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**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY'S POLITICAL LIFE AND THE CHANGES ON ITS  
POLITICAL CULTURE AFTER 1980**

**by**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AKP - Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)  
 ANAP - Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)  
 AP - Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*)  
 CHP - Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)  
 CKMP - Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*)  
 CU - Customs Union  
 CUP - Committee of Union and Progress  
 DİSK - Confederation Revolutionary Workers' Union (*Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)  
 DkP - Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti*)  
 DP - Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*)  
 DSP - Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*)  
 DYP - True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*)  
 EU - Europe Union  
 FP - Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*)  
 GP - Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*)  
 HADEP - People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*)  
 HaP - Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti*)  
 HP - Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*)  
 MÇP - Nationalist Labor Party (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*)  
 MDP - Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*)  
 MHP - Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)  
 MNP - National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*)  
 MP - Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*)  
 MSP - National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*).  
 NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 NSC - National Security Council  
 NUC - National Unity Committee  
 OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
 OEEC - Organisation for European Economic Cooperation  
 PKK - Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*)  
 RP - Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*)  
 SHP - Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokratik Halkçı Parti*)  
 SODEP - Social Democratic Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Parti*)  
 SPO - State Planning Organization  
 TİP - Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*)  
 TÜRKİŞ - Confederation of the Workers' Union of Turkey was created (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)  
 YTP - New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*)

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## ABSTRACT

The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He then became the first president and started a process of changes in the country in order to unlink it from the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. After his death in 1938, he was replaced by İsmet İnönü in the presidency. But in 1946 and 1950 the Turkish people had the chance to choose their representatives in a multi-party system. The Turkish electorate began to show a preference for center-right parties, a preference that would last until the beginning of the 1990's. Three times were when the order was not being assured in the country that the military intervened through coups: 1960, 1971 and 1980. The one from 1960, through its liberal constitution, started a process of political fragmentation and restored the multi-party system in the country; the one in 1971 banned parties that were considered dangerous for the state and promoted some amendments in the constitution in order to make it stricter; and the one in 1980 was considered the strictest one, since it banned all the political parties and wished to de-politicize the population and avoid a new party fragmentation through a completely new constitution. Even though several new parties emerged in the 1980's, the population seemed to still support the center-right parties. But the 1990's showed a new reality in the country's political culture: the population started to move towards the extreme-right, supporting parties with nationalist and Islamist programs.



## ÖZET

Türkiye'nin Cumhuriyeti 1923'de kuruldu, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tarafından. O ilk Cumhurbaşkanıydı ve Osmanlı Döneminden ayırmak için değişiklikler yapmayı başladı. 1983'indeki ölümünden sonra İnönü onun yerine geçti ama 1950'de ülkenin tek parti sistemi kalmamıştı ve insanların artık onları temsil edecek partiyi seçebiliyorlardı. Sonra Türk Milleti sağ partilere tercih etmeyi başladı ve bu 1990 yılların başına kadar devam edecekti. Ordu 3 defa ülkenin kontrolü eline aldı yaşanan sıkıntılar ve problemlerden dolayı. Bunlar 1960, 1971, ve 1980. 1960 yılındaki liberal kanun vardı ve politik bölünme başladı bu da çok partili bir sistem için kapıları açtı. 1971 olanında ülke için tehlike taşıyan partilerini yasak ettiler ve daha sert bir yönetim için yasada bazı değişiklikler yapıldı. En son olan, 1980, en sert darbe olarak hatırlanıyor çünkü bütün partiler yasaklandı ve Ordunun amacı, yeni bir yasa yaparak milleti politika'dan uzaklaştırmaktı ve öylece yeni bir parti bölünme olaydan kurtuldu. 1990'larda ülkenin politik kültüründen yeni bir gerçek ortaya çıktı; millet sanki aşırı sağ partilere doğru desteklerine götürdüler, ve bu partilerin milletçi ve islam bakış açıları vardı.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this work is not only to analyze the developments in Turkish political culture, principally in the post 1980 military coup period, but also to provide history of the whole Turkish political life since 1923. Thus, how the democratic process in Turkey developed since the republic's proclamation in 1923, from when the country had a one-party system, up until now when the reality is a fragmented and multi-party system. In addition, the political study of the political behaviour of the population relating to its political direction and the changes over the decades.

At first, a study of the approach to the political culture will be presented in such a way as to facilitate the understanding of the more detailed study that will be done about the Turkish case. Then, the importance of the evaluation of the political culture approach will be studied, as well as all the factors that influence its formation. Several case studies of political cultures that have been done, and analyzing the results, we see that it is really difficult to find a homogeneous political culture due to several influential factors, such as the socio-economic structure of a country and the ethnic groups that live inside the same territory that come to form political sub-cultures.

In order to define how the population is influenced when it comes to political culture, we should evaluate the level of participation in the system. Besides these general factors of definition about political culture, each person will surely have a different formation from others who could be living inside the same environment as themselves. This is due to factors of political socialization that also will be studied

in the first part of this work. These factors include, among others, the family environment, schools, peer groups, political parties, government, and religion.

When the political culture is studied, some values will be discussed out that are universally adopted by society in general. This is due to several factors such as external influence or the adaptation of society in the rhythm of the today's international society. Using these concepts, we will further see that Turkey, since the proclamation of the republic, didn't make any effort to adopt secularist values in a way to get closer to the West and modernize its society.

Again in the first part of this work, a study will be done about the political parties in order to provide a base to the study that will be done afterwards. Turkey has already passed through several party systems. With the republic's proclamation, Atatürk instituted a one-party system. But after his death and the government of İsmet İnönü, the demands of the population for a bigger democratic opening came with a new party that took its place in the Turkish political system, establishing a two-party system. Only after the constitution of 1961, that is said to be the most liberal times that the country has ever had, was a true multi-party system instituted.

The main division of this work will be all the elections that Turkey has experienced in its republican history. Elections are the most democratic way that the population has in order to choose its representatives of the government, even though the result may not represent the will of 100% of the electorate. Therefore, a brief explanation about elections, how they are done, the factors that influence them and the behaviour of electors will be given.

As a bridge to the specific study on the Turkish case, there is an explanation about political culture in Islamic countries. How, for instance, in several Muslim countries the laws of the Koran still define the national laws. That is not the Turkish case, which is said to be a laik country and the most western Islamic country, thanks principally to the changes that occurred in 1923 with the proclamation of the republic and the important role of Mustafa Kemal, a former officer of the Young Turks movement and leader of the independence war who became the first president.

Right after Mustafa Kemal became president, he managed to make a general reform in the political system of the Turkish society, creating new laws and abolishing bonds that were symbols of the link with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, in a second part of this study, the political life of Turkey since the proclamation of the republic will be studied so as to explain the main facts that have occurred since then. This will make the reading of the today's situation more comprehensible.

During the government of Mustafa Kemal, who in 1934 received the surname of Atatürk, the political party CHP was the one that governed the country for 27 years. However, in this one-party system, the state commanded the party in such a way as to mobilize the population and disseminate modernist ideas, turning back to the factor of influence of the parties in the political socialization of the people.

On the other hand, the changes stipulated by Atatürk were not that strong immediately, since some structures were actually inherited from the Ottomans. But, his biggest objective and the one of the Kemalists was to modernize Turkey

and create a total change, principally in the country's economy and politics. After the death of Atatürk, İnönü took his place and as the president he kept a lot of changes. But he faced a greater foreign challenge of the Second World War. His performance in this period will be studied in this second part of the work.

Some measures taken by İnönü changed the mood in the country completely, and naturally the party system fragmented and became a two-party system at the end of the 1940's. With the 1950 elections, for the first time in the republican history, another party would govern during the whole decade. This decade governed by the democrats will be studied, both internally and externally, with such topics as the Cyprus issue and the Turkish membership in NATO.

Though the way these issues were being treated each time only got the population to oppose more including the military, and that culminated in the first military coup of Turkey in 1960. After the promulgation of the 1961 constitution, the electoral laws were reformulated leading to the creation of several other political parties, starting the process of a multi-party system in Turkey. Elections were held in the same year and represented yet another change in Turkish political life: governments formed through coalitions. However, the decade was marked by the dominance of AP in the government. But in its last years, the government couldn't control the disorder in the country, and that is what forced the military once more to carry out a military coup which took place in 1971, but this time with much less extreme measures.

The 1970's were then marked by an alternation of power between CHP and AP, represented respectively by Ecevit and Demirel. This decade showed the world facing two huge oil crises, which also affected the Turkish economy as well

as the country's politics. The Turkish role at the end of the 1970's was essential, principally after the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan. Stability was something that the west wanted in Turkey, in order to avoid the same thing happening in the country, and this was also something that the military wanted. And seeing the politic-economic reality of the country at that time, the military decided to intervene yet again through a new coup in 1980.

Therefore, in the third and last part of this study, it will be studied to show how the 1980 military coup influenced Turkish political life and culture, principally through the constitution promulgated in 1982. But this time, the military were much stronger and their objective was to totally restructure Turkish politics, in a way to de-politicize the population. So, the ways the military used to attain these objectives will be explained.

In a way to control political life after the coup, the military supported the formation of two political parties, hoping that a two-party system would reign again in the country. However a third party, ANAP, was the one that would get people's preference and would win the elections and dominate the Turkish political life during the remainder of the 1980's. Although, contrary to what the military wanted, there was a new political fragmentation and several new parties appeared during the decade.

ANAP, represented principally by Turgut Özal, promoted a modernization process never seen before. This process privileged part of the population, and a class of "new riche" rose in society. At the same time, Turkey started to become one of the biggest countries with social difference in the world, pushing the excluded classes of this modernization process to become much more active in

the conduction of politics in the country. The biggest cases to be studied are the Kurds and the emergence of Islamic mobilization in the least favoured regions of the big cities in Turkey.

Therefore, the direction of the population moved to an extreme right, principally during the 1990's, supporting values such as nationalism and Islamism, which will be examined. This was influenced principally by factors such as the unhappiness of the population with the way that the government was being conducted until then by principally the center-right parties. Foreign issues that had a big importance in the developments of the Turkish politics during this decade include the new role of Turkey after the end of the Cold War, and the negotiations for a full membership in the Europe Union.

In the elections held during the 1990's, as mentioned before, the population towards the extreme right. In the 1995 elections, there was a victory of the RP, a party with strong Islamist roots. This study will explain the true reasons why this party came into power, besides the religious factor. But in 1999, after the ban of the RP its successor FP lost a little bit of space, but still kept a significant voice in the government, but this time parties that were said to be nationalists (DSP and MHP) were the big winners, since they became popular through facts such as the rivalry between secularists and Islamists and the imprisonment of PKK's leader Abdullah Öcalan.

Turkey was then effectively moved towards the extreme right, although a big part of the population still affirmed themselves as centrists. This study will present the results of a research realized for the first time in Turkey in order to

analyze the behaviour of the voters in the post-elections period, covering a series of topics such as religious values, economic status and political values.

However, principally economic, the way the nationalists were dealing with the government, which was marked by two strong economic crises, was not getting the population's support. These new economic crises caused the population to be unhappy when it came to the way that Turkish politics were being held by the "traditional politicians" and the result of this was that in the 2002 elections, the big winner was the new AKP followed by CHP, and traditional parties simply couldn't get the minimum vote necessary to get seats in the parliament. Therefore this study culminates in this period, noticing, for instance the lack of party identification of the population, and the factors that made this happen.



## 2 POLITICAL CULTURE APPROACH

When we talk about political culture, we need to keep in mind that it covers several sectors of society such as attitudes, beliefs, emotions and values that influence the political behavior of citizens through the political system they live under. Our values and attitudes reflect our way of behavior, and the same thing happens in politics. An immense question of political culture is whether the population defines the political institutions of a country or vice versa.

It is also useful to configure the political orientations of particular peoples, which would be a generalized belief system of some individuals. Something that we must always keep in mind is the level of consensus in a society. The bigger the consensus, the more homogeneous is its political culture and bigger are the chances for a population to define the institutions of government.

Otherwise, there is a big risk of public disorder or even revolution.

Political culture does not explain everything about politics. Even people with similar values and skills will behave differently when they face different opportunities or problems. Nor is political culture unchangeable. New experiences can alter the attitudes of individuals; for example, peasants who migrate to the city learn new ways of urban life.<sup>1</sup>

At any rate, it is not to be affirmed that every political culture must be homogeneous. Even in stable democracies can we find the existence of sub-political cultures, defined by different ways of thinking of the groups of society<sup>2</sup>. So it is viable to affirm that “most political cultures are in fact heterogeneous”<sup>3</sup>. But it is

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<sup>1</sup> ALMOND, G; POWELL JR, G; STROM, K; DALTON, R. **Comparative politics today: a world view**. 8 ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2004, p 46.

<sup>2</sup> The Turkish case is an example: it is a country where you can find different peoples such as the Turks, Kurds, Alevis, Sunnis...

<sup>3</sup> BALL, A. **Modern Politics & Government**. 5 ed. Malaysia: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993, p 58.

more common to study political cultures of countries from a big community inside a country.

But we have to avoid the formation of stereotypes when we are talking about political cultures. Most of the political culture researchers try to identify the national character of certain countries and then evaluate their political behavior. So these studies will not talk about every citizen within a country, but they will possibly affirm that the profile is accurate to the politically relevant strata. But some annalists criticize political culture studies, because some are from an extreme generalization that somehow makes people think that the political reality of a certain system is too simple. Therefore, the study must be as specific as possible.

A more accurate way of studying determined political cultures is survey research. Thus, a determined part of the population is selected in order to submit answers to a series of questions that will identify its beliefs and political actions. In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published the first big study on the political culture approach previously done in the book 'The Civic Culture'. The study is still considered a big step towards a study with the approach of this kind.

The extensive empirical research on political culture, as it has become more precise in its methods and more cautious about cultural biases, has revealed the considerable variability within political cultures across individuals, between groups, and over time. [...] But it is also evident from the survey that many societies do have a political culture – a general configuration of political beliefs that distinguishes them from certain other societies.<sup>4</sup>

Another concept of great relevance inside the study of political culture is the political ideology that can be understood as a set of beliefs about the political

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<sup>4</sup> DANZINGER, James M. **Understanding the political world:** a comparative introduction to political science. 3 ed. New York: Longman Publishers, 1996, p 36-37.

world as to what must be the objectives of the system and which are the best ways to accomplish these objectives.

First, a political ideology can be composed of the political beliefs of a single individual or of a group of any size. [...] Second, it is usually assumed that a political ideology displays high coherence, complexity, and salience, but it could be low on any of these dimensions. Third, the label “political ideology” is typically applied to one of a few comprehensive and widely held sets of beliefs.<sup>5</sup>

## 2.1 LEVELS OF POLITICAL CULTURE

A way to differentiate political culture from countries is by evaluating the level of participation of its citizenships inside the political system. All the political actions by individuals and groups are identified using the term *political participation*. But it must be clear that the political action cannot be treated like a unique dimension. And also a crescent recognition of the non-conventional political actions is being done, such as demonstrations, protests and rioting, in democratic or non-democratic countries.

There are three levels on which the population will be directed: the political system (views and values of the population and government), the political and policymaking process (roles and rights of each in the society), and policy outputs and outcomes (what the population expects from its leaders).

### 2.1.1 The system level

The pride of a nation is an excellent way to evaluate the political culture of a country. Analyzing some examples, we are able to see that this feeling of pride is

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<sup>5</sup> Ibd., p 38.

now nearly always directly related to the economic side of the country. Although, in several cases, countries with a more complicated economic situation still have a great amount of pride.

The historical development of a nation can also affect this feeling. In Germany and Japan, for instance, the events of the Second World War made their level of nationalism diminish considerably. The opposite took place when we consider Turkey, where after the War the nationalism levels were never so high. “In other cases, ethnicity, language, or history divides the public, which may strain national identities and ultimately lead to conflict and vision.”<sup>6</sup> In Turkey the level of national pride<sup>7</sup> is high, but it is not significantly higher nowadays because of some cases of ethnic difference.

Legitimacy is also a factor of great importance within a political system. When the citizens of a country agree with its government, or at least accept it, and are willing to obey the rules, the level of legitimacy is high. So it is natural for the government to try and make their citizens accept their written laws.

“In other political cultures, the leaders may base their claim to legitimacy on their special grace, wisdom, or ideology, which they claim will transform citizens’ lives for the better.”<sup>8</sup> This was the case with Turkey and Atatürk as based on the legitimacy acquired by Turkish people, and it used its wisdom to form a new nation with new laws, behavior rules and structure.

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<sup>6</sup> ALMOND, op. cit., p 47.

<sup>7</sup> The 2000-2002 World Values Survey, show that the level of national pride in Turkey is in 86, in a level that goes from 0 to “no proud at all” until 100 to “very proud”.

<sup>8</sup> ALMOND, op. cit, p 47.

### 2.1.2 The process level

This second level is related to the expectations of the citizens on how politics should be guided and on how the political process should be conducted. There are three groups that we can classify citizens according to their participation in the political processes; they are participants when they are directly involved in this process; they are subjects when they obey the laws, but don't vote or participate in anything related to politics; and they are parochial when they don't have any contact with the political process and are in an isolated situation that leave them barely aware of what is happening in the political world around them.

Anyway, it is not necessary to define which of those groups is better or worse to belong to, but the size of each group in each society is what will define its political identity better. For instance, in a society where there is a bigger group of participants, there will be bigger competition between the parties due to the larger number of activists involved in the process. "In summary, the distribution of these cultural patterns is related to the type of political process that citizens expect and support."<sup>9</sup>

Milbrath and Goed affirm that only a small part of the population can be considered totally active inside the political sphere of a country, that is, those who are activists in the way of political action, such as protests and partisan political work.

Some data can be used to compare levels of participation in several countries, although an accurate comparison can be difficult to obtain. This difficulty

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<sup>9</sup> id.

is explained by the different ways on which certain themes are treated by the country's constitutions, for instance. More than voting, the same act can vary in meaning in different political and cultural environments.

The World Values Survey has carried out research in Turkey in order to measure the level of participation of its citizens and the results are; 14% of the Turks have signed a petition, 6% participated in boycotts, 6% already participated in lawful demonstration and 3% in occupy building.

### 2.1.3 The policy level

This third and last level is about what the citizens and leaders have as priorities and what they expect from the government, socially as well as economically. But, as it has been observed in several cases, the more the population expects from the government, the more their support of the government diminishes.

In countries that are still in the developing phase, the population generally expects that the government at least covers the basic necessities such as housing, health, food, education, and to promote the society's well being. But in more developed countries, where these necessities have already been satisfied, the population is worried about other subjects such as immigration, workers' rights and the welfare state.

