to Intervene in the Gulf War, *MERIP Reports*, nos. 125/126, July-Sept. 1984, p.45.

November 1984, the U.S. and Iraq restored diplomatic relations, which had been ruptured in 1967.<sup>380</sup>

### 3.4.5 Rooting for a Draw

One of the major concerns throughout the Iran-Iraq war was that one of the nations would win a convincing victory and emerge as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. This would threaten the security of the weaker nations in the region and ultimately the economic security of the Western nations (and Asian countries such as Japan) that depend on Gulf oil. The United States therefore had an interest in seeing the two countries engage in a protracted, inconclusive war that left both worse off than when they started.

Iraq did the best in the initial fighting, seizing a large swath of territory in southern Iran, and besieging Abadan and Khorramshahr. But the tide of the war began to turn in mid-1981, when Iran broke the siege of Abadan and later recaptured Khorramshahr.<sup>381</sup> In May 1982, an Iranian counterattack restored the antebellum border, and shifted the momentum of the conflict.<sup>382</sup> By June 1982, the Iraqis had been driven completely out of Iran. From that point on, Iraq spent most of the war on the defensive.

Saddam offered to end the war, but Khomeini was not satisfied with having fended off the invaders; he now was determined to exact vengeance on Iraq by demanding reparations for the damage the attack had caused; he also wanted to see the overthrow of Saddam. Not surprisingly, Khomeini's demands were rejected.

In the summer of 1982, Iran launched its own offensive, attacking the Iraqi port of Basra. The Iranians appeared on the verge of a breakthrough, but the Iraqi forces held, and the fighting settled into a war of attrition. Still, Basra was closed, and Iraq was denied access

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<sup>380</sup> James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1988, p.307 and *War in the Persian Gulf: The U.S. Takes Sides*, Staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Nov. 1987, Committee Print S. Prt. 100-60, p.21-22

<sup>381</sup> "The Iran-Iraq War, : The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>382</sup> "First Gulf War", Available on site: <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/iraniraq.htm>

to the Gulf, severely restricting its commerce and, ultimately, the living conditions of the people.<sup>383</sup>

### 3.4.6 The United States No Position

The United States did not have diplomatic relations with either belligerent in 1980 and announced its neutrality in the conflict. For the first two years of the war, America took a position of strict neutrality. With the successful Iranian military campaigns of 1982 and the subsequent offenses against Iraq, policymakers began to fear an outright Iranian victory.<sup>384</sup> One typically humanitarian State Department official explained in 1983: “we don’t give a damn as long as the Iran-Iraq carnage does not affect our allies in the region or alter the balance of power.”<sup>385</sup> But a substantial body of diplomatic opinion believes that the American government has consistently “tilted” in favor of Iraq throughout the war despite its public proclamation of “neutrality.”<sup>386</sup> In fact, the United States was not indifferent to the war, but saw a number of positive opportunities opened up by its prolongation. Policymakers definitely did not want Iran to emerge victorious. The consensus was that Khomeini was a serious threat to the stability of the region and to U.S. vital interests, notably oil supplies and Israeli security.

On the other hand, Saddam was viewed as a psychopath backed by the Soviet Union who was less of a threat to American interests, but certainly no friend. Thus, the policy that emerged was to support the pro-Western regimes in the region, bolster their defenses, and hope the combatants weakened each other to the point where neither would emerge from the war as a regional threat to the region.

### 3.4.7 Arms to the Iran and Watergate Scandal

In the midst of the war, the United States changed its position and unexpectedly helped the Iranians. In 1985, the Reagan Administration agreed to secretly sell weapons to Iran to win support for the freeing of American hostages being held by terrorists in Lebanon. The

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<sup>383</sup> “The Iran-Iraq War, : The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Middle East Conflict”, Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>


<sup>384</sup> James A. Bill, Ibid, 1988, p.306

<sup>385</sup> Time, 25 July 1983

<sup>386</sup> Francis A. Boyle, “US Foreign Policy Toward the Iran/Iraq War”, Available on site: <http://www.counterpunch.org/boyle1214.html>

principal negotiator on the U.S. side was Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a military aide to the National Security Council, who reported his activities to the National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and his successor John Poindexter.<sup>387</sup>

The main tool by which U.S. policy makers sought to secure their position in Iran in 1985 and 1986 was secretly providing arms and intelligence information. As a proclaimed neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States was not supposed to supply weapons to either side. Nevertheless, US allies kept the combatants well-stocked.<sup>388</sup> Israel transferred vast quantities of U.S.-origin weapons to Iran;<sup>389</sup> to what extent U.S. permission for these shipments was obtained (as required by US law) is not known, but surely the U.S. had enough leverage to prevent the transfers if it had wanted to.



**Figure 3.18 Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North<sup>390</sup>**

In 1984, because of Iranian battlefield victories and the growing U.S.-Iraqi ties, Washington launched “Operation Staunch,” an effort to dry up Iran’s sources of arms by pressuring U.S. allies to stop supplying Teheran. U.S. secret arms sales to Iran in 1985 and 1986 thus not only violated U.S. neutrality, but undercut as well what the U.S. was trying

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<sup>387</sup> “The Iran-Iraq War: The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Middle East Conflict”, Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>388</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87*, Jane’s Publishing Co., London, 1987, p.23-36.

<sup>389</sup> Leslie H. Gelb, "Iran Said to Get Large-Scale Arms From Israel, Soviet and Europeans," *New York Times*, 8 Mar. 1982, p.A1,A10

<sup>390</sup> James a. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, Yale University Pres, New Haven and London, 1998, p.316-317

to get everyone else to do. The cynical would note that Operation Staunch made the U.S. arms transfers to Iran that much more valuable.

When this arms dealing became known, the Reagan administration was faced with a major scandal on several counts. Proceeds from the arms sales had been diverted to the Nicaraguan contras in violation of the Boland Amendment. And though the administrations professed uncompromising stand on terrorism was always hypocritical, given its sponsorship of terrorism in Nicaragua and elsewhere, being caught trading “arms-for-hostages” was particularly embarrassing. The administration skillfully exploited the public’s infatuation with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a mastermind of the Iran-contra scam.<sup>391</sup>

Now, in fact, this would not have been the first time the U.S. offered Teheran arms for hostages. In October 1980 the Carter administration had declared that spare parts for U.S. military equipment could be sold to Iran if the U.S. embassy hostages were released promptly.<sup>392</sup> There was even talk among U.S. officials about pre-positioning some spare parts in Germany, Pakistan, and Algeria so that the Iranians could get the equipment as soon as possible.<sup>393</sup> Republicans charged that Carter was trying to buy the hostages out in time for the election; there is some evidence that the Republicans in the meantime were engaged in an election maneuver of their own: negotiating with Iran to keep the hostages until after the election to ensure a Reagan victory.<sup>394</sup>

Whatever the arguments for purchasing the freedom of hostages, trading weapons to obtain their release is another matter entirely, since one is exchanging for the lives of some hostages the lives of those who will be fired on by the weapons. And trading weapons for “a strategic opening” is more reprehensible still, particularly so when the weapons are going to the country whose army is on the offensive. Reagan claimed that the weapons were all defensive in nature, but this is nonsense. Anti-tank missiles in the hands of an advancing army are offensive. And U.S. officials knew exactly what Iran wanted the weapons for: for example, as the Tower Commission noted, North and CIA officials

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<sup>391</sup> Richard A. Malanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War*, Second Edition, St Martin’s Press, 1996, p.179

<sup>392</sup> Murray Gordon ed., *Conflict in the Persian Gulf*, New York: Facts on File, 1981, p.163.

<sup>393</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1987, p.504

<sup>394</sup> Christopher Hitchens, *Nation*, 20 June 1987

discussed with their Iranian contacts “Iran’s urgent need” for “both intelligence and weapons to be used in offensive operations against Iraq.”<sup>395</sup>

The intelligence that the United States passed to the Iranians was a mixture of factual and bogus information. The CIA claimed that the false information was meant to discourage Iran’s final offensive, by for example exaggerating Soviet troop movements on the northern border.<sup>396</sup> But if the US simply wanted to discourage an Iranian attack, it could have done this more easily by telling Iran of Washington’s contingency plans to use U.S. air power in the event of an Iranian breakthrough against Iraq.<sup>397</sup> The misinformation about the Soviet Union, however, had the added advantage of inciting Iranian hostility to Moscow and to the local communists.

US intelligence did not deal only with the Soviet Union, but covered the Iraqi front as well. CIA deputy director John McMahon claimed that he warned Poindexter that such intelligence would give the Iranians “a definite edge,” with potentially “cataclysmic results,” and that he was able to persuade North to provide Iran with only a segment of the intelligence.<sup>398</sup> North, however, apparently gave critical data to Iran just before its crucial victory in the Fao Peninsula in February 1986.<sup>399</sup> It is unclear to what extent North was acting on his own here, but it is significant that despite McMahon’s warnings, neither Poindexter nor CIA Director Casey reversed the plans to provide the Iranians with the full intelligence information.<sup>400</sup>

At the same time that the US was giving Teheran weapons that one CIA analyst believed could affect the military balance<sup>401</sup> and passing on intelligence that the Tower Commission deemed of “potentially major significance,”<sup>402</sup> it was also providing Iraq with intelligence

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<sup>395</sup> President’s Special Review Board, *The Tower Commission Report*, Bantam Books/Times Books, New York, 1987, p.48

<sup>396</sup> President’s Special Review Board, *Ibid*, p.427

<sup>397</sup> Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, “U.S. Ready to Intervene in the Gulf War,” *MERIP Reports*, nos. 125/126, July-Sept. 1984, p.47-48

<sup>398</sup> President’s Special Review Board, *The Tower Commission Report*, Bantam Books/Times Books, New York, 1987, p.239-240

<sup>399</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87*, Jane’s Publishing Co., London, 1987, p.38

<sup>400</sup> President’s Special Review Board, *The Tower Commission Report*, Bantam Books/Times Books, New York, 1987, p.239-240

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid*, p.279

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid*, p.73



information, some misleading or incomplete.<sup>403</sup> In 1986, the CIA established a direct Washington-to-Baghdad link to provide the Iraqis with faster intelligence from U.S. satellites. Simultaneously, Casey was urging Iraqi officials to carry out more attacks on Iran, especially on economic targets.<sup>404</sup> Asked what the logic was of aiding both sides in a bloody war, a former official replied, "You had to have been there."<sup>405</sup>

### 3.4.8 The Final Battle

In 1987 and 1988, Khomeini continued to threaten a "final" offensive against Iraq, but none of these changed the situation on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the tanker war continued unabated.

On July 3, 1988, the US's Vincennes was patrolling the northern portion of the Straits of Hormuz. A group of Iranian gunboats had been threatening a Pakistani merchant vessel and one fired on the Vincennes. During the confrontation with the gunboats, the Vincennes picked up an aircraft on radar moving in its direction. The plane didn't respond to the ship's warnings, so the Vincennes fired a missile, bringing the plane down. It turned out to be an Iran Air commercial jet carrying 290 people; who all died in the crash. The Iranians claimed it was an intentional act, but President Reagan said it was a terrible accident, apologized and offered to pay compensation to the victims.

By August 1988, both the Iranians and Iraqis were growing weary of war. Both economies were in shambles, and it was clear a conclusive military result was impossible for either side.<sup>406</sup> In the summer of 1988, Iraq enjoyed great success on the battlefield, in which the Iranians suffered four significant defeats. In the end, Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 958, which led to a cease fire on August 20, 1988.<sup>407</sup> A major factor in

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<sup>403</sup> Stephen Engelberg, Iran and Iraq Got 'Doctored Data, U.S. Officials Say, New York Times, 12 Jan. 1987, p. A1, A6.

<sup>404</sup> Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1987, p.480

<sup>405</sup> Stephen Engelberg, *Ibid*

<sup>406</sup> "The Iran-Iraq War: The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>407</sup> "Iran-Iraq War", Available on site: <http://www.idf.il/iraq/english/info03.stm>, and Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Available on site: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/iran-iraq.htm>

the decision to end the war was the Iraqi use of poison gas, a factor that sapped the morale of the Iranian troops and the civilian population.<sup>408</sup>

Paradoxically, two years later, after Iraq invaded Kuwait (which had previously been more concerned about an Iranian attack), Saddam agreed to withdraw all his troops from Iranian territory, share control of the Shatt al-Arab (he had previously insisted on Iraqi control), and exchange prisoners. The two countries then resumed diplomatic relations.

No one is sure of the total casualties during the Iran-Iraq war, but estimates range from 500,000 to 1 million dead, 1-2 million wounded, and more than 80,000 prisoners. There were approximately 2.5 million refugees, and whole cities were destroyed. The financial cost is estimated at a minimum of \$200 billion.<sup>409</sup>

### 3.4.9 A Draw

The Iran-Iraq war ended at the end of eight years with neither country having gained a clear advantage.<sup>410</sup> The war would be extremely costly, one of the deadliest wars since the Second World War-In terms of casualties. It is surpassed only by conflicts such as the Vietnam War, Korean War and the War-In the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. While figures vary wildly, roughly a million people are estimated to have died.<sup>411</sup>

The border disputes were not resolved. Both autocrats remained in power and had shored up their internal support, but had lost influence outside their countries. Both countries suffered devastating loses of men, materiel, and financial resources. Nevertheless, Iraq emerged from the war with roughly one million men under arms, 500 combat aircraft, and 5,500 tanks, the nucleus of the force that would fight the U.S.-led coalition in the next Gulf war.

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<sup>408</sup> Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat, "Chemical Warfare In The Iraq-Iran War", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Available on site: <http://projects.sipri.se/>

<sup>409</sup> "The Iran-Iraq War, : The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict", Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

<sup>410</sup> Brad Martsching, "Iran-Iraq War and Waterway Claims", Available on site: <http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/>

<sup>411</sup> Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Available on site: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_War)

Despite the long war and its high cost, both Khomeini and Saddam continued to pursue their foreign policy agendas, and, within a couple of years, were fomenting instability elsewhere in the region. In the case of Iran, its revolutionaries continued to threaten the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia. The terrorists it sponsored persisted in their efforts to undermine Western interests and menace Israel, particularly from the Lebanese border. Iraq rebuilt its forces and launched another invasion, this time of Kuwait, in August 1990.<sup>412</sup>



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<sup>412</sup> “The Iran-Iraq War: The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Middle East Conflict”, Available on site: <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html>

## 4. OPERATIONS DESERT WAR AND ROLE OF NEW WORLD ORDER POLICY

### 4.1 THE NEW WORLD ORDER

*“Let me assure you, the United States has no intention of striving for a Pax Americana...We seek a Pax Universals built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations.”*

*George Bush*

#### 4.1.1 The Effect of Gulf War

During the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, George Bush found a need for “the vision thing”-his disparaging term for the idealistic appeals politicians sometimes have to make to garner support. He needed it to help overcome the arguments from many quarters (including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) that Saddam Hussein’s forcible annexation of Kuwait did not pose a sufficient threat to vital U.S. interests to justify going to war. Saddam couldn’t drink the additional oil he now controlled in Kuwait; if he charged too high a price, the industrial world could purchase its energy supplies elsewhere. Deter him from trying to grab control of Saudi oil (the justification for “Desert Shield”), but why sacrifice American blood and treasure to compel him to withdraw from Kuwait?

The President knew that his early determination to reverse Iraq’s aggression was not just visceral, or a personal reaction to having been diddled and defied by the Iraqi dictator. Nor was it that, having publicly declared “this shall not stand,” to let it stand would revive all of the “wimp” allegations. It was much more than any of these things, but as usual it was difficult for Bush to find the right concepts to express his larger view of the matter.

When Margaret Thatcher reminded that failure of the Western democracies to stand up to Germany prior to World War-II, he compared Saddam to Hitler. And then there was Truman committing the United States to reverse the North Korean invasion of South Korea. But Iraq was no Third Reich and Kuwait was no democratic Czechoslovakia; nor was this a case anymore of a proxy or client of America’s superpower rival expanding the patron’s sphere of control. Something else was at stake: the rules of the game, the world

order-the rules of international behavior for the post-Cold War era the world was now entering-the new world order.<sup>413</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Homilies in Search of a Substantive Core

In introducing the concept of a “new world order” to explain his overarching objectives in the Gulf, Bush presented a loose conglomeration of preachments that failed to distinguish the new world order from any of the usual goals of statecraft that are equally embraced in the rhetoric of democrats and despots, conservatives and radicals, imperialists and defenders of the status quo alike. The “new world order,” he told a joint session of Congress on September 11, 1990, was to be “a new era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world... can prosper and live in harmony... Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle... A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice... A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak...”<sup>414</sup>

At the end of the Gulf War, returning to address the Congress, he claimed to be able to see a new world coming into view-”In the words of Winston Churchill, a world orders in which “the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.”<sup>415</sup> A world where the United Nations freed from cold war stalemate-is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights finds a home among all nations, The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed that test.”<sup>416</sup>

Amorphous as it was, Bush’s new world order, when peeled back to its core-as revealed in his policy decisions and their more immediate justifications-was a revival of the old world order: the state-sovereignty system and its associated norms, which had been submerged

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<sup>413</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.561-562

<sup>414</sup> George Bush, address before joint Session of the Congress, September 11 1990, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 26(37): p.1359

<sup>415</sup> “What is New World Order”, Available on site: <http://www.storyofpakistan.com/>

<sup>416</sup> George Bush, address before joint Session of the Congress, on cessation of the Persian Gulf conflict, March 6, 1991, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 27(10), p.259

for some four decades into the supranational coalitions organized by the Cold War superpowers.

With roots extending back three centuries, the traditional system now manifesting itself as the new world order emphasized the sovereign equality of states, the sanctity of state borders, and noninterference by states in each other's domestic affairs. It was an elitist order run, as ever, by and for the great powers-sometimes in informal concert (as in the Group of Seven industrial powers), sometimes through membership in international agencies (as in the United Nations Security Council, the international Monetary Fund, and the World Bank), and sometimes unilaterally. To the rest of the world it might appear that this world order contained a double standard: the sovereignty and borders of the great powers could never be violated; but the weaker powers were subject to intervention, albeit intervention authorized by the international agencies controlled by the great powers-yes, there might be occasions for such apparent compromises with the principle of the sovereign equality of states, but these would only be for the purpose of upholding the norms of the system itself against radical states and movements attempting to overthrow the legitimate order.

Bush identified Saddam Hussein's violation of the sovereign independence of Kuwait as the first major test to the new-revived old-world order. All necessary means could and should be used to restore the independence of Kuwait. But actually Bush was describing only the first half of the test. The second half came at the end of Desert Storm when the United States forces, having pushed the Iraqis back out of Kuwait, were ready to move on toward Baghdad, and Bush said no. This was followed during successive weeks and months by another test in the form of appeals from the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites to the United States to intervene on their behalf against the brutal repression they were suffering at the hands of Saddam's forces. In each of these situations, Bush was true to his view that the rights and obligations of states toward one another were the essence of world order. Whereas how governments treated the people within their jurisdictions was, except in cases of actual or virtual genocide, normally their own business.

But, characteristically, he was not always consistent in acting according to the precepts of this world order philosophy. Success in the world of statecraft as well as in domestic politics often required the subordination of principle to prudence.<sup>417</sup>

## 4.2 IRAQ INVASION OF KUWAIT

### 4.2.1 US-Iraq Relations before War

As Saddam Hussein escalated his verbal threats and deployed his forces on the Kuwaiti border in late July 1990, President Bush and other US officials communicated their concerns in bland language couched in reassurances that the geopolitical interests the United States shared with Iraq in the region still constituted the controlling reality for Washington.

Saddam's impression that the United States considered Iraq a geopolitical partner had been nurtured in Washington throughout the 1980s. The common view among US strategists was that Iraq's September 1980 reopening of its war with Iran had been the crucial determinant of Teheran's decision to settle the embassy hostage conflict with the United States. With the Khomeini regime in Teheran having become Washington's new bete noire in the Middle East, the US government did what it could to assure that Iraq would win its war with Iran and emerge from that War-In a superior economic and military position. In 1982, the Department of State removed Iraq from its list of terrorist countries, so that it could qualify for US aid and credits. In 1984 full diplomatic relations (severed in the 1950s when Iraq became a Soviet client state) were reestablished between Washington and Baghdad. The White House encouraged its allies to sell Iraq conventional arms and high-technology equipment which Saddam used to develop ballistic missiles and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A dramatic indication of how determined the Reagan administration was to secure Iraq as a counterweight to Iran was the mild reaction by the White House to the mistaken launching of a missile from an Iraqi jet aircraft against (the US's. Stark (which killed thirty-seven US sailors and nearly sunk the ship)).<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>417</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.562-564

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid*, p.534

When President George Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, assumed control of U.S. foreign policy on 20 January 1989, they evidently believed that America's recent military clash with Iran and Saddam Hussein's need for Western help in rebuilding Iraq's war-torn economy would ensure better relations between Washington and Baghdad.<sup>419</sup> By the time of George Bush's inauguration in 1989, trade between the United States and Iraq had grown to \$3.6 billion a year. Despite allegations that Iraqi forces had used chemical warfare against the secessionist Kurds, reports of the worsening human rights situation in Iraq, and growing suspicions during 1989 that Iraq was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, President Bush resisted congressional efforts to get tough with Saddam Hussein.<sup>420</sup> As early as January 1989 a State Department transition team had suggested that "the lessons of war (with Iran) may have changed Iraq from a radical state challenging the system to a more responsible, status-quo state working within the system, and promoting stability in the region."<sup>421</sup> An Iraqi-American business connection had meanwhile been greatly facilitated by Kissinger Associates, according to the BNL<sup>422</sup> Blunder., by Kenneth Timmerman. In addition, despite incriminating information in the hands of the FBI, President Bush in October 1989 signed National Security Decision Directive 26, mandating more economic and political incentives supposedly to change the behavior of Iraq.<sup>423</sup> In January 1990 Bush signed an executive order certifying that it would be against the national interest of the United States to halt Export-import Bank loans to Iraq.<sup>424</sup>

The developing cordiality in US relations with Iraq was temporarily interrupted in April 1990, when Saddam made the speech in which he threatened to "burn half of Israel". The State Department then proposed sanctions against Iraq, including cutting off US export-import bank credits and credit for Iraqi purchases of US grain. However, many grain-state Congressmen, together with the Department of Commerce, "complained that curtailing Export-Import credits would hurt US businesses. Officials also argued that ending commodity credits would harm US rice growers." The capitalists' greed for quick profits clouded the thinking

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<sup>419</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.253

<sup>420</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.535

<sup>421</sup> Bruce W. Jentlesen, *With Friends like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990*, Norton Press, New York, 1994, p.98

<sup>422</sup> Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) : the second-largest bank in Italy and almost completely owned by the Italian government -- offered Iraq a \$100 million credit line for the purchase of U.S. grain

<sup>423</sup> William P. Hoar, "Making of a Monster: How the U.S. Helped Build Iraq's War Machine", *The New American*, Vol. 8, No. 18, September 7, 1992

<sup>424</sup> Jean Edward Smith, *George Bush's War*, Holt Press, New York, 1992, p.44-45



of their political representatives. As late as June, (said a Washington diplomat), “many US officials saw Iraq mainly as a strong market for American products - and one of the few remaining nations in which US technology is preferred to Japanese”.<sup>425</sup> (Iraq was the ninth largest customer for U.S. agricultural products.)<sup>426</sup>

