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DELEUZIAN LINES OF FLIGHT IN THE ENGLISH NOVEL

DOKTORA TEZİ

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Faruk KÖKOĞLU

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Tezin Türkçe Başlığı : İngiliz Romanında Deleuze'sal Kaçış Hatları
Tezin İngilizce Başlığı : Deleuzian Lines of Flight in the English Novel

* 1. Doktora Tezi savunma süresi asgari 90 azami 120 dakikadır.
2. Tutanak (jürinin karar ve imzaları haricinde) **bilgisayarda** doldurulmalıdır
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3. Doktora Tez savunmasında üyelerden en az birinin **üniversite dışından** olması zorunludur.

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INTRODUCTION: "INTIMACY AS THE OUTSIDE"

> There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so that a book has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as its subject. In short, we think that one cannot write sufficiently in the name of an outside. The outside has no image, no signification, no subjectivity. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 22-3)

Gilles Deleuze is one of the pioneers of contemporary French thought. Along with Lyotard, Derrida and Foucault, he is one of Nietzsche's French disciples to form the most radical ideas of difference. Lyotard's name is commonly associated with postmodernism; Derrida's, especially with deconstruction; and Foucault's, with post-structuralism and specifically with Nietzscheanism more than the others; however, there is no such a common trend to associate Deleuze's name with. We must either name the whole twentieth century after him as Foucault said, "perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian" (in Genesco 2001: 305); or call him to be the founder of the first philosophical system of the twenty-first century following Antoni Negri (in Genesco 2001: 459). There is another possibility which Deleuze himself would prefer most: He has been an apprentice in both an "untimely" philosophy after Nietzsche and a science-fiction of "nowhere" following Samuel Butler, for the benefit of a time and a people to come. He has sought the outside by opening himself some "fantastic paths" and creative "lines of flight" through the history of philosophy. He combated the dominant images of thought and opposed established powers and values in the history of philosophy. He also escaped all dominant discourses of his time. Deleuze's constructivist thought was mainly motivated by his love of the outside, exteriority, and positive encounters, along with his hatred of interiority, the dialectic and negativity. He developed special bonds with those who fled and became outsiders in the history of philosophy, like Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson. Furthermore, art

with its all forms presents Deleuze many lines of escape to productivity and creativity. Art is the outside of philosophy, for Deleuze, but it is in no way the outside of thought. It is just another form of thinking along with philosophy and science, and it thinks no less than the other two disciplines. Blurring the distinction between the three disciplines mentioned is not in the least intended by this study. Conversely, this project addresses how the disciplines of philosophy and art resonate with each other in a constant exchange mainly in the writings of Deleuze. It also demonstrates what distinguishes the two disciplines in their respective means of production, and compares in what ways they contribute to the conditions of possibility for creating new forms of thinking and living.

Deleuze, unlike his contemporaries, had no time, nor any interest in the slogans like "the end of philosophy," "overcoming metaphysics" or "the closure of the sign." He points to an internal problem which philosophy itself must overcome. The history of philosophy has taken up the roles of "the repressor" and "the agent of power" which prevent creative thought. "An image of thought called philosophy", Deleuze claims, "has been formed historically and it effectively prevents people from thinking" (1987: 13). Such an image of thought, rather than provoking thought, compels people to reflect and conform "to the dominant meanings and to the requirements of the established order" (13). This gives rise to the philosophers of the state who claim to know what thinking really is, and who already think for the people.

1.1. The Image of the World

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), Deleuze determines three dogmatic aspects of the traditional image of thought beginning with Socrates. Firstly, it presupposes that love of "the truth" motivates the thinker. It follows from this that thought has the truth as an innate faculty ("innateness of the idea, a priori nature of concepts"), and that thinking happens to us naturally as "the natural exercise of a faculty". Deleuze argues that truth is only an appearance, and should never be seen as a "universal", not even an abstract one. Truth can never be determined: it is always interpreted, or at best, produced. What is referred as truth, or truths in the multiple, brings into effect a

question of sense and value, that is, an art of interpretation and evaluation. Truth, like every phenomenon, changes colour according to the forces which appropriate, dominate and exploit it. So there is always a multiplicity of senses, and a multiplicity of truths that must all be demystified, unmasked. Truth cannot be the substance of thought since every truth is at the same time a falsity: both are produced. The real substance of thought is "sense and value", and its true categories "are not truth and falsity but the *noble* and the *base,* the *high* and the *low,* depending on the nature of the forces that take hold of thought itself" (Deleuze 1996: 104). Being noble and high is the attribute of active forces and affirmation, and baseness and lowness belong to reactive forces and negation. Therefore, the proper question of philosophy is not "What is the truth?" but "What is justice?" This is the most empirical and immanent, the most experimental and vitalist question in philosophy. It simultaneously addresses "the problems of interpretation and evaluation" (18).

Secondly, the traditional image of thought dispels the "body, passions, sensuous interests" as the distorters of the truth. It erects a white wall around itself to prevent flows onto those lands foreign to it, or to drive away "external forces which are opposed to thought" (103). What this dogmatic image expels as its exterior by erecting a white wall are in fact the real active forces that energise creative thought. It blocks exterior forces that are vital to thought. Thought is separated from vital forces that are in reality congenial with the most interior forces of a positive unconscious. In short, thought is separated from what makes thinking possible. As long as thought is blocked against active forces of the exterior, it is invaded and infected by reactive forces. Deleuze emphasises that, "insofar as our thinking is controlled by reactive forces, insofar as it finds its sense in reactive forces, we must admit that we are not yet thinking" (108). Consciousness is one such state of thought controlled by reactive forces. Thinking never happens to us by itself or naturally or consciously. It is activated only when forces of the outside does violence to it. Only the violent encounters of the unconscious make thinking possible.

Finally, the dogmatic image of thought secures its white wall with a method 'through which we are brought back to the nature of thought' (103), that is to say we are

brought back to the prison house of thought circulating in loops in the same area. The dialectic is one such method that still survives beginning with Socrates, culminating with Hegel, and deeply affecting modern thought. Dialectical method which proceeds through "negation, opposition or contradiction" presents a false movement that attracts all reactive forces that are against life, and that constrains creativity in thought. The dialectic cannot create anything except for representing what dominates and what is in power. It is an unhappy consciousness that can neither posit its own difference, nor criticise anything without elevating it at the same time. It survives parasitically by dividing the forces that are both on the same side into different camps (thesis and antithesis) and awaiting their collision (synthesis). Deleuze's following remark illustrates the misfortunate speculation of the dialectic best: "That the flower is the antithesis of the leaf, that it 'refutes' the leaf – this is a celebrated discovery dear to the dialectic" (Deleuze 1996: 15). The dialectic, for Deleuze, represents a false theatre of mediation by subjecting difference to its absolutely exterior. It distinguishes an object negatively through the abstraction of what it is not and fails to grasp the singularity of being.

Unproductiveness of life and thought, alienation and nihilism are the final avatars of such dogmatic images of thought including the dialectic. Nietzsche has combated all his life against them at the price of being misunderstood as a nihilist himself. Nietzsche labels the seed of all forms of nihilism and reactive forces as "the spirit of revenge". He traces its imprints to modern thought and science mainly in his *Will to Power*. Deleuze agreeably comments on Nietzsche's criticism that,

> the instinct of revenge is the force which constitutes the essence of what we call psychology, history, metaphysics and morality. The spirit of revenge is the genealogical element of *our* thought, the transcendental principle of *our* way of thinking. Nietzsche's struggle against nihilism and the spirit of revenge will therefore mean the reversal of metaphysics, the end of history as history of man and the transformation of the sciences. (35)

Before proposing a new image of thought that will make thinking an active and creative task that is affirmative of life, philosophy must first clear the ground with "an enterprise of demystification". If philosophy has any use, Deleuze indicates, it is to

disturb and dispel established orders, dominant meanings and representations of power freely and at liberty:

> Philosophy does not serve the State or the Church, who have other concerns. It serves no established power. The use of philosophy is to *sadden*. A philosophy that saddens no one, that annoys no one, is not a philosophy. […] Its only use is the exposure of all forms of baseness of thought. (Deleuze 1996: 106)

Deleuze's use of the word "sadden" must be understood positively as demystification. Sadness is, in fact, caused by reactive forces and their mystification. Demystification is a vitalistic enterprise used by Lucretius first as the denouncement of "everything that needs sadness to exercise its power" (Deleuze 1990: 279). It is also the first step in Deleuze's empiricism directed against the agents of power and repression in thought and their traces in all aspects of life. Demystification consists in dismantling all unities into their elements, decomposing the whole into its minute parts to obtain pure singularities so that they become themselves disparate, asignifying and acosmic in a continuous variation. The second step in Deleuzian empiricism is the creation of ever new relations between these disparate and non-communicating singularities in a way that affirms multiplicity. Deleuze summarises these two steps with Whitehead's definition of empiricism which he identifies with pluralism:

> [T]he abstract does not explain but must itself be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal but to find the conditions under which something new is produced. (Deleuze, 1987: vii)

In between these two steps is to experiment by tracing the lines of flight. These are accidental encounters with the outside which do violence to our mind and force us to think and act. They bypass consciousness, and escape the confines of philosophy. The term "lines of flight" first appears in *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* co-authored by Deleuze & Guattari. However, it is a Deleuzian contribution which can be traced in all his previous monologues. Lines of flight are one of the components of tragic thought and Dionysian state of art in Nietzsche; they are part of intuition and differentiation in Bergson, and affect in Spinoza. We see them as involution against logos in Proust; as cosmos and its physics of living relations against logical relations in Lawrence; and as the "clean break" in

Fitzgerald's 'The Crack-up'. Finally Artaud's whole schizoid "system of cruelty" against the wall of the signifier and his Body without Organs against judgement are all about lines of flight.

1.2. The Book and Signification

It can easily be seen that lines of flight are primarily antagonistic to consciousness, logos, cogito, representation and the whole system of signification. Lines of flight become active, positive and creative only on some certain conditions. They also entail some risks. If they fail, they either lead one back to the prison house of logos and representation, or they turn into a line of death leading to total madness or suicide. Hölderlin and Nietzsche's madness, Kleist and Woolf's suicide can be given as examples. Deleuze & Guattari show destructiveness of the lines of flight as the proof of their being not imaginary but real lines in all their reality (1996a: 140). So the first characteristic of lines of flight is that they are neither imaginary, nor symbolic but real and primary. Secondly, they are immanent to and extend into social field. Thirdly, they are geographical or nomadic making rhizomes that are always in the middle and extend into endless deserts. Fourthly, they are vital movements producing a chain of becomings from becoming-woman to becoming-imperceptible. Fifthly, they are impersonal and are motivated by the forces of anti-ego and anti-memory. Sixthly they are multilingual making one a foreigner in his own language with a minor usage of it. Seventhly, they promise freedom of desire, movement and statement. Finally, they are not escapist but combative presenting a much immanent and eminent politics and social criticism as the American Black Panther militant George Jackson said: 'I may take flight, but all the while I am fleeing, I will be looking for a weapon!' (quote Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 277). Lines of flight have nothing to do with transcendence, mysticism and flying; they never move vertically. They are always horizontal, spreading over a surface. Massumi, the translator of both volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, also explain that the French word "*fuite*" for flight or escape "covers not only the act of fleeing or eluding but also flowing, leaking, and disappearing into the distance" (in Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: xvi).

Lines of flight, as a Deleuzian contribution to schizoanalysis, cannot be thought separately from his foremost concept of difference developed to liberate thought from its dogmatic constraints. He developed the concept of difference mainly through his works on Bergson and Nietzsche. The concept gains its full power in *Difference and Repetition* (1968). In this work, Deleuze reconsiders the dogmatic image of thought in its eight postulates formed around the preceding terms of antagonism from which Deleuze seeks liberation. After giving a detailed analysis of all the postulates of the dogmatic image, he comments:

> They crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition […] (Deleuze 1994: 167)

Difference here must be understood as pure difference or 'difference-in-itself' in positive and creative terms as in the phrase "make the difference" (28). Similarly, Deleuze's view of repetition is not a monotonous, imitative and static repetition of the same as the expression "*Do as I do.*" demands in representational terms; but a dynamic, distinctive and creative one as the expression "*Do with me.*" suggests. Repetition in the second sense affirms both difference and heterogeneity and "involves the Other" (23).

The best known and dominant theory of difference in Western thought is that of the dialectic and it is based on negativity. Against the two dialectical formulations of difference, namely Plato's dialectic of alterity (e.g., blue is different from red, yellow, …etc.) and Hegel's dialectic of contradiction (e.g., black is different from white as its opposite), Deleuze favours Bergsonian internal difference (e.g., white differs from itself) (2004a: 49). Both forms of the dialectic subordinate difference to representation, so do Saussurean linguistics and Freudian psychoanalysis. When difference is subjected to representation and its four categories, it fails to reflect and express pure "difference-in-itself", the affirmative world of vitality and multiplicity. Difference becomes distorted, inverted and externalised negatively; and ultimately it disappears in thought. Four categories, or "illusions", of representation are resemblance, opposition, analogy, and identity. To clarify these categories better, we can illustrate each with a statement from, for instance, Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*: Examples of resemblance are "Everything else was blackness alike." (Hardy 1994a: 90) and "That's what every

woman says." (Hardy 1994a: 97); Tess's whisper to Angel, "… she you love is not my real self, but one in my image …" (273) is an example of opposition; "… her large eyes staring at him like those of a wild animal." (64) is that of analogy; and finally, Tess's statement to Alec, "I came, sir, to tell you that we are of the same family as you." (45), illustrates identity. Representation is very important in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, since Tess becomes the victim of the categories of representation. They are sources of tragedy in the novel. There are also examples of internal difference in Hardy's work, such as, "… no two whites were alike …" (11) and "It is Tess Durbeyfield, otherwise d'Urberville, somewhat changed—the same, but not the same" (112). The first example shows the internal difference of the colour white itself, and the second one illustrates Tess's durational and indeterminate self-differentiation as "a sheaf of susceptibilities" (227).

Deleuze's concept of difference, as it is with all his other concepts, evolves constructively without a final form and definition. Like a snowball, it keeps growing with new connections and encounters. This is one of the main sources of difficulty in understanding Deleuze. His styles of living, thinking and writing are immanent to each other forming a strong ethics. Deleuze cannot write about difference without opening himself to all kind of difference, and he cannot conceptualize difference without making difference differ from itself. Similarly his mistrust in representation makes him leave the categories of representation in thinking and writing altogether. With a disbelief in the communicativeness of language, he looks for alternative means of communication, like a new affect or pathos. Deleuze takes the creation of new concepts as the highest aim of philosophy and lives by/for it. Like a person who wears many pieces of clothing on top of the other with a fear of catching cold, Deleuze's mistrust in language leads him to make as many connections as possible for the creation of a single concept and to await still new encounters without finalizing it. As for his readers, he expects them to use his concepts like a tool to make still new connections of their own, or like a cog connecting one machine to other machines. Yet, his departure from representation is also meant to avoid facile recognition on the part of the reader, and to stimulate the unconscious and foster creativity and careful reading and thinking. So, if the readers are not sharing the same affects as Deleuze, it will be difficult for them to understand him.

Nietzsche's concept of the tragic illustrates this writer-text-reader relationship best: Tragedy is in the realm of Dionysus, the sovereign of the unconscious and creativity who does not have a shape, form and individuality. For the performance of his tragedy, he needs the mediation of Apollo, who reigns over consciousness and appearances. Apollo is only the master of drama and has neither understanding of nor taste for tragedy, therefore he expresses the tragic in a drama. In the end, only the audience who are tragic can grasp the tragic essence in drama and hear Dionysian rumble beneath Apollonian forms (Deleuze 1996: 10-12).

Aestheticisation of knowledge is another line of flight in making thought a productive activity, and another way of expressing internal difference. It is in fact the only way according to Proust as he refers to a "*qualitative difference*" that, "if there were no such thing as art, [it] would remain the eternal secret of each man" (quoted in Deleuze 2000: 41). Deleuze builds his concept of art on Nietzsche's aesthetics of creation. This tragic view of art has two principles. Firstly, art is not a disinterested engagement, "it does not heal, calm, sublimate or pay off, it does not "suspend desire, instinct or will" (Deleuze 1996: 102). Art stimulates thought and sense perception. For the benefit of active forces of life, it never remains silent about reactive conceptions of art, and likewise, of life and thought. Secondly, "art is the highest power of falsehood" (102). It gives lie and deception the highest power by turning them into prominent ideals. Art bestows truth a new sense as "bringing of power into effect", and invents "new possibilities of life" (103). We can see the traces of these Nietzschean principles of art in Woolf, as she writes at the beginning of *A Room of One's Own*:

> I need not say that what I am about to describe has no existence; Oxbridge is an invention; so is Fernham; "I" is only a convenient term for somebody who has no real being. Lies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be some truth mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth and to decide whether any part of it is worth keeping, if not, you will of course throw the whole of it into the wastepaper basket and forget all about it. (Woolf 1989: 4-5)

In these lines, Woolf clearly indicates that her work has nothing to do with disinterestedness and it primarily attempts to create some new truths by bringing the power of lies into effect. These lines, at the same time, indicate Woolf's tragic vision

and her ethics of reading. She attempts to convey her tragic message to those readers who share the same tragic vision as her. Her tragic truth lies completely outside the book. Language alone cannot convey it; something else is needed. Elsewhere Woolf names this something else as "emotion" as she writes, "both in writing and in reading it is the emotion that must come first" (Woolf 1975: 161).

As for the ethics of reading implied in the above quotation from Woolf, Woolf's reading with emotion shares a similar ethics with what Deleuze refers as "reading with love". Deleuze distinguishes two ways of reading a book. The first way of reading is a "*defensive*" and paranoid one which heavily relies on meaning and searches for signification. In this way of reading, you see the book "as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you're even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers" (Deleuze 1995: 7). The second way of reading a book is an "*intensive*" and schizoid one in which,

> you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is "Does it work, and how does it work?" How does it work for you? If it doesn't work, if nothing comes through, you try another book. This second way of reading's intensive: something comes through or it doesn't. There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. […] [I]t relates a book directly to what's Outside. A book is a little cog in much more complicated external machinery. Writing is one flow among others, with no special place in relation to the others, that comes into relations of current, countercurrent, and eddy with other flows. (8)

"This intensive way of reading," Deleuze goes on, "is reading with love" (9). The term "machine" stands primarily for the unconscious nature and impersonality of desire and its flows. There is not much need to say that machines, in Deleuze's use, cover all emotions. When we regard a book as a machine, we brush aside all significations. "What does it signify?" or "What does it mean?" are not proper questions to be sought in a book. Deleuze's questions "Does it work?", "How does it work?" and "How does it work for me?" are the proper and ethical ones to ask about a book we are reading. These questions test the book for its workability in general, and for its workability for us. Woolf's reading is also an intensive way of reading which she names "re-reading", or "reading over". What can be more intensive than re-reading? Woolf's re-reading has two steps. Emotion is the first one, and involves primarily what is outside the text and

its visible linguistic signification as she argues that, in a book, "there is nothing to be seen, there is everything to be felt" (Woolf 1975: 161). The second step in Woolf's "re-reading" is testing. In place of Deleuze's test of workability, here we have the test of survivability in a similar manner. It involves "discriminating" the book with questions:

> [T]o get our emotion directly and for ourselves is only the first step. We must go on to test it and riddle it with questions. If nothing survives, well and good; toss it into the waste-paper basket and have done with it. If something survives, place it for ever among the treasures of the universe. (161)

To tie together the above discussion about the ethics of reading, Deleuze would never lose time with mottos like "There is no outside of the text" (Derrida), nor would Woolf. For both of them, a book is contextual rather than textual. It has its outside, which are assemblages of desire in Deleuze, and emotion and its truths in Woolf. And it is worth reading unless it fails a test. Deleuze's test of workability involves a series of experiments in connecting the book and its flows of desire with the outside, and in "getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything" (Deleuze 1995: 9). For Woolf, it is the test of survivability. In Deleuzian terms, Woolf's work can be considered as a machine producing flows of desire, or flows of "lies" and flows of "truth" as Woolf expresses at the opening of *A Room of One's Own*. She does not urge readers to interpret or explain her work, since the book expresses a domain other than the language and reason; in her words, it is "a state of mind which neither words can express nor the reason explain" (Woolf 1975: 19). On the contrary, Woolf encourages the reader to feel and test the flows in her work by using them as cogs to connect to other machinery, and to the machines of their own bodies. The term "body" must be stressed here since Woolf demands "not only a new language" that is "more primitive, more sensual, more obscene, but a new hierarchy of the passions" (11). In that sense Woolf accords also with Deleuze's materialism, which valorises the body over logos and consciousness following Spinoza and Nietzsche.

While Deleuze aims to pull down the white wall of signification, the dogmatic image of thought and the reactive spirit of nihilism in it, Woolf wishes the destruction of "the leaning-tower of aristocratic literature" that is full of "discomfort", self-pitying, and "anger against society". She dreams for a literature that is no one's private land, a

"literature of the classless and towerless society of the future" (Woolf 1975: 151). Deleuze dreams the same for thought, and in fact, he sees the fulfilment of this dream in Anglo-American literature:

> Strange Anglo-American literature: from Thomas Hardy, from D. H. Lawrence to Malcolm Lowry, from Henry Miller to Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac, men who know how to leave, to scramble the codes, to cause flows to circulate, to traverse the desert of the body without organs. They overcome a limit, they shatter a wall, the capitalist barrier. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 132-3)

So are Melville, Stevenson, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe and Fitzgerald (Deleuze 1987: 36). Deleuze admires Anglo-American literature especially for its lines of flight and he shares Lawrence's idea that flight as tracing a horizontal line is the "highest aim of literature" (36). He even goes as far as equating his "transcendental empiricism" with the English novel. For him, empiricism is not following a first principle or a method, but a matter of an encounter with the outside, experimenting, and finding a new syntax. Deleuze also admires English language for being able to overcome its hegemonic and imperialistic tonality by putting itself into flight, primarily in the hands of its great writers who become foreigners in their own language inventing a "minoritarian" usage of English, and secondly in the hands of ethnic minorities who put English into variation by new dialects, such as, "a Black English, and also a Yellow English, a Red English, a broken English" on the other side of the continent, and "Gaelic-English, Irish English, etc." in the UK (58). Especially the people in the Third World now are learning English not to be subjected to its imperialism, but to put it into a flight.

1.3. The Author and Subjectivity

Deleuze has been deeply concerned about the formation of subjectivity and the process of individuation ever since the publication of his first book *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* in 1953. In this work, Deleuze, in a repetitive series of discussions, demonstrates how Hume accounts for the construction of knowledge, meaning and subjectivity in one and the same empirical process motivated by our passions and the associative links they lead to. He problematises how the subject constitutes itself within the mind without recourse to

psychology and transcendence (Deleuze 1991b: 103, 87). Hume recognizes two fundamental characteristics of human nature, which depend on a kind of double articulation: transcendence and artifice, or belief and invention. The subject is also articulated by the same double movement: "believing and inventing is what makes the subject a subject". Hume takes empiricism to its extreme limit by rendering all knowledge a kind of belief. Saying "The sun will rise tomorrow." is never an expression of an empirical truth, but only of a habit or belief depending on what Hume refers as "the principles of association". They are in fact the basis of all kind of knowledge. Invention, on the other hand, depends on "the principles of passion" which are utility and goal oriented. They are the sources of social conventions, morality, and personal dispositions, and create sympathies. Principles of association and belief give the subject its form and supply it with external relations and movement. Principles of passion and sympathy on the other hand, give the subject its singularity and equip it with a certain direction and fixity (104, 71).

Boundas, in his introduction to *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, repeatedly writes about Deleuze's contribution to a theory of subjectivity, probably with a certain theory oriented reader in mind. However, this approach might be misleading since Deleuze is not a theoretical thinker. All he has to do with theories is only for symptomatology preceding an extensive experimentation. For Deleuze, a theory at its best is practice. This is what empiricism is for. Similarly, on the issue of subjectivity, he writes that "there is no theoretical subjectivity", and that, "there is only a practical subject" (104). Hume's ideas on subjectivity, too, involve practice. Pointing out the negative aspects of both association and passion, Hume distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate beliefs, and prescribes the conditions of possibility for the legitimate ones. Similarly, there is a paradox of sympathy on the part of passions. Our sympathies make us social but partial. Partiality forms territories, such as my family, my school, my church, my party, my nation, my race. These territories have vide-ranging negative effects, such as, enclosure in Oedipal triangle, fascism and racism. Partiality is part of human nature and therefore it is difficult to overcome except by some artificial means which will integrate it into a positive whole. Hence, the double articulation of subjectivity regulated by the principles of association and passion is moulded into a new artifice through syntheses.

On the one hand, we correct beliefs and limit them to legitimate and immanent ones despite their tendency to expand. On the other hand, we try to expand our sympathies despite their limiting effects. Egoism is another obstacle for a more social subjectivity, but Hume regards sympathies more dangerous for society than egoism, since egoism is not part of human nature but sympathies are. We can overcome our egos but can only expand out sympathies to the outside of its natural limits in such a way that "the nearest must become the most distant, and the most distant, the nearest" (Deleuze 1991b: 50). Thus, in Deleuze's analysis of Hume's idea of the expansion of sympathies we find one source of the concept of deterritorialisation long before he meets Guattari.

Deleuze is concerned about practical subjectivity and ways of undoing the subject in all his monologues. In his work on Nietzsche, we see that "the death of God" makes no sense unless it is followed by the dissolution of the subject. Nietzsche valorises body over the conscious mind and distinguishes it from egoisms and from all "conscious ways of thinking, feeling, and willing". Only its active forces make the body a "self", which is necessarily unconscious. In this way the self becomes both active and productive. "The great activity is unconscious" is the Nietzschean dictum (Deleuze 1996: 41). In *The Logic of Sense* (1969) Deleuze looks at discursive subjectivity and he privileges free nomadic singularities of the impersonal and the pre-individual. Nomadic singularities are best seen in the language of the surface without heights or depths. This is the language of the schizophrenic which is the basis of humour as opposed to irony:

> A new type of esoteric language is formed here which is its own model and reality. Becoming-mad changes shape in its climb to the surface, […] and the same thing happens to the dissolved self, the cracked I, the lost identity, when they cease being buried and begin, on the contrary, to liberate the singularities of the surface. […] The tragic and the ironic give way to a new value, that of humor. For if irony is the co-extensiveness of being with the individual, or of the I with representation, humor is the co-extensiveness of sense with nonsense. Humor is the art of the surfaces and of the doubles, of nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is the art of the static genesis, the savoir-faire of the pure event, and the "fourth person singular"— with even signification, denotation, and manifestation suspended, all height and depth abolished. (Deleuze 1990: 141)

Deterritorialisation is a term identical to the line of flight, and gives it a new dimension of subjectivity. It is a specifically Guattarian contribution to Deleuze's

terminology of difference and to his conceptual evolution. Deleuze writes about his encounter with Guattari not in the sense of mutual contribution but in terms of a "double-theft" and "a-parallel evolution". Their cooperative work portrays "neither union nor juxtaposition, but a broken line which shoots between two, proliferation, tentacles" (Deleuze 1987: 18). Deleuze refers to this as a "pick-up method": not picking up a method, but pick-up as the method, or rather, the absence of any method. Deleuze had training in philosophy, and Guattari was trained as a psychotherapist. They both were critical about the prevalent theory and practice in their respective fields dominated by Hegelian dialectic, phenomenology, Freudian psychoanalysis and structuralism. The pick-up method of encounter between Deleuze & Guattari is best monumentalised in the concept of faciality or the face on which both signification and subjectification, white wall and black hole intersect:

> Signifiance is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies. Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face: the *white wall/black hole* system, A broad face with white cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a black hole. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 167)

Deleuze & Guattari's semiotics is not based on language, nor does it serve as a new language-system. They account for all historical and socio-political formations in terms of "a semiology of regimes of signs which is anti-psychiatric, anti-psychoanalytic, anti-philosophical" (Deleuze 1987: 120). Regimes of signs include all formalisations of expression, including the linguistic ones, in a given historical period, people and language. When different regimes of signs are found in the same period and people, we have a mixed semiotics. The terms strata, and stratifications combine both earth sciences and social sciences. Deleuze & Guattari extend social formations to a geological domain. They have a Spinozist outlook when they write "strata come at least in twos". They explain the functioning of strata on the ideas of the Danish Spinozist geologist and linguist Hjelmslev. Strata are subject to a double articulation. They are articulated twice as content/expression. The same articulation can be extended to all disciplines and sciences and it takes places as sedimentation/folding in geology, molar/molecular in chemistry and physics, nucleic acids/amino acids in biochemistry,

alloplastic/linguistic in geophilosophy (an inhuman anthropology), homoplastic/genetic in anthropology, virtual/actual in ontology, paranoia/schizophrenia in psychiatry, etc. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a).

1.4. Methodology and Limitations

The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, implicates a criticism of the three fields of thought, namely, the "field of reality", the "field of representation", and the "field of subjectivity" in praise of assemblages with "the outside". It also calls for a redefinition of "the world", "the book" and "the author", and a reconfiguration of their interaction with each other. The epigraph is, in fact, epithetical of Deleuze & Guattari's three projects that correspond to the three fields respectively: geophilosophy, pragmatics and schizoanalysis. This study presents an unfolding of the three fields and the three corresponding projects of Deleuze & Guattari.

The second chapter deals with geophilosophy from the point of view of style. What Deleuze & Guattari elucidate as "geophilosophy" is in fact giving the earth a chance to conceive for itself. In the same way, we can speak of a "geo-science" when the earth begins to know for itself, and a "geo-literature" when we begin to feel with the earth. We feel a rock as hard and solid. But how does a rock feel its surrounding, and how does it feel us? Deleuze & Guattari argue that everything contemplates, and everything feels by means of forces, not only animals and plants but also rocks and stars: 'everywhere there are forces that constitute microbrains, or inorganic life of things' (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 213). The most crucial thing here is that man is totally absent in all planes. It is inhuman that conceives, knows and feels things. Man only exists as another thing on the earth. Similarly, "I" in the brain is not a subject but an object. What is referred as "I" is always another in the brain. Deleuze & Guattari, after Cézanne, talk about the brain as an artist's "landscape: man absent from, but completely within the brain" (210). Consequently, geophilosophy is the project that determines the impersonal and nonhuman milieu of thinking, as becoming(-other), the movement of absolute deterritorialisation of man, and opposes it to historical conceptions of thought which are never free of nationalistic traits. In becoming, man

enters in a zone of proximity with the outside and acts in the name of a future and people to come:

> Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. The philosopher must become nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 109)

Becoming in its creative act of calling for a new earth and people combines both art and philosophy. The neologism "geostyle" refers to this convergence of art and philosophy on an impersonal milieu which replaces history with geography. Goodchild (1996: 71) refers to Deleuze & Guattari's concept of geophilosophy as a utopia. Of course there is a positive sense in utopias as Deleuze & Guattari distinguish between authoritarian "Utopias of transcendence" and "immanent, revolutionary, libertarian Utopias" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 100). Their task can be referred as utopian in the latter sense. Yet, even in its latter sense, utopia doesn't evade history, as Deleuze & Guattari write, "even when opposed to History [Utopia] is still subject to it and lodged within it as an ideal or motivation" (110). In this sense becoming of geophilosophy opposes itself to utopia. In itself, becoming "has neither beginning nor an end but only a milieu" (110).

Style is not something limited to writing alone, all organisms, and the earth have styles, so do all events. For Nietzsche, style is the unity of life and thought, as Deleuze comments: "Modes of life inspire ways of thinking, modes of thinking create ways of living" (Deleuze 2001: 66). This makes style both an ethical and aesthetic undertaking. Writing becomes a style only when it is deterritorialised in a becoming as opposed to territorialising in representation:

> Writing is very simple. Either it is a way of reterritorializing oneself, con-forming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of established states of things: not just schools and authors, but all those who write professionally, even in a non-literary sense. Or else, on the other hand, it is becoming, becoming something other than a writer, since what one is becoming at the same time becomes something other than writing. (Deleuze 1987: 74)

With becoming, writing becomes a means of a life that is more than personal. In this way it evades the imaginary and the symbolic, and opens the way to the real (51). Through writing in this way, "life escapes from the resentment of persons, societies and

reigns" (Deleuze 1987: 50). The reality of writing lies in our "becoming with the world" as a boundless experimentation, and not in accounting for our restricted "being in the world" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 196). One reaches this dimension of the real in writing, either when it is "the impossibility of another choice" as in the case of Kerouac (Deleuze 1987: 51), or when it is the only hope as in Woolf's case. Great authors never write for the fun of it. Nor is it for a living, but a way of life. Again in the case of Woolf, she cannot live, or rather, will not live, without writing.

The neologism "geostyle" in the title of the third chapter of this study is meant to relate Deleuze & Guattari's work to literature and writing for an audience who is not trained in philosophy, and who has no or little acquaintance with Deleuze & Guattari's work. In fact, not having a philosophical background is an advantage for a better understanding of Deleuze & Guattari's concepts which are mainly unhistorical and anti-historical: the only history a concept needs is immanent "precursors" to avoid being subjective. Neither objectivity nor subjectivity is a proper category of Deleuzian immanence. Having a philosophical background, conversely, hinders understanding more than facilitating in the specific case of Deleuze & Guattari's concepts and thought which destabilise many constants of philosophy. While relating Deleuze & Guattari's work to literature, the second chapter tries to find out what happens to the body in their study and presents some of their basic concepts in their own milieu as a box of tools that will be useful in the following chapters.

The fourth chapter deal with the two components of Deleuze & Guattari's concept of faciality, or "the white wall/black hole system" as an abstract machine of faciality. These two components are "signifiance" and "subjectivation" as briefly introduced in the above sections in their own specific development in Deleuze's thought, and in his cooperative work with Guattari.

The fifth chapter is about reading. Two ways of reading Deleuze points out have already been mentioned. The first way of reading is a disagreeable one, namely, the "defensive" or paranoid way which regards reading either as "a scholarly exercise in search of what it signifies" or "a textual exercise in search of a signifier". The second way of reading, "the intensive" or schizoid reading is Deleuze's favourite. In this way

reading becomes "a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring machines", or an exercise in extracting the "revolutionary force" of the text (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 106). In this way of reading, the work is never related to a symbolic, an imaginary, an ideological, a metaphysical or a representational domain. It is always treated on a line of flight or in a milieu which is real, nonfigurative, material and "machinic". On the line of flight, there is no distinction between life and work; they are one and the same. That is what Deleuze intended with his critical and clinical project when he first introduced it: "*Criticism and the clinic*: life and work are the same thing, when they have adapted the line of flight which makes them the components of the same war-machine" (Deleuze 1987: 141). When they are applied to a work, critical aspect disposes of linguistics and signifiance; and the clinical aspect does away with psychoanalysis and interpretation. Deleuzian Critico-clinical reading has three distinctive steps which are, respectively, the determination of the function of *the proper name*, the study of *the regimes of signs*, and the investigation of *the plane of composition*.

The first five chapters of this study carry out three simultaneous tasks together: accounting for Deleuze's thought and concepts, relating his work to literature, and extracting tools for a specifically Deleuzian way of reading a text that will be helpful in the last chapter.

As Buchanan and Marks indicate, it is "impossible to overestimate the importance of literature to Gilles Deleuze" (2000: 1). Henceforth, most of the books on Deleuze have at least one section on Literature. In addition, there are a number of books published specifically on the issue of Deleuze and literature. John Hughes' *Lines of Flight: Reading Deleuze with Hardy, Gissing, Conrad, Woolf* (1997), the collection of essays *Deleuze and Literature* (2000) edited by Buchanan and Marks, Ronald Bogue's *Deleuze on Literature* (2003), Mary Bryden's *Deleuze: Travels in Literature (*2007) offer valuable resource on how Deleuze reads works of literature, and how they can be read in a Deleuzian way. Yet Buchanan, in a recent essay published in *Deleuze and the Social* (2006, edited by Fuglsang and Sørensen) admits the following:

There are literally dozens of books on Deleuze & Guattari, but not one of them can tell you how to read a text in a manner that is recognisably Deleuzian. Even if one accepts Deleuze & Guattari's injunction against interpretation, it should nonetheless still be possible to identify reliably a body without organs and distinguish that from an abstract machine and so on. Otherwise, Deleuze's famous toolbox is useless to us in much the same way as surgical instruments are useless to the non-surgeon. And yet, given the wide differences in definitions to be found in the secondary literature, one can safely say we have not yet reached that stage. As cultural critics we are the poorer for this because it means the rich critical language Deleuze left us is not being utilised to its fullest extent. (Buchanan 2006: 147-8)

Thus, this study takes Buchanan's above statement as a challenge, and attempts to carry out a reading of Thomas Hardy's *The Return of the Native* (1878) and *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891) in a "recognisably Deleuzian" way in the sixth chapter. In the fourth and fifth chapters some illustrative readings of Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own*, and F. Scott Fitzgerald's 'The Crack-Up' are also attempted.

CHAPTER 2

GEOPHILOSOPHY: THE BODY AND ITS VITAL ENCOUNTERS

> 'Listen. Suppose this wasn't a crack in you – suppose it was a crack in the Grand Canyon.'
>
> 'The crack's in me,' I said heroically.
>
> 'Listen! The world only exists in your eyes – your conception of it. You can make it as big or small as you want to. And you're trying to be a little puny individual. By god, if I ever cracked, I'd try to make the world crack with me. Listen! The world only exists through your apprehension of it and so it's much better to say that it's not you that's cracked – it's the Grand Canyon.'
>
> 'Baby et up all her Spinoza?'
>
> (Fitzgerald, 1965: 44)

2.1. The Three Virtues

Deleuzian lines of flight lead one to new encounters with the outside. One becomes something other than he or she is. One becomes everyone/everything else, or in Deleuze & Guattari's words, "*tout le mond*", literally, the whole world. So the lines of flight in their ultimate consequences, for Deleuze, are three formulas for the dissolution of human beings in their conception of their own body, language and self. The human body is taken up with a nonorganic process toward the immanent limit of becoming-imperceptible; human language is connected with an asignifying process of becoming-indiscernible, and finally, human subjectivity is involved in an asubjective process of becoming-impersonal. These three processes, that will respectively be dealt with in this chapter and in the following three chapters, are referred to as "the three virtues" by Deleuze & Guattari, and they are meant for suppressing in oneself what prevents him or her from communicative encounters with the world outside, from connecting with things, with anything organic or inorganic. The aim is to free life where it becomes trapped, to free thought from its constraints, and to find new possibilities for living and thinking. In order to free thought from its constraints one needs to raise the body to the level of the soul or mind as per Deleuze's Spinozist concept of "the plane of immanence". Similarly, in order to free life from its traps, one needs to denounce the organism for a nonorganic life as per the concept of "the body without organs" (BwO)

which Deleuze borrows from Artaud: "It is organisms that die, not life" (Deleuze 1995: 143). Deleuze & Guattari discuss the three virtues in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia* (1980), and they point to the link between them:

> To be present at the dawn of the world. Such is the link between imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and impersonality—the three virtues. To reduce oneself to an abstract line, a trait, in order to find one's zone of indiscernibility with other traits, and in this way enter the haecceity and impersonality of the creator. One is then like grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything, into a becoming, because one has made a necessarily communicating world, because one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents us from slipping between things and growing in the midst of things. One has combined "everything" (*le "tout"*): the indefinite article, the infinitive-becoming, and the proper name to which one is reduced. Saturate, eliminate, put everything in. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 280)

Deleuze's style attains its highest speed in his cooperative works with Guattari with leaps, intervals, hiatuses and contractions as can be seen in the above passage quoted. It also has a multiplicity or intensity of voices. In this passage, one finds the voices of many people from the stoics to Bergson, and from Lewis Carroll to Artaud. To mention only one voice, the last sentence above, "Saturate, eliminate, put everything in", is the voice of Virginia Woolf as she describes her writing style in her diaries.[1]

Going back to the three virtues, which are the imperceptibility of the body, the indiscernibility of language and the impersonality of the self, their usefulness is not limited to life and thought only. They have benefits for the style of writing, as well. Deleuze, when discussing the French writer and artist Klossowsky's parallelism between language and body in *The Logic of Sense* (1969), mentions the three virtues as the sole condition for the expressive power of a style. Disintegration of the body, dissolution of the self and overturning the function of language are required "to discover a value that is purely expressive" (Deleuze 1990: 299). Deleuze argues that Klossowsky's "expressive or expressionist language" has three vocative values: "provocation", "evocation" and "revocation". For Klossowsky spirits are the source of

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[1] The quoted words allude to Woolf's dairy entry for 28 November 1928 in *A Writer's Diary* when she is thinking about a new style of writing for her next novel, *The Waves*. Part of the entry reads: "what I want now to do is to saturate every atom. I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give the moment whole; whatever it includes. […] I want to put practically everything in: yet to saturate" (Woolf 1987: 138).

expressiveness and the writer or the artist first needs to *provoke* them by silence. But in order to *evoke* the spirits for inspiration, the writer or the artist must *revoke* or denounce his or her own body, self and language: "Revoked (denounced) are corporeal unicity, personal identity, and the false simplicity of language in so far as it is supposed to denote bodies and to manifest a self" (Deleuze 1990: 299).

The Nietzschean theme of the "death of God" is the main motivation behind the dissolution of the body-self-language triad, or rather, the latter is the consequence of the former. They are all inseparable parts of the same master plan as a result of the change of perspective from a divine order to a worldly one which does not spare the world either. Hence this new master plan comprises "the death of God, the destruction of the world, the dissolution of the person, the disintegration of bodies, and the shifting function of language" (Deleuze 1990: 294). For Nietzsche death of God was not a new event. God dies many times in history. God's resting on the seventh day of the creation is his first death. He becomes man with Jesus, and Jesus is crucified: these are the second and third deaths. The idea of God is nihilistic in both the Old Testament (resentment) and the New Testament (bad conscience) for Nietzsche. The Christian God of love is not the antithesis of the Judaic God of hatred, but the outcome of it (Nietzsche 1996: 20; Deleuze 1996: 132). Similarly, the atheism which dominates in the West is the outcome of Christianity, and carries the same old nihilistic tendencies. Deleuze argues that Christianity "secretes its own atheism, an atheism of bad conscience and *ressentiment*. The reactive life instead of the divine will, the reactive Man instead of God, the Man-God replacing the God-Man—the *European Man*" (Deleuze 1996: 154). In this, Deleuze finds "the fourth sense of the death of God" (154): Reactive man kills God to take his place. But nothing changes: the despot takes the place of the monarch and guilty consciousness (e.g. Oedipus) presides among the public leading to their enslavement:

> Earlier, nihilism had meant depreciation, the negation of life in the name of higher values. But now the negation of these higher values is replaced by human values—all too human values (morals replace religion; utility, progress, even history replace divine values). Nothing has changed, for the same reactive life, the same slavery that had triumphed in the shadow of divine values now triumphs through human ones. (Deleuze 2001: 80)

Freud and his model of the unconscious, which is the main target of Deleuze & Guattari's unorthodox criticism in *Anti Oedipus*, is a crucial example here. It is argued in *Anti-Oedipus* that, although "Freud is confirmed in his most rigorous atheism", he injects "something religious into the unconscious" by "render[ing] religion unconscious, or the unconscious religious" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 58). Demystification of psychoanalysis is one of the projects carried out in *Anti-Oedipus* with questions such as, "what would Freudian analysis be without the celebrated guilt feelings ascribed to the unconscious?" (58).

In the introduction, Nietzsche's analysis of reactive forces is mentioned in respect to the dogmatic image of thought and to how this image prevents creative thinking. Socio-political effects of reactive forces, and their misuse by the agents of power and repression to enslave the public are no less important. Standing against these sad passions and their reactive use brings Nietzsche together with Lucretius and Spinoza in their liberative efforts:

> Lucretius exposes the trouble of the soul and those who need it to establish their power – Spinoza exposes sorrow, all the causes of sorrow and all those who found their power at the heart of this sorrow. – Nietzsche exposes *ressentiment*, bad conscience and the power of the negative which serves as their principle: the "untimeliness" of a philosophy which has liberation as its object. There is no unhappy consciousness which is not also man's enslavement, a trap for the will and an opportunity for all basenesses of thought. The reign of the negative is the reign of powerful beasts, Churches and States, which fetter us to their own ends. The murderer of God committed a sad crime because his motivation was sad: he wanted to take God's place, he killed in order to "steal", he remained in the negative whilst taking on the attributes of divinity. The death of God needs time finally to find its essence and become a joyful event. Time to expel the negative, to exorcise the reactive – the time of a becoming-active. This time is the cycle of the eternal return. (Deleuze 1996: 190)

It becomes evident that the death of God will never get its true sense without the disappearance of the human as such: "The death of God essentially signifies, and essentially entails, the dissolution of the self: God's tomb is also the tomb of the self" (Deleuze 1990: 294). Nietzsche proposes his concept of the Overman [*Übermensch*] for the purpose of overcoming man and the reactive nature and nihilistic tendencies of mankind, while at the same time transforming all humanities and sciences of man as such. For that reason, translating the concept of *Übermensch* as superman is misleading.

Overman is not a superior kind of man, nor a master race but a man who overcomes and defeats himself, and who no longer acts, thinks, or speaks like man:

> Nietzsche's struggle against nihilism and the spirit of revenge will therefore mean the reversal of metaphysics, the end of history as history of man and the transformation of the sciences. And we do not really know what a man denuded of *ressentiment* would be like. A man who would not accuse or depreciate existence—would he still be a man, would he think like a man? Would he not already be something other than a man, almost the Overman? (Deleuze 1996: 35)

Whence, Overman gives vent to new, nonhuman ways of feeling and thinking that are affirmative of life and that are liberated from nihilistic and reactive instincts. When the Overman is joined into "the cycle of the eternal return" which gives the former its law of becoming, it attains its highest power of creativity in "becoming-active".

2.2. Against the Negative and the Reactive

Nietzsche and Spinoza make up an indispensible couple for Deleuze in his efforts to exorcise all traces of the negative and the reactive and to expel all forms of dualism and transcendence in thought. Besides having a lot in common, both Spinoza's monism and Nietzsche's pluralism bypass dualisms and escape all forms of transcendence. The Nietzsche-Spinoza couple has another import for Deleuze, in that, he gets them into a helpful interaction with each other in his work. Deleuze reads Nietzsche with Spinoza to provide the former with a high coherence in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962). Similarly, he reads Spinoza with Nietzsche to save the former from monism and pantheism in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1970, revised edition 1981). But in most cases, Spinoza has an incomparable influence on Deleuze's thought. Deleuze writes that each time he reads Spinoza's work, it gives him "a gust of air from behind" and makes him mount "a witch's broom". He also admits, "We have not yet begun to understand Spinoza, and I myself no more than others" (1987: 15). Besides Deleuze's two solo works on Spinoza (*Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968) is the second), Spinoza has a powerful presence in all of his four cooperative works with Guattari.[2] Deleuze

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[2] Deleuze & Guattari have written four books together. The first one *Anti-Oedipus*, which, Deleuze mentions, 'is a sort of Spinozism of the unconscious' (1995: 144). They next wrote on Kafka who is mentioned above to be one of Spinoza's disciples. *A Thousand Plateaus*, their third book, invites Spinoza

indicates that Spinoza was at the same time Nietzsche's only predecessor apart from the Pre-Socratics (Deleuze 1996: ix).

Deleuze reads Spinoza's parallelism of body and mind as his major affinity to Nietzsche in its reversal of "consciousness, [moral] values and sad passions" in favour of an ethics of joy that pertains to materialism and atheism and an immanent investigation of the unconscious (Deleuze 1988b: 28-9). Traditional thinking valorises mind and consciousness over body and its passions. Descartes' cogito formulated as "I think therefore I am" is no exception. Spinoza is critical of it. His parallelism, Deleuze argues, rejects not only the superiority of the mind over the body, but also any primacy given to either one: "what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind" (18). With his parallelism, Spinoza also emphasizes "that the body surpasses the knowledge we have of it, and that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of it" (18). Hence Spinoza's parallelism implies a double task in one and the same process: "to capture the power of the body beyond the given conditions of our knowledge, and to capture the power of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness" (18).

Consciousness has a delusive nature, as Deleuze points out; it mistakes effects as real causes since it only registers effects, and real causes go unnoticed. When we encounter another body or mind, either we "compound" with it forming a stronger whole, or it "decomposes" us. To illustrate this, if we eat some nutritious food (another body encountered), or if we receive a word of encouragement from someone (another mind encountered), for instance, we have a stronger body or mind giving us the feeling of happiness. If we eat something poisonous or receive a threat from someone, on the other hand, this encounter decomposes our body or mind and breaks our coherence. This time we experience sadness as the outcome of the bad encounter. Our conscious mind is mostly unaware of these encounters which are real causes of what we experience as happening to our body or mind: "as conscious beings, we never apprehend anything but the effects of these compositions and decompositions of

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in the conceptual persona of Professor Challenger in one chapter, and the whole book is an application of Spinozism to many different fields. Finally, *What is Philosophy?* is built on Spinoza's absolute immanence, and the three elements in *Ethics*: affect, concept, and percept.

relations, which infinitely affects our nature" (Deleuze 1988b: 19). Nietzsche takes Spinoza's assertion that consciousness is only the inscription of effects one step further by claiming that, in Deleuze's words,

> consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated or into which he is "incorporated". Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which is not itself conscious. It is not the master's consciousness but the slave's consciousness in relation to a master who is not himself conscious. (Deleuze 1996: 39)

Nietzsche's above claim can be read as the valorisation of the unconscious which is the master (good master who is always active), as opposed to consciousness and the ego which are always in a state of subordination and enslavement to unknown powers outside them (either good or bad masters, depending on their being active or reactive). Consciousness for Nietzsche is a mere symptom of forces that are either active or reactive.

At the level of consciousness, that is, the realm of shadows and conventions, Spinoza defines the effect of an encounter between bodies, "the trace of one body upon another, the state of a body insofar as it suffers the action of another body", as a "sign" (Deleuze 1998: 138). He divides signs into "scalar affections" or "*affections*" of a present state (e.g., encounters of bodies in space) and "vectorial affects", or simply "*affects*" (effects of encounters on one's duration or instantaneous awareness of the flow of experience). My suntan, for instance is a scalar sign or affection of the encounter between my body and the sunlight. In a vectorial sense, the sunlight can affect my duration, as well, giving me "a pleasure or pain, a joy or sadness" either increasing or diminishing my power to act. Affections are further divided into four as indicative signs ("sensible indices", e.g. the example of suntan above), abstractive signs ("logical icons", e.g., "Man is a thinking animal."), imperative signs ("moral symbols", e.g. "You should/shouldn't do this because it's good/evil."), and hermeneutic or interpretive signs ("metaphysical idols", "He thought it was the will of God …."). Vectorial signs or affects on the other hand, are divided into two as "augmentative powers" (e.g.. food in one's body) and "diminutive servitudes" (e.g., poison in one's body) depending on the joyfulness or sadness of the encounter, the increase or decrease in our powers as the

result of the encounter. And Deleuze adds a third one to vectorial signs, "ambiguous or fluctuating signs" which cause both joy and sadness, or which increase and decrease our powers simultaneously (Deleuze 1998: 140), such as, a medicine with side effects. Affects (vectorial signs) "derive from" and "presuppose" affections (scalar signs) without being "reduced to them". Both affects and affections, which altogether make six or seven signs, continuously form combinations among themselves" (140).

Affections and affects which are likened to shadows of objects constitute the first aspect of Spinoza's *Ethics* for Deleuze, and they stipulate "new ways of feeling". The second aspect is concepts or common notions that probe and detect real causes behind effects and true structures of bodies. They are like the colours reflected in light and demand "new ways of thinking". Finally, the third aspect of *Ethics* is constituted by percepts that are pure figures, essences and singularities which envisage "new ways of seeing", and they are like pure light in itself (Deleuze 1998: 148; 1995: 165).

Nietzsche follows Spinoza in taking the body as a model.[3] A body, for him, no matter if it is a biological, chemical, social or a political one, is formed by relationships between forces which are either dominating or dominated, commanding or obeying, superior or inferior. These opposing dual characteristics define respectively the difference between forces as either "dominant" or "dominated" in quantity, and either "active" or "reactive" in quality: "In a body the superior or dominant forces are known as *active* and the inferior or dominated forces are known as *reactive*" (Deleuze 1996: 40). What Nietzsche terms as forces can be compared to vectorial signs or affects in Spinoza. Active forces are like augmentative powers which increase a body's power to act, and reactive forces are like dimunitive servitudes which decompose a body and prevent its action. While the unconscious is formed of purely active forces for Nietzsche, consciousness, being itself "essentially reactive", is only the expression of any relation of active and reactive forces (41). Besides consciousness, "memory and habit", and other functions such as "nutrition, reproduction, conservation and adaptation" are all reactive processes, "reactive specialisations, expressions of particular

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[3] Nietzsche writes the following in *Will to Power*: "Essential: to start from the *body* and employ it as guide. It is the much richer phenomenon, which allows of clearer observation. Belief in the body is better established than belief in the spirit" (1968: 289).

reactive forces" (Deleuze 1996: 41). On the other hand, all that can be said about active forces and the unconscious which they populate is that they are both indiscernible: "It is no doubt more difficult to characterise these active forces for, by nature, they escape consciousness, 'The great activity is unconscious'" (41). Therefore, one can interpret, represent or critique reactive forces, but active forces can only be affirmed or negated, created or destroyed, but never represented.

Forces must not be confused with power, or "will to power" in Nietzsche. While forces come from outside either acting or reacting, dominating or obeying, will to power comes from inside and it only wills with its two qualities of *affirmation* and *negation*: it only affirms or negates the vital force which gives it its own difference. Yet, will to power has an affinity with forces: it is the source of their qualities as active and reactive: "action and reaction need affirmation and negation as something which goes beyond them but is necessary for them to achieve their own ends" (Deleuze 1996: 54). Will to power goes beyond forces both as the source of their qualities of action and reaction and as what designates the qualities of becoming: "Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, *becoming active* personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a *becoming reactive*" (54). This indicates that, through becoming, will to power makes forces capable of changing from active to reactive, and from reactive to active. Finally, while forces determine the sense of a phenomenon, will to power gives it its value.

In normal conditions, active and superior forces manifest the power of acting and dominating, and reactive and inferior forces manifest the power of being acted on and obeying. Nietzsche calls this a positive and innate hierarchy, yet, he is always critical of reactive forces in every condition. Any reactive force, Deleuze indicates, "even when it obeys, limits active force, imposes limitations and partial restrictions on it and is already controlled by the spirit of negative" (56). A force is active only if it "goes to the limit of what it can do" (61), or if it "goes to its ultimate consequences, to the limit of [its] power or desire" (59). Reactive forces neither become active nor form a qualitatively greater force when they "triumph" by coming together and forming a quantitative superiority, or when they prevail over active forces. When reactive forces triumph over an active force, their only achievement is separating the active force "from what it can do". In this way, reactive forces make an active force join them and become itself

reactive; an active force turns reactive (Deleuze 1996: 57). This new situation in which reactive forces triumph turning active forces into reactive ones indicates a negative and inverted hierarchy. To illustrate the triumph of reactive forces, in the growth of a plant, for example, the internal power of the plant (e.g., its will to power as the affirmation of life and growth) comes together with active forces such as sunlight, water, and so on. In its normal growth, the flower definitely encounters some reactive forces but they do not hinder its growth, and thus they help active forces. When another reactive force comes into view and prevents the watering of the plant, even the sunlight which was previously an active force providing photosynthesis, becomes a reactive force causing the flower only to dry faster.

Nietzsche observes the distressing fact that the inverted hierarchy in which reactive forces prevail and turn active forces into reactive predominates the history of humanity. Negativity and reactivity prevail in all human endeavours. Thus Deleuze comments;

> Man's essence is the becoming-reactive of forces […]. The essence of man and of the world occupied by man is the becoming reactive of all forces, nihilism and nothing but nihilism. Man and his generic activity – these are the two skin-diseases of the Earth. (169)

Yet, Nietzsche has two opposing views of history. History as the history of mankind is reactive and negative. Pre- and post history, on the other hand, are active and positive periods. Similarly, culture has different functions in all three periods of history. Culture presents itself as "formative activity" or "species activity" in its pre-historic form resulting "the free and active man". Post-historic form of culture, on the other hand, presents itself as the product of pre-historic culture as "the autonomous and supramoral man" (137). History, as the triumph of reactive forces intervenes in both pre- and post-historic processes of culture and degenerates species activity and its production:[4]

> Instead of species activity, history presents us with races, peoples, classes, Churches and States. Onto species activity are grafted social organisations, associations, communities of a *reactive* character, parasites which cover it over and absorb it. By means of species activity – the movement of which they falsify – reactive forces form collectivities, what Nietzsche calls "herds". […] Instead of the sovereign individual as the product of culture, history presents

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[4] In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze & Guattari build their pre-signifying, post-signifying, and signifying semiotics on this Nietzshean classification of history as will be discussed in the third chapter.

us with its own product, the domesticated man in whom it finds the famous meaning of history: "the sublime abortion", "the gregarious animal, docile, sickly, mediocre being, the European today". History presents all the violence of culture as the legitimate property of peoples, States and Churches, as the manifestation of *their* force. And in fact, all the procedures of training are employed, but inside-out, twisted, inverted. (Deleuze 1996: 138)

Training as the act of giving human beings habits allows them to act out their reactive forces. Culture as generic activity is, in effect, "exercised on reactive forces, it gives them habits and sets models on them in order to make them suitable for being acted" (134). In this sense, human beings acquire a different kind of memory. It is neither a memory as a function of the past, nor a memory of traces or senses. It is an active memory of the *future*, of *words* and the *will* as opposed to the reactive memories of the *past*, of *traces* and *senses*. It is "the faculty of promising". Nietzsche regards the social enterprise of training or formation in the pre-historic species activity of culture as a "debtor-creditor" relationship. For him, social organisation is not based on exchange, but on "credit" or "debt". Responsibility of humans is their promise to train and act their reactive forces. It is a debt to be paid back in their relationship with other humans. Justice is the function of culture that regulates this "creditor-debtor" relationship: "justice makes man *responsible for a debt*" (135). When a promise is forgotten or not kept, when the dept which human beings become responsible through promising is not paid back, "punishment" emerges as the means of justice. When one does not keep the promise, he or she has to pay for it by undergoing pain for the injury he or she causes. Pain is the medium of exchange for the forgetting of the promise. In this way, the process of culture and justice is regulated not by reactive forces and the spirit of revenge but completely by active forces and positive feelings. The species activity is no longer present in the product. Similarly, justice and its punishment disappear by the end of training with a process of self-destruction. The debtor becomes liberated; the individual becomes free of his or her responsibility and debt. Punishment as a means of justice and justice itself as a means of training keep their positive sense as long as they remain as means and disappear when the training is completed. When history intervenes, on the other hand, it diverts this positive sense of justice and the debtor-creditor relationship of species activity. Justice, which served as an active means for training, and which

destroyed itself with the production of the free individual, leaves its place to reactive laws and legislators. Reactive laws are controlled by the instinct of revenge, and legislators are full of hatred for what is active. When reactive laws and legislators come together, they constitute overly self-preserving and jingoistic communities that lead to all forms of fascism and dogmatism: "Instead of justice and its process of self-destruction, history presents us with societies which have no wish to perish and which cannot imagine anything superior to their own laws" (Deleuze 1996: 138). Finally, debt becomes transformed into a debt toward reactive formations like the divinity, the church and the State. It becomes unpayable causing pangs of conscience in domesticated people, and finally leads to their enslavement.

In addition to reactive intervention of history in the active process of culture and its training as discussed above, reactive nature of mankind facilitates turning human history into a history of reactivity and degeneration. Previously, the unconscious was mentioned to be free of any reactive forces. But this unconscious must be distinguished from a reactive type of unconscious. The type of unconscious Freud theorises is a reactive one. For Freud consciousness is the realm of the ego, and the unconscious is the realm of both the id and the super-ego, but it can also be said to be fed by the conscious system of the ego. Both forms of the ego in Freud, namely the ego and the super-ego, subjects the unconscious to transcendence and despotism of the law and the signifier. Hence, the Freudian unconscious becomes "a pious conception of the unconscious" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 111). It is a reactive, anti-productive, representational, imaginary and symbolic unconscious which is "always artificial, repressive and repressed" (98). As for the active unconscious, for Nietzsche, it is real, autoproductive, nonrepresentational and unrepresentable, as Deleuze & Guattari indicate that, "It represents nothing, but it produces. It means nothing, but it works." (109). Nietzschean active unconscious calls for a purely libidinal and social investment of the unconscious as opposed to Freudian—*consequentially*—conscious and pseudo investment of the unconscious.

What Nietzsche conceptualised as the "reactive apparatus" shares some elements with Freud's topical hypothesis of "perceptual apparatus" (Freud 1997: 209). To begin with Freud's hypothesis, in the short essay 'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing Pad"'

(1925), Freud draws an analogy between the perceptual apparatus and a children's toy called the "mystic writing pad" which is an old version of magic slate or Etch-a-Sketch. As Freud describes it, the toy is made of a slab of dark brown wax at the bottom, a thin sheet of semi-transparent waxed paper placed over it, and a transparent layer of celluloid at the top. The middle layer of waxed paper is fixed into the wax from one end, and the other end is free. When one inscribes something on the upper layer of celluloid with a pointed object, the waxed paper presses against the wax slab forming engraved traces on it. The traces can be seen on the surface of the upper layer of celluloid. When the middle layer of waxed paper is stretched by being pulled up from its free end, the traces on the upper layer of celluloid disappear although they still remain imprinted on the wax slab at the bottom. The wax slab keeps permanent imprints of all previous inscriptions that are all overlaid and mixed up with one another. The wax slab stands for a deeper memory or "mnemic systems" and is compared to the unconscious by Freud. As for the two layers above the wax slab, they are compared to the parts of the perceptual apparatus:

> I do not think it is too far-fetched to compare the celluloid and waxed paper cover with the system Pcpt.-Cs. and its protective shield, the wax slab with the unconscious behind them, and the appearance and disappearance of the writing with the flickering-up and passing-away of consciousness in the process of perception. (Freud 1997: 211)

The middle layer of waxed paper stands for the part of the apparatus which receives the stimuli, namely, the "system perceptual consciousness" ("the system Pcpt.-Cs."). And the upper layer of celluloid is the "protective shield" of the perceptual system. It protects the perceptual system against any harmful effects of the stimuli or excitations received from outside. The "disappearance of the writing" from the surface layer stands for forgetting, that is, the becoming unconscious of what was previously conscious. Figure 1 below presents a rough sketch of the "mystic writing pad" and the perceptual apparatus according to Freud.

Upper layer: Transparent celluloid
Protective shield of the perceptual apparatus

Middle layer: Semi-transparent waxed paper
The system Perceptual Consciousness
(Part of the perceptual apparatus that receives
stimuli)

Bottom layer: Wax slab
The Unconscious (The mnemic systems on which all traces of stimuli are kept)

Figure 1: Freud's "Mystic Writing Pad" and the Perceptual System

Before going on with Nietzsche's "reactive apparatus", it must be noted that Nietzsche distinguished between two kinds of perceptions. The perceptions of the first kind are those of the inorganic world of the unconscious which are active and vital. The perceptions of the second kind belong to the organic world of consciousness, and they are inaccurate and can have more reactive effects. Nietzsche writes: "there are perceptions in the inorganic world, and perceptions of an absolute exactitude; it is here that truth reigns! With the organic world imprecision and appearance begin" (quoted in Deleuze 1996: 204n5). When Nietzsche writes about sense perceptions in general he mostly means reactive perceptions of the "organic process" as in the following line: "*all sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements*" (1968: 275).

Nietzsche specifies the reactive apparatus as consisting of two systems: the "reactive unconscious" and the "conscious system". The reactive unconscious is situated at the bottom, and it "is defined by mnemonic traces, by lasting imprints" (Deleuze 1996: 112). This can be compared to the bottom wax slab of Freud's mystic writing pad. The only difference between Freud and Nietzsche here is that while it singularly defines the unconscious for Freud, it is just one form, the most inferior form, of at least two unconscious systems for Nietzsche. The conscious system, the second system of the reactive apparatus, on the other hand, is situated at the surface. It is part of the system which, in Nietzsche's words, "receives the perceptible excitations but retains nothing of them, and thus has no memory" (quotes Deleuze 1996: 112). This second system is

analogous to the transparent celluloid at the surface of the mystic writing pad but differs from the Freudian model. For Nietzsche, consciousness has an entirely reactive functioning in both its origin and nature, but it can gain relatively active and positive virtues in an active type of human being under certain conditions. There is yet a third system which is located in between the two systems of the reactive apparatus. This third system is a totally active and positive apparatus, and separates the two reactive systems. It is the "faculty of forgetting" conceived as a wholly active and positive force. The middle semi-transparent layer of the mystic writing pad is a perfect analogy for the faculty of forgetting, but again with some differences form the Freudian model. In the following quotation Deleuze both defines the faculty of forgetting and criticises psychology for treating this faculty negatively:

> But the two systems or the two kinds of reactive forces must still be separated. The traces must not invade consciousness. A specific active force must be given the job of supporting consciousness and renewing its freshness, fluidity and mobile, agile chemistry at every moment. This active super-conscious faculty is the faculty of forgetting. Psychology's mistake was to treat forgetting as a negative determination, not to discover its active and positive character. (Deleuze 1996: 113)[5]

Deleuze goes on with quoting parts from Nietzsche's own definition of the faculty of forgetting in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887), which can be reproduced here at length:

> Forgetfulness is […] an active—in the strictest sense, positive—inhibiting capacity, responsible for the fact that what we absorb through experience impinges as little on our consciousness during its digestion (what might be called its psychic assimilation) as does the whole manifold process of our physical nourishment, that of so-called 'physical assimilation'. The temporary

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[5] Freud also has his share from this criticism. He deals with forgetting mainly in his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) and shows the "*motive of displeasure*" as the main motive behind cases of forgetting he observes (Freud 1914: 138). As the name of the book suggests, Freud treats forgetting as a disorder in this book although he points to some positive aspects of it. Besides the types of forgetting Freud deals with in that book, such as forgetting of proper names, names, foreign words, objects, impressions, intentions, etc,, have little to do with what Nietzsche means by active "faculty of forgetting" directed against reactive traces in the unconscious. Apart from all that, Freud's both method of analysis and personal life reveal that he is far from seeing forgetfulness as a remedy. He is a man of traces as his analyses are mainly aimed at revealing even the least significant traces in the unconscious and recalling the most hidden childhood memories (mainly for the purpose of relating them to his Holly Family and the Oedipus). Finally, about his personal life, Freud confesses in between sentences in his book mentioned above that, "I am usually rather resentful and cannot forget a single incident of an episode that has annoyed me" (139).

shutting of the doors and windows of consciousness; guaranteed freedom from the disturbance by the noise and struggle caused by our underworld of obedient organs as they co-operate with and compete against one another; a little silence, a little *tabula rasa* of consciousness, making room for the new, making room above all for the superior functions and functionaries—those of governing, anticipating, planning ahead (since our organism is structured as an oligarchy)—such is the use of what I have called active forgetfulness, an active forgetfulness whose function resembles that of a concierge preserving mental order, calm and decorum. On this basis, one may appreciate immediately to what extent there could be no happiness, no serenity, no hope, no pride, no *present* without forgetfulness. The man in whom this inhibiting apparatus is damaged and out of order may be compared to a dyspeptic (and not only compared)—he is never 'through' with anything… (Nietzsche 1996: 40)

While psychology treats forgetting as a disorder of the mind, Nietzsche discovers its positive and curative aspects as an inhibitive or repressive capacity practiced on the negative traces in the reactive unconscious. Nietzsche, conversely, considers the damage of this repressive capacity, that is, not being able to forget, as a serious disorder leading to mental dyspepsia. This dyspepsia presents itself as an additional reason why most human perception is reactive. Figure 2 below illustrates all the elements of Nietzsche's topology of the reactive apparatus on analogy of the "Mystic Writing Pad".

Upper layer:
Consciousness (reactive yet relatively noble when all forces are acted)

Middle layer:
Forgetting as an active and positive faculty
(Inhibitive apparatus seperating the two systems of the reactive apparatus and renewing the freshness and mobility of consciousness)

Bottom layer:
Reactive unconscious (invested by reactive forces which react to traces)

Figure 2: Nietzsche's Topology of the Reactive Apparatus

The "Mystic Writing Pad", which Freud used as an analogy to his topical hypothesis of perceptual apparatus as discussed above, presents itself as a good model for Nietzsche's topology of the reactive apparatus, as well. Both Freud and Nietzsche have different

perspectives of the unconscious, but in the case of their topical hypothesis discussed here they talk about the same unconscious which is compared to the bottom layer of wax slab on the "Mystic Writing Pad". But their real differences begin with the two layers on top of it. While Nietzsche stresses the need to protect the freshness of the consciousness (upper layer) from the traces in the unconscious (bottom layer), Freud feels the need to protect the consciousness from harmful external stimuli, and he puts consciousness (the middle layer in his analogy) in close interaction with the (reactive) unconscious with nothing separating them. Accordingly, while the protective shield which protects consciousness from external forces is the upper layer in his own analogy for Freud, the protective apparatus which protects consciousness against internal forces is the middle layer for Nietzsche. They provide different answers to the following questions: From what do we need to protect our consciousness? And where is the real enemy, outside us, or inside us?

