



**T.C
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE DEFENCE POLITICS

by

GÖRKEM DENİZ OKUMUŞ

**Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Business Administration**

İSTANBUL, 2007



T.C
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE DEFENCE POLITICS

by

Görkem Deniz OKUMUŞ

Supervisor

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı Caşın

Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Business Administration

İSTANBUL, 2007

TUTANAK

GÖRKEM DENİZ OKUMUŞ


7/6/2007

tarihinde


"CHANGING DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE DEFENCE POLITICS"

başlıklı tezini savunmuş ve başarılı olduğu oybirliği ile kabul edilmiştir.

Tez Danışmanı


:.....
Prof. Dr. Mesut Hekki, ÇAŞIN

Üye


:.....
Prof. Dr. Yasar GÜRBÜZ

Üye



:.....
Prof. Dr. YASAR ÖNAY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	III
LIST OF FIGURES.....	V
LIST OF TABLES.....	VI
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	VII
ABSTRACT.....	VII
ÖZET.....	IX
1.INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY WITH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES.....	5
2.1. REALIST DOCTRINE.....	5
2.2. LIBERAL DOCTRINE.....	11
2.3. BALANCE OF POWER THEORY.....	16
2.4. MARXIST DOCTRINE.....	21
3. UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS.....	26
3.1. CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY.....	29
3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND SINCE 19 TH CENTURY.....	34
3.2.1. Opium Wars.....	34
3.2.2. Sino Japanese War of 1895.....	36
3.2.3. The Boxer Rising.....	36
3.3. CHINA IN THE 20TH CENTURY.....	37
3.3.1. The Republican Revolution of 1911.....	37
3.3.2. Anti Japanese War.....	38
3.3.3. Return to Civil War.....	39
3.4. MAO ERA.....	39
3.4.1. Sino Soviet Dispute.....	41
3.4.2. Nixon’s Trip to China.....	41
3.5. DENG’S ERA.....	42
3.5.1. Tiananmen Protests of 1989.....	44
3.6. CHINA AFTER THE COLD WAR.....	46
4. CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR POWERS.....	49
4.1. CHINA U.S. RELATIONS.....	49
4.2. CHINA RUSSIA RELATIONS.....	54
4.3. CHINA E.U. RELATIONS.....	60
5.CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH THE THE REGIONAL POWERS.....	66
5.1. CHINA JAPAN RELATIONS.....	66
5.2. CHINA ASEAN RELATIONS.....	71

5.3. CHINA INDIA RELATIONS.....	77
5.4. CHINA MIDDLE-EAST RELATIONS.....	83
5.4.1. China Israil Relations.....	88
5.4.2. China Turkey Relations.....	92
5.4.3. China Iran Relations.....	94
5.5. CHINA AFRICA RELATIONS.....	97
6. CHINA’S ARMED FORCES.....	108
6.1. DOCTRINES OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY	108
6.1.1. People’s War Doctrine.....	108
6.1.2. People’s War Under Modern Conditions.....	110
6.1.3. Local Limited War.....	111
6.1.4. Local War Under High-Tech Conditions.....	113
6.2. PLA LAND FORCES.....	114
6.3. PLA NAVAL FORCES.....	117
6.3.1. China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions.....	122
6.4. PLA AIRFORCES PLAAF.....	124
6.5. PLA NUCLEAR FORCES.....	129
6.6. CHINA’S FOREIGN CONFLICTS SINCE 1949.....	133
6.6.1. Korean War.....	133
6.6.2. Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.....	134
6.6.3. The Sino Indian War.....	135
6.6.4. The Zhanbao Island Crash.....	136
6.6.5. The Conquest of Paracel Islands.....	137
6.6.6. The “Self-Defence Counter Attack “ Against Vietnam.....	137
7. CHINA’S DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY.....	140
7.1. CHINA’S DEFENSE BUDGET.....	140
7.2. PLA DEFENCE INDUSTRY.....	145
7.3. CHINA’S ARM SALES.....	148
7.4. CHINA’S SPACE INDUSTRY.....	154
7.4.1 China’s ASAT Weapons.....	157
8. PROBLEMS OF CHINA’S DEFENSE POLICY.....	158
8.1. COMPETITION IN THE PACIFIC.....	158
8.2. TAIWAN QUESTION.....	160
8.3. KOREA QUESTION.....	164
8.4. TIBET QUESTION.....	169
8.5. EASTERN TURKISTAN QUESTION.....	171
8.6. CHINA’S ENERGY SECURITY.....	172
8.7. SCENARIOUS FOR THE FUTURE.....	177
8.7.1. Threat of China.....	178
8.7.2. Rise of China.....	181
8.7.3. Collapse of China.....	185
9. CONCLUSION.....	187
REFERENCES.....	192
CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR.....	210

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
ASAT	Anti Satellite
APEC	Academy of Military Science
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CMC	Central Military Commission
CNPC	Chinese National Petrol Company
COSTIND	Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
CPV	Chinese People's Volunteers
DPRK	Democratic Republic of North Korea
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GLD	General Logistics Department
GMD	Guomindang
GNP	Gross Domestic Product
GPS	Global Positioning System
ICBM	Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
IEA	International Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
KOTRA	Korea Trade Promotion

LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MAC	Military Area Commands
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MRV	Multiple Reentry Vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTP	Non Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Air Forces
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SINOPEC	China National Petrochemical Corporation
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNO	United Nations Organization
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
SCO	Shangai Cooperation Organization
SCS	South China Sea
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: China's International Organization Memberships.....	15
Figure 3.1: Chinese Foreign Policy Goals.....	29
Figure 3.2: China and Its Surrounding Areas.....	32
Figure 4.1: Russia China Trade.....	57
Figure 4.2: German China Trade.....	63
Figure 5.1: Chinese Views on China-Japan Relations.....	71
Figure 5.2: Map of ASEAN countries.....	73
Figure 5.3: ASEAN China Trade.....	74
Figure 5.4: India's Influence in the World.....	81
Figure 5.5: India China Trade.....	82
Figure 5.6: Africa's Merchandise Exports to Asia	100
Figure 5.7: Africa's Merchandise Imports from Asia.....	101
Figure 5.8: China's FDI Outflows to Africa.....	102
Figure 5.9: Chinese aid to Sub Saharan Africa 1969-1987.....	103
Figure 6.1: China's Military Regions.....	116
Figure 6.2: China's Critical Sea Lines of Communication.....	119
Figure 6.3: Major PLA Naval Forces.....	120
Figure 6.4: South China Sea Territorial Claims.....	121
Figure 6.5: Major Air Force Units.....	128
Figure 6.6: Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles.....	130
Figure 6.7: Major Wars in Chinese History.....	139
Figure 6.8: Frequency of Wars in Chinese History.....	139
Figure 7.1: The PLA Budgeting Organizational System.....	142
Figure 7.2: Chinese Official Defense Budget, 1978-2003.....	142
Figure 7.3: Changing Priorities in the Official PLA Budget, 1997-2002.....	143
Figure 7.4: Western Estimates of Actual Chinese Military Expenditures.....	144
Figure 7.5: Chinese Defense Budgets and Estimates of Total Related Expenditures.....	145
Figure 7.6: Organizational Structure of Chinese Defense Industries.....	147
Figure 7.7: Chinese Revenue from Arms Sales.....	150
Figure 7.8: CRS and SIPRI Data on China's World Arms Transfers.....	150
Figure 7.9: Total World Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1990-1998.....	151
Figure 8.1: Map of China and Taiwan.....	162
Figure 8.2: China's Oil Production and Consumption, 1980-2000.....	173
Figure 8.3: Map of Chinese NOC only oil Investments.....	174
Figure 8.4: Total Primary Energy Supply in China from 1971 to 2030.....	175
Figure 8.5: Critical Threats to U.S. Vital Interests.....	180
Figure 8.6: China's Influence in the World.....	182
Figure 8.7: Critical Threats to China's Vital Interests.....	184
Figure 8.8: Grain Production Per Capita in China, 1979-2003	185

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: U.S. Merchandise Trade With China: 1980-2005.....	50
Table 4.2: The Arms Sale of the US to Taiwan in 2001.....	52
Table 4.3: Russian Arms Sales to China, 2001-2005.....	58
Table 4.4: EU-China Trade Statistics	63
Table 4.5: China's Acquisitions for Military Systems from Europe.....	65
Table 5.1: China Japan Trade.....	68
Table 5.2: Regional States Trade with China.....	75
Table 5.3: Two-way China-India FDI trends	83
Table 5.4: China's Oil Import from the Middle East.....	86
Table 5.5: China Turkey Trade.....	94
Table 6.1: Comparison of Key PLAAF Systems with Other Key Systems.....	126
Table 6.2: China's Missile Forces.....	131
Table 6.3: China and International/Multilateral Nonproliferation Treaties/Regimes.....	152
Table 6.4: Evolution of China's Export Control Systems since the 1990s.....	153
Table 6.5: China's Space Program Time Line.....	156

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor **Associated Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı Caşın** for his invaluable comments, his advices and help throughout my study. It was a great honor for me to study with him.

I would like to thank **Mr. Bedrettin Dalan**, the founder and president of the İstanbul Education and Culture Foundation, establishing opportunities in such a marvelous University.

I would like to express my best regards to **Prof. Dr. Reşat Kayalı**, the Dean of Yeditepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences, for his support throughout the master of International Relations program.

I would like to thank **Prof. Dr. Feroz Ahmed**, the president of Political Science and International Relations department.

I would like to express my best regards to **Prof Dr. Yaşar Gürbüz** and **Asst. Prof. Dr. Yaşar Onay**

I also would like to express my best regards to, **Prof.Dr. Necati Sözüöz**, **Prof Dr. Ali Fuat Boravali**, **Asst. Prof. Dr Mesut Hakkı Caşın**, **Dr. Dinç Yaylalier**, **Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona** for their lectures.

Finally, I would like to thank to my dear parents **Şükran and Nazım Okumuş** for their unlimited support.

ABSTRACT

Today the rise of China is the one of the most important issue in the international politics. The structure of China's defence politics is changing by the rapid economic development and political stability. China's defense policy has a very important impact on the all areas of the global politics. To understand this development, we need to understand the China's grand strategy in the modern history, China's international relations with major and regional powers and China's military capabilities.

Although China is rapidly increasing its military capabilities with the support of fast economic development, we estimate that China will keep following the low profile and peaceful diplomacy for the near future. However, when we check changing rapid dynamics of Asia-Pacific region, China also may prefer revisionist politics which challenges to USA, Russia and Japan. This option may create deeply threats for regional and global security.

In this thesis, we tried to understand the changing dynamics of the modern Chinese defence politics. Firstly, China's grand strategy and foreign policy were examined. Then, the military capabilities of the People's Liberation Army in the perspective of doctrinal change and defence industry modernization was analyzed. Finally, the problems of the China's defence policy and possible scenario's for the future of the China were examined.

ÖZET

Günümüzde Çin'in yükselişi Uluslararası politikanın en önemli konularından biridir. Çin'in savunma politikasının yapısı hızlı ekonomik kalkınma ve ülkedeki politik istikrarla beraber değişmektedir. Çin'in savunma politikasının küresel politikaların bütün yönleri üzerinde çok önemli bir etkisi vardır. Bu değişimi anlamak için Çin'in modern tarihteki büyük stratejisini, Çin'in büyük ve orta güçlerle olan ilişkilerini ve Çin'in askeri kapasitesini anlamalıyız.

Çin hızlı ekonomik büyümeyle askeri kapasitesini arttırmasına rağmen, Çin'in yakın gelecek için düşük profil ve barışçıl diplomasiyi devam ettireceğine inanılmaktadır. Ancak Asya Pasifik bölgesinin hızlı değişen dinamiklerine baktığımızda, Çin'in revizyonist politikayı tercih edip bölgede ABD, Rusya ve Japonya için bir rakip de olabilir. Bu durum bölgesel ve global güvenlik politikalarını derin bir şekilde etkileyebilir.

Bu tezde, Çin'in savunma politikasının değişen dinamiklerini incelemeye çalıştım. Öncelikli olarak Çin'in büyük stratejisi ve modern tarihi incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu'nun (PLA) askeri kapasitesini, zaman içinde doktrinlerindeki değişimi ve savunma endüstrisinin modernizasyonunu analiz edilmiştir. Son olarak Çin savunma politikasının problemleri ve gelecek için olası senaryolar incelenmiştir.

1. INTRODUCTION

In Asia the sleeping dragon is awakening. Developing its armed forces with new military technology, equipment, training, doctrine and becoming one of the biggest economy in the world, China aims to be a Great Power in the Twenty First Century.

In terms of physical size, China is the fourth largest country in the world about 3.7 million square miles, placing it behind Russia, Canada, and the United States. It shares borders with 15 other countries, ranks third place in the world in its reserves of natural resources, and has the highest hydropower potential in the world. With over 1.23 billion people, it is the world's most populous country. China's economy is the second largest in the world (in purchasing power parity terms), having quadrupled and grown at an average annual rate of about 9.5% since 1978., many observers estimate that China's economy will overtake that of the United States early in the next century to become the world's largest. Although China remains a predominantly agrarian economy, industry constitutes 49% of GDP.

China is a rising power since the end of the Cold War. Having been an ancient great power which had made its great contribution to the World civilization over thousand years, China, however, fell into a semi-colonial country position, and exploited by the Imperialist powers in modern history. After Chinese Communist Party had won the civil war and founded People's Republic in 1949, in Mao's words, China stood up.

Deng Xiaoping the new leader of the Chinese communist party after Mao, in the mid-1970s, made a series of decisions in a resolute and timely manner to lead the country out of the ideological rigidity, to form a new security concept and to start reform. The end of the Cold War has provided better conditions for China to focus on its domestic development. The successive Chinese leaders after Deng have largely carried on his policy. China has successfully embarked on a road of globalization. The result has been a fast economic growth and technological modernization over the two past decades.

China continues to focus on the economic and political transformation of the country. All Chinese foreign policy goals are about securing the country's economic development and territorial integrity. Chinese leaders hope to strengthen its legitimacy through a sophisticated foreign policy, putting China on the world stage as an influential player. Political developments contradicting these aims are perceived as threats. Traditional balance of power politics continue to influence foreign- and security policy of many nations. This line of thinking is most clearly seen in the Chinese foreign policy around the concept of the multi-polarized world. Because of the uneasiness with the supremacy of the last remaining superpower, many Chinese foreign policy makers hope that other poles like Europe, Russia and China itself will counterbalance the hegemon.

Three key words, modernization, nationalism, and regionalism, can be used to help us better understand aspects of Chinese foreign policy. Modernization refers to China's concentration on economic growth since 1978. Nationalism has increasingly become one of the primary driving forces behind Chinese foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, nationalistic feeling appears particularly strong among Chinese intellectuals, government officials and within the Chinese society. Regionalism emphasizes that China has remained a regional power, concentrating its activities primarily in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite its global aspirations, China has focused its main activities and interests in the Asia-Pacific area. From Beijing's perspective, the combined area of East and Southeast Asia has remained the most important areas for the Chinese foreign policy, not only for military and political reasons, but also for economic reasons, which has direct consequences for China's modernization drive.

China presents its economic and political rise as advantageous for all the world and hopes to dispel the current fears of its neighbors in the Asia Pacific. China is successfully working towards acquiring the reputation as a responsible regional power as well as an engine for growth, supporting stronger economic integration with neighbor countries.

We see that China does not keen on reaching foreign policy goals immediately. When Chinese see that achieving its foreign policy goals on an international dispute is not possible in the short term, they postpone their demands without giving up them totally. As we had seen in the case of Hong Kong, China can even wait for a century, if necessary.

Militarily, China may not even be playing the same game as the West. It may instead be seeking to achieve advantage over the others on its own terms, rather than theirs. When approaching military tasks, China looks at the vulnerabilities of its opponents. That means fighting asymmetrically to obtain a respectable payoff for a small risk. Throughout the world a profound reform in the military affairs led by the development of high-tech weapons is taking place. This reform or revolution, which is developing rapidly, exerts an important and profound influence on weaponry, military systems, combat training and military doctrine. During this new period, the Chinese military is working hard to improve its quality, aiming to form a modernized and regularized people's army with Chinese characteristics.

Today, China's army which is called People's Liberation Army (PLA) has ability to shot satellites. But this does not make PLA totally a high tech military. PLA still has mass infantry military properties. Chinese Communist Party needs PLA not only for external threats and policies but also for internal security issues.

China has embarked upon a force modernization program in support of its overall national security objectives and intended to diversify its options for use of force against potential targets such as Taiwan. Preparing for a potential conflict for the Taiwan is the primary driver for China's military modernization. While China professes a preference for resolving the Taiwan issue peacefully, Beijing also seeks military options. China is developing advanced information technology and long-range precision strike capabilities. In particular, China has greatly expanded its arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal ballistic missiles. PLA's force modernization program is heavily reliant upon assistance from Russia and other states. PLA hopes to increase its capabilities by significantly expanding its procurement of Russian weapon systems and technical assistance over the next several years. The success of PLA's force modernization, however, depends upon its ability to overcome technical, logistical and training problems.

In an increasingly interconnected world, countries are becoming more interdependent and mutually constrained. Great powers form their threat perception with this perspective in

this new global system. There is no longer a clear-cut line between an ally on one side, and an adversary or enemy on the other as in the Cold War. China seems to be aware of this fact and shapes its defense politics with this perspective.

Chapter 2 analyzes China's foreign policy with IR theories. Chapter 3 describes China's Grand strategy and modern history. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined the China's relations with the major and regional powers. Chapter 6 and 7 describe Armed Forces of China and its defense industry. Chapter 8 examines the problems of China's defense politics.

2. ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH INTERNATIONAL RELATION THEORIES

This thesis begins with the explanation of International Relations theories to understand China's defense policy and world politics. China's International behavior can be explained by IR theories. According to realists China is the rising challenger which will disturb the status quo soon or later. Liberals on the other hand have an optimist perspective. Liberals think that for the behalf of the economics China will be a cooperative state. Balance of power in China's case argues that China will probably form alliances with some of the big actors to challenge the hegemon or more specifically the USA. It seems to be that for modern China Power politics is more important than the ideological struggle. Although the name of the ruling party in China is "communist", Communism is no longer main priority for the Chinese. For this reason Marxist doctrine is less appropriate theory to explain the modern China's international behavior.

2.1 REALIST DOCTRINE

For realists, the emergence of China as a potential great power in the international system must be understood within the context of the end of bipolarity and the advent of a "unipolar world" following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.¹

Realism is a theory about international politics. It is an effort to explain both the behavior of individual states and the characteristics of the system as a whole. The ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of international system. Sovereignty is apolitical order based on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system. There is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behavior of states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical

¹ Res Li, "Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and International Stability", in Suisheng Zhao ed. **Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior**, (New York 2004, East Gate), p.24.

environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own resources.²

Realist theory held a dominant position in the study of international relations in the years extending from the end of World War II into the early 1980s. Central to classical realist theory are several key assumptions: (1) that the international system is based on states as the key actors; (2) that international politics is essentially confliction, a struggle for power in an anarchic setting in which nation-states inevitably rely on their own capabilities to ensure their survival; (3) that states exist in a condition of legal sovereignty in which nevertheless there are gradations of capabilities, with greater and lesser states as actors; (4) that states are unitary actors and that domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy; (5) that states are rational actors characterized by a decision-making process leading to choices based on national interest; and (6) that power is the most important concept in explaining and predicting state behavior.³

Power provides the core concept in realist theory for understanding state behavior. Although power has been defined as the aggregate of capabilities available to the state, the power of one state also is said to be relative to the aggregate capabilities of the state with which it has a confliction relationship. It has been suggested, that power is situational, or dependent on the issue, object, or goal for which it is employed. Economic power, however vast, cannot halt armored divisions, just as military power itself would not be sufficient to ensure global trade dominance.⁴ Chinese ruling elite since the beginning of four modernization sees the improving economical abilities as the core of the power building in the international arena. Realists argue that in the long run after reaching a mature level in economics China will give up low profile foreign policy strategy and will be more aggressive for the behalf of its national interests.

Power is a multi-faceted and complex notion, and it makes sense to think of the term under three headings, always bearing in mind that the three categories this will generate are

² S.Krasner, "Realism, imperialism, and democracy", *Political Theory*, Vol:20 (1992), p.39.

³ James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraf, Jr., *Contending Theories of Internaitol Relatios*, (200Longman, 2001, 5th edition), p. 63-64.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.75.

closely interrelated. Power is an *attribute*- it is something that people or groups states possess or have access to, have at hand to deploy in the world. Power is a *relationship*- it is the ability That people or groups or states have to exercise influence on others, to get their way in the world These two dimensions of power are clearly not separable, and most realist accounts of international relations have a story to tell about them. A third dimension of power in which it is seen as a property of a *structure* is less easily incorporated into realist accounts of the world, at least in so far as these accounts rely on the notion that power can only be exercised by an actor or agent.⁵ During the Mao era China was following an aggressive foreign policy to change the structure of the international system. Today however China accepts the existed structure and tries to improve its position with in the system.

Realism offers a state-centric account of the world, and, because realism takes the state to be central to international relations, topics such as the study of foreign policy decision-making or the analysis of the components of national power loom large; for the same reason interstate 'war' is taken to be *sui generis*, unlike any other form of social conflict. This state centrality suggests that realism ought to have a clear theory of the state and that this should be the natural jumping off point for the rest of its thinking. As it happens this is not the case; the lack of such a theory is an important problem at the heart of realism, indeed of International Relations as an academic discourse.⁶ As a result realist arguments are unable to explain civil wars in the political arena which are very common in history. Internal political situation in China can not be excluded from the external events and domestic events like Tiananmen protests of 1989 in such a big country can dramatically change the course of international events.

According to realist thought, a country's leaders should not be misled by moral imperatives, driven by cooperation for cooperation's sake, or unduly constrained by international institutions if such policies would cause the leaders to neglect balance-of-power calculations or the rational pursuit of national interests. Leaders should not be misled by the belief that the political or economic composition of other countries. By implication, a responsible leader should not base foreign policy on whether a potential ally

⁵ Chris Brown, **Uderstanding International Relations**, 2nd edition ,2001 Palgrave 2001, London , p.89.

⁶ Scott Burchill, p.68-69.

or partner state is democratic; rather, cooperation is possible when states have common interests and when policies are shaped to take into account the realities of their capabilities.⁷ With this perspective China is following a pragmatic strategy to deal with the threats of the 21st century.

One of the problem of the realist theory is unable to define the national interest in an objective way. National interest can have different meanings for the different political parties. In other words it is not possible to have pure realism separated from the idealism in the real world. This is one of the main reason which makes harder to interpret or estimate the China's foreign policy behavior.

The main study areas for the realist theory are security war and peace. The strength of the realist tradition is its capacity to argue from necessity. It seeks to describe reality, solve problems and understand the continuities of world politics. A normative concern with the causes of war and the conditions of peace, security and order will continue to guide research and teaching in International Relations because they are centrally important issues. Realism speaks to these concerns directly by privileging strategic interaction and the distribution of global power above other considerations.⁸ Realists sees the rise of China as the seed of future conflicts and they put the China into the war scenarios of the 21st century as a main actor.

The first coherent expressions of a realist approach to the study of international politics evolved out of the apparent failure of liberal principles to sustain peace in Europe after the First World War. Realist believed that no amount of wishful thinking or the application of domestic political principles to the international sphere would change the nature of global politics, in particular its endemic violence.⁹ According to realist strategists trade and liberal institutions can not prevent the conflict in the long run in the Asia Pacific and China after having enough military power will eventually become aggressive in international politics.

⁷ Celleste A. Wallender , US-Russian Relations Between Realism and Reality, **Current History**, (October 2003) , p. 307.

⁸ Scott Burchill, p.98.

⁹ Scott Burchill, **Theories of International Relations**, (2nd edition,2001 Palgrave 2001 New York), p.71.

According to Waltz there can be two causes of a war: War may result because state A has something that state B wants. The efficient cause of the war is the desire of state B; the permissive cause is the fact that there is nothing to prevent state B from undertaking the risks of war. In a different circumstance, the interrelation of efficient and permissive causes becomes still closer. State A may fear that if it does not cut state B down a peg now, it may be unable to do so ten years from now. State A becomes the aggressor in the present because it fears what state B may be able to do in the future.¹⁰ In China's case according to some realists rise of China in the long run may probably cause conflicts. From this point of view there is a strong probability of US China conflict long before China reaches great power status.

Whether China -an emerging or a rising power in the East Asia region and in the world - will be a "threat" to its neighbors and even to the United States within the next few decades is a big issue that have been widely discussed in the Western IR academic circle and among Western and Japanese political elites. Most Western neo-realist IR scholars have already drawn a dark picture of Eastern Asia regional security with a pessimistic view about "China threat"¹¹. Because of this kind of perceptions in the west Chinese politicians prefer to use the term "emerge of China" instead of "rise of China".

Some realist analysts of the Asian region have argued that the rise of China will sooner or later emerge as the most formidable security challenge in East Asia. As both balance of power theorists and power transition theorists predict, global security tends to be destabilized when there is a shift in the balance of power among the major powers. Should the growth rate of China's economy be sustained in the coming decades, the ascendance of China will certainly transform the power configuration in Northeast Asia. Democratic peace theorists also claim that nations with little political freedom are more likely than otherwise to go to war with democratic countries. In its road to democracy, China's Communist Party may be tempted to use force in its diplomacy in order to divert the people's demand for a pluralistic political system. Both China's desire for a power shift on its own terms and the inevitable internal demands for democracy might pose a difficult

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, **Man the State and War**, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2001),p.234.

¹¹ Jiang YE, "Will China be a "Threat" to Its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty First Century?", **Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies**, (2002), Vol.1, pp. 55-68

security problem for government strategists in Northeast Asia.¹² China has a dynamic population and culture. It is not easy to estimate the future of the domestic conditions. Chinese Communist party is promoting Chinese nationalism to suppress the social unrest. This policy as we have seen in the Japanese school books crises may cause international instability.

In contrast to American neo-realist theories that concentrate on how to maintain a power advantage, and in contrast to American theories on a 'democratic peace' that argue for the spread of democracy in order to prevent war, Chinese foreign policy emphasizes cooperation and peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems.¹³ China unlike the Eastern Europe and Soviet Union did not change the political system after the end of the cold war. Most like in the near future Chinese Communist Party will be the core of political power in China.

"Realists" would generally deny that any true friendship could develop between the United States and China because of their belief that the two nations are destined for conflict due to their place in the world order, where the U.S. is a status-quo and China a revisionist power. The realists would argue that the revisionist state is naturally dissatisfied with its position, which is determined by the status quo-state, and therefore, it will eventually challenge the status-quo power, resulting in conflict. The way to avoid such conflict would be to bring the revisionist state into the status quo-community. The goal of the United States, therefore, has not been to challenge China but to draw it closer to the international community.¹⁴ China used this situation for the economical development by attracting foreign direct investment from the west. China during 1980's and 1990's tried to show low profile in the international events although it is one of the members of the U.N. security council.

¹² Changhee Nam and Seiichiro Takagi, "Rising China and Shifting Alliances in Northeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges facing America and its Allies", **The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis**, Vol. XVI, No. 2, (Fall 2004), p.154

¹³ Brantly Womack, "Asymmetry Theory and China's Concept of Multipolarity", **Journal of Contemporary China** (2004), 13(39), May, 351-366

¹⁴ Rita Kernacs, M.A, "The Future of U.S. Relations with Japan and China: Will Bilateral Relations Survive the New American Unilateralism?", **Asia Pacific: Perspectives** (May 2004) Volume IV · Number 1, p.1

Intuitively, realism appears to be the more compelling theory in understanding Chinese foreign policy. After all, the notions of power, security, and wealth are the foundations of human civilization. China is an emerging great power within a system dictated by its former oppressors. The fact that China would want to shift the system in a way that elevates its own sense of economic, military, and security guarantee vis-à-vis other nations is completely understandable. But the realist argument cannot fully explain Chinese foreign policy, especially in multilateral regimes.¹⁵ Ideological and cultural differences are still very important to understand China's foreign and defense policies.

2.2. LIBERAL DOCTRINE

Liberal peace theory basically argues that open economies, high levels of economic development and democracy are factors contributing to a more peaceful world. Theory on interstate conflict has been taken from the dyadic level ("two democratic states are very unlikely to fight each other"), to the national level ("democracies are inherently more peaceful") and culminates in a systemic argument ("a world with more democracies is more peaceful").¹⁶

According to the democratic peace theory, democracies don't wage war on each other and therefore, as more countries become democratic, the potential for international conflict is reduced. From that point of view the democratization of China is critical in the long run for the peace and stability. Economically, China has already embraced capitalism, but politically, China still remains as a Communist state.

Liberal international relations theory applies to *all* States. Totalitarian governments, authoritarian dictatorships, and theocracies can all be depicted as representatives of some subset of actors in domestic and transnational society, even if it is a very small or particularistic slice. The preferences of such States are likely to differ from the preferences of States with more representative governments and more diverse and complex societies,

¹⁵ William S. W. Chang, "China and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations", **Stanford Journal Of East Asian Affairs** (Spring 2001) Volume 1, p.34

¹⁶ Mirjam E. Sorli, "The Liberal Peace Argument in the Middle East:Ali in Wonderland or Crude (oil) Reality ?",Paper presented to, **Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference**, University of Kent, Canterbury, Sept. 8-10, 2001, p.2

but not necessarily and not on all issues. Thus, like Realism, Liberalism is a comprehensive theory of the international system.¹⁷

Like their realist and institutionalist counterparts, the three core liberal assumptions introduced earlier are relatively thin or content-free. Taken by themselves, they do not define a single unambiguous model or set of hypotheses, not least because they do not specify precise sources of state preferences. Instead they support three separate variants of liberal theory, termed here ideational, commercial, and republican liberalism. Each rests on a distinctive specification of the central elements of liberal theory: social demands, the causal mechanisms whereby they are transformed into state preferences, and the resulting patterns of national preferences in world politics.¹⁸

The two world wars and the failure of collective security in the interwar period discredited liberal theories. Most writing about international politics in the United States after World War II was strongly realist in favor. However, as transnational economic interdependence increased, the late 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of interest in liberal theories. There are three strands of this liberal thinking: economic, social, and political. The political strand has two parts, one relating to institutions and the other to democracy.¹⁹ Liberalism demands market economy and open society to function. China does not have an open society or free market economy although it has a state lead capitalism and neo-mercantilist development policy.

America's liberal internationalism has been closely tied to its support of a multilateral framework as the best way of ensuring international peace and development. As such, America's liberal internationalist impulses contributed to widespread sentiment, both at home and abroad, that the U.S. was a benign hegemon.²⁰ During the President Clinton's administration, Liberal internationalism was again main political tool of the US foreign policy. President Clinton used engagement policy with the liberal perspective to deal with China.

¹⁷ Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States", *EJIL* 6, 1995,P.7

¹⁸ Andrew Moravsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously A Liberal Theory Of International Politics", *International Organization* 51, 4, (Autumn 1997), p.524

¹⁹ Joseph S. NYE, Jr., *Understanding Intenational Conflicts*, (Pearson 2005 New York), p. 45

²⁰ Tom Barry, "The Terms Of Power", *Foreign Policy In Focus*, (November 6 2002) ,p.2

Neoliberal models blame internal processes of bad government and wrong policies and do not see international processes as the cause of underdevelopment. They argue that the subversion of domestic and international markets, not their fair functioning, is to blame for underdevelopment. These theories suggest that globalisation can prevent narrow interests from dominating the market. The narrowing of ideological schisms and the spread of democracy will improve social welfare, since the created wealth can be redistributed in an accountable, if not consensual, manner.²¹ Liberals always criticize the state control of banking system in China and fixed value of yuan and one party rule in politics. For liberals if the engagement policy fails this will be because of China's conservative state centric policies and not being liberal enough in economical and political issues.

The democratic peace school, has established impressive empirical support for the thesis that democracies do not go to war against one another. The present issue is not the adequacy, or otherwise, of this claim and the theories that seek to explain it, but the question of its larger normative significance. Traditionally, liberals have seen war as an avoidable evil: evil not only because of the loss of life and suffering that it entails, but also because of the utter negation of liberal values; avoidable because in principle the world of states could be organised such that conflicts were resolved in the same, non-violent way as in liberal states, through bargaining and compromise.²² According to the democratic peace school, international organizations can prevent the wars by promoting more communications between the states. Liberals argue that if China enters most of the international organizations it will be a status quo power.

Liberalism has always been essentially cosmopolitan, holding out the prospect of improvement for all peoples, not just a favoured few. The benefits of peace among the rich and powerful are greatly to be welcomed, but there is no ground for liberal 'triumphalism' so long as they remain limited to the fortunate. Yet contemporary liberal theory on peace

²¹ Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "The Liberal Globalist Case", **Global Governance in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives on World Order**, (Stocholm Sweden, Almqvist & Wiksell International 2002), p.28

²² James R. Richardson, "Critical Liberalism in International Relations", **Working Paper** (Australian National University. Dept. of International Relations), (2002), p.12

and security avoids confronting the situation of the disadvantaged, which poses the most intractable problems of the present.²³ Although it is the main problem of modern international politics. If China can not reach the status that it deserves by the peaceful economical development than it would challenge the international order by military force like the the Japan in the first half of the 20th century.

There is a frequently heard argument that as China becomes increasingly tied to the international economy, its 'interdependence' with others will constrain it from taking political actions that could disrupt its vital connection to foreign markets and capital, and to high-technology imports from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. This claim was made time and again by the Clinton administration and its supporters in the debate about whether the US should extend permanent normal trade relations to China, and support Beijing's accession to the World Trade Organization. 'Interdependence' is another way of saying that trade is a tie that binds states to follow peaceful, cooperative foreign policies.²⁴


As regards U.S.-China relations, liberal optimists note that since the end of the Cold War there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in East Asia. Included among these are APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum); the ARF (the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional Forum); ASEAN _ 3; the East Asia Summit; an expanding network of bilateral military-to-military talks; and an even wider array of quasi-official track-2 security dialogues involving scholars, analysts, and bureaucrats from countries in the region. Over the course of the last decade, China has also sought entry into several important global institutions, including the WTO (which it entered in 2001) and the nuclear nonproliferation regime (which it joined in 1996). In addition, it has begun to play a more active and prominent role in the United Nations.²⁵

²³ James R. Richardson p.12

²⁴ Christopher Layne, "China's Role In American Grand Strategy: Partner, Regional Power, Or Great Power Rival?" p.71.

²⁵ Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations Is Conflict Inevitable?", **International Security**, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 13-14.

Figure 2.1: China's International Organization Memberships



Source: This figure is compiled from data in the Yearbook of International Organizations, 38th ed. (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 2000/2001).²⁶

China's elites are suspicious of many multilateral organizations, including those devoted to economic, environmental, nonproliferation, and regional security issues. In most cases, China joins such organizations to avoid losing face and influence. But Beijing does not allow these organizations to prevent it from pursuing its own economic and security interests. Chinese analysts often view international organizations and their universal norms as fronts for other powers.²⁷

To a significant extent, China's external behavior will be shaped by international institutions, forces, and balances of power beyond its. Consequently, many China specialists and foreign policy practitioners advocate enmeshing China in as many

²⁶ Alastair Iain Johnston ChiIs, "China a Status Quo Power?", *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p.13.

²⁷ Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing's World-View", *Foreign Affairs*, 75:5 (September/October 1996), p.38.

international regimes and binding commitments as possible so as to minimize its potential for disruptive behavior and maximize the smooth integration of China into the international order.²⁸ But China is rapidly increasing its economical and military assets which means that in the long run this strategy would not be effective enough.

Also the liberal theory advocates the democratization of China, but this kind of internal change backfired in 1989. China lacks a strong liberal tradition encouraging democracy in domestic politics fails. The process of liberalization and democratization have been very unstable and such process in Chinese politics could actually increase the potential for conflict. For this reason encouraging democracy in China is a weak solution to deal with the rising China.

2.3. BALANCE OF POWER THEORY

At the end of the Cold War, China expected the global pattern of power to gradually shift from U.S.-Soviet bipolarity to a multipolar world in which China would play a much larger role. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese experts estimated that the global balance of power in which the United States occupied the position of sole superpower was a transitional pattern, to last perhaps five to ten years, which would be replaced by a pattern of many powers or power centers, including China, Japan, Europe, and Russia, rising as independent “poles” to challenge American power and ambition. U.S. power and influence would decline. The Chinese expected U.S. relations with its allies in Western Europe and Asia to be strained by continued tensions in the economic sphere, perhaps spilling over into political and security matters. The more even distribution among several power centers of political authority and economic wealth would bring about a more stable international environment and advance China’s objectives of economic development, acceptance as a great power, and reunification with Taiwan.²⁹ China can challenge or balance the USA by itself. These is the main reason Chinese are demanding a multi power

²⁸ Gerald Segal, “Containment or Engagement of China?” Calculating Beijing’s Responses, in Michael E Brown ed., **The Rise of China**, (USA, MIT press), p.211.

²⁹ Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “China and the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a Time of Strategic Change and Shifts in the Balance of Power”, **Asia/Pacific Research Center**, October 1997,p.3.

world. In this kind of international system USA's power would be relatively weak and China's power compare to USA would be fair enough.

Balance of power theory is predicated on the notion that states seek to survive as independent entities. They also seek power in the anarchical global system; without power, states can become subservient to the will of others or lose their security and prosperity. Anarchy thus compels states to increase their power, because security and physical survival cannot be divorced from power maximization. As a result, the competition for power becomes a natural state of affairs in international politics. If and when a single state or coalition of states gains preponderance, however, it will eventually attempt to impose its will on others. Weaker states could lose their security and, in rare cases, cease to exist. States, especially small states, often can not achieve security on their own. Furthermore, the internal dynamics of a rising or dominant state could force it to seek hegemony or even eliminate weaker actors. Threatened states could also adopt the internal balancing strategy of building up arms, that is, to obtain countervailing capabilities and thereby attempt to balance the rising power's military strength.³⁰

The key grand strategic issue confronting U.S. policymakers today is whether the United States can escape the same fate that has befallen the other great powers that have contended for hegemony since the origin of the modern international state system (circa 1500). Since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have embraced primacy and adopted an ambitious grand strategy of expanding the United States' preponderant power— notwithstanding the seemingly ironclad rule of modern international history that hegemons always provoke, and are defeated by, the counter hegemonic balancing of other great powers.³¹ Since the Creation of modern state system with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia no single state reached the military power of today's USA. China can not balance USA with traditional tactics. China needs time to build its national strength and since Deng Xiaoping this is the main foreign policy parameter. For this reason strategic conditions for USA have a negative trend and time is on China's side.

³⁰ T.V.Paul, **Balance of Power Theory and Practice in The 21st Century**, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2004), p.4-5.

³¹ Christopher Layn, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming End of the United States Unipolar Moment", **International Security**, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), p.7.

Traditional balancing through alliance formation and military buildups is significant, but it seems able to capture only one, albeit the most significant, form of balance of power behavior.³²

Hard balancing is a strategy often exhibited by states engaged in intense interstate rivalry. States thus adopt strategies to build and update their military capabilities, as well as create and maintain formal alliances and counter alliances, to match the capabilities of their key opponents. The traditional realist and neo realist conceptions of balancing are mainly confined to hard balancing. Will China use hard balancing to balance USA or Japan is the number one question of the Chinese security projection in the new century.

Soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening. Soft balancing became more important in the nuclear age.

Asymmetric balancing refers to efforts by nation-states to balance and contain indirect threats posed by sub national actors such as terrorist groups that do not have the ability to challenge key state using conventional military capabilities or strategies. Asymmetric balancing also refers to the other side of the coin, that is, to efforts by sub national actors and their state sponsors to challenge and weaken established states using asymmetric means such as terrorism.

Neorealists tend to locate most, if not all, of the explanations for nation-state behavior in the structural characteristics of the international system, not in the internal characteristics of nation-states or individuals. But regardless of their positions on this issue, all realists come to the same conclusion about power in the international

³² Ibid,p.3

system: the distribution of power is the most important variable explaining nation-state behavior, and the best way of managing conflict in the system is by balancing power with power. Various balance of power theories all assume that the only effective way to prevent war is to prepare for war; one must be willing to threaten and to use force in order to reduce the likelihood that such force will in fact be used.³³ Major armed conflict between China and other big actors seems unrealistic in the nuclear age. But there can be proxy wars all around China because of the dynamic conditions of the east and south Asia. There are many unresolved territorial and political disputes in the region. All these disputes have two dimensions. USA wants to use these problems as a way to contain China on the other hand China wants to use these disputes to increase the sphere of influence around China.

Some liberal criticism of balance of power theory rest on historical examples in which balance of power failed and, on the inability of the theory, when applied to foreign policy behavior, to offer a long-term solution to the security dilemma. To liberals, anarchy is malleable and structural condition of conflict is not so determinative as realists would have us believe. The key factors necessary to obviate the negative aspects of anarchy and thereby obtain lasting security and order are democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions. Since democracies rarely fight one another, when satisfied democratic states are in ascendance, they tend to treat other democracies less belligerently than they treat non democracies.³⁴

In the modern International politics balance of prestige is a direct result balance of power. Prestige has become particularly important as a political weapon in an age in which the struggle for power is fought not only with the traditional methods of political pressure and military force, but in large measure as a struggle for the minds of men. In wide areas of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, the cold War was fought primarily in terms of competition between two rival political philosophies, economic system, and ways

³³ Robert. H.Dorf **Some Basic Concepts and Approaches to the Study of International Relations Guide To National Security Policy And Strategy**, Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (U.S. Army War College, 2004) p.9.