The more the government succeeds to satisfy the needs of the population, the bigger will be the population's support and its legitimacy.<sup>10</sup> "One of the basic

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<sup>10</sup> The 2000-2002 World Values Survey, shows that the level of satisfaction among the citizens about their government is 69%.

measures of government performance is its ability to meet the policy expectations of its citizens.”<sup>11</sup>

## 2.2 FACTORS FORMING POLITICAL CULTURE

There are several factors that define the political culture of a country. Those factors are interrelated. The first one is the *historical development* of each country, because the events in their history gradually define their political cultures. Some examples can be given: the Revolution in France in 1789, the American Independence War, the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom, the colonial periods of Asian and African countries, the Turkish Independence War and also its three military coups, in 1960, 1971 and 1980 that came along with big changes to the political life of their countries.

Another factor of immense importance is the *geography* of the country, which can also define the political culture of a country. A fine example is the British case: geographic situation of the island somehow protected the country from “foreign invasions”. Turkey is another big example of the influence of geography in its political culture. It is a country that is located in a unique geographical situation in the world, between two continents (Asia and Europe) and serving also as a gate between two worlds that are completely different ethnically and culturally (Middle East and the West).

The influence of different *ethnic groups* inside the same territory can vary from case to case. The factor that makes a group different from the other is inside the

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<sup>11</sup> ALMOND, op. cit., p 51.

territory and the way that it is treated has great importance in the definition of the political culture of this country. Some cases can be given: in Belgium where we find two distinct groups of people (Walloons and Flemish), in Canada where the main difference is defined by the language (English and French speakers), in South Africa during Apartheid, when the skin color divided the country between blacks and whites and in Turkey, that is constituted by several distinct ethnic groups (the Kurdish minority, for instance). The feeling of those people that need to belong to a specific ethnic group has a big importance also in the definition of the party system.

The *socio-economic structure* of a country also influences the definition of its political culture. This doesn't include just the level of salaries and people's wealth. But, for instance, industrialized societies differ a lot from the rural ones. The first have more of a chance to have a much more complex and rich political culture. There are several reasons for that, such as the higher educational level of the people and the impact of the media and communications, but "there is not always a direct link between the level of socio-economic development and participatory liberal democracies."<sup>12</sup>

Two important components of a political culture are: the support of the population to the state institutions and the level that the people feel they can influence the decision making process of the country. Although, it is difficult to measure these two levels. But there is a fact: the level of stability of a political system is directly linked to its level of socio-economic development.

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<sup>12</sup> BALL, op. cit., p 61.



In stable liberal democracies, the boundaries of the political system are fairly firmly drawn. There is a belief in the limitation of government activity. Thus the freedom of the individual is emphasized, and at the same time there is an expectation of benefits for the individual ensuing from government activity.<sup>13</sup>

Some symbols can contribute to stimulating political attitudes in the population, such as the national flag and anthem. Each political system uses these national symbols to make the national spirit of its citizens prominent. In Turkey, the national flag can be seen everywhere, alone or together with honors to its national hero, Atatürk. The love of the flag can also be noticed in the Turkish national anthem, İstiklal Marşı (Independence March), as it follows:

“Fear not, the crimson flag, waving in these dawns will never fade  
Before the last hearth that is burning in my nation vanishes.  
That is my nation's star, it will shine;  
That is mine, it belongs solely to my nation.

Oh coy crescent do not frown for I am ready to sacrifice myself for you!  
Please smile upon my heroic nation, why that anger, why that rage?  
If you frown, our blood shed for you will not be worthy.  
Freedom is the right of my nation who worships God and seeks what is right.”

Some observations may be made about the Turkish Flag: the star and the crescent, besides being Muslim symbols, were also used in the pre-Islamic era in Asia Minor. In 1783, Sultan Selim III substituted the green of the flag of the Navy with a red one that had a white crescent and a multi-pointed star, which was changed by a five-pointed one in 1844. With the abolition of the caliphate and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, no change was made to the flag, besides the establishment of design specifications. The Turks also call

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 63.

their flag *ay yıldız* (moon star) or *al sancak* (that can be interpreted as red banner, even if the word *sancak* has no equivalent in English).

Efforts are made to eliminate memories of previous regimes by new anthems, flags, rewriting history, in some cases inventing it, establishing new national heroes or resurrecting forgotten ones, changing street names and even those of towns, and a constant ritual bombardment of the population to provoke manifestations of national unity. This sense of unity can often be intensified by whipping up feeling against foreign symbols such as foreign embassies.<sup>14</sup>

By evaluating these conditions, and several other factors, we can affirm that political culture is not static, and can suffer modifications with influences coming either from the inside or from the outside of the political system. In several examples, like in Turkey and Japan, those modifications that the political culture have been suffering throughout the years resulted in a coexistence of traditional and modern values, but still lack a political stability to produce a viable political system.

There are several factors that can influence the mutation of a certain political culture. Among them are; industrialization, internal migrations and revolutions, and all can cause changes in political values and beliefs. In Turkey, after the military coup of 1980 and the establishment of a new constitution, the country entered a rather tedious industrialization process throughout the period of the Turgut Özal government. The stability of a political system is assimilated to the absorption of these new values by the society and the permanence of them.

### 2.3 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 67.

Individuals establish their political attitudes in different ways. Consequently, those collectively will define a political culture. In other words, from the moment that those beliefs and attitudes about the political system were established, we can consider this political socialization. The belief system is often referred to as the configuration of an individual's political orientations across political issues. After formed and established, those values will be passed from one generation to the other. A lot of children acquire these values while they are really young, but some agents of the society will later define if they will be strengthened in the personality of the person or if they will change over time.

At the deepest level, there are general identifications and beliefs such as nationalism, ethnic or class self-images, religious and ideological commitments, and a fundamental sense of rights and duties in the society. Divisions between ethnic or religious groups often generate such attachments because they are based on such self-images. At an intermediate level, individuals acquire less intense emotional attitudes toward politics and governmental institutions.<sup>15</sup>

Three points are of extreme importance as we study the political socialization agents: the socialization can be either direct or indirect; it continues to change during the life of an individual; it can represent both unification and a division inside a society.

The way that a person lives can influence his/her political behavior greatly.

And the environment includes everything that is around them and that is individual, such as political elements, and elements of the cultural and social

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<sup>15</sup> ALMOND, *op. Cit.*, p 52.

system (i.e. religious foundations), elements of economical order and physical features of the environment.<sup>16</sup>

The agents that influence the socialization of an individual and influence political attitudes result in the establishment and development of the attitudes and values of a political system. These agents cannot be evaluated in an isolated way, because all of them can simultaneously affect (on different levels) the political formation of an individual. It is also important to stress that even individuals that are living in the same environment can develop different political beliefs.

The *family* is obviously a factor of main influence in the process of political socialization of an individual. It is considered the first and maybe the most powerful and lasting agent of political socialization. Since the factor of obedience to the parents and their principles to the attachment to ethnic, linguistic and religious bonds that will therefore define the economic and carrier plans of the individual, and consequently the political education. Before the individual can take decisions and judgments by himself, they will get perceptions about the political sphere through conversations that they will have in their familiar environment. Another factor that is changing a lot inside the familiar environment, principally in developing countries, is the woman's role that can influence a lot in the modernization of those countries. However, the bigger the education formation of a person, the smaller the influence of family will be in its political behavior.

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<sup>16</sup> DANZINGER, op. cit., p 78.

So, we can say that the *educational institutions* are another factor of strong influence. They can have a role which will not be doubted principally in the transmission of laws that are not written, in the imposition of public tasks of the individual and in the importance of the national values<sup>17</sup>. Principally when we talk about public schools, we have to accept that these schools can be a really strong tool of political socialization, since they represent a controlled way of contact with the students that are still at an age that political beliefs are being formed. “Educational authorities can control what subjects are taught, what the textbooks contain, and even what teachers say and do.”<sup>18</sup> In this way the political authorities can align the vision of the political world with their own interests. The more educated the person, the more conscious he will be in the future as to what happens in the political sphere.

Peer groups, another factor of political socialization, are groups where people of common interests get together in an equal status to establish stronger bonds between them. This can include friends, neighbors, co-workers and organizations. A peer group socializes its member by motivating them to follow the attitudes and values accepted by the group. So a group is an aggregate of individuals that interact in order to reach a common goal. Several times some members change their values and interests in order to be accepted inside the group more, since they can be influenced by what “people like them” think.<sup>19</sup> And next comes the *volunteer groups of work and informal relations*.

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<sup>17</sup> In every school system there are rituals that support the political system.

<sup>18</sup> DANZINGER, op. cit., p 83.

<sup>19</sup> A person might want to influence the actions of his government but might believe that his individual actions will not make any difference. People tend to feel that they are relatively powerless in politics when acting alone – but there might be strength in numbers. If a person joins

These associations give political hints to their members in a way to mould political and social orientations of their members.

The *mass media* is nowadays responsible for the transmission of values that can cross the globe in seconds. Even in the least geographically favored cities, people have access to information in real time, through the television, radio, internet, magazines and newspapers. Ideologies can be easily spreaded universally.

Even the *government and the party agencies* represent a really important role in getting people politically involved. For instance, contact with bureaucratic agencies of the government is a reality and the direct contact with the governmental bureaucracy can change a person's point of view drastically over time, even in cases when the individual experiences a really strong formation within the family, school or society. On the influence of the political parties, "the person's political beliefs and actions are influenced by information that a political party provides of by the person's perceptions of what the party supports."<sup>20</sup>

Finally, we can stress the influence of *church and religion* in the political formation of the individual. Although it is not in every country that we can find formal bonds between religion and government, many times will the religious predominance of countries influence the conduction of their politics. "Catholic nations, for instance, are less likely to have liberal abortion polities, just as Islamic governments enforce strict moral codes."<sup>21</sup> In several countries there is

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with many others in a political group, it is possible that the group can exercise influence in the political world because of the group's numbers, organization, an capabilities. (P 60)

<sup>20</sup> DANZINGER, op. cit., p 70.

<sup>21</sup> ALMOND, op. cit., p 54.

a wedge between religious sub-political cultures and the government, which can induce the practicality of religious fundamentalism.

The emergence of aggressive religious fundamentalism in recent decades has had a major impact on the society and politics of countries as diverse as the United States, India, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Algeria, and Nigeria. [...] Fundamentalism usually defines a world in which believers must engage in the great struggle between the forces of spiritual goodness and evil. While the influence of fundamentalism has been most visible in the Middle East and among Muslim countries, it is important in Christian countries as well.<sup>22</sup>

In most societies, principally in developing ones, we can find a strong difference in the treatment of people with different class and sex. Even the occupation of the person can be restricted according to the class of gender in which the person belongs to. An example of several societies is the male restriction to worry about political issues and the female restriction to worry about society and family issues.

But the links formed between a certain behaviors of one of those institutions cannot be generalized on the formation of the political socialization of an individual, so rules inside these factors cannot be created.

#### 2.4 TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CULTURES

We can see in political world history that nations have been adopting values that, besides the factors of political socialization, can influence the formation of their political culture. For instance, in the world nowadays, it is a custom that nations give importance to values such as modernization and secularism, democratization, post-materialism, ethnicity and marketing.

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 55.

As mentioned before, due to the role of mass media in the current world, the development and welfare in developed countries when exposed to other countries, can encourage other countries' populations to fight for equality and improvements in their welfare level. Modernization also has another great influence: to contest the legitimacy of the countries that don't adopt the modern principles of democracy. The citizens of those countries are more and more involved in movements to guarantee a bigger and equal participation in the decision making process, motivated by examples of countries where these democratic principles have already reached a more developed level.

Besides political factors, the economic and marketing factors also can influence citizens to fight for equal advantages to the ones of the developed countries. Marketing is "a greater public acceptance of free markets and private profit incentives, rather than a government-managed economy."<sup>23</sup> The liberalization of the economic borders of the countries was, somehow, a way that the countries that couldn't modernize their economy by themselves found to reach a certain development level.<sup>24</sup>

Since the people from developed societies, citizens that were once young people who fought to acquire these rights some years ago; today, already with those conditions of welfare granted, are less worried about material values. The concern shifted to the side of social equality, environment protection, cultural pluralism and freedom of expression. This defense of post-materialism values can cause the emergence of groups that will defend those values such as workers' rights, feminism, and environmentalism, among others. Ron Inglehart

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibidi.*, p 59.

<sup>24</sup> That is what happened in Turkey principally during the Turgut Özal government in the 1980's.



affirms that the new generation is the most responsible for changing the socio-politic values which were suffered over previous years.

Inglehart concludes that older adults emphasize “materialist” values for strong defense, order maintenance, and economic growth; in contrast, many Young adults stress “postmaterialist” values for a more esthetically satisfying environment, for freedom of expression, and for mor personal power in social and political life.<sup>25</sup>

Another important factor of concern in modern societies is the definition of ethnic identities. Migrations have always occurred in the world, due to several problems such as wars, economic difficulties, political persecution and conflicts. Today, a lot of developed countries that host these immigrants can feel “threatened” by those migration movements. So we can see in several European countries, for instance, a growth in people’s interest about the conduct of the migration politics of those countries.

## 2.5 POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties are identified according to their common objective. Joseph Schumpeter defined this objective as to “prevail over the others in order to get into power or stay in it”. They can be presented in different ways inside the different political systems, making it difficult to imagine how those systems would be without political parties.

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<sup>25</sup> DANZINGER, op. cit., p 35.

From the moment that interest groups start to aim to obtain places inside the government, this becomes a political party.<sup>26</sup> However the parties must represent something ideologically united, and not just an electoral machine. Anyway, we cannot deny that the conquering of political power is their main objective.

Non-democratic ways can be used to reach the same objectives of the political parties, like coups that aim to capture power and change the political structures. In Turkey's modern history, for instance, there were three military coups that changed the political structure of the country, in their own way and proportions.

Among the functions of the political parties, there is one that aims to unite, simplify and establish the political process. "Parties bring together sectional interests, overcome geographical distances, and provide coherence to sometimes disruptive government structures." This is a factor of great importance to the political stability in a system. They want to enlarge and harmonize the interests that they represent.

It is natural that the political parties search to increase their support among the voters, in a multi-party political system and even in a system where just one party controls the government. Another function of the political parties is to be a link between government and population offering mobilization of it through media and local organizations. In this way, the party also moves the political attitude, increases the popular participation and consequently comes to meet potential political leaders.

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<sup>26</sup> This causes the fact that while the countries have several interest groups, their number of political parties is much smaller.

All the political parties have philosophical bases, and the stronger those bases are, the more credibility the party's ideology will have. But this ideology can at the same time "be an expression of agreement between the parties on existing political structures and political goals".<sup>27</sup>

### 2.5.1 Functions of political parties

Danziger gives a party the following six basic functions:

*Serving as brokers of ideas:* the parties must present solutions and try to attend the demands of the population that they represent. In this way the parties can be defined as *ideological* and *pragmatic*. Ideological parties support bigger and centralized objectives (such as Islamic fundamentalism) and will have in these objectives the general form of how the changes on the socio-political order will be reached. The pragmatic parties are more flexible on their objectives and direct themselves to a moderate change in the political sphere.

*Facilitating political socialization:* as already stated, the political parties are a big factor of influence in the socialization of the individuals inside the political culture. In this fashion, these citizens can develop a bigger party identification, in other words, they will trust in just one political party to represent their interests in the political sphere.

*Linking individual and system:* the parties must formulate, aggregate and communicate the demands of the population in order to accomplish them, as

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<sup>27</sup> BALL, op. cit., p 83.

the party has the political power in their hands, on behalf of the individuals whose interests it serves.

*Mobilizing and recruiting political activists:* the parties must offer an organized structure in a way that their supporters can direct their political interests. In this way, this involvement with the political party is also a way for a first mechanism with which these individuals can start to have direct role inside the party, and maybe further, a role as a “political gladiator”.

*Coordinating governmental operations:* political parties must gather all its members in order to make them work together so they can reach their objectives. But the parties also have the option to work together with the other parties, whose objectives are not so far from them, finding a way to harmonize these differences. Therefore the *coalitions* are a way of obtaining a bigger support of the population.

*Serving as sources of opposition:* in case the political party doesn't have the power in their hands and if this is in the hands of a party that doesn't come to meet its interests, this must develop an opposition role, but it cannot obstruct the actions of the effective government.

### 2.5.2 Structure of the political parties

Maurice Duverger defines the party structure in caucus (worried about the quality of its members and the electoral activity), the branch (worried about the quantity of members and the constant political action), the cell (based on the working place, it is not its main objective to win the elections, but to have

conspiracy (character) and militia (revolutionary parties adopt this system based in the hierarchy of the army).

Analyzing the critics of this classification of Duverger, it is relevant to consider the following factors:

1. The role of the leadership and the method of selecting it.
2. The degree of organizational centralization.
3. The power of the leadership in relation to the rank and file; the extent of disciplinary powers; participation in decision-making and policy initiation.
4. The control of the party bureaucracy.
5. The relationship of the parliamentary wing to the rest of the party.
6. Basis and extent of membership.<sup>28</sup>

#### 2.5.2.1 Determinants of the party structure

There are several factors that can influence the formation of a political party.

Besides its ideological framework and socio-economic factors, other factors have an extreme relevance when talking about the formation of political parties.

Nationalism and religious divisions may be more important than class in forming the basis of some political parties. Of course, the attitudes and values prevalent in society, the political culture, may be of vital significance in determining the types of political parties that emerge in any society.<sup>29</sup>

The historical factor is also of extreme influence in the formation of political parties. Historical changes can represent the formation of new parties. But it is important to check if these parties came from dissident groups that were already in power or if they were created from people outside the power.

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 88.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 89.

All these factors (ideology, structure of government, level of socio-economic development, political culture and historical facts) interrelate between them and cannot come to be studied in an isolate way.

### 2.5.3 Party systems

In order to analyze the parties of a determinate political system, several factors must be counted: the number of parties, the relative force of those parties, their ideological differences and their structures. Considering all those factors, we can get four general classifications of party systems.

- one-party systems: only one party has legality to get the power. One example is the communist countries.
- dominant party systems: there is more than one political party, all of them are able to compete for the power, however the same party always win. But eventually this dominant party can lose the power in a certain point and make the system become a multi-party system.
- two-party systems: there is an alternation of power between two political parties, according to the electoral success of each one, but both keep a real possibility to form a majority at the government.
  - distinct two-party systems: when the two parties have ideologies that are distinct one from the other.
  - indistinct two-party systems: when the two parties have similar political orientations and objective.

- two and-one-half party systems: when there is a third party but with limited power.
- multi-party systems: more than two parties participate essentially at the formation and activities of the government.
  - stable multi-party systems: when there is a number of parties different between them, all of them are capable to form a considerable majority at the government, even if sometimes through coalitions, but without losing this stability.
  - unstable multi-party systems: when there is more than one political party in the government, but with disagreements in their ideologies. When there is a coalition among these parties in the government, it is really probable that anytime one of the parties gives up of this support and the government enters into a crisis.