In the Nietzschean reactive apparatus, the deeper reactive forces that invade the unconscious and react to traces in it cause no harm as long as they remain in the reactive unconscious and are imperceptible. Yet, when the unconscious traces become confused with the newly received excitations, when they rise to the level of consciousness through the malfunctioning of the faculty of forgetting, imperceptible reaction to traces in the unconscious invades consciousness and becomes perceptible. When invaded by the unconscious reaction to traces (that has now become conscious), the second type of reactive forces, which were formerly eligible to act their reactions and form a healthy relationship with active forces, stop acting their reactions. Similarly, active forces, being "deprived of the material conditions of their functioning", cannot carry out their work. They are separated from what they can do. This whole process taking place in the reactive apparatus causes inability to forget anything. It is what defines *ressentiment* topologically:

> *Everything takes place between reactive forces:* some prevent others from being acted, some destroy others. This is a strange subterranean struggle which takes place entirely inside the reactive apparatus, but which nevertheless has consequences for the whole of activity. We rediscover the definition of *ressentiment: ressentiment* is a reaction which simultaneously becomes perceptible and ceases to be acted ... The man of *ressentiment* is characterised by the invasion of consciousness by mnemonic traces, the ascent of memory

into consciousness itself. … He only invests traces: for him excitation is locally confused with the trace … (Deleuze 1996: 114)

Nietzsche's topology of *ressentiment* (displacement of reactive forces) follows with a typology of it. *Ressentiment* is neither accidentally formed through undergoing too much excitations or pain, nor by the generalisation of a too strong excitation. Its formation is not quantitative but qualitative as a result of "a determinate relation in the subject itself between the different forces of which it is made up" (115). This is why a person of *ressentiment* is a type with certain personality traits. He or she has endless reactions that are only felt but not acted. These endless reactions constitute "the spirit of revenge". The object of these reactions is blamed "as an object on which revenge must be taken, which must be made to pay for this infinite delay" (115). People with *ressentiment* blame everything and everyone for their own inability to act their reactions. They project their own fault and pain on the other. "It's your fault …" is a phrase typical of them: "It's your fault if I am too weak.", "It's your fault if I am not rich enough.", "It's your fault if I am not beautiful/wise.", etc. All excitations, no matter whether they are good or bad, become painful to receive. Bad excitations are already painful, and the good ones are all interpreted as offensive. There is nothing that does not hurt a person of ressentiment. He or she lives with the idea of revenge, but his or her revenge, "even when it is realised, remains "spiritual", imaginary and symbolic in principle" (116). As for the traits of personality of *ressentiment*, each of the characteristics listed below corresponds to a specific phase in the evolution of *ressentiment* (117-25). When we are inflicted with *ressentiment*:

1. We become passive ("non-acted"). We want to profit by what we do not perform. Being ourselves incapable of loving, for instance, we want to be loved and cared. Impotence, dyspepsia, frigidity, insomnia, touchiness, slavishness, and neediness become some of our characteristics of passivity. (This trait, in fact, belongs to a topology of ressentiment resulting from the *displacement* of reactive forces—with the invasion of consciousness by traces, a person of ressentiment cannot act his/her reactions.)

2. We become unable "*to admire, respect or love*". Hatred and revenge prevail in all our deeds—even in our good deeds in a disguised form. (The phase of *falsification*: reactive

forces turn against active forces. They project a fictitious or false reactive image on active forces, separating them from what they can do.)

3. We impute wrongs to others ("It's your fault …") and accuse others in order to prove ourselves innocent and virtuous ("You are evil, therefore I am good."). (The phase of *depreciation*.)

4. We become the inventors of morality (good-evil). In order to survive, we need a hostile world with all sinners in it. (The phase of *negation* in which the values are reversed.)

With its three phases of falsification, depreciation and negation, *ressentiment* as the projection of pain and guilt, is the first stage of the triumph of nihilism. Its second stage is *bad conscience*. It is the introjection or interiorisation of force, pain and guilt ("It's my fault ..."). When reactive forces separate active forces from what they can do through falsification, active forces turn against themselves and are internalised. They do not vanish but become reactive: "Every instinct which does not vent itself externally *turns inward*—I call this the *internalization* of man" (Nietzsche 1996: 65).

In bad conscience, reactive forces change the direction of *ressentiment* by turning it inward. They usurp culture as human species activity and its training methods to form herds. The whole historical process of culture as training and selection provides the best means for the contagion of bad conscience in the hands of the State and the Church, that are, in turn, manipulated by the people of *ressentiment*. The latter who represent reactive forces are the true inventors of bad conscience (54-7). Bad conscience has two successive phases. The internalisation of force is the first phase. When force is internalised, it produces pain and the feeling of guilt which gradually deepen. This subsequent internalisation of pain and guilt is the second phase of bad conscience. The active and positive relationship of "debtor-creditor" in human species activity is interpreted into a reactive understanding as a debt toward a list of ancestors, divinities, and the society. Bad conscience reaches its superior form with the invention of "sin" which is made to be the cause of pain and guilt. Finally, debt toward the divinity becomes unpayable with the Christian idea of "redemption": "God sacrificing himself for the guilt of man, God paying himself off" (72). The spirit of revenge and hatred of

others survive in bad conscience as the spreading of the contagion itself and the breeding of a sick community (herd). The domesticated members of the community are eternally indebted to reactive instances and they can only pay the interest of their debt throughout their lives.

Finally, the ascetic ideal is the third stage of the triumph of nihilism and reactive forces. It is the moment of idealisation and sublimation of the reactive way of life and the will to nothingness which accompany both *ressentiment* and bad conscience. A weak and reactive life consequently leads to the negation of life and the will to nothingness: "Life is judged according to values which are said to be superior to life". Everything reactive is elevated to its opposite: "slaves are called masters; the weak are called strong; baseness is called nobility" (Deleuze 2001: 78-9). For Nietzsche, ascetic ideal corresponds to the degeneration of philosophy in Greece when *ressentiment* and bad conscience are adapted by philosophers.

2.3. Immanence versus Transcendence

Deleuze has a very exclusive use of the term "immanence" which can be defined as the quality of being internal to something and relating to everything. Conversely, his use of the antagonistic term "transcendence", the quality of being beyond or above something and relating to something external, has a much extended scope. While Deleuze's immanence excludes all consciousness, transcendence entails not only the transcendence of a higher unity, a being or a world beyond for him, but also the transcendence of good sense and common sense, the transcendence of representation and its categories, the transcendence of universals, the transcendence of the subject and the object, the transcendence of any dualism, and so on. All arborescent and binary relations of hierarchy and vertical relations of height and depth imply transcendence for Deleuze. His immanence, conversely, is always horizontal and rhizomatic on a smooth surface or a plane without levels. With the following questions, Deleuze reflects on both verticality (transcendence) and horizontality (immanence):

> [S]hould we go around erecting vertical axes and trying to stand up straight or, rather, stretch out, run out along the horizon, keep pushing the plane further out? And what sort of verticality do we want, one that gives us something to contemplate or one that makes us reflect or communicate? Or should we just

get rid of all verticality as transcendent and lie down hugging the earth, without looking, without reflecting, cut off from communication? (Deleuze 1995: 148)

Horizontality is evidently Deleuze's favourite choice. He discards contemplation, reflection and communication as delusive and transcendent forms in philosophy. Accordingly, he indicates in *What is Philosophy?* with Guattari that:

> Philosophy does not contemplate, reflect, or communicate, although it must create concepts for these actions or passions. Contemplation, reflection and communication are not disciplines but machines for constituting Universals in every discipline. The Universals of contemplation, and then of reflection, are like two illusions through which philosophy has already passed in its dream of dominating the other disciplines (objective idealism and subjective idealism). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 6-7)

As for the illusion of communication, which Deleuze & Guattari refer as "intersubjective idealism", it stipulates the so called universal "rules for an imaginary mastery of the markets and the media" (7). All universals need to be demystified as structures of transcendence for the singularity of concepts and their creation. This is the first principle of philosophy for Deleuze & Guattari: "Universals explain nothing but must themselves be explained" (7). In Deleuze's immanent thought, *constructivism* "takes the place of reflection", and a type of *expressionism* which Deleuze adapts from Spinoza and Leibniz replaces communication (Deleuze 1995: 147). Finally, the sheer creation of *concepts*—as the sole means of thinking in philosophy for Deleuze—can be said to take the place of contemplation.

Deleuze builds his idea of immanence on Spinoza's parallelisms or his principle of univocity: "oneness of substance (pantheism)". What interests Deleuze in this principle is not Spinoza's pantheism or God, but the immanent plane it expresses:

> Everyone knows the first principle of Spinoza: one substance for all the attributes. But we also know the third, fourth, or fifth principle: one Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all individuals, a Nature that is itself an individual varying in an infinite number of ways. What is involved is no longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather the laying out of a *common plane of immanence* on which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated. (Deleuze 1988b: 122)

Thus, univocity is the principle of immanence, and it requires that we see the whole universe as a single body or "individual" of interrelated events and combined relations of things leaving nothing outside and pertaining to no hierarchy.

How the principle of univocity functions can be examined by contrasting the transcendence of judgement and just (univocal, equal) immanence (Deleuze 1994: 36-7). Judgement has two indispensible functions, and two human faculties correspond to them. The first function of judgement is "distribution" with the corresponding quality or faculty of "common sense" which carries out "the *partition* of concepts". Greek mythology illustrates this function of judgement best: "Even among the gods, each has his domain, his category, his attributes, and all distribute limits and lots to mortals in accordance with destiny" (36). The second function of judgement is "hierarchization" with its quality or faculty of "good sense", and it secures "the *measuring* of subjects". Good sense posits a hierarchy to measure things or beings according to certain criteria, such as, "a limit" or "power" which is possessed, or the "degree of proximity or distance from a principle" (37). Platonism, and its "selective doctrine" of "the Idea" is Deleuze's renowned example of hierarchical judgement and its faculty of good sense. Deleuze criticises Plato for having "introduced transcendence into philosophy" with the hierarchy of "quality firsthand (necessarily and universally)" he imputes to the Idea, and "quality secondhand, thirdhand, and so forth" he allows to be determined for other things (Deleuze 1998: 136-7).

Immanence too has its distribution and hierarchy, but they are univocal. It has a univocal distribution of a nomadic type, "an errant and even "delirious" distribution, in which things are deployed across the entire extensity of a univocal and undistributed Being" (Deleuze 1994: 36-7). It is not a divine but "demonic" distribution on a plane that is "unlimited," or no limit has been determined for it. As for the hierarchy of immanence, remembering Nietzschean will to power and active forces discussed in the previous section, it depends solely on "whether a being eventually 'leaps over' or transcends its limits in going to the limit of what it can do, whatever its degree" (37). There is no quantitative distinction between beings here: "the smallest becomes equivalent to the largest once it is not separated from what it can do" (37). Thus univocity also entails equality: "equal being is immediately present in everything,

without mediation or intermediary, even though things reside unequally in this equal being". Deleuze refers to this equal and equivocal type of hierarchy as a "crowned anarchy". Finally, this discussion of univocity in relation to immanence will hopefully give a glimpse of what Deleuze's famous mottos about univocity might mean: "A single voice raises the clamour of being." (Deleuze 1994: 35) and "Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs" (36).

In the same way that immanence is the principle of univocity, univocity has immanence as its principle in the form of immanence cause (e.g., the cause is internal to its effect) as opposed to eminence of cause (e.g., exterior causality of transcendence). Immanent principle of univocity requires the formula, "God is said to be the cause of all things in the very sense that he is said to be the cause of himself" (Deleuze 1992: 67, 103). In immanent causality there is equality of Being and beings: "not only is being equal in itself, but it is seen to be equally present in all beings" (172). In eminent causality, on the other hand, Being and beings have nothing in common and always imply the hierarchy of "a system of the One-above-being" (172). Immanence defines difference positively as an internal difference or a difference-in-itself. Eminence, conversely, defines difference negatively as what one is not, or what one lacks.

Being rhizomatic is another illuminating aspect of immanence. Plants such as weed, grass, crabgrass and ginger belong to the rhizome family. Rhizomes are horizontal stems which grow continuously and laterally right below the surface of the ground, and they sprout at random intervals. Similarly, Deleuze & Guattari list a number of rhizomatic features of their immanent thought: it is connective, heterogeneous, multiple, proliferating, producing non-signifying ruptures, cartographic, and transferable to different milieus as in the art of decals (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 7-13). A rhizomatic diagram looks like a multiple set of spider diagrams which are all connected. Chomsky's syntactic tree (S, NP, VP, etc.) as will be dealt with in the third chapter of this study, is an example of an arborescent diagram, and therefore liable to Deleuze's criticism as a model of transcendence. Binary logic of dichotomy, which is the

transcendental principle of the tree model, and its variant form, biunivocal relationships[6] between different sets, Deleuze & Guattari argue, "still dominate psychoanalysis […], linguistics, structuralism, and even information science" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 5). On the whole, they find it odd that the tree system "has dominated Western reality and all of Western thought, from botany to biology and anatomy, but also gnosiology, theology, ontology, all of philosophy" (18). They even claim that, transcendence is "a specifically European disease" mainly due to its tree model (18). As models of rhizome, they give the examples of Henry Miller's China and its model of weed which grows "only to fill the waste spaces left by cultivated areas", and United States with its "beatnics, the underground, bands and gangs, successive lateral offshoots in immediate connection with the outside" (19). Figure 3 below shows basic diagrams of the tree and the rhizome.

       The Tree Diagram   **The Rhizome Diagram**

Figure 3: Three and Rhizome Diagrams

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[6] Biunivocal realations mean one-to-one relationship between two different sets. Each item in one set (A, B, C, etc.) is paired with a single item in another set (1, 2, 3), so that, one gets the equations, for instance, A-1, B-2, C-3, etc., as in a matching exercise. In a univocal relation, on the contrary, there is only one item in one set (A), pairing with every item in another set (1, 2, 3, etc.) respectively (A-1, A-2, A-3). To illustrate this, when Judge Schereber, one of Freud's patients, tells Freud about a superior god, an inferior god, and talking birds, Freud interprets the superior God as Schreber's father, and the inferior God as his elder brother and talking birds as young girls. Neither Freud nor any other psychoanalyst would have an alternative pairing of Schreber's images; they are always fixed, that is 'biunivocal' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 14). Univocal and rhizomatic analysis of the case of Judge Schreber, who is a schizophrenic for Deleuze & Guattari, will show that he is in the process of forming himself a body without organs filled up with "states through which Schreber-the-subject passes, […] following an endless circle of eternal return" (19). Deleuze & Guattari also mention the difference between "biunivocal relations" and "binary logic": the former refers to "relationships between objective elements or points", and the latter refers to the "differentiation in the subject" (1996a: 7).

A rhizome model produces a map which is open for all new connections that are possible between different fields. It is non-representational and asignifying, so that, it can be modified, reversed, and detached without any hierarchy. It has multiple entryways and exits with no beginnings and no ends. It is always a middle from where it develops, spills all over and connects with any point in any milieu, even a very distant one. The middle, "between things", "*intermezzo*" or "interbeing" never mean mediocre, average, or indifferent in Deleuze & Guattari's use. For them, the middle "is where things pick up speed", and "between things" designates "a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 25). The middle displays the connective "logic of the AND" in which Anglo-American writers are experts with their practice of pragmatics: "they know how to move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings" (25).

A tree model, on the other had, proceeds along a pivotal root as its ground and foundation. Its branches, which have only an apparent multiplicity, take a "principal unity" as granted and articulate not maps but traces in a hierarchy. Tracing neutralises and stabilises multiplicities and organises them in a representational image or a selective model of signification. It blocks all exits from the system and does not allow the formation of any rhizomes. Deleuze & Guattari illustrate the tree model and its tracing, again with psychoanalysis and with the story about Freud's patient Little Hans this time, and they point to the relation between desire and rhizome as follows:

> Look at what happened to Little Hans already, an example of child psychoanalysis at its purest: they kept on BREAKING HIS RHIZOME and BLOTCHING HIS MAP, setting it straight for him, blocking his every way out, until he began to desire his own shame and guilt, until they had rooted shame and guilt in him, PHOBIA (they barred him from the rhizome of the building, then from the rhizome of the street, they rooted him in his parents' bed, they radicled him to his own body, they fixated him on Professor Freud). […] Once a rhizome has been obstructed, arborified, it's all over, no desire stirs: for it is always by rhizome that desire moves and produces. Whenever desire climbs a tree, internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its death; the rhizome, on the other hand, acts on desire by external, productive outgrowths. (14)

Psychoanalytic or Freudian unconscious of a tree model is a representational one with traces. Psychoanalysis explores and reproduces an unconscious which has always been there "lurking in the dark recesses of memory and language" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 12). Desire, conversely, does not trace or regenerate anything but produces the unconscious as a rhizome (18). The rhizome model replaces the long-term memory of the tree model and its centralised tracing with short-term memory and active forgetting (e.g., erasing of traces). Rhizomatic lines or canals, lines of flight, intrinsic values, and a new type of dualism that challenges any hierarchy respectively take the place of tree roots or taproots, dead ends (impasses), exterior ends (goals), and old dualisms that establish hierarchies. Finally, there is one positive aspect of the tree model that it produces its own escapes; and the only negative aspect of the rhizome model is that it always has the danger of establishing its own hierarchies and its own despotic lines. Yet, Deleuze & Guattari still prefer the despots of the rhizome type (e.g., Mao acting "as a river" and flowing with its current) to the despots of the tree model (e.g. King Louis "sitting under a tree" and acting "as a fountainhead") (19-20).

Rhizome is thus one aspect of immanence as opposed to the transcendental model of the tree. Deleuze & Guattari also argue that thought and brain are not arborescent but rizomatic. Accordingly, all Deleuzian concepts, the creation of which he considers the main aim of all philosophy, share a rhizomatic layout and immanence. They are immanent and rhizomatic in their specific field of consistency. Deleuzian concepts form rhizomes in that they are consistent, syntagmatic, connective, linking, and in that they proceed by chance encounters and raptures. What ensures their immanence is particularly the fact that they share a high consistency both internally and externally, they never come out from nothing. A concept must have some "precursors" forming its history. Concepts are never universals, they are singular creations carrying the signature of their artist-creator, like Plato's Idea,[7] Nietzsche's eternal return, Bergson's duration, etc. Deleuze & Guattari (1996b: 3) write that "philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts", and that, "philosophers must distrust most those concepts they did not create themselves" (6).

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[7] In relation to concepts, Deleuze & Guattari accuse Plato that although he obeys the rule of creation of concepts anew, he teaches the opposite (1996b: 6).

A concept firstly has a number of components. These components are usually parts of other concepts and some of them can act as singular concepts having other components of their own. A concept has a limited number of components, and although it is open for new connections with new components, such a new connection changes the whole nature of the concept. Each concept forms a whole with its totalised cluster of components. But this whole is a fragmentary one which helps the concept to "escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 16).

The immanent rule of a concept is its internal and external consistency or neighbourhood referred to respectively as "endoconsistency" and "exoconsistency". A concept's relation with its components forms its internal consistency (Endoconsistency). The components that are distinct and heterogeneous become inseparable from the concept itself in a "zone of indiscernibility" which Deleuze & Guattari also refer to alternatively as "zone of neighbourhood", "threshold of indiscernibility", or simply "zone" (19). In this zone of indiscernibility, the concept passes through its components rendering them indistinguishable from itself. This is also referred as the "becoming" of the concept. When the components of a concept are saturated, the concept constitutes a whole that is fragmentary. A concept's relation with other concepts on the same plane constitutes its "external consistency" (exoconsistency) or "external neighbourhood". The concept which is fully condensed with its saturated components builds bridges with other concepts securing its consistency on the whole plane of concepts of the same cluster (e.g., of the same thinker or a school of thought).

Concepts are not physical entities with shapes but pure incorporeal events. Yet they are flat and horizontal multiplicities with no vertical levels that would imply any hierarchy. The certain shape given to the concept above stands for its singular nature which strictly depends on its components and their number. When components are saturated, they make connections to the point of closure allowing no new connections, and they absorb the concept which passes through them to their maximum. They constitute an inseparable fragmentary whole, a fully condensed concept in which no room is left for a new component. The addition of any new component will change the nature of the concept. Saturation is necessary for a concept to build bridges with the

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other concepts on the same plane. Being a fragmentary whole makes a concept both relative and absolute: "As a whole it is absolute, but insofar as it is fragmentary it is relative" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 21). This is because the concept has no other reference other than itself. It only has internal and external consistency, and it pertains to constructivism, in that, a plane is laid out first, and the concept is created on this plane.[8] One of Deleuze & Guattari's illustrations of the model of conceptualisation described above is Descartes' cogito, which is at the same time "a concept of the self". The Cartesian cogito, as it is stated in the sentence "I think therefore I am", has three components: "doubting, thinking, and being".[9] All three components have their variant forms or modes. Doubting can be perceptual, scientific, or obsessional. Thinking has modes such as feeling, imagining, or having ideas. Finally, the being can be a limited, an infinite (e.g. God), or an extended one (e.g. a God or Being with a material form that is visible at least to imagination). But the being in the Cartesian formula is limited to "thinking finite being" excluding other forms of being. This limitation of being also draws the limit of the concept rendering it "closed as fragmentary totality with 'I am a thinking thing'" (26). Here we need to look at Descartes's other concepts concerning other forms of being and how Descartes builds bridges between the cogito and other concepts of his system of thought. There are two zones of indiscernibility in the concept of the cogito. The first one is "between doubting and thinking (myself who doubts, I cannot doubt that I think)", and the second zone "is between thinking and being (in order to think it is necessary to be) (26).

For Deleuze & Guattari, Descartes's cogito is one of the best examples of concepts but it lacks immanence for some interrelated reasons. Firstly it does not have a precursor, and secondly it is subjective with its presuppositions that are very high and universal:

> It [Cartesian cogito] demands only a prephilosophical understanding, that is, implicit and subjective presuppositions: everyone knows what thinking, being,

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[8] This is how Deleuze & Guattari define philosophy as constructivism: "Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane." (1996b: 35-6), and for them "Constructivism unites the relative and the absolute" (22).
[9] Deleuze & Guattari indicate the complete statement of the concept of cogito as "Myself who doubts, I think, I am, I am a thinking thing" (1996b: 24).

and I mean (one knows by doing it, being it, or saying it). This is a very novel distinction. Such a plane requires a first concept that presupposes nothing objective. So the problem is "What is the first concept on this plane, or by beginning with what concept can truth as absolutely pure subjective certainty be determined?" Such is the cogito. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 26-7)

In an earlier monologue Deleuze introduces two more reasons that make the Cartesian cogito subject to transcendence and dogmatism. Hence, thirdly, the implicit presupposition in the syntax of cogito is representational, as Deleuze indicates that "*Everybody knows, no one can deny,* is the form of representation and the discourse of the representative" (Deleuze 1994: 130). Representation and its four categories discussed in the first chapter have their source in judgement. Fourthly, therefore, Cartesian cogito appeals to good sense as Deleuze indicates with some corrections about the nature of the cogito and the act of thinking itself:

> It cannot be regarded as a *fact* that thinking is the natural exercise of a faculty, and that this faculty is possessed of a good nature and a good will. 'Everybody' knows very well that in fact men think rarely, and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the excitement of a taste for thinking. Moreover, Descartes's famous suggestion that good sense (the capacity for thought) is of all things in the world the most equally distributed rests upon no more than an old saying, since it amounts to reminding us that men are prepared to complain of lack of memory, imagination or even hearing, but they always find themselves well served with regard to intelligence and thought. (132)

Kant, in his concept of the cogito, adds the component of "time" which he sees missing in Descartes. Hence, with Kant, cogito is transported onto a new plane, and becomes a different concept with components also differing from the Cartesian one. The "time" that Kant integrates into cogito, in turn, becomes an original concept and also calls in an original concept of space, a Kantian "blast of original concepts" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 32). As a result, the "I" of "… therefore I am" in Cartesian cogito, becomes an "I" fractured in time and space. Kantian "fractured I" bursts out as another original and more promising concept: "I am only determined in time as a passive and phenomenal self, an always affectable, modifiable, and variable self" (31). Therefore with Kant, philosophy has a "transcendental" turn, which must be distinguished from transcendence as a better term but not sufficient for Deleuze: "the correlation between

passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution" (Deleuze 1994: 86).

2.4. Immanence and the Transcendental

To avoid any confusion, in Deleuze's use, transcendence has transcendent ends which are pursued as the desired result. The term transcendental, or "transcendent exercise" (always in adjectival form), on the contrary, refers to the method of seeking immanence through transcending the known and recognizable limits of empiricism. The transcendental in Deleuze's use is still the domain of immanence. Empiricism which can be defined as deriving knowledge through experience, relies on the harmonious functioning of the faculties. The harmonious perception of sense stimuli depends on recognition. As for recognition, it depends on the representational common sense apparatus of judgement. Deleuze points to the contrast between the transcendental and common sense empiricism as follows:

> The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise. Transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world. The transcendent exercise must not be traced from the empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot be grasped from the point of view of common sense, that which measures the empirical operation of all the faculties. (1994: 143)

Deleuzian transcendental form presupposes a "differential theory" of the faculties. Deleuze finds the traces of it in Plato's distinction between "objects of recognition" "which do not disturb thought", and the objects of encounter "which force us to think" (138). The latter is an anticipation of the transcendental field. Plato discovers the transcendental, but subordinates it to the categories of representation (142). The term transcendental in the history of philosophy is usually associated with Kant. But this Kantian form of the transcendental, as in the term "transcendental philosophy" must be distinguished from its Deleuzian form as "transcendental empiricism". Deleuze points out that, although Kantian fractured I and passive self had the initiative of the impersonal, the death of God and the dissolution of the self, "Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection" (87). Kant does not

exclude the subject from his analysis, and turns it into a subjective judgement, or in Deleuze's words, into "a fantastic subjective tribunal" (Deleuze 1998: 126). Kant sets up a tribune of justice because he establishes judgement by turning distribution into "a supreme effort to save the world of representation", and his so called passive synthesis turns into an active reception without synthesis.[10]

In sum, Kantian transcendental differs from Deleuzian form for two main reasons. Kant, firstly, does not do away with the subject and, secondly, as the consequence of the first, builds his transcendental on ordinary empiricism and harmonious functioning of the faculties.[11] While Kant's method seeks the conditions of all possible experience of a rational subject, Deleuze's transcendental field seeks the possibility of real, unconscious experience free from any subject and object (Deleuze 1994: 46). Deleuzian transcendental empiricism can best be defined as an impersonal encounter in which sensibility meets its own limits and rises "to the "nth" power":

> Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. […] Sensibility, in the presence of that which can only be sensed (and is at the same time imperceptible) finds itself before its own limit, the sign, and raises itself to the level of a transcendental exercise: to the 'nth' power. (139-40)

In this impersonal affective encounter, recollections of solid empiricism remain limited and representational. Because an ordinary empirical memory requires that, "what is recalled must have been seen, heard, imagined or thought" (140) under the conscious supervision of the faculties. A transcendental memory on the other hand, recalls only what is empirically impossible or imperceptible. In their transcendental mode, all faculties are unhinged and discordant. All recollection becomes creative, and

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[10] Deleuze comments that passive synthesis in Kant "is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I' while passivity is understood as a simple receptivity without synthesis" (1994: 87).

[11] Deleuze writes the following: "For Kant as for Descartes, it is the identity of the Self in the 'I think' which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement on the form of a supposed Same object" (1994: 133), and, "Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness: the transcendental synthesis of apprehension is directly induced from an empirical apprehension" (135).

all encounters, productive. Each faculty attains its involuntary force and undergoes "triple violence" in its unhinged and discordant state of encounters:

> Each faculty must be borne to the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it falls prey to triple violence: the violence of that which forces it to be exercised, of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is able to grasp, yet also that of the ungraspable (from the point of view of its empirical exercise). This is the threefold limit of the final power. (Deleuze 1994: 143)

Sensory reception and ideas depart their common sense and good sense milieu for a new milieu of "para-sense" or nonsense. In this way, thinking, which is not innate at all, is made possible or "engendered" in itself first, and all thinking is meant only to create in an unavoidably "paradoxical operation" of the faculties:

> The transcendental operation of the faculties is a properly paradoxical operation, opposed to their exercise under the rule of a common sense. In consequence, the harmony between the faculties can appear only in the form of a *discordant harmony*, since each communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own difference and its divergence from the others. (145-6)

Deleuze defines paradox as the philosophical passion or pathos. It interrupts the common practice of the faculties, and posits each faculty on its incomparable limit. This limit of each faculty is its own difference on which its common form is based. In other words, differential, unconscious and involuntary activity of a faculty is seen primary in relation to its common and conscious form of activity. Deleuze asserts, in the case of common sense, for instance, that "Delirium lies at the base of good sense, which is why good sense is always secondary" (227). Similarly, it can also be stated that the unthinkable lies at the heart of thought, the forgotten or immemorial lies at the heart of memory, the imperceptible lies at the heart of sensibility, and so on, for all other faculties. Phantasm is the transcendental limit of imagination, silence is that of language. "Vitality" includes "monstrosity", and "sociability" includes "anarchy" at their limit (143).

The four categories of representation discussed earlier, have their transcendental limits and differential forms at their base: "opposition" depends on "difference in intensity", resemblance is based on "disparity in the phantasm", identity has "dissemblance in the form of time" as its origin, analogy is the effect of "the differential

in thought" (Deleuze 1994: 145). Deleuze adds that, these four categories of representation "are only effects produced by these presentations of difference, rather than being conditions which subordinate difference and make it something represented" (145). Finally, carried out in purely experimental and creative terms, transcendental exercise of a faculty leads to new discoveries which can never be known beforehand. It might even lead to the discovery of ever new faculties "whose existence is not yet suspected":

> [I]t may be that some well-known faculties – too well known – turn out to have no proper limit, no verbal adjective, because they are imposed and have an exercise only under the form of common sense. It may turn out, on the other hand, that new faculties arise, faculties which were repressed by that form of common sense. (143-4)

In *Proust and Signs* (1964), Deleuze demonstrates art and literature as the transcendental limit of both philosophy and science. He argues that, for Proust, when a sign does violence to our perception by interrupting our state of peace, it "forces us into search" and "mobilizes the involuntary and the unconscious" (Deleuze 1972: 15, xi). Deleuze claims that Proust's twelve-volume masterpiece *In Search of Lost Time* "is not oriented to the past and the discoveries of memory, but to the future and the progress of an apprenticeship" (26). This apprenticeship involves involuntary interpretation of signs as chance encounters under "the pressure of constraints" (16). Apprenticeship requires that all human faculties become suspended under the pressure of a sign, and they come back to life with delay only to interpret. When Proust contrasts his apprenticeship with traditional philosophy and logos, Deleuze finds a prominent criticism in it: "Philosophy, with all its method and its good will, is nothing compared to the secret pressures of the work of art" (98). Deleuze contrasts "irony", which he refers to as the "Socratic demon", with Proust's humour. Irony stands for the method in science, and for such methods in philosophy as idealism, rationalism and the dialectic. Irony as a method "consists in anticipating the encounters". As opposed to Proust's humour of chance encounters in which the "intelligence always comes after", in the Socratic method of irony, "the intelligence still comes before the encounters; it provokes them, it instigates and organizes them" (101). "*There is no Logos; there are only hieroglyphs.*" is Deleuze's motto which summarises Proust's apprenticeship (101).

Deleuze finds the principle of his transcendental empiricism in Artaud's defence of the "*genitality*" of thought, that can be defined as the "desexualised acquisition" of a dissolved self or "the genesis of thought in an always fractured I" (Deleuze 1994: 114). Against the innateness of being and the idea and reminiscence in thought, Artaud the schizophrenic writes:

> I am innately genital. ... There are some fools who think of themselves as beings, as innately being. I am he who, in order to be, must whip his innateness. One who innately must be a being, that is always whipping this sort of non-existent kennel […] (Quotes Deleuze 1994: 148)

With "non-existent kennel", Artaud refers to "the dogmatic image of thought" in Deleuze's words. By mentioning Artaud and his schizophrenic thought, Deleuze does not propose to replace the dogmatic image of thought with another image, that of schizophrenia in this case. He just reminds "that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also possibility for thought" (148). But when Oedipus with its dogmatic image of the holly family is on the agenda, schizophrenia becomes an indispensible antidote. Hence the transcendental empiricism becomes schizoanalysis in Deleuze's cooperative work with Guattari. They put forward that,

> Schizoanalysis is at once a transcendental and a materialist analysis. It is critical in the sense that it leads the criticism of Oedipus, or leads Oedipus, to the point of its own self-criticism. It sets out to explore a transcendental unconscious, rather than a metaphysical one. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 109)

Deleuze & Guattari make a distinction between clinical schizophrenics that need hospitalization and schizophrenia as a process that is revolutionary. Clinical schizophrenics in hospitals are those "people who tried to do something and failed, cracked up" (Deleuze 1987: 23). Contrary to neurotics who have imaginary problems, schizophrenics "have real problems" (15). And the latter are still revolutionary as opposed to fascist tendencies of paranoids. For Deleuze & Guattari, clinical schizophrenia is the end product of capitalism. Capitalism produces the schizophrenic as "its inherent tendency brought to fulfilment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 35). Schizophrenia as a process, or rather "schizoid process", on the other hand, is a revolutionary activity of decoding and deterritorializing the flows of capitalism; and unless it is blocked or halted, does not

turn into clinical schizophrenia. In short, clinical schizophrenia is produced, but schizophrenia as process is productive, Deleuze & Guattari also refer to this process as "desiring-production" that is "the limit of social production" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 101, 130), "the boundary between the molar organization and the molecular multiplicity of desire" (102). The molar organization is needed for survival, but the real productivity of the schizoid process is present only in its molecular multiplicity which begins with "a transcendental experience of the loss of the Ego" (84), a voyage onto the "transcendental unconscious" as quoted above. By making a distinction between a transcendental and a metaphysical unconscious, Deleuze & Guattari (1983: 109-10) sort a number of characteristics for each type of the unconscious presupposed respectively by psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. They are listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Psychoanalytic versus Schizoanalytic Unconscious

Psychoanalytic Unconscious	**Schizoanalytic Unconscious**
metaphysical	transcendental
ideological	material
Oedipal, paranoid	schizophrenic
imaginary	nonfigurative
symbolic	real
desire as lack (negative)	desire as flow (positive)
segregative	cartographic, nomadic
reactionary, capitalist	revolutionary
biunivocal	polyvocal
structural	machinic
molar	molecular
gregarious	microphysical, micrological
expressive	productive

Deleuze, in the essay 'Immanence: A Life' (1995), in his final monologue *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* (1995) before his death, returns to the topics of immanence and the transcendental, and combines both in the "indefinite" idea of "*a* life": "The transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of

immanence by a life" (Deleuze 2001: 28). For Deleuze, the indefinite article in "*a* life" is "an index of the transcendental" (Deleuze 2001: 28). "No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens" (28) claims Deleuze, and gives an incident of a subplot in Charles Dickens' last complete novel *Our Mutual Friend* (1864-65) as the best illustration of the immanent and transcendental concept of "*a* life". The subplot in Dickens' novel is about the lives, families and relations of river scavengers who search for dead bodies and any other things of value in the depths of the Thames in London area. Rogue Riderhood is one such scavenger who is wicked and very disreputable among everyone around him including his daughter. He conspires against his innocent old partner for blood-money, blackmails people, and is cruel to people around him. Miss Abbey Potterson, the mistress of a respectable riverside inn, is one of the people who hates Rogue Riderhood most and forbids him to the inn. On the same day that she suspects more "wicked" deeds to have come from him, Rogue Riderhood's body is found with no sign of life in the depths of the river after an accident near the inn. Miss Abbey orders people to empty the inn and to bring the body in. She realises only then that the body belongs to Rogue Riderhood, but this will not prevent her from doing her best to save him. She prepares the inn like a hospital room, orders people to fetch a doctor and find the rogue's daughter. When the doctor comes, four other people stay to help the doctor. All of them hate Riderhood, and none would be sorry if he were dead. But the rogue's state of being between life and death moves them to tears:

> See! A token of life! An indubitable token of life! The spark may smoulder and go out, or it may glow and expand, but see! The four rough fellows, seeing, shed tears. Neither Riderhood in this world, nor Riderhood in the other, could draw tears from them; but a striving human soul between the two can do it easily. (Dickens 1997: 440)

"A token of life" here is not the life of an individual, and it is not representative of the life of Riderhood, the villain. It is "an impersonal and yet singular life that releases pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens" (Deleuze 2001: 28). It is not the life of the rogue whom everybody hates, a life between the rogue's life and death. It is the life of an impersonal human "with whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude" (28-9). For that reason, Riderhood's daughter lives a short delusion to see

that people who normally hate his father "minister to him with such extraordinary interest, their anxiety is so keen, their vigilance is so great, their excited joy grows so intense as the signs of life strengthen" (Dickens 1997: 441). But when Riderhood recovers his senses, everyone there becomes cold and turns against him:

> The short-lived delusion begins to fade. The low, bad, unimpressible face is coming up from the depths of the river, or what other depths, to the surface again. As he grows warm, the doctor and the four men cool. As his lineaments soften with life, their faces and their hearts harden to him.
>
> "He will do now," says the doctor, washing his hands, and looking at the patient with growing disfavour. (441)

When Riderhood recovers, he becomes vicious again and insults the people there showing his bad temper. There is no other choice for his daughter but to take him home as quickly as possible before things get worse for everyone.

For Deleuze, "*a* life" in its immanent, impersonal, indefinite and singular mode is not limited to a "single moment when individual life confronts universal death"; it is always and everywhere present "in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects" (Deleuze 2001: 29). To witness the immanence of life in people, one needs to rip them off their subject and individuality in the paradoxical coexistence of past, present and future in a single moment, like Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway who "would not say of anyone in the world now that they were this or were that", who "felt very young; and at the same time unspeakably aged" (Woolf 1992b: 8), and who "would not say of herself I am this I am that" (9). In the first sentence everyone in the world becomes immanent for Mrs. Dalloway, and the second paradoxical sentence and the third sentence announce her own rise to immanence. When whole life becomes immanent, there remains nothing unsympathetic in the world as in the world of Clarissa Dalloway again: "what she loved was this, here, now, in front of her; the fat lady in the cab" (9). If one cannot do like Mrs. Dalloway, one might imagine little children: they "all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality". All they have are "singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face—not subjective qualities", and they "are infused with immanent life that is pure power and even bliss" (Deleuze 2001: 30). Deleuze also refers to this pure power of immanence as "haecceity", a Latin term from mediaeval philosophy with a new

sense. It literally means "thisness" and, in Deleuze & Guattari's use, stands for an immanent individuation of a singular type which is nonpersonal, nonsubjective and nonobjective:

> There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name *haecceity* for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 261)

"Today is Tuesday", "It's five o'clock now" are temporal indications of a moment. But the phrases "What a day!" and "What a terrible five o'clock in the afternoon!" (Deleuze 1987: 93) are indications of an event, an individuation, an intensive and collective type of haecceity which brings together many independent elements, only one of which is this day or this "five o'clock". A body, such as, a person, an animal or a thing, is an "assemblage haecceity" when it is considered only in terms of its relations of movement and rest in longitude and its capacities to affect and to be affected in latitude. A spatiotemporal milieu, such as an hour, a climate, or a location, on the other hand, is an "interassemblage haecceity" when intensities of longitude and latitude intersect on it (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 262). Nevertheless, both types of haecceities are inseparable from each other, and there is always a becoming-space or becoming-time of bodies, or both at the same time: "We are all five o'clock in the evening", or, "Five o'clock is this animal! This animal is this place! 'The thin dog is running in the road, this dog is the road,' cries Virginia Woolf" (263). Haecceity gives a body, a time or a space "an individuating function within a collectivity" (263) Linguistic indexes of a haecceity or an event are verbs in their infinite form (e.g., to green in an indeterminate time or tense), proper names (e.g., Parkinson's disease, Hurricane Andrew, Bergsonism),[12] and indefinite articles (e.g., a horse, a Hans, once upon a time). Deleuze

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[12] According to Deleuze & Guattari, these examples are called proper names "not by virtue of the specific and generic denominators that characterize them", but "by virtue of the event they are in themselves and in the assemblages" (1996a: 264). In that sense, they argue, "Tick, Wolf, Horse, etc, are true proper names", and mention "the becoming-horse of Little Hans, the becoming-wolf of the Were, the becoming-tick of the Stoic" as further examples of proper names.

& Guattari also mention the third person indefinite pronouns "one", "he" and "they" as other indexes of haecceity without a subject and argue after Blanchot that,

> ONE and HE—*one* is dying, *he* is unhappy— in no way take the place of a subject, but instead do away with any subject in favor of an assemblage of the haecceity type that carries or brings out the event insofar as it is unformed and incapable of being effectuated by persons ("something happens to them that they can only get a grip on again by letting go of their ability to say I"). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 264)

2.5. Assemblages and the Plane of Immanence

Deleuze indicates that everyone has a plane of immanence as long as they desire something: "You've got it already, you do not feel desire without its already being there" (Deleuze 1987: 90). But they do not have it unless they are aware of the plane they are located on and know how to construct one: "You haven't got it […] if you can't manage to construct it, if you do not know how to, by finding your places, your assemblages, your particles and your fluxes" (90). Assemblages are the key to all other terms here: our places, particles and fluxes are determined by the assemblages we are in.

An assemblage is a multiplicity made up of many terms which are themselves *heterogeneous*, made up of many parts, and *heterogenous*, made up of exterior relations. It is the smallest unit that defines a thing, a body, an idea, a word, a physical or a semiotic system. And the only unity an assemblage has is "co-functioning" of disparate elements (e.g., hydrogen and oxygen in water), "symbiosis" of distant and dissimilar things (e.g., "the wasp and the orchid"), "alliance" between unequals (e.g., the noblewoman and the knight in courtly love), or "sympathy" between different bodies (e.g., man-animal-tool, "man-horse-stirrup"). "An animal", for instance, "is defined less by its genus, its species, its organs, and its functions, than by the assemblages it enters" (69). Assemblages are social and machinic before being technical. Technical machines always depend of social machines: "Tools always presuppose a machine, and the machine is always social before being technical. There is always a social machine which selects or assigns the technical elements used" (70).

An assemblage has two axes: an axis of bodies and things (machinic assemblage of effectuation that concerns physical systems) and an axis of codes and utterances

(collective assemblage of enunciation that concerns semiotic systems or regimes of signs). Both these axes are cut through a third axis of territorialities and movements. This third axis makes both previous (physical and semiotic) systems complex ones with their territories and reterritorilisations that determine them on the one hand, and their cutting edges of deterritoarialisation and lines of flight that carry them away on the other:

> There is no assemblage without territory, without territoriality and reterritorialization which includes all sorts of artifices. But is there any assemblage without a point of deterritorialization, without a line of flight which leads it on to new creations, or else towards death? (Deleuze 1987: 72)

The third axis of territorialities and movements connects both physical system and semiotic system in a new complex system on a single plane, the plane of consistency or immanence. Deleuze & Guattari refer to this complex system as "the abstract machine" which reorganizes both systems in a double articulation as form of content (physical systems) and form of expression (semiotic systems) without making any distinctions between them.[13] Before moving into the most abstract domains, it will be of benefit to establish the plane of immanence in its most concrete form, in the machinic assemblage of bodies.

A machinic assemblage of bodies is defined by the "*latitude*" of its *intensive capacities* to affect and to be affected (becomings), and by the "*longitude*" of its *extensive relations* of movement and rest ("local movements"), speed and slowness ("differential speeds") (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 256-7, 260-1; Deleuze 1987: 93, 102). This is in fact how Spinoza defines a body, be it a human being or a community, an animal or a pack of animals, a piece of stone or a mountain, a statement or a book, a wind, an hour, a day, a season or a century. Spinoza defines a body neither "by its form, nor by its organs and its functions, nor as a substance or a subject" but only by the dimensions of "latitude" and "longitude" (Deleuze 1988b: 127). The former dimension is the dynamic proposition of affects, and the latter is the kinetic proposition of motions (123). The two dimensions can be compared to the dual aspect of consistency discussed in the previous chapter. The latitude of intensive capacities can be considered as the

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[13] The abstract machine will be dealt with more detail in relation to signification in the Fourth Chapter.

internal consistency of a body or a thing, and the longitude of extensive relations, its external consistency. These two dimensions together map out a plane which can be either called a plane of immanence or a plane of consistency:

> In this way we construct the map of a body. The longitudes and latitudes together constitute Nature, the plane of immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is constantly being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and collectivities. (Deleuze 1988b: 128)

The term Nature here does not exclude the artifice either. On the plane of immanence, one cannot make any distinction between natural and artificial arrangements: "Artifice is fully a part of Nature, since each thing, on the immanent plane of nature, is defined by the arrangements of motions and affects into which it enters" (124). Deleuze refers to ethology as a specifically Spinozean discipline. It studies things, animals and humans according to their affective capacities. Deleuze mentions the biologist Uexküll's study of a tick, an insect which lives on the blood of mammals, with three affects:

> Light affects it and it climbs on to the end of a branch. The smell of a mammal affects it and it drops down on to it. The hairs get in its way and it looks for a hairless place to burrow under the skin and drink the warm blood. Blind and deaf, the tick has only three affects in the vast forest, and for the rest of the time may sleep for years awaiting the encounter. (Deleuze 1987: 60)

A tick is capable of three things only: sensibility to light which makes it climb up, sensibility to the smell of a mammal to drop on, sensibility to the heat of bare skin to burrow its head into for sucking blood. If a tick found light and climbed up a tree but never encountered a mammal, no one would know its two other affects. Similarly, Deleuze argues that the situation is no different for human beings in terms of the affects they are capable of. He claims after Spinoza that "no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of; it is a long affair of experimentation" (Deleuze 1988b: 125). He continues that this experimentation requires

> a Spinozan wisdom that implies the construction of a plane of immanence or consistency. Spinoza's ethics has nothing to do with a morality; he conceives it as an ethology, that is, as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for affecting and being affected on this plane of immanence. That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way he does: you do not know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or a

mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination. (Deleuze 1988b: 125)

Hence, ethology becomes an alternative term to designate the plane of immanence and its two dimensions of differential speeds and affective encounters. This Spinozist experimentation or wisdom also accords with the Deleuzian transcendental exercise to discover the limits of human faculties and perhaps to discover some new faculties that are never known.

Deleuze & Guattari mention two cases which make them convinced that children too have the wisdom of Spinoza. The first case concerns Freud's patient Little Hans who invents the term "peepee-maker" not as an organ but as a machinic material:

> When Little Hans talks about a "peepee-maker," he is referring not to an organ or an organic function but basically to a material, in other words, to an aggregate whose elements vary according to its connections, its relations of movement and rest, the different individuated assemblages it enters. Does a girl have a peepee-maker? The boy says yes, and not by analogy, nor in order to conjure away a fear of castration. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 256)

"Individuated assemblages" are affective encounters stated in machinic terms. So, peepee-maker is an affective definition and points to a machinic function rather than an organic function. Not only boys and girls, but also cars have it in a completely different "machinic assemblage". The term machinic must be distinguished not only from organic but also from mechanical. Mechanical refers to "a system of closer and closer connections between dependent terms", machinic, on the other hand, refers to "a 'proximity' grouping between independent and heterogeneous terms (topological proximity is itself independent of distance or contiguity)" (Deleuze 1987: 104). All components of a grouping are parts of a single machine which is always social. When a technical machine has a human as its component, it is a social machine. A clock, for instance, is a technical machine when it is seen only as a device for measuring time, but when it reassures order in a work place, it becomes part of a social machine.

The second case which proves children to have the wisdom of Spinoza is again related to Little Hans in his becoming-horse. Little Hans makes a list of the affects of a draft horse as it enters into composition with the vehicle it carries and with the street:

> Little Hans's horse is not representative but affective. It is not a member of a species but an element or individual in a machinic assemblage: draft horse-omnibus-street. It is defined by a list of active and passive affects in the context of the individuated assemblage it is part of: having eyes blocked by blinders, having a bit and a bridle, being proud, having a big peepee-maker, pulling heavy loads, being whipped, falling, making a din with its legs, biting, etc. These affects circulate and are transformed within the assemblage: what a horse "can do." (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 257)

When discussing the rhizome in previous sections, Deleuze & Guattari were quoted on how psychoanalysts detached Little Hans from his rhizome of the street. Little Hans's becoming-horse is part of this rhizome. One of the criticisms that Deleuze & Guattari raise against psychoanalysis is about its view of "the animal as a representative of drives, or a representation of the parents". They emphasise "the reality of becoming-animal" as an "affect in itself, the drive in person, and represent[ing] nothing" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 259). According to them, Freud has no wisdom of Spinoza, no sense of ethology and misinterprets Little Hans' assemblages:

> Freud sees nothing but the father in the becoming-horse of Hans […] The horse's blinders are the father's eyeglasses, the black around its mouth is his mustache, its kicks are the parents' "lovemaking." Not one word about Hans's relation to the street, on how the street was forbidden to him […] Psychoanalysis has no feeling for unnatural participations, nor for the assemblages a child can mount in order to solve a problem from which all exits are barred him: a *plan(e)*, not a phantasy. (259-60)

Here is one reason why psychoanalysis remains in the category of the symbolic and the imaginary with no understanding of the reality of assemblages and the category of the real which assemblages alone deserve. Assemblages have no need of being interpreted. They are not the symptoms of anything but solutions to the problems which result when one's desire is repressed, turned away or blocked. All mahinic assemlages are at the same time assemblages of desire. In Deleuze & Guattari's vocabulary, desire, machine and the unconscious are synonyms, and they take the place of Id.

The French word *plan* has two different senses in English. It means both "plan" (as in a plan of action or mathematical plans) and "plane" (of surface, as in a geometrical or cartographic plane). Deleuze & Guattari use the term to designate both senses when they talk about plan(e)s in a general sense, but they mostly use it in the latter sense

which conforms more to their rhizomatic thought as in "the plane of immanence".[14] Similarly, Deleuze has two opposing conceptions of plane (Deleuze 1988b: 128-9; 1987: 91-4; Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 265-72). The first one is *the plane of organization* or *development*. It is a plane of transcendence on which forms are developed and subjects are formed. Yet the plane itself remains hidden as an extra dimension in addition to the given one. The forms necessitate a hidden structure, and the subjects call for a hidden signifier. The plane which has control over forms and subjects is never given but can only be inferred from its effects or teleological ends, from analogies, metaphors or metonymies. The plane of organisation is "a kind of design in the mind of man or in the mind of a god" (Deleuze 1987: 91) and can also be seen in "a society's organization of power" (Deleuze 1988b: 128). Deleuze also argues that the Law also has one such plane (1987: 92). The below passage from Kafka, who is one of Spinoza's most important disciples, illustrates the plane of organisation of the Law and its transcendence best:

> Our laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know. […] The very existence of these laws, however, is at most a matter of presumption. […] The Law is whatever the nobles do. (Kafka 1993: 404-5)

The plane of immanence or *consistency* is the second plane which stands in complete opposition to the first one. The plane of immanence has only affects in longitude, and movements and speeds in latitude on a single surface with no levels, with no supplementary hidden dimension. Deleuze & Guattari's account of the contrasting characteristics of both planes (1996b: 266-7) are recapitulated in Table 2 below.

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[14] Brian Massumi, the translator of the both volumes of Deleuze & Guattari's *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translates the French word *plan* as plan(e) when it is used in a general sense, and prefers plane in all other cases. Robert Hurley, the translator of Deleuze's *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, on the other hand, translates it as "plane" when Deleuze uses it in a positive sense, and he prefers to translate it as "plan" when the sense is a general or a negative one as will be explained below. It seems that what Deleuze & Guattari mean with it matters more than in whatever way the French word is translated into English. It is typical of Deleuze to use a classical word in a completely novel sense. He trusts words less than active, affective and diagrammatic descriptions.

Table 2: The Plane of Organisation versus the Plane of Immanence

The plane of organization *has/involves:*	The plane of immanence *has/involves:*
"development of forms"	"only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds"
"formation of subjects"	"only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages"
a supplementary hidden dimension which is not given (overcoding)	"many dimensions" but none is supplementary (decoding)
"a mental design", teleological	"an abstract design", geometrical
"an evolution" of form or "the filiation of forms"	"an involution, in which form is constantly dissolved, freeing times and speeds"
"interpretation" and reterritorialisations	"experimentation" and deterritorialisations
"pulsed time or tempo"	"floating time"
"structure and genesis"	"a process"
Strata and territories	no strata, no territory

Philosophers and theologians who uphold "order and law" are idealist practitioners of the plane of organization. And so are Göethe, Schiller and Hegel according to Deleuze. Spinoza, Hölderlin, Kleist and Nietzsche, on the other hand, develop their conceptions of "writing, art and even a new politics" on an outstanding plane of immanence (Deleuze 1987: 94). Deleuze & Guattari also indicate Proust's successful use of both planes in his monumental novel in seven volumes, *Remembrance of Things Past*. The narrator of the novel, in his relationship with Albertine, seems to follow the footsteps of Swann, a close friend of the narrator's family, and Swann's love affair with Odette told in the third person in the first volume *Swann's Way*. But, as Deleuze & Guattari indicate, Swann and the narrator proceed on different planes. Swann occupies a plane of organisation in his attitude towards Odette's lies, his taste in music and in other things:

> Swann is always thinking and feeling in terms of subjects, forms, resemblances between subjects, and correspondences between forms. For him, one of Odette's lies is a form whose secret subjective content must be

discovered, provoking amateur detective activity. To him Vinteuil's music is a form that must evoke something else, fall back on something else, echo other forms, whether paintings, faces, or landscapes. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 271)

Swann builds even his love for Odette on a resemblance and idealisation. In their first meetings, he feels nothing special for Odette and knows nothing about her bad reputation. The moment he thinks that she looks like a female figure in one of Botticelli's paintings, he immediately falls in love with Odette who will always treat him with self-interest and who will be unfaithful to him in their relationship. Although Swann discovers her lies and infidelities, he is always ready to interpret them in a solacing way as a result of his idealisation which blinds him. Swann also makes an association between his love for Odette and a sonata by the fictional composer Vinteuil. Odette uses the associative power of the sonata to reignite Swann's love for her when it seems to weaken. His humiliating love for her ends up with their marriage disapproved by the narrator's family.

The narrator, as a young boy, seems to take Swann as a model in his false idealisations and his deep interest in Swann's life and disreputable family. He falls in love with Swann's daughter Gilberte at first sight and he takes her dark eyes for blue. Also, earlier in the novel, he builds the beauty of the Duchess de Guermantes upon the portraits of her ancestors on tapestries and windows. Although he has never seen her, he thinks she must be the most beautiful woman in the world. When he meets the Duchess in person in a wedding, he is disappointed by her actual physical appearance but he cannot help falling in love with her when he catches her brief glimpse and smile at himself. When the narrator says the Duchess also has blue eyes, the reader doubts its genuineness. Yet the narrator, with his experience of signs as they mobilize the unconscious and the involuntary, proves himself to be on a different plane than Swann already in the first volume. The narrator turns "research" into both the production and interpretation of signs with a future orientation in a progression of an apprenticeship rather than a research into the past and the depths of the memory. Toward the end of the first volume, when his friendship with Gilberte begins to disappoint him, the narrator confronts his love for Gilberte and realises that in his friendship with Gilbert, it is he

alone who loves, and that the actual Gilberte and the girl who inspires his dreams are two different persons.

In *Within a Budding Grove*, the second volume of Proust's novel, the narrator's love for Gilberte dies away slowly. When he is on holiday in the seaside town of Balbec, his meeting a group of local girls and the famous impressionist painter Elstir are two important events which change the narrator's entire life. These events teach him that one's impression of a thing or a person always changes, and that a person is not one but many. He also learns that the individuation of a group of people, either collectively or singularly, "proceeds not by subjectivity but by haecceity" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 271). For the narrator, a band of young girls consists of nothing but "pure relations of speed and slowness" (271). Later when he decides to love Albertine, a member of the band in Balbec, his love and jealousy for her are on a different plane than those of Swann for Odette, and so is the narrator's attitude towards Albertine's lies. While Swann is on the plane of organization, the narrator uses the plane of immanence:

> Albertine's lies […] merge with the emission of a particle issuing form the eyes of the beloved, a particle that stands only for itself and travels too fast through the narrator's auditory or visual field. This molecular speed is unbearable because it indicates a distance, a *proximity* where Albertine would like to be, and already is. So that the narrator's pose is not principally that of the investigating detective but (a very different figure) that of the jailer. How can he become master of speed, how can he stand it nervously (as a headache) and perceptually (as a flash)? How can he build a prison for Albertine? Jealousy is different in Swann and the narrator, as is the perception of music: Vinteuil gradually ceases to be apprehended in terms of forms and comparable subjects, and assumes incredible speeds and slownesses that combine on a plane of consistency of variation […] It is as though Swann's desperate efforts to reterritorialize the flow of things (to reterritorialize Odette on a secret, painting on a face, music on the Bois de Boulogne) were replaced by the sped-up movement of deterritorialization, by a linear speed up of the abstract machine, sweeping away faces and landscapes, and then love, jealousy, painting, and music itself, according to increasingly stronger coefficients that nourish the Work at risk of dissolving everything and dying. For the narrator, despite partial victories, fails in his project; that project was not at all to regain time or to force back memories, but to become master of speeds to the rhythm of his asthma. It was to face annihilation. ((Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 271-2)

So far, it has been noted that Deleuze & Guattari fight against all kinds of dualisms. However, their distinction between two opposing planes, namely between a

nonphilosophical plane of organisation and a legitimately philosophical plane of immanence, seems to be a new kind of dualism. Deleuze rejects any such dualisms between the two planes, and he points to co-functioning between the transcendent plane of organization and the plane of immanence:

> it is from the forms and subjects of the first plane that the second constantly tears the particles between which there are no longer relationships of speed and slowness, and it is also on the plane of immanence that the other arises, working in it to block movements, fix affects, organize forms and subjects. The speed indicators presuppose forms that they dissolve, no less than the organizations presuppose the material in fusion which they put in order. We do not therefore speak of a dualism between two kinds of 'things', but of a multiplicity of dimensions, of lines and directions in the heart of an assemblage. (Deleuze 1987: 133)

Co-functioning, as indicated earlier, can take place between markedly different terms as a characteristic common to all assemblages. And it does not take place through filiations which succeed each other or that follow a line of descendence, but through alliances that spread like "contagions, epidemics and the wind" (69). Since assemblages always have a social aspect and are caused by desire, so are the two opposing planes. They are both the products of desire; they both form part of assemblages of desire.

2.6. Desire and the Body without Organs (BwO)

Deleuze & Guattari define desire in very simple and completely positive terms and emphasize its unconscious nature. Desire never needs interpreting. It is neither signifier nor signified. There is nothing symbolic or figurative about desire. It is always true and real and stands for itself. It does not refer to, conceal or recall something else. Desire is very simple: "Sleeping is a desire. Walking is a desire. Listening to music, or making music, or writing, are desires. A spring, a winter, are desires. Old age also is a desire. Even death" (Deleuze 1987: 95). Connecting, assembling and machining are the only conditions for a desire to exist. Machine is no metaphor of desire. The breast and the mouth are both machines: one produces the flow of milk, and the other connects to the former and interrupts the flow. Production of flows and interruptions are the effects of desire or the system of the unconscious as a machine: "desire that flows, interrupts, begins flowing again—it's totally literal" (Deleuze 2004a: 232). Desire as a category of

production and desiring-machines are "not mere metaphors" for Deleuze & Guattari (1983: 2). Machine is no longer opposed to human being, and it comes before the dichotomies of human-nonhuman, human-nature, natural-unnatural, operator-operated (subject-object), self-non-self, outside-inside. It constitutes "a proximity grouping of man-tool-animal-thing" (Deleuze 1987: 104) and covers all of species life that is both organic and nonorganic:

> There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 2)

For Deleuze & Guattari, desire has no internal drives or stages and no molar or transcendent structures. It is always assembled and produced with the outside in a complete molecular chain and non-signifying process. Desire is revolutionary and combines both the social and the libidinal in a single process that sweeps all history, politics and economy. By using the terms desiring-machines and desiring-production, Deleuze & Guattari suggest "introducing desire into the mechanism, and introducing production into desire" (22). This should not be viewed as an attempt to synthesize Marxism and Freudianism as Foucault warns us against:

> [S]uch an attempt always treats political economy (the flows of capital and interest) and the economy of the libido (the flows of desire) as two separate economies […] Deleuze & Guattari, on the other hand, postulate one and the same economy, the economy of flows. The flows and productions of desire will simply be viewed as the unconscious of the social productions. Behind every investment of time and interest and capital, an investment of desire, and vice versa. (in Deleuze & Guattari 1983: xviii)

Desire invests the social field unconsciously. Interests, on the other hand, invest the social field in a preconscious way. Desire is revolutionary and comes prior to all interests such as class interests, individual interests and interests of the capital. Desire is indifferent to any interests so it falls prey to all kinds of exploitation by organisations of power. In this way, desire, which is revolutionary in nature, has a new reactionary and anti-revolutionary direction. Guattari indicates the two opposing directions for desire as follows:

> [E]ither a revolutionary machine that can harness desire and the phenomena of desire will take shape, or desire will go on being manipulated by the forces of oppression, of repression, and so threaten, even from within, any revolutionary machine" (in Deleuze 1995: 18).

Desire is not only an easy affair, but also an easy prey for the organisations of power. For that reason Deleuze & Guattari draw a very large scope for desire which also includes in the assemblage those powers which manipulate and oppress desire itself. Hence, Deleuze & Guattari (1983: 165) write about "[m]oney, army, police, and State desire, fascist desire" and add "even fascism is desire". Desire, consequently, has two opposing poles: one is revolutionary and the other reactionary or fascist pole. Both poles have their delirious forms at their extreme limits. Schizophrenic and revolutionary form is represented in the French poet Rimbaud's phrase "I am of an inferior race always and forever". Paranoid, fascist and anti-revolutionary pole, on the other hand, is represented in the phrase "I am a superior race" (Deleuze 2004a: 235). Deleuze & Guattari regard ideology as "an illusion". It is a deceived and deceptive misinterpretation of "organisations of power": "There is no ideology, there are only organizations of power, once you accept that the organization of power is the unity of desire and the economic infrastructure" (Deleuze 2004a: 264). Desire, in its investment of the social field, is always part of infrastructure and production, and not of superstructure or ideology:

> The most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology, desire is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiring-production. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 348)

Deleuze & Guattari, with their conception of desire as the unconscious libidinal investment of the social field or of any social institutions, aim to abolish the dualities between "the objective and the subjective", "infrastructure and superstructure" and "production and ideology" (Deleuze 2004a: 195). They rather propose a "strict complementarity of the desiring subject of the institution, and the institutional object" (195). All structures coexist for Deleuze, and "[e]very structure is an infrastructure" (178). There are no superstructures but power relations or the relations of production and anti-production in a single order:

Desire never stops investing history, even in its darkest periods. The German masses had come to desire Nazism. […] Under certain conditions, the desire of the masses can turn against their own interests. What are those conditions? […] To formulate an answer, we realized that we couldn't just hook a Freudian engine up to the Marxist-Leninist train. We first had to undo a stereotypical hierarchy between an opaque economic infrastructure and social-ideological superstructures conceived in such a way that they confine the questions of sex and expression to representation, as far away from production as possible. The relations of production and those of reproduction participate in the same pairing of productive forces and anti-productive structures. (Deleuze 2004a: 217)

Desire's being an easy prey is profited not only by Nazism, but also by capitalism and socialism as Deleuze indicates "It happens that one desires against one's own interests: capitalism profits from this, but so does socialism, the party, and the party leadership" (257). Finally, psychoanalysis is staged to submit desire to anti-production and to the powers of repression. Psychoanalysis "breaks up all productions of desire" (Deleuze 1987: 77); it "cuts off and beats down all connections, all assemblages—it hates desire, it hates politics" (79); it "castrates the unconscious, injects castration into the unconscious" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 60). The Oedipus, by confining desire to family alone, shames and stupefies desire and persuades desire "to deny itself in the name of the more important interests of civilization" (120). The Oedipus makes the oppressors say "what if everyone did the same, what if everyone married his mother or kept his sister for himself? there would no longer be any differentiation, any exchanges possible" (120). And it makes the oppressed say "I'm a pervert. Curse on me if I ever dare to desire anything". This is how desire becomes depressed as a nihilist and resentful tendency and a guilt trip par excellence. Deleuze & Guattari argue further against psychoanalysis:

The order of desire is the order of production; all production is at once desiring-production and social production. We therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of production, for having shunted it into representation. Far from showing the boldness of psychoanalysis, this idea of unconscious representation marks from the outset its bankruptcy or its abnegation: an unconscious that no longer produces, but is content to believe. The unconscious believes in Oedipus, it believes in castration, in the law. (296)

They also indicate how representation of desire works in psychoanalysis as follows:

The signs of desire, being nonsignifying, become signifying in representation only in terms of a signifier of absence or lack. The structure is formed and appears only in terms of the symbolic term defined as a lack. The great Other as the nonhuman sex gives way, in representation, to a signifier of the great Other as an always missing term, the all-too-human sex, the phallus of molar castration. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 310)

Psychoanalysis represents desire in symbolic and imaginary terms and relates it to lack, the Law and signifier. As an example of desire represented in psychoanalysis, Deleuze mentions "fellatio", which is a real desire in itself, and Freud's interpretation of it in symbolic terms:

Freud on 'fellatio': the penis stands for the cow's udder, and the cow's udder for a mother's breast. A way of showing that fellatio is not a 'true' desire, but means something else, conceals something else. Something always has to recall something else – metaphor or metonymy. (Deleuze 1987: 77-8)

As for lack, "psychoanalysis uses the partial object in a negative way to weld desire to a fundamental lack" (Deleuze 1994a: 223). It cuts off partial objects from their chain of asignifying flows and reduce them to parental images. Long and big objects, for instance, stand for daddy, and the hollow ones, for mummy: "Say that it's Oedipus, or you'll get a slap in the face" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 45). Freud seeks something common to designate as lack in both sexes, and it is "the great Phallus, the Lack with two nonsuperimposible sides" (59-60). It is expected to lead to "desire for penis" in girls, and to the "fear of losing it or refusal of a passive attitude" in boys. Desire as lack teaches people only "resignation" from their early childhood. People are expected to submit themselves "to Oedipus, to castration": "for girls, renunciation of their desire for the penis; for boys, renunciation of male protest—in short, 'assumption of one's sex'" (59). Lack requires that there is "only one sex": man.[15] For Deleuze & Guattari, even the idea of "two sexes", man plus woman defined positively without being related to each other, is not a better one. While the idea of only one sex assumes the communication of both sexes at least on a common lack as castration, the idea of two sexes allows no communication between sexes and separates them "into two homosexual series" (295). Lacanian "the Great Other" as an attempt to define "the

[15] Deleuze & Guattari write on the psychoanalytic assumption of only one sex as follows: "We know how Freudianism is permeated by this bizarre notion that there is finally only one sex, the masculine, in relation to which the woman, the feminine, is denned as a lack, an absence" (1983: 294).

nonhuman nature of sex" is also a failure since it retains the Oedipus, castration, lack and the signifier (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 295). Non-human sex which Deleuze & Guattari favour refers to a molecularisation of sexuality in both men and women and to a multiplicity of sexes, "the *n* sexes", in desiring machines:

> [E]verywhere a microscopic transsexuality, resulting in the woman containing as many men as the man, and the man as many women, all capable of entering—men with women, women with men—into relations of production of desire that overturn the statistical order of the sexes. Making love is not just becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand. Desiring-machines or the nonhuman sex: not one or even two sexes, but *n* sexes. Schizoanalysis is the variable analysis of the *n* sexes in a subject, beyond the anthropomorphic representation that society imposes on this subject, and with which it represents its own sexuality. The schizoanalytic slogan of the desiring-revolution will be first of all: to each its own sexes. (295-6)

Deleuze & Guattari reject that the two sexes have anything in common. Yet, they argue, both sexes communicate "in a transverse mode" in "a hundred thousand ways". Male and female are only two determinations of "*n* sexes", and in this specific case the transverse communications between man-man, man-woman and woman-woman take place in the following way: "the male part of a man can communicate with the female part of a woman, but also with the male part of a woman, or with the female part of another man, or yet again with the male part of the other man, etc." (69).[16]

There is no castration in molecular unconscious and no oedipal trinity of daddy-mommy-me. It is an orphan like Antonin Artaud: "*I don't believe in father / in mother, / got no / papamummy*" (14). Being an orphan must not be understood as an absent father. The unconscious reproduces itself with nothing absent, it lacks nothing: "I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself" (15). Only schizophrenics can

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[16] Deleuze & Guattari indicate that a single human being, no matter man or woman, has both male and female parts which are "partitioned, noncommunicating", they add that "the man is merely the one in whom the male part, and the woman the one in whom the female part, dominates statistically" (1983: 69). Woolf, in fact, comes up with a similar idea when she is contemplating about the "unity of the mind" (a Spinozist theme par excellence) in an amateur way. She writes in *A Room of One's Own*: "And I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the soul so that in each of us two powers preside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain, the man predominates over the woman, and in the woman's brain, the woman predominates over the man" (1989: 98). She continues: "If one is man, still the woman part of the brain must have effect; and a woman also must have intercourse with the man in her. Coleridge perhaps meant this when he said that a great mind is androgynous" (98).

baffle and beat down a psychoanalyst so they are not the psychoanalyst's favorite patients:

> Freud doesn't like schizophrenics. He doesn't like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers—"an undesirable resemblance." (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 23)

Conversely, Deleuze & Guattari argue against Freud that "schizophrenia is the process of the production of desire and desiring-machines" (24). It is "the limit of social production determined by the conditions of capitalism" (130). Desire produces its own object. This object produced maybe unreal and hallucinatory, but its process of production is a real one. Lawrence's becoming tortoise in a poem about baby tortoises is criticized that his tortoises are not real. His response to those who criticise him is, Deleuze & Guattari report: "Possibly, but my becoming is, my becoming is real, even and especially if you have no way of judging it" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 244).