³⁴ *ibid*,p.9.

of life. The 2008 Beijing Olympiad will probably be used by China as a symbol of greatness and source of prestige.

The Cold War, which dominated the relations of the western world and the Soviet bloc during the two decades following the Second World War, was fought primarily with the weapons of prestige. The United States and the Soviet Union endeavored to impress each other with their military might, technological achievements, economic potential, and political principles in order to weaken each other's morale and deter each other from taking an irrevocable step toward war. Similarly, they tried to impress their allies, weaken the unity of the hostile coalition, and win the support of the uncommitted nations.³⁵ The Cold war era is one of the best examples for the balance of power theory and balance of prestige. China is also improving its image as one of the factors which effecting the security calculus. This is one of the reasons why China always tries to keep Japan's World War Two image alive in the region.

In the eyes of China's policymakers, and many of its intellectuals as well, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be enhanced by a better balance of power among the United States, Japan, and China. Currently, in Chinese eyes, this balance is impaired because China is relatively weak in this triangular relationship. Consequently, strengthening its military power, along with its enhanced economic strength, is viewed as contributing to regional stability, rather than disturbing it.³⁶ Today China is increasing its military and economical abilities peacefully. But when China reaches Great power status this policy may change. Especially in the situations when diplomacy and trade relations do not work to solve disputes. China has already passed a law against the Taiwan's independence which declares using armed forces if necessary.

The U.S. National Intelligence Council's report *Mapping the Global Future* notes: "The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century— will

³⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *ibid.*, p.93.

³⁶ Charles Wolf, Jr., Jonathan D. Pollack, **Straddling Economics and Politics: Cross-Cutting Issues in Asia, the United States, and the Global Economy**, (RAND, 2002), MR-1571-RC, USA, p.136

transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.”³⁷

Most certainly, China can not just yet be considered a status-quo power, or one that is entirely happy with the world balance of forces. It is true that Chinese elites have had a very positive view of the world situation since the end of the Cold War. The absence of serious threats to China’s security from its traditional enemies and rivals (among them, the former Soviet Union and India) has provided major relief and thus allowed Chinese leaders to focus almost singularly on its economic development programs. The opening up of its economy to foreign participation has broadened China's stake in preserving peace and stability in the region and in the world. The United States and Japan, the two major linchpins of the global market economy and the two status quo powers if ever there are any, are China's most important trade and investment partners. Therefore it may be argued that China shares their fundamental interests and objectives.³⁸ But this does not mean that in future China will be on the side of Japan and USA. The economical development of China is integrating the country to the global system but at the same time it is increasing the demand for oil and other raw materials. Competition for the resources and the control of the trade roads may cause China to be more aggressive.

2.4. MARXIST DOCTRINE

Mao Tse-tung's attitude towards the outside world was a mixture of idealism and realism; denial of all traditions but the continuation of traditional features. In the first place, it is highly nationalistic and most thoroughly anti-imperialist. In fact, this is the reason of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) winning the widest support among Chinese during the revolution, for it satisfied the national pride of the Chinese people, as no political force in

³⁷ National Intelligence Council, **Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project**, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2004), p. 47.

³⁸ Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, “China as a Rising Power: Implications for the Asia-Pacific”, **PASCN Discussion Paper** No. 99-06,p.2.

modern Chinese history ever had. Secondly, Mao was internationalist in supporting revolutionary struggles of other peoples. This position was pushed to the extreme, when China tried to form of leadership of world revolution. Thirdly, Mao countered the isolation and containment imposed on PRC by the United States with a policy which ended up in self-isolation.

In his late years, Mao decided to change all existing international laws and regulations, sought no more to recover China's position in the United Nations Organization (UNO) and advocated the creation of a "revolutionary UNO" together with "genuine revolutionary forces" of the world. However, in practice, Mao was very realistic and prudent and by no means adventurous in international affairs. This practical side led to the Ping Pong diplomacy between China and USA during the cold war.

Until the 1980s, Marxism was the main alternative to the mainstream realist and liberal traditions. Where realism and liberalism took the state system for granted, Marxism offered both a different explanation for international conflict and a blueprint for fundamentally transforming the existing international order. Orthodox Marxist theory saw capitalism as the central cause of international conflict. Neo Marxist "dependency" theory, by contrast, focused on relations between advanced capitalist powers and less developed states and argued that the former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.³⁹

Marxist theory argues that mode of production determines the political structure. "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society – the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life".⁴⁰

³⁹ Stephen M Walt, "International relations: One world, many theories", **Foreign Policy**; Washington; (Spring 1998); p.2

⁴⁰ Marx, K. (1904) **A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy**, (2nd edn, trans. N.I. Stone. New York: London: International Library Publishing Company), pp.11-12.

According to Marx economical crises in the capitalist economy is the main reason of wars. “In these crises, a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity — the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce... The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented”.⁴¹

Lenin came up with a similar conclusion about the behavior of Great powers in modern history. “Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist above it and alongside it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system”.⁴²

⁴¹Marx K, Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, **Selected Works**, Volume One, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1969), pp. 98-137

⁴²Lenin, Imperialism, “The Highest Stage of Capitalism”, **Lenin Collected Works**, (Moscow 1950) vol:22, p.265-266

Mao saw capitalist economy as the main reason of international conflicts and war. “Once man eliminated capitalism he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again know war.”⁴³ But ironically China was in conflict with USSR after late 1950s and Chinese labeled USSR as a revisionist power during the cold war.

How a country views its identity and role in the international system are prime parameters of foreign policy, especially when material interests are limited. From the Communist insurrection's victory through the 1970s, China saw itself as a revolutionary vanguard, spreading communist upheaval throughout the world. While this approach was shaped by China's national interest, it was no mere rationale.

As hope for global revolution faded and Beijing switched its partners from tiny opposition groups to governments and China projected itself as leader of the Third World, struggling against the hegemony of the superpowers, the USSR and the United States. Lacking the strength and resources of other great powers, China would try to make itself the leader of a massive coalition of the weaker states. Unable to provide large amounts of aid, money, or technology, Beijing stressed ideological factors. Essentially, this posture evolved into a basis for China to become a global great power in its own right. While echoes of this approach survive, it is harder to maintain after the Cold War and the Soviet Union's collapse, the fading of short-lived "South versus North" and nonaligned movement, and the formation of other regional and bilateral alliances. China's ideological fervor faded, too, in the post- Mao Zedong era of the country's politics and society. China replaced Mao's slogan of "politics in command" with "economic development in command."

After Mao's death and elimination of “gang of four” Deng Xiaoping made, great efforts to integrate China into the international community. Deng's international policy has three major parts. Theoretically, both Leninist thesis of the inevitability of world war in the imperialist age as well as Mao's concept of "three worlds" have been abandoned. The tendency of self-isolation has given way to the integration to globalization and to be a part

⁴³ Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War”, **Selected Military Writings**, (Foreign Languages Press. Beijing 1963), p.223.

of the main stream of the international community. Economic development is placed in the center of national goals, leading to pragmatic attitude and low profile in international affairs. There is no more desire to be leader of Mao's world revolution. Today China is still following this course.

3. UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

This paper tries to explain roots and results of new Chinese foreign policy in the 21st Century. China's impact on world affairs is growing day by day. Understanding China's Grand Strategy then becomes a Priority. Beijing has given enough clues that some time in the 21st century the People Republic's of China will become the number one economic power on Earth. Chinese self- conception as *zhongguo* means the country of the middle. In other words Chinese see themselves in the center of the world.

China's rapid development has attracted worldwide attention in recent years. The implications of various aspects of China's rise, from its expanding influence and military muscle to its growing demand for energy supplies, are being heatedly debated in the international community as well as within China. Correctly understanding China's achievements and its path toward greater development is thus crucial⁴⁴

China has a dualist geography. In other words China has neighbor states by land and sea. This dualism also shows itself in Chinese foreign policy and security strategy as engagement and containment options. China follows continental and maritime strategy at the same time. For this reason Chinese military modernization has three periods first short term transition, in medium term advanced modernization and in the long run to be a global power land, air and maritime high tech modernization.⁴⁵

China has been a largely reactive international power for most of the period beginning in 1949 with the formation of the Communist state, willingly—and often skillfully—playing the pivot in the strategic competition of other states. In the 1960s and 1970s, its leaders briefly promoted a model of international order that stressed national revolution and proletarian solidarity. Yet, with that exception, the country has offered no real alternative vision of the international system for most of the past five decades. Beneath the rhetorical

⁴⁴ Zheng Bijan, China's "'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status", *Foreign Affairs*, 84:5, (September/October 2005), pp.18-24.

⁴⁵ Doç.Dr Mesut Hakkı Çaşın," Değişen Uluslararası Konjonktür ve Çin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejilerinin Yeni Parametreleri", Atilla Sandıklı and İlhan Güllü ed. *Geleceğin Süper Gücü Çin*, (Tasam İstanbul 2005), pp.65-80.

veneer, Chinese leaders have conducted their own foreign policy largely on the basis of the same calculations of balance of power and relative national advantage that drove the behavior of other major powers during the Cold War. Thus, Chinese foreign policy evolved during the first 50 years of the People's Republic in a context set almost entirely by others.⁴⁶

For a quarter-century, indeed, almost since Richard Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, a comforting, even heart-warming notion has prevailed among many policymakers and experts on American policy toward the People's Republic of China. They believe that China will inevitably become more like the West, non-ideological, pragmatic, materialistic, and progressively freer in its culture and politics. According to them, China is militarily weak and unthreatening; while Beijing tends toward rhetorical excess, its actual behavior has been far more cautious, aimed at the overriding goals of economic growth and regional stability.⁴⁷

While this vision of China, and especially its diplomatic and economic behavior, was largely true until the middle to late 1980s, it is now obsolete, as it ignores many Chinese statements and actions that suggest the country is emerging as a great power rival of the United States in the Pacific. True, China is more open and internationally engaged than at any time since the communist revolution of 1949. Nevertheless, since the late 1980s Beijing's leaders, especially those who have taken over national policy in the wake of Deng Xiaoping's enfeeblement, have set goals that are contrary to American interests. Driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.⁴⁸

What is most striking about Chinese foreign policy is its effort to consolidate regional trends and promote stability. In its policies toward Russia, North and South Korea, Thailand, Burma, and the countries of Indochina, Central Asia, and South Asia, China has emphasized cooperative measures to consolidate existing relationships rather than forceful

⁴⁶ Evan A. Feigenbaum, "China's Challenge to Pax Americana", *The Washington Quarterly*, 24:3 (Summer 2001), p.31.

⁴⁷ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America", *Foreign Affairs*, 76:2, (March/ April 1997), p.18.

⁴⁸ *ibid*, p.19.

measures to promote new patterns of relations. China is a revisionist power, but for the foreseeable future it will seek to maintain the status quo -- and so should the United States.⁴⁹

A benign interpretation would see China as simply cultivating the sort of stable, peaceful, and prosperous regional environment that China requires for its own successful modernization. A more skeptical view sees China playing a long term game designed to curtail American influence and Weave a Close-knit economic and security community with China at the center.⁵⁰

Since 1949, Chinese administrations adopted a strategy “to modernize China without becoming dependent on, and thus exploited by, the West...with the nation’s long-cherished ideal to turn this poor backward country into an independent, prosperous, and powerful state.”⁵¹

China’s foreign policy is driven by a domestic agenda. The Chinese leadership continues to focus on the economic and political transformation of the country. All Chinese foreign policy aims in securing the country’s economic development and territorial integrity. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party hopes to strengthen its legitimacy through a sophisticated foreign policy, putting on the world stage China as an influential player and creating stability for the nation. Political developments contradicting or hampering these goals are perceived as threats.⁵²

China exerts worldwide economic influence and is the leading military and political power in Asia, but its importance and influence would be much greater if Chinese leaders were inclined to assert Chinese influence in world affairs more forcefully. Post–Mao Zedong leaders generally eschew such a global approach. Preoccupied with a long list of domestic economic, political, and social priorities, China’s leaders focus on maintaining the internal

⁴⁹ Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power”, **Foreign Affairs**, 76:2, (March/ April 1997),p.34.

⁵⁰ Catharin Dalpino and David Steinberg, “Southeast Asia Looks North: New Dynamics with China”, **Georgetown Southeast Asia Survey**, (2003-2004), Washington, Georgetown university, 2003, p.15.


⁵¹ Wilhelm, Alfred D., Jr. **The Chinese at the Negotiating Table**, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press), 1994.p.21.

⁵² Knut Dethlefsen, China’s Foreign Policy in Transition, **FES**, Briefing Paper ,(May 2004), p.3.

stability and economic prosperity essential to the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly of power.⁵³

Figure 3.1: Chinese Foreign Policy Goals

Percentage of Chinese who view each of the following as a very important foreign policy goal for China.



Source: Global Views 2006

3.1. CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

China as a country and as a civilization effects the world since the ancient days. This is the reason China's grand strategy has ancient roots. Traditionally Chinese like to overwhelm the enemy by using stratagems, not only in wars but also in politics. This behavior also shows itself in today's modern Chinese diplomacy. Chinese always use complex methods and their strategic time scale is longer than most of the nations.

⁵³ Robert Sutter, "Why Does China matter?", *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter, 2003-04), 27:1 p. 87.

China's traditional security strategy is based on deception. As Sun Tzu explains in his ancient book Art of War:

*Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under stress and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack when he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.*⁵⁴

Chinese military strategists define grand strategy as “the overall strategy of a nation or alliance of nations in which they use overall national strength” to achieve political goals, especially those related to national security and development. Put another way, Chinese strategy, as they define it, is one of maintaining balance among competing priorities for national economic development and maintaining the type of security environment within which such development can occur.⁵⁵

In the early 1990s, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997) gave guidance to China's foreign and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the “24 character” strategy: “*observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.*” Later, the phrase, “make some contributions (*you suo zuo wei*)” was added.⁵⁶

China's diplomacy thereby serves the political, economic and military needs of the country's grand strategy. Increased participation in multilateral forums, restrained currency policy and active cultivation of great power partnerships help mute perceptions of a “China-threat,” build China's reputation as a responsible actor, and convince others of the benefits of engagement with China as well as the counterproductive consequences of attempting to threaten, isolate or contain it.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ David Lai, “Learning From The Stones: A Go Approach To Mastering China's Strategic Concept, *Sh*”i, **Strategic Studies Institute**, monograph (May 2004),p.3.

⁵⁵ Department of Defense's annual report to Congress, **The Military Power of the People's Republic of China**, (Office of Department of Defense,USA 2005), p.9.

⁵⁶ *ibid*, p.11.

⁵⁷ Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice, **The China Quarterly**, (2001), p.858

In addition to providing for core survival concerns, China's contemporary grand strategy is designed to engineer the country's rise to the status of a true great power that shapes, rather than simply responds to, the international system. Achieving this goal, however, will take several decades of continued economic and military modernization during which China must sustain its recently impressive record of growth. It also presents a tough diplomatic challenge. As had become clear by the mid-1990s, China's expanding, yet still limited, power had already begun to elicit worried reactions from the U.S. and China's Asian neighbors.⁵⁸

In China, the security strategists of new generation have already come into scene. But they confront a much more complicated security situation. Elements affecting national security are becoming plural and compound. Although traditional military threat subsides, external political, economic and ideological challenges are intensifying. Progresses in technology and human values also bring about security pressures for the government controllability. Under such circumstances, security planners in China can not but update their conceptions of security challenges. However, the job itself is challenging. Without an intimate knowledge of modern norms and paradigms, security alternatives will remain limited in number and in significance. This fact indicates that the formulation of the PRC security concept will be a lasting phenomenon in the coming century. It is also foreseeable that the Chinese planners will have to work forcefully for it, even beyond their historical legacy and current capability.⁵⁹

China's security strategy is heavily conditioned by four fundamental features of its security environment.⁶⁰

- A long and in many places geographically vulnerable border,
- The presence of many potential threats, both nearby and distant,
- A domestic political system marked, both nearby and distant,
- A great power self-image.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.836.

⁵⁹ Liping, Xia. "China: A Responsible Great Power.", **Journal of Contemporary China** vol:10, #26 (2001)p.25.

⁶⁰ Michael D. Swaine, Ashley J. Tellis, **Interpreting China's Grand Strategy**, (RAND, Washington 2000), p.9.

Even through the total geographic expanse of the areas under the control of the unified Chinese state has repeatedly expanded and contracted throughout China's long history, its territorial borders extend for well over 10,000 miles... Much of the Chinese border crosses relatively open and flat grass and scrublands, deserts, and dry steppes. To the east and south, China's ocean borders abut the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Such a long, open, and exposed border has presented a major challenge to every Chinese government's efforts to maintain an adequate defense against external attack.⁶¹

Figure 3.2: China and Its Surrounding Areas



Source: RAND

⁶¹ *ibid*, pp.9-10.

During the modern period, China's security problem and resulting strategy has continued to center on efforts to preserve a fragile degree of domestic order and well-being as a first priority, and to consolidate control over the periphery as a primary means of external defense. However, these efforts have taken place largely within an environment of generally limited but increasing resources and capabilities.⁶²

The key question that China's basic security problem presents for the future is the extent to which these changing requirements for domestic order and periphery control, combined with China's increasing capabilities, will alter or reaffirm past historical patterns of strong state behavior, especially regarding the use of force rather than diplomacy⁶³

Based on rising Chinese economic and military power and expanding Chinese diplomatic and political interchange abroad, the overall power and importance of an accommodating China will continue to grow in world affairs. There likely will come a point well before 2020 when Chinese leaders will develop sufficient power to choose a different and more assertive approach to international affairs.⁶⁴

China, after floundering for more than a century, is now taking up the great power role that it believes, with good reason, to be its historical legacy... China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia, not by invading and occupying neighboring nations, but by being so much more powerful than they are that nothing will be allowed to happen in East Asia without China's at least tacit consent.⁶⁵

The main foreign affairs concepts involved in the "strategic opportunities" worldview are that relations among the world's great powers are generally relaxed and cooperative and that power configurations among the great powers are likely to remain stable, but that the international power competition involving the great powers is highly complex, involving "soft power" capabilities as well as classic military and economic considerations. In this

⁶² *ibid*, p.19.

⁶³ *ibid*, p.20.

⁶⁴ *ibid*,88

⁶⁵ Bernstein, R., Munro, R.H., **The Coming Conflict With China**, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York ,1997),p.4

situation, China should seek to cooperate with other countries and expand its own economic strength, particularly in the first decade of the 21st century.⁶⁶

3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY

Mao himself was a student of the Chinese ancient stratagems and after the Deng's reforms modern China even more reflects the old motifs in domestic and international politics. We need to understand China's history first to interpret its strategic behavior. China has long and well written history. But for practical reasons this thesis focuses since 19th century.

The 19th century is not a bright side of Chinese history. China insulted as a result of the opium wars and the 1895 Sino-Japanese war. Every lost war made Chinese life more miserable than the previous conditions. At the end of the century boxer reaction came up but again foreign powers won. Since then strong demand for modernization shaped the Chinese history.

3.2.1. The Opium wars

In 1793, the British sent an ambassador, Lord McCartney, at the head of a large delegation which was to negotiate with the emperor to allow trade to open up with Britain. The Emperor sent him off almost immediately with a polite but firm dismissal. Looking at the machines and tools which McCartney had brought from the west, the Emperor told him: 'We have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need of your country's manufactures.' The British, however, were not to be put off that easily, and they had a tool to force their way into the China market, a new and astoundingly popular product: opium. Opium had been known but relatively little used in China before the early nineteenth century, as it tended to be an exclusive, luxury product. However, its popularity suddenly grew after 1800. As the British East India Company grew more and more opium poppies in India, they looked to expand the market for their product. They soon found that there were eager customers in China... By the 1820s, there were around a million regular users of the drug in China. The sale was highly profitable for the British, but it provoked the anger of the Chinese imperial court.

⁶⁶ Suettinger, "China's Foreign Policy Leadership: Testing Time", **China Leadership Monitor**, No.9, p.3

The 'Opium War' of 1839-42 followed, with superior British technology literally outgunning anything the Chinese defenders could offer. 1842, the Chinese had to sign the humiliating Treaty of Nanjing, whereby they agreed to open ports to British trade, pay compensation for the destroyed opium, and hand over the island Hong Kong to Britain. Among the 'treaty ports' set up in this way as the small port town of Shanghai. This was the beginning of what the Chinese even now refer to as the 'century humiliation', the period when China's foreign and domestic policy was largely decided not by the Chinese government or people, but by foreign occupiers.⁶⁷

1856 the British, seeking to extend their trading rights in China, found an excuse to renew hostilities when some Chinese officials boarded the ship Arrow and lowered the British flag. The French joined the British in this war, using as their excuse the murder of a French missionary in the interior of China.

The allies began military operations in late 1857 and quickly forced the Chinese to sign the treaties of Tientsin (1858), which provided residence in Peking for foreign envoys, the opening of several new ports to Western trade and residence, the right of foreign travel in the interior of China, and freedom of movement for Christian missionaries. In further negotiations in Shanghai later in the year, the importation of opium was legalized. The Chinese, however, refused to ratify the treaties, and the allies resumed hostilities, captured Peking, and burned the emperor's summer palace. In 1860 the Chinese signed the Peking Convention, in which they agreed to observe the treaties of Tientsin

Before the nineteenth century, when China was still an empire, nationalism did not exist. The Chinese political elite begin to embrace modern nationalist doctrines for China's defense and regeneration only after China's disastrous defeat by British troops in the 1840-1842 Opium War, which led not only to the eventual disintegration of the Chinese empire but also to the loss of national sovereignty to imperialist powers. Since that time, the nationalist quest to blot out the humiliation China suffered at the hands of imperialists has been a recurring theme in Chinese politics. Almost all powerful Chinese political leaders from the early twentieth century through today have shared a deep bitterness at this

⁶⁷ Rana Mitter, **A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle With The Modern World**, (Oxford University Press, New York 2005) ,pp.29-30.

humiliation and have determined to restore China's pride and prestige, as well as its rightful place in the world.⁶⁸

3.2.2. Sino Japanese war of 1894-1895

Japan inflicted a humiliating military and naval defeat on China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and by the treaty of Shimonoseki imposed a harsh peace settlement on her in which she lost territory in Taiwan and a substantial area of the Liadong peninsula. China's humiliation was partly assuaged by the humiliation which Japan itself subsequently suffered at the hands of Russia, Germany and France in the three-power intervention which restored to the Chinese their losses in Manchuria.⁶⁹

After the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan on 22 June 1895 Japan observed a low posture policy towards China, even though her armies continued to occupy Weihaiwei until all installments of the war indemnity had been paid in 1898. Meanwhile, Japan focused its remained a spectator on the sidelines as the European countries leased parts of China. Recognizing China's weakness, however, Japan offered assistance at various levels. For example, it played a constructive role during the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898.

3.2.3. The Boxer Rising

In 1900 came the so-called Boxer Rising, a new popular movement against the gentry and the Manchu's similar to the many that had preceded it. The Beijing government succeeded, however, in negotiations that brought the movement into the service of the government and directed it against the foreigners. This removed the danger to the government and at the same time helped against the hated foreigners. But incidents resulted which the Beijing government had not anticipated. An international army was sent to China, and marched from Tientsin against Beijing, to liberate the besieged European legations and to punish the government. The Europeans captured Beijing (1900); the dowager empress and her

⁶⁸ Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable", *The Washington Quarterly* 29:1 (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 132-133.

⁶⁹ Ian Nish, *China and Japan*, (Oxford University Press, New York 1996), pp23-24.

prisoner, the emperor, had to flee; some of the palaces were looted. The peace treaty that followed exacted further concessions from China to the Europeans and enormous war indemnities, the payment of which continued into the 1940s, though most of the states placed the money at China's disposal for educational purposes.⁷⁰

3.3. CHINA IN THE THE 20TH CENTURY

Boxer rising in 1900 could not free China from the imperialist pressures but it weakened the Qing dynasty which opened the way for the Republican revolution. But the divided political forces which caused civil war and Japan invasion made China unable to be united until the victory of communist party in 1949.

3.3.1. The Republican Revolution of 1911

Chinese Revolution of 1911, the overthrow of the Manchu Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Chinese republic. After half a century of anti-Manchu risings, the imperial government began a reform movement which gave limited authority to provincial assemblies, and these became power bases for constitutional reformers and republicans. Weakened by provincial opposition to the nationalization of some major railways, the government was unable to suppress the republican Wuchang Uprising (10 October 1911). By the end of November fifteen provinces had seceded, and on 29 December 1911 provincial delegates proclaimed a republic, with Sun Yat-sen as provisional President. In February 1912, the last Qing emperor Puyi was forced to abdicate and Sun stepped down to allow Yuan Shikai to become President. The Provisional Constitution of March 1912 allowed for the institution of a democratically elected parliament, but this was ignored and eventually dissolved by Yuan Shikai after the abortive Second Revolution of 1913 which challenged his authority. Yuan had himself proclaimed emperor in 1915, but by that time central government was ineffective, and China was controlled by provincial warlords.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Wolfram Eberhard, **A History of China**, (Routledge, London 2005), p.311.

⁷¹ Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia. , The Learning Company, Inc. 1997 TLC Properties Inc.

3.3.2. Anti-Japanese War

Few Chinese had any illusions about Japanese designs on China. Hungry for raw materials and pressed by a growing population, Japan initiated the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931 and established ex-Qing emperor Puyi as head of the puppet regime of Manchukuo in 1932. The loss of Manchuria, and its vast potential for industrial development and war industries, was a blow to the Nationalist economy. The League of Nations, established at the end of World War I, was unable to act in the face of the Japanese defiance.

The Chinese resistance stiffened after July 7, 1937, when a clash occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops outside Beijing near the Marco Polo Bridge. This skirmish not only marked the beginning of open, though undeclared, war between China and Japan but also hastened the formal announcement of the second Guomindang-CCP united front against Japan.⁷²

The Communists had been promoting the formation of a coalition government ever since 1937. They wanted a “coalition government” because they were still too weak to seize power through military means, and direct participation in the government offered the next best approach to the same end. In these early days they did not succeed in this agitation. Only a few Communist leaders were given a minor role to play in the government.⁷³

In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but actually a nation economically prostrate and on the verge of all-out civil war. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least.

⁷² Barış Adıbelli, **Çin Dış Politikasında Tayvan Sorunu**, (IQ yayıncılık İstanbul 2006), pp.100-150.

⁷³ Keiji Furuya, **Chiang Kai-Shek His Life And Times**, (St. John's University, New York 1981), p.837.

3.3.3. Return to Civil War

The defeat of Japan had been relatively less favorable to them than to the Kuo-ming-tang armies, which had extensive transport facilities at their disposal. Even in the north-east, where the communists had obtained a strong foothold during the clandestine struggle against the Japanese occupying forces, the Nationalist troops had been able to seize control of the main centers at the time when Soviet armies were withdrawing, after dismantling and sending westward piece by piece the factories of this industrial area. However, the advantages enjoyed by the Nationalists were more apparent than real; their lines of communication were too extended and their armies held only the towns. The regime had not cured itself of its vices. As the fighting went on and the tactical superiority of the partisans-popular in the countryside thanks to their policy of redistributing the land-became clear, it grew more and more demoralized. Thus when the Red Armies won their first big victories, almost the whole of public opinion swung over to them.⁷⁴

In January 1949 Beijing was taken by the Communists without a fight, and its name changed back to Beijing. Between April and November, major cities passed from Kuomintang to Communist control with minimal resistance. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. After Chiang Kai-shek and a few hundred thousand Nationalist troops fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan, there remained only isolated pockets of resistance. In December 1949 Chiang proclaimed Taipei, Taiwan, the temporary capital of China.

3.4. MAO ERA

During the first months of existence of the People's Republic of China Mao adopted what in retrospect appear relatively restrained domestic policies. Although he ordered private property to be confiscated, he also promised indemnity and compensation to former property owners and shareholders, provided they were prepared to work for the 'socialist agrarian-industrial society' that was being planned in the new China. A similar offer was

⁷⁴ Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization*, (Cambridge University Press, USA 1999 second edition), p.644.

made to all those who had served as officials or civil servants under the GMD governments. Mao's aim was to ease the CCP's task of moving towards Communism by preserving continuity in administration.⁷⁵

In Mao's era, the foreign policy apparatus was rudimentary. Major decisions were made by Mao, often in private, and implemented by a small staff under Zhou Enlai, Mao's premier and sometime foreign minister. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao disbanded the few foreign policy institutes China had, called all but one of its ambassadors, and sent most of the foreign policy establishment to the countryside to be reeducated by the peasants.⁷⁶

Mao himself was perhaps both the cause and result of China's ambivalence toward Russia. His own rise within the CCP before 1949 was clearly at the expense of the pro-Moscow "returned students." Throughout his life, Mao studied English, not Russian, and preferred a Physician educated in the west to one trained by Russia. China's "lean-to-one-side" policy toward Moscow was a marriage of necessity rather than an expression of genuine mutual trust based on a shared ideology. Mao's rejection of the Soviet centralized approach in the late 1950s led to the most devastating famine in China's history (1959-61) and the self destruction of China's entire political infrastructure during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).⁷⁷

According to the theory of the "lost chance in China", the Chinese Communist leaders in the 1940s were open to better relations with the United States, but doctrinaire anticommunism prevented American leaders from responding to CCP cues. The result was over twenty years of containment from 1949 to 1972.⁷⁸

Although the Kennedy administration considered relaxing relations with China, a suitable opportunity never arose. China's denunciation of U.S.- Soviet detente, its 1962 border war with India, and its revolutionary rhetoric increased U.S. apprehension. The Kennedy

⁷⁵ Michael Lynch, **Mao**, (New York 2004, Routledge), p.149.

⁷⁶ Michael D. Swaine, **The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking**, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), p.99.

⁷⁷ Li Zhisui, **The Private Life of Chairman Mao**, (New York: Random House, 1994), p.21.

⁷⁸ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, **Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950**, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.156.

administration supported India in the border war and in 1963 considered carrying out a preemptive attack on China's nuclear weapons facilities.⁷⁹

3.4.1. Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s was the most important development in Chinese foreign relations. The Soviet Union had been China's principal benefactor and ally, but relations between the two were cooling. The Soviet agreement in late 1957 to help China produce its own nuclear weapons and missiles was terminated by mid-1959. From that point until the mid-1960s, the Soviets recalled all of their technicians and advisers from China and reduced or canceled economic and technical aid to China. The discord was occasioned by several factors. The two countries differed in their interpretation of the nature of "peaceful coexistence."

The Chinese took a more militant and unyielding position on the issue of anti-imperialist struggle, but the Soviets were unwilling, for example, to give their support on the Taiwan question. In addition, the two communist powers disagreed on doctrinal matters. The Chinese accused the Soviets of "revisionism"; the latter countered with charges of "dogmatism." Rivalry within the international communist movement also exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations. An additional complication was the history of suspicion each side had toward the other, especially the Chinese, who had lost a substantial part of territory to tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Whatever the causes of the dispute, the Soviet suspension of aid was a blow to the Chinese scheme for developing industrial and high-level (including nuclear) technology.

3.4.2. Nixon's Trip to China

USA tried to exploit the Sino-Soviet split by improving the relations with China. Although China was a communist state Chinese were considering the Soviet Union as the primary threat to their security.

⁷⁹ Gordon H Chang, **Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972**, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p.241.

In their accounts of the historic February 1972 trip to China, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger focus on the February 21 meeting with Mao Zedong as well as the talks with Zhou Enlai on the Vietnam War, Taiwan, and the Shanghai Communiqué. Both kept secret one of the trip's more remarkable episodes -- Kissinger's top secret intelligence briefing to the Chinese on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. They also kept secret some of their talks with Zhou; Kissinger later claimed that Zhou "spent very little of our time on" Taiwan, but actually Nixon and Kissinger went to some length to mollify his concerns about the possibility of Taiwanese independence and prospective Japanese influence over Taiwan.⁸⁰

Nixon's diplomatic opening to Beijing in 1971-72 and the major pullback of U.S. forces in Asia under the guidelines of the "Nixon doctrine," U.S. officials began to view Beijing more as a strategic asset against the Soviet Union than as an adversary to be confronted in the Taiwan Strait. The Nixon overtures resulted in the so-called "Shanghai Communiqué" of 1972 (the first of three U.S.-China communiqués) which set the stage for the reversal of U.S. post-WWII China policy.⁸¹

3.5. DENG'S ERA

The culmination of Deng Xiaoping's re-ascent to power and the start in earnest of political, economic, social, and cultural reforms were achieved at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee in December 1978. The Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms of the 1980s shifted the Chinese revolution from a communist toward a state-authoritarian model. He moved away from state planning and allowed the rise of market forces. He privatized agriculture, opened China to foreign investment. And pursued an export-oriented economic development policy. More recently his successors, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, have begun sharply reducing the burden of state-owned industry.

⁸⁰ Richard Nixon, **RN The Memories of Richard Nixon** (New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 559-580

⁸¹ Kerry Dumbaugh, "Taiwan's Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications", **Congressional Research Service**, (The Library of Congress February 23, 2006), pp.1-3.

These post-Mao policies have produced a rapidly developing economy. Yet the political structure remains thoroughly Leninist.⁸²

The evolution of China's foreign policy began under Deng, who, as supreme leader, initiated China's first major diplomatic transformation by launching the "reform and opening" movement in the late 1970s. Prior to Deng, Mao had rejected the rules of the international system and sought to overthrow it, pursuing change through revolution instead. Mao's foreign policy was noted for its bombastic language, strong opposition to the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union), close association with developing countries, relative isolation from international organizations, and economic autarky.⁸³

Beginning in the late 1970s, Deng initiated a dedicated effort to replace Mao's ideologically motivated and revisionist foreign policy with a more pragmatic one focused on integrating China into the international community. Chinese scholars characterize the shift from Mao's to Deng's diplomatic strategy as a five-part transition from

- revolutionary to state diplomacy
- anti-system to "participation" diplomacy
- simple "enemies, ourselves, and friends" diplomacy to "all-round diplomacy"
- choosing either one or the other between the U.S. and Soviet superpowers to the diplomacy of acting independently and making China's own decisions
- the diplomacy of the principle of safety first to attaching importance to economic diplomacy and so-called "low position" (*di wei*) diplomacy.⁸⁴

Deng took China in the opposite direction. To facilitate economic modernization at home, he promoted engagement with the international community. China expanded its international profile by significantly increasing its participation in intergovernmental and

⁸² Harvey Nelsen, "The Future of The Chinese State", **The Modern Chinese State**, edited by David Shambaugh, (Cambridge University Press, USA 2000), p.217

⁸³ Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy", **Foreign Affairs**, 82: 6 (November/December 2003), p.3.

⁸⁴ Li Limin, "Zhazhu jiyu, jue ding hao Zhongguo yu Shijie de Guanxi [Seizing Good Fortune and Resolving China's Relations with the World]," **Xiandai guoji guanxi**, No. 4, (2003), pp. 24-26.

nongovernmental organizations, especially financial ones, and China gradually began to emerge from its Mao-era isolation.⁸⁵

Three key words, **modernization**, **nationalism**, and **regionalism**, can be used to help us better understand directions of Chinese foreign policy. Modernization refers to China's concentration on economic growth. Since 1978, two years after the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized the need to shift China's priority from "revolution" to "modernization." In the beginning of 1980, Deng raised three tasks for China for the decade ahead (the 1980s): they were to "oppose hegemonism" and to "preserve world peace;" to work on "China's" reunification "with Taiwan;" and to "step up the drive for China's four modernizations."⁸⁶ Deng singled out the third task as the most important by stating that "modernization is at the core of all these major tasks, because it is the essential condition for solving both our domestic and our external problems;"⁸⁷ and "nothing short of a world war could tear us away from this line."⁸⁸

3.5.1 Tiananmen Protest Of 1989

Tiananmen protests started out on a small scale, in the form of mourning for Hu Yaobang and demands that the party revise their official view of him. The protests gained momentum after news of confrontation between students and police. At Hu's funeral, a large group of students gathered at Tiananmen Square and requested, to meet premier Li Peng, widely regarded to be Hu's political rival. but failed Thus students called for a strike in universities in Beijing. On April 26, an editorial in People's Daily, following an internal speech made by Deng Xiaoping, accused the students of plotting civil unrest. The statement enraged the students, and on April 29 about 50,000 students assembled on the streets of Beijing, disregarding the warning of a crackdown made by authorities and demanded that the government revoke the statement.

⁸⁵ *ibid* p.3.

⁸⁶ Zhao Quansheng, "Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-cold War Era, *World Affairs*", 159:3, (1997), p.114.

⁸⁷ Deng Xiaoping, "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us," January 16, 1980, in Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)*, (Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1984), p. 224.

⁸⁸ Deng Xiaoping, "Building A Socialism with A Specifically Chinese Character," June 30, 1984, in **Deng Xiaoping**, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (1982-1992)*, (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1994), p. 73.

The protests focused on the issue of corruption, which united both groups, and because the students were able to invoke Chinese archetypes of the selfless intellectual who spoke truth to power. Unlike the Tiananmen protests of 1987, which consisted mainly of students and intellectuals, the protests in 1989 commanded widespread support from the urban workers who were alarmed by growing inflation and corruption.

Because of the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, foreign media were present in mainland China in large numbers. Their coverage of the protests was extensive and generally favorable towards the protesters. Among the top leadership, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was strongly in favor of a soft approach to the demonstrations while Li Peng was seen to argue in favor of a crackdown. Ultimately, the decision to crack down on the demonstrations was made by a group of Party elders who saw abandonment of single-party rule as a return of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Soldiers and tanks from the 27th and 28th Armies of the People's Liberation Army were sent to take control of the city. By 5:40AM the following morning the Square had been cleared.

The Tiananmen Square protests damaged the reputation of the PRC in the West. Western media had been invited to cover the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev in May, and Protestors seized this opportunity, creating signs and banners designed for international television audiences.

Images of the protests would strongly shape Western views and policy toward the PRC throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century. There was considerable sympathy for the student protests among Chinese students in the West. Almost immediately, both the United States and the European Union announced an arms embargo, and China's image as reforming country was replaced by that of a repressive authoritarian regime. The Tiananmen protests were frequently invoked to argue that the PRC government was an aggressive threat to world peace.

The Tiananmen square protests dampened the growing concept of political liberalization that was popular in the late 1980s; as a result, many democratic reforms that were proposed during the 1980s were swept under the carpet. With a full appreciation of the rising

prosperity and international influence of the PRC as well as the difficulties that Russia has had since the end of the Cold War, many Chinese no longer consider immediate political liberalization to be wise, preferring to see slow stepwise democratization instead.

The United States and European Union embargo on weapons sales to the PRC, put in place as a result of the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests still remains in place 17 years later.

Deng Xiaoping and his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, wrapped themselves in the mantle of pragmatic nationalism, which they found remained the most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value shared by the regime and its critics. Pragmatic leaders moved quickly to position themselves as the defenders of China's national pride and interests by resisting Western sanctions after the Tiananmen crackdown, promoting China's business interests by entering the World Trade Organization, dissuading Taiwan from declaring independence, and winning its bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Pragmatic nationalism has resonated with the Chinese people as they have pursued greater wealth, at the same time as the regime's leaders have promoted the quest for power and prosperity.⁸⁹

3.6. CHINA AFTER THE COLD WAR

In Europe the end of the Cold War had a negative impact on European security. In East Europe and South Europe, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated and ethnic conflict intensified. In the Balkan Peninsula, ethnic clashes led to massive war. In Russia, the separatist war in Chechnya caused a lot of trouble. However, in Asia the situation is quite different. The end of the Cold War brought the Asian-Pacific region unprecedented peace and success. After the Cold War, the United States changed its former policy of countering and containing the East. This was replaced by a policy of keeping a balance of regional force, preventing a regional hegemony against the United States from emerging. Russia reduced its armaments dramatically and withdrew most of its military force from the Far East area. Meanwhile, China devotes itself to economic reform

⁸⁹ *ibid.*p.134.

and development, pursues a peaceful foreign policy, and keeps stable and friendly relations with surrounding countries.

The interrelationship among the powers of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan is generally stable and developing in the direction of improvement, although there is not complete harmony among these four Countries. Relations between the United States and Japan have improved further, and their alliance relationship is a very important factor in the security issues of the Asian–Pacific region. In South Asia, although the relations between India and Pakistan continue to be strained, the countries in the area are pursuing economic reform at various rates, giving priority to development and improving national power; this promotes the stability of South Asia. The participation of ASEAN in regional affairs as a whole plays an important and positive role in promoting peace and stability in region as time goes on.