There is no one universal system of classification of party systems, and the foregoing classification is less complex than most. However, it does illustrate both the problems of classification and the diversity of party systems.<sup>30</sup>

The political systems can be stable, they can change gradually or they can change drastically and dramatically, which generally result from political revolutions, wars and international interventions. Stable political systems are directly related to a well-formed political structure and culture. Since most of the political systems suffers natural changes, a lot of times it is difficult to classify it in a uniform way, since those changes are generally numerous and

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 94.

complex. Another factor that interrelates directly with the political systems is the electoral system of the country.

In Turkey, for instance, several changes have already taken place inside its political system during previous decades. From the proclamation of the republic in 1923 till 1950 the only political party that occupied the government was the Republican People's Party, so there was a one-party system. However after the first free elections in the country in 1950, this system became a two-party system. But it wasn't until the constitution of 1961, when there was a bigger political fragmentation and the country started a process of establishment of a multi-party system. At the same time, the majority party rule was weakening and giving space to coalitions formed by parties that gathered their voters in order to be in the government.

## 2.6 REPRESENTATION, ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Keeping in mind that most political systems believe that sovereignty is in people's hands and that they will then choose who will be responsible for them (government) and that the opinion of the majority always prevails on the minorities' opinion, we can have an idea of what we can understand by representation.

Ball uses the opinion of Rousseau about sovereignty to explain the concept of representation:



Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and does not admit of representation: it is either the same, or other; there is no intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and cannot be its representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can carry through no definite acts. Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void – is, in fact, not a law.<sup>31</sup>

In the modern democracies, there is a series of theories of representation that try to guarantee some natural rights that must be assured to the population and which respect is universally required, such as the preservation of the individual property and the control of government power to control these rights. The natural rights are beyond any government of the world.

Other examples of natural rights related to the theories of representation that can be cited are: the equality of the voting right to the population, that through it will be able to choose its representatives; the sovereignty of the people, expressed through the universal suffrage; the fact that the representative, even after being elected, must represent the opinion of a collectivity and must make sure that his own will does not prevail over the majority's.

Anyway, there is always, in the modern liberal democracies, the search of a way to make the representatives in the government constitute an exact social mirror of the electorate.

### 2.6.1 Functions of elections

Basically we can affirm that elections are a way for the voters to participate and choose their representatives, however their functions can vary according to the type of political system. But the act of choosing a representative doesn't

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 121.

mean that this, if elected, will be responsible or will be controlled by the voters. In one side, he was not elected by everyone, but by a majority, besides that it could be difficult for a voter to have a candidate whose proposals are totally in accordance with his opinion.

Another way to search for popular opinion is the referendum. These are used in cases that the public opinion is necessary when taking decisions in specific politics. But it is not necessarily the most democratic and populist way to search the opinion of its supporters. Generally, referendums are a conservative tool and the results tend to uphold the status quo.

The elections are not always responsible for the decision of which government will get the power, as it is like in one-party systems, where the population will only be able to influence the composition of the government choosing a candidate or another from the same party. "Elections allow a degree of communication between the rulers and the ruled; the latter can educate the former on what are perceived as the main political issues. Above all, elections are a means of legitimizing the right of the rulers to govern."<sup>32</sup>

### 2.6.2 Voting behavior

Another relevant point to be studied is the voting behavior of the voters. In several systems, before the elections, behavior and voting intention researches are conducted. Some points to remember: when at any moment the voter is asked about his intentions of the past or the future and, though the sample of

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibdi.*, 129.

voters must be chosen carefully; the nature of the questions are really important; there can be problems during the interpretation of the information that was gathered.

Within this complex arena of voting behaviour studies, three broad approaches stand out: first, the party identification model; voters cast their vote primarily out of long-term loyalty to a particular political party; secondly, the rational choice approach, with the electorate rationally deciding which way to vote on the performance and promises of the candidates or parties; thirdly, the sociological approach which emphasises the correlation between voting behaviour and the voter's class, religion or age, etc.<sup>33</sup>

But the party identification model can be acknowledged mainly in the 1960's and 1970's. Principally in the 1990's this reality changed. A new behavior called partisan dealignment surged. The voters of the industrial liberal democracies became more volatile, so he could change his behavior in every election. Because of that, the role of the election in the choosing of the elector's vote increased considerably. This will give votes to the party that gives out the greatest amount of information that matches his intentions and objectives.

There is also a tendency that the voters of the same social classes, religions, geographical regions, ethnicity, age and/or gender have a certain common preference when choosing their votes. This is explained by the sociological approach that will exactly search for a relation between social cleavages and voting behavior.

We cannot forget about the relevance of the social classes in the definition of the voting behavior of the electorate. Generally, it is normal that the working class supports left-of-centre parties and that the middle classes right-of-centre

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibdi.*, 131.

parties. This is because each one comes to meet their intentions and interests. However, we can observe that in the last two decades during the industrial liberal democracies, this relation between social classes and voting intentions has diminished.

Not counting that this relation can be affected by other factors such as religion, geographical region and age. The gender of the voter can also be considered an important factor. For instance the women, sometimes forgetting about social classes and religion (women tend to be more religious than the men), tend to vote for right-of-centre parties.

The ethnic factor, in many cases like in Turkey, has big relevance, since even some parties, sometimes extra officially, differ themselves through ethnic or linguistic lines.

### 2.6.3 The role of the mass media

Modern societies can now see the role of mass media, principally of television, growing considerably in the last years. In the liberal democracies it is the biggest font of political information and has a much larger role in the influence on the choice of the voters and in the results of the elections.

Noticing that, several political parties invest the most of their budgets in campaigns propagated in theses media to promote their electoral campaigns and also, in case the party is in the government at present, promote the works done by them in their reigning period in order to convince the voters to keep them in the government.

Although television is, without doubt, the biggest way of showing those political propagandas, there is no agreement between the theorists about the true role of it in the political formation of societies. Some authors claim that television just strengthens loyalties and political opinions that have already been formed, but others say that it plays a strong role in mass opinion and in the definition of the political agenda, when observing the current reality, is more likely to be accepted.

## 2.7 CHANGE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Some factors have so much influence on a society that they can cause immense changes inside a political system. No political system is immune to change, which can occur in several ways and affect several points.

The Assembly can be weakened or strengthened, parties can be eliminated or created, and election laws can be altered. All that, in democratic systems, must be done by formal rules, such as the Constitution.

Several times those changes can occur and their causes are easily identified, however they are not always that clear. But somehow, we can identify all these changes by classifying them as evolutionary or revolutionary. In other words: it is not only identifying the causes of changes in a political system that is difficult, but also, to interrelate all of them, since most of the time the change is not a consequence of just one cause.

It is also important to remember that those changes do not always represent bigger stability of the system (as it happens in most of the cases of evolutionary

causes). More often than not, the concept of consensus used to define the stability of a political system: “stable, liberal democratic systems have another distinctive characteristic; there is agreement on the rules by which the political system operates.”<sup>34</sup>

In this way, political cultures can be classified as consensual, when the citizens have a tendency to accept uniformly what the government decides about the solutions of the biggest problems of the society; and as conflictual, when the citizens are involved in the opinions on how to solve these problems. When a society is too divided in its political attitudes, we see the appearance of sub-political cultures.

However as stated before, it is almost impossible to obtain a homogeneous political culture inside a territory, there will never be general agreement on the methods of whose political system is conducted. In certain cases, groups that are not in accordance with the way politics are being conducted inside their countries, use violent ways of demonstrating their unhappiness with the political situation and to accomplish their political ends. This is happening in Northern Ireland with the IRA, in Spain with the ETA and in Turkey with the PKK. But those systems cannot be considered unstable or un-consensual just because of the existence of those groups, because they act in an isolated way, not affecting the stability of the regime of the country where they are established.

A lack of stability in a system affects its legitimacy. So it will be again said that such groups wouldn't be directly linked to a weakening in the stability and

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibdi.*, 245.

legitimacy of the system. However the system cannot simply exclude itself from the political sphere, for instance, the population that such groups are defending. In the Turkish case, despite the actions of the PKK, the Kurds have the same political rights as do the rest of the Turkish population. This is one of the basic rules to get legitimacy inside a system: elites and most of the people can have different opinions, one must accept the other, but not necessarily agree with the opposite ideas.

### 2.7.1 Political Change

As already mentioned before, political changes can have an evolutionary or revolutionary nature which depend on the ways that those changes were effectuated, their velocity and their intensity. However, even in cases where there was a big change or revolution in the political institutions of a country, if those were not stable or didn't have certain continuity, we cannot classify this change as radical.

There are several factors that can cause a political change of a system. Among them are: economic and social factors; war and foreign intervention (the first acting in a much more direct way than the second); effectiveness of the government (the level that the governmental institutions can lead the problems that they can face); individuals, groups and political elites (some independents at the government); and political ideologies (of a universal character that can explain, justify and encourage changes).

## 2.8 THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ISLAMIC STATES

Islam, quite different from other major religions of the world, presents itself in the way of guidance for every attitude during life, sacred and secular, public and private. Islam also can mean submission to the laws of God (Allah).

Muslims believe that the Koran is the book where the laws found fair society, appropriate human conduct and even economic progress.

Thus, the Koran plays a central role in the development of the political culture of Muslim countries. Following this logic, no Muslim country should have a political system independent from Islam; therefore the political institutions should follow the religious authorities.

This reality can still be seen in several countries in the Middle East such as Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. But several other countries developed government systems that act independently from the Shari' a<sup>35</sup> as well as a way of life that doesn't exactly follow the interpretation of the Koran. Several reasons were that those countries weakened the bonds in certain points with the Shari' a such as wealth, technology and contact with more developed and non-Muslim western countries.

So, we can notice the emergence of two different groups that conflict in this way of "doing politics" in Islamic countries: we can find the *fundamentalists*, that want the rules of the Koran and Shari' a to be followed; and the *modernizers*, that believe that Islam must be adapted to the life lived in the

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<sup>35</sup> The Shari'a provides detailed guidelines for public and private life and a legal system that were established more than 1,200 years ago and should be subject to only minimal interpretation or modification. (P 395)



current world. A special case and a great example is Turkey, a country of Muslim majority whose political culture was drastically altered.

Until the World War One, Turkey was part of the Ottoman Empire, whose government system was based on the sultanate. With the defeat in the War, the independence of several territories that belonged to the Empire and the division of its main territory among European countries, the military commander Mustafa Kemal organized an armed resistance in order to establish the independence of the territory said to belong to the Turks. After winning the war in 1922, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal became the first president of the country, and rapidly started a process of modernization of the country based on the unlink of the Islamic rules in the life of the people.

The new state should be based on independent principles and democracy. In order to achieve that, a new Constitution was promulgated in 1924 with several new values to the political life of the Republic such as: the abolition of the sultanate and Caliphate and the grant of executive power to the President of the Republic, the election of a legislature and the creation of a one-party system. This political system was created on modern models of government and of political participation. Besides the changes in the political sphere, Atatürk, until he died in 1938, also developed laws for living in society in order to separate it from extreme values of Islamic culture.

First, he promulgated laws that prohibited the wearing of religious garments in everyday life, abolished religious schools, and closed religious tombs as places of worship. Second, he encouraged the emergence and empowerment of a nationalist elite, by such steps as creating a new Turkish language and banning the public use of other languages, replacing the Ottoman script with the Latin alphabet, and establishing Turkish literacy programs, especially in urban areas. Third, he established

a new civil code to govern the legal relations between individuals and collectivities, relegating Shari'a law and the Koran to peripheral status in guiding public life. For example he reduced the subordinate role of women, encouraging them to work, providing them with rights of divorce and inheritance, allowing them to vote and hold public office, and banning polygamy.<sup>36</sup>

From this moment on, changes were gradually taking place inside the Turkish culture, principally from the 1960's on. We can also stress on the change from an agrarian society to an urban society<sup>37</sup> besides the fact that today Turkey is the Muslim country with the best-educated female population.

Politically, Turkey still couldn't reach the objective of maintaining a stable multi-party system. We can nominate several moments of political instability in the country's history.

### **3 TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE FROM 1923 TO 1980**

The first record of the Turks in world history, dates from the 6<sup>th</sup> century AD, when they belonged to Nomad tribes in the region of current Mongolia. The migrations of that time were generally directed from east to west and from north to south, and the last migrations registered were the Turks and the Mongols who besides being migrants were also conquerors.

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<sup>36</sup> DANZINGER, *op. cit.*, 1996.

<sup>37</sup> While 70 percent of the population lived in villages in 1964, Turkey is now 65 percent urban. The economy was 75 percent agrarian in 1978 and is now 70 percent industrial.

However, the first record of the usage of the term “Turk” to define such people dates from the 8<sup>th</sup> century. The tribes also started to acquire characteristics from the people that they met. Living alongside the Persians and Arabs influenced the way that their language developed and became richer with terms originating from those two languages. The conversion to Islam also took place because of the Arabian and Persian influences. This conversion, which occurred in the 10<sup>th</sup> century, opened even more gates to the Turks enabling them to expand and dominate the Islamic world of that time.

During the 12<sup>th</sup> century, the Turks were already in Asia Minor, but it was principally between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries that a lot of Turks moved from Central Asia to Asia Minor. It was also then when the territory that they were settled in at the time started to be called Turkey by the western Christians (from the Italian *Turchia*). It later came under the command of the warrior Osman, which was when the Turks started to expand inside Byzantine territory.

A main characteristic of the Turkish invasions and dominance is that the Turks didn't force the original inhabitants of the regions to move from the occupied territories, but they intermarried with them and converted some of them to Islam. For that reason even today the Turks represent a great diversity of ethnic types.

Inside the Ottoman Empire, the great majority of the inhabitants of Anatolia (Asian part of the empire) were Muslim, while the Christians were settled in the European side. Both were living peacefully but separately inside the Empire.

There was a moment when the Ottomans ruled from Central Europe to Morocco, from Persia and the Crimea to Sahara. But a big mistake of the Ottomans was that they didn't develop any research inside their territory, and were always importing technology from Europe including the military weapons. While this continued, the Christians inside the empire were continuing to develop intellectually and commercially. The crisis was imminent and reform became necessary in the 19<sup>th</sup> century inside the Ottoman Empire.

Starting from the army and navy, the sultans initiated a large process of modernization throughout the empire. Among all the new ideas that were coming in, France was the main source of most of them. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we see the birth of a movement called "Young Ottomans", later the Young Turks. Their main objective was the strengthening of an Ottoman patriotism that had been declining through the years.

But seeing that these objectives were not being reached, they began to promote multi-nationalism. Finally Muslim nationalism was promoted to defend the Turks and try to save the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, the Young Turks carried out a military coup. They became even stronger after the Balkan's Wars of 1912-13 that resulted in the loss of the most part of the Ottoman European territories.

During the I World War, the Young Turks allied with the Germans and that resulted in defeat at the end of the war. The division of all the empire's territory among European nations followed this defeat and that the independence of the Ottomans was lost.

The idea of Turk, or the Turkish nation, was being defined at that time. The Ottomans had already adopted the Turkish language as their official language, but the differences between them were defined according to the religion. The Ottoman concept of citizenship was never ethnic. Anyone could be considered Ottoman if he obeyed the dynasty and followed the culture of the empire. However, the last Ottoman parliament cited the term *Türk* referring to all the Muslim elements of the empire, including even Ottoman Jews. The concept of *Türk* would after be used as the definition and creation of the Turkish Republic.

### 3.1 THE TURKEY OF ATATÜRK AND THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

The Young Turks movement failed. But it led the way to the creation of a new national state. A Young Turk officer who distinguished himself in this process was Mustafa Kemal<sup>38</sup>. He started mobilizing the Islamic population of Anatolia in order to make them aware of western-Christian control of their territory. He soon became the main leader of the Turkish Independence War whose victory was defined when they re conquered all the territory that the Ottomans controlled of at the end of the war and that defined the new Turkey. But Atatürk didn't have any pretension of new expansions.

During the Independence War, the capital of his government was Ankara, which became the capital of the Turkish Republic after October 29<sup>th</sup> 1923. Istanbul was now governed by Ankara, like any other province. In the following year, he exiled the Ottoman dynasty and abolished the caliphate, in order to strengthen the

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<sup>38</sup> In 1934 he would receive the surname Atatürk, or, father of the Turks.

secular state of Turkey and by controlling religion. This all provoked the opposition of some traditional classes of the former capital, which had a really strong bond with the old monarchic elites.

Through the Lausanne Treaty of 1923<sup>39</sup>, Turkey was internationally recognized as an independent state. In August of the same year, Mustafa Kemal was re-elected president of the assembly that also officially approved Ankara as the official capital of the new country.

In this favourable political climate, and with what amounted to a legislative coup d'état against his rivals, on 29 October 1923, the assembly proclaimed Turkey a republic and elected Mustafa Kemal as its president. By establishing a republic, the Kemalists were proclaiming their commitment to modernity and equality, rather than the modernization and hierarchy of the old order.<sup>40</sup>

The foundations of the Turkish Republic were still not that strong. Mustafa Kemal inherited some structures and traditions from the Ottomans, but his main objective was to restructure a new country that had just been born. His initial goal was to bring the republican control to every territory of the country.

A paradox at this point was that the state idealized by him had a liberal republican constitution, but was commanded in an authoritarian way. He was also the leader of the only political party of the Republic at that time, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/CHP*). He created the party<sup>41</sup> in order to develop his support basis and gather everyone that opposed the former order. But a unique characteristic was that the state was commanding the party (and not vice-versa), in a way that it was used to mobilize the population and disseminate the modernist ideas.

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<sup>39</sup> July 24th 1923.

<sup>40</sup> AHMAD, F. **Turkey**: the quest for identity. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003, p 85.

<sup>41</sup> Originally he had only the denomination of People's Party.

Suffering from a certain level of opposition by some deputies, Mustafa Kemal and his followers, called 'Kemalists', tried hard to pass their message to the population of the country through speeches and interviews in the media. The Kemalists wanted a total political as well as economic change in Turkey. They wanted to create a new secular ideology to put Turkey into the western world and in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

At no time did the Kemalists demonstrate any affection to communism, even though the relations with Moscow were friendly.<sup>42</sup> The Kemalists also didn't want to be associated with the European authoritarian regimes in Germany and Italy. Their opposition against the fascist dictators was always kept strong. Atatürk didn't have the same attitude of those dictators. He used his charisma to convince the population to accept his program of reforms. This program was basically for domestic development, without any pretension of territorial expansion.<sup>43</sup>

Atatürk always adopted the politics of good neighborliness with the bordering countries. He described these politics as "peace at home and peace in the world", affirming that a harmony in the Turkish foreign politics would help in the internal harmony. And with the time, when his government was getting international credibility, he could re-establish military control in the Turkish straits and also accomplish the first and only territorial expansion of the country: the recovery of the province of Alexandretta (today called Hatay) from Syria, that was under French dominance.