For Deleuze & Guattari, schizophrenia is "the absolute limit" of desiring-production; capitalism presents itself as "the relative limit"; and Oedipus is posited as "the displaced limit" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 176). Capitalism has a positive aspect that it "liberates the flows of desire", but it "does so by substituting for codes a quantifying axiomatic that is even more oppressive" (139, 176). Deleuze & Guattari use the terms coding and decoding when "forms" are in question, and for "substances" they use the terms territorialisation and deterritorialisation. Decoding is a process of desire in which the flows of desire are set free and a desiring-machine is constructed. Coding refers primarily to the restriction and structuring of the flows of desire by "socius" especially in pre-capitalist societies which reject most ways of existing while favouring some fixed ones (social formation of evil and good in Nietzschean terms). Axiomatic as a specifically capitalist invention, has a different functioning from codes. It operates by a magic formula that every decoding and deterritorialisation are followed by a new coding and a new reterritorialisation is in the service of capitalism. What makes this formula magic is that, it takes place in a field of immanence without ever falling into transcendence:

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> The true axiomatic is that of the social machine itself, which takes the place of the old codings and organizes all the decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in the service of its ends. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 233)

Capitalist axiomatic widens the limit without ever reaching it by mixing immanent production with anti-production and by both producing and repressing schizoid flows:

> [C]apitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continue to act as capitalism's limit. For capitalism constantly counteracts, constantly inhibits this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free rein; it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit. (34)

Continually multiplying its axioms and reproducing its limits to digest every revolutionary movement, capitalism is the end of history for Deleuze & Guattari. There is no beyond of capitalism except schizophrenia. Capitalist axiomatic makes the whole world a single class as the immanent field of capital itself: "from the viewpoint of capitalist axiomatic there is only one class, a class with a universalist vocation, the bourgeoisie" (253). The bourgeoisie as a single class is nothing other than the class of slaves some of which command the others, as Deleuze & Guattari indicate: "there are no longer even any masters, but only slaves commanding other slaves" (254). They continue:

> Not that man is ever the slave of technical machines; he is rather the slave of the social machine. The bourgeois sets the example, he absorbs surplus value for ends that, taken as a whole, have nothing to do with his own enjoyment: more utterly enslaved than the lowest of slaves, he is the first servant of the ravenous machine, the beast of the reproduction of capital, internalization of the infinite debt. "I too am a slave"—these are the new words spoken by the master. "Only as personified capital is the capitalist respectable. As such, he shares with the miser the passion for wealth as wealth. […]" (254)

Truly revolutionary desiring machines are always outsiders in respect to the society as a single class of slaves mobilised by the socius or the social machine.[17] This

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[17] In the same way that they account for desire in machinic terms, Deleuze & Guattari account for the history of mankind in terms of social machines, respectively as the primitive machine, the despotic machine and the capitalist machine as three different ways of coding, overcoding and decoding of the flows (1983: 240-62).

is the only condition that desiring-machines do not become overturned by society, and that they continue to produce flows that might displace the social fabric with a fresh air from the outside:

> What we're trying to do is put libido in relation with an "outside." The flow of women among the primitives is in relation with flows of herd animals, flows of arrows. One day a group becomes nomadic. One day warriors show up in the village square: look at Kafka's 'Great Wall of China.' What are the flows of a society? Which flows are capable of subverting that society? And where is desire's place in all this? Something always happens to the libido, and it happens from far off on the horizon, not from within. Shouldn't ethnology, as well as psychoanalysis, be in relation with an outside? (Deleuze 2004a: 229)

Desiring-machines remain outside the society, but they work reciprocally with the social machine, within the social machine. Desiring machines have an immanent relationship with the social machine. Deleuze & Guattari aim to invest desiring-machines or libido in all social, economic and political fields in order to discover the immanent relationship between the libidinal and the social, desiring-machines and the social machine, the unconscious and the socius.

Regarding desire as machine also affects the form of questioning. Deleuze & Guattari no longer ask "What does it mean?" for anything they consider. "How does it work?" is the proper question they ask. With this form of questioning, Deleuze & Guattari replace "meaning" with "use" and "interpretation" with "functioning":

> How do these machines, these desiring-machines, work—yours and mine? With what sort of breakdowns as a part of their functioning? How do they pass from one body to another? How are they attached to the body without organs? What occurs when their mode of operation confronts the social machines? A tractable gear is greased, or on the contrary an infernal machine is made ready. What are the connections, what are the disjunctions, the conjunctions, what use is made of the syntheses? It represents nothing, but it produces. It means nothing, but it works. Desire makes its entry with the general collapse of the question "What does it mean?" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 109)

Hence, the first positive and ethical task which Deleuze & Guattari ascribe to schizoanalysis is "discovering in a subject the nature, the formation, or the functioning of his desiring-machines, independently of any interpretations" (322). Magnetic "attraction and repulsion" are two basic movements which set a machine working. These two conjoint movements are also valid for the functioning of desiring-machines:

"Repulsion is the condition of the machine's functioning, [and] attraction is the functioning itself" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 329-30). With its double movement, the desiring-machine on a body both repels and attracts organs without ever organizing them, without forming them into an organism. Deleuze & Guattari indicate that desire "passes through the body, and through the organs, but not through the organism" (326).

Deleuze & Guattari refer to the system of repulsion and attraction in desiring-machines as the body without organs, or "the BwO". The BwO takes its content from Spinoza as "the immanent substance", and its form, from a poem by Antonin Artaud: "The body is the body / it stands alone / it has no need of organs / the body is never an organism / organisms are the enemies of bodies" (quotes Deleuze 2004b: 44). The body without organs does not oppose itself to organs or "partial objects" as long as they remain unorganized and molecular:

> The partial objects and the body without organs are the two material elements of the schizophrenic desiring-machines: the one as the immobile motor, the others as the working parts; the one as the giant molecule, the others as the micromolecules—the two together in a relationship of continuity from one end to the other of the molecular chain of desire. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 327)

Body without organs is the unorganised, unproductive, sterile, unformed and non-stratified gigantic yet molecular body or matter. It is "the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 153) that "serves as a surface for the recording of the entire production of desire" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 11). One experiences a transcendental loss of the ego on the BwO. The BwO does not belong to a subject, but all subjects are situated on the BwO as a single piece with no sex, no voice, no ego and no limbs like Nietzsche's "Dionysus dismembered" or Lewis Carroll's egg-like Humpty Dumpty. The BwO is in fact an "intense egg", "crisscrossed with axes, banded with zones, localized with areas and fields, measured off by gradients, traversed by potentials, marked by thresholds" (84). It is an affective and intensive body on which there are only poles, zones, gradients, vital potentials and thresholds. The body without

organs is neither a concept, nor a notion, but a purely practical matter which resists any clear definition; everyone conceives and experiences it differently:[18]

> You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit. People ask, So what is this BwO?—But you're already on it, scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic; desert traveler and nomad of the steppes. On it we sleep, live our waking lives, fight—fight and are fought—seek our place, experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love. [...] [I]t is already under way the moment the body has had enough of organs and wants to slough them off, or loses them. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 150)

Hypochondriacs, paranoids, drug users, masochists, anorexics and hysterical lovers all have a strong experience of the BwO in diverse ways specific to them alone. But, in order to construct a BwO, one does not need to suffer from one of these disorders or extremities of the BwO. It is even better when he or she does not. Deleuze & Guattari distinguish between three different types of BwO's: "empty BwO's" of those who are inflicted with one of the above disorders, "cancerous BwO's" of fascism or the fascists inside us, and finally, "full BwO's on the plane of consistency" which has the positive example of schizophrenia as a process. Deleuze & Guattari warn us against the two negative types of BwO by asking: "How can we fabricate a BwO for ourselves without its being the cancerous BwO of a fascist inside us, or the empty BwO of a drug addict, paranoiac, or hypochondriac?" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 163). To illustrate the full BwO, Deleuze encounters in Lawrence's work, for instance, "the picture of such a body, with the sun and moon as its poles, with its planes, its sections, and its plexuses" (Deleuze 1998: 131). Literature also presents a possibility of putting empty BwO's into a productive use with a simulation on the BwO as in Henry Miller's getting drunk on pure water. Deleuze & Guattari call to mind this productive use by asking,

> Could what the drug user or masochist obtains also be obtained in a different fashion in the conditions of the plane, so it would even be possible to use drugs without using drugs, to get soused on pure water, as in Henry Miller's experimentations? (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 176)

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[18] Deleuze even confesses that, although he and Guattari have written about the body without organs for a long time, they notice only later that they "have not grasped it at all in the same way" (1987: 17).

The other possibility of positive and productive use of the BwO, for Deleuze & Guattari is an ethical and political choice to prevent the triumph of empty and cancerous BwO's both in ourselves and in society. While a psychoanalyst says "Stop, find your self again", Deleuze & Guattari say, on the contrary, "Let's go further still, we haven't found our BwO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled our self" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 151). And while psychoanalysis destroys "the real" and translates and transmutes everything into "phantasies" in interpretation, Deleuze & Guattari propose to destroy the phantasy and to retain the real in a programmatic experimentation on the BwO: "the BwO is what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy, and the signifiances and subjectifications as a whole" (151). The three strata that the BwO dismantles are "the organism", "signifiance", and "subjectification". In the same way that the organism imprisons the body, signifiance captures the mind and soul, and subjectification confines reality to what is dominant. The strata must be dismantled and destratified in order to release and experiment with the unconscious productions of desire:

> Tearing the conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration, tearing the unconscious away from signifiance and interpretation in order to make it a veritable production: this is assuredly no more or less difficult than tearing the body away from the organism. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 160)

Psychoanalysis has no understanding of the BwO; it only knows socius and the strata. While desiring-machines record desire as decoded flows on the BwO, Oedipal-narcissistic machine of psychoanalysis inscribes its familial codes on the socius in the service of the dominant reality and the strata. While psychoanalysis territorializes its "neurosis triangle" (daddy-mommy-me) on the socius, the "schizoid eccentric circle" of desire draws the socius out of its walls and territories: "the schizo-flows pass through the wall, scramble all the codes, and deterritorialize the socius" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 176). In that sense, the body without organs is nothing other than "the deterritorilized socius, the wilderness where the decoded flows run free" (176). Reactive and repressive death instinct of psychoanalysis is converted by desire into a positive experience of death in the service of vitality and the active powers of life. "Self destructions" of desire are by no means related to the "death drive":

> Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 160)

Deleuze & Guattari also indicate that there is no desire for death, "there is only death that desires, by virtue of the body without organs or the immobile motor, and there is also a life that desires, by virtue of the working organs" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 330). In the unconscious, negative death instinct is replaced by the positive "model and experience of death" (332). The model of death is generated in the body without organs as its motor; and it is converted, on the body without organs, into an experience of death that comes from outside with a novel vital force; finally there is a return from the experience to the model of the death again. This is the complete cycle of desiring-machines with a Nietzshean inspiration, the cycle of eternal return. Only the one who experiences death can truly desire life in becoming:

> As the authors of horror stories have understood so well, it is not death that serves as the model for catatonia, it is catatonic schizophrenia that gives its model to death. […] The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming. […] These intense becomings and feelings, these intensive emotions, feed deliriums and hallucinations. […] They control the unconscious experience of death, insofar as death is what is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes happening in every becoming—in the becoming-another-sex, the becoming-god, the becoming-a-race, etc., forming zones of intensity on the body without organs. Every intensity controls within its own life the experience of death, and envelops it. (329-30)

To locate the place of the body without organs within the wider scope of geophilosophy, in the same way that the plane of immanence or consistency is the immanent field of the unconscious, the body without organs constitutes "the *field of immanence* of desire, the *plane of consistency* specific to desire" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 154). There is a single plane of immanence on which a multiplicity of BwOs can circulate freely. In addition, the body without organs comprises only one aspect of the three syntheses of the unconscious, namely "the disjunctive syntheses of singularities and chains". The other two synthesis are "the connective syntheses of the partial

objects" that precedes the BwO and "the conjunctive synthesis of intensities and becomings" that follow it (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 338, 40-1). Deleuze deals with different aspects of the three synthesis of the unconscious in most of his work beginning with the earliest one, but his full treatment of them takes place in his collaborative work with Guattari, especially in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983: 1-22, 68-113). Table 3 below recapitulates the syntheses of the unconscious and contrasts them with their psychoanalytic displacements.

Table 3: The Three Syntheses of the Unconscious

	Connective Syntheses	**Disjunctive syntheses**	**Conjunctive syntheses**
They involve:	partial objects coupled with flows	Singularities and chains on the BwO	intensities and becomings on a field of immanence
Machinery:	the working parts	the immobile motor	the adjacent part
They produce:	production	recording	consumption, consummation
They mobilize:	Libido as productive or withdrawal energy	Numen as recording or detachment energy	Voluptas as residual energy of consummation
Logical and Linguistic elements:	assembling logic of " *and ... and then ...*"	separative syllogism of "*Either ... or ...*" Ex.: "*I am God I was not God I am a clown of God*" (Nijinski)	instant identity effect of "*So it's ...!*" Ex.: "*every name in history is I*" (Nietzsche)
Schizoanalytic legitimate use:	partial and nonspecific use	affirmative, nonrestrictive and inclusive use	nomadic and polyvocal use
Psychoanalytic illegitimate uses (Oedipal):	global and specific uses (parental / conjugal)	restrictive or exclusive uses (imaginary / symbolic)	segrative, personal and biunivocal uses (racist, nationalistic, religious / familial)
Psychoanalytic distortion:	*id*	*superego*	*ego*

	Connective Syntheses	**Disjunctive syntheses**	**Conjunctive syntheses**
Psychoanalytic paralogisms:	illusion of extrapolation (despotic signifier, lack, the Law; everything turns around the phallus, the same oedipal myth and the same despotic signifier)	impasse of the double bind: "*But see here God is daddy*" (Numen is confiscated); "*Am I a parent or a child?*" (phobic); "*Am I a man or a woman?*" (hysteric); "*Am I dead or alive?*" (obsessed)	reduction of the unconscious and its social investment to "eternal daddy-mommy", to the oedipal discovery of "*So it's my father, my mother*"

The BwO is not a divine substance, but "the energy that sweeps it is divine" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 13). This divine energy is Numen as the energy of recording deriving from Libido leading to Voluptas. Numen and Voluptas as the transformations of libidinal energy should never be understood as "desexualizations or sublimations" (291) but as non-anthropomorphic (e.g., *Homo natura*) and socio-political (e.g., *Homo historia*) investments of libido in molecular and unconscious ways and with miraculous and divinatory effects and hallucinations (not to be confused with illusions). All three syntheses present an impersonal and molecular outlook on sexuality, desire and the unconscious:

> Sexuality is no longer regarded as a specific energy that unites persons derived from the large aggregates, but as the molecular energy that places molecules-partial objects (libido) in connection, that organizes inclusive disjunctions on the giant molecule of the body without organs (numen), and that distributes states of being and becoming according to domains of presence or zones of intensity (voluptas). For desiring-machines are precisely that: the microphysics of the unconscious, the elements of the microunconscious. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 183)

To illustrate the syntheses of the unconscious as impersonal and molecular outlooks, Deleuze & Guattari's innovative treatment of Nietzsche and his delirium can be cited as follows:

> There is no Nietzsche-the-self, professor of philology, who suddenly loses his mind and supposedly identifies with all sorts of strange people; rather, there is the Nietzschean subject who passes through a series of states, and who identifies these states with the names of history: "*every name in history is I.*

..." The subject spreads itself out along the entire circumference of the circle, the center of which has been abandoned by the ego. At the center is the desiring-machine, the celibate machine of the Eternal Return. A residual subject of the machine, Nietzsche-as-subject garners a euphoric reward (Voluptas) from everything that this machine turns out, a product that the reader had thought to be no more than the fragmented *oeuvre* by Nietzsche. […] It is not a matter of identifying with various historical personages, but rather identifying the names of history with zones of intensity on the body without organs; and each time Nietzsche-as-subject exclaims: "They're *me*! So it's *me*!" No one has ever been as deeply involved in history as the schizo, or dealt with it in this way. He consumes all of universal history in one fell swoop. We began by defining him as *Homo natura*, and lo and behold, he has turned out to be *Homo historia*. This long road that leads from the one to the other stretches from Hölderlin to Nietzsche, and the pace becomes faster and faster. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 21)

CHAPTER 3

GEOSTYLE: AN ETHICO-AESTHETIC PLANE

> But if there's a whole ethics in this, there's an aesthetics too. Style, in a great writer, is always a style of life too, not anything at all personal, but inventing a possibility of life, a way of existing. (Deleuze 1995: 100)

3.1. Philosophy, Science and Art on the Witch's Broom

For Deleuze & Guattari, philosophy, science and art are three forms of thought that function to liberate thought and life from their constraints, to enable thinking the "unthought" and to invent new possibilities for living and thinking. In most of his works on philosophy, Deleuze uses both works of literature and scientific figures as great resources for his empirical thought. He further defines his empiricism as a form of science-fiction, and uses a highly literary style throughout his works. However, he never attempts to blur the distinction between philosophy, science and art. These three disciplines, for Deleuze, intersect and can be interwoven together. Yet they should remain distinctive without being synthesized as Deleuze indicates, "philosophy, art, and science come into relations of mutual resonance and exchange, but always for internal reasons" (Deleuze 1995: 125).

All three disciplines have their own marks of distinction even when relating the same phenomena interactively: "The way they impinge on one another depends on their own evolution" (125). In their specific routes, philosophy produces concepts, science extracts functions, and art creates sensations that consist of "affects" and "percepts". Therefore Deleuze is still doing philosophy even when he is reading Proust, Carroll, Melville, Lawrence, Dickens, Beckett, Kafka, and so on. He reads works of literature mainly for insights into his concepts to be either newly developed or reinforced with a constructive variation. Works of literature serve Deleuze more than supportive secondary thoughts. Deleuze notes in a similar way that an author should create affects and percepts through landscapes, figures and characters when he or she is producing a work of art, even when he or she is dealing with a philosophical or a scientific matter in a work of art.

It is also a fact that some exceptionally talented authors have produced nonfictional works in other disciplines, works which deal not with affects and percepts but with pure concepts and functions. D. H. Lawrence and Lewis Carroll can be given as two examples of such talented authors. Deleuze holds Lawrence's anti-oedipal work *Fantasia of the Unconscious* more valuable than what Freud has written about the unconscious. Similarly, Carroll's *The Game of Logic* is primarily a serious work on logic as a branch of philosophy. Yet, Deleuze regards Lewis Carroll as a foremost logician even in his fiction which is generally classified as Victorian nonsense. Carroll is a logician of the positive unconscious who carries the three syntheses of desire into the most molecular level of language, into the smallest meaningful element of it, that is, the morpheme. At this molecular level, he discovers the affective use of words in a domain of nonsense beyond the chain of signification. Carroll manages this by putting life and death into conversation in the opposition between Alice and Humpty Dumpty, between a fragmented little girl who loses her proper name and a body without organs as a fallen egg-shaped molecule. With his mastery over words, Humpty Dumpty reveals how devoid of sense words are without affect, and what desire is capable of doing with them: "They've a temper, some of them—particularly verbs: they're the proudest— adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That's what I say!" (Carroll 1994b: 101).

Both Lawrence and Carroll mediate between different disciplines with their novels and nonfictional works. Lawrence mediates between the unconscious and the novel, and Carroll mediates between logic, language and literature.

Deleuze refers to constant interaction between the three disciplines as mediation. He gives Resnais's film *Je t'aime, je t'aime* as an example of mediating the function called the "baker's transformation" in Prigogine's probabilistic physics (Deleuze 1995: 124). Baker's transformation, similar to a baker's kneading of dough, consists of stretching a square into a rectangle first and then cutting the rectangle into two equal halves and finally joining both pieces side by side to form a new square. The whole process can be repeated any number of times ending up with different fragmentations each time.[19]

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[19] Baker's transformation can be illustrated in a diagram as follows:

Deleuze argues that Resnais uses in his film *Je t'aime, je t'aime* a similar device, a machine, that "stirs up and fragments sheets of past in which the character is totally caught up and relives" (Deleuze 2005: 122). This takes place not in the form of flashbacks but irrational cuts in which the character is sent back to a moment of his past through a "return to the same image, but caught up in a new series" (214). Deleuze deals with Resnais's films in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985) with more detail. Resnais mediates not only between cinema and science but also cinema and philosophy by inventing "a cinema of philosophy" with his philospher characters who return from the land of the dead and relive, or "beings who have passed through a death, who are born from it, and go towards, another death, perhaps the same one" (208). Similarly Deleuze can be argued to have invented a philosophy of cinema with his two books on both classical cinema and its "movement-image", and modern cinema and its "time-image".

For Deleuze & Guattari philosophy, art and science share the same empirical goals: to explain, to experiment and to create. Explanation is used to demystify abstractions, overturn all categories of representation, dispute traditional images of thought, and break up unities. It makes void to experiment with and to create new possibilities of life and thought. Thinking is always experimenting, and experimenting is the sole condition for creating (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 111, 128). Deleuze refers to this creativity of thought in the three disciplines as "fabulation" after Bergson, the inventing of a new people that is always missing as a form of minority discourse. Deleuze uses the terms "fabulation", "legending", and "falsification" in the same sense as the common force in all disciplines:

> This idea that truth isn't something already out there we have to discover, but has to be created in every domain, is obvious in the sciences, for instance. Even in physics, there's no truth that doesn't presuppose a system of symbols, be they only coordinates. There's no truth that doesn't "falsify" established ideas. (Deleuze 1995: 126)

Besides the common goals of explaining, experimenting and creating, philosophy, science and art share some immanent and parallel features in Deleuze & Guattari's thought. The parallelism they draw between philosophy, science and art is a notable illustration and a consequential aspect of Deleuze's Spinozism which has been dealt with in the previous chapter.

The parallelism between the three disciplines consists in the triad of *diagrammatic*, *personalized*, and *intensive* features that are not derived from, but correspond with each other. They respectively call for *laying out*, *inventing* and *creating*, that is, laying out a plane, inventing personae, and carrying out the creation proper to the discipline in question. In each discipline, a plane is needed to be laid out first. Personalized inventions take effect on that plane, and they are needed for creating intensive features on the plane. All three features have distinctive properties depending on the discipline they belong to. Philosophy lays out a plane of immanence or consistency, invents conceptual personae of different types, and creates concepts. Science, on the other hand, lays out a plane of reference or coordination, invents partial observers, and creates functions or extracts propositional prospects. As for art, it lays out a plane of consistency, invents aesthetic figures or characters in the case of the novel, and creates composite sensations made up of affects and percepts. The three disciplines and their distinctive features are outlined in Table 4 below.

Table 4: The Three Disciplines and Their Distinctive Features

	Diagrammatic: *lays out,*	**Personalized:** *invents*,	**Intensive:** *creates*,
Philosophy	the plane of consistency or immanence	conceptual personae	concepts
Science	the plane of reference or coordination	partial observers	functions or propositional prospects
Art	the plane of composition	aesthetic figures	composite sensations (affects and percepts)

Thought, in all its three forms, cannot remain within the boundaries of a representational and orderly world. It has to confront chaos or the infinite. In this confrontation, thought needs the plane to be cast over chaos, and this involves an act of

violence against chaos. Thought cuts through chaos in different ways in its three forms, and it proceeds "by crises and shocks" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 203). Each discipline has its own perspective of the plane in its confrontation with chaos or the infinite. Philosophy lays out its plane of immanence "to save the infinite by giving it consistency". Science, with its plane of reference, "relinquishes the infinite in order to gain reference". Finally, art lays out its plane of composition "to create the finite that restores the infinite" (197). Although sense-stimuli are privileged creations of art, personalised inventions of philosophy and science bring about sensibilia of concepts in philosophy and sensibilia of functions in science. Therefore personalised inventions bring other disciplines into close contact with art in their specific creations. In this way, a philosopher is still creating concepts, but this time, the concept of an affect. A scientist, similarly, can be said to be creating functions of an affect. When artists, on the other hand, deal with concepts of philosophy or functions of science in their work of art, they might change or mix planes, but they still create affects: affects of philosophical concepts on the plane of immanence or affects of scientific functions on the plane of reference.

Partial mixing of planes is more common between philosophy and art. The plane of immanence of philosophy slides into the plane of composition of art in such a way "that parts of one may be occupied by entities of the other" (66). Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an example of a conceptual persona carried onto a plane of composition of art, and Mallarme's Igutur in his short prose with the same title, an aesthetic figure transported onto the plane of immanence of philosophy. Deleuze & Guattari mention, besides Mallarme, Hölderlin, Kleist, Artaud, Rimbaud, Michaux, Kafka, Pessoa, "and many English and American writers from Melville to Lawrence to Miller" among the authors who have used the plane of immanence of philosophy successfully in addition to the plane of composition of art. They claim that the above writers "have written the novel of Spinozism" without ever synthesizing philosophy and art (67). According to Deleuze, Spinoza has a special power of attraction in his thought which encompasses the highest speed and the widest range of encounters. Most children, all schizophrenics, all ethologists, many Anglo-American novelists are Spinozists. Deleuze (1988b: 126) indicates that, Nietzsche, Lawrence, Kafka and Artaud "are four great disciples" of

Spinoza. It is also worth noting that Spinoza's *Ethics* was first translated into English by George Eliot (Wikipedia). What brings them to Spinoza, in Nietzsche's words, is "the guidance of instinct" as it is the case with Nietzsche himself (quotes Deleuze 1988b: 129). For Deleuze, Spinoza is "the most philosophic of philosophers" or "the 'prince' of philosophers", especially for instructing "the philosopher how to become a nonphilosopher" (130). Spinoza's idea of parallelisms brings together both philosophy and nonphilosophy, mind and body, God and nature, nature and man, man and child, thought and life, life(style) and (writing) style, concept and affect, concept and percept, truth and artifice, rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious, and so on, on a single plane.

For Deleuze & Guattari, the human brain attains its nonhuman force with the three disciplines at their limit, so that the impersonal brain takes the place of a subject, and "man" becomes one of its objects:

> It is the brain that thinks and not man—the latter being only a cerebral crystallization. We will speak of the brain as Cézanne spoke of the landscape: man absent from, but completely within the brain. Philosophy, art, and science are not the mental objects of an objectified brain but the three aspects under which the brain becomes subject, Thought-brain. They are the three planes, the rafts on which the brain plunges into and confronts the chaos. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 210).

In its confrontation with the chaos, the impersonal brain as subject becomes a "*superject*" that supersedes chaos in philosophy, an "*eject*" that dispels chaos in science, and an "*inject*" that forces or tears open the canvas onto chaos in art. Deleuze & Guattari call this modus operandi of the nonhuman in philosophy as a "groping experimentation" with "measures that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable" (40). They continue:

> These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess. We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind. Even Descartes had his dream. To think is always to follow the witch's flight. […] [O]ne does not think without becoming something else, something that does not think—an animal, a molecule, a particle—and that comes back to thought and revives it. (40-41)

Deleuze & Guattari allude to Melville with the idea of returning from the horizon "with bloodshot eyes" as Deleuze later quotes from Melville that, "Thought divers … have been diving and coming up again with bloodshot eyes since the world began" (quotes Deleuze 1995: 102). This also explains why Melville is interested in Whales which dive deeper than any other fish, as he writes again in one of his letters that, "Any fish can swim near the surface, but it takes a great whale to go down stairs five miles or more" (102). But Deleuze is not a thinker of depths, and he does not like any vertical movements or any vertical structures like walls and trees with roots. He is a thinker of surfaces and horizontal lines. He prefers the dessert and rhizomes that grow horizontally spreading all over the surface. Therefore Melville's images of diving and depth become converted into flight and the horizon. Verticality and arborescence always lead to transcendence, for Deleuze; and dessert, horizon and rhizome stand for immanence.

Not only philosophers, but also artists and novelists are "thought divers" in Melville's words; they dive into the chaos, the river Acheron which leads to Hades. Their bloodshot eyes are the evidence of their having been back from the land of the dead. They pass through an intensity which "controls within its own limits the experience of death and envelops it" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 330). This intensity might even cause deliriums, hallucinations and frail health in some great thinkers and writers:

> The artist or philosopher often has slender, frail health, a weak constitution, a shaky hold on things: look at Spinoza, Nietzsche, Lawrence. Yet it's not death that breaks them, but seeing, experiencing, thinking too much life. Life overwhelms them. (Deleuze 1995: 143)
> It may be that the writer has delicate health, a weak constitution. He […] is only too weak for the life which runs in him or for the affects which pass in him. To write has no other function: to be a flux which combines with other fluxes—all the minority-becomings of the world. A flux is something intensive, instantaneous and mutant—between a creation and a destruction. (Deleuze 1987: 50)

Deleuze praises authors such as Hölderlin, Fitzgerald, Kerouac and Kleist; but he recognises their respective madness, alcoholism, drug-use and suicide pact as failures. What is important, for Deleuze, is not that they pass beyond those destructive boundaries but that they make creative and vital use of them even if things end up badly

for those writers and for many others. There are also some delicacies of health which inflict an author. Deleuze calls then the "charms" of life. For him, the charm in life is comparable to the style in writing: "Charm is the source of life just as style is the source of writing" (Deleuze 1987: 5). Life is a combination of so many unique chances in the same way that writing is the composition of so many singularities that create becomings. In that combination and composition, both life and writing should be thought as something non-personal with no personal ends:

> It is strange how great thinkers have a fragile personal life, an uncertain health, at the same time as they carry life to the state of absolute power or of 'Great Health'. These are not people, but the figure of their own combination. […] Charm gives life a non-personal power, above individuals; at the same time, style gives writing an external end [*fin*] - which goes beyond what is written. And this is the same thing: writing does not have its end in itself precisely because life is not something personal. The only aim [*fin*] of writing is life, through the combinations which it draws. This is the opposite of 'neurosis', in which life is constantly mutilated, debased, personalized, mortified, and in which writing takes itself as its own end. (5-6)

These combinations which constitute a life are called assemblages. When Deleuze & Guattari seem to praise psychosis and, on the contrary, when they openly criticise neurosis and other destructive forces, their only criterion is the subtle link between life and writing as described in the above quotation in non-personal terms and ends. Deleuze states it more clearly as follows:

> We are trying to extract from madness the life which it contains, while hating the lunatics who constantly kill life, turn it against itself. We are trying to extract from alcohol the life which it contains, without drinking: the great scene of drunkenness on pure water in Henry Miller. Becoming is loving without alcohol, drugs and madness, becoming-sober for a life which is richer and richer. This is sympathy, assembling. Making one's bed, the opposite of making a career, being neither simulator of identifications nor the frigid doctor of distances. You will get into your bed as you made it, no one will come to tuck you in. Too many people want to be tucked in by a huge identifying mother, or by the social medical officer of distances. (52-3)

In the same way that Miller becomes drunk on pure water, great novelists become psychotics, schizophrenics, or they create most insane becomings without really being so. All these are meant to extract from them the life they contain, to discover new possibilities of life and to effectuate the unconscious desiring-production which is

neither symbolic nor imaginary but real. When Deleuze & Guattari are criticized for overquoting works of literature, their response reopens the notions of literariness and ideology in literature for new discussions from the point of view of the category of the real and the machinic, and literature as assemblage:

> We have been criticized for overquoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work. Kleist and a mad war machine. Kafka and a most extraordinary bureaucratic machine ... (What if one became animal or plant *through* literature, which certainly does not mean literarily? Is it not first through the voice that one becomes animal?) Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been. All we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and selection, the plane of consistency, and in each case the units of measure. *Stratometers*, *deleometers*, *BwO units of density*, *BwO units of convergence*: Not only do these constitute a quantification of writing, but they define writing as always the measure of something else. Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 4-5).

"Stratoanalysis" is an alternative term for Deleuze & Guattari's geophilosopy or schizoanalysis. The strata refer primarily to geological "accumulations, coagulations, sedimentations, foldings", but they also have a social use and a general use with any structure. Deleuze & Guattari define the strata as the "phenomena of thickening on the Body of the earth, simultaneously molecular and molar" (502). They analyse and develop parallelisms between three major strata, "physicochemical, organic, and anthropomorphic", which apply respectively to matter, life and humanity. All strata or stratifications consist of imposing forms on matter, life and humanity, of organizing, classifying and hierarchising them. When one constitutes a Body without Organs, there remains no distinction between matter, life and humanity on it; they become indiscernible on the Body without Organs. Hence the Body without Organs is susceptible to stratifications:

> The BwO howls: "They've made me an organism! They've wrongfully folded me! They've stolen my body!" The judgment of God uproots it from its immanence and makes it an organism, a signification, a subject. It is the BwO that is stratified. It swings between two poles, the surfaces of stratification into which it is recoiled, on which it submits to the judgment, and the plane of

consistency in which it unfurls and opens to experimentation. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 159)

When one makes himself or herself a Body without Organs, it becomes a field of combat between the immanent forces of a plane which tries to save it by "dismantling and cutting across all the strata" and the transcendent powers of stratification which try to seize and imprison it in the tripartite strata of "the organism", "signifiance," and "subjectification". Deleuze & Guattari make the intimidating judgement of stratification resound as follows: [20]

> You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body—otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted—otherwise you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement—otherwise you're just a tramp. (159)

The world is stratified and continuously undergoes stratification through the organization of "forms and substances, codes and milieus, and rhythms"; the whole process "is like the creation of the world from chaos" (502). Yet, chaos is retained on the plane of consistency, that is, outside the strata in its three major forms. There is always "submolecular" or "unformed" matter in all matter, "unorganic" life in all life, and "nonhuman becomings" in all humanity: "How could unformed matter, unorganic life, nonhuman becoming be anything but chaos pure and simple?" (503). Deleuze & Guattari favour chaos against all the strata. But, in the case of human beings, they have a word of warning that plunging oneself into chaos head first may turn out more dangerous than the strata, and should be done according to "concrete rules of extreme caution":

> [A] too-sudden destratification may be suicidal, or turn cancerous. In other words, it will sometimes end in chaos, the void and destruction, and sometimes lock us back into the strata, which become more rigid still, losing their degrees of diversity, differentiation, and mobility. (503)

The question of destratification is at the same time the question of making oneself a full Body without Organs as opposed to suicidal empty BwO's (e.g. self destructive mental disorders that need hospitalisation) in total chaos, and cancerous BwO's (e.g.

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[20] The previous chapter deals with the stratum of organisation, and the strata of signifiance and subjectification will be dealt with in the following chapter.

fascism or the fascist inside each of us) on an even more rigid strata. To dismantle the strata without leading into a self-destruction or the destruction of others, one needs to locate himself or herself on the strata first with little or enough supplies of organism, signifiance and subjectivity. Three rules to attain a full BwO are making oneself a space on the strata, laying out a plane of immanence and searching for possible collective opportunities. Deleuze & Guattari explain these three rules as follows:

> We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines. … For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all of these; for it is not "my" body without organs, instead the "me" (*moi*) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 161)

In this passage we have all three syntheses of the unconscious which were examined in the previous chapter: "connection of desires" (connective syntheses), "conjunction of flows" (conjunctive syntheses) and "continuum of intensities" (disjunctive syntheses or rather symbioses between different species).

Assemblages have two different aspects. Their first aspect pertains to territory, and for that reason, it pertains to strata. On this territorial aspect, assemblages have a double articulation; they are articulated twice, or divided into two, as content (face-hand) and expression (gesture-word). Content unfolds into a pragmatic system and expression unfolds into a semiotic system (regimes of signs). Depending on what systems it unfolds into, double articulation might free an assemblage from the strata. The second aspect of assemblages consists of lines of deterritorialization. These lines cut through assemblages, carry them off or extend their territoriality into other domains that can be eccentric, cosmic, chaotic, immemorial or "yet to come" (505). There remains no self to act as a subject on the deterritorialised lines of the BwO; one becomes part of a collective whole or the crowd: "a whole mob inside you in pursuit of what, a witch's wind?" (Deleuze 1987: 76)

3.2. Art as an Assemblage: Classical, Romantic and Modern Refrains

Deleuze & Guattari account for the history and evolution of anything with assemblages and becomings, and with the series that proceed (not progress) from chaos to milieus and rhythms, to territories, and to lines of deterritorialisation. Milieus and rhythms come out of chaos, but they are more related to chaos than to territories: "Rhythm is milieus' answer to chaos. […] Chaos is not the opposite of rhythm, but the milieu of all milieus" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 313). Milieus are "directional components" and "ecstasies" of a chaos. They become territories or are territorialized when they "cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become expressive" (315). A living thing has four milieus as exterior (medium), interior (body or shelter), intermediary and annexed (the BwO and the plane of consistency): "an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions" (313). Deleuze & Guattari give the example of colour (intermediary milieu) in birds with both functional and expressive traits. A bird's colour is the function of a milieu "as long as it is tied to a type of action (sexuality, aggressiveness, flight)". But it becomes a territorial expression "when it acquires a temporal constancy and a spatial range" (315). Deleuze & Guattari add: "The same species of birds may have colored and uncolored representatives; the colored birds have a territory, whereas the all-white ones are gregarious" (315). Similarly when meter or cadence is introduced into rhythm, the latter becomes territorial and expressive (313-4). Although the "marking of a territory is dimensional", Deleuze & Guattari consider it not as a meter but as a rhythm since it involves not coding but transcoding which "is not a simple addition, but the constitution of a new plane, […] [a] melodic or rhythmic plane, surplus value of passage or bridging" (314). The fly code in the spider's web illustrates transcoding best: "there are sequences of the fly's own code in the spider's code; it is as though the spider had a fly in its head, a fly 'motif,' a fly 'refrain'" (314).

In the animal world, expressive territorial marks or signatures are not only visual (e.g., colours in birds) but also olfactory (e.g., odorous excrement in rabbits, urine in

other animals) and sonorous (e.g. bird songs). In the world of humanity, they are mainly visual (e.g., painting or flags) and sonorous (e.g., music or anthems). The sonorous has incomparable priority over the visual in both its deterritorializing power ("ecstasy") and territorial potentials ("hypnosis"): "Flags can do nothing without trumpets. Lasers are modulated on sound" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 348). Hence Deleuze & Guattari build their aesthetic concept of "the Refrain (ritornello)" on sonority, and account for the history and evolution of art, or rather its becoming and assemblages, in terms of the refrain.

The refrain is primarily a milieu's response to chaos like a frightened child in the dark who takes refuge in singing. For the child, the song becomes a comforting and calming point of support "in the heart of chaos". Secondly, the refrain serves to secure "the germinal forces" of a mission to be fulfilled in an interior space against "the forces of chaos". For instance, a housewife sings or listens to music or to the radio in order to keep chaos outside while she is doing her work. "Radios and television sets", Deleuze & Guattari indicate, "are like sound walls around every household and mark territories (the neighbor complains when it gets too loud)" (311). Finally, the refrain, while closing a territory to the forces of chaos, opens it on another side in order to invite the cosmic forces of the outside, "in order to join with the forces of the future" (311). This is like giving a break while working and inviting a friend for a coffee. Deleuze & Guattari point to these three aspects of the refrain which are three simultaneous or mixed responses to chaos as follows:

> Sometimes chaos is an immense black hole in which one endeavors to fix a fragile point as a center. Sometimes one organizes around that point a calm and stable "pace" (rather than a form): the black hole has become a home. Sometimes one grafts onto that pace a breakaway from the black hole. (312)

The Swiss painter Paul Klee (1879-1940) whom Deleuze & Guattari consider as "the most musicianly of painters" (303) combines all three aspects of the refrain in his concept of art. Becoming-child of art, becoming-sonorous of colour and visuality and the "cosmic 'breakaway'" are some important characteristics of Paul Klee's painting which illustrates the latest assemblage and the cosmic age in art, that is, "modernism" after "classicism" and "romanticism".

To begin with classicism in art, it is defined with the relation of form and matter or form and substance. The classical artist imposes forms on the forces of chaos and on the raw matter which is more related to chaos. His or her shelter is the milieus from where he or she organises, substantialises and codifies chaos and matter. The classical artist's only slogan is "Creation!". His or her method of creation is based on the binary rhythms and voices of "one-two", "man-woman", "the piano and the violin", and so on. In *Swann's Way*, Proust illustrates poetically the beginning of art as the binary aspect of the bird refrain and the artist as creator:

> At first the piano complained alone, like a bird deserted by its mate; the violin heard and answered it, as from a neighboring tree. It was as at the beginning of the world, as if there were as yet only the two of them on earth, or rather in this world closed to all the rest, fashioned by the logic of a creator, in which there would never be more than the two of them: this sonata. (Quote Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 338)[21]

The sonata Proust writes about in the above passage from *Swann's Way* is the one Swann associates with his love for Odette. It has a territorializing effect on Swann, and Odette uses this power whenever her infidelities and self-interest weakens Swann's love for her. The sonata awaits the narrator who is on a different plane than swan to attain its non-territorial power.

In Romanticism, the relation of matter and form changes in the direction of an assemblage that is no longer chaotic but terrestrial. Matter becomes mobile and expressive in a "continuous variation". And form becomes force "in continuous development, a gathering of the forces of the earth taking all the parts up into a sheaf". The bird refrain of classicism is reduced to a melody, and we have the earth refrain in its place. The earth, as the sum of all its forces, becomes a rhythmic and sonorous refrain. The romantic artist is no longer after creation but a lost territory secluded with the earth refrain: "The territory is haunted by a solitary voice; the voice of the earth resonates with it and provides it percussion rather than answering it". The slogan of the romantic artist is "Foundation". What his or her territory lacks is "a people"; "it half opens onto the Friend, the Loved One; but the Loved One is already dead, and the Friend uncertain, disturbing" (340). The German song "lied" summarizes the relationship between the

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[21] Proust 2006a: 336.

romantic artist and his or her territory for Deleuze & Guattari: "the One-Alone of the soul and the One-All of the earth". Similarly, the romantic hero is far from being "a hero of the people". He is a "mythic" hero and "a hero of the earth" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 340). When romanticism has its "hero of the people", his or her sound is subjected to an orchestration as "the One-Crowd" (e.g., the nation) instead of "the One-All" (the earth).[22] Hence "the One-Crowd" becomes the third characteristic of the relationship between the artist and territory in romanticism: "nationalism is everywhere in the figures of romanticism, sometimes as the driving force, sometimes as a black hole (fascism used Verdi much less than nazism did Wagner)" (341). "The One-All" and "the One-Crowd" are at the same time two different concepts of orchestration in romanticism. The former gives voice to "the forces of the earth", and the latter, to "the forces of the people" (341).

Finally, modernism is the age of the cosmic refrain best represented theorized by Paul Klee. Deleuze & Guattari recapitulate how modernism contrasts with classicism and romanticism as follows:

> The assemblage no longer confronts the forces of chaos [classicism], it no longer uses the forces of the earth or the people to deepen itself [romanticism] but instead opens onto the forces of the Cosmos [modernism]. […] The essential relation is no longer matters-forms (or substances-attributes); neither is it the continuous development of form and the continuous variation of matter. It is now a direct relation *material-forces*. A material is a molecularized matter, which must accordingly "harness" forces; these forces are necessarily forces of the Cosmos. There is no longer a matter that finds its corresponding principle of intelligibility in form. It is now a question of elaborating a material charged with harnessing forces of a different order: the visual material must capture nonvisible forces. Render visible, Klee said; not render or reproduce the visible. (342)

The contrast between foundational and terrestrial romantic art and cosmic modern art is also present between the philosophical movements in corresponding periods:

> [W]hereas romantic philosophy still appealed to a formal synthetic identity ensuring a continuous intelligibility of matter (a priori synthesis), modern philosophy tends to elaborate a material of thought in order to capture forces

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[22] Deleuze & Guattari indicate "The romantic hero, the voice of the romantic hero, acts as a subject, a subjectified individual with "feelings"; but this subjective vocal element is reflected in an orchestral and instrumental whole that on the contrary mobilizes nonsubjective "affects" and that reaches its height in romanticism." (1996a: 341).

that are not thinkable in themselves. This is Cosmos philosophy, after the manner of Nietzsche. The molecular material has even become so deterritorialized that we can no longer even speak of matters of expression, as we did in romantic territoriality. *Matters of expression are superseded by a material of capture.* The forces to be captured are no longer those of the earth, which still constitute a great expressive Form, but the forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and energetic Cosmos. […] The synthesizer, with its operation of consistency, has taken the place of the ground in a priori synthetic judgment: its synthesis is of the molecular and the cosmic, material and force [modern philosophy], not form and matter [classical philosophy], *Grund* and territory [romantic philosophy]. Philosophy is no longer synthetic judgment; it is like a thought synthesizer functioning to make thought travel, make it mobile, make it a force of the Cosmos (in the same way as one makes sound travel). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 342-3)

The synthesis in both modern philosophy and art is between molecular material and cosmic force: "When forces become necessarily cosmic, material becomes necessarily molecular, with enormous force operating in an infinitesimal space" (343). Hence modernism has two different refrains: "the cosmic refrain" of forces are accompanied and mobilized by "the molecularized refrains" of material as "combinations of water, wind, clouds, and fog" (347, 327). Modern artist as a synthesizer is more like an artisan, "the cosmic artisan" who synthesizes all kinds of "disparate elements" through becomings-molecular including becoming-mad and becoming-child. The whole imagination of an artisan consists of and is engendered by his or her technique with the sole aim of rendering visible the nonvisible cosmic forces. The artist's only concern now is "to consolidate the material, make it consistent, so that it can harness unthinkable, invisible, nonsonorous forces" (343). The consistency of the material summons all heterogeneous and unalike elements on a cosmic plane. For Deleuze & Guattari, the "cosmic 'breakaway'" and artisanship are best presented by Paul Klee who writes with a Spinozean and Nietzschean spirit "earthly things interest me less than cosmic things":[23]

> Klee says that one "tries convulsively to fly from the earth," and that one "rises above it ... powered by centrifugal forces that triumph over gravity." He adds that the artist begins by looking around him- or herself, into all the milieus, but does so in order to grasp the trace of creation in the created, of

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[23] Quoted by Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 342). Deleuze & Guattari quote Klee from his *On Modern Art* (London: Faber, 1966) also in the following passage.

naturing nature in natured nature; then, adopting "an earthbound position," the artist turns his or her attention to the microscopic, to crystals, molecules, atoms, and particles, not for scientific conformity, but for movement, for nothing but immanent movement; the artist tells him- or herself that this world has had different aspects, will have still others, and that there are already others on other planets; finally, the artist opens up to the Cosmos in order to harness forces in a "work" (without which the opening onto the Cosmos would only be a reverie incapable of enlarging the limits of the earth); this work requires very simple, pure, almost childish means, but also the forces of a *people*, which is what is still lacking. "We still lack the ultimate force. ... We seek a people. We began over there in the Bauhaus.[24] ... More we cannot do." (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 337-8)

The people modern art seeks are not the molar people of the romantic popular refrain, but "a molecular population, a people of oscillators as so many forces of interaction" (345). As for the modern artist who seeks a people, he or she is not in a populist refrain, but invokes the creation of a people to come. This is, for Deleuze & Guattari, the common pursuit in both modern art and philosophy:

Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking as the correlate of creation. It is not populist writers but the most aristocratic who lay claim to this future. This people and earth will not be found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 108)

What makes a writer aristocratic, firstly, is not his or her line of descent and the strata but his or her lines of flight, dignity of style and becoming. Secondly, in a more general sense, if anyone is capable of fleeing all kinds of majoritarian traps of opinion ("doxa") and cynical forms of communication ("orthodoxy"), he or she is aristocratic (as the opposite of democratic majority): "every noble soul flees and crawls far away whenever a little discussion, a colloquium, or a simple conversation is suggested" (145). Deleuze & Guattari find the essence of most discussions in these two exemplary statements of opinions: "as a man, I consider all women to be unfaithful"; "as a woman, I think men are liars" (145). Finally, being aristocratic of a writer is also related to his or her genius:

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[24] Bauhaus (1919-33) was a major innovative German school of architectural design and applied arts. Paul Klee taught there between 1920 and 1931.

> It should not be said that the genius is an extraordinary person, nor that everybody has genius. The genius is someone who knows how to make everybody/the whole world a becoming (Ulysses, perhaps: Joyce's failed ambition, Pound's near-success). One has entered becomings-animal, becomings-molecular, and finally becomings-imperceptible. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 200)

A noble and aristocratic writer of style and genius cannot resist travelling, leaving the territory and following the lines of flight. And Becket, one of noblest and most aristocratic writers of genius, tells us this is not at all an enjoyable affair: "We don't travel for the fun of it, as far as I know; we're foolish, but not that foolish" (quote Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 199). Such writers of genius and style cannot help becoming-minor, and the people of the future he or she calls for are always of a minor race:

> [T]he race summoned forth by art or philosophy is not the one that claims to be pure but rather an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race […]. Artaud said: to write *for* the illiterate—to speak for the aphasic, to think for the acephalous. But what does "for" mean? It is not "for their benefit," or yet "in their place." It is "before." It is a question of becoming. The thinker is not acephalic, aphasic, or illiterate, but becomes so. He becomes Indian, and never stops becoming so—perhaps "so that" the Indian who is himself Indian becomes something else and tears himself away from his own agony. […] Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. […] A people can only be created in abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more with art or philosophy. But books of philosophy and works of art also contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They have resistance in common—their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame, and to the present. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 109)

The two poles of double becoming go in line with the double refrain of modernism: molecular refrain and cosmic refrain. While the artist becomes molecular, the molecular becomes cosmic. They both constitute an indecomposable crystalline block as in the Mozart refrain: "the becoming-bird of Mozart is inseparable from a becoming-initiate of the bird, and forms a block with it" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 350). Similarly, the Schuman refrain produces molecular assemblages and unleashes them into the cosmos: "In a concerto, Schumann requires all the assemblages of the orchestra to make the cello wander the way a light fades into the distance or is extinguished" (350).

Deterritorializing the refrain is the final outcome of modern music and art alike, but this is not without dangers specific to it:

> Produce a deterritorialized refrain as the final end of music, release it in the Cosmos—that is more important than building a new system. Opening the assemblage onto a cosmic force. In the passage from one to the other, from the assemblage of sounds to the Machine that renders it sonorous, from the becoming-child of the musician to the becoming-cosmic of the child, many dangers crop up: black holes, closures, paralysis of the finger and auditory hallucinations, Schumann's madness, cosmic force gone *bad*, a note that pursues you, a sound that transfixes you. Yet one was already present in the other; the cosmic force was already present in the material, the great refrain in the little refrains, the great maneuver in the little maneuver. Except we can never be sure we will be strong enough, for we have no system, only lines and movements. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 350)

Similarly, double becomings are not devoid of dangers for the writer. Deleuze & Guattari indicate that the suicides of many writers are caused by the becomings they undergo since most becomings, as in becoming-animal, are against nature; they are "unnatural participations", "unnatural nuptials" (240).

Nietzsche's concepts of the Overman and the eternal return anticipate not only Klee's modern art in search for a people but also Kafka's conception of literature as "the affair of the people". The moment the artist attempts to create a people of the future, which amounts to a "*resistance to the present*", a micro-political involvement, he or she finds him- or herself in a situation of a combat with the established powers:

> The established powers have placed us in the situation of a combat at once atomic and cosmic, galactic. Many artists became aware of this situation long ago, even before it had been installed (Nietzsche, for example). They became aware of it because the same vector was traversing their own domain: a molecularization, an atomization of the material, coupled with a cosmicization of the forces taken up by that material. The question then became whether molecular or atomic "populations" of all natures (mass media, monitoring procedures, computers, space weapons) would continue to bombard the existing people in order to train it or control it or annihilate it—or if other molecular populations were possible, could slip into the first and give rise to a people yet to come. (345)

Nietzsche found himself faced with a German when he was expecting a Greek, Klee fled the Nazis, Lawrence combated psychoanalysis and the Holy Family, Kafka bumped into the forces of Americanism, Stalinism, fascism and bureaucracy, and finally

Deleuze & Guattari find themselves in a combat with the Oedipus, capitalism, democracy[25] and Europeanization,[26] in short, the whole of the strata and the stratifications and majoritarianism of all kinds. When one leaves the territory and enters the process of a becoming, a cat, for instance, the first thing he or she hears is the barking of a dog to intimidate and chase him or her back to the former territory. And when Virginia Woolf is in the process of becoming "little fish", the first thing she sees is perhaps the figure of a "giant crab" to stop her: "I found myself walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot. Instantly a man's figure rose to intercept me. […] He was a Beadle; I was a woman. This was the turf; there was the path" (Woolf 1989: 6). In the same way that becomings are double, the fleeing is also double; in fleeing a territory, one has to flee and combat its guardians, and there is nothing personal in this. Deleuze calls attention to the images of combat in the works of literature as follows:

> Hölderlin and the battlefield, Hyperion. Kleist: everywhere in his work is the idea of a war-machine against the apparatuses of the State, but in his own life also is the idea of a war to be waged, which must lead him to suicide. Fitzgerald: 'I had the feeling of standing in the dusk on an abandoned shooting field.'[27] *Criticism and the clinic:* life and work are the same thing, when they have adapted the line of flight which makes them the components of the same war-machine. In these conditions life has for a long time ceased to be personal and the work has ceased to be literary or textual. (Deleuze 1987: 140-1)

The ideas of war and combat in the works of above writers are not metaphors, but belong to the category of the real. For Deleuze, Hölderlin's madness, Kleist's suicide pact and Fitzgerald's alcoholism and self-destruction prove that the lines of flight are not imaginary or symbolic but real. They prove, at the same time, the unity of style in the lives and works of great writers.

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[25] Deleuze & Guattari's criticism of democracy has another aspect as they write that, "democratic States are so bound up with, and compromised by, dictatorial States that the defense of human rights must necessarily take up the internal criticism of every democracy" (1996b: 106).

[26] Deleuze & Guattari write "We lack creation. *We lack resistance to the present.* The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjected peoples" (1996b: 108).

[27] In 'The Crack-Up, Fitzgerald desribes a feeling he experiences at a certain moment of his life as follows: "a feeling that I was standing at twilight on a deserted range, with an empty rifle in my hands and the targets down" (1965: 48).

Writing is also a desire, a refrain (ritornello); and hence, Deleuze argues, it is very simple. Through writing, one either reterritorialises oneself "conforming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of established states of things", or one deterritorialises oneself, "becomes something other than a writer" (Deleuze 1987: 74). On the line of deterritorialisation, not only the writer but also the writing is deterritorialised. It no longer represents anything; nor does it have an end in itself. It is no longer a means to a personal life but has the sole aim of carrying "life to a state of non-personal power" so that "life escapes from the resentment of persons, societies and reigns" (50).

When writing claims no right to a territory, it "weds a war-machine and lines of flight, abandoning the Strata, segmentarities, sedentarity, the State apparatus" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 24). In Deleuze & Guattari's use a war-machine are not built for war but for the establishment of a "smooth space" to occupy, populate and extend on the creative lines of flight. Their concept of "Nomadism" combines both the war-machine and its smooth space. A war-machine, in fact, "tend[s] much more to be revolutionary, or artistic, rather than military" (Deleuze 1995: 33) and opposes itself to the State apparatus:

> The war-machine would have its origin among the nomadic shepherds, against the imperial sedentary peoples; it implies an arithmetical organization in an open space in which men and animals are distributed, as opposed to the geometrical organization of the State which divides out a closed space […] State power does not rest on a war-machine, but on the exercise of binary machines which run through us and the abstract machine which overcodes us: a whole 'police'. The war-machine, on the other hand, is run through with woman-becomings, animal-becomings, the becomings-imperceptible of the warrior […] (Deleuze 1987: 141)

A war-machine takes war as an aim only when the State apparatus wants to take hold of it. But in the end, the State apparatus appropriates it into its own mechanism and uses it (as did Tamburlaine) (142). Under that condition, the nomadic war-machine becomes destructive and its line of flight turns into "a line of abolition, of destruction of others and of itself". For that reason, Deleuze argues, "there is no history from the viewpoint of nomads, although everything passes through them" (142).

3.3. Affects as Nonhuman Encounters of Becoming

Affects, together with concepts and percepts, constitute the three different poles of style in philosophy according to Deleuze. Concepts that call for new ways of thinking are the only philosophical means of understanding. Affects that involve new ways of feeling and percepts that invoke new ways of seeing stand for the other of philosophy as the means of nonphilosophical understanding, and they are indispensable for a sound philosophical understanding. A philosopher needs the whole triad of concepts, affects and percepts "to get things moving" (Deleuze 1995: 165). These three poles of style in philosophy are, in fact, the three components of Spinoza's Ethics which make him "the most philosophical of philosophers […] who more than any other addresses nonphilosophers and calls forth the most intense nonphilosophical understanding" (165).

The only means of "nonphilosophical understanding" is art for Deleuze, and what a work of art preserves is nothing but a block of sensations composed of affects and percepts. Art composes an "image of a Universe" or "the constellation of a universe" through affects and percepts. They are both sole means of thinking in art: "Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 66). Affects and percepts go beyond ordinary affections of a subject and ordinary perceptions of an object. They are preserved in themselves and stand for themselves independently of any persons who go through them:

> Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are *beings* whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 164)

Style is what the artist needs to raise lived affective transformations to the affect, and lived perceptual states to the percept. A writer creates affects and percepts through his or her syntax, a musician, through modes and rhythms, and a painter, through lines

and colours. Deleuze & Guattari put special emphasis on the art of the novel and point to a common misunderstanding about it:

> many people think that novels can be created with our perceptions and affections, our memories and archives, our travels and fantasies, our children and parents, with the interesting characters we have met and, above all, the interesting character who is inevitably oneself (who isn't interesting?), and finally with our opinions holding it all together. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 170)

None of the above is true of the art of the novel for Deleuze & Guattari. The artist, including the novelist, shatters all lived perceptions and affections, and he or she becomes a seer through percepts and experiences becomings through affects. The novelist becomes a shadow in his or her work, and shadows cannot recount what happens to them or what they imagine. The novelist's memories and fantasies leave their place to "creative fabulation" which entails both "the fabrication of giants" out of the lived and the creation of "a people to come" out of the unexposed. Style in a great novelist "is always a question of freeing life wherever it is imprisoned, or of tempting it into an uncertain combat" (171).

To begin with the affect, Deleuze defines it elsewhere not as a feeling but as a compound of "becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming something else)" (Deleuze 1995: 137). He mentions two German writers Heinrich Von Kleist (1777-1811) and Franz Kafka (1883-1924) as the greatest authors who write in affects. Deleuze & Guattari argue that in Kleist love and hate "are no longer feelings but affects". Kleist's "becoming-bear", "the becoming-woman of Achilles and the becoming-dog of Penthesilea" in his play *Penthesilea* are some instances of affects which "trace a dazzling line of flight across forests and states" in Kleist's life and work (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 268). Kafka, one of the first Germans to appreciate Kleist's work after a century, is also an author of "*Gemüt* or nonsubjective affect" after Kleist. Kafka with the becoming-animal in his stories, and the becoming-insect of Gregor Samsa in *Metamorphosis* "kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, no less than all designation" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 22). Metamorphosis takes the place of any forms of allegory in Kafka's work. Kafka's stories and his becomings-animal in them create the affect of the escape or the flight in

itself independently of the feelings of fear and guilt. In fact, Kafka's great success is not his stories of animal-becoming which "oscillate between a schizo escape and an Oedipal impasse" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 15) but his novels of machinic assemblages and creative lines of flight. The minority-machine in Kafka's novels with its assemblages, regimes of signs and lines of flight both anticipate and use the "unknown sounds that come from the near future—Fascism, Stalinism, Americanism, *diabolical powers that are knocking at the door*" (41).

Deleuze & Guattari, in their cooperative work, unfold the Nietzschean cycle of eternal return as the law of becoming or becoming-active. Becoming is always becoming-minoritarian and becoming-molecular and this is the only creative and active movement. There is no becoming majoritarian or becoming molar which are always reactive movements of nihilism, and they lack creativity. Majoritarianism is a static being as a dead end, it is being-Nobody as opposed to the minoritarian process of becoming-Everybody: "There is a majoritarian 'fact' but it is the analytic fact of Nobody, as opposed to the becoming-minoritarian of everybody" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 105). One finds in this formula the self criticism of anthropocentrism, Eurocentrism, phallocentrism, logocentrism, linguistic constants of standard languages, and of any molar centres and arborescent structures. Deleuze & Guattari argue that men are always majority and molar identities: "the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language (Joyce's or Ezra Pound's Ulysses)" (105). Women, as a matter of fact, are always a minority although they outnumber men. But while men have only molar identities, women can both be molar and molecular as it is the case with everything except men. Therefore there is becoming-woman of men, but there is no becoming-man of women, or Deleuze & Guattari do not call it a becoming. A woman should become-woman, that is, she should become a molecular woman in intensity different from her molar identity. She might also become something else, something that is minor to women; a girl, a child, an animal or a plant, for instance. Woolf's writing illustrates woman-becoming of women best as Deleuze indicates that, "Virginia Woolf forbade herself 'to speak like a woman': she harnessed the woman-becoming of writing all the more for this" (Deleuze 1987: 43). This means that Woolf leaves her molar identity behind, and in doing so, she

becomes a molecular woman "capable of crossing and impregnating an entire social field, and of contaminating men, of sweeping them up in that becoming" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 276). Deleuze & Guattari argue that the rise of female writers in the English novel triggered becoming-woman of male writers, of even "the most phallocratic, such as Lawrence and Miller" (276). But the best example of becoming-woman in Literature is Henry James's work for Deleuze & Guattari (290).

In Woolf's interpretation, Coleridge's idea that "a great mind is androgynous" can be considered as becoming-woman in the case of male authors with a "man-womanly" mind. In *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf "amateurishly" draws "a plan of the soul" which comprises both masculine and feminine powers in the brain. In the brain of a man, masculine powers dominate feminine ones; and in the brain of a woman, feminine powers dominate over masculine ones. This plan also suggests Woolf a possibility of peaceful, harmonious and cooperative solution to the conflict of the sexes: "If one is man, still the woman part of the brain must have effect; and a woman also must have intercourse with the man in her" (Woolf 1989: 98). In terms of artistic creativity, Woolf conjectures that "Perhaps a mind that is purely masculine cannot create, any more than a mind that is purely feminine" (98). She also distinguishes between "androgynous", "sexless" and "male" authors and makes the following list:

> Shakespeare was androgynous; and so was Keats and Sterne and Cowper and Lamb and Coleridge. Shelley perhaps was sexless. Milton and Ben Johnson had a dash too much of the male in them. So had Wordsworth and Tolstoi. In our time Proust was wholly androgynous, if not perhaps a little too much of a woman. (103)

With some exceptions, the genre of the novel in general can be said to have close links with becoming-woman of male writers in English literature as Woolf argues that "it was the desire to write about women perhaps that led men by degrees to abandon the poetic drama which, with its violence, could make so little use of them, and to device the novel as a more fitting receptacle" (83). Writing about women is not becoming-woman but sparks it off, it helps male authors to dismantle their phallocentrism and set off to meet their true doubles which is mostly a woman, if not an animal or a child, etc. As for female writers, Woolf's idea of putting the female part of a woman in communication with the male part of her is in no way a be(com)ing-man, be(com)ing-phallocratic,

becoming-majoritarian. Woolf puts special emphasis on the "integrity of a woman novelist" and considers it as a flaw for a woman novelist to alter "her values in deference to the opinion of others" (Woolf 1989: 74). Women should "write as women write, not as men write" (74-5). She praises Jane Austen and Emily Bronte specifically for this reason: "Of all the thousand women who wrote novels then, they alone entirely ignored the perpetual admonitions of the eternal pedagogue—write this, think that" (75). What happens than if a woman gives voice to the male inside her? Deleuze & Guattari would argue she would still become a woman, but a "molecular woman" by silencing the molar and reactive woman inside. What Woolf also likes most in women are three molecular qualities: "unconventionality", "subtlety", "anonymity" (111). Woolf complains about the harsh sex-consciousness of her age: "No age can ever have been stridently sex-conscious as our own" (99). Hence, if a woman gives voice to the male inside, at least she will not do not what men did and will do away with her molar self and sex-consciousness, as Clarissa Dalloway refuses "to say of herself, I am this, I am that" (Woolf, 1992: 9).

For Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 277), becoming-woman is the first in the whole series of becomings and "the key to all the other becomings". It is followed by becoming-child, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, and so on. Finally, there comes becoming-imperceptible. They are not imaginary phantasms; they are lived realities of entering into composition with other forms of affects. Becoming is not imitating, representing, sympathising with, or identifying with what one becomes. In that sense, there is no becoming-woman in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, for Deleuze; it is only a work of hysterical trickery (Deleuze 1987: 43). Becoming is the phenomena of an encounter, a "double capture, of non-parallel evolution, of nuptials between two reigns" (2). It is the movement which undoes the binary machines—man-woman, man-animal, man-nature, etc.—forming a zone of indiscernibility, a block of becoming between the two terms, each forcing the other to their lines of flight. The other steps of becoming that follow becoming-woman are also fulfilled in writing which has no other aim for Deleuze:

> The aim, the finality of writing? Still way beyond a woman-becoming, a Negro-becoming, an animal-becoming, etc., beyond a minority-becoming, there is the

final enterprise of the becoming-imperceptible. Oh no, a writer cannot wish to be 'known', recognized. The imperceptible, common characteristic of the greatest speed and the greatest slowness. (Deleuze 1987: 45)

For Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 243), Melville's *Moby Dick*, is "one of the greatest masterpieces of becoming" with its becoming-whale. Captain Ahab, is already half whale before encountering Moby Dick with a whale's jaw-bone in place of his missing leg, yet he does not want to pair up with any whale but Moby Dick, "the Unique, the Leviathan", the most demonic and monstrous whale in the ocean. And when Ahab finally meets Moby Dick, "he enters in a zone of proximity where he can no longer be distinguished from Moby Dick, and strikes himself in striking the animal" (Deleuze 1998: 78). And while Captain Ahab becomes a whale, the whale becomes something else as it is in all becomings (double becoming). Moby Dick enters in a zone of proximity with a wall. It becomes a white wall. In calling representation and signification a "white wall", as will be discussed in the following chapter, Deleuze is inspired by the following lines from *Moby Dick*:

> How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there's naught beyond. But 'tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. (Melville 1998: 145)

All becomings involve multiplicities. This is more evident in becoming-animal which engages one with "a pack, a band, a population, a peopling" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 239). Yet, for Deleuze & Guattari, some animal-becomings may be negative and end up in an Oedipal way, as in the case of family pets. Some other may end up in racism or in defence of the state as in the case of state animals or the animals that are mythically associated with certain national temperaments, Orwell's *Animal Farm*, for instance. Deleuze & Guattari's favourite animals of becoming are "more demonic animals, pack or affect animals". Yet, it is possible to treat all animals anti-Oedipally as a pack or a demon depending on what affects one establishes with the animal. Deleuze & Guattari's best example of becoming-animal of a "pack mode" in literature is Virginia Woolf's becomings, in which she "experiences herself not as a monkey or a fish but as a troop of monkeys, a school of fish, according to her variable relations of becoming with the people she approaches" (239). The most intensive becomings of

Woolf can be seen in *The Waves* as will be discussed in detail in the sixth chapter. Hermione Lee (1977: 158) mentions Woolf's account of "[t]he life of a woman against the background of flying moths" in Woolf's diary. Hence, one might even speak of Woolf's passing into this background and becoming a cloud of flying moths herself as she writes in her diary, "I shall pass like a cloud on the waves" (Woolf 1987: 140).