In the transition phase at the end of the Cold War, the attention paid was high, it was a question, however, of allaying the central danger of the old era, the intercontinental nuclear war. The American-Soviet (later Russian) talks received a lot of attention. This also applied to the period directly afterwards when the news of "loose nukes" worried the public. Thereafter, the debate cooled off noticeably. The various proposals for extensive or comprehensive nuclear disarmament in the mid-1990's were already more or less the pure concern of experts and failed to interest the public, the highly technical character of these concepts would have surely contributed to this, too.⁹⁰

By the mid-1990s, China faced an emerging array of increasingly suspicious states along its periphery. What could Beijing do about this trend whose continuation might have resulted in China confronting an encircling coalition including virtually all the major and minor powers in the region as well as the U.S.? An important part of Beijing's response has been the emphasis in its diplomacy since mid-1996 on two interrelated efforts. The first entails actions, and not just words, to reassure China's regional neighbors and to enhance the PRC's reputation as a more responsible and co-operative player. So far, the principal manifestations of this have been a more active embrace of multilateralism and

⁹⁰ Harald Müller, Annette Schaper, **US Nuclear Policy After the Cold War**, (PRIF, Frankfurt 2004), p.61

widely touted self-restraint during the wave of currency devaluations that accompanied the Asian financial crisis. The second element of the present approach aims to reduce the likelihood that others will unite to prevent China's rise to the ranks of the great powers. Rather than pursuing a more traditional diplomatic strategy of forming alliances or simply repeating its long-standing mantra (that China has an independent foreign policy, will never seek hegemony, and poses a threat to no one), Beijing instead began a concerted effort to cultivate "partnerships" with the world's major states, arrangements that it hopes will increase the benefits they perceive in working with China while underscoring the opportunity costs of working against it. The following section examines more closely these two distinctive components of China's present strategy. As noted above, although this adjustment in PRC diplomacy does not mark a sharp break with Beijing's foreign policy of the early 1990s, it is distinguished by the level of China's international activism, especially in its great power diplomacy, and by Beijing's recognition that it had to do more to mollify its neighbours' concerns.⁹¹

The 'end of the Cold War' declarations made at the US-USSR summit in Malta (1989) and at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris (1990), were based on such clear facts in the Euro-Atlantic region as, for instance, remarkable progress in US-USSR arms reduction talks, democratization of the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries, the collapse of the Berlin wall and reunification of Germany. However, on what basis did the Cold War end in the Asia-Pacific? Indeed, with collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), it may be possible to say that the Cold War has fundamentally vanished, both in ideology and in political forms. Yet, it does not seem to provide enough ground for ending the Cold War in the Asia Pacific region, whose situation is much more complex than that of Europe.⁹²

⁹¹ Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *The China Quarterly*, (2001), p.842

⁹² Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945*, (Nissan Institute, New York 1998), p.194

4. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR POWERS

This paper shows the China's new foreign policy after the Cold war has four dimensions, participation in regional and global organizations, establishment of strategic partnerships and strong bilateral relations; expansion of economic ties, and reduction of distrust and anxiety in the security subjects. Since the declaration of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and after the reform began in 1978, China has become an increasingly important player in regional and global affairs. For this reason the question of how Chinese government will approach key issues in international political system becomes critical.

4.1. US CHINA RELATIONS

The "U.S. factor" in the Chinese national security calculus is important than in the past. Over the past few years, Chinese security analysts view the new security policies of the United States with increasing alarm. Chinese see U.S. challenges to China's security interests vital or even survival. For the Chinese government how to deal with the United States is the major foreign policy issue.

The rise of Beijing and the evolution of the balance of power in the Asia Pacific Region issue a challenge to the US leadership of security provisions in East Asia. A possible future conflict with China is emerging as a threat to the eyes of US military planners. In its latest planning document (called Joint Vision 2020), for the first time the Pentagon listed China as a potential adversary or a "peer competitor".⁹³

The war in Kosovo and the incident of the bomb fallen on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 seemed to have deteriorated the friendly Sino American relationship which, after Clinton's trip in China in July 1998, had been described as a "strategic partnership". The Chinese reacted harshly to the bomb fallen on its embassy in Belgrade. President Jiang Zemin for four days refused to answer to President Clinton who was calling to apologize.⁹⁴

⁹³ Maria Weber, "US-China: New Balance Of Power In East Asia After September 11th", Global Watch, no:22, (October 2002), p.6.

⁹⁴ *ibid*, p.9.

With Nixon’s historic reconciliation with China in 1972, Sino-American relations were restored, and China moved from being regarded as America’s most implacable enemy to being a friend and tacit ally.⁹⁵ After the cold war the amount of Sino-American trade significantly increased. And China became USA’s “strategic partner” during president Clinton’s era.(see table)

Table 4.1: U.S. Merchandise Trade With China: 1980-2005 (\$ in billions)

Year	U.S. Exports	U.S. Imports	U.S. Trade Balance
1980	3.8	1.1	2.7
1985	3.9	3.9	0
1990	4.8	15.2	-10.4
1995	11.7	45.6	-33.8
2000	16.3	100.1	-83.8
2001	19.2	102.3	-83.1
2002	22.1	125.2	-103.1
2003	28.4	152.4	-124.0
2004	34.7	196.7	-162.0
2005	41.8	243.5	-201.6

Source: USITC Data Web.

The U.S. trade deficit with China has grown significantly in recent years, due largely to a surge in U.S. imports of Chinese goods relative to U.S. exports to China. That deficit rose from \$30 billion in 1994 to \$162 billion in 2004 (see Table 4.1.). The U.S. trade deficit with China is now larger than that of any other U.S. trading partner, including Japan (\$75.2 billion), Canada (\$65.8 billion), and Mexico (\$45.1 billion). The U.S. trade deficit with

⁹⁵ Evelyn Goh, **Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”**, (Cambridge University Press) .p.1.

China in 2004 was 30.6% higher than it was in 2003. During the first five months of 2005, the U.S. trade deficit with China was 34% higher than the same period in 2004 and averaged \$3.6 billion per week. In comparison the U.S. trade deficit with China for the entire year of 1989 was \$3.5 billion.⁹⁶

While many Chinese have convinced themselves that U.S. power preeminence cannot last, they do grudgingly acknowledge the world system's current unipolar nature. This view represents a dramatic shift from the early 1990s, when many Chinese held out hope for a multipolar international system. To that end, Beijing deployed a strategy of resistance to American power that included elements of balancing—policies such as alliances of the weak that seek to counter the dominant power. During 1990s summits with Russian and other world leaders, Chinese sought and often produced joint declarations of opposition to “hegemonism” (read, U.S. power) and unipolarity.⁹⁷

U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China are well known. For the most part, U.S. worries on the security front have revolved around the following four key issues. First, growing concerns that Beijing is prepared to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue “sooner rather than later,” based on a calculus that few in the west can claim to understand with any degree of certainty. Second, U.S.A. concerns about Chinese proliferation behavior. Third, given the lack of defense transparency in China, uncertainties in the United States as to the intentions behind China's military modernization programs, conventional and nuclear. And fourth, questions in the United States as to whether China would like to see the U.S. Military pushed out of the Pacific, or at least pulled back. All of these issues are critically important to the regional security interests of the United States.⁹⁸

The Sino-US tension grew once more on April 1st 2001 when an American E-P3, a spy-plane crossing the Chinese territorial air space, crashed with a Chinese jetfighter. The Chinese pilot died, the American spy-plane was obliged to land on Hainan Island and the crew (24 members) was held as hostage.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Ibid,p.5.

⁹⁷ Peter Hays Gries, “China Eyes the Hegemon”, **Orbis**, (Summer 2005), p.406.

⁹⁸ David M. Finkelstein, “The View from Beijing: U.S.-China Security Relations from Kosovo to September”, (11, 2001), pp.20-30.

⁹⁹ ibid ,p.12.

In spite of the peaceful solution of spy-plane crisis, the tension between China and US remained high. On April 25th 2001 the Bush Administration decided to sale arms to Taiwan in an unprecedented scale since 1979 (Table 2, p. 31). This decision reaffirmed a further pro-Taiwan policy of the US security. Beijing’s reaction was strong: «Taiwan belong to China, it is a rebel province not a protectorate of a foreign power».

Some American writers believe that US-China conflict is inevitable. “The People’s Republic of China and the United States have become global rivals, countries whose relations are tense, whose interests are in conflict, and who face tougher, more dangerous times ahead”¹⁰⁰ The main idea of this realist view are that China considers America to be its main enemy and that Beijing seeks to replace the United States as the rising power in Asia.

Table 4.2: The Arms Sale of the US to Taiwan in 2001

Arms Sales
Four Kidd-class destroyers, to be ready by 2003
12 P-3C Orion aircraft
Eight diesel-Powered submarines
Paladin self-Propelled artillery system
MH-53E minesweeping helicopters
AAV7A1 Amphibious assault vehicles
Mk 48 torpedoes without advanced features
Avenger surface to air missile system
Submarine launched and surface-launched torpedoes
Aircraft survivability equipment
Technical briefing on the Patriot antimissile system the island has been developing

Source: The New York Times, April 24, 2001, p.6.

¹⁰⁰ Bernstein, R. and R. Munro, **The Coming Conflict with China**, (New York 1997), Knopf., p.3.

If one postulates that Sino-American relations are strategically competitive, then it is necessary to state the potential objects of competition.¹⁰¹ U.S. interests are twofold:

- to have military capability in or available to the region sufficient to prevent any power or combination of powers from dominating East Asia
- to ensure that the United States and its allies have unfettered access to regional markets and strategic resources, such as oil from the Middle East that transits the region's sea lanes.

China's primary external interests are threefold:

- to ensure secure borders on its periphery
- to sustain the regional stability and economic vitality essential to the regional trade and commerce so necessary for China's continued economic growth and modernization
- to ensure China's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The Bush Administration plans to be much more forceful than its predecessor in strengthening military cooperation with its allies in the Asia Pacific. To ensure its uni-superpower position in the post-Cold War international system, the US will be more flexible in terms of global military intervention and will place any US interests before everything else.¹⁰² As a matter of fact, the Bush Administration's diplomatic and defense policy indicates that the future US global security strategy will be a rerun of the Reagan Era, with a more active pursuit of the American Liberal hegemony. As a matter of fact, the Bush Administration's diplomatic and defense policy indicates that the future US global security strategy will be a rerun of the Reagan Era, with a more active pursuit of the American Liberal hegemony.¹⁰³

The Taiwan problem, however, seems unlikely to be resolved soon. If this forecast is accurate, it will have important and deeper consequences for issues that lie far beyond East Asian security. Foremost among these problems is the gradual institutionalization of a

¹⁰¹ Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," **International Security** 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), 81-118.

¹⁰² "Bush is Offering Taiwan Some Arms but not the Best", in **The New York Times**, (April 24, 2001), p.1

¹⁰³ "Reappearance of Reagan Foreign Policy Under President Bush", in **United Daily News**, (February 11, 2001), p.11

Chinese strategic vision that could hamstring U.S.–China relations on a variety of important questions in international politics that will appear, at first glance, to be only marginally related to the U.S.–China relationship.¹⁰⁴

4.2. CHINA RUSSIA RELATIONS

This thesis argues that Sino -Russian relations have two dimensions. Both of the countries are in competition for the resources of central Asia but they are allies when it comes to balancing the west.

In terms of both power and ideology, Russia, perhaps more than any other country, has good reason to see the rise of China as a threat. The historical decline of Russia and the steady rise of China in the past 20 years have been accompanied by a growing gap between the domestic political systems of the two nations. At the turn of the millennium, however, Sino-Russian relations are perhaps more equal and more mutually beneficial than they have been at any other time during the past 300 years.

In 2000, Putin told audiences in Russia’s Maritime Province, “If we don’t take concrete efforts, the future local population will speak Japanese, Chinese, or Korean.”¹⁰⁵ Moscow knows that China is an economic and strategic rival whose rising power must be resisted, yet it is by no means certain that there is an adequate strategy for doing so.

In Asia, Russia’s overriding security interests are tied to the fate of the vast portion of its territory in Siberia (especially land-locked eastern Siberia) and the Russian Far East, which lies between Lake Baikal and the Pacific coast and directly borders on China, Korea, Japan, and the United States (in the Bering Strait). If Russia is unable to come up with a working model of regional development suited to the new market environment at home and the international reality of globalization, it will inevitably lead to the progressive deindustrialization, depopulation, and overall degradation of Asiatic Russia. The lingering fear among Russia’s elites and the general public is that, if the country does not prove itself

¹⁰⁴ Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China’s Challenge to *Pax Americana*”, **Washington Quarterly** (Summer 2001), p.41

¹⁰⁵ “President Putin Urges Radical Changes in Policy in Russian Far East,” ITAR-TASS, (July 21,2000)

capable of developing a few million square miles of this resource-rich area, someone else will—usually assumed to be China.¹⁰⁶

Whereas Russia and China used to stand on the brink of nuclear war, with Russia prepared to launch a nuclear strike against China, now China and Russia have mutually pledged not to use nuclear weapons against one another. This is especially striking in that Russia recently dropped its no-first-use policy towards other countries. In July 2001, the two countries signed a major and comprehensive friendship treaty, 30 years after the first one expired on February 14, 1980.¹⁰⁷ More than 300 years of territorial/border disputes between Russia and China came to an end with the signing of the Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line of their 4,300-kilometer border.¹⁰⁸ China's historical rise and Russia's unprecedented peacetime decline during the last decade resulted in a structural equilibrium in relations.

The rise of China and the decline of Russia changed the balance of power in a relatively short period and left Russia more vulnerable than it had been at any time in the previous 3 centuries. The growing gap between the domestic political systems of Russia and China could easily become a source of conflict. Indeed, for much of the 1990s China was seen as a problem thanks to the combined influence of Russian realism (a mixture of Marxian materialism and Russian *realpolitik* thinking) and Russian multilateralism (a variation of Western Liberal institutionalism). Russians tended to hold the following views:¹⁰⁹

- A growing Chinese challenge in the Asia-Pacific needed to be dealt with seriously.
- Russia's close ties with China were to counter the adverse developments in the European theater caused by NATO expansion and Russian weakness, not to counter the potential expansion of U.S. power in Asia.
- Russia did not need and could not afford a new area of hopeless confrontation in Asia after NATO expansion was absorbed in the West.

¹⁰⁶ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and Global Security Norms", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2004 pp.72-73.

¹⁰⁷ Yu Bin, "Historical Ironies, Dividing Ideologies And Accidental "Alliance": Russian-Chinese Relations Into The 21st Century", *The Rise Of China In Asia: Security Implications Edited By Carolyn W. Pumphrey* p.106-110.

¹⁰⁸ Yu Bin, "End of History? What's Next?", *Comparitive Connections*, (4th Quarter 2004) Vol. 6, No. 4 January 2005, p.145.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p.118.


- Russia's vision of a multilateral world order actually viewed the U.S.-led alliances in East Asia as part of the multilateral institutional framework against which Russia should anchor its relations with China.

- After accepting a defeat in European security policy in the West, Russia badly needed to demonstrate its ability to cooperate with the United States and the West. It thought, moreover, that the United States might reward Russia for not opposing its goals in East Asia. Thus, both historical experience and post-Cold War necessities set the stage for a more challenging bilateral relationship between Beijing and Moscow.

Despite this, China and Russia have developed much closer and more cooperative relations. It is certainly true that China and Russia have many political differences. It is also true that a considerable amount of geo-strategic "discomfort" has resulted from the radical shift of power balance between the two countries.

The reluctant strategic partnership between Russia and China can be further demonstrated by their insignificant and disappointing economic relations. Despite the rather rosy predictions made by both sides in the mid-1990s and ambitious goals to push annual bilateral trade to U.S.\$20 billion by the decade's end, two-way trade in 2000 was at an insignificant level of \$8 billion, barely surpassing the 1993 level of \$7.7 billion. (See Figure 4.1)

Figure 4.1: Russia China Trade



Source: The Washington Post

Russian military sales to China have been a fast growing area of exchange. To date, Beijing and Moscow have completed some major transactions of military equipment including hundreds of *Sukhoi*-series jet fighters-bombers, ten Il-76 cargo planes, hundreds of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles (U.S. *Patriot* equivalent), helicopters, samples of Russia's main battle tanks and other armored vehicles, four *Kilo*-class conventional attack submarines, and two *Sovremenny*-class guided missile destroyers (with the powerful SS-N-22 *Sunburn* anti-ship cruise missiles). Meanwhile, more deals are reportedly being discussed, including a joint venture for developing China's own fighters; and the grant of a license to manufacture the *Kilo*-class submarine and nuclear-powered submarine, naval vessels, and nuclear and missile technology. These actual and possible Russian sales have been the largest foreign arms deliveries to the PRC since the early 1950s during the Sino-Soviet honeymoon.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ *ibid*, p.148.

Table 4.3: Russian Arms Sales to China, 2001-2005

Equipment	Year	Quantity
Su-30MKK aircraft	2001	38
Kilo-class submarines	2002	up to 8
SOVREMENNYI II-class destroyers	2002	2
S-300PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system	2002	4 battalions
Su-30MK2 aircraft	2003	24
S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile system	2004	8 battalions
AL-31F aircraft engines for the F-10 fighter	2004	100
IL-76 transport aircraft	2004	10
RD-93 aircraft engines for the JF-17 fighter	2005	100
IL-76 transport aircraft	2005	40
IL-78 tanker aircraft	2005	8

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency.

Note: Quantity indicates numbers of units in the purchase agreement. Actual deliveries may be spread across several years.

China’s main goals are to buy Russian weaponry at minimal cost, obtain secure energy assets from it, and keep Russia sufficiently estranged from Washington and NATO to give China a free hand in Asia, which would ultimately include a predominant position in Central Asia.¹¹¹

Confrontation with China would endanger many of Russia’s most pressing vital interests, including the need to create favorable international conditions for Russia’s domestic reforms, and above all, to ensure a peaceful and stable periphery. . . .¹¹²

Ultimately, Russia cannot do much regarding China if it does not improve its domestic political and economic structures. Moscow’s ambivalent China policy alone cannot help it regain its position in Asia, especially as China aims to prevent a rebirth of Russian power there. Internal reconstruction, which China cannot facilitate, must precede any revival of Russia’s ability to play an independent role in Asia.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Sergei Trush, “Russia’s Response to the NATO Expansion: China Factor” (Moscow: NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships 1997–1999, 1999).

¹¹² Li Jingjie, “Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership,” *Orbis*, (Fall 2000), pp. 528–29.

¹¹³ Stephen Blank, “Asia’s Shifting Strategic Landscape What is Russia to Asia?,” *Orbis*, (Fall 2003), pp.584- 585.

At the geopolitical and geo-strategic level, the current situation in East Asia points to a growing division between maritime powers (Japan and the United States) and their continental counterparts (China and Russia). The division distinguishes more advanced from relatively backward powers and established from emerging ones. . . . Although neither Russia nor China intends to renew a 1950s-style alliance at the expense of their respective relations with the United States and Japan, nonetheless both are being driven in that direction in the rather chilly and unsettling post-Cold War Asia-Pacific climate.¹¹⁴ At the beginning of the new millennium, both Russia and China are seriously alienated by the West. Despite the fact that the two are substantially Westernized, the Russians politically, and the Chinese economically.

Owing to the deterioration of relations with the U.S. after the end of the Cold War, China and Russia were able to assume the same position. In the process, China grew suspicious that the United States, in order to sustain its hegemony, was pushing for a blockade against China and a policy of interference on Chinese domestic affairs. In the case of Russia, it adopted pro-Western policy in efforts to gain support from the West in the initial stage of its transition to market economy. However, the United States did not recognize Russia's geopolitical vested rights, and weakened Russia's influence through NATO's eastward policy.¹¹⁵

The NATO bombing of Kosovo intensified the sense of crisis in both China and Russia for the following reasons: The armed intervention was carried out under a new doctrine in which humanitarian reasons took precedence over sovereignty. Moreover, the incident reconfirmed the overwhelming supremacy of American military power. Lastly, the military intervention was carried out on the basis of an arbitrary decision of the U.S. and Britain, bypassing the United Nations. China and Russia feared that if they overlooked the matter, it would provide justification for outside intervention in Chechnya, Taiwan, and Tibet, and even the issue of their own sovereignty.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Bin Yu, "East Asia: Geopolitique Into the 21st Century: A Chinese View", **Occasional paper**, Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, (June 1990), pp. 3- 8.

¹¹⁵ Lee Nam-ju, "From Partnership to Alliance? The Development of Sino-Russian Relations", **East Asian Review** Vol.13, No.1, (Spring 2001), p.58.

¹¹⁶ *ibid*,p.59

We may divide the relationship since normalization into three periods. The first, from 1989 to 1992, was one of considerable bilateral turbulence amid the repercussions of Tiananmen and the collapse of the European Communist Party states; only skilled diplomacy was able to salvage the relationship. The period from 1992 through 1999 focused on building a “constructive strategic partnership toward the 21st Century,” as both countries explored the possibility of forming a Eurasian counterweight to looming American hegemony.¹¹⁷

Despite changes in the strategic environment leading to closer cooperation between Russia and China in the short term, lagging Sino-Russian economic relations, the growing potential for Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia, and continuing distrust of China in the Russian border regions all set the scene for a more fluid Sino-Russian relationship in the new millennium.¹¹⁸

4.3. CHINA E.U. RELATIONS

One of the most important developments in world affairs in recent years has been the dramatic growth in ties between China and Europe. Sino-European relations are impressive and it is shaping the emerging global order. Chinese leaders hold regular high level meetings with European heads of the state and with EU officials which have resulted in a number of substantive agreements like Galileo satellite navigation program.

China’s current leaders would like to draw Europe into a multi-polar world order in which the transatlantic alliance would be weakened and in which China’s ability to maneuver between power poles on its interests would be maximized. In the 21st century China sees the EU as a potential balancer to balance USA.

The end of the Cold War has not only paved the way for the unification of Germany, but also the unification of Europe. It also added great dynamics to the European integration, which ended up with the latest round of expansion of the European Union in 2004,

¹¹⁷ Lowell Dittmer, “The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle”, **Journal of Chinese Political Science**, vol. 10, no. 1, (April 2005),p.12.

¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Wishnick, **Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy From Brezhnev to Yeltsin**, (University of Washington Press 2001), p.150

expanding the number of its members to 25. There are now only a few in the European continent left out of the EU, but they are all on the waiting list to be new members. For the first time in history, Europe can truly be taken as a whole political identity, represented by the EU.¹¹⁹

On China's part, Beijing views the European integration further moving ahead as one of the positive indications that the world is heading towards healthy multipolarity. During the Cold War, Beijing had also an interest in seeking cooperation with Europe. But its efforts seemed primarily driven by a desire to use Europe as either a counterweight to the threat from the former Soviet Union or a convenient tool in constraining the moves of the United States. Today, Beijing's motivations have evidently gone far beyond the Cold War mentality. It has taken Europe not only as an irreplaceable partner in economic and trade interactions, but also as an essential component in the future world structure. On the part of Europe, it is also clear that the rapid development and the rising influence of China would provide great incentives for the EU to seek more intimate cooperation with Beijing.¹²⁰

At the eighth EU-China summit held in Beijing on September 5, 2005, several treaties, memoranda, and protocols were signed covering work, employment and social issues; the utilization of space; energy; transport; biodiversity; the management of river catchments areas; science; and technological development. Moreover, the existing navigation agreement was expanded to include the EU's new member states, and China and the EU issued a joint declaration on climate change. In addition, it was decided to draft a new framework agreement on deepening the strategic partnership between Beijing and Brussels.¹²¹

How do the Chinese and the Europeans see each other? Europe does not perceive China as a threat; rather as a source of new possibilities with known risks. China pursues the policy of a peaceful great power which is in need of allies and exercises great care in choosing

¹¹⁹ Pan Zhenqiang, "The US-Europe-China Triangle in an Increasingly Multipolar World", (December 2005), *KAS/ Auslandsinformationen*, p.12.

¹²⁰ *ibid*, p.35

¹²¹ Pierre Baudin, "China und die Europäische Union: Zwiespältige Beziehungen", *KAS-AI* (5/2006), pp.47-50.

them. Beijing feels quite comfortable with the French approach of state sovereignty. The EU is proving a great market for China, besides offering access to technologies which permit the country to overcome its backwardness.¹²²

China's rapid economic development in the past 20 years has had a significant impact upon EU-China trade and economic relations. Total two-way trade has increased more than forty-fold since reforms began in China in 1978, and was worth €174 billion in 2004. Over the years EU companies have invested significantly in China attracted by the world's fastest growing economy, low production costs, and a rapidly mounting consumer market fuelled by an emerging middle class more than half the size of the entire population of the EU.¹²³

The EU is seeking to develop a "strategic partnership" with China. The EU views China as a rising political and economic power whose policies will have implications for global challenges ranging from weapons proliferation to environmental degradation. The EU believes that engagement with China on such issues would be mutually beneficial and hopes to further entrench China in the international system.¹²⁴

One preliminary distinction must be made between the European Union (EU)'s China policy and its various member states' China policy. China does not have the same degree of importance for France, Germany or the United Kingdom as in Denmark, Poland or Greek's foreign policy.¹²⁵

Germany, which excels its European counterparts in economic and military interactions with China, has lagged behind in terms of bilateral cultural exchanges and cooperation. Germany has long been China's largest trading partner in Europe, and German investment in China had amounted to 88.5 billion US dollars by the end of 2003.¹²⁶

¹²² *ibid.*, pp.47-50.


¹²³ Peter Mandelson, "EU-China 30 Years of Friendship", **Businessweek**, (2005),p.7.

¹²⁴ Kristin Archick, Richard F. Grimmett, Shirley Kan, "European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy", **CRS Report** (2005),p.18.

¹²⁵ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "Eu-China Policy And The Implications For Cross-Straits Relations", p.1.

¹²⁶ "Germany is China's largest trading partner in Europe", **The New Light of Myanmar**, (Friday, 17 December), 2004,p.5.

Figure 4.2: German China Trade



Source:Deutsche Bundesbank

Table 4.4: EU-China Trade Statistics (€bn)

	2003	Growth, year-on year	2002	Growth, year-on year	2001	Growth, year-on year
Total	€ 134.8	+13.5%	€ 116.1	+8.6%	€ 105.9	+9.5%
EU imports	€ 94.8	+15.9%	€ 81.8	+7.9%	€ 75.9	+8.4%
EU exports	€ 39.9	+16.7%	€ 34.2	+13.8%	€ 30	+18%
EU trade deficit	€ 54.9	+13.2 %	€ 47.6	+3.8.%	€45.8	+2.2%

Source: EUROSTAT

The European Union’s strategy toward China appears to be targeted at three levels: engaging Beijing in global multilateral institutions and helping it to gain confidence in assuming its appropriate roles and responsibilities in such institutions; intensifying bilateral interaction (at the EU level); and improving China’s “domestic capacity” to manage a range of governance challenges and improve the quality of life.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis”, **Current History**, (September 2004),p.247.

The EU has taken the lead in conceptualizing and implementing a broad based strategy to further ties and cooperate in a wide range of areas. The breadth and depth of Europe-China relations are impressive, and the global importance of the relationship ranks it as an emerging axis in world affairs. While this is appreciated in Asia and Europe, the United States has been slow to recognize what is transpiring in the EU-China relationship and its significance in the emerging global order.¹²⁸

Chinese scholars and foreign policy commentators emphasize that the absence of a “strategic rivalry” between the EU and China provides the basis for a closer and expanded relationship. Beijing, it is being argued, will not lose any of its political and economic influence through a strategic partnership with the EU.¹²⁹

Europeans towards China is characterized by the followings: “Would not treat China as a major opponent, but appear to be vigilant towards China’s development; Hope to integrate China into the international system, but also anxious that the growing influence of China would be detrimental to their interests”. In the eyes of some Chinese analysts, the EU is using “better” methods, such as dialogue and cultural exchanges etc., but their attempt is to transform China or westernize China. To what extent is this point of view popular and becoming more influential remains to be seen, but it is clear that Chinese leaders are still bound to be affected by their own ideological burden.¹³⁰

EU leaders refer to the EU-China link as a ‘strategic partnership’. The matters discussed by Brussels and Beijing and on which they seek to progress are global strategic issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, global security of energy supply, regional crises and the environment. Moreover, China and the EU are partners with significant global strengths, capabilities and responsibilities. Aware of their respective weights, the two edges of the Eurasian continent place their interaction in a global perspective.¹³¹

¹²⁸ *ibid*,p.243.

¹²⁹ Axel Berkofsky, “EU-China Relations – Strategic Partnership or Partners of Convenience”, **German Foreign Policy in Dialogue**, Volume 6, Number 16 Trier, Germany (June 23, 2005), p.16.

¹³⁰ Ting Wai, “EU-China Relations: Economic, Political and Social Aspects”, Hong Kong Baptist University, p.25

¹³¹ Alfredo Pastor and David Gosset, “The EU-China Relationship: A Key to the 21st Century Order”, **Real instituto Elcano**, (30/11/2005)p.2.

Table 4.5: China's Acquisitions for Military Systems from Europe

System/technology (dual-use included)	Country (company) as reported source of system or technology	Citations and comments
Pack Howitzers	Italy (OTO-Breda Division of Alenia Difesa)	<i>Jane's Defense Weekly</i> , May 14, 1997: supplied two samples to the PLA, and the PRC apparently made copies instead of making further orders.
EC 120 helicopter	France/Germany/Spain (Eurocopter) & Singapore (Technologies Aerospace)	<i>People's Daily</i> , Nov. 21, 2003: agreement to assemble the helicopters in China, developed since 1993
Searchwater maritime reconnaissance radars for PLA Navy's Y-8 AEW aircraft	U.K. (Racal Thorn Defense of Racal Electronics)	<i>Defense News</i> , Aug. 5-11, 1996; contract for 6-8 radars; <i>Jane's Aircraft 2004-2005</i> : at least one Y-8 AEW aircraft.
Spey engines for JH-7 naval strike fighters (export version called FBC-1 Flying Leopard)	U.K. (Rolls-Royce)	<i>Jane's Aircraft 2004-2005</i> : Contracts since 1970s with initial sale of an estimated 50 engines; <i>Defense News</i> , Feb. 1, 1999; <i>Far Eastern Economic Review</i> , Jan. 24, 2002: in 2001, supplied up to 90 additional jet engines, based on a 1999 deal.
DFH-4 communication satellite	France (Alcatel)	Alcatel, press release on new contract, Sept. 27, 2002
Galileo satellite navigation system (separate from U.S. GPS)	European Commission (European Space Agency)	<i>Xinhua</i> , October 10, 2004; China signed agreement with EU to join Galileo.

Source: CRS Report RL32870, European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy 2006, pp.38-40.

5. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE REGIONAL POWERS

This text explains the China's foreign policy towards the regional powers. China follows peaceful foreign policy and tries to solve its problems with active diplomacy. Regional powers are very important to increase the diplomatic and economic options of China for its development.

5.1. CHINA JAPAN RELATIONS

Rise of China dramatically effects Japan's position in the Pacific and in the international political arena. From Japan's point of view China is the number one rival or even threat in the region. How to handle the China question is primary political debate in Tokyo. First time after the World War two Japanese Navy actively took part in the NATO's military operation by giving logistical support to U.S. navy in the Indian Ocean. This new active policy shows that Japan in the 21st century may even change its anti-war constitution with the political support of USA to balance the China's military build up in the coming decades.

Historically, relations between Japan and China were clearly structured. One country was always more prosperous or powerful than the other. Before the nineteenth century, China was usually dominant; since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan has generally been preeminent. The prospect that China and Japan could both be powerful and affluent at the same time has only recently emerged, largely because while China's economy and influence have grown rapidly, Japan's have remained stagnant.¹³²

Japan's devastating war on China left an indelible mark on Sino-Japanese relations. Furthermore, the division of the post-war world into competing superpower blocks locked the two countries into opposing camps. In Asia, the symbol of that struggle was the US-Japan Security Treaty which came into force on 28 April 1952, and bound Japan tightly to the dictates of American foreign policy. For over twenty years, both China and Japan

¹³² Kent E. Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry", **Foreign Affairs**, (March/April 2006), Vol:85 No.2, p.1.

champed at the Cold War bit. Seeking some form of reconciliation within the Cold War framework, they turned in effect to an earlier strategy of shoring up unofficial relations in an effort to build trust and establish a formal relationship. The primary instrument of that endeavor was economic. It would be over two decades before that effort bore fruit.¹³³

In 2004, for the first time in post-World War II history, China surpassed the United States and became Japan's largest trading partner, a position it used to occupy consistently before 1945. Although Japan slipped from China's largest to the third largest trading partner that year, this was not because of lack of any "heat" in the staggering growth of economic exchange. Japanese exports to China, including those to Hong Kong, increased by 29 percent in 2004 compared to the previous year, and imports did so by 25.3 percent. Japanese companies increased their investments in China by 20.6 percent in 2003 and by 7.9 percent in 2004 on an implementation basis, and Japan was one of only three major countries that increased investment for those two years in a row (the other two were South Korea and France).¹³⁴

China-Japan trade has grown from \$1 billion in 1972 to \$101.9 billion in 2002, a shocking 100-fold increase in 30 years. Bilateral trade grew most dramatically after 1992. The two countries have become more important trading partners relative to other key trading partners. Japan has been China's largest trading partner since 1994. China has been Japan's second largest trading partner since 1993, trailing only the United States.¹³⁵

¹³³Dong Dong Zhang, **China's Relations with Japan in an Era of Economic Liberalization** (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., Commack, 1998), p.37.

¹³⁴ Akio Takahara, "Sino-Japanese Relations 60 Years after the War: a Japanese View", **Issues & Insights**, Vol. 5, No. 10, Honolulu, Hawaii (September 2005) p.39.

¹³⁵ Ming Wan, "The U.S. factor in Sino-Japanese Relations", **Asia Program Special Report**, No:113, (July 2003), p.16.

Table 5.1: China Japan Trade (US\$100 million)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Exports to China	173	187	219	219	218	200	233	304	311	399	572
Imports from China	206	276	359	406	421	369	429	553	581	617	752
Total	378	462	579	624	639	569	662	857	892	1,016	1,324
Balance of Payments	-33	-89	-140	-187	-203	-169	-195	-249	-270	-218	-180

Source: Trade Statistics, Japan Ministry of Finance

The private sector, with public sector backing, pushed for rationalization at a firm level, and pursued a high-value added, high technology, low-energy using manufacturing in response to uncertainty in world energy markets. Industries like textiles, steel, petrochemicals and shipbuilding, which relied heavily on intensive energy consumption or on a large amount of labor, had already encountered structural decline, and overseas relocation had begun. China's modernization program provided a good opportunity for Japanese exports.¹³⁶

In short, China and Japan are already quite integrated, measured by positive bias, in the market place. Generally speaking, when two nations are already close economically, it makes it easier to institutionalize the economic relationship in a formal setting, which in turn brings the countries even closer.¹³⁷

Not only the so-called Friendship Organizations urged the Japanese government to move to improve Japan-China relations, but business organizations such as Keidanren and the Japan-China Economic Association did too. It is not true that Japan wants to weaken China

¹³⁶ Dong Dong Zhang, **China's Relations with Japan in an Era of Economic Liberalization**, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., Commack, 1998), p.64

¹³⁷ *ibid*, p.17.

and dominate Asia. Rather, as it has always been ever since the Japanese government started providing China with ODA, Japan's interest is in China's stable economic development.¹³⁸

The Sino-Japanese relationship is a critical factor for Asian security and regional stability. As two big powers in Asia, the nature of their relations will have significant impact upon surrounding areas: a constant changing or troublesome Sino-Japanese relationship will affect the stability of the surrounding area; their influence is even greater than the U.S. military presence in the region. The Sino-Japanese relationship is the key to security and economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific. At the moment, the pace and level of Asia-Pacific security and economic cooperation are far less than those of Europe or America cooperation between the two biggest regional economies, East Asian economic integration will only be a dream.¹³⁹

For the first time in history, a strong China and a strong Japan are standing together in Asia. As a matter of fact, China's speedy emergence is viewed by some Japanese as even a threat. Previous popular slogans like "Japan First," "Japanese Model," "Japanese Experiences," and "Japan Miracle" are replaced by criticisms like "Japanese Crisis," "Stubborn Japanese Systems," and "Collapse of Japan"; what is more, new catchphrases like "the Rise of China" and "Chinese Century" are heard everywhere. In other words, the Japan-led wild geese flying model has evolved into a horserace. The strong sense of loss resulted in contending unconsciousness against China.¹⁴⁰

Despite Japan's economic difficulties, China's strategic challenge is Tokyo's most pressing concern, according to officials in the Foreign Ministry; the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry; and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). As the two big fish in a small pond, Japan's and China's rivalry for regional leadership is increasingly leaving China confident and Japan irritated.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ *ibid*, p.39.

¹³⁹ Ma Junwei, "Building Sino-Japanese Relations Oriented toward the 21st Century", **Issues & Insights**, Vol. 5, No. 10, Honolulu, Hawaii, p.47.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*,p.48.

¹⁴¹ Benjamin Self, "China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship", **The Washington Quarterly** ,(2002-2003), Vol:26, p.85.

China's expansion of its military capabilities in advanced air and naval systems is a significant concern to Tokyo. Japanese planners see these assets as well suited to strangling Japan's vital shipping lanes. Maritime Self-Defense Force strategists are particularly worried about Chinese submarines, noting the advanced technology of the Russian Kilo-class submarines that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) navy has acquired. The PLA air force will also become more capable over time, as it integrates the fourth generation of Russian fighter jets, Sukhoi-27s and Sukhoi-30s. China is also improving its cruise missiles, which could soon present a major threat to Japan.¹⁴²

Many contentious issues confront China and Japan. Among the most pressing is both countries' thirst for energy. Japan depends on imports for 99 percent of its oil and natural gas; coastal China is similarly bereft of resources. Thus, the offshore oil and gas fields under the East China Sea are attractive "domestic" sources of energy for both Beijing and Tokyo—and both have laid claim to them. China argues that the entire East China Sea continental shelf, extending eastward nearly all the way to Okinawa, is a "natural prolongation" of the Chinese mainland. Japan has declared its boundary with China to be a median line roughly 100 miles west of the Okinawa Trough (which lies undersea just west of Okinawa), where the richest petroleum deposits in the area are believed to be concentrated.¹⁴³

Regrettably, more than a half-century after the end of World War II, Japan's historical legacy remains an unresolved and nettlesome issue. The issue erupted recently in violent anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China, ostensibly over the publication of a new Japanese history textbook that critics claim glorifies Japan's colonial and wartime activities. However, the Chinese demonstrations were clearly politically motivated and directed by the leadership in Beijing to exploit Japan's wartime guilt to block Japan's bid for a seat on the U.N. Security Council.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² *ibid*, p.86.


¹⁴³ *ibid*, p.2

¹⁴⁴ Balbina Y. Hwang, "Japan's New Security Outlook: Implications for the United States", **Backgrounder** No:1865, (July 7 2005), p.4

In the end, Japan and China will need to play a greater role in working out regional security arrangements. As China grows more powerful and the Japanese economy becomes more profoundly intertwined with that of its neighbor, both countries are increasingly likely to reach out to each other in realms beyond the economic to find their own voice in regional security affairs. There is little to suggest a return to the hostilities of the mid-twentieth century. Rather, the process of accommodation will be peaceful. The stability of the entire region depends on it.¹⁴⁵

Figure 5.1: Chinese Views on China-Japan Relations

Percentage of Chinese respondents who say the following:



Source: Global Views 2006

5.2. CHINA AND ASEAN RELATIONS

Engagement of China and ASEAN is very impressive. The two sides have undertaken a series of steps to broaden and strengthen their relationship. Separate protocols have been concluded between China and ASEAN in the areas of human resource development,

¹⁴⁵Katherine G. Burns, "China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends", p.54.

information and communication technology, public health, development assistance, transportation cultural and academic exchanges and the environment.

China's historical involvement in Southeast Asia, as well as cultural affinity for China in many Southeast Asian states, will likely influence how China is viewed by regional states.¹⁴⁶ Historically, China has exerted much influence in Southeast Asia. This can be seen in China's past cultural influence in, and periodic dominance of, Vietnam as well as today through its increasing presence in Burma. While Chinese influence has extended through its contiguous borders with continental Southeast Asia, there was a brief period from 1405 to 1433 when China sent vast fleets under the command of Zheng He through Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean littoral to exact tribute for the Ming Dynasty.¹⁴⁷ The Chinese Diaspora has also led to significant ethnic Chinese minority populations in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Vietnam's relationship with China differs from other ASEAN states. Unlike other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam was ruled by China for a lengthy period of its history. During the Cold War, China supported communist parties or insurgencies in every Southeast Asian State with the exception of Singapore and Brunei. China ended such support over time with the last support being given in Burma. This was ended in the 1980s.¹⁴⁸

Before the 1990s, there was no official relationship between the ASEAN as a grouping and China, although China had official relations with certain individual ASEAN member states on a bilateral basis. From the late 1980s, China intensified its efforts to establish diplomatic relationship with all the remaining ASEAN states as the final step, leading to its eventual official relationship with the ASEAN grouping.

¹⁴⁶ Martin Stuart Fox, "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, no. 1, (2004) p.15.

¹⁴⁷ Louise Levathes, *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of The Dragon Throne*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p.25.

¹⁴⁸ Dalpino and Steinberg, 2002-03, p.48.

Figure 5.2: Map of ASEAN countries



Source: ASEAN Japan Center

On 19 July 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the opening session of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur as a guest of the Malaysian Government, where he expressed China's interest in cooperating with ASEAN, particularly in the field of science and technology. The latter responded positively. In September 1993, ASEAN Secretary-General Dato' Ajit Singh visited Beijing and agreed to establish two joint committees, one on co-operation in science and technology, and the other on economic and trade co-operation. An exchange of letters between the ASEAN secretary-general and the Chinese Foreign Minister on 23 July 1994 in Bangkok formalized the establishment of the two committees. At the same time, ASEAN and China agreed to engage in consultations on political and security issues at senior officials level. In July 1996, ASEAN accorded China full Dialogue Partner status at the 29th AMM in Jakarta, moving China from a Consultative Partner, which it had been since 1991.¹⁴⁹

By early 1997, there were already five parallel frameworks for dialogue between China and ASEAN. China participated in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN. In


¹⁴⁹ Sheng Lijun, "China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic Motivations", ISEAS Working Paper: International Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1(2003),pp.1-2.