In his fifteen years as president of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk had succeeded in creating a nation that acquired a new identity and was virtually self-sufficient and

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<sup>42</sup> In 1925 a friendship treaty was signed between the two parts.

<sup>43</sup> Unless to get the province of Alexandretta back from the French, in 1938.

independent [...] converting a country from its semi-feudal, agrarian base into a modern industrial economy. All the nation's energies had been directed to progress at home, while the goal of Turkey's foreign policy was to maintain the status quo.<sup>44</sup>

In order to reach the desired modernism level, the Kemalists intended to accomplish a change in several areas such as politics, culture and economy. Atatürk was more a patriot than a nationalist. The concept of Turkish laicism was introduced, that is, the state controls religion.<sup>45</sup>

With time, the regime started to become more confident, as new changes to secularize and modernize Turkey took root. Those measures include the abolition of the fez or cap and the discouragement of the use of the veil in women, stimulating the use of western clothes. The Latin alphabet was adopted and the Turkish language was revolutionized. Women got the same rights as men (some of those rights were granted much later in some other European countries).

The ideology that came to be known as Kemalism/Atatürkism was the result of the debate. It was launched in May 1931, at the third party congress, and consisted of six 'fundamental and unchanging principles', namely Republicanism (*Cumhuriyetçilik*), Nationalism/Reformism (*Milliyetçilik*), Populism (*Halkçılık*), Statism (*Devletçilik*), Laicism/Secularism (*Laiklik*) and Revolutionism/Reformism (*İnkılapçılık*). These 'principles' became the RPP's six arrows, the symbol of its emblem, and were incorporated into the constitution in 1937.<sup>46</sup>

But although having instituted a democratic system, it was still a one-party system, having suppressed any form of political opposition. Until 1930, there were two attempts to create opposition in Turkey, but both lasted for a really short period of time because Atatürk considered them hostile to his reforms and a threat

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<sup>44</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 92.

<sup>45</sup> It is important to remember that the concept of Turkish laicism doesn't totally spare state and religion, but simply says that the first will control the actions of the second.

<sup>46</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 88.



to his leadership. The first was in 1924, launched by some of his rivals and the second in 1930 when the Free Republican Party was created<sup>47</sup>.

### 3.2 İNÖNÜ'S PRESIDENCY AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

One day after the death of Atatürk, on November 11<sup>th</sup> 1938 İsmet İnönü was proclaimed the new president of the Republic, at the same time the CHP proclaimed Atatürk the eternal leader of the country. Just like Atatürk, he was a pragmatic, however in a more cautious way, more patient and sober than his predecessor. He didn't want to spoil the future of the republic because of a wrong choice. He also didn't want to repeat mistakes of the Unionists during the World War One.

İnönü was prime minister after Atatürk until 1937<sup>48</sup>, when Celal Bayar took his place. Both, İnönü and Bayar had very opposing personalities and some political disagreements happened between them. These disagreements, most of the time stemming from an economic origin, came to affect the Turkish politics for many years.

İnönü's first concern was to safeguard the achievements of the republic: the political and economic independence of the state, the integrity of the national territory, domestic law and order, Atatürk's Cultural Revolution and the slow but sure development of the national economy.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> The Free Republican Party was created by a close friend of Mustafa Kemal, Fethi Bey, that after seeing the growth of popularity of his party, decided to close it by his own, in order not to represent a challenge to Kemal.

<sup>48</sup> He was prime minister during two terms in this period, from 1923 to 1924 and from 1925 to 1937.

<sup>49</sup> MANGO, A. **The Turks today**. Manchester: John Murray Publishers, 2004, p 28.

İnönü decided to adopt an economic policy different from those of other developing countries in the world, which were accelerating the development and opening their economies to favor a free market.

With the threat of an expansion of Mussolini in the Mediterranean, İnönü started to seek international support to defend the country. Following the steps of the friendship with France since the reintegration of the province of Hatay in Turkey, he established an alliance with France and Great Britain.

In 1937 Bayar resigned and was substituted by Refik Saydam. But İnönü started to have a new preoccupation: a new war was about to break out. He decided to keep his distance from any international conflict, while Atatürk was never a neutralist.

In August 31<sup>st</sup> 1939, Germany invaded Poland and began the Second World War. With this, his concerns started to grow. Turkey was self-sufficient in food, textiles and coal, but depended a lot on imports to supply its manufactures demand. Somehow this trade balance kept well balanced. But the threat of the War forced the Turkish government to increase its army to 1.300.000 men in March 1940, reducing considerably its agricultural young population that went to do their military services.

Turkey felt even more threatened when Italy declared war on its Allies in June 1940. In October, Italy invaded Greece, forcing İnönü's government to stick to its policy of non-belligerence. In October 1941 Turkey signed a treaty of non-aggression and friendship with Nazi Germany. With the German victories in Russian territory, the Turkish fear of an invasion from Stalin was diminished. But with the developing of the battles, non-belligerence was redefined by "active

neutrality”, that is, Turkey had guns, but would only use them for self-defense. But İnönü still had an interest in keeping the neutrality of Turkey during the conflict.

Many refugees that came to Turkey from the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union and gave all their support to the Germans in their victories against the USSR. However nazi ideas of racism and the expansion of the Germans in soviet territory reinforced the discrimination policies against religious minorities in Turkey. Since 1908, the so-called Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)<sup>50</sup> adopted a national economy policy that gave privileges to Muslim Turkish businessmen. In 1932 this turned into a law that also prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in several occupations and commerce. This way those businessmen had a free pass from the government to eliminate their Christian and Jewish competition. Even Jews, the followers of Sabbati Sevi, ‘the false messiah, who during the 17<sup>th</sup> century had converted to Islam, and known as the Dönme, were discriminated against.<sup>51</sup> There were separate lists for Muslims, non-Muslims, foreigners and the Dönme. So a lot of non-Muslims had to sell their property, bought mainly by the new Turkish bourgeois class, that became more numerous and rich and constantly gave more support to the government. Facing this situation, a lot of Jews moved to the region of nowadays Israel, while Armenians and Greeks, due to the complicated situation in their home countries, decided to move to new destinies such as the United States.

The creator of the capital levy was prime minister Şükrü Saraoğlu, who took power in July 1942 after the death of Refik Saydam. To be adopted, the capital levy had to be approved by President İnönü. This pressure was calmed down right

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<sup>50</sup> Those would later form the CHP.

<sup>51</sup> It was the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire that the Muslims were treated in an unequal way inside the territory.

after the Germans surrendered in Stalingrad in February 1943. But that was not enough to solve the economic problems acquired by Turkey during the War. A big part of the population wasn't able to obtain their basic necessities supplied by the government.

İnönü also started to restrain rightists who agitated in support of the Germans against the Russians. But Great Britain had big interests that Turkey entered in the War by its side.

In August 1944 Turkey cut its relations with Germany and only in February 1945, when a victory of the Americans, Russians and English was assured, Turkey declared War to Germany and Japan. After that, Turkey became a founder member of the United Nations when it was created in San Francisco.

The friendship pact between Russians and Turks was not renewed by the soviets in 1945, but this didn't represent a big threat to the Turks, since the Russians were more worried about their new domains in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. On the Turkish situation in post II World War we can affirm that:

Turkey was a rightly run country when the Second World War ended in 1945. The government budget was balanced; publicly owned utilities showed a profit; foreign trade was in surplus. But economic rectitude was achieved at the cost of depressed living standards. The countryside was poor, not to say destitute. Public employees were badly paid. State enterprises paid their way not because they were well run, but because they could charge high prices for their goods and services. Commercial private initiative was stifled. Discontent was widespread. The government could contain it so long as its Republican People's Party (CHP) had a monopoly of power, the press was censored, strikes were banned and associations and demonstrations subject to stringent controls. But the country was used to authoritarian government: most people represented it, but few challenged it.<sup>52</sup>

The country's elites and the press were ready to end some government control. They started to represent a way of opposition to the government, however

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<sup>52</sup> MANGO, op. Cit., p 39.

in a non-violent way. In November 1945 İnönü proposed a series of changes in the political system that would align Turkey even more to Western capitalism and democracy. From 1945 on, the government settled on new programs of agrarian reforms. Land was taken from big landowners and given to landless people. But the government never included its own rural property of 3 million hectares.

This made the big landowners form an opposition to the CHP. They started to be represented in the party by Adnan Menderes. Just before the agreement of agrarian reform was signed, Celal Bayar got together with Menderes in order to put in practice the democratic principles established by the constitution. Such reforms included free elections inside the country, under a multi-party system that would direct Turkey even more to the western values. The importance of the political parties in Turkey started to grow when this was changing from an authoritarian one-party system to democracy by that time.<sup>53</sup>

But a big fear at that time was the formation of communist parties which was occurring in several other European countries. The communists represented an even bigger fear than the extreme right and religious parties did. But students against the formation of such left parties in Turkey naturally attacked the communists.

In January 1946, Celal Bayar lead the formation of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*/DP)<sup>54</sup>. They were willing to follow the Turkish constitution and respect the Kemalism principles but announced that they would adapt those principles according to the new situation of the world order and with their biggest

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<sup>53</sup> SAYARI, Sabri; ESMER, Yılmaz. **Politics, parties & elections in Turkey**. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p 10.

<sup>54</sup> Together with Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes, all former members of the CHP.

objective that was to accelerate the democratic process in Turkey. They used a lot of their populism to get the support of the citizens.

The mood in Turkey wasn't the same as 10 years before. People were unfaithful to CHP, a party that was really important in the creation of the republic. Almost anyone considered CHP able to govern Turkey in the post-War era. In July 1946 the first elections took place since the establishment of DP<sup>55</sup>, which was really behind CHP in the final results. But the DP contested the results saying that the responsible for the elections filled the ballots with votes for the republicans.<sup>56</sup>

Anyway, CHP won the elections of 1946 and Recep Peker was nominated prime minister. But in the following year, an İnönü statement announcing that he would act in an impartial way with the government and opposition, made Peker resign giving place to Hasan Saka in 1947 and to Şemsettin Günaltay in 1949.

Besides that, the unhappiness with the way that the economy was being conducted by İnönü was growing in the population, and Bayar exploited this point to get more popularity. In 1949 İnönü abandoned some secular values, for instance, permitting the opening of religious schools. This faced a strong opposition by DP and the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi/MP*), that had just been created by dissidents of the DP. "İnönü seemed to be abandoning three of the principal pillars of Kemalist ideology: statism, revolutionism, and laicism, and even started to embrace Islam."<sup>57</sup>

In 1948 Turkey entered the American Marshall plan to help in the reconstruction of the Europe, it became also a founder member of the

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<sup>55</sup> According to a constitutional emend, direct elections were instituted from then on.

<sup>56</sup> From the 465 seats at the parliament CHP had 390 and CP just 65.

<sup>57</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 103.

Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD). In two years Turkey had already received a monetary help of 200 million dollars.

### 3.3 THE 1950 ELECTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

In May 1950 the first free elections were carried through in Turkey's history. The reality was different: while the DP represented the interests of a lower class, including the Islamists, the CHP continued having an elitist image.<sup>58</sup> This time the CHP lost considerable support of the population that was elected the democrats by a great majority.<sup>59</sup> The mass opinion was that nothing would change in Turkey without taking İnönü out of the government. İnönü then denied any possibility of military intervention, now that for the first time since 1923 the CHP wasn't the governing party anymore.

The newly elected president was Celal Bayar and the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Both men, together with a lot of their ministers were dissidents of the CHP. This government wouldn't be considered a revolutionary one, because it wouldn't change any of Atatürk's reforms. However a lot of İnönü's measures accomplished during his governing years were stopped.

Some changes were done immediately, such as the adoption of pure Turkish as the constitutional language. The democrats were economic liberals but culturally conservatives. They represented a way of secularism and liberty walking

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<sup>58</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 11.

<sup>59</sup> The democrats got 53% of the votes (408 seats) and the republicans 39% (69 seats), this was because the winner-takes-all principle was instituted recently in the electoral system from Turkey, what formerly benefited the republicans.

side by side. Ideologically they were not that different from the republicans.<sup>60</sup> They even recognized the important role of the republicans in the establishment of the Turkish Republic, but declared that they were not adequate anymore to the population's necessities and the rhythm of the world was developing at that time. Therefore the big difference between both was maybe the difference of speed with which they wanted to develop the country. Prime Minister Menderes saw in his political power an essential key to Turkey's growth.

In power, the Democrats aroused great hope in the country. They had brought to an end the era of authoritarian single-party rule. They promised to rule democratically and bring about modernization and prosperity. In actual fact, there was no real ideological difference between the governing party and the opposition: both parties were committed to the creation of a modern, prosperous Turkey.<sup>61</sup>

Turkey changed considerably during its 10 years of democrat government. The private initiative got several privileges to new investments and at the same time the public sector had a great growth. The growth of GNP during this decade had an average of 6% a year. But after 3 years of government, some problems started to appear, such as the large deficit in the trade balance.

The two key questions during the 1950's were the de-colonization process and the Cold War, both affected Turkey. But the democrats decided to follow the same policies of their predecessors on the management of foreign policy, but with a new dynamism, such as the speeding up negotiations for Turkey's membership in NATO. The negotiations ended in 1952 when Turkey and Greece (even having a strong British opposition) became full-members of the organization. This way

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<sup>60</sup> At that time Turkey lived a period of indistinct two-party system.

<sup>61</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 107.



“Turkey abandoned all her foreign policy options and became totally committed to the organization.”<sup>62</sup>

The leftists in Turkey argued that such membership would be bad for the Turkish economy, but they were wrong. The left’s interest, as well as that of the soviets’ was that Turkey didn’t become a part of NATO, so they used radicalism to try to avoid it. While the then members of NATO believed in stability in Turkish territory to make the membership possible.

During the Cold War, Turkey increased its relations with the United States and became an important ally in the Middle East, Turkey also hoped to get foreign investments to promote faster economic growth.

In the 1954 elections in Turkey, despite the fall in the price of the agricultural products<sup>63</sup>, the voters were still very happy with the advances during the years of democrat government, and expecting better advances they guaranteed the democrats a new victory<sup>64</sup>. The democrats obtained an even larger majority and the number of seats. That made Menderes believe that his way of conducting t government was right, since the population showed its support in the elections. But gradually the elite started to turn against the democrats. The same elite before had supported the democrats because they represented the liberalization in the country’s politics, was turning against the DP because they were disappointed with the actions of the party. They believed that the political system that Turkey was living under had been created during the single-party

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<sup>62</sup> Id.

<sup>63</sup> The democrats, after that, started a process of agrarian reform, where lands were given to landless people and those were benefited with new technologies implemented in the agriculture by the government.

<sup>64</sup> At this time the democrats had a majority of 57% (490 seats) against 35% (30 seats) of the republicans.

period and had to be reformed. Although successful in the elections, the democrats saw that government institutions such as the army, judiciary and bureaucracy weren't at their side.

Another question of foreign policy that started to have a great influence at this time was Cyprus. The Greek community wanted independence from Britain and union with Greece. The Turkish community turned to Ankara for support, leading to a growth in Turkish nationalism. There were anti-Greek riots in Istanbul riots in September 1955 and Menderes's failure to maintain order weakened his government. Political opposition grew under the RPP and the newly formed Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi/HP*).

The democrats won the elections in 1957, but with a rather reduced majority.<sup>65</sup> The political tensions increased, once the opposition was stronger. So Menderes decided to create the "Fatherland Front" to weaken the critics and the opposition. But this initiative polarized the political life.

The economic crisis that the country was going through started to catch the attention of the opposition and military. Menderes had never considered the armed forces a priority and wanted to direct money for the modernization and economical development of the country. Besides that, with the Turkish membership in NATO, the armed forces took a new direction and the military started to get to know of new technology and methods that were used in other member countries but not in their home country.

This problem with the military started to acquire a political aspect when they began to articulate the RPP ideas. During a trip to England to sign an agreement

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<sup>65</sup> The democrats got 47% of the votes (419 seats) and the republicans 41% (173 seats).

about the Cyprus question, Menderes suffered an air accident. But he survived and came back to his country with a hero's welcome. But this was not enough to calm down the opposition.

The 1950's were marked by a two-party system between the DP and CHP that controlled 98% of the parliament during the whole decade. However there had been no succession in the government ante in the three elections that had taken place during those years, although DP usually won a large majority over CHP. Besides that, Turkey didn't present the stability normally associated with a two-party system in more developed countries. The biggest conflict between both was in the choice of methods about democracy. But Turkey was a country with a very short democratic history. This try at democracy ended after 10 years with a military coup.<sup>66</sup>

An act of the democrat majority in April 1959 recommended the suspension of all the political activity in the country, that the parliamentary bulletins should be banned and the press censored. That led to students and military cadet demonstrations. Prime Minister Menderes, President Bayar, ministers and democrat deputies were all arrested by the military junta. The junta led by General Cemal Gürsel took over the government. Influenced by university law professors, the military was convinced that the democrats were acting in a way of opposition to the country's constitution.

The result was that 15 members of the democrat government (including Menderes and Bayar) were condemned to death and other 400 were imprisoned. Menderes was hanged but Bayar was only imprisoned because of his age. From

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<sup>66</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, 12.

this moment students and the military appeared on the political scene as live forces of the nation. It was the first and last time that a junta, which didn't belong to the Turkish armed forces hierarchy, intervened in the government.

### 3.4 THE 1960 COUP AND THE BEGINNING OF A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN TURKEY

A National Unity Committee (NUC) was established to govern the country after the coup of May 27<sup>th</sup> 1960. "Rather than the election victory of May 1950, it was the period that followed the military coup of 27 May 1950, which marked the beginning of a new phase in Turkey's political, social and economical life."<sup>67</sup> The junta was lead by Colonel Alpaslan Türkes who declared in the coup's day that this had been accomplished and the armed forces had taken power in the country due to the crisis that the country was facing. He promised that new free elections would be held as soon as possible. General Cemal Güsel was elected president and prime minister at the same time.

The DP was banned since the military said that it had not respected the constitution during its years in government and violated other institutions such as the press, armed forces and schools. Besides, professors and intellectuals legitimated the coup and the extinction of DP affirming that this was within the Turkish law.

A new constitution was promulgated which would avoid any chance of power being monopolized by a single party. Created by a commission formed by the

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<sup>67</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 119.