Becomings and their lines of flight are productive of life, and they also extend into a social field in the form of political activism. Deleuze argues:

> The great and only error lies in thinking that a line of flight consists in fleeing from life; the flight into the imaginary, or into art. On the contrary, to flee is to produce the real, to create life, to find a weapon. (Deleuze 1987: 49)

Similarly, he considers in puzzlement that,

> People always think of a majoritarian future (when I am grown up, when I have power), whereas the problem is that of a minoritarian-becoming […] in order to invent new forces or new weapons. (5)

Unfortunately, no one is concerned about becoming-minoritarian except great writers. The task of becoming-minoritarian is carried out only by "minor literature" which resolves, at the same time, the question of what defines "popular", "proletariat", and "marginal" in literature. Minor literature has three characteristics for Deleuze & Guattari (1986: 16-9). Firstly, it deterritorialises language with a minor treatment of a major language. Secondly, everything in it is political in that social milieu no longer serves as a background for individual concerns but ties all individuals to itself politically. And finally, everything in it has a collective value with becomings so that, the writers, in their solitariness as outsiders in their community, give voice to a people who cannot voice themselves. Literature encounters its other that is illiterate:

> [W]riting always encounters a minority which does not write, and it does not undertake to write for this minority, in its place or at its bidding, but there is an encounter in which each pushes the other, draws it on to its line of flight in a combined deterritorialization. Writing always combines with something else, which is its own becoming. There is no assemblage which functions on a single flux. This is not a matter of imitation, but of conjunction. The writer is imbued to the core with a non-writer-becoming. (Deleuze 1987: 44)

Becoming makes writing a serious and difficult business for Deleuze since one has to lose his or her face in it. It involves betrayal (which Deleuze praises and contrasts to

the facile and double-dealing treachery he observes in French literature). Because a great writer of becoming betrays writing first by becoming a non-writer, and then his or her own sex, class, race, and so on:

> What other reason is there for writing than to be a traitor to one's own reign, traitor to one's sex, to one's class, to one's majority? And to be traitor to writing. […] Writing has no other end than to lose one's face, to jump over or pierce through the wall, to plane down the wall very patiently. This is what Fitzgerald called a true break: the line of flight, not the voyage into the South Seas, the acquisition of a clan-destiny (even if one has to become animal, to become Negro or woman). To be unknown at last, as are very few people, is to betray. (Deleuze 1987: 44-5)

Deleuze argues that great writers become shadows in writing, and in becoming-shadows, they produce truths and existences, and they "generate real bodies" (1995: 134). Finally, Nietzsche's following remarks prove him to be the greatest betrayer and shadow of all times and summarise what all becomings are about:

> From the sun I learned this: when he goes down, overrich; he pours gold into the sea out of inexhaustible riches, so that even the poorest fisherman still rows with golden oars. […] Like the sun, Zarathustra too wants to go under […] Thus my greatest love of the farthest demands it: *do not spare your neighbour!* Man is something that must be overcome. (Nietzsche 1982b: 310-1)

Nietzsche makes his concept of "*tragic* feeling" the principle of his thought as the realisation of "the eternal joy of becoming" in oneself. He considers Aristotelian catharsis—in Nietzsche's words, purging "of pity and terror" or purifying "oneself of a dangerous affect by its vehement discharge"—a misunderstanding of Greek tragedy (Nietzsche 1976: 562). Contrary to catharsis, Nietzsche proposes that becoming results in "an overflowing feeling of life and strength, where even pain still has the effect of a stimulus" (562), and that the "joy of becoming, beyond all terror and pity […,] include[s] even joy in destroying" (563). Nietzsche conceptualises the tragic feeling in his aesthetics with his Dionysian ideal as an affective type with the strongest instincts for life. Nietzsche's Dionysian artist is frenzied with a frail health like Nietzsche's own. His frenzies, frailty and other weaknesses of health serve to stimulate his vital instincts and his joy of eternal return. The Dionysian type, overcharged with the strongest instincts and affectivity, is a master of metamorphosis and becoming:

In the Dionysian state, […] the whole affective system is excited and enhanced so that it discharges all its means of expression at once and drives forth simultaneously the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and every kind of mimicking and acting. The essential feature here remains the ease of metamorphosis, the inability not to react (similar to certain hysterical types who also, upon any suggestion, enter into any role). It is impossible for the Dionysian type not to understand any suggestion; he does not overlook any sign of an affect; he possesses the instinct of understanding and guessing in the highest degree, just as he commands the art of communication in the highest degree. He enters into any skin, into any affect: he constantly transforms himself. (Nietzsche 1976: 519-20)

Nietzsche defines his Dionysian art as the responsibility "to transform into perfection", that is, the Dionysian artist, "transforms things until they mirror his power—until they are reflections of his perfection" (518). What Nietzsche means by transforming into perfection corresponds with Deleuzian notion of becoming-imperceptible and its relationship to the percept.

3.4. Percepts as Landscapes in the Absence of Human

In every respect, percepts are complementary to affects. They are interrelated: the most intense percepts pass through affects, and similarly, the most powerful affects pass through percepts. Deleuze defines percepts not as ordinary perceptions but as "packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them" (Deleuze 1995: 137). Percepts have a vitality of their own that surpasses their creators. The percept is in fact what defines the third and highest element of Spinoza's style in *The Ethics* after the affect and the concept which are respectively the first and the second elements. Deleuze uses the metaphor of light for the three components of Spinoza's style which is inseparable from his logic. For Deleuze, affects are like shadows of things under the rays of a light such as the use of chiaroscuro in painting. Concepts are like the colours of light, such as the spectrum of colours in the rainbow or the colours reflected in solid objects. As for percepts, they are like pure figures of light, that is, the "light in itself and for itself" proceeding in flashes (Deleuze 1998: 148). In terms of speed, affects can be said to have relative speed, and concepts only measure the relations between relative speeds of movement or rest. Percepts, on the other hand, have

absolute speed, the speed of light. Deleuze indicates that the Spinozean percept in *The Ethics* introduces

> a method of invention that proceed[s] by intervals and leaps, hiatuses and contractions, somewhat like a dog searching rather than a reasonable man explaining. Perhaps it surpasses all demonstration inasmuch as it operates in the "undecidable." (Deleuze 1998: 149)

Intervals, hiatuses, leaps, contractions, and other characteristics of percepts, such as, lacunae and cuts have the function of "bring[ing] together to the maximum degree terms that are distant as such, and thereby assur[ing] a speed of absolute survey" (150). In Spinozean terms of univocity, percepts are reached in a unity of God, the self (the subject) and the other (the object). Percepts bring together "the adequate ideas of ourselves, of God, and of other things" (Deleuze 1988b: 83). They are essences and singularities in which thought goes "from the essence of God to the singular essences of real beings" (85).

In ethological terms, percepts form "a symphony of Nature, the composition of a world that is increasingly wide and intense" or Nature as "the fullest and most intense Individual" with "contrapuntal relations that correspond to each thing" (126). Spinoza evokes that humans have both affective and perceptive capacities to raise themselves and things to affects and percepts. Deleuze's immanent and ethological notion of the melodic lines of counterpoint give an idea about how that can be possible:

> Every point has its counterpoints: the plant and the rain, the spider and the fly. So an animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with the world. The interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior. The speed or slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, actions, and reactions link together to constitute a particular individual in the world. (126)

Humans are no exceptions to this. We are also linked with everything to form a "particular individual in the world", that is the world itself or the whole universe. We are not in the world, but we are the world and the universe in a becoming-with-the-world. In his or her interiority, a human being is a selected universe, and in exteriority, the universe is a projected human body and mind. For instance, no one ca deny the presence of invisible lines which connect a woman's body to the moon which affects her mentally and physiologically in its menstrual revolution in the same way that it

affects the seas. For that reason, when a woman wants to make herself a Body without Organs, she must not forget to have the moon as one of its poles. Lines of flight have the power of making visible the invisible lines that connect us to the world or the universe as in the schizophrenic strolls of the German writer Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz (1751-92) and his spiritual bliss carried to fiction in Bühner's novella *Lenz*:

> [T]he simplest, purest creatures were closest to elemental nature, the more refined a man's mental life and feelings, the more blunted this elemental sense became; he did not consider it to be a higher plane, it lacked the requisite self-sufficiency, but he believed it must be an endless delight to feel moved by the unique life of each and every form; to have a soul for stones, metals, water and plants; to take in every being in nature into oneself as in a dream, as flowers do with the air at every waxing and waning of the moon. (Bühner 2004: 25-6)

Lines of flight pass through and collapse the interior only to open it to the exterior dissolving the human identity and the ego, and hence leading to percepts through which the landscape sees in the absence of human. In order to rise to the level of the percept, all sensation needs absolute freedom from the subject which must utterly disappear. Thus, the ultimate sequence in the chain of becomings, becoming-imperceptible, is the precondition for the creation of percepts. One must become imperceptible in order to make the imperceptible forces of the universe perceptible. This is what the percepts are for. Abstract painting serves a similar purpose by "summoning forces, populating the area of plain, uniform color with the forces it bears, making the invisible forces visible in themselves" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 181-2). Messian does the same in music by rendering "the sonorous force of time audible". And in literature Proust succeeds making "the illegible force of time legible and conceivable" (182). These explain the relationship of art with chaos: "Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or sensation" (204) Art struggles with chaos in order to turn chaos into a sensory aggregate of percepts, "in order to bring forth a vision that illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation" (204).

Deleuze (1995: 137) indicates that the "great English and American novelists" are the prime authors who have written in percepts. For Deleuze & Guattari, it is mainly through the works of Anglo-American authors that the novel has attained the highest percept. They mention Melville's percept of the ocean in *Moby Dick*, Woolf's percepts

of the town in *Mrs Dalloway* and "the mirror" in a short story. These works also illustrate in which ways percepts are complementary to affects or becomings that characters go through in novels:

> Characters can only exist, and the author can only create them, because they do not perceive but have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations. Ahab really does have perceptions of the sea, but only because he has entered into a relationship with Moby Dick that makes him a becoming-whale and forms a compound of sensations that no longer needs anyone: ocean. It is Mrs. Dalloway who perceives the town—but because she has passed into the town like "a knife through everything" and becomes imperceptible herself. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 169)

Ahab's becoming-whale, and the becoming-white wall of Moby Dick have been discussed in relation to affects in the previous section. In Moby Dick, Melville narrates the killing of four whales before the ultimate encounter with Moby Dick (Chapter 116, 'The Dying Whale'). Ahab himself slays the whale furthest from other three whales and from the ships. A percept is reached in the encounter of various forces which all turn pinkish-red at the time of sunset:

> [W]hen all the spearings of the crimson fight were done; and floating in the lovely sunset sea and sky, sun and whale both stilly died together; then, such a sweetness and such plaintiveness, such in wreathing orisons curled up in that rosy air. (Melville 1998: 400)

All the forces that form the percept, the sea, the sky, the sun, and the whale, fold and enfold in each other in the "crimson" or "rosy air". Ahab sits in his boat in tranquillity and contemplates the spectacle of the dying whale with a penetrating gaze:

> For that strange spectacle observable in all sperm whales dying – the turning sunwards of the head, and so expiring – that strange spectacle, beheld of such a placid evening, somehow to Ahab conveyed a wondrousness unknown before. (400)

Finally, the dying whale drags Ahab into the percept, as well. Ahab's passing into the percept adds the finishing touch to it. The oceanic percept now becomes fully polished:

> "He [the whale] turns and turns him [Ahab] to it [the sun], – how slowly, but how steadfastly, his homage-rendering and invoking brow, with his last dying motions. He too worships fire; most faithful, broad, baronial vassal of the sun! – Oh that these too-favoring eyes should see these too-favoring sights.

Look! here, far water-locked; beyond all hum of human weal or woe; in these most candid and impartial seas; where to traditions no rocks furnish tablets; where for long Chinese ages, the billows have still rolled on speechless and unspoken to, as stars that shine upon the Niger's unknown source; here, too, life dies sunwards full of faith, but see! no sooner dead, than death whirls round the corpse, and it heads some other way.

"Oh, thou dark Hindoo half of nature, who of drowned bones hast builded thy separate throne somewhere in the heart of these unverdured seas; thou art an infidel, thou queen, and too truly speakest to me in the wide-slaughtering Typhoon, and the hushed burial of its after calm. Nor has this thy whale sunwards turned his dying head, and then gone round again, without a lesson to me.

"Oh, trebly hooped and welded hip of power! Oh, high aspiring, rainbowed jet! – that one strivest, this one jettest all in vain! In vain, oh whale, dost thou seek intercedings with yon all-quickening sun, that only calls forth life, but gives it not again. Yet dost thou darker half, rock me with a prouder, if a darker faith. All thy unnamable imminglings float beneath me here; I am buoyed by breaths of once living things, exhaled as air, but water now.

"Then hail, for ever hail, O sea, in whose eternal tossings the wild fowl finds his only rest. Born of earth, yet suckled by the sea; though hill and valley mothered me, ye billows are my foster-brothers!" (Melville, 1998: 400)

Ahab cannot part, or does not disturb the percept, and he spends that night in the boat side by side with the dead whale away from his ship and crew who can only reach him the next morning. After having killed the whale, Ahab lays claim to become immortal, "Immortal on land and on sea!", and he pledges "yet to slay Moby Dick and survive it" (401). Ahab's sense of immortality is a result of the percept he has passed into in his Body without Organs which intensifies both the sensation and the event embodying that percept. Ahab incorporates death in his sensations, as Deleuze & Guattari indicate, "Every intensity controls within its own life the experience of death, and envelops it" (1983: 330). Ahab has the feeling of immortality since he has made death a part of himself. Someone who is ready to accept death is immortal in a sense. This is in fact the paradox Blanchot expresses best in his most intensive sensation of the event, "*I* do not die. I forfeit the power of dying. In this abyss one dies—one never ceases to die, and one never succeeds in dying" (quotes Deleuze 1990: 152, translation modified). It is no irony but the paradox of intensity in the percept that Ahab's sense of immortality ends up with his own death, that is, his slaying of himself in slaying Moby-Dick as the finishing stroke of his becoming-whale. Death is an inherent aspect of

becoming in most intensive cases. Thus Deleuze & Guattari (1983: 330) indicate that "every intensity is extinguished at the end, […] every becoming itself becomes a becoming-death". Ahab's accidental death results from a spiritual will to death as *amor fati*, love for the destiny that awaits him. Ahab wishes to be immortal, and indeed he is immortal as the connoisseur of the impersonal power of life in itself. He clings to it as his own: the whale dies with the sun, its life passes to Ahab; Ahab dies, his life passes to Ishmael, as the only survivor from Ahab's ship. Life and death are like twins, and it is no coincidence that Ishmael survives in a coffin, "the coffin life-buoy", which suddenly emerges from a whirlpool in the ocean.

Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* was also mentioned in relation to immanence and its pure power as haecceity in the second chapter of this study. The immanent process of dehumanization, which Mrs. Dalloway passes through, is also the precondition for the creation of the percept, that is, the percept of the town in the case of *Mrs. Dalloway*. Before rising to the percept, Clarissa Dalloway passes through the processes of doing away with the subject, the loss of identity, the proper name and the ego, and she experiences the paradoxical coexistence of different times. Clarissa is on errand in London experiencing some intensive affects. She is affected by influenza, has been inflicted with a pain of love like "an arrow sticking in her heart", she feels the sorrows of a newly finished war, and so on. But, despite all these, "she felt positive" on her errand, she loved "life", "London", "walking in London", that "moment of June" she was in, "the waves of […] divine vitality" coming from the Park nearby (Woolf 1992: 4-7). When Clarissa reaches the Park gates in all these affective states, she also attains the power of immanence and the percept of the town:

> She would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were that. She felt very young; at the same time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. She had a perpetual sense, as she watched the taxi cabs, of being out, out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day. […] She knew nothing; no language, no history; she scarcely read a book now, except memoirs in bed; and yet to her it was absolutely absorbing; all this; the cabs passing; and she would not say of Peter, she would not say of herself, I am this, I am that.
>
> Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct, she thought, walking on. […] Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond Street,

did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely? but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of the house there, ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself.

[…] [T]his body she wore (she stopped to look at a Dutch picture), this body, with all its capacities, seemed nothing – nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible; unseen; unknown; there being no more marrying, no more having of children now, but only this astonishing and rather solemn progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more; this being Mrs. Richard Dalloway. (Woolf 1992: 8-11)

London, with all its streets, trees, houses and inhabitants, is now part of Clarissa who has passed into the whole city "like a knife". She becomes imperceptible. She is now the air London breathes, and the eye through which London sees. Woolf's novel erects a vivid monument of a moment of London standing on its own. As in Ahab's oceanic percept, we have the sense of death in Woolf's urban percept. Both Ahab's claim of immortality, and Clarissa's sentiment that "it was very, very dangerous to live even one day" are expressions of an intensity in which their proper lines of flight encounter death. Clarissa's attitude to death differs from Ahab's. Her suicide at the end of the day is the result of an organic will to death as a wish "to cease completely". Clarissa wishes to be dead since she feels herself too weak for the impersonal life which she experiences outside of herself: "all this must go on without her". Her death is affirmative of the power of "a life" an immanent and impersonal life, or a "divine vitality".

As the third example of the percept, in a short story called 'The Lady in the Looking-Glass, a Reflection', Woolf raises the mirror to the percept. The mirror confers "stillness and immortality" on the things it reflects. Letters lying on a table appear to be heavy marble "tablets graven with eternal truth" inside the mirror, and they form part of a unified picture "as if it would have needed a chisel to dislodge them from the table" (Woolf 1985: 90). When the mistress of the house, Isabella Tyson, an elderly spinster,

approaches from the garden path and enters the hall where the mirror is hanged, the unified picture in the mirror makes room for and enfolds her. Other changes which the mirror confers upon her are depicted in the finishing strokes of the story as follows:

> At once the looking-glass began to pour over her a light that seemed to fix her; that seemed like some acid to bite off the unessential and superficial and to leave only the truth. It was an enthralling spectacle. Everything dropped from her – clouds, dress, basket, diamond – all that one had called the creeper and convolvulus. Here was the hard wall beneath. Here was the woman herself. She stood naked in that pitiless light. And there was nothing. Isabella was perfectly empty. She had no thoughts. She had no friends. She cared for nobody. As for her letters, they were all bills. Look, as she stood there, old and angular, veined and lined, with her high nose and her wrinkled neck, she did not even trouble to open them.
>
> People should not leave looking-glasses hanging in their rooms.
>
> (Woolf 1985: 93)

When Isabella is ripped off everything, what remains is a Body without Organs, "the hard wall beneath" which is "perfectly empty". The mirror leaves "only the truth", that is, the BwO as "intensity = 0", "[p]roduction of the real as an intensive magnitude starting at zero" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 152). What remains of Isabella is not a regression, but the production of positive energy and dynamism, the beginning of a desiring-production. Woolf finishes her story when the BwO is reached, but the story does not finish there since the BwO is only the beginning as it is in *Mrs. Dalloway*. This can be supported with Deleuze & Guattari's following remarks about the Body without Organs, which is more descriptive of Clarissa:

> The body is now nothing more than a set of valves, locks, floodgates, bowls, or communicating vessels, each with a proper name: a peopling of the BwO, a Metropolis that has to be managed with a whip. What peoples it, what passes across it, what does the blocking? […] (152)

As some other examples of the percept, Deleuze & Guattari (1996b: 169) also mention "the moor" in Hardy, "the hills" in Faulkner, and "the steppes" in Tolstoy and Chekhov. They all "preserve in themselves the hour of a day, a moment's degree of warmth". To preserve that moment, the colours in a painting or the characters in a novel pass into that landscape by becoming nonhuman visions of that moment itself. The writer or the painter crafts the monument of a moment as a compound of sensation which "must stand on its own". "The artist's greatest difficulty" in crafting the percept

of anything, Deleuze & Guattari (1996b: 164) indicate, "is to make it *stand up on its own*", which is, at the same time, "the only law of creation". The artist's materials, such as the painter's canvas and colours or the writer's words and syntax, disappear in the work and become percepts and affects as compounds of sensations:

> We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations. As percepts, sensations are not perceptions referring to an object (reference): if they resemble something it is with a resemblance produced with their own methods; and the smile on the canvas is made solely with colors, lines, shadow, and light. If resemblance haunts the work of art, it is because sensation refers only to its material: it is the percept or affect of the material itself, the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of metal, the crouch of Romanesque stone, and the ascent of Gothic stone. […] Even if the material lasts for only a few seconds it will give sensation the power to exist and be preserved in itself *in the eternity that coexists with this short duration.* (166)

Duration plays an important part in novels, as well. Memorability of a work of art has little or nothing to do with lived perceptions and affections of an author, and with his or her memories of a past. It is the monumentality created in the work of art standing up on its own. If there is any resemblance between the lives of great authors and their work of art, this is mainly due to the unity of their style, inseparability of their life and work. It is indiscernible in them whether their life shapes their work, or the reverse. For Deleuze, their work is no less real than their lives. Proust's monumental work *Remembrance of Things Past* [*A la recherché du temps perdu*] comes out of a similar discussion as Ingrid Wassenaar indicates in her introduction to the novel:

> Proust insisted on the primacy of the work of fiction over the lived life of the author. In fact his literary career is founded on it. *Remembrance of Things Past* finds its seeds in an essay Proust began called 'Contre Sainte-Beuve' ('Against Sainte-Beuve') which argued that the critic Sainte-Beuve was wrong to privilege biography over fiction in assessing works of literature. Proust suggested that we learn everything we need to know from the work of art itself, and that the raw materials, the life of the author, are of secondary interest. (In Proust 2006a: 9-10)

Contrary to what the English translation of the title suggests, Proust's work has nothing to do with the memories of a past.[28] Wassenaar also mentions Proust's disappointment

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[28] Deleuze notes the following in *Proust and Sings*: "Proust's work is not oriented to the past and the discoveries of memory, but to the future and the progress of an apprenticeship" (2000: 26). He also

with the title, *Remembrance of things Past* which had been chosen by his translator as an allusion to Shakespeare (in Proust 2006a: 17). Proust's greatness lies in the unity of his life and work, and it is in fact indiscernible if the following words in *Swann's Way* are more representative of Proust himself as the subject of enunciation or his narrator as the subject of the statement: "I myself seemed actually to have become the subject of my book" (Proust 2006a: 25). Proust's oeuvre can be read either as self-perfection a la Nietzsche or a becoming-imperceptible a la Deleuze & Guattari. Both readings amount to the primacy of sensations as blocks of affects and percepts, and as durations created through any material at hand. This material can be taken out of life, and its better if done so for Deleuze & Guattari as they indicate that "the monumental novelist is himself 'inspired' by the lived" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 172).

Deleuze & Guattari find an answer to the question of how a moment of the world can "be rendered durable or made to exist by itself" in Virginia Woolf's diaries which they often quote and dwell on as follows:

> "Saturate every atom," "eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity," everything that adheres to our current and lived perceptions, everything that nourishes the mediocre novelist; and keep only the saturation that gives us the percept. "It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: *but made transparent*"; "I want to put practically everything in; yet to saturate." Through having reached the percept as "the sacred source," through having seen Life in the living or the Living in the lived, the novelist or painter returns breathless and with bloodshot eyes. (172)[29]

Lived perceptions leave their place to percepts in a great novelist, and Woolf does it through "saturation".[30] Both Nietzsche's Dionysian art of self-perfection and Deleuze & Guattari's becoming-imperceptible coincide with Woolf's making-transparent. The

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indicates with Guattari that "Memory plays a small part in art (even and especially in Proust)" (1996b: 167).

[29] Deleuze & Guattari's all quotations in this passage are from Virginia Woolf's *The Diary of Virginia Woolf*, ed. Anne Olivier Bell. London: Hogarth Press, 1980, vol. 3, pp. 209, 210.

[30] Woolf (1987: 138) writes the following in *A Writer's Diary*:

[W]hat I want now to do is to saturate every atom. I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give the moment whole; whatever it includes. Say that the moment is a combination of thought; sensation; the voice of the sea. Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that don't belong to the moment; this appalling narrative business of the realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is false, unreal, merely conventional. Why admit anything to literature that is not poetry—by which I mean saturated? […] I want to put practically everything in: yet to saturate. That is what I want to do in *The Moths*. It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: but made transparent."

latter is also creative of percepts and it is practiced by Woolf as the saturation of every atom which has a close link to the transformational syntheses of the unconscious, namely, "the disjunctive syntheses of singularities and chains" on the body without organs and "the conjunctive syntheses of intensities and becomings" on a field of immanence.

Saturation of every atom entails the divine energy of Numen in the disjunctive syntheses of the unconscious. It has the Body without Organs as its motor, and it takes effect on an immanent plane. It is a coincidence that Andrew Jackson Davis in his book *Mental Disorders* (1871)[31] defines the divine energy of the human soul in terms of saturation of atoms and other "soul-elements":

> If the elements composing the Soul are not derived from the foods, and not from what we drink, and not from the air we breathe, from whence do they proceed? They are, I answer, derived from "what we feed on," and from the respirable air, but especially and chiefly they flow from the infinite ocean of celestial principles which, like the omnipresent spirit of God, pervades and saturates every atom, fluid, ether, essence, and element in the whole system. And thus to a human being life is infinitely more important and significant than is the same life to an animal. (Davis 1871: 131)

Contrary to Deleuze's immanent outlook, Davis defines the soul as a system of organisation presiding over the organs and regulating the body. For Davis, the Spirit stands for "the highest unity of principles, and the sublimest divinity of qualities in the mental constitution of man" (126). The Spirit is the hidden principle which controls the soul in a transcendent plane of organisation, and constitutes the Christian Trinity as the eternal structure together with "the infinite Father and Mother" (127).[32] An immanent plane, on the other hand, has no structures and no hidden principles which will guide the relations on it. There are only particles situated on the immanent plane with the sole principle of proximity. This is how Deleuze relates Woolf's notion of saturating every atom:

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[31] The full title of Andrew Jackson Davis's book is *Mental Disorders: Or, Diseases of the Brain and Nerves, Developing the Origin and Philosophy of Mania, Insanity, and Crime, with Full Directions for Their Treatment and Cure* (The USA: American News Co., 1871)

[32] In fact, Davis's pre-modernist Christian psychiatric stance is not much different from modern oedipal psychoanalysis since the latter also has recourse to Christian Trinity as its eternal truth when structure is concerned: "Oedipus as a structure is the Christian Trinity, whereas Oedipus as a crisis is a familial trinity insufficiently structured by faith. […] Oedipus forever!" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 82).

> [T]here are no longer any forms being organized as a result of a structure, or being developed as a result of a genesis; nor are there any subjects, persons or characters, which let themselves be attributed, formed or developed. There are only particles left, particles definable solely by relationships of movement and rest, speed and slowness, constructions of differential speeds (and it is not necessarily speed that wins; it is not necessarily slowness that is the last to get there). There are now only h[a]ecceities left, individuations which are precise and without subject, which are definable solely by affects or powers (and it is not necessarily the strongest that wins; it is not the one who is the richest in affects). (Deleuze 1987: 122-3)

Body without Organs is by no means a divinity but the energy that impels it is divine (Numen). It is the magical force of proper names. Deleuze & Guattari indicate that the identifications of divinity on the BwO, together with other racial and cultural identifications, have nothing to do with Gods, races and peoples in representational terms, but with "regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities" (1983: 86). Proper names do not represent anything but have a series of "effects" as it is best seen in physics: "the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect". Similarly, Deleuze & Guattari apply the effects of proper names to history: "a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabalus effect—all the names of history, and not the name of the father" (86) Identifications on the BwO have two different directions or schizoid voyages without subjects: "the geographic exterior voyage following nondecomposable distances, and the interior historical voyage enveloping intensities" (87). These two schizoid voyages constitute "haecceities" on the plane of immanence, and inscriptive "simulation" on the BwO not as the representation of a dominant reality but the production of "the Real":

> If identification is a nomination, a designation, then simulation is the writing corresponding to it, a writing that is strangely polyvocal, flush with the real. It carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively produced by the desiring-machine. The point where the copy ceases to be a copy in order to become the Real and its artifice. To seize an intensive real as produced in the coextension of nature and history, to ransack the Roman Empire, the Mexican cities, the Greek gods, and the discovered continents so as to extract from them this always-surplus reality […] (87)

3.5. The Plane of Composition and Peopling of the Void

Deleuze & Guattari's distinction between the plane of immanence or consistency and the plane of composition is a delayed one introduced only in their final cooperative

work *What is Philosophy?*. In their earlier works, they do not make such a distinction, and they use the terms plane of immanence or consistency and plane of composition to refer to both literature and philosophy. For instance, they earlier write that "there is a pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition, upon which everything is given, upon which unformed elements and materials dance" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 255). Therefore the discussion of the plane in the previous chapter incorporates both philosophy and literature. In this section, the plane of composition which is specific to art and literature and its difference from the plane of immanence will be discussed in detail.

Planes in both philosophy and art are points of juncture where thought encounters the unconscious and attains highest creativity. The land of the dead which Deleuze & Guattari often refer to stands for the vital ideas which populate the undiscovered depths of the brain as the subject where humans exist as nothing more than an object:

> If the mental objects of philosophy, art, and science (that is to say, vital ideas) have a place, it will be in the deepest of the synaptic fissures, in the hiatuses, intervals, and meantimes of a nonobjectifiable brain, in a place where to go in search of them will be to create. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 209)

The plane in all disciplines determines their specific attitude to chaos. Deleuze & Guattari refer to the triad of art, science and philosophy as the three sisters born of chaos, that is, "*Chaoids*" which are "the realities produced on the planes that cut through the chaos in three ways" (208). The brain as subject confronts chaos in its depths which designates "not a brain behind the brain but, first of all, a state of survey without distance, at ground level, a self-survey that no chasm, fold, or hiatus escapes" (210). While a philosopher seeks infinite yet inseparable "*variations*" (beings of the concept) in the absolute depths of the chaos, an artist seeks in it possible sensory "*varieties*" (beings of sensation) which are limited. Beings of sensation in art are percepts as "nonhuman forces of the cosmos" and affects as "man's nonhuman becomings" (183). The philosopher's plane of immanence as "an image of Thought-Being (noumenon)" is like a secant line which cuts through the chaos to defeat the infinite in a virtual category. The plane of composition, on the other hand, is an "anorganic" and catastrophic "image of a Universe (phenomenon)", a possible universe,

by means of which the artist aims "to restore the infinite" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 65, 202-3). While artists open outlooks on possible universes on their specific planes, philosophers "survey every possible universe", that is, a virtual universe, on their plane of immanence (167-8).

In the same way that a philosopher's concepts populate a plane of immanence, a novelist's characters and landscapes populate the plane of composition. Deleuze & Guattari compare philosophical concepts to "multiple waves, rising and falling", and the unique plane of immanence to a "single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them" (36). Although the novelist's specific plane is the plane of composition, nothing prevents him or her to use a plane of immanence since the latter is "the basis of all planes" (60). Yet, on that plane, he or she still has characters and landscapes rather than concepts. Woolf is one such novelist in most of her novels. Especially *The Waves* seems to have inspired Deleuze & Guattari in their above comparison. No other comparison can describe Woolf's novel better: her seven characters are like "multiple waves, rising and falling" which are rolled up and unrolled in the single wave of "life" as the unique and immanent plane. Woolf's work too has the wisdom of Spinoza par excellence. Woolf's novels can never be thought independently of a philosophical plane of immanence and an aesthetic or poetic plane of composition as she also suggests that "Fiction will be much better for standing cheek by jowl with poetry and philosophy" (Woolf 1989: 109).

Deleuze & Guattari mention "abstract art" and "conceptual art" as two limited efforts to bring art and philosophy together by composing sensations through dematerialization on their specific planes of composition. Abstract art uses "an architectonic plane of composition" as a unifying structural design and dematerialises sensation on it as "a purely spiritual being". But in this way, "a sensation of a sea or tree", for instance, is no longer a pure sensation, "but a sensation of the concept of sea or concept of tree" with a more philosophical inclination (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 198). Conceptual art, on the other hand, uses "a neutralized plane of composition" and dematerializes sensation "through generalization" which renders its object "reproducible to infinity". In this way, sensation is not dematerialized directly, but left to the spectator who decides "whether or not to 'materialize' the sensation", or, "whether or not it is art". It remains ambiguous whether such an abstraction leads us "to the sensation or to

the concept" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 198). For Deleuze & Guattari, depending on a simple opinion, "the simple 'opinion' of a spectator" in the case of abstract art, is respectable neither in art nor in philosophy. "Art does not have opinions" (176). Neither does philosophy. Concepts and sensations are in no way opinions.

For the same reason that art and philosophy have different planes, the becoming is different in both disciplines. Deleuze & Guattari point to the difference between sensory becoming and conceptual becoming as follows:

> Sensory becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming-other (while continuing to be what they are), [Van Gogh's] sunflower or Ahab, whereas conceptual becoming is the action by which the common event itself eludes what is. Conceptual becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter of expression. The monument does not actualize the virtual event but incorporates or embodies it: it gives it a body, a life, a universe. This was how Proust defined the art-monument by that life higher than the "lived," by its "qualitative differences," its "universes" that construct their own limits, their distances and proximities, their constellations and the blocs of sensations they put into motion—Rembrandt-universe or Debussy-universe. These universes are neither virtual nor actual; they are possibles, the possible as aesthetic category […] (177)

Virtual (incorporeal and singular events) and actual (states of things and bodies, and their mixtures) are both philosophical categories. Art, on the other hand, has a single category, that of "the possible", which also determines its plane of composition.

Deleuze & Guattari use the metaphor of a fisherman in the open sea to illustrate the philosopher and his or her plane of immanence which does not preexist but must be constructed: "It is as if one was casting a net, but the fisherman always risks being swept away and finding himself in the open sea when he thought he had reached a port" (203). To illustrate the artist's plane of consistency, they point to Lawrence's metaphor of an umbrella with a slit in it:

> In a violently poetic text, Lawrence describes what produces poetry: people are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions. But poets, artists, make a slit in the umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears through the rent […] Then come the crowd of imitators who repair the umbrella with something vaguely resembling the vision, and the

crowd of commentators who patch over the rent with opinions: communication. Other artists are always needed to make other slits, to carry out necessary and perhaps ever-greater destructions, thereby restoring to their predecessors the incommunicable novelty that we could no longer see. This is to say that artists struggle less against chaos (that, in a certain manner, all their wishes summon forth) than against the "clichés" of opinion. […] (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 203)

All sensation in art goes from chaos to composition. "Art is not chaos", Deleuze & Guattari indicate, "but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or sensation," "a composed chaos—neither foreseen nor preconceived." (204). In the same way that a writer or a painter begins on an empty piece of paper or an empty canvas, they must empty the words and colours they use, and begin with an erased plane to be recomposed each time with a new universe. Each work of art is a new universe created by an artist on a single plane of composition specific to him or her and is linked to other universes through the lines of flight, "so that the plane may be single at the same time as universes are irreducibly multiple" (196).

The painter and sculptor Lucio Fontana[33] turns Lawrence's metaphor of the slit in the umbrella into an actual practice in his cosmic slash series of painting. He opens his painting to the cosmos by making actual slashes in the canvas. Deleuze & Guattari comment on Fontana's slash series that,

> When Fontana slashes the colored canvas with a razor, he does not tear the color in doing this. On the contrary, he makes us see the area of plain, uniform color, of pure color, through the slit. Art indeed struggles with chaos, but it does so in order to bring forth a vision that illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation. (203-4)

The function of the plane of composition in art is like "deframing" as it is also seen both in Lawrence's metaphor and Fontana's practice. Deframing extends the aesthetic plane of composition in a book or a canvas to its outside, "onto an infinite cosmos". In this way, the plane can be said to cover the whole cosmos or the infinite:

> [A] sensation does not occupy a place on the plane without extending it, distending it over the entire earth, and freeing all the sensations it contains: opening out or splitting open, *equaling infinity*. Perhaps the peculiarity of art is

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[33] Lucio Fontana (1899-1968) was born in Italy to an Italian father and Argentinean mother. He was born and died in Argentina and spent his life partly in Italy and partly in Argentina. He was the founder of "spatialism" in painting.

to pass through the finite in order to rediscover, to restore the infinite. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 197)

In *What's Philosophy?*, Deleuze & Guattari return to their aesthetic discussion of the refrain which they start earlier in *A Thousand Plateaus*. This time they foreground not refrain but framing taken from painting and apply it to three major arts, namely, painting, music and writing (especially the novel). They also build their concept of the aesthetic plane of composition on framing. For Deleuze & Guattari each form of art has three main modes as territorial, deterritorialised and reterritorialized. They are roughly systematised in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Three Types of Assemblages

Assemblages:	*Territorial*	*Deterritorialized*	*Reterritorialized*
Music:	Territorial refrain	Molecular refrain	Cosmic refrain
Painting:	(En)framing	Deframing	Reframing
Writing:	"My cabin in Canada"	"Farewell, I am leaving"	"Yes, it's me; I had to come back"
Coexistent modes of sensation:	*Endosensation* *(the House)*	*Exosensation* *(the Universe or the Cosmos)*	
Components & characteristics:	- affects and percepts - compounds of sensation - house-territory - small refrain, melodic - joint frames and sections - finite, determinate - presupposes a *prior deterritorialisation* (fleeing the clichés of opinion)	- the plane of composition - field of forces - town-cosmos - large refrain, symphonic - vectorial space - infinite, limitless, abstract - involves reterritorialisation as a form of *higher deterritorialisation* (struggle against chaos leading to "a more profound struggle against opinion")	

Deleuze & Guattari, in arguing that "art begins with the animal, at least with the animal that carves out a territory and constructs a house", emphasise the territorial emergence of art (183). In the section on "refrains" above, milieus were distinguished from territories: the former were "directional" and "functional" (organic functions such as sexuality, reproduction, aggression, feeding), but the latter are "dimensional"

(spatial) and "expressive". Therefore, art begins when the milieu refrain is transformed into a territorial refrain. Becoming "expressive" or "the emergence of pure sensory qualities, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become expressive features" is the philosophical definition of a territory (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 183). Deleuze & Guattari illustrate the formation of territory with the bower bird of Australia:

> Every morning the *Sceno-poetes dentirostris,* a bird of the Australian rain forests, cuts leaves, makes them fall to the ground, and turns them over so that the paler, internal side contrasts with the earth. In this way it constructs a stage for itself like a ready-made; and directly above, on a creeper or a branch, while fluffing out the feathers beneath its beak to reveal their yellow roots, it sings a complex song made up from its own notes and, at intervals, those of other birds that it imitates: it is a complete artist. This is not synesthesia in the flesh but blocs of sensations in the territory—colors, postures, and sounds that sketch out a total work of art. These sonorous blocs are refrains; but there are also refrains of posture and color, and postures and colors are always being introduced into refrains: bowing low, straightening up, dancing in a circle and lines of colors. The whole of the refrain is the being of sensation. Monuments are refrains. In this respect art is continually haunted by the animal. (184)

Deleuze & Guattari oppose their concept of the territory to the phenomenological concept of the flesh. For them, the flesh or "fleshism" becomes "the final avatar of phenomenology and plunges it into the mystery of the incarnation [as] a pious and a sensual notion, a mixture of sensuality and religion" (178). Deleuze & Guattari argue that "[a]rt begins not with flesh but with the house" or with the territory (186); and the flesh is not a compound of sensation but only its "thermometer" or "developer", and it "disappears in what it develops", namely, in the compound of sensation as affects and percepts, nonhuman becomings and forces of the cosmos (183). What constitutes the sensation in a nude painting, for instance, in Rubens' *Venus at the mirror*, is not the flesh but becoming-animal "like a flayed beast", or becoming-plant like "peeled fruit" (179).

For Deleuze & Guattari, Kafka is the bower bird of literature with all sort of territorial refrains and blocks of sensations which are carried away by gusts of deterritorialisation:

> Kafka's art is the most profound meditation on the territory and the house, the burrow, portrait-postures (the inhabitant's lowered head with chin sunk into their chest or, on the contrary, "Shamefaced Lacky" whose angular head goes

right through the ceiling); sounds-music (dogs who are musicians in their very postures; Josephine, the singing mouse, of whom it will never be known whether she sings; Gregor whose squeaking combines with his sister's violin in a complex bedroom-house-territory relationship). All that is needed to produce art is here: a house, some postures, colors, and songs—on condition that it all opens onto and launches itself on a mad vector as on a witch's broom, a line of the universe or of deterritorialization […] (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 184-5)

Kafka's story 'The Burrow' has an animal narrator who constructs himself a burrow for defence against enemies of the outside and subterranean enemies which he has never seen but knows through legends. The labyrinthine burrow is a rhizome, an assemblage, and it leads nowhere. It has a narrow passage which widens every hundred yards to form a chamber to sleep and rest, to play, to store food or to trap the enemies. The burrow has fifty such chambers (reserve rooms, main rooms and auxiliary rooms) connected by passages and cross passages. Close to the middle is the largest chamber, "the Castle Keep" which is ten times bigger than the others. The animal assembles his entire store there. The outside where there is much freedom and better food is not a safe place for the animal. Yet the open wood has a special attraction for him as he says: "I […] feel new powers awakening in my body for which there was no room, as it were, in the burrow" (Kafka 1993: 476). Keenness of ears is perhaps one such power awakened in his body since he begins hearing a continuous "whistling sound" when he comes back to his burrow. The animal spends all his time to find the source of this whistling sound futilely. It is the call of desire: it tasks him, consumes all his energy, leads to numerous speculations and disturbs the peacefulness of the burrow. Sounds and postures (forms of content) and music and portraits (forms of expression) are recurrent territorial and deterritorialised modalities of sensation (e.g., motifs or themes) in Kafka. Bent heads and portraits in Kafka's work stand for "a blocked, oppressed or oppressing, neutralized desire"; straightened heads and musical sounds, on the other hand, indicate "a desire that straightens up or moves forward, and opens up to new connections" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 5).

Territorial framing of sensation has three modalities for Deleuze & Guattari (1996b: 168): "vibrating sensation" (air), clinching or "coupling sensation" (motif) and "opening or splitting, hollowing out sensation" (theme). These three modalities are related to

framing in painting; but, for Deleuze & Guattari, they find their best visual expressions "in sculpture",

> with its sensations of stone, marble, or metal, which vibrate according to the order of strong and weak beats, projections and hollows [air], its powerful clinches that intertwine them [motif], its development of large spaces between groups or within a single group where we no longer know whether it is the light or the air that sculpts or is sculpted [theme] (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 168)

The modalities of sensation attain their highest power in music as monophonic refrain, polyphonic melody and harmonic modification:

> The simplest cases are the melodic *air,* which is a monophonic refrain; the *motif,* which is already polyphonic, an element of a melody entering into the development of another and creating counterpoint; and the *theme,* as the object of harmonic modifications through melodic lines. These three elementary forms construct the sonorous house and its territory. They correspond to the three modalities of a being of sensation, for the air is a vibration, the motif is a clinch, a coupling, whereas the theme does not close without also unclenching, splitting, and opening. (189-90)

In the same way that even "the most shot up house opens onto a universe", every work of art has the potential of opening onto an infinite plane of composition in a kind of deframing. In painting, for instance, "Monet's house finds itself endlessly caught up by the plant forces of an unrestrained garden, a cosmos of roses" (180). A work of art needs "*a passage from the finite to the infinite,* but also from territory to deterritorialization" (180-1). In music the harmonic frame is carried onto a plane of composition when Chopin, Schuman and Liszt produced "compositional studies" with the piano (190). Wagner and Debussy become two important names to nominate the two directions in the developments of the plane of composition in music as the "disaggregation of the tonal frame":

> [T]he immense uniform areas [*aplats*] of continuous variation […] couple and combine the forces that have become sonorous in Wagner, or the broken tones [*tons rompus*] […] separate and disperse the forces by harmonizing their reversible passages in Debussy—Wagner-universe, Debussy-universe. (191)

For Deleuze & Guattari indicate that the plane of composition "arises as we distance ourselves from the house, even if this is in order to return, since no one will recognise us when we come back" (191). In that sense, deframing is followed by a reframing

within the largest plane of composition, deterritorialisation is followed by reterritorialisation on the plane of composition in unrecognizable ways, the small refrain is lost in the large refrain. Hence, Deleuze & Guattari point to the "strict coexistence or complementarity" between the house and the universe, between territory, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, between compounds of sensation (affects and percepts as endosensation) and the plane of composition (vectorial field of forces as exosensation), so that "neither of them advance[s] except through the other" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 196). The following lines point to this complementarity:

> The composite sensation, made up of percepts and affects, deterritorializes the system of opinion that brought together dominant perceptions and affections within a natural, historical, and social milieu. But the composite sensation is reterritorialized on the plane of composition, because it erects its houses there, because it appears there within interlocked frames or joined sections that surround its components; landscapes that have become pure percepts, and characters that become pure affects. At the same time the plane of composition involves sensation in a higher deterritorialization, making it pass through a sort of deframing which opens it up and breaks it open onto an infinite cosmos. (196-7)

Opinions have ideological dimension, but there is no ideology in sensation. Sensations have a deep power of dismantling all opinion for a single ethical reason for Deleuze & Guattari: "the misfortune of people comes from opinion" (206). Hence, politics is always present in sensation, not political parties and the State, but a micropolitics of the house and a geopolitics of the cosmos that are complementary to each other. Opening oneself to the outside or to the cosmos, for Deleuze, primarily involves fighting oneself, experimenting on oneself and, finally, opening oneself "up to love and desire"; and this "is pretty hard work" (Deleuze 1995: 10).

CHAPTER 4

FACIALITY: THE WHITE WALL OF SIGNIFIANCE AND THE BLACK HOLE OF SUBJECTIVITY

> It is only human nature, I reflected, and began drawing cart wheels and circles over the angry professor's face till he looked like a burning bush or a flaming comet—anyhow, an apparition without human semblance or significance. (Woolf 1989: 32)
>
> Yes, the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled. On the road to the asignifying and asubjective.
>
> (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 171)

4.1. Against the Dual Strata of Faciality

The concept of faciality is the best illustration of Deleuze & Guattari's collective work as a symbiosis, an assemblage, a rhizome, a double becoming, of their "pick-up method" as anti-methodology and their literalism as anti-metaphor. Before they assembled their work in *A Thousand Plateaus* in 1980, Deleuze informs us, Guattari had been attracted to the idea of black holes in relation to subjectivity: "The black hole is what captures you and does not let you get out. How do you get out of a black hole? How do you transmit signals from the bottom of a black hole?" Deleuze, on the other hand, had been engaged with the idea of signification as a white wall and with how to "plane down the wall and make a line of flight pass" (Deleuze 1987: 17). They needed a zone of indiscernibility which would neither unite nor juxtapose the two ideas but would offshoot between the two without disturbing the multiplicity and proliferation of both.

From another point of view, in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze & Guattari had already dismantled the organization in the body, or rather, saved the body from the stratum of organisation as the work of the abstract machine. They had neither come to the head nor confronted the other two strata, namely, signifiance and subjectification. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, it was then high time to dismantle the other two strata and to dismantle what makes the head an organ distinct from the body. Faciality served all their motives. Firstly, "black holes on a white wall are in fact a face, a broad face with white cheeks,

and pierced with black holes" (Deleuze 1987: 17-8). Secondly, the face separates the head from the body as a distinct organ:

> The head is included in the body, but the face is not. […] The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be *overcoded* by something we shall call the Face. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 170)

The face threatens not only the head but the whole body with facialisation:

> When the mouth and nose, but first the eyes, become a holey surface, all the other volumes and cavities of the body follow. An operation worthy of Doctor Moreau: horrible and magnificent. Hand, breast, stomach, penis and vagina, thigh, leg and foot, all come to be facialized. Fetishism, erotomania, etc., are inseparable from these processes of facialization. […] It is a much more unconscious and machinic operation that draws the entire body across the holey surface, and in which the role of the face is not as a model or image, but as an overcoding of all of the decoded parts. Everything remains sexual; there is no sublimation, but there are new coordinates. It is precisely because the face depends on an abstract machine that it is not content to cover the head, but touches all other parts of the body, and even, if necessary, other objects without resemblance. (170)

The abstract machine, not being content with facialising the physical body, goes on to facialise the social body. Hence faciality gains historical, social and political dimensions. The "faciality machine" with its white wall and black hole system becomes an oppressive pact between the despotic signifier and the authoritarian subject: "there is no signifiance without a despotic assemblage, no subjectification without an authoritarian assemblage" (180). With this oppressive pact, everyone is under the threat of being facialised, of being "pinned to the white wall and stuffed in the black hole" (181).

The abstract machine of faciality functions in two different ways. One is biunivocal, and the other binary. In the first order, an elementary face is related to the other in biunivocal terms as "a man *or* a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, 'an x *or* a y'"; or two faces are linked in twos: "a teacher and a student, father and son, worker and boss, cop and citizen, accused and judge" (177). In the second order, there is the binary selective machine of yes-no, or pass-fail type. Here

the abstract machine has the role of a "deviance detector" which is incapable of defining the deviant as the excluded other on equal terms, but must categorise it inclusively as second, third, and so on. In *A Room of One's Own*, Mary Seton expresses this best when she wants to cross "a grass plot" leaving the stony path and is stopped by a man: "he was a Beadle; I was a woman. This was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me" (Woolf 1989: 6). Deleuze & Guattari illustrate the binary selective machine from the point of its primal detection of diversity as racial:

> If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the wall, distributed by the hole. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an "other." […] From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices. Racism never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out (or those who only allow themselves to be identified at a given degree of divergence). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 178)

The exterior in Deleuze & Guattari's use must be understood in completely positive terms. Exteriorising one as the Other does not mean pushing someone out of "the turf" onto "the gravel" but rather, "asignifying" him or her, not subjecting him or her to the categories of representation discussed in the first chapter of this study, namely, resemblance, opposition, analogy and identity. When one is recognised as an other, he or she is seen as another self-expressive world with a language and face of his or her own. This is in fact how Deleuze defines the Other. Self-expressiveness should save one from the tyranny and futility of opinions such as "as a man, I consider all women to be unfaithful" or "as a woman, I think men are liars" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 145); or such as, "*Most women have no character at all*" (Pope) and "Les femmes sont extrêmes; elles sont meilleures ou pires que les homes"[34] (La Bruyere) (quotes Woolf

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[34] This French sentence can be translated as follows: "Women are extremes; they are either better or worse than men."

1989: 29). When one is recognised as the exterior, he or she is not oppressed, tyrannised, domineered; he or she is given the freedom to express him- or herself on equal terms; and most importantly, he or she is given the right to desire. Freedom from all tyranny and oppression is the first condition of desire, and desiring must not be confused with its condition. Need for freedom involves a negative proposition ("not wanting to …") but desire is always positive and is never touched by negativity or interiority. Hence Deleuze asserts:

> If you tie someone up and say to him 'Express yourself, friend', the most he will be able to say is that he doesn't want to be tied up. The only spontaneity in desire is doubtless of that kind: to not want to be oppressed, exploited, enslaved, subjugated. But no desire has ever been created with non-wishes. Not to want to be enslaved is a non-proposition. In retrospect every assemblage expresses and creates a desire by constructing the plane which makes it possible and, by making it possible, brings it about. Desire is not restricted to the privileged; neither is it restricted to the success of a revolution once it has occurred. It is in itself an immanent revolutionary process. […] We don't even believe in internal drives which would prompt desire. The plane of immanence has nothing to do with an interiority; it is like the Outside where all desires come from. (Deleuze 1987: 96-7)

One finds the most dreadful tyrant or oppressor not out there, but in his or her interiority, in the depths of his or her consciousness, subjectivity and ego. One can have legitimate desires not by non-wish-making but only by fleeing and dismantling both the interiority and the strata and by finding the lines of flight that will connect him or her to the Outside:

> And how can we unhook ourselves from the points of subjectification that secure us, nail us down to a dominant reality? Tearing the conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration, tearing the unconscious away from signifiance and interpretation in order to make it a veritable production: this is assuredly no more or less difficult than tearing the body away from the organism. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 160)

In order to dismantle signification, one needs "disarticulation" on the plane of consistency: "no signifier, never interpret!" And in order to dismantle subjectification, one needs "nomadism as the movement": "keep moving, even in place, never stop moving" (159). Deleuze & Guattari also express their schizoanalytic program and slogan against faciality as follows: "Find your black holes and white walls, know them,

know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 188).

Facialisation, in short, is using the power of the face as in the case of an angry mother telling her child to look at her face. Domestic power of parents, passional power of lovers and political power of leaders operate "through the face". Even the power of the cinema, Deleuze & Guattari argue, "operate[s] through the face of the star and the close-up" (175). They continue that,

> It is not the individuality of the face that counts but the efficacy of the ciphering it makes possible, and in what cases it makes it possible. This is an affair not of ideology but of economy and the organization of power (*pouvoir*). We are certainly not saying that the face, the power of the face (*la puissance du visage*), engenders and explains social power (*pouvoir*). *Certain assemblages of power* (*pouvoir*) *require the production of a face, others do not*. (175)

All assemblages of power are the workings of the abstract machine. The fact that some of them don't produce the face does not mean that facility is not involved in them. On the contrary, they require hiding the face. Hence, Deleuze & Guattari comment,

> It is certain that the signifier does not construct the wall that it needs all by itself; it is certain that subjectivity does not dig its hole all alone. Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an *abstract machine of faciality* (*visageite*). Thus the black hole/white wall system is, to begin with, not a face but the abstract machine that produces faces according to the changeable combinations of its cogwheels. Do not expect the abstract machine to resemble what it produces, or will produce. (168)

Therefore Deleuze & Guattari compare the face to a horror story as it is produced by the abstract machine. The spectre of the face may come to light anytime: "The abstract machine crops up when you least expect it, at a chance juncture when you are just falling asleep, or into a twilight state or hallucinating, or doing an amusing physics experiment …" (168-9).

Deleuze & Guattari account for the history of faciality and faciality in art; but how can faciality be incorporated into the three assemblages of art in its three periods discussed in the third chapter of this study, namely, classicism, romanticism, and modernism? Deleuze & Guattari relate the birth of faciality to the "Year Zero", the birth

of Christ. The classicism of faciality can be seen as the facialisation of the whole body as Deleuze & Guattari indicate: "Jesus Christ superstar: he invented the facialization of the entire body and spread it everywhere" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 176). The romanticism of faciality in art begins with the facialisation of the landscape and the exertion of "spiritual control over both faciality and landscapity (*paysagéité*)" through "Christian education" (172). And finally, dismantling the face, coupled with deterritorialisation, accord with modernism in art.

The genre of the novel has a special relation to faciality in both its romantic and modern periods. For Deleuze & Guattari, there is no evolution of the novel. The novel is an assemblage with two poles. The faciality traits of romanticism form one of its poles. Its other pole is composed of deterritorialisations coupled with defacialisations of modernism. And both poles can be present in the same novel. Deleuze & Guattari illustrate this polarity in the courtly novel of Chrétien de Troyes.[35] They point to the Christian education and "landscapity" in the courtly novel as traits of romanticism on the first pole:

> Open Chrétien de Troyes to any page and you will find a catatonic knight seated on his steed, leaning on his lance, waiting, seeing the face of his loved one in the landscape; you have to hit him to make him respond. Lancelot, in the presence of the queen's white face, doesn't notice his horse plunge into the river; or he gets into a passing cart and it turns out to be the cart of disgrace. There is a face-landscape aggregate proper to the novel, in which black holes sometimes distribute themselves on a white wall, and the white line of the horizon sometimes spins toward a black hole, or both simultaneously. (174)

The modern pole of deterritorialisation is also present in the same works by the same author. The knight of the courtly novel often forgets "his name, what he is doing, what people say to him, he doesn't know where he is going or to whom he is speaking", and he is carried away by "a line of absolute deterritorialization" (174). In general terms, what is peculiar to the genre of the novel is primarily the deterritorialisation of its characters, and this determines the beginning of the genre of the novel for Deleuze & Guattari:

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[35] Deleuze & Guattari argue that the novel begins with the author of Arthurian courtly romances Chrétien de Troyes who lived in the Twelfth Century (1996a: 173). Chrétien de Troyes wrote all his work in verse. They include *Philomena, Erec and Énide, Cligès, Yvain (The Knight of the Lion), Lancelot (The Knight of the Cart) and Perceval: The story of the Grail* (in Pendergast and Pnedergast 2003: 232-4).

> It is false to see Don Quixote as the end of the chivalric novel, invoking the hero's hallucinations, harebrained ideas, and hypnotic or cataleptic states. It is false to see novels such as Beckett's as the end of the novel in general, invoking the black holes, the characters' line of deterritorialization, the schizophrenic promenades of Molloy or the Unnameable, their loss of their names, memory, or purpose. […] The novel has always been defined by the adventure of lost characters who no longer know their name, what they are looking for, or what they are doing, amnesiacs, ataxics, catatonics. They differentiate the genre of the novel from the genres of epic or drama. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 173)

Hence, when Deleuze & Guattari write paradoxically that, "There is always a Christian education in the Novel. Molloy is the beginning of the novel", they point to the two opposing tendencies in the novel.

In *Swan's Way*, Proust also reverberates facialisations in order to dismantle them in a final stroke. Firstly, there are two moments of signifiance in Swann's love for Odette. Swann facialises one of Botticelli's paintings on Odette. He likens her to the female figure in the painting and he builds his love for Odette on this resemblance. Then, he facialises his love for Odette on Vinteuil's sonata. Whenever he hears this sonata it ignites his love for Odette. Hence, for Swann, "a thing must always recall something else, in a network of interpretations under the sign of the signifier" (185). Secondly, subjectification takes place when Swann's love for Odette turns into a passionate obsession through Odette's cool aloofness and Swann's piecemeal discovery of Odette's lies and infidelities. Consequently, Swann falls into deep "jealousy, querulous delusion, and erotomania" (186). Finally, with a countermovement, Swann is able to dismantle all faciality although it does not help him being trapped in a disgraceful marriage to Odette, a marriage built around Odette's indifference and self-interest and Swann's amateur "aestheticism" which falls back on Odette again. There is no love lost between the two:

> [A]t the end of his long passion, Swann attends a reception where he sees the faces of the servants and guests *disaggregate* into autonomous aesthetic traits, as if the line of picturality regained its independence, both beyond the wall and outside the black hole. Then Vinteuil's little phrase regains its transcendence and renews its connection with a still more intense, asignifying, and asubjective line of pure musicality. And Swann knows that he no longer loves Odette and, above all, that Odette will never again love him. (186)

It is now Proust's narrator's turn to try it out, "to break through the wall and out of the hole". Deleuze & Guattari emphasise that, Proust is an expert in leading his main character to get out of the hole, to break down the wall and do away with faciality "uniquely through art" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 186). With the exception of Proust and Beckett's French half, Deleuze & Guattari are critical about the French novel in its handling of faciality:

> The French novel is profoundly pessimistic and idealistic, "critical of life rather than creative of life." It stuffs its characters down the hole and bounces them off the wall. It can only conceive of organized voyages, and of salvation only through art, a still Catholic salvation, in other words, salvation through eternity. It spends its time plotting points instead of drawing lines, active lines of flight or of positive deterritorialization. (186)

Deleuze & Guattari emphasise, on the other hand, incomparable superiority of the Anglo-American novel in the perspective of dismantling faciality:

> From Hardy to Lawrence, from Melville to Miller, the same cry rings out: Go across, get out, breakthrough, make a beeline, don't get stuck on a point. Find the line of separation, follow it or create it, to the point of treachery. That is why their relationship to other civilizations, to the Orient or South America, and also to drugs and voyages in place, is entirely different from that of the French. They know how difficult it is to get out of the black hole of subjectivity, of consciousness and memory, of the couple and conjugality. (187)

Deleuze, in fact, defines the aim of writing as losing one's face and identity in it. For him, the sole end of writing is "to lose one's face, to jump over or pierce through the wall, to plane down the wall very patiently" (Deleuze 1987: 45). When one does away with his or her face, he or she has the liberty of a probing head. This was, Deleuze indicates, the problem of both Lawrence and Miller:

> Miller's problem (like Lawrence's): how to unmake the face, by liberating in ourselves the questing heads which trace the lines of becoming? How to get past the wall while avoiding bouncing back on it, behind, or being crushed? How to get out of the black hole instead of whirling round in its depths, which particles to get out of the black hole? How to shatter even our love in order to become finally capable of loving? How to become imperceptible? (45-6)

In terms of poetry, Virginia Woolf points to some changes in modern poetry in comparison with the poetry of Tennyson and Christina Rossetti who can be considered

as two poets of faciality in its romantic assemblage. The first change in poetry Woolf observes is that, it deterritorialises the old feelings which were familiar and easy to respond; and consequently, it also deterritorialises the reader's ability to memorise: modern poetry resists being committed to memory. Woolf's observation is as follows:

> [T]he living poets express a feeling that is actually being made and torn out of us at the moment. One does not recognise it in the first place; often for some reason one fears it; one watches it with keenness and compares it jealously and suspiciously with the old feeling that one knew. Hence the difficulty of modern poetry; and it is because of this difficulty that one cannot remember more than two consecutive lines of any good modern poet. (Woolf 1989: 14)

Woolf here is not only talking about a simple metaphorical "defamiliarisation" of the same feelings through style and vocabulary of the poet, but a complete change, deterritorialisation and metamorphosis of feelings together with the dismantling of the category of recognition which pertains to the strata of faciality. Modern poetry dismantles "romance" more than anything. Overwhelmed with nostalgia on one hand, and disillusionment on the other, Woolf seeks whom to blame for that:

> Shall we lay blame on the war? When the guns fired in August 1914, did the faces of men and women show so plain in each other's eyes that romance was killed? Certainly, it was a shock (to women in particular with their illusions about education, and so on) to see the faces of our rulers in the light of the shell-fire. So ugly they looked—German, English, French—so stupid. But lay the blame where one will, on whom one will, the illusion which inspired Tennyson and Christina Rossetti to sing so passionately about the coming of their loves is far rarer now than then. (15)

The above paragraph shows that Deleuze & Guattari are not alone in comparing the face to a horror story: not only those of parents, but also those of lovers and political leaders as they serve, respectively, the domestic, passional and political powers. Defacialisation will also bring together necessary changes in these three domains. What defines these three domains in dominant social formations is oedipalism: the oedipal holy family, the lovers' complaint with a deep oedipal need to be loved, and the oedipal model of the State power which "makes the despot into one of its images" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 267). What, then, is the modern poets' dismantling of romance pregnant to? Do they, like Lawrence and Miller in fiction, "shatter" romance until both men and women at liberty "become finally capable of" true romance in which no power of

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faciality, no interpretation and no egotism is involved? Poetry is beyond the scope of this study, but Virginia Woolf's observations, and her own line of flight in *A Room of One's Own* will be examined in connection with the above questions.

DEMO 1: Undoing the Face of the Patriarch and Mrs. Seton's Becoming

If Kafka is the bower bird of literature, Virginia Woolf is the nesting fish of the ocean of fiction with her double task of encouraging her school of "little fish" to come out of their "hiding" which had been carved out for them by the patriarchal society for "300 years" and leading them into a new territory of their own. This twofold task accords with the twofold movement of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation which is at once (micro)political, (micro)economic and aesthetic. In *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf gives voice to a woman's resistance to the strata and faciality as organisations of power. Her monumental struggle for territory has a spatiotemporal dimension. Thus Woolf stresses that "a woman must have money and a room of her own if she has to write fiction" (1989: 4). A separate room provides space for an uninterrupted act of writing and a fixed income secures its temporal continuity; spatial self-expression or art is coupled with temporal self-support or economy. Yet, there are some other dimensions which are more related to a fixed income as will be dealt with in the following pages.

The territory women seek (a territory for art) is more primal than the territory in art since the former is not production but the condition which will make production possible. Two different works can be compared as two different perspectives on Deleuze & Guattari's dictum that art begins "with the house": Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* and Klee's painting *Perspective on a Room with Occupants*.[36] The former is a struggle for art, a call for the freedom of desire and the construction of a factory; the latter, on the other hand, is pure art, desire in itself and production in a factory.[37] The

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[36] The choice of Klee's painting here has no other reason than being a work of art. Deleuze & Guattari also mention this painting dated 1921 in relation to territory in art. Hubert reproduces a copy of it in his essay on Klee's paintings (1977: 86).

[37] Deleuze & Guattari describe both the productivity in a work of art and the productivity of the unconscious with the production in a factory or a workshop as opposed to a theatre and staging which recall representation. Woolf is also fond of comparing London to a "a machine", "a workshop", a "factory", and its important buildings, such as the "the British Museum", to departments of that factory (1989: 26).

former is more controversial and is never free of aggression: "Why did men drink wine and women water? Why was one sex so prosperous and the other so poor? What effect has poverty on fiction?" (Woolf 1989: 4). But active and vitalistic feeling of aggression must be distinguished from reactive and nihilistic feeling of resentment. The former is a natural instinct against stratification like a growing plant's resistance to the law of gravity, and a natural controversy against opinion, against the opinion which stuffs one "down the hole", and bounces him or her "off the wall." In the case of women, Woolf expresses this in a charge "against the Fellows and Scholars" as follows: "in protection of their turf, which has been rolled for 300 years in succession, they had sent my little fish into hiding" (6).

Woolf begins her book on women and fiction with the keenness of a Foucauldian archaeologist and considers her problem with a threefold task: what women are like, the fiction written by them and "the fiction that is written about them". Considering that the topic is highly controversial and the task seems inconclusive, Woolf settles on using "all the liberties and licences of a novelist" to explain the string of ideas which led her to her own inference "about the room and the money" through the eyes of an aesthetic figure, Mary Seton. Woolf's task can be seen as the undoing of the face of the patriarch, modifying the way women mirror that face, and undoing her own potential reaction as a counter-face of rage and hatred. When Mary Seton sets about such a task, she is haunted by the face and figures of the patriarchal power throughout the book both as the form of content (e.g. the figure of the beadle to intercept her on the grass plot and the faces of lovers imagined) and the form of expression (e.g., shocking faces of the rulers "in the light of the shell-fire" and "the portrait of a grandfather by Romney" as a pathetic device to evince patriarchal power or so-called superiority of men).

Mrs. Seton, while taking notes on what is written about women in the library of the British Museum, she is surprised to see that women not only attract doctors and biologists but men of all professions and qualifications, and wonders why women are "so much more interesting to men than men are to women" (28). Many titles of the books in the catalogues read something like *X's opinion about Women*. Some honour women; and some others despise and humiliate them. When Mrs. Seton encounters a book entitled *The Mental, Moral, and Physical Inferiority of the Female Sex* written by

a Professor von X., she cannot retain her composure. It is the moment when the haunting faciality of the patriarch is reflected in her reactive unconscious of the reactive apparatus in Nietzschean terms, in its most concrete form, and she projects it down in her notebook with a pencil:

> I had unconsciously, in my listlessness, in my desperation, been drawing a picture […] I had been drawing a face, a figure. It was the face and the figure of Professor von X. engaged in writing his monumental work […] He was not in my picture a man attractive to women. He was heavily built; he had a great jowl; to balance that he had very small eyes; he was very red in the face. […] Drawing pictures was an idle way of finishing an unprofitable morning's work. Yet it is in our idleness, in our dreams, that the submerged truth sometimes comes to the top. A very elementary exercise in psychology, not to be dignified by the name of psycho-analysis, showed me, on looking at my notebook, that the sketch of the angry professor has been made in anger. Anger had snatched my pencil while I dreamt. (Woolf 1989: 31)

In a state of despair and being "flushed in anger", Mrs. Seton cannot help the traces in her reactive unconscious infest her consciousness, that is, the surface layer of her reactive apparatus. The professor's statement about the inferiority of women "had aroused the demon" inside her: "One does not like to be told that one is naturally the inferior of a little man" (32). The paralysis of her inhibitive apparatus or her faculty of forgetting is only temporary, and she undoes the face literally but is unable to tell the reason behind the professor's and other intellects' anger which can be explained with nothing but *ressentiment*:

> One has certain foolish vanities. It is only human nature, I reflected, and began drawing cart wheels and circles over the angry professor's face till he looked like a burning bush or a flaming comet—anyhow, an apparition without human semblance or significance. The professor was nothing now but a faggot burning on the top of Hampstead Heath. Soon my own anger was explained and done with; but curiosity remained. How explain the anger of professors? Why were they angry? (32)

By undoing the face of the resenting transgressor, Mrs. Seton also undoes the counter-face which is about to rouse inside her and breaks down her mirror. By destroying both face (moved by "the red light of emotion"), Mrs. Seton recovers her questing or probing head (seeking "the white light of truth") without a face and looks for what is behind those faces, that of the professor and others: "But why, […] why I

repeated, […] why are they angry?" (Woolf 1989: 33). In a quick glance at a newspaper with her awakened questing head, Mrs. Seton realises how deeply England is ruled by the same mentality of the professor:

> Nobody in their senses could fail to detect the dominance of the professor. His was the power and the money and the influence. He was the proprietor of the paper and its editor and sub-editor. He was the Foreign Secretary and the judge. […] With the exception of the fog he seemed to control everything. Yet he was angry. (33-4)

One possible answer that Mary Seton thinks of for the professor's anger against women and his reducing them to the ranks of inferiors in all aspects is a dialectical one: "Possibly when the professor insisted a little too emphatically upon the inferiority of women, he was concerned not with their inferiority but with his own superiority" (34). This dialectical reasoning gives women an important role in men's building of their own faciality as the power of patriarchy.

In fact, parallel with the above dialectical reasoning, Mrs Seton portrays domestic women of the past as looking-glasses which double the size of the figure of their men at the service of patriarchy and to the benefit of its facial power. She writes, "Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man twice its natural size" (35). Domestic women had no face of their own, or rather they had concave mirrors in its place acting as machines for converting the form of content (a man) into a form of expression (his oversized image). Woolf also puts forth that both the heroes of all civilisation and despots needed women as mirrors; as a rule of geometric optics, the more concave, hollow and repressed a mirror is, the bigger is the reflection in it:

> Whatever may be their use in civilised societies, mirrors are essential to all violent and heroic action. This is why Napoleon and Mussolini both insist so emphatically upon the inferiority of women, for if they were not inferior, they would cease to enlarge. (36)

In early twentieth century women undergo certain changes. All potential changes that women may undergo can be summarized as having active molecular and reactive molar poles. On the molecular and active pole, there are women who reject being mirrors of man and women who become probe heads or questing heads without wearing

a face. On the molar pole there are women who want to have a face of their own (a face which is never without rage against the other sex). And between these both poles, there are women who want to reflect men as they are (without doubling their size). The latter are still mirrors; not concave anymore but plain mirrors. Hence they have the potential of being either molar and reactive, or molecular and active, depending on the source of their motivation and their logic of reasoning.

The State apparatus and politics always have a molar argument following a Hegelian logic of negation which Nietzsche criticizes for being the logic of slaves. In Mrs. Seton's interpretation, it is the logic of Napoleon and Mussolini, and it builds the rightfulness of the self on the wrongness of the other. Deleuze illustrates this logic in a simple statement: "You are evil, therefore I am good". The form of this logic can be modified as "You do not love me, therefore you are evil", "It is your mistake if I am not beautiful enough", and so on. If this logic is translated into what Mrs. Seton attributes to Napoleon and Mussolini, we have something like "Women are inferior, therefore men are superior". Deleuze shows the error in this logic as follows:

> We can guess what the creature of *ressentiment* wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good. *You are evil, therefore I am good*; this is the slave's fundamental formula, […] "in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" [Nietzsche]. The slave needs, to set the other up as evil *from the outset*. (Deleuze 1996: 119)

Only through the negation of the other can the slave posit his or her absent self as rightful. This logic leads to a short-term destruction of the other (but this can be fatal), but in the long run, it is self-destructive: in reducing the other, one reduces him- or herself and uplifts the other (this is the essence of Hegelian *Aufhebung* and the main reason why Nietzsche hates the dialectic so much). If it ever happens and the slave becomes the master of the old master, he or she repeats the latter as the only model in the absence of an alternative and even becomes worse than the old master. Hence Deleuze argues, "Underneath the Hegelian image of the master we always find the slave" (10) and this makes Hegel a theorist of faciality par excellence. When the former slave becomes master, he or she does not stop being a slave and falls into what he or she

criticized before. It is always a déjà vu with different actors; same "evil" deeds and same hostility presides in the eternal yesterday or worse today.