December 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and all the ASEAN leaders had their first informal summit (ASEAN Plus One) and issued a joint statement to establish a partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust oriented towards the 21st century.¹⁵⁰

In 2002, China and ASEAN signed four important agreements: the declaration on conduct in the South China Sea, the joint declaration on cooperation in the field of security issues, the agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation and on agricultural cooperation. China seeks regional interdependence in the Pacific region, to increase its political capabilities.

If the Chinese government were to choose a slogan to convey the organizing principle and the substance of the multilateral component of its policy throughout the region, that slogan would undoubtedly be something like “Building the East Asian Community.” The idea of community has been a staple of the Southeast Asian political scene for many years.¹⁵¹

Figure 5.3: ASEAN China Trade



Source: Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation

The last decade has seen the acceleration of the process of globalization, the rise of regional trading arrangements, China’s emergence as a global economic force and the growing interdependence between ASEAN and China. ASEAN-China economic relations

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*, pp.1-2.

¹⁵¹ Ronald N. Montaperto, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally”, *Comparative Connections*, (4th Quarter 2004) Vol. 6, No. 4 January 2005, pp.80-82

have grown dramatically, benefiting from the dynamism of their economies, the liberalization of their trade regimes and the changes in their trade structure.¹⁵²

Table 5.2: Regional States Trade with China

	China Exports to		China Imports from	
	1992	2003	1992	2003
Brunei	10	34	5	312
Cambodia	13	295	0.2	26
Indonesia	471	4,482	1,554	5,747
Laos	28	98	4	11
Malaysia	645	6,141	830	13,986
Burma	259	910	131	169
Philippines	210	3,093	155	6,307
Singapore	2,030	8,864	1,236	10,485
Thailand	895	3,828	425	8,827
Vietnam	106	3,183	73	1,457

Source: United Nations Statistics Division-Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE)

China's relations with Southeast Asian states improved in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN states suffered significantly as the result of the financial crisis, developing substantial resentment of International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies and, according to some, of American policies during the crisis.¹⁵³ Many in ASEAN viewed the U.S. as being associated with what were viewed as intrusive and inappropriate policies being advocated by the IMF. In contrast, ASEAN states viewed China as relatively eager to help.¹⁵⁴

ASEAN-China trade totaled US \$39.5 billion in the year 2000. ASEAN's share in China's foreign merchandise trade has been continuously on the rise, increasing from 5.8 per cent in 1991 to 8.3 per cent in 2000. ASEAN is now China's fifth biggest trading partner.

¹⁵² ASEAN-China Expert Group, "Forging Closer Asean-China Economic Relations In The Twenty-First Century", **A Report Submitted on Economic Cooperation** (October 2001), p.34.

¹⁵³ Mark Beeson, "Southeast Asia and the Major Powers," in Mark Beeson ed. **Contemporary Southeast Asia**, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.203.

¹⁵⁴ Alice Ba, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century," **Asian Survey**, (July/August 2003), p.636.

Meanwhile, the share of China in ASEAN's trade has grown from 2.1 per cent in 1994 to 3.9 percent in 2000. China is now the sixth largest trade partner of ASEAN.¹⁵⁵

Strengthening ties with its neighbors has been the official diplomatic strategy of China since 1996. China reaffirms that it would commit itself to becoming a force for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. It stresses that neighboring countries would be "treated with kindness," hence posits its benevolent intent in handling various territorial, border and fishing disputes throughout the region. To achieve its regional objectives, China has the pressing need to maintain and enhance relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Such situations will eventually promote peace and stability in the region that are suitable for both parties' economic growth and national development.¹⁵⁶

China's rise to power has brought both benefits and concerns to the ASEAN members. In the short term, ASEAN hopes to benefit from China's modernization program by taking advantage of economic opportunities. However, as the reform process continues, China is able to augment its political, economic and military influence in the region. ASEAN supports the policy of engagement with China, hoping that the economic interdependence, and China's participation in the embryonic regional security architecture, will mitigate their security concerns. Nevertheless, they also take a realistic view of the rise of China, recognizing that the policy of engagement needs a military-security dimension.¹⁵⁷

China's ultimate strategic purpose remains a subject of debate and speculation among interested observers. Southeast Asia, however, is the sole region adjacent to China in which Chinese influence can most easily expand. A benign interpretation would see China as simply cultivating the sort of stable, peaceful, and prosperous regional environment that China requires for its own successful modernization. A more skeptical view sees China playing a long-term game designed to curtail American influence and weave a close-knit economic and security community with China at the center.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ *ibid* p.1.

¹⁵⁶ Ahmad Hasbullah Mohd Nawawi, "China-ASEAN Future Relations-An Analysis", **Usawc Strategy Research Project**, p.13

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*, p.2,

¹⁵⁸ Catharin Dalpino and David Steinberg, **Georgetown Southeast Asia Survey**, 2003-2004., Washington: Georgetown University, 2003, p.15.

The closer relationships between China and member states of the ASEAN, together with China's recent rise in regional and global prominence in geo-strategic, political, economic, social and cultural terms make China become more patient when it comes to the handling of the territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes in the SCS. China is now not only becoming supportive to a regional code of conduct in the SCS, but also willing to take actions to speed up the process of developing the code..¹⁵⁹

5.3. CHINA INDIA RELATIONS

The Chinese diplomatic initiative towards India, although motivated more by the shift in China's domestic development strategy than by international factors, was reinforced by the disappearance of the Soviet threat and Cold War alignments. The Chinese are trying to develop a more balanced set of relationships with the countries on the South Asian subcontinent. China and America had become involved with Pakistan during the Cold War largely because the Soviet Union had developed a close relationship with India. Today China tries to improve relations with India.

After the 1960's, the Chinese government's actions did little to alleviate the Indian government's suspicions. "Beijing has pursued a policy of containment and encirclement by proxy [and] some 90% of China's arms sales go to countries bordering India."¹⁶⁰

China has reverted to a policy of containing India by stepping up cooperation with Pakistan and agreeing to joint strategies with the US and other countries on a selective basis to put India on the defensive. China's powerful military will now use India's declared nuclear capability as a justification for supplying further nuclear equipment and expertise to

¹⁵⁹ Yann-Huei Song, "Cross-strait interactions on the South China Sea issues: a need for CBMs", **Marine Policy**, 29 (2005) p. 266.

¹⁶⁰ Mohan Malik, "Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: The China Factor," **Australian Journal of International Affairs**, 53.1 (1999): p.32.

Pakistan.¹⁶¹ Beijing had provided Pakistan with complete missiles, missile systems, as well as missile technology.¹⁶²

Chinese reactions to India are very different from those of India to China. China has a very pragmatic foreign policy. The response of the Chinese to the Indian nuclear tests of 1998 illustrates this asymmetry. For a decade after the 1962 war between India and China, relations between the two countries can best be described as that of a hostile standoff. Beginning in 1979, however, some years before the end of the cold war, China started to try and build better relations with India. The new initiatives were stimulated by Chinese domestic development strategy. When Deng Xiaoping embarked upon these very ambitious Chinese economic reforms, he also embarked on an omni-directional Chinese foreign policy designed to improve relations with all of China's neighbors. The goal was to resolve border disputes and develop friendly relations with all of China's neighbors so that friction between them would not hamper Chinese progress. The improvement of relations with India was basically part of that effort.¹⁶³

Pragmatic diplomacy seems to characterize the Chinese style of diplomacy toward all its Asian neighbors save Taiwan and Japan. We can see it in Chinese policies toward Korea and South East Asia, and as we have seen, toward India. This is why China's Asian neighbors do not necessarily see the growth of Chinese power as a problem for them. They recognize China's importance on the regional scene. They realize that they must take Chinese power into account and perhaps even defer to it. However, they do not see Chinese power as a threat to their own security.¹⁶⁴

In January 2005, a report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council predicted that by the year 2020, China and India would be vying with the United States for global economic supremacy. China itself, which has for decades looked at India with a mix of apathy and suspicion, is beginning to take note of India's economy and its attempts to beef up its armed forces. Attitudes in India have also changed and are trending toward positive

¹⁶¹ Ibid.,pp.37-38.

¹⁶² Brahma Chellaney, "After the Tests: India's Options," *Survival* 40.4 (1998-99): 97.

¹⁶³ Susan Shirk, "Chinese Perceptions Of India: Brief Comments", **The Rise Of China In Asia: Security Implications** Edited by Carolyn W. Pumphrey, pp.105-120.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid,p.109.

sentiments. Policy makers in New Delhi increasingly talk of China more as a partner than as a threat.¹⁶⁵

The India-Pakistan crisis has highlighted the shadow that Asia's rising superpower, China, casts on the Indian subcontinent, especially during times of tensions. The roots of the India-Pakistan animosity are deep-seated in religion, history, and the politics. Chinese strategists recognize the enduring nature of the India-Pakistan enmity and exploit it to Beijing's advantage. Beijing has long been the most important player in the India-Pakistan-China triangular relationship. Since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, China has aligned itself with Pakistan and made heavy strategic and economic investments in that country to keep India, under strategic pressure. China's attempts to improve ties with India since the early 1990s have been accompanied by parallel efforts to improve the Pakistani military's nuclear and conventional capabilities vis-à-vis India. Chinese nuclear and missile shield to Pakistan during the late 1980s and 1990s that emboldened Islamabad to wage a "proxy war" in Kashmir without fear of Indian retaliation.

The tension in Kashmir and Pakistan's ability to pin down Indian armed forces on its western frontiers are seen as enhancing China's sense of security, neither a full scale India-Pakistan war nor Pakistan's collapse would serve Beijing's strategic objectives. Concerned over the implications of a full scale war on China's southwestern borders since the 11 September 2001 Beijing has been keeping a close watch on the situation and has taken several diplomatic and military measures to safeguard its broader geostrategic interests in Asia.

Since the late 1990s, China had become increasingly concerned over the gradual shift in the regional balance of power in South Asia, driven by the steady rise of India coupled with the growing US-India entente and the talk of "India as a counterweight to China" in Washington's policy circles, and by Pakistan's gradual descent into the ranks of failed states.¹⁶⁶ Since the end of the Cold War, a politically dysfunctional and economically bankrupt Pakistan's flirtation with Islamic extremism and terrorism, coupled with its

¹⁶⁵ Prमित Mitra and Drew Thompson, "China and India: Rivals or Partners?", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, (April 2005) p.1.

¹⁶⁶ J. Mohan Malik, "China Edgy over Clinton's India Visit," **Pioneer**, (2 March 2000), p. 8.

nuclear and missile programs, had alienated Washington. However, the 11 September 2001 attacks changed all that. Pakistan saw an opportunity to revive its past close relations with the United States, shed its near pariah status, and enhance its economic and strategic position vis-à-vis India by instantaneously becoming a “frontline state” in the international coalition fighting global terrorism. In return, Washington lifted sanctions and agreed to provide Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid and debt rescheduling.¹⁶⁷

PLA threat perception of Russia or India in the mid 1990’s is relatively low compared to Japan or Taiwan, both allied to the US¹⁶⁸ India is an extremely important case to examine in China’s foreign policy. The nation’s size, potential, standing in the international system, democratic system of governance, place in the Sino-Pakistani-Indian security triangle give it an exceptional import.

In 1993, India conducted diplomatic forays bearing on nuclear policy. Prime Minister Rao traveled to Beijing, where the two governments signed an agreement to reduce troops and respect cease-fire lines along their disputed border.¹⁶⁹ Beyond signaling ongoing improvements in relations, the agreement allowed India to converse already stretched military resources and diminished the need to plan for a two-front war.¹⁷⁰

Still , China’s willingness to retrench militarily signified its indefinite acceptance of the status quo India conceived of its need for nuclear weapons as a counter to Chinese blackmail or aggrading, not as a means for Indian aggression to resolve the border dispute.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ J. Mann, “The Asian Challenge: The Unanticipated Consequences of the War in India, Pakistan, China, and Japan,” **American Prospect**, (19 November 2001), p. 22.


¹⁶⁸ Allen Whiting, “The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions.” In David Shambaugh & Richard H. Yang, Eds., **China’s Military in Transition**, (Oxford: Calrendon Press, 1997), pp.332-351.

¹⁶⁹ Lena H.Sun, “China, India Sign Accord to Ease Border Dispute,” **Washington Post**, September 8, 1993, p.1.

¹⁷⁰ Shekhar Gupta with Sudeep Chakravarti, “Vital Breakthrough,” **India Today**, (September 30, 1993),p.38.

¹⁷¹ George Perkovich, **India’s Nuclear Bomb**, (University of California Press, Berkeley 1999), p.337.

Figure 5.4: India's Influence in the World



Source: Global Views 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think India has in the world today, how much they think it will have in the world in ten years, and how much they want it to have. 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.

Geostrategic concerns require China to side with Pakistan, while publicly calling for restraint by both sides. In the triangular power balance, the South Asian military balance of power is neither pro-India nor pro-Pakistan, but pro-China. Beijing will take all means possible, to ensure that the regional power balance does not tilt in India's favor. Even in the absence of a war, Pakistan hopes to continue to reap significant military and economic payoffs not only from the Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry in Asia but also from the coming showdown between China and the United States, which will further increase the significance of China's strategic ties with Pakistan. In the meantime, for China, a stronger Pakistan aided by the United States, Western Europe, Japan, would be better able to balance and contain rival India.

While comparisons of the Indian and Chinese economic performance and their shares of the world market in various sectors continue unabated, the recent trend in bilateral trade and an emerging strategy of close economic cooperation between the two countries represents a significant development in the region.

Figure 5.5: India China Trade



Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Bilateral relations have deepened in recent times to include common positions in the international arena, notably at the UN Security Council, and the WTO. High-level visits have increased in recent years, the highpoints were the visit of Indian Prime Minister (Mr. A B Vajpayee) in 2003, and the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005. During Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s visit in April 2005, India and China announced a new "strategic partnership for peace and prosperity", pledging to resolve long-standing border disputes and boost economic cooperation bilateral trade by reducing trade barriers and enhancing multilateral cooperation.¹⁷²

Bilateral trade grew by more than 53% in two years, and rose to \$13.6 billion in 2004 with Indian exports to China touching \$ 7.67 billion and imports from China at US \$ 5.93

¹⁷² India China Economic Relations, **Ace Global**, (July 2005), pp.1-3.

billion. Based on present trends, two-way trade will surpass the target figure of US\$ 20 billion in next three years. China is already India's third largest trading partner after the US and UAE.¹⁷³

Table 5.3: Two-way China-India FDI trends (US\$ million)

Year	Chinese FDI in India	Indian FDI China
2000-01	0.00	7.94
2001-02	0.00	13.33
2002-03	0.00	29.55
2003-04	7.04	26.55
2004-05	0.05*	8.878**

*Until June 2004,** until November 2004

Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Industry

5.4. CHINA AND MIDDLE EAST

China is building closer ties to Middle Eastern states, exerting influence there, and finding that the region has a growing place in overall Chinese diplomacy. It has reached the point that not knowing China's Middle East policies means very important to understand Chinese diplomacy as a whole.

With the exception of Israel, none of Middle Eastern states recognized the People's Republic of China; in August 1950 the Political Committee of the Arab League voted to recognize Taiwan rather than the PRC as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people.¹⁷⁴ Many Middle Eastern states followed Washington's lead in voting against China's efforts in the United Nations and some sent troops to help South Korea. In response, the China routinely referred to Middle Eastern leaders as "the anti-revolutionary rulers". Even after Egypt's July Revolution of 1952, Beijing continued to refer to "the anti-revolutionary military dictators" of that country. While criticizing the rulers, China supported anti-colonial efforts. Chinese media cheered the 1951 anti-British campaign in Egypt, the nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1952-53, and the anti-French struggle in Algeria. However, China's support was only moral, and not material.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p.3.

¹⁷⁴ Lillian Craig Harris, **China Considers the Middle East**, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 81-82.

During the Suez Canal crisis of October 1956, China became the second strongest supporter of Egypt after the USSR. On November 6, 1956, the Egyptian ambassador in Beijing announced the startling news that a quarter of a million Chinese had taken to the streets in support of Egypt and volunteered to go to Egypt to fight with the Egyptians.¹⁷⁵

Later, Chinese support became practical and tangible, including shipments for military and civilian use plus the training of personnel. Chinese weapons supplied to the Palestinians between 1965 and 1969 have been valued by Israeli intelligence at about \$5 million.¹⁷⁶ After 1971, Beijing backed Egypt's Anwar as-Sadat, Sudan's Ja'far an-Numayri, and other Arab leaders as they expelled Soviet forces from their countries.¹⁷⁷

During the Deng Xiaoping period, China started to adopt a less ideological and more practical diplomacy, with the aim of creating a favorable international environment for China's new modernization program. This approach led to relations with all the Middle East countries and increase in Chinese influence as a result. Beijing no longer made a state's relations with Washington or Moscow the criterion instead, benefits to China itself became the basis of decisions.

After 1977, China set up diplomatic relations with a great number of Middle Eastern states: Jordan, Oman, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Palestinians. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, China urged a diplomatic solution, a position favored by Baghdad. Beijing abstained (that is, neither supported nor vetoed) on the UN resolution authorizing the coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait by force. But to win Chinese support, the United States and Europe dropped all remaining sanctions against China.¹⁷⁸ In January 1992, China started diplomatic relations with Israel. Leaders of almost every Middle Eastern country have visited Beijing, and China's counterparts have in turn traveled throughout the region. China now maintains good relations with all Middle East countries, a major accomplishment in the history of Sino-Middle East relations. In comparison, Russia, China's old rival, has steadily lost influence in the region.

¹⁷⁵ Tareq Y. Ismael, **International Relations in the Contemporary Middle East** (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 202.

¹⁷⁶ R. Medzini, "China and the Palestinians -a Developing Relationship?", **New Middle East**, (May 1971), p. 36.

¹⁷⁷ Yitzhak Shichor, **The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977**, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 168

¹⁷⁸ Mohan Malik, "Peking's Response to the Gulf Crisis", **Issues and Studies**, (September 1991), pp. 107-82.

Western media have repeatedly reported and commented on sales of Chinese arms and nuclear technology to the Middle East.¹⁷⁹ President Jiang Zemin stated in 1994 that China should oppose "hegemony" by helping dissident countries like Iran, but emphasized international stability furthering China's development as more important.¹⁸⁰ Western suspicions that China may be using these arms sales for political purposes focus on three issues: retaliation for sales to Taiwan; weakening the USA by building up its enemies; and establishing a special political relationship with oil suppliers, given that China is a significant importer of oil.

By 2015, 70 percent of China's oil imports is expected to come from the region.¹⁸¹ China's dependence on Middle East oil is increasing and that the Middle East will be the most important supply source of international oil for China.

China and Saudi Arabia, its top oil supplier, seem to have a symbiotic investment relationship in the oil sector. In addition to purchasing Saudi crude oil outright, China National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), in cooperation with Saudi Arabia's largest oil company, Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), has invested \$300 million to explore the Ghawar natural gas field in the Rub al-Khali desert in Saudi Arabia.¹⁸² In return, ARAMCO invested in a \$3.5 billion refinery expansion project in China's Fujian province in July 2005.

The Chinese and the Saudis launched an ambitious strategic relationship during the 1980s. The Saudis purchased CSS-2 intermediate range missiles from China. The Sino-Saudi CSS-2 missile deal was first publicly revealed as a *fait accompli* in March 1988. The first orders for the missiles were made in 1985, and a number of deliveries were made in 1987 and 1988 before news of the sale became public. The missiles delivered to Saudi Arabia came

¹⁷⁹ Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., "China Arms the Rogues", **Middle East Quarterly**, (Sept. 1997), pp. 33-39.

¹⁸⁰ Deng-Ker Lee, "Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post Cold War Era", **Issues and Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 8, (August 1994), p. 85.

¹⁸¹ John Calabrese, "The Risks and Rewards of China's Deepening Ties with the Middle East", Jamestown Foundation **China Brief**, Vol. 5, Issue 12 (May 24, 2005), p. 3

¹⁸² Shai Oster, "China Will Strike an Energy Deal with the Saudis", **The Wall Street Journal**, (January 23), 2006

from an array of over 100 nuclear-capable IRBMs that were first tested by the PRC in 1969 and later deployed in 1971.¹⁸³

There were at least 1,000 Chinese military advisers at Saudi Arabian missile installations in the mid-1990s. American and western technicians were denied access to such installations. Mullins also reports that China and Saudi Arabia have two secure telecommunications links for private leadership contacts.¹⁸⁴

Table 5.4: China’s Oil Import from the Middle East, (In Million Tons and Percent)

Exporter	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Iran	2,756,718	3,619,989	3,949,291	7,000,465	10,847,008
Iraq	239,010	607,352	974,155	3,183,182	372,056
Kuwait	68,790	282,285	330,443	433,428	1,459,823
Oman	9,033,023	5,793,430	5,020,825	15,660,840	8,140,355
Qatar	80,752	---	---	1,598,902	1,325,553
Saudi Arabia	499,908	1,807,618	2,496,968	5,730,211	8,778,376
UAE	48,438	514,506	---	430,474	649,766
Yemen	4,055,011	4,043,151	4,132,183	3,612,424	2,286,946
Sub-Total	16,781,650	16,668,331	16,903,865	37,649,926	33,859,883
Percent of Total	47.31%	61.01%	46.17%	53.58%	56.19%

Source: *Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade*, various years.

In January 2006, Saudi King Abdullah signed a broad energy, trade, and investment pact with China but did not reveal all of the details. In April 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a return visit to the Saudi capital, where he continued discreet negotiations on energy projects. In a speech to the Saudi Shura Council, Hu pledged that “China is ready to work

¹⁸³ R. Bates Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 114.

¹⁸⁴ Robert E. Mullins, “The Dynamics of Chinese Missile Proliferation”, *Pacific Review* Vol. 8, No. 1 (1991), p. 141.

with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to strengthen peace and development in the Middle East and to build a world of peace, stability and prosperity.”¹⁸⁵

Since U.S. suspension of Chinese oil concessions with Iraq following the Iraq War in 2003, the Chinese have looked for opportunities to access the Northern Iraq’s rich oilfields, which contain an estimated 40 percent of Iraq’s oil reserves and are in the only Iraqi provinces that are relatively secure from sectarian terrorism. High-level government visits between the PRC and the Northern Iraq regional government have opened up business and investment opportunities in various sectors as well.¹⁸⁶

China sees its new diplomatic clout in the Middle East as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States. At bottom, Beijing sees chronic crises in the Middle East as distractions for the United States, not as threats to world peace.

Beijing probably calculated that discreetly keeping the United States off balance in the Middle East and other global hot spots diverted U.S. energies from containing China’s expanding influence internationally.¹⁸⁷ At present, U.S. policy attention is mired in the politics and military dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan. For this reason, the United States has less of an attention span for more critical China’s security interests closer to the mainland, especially Taiwan.

Beyond straightforward petroleum and gas considerations, Beijing now regards cordial and cooperative ties with Middle Eastern states as vital to its geopolitical successes. China offers itself as an alternative policeman and advocate to the autocratic and theocratic regimes in the region that nurse grudges against USA.. China seems quite comfortable in its close patron–client relations with several entities of concern in the region, including Iran, Syria, Sudan, the Hamas-controlled Palestinian parliament, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

China is attempting to nurture strategic relationships in the region, because it lacks the military means to stop the United States from imposing a sea-based blockage of oil tanker

¹⁸⁵ Hu Jintao delivers important speech at Saudi Shura Council), **Renmin Ribao** (Beijing, April 24, 2006), p.1

¹⁸⁶ Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Kurdish Policy,” Jamestown Foundation **China Brief**, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (January 3, 2006), p. 3

¹⁸⁷ Robert G. Sutter, **Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States**, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 157.

traffic out of the Persian Gulf in some future contingency. China currently does not possess the naval capabilities necessary to defend its sea shipments of oil and, consequently, regards their passage through waters dominated by the U.S. Navy especially the Persian Gulf as a key strategic vulnerability¹⁸⁸

Struggles for power in the greater Middle East are influenced by major nation-states that lie beyond the region. The United States, Russia, and China each have important strategic interests in the region.

While Russian power in the greater Middle East has crested, China's power and influence in the region is on the rise. Chinese security ties in the Middle East is growing and are likely, over time, to pose an increasing problems to U.S. interests in the region. The Chinese are increasingly viewed by states in the region as a counterbalance or alternate source of military assistance. The Chinese are nurturing security relationships with countries that benefit from U.S. security assistance. These countries include Israel Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as well as states with which the United States has no security ties, most notably Iran.

5.4.1. China and Israel Relations

Israel was the first country in the Middle East to recognize the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 9 January 1950. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai responded a week later on January 16, extending "our welcome and thanks"¹⁸⁹ but not reciprocating with equal recognition of the Jewish state. Israel hoped that recognition...and ties with China would open the doors for political and economic activities in Asia.¹⁹⁰ In both 1950 and 1955, China and Israel nearly reached an agreement on diplomatic ties. The first effort failed due to U.S. pressure on Israel after the Korean War started;¹⁹¹ the second fell through due to a change in Chinese policy following the Bandung Conference of Asian and African states.

¹⁸⁸ Erica Strecker Downs, **China's Quest for Energy Security**, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p.25.

¹⁸⁹ Arnon Shai (1999). "The Israeli Communist Party's policy toward the People's Republic of China, 1949-1998," in **China and Israel**. Jonathan Goldstein (ed), (1948-1998. London: Praeger) p. 84

¹⁹⁰ Meron Medzini (1976). "Reflections on Israel's Asian Policy," in **Israel in the Third World**. Michael Curtis and S. Gitelson (eds). (New Brunswick Transaction Books, 1976), p.202

¹⁹¹ Michael Curtis & Susan Aurelia Gitelson, eds., **Israel in the Third World** (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 225.

Israel-China relations did not begin to thaw until the mid 1970s. The relations were cold due in part to Chairman Mao Zedong's alliance with the Arab states, even signing an arms pact with Egypt.¹⁹² China was even publicly anti-Israel. After, Mao's passing in the 1976, coupled with the deterioration of China-Soviet relations, opened new opportunities for Israel. In particular, China was cut off from USSR, as its primary weapons supplier and, in the late 1970s, courted Israel in a new political-military relationship. Israel's long experience battling Soviet-armed Arab states qualified it as a candidate to refurbish China's Soviet-based weaponry and provide it with new technology; China recognized Israel's expertise in this field and engaged it in regular meetings in Hong Kong.

This new relationship, however, was conducted in total secrecy. Open relations did not emerge until the late 1980s, and were initially limited to China's tourism office in Tel Aviv and the establishment of the Representative Office of Israel Academy of Science and Humanities in Beijing .

Diplomatic relations between the State of Israel and the People's Republic of China were formally established on 24 January 1992. From that moment on, relations rapidly developed, currently, cooperation between the two countries is flourishing on many different levels such as science, agriculture, culture and of course economics.

There has been rapid growth in economic and commercial ties between Israel and China during the past 15 years. The formal infrastructure of these ties was quickly established, with the signing of a series of agreements. The level of mutual trade grew rapidly, from \$ 54 million in 1992 to \$ 3.39 billion in 2006.¹⁹³

At the beginning of the relationship, trade was primarily focused on the fields of agriculture, chemicals and water. Today Israel-China commerce also encompasses the fields of life sciences, hi-tech and venture capital. The recognition of China's importance for Israeli industry and economy, combined with government support for Israeli business enterprises in China have made China a primary objective of Israeli business activity.

¹⁹² Medzini 204; Jonathan Goldstein, "The Republic of China and Israel", in **China and Israel, 1948-1998**. (London: Praeger: 1999)p. 1

¹⁹³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2007

Prior to the 1970s, ministerial contact between Israel and China was rare. Israel's early ties with China were established by the Israeli Defense Ministry but developed by the Foreign Ministry. The two ministries have generally agreed on the economic and political benefits of pursuing diplomatic relations with China.¹⁹⁴ While the Foreign Ministry coordinates diplomacy, the Defense Ministry controls most of the military negotiations, production and sales with China. Israeli governments have placed rigid controls on the sales of Israel's weapons manufacturers, and, since 1986, have required them to acquire a permit for all military exports. The concern is that China could re-export the advanced weaponry to Israel's enemies especially states like Iran

Before 1992, China was vociferously anti-Israel in public, and military sales during these period were done at great risk to Israeli security. However since normalization, , China has stopped denouncing Israel's right to exist. In practice, China gave little material help to the Palestinians while developing its relationship with Israel very rapidly. Despite its small size, Israel became an important investor in Chinese development projects and supplier of high-technology weapons.¹⁹⁵

China has also nurtured a security arrangement with Israel. Although Israel and China did not establish formal diplomatic relations until early 1992, secret military ties between the two countries date back to 1980, and various reports estimate that Israel has exported between \$1 and \$3 billion worth of arms and technology to the PRC.¹⁹⁶

Israel's sales of sophisticated weapons technology to China are much more than a source of revenue. Kumaraswamy argues that such sales are seen as a 'control mechanism' over the types of equipment and technology China exports to Israel's regional neighbors.¹⁹⁷ The diplomatic missions in the early 1990s of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ended with China's reassurances that it would cease missile exports to Syria and Iran by the early to mid 1990s. In 1997, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received similar assurances from China with promises to refuse Iranian requests

¹⁹⁴ Yitzhak Shichor. "Israel's Military Transfers to China and Taiwan," *Survival*. vol 40 (1) (1998): p. 78

¹⁹⁵ David Horowitz, "Breaking Down the Wall of Secrecy", *Jerusalem Report*, (January 9, 1992), p. 9.

¹⁹⁶ Richard A. Bitzinger, "Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Autumn 1992), p. 105.

¹⁹⁷ P.R. Kumaraswamy (1999). "China and Israel: Normalisation and After," in *China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence*, (London: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 37

for nuclear development assistance.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, monitoring military technology transfers is very difficult, especially when dealing with a closely guarded regime.

Considerable press coverage has focused on arms contracts between Israel and China, and the attendant controversies that such sales create in international politics. In late 2004 and early 2005, tension emerged (between the US, Israel and China) involving Israeli contracts to upgrade Israeli-made *Harpy* assault drones owned by China.¹⁹⁹ Officials in the US Department of Defense expressed concern about Israel's selling and upgrading such advanced technologies for China. This controversy is reminiscent of Israel's plan in the late 1990s to sell China the *Phalcon* early-warning system. The sale was cancelled in July 2000 as result of strong American pressure. The United States is concerned about its allies selling arms to states that could at some stage threaten U.S. security. Because of the US-Israeli strategic relationship on defense issues, Israel closely considers the U.S. position on arms sales.

Israel's relations with China are growing at a time when China's role in global affairs is rising rapidly and Israel-China ties are developing with this perspective. China's role in the region is deepening. China's influence among Middle Eastern states is likely to become even more pronounced, and China has already demonstrated its talent at cultivating and preserving, "good relations with virtually every country in the region, most obviously both Israel and Iran simultaneously."²⁰⁰

The scope of Israel and China's relations, compounded by the pace at which Israel-China ties have grown, suggests that their relationship will continue to develop positively. This contact is unique in enabling Israel to cultivate a more secure environment, and in helping Israel to widen its commercial and diplomatic ties to the East. The depth of Israel-China relations attests the dynamism of China's diplomacy.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., "China and Israel," 1999, p. 37-38

¹⁹⁹ Joshua Brilliant, "Israel's China-US weapons dilemma," **Washington Post**, (December 29, 2004)

²⁰⁰ Barry Rubin "China's Middle East Strategy", **MERIA Journal**, vol 3 no 1, (March 1999)

5.4.2. China and Turkey Relations

A long-term Turkish commitment to China is imperative because of China's vast market opportunities, her enhanced strategic importance in Eurasia and world power status, her historical links and cultural affinities with Turkey, her similar problems of development, her networking with Asia-Pacific's powerful overseas Chinese communities, and nearly five decades of zigzag progress in her troubled relations with the West. In retrospect, Turkey and China share a long past, cemented by the turning of centuries, and have influenced each other throughout history. Our Turkish forefathers were engaged in intense relations with the Chinese, be it in war or in peace. A host of intermarriages, cultural, political and economic exchanges have taken place between the Turkic and Chinese civilizations throughout the course of our common history, spanning more than 3000 years. Though the official Chinese history books may deny it, legend has it that the famous 6000km-long Great Wall buttressed ancient China against the advancing Turkic warriors. The Turks also once lived under Chinese rule as a minority nation due to the endless internal bickering among rival Turkic tribes.²⁰¹

The historic Silk Road goes all the way from Xian to Istanbul. And Anatolia served as a gateway for exchanges between China, Europe and the Middle East during that period. A rich variety of porcelain and other precious ornaments presented as gifts by the Chinese dynasties to the Ottoman sultans (now in the Topkapı Palace Museum) bear witness to this historic relationship. It is, however, ironic that after migrating to Anatolia from the Central Asian steppes the Turks never looked back to where they originally came from. Both the Ottomans and the modern Turks have always turned their face toward Europe and, perhaps to a lesser degree, toward the Middle East. In their eyes, China has never been elevated to a position of greater importance.²⁰²

President Demirel's visit to China in May 1995 highlighted Turkey's hopes for the future development of relations with this nation and the enthusiasm of Turkish companies for doing more business with China. This momentum should be maintained and further expanded with new initiatives because sustaining Turkey's engagement in China is vital to

²⁰¹ Mehmet Ögütçü, *China and Turkey*, p.4.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p.5.

Turkey's interests. Turkey must strengthen the mechanisms of co-operation and take advantage of immediate opportunities to define common goals and to advance them more systematically. Closer government ties are essential, but in a time of generational change on both sides, Turkey needs to deepen interaction at every level. Turkey must bolster cooperation in regions where Turkey and China share common interests and historic ties—for example, the Middle East, Central Asia and other former Soviet republics. Of course, nowhere is Turkey's regional co-operation more important than in meeting the new challenges and opportunities facing Eurasia. Turkey has a common interest in assuring that the historic transformations now under way in central Asian countries are consolidated and that these countries become integrated with the world community.²⁰³

Looking to the future, Turkey's relations with China seem promising. In April 1999, Chinese leader, Li Peng, Paid an official visit to Turkey, where he met with a group of Turkish businessmen and urged an increase of exchanges with their Chinese counterparts to further economic cooperation. Political results were also important as it was noted in the meeting that 'there were no fundamental conflict of interests between China and Turkey and the two had similar and identical views on many major and regional issues'. The warming of relations and the bilateral demands for cooperation resulted in a security cooperation agreement in February 2000. The agreement, which is composed of 12 articles declared the bilateral cooperation of China and Turkey in combating cross-border crimes.²⁰⁴

China and Turkey two nations established diplomatic relations on August 4, 1971. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Sino-Turkish relations have been developing smoothly. Especially, since 1980s, the exchanges between the two countries have been increased and the relations have developed rapidly. Turkish leaders who visited China are President Evren (December 1982), Prime Minister Ozal (July 1985), Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Karaduman (October 1985), President Demirel (May 1995) and Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Kalemuli (August 1996). Chinese leaders who visited Turkey are President Li Xiannian (March, 1984), Premier Zhao Ziyang (July, 1986), Chairman of the Eighth Standing Committee of National People's Congress Qiao

²⁰³ Ibid.,p.7.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.,p.417.

Shi (November, 1996) and Chairman of the Nineth Standing Committee of National People's Congress Li Peng (April, 1999), In April 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji of the State Council of China visited Turkey.²⁰⁵

Table 5.5: China Turkey Trade (Million Dollars)

Year	exports	imports	Trade balance	Volume
2002	238	1.384	-1.146	1.602
2003	532	2.065	-1.533	2.597
2003/8	309	1.478	-1.169	1.787
2004/8	280	2.699	-2.419	2.979

Source: Turkish Foreign Ministry

5.4.3. China and Iran Relations

China and Iran are important geopolitical actors as well as major players in the global energy market. In recent years, the Sino-Iranian relationship has broadened and deepened. Energy cooperation is the main axis around which this partnership revolves. As a result, China is a stakeholder in the outcome of the diplomatic crisis that has been brewing over the Iranian nuclear program. The relationship between China and Iran deserves careful scrutiny, not the least because their strategic motivations remain ambiguous and their dealings with each other

lack transparency.²⁰⁶

Iran nurtured military ties with China throughout its war with Iraq in the 1990s. The relationship primarily focused around Iranian purchases of Chinese conventional military hardware. Chinese military-technical exports to Iran began in 1981 after the start of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. The trade flow included thousands of tanks, armored personnel

²⁰⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People's Republic of China 2005

²⁰⁶ John Calabrese, China And Iran: Mismatched Partners, **Jamestown Foundation**, Occasional Papers, (August 2006), p.1

vehicles, and artillery pieces; several hundred surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles; thousands of antitank missiles and more than a hundred fighter aircraft; and dozens of small warships.²⁰⁷

Iran's international isolation has contributed to its reliance on China for help with WMD-related projects. As Barry Rubin judges, it is "Iran's pariah status that makes it an attractive market--or even a market at all--for China, as a supplier of last resort for certain conventional items and weapons of mass destruction."²⁰⁸

Five main considerations shape China's thinking on the Iranian nuclear issue: respecting Iran's right to a civilian nuclear program, perpetuating the nuclear nonproliferation regime, maintaining bilateral energy and economic ties with Iran, protecting relations with the United States, and promoting China's international image.²⁰⁹

Given China's increasingly closer energy and economic ties with Iran, Beijing is caught in a dilemma vis-à-vis Iran's uranium conversion. On one hand, Iran's uranium conversion raises the issue of the necessity of such nuclear fuel independence, especially considering Iran had tried to cover up this program. On the other hand, because Iran has a higher stake in trade with China, Beijing now has a greater ability to influence Tehran if it is willing to exert its leverage. Because Iran's nuclear program seems to be of vital interest to Tehran, China must now decide whether to risk its energy and economic interests and join the international pressure group.²¹⁰

The Middle East has been the major source of China's energy imports. From 1998 to 2003, crude oil from the Middle East accounted for 50.9 percent of China's total energy imports. Iran in particular has become indispensable to China's energy security. During this period, Iran accounted for 13.6 percent of China's oil imports, second only to Saudi Arabia's 16.7

²⁰⁷ Bates Gill, "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-Making in an Era of Reform," Chapter 9 in David M. Lampton (ed.), **The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000** (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 272-73.

²⁰⁸ Barry Rubin, "China's Middle East Strategy", **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1999), p. 48.

²⁰⁹ Dingli Shen, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom", **The Washington Quarterly**, (Spring 2006) 29:2, p.55.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.60

percent. In 2004, China imported 130 million tons of crude oil from Iran, accounting for 15 percent of its total imports of crude oil.²¹¹

China and Iran are also preparing for various other forms of closer energy cooperation. On October 28, 2004, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran that awarded Sinopec, China's second-largest oil giant, the rights to participate in developing Yadavaren, an Iranian oil field, in exchange for an agreement to purchase 10 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) over 25 years.²¹²

Yadavaren, as one of the world's largest undeveloped oil fields, would have a total production capacity of around 300,000 barrels per day, half of which would eventually be exported to China. It was understood that this deal, also covering the LNG construction on-site, could be as large as \$70 billion. Only half a year earlier, in March 2004, state oil trader Zhuhai Zhenrong also signed a preliminary deal to import more than 110 million tons of LNG from Iran over 25 years for \$20 billion.²¹³

President Jiang Zemin stated in 1994 that China should oppose "hegemony" by helping dissident countries like Iran, but emphasized international stability furthering China's development as more important.²¹⁴ China's leaders have tried to balance their various interests with Washington and Tehran and do not want to have to choose between the two. If the U.N. Security Council debates the Iranian nuclear issue, China will be forced to make a difficult choice: support sanctions on Iran, damaging Beijing's energy ties with Tehran or using right of veto, angering Washington; or play a passive role without a clear position, diminishing China's new role as a gradually more influential actor on the Global stage.

The balance and caution of China's policy is a result of that country's varied interests in the Middle East. China wants a peaceful, stable Middle East and to avoid entanglement in

²¹¹ Tian Hui, "Energy Drives China to Big Iran Market," **Oriental Morning Post**, (June 28, 2005), p. 13

²¹² Zhao Renfeng, "Iran Prefers China for Oil Exploration Projects", **China Daily**, (November 9, 2004),

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Jonathan Rynhold; Deng-Ker Lee, "Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post Cold War Era", **Issues and Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 8, (August 1994), p. 85.

regional conflicts or crises. Beijing prefers to focus on trade and economic development. On the one hand China prefers not to damage relations with the United States. On the other hand, China does not want to give up lucrative relationships with Iran, reduce arms sales or the supply of missile and nuclear technology, and see the region so dominated by the United States that there is no room for a Chinese economic role.

China has managed to develop and preserve good relations with virtually every country in the region, most obviously both Israel and Iran simultaneously. In general, Chinese strategy is relatively successful. But its arms sales and a tendency to violate commitments to restrain them could point to future problems for China's Middle East policy.