#### **4.2.2 Iraq’s Demands from Kuwait**

On July 16, foreign minister Tariq Aziz, in a letter to the Arab League, accused the Gulf States of conspiring with the United States to hold down oil prices in a scheme to undermine Iraqi economic recovery, and denounced Kuwait for stealing oil from the Rumaila field that straddled the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, insisted that the thievery cease, and that Kuwait pay 2.4 Billion dollar in compensation. Aziz further demanded that the gulf Arabs forgive Iraq’s 30 billion dollar debt; called for the establishment of an Arab “Marshall Plan” to reconstruct Iraq; and demanded support in OPEC for an Iraqi plan to push the price of oil up to 25 dollar a barrel. The next day, July 17, Iraqi Independence Day, Saddam Hussein himself attacked Kuwait and the Emirates, accusing them of conspiring with the Americans and the Zionist. He warned: “If words fail to afford us protection, then we will have no choice but to resort effective action to put things right and ensure the restitution of our rights”<sup>427</sup>

Kuwait resisted the Iraqi demands, not believing Saddam would actually carry out his threats. Arabs like to think of themselves as one large nation and no Arab state had ever invaded another in the modern era. The Kuwait Government made no real effort to prepare militarily for the attack or request American military assistance.<sup>428</sup>

#### **4.2.3 Invasion of Kuwait**

When Iraq began to openly threaten military action against Kuwait in mid-July, 1990, the reaction of the Bush administration is ambiguous. Secretary of Defense Cheney told reporter July 19 that American commitments, made during the Iran-Iraq War, to come to

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<sup>425</sup> Wall Street Journal, 2 October 1990

<sup>426</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.535

<sup>427</sup> Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf*, Free Press, Toronto, 1992, p.153

<sup>428</sup> “War and Social Upheaval: Iraq-Invasion of Kuwait (1990-91)”, Available on site: <http://histclo.hispeed.com/essay/war/iraq/war-kuwait.html>

Kuwait's defense were still valid; and on July 23, the administration ordered its naval vessels in the region to engage in joint exercises with the United Arab Emirates. But on July 24 Department of State spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler told reporters that "we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait."<sup>429</sup> On July 25, US Ambassador April Glaspie met with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein<sup>430</sup> and in essence he told the U.S. envoy that this was an inter-Arab problem and warned the United States not to intervene diplomatically or politically. He was willing to guarantee the United States all the oil it wanted (but as he revealed later, he believed the United States were still responding to the Vietnam War,<sup>431</sup> and believed that neither the West nor his Arab neighbors would militarily oppose an invasion.<sup>432</sup>) Following instructions from Secretary of State James Baker, Glaspie an Arabic-speaking career Foreign Service officer who had first been posted to the Persian Gulf during the late 1960s, assured Saddam that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."<sup>433</sup> But when Congressman Lee Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat who chaired the House Subcommittee on the Middle East, asked months later whether she had ever told Saddam Hussein that "if you go across the line into Kuwait, we are going to fight" Glaspie replied with a twinge of regret, "No, I did not."<sup>434</sup>

Two days later, with intelligence agencies reporting a huge build up of Iraqi troops just across the border from Kuwait, President Bush sent a mildly worded cable to Saddam emphasizing his desire for improved relations and advising that Iraq's disputes with Kuwait be resolved peaceably. Defense Department officials tried to toughen up the tepid presidential message, but to no avail. Only three paragraphs long, the cable as dispatched read:

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<sup>429</sup> Jean Edward Smith, *George Bush's War*, Holt Press, New York, 1992, p.52-57

<sup>430</sup> Available on site: <http://www.ibiblio.org/slanews/internet/iraq.htm>

<sup>431</sup> Judith Yaphe, *The Legacy of Iraq's Past and the Promise of Its Future, The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, University Press of Florida, 2002, p.25

<sup>432</sup> Charles Recknagle, *Iraq: U.S. Ambassador Analyzes Invasion Of Kuwait*, (An interview of David Newton with David Mack), Available on site: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/08/F.RU.990802124627.html>

<sup>433</sup> William P. Hoar, "Making of a Monster: How the U.S. Helped Build Iraq's War Machine", *The New American*, Vol. 8, No. 18, September 7, 1992 and Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2002, p.254

<sup>434</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.255

“I was pleased to learn of the agreement between Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations in Jeddah to find a peaceful solution to the current tensions between you. The United States and Iraq both have a strong interest in preserving the peace and stability of the Middle East. For this reason, we believe that differences are best resolved by peaceful means and not by threats involving military force or conflict.

I also welcome your statement that Iraq desires friendship, rather than confrontation with the United States. Let me reassure you, as my Ambassador, Senator Dole and others have done, that my administration continues to desire better relations with Iraq. We will also continue to support our other friends in the region with whom we have had longstanding ties. We see no necessary inconsistency between these two objectives.

As you know, we still have fundamental concerns about certain Iraqi policies and activities, and we will continue to raise these concerns with you in a spirit of friendship and candor, as we have in the past both to gain a better understanding of your interests and intentions and to ensure that you understand our concerns. I completely agree that both our Governments must maintain open channels of communication to avoid misunderstanding and in order to build a more durable foundation for improving our relations.”<sup>435</sup>

On 30 July Patrick Lang, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst monitoring the Persian Gulf, warned his boss that Iraq had massed more than 100,000 troops plus hundreds of howitzers, tanks, and helicopters along its southern border, giving Baghdad “the capability to overrun all of Kuwait and all of Eastern Saudi Arabia” with dramatic suddenness. “In short, Saddam Hussein has moved a force disproportionate to the task at hand, if it is to bluff,” Lang concluded. “Then there is only one answer: he intends to use it.”<sup>436</sup>

On July 31, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John Kelly, testifying before the Middle East subcommittee of the House foreign affairs committee, was asked about Secretary of Defense Cheney’s July 19 statement to reporters about U.S. commitments to Kuwait. Secretary Kelly’s answer must have reassured Saddam: “I’m not familiar with the quotation that you just referred to, but I am confident in the

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<sup>435</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “Pentagon Objected to a Message Bush Sent Iraq Before Its Invasion”, New York Times, October 25, 1992

<sup>436</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2002, p.255

administration's policy on the issue: We have no defense relationship with any Gulf country. This is clear." Kelly was pressed by the committee chairman to clarify what the U.S. policy would be in the event that "Iraq, for example, charged across the border into Kuwait... in that circumstance...is [it] correct to say . . . that we do not have a treaty commitment which would obligate us to engage U.S. forces there?" The Secretary confirmed that the United States did not have a treaty commitment to cover that circumstance.<sup>437</sup>

Just before dawn on 2 August 1990, an army of some 100,000 Iraqi troops supported by tanks stormed into Kuwait and within twenty-four hours, organized armed resistance had ended and the entire country was in Iraqi hands.<sup>438</sup> Secretary of State Baker, in the Soviet Union conferring with Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze, got the Soviets to cooperate with the United States in pushing a resolution through the United Nations Security Council at 6 A. M. on August 2 condemning the invasion and demanding "that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990."<sup>439</sup>

### **4.3 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND USE OF FORCE OPTIONS AGAINST TO SADDAM REGIME**

#### **4.3.1 The Commitment to Reverse Iraq Aggression**

The Bush administration had been caught completely off guard by news of the invasion. Before convening the National Security Council early on August 2, the President told reporters that he did not believe the Iraqi move into Kuwait threatened other countries and that he was not contemplating intervention.<sup>440</sup>

But in the NSC meeting a more ominous interpretation was put on the events in the Gulf region: by taking over Kuwait, "If Saddam stays where he is, he'll own twenty percent of the world's oil reserves. And a few miles away he can seize another twenty percent," CIA

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<sup>437</sup> Jean Edward Smith, *George Bush's War*, Holt Pres, New York, 1992, p.59-60

<sup>438</sup> Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf*, Free Press, Toronto, 1992, p.164

<sup>439</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, August 2, 1990, Department of Public Information DP/1104-41090, November 1990, p.3

<sup>440</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.537

director William Webster grimaced. “We’ve got to make a response,” NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft snapped, “and accommodating Saddam is not an option.” Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney agreed. “You can’t separate Kuwait from Saudi Arabia,” he explained. “When the Iraqis hit the Saudi border, they’re only forty kilometers from the Saudi oil fields. We have the potential here for a major conflict.”<sup>441</sup> The President asked for military options. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, contended that if U. S. force were to be used, the best option would indeed be to defend the Saudi border with Kuwait. The President, however, indicated that he was not at all comfortable with accepting the occupation of Kuwait as a *fait accompli*.<sup>442</sup> Lawrence Eagleburger suggested that the Bush administration work through the United Nations and seek Security Council authorization for economic sanctions and, ultimately, for military intervention. President Bush agreed that “we’ve got to get the international community behind us” and noted that he had already contacted Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussein, and Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, all of whom “still tell me they can find an Arab solution.”<sup>443</sup>

Saddam Hussein became a threat when he invaded Kuwait because his perceived military might, combined with the income from Kuwaiti oil revenues, would have made Iraq competitor with the United States for hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Oil was certainly a factor, and it was oil that made hegemony in the Gulf important to the United States. But as several high-ranking members of the Bush administration privately admitted, if the United States were to maintain its position as a great power in the post-Cold War world, it had to face down wars like Iraq.<sup>444</sup>

In Aspen, Colorado on the evening of August 2 to attend a meeting on international affairs with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher among others, Bush’s public stance stiffened. He talked of Iraq’s “naked aggression” and told the press that “We are not ruling any options in, but we are not ruling any options out.”<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>441</sup> Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, Random House Press, New York, 1996, p.450-451

<sup>442</sup> Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, Simon & Schuster Press, New York, 1991, p.229

<sup>443</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.255

<sup>444</sup> Zachary Karabell, *The Wrong Threat*, *World Politics* 96/97, edited by Helen E. Purkitt, *The Annual Editions Series*, Brown & Benchmark Publishers, p.140

<sup>445</sup> Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p.74

### 4.3.2 U.N. Resolution 661 (The Embargo Resolution)

The Bush-Baker campaign to obtain U.N. resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to generate international support for possible military operations focused on Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's immense international popularity at the time as well as the Soviet Union's veto power in the Security Council made him a special target of the President's efforts: his posture in the crisis would make a large difference in the kind of cooperation Washington could generate from other capitals and might even affect public attitudes in the United States toward the use of force in the Persian Gulf.<sup>446</sup>

To obtain this degree of Soviet Cooperation, Baker reassured Shevardnadze on August that Bush was not preparing to take unilateral military action against Iraq. The result was the U.S.-Soviet -statement of August 3, read aloud at the Moscow airport by Baker with Shevardnadze standing at his side, "jointly calling upon the rest of the international community to join with us in an international cut off of all arms supplies to Iraq."<sup>447</sup>

Soviet and U. S. diplomats at the United Nations worked together to formulate the Security Council resolution of August 6 instructing all members of the United Nations to cooperate in a comprehensive embargo on Iraq's oil exports and its export and import of other goods. The resolution imposes mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and establishes the Sanctions Committee to monitor those sanctions. The following sanctions were imposed.<sup>448</sup>

All States shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait or exported there from...;

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote...the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait . . . ;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products... but not including supplies intended strictly for medical

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<sup>446</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.538-539

<sup>447</sup> *Ibid*, p.539

<sup>448</sup> For a Free Kuwait Fact Sheet, United Nations Security Council Resolutions Condemning The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, P.O. Box 21, Falls Church, VA 22040-0021

purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait.

The embargo resolution was passed by a vote of 13 to 0, with only Cuba and Yemen abstaining.<sup>449</sup>

### 4.3.3 Efforts to Gain International Support

Operating from the promise that the United States might well have to go to war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, the administration pursued a three-pronged political strategy over the next few months, consisting of:

1. Efforts to gain United Nations legitimation for the use of force against Iraq;

2. Efforts to internationalize the military operation against Iraq without constraining U.S. combat effectiveness or flexibility while getting other countries to join a U.S.-led military coalition; and

3. A campaign to generate popular support in the United States for punishing Saddam, so that Bush would have a free hand to order U.S. forces into action without congressional interference.<sup>450</sup>

The first phase of America's military intervention in the Persian Gulf, Operation Desert Shield, called for the Pentagon to deploy approximately 200,000 U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia within ninety days to deter an Iraqi invasion. At the outset the biggest obstacle to Desert Shield was King Fahd, who had repeatedly refused to permit the Pentagon to stockpile weapons or to deploy logistical personnel inside his kingdom. Because Kuwait, the UAE, and the other Arab sheikdoms were quick to follow the Saudi lead, the Defense Department had been forced in early 1983 to establish the headquarters for the newly created CENTCOM not in the Persian Gulf but, rather, halfway around the world in Tampa, Florida.<sup>451</sup> Nevertheless, once Secretary of Defense Cheney and CENTCOM's Norman Schwarzkopf arrived in Jiddah, King Fahd's royal capital, on 6 August with

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<sup>449</sup> Resolution 661, August 6 1990, United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to the Crisis in the Gulf, p.3-4

<sup>450</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.538

<sup>451</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.257

satellite photos showing that the vanguard of Saddam Hussein's million-man army, the fourth largest in the world, was poised in Kuwait to strike Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud had a sudden change of heart. "We have to do this," King Fahd said after hearing Cheney and Schwarzkopf describe plans for Operation Desert Shield. "The most important thing is to proceed to protect our country, together with the Americans."<sup>452</sup>

On August 8, 1990 American fighter planes arrive in Saudi Arabia. Iraq declares a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait and annexes it as its nineteenth province.<sup>453</sup> During the next ten weeks the Pentagon would airlift and sealift almost 250,000 American GIs and nearly 2 million tons of military hardware and war supplies to Saudi Arabia.<sup>454</sup> Meanwhile, Secretary of State James Baker worked overtime to patch together the broadest possible anti-Iraq coalition. By late October US forces in the Persian Gulf had been joined by troops, tanks, or planes from Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and nearly two dozen other countries. This stunning display of international solidarity plus the tough economic sanctions maintained under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 seemed certain by mid-autumn to prevent Saddam Hussein from attempting to make the House of Saud his next victim.<sup>455</sup>

US diplomatic strategy henceforth was directed toward (a) securing a permissive mandate from the United Nations for the United States to use whatever means were necessary—including military action—to enforce the embargo and collateral UN resolutions demanding Saddam's unconditional withdrawal of his forces and (b) obtaining commitments from as many countries as possible to join or financially support a US-led military operation to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Security Council Resolution 665 of August 25 calls upon member states with maritime forces in the area to use "measures commensurate to specific circumstances," including military force, to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify cargoes and ensure strict implementation of the trade embargo."<sup>456</sup> Once again, the vote was 13 to 0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining. To placate the Soviets and Chinese, a direct

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<sup>452</sup> Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, Simon & Schuster Press, New York, 1991, p.266-271

<sup>453</sup> "The Iraq Crisis Timeline", Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>454</sup> Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1883-1992*, Free Press, New York, 1992, p.170-174

<sup>455</sup> James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992*, Putnam Press, New York, 1995, p.275-279

<sup>456</sup> Resolution 665, August 25 1990, United Nations Security Council Resolution Relating to the Crisis in the Gulf, p.3-4



reference to “minimum force” was deleted from the final text and the phrase “with maximum use of political measures” was substituted.<sup>457</sup>

In August, the Iraqi government prevented U. S. citizens and other foreigners from leaving Kuwait and Iraq-in effect, holding them as hostages to compel a lifting of the economic embargo and, even more starkly, as “human shields” at strategic sites to dissuade the United States and its allies from launching military attacks. The Iraqis also demanded that all countries close their embassies in Kuwait since it was no longer a sovereign state. The United States was among the countries that refused and ordered their embassy personnel to stay put. Another hostage crisis loomed. Saddam played his hostage card for its effects on public opinion in the West, inviting the media to interview the hostages in comfortable hotel accommodations. The administration tried to keep the names of the American hostages from the press and to minimize the publicity. As it turned out, however, the hostage ploy backfired on Saddam by undercutting whatever sympathy for the plight of the economically squeezed Iraqis he had been trying to generate. At the end of August, he announced that all foreign women and children were free to leave.<sup>458</sup>

On August 24, US reservists were put on alert and 7,500 National Guard and reservists were called to active duty. On November 8, Bush ordered the American Military buildup in the Persian Gulf area to increase to about 430,000.<sup>459</sup>

In October 1990, Bush had set in motion the Pentagon planning that would give the U.S. military an offensive option against Iraq, and by the end of the month he had approved the basic scenario that would be implemented the following January and February. Asserting the objectives of “complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait... and restoration of security and stability in the Persian Gulf region,” Bush announced on November 8:

“I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals.”

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<sup>457</sup> Elaine Sciolino, “How U.S. Got U.N. Backing For Use of force in the Gulf”, New York Times, August 30, 1990

<sup>458</sup> Seyom Brown, Ibid, p.545

<sup>459</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Ibid, p.12

The term “offensive military option” was chosen with care, and the President would not allow reporters to push him into revealing that he had already decided for war. When asked “Are you going to war?” his response was: “I would love to see a peaceful resolution... but don’t want to say what I will or will not do.”<sup>460</sup>

A proposal was quickly put forward by the Saudis that could have produced a peaceful withdrawal of Saddam’s forces from Kuwait. The proposal was for Kuwait to allow Iraq to remove two Kuwaiti islands that were blocking the entrance to Iraq’s seaport. The islands were barren islands that were owned by Kuwait; they did nothing for Kuwait and they blocked the precious little access that Iraq had to the sea.

The proposal was seen as a face saving measure for Saddam that would allow him to withdraw from Kuwait and still declare a victory. At the same time the action would have provided assistance to the Iraqi economy.

The opinion of James Adkins, attache at the US Embassy in Baghdad from 1963-1965 and later U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, was that the Bush administration, most likely President Bush himself, placed a call to King Fahd advising him to have the Saudi Sultan withdraw his suggestion.

This was done and the Sultan made no more public statements on the matter.

The reasoning behind this was that the Bush administration wanted the war to go forward. In fact there were several indications that Saddam was going to pull out of Kuwait without a fight. There were several offers for conditional withdrawal, which were rejected by the United States.<sup>461</sup>

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<sup>460</sup> George Bush, News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, November 8, 1990, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document, 26(45): 1789-95 p.1790-91

<sup>461</sup> Ibid




Figure 4.1 President Bush meeting with King Fahd to discuss Iraq on November 21, 1990<sup>462</sup>

#### 4.3.4 United Nation's Use of Forces Resolution

In the face of the intensifying domestic debate, Bush and Baker sought another UN resolution to give international legitimacy to the President's decision. State Department lawyers once again advised that it was unnecessary to obtain the Security Council's imprimatur: the United States could do all it wanted under the self-defense clause in Article 51. And Margaret Thatcher continued to counsel against the precedent of seeking approval from countries like Russia and China, which might hesitate to actually use force against an Arab client. But Bush hoped that with a special UN resolution authorizing the use of force to drive Saddam out of Kuwait, coalition members would be less likely to defect when the United States actually implemented its offensive option.<sup>463</sup>

The original US draft of the UN resolution contained an explicit authorization to employ "all necessary means, including the use of force." To assure the required majority in the Security Council, however, Secretary Baker settled for a more ambiguous yet sufficiently

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<sup>462</sup> "The invasion of Kuwait", Available on site: [http://www.rationalrevolution.net/invasion\\_of\\_kuwait.htm](http://www.rationalrevolution.net/invasion_of_kuwait.htm)

<sup>463</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.546-547

elastic wording. As passed on November 29, 1990 (with only Cuba and Yemen voting no and China abstaining), Resolution 678 stated that:

The Security Council...

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all of its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States, cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use- all necessary means to uphold and implement... (these resolutions) and to restore international peace and security in the area.<sup>464</sup>

To solidify support from the Soviets and other countries and to deflect the growing domestic criticism that the President had prematurely locked the country into a collision course, Bush announced on November 30 (just one day after the passage of the deadline resolution) that he was sending Secretary of State Baker to talk directly with Saddam Hussein. The announcement and press conference, more than any other public statement, revealed the President's thinking about why he had no alternative but to lead the nation into a war against Saddam Hussein. There was too much at stake:

"We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein. We're dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones and who desires to control one of the world's key resources... Our objectives remain what they were since the outset. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of embassies. And we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world."<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> Resolution 678, November 29, 1990, United Nations Security Council Resolution Relating to the Crisis in the Gulf

<sup>465</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.547-548

Saddam agreed to meet with the American Secretary of State, but not before January 12. Bush rejected the transparent ploy to extend the UN deadline by beginning “negotiations” just three days before its expiration. The final pre-war meeting took place in Geneva on January 9 between Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz. Baker attempted to deliver a direct letter to Saddam from President Bush. When Aziz saw that the letter was essentially an ultimatum (comprising a forecast of defeat for Saddam’s military and calamity for his country if he did not unconditionally relinquish his occupation of Kuwait), he refused to accept it. This bit of diplomatic theater was followed by a lengthy oral confrontation between Baker and Aziz in which both reiterated their set positions and exchanged warnings of the terrible destruction each would inflict in a war, including mutual threats of devastating retaliation in the event the other side used its weapons of mass destruction.<sup>466</sup>“This will not be another Vietnam” Baker informed Aziz. “Should war begin, God forbid, it will be fought to a swift, decisive conclusion.”<sup>467</sup>

#### 4.3.5 Desert Storm

*“By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all”<sup>468</sup>*

*George Bush (the day the war ended)*

Bush had all he required now to order U.S. forces into action against Iraq. He saw no need to ask the Congress for a declaration of war. The combination of the United Nations deadline resolution and his prerogatives as Commander in Chief would be sufficient. As head of state of a signatory country to the UN Charter, which had been duly approved by the Senate, Bush could claim to be already authorized by the Congress to use military force to implement a collective security decision of the Security Council—just as Truman did in the Korean War. As Commander in Chief, he had the duty to take military action to protect the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia from being attacked, which he was prepared to claim was imminent in light of intelligence on Saddam’s buildup of Iraqi forces across the border in Kuwait.

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<sup>466</sup> Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p.233

<sup>467</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.261

<sup>468</sup> Richard B. Du Boff, U.S. “Hegemony: Continuing Decline, Enduring Danger”, *Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine*, Dec2003, Vol. 55 Issue 7

But Scowcroft and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu persuaded the President that he would be in a much stronger position internationally as well as domestically if he could get the House and Senate to give him the advance backing in this instance that the Congress gave Eisenhower in the Formosa Straits crisis and Johnson at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. Accordingly, on January 8, Bush formally sent letters to both houses of Congress requesting them to adopt a resolution authorizing his use of United States armed forces to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This was the day before the Baker-Aziz confrontation in Geneva. The day after Geneva, the congressional debate began on Bush's request.<sup>469</sup>

After three days of fierce debate, Congress passed a joint resolution on 12 January supporting the use of forces to liberate Kuwait, provided that "all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq" had been exhausted. The vote was 52 to 47 in to Senate and 250 to 183 in the House.<sup>470</sup>

The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.

Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that (1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Resolutions cited in subsection (a) and (2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.<sup>471</sup>

Upon signing the resolution on January 14, Bush stated that "my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on the President's constitutional authority to use

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<sup>469</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.550-551

<sup>470</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.261

<sup>471</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.14, and Joint Congressional Resolution of January 12, 1991. Text Published as Appendix B in U.S. News and World Report, *Triumph Without Victory*, p.449-450

the Armed Forces to defend vital U. S. interests.” The next day, January 15, 1991, with the expiration of the UN deadline, the President signed the national security directive authorizing the execution of war plans he had approved at the end of December. The directive was transmuted by Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman Powell into operational orders to General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. central command for the Middle East and Southwest Asia. On January 16 Desert Shield became Desert Storm.<sup>472</sup>

The “new world order” was added to the rationale for using force to help mobilize support for the changeover from Desert Shield to Desert Storm. But like the other add-ons to the objective of extracting Iraq from Kuwait-disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, offensive missiles, and capacity to launch any further aggression; punishing Saddam for his aggression; getting the Iraqis to depose him from power-it only created confusion on the part of the military and public alike about the ultimate mission of the U.S. forces.