Nietzsche replaces this slave logic with his logic of the masters: "I am good, therefore you are evil." This new logic is fully affirmative, active and positive. This is another sense of the Deleuzian idea of aristocracy which does not come by descent. What Nietzsche calls master is not one who wants to become a master: this is only a false interpretation of his will to power. For Nietzsche the master represents active forces and affirmative will which affirms life.[38] The noble, the aristocrat or the true master is the one who can first say, "I am right" by actively positing his or her own positive difference, and then he or asserts "therefore you are evil" only in conclusion in order to protect him- and herself against the interference, *ressentiment*, destructiveness and contagiousness of the slave morality. Deleuze calls this concluding defensive part ("therefore you are evil") a positive "aggression".

One illustration of the logic of the master in *A Room of One's Own* can be seen in Mrs. Seton's discussion about Rebecca West who is portrayed as a plain mirror who reflects men as they are by shrinking them to their actual size. As stated above, being a mirror can either be active or reactive, it may function either through the logic of the master or through the slave logic of the dialectic. In the case of Rebecca West, Mrs. Seton argues that men have no right to call her "an arrant feminist" for expressing her self-difference or for expressing her own sentiments that make her different from any other object or household appliance. If Rebecca West has an aggressive tone, it is a natural reaction of the transgressed to the transgressor. Hence Rebecca West is not motivated by slavish desire to become a master. She only wants to be her own master without the intervention of the other sex. For that reason, Mrs. Seton cannot understand when a man named "Z, most humane, most modest of men", reads a paragraph from Rebecca West and cries, "The arrant feminist! She says that men are snobs!":

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[38] Deleuze quotes the following from Nietzsche's *Will to Power*: "Where I found a living creature, there I found will to power; and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master" (1996: 205n11). For that reason, the true Nietzschean master does not want to be a master in the molar sense of politics. He or she never involves in any dominant formations of power but flees them. Hence, one will never find a true Nietzschean master in molar politics, neither in leading political parties nor in opposition.

> [W]hy was Miss West an arrant feminist for making possibly true if uncomplimentary statement about the other sex?—was not merely the cry of wounded vanity; it was a protest against some infringement of his power to believe in himself. (Woolf 1989: 35)

Rebecca West is a Nietzschean master, in that, contrary to women of the past, she does not serve the established power of the patriarchy, and she attempts to demystify, defacialise this power which is an illusion. It is appalling even for the most "humane" and "modest" man to hear the truth about himself from a woman for the first time. Modern women are no longer concave mirrors, they are now plain mirrors, or, at their best, no mirrors at all but questing heads.

It must also be indicated that being a plain mirror is not free of dangers, and reflection should be made only in conclusion for the sole reason that human beings are not worthy of good mirrors. They are not capable of reflecting even a simple object as it is (let alone a person of the other sex, let alone another person of the same sex and let alone his or her own self). They either shrink or increase the size of what they reflect. This is one of the main reasons why Deleuze & Guattari fight against faciality, namely, signifiance (interpretation, representation, etc.) and subjectivity ("I think as a man/woman …", "Everybody knows that …", etc.). The real problem for Deleuze & Guattari, prior to the dialectical history of patriarchy (Ulysses, Oedipus, Jesus Christ, faciality, etc.), prior to the dialectical formation of femininity and masculinity as faces (organisms and subjects) in binary oppositions, is that of the body which is common to both genders:

> The question is fundamentally that of the body—the body they *steal* from us in order to fabricate opposable organisms. This body is stolen first from the girl: Stop behaving like that, you're not a little girl anymore, you're not a tomboy, etc. The girl's becoming is stolen first, in order to impose a history, or prehistory, upon her. The boy's turn comes next, but it is by using the girl as an example, by pointing to the girl as the object of his desire, that an opposed organism, a dominant history is fabricated for him too. The girl is the first victim, but she must also serve as an example and a trap. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 276)

The dominant history fabricated for the boy in Deleuze & Guattari's above account is in line with Woolf's Mrs. Seton's dialectical account of the patriarchy which produced Napoleons and Mussolinis. Deleuzian becoming aims to reverse that

dialectical process of history as the history of the slave morality. In the previous chapter it was discussed that there was no becoming molar for Deleuze & Guattari. Molarity is a dead end for them: God is dead, and there is no becoming-God of man; man is dead, and there is no becoming-man of woman, woman (in the molar sense) is dead, and there is no becoming woman of the girl. The girl is the molecular beginning since the first stolen body was hers. The Body without Organs is the reconstruction of that body which takes the girl as a model: Virginia Woolf's school of "little fish", Lewis Carroll's Alice with Humpty Dumpty, Proust's band of young girls at Balbec, and so on. The girl is a haecceity, a line of flight and a model of becoming for both men and women:

> Doubtless, the girl becomes a woman in the molar or organic sense. But conversely, becoming-woman or the molecular woman is the girl herself. The girl is certainly not defined by virginity; she is defined by a relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness, by a combination of atoms, an emission of particles: haecceity. She never ceases to roam upon a body without organs. She is an abstract line, or a line of flight. Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce *n* molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through. The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between, the intermezzo—that is what Virginia Woolf lived with all her energies, in all of her work, never ceasing to become. The girl is like the block of becoming that remains contemporaneous to each opposable term, man, woman, child, adult. It is not the girl who becomes a woman; it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 276-7)

Mrs. Seton in *A Room of One's Own* is Woolf's becoming-molecular. This is one of the reasons why she does not write such a serious work of nonfiction as Virginia Woolf but as *a* "Mrs Seton", or any proper name one wishes: "call me Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael or by any name you please—it is not a matter of any importance". It is not only to avoid saying, "I as Virginia Woolf …", but not to make the issue of "woman and fiction" a personal one. Mrs. Seton is not a subject of enunciation, she is a collectivity, a proper name, a haecceity. She is a becoming-woman par excellence, a molecular woman who is ready to forget her molar identity, to undo her loves and hates which make her a face or a counter-face of love and hatred. Mrs. Seton inherits two things from her aunt who dies in India: "the vote and the money", the former is molar, the latter molecular. They respectively pertain to a molar politics and a

molecular politics or micropolitics. Of course the vote was important, but Mrs. Seton argues, "Of the two—the vote and the money—the money, I own, seemed infinitely the more important" (37). In that choice Mrs. Seton seems well aware of the dangers of molarity and subjectivity which Deleuze & Guattari warn against:

> It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: "we as women ..." makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation. But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow. The song of life is often intoned by the driest of women, moved by *ressentiment,* the will to power and cold mothering. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 276)

Similarly, with her valorisation of the money, an annual income of five hundred pounds, over the vote, Mrs. Seton aims to recover and refine her own sentiments:

> What a change of temper a fixed income will bring about. No force in the world can take from me my five hundred pounds. Food, house and clothing are mine forever. Therefore not merely do effort and labour cease, but also hatred and bitterness. I need not hate any man; he cannot hurt me. I need not flatter any man; he has nothing to give me. So imperceptibly I found myself adopting a new attitude towards the other half of the human race. It was absurd to blame any class or any sex, as a whole. Great bodies of people are never responsible for what they do. They are driven by instincts which are not within their control. (Woolf 1989: 38)

This new attitude to the other gender is only the beginning of more changes resulting from the undoing of faciality through economic freedom. The other changes are as follows:

> Fear and bitterness modified themselves into pity and toleration; and then in a year or two, pity and toleration went, and the greatest release of all came, which is freedom to think of things in themselves. That building, for example, do I like it or not? Is that painting beautiful or not? Is that in my opinion a good book or a bad? Indeed my aunt's legacy unveiled the sky to me, and substituted for the large and imposing figure of a gentleman, which Milton recommended for my perpetual adoration, a view of the open sky. (39)

Swann in Proust's novel and Woolf's Mrs. Seton pass through different experiences of faciality, but in the end they are both able to dismantle it: Swann gains his aesthetic freedom through undoing the face of Odette, and Mrs. Seton gains her aesthetic freedom through undoing the face of patriarchy. Only after dismantling the face they are both

able to see autonomous aesthetic qualities in things. Things gain their own essence and value being never shadowed by faciality, representation, interpretation, subjectivity, and so on. The open sky unveiled for Mrs. Seton now has the potential of an aesthetic plane of composition and of the plane of immanence. She substitutes it for the transcendent plan of organisation shadowed by faciality represented as "the large and imposing figure of a gentleman".

In sum, when a woman has all the necessary conditions for producing a work of art, her work can be rightly compared with Klee's *Perspectives on a Room with Occupants*. Only when she has a room of her own, she can have *her own perspectives* on it with her own becoming(-woman) as Mrs. Seton puts it:

> The rooms differ so completely; they are calm or thunderous; open to the sea, or on the contrary, give on to a prison yard; are hung with washing; or alive with opals and silks; are hard as horsehair or soft as feathers—one has only to go into any room in any street for the whole of that extremely complex force of femininity to fly in one's face. How should it be otherwise? For women have sat indoors all these millions of years, so that by this time the very walls are permeated by their creative force, which has, indeed, so overcharged, the capacity of bricks and mortar that it must needs harness itself to pens and brushes and business and politics. But this creative power differs greatly from the creative power of men. […] It would be a thousand pities if women wrote like men, or lived like men, or looked like men. (Woolf 1989: 87-8)

In the above lines Mrs. Seton, in a similar way to Deleuze & Guattari, shows her antipathies for women's becoming-molar or becoming-man in writing. Deleuze & Guattari also suggest that a woman's writing "should produce a becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing and impregnating an entire social field" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 276). There is in fact a becoming-woman specific to the writing of novels as discussed in the previous chapter. Deleuze & Guattari illustrate this especially in the case of Lawrence and Miller who are known as "the most virile, the most phallocratic" novelists (276).[39]

For both male and female writers, becoming-woman is the first step and the first line of flight in becoming-imperceptible through the dismantling of the organism, in becoming-indiscernible through the undoing of signifiance, and in becoming-

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[39] For a discussion of Woolf's idea of androgyny in relation to becoming-woman see Chapter Three above.

impersonal through the undoing of subjectivity. In writing, one abandons the three strata. One becomes "anorganic", "asignifying", "asubjective": a body without organs and a faceless probe-head as an adjacent part of that body.

4.2. Micropolitics of Writing and the Lines of Flight: The Case of Anglo-American Literature

4.2.1. The Writer versus the Author

In his essay 'On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature' in *Dialogues*, Deleuze makes a distinction between the author as "the subject of enunciation" and the writer as a "proper name" of assemblage. An author is primarily defined with the identifications and the distances he or she creates. In either case he or she speaks for the people, in their place, and compels the reader to do so:

> The author, as subject of enunciation, is first of all a spirit: sometimes he identifies with his characters or makes us identify with them, or with the idea which they represent; sometimes, on the other hand, he introduces a distance which allows him and us to observe, to criticize, to prolong. But this is no good. The author creates a world, but there is no world which awaits us to be created. Neither identification nor distance, neither proximity nor remoteness, for, in all these cases, one is led to speak for, in the place of. (1987: 52)

An author's identifications and distances are the two authoritarian traps which Deleuze warns us against:

> There are many neurotics and lunatics in the world who do not let go of us until they have managed to reduce us to their state, pass us their poison, hysterics, narcissists, their contagion is insidious. There are many doctors and scholars who offer us a sanitized scientific observation, who are also true lunatics, paranoiacs. One must resist both of the traps, the one which offers us the mirror of contamination and identifications, and the one which points out to us the observation of the understanding. (Deleuze 1987: 53)

When Deleuze writes against neurotics, lunatics, hysterics and narcissists in literature, he mostly has in mind the French literature which he refers to as a "eulogy of neurosis". He identifies a "mania for judging and being judged", a hysteric craving "to be loved", and "a huge incapacity to love and admire" in some specific French authors (50). Deleuze also agrees with Lawrence's criticism of French literature that it is

"incurably intellectual, ideological and idealist, essentially critical, critical of life rather than creative of life" (Deleuze 1987: 49-50).

A writer, on the other hand, has the sympathy to speak with "the world, with a part of the world, with people". Deleuze maintains that sympathy is not a judgement, nor is it "a vague feeling of respect or of spiritual participation" (52). Sympathy is an assembling of bodies which either "love or hate" each other. These bodies can be social, psychic, biological or verbal populations. Hence, what defines a writer as distinct from an author is the former's production of assemblages:

> The writer invents assemblages starting from assemblages which have invented him, he makes one multiplicity pass into another. The difficult part is making all the elements of a non-homogeneous set converge, making them function together. Structures are linked to conditions of homogeneity, but assemblages are not. The assemblage is co-functioning, it is "sympathy", symbiosis. […] We only have sympathy to struggle and to write, Lawrence used to say. But sympathy is something to be reckoned with, it is a bodily struggle, hating what threatens and infects life, loving where it proliferates (no posterity or lineage, but a proliferation ...). (51-2, 53)

Writing with sympathy and love, then, becomes a flux which oscillates between destruction and creation in a line of flight and affirms an impersonal life beyond the resentments and judgements of any subjects. The writer is not a subject of enunciation, but a depersonalised "proper name" admitting of multiplicities which pervade and surround him or her. All enunciation is a collective assemblage; and all statements, written or spoken, do not belong to an individual subjectively, but are produced by the machinic assemblages in which the individual is situated. Being a proper name depends on the full awareness of that fact: "Even when you think you're writing on your own, you're always doing it with someone else you can't always name" (Deleuze 1995: 141). Deleuze's following statements, for instance, both define the proper name as a "desert", and illustrate the discourse proper to it:

> In each of us there is, as it were, an ascesis, in part turned against ourselves. We are deserts, but populated by tribes, flora and fauna. We pass out time in ordering these tribes, arranging them in other ways, getting rid of some and encouraging others to prosper. And all these clans, all these crowds, do not undermine the desert, which is our very ascesis; on the contrary they inhabit it, they pass through it, over it. […] The desert, experimentation on oneself, is

our only identity, our single chance for all the combinations which inhabit us. […] We should have so much liked to be something else. (Deleuze 1987: 11)

Proper names indicate a "nonpersonal" individuation, or the individuality of an event which is called a haecceity. Both proper names and haecceities "belong primarily to forces, events, motions and sources of movement, winds, typhoons, diseases, places and moments, rather than people" (Deleuze 1995: 34). As an example of nonpersonal individuations in Anglo-American literature, Deleuze mentions Thomas Hardy and his characters who "are not people or subjects" but "collections of intensive [and variable] sensations" (Deleuze 1987: 39-40). Deleuze observes a remarkable "respect for the individual" in Hardy's work for the reason that

> he saw himself and saw others as so many "unique chances"—the unique chance from which one combination or another had been drawn. Individuation without a subject. And these packets of sensations in the raw, these collections or combinations, run along the lines of chance, or mischance, where their encounters take place—if need be, their bad encounters which lead to death, to murder. Hardy invokes a sort of Greek destiny for this empiricist experimental world. (40)

The discourse of betrayal is the dominant discourse in Deleuze's 'On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature' specifically for the reason that it deals with "betrayal" or treachery as a positive and fundamental aspect of creative lines of flight as opposed to the deceptive and negative plots of trickery: "The creative theft of the traitor, as against the plagiarisms of the trickster" (41). Deleuze compares the traitor to "a simple man who no longer has any past or future", and the trickster, to "an orderly man ordering his future" (40). Deleuze mentions Flaubert's Madame Bovary as an example of a trickster. For Deleuze, Shakespeare's tragedies also abound in trickster-kings except Richard III, who is a traitor-king par excellence, nobler than all the other kings in Shakespeare's tragedies. Richard III is "not shap'd for sportive tricks" though "determined to prove a villain" (Shakespeare 1974: 712, 713). All his deeds prove him to have been motivated by the sole dream of being the greatest traitor to everything and by the unique desire to betray all the tricksters around him. Deleuze argues that,

> Shakespeare put on the stage many trickster-kings, who came to the throne by trickery, and who in the last analysis turn out to be good kings. But when he encounters Richard III he rises to the height of the most novelistic of tragedies.

> For Richard III does not simply want power, he wants treason. He does not want the conquest of the state, but the assemblage of a war-machine: how can he be the only traitor, and betray all simultaneously? (Deleuze 1987: 41-2)

Richard knows very well that he cannot trust Lady Anne whose husband and father-in-law he has murdered, but he still chooses and wins her as his wife only to betray her later as he says "Was ever woman in this humour woo'd? / Was ever woman in this humour won? / I'll have her, but I will not keep her long" (Shakespeare 1974: 717). Lady Anne's consent to marry Richard proves her doubly treacherous as well: she betrays her murdered ex-husband and is a potential traitor to her new husband. Richard finds his double in Lady Anne, and she is his becoming:

> Anne, already consenting and fascinated, has a presentiment of the tortuous line which Richard is tracing. And nothing reveals treason better than the choice of object. Not because it is a choice of object—a poor notion—but because it is a becoming, it is the demonic element *par excellence*. In his choice of Anne there is a woman-becoming in Richard III. (Deleuze 1987: 42)

In the history of England, Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 125) mention only Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), the leader of the English revolution, as the only traitor to the State apparatus or the British monarchy. But so was the historical Richard III. In his usurpation of the throne from the twelve-year-old heir of his brother King Edward IV, he devises a war machine, which is not very common among the kings of England, against the state Apparatus of his brother's widow Queen Elizabeth Woodville and her unpopular and deceitful kinsmen. It is true that he confines his two little nephews, the princes, to the Tower of London; but history presents no evidence of his involvement in their assassination in the tower.[40] What is usually known about war machines primarily depends on the State apparatus, on what the state historians write about them. Richard III seems to have been the victim of a similar treatment by his enemies, Queen Elisabeth Woodville's party and the Tudor dynasty since, as it is stated that,

> Although Richard, the last king of the house of York, did usurp the throne, little doubt exists that his unscrupulousness has been overemphasized by his enemies and by Tudor historians seeking to strengthen the Lancastrian

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[40] 'Richard III', *Microsoft Encarta* 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.

position. His baseness is strongly exaggerated in Shakespeare's play *Richard III*.[41]

In exaggerating the baseness of Richard III, Shakespeare seems to have served the State apparatus, but his historical source to Richard's short reign (1483-1485) was definitely so.[42] Yet, regardless of to what extent Shakespeare exaggerates Richard III, he makes him no less a betrayer, and no less a war machine. Shakespeare's Richard often talks about secret plans, but the readers know well that he has no secrets or other plans apart from keeping the throne for himself and whatever this plan may require.

War machines have a single secret in one of the following two ways. They are either "the wrath of God" against the State apparatus as in the Myth of Babel; or they have a contract with the demon as in the story of Cain in the Old Testament. But in the end, when the wrath is fulfilled or the contract is breached, war machines either destroy themselves or pass into the power of the State. In Shakespeare's *Richard III*, Richard Plantagenet's self destruction begins with his murdering of Lady Anne, his wife and double. And when he orders the murdering of his two nephews, the princes, in the Tower of London, he passes into the service of the State apparatus represented by his rival Henry (the earl of Richmond and later the first Tudor king Henry VII) outside the palace and by his deceptive friend Lord Stanley (step-father to Henry) who is double dealing from inside the palace. These two representatives benefit more from the murder of the two princes since this causes Richard to lose his popularity, on the one hand, and Henry gets rid of possible threats to his already-guaranteed future throne in advance, on the other. After the death of Richard in the battlefield, no male representative of the Plantagenet family is left (thanks to Richard) except Queen Elisabeth, the widow of Edward IV, and her daughter whom Henry can marry and finish the Wars of the Roses. Although Shakespeare has not written a play on him, Henry VII is typically Shakespearean. He comes to the throne with treachery and turns out to be a good king:

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[41] Ibid.

[42] This source was Thomas More, as Kastan writes that, "The story of Richard's rise and fall derives from an account by English statesman Thomas More, written about 1513" (Kastan, David Scott, 'William Shakespeare.' *Microsoft Encarta* 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation). More was also a close friend of Tudor king Henry VIII from 1510 to 1532 when Henry VIII got into a conflict with the papal authority.

the opposite of Richard III who comes to the throne with no treachery but betrayal and becomes the worst king ever.

In sum, Deleuze regards betrayal as an important aspect of lines of flight. What he primarily means with betrayal is the assembling of a war machine against the dominant relations of power. Deleuze is more concerned about war-machines and betrayals which are "revolutionary, or artistic, rather than military" (Deleuze 1995: 33). In betraying, one turns against "the fixed powers which try to hold [him or her] back, the established powers of the earth", "the world of dominant significations" and "the established order" (Deleuze 1987: 40, 41). Deleuze's claim that writing is betrayal must be understood in that perspective, thus he reflects: "What other reason is there for writing than to be traitor to one's own reign, traitor to one's sex, to one's class, to one's majority?" (44). When writing claims no right to a territory, it "weds a war-machine and lines of flight, abandoning the Strata, segmentarities, sedentarity, the State apparatus" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 24).

For Deleuze (1995: 7), writing is not a signifying "code" but an indiscernible "flow". The writer resists all codifications, does away with his or her own ego and becomes a shadow in writing. This view is in harmony with Henry Miller's treatment of writing as becoming indistinguishable. Miller argues that writing is an event of being "absorbed in the common stream," of "becom[ing] a fish again and not a freak of nature". "The only benefit", Miller goes on to reflect, "which the act of writing could offer me was to remove the differences which separated me from my fellow man" (quotes Deleuze 1987: 52). The writer becomes indiscernible, imperceptible and asignifying in writing. Yet, his or her polytonal discourse produces real bodies and true existences. He or she invents new possibilities of life and new ways of existing.

The writer's discourse has "a view to an unborn people that doesn't yet have a language" (Deleuze 1995: 143). There is nothing personal in that discourse: "You don't write with your ego, your memory, and your illnesses" (143). Writing turns out to be a new experience in becoming and veritable experimentation in itself. An author's discourse is the opposite of this. It is too personal and representational, and it has a perverse assumption of experience: "the author first does things and then tells us about

them" in a discourse of "the system 'I've seen a lot and been lots of places'" (Deleuze 1995: 134). This system of writing is only a sterile expression of a narcissist's life, and it never leads one to vital experimentation and creative production. The metamorphosis and deterritorialisations of a writer are opposed to the mimesis, territorialities and reterritorialisations of an author. Deleuze contrasts "too historical, cultural and organized" travels of the French authors who "are content to transport their 'egos'"[43] with revolutionary flights of Anglo-American writers "who know how to leave" following active, vital, long but broken lines of flight, and who know how "to scramble the codes, to cause the flows circulate, to traverse the desert of the body without organs" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 132-3). Deleuze indicates:

> Thomas Hardy, Melville, Stevenson, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe, Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Miller, Kerouac. In them everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside. They create a new Earth; but perhaps the movement of the earth is deterritorialization itself. American literature operates according to geographical lines: the flight towards the West, the discovery that the true East is in the West, the sense of the frontiers as something to cross, to push back, to go beyond. The becoming is geographical. There is no equivalent in France. (1987: 36-7)

4.2.2. Segmentation or the Lines of Life

In geographical terms, not only stratification (e.g. the three strata), but also segmentation (e.g. linearity) are indispensable in accounting for anything, including people. Deleuze remarks that everyone is "made up of very varied lines", and that, "there is a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight, etc." (1987: 10). Deleuze & Guattari distinguish between three geographical segments or lines that are present in life and society as well as in all other things (1996a: 195-8, 212-22). These three lines are respectively molar and sedentary lines of *rigid segmentation*, molecular and migrant lines of *supple segmentation* and abstract and nomadic *lines of flight*.

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[43] Proust and Beckett, half of whom Deleuze considers French, are two exceptions for Deleuze. It must also be noted that, Deleuze's criticism of French literature can never be generalised, and his criticism of certain French authors cover their specific works alone, not their whole oeuvre. In addition, Deleuze's critical discourse, must be read positively as a form of self-criticism.

The first type of lines, of rigid segmentarity, stands for a life that is spatially and socially well-planned with clear-cut territories and statues (room, house, school, workplace, army, district, town, city, state; family, colleagues, townsfolk, nation, and so on). Life is organised in contiguous circles and conjugal relations, yet it has strictly segmented and nonflexible boundaries "to ensure and control the identity of each agency, including personal identity" with a future orientation ("Now you're not a baby anymore"; "You're not at home now", and so on) (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 195; Deleuze 1987: 124). Deleuze (1987: 128-30) notes three main characteristics of rigid segmentations:

1. The segments hinge on binary machines "of social classes; of sexes, man-woman; of ages, child-adult; of races, black-white; of sectors, public-private; of subjectivations, ours-not ours". There is a whole "macropolitics" involved.

2. Segmentary codes and territories are determined by various "devices of power" ("Do not approach my territory, it is I who give the orders here"). The overcoding of segments and ordering of their relations are carried by an abstract machine of overcoding, and finally, the abstract machine is not controlled but effectuated by the State apparatus (e.g. the abstract machine of central bank). The relationship between the State apparatus and the abstract machines is one of interdependence.

3. All rigid segments encircle a plane of organisation which carries out both the development of forms and the formation of subjects. This plane "always has at its disposal a supplementary dimension (overcoding)" in the form of a secret which overwhelms its possessor ("See, I am bending under the burden of my secret, see what mystery resides within me").

The lines of the second type, of supple segmentation, are formed by molecular flows which carry the segments to a threshold of imperceptibility. Supple segments, Deleuze notes, "trace out little modifications, they make detours, they sketch out rises and falls: but they are no less precise for all this, they even direct irreversible processes" (124). More determined and internal relations of couples in the first kind of lines are replaced by less territorial relations of doubles which "are always external to themselves" and which "concern flows and particles eluding those classes, sexes, and persons" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 196). Supple segments are no less collective and no less real than the

rigid segments. We have "masses" instead of classes, and masses as micro-becomings do not have the same rhythm as classes. Macropolitics and molar organisation are replaced by micropolitics and molecular composition. Smallness or suppleness of molecular composition never means "that it is any less coexistensive with the entire social field than molar organization" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 215). The secret becomes an empty form in the line of supple segmentation. How it is handled becomes more important than what the secret is: "what counts is the form of the secret; the matter no longer even has to be discovered" (197). Supple segmentation dismantles rigid segments by molecularising them and causing them to leak and flow in all sides. But this does not mean that supple segmentation is better. It may prove as harmful as, or even more harmful than, rigid segmentation since "everything it dismantles it reassembles on its own level: micro-Oedipuses, microformations of power, microfascisms" (205). Supple or molecular segmentation relates to desire more than rigid and molar one, but its microformations have the danger of turning desire against itself in such a way that "desire desire[s] its own repression" (215). Deleuze & Guattari elucidate the negativity of supple segmentation in relation to desire as follows:

> The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. (215)

Hence, rigid and supple segmentations have a reciprocal relationship and each type of segmentation leads to the other. Supple lines leak from rigid ones, and rigid lines are formed of supple ones.[44]

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[44] Deleuze & Guattari write on the reciprocality of both lines that, "*the notion of mass is a molecular notion* operating according to a type of segmentation irreducible to the molar segmentarity of class. Yet classes are indeed fashioned from masses; they crystallize them. And masses are constantly flowing or leaking from classes" (1996a: 213).

Finally, in addition to rigid and supple segmentation, we have the line of flight in a completely different line. The line of flight cuts across both segments and reaches "an 'absolute' threshold" where "[t]here are no longer secrets" (Deleuze 1987: 127). Molar classes and molecular masses, molar couples and molecular doubles all give way to becomings, "becoming-everyone" and "becoming-clandestine" on a plane of consistency: "A clandestine passenger on a motionless voyage" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 198). One becomes imperceptible in a line of flight and is led to unforeseeable destinations. Hence, it is the most experimental and the most creative of the three lines. And for the same reason, it may turn out to be the most dangerous since "it is capable of the worst, of bouncing off the wall, falling into a black hole, taking the path of greatest regression, and in its vagaries reconstructing the most rigid of segments" (205). Deleuze describes that,

> This line is simple, abstract, and yet is the most complex of all, the most tortuous: it is the line of gravity or velocity, the line of flight and of the greatest gradient [….] This line appears to arise (*surgir*) afterwards, to become detached from the two others, if indeed it succeeds in detaching itself. For perhaps there are people who do not have this line, who have only the two others, or who have only one, who live on only one. Nevertheless, in another sense, this line has always been there, although it is the opposite of a destiny: it does not have to detach itself from the others, rather it is the first, the others are derived from it. (Deleuze 1987: 125)

The line of flight has primacy over the other two lines. This primacy is neither chronological nor in terms of generality but is untimely in terms of a haecceity which constitutes a social field. The primacy of the lines of flight is one of the most important points Deleuze raises against the Marxist view of the primacy of dialectical contradictions in the formation of a society:

> [W]hat is primary in a society are the lines, the movements of flight. For, far from being a flight from the social, far from being Utopian or even ideological, these constitute the social field, trace out its gradation and its boundaries, the whole of its becoming. A Marxist can be quickly recognized when he says that a society contradicts itself, is defined by its contradictions, and in particular by its class contradictions. We would rather say that, in a society, everything flees and that a society is defined by its lines of flight which affect masses of all kinds (here again, 'mass' is a molecular notion). A society, but also a collective assemblage, is defined first by its points of deterritorialization, its fluxes of deterritorialization. (135)

Lines of flight were previously said to be "the most complex of all" three lines, yet it makes things seem even more complex when all three lines—namely, abstract or nomadic lines of flight, molecular or migrant lines of supple segmentation and molar or sedentary lines of rigid segmentation—coexist or blend in three possible ways. Hence, Deleuze's following explanation is important to avoid confusion, and it recapitulates the whole discussion about the three lines:

> [W]e sometimes say that there are at least three different lines, sometimes only two, sometimes only one which is very muddled. Sometimes three lines because the line of flight or rupture combines all the movements of deterritorialization, precipitates their quanta, tears from them the accelerated particles which come into contact with one another, carries them on to a plane of consistence or a mutating machine; and then a second, molecular line where the deterritorializations are merely relative, always compensated by reterritorializations which impose on them so many loops, detours, of equilibrium and stabilization; finally the molar line with clearly determined segments, where the reterritorializations accumulate to form a plane of organization and pass into an overcoding machine. Three lines, one of which would be like the nomadic line, another migrant and the third sedentary (the migrant is not at all the same as the nomadic). Or else there would be only two lines, because the molecular line would appear only to be oscillating between the two extremes, sometimes carried along by the combination of fluxes of deterritorialization. sometimes brought back to the accumulation of reterritorializations (the migrant sometimes allies with the nomad, sometimes is a mercenary or the federate of an empire: the Ostrogoths and Visigoths). Or else there is only one line, the primary line of flight, of border or frontier, which is relativized in the second line, which allows itself to be stopped or cut in the third. But even then it may be convenient to present THE line as being born from the explosion of the two others. Nothing is more complicated than the line or the lines—it is that which Melville speaks of, uniting the boats in their organized segmentarity. Captain Ahab in his animal- and molecular-becoming, the white whale in its crazy flight. (Deleuze 1987: 136-7)

The study of the three lies in a social body as individuals or groups is the critical object of schizoanalysis, which Deleuze & Guattari also call with other names, such as, pragmatics, micropolitics, rhizomatics, cartography and diagrammatism. There is also a clinical aspect of schizoanalysis which carries out the study of the dangers[45] each line brings about. In psychological terms, Deleuze points to a similar analysis of the three

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[45] Deleuze & Guattari distinguish four dangers of the lines adapted from Nietzsche's and Carlos Castaneda's analyses. These four dangers are "first, Fear, then Clarity, then Power, and finally the great Disgust, the longing to kill and to die, the Passion for abolition" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 227)

lines by the French intellectual Fernand Deligny who observes them in autistic children first and expands to all people:

> A cartography is suggested today by Deligny when he follows the course of autistic children: the lines of custom, and also the supple lines where the child produces a loop, finds something, claps his hands, hums a ritornello, retraces his steps, and then the "lines of wandering" mixed up in the two others. All these lines are tangled. Deligny produces a geoanalysis, an analysis of lines which takes his path far from psychoanalysis, and which relates not only to autistic children, but to all children, to all adults (watch someone walking down the street and see what little inventions he introduces into it, if he is not too caught up in his rigid segmentarity, what little inventions he puts there), and not only their walk, but their gestures, their affects, their language, their style. (Deleuze 1987: 127)

As for the works of literature, Deleuze & Guattari account Proust's and Dostoyevsky's discovery of the molecular line, and the English novelists' venturing forth along these lines as observed by the French novelist and essayist Nathalie Sarraute in her analyses of molar conversation and molecular sub-conversation in the novel:

> Nathalie Sarraute, in her essay on the novel, praises English novelists, not only for discovering (as did Proust and Dostoyevsky) the great movements, territories, and points of the unconscious that allow us to regain time or revive the past, but also for inopportunely following these molecular lines, simultaneously present and imperceptible. She shows that dialogue or conversation does indeed comply with the breaks of a fixed segmentarity, with vast movements of regulated distribution corresponding to the attitudes and positions of each of us; but also that they are run through and swept up by micromovements, fine segmentations distributed in an entirely different way, unfindable particles of an anonymous matter, tiny cracks and postures operating by different agencies even in the unconscious, secret lines of disorientation or deterritorialization: as she puts it, a whole subconversation within conversation, in other words, a micropolitics of conversation. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 196-7)

4.2.3. Henry James and the Art of Novella

For Deleuze & Guattari, the best illustrations of all three lines in literature are presented Henry James's novella *In the Cage* (1898) and F. Scott Fitzgerald's autobiographical work 'The Crack-Up' (1936) which Deleuze & Guattari refer to as a novella. They discern the most important element of the literary genre of novella as its composition "around the question, 'What happened? Whatever could have happened?'",

but one never knows what (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 192). Deleuze & Guattari contrast it with the "tale" which revolves around the question, "What is going to happen? Something is always going to happen, come to pass", and one always knows what (192). Deleuze & Guattari propose: "The novella is a last novella, whereas the tale is a first tale" (193). They relate the novella to "the form of the secret, which remains impenetrable", and the tale to "the form of discovery, independent of what can be discovered" (193). As for the novel, Deleuze & Guattari argue, it "integrates elements of the novella and the tale into the variation of its perpetual living present (duration)" (192). But the novella is their favorite genre for its inclusive treatment of the three lines of life in parallel with the lines of writing:

> Not only is there a specificity of the novella, but there is also a specific way in which the novella treats a universal matter. For we are made of lines. We are not only referring to lines of writing. Lines of writing conjugate with other lines, life lines, lines of luck or misfortune, lines productive of the variation of the line of writing itself, lines that are between the lines of writing. Perhaps the novella has its own way of giving rise to and combining these lines, which nonetheless belong to everyone and every genre. […] We would like to demonstrate that the novella is defined by living lines, flesh lines, about which it brings a special revelation. Marcel Arland is correct to say that the novella "is nothing but pure lines right down to the nuances, and nothing but the pure and conscious power of the word." (194-5)

In James's novella, the unnamed heroine is a telegraphist who works in the post-office section of a grocery in Mayfair, a select part of London. All day, she sits behind the screen in her twice segmented space, "the innermost cell of captivity, a cage within the cage, fenced off from the rest by a frame of ground glass" (James 2001: 18). She is "fenced off", "fenced out or fenced in" spatially. Her job in her workplace is also well-defined with a clear-cut segmentation. It consists of handing out stamps and postal orders, weighing letters, answering questions, giving change and counting words. And in her free hours, she is mentioned to enjoy reading the novels she borrows "at a ha'penny a day". She is betrothed to Mr. Mudge who used to work in the grocery section next door but is later transferred to a higher position in another branch in a lower part of London. Mr. Mudge is always planning their future, and he tries to convince his fiancée to apply for a transfer to the similar but bigger office of the grocery where he is a foreman in a cheaper part of London so that they can see each other every

minute of the day and that she can save a few shillings on her lodgings. The girl is more concerned about her present and likes the torments of her present job since it is her window to another mysterious life with a totally different rhythm from her own and her fiancé's. She is interested in making more friends, whom she in fact knows only through the telegrams they send; and he is interested in making more money. Yet, all we have in the novella so far is a life of molar and rigid segmentation, as Deleuze & Guattari comment:

> Here, as for all of us, there is a line of rigid segmentarity on which everything seems calculable and foreseen, the beginning and end of a segment, the passage from one segment to another. Our lives are made like that: Not only are the great molar aggregates segmented (States, institutions, classes), but so are people as elements of an aggregate, as are feelings as relations between people; they are segmented, not in such a way as to disturb or disperse, but on the contrary to ensure and control the identity of each agency, including personal identity. The fiancé can say to the young woman, Even though there are differences between our segments, we have the same tastes and we are alike. I am a man, you are a woman; you are a telegraphist, I am a grocer; you count words, I weigh things; our segments fit together, conjugate. Conjugality. A whole interplay of well-determined, well-planned territories. They have a future but no becoming. This is the first life line, *the molar or rigid line of segmentarity*; in no sense is it dead, for it occupies and pervades our life, and always seems to prevail in the end. It even includes much tenderness and love. It would be too easy to say, "This is a bad line," for you find it everywhere, and in all the other lines. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 195)

The "ha'penny novels" she reads and her job which required word by word reading through hundreds of messages daily give the intelligent heroine a subtle experience in, and a perverse taste for, deciphering and interpreting signs. She acquires "the habit of remembering and fitting [the people] together with others" (James 2001: 22), "an instinct of observation and detection", a "gift for keeping the clues and finding her way in the tangle" (27), a thirst to fill the "strange gaps in her learning" (32), and a perverse "pleasure of knowing" everything about people without their being aware of it. She accesses the most intimate secrets of her customers whose real identities she can not decipher since they only use pseudonyms in the molecular lives they lead in a subtle segmentation. She knows so much about her customers that she begins loathing them:

> [S]he had seen [...] ladies wiring to different persons under different names. She had seen all sorts of things and pieced together all sorts of mysteries.

There had once been one—not long before—who, without winking, sent off five over five different signatures. Perhaps these represented five different friends who had asked her […] There were the brazen women, as she called them, of the higher and the lower fashion, whose squanderings and graspings, whose struggles and secrets and love-affairs and lies, she tracked and stored up against them till she had at moments, in private, a triumphant vicious feeling of mastery and ease, a sense of carrying their silly guilty secrets in her pocket, her small retentive brain, and thereby knowing so much more about them than they suspected or would care to think. There were those she would have liked to betray, to trip up, to bring down with words altered and fatal; and all through a personal hostility provoked by the lightest signs, by their accidents of tone and manner, by the particular kind of relation she always happened instantly to feel. (James 2001: 17-8, 27)

A rich couple who leads the life of a molecular or supple segmentation holds the heroine's special attention. The lady who used the pseudonyms of Mary and Cissy begins visiting the post-office alone first. She is very beautiful, in fact, she is "the handsomest woman" the heroine has ever seen. On a single occasion, she appears in the post-office with a gentleman whom the heroine knows as Captain Everard, which may not be his true name either as he also uses various pseudonyms such as Philip, William, "the Count", "the Pink 'Un", and so on. On most other occasions, Captain Everard who lives in a hotel nearby comes to the post-office alone. The heroine deciphers from his telegrams that his correspondent addressed as Lady Bradeen is no one else but Marry or Cissy. The heroine, then, focuses her whole attention on Captain Everard as the new friend in her imagination and on all the telegrams he wires. She reaches the threshold of the molecular life Captain Everard and his relations lead as she deciphers from their telegrams:

Their real meetings must have been constant, for half of it was appointments and allusions, all swimming in a sea of other allusions still, tangled in a complexity of questions that gave a wondrous image of their life. […] The days and hours of this new friend, as she came to account him, were at all events unrolled, and however much more she might have known she would still have wished to go beyond. In fact she did go beyond; she went quite far enough. (23-4)

The heroine is passionately obsessed by Captain Everard in both his presence and absence: "With Captain Everard she had simply the margin of the universe" (48). Every new telegram of his increases her knowledge of and affect for him. Deleuze & Guattari's comment:

> In relation to this man, directly with him, the young telegraphist develops a strange passional complicity, a whole intense molecular life that does not even enter into rivalry with the life she leads with her fiancé. […] This life, however, is not in her head, it is not imaginary. Rather, we should say that there are two politics involved, as the young woman suggests in a remarkable conversation with her fiancé: a macropolitics and a micropolitics that do not envision classes, sexes, people, or feelings in at all the same way. Or again, there are two very different types of relations: intrinsic relations of couples involving well-determined aggregates or elements (social classes, men and women, this or that particular person), and less localizable relations that are always external to themselves and instead concern flows and particles eluding those classes, sexes, and persons. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 196)

In addition to the first molar or rigid segmentation of the heroine and her fiancé and the molecular or supple segmentation of the secret and mysterious relation between Captain Everard and Lady Bradeen, there is a parallel segmentation to the second one. The new segmentation is again molecular and supple and takes place between the heroine and Captain Everard. However, this life of supple segmentation is experienced only by the heroine so far, and this is what torments her most:

> [S]he couldn't, not even once or twice, touch with him on any individual fact. She would have given anything to have been able to allude to one of his friends by name, to one of his engagements by date, to one of his difficulties by the solution. She would have given almost as much for just the right chance—it would have to be tremendously right—to show him in some sharp sweet way that she had perfectly penetrated the greatest of these last and now lived with it in a kind of heroism of sympathy. He was in love with a woman to whom, and to any view of whom, a lady-telegraphist, and especially one who passed a life among hams and cheeses, was as the sand on the floor; and what her dreams desired was the possibility of its somehow coming to him that her own interest in him could take a pure and noble account of such an infatuation and even of such an impropriety. As yet, however, she could only rub along with the hope that an accident, sooner or later, might give her a lift toward popping out with something that would surprise and perhaps even, some fine day, assist him. (James 2001: 49)

One day the heroine deciphers a terrifying information in between the lines of some coded telegrams that Captain Everard's life is in danger: "He perhaps didn't even himself know how scared he was; but *she* knew. They were in danger, they were in danger, Captain Everard and Lady Bradeen" (53). She feels that she is in a position to do something about it. In fact, she is ready to do everything for him, and she must urgently let him know about it. Hence, she meets Captain Everard "for the first time,

face to face outside the cage" (James 2001: 54). They sit in the park together. She makes him sure that this is the first and last time they meet together outside the post-office. Her passional confessions including the fact that she can do everything for him and her informative revelations that she knows everything mix with each other leaving Captain Everard in blush, puzzlement, admiration and supplication. Later, the heroine accounts her meeting with Captain Everard to her fiancé. In this dialogue, her utterances belong to a supple segmentation, and those of her fiancé, to a rigid segmentation, and we have both segments, a macropolitics and a micropolitics, in the same dialogue leading to a comic relief. The beginning of their dialogue is as follows:

> "I went out the other night and sat in the Park with a gentleman," she said at last.
> […] "And what did you get out of that?" […]
> "Nothing but a good chance to promise him I wouldn't forsake him. He's one of my customers."
> "Then it's for him not to forsake *you*."
> "Well, he won't. It's all right. But I must just keep on as long as he may want me."
> "Want you to sit with him in the Park?"
> "He may want me for that—but I shan't. I rather liked it, but once, under the circumstances, is enough. I can do better for him in another manner."
> "And what manner, pray?"
> "Well, elsewhere."
> "Elsewhere?—I *say*!"
> […] "You needn't 'say'—there's nothing to be said. And yet you ought perhaps to know."
> "Certainly I ought. But *what*—up to now?"
> "Why exactly what I told him. That I'd do anything for him." (83-4)

After their meeting in the park, the heroine and Captain Everard do not encounter each other much; in fact, they avoid each other. For the heroine, their meeting in the park secures Captain Everard as her true yet dreaded double in her molecular life of supple segmentation, as James writes that, "she was literally afraid of the alternate self who might be waiting outside. *He* might be waiting; it was he who was her alternate self, and of him she was afraid" (93). And she keeps waiting anxiously for "the celebrated 'danger'" which awaits Captain Everard, her double.

One day Captain Everard comes into the post-office in terror tells the heroine hastily: "Oh, yes, here it is—it's upon me at last! […] just help me, just *save* me, by

getting this off without the loss of a second!" (James 2001: 98). He needs the heroine's help about the details of an intercepted telegram which was sent by Lady Bradeen to another woman from the same post-office a few weeks earlier. The telegram had fallen "into the wrong hands", and Captain Everard urgently needed some secret numerical code on it. To everyone's surprise, the heroine remembers the exact date of the telegram and produces the six-digit secret code from her memory to save him. In the end, the heroine will return to her fiancé, and Captain Everard will have to marry Lady Bradeen whose husband dies suddenly. But the heroine, in between the time she meets Captain Everard in the park and the time she helps to save him in the post-office, has the experience of a new line of life, namely, the line of flight. Deleuze & Guattari comment:

> What happened? The molecular relation between the telegraphist and the telegraph sender dissolved in the form of the secret—because nothing happened. Each of them is propelled toward a rigid segmentarity: he will marry the now-widowed lady, she will marry her fiancé. And yet everything has changed. She has reached something like a new line, a third type, a kind of *line of flight* that is just as real as the others even if it occurs in place: this line no longer tolerates segments; rather, it is like an exploding of the two segmentary series. She has broken through the wall, she has gotten out of the black holes. She has attained a kind of absolute deterritorialization. "She ended up knowing so much that she could no longer interpret anything. *There were no longer shadows to help her see more clearly, only glare.*"[46] You cannot go further in life than this sentence by James. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 197)

With the appearance of a policeman who stops to watch the heroine at the end of the novella makes the question "What happened?" more intriguing. Was Captain Everard a criminal? Was the heroine involved in a crime or the crime(s) of her double? When talking to him in the park, what did she mean with the words, "What you *do* is rather strong!" "Your extravagance, your selfishness, your immorality, your crimes" (James 2001: 75)? These questions will remain unanswered, since this is not a tale or does not develop into a detective novel. There is nothing to be discovered, and all the three lines of life are covered skilfully in the impenetrability of the secret. Deleuze & Guattari distinguish certain features of each segment or line in James's novella. The line of

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[46] This quotation from James's novella is probably the translation of a translation. The original lines read: "She knew at last so much that she had quite lost her earlier sense of merely guessing. There were no different shades of distinctness—it all bounced out" (James 2001: 96).

molar or rigid segmentation consists of "many words and conversations, questions and answers, interminable explanations, precisions". In the line of molecular or supple segmentation there are "silences, allusions and hasty innuendos inviting interpretation. Finally, the line of flight "flashes […] like a train of motion" in linear jumps. Overall, there is no longer signifiance or interpretation in the line of flight, and "one can finally speak 'literally' of anything at all, […] calmly accepting that which occurs when it is no longer possible for anything to stand for anything else" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 198).

DEMO 2: Fitzgerald and Becoming a Writer against Segmentation

To justify Deleuze & Guattari, F. Scott Fitzgerald's autobiographical text, 'The Crack-Up', can be considered as a novella since it meets all the necessary conditions they propose to define a novella. The question "What happened?" which even Fitzgerald cannot provide an answer to prevails throughout the whole text. In addition, there is nothing personal in that text to make it an autobiography. Nor does Fitzgerald use the pronoun "I" as a subject of enunciation which will make him an author. It is the proper name of a "writer" par excellence as in his utterance, "I felt—therefore I was": the "I" as "F. Scott Fitzgerald" is the *becoming* of a writer who "experience[s] a crack-up of all values" and ceases "to be a person" altogether (Fitzgerald 1965: 51, 53).

Deleuze & Guattari argue that, in 'The Crack-Up', Fitzgerald discerns all the three lines of life they propose as molar, molecular and abstract flight lines. These three lines are respectively referred as "breaks", "cracks" and "rupture" in Fitzgerald's work: "The line of rigid segmentarity with molar breaks; the line of supple segmentation with molecular cracks; the line of flight or rupture" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 200). A more detailed analysis of these three lines in Fitzgerald's work will be attempted below.

'The Crack Up' opens with the sentence "Of course all life is a process of breaking down", and it accounts the becoming of a writer with a series of disasters, disappointments and disillusions which Fitzgerald calls "blows". He classifies them into two groups. The first group are molar or macro-blows, "the big sudden blows that come, or seem to come from outside". They come suddenly but with a warning, and they "don't show their effect all at once". The second group of blows are molecular or micro-

blows which come "from within". These, in contrast, come silently, and are never figured out "until it's too late to do anything about" them, or, "until you realize with finality that you will never be as good a man again" (Fitzgerald 1965: 39).

Macro-blows happen on the line of rigid segmentarity and cause macro-cracks which are no less rigid. One moves from one segment to the other, from one stratum to the other. Fitzgerald calls these segments or strata "common ills" which are "domestic, professional and personal" (40). His Princeton years are marked with the stratum of signifiance and rigid segmentation ruled by his egoist attempt to become a signifier, dream of a "career as a leader of men" and "desire for personal dominance" (47). He receives the first blow in his junior year at Princeton because of a health problem and he is forced to leave his old dreams and desires and embarks on learning how to write with the dream of a career as a great writer, a career which still pertains to a rigid segmentation with the remnants of his ego. But his self-pride is deeply wounded from the first blow; he tries his chance on a passional stratum, the stratum of subjectivity. He needs the affection of a girl to assert himself as a self or a subject: "Life around me was a solemn dream and I lived on the letters I wrote to a girl in another city" (47). In those letters, he manages to survive as a subject of statement. That girl is his first love Ginevra King, "a banker's daughter […] whose reputation for coquetry was well known" (Curnutt 2007: 16). Their relationship did not last long since they belonged to different segments (rich girl versus poor boy) and Ginevra married someone else doubling Fitzgerald's solemnity. Curnutt informs us that, in that solemn mood, Fiztgerald joins the American army, which has just entered the World War I, hoping to get killed in the war not for America but for himself. Unfortunately, he is not sent to the front; and while he is still a second lieutenant, he meets Zelda Sayers, a most popular and "preeminent belle" (17) and falls in love with her. Fitzgerald receives his next blow from Zelda who breaks their engagement being "wary of marrying a man whose military pay totaled $ 141 month" (17). At the same time, he is discharged from the army. To overcome the latest blows, Fitzgerald sets out to writing a novel to earn money, and to win Zelda back as he writes, "It was one of those tragic loves doomed for lack of money, and one day the girl closed it out on the basis of common sense. During a long summer of despair I wrote a novel instead of letters" (Fitzgerald 1965: 47). In the

end, he becomes a professional "author" and marries Zelda but he cannot manage to become a "writer" yet. He is afflicted with resentment against the leisure class and lacks the active faculty of forgetting:

> The man with the jingle of money in his pocket who married the girl a year later would always cherish an abiding distrust, an animosity, toward the leisure class—not the conviction of a revolutionist but the smouldering hatred of a peasant. In the years since then I have never been able to stop wondering where my friends' money came from […] For sixteen years I lived pretty much as this latter person, distrusting the rich, yet working for money with which to share their mobility and the grace that some of them brought into their lives. During this time I had plenty of the usual horses shot from under me—I remember some of their names—*Punctured Pride, Thwarted Expectation, Faithless, Show-off, Hard Hit, Never Again.* (Fitzgerald 1965: 47-8)

Fitzgerald's resentment (e.g., "It's your mistake if I am not …"), retreats to bad conscience (e.g., It is my mistake …") as he writes, "my morale never sank below the level of self-disgust". Finally, the man who cannot forget, who cannot stop the invasion of his consciousness by his reactive unconscious, finds solace in drinking and writing fiction which will be dubbed as "autobiographical". In addition, his uprising career as a novelist is threatened by the rise of the cinema "in the hands of Hollywood merchants or Russian idealists" following the age of jazz, and this added to his depression as he argues that "there was a rankling indignity, that to me had become almost an obsession, in seeing the power of the written word subordinated to another power, a more glittering, a grosser power" (49). In 'The Crack-Up', Fitzgerald makes no mention of his wife Zelda's nervous breakdown and hospitalisation which also affect him deeply. Finally, with the advent of financial difficulties, a new and more violent macro-blow comes about turning Fitzgerald into a silent war-machine:

> In its impact this blow was more violent than the other two but it was the same in kind—a feeling that I was standing at twilight on a deserted range, with an empty rifle in my hands and the targets down. No problem set—simply a silence with only the sound of my own breathing. (48)

Fitzgerald's times of silence coincide with his micro-crack which makes itself felt all of a sudden being lead by a micro-reprieve instead of a blow:

> But now I wanted to be absolutely alone and so arranged a certain insulation from ordinary cares.

It was not an unhappy time. I went away and there were fewer people. I found I was good-and-tired. I could lie around and was glad to, sleeping or dozing sometimes twenty hours a day and in the intervals trying resolutely not to think—instead I made lists—made lists and tore them up, hundreds of lists: of cavalry leaders and football players and cities, and popular tunes and pitchers, and happy times, and hobbies and houses lived in and how many suits since I left the army and how many pairs of shoes [….] And lists of women I'd liked, and of the times I had let myself be snubbed by people who had not been my betters in character or ability.

—And then suddenly, surprisingly, I got better.

—And cracked like an old plate as soon as I heard the news. (Fitzgerald 1965: 42)

Fitzgerald's lists are in fact the assemblages of the outside and of self-forgetting. He also makes a descent analysis of the assemblages which make up his conscience divided into five categories represented by four figures. His classmate from Princeton and editor Edmund Wilson represents his "intellectual conscience"; a man "in the fur business" models his "sense of 'good life'"; his friend Earnest Hemingway[47] has been his "artistic conscience"; and a fourth man orders his "relations with other people". Finally, his "political conscience" hardly ever exists except "as an element of irony" in his life and work (49-50). He concludes:

So there was not an 'I' any more—not a basis on which I could organize my self-respect—save my limitless capacity for toil that it seemed I possessed no more. It was strange to have no self—to be like a little boy left alone in a big house, who knew that now he could do anything he wanted to do, but found that there was nothing that he wanted to do— (50)

And he adds in parenthesis, "I have the feeling that someone, I'm not sure who, is sound asleep—someone who could have helped me to keep my shop open. It wasn't Lenin, and it wasn't God" (50-1). He begins asking what happened, where he had changed, where "the leak" was and many other questions without answers. Especially

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[47] In 'The Cack-Up', Fitzgerald does not give Hemingway's name. he solely writes: "a third contemporary had been an artistic conscience to me—I had not imitated his infectious style, because my own style, such as it is, was formed before he published anything, but there was an awful pull toward him when I was on a spot" (1965: 50). He meets Hemingway in Paris in 1925. Curnutt (2007: 21) accounts the friendship of the two authors as follows: "Scott had admired either one or both of Hemingway's first privately printed collections, *Three Stories and Ten Poems* (1923) and *in our time* (1924), and had recommended him to Perkins. Their friendship now established, he set about advancing Hemingway's career through book reviews and correspondence, finessing his entry into the Scribner's fold, and even offering editorial advice on Hemingway's debut novel, *The Sun Also Rises* (1926)."

his following questions prove him to be in a Dionysian state of metamorphosis and becoming:

> I only wanted absolute quiet to think out why I had developed a sad attitude toward sadness, a melancholy attitude toward melancholy and a tragic attitude toward tragedy—*why I had become identified with the objects of my horror or compassion.* (Fitzgerald 1965: 51-2)

If Fitzgerald had reached this Dionysian state through other means as a process (like Miller's being drunk on pure water), he could have made a positive use of it, but he interprets it as "the death of accomplishment" in his specific case (self-destruction through alcoholism). Fitzgerald realizes, to use the Deleuzian distinction, what a true becoming of a writer is as opposed to the inability of authors to become like everyone:

> Lenin did not willingly endure the sufferings of his proletariat, nor Washington of his troops, nor Dickens of his London poor. And when Tolstoy tried some such merging of himself with the objects of his attention, it was a fake and a failure. I mention these because they are the men best known to us all.
>   It was dangerous mist When Wordsworth decided that 'there had passed away a glory from the earth,' he felt no compulsion to pass away with it, and the Fiery Particle Keats never ceased his struggle against t.b.[48] nor in his last moments relinquished his hope of being among the English poets. (52)

In his Dionysian state, Fitzgerald discovers the concept and affect of the "clean break" as a line of flight and absolute deterritorialisation; and he contrasts it with the molecular line of the "jail-break" which results with reterritorialisation, a return to a new segment or to the old stratum:

> This led me to the idea that the ones who had survived had made some sort of clean break. This is a big word and is no parallel to a jail-break when one is probably headed for a new jail or will be forced back to the old one. The famous 'Escape' or 'run away from it all' is an excursion in a trap even if the trap includes the south seas, which are only for those who want to paint them or sail them. A clean break is something you cannot come back from; that is irretrievable because it makes the past cease to exist. (52-3)

Fitzgerald does away with the rigid segmentation which he defines as "a burden", and he is aware of the insufficiency of a supple segmentation which he describes as "a jail-break. And finally, with his discovery of the line of flight his becoming is fulfilled:

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[48] The abbreviation stands for "tuberculosis" which Keats suffered from and died of in Italy.

"I have now at last become a writer only. The man I had persistently tried to be became such a burden that I have 'cut him loose' with as little compunction as a Negro lady cuts loose a rival on Saturday night" (Fitzgerald 1965: 55).

To conclude, Fitzgerald's line of flight proves to be a dangerous one and leads to self-destruction. Fitzgerald's lines below which Deleuze & Guattari quote in admiration both summarise his self-destruction and combine the lines of life:

> Fitzgerald: "Perhaps fifty percent of our friends and relations will tell you in good faith that it was my drinking that drove Zelda mad, and the other half would assure you that it was her madness that drove me to drink. Neither of these judgments means much of anything. These two groups of friends and relations would be unanimous in saying that each of us would have been much better off without the other. The irony is that we have never been more in love with each other in all of our lives. She loves the alcohol on my lips. I cherish her most extravagant hallucinations." "In the end, nothing really had much importance. We destroyed ourselves. But in all honesty, I never thought we destroyed each other." (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 206) [49]

Deleuze & Guattari observe all three lines of life in this passage from Fitzgerald. Firstly, there is the molar or rigid segmentation of "friends and relations" classed as binary opposites ("fifty percent" and "the other half"). These people are also inclined to see Fitzgerald and Zelda as part of a rigid segmentation that forms a *couple* in conflict with each other. Then, there is the molecular and supple segmentation of doubles who are in love with each other with no regard of one's alcoholism and the other's madness. Finally, we have the absolute line of flight in Fitzgerald's choice of "ourselves" in place of "each other" in the above quotation: "We destroyed ourselves. But in all honesty, I never thought we destroyed each other". In this preference, Fitzgerald no longer regards Zelda as his couple or double, but as his "clandestine": "each of them the clandestine of the other", in Deleuze & Guattari's words (206).

Being a clandestine is the highest form of friendship and love through affect between two apparently distant bodies or things. A clandestine does not discover or reveal a secret but covers or hides it. And the secret is whatever that offends its owner.

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[49] Deleuze & Guattari do not provide a source for the above quotation from Fitzgerald. We find a similar line in one of Fitzgerald's letters to Zelda in his *A Life in Letters* (New York: Scribners, 1994, p. 189) as follows: "I wish the Beautiful and Damned had been a maturely written book because it was all true. We ruined ourselves—I have never honestly thought that we ruined each other" (quotes Tate 2007: 32).

Therefore, it can be concluded in a paradoxical manner that being a clandestine is having no secrets. A clandestine is deprived of his or her abilities for interpreting in distance (as in the case of James' heroine) and for psychoanalysing his or her partner in terms of familiarity (as in the case of Fitzgerald). He or she is a "schizoanalyst" par excellence as in the case of Deleuze & Guattari.

In the following lines, Deleuze both proves himself to be a clandestine of Kafka and of the other writers he reads and gives us an idea about how a reading should be carried out as will be discussed in the next chapter:

> My ideal, when I write about an author, would be to write nothing that could cause him sadness, or if he is dead, that might make him weep in his grave. Think of the author you are writing about. Think of him so hard that he can no longer be an object, and equally so that you cannot identify with him. Avoid the double shame of the scholar and the familiar. Give back to an author a little of the joy, the energy, the life of love and politics that he knew how to give and invent. So many dead writers must have wept over what has been written about them. I hope that Kafka was pleased with the book that we did on him, and it is for that reason that the book pleased nobody. (Deleuze 1987: 119)

In the same way that a writer avoids both distance and proximity in writing, the reader should do likewise. And then, there is also an ethical question: If you are going to offend a writer, why bother rereading or writing about him or her? For Deleuze, one must even know how to admire and respect an enemy as he does with Kant, one of Deleuze's foremost enemies whom he considers "the perfect incarnation of false critique":

> [W]hen you're facing such a work of genius, there's no point saying you disagree. First you have to know how to admire; you have to rediscover the problems he poses, his particular machinery. It is through admiration that you will come to genuine critique. The mania of people today is not knowing how to admire anything: either they're "against," or they situate everything at their own level while they chit-chat and scrutinize. That's no way to go about it. You have to work your way back to those problems which an author of genius has posed, all the way back to that which he does not say in what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to him, though you also turn it against him. You have to be inspired, visited by the geniuses you denounce. (Deleuze 2004a: 139)

CHAPTER 5

READING: A CRITICO-CLINICAL PROJECT

> *Criticism and the clinic*: life and work are the same thing, when they have adapted the line of flight which makes them the components of the same war-machine. In these conditions life has for a long time ceased to be personal and the work has ceased to be literary or textual.
>
> (Deleuze 1987: 141, 120)

5.1. Intensive Reading as Keeping the Finger on the Pulse of Life

On the basis of Spinozean parallelisms, whatever Deleuze writes about writing is equally valid about reading too. Hence, the distinction he makes between the writer and the author can also be made between the reader and the interpreter or the analyst. To recall the previous chapter, Deleuze has been quoted about a warning against the "identification" and "distance", "proximity" and "remoteness" an author creates. Again, at the end of the previous chapter, he has also been quoted about another warning against "the double shame of the scholar and the familiar", or against objectifying the writer or identifying with him or her in reading. Both warnings are aimed at the same target: the face as signifiance and subjectivation. And the same couple of arrows are shot twice: the critical and the clinical. Distant, remote, scholarly and objective are the attributes of signifiance represented by linguistics (the target of the critical aspect). Identifying, proximate and familiar, on the other hand, are the attributes of subjectivation represented by psychoanalysis (the target of the clinical aspect). Thus, two essentials of a Deleuzian reading are "A clinic without psychoanalysis or inter-pretation, a criticism without linguistics or signifiance" (Deleuze 1987: 120). Deleuze refers to the clinic as "the art of declensions" or variations, and the criticism as the "art of combinations" or conjugations (120).

Yet, Deleuze & Guattari point to a possible difference between writing and reading in relation to memory: "one writes using short-term memory, and thus short-term ideas, even if one reads or rereads using long-term memory of long-term concepts" (1996a: 16). What they mean with short-term memory in writing applies to a rhizome with a temporal and collective line, and it "includes forgetting as a process". Long-term

memory, on the other hand, applies to arborescence as "family, race, society, or civilisation" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 16). Thus, a reading might involve tracing and translating in a methodical way. But this is not the only way of reading for Deleuze. His favourite reading pertains to the rhizome and the short-term memory. In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, he refers to the latter way of reading as "the affective reading" in contrast to "a systematic reading" of an arborescent type:

> There is a double reading of Spinoza: *on* the one hand, a systematic reading in pursuit of the general idea and the unity of the parts, but on the other hand and at the same time, the affective reading, without an idea of the whole, where one *is* carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according to the velocity of this or that part. (Deleuze 1988b: 129)

It must also be emphasised that, for Deleuze, what makes both these readings possible has little to do with the reader's choice and is more related to Spinoza's genius and the immensity of his plane of immanence:

> [T]here is a strange privilege that Spinoza enjoys, something that seems to have been accomplished by him and no one else. He is a philosopher who commands an extraordinary conceptual apparatus, one that is highly developed, systematic, and scholarly; and yet he is the quintessential object of an immediate, unprepared encounter, such that a nonphilosopher, or even someone without any formal education, can receive a sudden illumination from him, a "flash." Then it is as if one discovers that one is a Spinozist; one arrives in the middle of Spinoza, one is sucked up, drawn into the system or the composition. (129)

Spinoza's exceptional relevance to literature has already been discussed in the second and third chapters of this study. It has been discussed in those chapters that Deleuze evidently strives to discover the revolutionary force of a work of art and intently explores the unconscious productions, positive encounters of bodies, active affects and impersonal percepts in works of literature. This whole Deleuzian enterprise aims at surveying Spinozist elements in literature, and for finding allies among writers who are Spinozists by chance or choice, by fate or legacy. As was also argued in the previous chapters, Anglo-American novelists who "were able in their novels to make writing an act of thought and life a non-personal power" are the most eligible ones for the legacy of Spinozism (Deleuze 1987: 30).

To illustrate this, Virginia Woolf's previously quoted single phrase from *Mrs. Dalloway*, is as illuminating as, and as moving as, the fifth chapter of Spinoza's *Ethics*: "being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best" (Woolf 1995: 10). This sentence has the power of an affect (Mrs Dalloway's encounter with "the people she knew best"), the speed of a percept ("laid out", "mist"), the collective force of an assemblage ("between the people"), the intimacy of a desiring-machine ("knew best"), and the immensity of a BwO ('being laid out'). It is neither symbolic nor metaphorical, but real (there are times when somebody feels that he or she is really like that, and it is in fact true beyond a feeling, but for the most part it goes unnoticed). In that phrase, we also have metamorphoses (becoming-mist), not invisibility but imperceptibility ("mist"), a rhizomatic indeterminacy ("between"), impersonality ("mist"), the loss of the ego and death of the self (when "I" is laid out, there will be no "I" left in the altar-tomb), collective enunciation (what I call "myself" is the product of an abstract machine of society which also includes the people I know best; therefore, "I" is an illusion), and so on. In it there is also an imagery of a signified "coitus", which would rejoice a psychoanalyst: "being laid …", the psychoanalyst would not even bother to listen to Mrs. Dalloway to finish her phrase: "There it is, your dirty little secret, your Oedipus". This would reduce the whole productivity of the unconscious to the Holy Family, "daddy, mommy, me", to a theatre of representation. Of course, libido and desire are present in this phrase, they are present everywhere. But, by restricting them to the family, one misses the libidinal investment of the whole social field. There is a whole becoming inhuman in that phrase. The imagery of human coitus is not a necessary outcome of it. Mrs. Clarissa is laid out as a mist: there is a molecularisation and dehumanisation of the libido in multiple prospective directions, toward numen or voluptas, which would be sought neither in Clarissa's nor in Woolf's past, nor in sublimation, but in the collective nature of enunciation:

> Every loved or desired being serves as a collective agent of enunciation. And it is certainly not, as Freud believed, the libido that must be desexualized and sublimated in order to invest society and its flows; on the contrary, it is love, desire, and their flows that manifest the directly social character of the nonsublimated libido and its sexual investments. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 353)

Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 4) distinguish between three types of books depending on how they are made by claiming that "There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made". Thus, there are classical "root-books", modern "radicle" or "fascicular-books" and rhizome-books. They also classify books according to the type of the reader, so that a book can be read as a signifying-book, as a subjective or passional-book, or as an asignifying rhizome-book. The signifying-book "always has an external model, a referent, face, family, or territory that preserves the book's oral character (126-7). As for the passional or subjective-book, it becomes internalised and internalises everything. Deleuze & Guattari regard not only the books of the monotheist religions but also the works of many other authors in this second passional category: "Wagner, Mallarme, and Joyce, Marx and Freud: still Bibles" (127). Deleuze & Guattari's ideal for a rhizome-book is as follows:

> A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements. In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity; strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. […] What is the body without organs of a book? There are several, depending on the nature of the lines considered, their particular grade or density, and the possibility of their converging on a "plane of consistency" assuring their selection. […] As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. (3-4)

Thus, the affective or rhizomatic way of reading of a book bypasses the question "What does it mean?" and treats a book like a machine and asks whether the book works and how it works in relation to an outside, in relation to other machines, and finally, in relation to a largest social machine which the reader also feels part of:

> We will never ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge. A book exists only through the outside and on the outside. A book itself is a little machine. (4)

Kleist is in fact the inventor of a rhizomatic and machinic writing as "a broken chain of affects and variable speeds, with accelerations and transformations, always in relation

with the outside. Open rings" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 9). Thus, works of literature are no exceptions and can be treated as machines composed of territories, multiplicities, speeds and intensities in relation to the larger machines of the outside:

> [W]hat is the relation (also measurable) of this literary machine to a war machine, love machine, revolutionary machine, etc.—and an *abstract machine* that sweeps them along? Kleist and a mad war machine. Kafka and a most extraordinary bureaucratic machine ... (What if one became animal or plant *through* literature, which certainly does not mean literarily? Is it not first through the voice that one becomes animal?) Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been. All we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and selection, the plane of consistency [...] (4)

"Intensive reading" is what Deleuze (1995: 8) calls the rhizomatic way of reading which treats the book as "a little cog in much more complicated external machinery" or "a little non-signifying machine" which is plugged in "to an electric circuit" that stands for the outside:

> This intensive way of reading, in contact with what's outside the book, as a flow meeting other flows, one machine among others, as a series of experiments for each reader in the midst of events that have nothing to do with books, as tearing the book into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything ... is reading with love. (8-9)

The element of love in reading brings up the question of ethics concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy, activeness or reactivity of any reading. Deleuze touches this issue in 'A Letter to a Harsh Critic' written to a resentful friend who criticises Deleuze for his long fingernails. Deleuze expresses his observations about interpretation with an offended tone as follows:

> At the end of your letter you say my worker's jacket (it's actually a peasant's jacket) is like Marilyn Monroe's pleated bodice and my fingernails are like Greta Garbo's dark glasses. And you shower me with ironic and spiteful advice. As you mention them several times, my fingernails, let's consider them. One might say that my mother used to cut them for me and it's to do with the Oedipus complex and castration (a ridiculous interpretation but a psychoanalytical one). One might also note, looking at my fingertips, that I haven't got the normal protective whorls, so that touching anything, especially fabric, causes such irritation that I need long nails to protect them (a teratological, selectionist interpretation). Or one might say, and it's true, that I dream of being, not invisible, but imperceptible, and the closest I can get to the

dream is having fingernails I can keep in my pockets, so I find nothing more disconcerting than somebody looking at them (a social psychologist's interpretation). One might, finally, say: "You mustn't bite your fingernails, because they're part of you; if you like fingernails, bite other people's if you want to and get the chance" (a Darien-style political interpretation). But you, you choose the shabbiest interpretation of all: he wants to be different, wants to do a Garbo. It's strange, anyway, how none of my friends have ever commented on my nails, finding them perfectly natural, as though they'd just landed there like seeds blown in the wind that nobody bothers mentioning. (Deleuze 1995: 5)

In the above quotation, what makes the first interpretation "ridiculous", the third one "true", and the last one "shabby"?