5.5. CHINA AFRICA RELATIONS

China's solidarity towards Africa is not a recent phenomenon though; it dates back to the founding fathers of the PRC (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) who supported the cause of the African people in opposing colonialism and imperialism. In return, after their independence, these new countries supported China's efforts to join the United Nations, successfully ousting Taiwan from both the Security Council and the General Assembly in 1971. Over the years China maintained its commitment to Africa for ideological reasons, providing assistance, mainly in health and education, and technical expertise, though never on the scale of the developed countries. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, China's cooperation with Africa has been expanding at a very fast rate, and this time the evidences point to economic motivations, namely to secure access to the rich natural resources of that continent.²¹⁵

China is increasing political leverage over the region. Indeed, by exploring further this south-south cooperation, China may become in the near future a very important player in that continent, replacing western influence in the long run, especially if it succeeds in turning into an important development agent by proving successful where western countries have failed decade after decade. And China may have just what it needs for

²¹⁵ Ana Cristina Alves, "Emerging Postcolonial Solidarities: China's New Economic Diplomacy Towards Subsaharan Africa", 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong (26 June - 29 June 2006),p.5.

Africa's development to take off: availability of money, cheap technology, expertise and goods and, most important, political will to pursue this purpose. Besides, China and Africa seem to have a lot in common: they are developing economies, they were subject to European colonialism, and both have rigid political systems and markets. Despite this background, China has achieved an extraordinary economic growth, making it a very attractive new paradigm for African countries.²¹⁶

China focus on Africa is not a new fact as it has been paying great attention to the continent since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Nonetheless the nature of this interest has changed overtime. During the Cold War period, the reasons of the Chinese interest in Africa were mainly political. Even economic and technological aid pursued strict political purposes, contending with the USSR for the international leadership of communism and to gain support to recover the seat at the United Nations Security Council. Throughout decades China's foreign diplomacy towards Africa was openly intended to form a front against the new colonialism as stated in the first of the five principles enunciated by premier Zhou Enlai during his tour to Africa in January 1964.

Most of the African countries achieved independence by the 70's, the Chinese speech stressing then the underdevelopment condition as the key issue linking Africa and China. In this new framework, Mao Zedong, during the visit of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, classified Asia, Africa and Latin America as the third world to unite. In the 80's, China was consolidating the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Beijing start looking to the African continent with economic interests.

China's foreign policy towards Africa became clearly economic oriented. The new Chinese foreign policy for Africa became more visible in the second half of the 90's. During his tour to six African countries in 1996, Jiang Zemin proposed the development of a long-term and better structured cooperative relationship between China and the African countries.

The first ever China-Africa Co-operation Forum was held in Beijing from 11–12 October 2000. Forty-four African countries, bringing in 80 ministers, attended the forum. In his

²¹⁶ Ibid.,p.12.

opening address Jian Zeming said that: China and Africa are faced with both historical opportunities for greater development and unprecedented challenges. At this historical juncture, an in-depth discussion between us on how to strengthen co-operation and promote common development will undoubtedly exert a far-reaching important impact on the cross-century development of Sino- African relations, closer South-South cooperation and the establishment of an equitable and just new international political and economic order.²¹⁷


The raw materials in the African continent and weak political structure of African states, are strong magnets for the world fastest growing economy, which desperately needs to access new sources of natural resources in order to fuel its Industrial complex and sustain its economic growth rate. China also needs markets to export, its cheap light industry goods, the technology and expertise that sustain its development model.

The high growth of Africa's trade with Asia is largely driven by exports to China and India, the two dynamic economies not only in Asia but also worldwide. The China-India-driven export growth of African countries underpins the earlier observation that Africa's exports to Asia are largely driven by increasing demand in Asia for natural resources and other primary commodities arising from Asia's growing industrial sectors and increasing purchasing power. China and India are the countries where such demand is most visible. While Japan and South Korea were the most important markets for Africa's exports in the early 1990s, both China and India doubled their annual growth rates of imports from Africa between the periods of 1990–1994 and 1999–2004 (figure 2.15). China and India have 40 percent and 9 percent shares, respectively, of Africa's total exports to Asia today.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Domingos Jardo Muekalia, "Africa And China's Strategic Partnership", **African Security Review** vol: 13,(2004), p.8.

²¹⁸ Harry G. Broadman, **Africa's Silk Road China and India's New Economic Frontier**, (2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank Washington DC), p.75.

Figure 5.6: Africa's Merchandise Exports to Asia



Source: UN COMTRADE


The leading role of China in African-Asian trade relations is not limited to Africa's exports. On the import side as well, China has become the major trading partners for African countries. Japan used to be the largest Asian exporter of products that Africa imported from Asian countries. However, China has taken over the leading position from Japan, accounting for more than one-third of Asia's total exports to Africa.

Africa mainly exports petroleum and raw materials to China, and non-oil minerals to India, while it imports more value-added commodities from both China and India. Oil and natural gas are the single most dominant category of products exported from Africa to China, accounting for more than 62 percent of total African exports to China, followed by ores and metals (17 percent) and agricultural raw materials (7 percent). In addition, Angola, Sudan,

and the Democratic Republic of Congo provide 85 percent of African oil exports to China (box 2.1). Exports to India also show a high concentration in resource based products. Ore and metals comprise 61 percent, followed by agricultural raw materials (19 percent).²¹⁹

²¹⁹ Ibid.,p.76.

Figure 5.7: Africa's Merchandise Imports from Asia




Source: UN COMTRADE

African-Asian FDI flows are also growing rapidly, but the volume of such flows is more modest than that of trade. While there is some African foreign direct investment in China and India, this investment is dominated by the flows of Chinese and Indian FDI in Africa. As of mid-2006, the stock of China's FDI to Africa is estimated to be \$1.18 billion.

The vast majority of Chinese and Indian FDI inflows to Africa over the past decade have been largely concentrated in the extractive industries. Since such investments are typically capital intensive, they have engendered limited domestic employment creation. However, in the last few years, Chinese and Indian FDI in Africa has begun to diversify into many other sectors, including apparel, agro processing, power generation, road construction, tourism, and telecommunications, among others. Chinese and Indian FDI in Africa has also become more diversified geographically; figure 6 shows the current country distribution of Chinese FDI flows to Africa.²²⁰

²²⁰ Ibid., p.10.

Figure 5.8: China's FDI Outflows to Africa



Source: 2004 Chinese FDI Statistics Bulletin.


In 2000, Beijing created the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) as a vehicle for expanding Sino-African economic, trade, and political links. The two triennial FOFAC conferences held so far (Beijing in 2000, Addis Abba in 2003) enjoyed high level representation, including African presidents and deputies, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. China's president, vice-president, and premier were present at the Beijing meeting. Premier Wen Jiabao attended the Addis Abba conference in December 2003.²²¹

China recently issued its first position paper on relations with Africa. The paper was timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of China establishing diplomatic relations with Egypt, the first Arab and African country to recognize the Communist government in Beijing. China now has diplomatic relations with 47 out of Africa's 53 countries and may soon persuade Chad to withdraw its recognition of Taiwan. This paper takes a very positive view of China's relationship with Africa, pledging more co-operation on many fronts, including trade, investment, and sharing experience in governance and development.²²²

²²¹ David Hale, "China's Economic Takeoff: Implications for Africa", **Brenthurst Discussion Paper**, (1/2006), p.10

²²² *Ibid.*, p.10.

Figure 5.9: Chinese aid to Sub Saharan Africa 1969-1987



Source: Bartke (1992) in Taylor (2001)

China's soft power gambit can also be seen in its heavy investments in Africa's educational systems, both by sending teachers to Africa and providing scholarships to African students from across the continent to study in Chinese universities. Between the start of the educational exchanges in the mid-1950s and 2000, 5,582 African students had enrolled in Chinese universities. This support for education improves China's image in many countries. These educational programs help to provide China with the kind of workforce it requires to expand its own high tech industries. As China's space program expands and matures, it is seeking to improve its space tracking capabilities in the southern hemisphere. China operates a space tracking station in Namibia, and utilizes South African ports of call to support space-tracking ships.²²³

China's investments in Africa pay an added dividend in the diplomatic effort to deny Taiwan international space through recognition by individual countries and their resulting support in multilateral forums, such as the UN. For example, China's deployment of 90 peacekeepers to Liberia in December of 2003 occurred two months after Liberia switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, illustrating the strategic importance that African nations hold in the on-going diplomatic struggle between Taiwan and the Mainland. Seven countries in Africa currently recognize Taiwan, making up one quarter of

²²³ Drew Thompson, "Economic Growth and Soft Power: China's Africa Strategy", **ChinaBrief** Volume IV . Issue 24 . (December 7, 2004), p.4

the total. However, several African countries have played China and Taiwan against one another, seeking massive aid packages and switching recognition.²²⁴

According to the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, one of the main advantages of Africa working with China is that there are no political strings attached. China does not demand a good human-rights and governance track record, as do funding packages from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.²²⁵

China is not a new player in Africa. But its economic and political presence on the continent and its impact on Africa have grown exponentially in the last few years. This has huge consequences for Africa, but it also has significant implications for western policy towards the continent.²²⁶

5.6. SHANGAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

Chinese leaders think that they reduce the influence of the USA and Japan in Asia Pacific by increasing China's involvement in the regional organizations. The SCO, established in June 2001, grew out of the "Shanghai five" group. Today the members of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kryghistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The permanent secretariat headquarters of the organization are in Beijing, which reflects influence of China. SCO mainly focuses on non traditional security threats like terrorism and in 2003, the SCO expanded its focus to compromise economic cooperation.

The cooperation of the "Shanghai Five" developed through the border arrangement has doubtlessly contributed to the great success in regional security, particularly in Russo-Chinese security, which has yet to be declared a political problem. The "Shanghai Five" entered a new phase at the Almaty summit in 1998 in terms of both quality and quantity.

²²⁴ Ibid.,p.4.

²²⁵ Aymeric Vincenot, China's Hu to Visit Three African States to Bolster Partnerships, **Agence France Press**, (27 January, 16 July 2004)

²²⁶ Leni Wild and David Mepham, "The New Sinosphere: China In Africa" , **IPPR** , (2005), p.1.

The summit began to be held regularly every year and broadened the scope of cooperation between the member states.²²⁷

The Shanghai Five came as a natural reaction to the serious threat that the Central Asian region would become an area of permanent instability following an upsurge of international terrorism, religious extremism and national separatism.

The process began in 1989 with negotiations on confidence-building measures on the Soviet- Chinese border to bolster the talks already under way between the USSR and the People's Republic of China on border issues. These negotiations were later transformed into talks on confidence-building measures and armed forces cuts between Russia, Kazakhstan, Krgyzstan and Tajikistan on the one hand, and China on the other. This enabled the five countries to create a climate of trust and security throughout the entire length of the former Soviet-Chinese border and to provide pre-requisites for further constructive cooperation within the Five. The agenda began to feature other items: issues of a general political and economic nature, security, economics, and so on, which suggested that a new model of regional cooperation had emerged.²²⁸

Against the backdrop of political multi-polarization, and economic and information globalization in the 21st century, the presidents firmly believed that to transform the "Shanghai Five" mechanism into a higher level of cooperation will help member states to share opportunities and deal with new challenges and threats more effectively, according to the Declaration.²²⁹

On the basis of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in 1996 in Shanghai and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in 1997 in Moscow, the SCO plans to expand cooperation among the member states in political, economic and trade, cultural, scientific and technological and other fields. The principles

²²⁷ Iwashita Akihiro, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of "Partnership" after the Post-Cold War Period", p.264.

²²⁸ Yevgeny Kozhokin, "Shanghai Five: Present Realities And Future Prospects", **Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies**, p.1.

²²⁹ Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (6/15/2001) Monterey Institute of International Studies 2002, p.1.

embodied in the above two treaties determine the basis of the relationship among the SCO member states, the Declaration said.²³⁰

1. The SCO has completed building of institution and legal framework, which ensures its effective functioning.
2. It has carried out close security cooperation focusing on addressing non-traditional security threats and challenges such as fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking.
3. It has adopted a long-term plan, set direction for regional economic cooperation and identified the goal, priority areas and major tasks of economic cooperation among member states. It has set up the SCO Business Council and the Interbank Association.
4. Following the principles of openness, non-alliance and not targeting at any third party, it has actively engaged in dialogue, exchange and cooperation of various forms with countries and international organizations that, like the SCO, are ready to carry out cooperation on an equal and constructive basis with mutual respect to safeguard regional peace, security and stability.²³¹

The SCO also provides the sort of structure that some international relations theorists have identified as important for effective regional integration. These theorists have emphasized that successful regionalism does not depend necessarily on shared political systems, political rights or economic policy settings. It does depend on the creation of new supranational organs that promote political cooperation and harmonization at the international level. This political regionalism does not necessarily depend on economic integration. Particular forms of economic cooperation can become the primary field of policy through which that political harmonization occurs. But security policy is another important potential field through which such political harmonization can occur.²³²

"The six countries that constitute the SCO cover 30 million square kilometers - 60 per cent of continental Europe and Asia - and have a combined population of 1.5 billion - about one

²³⁰ *ibid*,p.2

²³¹ Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Shanghai, 15 June 2006) p.1.

²³² Dr Greg Austin, "European Union Policy Responses to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, European" Institute for Asian Studies ,EIAS , (02/2004) , p.6.

quarter of the world population. From a strategic perspective, a Sino-Russian axis is a formidable combination. Central Asia added to it makes the alliance a serious contender for power and influence in the evolving global scenario.²³³

After an initial period of halting growth, the S.C.O. has emerged as an alliance serving as an effective vehicle for Beijing's and Moscow's geopolitical aims. Look for the alliance to continue to further the interests of the Moscow-Beijing axis as long as those two power centers are careful to maintain their accord and the regimes in Central Asia depend on the axis for political support. As the S.C.O. grows in strength, Washington's influence in Central Asia will diminish.²³⁴

²³³ Khalid Hasan, 'Where American liberalism stops', Dawn, 28 January 2002,p.4

²³⁴ Michael A. Weinstein, "Intelligence Brief: Shanghai Cooperation Organization", (12 July 2005), Power and Interest Research Group **PINR**,p.2.

6. CHINA'S ARMED FORCES

In this thesis the author tries to show the evolution and capabilities of PLA from past to the near future. China today has a rapidly developing military capability. Chinese defense strategy focuses on territorial integrity of China, political stability in the region and ability to protect economic development. For this purpose China tries to transpose its mass infantry based military to a high-tech armed force. Although China's military modernization program is not too much compare to its GDP, steady high economic growth of the country makes the neighbor states and global powers anxious about the future. At this point understanding abilities of the PLA and its evolution becomes crucial.

Chinese Armed Forces has been very defensive from a historical and strategical perspective in the north such as Mongolia, Central Asia, Tibet and Manchuria but rather aggressive in the South axis where it continues to lay claim to territories like Korea, Vietnam, Hong-Kong and Paracel Islands; in terms of relations with neighbours. By 2010, China will emerge as a global Super Power that will upset U.S1. Russian and Japanese interest at the Trans-Pacific Basin.²³⁵

6.1 DOCTRINES OF THE PLA

A military doctrine of an army is the guide line of its military strategy. All the technology, equipment, personal, and training follows the doctrine. However doctrines do not automatically translate into capabilities. PLA's future doctrines will be closely related to China's technological level and its economical power.

6.1.1. People's War

People's War reflects the most traditional vision and derives from Mao Tse-tung's doctrine. In this doctrine, China would defend its own territory against a land invasion by exploiting its advantages in manpower and geography. Conventional strategy and weapons would at the end dominate in a long war of attrition. Though a mass ground assault on the mainland

²³⁵ Mesut Hakkı Caşın, Çin Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Sarı Ejderin Uykusu, **Avrasya Dosyası**, (Summer 1995) no:2 pp.35-36.

seems highly implausible, this construct still accounts for more military resources than the others.

The People's War doctrine, which was the result of lessons learned from the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) and the civil war, emphasized the preparation of masses of foot soldiers and militia to engage in prolonged guerrilla warfare in China's vast inner land. China postulated that a potential enemy could not be successful in dealing with China because of China's vast territory, complicated terrain and huge numbers of people. Thus, their defense strategy provided for the protracted war on Chinese soil, requires large conventional forces.

In Mao's doctrine, the PLA and paramilitary forces, supported by the local population, would conduct protracted war against any invader. Initially, the PLA's main forces, using conventional tactics, would carry out a strategic retreat supported by guerrilla operations until the enemy forces were overextended and dispersed. PLA forces would then be reconfigured and concentrated to annihilate the enemy. In this doctrine small towns have priority as Mao advises "Take medium and small cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later."²³⁶ Main aim of People's war strategy is termination of the enemy armed forces. "Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a place our main objective."²³⁷

In Korea, Chinese units had a difficult time applying "people's war" principles because they could not take advantage of their numerical superiority and had no space to trade for time. The PLA's massed, unsupported (air or artillery) light infantry attacks against superior American firepower did not work and in most cases led to the high personnel and equipment losses. In fact, Korea was a wake-up call for the PLA and made its leaders aware of the need to modernize weaponry, combat skills, and military doctrine before again engaging a strong military force.

China fought thousands of wars during its 5000-year history to keep the country unified. In ancient China, warfare was considered an abnormal state of affairs and the profession of

²³⁶ Mao Tse-Tung, **Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung**, (People's Publishing House, vol:4, 2nd edition, 1967 Beijing), p.144.

²³⁷ *ibid*, p.144.

arms was held in low esteem. Confucius likened war to an insect that eats up resources, and mothers discouraged their sons from joining the armed forces by telling them "good iron is not used for nails and good men are not used for soldiers." Armies were raised to confront situations when military force is necessary and were quickly disbanded when the situation was resolved.

The teachings of the ancients have had a considerable influence on modern Chinese strategists. Mao Zedong was perhaps the leading practitioner of the ancient precepts in the modern era. Even in the recent evolutions of China's military doctrine, the influence of the ancient strategists is obvious. Two basis of ancient Chinese war-fighting doctrine are particularly evident: "trading space for time" and "defeating a superior enemy with an inferior force." The first refers to luring the enemy so deep that it becomes overextended and can be defeated at a time and place of one's select. The second has many variants, but in general terms the Chinese armies try to isolate small formations of the enemy forces, overwhelm them, and move on to others. The cumulative effect of several small victories is equal to or greater than defeating the enemy in one main battle, and with this strategy defeat is usually avoided.

6.1.2. 1964-1983: "People's War Under Modern Conditions"

In the late 1970's The Maoist doctrine of the "people's war" which had been prevalent in the late 1960s and 1970s, was replaced by a new doctrine of the "people's war under modern conditions." This change stressed the strategic aspects of how to fight the war rather than what type and nature of war the PLA should be prepared to fight.²³⁸

Two factors changed Beijing's military doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1964 China acquired nuclear weapons. By the early 1980's, China had developed and deployed a small but usable strategic nuclear force.²³⁹ Nuclear weapons gave the Chinese the capability to change their strategy and the Soviets were the main reason of this change. For most of the 1960s and 1970s, China's national military strategy was based mainly on defending China

²³⁸ Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine Strategy and Tactics, 1985-1995: Chinese Perspective", in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, **China's Military in Transition**, (Oxford University Press Oxford 1997), p.179.

²³⁹ Ellis Jofe, **The Chinese Army after Mao**, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp.70-93

against a possible Soviet attack. During that period, the PLA compensated for its outdated capabilities by using concepts of operations based on the threat of nuclear retaliation origin other words "people's war under modern conditions." Continental defense was still the primary strategy, but it included the ability to conduct offensive operations short distances outside China's borders. "People's war under modern conditions" differed from people's war in two ways. First, the intent of the new strategy was to defeat the enemy closer to China's borders, avoiding a long retreat into the interior.

Second, cities would have to be defended because cities were important to support the logistical requirements of the Chinese armed forces. The new strategy still relied on the PLA's massive size, and its ultimate defense was to fall back into China's interior and exhaust its enemy through protracted war.

PLA operations in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war were the most extensive and costly since the Korean War.²⁴⁰ But despite the new "people's war under modern conditions" strategy, Chinese conventional equipment and combat performance had not improved since Korean war. The PLA could not use its manpower advantage, trade space for time, or use deception techniques. The Sino-Vietnam War was largely a conventional war, and the Chinese did not do very well.

6.1.3. 1980—"Local Limited War"

After China's Vietnam war defeat, Deng Xiaoping made a sharp speech in 1979 to the Central Military Commission, asserting that the PLA's weaknesses in education, training, organization, doctrine, tactics, and management procedures meant that the PLA could not maintain or employ better hardware even if the nation could afford to supply it. For the next several years the PLA focused on the organizational, doctrinal, and human aspects of military modernization.

The strategic underpinning for a long-term military modernization process was set in 1985 when China's supreme military command, the Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, declared the most likely military contingency

²⁴⁰ Harlan W. Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 8 (August 1979), pp. 801-815.

China faced to be “local, limited war” (replacing the threat of the “early, major, and nuclear war” foreseen by Mao Tse-tung).²⁴¹

During the same period, as the world situation changed, Beijing’s analysts concluded that reduced superpower influence meant that there was increased probability of small-scale wars and ethnic conflicts where border and territorial disputes had been held in check by the dynamic of superpower confrontation. Also the increasing scarcity of natural resources as a result of rapid economic development in the Asia Pacific region could lead to territorial disputes.

By 1983, the Chinese had basically written off the Soviet threat. The Reagan military build up, convinced the Chinese that the US would prevail in any contest with the Soviet Union. There was also an emerging perception among Chinese that the Soviet Union was a “paper tiger.” If the Russians could not defeat Afghans, why should China be feared? Based on these perceptions, China’s defense policy shifted from a strategy designed primarily to deter the USSR to a strategy that could win local wars around China’s borders and maritime territories.²⁴²

In a modern limited war, protraction and attrition were out, speed, mobility, and lethality were in. Weapons systems for the new doctrine had to have greater range, accuracy, and be able to operate at night in all weather conditions. Military capabilities, for the Navy and Air Force, had to adapt to a new defensive perimeter that extended 600 miles from China’s shore.

China modernized the education and training system of the PLA, reduced its ranks by a million, reduced the number of Military Area Commands (MAC) from eleven to seven, closed or combined several military academies, but the China’s weapons modernization programs were unable to keep pace with changes in new security strategy. An attempt was made in the late 1980s to solve at least the weapon modernization problem by purchasing

²⁴¹ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, **The Great Wall and The Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security**, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p.144.

²⁴² Harry Harding, “The Domestic Politics of China’s Global Posture, 1973–1978”, in Thomas Fingar, ed., **China’s Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 43–96.

weapon systems and know-how from foreign sources. In 1991, the Chinese witnessed the Gulf war and this event again forced China to change its military doctrine.

6.1.4. Present Doctrine: Local War Under High-Technology Conditions

For China, first Gulf war in 1991 was a wake-up call of major proportions. Iraq's own swollen army, equipped in large part with Chinese weaponry, was effaced by better equipped and better trained opponents.²⁴³The Gulf War convinced Chinese military strategists that the war of the future is most likely to be localized, fought to achieve limited political objectives, and won by which ever side is better able to concentrate high-technology force at some distance from its national borders in a decisive strike. The reaction to the war was fairly intense. At least seven high-level meetings between January and May 1991 addressed the implications of the Gulf War for China. Within four months of the war's conclusion, the Chinese leadership adopted a "qualitative military strategy for post-Cold War national security" and replaced "limited local war" as the supporting doctrine with "limited local war under high-tech conditions."²⁴⁴

After the Gulf War the PLA was forced to confront the elements of modern warfare: precision-guided munitions; stealth technology; electronic countermeasures; airborne command and control systems; in-flight refueling; the minimum loss of attack aircraft and life; the use of satellites in anti-ballistic missile defense, strategic targeting, and intelligence gathering; early warning and surveillance; the use of command centers half a world away; the use of anti-ballistic missile defense; massive airlift and rapid deployment . . . and the list goes on.²⁴⁵

According to "limited war under high-technology" doctrine the PLAAF and PLAN have priority because they implement the new doctrine's long-range (600 mile) force projection requirement and will have important airlift and sea lift operations. This has resulted in a growing emphasis on the acquisition of advanced airplanes and ships, anti-ship defenses, and land-and sea-based anti-air defense systems in most of the cases from Russia. Military planners also hope that electronics will become the defense establishment's lead

²⁴³ Solomon M. Karmel, "The Maoist Drag on China's Military", *Orbis* (summer 1998), p.382.

²⁴⁴ Russell D. Howard, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms And Slow Legs"", INSS Occasional Paper 28 **Regional Security Series** (September 1999), p.15.

²⁴⁵ *ibid*, p.16.

industry.²⁴⁶ When "limited war under high-technology" was first articulated, both the PLAAF's and the PLAN's capabilities in these areas was limited. They are much better now.

Traditional PLA doctrine contains the principle that an asymmetric strategy permits militarily inferior forces to defeat enemies who are superior in arms and equipment. This longstanding doctrinal principle has been partially abandoned in the reform era.. Although the PLA trusts that its outdated equipment will perform useful roles, high technology weapons and supporting systems will form the sharp part of the PLA spear. The information warfare, anti-satellite systems, and missile attacks contemplated by Chinese military researchers rely on advanced technologies for their success.

6.2. PLA LAND FORCES

Traditionally, the PLA ground forces have been organized into a three-tiered structure:²⁴⁷

- Main force units, though stationed in specific locales, may be deployed anywhere throughout the country as required;
- Local or regional forces are primarily responsible for defense of the areas where they are stationed and consist of active and reserve PLA units, as well as People's Armed Police (PAP) units, which would perform as light infantry; and
- Militia units that would provide combat and logistics support to main and local force units in local defense.

China's ground forces are divided among approximately 20 group armies, more than 40 maneuver divisions, and some 40 maneuver brigades. More than a dozen of these divisions and several of these brigades are designated "rapid reaction" units. China completed a 500,000-man force reduction in 2000 in an effort to streamline the force further and free up funding for modernization. This reduction was achieved primarily through the deactivation of several group army headquarters; the transfer of personnel to the People's Armed

²⁴⁶ Huang Xiaofeng and Yao Zheng, "The Special Requirements of Electronic Warfare on National Defense Industrial Structures", *MSER* (2 1997), pp.22-23.

²⁴⁷ Dennis J. Blasko, "PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward A Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force", in *The PLA as Organization*, ed. James C.Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), pp.310-311.

Police; and the downsizing of approximately 30 combat divisions to brigades. Recent improvements also have focused on increasing the capability of reserve and militia units. The size of the PLA ground forces suggests that continued modernization will remain slow, deliberate, and limited through at least 2010. By 2020, infantry, airborne, armor and army aviation units will comprise a much larger percentage of the force.²⁴⁸

On the surface, the PLA appears to have established the parameters for the type of force it would like to become: a smaller, more rapidly deployable, combined arms force equipped with weapons that increase the range from which it can strike the enemy, while retaining its traditions of stealth, deception, and flexibility.

China has the largest military in the world. China's military comprises four services: ground forces (PLA), naval forces (PLAN, includes marines and aviation components), air forces (PLAAF, includes airborne forces), and strategic missile forces (Second Artillery). Following downsizing this year, the active force will total some 2.3 million personnel. A fifth element consists of the paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP) and reserves. The combined total, distributed across seven military regions, exceeds 3.2 million. China also has some 10 million organized militia members throughout the country.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ USA, Department of Defence Report to Congress, (2002), p.23

²⁴⁹ USA Department of Defence, China report (2005), p.27

Figure 6.1: China's Military Regions



Source: USA Department of Defense 2005 report p.27.

While PLA ground forces continue to make advances in several areas, they remain faced with several key challenges, including:²⁵⁰

- **Downsizing and Restructuring.** China's leadership still considers its ground forces as too "infantry-heavy." Beijing probably believes that further troop reductions accompanied by additional restructuring are required in order to make the force a more appropriately balanced combined arms force with increased mobility, lethality, and survivability.
- **The Pace of Modernization.** Recent fielding of new equipment has thus far been in limited numbers and, therefore, has not improved appreciably the capabilities of

²⁵⁰ FY2000, Department of Defence Report to Congress, 2002, p.24.

most of the PLA's ground forces. Even with the consolidation of ground force assets into progressively fewer units, the army remains so large as to impede rapid equipment modernization throughout its force structure. However, new equipment, while not being deployed throughout the whole of China, is being deployed to the PLA's strategically important areas, especially the southeast.

PLA ground forces have not been engaged in combat against a foreign enemy since 1979. Though they have studied the experiences of modern combat of foreign armies, they have not themselves had experience of planning for or conducting mid- or high-intensity modern operations, nor have they felt the impact of modern forces arrayed against them. Theoretically they understand the importance of integrating weapons into systems that increase the effectiveness of each weapon if only used by itself. Practically, the integration of numerous new systems into an effective whole is not achieved quickly. Operational techniques must be attempted, practiced, and modified to meet realistic conditions in an unending iterative process. Mere acquisition of modern equipment does not guarantee a modern force.²⁵¹

6.3. PLA NAVY, PLAN

China has an active naval modernization program within its armed forces. This is being implemented with a greater focus on domestic shipbuilding projects and the continued reliance on Russian arms acquisitions. It is possible that China will become the most powerful, diversified, and largest maritime force in the East Asian region. As long as this course of technological self-innovation and foreign purchasing continues, China could achieve regional hegemony and become capable of exerting its dominance over the disputed areas in the South China Sea.²⁵²

Beijing announced in March 2001 that it was increasing defense expenditures by over 17.7%, the largest increase in over two decades. The People's Liberation Army Navy's

²⁵¹ Dennis J. Blasko, "PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward A Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force", in **The PLA as Organization**, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p.344.

²⁵² Karsten von Hoesslin, "The China Question: A Window Of Opportunity", **Journal of Military and Strategic Studies**, (Fall 2004), Vol. 7, Issue 1, p.80.

(PLAN) modernization program is the most significant variable that reinforces its upcoming window of opportunity. Historically, China's navy has been weak and outdated. However, the PRC has actively begun to increase the PLAN's capabilities by developing new projects domestically and continuing its notable arms acquisitions from Russia. There are three primary objectives behind the PRC's modernization program. The first can be attributed to the escalating animosities within the Taiwan Strait. The second is the perception of an increased threat posed by the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) with its potential amendment of Article Nine. The third factor is the desirability to develop a blue water fleet.²⁵³

Naval strategy may be framed in terms of maritime geography, usually under four categories:

- River
- brown water
- green water
- blue water.

These categories designate operations ranging from inland waters to global deployments by large, relatively self-sufficient fleets. The latter three are not neatly, consistently delineated areas, but in China's case, *brown water* may be defined as reaching from the coast to about 200 nm to seaward. *Green water* refers to the ocean areas from the seaward end of brown water to a point, marked by the Caroline and other islands, about 1,800 nm from the coast. *Blue water* refers to the remaining global ocean areas.

Brown water is the most important maritime arena for China, as it is for any nation, since it includes coastal traffic, territorial waters, the contiguous zone, and the claimed exclusive economic zone. In these areas occur the great majority of a nation's maritime police, customs, environmental, and economic concerns. China's territorial claims heighten the importance of its brown water as a naval arena; Taiwan is the most important of these, of course, but maritime disputes also exist with Korea, Japan, and most of the Southeast Asian nations.

²⁵³ *ibid.*,p.51.

Figure 6.2: China's Critical Sea Lines of Communication



Note: In 2004, over 80 percent of Chinese crude oil imports transited the Straits of Malacca, with less than 2 percent transiting the Straits of Lombok.
Source: FY2000 DOD Report to U.S. Congress 2005.

Beijing's most important maritime strategic concern in the green water arena is probably homeland defense against sea-based, long-range missiles. Other concerns include regional sea lines of communication, and economic resources both in the continental shelf area and even further field, especially fisheries.

As far as the blue water realm is concerned, the PLAN is already active in terms of the naval mission of *presence*—that is, of sending naval units on long voyages to extend diplomatic reach and spread the nation's influence. Another blue water capability is represented in China's sea based ICBM force, limited though it is.

Figure 6.3: Major PLA Naval Forces




Source's Department of Defense 2006 PRC Report

According to China's maritime doctrine, there are two combat models: the first is the independent employment of naval power, and the second is that of joint operations with other services, particularly the army. According to the first model, the navy's role is to project power into areas far from home waters, most likely in the form of strategic independent campaigns against the enemy's fleets or land targets. Under the second model, the PLAN's primary mission is defensive—to engage enemy ships in coastal waters—but the navy also has an offensive role, to assist the army and air force in amphibious operations. At present, the PLAN is limited in scope to missions of the second model, and has accordingly developed a light fleet. Ultimately, though, the goal is to fulfill the first model.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p.107.

In combat terms, the PLAN is restricted to offshore-water defense, mostly at the campaign level. In other words, although the Chinese naval strategy envisages, on paper, a global reach in the future, for the present it emphasizes the strategic or tactical deployment of naval power. This emphasis limits strategic objectives, weapons acquisition, and battle planning. More importantly, the PLAN's maritime strategy is reflected in the combat models that actually guide the navy's modernization.²⁵⁵

Figure 6.4: South China Sea Territorial Claims



Source: Middlebury Education, 1/1/2002 <http://www.middlebury.edu/southchinasea>

To project military power and have the capability to seriously contest control of the seas adjacent to the Chinese coast and the Indian Ocean, China would have to possess a “blue water” navy. For China to develop a modern regional navy, it would either have to build the fleet itself; or buy the ships and aircraft entirely from other countries; or import a small

²⁵⁵ Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors”, *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 1 (Winter 2004), p.106

number of advanced weapons and platforms, disassemble them, reverse engineer them, and mass produce them.²⁵⁶

Could China develop and build a regional blue water navy before 2010? The answer is no. The Chinese defense industry produces weapons systems decades behind the developed countries of the West. Additionally, China lacks a pool of educated citizens with the technical and engineering backgrounds necessary to build the infrastructure or design the specifications to produce a power projection navy by 2010.²⁵⁷

6.3.1. China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions

The importance of the aircraft carriers was underlined by the naval academy's president, Admiral Yao:

“Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers as the symbols of a country's important deterrent power have been accorded more attention. For some historical reasons, China has not yet built aircraft carriers. But the Academy must look forward and train experts needed for the carriers. As the building process is long we simply cannot afford to dig wells after becoming thirsty.”²⁵⁸

Aircraft carriers are perceived as potent symbols of national power around the world, and China is no different. The memory of the “Century of Humiliation” (1842–1949), when European countries, Russia, and Japan forced a weakened China to grant territorial concessions and then divided the country into competing spheres of influence, still has a deep resonance among the Chinese people. The Chinese see a powerful navy, capable of projecting power into the world's oceans, as an important tool to prevent China from being “bullied” again by outside powers.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ Christopher D. Yung, “People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century” , (Alexandria, VA: **Center for Naval Analyses**, March 1996), p. 1.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁵⁸ Shen Lijiang, “The Mysterious Course of the Pilot Warship Captains,” **Jianchuan Zhishi**, no. 7 (1989), p. 6.

²⁵⁹ Ian Storey and You Ji, “China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors”, **Naval War College Review** 57, no. 1 (Winter 2004), p.93.

From the mid-1980s onward foreign analysts could agree only that China was committed to learning as much as possible about aircraft carriers. In 1985 China purchased the former Australian *HMAS Melbourne* (built in 1943 as Britain's *HMS Majestic*), and then in 1998, purchased the former Soviet Pacific Fleet ASW carrier *Minsk*, and then the *Kiev*, and then was reported to have purchased the former Soviet/Ukrainian large-deck carrier *Varyag* 1998 for \$20 million.²⁶⁰ In the meantime China was reported to have purchased Russian plans for the *Kiev* class and in 1996 reportedly tried to purchase the then just retired French carrier *Clemenceau*²⁶¹

The PLA, especially the PLAN, now seems almost wholly, even obsessively, focused on the Taiwan problem. Two other factors should be taken into account, however, and already seem to be intruding into Chinese strategic thinking. First, an emerging China wants to build a military appropriate to the country that it is becoming. Second, China's all-important national economic growth, which keeps the Communist Party in power, is dependent on ocean commerce. As the PLA Navy tries to look beyond Taiwan or to decide what, even now, it should be thinking about besides that, it sees a long-term capability to secure sea and land routes for the flow of oil and natural gas, as well as other commodities, as a leading priority for China.²⁶²

A PLA Navy able to carry out that mission would almost certainly have some form of organic air, so that it could effectively operate beyond the range of land-based aircraft—far south in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, even to the Indian Ocean. Current shipyard work on the incomplete aircraft carrier *Varyag* may be the start of a move in that direction, unlike so many Chinese aircraft-carrier rumors of past decades.²⁶³

China has been interested in the concept of aircraft carriers since the early 1980s, when Admiral Liu Huaqing advocated the acquisition of such vessels as part of his blue-water navy aspirations. With the retirement of Liu in 1997, however, the aircraft carrier lost its champion in the Chinese navy. At the same time, the need to control the South China Sea

²⁶⁰ Bruce Gilley, "Flying Start" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (March 11, 1999), p. 24.

²⁶¹ Nayan Chanda, "No Cash Carrier", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (October 10, 1996), p. 20.

²⁶² Eric A. McVadon, "China's Maturing Navy", *Naval War College Review*, (Spring 2006), Vol. 59, No. 2, p.102.

²⁶³ *ibid.*, p.103.

as a strategic priority was downgraded as reunification with Taiwan hurtled to the top of Beijing's agenda. In that context, given the relative closeness of Taiwan and improvements in the capabilities of the Chinese air force and missile arsenal, aircraft carriers are not now considered vital. Moreover, the costs associated with building and operating aircraft carriers, the technical difficulties involved, and the likely adverse reaction of neighboring countries all argue against a Chinese carrier battle group for the moment.²⁶⁴

6.4. PLA AIRFORCES PLAAF

“We should build an Air Force capable of both offensive and defensive operations with Chinese characteristics”.²⁶⁵ Ziang Zemin

China's Air Force, known as the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), is in a crucial transition period, as it changes from an obsolescent giant to a modern force prepared to fight local, limited wars under high-tech conditions. The PLAAF is slowly moving from a defensive force dominated by 1950s vintage combat aircraft with short legs and limited all-weather intercept capabilities to an offensive-oriented force with extended range and greater lethality. While new aircraft like the J-10, J-11 (Su-27), and Su-30 are gradually introduced into the force, older aircraft like the J-7 and J-8 are being modified with better avionics and air-to-air missiles to bridge the gap. The new combat aircraft force of the 21st century will be controlled by airborne early warning aircraft, refueled by tankers, and supported by electronic countermeasure and intelligence collection aircraft.²⁶⁶

There is no simple description of the PLAAF's operational capabilities. The PLAAF is in the process of modernizing, but it still has a long way to go. Parts of the PLAAF are clearly obsolete, yet other parts have the most modern, sophisticated aircraft, SAMs, and software. The key to the PLAAF's modernization is integrating all of the different components,

²⁶⁴ *ibid.*,p.90.

²⁶⁵ Oliver Chou, “President Calls for Hi-Tech push by Air Force,” **South China Morning Post**, (March 3), 1999.

²⁶⁶ *ibid.*,p.190.

including its branches and new and old weapon systems, into a single operational unit within

the PLAAF and with the rest of the PLA as a whole. As one China watcher recently stated, “It is not just a matter of the glass being half empty or half full, because the glass is getting bigger.”²⁶⁷

The PLA has been shifting over the past 20 years from continental defense in depth to peripheral defense and maritime force projection, and from a ground-force dominated approach to war, to a multi-service joint operations doctrine. In conceptualizing the battlefield, the PLA has shifted from a two-dimensional concept, where the ground war was the central focus, to a multidimensional battle space, where space and cyberspace play roles as important as the traditional air-land-sea dimensions. The PLA has faced the major difficulty of the absence of any period of stability in which it could complete the organizational, training, and logistics changes required to implement a revised strategy and operational doctrine.²⁶⁸

One analyst claims that China’s difficulties in maintaining advanced technology result in part from poor manufacturing processes. Lacking the tight tolerances required to manufacture identical parts, PRC aircraft are literally one of a kind. “The implication is that there is no interchangeability of parts between two unique airframes of the same type of aircraft. This can be a tremendous maintenance headache involving grounding of aircraft in case of even minor under service abilities until inoperative parts are repaired or replacements manufactured to tailor-made specifications.”²⁶⁹

²⁶⁷ Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Operations And Modernization”, **People’s Liberation Army After Next**, Ed: Susan M. Puska, (August 2000, SSI), p.233.

²⁶⁸ Paul H.B. Godwin, “Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” presented at the 1999 CAPS-RAND PLA Conference, pp. 7, 43.

²⁶⁹ Sachdev. A.K., “Modernization of the Chinese Air Force”, **Strategic Analysis**, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, (September 1999)

Table 6.1: Comparison of Key PLAAF Systems with Other Key Systems

	PRC	Taiwan	Japan	U.S. Air Forces in Asia		
				CVBG*	Korea* *	Japan
Modern Fighters/Attack Aircraft	48 Su-27	150 F-16 130 IDF 60Mirages 2000	160 F-15 J/DJ	14 F-14 36 F/A-18C/D	72 F-16	36 F-16 54 F15 C/D
AAMs	AA-10 AA-11	AIM-9J/P Matra Mica Sky sword I/II	AIM-7 AIM-9	AIM-7 AIM-9 AIM-54 AIM-120	AIM-9 AIM-120	AIM-7 AIM-9 AIM-120
AEW/AWACS	0	4 E-2T	10 E2-C 4 E-3	4 E-2C	0	2 E-3
EW	0	2 C-130HE 2 cc-47	EP-3 1 EC-1 10 YS-11E	4 EA-6B	0	0
Aerial Refueling	~10	0	0	2KS-3B	0	
Long Range SAMs Missiles/launchers (estimates)	SA-10 256-384/64-96	Patriot 24-6 I-Hawk 240-78 Sky Bow 465/115	Patriot 128/32 I-Hawk 200/66	0	0	0

* Yokosuka, Japan, is home port for 1 U.S. aircraft carrier, 6 surface combatants.