NUC, this followed the principles that democracy could not exist if the institutions dated from the one-party system era of Turkey were kept the way they were. It was the most liberal constitution Turkey had had till then, supporting a civil government and also the creation of universities and autonomous media.

The military then created the National Security Council (NSC) that they would then have an autonomy recognized by the civilians to, together with the government, guarantee the order that had been just restored. In order to accelerate the economy, the NUC also created the State Planning Organization (SPO) that would plan the economy under five-year plan of development in the areas of investments, taxes, prices and international trade.

The results were considerable in the scope of the SPO and the growth of the GNP was in average 7% a year during the 1960's. Inflation also grew, but nothing compared to that of the last years of the Menderes government.

Another factor that also contributed to improve the economy of Turkey was the Turkish workers in Germany. Around 500 thousand Turks went to work there until 1971. The results were that those workers sent back their salaries to their families in German marks, making the Turkish economy dependent of those remittances.

Besides, the agrarian population of Turkey was reduced considerably, and the industrial development was accelerated. Turkey was not predominantly agrarian anymore. At the end of the 1960's Turkey already had a dynamic industrial sector and by 1973 this overtook agriculture.

The new constitution also renewed the system of electoral laws, implementing the proportional representation. That was an incentive for the proliferation of new political parties. This constitution was approved through a referendum in July 1961, although 40% of the population was against it, showing that the democrats still had strong support of the population and that they were afraid by the possible come back of the republican one-party system from before 1950. But that didn't happen; Turkey started to live a new reality with the end of a two-party system and the increasing of political fragmentation.<sup>68</sup>

In the October 1961 elections<sup>69</sup>, CHP was the winner, but with a smaller percentage of the votes compared to the 1957 election<sup>70</sup>. However its opposition was shared by three other parties: the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi/AP*), the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi/YTP*) and the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi/CKMP*). The AP and the YTP were the strongest oppositions and together they got 48.5% of the votes. İnönü was elected prime minister for the third time by CHP, but at the first time in history through a coalition with Ragıp Gümüşpala from AP<sup>71</sup>. The president would be Cemal Gürsel. İnönü always had a big prestige with the military, since the Independence War. In 1962 the coalition was extended to the YTP<sup>72</sup>. This was another big change in the political system from Turkey, since for the first time a political party couldn't get an absolute

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<sup>68</sup> SAYARI, op. cit., p 13.

<sup>69</sup> From then on there was a bicameral parliament elected every four years under a system of proportional representation.

<sup>70</sup> There was a fall from 41% to 36% of the votes of the 1957 elections to the one in 1961, that corresponded to 173 seats in the parliament, followed by AP that had 34% of the votes (158 seats).

<sup>71</sup> The coalition CHP and AP would last from 1961 to 1964.

<sup>72</sup> The coalition with YTP lasted till December 1963.

majority in the elections and the majority party rule was replaced by a coalition of minority governments.<sup>73</sup>

Although several workers rights were once again assured (such as the right for strike) the Confederation of the Workers' Union of Turkey was created (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu/TÜRKİŞ*). TÜRKİŞ was unofficially affiliated to the AP, which made the government to take control over the workers. After that, in 1967, some of their members broke away and formed the Confederation Revolutionary Workers' Union (*Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu/DİSK*) that had the support from the newly created Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi/TİP*). So the new state had a social character giving civil rights to the workers and universities.

Gümüşpala died in 1964, and was replaced by Süleyman Demirel who gradually turned the AP into the biggest successor of the DP<sup>74</sup>. The support of the voters for the AP was demonstrated in the local elections of 1963 when this party got the majority of the votes. Anyway, the success of the AP lead by Demirel would be consolidated in the following elections in 1965.

In 1965 the AP got an absolute majority in the parliament, followed by CHP and by MP<sup>75</sup>, and got to form a government. But Demirel was still under the eyes of the military that were cautious about the developments of the Turkish politics. Although there was a visible economic growth during this decade, the military and civilians were still not totally satisfied, due also to the still high levels of social differences in the country.

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<sup>73</sup> SAYARI, op. cit., p 9.

<sup>74</sup> The use of the term "Democrat" by any new party had been banned.

<sup>75</sup> AP: 53% of the votes (240 seats), CHP: 28% of the votes (134 seats) and MP: 6% of the votes (31 seats).

Externally Turkey was not in an isolated position in the global sphere anymore. It was inside the Cold War reality. But its alignment with the Americans started to be criticized from Turkish nationalists and leftists. Turkish foreign policy became a really important issue in politics.

Once again the Cyprus erupted. Even with the creation of a Republic in the island in 1960, with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president, in 1963 the two communities came into conflict. Several nationalists supported a Turkish intervention, disobeying the American recommendations of non-intervention. But this intervention would happen in 1971, demonstrating a redirection of the Turkish foreign policy towards Europe and away from USA. But at the end of the 1960's the North American influence in the Middle East was already consolidated and that would weaken the Turkish position in the region.

In 1969 Demirel won again the elections, with a smaller AP majority. But that wouldn't change much in the governmental structure<sup>76</sup>. However a faction of the AP, unhappy with Demirel's AP, founded the Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti/DkP*). Besides, the leftists and the political right were also unhappy with the way politics were being run, and new parties started to be formed: the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/MHP*) led by Türkeş, the center-right Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi/GP*) led by Turhan Feyzioglu and the Islamic oriented National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi/MNP*) led by Necmettin Erbakan. But this bigger fragmentation of the right would just bring more political instability.

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<sup>76</sup> AP: 46% (256 seats) e CHP: 27% (143 seats).



The situation in Turkey started to get worse at the beginning of the 1970's. Unemployment rates were high due to the population growth and there were not enough jobs to absorb it. The left started also to turn them against the government. Because the TİP had been really harmed in the 1969 elections because of the abolition of an electoral law from 1961. The left began to call for a new coup getting together with radical officials, and started a process of a new "National Democratic Revolution".

Demirel's intention to weaken the TİP, and consequently weaken also the DİSK in favor of the TÜRKiŞ, led several workers to start a series of protests in the Istanbul/Marmara region in June 1970, putting an end to order in the streets. By 1971, Turkey was full of workers' protests, leftists students, neo-fascists militants and even Islamists.

On March 12<sup>th</sup> 1971 the Turkish armed forces sent a memorandum requiring the formation of a national government that would take the necessary measures to re-establish order in the country, something that Demirel couldn't do.

Demirel then resigned, but made it clear that his party would support a new government that would come to power. This coup promoted the imprisonment of many revolutionaries and their mentors. A lot of guns were found, suspects were jailed and political parties considered radicals (the TİP and the MNP) were banned. "The coup of 12 March [1971] lowered the curtain on the rebellious generation of 1968. The 12<sup>th</sup> of March marked the beginning of the mass imprisonment of the rebellious young."<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> MANGO, op. cit., p 70.

### 3.5 THE 1971 COUP

The military calmed down the country, but the March 12th 1971 coup was a measure that the Turkish politics found difficult to control. The left, officially represented by the banning of the TIP, was attacked in a way to pacify the workers that had rebelled. Nihat Erim was appointed to be the leader of the transition government<sup>78</sup>. Besides the banning of the leftist parties, strikes were forbidden and martial law was declared in several Turkish provinces. The political life of the country had stopped. Erim declared that the constitution of 1961 was too liberal and amended it.<sup>79</sup> Erim said that the constitution wasn't opened to socialism, but for a social democracy. In the summer of 1973 new elections were held under the amended constitution after order was re-established.

After some discussion and disagreements about the choice of a new president, the armed forces said that the politicians should choose the new president who would be elected only with their approval. The person finally was chosen: Admiral Fahri Korutürk, and he was elected in April 1973.

In the 1973 elections, the AP and the CHP shared power. But some voters supported political Islam and avoided directly participating in Turkish politics, directed their preferences to center-right parties. However some islamists formed their to replace the banned MNP. Necmettin Erbakan formed the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*/MSP).

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<sup>78</sup> He had the support from AP and from CHP as well.

<sup>79</sup> "Virtually every institution of state and society was modified: the trade unions, the press, radio and television, the universities, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the assembly, the Senate and the Court of Appeal." AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., P 136.

A big change was about to happen inside the CHP. It had become a center-left social democrat party with the leadership of its general secretary Bülent Ecevit.

“The growing salience of Marxist and extreme nationalist ideologies in political life led them to modify their ideological orientations.”<sup>80</sup> However Ecevit had to face the party’s president İnönü who was on the military’s side. During a party conference in 1972, Ecevit was elected to be the new CHP president and İnönü gave up from politics.

With CHP’s victory at the 1973 elections, Ecevit was elected prime minister but without an absolute majority. In second place there was the AP and in third place, the MSP.<sup>81</sup> The fragmentation of the right was more serious than what it was expected. CHP couldn’t get an absolute majority inside the assembly and Ecevit tried to search for coalitions with the center-right parties who could get a 60% of the votes all together. But they were not in agreement with Ecevit. After failing to convince them to form this coalition, Ecevit proposed it to Erbakan, who accepted in 1974, affirming that both were searching for democracy and the assuring of the fundamental rights and liberties. Ecevit gave amnesty to all the revolutionaries jailed by the military. But the right opposed this measure saying that it was a step towards the anarchy in the country. After that the new revolutionary and party movements started.

Young revolutionaries who found the radical Dev-Geç too moderate set up Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left), which after became DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), an organization dedicated to acts of terror. Marxist Kurdish separatists, who had found their voice in the Turkish Workers Party (TİP), regrouped in the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths (DDKO). On the right, Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş returned to Turkey and took control of a small party which he renamed Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in 1969.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> SAYARI, op. cit., p 14.

<sup>81</sup> CHP: 33% (185 seats), AP: 29% (149 seats), MSP: 12% (48 seats).

<sup>82</sup> MANGO, op. cit., p 72.

In February 1974, Ecevit decided on a military intervention in Cyprus, and that was not good for the Turkish image abroad. A unity on Cyprus territory was long awaited and that would also make the Turkey-Greece relations calm down. The USA canceled their weapons supply to Turkey, which then impeded the Americans to use their bases in the territory.

Turkey had to support Turkish Cyprus materially. But internally Turks were proud of this intervention, something that represented independence of their foreign policy. Assured by his popularity, Ecevit was sure that he would get a majority in the following elections. He therefore resigned as the prime minister post in September 1974, abolished the coalition with Erbakan and left Turkey without a government for 241 days. But finally Erbakan (MSP) got together with Demirel (AP) in order to form the so-called Nationalist Front in March 1975 together with other right parties.

New elections would be held only in 1977 and Ecevit got the majority of the votes again, however without an absolute majority. The second runner was the AP. The MSP got weaker and the MHP stronger.<sup>83</sup> Demirel proposed the formation of a new coalition but that didn't last for too long since many members of AP left the party and supported Ecevit independently.

The two major parties acted in the interests of their leaders rather than on behalf of the 'national consensus' of becoming more powerful and articulate, it was still not able to dictate politics to the parties. Elections had failed to provide stability, and political life became even more polarized and political violence continued unabated.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> CHP: 41% (213 seats); AP: 37% (189 seats), MSP: 8% (24 seats), MHP: 6% (16 seats).

<sup>84</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 143.

Movements of violence occurred in the country between left-wings and right-wings. After many deaths, Ecevit couldn't restore law and order in the country and declared martial law in December 1978 in 13 Turkish provinces. His unsuccessful try to put an end to the terrorism was one of the main reasons why he lost the support of the population. Even with the martial law, terrorism in the country went on. The violence spread in universities and also in movements like the DİSK.

The situation was uncontrollable. Inflation was really high, leaving the Turkish economy in a critical state. Similarly, foreign policy was impractical. Demirel tried his best to attract new foreign capital to Turkey. An agreement was signed with the European Economic Community (EEC) in September 1963, aiming a future full membership after this complicated phase that the country was facing. At the same time Greece also quickened its process of adhesion to the block, which was signed in 1979.

Turkey was also being affected by the oil crisis during the 1970's. It couldn't pay for its oil supplies anymore and its situation at the end of the decade was serious. Notwithstanding the situation and losing support in the senate, Ecevit resigned in October 1979 and gave his place again to Demirel who formed a minority government.

Demirel appointed Turgut Özal as the leader of a new State Planning Organization. He introduced an economic in January 1980 which made the Turkish Lira a convertible currency. Therefore exports increased considerably and started to compete in a better way in the international market. Despite the success of the program, the economy was not the only political victim of the

parties. The acts of violence were still taking place in the country and the parliament could not come to an agreement on choosing a new president for the country.

The end of the 1970's in the world was destabilized by the Iranian revolution and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Stability was something that the world wanted in Turkey, but also something that the political parties in power until then had not been able to institute. Since 1979 the leaders of the Turkish armed forces were already alarmed about the disorder in the country. Aware of the important role of Turkey in the world context, the Americans concluded that Turkey could not play a regional role under Demirel. Only the military could do that.

Finally, on September 12<sup>th</sup> 1980, the high command of the armed forces suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament and all the political parties and became government. The coup at this time had the great support of the middle classes. At the same time the other classes saw the military government a way of guarantying law and order in the country through an authoritarian government. The number of deaths during the 1970's was so big that the fear was constant. The population then gave their support to the military that somehow put an end to this fear.

#### 4 THE 1980 COUP AND THE CHANGES ON THE TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE

After the coup of September 12<sup>th</sup> 1980, General Kenan Evren took over as Head of State, with Bülent Ulusu as Prime Minister. Through several announcements to the population, they denounced the former governments.

The population was aware of the military's intentions, so they trusted them on their mission to save the state. They promised that they would do that in a drastic and impartial way. For that reason, they once again formed a National Security Council (NSC).

After order was restored, attention then turned to a new constitution. The NSC wanted to renew the whole political system of Turkey through this constitution, to get away from the liberal system that was instituted with the constitution of 1961. Any activity that could risk the unity of the state would be considered illegal.

The coup of 1980 had a much bigger impact on the Turkish party system compared to the two former coups. While the 1960 coup was accomplished in order just to ban the DP, one of the two biggest parties of that time, and the one in 1971 had just banned two parties that were considered harmful to the political order (the TİP and the MNP) the one in 1980 had many more revolutionary purposes in mind so as to change the political system of Turkey.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> SAYARI, Sabri; ESMER, Yılmaz. **Politics, parties & elections in Turkey**. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p 15.

The first measures that were taken by the NSC was to suspend the old constitution, dissolve the parliament, forbid strikes, ban all political parties as well as their leaders, and take away their political rights for a stipulated period of 10 years. The military suspended all the local governments that were considered suspect and a threat to the new national order. The left was totally restrained by the military rule that also implicated a rather strong program to combat terrorism. A lot of people were arrested, taken into custody and tortured. Those acts of torture were denounced by the international society of that time.

The military wanted to de-politicize the society through measures they had already taken. They promised drastic changes in every aspect of Turkish life but left the economy and foreign policy untouched. As a part of those measures, there was the restriction against the creation of new party organizations. The parties couldn't form youth or women's branches, and students, academics and civil servants could not be affiliated to them. In this way, the military weakened the organization of parties.

The interruption of electoral and parliamentary politics through three military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980 provide even more striking evidence concerning the efforts of the military and bureaucratic elites to the sanctions imposed on political party elites, and the introduction of institutional changes have had a strong impact on the dynamics of the party system.<sup>86</sup>

#### 4.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF 1982

In October 1981, it was settled on that a committee would write the new constitution. This new, upcoming constitution would be the most detailed and

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 26.



largest constitution that Turkey had ever had. Firstly, a draft was presented to the population which was afraid of the extreme power that would be given to the President and the quantity of freedom would be suppressed, such as the freedom of the press and unions.

Through a referendum in November 1982, the new constitution was approved by 91% of the population and simultaneously, General Evren was elected as President for the next seven years. This high approval by the population, even though they were not completely happy about its conditions, was a way of protest voting, explained by the will of the voters to put an end to the years of military dominance in the government. It was not that they were not happy with the way politics were being handled during those years, but they felt that it was time to return to democracy.

Turkey had already had four long decades of democratic life in their history and during this period of time, the government had been changed several times. In this phase, for less than five years had the military taken care of the government. But there are still strong bonds between the military and the Turkish political life even today, and residues of military involvement inside the government are still present.

The generals then permitted new parties to be formed, but with the approval of the junta. None of them could be established, if the majority of members belonged to the old political order that was dissolved by the coup of 1980 or if they were considered to be against the objectives of the new state. For those reasons, the creation of two new political parties; the Social Democratic Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Parti/SODEP*) by Erdal İnönü; and the Great Turkey Party by Demirel,

was hindered by the military. The first was kept away from the following elections and the second was banned soon after its founding because of alleged close resemblances to the banned AP.

A new electoral law was instituted, stipulating that the parties which couldn't get a minimum of 10% of the votes at the elections would not get any seats at parliament<sup>87</sup>. Thus they wanted to prevent the fragmentation of the party system. The objective of the military was to establish a two-party system with two centrists and moderate parties, so there would not be any leftist, ultra nationalist nor Islamic parties.<sup>88</sup> The two political parties created and supported by the military were: the center-right Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*/MDP) directly created by the military, and the center-left Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti*/HaP).

However, a third party emerged: the so-called Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*/ANAP) created by Turgut Özal. Its ideology gave emphasis on free market economics and was considered a center-right party. According to the military, the first should be the party on government and the second would represent an opposition inside the parliament. They believed that even MDP or the HaP would be able to follow the philosophy instituted by the coup of 1980, and they hoped that the ANAP would represent a party with little political strength.

The military government appointed Özal as deputy PM to run the economy, since he was the person trusted by the international creditors but his appointed did

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<sup>87</sup> Afterwards, this would be the cause of the elimination in the parliament of MHP and CHP in the elections of 1995 and 1999 respectively, and in the establishment of a government with only two parties (AKP and CHP) in 2002.

<sup>88</sup> SAYARI, op. cit, p 15.

not work out the way it was supposed to, and in 1982 he resigned. As a result, he joined a private employer's association which he enabled him to create his own party. According to him, ANAP would represent all the existing political segments from before 1980 and it would be considered neither right nor left. "It was conservative like the JP, traditionalist like the Islamists, nationalist like the neo-fascists, and left-of-center like the RPP because it believed in social justice."<sup>89</sup>

#### 4.2 THE 1983 ELECTIONS

During the electoral campaigns, neither MDP nor HaP seemed to be able enough to catch the attention of the voters. The people were looking at Özal to be a person that would bring democracy back to the country. Elections were held in 1983, and despite Evren's announcement telling the public not to vote for Özal's party, ANAP won an absolute majority in the parliament, followed by HaP and MDP.<sup>90</sup> Thus, the voters were able to show their independence and also a way to get rid of military influence in politics. Özal hoped to get the center-right together again. This represented the end of the political dominance of the two traditional Turkish political parties till then: CHP and DP in the 1950's and CHP and AP between 1960 and 1980.

But new parties were about to be created, even though all of them had strong bonds with the parties from the pre-1980 era. On the center-right they were: the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi/DYP*) founded under a proxy of Demirel, even having a name related to the Islamism. But it could not get the support of

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<sup>89</sup> AHMAD, F. **Turkey: the quest for identity**. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003, p 154.

<sup>90</sup> ANAP got 45% of the votes (211 seats), HaP 30% (117 seats) and MDP 23% (71 seats).

Necmettin Erbakan who also found a proxy party, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*/RP). On the center-left there was: the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokratik Halkçı Parti*/SHP) founded by Erdal İnönü through a merger between the HaP and the SODEP, and the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*/DSP) founded by Ecevit's wife.

Consequently, the efforts of the military to reduce the fragmentation of the party system had failed and the number of parties grew considerably. But the policies of all those parties were similar, so the differences between them were more personal than ideological. It is important to remember that in Turkey there is a big movement of politicians that migrate from one party to the other. This party infidelity proves that it is not only the voters that change from one party to another, but also the politicians themselves do that.

The ANAP's strength was consolidated in the local elections during the following year, when it won the majority of the cities. The HaP and the MDP performed weakly in those elections, and the new ANAP's opposition was locally surging with the SHP and the DYP.

#### 4.2.1 The modernization process of Turkey during Özal's governments

Özal left the military to take care of the order while he took care of the economy. The growth of the economy during the first years of Özal's government was surprising, having an average of 7% of growth per year. He governed Turkey during an uncommon period of political stability in Turkey and completely changed the economy, moving it away from the traditional

reliance on state control and tried to open it to the world market through deregulation, privatization and openness to foreign investment.<sup>91</sup> He started to support the exports, principally when imports were liberalized, using the capital levy given to the exporters. The tourism sector also presented high levels of growth.

The biggest efforts of Özal were on energy and communication fields which according to him were key sectors of development that were not yet up to date in Turkey. Even his political rivals considered him an entrepreneur but he was not doing something new, he was simply following the tendencies of the 1980's of open society, free markets and globalization.

Özal created a program of incentives to accelerate the process of moneymaking. He cared a lot about the success of the individuals. The two biggest examples that the Turkish society had were the families of Koç and Sabancı, who from small scale trading of the 1950's became big business dynasties after they invested in the Balkans, Russia and on the Turkic republics created after the fall of the USSR. What Özal wanted was for people to get rich quickly.

Although the economy was passing through dramatic changes during those years, the biggest problem of inequity that had caused the largest conflicts during the past decades had not been solved. Privileges were granted in an unequal way to the different social classes of Turkey. The situation became so serious that the World Bank came to qualify Turkey in the 1980's as one of the seven top countries

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<sup>91</sup> SAYARI, op. cit., p 42.

in the world with the highest level of social differences.<sup>92</sup> There was a lack of education and money, and the population didn't have the same access to knowledge, principally one of foreign languages, which was extremely necessary in the integration of the work market in this new Turkish reality.

The opening of the Turkish economy to the world market in the 1980's, and the state's abandonment of its previous role as guarantor of economic security through a controlled economy, created enormous economic dislocations and visibly exacerbated differences between rich and poor. The government began to privatize industry and dismantle the already threadbare social safety net. Despite improvement in the economy, unemployment and income differentials increased. Yet discussion of poverty, inequality, and injustice in politics and the media fell out of fashion, replaced by a focus on identity issues.<sup>93</sup>

The inflation rates were high, so the banks were giving credit to people who had become rich quickly and after obtaining this "easy credit", could invest in their enterprises and charge high prices for their goods and services. This high inflation gave immediate privileges, principally to the currency speculators. Even members of Özal's family were following this rhythm: his wife Semra and his son, who founded the Istanbul Stock Exchange.

At the same time that the traditional Turkish elite was really different from this class of the "new rich" that emerged. This process of enrichment of the population also started to cause the creation of new "Islamic elites" that had members who ranged from businessmen to Islamic activists. Therefore, the military and Özal's government were supporting Islamic values since the 1980 coup, noticing that Islam could be a unifying force of people who would move away from any threat of growth of the left parties in Turkey. Among the

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<sup>92</sup> WHITE, J. **Islamist mobilization in Turkey**: a study in venacular politics. 2 ed. Washington: University of Washington Press, 2003, p 42.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 123.

programs that the government was instituting were the construction of new mosques and the incentive to Islam schooling.<sup>94</sup>

Özal wanted to introduce economic liberalization, but didn't take care of the legal instruments of control to regulate and limit its excesses. Unfortunately, he was not giving enough incentive to ethical values inside society, and this weakened the public's opinion about his initiatives.

Nevertheless, Turkey's society and economy were transformed under Özal. Turkey had become a consumer society [...] Everything was available to the new rich [...] Cars, especially imported cars, became a status symbol, as did works of art, antiques and rare books [...] Universities were privatized to serve this new clientele and to produce the business managers which the private sector constantly needed. English was now the lingua franca of this class and positions were even advertised in the Turkish press in English, a language foreign to the majority.<sup>95</sup>

After the end of his mandate as prime ministers, Özal started to become worried on how he would keep himself in power. However, a new obstacle was about to emerge: the political leaders that had been banned from their political life for 10 years, salvaged their rights with a referendum in September 1987 that was seen vital by the public, but that received a strong opposition by Özal. With the return of Demirel (DYP), Ecevit (DSP), Erbakan (RP) and Türkeş at the Nationalist Labor Party (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi/MÇP*), Özal was again threatened by his opposition.

By disqualifying former politicians and creating new institutions, the generals succeeded in depoliticizing the entire system. By the time the political rights of former politicians – Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan and Türkeş – were restored with the 1987 referendum, the entire political architecture of the country had been altered [...] There was no longer any significant difference between the parties save for the rhetoric; that was the end of ideology.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> AHMAD, F. **The making of modern Turkey**. London: Routledge, 1993, p 221.

<sup>95</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 161.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 168.

### 4.3 THE 1987 ELECTIONS

Özal quickly decided to bring the elections forward before his rivals, principally DYP, were prepared. Then he made a modification to the electoral law that would favor his party in the elections, inducing a larger number of seats to it. Therefore in the elections of 1987, ANAP was the biggest winner, followed by the SHP and the DYP.<sup>97</sup> This result underwent a lot of critic from the opposition. The levels of popularity from ANAP had already fallen considerably in the first four years of Özal's government, and principally after the return of Demirel, ANAP lost even more strength at the elections. Anyway, the two victories of ANAP in 1983 and 1987 consolidated it as dominant in the party system of Turkey during the 1980's.<sup>98</sup>

After 1987 critics went on the offensive even more. The media, trade unions and pressure groups started to get together in order to bring about ANAP's fall. In 1989, the first sign that the critics were succeeding was the failure of ANAP at the local elections. After so much pressure in trying to get Özal to resign, he announced the launch his candidature for the presidency. Still counting on his majority in the parliament, he won, becoming the second civilian president.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> ANAP got a total of 9 million votes while SHP got 6 million, even though the difference in the number of seats in the parliament was much bigger. ANAP got a total of 36% of the votes (292 seats), SHP 24% (99 seats) and DYP 19% (59 seats). The other parties couldn't get the minimum of 10% in order to get seats in the parliament.

<sup>98</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 16.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 62.



But this didn't make him lose his "day-to-day government". The new prime minister, Yıldırım Akbulut had little prestige in society and was Özal's puppet. His first years as president were marked by immense instability. The Kurds increased their pressure in the southeast while political killings started to take place in Istanbul and Ankara. In a way to restrain this, the government created an antiterrorist law giving power to the police and army in order to contain the situation.

Özal also restarted the process of membership in the European Economic Community. His argument was that the European civilization was born in Turkish territory and that the economic stability could only be reached with the rhythm of free market that Turkey was following, and to reach the same economic level as the Europeans would just be a matter of time. But the European Commission was not convinced and after two years of negotiations, declared that the two sides were not yet ready to integrate. But at least the eligibility of Turkey for a future membership was recognized.

Turkey, under Özal's presidency, was also worried about its new role inside NATO, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The preoccupation of NATO with USSR was not that alarming anymore. Finally the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 would totally change the Turkish situation.

Özal allowed the use of bases for defense against Iraq and closed the pipeline that transported oil to Turkey. However he didn't get the support necessary of the armed forces in order to intervene military in Iraq. Besides the action against Kuwait, Iraq started to attack the Kurdish population in the north of its

territory, promoting a wave of refugees that entered in Turkish territory.

Turkey then created a safe haven to receive them. The fact that the influx of Kurds made with the Kurdish insurgency more dangerous and harmed the economy.

This support for the allies led to strong opposition from the Turkish population, but Özal insisted that the profit to Turkey in case of an ally's victory would be much bigger than the losses that it would have boycotting Iraq. He was right and that was proved at the end of the war. Iraq was Turkey's second biggest trade partner and critics accused Özal for the loss of this market. But the boycott against Iraq would have come anyway because of the UN resolution which Turkey accepted.

In other words, he ignored the critics and aligned Turkey to the probable winners of the conflict.<sup>100</sup> He was right about who would win the war, and after could take the advantages from this alignment to the country. But the victory would not help ANAP in the following elections. Its popularity was being transferred to its biggest rival, the DYP. Trying to recuperate popularity, Mesut Yılmaz came to replace Akbulut in the post of prime minister. He represented someone with much more prestige and respect than his antecessor. Before the economic situation of the country get even worse, he decided to yet again bring forward parliamentary elections.

The collapse of the USSR and the new goals of the Turkish foreign policy had a really big influence in the changes of political values and behavior of the voters. The preoccupation started to turn around issues such as ethnic identity and

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<sup>100</sup> It is believed also that Özal thought that with a possible partition of the Iraqi territory, the Kurdish north of the country would join the Turkish Federation.

religiosity. Therefore after that, parties that had strong feelings of religion and ethnic nationalism were getting a larger space inside the politics in the country. The movement from center to the extreme right was much bigger than the one from center to left. The 1990's would consolidate those facts.<sup>101</sup>

#### 4.4 THE 1991 ELECTIONS

The elections in the 1990 would bring again a high level of political fragmentation, coming against the military ideas of the 1980's coup. The elections held in October 1991 showed the beginning of this process. The biggest winner, as expected, was Demirel's DYP, followed by ANAP, SHP and RP.<sup>102</sup> Despite the similarities between ANAP and DYP, Demirel still felt that the country needed changes<sup>103</sup>. Because of that, he refused a possible coalition with ANAP, staying in opposition, and preferring one with the social democrats that was established in 1991. As prime ministers, Demirel felt that working with president Özal would not be an easy task. What happened was that while Özal would follow with his foreign policy, Demirel would be busy with the economic problems. "In theory, the government was strong and capable of providing stability and solutions to Turkey's problems."<sup>104</sup> In 1992 the inflation rates and the external debt raised to levels out of control.

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<sup>101</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 49.

<sup>102</sup> DYP got 27% of the votes (178 seats), ANAP 24% (115 seats), SHP 20% (88 seats) and RP 17% (62 seats).

<sup>103</sup> Demirel acted much more carefully than Özal. He also wanted to enrich Turkey, but in a much more slower and calmer way.

<sup>104</sup> AHMAD, 2003, *op.cit.*, p 158.

Özal started to develop a program of influence in the newly-created Turkic republics of the former USSR. For example, he supported Azerbaijan in the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh against Armenia, but he didn't count on the surprise that was about to come: Russia supported the Armenians. It was Özal's main goal to put Turkey between the 10 or 15 biggest economies in the world, and according to him<sup>105</sup>, an alliance with those new countries from Central Asia and Caucasus would be the key to make the 21<sup>st</sup> century the century of the Turks and Turkey. However Özal died in April 1993, 10 months after this announcement.

Demirel then succeeded Özal as Turkey's president, and decided to point as prime minister his protégée Tansu Çiller<sup>106</sup> who became the first female prime minister of Turkey. The business class gave strong support to Çiller. Demirel believed that she would obey all his decisions and would stride in harmony with him. He came to regret his decision.<sup>107</sup>

At the end of 1993, the external debt of Turkey already reached 67 billion dollars, and there were no more expectations of more foreign capital in the country since Russia was about to default and did not represent any threat. There was a huge escape of capital from Turkey and Tansu Çiller searched for help from the IMF which required several reforms from the Turkish government including the devaluation of the currency. This was considered the worst economic crisis that Turkey had ever seen. Çiller's administration faced two issues; the rise of the

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<sup>105</sup> According to his speech during the Third Economic Congress in İzmir, in June 1992.

<sup>106</sup> Tansu Çiller had already affiliated to DYP in Demirel's campaign in 1991, in a way to ameliorate the image of the party and modernize its pillars.

<sup>107</sup> MANGO, A. **The Turks today**. Manchester: John Murray Publishers, 2004, p 94.

Kurdish insurgency in the southeast of their territory and relations with European Union.

#### 4.4.1 The Kurdish Insurgency

The Kurdish issue started in 1984 when they felt excluded during the years of progress of Turkey. Since the Kemalist era they were not ethnically separated and were considered a part of the Turkish nation when speaking about ethnicity and race. Over the years, the Kurds were not recognized as a national minority and the Turkish government continued considering the Turkish and the Kurdish as parts of the same nation.

While the Turks affirm that the Kurds were given the same rights by the state, the Kurdish started to contest this claim, and demanded greater cultural freedom for the government. Most of the advantages brought by the free market were directed to western Turkey, leaving the East (the region where the Kurdish were) with high rates of unemployment and with a great number of landless.

The Kurdish cultural freedoms were even more restrained during the coup of 1980, when the generals prohibited the use of any language but the Turkish in the Republic's territory<sup>108</sup>. So Kurdish could not be used anymore. Besides that, they were victims of constant humiliations came from the military that were taking care of the region.

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<sup>108</sup> Even their son's names should be Turkish names.

But the paradox was that some Kurds were members of the national parliament. But since Kurdish party, the People's Labour Party was banned from the elections, these politicians got along principally with the social democrats in order to be candidate themselves.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan/ PKK*) is a militant organization, aiming to create an independent Kurdish state that would include southeastern Turkey. Initially they had Marxist rhetoric, which was replaced by the Islamic discourse one after the fall of the USSR. In the 1990's, they started to get more weapons came principally from northern Iraq that also counts with a Kurdish population. Also there were some secret economic support from Iran, Syria and Greece.

In March 1993, after a cease-fire proposed by the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, the government started to be more active in the region. According to the Turkish government the Kurds are one of the 25 or 26 different ethnic or religious groups that live in Turkey. All of them have equal rights since no group is in a majority.<sup>109</sup>

Following this wave of repression, the Kurdish People's Labour Party was totally banned in 1993. However in 1994 the creation of the People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi/HADEP*) was permitted. Ethnically based parties are not allowed in Turkey, so the program of HADEP doesn't contain any reference to Kurdish nationalism and is about democratization and cultural pluralism. The Kurds represent approximately 20% of the Turkish population, being the second biggest ethnic group in the country. So when we speak about the

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<sup>109</sup> KUSHNER, D. Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey. **Journal of Contemporary History**, v. 32, n. 2, p. 219-233, apr 1997.

ethnic issue in the political choice, it is natural that this group is considered of a big relevance.

The elections that followed the creation of HADEP would confirm what was expected: its success was regionalized and concentrated in the East and Southeast regions, where there is a Kurdish majority. We can affirm that between one fourth and one third of the Kurds voted to HADEP. But even among the Kurds we can find considerable differences. A group of Kurds tend to support center-right parties especially the DYP, while the center-left parties doesn't receive so much support from them.<sup>110</sup>

Another thing that deserves attention is the fact that with the migrations of the Kurds to other Turkish cities in the West and the South, support for HADEP increased considerable in cities like Adana and Mersin, that received a bigger number of Kurdish migrants.

Internationally Turkey started to receive strong criticism and asked to solve this Kurdish issue as soon as possible. The Kurds started to receive more and more support principally from European countries. They were thousands of Kurds in Europe by the 1990's and the Kurdish issue was becoming a key issue in the process of the Turkish membership in the Europe Union.<sup>111</sup>

All this Kurdish issue<sup>112</sup> caused a big impact in the last year on the context of the Turkish society and nationalism in the country. The population started to give more importance to the national values. Even president Demirel stated that

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<sup>110</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 142.

<sup>111</sup> Among the EU exigences, in the issue of the human rights, it was settled that the Kurds should have guaranteed the right for education and mass media in the Kurdish language. Besides the abolition of the death penalty.

<sup>112</sup> Such as the sunni-alevi question.

the concept of nationalism is based in principles such as “common destiny, constitutional patriotism and civic identity”<sup>113</sup>.

#### 4.4.2 Europe Union

Since the end of the Second World War, Turkey started to align itself inside the new routes that the world was taking to the free market. It started to become a member of organizations such as NATO and OEEC. It was something natural that Turkey would also want to belong to the idea of “European unity” that was merging at that time.

The relations between Turkey and the European Union started in the end of the 1950's under the initiative of the Democrat Party, culminating in the signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, guaranteeing an associate membership for Turkey. But this relationship was full of ups and downs. The military interventions of 1971 and 1980 made the EU suspended economic and military assistance for Turkey.<sup>114</sup> And in 1980, the Turks (represented by Demirel) stopped the membership agreement that had been proposed together with Greece that became a member of the block in the following year.

Since then, the attempts to attain membership after the reestablishment of democracy in 1983 were all frustrated. With the collapse of the USSR, the European Union was under a level of pressure without precedents: the emergent

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<sup>113</sup> KUSHNER, D. Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey. **Journal of Contemporary History**, v. 32, n. 2, p. 219-233, apr 1997.

<sup>114</sup> YESILADA, B. Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. **Middle East Journal**. V 56, n 1, winter 2002.



democracies of Eastern and Central Europe wanted to be a part of the bloc as soon as possible. The membership to the EU represents the realization of their dream of returning to Europe after the artificial division of the Iron Curtain. Besides symbolizing the re-entry in the European family, the accession contributed to stabilize their young democracies and to create a context for the development of balanced market economies from the social point of view. The EU offers socio-economic advantages that will consolidate the democratic development through the access to a united market and to bigger financial assistance. It still provides bigger possibilities of direct investment and economic growth, as well as a steady enterprise context and progressive social politics. In Turkey there was a feeling that they shouldn't be out of this integration process.<sup>115</sup>

In 1995 a Customs Union (CU) was signed that guaranteed better relations between the EU and Turkey, opening the Turkish market of 65 million consumers for European companies. Tansu Çiller believed that this Customs Union would be the first step to a full membership, but critics argued that this was what the Europe Union ever wanted with Turkey.

They were right. But the CU was useful for the Turkish industry to develop and be able to compete with Europe. In 1997 Turkey was surprised with the result of the Luxembourg Summit where it was not included in the list of the countries that were in the EU plan of membership that included countries with weaker economies such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus, whose accession to the block went against international treaties that had established its creation.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> COMISSÃO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS. **Rumo a uma União alargada**. Available in <[http://europa.eu.int/enlargement/report2002/strategy\\_pt.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/enlargement/report2002/strategy_pt.pdf)>. Access in: Jan 17 2005.

<sup>116</sup> YESILADA, op cit.

Ciller expected that this signature would help her in the following elections. She also alleged that a larger approximation with Europe would mean a way to stop political Islam. She was wrong.

#### 4.4.3 Islamist mobilization

The local elections in 1994 represented a beginning and a sign of the reality Turkey would face in the following year. The RP was the biggest winner getting the control of most of the Turkish cities. On the other side ANAP was already showing a national as well as local weakening. It is also worth remembering that each Turkish region tends to have a different electoral behavior, therefore the performance of each party depends also from geographical factors.<sup>117</sup> These elections had a high voter turnout, which can be explained also by the population growth of the big cities that led the people to become more worried about the biggest problems of urban living.

Among the cities where the RP won were Istanbul and Ankara. Having the control of the biggest Turkish cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir<sup>118</sup>, gave the party a bigger projection to a larger number of people and a bigger visibility in national politics. This also facilitated the party's ability to gain access to new sources of patronage that could be used to recruit new activists and supporters.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> DYP, for instance, had a tendency to win the elections in smaller western cities, but have a relatively weak result in the big cities.

<sup>118</sup> The three cities together represent one third of the whole Turkish electorate.

<sup>119</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 73.

This phenomenon of popularity of RP happened principally in the poorest peripheral regions of the biggest cities (*gecekondu*) that received migrants coming from Turkey's countryside, and tended to support the RP. Those large scale migrations tended to change the nature of the mass aspirations.<sup>120</sup> Other factors also include the unhappiness with the policies of the center-left and center right parties. So among the two hypotheses that explain the rise of the support to the Islamic parties, the one of *protest vote* and the one of *rise in Islamism*, the first one seems to be stronger.

The rivalry between secularists and Islamists became sharper while the Islamist parties started to get a larger public preference.<sup>121</sup> Some Ottoman values started to come back to people's minds. At the same time this rise of the Islamic values in the society caused a reaction among the secularists, who also started to exalt their values to the society.

Economic reasons led the poorer classes to support the Islamist. The people did not choose to vote for Islamist parties because of their religious beliefs. The majority of the Islamist voters showed inflation, unemployment, corruption and the lack of infrastructure in the regions where they lived for the way they voted.<sup>122</sup>

In those *gecekondu* most of the adults (including housewives, students and retired people) were not participating in the economic life of the country, and a lot of those neighborhoods didn't have services such as banks, post offices and the

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<sup>120</sup> WHITE, op. cit., p 37.

<sup>121</sup> During the secularist reforms from Atatürk, the new instituted ideas had much more difficulty to penetrate in the most distant regions of the Republic. However this lack was fulfilled with the time with the institution of secular schooling, geographic mobility and most recently with the modernization of the mass media.

<sup>122</sup> WHITE, op. cit., p 79.

necessary number of doctors. So the RP started to mobilize this population, using a populist discourse to get the support of it.

This populism wasn't only represented in the person of their leaders, but also in the way that their messages reached the people. The party promoted even before its victory at the elections, community meetings with the people that came to show their necessities and interests. At the same time speeches maintained the same level of populism, covering issues such as Islamism and attacks on modernism.<sup>123</sup>

Once again it must be emphasized that the people's support for the RP doesn't have just religious fundamentals, although the structure of the network formed by the RP inside those *gecekondu* was linked to religious beliefs. Even the Islamic family structure of those regions helped in the popularity of the party; for instance, the man of the family convinced the other members also support the same party he was supporting.

The 1995 elections would prove the popularity of the RP. But notice that 41% of the people that voted to RP declared themselves as laic and respected the Kemalist values. During the same research, it was affirmed the trust of the Turks to their army, since 85% of the interviewed said it was the most reliable national institution, followed by the police (71%), the courts (60%), the parliament (54%) and below comes the government (49%). This bigger support to institutions that are inherited from the Kemalist era proved that the population still kept a sense of

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<sup>123</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 164.

nationalism and unity. As a result, the leader of RP, Erbakan, toned down his speech related to these institutions.<sup>124</sup>

#### 4.5 THE 1995 ELECTIONS

With the weakening of DYP after Çiller's government, the elections held in December 1995 revealed something new about the Turkish nation's politics: the RP attained a majority in the parliament. In second place, came DYP, followed by ANAP, DSP and CHP<sup>125</sup>. The popular appeal of RP was one of the main reasons that helped them to win these elections, and its victory proved a growth towards the influence of Islam and religious activity in Turkey.<sup>126</sup>

After much speculations, ANAP and DYP formed a coalition in March 1996, the "Mother Path", where it was settled that Mesut Yılmaz would be the prime minister in 1996 and Çiller in 1997. However, Erbakan did everything to attack the coalition, threatening Çiller with accusations of corruption. As tensions were rising inside the coalition, the DYP and ANAP proved to be unable to work together, thus Yılmaz resigned in June 1996.

It seemed natural that Erbakan would form the next coalition and even the business class agreed. He continued to attack Çiller with parliamentary investigations into her corruption but at the same time he secretly proposed a coalition with her party. So the unthinkable happened: the so-called "Welfare-Path"

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<sup>124</sup> ZUBAIDA, S. Turkish Islam and national identity. **Middle East Report**, n. 199, p 10-15, apr-jun 1996.

<sup>125</sup> RP with 21% (158 seats), DYP with 19% (135 seats), ANAP with 19% (132 seats), DSP with 14% (76 seats) and CHP, that re-emerged in the political scene in 1992 under its original name, with 10% (49 seats).

<sup>126</sup> SAYARI, op. cit., p 19.

coalition was finally formed in June 1996 even though Çiller presented herself as the guardian of secularism and anti-Islamist. Erbakan had become the first prime minister to come from an Islamist party in Turkey's history.

There were many reasons of the success of RP in these elections. Besides the theories of protest voting and Islamic mobilization, some secularists came to accuse the party of buying votes. But even throughout the elections, the way the RP's campaign was being conducted also helped the voter to decide: during its campaign, Erbakan appealed to every class of society with different aspirations, therefore managing to get together all the differences within a populist image.<sup>127</sup>

But from the beginning, he began to realise that he would endure strong opposition from the Secularists. The majority of the population's thoughts on rival political ideologies started to change after the 1995 elections. Till then there was rivalry between left and right, but now the conflicts between Secularists and Islamics seemed to become the main source of polarization in Turkey.

Another change in Turkish politics during the 1990's, was the establishment of the dominance of the center-right parties that dominated the scene in the 1950's till the 1980's (DP, AP and ANAP).<sup>128</sup> Since the beginning, due to much political instability, the economy presented signs of greater weakening. A lot of investments started to leave the country.

Erbakan always claimed that one of his main goals was the creation of a brotherhood between the Islamic countries, in a way to weaken the bonds of Turkey with the West. Soon after he was elected, he started to implement some of

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<sup>127</sup> WHITE, op. cit., p 121.

<sup>128</sup> SAYARI, op. cit., p 21.

these ideas. However, he noticed the impossibility to execute such ideas, when he saw the reality of the Turkey-Middle East relations. The USA started to criticize the government about visits the Erbakan was making to some countries such as Iran which were considered hostile by Washington.

Afterwards, worried about his image, Erbakan started to try and walk on the same line as the secularists. The Turkish press came to classify this new direction of the RP's government as simply the Islamic version of Secularism.<sup>129</sup> All this effort was not enough; his government was not making any effective change in the foreign policy. Besides not satisfying both sides, this moderate position of RP also wasn't meeting the military and the voters' ideas.

A specific event in February 1997 led to a showdown. The RP mayor of the city of Sincan promoted "Jerusalem Day" and supported Hamas and Hizbullah. The military responded with more pressure on the party denouncing it as Islamic and anti-constitutional. The NSC declared that political Islam was more dangerous than the Kurdish movement, and imposed on Erbakan, several measures that should be taken by him, measures in the educational system, in order to support the secularist values in it even more.

However, the DYP-RP coalition did not achieve the wished results, and some of DYP's members started to abandon the party, forcing Çiller to give it up, expecting to be asked to form a new government. This situation also forced Erbakan to resign. But president Demirel was not willing to support Çiller anymore, and proposed the formation of a new coalition together with DSP and ANAP, under Mesul Yılmaz, for the third time.

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<sup>129</sup> WHITE, op. cit., p 134.

Feeling the pressure from the government and from the military that their party was about to be dissolved, some members of the RP founded the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*/FP) in December 1997. “Each time the Islamist party was dissolved, its successor claimed to be more moderate and less Islamist.”<sup>130</sup> The expected occurred, and in January of the following year, the constitutional court banned the RP, and some party leaders, as Erbakan and the Istanbul city mayor, Recep Tayip Erdoğan, were also banned from a political life for 5 years and later sent to prison.

According to the court, the RP was banned because it was against the essence of the constitution. The military started a campaign in February 1999 that aimed an eradication of political Islam from education, business and other activities. The so-called “Green Capital” that financed Islamic parties, was forbidden.

The coalition lasted 16 months, when Yılmaz resigned in November 1998, because of parliamentary prosecution. He was replaced by Ecevit (DSP) who formed a coalition with independents in January 1999 that would prepare the country for a new election that would be held three months later.

#### 4.6 THE 1999 ELECTIONS

In 1999, national and local elections were held on the same day for the first time in Turkey’s history. They were marked by issues that were dominating the political situation of that time such as the tension between secularists and

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<sup>130</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 172.



Islamists, after the ban of RP, and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan that raised the popularity of Ecevit.

Consequently, DSP won the elections, followed by the far-right party MHP<sup>131</sup>, both benefited from the rising nationalist spirit at that time. The FP, harmed by the ban of RP, had its number of seats reduced when compared to its predecessor. ANAP and DYP had their number of seats strongly reduced, probably due to the corruption scandals during Çiller and Yılmaz's governments. And for the first time, CHP didn't get any seats at parliament.<sup>132</sup> The new spectrum of Turkish politics was facing this reality: the center-right, center-left and extremist parties represented groups from practically the same influence inside the parliament.

In the 1990's the Turkish electorate was no longer supporting the centrist parties anymore, and this was proved by the visible decline of ANAP and DYP. In the 1991 elections they were still able to attain the majority of seats in parliament; however in 1999 both hardly got any support from a quarter of the electorate. MHP was the one who benefited most from this movement of the preference of the voters and the rise of Nationalism in the 1990's.

But even though the preference for votes was going to extremist parties, the population was still considering itself mostly centrist. According to Çarkoğlu, there are two reasons for that: firstly "frequent manipulation of the election system by the incumbents to obtain electoral gains"; and secondly "the demands of the rapidly

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<sup>131</sup> That re-emerged first in 1983 as the Nationalist Labor Party, and then adopted its original name in 1993. In 1997, after the death of Türkeş, Devlet Bahçeli assumed the leadership of the party.

<sup>132</sup> The DSP got 22% of the votes (134 seats), MHP got 18% (126 seats), FP got 15% (102 seats), ANAP got 13% (88 seats) and DYP got 12% (83 seats).

growing and rapidly changing Turkish society.”<sup>133</sup> So another reason for these events taking place would also be the unhappiness of the population with their center-right parties.

Turkey had then moved to the extreme right. The Islamic votes, this time represented by the FP, were reduced, but still strong, in the national elections. But in the local elections they accomplished a great success. The same happened with HADEP, which despite not getting the 10% necessary to win seats in parliament won the local elections in several cities in the southeast of Turkey.<sup>134</sup> This was something new in Turkey: the results of the local elections were now not a simple reflex of the results in the national elections.

For the first time in Turkey, after the 1999 elections, research was carried out in order to analyze the behaviour of the voters, covering a series of topics such as religious values, economical status and political values. The variables used to analyze the results included age, gender and schooling level. Some conclusions of the research follow:<sup>135</sup>

- The center-left showed a stability of the votes, and the CHP is considered the most leftist party. It is the preference of the people that value secularist concepts and also gets, most of the time, votes from people with a higher social and schooling level.
- The center-right lost dramatically to the extreme right: DSP, the winner in the elections, has more strength in the big cities, and while secularist values are positive for the party, the schooling level of the people is not; ANAP is more popular among women, but loses

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<sup>133</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 43.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 19.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 94-110.

popularity where people have higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and schooling; DYP appeared to be a party of preference to older people, and curiously leftist direction to politics and religiosity are factors that are in favour to DYP;

- The extreme right party that most of the votes migrated to was the MHP, and not surprisingly receives the support from people with nationalist values and also from younger voters principally from rural areas; religion is a factor of great relevance in the choice of the voters of FP, as well as defence of the democratic values and human rights.

The geographic factor is also relevant in the evaluation of the results from the 1999 elections. While more developed and rich regions such as the Aegean, Marmara and Black Sea tend to have larger stability in support for centrist parties (either for left or right), in the least developed regions of the East and Southeast they present an anti-systematic and personal voting behavior tending to vote for parties with a pro-Islamic and nationalist discourse. "In other words, as long as developmental problems and disparities continue, the electoral bases of anti-systemic, nationalist, and pro-Islamist parties will most likely stay intact if not expand".<sup>136</sup>

Also according to the research, the large majority of the Turks declared themselves practising Muslims. Naturally the voters that said to be supporters of Secularist parties, such as CHP, are really low on the scale of religion, while this scale is much higher when we speak about the supporters of parties such as FP.

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<sup>136</sup> *Ibdi.*, 133.

However, still three fifths of the participants in this research said that a party operating on the basis of religion should not have a place inside Turkish politics.<sup>137</sup>

After the elections, a coalition between DSP, MHP and ANAP was formed, with Ecevit as prime minister still. Ecevit changed his speech totally from center-left to nationalist, satisfying the nationalist MHP. It was also natural that the main preoccupation of the coalition would be the economy. The coalition showed credibility and trust to the business society.

In 1997, the Europe Union excluded Turkey from its list of membership candidates<sup>138</sup>, and this left the country astonished. But in 1999, the Europe Union restarted the negotiations of a possible Turkish membership in the bloc, but only if the country could accomplish the necessary criteria to the access, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. Ecevit agreed on following the process.

In August 1999, a serious earthquake hit the region of Izmit. The Turkish government failed to come to the aid of the victims efficiently in contrast to the foreign teams. Economic problems also emerged because of the earthquake. This caused great discontent and demands for measures from the nationalists.

Ecevit sought help from the IMF. This forced Turkey to review its concepts of direction about the economy. In the year 2000, Turkey showed a strong growth in its economy and imports. But the prescriptions imposed by the IMF caused serious consequences for the economy and society. The Turkish Lira was devalued and the inflation rates were also high. In November the situation got worse and people were going bankrupt.

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<sup>137</sup> WHITE, op. cit., p 57.

<sup>138</sup> Such list contained, for instance, Cyprus, that presented its candidature through the Greek Cypriots.

At the end of Demirel's presidency in May 2000<sup>139</sup>, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, then the president of the constitutional court, was elected president. From the beginning of his tenure, Sezer attacked the government declaring that they were hiding corruption scandals. The Prime Minister, Ecevit, took this accusation personally, and announced to the press that the state was under a "serious crisis". Already affected by the November crisis, the Turkish markets collapsed in February 2001, investments left the country and the Turkish Lira devalued even more. The unemployment rate rose and production reduced drastically while inflation exploding.

Since Ecevit and Sezer were not talking to each other, Kemal Derviş was charged to solve the crisis. He was a World Bank official who negotiated with new credits with the IMF and proposed new reforms for the Turkish economy. But the population had no faith that a short-time solution would be found and new protests started to occur all over the country.

But the Derviş program started to work well and in the following year the economy started to restructure. The September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 attack in New York also came to redefine Turkey's role inside the international community. Its importance in the region rose a great deal for the Americans and they started to send new fiscal help to Turkey which also helped in the restructure after two serious economic crises.

The FP couldn't escape from the political prosecution and was dissolved by the constitutional court in June 2001. They were accused of supporting Islamic values and fundamentalism in the society. This was the main reason of the first

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<sup>139</sup> There was a try of amend in the constitution in order to allow Demirel to be reelected, what was not approved because of disagreements in the coalition.

big split among the Islamist segment in the Turkish politics. While the followers of Erbakan founded the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) the reformists of FP founded the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP*) under the leadership of Erdoğan.

#### 4.7 THE 2002 ELECTIONS

In May 2002, Ecevit was seriously ill but refused to resign from his post, because this would represent a break of the coalition and the call of early elections under a new prime minister. He believed that this would cause a whole new crisis in the Turkish economy. This time it would be even more complicated damaging to the membership process in the Europe Union, the main subject of that time.

After an announcement from Ecevit that he would just resign if he didn't have the majority in the parliament, a lot of his party's members, including Kemal Derviş, left the party. The creation of a new political party to be formed by these dissident members of DSP<sup>140</sup> was talked about. After this speculation and proposal to create a new center-right party, Ecevit, instead of resigning, called for early elections.

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<sup>140</sup> Afterwards the New Turkey Party was created under the leadership of İsmail Cem. Kemal Derviş stayed for a short period of time in the party and soon after joined the CHP.

Polls were done and they indicated that in these early elections announced by Ecevit, the party of preference from the voters was the then recently created AKP<sup>141</sup>. But the business class was at CHP's side (principally after Derviş joined the party), and believed that a coalition AKP/CHP would be the best for the country in order to prevent AKP from trying any Islamic extremism like its predecessors.

Turkey's November 3<sup>rd</sup> 2002 general elections ended with a predicted but still impressive victory for the AKP, becoming the first party since the 1987 elections to acquire a majority in the government.<sup>142</sup> None of the three parties that formed the old coalition (DSP, ANAP and MHP) could get the minimum of 10% to obtain a representation inside the parliament. "It seemed that the voters had humiliated and eliminated the former party leaders – Bülent Ecevit, Devlet Bahçeli, Necmettin Erbakan, Mesut Yılmaz, and Tansu Çiller."<sup>143</sup> Only two parties could get in: AKP and CHP.<sup>144</sup> Although the fact that the only two parties in the government together had only 53% of the votes, Turkey seemed to be starting a process of stabilization in its government.

This was the result of a phenomenon that had been ready to take place since the 1990's, when the population was no longer supporting the traditional political parties and their leaders, in order to give more value to the new names in politics. But this doesn't affirm that they were supporting only one or another

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<sup>141</sup> The abbreviation can be AKP, or AK Parti; the first one is more popular among the party's opponents while the second is the preferred by its supporters since the word "ak" in Turkish means "white, clean, unblemished" and therefore gives a positive impression about the party.