One might interpret Deleuze's fingernails in some other ways: as a sign of sadism (as they can be used as weapons), a sign of masochism (he might have received a severe but sweet beating from his parents, an aunt or a female teacher for his long fingernails when he was a child with "supersensual" ideals, and everyone knows Deleuze is fond of Masoch), a sign of homosexuality (since it is usually women who wear long fingernails), a sign of becoming-woman (for the same reason as the previous one, and one does not need to be a homosexual for this), a sign of becoming-plant or becoming-animal (long fingernails look like the branches/roots of a tree, the claws of birds and most mammals, or the pincers of a crab or a lobster which Deleuze is very fond of; he even defines God as a double-articulating Lobster, the Abstract Machine). Or, one might consult a dictionary of symbols or folklore, make a research about men who used to wear long fingernails and try to find something common to all of them; one might look for any references to long fingernails in other books, in Pushkin's poems, Shakespeare's tragedies, Proust's novels, and so on. One might also look at the French word for fingernails, *les ongles*, and try to associate it with similar words, such as, *ONG* (abbreviation for Nongovernmental Organisations, a very Deleuzian issue), *Les Onglua* (a French community with which Deleuze might have familial links), and so on.[50] Then, a Deleuze fan might come up with long fingernails imitating Deleuze and boasting

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[50] This type of linguistic association, Deleuze argues, is also common in psychoanalysis, and gives some "real" but "confidential" examples of it in France, such as, "A patient says, 'I want to go off with a hippy group' *[groupe hippie],* the manipulator replies, 'Why do you say big pee?' *[gros pipi]*" (1987: 20). And he comments: "psychoanalysis is not at all the purloined letter, it is the forced choice" (21). Similarly, all forced interpretations share this psychoanalytic delusion.

about being a true Deleuzian. Yet another fan might be disappointed by Deleuze's long fingernails and forget Deleuze and his works completely. One might even read about Deleuze's life and try to find out what significance long fingernails might have for him. Finally, one might find his fingernails not worthy of commenting at all, and move, for instance, to Deleuze's jacket as Deleuze himself stresses that it is not a worker's jacket but a peasant's: a nice variation of Marxism, and a peasant is the furthest from the State apparatus, further than a worker, and so on.

Some of the above interpretations look acceptable, and some others do not. But none of them truly reflects a Deleuzian reading of a book including his favourite or "true" interpretation since it is not reached through a rhizomatic reading and has the author's lead. It indicates an authoritarian perspective which the reader must avoid: "a book has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as its subject" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 23). Some of the interpretations, on the other hand, look very Deleuzian, and are positive (those related to becomings), and they might also be true interpretations; but they are too facile and too representational. Becomings are non-representational, but the above interpretations are built on "resemblance".

As for the reactive and negative interpretations and the interpretations which Deleuze dubs as "ridiculous" and "shabby", they all treat the long fingernails as the symptom of a disorder and attempt at diagnosing Deleuze and discovering his dirty little secret, any unresolved conflicts of his childhood. This is a regressive interpretation which must be avoided in a rhizomatic reading. With respect to great writers and artists, Deleuze (1995: 143) defines them, after Nietzsche, as the doctors of civilisation: "They're not ill; on the contrary, they're a rather special kind of doctor" (142). And there is no use in "looking for a sign of neurosis or psychosis like a secret in their work, the hidden code of their work" (142). He also points out with Guattari that, "there is no longer even any need for applying psychoanalysis to the work of art, since the work itself constitutes a successful psychoanalysis" a sublime 'transference' with exemplary collective virtualities" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 134). This can be illustrated with Masoch's symptomatology of masochism, in a similar way to Parkinson's symptomatology of Parkinson's disease:

> Why has Masoch given his name to a perversion as old as the world? Not because he "suffered" from it, but because he transformed the symptoms, he set out a novel picture of it by making the contract its primary sign and also by linking masochistic practices to the place of ethnic minorities in society and the role of women in those minorities: masochism becomes an act of resistance, inseparable from a minority sense of humor. Masoch's a great symptomatologist. (Deleuze 1995: 142)[51]

Similarly, the maddest characters in the works of great writers are still doctors of a sick society like Melville's Bartleby: "even in his catatonic or anorexic state, Bartleby is not the patient, but the doctor of a sick America, the *Medicine-Man,* the new Christ or the brother to us all" (Deleuze 1998: 90). Treating a work of art as a symptom misses its symptomatological and clinical power, creative and critical resistance, potential revolutionary force and vitalism: "You write with a view to an unborn people that doesn't yet have a language. Creating isn't communicating but resisting" (Deleuze 1995: 143). For Deleuze, symptomatology is the outside of medicine which brigs together all disciplines including art. It is "a neutral point, a zero point, where artists and philosophers and doctors and patients can come together" (Deleuze 2004a: 134). Hence, art has claim to symptomatology as much as any social or medical sciences:

> Perhaps there are three different medical acts: symptomology, or the study of signs; etiology, or the search for causes; and therapeutics, or the search for and application of a treatment. Whereas etiology and therapeutics are integral parts of medicine, symptomology appeals to a kind of neutral point, a limit that is premedical or sub-medical, belonging as much to art as to medicine: it's all about drawing a "portrait." The work of art exhibits symptoms, as do the body or the soul, albeit in a very different way. In this sense, the artist or writer can be a great symptomologist, just like the best doctor […] (132)

Going back to Deleuze's long fingernails, a rhizomatic reading of them can be attempted as follows. Such a reading must be asignifying, non-interpretative and nonrepresentational. We start with ignoring completely what long dark fingernails signify and who is wearing them. We consider them like little machines which are part

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[51] Contrary to what psychoanalysts argue, Deleuze's own study of Masoch and Sade demonstrates that masochism is a disorder which is completely different from Sadism. For Deleuze a masochist is "a victim in search of a torturer and who needs to educate, persuade and conclude an alliance with the torturer in order to realize the strangest of schemes. This is why advertisements are part of the language of masochism while they have no place in true sadism, and why the masochist draws up contracts while the sadist abominates and destroys them" (1989: 20).

of other machines. Calling them protective extensions of a body is more descriptive of their function. In that specific case they are longer than others: Does their being longer increase or decrease their protectiveness? Do they facilitate or limit the movements of fingers and the whole body? After Kierkegaard who says "I look only at the movements" (quote Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 281), we are now only concerned with the movements of those fingernail-machines as part of a larger machine in connection with other similar machines and within a much larger machinic assemblage.

If we are observing Deleuze in a conference room giving a lecture to an audience, the larger machinic assemblage will include the whole room and everything in it, such as the desk, the audience, the chairs, the lighting, the walls, the time of the day, the exact date and hour, and so on. How do the long fingernails move while the person is talking to the audience? Do they make any repetitive movements? Where are the fingers most of the time? Are they mostly in pockets, moving in the air, kept on the desk, or behind the desk? Are there any changes in the movements of the fingernails in different states of the body-machine, or at a moment of crisis, e.g., when Deleuze is very annoyed, excited, angry, happy, enchanted, etc.? If some audience are gazing at the fingernails and Deleuze notices it, will there be any change in the movements of the fingernails, and how? When Deleuze is outside in the street, his fingernails become part of the largest machinic assemblage which includes the pavements, cars, buildings, other bodies moving or resting, the sky, the sun/moon/clouds. How do they move in that new assemblage? In smaller territories like a house, the long fingernails-house-machine will be a combination of smaller room-machines which will include all other bodies such as the wife, the children, the guests and all other things inside.

As the long fingernails are part of a social machine which talks we must also add speeches and facial expressions and all kinds of enunciation as another assemblage parallel to the machinic ones. In the end, our whole observation will probably be closest to that of Deleuze's social psychologist. But we cannot guarantee the same interpretation as what Deleuze calls to be the true one since there will be some parts missing in our observations, on the one hand, and our own observation might have some elements which Deleuze and his social psychologist have never noticed. Everything we have observed must be formed into one or more "regimes of signs" that specifically

belong to the observed body in the unity of its machinic movements and its enunciations. Regimes of signs are, in fact, what interests Deleuze most in a work of art:

> I think this is what I wanted to do when I worked on some writers, Sacher-Masoch, Proust or Lewis Carroll. What interested me, or should have interested me, was not the psychoanalysis, or the psychiatry, or the linguistics, but the regimes of signs of a given author. (Deleuze 1987: 119)

The task of a Deleuzian reader is similar to a social psychologist's: they both keep their finger on the pulse of becomings which happen silently in life and work with an almost imperceptible resistance to both universal and personal memory. Deleuze points out that,

> We think too much in terms of history, whether personal or universal. Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits. There is a woman-becoming which is not the same as women, their past and their future, and it is essential that women enter this becoming to get out of their past and their future, their history. There is a revolutionary-becoming which is not the same as the future of the revolution, and which does not necessarily happen through the militants. (2)

The only difference between a social psychologist and a reader is that the former observes life as it is lived, and the latter captures life in syntax and style. Thus Deleuze indicates that becomings "are acts which can only be contained in life and expressed in a style", and what defines a style in writing is the use of "inexact words to designate something exactly" (3). Deleuze continues:

> Today we have at our disposal new ways of reading, and perhaps of writing. There are ones which are bad and rotten. For example, we get the feeling that some books are written for the review that a journalist will have to produce, so that there is no longer even any need for a review, but only for empty words ('You must read that! It's great! Go on! You'll see!') to avoid reading the book and putting the article together. But the good ways of reading today succeed in treating a book as you would treat a record you listen to, a film or a TV programme you watch; any treatment of the book which claims for it a special respect – an attention of another kind – comes from another era and definitively condemns the book. There's no question of difficulty or understanding: concepts are exactly like sounds, colours or images, they are intensities which suit you or not, which are acceptable or aren't acceptable. […] There's nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. (3-4)

Deleuze finds in Proust's following words the best definition of style: "Great literature is written in a sort of foreign language. To each sentence we attach a meaning,

or at any rate a mental image, which is often a mistranslation. But in great literature all our mistranslations result in beauty" (quotes Deleuze 1987: 5) Hence the task of reading consists in capturing and multiplying that beauty without interpreting. Beauty belongs to the joy of life even in suffering and tragedy: "In life there is a sort of awkwardness, a delicacy of health, a frailty of constitution, a vital stammering which is someone's charm". In life, most great writers suffered from some illnesses in person (e.g. Proust's asthma which kept him in bed all day, Wool's migraines, the illnesses of D. H. Lawrence, Nietzsche and Spinoza), but in their writing it is language which suffers and stammers; and in the stammering of their style they portray a great health and vitality:

> A style is managing to stammer in one's own language. It is difficult, because there has to be a need for such stammering. Not being a stammerer in one's speech, but being a stammerer of language itself. […] Charm is the source of life just as style is the source of writing. Life is not your history - those who have no charm have no life, it is as though they are dead. But the charm is not the person. It is what makes people be grasped as so many combinations and so many unique chances from which such a combination has been drawn. It is a throw of the dice which necessarily wins, since it affirms chance sufficiently instead of detaching or mutilating chance or reducing it to probabilities. […] Charm gives life a non-personal power, above individuals; at the same time, style gives writing an external end [*fin*] - which goes beyond what is written. And this is the same thing: writing does not have its end in itself precisely because life is not something personal. (Deleuze 1987: 5-6)

Neither life is personal, nor does language have life: "Language is not life […] Life does not speak; it listens and waits" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 76). Life only glimpses when the person and the language begin to break down and stammer. This is in fact the riddle of the tragedy. According to Nietzsche, the Greeks were unable to solve that riddle and "misinterpreted" the tragedy as drama.

Nietzsche argues that, the tragedy was primarily only the satyr "chorus" and not a "drama". The tragedy is the realm of Dionysus, the god of positive unconscious, real forces, virtual life, and metamorphoses. The drama, on the other hand, is the realm of Apollo, the god of dreams and actual appearances, which cannot portray vitality. In the Apollonian realm things look brighter, but they are always "ill seen, ill said" (Beckett). Nietzsche defines the Dionysian chorus after Schiller as "a living bulwark against the onslaught of reality, because", he continues, "it—the satyr chorus—portrays the

existence more truthfully, more essentially, more perfectly than the cultured man who ordinarily considers himself as the sole reality" (Nietzsche 1995: 24). Drama begins, according to Nietzsche, when "the attempt is made to present the god as real and to display the visionary figure together with its aura of splendor before the eyes of all" (28). Hence, the tragedy turns into an "Apollonian dream state in which the world of day is veiled, and a new world, clearer, more intelligible, more vivid and yet more shadowy than the old, by a perpetual transformation is born and reborn before our eyes" (28) Nietzsche defines "Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus, disburdening itself again and again in an Apollonian image-world". Similarly, he defines the drama as "the Apollonian embodiment of Dionysian perceptions and influences" (27). The music of the chorus and "dionysiacally excited spectator" who admire Dionysus remain the only tragic elements in Greek tragedy:

> The Apollonian appearances, in which Dionysus objectifies himself, are no longer "ein ewiges Meer, ein wechselnd Weben, ein glühend Leben,"[52] as is the music of the chorus. They are no longer those forces merely felt, but not condensed into a picture, by which the inspired votary of Dionysus divines the proximity of his god. Now the clearness and firmness of epic form speak to him from the scene; now Dionysus no longer speaks through forces, but as an epic hero, almost the tongue of Homer. (28-9)

Great writers now are the only inheritors of Dionysus, the molecular and the imperceptible. And if they invent a new language within their mother tongue, and if they make language stammer and shatter to pieces, this is primarily due to give Apollo his notice and revive the original chorus. We have this Dionysian instinct of pure musicality in D. H. Lawrence as he writes that: "There is no straight path between you and me, dear reader, so don't blame me if my words fly like dust into your eyes and grit between your teeth, instead of like music into your ears" (Lawrence 1922: 15-6).

Proust and Beckett's having almost no style and Woolf's saturation of every atom, can also be regarded as attempts to revive the Dionysian joy of life and the active productions of the unconscious. But their works still need readers who are tragic enough in order not to interpret them as dramas again, and who are capable of reviving the tragic spectator and share the writers' joy. Proust, after Nietzsche, is the greatest

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[52] This line is from Faust which can be translated as "an eternal sea, a changing weave, a luminous life".

Dionysian artist of Modernism who does not use style but a plane of composition which is like a Spider's net:[53] It is a trap for Apollonian flies, but a resting place for the Dionysian rain drops until the sun evaporates them in the morning. With his "nonstyle," Proust expels Apollo, and reaches the reader's unconscious directly with a telescope through a long distance in space and time. In the following extract from *Remembrance of Things Past* (Volume 7, *Time Regained*), Proust's narrator addresses both Dionysian and Apollonian readers pointing out a reality of reading and its ethics:

> I was thinking more modestly about my book and it would not even be true to say that I was thinking of those who would read it as my readers. For, as I have already shown, they would not be my readers, but the readers of themselves, my book being only a sort of magnifying-glass like those offered by the optician of Combray to a purchaser. So that I should ask neither their praise nor their blame but only that they should tell me if it was right or not, whether the words they were reading within themselves were those I wrote (possible divergencies in this respect might not always arise from my mistake but sometimes because the reader's eyes would not be those to whom my book was suitable). (Proust 2006b: 1272-3)

Nietzsche's Dionysus in his dithyrambs to Ariadne, a woman deserted by his egoist husband Theseus, an Apollonian hero whom she had helped to kill the Minotaur, only asks for her affirmation and her saying "yes" to him. Dionysus invites her to his own labyrinth (the reader as Ariadne and the text is the labyrinth where she may find salvation through forgetfulness):[54]

> Just as other women are between two men, Ariadne is between Theseus and Dionysus. She passes from Theseus to Dionysus. She began by hating Dionysus the Bull. But abandoned by Theseus, whom she had nonetheless guided through the labyrinth, she is carried off by Dionysus, and discovers another labyrinth. (Deleuze 1995: 99)

Finally, Deleuzian reading is not always affirmative, and it becomes harshest when it is a question of another deformation of tragedy: the reduction of Dionysus, the god, to

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[53] The notion of "Proust's spider-becoming" is a Deleuzian invention as will be discussed in the following sections.

[54] In Nietzsche's thought Ariadne plays the role of overcoming reactive feelings. Being a reactive reader blocks all possible ways for an affective reading of a text. Morford and Lenardon (2003: 373) note the following about Ariadne in their *Classical Mythology*: "As the lover or the wife of a hero, a heroine can perform great feats because of passionate devotion. Ariadne helps Theseus kill the Minotaur, and without Medea, Jason never could have won the golden fleece. When heroines are abandoned or betrayed, they can be driven by despair and hatred to wreak a terrifying revenge or, like Ariadne, find salvation."

Oedipus, the man, by Sophocles; and the reduction of the unconscious-as-a-workshop to a theatre of familial representation by Freud:

> "[…] We are all guilty of crime, the great crime of not living life to the full."[55] You weren't born Oedipus, you caused it to grow in yourself; and you aim to get out of it through fantasy, through castration, but this in turn you have caused to grow in Oedipus—namely, in yourself: the horrible circle. Shit on your whole mortifying, imaginary, and symbolic theater. What does schizoanalysis ask? Nothing more than a bit of a relation to the outside, a little real reality. And we claim the right to a radical laxity, a radical incompetence—the right to enter the analyst's office and say it smells bad there. It reeks of the great death and the little ego. (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 334)

Hence, along with its positive task, schizoanalysis carries a negative and destructive task which is "violent, brutal: defamiliarizing, de-oedipalizing, decastrating; undoing theatre, dream, and fantasy; decoding, deterritorializing—a terrible curettage, a malevolent activity" (381). Yet Deleuze & Guattari distinguish their negative task as a natural aggression from the psychoanalytic and the Hegelian reactive tasks:

> Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration. It is not a matter of pious destructions, such as those performed by psychoanalysis under the benevolent neutral eye of the analyst. For these are Hegel-style destructions, ways of conserving. (311)

As for Sophocles' Oedipus, his biggest error was not all the tragic events he passed through, but the answer he gave to Sphinx's riddle. The true answer to the riddle would be not "Man" but Dionysus, the god of metamorphosis and becoming. Oedipus turns the "cosmic force" of a Dionysian symbol into an allegory of "Man". Deleuze points out that,

> [T]he symbol means nothing, and has neither to be explained nor interpreted, as opposed to the intellectual consciousness of allegory. It is a *rotative thought,* in which a group of images turn ever more quickly around a mysterious point, as opposed to the linear allegorical chain. Consider the Sphinx's riddle: "What is it that goes first on four legs, then on two, and then on three?" It would be rather foolish to see this as three linked parts whose final response would be Man. It comes to life, on the contrary, only if one feels the three groups of images in the process of whirling around the most mysterious point of man: images of the animal-child; then those of the creature

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[55] The quoted line is part of a long quotation from Henry Miller's *Sexus* (New York: Groves Press, 1965, pp. 429-30).

on two paws, a monkey, bird, or frog; and then those of the unknown beast on three paws, from beyond the seas and deserts. (Deleuze 1998: 48)

For the Modern Oedipus, Sphinx's riddle becomes a "dirty little secret", and its answer is always the same: "your father"—the symbolic order of the signifier, "coitus"—the imaginary order of the signified, "the Great Other"—iconic order of the signifiable, and the whole unconscious is indexed to the Holy Family: "Daddy-mommy-me—one is sure to re-encounter them everywhere, since everything has been applied to them" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 265). Someone is terribly jealous of the Dionysian joy and happiness:

> All the cynical tactics of bad conscience, just as Nietzsche and then Lawrence and Miller analyzed them to arrive at a definition of civilized European man: the hypnosis and the reign of images, the torpor they spread; the hatred of life and of all that is free, of all that passes and flows; the universal effusion of the death instinct; depression and guilt used as a means of contagion, the kiss of the Vampire: aren't you ashamed to be happy? (268-9)

The modern Oedipus is not only the psychoanalyst but also the linguist: Sphinx's riddle is a riddle of deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations, not to be equated with a linguistic element, "man" as signified. Signs do not signify things: "Signs are not signs of a thing; they are signs of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, they mark a certain threshold crossed in the course of these movements" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 67). When signs become linguistic, language becomes the vehicle of the State apparatus and other powers to subjugate the masses: indexes come to territorialise people, icons reterritorialise them, and symbols create false and allegoric deterritorialisations, and finally axioms code the desires of masses with "the anguish of decoded flows" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 139). The "great Despot" has determined a new role for the language: it must "serve the common good of the nation" and become "the vehicle of information": the masses must learn grammar not to confuse orders and be good citizens. They must also know what happens to transgressors ("see what happed to Oedipus"). According to Foucault, not only psychoanalysis and linguistics but all social sciences are responsible for it. His following observations in his preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, explain why schizoanalysis is sometimes so aggressive:

The human and social sciences […] talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects. (Foucault in Deleuze & Guattari 1983: xx)

5.2. Micropolitics of Language: the Order-Word and the Password

Nietzsche defines language as the metaphor of a metaphor: "A nerve stimulus, first transposed into an image—first metaphor. The image, in turn, imitated by a sound—second metaphor" (Nietzsche 1976: 46). Looking back on language and investigating its power of persuasion in his later life, Nietzsche admits, "I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar" (483). He relates language to "the age of most rudimentary forms of psychology" and to "a realm of crude fetishism" (482) and criticises logocentrism by proclaiming "'Reason' in language—oh, what an old deceptive female she is" (483). In every occasion, Nietzsche repeats his doubts about the adequacy of language in expressing realities (45) and emphasises its mediatory role in the exertion of power (161).

Deleuze & Guattari follow Nietzsche in writing that "A rule of Grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 76). In that sense, the proletarianisation of people begins with the first lessons in grammar at the elementary school. Deleuze & Guattari claim, "we give children language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes" (76). When language is said to be informative, it is primarily made into an ideal medium for emitting, receiving, transmitting and supervising commands and orders. What one emits, receives and transmits through language is the "order-word" that both carries orders and gives order to life, both commands and organises everything:

> One must be just informed enough not to confuse "Fire!" with "Fore!" or to avoid the unfortunate situation of the teacher and the student as described by Lewis Carroll (the teacher, at the top of the stairs, asks a question that is passed on by servants, who distort it at each step of the way, and the student, below in the courtyard, returns an answer that is also distorted at each stage of the trip back). Language is not life; it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it listens and waits. Every order-word, even a father's to his son, carries a little death sentence—a Judgment, as Kafka put it. (76)

For Deleuze & Guattari, information and communication are two modern myths of language. Parallel to the two aspects of faciality discussed in the previous chapter (signifiance and subjectivation), informativeness of language (frequency) is a supplementary effect of "dominant significations", and its communicativeness (resonance) is resulted from "an established order of subjection" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 79). Frequency and resonance are two forms of the redundancy of language: "The order-word itself is the redundancy of the act and the statement. Newspapers, news, proceed by redundancy, in that they tell us what we 'must' think, retain, expect, etc." (79). Language is indirect-discourse in the sense that it carries something said from one person to another: "language does not operate between something seen (or felt) and something said, but always goes from saying to saying" (76).

All discourse or all language is indirect discourse. If humans communicate, or if there exists a direct coding among them, this is not primarily through language. Deleuze & Guattari illustrate a true communication and coding with the example of bees. Bees communicate but this is without a language. A honey bee which has seen a source of nectar communicates its exact location to other bees in the hive through a waggle dance. But other bees in the hive cannot transmit that message to third parties. Contrary to human language and its *indirect designation* (always from a second to a third party), the bee dance has a *direct coding* with what has been seen (always from the first to a second party) and cannot be repeated by other bees which haven't seen it. In that sense, the bee dance is a nondiscursive code and differs from a language which is always an indirect discourse:

> Language is not content to go from a first party to a second party, from one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes from a second party to a third party, neither of whom has seen. It is in this sense that language is the transmission of the word as order-word, not the communication of a sign as information. (77)

Indirect discourse can also be defined as "the presence of a reported statement within the reported statement" (84). Direct discourse has no primary existence in human language. It also needs to be mentioned that language has a nondiscursive function which Austin (2003: 233) calls the "performative" function. It is a function internal to language by which one performs something in saying it: one promises by saying "I

promise …", one swears by saying "I swear …", one apologises by saying "I apologise …" or one marries somebody by saying "I do …", as Austin comments for the last example: "when I say 'I do' (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife), I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it" (Austin 2003: 235). Illocutionary speech acts have a wider scope than the performative. They stand for the acts performed in speaking such as, asking a question by using the question form or promising by saying "I love you", "I will …", and so on. Both performative and illocutionary acts are in no way informative, and they still have the order-word function and are redundant. Deleuze & Guattari state,

> Order-words do not concern commands only, but every act that is linked to statements by a "social obligation." Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly. Questions, promises, are order-words. The only possible definition of language is the set of all order-words, implicit presuppositions, or speech acts current in a language at a given moment. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 79)

Language as indirect discourse or as the transmission of the order-word is never individual or subjective, but always involves an assemblage that is social, impersonal and collective: "Indirect discourse is not explained by the distinction between subjects; rather, it is the assemblage, as it freely appears in this discourse, that explains all the voices present within a single voice" (80). Thus, in Deleuze & Guattari's terminology, the closest rendering of language is "collective assemblage of enunciation". Likewise, they define language always in relation to its outside as "the set of all incorporeal transformations current in a given society and attributed to the bodies of that society" (80). The term bodies in the above definition includes not only physical bodies and things but also actions, passions, affects and the changes attributed to those bodies and all sorts of mental bodies. Love and marriage, for example, are primarily corporeal acts and indicate intermingling of bodies. But the statements "I love you" and "I do …" express "noncorporeal" acts attributed to those bodies, and they bring about incorporeal transformations by converting the bodies into couples as lovers or husband-and-wife. Deleuze & Guattari's renowned example of "an airplane hijacking" deserves quoting:

> In an airplane hijacking, the threat of a hijacker brandishing a revolver is obviously an action; so is the execution of the hostages, if it occurs. But the transformation of the passengers into hostages, and of the plane-body into a

prison-body, is an instantaneous incorporeal transformation, a "mass media act" in the sense in which the English speak of "speech acts." The order-words or assemblages of enunciation in a given society (in short, the illocutionary) designate this instantaneous relation between statements and the incorporeal transformations or noncorporeal attributes they express. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 81)

Deleuze & Guattari relate the semiotic system in a society to an abstract machine which is external to language, and to regimes of signs which survey language in relation to the formations of power outside it. For Deleuze & Guattari, collective assemblages of enunciation or regimes of signs are not related to linguistics regarded as a homogeneous and autonomous system which defines language with constants, universals and linear structures (e.g., phonological commutativity, syntactical transformativity and semantic generativity, Chomsky's syntactic tree diagram, distinctive features, competence, synchrony, etc.) (92). Deleuze & Guattari also criticise linguists' privileging of a dominant and major use ("the language of power") in order to carry out a so called scientific study of language. They point out that "language is a heterogeneous, variable reality", and nondistinctive features of prosody, stylistics and pragmatics which prevail in language define it as a "superlinear and 'suprasegmental'" fact. The scientific enterprises of homogeneity, autonomy and unity of language always go along with political interests:

> The unity of language is fundamentally political. There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language that at times advances along a broad front, and at times swoops down on diverse centers simultaneously. […] The scientific enterprise of extracting constants and constant relations is always coupled with the political enterprise of imposing them on speakers and transmitting order-words. (101)

When linked to its outside, to non-linguistic factors, language is put to a continuous variation with no constants. Only a pragmatic study of language can discover the variables of usage which are internal to collective assemblage of enunciation. Defining language-function not as communication or information but the transmission of order-word is part of a pragmatics which saves linguistics from being trapped in a closed circuit (e.g. textaulity) and it is the first step to a study of regimes of signs: "Linguistics is nothing without a pragmatics (semiotic or political) to define the effectuation of the condition of possibility of language and the usage of linguistic elements" (85). Defining

language-usage as the transmission of the order-word is what "effectuates the condition of possibility of language" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 106) in relation to its outside, to non-linguistic factors. Regimes of signs can never be thought independently of regimes of bodies that are social, historical, political, geographical, zoological, and so on:

> "I swear" is not the same when said in the family, at school, in a love affair, in a secret society, or in court: it is not the same thing, and neither is it the same statement; it is not the same bodily situation, and neither is it the same incorporeal transformation. The transformation applies to bodies but is itself incorporeal, internal to enunciation. There are variables of expression *that establish a relation between language and the outside, but precisely because they are immanent to language*. As long as linguistics confines itself to constants, whether syntactical, morphological, or phonological, it ties the statement to a signifier and enunciation to a subject and accordingly botches the assemblage; it consigns circumstances to the exterior, closes language in on itself, and makes pragmatics a residue. (82)

Thus, when language is related to its outside, its "minimum real unit" is not the morpheme, "the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier but the *assemblage*". "The utterance is the product of an assemblage—which is always collective, which brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events" (Deleuze 1987: 51).

When language is treated as indirect discourse, the expressing subject also becomes an illusion. Deleuze claims that in language, or rather, "in any assemblage, there exist 'processes of subjectivation' which assign various subjects: some are images, and some are signs" (Deleuze 2007: 201). Hence the speaking subject is always a constellation or an assemblage of different voices either in the reactive apparatus or in the positive unconscious. The subject pronoun "I" in an utterance is always burdened with the order-word. Deleuze & Guattari comment,

> To write is perhaps to bring this assemblage of the unconscious to the light of day, to select the whispering voices, to gather the tribes and secret idioms from which I extract something I call my Self (*Moi*). *I* is an order-word. A schizophrenic said: "I heard voices say: *he is conscious of life*." In this sense, there is indeed a schizophrenic cogito, but it is a cogito that makes self-consciousness the incorporeal transformation of an order-word, or a result of indirect discourse. My direct discourse is still the free indirect discourse running through me, coming from other worlds or other planets. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 84)

The term "order-word" in *A thousand Plateaus* is the most commonly used translation of the French word "*mot d'ordre*", which in fact has double sense, and its other meaning is "password". The term order-word is applicable to the reactive apparatus, the three strata in society, both rigid and subtle segmentations of life, and finally, to the Cartesian or the oedipal cogito. The password, conversely, is applicable only to the lines of flight, the positive unconscious and to the schizophrenic cogito. The difference between both senses of the order-word can be illustrated with two different uses of the word "I" in Deleuze & Guattari's work.

"I" as the order-word is best seen in the following utterance: "I, as a man, understand you, but as judge, as boss, as colonel or general, that is to say as the father, I condemn you" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 64). This statement does not say anything more than a coded and segmented chess piece on a stratified chess board could say: "I, as a pawn, can move straight ahead one or two squares to a vacant space, but I can only capture my opponent in the adjacent square ahead diagonally …" Any other movements for both subjects are against the strata or against the rules which are always external and are generated by an abstract machine as socius or as chess rules. Hence, "I" as a subject burdened by the order-word or as subjected to a dominant reality has to choose between three deaths, an immediate, a potential or an inflictable death:

> Order-words bring immediate death to those who receive the order, or potential death if they do not obey, or a death they must themselves inflict, take elsewhere. A father's orders to his son, "You will do this," "You will not do that," cannot be separated from the little death sentence the son experiences on a point of his person. Death, death; it is the only judgment, and it is what makes judgment a system. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 107)

Although death is applicable to bodies, it becomes an incorporeal transformation, an incorporeal death, as the "expressed" of an enunciation or a statement.[56]

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[56] An extreme case of regarding one's mother tongue as the incorporeal transformation of a death sentence is presented by the young American anorexic and schizophrenic Louis Wolfson who cannot stand eating food and hearing English words. Wolfson feels great pain in hearing his mother speak English (Deleuze 1998: 13-20). Deleuze indicates that, for Wolfson, his mother tongue "is a box containing words that are always cutting; but letters (especially consonants) are constantly falling from these words, and must be avoided or warded off as so many thorns or splinters that are particularly harmful or harsh" (15).

As for the password, it is already present in the order-word and must be extracted from it not by fleeing the order-word, but by fleeing the death sentence it carries. And hence, the order-word is made to take flight itself or flee as a component of passage:

> There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or organized, stratified compositions. A single thing or word undoubtedly has this twofold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other—to transform the compositions of order into components of passage. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 110)

Individual statements of a person are never the product of his or her ego which would be the subject of enunciation (the speaking subject). They always result from collective arrangements which constitute a whole network of multiplicities, masses, crowds and tribes populating the unconscious. One of the best examples of the order-word as password is present in Nietzsche's whole oeuvre as the productions of a schizoid cogito. Nietzsche produces and reproduces collective agents of enunciation within their machinic arrangements. Thus, when Nietzsche says "I", it is mostly effectuated as a third person: "'I think as Idiot,' 'I will as Zarathustra,' 'I dance as Dionysus,' 'I claim as Lover'" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996b: 64). The only subject of Nietzsche's production and reproduction is the unconscious unity of Dionysian metamorphoses (machinic assemblage) and chorus (collective enunciation). There is nothing to be discovered and noting to be interpreted in the unconscious which is itself an assemblage. The unconscious must be produced and reproduced over and over.

Parallel to the order-word function and the password function beneath it, Deleuze & Guattari distinguish between a major language and a minor language. Major and minor do not refer to two different languages, but to different treatments and usages of the same language. A major treatment of a language, which is more related to order-word function, is never without the assumptions of a privileged constancy, standardisation, and "a state of power and domination". A minor or minoritarian treatment of a language related to the password function, conversely, proposes a positive and creative difference and a potential becoming. It foregrounds subsystems or outsytems against majoritarian implications and homogeneous systems.

In Deleuze & Guattari's use, minority has various mixed references such as "musical, literary, linguistic, as well as juridical and political" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 105). In linguistic terms, minority does not mean having recourse to a minor dialect independently of the standard language, but carrying out a minor treatment of a major language by putting the constants of the latter into continuous variation and creative use. A literary style as in e. e. cumming's line "he danced his did" always puts the constants of a language into continuous variation and foregrounds "apertinent, asyntactic or agrammatical, asemantic" features of a minoritarian use (99). Deleuze & Guattari indicate:

> What is called a style can be the most natural thing in the world; it is nothing other than the procedure of a continuous variation. […] [A] style is not an individual psychological creation but an assemblage of enunciation, it unavoidably produces a language within a language. Take an arbitrary list of authors we are fond of: Kafka once again, Beckett, Gherasim Luca, Luc Godard. It will be noted that they are all more or less in a bilingual situation: Kafka, the Czechoslovakian Jew writing in German; Beckett, the Irishman writing in English and French; Luca, originally from Romania; Godard and his will to be Swiss. (97-8)

Through the style, great writers become foreigners in their mother tongue, and they make the language stammer and take flight. Thus style always becomes another language as can be seen in the Dionysian chorus in the original tragedy:

> It was Proust who said that "masterpieces are written in a kind of foreign language." That is the same as stammering, making language stammer rather than stammering in speech. To be a foreigner, but in one's own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one's own. To be bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois. To be a bastard, a half-breed, but through a purification of race. That is when style becomes a language. That is when language becomes intensive, a pure continuum of values and intensities. (98)

Stammering of language is not a variation of the dialogical marker, such as, "substituting for 'he said' expressions like 'he murmured,' 'he stammered,' 'he sobbed,' 'he giggled,' 'he cried,' 'he stuttered,'". Nor it is the indicated stammering of the characters such as "Masoch's heroes [who] are constantly murmuring", or Gregor in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*: Gregor becomes a cockroach and he "squeaks more than he speaks, but this is according to the testimony of others" (Deleuze 1998: 107). For

Deleuze, true stammering in language is the stammering of the writer himself or herself, on the basic principle of "*saying is doing*" (Deleuze 1998: 107).

In the case of Masoch and Kafka again, they are not content to make stuttering a component of "expression" (what is said) alone but they pass it to the component of the "content" (what is seen or done) as well, and they attain a true stuttering in that way: Kafka "confirms Gregor's squeaking through the trembling of his feet and the oscillations of his body"; and Masoch "doubles the stammering of his characters with the heavy suspense of the boudoir, the hum of the village, or the vibrations of the steppe" (108). Deleuze, after the French linguist Guillaume, seeks a means for considering "each term of a language not as a constant in relation to other constants, but as a series of differential positions or points of view on a specifiable dynamism". In that, Deleuze's approach is more scientific than a linguist's:

> Can we make progress if we do not enter into *regions far from equilibrium?* Physics attests to this. Keynes made advances in political economy because he related it to the situation of a "boom," and no longer one of equilibrium. This is the only way to introduce desire into the corresponding field. Must language then be put into a state of *boom,* close to a *crash?* Dante is admired for having "listened to stammerers" and studied "speech impediments," not only to derive speech effects from them, but in order to undertake a vast phonetic, lexical, and even syntactic creation. (108)

Likewise, Beckett's observations similar to Dante are well-known. All these suggest that great writers are not only the doctors of the society, but they are also among the best clinicians of language. This is in fact another sense of Deleuze's term "clinical". All major languages are inflicted with the paranoia of meaning and fossilization (like many dead languages). All great writers attempt to cure it, like, for instance, T. H. Lawrence in English, and Kleist versus Goethe in German:

> What better compliment could one receive than that of the critic who said of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*: this is not English. Lawrence made English stumble in order to extract from it the music and visions of Arabia. And what language did Kleist awaken deep within German by means of grimaces, slips of the tongue, screechings, inarticulate sounds, extended liaisons, and brutal accelerations and decelerations, at the risk of horrifying Goethe, the greatest representative of the major language, and in order to attain these truly strange ends: petrified visions and a vertiginous music. (110)

In the stammering of language two correlative aims are achieved: "the tensor and the limit, the tension in language and the limit of language" (Deleuze 1998: 112). With its tension, the word becomes unified with the thing as suggested by Humpty Dumpty: "*my* name means the shape I am" (Carroll 1994b: 94). And finally, at its limit language reaches its outside, it becomes silence. That is to say, it becomes truly communicative as in the waggle dance of bees, or as Deleuze suggests: "Words paint and sing, but only at the limit of the path they trace through their divisions and combinations. Words create silence" (Deleuze 1998: 113). The tensor and the limit are the only passwords to ward off the regimes of signs.

Along with Mandelstam and Khlebnikov, Andrey Bely is a Russian novelist whom Deleuze mentions to push the Russian language to its outside. Bely's childish stuttering in his novel *Kotik Letaev* (1922) explodes language and he has to warn the reader with the following remark: "Do not try to find a well-polished sentence or a perfectly coherent image in it, what is printed on the pages is an embarrassed word, a stuttering ..." (quotes Deleuze 1998: 113). What such writers of style, or rather, of nonstyle, communicate to the reader are not any meanings behind words and sentences, nor their interpretations, but a machinic arrangement, a machinic assemblage which the reader must be a part of and observe how it functions at the limit of language. Then, words and phrases become cogs which can be used anywhere and assembled with anything.

5.3. Regimes of Signs: What Does the Language Think it Is?

Deleuze & Guattari's pragmatic and social approach to language bypasses Saussurean linguistics and is based on the Stoic distinction between "bodies or states of affairs" and "incorporeal effects or events" as two independent and heterogeneous entities (Deleuze 1990: 6). On the part of bodies, the Stoics also include all physical things, "mixtures of bodies", "their tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions", causes and agents. The only time of the bodies is the real or living present (*Chronos*): "Only the present exists in time and gathers together or absorbs the past and future". On the part of events, on the other hand, the Stoics include the effects and "results of actions and passions" and logical attributes which are not any real qualities. The time of events is an unlimited one (*Aion*) in which there is no present but a continuous

becoming-past of future and the immediate incorporeal transformations resulting from the intermingling of bodies: "the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present" (Deleuze 1990: 5). Similarly, Deleuze & Guattari divide a social field into two different sets after the Stoics as "corporeal modifications" (intermingling of bodies, things) and "incorporeal transformations" (events, signs, language). They illustrate both sets in the manner of the Stoics:

> When knife cuts flesh, when food or poison spreads through the body, when a drop of wine falls into water, there is an *intermingling of bodies*; but the statements, "The knife is cutting the flesh," "I am eating," "The water is turning red," express *incorporeal transformations* of an entirely different nature (events). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 86)

Incorporeal transformations "are the expressed of statements". Although they "are *attributed* to bodies", they never "describe or represent" them. Representations must also be classified as bodies: when one says "a green tree", or "the tree is green", he or she expresses not an event of Aion or an incorporeal transformation, but represents two different bodies intermingling in the real time of present: a "tree" plus some degree of "green". Both substantives (nouns) and adjectives are still bodies according to the Stoics (Deleuze 1990: 5). True events and incorporeal transformations are expressed in verbs which belong to the time of Aion, such as "to green" in the utterance "the tree greens". "To green" is only the expression of a transformation attributed to a tree; it neither represents the tree nor expresses the present.

For the formalisation of the set of bodies (corporeal modifications) and the set of events (incorporeal transformations), Deleuze & Guattari adopt the Spinozist linguist Hjelmslev's "stratic" distinction as "content" (bodies, things, or what is *seen*) and "expression" (events, signs, or what is *said*):

> [W]e are presented […] with two formalizations, one of *content*, the other of *expression*. For content is not opposed to form but has its own formalization: the hand-tool pole, or the lesson of things. It is, however, opposed to expression, inasmuch as expression also has its own formalization: the face-language pole, the lesson of signs. Precisely because content, like expression, has a form of its own, one can never assign the form of expression the function of simply representing, describing, or averring a corresponding content: there is neither correspondence nor conformity. The two formalizations are not of the same nature; they are independent, heterogeneous. (85-6)

The relation between content and expression can not be explained in terms of cause and effect or signifier and signified. Between the two, Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 503) indicate, "there is real distinction, reciprocal presupposition, and only isomorphy".

The dual segments or formalisations of content (what is seen) and expression (what is said) discussed above, constitute only one axis of the assemblages, the horizontal axis: respectively, the machinic assemblages of bodies (form of content) and the collective assemblages of enunciation or the regimes of signs (form of expression). The assemblages also have a second, vertical, axis which again has dual vectors related to movements and rests. The first vector of the vertical axis is related to territorialisation and reterritorialisations. It is "oriented toward the strata" and stabilizes the segments separately as form of content and form of expression, yet it places them in reciprocal presupposition. The second vector of the vertical axis includes "cutting edges of deterritorialisation" that carry off the segments of assemblages. On this vector which is "oriented toward the plane of consistency or destratification", assemblages are put into creative use along the lines of flight. There is no longer any distinction between content and expression, but only traits of content and traits of expression are retained to enable new creations and revolutionary formations (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 88, 145; Deleuze 1987: 72). An assemblage is thus tetravalent with its two segments and two vectors on two different axes. The components of an assemblage are shown in a lobster diagram in Figure 4 below.

HORIZONTAL AXIS

FORM

SUBSTANCE

MATTER

FUNCTION

VERTICAL AXIS

ABSTRACT

MACHINES

(1) Form of Content: Machinic Assemblages of Bodies (desire, corporeal effectuations, physical systems)

(2) Form of Expression: Collective Assemblages of Enunciation, Regimes of Signs (pragmatics, incorporeal transformations, statements, codes, semiotic systems)

(3) Segmentations within the Strata: Territorialities, Reterritorialisations (stratification, totalisation, organisation, coding, overcoding, blockages, black holes,lines of death, formalisations, the State apparatus)

(4) Movements on the Plane of Consistency: Deterritorialisations, Lines of Flight, (destratification, decoding, becoming, BwO, continuous variation, metamorphosis, susbtantial elements and formal traits, the war machine)

Figure 4: The Lobster Diagram of an Assemblage

The third plateau entitled '10,000 B.C: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is?)' in Deleuze & Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* opens with a full page photo of a lobster, which is very important to their aesthetic figure of the Spinozist Professor Challenger. Considering the prophetic professor's relentless argument that the articulation of assemblages are always in doubles, Deleuze & Guattari recount:

> God is a Lobster, or a double pincer, a double bind. Not only do strata come at least in pairs, but in a different way each stratum is double (it itself has several layers). Each stratum exhibits phenomena constitutive *of double articulation.* Articulate twice, B-A, BA. This is not at all to say that the strata speak or are language based. Double articulation is so extremely variable that we cannot begin with a general model, only a relatively simple case. […] (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 40)

Hence, the Lobster stands as the model of the abstract machine which precedes and double-articulates the assemblages as illustrated in Figure 4 above. An abstract machine is never thought as a "transcendental Idea" or an "infrastructure". The true abstract machine of the unconscious pertains to the plane of consistency and draws the cutting edges of deterritorialisation. It is composed of "*unformed matters and nonformal functions*" (510). It is defined as "pure Matter-Function—a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute" (141). It is neither physical (corporeal) nor semiotic (expressive). It substitutes substance and content

(bodies) with *matters* and replaces form and expression (semiotics) with *functions*. It is deterritorialised, destratified, and desegmentalised. In addition, "it knows nothing of the distinction between the artificial and the natural" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 141).

Deleuze & Guattari distinguish between three different abstract machines in their typological assessments. Schizoanalysis carries out both "a qualitative analysis of abstract machines" and "a quantitative analysis of the assemblages" in their reciprocal interactions (513). A "typological analysis" of the abstract machines carries out a classification from the standpoint of assemblages which the abstract machines lead to. The true abstract machine examined above is a *diagrammatic* one, and it takes place on the plane of consistency. The other two abstract machines are the *stratic* which leads to territorialisations and the *axiomatic* which produces reterritorialisations. Deleuze & Guattari describe the typology of abstract machines and comment on them as follows:

> There are different types of abstract machines that overlap in their operations and qualify the assemblages: *abstract machines of consistency*, singular and mutant, with multiplied connections; *abstract machines of stratification* that surround the plane of consistency with another plane; and *axiomatic or overcoding abstract machines* that perform totalizations, homogenizations, conjunctions of closure. Every abstract machine is linked to other abstract machines, not only because they are inseparably political, economic, scientific, artistic, ecological, cosmic—perceptive, affective, active, thinking, physical, and semiotic—but because their various types are as intertwined as their operations are convergent. (514)

On the plane of consistency there is no distinction between form of content and form of expression, hence the diagrammatic abstract machine produces no signs or signifying regimes but diagrams and diagrammatic intensities. Only the stratic and axiomatic abstract machines produce signs with the separation of content and expression: "Expression then constitutes indexes, icons, or symbols that enter regimes or semiotic systems. Content then constitutes bodies, things, or objects that enter physical systems, organisms, and organizations" (143). Hence the three types of signs are respectively, indexes which refer to territorialisations, icons which refer to reterritorialisations, and symbols which refer to negative deterritorialisations.

Going back to our discussion of the regimes of signs, it can be recapitulated that, language with its order-word function is studied under regimes of signs which form part

of the assemblage of expression or of semiotic systems. The assemblage of expression is complementary to that of content. Finally, all assemblages are distributed by abstract machines. The diagrammatic functions of the abstract machine "go beyond any system of semiology, linguistics, or logic" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 148). The abstract machine connects language to pragmatics and "to a whole micropolitics of the social field" (7). Similarly, regimes of signs cannot be reduced to linguistic categories alone. Hence, contrary to what linguists propose, Deleuze & Guattari argue that there is not "a purely language-based abstract machine" which will limit itself to the form of expression and to so called universals of language alone (141).

The abstract machine does not presuppose a language, and has diagrams in place of signs. Regimes of signs, on the other hand, cannot be accounted for by any linguistic category. Deleuze & Guattari define them by means of "variables that are internal to enunciation but remain external to the constants of language and irreducible to linguistic categories" (140). Regimes of signs are based on abstract machines and a whole range of diagrammatic functions, machinic assemblages and reciprocal presupposition of form and content. A regime of signs has four components "which form the object of Pragmatics" (145). These four components which also define schizoanalysis can be summarized, from less to more profound, as follows (145-6):

1. The *generative* component (*tracing*) shows "how every regime of signs or semiotic is concretely mixed".

2. The *transformational* component (*mapping*) shows "transformations from one regime to another, past, present, or potential (as a function of the creation of new regimes)".

3. The *diagrammatic* component (*diagramming*) studies abstract machines (as they emerge newly and multiply) "from the standpoint of semiotically unformed matters in relation to physically unformed matters".

4. The *machinic* component (*programming*) studies "the assemblages that effectuate abstract machines, simultaneously semiotizing matters of expression and physicalizing matters of content".

Within the generative component, Deleuze & Guattari isolate at least four different regimes of signs which are *presignifying*, *signifying*, *countersignifying* and *postsignifying*. Table 6 below summarises the regimes of signs with their characteristic traits (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 135-6, 140; Deleuze 2007 13-6).

Table 6: An Outline of the Regimes of Signs

	Presignifying Regime	Signifying Regime	Countersigni-fying Regime	Postsignifying Regime
Overcoding	operates diffusely, marking the privileged status of language	fully effectuated by the signifier, and by the State apparatus that emits it	assured by the Number as form of expression or enunciation, and by the War Machine upon which it depends	assured by the redundancy of consciousness
Enunciation	collective	uniform		subjectified […] on a passional line that makes the organization of power immanent
Statements	polyvocal	controlled in a regime of circularity		syntagmatic, paradigmatic
Substances of expression	multiple, non-facial	unifying, facial		doubling, double turning away
Deterritorial-ization	Relative, determined by the confrontation between the territorialities and segmentary lineages that ward off the State apparatus	Relative, taken as far as it can go by a redundant and perpetual referral from sign to sign	follows a line of active destruction or abolition	raised to the absolute, although in a way that is still negative
FUNCTION	segmentarization	signifiance and interpretation	Numeration	subjectification
Clinical type of delirium		paranoid		passional
Social formations	primitive, territorial (hunter nomads)	pre-capitalist, despotic or imperial	nomadic (animal-rising and warrior nomads against empires)	capitalist, subjective
Example statements of "love"	"I love you, all women of my tribe"	"Long live the king, we all love you. How can't we?"	"I love you, my terrible enemy." (e.g., as said by Penthesilea to Achilles)	"I am proud he/she loves me, but I suspect I am betrayed …"

Sometimes transformations from a known regime or from a completely new regime into one of the four above regimes take place. The type of the transformational components is determined by which regime the transformation is made into. Hence, four types of transformations into each of the four regimes of signs are, respectively, *analogical*, *symbolic*, *strategic* (or *polemical*) and *mimetic* (or *consciousness-related*) (136). The type of transformations into each regime is illustrated in Table 7 below. For instance, an analogical transformation means that the transformation is made into a presignifying regime from any other regimes and what we ultimately have belongs to the presignifying regime.

Table 7: The Type of Transformations into Each Regime

Presignifying Regime	Signifying Regime	Countersignifying Regime	Postsignifying Regime
Analogical	Symbolic	Polemical or Strategic	Mimetic or Consciousness-related

Although Deleuze & Guattari name only four regimes of signs or semiotic regimes arbitrarily, there might be more of them. Deleuze & Guattari avoid identifying a semiotic regime with a moment in history and certain peoples since the regimes are always mixed even within the same period or community. They maintain that,

> [A] given people, language, or period assures the relative dominance of a certain regime. Perhaps all semiotics are mixed and not only combine with various forms of content but also combine different regimes of signs. Presignifying elements are always active in the signifying regime; countersignifying elements are always present and at work within it; and postsignifying elements are already there. Even that is to mark too much temporality. The semiotics and their mixtures may appear in a history of confrontation and intermingling of peoples, but also in languages in which there are several competing functions, or in a psychiatric hospital in which different forms of insanity coexist among the patients or even combine in a single patient; or in an ordinary conversation in which people are speaking the same tongue but different languages (all of a sudden a fragment of an unexpected semiotic surfaces). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 119)

Deleuze & Guattari are neither proposing a new kind of evolutionism nor doing history by means of their thorough investigation of regimes of signs within communities of the world and all periods of history. They assert in both critical and clinical terms that,

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Semiotic systems depend on assemblages, and it is the assemblages that determine that a given people, period, or language, and even a given style, fashion, pathology, or minuscule event in a limited situation, can assure the predominance of one semiotic or another. We are trying to make maps of regimes of signs: we can turn them around or retain selected coordinates or dimensions, and depending on the case we will be dealing with a social formation, a pathological delusion (délire), a historical event, etc. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 119)

In their analysis of regimes of signs, Deleuze & Guattari focus mainly on two regimes, the "signifying regime" and the "postsignifying regime", which can be named alternatively as the "paranoid signifying regime" and the "passional subjective regime". Both regimes represent, for Deleuze & Guattari, "the two diseases of the earth or the skin" (114), or "two regimes of madness" as the title of Deleuze's 1974 essay suggests (2007: 11-6).

5.3.1. Paranoid Signifying Regime of the Tower

Expression (e.g., words) and content (e.g. things) in social life "involve two parallel formalizations" effectuated by the abstract machine. And under the regulation of machinic assemblages, the segments of each formalisation "constantly intertwine, embed themselves in one another". Their parallelism also implies that, like the two pincers of a lobster's claw, neither formalisation is granted a privilege over the other. Thus, the form of expression and the form of content do not stand for, respectively, a signifier (e.g. the word "tree") and its signified (a "tree" we see). Nor do they represent the socio-cultural superstructure (ideology) and its material base (production). The realm of the abstract machine has its own instinctive logic. Bertrand Russell writes in a sarcastic tone that, "intellect is the misfortune of man, while instinct is seen at its best in ants, bees, and Bergson" (1995: 758),[57] but to understand the abstract machine and its formalisations as content and expression, one needs to look through the eyes of ants and bees which do not have a language and superstructure.

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[57] Along with Spinoza and Nietzsche, Bergson has an important place in Deleuze's thought, although he is unfortunately omitted in this study. All three philosophers belong to the tradition of immanence and share the Dionysian heritage.

The waggle dance of a honey bee is the form of expression, and its form of content is the exact location of a source of nectar as seen by the bee which performs the waggle dance in consideration of the sun's exact location in the sky, the exact angle between the sun, the hive and the source of nectar, the distance, and so on. Thus the form of content as the actual source of nectar is a complete machinic assemblage, and the form of expression is never independent of the form of content. Another bee which has not been in that machinic assemblage can infer the form of content (source of nectar) from its form of expression (the waggle dance), but cannot produce the same form of expression. Human language never functions like that. As humans, if we see a house-form as a form of content, and produce the utterance "It's a house", as the form of expression this is only out of habit and for the sake of convenience. The house as a signifier never takes us to a house as signified: "it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say" (Foucault 1994: 9). Who speaks in language is no one but the language itself. The signifier-signified binary system of language makes it an enclosed and homogeneous system. Deleuze & Guattari's following account of a Foucauldian analysis is easier to grasp in the light of the bee illustration above:

> Take a thing like the prison: the prison is a form, the "prison-form"; it is a form of content on a stratum and is related to other forms of content (school, barracks, hospital, factory). This thing or form does not refer back to the word "prison" but to entirely different words and concepts, such as "delinquent" and "delinquency," which express a new way of classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts. "Delinquency" is the form of expression in reciprocal presupposition with the form of content "prison." Delinquency is in no way a signifier, even a juridical signifier, the signified of which would be the prison. That would flatten the entire analysis. Moreover, the form of expression is reducible not to words but to a set of statements arising in the social field considered as a stratum (that is what a regime of signs is). The form of content is reducible not to a thing but to a complex state of things as a formation of power (architecture, regimentation, etc.). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 66-7)

When a hierarchy is introduced between the parallel formations of content and expression, a dialectic of result is mistaken for the immanent process on a single plane of consistency. This hierarchy reduces the form of content to "an economic base of production", the assemblages are reduces to "the first story of a superstructure that, as such, is necessarily situated within a State apparatus", and finally the form of expression

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is reduced to "the second story of the superstructure, defined by ideology" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 68). Hence other misconceptions and mystifications follow:

> It isn't altogether clear where language should go, since the great Despot decided that it should be reserved a special place, as the common good of the nation and the vehicle for information. Thus one misconstrues the nature of language, which exists only in heterogeneous regimes of signs, and rather than circulating information distributes contradictory orders. It misconstrues the nature of regimes of signs, which express organizations of power or assemblages and have nothing to do with ideology as the supposed expression of a content (ideology is a most execrable concept obscuring all of the effectively operating social machines). It misconstrues the nature of organizations of power, which are in no way located within a State apparatus but rather are everywhere, effecting formalizations of content and expression, the segments of which they intertwine. Finally, it misconstrues the nature of content, which is in no way economic "in the last instance," since there are as many directly economic signs or expressions as there are noneconomic contents. Nor can the status of social formations be analyzed by throwing some signifier into the base, or vice versa, or a bit of phallus or castration into political economy, or a bit of economics or politics into psychoanalysis. (68-9)

All attempts to render everything into signifier and signified mean we are brought to a symbolic realm of a semiotic regime called the despotic or paranoid "signifying regime". Human language, its linguistic system and the hierarchy in society must all be studied within this regime.

In their study of the signifying regime, Deleuze & Guattari have in mind as a model primarily the "paranoid Pharaoh" and his "imperial network" and language system and a "pyramidal" hierarchy. They also produce a flat spiral diagram of the signifying regime which is modified in Figure 5 below into a two dimensional and vertical one with the mythical Tower of Babel as a model in mind.[58]

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[58] Deleuze & Guattari's original diagram of the signifying regime is as follows (1996a: 135):

(1) The Center or the Signifier; the faciality of the god or despot. (2) The Temple or Palace, with priests and bureaucrats. (3) The organization in circles and the sign referring to other signs on the same circle or on different circles. (4) The interpretive development of signifier into signified, which then reimparts signifier. (5) The expiatory animal; the blocking of the line of flight. (6) The scapegoat, or the negative sign of the line of flight.
 (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 135)

Figure 5: The Signifying Regime

The temple of priests is situated at the top of the tower. In the middle of it is "the signifying centre" where the body or the face of the despot or god is located. The priests in the temple continually interpret the messages they receive from the despot. They successively "recharge the signified" and convert it "into signifier". Along the spiral and the sloping path leading from the bottom of the tower to the door of the temple at the top are lined the "hysterical" mass of people who carry the interpreted messages horizontally in the same circle or vertically to other circles below or above. When the signifying chain is broken somewhere, a scapegoat is chosen and punished by the priests. No revolutionary ideas or transgressions are allowed. All the lines of flight are blocked as the sign of the negative. This regime includes "all subjected, arborescent, hierarchical, centered groups: political parties, literary movements, psychoanalytic associations, families, conjugal units, etc." (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 116). The common characteristics of those groups are their privileging of the "Signifier", which "reigns over every domestic squabble, and in every State apparatus", of the "photo, faciality, redundancy, signifiance, and interpretation" (116)

In terms of literary movements, for instance, Virginia Woolf draws a similar picture of the writer who "sits upon a tower raised above the rest" of the people. What is significant about this tower for the writer is that "it decides his angle of vision; it affects his power of communication" (Woolf 1975: 138). According to Woolf, the period of

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"the leaning-tower writers" continues down to the First World War. "Discomfort; pity for themselves; anger against society"; "scapegoat beating; excuse finding" are some characteristics of those "unconscious inheritors of a great tradition" (Woolf 1975: 139). Woolf herself, conversely, wishes for "a stronger, a more varied literature of the classless and towerless society of the future" (151).

Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 117) make a list of "eight aspects or principles" for the signifying regime as follows:

1. The "limitlessness of signifiance": "the sign refers to another sign, ad infinitum". The sign is deterritorialised.

2. The "circularity of the deterritorialised sign": "the sign is brought back by other signs and never ceases to return".

3. The "metaphor or hysteria of signs": "the sign jumps from circle to circle and constantly displaces the center at the same time as it ties into it".

4. The "interpretosis of the priest": "the expansion of the circles is assured by interpretations that impart signified and reimpart signifier".

5. The "despotic signifier": "the infinite set of signs refers to a supreme signifier presenting itself as both lack and excess". It shows "the limit of the system's deterritorialization".

6. The traits of "faciality": "the form of the signifier has a substance, or the signifier has a body, namely, the Face" which leads to "reterritorialisation".

7. The "principle of the scapegoat": "the system's line of flight is assigned a negative value, condemned as that which exceeds the signifying regime's power of deterritorialization".

8. The illusion of universality: "the regime is one of universal deception, in its jumps, in the regulated circles, in the seer's regulation of interpretations, in the publicness of the facialized center, and in the treatment of the line of flight".

Although this regime is equated with pre-capitalism, it is still effective in the dominant language of each nation, the State apparatus and in the dialectical line of thought defined with three Hs: Hegel-Husserl-Heidegger. Deleuze also regards the

Marx-Freud-Saussure triad and Chomsky among the main exponents of the signifying despotic regime:

> Marxism brandishes a judgement of history, or even a people's tribunal— which are even more disturbing than the others. Psychoanalysis increasingly concerns itself with the 'thought' function and—not without reason—allies itself with linguistics. These are the new apparatuses of power in thought itself, and Marx, Freud and Saussure make up a strange, three-headed Repressor, a dominant major language. To interpret, to transform, to utter are the new forms of 'correct' ideas. Even Chomsky's syntactic marker is primarily a marker of power. Linguistics triumphed at the same time as information was being developed as power, and was imposing its image of language and of thought, consistent with the transmission of 'order-words' and the organization of redundancies. (Deleuze 1987: 14)

5.3.2. Passional Subjective Regime of the Desert(er)

If Saussure is the foremost theorist of the signifying regime with his splitting of a whole asignifying assemblage into a signifier and a signified, Descartes is the foremost theorist of the subjective regime with his splitting of the asubjective collectivity into a speaking subject and a spoken subject. His formula "I think therefore I am", is a novelty in the history of philosophy; and he leaves the mainstream of philosophers with his invention. He invents "the self" and divides it between a thinking "I" as the subject of enunciation (a speaking/thinking subject which is always a passional delusion) and an "I" which exists in that thought as the subject of the statement (a spoken subject, a self subjected to the thinking "I"). Hence, the syntagmatic extension of the Cartesian cogito leads to utterances like, "I think therefore I am (nothing but a thinking thing)" or "I think therefore I am (nothing but a slave of what I think)". Its paradigmatic extension has a wider scope which includes such statements as "I love X (and hopefully X loves me) therefore X makes me exist as a self". All these statements are very Cartesian, and they reflect the paradoxical state of the cogito as Deleuze & Guattari indicate for the passional subjective regime as a whole:

> This is the paradox of the legislator-subject replacing the signifying despot: the more you obey the statements of the dominant reality, the more in command you are as subject of enunciation in mental reality, for in the end you are only obeying yourself! You are the one in command, in your capacity as a rational being. A new form of slavery is invented, namely, being slave to oneself, or to pure "reason," the Cogito. Is there anything more passional than

pure reason? Is there a colder, more extreme, more self-interested passion than the Cogito? (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 130).

The cogito deserts the despot's palace and the prison house of signifiance. But it replaces the old master or the former slavery with a new, internalised one; either with self-slavery or with a choose-or-invent-your-own-master type of slavery. The new internalised master constitutes a passional point of subjectification which issues the doubling of subjects disallowing the signifying centre of the despotic regime.

The passional subjective regime has two aspects, a syntagmatic and a paradigmatic one (131). The Cartesian doubling of the subjects as passion for consciousness is its syntagmatic aspect, and the paradigmatic aspect includes the passion for love as illustrated above in an extended utterance of the Cartesian formula. The point of subjectification takes place in the brain ("Self = Self" double) in the syntagmatic aspect; and it takes place between two hearts ("Man = Woman" double) in the paradigmatic aspect. Deleuze & Guattari imply that both syntagmatic and paradigmatic aspects of the passional regime do not happen in the same person simultaneously: "there is a celibate side to this doubled consciousness, and there is passional love couple that no longer has any use for consciousness or reason" (131). In the case of love-passion, there is always a betrayal involved:

> The most loyal and tender, or intense, love assigns subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement that constantly switch places, wrapped in the sweetness of being a naked statement in the other's mouth, and of the other's being a naked enunciation in my own mouth. But there is always a traitor in the making. What love is not betrayed? What cogito lacks its evil genius, the traitor it will never be rid of? "Tristan ... Isolde ... Isolde ... Tristan": the cry of the two subjects climbs the scale of intensities until it reaches the summit of a suffocating consciousness, whereas the ship follows the line of the waters, the line of death and the unconscious, betrayal, a continuous melody line. Passional love is a cogito built for two, just as the cogito is a passion for the self alone. There is a potential couple in the cogito, just as there is a doubling of a single virtual subject in love-passion. (131)

The paradigmatic aspect can in fact have as many variations as there are things one can love to make his or her point of subjectification. In Shakespeare's *Richard III*, for instance, Lady Anne is only a secondary point of subjectification for Richard III. His main point of subjectification has always been the throne. Thus he betrays even his true

double, Lady Anne, for the throne ("Richard = the throne" double: anything that comes between the two has to be betrayed). In order to secure his throne, he betrays Lady Anne with his own niece who was a princess, by means of an incestuous marriage plan.

Capitalism also pertains to a passional subjective regime with "Capital [as] a point of subjectification par excellence" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 130). In capitalism, there are no signifying centres, and everything proceeds on a straight and immanent line constituted by "the movement of money-capital". Along this line subjects are formed and normalised "as agents of capital and work" subjected to "unequal distribution of goods and mans of payment". In the capitalist system, the standardised and doubled subject is well aware of the immanent fact that "the more he obeys, the more he commands, since he obeys only himself. Perpetually one falls back from the commanding subject [of enunciation] onto the obeying subject [of statement] in the name of the law of capital" (Deleuze 2007: 15).

The postsignifying authoritarian regime is a name Deleuze & Guattari use alternatively for the passional subjective regime. They indicate that "a subject is never the condition of possibility of language or the cause of the statement: there is no subject, only collective assemblages of enunciation". They also report from Althusser that "subjectification as a regime of signs or a form of expression is tied to an assemblage, in other words, an organization of power that is already fully functioning in the economy" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 130). Thus the regime of subjectification does not have an ideological content either; everything in it is a power takeover.

For Deleuze & Guattari, the Old Testament is a great resource for the passional subjective regime especially with the stories of Cain, Jonah and Jesus (double betrayals); and the story of Moses and his passional Jewish followers who leave Egypt opposing themselves to the imperial paranoid regime of the pharaoh (doubling of subjects). In the Case of Cain, the first betrayer, he turns his face away from God and God turns his face away from him sending him along a line of flight into the desert (double turning away). The betrayals in the story of Jonah are more sympathetic:

> God calls upon Jonah to go to Nineveh to entreat the inhabitants, who had repeatedly betrayed God, to mend their ways. But Jonah's first act is to take off in the opposite direction; he also betrays God, fleeing "far from the face of

Adonai." He takes a ship for Tarshish and sleeps, like a righteous man. The tempest sent by God causes him to be thrown into the sea, where he is swallowed by the great fish and vomited out at the boundary between land and water, the limit of separation or line of flight earlier occupied by the dove of the Ark (Jonah, precisely, is the word for dove). (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 123)

With Jesus, betrayal becomes multiplied and universalised: "he betrays the God of the Jews, he betrays the Jews, he is betrayed by God ("Why hast thou forsaken me?"), he is betrayed by Judas, the true man. He took evil upon himself, but the Jews who kill him also take it upon themselves" (124). The story of the Prophet Moses is the best illustration of the passional regime in contrast to the signifying one:

> God withdraws his face, becoming a point of subjectification for the drawing of a line of flight or deterritorialization; Moses is the subject of enunciation, constituted on the basis of the tablets of God that replace the face; the Jewish people constitute the subject of the statement, for betrayal as well as for a new land, and enter an ever-renewed covenant or linear "proceeding" rather than a circular expansion. […] Your grievance, your proceeding: that is Moses' word to his people, and the proceedings come one after the other along a line of Passion. From this Kafka derives his own conception of querulousness or the proceeding, and the succession of linear segments: the father-proceeding, hotel-proceeding, ship-proceeding, court-proceeding… (127, 122)

There is no interpretation in the passional subjective regime. Thus, it has prophets in place of priests: "The prophet does not know how to talk, God puts the words in his mouth" (124). In that sense, Descartes is not priestly but prophetic in his Cartesian formula. His God, Cogito, "puts the words in his mouth" and divide him into two subjects. In this way God is no longer a face, but an inner voice, an internalized point of subjectivation; and in the case of love-passion an externalized one. Thus, the point of subjectivation is the first component of this regime together with betrayals which accompany it (again the Cartesian formula is a formula of betrayal: it betrays the whole history of philosophy). Secondly, there is the doubling of the subject between a subject of enunciation, speaking or commanding subject, and a subject of statement, spoken or obeying subject. The speaking subject always recoils or is thrown back into the spoken subject. Thirdly, the subject builds a new system of transcendence in his or her imagination while the linear proceeding is still uninterrupted, as Virginia Woolf writes against the authors of the leaning tower: "We have only been climbing an imaginary

tower. We can cease to imagine. We can come down" (Woolf 1975: 139). Finally, although there are no scapegoats in this regime, linear proceedings have two negative movements: Either one goes further along the line of flight which leads to an impasse, into a black hole (such as self-destruction, madness, suicide, murder, and so on). Or one is reterritorialised and stratified in a new segmentation in a perpetual state of to and fro. Figure 6 below illustrates the passional subjective regime and its basic components.