**U.S. Aircraft in Korea can self-deploy without refueling to Japan.

Source: *The Military Balance 1999-2000*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Table 6.1. compares the key platforms in the inventories of the PRC, Taiwan, Japan, and U.S. air forces stationed in the region. This table illustrates that Taiwan, for instance, has seven times more modern fighter aircraft than does the PRC. (Taiwan and Japan also have AEW and EW forces which the PLA does not. The implications of the PLA's deficiency in this regard will be discussed below.) Disregarding arguments about the Su-27's technological capabilities and assuming a rough parity between the Su-27 and modern Western fighter aircraft, the numerical inequity between the PRC's modern fighters (48)

and Taiwan's modern air force (340 fighters) brings into question the PLAAF's ability to mount effective offensive action in this scenario. However, a force of about 48 Su-27s is enough to make a tangible impact on the PRC's ability to conduct defensive operations, especially when integrated with modern air defenses.²⁷⁰

In summary, modern aerial refueling, AEW/AWACS, and electronic warfare capabilities strongly influence the effectiveness of overall offensive and defensive air operations. China's attempts to acquire these capabilities implicitly underscore their value. Until the PLA Air Force has effective aerial refueling, AEW, and EW capabilities, it will have difficulty flying its Russian-design fighter aircraft against modern air defenses or using its air defenses against attacking air forces.²⁷¹

Many analysts criticize China's pilot training. They note that pilots spend too few hours in the cockpit and that the training they do undergo does not adequately prepare them for real combat. The PLA Air Force's Su-27 pilots have flown just 60- 100 hours per year.²⁷² This figure is well below the NATO standard and just barely enough training to ensure that the pilots can operate the aircraft safely.²⁷³ Moreover, after losing several Su-27s to training accidents, each Su-27 aircraft is flown only about 10 hours monthly.²⁷⁴ This lack of training affects not only the fighter pilots but the quality of the whole PLA Air Force.

While there is consensus that PLA pilot training is not match with Western standards, it is unclear how far behind they really are and how long it will take China to catch up. For instance, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified in January 2000 that China has made improvements in its pilot training program that have resulted in much greater proficiency.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ Shirley A. Kan, "China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis", **CRS Report** for Congress, (10 2000), p.33.

²⁷¹ *ibid.*, p.42.


²⁷² Allen, Kenneth W., "PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment," in **Crisis in the Taiwan Strait**, edited by James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, (American Enterprise Institute and National Defense University Press 1997)

²⁷³ Mann, Paul, "U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China's for Decades." **Aviation Week & Space Technology**, (January 17, 2000)

²⁷⁴ Brodie, Jonathan, "China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships and Submarines," **Jane's Defense Weekly**, (December 22, 1999)

²⁷⁵ Wall, Robert, "CIA: China-Taiwan Clash Possible Soon," **Aviation Week & Space Technology**, (February 7, 2000)

Figure 6.5: Major Air Force Units



Source: USA Department of Defense, PRC Report 2006.

6.5. PLA NUCLEAR FORCES

Chairman Mao Zedong once said that nuclear weapons were “paper tigers”. As he later explained, this statement was meant to inspire the Chinese people’s morale and he did not mean that nuclear weapons were really merely paper tigers. His statement was mainly to

emphasize the fact that wars could not be won only with one or two advanced weapons. Mao Zedong had a clear understanding of nuclear weapons' effects. He said in 1970 that "though there still exists the possibility for major powers to fight world wars, the atomic bombs have prevented them from doing so." This shows that Mao understood the principle of nuclear deterrence.²⁷⁶

When Mao Zedong initially called on his people to develop nuclear weapons, he did, indeed, seem to be thinking primarily in terms of countering the nuclear forces of other countries. "We also need the atom bomb," Mao stated in 1956. "If our nation does not want to be intimidated, we have to have this thing."²⁷⁷

The Chinese decision-making group had clear-cut principles for nuclear force development in terms of quantity. Several leaders remarked time after time, "we need atom bombs and hydrogen bombs. But we only need a limited amount." It is no use to have many of them." Of course, these weapons must have a deterrent effect, and a certain number and survival of the nuclear weapons must be guaranteed. Premier Zhou Enlai once said regarding nuclear weapons that "the key does not lie with their quantity, rather, we need to have a minimum amount, quality and variety". In short, the key to having a credible nuclear deterrence is to guarantee an effective nuclear retaliatory capability. Just as Gen. Nie Rongzhen said, we "must have minimal retaliatory strike capability."²⁷⁸

Major General Wu Jianguo, has explicitly stated that his country may find nuclear weapons useful in local wars. Wu claims that Britain, America, and the Soviet Union used nuclear weapons to improve their positions in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War:

These countries threatened to use nuclear weapons in conventional wars because they believed that with nuclear weapons in hand, psychologically they would be able to hold a dominant position which would enhance troop morale and frighten the enemy on the one


²⁷⁶ Sun Xiangli, "Analysis of China's Nuclear Strategy" ,**China Security**, World Security Institute China Program, p.23.

²⁷⁷ Yang Huan, "China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons" in Pillsbury, **Chinese Views of Future Warfare**, p. 132.

²⁷⁸ *ibid.*,p.23.

hand, and restrict the enemy's use of some conventional means on the other, thus changing the direction of the war.²⁷⁹

Figure 6.6: Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles



Note: China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31 and DF-31A, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.

Source: Department of Defense 2005 PLA Report

The introduction of the road-mobile DF-31-series ICBMs will supplement China's silo based strategic force. The mobility of the new DF-31-class missiles will enable these systems to operate over a larger area, making them more difficult to locate and neutralize. The introduction of a new generation of SLBMs on China's new ballistic-missile submarine will provide an additional survivable nuclear option. Finally, replacement of the older, silo-based CSS-4 Mod 1 with the longer range CSS-4 Mod 2, coupled with the

²⁷⁹ Wu Jianguo, "Nuclear Shadows on High-Tech Warfare," in Pillsbury, *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, p. 142.

ongoing migration to mobile, solid-fueled systems will enhance the operational capabilities and survivability of China’s strategic missile force.²⁸⁰

Chinese officials continue to hint that their view of nuclear weapons is more pragmatic than documents like the Chinese White Paper might imply. According to one report, which may well be apocryphal, a PRC military officer once warned his American counterpart, “In the end you care a lot more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.”²⁸¹ Chinese military writings discuss the role of nuclear arms in deterring foreign threats, but they also portray these weapons as tools which China might use to achieve strategic objectives.

Table 6.2: China’s Missile Forces

China’s Missile Inventory Total	Launchers/ Missiles	Estimated Range
CSS-4 ICBM	20/20	8,460+ km
CSS-3 ICBM	10-14/20-24	5,470+ km
CSS-2 IRBM	6-10/14-18	2,790+ km
CSS-5 MRBM Mod 1/2	34-38/19-23	1,770+ km
JL-1 SLBM	10-14/10-14	1,770+ km
CSS-6 SRBM	70-80/230-270	600 km
CSS-7 SRBM	100-120/420-460	300 km
DF-31 ICBM	DEVELOPMENTAL	7,250+ km
DF-31A ICBM	DEVELOPMENTAL	11,270+ km

Source: Department of Defense 2005 PLA Report

²⁸⁰ Department of Defence 2005 Report, p.29.

²⁸¹ Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, **China, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment** (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), p. 29.

The US National Intelligence Council report summarizes the Chinese ballistic missile threat to the US as follows:²⁸²

- “Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a survivable long-range missile force that can hold a significant portion of the US population at risk in a retaliatory strike.
- China's current force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs can reach targets in all of the United States.
- Beijing also is developing two new road-mobile, solid propellant ICBMs.
- It conducted the first flight test of the mobile DF-31 ICBM in August 1999; we judge it will have a range of about 8,000 km and will be targeted primarily against Russia and Asia.
- We expect a test of a longer range mobile ICBM within the next several years; it will be targeted primarily against the United States.
- China is developing the JL-2 SLBM, which we expect to be tested within the next decade. The JL-2 probably will be able to target the United States from launch areas near China.
- By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted against the United States, having added a few tens of more survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads—in part influenced by US technology gained through espionage.
- China has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for 20 years. If China needed a multiple-RV (MRV) capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31-type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) 1 for the CSS-4 in a few years. MIRVing a future mobile missile would be many years off.
- China is also significantly improving its theater missile capabilities and is increasing the size of its SRBM force deployed opposite Taiwan.
- We assess that an unauthorized launch of a Chinese strategic missile is highly unlikely.”

The PRC's strategic nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of limited deterrence—the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy in a retaliatory strike. China's nuclear forces generally are believed to follow a counter value strategy that targets population centers.²⁸³

²⁸² National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015”, (September 1999 (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99)).

²⁸³ Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces In The Age of Global Missile defense: Challenges And Responses”, **China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives On Security, Ballistic Missiles, And Conventional Capabilities**, Ed. Andrew Scobell And Larry M. Wortzel, p.110.

Chinese authorities are undoubtedly as sincere as any other world leaders when they call for arms control and disarmament. Nevertheless, as long as nuclear weapons remain a fixture of international politics, one must assume that the PRC will attempt to extract the maximum possible advantage from its nuclear capabilities. Although Beijing may adjust its programs to account for its integration into global economic regimes, America's decision to deploy missile defenses, and similar issues, only an event of epochal proportions is likely to change the overall direction of its policy. Others must make their own plans accordingly.²⁸⁴

The PRC's nuclear policy has remained consistent for close to 40 years. If PRC leaders do not feel that their external environment has changed, they have few reasons to change that policy.²⁸⁵

6.6. CHINA'S FOREIGN CONFLICTS SINCE 1949

At the founding of the People's Republic China on the October 1, 1949, the People's Liberation Army was 5.5 million strong. China's enemies would change; the PLA's size, force structure, doctrine, equipment, and role in society would vary; and the balance between politics and professionalism would be constant source of tension within the PLA. However, in every test the Chinese military remained faithful to the Communist Party.²⁸⁶

6.6.1. Korean War

On June 25, 1950, Korean war began when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK). On June 27 1950 the South Korean army was defeated. On the same day United Nations asked member Countries to assist South Korea. President Truman ordered to deploy U.S. ground forces into Korea on June 30, 1950. This force was easily overrun by North Korean army. On September 1 1950 Mao

²⁸⁴ Thomas M. Kane, "Dragon or Dinosaur? Nuclear Weapons in a Modernizing China", *Parameters*, p.111.

²⁸⁵ *ibid.*

²⁸⁶ Dennis J. Blasko, *Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989*, David A Graff and Robin Higham ed. In *A Military History of China*, (Westview Press Colorado 2002), p.249.

Zedong publicly stated that China could not tolerate the invasion of a neighbor, to deter the U.S. forces from going into North Korea.

New U.S. forces successfully deployed Inchon by an amphibious operation and Seoul was captured on September 26. On October 7 U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel and Pyongyang was captured on October 19. China began to react this events by using Chinese People's Volunteers.(CPV). This force was consisting of light infantry and had begun crossing the Yalu River. The CPV moved at night and hide during day to cover its movements. On November 1, the CPV ambushed the U.S. forces at Unsan. The second CPV Campaign drove U.N. forces completely out of North Korea. As a result of third CPV campaign Seoul fell on January 4, 1951 and U.N: forces were pushed back to the 37th parallel.

The U.N. forces seized the initiative after the February 17 and Seoul was captured for a second time. The dismissal of MacArthur by Truman in April for seeking to promote all-out war against China with atomic weapons if necessary, encouraged a stalemate in Korea.²⁸⁷On June 4 1953 after the heavy fighting between 1951 and 1953 Chinese and North Koreans agreed to accept U.N. truce proposals and fighting ceased. The result of the war was a moral victory for PRC.

The Korean War alerted the PLA leadership to the “the importance of logistic[s]...in a modern war”²⁸⁸ and the need for major change. When China entered the war, logistics support to the operations was carried out under the policy of “self-reliance and basing ourselves on home supplies.”²⁸⁹ This policy, depending on the local population for food and the enemy for captured ammunition proved inadequate, outside China's borders.

6.6.2. Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958

The traditionalists argue that the Chinese leaders, particularly Mao Zedong,” needed” an external adventure to make a point to back up such domestic policies as the suppression of

²⁸⁷ Dan Van Dart, **Standard of Power**, (London 2001, Pimlico press), p.335.

²⁸⁸ Nie Rongzhen, translated by Zhong Renyi, **Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen**, (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), p. 645.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*,p.647

dissent, the Great Leap Forward Campaign, and the mass militia movement. The revisionists argue that Mao felt greatly threatened by U.S. actions in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan, and that the bombardment was simply a response to the external threat in the Taiwan Strait.²⁹⁰

On August 23 the, PLA began shelling nationalists hold island of Quemoy. The United States, send six aircraft carrier battle group to the area. Taiwan and PRC fought seven air battles between August 23 and the end of the October. In the end no invasion of Quemoy or Matsu island mounted. U.S. support continued to flow into Taiwan.

6.6.3. The Sino-Indian war

After driving Indian forces out of the area around the of Longju, China observed the McMahon line drawn in 1914 as the de facto border between Tibet and India's region of Assam.²⁹¹ China and India had clashed in October 1959 in the western sector of the border. In June 1962 a platoon of India moved about four miles north of the McMahon line to the Thagla Ridge, which India treated as the border.

On September 8 Chinese forces advanced on the Thagla Ridge, to press the Indians to withdraw. China also issued a diplomatic protest on September 16 complaining about the presence of the Indian troops. India argued that the Thagla Ridge was the dominant terrain feature and, therefore, should be the border. Indian forces was in logistically insupportable and militarily dangerous conditions while Chinese forces had better logistics and weapons as a result of a road system that would support heavy vehicles. Through September, there were skirmishes around the Thagla area and both sides took casualties. On the morning of October 29 China attacked the Thagla Ridge defeated Indian 7th Brigade and captured its commander. Along the Galwan River, the PLA launched attack against Indian forces in the Chap River valley. Meanwhile American supplies began to flow India. By November after pushing Indians back China had announced unilateral ceasefire. Indian casualties

²⁹⁰ Shu Guang Zhang, **Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958**, (Cornell University Press, London 1992), p.225.

²⁹¹ Brigadier J.P.Dalvi, **Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian war of 1962**, (Bombay: Thacker, 1969), pp.43-45.

were 1,383 death 1696 missing and 3968 captured by Chinese forces. Chinese losses were far lower. At the end of the war China took the control of the Aksai Chin Plateau.

6.6.4. The Zhanbao (Damansky) Island Clash

Damansky/Zhenbao is a half-kilometer by one-kilometer-long island on the Ussuri River, Which forms the boundary between China's Heilongjiang province and the primorye Krai or Maritime province of the Soviet Union, now Russia.²⁹²

A Major Clash broke out at Zhenbao Island on the Ussri River between the Cities of Khabarousk and Vladivostok. China maintained that the border between the two countries was the central line of the main channel, putting the island on the Chinese side. Moscow claimed that the Amur and Ussuri rivers of the Chinese banks were the border, which puts same 600 islands on the Russian side.

On March 2 1969 a Chinese patrol crossing the frozen river to the island was challenged by Russian soldiers. Chinese gun fire killed seven Russians and wounded twenty three. Chinese said Russians fired first. On March 4 and 12 Russians send reinforcements to the island and flew reconnaissance plane along the border. Then on March 15 Russians again tried to seize the island. Clashes continued through March 17 when both Russia and China deescalated the conflict. Tensions continued for several years.

Until Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's 1986 speech in Vladivostok, in which he proposed that the border should run along the main navigation channel, and suggested a fresh round of boundary negotiations. A working group of diplomatic and military experts from both sides was established in 1988 to demarcate the border, and the border was re-opened, the may 1991 agreement demarcated 98 percent of the boundary between China and Russia.²⁹³

²⁹² Chien-Peng Chung, **Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes**, (Routledge Press, London 2004), p.62.

²⁹³ **Ibid.**, p.61.

6.6.5. The Conquest of Paracel Islands

The seizure of the Paracels must be viewed as a means of developing a more active PLA navy and maritime role for China in the South China Sea. On January 11, 1974 PRC claimed that Paracels and the “ sea areas around them” belong to China. Chinese first began to move fishing vessels into the area. A common tactic when China is seeking to reinforce its maritime claims. On January 17 PLA navy with air support overwhelmed the Vietnam’s naval forces in two days. 600 PLA troops had landed and taken control of the Paracels. This action was the first time China used military force after improved relations with USA.

In January 1972 U.S. took no action and Vietnam was not in a position to react either. The Paracel Islands operation of 1974 is notable because its the only PLA’s amphibious operation involving the projection of troops across any distance which also show that when there is a window of opportunity over disputed areas around China, Chinese do not miss their chances.

China’s military confrontation with Vietnam in January 1974 resulted in the annexation of the Paracel Islands, and another clash between the two countries in March 1988 allowed China to secure six islets in Spratly archipelago. In March 1998 China installed a ground satellite station on Woody Island within the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.²⁹⁴

6.6.6. The “Self-Defense Counter Attack” against Vietnam

Between 1978 and 1979 Vietnamese military forces began operations in Cambodia to drive the Chinese-supported leader Pol-Pot from power. In response to Vietnam’s operations China complained about series of violations along the Sino-Vietnamese border. China’s intention was, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, to “teach Vietnam a lesson” it would not soon forget.²⁹⁵The PLA moved main field force armies to north of the Vietnamese border.

²⁹⁴ Duk-ki Kim, **Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geo- Strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects**, (Frank Cass Publishers, London 2000), p.68.

²⁹⁵ Henry J. Kenny, Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 war with China, in,David Michael. Finkelstein, Mark A Ryan, Michael A. McDevitt,**Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949**,(New York 2003, CNA press) p.217.

Divisions moved by rail under cover of night. Their numbers were between thirty and forty. At the same time China made preparations to defend the north against any potential Soviet counter attack. Because Moscow and Hanoi had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in November 1978

On February 17 1979 Chinese forces attacked across the Vietnamese border. Vietnamese had responded by attacking the Chinese military build up. Chinese aim was to punish Vietnam. But after very heavy resistance, Chinese forces halted and began an orderly withdrawal that was completed by March 17, 1979. Vietnamese claimed to have killed or wounded 42,000 Chinese which is probably the actual outcome.

Regardless of great efforts made to destroy Vietnamese main forces, the planned large-unit operations had to revert to small-unit guerrilla warfare, with occasional surges of regular military action, in which Vietnamese troops harassed Chinese formations and inflicted heavy casualties on them.²⁹⁶

In this war the PLA units suffered from poor command and control, poor logistics, and lack of ability to coordinate large formations on the battlefield. After this experience PLA began to discuss restructuring its group armies and restoring a rank structure to facilitate battlefield command and control. PLA began focus on combined arms operations to coordinate its infantry armor, artillery and engineers. The PLA also sought to develop rapid reaction forces and to reorganize its logistics structure.

²⁹⁶Jianxiang Bi, The PLA'S Revolution in Operational Art: Retrospects and Prospects,in. Thierry Gongora, Harald Von Riekhoff, **Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defence and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century**, (Greenwood Press London 2000), p.111.

Figure 6.7: Major Wars in Chinese History





Figure 6.8: Frequency of Wars in Chinese History



7. CHINA'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

China's defense industries are producing a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the short-term, would enhance China's capabilities in a possible conflict over Taiwan and China's long-term military position in Asia. Chinese government has been substantially increasing its reported military spending, especially on defense procurement.

Reported increases in expenditures have been matched by purchases of more and better weaponry, most of which is manufactured by Chinese enterprises. These weapon systems reflect improvements in the technological capabilities of China's defense manufacturing base. China has a growing pool of technical talent in its civilian sector whom Beijing is now attracting to work in the defense sector. The government is also making a concerted effort to reform the institutional framework of the defense industry.

As China's economic and resource base expands, Beijing has three paths by which to translate these economic achievements into improved military capabilities. The first is to produce all the weapons domestically to equip the country's military. The second is to purchase major weapons from the high-tech military equipment manufacturers of the world. A third path combines these two approaches by trying to improve domestic manufacturing processes and military equipment designs to produce better quality weapons at home while importing weaponry that domestic manufacturers are not yet capable of producing. Since the 1990s China has been following the third path, improving domestic industry while purchasing advanced weapon systems from abroad, mostly from Russia and Israel.

7.1. CHINA'S DEFENCE BUDGET

At the top of the system, the Party leadership in the Politburo Standing Committee, the rump Politburo, and the Central Committee set overall strategic guidelines and direction for the country, including the importance of military funding relative to other national priorities, such as economic modernization. On the right side of the figure are the civilian governmental organs, headed by the State Council under the leadership of China's prime

minister. While many government bodies have responsibilities for oversight and management of parts of the financial and economic system (collectively known as the “national finance apparatus,” or *guojia caizheng*), the Ministry of Finance has “budget responsibility” (*yusuan baogan*) for developing the national budget, and “leads and administrates . . . defense expenditure and assets”²⁹⁷

The General Logistics Department’s (GLD’s) Finance Department is “the CMC’s highest money management organ” and the “army’s functional department” (*jundui zhineng bumen*) for money management (*licai*). It is responsible for²⁹⁸


- organizing and guiding the Army’s implementation of the Party and government’s financial policies
- formulating the military’s financial laws and regulations
- producing the total annual military budget and financial accounting for civilian ministries
- organizing and overseeing military accounting work
- guiding economic production work
- managing funds for “strategic material stores” (*zhanlue wuzi chubei*) and overseeing “circulating funds” (*zhouzhuanjin*)
- setting military industrial product prices
- organizing wartime finance work
- organizing financial personnel training and evaluating technologies for financial work
- supervising financial investigations of lower-level units

The overall PLA budget organization system is summarized in Figure below:

²⁹⁷ Keith Crane , Roger Cliff , Evan Medeiros James Mulvenon , William Overholt, **Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints**, MG260, (RAND 2005),p.96.


²⁹⁸ Ibid.

Figure 7.1: The PLA Budgeting Organizational System



Source: RAND MG260


Figure 7.2: Chinese Official Defense Budget, 1978-2003



Source: RAND MG260

1997, the official budget has been divided roughly equally among personnel, operations and maintenance, and equipment at one-third apiece, based on data on internal breakdowns revealed in the 1998, 2000, and 2002 *Defense White Papers* (Figure 4.8). Compared with other militaries, the PLA spends a relatively smaller amount of its total budget on personnel costs, although the large demobilizations since the early 1980s have undoubtedly suppressed sharp increases in human resource expenditures.

Figure 7.3: Changing Priorities in the Official PLA Budget, 1997-2002




SOURCE: *China's National Defense* in 1998, 2002. *Defense White Paper*, 1998, 2000, 2002.

From the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping initiated reform of China's planned economy, until recently, China's defense industries led a troubled existence. Government procurement of military goods declined dramatically following the adoption of Deng's "Four Modernizations Policy" which placed the military as the last priority. As a result, many defense enterprises were officially encouraged to convert their facilities to the production of nonmilitary goods or engage in arms sales to generate income to replace dwindling government purchases of military equipment. Many firms soon became dependent on these alternate sources of income for their very survival.

In his speech to the 15th Party Congress in October 1997, Jiang offered a dire warning against corruption in the PLA, and urged to preserve "the nature, true colour, and work

style of the people’s army”. It was followed in July 1998 by a terse order whereby Jiang Zemin called for the dissolution of the military-business complex. This divestiture, since then, has drained some of the potential swamp in which military corruption previously festered. To compensate for the financial losses, the PLA was promised liberal budgetary grants. Thus, during the period 2000-2005, the official defense budget rose by more than two times.²⁹⁹


Figure 7.4: Western Estimates of Actual Chinese Military Expenditures



Sources: Wang Shaoguang, “The Military Expenditure of China, 1989–98,” *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Department of Defense, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2002), 2, accessed at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf>>; Richard A. Bitzinger and Chong-Pin Lin, *The Defense Budget of the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, 1994); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “China’s Military Expenditures,” *The Military Balance 1995/96* (London: IISS, 1995), 270–275; David Shambaugh, “World Military Expenditure,” *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2000); Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., *Long Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994–2015: The United States and Asia* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).

²⁹⁹ Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “The Political Economy of China’s Defence Modernisation”, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Oct-Dec 2005), p.693

Figure 7.5: Chinese Defense Budgets and Estimates of Total Related Expenditures



Source: Pentagon's 2006 China Report

7.2. PLA DEFENSE INDUSTRY

China possesses one of the oldest, largest, and most diversified military-industrial complexes in the developing world: an agglomeration of around 1,000 enterprises employing some three million workers, including 300,000-plus engineers and technicians. Moreover, China is one of the few countries in the developing world to produce a full range of military equipment including small arms, armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, warships, submarines, and nuclear weapons.

But China's military-industrial complex suffers from a number of shortcomings. It is one of the most technologically backwards defense industries; until recently, most indigenously developed weapons systems were at least 20 years behind the West – basically comparable to 1970s or 1980s-era technology – and quality control was consistently poor. Similarly, China's defense research and development (R&D) base was long viewed to be deficient in several critical areas, including aeronautics, propulsion (such as jet engines),

microelectronics, computers, avionics, sensors and seekers, electronic warfare, and advanced materials. Furthermore, the Chinese have traditionally been weak in the area of systems integration – that is, the ability to design and develop a piece of military equipment that integrates hundreds or even thousands of disparate components and subsystems and have it to function effectively as a single unit. Consequently, China's defense industry has often experienced difficulties "translating theory and design into reliable weapon systems."³⁰⁰

Finally, China's military-industrial complex has long functioned under an organizational and managerial culture that, in a manner typical of most state-owned enterprises (SOEs), was often highly centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and risk-averse.³⁰¹

The economic achievements of China in the last two decades have led to an overall improvement in the modernization and combat capability of the PLA. After 1985, the PLA has been trimmed time and again, in 1987-89, in 1997 when its strength was further reduced by 500,000, and another reduction of 200,000 was announced in 2003. Simultaneously, the military regions have also been reduced from 11 to 7. Apparently, these steps are aimed at transforming the PLA from a numerically superior to a qualitatively superior military, and from manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive force.³⁰²

Two major national development programs have been enacted. One is the National High Technology Development Program (also called the 863 program because it was initiated in March, 1986), focused on biotechnology, space technology, information technology, laser technology, automation technology, energy, and advanced materials. The second is the Torch program, focused on commercialization of government sponsored research. This program is concentrating on new materials, microelectronics and information, energy, biotechnology, and electromechanical devices. The two programs are directed by the State


³⁰⁰ Mark A. Stokes, **China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States** (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 136.

³⁰¹ Harlan Jencks, "COSTIND is Dead, Long Live COSTIND! Restructuring China's Defense Scientific, Technical, and Industrial Sector," in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., **The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age** (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 62.

³⁰² Bhartendu Kumar Singh, The Political Economy of China's Defence Modernisation, **Strategic Analysis**, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Oct-Dec 2005), p.693

Science and Technology Commission and by COSTIND. The 863 and the Torch programs are a part of a larger reform intended to revitalize China's scientific base.³⁰³ The reforms include partially commercializing scientific institutes by making them responsible for generating a portion of their operating revenues.³⁰⁴

Figure 7.6: Organizational Structure of Chinese Defense Industries



MBI = Machine Building Industry.

Source: RAND MG260

The Chinese government has recognized the problems of its defense industrial complex and, during the 1980s and 1990s, made attempts to reform it. These efforts relied mainly on two strategies: defense conversion, and institutional reorganization. Similar to China's

³⁰³ Ronald D. Humble, "Science, Technology, and China's Defence Industrial Base," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (January 1992), pp. 6-8.

³⁰⁴ W. Frieman, "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, editors, *China's Military Faces the Future*, (M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1999), pp. 247-267.

experience with defense conversion, institutional reorganization was largely a cosmetic and ineffective pathway to reforming China's defense production capabilities. The government frequently changed the names of enterprises and institutions and shuffled organizational responsibilities, but it did not change the situation very much.

China continues to rely heavily on foreign design inputs for most advanced and complex systems. Today's defense industrial base is comprised of two distinct elements— over 2000 ministries and corporations organized under the State Council, and Chinese military industries reporting directly to the People's Liberation Army.³⁰⁵

In 1982 a new Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for Defense (COSTIND) was created to oversee armaments development, production, and procurement. This combined the functions of three earlier organizations in order to promote greater rationality in the armament process.³⁰⁶ COSTIND has responsibility for the overall armaments research, development, and production program, for setting requirements for new systems with the research institutes, and for coordinating among the production factories.³⁰⁷

7.3. CHINA'S ARMSALES

In terms of quantity, while China had consistently ranked among the top five arms exporters to the developing world since the early 1950s, it steadily augmented its market share especially beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the onset of the Cambodian civil war, the war in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war. According to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China quadrupled its share of exports to the developing world, rising from a 1.8 percent share over the period 1970 to 1979 to gain nearly 8.0 percent of the market by 1990. If measured in terms of contracted value (rather than actual transfers), China had by 1990 risen to become the world's third largest exporter to the developing world. In reaching these

³⁰⁵ John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries", *The China Quarterly*, (June, 1996), p.403.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

³⁰⁷ W. Frieman, "China's Defence Industries," *Pacific Review*, 1993, p. 54.

heights, China paralleled the spectacular increase overall in arms exports to the developing world from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s.³⁰⁸

The Chinese military earns foreign exchange from arms sales abroad that, in turn, are invested in Chinese military modernization efforts. There can be little doubt that the profit motive was an important factor driving the PRC to supply the combatants in the Iran-Iraq War. With the receipt of foreign exchange being the key element to China's modernization efforts and ultimately, to China's security strategy profitable arms exports to Iran and Iraq were promoted.³⁰⁹

With the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the beginnings of the Cambodian peace process in Southeast Asia, Chinese arms exports—like those for many other suppliers—fell precipitously. Beginning in the 1990s and throughout the decade, China's arms exports experienced gradual and sustained shifts in volume, recipients, and the types of weapons sold.³¹⁰

Demand for the high-tech systems in the 1990s had negative effect on China's viability as a major exporter of conventional weapons. During the late 1990s, China's arms exports generated a fraction of the income compared to previous years and China's share of the developing world arms market declined. China signed few new contracts for major weapons systems, with its traditional clients, facing difficulties in penetrating new markets. China also cancelled some large deals in response to Western opposition.

Despite the declining volume of Chinese arms exports, China's shrinking market share, and the possibility that its arms exports control process will become rational and effective, Chinese arms transfers will continue to be an issue of concern for western policymakers in the coming years. China's past willingness to introduce certain military products such as cruise missiles and ballistic missile technologies into regions like the Middle East and


³⁰⁸ Evan S. Medeiros, Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players, And Process", **Strategic Studies Institute**, (August 2000), p.2.

³⁰⁹ R. Bates Gill, **Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 92.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.5.


South Asia show that Chinese arms exports will remain of interest to western, policy analysts, and military planners. Over the years, China has established strong political and technical relationships with the some of the developing countries which can easily facilitate continued and possibly upgraded arms exports to those regions.

Figure 7.7: Chinese Revenue from Arms Sales



SOURCE: Grimmett, 2002.


Figure 7.8: CRS and SIPRI Data on China’s World Arms Transfers



Source: U.S. Congress Research Service

China is a relatively minor player in the global arms market. Figure 7.7 shows that revenue in the 1990s ranged from \$700 million to \$1200 million per year. The main customers have been developing nations, including Iran, Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand. The revenue from these sales goes primarily to defense-industrial firms of China.

Figure 7.9: Total World Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1990-1998



Source: U.S. Congress Research Service

Table 6.3: China and International/Multilateral Nonproliferation Treaties/Regimes

International Treaties and Negotiations	Multilateral Export Control Regimes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), March 1992 • Supported the indefinite extension of the NPT, May 1995 • Signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), September 1996 • Signed and ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol in 2002 (the only nuclear weapons state to do so) • Signed on to the Latin American Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (1973); South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (1987); Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (1996); Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (1999) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 • Joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997 • Applied for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in January 2004 and was accepted into the NSG in May 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signed the Geneva Protocols in 1952 • Signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984 • Signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), January 1993; • Ratified the CWC and joined the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as a founding member, April 1997 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issued domestic regulations on exports of chemical, biological and dual-use items with control list similar to that maintained by the Australia Group (1995-2002) • Consultation with the Australia Group
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in but later withdrew from the P-5 talks on Middle East Arms control, 1991-92 • Participated in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms from 1993 to 1997 • Signed the Inhumane Weapons Convention in 1981 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultation with the Wassenaar Arrangement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1983 • Participated in the negotiation of but did not sign on to the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pledged to abide by the original 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines in February 1992 • Agreed in the October 1994 US-China joint statement to adhere to the MTCR and agreed to apply the concept of “inherent capability” to its missile exports • U.S.-China official talks during 1997-1998 on China’s possible membership in the MTCR • Consultation with the MTCR on membership; bid not successful at the October 2004 plenary meeting

Sources: Adapted from Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, updated 2004) <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm>>; database compiled by the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies <<http://nti.org.db.china>>.

Table 6.4: Evolution of China’s Export Control Systems since the 1990s

SECTORS	LAWS AND REGULATIONS
General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign Trade Law, 1994
Chemical, Biological & Dual-Use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulations on Chemical Export Controls, December 1995 • Supplement to the December 1995 regulations, March 1997 • A ministerial circular (executive decree) on strengthening chemical export controls, August 1997 • Decree No.1 of the State Petroleum and Chemical Industry Administration (regarding chemical export controls), June 1998 [Note: These regulations have expanded the coverage of China’s chemical export controls to include dual-use chemicals covered by the Australia Group] • Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies and Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, October 2002 • Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies and Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, October 2002
Nuclear & Dual-Use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Circular on Strict Implementation of China’s Nuclear Export Policy, May 1997 • Regulations on Nuclear Export Control, September 1997 (Note: The control list included in the 1997 regulations is identical to that used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to which China is not a member) • Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Nuclear Goods and Related Technologies, June 1998 • Amended Nuclear Export Control List, June 2001
Military & Dual-Use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulations on Control of Military Products Export, October 1997 • The Procedures for the Management of Restricted Technology Export, November 1998 (Note: The new regulations cover 183 dual-use technologies, including some on the Wassenaar Arrangement’s “core list” of dual-use technologies) • China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economics Cooperation (MOFTEC) released a Catalogue of Technologies which are Restricted or Banned in China, presumably also in late 1998 • Decision of the State Council and the Central Military Commission on amending the PRC Regulations on Control of Military Product Exports, October 2002
Ballistic Missiles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List, August 2002

Sources: Adapted from database compiled by the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies <<http://www.nti.org/db/china>>.

7.4. CHINA'S SPACE INDUSTRY

China's emphasis on space technology has serious implications, for the international community. The PRC's space program began in the 1950s, initially serving to promote the party ideology. Space technology is a major political symbol of Chinese nationalism, an important economic sector, and an effective dual-use technology collaborator with the Chinese military. Thus the program is now more important than ever before to China.

In 2001 Zhang Houying, human spaceflight application system commander at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said that "by developing a human space flight program, China can aggrandize its national prestige as well as military prowess."³¹¹

The world's first rockets were invented in ancient China, but the initiation of the PRC's space program required some early, albeit short-lived, technical assistance from the Soviet Union. The first modern Chinese-built spacecraft was launched in 1960. Following this launch, the Chinese space program had many ambitious plans, including putting a Chinese astronaut into space as early as 1973. However, the program suffered from the country's many political upheavals, including the Cultural Revolution. The PRC's first satellite, the DFH-1, was not launched until 1970 and did little more than transmit China's Communist anthem, "The East Is Red." In 1978 the PRC announced that it was working on a manned space capsule and a Skylab-type space station, but by 1981 these projects had been cancelled, reportedly for being too expensive.³¹²

Beijing views U.S. military power in the Pacific as an obstacle to China's aspiration of becoming the dominant regional power or a superpower. Beijing is modernizing and expanding China's military capabilities not only to keep an increasingly independent Taiwan under pressure, but also to effectively deny the U.S. military the ability to operate against China or its interests in Asia. Chinese planners have realized that area-denial operations require the conduct of space-based surveillance and the other benefits of space technology.

³¹¹ Sibing He, "Space Official in Beijing Reveals Dual Purpose of Shenzhou", **Space Daily**, (Mar. 7, 2003)

³¹² William S. Murray III and Robert Antonellis, China's Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon (and Us), **Orbis**, (Fall 2003), p.646.

By 1985, China's space launch technology had improved enough that it began to enter the commercial space market and, with technical assistance from the United States, developed some reliable space launch and satellite recovery capabilities. This path proved to be so successful that, by October 2000, China had developed and launched dozens of satellites, with a flight success rate of over 90 percent—making China only the fifth country or group of countries in the world (after the United States, Russia, the European Space Agency, and Japan) capable of developing and launching geo-stationary telecommunications satellites independently, and only the third country (after the United States and Russia) to utilize satellite recovery technology.³¹³

On Wednesday, 15 October 2003 China launched the *Shenzhou 5* and its first astronaut (*taikonaut*) into orbit, joining the USA and Russia in the exclusive club of countries that have carried out manned missions into Space. According to American analysts, national prestige and pride are the main motivations of this (very expensive) program, of which China has emphasized the indigenous nature, although it could not have been achieved without Russian assistance. But for the Chinese it is more than simply symbolic: it is a reaction to China's new-found awareness that Space is important for the future of military operations (in relation to the US Revolution in Military Affairs) and is a domain from which China cannot remain excluded.³¹⁴

According to Richard Fisher of The Jamestown Foundation, the People's Liberation Army is aware that the “control of space” concept - as theorized by the US military - is an objective that China must achieve: “China needs to be able to deny to the United States access and use of space, as they themselves exploit space to support their own forces”.³¹⁵

³¹³ *ibid.*, p.646.

³¹⁴ Gabriele Garibaldi, “The Chinese Threat to American Leadership in Space”, *Security Dialogue*, (July 20, 2004), p.3.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3.

Table 6.5: China’s Space Program Time Line

1955—American missile expert Qian Xuesen returns to China
1960—China launches first indigenously manufactured rocket
1970—PRC launches Dong Fang Hong-1, its first Earth satellite
1975—PRC launches first remote sensing satellite, FSW-0
1985—China offers first commercial launch services
1992—Jiang Zemin approves Project 921, PRC manned spaceflight program
1993—PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian visits Russia’s Star City, inaugurating bilateral space cooperation
1999— <i>Shenzhou 1</i> prototype initiates active testing stage of manned space program
2000— <i>Beidou 1</i> , first PRC navigation satellite, launched
2003— <i>Shenzhou 5</i> launches Lt. Col. Yang Liwei, China’s first astronaut

Sources: Brian Harvey, *China’s Space Program—From Conception to Manned Spaceflight* (New York: Springer-Praxis, 2004) pp. 323– 328; Globalsecurity.org.

China has recently partnered with the European Union (EU) on the Galileo navigation satellite system being developed by the EU as an alternative to the American Global Positioning System (GPS). China has committed approximately \$259 million in hard currency to this project, a system that is worrisome for Washington even without Chinese involvement because of its potential to interfere technically with GPS. Signing on to Galileo early gives China a stakeholder position, and it will be working with EU countries on both technical and manufacturing aspects of the program. Clearly, China is taking a two-track approach to space matters: discouraging international activity in space weapons while actively pursuing countermeasures and options of their own.³¹⁶

³¹⁶ Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Wei Qi, The Launch of *Shenzhou V*, *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2004, Vol. LVII, No. 2, p.123.

7.4.1 China's ASAT Weapons

China's apparent success in destroying one of its own orbiting satellites on January 11-2007 with a ballistic missile signals that its rising military intends to contest U.S. supremacy in space. The test of an anti-satellite weapon, was perceived by experts as China's most provocative military action since it test fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan more than a decade ago. Unlike the Taiwan exercise, the main target this time was the U.S.A., the superpower in space.

With energetic diplomacy and generous aid policies, Chinese officials have used soft power strategy recent years to present their country as a new kind of global power that, had only good will toward other nations. But the test shows that the reality is more complex. This is the other face of China, the hard power side that China usually tries to keep hidden. Having a weapon that can disable or destroy satellites is a component of China's unofficial doctrine of asymmetrical warfare

China maintains a minimal nuclear arsenal that could inflict enough damage on an enemy to guard against any pre-emptive strike,. But the increasing sophistication of American missile interceptors, which are linked to satellite surveillance, threatens the viability of China's nuclear arsenal. That may have prompted the China to show that it had the means to protect missile sites and ensure China's retaliatory capacity by showing that it could take out satellites.

China and Russia were working on systems to hit American satellites with lasers or missiles. Chinese had used a ground-based laser to illuminate satellites., a possible first step to using lasers to destroy satellites.³¹⁷ China's anti-satellite test makes a race to weaponise space more likely.³¹⁸ China is becoming more assertive in just about every military. It is not going to let the U.S. to be the hegemon in space forever.

³¹⁷ Joseph Kahn, "News Analysis: China's missile test: A message for U.S", **International Herald Tribune**, (Friday, January 19, 2007)

³¹⁸ David Simonds, "A new arms race in space?", **The Economist**, (January 25th 2007), p.501.