Bush devolved the primary responsibility onto Cheney, Powell, and Schwarzkopf for devising and carrying out the military missions necessary to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.<sup>473</sup>

The start of the coalition’s military operation was announced on 17 January by then-U.S. President George Bush in a televised announcement to the American people. “Just two hours ago, allied air forces began attacking military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged. This conflict started 2 August when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait, a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations, was crushed, its people brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined,” Bush said.<sup>474</sup>

On January 17 1991, U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles smashed into selected military targets in and around Baghdad, signaling that Desert Shield had become Desert Storm. The war

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<sup>472</sup> Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, Simon & Schuster Press, New York, 1991, p.366-367

<sup>473</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, 1994, p.552

<sup>474</sup> Charles Recknagel, “Iraq: Invasion Of Kuwait 12 Years Ago Ignited Continuing Crisis”, Available on site: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/>

unfolded just as Bush, Powell, and Solarz had foreseen. For more than a month high-tech F-117 Stealth jet fighters, aging B-52 bombers, and warplanes from other members of the coalition pounded Saddam Hussein's army and air force and pulverized much of Iraq's economic infrastructure.




Figure 4. 2 Initial air attack<sup>475</sup>

While the air war raged, the Pentagon methodically prepared for the ground war to follow. “Our strategy in going after this army is very simple,” Colin Powell told reporters on 23 January. “First we are going to cut it off, and then we are going to kill it.”<sup>476</sup> At 4:00 a.m. on 24 February, General Norman Schwarzkopf launched the blitzkrieg that Powell had promised, ordering 30,000 US marines to storm Kuwait City and sending the 82nd and 101st Airborne and two US armored divisions knifing across the desert 300 miles to the

<sup>475</sup> Available on site: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/maps/>

<sup>476</sup> Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, Random House Press, New York, 1996, p.512,518



west in a brilliant flanking maneuver that blocked the Iraqi army's line of retreat. On Feb. 26, 1991: Allied troops take control of Kuwait.<sup>477</sup>

In just 100 hours in the Persian Gulf the Pentagon had accomplished what it could not in 100 months in Southeast Asia, while Iraqi casualties numbered in the tens of thousands, Operation Desert Storm saw just 148 Americans killed in action and another 467 wounded.<sup>478</sup>

Most of the militant actions during the forty-four days of Desert Storm were publicly justified as necessary for accomplishing this overriding objective as quickly as possible with a minimum of U. S. casualties. The unrelenting and withering bombing of Saddam's military forces and military-related infrastructure-both in Iraq and in Kuwait-were designed not only to hobble Iraq's ability to hold on to Kuwait against the forthcoming coalition ground attack, but also to drive home to Saddam that the longer he persisted the less he would be left with to sustain his power within Iraq. Bush's most controversial decision of the war, his ordering Schwarzkopf to institute a cease-fire on February 27 (the fourth day of the massive ground assault into Kuwait), thereby allowing major elements of Saddam's elite Republican Guard with their tanks and helicopter gun ships to be pulled back deeply into Iraq.<sup>479</sup> Before War, most indicators believed that Iraqi military that occupied Kuwait was proficient and well equipped with modern weaponry, especially tanks, artillery, and air defense systems, and they expected a bloody struggle, but once the war began, Iraqi forces were brushed aside with stunning suddenness and minimal human cost to the United States and its allies, leaving the world to ponder the war's meaning.<sup>480</sup>

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<sup>477</sup> "Key events since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait", Available on site: <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/side/1653989>

<sup>478</sup> Douglas Little, *Ibid*, p.261

<sup>479</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.552-553

<sup>480</sup> Steven Metz, *Racing Toward the Future: The Future of American Foreign Policy*, Edited by: Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher M. Jones, Bedford Martin's Press, New York, 1999, p.313





Figure 4. 3 Gulf War of 1991<sup>481</sup>

<sup>481</sup> Available on site: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/maps/>



**Figure 4.4 Bush administration meeting on February 21, 1991 to discuss an offer made by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait<sup>482</sup>**

Feeling betrayed by Saddam, Bush wanted to get rid of him-but not through an American invasion and occupation of Iraq (no more Vietnam-type quagmires), nor through bringing about full-scale insurrections by the Shiites and Kurds (creating a Lebanon-type cauldron that would tempt intervention by Iran). The White House hoped that the punishment inflicted on Iraq proper would stimulate “a palace revolt” among Baghdad’s military and political elite, disillusioned and angry with Saddam for stupidly bringing such a humiliating calamity on the country. Yet Bush’s rhetoric, for example, his February 15 plea to the people of Iraq to “take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside,” continued to stimulate domestic hunger for a dramatic finale.<sup>483</sup>

Privately, Bush kept his cool. He called a cease-fire on February 28, 1991,<sup>484</sup> not simply to avoid having to occupy Iraq militarily, but also to avoid the total collapse of a viable Iraqi state able to balance Iranian power-the original motive for Washington’s courtship of Baghdad after the Iranian revolution. Instead of completely smashing Saddam’s elite legions and forcing him out of power, Bush settled for Iraq’s acceptance of harsh cease-fire

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<sup>482</sup> “The Invasion of Kuwait”, Available on site: [http://www.rationalrevolution.net/invasion\\_of\\_kuwait.htm](http://www.rationalrevolution.net/invasion_of_kuwait.htm)

<sup>483</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p. 553

<sup>484</sup> “Key events since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait”, Available on site: <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA>

terms that subjected the country to an unprecedented degree of imposed disarmament and intrusive international control.<sup>485</sup>

On March 2 the UN Security Council, by a vote of 11 of the 15 members (with India, China, and Yemen abstaining, and Cuba against) passed a new resolution designed to convert the temporary cease-fire into a permanent end to hostilities. Iraq was required to rescind its annexation of Kuwait, return all POWs and abducted Kuwaitis, accept liability under international law for all it had done, and rebuild Kuwait.<sup>486</sup>

### **4.3.6 Casualties of the War**

#### **4.3.6.1 The Coalition Force**

The U.S. had more than 500,000 troops in the Persian Gulf War, while the non-U.S. coalition forces equaled roughly 160,000, or 24 percent, of all forces. Here are some details about the casualties in the Gulf War:

- U.S. casualties: 148 battle deaths, 145 nonbattle deaths
- U.S. wounded in action: 467
- British casualties: 24, nine by U.S. fire
- British wounded in action: 10
- French casualties: 2
- French wounded in action: 25 (estimated)
- Allied Arab casualties: 39
- Allied combat air sorties flown: More than 116,000
- Coalition aircraft losses: 75 (63 U.S., 12 Allied)
- Fixed wing: 37 combat, 15 noncombat (U.S. losses -- 28 combat, 12 noncombat; no US losses in air-to-air engagements)
- Helicopters: 5 combat, 18 noncombat (all U.S.)

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<sup>485</sup> Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.553

<sup>486</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Ibid*, p.16

#### **4.3.6.2 Iraqi Forces**

In June 1991, the U.S. estimated that more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died, 300,000 were wounded, 150,000 deserted and 60,000 were taken prisoner. Many human rights groups claimed a much higher number of Iraqis were killed in action. According to Baghdad, civilian casualties numbered more than 35,000. However, since the war, some scholars have concluded that the number of Iraqi soldiers who were killed was significantly less than initially reported.

Estimated Iraqi Losses: (Reported by US Central Command, March 7, 1991) 36 fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-air engagements, 6 helicopters in air-to-air engagements, 68 fixed- and 13 rotary-wing aircraft destroyed on the ground, 137 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran, 3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks, 2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles, 2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces, 19 naval ships sunk, 6 damaged, 42 divisions made combat-ineffective. Enemy prisoners of war captured: U.S. forces released 71,204 to Saudi control.

#### **4.3.6.3 The Cost of the War**

The U.S. Department of Defense has estimated the cost of the Gulf War at \$61 billion; however, other sources say that number could be as high as \$71 billion. The operation was financed by more than \$53 billion pledged by countries around the world, most of which came from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States (\$36 billion) and Germany and Japan (\$16 billion).<sup>487</sup>

#### **4.3.7 Consequences of Conflict**

1. Saddam's second war of foreign conquest ended even worse than the first one. Iraq again stood defeated with the liberation of Kuwait.
2. Despite the crushing defeat and subsequent Shiite and Kurdish rebellions, Saddam's government retained a strong grip on power in Iraq.

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<sup>487</sup> "Gulf War Facts", Available on site: <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/>

3. As a result of the cease-fire terms, Iraq had to accept the imposition of “no-fly zones” over her territory and United Nations weapons inspection teams sifting through her nuclear and other weapons programs.

4. The economic and trade sanctions begun during the war continue to the Iraq War, contributing to severe economic hardship in Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of children have died due to the sanctions.<sup>488</sup>

#### **4.4 THE RESPONSIBILITY OF USA’S TO PROLIFERATION OF WMD**

##### **4.4.1 Global Arms Control and Halting the Spread of WMD**

Containing, if not reversing, nuclear weapons proliferation is becoming important in the arms control and disarmament agenda. Banning the production of chemical and biological weapons is also important. The nuclear nonproliferation effort has been a major element of US national security strategy since the mid-1960s. It was enshrined in the 1968 NPT, which recognized the existence of only five nuclear weapon states: these are the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. These became known as the P-5.<sup>489</sup>

##### **4.4.2 Security Council Resolution 687**

The Cease –fire terms, incorporated in Security Council Resolution 687(April 3, 1991) included the requirements that:

Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, removal and rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

- (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents; and related subsystems and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
- (b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities... and that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable

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<sup>488</sup> “Consequences of Conflict”, Available On Site: <http://Www.Historyguy.Com/Gulfwar.Html>

<sup>489</sup> Priorities for a Turbulent World, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strategic>, p.292

material... or components...research, development, support or manufacturing facilities... and to accept... urgent, on-site inspection and the destruction, removal, and rendering harmless of all these items.<sup>490</sup>

#### 4.4.3 Establishing UNSCOM Inspections (1991)

Following the end of Desert Storm, the U.S.-led coalition sought to coerce Iraq to fulfill various UN resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolution 687, which called for Baghdad to eliminate its NBC programs. Under the terms of 687, Iraq was to inventory its chemical and biological weapons programs and stock and all material related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Iraq's military weakness initially gave it little choice but to acquiesce in permitting the inspections. For more than a year following the end of Desert Storm, however, Iraq resisted UNSCOM inspections and refused to cooperate with inspectors in any way. Inspectors nonetheless made progress in uncovering the extent of Iraq's NBC programs, but Iraq's continued resistance and deception prevented a full accounting of Iraq's NBC programs.

In response to Iraqi harassment of inspectors and refusal to cooperate, the United States and Britain (and at times France) threatened bombing campaigns several times in 1991 and 1992. The United States used its military presence in the region, which it occasionally bolstered, to back up threats. During a standoff in March 1991, the United States sent the carrier America and its battle group to the Gulf as an escalation option—a particularly potent threat given the large US ground presence then in Iraq itself and along its borders. In September 1991, President Bush sent combat aircraft and Patriot missile batteries to Saudi Arabia after Iraq temporarily detained 40 UN inspectors. In these cases, Washington apparently was weighing a graduated bombing campaign to force Iraqi compliance. Iraq backed down as a result of these threats,<sup>491</sup> and submitted to the United Nations Special commission on Iraq and the IAEA details of the quantities and locations of its chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and nuclear materials stockpiles. This listing was required by the terms of Security Council resolution 687 and was designed to provide the baseline for

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<sup>490</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 668, April 3, 1991, United Nations Resolutions Relating to the Crisis in the Gulf and Seyom Brown, *Ibid*, p.554

<sup>491</sup> Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, *Confronting Iraq*, 2000, p.39

the inspection activities that were to lead to the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.<sup>492</sup>

#### 4.4.4 Responding To Inspection and No-Fly Zone Standoffs (December 1992–January 1993)

In December 1992, Iraq initiated a crisis with coalition forces, making limited incursions in the southern no-fly zone and threatening to shoot down US monitoring aircraft. At roughly the same time, Iraq blocked the inspection of suspected NBC sites.



Figure 4.5 North and South No-Fly Zones<sup>493</sup>

To coerce Baghdad to stop these provocations, U.S., British, and French forces conducted air strikes against several military sites. On January 13, allied warplanes bombed, among other things, air defense facilities in the southern no-fly zone.<sup>494</sup> On January 17, 1993 United States struck the Zafraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facility, near Baghdad, with up to 42 Tomahawk Cruise missiles. This strike was designed to punish Saddam Hussein for Iraq's non-compliance with United Nations weapons inspections.<sup>495</sup> On June 27, 1993, The

<sup>492</sup> David A. Kay, "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond", World Politics, 96/97, edited by Helen E. Purkitt, The Annual Editions Series, Brown&Benchmark Publishers, p.210

<sup>493</sup> Available on site: [http://www.historyguy.com/no-fly\\_zone\\_war.html](http://www.historyguy.com/no-fly_zone_war.html)


<sup>494</sup> Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, Confronting Iraq, 2000, p.52

<sup>495</sup> "Causes of Conflict", Available on site: [http://www.historyguy.com/no-fly\\_zone\\_war.html](http://www.historyguy.com/no-fly_zone_war.html)



United States fires 24 cruise missiles at intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.<sup>496</sup> The following day, allied aircraft again attacked Iraqi military facilities in the no-fly zones. During the course of this crisis, Saddam repeatedly offered partial compliance or conditional compliance (for example, Iraq offered to allow inspection flights into the country but only if UN planes stayed out of the southern no-fly zone). At one point, Iraq offered what it termed a “cease-fire” in an apparent attempt to divide the coalition. Such efforts confronted the allies with the following dilemma: because Iraq was at least in partial compliance with weapons inspections and other demilitarization requirements, a robust military response might require sacrificing some of these gains.

In the end, however, Iraq backed down. U.S. and allied military strikes against Iraq in January 1993 compelled Iraq to cease violating the no-fly zones and actively challenging UNSCOM inspections for several years.<sup>497</sup>



**Figure 4.6 Iraqi al-Hussein Scud missile to be destroyed by United Nations inspectors in Iraq<sup>498</sup>**

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<sup>496</sup> Special Report, Years of tension: 1992-96, November 17, 1997, Available on site: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special\\_report/iraq/32039.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/iraq/32039.stm) and “Key events since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait”, Available on site: <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/side/1653989>

<sup>497</sup> Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, Ibid, p.52

<sup>498</sup> Priorities for a Turbulent World, Ibid

#### **4.4.5 Deterring an Invasion of Kuwait (1994)**

On October 5, 1994, intelligence analysts discovered Iraq was deploying two Republican Guard armored divisions near the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq made bellicose statements regarding Kuwait and also threatened to expel UNSCOM inspectors.

The United States responded by rapidly deploying troops to the theater (Operation Vigilant Warrior) and threatening large-scale strikes if Iraq did not withdraw. On October 15, the UN Security Council passed resolution 949, which demanded that Iraq pull back its forces and that Iraq not again deploy its forces near the Kuwaiti border. Both the United States and Britain subsequently warned Iraq that they would use force to stop any Iraqi buildup south of the thirty-second parallel.

Vigilant Warrior was a massive effort. Already, U.S.-led coalition forces had a substantial air presence in the region to enforce Operation Southern Watch. To reinforce this presence, the United States sent the aircraft carrier *George Washington* to the region, moved additional strike and reconnaissance assets there, dispatched a Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, and sent an Army Mechanized Task Force. The United States also deployed additional air assets, while the French sent a destroyer and the British a frigate and destroyer.

After this rapid buildup, Saddam announced on October 10 that his forces would withdraw. Iraq pulled back its forces from the border area and recognized both Kuwait's sovereignty and the Iraq-Kuwait border. Perhaps fearing that domestic discontent or unrest among the military might spread as a result, Saddam on October 7 established yet another regime protection force, the Fedayeen Saddam, to preserve regime stability.<sup>499</sup>

#### **4.4.6 Halting Defiance to UNSCOM (1997–1998)**

From autumn 1997 through the end of 1998, Saddam blocked UNSCOM inspections on numerous occasions, leading the United States to issue coercive threats in several instances. This confrontation probably would have come sooner, had it not been for the August 1995 defection of Husayn Kamil, which panicked the regime and led it to reveal

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<sup>499</sup> Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, *Ibid*, p.55

considerable material on its NBC programs. Even so, throughout 1996, Iraq constantly blocked inspectors from entering suspected NBC sites, harassed them, and otherwise prevented UNSCOM from completing its mission.


The initial UN response to this interference was tepid at best. On October 6, 1997, the chief of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported that Iraq's account of its biological programs was not remotely credible and that Iraq was systematically interfering with the inspectors' work. Despite this report, the Security Council refused to authorize the use of force against Iraq in response. The Security Council blocked U.S. and British proposals to threaten Iraq with military strikes or otherwise ratchet up pressure. This weak response apparently emboldened Saddam.

On October 29, 1997, Iraq announced its intention to expel American members of the inspection teams and later threatened to shoot down U-2 spy planes monitoring Iraqi compliance. The United States Attempts to Coerce Iraq responded by increasing its military forces in the region and threatening strikes if Iraq did not comply. Following the U.S. buildup, Iraq rescinded its ultimatums and readmitted the expelled inspectors. Baghdad then announced that Saddam's presidential palaces would be off-limits. After the United States again moved to the brink of military strikes, on February 23, 1998, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan brokered a deal ending Saddam's opposition to inspections in return for several concessions that greatly weakened the inspection effort.

Although the Annan deal bought several months of inspections without a standoff, in August 1998 Iraq protested continued sanctions and announced its intention to end its relationship with inspectors. At the end of October it blocked UN monitoring efforts. The United States and Britain threatened military strikes to coerce Iraqi compliance. After the UN withdrew much of its staff in November, the United States launched B-52 bombers to attack Iraq. Having been criticized at home for "pinprick" strikes on Iraq in 1996, the Clinton administration and the military prepared for more extensive strikes on Iraq. At the last minute, Saddam agreed to submit to the inspections once again, and the strikes were called off.

#### 4.4.7 Forcing Compliance with UNSCOM (Operation Desert Fox, December 1998)

After the last-minute abort order for the November 1998 strikes-and the criticism that accompanied this decision-the United States was prepared to respond quickly after any further Iraqi defiance of UNSCOM. This opportunity came soon. In December 1998, Ambassador Butler issued his report to the Security Council, which declared that Iraq was not meeting its obligations to UNSCOM. Iraq had blocked UNSCOM inspections even though the inspectors' information was dated and the sites chosen were not sensitive.



**Figure 4.7 President Clinton issuing a warning to Saddam Hussein, flanked by Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton<sup>500</sup>**

In response, the United States and Britain began a large-scale, four day air and cruise missile campaign against Iraqi military targets (Operation Desert Fox). The United States and Britain launched roughly 600 aircraft sorties and 400 cruise missile strikes against approximately 100 targets, including Iraqi intelligence and security forces facilities,

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<sup>500</sup> Priorities For A Turbulent World, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html>

presidential palaces, air-defense systems, NBC sites, and economic targets.<sup>501</sup> The strikes were designed to deliver a serious blow to Saddam Hussein's capability to manufacture, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten or otherwise intimidate his neighbors.<sup>502</sup> As a result of these attacks, the Iraqi government declared an end to all UNSCOM inspections and said it would militarily challenge the "no-fly" zones.<sup>503</sup>

#### 4.5 CREATING A KURDISH SAFE HAVEN (1991–1992)

As the War with Iraq ended in 1991, President George Bush urged the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and depose Saddam<sup>504</sup>, and Iraq's Kurdish minority rose against the Saddam regime. On March 22, 1991, the regime began its counteroffensive. Iraqi Army attacks on rebels in northern Iraq caused massive casualties and suffering among Iraqi Kurds. Tens of thousands of Kurds died as the central government reestablished itself, and over one million Kurds fled their villages toward Iran or Turkey.

To alleviate the crisis, the United States dispatched troops in April 1991 to create a "safe haven" for returning refugees. UN Security Council Resolution 688, passed on April 5, that the government of Iraq cease the military repression of its civilian population in the Kurdish and Shiite areas and that it allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance. Resolution 688 was as far as Bush wanted to go to intervene in Iraq's political affairs after the conclusion of the Gulf War- a considerable backtracking from his wartime encouragement of the people of Iraq to overthrow the Saddam dictatorship.<sup>505</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 688 authorized the use of force to protect relief efforts in the Kurdish north. U.S., French, and British forces set up a "safety zone" and secured refugee camps in northern Iraq. By the end of May 1991, many Kurds in Turkey had returned to Iraq, and Kurds displaced within Iraq had returned to their homes. In May, the United Nations assumed authority for the relief operation.

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<sup>501</sup> Ibid, p.64-68

<sup>502</sup> "Operation Desert Fox", Available on site: [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/desert\\_fox.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/desert_fox.htm)

<sup>503</sup> "Causes of Conflict", [http://www.historyguy.com/no-fly\\_zone\\_war.html](http://www.historyguy.com/no-fly_zone_war.html) and Key events since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Available on site: <http://www.chron.com/>

<sup>504</sup> David Wurmser, *Tyranny's Ally, America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*, The AEI Press, Washington DC., 1999, p.10

<sup>505</sup> Seyom Brown, Ibid, p.554

The United States directly, intervened to protect the Kurds. More than 10,000 U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel participated in Operation Provide Comfort, and allied countries contributed approximately 11,000 more. While U.S. and allied forces were in the country, the Iraqi campaign stopped. In addition to securing the safe haven, the United States also established a force in Turkey to deter Iraq and to protect the Kurds. Even after the UN assumed control of the relief effort, an implicit U.S. military commitment remained.

The confrontation did not end after the creation of the protected zone. In August and September, Iraq began to threaten the enclave, building up troops in the north and conducting forays against the Kurds. Firefights between Iraqi forces and Kurdish paramilitary groups were common. After U.S. threats to retaliate, however, Saddam backed off and did not challenge the enclave directly until 1996.

In general, Iraq showed tremendous respect for U.S. power. After the successes of Desert Storm, Baghdad probably feared renewed attacks if it pushed too hard. Indeed, Iraq not only abided by the terms of Resolution 688, but it also evacuated military forces from all of the North of Iraq, wrongly assuming that U.S. airpower protected the entire region.

After establishing the enclave, the Bush (and subsequently the Clinton) administration capitalized on its existence to press Saddam further. By playing up the plight of the Kurds, the international community remained focused on Iraq's abysmal human rights record and thus on the need to keep Iraq under sanctions and isolated diplomatically. In addition, the enclave became a base for the U.S.-backed Iraqi opposition and for U.S. intelligence operatives seeking to foment a coup.<sup>506</sup>

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<sup>506</sup> Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, *Ibid*, p.43-44

## 5. THE IDEA OF “PREEMPTIVE STRIKE” AND OPENING “AXIS OF EVIL” POLICIES UNDER THE BUSH DOCTRINE

*“It’s... important to keep strong ties in the Middle East, with credible ties, because of the energy crisis we’re now in... I-I hope to get a sense of, should I be fortunate enough to be president, how my administration will react to the Middle East.”<sup>507</sup>*

*George W. Bush*

*“The United States has always been ready to use its superior military strength”<sup>508</sup>*

*Gabriel Kolko*

### 5.1 SEPTEMBER 11 AND AFGHANISTAN

*“This War-Is a unique war. It’s unique in the way, in which it began, with the largest attack on this country in our nation’s history. It’s unique in that we continue to fight abroad while there’s a continuing threat of attack at home...It’s unique in that it’s much more subtle and complex than a conventional war. It’s unique in the speed with which it came together...It’s unique in the fact that is war that has to be fought by many means other than just military.”<sup>509</sup>*

*Paul Wolfowitz*

#### 5.1.1 September 11 Terrorist Attack

The attacks of September 11, 2001, gave weight to neoconservative arguments and colored Bush’s thinking.<sup>510</sup> This terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the abortive attack (possibly aimed at the White House or Camp David) that resulted in the crash of a jetliner in Pennsylvania marked the start of a new era in American strategic

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<sup>507</sup> Chris Toensing, “Bush’s Middle East Policy: Look to his Advisers”, A Global Affairs Commentary, Dec. 2000, Available on site: <http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/>

<sup>508</sup> Richard B. Du Boff, “U.S. Hegemony: Continuing Decline, Enduring Danger”, Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, Dec2003, Vol. 55 Issue 7

<sup>509</sup> Mesut Hakkı Casin, “Re-Mapping Euro-Atlantic Collective Security Strategy Routes Beyond the September 11 Terrorist Attack”, M5 Defense and Strategy Report, October 2002

<sup>510</sup> Joaquin Cabrejas, “Behind Bush’s Drive to War”, Humanist; Nov/Dec2003, Vol. 63, Issue 6, p.20

thinking.<sup>511</sup> The terror attacks of that morning have had an impact comparable to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, that propelled the United States into World War-II. An entirely new and ominous threat suddenly became a reality and dictated a new grand strategy for the United States. This new policy, dubbed the “Bush Doctrine,” focuses on the threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.<sup>512</sup> After terrorist attack its territory at New York and the Pentagon, the US decided to use force against the Taliban and Al Qaida terror organizations in Afghanistan lawful under UN Charter Art.2/4 and Art.51 which related self defense.<sup>513</sup>



Figure 5.1 September 11 Attack<sup>514</sup>

### 5.1.2 War on Terrorism

*“We will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.”<sup>515</sup>*

*George Bush*

<sup>511</sup> Jeffrey Richelson and Michael L. Evans, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 55, September 21, 2001,

<sup>512</sup> Robert J. Lieber, “A New Era in U.S. Strategic Thinking”, Available on site: <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0902/ijge/gj01.htm>

<sup>513</sup> Mesut Hakkı Casin, “Re-Mapping Euro-Atlantic Collective Security Strategy Routes Beyond the September 11 Terrorist Attack”, M5 Defense and Strategy Report, October 2002

<sup>514</sup> Available on site: <http://www.september11news.com/>

<sup>515</sup> Robert J. Lieber, Ibid



Immediately following and in response to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, the United States government announced its intentions to begin a War on Terrorism (or War on Terror), a protracted struggle against terrorists and states that aid terrorists.<sup>516</sup> First, on the domestic front, the administration sought and received a joint resolution from Congress authorizing use of military force, in the exercise of legitimate self-defense. In the language of the resolution: “The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States....”

The resolution passed by a margin of 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House of Representatives. Public opinion, which had been deeply divided since the November 2000 presidential election, rallied in broad support not only of the war effort, but of the President himself.<sup>517</sup>

On October 10, 2001, US President George W. Bush presented a list of 22 most wanted terrorists. Then in the first such act since World War-II, President Bush signed an executive order on November 13, 2001 allowing military tribunals against any foreigners suspected of having connections to terrorist acts or planned acts on the United States. US-led military forces later invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq under the rubric of the War on Terrorism.<sup>518</sup>

Critics argue that the wealthy and powerful elite as a whole are using the ‘war on terrorism’ as a means to achieve one or more of the following objectives:

- Evade the political and economic repercussions that the worsening financial crisis will have on both the elite and the U.S. nation as a whole.
- Dodge the blame for causing the current financial crisis which was a direct result of the ultra-liberalization of the various financial and commodity markets, the neoliberalization policies of privatization and ‘free trade’, and the reckless expansion of money and credit (among other things).

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<sup>516</sup> Available on site: [http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/War\\_on\\_Terror#The\\_Naming\\_of\\_the\\_Axis\\_of\\_Evil](http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Terror#The_Naming_of_the_Axis_of_Evil)

<sup>517</sup> Robert J. Lieber, “A New Era in U.S. Strategic Thinking”, Available on site: <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0902/ijge/gj01.htm>

<sup>518</sup> Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Ibid

- Instigate a ‘clash of civilizations’ that will provide the U.S. with an excuse to reorganize the world under the tutelage of an American empire.
- Secure control of the oil and gas rich lands of Central Asia and the Middle East.
- Undermine the political and economic development and integration of the Eurasian landmass.
- Maintain economic power during the course of the current financial crisis by using US taxpayer money (and lives) to force on the world that which a truly free market would not have otherwise allowed - unchallenged American economic and political supremacy.<sup>519</sup>

“Even without Sept. 11, we would have had this struggle over how to use American power.” says Ellen Laipson, president of the Stimson Center, a Washington foreign- policy think tank.<sup>520</sup>

### 5.1.3 Axis of Evil Policies

*“They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century... they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies”<sup>521</sup>*

*George Bush-September 20, 2001*

People recognize “axis” as the shorthand term for the Axis Powers--Germany, Italy and Japan--in World War-II. They were the major enemies of a larger group of Allied Powers led by the United States, Britain and Russia. Had Franklin D. Roosevelt--that other great communicator--coined “Axis Powers” to stand for that unholy alliance of fascist states? According to Roosevelt’s public papers in World Book’s American Reference Library, he did use “axis” 157 times in a political sense but never before Nov. 11, 1940. Furthermore, his usage did not define the term but merely used one that was already “out there.”<sup>522</sup>

<sup>519</sup> “War on Terrorism”, Available on site: <http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/wot/default.html>

<sup>520</sup> Howard La Franchi, “America’s World”, Christian Science Monitor; 9/10/2003, Vol. 95 Issue 200

<sup>521</sup> Shibley Telhami, The Stakes- America and The Middle East, West View Press, 2002, p.15

<sup>522</sup> Kenneth Janda and Stefano Mula, “Who said “axis” first?” Chicago Tribune, April 21, 2002, Section 2

But, George W. Bush named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil“. In US political rhetoric these are called “rogue states” who do not respect international law and often have programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. The use of the word “axis” was more rhetorical than literal; no assertions have been made that Iran, Iraq, or North Korea are in any way politically allied (The former Ba’athist regime in Iraq and the Shi’ite fundamentalist regime in Iran were enemies). The statement has become a lightning rod for opposition to the War on Terrorism and to George W. Bush in particular. Interestingly, the inclusion of North Korea in the “Axis of Evil” subtly served to politically distance the US from the perception that the “war on terror” was a code phrase for a “war against Islam”.<sup>523</sup> Even critics agree that the “axis of evil” was a clever piece of rhetoric in explaining the president’s policies to the American people. But as foreign policy, there is wide consensus that it exacerbated the dangers it attempted to contain.<sup>524</sup>

Indeed, Bush’s propensity to starkly delineate the world into good and *evil* made him more likely to embrace the idea of a just war. Even before his now-sullied attempt to declare Iraq an imminent threat to the United States, Bush called Hussein “*evil*” and declared his country a charter member of the “*axis of evil.*” On the subject of Hussein’s use of chemical weapons, Bush said in his 2002 State of the Union speech, “If this is not *evil*, then *evil* has no meaning.” As the Montreal Gazette points out, political parlance didn’t involve the extensive use of *evil* until the Bush administration. “But the very concept of *evil* is problematic. When it becomes used as part of political rhetoric it silences conversation. That’s the real problem. Once you’ve defined something that way, the only *policy* option is to destroy the *evil*,” adds Tony Lang of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.<sup>525</sup>

Bush’s supporters naturally insist this is a good thing. It has opened our eyes to the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of dictators<sup>526</sup>

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<sup>523</sup> “War on terror”, Available on site: <http://history.searchbeat.com/terror.htm>

<sup>524</sup> Maura Reynolds, “Axis of Evil Rhetoric Said to Heighten Dangers”, The Los Angeles Times, January 21, 2003

<sup>525</sup> Joaquin Cabrejas, “Behind Bush’s Drive to War”, Humanist, Nov/Dec2003, Vol. 63, Issue 6, p.20

<sup>526</sup> “How I created the axis of evil”, The Guardian, Tuesday January 28, 2003

#### 5.1.4 Preemptive Strike Policies

The National Security Strategy declares that the “United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security,” and given the risk of inaction against enemies prepared to strike first, “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”<sup>527</sup> The National Security Strategy goes on to say, “Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing for attack.” However, “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” Because Rogue states know they can’t win with conventional weapons, “they will rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.”<sup>528</sup>

The Bush Administration does not regard preemption as an exchanged for traditional nonmilitary measures such as coercive diplomacy and sanctions or for proactive counter proliferation and strengthened nonproliferation efforts. Preemption is an “add-on” tailored to deal with the new, non-detectable threat. But the question does arise as to whether “preemption” best characterizes the new policy or not. The Pentagon’s official definition of preemption is “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”<sup>529</sup> In contrast, preventive War-Is “a War-Initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk.”<sup>530</sup> Harvard’s Graham Allison has captured the logic of preventive war: “I may some day have a war with you, and right now I’m strong and you’re not. So I’m going to have the war now.” Allison went on to point out that this logic was very much behind the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, “and in honest moments some Japanese scholars say-off the record—that [Japan’s] big mistake was waiting too long.”<sup>531</sup>

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<sup>527</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, White House, September 2002, p.15, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/library/>

<sup>528</sup> Ibid

<sup>529</sup> US Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, Department of Defense, 12 April 2002, p.415, Available on site: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>

<sup>530</sup> Ibid p.419

<sup>531</sup> David E Sanger, “Beating Them To The Prewar”, The New York Times, 28 September 2002,

The difference between preemption and preventive War-Is important. As defined above, preemptive attack is justifiable if it meets Secretary of State Daniel Webster's strict criteria, enunciated in 1837, the legal standard, that the threat be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moments for deliberation."<sup>532</sup> Preventive war on the other hand, has none, because the threat is neither certain nor imminent. This makes preventive War-Indistinguishable from outright attack, which may explain why the Bush Administration insists that its strategy is preemptive, despite the fact that some Cabinet officials have used the terms interchangeably.

### 5.1.5 Trends in USA Defense Spending

A recent report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies highlighted the growing disparity between military expenditures in the United States and its potential adversaries.

The dominance of America in this area is still unparalleled.<sup>533</sup> The Clinton administration's national security budget had grown to about \$300 billion a year by 2001 (including about \$15 billion in annual funding for nuclear weapons activities at the Department of Energy). Incorporating the effects of September 11, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Bush Doctrine, President Bush's budgets are now as follows: \$329 billion in 2001, \$351 billion in 2002, and \$396 billion for 2003.<sup>534</sup>

The \$396 billion U.S. defense budget for 2003 is roughly 40% of the world's total arms spending. Russia comes in second at \$60 billion, followed by China, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Combined spending among the U.S. and its closest allies (NATO, Japan, South Korea and Australia) is approximately 2/3 of all global spending. The nations that are considered rogue states (including axis of evil states) by the U.S. government (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria) spend only \$15 billion altogether, or less than 1/26 as much as the U.S.

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<sup>532</sup> Michael Eliot, "Strike First, Explain yourself Later", Time, 24 June 2002

<sup>533</sup> "Trends in Global Defense Spending", Available on site: <http://www.fpa.org/newsletter>

<sup>534</sup> Available on site: [www.ciaonet.org/pbei/bi/](http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/bi/)

Table 5.1 Major Spenders (fiscal year 2003)<sup>535</sup>

Countries	Military Budget
United States	\$396.1 Billion
Russia	\$60.0
China	\$42.0
Japan	\$40.4
United Kingdom	\$34.0
Saudi Arabia	\$27.2
France	\$25.3
Germany	\$21.0
Brazil	\$17.9
India	\$15.6
Italy	\$15.5
South Korea	\$11.8




Figure 5.2 Comparative of spenders<sup>536</sup>

If we compare the U.S. military budget-2003, then we can see example at the below.

<sup>535</sup> "Last of the Big Time Spenders", Available on site: <http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersFY03.html>

<sup>536</sup> Available on site: <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp>

-At \$396 billion, the US military budget 2003 is more than six times larger than that of Russia, the second largest spender.

-It is more than 26 times as large as the combined spending of the seven countries traditionally identified by the Pentagon as our most likely adversaries (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria).<sup>537</sup>

-It is more than the combined spending of the next 25 nations.

-The United States and its close allies spend more than the rest of the world combined, accounting for more than two-thirds of all military spending. Together they spend over 39 times more than the seven rogue states. ("Allies" includes NATO, Australia, Japan and South Korea.)<sup>538</sup>

#### **5.1.6 First Target: Afghanistan**

*"The USA is trying to show its muscle, score a victory and scare everyone in the world. They don't care about the suffering of the Afghans or how many people we will lose. And we don't like that. Because Afghans are now being made to suffer for these Arab fanatics, but we all know who brought these Arabs to Afghanistan in the 1980s, armed them and gave them a base. It was the Americans and the CIA. And the Americans who did this all got medals and good careers, while all these years Afghans suffered from these Arabs and their allies. Now, when America is attacked, instead of punishing the Americans who did this, it punishes the Afghans."<sup>539</sup>*

*Abdul Haq, (Afghan envoy executed by the Taliban in Afghanistan)*

##### **5.1.6.1 An Ultimatum to Taliban and Invasion of Afghanistan**

The first target was Afghanistan and the Al-Qaida terrorist organization based therein. In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, US President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban, to:

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<sup>537</sup> "The Axis Of Evil", Available on site: <http://www.8thdaycenter.org/>

<sup>538</sup> "Military Spending", Available on site: <http://www.webcom.com/ipa/issues.html>

<sup>539</sup> Available on site: [http://www.krysstal.com/democracy\\_whyusa02](http://www.krysstal.com/democracy_whyusa02).

- Deliver Al-Qaida leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
- Release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens
- Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country
- Close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and “hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities”.
- Give the US full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure

President Bush further stated that the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, noting it would be an insult to Islam, but made statements through their Pakistan embassy. Their initial response was to demand evidence of bin Laden’s culpability in the September 11th attacks and to offer to try him in an Islamic court.<sup>540</sup> When the United States refused and instead threatened the Taliban with military action, the Taliban offered to extradite bin Laden to Pakistan, where he could be tried under Islamic law. This offer too was refused. The United States and other western nations then led an attack along with local Afghan anti-Taliban forces, including several local warlords and the Northern Alliance. Many of the Afghani groups had held power before the Taliban came to power, and ruled with human rights records similar to the Taliban. This effort succeeded in removing the Taliban from power. Most Taliban did not fight; they simply went back to their tribe. The weak government in Kabul, the well armed Warlords and the hidden Taliban did not change the situation, that Afghanistan is a unstable country. To date, Osama bin Laden has not been arrested or killed. His words have reportedly come to light from time to time, often via Arabic media outlets, and usually in support of anti-western atrocities, such as the bombing in Bali and Tunisia.<sup>541</sup>

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<sup>540</sup> Available on site: [http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.\\_invasion\\_of\\_Afghanistan](http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._invasion_of_Afghanistan)

<sup>541</sup>“War on terrorism”, Available on site: [http://www.informationheadquarters.com/September11\\_2001/War\\_on\\_Terrorism.shtml](http://www.informationheadquarters.com/September11_2001/War_on_Terrorism.shtml)





Figure 5.3 Al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden and U.S. forces on patrol<sup>542</sup>

### 5.1.6.2 Afghanistan and Oil

The invasion of Afghanistan is certainly a campaign against terrorism, but it may also be a late colonial adventure. Afghanistan is as indispensable to the regional control and transport of oil in central Asia as Egypt was in the Middle East.

The Caspian Sea basin has attracted US interest for the following reasons:

1. The oil of this region is considered to be of good quality.
2. The biggest part of this oil is intended for export, since the needs of the producing countries are relatively low and are expected to remain low.
3. The fact that the countries of the region lack the capital and the technology to proceed independently to the development of these oilfields offers American companies, such as Chevron, considerable investment opportunities.

In this context, we can better understand the geopolitical and economic aims of the US in Central Asia.<sup>543</sup>

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<sup>542</sup> Time, April 14, 2003, p.12

<sup>543</sup> Constantine Arvanitopoulos, "The Geopolitics of Oil in Central Asia", Available on site: <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/winter98/>

These energy resources and, in particular, the oil and natural gas deposits have now become the apple of discord in Central Asia introducing, according to analysts, a new chapter in the Great Game<sup>544</sup> of control over Eurasia. Afghanistan has some oil and gas of its own, but not enough to qualify as a major strategic concern. The fact that the three countries which share the majority of the region's energy and resources, namely Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, are landlocked makes them depend on their immediate neighbors for access to the Western markets.

The essence of this new geopolitical game in Central Asia is twofold: first, control of production of the oil and gas, and second, control of the pipelines which will transfer the oil to the Western markets.<sup>545</sup>

In 1998, Dick Cheney, now US vice-president but then chief executive of a major oil services company, remarked: "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian." But the oil and gas there is worthless until it is moved. The only route which makes both political and economic sense is through Afghanistan.<sup>546</sup>

The American oil company Unocal has proposed the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and later to India. Taliban Regime has prevented this project from moving forward.

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<sup>544</sup> The phrase Great Game has been borrowed from Rudyard Kipling's description of the rivalry between Tsarist Russia, Victorian England and the Ottoman Empire in Central Asia for control of trade routes to India in the 19th century. See Fiona Hill, *Pipeline Politics, Russo-Turkish Competition and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean in Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean*, edited by Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis. Intercollege Press, Cyprus, 1997, p. 200.

<sup>545</sup> Constantine Arvanitopoulos, *Ibid*

<sup>546</sup> George Monbiot, "A pro-western regime in Kabul should give the US an Afghan route for Caspian oil", *The Guardian*, October 23, 2001,




Figure 5.4 Oil and gas pipeline<sup>547</sup>

## 5.2 IRAQ OPERATION

*“We are sending a clear signal to the world that we will not submit to a future in which dictators and terrorists can arm and threaten the peace without consequence.”<sup>548</sup>*

*President Bush, March 28, 2003*

### 5.2.1 Support and Opposition

#### 5.2.1.1 Coalition of the Willing

The Bush administration claimed that the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq included 49 nations, a group that was frequently referred to as the “coalition of the willing“. These nations provided combat troops, support troops, and logistical support for the invasion. The

<sup>547</sup> “Central Asian Oil and Gas Pipelines”, Available on site: <http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm>

<sup>548</sup> “Global War on Terrorism”, Available on site: [http://www.af.mil/news/opscenter/swa\\_ops.shtml](http://www.af.mil/news/opscenter/swa_ops.shtml)

nations contributing combat forces were, roughly: United States (250,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), Denmark (200), and Poland (54). Ten other countries were known to have offered small numbers of noncombat forces, mostly both medical teams and specialists in decontamination. In several of these countries a majority of the public was opposed to the war. In Spain polls reported at one time a 90% opposition to the war.<sup>549</sup>

### 5.2.1.2 Public Opposition

Before War there have been street protests against the War on Terrorism in general or war on Iraq in specific in many major cities in the U.S. and other nations. On the 28th of September 2002, one of the biggest anti-war demonstrations in Europe since the Vietnam War took place on the streets of London. Up to 450,000 people took part, representing diverse political, religious and other groups. This was at a time when public feeling in Britain against a war was running high, with a clear majority in the polls.



Figure 5. 5 Protesters under Big Ben, New York and Berlin<sup>550</sup>

On the 26th of October 2002, the largest peace demonstration in the United States since the Vietnam War era occurred in Washington D.C. About 100,000 protestors joined on the Mall, the area adjacent to the highest offices of government, to protest the war. In contrast to other recent protests, in which protestors reported being violently attacked by police or

<sup>549</sup> "2003 invasion of Iraq", Available on site: [http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.\\_invasion\\_of\\_Iraq](http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._invasion_of_Iraq)

<sup>550</sup> Time, February, 24, 2003, p.19-20

security forces, protestors in this action were evidently permitted to speak and assemble more freely.

On the same day protest rallies also took place in Mexico, Japan, Spain, Germany, South Korea, Belgium and Australia.<sup>551</sup>

### 5.2.1.3 Critics about the Legality of War




Figure 5. 6 Chirac has been at the center of a whirlwind of diplomacy as part of his effort to convince world leaders<sup>552</sup>

Popular opposition to war on Iraq led to global protests, and the war was criticized by France, Belgium, Russia, the People's Republic of China, Germany, and the Arab League.

There are some that claim the US intervention took place without any international legal framework. Others would counter by pointing out that the UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing the 1991 invasion gave legal authority to use "...all necessary means...", which is diplomatic code for going to war. This war ended with a cease fire instead of a permanent peace treaty. Their view was that Iraq had violated the terms of the cease-fire by breaching two key conditions and thus made the invasion of Iraq a legal continuation of the earlier war. To support this stance, one has to "reactivate" the war resolution from 1991; if a war resolution can be reactivated ten years after the fact, it would imply that almost any nation that has ever been at war that ended in a ceasefire (such as Korea) could have the war restarted if any other nation felt at any time that they

<sup>551</sup> Available on site: <http://history.searchbeat.com/terror.htm>

<sup>552</sup> Time, February, 24, 2003, p.25

were no longer meeting the conditions of the cease fire that ended that war. Since the majority of the United Nations Security Council members (both permanent and rotating) did not support the attack, it appears that they viewed the attack as not being valid under the 1991 resolution. However, a resolution drafted and accepted the year before the invasion fully endorsed the use of military action to force Iraq to comply with the United Nations desires, and every country that sat upon the Security Council voted to draft that resolution.

Several nations say the attack violated international law as a war of aggression since it lacked the validity of a UN Security Council resolution to authorize military force. The Egyptian former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called the intervention a violation of the UN charter. The United States and United Kingdom claim it was a legal action which they were within their rights to undertake. Along with Poland and Australia, the invasion was supported by the governments of several European nations, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, and Spain. Many people regarded the attack on Iraq to be hypocritical, when other nations such as Israel are also in breach of UN resolutions and have nuclear weapons.<sup>553</sup>

## **5.2.2 American-Turkish Relations and the War**

### **5.2.2.1 The View from Ankara**

Turkish American relations are always at a watershed. But it is seen that 2003 was an extraordinary year and that it will differ from years that had been marked as turning points in the past. The pivotal factor in this is the fact that Iraq War. When the US plans on Iraq started to unfold, a simultaneous debate began on Turkey's position in the operation. Turkey's status as a NATO ally and a strategic partner of the United States in the Middle East and its location north of Iraq make it key to the operation in Iraq.<sup>554</sup> But the refusal of Turkey to allow US troops to use its territory to launch a northern front in the War-In Iraq disappointed many in the United States. However, close examination of Turkey's interests and views suggests that this refusal should not have come as a surprise to policymakers.

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<sup>553</sup> "2003 Invasion of Iraq", Available on site: [http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.\\_invasion\\_of\\_Iraq](http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._invasion_of_Iraq)

<sup>554</sup> Sebnem Udum, "Turkey's Position in the Iraq Operation: Bridge or Barrier?", Proliferation Research and Assessment Program, Available on site: <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/turkey.htm>

First, we should state that Turkey's policy vis-à-vis the north of Iraq has been pursued with great determination and correctness lately. As of late 2002 when the American attack on Iraq was pronounced, Turkish officials have clearly expressed the following at all levels:

1. We are in favor of the territorial integrity of Iraq.
2. We will not allow the establishment of a new state in the north of Iraq.
3. Protection of the lives and properties alongside the rights of Iraqi Turks is one of our priorities.

Turkish officials of all ranks have stated the above conditions as Turkey's irreversible with respect to the policy on the north of Iraq. In fact, they went even further and the emergence of a structure in the north of Iraq threatening to Turkish security was declared as a *casus belli*.<sup>555</sup>

Many Turks consider themselves the true casualties of the 1991 Gulf War, believing that their security and economy were more negatively affected by that conflict than those of any other country. Turkey estimates that its economy suffered losses of between \$40 and \$65 billion over the past decade due to reduced trade with a sanctioned and relatively impoverished Iraq, its main trading partner before 1990.<sup>556</sup> Politically, Turkish leaders were extremely concerned over the post-war creation in northern Iraq of a *de facto* Kurdish state, which they continue to perceive as a threat to their national security.

#### **5.2.2.2 To the Beginning of the War**

Turkey considers the United States to be a strategic partner, and the United States views Turkey as a key player in the region. Turkey's leadership role in establishing relations with Israel, its support of the United States during the first Gulf War have all been viewed favorably in Washington. However, as elaborated above, differences in views on Iraq arose after the first Gulf War. The initially skeptical Turkish reaction to US plans for a second war were fed by fears that the United States would try to trade support of an autonomous

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<sup>555</sup>Cemalettin Taşkıran, "Iraq And The Middle East Policies Of Turkey And The USA", Available on site: [http://www.stradigma.com/English/June2003/Articles\\_02.Html](http://www.stradigma.com/English/June2003/Articles_02.Html)

<sup>556</sup>Illene R. Prusher, "Turkey Weighs Economic, Political Costs of a Gulf War", *Christian Science Monitor*, January 10, 2003, Available on site: <http://www.csmonitor.com/>

state of Iraqi Kurds for their backing in a war against Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, both the new Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Bush administration seem to have poorly managed the final negotiations that took place prior to the US attacks on Iraq.<sup>557</sup> For Abdullah Akyüz, Turkish Parliament's rejection of deployment of US troops in Turkey signified failed diplomacy by both US and Turkey.<sup>558</sup>

The United States had requested that Turkey permit 165,000 US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish territory, in spite of the fact that a large majority of Turks were against doing so without a UN resolution specifically sanctioning the war. The United States had insisted also that Ankara refrain from intervening in the conflict, though nearly all Turks believed that it would have a direct impact on their security. These points put considerable strain on the Erdoğan administration at a time when it was also being pressured to support the United Nations plan for Cyprus, to deal with the terms of accession to the European Union (EU), and to respond to the critiques of the EU's largest members, France and Germany, who vocally opposed the war on Iraq.

Ultimately, the new Turkish government undertook not to repeat what it considered tactical mistakes in 1990. This determination, together with the government's lack of experience, public opposition to the war which stood at 83 percent in Turkey<sup>559</sup> and at similar levels in other parts of Europe and in the Middle East (This public opposition is an outgrowth of growing skepticism in Turkey about the US policies in the Middle East and it had an increasing impact on the decision making process in the country)<sup>560</sup>, the high stakes involved, and ambiguity concerning potential benefits of the war for Turkey made many parliamentarians refuse to support the US request. As a result, the Turkish parliament, by a narrow margin, denied US troop's permission to invade Iraq from Turkish territory.<sup>561</sup>

Following the failure of the March 1<sup>st</sup> resolution, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the ruling JDP was elected to Parliament on March 9 and formed a new cabinet on March 14.

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<sup>557</sup> Trudy Rubin, "An ally, and a Pandora's Box: Mishandling of Turkey Could Lead to Disaster", The Philadelphia Enquirer, February 26, 2003.

<sup>558</sup> Abdullah Akyüz, Speech at the National Press Club, Available on site: <http://www.tusiad.us/>

<sup>559</sup> Available on site: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0110/p07s01-woiq.html>

<sup>560</sup> Abdullah Akyüz, "US-Turkey Relations In Light Of The Iraq Crisis", Speech Delivered At The Institute Of Governmental Affairs, May 2, 2003

<sup>561</sup> Sebnem Udum, "Turkey's Position in the Iraq Operation: Bridge or Barrier?", Proliferation Research and Assessment Program, Available on site: <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/turkey.htm>



This development increased expectations in both Turkey and the US that Erdoğan will push for a second resolution asking for Parliamentary approval for opening a northern Front. The fact that the Chief of General Staff pronounced an open support on March 5<sup>th</sup> for such an act had already signaled renewed efforts in the Parliament. Indeed, the Turkish Parliament on March 20 ratified a second resolution granting over flight rights to the coalition forces and authorizing Turkish troops to be deployed in Northern Iraq. It appears that by then the US had already abandoned the “A” plan that required the right to station US troops in Turkey, and did not request this authorization from Turkey anymore.<sup>562</sup>

### **5.2.3 Events Leading to the Invasion**

Following Sept 11 terrorist attacks on World Trade Towers, US President Bush declares a War on Terror, targeting Iraq as a major player in an “Axis of Evil.” Evidence for Iraqi involvement in the attacks is sketchy, but includes a probable contact between hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraq official in Czechoslovakia, as well as evidence of defectors that prospective hijackers were trained at Salman Pak base.<sup>563</sup>

In September 2000, in the Rebuilding America’s Defenses report, the Project for the New American Century planned an attack on Iraq, independently of whether or not Saddam Hussein remained in power. One year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is reported to have written in his notes, “best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit Saddam Hussein at same time. Not only Osama bin Laden”. Shortly thereafter, the George W. Bush administration announced a War on Terrorism, accompanied by the doctrine of preemptive military action dubbed the Bush doctrine<sup>564</sup>

On Sept 14, 2001 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, says that it is “not just simply a matter of capturing people, but ending states who sponsor terrorism”. Wolfowitz gained stature after the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, which he had correctly pointed out as a possibility in 1979. Speculation grows that Iraq may have had a hand in training the

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<sup>562</sup> Abdullah Akyüz, “US-Turkey Relations In Light Of The Iraq Crisis”, Speech Delivered At The Institute Of Governmental Affairs, May 2, 2003

<sup>563</sup> “The Iraq Crisis – Timeline”, Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>564</sup> “2003 invasion of Iraq”, Available on site: [http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.\\_invasion\\_of\\_Iraq](http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._invasion_of_Iraq)

hijackers. James Woolsey, CIA director from 1993-95, speaks of the potential for a “very fruitful marriage between Saddam and Bin Laden”.

On Sept 20, 2001 British and US jets bomb surface to air missile batteries in southern Iraq. A Ministry of Defense official of Iraq denies any connection to the September 11 attacks.

On Sept 21, 2001 US officials tell the Washington Times that Saddam Hussein made contact with Bin Laden days before the attacks. Later, it is verified after repeated denials that hijacker Mohamed Atta met with Iraqi officials in Czechoslovakia. Iraqi defectors claim that hijackers were trained in a mockup Boeing 707 at the Salman Pak base in Iraq.

On Jan 29, 2002 US President George Bush lists Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Syria as part of an “axis of evil” in his state of the nation speech to Congress. “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger,” he says and shifts the focus of US foreign policy from terror groups to government.

On August 2002 Iraq invites chief weapons inspector to Baghdad for talks on resuming inspections.

On Sept 12, 2002 US President George W. Bush addresses a special session of the UN, calls for multilateral action against Iraq. Iraq responds by announcing it will allow inspections unconditionally, but quickly retracts the offer, making it conditional on no new US resolutions.

On Sept 22, 2002 British PM Tony Blair releases dossier showing Iraq has significant WMD capabilities, in an effort to gain support for British role in projected US invasion.<sup>565</sup>

On October 2002, Vice-President Dick Cheney declared that the strategy of Cold War deterrence used against the Soviet Union no longer is viable: “There is only one way to protect ourselves against catastrophic terrorist violence, and that is to destroy the terrorists before they can launch further attacks against the U.S.”<sup>566</sup> And in the same month, the United States Congress granted President Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq. The Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq was

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<sup>565</sup> “The Iraq Crisis Timeline”, Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>566</sup> Stan Crock, “Preemptive War Is the Wrong Weapon”, Business Week Online, 10/22/2003

worded so as to encourage, but not require, UN Security Council approval for military action.<sup>567</sup>

On Nov. 8, 2002 UN Security Council unanimously approves U.S.-drafted resolution aimed at getting Saddam to disarm, after eight weeks of negotiation. The resolution says Saddam will face “serious consequences” if he does not comply with weapons inspectors.<sup>568</sup> For resolution 1441 Iraq must declare all weapons of mass destruction in its possession by December 8, 2002. UN’s inspection teams began inspecting sites in Iraq. The United States also began preparations for an invasion of Iraq, with a host of diplomatic, public relations and military preparations.<sup>569</sup> On Dec 7, 2002 Iraq submits documentation as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1441 that details the disposal of weapons of mass destruction. The document claims that Iraq has disposed of all such weapons. Shortly thereafter, US experts examining the documentation claim it is not complete and convincing.<sup>570</sup>

In February 2003, The US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, proclaimed that there were sufficient forces in the Gulf region for war to be launched at any time. At the weekend, the Pentagon claimed that it had some 200,000 troops in the region, roughly half of them in Kuwait.<sup>571</sup> On March 1, 2003 Arab summit in Sharm el-Shaikh calls on Iraq to disarm, but does not call for regime change in Iraq; Iraq begins destroying Samoud II missiles which have a range greater than that allowed by the UN. On March 7, 2003, U.S. and Britain calling for a second resolution that will authorize a war against Iraq, with stiff opposition from France, Russia, Germany and Arab countries.<sup>572</sup>

#### **5.2.4 The Beginning of the Conflict**

American air war commanders carried out a comprehensive plan to disrupt Iraq’s military command and control system before the Iraq war.<sup>573</sup> In other words, the Iraq War began in

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<sup>567</sup> “2003 invasion of Iraq”, Ibid

<sup>568</sup> “Key events since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait”, Available on site: <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/side/1653989>

<sup>569</sup> “2003 Invasion of Iraq”, Ibid

<sup>570</sup> “The Iraq Crisis – Timeline”, Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>571</sup> Raymond Whitaker, “US and Britain Pound Iraqi Defenses in Massive Escalation of Air Strikes”, the Independent/UK, February 23, 2003

<sup>572</sup> “The Iraq Crisis – Timeline”, Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>573</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Attacked Iraqi Defenses Starting in 2002”, New York Times, July 19, 2003

late 2002, when the United States and Britain stepped up their attacks on Iraqi air defenses in ways that increasingly acted more as suppression of enemy air defense activity than punitive efforts to enforce the no fly zones. From March 1 on, such attacks built to the point where Iraq could have had no doubt that it was losing its capability to maintain cohesive air defense and could be under attack within days. At the same time, it can be argued that the very reality of this threat should have persuaded Iraq to accept the US and British ultimatum. These same air strikes destroyed much of the optical fiber communications systems Iraq relied upon for secure communications, forcing Iraq to use high frequency radio communications that could be easily characterized and tracked, and sometimes decrypted.<sup>574</sup>

Long before then, the US and Britain had moved much of the supplies and equipment they needed into the theater by seeing, and had created new basing and support facilities in Kuwait and other Gulf countries. These steps were critical because some 80% of more of all heavy equipment, weapons, and supplies had to move by sea, which took some six to eight weeks. Moreover, creating combat ready bases allowed the rapid movement of personnel by air under conditions where such personnel could quickly “marry up” with the necessary weapons, supplies, and facilities.

General Franks had deliberately exploited Turkey’s decision to not allow the US and Britain to base forces in Turkey by delaying the movement of the ships carrying equipment from the US 4th Mechanized Division from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Franks knew the division could not close quickly enough on Kuwait to be ready for the war, but by acting as if the US might still be able to move through Turkey he created a deception plan that helped pin down most of the 13 divisions Iraq had deployed north of Baghdad.

Two Special Operations Groups of CIA and Special Forces teams had long been present in Northern Iraq, and the CIA seems to have made an extensive effort to persuade or bribe Iraqi officers not to fight before the war started. More than 5012-member US Special Forces A teams had entered the Iraqi desert, along with British and Australian Special Forces. They prepared to take out Iraqi observation posts along Iraq’s borders with

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<sup>574</sup> Much of this description of prewar activity is based upon Joseph L. Galloway, “Franks: We Held 25% of Iraq before War,” Miami Herald, June 20, 2003.

Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Other Special Forces teams looked for Scud missiles and the deployment of chemical and biological weapons. British and Australian Special Forces were also present, but all details of their operations are classified.<sup>575</sup>

The start of hostilities came after the expiration of a 48-hour deadline which was set by U.S. President George W. Bush, demanding that Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, ending the diplomatic Iraq disarmament crisis.

The US military operations in this war were conducted under the name of **Operation Iraqi Freedom**. The UK military operations in this war were conducted under the name of **Operation Telic**. The Australian codename was **Operation Falconer**.<sup>576</sup>

At 9:34 PM EST on March 19, 2003 (5:34 AM local time in Baghdad on March 20), United States and United Kingdom forces consisting of 40 cruise missiles and strikes led by 2 F-117s from the 8th Fighter Squadron (supported by Navy EA-6B Prowlers) and other aircraft began conducting military operations against the state of Iraq designed to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and to remove the Iraqi Regime from power. Less than two hours after a deadline expired for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq, the sound of air raid sirens were heard in Baghdad. A short time later, President Bush addressed the American public stating that coalition forces were in the “early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”<sup>577</sup>

The attack came when the United States had only part of the forces included in its original war plan. It came before any of the forces from the US Army 4th Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Cavalry Division could begin large-scale movement away from the Turkish theater where they had originally planned to fight toward the Gulf. The attack also began before the 101st Airborne Division could deploy most of its equipment.<sup>578</sup>

The Coalition also changed its war plan to delay plans to execute a massive preparatory air campaign of 2–3 days and some 3,000 precision strikes. Instead, U.S. and British ground

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<sup>575</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington DC, 2003, p.53-54

<sup>576</sup> “2003 invasion of Iraq”, *Ibid*

<sup>577</sup> “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, Available on site: [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi\\_freedom\\_d25.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom_d25.htm)

<sup>578</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *Ibid*, p.53-54

forces drove into Iraq with little preparatory air bombardment because it was hoped that the decapitation strike on the regime would deprive its armed forces of leadership and the will to fight and that an air campaign of the scale that might interfere with nation-building could be avoided. Roughly 24 targets were also removed from the prewar strike plan while waiting to see if the leadership had been killed, including sites with a high risk of civilian casualties and leadership sites and communications nodes that might be needed to disseminate the information that the regime has collapsed.<sup>579</sup>




Figure 5.7 Map of Iraq<sup>580</sup>

General Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, later responded as follows to a question asking if the war would have gone better with more forces on the ground:

“I think less well. If you look at the initial objectives-trying to have some modicum of tactical surprise at the time we had over 220,000 forces in the region- how do you achieve tactical surprise? Well, it’s not by amassing 500,000 to 600,000 folks in Kuwait and Saudi

<sup>579</sup> Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “An Air War of Might, Coordination, and Risks”, Washington Post, April 27, 2003

<sup>580</sup> Available on site: <http://www.af.mil/news/opscenter/maps.html>

Arabia. I think we were clearly inside the decision loop capability of the regime. We started the war first, before the air war.”<sup>581</sup>

In retrospect, it is hard to argue with the Coalition’s level of military success. There are times to take well-reasoned risks, and victory is its own validation.

### **5.2.5 Land Forces Enters the Iraq**

Iraq launched its first theater missile against Kuwait on March 20. Coalition land forces pushed into Iraq. The 3rd Commando Brigade conducted an amphibious assault on the Al Faw peninsula, encountering light resistance. Casualties were inflicted on the enemy and prisoners taken. Oil infrastructure was successfully secured to prevent Saddam Hussein from attempting to release oil as an environmental weapon. Elements of 1(UK) Armored Division also entered Iraq along with other Coalition forces, thrusting towards Basra.

U.S. Marines seized the port of Umm Qasr, and Royal Navy mine hunters began work to clear the associated waterways of any mines. With the advanced of American Ground forces, many of Iraqi forces surrendered.

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<sup>581</sup> “Interview: General Richard Myers,” Defense News, April 14, 2003, p.46.




Figure 5.8 Iraq War map<sup>582</sup>




Figure 5.9 Prisoners of war<sup>583</sup>

<sup>582</sup> Available on site: <http://bbsnews.net/bbsnphotos/>

<sup>583</sup> Milliyet, 22 March 2003



The 3rd U.S. Infantry Division advanced north toward Baghdad. U.S. troops, supported by British specialist personnel secured oilfields in the Basra area.

U.S. warships and Royal Navy submarines launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles at high-value targets including command and control centers in Baghdad. Three U.S. ships and two British submarines that were part of the Coalition Forces Maritime Component launched TLAMs during the previous night's military operations to disarm Iraq. The ships included the Aegis guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) in the Persian Gulf and two Los Angeles class submarines, USS Columbia (SSN 771) and USS Providence (SSN 719). The Royal Navy submarines that launched Tomahawks include the Trafalgar class HMS Turbulent and the Swiftsure class HMS Splendid.

Other Royal Navy vessels provided naval gunfire to support the advance of 3 Commando Brigade.

In the air, Coalition aircraft, including RAF assets, were involved in a wide variety of operations. Tornado GR4s attacked key facilities, and Harrier GR7s provided close air support. Other aircraft, including tankers, provided invaluable support.

A U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 Sea Knight with 12 U.S. and UK personnel aboard crashed in Kuwait south of Umm Qasr, near Highway 801 in Kuwait; there were no survivors. Enemy action was not thought to have been the cause.

News sources reported that Iraq fired seven missiles at Kuwait, four of which were intercepted; the remaining missiles were allowed to land in unpopulated areas and caused no casualties after missile defense systems calculated that their point of impact was inconsequential and they should not be engaged.

Unconfirmed media reports stated that Iraqi forces moved missile launchers from the Basra area to Qurnah. The report quoted military sources as stating the missile attacks were not random launches and were aimed at U.S. positions in Kuwait. Iraq fired six Ababil-100 missiles at several targets in Kuwait, including the "Thunder Road" staging area for the 101st Airborne Division; Camp Doha, command center for coalition forces; Camp Udari, another staging area; the Ali Al Salem airbase; and Tactical Assembly Area Fox, a large

Marine logistics base. Of these six missiles, four were shot down, while the two launched against Tactical Assembly Area Fox missed their target. Additionally, Iraqi forces launched a CSS-C-3 Seersucker cruise missile at the headquarters of the 1st MEF at Camp Commando.<sup>584</sup>

### **5.2.6 U.S. Delineated the Military Objectives**

With the beginnings of the conflict, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined the military objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom:

Objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom consist of first, ending the regime of Saddam Hussein; Second, to identify, isolate and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; Third, to search for, to capture and to drive out terrorists from the country; Fourth, to collect intelligence related to terrorist networks; Fifth, to collect such intelligence as is related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction; Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needed citizens; Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. Finally, to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.<sup>585</sup>

### **5.2.7 U.S. Ground Force's Advance to the Baghdad**

As ground forces continued to make good progress, air campaign stepped up, aimed at several hundred military targets throughout Iraq. Coalition aircraft flew some 3,000 sorties in the air attack.

Sources differ over the scale of the air assault. US CENTAF reported that the air campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom launched into high gear shortly before 1:00 p.m. EST on March 21, as hundreds of Coalition aircraft and cruise missiles targeted select regime leadership and military targets in Baghdad and other various cities. Military command and control installations, structures, and buildings were the targeted sites. Other cities with

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<sup>584</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *Ibid*, p. 58

<sup>585</sup> Operation Iraqi Freedom, Available on site: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/>

military sites targeted were the northern towns of Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tikrit. More than 1,700 air sorties and 504 TLAM and CALCM cruise missiles were used.<sup>586</sup>

The USAF in the United States reported that the coalition flew 1,500 sorties, 700 of which were flown by strike aircraft. The rest were jammers, bomber escorts, surveillance, etc., during the 24-hour period that started March 21 at 1:00 p.m. EST.

- **The coalition** launched a total of 600 cruise missiles-500 Navy sea-launched cruise missiles [Tomahawks] and 100 Air Force air-launched cruise missiles [CALCMs].
- [The missiles were aimed at some 1,000 targets, also known as aim-points all over Iraq Military command and control installations, structures, and buildings were the targeted sites. Other cities with military sites targeted were the northern towns of Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tikrit.
- Planes involved were B-52 bombers, B-2 stealth bombers, and F-117 stealth fighter-bombers. F-15s were used for air defense suppression. Anti-aircraft fire was encountered, but no opposition from Iraqi aircraft.




Figure 5.10 B-52 bombers<sup>587</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> T. Michael Mosley, Operation Iraqi Freedom-By the Numbers, USCENAF, Assessment and Analysis Division, April 30, 2003.

- The air campaign was adjusted in stride, as it was under way. Some planes hit the targets they had been tasked with upon departure; others had their targets shifted en route. Combined Force Air Component Commander Lt. General Michael Moseley, head of the air campaign, was described as “the quarterback of the operation, calling audibles in response to changing circumstances.”

- The early success of the air campaign allowed the Coalition to further reduce its target list by hundreds of targets, including rail lines, bridges, power stations, and other facilities. It was clear that striking them was not necessary to support the land advance and they would have great value for nation-building once the war was over.<sup>588</sup>

On 3-4 April, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander reported daily and total sorties on April 3 as follows:

On April 3, the daily U.S. air effort totaled

- 1,900 total missions
- 850 attack missions-85 percent focused on “destroying Iraqi ground troops”
- 450 air refueling tanker missions
- 200 cargo airlift missions
- 100 command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

Since the start of the war (through Tuesday):

- 23,000 sorties flown
- 27.1 million gallons of fuel pumped into planes on refueling missions
- 31,000 short tons of cargo moved by aircraft

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<sup>587</sup> Available on site: <http://www.ntua.gr/dep/Iraq-War/>

<sup>588</sup> Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “An Air War of Might, Coordination, and Risks”, Washington Post, April 27, 2003

- 38,000 passengers moved since October 2002

- 26 million leaflets dropped (apparently different than what USCENTCOM says... but these are the numbers being turned out by the Air Force)

Coalition forces struck Iraqi Air Force headquarters buildings in central Baghdad. The first fixed-wing Coalition aircraft (A-10s) were based at Tallil Airport in Iraq on April 4.

The land component attacked further into the defenses of Baghdad, seizing key objectives. Concurrently, operations continued to eliminate paramilitaries and regime elements remaining in urban areas within the zone of attack. V Corps forces completed the destruction of the Medina Division April 3 and continued their march to Baghdad. The 3rd Infantry Division continued its attack through the Karbala Gap, with soldiers from 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teaming with soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team to isolate Karbala and deny enemy forces freedom of maneuver. Soldiers from the 3rd BCT also rendered more than 30 enemy armor weapon systems inoperable in a military compound in their sector.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) completed the isolation of An Najaf, denying enemy paramilitary forces access to the city. The division was able to enlist the help of a local cleric to begin distributing humanitarian assistance supplies to the populace. The 82nd Airborne Division conducted direct action missions against paramilitary and Iraqi intelligence service facilities in an effort to secure the As Samawah area. Soldiers from the division's 2nd Brigade established positions to ensure that coalition supply routes remained secure.

Coalition special operations forces in northern Iraq continued concentrated air attacks against regime military forces in northern Iraq, maintaining effective control of roads leading into and out of Iraq and roads between Baghdad and Tikrit. Special operations forces in key locations throughout the country were positioned to locate regime facilities or strategic systems and to direct precision fires to destroy them.

Operations were conducted to ensure reply lines remained open, especially in As-Samawah and An-Najaf. The U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force continued its attack

toward Baghdad, destroying remnants of the Baghdad Republican Guard division near al-Kut and elements of the Al Nida Republican Guard division between al-Kut and Baghdad. During the fighting near al-Kut, three Marine tanks were hit by Iraqi fire. It was not known whether the tanks were disabled or destroyed. Additionally, CENTCOM relieved the commander of the 1st Marine Regiment of the 1st MEF, Colonel Dowdy. No further explanation of the dismissal was given.

Elements of the 1st MEF encountered foreign volunteers in fighting near Azizyah, southeast of Baghdad. Thought to be largely Syrian and Egyptian, these irregulars tended to be somewhat more steadfast than many of their Iraqi counterparts. V Corps secured southern approaches to Baghdad and captured the Saddam International Airport to the west of the city. Two Marine pilots were killed in the crash of their AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter in central Iraq. In the south, UK forces continued to expand the area influenced by the coalition and efforts to rid Basra of regime death squads. Aggressive patrols in the vicinity of al- Zubair, just north and west of Basra, resulted in the seizure of a cache of 56 surface-to surface short-range ballistic missiles and four missile launchers.

A suspected nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training school in western Iraq was investigated by Coalition forces.<sup>589</sup>

### **5.2.8 The “Battle of Baghdad”**

One of the most striking aspects of the climactic battles of the Iraq War-Is that the much anticipated “Battle of Baghdad” involved a series of relatively small battles rather than a climactic encounter. By the time the battle began, Coalition air power had already inflicted massive damage on Iraq’s Republican Guard and other units that had actively maneuvered or fought. It had destroyed much of Iraq’s command and control capability and had shocked many units to into ceasing to maneuver to fight or even into disbanding.

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<sup>589</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington DC, 2003, p.80-81




Figure 5.11 Map of Baghdad<sup>590</sup>

The Coalition had also achieved an unprecedented degree of “air dominance” that allowed it to fly stacks of attack aircraft around the city with a wide range of different attack sensors and munitions that allowed on-call destruction of targets with minimal collateral damage. It was able to fly A-10s in low-altitude strafing missions and use attack helicopters for urban close air support. It could also operate normally vulnerable slow fliers like refueling tankers and sensor aircraft like the E-8C JSTARS in more forward positions where they could support the air battle. V Corps successful push through the Karbala Gap, and the weakness of the remaining Republican Guard defense, opened up the defenses of Baghdad before the Iraqi regime could reposition its forces to the limited extent it could do so in the face of Coalition airpower. It became apparent that the Republican Guard had been shattered outside of Baghdad, and the large numbers of regular army forces remaining either could or would not maneuver effectively against advancing Coalition forces.

This was less true in the 1st MEF area. The Marine Corps line of advance pushed through significant concentrations of regular forces and was inherently more vulnerable to attack.

<sup>590</sup> Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/baghdad2.htm>

Nevertheless, the Marines advanced with remarkable speed, given the size of the remaining Iraqi ground forces.<sup>591</sup>

The sudden V Corps drive into Baghdad's international airport both exposed the overall weakness of the remaining Iraqi forces and divided them, and it enabled the Coalition to launch deep armored penetrations and raids into Baghdad. These "thunder runs" showed that the Coalition could defeat Iraq's remaining forces, and they proved to the Iraqi defenders that the regime's claims about Coalition defeats were false. They demoralized some of the defenders, further weakened the Iraqi regime's control over the city and the nation, and again forced the remaining elements of Iraqi forces into something approaching meeting engagements that made them far more vulnerable than a positioned and dug-in defense.<sup>592</sup>



Figure 5.12 Saddam international Airport<sup>593</sup>

The sheer speed of the V Corps and 1st MEF penetration into the regime's center of power in Baghdad, the permeating shock of continuing precision air strikes, and the operations of

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<sup>591</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington DC, 2003, p.82-83

<sup>592</sup> For a good description of Iraqi attitudes and the combined impact of such runs and Coalition air attacks, see William Branigan, "A Brief Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers," *Washington Post*, April 27, 2003, p. A-25.

<sup>593</sup> Available on site: <http://www.azcentral.com/news/specials/iraq/retro-photogallery.html>



Special Forces and the 173rd Airborne Brigade largely paralyzed and then defeated most Iraqi resistance in the west and north as effective fighting forces. More broadly, arms caches scattered throughout Baghdad and the country by the Iraqi regime indicated that the regime may have believed it could rely on the mass mobilization of the Iraqi people through the Popular Army. In practice, however, no such mobilization occurred. Cadres of regime loyalists did fight and presented a serious problem in terms of urban warfare in many cities in the south, but only as cadres-not as forces backed by large-scale popular support. The regime had similar cadres in Baghdad, but remarkably little popular support. Only relatively small elements of the Republican Guard and regular army forces made dedicated efforts to infiltrate back into the city to support its defense.

As a result, the regime of Saddam Hussein had little or no ability to conduct any kind of mass urban warfare throughout the city. V Corps and the 1st MEF were able to choose their areas and lines of attack with considerable flexibility and without encountering asymmetric tactics like mass suicide attacks or being dragged into house-by-house fighting. There was loyalist resistance, but it tended to disperse and melt away after initial defeats. The result was that the fighting inside the city became more of a pacification campaign than classic urban warfare. One of the practical lessons of the conflict is that a tightly centralized dictatorship, with no convincing popular ideology and support, is inherently vulnerable to a strike at its center of power.<sup>594</sup>

### **5.2.9 The End of the Battle of Baghdad and Movement towards Tikrit**

By April 10 and 11, Coalition forces had effectively defeated organized resistance in Baghdad and could begin to deploy elements of their land forces toward Tikrit. At that point, it was still not clear whether the U.S. V Corps and 1 MEF forces would meet serious Iraqi resistance as they moved north.

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<sup>594</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington DC, 2003,p.83




Figure 5.13 American forces in to Baghdad<sup>595</sup>

While U.S. intelligence estimated that most of the Republican Guard had been destroyed, there were indications that up to one brigade of the Republican Guard, along with Special Republican Guard forces, might be digging in the area of Tikrit. Many of the combat forces of the three Iraqi regular army corps in the north had been heavily bombed but had not yet come under meaningful land attack, and at least some elements seemed to be a potential threat. Even so, most of the remaining 10 regular army divisions surrendered or collapsed, and there seemed to be only elements of one brigade of the Adnan Division of the Republican Guard left near Tikrit. Even before 22 days of bombing and attack, the Adnan Division was only mediocre quality by Guard standards, and a brigade would have had only around 50–60 tanks even at full strength.

Although no precise characterization of Iraq's remaining forces was possible, Tikrit seemed to have had additional elements of the Special Republican Guard, even though these had no more strength than the equivalent of a few battalions. The heavy 4th Brigade does not seem to have deployed its armor to Tikrit from Baghdad, but some reinforcement was possible. Other elements of the Special Republican Guards that might have been in Tikrit included:

- Survivors from the 2nd Brigade, which was normally headquartered at the Al Rashid military base and had combat elements outside Baghdad and in the Mosul area. Three battalions—the 11th, 14th, and 15th—seemed reasonably well suited for urban fighting, and a few elements may have moved toward Tikrit. It was unclear whether any engaged the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division when it seized the airport on April 3/4t or the 1st Marine Division on

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<sup>595</sup> Posta and Akşam, 10 April 2003

the fighting of 4/5. The brigade may have taken serious losses-all forces had been hit hard from the air-and it probably had lost most major facilities and at least 70-80 percent of its effectiveness.

- The 4th Battalion was a significant combat unit that protected Saddam's palace in Makhool in the Bayji area north of Baghdad. The 6th Battalion protected the palaces in the Mosul area. The 11th Battalion guarded the approaches to Baghdad from the direction of Taji. The 14th Battalion guarded the approaches to Baghdad from the direction of Salman Pak and Al Kut. The 15th Battalion was part of the western defenses of Baghdad.

- The 3rd Brigade was headquartered at Taji and had four combat battalions to defend Taji and the approaches to Baghdad. All forces had been hit hard from the air and had probably lost most major facilities and at least 70-80 percent of their effectiveness. The 3rd Battalion was a rapid reaction combat force. The 9<sup>th</sup> Battalion protected the palaces and road approaches in the Tharthar area. The 10<sup>th</sup> Battalion was a combat unit in Taji that protected Baghdad from the direction of north and northwest.

As for the regular divisions in the north, one of the great mysteries of the War-Is why Saddam left so many forces in place rather than rush them south the moment it was clear the 4th U.S. Army Infantry Division was not coming through Turkey. These divisions were in place near the Kurdish area and Iranian border, and they too were hit hard for 19 days.

The regular army forces were hit hard from the air during the initial weeks of the war. Kirkuk and Arbil had been liberated, and Mosul had surrendered. This had a major impact on the regular army forces that remained:

- The 1st Corps had 1 Mechanized Division; 3 Infantry Divisions. It had its headquarters at Khaleed Camp (al Rashid Command Center) in Kirkuk City. It included the 2nd Infantry Division headquartered at Alrabee, the 5th Mechanized division headquartered at Shuwan, the 8th Infantry Division headquartered at Shuwan, and the 38th Infantry Division headquartered at Quader Karam. These forces were under significant air attack from D3 on and then were under pressure from the land as well because of U.S. deployments in the north. Most units were believed to have broken up and disbanded by April 9. The full status was unknown.

- The 5th Corps had 1 mechanized division and 3 infantry divisions. It had its headquarters at Alsalamia Camp (Amouria Command Center) in Mosul. When the war began, it had units defending the border area with Syria and Turkey as well as covering other parts of the north. It included the 1st Mechanized Division headquartered at Makhmur, the 4th Infantry Division headquartered at Bashiqa Maonten, the 7th Infantry Division headquartered at Alton Kopri Castle, and the 16th Infantry Division headquartered near the Saddam Dam and Mosul. 5th Corps forces were under significant air attack from D3 on and then under pressure because of US land force deployments in the north. The corps commander surrendered on April 11. Most units were believed to have broken up and disbanded and the full status was unknown.

- The 2nd Corps was headquartered at the Mansouria Alabal Camp (Al Yarmouk Command Center) in Deyala, and when the war began it was deployed east of Baghdad to defend against Iran or any attack by Iranian-backed Iraqi opposition forces. It included the 3rd Armored Division headquartered at Jalawia, the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division headquartered at Amerli, and the 34th Infantry Division headquartered near Khanaqin. These units too had been under significant air attack and recently under limited pressure because of U.S. deployments in the north. Some units of the Corps had retreated and others had disbanded.

It is still unclear exactly why Iraqi forces collapsed so quickly. As the following chronology shows, the U.S. forces did not have to fight the expected battle of Tikrit and did not meet major organized resistance from other Iraqi forces. A combination of several causes—the fall of Baghdad, silence from the regime, weeks of precision air bombing, the breakdown in Iraqi command and control capability, and the sheer demoralization of a force that had lost cohesion and organized capability to resist—seem to have led to the rapid collapse of the remaining Iraqi force structure. In most cases, the regular forces were so shattered by air power, and so defeated in political and psychological terms, that they ceased to fight.<sup>596</sup>

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<sup>596</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington DC, 2003, p.96-99

### 5.2.10 The End of the Conflict and First Efforts at the Transition to Nation Building

By the 13 of April, the last remnants of organized resistance by main Iraqi units were fading and Saddam Hussein's regime had lost control over every major town in Iraq. It is not clear why no meaningful defense of Tikrit took place, but few cities in Iraq were more of a "free fire zone" for attack:

- Tikrit had a number of bunkers and a tunnel network. At the same time, it had been steadily bombed, and it had poor urban geography to defend.
- It was long and narrow, with little defensive depth.
- It had been given so much money that its streets were often wide and open.
- The main palace complex was totally outside the city with no defensive shield in terms of civilian areas. The palaces inside the city were wide open.
- There were three airports on the outskirts that had to be defended.
- It had many major equipment and storage centers and command and control facilities but these too had been hit from the air.
- There were many major routes into the city or just north and south of it, and a bridge crossed the Tigris from the east in its center,
- A major four-lane bypass passed by the city on the west, allowing easy movement without entering the city.
- The terrain was relatively trafficable off-road all around the city.

In any case, there was no formal regime surrender, and no smooth transition from war to peace. If anything, war with Iraqi forces faded into peacemaking duties and dealing with Iraq's divided factions while simultaneously attempting to deal with humanitarian concerns and nation-building.<sup>597</sup>

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<sup>597</sup> Ibid, p.105-106

On May 1, 2003 President Bush has declared an end to the Iraq war.<sup>598</sup>

### **5.2.11 Casualties of the War**

The U.S. had more than 300,000 troops in the Iraq War. Here are some details about the casualties since the beginnings of the War.

-Total Casualties are **591**(USA: 495, UK: 56, others: 40)

-Total Wounded: **2849** (Hostile: 2461, No hostile: 388)

-Total Fatalities since May 1st: **356**

-Hostile US Fatalities since May 1st: **229**

-Hostile Fatalities since May 1st: **276**

-US deaths since July 2nd: **290** (Bush announces, “Bring them on”)

-Total Hostile Fatalities since December 13th: **37** (Saddam Hussein is captured)<sup>599</sup>

This war cost the lives of at least 1,101 Iraqi civilians, many of them women and children, according to records at the city’s 19 largest hospitals. The civilian death toll was almost certainly higher. The hospital records say that another 1,255 dead were “probably” civilians, including many women and children.<sup>600</sup>

### **5.3 NEW TRENDS WITH KURDS AND TURKEY’S SENSITIVENESS ABOUT NORTH OF IRAQ**

The new government as well has repeated Turkish aforementioned sensitivities at all levels parallel to the official organs of the state. The determined attitude of the Turkish Armed Forces in the days whether or not the second troops motion would be endorsed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly was being discussed should be added to this. In the days when both the US and the EU were clearly demanding Turkey not to enter the north of

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<sup>598</sup> “The Iraq Crisis – Timeline”, Available on site: <http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm>

<sup>599</sup> “Military Fatalities: By Time Period”, Available on site: <http://lunaville.org/warcasualties/Summary.aspx>

<sup>600</sup> “Baghdad battle killed 2,300”, Available on site: <http://www.ccmep.org/>

Iraq, Özkök has declared that Turkish Army would not enter the north of Iraq should the following conditions not appear:

1. The emergence of a migration movement from the north toward our borders,
2. An attack by one group in the north on another,
3. An attack on Turkish Army from any group,
4. Entry of peshmerge groups into Mosul and Kirkuk.<sup>601</sup>

Unfortunately, the US attack on Iraq commenced afterwards. On the 18th-19th day of the attack, Iraqi Forces dissolved and the peshmerge in the north of Iraq have seized the opportunity of the power vacuum in the north of Iraq emanating from the shortage of US troops and the collapse of the Ba'ath regime to enter Kirkuk first and Mosul later on. Not only have they entered these two Turkish cities - cities which Turkey has assertively stated from the outset that it does not want the peshmerge to enter- but also they have looted government buildings in the cities. That the first venues to be looted were land and population registry offices in both cities shows that the peshmerge wanted to erase records to relegate the Turkish (Turkmen) population into a minority on paper.<sup>602</sup> Peshmerge declared that they would withdraw from the two cities as soon as American troops arrive and transfer the control of the cities to US troops upon Turkey's sensitivities and US pressure indirectly. Peshmerge who have entered Kirkuk on April 10th have still not evacuated the two cities. Peshmerge exerted pressure on Iraqi Turks for the evacuation of Turkmen offices in Kirkuk and they even demanded the evacuation of Iraqi Turkmen Front offices within a given period. Furthermore, dozens of Iraqi Turks were massacred by the peshmerge

Of course, what Turkey should have done was not to overlook its former commitments. One of the fundamental sensitiveness of the Turkish state and the Turkish nation is the Mosul-Kirkuk issue. Declaring that "I will enter the north of Iraq should these conditions occur or I will consider these conditions as a casus-belli" requires exhibiting the necessary

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<sup>601</sup> Posta 27 March 2003,

<sup>602</sup> Akşam 13 April 2003

determination when those conditions hold. It is understood that the peshmerge, in coordination with the USA, are testing Turkey's determination. Events that unfolded in Kirkuk and Mosul can be thought of as the infrastructure of a new "formation". Moreover, Turkey has listed breaches to the security of the lives and properties of Iraqi Turks as a reason requiring entry into the north of Iraq.

One of the questions that come to mind here is the question of "why Turkey does not execute what it said before?" It is understood from attitudes and statements up until now that Turkey has left the resolution of matters which it had said would require its entry into the north of Iraq to the US. Verbal guarantee from the US to Turkey that "your sensitivities will be taken into account and matters that worry you will not be allowed to flourish" was considered sufficient. However, it cannot be said that the US really takes Turkey's worries with respect to the north of Iraq into account. Everyone knows that the peshmerge in the north of Iraq have organized themselves into tribal structures and they operate within this structure. It was sufficient for peshmerge leaders Talabani and Barzani to say "Don't enter Mosul and Kirkuk!" However, what was said seems to be the contrary. When one peshmerge group acted quickly and entered Kirkuk, the other proposed cooperation to Turkey to evacuate that group from there. After Turkey's silence, the peshmerge group that made the proposal to Turkey has entered the city of Mosul this time and maintained balance according to itself. The seizure of heavy weaponry possessed by the Iraqi army left during the retreat by the two groups alongside PKK-KADEK militants as they entered these cities formerly controlled by the Saddam regime is a matter of concern and a condition to the disadvantage of Turkey and Iraqi Turks.

The US has not prevented peshmerge groups in the north of Iraq from entering Mosul and Kirkuk. This cannot be explained on the basis of the absence of a sufficient amount of troops in the region. Thinking that Talabani and Barzani can deviate from US direction is not realistic at this stage. What is understood is that the US has taken a blind eye on peshmerge entry into Mosul and Kirkuk. Verbal guarantees given to Turkey over this issue may have no meaning beyond saving the day. As far as international relations and international law are concerned, these promises are not binding guarantees. The US seems to be willing to review its relations with Turkey in a new framework upon the rejection by the TGNA of the request to open a northern front. In this new assessment, the US seems to



be intent on making Turkey feel its thought that the political, economic and military support it offered to Turkey for years has not been reciprocated (?).

However, such an approach in relations between states is quite wrong and dangerous. Regional interests and evaluations on the region of very distant states like Turkey and the US in different geographical regions will naturally be different from each other and at times clash. In such cases, it will be wrong for the parties to instantly react and take up a position that might harm the other party.

For instance, what will the result be if Turkey thinks that it might have been exploited in the Iraq issue, that what is demanded of it is entirely geared toward maintaining the security of another country, that in the long-term the demands would hurt Turkey's interests in the region and of a nature destroying its prestige in the region and determine its position in the light of these thoughts? What is conceivable is that Turkey might not be strong enough to take such a position and in that case the US position would be more meaningful. This is not an acceptable approach either. It needs to be remembered that economic, political and military power are not permanent. When who was a strong power ten years, fifteen years, two centuries ago is recalled, the incorrectness of this approach will be evident.

It is imperative to look at latest developments regarding the north of Iraq from the standpoints of both the future of Turkish-American relations and Turkey's security. News that "the US demanded Turkey to terminate Turkish military presence in the north of Iraq" has rightfully attracted the attention of the Turkish public to the north of Iraq again. In particular, the capture of heavy weaponry belonging to the Iraqi army by PKK or KADEK militants, which the US either tolerates or overlooks, has introduced a new and very important security dimension to the issue. Turkish officials have stated that there are around 5000 PKK militants equipped with heavy weaponry in the region, that this constitutes an important security problem and that the Turkish Armed Forces would not retreat its forces in the region until this threat is completely eliminated. Despite that highest-ranking US officials have stated that PKK militants would be disarmed and passivated, it can be predicted that promises of this sort will serve more than keeping us busy when rather unfriendly statements and procedures from the US to Turkey lately are

taken into account. U.S. has been stating that it will disarm PKK militants in the region and either integrate them into the Iraqi army or expel them from the region. What seems to be the case is that US officials are continuing their delaying tactics.

As we know, for a long time Turkish foreign policy is unfortunately based on preserving and maintaining the status quo. Such a policy is not dynamic; it is not prepared for unexpected events. However, just as much as it is not possible to maintain the status quo at all times, sometimes not maintaining it may be a more correct policy. In any case, strong and sudden deviations particularly in foreign policy should be avoided.<sup>603</sup>

Turkey has since begun to adjust its policies to the changed regional security environment, focusing on strategies for dealing with Iran, post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, and Israel. Perceiving continued and renewed threats to its territorial integrity, Ankara is focused on promoting stability in its immediate area –including in the economic arena – and it is actively monitoring any potential upsurge in the momentum or activities of Kurdish autonomy movements in Turkey and northern Iraq.<sup>604</sup>

## **5.4 QUAGMIRE OF USA IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

### **5.4.1 Guerilla Warfare**

The ongoing resistance in Iraq is concentrated in, but not limited to, an area known as the Sunni triangle and Baghdad. Critics point out that the regions where violence is most common are also the most populated regions. This resistance may be described as guerilla warfare. The tactics used thus far include mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPG, as well as purported sabotage against the oil infrastructure.<sup>605</sup>

These attackers were able to strike and hide largely because the Sunnis in the areas where they operated still feared the return of the old regime, and because much of the population resented the US and British occupation for its initial failures in providing security and aid. It was not clear that there was popular support for such attacks, and indeed some polls

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<sup>603</sup> Cemalettin Taşkıran, “Iraq And The Middle East Policies Of Turkey And The USA”, Available on site: <http://www.stradigma.com/English/June2003/>

<sup>604</sup> Sebnem Udum, “Turkey’s Position in the Iraq Operation: Bridge or Barrier?”, Proliferation Research and Assessment Program, Available on site: <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/turkey.htm>

<sup>605</sup> “2003 invasion of Iraq”, Ibid

showed just the opposite. The attacks were also taking place at a time when the US and British nation building effort was only beginning to gather momentum, and the US and Britain still had ample opportunity to succeed in conflict termination and nation building. Moreover, on July 21, the US was able to kill Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay, showing it could find and capture or kill even the most senior Ba'athist. By that time, it had also captured or killed 37 of the 52 top leaders in the "deck of cards" the US had used to list the most threatening members of Saddam's regime, and had some 600- 800 other leaders in custody.<sup>606</sup>

At the same time, the rise of localized violence in Iraq did create the risk of more serious forms of guerrilla warfare and illustrate the need for a well managed military and strategic linkage between war fighting and nation building.

#### **5.4.2 Possible Developments in the Future of Iraq**

There were three major scenarios for the success or failure of nation building.

##### **5.4.2.1 The Best Case Scenario**

The best case scenario was that the US-led nation building and security efforts would get enough direction, coordination, and resources to steadily gather momentum in spite of early mistakes and Ba'athist and other attempts to sabotage the nation building effort. Effective Iraqi police forces would supplement the coalition security effort. The US and its allies would begin to work with the Iraqis to set clearly defined goals for nation building that won the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. An effort to draft a new constitution would gather popular support and succeed. Some form of pluralist federalism would be created to deal with Iraq's ethnic and sectarian divisions. The nation building effort would find a way to resume oil exports and get enough outside investment support economic reform and development in ways the Iraqi people do not see as an effort to seize their patrimony.<sup>607</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> Tomas E. Ricks, "Hussein's Two Sons Killed in firefight with US Troops", The Washington Post, July 23, 2003

<sup>607</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington DC, 2003, p.361

#### **5.4.2.2 Probable Scenario**

The most probable scenario was mixed success in nation building. This was success of a kind that put Iraq on a better political and economic path, but did so in a climate of lingering low-level security threats and continuing Iraqi ethnic and sectarian tensions. Such success would have many limits but would still be far better for the Iraqi than the rule of Saddam Hussein. It would still give the US and other nation-builders a victory and allow them to leave. It would scarcely be the “shining city on a hill” that would transform the entire Middle East that some neoconservative had predicted, but it would certainly be Iraq.<sup>608</sup>

#### **5.4.2.3 The Worst Case Scenario (Guerrilla War Gather Popular Support)**

The worst case scenario was very different and illustrated the same kind of linkage between military action and nation building that occurred in Afghanistan. This scenario was steadily escalating guerrilla war that slowly gather popular support, and a broadening of the fighting to include the Kurdish-Arab areas in the North and the Shi'ite areas that dominated southern and much of central Iraq. It was a case where the US and UK came to fight the equivalent of a third Gulf War, and where violence and sabotage paralyzed nation building.

This worst case could only occur, however, as the result of a combination of failures in nation building that the US, Britain, and their allies had ample opportunity to avoid. It would happen if:

- The nation building effort continued to blunder. Progress was too slow and too many promises were not kept. Local security continued to falter, the growth in Iraq jobs and economic activity was too slow, and many well-intended reforms either did not work or paid off too late to develop any real Iraqi support or gratitude.
- The problems in nation building increasingly led the US and its allies act as occupiers rather than liberators. Rather than Iraq for the Iraqis on Iraqi terms-with clear goals in terms of milestones, political and economic action, and a transition to Iraqi rule-the US

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<sup>608</sup> Ibid, p.361

muddled through in ways that appear increasingly to involve a presence of 5-10 years, rather than one of 12-24 months. Rather than goals that could attract real Iraqi support, and win hearts and minds, the US appeared to be embarked on an effort to rebuild Iraq in its own image.

- The US and its allies continued to select the leaders they wanted, rather than the leaders the Iraqis wanted. Rather than screening the Ba'ath and Iraqi military, large blocs of Iraq's best people were rejected because they went along with Saddam's dictatorship to survive. Not only was there a major power vacuum, but an increasing incentive to oppose the US-led nation building effort.

- The US security effort to halt the largely Sunni violence in Central Iraq had only partial success – even if Saddam and his sons were caught. It had its tactical successes, but alienated a large number of Sunnis in the process, who felt increasingly disenfranchised as the Shi'ites and Kurds gained a fair share of wealth and power for the first time.

- The US and British nation builders and military forces increasingly huddled behind their own security barriers, creating a growing distance from ordinary Iraqis. This created more and more physical barriers to the movement of the population and larger “no go” zones. The US continued in its efforts to seal off much of central Baghdad and in its symbolic occupation of Saddam's palaces. At the same time, the failure to properly integrate the military and civil sides of the US nation building effort that began before the War-In Kuwait continued to present coordination problems in Iraq.

- The remnants of the Ba'ath and the cult of Saddam became a major force in the Sunni part of the population, and low level violence and sabotage combined with a poorly managed nation building effort to create centers of organized opposition to the US and Britain that could not be eliminated and which undercut much of the nation building effort. Even those Sunnis who did not want Saddam back, came to want the US and Britain out.

- The US sought to ignore the lack of any meaningful secular opposition leaders in the Shi'ite south, and to avoid having religious Shi'ites come to power. This increasingly alienate Iraq's Shi'ites, who earlier had tolerated-not supported-the US and British military advance. The end result played into the hands of Iraqi Shi'ite religious hard-liners and Iran.

The same pattern of resistance and violence emerged in the South that already exists in Central Iraq. It not only opposed the US-led nation building effort, but political secularism in Iraq and any reassertion of Sunni/Ba'ath/purely secular authority. The result was growing sectarian divisions that further complicated the nation building effort.

- The Kurds continued to support the US and Britain, but this did not mean Kurdish unity. Barzani and Talabani moved back towards a power struggle as the cash flow from oil for food and smuggling dropped. Moreover, ethnic cleansing and Kurdish power struggles with the Arabs and Turcomans complicated the problems the US has with the Arabs and relations with Turkey. The US was blamed by Sunnis and Turcomans for the assertion of Kurdish power.

- US efforts to try to create a federal structure that could bridge over the ethnic and sectarian differences between Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurd came too late to prevent civil tension and violence, and no Iraqi faction was convinced that such efforts would give them a fair share of real power. Fear of prolonged occupation, and the feeling among most Iraqis that those who went along with the US effort did so as appeasers and for their own benefit, further undercut the nation-building effort and added to the level of anti-nation building/anti US and UK violence.

- The US tried to handle all of these problems as inexpensively as possible in a country that had no meaningful exports other than oil and dates before the war, and only earned \$12.5 billion in oil exports in 2002. It continued to talk about oil wealth in a country that has already lost some six months of oil export revenues by July 2003, and whose t export capacity had dropped from over two million barrels a day in 2000 to around 800,000 – and where every effort to revitalize oil exports met with sabotage. ORHA never got the money it needs to succeed, and the US and Britain tried to mortgage future oil revenues to pay for current nation building.

- Rather than conduct an open and transparent effort to rehabilitate Iraq's petroleum industry, with Iraq technocratic and political advice, the US acted on its own priorities and perceptions. Ordinary Iraqis came to feel their oil was being stolen. Oil revenues were not used as the "glue" to unit Iraq's divided factions in some form of federalism. Ideas like "securitizing" Iraq's oil revenues to make direct payments to Iraqi citizens deprived the

new Iraqi government the nation builder sought to create of financial power and leverage. Iraqis with no experience in dealing with such funds became the natural prey of Iraqis who know how to manipulate money and such payments.

- The US failed to confront its allies with the need to forgive Iraqi reparations and debt – claims potentially amounting to over \$200 billion – leaving Iraq angry and without a financial future. It continued to leave the contingency contracts Saddam signed with Russia, France, and other oil firms as valid -- although these contracts were clearly political efforts to win support to end UN sanctions.

- Other aspects of the nation building effort lacked transparency, such as nation building contracts, assistance to Iraqi businesses, and the search for foreign investment. The US and British improvise solutions in Western market terms, failing to realize that the end result is to operate in a climate of hostile Iraqi conspiracy theories that believe the US and Britain are in Iraq to seize its oil revenues, benefit from contracts, and finance an occupation. The US and its allies do the right thing in economic and technocratic terms, but every such action ends in increasing Iraqi distrust and hostility because it lacks transparency and a quick transition to Iraqi planning and control.

- A token 40,000 man Iraqi Army is seen as leaving Iraq defenseless, and as dependent on US and British occupiers. This leaves Iraq without any clear plan to create a meaningful self-defense capability against Iran and Turkey, and deal with Iranian proliferation. There also is not clear plan to share control over military power equitably among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian factions. This makes the new force seem like a puppet army. Even those officers who seem to support the US and British secretly become increasingly nationalistic and hostile.

- Each step ends in making the US and its allies more dependent on friendly Iraqi “leaders” with limited real influence and credibility, and Iraqis willing to go along with the “occupying” powers for their own benefit. The result is to create a climate that is more and more security, rather than nation building oriented. US and allied forces will spend more and more time in “fortress” casernes and headquarters and in patrolling for self-defense purposes.

In military terms, the key lesson from all three of these scenarios is the same. Iraq is a case example of the fact that will be many future cases where victory in asymmetric and regional conflicts is directly tied to a major commitment to nation building. Victory is not defined by having a successful exit strategy; it is defined by winning the end game.<sup>609</sup>

## 5.5 NEXT TARGET: IRAN?

With Iraq under US occupation and Syria shaken by a series of high-level threats from the administration here, Iran is now looming as a major target for US pressure.

With officials in Washington talking darkly about “Iranian agents” crossing the border into Iraq to foment trouble for the U.S. occupation, a leading neo-conservative strategist Monday said the United States is already in a “death struggle” with Teheran, and he urged the administration of President George W. Bush to “take the fight to Iran”, through “covert operations”, among other measures.<sup>610</sup> Iran, a member of George Bush’s “axis of evil”, is being accused by the USA of preparing terrorists and of harboring Al-Qaeda members. This, according to previous belligerent declarations by Bush, is reason enough for an attack.<sup>611</sup>

“The liberation of Iraq was the first great battle for the future of the Middle East,” wrote Kristol in the Standard’s latest issue. “The next great battle - not, we hope, a military battle will be for Iran. We are already in a death struggle with Iran over the future of Iraq,” added the editor, who is closely associated with Richard Perle and other neo-conservatives in the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board (DPB). Kristol’s blast reflects the ongoing and increasingly intense policy debate within the administration between hawks centered in the Defense Department and Vice President Dick Cheney’s office on the one hand and “realists” in the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the other.<sup>612</sup>

The Islamic government in Teheran, long accused by Washington of being the world’s most active supporter of international terrorism, primarily due to its backing for Lebanon’s

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<sup>609</sup> Ibid, p.361-364

<sup>610</sup> Jim Lobe, “Next Target Iran”, Available on site:  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/targets/2003/0506iran.htm>

<sup>611</sup> Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, Pravda, Available on site: <http://english.pravda.ru/politics/>

<sup>612</sup> Available on site: <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/twr151m.htm>



Hezbollah, has been a particular target for neo-conservatives like Kristol, who see it as the greatest long-term threat to Israel, especially now that Baghdad is in U.S. hands.

In an open letter to Bush sent on Sep. 20, 2001, just nine days after the Sep. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the influential Project for the New American Century (PNAC), chaired by Kristol, called for Washington to deliver an ultimatum to both Syria and Iran demanding a halt to their support for Hezbollah.

“Should Iran and Syria refuse to comply, the administration should consider appropriate measures of retaliation against these known state sponsors of terrorism,” urged the letter, whose agenda for the anti-terrorist campaign so far has been followed in virtually each detail, from the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam in Iraq, to the cutting off of U.S. support for Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. In fact, intelligence reports claim that supplies to Hezbollah have fallen off fairly sharply in the last year, but the neo-conservatives and other hawks are now claiming that Teheran is determined to make Washington’s stay in Iraq difficult.<sup>613</sup>

Iran is expected to produce a few nuclear weapons within five years to counter Israel’s large nuclear arsenal, and is developing a medium-range missile, Shahab3, that can easily reach Israel. With 68 million people and a growing industrial base, Iran is seen by Israel as a serious threat and major Middle East geopolitical rival.<sup>614</sup>

Despite informal but relatively high-level diplomatic contacts between the two countries - which broke off formal ties after the US embassy seizure in Teheran in late 1979 - in the run-up to the war, the hawks are claiming that Iran failed to co-operate during the actual hostilities and is now actively undermining US efforts to stabilize Iraq. In an article appearing in ‘The New Republic’, Eli Lake, a reporter with close ties to administration hardliners, claimed that Iran has not only provided safe haven to a number of Iraqi and Islamist fugitives wanted by Washington, but has also planned to infiltrate its own paramilitary units to create confusion on the ground. In addition, US media reports have been filled with assertions about “Iranian agents” in the Shiite community in Iraq whose

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<sup>613</sup> Available on site: <http://www.countercurrents.org/us-lobe070503.htm>

<sup>614</sup> Eric S. Margolis, “Next Target: Iran”, Available on site: <http://www.bigeye.com/110802.htm>

goal is to back local clerics in a bid to create an “Iranian-style Islamic Republic”. Shiites constitute about 60 percent of Iraq’s population.<sup>615</sup>



**Figure 5. 14 Shahab 3 Missiles<sup>616</sup>**

Kristol’s article reflects the thinking of a number of neo-conservative strategists who have been arguing virtually since Sep. 11 that the Iranian people, especially the youth, are ready to rise up against the mullahs, including the reformists led by President Mohammed Khatami, the minute Washington installs a secular, democratic government next door in Iraq.

“The theocrats ruling Iran understand that the stakes are now double or nothing,” according to Kristol. “They can stay in power by disrupting efforts to create a pluralist, non-theocratic, Shia-majority state next door - or they can fail, as success in Iraq sounds the death knell for the Iranian revolution.”<sup>617</sup>

The hawks have been encouraged in that view by much of the Iranian exile community, according to Gary Sick, a Columbia University expert who served on the National Security Council under the Carter administration. “The argument among the American ayatollahs

<sup>615</sup> Available on site: <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/twr151m.htm>

<sup>616</sup> *Priorities For A Turbulent World*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Available on site: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html>

<sup>617</sup> Available on site: <http://www.commondreams.org/>

(of conservatism) is that the only solution for Iran is to get rid of the regime,” says Sick. “They say that the Iranian people are ready to rise up, the regime is about to collapse, but people in Iran say this is just nonsense. The situation in Iran was far more unsettled in 1999 than it is now,” added Sick, who noted that suspicions among Iranians that Washington is already trying to manipulate the internal situation is “complicating the life of (Iran’s) reformers”.

The fact that prominent neo-conservatives closely tied to administration hawks are now calling for covert action against Teheran, combined with the surrender accord with the Mujahadeen, is likely to fuel those suspicions and will, in any case, make it far more difficult for forces with influence in Iran to press for co-operation with Washington.

Sick said he was “totally surprised” by the surrender accord, whose details have still not been released. “The notion that we would join forces with (the Mujahadeen) really undercuts the whole idea of our war on terrorism,” he noted, and will preclude “any kind of working arrangement with Iran”. But Kristol and his comrades in and out of the administration insist that there is no point in working with Teheran anyway and much to be gained by helping oust the “theocrats”. “Iran is the tipping point in the war on proliferation, the war on terror, and the effort to reshape the Middle East. If Iran goes pro-Western and anti-terror, positive changes in Syria and Saudi Arabia will follow much more easily. And the chances for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement will greatly improve,” wrote Kristol.<sup>618</sup>

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<sup>618</sup> Jim Lobe, *Ibid*

## 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The world conjuncture has changed after the Cold War. The US has the position of the only super power in the World. The Cold War-Is over but a new war has begun. But Turkey has continued to carry its US-centered foreign policy out and has viewed the US as the most reliable ally. However, although the US has declared the same rhetoric, it started to view Turkey differently. Unfortunately, Turkey has stayed distant to new formations and new opportunities as required by its status quo policy. So much so that it has not seen some cases to its advantage, or simply overlooked them. Ankara must play a more active role in shaping the new Middle East.

The Turkish side fears that the US favors the Kurds over Turks, and this may result in the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Additionally, Turkish policymakers have no clear understanding of the “grand plan” that the USA is likely to pursue in the Middle East. In a similar way, the US side has concerns about the intentions of Turkish army in terms of controlling Kurdish groups as well as oil resources in Mosul and Kirkuk as a setback to Kurds. Such discriminations were unfortunately reflected in negotiations that took place between the government officials.

Turkey has spent too much time focusing on the terrorism. As Turkey fought PKK terrorism since 1980's, the US has not recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and this terrorist network was considered PKK as a “freedom fighter”. Only when the US itself was hurt by September 11 terrorist attack, and the PKK changed its name was it included in the list of terrorist organizations. During the Gulf War, the US, by almost doing away with the 36th parallel as a parallel, declared regions of the north of Iraq where the peshmerge lived as a “Security Zone” and leaved out Turcoman from this zone, leaving them to Saddam's mercy. There are a lot of cases that US helicopters have dropped down mystery (?) packages in the north of Iraq on Cudi Mount and regions settled by PKK militants. US went even further and supported the infrastructure of a new Kurdish state in the north of Iraq after the Gulf War whose name is given yet one that is not recognized.

Turkish Parliament's rejection of deployment of US troops in Turkey has created disappointment in the US, which views Turkey as one of its provinces and evaluates it as such. However, the biggest share in the decision again belonged to the US. US

unwillingness to see Turkish Armed Forces in the region an awareness of Turkey's sensitivities in the north of Iraq (US'S demand to take them under its own control and limit them in number), its getting peshmerge leaders to issue statements that cross the line in order to intimidate Turkey and its making Turkey the subject of cartoons which show it both to its own public and to the international public in a position that does anything for money taking advantage of the economic hardship it was in were the basic reasons behind the rejection of the troops motion.

The US assesses all these developments as serious as far as its own interests and interests in the region are concerned. Today, the US presents the image that it is taking revenge from Turkey looking at the attitudes it adopts towards development both in the north of Iraq and in the region. Mosul-Kirkuk events, Suleymania Crisis, attitudes of US General Garner with respect to Talabani and Barzani, attitude of Rumsfeld who landed on Incirlik air base and ignored diplomatic etiquette to make a show of anger to Turkey, the opening of a branch in Baghdad by PKK militants after changing their name and the declarations made by Wolfowitz and Grossman are significant reflections of this approach.

Turkey is at a very important crossroads. Turkey will of course continue its efforts aimed at the West, and it should do. But pursuing a single-centered and dependent foreign policy is not right. It is time a broad-based, active and prepared foreign policy was pursued. Turkey's geography, history and strategic position force us to pursue such a policy. Turkish policies vis-à-vis the region can be evaluated as follows:

The international conjuncture has had a huge transformation after the Cold War. With this transformation, many new opportunities and new areas of problem parallel to this have emerged for our country. Despite that the principles of traditional Turkish foreign policy have tried to preserve the status quo oriented structure, great transformations have been experienced in the region Turkey is located since those years. This transformation process still goes on. Turkey's desires to preserve the status quo and avoid harm have rightfully led it to enhance its defensive force and defense systems. As such enhancement would be facilitated by economic prosperity and technological know-how; latest developments have led Turkey to cooperate with international institutions and with economically and militarily powerful states. However, over time, this cooperation has turned into dependence and in

some vital national matters; Turkey faced economic, political and military pressures over its use of military power. Turkey's moves to act in line with its national interests have brought about the desire of states supplying Turkey with weapons and equipment to either prevent or control its military power in particular through the introduction of restrictions.

US on the other hand carry out its main policy through the strategy based on the control of world's energy resources. It has also been openly informing the world of this strategy and undertakes what it requires. As a requirement of this fundamental policy which can be outlined as "the production and removal of oil and other energy resources in a way that will not hurt the economies of the US and the continuation of uninterrupted production at reasonable prices", the US wishes to permanently control oil rich countries of the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia and tries to shape the balance of power in these regions in line with its national interests all the time.

Turkey is the part of the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia geographical region. In this region, which the US tries to reshape, under these circumstances, sustaining pre-1990 policies and undertaking efforts for the maintenance of these policies is not fit for the reelpolitik context, and hence not possible. We can outline US policies vis-à-vis the geographical region we are in as follows:

- Controlling oil, energy resources and energy route (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States),
- Ensuring the survival and security of the state of Israel
- Weakening states which have a potential threat to Israel,
- Controlling Iraq, Syria and Iran within this context,
- Reducing the threat of radical Islam which is against USA,
- Preventing, or at least managing, the spread of WMD possessed by the states in the region (especially Iran).

Each one of these interest, taken alone, gives the United States a vital concern with the future of the Middle East. But some of these policies clashes with the policies of other states in the region. However, what we see is that the US tries to impose this issue. It is determined not to give a voice to any state in the region. Lately, we are observing an increase in US pressure on Syria. What is clear is that the US took the course of forcing important developments through pressure and threat against Syria and Iran instead of a direct military attack as with Iraq.

In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the US is keen to prioritize the wishes of the Russian Federation and not to clash with the Russian Federation; continues its inclination to execute its policies in the region through the support of the Russian Federation by economic assistance and credits. Upon the disagreement, which started with Russian Federation's opposition to Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and went on with the NATO enlargement process, the US Senate has modified the CFE in line with the demands of the Russian Federation and ratified it as such. Thus, Russian Federation did not oppose NATO enlargement. Concessions to the Russian Federation do not go along with Turkish policy. Russian Federation's desire to establish bases in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and its actually doing so can give way to an adverse condition with respect to Turkey's policies vis-à-vis the states of the region. Yet the US has sided with the Russian Federation.

The world we live in is a new world. Moving stones are being relocated. Turkey has many areas of maneuver and cooperation in this new world. Rather than policies that are excessively dependent on the super power, new opportunities have become available in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Turkey should also see and understand this clearly: US policies in this region do not coincide with Turkey's long-term regional policies, and on the contrary they clash often times.

Turkey should seek for better relations and enhanced cooperation with diverse regions like Russia, Central Asia and Far East which are in fact directly and closely related to Turkey, and close relations with the US and the EU without submitting itself.

Turkey can assume an important role in the Central Asia, Caucasus and the Mediterranean together with Russia. On the other hand, regional cooperative undertakings in the spheres of economy and politics with Central Asian states and our Middle Eastern neighbors can contribute both to the region and to world stability and the development of peace. Such regional cooperation is against neither the EU nor the US. Furthermore, such cooperation is not an alternative to cooperation with those countries.

Turkey should avoid being excessively dependent on a single center in the new world conjuncture and seek for and find ways to pursue an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey's national interests and regional policies in the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus can no longer be parallel to the policies of the EU and the US compared to the pre-1990s. At the center of these multi-dimensional new formations, Turkey has to follow new and national policies by being more confident in itself, by relying more on its young population, educated persons and on its entrepreneurship spirit. Our proximity to the aforementioned regions, common cultural bonds and values force us into forging new political, military and economic relationships in this region. In order to do that, there is a need to clearly lay down our goals and identify and pursue a permanent and rational strategy.

President George W. Bush's scheduled participation at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] summit to be held in Turkey is very important for the US administration. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's planned visit to Washington, probably in late January, is another important opportunity. Both visits could open up new horizons and approaches in Turkish-American relations within the framework of Iraq's future and the Middle East.



## APPENDIX A: BAGHDAD PACT

### **PACT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINION OF PAKISTAN, AND THE KINGDOM OF IRAN, FEBRUARY 24, 1955<sup>619</sup>**

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims, and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

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<sup>619</sup> American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Volume 1, Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117, Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1957, Available on site: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/baghdad.htm>

## **ARTICLE 1**

Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

## **ARTICLE 2**

In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

## **ARTICLE 3**

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

## **ARTICLE 4**

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.

## **ARTICLE 5**

This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

#### **ARTICLE 6**

A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

#### **ARTICLE 7**

This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

#### **ARTICLE 8**

This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Done in duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of February 1955.

**APPENDIX B: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS  
RELATING TO IRAQ<sup>620</sup>**

The following is a complete list of Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) involving Iraq. The overwhelming majority of resolution since 1990 relate to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent developments. The resolutions deemed particularly important are indicated in bold.

**2003**

- **1511 (16 October 2003)**

- This resolution:

- mandates the UN to 'strengthen its vital role in Iraq' (para 8)
    - 'underscores...the temporary nature of the Coalition Provisional Authority' (para 1), welcomes the Governing Council and its ministers as "the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration" (para 4), and supports moves towards self-government under its auspices(para 3)
    - invites the Governing Council to draw up, by 15 December, a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding elections, in cooperation with, and assisted by, the CPA and the UN representative (para 7 & 8). Requests the CPA to report to the Security Council on progress towards the transfer of power (para 6)
    - Authorizes a multinational security force, and urges states to contribute to it and to the reconstruction of Iraq (para 13 & 14). Requests states to contribute financially (para 20), including at a Donors Conference (para 21), by providing required resources (para 22) and by transferring assets of the former regime to the Development Fund for Iraq (para 24)
    - Requests the Secretary General to report on UN operations in Iraq (para 12). Requests the US to report, at least every 6 months, on

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<sup>620</sup> Available on site: <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html>

military matters (para 25). Decides that the Security Council should review the mission of the UN force within a year, and that its mandate will expire once power has been transferred to an Iraqi government (para 15)

- Reiterates the demand made in Resolution 1483 for an International Advisory and Monitoring Board to supervise administration of the Development Fund for Iraq (para 23)
- Three earlier US drafts for this resolution were made public, on 4 September, 1 October and 13 October 2003. Postings to the CASI discussion list summarize differences between the first and second drafts, and between the second and third drafts. Amendments to the first draft were publicly proposed by France and Germany, and by Syria. Several of the Franco-German proposals were incorporated into the resolution.
- **1500 (14 August 2003)**
  - Establishes UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, as proposed by the Secretary General in a report on July 17
  - Welcomes creation of Governing Council
- **1490 (3 July 2003)**
  - Disbands the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), and removes the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Comes into force on 6 October 2003.
- **1483 (22 May 2003)**
  - Lifts non-military sanctions
  - Recognizes Britain and the United States as occupying powers ('The Authority'), and calls on them to attempt to improve security and stability, and provide opportunities for the Iraqis to determine their political future. Creates position of UN Special Representative to Iraq, to coordinate UN activity. Requires establishment of Development Fund for Iraq
  - Summaries and analysis can be found on pages 10-13 of the Open Society Institute paper "Reconstructing Iraq: a guide to the issues", and in this article from the American Society of International Law. A Parliamentary research paper (2 June 2003) provides a British government perspective.

- Initial US-UK draft (9 May)
- Revised US-UK-Spain draft (15 May)
- The Open Society Institute criticized aspects of this resolution, and suggested changes to allow greater supervision of the occupying powers
- **1476 (24 April 2003)**
- **1472 (28 March 2003)**
  - Gives UN more authority to administer the “oil for food” programme for the next 45 days. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish alternative locations for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and equipment, and proceed with approved contracts after a review to determine priorities. Other steps called for include: transferring unencumbered funds between accounts created pursuant to the programme on an exceptional and reimbursable basis to ensure the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies; and using funds deposited in the accounts to compensate suppliers and shippers for agreed additional shipping, transportation and storage costs incurred as a result of diverting and delaying shipments
- Resolution proposed by Spain, the US and the UK, which would have authorized military action against Iraq (7 March 2003)
  - Comments of Kofi Annan on 10 March, 11 March and 17 March
  - Joint statement by France, Russia and Germany in opposition to a UN resolution authorizing force
  - Statements by France and Germany (19 March)

## 2002

- **1454 (30 December 2002): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Implements revisions to the Goods Review List.
- **1447 (4 December 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends the oil-for-food programme by 6 months, obliges the council to review the goods review list within one month and asks the Secretary General to produce a report on the adequacy of Iraq’s distribution mechanisms within the country and oil-for-food revenues within six months.

- **1443 (25 November 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends the oil-for-food programme by 9 days only, due to disagreements over US proposals to broaden the Goods Review List.
- **1441 (8 November 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Earlier drafts of this resolution are as follows: the **US/UK drafts** of 2 October 2002, 25 October 2002 and 5 November 2002; the **Russian** draft and the **French** draft of 23 October 2002. Collections of critical comments on the resolution can be found on the websites of the Institute for Public Accuracy and Eclipse review.
  - Post-vote statements by the US, UK, France, Russia and China are available from the Global Policy Forum
- **1409 (14 May 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends the oil-for-food programme by six months, and introduces a new import procedure. Only items on the annexed Goods Review List (GRL) are to be reviewed by the Sanctions Committee. Although the GRL is annexed to a letter from the US ambassador dated 3 May 2002 - before the resolution was even officially passed - it was only released on 14 August 2002.

## 2001

- **1382 (29 November 2001): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends the oil-for-food programme by 180 days, commencing Phase XI on 1 December 2001. It also adopts a new “goods review list” (GRL) and procedures for its application to come into force on 30 May 2002. Note that the GRL consists not only of the items actually listed in the annex to the resolution, but also those on the “1051 lists” and those listed within a new 150-page list drawn up by the US. This latter list was an annex to a letter from the US ambassador dated 27 November 2001. All applications to import goods will have to be reviewed by Unmovic and the UN Office of the Iraq Programme to determine if the proposed imports contain items on the GRL.

- **1360 (3 July 2001): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends the oil-for-food programme by 150 days to begin Phase X, after no agreement was reached over the new UK proposals for a modified sanctions regime. The subsequent exchange of letters between the UN and Iraq, agreeing to the continuation of the programme under the terms of this resolution, is dated 5 July 2001.
- **1352 (1 June 2001): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends Phase IX of the oil-for-food programme by one month only, after there is general agreement that more time is necessary to review the UK's draft resolution (and annex) to change the scope and mode of operation of the sanctions.

2000

- **1330 (4 December 2000): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends the oil-for-food programme by 180 days, to commence Phase IX. The resolution also allocates another \$600m to oil-industry spares, requests exploration into a "cash component" (para. 15), reduces Compensation Fund deductions to 25% (para 12), requests electricity and housing "green lists" (para 10), expresses "readiness to consider" paying Iraq's UN membership dues out of oil-for-food revenue, seeks expanded versions of the existing "green lists" (para 11), and asks the Secretary-General to report on other oil export routes from Iraq.
- **1302 (8 June 2000): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Begins Phase VIII of "oil for food". Paragraph 8 asks for water and sanitation "green lists". Paragraph 9 extends the oil spare parts permission of SCR 1293. Paragraph 18 calls for the establishment of a team of "independent experts to prepare by 26 November 2000 a comprehensive report and analysis of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, including the current humanitarian needs... and recommendations to meet those needs, within the framework of the existing resolutions". According to a UN



source, the UK and US insisted upon the final clause of paragraph 18, knowing that the Iraqi government's position would prevent it from cooperating with such an analysis. As a result, there has been no cooperation and no such report has been produced. The BBC's report outlines the politics behind the comprehensive report. AP's report concentrates on the debate around bombing in the "no fly zones". On 30 October, the chair of the group of independent experts mentioned in the resolution was announced as Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway.

- **1293 (31 March 2000): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Doubles permitted oil spare part imports for Phases VI and VII. Paragraphs 53 - 57 of the UN Secretary-General's 10 March 2000 report (S/2000/208) explains the background to this doubling. See CNN's story for mention of some of the politics of the resolution.

## 1999

- **1284 (17 December 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Replaces UNSCOM with Unmovic, demands Iraqi co-operation on prisoners of war, alters the "oil for food" programme, and discusses the possible suspension of sanctions in ambiguous terms.
- **1281 (10 December 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Begins Phase VII of "oil for food", to start on 12 December 1999. The report requested in paragraph 9 is S/2000/26.
- **1280 (3 December 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends Phase VI to 11 December 1999 due to wrangling over SCR 1284.
- **1275 (19 November 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Extends Phase VI to 4 December 1999 due to wrangling over SCR 1284.
- **1266 (4 October 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Allows an additional \$3.04 billion in oil sales to offset deficits during previous Phases and (possibly) to slow the rise in oil prices.
- **1242 (21 May 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Begins Phase VI of "oil for food", to start on 25 May 1999.

1998

- **1210 (24 November 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Begins Phase V of “oil for food”, to start on 26 November 1998.
- **1205 (5 November 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Echoes SCR 1194, demands that the Iraqi government “provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation” with inspectors and alludes to the threat to “international peace and security” posed by the non-cooperation.
- **1194 (9 September 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - “Condemns the decision by Iraq ... to suspend cooperation with [UNSCOM] and the IAEA”, demands that the decisions be reversed and cancels October 1998 scheduled sanctions review.
- **1175 (19 June 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Gives Iraq permission to apply to import up to \$300 million of oil industry spare parts this Phase to allow it to increase its oil production to the cap set in SCR 1153.
- **1158 (25 March 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Continues Phase III but under the enhanced provisions of SCR 1153.
- **1154 (2 March 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Commends the Secretary-General for securing commitments from the Iraqi government to fully comply with weapons inspections on his mission to Baghdad, and endorses the memorandum of understanding (S/1998/166) that was signed on 23 February. The mapping of the areas of the eight “presidential sites” by a UN Technical Mission is described in an annexed report to a letter from the Secretary-General of 27 February (S/1998/166/Add.1). The procedures for the inspection of “presidential sites” are laid out in an annex to the letter from the Secretary-General of 8 March 1998 (S/1998/208). This agreement put off US and British bombing threats.
- **1153 (20 February 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Agrees to increase the cap on permitted Iraqi oil sales to \$5.256 billion per Phase once the Secretary-General has approved an “enhanced distribution plan” for the new revenue. Recognizes the importance of infrastructure and

project-based purchases. Phase IV eventually begins on 30 May 1998. Resolution passed during UNSCOM crisis.

1997

- **1143 (4 December 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Begins Phase III of “oil for food”, to start on 5 December 1997 and welcomes the Secretary-General’s intention to submit a supplementary report on possible improvements in the “oil for food” programme.
- **1137 (12 November 1997): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Rejects Iraqi Governments announced intention to prohibit weapons inspections unless the composition of UNSCOM teams is altered to limit the number of inspectors from the US, and to prohibit UNSCOM over flights. Imposes travel ban on officials to be lifted when full cooperation resumes. Sanctions review to be in April 1998 if cooperation has been restored.
- **1134 (23 October 1997): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Reaffirms Iraq’s obligations to cooperate with weapons inspectors after Iraqi officials announce in September 1997 that “presidential sites” are off-limits to inspectors. Threatens travel ban on obstructive Iraqi officials not “carrying out bona fide diplomatic assignments or missions” if non-cooperation continues. Sanctions reviews again delayed.
- **1129 (12 September 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Alters timing of permitted Phase II oil sales in response to Iraqi government’s refusal to sell oil until its Distribution Plan was approved by the UN.
- **1115 (21 June 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - “Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites” and “demands that [they] cooperate fully” with UNSCOM. Suspends the sanctions and arms embargo reviews (paragraphs 21 and 28 of SCR 687) until the next UNSCOM report and threatens to “impose additional measures on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance”.

- **1111 (4 June 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Begins Phase II of “oil for food”, to start on 8 June 1997.

## 1996

- **1060 (12 June 1996): Iraq.**
  - On Iraq’s refusal to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission.
- **1051 (27 March 1996): Iraq.**
  - Establishes mechanism for long-term monitoring of potentially “dual use” Iraqi imports and exports, as called for by SCR 715.

## 1995

- **986 (14 April 1995): Iraq**
  - New “oil for food” resolution, allowing \$1 billion in oil sales every 90 days. Memorandum of understanding signed by UN and Government of Iraq on 20 May 1996; Phase I begins on 10 December 1996.

## 1994

- **949 (15 October 1994): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - “Condemns recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of ... Kuwait”, demands an immediate withdrawal and full co-operation with UNSCOM. According to a spokesman for the US Central Command, the resolution was passed following a threatening buildup of Iraqi forces near the border with Kuwait, and bars Iraq from moving SAMs into the southern no-fly zone.
- **899 (4 March 1994): Iraq-Kuwait.**
  - Allows compensation to private Iraqi citizens who lost assets to the boundary demarcation process.

## 1993

- **833 (27 May 1993): Iraq-Kuwait**

- “Welcomes... the successful conclusion of the work of the [Boundary Demarcation] Commission”. The Iraqi National Assembly recognised the territorial integrity and political independence of the State of Kuwait, within the boundaries laid down by the Boundary Demarcation Commission, on 10 November 1994, and its decision was ratified in a decree signed by Saddam Hussein on the same day.
- **806 (5 February 1993): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Arms UNIKOM to prevent border incursions by Iraq.

## 1992

- **778 (2 October 1992): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Deplores Iraq’s refusal to implement SCR 706 and 712 and recalls Iraq’s liabilities. Takes steps to transfer funds (including Iraqi assets overseas) into the UN account established to pay for compensation and humanitarian expenses.
- **773 (26 August 1992): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Responds to a report on progress by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and notes that the Commission “is not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq”.

## 1991

- **715 (11 October 1991): Iraq**
  - Approves the plans of UNSCOM and the IAEA, including for long term monitoring. Iraq agreed to the monitoring system established by this resolution on 26 November 1993.
- **712 (19 September 1991): Iraq**
  - Rejects the Secretary-General’s suggestion that at least \$2 billion in oil revenue be made available for humanitarian needs; instead allows *total* sale of \$1.6 billion. Eventually rejected by Government of Iraq.
- **707 (15 August 1991): Iraq**
  - Condemns Iraq’s non-compliance on weapons inspections as a “material breach” of Resolution 687, and incorporates into its standard for compliance

with SCR687 that Iraq provide “full, final and complete disclosure ... of all aspects of its programmes to develop” prohibited weaponry. Also grants permission for UNSCOM and the IAEA to conduct flights throughout Iraq, for surveillance or logistical purposes.

- **706 (15 August 1991): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Decides to allow emergency oil sale by Iraq to fund compensation claims, weapons inspection and humanitarian needs in Iraq.
- **705 (15 August 1991): Iraq**
  - “Decides that... compensation to be paid by Iraq ... shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports”.
- **700 (17 June 1991): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Approves the Secretary-General’s guidelines on an arms and dual-use embargo on Iraq and calls upon states to act consistently with them. Paragraph 5 of this resolution makes the 661 committee responsible for the on-going monitoring regime, thus ensuring that it would retain a role in the long-term relationship between the UN and Iraq.
- **699 (17 June 1991): Iraq**
  - Approves the Secretary-General’s plan for UNSCOM and the IAEA and asks for support from Member States.
- **692 (20 May 1991): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Establishes the UN Compensation Commission and asks the Secretary-General to indicate the maximum possible level of Iraq’s contribution to the Compensation Fund.
- **689 (9 April 1991): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Approves the Secretary-General’s report on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).
- **688 (5 April 1991): Iraq**
  - “Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population” in the post-war civil war and “demands that Iraq ... immediately end this repression”. 688 is occasionally claimed to provide the legal basis for the American and British “no fly zones”. These claims are incorrect both because 688 does not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a necessary condition for the use of force,

and because it does not authorize specific measures to uphold human rights in Iraq, such as “no fly zones”.

- **687 (3 April 1991): Iraq-Kuwait**

- Declares effective a formal cease-fire (upon Iraqi acceptance), establishes the UN Special Commission on weapons (UNSCOM) extends sanctions and, in paragraphs 21 and 22, provides ambiguous conditions for lifting or easing them. Described as a “Christmas tree”, because “so much was hung on it”. The fourth preambulatory clause, on “the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions”, has been referred to as the “Saddam Hussein clause” as it has been used to link the continuation of sanctions with the survival of the present Iraqi regime.

- **686 (2 March 1991): Iraq-Kuwait**

- Affirms the “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq” and sets out terms for a cease-fire. The use of force remains valid to fulfill these conditions.

- **685 (31 January 1991): Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran .**

1990

- **678 (29 November 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**

- “Authorizes Member States... to use all necessary means” to bring Iraq into compliance with previous Security Council resolutions if it did not do so by 15 January 1991.

- **677 (28 November 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**

- Concerned by Iraq’s attempts to “alter the demographic composition of ... Kuwait and to destroy the civil records”.

- **676 (28 November 1990): Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran**

- **674 (29 October 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**

- “Reminds Iraq that ... it is liable for any loss ... as a result of the invasion ... of Kuwait”.

- **671 (27 September 1990): Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran**

- **670 (25 September 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**

- Strengthens and clarifies the embargo; confirms that it applies to aircraft. France and the USA disagree on whether 670 requires 661 approval for flights without cargo. Paragraph 12 of the resolution also invokes the possibility of unspecified “measures” against states that evade the sanctions regime. This paragraph seems to have been directed against Jordan and Sudan in particular. It caused disquiet within delegations, as the United Nations Charter has traditionally been interpreted as only permitting the Security Council to impose such measures against the state responsible for a breach of or threat to the peace.
- **669 (24 September 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Asks the Sanctions Committee to consider requests for economic assistance from countries harmed by the sanctions on Iraq.
- **667 (16 September 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Protests “the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait”.
- **666 (13 September 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - “Decides [to] ... keep the situation regarding foodstuffs ... under constant review”, giving the Security Council responsibility for determining when “humanitarian circumstances” had arisen.
- **665 (25 August 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Imposes a shipping blockade by calling for the use of “such measures ... as may be necessary” to enforce the maritime embargo. In effect, this resolution reassigns some of the practical responsibility for monitoring compliance with sanctions away from the UN machinery, in the form of the 661 committee, and to the States imposing the naval blockade.
- **664 (18 August 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Demands that Iraq release “third state nationals”.
- **662 (9 August 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Decides that Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait is “null and void”.
- **661 (6 August 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Imposes comprehensive sanctions on Iraq and establishes a sanctions committee (the “661 committee”) in paragraph 6 to monitor them. Paragraphs 3 and 4 drawn from those of SCR 253.



- **660 (2 August 1990): Iraq-Kuwait**
  - Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demands Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal.
- **651 (29 March 1990): Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran**

#### **Resolutions on Iraq before 1990**

- **642 (29 September 1989): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **631 (8 February 1989): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **620 (26 August 1988): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **619 (9 August 1988): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **612 (9 May 1988): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **598 (20 July 1987): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **588 (8 October 1986): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **582 (24 February 1986): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **540 (31 October 1983): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **522 (4 October 1982): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **514 (12 July 1982): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **487 (19 June 1981): Iraq - Israel**
- **479 (28 September 1980): Iraq - Islamic Republic of Iran**
- **348 (28 May 1974): Iraq - Iran**

## **APPENDIX C: LETTER OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRIME MINISTER İNÖNÜ AND İNÖNÜ'S REPLY<sup>621</sup>**

Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966.

### **White House Statement**

At the request of the Government of Turkey, the White House is today releasing the texts of letters exchanged on June 5, 1964, between President Johnson and the then Prime Minister of Turkey İsmet İnönü on the Cyprus crisis. Steps subsequent to this exchange of letters led to the visit of Prime Minister İnönü to Washington later in that month and constructive discussions by the President and the Prime Minister of the issues involved. A joint communique released at the conclusion of those discussions welcomed the opportunity for a full exchange of views by the two leaders and the occasion to consider ways in which the two countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations with respect to the safety and security of Cyprus. The communique noted that "the cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States." The United States continues to value highly the close and friendly relations we maintain with Turkey.

### **President Johnson's Letter to Prime Minister İnönü, June 5, 1964:**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present a unilateral decision

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<sup>621</sup>Available on site: <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/app.html>

of such consequence to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken. It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of affecting a form of partition of the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that the Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibility of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable. I must call your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable." Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement

between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candors that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the friendliest fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficient effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe. You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregarding of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American People and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the Communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and

will remain so. Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest of issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secretary and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council. I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Prime Minister

### **İnönü's Response to the President, June 13, 1964.**

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through Ambassador Hare. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee. With due regard to the spirit of candor and friendship in which your message is meant to be written, I will, in my reply, try also to explain to you in full frankness my views about the situation.

Mr. President,

Your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergence of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations. It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was, under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected. In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 1963, we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was no a party to this issue. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for intervention and, as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British command was set-up on December 26, 1963. Upon the failure of the London conference and the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the island against the Turkish Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity of intervention to restore order in the island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you that we might have to intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However you asked us not to intervene and assured us that Makarios would get at the United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would be preserved. We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations force, decided upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention was felt for the third time to protect the Turkish Community against the assaults of the terrorist in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether the United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the

Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the force would be set up very shortly, you insisted against that we refrain from intervening. Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations forces to assume their duty.

Dear Mr. President,

The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which rendered ineffective all measures taken so far. From the very onset, the negotiations held to restore security and the temporary setups have all helped only to increase the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarios administration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the United Nations as an additional instrument to backup their ruthless and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration of constitutional order and to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of the instigative attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots. During the talks held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your secretary of State at The Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we received no answer. I think I have thus reminded you how many times and under what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention in Cyprus. I do remember having emphasized to your high level officials our due appreciation of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States within the alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her to maintain solidarity within the alliance. As you see, we never had the intention to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance stems from our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for months utmost distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between two allies, namely, Turkey and Greece.

Mr. President,

In your message you further emphasize the obligation of Turkey, under the provisions of the Treaty, to consult with the other two guaranteeing powers, before taking any unilateral

action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But Greece has not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiating international treaties, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged them. The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various examples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in writing, to your State Department. We likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power. In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities. As you see Turkey has earnestly explored every avenue of consulting continuously and acting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being the fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation of consulting with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral action. I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which has felt the need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by the precept "pacta sunt servanda" which is the fundamental rule of international law. this precept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently as "the basis of survival" by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the "American Law Institute" is now being completely and contemptuously ignored by Greece, our NATO ally and by the Greek Cypriots.

Dear Mr. President,

As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take the concerted action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of re-establishing the State of affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee was signed with understanding being shared by all parties thereto. The "Gentleman's Agreement" signed on February 19, 1959 by the Foreign



Ministers of Turkey and Greece, does an evidence of that common understand. On the other hand, at the time of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, the members of the organization were fully acquainted with all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic and no objections were raised in this respect. Furthermore, in the course of discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolution adopted on March 4, 1964 by the Security Council, the United States Delegate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power to annul or amend international treaties. The understanding expressed in your message that the intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would be for the purposes of affecting the partition of the island has caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States. I would like to assure you the most categorically and most sincerely that if ever Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements. In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President that the postponement of our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey by the Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Mr. President,

Referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the very essence of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other and that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would led to a military engagement between Greek and Turkish forces. I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but the obligation for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among themselves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally vital requisite of the alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable. As to the concern you over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek War-In case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus is Conformity with her rights and obligations stipulated in international agreements, I would like to stress that Turkey would undertake a "military

operation” in Cyprus exclusively under the conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore a Turco-Greek war so properly described as “literally unthinkable” by the Honorable Dean Rusk could only occur in case of Greece’s aggression against Turkey. Our view, in case of such an intervention, is to invite to an effective collaboration, with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and the United Kingdom in their capacity as guaranteeing powers. If despite this invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we would in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government’s attention on these matters. The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to project in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO’s structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor’s allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the north Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO should start discussing the right and the wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is why Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking the forthwith such an action as they deem necessary. In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963. As

you will recall, at the meeting of NATO Ministerial Council held three weeks ago at the Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties continued to be the basis for legality as regards the situation in the island and the status of Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of the flagrantly unlawful act of one of the parties of the island should in no way mean that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and obligations of Turkey by virtue of those agreements should be ignored. Such an understanding would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements are considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur. I am sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot be accepted. I am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about the obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in situation that can, by no means, be attributed to an arbitrary act of Turkey. An opposite way of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of Article 5 of the United Nations Charter. In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President, you will agree with me if I say that such a concern, which I do not share, is groundless especially for the following reasons : Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and have even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organization and, in order to secure its functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the said resolution. Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave concern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppression. The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations Forces, assuaging Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their troops ; but they do not try to stop the Greeks when the troops of the Turks are at

stake and they act as mere spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach you, whereas we live in atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic events. The report of Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had further convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces under his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and the besieging of villages have considerably increased.

Dear Mr. President

Our allies who are in position to arbitrate in the Cyprus issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties and abrogating the constitution. Security can be established in the island only through the proper functioning of an authority above the government of Cyprus. Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot government are being sought to restore security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the December events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations command have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every measure acceptable to Makarios has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression and aggression.

Dear Mr. President,

You put forward in your message the resentment caused in Greece by the policy pursued by your Government. Within the content of the Cyprus issues, the nature of Greek policy and the course of action undertaken by the Greece indicate that she is apt to resort to every means within her power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our allies understand the suffering we bear in our rightful cause and the irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you understand our rightful position and convince you of the necessity of spending every effort and making use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well

deserves. The France and the Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good example. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless devastation of the whole Anatolia by the armies of that country.

Dear Mr. President

As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to be sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.

Mr. President

I thank you for your statement emphasizing the value attached by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to United States to talk to Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security Council will meet on June the 17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO will have paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United Nations mediator Mr. Tuomioja will have submitted his result to the Secretary-General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20th. It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views and designs you may have on the Cyprus question so that I may be able to study them thoroughly before my departure for Washington. Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitful and promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this message to you.

Sincerely,

İsmet İnönü

Prime minister of Turkey

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