(1) The point of subjectification, replacing the center of signfiance. (2) The two faces turned away from each other. (3) The subject of enunciation resulting from the point of subjectification and the turning away. (4) The subject of the statement, into which the subject of enunciation recoils. (5) The succession of finite linear proceedings accompanied by a new form of priest and a new bureaucracy. (6) The line of flight, which is freed but still segmented, remaining negative and blocked.
(Deleuze and Guattari 1996a: 137)

Figure 6: The Subjective Regime

Deleuze & Guattari provide a more detailed description of the subjective regime as follows:

> Subjectification assigns the line of flight a positive sign, it carries deterritorialization to the absolute, intensity to the highest degree, redundancy to a reflexive form, etc. But it has its own way of repudiating the positivity it frees, or of relativizing the absoluteness it attains, without, however, falling back to the preceding [e.g. signifying] regime. In this redundancy of resonance, the absolute of consciousness is the absolute of impotence and the intensity of passion, the heat of the void. This is because Subjectification essentially constitutes finite linear proceedings, one of which ends before the next begins: thus the cogito is always recommenced, a passion or grievance is always recapitulated. Every consciousness pursues its own death, every love-passion its own end, attracted by a black hole, and all the black holes resonate together. Thus subjectification imposes on the line of flight a segmentarity that is forever repudiating that line, and upon absolute deterritorialization a point of

> abolition that is forever blocking that deterritorialization or diverting it. The reason for this is simple: forms of expression and regimes of signs are still *strata* (even considered in themselves, after abstracting forms of content); subjectification is no less a stratum than signifiance. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 133-4)

As a subject effectuated in language, one is always divided between a fictitious speaking subject and a subject that is spoken about. Channels of mass communication, for instance, serve as the main medium of "input" and "output" in the "machinic enslavement" of an individual by a dominant discourse. Deleuze & Guattari illustrate it with the example of television which also serves the doubling of the subject: "one is subjected to TV insofar as one uses and consumes it, in the very particular situation of a subject of the statement that more or less mistakes itself for a subject of enunciation ('you, dear television viewers, who make TV what it is ...')" (1996a: 458). The reactive unconscious also has the function of stopping an individual from speaking and thinking through the division of subjects with an apparent speaking subject and a factual enslavement. One is either enslaved by a dominant discourse through consuming the order-word (the capitalist axiomatic is the limit here); or one becomes an illusionary self-enslaved legislating-subject who always says "I" (as in the Cartesian cogito):

> A fictitious expressing subject, an absolute I, has been made the cause of utterances whose relative subject can be any one of the personal pronouns (I, you, he, etc.) that are usually assigned according to the hierarchy and stratification of the dominant reality. Far from maintaining a relationship with the proper name, personal pronouns effect its nullification in a function of capitalist exchange. (Deleuze 2007: 83)

Psychoanalysis is a case of mixed semiotics designed to prevent people from forming utterances of genuine production. It combines both the signifying regime and subjective regime. And in so doing, it has at its disposal both a system of interpretation "whose purpose is to translate whatever the patient says into another language" (86), and a system of subjectification which doubles the subject as a subject of enunciation—the *analysand*, or rather the psychoanalyst himself or herself who speaks through the analysand—and a subject of statement—the *psychoanalyzed* patient who is then normalized, Oedipalized, standardized, capitalized and made more submissive to the psychoanalyst in the following sessions and to the dominant reality forever. The former

system is a despotic one and the latter is the essence of capitalist economy and politics. "But the originality of psychoanalysis", asserts Deleuze, "resides in the clever penetration of these two systems, or as it has been so aptly put: 'the subjectivation of the id' and 'the autonomy of an irreducibly subjective experience'" (Deleuze 2007: 86). These two systems of interpretation and subjectivation "block every possibility of real experimentation, just as they impede the production of desire and the formation of utterances" (86-7). Thus, psychoanalysis turns both the order-word and the subjectivation functions of language to its own benefit. These two functions are correlative of the State apparatus and the cogito:

> Do you know what must be done to keep someone from speaking in his or her name? Have them say "I". The more the cause of expression is attributed to a subject, whose utterances are then referred to other subjects which depend on it as the originator, the more the assemblage of desire is broken, the more the conditions required for the formation of utterances tend to dissolve—the more the expressing subject can be foisted on the subjects of utterance [spoken subjects], which have become docile and sad. We are not saying that this procedure is peculiar to psychoanalysis. In fact, it fundamentally belongs to the "democratic" State apparatus (the identity of legislator and subject). Theoretically it is woven in with the long history of the Cogito. But "therapeutically," psychoanalysis has figured out how to make it work to its own advantage. (83)

To Deleuze & Guattari's annoyance, and as suggested by Hölderlin, Heidegger and Nietzsche, Sophocles' Oedipus also has a mixed semiotic through the combination of the despotic signifying regime of *Oedipus the King* with the passional subjective regime of *Oedipus at Colonus*:

> Something is still bothering us: the story of Oedipus. Oedipus is almost unique in the Greek world. The whole first part is imperial, despotic, paranoid, interpretive, divinatory. But the whole second part is Oedipus's wandering, his line of flight, the double turning away of his own face and that of God. […] Oedipus, his name is *atheos*: he invents something worse than death or exile, he wanders and survives on a strangely positive line of separation or deterritorialization. Hölderlin and Heidegger see this as the birth of the *double turning away*, the change of face, and also the birth of modern tragedy, for which they bizarrely credit the Greeks: the outcome is no longer murder or sudden death but survival under reprieve, unlimited postponement. Nietzsche suggests that Oedipus, as opposed to Prometheus, was the Semitic myth of the Greeks, the glorification of Passion or passivity. Oedipus: Greek Cain. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 124-5)

5.3.3. Two Regimes of Madness

In clinical or psychiatric terms, all regimes of signs have their specific madness and delusions at their limits. The delusion associated with the despotic signifying regime is paranoia. Although paranoiacs look completely mad from the outside, they are not mad in reality and their "reasoning is impeccable" (Deleuze 2007: 14). Paranoiacs are not usually consigned to a mental institution. Freud's patient Judge Schreber belongs to this category: "President Schreber developed his radiating paranoia and relations with God in every direction, but he was not mad in that he remained capable of managing his wealth wisely and distinguishing between circles" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 120).

The disorder associated with the passional subjective regime, on the other hand is "passional delusion" (Clérambault). It is also known as "monomania" (Esquirol), "querulous delusion" (Kreaplin) or "grievance delusion" (Serieux & Capgras) as opposed to paranoia or mania in the signifying regime (120). Deleuze relates from the French psychiatrist Clérambault that a person of passional delusion "shows no sign of madness, except on certain points that are difficult to discern, and nonetheless he is mad, his madness manifests itself in a rash acting out (for example, the assassin)" (Deleuze 2007: 14). Deleuze & Guattari account for the three phases in Clérambault's "scheme of passional delusion" in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1996a: 128). Deleuze also reconsiders the issue later in *Dialogues* (1987: 108-9). Their observations can be summarised in the following three points:

1. *The postulate*: the point of subjectivation—"He loves me."

2. *The phase of "high intensity"*: "flux of pride" "as the tonality of the subject of enunciation (delusional pursuit of the loved one)"—"'He loves me, 'he' gave me a sign; I constitute myself as a subject of enunciation."

3. *The phase of "low intensity"* (the end of a proceeding before another begins): "Spite, Rancor", "a result of a reversion to the subject of a statement"—"He is cheating me", "He is a traitor"; "I fall back to the condition of subject of utterances."

"The point of subjectification in a passional subjective proceeding can be anything as long as the following traits are displayed: "the double turning away, betrayal, and

existence under reprieve". Thus, an anorexic's point of subjectification is food—"anorexics do not confront death but save themselves by betraying food, which is equally a traitor since it is suspected of containing larvae, worms, and microbes";[59] for a fetishist, a "dress, an article of underwear, a shoe" play the same role. An individual can have more than one or changing points of subjectification: "The various forms of education or 'normalization' imposed upon an individual consist in making him or her change points of subjectification, always moving toward a higher, nobler one in closer conformity with the supposed ideal" (129).

Deleuze & Guattari (1996a: 120-1) make a comparison of madness in two regimes, namely the signifying and the passional subjective regimes. Their comparison is outlined in Table 8 below.

Table 8: Two Regimes of Madness Compared

Paranoia or Mania (signifying regime, redundancy of resonance)	**Passional Delusion or Monomania** (postsignifying passional regime, redundancy of frequency)
- "insidious onset"	- "decisive external occurrence"
- "a hidden centre bearing witness to endogenous forces organized around an idea"	- "a relation with the outside"
- imaginative endeavour	- emotional "effort and action"
- "ideational delusion" by:	- "subjective" or "active delusion" by:
1. "the development of a network stretching across an amorphous continuum, a gliding atmosphere into which the slightest incident may be carried",	1. "a limited constellation operating in a single sector",
2. "an organization of radiating circles expanding by circular irradiation in all directions"	2. "a 'postulate' or 'concise formula' serving as the point of departure for a linear series or proceeding that runs its course, at which point a new proceeding begins"
- "*the simultaneity of circles in unlimited expansion*"	- "*the linear and temporal succession of finite proceedings*"
- "seeming mad without being it"	- "being [mad] without seeming it"
- a *bourgeois* madness, but "all paranoiacs are not bourgeois".	- a *proletarian* madness but "all passionals or monomaniacs are not proletarian".

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[59] Deleuze pays homage to his wife Fanny for her analysis of anorexia that, "it is a question of food fluxes, but combined with other fluxes, clothes fluxes, for example (specifically) anorexic elegance" (Deleuze 1987: 109). Fanny's famous trinity of anorexics consists of the German film director Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau, Virginia Woolf, and the British Hollywood actress Kay Kendall (110).

Deleuze & Guattari base their comparison of the madness specific to the signifying and the postsignifying regimes on the studies of psychiatrists Clérambault and Serieux & Capgrass. For each regime of signs, Deleuze & Guattari determine a negative, reactive and molar limit as paranoia ("the breakdown") and a positive, revolutionary and molecular line of flight as schizophrenic process ("the breakthrough").

DEMO 3: Zelda Fitzgerald's Formula or a Cogito for Love

The best examples of doubling of the subject in a passional-love couple are present in the love letters exchanged between lovers. Deleuze & Guattari consider Kafka's love letters an important part of his oeuvre along with his stories and novels. But Kafka's love letters are unique and diabolical like his love, the Kafkaesque love. In love letters, there is always a wish for reunion; but Kafka, the celibate, only writes to avoid it: "the family's cross and marriage's garlic" are two things he fears most (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 30): "The 'Letter to the Father' is the exorcism of Oedipus and the family by the writing machine, just as the letters to Felice are the exorcism of conjugality" (32). In his exchange of letters with Felice whom he meets only once, he never looks "for a feminine inspiration or for a maternal protection but for a physical force that will enable him to write" (30). Proust's treatment of love letters in his work is similar to Kafka's: "Proust also uses his letters to make faraway pack with the devil or a phantom in order to break the proximity of the conjugal contact". Proust and Kafka are two "vampires who take nourishment from blood only by sending out their letter-bats" (33). Yet, In Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past,* the jealous narrator's style of the exorcism of proximity is very outlandish: he locks his beloved one into the house and communicates with her through "small notes slid under the door". This is the "ideal of Proust's letters" (34).

To illustrate the three phases of passional delusion, namely, the postulate, the high intensity and the low intensity, the love-letters of Zelda (Sayre) Fitzgerald are the best examples which prove her to be the Descartes of the American Jazz Age. The following two extracts are taken from her letters to her husband Fitzgerald. But they will be examined free of their context and the person who writes them. They will be examined as productions of a "collective enunciation" as both Deleuze & Guattari believe that

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there is no subject of enunciation. Biographical references to Zelda's life will only be looked at for verification in the footnotes. The first extract is as follows:

"*I don't want to live—I want to love first, and live incidentally.*"[60]

The above utterance is the formula, or the postulate of a love-cogito par excellence, and it evidently belongs to the passional subjective regime. The "I" in "I want to love first" is the illusionary subject of enunciation whose life is subjected to love in the second part "and live incidentally" in which the subject of enunciation is recoiled into the subject of the statement (I will submit my life to love). In that utterance we do not have a positive and affirmative *amor fati*, love of the fate, but a negative fate of love which negates life ("I will be a subject or victim of love: it will shape me in whatever way it wills."). There is also a betrayal in the utterance; life is betrayed. Love is the only point of subjectivation encouraged by its resonance which is not given in the statement. "I want to love X, and X must love me, too, to give me a high intensity, to make me proud". The point of subjectivation for love can be anything. The illusionary subject of enunciation will jump from one point of subjectivation to the other. He or she is innocent and wishes nothing ill in his or her motives. In reality he or she is the subject of the statement and the formula will carry him or her anywhere depending on the circumstances or the incidents of life. He or she is now a free vector moving around until a consciousness returns, or a black hole is arrived at. When one point of subjectivation ascends to low intensity, he or she will find a new one, and so on. Several possible points of subjectivation are listed below.

The first possible point of subjectivation is heterosexual love, the essence of which is jealousy, the "first law of love", as Deleuze argues after Proust: "jealousy is deeper than love, it contains love's truth" (Deleuze 2000: 9). Thus the paradox of love is similar to the paradox of the Cartesian cogito: "the means we count on to preserve us from jealousy are the very means that develop that jealousy, giving it a kind of autonomy, of independence with regard to our love" (8-9).[61]

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[60] Quoted in *Microsoft ® Encarta ®* 2006, 'Quotations (Zelda Fitzgerald)'.
[61] In any biography of F. Scott Fitzgerald, all can be found about Zelda is very limited, and they are far from reflecting Zelda's point of view. The above quotation is from Zelda's letter to Fitzgerald. Hence Zelda's point of subjectivation must be read as her husband Fitzgerald; there cannot be any other

The second possible point of subjectivation is homosexual love as the "secret" point of subjectivation and the a priori principle "that jealousy discovers" according to "the second law of Proustian love". Deleuze gives an account of the androgynous cogito in Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* as follows:

> [T]he world expressed by the loved woman is always a world that excludes us, even when she gives us a mark of preference. […] We interpret all the signs of the loved woman, but, at the end of this painful decipherment, we come up against the sign of Gomorrah [e.g. lesbianism] as though against the deepest expression of an original feminine reality. (Deleuze 2000: 10)

Weather heterosexual or homosexual, all signs of love are inflicted with deception (heterosexual) and secrecy (homosexual): "The entire world of love extends from the signs revealing deception to the concealed signs of Sodom and of Gomorrah" (11). In Proust's novel, Sodom series are represented by the paranoid character Charlus, and the Gomorrah series, by the passional character Albertine who is the narrator's beloved. The narrator locks her in his house out of jealousy. Other possible points of subjectivation for the utterance above can be a divine love, Oedipal need to be loved, narcissistic love, pure love without an object, an obsession for an object/objective, and so on. But it can never be a positive love of life since life is excluded in the formula. There is an evocation for a tragic life, but not in the sense of Nietzschean tragedy.[62]

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possibility. In that case, an indication of her jealousy is seen when the Fitzgeralds move to France. There, Fitzgerald meets Hemingway whom he admires in every aspect (Hemingway the war hero, the athlete, and a talent for writing; indeed Fitzgerald is one of the first people to discover Hemingway's professional talent), and spends most of his time with him "arguing about writing" and trying "to advance Hemingway's career" as a writer. Being also very busy with writing a new novel, Fitzgerald neglects Zelda who becomes depressed. She is very disturbed by Hemingway's closeness with her husband. She never likes him, and she even charges Fitzgerald and Hemingway for having a "homosexual relationship" (Tate 2007: 315). Zelda's reaction can be read as a sign of jealousy, but beyond that, it is a natural reaction of a married woman with a child who is neglected by her husband who is obsessed with another man and is destroying both his family life and career. Fitzgerald's novelist friend Wescott also claims that, "Fitzgerald's enthusiastic admiration for Hemingway damaged him by causing him to cease writing seriously" (Tate 2007: 316). Disappointed in Fitzgerald, Zelda's low intensity begins. She starts flirting with a French aviator and asks her husband for a divorce, but she is persuaded by her husband "not to pursue divorce". Tate adds, "Zelda later said that Fitzgerald had locked her in the villa for a month" (330). Zelda betrays her husband but she is not deceptive, she has no secrets. She finds her new point of subjectivation in the French aviator for her formula. But she is prevented from fulfilling this new proceeding. She must now find a new proceeding lead by the formula.

[62] After two heterosexual proceedings ending in low intensity, Zelda decides to become a "professional ballet dancer" and starts taking lessons in the USA. She is also writing and painting. But ballet becomes an obsession for her. When the Fitzgeralds move back to France, she resumes her ballet training with the Russian prima ballerina Madame Lubov Egorova with a very intense programme damaging her health

A second extract from Zelda Fitzgerald's letters to her husband illustrates the recoiling of the subject of enunciation into the subject of statement:

> *Don't you think I was made for you? I feel like you had me ordered—and I was delivered to you—to be worn—I want you to wear me, like a watch-charm or a button hole boquet—to the world.*[63]

In the utterance above, the beloved one is addressed directly. It is still under the spell of the first formula of "I want to love". The repeated subject pronoun "I" is never the subject of enunciation. It is used in the passive mode in all sentences and always recoils into "you", it submits itself to "you" passionately. "You" is treated as the real subject, yet there is also a third subject presupposed in the passive formations, I was made … / delivered …": the maker and the deliverer is the real subject of enunciation, or an abstract machine, a god, the god of language that Nietzsche claimed to exist in grammar, and so on. When "I" becomes the object pronoun "me" in the last sentence it is compared to two different objects: a "watch-charm", and a "button hole boquet" ("boquet" is Zelda's spelling) that appeal to the eye, supported by the form "to be worn … to the world". Here we have the typical frenzy which Nietzsche calls Apollonian: ""The Apollonian frenzy excites the eye above all, so that it gains the power of vision. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are visionaries par excellence". We have an Apollo who has confidence in his or her beautiful forms. We also have an Apollo of the Greek tragedy in the utterance above subjected to Dionysian insights, as Nietzsche defines the Greek tragedy which is a drama as "the Apollonian embodiment of

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(Tate 2007: 8, 292). Zelda, along with ballet, has a new point of subjectivation which is homosexuality. Both points of subjectivation end in low intensity: becoming a professional ballet dancer is hard to attain, and her homosexual inclinations are always repressed. These two disappointments coincide with her first nervous breakdown. The following extract is from the records of Malmeison Clinic near Paris where she was first taken with the symptom of "acute anxiety":

> Mrs. FITZ-GERALD entered on 23 April 1930 in a state of acute anxiety, restlessness, continually repeating: "This is dreadful, this is horrible, what is going to become of me, I have to work, and I will no longer be able to, I must die, and yet I have to work. I will never be cured, let me leave. I have to go see 'Madame' (dance teacher), she has given me the greatest joy that can exist, it is comparable to the light of the sun that falls on a block of crystal, to a symphony of perfume, the most perfect chord from the greatest composer in music."...

> Finally, we are in the presence of a lady exhausted from work in an environment of professional dancers. Some obsessive ideas, the main one of which is her fear of becoming a homosexual. She thinks she is in love with her dance teacher (Madame X) as she had already thought in the past of being in love with another woman. (Quotes Tate 2007: 339)

[63] Quoted in *Microsoft ® Encarta ® 2006*, 'Quotations (Zelda Fitzgerald)'.

Dionysian perceptions and influences". Hence, Apollo is never a subject of enunciation but a subject of the statement, spoken subject, which is subjected to Dionysus who is his true god. Dionysus is the collective enunciation par excellence, the God of music who is life in its virtual form. Hence we are also faced with a dramatist and an actor whose director is Dionysus. But is Dionysus the true subject of enunciation in the above utterance indicated in the passive forms "I was made, I was delivered" (the faith hidden in language, or a faith in a transcendent reality, a Spinozean immanent "God or Nature", or Deleuze & Guattari's Lobster? Or is it "you", the beloved one who is addressed in the utterance?

In fact, Fitzgerald wears Zelda to the world not as a bouquet but as a "flapper", a "muse" and a model for most of his characters. Fitzgerald creates his flapper model in his early story 'Bernice Bobs her Hair' (1920) based on Fitzgerald's "real-life advice" to his sister "in the areas of conversation, poise, carriage, dancing, facial expression, grace, dress, and personality" (Tate 2007: 38). Prior to his marriage with Zelda, he combines both his flapper model and Zelda in his character Rosalind in *This Side of Paradise* (1920). Zelda later writes about Rosalind as follows: "I like girls like that. ... I like their courage, their recklessness and spend-thriftness. Rosalind was the original American flapper" (quotes Tate 2007: 234). Then Zelda becomes the first and the last flapper of the American Jazz Age as Curnutt (2007: 18) indicates: "while Zelda was more properly a belle than a flapper, she obligingly bobbed her hair, adopted prevailing New York fashions, and played the role of muse in celebrity interviews and profiles".

Then we have the Zelda-Scott couple's voices get confused as it usually happens in the passional regime. Fitzgerald uses Zelda's diary notes in his novels. He even uses Zelda's illness as a model in his novels. Zelda is also a talented writer of stories but her talent is always regarded as "third-rate" by her husband (24). At times of their low intensities, each of them accuses the other for stealing his or her voice. Zelda, for instance, writes the following after the publication of Fitzgerald's *The Beautiful and Damned* (1922):

> "It seems to me that on one page I recognized a portion of an old diary of mine which mysteriously disappeared shortly after my marriage, and also scraps of letters which, though considerably edited, sound to me vaguely familiar. In

fact, Mr. Fitzgerald—I believe that is how he spells his name—seems to believe that plagiarism begins at home." (Quotes Tate 2007: 303)

While Zelda is in hospital in Baltimore after her second breakdown, she writes her own novel in her own voice, *Save me the Waltz* (1932), an autobiographical one, like her husband's novels. This time Fitzgerald accuses Zelda for stealing his voice and imposes a ban on her writing:

> Fitzgerald had been furious about the first draft of *Save Me the Waltz,* which he felt was too openly autobiographical and too close to the material he wanted to use in *Tender Is the Night.* He was satisfied with Zelda's subsequent revisions, but he put limitations on what she could write next. (Tate 2007: 322)

5.4. Reading Love-Letters and the Critico-clinical Process

Deleuze, in *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet, describes all writing as a love-letter: "One only writes through love, all writing is a love-letter: the literature-Real" (1987: 51). This suggests that all reading is also reading love-letters as Deleuze has already defined his intensive way of reading as "reading with love" (1995: 9). How are we to combine reading love-letters with Deleuze's warning against both the identification and distance with the writer? How are we to overcome the fallacies of the paranoia of the signifier and the passional delusion of divided subjects which are inflicted on love-letters and on all writing in general?

Kafka and Proust's treatment of letters as discussed in the previous section might be very inspiring for a Deleuzian way of reading, neither with distance nor with proximity. Both writers in their own style find ways of exorcising proximity and distance. The plane of composition of a work of art, whether it is immanent or transcendent, also proposes or evokes its own method of reading not as a problem of meaning but of use: "The modern work of art has no problem of meaning, it has only a problem of use" (Deleuze 2000: 146). "Use" means an unconscious machinic production as the true process of reading as Deleuze argues after Proust and contrasts it with paranoia (discovery) and passional delusion (logical creation such as cogito):

> Proust rejects so forcefully the state of a truth that is not produced but merely discovered or, on the contrary, created, and the state of a thought that would presuppose itself by putting intelligence "before," uniting all one's faculties in

a voluntary use corresponding to discovery or to creation (Logos). "The ideas formed by pure intelligence have only a *logical or* possible truth, their choice is arbitrary. The book with letters figured, not drawn by us, is our only book. Not that the ideas we form cannot be accurate *logically,* but we do not know if they are *true.*" And the creative imagination is worth no more than the discovering or observing intelligence. (Deleuze 2000: 147)

Deleuze reads the plane of composition in Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*, for instance, as a huge heavy spider, as Deleuze & Guattari (1986: 33-4) indicate: "the subject of the statement assumes all the movement while the subject of the enunciation remains in bed, in a corner of his web like a spider (Proust's becoming spider)". This is in fact the main characteristic of Proust's love-letters. Deleuze's following observations about Proust's narrator in 'Proust Round Table' (1975) are at the same time a description of a spider's affects:

> He is a very bizarre narrator. Totally bizarre. How is he presented? He has no organs, he can't see, he does not understand anything, he does not observe anything, he knows nothing; when something is shown to him, he looks but does not see it [...] What sort of activity could he have? I think that someone who is in that state can only respond to signs, to signals. In other words, the narrator is a spider. A spider is good for nothing. It doesn't understand anything; you can put a fly in front of it and it won't budge. But as soon as the slightest edge of its web starts vibrating, it moves its heavy body. It has no perceptions, no sensations. It responds to signals, nothing else. Just like the narrator. He also spins a web—his work—and responds to its vibrations while spinning it. A spider-madness, narrator-madness that understands nothing, doesn't want to understand anything, isn't interested in anything except the little sign back in the background. Both the certain madness of Charlus and the possible madness of Albertine emanate from him. (Deleuze 2007: 30-1)

At a distance, a spider perceives everything as nebulae or a cloud of little dots. When it comes closer to an object, singularities are formed "in a kind of series". Finally, a mad blindness and dissolution of the object follow when the spider is in contact with the object. When Proust's narrator kisses Albertine the fist time, it is the kiss of a spider in three phases as Deleuze observes:

> First, the nebula of the face with a bright, moving dot. Then the narrator comes closer: "In the short path from my lips to her cheek, I saw ten Albertines." Lastly, the great final moment comes when his mouth reaches the cheek and he is nothing more than a blind body grappling with Albertine's breaking up, her dispersion: "[...] suddenly, my eyes stopped seeing, then my nose, crushed, no longer perceived any odors, and without knowing for all that more about

the taste of the desired rose, I learned, from these detestable signs, that I was finally kissing Albertine's cheek." (Deleuze 2007: 33)[64]

Similarly, Deleuze's *Proust and Signs* (1964, second edition 1972) is his own becoming another arthropod (a lobster with ten feet if not a spider). The three phases of the spider's perception is parallel to the three syntheses of the unconscious studied in the second chapter.[65] In *Proust and Signs* Deleuze refers to the three syntheses as the "three orders of truth" with three machinic functions. In the first synthesis of partial objects we have the regimes of signs, including worldly signs (signifiance) the signs of love (subjectivation), and dreams which vacillate among all the regimes:

> Proust groups here the values of worldliness with their frivolous pleasures, the values of love with their sufferings, and even the values of sleep with their dreams. In the "vocation" of a man of letters, these all constitute an "apprenticeship," meaning the familiarity with a raw material that we will recognize only subsequently in the finished product (Deleuze 2000: 149-50)

The second syntheses concerns the dematerialised and unconscious production of the signs of art as the signs of the highest order which set up "a resonance between two remote objects "by the indescribable link of an alliance of words". They are not sensuous signs which are impressionistic or symbolic, and which ultimately signify something (like the taste of madeleine which reminds Proust's narrator of the past memory of Combray) but an involuntary production of a new image without signification of an object (Combray as experienced in the past) and designation of a subject (the taste of a madeleine the narrator's grandmother used to cook). Deleuze compares the Proustian image to "post-symbolist conceptions" such as Joyce's "epiphany" and Pound's "imagism and vorticism":

> The following features seem to be shared: image as autonomous link between two concrete objects *insofar* as they are different (image, concrete equation); style, as multiplicity of viewpoints toward the same object and exchange of viewpoints toward several objects; language, as integrating and comprehending its own variations constitutive of a universal history and making each fragment speak according to its own voice; literature as

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[64] Deleuze quotes Proust from *The Guermantes Way*, from the third volume of *Remembrance of Things Past* (Proust 2006a: 1165).

[65] See the last section of Chapter 2 (pp. 73-82) above for a detailed study of the three syntheses of the unconscious. Table 1 on pages 80-1 also summarises the three syntheses and compares them with psychoanalysis.

production, as operation of effect-producing machines; explication, not as didactic intention but as technique of envelopment and development; writing as *ideogrammatic* method (with which Proust allies himself on several occasions). (Deleuze 2000: 188)

The Proustian image "is not only a matter of discovery or creation, but of production. The productive process is connected to "the unconscious machine of involuntary memory", so that it produces similar effects on the reader:

> This is the supreme instance in which one can say: the machine works. That art is a machine for producing, and notably for producing certain effects, Proust is most intensely aware—effects on other people, because the readers or spectators will begin to discover, in themselves and outside or themselves, effects analogous to those that the work of art has been able to produce. (153)

Finally, the third syntheses produces a "universal alteration, death and the idea of death", a forced movement towards a "catastrophe (signs of aging, disease, and death)" (148) as a specifically Proustian mechanism of folding of the work of art upon itself: "*It is the work of art that produces within itself and upon itself its own effects and is filled with them and nourished by them:* the work of art is nourished by the truths it engenders" (154).

In *Remembrance of Things Past*, the three syntheses appear in the dual movement of composition and decomposition in which logos with its plane of organization give way to pathos as a vegetal and schizoid plane of composition:

> The logos is a huge Animal whose parts unite in a whole and are unified under a principle or a leading idea; but the pathos is a vegetal realm consisting of cellular elements that communicate only indirectly, only marginally, so that no totalization, no unification, can unite this world of ultimate fragments. It is a schizoid universe of closed vessels, of cellular regions, where contiguity itself is a distance: the world of sex. […] Aberrant relations between closed vessels; the bumblebee that constitutes the communication between flowers and loses its proper animal value becomes in relation to the latter merely a marginalized fragment, a disparate element in an apparatus of vegetal reproduction. (174-5)

When the narrator kisses Albertine for the first time (described as the kiss of a spider above) and "complains that we have no adequate organ to perform such an action that fills our lips, stuffs our nose, and closes our eyes", Deleuze argues, the narrator proves himself to be not only a huge spider but also "an enormous Body without

organs" (Deleuze 2000: 181), an enormous machine which is comprised of the spider and the web as parts of the same body (182).

When the reader opens any page in Proust's work this imperceptible spider will jump out of the book into his or her body and will spin its thread there. It will not be the same thread definitely and not the same spider but a becoming equivalent to it. The reader must know that this spider is neither an objective reality nor a subjective creation but the production of reality as a Proustian universe, a plane of composition on which the name Proust has a proper name function, which is the first component of a Deleuzian reading. The reader in turn must also be a proper name: not a reader called Mr. X who reads in the name of an "adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language" (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 105) or Ms X who reads in the name of a molar womanhood. Deleuze & Guattari find a mode of aberrant communication between the sexes not as bisexuality but in the idea of a universal girl or child:

> Trost, a mysterious author, painted a portrait of the girl, to whom he linked the fate of the revolution: her speed, her freely machinic body, her intensities, her abstract line or line of flight, her molecular production, her indifference to memory, her nonfigurative character—"the nonfigurative of desire." Joan of Arc? The special role of the girl in Russian terrorism: the girl with the bomb, guardian of dynamite? It is certain that molecular politics proceeds via the girl and the child. But it is also certain that girls and children draw their strength neither from the molar status that subdues them nor from the organism and subjectivity they receive; they draw their strength from the becoming-molecular they cause to pass between sexes and ages, the becoming-child of the adult as well as of the child, the becoming-woman of the man as well as of the woman. The girl and the child do not become; it is becoming itself that is a child or a girl. The child does not become an adult any more than the girl becomes a woman; the girl is the becoming-woman of each sex, just as the child is the becoming-young of every age. (277)

When Virginia Woolf reads the books of Lewis-Carroll, the universal symbol of a man's becoming-girl, she writes the following observations:

> [T]he two Alices are not books for children. They are the only books in which we become children. President Wilson, Queen Victoria, *The Times* leader writer, the late Lord Salisbury—it does not matter how old, how important, or how insignificant you are, you become a child again. To become a child is to be very literal; to find everything so strange that nothing is surprising; to be heartless, to be ruthless, yet to be so passionate that a snub or a shadow drapes the world. (Woolf 1975: 82)

Virginia Woolf wonders about Carroll's real name asking "is it the Rev. C. L. Dodgson? Is it Lewis Carroll? Or is it both combined?" (Woolf 1975: 83) The proper name is the best answer to this question. Lewis Carroll, more than being the pseudonym for Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, is a proper name par excellence, a proper name in which no molar identity remains, including the writer who is no longer Dodgson and the reader who is no longer Queen Victoria or Virginia Woolf. Lewis Carroll does not only apply the three syntheses of the unconscious to language (as connective, conjunctive and disjunctive synthesis) but also makes his pseudonym the production of such a machinic synthesis. Thus, it will not be wrong to say, in the manner of Humpty Dumpty, that Charles Lutwidge means Lewis Carroll which comes out of an affective relationship between English and Latin.

When Deleuze defines his critico-clinical project of reading as "Criticism, art of combinations" or conjugations and "the clinic, art of declensions" (Deleuze 1987: 120), he is speaking the language of Carroll. Combinations refer to an outline of the plane of composition and regimes of signs (critical), and declensions refer to an outline of the three lines of life on that plane and the potential regimes of madness (clinical). Thus, Deleuze summaries his critico-clinical project in three interrelated steps (119-23):

1. *Determining the "function of the proper name" which does not refer to the writer as the subject who produces the work (the subject of enunciation), but to the impersonal individuations produced in the work.*

Deleuze illustrates the proper name with Charlotte Bronte and Virginia Woolf: "Charlotte Bronte designates a state of the winds more than a person; Virginia Woolf designates a state of reigns, ages and sexes" (120). Masochism is most descriptive of a proper name, like the proper name in Parkinson's disease. In the same way that Parkinson did not invent the disease known with his name, Masoch did not invent masochism. He only brought together the symptoms of a disorder as an assemblage that was always present and real: "An assemblage may have been in existence for a long time before it receives its proper name which gives it a special consistence as if it were thus separated from a more general regime to assume a kind of autonomy" (120). There is a strong relationship between regimes of signs and a writer's becoming a proper

name, as Deleuze explains that "The more you create your own regime of signs, the less you will be a person or a subject, the more you will be a 'collective' that meets other collectives and that combines and interconnects with others" (Deleuze 1987: 121). This is the art of combinations to attain a proper name. While reading too, the more the reader concentrates on the regimes of signs the more collective meanings will be produced which will be neither objective nor subjective.

The following are questions that need to be asked in relation to this step (120):

a) "Why, at a certain moment, does the proper name isolate an assemblage, why does it make it into a particular regime of signs, according to a transformational component?"

b) Cannot a Brontism, Woolfism, Beckettism, or a Fitzgeraldism be distinguished "on the lines of a generalised clinic, that is, a semiology of regimes of signs which is anti-psychiatric, anti-psychoanalytic, anti-philosophical?"

c) "[W]hat will an isolated, named regime of signs become in the clinical current which carries it away?"

2. *Mapping out regimes of signs employed in the work.*

As discussed in the above sections, regimes of signs are not linguistically determined. They are semiotic systems as a specific formalisation of expression within a social field. Although Deleuze & Guattari study only four of them, there can be an infinite number of regimes of signs. Finding out an ever new regime depends on the reader's understanding of the function of the abstract machine from which both semiotic systems and physical systems emanate. If the reader identifies too much with the writer he or she becomes the writer's accomplice, as in the case of James' heroine in *In the Cage.* If the distance is too much, on the other hand, the reader produces a dramatic irony, as in the dialogue between James's heroine and her fiancé. If the reader sticks to the regimes of signs, he or she shares the innocence of the writer, as in the love-letters between Kafka and Felice.

The study of the regimes of signs has two components:

a) *The generative component*: does the writer combine different regimes of signs to form mixed semiotics?

b) *The transformational component*: Does an element of expression in one regime become an element of content in another one, or vice versa?

3. *Investigating the plane of composition on which all lines cross each other, and all the regimes of signs intersect (diagrammatic component).*

The plane of composition is the moment when the reader grasps the abstract machine functioning in the work of art and it only becomes visible after reading. In James' *In the Cage* it is a real cage which the reader thinks the heroine is trapped in. Only when the novella ends, the reader notices that he or she is the one who is in the cage: asking himself or herself "What signs did I miss?" or "What is the secret?" Deleuze indicates that, on the plane of composition, "there is no longer any fixed distinction between content and expression. We no longer know if it is a flux of words or of alcohol, we are so drunk on pure water" (Deleuze 1987: 122). They can only be defined as affects, as Deleuze does with the affects of a spider and its web in the case of Proust's work.

CHAPTER 6

HARDY'S DEMISTIFICATION OF FACIALITY AND FATALITY IN *TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES*

> DIONYSUS: Be clever, Ariadne!
> You have small ears, you have my ears:
> Put a clever word into them!
> Must one not first hate each other if one is to love each other?
> I am your labyrinth.
>
> (Nietzsche 1976: 345)

6.1. Hardy's Tetravalent Return to the Native Wessex

Deleuze often mentions Hardy among his favourite Anglo-American novelists but he only makes some passing and parenthetical references[66] which focus on three aspects of Hardy's fiction: the characterization as "individuation", the percept of the "heath", and the "Ishmaelite" element, which can be read as his characters' being outcasts who are banished from society and in war with it, and who are, at the same time, prone to forces outside themselves in total submissiveness. To begin with, the following long quotation from *Dialogues* is mainly about Hardy's characterisation but also alludes to other two aspects, as well:

> Take as an example the case of Thomas Hardy: his characters are not people or subjects, they are collections of intensive sensations, each is such a collection, a packet, a bloc of variable sensations. There is a strange respect for the individual, an extraordinary respect: not because he would seize upon himself as a person and be recognized as a person, in the French way, but on the contrary because he saw himself and saw others as so many "unique chances"—the unique chance from which one combination or another had been drawn. Individuation without a subject. And these packets of sensations in the raw, these collections or combinations, run along the lines of chance, or mischance, where their encounters take place—if need be, their bad encounters which lead to death, to murder. Hardy invokes a sort of Greek destiny for this empiricist experimental world. Individuals, packets of sensations, run over the heath like a line of flight or a line of deterritorialization of the earth. (Deleuze 1987: 39-40)

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[66] *Proust and Signs* page 47, *Dialogues,* pages 36, 39-40, 50 and *Essays, Critical, Clinical,* page 55.

Hardy sees himself and others as spectres or ghosts. Thus Woolf quotes him asserting, "I have unconsciously the habit of regarding the scene as if I were a spectre not solid enough to influence my environment; only fit to behold and say, as another spectre said, 'Peace be unto you'", and that "people are somnambulists—the material is not the real—only the visible, the real being invisible optically" (quotes Woolf 1978: 67). When one is removed from the orbit of the solid figure (or the solid corpse), he or she becomes a spatio-temporal combination of all ages and years and even generations as Hardy describes Tess at the opening pages of *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891) as a "mere vessel of emotion untinctured by experience":

> Phases of her childhood lurked in her aspect still. As she walked along today, for all her bouncing handsome womanliness, you could sometimes see her twelfth year in her cheeks, or her ninth sparkling from her eyes; and even her fifth would flit over the curves of her mouth now and then. (Hardy 1994a: 13)

Past and future combine in Tess. Her past is hidden in her future. When one looks at Tess closer, one can see the ghost of her mother (19), and even the ghosts of her ancestors, "the ladies of the d'Urberville family" (277). Tess seems to lack a present form: she is the becoming-past of her future as a sheer movement in time. This is how Tess looks from outside. When looked from inside, Tess does not know about ghosts although she has a ghostly ability. "I don't know about ghosts," she says and adds, "but I do know that our souls can be made to go outside our bodies when we are alive" (154). She is also very much affected by the gaze when she has the constraining consciousness of it. She has then "the constraint of a domestic animal that perceives itself to be watched" (155). When there are no gazes upon her, in the sight of the valleys of Egdon Heath, for instance, she is joyfully relaxed with an ease of manner and lightness of spirit: "Either the change in the quality of the air from heavy to light, or the sense of being amid new scenes where there were no invidious eyes upon her, sent up her spirits wonderfully" (133). But there are two sides of Tess that can be read from her face: "One day she was pink and flawless; another pale and tragical" (134). In all her passivity Tess is under the effect of two different forces as all human beings are: "the two forces were at work here as everywhere, the inherent will to enjoy, and the circumstantial will against enjoyment" (365).

Hardy remarks that he does not "whip and scourge [his] characters into doing something contrary to their natures" that would "produce the spurious effect of their being in harmony with social forms and ordinances", and that he leaves his characters "alone to act as they will" (Hardy 1997: 258). This is probably what Deleuze refers to as Hardy's "strange respect for the individual". Hardy argues in another essay that,

> [T]he characters, however they may differ, express mainly the author, his largeness of heart or otherwise, his culture, his insight, and very little of any other living person, except in such an inferior kind of procedure as might occasionally be applied to dialogue, and would take the narrative out of the category of fiction; *i.e.*, verbatim reporting without selective judgment. (252-3)

In the case of Tess, for instance, she is clearly whipped into a tragic end which affects the reader. She is primarily whipped into this end by the society and by other exterior forces. The author also places another machine into Tess, a reactive and hereditary "pride" which adds to and whips her internally to her tragic end. If the reader identifies with Tess, who is in no way a becoming, he or she becomes trapped in a masochistic disavowal and accuses the writer with sadism against Tess. But if the reader follows Hardy in his assertion that the novel is not the thing but "a view of the thing", or that "a novel is an impression, not an argument" (Hardy 1994a: viii), the reading might lead to an "exercise of generous imaginativeness, which shall find in a tale not only all that was put there by the author, put he it never so awkwardly, but which shall, find there what was never inserted by him, never foreseen, never contemplated" (Hardy 1997: 243). This would be the safest way to share the writer's innocence if not to become his or her accomplice. Going back to Tess's pride under these circumstances, it seems that Hardy, in his experimentation with pride, symptomatises how pride is connected with and might lead to enslavement, the formula of which we need to find out. In this context, Hardy describes a moment of post-confessional low intensity between Tess and Angel as follows: "her mood of long-suffering made his ways easy for him, and she herself was his best advocate. Pride too entered her submission—which perhaps was a symptom of that reckless acquiescence in chance too apparent in the whole d'Urberville family" (Hardy 1994a: 324). While Proust discovers homosexuality and the estrangement of both sexes as the objective end of the passional regime, we see

this ultimate end, in Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, as a kind of masochistic suffering on a full body without organs leading Tess to self-effacement, murder and self-destruction through this murder.

Deleuze's second reference to Hardy is related to "heath-becoming" or "the heath-line" in his Wessex novels: "it is not that the heath is the subject or the content of the novel, but that a flux of modern writing combines with a flux of immemorial heath" (Deleuze 1987: 50). Hardy's fictional Wessex, the name of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom in the south east of England, is geographically the same location as today, but most place names on it are different. Hardy even draws maps of his own Wessex to be printed in his novels as he is convinced as a result "that nothing could give such reality to tale as a map of this sort" (Hardy 1978: 61). But it must be recalled here that, for Hardy, realism is "artificially distilled from the fruits of observation" (Hardy 1997: 262). Finally, Deleuze's third reference to Hardy is related to the Ishmaelitish element in his novels evoking an affinity with Masoch's style: "For Masoch, the novel is Cainian, just as it was Ishmaelite for Thomas Hardy (the steppe and the heather). It is the broken line of Cain" (Deleuze 1998: 55).

The strongest presence and effect of the "heath" in Hardy's Wessex novels is best seen in *The Return of the Native* (1878) with the fictional "Egdon Heath" which Hardy uses for the cluster of adjoined heaths between Dorchester and Bournemouth in the south of England (or between Casterbridge and Sandbourne in Hardy's Wessex). The following lines about Egdon Heath are from the opening pages of the novel:

> The place became full of much more intentness now; for when other things sank brooding to sleep the heath appeared slowly to awake and listen. Every night its Titanic form seemed to await something; but it had waited thus, unmoved, during so many centuries, during the crises of so many things, that it could only be imagined to await one last crisis—the final overthrow.
>
> […] Then Egdon was aroused to reciprocity; for the storm was its lover, and the wind its friend. Then it became the home of strange phantoms […]
>
> It was at present a place perfectly accordant with man's nature—neither ghastly, hateful, nor ugly; neither commonplace, unmeaning, nor tame; but, like man, slighted and enduring; and withal singularly colossal and mysterious in its swarthy monotony. As with some persons who have long lived apart, solitude seemed to look out of its countenance. It had a lonely face, suggesting tragical possibilities.

> [...] The untameable, Ishmaelitish thing that Egdon now was it always had been. Civilization was its enemy [...] (Hardy 1994c: 4, 5, 6)

Egdon Heath is Hardy's body without organs par excellence. It is the dialectical plane of composition for the "collision between the individual and the general" in Hardy's fiction. Hardy regards life primarily as a "physiological fact", hence, he believes it is best portrayed in the "relations of the sexes" and the "catastrophes based on sexual relations" (Hardy 1997: 256). Hence, most of Hardy's fiction focuses on an in-depth treatment of the passional subjective regime under the effect of both interior and exterior forces. Binary strata of men and women are coupled (territorialised), decoupled (deterritorialised), re-coupled, cross-coupled or mismatched (reterritorialised) along the three lines of life. By means of these in-depth treatments which usually end up in negative lines of flight or in black-holes, Hardy forces the limits of the passional regime with his exceptional or singular individuations beyond the borders of plausibility (e.g., more real than real or unbelievable characters). Other semiotic regimes, such as the despotic, the presignifying and the countersignifying regimes of signs, take place only secondarily and are subsidiary to the passional regime.

In *The Return of the Native*, we witness the ruthless face of Egdon Heath when it collaborates with fate in leading not only Eustacia Vye, an outcast who is never reconciled to "celestial imperiousness" on Egdon which is her prison and Hades, but also Clym Yeobright, the native of Egdon who returns from Paris where he used to work as a diamond dealer in the hope of starting a school in Egdon. Egdon Heath seems to have a sinister hatred for education, perhaps due to its being the prerequisite of civilisation. Nothing else explains its paradoxical brutality against both Eustacia and Clym: Eustacia is the only educated woman in Egdon with "some forwardness of mind" and "instincts toward social nonconformity" (Hardy 1994c: 80), and Clym wants to do something "worthy" by becoming "a schoolmaster to the poor and ignorant, to teach them what nobody else will" (206). Circumstances bring Eustacia and Clym together. The former leaves her lover Wildeve, and the latter rejects his mother Mrs. Yeobright's wish to betroth him to his cousin Thomasin. First, Wildeve and Thomasin get married, and then, Clym and Eustacia's marriage follows. Through their marriage, Eustacia hopes Clym will take her to Paris one day, and Clym hopes Eustacia, as an educated

person, will be an invaluable help in his future school. But neither happens. Clym's night-studies weaken his eyes and incapacitate him. Instead of being a schoolmaster, he becomes a furze-cutter and will never leave Egdon again. Eustacia is disappointed in her husband as she confesses that "I thought I saw a promise of that life in him" (Hardy 1994c: 334). With her own style of rereading history, she discovers a nihilist in her husband: "He's an enthusiast about ideas, and careless about outward things. He often reminds me of the Apostle Paul. […] [T]hough Paul was excellent as a man in the Bible he would hardly have done in real life" (332). Thomasin and Wildeve have a baby daughter and they name her "Eustacia". Meanwhile, Wildeve will never leave his former beloved and Clym's new wife Eustacia alone. He is "the man of sentiment" or "the Rousseau of Egdon": "To be yearning for the difficult, to be weary of that offered; to care for the remote, to dislike the near; it was Wildeve's nature always" (254).

Following the death of Clym's mother caused by snakebite near his house, Clym accuses Eustacia for causing his mother's death and for betraying him with Wildeve, and Eustacia leaves her husband. She does not go back to Wildeve either and she finally decides to escape from her prison Egdon with Wildeve's help. But while she is running away, she drowns herself in a stream and Wildeve is also drowned while trying to save her. Clym then accuses himself for the deaths of both his mother Mrs. Yeobirhgt and his wife Eustacia. He eventually becomes a self-castrated, self-pitying and wandering preacher on Egdon Heath: "How can I have the conscience to marry after having driven two women to their deaths?" (469). In Clym, we see the modern, suffering and redemptive Oedipus in the flesh more than an apostle: "for what I have done no man or law can punish me!" (447).

There is in fact another native who returns to Egdon before Clym does: The mysterious reddleman Diggory Venn who finally marries the widowed Thomasin, whom he has always loved. At the beginning of the novel, when Thomasin's marriage to Wildeve does not take place on the first appointed day, she leaves the church downhearted and wants to go home alone. But she is happy to see her old friend Diggory Venn and asks him to take her to her house in his van. Venn agrees; and when she gets on the van, she faints. This is how the reddleman comes back to Egdon Heath with Thomasin lying asleep in his van. We learn later that Venn was an old suitor of

Thomasin who had rejected him kindly with a letter which he still keeps in his pocket. His being rejected by Thomasin is the actual reason of his becoming a wandering reddleman: "Rejected suitors take to roaming as naturally as unhived bees; and the business to which he had cynically devoted himself was in many ways congenial to Venn" (Hardy 1994c: 92). His meeting Thomasin on that day is only a "coincidence" as it always happens in Hardy's novels. He has no intention of becoming her suitor again since he believes Thomasin will never accept him. All he wants is to be her shadow and protective angel and to aid her happiness if possible: "To be in Thomasin's heath, and near her, yet unseen, was the one ewe-lamb of pleasure left to him" (92-3). Venn is also "determined to aid her to be happy in her own chosen way" (93) Thus, the reddleman becomes Hardy's model of the disinterested, unselfish, unpassionate and "generous" lover of strategy (178, 93). Eustacia finds the reddleman's disinterestedness "absurd". And for his shrewdness, he is "all too human", in Nietzsche's words.

Venn discovers that Wildeve's old lover Eustacia who still loves him is the main reason which obstructs Thomasin and Wildeve's marriage plan, and hence, the reason of Thomasin's unhappiness. Then Venn intervenes to correct things and to prepare the way to that wedding. His first error is to decide for Thomasin about what will make her happy. Then he tries to convince Eustacia to let Wildeve free, and finally succeeds in it by taking a note from her to Wildeve informing her decision to "hold no further communication" with him. Although Wildeve feels humiliated to read Eustacia's note to him, he is now more determined about marrying Thomasin. When Venn hears about some rumours that Thomasin wishes to marry him, he hurries directly to her house, but when he sees that Wildeve has already been there and won Thomasin again, he is shattered: "Venn's heart sank within him, though it had not risen unduly high" (182). He recovers very shortly and retreats to his former position of disinterested lover and Thomasin's protective angel.

After the two marriages take place, Venn keeps interfering from a distance still without intending any harm. When Thomasin's husband Wildeve begins seeing his old lover Eustacia, Venn is also there to scare Wildeve away with a gun and he misinterprets Eustacia's loyalty to her husband. He convinces Clym's mother to

reconcile with his son and to visit him which will lead to a series of unfortunate events ending with her tragic death. Eustacia will have to pay for all.

In the end, we have four different returns to Egdon Heath in *The Return of the Native*: Eustacia's Promethean return to water, Clym's Oedipal return to his mother as well as to his mother land, Venn's quasi-idyllic return as the "shrewd" man and Thomasin's vegetative and reproductive return as the most harmonious creature on Egdon Heath. These four returns correspond to three different tales: the true Ariadnean tragedy of Eustacia, the parody of the Oedipal Greek drama about Clym's terrible fate, and finally Thomasin and Venn's melodrama with idyllic contours which overshadows the previous two tales at the price of three victims.

More than the melodramatic ending of the novel, the dialectical synthesis hidden in it as the return of the man seems to be one of the problematic aspects of the novel for a Deleuzian reading. The reddleman comes to Egdon Heath like Dionysus but ends up being Socrates the dialectician and the ironist. Hardy associates all his characters with some names in history except his reddleman whom we can associate with the Wagnerian artists of the romantic decadence who, Nietzsche argues, "misunderstand love": "They imagine that they are selfless in it because they appear to be seeking the advantage of another creature often to their own disadvantage. But in return they want to possess the other creature" (Nietzsche 1911b: 4). Nietzsche also defines "disinterestedness" as a "principle of decadence, the will to nonentity in art as well as morality" (66-7). Hardy presents the marriage of the reddleman Venn and Thomasin as happening coincidentally or unexpectedly but a subtitle in 'Book One' does not say so: 'Love Leads a Shrewd Man into Strategy' (Hardy 1994c: 89-99). The reddleman Venn carries the sign of Wagnerian shrewdness par excellence. Hardy, in fact, justifies himself, in the book edition of *The Return of the Native* with a footnote he adds just before the last chapter in which Venn marries Thomasin:

> The writer may state here that the original conception of the story did not design a marriage between Thomasin and Venn. He was to have retained his isolated and weird character to the last, and to have disappeared mysteriously from the heath, nobody knowing whither—Thomasin remaining a widow. But certain circumstances of serial publication led to a change of intent. (Hardy 1994c: 470n1)

With this footnote Hardy implies a social and editorial influence on the novel. He is not writing the novel alone. The socius whom Hardy's editors represent is also with him in the writing of the novel. The society finds its representative in the novel too: the reddleman Venn. Hence, the problem of the reddleman is the problem of the socius. Hardy's above footnote also implies that he thought of the reddleman as a kind of *deus ex machina* in the form of a real human being, though "isolated and weird", and a real character to provide a tragic effect. Hardy employs a character for his tragic effect of the fate, but his character does not like the role given to him and asks for more. And he is such a decedent and such a shrewd man that he even misleads and betrays his own creator, the writer. The reddleman turns out to be the voice of the socius par excellence. Hardy *coincidentally* brings together the symptoms of a type of decadence on the other side of the English Channel. And the title of a chapter in 'Book One', 'Love Leads a Shrewd Man into Strategy', contains the sign of Hardy's protest against society, his Promethean fire signal to his future readers.

In *The Return of the Native,* bonfires are introduced as a widespread custom before the coming of the winter on Egdon Heath. They symbolise "a spontaneous, Promethean rebelliousness against that fiat that this recurrent season shall bring foul times, cold darkness, misery and death" (Hardy 1994c: 17-8). The reddleman Venn also arrives in Egdon Heath with a red van and in read clothes: "like his van, he was completely red. One dye of that tincture covered his clothes, the cap upon his head, his boots, his face, and his hands. He was not temporarily overlaid with the colour; it permeated him" (9). Yet, colour red and being a reddleman is a mask for Venn, the mask of a wanderer as a rejected suitor. After the deaths of both Eustacia and Wildeve, he is "no longer a reddleman". He becomes all "white", and all too human as Clym wonders: "What shall we have to frighten Thomasin's baby with, now you have become a human being again?" (455).

Eustacia is also defined with the colour red, not as an outer colour but an inner one which is associated with her desire and libidinal instincts: "you could fancy the colour of Eustacia's soul to be flamelike. The sparks from it that rose into her dark pupils gave the same impression" (76). Bonfires on Egdon Heath have another significance to Eustacia who is a girl of the sea and the daughter of an immigrant Corfiote father and an

English mother from the "watering-place" Budmouth, a seaside town in Hardy's Wessex. After the death of both of her parents, she is left to the care of her grandfather Captain Vye, who retires to live on Egdon Heath after a shipwreck. She is an outside force on Egdon and the most Ishmaelitish creature looking for her life-promising rescuer[67] with an hourglass in one hand and a telescope in the other. She needs a rescuer for subjectivation through passionate love more than a particular rescuer mixed with an Oedipal need "to be loved to madness": "she seemed to long for the abstraction called passionate love more than for any particular lover" (Hardy 1994c: 79). Eustacia uses the Promethean fire, or rather, the bonfire, as a signal to communicate her love to Wildeve, which is very rare in Hardy's Wessex, as an alternative to the noncommunicating love-letters.

Hardy, like his contemporary Nietzsche, does not believe in God; but unlike Nietzsche, he believes in the communicativeness of language and the necessity of human interference in the accidental chance and dark destiny. The only instance in which language is not communicative in Hardy's fictional world is the love-letter:[68] it is never received by the addressee, as in Clym's letter to Eustacia before her last walk to death. In *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, Angel never receives Tess's letters, such as her very crucial four-page confessional letter which she slips under Angel's door, but which gets stuck under the edge of the carpet (the "incident of the misplaced letter"); and Tess's letters to him when he is in Brazil are always received when it is too late. Hence, Eustacia's fire signal is a true Promethean discovery as an alternative to love-letters in Hardy's fiction. But neither Wildeve nor Clym are capable of understanding her.

Hardy compares his "queen of night", Eustacia, to a "model goddess" with a "true Tartarean dignity" (75, 77). And in heaven, he assigns her a place between Cleopatra (69-30 BC) and Heloise (1101-62 AD), the two passionate heroines of history (82). Hardy introduces her as a seductress, as a femme fatale, but she tempts men less than tempting beliefs and conventions. She is more like a nonconformist prophetess. Her

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[67] Hardy's depiction of Eustacia as a woman so dependent on men is another element of romantic decadence in Nietzsche's terms, or an element of Wagnerian "opera of salvation": "Someone always wants to be saved in his operas,—now it is a youth, anon it is a maid,—this is *his problem*. [...] Or that beautiful girls most love to be saved by a knight who also happens to be a Wagnerite" (Nietzsche 1911b: 7).

[68] The letters of bad news are exceptional: they are received immediately.

libido is invested in social criticism with hallucinations of history.[69] Hardy alludes to Alcinous, as the source of Eustacia's dignity[70] and makes no mention of Ariadne. But along with Tess, in a Deleuzian context, Eustacia is more comparable to Ariadne whom Theseus abandons on the island of Naxos. Eustacia is also abandoned in Egdon Heath by two Theseuses with no Dionysus arriving: She is abandoned first by the dreamer Wildeve who promised her a far-away life in America, and than by the idealist Clym who robs her of the most intimate dreams of a life within reach.

In Greek mythology, there are various versions of the story of Ariadne. But common to most versions, Ariadne, the daughter of King Minos, falls in love with Theseus who tasks himself to enter Minos' Labyrinth built by Daedalus and kill the Minotaur. Ariadne gives him a thread in order not to get lost in the labyrinth and to trace his way back out of it. According to one version, Ariadne helps Theseus "in exchange for him promising to take her back to Athens and marry her".[71] Theseus, after having killed the beast, sails to the island of Naxos with his other fellowmen, Ariadne and her sister Phaedra.[72] But Theseus leaves Ariadne alone on the island either as a result of his forgetfulness according to most sources or treacherously. Ariadne is then sleeping on the shore. When she opens her eyes, she forlornly watches Theseus' ship sailing away at full speed. Ovid writes: "And now Ariadne beat her soft breast again and again: 'My faithless lover has gone,' cried she. 'What will become of me?' 'What will become of me?' she cried" (in Morford and Lenardon 2003: 561). Ovid continues to describe the arrival of Dionysus (Bacchus) on the island as follows:

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[69] "Her high gods were William the Conqueror, Strafford, and Napoleon Buonaparte, as they had appeared in the Lady's History used at the establishment in which she was educated. Had she been a mother she would have christened her boys such names as Saul or Sisera in preference to Jacob or David, neither of whom she admired. At school she had used to side with the Philistines in several battles, and had wondered if Pontius Pilate were as handsome as he was frank and fair". (Hardy 1994c: 80)

[70] Alcinous, another Corfiote like Eustacia's father, is the mythical king of Phaeacians living on the Greek island of Corfu (the ancient island of Scheria). Alcinous also has a daughter called Nausicaä, who discovers Odysseus at the seashore and gives him protection with her father (Morford and Lenardon 2003: 493). Morford and Lenardon (727-8) also mention the English novelist Samuel Butler's "thesis that Nausicaä (not Homer) is responsible for the composition of the Odyssey" in his book *Authoress of the Odyssey* published in 1897. Hardy clearly alludes to Nausicaä with his character Eustacia. And Butler's thesis also surprisingly coincides with Hardy's earlier creation of Eustacia (in 1878) as the rewriter of history.

[71] *The Probert Encyclopaedia of Mythology* (2002: 29).

[72] We find the addition of Phaedra among the list of people in Theseus' ship in *New Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology* (1987: 195).

And now came the god in his chariot decked to the top with vines, driving yoked tigers with golden reins. Ariadne lost her color, her voice, her thoughts of Theseus; twice she tried to run away, and twice fear held her rooted. Then said the god: "Behold I am here, a more faithful object of your love. Away with fear! You shall be the Cretan wife of Bacchus. Take the heavens as my gift; you shall be observed in the heavens as a constellation. Often as the Cretan Crown (Corona) will you guide lost sailors." (in Morford and Lenardon 2003: 561)

In their first encounter, Ariadne retreats from Dionysus hatefully as expressed in Nietzsche's dithyramb: "Must we not first hate each other if we are to love each other?" Later she accepts him warmly as her last hope, as Nietzsche makes her say to Dionysus in his dithyrambic account of the myth: "Speak, finally, you who hide behind the lightning? Unknown! Speak! What do you want...? O come back, my unknown God! my pain! my last happiness" (quotes Deleuze 1996: 173).

For Nietzsche, Theseus, an Apollonian hero in the myth, symbolises the romantic decadence, egomania, ressentiment and secret nationalism in Wagner's art and music, which he realises only later. In fact Nietzsche has a close and long relationship with Wagner in Leipzig. He even dedicates *The Birth of Tragedy* to Richard Wagner. Before his complete break with him, Nietzsche has the following conflicting thoughts, which are also present in *The Birth of Tragedy*, about Wagner during their close friendship:

> [Nietzsche] sometimes had the unpleasant feeling that Wagner was using him and borrowing his own concept of the tragic; sometimes he had the delightful feeling that with Cosima's help he would carry Wagner to truths that, he, Wagner, couldn't discover on his own. (Deleuze 2001: 55)

Cosima, Wagner's much younger wife, seems to be the main force behind Nietzsche's prolonged, endured and misused friendship with Wagner. Wagner was Cosima's second husband after she "left the musician Hans von Bülow". "Her friends sometimes called her Ariadne and suggested parallelism: Bülow-Theseus, Wagner-Dionysus" (54-5). But when Nietzsche saw a true and inherent Theseus behind the Dionysian mask of Wagner, he was in a big disappointment. He felt both himself and Cosima (Ariadne) deceived and misused. He was also in a similar position to Ariadne's

(we can call it an Ariadne syndrome independently of her sex), by allowing his own theory of the tragic (like Ariadne's thread) being misused by Wagner.[73]

Nietzsche develops his theory of Ariadne in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883-85). Deleuze comments on it in terms of its relationship to the passional regime and the femininity specific to that regime:

> As long as woman loves man, as long as she is mother, sister, wife of man, even if he is the higher man, she is only the feminine image of man: the feminine power remains fettered in man. As terrible mothers, terrible sisters and wives, femininity represents the spirit of revenge and the *ressentiment* which animates man himself. But Ariadne, abandoned by Theseus, senses the coming of a transmutation which is specific to her: the feminine power emancipated, become beneficent and affirmative, the Anima. (Deleuze 1996: 187)

One of the most important roles of Eustacia in Hardy's Return of the Native is that she serves as the distracter of Clym who is the most central character in the novel. Hardy uses her to distract Clym's attention from his cousin, for whom he is the most probable suitor. In that sense she also contributes to Clym's tragic downfall and isolation as well as to the reddleman's strategy. Hence she is not only between Clym and Wildeve, but also between the reddleman and the writer. Everybody needs her for his own end: Clym needs her for his future project; Wildeve needs her as his old beloved. The reddleman and the writer need her to distract Clym, but each has his own end. The reddleman needs her to keep Clym away from Thomasin; and the writer needs her to contribute to the main protagonist Clym's castration and downfall. Hence Eustacia is four times Ariadne, with no Dionysus arriving. And unlike Wildeve, she has no social representatives behind to prevent her tragic end. In the same way that Wildeve

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[73] What is meant with the Ariadne syndrome is one's realisation of being deceived by anything, by a husband, a wife, a beloved, an idea, a political party, the state, and so on. Both Deleuze & Guattari passed through this syndrome. Deleuze had his Hegelian and Freudian professors as his Theseuses, and Guattari had Lacan and the Vincennes Department of Psychoanalysis ("*Le Champ freudien*") as his Theseuses. It is a temporary state of nihilism which may be self-destructive unless a positive and vital alternative is devised as a last hope. This Dionysian alternative for Deleuze & Guattari was schizoanalysis as a positive task. For Nietzsche, what we call as the Ariadne syndrome coincided with his illness and he left his teaching position in Basel and Wagner (Deleuze 2001: 56). What Nietzsche found in Cosima was her support of his true Dionysian ideas during the years he stayed with Wagner. What he missed in Basel was his talks with Cosima, and he could not forget her. When he finally had his biggest nervous break down in 1888 he wrote a letter signed as Dionysus to the widowed Cosima Wagner: "Ariadne, I love you. Dionysus." (Deleuze 2001: 63).

is the decadent hero of the socius, Eustacia is the victim of a decedent socius. In *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* we will witness the same biased socius against Tess.

6.2. The Tyranny of the Socius: The Plane of Composition and the BwO in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*

In Hardy's earlier novels, the time of the story precedes the time of his writing by a few decades accompanied by some charmingly rustic nostalgia and pastoral humour. For instance, Hardy sets down the story time of *The Return of the Native* (1878) "as between 1840", the year of his birth, "and 1850". But in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (first appeared in periodical episodes in 1889 and published as a three volume book in 1891), the story time seems more contemporaneous with the time of writing with a more realistic depiction of the rural life and a more involved description of the socio-economic conditions and mobility with the advent of capitalism, mechanization and new codes of farming in the countryside. Hence, in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* we do not see an idyllic reddleman in red taking a fainted woman to her house in his red van or a historic Eustacia who disguises herself as the falling "Turkish Knight" in the mummers' play or tends a bonfire with her grandmother's hourglass in one hand and her grandfather's telescope in the other.

In fact, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* has an idyllic and joyful opening, similar to the scenes in *The Return of the Native*. We see Tess's drunk father riding in a chariot which belongs to The Pure Drop Inn and is driven by a female servant and acting in his own manner "how are the mighty fallen" (Hardy 1994a: 6). And within the same frame, we see the proceeding of the women's May-Day club-walking in Marlott. The members of the club, which "alone lived to uphold the local Cerealia" (10), consists mostly of young girls in white gowns, each one carrying "in her right hand a peeled willow wand, and in her left a bunch of white flowers" (11). But as the chapters proceed, the atmosphere becomes somber and gloomy, especially for Tess. We rarely see her smiling; and when she smiles, it is always accompanied by a deeper sorrow. She is even unable to laugh at Dairyman Crick's funniest jokes about one of his former milkers "Jack Dollop, a 'hore's bird of a fellow": "The laughter which followed this sally was supplemented only by a sorry smile, for form's sake, from Tess. What was comedy to them was

tragedy to her; and she could hardly bear their mirth" (Hardy 1994a: 231). We meet the rural classes of squires and their "workfolk", farmer's and their labourers, landowners and their life-holders (tenants until the head of the family dies), "nouveaux riches"—or social climbers—and impoverished aristocrats, such as Alec, a "spurious d'Urberville, compounded of money and ambition", and Tess, a "true d'Urberville to the bone" but helpless and susceptible to any exploitation being "unaided by Victorian lucre" (163, 15).

There is a binary machine at work in the novel. It couples and decouples the opposite poles of both sexes: the Tess-Alec encounter in Trantridge is the first encounter, which ends when Alec seduces Tess. The second, the Tess-baby encounter in Marlott ends with the death of her baby. And then, the Tess-Angel encounter begins at Talbothays Diary and finishes with their marriage without consummation when Angel learns about Alec's seduction of Tess.

These three primary encounters are followed by the wandering encounters of all three characters separately: Angel wanders alone in Brazil, Tess wanders alone on the arched line between Marlott, Flintcomb-Ash and Kigsbere in Egdon Heath, and Alec initially wanders alone, and then he begins wandering near and whirling around Tess. When there is no news from Angel and Tess family has to leave their house upon her father's death, we see the second Tess-Alec encounter in a lodging house at Sandbourne (Bournemouth), a seaside town of Wessex. It ends with Tess's murder of Alec after the sudden and unexpected reappearance of Angel at the door of the lodging house. Next, we have the second Angel-Tess encounter in a secluded flight which ends with the arrestment of Tess at Stonehenge. Finally, we have the dialectical synthetic encounter between Angel and Tess's sister Lisa-Lu who leave hand in hand at the sight of Tess's execution carried out in the faraway prison.

The final encounter of Angel and Lisa-Lu is a very disturbing synthesis like the Reddleman and Thomasin synthesis in *The Return of the Native*. Angel walks out of the novel like one of Shakespeare's good kings, like Richmond (Henry VII) in *Richard III*, for instance. But even the most anti-dialectical reader finds it difficult to reject this synthesis because it has been tied into Tess's last wish, and Tess's doom is determined

by the highest court of the dialectician and the moralist, Hardy's Aeschylean "President of the Immortals", who finally "end[s] his sport with Tess" (Hardy 1994a: 508), his scapegoat to rid Wessex of its iniquities. We are faced with a dialectical and decedent socius with this synthetic ending of the novel. And Hardy does not help us with a footnote, if the synthetic ending was his true intention or, to recall the footnote in *The Return of the Native*, if it was led by "certain circumstances of serial publication". There is one thing certain, which is that the publication of *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* was subject to many editorial interventions, censorship, self-censorship (Boumelha 2005: xvi, xxi), later extractions and additions (Hardy 1994a: xi). Hence, a Deleuzian reading requires that Angel who walks out of the novel synthetically points to the diabolical forces of Hardy's time and those of the future. In Angel we read the linguistic imperialism of majoritarian English over minor dialects, and a decadence of a new type.

Angel is another all-too-human Theseus who leaves his Ariadne on Naxos to be killed by Artemis and leaves the island with her sister Phaedra.[74] Angel is also like the reddleman Venn in that he produces a similar "tragic" effect. But while the Reddleman leads to tragedy with his presence and active involvement in the events, Angel leads to tragedy with his absence when he is most needed and his sudden appearance when it is too late or when he is never expected, as can be seen in the instance when Tess complains to him at the door of Alec's lodgement: "I waited and waited for you […] But you did not come! […] He was very kind to me, and to mother, and to all of us after father's death. He—"; Angel interrupts her: "I don't understand" (484). In Hardy's Wessex not only the shrewdness of man but also his lack of understanding—if not a pretended one—brings tragedy: there is no escape from his President of the Immortals. Alec and Tess are also modified versions of Wildeve and Eustacia who die together in *The Return of the Native*: Alec is a Wildeve who is made a tyrant, and Tess is a Eustacia who is robbed of her libido, her desire and her becoming. We also observe half of Clym in Angel in terms of his idealisms and unconventional tasks for occupation. The former quits his job as a diamond dealer in Paris with the hope of educating people in his

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[74] In Homer's version of the story of Ariadne, she "was killed by Artemis upon Naxos as a punishment for eloping with Theseus when she was already betrothed to Dionysus" (Morford and Lenardon 2003: 561).

homeland, and the latter, being out of his class as the son of a cleric, learns taming animals and tames Tess as his future helper and accomplice, and we never know what or who he tames in Brazil, a country where farming heavily depended on slave labour until the abolition of slavery in 1888. Alec possesses the other half of Clym in terms of his relationship with his mother and his farcical turning to evangelical preaching in remorse for his past sins: "He had, he said, been the greatest of sinners. He had suffocated; he had wantonly associated with the reckless and the reckless and the lewd. But a day of awakening had come […]" (Hardy 1994a: 386). Alec is firstly converted to evangelism by Angel's father. But when he meets Tess again, he returns to his old wanton days, and finally, he is converted into Angel's paganism through the latter's pagan prophetess, Tess.

The plane of composition in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* is an organisational one like a chess board which extends to Stonehenge in the north, Wintochester Prison in the east, Emminster in the west, and Egdon Heath—on the line of Talbothays, Kingsbere and Sandbourne—in the south. And the characters are like chess pieces with a limited choice of movements and a limited choice of encounters leading to frequent coincidences and "rencounters". The role of men in this game varies but women are always on the front line as pawns in both socioeconomic and sexual terms. Paws numerically constitute the majority on a chessboard, but they are the lowest in value even though they can be very influential in the game. They are also easier to be sacrificed for the protection of a major piece or for other strategic reasons. In addition, all other pieces can move backwards in the game except pawns. The latter cannot undo their past. In the case of Tess, she gives it a try after her bad experience with Alec in order to see if she would be able to change the rules of the game: "Was once lost always lost really true of chastity? she would ask herself. She might prove it false if she could veil bygones. The recuperative power which pervaded organic nature was surely not denied to maidenhood alone" (126). But unfortunately she fails even with Angel who considers himself non-dogmatic and nonconformist in thinking (206) and communistic in sharing the labour with other women on the basis of "his rule of taking part with the rest in everything" (179).

It is true that Alec robs Tess of her body physically, but he cannot rob her of her self-respect as she addresses Alec when she is leaving his farm:

> "I have never really and truly loved you, and I think I never can." She added mournfully, "Perhaps, of all things, a lie on this thing would do the most good to me now; but I have honour enough left, little as 'tis, not to tell that lie. If I did love you I may have the best o' causes for letting you know it. But I don't." (Hardy 1994a: 99)

Angel, conversely, robs Tess of her soul, her self-respect and her desire to live. Angel gives her the idea of being "evil" for the first time in her life: "Angel, am I too wicked for you and me to live together?" (294). Tess's love for Angel is another thing she cannot undo like her past. Tess, having no "selfhood" left to support her pride, she transfers it to Angel who does his best to prove himself to be her victim. Hence, Angel becomes her sole pride, hereditary sovereign and overlord. Since she loved him passionately, "he was so godlike in her eyes" already in Talbothays (233); and after their confessions, she is ready to be a human sacrifice at his pagan altar if only he would accept her: "I will obey you like your wretched slave, even if it is to lie down and die". This is no joke; Tess will do it without hesitation, but Angel responds to her only with sarcasm: "You are very good. But it strikes me that there is a want of harmony between your present mood of self-sacrifice and your past mood of self-preservation" (294).

In socioeconomic terms, women constitute the majority of the workfolk in the rural area in the specific case of Hardy's Wessex or the real Dorsetshire of his time. In his essay 'The Dorsetshire Labourer', Hardy (1997: 279) notes that there is a high demand for women's labour in farming since "a woman, like a boy, fills the place of a man at half wages, can be better depended on for steadiness". For Hardy, women attain an impersonal and metamorphic attribute by becoming "part and parcel of outdoor nature" while they are working afield: "A field-man is a personality afield; a field-woman is a portion of the field; she had somehow lost her own margin, imbibed the essence of her surrounding, and assimilated herself with it" (Hardy 1994a: 111). This account accords with the Hellenic view of woman as "more closely related to Nature than man" in a complete contrast to culture (Nietzsche 1911a: 23). The line of occupation for a farmwoman in Dorchester consists of "haymaking" or harvesting, "turnip-hacking" (or

hacking swedes, Swedish turnips used as animal food) "feeding the threshing machine" and "weeding wheat and barley" (Hardy 1997: 279).

Dairy work seems to be the most undemanding and the easiest occupation for a woman as compared to other farm labour. And the most difficult occupation is unquestionably the feeding of the threshing machine. Mechanisation in farming does not decrease women's labour especially in the case of the threshing machine, which was the nightmare of every woman around Dorchester in the last half of the 19th century as Hardy notes. Standing "just above the whizzing wire drum, and feed[ing] from morning to night" can have fatal results for a woman. Hardy recounts the following incident he has witnessed:

> A thin saucer-eyed woman of fifty-five, who had been feeding the machine all day, declared on one occasion that in crossing a field on her way home in the fog after dusk, she was so dizzy from the work as to be unable to find the opposite gate, and there she walked round and round the field, bewildered and terrified, till three o'clock in the morning, before she could get out. The farmer said that the ale had got into her head, but she maintained that it was the spinning of the machine. The point was never clearly settled between them; and the poor woman is now dead and buried. (280)

In *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, Hardy presents a valuable historical record of all farm labour for women with vivid descriptions as experienced by Tess and the bevy of girls around her. Tess, in fact does not belong to the lowest rural class of "Hodges", the farm-labouring community, but one class above them. She is the eldest daughter of John Durbeyfield, a small "haggler" or a pedlar, with six other brothers and sisters who are "passengers in the Durbeyfield ship—entirely dependent on the judgement of the two Durbeyfield adults for their pleasures, their necessities, their health, even their existence" (Hardy 1994a: 24). At the beginning of the novel, we see Tess at the age of sixteen and a half, and her youngest sibling is only one year old. Another conflicting binary opposition in the novel exists between Tess and her mother Joan:

> Between the mother, with her fast-perishing lumber of superstitions, folk-lore, dialect, and orally transmitted ballads, and the daughter, with her trained National teachings and Standard knowledge under an infinitely Revised Code, there was a gap of two hundred years as ordinarily understood. When they were together the Jacobean and the Victorian ages were juxtaposed. (23-4)

Her father finds Tess unconventionally "queer", but her mother knows that "she's tractable at bottom". Her mother needs Tess's tractability for her "grand projick" which involves a plot like that of Richardson's *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded.* The source of inspiration for her project is not Richardson's book but her thick volume of *Compleat Fortune-Teller*, her only sacred scripture, but also a cursed one: it must not be kept inside the house. Joan's project is part of an antiquarian's recent discovery that her husband is the only male "lineal representative of the ancient knightly family of d'Urbervilles", and that "there's hardly such another family in England" (Hardy 1994a: 4, 5). She tells about her project to her husband first: "I've been thinking since you brought the news that there's a great rich lady out by Trantridge, on the edge o' The Chase, of the name of d'Urberville." "And my projick is to send Tess to claim kin" (28). Joan can tell from her sacred text that Tess would "be sure to win the lady", "and likely enough 'twould lead to some noble gentleman marrying her" (29). But unfortunately Tess is not Pamela. Nor are the rich lady in Trantridge and her son Alec truly nobles or genuine d'Urbervilles. They are not the natives of Hardy's Wessex either.

In *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, the British Museum in London serves as an Abstract Machine producing a face of aristocracy for the nouveau riche family of the Stokes. Mr. Simon Stoke, Alec's lately deceased father, is a social climber who has made his fortune in the industrial area in the north of England. Some say he was "an honest merchant", and some others say "a money-lender" in the north. Somehow he decides to move to the south and buys a big farmland in the north of Wessex. On his way, he pays a visit to the British Museum for an ingenious purpose, similar to Mrs. Durbeyfield's "projick", of new aristocratic assemblages:

> Conning for an hour in the British Museum the pages of works devoted to extinct, half-extinct, obscured, and ruined families appertaining to the quarter of England in which he proposed to settle, he considered that *d'Urberville* looked and sounded as well as any of them: and d'Urberville accordingly was annexed to his own name for himself and his heirs eternally. Yet he was not an extravagant-minded man in this, and in constructing his family tree on the new basis was duly reasonable in framing his inter-marriages and aristocratic links, never inserting a single title above a rank of strict moderation. (44)

Mr. Stoke could never know that the name "d'Urberville" would bring his family no fortune but a curse which his son Alec will be afflicted to, like the curse of the Delphic

oracle about King Laius. Mr. Stoke, in buying the name of d'Urberville, buys his son's destiny. It functions like an order-word which carries death to the son. Deleuze never praises pessimism, but nothing could demystify the curse of affiliation to a superior race, even the simulacrum of such an affiliation, better than Hardy's pessimism. The situation is not much different on the part of the Durbeyfield family in Marlott, that is, the genuine d'Urbervilles. They become afflicted with the curse of their name on the same day they receive their part of the oracle.

John Durbeyfield's oracle comes to him in person, like Shakespeare's "Sir Oracle": the local historian and antiquarian Parson Tringham who has been addressing the poor haggler as "Sir John" every time they meet adding to the latter's curiosity for nearly a month. The moment he cannot help asking the Parson why he has been calling him "Sir John", he becomes incapacitated under the weight of knowing that he belongs to an "extinct" noble race of "Sir Pagan d'Urberville" of Normandy, William the Conqueror's distinguished knight. The Parson only needs to look at John' face closer to assure the faciality: "Throw up your chin a moment, so that I may catch the profile of your face better. Yes, that's the d'Urberville nose and chin—a little debased" (Hardy 1994a: 4). John Durbeyfield sadly learns that his ancestors have currently no "lands", "family mansions" and no "estates" left except huge ancestral vaults and tombs in Kingsbere. He finally asks the Parson what he can do with all this knowledge:

> "And what had I better do about it, sir?" asked Durbeyfield, after a pause.
> "Oh—nothing, nothing; except chasten yourself with the thought of 'how are the mighty fallen.' It is a fact of some interest to the local historian and genealogist, nothing more. […]" (6)

John also tells the Parson about the mysterious and prosperous past of his great grandfather who came to Marlott in Blackmoor Valley from an unknown place with some secrets: "my family had seen better days afore they came to Blackmoor. […] 'Twas said that my gr't-granfer had secrets, and didn't care to talk of where he came from" (5). The secrets of the d'Urberville family will remain a hidden form of expression throughout the novel without ever rising to the form of content. But we understand soon that Tess will be doomed to repeat those secrets which are hereditary. Laying claim to an aristocracy, or to any other forms of majoritarianism, brings nothing

but disaster and death on its absolute limit, on its body without organs. Hardy will formalise this absolute end in his next and last novel *Jude the Obscure* (1896) with a phrase from 'Corinthians' in the New Testament enunciated by Jude: "We are acting by the letter; and 'the letter killeth'!" (Hardy 2001: 459).

Being an aristocrat primarily means three things for John: giving orders, having a servant driving him home, eating the best possible supper at home, and drinking rum to celebrate the great news which is to him nothing but a dream he will never want to be awoken from. He starts practicing aristocracy with the first person approaching: "Now obey my orders, and take the message I'm going to charge 'ee wi' ...." (Hardy 1994a: 7). It is the only moment we see him sober until the next day. He gets so drunk that, he is unable to transport the load of beehives which has to be in Casterbridge market early next morning. Tess is obliged to do it with her younger brother Abraham; and unfortunately she causes the death of Prince, their only horse, by falling asleep on the carriage. Tess becomes very depressed and accuses herself bitterly for killing Prince, the family's only source of income: "Nobody blamed Tess as she blamed herself" (38). This feeling of guilt makes it easier for Joan to bring Tess round to her earlier project of claiming kin to the rich lady in Trantridge, and ask for her help for the current trouble they are faced with. Tess finally gives in saying, "I don't mind going and seeing her, but you must leave it to me about asking for help. And don't go thinking about her making a match for me—it is silly" (40). All Tess wants is to find work on a farm and earn enough money to buy her family a horse.

Annexing the name d'Urberville to theirs does not make the Stokes richer; but the facial discovery of the Durbeyfield family makes them immediately poorer and out of their class. Tess is also immediately doomed to the family secret in a chain of causes and effects: Parson Tringham's news leads to her killing of Prince, the latter makes her part of her mother's project which is also related to the news, the project makes her a victim of Alec, being a victim makes her leave her hometown, and so on, in the form of moves and countermoves in chess. Tess always plays the part of a countermove since the main moves which force her out of her current position come from outside. And she is definitely an unconventional player who does not know or does not want to know how to play, making things worse for herself and for her family. Besides, she knows no

strategy, especially with men: she is definitely an anti-Pamela as a heroine. When she finds it very difficult to decide which countermove to take, she turns to her mother who unfortunately misleads her every time. Joan is an obsessed mother who solely has her daughter's marrying any gentleman in prospect without ever giving her proper education for it. She does not even tell her daughter a few words of warning before sending her to Trantridge. Tess turns to her mother for a second time for advice before she accepts Angel's proposal. This time Joan advices her to conceal her past: "on no account do you say a word of your Bygone Trouble to him. [I] did not tell everything to your Father […] No girl would be such a Fool, specially as it is so long ago, and not your Fault at all" (Hardy 1994a: 419). It is due to her mother's advice that she delays the confession until the last minute, and when she finally wants to talk to Alec about it, just before the marriage, Alec delays it to a time after the matrimony leading to the worst possible consequences for Tess, similarly to what happened in Joan's "grand projick". After the first accident with Angel, Tess complains to her mother for misleading, or rather for not leading her at all:

> "[…] Why didn't you tell me there was danger in men-folk? Why didn't you warn me? Ladies know what to fend hands against, because they read novels that tell them of these tricks; but I never had the chance o' learning in that way, and you did not help me!" (104)

How Tess knows about those ladies and their novels and does not know their tricks is an enigma if it is not the voice of the author as the subject of enunciation mixed with Tess's voice, but Hardy is sometimes present as the authorial face in the voices of his characters. Another example of the authorial face takes place when Tess is transporting the beehives with Abraham before they fall asleep on the wagon. Abraham asks Tess about the stars which she believes to be "worlds" like ours: "Most of them splendid and sound—a few blighted". She adds, being only an innocent girl of sixteen with no experience (as we are informed), with Hardy's pessimism that the star we live on is a "blighted one" (34). Woolf, considering the same dialogue in Hardy's novel, comments on Tess's above assertion that "rather the mournful thinker who has assumed her mask speaks for her" (Woolf 1935: 106). Tess's and other characters' confused voices or the subject of enunciation intervening in them make it difficult to discern the true becoming of Hardy's characters. The becoming(-minoritarian) of his characters is always

interrupted with majoritarian movements and desires. Tess's obsession with the major London English is one such case of majoritarianism:

> Mrs. Durbeyfield habitually spoke the dialect; her daughter, who had passed the Sixth Standard in the National School under a London-trained mistress, spoke two languages: the dialect at home, more or less; ordinary English abroad and to persons of quality. (Hardy 1994a: 21)

There is nothing wrong with speaking the majoritarian English, but it affects Tess's choice of a male partner who must be "a person of quality" or a man "of a superior class" (14) speaking Standard English. He must be "Angel Clare", an Apollonian orator and a potential rhetor, a teacher of rhetoric; or a majoritarian Ulysses in Deleuze and Guattari's words (1996a: 105): "the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language (Joyce's or Ezra Pound's Ulysses)".

In fact, a pre-signifying Tess-Angel encounter takes place in the opening pages of the novel during the women's club-walking in Marlott. Angel is on "a walking tour through the Vale of Blackmoor" with his two other brothers. When they see "the bevy of girls dancing without male partners" (Hardy 1994a: 14-5), Angel departs from his brothers for a short time and joins the girls to become their first male partner. Angel dances with a few girls of his choice except Tess whom he notices only after he leaves the group in order to catch his brothers (the first motif of the "too late"). Tess seems to have fallen in love with him at first sight, not because he is good-looking, attractive, and so on, but because he speaks Standard English: "She had no spirit to dance again for a long time, though she might have had plenty of partners; but ah! they did not speak so nicely as the strange young man had done" (18). With this majoritarian tendency, Tess proves herself to be tractable to the order-word which is given a beautiful and subjectifying Apollonian form. Angel, being a pre-signifying primitive communist[75] in his visionary ideals but a post-signifying capitalist in his conduct, is the representative of the subjective regime par excellence.

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[75] Primitive communism refers to the first phase of society in Marx's classification of history in five stages (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 219).

During Tess's preliminary short visit to Trantridge, Alec proves himself to be a seducer and a libertine epicure or "the rural Lothario"[76] to the reader; but Tess, as a result of the ignorance of her age, is not able to name it. Her first impression of Alec is that he is an authoritative barbarian with a want of dignity. Being with Alec gives Tess a feeling of uneasiness and defencelessness. She never wishes to see him again unless she is forced to. Alec never cares about Tess's being a genuine d'Urberville but is more concerned about what Tess's mother secretly wishes him to see in her daughter, namely, "a luxuriance of aspect, a fullness of growth, which made her appear more of a woman than she really was" (Hardy 1994a: 49). Alec begins as a representative of the despotic signifying regime, passes through a farcical evangelism, and, when he meets Tess again after four years, ends up in a countersignifying regime with both passional and diagrammatic (Dionysian) contours: "Tess, ever since you told me of that child of ours, it is just as if my feelings, which have been flowing in a strong puritanical stream, had suddenly found a way open in the direction of you, and had all at once gushed through" (419). Angel is very quick in learning what makes Tess most tractable and waits patiently, and at times affectionately, for the day she will have no other choice but return to him as a war machine which will also engrave his doom with a carving-knife.

Tess is the only body without organs in the novel, the BwO on which everyone tries to excerpt their power. The plane of composition stands as the counterpoint of this BwO, or a pawn everyone tries to capture or manipulate on the chessboard. Tess is manipulated respectively by her mother, whom she regards as "the only person in the world who had any shadow of right to control her action" (246) and by the subject of enunciation as her copyright owner. And she is mastered firstly by Alec, whom she does not like at all. He manages to "master" her body twice as his victim—"See how you have mastered me!" (99)—and mistress—"I shall not cry out. Once victim, always victim—that's the law!" (423). Secondly, she is willingly mastered by Angel who trains her as his exact copy and simulacrum as we notice later while she is talking to Alec:

> She reflected; and with her acute memory for the letter of Angel Clare's remarks, even when she did not comprehend their spirit, she recalled a

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[76] Historical writer and novelist of the late nineteenth century Mrs. Oliphant, defines Alec as "the rural Lothario with whom we are so well acquainted" in her review of the novel written in 1892 (in Cox 1992: 221).

merciless polemical syllogism that she had heard him use […] In delivering it she gave also Clare's accent and manner with reverential faithfulness. (Hardy 1994a: 409)

Tess acts like a prophetess carrying messages from Angel to Alec without knowing what those messages really mean, as Alec remarks: "Fancy your being able to teach me what you don't know yourself!" (410). She is now speaking Standard English fluently, as well: "How is it that you speak so fluently now? Who has taught you such good English?" (396).

The last person who exerts his mastery on Tess is Farmer Groby in Flintcomb-Ash during her wandering encounters after Angel deserts her. Farmer Groby consumes Tess's labour force completing the whole circle of forces mastering her and giving them an economic meaning of exchange. Through her labour power, Tess becomes an agent in the production of the capital which is the master of her other masters. The most important thing about physical labour under a Farmer who treats her more tyrannically than other workers is that it becomes a relief for Tess after all the previous pain and suffering she has undergone: "To have as a master this man of stone, who would have cuffed her if he had dared, was almost a relief after her former experiences" (406). This is in fact the secret of capital which enslaves its victims with their own will. Farmer Groby turns out to be the person who knows Tess from Trantridge, and who later sees her with Angel in another town and while he tries to tell the person with him some insulting words about Tess concerning her relations with Alec, Angel punches him. Farmer Groby does not say anything further in order not to hurt Angel's feelings. He is also intimidated by Angel who is in the position of his master as a member of a higher, "monied", class. For that reason his tyranny towards Tess is also mixed with vengeance for the punch he has received from Angel. He wants to show Tess "which is master here": "Well, you thought you had got the better of me the first time at the inn with your fancy-man, and the second time on the road, when you bolted; but now I think I've got the better you" (370).

As a farm labourer contracted to work till "Lady Day" in Flintcomb-Ash, Tess has the hardest period of her working life. She starts with "swede-hacking", "swede-grubbing" and "swede-trimming" in the cold with two other girls, Marian and Izz Huet,

whom she worked with in Talbothays, and doing some extra cleaning works. Finally, when the itinerant threshing machine arrives on the farm, Tess, who is also physically stronger than the other girls, is asked by Farmer Groby to serve on its platform. The tyrannical threshing machine and its demonic engineman are described under the gaze of bewildered Tess, Izz Huet and other workers as follows:

> Close under the eaves of the stack, and as yet barely visible, was the red tyrant that the women had come to serve—a timber-framed construction, with straps and wheels appertaining—the threshing-machine which, whilst it was going, kept up a despotic demand upon the endurance of their muscles and nerves.
>   A little way off there was another indistinct figure; this one black, with a sustained hiss that spoke of strength very much in reserve. The long chimney running up beside an ash-tree, and the warmth which radiated from the spot, explained without the necessity of much daylight that here was the engine which was to act as the *primum mobile* of this little world. By the engine stood a dark motionless being, a sooty and grimy embodiment of tallness, in a sort of trance, with a heap of coals by his side: it was the engineman. The isolation of his manner and colour lent him the appearance of a creature from Tophet, who had strayed into the pellucid smokelessness of this region of yellow grain and pale soil, with which he had nothing in common, to amaze and to discompose its aborigines. (Hardy 1994a: 414-5)

Serving on the rickety threshing-machine with an incessant drumming sound is the ultimate torture Tess undergoes with total exhaustion. The severity of her earlier incorporeal torments, makes this physical one very light and endurable for Tess, and she never complains. She experiences the physical sensation of a body without organs which she has been building up for the last four years and more. The physical body without organs does not mean an organless body, but refers to the absence of a unity and organisation among the organs as in the following state of Tess when the machine she serves halts for a while: "her knees trembling so wretchedly with the shaking of the machine that she could scarcely walk" (418); "the incessant quivering, in which every fibre of her frame participated, had thrown her into a stupefied reverie in which her arms worked on independently of her consciousness. She hardly knew where she was" (425). Finally we have a true ghost and a true picture and model of death out of Tess who gradually begins "to grow cadaverous and saucer-eyed" (425). We can no longer avoid it, but Hardy is building bit by bit a truly masochist body without organs for his Tess. Likewise, Deleuze & Guattari assert that,

[T]he masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a body without organs and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire. That there are other ways, other procedures than masochism, and certainly better ones, is beside the point; it is enough that some find this procedure suitable for them. […] The masochist constructs an entire assemblage that simultaneously draws and fills the field of immanence of desire; he constitutes a body without organs or plane of consistency using himself, the horse, and the mistress. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 155, 156)

Figure 7 below recapitulates Tess's full body without organs and the regimes of signs it is subjected to. Each consummative movement simultaneously corresponds to a specific regime of signs and a form of enslavement. Strategic movements will be dealt with in relation to masochism in the following sections.


Figure 7: Tess's BwO and Investments of Her Desire

6.3. *Master-Horse-Mistress Symbolism and Death: From Sadism to Masochism*

The above masochistic BwO, which we have diagrammatised with a truly Deleuzian reading (critical aspect) of the regimes of signs avoiding both distance and proximity with the writer, is a surprising result. We are also terrified with the discovery of the

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masochistic gland in our brain, or rather on the BwO above which we think we share with Hardy's character Tess. Tess may not be a real person, she might be a fictional creation, but the BwO above is more real than her, at least for the quasi-Deleuzian reader, who never read the novel in the classical sense of reading but plugged his or her (desexualised) body to Hardy's text: and saw only forces in movement leading to the discovery of the "Tess" inside us. But we have a big dilemma here since we have never seen a masochist before. In a similar fashion, Deleuze & Guattari (1983: 380) confess humorously in *Anti-Oedipus*, "Someone asked us if we had ever seen a schizophrenic— no, no, we have never seen one". It is humorous, but it is also true, and its real humour lies here: if one discovers his or her desiring-machine, there is no need to meet a real schizophrenic or a masochist: you only need to find the right counterpart in your brain, or the right cog in your machinery, the right connections on your BwO; and then sit back and watch how a schizophrenic or masochist behaves, how Zelda becomes mad, under what conditions an innocent girl like Tess turns out to be a war-machine, and how Angel laughs at her back …, and such things are never written for several reasons: a writer might not have foreseen it, or he is she is too terrified to write about it; he or she might have hoped that his or her true tragic readers will discover it, and so on. Such things, in fact, constitute the revolutionary force of the text.

Robert Kincaid, in his essay '"You did not come": Absence, Death and Eroticism in *Tess'* (1990) sounds surprisingly parallel to our reading although he has a Freudian perspective which a Deleuzian reader must avoid strategically. Otherwise we will never see the revolutionary force in Hardy's novel if we can find any. If we cannot, we will at least illustrate an alternative reading which we believe to be an ethical and positive one with full respect to the author. We believe that if we see anything reactive in the text, it is in us. We need to kill the fascist, the paranoid and the nihilist in us after seeing what dangers and what kind of madness lie in these affects (the clinical aspect). Kincaid gives us the following valuable information about a process, which he calls a "sadistic" one with some uneasiness, in Victorian literature:

> [A] person is first figured by being emptied of anything that would disrupt the image; the image is then constituted so as to suit the other's purpose, and in Tess, or for the character Tess, that purpose is the promoting of the erotic satisfactions of pain (satisfactions I will, with some uneasiness, call sadism).

> Others perform this vanishing act on Tess so resolutely that they kill her, finding, it seems, the ideal sadistic object in a corpse they can dress up and manipulate at will. (Kincaid 1994: 13-4)

By "others" Kincaid means Alec, Angel, Hardy and the implied reader:

> Who are they? Alec, most obviously, but also Angel, and also Hardy's narrator, and also the reader. The most distinguishing insistence of this novel, of this study of how we formulate others, is that we all formulate in the same way, and perhaps for the same ends. We are all of us Alecs, Angels, Hardys; we all wish to create images by distancing, even or especially if that distancing means annihilating. We are all sadists […] (14)

These are not "overstatements", and we are in complete agreement with Kincaid. Alec is truly depicted as a sadist, and later he becomes a vey dubious character wandering between sadistic and active feelings. If Tess really returns to him, these are mainly due to these active changes. But Hardy keeps sadist implications of Alec until the very end of the novel to make him a deserving victim of a plan which is not Tess's own. As for Angel, he is our secret sadist who disguises his sadism under a forced pretence. Kincaid's ideas about Hardy might be true' but we do not know the real Hardy, and we do not even want to know. We want to see the positive side of him as a symptomatologist free of all ideological, idealist and representational implications. We read Hardy's portrait sitting sideways to the twilight. We have only one objection, or rather an addition, to Kincaid that Deleuzian reading is not an implied reading. In that sense, it is asignifying, nonrepresentational, non-linguistic and non-oedipal. The minoritarian perspective or becoming-minoritarian protects a Deleuzian reader from both the paranoia of sadism. Avoiding distance and proximity prevents us indentifying ourselves with any characters but only with their affects and movements. The starting point of our reading is not that we are all Alecs, etc., but "we are all Tesses" independently of "others" on the BwO we have constituted above. We do not look at the BwO from a majoritarian perspective: we are inside it; we look at the world from there and try to see who else wants to benefit from this BwO unforeseen by the writer and unforeseen by anyone. We will play the masochist but without its "pleasure" principle like Henry Miller's being drunk on pure water.

Deleuze & Guattari define masochism independently of sadism. Sadism is a majoritarian illness, but masochism is a minoritarian one: it is the illness of the provincial proletariat. Masochism begins with a becoming-animal, but a becoming-the-wrong-animal: a horse. Horses have two main affects: they carry loads, and they are trained. Thus, there is a formula, an axiom of training in masochism:

> *Training axiom—destroy the instinctive forces in order to replace them with transmitted forces*. In fact, it is less a destruction than an exchange and circulation ("what happens to a horse can also happen to me"). Horses are trained: humans impose upon the horse's instinctive forces transmitted forces that regulate the former, select, dominate, overcode them. The masochist effects an inversion of signs: the horse transmits its transmitted forces to him, so that the masochist's innate forces will in turn be tamed. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 155-6)

In *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* there is in fact a becoming-horse imposed on Tess. The master-horse-mistress assemblage, which is, Deleuze & Guattari argue, a masochist one, takes place throughout the novel and they are always accompanied with a death motif. We firstly see John Durbeyfield chanting about his dead ancestors on a carriage driven by a maiden. Next, we see Tess driving on a wagon with Abraham and killing Prince. We also see Tess trying to undo the death of Prince by pressing her hand on the bleeding wound on Prince's body. It makes all her face and dress covered by blood. It symbolically signifies Tess's desire to be dead in place of Prince. In fact, she symbolically dies with Prince. A negative feeling also comes with it: she accuses herself for murdering Prince, so she must sacrifice herself for her family: "'Tis all my doing—all mine!' the girl cried, gazing at the spectacle. 'No excuse for me—none. What will mother and father live on now? […]'" (Hardy 1994a: 36). This is the first one of Tess's many symbolic deaths in the novel, the beginning of her becoming-the-false-animal, her becoming-the-family-horse with a deep feeling of guilt: "'Well, as I killed the horse, mother,' she said mournfully, 'I suppose I ought to do something'" (40). All she wants is to work and earn enough money in order to buy a new horse: "Her idea had been to get together sufficient money during the summer to purchase another horse" (Hardy 1994a: 53). Only on this basis she agrees to go to Trantridge despite her reservations about Alec in her first visit: "It is for you to decide. I killed the old horse, and I suppose I ought to do something to get ye a new one. But—but—I don't quite like Mr.

d'Urberville being there!" (Hardy 1994a: 54). At Tess's consent to go to Trantridge, Joan cannot suppress her matrimonial intention: "That's right! For such a pretty maid as 'tis, this is a fine chance" (54). When small children also start chanting that their sister will marry a gentleman, Tess reproaches her mother angrily:

> 'Now,' said Tess, flushing and turning quickly, 'I'll hear no more o' that! Mother, how could you ever put such stuff into their heads?'
> 'Going to work, my dears, for our rich relation, and help get enough money for a new horse,' said Mrs Durbeyfield pacifically. (58)

For Joan, getting "enough money for a new horse" becomes a euphemistic cover for her daughter's winning a husband who will definitely buy them as many horses as they want. Hence we have the Joan-Horse-Tess assemblage in the form of an "honest beauty flanked by innocence, and backed by simple-souled vanity". When the libertine Alec enters into this assemblage, Tess's subconscious becoming-horse as the one who will carry the family's load will have a new sense which is her prospective becoming-a-horse-to-be-tamed in the hands of Alec. Joan is very much disturbed at the subconscious idea of that prospective danger and cannot sleep at night after sending Tess to Trantridge, but it is too late to do anything about it as she tells John in bed: "if 'twere the doing again, I wouldn't let her go till I had found out whether the gentleman is really a good-hearted young man and choice over her as his kinswoman" (60). Joan, even in her regret, draws a picture of an oedipal mother who has no respect for her daughter's will.

Then, we see Alec driving Tess to Trantridge on a gig pulled by Tib, his horse with a "queer temper" like Tess's. Tib is also a murderess like Tess:

> "I fancy she looked round at me in a very grim way just then. Didn't you notice it?"
> "Don't try to frighten me, sir," said Tess stiffly.
> "Well, I don't. If any living man can manage this horse I can: I won't say any living man can do it—but if such has the power, I am he.'
> "Why do you have such a horse?"
> "Ah, well may you ask it! It was my fate, I suppose. Tib has killed one chap; and just after I bought her she nearly killed me. And then, take my word for it, I nearly killed her. But she's touchy still, very touchy; and one's life is hardly safe behind her sometimes." (63)

By frightening Tess to death and threatening to ride faster, he manages to kiss Tess who feels very ashamed. She cries and tries to "undo the kiss" by wiping her face. Alec is less surprised by Tib's touchiness than by Tess's sensitivity: "You are mighty sensitive for a cottage girl!" (Hardy 1994a: 65). Tess manages to keep herself away from Alec in Trantridge for three months until the night of her seduction. With her seduction, Tess dies for the second time symbolically. On that night, Tess tells Alec that she will leave Trantridge the next morning, but somehow she stays there for four more weeks; and these four weeks are completely censored. Next we find Tess returning home next to Alec on the gig again. The Alec-horse-Tess assemblage is primarily a sadistic assemblage between the sadist Alec and Tess. Alec has finally managed to tame her like Tib: "See how you've mastered me!" (99).

Next, in Talbothays, Tess finds herself in another sadistic assemblage of a different type. Angel does not tame horses, and he does not have a whip. But he masters Tess with his knowledge and his perfect language: "'he knew everything!' said she, with a triumphant simplicity of faith in Angel Clare that the most perfect man could hardly have deserved, much less her husband" (409). In the end, as we have seen earlier, Angel is capable of using language like a real whip after the matrimony. In Talbothays, we do not see Tess as a becoming-horse, but other animal metaphors are used for her: "a fascinated bird, "a cat" approaching Angel "stealthily" (157). When Angel sees "the red interior of her mouth", he likens it to "a snake's" (217). Finally Tess is compared to "a friendly leopard at pause" (239). We see the Tess-Angel-horse assemblage when they first speak about marriage while they are carrying milk to the station on "the spring-waggon". During that ride Tess also attempts to tell Angel about her past experience with Alec, but she only ends up telling him that she is a genuine d'Urberville for the first time.

Although Angel did not like the people of aristocratic origin, to our surprise, he is very much interested in the subject. In that sense Angel is in complete contrast to Alec who has no interest in Tess's being a genuine d'Urberville. Alec does not even believe Tess's story about being a true d'Urberville when they first meet in Trantridge: "But, Tess, no nonsense about 'd'Urberville';—'Durbeyfield' only, you know—quite another

name" (Hardy 1994a: 48). It is in fact Angel who cares most about Tess's being a true d'Urberville despite his dislike of the names of aristocracy:

> '[…] I do hate the aristocratic principle of blood before everything, and do think that as reasoners the only pedigrees we ought to respect are those spiritual ones of the wise and virtuous, without regard to corporal paternity. But I am extremely interested in this news—you can have no idea how interested I am! Are you not interested yourself in being one of that well-known line?' (241-2)

Tess's response to that question is negative: "I have thought it sad […] I don't value it particularly" (242). Angel thinks his snobbish mother will also be very happy to know about Tess's aristocratic descent:

> '[…] For your own sake I rejoice in your descent. Society is hopelessly snobbish, and this fact of your extraction may make an appreciable difference to its acceptance of you as my wife, after I have made you the well-read woman that I mean to make you. My mother too, poor soul, will think so much better of you on account of it. Tess, you must spell your name correctly—d'Urberville—from this very day.'
> 'I like the other way rather best.'
> 'But you *must*, dearest! Good heavens, why dozens of mushroom millionaires would jump at such a possession! […]'
> 'Angel, I think I would rather not take the name! It is unlucky, perhaps!'
> She was agitated.
> 'Now then, Mistress Teresa d'Urberville, I have you. Take my name, and so you will escape yours! […] (242-3)

Angel's reason for preferring the name of d'Urberville might coincide with Hardy's reason for naming his book *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* since Tess has never been a d'Urberville in her life: she was born as a Durbeyfield, and she is consequently "Mrs. Angel Clare" (273) after her marriage to Angel. And she can not marry Alec (for the reason that her legal husband is Angel). We get a clue here that Hardy is writing his novel for the snobbish Victorian society.

Angel's extravagant rejoicing at Tess's being a d'Urberville leads him to hire the d'Urberville coach for their matrimony and to reserve an ancestral mansion of the d'Urbervilles for their honeymoon. When Tess and Angel leave the church on the d'Urberville coach after their matrimony, we hear a legend about d'Urbervilles in the form of a new oracle. When she is on the coach, Tess has a sense of déjà vu although she sees the coach for the first time: "It is very odd—I must have seen it in a dream"

(Hardy 1994a: 272). And Angel tells her about "the legend of the d'Urberville Coach" as follows:

> 'A certain d'Urberville of the sixteenth or seventeenth century committed a dreadful crime in his family coach; and since that time members of the family see or hear the old coach whenever—But I'll tell you another day—it is rather gloomy. Evidently some dim knowledge of it has been brought back to your mind by the sight of this venerable caravan.'
> 'I don't remember hearing it before,' she murmured. 'Is it when we are going to die, Angel, that members of my family see it, or is it when we have committed a crime?' (272-3)

In the night of the same day, Tess will have her third symbolic death after confessing to Angel about her relation with Alec. In the third night of their ruined and unconsummated honeymoon in the ancient d'Urberville mansion, we see Angel walking in his sleep and coming to Tess's room. In a state of somnambulism, Angel carries Tess in his arms (without a horse) to the ruins of a nearby abbey saying "My, wife—dead, dead", and he lays her inside an "empty stone coffin of an abbot" (316-8). In a way, Angel, as a new enthusiastic member of the d'Urbervilles by marriage, accomplishes the legendary murder committed by a certain d'Urberville man in a pre-signifying dream-state.

The most terrifying thing about the Gothic style ancestral mansion for Tess is the "life-sized portraits" of two d'Urberville ladies on a wall:

> [T]hese paintings represent women of middle age, of a date some two hundred years ago, whose lineaments once seen can never be forgotten. The long pointed features, narrow eye, and smirk of the one, so suggestive of merciless treachery; the bill-hook nose, large teeth, and bold eye of the other suggesting arrogance to the point of ferocity, haunt the beholder afterwards in his dreams.
> 'Whose portraits are those?' asked Clare of the charwoman.
> 'I have been told by old folk that they were ladies of the d'Urberville family, the ancient lords of this manor,' she said, 'Owing to their being builded into the wall they can't be moved away.' (277)

In the same way that Parson Tringham had examined John Dutbeyfield's face, Angel quietly examines the faces of the ladies in the portraits and he witnesses their striking resemblance to Tess: "her fine features were unquestionably traceable in these exaggerated forms. He said nothing of this, however […]" (277). The fact that the

portraits cannot be removed symbolizes "Heredity", and it reminds us of the following lines in one of Hardy's poems with the same title:

> I am the family face;
> Flesh perishes, I live on.
> Projecting trait and trace
> Through Time to times anon,
> And leaping from place to place
> Over oblivion.
>
> (Hardy 1992: 176)

We see the actual incident of a masochistic master-horse-mistress assemblage, when Tess is having her meal on the aforementioned threshing machine. Alec is also there, and he climbs up the machine and sits opposite Tess. While they are talking, Alec uses offending words about her deserter husband Angel, and she furiously hits him in the face with her heavy working gloves causing his lips to bleed. There she has the sense of being capable of giving harm to someone, of her capability of turning into a war-machine and of murdering Alec. This incident is accompanied with a masochist evocation, or rather provocation, of a full body without organs as well:

> "Now, punish me!" she said, turning up her eyes to him with the hopeless defiance of the sparrow's gaze before its captor twists its neck. "Whip me, crush me; you need not mind those people under the rick! I shall not cry out. Once victim, always victim—that's the law!"
> "O no, no, Tess," he said blandly. "I can make full allowance for this. Yet you most unjustly forget one thing, that I would have married you if you had not put it out of my power to do so. Did I not ask you flatly to be my wife—hey? Answer me." (Hardy 1994a: 423)

Finally, while Tess is thoughtfully looking out of the window of her family house back in Marlott, she sees, or she thinks she saw, "a man in a white mackintosh […] riding down the street" on a carriage with horses (451). She tells the incident to Alec who arrives there immediately after it, and this time Alec relates to her another version of the d'Urberville legend which he knows partly:

> "One of the family is said to have abducted some beautiful woman, who tried to escape from the coach in which he was carrying her off, and in the struggle he killed her—or she killed him—I forget which. Such is one version of the tale...." (452)

The legend or the murder story takes place on the larger plane of organisation (not an immanent but a transcendent plane of fate). It constitutes a form of expression never rising to the level of the form of content. It is not directly linked to Tess's immanent full body without organs and her involvement with the idea of death. It functions as a foreshadowing idea. Even Tess's murdering of Alec develops in a manner immanent in Tess's masochist body without organs. The legend on which the plot depends has no direct effect on the development of the plot and it constitutes a dialectic element of suspense.

6.4. Masochism and the Contract: "I have no wish opposed to yours."

Deleuze considers contract, or "the need to establish a contract", the most important aspect and the essence of masochism: "the masochist draws up contracts while the sadist abominates and destroys them. The sadist is in need of institutions, the masochist of contractual relations" (Deleuze 1989: 20). Masochism has three different components for Deleuze (2004a: 133-4):

1) "an alliance between pleasure and pain",

2) "a way to act out humiliation and slavery",

3) "slavery instituted within a contractual relation".

All three elements abound in Hardy's novel. He writes about "the soft torments, the bitter sweets, the pleasing pains, and the agreeable distresses" (Hardy 1994a: 18), "torturing ecstasy" and "pleasure girdled about with pain" (200). And in the case of Tess, even in her happiest times with Angel in Talbothays, pleasure and pain are positively united in her: "Tess had never before known a time in which the thread of her life was so distinctly twisted of two strands, positive pleasure and positive pain". We also see her in a state of "palpitating misery broken by momentary shoots of joy" (Hardy 1994a: 228). We have already seen how humiliated she was in her encounters with Angel, Alec and Farmer Groby. When the couple loved each other, in the case of the Angel-Tess encounter, her humiliation was the worst yet could not be undone (so it must be fatal, or fatality must be primarily related to it); when Alec loved Tess but she did not, her humiliation was average and could be overcome; and finally, in the Tess-

Farmer Groby encounter, when neither she nor he loved each other, her humiliation became most tolerable as she admitted: "He won't hurt me. *He's* not in love with me. I can leave at Lady-Day" (Hardy 1994a: 405).

With "Lady-Day', Tess refers to the date her contract with the farmer will terminate and she will be free. The contract is the third and the most crucial element of masochism. Besides her *time limited contract* with Farmer Groby, Tess has two other contracts. The first one is her "*natural*" *living contract* with Alec. We do not say it; it is in Angel's head, he assumes it: "that man" who "lives", "your husband in nature, and not I" (310). Towards the end of the novel, Tess also comes to terms with her absent husband Angel that Alec is her sole husband: "a consciousness that in a physical sense this man alone was her husband seemed to weigh on her more and more" (457). Finally there is the *life-contract* between Tess and Angel at two different levels: firstly, as a written marriage-contract, which ends when one of the couple or both die (if they do not or cannot get divorced); and secondly, as a *masochistic-contract* internalised by Tess when her humiliation rises to the highest level during the three days of the unconsummated honeymoon.

Confessing to Angel her past unlucky relationship with Alec is very difficult for Tess. Hence she always avoids the subject of marriage. She is happy to live with Angel as lovers. She prefers to delay marriage infinitely. But Angel presses her as she confesses to him later: "I told you I thought I was not respectable enough long ago—and on that account I didn't want to marry you, only—only you urged me!' (308). The suspension of the confession is not only an element of masochism crucial to the plot, but also a very difficult situation especially for a Victorian woman. Tess feels very helpless. There is in fact a too artificial authorial involvement in the suspension. It is impossible in a small place like Wessex that such news will not be heard by everyone in or near Talbothays. Hardy also makes Angel play the dumb man never suspecting such a thing after Tess's so clear hints that she does not deserve to be his husband. It is evident that Hardy has made it Tess's "authorial" destiny. Tess sounds like protesting against the narrator: "'Why don't somebody tell him all about me?' she said. 'It was only forty miles off—why hasn't it reached here? Somebody must know!'" (227). Then

Hardy puts in Tess the feeling of "jealousy" to convince her to concealment, or make it more desirable for her:

> 'I shall give way—I shall say yes—I shall let myself marry him—I cannot help it!' she jealously panted, with her hot face to the pillow that night, on hearing one of the other girls sigh his name in her sleep. 'I can't bear to let anybody have him but me! Yet it is a wrong to him, and may kill him when he knows! O my heart—O—O—O!' (Hardy 1994a: 229)

Here we have an unbearable dialectic combination of pain and pleasure which is valid for both Tess and Angel. "A wrong" that "may kill him" looks like a formula which Tess uses again before she murders Alec.

In order to give Tess at least a small trump card, and to set a trap for Angel simultaneously, Hardy designs the following dialogue between Angel and Tess just before the matrimony:

> 'I am so anxious to talk to you—I want to confess all my faults and blunders!' she said with attempted lightness.
> 'No, no—we can't have faults talked of—you must be deemed perfect today at least, my Sweet!' he cried. 'We shall have plenty of time, hereafter, I hope, to talk over our failings. I will confess mine at the same time.'
> 'But it would be better for me to do it now, I think, so that you could not say——'
> 'Well, my quixotic one, you shall tell me anything—say, as soon as we are settled in our lodging; not now. I, too, will tell you my faults then. But do not let us spoil the day with them; they will be excellent matter for a dull time.'
> 'Then you don't wish me to, dearest?'
> 'I do not, Tessy, really.' (269-70)

In the first evening of their honeymoon, Alec remembers his earlier promise and tells Tess about his involvement with an older woman as a minor incident in his past and explains why he did not want to tell about it to Tess earlier as follows:

> 'I did not mention it because I was afraid of endangering my chance of you, […] Well, I would not risk it. I was going to tell you a month ago—at the time you agreed to be mine, but I could not; I thought it might frighten you away from me. I put it off; then I thought I would tell you yesterday, to give you a chance at least of escaping me. But I did not. And I did not this morning, when you proposed our confessing our faults on the landing—the sinner that I was! (285)

Tess forgives him immediately. She is also very happy and full of hope that she will be forgiven because of the resemblance between their experiences: "O, Angel—I am

almost glad—because now *you* can forgive *me*!", "because, 'tis just the same! I will tell you now". But after telling her own past, she learns from Angel in disappointment that it is not the same: "O Tess, forgiveness does not apply to the case! You were one person; now you are another. My God—how can forgiveness meet such a grotesque—prestidigitation as that!" (Hardy 1994a: 292). Tess cannot give a meaning to Angel's discrimination.

In Trantridge Alec had falsely treated Tess like all other women; and in Talbothays, Angel had done her injustice is another way by idealising her as the perfect woman in the world, a Greek goddess: "She was no longer the milkmaid, but a visionary essence of woman—a whole sex condensed into one typical form. He called her Artemis, Demeter, and other fanciful names half teasingly, which she did not like because she did not understand them" (167). After the confessions, he tells Tess with the same injustice: "I repeat the woman I have been loving is not you." "Another woman in your shape" (293).

Tess is very much condemned, humiliated and disgraced by Alec. He gives her the sense of being evil for the first time in her life. Then we have a masochistic disavowal of her ego, and her pride passes to Angel whom she "idolises" (350): There is no Tess any more but Angel. Tess's masochistic reveries follow, and an oral contract takes shape between the estranged couple, and it is unconditionally, or rather under one condition (rule number 8 below: "don't make it more than I can bear!"), declared by Tess item by item:

> [1] 'I shan't ask you to let me live with you, Angel, because I have no right to!
>   'Shan't you?'
> [2] 'No, I shan't do anything, unless you order me to; and if you go away from me I shall not follow 'ee; and if you never speak to me any more I shall not ask why, unless you tell me I may.'
>   'And if I order you to do anything?'
> [3] 'I will obey you like your wretched slave, even if it is to lie down and die.' (Hardy 1994a: 294)
>
> [4] 'I don't see how I can help being the cause of much misery to you all your life. The river is down there. I can put an end to myself in it. I am not afraid.' (298)
>
> [5] '[…] I have no wish opposed to yours.' (306)
>
> [6] 'Until you come to me I must not try to come to you?'

'Just so.'

'May I write to you?'

'O yes—if you are ill, or want anything at all. I hope that will not be the case; so that it may happen that I write first to you.'

[7] 'I agree to the conditions, Angel; because you know best what my punishment ought to be; [8] only—only—don't make it more than I can bear!' (323)

When Angel is in Brazil, Tess adds two more rules to the contract by letter:

[9] If you would come, I could die in your arms! I would be well content to do that if so be you had forgiven me! (428)

[10] I would be content, ay, glad, to live with you as your servant, if I may not as your wife; so that I could only be near you, and get glimpses of you, and think of you as mine. (429)

Later Angel makes some amendments to the rule number 3 about committing suicide:

'I don't wish to add murder to my other follies,' he said.

'I will leave something to show that I did it myself—on account of my shame. They will not blame you then.'

'Don't speak so absurdly—I wish not to hear it. It is nonsense to have such thoughts in this kind of case, which is rather one for satirical laughter than for tragedy. You don't in the least understand the quality of the mishap. It would be viewed in the light of a joke by nine-tenths of the world if it were known. Please oblige me by returning to the house, and going to bed.' (294)

He rejects Tess's idea of drowning herself in the river on two bases. Firstly, he does not wish to be known as a murderer, and secondly, it will be a too simple death and not tragic enough. Here we have the authorial intervention in Angel's voice: Hardy wants to create a true tragedy and he needs Tess alive for that. With the type of death Tess suggests, that is, drowning herself in the river, reminds us of Eustacia's suicide in the river. Was it a satirical death? It is true that Eustacia's suicide didn't have a good motive, and it was a premature death for herself. Her death makes sense only when she drags Wildeve to an accidental death after herself. Nobody cries after Wildeve but one person profits from it: Diggory Venn who can now marry the widowed Thomasin. We already know Venn's sinister plan despite Hardy's original intention. We perceive a similar sinister plan in Angel's head since the issue of committing suicide reappears in

the novel and attracts Angel. He shows his interest in it with curious short questions. Tess opens the subject first:

> '[…] I ought to have done it, to have done it last night! But I hadn't the courage. That's just like me!'
> 'The courage to do what?'
> As she did not answer he took her by the hand.
> 'What were you thinking of doing?' he inquired.
> 'Of putting an end to myself.'
> 'When?'
> She writhed under this inquisitorial manner of his. 'Last night,' she answered.
> 'Where?'
> 'Under your mistletoe.'
> 'My good—! How?' he asked sternly.
> 'I'll tell you, if you won't be angry with me!' she said, shrinking. 'It was with the cord of my box. But I could not—do the last thing! I was afraid that it might cause a scandal to your name.' […]
> 'Now, listen to this. You must not dare to think of such a horrible thing! How could you! You will promise me as your husband to attempt that no more.'
> 'I am ready to promise. I saw how wicked it was.' (Hardy 1994a: 305-6)

In this dialogue, we notice that some sinister plans are being formed in Angel's mind. His questions are not related to sadistic pleasures in the reflection of a simple suicide; but a sadistic or paranoiac revenge by murder. Earlier Angel asks Tess some questions about Alec and learns that the latter is alive. Angel's deep thought seems to concern Alec as well. He is behind a plan which will include Alec's murder:

> "[…] How can we live together while that man lives?—he being your husband in nature, and not I. If he were dead it might be different... Besides, that's not all the difficulty; it lies in another consideration—one bearing upon the future of other people than ourselves. Think of years to come, and children being born to us, and this past matter getting known—for it must get known. There is not an uttermost part of the earth but somebody comes from it or goes to it from elsewhere. Well, think of wretches of our flesh and blood growing up under a taunt which they will gradually get to feel the full force of with their expanding years. What an awakening for them! What a prospect! Can you honestly say 'Remain' after contemplating this contingency? Don't you think we had better endure the ills we have than fly to others?" (310-1)

In Alec's above speech we sense two secret modification of the rule number 3 in the masochistic contract. Angel knows Tess better than we do, and he knows what she can

do for him in her absolute submission to his orders. And Tess is clever enough not to miss a single point:

a) While Alec is alive there is no possibility of Tess and Angel's living together. If Tess and Angel are to come together again, Alec must be dead.

b) Even if Alec dies, there is the problem of the future: their children will definitely learn about Tess's disgraceful past. A married life between them is impossible. (They might flee to another country but Angel's family will definitely learn about Tess's past.)

As the novel proceeds we learn with great surprise that Tess has "adhered with literal exactness to orders which he [Angel] had given and forgotten" (Hardy 1994a: 350), and she will definitely continue to do it. In her wandering encounters, especially in her dialogues with Alec, we observe a deep passional delusion in Tess, a contractual monomania. But when she cannot hear from Angel for a longer time than she expected, she puts the rule number 8 into action: "don't make it more than I can bear". Her internalized contract with Angel has finished even before her contract with Farmer Groby finishes. Then Tess writes Angel a "last" letter to inform him about the ending of the contract after a "careful" consideration:

> O why have you treated me so monstrously, Angel! I do not deserve it. I have thought it all over carefully, and I can never, never forgive you! You know that I did not intend to wrong you—why have you so wronged me? You are cruel, cruel indeed! I will try to forget you. It is all injustice I have received at your hands!   T. (455)

After her father's death, Tess and her family have to empty the house where her father was the last life-tenant (he and his family can stay in the house only till he dies, another rural contract). Neither the land owner, nor the other people in Marlott want them to stay there since they think Tess is not "a proper woman". Hardy, describes the mobility from rural areas to large towns, contrary to what the statisticians say about it, as "the tendency of water to flow uphill when forced by machinery":

> Cottagers who were not directly employed on the land were looked upon with disfavour, and the banishment of some starved the trade of others, who were thus obliged to follow. These families, who had formed the backbone of the village life in the past who were the depositaries of the village traditions, had to seek refuge in the large centres; the process, humorously designated by statisticians as 'the tendency of the rural population towards the large towns',

being really the tendency of water to flow uphill when forced by machinery. (Hardy 1994a: 450)

In short, Tess and her family move to Kingsbere, and having no place to go, they unload their belongings near the church where their d'Urberville ancestors lie. Alec also appears among the ancient tombs as their last hope:

'[…] A family gathering, is it not, with these old fellows under us here? Listen.'
He stamped with his heel heavily on the floor; whereupon there arose a hollow echo from below.
'That shook them a bit, I'll warrant!' he continued. 'And you thought I was the mere stone reproduction of one of them. But no. The old order changeth. The little finger of the sham d'Urberville can do more for you than the whole dynasty of the real underneath.... Now command me. What shall I do?'
'Go away!' she murmured.
'I will—I'll look for your mother,' said he blandly. But in passing her he whispered: 'Mind this; you'll be civil yet!' (465)

Next, there is a lapse of time again, and we see Angel tracing Tess through Marlott, another place (the name of which the narrator never mentions, but from the descriptions we guess it to be Transtridge) where Joan lives with her six other children except Tess, and Sandbourne. He is finally at the door of the Lodging house where Tess and Alec are staying. Despite Angel's pretensions and the unreliable narrator, we believe that Angel knows everything, and he is there to see if the contract will return. His appearance is like "the letter killeth": the contract returns, and Tess becomes a destructive war-machine killing Alec. She kills Alec not for revenge, but as part of her master's task: revised rule number 3, section a. Tess has no hope of living with Angel forever. She might have chosen to leave Alec without killing him. But she has a dilemma if we recall what Angel told her earlier: "How can we live together while that man lives?" (The narrator also emphasises in every occasion that Tess does not forget what Angel has ever told her.)

Tess's second dilemma is that she cannot hope to be Angel's wife, if we recall the revised rule number 3, section b of the invisible masochistic contract mentioned above. Then, she suggests a "best" substitute for herself, her sister Liza-Lu, despite Angel's disinterestedness (which reminds us of the so called disinterestedness of the decadent Venn in *The Return of the Native*). Thus Tess tells Angel,

'[…] People marry sister-laws continually about Marlott; and 'Liza-Lu is so gentle and sweet, and she is growing so beautiful. O, I could share you with her willingly when we are spirits! If you would train her and teach her, Angel, and bring her up for your own self! ... She has all the best of me without the bad of me; and if she were to become yours it would almost seem as if death had not divided us.... Well, I have said it. I won't mention it again.' (Hardy 1994a: 503)

We know that Tess is indoctrinated or brainwashed by Angel about everything. We are not sure if she is also brainwashed about her matrimonial plan concerning Angel and her sister, or if she repeats her mother's "grand projick" which she detested most. If the latter is true, we must conclude that Tess unfortunately has inherited from her mother the "grand projick": in the same way that Tess became the victim of her mother's matrimonial project, Lisa-Lu becomes the victim of Tess's new matrimonial project.

The final Angel-Lisa Lu synthesis points to the serialisation of an earlier motif. One Sunday in Talbothays, Tess, and the three other milkmaids—Marian, Izz Heut and Retty—are going to the church with their "white stockings and thin shoes" but cannot cross a hollow part of the path which has been flooded as a result of the previous night's rain. Angel is also on his Sunday walk, and after observing the girls' problem comes to "help them—one of them in particular" and tells them: "I'll carry you through the pool—every Jill of you" (183). He first carries the three milkmaids: "Marian had been like a sack of meal, a dead weight of plumpness under which he has literally staggered. Izz had ridden sensibly and calmly. Retty was a bunch of hysterics" (184). When it is finally Tess's turn, Angel whispers to her: "Three Leahs to get one Rachel". Leah and Rachel are two sisters and are respectively the wives of Jacob (Israel) in *Genesis*: "Leah was tender eyed; but Rachel was beautiful and well favoured" (*Genesis* 29:17). In order to marry Rachel, Jacob has to serve her father Laban for seven years. But at the end of seven years, he is tricked into marrying Leah, the elder one. Then Jacob has to work for Laban another seven years to marry Rachel this time (Vogan 2005: 32-3). In the above episode, the three milkmaids are compared to Leah, and Tess to Rachel. But at the end of the novel Tess takes the place of Leah for Angel, and Liza-Lu becomes his Rachel. In fact, with this final synthesis, the metaphor acquires its true meaning.

After Tess's murdering of Alec, Tess and Angel spend six nights in the empty and deserted building which used to be a court. Clare recognises the empty building: "It is Bramshurst Court. You can see that it is shut up, and grass is growing on the drive" (Hardy 1994a: 495). The empty courthouse symbolises the absence of justice par excellence: Tess has not done anything to deserve to be punished. She is the victim and the scapegoat of the socius represented not only by Alec, who belongs to the past, but also by Angel as the representative of the demonical forces of the future.

CONCLUSION: OEDIPUS RREVISITED

For Deleuze & Guattari all fits of delirium are social rather than familial. The Oedipus complex, for instance, is primarily the problem of the father Laius through an oracle which represents the socius. Hence Deleuze & Guattari rightly argue that Oedipus, before being a familial investment, is primarily "the investment of a social field into which the father and the child are plunged, simultaneously immersed" ((Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 275). It is the father's paranoia before being the child's neurosis. "The Paranoiac father Oedipalizes the son" (275). There is no chicken-and-egg situation in this: the former, which is a social delirium, causes the latter and not the reverse (272-3). How can Oedipus be an originary problem of the child? Did Laius have his neurosis when he was a child? Did he have paranoia before the oracle? Laius' sickness and all sickness begin with the socius: "every delirium is first of all the investment of a field that is social, economic, political, cultural, racial and racist, pedagogical, and religious" (274). And the two poles of delirium as the two types of the social investment of desire are, for Deleuze & Guattari,

> first, a paranoiac fascisizing (*fascisant*) type or pole that invests the formation of central sovereignty; overinvests it by making it the final eternal cause for all the other social forms of history; counterinvests the enclaves or the periphery; and disinvests every free "figure" of desire—yes, I am your kind, and I belong to the superior race and class. And second, a schizorevolutionary type or pole that follows the *lines of escape* of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery—proceeding in an inverse fashion from that of the other pole: I am not your kind, I belong eternally to the inferior race, I am a beast, a black. (277)

These two poles of social investment correspond to "the two physical lines. The line of paranoia is that of molar and repressive line of macrophysics "that goes toward the large numbers and the mass phenomena". The line of schizophrenia or flight is a molecular and "infinitesimal" one which unfolds desire onto minuscule multiplicities with no statistical significance.

We do not see any madness in social investments. Being part of a social aggregate, of the strata and of rigid and supple segmentations does not make us mad. We need a bit

of everything. We observe delirium only when we examine all these aggregates under a microscope or at the limit of the socius. And this limit is the body without organs. We have paranoia or schizophrenia on the body without organs as the limit of socius, its dead end. In the case of our paranoia which is much easier to observe, for instance, it "makes us spectators to the imaginary birth of the mass phenomenon" in a microscopic level and at its limit:

> The socius—the earth, the body of the despot, capital-money—are clothed full bodies, just as the body without organs is a naked full body; but the latter exists at the limit, at the end, not at the origin. And doubtless the body without organs haunts all forms of socius. But in this very sense, if social investments can be said to be paranoiac or schizophrenic, it is to the extent that they have paranoia and schizophrenia as ultimate products under the determinate conditions of capitalism. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996a: 281)

Each regime of signs has its specific abstract machine or socius and its corresponding delirium on the body without organs one pole of which "is occupied by the molar aggregates, and the other populated by molecular elements". Firstly the body of the earth, the socius specific to the presignifying regime, has its territorial "perversions" on its molar plane of organisation (e.g. the Delphic oracle). Secondly, the despotic body, the socius specific to despotic signifying regime, has its "paranoiac psychoses" (e.g. King Laius or Freudian psychoanalyst). Thirdly, the body of the capital-money, the socius specific to the postsignifying capitalist regime, has its familial or Oedipal neurosis (e.g. Oedipus the son or the analysand whose desire is physically and socially repressed). Figure 8 below illustrates the body without organs, molar, molecular and strategic movements on it, and the delusion specific to each movement. The figure is adapted from Deleuze & Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1983: 281-3). The war-machine, which they introduce into their thought in *A Thousand Plateaus* together with the countersignifying regime and nomadic spaces, is fitted into the diagram not as another kind of socius but as a strategic set of movements. The body without organs (the BwO) is not the chicken but a huge last egg, the rotten nest-egg which no one takes, and no chicken comes out of it. It is a dead body. And the positive line of flight leads to Acheron. Only the greatest artists follow this route, cross the Acheron and come back sane.

White wall | **Socius**

Body of the Earth

Despotic Body

Body of Capital-Money

1
2
3
4
6
5

Full Body without Organs

Black hole

5

7

1. "Perversions as territorial entities"
2. "Paranoiac psychoses as despotic entities"
3. "Oedipal neureses as familial entities"
4. Line of destruction (war) and self-destruction (dissolution)
5. Creative line of flight (artistic or revolutionary composition of smooth space)
6. "Schizophrenia as clinical entity" (negative line of flight)
7. Schizophrenia as process (positive line of flight)

KEY:

Molar movements (Paranoia)

Strategic or countermovements (War-machines)

Molecular movements (Schizophrenia)

Figure 8: The Social Field and Its Clinical Disorders on the BwO

Nietzsche crossed the Acheron and came back in laughter and joy which is the essence of art for him: "There can be no tragic work because there is a necessary joy in creation: […] there is no unhappy creation, it is always a vis comica. Nietzsche said: 'the tragic hero is happy'" (Deleuze 2004a: 134). Before his final nervous breakdown, Nietzsche used even madness as a mask for laughter. Melville came back from the Acheron with bloodshot eyes. Ghostly Hardy was proud of being between life and death and enjoyed the idea of being mistaken for a stillborn baby at his birth and he spent the rest of his life with nostalgia for his pagan empire of Wessex and the presignifying regime of Egdon Heath (Sutherland 2008). Jack Kerouac followed his line of flight and crossed the Acheron but came back with his delirium being "immersed in dreams of a Great America, and then in search of his Breton ancestors of the superior race" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 277). The movements on the BwO either leads one to the line of flight on the molecular line passing through the white wall as swiftly and horizontally as possible avoiding sharp rises (which end up in delirium, or one strikes the white wall) and sharp falls (which end up in a black hole, in clinic or with suicide). Or one discovers his or her perversity, paranoia and Oedipus along molar lines.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

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ÖZET

DELEUZIAN LINES OF FLIGTH IN THE ENGLISH NOVEL
(İngiliz Romanında Deleuze'sal Kaçış Hatları)

KÖKOĞLU, Faruk

İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı, Doktora Tezi

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Bu tez Gilles Deleuze'un—hem monolog eserlerinde hem Felix Guattari ile ortak çalışmalarında—geliştirdiği düşünceyi dört farklı açıdan ele almaktadır. İlk olarak, bilinçaltı üretim aşısından. Pozitif, göçebesel, makinesel, gerçek, üretken, ancak kişisellik özelliği olmayan bir bilinçaltı tanımlaması Batıda bir ilk olmuştur. Ayrıca Deleuze bilinçaltının ödipal, reaktif, düşsel ve sembolik olarak yorumlanmasına ve arzunun psikanalizde eksiklik olarak tanımlanmasına eleştirel yaklaşmaktadır. İkinci olarak, Deleuze'un düşüncesi Spinoza ve Nietzsche'den esinlenerek yaşam ve düşünce tarzlarını bir olarak gören etik özelliği açısından ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, Deleuze'un salt içkenliği ön plana çıkararak Batıda hala var olan dogmatik ve aşkın düşünceleri çok boyutlu eleştirmesi incelenmektedir. Deleuze'un aşkınlık tanımı sadece dünyanın ötesini değil, yaratıcılığı ve üretimi öldüren simgelemeyi, hiyerarşiler kuran ve duvarlar ören yargılamaları, gerçek düşünmenin ne olduğunu unutturan aşınalığı da içermektedir. Dördüncü olarak ta, Deleuze'un düşüncesi, edebiyatla ilişkisi bakımından ele alınmaktadır. Deleuze Edebiyatta ve özellikle İngiliz ve Amerikan edebiyatında kendi düşüncesine hem "gerçek" müttefikler, hem de "ampirik" bir uygulama alanı bulmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu tezde Deleuze'un "kritik-klinik" diye isimlendirdiği özgün ve bir okuma tarzı incelenmektedir: "psikanalizsiz veya yorumsuz bir klinik, dilbilimsiz veya imgesiz bir kritik." Son olarak, bu okuma tarzının Thomas Hardy'nin *The Return of the Native* (1878) ve *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891) romanları üzerinde uygulanması yapılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Deleuze, Guattari, Hardy, Woolf, edebiyat, şizoanaliz, kavram, içkenlik, kaçış hatları, yersizyurtsuzlaşma, oluş, imge rejimleri.

ABSTRACT

DELEUZIAN LINES OF FLIGTH IN THE ENGLISH NOVEL

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This study Approaches Gilles Deleuze's thought—in both his monologues and his cooperative works with Felix Guattari—from four different perspectives. Firstly form the point of view of unconscious production. His redefinition of unconscious as positive, nomadic, machinic, real, impersonal and productive is a novelty in Western thought. And he is critical of oedipal, reactive, and imaginary-symbolic interpretation of the unconscious, and psychoanalytic definition of desire as lack. Secondly, from the point of view of his ethics that brings together one's way of living and thinking after Spinoza and Nietzsche. Thirdly, from the point of view of his multi-dimensional criticism of dogmatisms and transcendences in western thought in favour of an absolute immanence. His definition of the transcendence does not only include a world beyond, but also the categories of representation which kills creativity and production, judgements of good sense and common sense which both bring hierarchies and erect walls, categories of recognition which makes us forgot what the real activity of thinking is, and subjectivity which turns out into a dangerous black hole. Fourth and the last point of view is his relation to literature. In literature, and especially in Anglo-American literature, he both finds "real" allies and an "empirical" field of practice for his thought. This study also investigates a specifically Deleuzian way of reading which he calls "critico-clinical": "A clinic without psychoanalysis or interpretation, a criticism without linguistics or signifiance." Finally, it attempts a critico-clinical reading of Thomas Hardy's *The Return of the Native* (1878) and *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891).

Keywords: Deleuze, Guattari, Hardy, Woolf, literature, schizoanalysis, concept, immanence, lines of flight, deterritorialisation, becoming, regimes of signs.