8. FUTURE OF CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY

In this thesis the author tries to explain the future course of the Chinese defense politics. China has domestic and international problems for its security. At the international level the Taiwan and Korea questions are very serious, at the domestic level Tibet and Eastern Turkistan questions are challenging. There are also territorial disputes in the Pacific. China's defense policy behaviour to handle these problems will shape the new century.

8.1. COMPETITION IN THE PACIFIC

The Asian-Pacific region contains thirty-one countries. The basic geopolitical numerology of this region can be summarized as "one superpower (the United States)," "two economic powers (the United States and Japan)," "three political powers (the United States, Russia, and China)," "four military powers (the United States, Russia, China, and Japan)," and "five main political forces (the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN))." There are great differences among the countries in the region in terms of social systems, historical traditions, ethnic communities and religion, levels of economic development, national strength, and foreign policy, and so forth; but these countries also have a lot of common interests. So the interrelationships among them are very complicated, and need careful and skillful handling.³¹⁹

The United States is the most important political force in the Asian-Pacific region. After the Second World War, the United States became a tyranny (political, economic, and military) superpower. Relying on its strong military force, especially its strong navy, the United States controlled the Pacific Ocean and looked upon it as its "inland lake."... Given its oncoming decline in relative economic strength over the next half century, the United States won't be able to dominate Asian-Pacific affairs as it did during the Cold War.³²⁰

The end of World War II erased Japan's imperial designs on the Pacific, along with most traces of its pre-war presence in Micronesia. During the 1950s and 1960s, Japan had little reason to pay attention to the Pacific Islands, where the Western colonial powers were still firmly entrenched, and where only a few Japanese businesses were active. Starting in the

³¹⁹ Cao, Renyi, *Vision of Security of The Asian-Pacific Region*. **ACDIS Occasional Papers**, p.1

³²⁰ Cao, Renyi, *ibid*

1970s, however, Japan became increasingly interested in this vast oceanic realm, driven largely by pragmatic concerns, notably the search for commercial opportunities and a desire for regional stability.³²¹

As a global power, Tokyo has a political interest in maintaining good relations with the Pacific Island nations, eight of which are voting members of the United Nations General Assembly, and which, as a bloc, could tip the balance in a vote crucial to Japan. It also has a strategic interest in the region, which straddles some of the vital sea lanes connecting this trading nation with the rest of the world... With the establishment of internationally recognized 200-mile EEZs, extending control of the waters surrounding the Pacific nations, Japan began in the mid-1970s to support a broad range of fisheries and marine resources projects.³²²

USA choose Japan to balance China because of the following reasons. (1) They have identical positions towards the issue of Taiwan: Both believe that “the no unification, no independence and no war” situation would serve their own national interests best and therefore is the most favorable strategic option. (2) Japan and the US have reached consensus on the excuse (guarding against the DPRK) and real cause (China) of deploying TMD and already have begun joint research and development of the system. (3) Japan hopes to realize its ambition of restoring a big political and military power through the support of the US while the latter hopes Japan could continue to share its political responsibility and military bills in Asia... (4) Speaking from geopolitics, economic strength, and Sino-US-Japan triangular relations, the US and Japan have other common grounds and needs in containing China.³²³

The main approach adopted by the US to win over Japan is to strengthen the US-Japan military alliance. In 1996, the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security claimed that the US-Japan alliance would continue to serve as the corner stone for stability and prosperity in the

³²¹ Gerard A. Finin, Terence Wesley-Smith, “A New Era for Japan and the Pacific Islands: The Tokyo Summit”, **Analysis from the East-West Center**, (september 1997), p.3.

³²² Gerard A. Finin, Terence Wesley-Smith, **ibid.**, p.4.

³²³ XIN Benjian, “Security Dilemma, Balance of Power Vs. US Policy Towards China in the Post-Cold War Era”, **Guoji Guanxi** (Contemporary International Relations), (september 2001), p.7

Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century. In 1997, the new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation were introduced... The US hopes to realize its long-term strategic goals of “maintaining a US presence, containing China, and constraining Japan” by converting the US-Japan alliance into a “NATO in Asia”.³²⁴

8.2. TAIWAN QUESTION

With the victory of Mao Tse-tung and his Communist Party military forces on mainland China in 1949, America’s former World War II ally, the Republic of China (ROC) led by Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the island of Taiwan off the south China coast. For the next thirty years, both regimes claimed legitimacy as the sole legal government of the Chinese people. While on October 1, 1949, Mao proclaimed the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chiang Kai-shek re-established a temporary capital for his government in Taipei, Taiwan, declaring the ROC still to be the legitimate Chinese government-in-exile and he would “retake the mainland” and drive out communist forces.

The United States initially appeared reluctant to support the ROC’s claim of legitimacy, But that U.S. position quickly evaporated with North Korea’s surprise invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. Within a week, President Truman ordered U.S. military to go to South Korea’s aid and ordered the U.S. 7th fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan. As a result, in April 1951, the United States resumed direct military assistance to the ROC government, and in 1954 the United States and Chiang’s government on Taiwan signed the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, making the two governments allies once again.

Official U.S. recognition of PRC legitimacy did not come until 1979, after the Carter Administration made a surprise announcement on December 15, 1978, that the United States would sever official relations with the ROC government on Taiwan and recognize the communist government in Beijing on January 1 of the new year.⁵ In the Joint Communiqué on Establishing Diplomatic Relations that announced the change, the United States acknowledged (an important distinction in future debate on the U.S. “one-China”

³²⁴ XIN Benjian,ibid.p.7

policy) that both the PRC and ROC governments claimed there was only one China and that Taiwan was a province of it.³²⁵

Taiwan cannot stand alone against China. Locked out of the system of formal alliances as well as the UN, Taiwan can neither deter nor retaliate against a possible attack by China by itself, for it has no offensive weapons systems. Moreover, the difference between the two countries in size, population, and military power is so great that Taiwan cannot overcome it with even the most advanced defensive technology.³²⁶

A final challenge is the modernization of China's PLA. The overall modernization is rapidly forging ahead, making it increasingly difficult for Taiwan to keep up. If Taiwan does not overcome its key defense disadvantages, the Pentagon forecasts that a major cross-strait military imbalance will occur between 2005 and 2008.³²⁷

In arms procurement, in 2001, China's arms purchases totaled approximately \$6 billion, compared to Taiwan's \$1.8 billion. The next year, China's purchases amounted to \$6.9 billion, compared to \$1.6 billion for Taiwan. If this imbalance in weapons system investment between the two sides continues, China will eventually gain complete advantage across the board.³²⁸

³²⁵ Ibid., pp.1-3.

³²⁶ Fang Hsu-hsiung, "The Transformation of U.S.-Taiwan Military Relations", *Orbis*, (summer 2004), p.551.

³²⁷ Ibid.,p.559.

³²⁸ David Shambaugh "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage", *Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2000)

Figure 8.1: Map of China and Taiwan



Source: americandiplomacy.org

There is a real, fear in Beijing that should a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence go unpunished, restive regions of China may also try to break away. Separatist tendencies within China cannot, however, easily be linked to Taiwan; such regions each involve dynamics and circumstances that are unrelated to the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is qualitatively different. Tibet, Xingjian, and Inner Mongolia are, after all, constituent parts of the People's Republic of China; Taiwan, quite clearly, is not.³²⁹

Taiwan's physical position complicates free access to the Pacific from the mainland. The island does not block that access entirely, but its possession by a maritime power inimical to China might threaten both China and China's sea-lanes, both eastward to the Pacific and down through the South China Sea.³³⁰

China has long regarded Taiwan as a renegade province that must be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary, even though the island has governed itself since the end of a civil war in 1949. China believes that Taiwan's integration under mainland authority is an essential step towards completing national unification following the reversions of Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Although there is no timeline to resolve

³²⁹ Chris Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, And Why It Matters", *Naval War College Review*, (Autumn 2001), Vol. LIV, No. 4, p.76.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*,p.77.

the Taiwan issue, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao does not want to be accused of 'losing' Taiwan.³³¹

China is engaged in a broad effort to wield its increasing military power to coerce greater obedience from its neighbors. As a result, the US seeks to maintain a military deterrent balance of power as the linchpin of security in the Taiwan Strait. For Taiwan and the US, such deterrence aims at preventing China from using force to compel reunification on Beijing's terms. But for China it aims to prevent Taiwan from progressing from a *de facto* to a *de jure* independent country. Given the trans-Atlantic rift, Beijing perceives a window of opportunity to exercise leverage over the EU. But European arms sales to China could produce an imbalance and disturb the cross-Strait *status quo*, there by increasing the likelihood of military conflict. The stakes are unusually high because US military credibility in Asia is tied to the security of Taiwan. Allowing Taiwan to fall to China by force or coercion would prove fatal to American leadership in East Asia.³³²

If the Chinese are smart, they will not pick a fight over Taiwan now. This is not the time. What they should do is concentrate on building their economy to the point where it is bigger than the U.S. economy. Then they can translate that economic strength into military might and create a situation where they are in a position to dictate terms to states in the region and to give the United States all sorts of trouble.³³³

8.3. CHINA AND KOREA QUESTION

The 1950-1953 Korean War, despite the deaths of millions of Koreans and tens of thousands of Americans, neither furthered Korea's reunification nor set the stage for a durable peace. Today, as before the war, the two halves of Korea remain hostile rivals, and a durable peace remains elusive. Two million soldiers, thousands of artillery pieces and

³³¹ Soeren Kern, "Are China and the US Drifting Towards War over Taiwan?", **USA-Transatlantic Dialogue, Elcano Royal Institute** No: 37, (2005),p.1.

³³² *Ibid.*, p.8.

³³³ *Ibid.*,pp.1-5.

tanks, hundreds of ballistic missiles and jet aircraft, not to mention naval forces, preserve a fragile truce through deterrence that means the mutual fear of war.³³⁴

Northeast Asia has always been a major component of China's security policy. After the Cold War, the PRC is rightfully relaxed in this region. It now has the best relationship it has had with every country in the region in over one hundred years, and there is almost no security threat in sight...China currently has good relations with both North and South Korea. The Chinese feel that this is a golden opportunity for them...Limited by its own capacity, the PRC is likely to play the old balance of power game to maintain the favorable status quo.³³⁵

By the mid 1990s, the surrounding areas of China all looked eventless, except Northeast Asia. More specifically, two sizable armies face each other along the demilitarized zone on the Korean peninsula, and a nuclear proliferation issue threatens an escalated conflict that could drag China into a direct confrontation with the United States.³³⁶

The U.S.–South Korea alliance is a product of the Cold War. South Korea's foreign policy maintained rigid ideological lines, following U.S. security measures. South Korea accepted American dominance because its survival depended on U.S. military and economic support. But recent economic success and the move toward democracy changed Koreans' perceptions of not only their nation but other nations as well. In the mid-1990s, South Korea became the 11th largest economy in the world and gave a few billion dollars in assistance to the former Soviet Union, whose GNP remains about 70 percent of South Korea's. It also joined the OECD, the "club" of developed nations. Improved relations with China and Russia and the Kim Dae Jung government's sunshine policy of engagement with North Korea have significantly reduced South Korea's security and economic dependence on the United States.³³⁷

³³⁴ C. Kenneth Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy", *Asian Perspective*, Vol.27, No.1, (2003), p.198.

³³⁵ Fei-Ling Wang, Chinese Security Policy in Northeast Asia, in ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A. Olsen, *The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security*, (London 1996, Lynie Rienner Publishers, Inc.), p.60

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.42.

³³⁷ Choong Nam Kim, "Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.–ROK Alliance", *Analysis from the East-West Center*, (April 2003), p.2.

China has done very well for itself in the post–Cold War era. Relaxed security, encouraging a more liberal economy and society, and globalization have accelerated world trade with and investments in China. For both China and South Korea, geographical proximity and cultural affinity make trade and investment ties not only convenient but also desirable. China is the new frontier for the Korean economy: it is South Korea’s second largest export market after the United States and replaced Japan as Korea’s major business partner. Bilateral trade between China and Korea was up from \$3 billion in 1991 to more than \$30 billion in 2001; social, cultural, and political ties have also grown robustly. For China, South Korea is its fourth largest foreign investor and an attractive partner because Korea’s intermediate technology is suited to its needs. Psychologically and culturally, South Koreans feel confident about China, where South Korea is perceived as a wealthy and developed country.³³⁸

The role of the United States in the region is also changing. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the global balance has shifted decisively in America’s favor and it now has a wider range of strategic choices. The strategic security of South Korea is no longer of vital interest to the United States. The only fundamental U.S. concern on the peninsula is that North Korea should not be allowed to threaten the U.S. homeland with its WMD—and that North Korea should not be permitted to sell such weapons. One wonders whether Washington has any post–Cold War policy that Seoul would support. Given the lack of a common vision, enormous geographical distance, cultural and ethnic differences, and the emerging regionalism in Northeast Asia, the United States seems even further removed from Korea than it was during the Cold War.³³⁹

China cannot afford to sustain its increasingly burdensome economic relationship with North Korea for long. The continued decentralization of China’s economic policymaking authority and the privatization of its large enterprises have limited Beijing’s ability to dictate prices and timetables for economic transactions between local Chinese governments

³³⁸ Choong Nam Kim, *ibid.*, p.5.

³³⁹ Choong Nam Kim, *ibid.*, p.6.

and North Korea. It is conceivable that China's economic assistance will not remain available to North Korea free of obligation... Beijing may require that in return for China's food aid, North Korea adopt an open-door economic policy and institute sweeping structural reforms in its agricultural sector.³⁴⁰

China will not allow North Korea to Collapse economically, will not be a mere bystander in the event of nation-wide disorders in North Korea, and will probably send troops into the North Korea either to support the Pyongyang regime or to keep its own borders stable.³⁴¹

China's policy calculus toward the DPRK—both in general and in the current crisis—involves a hierarchy of several interrelated interests:³⁴²

1. DPRK regime survival;
2. DPRK regime reform;
3. maintaining and developing more comprehensively robust relations between China and South Korea;
4. establishing China's dominant external influence over the Korean peninsula (North and South);
5. integrating North and South, through economic and social means, leading to political unification over time; and
6. unprovocative and responsible North Korean behavior on security issues ranging from its nuclear weapons program to proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to the deployments of DPRK conventional forces.

It is important to recognize that this hierarchy does not mean that China accepts the status quo on the peninsula. Although some analysts, particularly in the West, assume that China prefers the status quo to regime change, this is not in fact the case. China may favor the status quo over regime collapse, but China's preferred future for the DPRK is regime

³⁴⁰ Chae-Jin Lee Conflict and Cooperation: The Pacific Powers and Korea, in ed.Nick Eberstadt, **Korea's Future and The Great Powers**, (University of Washington Press, 2001), p.73

³⁴¹ Ibid., p.73.

³⁴² David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term", **The Washington Quarterly**, vol: 26:2,(Spring 2003), pp.44-45.

reform. China does not believe that the current situation on the peninsula or in the DPRK is stable or conducive either to regional stability or China's own national security, economic growth, or other national interests. For Beijing, enhancing stability is critical.³⁴³

The war in Iraq had led the leaders in Pyongyang to draw three conclusions: nonaggression agreement with the United States was pointless, no inspection regime would ever be good enough for Washington, and only a nuclear weapon would deter a U.S. intervention.³⁴⁴

North Korea's attempt to acquire a nuclear deterrent also risks disrupting East Asia's nuclear balance. A North Korean bomb could jeopardize long-term stability in the region by triggering the nuclear ambitions of Japan, South Korea, or even Taiwan. China already has three nuclear neighbors in Russia, India, and Pakistan. A regional nuclear arms race among existing non nuclear neighbors could leave it surrounded. The disclosure in September 2004 of South Korea's near bomb-grade uranium enrichment experiment four years earlier and plutonium-based nuclear research in the early 1980s heightened such concerns. Japan is widely believed to possess the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly and easily if it chooses to do so.³⁴⁵

China's diplomatic achievements as host, peacemaker, and mediator, as well as the international recognition of these achievements, seem to have encouraged Beijing to persevere

in its new, proactive foreign policy. Beijing's embrace of multilateralism, initiation of active intervention, and willingness to flex some diplomatic muscles are helping to project a fresh international image. Yet, this new diplomacy also tests China's resolve and ability to reemerge as a power player in the international arena by ending the North Korean nuclear crisis.³⁴⁶

³⁴³ Ibid., p.45.

³⁴⁴ John Feffer, **North Korea/South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis**, (Canada 2003, Seven Stories Press), p.12.

³⁴⁵ Anne Wu, "What China Whispers to North Korea", **The Washington Quarterly** vol:28:2, (Spring 2005), p. 38

³⁴⁶ Ibid.,p.44.

The abandonment of Mao's model of economic development and the institution of Deng's modernization programs caused China to become more receptive to trade with the South. This was largely indirect trade through third countries, but by 1985, total trade with the ROK surpassed that of North Korea. Thus, the willingness to separate politics from economics enabled an incremental change in perceptions.³⁴⁷

The ROK's view of China as a status quo power, ripe for economic and diplomatic intercourse, came to fruition in the 1990s. The establishment of trade officers between the Korea Trade Promotion (KOTRA) and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1990 marked the start of government sanctioned economic relations and the shift from indirect trade to open and direct transactions... In 1990, the Soviet Union opened the path to diplomatic relations in August 1992. Sino-Soviet reconciliation was a significant factor in Chinese calculations to normalize with Seoul. The Deng-Gorbachev summit of 1989 and the end of Sino-Soviet competition reduced in Chinese minds the strategic consequences of losing North Korea to Moscow. This made the opening with South Korea more feasible.³⁴⁸

During the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing sided with the US and the ROK on many aspects of this dispute. It opposed North Korea's renegeing on the NPT treaty and counseled them to return to their commitments. It clearly stated that it saw the North Korean nuclear program (in conjunction with its ballistic missile program) destabilizing for the region, and advocated, with its new diplomatic partner in Seoul, non nuclear peninsula. It also expressed support for the Agreed Framework. At the same time however, Beijing strongly opposed any acts of coercion against North.³⁴⁹

For decades, the Korean Peninsula has remained a subject of deep international concern. In fact, this tense region is probably the worst remaining legacy of the Cold War. Despite efforts to reduce arms elsewhere in the world, the North-South relationship frequently lingers on the brink of direct military conflict. The Korean situation, therefore, constitutes

³⁴⁷ Victor D.Cha, *Engaging China: the view from korea*, in. Alastair Iain ed., **Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power**, (New York 2005, Routledge), p.34.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.35.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.45.

a hotbed of tension and instability in the Pacific region, with potentially global consequences should a conflict break out.³⁵⁰

8.4. CHINA AND TIBET QUESTION

In 1949-1951, the newly established communist government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) backed up this claim by sending military troops to occupy Tibet. Since then, Tibet has been under active Chinese rule as its westernmost province, Xizang (the Tibet Autonomous Region). Much of the PRC's tenure there has been troubled, particularly during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when most monasteries, palaces, and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and culture were either damaged or destroyed. The International Campaign for Tibet claims that over 1 million Tibetans died during the first 30 years of PRC rule.³⁵¹

In the late 1980's, Tibet became a recurring issue in U.S. consideration of matters relating to China. A number of factors have contributed to Members' greater interest. These include: the Dalai Lama's and the Tibetan community's ongoing political activities; reports of human rights abuses and China's continuing repressive social and political controls in Tibet; and the lack of consensus among U.S. policymakers over what U.S. policy should be. As a matter of official policy, the U.S. government recognizes Tibet as part of China and has always done so, although some dispute the historical consistency of this U.S. position. Some assert that past U.S. actions which treated Tibet as if it were an independent state in effect signaled U.S. recognition.³⁵²

Since normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, both Republican and Democratic U.S. Administrations have favored policies of engagement with China. In the process, they have sought to minimize areas of potential tension with Beijing where Chinese leaders have taken strong positions, such as on the question of Tibet's political status.

³⁵⁰ Alexander Zarubin, "The Korean Peninsula, From Inter-Korean Confrontation to a System of Cooperative Security", in ed. James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, **The North Korean Nuclear Program**, (Routledge London 2000), p.210.

³⁵¹ Warren W. Smith, **The Tibetan Nation**, (Penguin press New York 1991), p. 607.

³⁵² Michael C. van Walt van Praag, **The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law**, (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1987), p. 139.

The Dalai Lama's and his exiled community's efforts to gain international support for Tibet's cause took a major step forward in 1986-1987, when a series of meetings between Tibetan and Western supporters in New York, Washington, and London launched what has become known as Tibet's "international campaign."³⁵³ The goal of this campaign was to garner Western and mostly U.S. support for Tibet's situation, and ultimately to bring this international pressure to influence Beijing to make satisfactory political concessions. One result of this new strategy, the U.S. Congress in 1987 began to put pressure on the White House to protect Tibetan culture and accord Tibet greater status in U.S. law, despite Beijing's strong objections.

In 1991, two years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China launched a "patriotic education" campaign in an effort to promote loyalty to the communist regime.³⁵⁴ In the 1990s, the campaign became a government tool in to control monastic activity in Tibet and discredit the Dalai Lama among Tibetans. Chinese officials visit Tibetan monasteries and subject Tibetan monks to "patriotic" education and training. The campaign requires monks to sign a declaration attesting to a number of patriotic statements, including rejection and denunciation of the Dalai Lama; acceptance of China's choice for the Panchen Lama; recognition that Tibet is part of China. There reportedly has been widespread and intensive resistance to this campaign.

The decision of the Chinese government to become a direct player in the ancient spiritual rites of Tibetan Buddhism has several implications for Tibet's political future. In addition, the Chinese government's involvement in the Panchen Lama succession has led many observers to speculate that Beijing is positioning itself to choose the next Dalai Lama. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, such an option might improve Beijing's prospects for controlling Tibet's religious leaders and marginalizing the Tibetan independence movement. But it also could create a long-term religious succession crisis in Tibet and

³⁵³ Goldstein, Melvyn, **The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama**, (University of California Press, 1997), pp. 76 and 138.

³⁵⁴ Suisheng Zhao, "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China", in **Communist and Post-Communist Studies**, (1998), Vol. 31, pp. 287-302.

cause serious rifts among Tibetans that could ultimately be destabilizing factor for Chinese rule.

8.5. CHINA AND EASTTURKISTANXINJIANG QUESTION

In the 1950s, Mao's argument on 'China's political and cultural integrity' and his declaration that 'Xinjiang was a part of China for over 2000 years' led to strict control over the people in the region. During the Cultural Revolution assimilation policies and the forced settlement of Chinese 'Han' ethnic groups in this particular region succeeded in altering the population distribution, with the 'Han' population figures increasing by almost 8% every year.³⁵⁵

Xinjiang is China's largest and most ethnically diverse region, with 47 different ethnic groups dispersed across 617,760 square miles. Its per capita gross domestic product of US\$598 makes it one of the least developed areas in China. The region, however, has substantial, largely undeveloped, oil, gas, and coal resources, as well as abundant gold ore.

Today the Xinjiang/Eastern Turkistan province comprises the most fertile land in China as well as tremendous energy and material potential, earning it the occasional sobriquet of the 'Chinese California'. In addition its growing strategic importance intensified the conflict of interests over the region, as the province borders the ex-Soviet Turkish speaking Republics of Kazakhstan, Kırgızistan and Tajikistan. The non-Han residents of Xinjiang province have far more in common with their brethren, both in the new Republics and in Turkey, than they do with the Chinese leaders in Beijing. The common historical and ethnic background linking the people of these different countries may prove advantageous to China in approaching the Central Asian Republics as a trading partner, or ally, or even a hegemonic power.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁵ Ahat Andican "Türkistan Cumhuriyetleri, Rusya ve Çin Üçgeninde Doğu Türkistan", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.2, No.2, (Summer 1995), p.82.

³⁵⁶ Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, "Opening the Closed Window to the East; Turkey's Relations with East Asian Countries", in ed. İdris Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, (Florida 2004, Brown Walker Press), p.416.

The Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, warned the Turkish prime minister, Bülent Ecevit in 1998 that the anti-Chinese activities by the Uygur people living in Turkey might disturb political relations between China and Turkey.³⁵⁷

The Turkic Uighurs in Xinjiang oppose de facto direct rule from Beijing. The estimated 15,000 Uighurs based in Turkey play on the sympathies of pan-Turkik groups who still refer to Xinjiang as Eastern Turkestan. Tensions between China and Turkey surfaced in March 1997 following a clampdown in Xinjiang after Uighurs were linked with an explosion in Beijing. China warned Turkey not to interfere in its internal affairs.³⁵⁸


8.6. CHINA'S QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY

China's rapid growth since market reforms began nearly twenty years ago has sparked a surging demand for energy to serve an expanding industrial and commercial economy as well as households with rising living standards. China has vast coal resources but this type of energy is not effective in modern industry as oil. So imported energy, notably oil, has become an attractive alternative for China which need it most and have had the greatest access to it as the economy opened. The nation made considerable efforts to exploit its domestic resources, but growth eventually overwhelmed them and led to rising net oil imports. Continued dependence on imports is now irreversible unless new, reserves of domestic oil can be found.

³⁵⁷ Mehmet Ögütçü, *Geleceğimiz Asya'da mı? Yaralı Asya, Çin ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: AD Kitapçılık), 1999, p.164.

³⁵⁸ Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, (Brookings Institutions, London 2001), p.214.

Figure 8.2: China's Oil Production and Consumption, 1980-2000




Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Main Products of the Office of Energy Markets and End Use, Country Analysis Briefs, “China: An Energy Sector Overview,”

Actions to mitigate the liabilities of import dependence cover all the standard fields : creation of a strategic oil reserve; pursuit of diversified, secure import sources; more receptive policies toward foreign investment in Chinese energy activities; and Chinese investment in foreign production facilities, developing oil and gas pipelines within producing countries or from the producers to China. All these actions show dual motivations. Aware of its growing dependency on imported energy, China seeks a more prominent position in the existing global system of energy production and trade but, where it can, it tries to open *new* connections in the global markets. Increasingly – as in all heavily import dependent countries – external energy policies come to form a subset of foreign economic and security policies in general.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁹ Mehmet Ögütçü, “China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security”, **International Energy Agency**, p.8.

Figure 8.3: Map of Chinese NOC only oil Investments



Source: Fullbright L.L.P.


China's overseas investment has gone, so far, to several Middle Eastern countries, plus Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Venezuela and the United States. CNOOC has investments in Indonesia and the Gulf of Mexico, and plans new ventures in the Middle East (especially Iran), Central Asia, Myanmar and other parts of Asia. CNPC has been even more active, with exploration and production contracts signed or under negotiation in at least 20 countries. By the end of 1997, CNPC had pledged more than \$8 billion for oil concessions in Sudan, Venezuela, Iraq and Kazakhstan, plus—at least notionally—another \$12.5 billion to lay four immense (but still far from real) oil and gas pipelines from Russia and Central Asia to China. The oil projects in Iraq, Kazakhstan and Venezuela are large scale. CNPC's entry into Kazakhstan laid down a Chinese marker in oil-rich Central Asia, a key area where a Chinese presence had previously been minimal.³⁶⁰

³⁶⁰ Ibid.,p.10.

China's primary commercial energy demand will grow by 2.7% per year from 2000 to 2030. This growth is much slower than in the past decade, but is still faster than in most other regions and countries and leads to nearly a doubling of demand over the projection period. The 1,182 Million tone increase in demand represents about a fifth of the total increase in worldwide demand between 2000 and 2030.³⁶¹

The share of coal in China's primary energy supply will drop from 70% in 2000 to 60% in 2030, while that of each other fuel increases. Coal remains the dominant fuel in power generation, but is increasingly replaced by other fuels in industry and households. Nonetheless, China's coal demand will continue to increase and that increase will account for around 50% of the world's total incremental demand for coal over the next 30 years. Primary consumption of oil grows steadily, driven mainly by transport demand and to a lesser extent by industry. Some 16% of the increase in world oil demand comes from China. Natural gas use expands even more rapidly, but from a much smaller base. Although gas' share in primary supply nearly doubles, it still only meets about 7% of the country's energy needs in 2030. Likewise, nuclear power, which plays a very small role in China's energy supply today, surges by 9.3% per year, but finishes with a mere 3% share of total energy.³⁶²

Figure 8.4: Total Primary Energy Supply in China from 1971 to 2030



Source: IEA, 2002, *World Energy Outlook*.

³⁶¹ IEA, "Developing China's Natural Gas Market", **IEA Report**, (2002, Paris France), p.50.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, p.50.

For the first time, energy security is included as one of the central elements in the country's 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) for the energy sector. Emergency oil stocks (or strategic oil reserves) like those held in IEA countries, are now formally included in the government's energy agenda.

In addition to building emergency oil stocks, the government is also aggressively pursuing other energy security measures. They include:³⁶³

- adjustment of energy supply structure to increase the share of cleaner energy sources, especially cleaner coal products and technologies;
- energy diversification to increase the share of natural gas and renewable, while appropriately developing nuclear energy; developing coal liquefaction technology and other oil substitutes such as methanol-alcohol;
- encouraging Chinese oil companies to develop oil supply sources outside the country;
- increasing energy conservation efforts;
- strengthening environmental protection; and
- increased international co-operation.

Beyond China itself, untrammled energy growth could have wider geopolitical implications. How China resolves its energy challenges will be felt not just within the country but will reverberate around the world. China's growing presence on the international stage could ultimately create issues with the United States, competition for energy resources in Russia, the Caspian region, the Middle East, the Americas, and Africa.

Geopolitical development with an energy impact has been the growth of the Asian economies and their political weight. Particularly important in this context has been the rise of China, helped by economic reforms. As it gradually becomes a major energy importer, China has a growing interest in diversifying from dependence on Middle East oil.

³⁶³ Ibid.,p.54.

China may also contribute to greater political instability in the region, if it becomes more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea.³⁶⁴

Energy is a central priority on China's national security agenda and is behind its growing regional and global drive to secure its future needs. This is creating regional rivalries with Japan, India, Russia, and Southeast Asia by fueling competition for control over energy supplies, vital sea lanes, and key pipeline routes. As China becomes a key player in global energy markets and energy geopolitics, its activities are increasingly likely to affect U.S. interests. Chinese energy and diplomatic ties with Sudan, Iran, and Myanmar are complicating U.S. efforts to isolate these regimes. China is also becoming an aggressive competitor with the U.S. in global oil markets.

8.7. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

There is no question about the breadth of profundity of the social change that has occurred in China, but there is a great deal of uncertainty and debate about its meaning for the present and future of China. Specialists who follow China closely remain deeply divided over whether China, as it begins the post-Deng era, is emerging as the latest instance of the East Asian development state, imploding like other socialist states, on the verge of democratic transition, or rising as a threat to East Asia and the United States.³⁶⁵ For the near future China rejects the U.S. and western hegemony and tries to be a great power as a new balancer.³⁶⁶

Optimists point to the vast improvements in China over the past decade and more, and assume that the future will see similar improvements. They also generally assume that the more China develops economically and the more it enters the international arena, the more it will develop a middle class and the more likely it will be to democratize. In contrast pessimists view China's human rights record, the government's penchant for rejecting even modest moments in the direction of democratization, efforts to modernize the military, and

³⁶⁴ J. Bielecki , "Energy security: is the wolf at the door?", **The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance** vol: 42 (2002) p.243.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.,p.86.

³⁶⁶ Mesut Hakkı Caşın, "Çin Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Sarı Ejderin Uykusu", **Avrasya Dosyası**, (Summer 1995) no:2 p.34.

the growth of nationalism as indications that China will develop into a strong, menacing presence in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁶⁷

Though the Chinese see their country as on the rise as a world power and express enthusiasm for this development, it is striking that when asked about what Chinese foreign policy priorities should be— in terms of goals and threats—concerns related to world power status do not come out on top. Rather, there is much more concern about issues related to economic security and quality of life, probably reflecting both the emphasis of Chinese leaders over almost thirty years on economic improvement and the more recent concern of the Chinese public with some of the unintended consequences and limitations of economic growth such as a worsening environment.³⁶⁸

8.7.1. Threat of China

Having suffered humiliation at the hands of other powers in the past, the Chinese people are prone to translate their new-found self-confidence into narrow nationalism. In light of China's increasing overall power and ambitions, it therefore comes as no surprise that many China observers see China as at least a potential source of instability in the decades to come.³⁶⁹

Historically, it is argued, China has never been hegemonic. On the other hand, it may also be argued that China did not have the compelling reason nor means to throw its weight around in the past. This seems to be changing. Ever a continental power (except for exploits of the Admiral Cheng-ho), China is now embarking on an ambitious naval modernization program that will turn it into a maritime power as well within a relatively short period of time.³⁷⁰

The hypothesis of China's 'threat' has been expressed in very different ways. Leaving aside the more demagogical and apocalyptic, the following three can be mentioned: (1) the

³⁶⁷ Joseph Fewsmith, **Elite Politics in Contemporary China**, (New York 2001, East Gate), p.62.

³⁶⁸ Global Views 2006

³⁶⁹ Aileen S.P. Baviera, "China as a Rising Power: Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region", **PASCN Discussion Paper** No. 99-06, p.3.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*,p.3.

realistic approach, according to which the threat is inevitable, based on both the historical experience of the 20th century and China's large size; (2) the insistence on the continuous friction with the United States; and (3) the idea that China is waiting until it is fully developed before dominating the world.³⁷¹

China has more contiguous neighbors than any other country in the world. Inevitably, it has had disputes with most of them over territorial issues, in addition to similar quarrels with its maritime neighbor. These disputes fall into four categories, those over lost tributaries, land boundaries, irredentism, and the China Sea. Beijing has exploited all four categories, especially the third as means of mobilizing domestic nationalism in its own support on a wide range of issues.³⁷²

In January 2005, General-Lieutenant V.I. Ostankov, director of the General Staff's Military-Strategic Studies Center, warned that the strengthening of China's economic might and its growing population require tremendous resources. Because the repository of the world's natural resources has already been divided up, it seems logical that the vector of Chinese expansion will be directed toward the abutting regions of Russia (above all, Siberia and the Far East) as well as of Kazakhstan and other countries of Central Asia. Nor should it be forgotten that China's geopolitics as formulated by Mao gave priority to expanding the country's borders, especially by annexing Russian territories.³⁷³ China, as a result of rapid economic development can increase her sphere of influence from Japan to Middle east.³⁷⁴

China's military build-up is aimed at buttressing its diplomatic campaign. Such 'coercive diplomacy', however, may well backfire on China as it has already caused considerable consternation through out the region. Asians are beginning to increasingly look at China rather than Japan as the looming threat to the region.³⁷⁵

³⁷¹ Pablo Bustelo, China's Emergence: Threat or 'Peaceful Rise'?, **Real Instituto Elcano** (2005), p.2.

³⁷² Harold C.Hinton, China as an Asian Power,in.Thomas W.Robinson ed., **Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice**, (New York 1998, Oxford University Press), p.352.

³⁷³ General-Lieutenant V.I. Ostankov, "Geopolitical Problems and Possible Solutions in the Context of Ensuring RF Security," **VM**, no. 1, (2005), pp. 2-7.


³⁷⁴ Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, İpek Yolundan Çin Denizine Barış ve Güvenliğin Yeni Parametreleri, in ed.Deniz Ülke Arıboğan ,**Çin'in Gölgesinde Uzakdoğu Asya**, (Bağlam Yayınları İstanbul, 2001), p.112.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.,p.372.

While there is clearly some concern among Americans about China, the threat of China’s rise as a world power ranks low compared to concern about other threats facing the United States. When Americans are asked about a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next ten years, the threats of international terrorism and of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers continue to be viewed as the most “critical” threats³⁷⁶

Figure 8.5: Critical Threats to U.S. Vital Interests

Percentage of who see each of the following as a critical threat to U.S. vital interests in the next ten years.



Source: Global Views 2006

³⁷⁶Marshall M. Bouton, “The United States and the Rise of China and India”, *The Global Views 2006*, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, pp.15-16.

8.7.2. Rise of China

“We are all convinced that our work will go down in the history of mankind, demonstrating that the Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up.”³⁷⁷

China’s rise means the world will need to get used to a different kind of economic superpower, one that has huge numbers of people poorer than those living in countries that China has suppressed. In such a country even a small rise in the national standard of living results in an enormous change in the total size of the national economy.³⁷⁸

The transformation of the Chinese economy through sustained structural reforms in the economic sector and its tenacious grip of its political and social order has indeed brought about economic and technological transformation. China’s sustained 8-9% growth has been with costs and consequences in terms of its relentless quest for mineral, material and energy resources on the one hand and on the other its formidable manufacturing capabilities have catapulted it into a position of global preeminence. The consequences of this rapid economic growth have generated profound global impact that has resulted in the convergence of the United States, Europe and Japan into China’s economic miracle. The China miracle also has its portent consequences on military and strategic modernization even as Chinese military buildup and leveraging of its economic power has alarmed the region of the nature and scope of its “rising power”.³⁷⁹

Anticipating at least a decade or two of peace, China could afford downplay military modernization in the short run and concentrate on economic development, so as to lay the foundations for military modernization in the long run. In this strategy the Chinese have been consciously or subconsciously following the Japanese example of creating a huge

³⁷⁷ Mao, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up”, 21 sept 1949, **Selected Works**, Vol:5 (Beijing: Foreign Languages) press, 1977, p.16


³⁷⁸ Ted C. Fishman, **China Inc.**, (New York 2005, Scribner), p.296.

³⁷⁹ Vijay Sakhuja, The Shifting Geopolitical System In The Asia-Pacific: An Indian Perspective, **Regional Outlook Forum** 2006, p.2.

GDP, based on market economy and extensive international economic relations, only a fraction of which could provide ample resources for modernizing the military system.³⁸⁰

During the post-1949 period, the conceptual framework that China's leaders have brought to bear on the analysis of international affairs has involved a focus on the rise and fall of hegemonic powers, powers that have been willing to use their resources in an attempt to achieve global domination and to constrain the actions of others. China's strategy has been to try to form a united front against such a hegemon in order to contain its ambitions and ensure its decline.³⁸¹

Figure 8.6: China's Influence in the World



Source: Global Views 2006

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p.147.

³⁸¹ Harry Harding, China's Changing Roles in the Contemporary World, in Harding, ed., **China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984 211.

Looking to the future, no country sees China in ten years as overtaking the United States in terms of world influence. While the Chinese see themselves as pulling even with the United States (rising from 7.8 to 8.3), the other nations surveyed see China's influence rising more modestly, with the United States staying clearly ahead. Americans see China's influence rising from 6.4 to 6.8 (putting China second behind the United States' 8.0), and Indians see China rising from 6.0 to 6.2, moving it ahead of Russia, even with Japan, but still behind the United States and India.

China's growing regional influence derives not only from its hard power but its influence is also growing in ways associated with soft power. Beijing fashions a new set of norms to govern interstate relations. This is Particularly the case in Asean, Where China's initiatives dovetail very closely with ASEAN's own norms articulated over many years.³⁸²

The second area of potential Chinese soft power lies in the realm of higher education. During the 2003 academic year, there were 77,628 foreign students studying for advanced degrees in China's universities, approximately 80 percent of which came from other Asian countries. South Korea sent by far the largest number of these students (35,363), while Japan sent 12,765, Vietnam 3,487, Indonesia 2,563, Thailand 1,554, and Nepal 1,199. During that same year there were 3,693 students from the United States. The precise influence that this training will have on future generations of Asian elites is difficult to predict, but these individuals will certainly be sensitized to Chinese viewpoints and interests, and they will have the knowledge of the Chinese language, society, culture, history, and politics.³⁸³

Especially since the early 1990s Beijing has been committed to making China a great Power, economically and militarily, by the first quarter of the next century, which is also the beginning of the third millennium. Power will be needed not only to protect the fast-


³⁸² David Shambaugh, **Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics**, (California 2005, University of California Press), p.25.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*,p.25.

growing modernization processes and to deter external hostile adversaries, but also as a symbol of greatness.³⁸⁴

Figure 8.7: Critical Threats to China’s Vital Interests

Percentage of Chinese who view each of the following as a critical threat to Chinese vital interests in the next ten years.



Source: Global Views 2006


Asked to rate a list of threats to the vital interests of China, only two are considered critical by a majority of Chinese. Chinese again cite quality-of-life issues as paramount. In first place, with 65% calling the threat critical, is AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics, followed by disruption in energy supply, with 54% calling it critical. Another environmental issue—global warming—is in third place, with 47% calling it critical. Only in fourth place does a traditional great power issue appear—international terrorism, with 42% calling it critical. It is followed by another—the U.S. military presence in Asia—with 38% seeing it as critical.

³⁸⁴ Yitzhak Shichor, “Conversion and Diversion: The Politics of China’s Military Industry after Mao”, in ed. Efraim Inbar, **The Politics And Economics of Defence Industries**, (BESA, London 1998 Frank Cass Publishers), p.161.

8.7.3. Colapse of China

China's millions, frequently cited as an element of her potential power, are in fact a serious source of weakness. True, there are empty spaces in the hinterlands of Tibet and Central Asia which are now being peopled by Han Chinese sent from overcrowded cities and farm villages. But vast areas of these territories are inhospitable, and mere displacement of people to subsistence areas is no more than a temporary solution.³⁸⁵

Figure 8.8: Grain Production Per Capita in China, 1979-2003



Source: NBS 2004 and additional previous issues, with calculations.