<sup>142</sup> ÇARKOĞLU, Ali. Turkey's November 2002 elections: a new beginning? **Middle East review of International Affairs**, v. 6, n. 5, Dec 2002.

<sup>143</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 181.

<sup>144</sup> AKP got a majority of 34% of the votes (363 seats) and CHP 19% (180 seats).

party, because in this decade there was a big fall in the level of party identification by the population.<sup>145</sup>

One of the main reasons for this fall of party identification is the instability in the Turkish party system. Each election the voters have to share their opinions between a larger number of parties.<sup>146</sup> This, together with their own change of behavior and values, caused a major change in each election.

It is seen in the conduct of the voters in 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections when the winning party did not get an absolute majority of the votes. In fact, the opposite happened; the percentage that they gained the victory with then diminished in each election. The biggest competition of that time, different from periods like the 1970's, was between parties with very similar ideologies. Thus, each time, the voters were moving away from centrist parties and giving their support to the extremist parties.

Maybe the biggest reason for this migration from center to extreme right was that the population was unhappy with the way economy was being conducted in the country. They started to realize that the centrist parties were not capable anymore of dealing effectively with these problems.<sup>147</sup>

The leadership of the winners seems committed to integrating Turkey into Europe. However, their religiously conservative constituency is known to be sceptical toward EU membership. From the perspective of economic interests, AKP supporters seem to reflect resurgent conservative Anatolian capital against the secular establishment of Istanbul, the largest city of Turkey. The influence of upwardly mobile Anatolian firms may aim to shift the power balance in their favour through advocating irresponsible populist social and economic policies together with revitalized pro-Islamist actions and a push for private business gains through access to or effective control of the government.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> SAYARI, *op. cit.*, p 10.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 115.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibdi.*, p 19.

<sup>148</sup> ÇARKOĞLU, *op. cit.*



The conclusions of the Periodic Report of 2002 evaluated the Turkish progress with the same criteria and methods applied to all the candidate countries. The Report concluded that Turkey had made a significant progress in the three biggest areas enclosed for the Adhesion Partnership: the political, economic criteria and the criteria related to the communitarian rules.<sup>149</sup> According to the report, politically, Turkey advanced on its constitutional reform mainly due to some measures of legislative character. The conclusions of the Commission had detached the legal alterations adopted by the Turkish Parliament in August 2002, as the elimination of the death penalty and the expansion of education to other languages other than Turkish. From the four regions that were under state of emergency in the previous year, two of them had left this situation behind and, the forecast was of that the same would happen really soon in the other two, opening a way to a bigger protection of human rights. Despite these advances, Turkey still is far from fully satisfying the political criteria. Relative questions to the full protection of fundamental rights and liberties have to be developed, as well as the executive and judicial organisms having to adopt regulations and other administrative measures to guarantee its effectiveness. Some important questions, such as the fight against torture and maltreatment, the civil control of the military and the situation of imprisoned people for having showed non-violent opinions and in compliance with the European Council of Human Rights, must be solved. Anyway, Turkey is being stimulated to fulfil this political criterion in order to continue with the process of reform that is being carried through.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> COMISSÃO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS, *op. cit.*

<sup>150</sup> *id.*

Another important question is the one directly related to Turkish Foreign Policy, the Cyprus question. It is a Commission interest that Turkey follows the objectives of European Union with full support to the UN efforts to find a global solution for the Cyprus problem. Turkey has had its process of membership delayed because of the consequences of two deeply destabilising financial crises, although having improved the level of the functioning of its market economy, which will improve its capacity to face the pressure of competition.<sup>151</sup>

On the topic of the criteria related to community law, Turkey continued the alignment to the legislation in the enclosed domains of the customs union and in some other sectors, such as the banking sector, telecommunications, energy and agriculture. It proceeded to the reorganization of the financial sector and to the rationalization of the administrative capacity in this domain. In most of the other areas there are still important differences between the community law and Turkish legislation.

Erdoğan represented a new tendency in Turkish politics. He wasn't someone that summarized a whole inside a political party, besides being a relatively new name inside the political world was what made him different from his rivals.

Although AKP have roots inside political Islam, it portrays itself as a moderate, right-wing conservative party. But Erdoğan couldn't occupy the place of prime minister because of his prison sentence in 1998, so Abdullah Gül became prime minister in November 2002.

The Gül government faced a number of interconnected challenges: the new UN (Kofi Annan) plan for the reunification of Cyprus [...]; the question of EU accession [...]; negotiations with the IMF and Turkey's huge debt; the problem of the economy at home and related unemployment and poverty;

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<sup>151</sup> id.

human rights and torture; the headscarf issue and the general's warning; the possibility of a US war with Iraq.<sup>152</sup>

However, Gül was always treated as a temporary prime minister who was waiting for the constitutional amendment that would allow Erdogan to replace him. This amendment was passed in January 2003 and in March Gül resigned and Erdoğan took over as prime minister.

The 2002 elections brought into power a very different group of leaders from the ones that had governed Turkey till then. For the first time since 1991, a single-party government was established. While AKP continued to be sceptic with its opinion on Turkey's membership in the Europe Union, the new rulers began with an impressive tour of European capitals and pushed for a starting date on negotiations regarding Turkish membership. Most importantly, they were advancing on the Cyprus issue. In this situation AKP was able to get much more power to make the decided changes in public administration, agriculture, education and in other areas.

The only opposition party, CHP, began to notice they were in a position where he could not get popularity if they only opposed the AKP government. With the improving economical situation, AKP was able to start solving issues related to the Islamic question such as the headscarf and penalizing adultery. But AKP also adopted a more centrist position, weakening the position even more of the other center-right parties. This would also make the AKP victory represent not only a temporary fact in Turkish politics, but something that could last for years.

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<sup>152</sup> AHMAD, 2003, op. cit., p 182.

With a much weaker center in parliament and a populist right-of-center in power, the post-election period is more likely to see several crises, including an uneasy relationship between the prime minister and a president known to be a liberal secularist. Another is the headscarves or turban issue. However, for this to become a major issue, the CHP or other parties would have to challenge the AKP. Pressure might also come from the AKP's own constituency to take action.<sup>153</sup>

Talking about issues such as Cyprus and the exigencies of the Europe Union, the military might also again become a factor if it believes the AKP is acting in too Islamist a fashion. A crisis could also happen when originating from international criticism of government economic policies, which could lead to a crisis of confidence and thus, more internal economic problems.

AKP's biggest test is its ability to appeal to average people through its economic policies while transforming itself from a marginal to a centrist party.

In rosy scenarios, AKP's challenge will be to maintain a long-term growth strategy rather than just exploiting a short-term opportunity. In gloomy scenarios, AKP could face internal conflict and opt for more extreme policies.

In all likelihood, whichever direction the events take, Turkey's politics are likely to be far different than they were before the November 2002 elections.

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<sup>153</sup> ÇARKOĞLU, *op. cit.*

## CONCLUSION

The democratic history of Turkey is something quite recent. The republic was proclaimed in 1923, but it was only in 1950, when the country had its first free elections. And from then on, it effectively became a two-party system, and then finally after 1960, it became a multi-party system. But we can see that during this whole process, Turkey had a really strong wish to make itself adequate more each time according to the Western model of democracy, development and modernization. And, no matter which party was in power, this is a common objective among the population.

Therefore we can perceive that every time this course of action was being harmed, somehow the population or the military were the cause of the changes inside the Turkish political sphere. It was the case of the three coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 carried out by the military. Also, the behavior of the voters in the elections was mostly a form of protest against the course of the country's politics.

Since 1950, during its first effective opportunity to choose its representatives, the population didn't choose to keep the party that was in power and that had been created by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Therefore, from these elections on, we see a preference for centre-right parties on the part of Turkish voters, at least until the beginning of the 1990's.

Everyone's aim was stability of either political or economic state.

However, as studied in this work, it is really difficult to find a political culture that can be considered homogeneous, and we can note that during the whole

democratic history of Turkey, various manifestations of unhappiness were the cause for big revolutions. More often than not, the effectiveness of the three military coups that took place throughout these 83 years of republic is questioned, since many of the objectives of the military were accomplished in a short term, but weakened afterwards.

Nonetheless, the military forces are still in first place preference of the population when indicating which national institution transmits greater confidence to them. This is due to the fact that every time disorder overtook the country, it was the military that intervened in order to restore stability. Each time the military received strong support from the population, however they were not interested in a Government run by the military, therefore it was also everyone's wish that after each coup, a government chosen by the people would be rapidly restored through free elections.

Among the three military coups, the one in 1980 was the one that had the biggest impact on the Turkish political life. While the one from 1960 only banned DP, the party that was the government in power then, and the one from 1971 banned only parties considered dangerous to the democracy (TİP and MNP), the 1980 coup was much more radical: it banned all the political parties from that time as well as all their leaders from political life. Its biggest objective was to depoliticize the population and interrupt the process of political fragmentation.

This instability in the party system of Turkey was the main reason that the party fidelity of the population was harmed, since political parties emerged and disappeared rather rapidly. Contrary to what the military predicted, what happened during the 1980's was that several new political parties emerged, a lot of them with

direct links to parties from the era before the coup. Despite this instability, as mentioned before, the population always had a tendency to support centre-right parties. This is proved by the dominance of the DP during the 1950's, of the AP during the 1960's and 1970's and of ANAP during the 1980's.

However, from the 1990's on, the population was unhappy with the way the centre-right parties were governing and through populist and nationalist movements, started to move towards the extreme right shown in the preference of its votes for either nationalist parties or Islamist. Paradoxically, the population still self affirmed itself as centrist and its majority was totally against a government that was directly linked to religion in the country.

A strong factor that was in influence during this decade was Islamist mobilization that occurred, principally in the least favoured regions of the large centre. This made the strength of the parties with strong Islamic discourse (such as RP and FP) rise dramatically. However it is questionable if the real reason for the success of such parties was really the religious factor. It would be more viable to affirm the populist aspect of those parties was the real reason for such success. The way that they passed their messages to the population either directly through its leaders or through representatives that were present in each community was something that motivated the population to support them even more.

Besides the parties of Islamic speech, the population also started to support nationalist parties from the extreme right more and more. This was due to the fact of the great valorisation of national values influenced also by the "inefficiency" of the centrist parties that were in government till then. Facts such as the imprisonment of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan during the Ecevit government in

1999, made the population move even more towards those parties. This was a process that was also happening in several other European countries, and once more Turkey was inside such tendencies.

We can also conclude that the economic factor was always something that influenced the behaviour of the voters during their choices in the elections. A good example is what happened during the 2002 elections was when after Turkey had faced two huge economic crises, parties that until then were traditionally in the government couldn't get the minimum of 10% necessary to be present in the parliament and AKP, a party that had just been created with roots in the RP and FP, finished the elections as the big winner, obtaining the absolute majority in the parliament and having only CHP as opposition.

External questions have also always had great relevance in the internal behaviour of the population. Such questions included, for instance, the Second World War, the Cyprus conflict and the membership process of Turkey in the Europe Union. This last topic was always important to the Turks, since it would then consolidate integration with the West. Therefore, the way that each government dealt with this process influenced Turkish public opinion greatly.

We saw also that, as in the majority of political systems, Turkey doesn't present a homogeneous political culture. This is due principally to ethnic issues. When we talk about ethnicity in Turkey, we can consider the Kurds as the main ethnic group, after the Turks, in the configuration of the Turkish politics. Besides its influence in the southeast of the territory, where the majority of the Kurds are, we see that internal migrations from them also influenced cities that received a larger number of migrants.




To sum up, what all the Turkish population has always wanted was the modernization of their country and its development in an equal and uniform way through the entire territory, based on the principles created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the formation of the Republic of Turkey. We see that the majority of people value such principles and wants them to be respected and followed by any party that can be in power.

**APPENDIX A – THE PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS OF TURKEY  
SINCE 1923**

	PRESIDENT	PRIME MINISTER	
1923	Atatürk (CHP)	Ismet İnönü (CHP)	
1924		Fethi Okyar (CHP)	
1925		Ismet İnönü (CHP)	Ismet İnönü (CHP)
1926			
1927			
1928			
1929			
1930			
1931			
1932			
1933			
1934			
1935			
1936	Ismet İnönü (CHP)	Celal Bayar (CHP)	
1937		Refik Saydam (CHP)	
1938		Sükrü Saracoglu (CHP)	
1939		Recep Peker (CHP)	
1940		Hasan Saka (CHP)	
1941		Semsettin Günaltay (CHP)	
1942		Celal Bayar (DP)	Adnan Menderes (DP)
1943			
1944			
1945			
1946			
1947			
1948			
1949			
1950			
1951			
1952			
1953	Cemal Gürsel	Cemal Gürsel	
1954			
1955	Ismet İnönü (CHP)	Ismet İnönü (CHP)	
1956			
1957			
1958			
1959			
1960	Cemal Gürsel	Suat H. Ürgüplü (AP)	
1961			
1962			
1963			
1964			
1965			

1966	Cevdet Sunay	Süleyman Demirel (AP)
1967		
1968		
1969		
1970		
1971		Nihat Erim
1972		
1973	Fahri Korutürk	Naim Talu
1974		Bülent Ecevit (CHP)
		Sadi Irmak
1975		Süleyman Demirel (AP)
1976		Bülent Ecevit (CHP)
1977		Süleyman Demirel (AP)
1978		Bülent Ecevit (CHP)
1979		Süleyman Demirel (AP)
1980	Kenan Evren	Bülent Ulusu
1981		
1982		
1983		Turgut Özal (ANAP)
1984		
1985		
1986		
1987		
1988		
1989	Turgut Özal (ANAP)	Yıldırım Akbulut (ANAP)
1990		Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP)
1991		Süleyman Demirel (DYP)
1992	Süleyman Demirel (DYP)	Tansu Ciller (DYP)
1993		
1994		
1995		
1996		Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP)
		Necmetin Erbakan (RP)
1997		Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP)
1998	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	Bulent Ecevit (DSP)
1999		Abdullah Gül (AK)
2000		
2001		Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AK)
2002		
2003		
2004		
2005		
2006		



**APPENDIX B – PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND SEATS WON BY PARTY IN  
PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, 1950-1977**

**Source:** SAYARI, S; ESMER, Y. Politics, parties & elections in Turkey. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

**Percentage of votes won by party in parliamentary elections, 1950-1977**

<b>Party</b>	<b>1950</b>	<b>1954</b>	<b>1957</b>	<b>1961</b>	<b>1965</b>	<b>1969</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1977</b>
CHP	39.9	35.3	41.1	36.7	28.7	27.4	33.3	41.4
DP	53.3	57.5	47.9	---	---	---	---	---
MP	3.0	---	---	---	6.3	3.2	---	---
CMP	---	4.8	7.1	---	---	---	---	---
HP	---	0.6	3.8	---	---	---	---	---
AP	---	---	---	34.8	52.9	46.5	29.8	36.9
CKMP	---	---	---	14.0	2.2	---	---	---
CGP	---	---	---	---	---	6.6	5.3	1.9
DkP	---	---	---	---	---	---	11.9	1.9
TBP	---	---	---	---	---	2.8	1.1	---
TİP	---	---	---	---	3.0	2.7	---	---
YTP	---	---	---	13.7	3.7	2.2	---	---
MHP	---	---	---	---	---	3.0	3.4	6.4
MSP	---	---	---	---	---	---	11.8	8.6
Independents	3.8	1.8	0.1	0.8	3.2	5.6	2.8	2.4
Others	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.6	0.5

**Parliamentary seats won by party in parliamentary elections, 1950-1977**

<b>Party</b>	<b>1950</b>	<b>1954</b>	<b>1957</b>	<b>1961</b>	<b>1965</b>	<b>1969</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1977</b>
CHP	69	30	173	173	134	143	185	213
DP	408	490	419	---	---	---	---	---
MP	1	---	---	---	31	6	---	---
HP	---	5	4	---	---	---	---	---
AP	---	---	---	158	240	256	149	189
CKMP	---	---	---	54	11	---	---	---
CGP	---	---	---	---	---	15	13	3
DkP	---	---	---	---	---	---	45	1
TBP	---	---	---	---	---	8	1	---
TİP	---	---	---	---	14	2	---	---
YTP	---	---	---	65	19	6	---	---
MHP	---	---	---	---	---	1	3	16
MSP	---	---	---	---	---	---	48	24
Independents	9	10	2	---	1	13	6	4

**APPENDIX C – PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND SEATS WON BY PARTY IN  
PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, 1983-1999**

**Sources:** SAYARI, S; ESMER, Y. Politics, parties & elections in Turkey. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

**ÇARKOĞLU, A. Turkey's November 2002 elections: a new beginning?** Middle East review of International Affairs, v. 6, n. 5, Dec 2002.

**Percentage of votes won by party in parliamentary elections, 1950-1977**

Party	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002
CHP				10.7	8.7	19.4
MHP		2.9		8.2	17.9	8.3
ANAP	45.1	36.3	24.0	19.7	13.2	5.1
Hap	30.5					
MDP	23.3					
DSP		8.5	10.8	14.6	22.2	1.2
DYP		19.1	27.1	19.2	12.0	9.5
RP		7.2	16.9	21.4		
SHP		24.7	20.8			
SP						2.4
HADEP				4.2	4.8	6.2
FP					15.4	
AKP						34.2
GP						7.2
Independents	1.1	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.9	0.9
Others		3.9	0.4	1.6	4.9	4.1

**Parliamentary seats won by party in parliamentary elections, 1950-1977**

Party	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002
CHP				49		178
MHP					126	
ANAP	211	292	115	132	88	
Hap	117					
MDP	71					
DSP			7	76	134	
DYP		59	178	135	83	
RP			62	158		
SHP		99	88			
FP					102	
AKP						363
Independents					9	9

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### Professional experiences

- 2004**            **Prointer** – Consultant responsible for the organization of the II International Association of Science Parks - Latin American Conference in Foz do Iguassu, PR, Brazil.
- 2002-2003**      **Prointer** – Trainee responsible for the organization of business missions and also consultant services for the private and public sectors.
- 1998-1999**      **Senna Insurance Administration Office** – Insurance assistant.
- 1997-1998**      **Protur Turism** – Tourism assistant, responsible for the emission of travel tickets and visas.

### Education and Qualifications

- 1999 – 2003**    **BA International Relations**, University of Curitiba – Brazil – GPA 8,66

### Other Skills and Qualifications

**Languages:**

<b>Portuguese</b>	mother language
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**Computing:** High level in Windows, Internet, Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, Access and PowerPoint).

### Interests

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