A chaotic China view asserts that unless the communist leadership decides to unleash a speedy process of political pluralization and democratization to create a polity which is governed by the rule of law and norms of civil society, China could collapse from within. If this were to happen, not only would the country be divided into numerous weak ethno-political entities, involved in internal conflicts, but also the world would have to cope with

³⁸⁵ Samuel B.Griffith, "The Military Potential of China",in ed. Alastair Buchan, **China And The Peace of Asia**, (London 1965, Chatto and Windus Ltd), p.69.

a massive, tragic trans-border refugee problem and serious threats to regional and for that matter world stability and security.³⁸⁶

The case of China is indeed a highly complex one. While the ruling communist elite is determined to control the future of the country, the very process of social and economic reform that it has pursued so vigorously over the last decades is bound to foster the growth of civil society and political pluralism, narrowing the options of the elite. As the situation stands, the chances are that China may vacillate between being defensive and assertive in its domestic and foreign policy, but eventually take a direction similar to that of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. But of course, for China to move in this direction depends not just on how the country's Communist Party readjust to the new realities of China but also on how China is treated by the outside world, especially those states which fear the emergence of China as a superpower in the coming decades.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁶ Amin Saikal, "Emerging powers: The cases of China, India, Iran, and Israel", in Muthia Alagappa ed., **International Security Management and the United Nations**, (USA 1999, United Nations University Press), p.70.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.71-72.

9. CONCLUSION

During the 19th century China was a colonized country by the major powers namely Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the USA. The primary goal of Chinese foreign policy since the removal of the last foreign forces in 1949 has been to recapture 'stolen' territories and gain the respect. The handing back of Hong Kong and Macao marks the end of foreign occupation of China. Now Taiwan is the main concern not only to gain territory but also to gain prestige.

China's rise and changing perceptions have prompted countries along China's periphery to readjust their relations with Beijing. As China's influence continues to grow, many of these countries look to Beijing for the regional leadership and take into account China's interests in their decision making mechanism. Although China is far from being the only consequential power in the region, its desire for a larger role has become a principal catalyst in shaping a new order in Asia. In this new order, Asia's principal subregions are becoming increasingly interactive and enmeshed in a growing net of interdependence. The emerging order is also changing the role of the United States and its regional allies, as well as by the maturing of regional organizations that do not involve the USA.

Just over a decade ago China did not enjoy full diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Singapore, or South Korea; relations with Vietnam and India were hostile and their borders were militarized. The collapse of the Soviet Union and East European communist party-states had greatly increased the Chinese leadership's feelings of insecurity and they began to fear their own possible overthrow. Today, transfer of power has brought a new and confident leadership to power in Beijing. China's new leaders face complex challenges in foreign policy. China's relations with the major powers have never been so strong and together with China's improved position in Asia, China's reputation in the world has never been better.

The implications of China's globalization and rise as a major power can be seen in its impact both on Beijing and on policy deliberations in Taipei, Tokyo, Moscow, Washington, Brussels and Seoul. The Chinese Communist leadership is having to cede space in its decision making process to industrial interests and the leaders themselves are

coming into power with experience in the transformation of society that comes from development and modernization after opening to the outside world. China now depends on international investment and trade for the economic growth needed to maintain the domestic development.

China's trading partners know that dependency on the Chinese market means that Beijing is looming larger in all aspects of policy making. This raises several policy issues. One of them is how to deal with a modernizing and more powerful PLA, financed by the rapidly growing economy. Another is how to integrate China to the East Asian institutions with Beijing's desire as China at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery.

Today, China has greater strength compare to the past and also believes it faces few immediate threats. In addition to providing support for core foreign policy concerns, China's contemporary grand strategy is designed to manage the country's rise to the status of a great power that shapes, rather than simply responds to the international system.

To achieve this goal, China needs several decades of continued economic and military modernization. During this period China must sustain its high economic growth. It also presents a diplomatic challenge. As had become clear by the mid-1990s, China's expanding power had already begun to elicit worried reactions from the U.S. and China's Asian neighbors. Because of these reactions, since 1996 Beijing has forged a diplomatic strategy with purposes to maintain the international conditions that will make it feasible for China to focus on the domestic development necessary if it is to increase its relative capabilities.

One of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. in East Asia is "managing" the inevitable rise of China or more reasonable to state that to successfully integrate China into the global community. China's economic development has progressed in tandem with China's integration into the global community. Chinese national interests increasingly affect global geopolitical arrangements that have been in place since the end of World War II. As the dominant power in East Asia, it falls upon the United States to maintain stability and security in the region as well as diplomatic, economic, and trade policies that guide

peaceful trends in the region. Bilateral relations of USA in the region are main structure that contributes stability in the region. As China's economy grows, and its national interests increasingly extend beyond its borders, the U.S. will face a serious challenge.

Since 1990 China has embarked upon an ambitious and expensive project to upgrade its armed forces with modern weapons. The Chinese leadership relies upon the military for prestige, therefore the acquisition and development of new weapons has political as well as military reasons.

Russia, Israel, and European countries and even USA has supplied the bulk of China's new weapons. However there are still a number of deficiencies in the equipment, technologies and the PLA's ability to use these new systems.

Since the end of the Cold War there is no credible military threat to China. The primary threat to the Chinese state comes from domestic dissatisfaction with the government of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Domestic crises rather than invasion by imperialists tire the minds of decision-makers in Beijing. The regime maintains the legitimacy through providing economic development, political order, and a revival of China's international prestige. For as long as the leadership can supply rising living standards the public is likely to accept the regime. China's Grand strategy policy is to keep military modernization in second place to promoting development - this principle has, restricted the amount PLA is willing to spend on arms procurement.

The military role in this political system is complicated. Their traditional role has been to act as the bodyguard of the CCP and defend it from enemies within and outside the state.

The Peoples Liberation Army now has another role, which is to enhance and maintain China's prestige abroad. Prestige was one of the important reasons for the Chinese nuclear program during the cold war, and it lies at the heart of her current modernization process.

Chinese military with modern weapons will show the Chinese people that their leaders can make their country strong and respected. A second factor is the ability of the military to deal with any future negative contingency such as a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan or further encroachments upon China's possessions in the South China Sea.

Main theme of China's global and regional agenda over coming decades will be focused on securing defacto flow of energy and raw materials resources to China, and markets for its industrial products. China's behavior on the global stage in recent times represents a precursor to a future environment where much of China's foreign policy and defense policy will be aimed at protecting its economic position.

It is often argued that China's military buildup is intended to force Taiwan into reunification, and deter a US defense of Taiwan. This view is not supported by fact, as the scale and strategic reach of capabilities being developed by China is well in excess of what would be required to defeat Taiwan military and make a US defense of Taiwan prohibitively expensive. China's long term goal is clearly to become the dominant military power in Asia, displacing the US from this position.

The introduction of legislation authorizing the use of military force against Taiwan represents a major policy change, as it legislates the acquisition of territory by military invasion rather than political means. This represents a break with over two decades of policy which emphasized 'soft power' over military power as a method of achieving policy aims.

China's developing dual oriented strategy of using 'soft power' and military power shows a good understanding of how the US exerts influence on the global stage, and in many respects emulates the US model very effectively. As China's strategic goals are mostly regional rather than global, China can focus smaller resources than the US could with much greater effect in Asia Pacific.

China has a long history of using military power for coercive purposes. The Korean War, the invasion of northern India during the early 1960s and invasion of Vietnam during the late 1970s, and the ongoing efforts to intimidate Taiwan illustrate a consistent motif of an aggressive policy. Where an opportunity exists to do so without sanction, China has always used military force to achieve its policy aims.

China has never been hegemonic global power. On the other hand, it may also be argued that China did not have the reasons to be a great power in the past. This seems to change in the 21st century. Historically China was a continental power, China is now embarking on an ambitious naval modernization program that will turn it into a major maritime player within a relatively short period of time. Military doctrine is shifting from the emphasis on luring the enemy into one's territory into attacking the enemy before he reaches the border. The People's Liberation Army has also been indoctrinated with a new slogan of "safeguarding China's territorial integrity and protecting maritime rights". This is actually not too different from what other States in the region are trying to do, except that China has many times more ships and more resources than the most other countries combined. Moreover, it is perceived that China has irredentist tendencies, and that Chinese leaders seem to follow the illusion that any piece of territory written about in Chinese dynastic records belongs to today's China.

In this thesis I tried to show that China has a peaceful strategy to gain time for building a strong military in the long run. Chinese leaders carefully analyzed the mistakes of the USSR and do not want to repeat them. China is steadily improving its military capabilities in the terms of doctrine, military technology, and training. However, China gives priority to the development instead of the military and tries to be the number one economy of the world in the coming decades. In conclusion, we believe that China will keep following the low profile and peaceful diplomacy for the near future.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

Adıbelli, Barış, **Çin Dış Politikasında Tayvan Sorunu**, (İstanbul: IQ yayıncılık, , 2006)

Allen, Kenneth W., “PLA Air Force Operations And Modernization”, **People’s Liberation Army After Next**, ed: Susan M. Puska, (SSI ,August 2000)

Allen, Kenneth W., “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in **Crisis in the Taiwan Strait**, edited by James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, (American Enterprise Institute and National Defense University Press, 1997)

Allison, Roy and Lena Jonson, **Central Asian Security: The New International Context**, (London, Brookings Institutions, 2000)

Arıboğan, Deniz Ülke, “Opening the Closed Window to the East; Turkey’s Relations with East Asian Countries”,in ed. İdris Bal, **Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era**, (Florida, Brown Walker Pres, 2004)

Bernstein, R., Munro, R.H., **The Coming Conflict With China**, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997)

Bi, Jianxiang, The PLA’S Revolution in Operational Art: Retrospects and Prospects, in Thierry Gongora, Harald Von Riekhoff, **Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defence and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century**, (London: Greenwood press 2000)

Bin,Yu, “Historical Irones, Dividing Ideologies And Accidental “Alliance”: Russian-Chinese Relations Into The 21st Century”, **The Rise Of China In Asia: Security Implications** edited By Carolyn W. Pumphrey

Blasko, Dennis J., Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989,David A Graff and Robin Higham ed. In **A Military History of China**, (Colorado: Westview Press 2002)

Blasko,Dennis J., “PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward A Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force”, in **The PLA as Organization**, ed. James C.Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002)

Brigadier, J.P.Dalvi, **Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian war of 1962**, (Bombay: Thacker, 1969)

Broadman, Harry G., **Africa’s Silk Road China and India’s New Economic Frontier**, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2007)

- Brown, Chris, **Understanding International Relations**, (London: Palgrave, 2001)
- Burchill, Scott, **Theories of International Relations**, (New York: Palgrave, 2001)
- Cha, Victor D., Engaging China: the view from Korea, in. Alastair Iain ed., **Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power**, (New York: Routledge, 2005)
- Çaşın, Mesut Hakkı, “Değişen Uluslararası Konjonktür ve Çin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejilerinin Yeni parametreleri”, Atilla Sandıklı and İlhan Güllü ed. in **Geleceğin Süper Gücü Çin**, (İstanbul: Tasam, 2005)
- Çaşın, Mesut Hakkı, İpek Yolundan Çin Denzine Barış ve Güvenliğin Yeni Parametreleri, in ed.Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, **Çin’in Gölgesinde Uzakdoğu Asya**, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2001)
- Chang, Gordon H, **Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972**, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990)
- Chung, Chien-Peng, **Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes**, (London: Routledge Press, 2004)
- Crane, Keith, Roger Cliff, Evan Medeiros James Mulvenon, William Overholt, **Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints**, (Santa Monica CA:RAND, 2005)
- Dart, Dan Van, **Standard of Power**, (London 2001, Pimlico press)
- Dorf, Robert. H. **Some Basic Concepts and Approaches to the Study of International Relations Guide To National Security Policy And Strategy**, Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (U.S. Army War College, 2004)
- Dougherty, James E., Robert L. Pfaltzgraf, Jr., **Contending Theories of International Relations**, (Longman, 2001)
- Downs Erica Strecker, **China’s Quest for Energy Security**, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000)
- Duk-ki, Kim, **Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geo- Strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects**, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000)
- Fishman, Ted C., **China Inc**, (New York:, Scribner, 2005)
- Feffer, John, **North Korea/South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis**, (Canada: Seven Stories Press, 2003)
- Fewsmith, Joseph, **Elite Politics in Contemporary China**, (New York:, East Gate 2001)

- Frieman, W., "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, editors, **China's Military Faces the Future**, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999)
- Furuya Keiji, **Chiang Kai-Shek His Life And Times**, (New York: St. John's University, 1981)
- Gernet, Jacques, **A History of Chinese Civilization**,(USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
- Gill, R. Bates, **Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order** (Westport: CT: Praeger, 1992)
- Gill, Bates, "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-Making in an Era of Reform," Chapter 9 in David M. Lampton (ed.), **The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000** (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001)
- Gill R. Bates, **Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order** (Westport: CT: Praeger, 1992)
- Griffith, Samuel B., "The Military Potential of China", in ed. Alastair Buchan, **China And The Peace of Asia**, (London: Chatto and Windus Ltd, 1965)
- Goh, Evelyn, **Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"**, (Cambridge University Press)
- Goldstein Jonathan, "The Republic of China and Israel", in **China and Israel, 1948-1998**, (London: Praeger, 1999)
- Goldstein, Melvyn, **The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama**, (University of California Press, 1997)
- Harding, Harry, "The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture, 1973-1978", in Thomas Fingar, ed., **China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980)
- Harding, Harry, "China's Changing Roles in the Contemporary World" in Harding, ed., **China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s**, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)
- Hara, Kimie, **Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945**, (New York: Nissan Institute, 1998)
- Haris, Lillian Craig, **China Considers the Middle East**, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993)
- Hinton, Harold C., China as an Asian Power, in Thomas W. Robinson ed., **Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice**, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)

Huan Yang, "China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons" in Pillsbury, **Chinese Views of Future Warfare**

IEA, "Developing China's Natural Gas Market", **IEA Report**, (Paris France: 2002)

Ismael, Tareq Y., **International Relations in the Contemporary Middle East** (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986)

Jencks, Harlan, "COSTIND is Dead, Long Live COSTIND! Restructuring China's Defense Scientific, Technical, and Industrial Sector," in eds. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, **The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age** (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999)

Jofe, Ellis, **The Chinese Army after Mao**, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987)

Kenny, Henry J., Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 war with China, in, David Michael. Finkelstein, Mark A Ryan, Michael A. McDevitt, **Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949**, (New York, CNA press, 2003)

Kumaraswamy, P.R., "China and Israel: Normalisation and After," in **China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence**, (London: Sage Publications, 1999)

Lee, Chae-Jin Conflict and Cooperation: The Pacific Powers and Korea, in ed. Nick Eberstadt, **Korea's Future and The Great Powers**, (University of Washington Press, 2001)

Lenin, "Imperialism, "The Highest Stage of Capitalism"", **Lenin Collected Works**, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1950)

Levathes, Louise, **When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of The Dragon Throne**, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994)

Li, Nan, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine Strategy and Tactics, 1985-1995: Chinese Perspective", in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, **China's Military in Transition**, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)

Li, Res, "Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and International Stability", in Suisheng Zhao ed. **Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior**, (New York: East Gate, 2004)

Lynch, Michael, **Mao**, (New York: Routledge 2004)

Marx, K. , **A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy**, (. New York: London: International Library Publishing Company, 1999)

Marx K, Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, **Selected Works, Volume One**, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969)

Manning, Robert A., Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, **China, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment**, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000)

Medzini Meron (1976). “Reflections on Israel’s Asian Policy,” in **Israel in the Third World**, Michael Curtis and S. Gitelson (eds). (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976)

Michael C. van Walt van Praag, **The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law**, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Pres, 1987)

Mitter Rana, **A Bitter Revolution:China’s Struggle With The Modern World**, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Müller, Harald, Annette Schaper, **US Nuclear Policy After the Cold War**, (Frankfurt: PRIF, 2004)

Nathan, Andrew J. and Robert S. Ross, **The Great Wall and The Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security**, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997)

National Intelligence Council, “**Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015**”, (Washington, D.C.: CIA publications, 1999)

National Intelligence Council, **Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project** (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2004)

Nelsen Harvey, “The Future of The Chinese State”, **The Modern Chinese State**, edited by David Shambaugh, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

Nish Ian, **China and Japan**, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

Nixon Richard, **RN The Memoirs of Richard Nixon** (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978)

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., **Understanding Intenational Conflicts**, (New York:Pearson 2005)

Ögütçü, Mehmet, **Geleceğimiz Asya’da mı? Yaralı Asya, Çin ve Türkiye**, (İstanbul: AD Kitapçılık, 1999)

Ögütçü, Mehmet, “China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security”, **International Energy Agency**,

Paul,T.V., **Balance of Power Theory and Practice in The 21st Century**, (Stanford: California University Press, 2004)

Perkovich, George, **India's Nuclear Bomb**, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999)

Rongzhen, Nie, translated by Zhong Renyi, **Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen**, (Beijing: New World Press, 1988)

Segal, Gerald, "Containment or Engagement of China?" Calculating Beijing's Responses, in Michael E Brown ed., **The Rise of China**, (USA:MIT press 2001)

Shai, Arnon (1999). "The Israeli Communist Party's policy toward the People's Republic of China, 1949-1998" in **China and Israel**. Jonathan Goldstein (ed), (London: Praeger, 1999)

Saikal, Amin, "Emerging powers: The cases of China, India, Iran, and Israel",in Muthia Alagappa ed.,**International Security Management and the United Nations**, (USA: United Nations University Press,1999)

Shambaugh, David, **Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics**, (California: University of California Press, 2005)

Shichor, Yitzhak, **The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977**, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)

Shichor, Yitzhak, "Conversion and Diversion: The Politics of China's Military Industry after Mao",in ed. Efraim Inbar, **The Politics And Economics of Defence Industries**, (London BESA Frank Cass Publishers, 1998)

Shirk Susan, "Chinese Perceptions Of India: Brief Comments", **The Rise Of China In Asia: Security Implications** edited by Carolyn W. Pumphrey
Smith, Warren W., **The Tibetan Nation**,(NewYork: Penguin press 1991)

Soysa, Indra de and Nils Petter Gleditsch,"The Liberal Globalist Case", **Global Governance in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives on World Order**, (Stocholm Sweden: Almkvist & Wiksell International, 2002)

Stokes, Mark A., "Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces In The Age of Global Missile defense: Challenges And Responses", **China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives On Security, Ballistic Missiles, And Conventional Capabilities**, Ed. Andrew Scobell And Larry M. Wortzel,

Stokes, Mark A., **China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States** (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999)

Sutter, Robert G., **Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States**, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000)

Swaine, Michael D., Ashley J. Tellis, **Interpreting China's Grand Strategy**, (Washington: RAND, 2000)

Swaine Michael D., **The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking**, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996)

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, **Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950**, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)

Tse-tung, Mao, "On Protracted War", **Selected Military Writings**, (Beijing:Foreign Languages Pres, 1963)

Tse-Tung, Mao, **Selected Works of MaoTse-Tung**, (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1967)

Tse-Tung, Mao, "The Chinese People Have Stood Up", **Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung**, Vol:5 (Beijing: Foreign Languages press,1977 ,p.16)

Waltz, Kenneth N., **Man the State and War**, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001)

Wang, Fei-Ling, Chinese Security Policy in Northeast Asia,in ed.Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A.Olsen, **The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security**, (London:, Lynie Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996)

Wilhelm, Alfred D., Jr., **The Chinese at the Negotiating Table**, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994)

Wishnick Elizabeth, **Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy From Brezhnev to Yeltsin**, (USA: University of Washington Press, 2001)

Whiting, Allen, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions." In David Shambaugh & Richard H. Yang, Eds., **China's Military in Transition**, (Oxford: Calrendon Press, 1997)

Wolfram Eberhard, **A History of China**, (London: Routledge, 2005)

Wolf, Charles, Jr., Jonathan D. Pollack, **Straddling Economics and Politics: Cross-Cutting Issues in Asia, the United States, and the Global Economy**, (Santa Monica: RAND 2002)

Xiaoping, Deng, "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us," January 16, 1980, in Deng Xiaoping, **Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)**, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984)

Xiaoping, Deng, "Building A Socialism with A Specifically Chinese Character," June 30, 1984, in Deng Xiaoping, **Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (1982-1992)**, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994)

Zarubin, Alexander, "The Korean Peninsula, From Inter-Korean Confrontation to a System of Cooperative Security", in ed. James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, **The North Korean Nuclear Program**, (London: Routledge, 2000)

Zhisui, Li, **The Private Life of Chairman Mao**, (New York: Random House, 1994)

Zhang, Dong Dong, **China's Relations with Japan in an Era of Economic Liberalization** (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., Commack, 1998)

Zhang Shu Guang, **Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958**, (Cornell University Press, London 1992)

ARTICLES

Akihiro, Iwashita, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of "Partnership" after the Post-Cold War Period"

Alves, Ana Cristina, "Emerging Postcolonial Solidarities: China's New Economic Diplomacy Towards Subsaharan Africa", **16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia** in Wollongong (26 June - 29 June 2006)

Andican, Ahat "Türkistan Cumhuriyetleri, Rusya ve Çin Üçgeninde Doğu Türkistan", **Avrasya Dosyası**, Vol.2, No.2, (Summer 1995)

Archick, Kristin, Richard F. Grimmett, Shirley Kan, "European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy", **CRS Report** (2005)

Austin, Greg, "European Union Policy Responses to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, European" Institute for Asian Studies, **EIAS**, (02/2004)

ASEAN-China Expert Group, "Forging Closer Asean-China Economic Relations In The Twenty-First Century", **A Report Submitted on Economic Cooperation** (October 2001)

Ba, Alice, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century," **Asian Survey**, (July/August 2003), p.636.

Barry, Tom, "The Terms Of Power", **Foreign Policy In Focus**, (November 6 2002)

Baudin Pierre, "China und die Europäische Union: Zwiespältige Beziehungen", **KAS-AI** (5/2006)

Baviera, Aileen San Pablo, "China as a Rising Power: Implications for the Asia-Pacific", **PASCN Discussion Paper** No. 99-06

Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America", **Foreign Affairs**, 76:2, (March/ April 1997)

- Berkofsky, Axel, "EU-China Relations – Strategic Partnership or Partners of Convenience", **German Foreign Policy in Dialogue**, Volume 6, Number 16 Trier, Germany (June 23, 2005)
- Beeson, Mark, "Southeast Asia and the Major Powers," in Mark Beeson ed. **Contemporary Southeast Asia**, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
- Bielecki, J. , "Energy security: is the wolf at the door?", **The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance** vol: 42 (2002)
- Bijan, Zheng, China's "'Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status", **Foreign Affairs**, 84:5, (September/October 2005)
- Bitzinger, Richard A., "Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World," **International Security**, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Autumn 1992)
- Bin, Yu, "End of History? What's Next?", **Comparitive Connections**, (4th Quarter 2004) Vol. 6, No. 4 January 2005
- Blank, Stephen, "Asia's Shifting Strategic Landscape What is Russia to Asia?", **Orbis**, (Fall 2003)
- Brilliant, Joshua, "Israel's China-US weapons dilemma," **Washington Post**, (December 29, 2004)
- Brodie, Jonathan, "China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships and Submarines," **Jane's Defense Weekly**, (December 22, 1999)
- Bouton, Marshall M., "The United States and the Rise of China and India", **The Global Views 2006**, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, (2006)
- Bustelo, Pablo, China's Emergence: Threat or 'Peaceful Rise'?, **Real Instituto Elcano** (2005)
- Burns, Katherine G., "China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends"
- Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, "Eu-China Policy And The Implications For Cross-Straits Relations"
- Calabrese, John, "The Risks and Rewards of China's Deepening Ties with the Middle East", Jamestown Foundation **China Brief**, Vol. 5, Issue 12 (May 24, 2005)
- Calabrese, John, China And Iran: Mismatched Partners, **Jamestown Foundation**, Occasional Papers, (August 2006)
- Calder, Kent E., "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol:85 No.2 (March/April 2006)
- Çaşın, Mesut Hakkı, Çin Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Sarı Ejderin Uykusu, **Avrasya Dosyası**, no:2

(Summer 1995)

Chanda Nayan, "No Cash Carrier", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, (October 10, 1996)

Chellaney, Brahma, "After the Tests: India's Options," **Survival** 40.4 (1998-99)

Chou, Oliver, "President calls for hi-tech push by Air Force," **South China Morning Post**, (March 3), 1999

Christensen, Thomas J. "Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing's World-View", **Foreign Affairs**, 75:5 (September/October 1996)

Choong, Nam Kim, "Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK Alliance", **Analysis from the East-West Center**, (April 2003)

Çaşın, Mesut Hakkı, "Çin Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Sarı Ejderin Uykusu", **Avrasya Dosyası**, no:2 (Summer 1995)

Dalpino, Catharin and David Steinberg, "Southeast Asia Looks North: New Dynamics with China", **Georgetown Southeast Asia Survey**, (2003-2004), Washington, Georgetown university, 2003

Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (6/15/2001) **Monterey Institute of International Studies** 2002

Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Shanghai, 15 June 2006)

Dethlefsen, Knut, China's Foreign Policy in Transition, **FES**, Briefing Paper ,(May 2004)

USA,Department of Defence Report to Congress, **The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2002** (Office of Department of Defense,USA 2002),

Department of Defense's annual report to Congress, **The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005**, (Office of Department of Defense,USA 2005)

Dittmer, Lowell, "The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle", **Journal of Chinese Political Science**, vol. 10, no. 1, (April 2005)

Dumbaugh, Kerry, "Taiwan's Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications", **Congressional Research Service**, (The Library of Congress February 23, 2006)

Fang, Hsu-hsiung, "The Transformation of U.S.-Taiwan Military Relations", **Orbis**, (summer 2004)

Feigenbaum, Evan A., "China's Challenge to Pax Americana", **The Washington Quarterly**, 24:3, (Summer 2001)

- Finin, Gerard A., Terence Wesley-Smith, "A New Era for Japan and the Pacific Islands: The Tokyo Summit", **Analysis from the East-West Center**, (September 1997)
- Finkelstein David M., "The View from Beijing: U.S.-China Security Relations from Kosovo to September", (11, 2001)
- Freese, Joan Johnson, Space Wei Qi, The Launch of *Shenzhou V*, **Naval War College Review**, Vol. LVII, No. 2, (Spring 2004)
- Fox Martin Stuart, "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations," **Contemporary Southeast Asia**, no. 1, (2004)
- Frankenstein, John and Bates Gill, "Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries", **The China Quarterly**, (June, 1996)
- Friedberg, Aaron L., "The Future of U.S.-China Relations Is Conflict Inevitable?", **International Security**, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005)
- Frieman, W., "China's Defence Industries," **Pacific Review**, 1993
- Gaffney, Frank J., Jr., "China Arms the Rogues", **Middle East Quarterly**, (September 1997)
- Garibaldi, Gabriele, "The Chinese Threat to American Leadership in Space", **Security Dialogue**, (July 20, 2004)
- Garrett, Banning and Bonnie Glaser, "China and the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a Time of Strategic Change and Shifts in the Balance of Power", **Asia/Pacific Research Center**, (October 1997)
- Gilley, Bruce, "Flying Start", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, (March 11, 1999)
- Godwin, Paul H.B., "Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese People's Liberation Army," presented at the **CAPS-RAND PLA Conference**, 1999
- Goldstein, Avery, The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice, **The China Quarterly**, (2001)
- Gries, Peter Hays, "China Eyes the Hegemon", **Orbis**, (Summer 2005)
- Gupta, Shekhar with Sudeep Chakravarti, "Vital Breakthrough," **India Today**, (September 30, 1993)
- Hale, David, "China's Economic Takeoff: Implications for Africa", **Brenthurst Discussion Paper**, (1/2006)
- Hasan, Khalid, 'Where American liberalism stops', **Dawn**, (28 January 2002)

Hasbullah, Ahmad, Mohd Nawawi, "China-ASEAN Future Relations-An Analysis", **Usawc Strategy Research Project**

Hoesslin, Karsten von, "The China Question: A Window Of Opportunity", **Journal of Military and Strategic Studies**, Vol. 7, Issue 1 (Fall 2004)

Hui, Tian, "Energy Drives China to Big Iran Market," **Oriental Morning Post**, (June 28, 2005)

Horowitz, David, "Breaking Down the Wall of Secrecy", **Jerusalem Report**, (January 9, 1992)

Howard, Russell D., "The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms And Slow Legs"", **INSS Occasional Paper 28 Regional Security Series** (September 1999)

Humble, Ronald D., "Science, Technology, and China's Defence Industrial Base," **Jane's Intelligence Review**, (January 1992)

Hwang, Balbina Y., "Japan's New Security Outlook:Implications for the United States", **Backgrounder** No:1865, (July 7 2005)

Iain, Alastair Johnston ChiIs, "China a Status Quo Power?", **International Security**, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003)

India China Economic Relations, **Ace Global**, (July 2005)

Jencks, Harlan W., "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment", **Asian Survey**, Vol. XIX, No. 8 (August 1979)

Jingjie, Li, "Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership," **Orbis**, (Fall 2000)

Junwei, Ma, "Building Sino-Japanese Relations Oriented toward the 21st Century", **Issues & Insights**, Vol. 5, No. 10, Honolulu, Hawaii,

Kahn, Joseph, "News Analysis: China's missile test: A message for U.S", **International Herald Tribune**, (Friday, January 19, 2007)

Kan, Shirley A., "China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis", **CRS Report for Congress**, (10 2000)

Kane, Thomas M., "Dragon or Dinosaur? NuclearWeapons in a Modernizing China", **Parameters**

Karmel, Solomon M., "The Maoist Drag on China's Military", **Orbis** (summer 1998)

Kernacs, Rita, M.A., "The Future of U.S. Relations with Japan and China: Will Bilateral Relations Survive the New American Unilateralism?", **Asia Pacific: Perspectives** Volume IV · Number 1 (May 2004)

- Krasner, S., "Realism, imperialism, and democracy", **Political Theory**, Vol:20 (1992)
- Kozhokin, Yevgeny, "Shanghai Five: Present Realities And Future Prospects", **Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies**,
- Lai, David, "Learning From The Stones: A *Go* Approach To Mastering China's Strategic Concept, *Sh'i*", **Strategic Studies Institute**, monograph (May 2004)
- Layne, Christopher, "China's Role In American Grand Strategy: Partner, Regional Power, Or Great Power Rival?"
- Layne, Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming End of the United States Unipolar Moment", **International Security**, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006)
- Lee, Deng-Ker, "Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post Cold War Era", **Issues and Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 8, (August 1994)
- Lijun, Sheng, "China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic Motivations", **ISEAS Working Paper: International Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1**(2003)
- Lijiang, Shen "The Mysterious Course of the Pilot Warship Captains," **Jianchuan Zhishi**, no. 7 (1989)
- Limin, Li, "Zhazhu jiyu, jueding hao Zhongguo yu shijie de guanxi [Seizing Good Fortune and Resolving China's Relations with the World]," **Xiandai guoji guanxi**, No. 4, (2003)
- Malik, Mohan, "Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: The China Factor," **Australian Journal of International Affairs**, 53.1 (1999)
- Malik, J. Mohan, "China Edgy over Clinton's India Visit," **Pioneer**, (2 March 2000)
- Malik, Mohan, "Peking's Response to the Gulf Crisis", **Issues and Studies**, (September 1991)
- Mann, J., "The Asian Challenge: The Unanticipated Consequences of the War in India, Pakistan, China, and Japan," **American Prospect**, (19 November 2001)
- Mandelson, Peter, "EU-China 30 Years of Friendship", **Businessweek**, (2005).
- Mann, Paul, "U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China's for Decades." **Aviation Week & Space Technology**, (January 17, 2000)
- McVadon, Eric A., "China's Maturing Navy", **Naval War College Review**, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2006)
- Medeiros, Evan S., Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players, And Process", **Strategic Studies Institute**, (August 2000)

- Medeiros, Evan S. and M. Taylor Fravel, “China's New Diplomacy”, **Foreign Affairs**, 82: 6 (November/December 2003)
- Medzini, R., "China and the Palestinians -a Developing Relationship?", **New Middle East**, (May 1971)
- Mitra, Pramit and Drew Thompson, “China and India: Rivals or Partners?”, **Far Eastern Economic Review** , (April 2005)
- Montaperto, Ronald N., “China-Southeast Asia Relations:Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally”, **Comparative Connections**, (4th Quarter 2004) Vol. 6, No. 4 January 2005
- Moravcsik, Andrew, ”Taking Preferences Seriously A Liberal Theory Of International Politics”, **International Organization** 51, 4, (Autumn 1997)
- Muekalia, Domingos Jardo, “Africa And China’s Strategic Partnership”, **African Security Review** vol: 13,(2004)
- Mullins, Robert E., “The Dynamics of Chinese Missile Proliferation”, **Pacific Review** Vol. 8, No. 1 (1991)
- Murray III, William S and Robert Antonellis, China’s Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon (and Us), **Orbis**, (Fall 2003)
- Nam, Changhee and Seiichiro Takagi, “Rising China and Shifting Alliances in Northeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges facing America and its Allies”, **The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis**, Vol. XVI, No. 2, (Fall 2004)
- Nam-ju, Lee, “From Partnership to Alliance? The Development of Sino-Russian Relations”, **East Asian Review** Vol.13, No.1, (Spring 2001)
- Oster, Shai, “China Will Strike an Energy Deal with the Saudis”, **The Wall Street Journal**, (January 23), 2006
- Ostankov, V.I., “Geopolitical Problems and Possible Solutions in the Context of Ensuring RF Security,” **VM**, no. 1, (2005)
- Pastor, Alfredo and David Gosset, “The EU-China Relationship: A Key to the 21st Century Order”, **Real instituto Elcano**, (30/11/2005)
- Quansheng, Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-cold War Era”, **World Affairs**, 159:3, (1997)
- Quinones, C. Kenneth, “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy”, **Asian Perspective**, Vol.27, No.1, (2003)

- Rahman, Chris, "Defending Taiwan, And Why It Matters", **Naval War College Review**, Vol. LIV, No. 4, (Autumn 2001)
- Renfeng, Zhao, "Iran Prefers China for Oil Exploration Projects", **China Daily**, (November 9, 2004)
- Renyi, Cao, , Vision of Security of The Asian-Pacific Region. **ACDIS Occasional Papers**
- Richardson, James R., "Critical Liberalism in International Relations", Working paper **Australian National University. Dept. of International Relations**, (2002)
- Ross, Robert S., "Beijing as a Conservative Power", **Foreign Affairs**, 76:2, (March/ April 1997),p.34.
- Ross, Robert S., "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," **International Security** 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999)
- Rubin, Barry "China's Middle East Strategy", **MERIA Journal**, vol 3 no 1, (March 1999)
- Rynhold, Jonathan; Deng-Ker Lee, "Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post Cold War Era", **Issues and Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 8, (August 1994)
- Sachdev, A.K., "Modernization of the Chinese Air Force", **Strategic Analysis**, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, (September 1999)
- Sakhuja, Vijay, The Shifting Geopolitical System In The Asia-Pacific: An Indian Perspective, **Regional Outlook Forum**, (2006)
- Self,Benjamin, "China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship", **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol:26, (2002-2003),
- Shambaugh, David , "China and Europe: The Emerging Axis", **Current History**, (September 2004)
- Shambaugh, David "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage", **Washington Quarterly**, (Spring 2000)
- Shambaugh, David, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term", **The Washington Quarterly**, vol: 26:2,(Spring 2003)
- Shen, Dingli, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom", **The Washington Quarterly**, 29:2 (Spring 2006)
- Shichor, Yitzhak, "China's Kurdish Policy," Jamestown Foundation **China Brief**, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (January 3, 2006)
- Shichor, Yitzhak. "Israel's Military Transfers to China and Taiwan," **Survival**. vol 40 (1) (1998)

- Sibing, He, “Space Official in Beijing Reveals Dual Purpose of Shenzhou”, **Space Daily**, (Mar. 7, 2003)
- Simonds, David, “A new arms race in space?”, **The Economist**, (January 25th 2007)
- Singh, Bhartendu Kumar, “The Political Economy of China’s Defence Modernisation”, **Strategic Analysis**, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Oct-Dec 2005)
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “International Law in a World of Liberal States”, **EJIL** vol:6, 1995
- Soeren Kern, “Are China and the US Drifting Towards War over Taiwan?”, **USA-Transatlantic Dialogue, Elcano Royal Institute** No: 37, (2005)
- Song, Yann-Huei, “Cross–strait interactions on the South China Sea issues: a need for CBMs”, **Marine Policy**, 29 (2005)
- Sorli, Mirjam E., “The Liberal Peace Argument in the Middle East:Ali in Wonderland or Crude (oil) Reality ?”,Paper presented to, **Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference**,University of Kent, Canterbury, Sept. 8-10, 2001
- Storey, Ian and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors”, **Naval War College Review**, vol:57, no. 1 (Winter 2004)
- Sun, Lena H.,”China, India Sign Accord to Ease Border Dispute,” **Washington Post**, (September 8, 1993)
- Sutter,, Robert, “Why Does China matter?”, **The Washington Quarterly**, 27:1 (Winter, 2003-04),
- Sutter, Robert G., **Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States**, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000)
- Suettinger, “China’s Foreign Policy Leadership: Testing Time”, **China Leadership Monitor**, No.9
- Takahara, Akio, “Sino-Japanese Relations 60 Years after the War: a Japanese View”, **Issues & Insights**, Vol. 5, No. 10, Honolulu, Hawaii (September 2005)
- Thompson, Drew, “Economic Growth and Soft Power: China’s Africa Strategy”, **ChinaBrief** Volume IV Issue 24 (December 7, 2004)
- Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia and Global SecurityNorms”, **The Washington Quarterly**, Spring 2004

- Trush, Sergei, "Russia's Response to the NATO Expansion: China Factor" (Moscow: NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships 1997–1999, 1999)
- Vincenot, Aymeric, China's Hu to Visit Three African States to Bolster Partnerships, **Agence France Press**, (27 January, 16 July 2004)
- Wai, Ting, "EU-China Relations: Economic, Political and Social Aspects", Hong Kong Baptist University
- Wall, Robert, "CIA: China-Taiwan Clash Possible Soon," **Aviation Week & Space Technology**, (February 7, 2000)
- Wallender, Celleste A., US-Russian Relations Between Realism and Reality, **Current History**, (October 2003)
- Walt, Stephen M, "International relations: One world, many theories", **Foreign Policy**; Washington; (Spring 1998)
- Wan, Ming, "The U.S. factor in Sino-Japanese Relations", **Asia Program Special Report**, No:113, (July 2003)
- Weber, Maria, "US-China: New Balance Of Power In East Asia After September 11th", **Global Watch**, no:22, (October 2002)
- Weinstein, Michael A., "Intelligence Brief: Shanghai Cooperation Organization", Power and Interest Research Group **PINR** (12 July 2005)
- Wild, Leni and David Mephram, "The New Sinosphere: China In Africa" , **IPPR** , (2005)
- William S. W. Chang, "China and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations", **Stanford Journal Of East Asian Affairs**, Volume 1 (Spring 2001)
- Womack, Brantly "Asymmetry Theory and China's Concept of Multipolarity", **Journal of Contemporary China** Vol:13, (2004)
- Wu, Anne, "What China Whispers to North Korea", **The Washington Quarterly** vol:28:2, (Spring 2005)
- Xia, Liping,. "China: A Responsible Great Power.", **Journal of Contemporary China** vol:10, #26 (2001)
- Xiaofeng, Huang and Yao Zheng, "The Special Requirements of Electronic Warfare on National Defense Industrial Structures", **MSER** (2 1997)
- Xiangli, Sun, "Analysis of China's Nuclear Strategy" ,**China Security**, World Security Institute China Program

XIN, Benjian, "Security Dilemma, Balance of Power Vs. US Policy Towards China in the Post-Cold War Era", **Guoji Guanxi** (Contemporary International Relations),(september 2001)

YE, Jiang, "Will China be a "Threat" to Its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty First Century?", **Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies**, Vol.1 (2002)

Yu, Bin, "East Asia: Geopolitique Into the 21st Century: A Chinese View", **Occasional paper**, Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, (June 1990)

Yung, Christopher D., "People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century", (Alexandria, VA:**Center for Naval Analyses**, March 1996)

Zhao, Suisheng, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable", **The Washington Quarterly** 29:1 (Winter 2005-2006)

Zhao, Suisheng, "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China", in **Communist and Post- Communist Studies**, Vol. 31 (1998)

Zhenqiang, Pan, "The US-Europe-China Triangle in an Increasingly Multipolar World", **KAS/ Auslandsinformationen**, (December 2005)

NEWSPAPERS

"*Bush is Offering Taiwan Some Arms but not the Best*", in **The New York Times**,(April 24, 2001)

"*Reappearance of Reagan Foreign Policy Under President Bush*", in **United Daily News**, (February 11, 2001), p.11

"President Putin Urges Radical Changes in Policy in Russian Far East," **ITAR-TASS**, (July 21,2000)

"Germany is China's largest trading partner in Europe", **The New Light of Myanmar**, (Friday, 17 December), 2004.

Hu Jintao delivers important speech at Saudi Shura Council), **Renmin Ribao** (Beijing, April 24, 2006)

CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR

Görkem Deniz OKUMUŞ

Kişisel Bilgiler:

Doğum Tarihi :08.07.1978

Doğum Yeri :Ankara

Medeni Durumu :Bekar

Eğitim:

Lise :1995-1997 19 Mayıs Lisesi

Lisans :1997-2002 Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler

Yüksek Lisans :2004-2007 Yeditepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü