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**CHANGING NATURE AND MAIN TRENDS**

**AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER**

**RUSSIAN-US FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS**

**by**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
CES	Common Economic Space
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFDP	Council for Foreign and Defense Politics
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
e.g	Exempli Gratia (Latin: For Example)
EIA	Energy Information Administration
etc.	Et Cetera (Latin: And So Forth)
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSA	Freedom Support Act
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RF	Russian Federation



OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
US	United States of America.
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons Of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

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## INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States (US) was the main pioneer in the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The two bloc's countries considered each other to be their main enemy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relationship between Russia and the US has undergone substantial changes. Both countries defined their relationship as a "strategic partnership" in early 90's. Today a US-Russian Federation (RF) relation has a complex structure covering both the conflicting and coinciding interests.

Upon the demise of the Soviet Union, the international political system became unipolar: America remained as the sole superpower while the heir of USSR, the Russian Federation, turned into minor or medium global player. A unipolar world is not *terra incognita*. There have been two other comparable unipolar moments in modern international history.

The main thesis of this study, using the neorealist theory, is that the "unipolar moment" is a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity (or multi-centrism) along 2000-2010: The Unipolarity is an illusion and the new great powers will rise.<sup>1</sup> The argument relies on the premise that states balance against hegemony, even those like the United States that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion. Unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemony's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its preeminence.

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<sup>1</sup> Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise"; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p. 244.

It will be difficult for the United States to maintain the Cold War *status quo* because structural change has destroyed the bipolar foundation of the post-1945 international system.

As Kenneth N. Waltz says, “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it.”<sup>2</sup> In a unipolar world, systemic constraint - balancing, uneven growth rates, and the sameness effect - impel eligible states (i.e., those with the capability to do so) to become great powers.

In the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least durable of international configurations. This is so for two main reasons. One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders thus weakening themselves in the long run. Ted Robert Gurr, after examining 336 polities, reached the same conclusion that Robert Wesson had reached earlier: “Imperial decay is . . . primarily a result of the misuse of Power which follows inevitably from its concentration.”<sup>3</sup>

The other reason for the short duration of unipolarity is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. America’s founding fathers warned against the perils of Power in the absence of checks and balances.<sup>4</sup>

According to neo-realist there is a grand strategy that could accomplish the two main geopolitical tasks facing the United States in the years ahead:

- Managing the potentially difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity; and
- Advancing American interests in the multi-polar world that inevitably will emerge.<sup>5</sup>

At the Russian side the recovery of the late Cold War period losses are now underway. Russia’s successful socio-economic development economic growth, plus reasonable

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<sup>2</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” PS, December 1991, p. 669.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Ted Robert Gurr, “*Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971*,” **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 68, No. 4 (December 1974), p. 1504.

<sup>4</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, **International Security**, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, p. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise”; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p.245.

distribution of that new wealth to broad sectors of the population, and particularly a developing middle class in Russia, those are going to be the key factors that support long term stability, democracy and prosperity in Russia. This would, we believe, be the basis for Russia – not another super or global Power but- to be great Power in the new multi-centric world.

In short, this study is aimed at explaining the dynamics of the new international Political system that determining the Russo-American conflict and cooperation spheres. Basically it is argued that the sole superpower of the post-cold war period, namely the United States, will be balanced, a process already underway, by other great powers and that the Russian Federation under the President Vladimir Putin became one of the striking candidate for this post. Aiming at exposing the reasons behind the above argument, the thesis is divided into four chapters.

In the first chapter it is focused on the theoretical issues aiming at explaining the conflict and cooperation in the post-cold war era and specifically in the Russo-American relations. The task to conceptualize the Russo-American relations in a changing this environment led us to define fundamental tenets of Post-Cold War era. These are the triumph and expansion movements of capitalism; the rise of USA as the sole hegemon in the new system and Russia as the loser at least at the beginning of this era.

This depiction of the world political system is followed by a more theoretical debate on the nature of post-cold war world system: Liberals are shortly analyzed and focused on the neo-realist or structural realist theories. Since there are several variants of the Neo-realist theory we preferred to concentrate on the most salient theorist in the “school”: Kenneth Waltz So the neo-realist interpretation of international politics, conflict and cooperation between states in the system and nature of post-cold war era are analyzed from a Waltzian point of view.

The second and the third chapters are dedicated to the analyses of the US and RF foreign policies starting with the former one. The chapter named as post-cold war us foreign policy begins with the historical background section: Turning Points in US Foreign Policy Post 1990 developments and salient debates around these developments are taken into consideration.

End of History and Clash between Civilizations theories are followed by empowerment of neo-cons in US Domestic and Foreign Policy. Chapter two attempted to analyze the alterations in main foreign policy issues namely US-EU Relations; US policy towards Middle Eastern Affairs and of course US foreign policy aims with regard to Russia. For Russia is at the focal point of this thesis a major part of the US Foreign policy analysis is dedicated to the US-Russian relations with a special focus on post September 11 period.

The mirror image of the second chapter could be finding in the third chapter. Post Cold War Russian foreign policy, first of all, depicted in historical terms shortly. The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy is analyzed due to preordination affirmed in thesis study: Analysis of Russian Approach to US-Russia relations in 1990s followed by depicting the Yeltsin Period in three phases: Emergence, Establishment and Preparations phase; The reassertion phase: And a transitional phase.

The main focus of this chapter is Putin period. This period is divided into two subtitles: Putin's first and the second terms. Within these distinctions the policy of "Near Abroad" and new foreign policy concept of 2000 are concentrated areas. Again, like in the second chapter the September 11 event is taken as a salient turning point in Russian-US Relations.

The last chapter before the conclusion part is a thematic re-evaluation and elaboration of the facts and theories of Russian-US relations in terms of areas of conflict and cooperation. Therefore, following the Emergence of multi-centrism in a unipolar world is taken as a general framework for areas of cooperation and the pillars of partnership.

## **I. THEORIES**

### **A. Realism**

Realism is a theory about international politics. It is an effort to explain both the behavior of individual states and the characteristics of the system as a whole. The ontological given

for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of international system. Sovereignty is apolitical order based on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system. There is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behavior of states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own resources.<sup>6</sup>

Realist theory held a dominant position in the study of international relations in the years extending from the end of World War II into the early 1980s. Central to classical realist theory are several key assumptions:(1) that the international system is based on states as the key actors; (2) that international politics is essentially conflictual, a struggle for power in an anarchic setting in which nation-states inevitably rely on their own capabilities to ensure their survival;(3) that states exist in a condition of legal sovereignty in which nevertheless there are gradations of capabilities, with greater and lesser states as actors; (4) that states are unitary actors and that domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy; (5) that states are rational actors characterized by a decision-making process leading to choices based on national interest; and (6) that power is the most important concept in explaining and predicting state behavior.<sup>7</sup>

Because power provides the core concept in realist theory for understanding state behavior, the need for greater definitional clarity abundantly apparent. Although power has been defined as the aggregate of capabilities available to the state, the power of one state also is said to be relative to the aggregate capabilities of the state with which it has a conflictual relationship. It has been suggested, that power is situational, or dependent on the issue, object, or goal for which it is employed. Economic power, however vast, cannot halt armored divisions, just as military power itself would not be sufficient to ensure global trade dominance.<sup>8</sup>

Power is a multi-faceted and complex notion, and it makes sense to think of the term under three headings, always bearing in mind that the three categories this will generate are closely interrelated. Power is an *attribute*- it is something that people or groups states possess or have access to, have at hand to deploy in the world. Power is a *relationship*- it is

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<sup>6</sup> S.Krasner, 'Realism, imperialism, and democracy', **Political Theory**, 20(1992), p.39.

<sup>7</sup> James E. Dougherty, Robert L.Pfaltzgraf, Jr., **Contending Theories of Internaitol Relatios**, 5th edition, 2001 Longman, p. 63-64.

the ability That people or groups or states have to exercise influence on others, to get their way in the world These two dimensions of power are clearly not separable, and most realist accounts of international relations have a story to tell about them. A third dimension of power in which it is seen as a property of a *structure* is less easily incorporated into realist accounts of the world, at least in so far as these accounts rely on the notion that power can only be exercised by an actor or agent.<sup>9</sup>

Realism offers a state-centric account of the world, and, because realism takes the state to be central to international relations, topics such as the study of foreign policy decision-making or the analysis of the components of national power loom large; for the same reason interstate ‘war’ is taken to be *sui generis*, unlike any other form of social conflict. This state centrality suggests that realism ought to have a clear theory of the state and that this should be the natural jumping off point for the rest of its thinking. As it happens this is not the case; the lack of such a theory is an important problem at the heart of realism, indeed of International Relations as an academic discourse.<sup>10</sup>

According to realist thought, a country’s leaders should not be misled by moral imperatives, driven by cooperation for cooperation’s sake, or unduly constrained by international institutions if such policies would cause the leaders to neglect balance-of-power calculations or the rational pursuit of national interests. Leaders should not be misled by the belief that the political or economic composition of other countries. By implication, a responsible leader should not base foreign policy on whether a potential ally or partner state is democratic; rather, cooperation is possible when states have common interests and when policies are shaped to take into account the realities of their capabilities.<sup>11</sup>

One of the problems of the realist theory is unable to define the national interest in an objective way. National interest can have different meanings for the different political parties. In other words it is not possible to have pure realism separated from the idealism in the real world

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p.75.

<sup>9</sup> Chris Brown, **Understanding International Relations**, 2nd edition ,2001 Palgrave 2001 London , P.89.

<sup>10</sup> Scott Burchill, p.68-69.

<sup>11</sup> Celleste A. Wallender , US-Russian Relations Between Realism and Reality, **Current History**, October 2003, p. 307.



The main study areas for the realist theory are security war and peace. The strength of the realist tradition is its capacity to argue from necessity. It seeks to describe reality, solve problems and understand the continuities of world politics. A normative concern with the causes of war and the conditions of peace, security and order will continue to guide research and teaching in International Relations because they are centrally important issues. Realism speaks to these concerns directly by privileging strategic interaction and the distribution of global power above other considerations.<sup>12</sup>

The first coherent expressions of a realist approach to the study of international politics evolved out of the apparent failure of liberal principles to sustain peace in Europe after the First World War. Realist believed that no amount of wishful thinking or the application of domestic political principles to the international sphere would change the nature of global politics, in particular its endemic violence.<sup>13</sup> According to realist strategists trade and liberal institutions can not prevent the conflict in the long run in the Asia Pacific and China after having enough military power will eventually become aggressive in international politics.

According to Waltz there can be two causes of a war: War may result because state A has something that state B wants. The efficient cause of the war is the desire of state B; the permissive cause is the fact that there is nothing to prevent state B from undertaking the risks of war. In a different circumstance, the interrelation of efficient and permissive causes becomes still closer. State A may fear that if it does not cut state B down a peg now, it may be unable to do so ten years from now. State A becomes the aggressor in the present because it fears what state B may be able to do in the future.<sup>14</sup>

## **B. Liberal Doctrine:**

Liberal peace theory basically argues that open economies, high levels of economic development and democracy are factors contributing to a more peaceful world. Theory on interstate conflict has been taken from the dyadic level (“two democratic states are very unlikely to fight each other”), to the national level (“democracies are inherently more

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<sup>12</sup> Scott Burchill, p.98.

<sup>13</sup> Scott Burchill, **Theories of International Relations**, 2nd edition, 2001 Palgrave 2001 New York, p.71.

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, **Man the State and War**, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p.234.

peaceful”) and culminates in a systemic argument (“a world with more democracies is more peaceful”).<sup>15</sup>

Liberal international relations theory applies to *all* States. Totalitarian governments, authoritarian dictatorships, and theocracies can all be depicted as representatives of some subset of actors in domestic and transnational society, even if it is a very small or particularistic slice. The preferences of such States are likely to differ from the preferences of States with more representative governments and more diverse and complex societies, but not necessarily and not on all issues. Thus, like Realism, Liberalism is a comprehensive theory of the international system.<sup>16</sup>

Like their realist and institutionalist counterparts, the three core liberal assumptions introduced earlier are relatively thin or content-free. Taken by themselves, they do not define a single unambiguous model or set of hypotheses, not least because they do not specify precise sources of state preferences. Instead they support three separate variants of liberal theory, termed here ideational, commercial, and republican liberalism. Each rests on a distinctive specification of the central elements of liberal theory: social demands, the causal mechanisms whereby they are transformed into state preferences, and the resulting patterns of national preferences in world politics.<sup>17</sup>

The two world wars and the failure of collective security in the interwar period discredited liberal theories. Most writing about international politics in the United States after World War II was strongly realist in favor. However, as transnational economic interdependence increased, the late 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of interest in liberal theories. There are three strands of this liberal thinking: economic, social, and political. The political strand has two parts, one relating to institutions and the other to democracy.<sup>18</sup> Liberalism demands market economy and open society to function.

America’s liberal internationalism has been closely tied to its support of a multilateral framework as the best way of ensuring international peace and development. As such,

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<sup>15</sup> Mirjam E. Sorli, The. Sorli, The Liberal Peace Argument in the Middle East:Ali in Wonderland or Crude (oil) Reality ?,Paper presented to, **Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference**,University of Kent, Canterbury, Sept. 8-10, 2001 p.2

<sup>16</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, **EJIL** 6, 1995,P.7

<sup>17</sup> Andrew Moravcsik,Taking Preferences Seriously A Liberal Theory Of International Politics,**International Organization** 51, 4, Autumn 1997, p.524

<sup>18</sup> Joseph S. NYE, Jr., **Understanding Intenational Conflicts**, Pearson 2005 New York, p. 45

America's liberal internationalist impulses contributed to widespread sentiment, both at home and abroad, that the U.S. was a benign hegemon.<sup>19</sup> During the President Clinton's administration, Liberal internationalism was again main political tool of the US foreign policy. President Clinton used engagement policy with the liberal perspective to deal with Russia.

Neoliberal models blame internal processes of bad government and dirigiste policies and do not see international processes as the cause of underdevelopment. They argue that the subversion of domestic and international markets, not their fair functioning, is to blame for underdevelopment. These theories suggest that globalisation can prevent narrow interests from dominating the market. The narrowing of ideological schisms and the spread of democracy will improve social welfare, since the created wealth can be redistributed in an accountable, if not consensual, manner.<sup>20</sup>

The democratic peace school, has established impressive empirical support for the thesis that democracies do not go to war against one another. The present issue is not the adequacy, or otherwise, of this claim and the theories that seek to explain it, but the question of its larger normative significance. Traditionally, liberals have seen war as an avoidable evil: evil not only because of the loss of life and suffering that it entails, but also because of the utter negation of liberal values; avoidable because in principle the world of states could be organised such that conflicts were resolved in the same, non-violent way as in liberal states, through bargaining and compromise.<sup>21</sup> According to the democratic peace school, international organizations can prevent the wars by promoting more communicatins between the states.

Liberalism has always been essentially cosmopolitan, holding out the prospect of improvement for all peoples, not just a favoured few. The benefits of peace among the rich and powerful are greatly to be welcomed, but there is no ground for liberal 'triumphalism' so long as they remain limited to the fortunate. Yet contemporary liberal theory on peace and security avoids confronting the situation of the disadvantaged, which poses the most intractable problems of the present.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Tom Barry, The Terms Of Power, **Foreign Policy In Focus**, November 6 2002,p.2

<sup>20</sup> Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch,The Liberal Globalist Case, **Global Governance in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives on World Order**, Stocholm Sweden, Almkvist & Wiksell International 2002, p.28

<sup>21</sup> James R.Richardson, Critical Liberalism in International Relations, Working paper (Australian National University. Dept. of International Relations), 2002 ,p.12

<sup>22</sup> James R.Richardson p.12

### **C. Balance Of Power Theory:**

Balance of power theory is predicated on the notion that states seek to survive an independent entities. They also seek power in the anarchical global system; without power, states can become subservient to the will of others or lose their security and prosperity. Anarchy thus compels states to increase their power, because security and physical survival cannot be divorced from power maximation. As a result, the competition for power becomes a natural state of affairs in international politics. If and when a single state or coalition of states gains preponderance, however, it will eventually attempt to impose its will on others. Weaker states could lose their security and, in rare cases, cease to exist. States, especially small states, often cannot achieve security on their own. Furthermore, the internal dynamics of a rising or dominant state could force it to seek hegemony or even eliminate weaker actors. Threatened states could also adopt the internal balancing strategy of building up arms, that is, to obtain countervailing capabilities and thereby attempt to balance the rising power's military strength.<sup>23</sup>

The key grand strategic issue confronting U.S. policymakers today is whether the United States can escape the same fate that has befallen the other great powers that have contended for hegemony since the origin of the modern international state system (circa 1500). Since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have embraced primacy and adopted an ambitious grand strategy of expanding the United States' preponderant power—notwithstanding the seemingly ironclad rule of modern international history that hegemony always provoke, and are defeated by, the counter hegemonic balancing of other great powers.<sup>24</sup> Since the Creation of modern state system with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia no single state reached the military power of today's USA.

Traditional balancing through alliance formation and military buildups is significant, but it seems able to capture only one, albeit the most significant, form of balance of power behavior.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> T.V.Paul, **Balance of Power Theory and Practice in The 21st Century**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2004, p.4-5.

<sup>24</sup> Christopher Layn, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment, **International Security**, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), p.7.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid,p.3

*Hard balancing* is a strategy often exhibited by states engaged in intense interstate rivalry. States thus adopt strategies to build and update their military capabilities, as well as create and maintain formal alliances and counter alliances, to match the capabilities of their key opponents. The traditional realist and neo realist conceptions of balancing are mainly confined to hard balancing.

*Soft balancing* involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening. Soft balancing is become more important in the nuclear age.

*Asymmetric balancing* refers to efforts by nation-states to balance and contain indirect threats posed by subnational actors such as terrorist groups that do not have the ability to challenge key state using conventional military capabilities or strategies. Asymmetric balancing also refers to the other side of the coin, that is, to efforts by subnational actors and their state sponsors to challenge and weaken established states using asymmetric means such as terrorism.

Neorealists tend to locate most, if not all, of the explanations for nation-state behavior in the structural characteristics of the international system, not in the internal characteristics of nation-states or individuals. But regardless of their positions on this issue, all realists come to the same conclusion about power in the international system: the distribution of power is the most important variable explaining nation-state behavior, and the best way of managing conflict in the system is by balancing power with power. Various balance of power theories all assume that the only effective way to prevent war is to prepare for war; one must be willing to threaten and to use force in order to reduce the likelihood that such force will in fact be used.<sup>26</sup>

Some liberal criticism of balance of power theory rest on historical examples in which balance of power failed and on the inability of the theory, when applied to foreign policy

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<sup>26</sup> Robert. H.Dorf **Some Basic Concepts and Approaches to the Study of International Relations Guide To National Security Policy And Strategy**, Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. U.S. Army War College, 2004 p.9.

behavior, to offer a long-term solution to the security dilemma. To liberals, anarchy is malleable and structural condition of conflict is not so determinative as realists would have us believe. The key factors necessary to obviate the negative aspects of anarchy and thereby obtain lasting security and order are democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions. Since democracies rarely fight one another, when satisfied democratic states are in ascendance, they tend to treat other democracies less belligerently than they treat non-democracies.<sup>27</sup>

The cold War, which dominated the relations of the western world and the Soviet bloc during the two decades following the Second World War, was fought primarily with the weapons of prestige. The United States and the Soviet Union endeavored to impress each other with their military might, technological achievements, economic potential, and political principles in order to weaken each other's morale and deter each other from taking an irrevocable step toward war. Similarly, they tried to impress their allies, weaken the unity of the hostile coalition, and win the support of the uncommitted nations.<sup>28</sup> The Cold War era is one of the best examples for the balance of power theory and balance of prestige.

#### **D. Marxist Doctrine**

Until the 1980s, Marxism was the main alternative to the mainstream realist and liberal traditions. Where realism and liberalism took the state system for granted, marxism offered both a different explanation for international conflict and a blueprint for fundamentally transforming the existing international order. Orthodox marxist theory saw capitalism as the central cause of international conflict. Neomarxist "dependency" theory, by contrast, focused on relations between advanced capitalist powers and less developed states and argued that the former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.<sup>29</sup>

Marxist theory argues that mode of production determines the political structure. "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a

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<sup>27</sup> *ibid*,p.9.

<sup>28</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau,*ibid*,p.93.

<sup>29</sup> Stephen M Walt, *International relations: One world, many theories*, **Foreign Policy** ; Washington; Spring 1998; p.2

definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society – the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life”.<sup>30</sup>

According to Marx economical crises in the capitalist economy is the main reason of wars. “In these crises, a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity — the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. ... The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented”.<sup>31</sup>

Lenin came up with a similar conclusion about the behavior of great powers in modern history. “Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist above it and alongside it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense

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<sup>30</sup> Marx, K. (1904) **A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy**, 2nd edn, trans. N.I. Stone. New York: London: International Library Publishing Company.pp.11-12.

<sup>31</sup> Marx, Engels **Manifesto of the Communist Party**, Selected Works, Volume One, Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1969, pp. 98-137

antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system”.<sup>32</sup>

Mao saw capitalist economy as the main reason of international conflicts and war. “Once man eliminated capitalism he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again know war.”<sup>33</sup> But ironically China was in conflict with USSR after late 1950s and Chinese labeled USSR as a revisionist power during the Cold War.

### **I. I. COLD WAR AND THE RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS**

The word “super-power” was defined in 1926 as the “systematic grouping and interconnection of existing power systems”.<sup>34</sup> The term was applied to describe the working of an electricity grid, but it was possibly, and by no means inappropriately, at the back of *the* mind of W T. R. Fox, who made the first recorded use of it in a book, entitled *The Super-Powers* published in 1944. The subtitle of the book was 'The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union-Their Responsibility for Peace'. In 1980, Fox wondered why he could have made what later appeared to have been the elementary mistake of including Britain along with what he had termed the other two, peripheral powers.<sup>35</sup>

The peripheral designation was one of the reasons for Fox's error in 1944, when there was still considerable acceptance of Britain and Europe as the center of the world. Moreover, in a sense the christening came before the birth, since one of the essential attributes of superpower, the ability to wreak global destruction through nuclear warfare, had yet to emerge. Also, in 1944 the British Empire had not seemed to be on the brink of collapse, nor was it then quite as clear as it later became that the major ideological clash would be between updated Wilsonism and Leninism.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin Collected Works, Moscow 1950 vol:22, pp.265-266

<sup>33</sup> Mao Tse-tung, **On Protracted War. Selected Military Writings**, Foreign Languages Press. Beijing 1963, p.223.

<sup>34</sup> Ernest V. Pannell, “Super Power”, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Thirteenth Edition, vol. III, pp. 681-684

<sup>35</sup> William T.R. Fox, “The Super –Powers Then and Now”, *International Journal*, Vol. 35, 1979-80 Thirteenth Edition, vol. III, pp.416-425

<sup>36</sup> Paul Dukes, “The Superpowers- A Short History”, Routledge, London, p.85



Fox included Britain in his new category, several observers of the international scene including Adolf Hitler, Charles de Gaulle and Bertrand Russell soon pointed out that there would be no more than two great powers after the end of the Second World War, the USA and USSR. However, none of them could predict the manner in which these two would come to exert such preponderant influence in the postwar years, and the manner in which the term superpower would gain general acceptance in the West. Soviet use of the term was somewhat reluctant, probably because it had no place in Marxist-Leninist vocabulary. There was the misleading implication that the USSR was the equal of the USA in every sense. Most obviously, the socialist economy had a vast amount of catching up to do before it could complete its task of overtaking.<sup>37</sup>

## **A. The Russo-Soviet and US Approach to Foreign Policy**

Before World War II American foreign policy was to a large degree driven by a cultural tradition that reflected the nation's detachment from Europe and its pursuit of a democratic way of life in the New World. Such cultural influences affect the foreign policies of every nation-state.<sup>38</sup> It is thus useful to contrast the American tradition with that of its Cold War rival, the Soviet Union, whose leaders also inherited a distinct cultural style of foreign policy, the product of centuries of fractious coexistence with a diverse and often-menacing external environment. These leaders then integrated the lessons of Russian history with the maxims of Marxist-Leninist ideology to fashion an aggressive approach to postwar foreign affairs.

### **1. The Russo Background**

As in the American case, understanding the source of the Russo-Soviet "style" of foreign policy begins simply by analyzing a globe. Unlike the United States and other maritime powers, Russia was not blessed by geography. Unprotected by natural barriers such as oceans or mountains, its people were vulnerable to invasions from several directions. And the enormous size of its territory rendered internal cohesion, communication, and transportation very difficult, especially given the diverse ethnic backgrounds of the Russian people.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p.85

<sup>38</sup>Quoted in James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970, p.582.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Russia was ruled by the Mongols from the East. By the 1460s Mongol domination had been repelled and Muscovy had emerged as the capital of a Russian super state.<sup>39</sup> In more modern times, Napoleon Bonaparte's armies invaded and captured Moscow in 1812; British and French armies landed in the Crimea in 1854-1856; and Japan attacked and claimed territories in eastern Russia in 1904-1905. Germany invaded Russia twice during the twentieth century, its first attack prompting the final collapse of the Russian monarchy, civil war, and the rise of the Bolsheviks to power.<sup>40</sup>

Historically, then, Russia could not take its security for granted or give priority to domestic affairs. In these circumstances political power became centralized in the state, which, under both the czars and communist leaders, firmly held the far-flung regions together.<sup>41</sup> Such efforts, however, required large standing military forces, and much of the Russian population was mobilized in their service. Indeed, the Russian armed forces were consistently larger than those of the other European great powers, a fact not lost on leaders in Warsaw, Budapest, Paris, and London.<sup>42</sup>

This militarization of Russian society, purportedly for defensive purposes, also carried with it the potential for outward aggression. To the historian Richard Pipes, Russia no more became the world's largest territorial state by repelling repeated invasions than a man becomes rich by being robbed.<sup>43</sup> The same lack of natural frontiers that failed to protect Russia from invasion also allowed its power to extend outward from its frontiers. Indeed, sustained territorial expansion has been called the "Russian way." According to President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, any list of aggressions against Russia in the last two centuries would be dwarfed by Russian expansionist moves against its neighbors.<sup>44</sup>

Whether Russian motives were defensive or offensive, the result was a pattern of expansion. To the degree that Russian rulers feared attacks, they pushed outward to keep the enemy as far away as possible. Territorial extension became a partial substitute for the

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<sup>39</sup> Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, *Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi*, Okumuş Adam Yayınları, pp. 35-64

<sup>40</sup> Paul Dukes, *October and the VWorld: Perspectives on the Russian Revolution*, London, 1979, pp. 123-5.

<sup>41</sup> Jeffrey Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861—1917*, Princeton, N.J., 1985, p. 356.

<sup>42</sup> Thomson, *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XII, p. 100.

<sup>43</sup> Richard Pipes, as quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan*, Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, pp. 19-20.

lack of wide rivers or mountains that might have afforded a degree of natural protection. Individual rulers ambitions, such as Peter the Great's determination to have access to the sea, also resulted in territorial conquest and defeat of the power blocking that aim.<sup>45</sup> Even before the Bolsheviks seized power, authoritarianism, militarism, and expansionism characterized the Russian state; being a good neighbor was an alien concept. The basic "rules" of power politics the emphasis on national interests, distrust of other states, expectation of conflict, self-reliance, and the possession of sufficient power, especially military power were deeply ingrained in Russia's leaders.<sup>46</sup>

## 2. The Soviet Ingredient

These attitudes were modified and strengthened by the outlook of the new regime after 1917. Russian political culture was fused with Marxist ideology, as adapted to Russian circumstances by Vladimir Lenin, to create an all-encompassing *Weltanschauung* (world view). The new leaders ideological outlook did not dictate action in specific situations, but it did provide them with a broad framework for perceiving and understanding the world.<sup>47</sup>

As Lenin was aware, the application of Marxism to Russia suffered from one glaring deficiency. In Karl Marx's dialectic view, communism stemmed directly from the failures of capitalism. Thus a communist society must first experience industrialization, urbanization, and the enlistment of its working classes into an organized "proletariat." This, of course, did not pertain to the largely agrarian Russia whose population was only then emerging from its feudal traditions.<sup>48</sup>

Ideology was more than a way of viewing the world; it also gave the Soviet leaders a mission. For them, capitalism was the chief obstacle to humanity's liberation. Thus Soviet leaders considered the American and West European governments to be enemies because of what they were-capitalist. Moreover, unlike the traditional thinking of the great powers, who had no "permanent" friends or enemies and who shifted allegiances as the distribution of power changed, Soviet ideology clearly discriminated friend from foe on a permanent

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<sup>44</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Union: The Aims, Problems, and Challenges to the West," in *The Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s*, Adelphi Paper No. 189, Part I, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984.

<sup>45</sup> Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, London, 1978, pp. 404-445

<sup>46</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet—American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, Baltimore, 1973, pp. 8-9.

<sup>47</sup> Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, London, 1992, p. 55.

basis. Because the Soviet Union denounced capitalist states as foes, and because the Soviet mission was to export its revolution and create a new post capitalist international order, the relationship between it and the capitalist states would be marked by conflict until the victory of Soviet ideology. Its leaders, moreover, took it for granted that the capitalist states were equally hostile and determined to eliminate communism and the Soviet Union, if only to avoid their own demise.<sup>49</sup>

The effect of this pattern was to perpetuate historic Russian suspicions of foreigners and feelings of insecurity. Soviet leaders believed the state system, increasingly composed of capitalist states with close economic ties, was a very hostile environment. They rejected the latter's professions of goodwill and peaceful intentions and committed their country to the "inevitable and irreconcilable struggle" against these states.<sup>50</sup> They fostered a strong emphasis on self-reliance and an equally intense concern with Soviet power. Tactically, they were convinced that when an enemy made concessions in negotiations or became more accommodating, it was not because the enemy wanted a friendlier relationship but because it was compelled to do so by the Soviet Union's growing strength, a viewpoint that led to a self-sustaining rationale for ever more military power.<sup>51</sup>

Russian history stood as a warning to Soviet leaders that peace was but a preparation for the next war. Their ideological perceptions strengthened the view that peace was but the continuation of the last war by other means. The Soviet worldview, in short, reinforced the historically repetitious cycles that had previously and consistently resulted in a further expansion of Soviet power. Even if insecurity drove this expansion rather than any historical mission, the result for neighboring states remained the same they were vulnerable.<sup>52</sup> They were perceived as inherent threats to Soviet interests and they represented possible additions to the Soviet Union's own frontiers. Such a drive to achieve absolute security in a system in which no state could achieve that aim short of total domination left other states insecure and contributed to the volatility of the international system throughout the Cold War.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> W Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 80-81.

<sup>49</sup> Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia*, 1996, London pp. 189-194.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188

<sup>51</sup> W.H. Parker, *The Super-Powers: The United States and Soviet Union Compared*, London, 1972, pp. 63-68

<sup>52</sup> Peter Kolchin, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom*, Cambridge, Mass., 1987, pp. 30-1.

<sup>53</sup> Paul Dukes, 'Some Cultural Aspects of the Context of Von Grimm's Prediction', in A.G. Cross, R.R Bartlett and K. Rasmussen (eds), *Russia and the World of the Eighteenth Century*, Columbus, Ohio, 1988, pp. 45—57.

The contrast between American culture and national style, which emphasized peace as normal and conflict as abnormal, and that of the Soviet Union, which stressed the pervasiveness of war, could not have been more striking. Both societies felt a sense of historical mission, yet their principles, goals, and tactics were worlds apart. These clashing approaches to foreign policy were to confront one another as the Soviet and Western armies, led by the United States, advanced from the opposing ends of Europe.<sup>54</sup>

### **3. Soviet Expansion After World War II**

The American dream of postwar peace and Big Three cooperation was shattered when the Red Army, having finally halted the Nazi armies and decisively defeated the Germans at Stalingrad in late 1942, slowly began to drive the enemy out of the Soviet Union and then pursue the retreating Germans to Berlin. The Soviet Union, which in 1940 had annexed the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) after signing the Nazi-Soviet pact, thus expanded into Eastern and central Europe and began to impose its control on Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania even before the end of the war.<sup>55</sup>

In each of the nations of Eastern Europe occupied by their troops, the Soviets unilaterally established pro-Soviet coalition governments. The key posts in these regimes the ministry of the interior, which usually controlled the police, and the ministry of defense, which controlled the army, was in the hands of the communists. With these decisive levers of power in their grasp, the Soviets found it an easy matter to extend their domination and subvert the independence of these countries. As the war drew to a close, it became clear that the words of the Yalta Declaration, in which the Soviets had committed themselves to free elections and democratic governments in Eastern Europe, meant quite different things to the Soviets and to the Americans. For the Soviet Union, control of Eastern Europe, and especially Poland, was essential because this area was a vital link in its security belt.<sup>56</sup> After suffering two German invasions in less than thirty years, it was perhaps inevitable that the Soviet Union would try to establish "friendly" governments throughout the area.<sup>57</sup> To the Soviets, democratic governments meant communist regimes, and free elections meant elections from which parties not favorable to the communists were barred. The peace treaties with the former German satellite states (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania), which

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<sup>54</sup> Richard W Leopold and Arthur S. Link (eds), *Problems in American History*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957, pp. 178-9

<sup>55</sup> Walter La Feber, *The American Age*, New York, 1989, pp. 96-97.

<sup>56</sup> Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia c. 882-1996*, London, 1998, p. 130.

<sup>57</sup> LaFeber, *The American Age*, pp. 162-248

were painfully negotiated by the victors in a series of foreign ministers' conferences during 1945 and 1946, could not loosen the tightening Soviet grip on what were by now Soviet satellite states.<sup>58</sup>

In terms of the state system, the Soviet behavior was understandable. Each state had to act as its own guardian against potential adversaries in a system characterized by conflict among states and a sense of insecurity and fear on the part of its members. As the alliance against the common enemy came to an end, the Soviet Union predictably would strengthen itself against the power most likely to be its new opponent. As czarist Russia, with a long history of invasions from the East and West, it had learned the basic rules of the international game through bitter experience.<sup>59</sup>

## **B. U.S.-Soviet Differences**

No issue could have reflected more accurately the differences between the United States and Soviet Union. Roosevelt acted precisely on the assumption that noncommunist did not have to mean anti-Soviet. During the war, he had been all too aware of the consequences of a possible Soviet-American clash in the wake of Germany's defeat. He therefore single-mindedly pursued a policy of friendship toward the Soviet Union. Roosevelt, however, did not view free elections in Eastern Europe in terms of the creation of a new anti-Soviet belt. For him, free elections, noncommunist coalition governments in which communists might participate if they gained a sizable vote, and a friendly attitude between East and West were quite compatible.<sup>60</sup>

The model he had in mind was Czechoslovakia. As the only democracy in that area, Czechoslovakia had maintained close ties with the West since its birth after World War I. But because France and Britain had failed to defend Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938 and betrayed it by appeasing Hitler, it also had become friendly with the Soviet Union. After 1945 Czechoslovakia, like the other East European states, knew that it lay in the Soviet sphere of influence and that its security depended on getting along with, not irritating, its powerful neighbor. Thus Czech leaders expressed only amicable feelings for the Soviet

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 256

<sup>59</sup> I. KIAMKIN, 'Russian Statehood, the CIS, and the Problem of Security', in Leon Rabinovich Aron & Kenneth M. Jensen (eds), *The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy* (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994, pp. 107-118

<sup>60</sup> M.Ya. Geftter and VL. Malkov, 'Reply to an American Scholar', *Soviet Studies in History*, vol. V. 1966-7, pp 23 -28

Union and signed a security treaty with Moscow. And in one of the rare free elections the Soviets allowed in Eastern Europe, the Communist Party received the largest vote of any party and therefore the key posts in the government.<sup>61</sup> To share power in a coalition government, however, was to share power with class enemies. A "friendly" state, to Soviet leaders, was one totally controlled by the Communist Party. Soviet security therefore required ideological homogeneity in Eastern Europe and Soviet domination. By contrast, a "friendly" state in Roosevelt's eyes was one sensitive to Soviet security interests but possessive of its domestic autonomy. A Communist Party monopoly of power was not a prerequisite for the states of Eastern Europe to adopt a pro-Soviet foreign policy.<sup>62</sup>

During World War II the heroic Soviet war effort and sacrifices had created an enormous reservoir of goodwill in the West. Had the Soviets acted with greater restraint after the war and accepted states that, regardless of their government's composition, would have adjusted to their Soviet neighbor, Stalin could have had the security he was seeking. But Stalin did not trust Roosevelt. No matter how personable the president was, no matter how sincere his statements of goodwill and postwar friendship, Stalin saw him as the leader of a capitalist nation. As a "tool of Wall Street," Roosevelt could not be sincere in his peaceful professions. To Stalin, Roosevelt was an American version of himself, a man who was fully aware of the impending postwar Soviet-American struggle and equally determined to weaken his adversary and gain the advantage for his nation. In Eastern Europe, Soviet bayonets enforced Stalin's will. The Soviet style ensured that the wartime alliance would break up and that eventually the Western allies would return Stalin's hostility, proving to him that he had been right all along about Western enmity.<sup>63</sup>

Churchill, concerned about Stalin's behavior in Eastern Europe, urged the United States to send forces to capture the symbolically important German capital of Berlin (instead of rounding up the remnants of Germany's defeated army) and to advance the U.S. armies as far east as possible, including farther into Czechoslovakia. He also suggested that U.S. forces not pull back to their agreed-upon occupation zones in Germany until Stalin observed his agreements in Eastern Europe and that, until then, the United States not shift the bulk of its military power from Europe to the Far East for the final offensive against Japan. Roosevelt declined all these suggestions. He had assured Stalin that all American troops would be withdrawn within two years after the war. Why then should Stalin worry

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<sup>61</sup> J.M. Roberts: "Yirminci Yüzyıl Tarihi", Çev. Sinem Gül, Dost Kitapevi, Ankara, pp.315-386

<sup>62</sup> Edward Carr, Sovyet Rusya Tarihi, Çev. Orhan Suda, C.1 Metis Yayınları, 1998, pp. 28-39

<sup>63</sup> Fikret Ertan "Rusya'nın Dönüşümü, İstanbul, 2001, pp.23-28

about American opposition to his efforts to control Eastern Europe? The Soviet leader exercised caution when he encountered opposition, but he ignored diplomatic notes of protest. Carefully waiting to see what the United States would do, Stalin allowed free elections in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the two states closest to American power. But continued U.S. and British verbal warnings, unsupported by action, did not impress Stalin. Consequently, Hungary's freedom was soon destroyed by the Soviets.<sup>64</sup>

Then in 1948 even the Czech government, in which the Communist Party had the largest plurality, was overthrown by the Soviets in a coup d'etat. Contrary to Roosevelt's expectations, not even a communist-controlled coalition government was acceptable to Stalin. Indeed, as the Soviet satellization of Eastern Europe was to show, the failure of the United States was not the failure of efforts to accommodate Soviet interests in Eastern Europe; it was the failure to resist Stalin earlier. Because Stalin apparently saw no limits to Soviet expansion and his conception of Soviet security left little, if any, security for his neighbors, those limits had to be defined by the two Western powers, of which the United States was by far the stronger at the end of the war.

## **1. The Soviet Oppress To the South**

As in the two world wars, in which Britain had led the effort to contain Germany, it was London—not Washington that took the first steps in opposing the Soviet Union after 1945. Indeed, the United States at first tried to play the role of mediator between the Soviet Union and Britain. Only when British power proved to be insufficient did the United States take over the task of balancing Soviet power. American initiative evolved gradually in the 1946-1947 period and was precipitated by Stalin's attempt to consolidate his power beyond Eastern Europe.<sup>65</sup> The United States had accommodated itself to Soviet control of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, the corridor through which Germany had attacked Russia twice in a quarter century. Moscow's security interests in this region were understandable, and Washington, despite its disappointment over the Soviet failure to fulfill its Yalta obligations in Poland, quickly recognized the new Polish government as well as the other Soviet-installed regimes in Eastern Europe.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>For an elaboration, see Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986

<sup>65</sup> W LaFeber, "America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996", New York, 1997, pp. 186-198

<sup>66</sup> Fahir ARMAOĞLU, *Belgelerle Türk - Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açıklamalı)*, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991, pp.163- 169



As these events unfolded, however, the Soviets began moving toward the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Turkey, Greece, and Iran were the first to feel pressure. If Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe could be explained in defensive terms, this was less true for the area south of the Soviet Union, the line that runs from Turkey to India. Long before Stalin, the czars had sought access to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles Straits. Simultaneously they had tried to expand southward to establish a warm-water port and to bring Soviet power closer to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.<sup>67</sup>

The Soviet Union first sought to gain influence in Turkey. Indeed, the Soviets had begun to do this as early as June 1945 when they made several demands: the cession of several Turkish districts lying on the Turkish-Soviet frontier, the revision of the Montreux Convention governing the Dardanelles Straits in favor of a joint Soviet-Turkish administration, the severance of Turkey's ties with Britain and the conclusion of a treaty with the Soviet Union similar to those that the Soviet Union had concluded with its Balkan satellites, and finally, the leasing to the Soviet Union of bases for naval and land forces in the Dardanelles for "joint defense." The United States sent a naval task force into the Mediterranean immediately after the Soviets issued these demands. Twelve days later the United States formally replied to the Soviets by rejecting their demand to share responsibility for the defense of the straits with Turkey. Britain sent a similar reply.<sup>68</sup>

In Greece, communist pressure was exerted on the government through widespread guerrilla warfare, which began in the fall of 1946. Civil war in Greece was nothing new. During World War II communist and anticommunist guerrillas had spent much of their energy battling each other instead of the Germans. When the British landed in Greece and the Germans withdrew, the communists attempted to take over Athens. Only after several weeks of bitter street fighting and the landing of British reinforcements was the communist control of Athens dislodged; a truce was signed in January 1945. Just over a year later the Greeks held a general election in which right-wing forces captured the majority of votes. In August 1946 the communist forces renewed the war in the north, where the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe could keep the guerrillas well supplied.<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, Soviet pressure on Iran intensified as the Soviets refused to withdraw their troops from that country. These troops had been there since late 1941, when the Soviet

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<sup>67</sup> Edward Carr, *Sovyet Rusya Tarihi*, Çev. Orhan Suda, C.1 Metis Yayınları, 1998, pp. 63-96

<sup>68</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914-1995 Volume: 1-2*, Alkım Yayınları, 1996, pp. 181-216

<sup>69</sup> W LaFeber, "America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996", New York, 1997, pp. 198-201

Union and Britain had invaded Iran to forestall increased Nazi influence and to use Iran as a corridor through which the West could ship military aid to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had occupied northern Iran, the British the central and southern sections. When the British withdrew, the Soviets sought to convert Iran into a Soviet satellite. The Iranian prime minister's offer of oil concessions to less than detaching the northern area of Azerbaijan and then by various means pressuring Iran into servile status.<sup>70</sup> The American government was once more confronted with the need to support Great Britain. After the United States and Britain delivered firm statements that they would use force to defend Iran, Stalin finally relented.

Although U.S. efforts in these areas were largely effective, actions taken by President Harry Truman, Roosevelt's successor, were merely swift reactions to immediate crises; they were not the product of an overall American strategy.<sup>71</sup> Such a coherent strategy came only after a reassessment of Soviet foreign policy that placed the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe and beyond in historic perspective.

### **C. Ending the Cold War: Negotiating the Terms of Peace**

The implosion of the Soviet bloc already had begun by the time George Bush became president in January 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms were rapidly undermining the Communist Party's hold in Moscow, the Baltic states were demanding independence, and the first streams of East Europeans were making their way across the iron curtain with the reluctant assent of their crippled political leaders. Many analysts (including George Kennan, father of the containment policy) proclaimed that the Cold War was effectively over.

For Bush, the principal task of American foreign policy would be to manage this historic transition, as smoothly as possible and to ensure that the Warsaw Pact's demise would not be overwhelmed by an even greater cataclysm. If that were accomplished, Bush looked forward to a harmonious new era in which the attributes of the Western political and economic system would be extended into the former communist bloc and provide the basis for global stability and prosperity.

#### **1. Who “Win” Or Who “Lose” The Cold War?**

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<sup>70</sup> Paul Kennedy, "Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri" İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, pp.301-305

Throughout his presidency George Bush was dogged by the notion that he lacked a coherent vision of the future of world politics. Further, he was criticized for what seemed to be an overly cautious approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, his continuing embrace of Gorbachev after the Soviet leader lost legitimacy, and his resistance to immediate deep cuts in American defense spending.<sup>72</sup> Bush, the lifelong government bureaucrat, manager, presumably lacked the panache to seize such a profound historic opportunity.

The three-year free fall of the Soviet system was by no means a certainty when Bush arrived in office, and its peaceful course was without precedent. In assisting Gorbachev when he urgently needed outside support, in insisting on German unification on Western terms, and in exploiting the opportunity for drastic nuclear disarmament, Bush navigated the United States and its allies through a complicated phase of international relations toward their ultimate victory in a protracted conflict of global proportions. Bush was chastised for adhering to the most "prudent" approach to world politics, but history may suggest that prudence was precisely the approach the world required.<sup>73</sup>

Immediately after the Cold War ended, the question was raised whether the United States had won the war and whether its containment policy had been successful. Or was it more accurate to say that the Soviet Union, plagued by internal problems of its own making, had lost the Cold War? But it was not merely an academic exercise, for the answers to these questions would reveal the central lessons of the Cold War, which in turn would figure in the establishment of guidelines for future American foreign policy.

## **2. The Contending Arguments In Perspective**

Advocates of the view that the United States had "won" the Cold War claimed that the Western system of political, economic, and military organization was simply more durable than that of the Soviet Union and its allies. Furthermore, the U.S. led containment policy successfully combined pressure and patience to overwhelm Soviet capabilities. In other words, containment had worked much as George Kennan predicted it would nearly fifty

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid, pp.310-311

<sup>72</sup> Paul Dukes, "A History of Russia" c. 882-1996, London, 1998, p. 130.

<sup>73</sup> See John Lewis, "The United States and the End of the Cold War, New Oxford University, 1992, p.193

years earlier, preventing Soviet expansion through the selective application of Western resistance.

If the Soviet Union had instead "lost" the war diminished the role of the containment policy. If the United States had "won," as merely because the Soviet Union's flawed system made its demise inevitable. Its excessive centralization of power, bureaucratic planning, and supervision of every detail of Soviet life, economic and otherwise, well as its command economy and ideological oppression, contributed to its undoing.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, for some neo-Marxists the Soviet Union's demise reflected its perversion of Marxist ideals and principles, not the bankruptcy of the political theory.

Both views call for a closer look at the Soviet experience in converting the aspirations of the 1917 Russian Revolution into practice. Seventy years after the revolution, the Soviet standard of living was so low that even Eastern Europe, with its own economic problems, appeared affluent by contrast. According to the former Soviet Union's own statistics, about 40 percent of its population and almost 80 percent of its elderly citizens lived in poverty. One-third of its households had no running water.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, the Soviet Union was the only industrialized society in which infant mortality had risen and male life expectancy had declined in the late twentieth century. In Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, "Perhaps never before in history have such a gifted people, in control of such abundant resources, labored so hard for so long to produce so little."<sup>76</sup>

The Soviet economy, which was supposed to have demonstrated the superiority of socialism, sputtered for decades and then collapsed. Deliberately isolating itself from the global capitalist economy. The Soviet Union intended to build an economy that was self-sufficient and productive, assuring a bountiful life for the workers and peasants who so long had been deprived. Instead, the centralized command economy meant no domestic competition among firms, and its self-exclusion from the international economy ensured that it remained unchallenged by foreign competition.

Soviet communism was efficient only in producing military hardware. But this, ironically, also contributed to its defeat. As a state with natural protective barriers, frequently invaded throughout its history, first Russia and then the Soviet Union kept sizable standing forces

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<sup>74</sup> See Walter Laquer, *The Dream that Failed*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994,

<sup>75</sup> See Charles W. Kegley, "How Did The Cold War Die?" *Principles for an Autopmersion International Studies Review*, summer 1994, pp 11-41.

for its defense. Its twentieth-century experiences with Germany did nothing to relieve the longtime Russian sense of insecurity, fueled by the Marxist conception of politics as a constant struggle and its perception that enemies were everywhere.<sup>77</sup> But whether Soviet expansionism stemmed from a defensive preoccupation with security or from an offensive ideological goal of aggrandizement, Moscow's drive for absolute security left other states feeling absolutely insecure. It is no wonder, then, that such insecurity drove all of the Soviet Union's great-power neighbors (Western Europe, on one side; Turkey, Iran, China, Japan, and South Korea, on the other sides) to accelerate their own defense spending. Furthermore, many Soviet accomplishments, such as its inroads in the Third World, considered at the time as setbacks for the United States, were actually setbacks for Moscow. Cuba in the 1960s, Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s, and Afghanistan in the 1980s gave the Soviet system a bad case of indigestion. The logic, then, of this thesis—the more the Soviet Union expanded, the greater the cost—was that the U.S.-led containment policy was not an essential ingredient in stopping Soviet expansion. Indeed, it was precisely where containment *failed*, providing an opening for Moscow, that the Soviet Union's burden became too great to bear.<sup>78</sup>

Strobe Talbott, *Time's* Soviet expert and later a deputy secretary of state in the Clinton administration, asserted that the Soviet threat was a "grotesque exaggeration" and claimed in retrospect, "The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years were right all along."<sup>79</sup> The Soviet "meltdown" in the Cold War was self-inflicted "not because of anything the outside world has done or not done or threatened to do." Thus American and Western policies had little to do with the Soviet defeat in the Cold War since its cause was purely internal. Characteristic of the revisionist view that has followed every major American war, Talbott's analysis was: that there really had been no major danger to this country; that the nation's long, intense, and dangerous involvement in the post-World War II world had not been necessary; and that the containment policy, instead of playing a key role in the defeat of America's adversary, had merely prolonged the Cold War. Soviet power "was actually Soviet weakness," and the conflict itself "distorted priorities, distracted attention and preoccupied many of the best and the brightest minds in government, academe, and think tanks for nearly two generations." Thus it would have been better to avoid the "grand

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<sup>76</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Game Plan", Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p.123

<sup>77</sup> Colin White, "Russia and America: The Roots of Economic Divergence", London, 1987, with quotations from pp. 13- 97.

<sup>78</sup> John Mueller, "Enough Rope," New Republic, July 3, 1989, p.15.

<sup>79</sup> Strobe Talbott, "Rethinking the Red Menace," Time, January 1, 1990, pp. 66-71.

obsession" with the "Red Menace," to have remained isolated from the power politics that diverted resources from domestic reforms to military preparations and war. Gorbachev, Talbott claimed, not only helped to show that the Soviet threat was not what it used to be, but "what's more, that it never was."<sup>80</sup>

Soviet communism, a far cry from the worker's Utopia envisioned by Karl Marx, surely deserves some of the credit it has been given for abetting its own collapse. But to conclude from this that the containment policy was not necessary, or, if necessary, was not a key ingredient in the Soviet Union's demise, is to differ from the conclusions drawn by its potential victims. As the United States attempted to withdraw from Europe after World War II, countries such as Iran and Turkey, followed by those in Western Europe, pleaded with the United States to help them. The collapse of the former great powers of Western Europe left the Soviet Union as the potential hegemon throughout Eurasia. All countries saw their independence and national integrity at stake; America's continued presence was their only protection. Had the United States retreated into isolationism, as it did after World War I, the countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union would have been exposed to Soviet control.<sup>81</sup>

Western Europe remained the pivotal strategic stake throughout the Cold War. The Soviets repeatedly tried to intimidate these nations, to divide them (especially West Germany from the United States), and to drive the United States back to its shores. But the containment policy made Moscow cautious about expanding its power, from this perspective, the ancient rule of states is a prudent one: power must be met by countervailing power. A balance among states is the only guarantee that they will retain their independence and preserve their way of life. Without containment, the inefficiencies of the Soviet system might not have mattered as much; the Soviet Union would not had to engage in a costly, ongoing arms competition.

Containment, however, was not aimed just at blocking Soviet domination of Western Europe and the rest of Eurasia; it also was intended to win time for the Soviet leadership to reexamine its goals and moderate its ambitions. Thus the American strategy in the Cold War rested largely and correctly on a tactical assumption of Soviet behavior. As George Kennan had explained years earlier, the United States had

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p.75

<sup>81</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Grand Failure, New York, Collier Books, 1989", Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989,

*it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, aid in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, messianic movement—and particularly that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of those state affairs.*<sup>82</sup>

The Cold War expert demonstrated the virtue of patience in foreign policy. While interning the Soviet threat as the country's paramount concern, Kennan saw no quick fixes and recommended no immediate solutions to the problem. To the contrary, he anticipated a prolonged, low intensity struggle along several distant frontiers. The conflict would be set most effectively and most peacefully through the gradual expose of contradictions within Soviet society. Soviet communism, in his view would ultimately *self-destruct* under the weight of these contradictions. In the meantime, the United States would have to pursue a "long-term patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."<sup>83</sup> From Truman to Bush, that is just what U.S. presidents did.

The importance of the containment policy becomes even more evident when it is contrasted to an earlier period of American foreign policy. If the principal causes of the Cold War were the structure of the postwar state system and the Soviet style in foreign policy, then America's national style made its own contribution. By failing to take a firm stand against Soviet policy during World War II, after it had become evident from repeated episodes that it was impossible to accommodate Soviet interests in Eastern Europe and Asia, the United States has to accept some of the blame for the Cold War that followed. This is not to say that the United States passively accepted Soviet expansionism, but only that it did not oppose Stalin early enough, that it continued to cling to its hope for postwar amity with the Soviet Union despite Soviet behavior in the late stages of the war, and that after hostilities had ceased, it dissipated its strength immediately in a helter-skelter demobilization. Stalin respected American power and was a cautious statesman, but when President Roosevelt informed him that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe after two years, Stalin did not need to concern himself about American protests against Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. Protests were one thing, action another. Not until after the war did the

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<sup>82</sup> George Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp.127-128.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, 130

United States act and draw the lines beyond which Soviet expansion would not be tolerated.

The American containment policy, then, played a critical role in the defeat of the Soviet Union. If the United States had not resisted Soviet expansion, Moscow, believing that communism represented the wave of the future, would have become more assertive and aggressive; perceive weakness always invited efforts to expand. For example, when Khrushchev claimed that the balance of power had turned in favor of the Soviet Union, he precipitated a series of crises in West Berlin and Cuba that stretched from 1957 to 1962.

### **3. Containment Policy**

Containment was not a flawless policy. Once the Cold War started, U.S. misperceptions, like those of Soviet leaders, fed the superpower conflict. For example, Washington frequently exaggerated Soviet military capabilities. Fears of Soviet superiority the bomber gap in the 1950s, the missile gaps a few years later, the ABM gap in the mid-1960s, and "the window of vulnerability" in the early 1980s propelled the arms competition already well under way. In addition, the U.S. emphasis on anticommunism meant American policy often was insensitive to the nationalism of the new nations. As a result, the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliances proved weak reeds for containing communism, alienating important states such as Egypt and India which shifted toward the Soviet Union, aggravating regional rivalries, and aligning the United States with discredited regimes such as Nationalist China and Iran.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, in the name of anticommunism Washington often supported authoritarian, right-wing regimes in the Third World; it saw no democratic alternatives to the regimes it backed other than left-wing pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese ones, which were unacceptable.

The U.S. government also consistently exaggerated the monolithic nature of international communism. The fall of Nationalist China, the Korean War, and the communist Chinese intervention in that war transformed the containment policy, which originally was limited, responding to Soviet moves in the eastern Mediterranean and Western Europe into global anticommunism. The events of 1949 and 1950 led to virulent anticommunism in the United States, with the Republican (notably Sen. Joe McCarthy) accusing the Democrats of being

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<sup>84</sup> Gardioff, Raymond L., "The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War", Washington, DC, 1994, pp. 84-87



"soft 01 communism" and engaging in paranoid witch hunts.<sup>85</sup> Future Democrat B administrations therefore would not be able to exploit the growing differences between the Soviet Union and China; instead, seeking to avoid being charged with the "loss of Indochina," as they had been with loss of China" Democratic administrations intervened militarily Vietnam.<sup>86</sup>

## II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The international environment of inter-state and infra-state system has changed with the collapse of the USSR. Collapse of the Soviet system coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet Union as socialist federal state consisting of 15 republics together with a bloc of countries allied with Soviet Union. The dissolution also marks the last day of Cold War era. The Cold War era has characterized by bipolarity in world system. At the two ends of the poles were countries USSR and US. These countries were the bloc leaders and superpowers.

The end of World War II created an unprecedented historical situation. The world's traditional centers of political power (particularly in Europe) collapsed, and a bipolar relationship emerged. There are several interpretations about the reasons that led to Cold War. We could categorize them into three:

The Orthodox Interpretation<sup>87</sup> (Adam Ulam, Thomas Bailey, etc.)

The Cold War resulted from:

-Soviet expansionism, as exemplified by Stalin's violation of wartime agreements forged at Yalta and Potsdam. His imposition of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe

-Variously attributed to 1) Russian character – Russian infants were swaddled and thus as adults sought to be expansionist and aggressive or 2) Communist ideology.

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<sup>85</sup> Stephan, John J. (ed.), "Soviet—American Horizons on the Pacific", Honolulu, 1986, pp. 132-134

<sup>86</sup> Jonathan Schell, *The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons Now*, London, 1998, p. 123.

<sup>87</sup> Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 187-189

-US was innocent. Its response was the logical and necessary response.

**The Revisionist Interpretation** (William Appleman Williams, Walter LaFeber, Gar Alperovitz, Bart Bernstein)

-The Cold War was the most recent version of American efforts in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to preserve an “open door” for American trade in world markets. An effort to ensure a postwar order shaped in the American image, with every nation open to American influence and trade.

-America dropped the bomb to scare the Russians and a third interpretation that has sometimes been called **Post-Revisionist**.<sup>88</sup> This approach:

-Focused on misperceptions and allots blame to both sides.

-Two nations (who didn't understand each other well) struggled to preserve a wartime alliance that temporarily disguised basic differences in outlook and interests. Once the war crisis had faded, Soviet leaders came to see the US as an expansionist power seeking world supremacy, threatening USSR security and manipulating weaker states. Meanwhile the US saw the USSR as bullying aggressor bent on grabbing territory, subjugating neighbors and disturbing the postwar peace through subversion. Each side saw offense where the other saw defense.

-Scramble for postwar position accentuated differences of power, interests, and ideology.

When the Cold War ceased with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. America remained, as the sole superpower while the heir of USSR, the Russian Federation, turned into minor global player just a little greater than a regional power. As the 'continued state Russia assumed not only the treaty, financial and other responsibilities of the USSR, but also many of the attitudes and ambiguities of the former superpower. Russia inherited the institutions of the Soviet Union together with uncertainty about its proper place and role in the world.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup><http://150.174.33.57/facultypage/whogan/123/Class%2020.Cold%20War.Containment.Brinkmanship.doc>

<sup>89</sup> Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p. 372.

Russo-American relations lost its dominant, determining character in world politics. But as this has happened as a result of change, the current situation is also under change. The post Cold War era today, is not reflecting the same world as it was in early 1990's. The very first predictions and expectations about the post-bipolar world system today could be reviewed. Russia's first years of reform was almost catastrophic, which in turn made the country quite a dependant economically to the west.<sup>90</sup> Today, the Russian federation under Vladimir Putin maybe not comparable to the Brezhnev period Soviet Union, but gaining power and could not be accounted a weak power as it was in Yeltsin's first term.

As Russia regaining its capacity in military and economic zones Russo-American relation are becoming more and more important in determining the world political developments. Before going further about the nature of the relations of the two nations in a new global environment we should define the fundamental attributes of this new environment and different approaches to interpret its character in terms of inter-state relations.

### **A. Fundamental Tenets of Post-Cold War Era**

The difficulty to explain the events and process of the world after Cold War, as any period in history, rises from the very complexity of the fact itself. Different writers, schools of thought approached to the issue from different perspectives. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1993) writing about what they term the 'real world order' after 1989 conclude that there is not a single "zone" but two: in one (mainly the advanced capitalist countries) there is peace and relative prosperity, and in the other (primarily in the old Third World and the former Soviet bloc) there is turmoil.<sup>91</sup>

The American historian, John Gaddis, has devised a similar typology and refers to the world as being the product of two competing forces, one integrative and the other disintegrative. Harvey Staar has adopted a very similar approach and significantly entitles one of his more recent studies *Anarchy, Order and Integration*<sup>92</sup>, in this way indicating that

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<sup>90</sup> From the reformers point of view, see.: Aleksandr Yakovlev, *Sovyetler Birliğinde Ne Yapmak İstiyoruz?*, Çev.: Çiğdem Kömürçüoğlu, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1991. For a critical review see: Hilary Appel, *A New Capitalist Order: Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies) University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004.

<sup>91</sup> Michael Cox, *International History since 1989*, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.117.

<sup>92</sup> Harvey Staar, **Anarchy, Order and Integration, How to Manage Interdependence**, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1997.passim.

the international system is not only a highly complex place, but that even those factors which make for stability and prosperity in one part of it, may lead to quite different consequences in another.<sup>93</sup>

The above picture of the International relations discipline on question of post-cold war era depiction is no doubt applies to our explanation of it. Here we will only try to distinguish between what is important and what we deem to be less important. So to depict a greater picture of post Cold War period relying on the most salient tenets of it we should distinguish and focus on the following developments:

- Triumph and expansion of Capitalism
- Rise of USA as the sole hegemon in the new system
- Russia lost its former importance
- Emergence of Multi-polarity in a unipolar world

### **1. Triumphs and Expansion of Capitalism**

After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev shocked delegates to the 20th Party Congress on February 23 ,1956 by publicly denouncing him as a tyrant with an elaborate "cult of personality". This effectively alienated Khrushchev from the more conservative elements of the Party.<sup>94</sup>

Khrushchev became Premier on March 27, 1958 after a long and complex series of maneuvers, notably the crucial removal of Stalin's obvious successor, Beria, head of the KGB. Even before this watershed speech, however, the new leadership declared an amnesty for some serving prison sentences for criminal offences, announced price cuts, and relaxed the restrictions on private plots. De-Stalinization also spelled an end to the role of large-scale forced labor in the economy.

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<sup>93</sup> Michael Cox, International History since 1989, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations**", Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 2001, p.119.

<sup>94</sup> Blackburn; 1991, pp.116-133.

The ten-year period that followed Stalin's death also witnessed the reassertion of political power over the means of coercion. The party became the dominant institution over the secret police and army.<sup>95</sup> Khrushchev outmaneuvered his Stalinist rivals. But he was regarded by his political enemies especially the emerging caste of professional technocrats as a boorish peasant who would interrupt speakers to insult them. Khrushchev was deposed in 1964, largely due to his poor handling of the Cuban missile crisis, his personal mannerisms, and his reformist positions on central economic planning, which alarmed party cadres and state bureaucrats.<sup>96</sup>

After 1964, First Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosygin emerged as the most influential cadres in the new collective leadership. Eager to avoid Khrushchev's failures, Brezhnev and Kosygin, who represented a new generation of post-revolutionary professional technocrats, conducted state and party affairs in a discrete, cautious manner.

According to John Eatwell(*The New Palgrave: problems of the planned economy*) by the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union was a complex industrialized society with an intricate division of labor and with complex interconnection of industries over a huge geographical expanse that had reached military parity with the Western powers.

When the First Five-Year Plan drafted by GOSPLAN<sup>97</sup> established centralized planning as the basis of economic decision-making, the Soviet Union was still largely an agrarian nation lacking the complexities of a highly industrialized one. Thus, its goals, namely augmenting the country's industrial base, were those of extensive growth or the mobilization of resources. At a high human cost, due in large part to prison labor, and the effective militarization of factories, the Soviet Union forged a modern, highly industrialized economy more rapidly than any other nation beforehand.<sup>98</sup> John Eatwell maintains that under Brezhnev's tutelage, the Soviet economy still had not yet exhausted its capacity for growth. The Soviet Union improved living standards by doubling urban wages and raising rural wages by around 75%, building millions of one-family apartments, and manufacturing large quantities of consumer goods and home appliances. Industrial output also increased by 75%, and the Soviet Union became the world's largest producer of oil and

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<sup>95</sup> Blackburn; 1991,p.123

<sup>96</sup> Blackburn; 1991, p.128

<sup>97</sup> GOSPLAN was responsible body for the central planning and preparation of 5-year economic planning

<sup>98</sup> Eatwell, 1990, p.73

steel. The twenty years following Stalin's death in 1953 were the best period in the history of Russia for the ordinary citizen in terms of rising living standards, stability, and peace.<sup>99</sup>

Terror, famines, and world war were largely horrific memories while the tide of history appeared to be turning in favor of the Soviet Union. The United States was mired in economic recession resulting from the OPEC oil embargo, inflation caused by excessive government expenditures for the Vietnam War, and not to mention the wartime quagmire. Meanwhile, pro-Soviet regimes were making great strides abroad, especially in the Third World. Vietnam had defeated the United States, becoming a united, independent state under a Communist government while other Communist governments and pro-Soviet insurgencies were spreading rapidly across Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.<sup>100</sup>

Although reform stalled between 1964-1982, the generational shift gave new momentum for reform. Changing relations with the United States might also have been an impetus for reform. By the Reagan years in the United States, the abandonment of Détente<sup>101</sup> would force the Soviets to greatly improve their productive capabilities in order to reciprocate the new arms build-up, especially amid talks of "star wars" missile defense. (Perestroika in perspective: the design and dilemmas of Soviet reform, Padma Desai) By the time Gorbachev would usher in the process that would lead to the political collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant dismantling of the Soviet administrative command economy through his programs of *Glasnost* (political openness) and *Perestroika* (economic restructuring), the Soviet economy suffered from both hidden inflation and pervasive supply shortages.<sup>102</sup>

Mikhail Gorbachev took office in March 1985, shortly after Konstantin Chernenko's death. Gorbachev instituted a number of political reforms under the name of *Glasnost*, these included relaxing censorship and political repression, reducing the powers of the KGB and democratisation. The reforms were intended to break down resistance against Gorbachev's economic reforms, by conservative elements within the Communist Party. Under these reforms, much to the alarm of party conservatives. Competitive elections were introduced for the posts of officials by people within the communist party.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Eatwell, 1990, p.119

<sup>100</sup> Eatwell, 1990, p.141

<sup>101</sup> Until Regan Administration came to power US strategy was policy of containment, with Regan came to power US military build-up gained momentum

<sup>102</sup> Desai, 1989, p.21

<sup>103</sup> Desai, 1989, p.25

Gorbachev's relaxation of censorship and attempts created more political openness. However had the unintended effect of re-awakening long suppressed nationalist and anti-Russian feelings in the Soviet Union's constituent republics. During the 1980s calls for greater independence from Moscow's rule grew louder, this was especially marked in the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, which had been annexed into the Soviet Union by Stalin in 1940.<sup>104</sup> Nationalist feeling also took hold in other Soviet republics such as the Ukraine and Azerbaijan. These nationalist movements were strengthened greatly by the declining Soviet economy, whereby Moscow's rule became a convenient scapegoat for economic troubles. Gorbachev had accidentally unleashed a force that would ultimately destroy the Soviet Union. On February 15, 1989, Soviet forces completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviet Union continued to support the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with substantial aid until the end of 1991. In 1989 the communist governments of the Soviet Union's satellite states were overthrown one by one with feeble resistance from Moscow.<sup>105</sup>

By the late 1980s the process of openness and democratization began to run out of control, and went far beyond what Gorbachev had intended. In elections to the regional assemblies of the Soviet Union's constituent republics, nationalists swept the board. As Gorbachev had weakened the system of internal political repression, the ability of the USSR's central Moscow government to impose its will on the USSR's constituent republics had been largely undermined.

One of the most important themes came to the front after Cold War, is the alleged triumph of capitalism over socialism in economic, ideological and Political spheres.<sup>106</sup> One of the most important trends of the post-communist era: the triumph of capitalism as a world system, one that transformed the lives of most of humanity for better or worse, swept away all barriers to the operation of the market around the world, often with devastating social consequences, and transformed the character of international politics.

Indeed, if we think of the Cold War as an ongoing competition between different economic systems, where in one private property dominated and in the other the means of production were nationalized, then we can better understand the real significance of what really happened in 1989. For what transpired, in essence, was not simply the withdrawal of Soviet

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<sup>104</sup> Lovell, 2006,p.35.

<sup>105</sup> Lovell, 2006,p.38

<sup>106</sup> See. Leslie Holmes, Post-Komunizm, Çev: Yavuz Aloğan, İstanbul: Mavi Ada Yayınları, 2000.

power from Eastern Europe or even the subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact, but rather the end of a competition between alternative economic systems and the victory of one of them over the other.

Then, when in 1991, the USSR finally disintegrated and withdrew its support from its diminishing number of allies around the world (Cuba and Vietnam in particular) it put increased pressure on these regimes to change as well. Little wonder the West felt it had won the Cold War. The move from a bifurcated, two-world order in which the market only operated in some countries, to one in which it was operating in all (or nearly all) had immense and long-lasting consequences. If one result of the global triumph of the market was to change the ways in which countries tended to determine their foreign policy goals.

It would be an exaggeration to say that during the Cold War foreign policy was basically about military, security, and that in the new era it was primarily concerned with economics, but there is something to the argument. In fact, what we see throughout the advanced capitalist countries during the 1990s is an interesting trend, whereby on the one hand governments begin to reduce the vast amounts being spent on military, and on the other start thinking far more seriously about how to make their economies lean and efficient in an increasingly tough environment.

At the same time, government departments whose primary purpose was to help national companies win markets abroad tended to move up the bureaucratic ladder, while those viewed as having a less important economic function tended to move down. Even intelligence agencies found themselves under increasing pressure after the Cold War to define a new role for themselves, and whilst they continued to carry out their 'normal' assignments of specifying traditional threats to national security, some of them did start to take on new missions, one of which was to help their countries compete more effectively.<sup>107</sup>

Inevitably, in this age of geo-economics, the character of politics, domestic and international, changed out of all recognition. During the Cold War, after all, politics in the West had largely been defined by the larger strategic relationship with the 'other', the Soviet Union. Now, with the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent collapse of the

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<sup>107</sup> Michael Cox, *International History since 1989*, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.121.



USSR, the focus shifted towards the global world economy and how countries might survive and prosper within it.

Capitalism in its new post-communist manifestation thus assumed an increasingly intensive form, where little thought appeared to be given to human welfare and social cohesion, and everything seemed to revolve around profit and the balance sheet. The system was also prone to great fluctuation and many feared that at some point it was bound to meet its nemesis, as some thought it had done during the great financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. Even some of those who were the beneficiaries of the new economic order, like the financier George Soros, were concerned about the consequences of this new ‘unfettered capitalism’ and urged governments to intervene more often and more effectively to protect society from its ravages. Others, the anti-globalization forces, went further still and in the so-called ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999 took their protest against the logic of globalization to the streets.<sup>108</sup>

## **2. Rise of USA as the “Sole Hegemon” in the New System**

In the late 1980s, many writers predicting a US decline and the inability of the United States to compete effectively in the world economy. Best known among them, Paul Kennedy predicted a fairly bleak future and warned US leaders that the nation faced what all other empires had confronted before: erosion in its global position that would over time turn the United States from a superpower into an ‘ordinary country.’<sup>109</sup>

But these predictions failed, at least so far. If a triumphant capitalism was one result of the end of the Cold War, another was a resurgence of American self-confidence, so much so that by the beginning of the new millennium pundits were confidently predicting that the new century would be even more “American” than the old one.

The United States found itself in a position of unrivalled dominance in a unipolar world where its reach seemed unlimited and its freedom of maneuver unprecedented.

Between 1992 and 2000 the US experienced the longest boom of the post-war period, during which the value of US stocks doubled and then doubled again, unemployment dropped

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p.130.

dramatically as tens of millions of new jobs were created, and the American deficit finally disappeared. By the end of the decade there were few speaking, as they had been only ten years earlier of US economic frailty or an American inability to compete effectively.<sup>110</sup>

Not only economic success, and even not only military capacity primacy but also the balance of power in world developments showed that the only global intervention capacity belongs to US. All other countries, including rising regional powers, continued to follow America for political and military leadership-something that became all too apparent during the long-drawn-out carnage in Bosnia where it was decisive American intervention (after European and UN dithering) that finally brought that particular phase of the conflict in former Yugoslavia to an end.

It was not insignificant, and did not go unnoticed, that the Treaty which finally brought the war in Bosnia to a conclusion in November 1995 was not signed in Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Beijing or Brussels, but in the small American town of Dayton, Ohio.<sup>111</sup>

Finally, the US, and the US alone, had crucial global reach that extended across the Pacific and the Atlantic, into Central and Latin America, and deep into the heart of the Middle East and South Asia. In each of these vital regions, the United States continued to act as referee and player, often compelling others to seek agreement.

If we could call the US the biggest winner then we should also call Russia the biggest loser with the end of Cold War. No doubt that Russia is recovering its losses. But what it lost during the transition turmoil still not recovered in any areas.

On the other hand there are alternative theses that pursue the view that Russia is not a 'loser' of the Cold War game<sup>112</sup>. It is a reality that Russia was not demolished down with the Cold War; the governing elites led by Vladimir Putin were among the parts that took advantage of the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, competitive authoritarian regimes such as the one established after the end of USSR, cover formal democratic institutions as the

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<sup>109</sup> Paul Kennedy, **Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri (16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Ekonomik Değişim ve Askeri Çatışmalar)**, Çev.: Birtane Karanakçı, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 10. basım, 2005, s. 14.vd.

<sup>110</sup> <http://wikipedia.org.en.usec.asm>.

<sup>111</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Touchstone Publ., p. 820.

<sup>112</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, **Competitive authoritarianism: The emergence and dynamics of hybrid regimes in the postcold War era**, 2006, University of Michigan Publications,

basic means of gaining power, but where fraud, civil liberties violations, and abuse of state and media resources are frequently observed. All in all, it was authoritarian Russia that was beneficiary of the Cold War against the other Russia that could demand more liberty.

### 3. Russia Lost its Former Importance

Post-communist Russia lurched from one near-fatal crisis to another throughout the 1990s while the United States prospered in a world increasingly organized along economic lines consonant with American interests and values. Following Yeltsin's election, Russian industrial production dropped by nearly 40 per cent, over 80 per cent of Russians experienced a reduction in their living standards, health care disintegrated, life expectancy fell along with the birth rate, and morale overall collapsed. Between 1990 and 2003, its annual GDP growth rate varied from -15 percent in 1992 to +10 percent in 2000. Given this wide range, Russia can be characterized as having a considerably more uncertain economic future than many other nations of the world. As a result, 1.5 percentage points are added and subtracted from the reference case GDP assumptions to derive the high and low macroeconomic projections for Russia.<sup>113</sup> Most of the nonfreezing ports, consumer goods factories, oil and gas pipelines, and a significant portion of the Soviet Union's high-tech enterprises (including nuclear power stations) were outside of Russia, in the newly independent states.<sup>114</sup>

Russia's industries were mainly focused on heavy and military branches. Russia has also taken up the responsibility for settling the USSR's external debts, although its population made up just half of the population of the USSR at the time of its dissolution. The largest state enterprises (petroleum, metallurgy, and the like) were controversially privatized for the small sum of \$US 600 million, far less than they were worth.<sup>115</sup> A significant number of Russians clearly did not care for the new order and registered their protest either by repeatedly expressing nostalgia for the good old days under Soviet rule, or by supporting the newly formed Russian Communist Party led by Gennadi Zyuganov<sup>116</sup>.

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[http://scholar.google.com/url?sa=U&q=http://sitemaker.umich.edu/comparative.speaker.series/files/levitsky\\_with\\_bib.pdf](http://scholar.google.com/url?sa=U&q=http://sitemaker.umich.edu/comparative.speaker.series/files/levitsky_with_bib.pdf), 2006, s. 5

<sup>113</sup>International Energy Outlook Energy Information Administration, June, 2006, p.28. [www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html).

<sup>114</sup> Lanine R. Wedel, "Tainted Transactions", **The National Interest**, no: 59, Spring 2000, p. 20.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p. 22.

<sup>116</sup>Overview of Russia, <http://www.canadiancontent.net/profiles/Russia.html>

At least in theory this was not the expected outcome. As Wedel depicts it the “shock therapy” was itself shocking: “Only a few years ago, American policy-makers were confidently predicting that a regimen of privatization and market reform would in due course transform Russia into a stable and prosperous democracy. Today all that has passed away. Far from fulfilling their promise of a better life, the US-sponsored reforms of the 1990s have left many, if not most Russians worse off. For this state of affairs many Russians today blame the Western aid and advice they had received. Some indeed believe that the United States set out deliberately to destroy their economy.”<sup>117</sup>

Today Russia remains in a state of tension between the temptations of high oil prices, which mitigate the urgency of structural reforms and the danger of low oil prices, which threaten the viability of the state itself, as they did after 1986 and in 1998, when the world price of oil sank to \$10 per barrel. This is, of course, the fate of petro-states around the world. Russian President Putin seems to understand this situation perfectly, as his remarks in the 2003 annual State of the Nation address reveal: “Our economic foundation is... unreliable and very weak.... Russia will [prosper] only when it is not dependent on unpredictable changes in external markets.”<sup>118</sup> To take just one additional indicator of dependence, Russia's ratio of net debts to current account receipts stood at 78 percent in mid-2003, compared to a median of 32 percent for a group of twelve investment-grade economies outside of those of North America, Western Europe, and Japan.<sup>119</sup>

## **B. Theories Of Post-Cold War World System**

One of the cornerstones of the realist theory, which is a part of the international relations theory, is the Cold War itself<sup>120</sup>. The two-poled world shaped by capitalism at one hand and socialism on the other, ideological elements had come forth. Eralp describes the foreign policies determined by the realist theory during the Cold War years as follows<sup>121</sup>:

“ Soğuk Savaş döneminde ideolojik unsurları ön plana çıkması ile Realizmin güç kavramına verdiği önem çelişiyor gibi görünebilir. Ancak, Realistler Soğuk Savaş

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<sup>117</sup> Lanine R. Wedel, “*Tainted Transactions*”, **The National Interest**, no: 59, Spring 2000, p. 23

<sup>118</sup> Transcript of President's State of the Nation address, *BBC Monitoring*, May 16, 2003, at *JRL*, #7186, May 18, 2003, item no. 1. Cited in: Allen C. Lynch, **How Russia Is Not Ruled, Reflections on Russian Political Development**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.246.

<sup>119</sup> Allen C. Lynch, *How Russia Is Not Ruled, Reflections on Russian Political Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.245.

<sup>120</sup> Atilla Eralp Devlet, *Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2003, ss. 81-82.

yıllarında güç unsuruna ağırlık vererek adeta aklıseline temsil etmiştir; dış politika uygulamalarında ideolojik tutumlar etkisiyle olabilecek tırmanmaları engelleyecek rasyonel çözümleri savunmuşlardır. Bunun en tipik örneklerinden birisi dönemin önde gelen Realist düşünür ve uygulayıcısı George Kenan ve önerdiği Sovyetler Birliği’ni çevreleme politikasıdır.”

Instead of emphasis on ideological elements, the emphasis made above is on military terms, which in time helped the realist theory became the hegemonic school of thought in the aftermath of the World War II era. However, this was also the reason for the realist theory to lose its efficiency and effect in the international arena after the end of the Cold War era.

The realist theory approaches international relations from the perspective of power relations as well as national interests. This solid perspective was however not enough to bring explanations to the developments that took place in the international relations arena in the aftermath of cold War era. Because, within its existence realism was but a part of idealist theory.<sup>122</sup>

The static approach of the realist theory mentioned above led to the neglect of the historical perspective as well. With the end of the Cold War, the evolutions and revolutions experienced through the arena of international relations could not be elucidated with the frameworks supplied through the realist theory. This inability had evidently led to the search for alternative theories in the post-Cold War era, neo-realist theory being among one of the consequences of this research.

In this study, we use neo-realist theory to analyze the implications of unipolarity. We agree with Christopher Layne stating that the “unipolar moment” is just that, a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity between 2000-2010 “The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise.”<sup>123</sup> The argument relies on the premise that states balance against hegemons, even those like the United States that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion.

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 84.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, p.266.

<sup>123</sup> Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise”;; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p.244.

As Kenneth N. Waltz says, “*In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it.*”<sup>124</sup> In a unipolar world, systemic constraints balancing, uneven growth rates, and the sameness effect-impel eligible states (i.e., those with the capability to do so) to become great powers. In the following chapters using the neo-realist theory to explain the process of great power emergence we will try to show how Russia is becoming a “great power” along with the others like China despite several incapability’s. Before clarifying the details of argument let us overview the theoretical assumption about the international system in post Cold War era focusing on conditions for conflict and reconciliation.

The conflict and cooperation areas between Russian Federation and the United States should be explained within a new world system context analysis. This refers to the theories and approaches contending post Cold War international political environment. In order to accomplish this task we take a look at the very different, and entirely credible ways in which different writers from different ideological and cultural backgrounds have tried to understand-and in some ways anticipate-the main features of the modern era.

Following the Cox we would divide the big picture theorists basically into three distinct camps: Liberal optimists who see enormous potential in the new world in the making and look forward to much better times ahead: Realists who feel that the world is still as dangerous as it was before, if not more so; and Radicals who insist that the international order remains as unequal and as exploitative as ever.<sup>125</sup>

## **1. Liberals**

Most influential liberal theories of the post-cold war world advanced by a former US State Department official, Francis Fukuyama who shot to fame in the late 1980s with his “end of history” thesis which became popular among Turkish scholars as well. His basic thesis consisted of a rather simple but highly important set of assertions. These can be summarized thus:

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<sup>124</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” PS, December 1991, p. 669.

<sup>125</sup> Michael Cox, International History since 1989, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.113.

- that ‘history’ since the French Revolution had been driven by a core dynamic conflict between the forces supporting collectivism and those endorsing the ideals of ‘bourgeois’ individualism;
- that with the Russian Revolution of 1917 the balance clearly tilted towards the former;
- by the late 1970s however the balance began to tilt the other way as the various efforts at economic planning in the Third World started to show signs of fatigue; already before the fall of communism therefore the socialist project was in trouble;
- this became manifest when Gorbachev assumed office in the USSR in 1985 and began to challenge traditional Soviet ways of thinking about the world in general and the role of the market in particular;
- it became clearer still when Gorbachev finally decided to abandon Eastern Europe and the peoples of these countries opted for ‘bourgeois’ democracy and market economics-thus ending the division of Europe on terms entirely favorable to the West. This, according to Fukuyama, represented a huge victory for the forces of individualism, marking what he termed the ‘end’ of one phase in ‘history’, and the beginning of another where liberal economic values would prevail globally. All other options had been tried and failed. There was now no alternative to liberal capitalism.<sup>126</sup> Fukuyama wrote, in 1989 that:

“The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war.

But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’<sup>127</sup>

Fukuyama’s optimistic assessments about the inevitability of the market were paralleled by a series of equally upbeat political statements about the potential for peace in the post-cold

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<sup>126</sup> See: Francis Fukuyama, **The End of the History and the Last Man**, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.

war age. Ironically these assumed their sharpest political form soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. President George Bush then used the occasion to outline his own particular vision and declared to both houses of Congress that the threat posed by Saddam to the Middle East opened up the very real possibility of building a ‘new world order’ based on a combination of US military power, collective action by all the major powers, and an enhanced role for the United Nations.

Bush’s optimistic rhetoric also drew inspiration from a number of academic theories about the world-theories, which became increasingly popular and influential after 1989. Building upon the collapse of communism, but drawing intellectual sustenance from other, longer-term trends, the conclusion they arrived at was that the international system could look forward to less dangerous times.<sup>128</sup>

According to the liberal political thesis in a world where liberal democracy was rapidly becoming the norm, there was less likelihood of war. Because the number of democracies had grown exponentially since the early 1970s-accelerating after 1989 and 1991 to include most of the countries of the old Soviet bloc-it followed that peace was now far more likely than war.

Accordingly the liberal political theorists tended to have great faith in international institutions and their pacifying role. The modern world, according to a number of liberal theorists like John Ikenberry, was especially rich in multilateral institutions, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Union, being perhaps the most significant. Naturally enough, these served the particular interests of the various nation-states. But they also performed the larger function of binding different states together and getting them to abide by similar, non-conflictual norms, so contributing to the cause of peace.<sup>129</sup>

Liberals also agreed that globalization therefore was not merely an economic imperative, but served an important security role as well: They argued that the world trade grew, as the financial ties between different geographical zones deepened, and countries invested more

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<sup>127</sup> Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, **National Interest**, Summer 1989.

<sup>128</sup> Michael Cox, International History since 1989, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations**”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.115.



heavily in each other's economy then each state would develop a powerful set of material incentives to get on with their neighbors. The possibility of war remained, but in an increasingly integrated world economic system, the likelihood of it actually occurring would diminish rapidly.

After 1970s neo-liberal view came to the agenda against etatist theories, most popular advocates of which were Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, James Buchanan. These people briefly said that state intervention was not a must for the *wealth of nations* and the state should be perceived as an organization run by self-seeking politicians and bureaucrats. These persons had limited capacity to develop economic means for the well being of society and were highly affected by a number of certain interest groups, which led to imperfect competition and thus government failures and corruption. The mechanisms established to provide a free market and related environment, would naturally care for a free market rather than the lives of persons if they economically are not essential (i.e. not rich). Also from the very same perspective, the free market defenders might ignore the fact that there are millions of children hired as labourers in East Asia to produce things cheaper. Child labouring is prohibited in the developed economies of the world, while this is not the case for emerging and less-developed markets<sup>130</sup>. Free market advocates think that free-circulation of labour should be a must in Ricardian<sup>131</sup> sense for ideal perfect competition.

Economic rationalism rooting from free-market thought makes exaggerated emphasis over man's self-interest. Money and economic well-being do not mean everything. Human beings live not by bread alone, but also affected by passions and emotional complexes, which cut across all social strata, classes and group interests<sup>132</sup>.

Despite the fact that neo-liberals do not see the state as something necessary to carry out deeds other than security and diplomatic relations among nations, market economies can't do without more intervention of state. Any economic institution cannot do without proper and well-established laws designed for making contracts, banking, and even a healthy

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<sup>129</sup> Michael Cox, International History since 1989, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.116.

<sup>130</sup> Chang H. 2001 "Breaking the Mould An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neoliberal Theory of the Market and the State" Social Policy and Development Programme Paper Number 6, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: New York, NY. p. 15.

<sup>131</sup> Please see "Ricardian Model." Def. 1. Deardorff's Glossary of International Economics. 2006. Michigan U-Ann Arbor. 14 Nov. 2006 <<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/r.html>> for more information on the basics of Ricardian economics.

environment for entrepreneurs. State is the only mechanism yet-known to work as a regulatory agent among different classes and within the classes themselves<sup>133</sup>. Without the presence of an effective regulatory mechanism anomy would emerge. In the past making of national markets was when the institutions of modern nation states were established.

## **2. Neo-realist Interpretation of International Politics**

The new realism, in contrast to the old, begins by proposing a solution to the problem of distinguishing factors internal to international political systems from those that are external. Theory isolates one realm from others in order to deal with it intellectually. By depicting an international-political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neo-realism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes a theory about it possible. Neo-realism is sometimes referred to as structural realism; Waltz formulates his own theory as neo-realist theory.<sup>134</sup>

According to Waltz, neo-realism develops the concept of a system-structure which at once bounds the domain that students of international politics deal with and enables them to see how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others.

The concept of structure is based on the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes, international structures are defined, first, by the ordering principle of the system, in this case anarchy, and second, by the distribution of capabilities across units.<sup>135</sup>

In an anarchic realm, structures are defined in terms of their major units; international structures vary with significant changes in the number of great powers. Great powers are marked off from others by the combined capabilities (or power) they command. When their number changes consequentially, the calculations and behaviors of states, and the outcomes their interactions produce, vary.

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<sup>132</sup> Riha, T. J. F. 1994. "Missing: Morality in the Transformation of Former Socialist Countries" *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 21, Nos 10/11/12, pp. 10-31, p. 17.

<sup>133</sup> World Bank. 1991. *World Development Report*, World Bank: Washington, D.C., p. 52.

<sup>134</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neo-realist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring / summer 1990, Vol 44, No: 1, pp 21-48.

<sup>135</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neo-realist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, spring / summer 1990, Vol 44, No: 1, p 39.

The idea that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure is neo-realism's fundamental departure from traditional realism. The spareness of the definition of international structure has attracted criticism. Robert Keohane asserts that neo-realist theory "can be modified progressively to attain closer correspondence with reality."<sup>136</sup>

"Theory", according to Waltz, "after all, is mostly omissions"<sup>137</sup>. What is omitted cannot be added without thoroughly reworking the theory and turning it into a different one. Should one broaden the perspective of international-political theory to include economics? An international political-economic theory would presumably be twice as good as a theory of international politics alone. To fashion such a theory, one would have to show how the international political-economic domain could be marked off from others. One would first have to define its structures and then develop a theory to explain actions and outcomes within it.

Waltz's theory of international relation could be grasped also by looking at the differences that he depicts between his neo-realism and the traditional realist theory. For Waltz neo-realism breaks with realism. For Neo-realism produces a shift in causal relations, offers a different interpretation of power, and treats the unit level differently.<sup>138</sup>

The neorealist's world looks different from the one that earlier realists had portrayed. For realists, the world addressed is one of interacting states. For neorealists, interacting states can be adequately studied only by distinguishing between structural and unit-level causes and effects. Structure becomes a new object of inquiry, as well as an occasion for argument. In the light of neorealist theory, means and ends are differently viewed, as are causes and effects. Realists think of causes running in one direction, from interacting states to the outcomes their acts and interactions produce.

### 3. Objections

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<sup>136</sup> Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in Keohane, **Neo-realism and Its Critics**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p.191.

<sup>137</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neo-realist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, spring / summer 1990, Vol 44, No: 1, pp 41-46.

<sup>138</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, spring / summer 1990, Vol 44, No: 1, p. 42.

The anarchy argument that moral principles do not apply to international relations relies on oversimplified notions of morality, of international affairs, and of domestic politics as well. That is it oversimplifies morality by equating it with simplistic moralism. In other words moral theory rarely deals with easy problems that can be resolved by application of simplistic moral rules. On the contrary its traditional domain, instead, is difficult dilemmas in which principles and interests conflict.

There are, of course, differences of opinion about how to accommodate competing interests consistently with morality; one might take the Utopian position that self-interest and security are irrelevant and that abstract and unyielding principles are all that matter. But a moral person need not; wholesale rejection of morality is therefore out of place. The anarchy argument also oversimplifies international relations. Its version of the international system is that power is diffuse rather than centralized, that equality rather than hierarchy is standard. Certainly there is diffusion of power at some times and in certain parts of the international system. But at other times and places, hierarchy is a better description.

It is a mistake to generalize from the former cases, ignoring the latter. International relations theory needs to deal with both. It is equally mistaken to become mesmerized by one's own formalizations, which capture elements of sovereign-state equality but leave unmentioned consistent power differentials.<sup>139</sup>

The anarchy argument, finally, oversimplifies domestic politics, probably in order to maintain the sharpest possible contrast with international relations. Domestic political relations are portrayed as centralized, ordered, hierarchical, and legitimate. Sometimes they are. But they are also sometimes chaotic, illegitimate, disorderly - and anarchical. Domestic regimes, moreover, can be vulnerable internally in many of the same ways that they are vulnerable externally. The "security dilemma" which realists describe between states is not unique to international affairs. States also face security risks in their dealings with their own citizens, and political morality must face the question of what to do in such circumstances.<sup>140</sup>

The anarchy argument is phrased as an objection to applying moral principles to international relations. But in fact it is corrosive of all morality, domestic as well as

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<sup>139</sup> Lea Brilmayer, **American Hegemony, and Political Morality in a One-Superpower World**, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1994, p. 36.

international. Its logic would lead to the conclusion that the strongest actor in the system is never subject to moral censure. It seems to suggest that moral principles are irrelevant whenever no authority exists to ensure satisfaction of one's preferences, even though domestically there are many sorts of interests that are not guaranteed by states.

Where security is at stake, it seems to hold, moral principles are completely irrelevant-even though security concerns also arise domestically. The anarchy argument essentially holds that whenever a genuinely difficult issue arises, morality just drops out of the picture. But the prime objective of morality, including political morality, is to deal with genuinely difficult problems.<sup>141</sup>

Of course, the simple claim that political morality applies to international relations does not tell very much about what moral principles there are or what they require.

### **C. Neo-Realist Theory: On Post Cold War Era And Russo-American Relations**

Realists are not realists because they are 'realistic', but rather because they have what they believe is a more coherent analysis about the way states have always operated and operate now.

Mearsheimer's argument about going 'back to the future' is built upon the basic realist argument that the Cold War system of bipolarity led to a 'long peace' that might now be undermined by its dissolution. In his view this newfound optimism was premised upon a major misreading of history in general and the Cold War in particular. In his opinion the Cold War, had actually made it much safer after 1945. It thus followed that the new international order would be less stable rather than more as a result of what had happened in Eastern Europe after 1989.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Lea Brilmayer, *American Hegemony, and Political Morality in a One-Superpower World*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1994, p. 37.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, p.36

<sup>142</sup> John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", **International Security**, summer, 1990.passim

States do have one channel of speech; there are not multiple voices for states' foreign policies. Despite the fact that there may emerge domestic disputes over a particular policy issue, only one policy will be directed in the international arena<sup>143</sup> Because of this neo-realists argue that domestic dynamics are not conclusive to explain state interaction. On the other hand this does not mean, that analyses should remain at the structural level. Neo-realism freely approves that to access a complete explanation of any event a unit level or individual level of analysis can be used<sup>144</sup>.

## **1. Conflict and Cooperation**

Waltz argues that a big anomaly in realist theory is seen in the attempt to explain alternations of war and peace. Like most students of international politics, realists infer outcomes from the salient attributes of the actors producing them. Governmental forms, economic systems, social institutions, political ideologies are but a few examples of where the causes of war and peace have been found. Yet, although causes are specifically assigned, we know that states with every imaginable variation of economic institution, social custom, and political ideology have fought wars.

If an indicated condition seems to have caused a given war, one must wonder what accounts for the repetition of wars even as their causes vary. Variations in the quality of the units are not linked directly to the outcomes their behaviors produce, nor are variations in patterns of interaction. Many, for example, have claimed that World War I was caused by the interaction of two opposed and closely balanced coalitions. But then many have claimed that World War II was caused by the failure of some states to right an imbalance of power by combining to counter an existing alliance.

Over the centuries, the texture of international life has remained impressively, or depressingly, uniform even while profound changes were taking place in the composition of states, which, according to realists, account for national behavior and international

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<sup>143</sup> John Rosenau, and Mark Durfee. *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, 2nd ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 2000, p. 14. and Rosenau and Durfee 2000, p.14.

<sup>144</sup> B. Buzan. "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?" In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalewski, 47–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 51.

outcomes. Realists cannot explain the disjunction between supposed causes and observed effects.<sup>145</sup>

Waltz believes neorealists can. Neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to traditional realism's unit-level explanations. More generally, neorealism reconceives the causal link between interacting units and international outcomes. Neorealist theory shows that causes run not in one direction, from interacting units to outcomes produced, but rather in two directions.

One must believe that some causes of international outcomes are located at the level of the interacting units. Since variations in unit-level causes do not correspond to variations in observed outcomes, one has to believe that some causes are located at the structural level of international politics as well. Realists cannot handle causation at a level above states because they fail to conceive of structure as a force that shapes and shoves the units. Causes at the level of units interact with those at the level of the structure and because they do so explanation at the level of units alone is bound to mislead. If one's theory allows for the handling of both unit-level and structure-level causes, then it can cope with both the changes and the continuities that occur in a system.

Power in neorealist theory is simply the combined capability of a state. Its distribution across states, and changes in that distribution, help to define structures and changes in them as explained above. Some complaints have been made about the absence of efforts on the part of neorealists to devise objective measures of power. Whatever the difficulties of measurement may be, they are not theoretical difficulties but practical ones encountered when moving from theory to its practical application.

Neorealists concentrate their attention on the central, previously unanswered question in the study of international politics: How can the structure of an international-political system be distinguished from its interacting parts? Once that question is answered, to the effects of structure on interacting units. Theorists concerned with structural explanations need not ask how variations in units affect outcomes, even though outcomes find their causes at both structural and unit levels.

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<sup>145</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, spring / summer 1990, Vol 44, No: 1, p. 43.

Neorealists see states as like units; each state “is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit.” Autonomy is the unit-level counterpart of anarchy at the structural level. Theory of international politics can leave aside variation in the composition of states and in the resources and technology they command because the logic of anarchy does not vary with its content. Realists concentrate on the heterogeneity of states because they believe that differences of behavior and outcomes proceed directly from differences in the composition of units. Noticing that the proposition is faulty, neorealists offer a theory that explains how structures affect behavior and outcomes.<sup>146</sup>

## 2. Explaining Post-Cold War Era

Kenneth Waltz replies counter-neorealist approaches on the question of whether neorealist theory captures the realities of the post Cold war world affairs: argues that if the conditions that a theory contemplated have changed, the theory no longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? Changes of the system would do it; changes *in* the system would not.

Within-system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and war fighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others’ security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system.<sup>147</sup> Both changes of weaponry and changes of polarity were big ones with ramifications that spread through the system, yet they did not transform it. If the system were transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics, and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future.<sup>148</sup>

For Waltz the world, however, has not been transformed; the structure of international politics has simply been remade by the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and for a time

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<sup>146</sup> Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, *Journal of International Affairs*, spring / summer 1990, Vol 44, No: 1, p. 45.

<sup>147</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6.



we will live with unipolarity. Moreover, the forces and factors did not remake international politics that some believe are creating a new world order.<sup>149</sup>

The end of the Cold War coincided with what many took to be a new democratic wave. The trend toward democracy combined with Michael Doyle's rediscovery of the peaceful behavior of liberal democratic states *inter se* contributes strongly to the belief that war is obsolescent, if not obsolete, among the advanced industrial states of the world.<sup>150</sup>

This democratic peace thesis holds that democracies do not fight democracies. Proponents of the democratic peace thesis write as though the spread of democracy will negate the effects of anarchy. No causes of conflict and war will any longer be found at the structural level. Francis Fukuyama finds it "perfectly possible to imagine anarchic state systems that are nonetheless peaceful." He sees no reason to associate anarchy with war. Bruce Russett believes that, with enough democracies in the world, it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice . . . since at least the seventeenth century."<sup>151</sup>

Waltz disagrees with this point and defends the neorealist position. According to him first of all democracies coexist with undemocratic states.<sup>152</sup> The idea that peace may prevail among democratic states, for Waltz, is a comforting thought. Secondly he believes the interdependence theory collapsed as early as World War I.

Moreover he describes interdependence as an ideology used by Americans to commonage the great leverage the United States enjoys in international politics by making it seem that strong and weak, rich and poor nations are similarly entangled in a thick web of interdependence.<sup>153</sup> Thirdly international institutions are weak to face with difficulties of conflicting international interests. According to Waltz the causes of war lie not simply in states or in the state system; they are found in both.

### III. MAIN TENDENCIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR US FOREIGN POLICY

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p. 39.

<sup>150</sup> Michael W. Doyle, "Kant: Liberalism and World Politics," **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 80, No. 4 December 1986, pp. 1151–1169.

<sup>151</sup> Francis Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man**, New York: Free Press, 1992, pp. 254–256. & Bruce Russett, **Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War Peace**, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 24.

<sup>152</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, **International Security**, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, p. 11.

## A. Competing Systems and Countries

Given the different economic goals of capitalism in the USA and socialism in the USSR, then, the Soviet economy had its periods of success but failed disastrously in the end. During the period of gestation of superpower, there was considerable recovery in the 1920s, fast heavy industrial growth in the 1930s, and a remarkable performance in the difficult conditions of the Second World War.

Nevertheless, in spite of the reverses of the Great Depression and the no more than partial success of the New Deal, the USA was far in front by 1945 and maintained that lead afterwards, even if there were some appearances to the contrary during the youth of the superpowers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. From about the middle of the 1960s, however, in the period of maturity, there was a deceleration in the growth of Soviet heavy industry, “traditionally the main engine of relatively high rates of growth in the past”, and also in light industry and transportation and, worst of all, in agriculture. Moreover, the USSR was far behind in the technological revolution.

Calculations on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 indicated that its GNP was approximately no more than one-third of that of the USA, and at least one expert suggested that the figure was as low as 14 per cent. The post-Soviet performance has been even worse, prompting at least some doubts about the suitability for the Russian Federation of “a developed market economy”. In other words, there is continued divergence rather than convergence.<sup>154</sup>

Reflective post-Soviet study has come to the following conclusions:

1. The former Soviet Union was especially active (and not without success!) in building up resources for “catching up” with the USA: employment in the economy was 1.5 times more, in industry 1.4 times more, capital formation was three times greater. More iron and steel was produced in the Soviet Union, to name but two items. All of this was the consequence of “huge investment and accumulation, faster rates of growth of means of production, the presence of gigantic natural and human resources and the operation of extensive factors in economic development”.

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid, pp. 13- 16.

2. But Soviet gross output in industry was less impressive than American: the former was no more than 51 per cent of the latter.

3. “The Soviet Union had very weak results in the field of high-tech output, personal consumption and efficiency of production.” The USA produced five times more plastic, ten times more PCs and ten times more durable consumer goods. American ratios were higher in labor productivity, material and capital output as well.

4. In general: “The totalitarian command non-market economy could not be competitive with a developed market economy.”<sup>155</sup>

## **B. Background: Turning Points in US Foreign Policy**

There are several preordination proposals for the turning points in the post-war history of the United States. Although they offer some different way of looking at the issue they do not exclude one another. On the contrary they give us parts of a greater picture on that matter. Among them three seemed us informative: Kegley and Wittkopf’s, Halliday’s and Windsor’s assessment of the period:

### i- Kegley and Wittkopf’s Periodization of Postwar History<sup>156</sup>

#### A. 1945–1962: Confrontation

1963–1978: From Coexistence to Detente

1979–1991: From Renewed Confrontation to Rapprochement

### ii- Halliday’s Periodization of Postwar History<sup>157</sup>

#### A. 1946–1953: First Cold War (Phase I)

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<sup>154</sup> Paul Dukes, **The Superpowers, A Short History**, London & NY: Rotledge, 2000, p. 164.

<sup>155</sup> Paul Dukes, **The Superpowers, A Short History**, London & NY: Rotledge, 2000, p. 164.

<sup>156</sup> Kegley, C.W. and E.R. Wittkopf. *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives (Fourth Edition)*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995.

<sup>157</sup> Halliday, F. *The Making of the Second Cold War (Second Edition)*. London: Verso, 1987, pp. 3–7.

1953–1969: Oscillatory Antagonism (Phase II)

1969–1979: Detente (Phase III)

1979–1988: Second Cold War (Phase IV)

iii- General Characterization of Superpower Rivalry During the Cold War Period<sup>158</sup>

A. Soviet-American Condominium and Superpower Intervention

B. Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD)

C. Superpower Responsibility to Maintain International Order

1. Natural Law

2. Public Order

D. Higher Legitimacy of Superpowers: Their Historical-Ideological Task

1. US: Manifest Destiny and Liberal Democracy

2. USSR: Proletarian Hegemony and International Communism

E. Symmetry and Asymmetry

## **1. Historical Developments and Key Events<sup>159</sup>**

The history of superpowers coincides with the global histories. Indeed many domestic developments, decisions and moves are not so domestic due to their effects on the global level. US political history could not be separated from its history of foreign relations.

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<sup>158</sup>Windsor, in Bull, H., ed. *Intervention in World Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. “Superpower Intervention”

Moreover this history is one of the determining components of the global history. A brief look at the developments and events in US Cold War political history sums up this picture.

1943

Teheran Conference

The first of the “Big Three” Summit Meetings between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill (representing the US, the USSR, and the UK, respectively).

4–11 February 1945, Yalta Conference

The Yalta Conference, held in the Crimea, was the second of the “Big Three” Summit Meetings, and dealt primarily with the impending postwar arrangements for Germany, Poland, and the Far East. In 1944, the Allies had agreed to divide Germany into American, Soviet, and British zones of military occupation. This was ratified at Yalta, though Churchill persuaded Stalin to accept a French zone as well. Once again, the Allies demanded the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Stalin had already organized a Communist-dominated provisional government in Poland, but at the protestation of the Western Allies, agreed to include “democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad, promising that “free elections” would be held in Poland. These pledges, of course, were never honored.

Stalin wanted to give a large part of eastern Germany to Poland to compensate the Poles for the territory the Soviet Union had taken from them. The Western Allies accepted the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish border and, although unhappy about it, also had to accept the Oder-Neisse Line as the Polish-German Border. In fact, there was probably little they could do about the latter, since Russian troops already occupied the area.

The USSR agreed to enter the war against Japan three months after ending the war with Germany; in return, it would recover those possessions it had lost in the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). To everyone’s dismay, the Russians accepted the idea of an American occupation of Japan.

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<sup>159</sup> All material paraphrased from Townson, D. *The New Penguin Dictionary of Modern History*, 1789–

Realizing that the Russians would be in Korea before they could, the Americans persuaded the Russians to accept a Russian military occupation of Korea north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and an American occupation to the south of it. At the time, these were presumed to be temporary arrangements until Korea could later be unified.

An agreement by the Western Allies to send back to Russia all Soviet citizens later caused much controversy, especially as, by September 1945, many of the two million people whom had been returned to the USSR were shot as German collaborators or sent to forced labor camps. The USSR, however, also agreed to the establishment of the United Nations.

The Yalta Conference was criticized in the US for making Stalin's position much stronger in both Europe and the Far East; yet, as some have argued, there was little the other powers could do, since Russian troops already occupied much of Germany and Eastern Europe, and also since Britain and the US were anxious to receive Stalin's commitment to the war against Japan.<sup>160</sup>

17 July– 2 August 1945, Potsdam Conference

The last of the Allied Summit Meetings, taking place just outside of Berlin and shortly after the death of FDR, which left Harry S. Truman as president of the US. Another important change in personalities was brought about by Churchill's is being defeated by Attlee in the recent British general election, thus leaving Stalin as the only remaining figure among the "Big Three."

Germany had surrendered in May; however, as the Allies found little upon which they could agree, many crucial arrangements were left vague and poorly defined. They agreed, nonetheless, on an Allied Control Commission with representatives from the US, USSR, Britain, and France, and that this group would coordinate policy in Germany, although its actions could be vetoed by any individual power. A body representing all the powers was established to administer Berlin.

It was agreed that Germany should make reparations. The amount, however, was not fixed, as the Western Allies had learned from the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that preventing

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1945. London: Penguin, 1994.

<sup>160</sup> Townson, *ibid.*, 1994, pp. 925–926.

German economic development could slow down the revival of the European economy as a whole.

The territorial decisions of Yalta were confirmed: the six million Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary should be resettled in Germany. The Communist-dominated Polish government was recognized after Stalin agreed to include some members of the London-based government-in-exile; and he also promised that there would be “free elections” in all countries liberated by Soviet troops. Additionally, an International Military Tribunal would be established to try war criminals.<sup>161</sup>

5 March 1946

Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech in Fulton, Missouri

With President Truman alongside him, Churchill declares, “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.”

September 1946

While in Stuttgart, James F. Byrnes, Truman’s Secretary of State, makes a similar speech to that of Churchill’s in Fulton.

1949

USSR acquires the atom bomb; four years after the US used its first nuclear weapons on Japan.

1947, Truman Doctrine

On 12 March 1947, President Truman expressed the most important US policy initiative since the Monroe Doctrine of 1917; this initiative was quickly translated into the policy of “containment”: “At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life.

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<sup>161</sup> Townson, *ibid.*, 1994 p. 670.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, and guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

1953

First, the US acquires the hydrogen bomb; then, three months later, so do the Soviets. There have been two periods of consensus in the post-World War II era of American foreign policy. The first, loosely termed containment, began to form in 1947, was fully operative by 1954, flourished until the mid 1960s, and was moribund by 1968. The second epoch, even more loosely dubbed detente, emerged between Nixon's "silent majority" speech of November 1969 and the last great antiwar march in May 1971, prevailed from mid-1971 until late 1973, and was floundering by early 1975.

While dissimilar in several respects, each consensus was characterized by a focus on Soviet-American relations, specific diagnoses of Soviet capabilities and intentions, and relatively clear prescriptions for American responses to Moscow. What helped to give the earlier consensus much greater longevity was the presence of remarkably cohesive, articulate elite responsible for shaping, sustaining, and ultimately destroying it<sup>162</sup>.

## **2. Administration and Doctrines**

1945–1953, Truman Doctrine

US vows to support "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This was quickly translated into the policy of "containment" as briefed above.

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<sup>162</sup> Richard A. Melanson, "A Neo Consensus American Foreign Policy in 1980s" in Richard A. Melanson (ed) **Neither Cold War nor Detente, Soviet-American Relations in 1980s**, Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1989, p.187.



### 1953–1961, Eisenhower Doctrine

With the decline of Britain's international role during the early-postwar years, President Eisenhower's administration felt it necessary for the US to fill this power vacuum in order to keep the USSR from seizing any potential opportunities in the old colonial areas, the Middle East being a case in point. The main disincentive to Soviet aggression, of course, was the threat of "massive retaliation," a policy that was difficult to implement on a local basis or in the event of internal struggles.

In contrast to Truman's policy of "containment," the Eisenhower administration placed its emphasis on "rollback" and the idea of liberation from the Communist threat. The success of this policy initiative was relatively limited.

### 1961–1963, Kennedy Doctrine

"Let any nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foes, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty. This much we pledge-and more" (President Kennedy's Inaugural Address).

1963–1968, *Johnson Years*, No specific doctrine renamed after that administration. This period is a transitional period between Kennedy and Nixon doctrines

### 1969–1974, Nixon Doctrine

Realizing that the US could no longer maintain the preponderance of its immediate postwar position, President Nixon sought to assist Third World allies in becoming regional hegemony on behalf of American interests, Iran under the Shah being a case in point. Also, of course, Kissinger sought to reorganize the balance of power structure by bringing China into the global fore.

### 1974–1977, Ford Years

This period could be accounted as a continuation of Nixon years Foreign policy and security topics include; the Middle East peace negotiations, aid to Israel, SALT, the Vietnamese War, Panama Canal Treaty negotiations, the Helsinki Agreements, Angola,

American-Soviet relations, military readiness, Southern Africa, and investigations of the intelligence community.<sup>163</sup>

1977–1981, Carter Doctrine

Though limited generally to the Persian Gulf, President Carter defined American vital interests and even vowed to repel Soviet assaults on them “by any means necessary—including military force.”

1981–1989, Reagan Doctrine

Under President Ronald Reagan, US foreign policy displayed a strong commitment to fight throughout the Third World in order to prevent Communist victories, US support for the Afghan rebels and the Contras in Central America being two cases in point.

Reagan followed by Bush Clinton and Bush Jr.. The transition from father Bush to the son Bush characterizes a turn back to Cold War policies in a different context. Clinton period seems to an exception. The years following the demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War have been a far more frustrating period of foreign policy and policy making than some anticipated in the early 1990s. Only two presidents -Bill Clinton and George W. Bush- have had to deal with the challenges resulting from the onset of American primacy within a context of globalization. Nevertheless there are points of comparison allowing an interim overview of their foreign policy of both presidents.<sup>164</sup>

Both administrations undertook strategic assessments of the international position of the United States and both administrations revealed their operational modalities for engaging the international system quite early in their tenures. Indeed, in the case of the Bush administration, it has been the operational style of the administration that has drawn the most attention. Thus “unilateralism” became the defining characteristic of the Bush administration for most observers before the catastrophic events of 9/11 and the descriptor stuck even as the administration defined its substantive focus in terms of wars on terrorism and Iraq, both fought by means of an international “coalition.”<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> [www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gf38.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gf38.html) - 31k - 16 Ağustos 2006 -

<sup>164</sup> Sait Yılmaz, 21. Yüzyılda Güvenlik ve İstihbarat, İstanbul: Alfa Yay. 2006.

<sup>165</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş, Gözden Geçirilmiş İkinci Baskı, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2005.

The September 11 2001 attacks, or 9/11, were the series of coordinated terrorist suicide attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in the United States on September 11, 2001. The effects of that event uncomparable to any of its kind. Shortly following the attacks, the US government accused Al Qaeda, a hardline Islamic organization widely held responsible for numerous terrorist acts, of funding and carrying out the attacks. This led to a “War on Terrorism” that included the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (with support of the United Nations). It was also evoked to generate domestic support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq (without explicit support or rejection of the U.N.), and been used by the U.S. government as a justification to increase pressure on groups accused of being terrorists, as well as governments and countries accused of harboring them.

September eleven fundamentally changed the nature of international relations and the US foreign policy. In other words terrorist attacks were a critical turning point both for the United States of America and the International Community. Some thinkers evaluated that date as a point that created an acute alteration of the conception of the defense.<sup>166</sup> Some others even described the situation as “another new world order.”<sup>167</sup>

We do not claim however, that September eleven was the first and the only turning point in the history of the foreign policy of the United States of America. Our brief exploration of the turning points in US foreign policy in the post II. World War period would assert that. But what make September Eleven a “turning point” in the full sense of the term are its all-covering effects on the agenda of international relations.

The effects of September eleven as attack aimed at creating unsafely within the western countries and the results of the new foreign policy approach of the Bush Administration were really global both in policy and societal terms.<sup>168</sup>

The very first measure taken by the Bush administration was the restriction in civil liberties. The speeches of the President Bush initiated or at least furthered hostility towards Muslims, and Islam in general. After Clinton years this was a turn back to “falconism”. The

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<sup>166</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, “The US Response to Terrorism and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations”, In Gustav Lindstrom (Ed), Shift Or Rift, Assessing US\_EU Relations After Iraq, Institute For Security Studies, EU Publ. Paris, 2003, p.207.

<sup>167</sup> Sabeel Rahman, “Another New World Order? Multilateralism in the Aftermath of September 11” Harvard International Review, Vol 23 No 4, winter 2002, p. 40.

<sup>168</sup> 11 Eylül'den 5 yıl sonra dünyayı nasıl görüyorsunuz?, Dünya Bülteni, [http://www.dunyabulteni.net/haber\\_detay.php?haber\\_id=4781&Grup=DOSYA](http://www.dunyabulteni.net/haber_detay.php?haber_id=4781&Grup=DOSYA)

“falcons” were the neoconservatives, a group of people occupying important posts in state and presidential apparatus.

### 3. Clash between Civilizations?

Samuel Huntington’s famous book with the above label gained extra fame after the ‘September eleven’ developments.<sup>169</sup> It was basically because the terrorists were Muslim and organizers of the attack were aiming Islamic victory over the “satanic” Christia USA and the West. Against all objections to the argument that paraphrasing “terrorists versus US clash” as a “civilization clash”, silently gained approval by the larger parts of the global society.

Hostility towards Muslims in global public opinion fired by the Bush’s speech made after September eleven attacks. Fearful of backlash, most leaders of Muslim communities in the US, Canada, and Europe have responded in predictable ways to the Twin Towers atrocity. This has essentially two parts: first, that Islam is a religion of peace; and second that “Islam was hijacked by fanatics” on the 11th of September 2001.<sup>170</sup>

Turkey, on the other hand, exemplified as a good combination of Islam and democracy. But that attribute helped little indeed to Turkey for getting extra financial aid from US, since her Parliament was critical about the aims of US operations in Iraq.

Actually Despite Huntington’s claim of a clash of civilizations between the West and the rest, the WVS reveals that, at this point in history, democracy has an overwhelmingly positive image throughout the world. In country after country, a clear majority of the population describes, “having a democratic political system” as either “good” or “very good.” These results represent a dramatic change from the 1930s and 1940s, when fascist regimes won overwhelming mass approval in many societies; and for many decades, Communist regimes had widespread support. But in the last decade, democracy became virtually the only political model with global appeal, no matter what the culture. With the exception of Pakistan, most of the Muslim countries surveyed think highly of democracy: In Albania, Egypt, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Morocco, and Turkey, 92 to 99

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<sup>169</sup> See: Samuel P. Huntington, **Medeniyetler Çatışması**, (ed:) Murat Yılmaz, Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 9. Ed. 2005.

<sup>170</sup> Muslims And The West After 9/11 By Pervez Hoodbhoy January 12, 2002; Znet Foreign policy <http://www.zmag.org/content/ForeignPolicy/hoodbhoy0110.cfm15012004>: 18.41

percent of the public endorsed democratic institutions-a higher proportion than in the United States (89 percent)<sup>171</sup>

#### 4. Empowerment of neocons in US Domestic and Foreign Policy

It is widely argued that the September eleven events empowered the neo conservative clique: The doctrine and ideology of the post-9/11 US foreign policy are shaped by these “neocons”. The leading person among the neocon circles is Paul Wolfowitz is called the “uber-neocon” by American media.<sup>172</sup>

The most important activists are Richard Perle, who until recently headed the Defense Policy Board (he's still a member; James Woolsey, who was CIA director during the Clinton administration; Kenneth Adelman, a former official in the Ford and Reagan administrations who trains executives by using Shakespeare's plays as a guide to the use of power; Douglas Feith, the undersecretary of defense for policy, the Pentagon official in charge of the reconstruction of Iraq; and I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Cheney's chief of staff.<sup>173</sup> These figures demonstrate the power of neocons in Bush Administration.

Even some analysts argued, “Growing evidence reveals the September eleven attacks were planned by US to support the dreams of the Neocons”.<sup>174</sup> But this is an argument hard to be confirmed or unconfirmed.

Neocons got empowered but hard to say that they are omnipotent. The conflict within the Bush administration over policy for postwar Iraq –both before, during and after the war– has caused much confusion.<sup>175</sup> The neocons don't win all the time. In the argument over how involved the UN should be in postwar Iraq, the State Department and Tony Blair favored a fairly large role whereas the Defense Department (neocons' base) preferred virtually none at all.<sup>176</sup> The President came down somewhere near the middle, saying that the UN should have a “vital” role. So we should sum up that the US foreign policy is in mood of a pendulum swinging between the realists and the neocons.

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<sup>171</sup> <http://www.umich.edu/news/index.html?Releases/2004/Sep04/charts>

<sup>172</sup> Twilight of Neoicons?, <http://billmon.org/archives/000924.html> at December 23, 2003 09:45 PM

<sup>173</sup> The Neocons in Power, By *Elizabeth Drew*, New York Times Book Supplement, VOL. 50, NO. 10 · JUNE 12, 2003, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16378>

<sup>174</sup> Declaration of War, [www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg\\_id=00BYQL](http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=00BYQL) - 12k

<sup>175</sup> Mahir Kaynak, ABD Ne İstiyor, *Yarın Dergisi*, <http://www.yarindergisi.com/yarindergisi2/yazilar>.

<sup>176</sup> The Neocons in Power, By *Elizabeth Drew*, New York Times Book Supplement, VOL. 50, NO. 10 · JUNE 12, 2003, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16378>: 14022004:16:25

## C. Alterations in Main Foreign Policy Issues

The effects of eleven September and the changes in foreign policy are related but not identical. The changes in US Foreign policy are numerous: To make it simpler we could categorize the changes in US Foreign policy into three categories. US-Russian relations including Central Asian affairs; US-EU relations and the US Policy towards Middle East.

### 1- US-EU Relations

Not exactly after the 9/11, but after war on Iraq EU-US relations has really changed. Prof. Berdahl says that after the war on Iraq, US stand isolated from virtually all of her historic allies, with the exception of Britain. He makes his claim on the fact that US opposed in this action by the established, stable, historic democracies of France, Germany, and Canada, and some of the other western European states. In addition, by other major powers, Russia and China in particular.<sup>177</sup>

He continues: “This has been an historic turning point in American foreign policy, one that has left NATO in tatters and the United Nations seriously damaged - all the international institutions that have been built up since the Second World War. It’s a radical departure, and I can’t help being concerned about it as an American citizen.”<sup>178</sup>

Former US ambassador to the EU, Stuart Eizenstat reaffirmed that the he nature of the recent split between the US and EU, is “the most profound gulf” ever in the relationship. Citing differing political philosophies, divergent attitudes towards Israel, and trade disputes, the Ambassador explained that fundamentally the tensions today are the result of a failure on each side to appreciate the changes each has gone through; of the EU’s first steps in common diplomatic efforts, and of the trauma to the US’s psyche after 9/11.<sup>179</sup>

According to American point of view, with the exception of the Tony Blair, European Leaders have not built a public case that European interests are unsafe in an unsafe world or that Europe should globalize its security responsibilities in an era of globalization.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> “Berdahl speaks out on U.S. foreign policy”, By Jonathan King, Public Affairs, UC Berkeley News, [http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2003/03/19\\_berd.shtml](http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2003/03/19_berd.shtml) ; 13022004:12:46


<sup>178</sup> “Berdahl speaks out on U.S. foreign policy”, By Jonathan King, Public Affairs,

<sup>179</sup> Pieter Ott, “Symposium for the 50th Anniversary of US-EU”, 14 February 2004, US Foreign Policy Center for European Policy Studies, Articles, [http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article\\_id=174](http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=174).

<sup>180</sup> David C. Gompert, “What does Americans want of Europe”, in Lidndstrom p. 49.

But Europeans seem to evaluate the case in a different manner: They believe the new US foreign policy severely damaging the role of UN and the conventions of the international relations.

**Figure III. 1.** EU trade in goods and services with regard to the USA, China, Russia, Japan and Canada (billion EUR) (March 2006)



Source:

EU Official site: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/us/economic\\_relations/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/economic_relations/index.htm)

## 2. US policy towards Middle Eastern Affairs

After the 9/11 Osama bin Laden said in his letter to western media that “...America wouldn't live in security until we live it truly in Palestine. This showed the reality of America, which puts Israel's interest above its own people's interest. America won't get out of this crisis until it gets out of the Arabian Peninsula, and until it stops its support of Israel.”<sup>181</sup>

No matter to what extent this claim was reflecting the existing situation, middle eastern public opinion shares the hardcore message of this argument, although not agree in using

<sup>181</sup> Osama bin Laden, October 2001 “<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001>” \o “2001

methods that the Al Qaeda used. The need for a “enemy” of Cold War type, US hardliners, the neocons, found a ground in for their claim that the islamic terrorism threatens the world peace and USA should take preemptive measures against it.

The very motive of the popular support of the hardlineres is justified with the existence of such a threat. As long as the neocon-jewish lobby alliance continues, there seems a rare change for peace in the middle east.

Another outcome of the US foreign policy towards Middle East is best formulated in the “Greater Middle East Project”. The term “greater” refers to the region surrounding the Middle East. That includes Central Asia, Caucasia, Western North Africa and even Balkans to some extend. In other words Middle East in the greater sense refers to the oil and oil transportation regions. The US officials identify this whole region as the region of instability. The project is to eliminate the instability that threatens the oils production, distribution on the one hand, and to destroy the bases of terrorist act in their own regions. The logic of a Greater Middle East proceeds from the premise that the threat of terrorism is no longer limited to acts that can be predicted in advance, such as hijacking planes.

The project has two fundamental dimensions. The first one is to share the responsibilities and the burden of the war on terrorism with the Allies: The American/British side had to concede that the coalition's *casus belli*, namely, Iraq's alleged arsenal of WMDs, did not exist, while the French/German side could not reap the fruits of the failure of the opposite group because military might was disproportionate to the advantage of the latter. According to Nicholas Burns, the US military budget for 2003 reached the colossal sum of \$376 billion, while the military budgets of all 18 US allies taken together amounted to only \$140 billion.

The feeling of failure on both sides led to the emergence of a new equation. With each unable to impose its conditions on the other, both realized they had to reach some sort of compromise. That is one of the aims what Washington hopes to achieve with its Greater Middle East project. (Sid-Ahmed, 2004)

The second dimension of the project is related to its formulated aims on the transformation of the regimes, states and the societies of this greater region. In Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s words, it's a view of an evolution in the Middle East...that



aiming at transforming the Middle East into an image of the United States or an image of Turkey” (Wolfowitz, 2004).

It is widely argued that the overthrow of Shevardnadze in Georgia was the first operation of the Greater Middle East Project proclaiming the US would implement her policies on the control of the energy resources in a greater sense and area.


September eleven altered the priorities in foreign policy and the doctrine of “preemptive measures” became official policy. War on terrorism, especially the way US conduct it, brought several changes in the positions of the various countries towards US. The U.S. faced a complex framework of political, economic, and security challenges in all spheres of international interaction as it pursues its war on terrorism. Not only the states but also ordinary people both in the US and in other parts of the world had been subject to those changes. All those signs are referring September eleven as a turning point.

Although Bush administration is not fully guided by the neocons, the neocon policies gained the upper hand in US foreign policy preferences. US now following a hard-line approach in her relation with the rest of the world. Transatlantic relation for the first times after the World War II experienced such a serious tension. Russia also continues to her objections against the US approach to the problem of terrorism allying with France and China in the UN Security Council. Central Asian and Caucasian countries declared their full support for the US President in his “war on terrorism” in order to get more support from the US, which they need to balance Russia.

Middle East is the most affected region from new US foreign policy. The neocons’ relation to Jewish lobby in the States and their alliance with the hardliner Israeli government furthered the agony in the Middle East. Palestinian question still waits to be resolved. The future of the Iraq, on the other hand, like the future of Afghanistan, is a mysterious question. There does not seem a lasting US proposal for resolving the problems in those mentioned regions.

The question whether the neocon reign in the US foreign policy would continue or not would seem to be determined by the result of the coming US Presidential Elections. This would probably determine the continuation or a break of the policies after turning point marked by September eleven.

Figure III. 2: U.S. Exports of Services by **Region/Country, 2005** (Billions of U.S. Dollars)



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.

**Source:** Trade Conflict and the U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship / U.S. Exports of Services by Region/Country, 2005

### 3. U.S. Security Interests In Central Asia

In the 1990s the United States initiated military engagement with Central Asia to support the region’s integration with western political-military institutions, as well as to protect the sovereignty and independence of these states, assist them to improve their border security against transnational threats, encourage them to adopt market-oriented reform and democratization, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. After 9/11, for the first time the United States acquired temporary basing in this region in response to a changing security environment, as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became frontline states in Operation Enduring Freedom. Anti-terrorism has become the central focus of U.S. policy in the region, although other goals still remain important. As Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee, the United States “will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before.”<sup>182</sup>

Prior to 9/11, Central Asia had been relatively marginal to U.S. national security, but since then the region has assumed a new importance as U.S. policymakers have used the lessons

of Enduring Freedom to refashion the American national security framework and revise long-standing concepts of deterrence to address new threats from international terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that the war in Afghanistan shows that the United States is prepared to take preemptive action against states sponsoring terrorism.<sup>183</sup> Although as a presidential candidate George W. Bush had criticized President William Clinton for turning the United States into “the world’s policeman,” the Bush administration is currently revising the United States national security strategy to support preemptive action against terrorists and the countries that support them.<sup>184</sup>

In a June 1, 2002, address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Bush outlined what he termed the “three silos” of his foreign policy: defending the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants; preserving the peace by building good relations among great powers; and extending the peace by encouraging free and open societies.<sup>185</sup> This policy, as applied to Central Asia since 9/11, has proven to embrace mutually contradictory goals. By placing a priority on anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and encouraging public distrust of U.S. intentions in the region. Although Russia, and to a lesser extent, China have cooperated with the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, their support is not unqualified and could easily dissipate in the event the United States decides to maintain a long-term military presence in “Central Asia or expand the war on terrorism in a major ground attack against Iraq.

After providing background on the development of U.S. security interests in Central Asia, this monograph examines post-9/11 trends in U.S. policy and military engagement.

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<sup>182</sup> Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia,” *The Washington Post*, February 9, 2002, p. 39.

<sup>183</sup> Edward Alden, “America Strives to Reshape Military Doctrine,” *Financial Times*, June 18, 2002, p. 2. For background see David E. Sanger, “Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First,” *The New York Times*, June 17, 2002, pp. 41-46.

<sup>184</sup> Critics claim that preemption should not give the U.S. *carte blanche*—Congress and allies should be consulted; a rationale for intervention must be presented; the threat must be identified precisely prior to any preemptive action; and there is no justification for first use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, should the U.S. adopt a preemptive doctrine, this may encourage others (for example, India and Pakistan) to act accordingly. See Editorial, “striking First,” *The New York Times*, June 23, 2002, p. 12; Editorial, “The Dangers of Jumping the Gun,” *Financial Times* (London), June 18, 2002, p. 14. U.S. military doctrine already is being revised to allow for preemptive strikes against states threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. Walter Pincus, “U.S. Nuclear Arms Stance Modified by Policy Study,” *The Washington Post*, March 23, 2002, p. 214.

<sup>185</sup> Mike Allen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies; In West Point Speech, President Lays Out Broader U.S. Policy,” *The Washington Post*, June 2, 2002, p. 31.

The monograph points out that weak regional security organizations, contingent support in Russia and China to the expanding American military foothold in the region, and instability in Central Asia will pose considerable challenges for the United States military. In conclusion, the monograph recommends an emphasis on rapid deployment from existing bases in Turkey rather than continued basing in Central Asia, a more coherent regional strategy and improved foreign area expertise for the Central Asian region, and a multilateral approach to addressing instability in the area.

#### **4. The Development of U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia.**

U.S. military cooperation with Central Asian states expanded rapidly in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 due to the framework of relations that had been built piecemeal in the 1990s. After recognizing the newly independent Central Asian states in late 1991, the United States developed diplomatic relations with them in an effort to support democratization and responsible security policies, and provide a counterweight to the expansion of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence.<sup>186</sup> With the passage of the Freedom Support Act on October 24, 1992, the United States laid the foundation for multifaceted assistance to the Central Asian states, initially focusing on democratization and the promotion of free market economies. Security cooperation increasingly would play an important role in U.S. relations with these states because of the important U.S. security interest in eliminating nuclear weapons based in Kazakhstan and in preventing proliferation in the region.

Consequently, Kazakhstan was the initial focus of U.S. security cooperation in Central Asia. In December 1993, Vice-President Al Gore and Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a cooperative threat reduction (CTR) agreement to dismantle and destroy the 104 SS-18 missiles and silos in Kazakhstan. The following year, U.S.-Kazakhstan security cooperation became institutionalized in a joint commission.<sup>187</sup> By mid-1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, had joined NATO's partnership for peace program (PfP), and officers from these states, plus Tajikistan, began participating in PfP exercises as of 1995.<sup>188</sup> The inclusion of the Central Asian states in the PfP program formalized their relations with NATO, provided a mechanism for regional security cooperation, and established a basis for combined action. According to Strobe

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<sup>186</sup> Jim Nichol, *Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, May 18, 2001, p. 3; <http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/international>

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid*, p.9

Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, expanding military-to-military cooperation would help reduce regional instability and promote mutual security in an effort to avoid any replay of the 19th Century Great Game with its zero-sum competition for influence among great powers.<sup>189</sup>

Due to concern about the threat of proliferation of nuclear materials from Kazakhstan, since 1994 the United States has been assisting the country to shut down the Aktau fast breeder reactor and remove nuclear materials. In recognition of the geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan in the struggle to eliminate Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network, a U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission was formed in February 1998.<sup>190</sup> In 1999, the United States and Uzbekistan signed a CTR agreement to dismantle and decontaminate a biological weapons research facility and to provide alternative employment for its scientists. Uzbekistan's importance to U.S. nonproliferation efforts was highlighted in March 2000, when Uzbekistan used American detectors to intercept radioactive materials from Kazakhstan destined for the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.<sup>191</sup>

In March 17, 1999, testimony to Congress, former NIS Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich summed up the Clinton administration's policy toward Central Asia as pursuing four interrelated goals: (1) democratization; (2) market-oriented reform; (3) greater integration with western political and military institutions; and (4) responsible security policies on nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and drug trafficking. Sestanovich noted that securing the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian states was the cornerstone of U.S. policy.<sup>192</sup>

The Clinton administration's national security strategy elaborated on the security interests underpinning U.S. policy toward Central Asia. These included establishing the rule of law in an effort to combat crime and corruption, creating a stable environment for energy exports (as a part of a broader U.S. interest in diversifying energy supplies), reducing regional threats (nonproliferation, terrorism), and developing regional cooperation to

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid, p.8

<sup>189</sup> Strobe Talbott, "The Great Game Is Over," *Financial Times*, September 1, 1997, p. 18.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p. 9

<sup>192</sup> Frank T. Tsongos, "Central Asia: Official Outlines U.S. Policy," RFE/RL, March 18, 1999, <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999>.

encourage the Central Asian states to support one another in the event of instability or threats to peace.<sup>193</sup>

Congress reaffirmed the United States commitment to military engagement with Central Asia with the passage on March 10, 1999, of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to support the economic and political independence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus and promote regional reconciliation, cooperation, and economic development. The new legislation provided for border control assistance to facilitate interdiction of drug trafficking, nonproliferation, and transnational criminal activities, as well as for humanitarian assistance to victims of conflicts in the region, and assistance for the development of free market economies and associated infrastructure.<sup>194</sup> Anti-terrorism became a more explicit component of U.S. policy toward Central Asia in the aftermath of armed incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999.

In April 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced a new Central Asian Border Security Initiative (CASI), which provided \$3 million in additional security assistance to each of the Central Asian states, initially to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and later to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan as well. After further IMU attacks in Uzbekistan in August 2000, during which several Americans were held hostage, the State Department included the IMU, linked to Osama bin Laden, in its list of foreign terrorist organizations in September 2000.<sup>195</sup> In its initial year in office, the Bush administration maintained the core components of the

## **5. Clinton Policy Toward Central**

Asia (regional security, political and economic reform), while further accentuating the importance of energy development.<sup>196</sup> Yet, at the same time as Central Asia's importance increased for energy development and counterterrorism efforts, by the end of the decade,

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<sup>193</sup> A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999, released, January 5, 2000, <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil>.

<sup>194</sup> Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1-5, <http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/silkroad.html>

<sup>195</sup> U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, June 6, 2001, Serial No. 107-21, p. 10, <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees>.

<sup>196</sup> Testimony by Clifford Bond, Acting Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for NIS, in *ibid.*, p. 7.

U.S. policymakers, especially in Congress,<sup>197</sup> became increasingly disappointed by the lack of progress toward democratization, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, and by Uzbekistan's continuing deplorable human rights record.

#### **a. Post-9/11 Policy Shifts**

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, anti-terrorism became the defining principle of U.S. foreign policy, resulting in a major reshuffling of Washington's foreign relations.<sup>198</sup> On the 6-month anniversary of the attacks, Bush stated that the United States response depended on the "critical support" of countries such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan, a remarkable turnaround considering that up until September 11 sanctions had been imposed on Pakistan (and India) due to their 1998 nuclear tests and Uzbekistan had been criticized sharply for its poor human rights record.<sup>199</sup>

In Central Asia the change in U.S. priorities was felt immediately, as Uzbekistan, in particular, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan suddenly became frontline states in the U.S.-led struggle against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network. Top U.S. officials streamed through Central Asian capitals. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev both held summit meetings with President Bush.

In testimony to a newly created Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Central Asia and the Caucasus (its formation in itself a testament to the increasing importance of the region for U.S. foreign policy), Assistant Secretary of State A. Elizabeth Jones hailed the important role the Central Asian states played in providing a corridor for shipmentsofhumanitarian aid to Afghanistan and in supporting coalition anti-terrorism efforts. She outlined three sets of long-term interests the United States would continue to pursue in the region: (1) preventing the spread of terrorism; (2) assisting the Central Asian

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<sup>197</sup> A September 13, 2000, resolution by the House of Representatives, for example, noted Congressional concern about the pattern of human rights abuses in Central Asia and called upon these states to meet their OSCE obligations. Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, September 13, 2000, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. Also *U.S. Policy in Central Asia*, p. 6.

<sup>198</sup> The State of the Union; Transcript of the President's Address," *The Los Angeles Times*, Part A, Part I, p. 20.

<sup>199</sup> On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted sanctions (required by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act) against both India and Pakistan. Human Rights Watch, *Dangerous Dealings*, February 2002, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 4.

states with economic and political reform and the rule of law, and (3) ensuring the security and transparent development of Caspian energy resources.<sup>200</sup>

Central Asian states, which had received a relatively small share of U.S. assistance funds for the former Soviet Union, saw their support increased across the board due to emergency supplemental appropriations to facilitate their participation in anti-terrorism activities. In 2001, Uzbekistan gained the most from the additional funding, receiving an extra \$25 million in foreign military financing (FMF), \$18 million in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs (NADR), and \$40.5 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds. Despite the new American largesse with respect to Uzbekistan, the Senate succeeded in including an amendment to the Foreign Appropriations Act on October 24, 2001, requiring the State Department to report to Congress every 6 months on Uzbekistan's use of U.S. military assistance and human rights violations.<sup>201</sup>

The war against terrorism also led to a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan, which received an additional \$3 million in NADR funding in FY 2001. In an effort to facilitate military cooperation with that country, the Senate amended U.S. legislation prohibiting any American aid to Azerbaijan (with the exception of funds for disarmament programs) until its government takes real steps to end all blockades and use of force against the Armenian enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh. The foreign appropriations bill passed on October 24, 2001 gives the president the authority to waive any restrictions on aid to Azerbaijan if he determines it is in the national interest to do so. The Bush administration requested \$50 million for Azerbaijan in FY2002 and \$52.98 million in FY 2003, including \$3 million in FMF, \$750,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) and \$46 million in FSA funding.

At the same time, the Bush administration began a reappraisal of the roles of the great powers in Central Asia, a process with significant implications for the region's geopolitics. U.S. assessments of Russia's role in Central Asia always depended on the level of cooperation in U.S.-Russia relations. During the Clinton administration, for example, the National Security strategy noted that the fate of Central Asia would depend on the prospects for reform in Russia.<sup>202</sup> Reflecting the initial skepticism of the Bush administration about Russia, a U.S. official told Congress that Washington had an interest

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<sup>200</sup> A. Elizabeth Jones, "U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation," Testimony to the Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, December 13, 2001, p. 9.

<sup>201</sup> *Dangerous Dealings*, p. 5; Tarnoff, p. 8.



in preventing ties with Russia from complicating U.S. policy toward Central Asia and in cooperating where Moscow and Washington had common interests, for instance, in the United States-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan.<sup>203</sup>

Since 9/11, U.S.-Russia cooperation has improved dramatically, facilitating the expanding U.S. security role in Central Asia. Despite Washington's wariness of China, China has proved a cooperative partner in persuading Pakistan to work closely with the United States in the anti-terrorism struggle, sharing intelligence and financial information about terrorist groups.

Moreover, even though in its first year in office the Bush administration displayed hostility to multilateralism, since 9/11 there has been a new awareness of the importance of regional and international organizations in integrating Central Asia within Western institutions and in facilitating regional anti-terrorism initiatives. Indeed, in the months since 9/11, the United States has sought to combat transnational threats such as terrorism by seeking to bring together states sharing U.S. values.<sup>204</sup> Although the anti-terrorism coalition was formed to fight the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network, there is debate in the administration regarding the type of security architecture necessary to address future security needs.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Jones noted that the countries of Central Asia "will play a critical role" in the campaign against terrorism, but will require the support of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).<sup>205</sup>

On December 13-14, 2001, OSCE held an international conference in Bishkek on enhancing security and stability in Central Asia and strengthening efforts to counter terrorism. In particular, the conference focused on preventative measures, such as democratization, economic development, crime prevention, and border control. In his comments to the OSCE Permanent Council on December 20, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to OSCE Stephen Minikes noted the importance of creating the social, economic, and

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<sup>202</sup> A National Security Strategy for a New Century, op.cit.

<sup>203</sup> Also see U.S. Policy in Central Asia, p. 8.

<sup>204</sup> Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World," The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 22, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632pf.htm>.

<sup>205</sup> Elizabeth Jones, "Anti-Terror Cooperation a New Foreign Policy Standard, Jones Says," Speech to the German Studies Association annual conference, October 5, 2001, <http://www.usinfo.state.gov>.

political conditions under which terrorism cannot thrive and called upon the OSCE to take concrete steps, such as denying terrorists access to funding and improving cooperation among law enforcement agencies.<sup>206</sup>

## **b. U.S. Military Engagement in Central Asia**

As policymakers have defined U.S. security interests in Central Asia, the United States military has taken a series of steps to engage Central Asia and enhance military-to-military cooperation. Reflecting the initial focus on Kazakhstan as the cornerstone of U.S. security in Central Asia, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a defense cooperation agreement in 1994, which was to involve dialogue on defense doctrine, training, and budgets. A subsequent agreement in 1997 expanded U.S. military cooperation with Kazakhstan to include nuclear security and defense conversion assistance. In recognition of Uzbekistan's increasing importance in regional counterterrorism efforts, similar agreements were signed with Uzbekistan, which, in 2000 also became the first recipient of a sizeable transfer of military equipment under the Foreign Military Financing program.<sup>207</sup> It was not until 2001 that the United States began to appreciate the importance of stability in Tajikistan and the coalition government's vulnerability to Islamic militant groups. During a May 2001 visit to Dushanbe, General Tommy Franks, General Anthony Zinni's successor as head of Central Command (CENTCOM), called Tajikistan "a strategically important country" and promised security assistance. Tajikistan then committed to joining NATO's Partnership for Peace Program.<sup>208</sup>

Expanding U.S. military engagement with Central Asian States has been viewed as a key mechanism to promote their integration into Western political-military institutions, encourage civilian control over militaries, and institutionalize cooperative relations with the United States military, while dissuading other regional powers-especially Russia, China, and Iran-from seeking to dominate the region.<sup>209</sup> Beginning in 1993, military officials from Central Asia began to receive training at the GeorgeC.Marshall

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<sup>206</sup> <http://usinfo.state.gov>.

<sup>207</sup> Uzbekistan received 16 military transport vehicles. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan later obtained coast guard vessels. Nichol, p. 8.

<sup>208</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 111.

<sup>209</sup> Stephen J. Blank, *U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2000, p.2.

Center in Garmisch, Germany, as part of a German-American security initiative.<sup>210</sup> By mid-1994, all of the Central Asian states with the exception of Tajikistan, had joined NATO's PfP program. The program hosted a series of exercises to provide training in peacekeeping activities and develop interoperability. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan participated in Operation NUGGET exercises in peacekeeping tactics for land forces, which took place in August 1995 and in July 1997 at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the latter with Kazakhstan's participation. The three also took part in a multicountry amphibious exercise in North Carolina, along with the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and 16 other PfP members. In March 2001, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan joined the United States, five other NATO countries, and 13 PfP members in exercises in Nova Scotia.<sup>211</sup>

In December 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint peacekeeping unit, with the support of CENTCOM. The new unit, Centrazbat, was created to maintain stability in Central Asia and enable the three participating states to share information about tactics in support of their bid to join U.N. peacekeeping missions. Centrazbat exercises have been held annually, with the participation of the United States,<sup>212</sup> other NATO members, and regional states, since 1997, with an alternating focus on field and command training.

On October 1, 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility for the five Central Asian states, which, as former Soviet republics, previously fell under the purview of the European Command. According to former CENTCOM Commander General Zinni, it was essential to integrate these states into CENTCOM's overall collective engagement strategy, based on the premise that "an ounce of proactive engagement protection is cheaper than a pound of war fighting cure."<sup>213</sup>

Thus, the United States supported efforts such as Centrazbat to promote regional stability and deter efforts by extremists to create instability. Marine Corps Brigadier General Martin R. Berndt noted, not long after the formation of the joint battalion, that another rationale

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<sup>210</sup> The Marshall Center also works closely with CENTCOM. Ron Martz, "War on Terrorism: U.S. Allies: Initiative Laid Foundation for Central Asian Cooperation," *The Atlanta Constitution*, January 12, 2002, p. 9A. Central Asian military personnel also attended U.S. military schools and received in-country training from Special Forces teams. C. J. Chivers, "A Nation Challenged: Special Forces: Long Before the War, Green Berets Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan," *The New York Times*, October 25, 2001, p. A1.

<sup>211</sup> Kenley Butler, "U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian States," September 17, 2001, p. 2, <http://www.cns.miiis.edu>

<sup>212</sup> The 82nd airborne division participated in 1997 and 2000 exercises in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while the U.S. 10th Mountain Division joined a 1998 exercise in Uzbekistan. Butler, pp. 1-2.

for U.S. participation in Centrazbat was to create working relationships between U.S. forces and Central Asian militaries prior to the eruption of a crisis requiring their joint efforts.<sup>214</sup>

The 2001 exercise was held at a U.S. military base in Germany and focused on regional cooperation. Exercises were cancelled for 2002 due to ongoing cooperation with Central Asian militaries as a part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, but are likely to be continued in future years.<sup>215</sup>

### **c. New Challenges and U.S. Military Responses**

In October 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) summarized many of the general principles underlying U.S. security interests, which clearly are underpinning U.S. diplomatic overtures and military engagement with Central Asia: preventing the hostile domination of key areas and maintaining a stable balance of power; maintaining access to key markets and strategic resources; addressing threats from territories of weak states; sustaining coalitions; and preparing to intervene in unexpected crises.<sup>216</sup> The document noted the emergence of Asia as a region especially vulnerable to military conflict and characterized it as an "arc of instability," due to the area's volatile mix of rising and declining powers, and the presence of radical and extremist movements, many of which have substantial military capabilities and the potential to develop weapons of mass destruction.<sup>217</sup>

The QDR outlined a shift in defense planning, from the traditional threat-based model to a capabilities-based approach. Instead of focusing on identifying potential adversaries or areas of conflict, the new model of defense planning seeks to "anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the United States from acting in defense of its allies and friends, or directly attack the United States or its deployed forces."<sup>218</sup> Specifically, the QDR emphasizes the importance of preparing forward deployed forces for a variety of contingencies worldwide by expanding basing options beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, and securing temporary access to facilities for

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<sup>213</sup> "Command in the News—U.S. Central Command," February 1, 2002, p. 8, <http://www.army.mil/usar/news/2002archives/January/USCENTCOM.html>.

<sup>214</sup> Butler, p. 2.

<sup>215</sup> Robert Karnio, "Anti-Terror Needs Cancel CENTRASBAT," January 23, 2002, <http://www.janes.com>.

<sup>216</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), September 30, 2001, p. 2.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

training and exercises in areas where the United States lacks bases.<sup>219</sup> The QDR also calls for strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships by increasing peacetime training and preparations for coalition operations.<sup>220</sup>

The QDR purports to transform American defense to incorporate new technologies and adapt existing capabilities to a changeable strategic environment. Operationally, this will require the U.S. military to protect U.S. military assets at home and overseas, project and sustain forces in distant hostile environments, maintain secure information systems, employ means necessary to deny sanctuary to enemies (intelligence, surveillance, tracking, military engagement), and develop joint operations and survivable space systems.<sup>221</sup>

In particular, the U.S. Army is called upon to accelerate the introduction of forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT). In October 1999, prior to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's review of U.S. military strategy culminating in the 2001 QDR,<sup>222</sup> Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki proposed creating six IBCTs to improve rapid power projection capacity. The IBCTs form the core of an interim force, the near-term component of a 30-year strategy to shape the Army into a more responsive and maneuverable force.<sup>223</sup> In a November 2001 speech, General Shinseki noted that current operations in Central Asia reinforce the importance of acquiring a capability to project conventional war-fighting power in remote areas with inadequate infrastructure.<sup>224</sup>

The U.S. military's involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus expanded to include: temporary forward basing in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; access to airspace and restricted use of bases in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; train and equip missions in Georgia; assistance for border security in Azerbaijan; and coalition-building by high-level

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>222</sup> For a discussion of the Rumsfeld review, see Bill Keller, "How to Fight the Next War," *The New York Times*, March 10, 2002; Andrew Krepinovich, "The Bush Administration's Call for Defense Transformation: A Congressional Guide," May 19, 2001, <http://www.cabaonline.org>; Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinovich and Micheal Vickers, "A Strategy for a Long Peace," January 30, 2001, <http://www.cabaonline>.

<sup>223</sup> This transformed force will be known as the Objective Force. For a detailed description see "Concept for the Objective Force," November 8, 2001, <http://www.mil/features/WhitePaper/default.htm>. The goal is to deploy a combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours after liftoff, one war-fighting division on the ground within 120 hours, and five such divisions within 30 days. "Army Announces Vision for the Future," U.S. Army News Release, October 12, 1999; <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news>.

<sup>224</sup> Prepared Remarks General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at the Association of the United States Army Seminar, November 8, 2001, Washington, DC, U.S. Army News Release, November 8, 2001, <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news>.

visits to Central Asia, intelligence-sharing, improved coordination within CENTCOM, and increased assistance.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. officials pressed Central Asian states for assistance with the struggle against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Initially the Central Asian states reacted cautiously to American requests. Nevertheless, all five states offered to share intelligence and grant U.S. access to their air space. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan also allowed coalition aircraft to make emergency landings.<sup>225</sup> Uzbekistan pledged the use of the Karshi Khanabad air base, as long as it would not be involved in positioning ground troops for an invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>226</sup> Tajikistan offered the use of its air space and territory to the U.S. military, but had to backtrack due to pressure from Russia, which continues to station 7,000 troops from the 201st division and another 11,000 border guards in the country. After Russia withdrew its opposition, Tajikistan offered the Pentagon (and later the French military) the use of the Dushanbe airport on a contingency basis.<sup>227</sup>

Although the coalition government, which includes Islamic parties, feared the domestic consequences of close military cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, on November 3, 2001, Tajikistan's leaders and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reached an agreement to allow the United States to consider using three additional bases (Khujand, Kurgan-Tyube, and Kulyab) in exchange for a substantial increase in aid.<sup>228</sup> Ultimately 35 U.S., French, and Italian warplanes were deployed at Kulyab, deemed the most suitable for immediate use.<sup>229</sup>

These arrangements were kept private in the interest of Tajikistan's security, but access to basing in the country's south would prove significant to coalition efforts by providing a

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<sup>225</sup> Kazakhstan's defense minister, Colonel-General Mukhtar Altyntayev, offered the Chimkent airport as a "reserve" option for the coalition and proposed that Kazakhstan's rapid deployment unit, KazBat, join international forces in Afghanistan. Jamestown Foundation, *Fortnight in Review*, January 4, 2002, p. 7.

<sup>226</sup> Rashid, p. 183. According to U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Larry Napper, U.S. and Kazakh leaders discussed allowing international coalition forces to use an airbase in certain unspecified emergency situations. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 6, No. 62, Part I, April 3, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>227</sup> RFE/RL Central Asia Report, September 28, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 10; <http://www.rferl.org> and Idem, October 11, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 12, in *ibid*.

<sup>228</sup> Vernon Loeb and Susan B. Glasser, "Tajikistan Allows U.S. to Assess 3 Air Bases," *The Washington Post*, November 3, 2001, p. A3; Michael R. Gordon with C.J. Chivers, "A Nation Challenged: U.S. May Gain Use of More Air Bases to Strike Taliban," *The New York Times*, November 5, 2001, p. A1; Michael Blanchfield, "U.S. Exchanges Aid for Use of Tajik Bases," *Ottawa Citizen*, November 5, 2001, p. B1. Japanese diplomats based in Dushanbe reportedly played a role in convincing the coalition-government to grant the U.S. basing rights. See Rashid, p. 185.

<sup>229</sup> Jamestown Foundation, *Fortnight Review*, December 14, 2001, p. 5.

land bridge to northern Afghanistan and enabling aircraft located there to fly multiple missions daily and reach their targets within an hour.<sup>230</sup> By April 2002, the United States was providing military equipment to Tajikistan.<sup>231</sup>

After Rumsfeld visited Tashkent, on October 5, 2001, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with U.S. officials allowing a limited number of U.S. military personnel (not more than 1,500 troops) to operate out of the Khanabad airbase in exchange for security guarantees and U.S. agreement to target training camps in Afghanistan, known to harbor the IMU.<sup>232</sup> The agreement also provided for intelligence sharing and U.S. use of Uzbekistan's airspace. Uzbek officials reportedly stipulated that aircraft based at Khanabad would be used primarily for humanitarian and search-and-rescue attacks.<sup>233</sup> Uzbek President Karimov stated that no negotiations regarding the time frame of the U.S. military presence had taken place.<sup>234</sup>

CENTCOM and Uzbekistan have been cooperating closely. In December 2001, five Uzbek representatives were posted to CENTCOM.<sup>235</sup> During CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Frank's visit to Uzbekistan in January 2002, CENTCOM and the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan signed an agreement to develop military-to-military cooperation through joint seminars, training, and partnerships with U.S. units.<sup>236</sup>

During his March 2002 visit to Washington, Karimov told reporters that "the United States may remain in Uzbekistan as long as they think it's necessary; in other words, as long as it

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<sup>230</sup> Robert J. Caldwell, "The List of Allies Grows in the War against Terrorism," *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, November 11, 2001, p. 54.

<sup>231</sup> President Bush signed a memorandum on April 19, 2002, approving the deliveries under the Foreign Assistance Act and ArmsControl Act. Jamestown Foundation, *Fortnight Review*, May 3, 2002, p.7.

<sup>232</sup> Central Asia Report, October 11, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 12, <http://www.rferl.org>. According to an October 12, 2001 U.S.-Uzbekistan joint statement, the two states would "consult on an urgent basis about appropriate steps to address the situation in the event of a direct threat to the security or territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan." "Joint Statement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan," October 12, 2001, <http://usinfo.state.gov>; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "U.S. Is Building Up Its Military Bases in Afghan Region," *The New York Times*, January 9, 2002, p. A10.

<sup>233</sup> Tamara Makarenko and Daphne Billiouri, "Central Asian States to Pay the Price of US Strikes," October 19, 2001, <http://www.janes.com>.

<sup>234</sup> Tamara Makarenko, "The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism," January 23, 2002, <http://www.janes.com>.

<sup>235</sup> Fact Sheet on Coalition Partners' Contributions in War on Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, February 26, 2002, <http://usinfo.state.gov>.

<sup>236</sup> Press conference with CENTCOM CINC General Tommy Franks, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, January 24, 2002.

takes to finish disrupting the terrorist network.”<sup>237</sup> In return, in agreements codifying a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan, the United States pledged to “regard with grave concern any external threat to Uzbekistan.”<sup>238</sup>

In contrast to the largely secret agreements the U.S. military concluded with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on December 5, 2001 the United States Department of State and Kyrgyz officials signed a basing access agreement allowing U.S. forces to use Manas airport. The agreement allows for basing rights for Western forces for a 1-year period, which President Askar Akayev has termed “the optimal duration.”<sup>239</sup> Kyrgyz Security Council Secretary Misir Ashirkulov stated that these forces would remain at Manas only as long as operations continue in Afghanistan, and basing rights will only be extended beyond 2002 if these operations take longer than expected.<sup>240</sup> Australian, French, Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Korean, and Spanish aircraft also will use Manas, bringing the total number of foreign forces to approximately 3,000.<sup>241</sup>

The U.S. military also expanded cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of 9/11. Under a U.S. train and equip program, 2000 elite Georgian troops will be trained in counterterrorism tactics. Although the United States has provided Georgia with significant amountsofmilitary equipment and training over the course of the past decade, the new effort launched in March 2002 came at a time when Russia was threatening to intervene militarily in Georgia in pursuit of Al Qaeda operatives who allegedly fled to the Pankisi Gorge.<sup>242</sup>

Azerbaijan reportedly has provided its airbases for coalition refueling en route to Central Asia since October 2001. By removing Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) from the list of countries barred from receiving U.S. military and security assistance, the U.S. Government is laying the foundation for increased military cooperation with the Caucasus. In late March, Azerbaijani defense officials signed the country’s first security agreement with the

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<sup>237</sup> Todd S. Purdum, “Uzbekistan’s Leader Doubts Chances for Afghan Peace,” *The New York Times*, March 14, 2002, p. 318.

<sup>238</sup> Under the agreement Uzbekistan is obligated “to intensify the democratic transformation of its society politically and economically.” Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War; U.S. Tashkent Sign Cooperation Pact,” *The Washington Post*, March 13, 2002, p. 123.

<sup>239</sup> Interview on Russian television, cited in Pierre L’Huillery, “RAAF Off to Battle as Kyrgyzstan Offers Base,” *The Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), December 7, 2001, p. 4.

<sup>240</sup> RFE/RL Newslines, Vol 6, No. 70, Part I, April 15, 2002; <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>241</sup> Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia,” *The Washington Post*, February 9, 2002, p. A1; Fact Sheet on Coalition Partners’ Contributions in War on Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, February 26, 2002, <http://usinfo.state.gov>.



United States, under which the Pentagon would provide assistance with air traffic control and safety, military and peace-keeping training, enhancing naval border control, and upgrading military airports.<sup>243</sup>

#### **d. Challenges for the U.S. Military**

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has noted that the U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan “may be more political than actually military,” i.e. they symbolize the U.S. security commitment to these states and Washington’s intention to protect them from future terrorist threats.<sup>244</sup> Nevertheless, the extension of basing beyond the conflict in Afghanistan will have uncertain political costs and may exacerbate regional geopolitical rivalries and instability.

Washington’s ability to take the lead in protecting the security of Central Asia, a region where the United States previously has shown little inclination to intervene militarily, reflects the weakness of the existing regional security organizations and new cooperative trends in U.S. relations with great powers in the region. How long these cooperative trends will endure will depend on a variety of inter-related factors, including the timeframe of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, the reactions of regional powers to the growing U.S. security interests in Central Asia, and the scope of the United States anti-terrorism campaign, particularly its extension to Iraq.

#### **e. Weak Regional Institutions**

In the past decade several regional organizations have developed in Central Asia to address transnational threats and promote economic cooperation. After the collapse of the USSR, China and Russia began convening regular meetings with their Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, to discuss confidence-building along their common borders. After a meeting in June 1996 in Shanghai, the group became known as

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<sup>242</sup> Jamestown Foundation, *Fortnight in Review*, April 19, 2001, pp. 5-6.

<sup>243</sup> Cited in Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia,” *The Washington Post*, February 9, 2002, p. 21.

<sup>244</sup> Gregory Gleason, “Policy Dimensions of West Afghan Borders after the Shanghai Accord,” *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2001, pp. 107-108; 116-125.

the Shanghai Five and signed a number of agreements, paving the way for bilateral border negotiations and regional economic cooperation.<sup>245</sup>

At the group's June 2001 meeting members decided to create a formal institutional framework for their meetings, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China has sought to play a leading role in the SCO and promote economic cooperation among its members, in an effort to counterbalance growing U.S. economic interests in Central Asia, particularly in the energy sector.<sup>246</sup> Reflecting the broadening of the group's mandate, in June 2001 Uzbekistan joined the group, and subsequently other regional states, including Mongolia, Pakistan, and India, have expressed interest in membership.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the Central Asian members were quick to cooperate with Washington in the war against the Taliban and the SCO proved ineffective beyond issuing joint statements against terrorism. Although, members signed an organizational charter at the June 2002 meeting in St. Petersburg, and agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Beijing and an anti-terrorism unit in Bishkek, they remain divided over the SCO's priorities.<sup>247</sup> Initially, there was some reason to believe that cooperation in the U.S.-led coalition would reinvigorate GUUAM the grouping including Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—due to Uzbekistan's close partnership with Washington, increasing U.S. military assistance to Georgia, and the development of security ties to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, member states have preferred to develop their bilateral ties with the United States. Uzbekistan, for example, withdrew from the grouping due its "lack of progress" in addressing key issues.<sup>248</sup>

Even though existing regional groupings have yet to prove effective, a new Asian security organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), was founded on June 4, 2002, to bring together representatives from Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East to promote regional economic cooperation and security.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> Andrew Higgins and Charles Hutzler, "China Pursues a Great Game of Its Own," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 14, 2001, pp. 214, 217.

<sup>246</sup> RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 2, No. 23, June 2002, pp. 1-2, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>247</sup> RFE/RL Newslines, Vol. 6, No. 111, Part I, June 14, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>. Uzbekistan later claimed that its withdrawal was temporary. RFE/RL Newslines, Vol. 6, No. 119, Part I, June 26, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>248</sup> RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 2, No. 22, June 6, 2002, p. 1, <http://www.rferl.org>. Although modeled on the OSCE, which also seeks to commit members to international human rights norms, this issue is not on the CICA's agenda.

<sup>249</sup> Nazarbayev proposed the idea for the creation of CICA in his first address to the U.N. General Assembly in 1992. Christopher Pala, "Nazarbayev Aiming for Peace and Stability," <http://www.securities.com>.

Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev had been advocating the creation of such an organization for more than a decade and its first meeting was held in Almaty.<sup>250</sup> Kazakh officials noted that the new group could play a role in addressing key regional issues, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and water resource management, although they expected CICA to face greater obstacles in achieving consensus due to the diversity of membership.<sup>251</sup> The first session concluded with the signing of the Almaty Act, an appeal to the 16 participants (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan) to join forces against terrorism.<sup>252</sup>

Although both Pakistan's President Pervez Musharaff and India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee attended the conference, they refused to meet under its auspices and U.S. shuttle diplomacy ended up playing a key role in reducing tensions between the two neighbors over Kashmir.

Despite its initial ineffectiveness in conflict resolution, CICA is poised to play a role in facilitating bilateral contacts among some of its members. Just prior to the meeting, for example, India and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on military cooperation and discussed potential cooperation in energy, transportation, and pharmaceuticals.<sup>253</sup>

Regional security has been difficult to ensure, even when goals are more narrowly focused, as the case of the "6+2" working group, established under U.N. auspices to promote a region-wide solution to the conflict in Afghanistan attests. The group was set up in August 1997 after Uzbekistan suggested that the U.N. form a contact group on Afghanistan to include its neighbors (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Iran, and Pakistan) plus the United States and Russia. Although previously not effective in finding a solution to Afghanistan's security problems, 6+2 provides an interesting model of a regional security organization geared to resolution of a specific conflict.<sup>254</sup> It is also the only group in Central Asia inviting U.S. participation.

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<sup>250</sup> RFE/RL Newline, Vol. 6, No. 104, Part I, June 5, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2

<sup>252</sup> RFE/RL Newline Vol. 6, No. 103, Part I, June 4, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>253</sup> Roy Allison, "structures and Frameworks for Security Policy Cooperation in Central Asia," in eds. Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, *Central Asian Security* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 225.

<sup>254</sup> Michael Vatikiotis, Ben Dolven, and David Murphy, "Terror Throws Us Together, For Now," *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), November 21, 2001, pp. 36-39; Susan V Lawrence, "It Takes More to make a Revolution," *FEER*, February 14, 2002, pp. 26-28.

## **f. Great Power Cooperation: Driving Forces and Fault-lines**

In the absence of effective regional institutions, U.S. bilateral diplomacy with China and Russia has proved important in addressing growing U.S. security interests in Central Asia. In the case of China, cooperation in the anti-terrorism coalition has provided an impetus for more frequent communication and enabled the two countries to put tensions over the April 2001 spy plane incident behind them.<sup>255</sup> Initially Chinese leaders believed that the U.S. focus on anti-terrorism coalition-building would counter unilateralist trends and reduce the focus on China as a potential threat to U.S. interests in Asia. China also saw an opportunity to find a new area of cooperation with the United States, despite reservations about the use of military force in response to the 9/11 attacks, and hoped that Chinese cooperation with the United States would result in concessions on Taiwan and support for Chinese policies to combat Uighur separatism.<sup>256</sup> In an effort to avoid condoning U.S. intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, Chinese officials have stressed the importance of establishing “concrete evidence” before intervening militarily and operating within the U.N. framework.<sup>257</sup> They have been quite clear about China’s opposition to the “willful expansion of the war against terror” to Iraq or other countries the United States has chosen to include in the “axis of evil” rubric.<sup>258</sup>

Chinese leaders are concerned about the security implications of a long-term U.S. military presence in South and Central Asia and enhanced U.S. military cooperation with Southeast Asian states. Nevertheless, since 9/11 China has shared information about financial flows of suspected terrorist groups, held talks with U.S. officials about coordinating anti-terrorism activities, provided humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and urged its ally, Pakistan, to assist the U.S.-led coalition and reduce tensions in Kashmir. In addition to providing a new issue area for cooperation with the United States, Chinese officials view their

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<sup>255</sup> Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The Terror Attack and China’s Deeper Concerns,” *China Brief* Volume 1, Issue 6, September 27, 2001, <http://www.jamestown.org>.

<sup>256</sup> Jing-dong Yuan, “The War on Terrorism: China’s Opportunities and Dilemmas,” *Nautilus Special Forum*, September 26, 2001, <http://www.nautilus.org>.

<sup>257</sup> Bao Erwen, “Chinese Agency Says Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Does Not Exist,” *Xinhua*, February 3, 2002, <http://www.securities.org>. This statement also cited Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s opposition to the extension of the war on terrorism to Iraq.

<sup>258</sup> China also has been urging Central Asian neighbors to help fight Uighur separatists. BBC Monitoring, June 4, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>. On China’s effort to link Uighur separatists to Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist activities, see “PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu on ‘East Turkestan’ Forces Receiving Support from Bin Laden,” *Beijing Renmin Ribao* (internet version), November 16,

participation in the anti-terrorism coalition as justifying an intensified crackdown on Uighur separatists, whom Beijing alleges have received training from Al Qaeda camps.<sup>259</sup>

Although the anti-terrorism struggle has provided new impetus for U.S.-China cooperation, China's security environment has deteriorated since 9/11 as Chinese leaders saw key allies, such as Russia and Pakistan, tilt toward the United States; relations between Washington and India improve; U.S. military cooperation with Southeast Asian states increase; instability along China's western borders deepen; the United States confirm for Chinese leaders Washington's increasing aspiration for global dominance by revising the United States nuclear posture and national security strategy; Japanese officials discuss a nuclear option; and the U.S. military establish bases for the first time in Central Asia. These dramatic shifts in global politics have prompted Chinese experts to reevaluate the strategic context of China's security policy and discuss various possible responses, including greater reliance on multilateral cooperation (to counteract perceived U.S. unilateralist tendencies) or a "readjustment" of China's security policy in response to mounting U.S. pressures.<sup>260</sup>

Given that this series of negative developments in China's security environment has developed at a time when Chinese leaders have been preoccupied by leadership succession, thus far they have focused their attention on their overriding current concern in U.S.-China relations, the Taiwan issue, and have not directly criticized the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Nonetheless, Chinese commentary emphasizes that Central Asia is likely to be the locus of great power rivalry, especially over energy.<sup>261</sup>

Chinese leaders have responded to the increased U.S. military cooperation with Central Asia by reinvigorating Chinese diplomacy in the region and advocating cooperation in regional security frameworks, excluding U.S. participation, a surprising development

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<sup>259</sup> *Foreign Broadcast International China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-2001-1116*, <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>; "Text of PRC State Council Article on East Turkistan 'Terrorist Forces'," *Xinhua*, January 21, 2002, *FBIS-CHI- 2002-0121*, <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>; Chen Guohua, "Xinjiang Adopts Measures to Crack Down on Splittists," *Zhongguo Xinwen She*, June 23, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>. While satisfied with the limited cooperation achieved with China in anti-terrorism activities, U.S. officials have pointed out that countries should not interpret anti-terrorism as license to suppress ethnic minorities.

<sup>260</sup> "U.S. Views China as No.1 Rival, Chinese Experts Say," *China Online News*, June 14, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>. On multi-lateralism as a solution, see Zhou Shuchun, "11 September Accelerates Change of World Order, Intensifies U.S. Unilateralism and Russian Tilt to West," June 3, 2002, pp. 10-13, <http://www.securities.com>.

<sup>261</sup> Lu Yousheng, "New Developments in the International Security Situation," *Liaowang*, May 13, 2002, No. 20, pp. 58-59 in *FBIS-CHI-2002-0521*, <http://www.securities.com>; ZhengLi, "Oil Interests Prompt the US to Exhaust Its Military Options," *Beijing Renmin Ribao (Guangzhou China News Supplement)*, April 9, 2002, p. 2 in *FBIS-CHI-2002-0409*, April 9, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>.

considering Beijing's usual caution about multilateralism. Jiang Zemin held bilateral talks with Central Asian leaders in connection with the meetings of CICA in Almaty in May 2002 and of the SCO in Petersburg in June 2002. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, Jiang's Eurasian initiative was a "major diplomatic move" to respond to profound changes in the international security environment of the region.<sup>262</sup> Jiang used these meetings to put forward a vision of Central Asian security maintained by Asians.<sup>263</sup> In the short term, China is seeking to expand economic cooperation with Kazakhstan in the energy sector and to boost security ties with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan by providing military aid.<sup>264</sup>

Considering Russia's historical ties to the region, the substantial investment the United States has been making there since 9/11, and the wary reaction in Central Asia to Beijing's inroads, Chinese diplomatic efforts are unlikely to bear fruit. While the Kazakh leadership is interested in economic cooperation with China, there is concern in Kazakhstan about the potential for Chinese economic domination.<sup>265</sup> In Kyrgyzstan, the border demarcation with China, involving the return of territory, sparked mass demonstrations in March 2002 and opposition by the parliament. Public opinion polling in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan reveals considerable distrust of China's intentions in the region: 56% in Kyrgyzstan, 40% in Uzbekistan, and 52% in Kazakhstan stated that China could not be trusted to act responsibly in Central Asia.<sup>266</sup>

Instead China is likely to seek to boost its own military might, and extend its economic influence in Central Asia and Southeast Asia. According to a Russian analysis, one of the reasons behind China's decision to purchase eight diesel Kilo-class submarines was to protect Chinese interests in Southeast Asia against further U.S. encroachments, as Beijing is convinced that the United States will seek to take over the Russian base at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> Zeng Hu and Che Yuming, "Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxun Comments 17 June on Jiang Zemin's Recent Eurasian Trip," Xinhua, June 18, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0618, <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.

<sup>263</sup> "Presidents Emphasize Regional Security," Cbnet-China Daily, May 18, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>.

<sup>264</sup> According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, China is providing \$3 million in military assistance to Kazakhstan and \$1.2 million to Kyrgyzstan. "Chinese Politics: China Using Separatists to Influence Central Asia," STRATFOR, May 29, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>

<sup>265</sup> "US Presence Prompts China to Get Closer to Russia, Expand into Central Asia," Ekspress-K (Almaty), in Russian, April 11, 2002, p. 3, in BBC Monitoring, April 11, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>.

<sup>266</sup> Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, Opinion Analysis, "Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia," May 31, 2002, M-44-02. p. 3.

<sup>267</sup> Vladimir Urban, "China Getting Ready for the Americans' Arrival to Cam Ranh," Novye Izvestiya, June 27, 2002, pp. 1, 5, <http://www.securities.com>. On Chinese efforts to improve power projection capabilities in Southeast Asia, see Mark J. Valencia, "Tension in the South China Sea," FEER, April 19, 2001, p. 31.

Chinese cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition has provided important support, but China's role has been limited compared to Russia's. Without a cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship, President Putin's acquiescence to an American military presence in Moscow's sphere of influence would have been hard to imagine.<sup>268</sup>

Although Putin was the first leader to offer moral support after the 9/11 attacks, it was the Central Asian states who pushed Russia into greater cooperation with the anti-terrorism effort than might otherwise have been forthcoming.<sup>269</sup> Initially Russian leaders opposed any U.S. use of bases in Central Asia. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that he failed to see any "reasons whatsoever, even hypothetical, for any suppositions about conducting NATO operations from territories of Central Asian countries, members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]."<sup>270</sup> At first President Putin tried to pressure the Central Asian leaders to follow Moscow's lead, by telephoning them on September 17 and urging them to act according to the CIS framework on anti-terrorism issues.

Although initially seeking Moscow's approval, U.S. officials then went directly to the Central Asian leaders to seek their support. Uzbekistan is not a member of the CIS and extended the use of its bases to the U.S. led coalition. Kazakhstan, and then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, after securing Moscow's approval, also opened up bases and offered their air space for the coalition's use. Russian officials were then obliged to reverse their previous opposition to U.S. basing in Central Asia.<sup>271</sup> Putin, who kept silent on the matter for nearly two weeks, gave a speech on September 24, 2001 in which he pledged Russia's cooperation with U.S. plans to attack Afghanistan, but only once the U.N. Security Council had approved them.<sup>272</sup>

For Putin, the 9/11 events represented an opportunity to rejoin the superpower club. By participating in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition, closing bases in Vietnam and Cuba (albeit in decisions made prior to 9/11) and taking a conciliatory stance on President Bush's December 13, 2002 decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, Putin hoped that

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<sup>268</sup> Andrew C. Kuchins, "summit with Substance: Creating Payoffs in an Unequal Partnership," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, No. 16, May 2002, p. 2.

<sup>269</sup> CentralAsianReport, September 20, 2001, Volume 1, Number 9 and October 11, 2001, Volume 1, Number 12, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>270</sup> Vladimir Mukhin, "Fight against Terrorism Raises Political Issues," The Russia Journal, September 21, 2001, <http://www.securities.com>. Chief of the General Staff Anatolii Kvashin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov issued similar denials. Also see Michael Wines, "To Free the Way for the U.S., or Not? Either Way, a Fateful Choice for Russia," The New York Times, September 21, 2001, p. 42.

<sup>271</sup> Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, September 28, 2001, pp. 5-6.

<sup>272</sup> Agence France-Presse, September 22, 2001.

the United States would once again see the need to treat Russia as a great power.<sup>273</sup> The Russian president also expected some concessions in return, especially an end to criticism of Russia's policies toward Chechnya, *carte blanche* to conduct anti-terrorism operations in Georgia, and perhaps also preferential terms for repayment of Soviet era debt and World Trade Organization (WTO) entry.<sup>274</sup>

Russian cooperation in the anti-terrorism coalition has been wide-ranging, including sharing intelligence about the Taliban, offering the use of Russian air space, providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and supporting the Northern Alliance. To coordinate their activities, Russian and U.S. officials are meeting in a wide range of venues. Russia dispatched representatives to CENTCOM. On October 19, 2001, the United States and Russia held consultations on Central Asia for the first time. The United States and Russia are cooperating on Afghanistan and regional anti-terrorism issues in a joint working group on counter-terrorism, established in 2000, the U.S.-Russia working group on Afghanistan, the 6+2 framework, and the Russia-NATO Council, formed in December 2001.

American officials choose to emphasize the positive post-9/11 U.S.-Russia relations. General Franks has noted the intersection of U.S. and Russian interests in Central Asia.<sup>275</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jones has called attention to the "extraordinary cooperation with Russia in a region . . . that Russia naturally regards as its own backyard."<sup>276</sup> Yet Putin's initial failure to show substantial immediate benefits for Russian cooperation with Washington on Afghanistan and underlying wariness of an increased American military presence in Central Asia made the Russian leader vulnerable to more nationalist critics at home in early 2002. Prior to 9/11, Russian policymakers were already suspicious of U.S. intentions in Central Asia and concerned that Washington was using programs such as PfP to squeeze Russia out of the region.<sup>277</sup>

By early 2002, after the United States concluded basing agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, critical voices began to be heard in Moscow. In January 2002, Gennady Seleznev, speaker of the Russian Duma, spoke out against any permanent U.S.

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273 Taras Kazio, "The U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership: Permanent Fixture or Temporary Marriage of Convenience?" *Central Asian Insight*, December 4, 2001, <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

274 On the link between Putin's anti-terrorism policy and Russia's war against Chechnya, see Stephen J. Blank, "Putin's Twelve-Step Program," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2001, p. 147

<sup>275</sup> Cited in Rashid, *Jihad*, p. 193.

<sup>276</sup> Jones, "U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation," p. 12.

<sup>277</sup> Gennady Chufirin, *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2000), p. 480.



basing in Central Asia.<sup>278</sup> Moscow newspapers lamented Russia's loss of influence in the region.<sup>279</sup>

The Russian public also proved skeptical. A ROMIR poll taken in October 2001 showed that 63.5% of Russians were opposed to U.S. access to bases in Central Asia, with 39.8% in favor.<sup>280</sup> According to a November 2001 poll by the Russian Center for Public Opinion, only 20% of Russians saw fundamental change in U.S.-Russia relations resulting from Russian participation in the anti-terrorism coalition.<sup>281</sup>

The Russian leader's immediate concern has been to recoup Russia's dwindling clout in the region through a series of diplomatic initiatives. In October 2001, the Kremlin unsuccessfully sought to coordinate intelligence sharing between the Central Asian states and the United States in an effort to control their cooperation.<sup>282</sup> At a December 2001 CIS summit, Putin emphasized that 9/11 highlighted the importance of multilateral cooperation and noted that "the tragic events of September 11 showed how vulnerable a country is on its own—even a country that is very powerful, economically and militarily."<sup>283</sup> In his State-of-the-Nation speech on April 18, 2002, the Russian president sought to give the entire credit to the CIS—without even mentioning the United States role—for success in the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan.<sup>284</sup> At the May 2002 CIS summit, Putin proposed creating a joint military body, which would be commanded by the Russian Chief of the General Staff Kvashin, but no agreement was reached on the issue. Nevertheless, signatories to the collective security treaty formed a new collective security organization, which would ensure regional security and cooperate with other organizations, such as NATO and the SCO.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Agence France-Presse, January 9, 2002

<sup>279</sup> Yuri Chernogaev, "srednaya Aziia, kotoruiu my poteriali" ("The Central Asia that We Have Lost", Kommersant, January 11, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>; Aleksei Nikolaev, "Tema nedeli - Chto imeem v Sredney Azii?" "Theme of the Week—What's Happening in Central Asia?", Ekspert, December 3, 2001, <http://www.securities.com>.

<sup>280</sup> Michael McFaul, "Putin's Risky Westward Turn," The Christian Science Monitor, November 9, 2001, p. 11.

<sup>281</sup> Igor Torbakov, "Good Bush-Putin Rapport Can't Hide Obstacles to Long-Term US-Russian Cooperation," Eurasia Insight, November 19, 2001, <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

<sup>282</sup> Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, October 12, 2001, p. 6.

<sup>283</sup> Sarah Karush, "Putin Calls for Closer Integration of CIS," The St. Petersburg Times, December 4, 2001, <http://www.securities.com>.

<sup>284</sup> In subsequent individual statements Central Asian leaders noted the U.S. leadership of the anti-terrorism effort. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, May 3, 2002, pp. 6-7.

<sup>285</sup> Sergei Blagov, "Russia Pushes for Deeper Post-Soviet Integration," Asia Times Online, May 16, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>.

Many Russian appeals to enhance CIS integration have largely fallen on deaf ears and Putin has sought a variety of other economic and political levers of influence. In January 2002, the Russian president called for the formation of a Eurasian gas alliance, including Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. The alliance would export gas to Europe via the Russian state-owned monopoly Gazprom, effectively granting Moscow the power to cut off exports from Central Asian states should they fail to be sufficiently loyal to Moscow.<sup>286</sup> At the SCO summit, Putin called attention to a 15-year agreement to export oil from Kazakhstan via Russia and noted the recent improvement in trade relations with Uzbekistan.<sup>287</sup> Later on in June, when Kyrgyzstan's President Akayev faced continuous mass demonstrations protesting the treatment of an opposition figure and the border settlement with China, top Russian officials were dispatched to Bishkek to show their support for the embattled president and offered to improve military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan.<sup>288</sup>

Moreover, Russia has been competing with the United States for influence in Afghanistan, a development that some observers have compared to the great power rivalry in Europe right before the fall of Berlin in 1945. Although Russia did not contribute troops to the war against the Taliban, Moscow dispatched twelve planeloads of 'specialists' to Kabul in early December, a move described by Secretary of State Colin Powell as potentially creating tensions in U.S.-Russia relations.<sup>289</sup> Russia was the second country (after Great Britain) to reopen its embassy in Kabul and its support for the Northern Alliance ensured it a key role in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

While it is true that the United States-Russian partnership has deepened in the spring of 2002, after successful arms control talks and a productive summit meeting in May, Russian support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition has never been unconditional. Above all, Russia fully expects the U.S. military presence in Central Asia to be temporary. Should basing rights be extended indefinitely, this would embolden latent opposition to Putin in the military and intelligence services in particular.

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<sup>286</sup> <http://www.securities.com>; "Russian Manoeuvres over Energy Export Routes to Safeguard Position in Central Asia," Panorama (Almaty), January 27, 2002, p. 9.

<sup>287</sup> RFE/RL Newline, Vol. 6, No. 107, Part I, June 10, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

<sup>288</sup> Sergei Blagov, "Russia Boosts Military Ties with Kyrgyzstan," Asia Times Online, June 15, 2002, <http://www.securities.com>

<sup>289</sup> Viktor Kvashnin, the chief of the General Staff, was put in charge of aid to the Northern Alliance. Glen Howard, "Is Russia Outmanoeuvring the USA in Afghanistan?" Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, January 14, 2002, <http://www.janes.com>.

Furthermore, the expansion of the war on terrorism to Iraq would place the new Russian-American partnership under considerable stress. Although the Russian president may be able to tolerate limited air strikes, if the United States went forward with preemptive ground attack against Iraq,<sup>290</sup> the Russian president would find himself in a very difficult position politically. After acquiescing to U.S. basing in Central Asia and a U.S. pull-out from the ABM treaty, Russia would be asked to sacrifice its economic interests in Iraq, a move unlikely to garner support in Russian policy circles and, to the contrary, one with the potential to undermine Putin's support for U.S. policies on other issues. Prior consultation would be insufficient to achieve Russian concurrence to a preemptive U.S. ground attack, as Russian leaders would be expecting substantial financial compensation for their losses. Even so, if the United States intervened unilaterally in Iraq, domestic opposition in Russia to Putin's westward-leaning diplomacy would increase and, as was the case with the United States intervention in Kosovo in 1999, would strengthen voices in Moscow advocating a partnership with China and India to counteract Washington's efforts to impose its will on global affairs.

#### **g. Deepening Domestic Instability in Central Asia**

Expanding U.S. military engagement with Central Asia is designed to shore up weak states that are vulnerable to terrorism, promote their integration into western institutions, provide support for moderate Islamic regimes, as well as to stabilize Afghanistan's immediate external environment.<sup>291</sup> Yet as Andrew Bacevich noted, "to venture into the steppes is to venture into a minefield."<sup>292</sup>

The largely secular regimes of Central Asia have faced challenges from radical Islamic movements within their borders, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Although the IMU had bases in Northern Afghanistan and links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the group mounted its 1999 and 2000 incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from Tajikistan as a part of a broader effort to control drug trafficking routes within the Ferghana valley.<sup>293</sup> Although the IMU's bases in Afghanistan were targeted during the Afghanistan war, the group has maintained an underground network in Central Asia and

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290 Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Plan for Iraq Is Said to Include Attack on 3 Sides: Preliminary Document Envisions Tens of Thousands of Troops," *The New York Times*, July 5, 2002, pp. 11-16.

291 Charles Fairbanks, "Bases of Debate: America in Central Asia," *The National Interest*, Summer 2002, pp. 45-53.

292 Andrew J. Bacevich, "Steppes to Empire," *The National Interest*, Summer 2002, p.52.

293 Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, "Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002, p. 196.

there is some evidence that IMU fighters from Afghanistan are seeking to return to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>294</sup>

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, founded in Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 1953, seeks to create a united Islamic super-state in Central Asia, which would be ruled by sharia law. Although it does not advocate the overthrow of existing states by violent means and is not officially regarded as a terrorist group by the U.S.-led coalition or the Central Asian states, it is not allowed to register legally as a political party and operates mostly underground.<sup>295</sup> As one of the few alternatives in a region where political opposition is repressed, the group has become increasingly popular, especially among the impoverished rural residents of Ferghana, where unemployment reaches 80%.<sup>296</sup> Since the United States has been using the Manas base, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been distributing leaflets opposing the American military presence.<sup>297</sup>

Although Central Asians are mainly moderate Sunni Muslims, repressive regimes, corrupt elites, and pervasive poverty have made the region a breeding ground for terrorists and other radical movements.<sup>298</sup> The United States hoped that by developing the energy sector in these countries, overall increases in development would trickle down to the population, but corruption and lack of transparency have facilitated the formation of a criminalized elite, increasing public dissatisfaction with their own governments and cooperation with the West.<sup>299</sup>

The new military assistance money pouring into Central Asia since 9/11 is likely to exacerbate this problem. In Kyrgyzstan, the United States pays approximately \$7,000 per take-off from Manas, used for about 30 coalition flights daily, as well as \$1,000 per truck and \$500 per car entering the airport, plus \$3.5 million for helicopter parts and aircraft repairs.<sup>300</sup> Just as with oil revenue in Kazakhstan, corruption in Kyrgyzstan renders unlikely any fair distribution of these funds to impoverished citizens.

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294 Ahmed Rashid, "Trouble Ahead," FEER, May 9, 2002, p. 18; RFE/RL Newswire, Vol. 6, No. 114, Part I, June 19, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

295 Tamara Makarenko, "The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1, 2002, [www.janes.com](http://www.janes.com).

296 Rashid, Jihad, pp. 116-117.

297 Idem, "Trouble Ahead," p. 18.

298 Idem, Jihad, p. 228.

299 Stephen J. Blank, "The United States and Central Asia," in Allison, op.cit., p. 142.

300 Makarenko, op.cit.

Uzbekistan has received the lion's share of increased funding post-9/11-nearly \$172 million-more than ten times the total amounts budgeted for each of the other Central Asian states in aid requests in FY2001-2003. In FY 2001 Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian country to receive additional foreign military financing, in the amount of \$25 million, \$5 million more than NATO ally Turkey.<sup>301</sup> NGOs have faulted the Bush administration for focusing excessively on security assistance to the detriment of other needs in Central Asia.<sup>302</sup>

The increased U.S. military presence in Central Asia gives the public the impression that Washington supports these repressive regimes, while providing authoritarian leaders reason to hope that U.S. forces would back them up in case of a mass effort to oust them. The protest marches taking place in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2002, attracting thousands of supporters, could lead to a widespread movement to oust President Akayev,<sup>303</sup> a very real example of a situation in which the U.S. military presence appears to be supporting a less than democratic leader instead of encouraging the development of political pluralism. U.S. troops stationed in Central Asia also make good targets for anti-government insurgents and are as vulnerable as the weak states that host them.

U.S. policymakers are well aware that democratic and prosperous Central Asian states would provide the strongest bulwark against terrorism and are funding an impressive list of economic, social, and political programs in addition to military aid. Yet the emphasis has been on rewarding the Central Asian states for their cooperation and providing aid incentives for continued participation in the anti-terrorism coalition, rather than on using closer cooperation to encourage higher standards of economic and political openness.

Although prior to 9/11 U.S. policymakers highlighted the lack of progress toward democratization in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, the increasing consolidation of one-party rule in Tajikistan, and the continued erosion of democratic norms in Kyrgyzstan, many American officials now overstate the degree of progress currently taking place in these countries to make a case for continued close security

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<sup>301</sup> Matt Schroeder, "War on Terrorism Aid Tables," Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, May 2002.

<sup>302</sup> Edward Epstein, "Bush Foreign Aid Budget Called Way Too Low," The San Francisco Chronicle, February 13, 2002, p. A13.

<sup>303</sup> Supporters of parliamentary deputy Azimbek Beknazarov staged marches across Kyrgyzstan to protest against what they viewed as politically motivated efforts by the Akayev government to deprive the opposition leader of his seat. See RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 2, No. 24, June 20, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org>.

cooperation. U.S. officials note that Uzbekistan, for example, has taken some unprecedented steps allowing a visit by the U.N. Rapporteur on Torture, permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit detention centers, and registering one human rights organization.

According to Human Rights Watch, however, there is no reason to point to any fundamental change in the country's overall appalling human rights record, which includes inhumane treatment of prisoners, the use of torture in detention, tight restrictions on the media, and a continuing ban on independent parties and social movements. More than 7,000 remain imprisoned on religious and political charges.<sup>304</sup>

Assured of U.S. support, President Karimov saw the opportunity to renege on a pre-9/11 pledge to release thousands of political prisoners: approximately 800 were released but kept under tight surveillance, while the rest lost their chance for amnesty.<sup>305</sup> Despite such evidence of backsliding, the U.S. Government removed Uzbekistan from the list of countries of particular concern for religious freedom, mandated by the 1998 U.S. International Religious Freedom Act.<sup>306</sup> Meanwhile, Muslim believers and the human rights personnel who defend them continue to be arrested in Uzbekistan on the pretext of their association with terrorists.

Enhanced cooperation with the United States in anti-terrorism is unlikely to secure integration of these states in western institutions and transform them into liberal democracies unless Washington establishes clear benchmarks for progress and links increases in aid, especially military assistance, to evidence of movement toward these goals. For its own part, the U.S. Government would have to make a much larger long-term commitment to assist these countries, especially in poverty reduction. Moreover, the June 2002 scare over the possible contamination of the Khanabad base in Uzbekistan by nerve gas left behind after the Soviets' departure showed that greater assistance to the environmental health of Central Asia also should be viewed as a U.S. security interest.

Instead of the United States exerting leverage over Central Asia to move toward democratization, states like Uzbekistan have proven to be the tougher negotiators, as the debacle over the opening of Friendship Bridge demonstrated. The United States had urged

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<sup>304</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, New York, 2002, pp. 370-378.

<sup>305</sup> Muhammad Salih, "America's Shady Ally against Terror," The New York Times, March 11, 2002, p. A21. Salih is the exiled leader of the Erk (Freedom) party of Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan to open the 1km land link to Afghanistan in an effort to expedite delivery of humanitarian aid to hundreds of thousands of refugees living in desperate conditions there. Uzbekistan demurred for several months, citing security concerns. Consequently, the coalition had to resort to more time-consuming methods, such as shipping the supplies by river barge across the Amu-Darya or even by mule from Tajikistan. Finally it took a visit by Secretary of State Colin Powell to Uzbekistan in December, during which he pledged a long-term commitment to a cooperative relationship with Uzbekistan. After Powell's visit, Karimov agreed to reopen the bridge, closed since 1997, as soon as a last technical assessment was made.<sup>307</sup> Karimov's hard bargaining also delayed the initial entry of French troops destined for the Mazar-e-Sharif base in Afghanistan.<sup>308</sup>

Although Central Asian leaders have sought out closer military cooperation with the United States and rebuffed Russian pressure for greater coordination of anti-terrorism cooperation within the CIS, public opinion surveys taken in Central Asia in the fall-winter 2001-2 indicate considerable popular opposition to the US military presence in the region. Majorities in three of four countries surveyed by local polling organizations hired by the United States government came out against a permanent U.S. military presence in the region: Azerbaijan (43% opposed, 20% in favor), Kazakhstan (77% opposed, 8% in favor) and Kyrgyzstan (72% opposed, 22% in favor). Only in Uzbekistan does a majority support a permanent U.S. military presence (61% in favor, 21% opposed).<sup>309</sup> Similarly, respondents in Kyrgyzstan were split on the wisdom of their government's decision to allow the basing of U.S. fighter planes in their country: 47% supported the policy, while 49.7% disagreed.<sup>310</sup> In Kazakhstan, 86% supported their government's decision to refuse basing rights to U.S. and coalition forces. In Uzbekistan, however, 82.4% of those surveyed supported their government's decision to allow U.S. forces to use Khanabad.

Nevertheless, all three Central Asian states are more comfortable with a greater United Nations role in peace-keeping in the region than with a U.S. military presence: 71.2% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 72.3% in Uzbekistan, and 82.1% in Kyrgyzstan expressed a preference for the U.N. alone or in cooperation with local Afghan groups to take charge of

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<sup>306</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, p. 377.

<sup>307</sup> Robin Wright, "Powell Seeks Deeper U.S. Ties with Central Asian Nations," The Los Angeles Times, Part A, p. 30

<sup>308</sup> David Stern, "Uzbek Paralysis Slows Aid to a Trickle," Financial Times, November 26, 2001, p. 6.

<sup>309</sup> "Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, M-44-02, May 31, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>310</sup> Information on Central Asian views of their countries' policies on basing rights comes from unpublished data gathered for "Russia in Central Asia" op.cit.

peace-keeping duties. Conversely, 10.6% in Kazakhstan supported a role for the West in cooperation with the UN, 7.5% in Uzbekistan, and 8.9% in Kyrgyzstan.<sup>311</sup>

Several factors explain Uzbekistan's greater receptivity to U.S. forces in the region. To some extent, public opinion reflects the preferences expressed in the region's media. Uzbekistan's government-controlled media were largely supportive of the U.S. military presence and intervention in Afghanistan, while coverage has been more skeptical in Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan and negative in Kazakhstan.<sup>312</sup>

Only Uzbekistan appears to believe U.S. assurances that it will not maintain a permanent military presence in Central Asia (54%, with 21% disagreeing) while this pledge is disputed in Azerbaijan where 50% of respondents believe that the U.S. military will remain in the region (with 17% saying the United States will not) and in Kazakhstan (51% believe U.S. will stay, 35% disagree). Opinion was more evenly divided in Kyrgyzstan (40% say the United States will maintain a permanent military presence, 54% disagree).<sup>313</sup> Similarly, Uzbekistan is the only country of those surveyed with a majority believing that the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan was justified (71%, compared to 45% for Kazakhstan, 50% for Kyrgyzstan, and 21% for Azerbaijan) and approving of the military campaign (79% compared to 20% for Azerbaijan, 39% for Kazakhstan, and 53% for Kyrgyzstan).<sup>314</sup>

Although the greater U.S. security interest in fighting terrorism in Central Asia was a policy departure for Washington, elites in Kazakhstan, for example, sees more continuity in their security environment. While not discounting the potential for terrorism in their region, elites interviewed in Kazakhstan in the immediate aftermath of

9/11 appeared to be more concerned about illegal drug trafficking (84%) and at least as much concerned about health and environmental problems (60%) as about the threat from terrorism (61%) and Islamic extremism (57%).<sup>315</sup>

Opposition in some Central Asian states to a U.S. military presence in the region also reflects their concern about its impact on the regional balance of power. Respondents in

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<sup>311</sup> *ibid.* p. 7

<sup>312</sup> "Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia," p. 1.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>315</sup> "CIS Elites' Security Concerns Post-September 11: More than Just Terrorism," Office of Research, Department of State, Washington, DC, M-249-01, December 31, 2001, p. 3.



Kyrgyzstan are the most wary of a shift in favor of Uzbekistan. When asked whether Uzbekistan's cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan indicates a U.S. Preference for Tashkent, 44.1% said yes and 45.9% said no, compared to 29.7% and 53.8% for Kazakhstan. In results appearing to confirm regional fears, a majority of respondents in Uzbekistan interprets the new cooperation with the United States as a sign of preference (70.5% yes, 14% no).<sup>316</sup>

Despite the new cooperative thrust in U.S.-Russian relations, an underlying rationale for U.S. security interests in Central Asia has been to prevent Russian domination. Polling of Central Asian publics reveals an understanding of this dynamic and opposition to it. When asked how much trust they have in various countries to address their region's problems, they placed the most trust in Russia (92% in Kyrgyzstan, 80% in Uzbekistan, and 76% in Kazakhstan). The U.N. came in second (77% in Kyrgyzstan, 74% in Uzbekistan, and 62% in Kazakhstan), while the United States ranked third (68% in Kyrgyzstan, 74% in Uzbekistan, and 51% in Kazakhstan).<sup>317</sup> According to this polling research, majorities in these three Central Asian countries fear that a permanent U.S. presence will weaken Russian influence in the region (61% in Kyrgyzstan, 43% in Uzbekistan, and 48% in Kazakhstan) and that this would be bad for Central Asia (92% in Kyrgyzstan, 64% in Uzbekistan, and 67% in Kazakhstan).<sup>318</sup> This study concludes that support remains for Russia because its policies are more familiar and viewed as supporting stability, while U.S. motives remain less clear.<sup>319</sup> Other public opinion research has shown some discomfort with U.S. global policies and their potential impact on Central Asia.<sup>320</sup>

Thus, U.S. policymakers should be wary of equating the self-interested cooperation by Central Asian leaders in the anti-terrorism coalition with public support for a U.S. military presence. For Central Asian publics, terrorism is just one of a long list of problems, dominated by concerns such as drug trafficking, poverty, and public health, while Central Asian leaders see the political value of overstating a terrorist threat to bring in the foreign military assistance needed to maintain their own power and repress political opponents.

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<sup>316</sup> Unpublished data from "Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia."

<sup>317</sup> "Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia," p. 2. Central Asian publics ranked other regional powers, such as Turkey, Pakistan, China, and Iran, considerably lower. See p. 3.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid., pp. 5-6. For background on the evolution of Central Asian Views of Central Asia, see Regina Feranda, "Ties That Bind, Opinions That Divide: How Neighboring Countries Have Viewed Russia, 1991-2001," Research Report, Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, May 21, 2001, R-2-01.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>320</sup> "Regard for American Society High in Central Asia, Azerbaijan; Views More Mixed on U.S. Global Role," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, M-46-02, June 11, 2001, p. 1.

## **h. General Assessment**

There is a danger that U.S. policy toward Central Asia may prove counterproductive: to defend the peace against terrorism, the United States has ended up cooperating with the very tyrants responsible for the repression that increases support for home-grown anti-government and transnational movements. With greater U.S. involvement in the region, popular expectations of change will rise, and should the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia fail to reform, social explosions may occur in the region, perpetuating instability and harming U.S. interests.<sup>321</sup> While the United States should continue to provide military assistance designed to provide border security and interdict narcotics and weapons trafficking, strict conditionality should be applied to ensure that the Central Asian states do not use American aid to further institutionalize social repression and instead are obliged to achieve clearly defined benchmarks in economic and political reform.

The U.S. military should withdraw completely from all Central Asian bases as soon as hostilities in Afghanistan end to avoid becoming a target or an inspiration for domestic anti-government or transnational terrorist movements. Instead, the U.S. military should focus its efforts on developing rapid deployment capabilities that could be located in existing bases in Turkey (Incirlik and Antalya). While U.S. forces remain in Central Asia, greater resources should be devoted to civil affairs projects and an effort should be made to rely as much as possible on local suppliers for base needs to provide some immediate socio-economic benefits to host communities.

Coordination in the development of military, economic, political, and economic assistance will help ensure that the goals of U.S. aid will be mutually supportive, but appropriate policies require a more detailed understanding of the region. In particular, the U.S. military should devote greater resources to foreign area training for Central Asia and develop a corps of experts with knowledge of Central Asian languages and background in Near East and Middle East studies, as well as CIS affairs.

Although anti-terrorism cooperation has dominated U.S. security interests in Central Asia since 9/11, over the long term domestic insurgencies within these states and inter-state rivalry will pose a greater threat to the region than transnational terrorist groups such as Al

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<sup>321</sup>Jonathan Curiel, "Q&A; Ahmed Rashid; The Toughest Beat in the World," *The San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday Review*, March 3, 2002, p. 2.

Qaeda.<sup>322</sup>To avoid compounding instability in these states, the United States needs a regional strategy for Central Asia that addresses a wide range of potential sources of regional instability, including conflicts over water resource management, border disputes, refugee issues, environmental concerns, and drug trafficking.<sup>323</sup>

In particular, the United States should take care to avoid singling out Uzbekistan, admittedly a key partner in the anti-terrorism coalition, but a potential regional hegemon in Central Asia.<sup>324</sup>Since 9/11, the focus of U.S. security interests has shifted from Kazakhstan, the initial target of U.S. security aid due to proliferation concerns, to Uzbekistan, accentuating the rivalry between these two states and exposing weaker regional states such as Kyrgyzstan to Uzbek encroachments on its borders in the name of anti-terrorism activities.

With the successful conclusion of enduring freedom, the United States government faces a choice of two vastly different policy directions. One would involve a unilateral strategy, based on self-defense and preemptive attack against terrorist groups and regimes, while the second would support continued multilateral collaboration against transnational threats.<sup>325</sup>

A unilateral strategy would accentuate public suspicion of U.S. intentions in Central Asia and erode support in Russia and China for Washington's regional anti-terrorism efforts, potentially resurrecting regional initiatives aimed at minimizing the United States role in the region. Multilateral collaboration, on the other hand, would encourage the Central Asian militaries to work with each other and within the framework of western military and political institutions. To this end, intelligence-sharing, PfP and joint peace-keeping activities should be continued and greater training for Central Asian military and security officials should be provided. In deference to regional sensitivities, the United States should recognize its outsider status in Central Asia and work within existing regional structures, such as the 6+2 framework.

One of the key lessons of 9/11 is that despite its preponderant power, the United States remains vulnerable to transnational threats and requires the collaboration of other states to combat them. In Central Asia, this will require a redefinition of U.S. security interests and

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<sup>322</sup> Michael T. Klare, "Can the Alliance Hold?" *Newsday*, January 6, 2002, p. 44.

<sup>323</sup> Martha Brill Olcott, "Preventing New Afghanistan: A Regional Strategy for Reconstruction," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief*, No. 11, January 2002, pp. 6-7.

<sup>324</sup> Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2002, p. 61.

<sup>325</sup> G. John Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2001-2, p. 28.

development of a regional strategy that would address the interrelated nature of political, economic, and security problems in the region.

#### **D. Russia, The United States, And The Caucasus**

##### **1. The Caucasus Region In World Politics**

The Caucasus is geographically bounded by Russia's Krasnodar and Stavropol districts in the north, the Araxes River and Iranian and Turkish boundaries in the south, and the Black and Caspian Seas. It is conventionally divided into two parts separated by the Caucasus mountain chain. The *Northern Caucasus* subregion is one of the seven large Russian federal regions crafted by Vladimir Putin, and includes the seven federal entities of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Northern Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Adygea. The *Southern Caucasus* includes the new independent states of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. These two subregions are distinct but also linked by historical experience, ethnic commonality, cultural and linguistic traits, and strategic dynamics. The Caucasus meets Buzan's criteria for designation as a security complex, and thinking of the region in those terms can help us to understand the particular security challenges that it presents.<sup>326</sup>

The Caucasus region is characterized by ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. The Northern Caucasus is one of the most ethnically complex regions in the world. Dagestan, with a population of about 2 million, contains more than 30 distinct ethno-linguistic groups.<sup>327</sup> Ethnic complexity is less pronounced in the Southern Caucasus, but not less real.

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<sup>326</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies*, Boulder: L. Rienner, 1991, and Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 419-423.

<sup>327</sup> Sebastian Smith, *Allah's Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya*, London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001, pp. 6-29,

Georgia's population is approximately 65 percent Georgian, but the Georgians have important local affiliations (Kartvelians, Mingrelians, Svans, Ajars), and there are Armenian, Azeri, Osset, Greek, and Abkhaz minorities. Azerbaijan is 90 percent Azeri, but contains a significant Armenian minority in the Javakh district. The Azeris are a multistate nation, and perhaps as many as 20 million Azeris reside in neighboring Iran. Armenia is 95 percent Armenian, but its population also has local identities. The large Armenian Diaspora is a significant and sometimes-divisive domestic political factor. The region is also a point of intersection between confessional communities. About 80 percent of Azeris affiliate with Shia Islam, and there are other Shia communities, including the Talysh of Azerbaijan and some Dagestanis. Most Dagestanis associate with Sunni Islam, as do the Chechen and Ingush, the Circassian peoples (the Adyge, Cherkess, and Kabardins), about 20 percent of the Osset population, and 35 percent of Abkhaz. The Georgian Orthodox and Armenian Monophysite churches are among the world's oldest organized Christian communities, and the majority of Ossets are Orthodox Christians as is the region's Slavic population. There also are small Jewish communities including the Tats (Mountain Jews) of Azerbaijan, and in Dagestan. Historically, the region has been fragmented politically and dominated by adjacent power centers (the Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires). The Caucasus never has developed functional regional institutions or a shared political identity. In the post-Cold War era, the Caucasus has remained underdeveloped institutionally and relatively impoverished. The region as a whole is plagued by many of the typical dilemmas of post-Sovietism, including incomplete nation-building, cultural disorientation, deeply rooted corruption, socio-economic and environmental disintegration, regional conflict and separatism, fragile democratization, and flourishing criminal networks. Despite these problems, however, the region's strategic significance in many ways has become more pronounced.

The strategic weight accorded to the Caucasus rests on several factors: (a) *Regional Instability*—the region has been plagued by armed conflict and instability with the potential to escalate and expand; (b) *Islamic Radicalism*—the Caucasus covers an important “fault line” between Christian and Islamic civilization, has been plagued by local conflict with a religious dimension and risks becoming a potential zone of engagement for Islamist extremism; (c) *Embedded Criminality*—poverty and the weakness of the Soviet successor states have allowed the region to be transformed into a transit corridor for various kinds of criminal trafficking; and (d) *Strategic Resources*—the oil and natural gas resources of the Caspian basin have become a much sought after prize, and the Caucasus represents a

logical corridor of access for transporting these resources into world markets. These factors have made the Caspian an apple of discord between great powers, notably the Russian Federation and the United States, which have crafted assertive regional policies on the basis of conflicting definitions of interests. The resultant competition is sometimes referred to as a part of the “new great game” for geopolitical leverage in the “arc of crisis” along Russia’s southern flank.<sup>328</sup>

Similar to the modern Balkans, the Caucasus is an area where the dilemmas of post-communism, regional order, and geostrategic orientation are sharp and unresolved. It is attached to the greater Middle East geographically and by the Islamic factor; to Europe by institutions (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the Council of Europe, the European Union [EU], the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the Partnership for Peace [PfP]) and the aspirations of elites; and to the Russian north by economic dependencies and complex cultural and demographic affiliations. It is, like the modern Middle East, a region with important oil and natural gas holdings, but with traditions of authoritarian governance, the profound dilemma of frustrated modernization, and a large number of unresolved local disputes.

## **2. Security Challenges**

The most important object of discord undoubtedly has been the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin. Azerbaijan is a major oil producer, and the Caucasus as a whole represents an important potential transit corridor for bringing Caspian oil and natural gas into regional and global markets. The region serves as a point of transit in a larger sense as well, as part of an emerging transportation artery defined by the EU’s Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) project. Launched by the EU in 1993, TRACECA includes a series of infrastructure initiatives including the construction of highways, railroads, fiber optic cables, and oil and gas pipelines, as well as a targeted expansion of exports, intended to recreate the Silk Road of the medieval centuries binding Europe to Asia. The Caucasus also has become a route for the east-west drug trade and other kinds of criminal trafficking.<sup>329</sup> In the post-Soviet period, it has been highly unstable, with four unresolved

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<sup>328</sup> R. Craig Nation, “An Arc of Crisis? The Strategic Environment From the Adriatic to the Caspian,” in Stefano Bianchini, ed., *From the Adriatic to the Caspian: The Dynamics of (De)stabilization*, Ravenna, Italy: Longo, 2001, pp. 147-168.

<sup>329</sup> Camille Verleuw, *Trafcs et crimes en Asie Centrale et en Caucase*, (Trafficking and Criminality in Central Asia and the Caucasus) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.

armed conflicts in place, all related to the attempt by small, ethnically defined enclaves to assert independence from larger metropolitan states (the cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh).

The states of the Southern Caucasus are weak and actively have courted the support of great power sponsors the competitive engagement of external powers is a significant part of the region's security profile. Russia has an obvious motivation to restore order on its national territory in Chechnya, and to promote a positive regional balance supporting its national purpose to the south. The Chechnya conflict, in particular, has raised the specter of Islamist terrorism, and threatened repeatedly to spill over beyond the boundaries of Chechnya itself. But the weakened Russian Federation of the post-Soviet era has not been strong enough to sustain the region as a closed preserve as it has done in the past. The "power vacuum created by the Soviet collapse provided an inviting milieu for the West's political and economic intrusion into an uncharted territory."<sup>330</sup> The United States has been drawn to the window of opportunity to forward a policy of reducing Russian influence and promoting the sovereignty of the new independent states and "geopolitical pluralism" within the post-Soviet space; assuring access to the resources of the Caspian; and securing regional allies and potential military access (over-flight and potential basing), extending its strategic reach into Inner Asia. The EU has become attracted by the transit of energy resources and concerned by the challenges of trafficking and criminality that regional instability aggravates. In July 2003 the European Council appointed Finnish diplomat Heiki Talvitie as EU Special Representative to the region. In 2004 the states of the Southern Caucasus were made subjects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), allowing the negotiation of bilateral "Action Plans" to permit states without immediate prospects for accession to take advantage of more limited forms of association.

Iran and Turkey also have sought to sponsor local clients in search of strategic leverage. The Caucasus indeed has become part of a new great game, or "tournament of shadows" in Russian parlance, played for high geopolitical stakes, that is alive and well in the Caspian, Black Sea, and Inner Asian arenas. It has taken on a strategic weight that is incommensurate with its inherent fragility, and potentially dangerous in its consequences.

#### **a. The War in Chechnya**

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<sup>330</sup> R. Hrair Dekmejian and Hovann H. Simonian, *Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2001, p. 28.

The massacre of innocents in Beslan in September 2004 seemed to expose the futility of Russia's pursuit of a military victory in the embattled Northern Caucasus. Beslan was the latest of at least a dozen major terrorist incidents in Russia since 1995, the fifth hostage-taking event in that period, and the worst hostage-seizure in history in terms of its consequences.<sup>331</sup> Russia's strategy for reasserting control in Chechnya through "Chechenization," combining a harsh anti-insurgency campaign with the effort to impose a Russia-true Chechen leadership, seemed consigned to futility. The result of years of counterinsurgency campaigning, it appeared, was only more ferocious resistance. That the attack was staged out of Ingushetia against a city in Northern Ossetia seemed to be a blatant attempt to expand the Chechen conflict throughout the Northern Caucasus.<sup>332</sup> In the wake of the incident, Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basaev threatened new rounds of terror attacks, including the use of chemical, biological, and "nuclear weapons of various sizes."<sup>333</sup> Western observers highlighted "the extreme gravity of a situation that risks spilling over into the entire northern Caucasus . . . unresolved from a military point of view and a failure from a political one."<sup>334</sup> For many observers, the horrific nature of the violence reflected as badly on the callousness or ineptness of the Russian authorities as it did on the perpetrators. Representatives of the Chechen independence movement abroad were quick to condemn the atrocity, but also to assert that the real responsibility lay with Russia and the long campaign of terrorist repression directed against a legitimate national liberation struggle.<sup>335</sup> A good deal of international commentary, as well as Russian critiques reflecting the perspective of the political opposition to Putin, echoed that judgment.<sup>336</sup> The death of elected Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov as the result of a raid by Russian Special Forces on March 8, 2005, seemed to drive the dynamic of conflict

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<sup>331</sup> For a thorough account of the Beslan events, see "Die Kinder von Beslan: Geschichte eines Verbrechens," ("The Children of Beslan: History of a Crime"), *Der Spiegel*, No. 53, December 27, 2004, pp. 65-101.

<sup>332</sup> Ingushetia is involved in a long-standing territorial dispute with Northern Ossetia over the Prigorodny district. In 1992 an armed conflict erupted in the district that occasioned some 60,000 refugees, 600 deaths, and the destruction of over 3000 homes. K. S. Gadzhiev, *Geopolitika Kavkaza*, (The Geopolitics of the Caucasus), Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001, pp. 50-51.

<sup>333</sup> Cited in Andrei Riskin, "Sluzhba bezopasnosti prezidenta Chechni neset poteri: Basaev ugrozhaet Rossii oruzhiem massovogo unichtozheniia," ("The Security Services of the Chechen President Suffer Losses: Basaev Threatens Russia with Weapons of Mass Destruction"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, November 1, 2004.

<sup>334</sup> Paolo Calzini, "Vladimir Putin and the Chechen War," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XL, No. 2, April-June 2005, p. 20.

<sup>335</sup> Ahmed Zakaev, "Our Dead and Injured Children: Beslan Was Barbaric-So Has Been Russia's Reign of Terror in Chechnya," *The Guardian*, September 7, 2004. Zakaev, deputy prime minister in the Chechen government headed by Aslan Maskhadov, was voted into office in 1997. In 2003, in a move bitterly criticized by Russian authorities, he was granted political asylum in the United Kingdom.

<sup>336</sup> Dutch foreign minister Bertrand Bot set the tone in the immediate aftermath of the incident, directing his demands for explanations of a terrorist attack that took the lives of at least 350 Russian citizens, the majority of whom were children, to the Russian government. "Nous aimerions apprendre des autorités Russes," stated Bot, "comment cette tragédie a pu arriver." Cited in "Questions Russes," ("Russian Questions"), *Le Monde*, September 7, 2004. Calzini argues that the "increasing response by Chechens to terrorism as a means of struggle can be seen as a reaction to the extreme brutality of the repression." Calzini, "Vladimir Putin and the



even further into a dead end.<sup>337</sup> Maskhadov was viewed widely as a legitimate leader and the only available interlocutor capable of working toward a negotiated solution.<sup>338</sup> Following his death, the terrorist Basaev assumed sole leadership of the Chechen independence movement a man with whom negotiation was impossible.<sup>339</sup>

The appearance of stall was misleading to some extent. In retrospect, the Beslan assault appears more like an act of desperation by a fagging movement at the end of its tether than the beginning of a new and robust wave of terror. Russia's counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya has been brutal and protracted, but not entirely unsuccessful. The ability of the Chechen resistance to mobilize the population and stage large-scale military reprisals has been shattered. Russia pays a price in blood and treasure for its occupation, but it has not been forced to abandon it, or to turn away from the policy of Chechenization that guides it. Moscow remains concerned about the possible demonstration effect of a successful declaration of independence by one of the Russian federal entities. The example of Chechen independence in the period 1994-96, marked by appalling lawlessness and collapsing living standards, was extremely negative.<sup>340</sup> Russia has no interest in once again toying with a scenario where, in the words of Putin, "a power vacuum was created that fundamentalists filled in the worst possible manner."<sup>341</sup> It also is worth keeping in mind that the second Chechen War, launched by Putin on his road to the presidency at the end of 1999, has been linked inextricably to his person and legacy ever since. For Putin the statesman, nothing short of victory will do. Basaev's Islamist orientation and resort to catastrophic terrorism as weapon of choice left him isolated and discredited. They also have, to some extent at least, encouraged strategic alignment between the United States and Russia in the name of the global war against terrorism.<sup>342</sup>

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Chechen War," p. 22. For a highly critical Russian perspective that sees post Beslan Russia "hurtling back into a Soviet abyss," see Anna Politkovskaya, "Poisoned by Putin," *The Guardian*, September 9, 2004.

<sup>337</sup> Nick Paton Walsh, "Chechen Rebel Leader Killed in Russian Assault," *The Guardian*, March 9, 2005.

<sup>338</sup> Ian Traynor, "Spurned by Putin, Rejected by Militants," *The Guardian*, March 9, 2005.

<sup>339</sup> Chamil Basaev promet de poursuivre le 'djidhad'," (Shamil Basaev Promises to Continue the 'Jihad'), *Le Monde*, March 9, 2005.

<sup>340</sup> Nabi Abdullaev, "Chechnya Ten Years Later," *Current History*, Vol. 103, No. 675, October 2004, pp. 332-336.

<sup>341</sup> Cited from "Chto govoril Vladimir Putin," ("What Vladimir Putin Said"), *Izvestiia*, September 10, 2004.

<sup>342</sup> For arguments to this effect, see Ariel Cohen, "U.S.— Russian Security Cooperation After Beslan," *Backgrounder*, No. 1809, October 25, 2004, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2004; and Mark N. Katz, "Eurasia Insight: Russia and America After Beslan," *Eurasia.org*, October 13, 2004. Putin was quick to define the Beslan assaults as acts of international terrorism, and he has held to this definition quite consistently. "M. Poutine accuse et s'explique sur sa 'guerre totale' au terrorisme," ("Mr. Putin Accuses and Explains His Position on the 'Total War' Against Terrorism"), *Le Monde*, September 7, 2004.

The Chechen conflict is not “frozen” in the sense that the term sometimes is used with regard to the latent conflicts in Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. There is nothing resembling a ceasefire and low intensity violence is chronic. On May 16 and 17, 2006, a shoot-out between authorities and a small group of insurgents in the city of Kizil-Yurt, Dagestan, left three dead; insurgents ambushed a Russian Army convoy in the village of Nikikhiti, Chechnya, killing five; and a car bomb attack attributed to the Chechen resistance in Nazran, Ingushetia, killed Deputy Interior Minister of Ingushetia Dzhabrail Kostoev and seven others.<sup>343</sup> The Nazran attack was described by a headline in *Izvestiia* as the possible beginning of “a new season of terrorism”—certainly a possibility given the region’s volatility.<sup>344</sup> But it remains the case that the Chechen authorities have not succeeded in controlling territory and creating a convincing alternative political regime. The assassination of Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov (elected under Russian auspices in May and October 2003) at the hands of the Chechen resistance in May 2004 was a blow to the policy of Chechenization, but his son Ramzan Kadyrov has stepped into the gap, the extent of violent resistance inside Chechnya has been drastically reduced, and the policy is alive. Escalation of the conflict into the volatile Northern Caucasus remains possible, not least because the region contains numerous flash points that provide dry tinder for provocation, but diligent governance and oversight can head off such worst-case scenarios.<sup>345</sup> Is the relative stabilization in progress inside Chechnya a “façade,” a Potemkin village whose artificiality eventually will be exposed?<sup>346</sup> It perhaps is not yet possible to answer the question with certainty. The Chechen conflict remains dangerous, not least as a possible source for future acts of catastrophic terrorism. In strategic terms, however, for the time being at least, it might be described as more of a nuisance than a source of dire preoccupation.

## **b. The Caspian Knot**

The saga of Caspian hydrocarbon reserves, already long, risks becoming endless. Over the past decade, assessments of the basin’s potential have ranged widely, from predictions of vast reserves destined to make the Caspian a new El Dorado, to pessimistic reassessments

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<sup>343</sup> C. J. Chivers, “Violence Flares in Russia’s Caucasus,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 17, 2006; and Andrei Riskin, “Sinkhronizatsiia terrora,” (“The Synchronization of Terror”), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, May 18, 2006.

<sup>344</sup> Aleksandr Stepanov, “Terroristy otkryvaiut novyi Sezon?” (“Terrorists Open a New Window”), *Izvestiia*, May 17, 2006.

<sup>345</sup> Musa Muradov, “Shamil’ Basaev poiavilsia bessledno,” (“Shamil Basaev Appears Without a Trace”), *Kommersant*, May 31, 2006.

arguing that production levels will likely be low and the impact on world energy markets marginal at best. In 1997 the United States was estimating proven reserves of 16 billion barrels of oil, and possible reserves of up to 200 billion barrels.<sup>347</sup> Such capacity would make the Caspian basin the third largest source of oil and natural gas reserves in the world, after Saudi Arabia and Russian Siberia, and a potential “third hub” for global demand well into the future.<sup>348</sup> The figures were compelling, and in a seminal public address on July 21, 1997, Strobe Talbott described the Caspian area, and entire southern flank of the Russian Federation, as a “strategically vital region” destined to become part of the Euro-Atlantic Community, which the United States could “not afford” to neglect.<sup>349</sup> Military analysts identified access to the Caspian as “a vital American interest” worth pursuing, if need be, with armed force.<sup>350</sup> The 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act defined the Caucasus as an “important geopolitical isthmus” in conjunction with its energy potential, and supported the effort to reconstruct a Europe-Asia transport corridor that would bypass Russia to the south.<sup>351</sup>

The estimates upon which such projects were constructed were criticized from the first, but with little effect.<sup>352</sup> More recent estimates (also disputed) have shifted direction dramatically. The region is now being described by some as a “strategically negligible” area whose long-term potential has been “deliberately exaggerated” by “a spectacular bluff,” with reliable reserves limited to 18-31 billion barrels.<sup>353</sup> No matter-the Caspian region has been elevated to the status of geopolitical prize, and it is a status that it will most likely retain.

Is it possible to come to some kind of reasonable, consensual estimate of the Caspian’s real potential as an energy hub? Several points of orientation can be mentioned. First of all, the sea has not been explored fully. The gap between proven reserves (modest) and full potential (potentially significant) cannot yet be fixed accurately. It, however, is clear that

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<sup>346</sup> Anne Nivat, “Ravalement de façade en Tchétchénie,” (“Renewal of Facade in Chechnya”), *Le monde diplomatique*, May 2006, pp. 6-7.

<sup>347</sup> Martha Hamilton, “The Last Great Race for Oil Reserves?” *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1998, p. H1.

<sup>348</sup> Robert V. Barylski, “Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 2, Spring 1995.

<sup>349</sup> Cited from [www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html).

<sup>350</sup> Major Adrian W. Burke, “A U.S. Regional Strategy for the Caspian Sea Basin,” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Fall 1999, p.213

<sup>351</sup> Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session, S. 579, March 10, 1999.

<sup>352</sup> Martha Brill Olcott, “The Caspian’s False Promise,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 11, Summer 1998, pp. 95-113; and Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The Real Geopolitics of Energy,” *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 110-112.

<sup>353</sup> Alec Rasizade, “The Great Game of Caspian Energy: Ambitions and Realities,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 7, No. 1, April 2005, p. 2.

although the Caspian may represent a meaningful source of energy supply, its potential does not approach that of the Russian Federation or Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Nonetheless, the basin contains strategically significant resources that can usefully supplement global supply in ever-tighter energy markets, are especially coveted as a potential reserve by a rapidly developing China, and are of special importance to regional states with limited economic prospects.<sup>354</sup> Access to the energy resources of the Caspian basin historically has been monopolized by the Russian Federation. Efforts to create a wider framework for access and distribution therefore make good strategic sense.

The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) main export pipeline (initiated on September 1, 2002, and opened in the summer of 2006), and a Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline (bypassing Russian and Iran) directed at the Turkish market, represent U.S.-led challenges to what was once Russia's nearly total control of access to Caspian resources.<sup>355</sup> More recently Washington has expressed interest in sponsoring a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) natural gas pipeline, with Indian participation, to draw natural gas resources onto world markets without reliance on Russia. These are competitive initiatives, but their impact has been diluted to some extent by the way in which regional energy markets have evolved. Russia retains considerable leverage and sufficient pipeline capacity to sustain export potential. The Tengiz-Novorossiisk pipeline, for example, is adequate to transport the significant oil reserves of Kazakhstan's Kashagan fields, and Russia's Blue Stream natural gas link to Turkey is likely to supply a dominant part of the Turkish market. Moreover, energy politics in the Russian Federation goes well beyond the politics of the Caspian. Russian production has increased considerably in recent years, energy revenues have become the essential motor of Russian economic revival, and Moscow uses its resource potential purposefully in pursuit of national interests.<sup>356</sup> In the larger picture of Russian energy policy, the Caspian "great game" is more like a sideshow. Secondly, declining estimates of potential have taken some of the urgency out of competitive angling for leverage and influence: "the Caspian basin does not constitute by itself an area of vital strategic interest for the West."<sup>357</sup> Nor are Western interests significantly threatened. Russian elites realize that the new Russia is not in a position to

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354Gawdat Bahgat, "Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region," *International Studies Perspectives*, No. 3, 2002, pp. 310-327.

355Sokhbet Mamedov, "Baku otviazalsia ot rossiiskoi trubny," ("Baku Cuts Loose from the Russian Pipeline"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, May 30, 2006.

356 Pepe Escobar, "The Gazprom Nation," *Asian Times Online*, May 26, 2006.

357 Rasizade, "The Great Game of Caspian Energy," p. 3.

dictate policy in the Caspian area, and that excessive pressure upon the region's new independent states is only likely to encourage defiance.<sup>358</sup>

Russia and the United States could choose to move toward a *modus operandi* that would allow both to address their most important interests in a non conflicting manner, at least insofar as the logic of economic advantage is made the decisive measure. Unfortunately, this is not the case at present. Russian sources assert that the flag follows commerce, and that U.S. policy in the post-Soviet space “will not be limited to uniting the region with the Western economic system, but will also include political and military cooperation and a high degree of readiness to strengthen and defend its position with the most resolute measures.”<sup>359</sup> U.S. policy indeed has focused on reducing the Russian and Iranian footprint in the region. The decision to build the BTC, in defiance of the best council of representatives of the oil and gas industry and in spite of the fact that an Iranian route would be economically the most efficient choice, has been described as a triumph of geopolitics with an essentially strategic rationale, and in that sense “a prominent success” for the U.S. policy of “creating an east-west transit corridor” intended to bind the Caspian region to the West.<sup>360</sup> As concerns the Caspian energy hub, the United States and Russia remain rivals for access and influence.

The absence of collaboration in the energy sector affects the larger U.S.-Russian strategic relationship throughout the Caucasus and Inner Asia. U.S.-Russian collaboration in the war on terrorism, originally focused on the elimination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has faded gradually as Moscow has reevaluated what the relationship stands to bring it. The closure of the U.S. military facility in Uzbekistan, and pressure to impose timelines for a U.S. withdrawal from Tajikistan, symbolize a turning of the tide. Both Washington and Moscow now are seeking to cultivate competing regional associations as sources of support. For years the United States has encouraged the development of the so-called GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova) organization as a counter to Russian domination of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). More recently, Moscow has attempted to reinforce the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO—

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<sup>358</sup> Iu. Fedorov, “Kaspiiskii uzul,” (“The Caspian Knot”), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 4, 1996, pp 82-96.

<sup>359</sup> E. V. Mitiaeva, “Razvitie situatsii v Kaspiiskom regione i interesy SshA,” (“The Developing Situation in the Caspian Region and U.S. Interests”), *SshA—Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul'tura*, No. 11 (359), November 1999, p. 21.

<sup>360</sup> Brenda Shaffer, “From Pipedream to Pipeline: A Caspian Success Story,” *Current History*, Vol. 104, No. 684, October 2005, p. 243.

Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan) as a collective security forum, and is considering the possibility of expanding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) toward South Asia, possibly to include Iran, Pakistan, and even India. The recent decisions by Uzbekistan to pull out of the GUUAM (now reduced to the acronym GUAM), the refusal of Kazakhstan to turn away from its privileged relations with Russia despite U.S. pressure, Russian refusal to cooperate with the diplomatic isolation of Iran in the context of the dispute over its nuclear programs, and generally improved Russia-China relations have all made clear that, in the greater Caspian area, Moscow still has significant policy levers at its disposal. These setbacks for the U.S. agenda, combined with continuing instability in Afghanistan, have encouraged a sharpening of American regional policy. In Lithuania and the Kazakh capital of Astana during May 2006, U.S. Vice-President Richard Cheney pointedly chastised Moscow for its purported attempt to use oil and natural gas as “tools of intimidation and blackmail” and urged the Central Asians to opt for pipelines to the West bypassing Russia.<sup>361</sup> Washington also has footed a “Greater Central Asia” initiative intended to bind post-Soviet Central Asia more closely to a South Asian region where the United States has greater leverage.<sup>362</sup> All of these moves and counter moves reveal the essentially competitive character of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the greater Caspian region. Business interests as defined by private enterprise rather than national strategic goals provide a promising foundation for cooperative and mutually beneficial development. But whether the market will be allowed to lead the way in the current competitive geopolitical environment is an open question.

### **c. The Southern Caucasus and its “Frozen Conflicts.”**

The three new independent states of the Southern Caucasus rank among the most troubled and instable to emerge from the Soviet break down.

*Azerbaijan.* Azerbaijan began its independent national existence in the throes of a war with neighboring Armenia. The outcome was the loss of control over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and a substantial part of Azeri territory (perhaps as much as 16 percent) providing a corridor of access between Armenia proper and Stepanakert. After some initial political instability, including a brief period of pro-Turkish government under Abulfaz Elçibey, in

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<sup>361</sup> Ilan Greenberg and Andrew E. Kramer, “Cheney Urges Kazakhs to Bypass Russia,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, 2006.

1993 power was assumed by Gaidar Aliev, a strange political hybrid who was a former member of the communist-era Brezhnev Politburo, a regional power broker with personal authority rooted in the clan structure of his native Nakhichevan, and ambitious oriental satrap, all rolled into one. Significantly tainted elections conducted in October 2003, followed by a wave of protests that were suppressed brutally, transferred the presidency to Gaidar's son, Ilham Aliev.<sup>363</sup> Parliamentary elections in November 2005, equally tainted, brought pro-government parties a large majority.<sup>364</sup> Politically, Azerbaijan is a prime example of a post-Soviet autocracy where a democratic façade only partially disguises the abusive control of a narrow ruling clique, in this case representing a familial clan with succession determined on the basis of primogeniture.

Geopolitically, Azerbaijan gradually has moved away from the Russian orbit toward closer relations with the West. Its oil and natural gas holdings, and prospects for substantial economic growth, make it an attractive partner, and the United States has pursued closer ties aggressively. Other regional powers with an eye upon Azeri energy holdings, including Turkey and Pakistan, also have been active courting favor. Turkey has sustained a special relationship with Azerbaijan since independence, grounded in linguistic and cultural affinity, as well as shared interests. The BTC, which binds Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, was designed specifically to advantage Azerbaijan and exploit its energy riches. After taking office in 2001, President George W. Bush moved quickly to use executive prerogative to repeal Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, which banned economic relations with Azerbaijan as a consequence of its policies toward Armenia. On the eve of the 2005 parliamentary elections, Bush spoke publicly of the possibility to “elevate our countries’ relations to a new strategic level.”<sup>365</sup> Already in 1999, Azeri Foreign Minister Vafa Guluzade had called for the United States and Turkey to take the initiative to create a NATO-run military base on Azerbaijan’s territory, and in 2002 Azerbaijan formally announced its candidacy to join the Alliance.<sup>366</sup> The United States enjoys over-fight privileges in the entire Southern Caucasus, and might be attracted by the possibility of basing facilities in Azerbaijan that would facilitate broader strategic access. Despite its

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<sup>362</sup> See the statements by Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs

<sup>363</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Azerbaijan: Government Launches Crackdown. After Election, Hundreds of Opposition Members Arrested,” Human Rights News, October 22, 2003, accessed at [www.hrw.org/press/2003/10/azerbaijan102203.htm](http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/10/azerbaijan102203.htm).

<sup>364</sup> Azerbaijan’s 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity, Europe Briefing No. 40, Baku/Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 21, 2005.

<sup>365</sup> Cited in Jackson Diehl, “An Oil-Rich Test for Bush,” The Washington Post, October 24, 2005.

<sup>366</sup> Guluzade Proposes Western Military Base in Azerbaijan,” Jamestown Foundation Monitor, January 19, 1999.

autocratic political regime and well-documented human rights abuses, Azerbaijan steadily has drawn closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.

There are significant problems with these kinds of scenarios for expanded integration. Azerbaijan is a corrupt and dictatorial polity. Windfall oil wealth by and large is being used to reinforce the status of a deeply entrenched and venal post-communist elite closely linked to the Aliev dynasty. Azeri oil production is expected to peak by 2010, and it is not clear that oil and natural gas revenues will be used with foresight to prepare the way for more balanced long-term national development. Azerbaijan usually is described as a moderate Islamic regime, but moderation is achieved at the price of severe repression of political Islam, as well as other oppositional tendencies. Moreover, true to the calculating and cautious policy crafted by Gaidar Aliev, Baku has sought to maintain some balance in relations between East and West. Moscow continues to operate a military station for radio monitoring and early warning in Gabala on Azeri territory. Azerbaijan has been a cooperative partner in the Russian campaign against Chechen terrorism. Its relations with the EU occasionally have been troubled by European criticism of violation of democratic norms and human rights standards, although Baku has welcomed the opportunities presented by the ENP. Baku's position inside the reduced GUAM organization cannot be taken for granted, given the more pronounced pro-Western orientation of its Georgian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan partners.<sup>367</sup> Azeri Defense Minister Safar Abiev has responded positively to a suggestion by his Russian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran pool their resources to create a multinational force to patrol the Caspian basin.<sup>368</sup> Azerbaijan is aware that the United States can be a fckle partner, and has sought to position itself accordingly. Ilham Aliev's state visit to Washington in April 2006 highlighted strategic cooperation, but the Azeri leader was careful to specify that Azerbaijan would not cooperate with any hostile actions toward its neighbor Iran.<sup>369</sup>

The most significant unresolved issue hanging over Azerbaijan's future is the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.<sup>370</sup> The Supreme Soviet of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region declared its intent to unite with Armenia in February 1988, and Armenia-Azeri

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<sup>367</sup> Aleksei Bausin, "Stolitsa GUAMa—Kiev," ("The Capital of GUAM - Kyiv"), *Izvestiia*, May 24, 2006.

<sup>368</sup> Sergei Blagov, "Russia Says 'Nyet' to Military in the Caspian," *Asia Times Online*, March 21, 2006.

<sup>369</sup> Sokhbet Mamedov, "Il'kham Aliev pytaetsia otvesti udar ot Irana," ("Ilham Aliev Tries to Defect the Blow from Iran"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, April 28, 2006.

<sup>370</sup> See Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*, New York: 2003, for background



friction subsequently became a significant source of tension, paving the way toward the Soviet collapse. On September 2, 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence, and between 1991 and 1994, with strong Armenian support, it prevailed in a bloody war that may have taken as many as 20,000 lives and produced more than one million internally displaced persons (IDPs).<sup>371</sup> A ceasefire has been in effect since May 1994, but, despite many attempts at mediation, the situation on the ground remains locked in place.<sup>372</sup> The reality is that for all intents and purposes, Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories have been integrated thoroughly into the Armenian Republic. Material circumstances inside the embattled enclave are difficult, and there has been a significant population exodus, but commitment to sustain independence appears to be undaunted. Azeri and Armenian soldiers in close proximity man the ceasefire line. There are regular freights and the constant danger of a local incident sparking wider violence. Azerbaijan refuses to compromise on the question of sovereignty or to rule out the option of retaking the enclave by force. Under the Alievs, it has sought to maintain its legal claims to the territory, defined as an integral part of the Azeri nation; sustain an intimidating military presence surrounding the enclave; and wait patiently while the influx of oil revenues make it stronger. With Western support, Azerbaijan currently is engaged in a significant force modernization program.

The balance of forces in the region gradually may be shifting to Azerbaijan's advantage, but there are good reasons why a renewal of military operations would not be in Baku's best interests. A flare-up of violence in the area could strike a serious blow at Azeri intentions to leverage its energy resources on world markets. The BTC pipeline runs close to the enclave and could be endangered by sabotage. Nagorno-Karabakh is supported financially by the large and prosperous Armenian Diaspora and thoroughly integrated with Armenia proper in economic terms. It is basically self-sufficient, thanks to the largesse of its metropolitan sponsor. Conquering and assimilating the territory would represent a major challenge, and could involve the Azeris in human rights abuses that would damage their international standing. The Armenian armed forces are powerful and probably still at least a match for their Azeri counterparts. Not least, Armenia's strategic alliance with the Russian Federation, and association with a more dynamic CSTO, offers a deterrent shield. Nagorno-Karabakh provides an excellent example of the way that Russia has been able to make use of separatist conflicts in the Caucasus region to further its own interests. U.S.

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<sup>371</sup> Arif Yunusov, "Statistics of Losses in the Armenian- Azerbaijani War," in *Karabakh Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*, Baku, 2002, pp. 20-22.

sponsorship for Baku has made the relevance of strategic alignment with Armenia all the greater, and the key to that alignment for the present is the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

*Armenia.* A massive earthquake struck Soviet Armenia in 1988, claiming over 25,000 victims, directly affecting more than a third of the population, and leaving ruin in its wake. Armenia successfully established independence in 1991 and won its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-94, but at a high cost. The shocks of natural disaster and regional war, the rigid blockade imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the disappearance of the traditional commercial framework once provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) administered body blows to the Armenian economy from which it has yet to recover.

Today Armenia is in the midst of an impressive economic revival, with annual growth rates of over 10 percent led by new sectors in construction, diamond processing, and tourism. It has a long way to go. Its population, greatly reduced by migration and demographically aging, remains massively impoverished. Armenia is landlocked between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and has access to world markets only through Georgia and Iran. Poor relations with its immediate neighbors leave it isolated in the region and excluded from all major regional development and pipeline projects. Popular dissatisfaction is high, and Armenia has struggled with a turbulent domestic political environment. The first president of independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was forced to resign in 1998 after releasing an open letter urging concessions toward Azerbaijan in search of a negotiated settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. His successor, Robert Kocharian, a hero of the war with Azerbaijan and subsequently president of Nagorno-Karabakh and Prime Minister of Armenia, came to office with the reputation of an uncompromising hawk. Kocharian was elected in 1998 and reelected in 2003. Both elections were seriously marred by vote fraud and condemned as such by OSCE monitors.<sup>373</sup> Independent Armenia has established a destructive tradition of political violence, including a string of unsolved assassinations. In 1999 an armed raid upon the Armenian parliament, with obscure motives that have never been satisfactorily clarified, resulted in the shooting death of eight people, including Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and Speaker of the Parliament Karen Demirchian. Kocharian has not hesitated to use force to repress dissent. The Armenian Diaspora (particularly devoted to the cause of

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<sup>372</sup> For a recent effort, see Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Europe Report No. 167, Tbilisi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 11, 2005.

Nagorno-Karabakh), the armed forces (well-equipped, highly professional, and 60,000 strong), and the Karabakh clan from which Kocharian derives are the essential pillars of his government. It is no secret that the open-ended Karabakh dispute, and the isolation to which Armenia has been consigned as a result, are important barriers to prospects for balanced development. But the Kocharian government is neither inclined nor well positioned to offer concessions. Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian repeatedly has asserted: “the Armenian army serves as a guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh security.”<sup>374</sup>

The ultimate guarantor of Armenian security, in view of its inherent fragility and substantial isolation, is strategic alliance with the Russian Federation. The Russian-Armenian relationship rests upon a long tradition of association between Christian civilizations confronting occasionally hostile Islamic neighbors. It was reinforced by the perceived role of Russia as protector of the Armenians following the genocide of 1915.<sup>375</sup> Since May 1992 Armenia has been associated with the CIS Agreement on Collective Security, it is a member of the CSTO, and is linked to Moscow by a bilateral Mutual Assistance Treaty. Russia maintains military forces at two sites within Armenia, and its forces engage in military exercises with their Armenian counterparts on a regular basis. The presence of Russian forces on Armenian soil has a powerful deterrent effect—for all intents and purposes any attack on Armenia would become an attack on Russia as well. So long as Azerbaijan holds out the possibility of a resort to force to recoup Nagorno-Karabakh, this kind of deterrent function will be relevant strategically. Russia is also in the process of establishing a more robust economic presence. Trade has increased exponentially, economic remittances sent home by Armenians working in Russia have become economically critical, and debt-for-equity swaps have made Russia an ever more important player on the Armenian domestic stage. Some see the trend as consistent with Anatoli Chubais’ theory of “liberal empire,” according to which economic presence is the real key to expanding political influence.<sup>376</sup>

Armenia has sought to balance the powerful Russian presence by developing ties with other partners, with limited success. The EU has become more active in Armenia since the signing of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1999, and in 2004 all of the states

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<sup>373</sup> See the OSCE’s Final Report on Presidential Elections in Armenia, February 19, and March 5, 2003, in [www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/04/1203\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/04/1203_en.pdf).

<sup>374</sup> Cited from “Karabakh Exercises Aimed at Keeping Peace-Armenian Defence Minister,” Armininfo, August 10, 2004, accessed at [www.armininfo.am](http://www.armininfo.am).

<sup>375</sup> Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005.

<sup>376</sup> “RAO UES Chief Sees Russia as Liberal Empire,” *The Russia Journal*, September 26, 2003.

of the Southern Caucasus became subjects of the ENP.<sup>377</sup> Recent polls have indicated some public support for a stronger European orientation, and inclusion within the ENP has encouraged improved relations with Brussels.<sup>378</sup> Yerevan has established a high level commission to explore avenues for cooperation, but there are strict limits, defined above all by strategic dependency on Russia, to how far rapprochement is likely to proceed.<sup>379</sup> Motivated in part by a powerful domestic Armenian lobby, the United States provides meaningful financial assistance, and in July 2004 the U.S. Congress approved a parity policy allowing \$5 million in military assistance annually to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia has reciprocated by sending a small contingent of doctors, truck drivers, and demining specialists to nearby Iraq. Yerevan cautiously has probed opportunities for improved relations with Turkey, without significant results. Iran, however, is emerging as a promising regional partner. For Teheran, also subject to regional isolation, Armenia offers a useful corridor of access to the Black Sea area and Europe.

These would-be partners see small and impoverished Armenia as the means to a variety of national ends. Washington is interested in enhanced stability along the BTC route, including, if possible, some kind of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey (the BTC route passes directly through the predominantly Armenian Javakh area inside Azerbaijan); an expanded NATO role in the Southern Caucasus (Armenia has been associated with the Partnership for Peace initiative since 1995); and cooperative efforts to contain the expansion of Iranian influence. The EU shares these goals. Ankara also should share them to some extent—the blockade of Armenia is one of many initiatives that will have to be put to rest if Ankara’s timetable for EU accession is to make progress. Iran is constructing a gas pipeline to supply the Armenian market, and its border with Armenia is a vital opening to the West. Good relations with Yerevan are useful to these ends. In no case, however, do the benefits that accrue to Armenia from relations with the United States or its regional neighbors, come close to matching the strong cultural affinity and strategic dependency that links it to the Russian north.

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<sup>377</sup> See the EU’s 2001 Armenia Country Strategy Paper in [www.eruopa.eu.int/comm\\_external\\_relations/ceece/pca/pca\\_armenia.pdf](http://www.eruopa.eu.int/comm_external_relations/ceece/pca/pca_armenia.pdf)

<sup>378</sup> “Poll Shows Armenians Prefer EU to CIS,” RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 7, No. 40, October 22, 2004, p. 4.

<sup>379</sup> “New Government Body to Coordinate Armenian Policy on the EU,” RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 7, No. 31, August 5, 2004, pp. 3-4.

*Georgia.* Georgia has been the most contested state of the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus.<sup>380</sup> The brief tenure of the ultra-nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia as President at the end of the Soviet period provoked a series of secessionist movements that resulted in declarations of independence followed by military defiance of the Georgian metropolitan state in Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Ajara district in the southwest also moved to proclaim a kind of de facto sovereignty. Ceasefires in 1994 brought the fighting to an end without achieving any resolution of underlying differences. In both Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia Russian peacekeepers continue to monitor disputed borders. Georgia insists on the premise of sovereignty, but is too weak to act decisively to reassert control. During the 1990s, the government of Edvard Shevardnadze was forced to tolerate the existence of the de facto states on Georgian territory against a background of precipitous national decline. Vote fraud in the election of 2005 led to the ouster of Shevardnadze as a result of pressure from the street in the much-touted “Rose Revolution.”<sup>381</sup> Subsequently, the new government of Mikheil Saakashvili has struggled, with mixed success, to navigate Georgia’s foundering ship of state, described by Dov Lynch as “a bankrupt, enfeebled, and deeply corrupt state, with no control over large parts of its territory and declining international support” for whom prospects “were bleak.”<sup>382</sup>

Saakashvili proclaimed the Georgian revolution to be the prototype for a “third wave of liberation” following in the wake of the collapse of European Fascism after World War II and the “Velvet Revolutions” that brought down European Communism from 1989 onward.<sup>383</sup> The ouster of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma as a result of popular protests with strong international support in the “Orange Revolution” of November-December 2004 seemed to lend the assertion some credence. Russia saw the events quite differently, as an overt use of American soft power to exploit dissatisfaction and impose pro-Western and anti-Russian regimes in areas where it had vital interest at stake. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov condemned the event dismissively (and not altogether inaccurately) as “the forced ouster of the current lawful president from office.”<sup>384</sup> In the wake of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, a serious blow to Russia’s interests, Putin advisor Sergei Yastrzhembskii put forward a conspiracy theory that interpreted the larger phenomenon of

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<sup>380</sup> Jonathan Wheatley, *Georgia From the National Awakening to the Rose Revolution*, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2005.

<sup>381</sup> Lincoln Mitchell, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” *Current History*, Vol. 103, No. 675, October 2004, pp. 342-348.

<sup>382</sup> Dov Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters*, Chaillot Paper No. 86, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2006, p. 22. Prior to 2003, Georgia was identified widely as a failing state. See Anatol Lieven, “Georgia—A Failing State?” *Eurasianet Magazine*, Eurasianet.org, January 30, 2001.

<sup>383</sup> M. Saakashvili, “Europe’s Third Wave of Liberation,” *Financial Times*, December 20, 2004.

“Colored Revolutions” as a manifestation of American grand strategy devoted to keeping Russia down: “There was Belgrade, there was Tbilisi; we can see the same hand, probably the same resources, the same puppet masters.”<sup>385</sup> Apart from any other effects, Georgia’s Rose Revolution opened a significant new front in the struggle for influence between the United States and Russia in the Caucasus.

Georgia always has been skeptical toward the CIS, wary of Russian intentions, and attracted to strategic partnership with Washington. Early in his tenure in office, Saakashvili went out of his way to articulate, in both Moscow and Washington, that a democratic Georgia would not become “a battlefield between Russia and the United States.”<sup>386</sup> But his actions have in some ways belied his words. The government born of the Rose Revolution clearly has established the strategic objective of reinforcing a special relationship with the United States and expanding cooperation with NATO.<sup>387</sup> Its orientation toward the EU is much less strong. Tbilisi has accepted the status of subject of the ENP without caveat and not forwarded the goal of eventual accession to the EU as forcefully as have, for example, the Central European states of Moldova and Ukraine. Its French-born Foreign Minister, Salome Zourabishvili, described Georgia as a European country “by default.”<sup>388</sup> Georgia presently is engaged in far reaching military-to-military cooperation with the United States, high points of which include the Georgia Train and Equip Program launched in 2002, and the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, underway since 2005. It is reforming and bolstering its armed forces under U.S. guidance.<sup>389</sup> Tbilisi concluded an Individual Partnership Action Plan to define guide-lines toward eventual accession to NATO in October 2004, and seeks to move forward to a Membership Action Plan with the possibility for accession as soon as 2008-09. Since March 2005, NATO has been granted the right of transit for military forces across Georgian land and air space. In 2005 a new National Military Strategy and the draft of a National Security Strategy were released that unambiguously assert Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic vocation and cite Russian policies as a primary threat to Georgian security.<sup>390</sup> Military cooperation with Turkey also has

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<sup>384</sup> Cited from an interview in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, December 4-6, 2003, p. 1.

<sup>385</sup> Cited from Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters*, p. 24, from an interview on RTR, Russia TV, Moscow, November 27, 2004

<sup>386</sup> N. Nougayrède, “La Russie s’inquiète du nouveau pouvoir en Géorgie,” (“Russia Becomes Concerned by the New Power in Georgia”), *Le Monde*, November 26, 2003.

<sup>387</sup> David Gudishvili, “NATO Membership as Georgia’s Foreign Policy Priority,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 4 (22), 2003, pp. 24-32.

<sup>388</sup> “Moscow Plays a Dangerous Game” *Time*, October 14, 2004, p. 14.

<sup>389</sup> David Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” in Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold, eds., *Statehood and Society: Georgia After the Rose Revolution*, Boston: The MIT Press, 2005.

<sup>390</sup> “National Security Concept Finalized,” *Civil Georgia Report*, May 15, 2005.

expanded, fueled by a shared interest in the security of the BTC and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline.<sup>391</sup>

The course of the Colored Revolutions in both Georgia and Ukraine has not run smooth. In 2004-05 the EU deployed its first-ever civilian Rule of Law mission under the aegis of the European Security and Defence Policy in Georgia, dubbed *EUJUST Themis*. The results may be described as modest. Georgia remains a deeply troubled polity struggling with entrenched corruption and systematic abuses of authority. The Saakashvili government has been criticized widely for authoritarian proclivities.<sup>392</sup> Its constitutional reforms have enhanced presidential prerogative, and earned round condemnation from the Council of Europe.<sup>393</sup> The economic situation remains dire, and the potential for social and political unrest high. Disintegrating relations with the Russian Federation, including punitive measures imposed by Moscow designed to up the ante for defiance (Russia has recently called for an increase in energy transfer prices, and imposed an embargo on the importation of Georgian wine, for example) do not bode well for Georgia's long-term stability.

Saakashvili has achieved some notable accomplishments. There is no doubt that Georgia's international stature has improved under his direction, and prospects for democratic development have improved. An accord of May 2005 committed Russia to withdraw its remaining two military bases from Georgian territory by December 31, 2007, a long-standing goal of Georgian diplomacy.<sup>394</sup> In May 2004, as a result of Georgian pressing, the defiant Ajara regional leader Aslan Abashidze was forced to flee the country, and, in July 2004, Ajara was peacefully reincorporated into the Georgian body politic.<sup>395</sup>

Georgia has made no comparable progress in coming to terms with the separatist states of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. The resumption of armed conflict in Southern Ossetia in

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<sup>391</sup> "Turkey Grants 1.5 Million Dollars to the Georgian Armed Forces," *Civil Georgia Report*, June 9, 2005; and Emmanuel Karagiannis, "The Turkish-Georgian Partnership and the Pipeline Factor," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 2004, pp. 13-26.

<sup>392</sup> Ghia Nodia, "Is Georgia Heading for a New Revolution?" *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*, Vol. 8, No. 31, September 10, 2005.

<sup>393</sup> A report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) describes Georgia as "a semi-presidential system with very strong powers to the President, basically no parliamentary opposition, a weaker civil society, a judicial system that is not yet sufficiently independent and functioning, undeveloped or nonexistent local democracy, a self-censored media and an inadequate model of autonomy in Ajaria." Council of Europe, Report of the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Georgia, DOC. 10383, December 21, 2004.

<sup>394</sup> For background, see Robert L. Larsson, "The Enemy Within: Russia's Military Withdrawal from Georgia," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2004, pp. 405-424.

<sup>395</sup> Saakashvili's Ajara Success: Replicable Elsewhere in Georgia? Europe Briefing No. 143, Tbilisi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 18, 2004.

August 2004, including harsh but ineffective Georgian military provocations, if anything, has made the situation worse. Under pressure as a result of U.S. inroads, the Russian Federation has become more committed to support for the status quo.<sup>396</sup> The separatist states are fragile, impoverished, and criminalized, but they have been in existence for more than a decade and are not likely to fold their tents any time soon. Georgia refuses to rule out the “Operation Storm” option of retaking its secessionist provinces by force, but it is not strong enough to contemplate such action. The United States has sought to discourage a resort to force, fearing the possible effects upon regional security and the integrity of the BTC.

Russia’s role in these secessionist conflicts perhaps sometimes is exaggerated. Moscow did not create the tensions that led to declarations of independence the conflicts are essentially about local issues and it is not in a position to resolve them unilaterally. Tbilisi, as has been the case with Baku in regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Chişinau with regard to Transnistria, has been reticent to address the legitimate grievances and sensitivities of the peoples in question. The Chechen question makes Russia loath to unambiguously support secessionist provinces. But mainstream evaluations note the weakness of the Azeri and Georgian states as significant barriers to reintegration, and describe Abkhazia and South Ossetia, no doubt realistically, as “de facto subjects of international relations.”<sup>397</sup> The ability to serve as external sponsor for the separatist states gives Moscow real leverage in the region. So long as the contest for Georgia is defined on both sides as a zero-sum struggle for influence, Russia’s motives, and policy priorities, are not likely to change.

### **3. The Great Game in the Caucasus**

The post-Soviet Caucasus has not succeeded in creating a functional regional security framework. Dov Lynch speaks, no doubt optimistically, of “a regional security system in formation.”<sup>398</sup> But there is little evidence of any kind of effective security interaction relevant to the needs of the region as a whole. Polarization along a fault line defined by great power priorities not related intrinsically to the interests of the Caucasus itself defines patterns of association in the security realm. The resultant polarization contributes to a

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<sup>396</sup> Or status-quo plus. The possibility of admitting Abkhazia and Transnistria into the Commonwealth of Independent States also has been suggested. Svetlana Gamova, “Gruziiu i Ukrainu zameniati v SNG Abkhaziia i Pridnestrov’e,” (“Abkhazia and Transnistria Replace Georgia and Ukraine in the CIS”), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, May 12, 2006.

<sup>397</sup> Gadzhiev, *Geopolitika Kavkaza*, (Geopolitics of the Caspian), p. 165

<sup>398</sup> Dov Lynch, *Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2004, p. 99.



perpetuation of division and conflict in an impoverished and unstable region that can ill afford the luxury.

Russia is engaged in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya that repeatedly has threatened to spill over into the larger Northern Caucasus region and into Georgia to the south. It sustains a military alliance with Armenia, keeps forces deployed in Georgia as well as the separatist states of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, and cultivates positive relations with neighboring Iran. Since the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Moscow's presence in Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia has expanded, and the dependence of the separatist entities upon Russian sponsorship has grown stronger. Azerbaijan and Georgia have cultivated the geopolitical sponsorship of the United States, and are linked militarily to the United States, Turkey, and key European powers, including Germany and the United Kingdom. Azerbaijan sustains a close relationship with neighboring Turkey, which joins it in imposing a costly boycott on Armenia. Georgia is pushing an agenda for NATO accession, with U.S. support. The pipeline politics of the Caspian basin remains a source of discord, with the United States and Russia sponsoring competing frameworks for access and market development. The EU increasingly has become engaged in the Caucasus region, but it has not established itself as an independent strategic partner.<sup>399</sup> The European agenda in the region remains broadly consonant with that of the U.S.-led western security community.

U.S. regional goals seem to be to contain Russia; isolate Iran; ensure some degree of control over the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian and develop alternative pipeline access routes; reward and sustain the allegiance of regional allies including Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan; open up the possibility of greater military access including possible basing rights; and reinforce regional stability and resolve the issues of Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh by encouraging their reintegration into the metropolitan states with some kind of guaranteed autonomy. More generally the United States seeks to project influence into a regional power vacuum with the larger goals of checking Russian reassertion, preempting an expansion of Iranian and Chinese influence, and reducing Islamist penetration. These are ambitious goals that will be difficult to achieve.

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<sup>399</sup> Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's Role, Europe Report No. 173, Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 20, 2006.

The Chechen insurgency threatens the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, and its containment has become tied up inextricably with the political persona of Vladimir Putin. The issue has major implications for Russian policy in the Caucasus since October 2003 Moscow has claimed the right to launch preemptive military strikes against terrorist organizations operating outside its territory.<sup>400</sup> The Islamic factor in the entire “arc of crisis” along the Russian Federation’s southern flank has serious security implications.<sup>401</sup> Russia has important investments and economic interests at stake in the region. Its commitment to the exploitation of Caspian basin oil and natural gas potential is considerable. The perception of U.S. and EU encroachment designed to detach the region from Russia and attach it to a putative Euro-Atlantic community is viewed as an assault on vital national interests. Russia consistently has defined the cultivation of a sphere of influence (in classic geopolitical terms) in the “Near Abroad” within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union as a national priority. The policies of Washington and Brussels have challenged that priority. The ENP speaks of a “shared neighborhood” (a phrase that Moscow rejects) on the EU and Russian periphery, and in effect seeks to cultivate the new independent states of Central Europe and the Southern Caucasus as the Near Abroad of the EU. The possible inclusion of Ukraine, in particular, in the NATO Alliance has the potential to significantly disturb the larger pattern of U.S.-Russian relations.<sup>402</sup> TRACECA has been described as an initiative whose goal is “the integral inclusion of the Southern Caucasus in the American sphere of control.”<sup>403</sup> American policy in the Caucasus is perceived as revisionist, actively seeking to change the geostrategic balance to Russia’s disadvantage<sup>404</sup>.

The Russian policy response seems to be to use its own instruments of soft power to reinforce dependency the “liberal empire”; to leverage support for separatist entities in Georgia and Azerbaijan; to cultivate relations with regional allies including Armenia and Iran; to stay the course in Chechnya in search of a medium-term solution based upon the Chechenization scenario; and to thwart Western designs where possible through a combination of incentives, punitive measures, and leveraging of local influence. More

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<sup>400</sup> Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” RIA Novosti, October 3, 2003, accessed at [www.rian.ru](http://www.rian.ru).

<sup>401</sup> I. V. Zhuravlev, S. A. Mel’kov, and L. I. Shershnev, Put’ voinov Allakha: Islam i politika Rossii, (The Way of the Warriors of Allah: Islam and Russian Politics), Moscow: Veche, 2004.

<sup>402</sup> See the interview with Director of the Institute for the United States and Canada Sergei Rogov in Artur Blinov, “Nestabil’noe partnerstvo Moskvyy i Vashingtona,” (“Unstable Partnership Between Moscow and Washington”), Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 31, 2006.

<sup>403</sup> [www.traceca.org.tr/](http://www.traceca.org.tr/)

<sup>404</sup> Valentin Fedorov, Rossiia: Vnutrennie i vneshnie opasnosti, (Russia: Internal and External Dangers), Moscow: OGIN Press, 2004, pp. 270-281

generally, Moscow seeks to frustrate U.S. and EU encroachment, to sustain its position as the *Ordnungsmacht* in a volatile neighboring region, to pursue its economic interests, to sustain the geopolitical status quo, and to contain and if possible defeat embedded terrorism. The way in which the United States and Russia are defining their interests in the Caucasus region is a recipe for protracted conflict.<sup>405</sup>

It is curiously at odds with the larger framework of interests that could be defining U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century. Indeed, U.S. and Russian interests on a global scale can be interpreted as largely coincidental. Both states identify Islamist extremism and catastrophic terrorism as primary security threats. Russia is now a fully converted market economy sustaining high growth rates with a strong vested interest in sound and stable global markets. As the world's largest (or second largest) oil producer and oil consumer respectively, Russia and America have a shared interest in regulating world energy markets to their mutual advantage. As the world's ranking nuclear powers, and the only countries in the world capable of attacking one another and wreaking major damage, they have a mutual interest in promoting nonproliferation and cultivating strategic stability. Both countries confront the dilemma of power transition, and the inexorable rise of a potential Chinese superpower, as a prime concern in the century to come.

The United States has no vital interests at stake on the Russian periphery, and U.S. engagement does not place Russian interests at risk. The enlargement of Western institutions such as the EU and NATO need not threaten Russia, toward whom they manifest no hostile intent. Enlargement, in fact, can be perceived as a beneficial contribution to regional stability so long (and this is a meaningful condition) as Russia itself is engaged positively. The NATO-Russia Council and EU-Russia Strategic Partnership represent steps toward positive engagement, albeit, for the time being, inadequate ones. Russia is not a predator bent upon subjugating its neighbors.<sup>406</sup> Its motives in the Caucasus region are oriented strongly toward warding off further decline and securing economic interests—the motives of “a status quo power that is no longer able to prevent or resist the rise of change.”<sup>407</sup> The ogre of Russian authoritarianism has been much discussed of late, but Putin's agenda for authoritarian modernization, linked as it is to

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405 Ilan Berman, “The New Battleground: The Caucasus and Central Asia,” *The Washington Post*, Winter 2004-05, pp. 59-69.

<sup>406</sup> It is so described in Minassian, “Security in the Southern Caucasus”, p. 781.

<sup>407</sup> Andrei Zagorski, “Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood,” in Dov Lynch, ed., *What Russia Sees*, Chaillot Paper No. 74, Paris: European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2005, p. 69.

the effort to recreate a strong and purposeful Russian state, need not be perceived as threatening or destabilizing. The widespread presumption that Putin's authoritarianism is tied to "the concomitant rise of an increasingly assertive, neo-imperial foreign policy" is just that, a presumption that may and should be challenged.<sup>408</sup> Russia's attempt to defend its leverage in strategically sensitive areas adjacent to its borders is in some ways no more than prudent. For the United States, whose regional presence is built upon the weak shoulders of political regimes in Azerbaijan and Georgia that are plagued by corruption, social unrest, and abuse of authority, the attempt to achieve more robust cooperation with a Russian regional partner in areas where interests overlap might be an option worth considering. Current trends are not positive, but they also are not irreversible.

The "great game" in the Caucasus is harmful to the interests of the region's peoples who, more than a decade after the Velvet Revolutions that swept away the communist past, remain trapped in a malaise of economic decline, quasi-authoritarian governance, widespread corruption, social demoralization, "frozen" local conflicts, and great power intrusion. Intelligent policy needs to think beyond the assertive, zero-sum framework that currently structures competition for regional influence, focused on the cultivation of local allies placed at odds with their regional neighbors, toward a mutual security model more appropriate to the real nature of the Russian-American relationship, more focused on the larger Caucasus regional security complex, and better adapted to addressing the real, human security imperatives that continue to make the Caucasus one of the more volatile and contested regions in world politics.

## **E. US -China Relations**

With Nixon's historic reconciliation with China in 1972, Sino-American relations were restored, and China moved from being regarded as America's most implacable enemy to being a friend and tacit ally.<sup>409</sup> After the Cold War the amount of Sino-American trade significantly increased. And China became USA's "strategic partner" during president Clinton's era.

The U.S. trade deficit with China has grown significantly in recent years, due largely to a surge in U.S. imports of Chinese goods relative to U.S. exports to China. That deficit rose

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<sup>408</sup> Berman, "The New Battleground," p. 59

<sup>409</sup> Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"*, Cambridge University Press, p.1.

from \$30 billion in 1994 to \$162 billion in 2004 (see **Table 1**). The U.S. trade deficit with China is now larger than that of any other U.S. trading partner, including Japan (\$75.2 billion), Canada (\$65.8 billion), and Mexico (\$45.1 billion). The U.S. trade deficit with China in 2004 was 30.6% higher than it was in 2003. During the first five months of 2005, the U.S. trade deficit with China was 34% higher than the same period in 2004 and averaged \$3.6 billion per week. In comparison the U.S. trade deficit with China for the entire year of 1989 was \$3.5 billion.<sup>410</sup>

While many Chinese have convinced themselves that U.S. power preeminence cannot last, they do grudgingly acknowledge the world system's current unipolar nature. This view represents a dramatic shift from the early 1990s, when many Chinese held out hope for a multipolar international system. To that end, Beijing deployed a strategy of resistance to American power that included elements of balancing—policies such as alliances of the weak that seek to counter the dominant power. During 1990s summits with Russian and other world leaders, Chinese sought and often produced joint declarations of opposition to “hegemonism” (read, U.S. power) and unipolarity.<sup>411</sup>

U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China are well known. For the most part, U.S. worries on the security front have revolved around the following four key issues. First, growing concerns that Beijing is prepared to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue “sooner rather than later,” based on a calculus that few in the west can claim to understand with any degree of certainty. Second, U.S. concern about Chinese proliferation behavior. Third, given the lack of defense transparency in China, uncertainties in the United States as to the intentions behind China's military modernization programs—conventional and nuclear. And fourth, questions in the United States as to whether China would like to see the U.S. Military pushed out of the Pacific, or at least pulled back. All of these issues are critically important to the regional security interests of the United States.<sup>412</sup>

The “U.S. factor” in the Chinese national security calculus is important than in the past. Over the past few years, Chinese security analysts view the new security policies of the United States with increasing alarm. Chinese see U.S. challenges to China's security

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<sup>410</sup> *Ibid*, p.5.

<sup>411</sup> Peter Hays Gries, *China Eyes the Hegemon*, *Orbis*, Summer 2005, p.406.

<sup>412</sup> David M. Finkelstein, *The View from Beijing: U.S.-China Security Relations from Kosovo to September 11, 2001*, pp.20-30.

interests vital or even survival. For Chinese government how to deal with the United States is the major foreign policy issue.

The rise of Beijing and the evolution of the balance of power in the Asia Pacific Region issue a challenge to the US leadership of security provisions in East Asia. A possible future conflict with China is emerging as a threat to the eyes of US military planners. In its latest planning document (called Joint Vision 2020), for the first time the Pentagon listed China as a potential adversary or a “peer competitor”.<sup>413</sup>

The war in Kosovo and the incident of the bomb fallen on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 seemed to have deteriorated the friendly sino-american relationship which, after Clinton’s trip in China in July 1998, had been described as a “strategic partnership”. The Chinese reacted harshly to the bomb fallen on its embassy in Belgrade. President Jiang Zemin for four days refused to answer to President Clinton who was calling to apologize.<sup>414</sup>

The Sino-US tension grew once more on April 1st 2001 when an American E-P3, a spy-plane crossing the Chinese territorial air space, crashed with a Chinese jetfighter. The Chinese pilot died, the American spy-plane was obliged to land on Hainan Island and the crew (24 members) was held as hostage.<sup>415</sup>

In spite of the peaceful solution of spy-plane crisis, the tension between China and US remained high. On April 25th 2001 the Bush Administration decided to sale arms to Taiwan in an unprecedented scale since 1979 (Table 2, p. 31). This decision reaffirmed a further pro-Taiwan policy of the US security. Beijing’s reaction was strong: “Taiwan belong to China, it is a rebel province not a protectorate of a foreign power”.

Some American writers believe that US-China conflict is inevitable. “The People’s Republic of China and the United States have become global rivals, countries whose relations are tense, whose interests are in conflict, and who face tougher, more dangerous times ahead”<sup>416</sup>

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<sup>413</sup> Maria Weber, Us-China: New Balance Of Power In East Asia After September 11th, Global Watch, no:22, October 2002, p.6.

<sup>414</sup> *ibid*, p.9.

<sup>415</sup> *ibid*, p.12.

<sup>416</sup> Bernstein, R. and R. Munro, **The Coming Conflict with China**, New York 1997, Knopf., p.3.

The Bush Administration plans to be much more forceful than its predecessor in strengthening military cooperation with its allies in the Asia Pacific. To ensure its uni-superpower position in the post-Cold War international system, the US will be more flexible in terms of global military intervention and will place any US interests before everything else.<sup>417</sup> As a matter of fact, the Bush Administration's diplomatic and defense policy indicates that the future US global security strategy will be a rerun of the Reagan Era, with a more active pursuit of the American Liberal hegemony. As a matter of fact, the Bush Administration's diplomatic and defense policy indicates that the future US global security strategy will be a rerun of the Reagan Era, with a more active pursuit of the American Liberal hegemony.<sup>418</sup>

#### **F. US Foreign Policy Aims With Regard To Russia**

The post-Cold War US perception of self, and its vision of the world, did not allow for the kind of bilateral relationship for which Russia was striving. American strategy was founded on "engagement and leadership abroad" and use of "all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to provide global leadership, and to remain a reliable security partner for the community of nations that share our interests."<sup>419</sup>

The US wanted to "engage" Russia and bring it closer to-but not into, at least for a time being-the American-led Euro-Atlantic community that was founded on common identity. This community was founded, first, on mature and stable liberal democratic systems and, second, on recognition of American leadership. For the US, Russia was not a very stable country, "in transition" from a communist past to a democratic future, and not a mature liberal democracy.

As many specialists and politicians are recognizing, relations between Russia and the United States are currently going through a serious crisis. And the US intervention in Iraq is not the only or even the most important factor. The problem for Russian-US relations today is that the political processes have moved far ahead of the economic processes.

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<sup>417</sup> *Bush is Offering Taiwan Some Arms but not the Best*, in «**The New York Times**», April 24, 2001, p.1.

<sup>418</sup> *Reappearance of Reagan Foreign Policy Under President Bush*, in «**United Daily News**», February 11, 2001, p.11.

<sup>419</sup> **A National Security Strategy for a New Century**, Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999, p.3.

Politically speaking, both countries have already declared themselves allies and furthermore not just in the fight against international terrorism but also in the building of a future, more stable, world. However, a single vision of the world presumes the existence of developed economic relations and active bilateral cooperation. The strategic partnership between the United States and Britain, for example, is based on the common interests of major British and US financial-industrial groups that assumed a transnational character a long time ago. There are only isolated strategic joint projects in Russian-US economic relations and at the moment they cannot replace the fact that the population keeps its savings in US dollars, for example. But the main thing is that the perception of Russian business within the US economic elite and particularly the political elite is marked by negative stereotypes.<sup>420</sup>

From another perspective Russia could not fit into the “enlarged” democratic space envisioned by Clinton era National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Lake - the architect of enlargement- firmly linked the expansion of democracy to NATO expansion. Countries like Russia, China, or India could not be easily “engaged,” and Western-dominated institutions could not readily “enlarge” to include these giants.

At the same time, smaller countries of the former Soviet Union, especially in Russia’s former Western borderlands, could be more naturally “engaged,” and the Western institutions could more easily be “enlarged” to these areas. The theoretical construct of a future Euro-Atlantic system suggested, for example, by Zbigniew Brzezinski could include only a confederated Russian state on the periphery of Europe. This state would be of “a loosely confederated Russia-composed of a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic.”<sup>421</sup>

Centralized Russia, therefore, was seen as a force that could obstruct the American goal of engaging Eurasia.<sup>422</sup>

## **1. US Russia Policy: Time To Put The Brakes On Democratic Reform**

The year 1989 was truly a watershed year in world history. The year started with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Throughout the year, Anti-Soviet

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<sup>420</sup> **Role of business in shaping future Russian-US relations viewed;** BBC Monitoring; Source: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 9 Apr 03, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/252-9.cfm>

<sup>421</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A *Geostrategy for Eurasia*,” **Foreign Policy**, 1997, Vol. 76, No. 5, p. 56.



demonstrations gained momentum throughout Eastern Europe, culminating with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November. The year ended with a superpower summit in Malta, where Soviet Chairman Mikhael Gorbachev and President George H. W. Bush declared an end to the Cold War.<sup>423</sup> By the end of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was officially dissolved. The archenemy of the United States was no more. In its place were 15 newly independent nations, including a federated, democratic Russian state led by President Boris Yeltsin. And as the iron curtain was lifted across Europe, 12 former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe also became truly independent nations.

President Bush hailed the end of the US grand strategy of Soviet containment, and developed a new theme, that of a new world order, an era of cooperation between the once antagonistic superpowers.<sup>424</sup> In his State of the Union Address to Congress in 1990, he articulated the optimism of the day: "It's time to build on our new relationship with the Soviet Union, to endorse and encourage a peaceful process of internal change toward democracy and economic opportunity."<sup>425</sup>

But through the ensuing years, this initial optimism and encouragement gave way to rising antagonism and distrust between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, the current National Security Strategy of the United States codifies this distrust a matter of record:

"Lingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our relations. Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern. Russia's very weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation."<sup>426</sup>

Although the National Security Strategy is committed to improving relations with Russia, US foreign policy has been insensitive to the Russian situation. In a remarkably short period of time, Russia has moved from a system of Soviet totalitarian government and

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<sup>422</sup> Ibid, p. 87.

<sup>423</sup> William E. Watson, *The Collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union*, ed. Randall M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), xix.

<sup>424</sup> Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, "The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1 2001, p.56.

<sup>425</sup> George H. W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union," Washington, D.C., 31 January 1990; available from [http://www.cspan.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current\\_event&code=bush\\_admin&year=1990](http://www.cspan.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=1990); Internet; accessed 5 December 2004.

Marxist economics to what our National Security Strategy describes as the “single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”<sup>427</sup> The tremendous challenges facing Russia today have been aggravated by the revolutionary pace of this reform. The United States has further aggravated these problems in many ways. This paper makes the argument that the United States should reassess its policies toward Russia, and toward reforming nations in general.

## **2. US/Russia Relations Since 1989**

Several key events account for the deterioration in US/Russia relations since 1989. It is instructive to look at these events from both the American and Russian viewpoints.

### **a. Marginalizing Russia In International Affairs**

The first real order of business in the post-Cold War world was German reunification. A main sticking point between the United States and Soviet Russia was NATO membership. Chairman Gorbachev initially insisted a reunited Germany must remain neutral, outside of the NATO alliance: “It means a historical enemy in a powerful rival alliance. It comes with no counterbalancing guarantees for our security.”<sup>428</sup> Gorbachev was under tremendous pressure not to concede on this issue. In fact, all of Russia’s political factions the communists, the nationalists, and the free-market reformers were in agreement that NATO membership for Germany posed a threat to Russian security.<sup>429</sup> In the West, however, the issue was looked at from quite another perspective. During the Cold War, Germany’s membership in NATO brought German military power into a subordinate relationship to NATO’s integrated military command structure, and solved the security dilemma that resulted in two World Wars.<sup>430</sup> Continued NATO membership would allay the fears of Germany’s neighbors, most notably France,<sup>431</sup> of a resurgent Germany with an independent

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<sup>426</sup>George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 17 Sep 2002), 27.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, p.37.

<sup>428</sup> Michael Parks, “The Kremlin’s ‘German Question’ Specter of Historic Foe Unified—and in Rival NATO—Rekindles Old Fears,” *Los Angeles Times*, 16 June 1990, sec. A, p. 3.

<sup>429</sup> Alexei K. Pushkov, “Don’t Isolate Us: A Russian View of NATO Expansion,” *The National Interest* (Spring 1997) [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 11 January 2005.

<sup>430</sup>Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (Winter 1990/1991): p.91.

<sup>431</sup>Jacob Heilbrunn, “Tomorrow’s Germany,” *The National Interest* (Summer 1994) [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 11 January 2005.

military establishment dominating Europe.<sup>432</sup> President George H. W. Bush, although willing to let the Germans themselves decide the issue, wanted Germany to remain in the western alliance.<sup>433</sup> In the end, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pushed for retention of NATO membership. Gorbachev acquiesced, after Kohl agreed to several concessions to pacify the strong opposition in the Russian Duma. Among these concessions were: Germany would not obtain nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; its armed forces would never exceed 370,000 troops; and Germany would finance East German debt to Russia.<sup>434</sup>

But unified Germany's membership was just the first step in NATO enlargement. No longer trapped behind the iron curtain, the former Soviet satellites were eager to establish tight bonds with the West. Their eagerness was motivated largely by the belief that Russia could revert to totalitarian rule with hegemonic ambitions at any moment.<sup>435</sup> Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and others aggressively sought NATO membership. It also became clear that Russia would not be invited into the alliance. NATO enlargement over Russia's objections led Russians to believe that the West was marginalizing their interests, and was no longer trying to work out post-Cold War European security arrangements on a collaborative basis.<sup>436</sup> Many in Russia viewed the West as striving to encircle and isolate them from the world community. George Kennan, the author of the US Cold War Grand Strategy of Soviet containment, called NATO expansion "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era."<sup>437</sup> Gorbachev's chief political opposition severely criticized any NATO enlargement as a serious threat to Russian security.<sup>438</sup> NATO attempted to mitigate Russia's fears through the Founding Act, which gave Russia a

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<sup>432</sup>Henry A. Kissinger, "Preparing for Two Great Challenges in Europe Alliances: Germany and a Resurgent Russia Will Pose Security Problems for Nations Between Them—A Redesignated NATO is One Answer," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 April 1993, sec. A, p. 2.

<sup>433</sup>Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 114.

<sup>434</sup>Tyler Marshall, "Soviets Agree to Germany in NATO Europe: Gorbachev and Kohl sweep Away the Final Barriers to Unification," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 July 1990, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>435</sup>Mark Webber, *Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 7.

<sup>436</sup>Darius Suziedelis, Jon Kessmeier, and Thomas Molino, *Europe, Russia, and the United States: Managing Disagreements, Building Consensus*, (Wilton Park, Sussex, England: Center for Global Security and Cooperation, 1999), 21.

<sup>437</sup>James M. Goldgeier, "The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO," *Brookings Review* (Summer 1999): 18 [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 22 January 2005.

<sup>438</sup>Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp.235-243.

consultative role in NATO. Personifying what Russians perceived as an anti-Russian bias in the West, former statesman Henry Kissinger severely criticized the Founding Act.<sup>439</sup>

During the Gulf War of 1991, although basically supportive of the actions proposed by the US-led coalition, the Soviet Russian leaders wanted a voice in the decision-making process, and were offended when this did not materialize. When informed, after the fact, which US troops were deploying to Saudi Arabia, an enraged Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze asked, “Are you consulting us or are you informing us?”<sup>440</sup>

But the biggest offense taken by Russia over American marginalization of Russian interests came with NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo. Russians wanted to pursue more negotiations with their traditional Serbian allies, and saw the action as a threat to Russia itself, which has similar ethnic enclaves clamoring for independence. The United States and NATO acted without first taking the matter to the UN Security Council. Russia’s reaction to the bombing of Serbia was severe. It pulled out of NATO military collaboration projects made possible by the Founding Act, delayed ratification of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and talked of restoring its strategic nuclear posture to provide a balance of power with a de facto hegemonic United States.<sup>441</sup> “In the Russian view, the entire system of consultative mechanisms established for dialogue with the West since 1991 collapsed following the unilateral decision to launch Operation ALLIED FORCE.”<sup>442</sup>

And finally, Russia vehemently objected to US Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Russia’s concerns were both economic and geo-political. Russia held \$8 billion in Iraqi debt, and Iraqi oil accounted for \$4 billion in Russian trade annually.<sup>443</sup> Iraq was a critical source of oil for Russia, and in addition to obtaining it through the UN oil-for-food program, Russia had been violating the UN embargo to obtain it.<sup>444</sup> President Putin voiced strong concern about the effect the war could have on the stability of the Islamic regions of Russia and its

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<sup>439</sup> Tom Carter, "Kissinger Criticizes NATO-Russia Deal: Could Lead to 'Dysfunctional' Alliance," *The Washington Times*, 31 October 1997, p. 15 [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 11 January 2005.

<sup>440</sup> Miller and Yetiv, p.56.

<sup>441</sup> Suziedelis, Kessmeier, and Molino, p.3.

<sup>442</sup> *Ibid.*, p.21.

<sup>443</sup> Oleksandr Gladkyy, “American Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations with Russia and China after 11 September,” *World Affairs* 116, no. 10 (Summer 2003): p.3.

<sup>444</sup> Roberto Suro and Guy Gugliotta, “Navy Prepares to Move Russian Tanker to Port,” *The Washington Post*, 5 February 2000, sec. A, p. 16.

bordering former Soviet republics, as well as America's disregard for Security Council opinion.<sup>445</sup>

## **b. Economic Pressure And The Imf**

Economic reform in Russia has been a very rocky road. Virtually all Russian industry was owned and run by the state. The Soviet state was essentially bankrupt after 70 years of mismanagement, and failed social and economic experimentation. The wreckage of the Soviet economy caused a debate about whether the West should implement a new "Marshall Plan" to provide economic stability as it did for Western Europe after World War II,<sup>446 447</sup> but Kissinger and others argued against it.<sup>448</sup> Chairman Gorbachev acknowledged the dire state of the Soviet economy, and appealed for Western aid to implement his agenda of political, economic, and social reforms.<sup>449</sup> In the end, the West did not react to Chairman Gorbachev's appeal. According to Martin Walker, Editor-in-Chief of United Press International and that organization's former Moscow Bureau Chief, "The West's collective failure to do for its adversary in the Cold War what the United States alone achieved for Western Europe, Germany, and Japan after World War II is the greatest disappointment of the past decade."<sup>450</sup>

Along with the pressure to go it alone without Western aid, the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed for fast privatization of huge enterprises such as the gas, oil, and telecommunications industries. However, without a regulatory agency such as the US government's Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), very few controls were placed on the Russian privatization process, and the result was bribery, corruption, and ultimately economic disaster. A small, corrupt class of oligarchs soon controlled nearly 50 percent of Russia's assets.<sup>451</sup> Mismanagement of investment and monetary reform led to

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<sup>445</sup> Brandon Mitchener and Jeanne Whalen, "France and Russia Signal Opposition To Postwar Plan—Chirac Says Rebuilding Of Iraq Must Be U.N. Job; Putin Warns of Instability," Wall Street Journal, 24 Mar 2003, sec. A, p. 15.

<sup>446</sup> Michael McFaul and Tova Perlmutter, eds., *Privatization, Conversion, and Enterprise Reform in Russia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 162.

<sup>447</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, "Europe: Trying for Thatcherism in Poland," Wall Street Journal, 31 October 1998, p. 1.

<sup>448</sup> Shlomo Maital and Ben-Zion Milner, "Russia and Poland: The Anatomy of Transition," *Challenge* 36, no. 5 (1993) [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 20 December 2004.

<sup>449</sup> Michael Parks, "Gorbachev Appeals for Massive Western Help Soviet Union: He Says It's Vital to Ensure the Success of Reforms and to Tide the Nation Through the Next 2 Years," Los Angeles Times, 27 July 1990, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>450</sup> Martin Walker, "Europe's Existential Crisis," *The Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 2001): 30 [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 22 January 2005.

<sup>451</sup> Marshall I. Goldman, *The Privatization of Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 2

26-fold inflation in 1992; most Russians lost their life savings and the poverty level rose to 38 percent.<sup>452</sup> Lack of institutional economic buffers contributed to the Russian stock market crash of 1998, with stocks losing 90 percent of their value.<sup>453</sup> By one account, 60 million Russians live in poverty today, versus 2 million in Soviet Russia, and male life expectancy has dropped from 65 to 57 years.<sup>454</sup> Russia's GDP fell 40 percent between 1991 and 1998.<sup>455</sup> Many in Russia feel the blame lies primarily with the IMF, backed by US pressure to accelerate free-market reforms.<sup>456</sup> This opinion is also shared by at least one American analyst.<sup>457</sup> The Clinton administration, in its sixth year, started backing off of many of the economic reform demands, but by then many Russians believed the United States was behind the economic ruin of their country, and more than half of young Russians thought Western assistance was motivated by increasing Russia's dependence on the West.<sup>458</sup> Recently, President George W. Bush renewed the harsh criticism of Russian economic reform and the attempts by President Putin to reel in the oligarchs.<sup>459</sup>

### **c. Internal Security**

The economic problems fanned the flames of organized crime. The mafia dominates Russian business and industry,<sup>460</sup> and Russians, already conditioned to distrust the excesses of capitalism, have become even more wary of free-market reform. In 1993, Russia's Chief Justice railed against the rapid economic reform, warning the country was fast turning into a mafia state.<sup>461</sup> Government and law enforcement officials were known for taking bribes.<sup>462,463</sup> The government was so cash-strapped that it couldn't pay the Russian military, which started making threats.<sup>464</sup> Russian soldiers could be found begging and stealing. Understandably, the readiness rate of the Russian military plummeted, and

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<sup>452</sup> Ibid.p.3

<sup>453</sup> Ibid, p.12

<sup>454</sup> Boris Kagarlitsky, "Testimony to the House Banking Committee on the IMF and the Russian Economy," 10 September 1998; available from <<http://www.cepr.net/IMF/kagarlit.htm>>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2004.

<sup>455</sup> Goldman, p. 200.

<sup>456</sup> Kagarlitsky,p.15

<sup>457</sup> Goldman, p.208

<sup>458</sup> Thomas W. Lippman, Madeline Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 231.

<sup>459</sup> Peter Slevin and Peter Baker, "Bush Changing Views on Putin; Administration That Hailed Russian Leader Alters Course," The Washington Post, 14 December 2003, sec. A, p. 26.

<sup>460</sup> Goldman, p. 210

<sup>461</sup> Lynn D. Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, Property to the People: The Struggle for Radical Economic Reform in Russia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p.133.

<sup>462</sup> Paul Felgengauer et al., "Rokhlin Charges Major Corruption in Military," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 48, no. 27,Columbus: 31 July 1996, p. 14.

<sup>463</sup> Kim Murphy, "Russia May Pay for Bribes in Lives; After Alleged Payoffs in Passenger Jet and School Tragedies, Corruption has a More Sinister Air," Los Angeles Times, 8 November 2004, sec. A, p.1.

Russian national pride suffered through several embarrassing failures in military operations: the Kursk rescue during which the Russian military was incapable of doing anything yet too proud to ask for foreign assistance until it was too late;<sup>465</sup> the bloody insurrection in Chechnya; the botched rescue of hostages held in a Moscow theater by Chechnyan terrorists, during which Russian authorities used an ostensibly non-lethal gas which killed 117 hostages;<sup>466</sup> and finally the Beslan school terrorist incident where 405 out of 1220 hostages were killed in the crossfire between the terrorists and Russian authorities.<sup>467</sup>

Russia considered the move against the Chechnyan insurrection an internal security issue and a needed anti-terrorist measure, and no business of anyone outside Russia. However, the US State Department and the European Union harshly criticized Russia's handling of the action, pushing for outside mediation and accusing Russia of excessive use of force.<sup>468</sup> -  
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In the wake of the Beslan horror, President Putin instituted a wide-range of measures to increase security, including strengthening anti-corruption laws and consolidating national security and anti-terrorism forces.<sup>470</sup> These measures were similar to those implemented by the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001. President Putin also suspended popular election of the governors of Russia's recalcitrant autonomous republics. Instead he will now nominate them for approval by the local legislatures.<sup>471</sup> In the Russian view, the move was a necessary step to restore security in the long-term evolution of Russia's democratic reform.<sup>472</sup> But the Bush administration interpreted this

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<sup>464</sup> Goldman, p.5

<sup>465</sup> Kursk Disaster May Accelerate Military Reform," OxResearch Analytica 18 August 2000 [journal on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 12 December 2004.

<sup>466</sup> Peter Baker, "Russia Defends Actions Taken in Theater Siege; No Regrets About Use of Gas or Secrecy," The Washington Post, 1 November 2002, sec. A, p. 30.

<sup>467</sup> Peter Baker, "After School Siege, Russians' Grief Turns to Anger," The Washington Post, 12 October 2004, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>468</sup> Jane Perlez, "Talk by Putin Skips the War, But Albright Reminds Him," New York Times, 2 February 2000, sec. A, p. 5.

<sup>469</sup> United States-European Union summit statement on Chechnya," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 35, no. 50 (20 December 1999): 2632 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 5 November 2004.

<sup>470</sup> Kim Murphy, "Russia May Pay for Bribes in Lives; After Alleged Payoffs in Passenger Jet and School Tragedies, Corruption has a More Sinister Air," Los Angeles Times, 8 November 2004, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>471</sup> Guy Chazan, Greg White, and Carla Anne Robbins, "Citing Terror Fight, Putin Seeks Political Overhaul; Russian Leader's Proposals Would Consolidate Power, Stoking Critics' Concerns," Wall Street Journal, 14 September 2004, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>472</sup> Vlad Sobell, "Putin's Political Reforms Need Not be Viewed as Anti-Democratic," Center for Defense Information; (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 5 November

action as a serious threat to democratic reform, and criticism came from both the State Department and President Bush himself.<sup>473</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> Mike Allen, "In Rare Rebuke, Bush Faults Putin's Moves to Centralize Power," *The Washington Post*, 16 September 2004, sec. A, p. 28.



#### **d. Prerequisites For Freedom, Democracy, And Free Enterprise**

In searching for a less antagonistic approach toward Russia and its reform, it is useful first to examine the work of political philosophers concerning the purpose of government and those factors that promote successful democratic reform.

#### **e. Checks And Balances**

Democracy is no panacea. From its beginnings in ancient Greece, scholars have warned against its excesses. Plato did not believe ordinary citizens should have a hand in state affairs, as they were not qualified; it should be left to professional “Philosopher-Kings” to rule. His convictions resulted from the trial of his mentor, Socrates, who was sentenced to death by a democratic jury.<sup>474</sup> Plato’s student Aristotle believed that under ideal conditions, the best type of government was an aristocracy of the nation’s most virtuous citizens.<sup>475</sup> Concerning democracy, Aristotle preferred a hybrid of oligarchy and democracy called *politeia*. Politeia was democracy with a set of measures implemented to protect the minority, especially the educated, wealthy class, who had the most to offer society, and likewise the most to lose if the poor, uneducated majority organized against them.<sup>476</sup>

Thus the Greek masters understood that unchecked, democracy can devolve into mob rule. This was manifestly evident in the French Revolution of 1789, where the monarchy was overthrown, but the republic that replaced it very soon devolved into one of the most despotic terrorist regimes in recorded history. In the long run, it set the stage for democratic reform throughout Europe, but in the short-term, it set the conditions for Napoleon’s rise to imperial autocratic power. If not managed properly, democracy can create a chaos that makes autocracy very attractive by comparison. Effective checks and balances are essential.

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<sup>474</sup> Simon Goldhill, “Of the People, By the People,” in *The Ancient World*, (Washington, D.C.: US News and World Report, 2004), p.30.

<sup>475</sup> Timothy A. Robinson, *Aristotle in Outline*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995, p. 99.

<sup>476</sup> *Ibid.* p. 100

In the American experience, the founding fathers built on the lessons of history to set up a representative constitutional democracy a federal republic with an elaborate system of checks and balances to prevent devolution into mob rule or autocracy. The US system of checks and balances serves to prevent too much power from being wielded by the executive or the legislature. The legislature makes laws and limits the power of the executive. The executive holds veto power over the legislature. The judiciary limits the law-making power of the legislature by interpreting the constitution, protecting the constitutional rights of the minority from the majority, and vice-versa.

In contrast, Russia has a weak system of checks and balances. There is weak accountability of politicians to the electorate, as evidenced by the fact that the President, Prime Minister, and Duma have yet to be chosen in the same way in successive changes of government. Additionally, the Duma has been incapable of holding the president and ministers accountable.<sup>477</sup>

#### **f. Security And The Rule Of Law**

Throughout the ages, political philosophers such as St Augustine, Luther, Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, wrote that a government must first provide safety and security, with justice and freedom relegated to secondary concerns.<sup>478</sup> In an anarchic international system, the state must provide basic security and prosperity or risk its survival, and a democratic government is no exception. Kenneth N. Waltz, in his synthesis of historical thought in political philosophy, “Man, the State, and War,” concludes:

In times of relative quiescence the question men put is likely to be: What good is life without justice and freedom? Better to die than live like a slave. In times of domestic troubles, of hunger and civil war, of pressing insecurity, however, many will ask: Of what use is freedom without a power sufficient to establish and maintain conditions of security? ...If the alternative to tyranny is chaos and if chaos means a war of all against all, then the

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<sup>477</sup> Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), xiv.

<sup>478</sup> Kenneth L. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War, a Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p.12

willingness to endure tyranny becomes understandable. In the absence of order there can be no enjoyment of liberty.<sup>479</sup>

And while justice and freedom may be secondary as basic concerns of people and states, they are by definition essential to achieving “the single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”<sup>480</sup> Both justice and freedom imply the rule of law as an additional prerequisite to successful democratic reform. Freedom and liberty are often used interchangeably, but the concept of liberty entails those freedoms exercised by the people and supported by their government. Thus whatever liberties a people, or class of people within a society have accrued, the state cannot guarantee those liberties if there is an absence of basic law and order. And as the 17<sup>th</sup> Century British philosopher Hobbes pointed out, complete freedom cannot be achieved in a secure society—citizens must do without certain liberties if they are to enjoy any freedom at all.<sup>481</sup>

Russia’s current security situation is dire, and the rule of law is virtually absent. Economic collapse, terrorist threats, and organized crime are huge destabilizers. Additionally, Russia has tremendous geopolitical challenges. The Russian federation of today is the vestige of a vast empire, held together historically only by a string of strong-handed totalitarian rulers from the Czars to the communists. Russia does not have a homogeneous culture. It is a patchwork of 21 republics, 49 oblasts, 6 krais and 10 okrugs within the federation, many of which represent ethnic enclaves with aspirations for self-determination, such as the Chechnyan Republic.

Controlling borders and conflict is a huge challenge. While the United States borders two peaceful nations, Russia borders 13, many of which have serious security problems of their own which affect ethnic groups within the Russian Federation. For example, the instability of Georgia’s province of Southern Ossetia regularly permeates Russia’s Republic of Northern Ossetia. Many of these autonomous regions are taking advantage of the disorder in Russia to challenge Russian sovereignty,<sup>482</sup> which has grave economic implications for Russia since much of its natural resources, including vast oil reserves, lie in these regions.

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<sup>479</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>480</sup> George W. Bush

<sup>481</sup> Waltz, 85.

<sup>482</sup> Maital and Milner.

Beyond the security issues facing Russian citizens daily, the Russian government itself was almost toppled three times since the reforms began. In 1991, a coup by Soviet hard-liners was unsuccessful in deposing Mikhail Gorbachev and his agenda of reform. In 1993, Boris Yeltsin survived an armed coup, including a tank attack on the Russian Parliament building.<sup>483</sup> And finally, in 1996, the Communists were nearly elected back into power. Only a last-minute alliance between Yeltsin and the oligarchs prevented reversion to a Soviet state. In return for their support, Yeltsin gave seven of the oligarchs the inside track on state divestiture of some natural resources, businesses, and media facilities.<sup>484</sup> Thus Yeltsin had to compromise democratic and free market reforms to save their framework.

And finally, most Russian officials grew up with the cronyism of the corrupt communist political system. According to Marshall Goldman's analysis, because of this culture, neither the government nor the business sector in Russia respects the rule of law.<sup>485</sup>

#### **g. Prosperity**

In a free society, prosperity aids in establishing the rule of law. Without substantial middle-class wealth, the people do not have a stake in the social order, and will not demand the rule of law in their leaders. "Laws alone, without public pressure to enforce them, will seldom be effective."<sup>486</sup> Again, Russia's situation is dire. Russia lacks prosperity. The economy has shrunk since the fall of the Soviet Union. Goldman concludes that economic reform in Russia will not progress until an independent middle class develops.<sup>487</sup>

#### **h. Consensus Of Democratic Political Parties**

Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister set out one additional criterion for stable democracy: the absence of major anti-democratic political parties.<sup>488</sup> This factor correlates closely to the others. If a democratic government does not have appropriate checks and

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<sup>483</sup> Goldman, 23.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid., pp.1-2.

<sup>485</sup> Ibid., p.210.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid.,p. 10.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid., p.221.

<sup>488</sup> White, Rose, and McAllister, xiv.

balances, and cannot provide adequate security and prosperity for its citizens, the people will seek alternative forms of government.

Russia fails here too. Some of Russia's major political factions are in fact quite anti-democratic, and with the apparent failure of democratic and free-market reforms, these parties are gaining in strength. The government has been so ineffective that half of all Russians believe democracy is not compatible with Russian tradition, according to a 1995 poll.<sup>489</sup>

The Soviet system allowed only one political party, and elections were simply charades to showcase universal support for communism to the rest of the world. With the Communist Party still the only legal party in 1991; the ballot in Soviet Russia's first truly free election was a slate of individuals, without political party affiliation. Based on an aggressive agenda of democratic reform, Boris Yeltsin won a clear victory, getting 60 percent of the national vote in a field of six major candidates.<sup>490</sup> Political parties developed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its prohibition on dissenting political parties. Worsening economic and security conditions increased support for the anti-democratic parties. Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 showed significant support for the communists and the nationalist parties,<sup>491</sup> and the communists came close to winning the presidential election of 1996. A victory in the polls by either element could mean the quick termination of Russia's bold democratic experiment.

All these shortcomings in Russia's profile for free-market democracy need time to correct one cannot create a democracy over night. History is full of examples of democratic reform failing for lack of the prerequisite factors outlined above. The French Revolution, discussed earlier, is perhaps the prime example.

### **i. Revolutionary Reform Failures**

Russia itself was a fledgling democracy between the February and October revolutions of 1917. The inability of the short-lived Kerensky Republic to maintain security and

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<sup>489</sup>Ibid., xiii.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid., xxxix.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid., xii.

economic prosperity paved the way for the October revolution with the Bolsheviks seizing power.<sup>492</sup>

After World War I, radical democratic reform was imposed on Germany by the victorious allies. Germany's Weimar Republic existed from 1918 to 1933. The middle class was largely destroyed by the worldwide depression, the economic drain of war reparations dictated by the terms of the armistice, and the French occupation of the Ruhr industrial area in 1923. The economic chaos that ensued set the stage for Hitler's rise to power, restoring apparent security and economic prosperity for most Germans. The stark analogy between the Weimar Republic and Russia today has already been made.<sup>493 - 494</sup>

There are many similarities between the Russian situation and that of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Like Russia, Yugoslavia was a federation of republics built along ethnic lines. In Russia, this federation was held together by the czars, then the communists, through totalitarian rule. In Yugoslavia a succession of rulers—the Ottoman Turks, the Austro-Hungarian Hapsburgs, a brief inter-war authoritarian monarchy dominated by Serbians, and the Cold-War period dictator Marshall Jozep Broz Tito—also dealt with internal security turmoil through authoritarian rule. Tito died in 1980, and communist control of the country slowly gave way to ethnic nationalist polarization by the early 1990s. Both Russia and Yugoslavia had modest middle classes, which were soon decimated—in Russia due to poor economic planning and in Yugoslavia due to deliberate severing of the trans-Yugoslavian economic ties that brought a measure of prosperity under Marshall Tito. In Yugoslavia, law and order deteriorated. The result was a series of civil wars as Serbia tried to strengthen the federation and Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia moved towards independence. Writing in 1994, Stevan Pavlowitch echoed the cautions of Plato and Aristotle, decrying “The Barbarity of Tribal Majority Rule.”<sup>495</sup> While the breakup along ethnic lines may have been inevitable, he stated that the violence was not, had the West understood the complexity of the situation. His assessment of Yugoslavia is just as relevant to Russia

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<sup>492</sup> Maital and Milner.

<sup>493</sup> Martin Sieff, "Assassination Stirs Fear of Weimar Era in Russia," *The Washington Times*, 29 November 1998, p. 6 [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 21 December 2004.

<sup>494</sup> Mark Medish, "Russia: Lost and Found," *Daedalus* 123, no. 3 (1994) [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 23 December 2004.

<sup>495</sup> Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Who Is 'Balkanizing' Whom? The Misunderstandings between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West," *Daedalus* 123, no. 2 (1994) [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 21 December 2004.

today: “where forty years of communism had prevented both a critical study of the past and a political discussion of the future, there is no political culture. With no understanding of politics, people look for the simplest (and the most dangerous) explanations: conspiracies, love, and hate.”<sup>496</sup> The ethnic fault lines in the Russian Federation, coupled with the lack of a substantial middle class with a political culture, is likewise leading to a resurgence of nationalism among Russia’s ethnic groups, which could easily result in conflict and Balkanization.

#### **j. Evolutionary Reform Successes**

By contrast to the historical examples of failures in implementing revolutionary reforms, historical and contemporary examples of slower, evolutionary transitions to democracy and free-market economics underscore the need to take it slow.

The American Revolution was not so much a revolution as one step along America’s evolution toward the three pillars enshrined in freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. Unlike the citizens of the French Revolution, the Weimar or Kerensky Republics, Yugoslavia, or contemporary Russia, the American colonists were not starting from scratch. Many of the factors for successful reform were well entrenched in colonial society before the Declaration of Independence. First, there was already a large, prosperous middle class of merchants with a high stake in independence from British taxes. Second, the American colonies, part of the mercantile British Empire, already had a strong tradition of free enterprise. Third, although the colonists were denied many of the freedoms British subjects enjoyed in England, the British system of parliamentary democratic government was well established by 1776, and part of the culture inherited by the colonists. And finally, the framers of the new republic had studied other democratic societies intensely, and set up an intricate system of checks and balances to prevent abuses. These factors helped ensure the success of the American adoption of more freedom for its citizens, and democratic government without a monarch. And beyond all those positive factors, none of which Russia has, George Washington established the most important norm for the Executive Branch when he declined the overtures of many to grant him autocratic powers in those troubled times.

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<sup>496</sup> Ibid.

The former Soviet-block Eastern European states took various paths to reform, and those that chose a less revolutionary pace have outperformed the others. Czechoslovakia was very aggressive, but got ahead of its ability to regulate privatization of government-controlled industry. A risky voucher system for financing privatized industries went awry, derailed by a greedy opportunist who made off with 200 million dollars and set back reform several years.<sup>497</sup>

Poland's program was the most successful for several reasons. First, it managed to resist the collectivization of its farms while under Soviet influence,<sup>498</sup> and in defiance of the Soviet government had been implementing some other free-market reforms since 1982.<sup>499</sup> So its agricultural and business sectors already had a modest tradition of free enterprise. Second, there was much internal debate and thought put into just how to privatize effectively. Poland's privatization program was structured from the start to prevent favoritism, corruption, mafia influence, and monopolies from controlling too much. And third, under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush, the United States initially encouraged a slow pace of reform in Poland to avoid chaos.<sup>500</sup> Resisting later IMF pressure, Poland proceeded deliberately and gradually.<sup>501</sup> Poland's reform planning is now held up as a model. It was the only former Soviet-block nation to achieve positive GNP growth every year from 1992 to 2000.<sup>502</sup> Poland's success was all the more remarkable for having concurrently dealt with additional economic pressure from both the European Union and NATO, to meet their membership standards. Poland spent \$15.7 billion to meet NATO standards alone.<sup>503</sup>

China is perhaps the best example of evolutionary democratic and free-market reform. China's controlled free-market reform program dates back to 1972, and is slowly creating a large middle class. This middle class is clamoring for more and more democratic reform. Despite the brutal 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, in which up to 500 student demonstrators were killed, this event, ironically, highlights some positive trends. The

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<sup>497</sup> Goldman, p.199

<sup>498</sup> Ibid.,p. 201.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid., p.200.

<sup>500</sup> David S. Broder, "Playing a Subtle Hand," The Washington Post, 18 July 1989, sec. A, p. 23.

<sup>501</sup> Goldman,p.208

<sup>502</sup> Goldman, pp.16-17.

<sup>503</sup> Pat Koza, "Poland Braces for Major Outlays to Join NATO," The Washington Times, 7 March 1999, p. 8 [database on-line]; available from Questia, accessed 22 January 2005.



students demonstrated that there is a popular movement for more democratic reform, growing stronger as the middle class expands. It also demonstrated that elements of the Chinese Army are sympathetic. President George H. W. Bush's response was basically token sanctions, while maintaining China's Most-Favored-Nation status. He was widely criticized as being too weak in protesting the massacre<sup>504-505</sup> Despite this criticism; however, he proceeded to pursue a policy of engagement with China, which he explained in a commencement speech he gave at Yale in 1991. He believed that only continued constructive engagement with China would encourage more free-market reform, and with that increasing wealth would come a stronger foundation for peaceful, democratic reform<sup>506</sup> Wisely, as with Poland, he was willing to let reform in China come at an evolutionary pace.

#### **k. Close Calls For Democracy**

History is also full of examples of existing democratic states being rescued by carefully planned economic assistance the fostering of prosperity and the development of a large middle class as a way of maintaining stability and preventing social unrest.

America's own experience during the Great Depression is a prime example. Many historians describe the depression as the complete failure of free-market capitalism. Communist and fascist political philosophies were gaining appeal among a growing number of impoverished Americans. President Roosevelt dealt with the instability by shoring up the middle class, establishing various forms of government economic assistance via the New Deal.<sup>507</sup>

Likewise in Europe at the end of World War II, a prime motivation for the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan was to encourage European economic recovery and political reform so as to protect Europe from Communist domination. Communists were agitating in

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<sup>504</sup> Yuen Ying Chan, "Playing the China Card," *The Village Voice* 34, no. 25, 20 June 1989, 11.

<sup>505</sup> Eric A. Hy, *Values Versus Interests: The US Response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Case 170, Part A (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, 1992).

<sup>506</sup> George H. W. Bush, "Commencement Address of George H. W. Bush," New Haven, CT, 27 May 1991; available from <<http://www.yale.edu/lt/archives/v8n1/v8n1georgehwush.htm>>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2004.

<sup>507</sup> Paul Craig Roberts and Lawrence M. Stratton, "The Fed's Depression and the Birth of the New Deal," *Policy Review* (2001): 19 [database on-line]; available from Questia, accessed 22 December 2004

Greece and Turkey in 1947, and were postured to win pending elections in Italy in 1948<sup>508</sup> Creating a prosperous middle class was seen as a key strategy in preventing communist subversion. Historians credit the massive economic assistance of the Marshall Plan, coupled with the US security umbrella which allowed Europe to concentrate on economic recovery vice military defense, as having deterred Soviet expansion in Western Europe<sup>509</sup> A Report to the National Security Council, NSC-68, in 1950, made the development of worldwide economic prosperity a key element of American Cold War strategy, a hedge against communist ideology taking hold among the impoverished masses yearning for basic security and prosperity.<sup>510</sup>

Thus Russia has taken on an accelerated program of reform without the prerequisites necessary for success. History has shown that without these essential ingredients, reform is doomed to failure. Russia lacks proper checks and balances in government. It lacks basic security, threatened by anti-democratic political parties, mafia, and terrorists. It lacks cultural respect for law and order due to a legacy of corruption in government and industry. It lacks a large prosperous middle class, and it has large opposition political parties that are anti-democratic.

Russia's challenges are greater than anything the United States ever faced in building and sustaining democracy. Yet Russia's success in implementing reform is absolutely vital to US national interests. If the democratic reformers are unsuccessful, reversion to communist or nationalist government would be an international catastrophe. It could mean a return to Cold-War style competition, nuclear saber-rattling, and hostile or hegemonic relationships with its now-democratic neighbors. Or, worse, Russia could become the world's largest failed state a Somalia with weapons of mass destruction. It is imperative that Russian reform succeeds, and to ensure that success, the United States should adopt a new, constructive policy toward Russia, as follows.

·Revise the National Security Strategy to remove any antagonistic language about a US/Russia relationship of distrust. US policymakers need to quit viewing Russia as the

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<sup>508</sup> Rachel Yarnell Thompson, "The World Hangs in the Balance: George C. Marshall and the European Recovery Plan," *Social Education* 67, no. 6 (2003) [database on-line]; available from Questia; accessed 22 December 2004.

<sup>509</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>510</sup> "Naval War College Review" 27, no. 6 (Newport RI: May/June 1975):p.69.

traditional enemy, and focus on mutual interests, such as fighting transnational terrorism, and making democracy work.

- Encourage the reforms of President Putin, as interim measures to provide security by combating terrorism and the mafia, ensuring positive control of weapons of mass destruction, and growing credible government institutions with proper checks and balances to mitigate corruption.

- Foster a closer bi-lateral military alliance with Russia, in addition to the multi-lateral Partnership for Peace, to assist its military in achieving an increased state of readiness to protect its borders, become partners in fighting trans-national terrorism, and guaranteeing the control of its weapons of mass destruction.

- Help Russia grows a large, prosperous, multi-ethnic middle class, through Marshall-Plan style economic aid if necessary. Initial US assistance or aid could take the form of helping Russia bust up the monopolies built by the oligarchs, establishing a Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate and protect investors, and restoring the value of pension plans lost during the rampant inflation of the 1990s. In essence, this is similar to the approach the United States is taking with Iraq today, providing a massive infusion of economic aid to ensure a successful transition to democracy. The investment in Russia should be considered much less risky though, because Russian leadership has demonstrated a strong desire to reform, initiated from within.

- Once the middle class has been established, assist Russia in instituting full democratic reform.

- Once the economic development and reform are complete, push for Russia NATO membership.

- Finally, the United States should learn from the experiences of reform in China and Russia, and form similar strategies for averting economic disaster and regional instability when inevitable reform comes to North Korea, Cuba, and Iran.

US/Russia relations have deteriorated since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Much of the antagonism between the two countries has come from US criticism of Russian policies. While some of this criticism was justified by US national interests the security of nuclear weapons, arms sales, and nuclear assistance to Iran much was the result of US insensitivity to the Russian situation and impatience with the pace of Russian reform.

The Russian people, under the progressive leadership of Mikhael Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin, have demonstrated a bold, brave commitment to freedom, democracy and free enterprise, despite lacking the essential ingredients for successful reform. History shows that without these essential ingredients, Russia's chances of succeeding in this endeavor are not good.

History also shows that people need security, both physical and economic, before the luxury of democratic civil liberties. A prosperous middle class, with a stake in a free-market social order, both facilitates democratic reform in autocratic societies and works against reversion to authoritarian rule in democratic societies. President George H. W. Bush understood this, as demonstrated in his policies encouraging evolutionary, vice revolutionary, economic reform in both Poland and China.

Russia's success in implementing reform is vital to US national interests. This paper recommends a new, constructive policy to encourage slower, deliberately planned, evolutionary reform in Russia, focusing on internal security first, then prosperity, then full democratic reform. Without such a measured approach, Russia will surely remain on the brink. Thrice since 1989, it has survived a reversion to authoritarian rule. Russia could very soon find itself in the same situation as Spain in 1936, with a grim choice between communist victory at the polls or nationalist dictatorship, and the real possibility of civil war.

In short the United States should revisit the original intent of President George H. W. Bush: "It's time to build on our new relationship with [Russia], to endorse and encourage a peaceful process of internal change toward democracy and economic opportunity."<sup>511</sup>

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<sup>511</sup> George H. W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union."

## **G. US-Russian Relations After September 11**

President Vladimir Putin's initial emotional response on the day of the attack was: "Americans, we are with you." Putin's unprecedented cooperation in U.S. efforts to crack down on Islamic terrorism may well be predicated on the assumption that the United States is fundamentally weakened by the events of Sept. 11, and thus willing to forge a new partnership with Russia on equal terms.<sup>512</sup> The developments till war on Iraq confirmed this belief.

U.S.-Russian relations have been bolstered by a united front against terrorists, thus opening new possibilities for collaboration a great change in bilateral relations that were viewed as frosty before September eleven. Advances in relations were visible: West softened her policy about the Russian policy of Chechnya and the Russia confirmed the US's decision to open airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

On the other hand Putin's initiatives drew criticism, some of it public, from conservatives in the Russian military establishment. In particular, his willingness to accept a U.S. military presence in Central Asia was a startling turnaround from Russian policies of the previous decade (if not previous century), which had been devoted to keeping foreign powers out of the region.

Putin's actions were greeted with enthusiasm especially among liberals and centrists in the foreign policy elite, who see Sept. 11 as an opening to put Russia's relations with the West back on a sound footing, a second chance to seize the missed opportunities of 1988-92. Having accepted Sept. 11 as a watershed, there is discussion in Moscow about the concessions that Russia can expect from the United States as the price for the new partnership. The shopping list includes: an end to criticism of the war in Chechnya; cancellation of Soviet-era debts; abandonment of national missile defense; an end to NATO expansion; lifting sanctions on Iraq; U.S. help in the event of future terrorist attacks on Russia; and more. If Russia really believes that the September bombings will lead the United States to abandon unilateralism, it is headed for a rude awakening.<sup>513</sup>

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<sup>512</sup> A Turning Point in U.S.- Russian Relations? by Peter Rutland The Moscow Times Oct. 15, 2001, Online ed.

<sup>513</sup> *Ibid.*

The war on Iraq was the end of “detente” in Russo-American relations. It was a boundary that Russians could give as a bid against her Chechnya policy. But campaign against Iraq was more than tolerable. It was an open neglect of the Russians as well as the Chinese and the Europeans as partners in the International affairs. Still this tension exists between the mentioned countries

Writers like Falk believes that the first and second terms of Bush reflect a continuation.<sup>514</sup> This continuation could also be seen in Putin’s first and second terms. Of course continuation and break in policy issues are quite relative or subjective. However the course of policies draw a continuation line. Both presidents represented a hardliner policy framework in their both terms.

#### **H. US Interests with relation to Russia**

The most important near-term interest for the United States in its relationship with Russia is Russian support in the war on terrorism Andrew Kuchins, America's interests in relations with Russia, believes that collaboration on the war on terrorism and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the United States’ key interests in Russia. Kuchins also believes that the U.S. sees Russia as an important partner in energy development.<sup>515</sup>

The most important near-term interest for the United States in its relationship with Russia is: first of all support from Russia in the war on terrorism. And also just as importantly is support from Russia in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are the two most significant near and midterm issues for the U.S. in its relationship with Russia. In the war on terrorism, obviously in Afghanistan we had a strong coincidence of interests, and that was quite a successful partnership. In Iraq our interests differed considerably, hence the difficulties caused in the relationship.

Other concerns of course high on the agenda for the Bush administration are the other two countries of the so-called Axis of Evil, N. Korea and Iran, and in both of these cases, the

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<sup>514</sup> Richard A. Falk, *Dünya Düzeni Nereye?*, trans: N. Avhan & N. Domaniç, İstanbul:Metis Yayınları, 2005, chapter 8.

role of Russia is quite important, and Russia's changing policies in the course of the last year both in the North Korea case and more significantly in the Iranian case have been positive factors in US-Russian relations. Differences over Iran's nuclear program for the last ten years have been the biggest thorn in the relationship. The increasing level of cooperation between Russia and the United States on Iran has been very important for the Bush administration.<sup>516</sup>

In the more mid to long term, the United States sees Russia potentially as an important partner in guaranteeing stability in Eurasia. Russia borders on Northeast Asia, East Asia, and what Russia refers to as the greater Middle East, and also Europe. The European theater, unlike the Cold War, is not so significant from a security standpoint in the relationship since it is relatively stable and does not present major security threats. But especially in the south and in the east Russia could be a very important partner from the standpoint of the United States. And that relates also to issues like Iran and North Korea.

Also in the mid to long term the U.S. sees Russia as an important partner in energy development and energy supply to the United States, an alternative source of oil, and perhaps in the long term – certainly in the long term, if this develops – a supplier of natural gas, liquefied natural gas. But that won't be until at least 10 years from now.

Very broadly speaking, there are some in the U.S. more concerned about Russia's internal development, the status of democracy, the status of democratic reform, and that approach was more associated with key figures in the Clinton administration, in the democratic camp. The Bush administration, when it came to power, its approach to Russia was rather different, a number of key figures in the Bush administration including Condoleezza Rice criticized the Clinton administration approach of trying intervene too much in Russia's domestic affairs and not doing so very successfully, and they looked at Russia more from a strictly a security standpoint, or more from Real Politic standpoint, but they were primarily interested in Russia's international behavior. There has always been this tension between Russia's importance for the United States from the standpoint of international security, and

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<sup>515</sup> Andrew Kuchins, "America's interests in relations with Russia", <http://www.kreml.org/decisions/38370900/39752895>

<sup>516</sup> Andrew Kuchins, "America's interests in relations with Russia", <http://www.kreml.org/decisions/38370900/39752895>

the U.S. interest in promoting Russia's development in the direction of a market democracy.

After 9/11, the security interests have become even more paramount from the U.S. standpoint and Russia's value as a partner has increased. But even in the past, before 9/11, when it came to a trade off between being concerned about Russia's domestic development as opposed to thinking about security interests of the U.S., the U.S. typically would look the other way in domestic developments, with the hopes of preserving its partnership and Russian support on security issues.<sup>517</sup>

This kind of tension increases the challenges for policymakers. Both in Washington and in Moscow policymakers have to be sensitive to domestic political interests, and this places greater constraints on what may be possible. Strategic and foreign policy decisions could not be taken in a political vacuum in democracies.

As suggested, in the long term, Russia's successful socio-economic development economic growth, plus reasonable distribution of that new wealth to broad sectors of the population, and particularly a developing middle class in Russia, those are going to be the key factors that support long term stability, democracy and prosperity in Russia. So they're certainly major concerns for the US, but they're things that from a policy standpoint the United States government has the least influence over: These are principally going to be the results of the decisions made by the Russian government and success on this front will be measured in decades rather than months or years.

Table III. 1. US trade with Russia 1996-2005

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<sup>517</sup> Andrew Kuchins, "America's interests in relations with Russia", <http://www.kreml.org/decisions/38370900/39752895>



	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Exports	3.3	3.4	3.6	2.1	2.1	2.7	2.4	2.4	3.0	3.9
Imports	3.6	4.3	5.7	5.9	7.8	6.3	6.8	8.6	12.6	15.3
Balances	-0.2	-1.0	-2.3	-3.9	-5.6	-3.5	-4.4	-6.2	-8.9	-11.3

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration

#### IV. POST COLD WAR RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

As to Russia's interests in the U.S. corresponding with the U.S. interests in Russia – what are Russia's interests in the US, what is the Russian agenda with the United States? This has not been so clear within the last decade, and Russia has been principally reactive to the U.S. agenda. Now that's understandable to some extent given Russia's generally relatively weak condition, and the domestic challenges and problems that Russia has been dealing with, it's natural that Russia be more preoccupied with its domestic development rather than foreign policy. Now as Russia's economy recovers, Russia will be more assertive in international relations, on a wide variety of issues.

The first set of issues that will be a challenge for the U.S.-Russian relationship will be Russia's growing power and influence in the former Soviet states, the CIS. Here we already see the increase of Russian influence primarily through economic means. But as the Russian economy grows and at some point the Russian military is going to recover, Russia's military and security influence in the region will grow. RF has the establishment of the military base in Kant in Kyrgyzstan, while it's mostly of a symbolic nature at this point, mostly indicative of a future development for Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

As it will be exerting more economic and military power, this could pose a potential for differences between the two and renewed competition there. But there also is the possibility for cooperation. How it's going to be managed is not clear, and there is a

significant likelihood that opportunities for partnership could be missed that could be in the interests of both sides.<sup>518</sup>

### **A. The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy**

With the fall of communism the whole geopolitical and strategic balance not only of the post-Second World War era but also of the whole epoch since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 came to an end. Russia's long climb from local, regional, continental and then to global power was suddenly dramatically reversed. The dissolution of communism ended one set of problems associated with global confrontation in the Cold War, but the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised no less epochal issues.

As Richard Sakwa put it, the definition of foreign policy to a large degree depends on the self-definition of a country itself.<sup>519</sup> Russia's search for a new identity and political shape in the post Cold War period went hand in hand with its search for foreign policy that is coherent with its plausible role in the new world. Russia's size, location, and history generated multifaceted if not contradictory foreign policies.

To track this search one should follow the evolution of Russian internal and foreign policy along with the Yeltsin and Putin periods. Their different periodization proposal in the analysis of Russian post Cold War foreign policy history. Sakwa for example propose a six stage periodization:

- “the emergence phase: Before the coup
  
- the establishment phase: August-December 1991
  
- the ‘romantic’ phase: January 1992-February 1993
  
- the reassertion phase: March 1993-December 1995

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<sup>518</sup> Andrew Kuchins, “America's interests in relations with Russia”, <http://www.kreml.org/decisions/38370900/39752895>

<sup>519</sup> Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.347.

- the new pragmatism: January 1996-1999

- the new realism: 2000- ?”<sup>520</sup>

Another approach to understand and analyze the Russian foreign policy is to analyze the whole history as a rivalry between the “Atlantist “and “Eurasianist” factions in Russian elites. As it is stated in one of the representative of this approach, Andrew A. Bouchkin, two factions were in conflict almost from the very beginning of the new era.<sup>521</sup>

Actually both approaches are right in their concern. We will combine these two approaches in understanding the changes and determining assets of Russian Foreign policy in general and with USA in particular. Our proposal for a periodization in foreign policy of Russian Federation would be as follows:

Yeltsin Period: Emergence, Establishment and Preparations phase.

Putin Period: Reassertion, Pragmatism and Realism phase.

## **B. Russian Approach to US-Russia Relations in 1990s**

In 1991-1995, the main aim of Russian **policy** was to create an image of Russia as a democracy and, at the same time, a “great power.” The claim of a special relationship with the United States as an equal partner was founded on the belief that both states now belonged to the family of “civilized countries.”<sup>522</sup> The assumption was that Russia and the United States interacted in the international arena as entities of the same kind. In other words, Russia strove for a values-based equal partnership with the United States. This was a fundamental misperception from three perspectives.

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<sup>520</sup> Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp. 347-374.

<sup>521</sup> Andrew A. Bouchkin, “Russia’s Far Eastern Policy in the 1990’s: Priorities and Prospects”, in; Adeed Dawisha & Karen Dawisha (Eds.) **The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New Sates of Eurasia**, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 66-83.

<sup>522</sup> Igor Zevelev, “*Russian-US Bilateral Relationship*”, **International Politics No: 39**, December 2002, p.357.

First, from a “realist” point of view, Russia was no equal to the Soviet Union - or to the United States - in terms of its power and influence, and thus did not have a realistic chance to become an equal partner to the US. Concrete Russian policies, notwithstanding the boastful rhetoric regarding Russia’s greatness, indicated strategic retreat and attempts to adapt to a weakening of Russia’s global role. Russia has been moving in the opposite direction from the United States.

This direction led to a change of Russian politics from global to more regional (Eurasian) issues, which pulled Russia away from Atlantic Pact first slowly (during Clinton’s reign in the U.S.) then at a fast pace after G. W. Bush came to power. Enlargement and expansion have been replaced by withdrawal from many regions of the world where Russia’s foreign policy agenda was once strong. Importing a model of societal development, not exporting a Russian model, has become an important task. Under these circumstances, equality in partnership was more a dream than a realistic agenda.

Second, from the “liberal” perspective, which takes into account not only power and security, but also political and social values, norms, and ideologies as factors of foreign policies, Russia is no match to either of the two Cold War-era superpowers - primarily in the ideological sphere. As Ken Aldred and Martin Smith note, “in the ideological arena, as in the military, the United States has remained in a special category of power by itself.”<sup>523</sup>

Russian foreign policy makers were very uneasy with Clinton’s neo-liberal rhetoric of promoting freedom, democracy, open markets, and globalization. Clinton’s policies of humanitarian intervention and nation building in failed states puzzled Russian neo-realists. The idea of military intervention for purposes that failed to conform to traditional notions of state security did not fit the prevailing Russian worldview. That is why many Russian observers later developed very bizarre explanations for the 1999 intervention in Kosovo- e.g. America plans to get control over lead ore mines and or Washington’s aim to weaken European currencies.

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<sup>523</sup> Ken Aldred and Martin Smith, **Superpowers in the Post-Cold War Era**, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, p. 68 Eric Helque, “*Familiarity May Breed Conflict for US, Russia*,” **The Russia Journal**, Vol. 4, No. 2, January 20-26, 2001), <http://www.trj.ru/index.ttm?obj=4094>

In this context, it is clear why so many Russian politicians sincerely welcomed George W. Bush's victory in the 2000 presidential campaign. Dmitry Trenin asserted that there was "a kind of Republican Party mythology" in the Russian foreign policy community. "They believe Republicans think the same way as they do and that they share the same world views."<sup>524</sup>

For neo-realists, the feature of any system is the distribution of material power, and hence the dominant political reality of the post-Cold War order is the preponderance of the United States. Military power and war are central to understanding how power is distributed and what counts as a great power: 'Great powers are determined on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world.'<sup>525</sup> From this perspective, the puzzle of the post-Cold War period, and even more of the post-September 11 periods, has been the absence of overt balancing behaviour against the United States. Some explain this simply as a reflection of the overwhelming power of the United States<sup>526</sup>. Others suggest that whether or not balancing behaviour occurs reflects not just the fact of US power but rather how the US uses that power.

Dmitri Rogozin, the head of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs, welcomed Bush, who "will focus attention on the solution of (America's) own problems, on the strengthening of domestic security, and will not assume the role of a global Messiah, which Democrats sometimes liked to do." Russians clearly underestimated how deeply bi-partisan American liberal internationalism had been. As John Ikenberry points out, "Reagan and Bush pursued policies that reflected a strong commitment to the expansion of democracy, markets, and the rule of law."<sup>527</sup>

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<sup>524</sup>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News line, Vol. 4, No. 241, Part I, December 2000, <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/12/141200.asp>. Cited in: Igor Zevelev, "Russian-US Bilateral Relationship", *International Politics* No: 39, December 2002, p.359.

<sup>525</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of great power politics*, New York: Norton, 2001, p. 5. Power politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin/RIIA, 1979), ch. 3.

<sup>526</sup> William C. Wohlforth, "The stability of a unipolar world", *International Security* 24: 1, 1999, pp. 5-41.

<sup>527</sup> G. John Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy? The 'Hidden Grand Strategy' of American Foreign Policy," *Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999), pp. 56-65.

A new Russia lacked a universal idea it could offer to the world. Moreover, the Russian elite could not find a unifying idea acceptable to most of the Russian people. The failure of Russian intellectuals to formulate a “national idea” for which President Yeltsin had called in August 1996 was very indicative.<sup>528</sup>

By the mid 1990s, many influential Russian foreign policy makers realized that by embracing the ideology of liberalism and democracy, Russia seemed to confine itself to the secondary role of a country “in transition” in the international arena. Such countries are led, judged, praised, and punished for progress or lack of it by others. Absent an equal partnership with the US required adjusting Moscow’s overarching concept of international relations. Kozyrev’s “Russia joining the civilized world” was replaced by Primakov’s “Russia as one of centers of power in a multipolar world” in 1996-1999. This construct continues to play an important role in Putin’s foreign policy.<sup>529</sup>

### **C. Yeltsin Period: Emergence, Establishment and Preparations phases.**

Yeltsin’s election to chair the Russian CP on 29 May 1990 and the Declaration of Russian State Sovereignty on 12 June set the scene for a debate over Russia’s national interests and over the shape of its foreign policy. Already by October, two central principles had emerged: that Russia would seek friendly relations with the other Soviet republics in a renewed union; and that Russia wished to return as an autonomous force in world politics, defending its status as a great power but at the same time seeking ‘to occupy a worthy (*dostoinoe*) place in the community of civilized peoples of Eurasia and America’.<sup>530</sup>

The interdependence of foreign and domestic policy under Yeltsin was closer than ever before as Russia sought a favourable international climate to assist economic reform and to facilitate its reintegration into the international system. In the first period Russian foreign policy was thoroughly “domesticated”, with domestic reform taking priority over any

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<sup>528</sup> *Rossiia v poiskakh idei. Analiz pressy.* (Moscow: Gruppy konsulantov pri Administratsii Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997). Cited in: Igor Zevelev, “Russian-US Bilateral Relationship”, **International Politics** No: 39, December 2002, p.361.

<sup>529</sup> Igor Zevelev, “Russian-US Bilateral Relationship”, **International Politics** No: 39, December 2002, p.360.

<sup>530</sup> A.V. Kozyrev, ‘Vneshnyaya politika preobrazhayushcheysya Rossii’, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1 (1994), p. 4. Cited in: Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp.348-352.

remaining global ambitions, but gradually the outlines of a more ‘balanced’ policy took shape.

A separate Russian diplomatic service was re-established in October 1990, and in November Andrei Kozyrev was appointed foreign minister. From 1974 to 1990, Kozyrev had worked in the Directorate of International Organizations in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and thus it is not surprising that he later placed so much emphasis on international institutions. He argued that Russian policy would no longer be based on ideology or messianic ambitions but on common sense and the realistic evaluation of concrete needs. He developed new approaches to international issues, even though policy, in this area as in most others, remained in Yeltsin’s hands. Russia’s first independent acts reflected the blurred distinction between foreign and domestic policy.

Soviet and Russian foreign policy began to diverge as Russian diplomacy sought to facilitate the radical transformation of society and to defend what came to be seen as Russian national interests separate and distinct from those of the Soviet Union. During Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in April 1991, for example, Yeltsin made it clear that the USSR could not negotiate a return of the four disputed Kurile Islands without consulting Russia.<sup>531</sup>

Yeltsin’s defense of the concept of a sovereign and independent Russia, presented so eloquently during his presidential campaign in June 1991, however, was conceived within the framework of a renewed Union. Russia sought not the disintegration of the Union but its transformation on the basis of a renegotiated treaty, retaining a system of collective security, a coordinated foreign policy, and the maintenance of a common economic, transport and emigrational space.<sup>532</sup>

To this end Russia took an active part in the nine-plus-one negotiations for a new Union treaty and was committed to signing the documents on 20 August when the *August coup* intervened. Russia’s assertion of an independent foreign policy, therefore, was considered compatible with a renewed Union with its own federal government. The Union renewal

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<sup>531</sup> Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.350.

<sup>532</sup> Ronald Grigory Suny, *The Soviet Experiment, Russia, the USSR and the Successor States*, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, p. 56.

process was derailed by the events of August 1991 and never gained momentum thereafter, despite Gorbachev's last-ditch attempts to transform the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States.<sup>533</sup>

Following Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation as Soviet foreign minister on 20 December 1990, Alexander Bessmertnykh had been appointed in his place, but during the *coup* he had wavered. The former ambassador to Prague, Boris Pankin, and one of a handful of Soviet envoys who denounced the putschists without hesitation in turn replaced him. Pankin notes the atmosphere:

“In those days the common obsession that gripped our entire leadership was with the idea of becoming a ‘civilized state’. The issue of being patronized or humbled did not arise. In fact giving advice to the Soviet Union was a pastime that had been positively encouraged by the highly sociable Shevardnadze, who in all his contacts with the West seemed more ready to be polite and accommodating than to stand firm.”<sup>534</sup>

Pankin, however, proved to be only a temporary appointment, and although he fought to defend the Soviet MFA and modified some of the cuts imposed on its personnel, the emerging Russian MFA accepted him neither by the Soviet foreign policy establishment nor. The reappointment of Shevardnadze on 19 November 1991 as Minister of External Relations represented Gorbachev's last desperate attempt to restore his crumbling authority.

By 18 December 1991, Yeltsin brought the Soviet diplomatic service under Russian control, and on 22 December the Soviet foreign and defense ministries were abolished. The Soviet Ministry of External Relations was merged with Russia's. Yeltsin placed himself at the head of the Russian MFA, and Burbulis took over routine operations.<sup>535</sup>

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<sup>533</sup> Ronald Grigory Suny, *The Soviet Experiment, Russia, the USSR and the Successor States*, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, p. 57.

<sup>534</sup> Boris Pankin, *The Last Hundred Days of the Soviet Union* (London, I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 104. Cited in: Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.349.

<sup>535</sup> Suzanne Crow, ‘Personnel Changes in the Russian Foreign Ministry’, *RFEIRL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 16 (17 April 1992), pp. 18-22, at p. 18. Cited in: Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp.349-351.



Russia inherited the mantle of responsibility and sought international recognition for its new role. Russia was recognized as the 'continued state to the USSR', taking over responsibility for Soviet treaties and obligations, and above all for the Soviet strategic arsenal. Russia became the residual legatee of all the authority that was not devolved to the other republics.

Russian Federation took over the USSR's seat in UN Security Council as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, giving it a right of veto. Freed from the burden of the Union, Russia re-entered the world stage and by January 1992 had already been recognized by 131 states. Addressing the Russian MFA on 27 October 1991, Yeltsin set two main aims for Russian policy:

-To secure favorable external conditions for domestic political and economic reforms;

-And to overcome the legacy of the Cold War and to dismantle confrontational structures.<sup>536</sup>

Both policies were laced with ambiguities: To what degree would economics (reform at home and global integration) be placed above national interests, however defined? How would this Atlanticist orientation be compatible with Russia's great power status? Why was nothing said about forging a new relationship with the former Soviet states? Questions such as these have led to this period of Russian foreign policy being dubbed 'romantic', allegedly excessively pro-Western at the expense of Russia's own interests and at the price of the neglect of its own 'backyard' in the CIS.

National-patriots, centrists and democratic static's alike were to varying degrees skeptical about the viability of the Soviet successor states, and insisted that Russia should direct its policy far more actively towards them. Post-communist Russian nation building was profoundly influenced by the problem of the 25 million Russians (however defined) who had suddenly found themselves 'abroad', and the claimed defense of their rights and status permeated domestic politics.

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<sup>536</sup> Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya politika', p.6. Cited in: Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp.349-350.

The Russian leadership was hesitant to adopt ethnicity as a factor in inter-state relations and thus allegedly abandoned their compatriots abroad; by the same token the sanctity of the new international borders and the sovereignty of the new states was acknowledged. This did not, however, prevent the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policy when discussing relations with the former Soviet states, especially when Russian strategic interests were concerned. The widespread use of the term *blizhnee zarubezh'e* (near abroad) for the former Soviet republics suggested that these countries were somehow in a different category from genuinely foreign countries.<sup>537</sup>

Kozyrev noted that ‘the second Russian Revolution unfolded in a favorable foreign policy setting’, and proceeded on the assumption that military force was no longer relevant as an instrument of policy. This view was immediately contradicted by the dominant role that the Russian military played in shaping policy in the near abroad as the foreign ministry all but abdicated responsibility in the area.

Kozyrev on several occasions condemned the military and the ‘party of war’.<sup>538</sup> With the onset of a deep Western economic recession in the early 1990s and Germany’s preoccupation with absorbing its new eastern territories, the international environment deteriorated. Western funds became more limited, and in any case the bulk went to the ‘old’ Eastern Europe (above all Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic).<sup>539</sup>

Whether justified or not, there was a palpable sense of disappointment in Russia as early hopes of a rapid transformation with Western help evaporated. This period has been dubbed ‘romantic’ but it might better be characterized as idealistic, in the sense that it sought indeed to base policy on a set of universal ideals. Soviet ideology had given way to a democratic idealism, but structurally it could be argued that policy remained abstracted from the realities of Russia’s new position and challenges.

## **1. The reassertion phase: March 1993-December 1995**

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<sup>537</sup> Devendra Kaushik, Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri: 10 Yıllık Bağımsızlık Döneminin Bilançosu, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/pdf/etud/etud20.pdf>

<sup>538</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, ‘Russia: A Chance of Survival’, *Foreign Affairs* (spring 1992), pp. 1-16, at p. 4. Cited in: Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp. 350.

<sup>539</sup> Yaşar Onay, Türkiye Rusya İlişkilerinde NATO Gölgesi, **Tusiad Görüş Dergisi**, Temmuz-Ağustos 1997, p..32.

Post-communist Russian foreign policy is marked by continuity in strategic goals, but a turning point in tone and to a lesser degree in substance took place towards the end of 1992 and into early 1993. The opposition condemned Kozyrev's alleged servility and 'romantic' obsession with the West and his failure to formulate an effective policy towards the former Soviet republics.

Russia's Congress of People's Deputies attempted to impeach Yeltsin on March 26, 1993. Yeltsin's opponents gathered more than 600 votes for impeachment, but fell 72 votes short. On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin disbanded the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies by decree, which was illegal under the constitution. On the same day there was a military showdown, the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993. With military help, Yeltsin held control. The conflict resulted in a number of civilian casualties, but was resolved in Yeltsin's favor. Elections were held on December 12, 1993.

Since the Chechen separatists declared independence in the early 1990s, an intermittent guerrilla war (First Chechen War, Second Chechen War) has been fought between disparate Chechen groups and the Russian military. Some of these groups have grown increasingly Islamist over the course of the struggle. It is estimated that over 200,000 people have died in this conflict. Minor armed conflicts also exist in North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

As far as the national-patriots and centrists were concerned, allegiance to the principles of a cosmopolitan liberal universalism threatened Russia's very existence as a state. Russian policy began explicitly to assert a hegemonic concept of its "vital national interests" in the near abroad, coupled with a reassertion of Russia's great power status in the world at large. Already in March 1992, Stankevich and other proponents of an active post-imperial Russian foreign policy sponsored a Russian Monroe Doctrine, defining the whole area of the former Soviet Union as one vital to Russian national interests.<sup>540</sup>

This approach was further developed in August 1992 in the first "Strategy for Russia" report of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), established by Sergei

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<sup>540</sup>*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 28 March 1992. Andranik Migranyan later claimed to have rediscovered the notion of the Monroe Doctrine for Russia, 'Russia and the Near Abroad', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 12 January 1994. Cited in Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London:

Karaganov, the deputy director of the Institute of Europe. The document argued that Russia's interests were not necessarily the same as the West's, and, indeed, that the gap between the two would probably increase; and as a corollary, the focus of Russian policy should shift from the West to the near abroad from whence the main challenges to Russian security would come. Thus, the document advocated an 'enlightened post-imperial course' that could balance the relationship with the West and Russia's concerns in the near abroad.<sup>541</sup>

In a speech to the Civic Union conference on 28 February 1993, Yeltsin for the first time made explicit Russia's claim to have a 'vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR', and appealed to the UN 'to grant Russia special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability in this region'. In 1993, the new line was formalized in the 'Foreign Policy Concept' drafted by the Security Council, which once again declared Russia to be the guarantor of stability in the former Soviet Union. While the international community was reluctant to endorse Russia's special role, it was unwilling to intervene itself and thus *de facto* Russia was granted a free hand to impose its own order in the post-Soviet space - with the important exception of the Baltic states.

Kozyrev's own position evolved, with his enemies accusing him of a chameleon-like opportunism to maintain his post, usually involving uncritical support for Yeltsin. Kozyrev sought to combine two principles that according to some were mutually exclusive. On the one hand, he sought to 'guarantee the rights of citizens and the dynamic socio-economic development of society'; on the other, he insisted that Russia was 'a normal great power, achieving its interests not through confrontation but through co-operation'.

By late 1993, Kozyrev had adopted a more sharply defined empire-saving strategy, insisting that Russia had the right to intervene to prevent the country 'losing geopolitical positions that took centuries to achieve'.<sup>542</sup> Alarmed by the apparent appeal of Zhirinovskiy's nationalistic rhetoric in the December 1993 elections, much of the Russian political elite incorporated some of his ideas into their own programs.

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Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.359.

<sup>541</sup> Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp. 351-354.

<sup>542</sup> *Izvestiya*, 8 October 1993. Cited in; Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.352.

This tough approach was vividly manifested in Kozyrev's refusal in November 1994 to sign documents already agreed with NATO concerning the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmed in Brussels.

Attempts by the West to de-legitimize the pursuit of Russia's 'normal' great power interests by forever raising the spectre of a revival of the Cold War, according to Yeltsin a month later at the Budapest summit of the OSCE in December 1994, threatened precisely to lead to the emergence of a 'cold peace'.<sup>543</sup>

It was at this time that Kozyrev left the Russia's Choice faction in the Duma when they condemned the war in Chechnya. Kozyrev became a proponent of the reconstituted ideology of power, but this did not mean the abandonment of all of his earlier views and he remained committed to a viable relationship with the West. Despite his partial conversion to a great-power ideology, his critics continued to characterize his foreign policy as confused and amateur.<sup>544</sup>

Kozyrev's newfound statism not only undermined his credibility as a liberal but also damaged his ability to function as foreign minister. At home his stand was widely interpreted as yet another maneuver to stay in power, while abroad his credibility, already undermined by the indeterminacy of Russian policy in the Bosnian war (1992-5), imbued Russia's foreign policy with a damaging unpredictability. National-patriots' and neo-communists' denunciations were roused to fever pitch by his weak response to the threat of NATO expansion and the bombing of Serb positions in Bosnia in August 1995.

Despite his alignment with 'pragmatic nationalists' Kozyrev remained committed to a constructive relationship with the West, refusing to accept that the latter remained the threat it had been during the Cold War. In the December 1995 elections, Kozyrev retained his single-member seat in Murmansk; faced with the choice of leaving the foreign ministry or giving up his seat, he chose the former and on 5 January 1996 resigned.

## **2. Late Yeltsin Pro-Putin Politics: Primakov Period**

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<sup>543</sup> Andrei Kozyrev. "Partnership or Cold Peace?", *Foreign Policy*, No. 99 (summer 1995). pp. 3-14. Cited in; Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.352.

Kozyrev's replacement as foreign minister was the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgenii Primakov; a specialist on Middle Eastern affairs, Primakov had raised high in the former regime. Although foreign policy is a presidential prerogative, the change of ministers inevitably changed the tone and modified the substance of policy. While seeking to maintain good relations with the West, Russia would now reassert its position in China, the Far East and with its traditional allies in the Middle East. A pragmatic politician, Primakov nevertheless took a substantive view of Russia's national interests and insisted that the country was a great power.<sup>545</sup>

A state's international behavior may be deconstructed first, into signals consisting of symbolic deeds and words and, second, indices that project capabilities, intentions, and actions. Robert Jervis emphasizes that, while a country may make concerted efforts to project an image of a peaceful state which does not have designs on its neighbors and lives up to promises, its actual behavior in the international arena may be much more assertive.

The projected image may be deceptive in this case. Primakov's foreign policy did the opposite. It tried to project an assertive image of a great power, but actually behaved constructively and cooperatively in most cases. Why did Russia do this? First, Russia may have projected an image of a great power mainly for domestic purposes. Probably, this is not a full answer.<sup>546</sup>

Stanley Hoffman argues that states in the present international system, where it is difficult to use force, transfer their expectations from physical mastery to the shaping of international milieu. International politics should be defined today as less of a struggle for power than as a contest for the shaping of perceptions.<sup>547</sup> Russia was weak in capabilities in the 1990s, yet tried to shape the perception that it was a great power.

The Russian paratroopers' march to Pristina airport in 1999 was a characteristic signal, a symbolic deed, designed to project a desired image that could not be supported by

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<sup>544</sup> Cited in; Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.353.

<sup>545</sup> *Izvestiya*, 10 February 1996, p. 3. Cited in; Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.353.

<sup>546</sup> Igor Zevelev, "Russian-US Bilateral Relationship", **And International Politics** No: 39, December 2002, p.361.

<sup>547</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, "*Perceptions, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict*," **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol. 21, No.1, 1967, p. 58.

substantive indices. Later, joining the Western policies in Kosovo was an indication of cooperative behavior that had no alternative. There was evident tension between signals and indices.

Russia tried to maintain its desired image of a great power, but was able to support it only via signals. This led to another evolving tension, namely between Russia's desired image and the image of Russia held by other international actors. Self-perception and the perception of others diverged.

Primakov Period's four priority tasks for Russian foreign policy were:

- To create the external conditions to strengthen Russia's territorial integrity;
- To support integrative tendencies within the CIS;
- To stabilize regional conflicts (above all in the former USSR and Yugoslavia);
- And to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>548</sup>

Primakov had been highly critical of the West, and thus the communists and nationalists in the Duma welcomed his appointment.

As prime minister between September 1998 and May 1999, Primakov remained a guiding influence on foreign policy, although the succeeding foreign minister, Igor Ivanov had views of his own. During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, Ivanov was willing to employ some harsh anti-Western rhetoric. Russian foreign-policy pragmatism remained even after Primakov's forced retirement from government. This pragmatism combined with active realism with the presidency of Vladimir Putin.

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<sup>548</sup> Independent, 13 January 1996, p. 9. Cited in; Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.354.

## **D. Putin's First Term**

After Yeltsin's presidency in the 1990s, Vladimir Putin was elected in 2000. Under Putin, the intensified state control of the Russian media has raised Western concerns over Russian civil liberties. At the same time, rising oil prices, international political tensions, and war in the Middle East have increased Russia's revenue from oil production and export, stimulating significant economic expansion. Putin's presidency has shown improvements in the Russian standard of living, as opposed to the 1990s. Even with these economic improvements, acute political crises, human rights abuses, and largely criticized government failures remain.

Despite the economic distress and decreased military funding following the fall of the Soviet Union, the country still retains its large nuclear weapons arsenal. While President Putin is criticized as an autocrat by some of his Western counterparts, his relationships with US President George W. Bush, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, French President Jacques Chirac, and the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi are apparently friendly. Putin's relationship with Germany's new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is expected to be "cooler" and "more business-like" than his partnership with Gerhard Schröder .

### **1. "Near Abroad"**

When Washington succeeded in engineering the economic and political collapse of the USSR at the end of the 1980s, some in the U.S. seemed so content with the developments taking place. After a decade of crisis during which foreign (many American) companies plundered Russia's treasures, that nation had elected as president Vladimir Putin, an ex-KGB officer who, as a career move, had recently spent some time at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute writing a dissertation titled "Toward a Russian Transnational Energy



Company.” His thesis: Russia should use its vast energy reserves for geo-strategic advantage<sup>549</sup>.

After entering office in 2000, Putin moved to reconsolidate state control over the country’s oil and gas industries. As of 2006, this task was almost accomplished. Putin has paid off much of Russia’s foreign debt, the nation has accumulated impressive financial reserves, and Gazprom recently overtook BP to become the world’s second-largest energy company.

Putin is sewing up an increasing portion of the European gas and oil market, where Russia supplies about a quarter of continental oil and a third of its gas. Russia supplies more than one third of Japan’s natural gas needs as well. Putin knows his country will need enormous capital investments to keep exporting energy resources; Europe and Japan need these resources and pay cash to invest. Putin’s goal seems to form a natural-gas version of OPEC; a cartel with supply networks throughout Central Asia and with pipelines supplying Europe and China.

During his time in office, Putin has attempted to strengthen relations with other members of the CIS. The “near abroad” zone of traditional Russian influence has again become a foreign policy priority under Putin, as the EU and NATO have grown to encompass much of Central Europe and, more recently, the Baltic states. While tacitly accepting the enlargement of NATO into the Baltic states, Putin attempted to increase Russia’s influence over Belarus and Ukraine.

Russia's relations with the Former Soviet States since Putin assumed the Presidency can be characterized by 3 factors: energy dependency; the threat of Islamic terrorism and trade ties. At best, however, the near abroad will remain a soft sphere of Russian influence, open to subversion.

The Putin leadership, like its predecessor, desires the full integration of the CIS, with Russia as the core and leader of the integration process. Russia sees all CIS member states as strategic partners. According to the new foreign policy concept, Russia will interact with

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<sup>549</sup> Heinberg, Richard, (2006) “Energy Geopolitics 2006 - Welcome to the 21 Century. A world for which none of us is prepared.” [http://www.gnn.tv/articles/2330/Energy\\_Geopolitics\\_2006](http://www.gnn.tv/articles/2330/Energy_Geopolitics_2006)

the CIS member states both in the CIS as a whole and also through associations such as the Customs Union (consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the Collective Security Treaty. Considerable emphasis will be placed on the creation of a free trade zone. A CIS free trade agreement was signed in 1994, but has yet to be ratified by the Russian parliament.<sup>550</sup>

There is however awareness that Russia lacks the policy instruments to be able to bring about such a state of affairs. The failure so far to carry out an effective economic reform in Russia means that the Russian Federation is unlikely to become a pole of attraction for other CIS members: Whilst energy dependency and the threat of Islamic terrorism enables Moscow to bind some states closer to her, she lacks the resources to create an exclusive sphere of influence.

States such as Georgia and Azerbaijan are likely to continue to look toward NATO. Outside of the CIS, all three Baltic States will continue to look westwards despite Moscow's disapproval. All the states of the near abroad (with the exception of Belarus) will also seek economic partners other than Russia if such partnerships offer more benefits than can be offered by Russia and by Russian companies.

Nevertheless, Russia has had some success in enhancing her influence in the CIS in 2000. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan now look to Moscow more than they did previously, and Ukraine now seems inclined to pursue a more deferential policy due to her energy problems. Covert support for the unrecognized states of Transdnestr, Abkhazia, South Osetia, Adjara and Nagorny Karabakh can always be used as a means of pressurizing Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

## **2. Name of the Document: Foreign Policy Concept 2000**

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<sup>550</sup> Dr M. A. Smith, **Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad**, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, December 2000, p. 16.

The base line for Russian foreign policy is the new foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, which was approved by President Vladimir Putin on 28 June 2000. It replaces the previous concept of 1993, which was felt no longer to correspond to the realities of the contemporary international system.<sup>551</sup>

On coming to power Putin retained Ivanov as foreign minister, yet an appreciable change took place in foreign policy. Although elements of Primakovian “pragmatism” remained, policy now lacked the groundless assurance that Russia was a great power, and that it was the West’s misfortune not to recognize this.

Following a meeting of the Security Council on 24 March 2000 devoted to Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept, Ivanov commented that the document was ‘more realistic’ than its 1993 predecessor. The Concept was adopted on 28 June 2000 and combined a commitment to international integration with assertions about Russia’s great power status.<sup>552</sup>

Document notes “the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad.” Elsewhere, the concept argues that a “successful foreign policy ... must be based on maintaining a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining these objectives.

Concentration of politico-diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means on resolving foreign political tasks must be commensurate with their real significance for Russia's national interests.” Indeed the 2000 foreign policy concept sees its first foreign policy objective as “to ensure the reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity...”<sup>553</sup>

Although almost all the elements were there before, Putin’s foreign policy was marked by a more sober appreciation of reality and of Russia’s real as opposed to idealized

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<sup>551</sup> Dr M. A. Smith, **Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad**, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, December 2000, p.1.

<sup>552</sup> <http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm>, in English. Cited in; Richard Sakwa, **Russian Politics and Society**, and London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, p.354.

<sup>553</sup> Dr M. A. Smith, **Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad**, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, December 2000, p. 1-2.

interpretations of its interests. In a keynote speech to the MFA on 26 January 2001, Putin urged that Russian diplomacy had to focus more on promoting the country's economic interests abroad, while at the same time improving its image. The new realism was no less ambitious in its own evaluation of Russia's role, but was marked by a realization that the means were lacking to maintain what was considered Russia's rightful place in the world.

Putin stressed the need to rebuild the domestic economy, while at the same time sought to achieve by diplomacy what was lacking materially. He engaged in a round of high-profile visits (some thirty in his first year as president) as he took the management of foreign affairs into his own hands. However, the tangible benefits of his globetrotting appeared slender, and ultimately only accentuated not Russia's global role but its difficulty in sustaining that role.

The U.S. may have won the Cold War, but Russia will not be so easily excelled in the energy war. Russia is nearly tied with US ally Saudi Arabia in oil production, however the Saudis export more because Russia uses a larger proportion domestically<sup>554</sup>. While Russia's rate of production is likely to stall in the next year or two and then begin its inevitable and terminal decline, much the same can likely be said for Saudi Arabia's.

Russia's relations with China have warmed during Putin's term. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was born on June 15, 2001, with Russia, China, and four former USSR Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) as charter members. While there is little discussion of the SCO in U.S. media, that organization gradually expands its capacity to act as a geopolitical counterweight to Washington. Beijing also moves to secure energy at the sources<sup>555</sup>. China's booming economy, with 9% growth, requires massive natural resources to sustain its growth. China became a net importer of oil in 1993. By 2045, China will depend on imported oil for 45% of its energy needs.

As of 2006, Kazakhstan crude oil began to flow into China from a newly completed oil pipeline from Atasu in Kazakhstan to the Alataw Pass in far western China Xinjiang

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<sup>554</sup> Heinberg, Richard, a.g.e. (2006)

<sup>555</sup> Engdahl, F. William (2006), "USA out-flanked in Eurasia Energy Politics?", Global Research Web Site, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ENG20060603&articleId=2571>

province, a 1,000-kilometer route announced in 2005. It marked the first time oil is being pumped directly into China. Kazakhstan is also a member of the SCO but had been regarded by Washington since the collapse of the Soviet Union as its sphere of influence, with ChevronTexaco, Condi Rice's old oil company, a major oil participant<sup>556</sup>.

By 2011 the pipeline will extend some 3,000 kilometers to Dushanzi where the Chinese are building its largest oil refinery due to complete by 2008. China financed the entire \$700 million pipeline and will buy the oil. In 2005 China's CNPC state oil company bought PetroKazakhstan for \$4.2 billion and will use it to develop oilfields in Kazakhstan. China is also in negotiations with Russia for a pipeline to deliver Siberian oil to Northeast China a project that could be completed by 2008, and a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Heilongjiang in China's Northeast. China just passed Japan to rank as world's second largest oil importer behind the United States. Beijing and Moscow are also integrating their electricity economies. In late May the China State Grid Corp announced it plans to increase imports of Russian electricity fivefold by 2010.

Russia and China have joined together in a strategic partnership aimed at countering the U.S. and Western "monopoly in world affairs," as stated in a joint statement released by the Chinese and Russian presidents in July 2005<sup>557</sup>. The long-standing border disputes between the two countries were settled in agreements in 2005, and joint military exercises were carried out in the same year.

In August 2005, for the first time since 1965, Russian and Chinese armed forces carried out joint military exercises. The formal objectives of the mission were to strengthen the capability of joint operations and the exchange of experience; to establish methods of organizing cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, separatism and extremism; and to enhance mutual combat readiness against newly developing threats.

The exercises aimed at developing the use of strategic long-range bombers, neutralization of anti-aircraft defenses, command posts and airbases, gaining air superiority, enforcing a

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<sup>556</sup> Engdahl, F. William 2006, Ibid.

<sup>557</sup> De Haas, Marcel, 2006, "Russia-China Security Cooperation", The Power and Interest News Report Web Site, <http://www.pinr.com>.

maritime blockade and the control of maritime territory<sup>558</sup>. The actual objective of the maneuvers was likely to display to the Western world that Russia and China consider themselves to be in control of the Asia-Pacific region and that outside powers will be denied the right to interfere in their sphere of influence.

The demonstration of weapon systems at the 2005 Sino-Russian exercises might have been meant to promote Russian arms sales to observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.). India, for instance, comprises around 40 % of Russia's arms exports and Iran is considered to be an important growth market for the Russian arms market. Currently, some 45 % of Russia's arms exports go to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China -- including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers -- amounting to an average of US\$2 billion annually. China has been the largest consumer of Russian military equipment for a number of years. Russia's arms trade to China is an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries.

There are alternative views however. The recent five-nation energy summit of major Asian consuming countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India and the US) hosted by China in 2006 is an expression of Beijing's match of interests with Washington in leading an energy dialogue of consuming countries vis-à-vis Russia. On the other hand, Moscow is keeping Chinese companies out of investment opportunities in Russia's strategic oil and gas fields in Russia's Siberia and the Far East, and even in the Russian pipelines leading to the Chinese market<sup>559</sup>.

In one of the affluent moves by Putin's Russia in the area of energy geopolitics, the Kremlin-controlled Gazprom gas monopoly has entered into negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert through Olmert's billionaire friend, Benny Steinmetz, to secure Russian natural gas supplies to Israel via an undersea pipeline from Turkey to Israel<sup>560</sup>. The gas would be diverted from the underutilized Russia-Turkey Bluestream pipeline that Russia built for increasing influence over Turkey two years ago. Putin clearly seeks to gain a lever inside Israel over the one-sided US influence on Israel policy.

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<sup>558</sup> De Haas, *Ibid.*

<sup>559</sup> Bhadrakumar, B. K., 2006, "The Great Game on a razor's edge"  
[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\\_Asia/HL23Ag03.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HL23Ag03.html)

<sup>560</sup> Engdahl, *ibid.*

## E. Putin's Second Term

By early 2000 it became evident that Russia did not want to recognize unconditional American leadership and insisted on its own status of "great power." The public has generally supported this policy of the elite. According to the study done by Zevelev only two percent of poll respondents agree that Russia should acknowledge the leading role of the only superpower. Thirty percent prefer that Russia seek multipolarity as one of the influential centers of world politics, while an additional 28 percent would like to see their country as one of the two superpowers on par with the United States. Only 25 percent favor concentration on domestic issues and paying less attention to international affairs.<sup>561</sup>

Putin chose to avoid an open fight with such perceptions, instead adjusting his foreign policy imagery. Eschewing the dominant *real politic* perceptions in Russian foreign policy thinking, Putin argued in late 2001 that partnership with the West must not be based only on interests. He suggested "a partnership which is based upon common values of civilization."<sup>562</sup> It may seem that the Russian vision of a relationship with the West has come full circle and returned to Gorbachev's "panhuman values" and Kozyrev's "Russia joining the family of civilized countries" concept. This, however, would be premature.

The clue to Putin's notion of common values may be found in his earlier programmatic document published on the Internet in late 1999 when he was a newly appointed acting prime minister. It may be viewed as his first published political program and vision of Russia. In both, Putin actually outlined two layers of values that existed in Russia: supranational, panhuman values and more primordial, traditional Russian values.

In the first group, he lists such liberal principles as "the freedom of expression, the right to leave the country, and other fundamental political rights and personal liberties." In the second group, Putin lists patriotism, *derzhavnost'* (great power), *gosudarsvennichestvo* (state-centeredness), and social justice. This approach is quite different from what Kozyrev suggested earlier.

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<sup>561</sup> Igor Zevelev, "Russian-US Bilateral Relationship", **International Politics** No: 39, December 2002, p.361.

<sup>562</sup> "Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. V. Putina i otvety na voprosy zhurnalistov na sovmestnoi pres-conferentsii s Prezidentom SShA Dzh. Bushem. 21 oktyabrya 2001 goda. Shanhai," <http://president.kremlin.ru/events/347.html>; Cited in: Igor Zevelev, "Russian-US Bilateral Relationship", **International Politics** No: 39, December 2002, p.361.

Kozyrev suggested, “The real question is not whether ‘Western’ democratic values and market economic principles are acceptable to Russia. The question is what concrete ways and methods must be used to apply them to the realities (of) Russia which was separated from democracy and market for so many years.” Kozyrev never spoke about any Russian values that could be different from the Western ones.<sup>563</sup> Putin suggests that panhuman values might be quite compatible with traditional Russian ones.

A Putin-style partnership with the West envisions both common interests and common values. However, it does not preclude the existence of other interests and values on the Russian side. This outlook differs from Kozyrev’s that advocated, especially in 1991-1992, a complete congruence of Russian and Western interests and values. Putin’s approach is also different from Primakov’s preoccupation with multipolarity. Primakov’s paradigm was helpful in overcoming Kozyrev’s unrealistic agenda and adapting Russian foreign policy to the realities of Russia.

Putin’s leitmotif of Russia’s integration into the world, with tacit understanding that the West and the United States in particular lead it, seems to be more congruent with the idea of partnership. Putin seems in search of a comfortable and respectable niche for Russia in this world.

## **1. Putin In Domestic Power Politics**

Putin has moved at the same time to consolidate his own power while lessening that of a number of potential or real political rivals. Various influential elite elements surround him, including what might be termed liberal reformers (such as Chubais), ‘go slow’ reformers (such as Abramovich), and representatives of the power ministries (including the police, internal security and military bureaucracies), with Putin’s actions suggesting a balancing of these various interests. His creation by decree of seven federal regions, encompassing all of the federation’s 89 provinces and major cities, was designed to reconsolidate the federal executive’s power over the restive periphery.

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<sup>563</sup> Pal Kolsto, “Nation-Building and the Quest for Common Values in Russia Under Putin,” paper presented at the 6th Annual World Convention of the Association for the Studies of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York (April 5-7, 2001).; Cited in: Igor Zevelev, “Russian-US Bilateral Relationship”, **International Politics** No: 39, December 2002, p.362.



The seven presidential representatives overseeing these federal regions were invested with real power, an ability to oversee the actions of regional officials, and the responsibility to bring those officials' actions and regional laws into conformity with federal laws and intentions. By late 2000 there was already solid evidence they were making inroads in fighting regional separatism. Meanwhile, his initiatives to reorganize and essentially downgrade the influence of the federal parliament's upper chamber, the Federation Council, and to create a new State Council as a consultative body drawing in regional leaders' inputs, were further weakening the autonomy of sub federal authorities.<sup>564</sup>

## 2. Russia- NATO Relation

Many commentators who have analyzed the NATO-Russia relationship have offered suggestions for deepening and enrooting this relationship in a durable form. They all depend upon the political will of the parties involved. For all its achievements, this partnership remains limited and is in danger of stagnating. Western uncertainty and ambivalence about Russia is reciprocated by Russia's continuing belief that NATO and the West is both a military-strategic enemy and threat, as well as a normative and ideological adversary.<sup>565</sup> Furthermore, recent Russian suggestions that it is interested in somehow incorporating South Ossetia into Russia, or the incitement of anti-NATO demonstrations in Ukraine and the continuing efforts to undermine pro-Western regimes in Georgia and Ukraine, and pressures to develop its military with a view toward scenarios clearly aimed at NATO or America suggest a ratcheting up of a more overtly anti-NATO policy.<sup>566</sup>

Strategic cooperation on this basis is not possible beyond a very limited range of shared experiences because interests still really cannot be defined as common nor can threats be seen as shared. The strategic issues in the Russo-NATO relationship go to the heart of the values gap and the ensuing normative rivalry between Russia and NATO that is seen in

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<sup>564</sup> John P. Willerton Jr., "The Presidency: From Yeltsin to Putin", in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (Eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics*, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, p. 40.

<sup>565</sup> Hunter and Rogov, eds.; Tarasenko

<sup>566</sup> Vladimir Socor, "Kyiv's Political Stalemate Complicates Relations with NATO," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, June 5, 2006; Vladimir Socor, "Weak Authority Emboldens Anti-NATO Protests in Ukraine," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, June 2, 2006; "Russia's Support for Ossetian Unification," *Jane's Foreign Report*, May 11, 2006; Stephen Blank, "Reading Putin's Military Tea Leaves," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, May 19, 2006.

every study of the increasingly difficult Russia-EU relationship, for example.<sup>567</sup> Moreover, as noted above, “It is clearly fundamental that NATO wants to cooperate with Russia across a broad front. One only has to consider the Alliance’s near-continuous outreach.”<sup>568</sup> NATO Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer said as much in a speech to the Institute of Europe in Moscow on June 24, 2005, where he stated:

NATO is Russia’s partner in security, and this partnership can go as far as the Russian government, and ultimately the Russian people, are prepared to take it. If you doubt this, consider the fact that NATO is currently conducting five ongoing missions to maintain peace and stability in Kosovo and Afghanistan, to build the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, to promote defense reform, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to help defend, deter, and protect against terrorism through maritime operations in the Mediterranean. All five of these missions enjoy the active support of the Russian Federation, whether through votes in the UN Security Council or through the active contribution of military forces or logistical support. Our interests coincide more than ever before. And I am sure that NATO’s support to the African Union in Darfur also will meet with active Russian approval. But in broader, strategic terms, NATO’s overall objective to expand security and stability, based upon shared democratic values, throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, is difficult without robust cooperation with Russia. Effective responses to Russia’s real national security threats are equally impossible without cooperation with NATO Allies, using mechanisms like the NATO-Russia council. The future is in your hands and the hands of your political leadership.<sup>569</sup>

Russia, on the other hand, clearly still cannot decide whether to cooperate seriously with NATO or to impose restrictions upon this cooperation that undermine its potential benefits for all concerned parties.

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<sup>567</sup> Oksana Antonenko and Katherine Pinnick, eds., *Russia and the European Union*, London and New York, Routledge and the IISS, 2005; Dov Lynch, ed., *What Russia Sees*, Chaillot Paper, No. 74, Paris, Institute for European Security Studies of the European Union, 2005; Andrew Monaghan, “A Sea Change and Its Undercurrents: Russian Perspectives of European Military Integration,” *World Defence Systems*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 2005, pp. 67-68.

<sup>568</sup> Donald and Yarymovych, p. 4.

<sup>569</sup> Brussels, Press Release of “Speech Given by NATO Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer at the Institute of Europe in Moscow on 24 June,” Brussels, June 24, 2005, *FBIS SOV*, June 25, 2005. [www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm](http://www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm)

In 2002, Russian, American, and European elites claimed to have agreed upon the goal of reuniting Russia with the West.<sup>570</sup> They also understood that realizing that goal would oblige the West to make Russia a full partner within the Euro-Atlantic world and duly take its interests into account.<sup>571</sup> Yet that concord has been dashed, and trends point in the other direction with partnership as far away as ever. This is not merely a matter of Russian estrangement from America. In fact, mutual EU-Russian skepticism and tension on economic, political, and military issues is pervasive and probably growing.<sup>572</sup> Russia visibly has renounced the strategic course towards integration proclaimed by President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in 2001-02. Both sides seem to be trapped in a spiral of mutual estrangement. As Dmitry Trenin recently wrote,

*Western relations with Russia can no longer be described in terms of integration, as it is traditionally understood, that is gradually drawing Russia into the Western institutional orbit. For that there is neither particular demand on the part of Russia nor sufficient supply on the part of the United States or NATO and the EU.*<sup>573</sup>

Indeed, Trenin argues that Russia does not want to *belong* to a larger institutional grouping.<sup>574</sup> Consequently, these are trying times for those who want Russia fully to reclaim what Putin called its European vocation and Europe's consequent reunification. Ultimately this is not only a recipe for the frustration of partnership and for remaining stuck in the mire of a bifurcated Europe, it also is a recipe for the further erosion of Russian security.

Russia can have security, prosperity, and democracy, or it can have insecurity, conflict, violence, and authoritarian poverty that insist on chasing after the wrecks of empire even as the country's demographic and other crises gallop out of control. As we saw above, partnership or true cohesion with NATO actually benefits its key defense industrial

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<sup>570</sup> The Twain Shall Meet, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 2.

<sup>571</sup> Ibid.

<sup>572</sup> Oksana Antonenko and Katherine Pinnick, eds., *Russia and the European Union*; Dov Lynch, ed., *What Russia Sees*; Monaghan.

<sup>573</sup> Dmitry Trenin, *Reading Russia Right*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, No. 42, October, 2005, p. 2.

<sup>574</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

sectors.<sup>575</sup> Moreover, as De Hoop Scheffer's speech indicates, NATO will not be found wanting if Russia seeks to expand the parameters of this partnership.

Nevertheless, the defense industrial sectors and the government still seem bewitched by empire and its autocratic and autarchic prerequisites. Russia can have a partner if it wants one, but it has to return to reality, for it cannot afford this empire and, in fact, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, it needs NATO and the EU more than they need it. More importantly, NATO, for all its reservations about Russia, is prepared to go as far to meet Russia, as Russia wants it to go.

First, Russia's current military reforms, despite seven strong years of growth, clearly indicate that its armed forces are still too large to be supported and must be reconfigured even more for domestic tasks of counterinsurgency and counter terrorism.<sup>576</sup> Their performance in Chechnya does not inspire one with confidence that they could perform well in an imperial mission.<sup>577</sup> Second, in fact, Europe and America subsidize Russia and its empire that could not otherwise exist. Russia can only maintain its empire by hidden and overt subsidies to CIS governments in energy or in the sale of Russian weapons at below market prices. It can afford to do this only by charging its European energy customers full market prices even as it refuses to charge those prices at home, despite EU pressures to do so. Thus the EU and NATO membership now subsidizes the Russian empire which otherwise would become totally insupportable. The same may be said of U.S. funding for the Nunn-Lugar or Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Despite its value, if Russia had to pay for all those programs on its own, it could not afford the rising outlays on its armed forces or their current bloated size.

Moscow fully understands this quandary. It even uses its inability to fund its own internal military requirements fully as a justification for imperialism and shifting the burden of maintaining Russian forces onto neighboring states like Georgia, as Ivanov's May 2005

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<sup>575</sup> Smolnikov, p. 59.

<sup>576</sup> See the sources cited in Blank, "Potemkin's Treadmill," pp. 174-205.

<sup>577</sup> Mark Kramer, "Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimensions of the Russian-Chechen Conflict," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. LVII, No. 2, March, 2005, pp. 209-290; Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya," *International Security*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, Winter 2004-05, pp. 5-63.

remarks on that subject indicate.<sup>578</sup> Yet the Russian leadership refuses to learn the full lesson emerging from these facts.

If Russia wants what it needs and what Europe has, peace, prosperity, and democracy, it has no choice but to embrace what James Sherr called its European choice.<sup>579</sup> There is no other way, no Russian Sonderweg or Osobyi Put'. The last such attempts died in Berlin, one in 1945 and the other in 1989, and Russia no longer has the means or the will to resurrect a new version. The West, however, does have such a vision; it is called democracy, no matter how many crimes and follies are committed in its name. NATO and the EU, each in their own way, embodies that vision. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Europe's people increasingly want those values and policies and not those of failed empires. There is good reason to believe that the Russian people not only want peace but its blessings, including democracy, even if they have their own particular definition of the term. Ultimately only this partnership, if allowed to flourish, can give it to them.

For that to happen, the ambivalence that now inhibits its realization must give way to genuine partnership. NATO does and must continue keep the door open to partnership, but it can only do so on its terms.

Whether Russia likes it or not, it neither can nor should be able to dictate the terms of that partnership because, as we saw above, its terms at best will freeze existing conflicts and bring neither peace, nor prosperity, nor security, not to mention democracy. But if Moscow insists on empire and autocracy as the condition of its partnership with Europe, e.g., a free hand to annex South Ossetia, Trans-Dniester, or Abkhazia, it is only repaving the road to the past. Therefore, what Moscow's terms might represent at worst is a possibility too awful to contemplate.

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<sup>578</sup> Interview with Sergei Ivanov," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 4, 2005 cited. [www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm](http://www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm)

<sup>579</sup> James Sherr, "The Dual Enlargements and Ukraine," Anatol Lieven and Dmitri V. Trenin, eds., *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 120.

## F. China-Russia Relations

In terms of both power and ideology, Russia, perhaps more than any other country, has good reason to see the rise of China as a threat. The historical decline of Russia and the steady rise of China in the past 20 years have been accompanied by a growing gap between the domestic political systems of the two nations. At the turn of the millennium, however, Sino-Russian relations are perhaps more equal and more mutually beneficial than they have been at any other time during the past 300 years.

In 2000, Putin told audiences in Russia's Maritime Province, "If we don't take concrete efforts, the future local population will speak Japanese, Chinese, or Korean."<sup>580</sup> Moscow knows that China is an economic and strategic rival whose rising power must be resisted, yet it is by no means certain that there is an adequate strategy for doing so.

Whereas Russia and China used to stand on the brink of nuclear war, with Russia prepared to launch a nuclear strike against China, now China and Russia have mutually pledged not to use nuclear weapons against one another. This is especially striking in that Russia recently dropped its no-first-use policy towards other countries. In July 2001, the two countries signed a major and comprehensive friendship treaty, 30 years after the first one expired on February 14, 1980.<sup>581</sup> China's historical rise and Russia's unprecedented peacetime decline during the last decade resulted in a structural equilibrium in relations.

The rise of China and the decline of Russia changed the balance of power in a relatively short period and left Russia more vulnerable than it had been at any time in the previous 3 centuries. The growing gap between the domestic political systems of Russia and China could easily become a source of conflict. Indeed, for much of the 1990s China was seen as a problem thanks to the combined influence of Russian realism (a mixture of Marxian

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<sup>580</sup> President Putin Urges Radical Changes in Policy in Russian Far East," ITAR-TASS, July 21, 2000.

<sup>581</sup> Yu, Bin Historical Ironies, Dividing Ideologies And Accidental "Alliance": Russian-Chinese Relations Into The 21st Century, **The Rise Of China In Asia: Security Implications Edited By Carolyn W. Pumphrey** P.106-110

materialism and Russian *realpolitik* thinking) and Russian multilateralism (a variation of Western Liberal institutionalism). Russians tended to hold the following views:<sup>582</sup>

- A growing Chinese challenge in the Asia-Pacific needed to be dealt with seriously.
- Russia's close ties with China were to counter the adverse developments in the European theater caused by NATO expansion and Russian weakness, not to counter the potential expansion of U.S. power in Asia.
- Russia did not need and could not afford a new area of hopeless confrontation in Asia after NATO expansion was absorbed in the West.
- Russia's vision of an Amultilateral world order actually viewed the U.S.-led alliances in East Asia as part of the multilateral institutional framework against which Russia should anchor its relations with China.
- After accepting a defeat in European security policy in the West, Russia badly needed to demonstrate its ability to cooperate with the United States and the West. It thought, moreover, that the United States might reward Russia for not opposing its goals in East

Thus, both historical experience and post-Cold War necessities set the stage for a more challenging bilateral relationship between Beijing and Moscow.


Despite this, China and Russia have developed much closer and more cooperative relations. It is certainly true that China and Russia have many political differences. It is also true that a considerable amount of geo-strategic "discomfort" has resulted from the radical shift of power balance between the two countries.

The reluctant strategic partnership between Russia and China can be further demonstrated by their insignificant and disappointing economic relations. Despite the rather rosy predictions made by both sides in the mid-1990s and ambitious goals to push annual bilateral trade to U.S.\$20 billion by the decade's end, two-way trade in 2000 was at an

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<sup>582</sup> *Ibid*, p.118.

insignificant level of \$8 billion, barely surpassing the 1993 level of \$7.7 billion. (See Figure 1.)



**Figure IV 1. Sino-Russian (Soviet) Trade, 1980-2000.**

Russian military sales to China have been a fast growing area of exchange. To date, Beijing and Moscow have completed some major transactions of military equipment including hundreds of *Sukhoi*-series jet fighters-bombers, ten Il-76 cargo planes, hundreds of S-300 anti-aircraft. Missiles (U.S. *Patriot* equivalent), helicopters, samples of Russia's main battle tanks and other armored vehicles, four *Kilo*-class conventional attack submarines, and two *Sovremenny*-class guided missile destroyers (with the powerful SS-N-22 *Sunburn* antiship cruise missiles). Meanwhile, more deals are reportedly being discussed, including a joint venture for developing China's own fighters; and the grant of a license to manufacture the *Kilo*-class submarine and nuclear-powered submarine, naval vessels, and nuclear and missile technology. These actual and possible Russian sales have been the largest foreign arms deliveries to the PRC since the early 1950s during the Sino-Soviet honeymoon.<sup>583</sup>



**Table IV. 1. Russian Arms Sales to China, 2001-2005**

<b>Equipment</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
Su-30MKK aircraft	2001	38
Kilo-class submarines	2002	up to 8
SOVREMENNYI II-class destroyers	2002	2
S-300PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system	2002	4 battalions
Su-30MK2 aircraft	2003	24
S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile system	2004	8 battalions
AL-31F aircraft engines for the F-10 fighter	2004	100
IL-76 transport aircraft	2004	10
RD-93 aircraft engines for the JF-17 fighter	2005	100
IL-76 transport aircraft	2005	40
IL-78 tanker aircraft	2005	8

**Source: Defense Intelligence Agency.**

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<sup>583</sup> *ibid*, p.148.

Note: Quantity indicates numbers of units in the purchase agreement. Actual deliveries may be spread across several years.

China's main goals are to buy Russian weaponry at minimal cost, obtain secure energy assets from it, and keep Russia sufficiently estranged from Washington and NATO to give China a free hand in Asia, which would ultimately include a predominant position in Central Asia.<sup>584</sup>

Ultimately, Russia cannot do much regarding China if it does not improve its domestic political and economic structures. Moscow's ambivalent China policy alone cannot help it regain its position in Asia, especially as China aims to prevent a rebirth of Russian power there. Internal reconstruction, which China cannot facilitate, must precede any revival of Russia's ability to play an independent role in Asia.<sup>585</sup>

At the geopolitical and geostrategic level, the current situation in East Asia points to a growing division between maritime powers (Japan and the United States) and their continental counterparts (China and Russia). The division distinguishes more advanced from relatively backward powers and established from emerging ones... Although neither Russia nor China intends to renew a 1950s-style alliance at the expense of their respective relations with the United States and Japan, nonetheless both are being driven in that direction in the rather chilly and unsettling post-Cold War Asia-Pacific climate.<sup>586</sup> At the beginning of the new millennium, both Russia and China are seriously alienated by the West. Despite the fact that the two are substantially Westernized, the Russians politically, and the Chinese economically.

Owing to the deterioration of relations with the U.S. after the end of the Cold War, China and Russia were able to assume the same position. In the process, China grew suspicious that the United States, in order to sustain its hegemony, was pushing for a blockade against China and a policy of interference on Chinese domestic affairs. In the case of Russia, it

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<sup>584</sup> Sergei Trush, *Russia's Response to the NATO Expansion: China Factor* (Moscow: NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships 1997–1999, 1999).

<sup>585</sup> Stephen Blank, *Asia's Shifting Strategic Landscape What is Russia to Asia?*, *Orbis*, Fall 2003, pp.584-585.

<sup>586</sup> Bin Yu, *East Asia: Geopolitique Into the 21st Century: A Chinese View*, *Occasional paper*, Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, June 1990, pp. 3- 8.

adopted pro-Western policy in efforts to gain support from the West in the initial stage of its transition to market economy. However, the United States did not recognize Russia's geopolitical vested rights, and weakened Russia's influence through NATO's eastward policy.<sup>587</sup>

The NATO bombing of Kosovo intensified the sense of crisis in both China and Russia for the following reasons: The armed intervention was carried out under a new doctrine in which humanitarian reasons took precedence over sovereignty. Moreover, the incident reconfirmed the overwhelming supremacy of American military power. Lastly, the military intervention was carried out on the basis of an arbitrary decision of the U.S. and Britain, bypassing the United Nations. China and Russia feared that if they overlooked the matter, it would provide justification for outside intervention in Chechnya, Taiwan, and Tibet, and even the issue of their own sovereignty.<sup>588</sup>

We may divide the relationship since normalization into three periods. The first, from 1989 to 1992, was one of considerable bilateral turbulence amid the repercussions of Tiananmen and the collapse of the European Communist Party states; only skilled diplomacy was able to salvage the relationship. The period from 1992 through 1999 focused on building a "constructive strategic partnership toward the 21st Century," as both countries explored the possibility of forming a Eurasian counterweight to looming American hegemony.<sup>589</sup>

Despite changes in the strategic environment leading to closer cooperation between Russia and China in the short term, lagging Sino-Russian economic relations, the growing potential for Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia, and continuing distrust of China in the Russian border regions all set the scene for a more fluid Sino-Russian relationship in the new millennium.<sup>590</sup>

## 1. The Conditions After The End of The Cold War

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<sup>587</sup> Lee Nam-ju, From Partnership to Alliance? The Development of Sino-Russian Relations, **East Asian Review** Vol.13, No.1, Spring 2001, p.58.

<sup>588</sup> *ibid*, p.59

<sup>589</sup> Lowell Dittmer, The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle, **Journal of Chinese Political Science**, vol. 10, no. 1, April 2005, p.12.

<sup>590</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy From Brezhnev to Yeltsin*, University of Washington Press 2001, p.150

In Europe the end of the Cold War had a grave impact on European security. In East Europe and South Europe, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated. National and ethnic conflict intensified. In the Balkan Peninsula, national and ethnic clashes led to massive war. In Russia, the separatist war in Chechnya still goes on and there is no sign of a settlement in the near future. However, in Asia the situation is quite different. The end of the Cold War brought the Asian–Pacific region unprecedented peace and prosperity. After the Cold War, the United States changed its former policy of countering and containing the Soviet Union. This was replaced by a policy of keeping a balance of regional force, preventing a force vacuum and regional hegemony against the United States from emerging. Russia reduced its armaments dramatically and withdrew most of its military force from the Far East area. Meanwhile, China devotes itself to economic reform and development, pursues a good-neighbor foreign policy, and keeps stable and friendly relations with surrounding countries. The interrelationship among the powers of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan is generally stable and developing in the direction of improvement, although there is not complete harmony among these four big nations. Relations between the United States and Japan have improved further, and their alliance relationship remains a most important factor in the security issues of the Asian–Pacific region. In South Asia, although the relations between India and Pakistan continue to be strained, the countries in the area are pursuing economic reform at various rates, giving priority to development and strengthening global national power; this promotes the stability of South Asia. The participation of ASEAN in Asian–Pacific regional affairs as a whole plays a more and more important and positive role in promoting peace and stability in region as time goes on.<sup>591</sup>

In the transition phase at the end of the Cold War, the attention paid was high, it was a question, however, of allaying the central danger of the old era, the intercontinental nuclear war. The American-Soviet (later Russian) talks received a lot of attention. This also applied to the period directly afterwards when the news of "loose nukes" worried the public. Thereafter, the debate cooled off noticeably. The various proposals for extensive or comprehensive nuclear disarmament in the mid-1990's were already more or less the pure concern of experts and failed to interest the public, the highly technical character of these concepts would have surely contributed to this, too. Towards the end of the 1990's, there

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<sup>591</sup> Renyi Cao, *ibid.* p.5.

was just a very limited spell of public excitement about the Test Ban Treaty and its rejection, which was not enough, however, to lead to a really wide debate. Soon after that, September 11th dominated the picture. By bringing together the terror risk, nuclear threat, proliferation and its own deterrence ability, the Bush government gave the impression of a competent and active response to a big threat. Vested with this trust, the government went about dismantling the multilateral, cooperative security policy scarcely unhindered. We are now facing the paradoxical result that the institutional mechanisms of American democracy have annulled the effectiveness of the most important mechanism for a peaceful democratic nature, the informed public debate.<sup>592</sup>

The ‘end of the Cold War’ declarations made at the US-USSR summit in Malta (1989) and at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris (1990), were based on such clear facts in the Euro-Atlantic region as, for instance, remarkable progress in US-USSR arms reduction talks, democratization of the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries, the collapse of the Berlin wall and reunification of Germany. However, on what basis did the Cold War end in the Asia-Pacific? Indeed, with collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), it may be possible to say that the Cold War has fundamentally vanished, both in ideology and in political forms. Yet, it does not seem to provide enough ground for ending the Cold War in the Asia Pacific region, whose situation is much more complex than that of Europe.<sup>593</sup>

## **2. Competition in the Pacific**

The Asian–Pacific region contains thirty-one countries. The basic geopolitical numerology of this region can be summarized as “one superpower (the United States),” “two economic powers (the United States and Japan),” “three political powers (the United States, Russia, and China),” “four military powers (the United States, Russia, China, and Japan),” and “five main political forces (the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)).” There are great differences among the countries in the region in terms of social systems, historical traditions, ethnic communities and religion, levels of economic development, national strength, and foreign policy, and so forth; but

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<sup>592</sup> Harald Müller, Annette Schaper, *US Nuclear Policy After the Cold War*, PRIF, Frankfurt 2004, p.61

<sup>593</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945*, Nissan Institute, New York 1998.,p.194

these countries also have a lot of common interests. So the interrelationships among them are very complicated, and need careful and skillful handling.<sup>594</sup>

The United States objectives in the Asia-Pacific are quite different from Europe. While the end of the Cold war had resulted in the emergence of a cooperative security milieu in Europe, the Asia-Pacific strategic environment features signs of competitive rivalries amidst the prevalence of economic cooperation. Hence the central purpose of US has thus been to augmenting the capabilities of its ally's viz., Japan, South Korea, and Australia who have mutual defense agreements with the US. These agreements have contributed to regional stability and deterred crises. The United States has also been strengthening its special relations with Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines for interoperable missions and access facilities. It has been engaging with Malaysia and Indonesia to strengthen capabilities in the war against terror.<sup>595</sup>

The United States is the most important political force in the Asian-Pacific region. After the Second World War, the United States became a trinary (political, economic, and military) superpower. Relying on its strong military force, especially its strong navy, the United States controlled the Pacific Ocean and looked upon it as its "inland lake." It then seeped into the continent of Asia, pushed its "defense frontier" to the Pacific island chain area, and deployed a lot of troops in the Asian-Pacific region. Its political, economic and military influence extended over the whole Asian-Pacific region. In the northeast Asian area, the United States signed a "Common Defense Agreement" with Japan and South Korea. In Southeast Asia, the United States organized a military alliance treaty. In South Asia, the United States also had its influence through foreign aid and later via nuclear nonproliferation policy. After the Vietnam War, the United States became more cautious about military intervention in areas of peripheral interest. And geographical distance allowed this luxury once the United States absorbed the lesson of the Vietnam War. Given its oncoming decline in relative economic strength over the next half century, the United States won't be able to dominate Asian-Pacific affairs as it did during the Cold War. But at present, the United States is still the strongest country in the Asian-Pacific region and continues to maintain about one hundred thousand troops in Asia. It plays a very important

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<sup>594</sup> Cao, Renyi, Vision of Security of The Asian-Pacific Region. **ACDIS Occasional Papers**, p.1

<sup>595</sup> Vijay Sakhuja, **ibid**, p.3

role in Asian–Pacific region affairs, especially in evolution of the Korean Peninsula situation.<sup>596</sup>

The US chose Japan to balance China because of the following reasons. (1) They have identical positions towards the issue of Taiwan: Both believe that “the no unification, no independence and no war” situation would serve their own national interests best and therefore is the most favorable strategic option. (2) Japan and the US have reached consensus on the excuse (guarding against the DPRK) and real cause (China) of deploying TMD and already have begun joint research and development of the system. (3) Japan hopes to realize its ambition of restoring a big political and military power through the support of the US while the latter hopes Japan could continue to share its political responsibility and military bills in Asia. They do need each other. (4) Speaking from geopolitics, economic strength, and Sino-US-Japan triangular relations, the US and Japan have other common grounds and needs in containing China.<sup>597</sup>

The main approach adopted by the US to win over Japan is to strengthen the US-Japan military alliance. In 1996, the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security claimed that the US-Japan alliance would continue to serve as the corner stone for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century. In 1997, the new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation were introduced. Two years later, the Japanese Diet passed three bills related to the new Guidelines, which provided detailed approaches to enhance the Japan-US alliance. The US hopes to realize its long-term strategic goals of “maintaining a US presence, containing China, and constraining Japan” by converting the US-Japan alliance into a “NATO in Asia”.<sup>598</sup>

In Asia, Russia’s overriding security interests are tied to the fate of the vast portion of its territory in Siberia (especially land-locked eastern Siberia) and the Russian Far East, which lies between Lake Baikal and the Pacific coast and directly borders on China, Korea, Japan, and the United States (in the Bering Strait). If Russia is unable to come up with a working model of regional development suited to the new market environment at home and the international reality of globalization, it will inevitably lead to the progressive

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<sup>596</sup> Cao, Renyi, *ibid*

<sup>597</sup> XIN Benjian, Security Dilemma, Balance of Power Vs. US Policy Towards China in the Post-Cold War Era, Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), september 2001, p.7

deindustrialization, depopulation, and overall degradation of Asiatic Russia. The lingering fear among Russia's elites and the general public is that, if the country does not prove itself capable of developing a few million square miles of this resource-rich area, someone else will—usually assumed to be China. A Russia that does not extend east of the Urals will then cease to be the Russia the world knows today and will become the Russia that was Muscovy.<sup>599</sup>

Meeting this challenge will have little to do with traditional security arrangements. When and if the Chinese come, they are more likely to arrive as peaceful settlers and laborers, not as a military force. The Chinese are increasingly interested in Russian energy resources in particular, but they would prefer business deals to any form of occupation. The danger for Russia lays not so much in the loss of territory but in the failure to develop it properly. Rather than shut itself out, Russia should open itself up and proceed to integrate its regional (i.e., Siberian and Far Eastern) and national market with the powerful economies of Northeast Asia—China, Japan (a key potential partner for Asiatic Russia's modernization), and South Korea—as well as the wider Pacific rim, from Canada and Alaska to the western continental United States and beyond. At this point, Russia has realized that its energy resources make the country a desirable partner for its immediate neighbors, but Moscow is still uncertain as to how to deal with China and Japan, which are actually competing for Russian oil. To become part of the dynamic Northeast Asian region and to reverse the trend toward degradation of the Far Eastern/Siberian region, Moscow needs a comprehensive outreach and integration strategy, which it still lacks.<sup>600</sup>

More than 300 years of territorial/border disputes between Russia and China came to an end in the fourth quarter with the signing of the Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line of their 4,300-kilometer border. At year's end, Taiwan's Russia-born former first lady (1978-88) Faina (Epatcheva Vakhreva) Chiang died at the age of 88, ending the final Russian/Soviet touch on China's turbulent 20th century.<sup>601</sup>

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<sup>598</sup> XIN Benjian, *ibid.* p.7

<sup>599</sup> Dmitri Trenin, **Russia and Global Security Norms**, *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2004 pp.72-73.

<sup>600</sup> *ibid.*, 72

<sup>601</sup> Yu Bin, *End of History? What's Next?*, *Comparative Connections*, 4th Quarter 2004 Vol. 6, No. 4 January 2005, p.145.



Life after “history,” however, continued with both strategic cooperation and competition throughout their bilateral relationship. The quarter saw Russian President Putin’s third official visit to China, which was accompanied by record bilateral trade (\$20 billion in 2004) and fresh momentum in military-military relations (a joint military exercise in 2005 and upgrading Russian military transactions to China). But what really ended on the last day of the year was Russia’s indecision regarding an oil pipeline to China. On Dec. 31, Russia’s prime minister approved a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Industry and Energy Ministry to build an oil pipeline from Taishet in East Siberia to the Perevoznaya Bay in the Pacific Primorsk region, without a word about China nor a branch to Daching.<sup>602</sup>

Largely because of the breakthrough in, or disappearance of, the border issue, Putin described his talks with Hu Jintao as “a summit of breakthrough decisions.” The joint

communiqué, however, casts a less glowing light on the agreement calling it “a political win-win, balanced, and reasonable solution” for the two sides. For his part, President Hu seemed to be more concerned about post-settlement bilateral ties.<sup>603</sup>

### **3. Shangai Cooperation Organization**

Russia leaders think that they reduce the influence of the USA and Japna in Asia Pacific by increasing Russia’s involment in the regional organizations. The SCO, established in June 2001, grew out of the “Shanghai five” group. Today the members of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Krygzhistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The permanent secretariat headquarters of the organization are in Beijing, which reflects influence of China. SCO mainly focuses on nontraditional security threats like terrorism and in 2003; the SCO expanded its focus to compromise economic cooperation

The cooperation of the “Shanghai Five” developed through the border arrangement has doubtlessly contributed to the great success in regional security, particularly in Russo-Chinese security, which has yet to be declared a political problem. The “Shanghai Five” entered a new phase at the Almaty summit in 1998 in terms of both quality and quantity.

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<sup>602</sup> Ibid

The summit began to be held regularly every year and broadened the scope of cooperation between the member states.<sup>604</sup>

The Shanghai Five came as a natural reaction to the serious threat that the Central Asian region would become an area of permanent instability following an upsurge of international terrorism, religious extremism and national separatism.

The process began in 1989 with negotiations on confidence-building measures on the Soviet- Chinese border to bolster the talks already under way between the USSR and the People's Republic of China on border issues. These negotiations were later transformed into talks on confidence-building measures and armed forces cuts between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan on the one hand, and China on the other. This enabled the five countries to create a climate of trust and security throughout the entire length of the former Soviet-Chinese border and to provide pre-requisites for further constructive cooperation within the Five. The agenda began to feature other items: issues of a general political and economic nature, security, economics, and so on, which suggested that a new model of regional cooperation had emerged.<sup>605</sup>

Against the backdrop of political multi-polarization, and economic and information globalization in the 21st century, the presidents firmly believed that to transform the "Shanghai Five" mechanism into a higher level of cooperation will help member states to share opportunities and deal with new challenges and threats more effectively, according to the Declaration.<sup>606</sup>

On the basis of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in 1996 in Shanghai and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in 1997 in Moscow, the SCO plans to expand cooperation among the member states in political, economic and trade, cultural, scientific and technological and other fields. The principles

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<sup>603</sup> *ibid*

<sup>604</sup> IWASHITA Akihiro, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of "Partnership" after the Post-Cold War Period*, p.264.

<sup>605</sup> Yevgeny KOZHOKIN, *Shanghai Five: Present Realities And Future Prospects*, **Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies**, p.1.

<sup>606</sup> Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (6/15/2001) Monterey Institute of International Studies 2002, p.1.

embodied in the above two treaties determine the basis of the relationship among the SCO member states, the Declaration said.<sup>607</sup>

1. The SCO has completed building of institution and legal framework, which ensures its effective functioning.

2. It has carried out close security cooperation focusing on addressing non-traditional security threats and challenges such as fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking.

3. It has adopted a long-term plan, set direction for regional economic cooperation and identified the goal, priority areas and major tasks of economic cooperation among member states. It has set up the SCO Business Council and the Interbank Association.

4. Following the principles of openness, non-alliance and not targeting at any third party, it has actively engaged in dialogue, exchange and cooperation of various forms with countries and international organisations that, like the SCO, are ready to carry out cooperation on an equal and constructive basis with mutual respect to safeguard regional peace, security and stability.<sup>608</sup>

The SCO also provides the sort of structure that some international relations theorists have identified as important for effective regional integration. These theorists have emphasized that successful regionalism does not depend necessarily on shared political systems, political rights or economic policy settings. It does depend on the creation of new supranational organs that promote political cooperation and harmonization at the international level. This political regionalism does not necessarily depend on economic integration. Particular forms of economic cooperation can become the primary field of policy through which that political harmonization occurs. But security policy is another important potential field through which such political harmonization can occur.<sup>609</sup>

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<sup>607</sup> *ibid*, p.2

<sup>608</sup> Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Shanghai, 15 June 2006) p.1.

<sup>609</sup> Dr Greg Austin, **European Union Policy Responses to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization**, European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), 02/2004 – p.6.

'The six countries that constitute the SCO cover 30 million square kilometres - 60 per cent of continental Europe and Asia - and have a combined population of 1.5 billion - about one quarter of the world population. From a strategic perspective, a Sino-Russian axis is a formidable combination. Central Asia added to it makes the alliance a serious contender for power and influence in the evolving global scenario.'<sup>610</sup>

After an initial period of halting growth, the S.C.O. has emerged as an alliance serving as an effective vehicle for Beijing's and Moscow's geopolitical aims. Look for the alliance to continue to further the interests of the Moscow-Beijing axis as long as those two power centers are careful to maintain their accord and the regimes in Central Asia depend on the axis for political support. As the S.C.O. grows in strength, Washington's influence in Central Asia will diminish.<sup>611</sup>

### **G. September 11 and Russian-US Relations**

For global integration, the tragic events of September 2001 may be seen as a catalyst of integration on the basis of September 11 and Russian-US Relations

The aftermath of the terrorist attacks in September 2001 has opened a window of opportunity for the Russian-American relationship. This theme has been prevalent in many commentaries. Peter Rutland, however, suggests that if Putin's unprecedented cooperation with Washington assumed a weakened America willing to forge a partnership with Russia on equal terms, abandon unilateralism, and embrace multipolarity, Moscow is headed for a rude awakening.

Analysis of Putin's worldview, however, suggests that he is not inclined to look at all international problems exclusively through the lens of multipolarity. If examined through the lens of Russia's need joint struggle against common threats.

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<sup>610</sup> Khalid Hasan, 'Where American liberalism stops', Dawn, 28 January 2002, p.4

<sup>611</sup> Michael A. Weinstein, **Intelligence Brief: Shanghai Cooperation Organization**, 12 July 2005, Power and Interest Research Group PINR, p.2.

Putin surprised many Russian nationalists and even his own defense minister when, in the wake of the September 11 attacks in the United States, he agreed to the establishment of coalition military bases in Central Asia before and during the US-led Invasion of Afghanistan. Russian nationalists objected to the establishment of any US military presence on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and had expected Putin to keep the US out of the Central Asian republics, or at the very least extract a commitment from Washington to withdraw from these bases as soon as the immediate military purpose had passed.

Actually the reason why had Russia joined the anti-terror coalition and why does Russia disagree with the US proposal of the pre-emptive strike on Iraq lie, in perception of global system that connects the “war against terror” with the Chechen war and NATO enlargement eastward as well as the whole set of global security, disarmament and arms reduction problems with the perception of identifiable threats, risks and dangers.<sup>612</sup> Vladimir Rukavishnikov argues that the Russian perception of the American war on terror is linked with popular attitudes toward President Putin's foreign policy and a change of attitudes toward the USA occurred in the post-Cold war period.<sup>613</sup>

During the Iraq crisis of 2003, Putin opposed Washington's move to invade Iraq without the benefit of a United Nations Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force. After the official end of the war was announced, American president George W. Bush asked the United Nations to lift sanctions on Iraq. Putin supported lifting of the sanctions in due course, arguing that the UN commission first be given a chance to complete its work on the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

During the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, Putin visited Ukraine twice before the election to show his support for Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and congratulated him on his alleged victory before official election results. Putin's direct support for Yanukovich was criticized by some commentators as unwarranted interference in the affairs of post-Soviet Ukraine.

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<sup>612</sup>James M. Goldgeier, Ne Zaman Değil, Kim?, NATO Review, Türkçe, İlkbahar 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/turkish/art2.html>

<sup>613</sup> Vladimir Rukavishnikov “*The Russian Perception of the American ‘War on Terror’*” Working Paper, **Copenhagen Peace Research Institute** September 2002, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ruv02/ruv02.html>

Russian oil products can be exported to foreign markets by three routes: Western Europe via the Baltic Sea and Black Sea; the northern route; the Far East to China or Japan and East Asian markets. Russia has oil terminals on the Baltic at St Petersburg and a newly expanded oil terminal at Primorsk. There are additional oil terminals under construction at Vysotsk, Batareynaya Bay and Ust-Luga.

Russia's state-owned natural-gas pipeline network, its so-called "unified gas-transportation system", includes a vast network of pipelines and compressor stations extending more than 150,000 km. across Russia. By law only the state-owned Gazprom is allowed to use the pipelines, which make the heart of Putin's new natural-gas geopolitics and the focus of conflict with Western oil and gas companies as well as the European Union, whose energy commissioner, Andras Piebalgs, is from new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member Latvia, formerly part of the Soviet Union<sup>614</sup>.

In 2001, Washington found a way to bring the Baltic republics into NATO, Putin backed the development of a major new oil port on the Russian coast of the Baltic Sea in Primorsk at a cost of USD 2.2 billion<sup>615</sup>. This project, known as the "Baltic Pipeline System" (BPS), greatly decreases export dependency on Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The Baltic is Russia's main oil-export route, carrying crude oil from Russia's West Siberia and Timan-Pechora oil provinces westward to the port of Primorsk on the Gulf of Finland. The BPS was completed in March with capacity to carry more than 1.3 million barrels per day of Russian oil to Western markets in Europe and beyond.

In 2006, former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was named chairman of a Russian-German consortium building a natural-gas pipeline going some 1,200km under the Baltic Sea. Majority shareholder in this North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) project, with 51%, is the Russian state-controlled Gazprom, the world's largest natural-gas company. The German companies BASF and E.ON each hold 24.5%. The project, estimated to cost USD 5.8 billion, was started in late 2005 and will connect the gas terminal at the Russian port city of Vyborg on the Baltic near St Petersburg with the Baltic city of Greifswald in eastern Germany.

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<sup>614</sup> Engdahl, F William, "The Emerging Russian Giant, Part 2 – Washington's Nightmare", Asian Times, 2006. [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\\_Asia/HJ26Ag01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HJ26Ag01.html)

<sup>615</sup> Engdahl, F William, The Emerging Russian Giant..., Ibid.

The Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field in West Siberia will be developed in a joint venture between Gazprom and BASF to feed the pipeline. It was Gerhard Schroeder's last major act as chancellor, and received protest from the pro-Washington Polish government, as well as Ukraine, as both countries stood to lose control over pipeline flows from Russia. Despite her close ties to the US administration of President George W Bush, Chancellor Angela Merkel has been forced to accept the project<sup>616</sup>.

In 2005, Putin and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder negotiated the construction of a major oil pipeline over the Baltic exclusively between Russia and Germany. Schröder also attended Putin's 53rd birthday in Saint Petersburg the same year. That is Putin's affords to get closer with Europe reflects a policy to balance US from different points. Although Putin will not be candidate for presidential elections 2008 the foreign policy line would probably be followed by the new president no matter who he or she would be.<sup>617</sup>

Realism is about power and its distribution. For classical realists, the drive for power and the selfish character of that drive stems from human nature, which is acquisitive and self-interested. In a world where security has the key and principal importance, the kind of power that matters most is political and military power, not economic, social, cultural power(s). Realists are also interested in material strength. The road to peace in such a world is to stand against power-hungry states and their leaders with sufficient opposition power to deter them. The most famous mechanism for this is the balance of power mechanism in which several states ally to counterbalance the power of a would-be hegemon<sup>618</sup>. The essential point here is that strength deters, and that power underwrites the peace. Placing hope in treaties and international laws and the spread of democracy amount to dangerous dreaming.

According to Mearsheimer, world politics is a jungle, and every great power a jungle cat. When there is a rough balance of power, they may hold each other in check. But now and then one state pulls ahead. In this situation of 'unbalanced multipolarity', it usually makes a run for regional hegemony. Most powers are too weak to try, but these 'still act

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<sup>616</sup> Engdahl, F William, *The Emerging Russian Giant...*, Ibid.

<sup>617</sup> Sinan Ogan, *Putin 2008'de Aday Olmayacak*, Türkiye Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 30 Sept 2005. <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?yazi=523&kat=1>

offensively to amass as much power as [they] can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power'. The choice is to eat or be eaten. Even gambles such as Hitler's can be reasonable, since blocking coalitions may not form in time, and 'the security benefits of hegemony are enormous' if they pay off<sup>619</sup>.

Mearsheimer is not just saying that states seize opportunities to expand on the cheap. The debate between offensive and defensive realists is often cast as whether states seek to expand or try to preserve the status quo<sup>620</sup>, but this description of defensive realism is – or at any rate should be – a straw man. Fareed Zakaria's finding that around the end of the nineteenth century '[t]he United States did not expand against strong states that posed a great threat . . . but largely against areas that were weak'<sup>621</sup> is just what defensive realism should predict. Whether a given act of aggression was reasonable or excessive may sometimes be a matter of opinion.

The US – Russia relations under the conceptualization made above in the post September 11 period is a matter of Russia's ability to establish alternative power pole(s) against the seemingly-only super power U.S. and the ability to re-establish a balance of power against the U.S. with her<sup>622</sup> natural allies such as China, Germany and France against a hegemon unipolar world shaped by the U.S.

## 1. Great Power Policy

At the heart of the new foreign policy was the idea of Russia as a 'normal great power', one 'that does not rely on threats (like the USSR) but at the same time knows how to live in a world that is not conflict-free'.<sup>623</sup> The notion of 'great power' is itself contentious, and Russia's claims to be one inevitably alarmed its neighbors. While the idea of 'normality' in this context acted as a normative acknowledgement of acceptable forms of behaviors, it could not be anything but ambiguous.

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<sup>618</sup> Michael J. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, Idealist', *International Affairs*, 79: 3, 2003, pp. 503 - 522.

<sup>619</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001, pp. 2–3, 33–5, 44–5, 211–13, 233, ch. 9.

<sup>620</sup> Colin Elman, 'Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?' *Security Studies*, 6 (Autumn 1996), pp. 27-28.

<sup>621</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 184.

<sup>622</sup> Russia's



Different conceptions of Russian national interest were reflected in contradictory foreign policies. Policy was torn between, on the one hand, an approach that stressed great power rivalries and its associated concept of the balance of power and, on the other hand, a view based on the concept of interdependence, global economic integration and mutual security regimes.

Although liberals insisted that Russia's identity and national interests would be forged not in global struggle with the West but in developing a new political and economic order at home, those of a more nationalist disposition insisted that Russia should not shirk its historical responsibilities as the core of an alternative order to that of the West, as the obstacle to the allegedly hegemonic ambitions of the sole remaining superpower and its allies, and as the protector of smaller nations (Serbia, Iraq, Cuba). These fundamental policy divergences were exacerbated by the difficulty in setting priorities in a confused and weakly accountable institutional setting.

The government pursued not so much a multi-polar as a multi-directional, if not outright amorphous, foreign policy. There were positive aspects to this, however, in the sense that the aggressive rhetoric of certain nationalist and neo-communist groups was tempered by public opinion, conflicts between elites and interest groups, and tensions between institutions. The Russian case seems to demonstrate that democratization does not necessarily provoke aggressive foreign policies. The redefinition of national interest proved to be an open-ended process in which the struggle between liberal and national-patriotic approaches reflected the larger struggle over Russia's own identity and place in the world. Putin's liberal patriotic approach sought to finesse these differences if not to overcome the contradictions.

In short, Putin's moves may be interpreted as repositioning tension from the space between behavior and identity, as was the case when Primakov shaped Russia's foreign policy, to a tension within identity itself. Tension now exists between external and internal components of identity- between an external, "Westernized" identity projected into the international arena and an internal, "Eurasian" component of identity understood within the state itself. Indications of change in this internal aspect of identity and its gradual "Westernization"

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<sup>623</sup> Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, London: Routledge, 3rd ed., 2002, pp.372-375

may increase in years to come. This Westernizing trend could eventually dominate domestic discourse and encourage acceptance not only by all major political actors but also a transformation of popular attitudes regarding Russia's relation to the West.

#### **a. New U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement**

Russian President Vladimir Putin (On June 27 2006) proposed to begin talks with the United States on replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), set to expire in 2009.<sup>624</sup> Calling for a "renewed dialogue on the main disarmament issues," Putin did not provide any specifics on the kind of agreement he was seeking; nor was there any direct response from Washington, although U.S. officials say they plan to work with Russia on the issue.

Therefore, it seems valuable to look at whether it might make sense to replace START and what role such an agreement could play in the arms control context of the 21st century.

U.S. and Russian officials must first decide if they should replace START, extend it, or allow it to expire. They will have to take into account significant changes in the strategic landscape, particularly the implementation of the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which will be in force until 2012. That treaty went beyond START in calling for deeper cuts. But it does not include a verification mechanism or arrangements for the destruction of launchers or delivery vehicles. Instead, its only verification provisions are those of START.<sup>625</sup>

Putin's call should be supported by the United States. By maintaining transparency in strategic areas, a new or extended START would increase both countries' confidence in

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<sup>624</sup> Putin held a meeting with ambassadors and permanent representatives of the Russian Federation in Moscow at the Foreign Ministry on June 27, 2006.

<sup>625</sup> Both the U.S. and Russian governments issued statements that they would use the existing START inspection mechanism to verify SORT. President George W. Bush mentioned in the SORT letter of transmittal to the U.S. Senate that "the Parties will use the comprehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the "START Treaty") to provide the foundation for confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions." A similar answer was given by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "the [SORT] Treaty contains an important clause confirming that the START-1 Treaty remains in force.... Thus, a close link is being established between the two treaties - START-1 and the new Treaty.... Thus, the thoroughly developed verification mechanism it provides for, which makes it possible to sufficiently accurately trace the state of affairs in the strategic arsenals of the sides, will be operative as well."

their broader relationship, which continues to be tested.<sup>626</sup> It would also demonstrate the two nuclear superpowers' commitment to Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which calls for nuclear-weapon states to take steps toward nuclear disarmament, thus strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Still, squaring the quite diverse political and diplomatic goals of the United States and Russia in any negotiations could prove exceedingly difficult.

### **b. Behind Putin's Call for Talks**

Putin's June 27 proposal came soon after he revealed his disappointment to the Russian parliament that disarmament issues had vanished from the international agenda. Although in his annual address in May, he had said it was "too early to speak of an end to the arms race."

That dialogue has languished after conclusion of SORT. Russia had hoped that talks in two bodies established the same day that SORT was signed—the Consultative Group on Strategic Stability (CGSS) and the Bilateral Implementation Commission would work out existing disagreements on strategic arms issues.

These hopes have not yet been realized. Indeed, the offensive transparency working groups under the CGSS stopped meeting after January 2005. Russia is also concerned that if START were to lapse, some limitations on the development of new types of strategic arms, including some space weapons, would disappear as well.

The Bush administration has appeared reluctant to engage in such discussions, viewing U.S.-Russian strategic arms control as passé after the end of the Cold War. U.S. officials argued that such pacts were designed to manage relations between adversaries, and recent years had seen the emergence of a new U.S.-Russian partnership. Indeed, only a push from Congress and the Kremlin forced the White House to reluctantly accede to the three-page SORT.

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626 Nikolai Zlobin, "Russia and the U.S. —What's Next?" Center for Defence Information, November 2, 2005; Peter Baker, "Russian Relations Under Scrutiny," *The Washington Post*, February 26, 2006, p. A1.

Yet, there have been some recent signs that the Bush administration's attitude toward strategic talks may be changing. In a May 2006 interview with *Arms Control Today*, STRATCOM Commander General James Cartwright spoke strongly in favor of transforming or extending the START verification regime.<sup>627</sup> The same month, Robert Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told *Arms Control Today* that he and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak had formed a group to look at the issue of START's expiration.<sup>628</sup> Later, Kislyak himself not only confirmed this fact but also hinted at a June 2006 press conference that there are hopes for progress in negotiations. At the July 2006 Group of Eight meeting in St. Petersburg, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that President George W. Bush and Putin had asked their bureaucracies to review the implementation of START. A Putin aide said that the U.S. and Russian presidents "briefly discussed and outlined what needs to be done" in relation to START.

Since SORT lacks appropriate verification provisions it is clear that in order to retain the existing level of transparency of their strategic forces, the United States and Russia have to replace START or simply extend the current treaty. Given the Bush administration's allergy to new arms control agreements, the easiest alternative by far would be to extend START for five more years. This option is especially attractive because it does not require long negotiations and subsequent ratification by the parties. Article XVII of START allows states-parties Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States<sup>629</sup> to gather and consider the problem of START's future no later than a year before it ends, or December 2008. However, there are problems that may become insurmountable obstacles to a simple START extension.

## **2. U.S. and Russian Strategic Modernization**

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<sup>627</sup> Wade Boese and Miles Pomper, "Strategic Decisions: An Interview With STRATCOM Commander General James E. Cartwright," *Arms Control Today*, June 2006, pp. 6-11.

<sup>628</sup> Wade Boese and Miles Pomper, "Reshaping the U.S. Non-Proliferation Strategy: An Interview with the Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph," *Arms Control Today*, June 2006, pp. 18-22.

<sup>629</sup> START was signed July 31, 1991, by the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union's breakup later that year, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine became the successors to the treaty. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred all of their nuclear weapons to Russia and eliminated their strategic platforms and infrastructure in accordance with START provisions.

U.S. and Russian efforts to modernize their strategic offensive forces pose one set of problems. The 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review placed a strong priority on converting excess U.S. strategic delivery systems for use as conventional-weapon carriers. Some of these plans will likely collide with START constraints.

The Department of Defense has requested funding from Congress to deploy conventional ballistic missiles at sea, using precision warheads delivered from Trident nuclear submarines.<sup>630</sup> Another option being considered is development of a submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (SLIRBM), which could be deployed on submarines and surface ships. Because the SLIRBM's planned range exceeds 600 kilometers, the missile would be limited by START. The treaty prohibits deployment of such a missile on surface ships.

Also, if the Pentagon is unsuccessful in persuading a reluctant Congress to move forward with using the Trident submarines as conventional ballistic missile carriers, the administration may decide to go with a land-based alternative that could present its own challenges to START verification.<sup>631</sup>

For example, Air Force officials have raised the possibility of deploying retired Minuteman II and MX ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads. One of the options being considered is deploying these missiles on launch pads near the U.S. coasts instead of in silos at existing ICBM bases.<sup>632</sup> Potential launch pads include the Cape Canaveral space launch facility in Florida and the Vandenberg ICBM test launch site in California. These sites would be chosen to make conventional ICBM launches clearly distinguishable from nuclear ICBM launches so that third parties such as Russia or China would not think there was a nuclear attack directed at them. The sites' coastal locations would also make it possible to avoid dropping first and second missile stages on U.S. or Canadian land areas. According to the Air Force, several dozen conventionally armed ICBMs could be deployed within two years at a relatively low cost of \$31 million.<sup>633</sup>

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<sup>630</sup> Steve Andreasen, "Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles With Conventional Warheads," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2006.

<sup>631</sup> Elaine Grossman, "Air Force Proposes New Strike Missile," *InsideDefense.com* NewsStand, April 8, 2006.

<sup>632</sup> Amy F. Woolf, "Conventional Warheads for Long Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, RL33067, September 6, 2005.

<sup>633</sup> *Ibid.*

START does not prohibit the deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles but includes quite strong limitations on deployment methods and sites. ICBMs must be deployed in silo, road-mobile, or rail-mobile launchers.<sup>634</sup> START does permit “soft-site” launch pads for ICBMs at test ranges or space-launch facilities.

But, the Vandenberg base, a declared ICBM test site, has a limited number of ICBM silos.<sup>635</sup> For this reason, deployment of more than 10 to 20 conventional ICBMs in Vandenberg would require building new silos or mobile launchers for missiles. Furthermore, the aggregate number of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) located at test facilities is limited to 25, and the aggregate number of test launchers is limited to 20 silo and 20 mobile launchers.<sup>636</sup> The treaty also prohibits flight tests of ICBMs equipped with re-entry vehicles from space-launch facilities, which would seem to preclude deployment at Cape Canaveral.<sup>637</sup>

It is notable that U.S. interest in converting strategic delivery systems into conventional platforms already may be prompting the United States to circumvent START provisions. An example is a program to convert four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines armed with Trident I SLBMs to “special-purpose” submarines for launching long-range cruise missiles. To minimize the cost, this conversion is being carried out without removing the ballistic-missile launchers. According to START, converted submarines are treaty accountable and subject to inspections. The United States does not argue with the need to account for special-purpose submarines under START, but it will likely try to avoid inspections, which may become one of the sticking points of START implementation in the near future.

The United States will likely do this by placing the submarines at locations that are not listed as inspectable sites, i.e., facilities that are not ballistic missile submarine bases; facilities for production, repair, storage, or loading of SLBMs; or facilities for training of SLBM crews. Instead, the submarines may have their home ports at Bremerton, Wash., and Norfolk, Va., where submarine conversion and reactor refueling are performed, or at naval

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<sup>634</sup> START, Art. V, para. 3.

<sup>635</sup> According to the START memorandum of understanding data as of July 1, 2005, there were 10 test silo launchers at Vandenberg base.

<sup>636</sup> START, Art. IV, paras. 1(d), 2(d).

<sup>637</sup> START, Art. V, para. 14.

bases at Guam and Diego Garcia, which are considered as potential homeports for Ohio-class special-purpose submarines.<sup>638</sup> It is possible that the United States may thus avoid violating the legal language of START, while undermining its spirit.

A similar problem emerged in the late 1980s when START was being negotiated. The United States announced that it planned to convert two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines (SSBN-645 “James K. Polk” and SSBN-642 “Kamehameha”) into special-purpose submarines without eliminating their ballistic missile launchers or missile compartments. In order to exempt these submarines from START inspections, the parties worked out the Thirty-Third Agreed Statement of START, which imposed a set of restrictions on special-purpose submarines.<sup>639</sup>

Moscow suggested that the parties to START work out a similar agreed statement with regard to these Trident-converted ballistic missile submarines, but the United States has not yet responded. Likewise, Russia is increasingly concerned that the United States continues to keep its nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) ready for deployment. In the past, Russia made numerous failed attempts to include nuclear-armed SLCMs in strategic arms limitation treaties.

START creates obstacles for Russia’s strategic forces modernization program as well, but for other reasons. An analysis of likely future Russian strategic force development suggests that until 2015-2020 the level of deployed strategic warheads will mostly depend on SS-18 and SS-19 type ICBMs with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. After these missiles are retired, the number of deployed Russian warheads will shrink drastically, making it impossible for Russia to maintain equality with the United States. Indeed, Russia’s arsenal will likely drop near the level of the “third” nuclear states: the United Kingdom, France, and China. To ameliorate this situation, Russia may decide by the end of

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<sup>638</sup> Andrew Scutro, “Balance of Sub Fleet to Swing Toward the Pacific,” *Navy Times*, February 20, 2006. Another potential home port under consideration is Pearl Harbor. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RS21007, June 23, 2005.

<sup>639</sup> The agreement stated that no more than two special-purpose submarines converted from Poseidon SSBNs would be exempt from inspections; the launchers of converted submarines will be counted according to START accounting rules; converted submarines cannot be permanently based at ports specified as ballistic missile submarine bases in the START memorandum of understanding; and when such a submarine is located at the port where it is permanently based, its launch tubes have to be opened on request of the Soviet

this decade to deploy multiple warheads on its SS-27 (“Topol-M”) silo- and mobile-based ICBMs, something that is currently prohibited by START provisions. Official statements suggest that such plans are being actively discussed by Russia’s political and military leadership.<sup>640</sup>

Russia may also wish to deploy the new multiple-warhead Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) as a land-based ICBM as well. Deploying a land-based Bulava variant would be easier and cheaper than the proposed construction of six Yuriy Dolgorukiy-type (Borey-class) submarines and the deployment of Bulava missiles on three aging Typhoon-class strategic submarines. START constraints would be an obstacle to the deployment of a mobile variant of the Bulava.<sup>641</sup>

If START is allowed to expire, Russia will also be able to build up the number of its deployed strategic warheads by increasing the number of warheads on its SS-N-23 SLBMs.<sup>642</sup> START limits this type of missile to four warheads. In the past, however, the Soviet Union developed an SS-N-23 variant carrying 10 warheads.<sup>643</sup>

START limitations on movements of road-mobile missile systems are also among the treaty provisions most frequently criticized in Russia. Taking advantage of these provisions, the United States has rebuked Russia in some meetings of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for moving such missiles.<sup>644</sup>

#### **a. Drawbacks of START Verification**

The elaborate nature and high cost of START inspections pose another obstacle to a simple extension of the treaty. Many experts in the United States and Russia believe that the treaty needs to be updated for an era far different from when the treaty was negotiated during the Cold War. At that time, the parties knew little about each other, and the level of mutual

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side for a period of no less than 12 hours in order to allow it to verify by satellite inspection that they do not contain ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union had a right to make two requests per submarine each year.

<sup>640</sup> Aleksandr Dolinin, “The guard of power’s security,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, December 16, 2005.

<sup>641</sup> START, Art. V, para. 6.

<sup>642</sup> START, Art. V, para. 12.

<sup>643</sup> Pavel Podvig, ed., *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 335.



confidence was much lower than today. Therefore, a substantial bureaucratic infrastructure was required.<sup>645</sup>

The treaty includes 12 types of inspection visits, as well as continuous monitoring inspection at ICBM production facilities. As table 1 indicates, the United States has conducted more inspections than Russia. U.S. teams typically make about 35-40 inspection trips annually to sites in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine while the Soviet Union successor states conduct about 25-30 trips a year to U.S. sites. Since the beginning of inspections in December 1994 to December 2004, the United States has carried out almost 50 percent more inspections than the former Soviet states.

Former Soviet Union inspectors have been hampered by budgetary considerations. In 2002-2004 the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency spent about \$10-12 million on START inspections.<sup>646</sup> Russian expenditures were less by almost a factor of 10.<sup>647</sup>

The financial constraint was the most stringent after Russia's August 1998 ruble devaluation. The following year, Russia conducted 19 inspection visits, compared to 34 by the United States. Visits by U.S. inspectors can also be financially burdensome for Russia because the inspected party bears all the transportation and living costs after the inspecting team arrives at a port of entry, even though inspected facilities may be quite distant. Disruptions of planned military activities at the sites visited by teams of inspectors are also costly.

Despite the costs, the intrusive and detailed procedures specified in the START inspection protocol do not always achieve their goals. The most striking example relates to on-site inspections of re-entry vehicles. These are intended to check on a random basis the number

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<sup>644</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," August 2005, p. 13 (hereinafter State Department arms control adherence guide).

<sup>645</sup> Moscow Carnegie Center, 2005, p. 56; Avis Bohlen, "The Rise and Fall of Arms Control," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003).

<sup>646</sup> Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/ FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates," February 2003, p. 31.

<sup>647</sup> Unfortunately, data on Russian expenses on START inspections do not exist in open literature except for the year 2001, when 39.6 million rubles (about \$1.4 million) were allocated in the state budget. Pyotr Romashkin, "Draft Federal Budget of 2001 and Spending for Implementing Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties," Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), September 8, 2000.

of warheads declared to be mounted on each missile. The inspected side has a right to place a form-fitting cover on the front section of the missile in order to hide sensitive information. Russian inspectors have raised concerns many times that the hard cover used by the U.S. Navy to cover the re-entry vehicles on Trident II ballistic missiles does not allow confident verification that the missile contains no more than the eight warheads allowed by START. Similar complaints have been made by U.S. inspectors with respect to the hard cover used by Russia during re-entry-vehicle inspections of the SS-25 ICBM.<sup>648</sup>

Approaches to telemetry data exchange need to be modernized as well. Specifically, the parties have been unable to resolve the problem of telemetry data interpretation for some Trident II SLBM test launches. The number of re-entry vehicle deployment maneuvers carried out in these tests appears to exceed the number of re-entry vehicles attributed to this type of SLBM.<sup>649</sup>

#### **b. Cooperative Reduction Programs**

One of the reasons for diminished U.S. interest in strategic arms control negotiations is the data obtained as a result of the implementation of the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs. Some U.S. experts even claim that CTR programs could replace traditional arms control in providing transparency.<sup>650</sup> Yet, the transparency mechanisms of the CTR programs are unlikely to provide an adequate replacement for the START verification regime.

Most importantly, verifiable arms control treaties such as START provide the political foundation for the CTR assistance programs. Representing a clear commitment by both countries to cut their nuclear arsenals and provide strategic transparency, they help Russian and U.S. leaders sell such cuts to their domestic publics.

By contrast, the transparency provided by the CTR projects are one sided. Because the program is financed by the United States, Russia provides information and access to its

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<sup>648</sup> Ivan Sidorov, "To what extent the parties are responsible in START implementation?,"

<sup>649</sup> See A. S. Diakov, ed., *U.S.-Russian Relations in Nuclear Arms Reductions: Current State and Prospects*, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, MIPT, 2001 (in Russian).

<sup>650</sup> See Rose Gottenmoeller, "Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian Policy," in *The Russian Military, Power and Policy*, eds. Steven E. Miller and Dmitry Trenin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 183-215.

facilities to U.S. officials in connection with CTR projects. Some have suggested that the United States provide reciprocal transparency by allowing Russian companies to compete on an equal basis for contracts to eliminate U.S. weapon systems. Yet, even if the United States allowed Russian companies to compete for elimination contracts, the scale of such Russian participation would not be comparable to that of the United States: U.S. officials are giving less priority to eliminating missiles and other such strategic delivery systems than to modernizing them or converting them to carry non-nuclear payloads.

Moreover, there would be legal problems in implementing CTR programs without START. These projects are currently carried out under the CTR umbrella agreement, formally called the U.S.-Russian Agreement Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation. It was signed in 1992 and extended twice for seven-year intervals, most recently in June.<sup>651</sup> The CTR projects are also regulated by interdepartmental agreements between the U.S. Department of Defense and a corresponding entity in Russia (as of 2006, Russia was represented by the Roscosmos federal agency). The elimination procedures of Russian strategic weapons, however, are regulated by the START conversion or elimination protocol and verified under the START inspection protocol. Thus, the United States and Russia would have no legal basis for the elimination of Russian arms and the verification of this elimination even if the efforts continued to be financially supported under the CTR programs.

Finally, continued Russian interest in getting funding from the United States for its strategic arms elimination can no longer be taken for granted, as nearly all of these projects are likely to end or shrink significantly after 2009. The only exception is the project on elimination of solid propellant mobile SS-25 ICBMs and their launchers, which by 2009 is going to be at its halfway point at best. Spending on this effort is currently about a half of the annual budget of the CTR Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination Program, which is in the range of \$50-80 million per year in fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2007.<sup>652</sup> Most likely, the required spending on SS-25 elimination after 2009 will not exceed \$20-30 million,

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<sup>651</sup> Wade Boese, "U.S., Russia Extend Threat Reduction Authority," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2006, p. 42.

<sup>652</sup> Fiscal Year 2006 CTR Annual Report to Congress, 2005.

which Russia could easily afford.<sup>653</sup> Indeed, Russia is already becoming less dependent on Western support for eliminating its excess arms and military equipment. In 1999, when CTR support was critical, Russia allocated the equivalent of about \$82.3 million for this purpose. Since that time, however, Russia has steadily increased its spending on elimination of arms and military equipment. It plans to spend more than \$670 million in 2006.<sup>654</sup>

### **c. The Framework of a New Agreement**

It seems clear that neither letting START expires nor simply extending it look like particularly good options. At the same time, modifying the existing treaty also does not appear to be wise. The treaty is too complex, and many of its provisions simply do not reflect today's realities. A modernized START is not likely to be worth the effort required, especially as at least the United States has little appetite for long negotiations. By contrast, Putin's proposal could provide a way for a compromise.

To be sure, a new negotiation could open the door to the long list of ambitious goals that each side has long sought and that could stall negotiations. Russia is interested in discussing strategic stability in a broad context that includes offensive and defensive strategic arms, space weapons, anti-submarine warfare, and precision-guided weapons—the whole set of perceived potential threats to its future deterrence capability. The United States, on the other hand, would like to discuss limiting tactical nuclear weapons.

In our opinion, a breakthrough is possible if these issues are skirted and if a new START resolved two problems that SORT failed to address: the U.S. desire for new nuclear warhead counting rules and Russia's wish to limit U.S. deployment of non-nuclear offensive strategic arms and provide greater transparency to these weapons. A possible compromise would call for Russia to accept the U.S. approach to count only operationally deployed nuclear warheads. At the same time, the United States has to agree with the Russian position to consider delivery means as strategic weapons under a new START

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<sup>653</sup> Local populations near solid propellant missile-elimination facilities have raised a wave of protests against the project, considering it unsafe for the environment. It is therefore likely that SS-25 elimination will proceed more slowly than planned, with correspondingly lower annual spending requirements.

<sup>654</sup> Pyotr Romashkin, "Federal Budget Spending on Eliminating Excess Arms," Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, MIPT, May 25, 2006

even if their nuclear warheads are replaced with conventional ones. Therefore, such conventional strategic delivery means should be covered by associated limits for deployment, as well as transparency and verification measures.

Achieving such a compromise would also allow both countries to accept lower limits on the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads permitted under a new agreement, compared to SORT's 1,700-2,200 warhead limits. Limiting both countries to no more than 1,500 warheads or perhaps even a lower level seems realistic. Russia has already proposed its readiness to reduce its strategic forces to the level of 1,000 warheads. The Pentagon's willingness to convert some Trident SLBMs to conventional ballistic missiles and cut 50 of 500 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs indicates that the United States might not be averse to further cuts as well.<sup>655</sup> Moreover, such cuts could prove politically beneficial for both sides.

Both sides are likely interested in keeping limits on development of certain types of destabilizing strategic arms and on transfers of strategic arms to third parties. Such a treaty could retain the flexibility of SORT in avoiding limits on numbers attributed to subcategories or types of delivery systems, so that both sides can tweak their strategic arsenals. Likewise, the parties could drop some restrictions on deployment methods of conventional missiles.

Yet, the primary aim of a new agreement should be the creation of a new verification mechanism, which would replace the one in START and at the same time retain current levels of transparency. START's data exchanges, notifications, and inspections could become a basis for a new mechanism. The two countries could decide what kind of data and types of inspections are still critically important and which are obsolete and could be canceled. The quotas for the number of inspections could also be revised in such talks. Revised inspection procedures could also be negotiated to help to resolve mutual concerns.

### **3. A New Paradoxes in the Russia-USA Relationship**

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<sup>655</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," February 3, 2006, p. 50.

The extremely assertive foreign policy of the USA since September 2001 has been a cause of concern in many countries, as posing a major challenge to the entire post-1945 structure of international relations. It causes concern to nations that have been allies of the USA since the end of the Second World War, as well as to possible rivals (such as China), and to nations that could be either potential allies/partners or potential rivals (such as the Russian Federation).

The Russian leadership sees US foreign policy conduct as a source of major concern, given that it sees itself as a major power in the international arena, and in many respects sees the bilateral Russo-US relationship as the most important of its kind in the contemporary international system. The USA's leading role in NATO, its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and its role in the Middle East bring the USA into direct contact in areas which are perceived by Moscow as being of fundamental interest to the Russian Federation.

The US-Russian relationship appears to have survived the test of the Iraq war, in that its basic aspects remain untouched, despite the Russian leadership's opposition to the US decision. Russian President Vladimir Putin commented in September 2003 that Russia and the USA were allies in fighting terrorism, and partners in other issue areas, implying a close and cooperative relationship.<sup>656</sup> In September 2003 the then Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov commented that disputes between Russia and the USA over Iraq were 'history', and that cooperation between the two sides was deepening.<sup>657</sup> However he also warned at the UN General Assembly that Russia opposed unilateral approaches to the resolution and prevention of conflicts.

The Russian leadership continued to advocate a close partner-like relationship with the USA, whilst disagreeing with the USA's increasing tendency to resolve major international security problems outside of the UN framework. In this light, it continued to argue for a reformed UN, with a much larger Security Council.

Similar comments were made by Ivanov in *Kommersant* in February 2004, when he noted that "there has not been a rollback on any of the areas of cooperation" between the Russian Federation and the USA. He dismissed claims that the bilateral relationship was based

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<sup>656</sup> See BBC Monitoring 27 September 2003, <http://news.monitor.bbc.co.uk/>.

solely on the good personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and George Bush, although he argued that more effort should be made to institutionalize the relationship. He commented that both powers would have differences in the future, noting “the main thing is that we should also have mechanisms for resolving the contradictions that would allow us not to jeopardize Russian-American relations as a whole”.<sup>658</sup> A similar tone has been taken by the new foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. In April he reiterated the notion of the USA and Russia being the closest of allies in the fight against international terrorism, noting, “Russia, the United States, and the European Union countries have a vast joint agenda based on the common responsibility for security and stability in the world”.<sup>659</sup> In his first press conference after becoming foreign minister, Lavrov noted that Russia’s disagreements with the USA were only of a tactical, rather than a strategic character.

There is practically nothing to separate us with the Americans in the vision of the strategic tasks before humanity in the field of ensuring security and stability. And that there are different readings as to how to achieve those tasks is something that's quite natural between partners. As the saying goes, truth is born in disputes.<sup>660</sup>

Whilst concerned about what it sees as unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy, the Russian leadership is likely to continue with this line. There is little point antagonizing the USA, as the latter is too powerful to be stopped. Russia’s most logical choice in this situation is to emphasize the importance of partnership with the USA, whilst at the same time expressing moderate disagreement over differences, and to attempt to build informal coalitions with powers that share Russian concerns in order to lobby Washington to change course. The formation of what may be termed an informal coalition with France and Germany in 2003 over Iraq may be regarded as such an attempt.

Those outside government are able to express their views more forcibly. **Konstantin Kosachev**, the chairman of the Duma international affairs committee warned in February 2004 that the USA should not try to speak to Russia from a “position of strength”.<sup>661</sup> He

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<sup>657</sup> Ibid, 25 September 2003.

<sup>658</sup> See This article appears on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://www.mid.ru>, 13 February 2004.(English version)

<sup>659</sup> See Sergey Lavrov’s article in the Wall Street Journal, 1 April 2004.

<sup>660</sup> <http://www.mid.ru>, 17 March 2004.

<sup>661</sup> BBC Monitoring, 1 February 2004, <http://news.monitor.bbc.co.uk/>.

considered that US policy towards Russia was complicated by the fact that elements within the Bush Administration had differing approaches toward Russia. A hard line was taken by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney, and a more moderate one by George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Russian international relations specialists have a variety of views on the USA's current foreign policy role and its implications for the international system, for America's allies, and for the Russian Federation.

### **a. The USA's Position in the International System**

No one disputes America's current domination of the international system. The Russian Americanist **Anatoly Utkin** describes the USA as the world hegemon, and indisputable vanguard of the West, which he regards as having military, scientific and technical supremacy over the rest of the world.<sup>662</sup> One may regard this as a statement of the obvious. However, what is significant is Utkin's analysis of the possible threats to America's dominance.

Utkin considers that global demographic changes pose the greatest long-term threat. He notes that in 1950, the industrial world comprised 29 per cent of the world's population. By 2000, this share had been reduced to 18 per cent, and by 2050; it could go down to 10 per cent. In 1900 the population of the north was superior to that of the south by a ratio of 2.5:1. By 2050, the ratio is likely to be directly reversed. Europe's population could be one-third of its current level by the year 2100. This raises the question of whether the USA would be interested in maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. Utkin quotes the American conservative Pat Buchanan:

### **3. A new Paradox in the Russia-USA Relationship**

What is it that it is proposed that the Americans should defend in Europe? Christianity? It is dying in Europe. Western civilization? But the Europeans by their own decisions are dooming themselves to disappearing in the 22<sup>nd</sup> century.

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<sup>662</sup> Anatoly Utkin, 'Mir. Budushcheye Zapada', Svobodnaya Mysl', No 2, 2003.



Utkin quotes the German Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg commenting to the Kaiser in 1914 that by allying with Austria-Hungary, Germany was acting as the ally of a corpse. Utkin suggests that Americans are now saying virtually the same thing about Europe.

The USA itself is undergoing demographic changes. Utkin quotes former President Clinton as stating that by the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century no one race will predominate in the USA. The USA would thus cease to be a European oriented Anglo-Saxon power, which could result in radical changes in the internal US political system and in its foreign policy. Utkin goes on to argue that the West as a whole is dying out, commenting that the population of the non-western world currently outstrips that of the West by a factor of 5:1, and in 2050 it could outstrip the western world by 10:1. Utkin notes the potential challenge to the USA in the following way:

In 1990 America was victorious in the war in the Persian Gulf, having 600 warships. In the period of the new aggravation of relations [ie the build up to the Iraq war], the number of vessels of the US Navy had been reduced to 300. The projection for 2010 is 200 ships. But even this is not the most important factor. Will the USA be prepared after 2025 to maintain the independence of Kuwait in face of 100 million strong Iran, or 50 million strong Iraq? The USA will simply not be physically able to create a version of the “Macarthur regency” over the huge Arab world. Along with this one must take into account that Iran at this time will probably possess nuclear weapons and missiles.

Utkin goes on to argue that the west’s future enemy will not be a traditional military opponent, but a world, which has another way of looking at God and man. Utkin is pessimistic of the West’s ability to counter this challenge successfully. He therefore casts doubt on the long-term ability of the USA to sustain the dominance it has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. He does not discuss how Russia should respond to such a scenario. One of the logical implications of his argument however, is that if the USA’s dominance of the international system is eventually doomed because of the shifting demographic balance, then Russia needs to position herself carefully vis-à-vis the USA and the “South”.

Other Russian analysts view the implications of this Trans-Atlantic drift in different ways. **Natal'ya Narochnitskaya**, who became deputy chairman of the Duma foreign affairs committee after the December 2003 elections, argues that the USA, in alliance with Britain, has had a long-term strategy, which originated long before the Second World War, to dominate and control Eurasia.<sup>663</sup> She is of the opinion that the USA has sought to penetrate and control Europe for decades as part of this strategy. Narochnitskaya believes that although anti-Americanism is growing in Europe, and the disputes in NATO have been very serious, the US-European partnership is not at an end, as Europe has yet to demonstrate that it has the desire to put forward its own cultural-historical and political project as an alternative to the USA's global management. She is cautious about the differences that arose over Iraq, and states that there is no evidence to suggest that these differences will put an end to the Trans-Atlantic partnership. By contrast, she considers that both the USA and Europe have sought in 2003 to overcome their differences, although the accomplishment of this objective has been hindered by Washington's tendency to judge all actors in the international system, including the UN, by the criteria of whether they agree with the USA and are willing to serve US interests. Narochnitsakaya is also of the view that the USA's and Russian Federation's approaches to the war on terrorism differ significantly. The USA is fighting a war on terrorism in order to maintain its domination of the international system, whereas Russia is doing so simply in order to survive.

The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's use of the term "New Europe" of the former communist states, in contrast to the "Old Europe" of France and Germany is seen as part of the US desire to create a sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe in order to extend American influence into Eurasia. The break up of the old Soviet Empire is not benefiting "Old Europe", but instead helps the USA's long-term goal. According to Narochnitskaya, NATO widening, NATO's role in former Yugoslavia, the US' expanding presence in Transcaucasia and Central Asia are all part of Washington's strategy.

Narochnitskaya is of the view that moves to enhance Europe's independence vis-à-vis the USA by developing the EU have so far failed to reduce American dominance of Europe. She argues that Europe needs to develop as an alternative power center. The post-Cold War international system is not stable. She notes the number of conflicts that have erupted since

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<sup>663</sup> See her website <http://www.narochnitskaia.ru>. (English version)

the end of the Cold War, which makes it impossible for the international system to become self-governing. The spread of nuclear weapons technology makes this instability dangerous. She also argues that the USA does not possess sufficient power to maintain this system, and it will therefore eventually collapse.

Narochnitskaya repeats the standard Russian line about the need for a multipolar international system, which would permit globalization to develop along positive lines, and also enable Russia to modernize. She sees a Russo-European partnership as a desirable development for both parties, as it would be able to prevent the Anglo-Saxon goal of dominating and controlling Eurasia. Noting the problems in relations between “Old Europe” and the USA, Narochmitskaya comments:

The most important thing for Russia in this situation is to consider the extent of old Europe’s awareness of the reason for its situation, and also its desire and capacity to pour out its accumulated dissatisfaction into a historical and geopolitical conception of a European common dwelling place (*obschezhitie*), different from the one that is accepted as being named Atlanticist.

Narochnitskaya calls on Europe to reconsider both its place in the world, and its attitude towards Russia. She says Europe should stop seeing Russia as a humiliated power, and stop feeling uncertain in facing Russia’s huge size, potential self-sufficiency, and unusual tenacity in the face of tests which no other state could endure. She argues that Russia by opposing extremist Islam is protecting the western world, yet Europe remains ungrateful for this. She argues that France, Germany and Russia have a common spiritual foundation, and these three powers therefore have a special responsibility for the choice of Europe’s future and the form of its unity.

Narochnitskaya contends that a stable international system at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century should comprise a triangular relationship between the USA, Russia and Europe. This requires Russia to re-establish what Narochmitskaya sees as her natural historical

mission as the upholder of equilibrium between East and West. Thus Russia cannot permit herself to be pushed out of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions. Narochnitskaya believes that the notion of a choice between “with America versus Europe”, or “with Europe versus America” is a false one. Instead she sees it as important that Russia is not used as a card in any struggle between America and Islam, America and China, America and Europe. She favours George Kennan’s axiom that US-Russian relations should be both good and distant to a rational degree.

Vladislav Inozemtsev, believes that the current international system is much less orderly than the one which prevailed during the Cold War.<sup>664</sup> “Once the economic and political apex of the world shifted from Europe to the United States, globalization became much more rapid and chaotic.” Globalization has brought chaos partly because it has undermined national sovereignty, one of the foundation stones of international politics since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.

Inozemtsev argues that a new world order should be created to overcome the instability caused by American-led globalization. In his view, this new world order should consist of an alliance of the USA, EU, Japan, plus Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other minor “Western offshoots”.

The new alliance would be the undisputed global economic, technological and military leader, embracing the best-educated and wealthiest part of the world’s population.

Such an integration of the core countries would gradually change the global configuration, with the unipolar world finally becoming a reality. If the leading world powers succeed in establishing institutions that would operate on the basis of their principles – such as an International Criminal Court; an International WMD agency; an International service combating illegal trafficking of drugs and people; and some others – these collective institutions would not have to consider problems of legitimacy since they would comprise an unprecedented power.

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<sup>664</sup> Vladislav Inozemtsev, Rethinking the New World Order, Russia in Global Affairs, Vol:I, No 4, October/December-2003, <http://eng.globalisation.ru/live/about.asp>.

Moreover, this alliance could guarantee security to countries committed to its ideals (eg countries that have renounced their nuclear or chemical arsenals). Such guarantees would be a major factor in ensuring international stability. However, the above does not mean that this new “northern alliance” would initiate any dramatic transformations in the rest of the world: quite the opposite, its primary objective would be “maintaining the distance” between the core and the periphery. Such a strategy would guarantee the rigid protection of its economic interests, security, freedoms and lifestyles. Taking into account that some level of policing the periphery will be unavoidable, one should admit that the United States would become the natural leader in most of these issues.

Inozemtsev believes that the creation of such a core is quite feasible, as many of these countries have been allies for decades, and Russia’s cooperation with them has grown considerably in recent years. Many may, however, consider such proposals utopian, particularly as they seem to partly concede the idea of US dominance of the international system, and Russian acceptance of it. It also appears to overlook the likelihood of policy divergences between the USA and the European Union, let alone between Russia and the USA. When discussing contemporary US foreign policy, Inozemtsev makes the following points:

US foreign policy today seems extremely wily. American leaders recognize the principle of sovereignty but always find casuistic pretexts for violating it. They preach universal values yet increasingly pursue a strategy of unilateralism. They proclaim devotion to economic freedoms but, at the same time, charge many European imports with customs duties and impose arbitrary economic sanctions against other countries. They think it is natural that the United States is the main crossroads for global money flows, but they cannot get used to the idea that America is now becoming the main target of extremists and terrorists’ attacks. And most importantly, US policymakers seem to be sincerely surprised that their state powers are now losing the war against terrorist networks, but consider quite natural the ease with which their corporate networks subjugate peripheral countries’ governments.

It is hard to see why the USA should change if Inozemtsev’s core alliance is ever formed, given that he accepts that the USA would be the “natural leader” of this core. It also appears to run counter to his thinking as expressed elsewhere. In an article on Russo-US

relations in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* in October 2003, he argues that Russia has obtained little from the USA since September 2001, in spite of Moscow's support for Washington over "9/11".<sup>665</sup> The USA continued to pursue a discriminatory policy towards Russia in trade relations, and withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. Russia took only a mildly critical line towards the USA over Iraq in 2003, but was rewarded only by rebukes from Washington about the need for the Putin leadership to refrain from authoritarianism. Inozemtsev also believes that the USA does not appreciate fully that the Russian Federation also suffers from terrorism, even though cooperation in the war on terrorism is supposed to be one of the key features of the post-September 2001 Russo-US relationship.

Inozemtsev argues that US foreign policy is driven by a missionary zeal to establish freedom and democracy throughout the world, with the USA alone defining what is democratic. This means that the USA is only interested in temporary alliances with non-democratic countries. Inozemtsev believes that the USA has only partially deideologised its approach towards the Russian Federation, and imposes tough conditions on Russia as the price for US-Russian partnership: Russia should put forward her own conditions. He believes that this is feasible, as, like many other Russian analysts, he considers that the US power is limited, and that the USA is burdened with weaknesses.

Inozemtsev argues that the military challenge that the USA faces in Iraq shows the limitations on US military power, and that the USA needs the rest of the world more than the rest of the world needs her. He is also of the view that the USA faces significant economic difficulties, such as her massive trade deficit and her equally large budget deficit, and that the US unilateralist approach runs the risk of making her isolated. He notes that the USA in 2002 had imposed sanctions without the consent of the international community against 75 states comprising 52 per cent of the world's population. Inozemtsev feels that these factors make the USA vulnerable, therefore Russia does not need to view the USA as a "senior partner", and can therefore seek partnership on an equal basis.

This approach appears unduly optimistic at present. Inozemtsev does not suggest what conditions Russia could insist on as her price for partnership, or what else Russia could do to try and restrain US unilateralism.

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<sup>665</sup> <http://eng.globalisation.ru/live/about.asp>.

Aleksey Bogaturov argues that the US political elite is motivated by what he terms the “American project for Russia and the whole world,”<sup>666</sup> which is aimed at the creation of a US-led international system. He states that the USA ideally does not want rifts with other states, preferring them to follow its lead. Bogaturov considers that a key goal of US strategy is to use the resources of its allies and partners in order to achieve her foreign policy goals, not by conquering and seizing the resources of other states, but by political and economic integration. He considers NAFTA and the plan to create a free trade area for the entire western hemisphere as part of this process, along with close political, military economic ties with Japan, and increasing trade and economic ties with China, Taiwan, South Korea, ASEAN and Australia. Bogaturov calls this a universal pan-integrationist strategy. The USA’s NATO partners and the Russian Federation are also objects of this strategy.

Bogaturov sees US-Russian partnership within this context. He says that the USA understands more clearly than Russian liberal politicians Russia’s value and potential, not so much as a source of energy resources, but her geo-political, geo-economic potential, plus that afforded by the geographical space she occupies. This, and the potential of Russian influence in key points of the belt of neighboring territories (the Far East, Central Asia and Transcaucasia), transforms Russia into a valuable potential partner of the USA. Bogaturov concludes that for the USA, Russia’s democratization is not a goal in itself, but an instrument for maintaining partnership with Moscow.

Bogaturov notes that although the international system is US dominated, it is also pluralist, as other major states often differ with Washington, as over Iraq in 2003. He sees the main contradiction in international relations being between the networked, dispersed character of trans-state threats to international security, and old mechanisms of managing international relations by the major powers and fora such as the UN and G8. He argues that the world faces a triple headed threat, namely international terrorism, narco-business, and international financial flows which fund terrorism, and which are beyond the control of nation-states. This is a consequence of globalisation, which is a phenomenon largely encouraged by the USA.

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<sup>666</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

In this situation, is a Russo-US alliance feasible? Bogaturov believes that Putin has a far better chance than either Gorbachev or Yeltsin to build a lasting alliance. This is not just because the two powers face a common threat. Bogaturov believes Russia is now extremely attractive as a partner for the USA because Washington has re-configured her geopolitical interests, and Russia has begun to play an important part in this new configuration.

Bogaturov argues that US foreign policy is being “Eurasianised”. In contrast to Narochnitskaya, Bogaturov believes that the US interest in Eurasia is new. Previously (during the Cold War) Europe was the USA’s front line of defence. Europe is now the rear, and the new front is Central Eurasia, that is Afghanistan, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, and the two new nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. He writes:

Here in the new century is a new geopolitical center of the world. To the east of it is China, powerful and dangerous. To the west, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia - three mighty oil powers, openly, as the first two, and half openly, as the last, hostile to the United States. Europe cannot, or almost cannot help the Americans in this part of the world. Its lot is to play an auxiliary, and not the main partner role in American global strategy.

Bogaturov goes on to note the declining importance of NATO to the US, and suggests that bilateral alliances may be more important to Washington, mentioning Britain, Japan and possibly India as examples. It is in this context that Bogaturov places the significance of Russo-US partnership. He believes that the USA has a double approach towards Russia. On the one hand, Washington will criticize Moscow over issues such as Chechnya, whilst at the same time pull Russia into a long-term political and military-political interaction in which the USA plays the guiding role.

This gives Russia the chance to enhance its position among the major world powers, but it also means that the Russian political elite will have to take into account US views when formulating both domestic and foreign policy to a greater extent than hitherto. Bogaturov feels that the Russian elite is not yet prepared for this.

However he feels that Washington, despite its dominance, desires to cooperate with other major powers and avoid rupturing relations with them. Bogaturov notes that during the



diplomatic maneuverings that took place in early 2003, neither the USA, France nor Germany desired a total break in Trans-Atlantic relations, and both sides sought to repair the breach once the war was over. Bogaturov argues that Russia can play the same game of trying to influence the USA within the camp of US allies rather than outside it. This is how he views Franco-German-Russian diplomatic cooperation over Iraq, rejecting the idea that Russia is playing the old Soviet game of trying to exploit “inter-imperialist contradictions” between the USA and Western Europe. Bogaturov is obviously assuming that the rift will not fatally widen. If that were to happen, then Russian foreign policy would face a hard choice.

Aleksandr Terent'yev believes that the USA and EU have radically different views of international order that are not compatible.<sup>667</sup> He shares the views expressed by American Robert Kagan in his book *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. The Bush Administration is dominated by advocates of realpolitik, who adhere to the use of force to establish and maintain US dominance, and have little interest in cooperating with other states except where it facilitates US hegemony. The USA thus has little interest in international law and international institutions. American strategy threatens the sovereignty of other nations and so undermines the Westphalian state-centric model of international relations. The USA justifies her approach with a messianic belief that her values are “good”, and that she is fighting “evil” in the international arena. US moral values are thus superior to the constraints of international law.

Terent'yev contrasts with Bogaturov, Pavlov and Bessmertnykh in highlighting the differences between the USA and Europe, and downplaying moves since the end of the Iraq conflict to overcome these rifts. He considers that the USA is now highly unilateralist, with little interest in the UN or in cooperating with allies.

He argues that there is a crisis in Trans-Atlantic relations, although he accepts that they may later reach a rapprochement.

The crisis in relations of the two trans-Atlantic partners is conditioned above all by the anti-thesis of the USA’s “new world order” and the European peace-structure

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<sup>667</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

(*miroustroystvo*), and up until now, while the American administration does not reject a unilateral foreign policy, Europe will take a critical attitude towards its ally.

Terent'yev argues that the situation in the Middle East shows the difference in thinking on the two sides of the Atlantic. The USA, seeing the inadequacy of international institutions, decides to use force unilaterally without UN sanction in accordance with her doctrine of preventive war. Europe, by contrast, holds to its project of a peace-structure, rejecting the tenets of *realpolitik*. The two approaches to international relations are not compatible, hence the current US-European split. Terent'yev notes the irony of both the USA and the European Union challenging the Westphalian model of international relations; the USA by threatening the sovereignty of other states, although she remains a sovereign state, committed to protecting the American national interest as defined by the Bush Administration. The European Union challenges the model from a different perspective by its construction of a European peace-structure that transcends the nation-state and seeks to avoid using force. Terent'yev does not discuss the implications for Russian foreign policy of this conflict. It is interesting that he does not rule out a rapprochement between the USA and Europe, which perhaps echoes the current Russian desire to have partnerships with both parties and to avoid having to choose between either.

### **US-Russian Relations**

In November 2003, a round table discussion on US-Russian relations appeared in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and the USSR.<sup>668</sup> **Aleksey Arbatov** accepts that US-Russian partnership in general cannot be based upon equality, given the disparity in power.<sup>669</sup> However he believes that in specific issue areas it can effectively be a partnership of equals. He argues that due to its geographical position, ties and influence in various regions, Russia can be an extremely important partner of the USA, eg over Afghanistan in 2001. Arbatov suggests that in fighting international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and in seeking the resolution of various regional conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and potentially in the Far East, there could be similar close

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<sup>668</sup> '70 years of diplomatic relations between Russia and the USA', *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No 7, 2003.

<sup>669</sup> Aleksey Arbatov was deputy chairman Duma defence committee 1994-2003. He is now at the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, <http://www.carnegie.ru>.

cooperation between Moscow and Washington. He also suggests that the two states propose to jointly build new reactors that will not leave waste products that could be used to construct nuclear weapons.

He warns, however, that there is currently in Russia only a narrow base of support for partnership with the USA; only a small number of Duma deputies see Russo-US cooperation as intrinsically good. Most either support or oppose cooperation because the Putin himself favors cooperating with Washington. Arbatov goes on to say that there is no deep understanding of the idea of cooperation with the USA amongst the Russian political elite and security community as a whole. This means that Russo-US relations depend too much on the personal relationship between the presidents. He suggests that meaningful cooperation in the future will require that Russian policy be more consistent, and US policy less unilateralist.

He believes that cooperation with the USA should also be pursued via the development of cooperation with the EU and Japan, as both of these entities are also allies of the USA. He outlines Russia's importance as follows:

As the most important state in the Eurasian super-region we can adequately cooperate with the USA and her allies in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the struggle with terrorism, spread of WMD, and with threats of a new type: narcotics, crime, illegal immigration, contraband, poaching, and of course epidemics. In a word, in spheres which are global in character. The borders of such cooperation are truly limitless, but this does not mean that the path to it will be smooth and direct. In order to proceed along the line of such cooperation, the West, meaning by this the West and its far eastern allies, seriously need to change their attitude towards Russia, to accept her as a serious partner, respect her legitimate interests, and must not to deceive her.

Many analysts in the discussion were of the opinion that it is an illusion that Russia could ever form an extremely close relationship with the USA. Viktor Kremnyuk of the USA-Canada Institute noted that while relations became closer after the end of the Cold War, they never reached the closeness of US-UK or even US-French relations. He considers that

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Russia is currently in the position of seeking to define its optimal model of US-Russian relations: deep cooperation is currently not possible.<sup>670</sup>

Kremnyuk argues that there are two versions of Russia with which the USA could have relationships. One is a source of energy and raw materials. This is the type of relationship America prefers, “our resources and their technology.” The second version is a Russia that seeks to develop its space, defence and nuclear industries in order to turn itself into a technologically advanced power. America seeks to prevent Russian access to foreign markets to sell her high-tech products. He advocates that Russia should use earnings from the export of raw materials to modernize her high-tech sector. At the same time she should seek western (including US) investment in this sector. He notes that if Siberia is not developed then Russia may face pressure from China to divide up this region. He implies that this could enhance Chinese power vis-à-vis the USA, and so argues that it is in America’s interest that she does not just see Russia as a source of raw materials. He advocates Russo-US cooperation in areas such as space research and anti-missile defence.<sup>671</sup>

Most analysts appeared to be of the view that it was difficult for Russia to decide what sort of relationship with the US would be suitable. Aleksandr Belonogov, who was a deputy foreign minister from 1990-92 and the USSR’s representative at the UN from 1986-90, argued that the USA is still heavily influenced by Cold War stereotypes, and that the American political elite still manifests an anti-Soviet syndrome in its approach towards Russia. This therefore means that Washington desires to keep Russia in a subordinate position. He notes that Russia is now peripheral to US interests, which means it will be difficult for Russia to be taken seriously by the USA.

Sergey Kortunov, deputy chairman of the expert council of the international affairs committee of the Federation Council, feels that an opportunity was missed after 1991 to build Russo-American relations on a new ideological basis. He feels that the Russian political elite was then more interested in creating a new relationship than the USA, presumably as the latter had emerged victorious in the Cold War. However he feels that there are solid reasons for building a very cooperative relationship, as Russo-US security

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<sup>670</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

interests coincide to a very significant extent in areas such as the Middle East and Central Asia. He thus welcomes the US presence in these regions. He goes on to suggest that Russia and the USA undertake large-scale joint projects. He proposes a project for the “Greater Caucasus,” although he provides no details of what this project would comprise. He also suggests that the two states could also promote reform in Belarus, although he again provides no details.

### **b. Iraq War and What Changed?**

Aleksandr Konovalov of the international relations institute MGIMO argues that the goal of US policy towards Iraq was regime change all along.<sup>672</sup> He cites an unnamed member of the US political elite as admitting this, stating that it was proposed to US President George Bush that he should have openly proclaimed this as the US goal, using the argument that Saddam Hussein was a threat to world peace. The US source claimed that Colin Powell successfully argued against this, as regime change could not be justified in international law.

Konovalov says that the US is now more open in its declaration of its war aims, and that the USA now sees Iraq as a suitable launch pad for democratizing the Middle East, believing that a democratic Middle East would no longer be a breeding ground for terrorism. Konovalov notes, however, that the task of building a stable democracy in Iraq will be extraordinarily difficult for the USA. Since 1945 the USA has attempted regime change 16 times in different countries. Only in two cases (Germany and Japan) has regime change produced stable democracies.

Interestingly, Konovalov does not oppose the US goal of regime change in Iraq, so contradicting the position taken by the Russian leadership.

Thus the USA began in Iraq the first experiment in recent times of the forcible change of a totalitarian regime. The goals of this operation do not, to a large extent, contradict Russian foreign policy interests, although the methods of carrying out the operation, and thinking behind it, do give rise to certain doubts. In these conditions, what is important for Russia is

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<sup>671</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

that the declared goals were successfully achieved, and that these achievements do not violate the norms of international law. This does not exclude that in case of need, the rules of the game adopted by the international community, can be jointly improved, corrected and brought into correlation with the new challenges and threats to international security.

In the final account, if the Middle East ceases to be a refuge of international terrorism, a source of conflict and threats to international security, and will be successfully “written into” the globalising world economy, having preserved its civilisational identity, then Russia will only gain from this.

Konovalov seems to be close to arguing that regime change is not necessarily wrong, and that there may be a case for altering international law to take this into account.

Nikolay Pavlov of IMEMO draws nine conclusions from the US-Iraq war of 2003 for Russian foreign policy.<sup>673</sup>

The world will remain unipolar. The USA’s predominance will remain unchallenged. USA is becoming an imperial power, with its national interests embracing the whole planet. The notion of multipolarity proposed by some Russian politicians and analysts is unrealistic. This is a significant divergence of opinion, as many in Russia argue that American unipolarity can only be a temporary phenomenon, which will be superseded by the emergence of other national centers of power. Pavlov considers that Russians who advocate multipolarity have failed to see how much international relations has changed in the last decade, and are still thinking in traditional realpolitik terms.

A unipolar world means that the USA will seek to maintain the status quo for as long as possible, and prevent the emergence of any possible rival in Europe and Asia. Other states will have to surrender part of their sovereignty to the USA. This affects both allies and opponents of Washington and requires a global US military presence, for which 9/11 was the catalyst.

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<sup>672</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

<sup>673</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

The USA will be unable to sustain her current global role indefinitely. In the long term US military and economic power will dissipate as a consequence of carrying this burden. It could cause a serious economic slowdown, or even a crisis. In addition, the pursuing of an imperial policy will undermine both the material and ideological foundations of “hyperpowerdom”, and therefore of a unipolar international system. It is likely to lead in the long term to a new wave of anti-Americanism, an upsurge in international terrorism, and new inter-religious and ethnic conflicts which will disturb the balance of the international system.

Splits in the western camp are likely to be only tactical in character. Countries such as France and Germany are unlikely to terminate their alliance with the USA, despite differences over Iraq.

The main tendency in contemporary international relations is the globalization of economic ties due to advanced information and communication technology. Another major tendency is the internationalization of bilateral relations in connection with the increased weight of leading international, principally financial-economic organizations. Globalisation and internationalization increase the interdependence of states, and narrow the scope for independent activity. The development of Russo-European relations must be seen within this context. A united Europe linked with Russia will not be able to become a power centre independent of the USA.

Iraq demonstrates that USA no longer regards the UN as necessarily playing a central role in maintaining international security. Russia and other countries do not share this view, seeing the UN as a means of trying to influence the USA and restrain her imperial ambitions.

Since 9/11, there has been a legitimization of the following foreign policy objectives pursued by democratic countries: supporting the extension of democracy and human rights; countering international terrorism and dictatorships, the spread of WMD, illegal migration and drug-trafficking. This forces Russia to reconsider her relations with a whole range of countries regarded as rogue states. There are both political and economic implications. She has to consider her image and her economic relations with these states. For example, in the

case of Iraq, Moscow acknowledged the positive impact of the overthrow of a tyrannical regime, but was cautious about whether she should write off Iraq's debts.

The debate within the Russian political elite about Iraq in 2003 revealed that Russia has no national consensus about the fundamental questions of foreign policy. Pavlov argues that there is a discord between the interests of the state and the interests of the nation in foreign policy.

The Russian leadership needs to reconcile this divergence, and to build on this base a foreign policy which is clear, logical, flexible yet predictable, supported within the country and respected by the international community.

Pavlov does not expound points 8 and 9 in detail, and provides no concrete examples of what foreign policy should be, or where state and national interests currently diverge. His comments about multipolarity are interesting, as he runs counter to the generally held Russian viewpoint. However, if US power eventually declines, which he considers inevitable in the long term, then presumably in such circumstances other national power centres could emerge. Although strong economic ties (globalization) may make it difficult at present to contemplate Europe ever emerging as a strategic rival to the USA, it should not be assumed that economic ties guarantee the prevention of such rivalry in the future.

Former Soviet foreign minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh believes that the US war against Iraq has had both positive and negative consequences.<sup>674</sup> On the positive side, Saddam has been removed, and international terrorist organisations will have learned that the USA will not hesitate to use force in response to their actions. However US actions have given rise to concern about the future of the Westphalian system, and the future role of the UN and international law. Bessmertnykh argues that the USA's greater willingness to use force means that it is more important than ever to ensure that the use of power in foreign policy must be combined with ethics. He repeats standard Russian concerns that the mixing of the war on terrorism with regime change could undermine anti-terrorist cooperation between major powers. He also echoes other Russian politicians and analysts in urging the USA not to treat its allies and partners as mere tools of US policy.

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<sup>674</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.



Interestingly he argues that the USA's decision not to seek a second UN Security Council resolution in 2003 paradoxically helped minimize splits in NATO. He suggests that if France had vetoed a resolution and the USA had gone to war regardless, then the rift between the USA and France (and Germany) would have been greater than it actually was. Like Bogaturov and Pavlov, Bessmertnykh does not believe that splits over Iraq will destroy the Trans-Atlantic relationship, or US-Russian partnership. He notes that the Bush Administration has returned to the UN in an attempt to stabilize Iraq; it does therefore act pragmatically. He considers it important for Russia to continue to develop close ties with both Europe and the USA.

### **c. USA and International Law**

Given that the USA's attack on Iraq in March 2003 was carried out without the sanction of the UN Security Council, there are obvious implications for international law. This has been a cause of concern for the Russian leadership. In November 2003 Leonid Skotnikov, who is Russia's plenipotentiary ambassador at the UN in Geneva, expressed concern in an article in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* over the USA's National Security Strategy of 2002, which in his view sought to justify the use of force by the USA in preventive strikes without prior legal sanction.<sup>675</sup> He argues that the existing role played by the UN Security Council in determining when force can legitimately be used cannot be set aside, and it is wrong to attempt to write off the UN by arguing that its Charter no longer corresponds to the security problems of the modern world, as this could completely destroy the entire international legal order.

Deputy foreign minister Yury Fedotov took a similar line in the same issue of *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, in which he expressed the standard Russian line over the UN, arguing that it should play the central role in maintaining international security, and that its role was both required and irreplaceable.<sup>676</sup>

### **d. Implications For Russia**

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<sup>675</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

<sup>676</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

The evolution of the international system and the role played in it by the USA as the most powerful nation in it obviously has implications for Russia's position, and this too is the object of discussion by Russian analysts. In July 2003, Sergey Medvedev developed the discussion about the future world order and Russia's place within it.<sup>677</sup> He does not specifically devote attention to US foreign policy, but takes it as axiomatic that the current international system is dominated by the West, in particular the USA. He argues that in order to change the world, the task of Russian foreign policy is first to adapt to this.

When considering the changes in Russian foreign policy since 1991, he notes that there has been a "deterritorialisation" in Russian foreign policy thinking. The Russian political elite (and society as a whole) no longer sees the holding on to territory at all costs as an immutable principle, as it was during the Soviet era. Neither the Russian leadership nor society is willing, for example, to pay any price to re-establish Russian control over Ukraine or Belarus, even if such a re-establishment was possible.

A second important factor has been the increased importance of economics in Russian foreign policy. Geo-economics is replacing geo-politics as a motive force in the formulation of foreign policy, with economic lobby groups such as the oil and gas industries, the banking and financial elites, civil nuclear power industry and the metallurgy sector playing an increasingly important role in the foreign policy process. This creates strong integrationist pressures, and increased Russian interest in joining major international organizations in the 1990s. The financial crisis of 1998 made clear Russia's economic dependence on the West, which is why Russia's foreign policy has avoided any major rift with the West since 1991. Even the anti-western sentiment that arose in 1999 as a result of the Kosovo crisis soon dissipated as the leadership realized that cooperation with the West was essential for Russia.

The Putin leadership has accepted this state of affairs. According to Medvedev, Putin realized that Russia needed to cooperate with the West in order to overcome her internal problems. He also realised that Russia was in danger of losing out on benefits from globalisation, and that to carry out internal reforms, he needed western support in order to create a predictable external environment and demonstrate that Russia can be a reliable

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<sup>677</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

international partner. Hence the major effort at cooperation with the West and a shift away from the multipolar rhetoric of the late Yeltsin period.

Medvedev argues that Putin has reversed the traditional paradigm of Soviet/Russian foreign policy. The traditional paradigm is that control of national territory is the overriding strategic objective, and alliances, treaties and norms are tactical objectives. Medvedev believes that Putin sees territory as a tactical resource, and alliance with the West as a strategic goal. He is therefore not concerned about NATO widening, the US military presence in Central Asia or the Russian withdrawal from bases in Cuba and Vietnam.

For the first time in all of Russia's history, the national interest is not directly linked with the might of the country, and control over territory, but with internal reform, the economic well-being of the nation, and efficiency of the leadership. Putin undoubtedly sees Russia as a power (*derzhava*), but in a new way. His policy cannot be called pro-western (as for example, Kozyrev's policy); Putin's policy is pro-Russian in the pragmatic sense of the word. If for Kozyrev association with the West was an ideological step, an act of faith, then Putin is moved by enlightened egoism: he needs the West so that Russia can triumph in the era of globalisation. As is known, one of the principles of judo is to use the strength of one's rival in one's own interests.

If Medvedev is correct, if Putin's rapprochement with the West leads to a stronger Russia, then in the long term Russia may not continue with a pro-western policy if she feels strong enough to hold her own in the international arena. This would not necessarily be an anti-western foreign policy orientation, but perhaps akin to that of contemporary China towards the West. Medvedev also uses the term "West" without distinguishing between its different power centers, although he does note that it is an open question whether the West in the future will be Hobbesian (motivated by realpolitik and using force like the USA under George Bush), or Kantian (seeking to resolve disputes through the use of soft power and international law as favoured by the European Union).

Viktor Sheynis of the international relations institute IMEMO also discussed the subject in *MEMO* in April 2003.<sup>678</sup> He accepts that intervention in the affairs of other states is under certain circumstances an acceptable feature of international relations in the current era. He argues that that the international community cannot permit regimes such as the Iraqi (under Saddam Hussein) or North Korean to acquire WMD, and that this raises the question of what is to be done about such regimes if political and economic pressure fails to resolve the security problem they pose. He also accepts that egregious violations of human rights may also justify some form of international intervention. In expressing such thinking, Sheynis seems to be coming close to the viewpoints expressed in some western (particularly American) circles.

He goes on to discuss the vexed question of who can then decide to intervene militarily. He states that only the UN can legitimately do this, but accepts that this organization is often not able to respond effectively to such crises. He is thus once again echoing the thinking expressed by some conservative American thinkers. He goes on to note that these decisions are now often being taken by western alliance organizations, by groups of states or individual states acting unilaterally. He quotes a British scholar, Alex Butler, who notes that international security is being “formed by the most powerful economically and strong politically states, which permits them to impose their national interests on the rest of the world, transforming them into international interests. There are two means of accomplishing this: either become strong, or join the strong states.” Sheynis writes that in “these conditions, the participation of Russia, albeit not as a superpower, but as a world class country, in structures similar to the G8, or Russia-NATO Council could become an important instrument of influence on the path of world affairs”. From this Sheynis advocates closer cooperation by Russia with western powers so she could play this role. He criticizes Russian foreign policy for not making sufficient efforts to be cooperative. This is an interesting contrast to many Russian analysts who accuse western powers of having no real interest in cooperating with Russia as a serious partner.

He decisively rejects the favorite Russian notion of multipolarity, arguing that the diversity of the current world does not alter the fact that its basic structure is a western unipolarity led by the USA, and that it will remain so for generations. Attempts to create alternative

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<sup>678</sup> <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

power centers will be unsuccessful and counterproductive. He rejects the idea of Russia cooperating with Europe in order to counter the USA. He therefore seems to argue that Russia should throw in its lot with this unipolar structure, which echoes Inozemtsev's idea of a core alliance.

Sheynis takes the view that the breakdown of the global security system formed after 1945 is irreversible, and that there is little point in opposing the USA, as that will only hinder Russia's own attempts at internal modernization. He argues that the only worthwhile allies for a modernizing Russia are democratic ones. This poses a dilemma for Russia. Sheynis believes that there is little support within the Russian political establishment for the close cooperation with the West that Putin has advocated since September 2001. This establishment would prefer to create an anti-US Eurasian "pole" in a multipolar international system. He also argues that there is a contradiction between Putin's foreign policy orientation of close cooperation with the West and his disregard for democratic norms at home. He feels that this makes a full alliance with the USA impossible, which he considers to be damaging to Russia's national interests.

The Putin leadership accepts the reality of the current international system, namely that it is dominated by the USA. Putin himself sees no point in opposing the status quo, given the USA's strength and Russia's weakness. However this acceptance of the inevitable contains many paradoxes. Perhaps most interesting is the point made by Sergey Medvedev, when comparing Putin's current foreign policy with that of the Kozyrev period in the early 1990s. Both Putin and Kozyrev favour close western partnership, but whereas Kozyrev saw this partnership as a means whereby Russia could become an integral part of the West, fully sharing its values, as West Germany did after 1945, Putin sees partnership as simply a means of not being marginalized by US-led globalization. Marginalisation would destroy any hopes of regaining great power status. This is a paradox, as Putin is pursuing a western oriented foreign policy, but has no interest in westernising (ie democratising) Russia. The lack of interest in becoming part of a western *Wertegemeinschaft* places limits on the extent of possible partnership between Russia and the USA. It carries the possibility that a stronger Russia might at some point turn its back on partnership. Hence partnership with the USA is not an end itself under Putin, but rather a means to an end. There is little support within the Russian political elite for genuine partnership with the USA, thus any

*volte-face* by Putin or a successor resulting in a rejection of close partnership would probably carry a good deal of support.

Russian approaches towards the USA have also been dominated by the fear that Washington may see Russia as irrelevant.<sup>679</sup> This concern was heightened by attitudes displayed by elements of the Bush Administration when it first came to office. However, if the claims made by certain Russian analysts that the USA now sees Eurasia as a core interest are correct, then this should give Russia an opportunity to enhance her importance as a partner to Washington. This is certainly the approach that Putin has taken since September 2001.

Russia's relations with the USA always raise the question of the interaction between Russo-European, US-European and Russo-US relationships. In the Cold War, Soviet foreign policy was often seen as attempting to decouple the USA from Western Europe. Similar claims have been made about post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. The Putin leadership has taken great pains to deny this. Then foreign minister Igor Ivanov stated in March 2003 that Russia was "not interested in the aggravation of relations between the USA and Europe". He also made similar comments in April 2004 in his new capacity as secretary of the Security Council:

Our country does not seek unilateral advantages, nor will it do so in the future, from the differences of opinion, which have recently been hampering coordinated actions in the Euroatlantic space. On the contrary, it is precisely the unity of the states located in the Euroatlantic space, regardless of their affiliation to this or that alliance and grouping, that we see as the guarantee of effectively and jointly countering the threats and challenges, which our states are currently confronting.<sup>680</sup>

This is probably true. Moscow has no desire to introduce unnecessary and fruitless irritants into its relationship with the USA. To do so would jeopardize the policy of cooperation undertaken by Putin as part of his strategy of modernizing Russia in order to ensure that it

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<sup>679</sup> See as an example Thomas Graham, 'A world without Russia?', Jamestown Foundation Conference, Washington DC, 9 June 1999;

<sup>680</sup> BBC Monitoring, 22 March 2003, 16 April 2004

becomes an important part of a globalized world. Cooperation with the USA and with Europe can both be regarded as key components of this strategy.

There consequently has been relatively little concern expressed over the second wave of NATO widening that took place in March 2004, when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became members of the alliance. Whilst no Russian analyst or policymaker is likely to welcome the eastward expansion of the Alliance, particularly into the territory of the former Soviet Union, this is probably offset by his awareness of NATO's reduced importance to the USA. Col-General Aleksandr Rukshin, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, made the interesting comment in January 2004 that "we cannot prohibit NATO from accepting one state or another, which meets its requirements. However, it is worth mentioning that the more member-states NATO accepts, the less controllable it becomes."<sup>681</sup> Defense minister Sergey Ivanov commented in April 2004 that Russia's attitude to NATO widening was "calmly negative", and this appears to sum up the official Russian attitude.

If Putin is unconcerned about the stationing of US forces in Central Asia, then he is unlikely to be overly perturbed about US forces being stationed in Eastern Europe. However if Arbatov's assessment that the pro-American constituency in the Russian political elite is small, then NATO widening will enhance their negative perceptions of the USA's international role, particularly if Russian foreign policy does undergo any radical change in the future.

It is significant that most analysts have tended to downplay the importance of the rifts that arose between the USA and "Old Europe" in 2003 over Iraq, and have instead seen the attempts to heal these differences as evidence that centripetal tendencies in the Trans-Atlantic alliance prevail over centrifugal ones. The problems were depicted as a dispute within the western camp that will not decouple the Atlantic Alliance. This is not to say that Moscow would not welcome a looser relationship between the USA and Old Europe, with Russia in the long term becoming a more important partner of the major European powers. The possibility of the USA stationing its forces in Poland and other former Warsaw Pact states makes the development of Russia's ties with "Old Europe" an important

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<sup>681</sup> BBC Monitoring, 14 January 2004

counterweight to the USA's focus on "New Europe". However, Russia is unlikely at present to desire a major rift, as she would hate to have to choose between the two, not least because of her current weakness. A strong Russia, on the other hand, may feel that if she ever did have to choose, then in the long term she is a European power, and therefore has more in common strategically with Old Europe than with the USA. Therefore, even though Moscow has in 2004 expressed some concern over the economic implications for her of EU widening, and has also been discomfited by EU criticisms of certain human rights issues, this will not dissuade her from seeking to see the EU as an important economic and security partner.

#### **4. US–Russia Energy Dialogue**

Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin continue to promise that the US–Russia energy dialogue will lead to a thriving oil and gas trade between their two countries.<sup>682</sup> In Washington on September 16, 2005, Putin met with representatives of ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron to discuss development of the vast Shtokman gas field, with 3 trillion cubic meters of proven reserves.<sup>683</sup> Officials sometimes tout the possible Murmansk/Indiga pipeline project, which would provide for significant oil exports to the US. Unfortunately the prospects for both of these mega-projects are murky, at best.

The Yukos prosecution revealed that the Putin regime sees the energy sector primarily as a strategic asset and an instrument of foreign policy, and only secondarily as an economic driver. As such, in the Russian view, the energy sector must be under state control. The man who symbolized the development of a new, progressive and internationally minded business class in Russia, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO of Yukos, is sitting in a Moscow prison. Charges have been filed that attack the validity of the 1990s privatizations, despite repeated assurances from President Putin that the admittedly flawed privatization process will not be revisited. A US company may ultimately be permitted to develop the Shtokman field in exchange for a share of the US LNG market, but the Russian government's decision will be dictated by mostly political considerations. The shifting sands of Russian

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<sup>682</sup> Presidents Bush and Putin signed the document inaugurating the US–Russia Energy Dialogue in May 2001.

<sup>683</sup> This is more than the current annual gas output of the entire world.



politics would hardly provide a firm basis for the property rights of the US firm fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to win the concession.

The present outlook for US–Russian energy cooperation stands in marked contrast to the euphoria that characterized the relationship before the Yukos affair. In September 2003 more than 250 American government officials and petroleum industry executives, headed by Commerce Secretary Don Evans and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, showed up in St. Petersburg for the second Commercial Energy Summit. The Americans were joined by an even larger contingent from the Russian side, also headed by the finance and energy ministers. Putin fully endorsed the policy process and cooperation in major oil and gas projects. CEOs of major Russian oil companies and state enterprises were present, as were their American counterparts. The American chairman of the newly formed company TNK-BP spoke, representing a new \$8 billion investment in the Russian oil and gas patch. Speculation was rife that ExxonMobil or ChevronTexaco was about to take a 25 percent or higher stake, worth tens of billions, in YukoSibneft.<sup>684</sup> The conference concluded with a banquet in a state dining room of one of Catherine the Great’s palaces, followed by a spectacular fireworks display. Russia finally seemed open for business and willing to play by international rules, at least in the petroleum sector. Enthusiasm for the future of bilateral cooperation could not have been higher.

Two years later, the state has swallowed Yukos. Western energy companies have sobered up considerably since 2003, but fuzzy thinking remains prevalent among US officials. Perhaps lulled by Putin’s assurances that Yukos was an isolated case, they have overlooked the implications of his increasingly authoritarian and statist policies, particularly in the energy sector. Putin has jeopardized the foundation of Russia’s recent natural resource boom secure property rights under the rule of law, which lead for a time to reinvestment of Russian capital and the introduction of Western managerial and technological methods. Net capital inflows, which only began in 2003, have given way to renewed capital flight.

Mega-projects such as the Murmansk/Indiga pipeline and the Shtokman LNG export project remain far from realization. The likelihood of a major infusion of international

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<sup>684</sup> Yukos’ acquisition of Sibneft collapsed as a result of the tax fraud and other charges leveled against it.

capital at a time when the Russian private sector's independent management of oil and gas assets is questioned seems remote. Special commissions have been formed to investigate the performance of Russian and Western companies like ExxonMobil and Shell under existing petroleum licenses, just as major investment decisions are being made.

The enthusiasm of autumn 2003 has been replaced by the cold wind of an early Russian winter. Whither American policy? Should the US reassess energy cooperation with Russia and rethink the means to its policy goals?

### **a. The Fundamentals**

The case for the development of US–Russia energy relations is very simple. Russia has regained its former Soviet position as one of the world's largest oil producers. It is already the second largest oil exporter, after Saudi Arabia. It has the largest natural gas reserves in the world by a wide margin, ahead of Iran. Oil and gas represent more than a quarter of GDP and half of export earnings. The sector has been the engine of economic growth and led the modernization of business practices since the financial collapse of 1998. Prior to the Yukos case, it had begun to attract significant foreign direct investment.

The US is the largest oil and gas consumer in the world. It imports well over half the oil it consumes from increasingly politically uncertain parts of the world, not only the Middle East but also more recently unstable countries in South America and West Africa. American oil companies need to augment existing production with new oil reserves, but are largely blocked from making equity investments in the Persian Gulf, which has the most abundant and economically viable petroleum resources, due to host government policies. There is a growing shortage of domestically produced natural gas and higher gas prices negatively affect the US economy.

Both countries have strong geopolitical and economic interests in fostering oil and gas diversity. The US search for diverse sources is a good fit with Russia's search for markets. Energy cooperation seems like a good complement to cooperation on the global war against terrorism.

Moreover, Russia is in need of foreign investment in the oil and gas sector, particularly in high-risk exploration or technologically challenging development. To develop offshore Sakhalin or the Shtokman field, which will require LNG technology, the Russian government needs Western capital and expertise. The easy steps for reviving production to previous levels have been taken, including the use of Western contractors for modern seismic interpretation, drilling and reservoir management technology. Sustaining production growth now requires providing suitable business conditions for significant domestic and international investments. By international standards, the Russian oil and gas patch remains woefully underdeveloped relative to its resource base, especially in transportation, i.e., oil and gas pipelines. American oil companies have both the means and the interest to invest.

The convergence of corporate and government interests would be appealing to most administrations, and certainly to one that traces its roots to Midland, Texas. Without energy, the bilateral economic dialogue may be reduced to the seemingly implacable challenges posed by chickens, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, WTO accession, and democratization.

#### **b. Happy Marriage or Hype?**

No amount of success in promoting energy cooperation with Russia will fundamentally improve US oil supply vulnerability. Three-quarters of known world oil reserves are in the OPEC countries. Two-thirds of the reserves, and much of the economically extractable oil, are in the Persian Gulf. Oil is a largely fungible commodity traded in a worldwide market under short-term contracts.

Certainly incremental production from Russia or Alaska, or any other non-OPEC (and particularly non-Middle Eastern) sources is important in extending the time when the last incremental barrel must come from the Persian Gulf. This moderates the monopoly power of the OPEC cartel, whose uneven management of production policy has led to volatility in pricing and big increases in non-OPEC production worldwide over the past two decades. Increases in oil production outside the Middle East continue today in the Caspian, from deep-water reserves off West Africa and in the Gulf of Mexico, from Canadian tar sands

and in the Venezuelan Orinoco Belt. With 5 percent of total world oil reserves, Russia is important but no more so than these other areas.

Russia cannot replace Saudi Arabia or other major producers in the Persian Gulf. With a reserve/production ratio of approximately 30 years, Russia cannot be compared to Persian Gulf producers with a ratio of 70, 80 or over 100 years. Russia is a price taker, not a price setter, in an energy market dominated by OPEC.

**Table IV. 2 Russian Oil on the US Market**

Year	2000	2020
Net Imports	462	737
Imports from the Russian Federation	0.39	100
Russian market share (in percent)	0.084416	13.56852

Oil unit is million metric tons.

Sources: Net imports data from the US Energy Information Administration.

2000 Russia imports data from UN Comtrade. But the likelihood of such a best-case scenario is comparatively small. In January 2005 the heads of Lukoil and Transneft said they no longer consider the Murmansk route economically feasible.<sup>685</sup> The Indiga route raises difficulties because that port is icebound for several months of the year. Moreover Transneft is focused on the Daqing/Nakhodka pipeline at the moment and seems reluctant

to undertake two such major efforts simultaneously. More generally, the Russian state does not regard the US as one of its most important future energy markets. The government's *Russian Energy Strategy Through 2020* devotes a whole page to European and CIS markets before arriving at one paragraph on the US market. The strategy says the US "may become a long-term market for sales of Russian oil production and American capital may become a source of investment in the growth of the Russian oil industry and its export transit infrastructure."<sup>686</sup> The document indicates the US market is a relatively low priority, behind not only European and CIS, but also Asian markets.

Even if the Murmansk/Indiga or Sakhalin projects come to fruition, the process will take years and provide only around 13 percent of US imports. While such diversification is desirable for both economic and security reasons, it will not reduce overall US import dependence or vulnerability to oil price fluctuations. A serious supply disruption in the Persian Gulf would have the same impact on world oil markets and US oil supply and prices whether significant volumes of Russian oil reach US shores or not. This was demonstrated in 2002 when temporary disturbances limited Venezuelan and Nigerian oil exports. Even if every barrel of Russia's current 8.5 million total daily productions were to be exported to the US, leaving nothing for domestic consumption, it still would not satisfy current US import needs of 11 million barrels of oil per day. What's more, we are treaty-bound to share in the pain of any major supply interruption by allocating available supply with other International Energy Agency countries. As long as the US is so import-dependent, it is destined to suffer through the vicissitudes of global oil markets along with the rest of the world.

Russia is much more of a titan in gas, where it accounts for 25 percent of world exports and 25 percent of proven reserves.<sup>687</sup> The prospects for Russia-US cooperation on gas are somewhat better, but the *Russian Energy Strategy* mentions gas exports to the US only in passing, calling it a future market.<sup>688</sup> Moreover the development of trade in LNG would not fundamentally alter the US market. The US is far less import-dependent in gas than in

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<sup>685</sup> Major Russian Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Projects," <[http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia\\_pipelines.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia_pipelines.html)>.

<sup>686</sup> Russian Energy Strategy Through 2020 (Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda). p. 55, <<http://www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.strategy.pdf>>.

<sup>687</sup> International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, p. 285.

<sup>688</sup> Russian Energy Strategy Through 2020, p. 55.

oil, importing approximately 15 percent of the amount it consumes annually.<sup>689</sup> Most of this comes by pipeline from Canada, with LNG accounting for only a tiny fraction of imports. Some experts believe the share of LNG could grow to near 25percent over the next twenty years. After a meeting with Gazprom officials in May 2004, Deputy Secretary of Energy Kyle McSlarrow called Russia and the US an “obvious fit” in the gas business, forecasting that US LNG imports could reach 143 million tons per year by 2025.<sup>690</sup> But this is far from certain. The prospect of Russian LNG reaching US shores is equally uncertain, even if a US firm develops the Shtokman field. Several other countries, including Angola, Norway, and Egypt, could deliver LNG more cheaply and are interested in the US market. One executive with a major oil firm remarked of Russian LNG, “There’s a risk of flavor of the monthism about all this.”<sup>691</sup>

### **c. Policy Reform or Project Promotion?**

Policies that remove structural impediments to balanced growth are far more likely than government-selected projects to produce and sustain long-term economic growth.

First of all, governments are universally bad at picking projects and the bigger the project, the bigger their mistakes. This is not just true of Soviet-style command economies. In the energy sector, one only need only recall the US synthetic fuels (e.g., shale oil) fiasco in the 1980s and the ongoing debate in the US Congress on ethanol subsidies.

Subsidizing energy consumption or inefficient industry in a transitional economy may be understandable policy or at least good politics. However, such policies also distort the market, encourage the arbitrary exercise of bureaucratic power, invite abuse of political control, promote corrupt business practices and dampen sound investment—as is evident throughout the Russian petroleum industry. Reform is a continual journey in a dynamic market economy, not a terminal destination at times of temporarily favorable external economic conditions, such as high world oil prices. This is where the US can truly help advance the cause of economic reform in Russia. Today it is easy to forget today that in the 1970s the US energy sector was a maze of over-regulation and distortion of market signals,

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<sup>689</sup>“Natural Gas Imports, Exports, and Net Imports 1949–2004,” <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb0603.html>>.

<sup>690</sup> “Russia: Dash for Liquefied Gas,” *Petroleum Economist*, July 2004.

with price controls on gasoline retail margins, oil import quotas, crude oil entitlements, a bias toward small refiners, differential pricing between “old” gas and “new” gas, all designed to “protect” the consumer and small domestic producers. Price controls removed competition from retail marketing, which led to subsidized wasteful investment and consumption. The result was high prices and gasoline lines during the two global oil crises. Deregulation did not start until the Carter and Reagan administrations, within living memory of many still in the US government. The specter of high consumer prices was also raised in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but never materialized. Instead retail energy prices stabilized at a lower level after decontrol, and energy efficiency improved after price distortions were removed. Many lessons from the US experience may apply to Russia today.

Sharing evolving US regulatory experience with Russian colleagues who face similar challenges can be an important and useful contribution to economic partnership. This is far better than preaching to them on what laws to pass in order to attract American investment, such as the decade-long futile effort on production sharing agreement (PSA) legislation. The Murmansk project and LNG exports are fine to talk about if they advance the reform agenda, but not if they are a replacement for reform or, even worse, diversionary devices to delay reform indefinitely.

#### **d. Politics and Power**

It appears to be more appealing to government leaders to discuss projects like Murmansk or Russian natural gas exports to the US, even though mega-projects like these take many years to come to fruition. Not only do such projects fail to promote structural reform, they divert attention from the economic policies of the Russian state and the attendant risks for foreign investors.

Putin has sought to portray the Yukos prosecution as a one-time purge. Some Western observers have characterized it as a simple theft, part of a transition from “Yeltsin oligarchs” to “Putin oligarchs.” This narrative implies the Yukos affair was a flawed

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<sup>691</sup> “Russia: Dash for Liquefied Gas,” *Petroleum Economist*, July 2004.

episode for an economy firmly on the market path. Even if this were the case, it would cast a significant pall over property rights and the rule of law in Russia.

But this comparatively sunny story misses the true significance of Yukos. The Yukos case illuminated a fundamental shift in the state's attitude toward the economy. The state now sees the energy sector not just as a source of spoils and economic growth, but also as a lever of international political power. If the Yukos affair had really been merely a struggle over property, a very different scenario might have played out. Perhaps Yukos would have gone to a more regime-friendly oligarch, like Vladimir Potanin or Oleg Deripaska, with a sizeable portion of the profits kicked back to the regime. Officials might have permitted private pipelines or expanded the Transneft system in order to increase their own opportunities for rent seeking.

Instead the government dismembered the most innovative energy company in Russia, torpedoing FDI and causing production to stagnate. While Kremlin decision makers may be receiving distorted information these days, they could not have failed to foresee these consequences. They decided, however, that state control over the energy sector was worth the inevitable price in lost rents and lost growth. Since then the Russian government has publicly rejected the concept of privately owned and controlled trunk oil pipelines and the idea of breaking up the Gazprom monopoly in natural gas. Indeed it has positioned Gazprom as a power not only in gas but also in oil, contriving to put both Yuganskneftegaz and Sibneft in its hands.<sup>692</sup> Together these firms account for approximately 30 percent of Russian oil production.

Why has the state adopted such a course? The answers would be difficult to divine even with a roomful of Kremlinologists, an Ouija board and magic 8-ball. Perhaps Russian energy policy reflects the persistent fortress mentality inherited from the USSR and exacerbated by the recent "color revolutions" in the CIS. Perhaps the bureaucracy is simply strengthening its own position and preventing the emergence of alternative centers of

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<sup>692</sup> Yuganskneftegaz was Yukos' largest oil-producing unit. Sibneft was the property of oligarch Roman Abramovich.



power. Whatever its motivations, the state has opted to destroy the most promising sector of the Russian economy.

This takes us back to the former head of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who now sits in a Moscow prison. As long as a country's economy is based on the exploitation of oil and gas resources, it will favor a highly centralized political system where a few men hold the power to reward state-owned concessions and guarantee investment conditions.

Left to its own devices, the petroleum industry, which by its very nature routinely takes multi-billion dollar investment risks, would support central authority overruling local authority or civil society in Santa Barbara County, California or Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, as well as in the delta of Nigeria, Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela, or Western Siberia and Sakhalin. Mr. Khodorkovsky was the beneficiary of such centralized power at the beginning of privatization in Russia. He is now a victim of the same type of power. There is no guarantee Western firms will not one day find themselves in an analogous position. Suppose for a moment the Kremlin allows a Western firm to develop the Shtokman field. Without secure property rights rooted in a consistently applied system of law, that firm will be running a tremendous risk. For who is to say the Kremlin won't again put security before economic growth? Perhaps the risks are worth it, given the profits involved, but Western companies should not labor under any gauzy illusions about the Russian business environment.

Whether that environment, and the state that has fostered it, will change remains an open question. The answer will depend largely on the choices made by the Russian state and the Russian people over the coming years. Russia's G8 chairmanship provides a unique opportunity for Bush and other Western leaders to move beyond photo opportunities and influence these choices. If the countries of the economic G7 want to see a more democratic, transparent Russia, devoted to the rule of law, they would do well to promote not specious mega-projects, but rather structural reform and reduced government intervention in the energy sector. President Putin has made his choice. Now the rest of the world must choose either to play by his rules or to give him a reason to change them.

## **5. Russia and the Energy Supply of Europe**

In discussing the energy relations between Europe and Russia, the forecasts of the EU as well as that of the Russian Energy Strategy may serve as starting points.<sup>693</sup> The Russian Energy Strategy for the period until 2020, approved by the Russian government in 2003, replaces a similar document from 1995.<sup>694</sup> However, the new Energy Strategy is more than just a projection of current trends. Although it does not have a binding character, it is meant to set the course for Russia's energy policy and to serve as a guideline of the administration's energy policy in the foreseeable future. The Strategy proceeds from certain assumptions concerning the development of the world economy and the Russian economy until 2020. An "optimistic" scenario presumes that, due to far-reaching reforms and a favourable external economic environment and in particular growth of the world economy by 3.5 percent per annum, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Russia will triple by 2020. A moderate scenario assumes that the world economy will grow by 2.5 percent per annum and that Russian GDP will double by that year. The optimistic scenario presumes an annual economic growth in Russia of 6.2 percent in the period 2000–2020, which can certainly be considered to be too high.<sup>695</sup> Assumptions concerning the price of energy sources are more convincing in the optimistic scenario than in the moderate. The following analysis is based on the *optimistic* scenario of the Russian Energy Strategy. It implies a relatively large amount of production of energy and correspondingly large exports and outlines the maximum contribution of the Russian energy sector to the long-term energy supply of Europe. As will be seen during the following discussion, Russia will remain the main energy supplier of Europe until 2020, but in the course of time more and more European energy imports must come from other supplier countries.

### **a. Europe and Russian Oil**

According to the Russian Energy Strategy of 2003, the volume of oil exports, which stood at 145 million tons in 2000, will increase to more than 300 million tons in 2020. However, exports to Europe in that period are to increase only by little more than 30 million tons, that

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<sup>693</sup> For the purposes of this contribution, "Europe" is defined as the European Union extended to about 30 members but excluding CIS countries.

<sup>694</sup> Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020, approved by the Russian government August 28, 2003, <<http://www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.strategy.pdf>>.

<sup>695</sup> The main reason for this scepticism is the low Russian investment rate, which turned out to be less than 20 percent in the first years of the millennium, i.e. only about half of what is necessary for a sustainable growth of 5–6 percent. The Russian Energy Strategy presupposes that the investment rate will not rise substantially until 2010 and will reach 25 percent of GDP only in the decade 2010–2020.

is, from 127.5 million to 160 million tons or 1.1 percent per annum. An increase of the same scope is expected for the exports to the CIS countries, whereas oil exports to other countries like the United States and China, which has been low so far, will rise to about 100 million tons in 2010. Thus, the increase of Russian oil exports will clearly shift from west to east. Accordingly, the Energy Strategy expects the highest increase rates of oil exports from Eastern Siberia.

**Table IV. 3 Export of Fossil Fuels 2000–2020 According to the Russian Energy Strategy 2003**

Years	2000	2020	<i>Difference 2000–2020</i>
Oil (million tons): Total	145	303	158
CIS-States	17	50	33
Europe*	128	160	33
China/South East Asia/USA	1	93	93
Natural gas (billion m <sup>3</sup> ):	194	281	87
CIS-States	60	50	–10
Europe*	134	165	31
China/South East Asia/USA**	0	66	66

Discrepancies in the sums total are due to rounding.

\* Europe in the Strategy's definition pertains to Western and Eastern Europe including Turkey but excluding the CIS states.

\*\* Partially liquid gas.

Source: [Russia's Energy Strategy for the Period Until 2020], approved 28.8.2003, <http://www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.strategy.pdf>

According to the forecasts of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the European Commission, the European requirement for oil imports in the period 2000–2020 will increase by about 180 million tons under the premise of a moderate growth of oil

consumption; this is caused both by an increase in consumption and by a parallel oil production decrease in Europe.<sup>696</sup> According to current plans and forecasts, Russia will contribute to this increase of imports only by less than 20 percent. Consequently, more than 80 percent of additional import requirements of Europe must be covered from other world regions.<sup>697</sup> However, for Europe (EU-30) Russia will remain the most important individual oil supplier, though its share will slightly decrease from 30 to 27 percent.<sup>698</sup>

**Table IV. 4 Russian Oil on the European Market**

2000	2020	Increase 2000–2020
428	>600	~180
128	160	~30
30	27	17

Net imports of EU-30 (million t) of which imports from Russia (million t)

Russian share (percent)

Sources of the primary dates: Energy Information Administration (EIA), *International Energy Outlook 2003*, May 2003; European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, *European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030*, Paris 2003.

While 88 percent of the Russian oil exports went to Europe in 2000, this share will be reduced by 2020 to approximately 50 percent according to the forecast of the Energy Strategy. In contrast, the share of the USA and the Far East, which in 2000 amounted to no

<sup>696</sup> The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), an independent statistical department within the US Department of Energy, regularly publishes data about energy consumption in world regions and individual states in its *International Energy Outlook*, the May 2003 issue of which is here referred to; see <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html>>. In the reference case of an average growth of production and energy consumption in the EU-30 area, the requirement of additional oil imports is 179 million tons, in the case of low economic growth 75 million tons, and in the case of high growth 324 million tons. See also European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, *European Energy and Transport Trends 2030*, Paris 2003, Appendix 2, p. 152, <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy\\_transport/figures/trends\\_2030/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030/index_en.htm)>.

<sup>697</sup> For the forecast of international trade flows through 2025 see EIA, *International Energy Outlook 2003*, Table 14, p. 42, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html>

<sup>698</sup> The share of 30 percent or 27 percent respectively refers to the case of an average growth of consumption in EU-30 and, moreover, to the optimistic scenario of the Russian Energy Strategy.

<sup>698</sup> The share of 30 percent or 27 percent respectively refers to the case of an average growth of consumption in EU-30 and, moreover, to the optimistic scenario of the Russian Energy Strategy.

more than 3 percent, will be one third or even more by 2020.<sup>699</sup> Thus the Russian Energy Strategy expects a diversification of the Russian oil exports, which, from the Russian point of view, will contribute to reducing the dependence on a small number of importing countries.

### **b. Europe and Russian Gas**

There has been a rapidly increasing demand of natural gas in Europe. This is due to the European intention for ecological reasons to substitute coal and oil by “clean” natural gas (reduction in the emission of carbon dioxide) but also an expanding gas supply network. While EU-30 oil imports are likely to increase in the period between 2000 and 2020 approximately by 40 percent, gas imports will increase (medium economic growth scenario) by more than 200 percent in the low growth scenario by 150 percent (EIA forecast). This is a result of both an increase of gas consumption by 50–75 percent and a stagnation or decrease of Europe’s own gas production. The widening gap between increasing consumption and decreasing production of gas and the attendant dramatic jump in projected European gas imports by approximately 300 billion m<sup>3</sup> far exceeds Russia’s intentions and potential.

But what *are* the Russian plans for the gas supply of the European market? While the overall volume of Russian gas exports is to increase between 2000 and 2020 by 87 billion m<sup>3</sup>, that is, 45 percent, exports to the extended European Union will rise only by 31 billion m<sup>3</sup> or 23 percent.<sup>700</sup> Thus, according to the Russian Energy Strategy, the intended increase of Russian gas production will predominantly be used for exports into regions outside Europe. This corresponds to the fact that the increase of gas production is expected not in Western Russia but in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, from where gas can be transported either onshore or—in the form of LNG—by ship to South East Asia and the United States. An analogous shift to the East is also expected for the increase of oil production.

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<sup>700</sup> By 2020 Russia plans to deliver to the CIS countries about 10 billion m<sup>3</sup> less than in 2000. One should, however, not be too strict with these figures since the Energy Strategy only provides a rough orientation.

**Table IV. 5 Russian Natural Gas on the European Market**

2000	2020	Increase 2000–2020
200	500	~300
134	165	~30
67	33	10

Net imports of EU-30, total (billion m<sup>3</sup>) among this, imports from Russia (billion m<sup>3</sup>)  
Russian share (percent)

Sources of the primary dates: Energy Information Administration (EIA), *International Energy Outlook 2003*, May 2003; European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, *European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030*, Paris 2003.

While in 2000 about 70 percent of the European (EU-30) gas imports came from Russia, this share will be only 50 percent in 2010 and less than 30 percent in 2020. The remaining deficit of 70 percent will then have to be covered by multiple supplier countries. Although no precise forecasts are possible for the time after 2010, Europe will find itself compelled to import gas increasingly—partly in the form of liquefied gas—from North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

While the slight decrease in the share of Russian oil in European imports is not a cause for concern, the foreseeable marked decrease of the share of Russian natural gas in European imports raises some questions: How to satisfy in future Europe's additional demand of natural gas? Liquefied natural gas is one option. Furthermore, as pipeline deliveries are economically efficient below a distance of 4 000–5 000 km, pipeline suppliers could be Northern Africa, the Middle East, or the Caspian region. Algeria, next to Russia the main external supplier of Europe, will probably be able to raise its deliveries from approximately 60 to 120 billion m<sup>3</sup> by 2020—provided that new fields like the Salah region in the Sahara are opened up and new export pipelines to Europe will be built. In this case, Algeria could achieve an increase in its gas deliveries to Europe twice large as that which Russia has envisaged in its Energy Strategy. Libya, too, by using the new Green Stream pipeline, will be able to raise its so far quite low volume of exports of one billion m<sup>3</sup> to 30-40 billion m<sup>3</sup>. Future gas exports from Egypt to Europe will flow via the Jordan pipeline to Turkey and in addition can be raised by the realization of liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects and reach a possible volume of 30 billion m<sup>3</sup> in 2020. Nigerian gas deliveries to Europe can be

transported only in the form of LNG because transportation via Algeria is too expensive. Other supplies to Europe, which are at present insignificant but likely to increase in the future, could be Trinidad and Venezuela as well as the Middle East (excluding Iran). According to these assumptions, gas supplies of Europe from these regions will by 2020 have increased by approximately 250 billion m<sup>3</sup>, compared with 2000, which means that North Africa, the Middle East, and the Caspian region all together will deliver more natural gas to Europe than Russia.

Iran will presumably become-next to Algeria-a main supplier of gas if its super giant field South Pars is connected to the European gas infrastructure; this, however, could be the case only after 2015. Beginning in 2020, 60–100 billion m<sup>3</sup> can be delivered from Iran to Europe and from 2025 approximately 150 billion m<sup>3</sup>. Turkey will presumably become an important transit country for natural gas from the Middle East, Iran, and the Caspian region.<sup>701</sup> Apart from the pipelines, which will have to be combined to a network, it will be necessary to build storage stations and gas liquefaction plants in various places of the extra-European gas compound network. If deliveries from North Africa and the Middle East including Iran will indeed increase as described above, a shortage of gas in Europe is unlikely to emerge. But this presupposes relative political stability in the respective regions.

### **c. The Political Dimension of Russian Oil and Gas**

In some European countries, Germany being one notable example, there has been concern that the relatively high share of Russian oil and gas in consumption established some kind of dangerous “dependency.” The concern, however, lacks justification. With oil imports one cannot generally speak of critical dependence on any one country since that commodity is available to anyone who can pay the market price. Natural gas, as long as

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<sup>701</sup> See Conference on Natural Gas Transit and Storage in Southeast Europe An Opportunity to Diversify European Gas Supply?, Istanbul, May 31–June 1, 2002.

pipelines are needed to carry it, could be a different matter. But transport by pipeline makes suppliers and buyers fundamentally dependent on one another as long as both have limited access to alternative markets. As a result, neither supplier nor consumer countries really have much leeway for “turning off the gas.” In addition, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is gaining an increasing share of a gradually expanding world market in natural gas, thus further weakening the alleged “dependency” of gas importing countries on certain suppliers.

#### **d. The Specific Character of EU–Russia Relations**

The EU and its member states not only share a long and often difficult history with Russia but also immediate geographical proximity. After EU enlargement, five member states (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) have direct land borders with Russia, and three others (Denmark, Germany, and Sweden) are Russia’s neighbors across the Baltic Sea. As is most evident in questions over the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, this proximity creates both opportunities for cooperation and the danger of friction. In any case, the two partners cannot ignore each other.

Geographical proximity and historical ties are responsible for the long list of topics discussed in the bilateral dialogue. In particular, this is true for the close economic cooperation, including the indispensable role of the EU as Russia’s largest trade and investment partner for the modernization of the Russian economy and the importance of Russian energy exports for both the EU and Russia. In view of evident opportunities, both sides have an equally strong interest in further developing cooperation in this field and in the extension of infrastructure networks, as well as in scientific, technological and cultural exchange.

In principle, similar interests and geographical proximity also suggest cooperation against environmental hazards, battling organized crime, trafficking in drugs and illegal migration on the one hand, and facilitating travel and the exchange of people in both directions on the other. In the political field, cooperation seems indispensable for creating durable security and stability in the common neighbourhood by solving regional and frozen conflicts or



untenable domestic situations, in particular in Moldova/Transdnistria, the Transcaucasus, and Belarus.<sup>702</sup>

However, in many of these fields, the EU easily finds itself in what the Russian side sees as a *demandeur* position. Against the background of old thinking in terms of zero-sum games and *chasse gardée*, Russia often demands a “price” for complying with international standards or even for doing things that are evidently in its own interest. This was the case when the EU asked Russia to respect its OSCE obligations, to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and to cooperate effectively in the elimination of nuclear waste and other serious environmental hazards or to conclude a readmission agreement before liberalizing travel regimes.

Conversely, Russia finds itself in a kind of *demandeur* position regarding questions such as its membership in the WTO and its integration into the world economy, the transit of people and goods to and from Kaliningrad and the improvement of the general situation in and around the enclave, the facilitation and eventual abolishment of EU visa requirements for Russian citizens, or the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states.

Yet progress in solving even long-standing issues can be made when the political will is there on both sides. Such was the case when the Russian State Duma (on October 22, 2004) and the Federation Council (on October 27, 2004), ratified the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the Protocol on the extension of the PCA to the new EU member states. Both are issues of highest importance for EU–Russia relations. At the same time, the Duma adopted a statement outlining a number of outstanding issues in this relationship, including Russian requests concerning the transit of goods to and from Kaliningrad and visa-free Kaliningrad travel by high-speed train, as well as the rights of ethnic minorities in Latvia and Estonia.

Both the uncontroversial and the more difficult issues on the bilateral agenda are primarily a result of geographical proximity. As such, they cannot be ignored and will not disappear

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<sup>702</sup> For a detailed analysis of EU–Russia relations see Rolf Schuette, *EU–Russia Relations: Interests and Values—A European Perspective* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004; Carnegie Papers No. 54

from the agenda even if the questions involved might not be solved easily or in the short run. They can be ignored for a while but will eventually return to the dialogue. While the European Union and Russia are highly interdependent in all these matters, none of them plays an important role in United States-Russia relations.

The great number of documents adopted jointly by the EU and Russia, or by the two partners individually, have created a wide and growing agenda. Every EU Presidency, every EU–Russia Summit, the Commission, and the Council Secretariat have sought to add substance to the bilateral agenda, if possible by a new initiative. Member states have made an additional contribution to this process of agenda setting through their own initiatives. As an example, the concept of the “four common spaces” between the EU and Russia arose from an initial joint proposal by France and Germany. These are: (a) the Common Economic Space, (b) the Common Space of External Security, (c) the Common Space of Freedom, Security, and Justice, and (d) the Common Space of Research and Education, are including cultural aspects.

In essence, the logic of EU foreign policy-making vis-à-vis Russia and other third states can be seen as a kind of export of the EU’s internal *acquis communautaire*. Thus, step-by-step, the Russian Federation will be integrated into a “Common Economic Space,” including the adoption of the four fundamental freedoms of the internal market (free movement of goods, capital, services and people). The projected EU–Russia “Common Space of Freedom, Security, and Justice” is another example of extending EU internal programmes (the so-called Tampere Process) to third states.

This approach has created a dense legal and institutional framework as reflected in the dialogue structures of the EU–Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). By virtue of the wide range of topics that are covered by the PCA (and the four common spaces), European officials and their Russian counterparts regularly meet on at least four different administrative levels and with even higher annual frequency than in the EU–US dialogue.

The proliferation of institutions stands out as another peculiarity in EU– Russia cooperation when compared with the US–Russia relationship. This has to do with the

complex institutional setup of the European Union itself. Many different actors draft EU policy towards Russia: The Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the individual EU member states. As a result, the EU has shown a tendency to establish additional institutions, which were not originally intended by the PCA, for example the two “High Level Groups” on the energy dialogue and on the Common Economic Space. Only recently, the EU has begun to streamline its dialogue with Russia, for example by reforming the EU–Russia Cooperation Council (now called the Permanent Partnership Council).

#### **e. The EU’s Search for “Common European Values”**

Reference to common European values has been a central feature of EU– Russia documents, agreements and declarations. Even though the EU never laid out the “European” character of these values (as compared with their universal status), it is quite obvious that the EU, without saying so explicitly, expected or at least hoped for more commitment to those values from Russia (and other European countries) than from partners on other continents. The growing disappointment with President Putin’s domestic policies is understandable only against the background of such high expectations.

Why do EU leaders expect Russia to subscribe to values such as the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights and free media? The answer lies partly in the analysis given above. Both the social dimension of geographical proximity and the institutional project of extending the EU’s legal framework to Russia explain why the European Union is looking for common values to be shared with the Russian leadership and population.

First: Against the background of geographical proximity, cultural ties, and a shared (though not common) history on the European continent, the EU ascribes to Russia a much stronger disposition to share its continental values than to countries in Africa or Asia. Furthermore, European heads of state and government have not forgotten Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s wished to make Russia a member of the “House of Europe.”

Second: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or indeed the concept of common spaces, implies common institutions. However, they are an embodiment of *European*

values and reflect European political culture, but not necessarily Russian political culture. In other words: The EU tries to project its own historical experience onto the Russian Federation, i.e. peaceful cooperation through an evolutionary process of institutional integration. Since institutions are always carriers of “values” at the same time as they are expressions of interests, rules and regulations, it should not be surprising to see the EU expect those values from Russia, the most important neighbor in the European House.

But the study of EU–Russia relations shows that the European demand for Russian adherence to common values is only of relative importance to the EU. The EU has not always been consistent in raising this issue with the Russian leadership. Furthermore, the EU’s normative power seems to be relatively weak when it is projected towards a big and important partner country like Russia. In such cases, shared interests may easily prevail over common values. Russia sees itself as an indispensable and independent world power and it is largely perceived as such by the European Union. Thus, it can be assumed that even if the current trend towards autocracy in Russian domestic politics continues, the EU is likely to continue its policy of dialogue and defining common interests rather than risk a serious deterioration of bilateral relations.

On the other hand, a feel for “common European values” is not completely absent on the Russian side. At least in official statements, e.g. at EU–Russia Summits, President Putin usually adopts the European rhetoric of shared values. Even if his administration often seems to act to the contrary, he pays lip service to the EU vocabulary. In the long run, this may not be irrelevant. Although the EU and Russia may fail to agree entirely on the importance of such values and their concrete meaning, continuous reference to the rule of law, respect for human rights, democratic reform and freedom of expression as an exercise in good European conduct may have positive long-term effects. This process might be enhanced by making clear to the Russian leadership that full respect for Russia as an equal partner in the family of world democracies will only be possible if Russia shares European values not only in words, but also in its domestic and foreign policies.

#### **IV. I RUSSIAN-US RELATIONS: AREAS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION**

##### **A. Emergence Of Multipolarity In A Unipolar World**

Soviet Union's collapse transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity.<sup>703</sup> There are states that are formidable militarily (Russia) or economically (Japan and Germany). Germany, Japan and Russia certainly have the potential to be great powers. Germany and Japan cannot today be considered great powers, however, because they lack the requisite military capabilities, especially strategic nuclear arsenals that would give them deterrence self-sufficiency.

Notwithstanding Russia's still formidable nuclear and conventional military capabilities, economic difficulties and domestic political uncertainties have undercut its great power status. China will be a strong contender for great power status if it can maintain its internal cohesion.<sup>704</sup>

In today's international system only the United States possesses imposing strength in all categories of great power capability, it enjoys a preeminent role in international politics' Analysts of such diverse views as the liberal internationalist Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and neoconservatives Charles Krauthammer and Joshua Muravchick agree that a unipolar world is highly conducive to American interests.<sup>705</sup> Belief that unipolarity favors the United States, and hence should be maintained, resonated in official Washington as well. This became apparent in March 1992, when the initial draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years 1994-99 was leaked to the *New York Times*.<sup>706</sup>

Specifically, the document stated that, "We must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order" and that "we must maintain the

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<sup>703</sup> By unipolarity we refer to system "in which a single power is geopolitical preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it." See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will rise"; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p 244.

<sup>704</sup> Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," *New York Times*, January 11, 1993, p. A1. Cited in: Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise"; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p. 244.

<sup>705</sup> See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 1990.; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/91.

<sup>706</sup> Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. A1. Cited in: Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise"; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p.246.

mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”<sup>707</sup>

The initial draft of the DPG was controversial, and a subsequent draft deleted the language referring to the goal of preserving unipolarity. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that the DPG accurately reflected official views about unipolarity. For example, the 1991 Summer Study organized by the Pentagon's Director of Net Assessment defined a “manageable” world, as one in which there is no threat to America's superpower role.

The main risk to American security, the study argued, is that of “Germany and/ or Japan disconnecting from multilateral security and economic arrangements and pursuing an independent course”.<sup>708</sup> During late 1992 and early 1993, the Pentagon's Joint Staff was preparing a “new NSC 68” intended to establish an intellectual framework for America's post-Cold War grand strategy. One of this document's key themes is that a multipolar world is, by definition, dangerously unstable. There is as yet no evidence that the Clinton administration's view of unipolarity will differ from the Bush administrations.

Although there are shadings of difference among the various proposals for perpetuating unipolarity, it is fair to speak of a single strategy of predominance. This strategy is not overtly aggressive; the use of preventive measures to suppress the emergence of new great powers is not contemplated. It is not, in other words, a strategy of heavy-handed American dominance. Rather the strategy of preponderance seeks to preserve unipolarity by persuading Japan and Germany that they are better off remaining within the orbit of an American-led security and economic system than they would be if they became great powers.

The strategy of preponderance assumes that rather than balancing against the United States, other states will bandwagon with it. Important benefits are thought to flow from the perpetuation of unipolarity. In a unipolar system, it is argued, the United States could avoid the unpredictable geopolitical consequences that would attend the emergence of new great powers. Unipolarity would, it is said, minimize the risks of both strategic uncertainty and

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<sup>707</sup> Cited in: Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise”; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p.246.

instability. In effect, the strategy of preponderance aims at preserving the Cold War status quo, even though the Cold War is over.

## **B. General Framework For Areas Of Cooperation And The Pillars Of Partnership**

Will RF and US establish great power cooperation through the United Nations Security Council and other means? Do they have a common ground for benefiting from cooperation? The answer is that there is a ground at least to some extent and cooperation between the two countries will continue in core areas related to common security interests. Cooperation not only supports a constructive and cordial relationship between the United States and Russia; it also strengthens broader global stability. The US-Russian relationship over the next decade likely will prove a model of realist foreign policy, serving basic security interests.

The relationship will fall far short of a strategic partnership, however, because realism is not enough to support it. A global strategic partnership can be built only on a strong foundation of common purpose and stable domestic support, which is lacking in both countries.

Russia and the United States can be allies in the best traditions of far-sighted traditional great power diplomacy, but the realities of domestic constraints and the imbalance of their national power will prevent their alliance from meeting the requirements of deep security and economic integration in the first decade of the twenty-first century. If only realism could prevail, one is tempted to hope, the United States and Russia could work together to meet their common interests in security, stability, and prosperity. Reality, however, just keeps getting in the way.

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<sup>708</sup> Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), 2992 *Summer Study*, Organized by the Director, Net Assessment,

### C. Optimist Approaches

For some in Russian political sphere there is every reason to believe that Russian-US ties can evolve into relations of partners. They are mainly non-Eurasian's figures. According to Yevgeny Primakov, it is possible for Russia and the U.S. to develop a partner relationship in specific areas where their interests overlap. According to Primakov these areas are energy, security issues against the international terrorism and anti WMD measures.<sup>709</sup>

Primakov argues that the shortage of energy resources in the United States, together with the instability in the Middle East, make Russia a major potential source of oil and gas supplies to the U.S. Meanwhile, Russia's Gazprom is completing negotiations with several foreign companies for the joint development of the giant Stockman gas condensate field. There are plans for the supply of Stockman gas to the American market. Another plan taking shape is the construction of an oil pipeline to the coast of the Arctic Ocean, which will enable Russia to step up its oil supplies to America.<sup>710</sup>

Secondly, the threat of international terrorism leaves no alternative but for Moscow and Washington to cooperate in the security sphere. Russia, for example, played an important role in the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan by supplying armaments to the Northern Alliance.

Also, Russia encouraged the Central Asian states to provide intermediate military bases to the U.S. for the duration of military actions in Afghanistan. Primakov believes that despite its disagreement with the U.S. unilateral operation in Iraq, Russia is making efforts to prevent manifestations of anti-Americanism in its own policy, as well as in the policies of other European countries. At the same time, Moscow resolutely and effectively opposes Islamic extremism, which is now targeted against the United States.

During the Cold War years, Washington supported the struggle of Islamic extremists against the Soviet military in Afghanistan, and it was at this time that Osama bin Laden emerged in the foreground of that struggle. When the Soviet Union saw that its military

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held at Newport, R.I., August 5-13, 1991, p. 17.

<sup>709</sup> Yevgeny Primakov, "Russia and the U.S. in Need of Trust and Cooperation" *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol. 4:No. 1, January-March 2006, p.133.



actions were senseless and ineffective, it withdrew from Afghanistan, while the al-Qaeda phenomenon has become a burden to the world. White gloves did not develop soviet policy, of course; yet, aware of the very real danger posed by Islamic extremism, Moscow never used it as a factor of force against the U.S., even in the Cold War years.<sup>711</sup>

Primakov and likeminded non-urasianist in Russian politics believes that political cooperation must be aimed at encouraging those countries with Moslem populations to lead the antiterrorist struggle and to change the sentiments of the average Moslem man on the street. This goal can be achieved by settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has become an incubator of terrorism. In the military and political planes, the intelligence communities of Russia and the U.S. should not only exchange information, but also provide a joint analysis of this data in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.

Thirdly, the United States, Russia and China are among the major international actors that are capable of checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They achieved some success in a years-long negotiation process with North Korea for the termination of its military nuclear program.<sup>712</sup>

According to Primakov, this semi-breakthrough became possible thanks to two circumstances: First, North Korea was actually offered guarantees that, like other states, it would have the right to develop peaceful nuclear programs - naturally under the strict control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Second, the U.S. pledged not to undertake military actions against Pyongyang. A similar model should be applied to Iran as well. It is necessary to set up a group for organizing negotiations involving Iran, Russia, the U.S., and the European Union and, possibly, China and India, which would propose to Teheran the same terms that were given to North Korea.<sup>713</sup>

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<sup>710</sup> Ibid, p134.

<sup>711</sup> Yasar Onay, *Rusya ve Değişim*, Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2002, pp.169-173.

<sup>712</sup> İlyas Kamalov, "Rusya, Türkiye ve Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü (ŞİÖ) electronic data. <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=1053&kat1=6&kat2=5> Ekim 2006.

<sup>713</sup> Yevgeny Primakov, "Russia and the U.S. in Need of Trust and Cooperation" *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol. 4:No. 1, January-March 2006, p.134.

#### **D. Neo-Realist Conception of the Relations**

It is regarded that realism has a general appeal-who would want to be unrealistic in foreign policy? But as a concept in international relations it has a specific meaning: in the conduct of foreign relations, national interests defined in terms of power and security guide national leaders. According to realist thought, a country's leaders should not be misled by moral imperatives, driven by cooperation for cooperation's sake, or unduly constrained by international institutions if such policies would cause the leaders to neglect balance-of-power calculations or the rational pursuit of national interests.

Leaders should not be misled by the belief that the political or economic composition of other countries-whether they are liberal democracies or market economies, for example-will or should significantly affect foreign policy choices. By implication, a responsible leader should not base foreign policy on whether a potential ally or partner state is democratic; rather, cooperation is possible when states have common interests and when policies are shaped to take into account the realities of their capabilities.

George Bush's administration came into office articulating a clear realist premise for its foreign policy, particularly toward Russia. It criticized the Clinton administration's emphasis on engagement and reform of Russia's domestic political and economic order and declared that it would seek cooperation where interests coincided, but would not shrink from confronting Russia in areas where interests diverged, such as nuclear technology sales to Iran. Bush administration officials stated early on that the United States would not seek or adhere to arms control agreements merely for the sake of the habit of cooperation.

Bush administration said it would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty if it could not achieve modifications that would allow the United States to develop and deploy new systems to provide defensive coverage of the American homeland. Most important, Russia was to be downgraded from its preeminent role in us foreign policy in accordance with its decline in power: Russia was not viewed as irrelevant, but simply one among the ranks of other great powers, meriting neither constant high-level attention nor special status.

Similarly on the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin appeared to base his new foreign policy pragmatism on a cold assessment of his nation's strategic interests. Russia's foreign policy concepts and national security doctrine were reformulated to identify Russian weakness as the greatest threat the country faced, and to support development of a vibrant and successful economy as the main foreign policy task.

Terrorism supplanted the United States and NATO as the main external threat to Russian security, reflecting Russian preoccupation not only with the war in Chechnya, but also with transnational criminal and terrorist networks-often although not exclusively with Islamic links- extending from Central Asia through the Caucasus. Even before the terror attacks of September 11, Putin's foreign policy rhetoric was characterized by a startling degree of self-critical realism: looking at the country's weaknesses unflinchingly and finding Russia wanting and vulnerable.

It certainly was possible that a more forceful Putin regime, waging a war in Chechnya and bent upon asserting its own national interests, would set back us-Russian relations when joined with a confident Bush administration dismissive of sentiment in its Russia policy. Yet, by mid-2001, the relationship looked better than it had in years, seemingly bolstering realist prescriptions. On the two security issues that dominated the agenda and on which the two countries seemed headed toward confrontation-us withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and NATO's plans for a second round of enlargement-Putin declared that Russia did not agree with the American position, but would not become "hysterical" or sacrifice its relations with the West in a vain attempt to block us policy.

Actually Kenneth Waltz on that issue argued that the reasons for expanding NATO are weak, most of them the product not of America's foreign policy interests but of its domestic political impulses. For him the reasons for opposing expansion are strong. For NATO's expansion draws new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and can find no logical stopping place west of Russia. It weakens those Russians most inclined towards liberal democracy and a market economy. It strengthens Russians of opposite inclination. It reduces hope for further major reductions of nuclear weaponry. It pushes Russia towards China instead of drawing Russia towards Europe and America. Late in 1996, expecting a measure of indifference, an official in the Indian Ministry of External

Affairs was asked whether India was concerned over expansive NATO policy. He immediately replied that a policy seemingly designed to bring Russia and China together was of course of great concern to India. Despite much talk about the ‘globalization’ of international politics, American political leaders to a dismaying extent think of East *or* West rather than of their interaction.<sup>714</sup>

Putin made a priority of economic reform and integration, seeking us support for foreign investment and Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). He found a receptive partner in the Republican, business-oriented American president. Faced with growing European criticism and concerns that it preferred unilateral action to cooperation, the Bush administration shifted its focus as well. The administration sought Russian acceptance of its preferred policies on missile defense. It negotiated a strategic arms agreement based on deep cuts in deployed weapons. And it attempted to engage Russia in a special relationship with NATO.

### **1. International Terrorism Factor**

The realist groundwork for focusing on common strategic national interests was thus already laid when Al Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. The attack made transnational terrorism—a terrorism rooted partly in Russia’s Eurasian borderlands—the core threat to American security. This common strategic interest with Russia was not abstract: Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, and the Taliban regime that harbored it was viewed as a threat to Russia and the newly independent Central Asian states.

Many within Putin’s government opposed the Russian president’s decision to accept us military bases in Central Asia and to support the US military mission in Afghanistan with intelligence and aid to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. But Putin’s motives were far from altruistic. Russians had viewed the Taliban as a major threat throughout the 1990s, but had not been successful in eliminating it.

By supporting the United States, Putin achieved a significant security objective that Russia had been unable to achieve alone. And by working with Russian intelligence and the

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<sup>714</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Intimations of Multipolarity*, p. 7.

military, the United States was able to adapt a creative and unexpectedly effective military strategy that resulted in the relatively swift collapse of the Taliban regime.

Likewise, the early common interest of the United States and Russia in the securing, storing, and disposing of Russia's inherited arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) took on new dimensions and urgency after 9-11. Russia and the United States suddenly had a very large and very serious common security agenda in the combination of terrorism and WMD that former Democratic Senator Sam Nunn has labeled "catastrophic terrorism."

Along with terrorism and WMD, common strategic interests include a third pillar: economic concerns. Russia clearly sees economic growth and international integration as necessary for national power and security, but what is America's strategic interest in an economically successful and integrated Russia? One consideration is that an enfeebled Russia invites the spread of terrorist bases and networks in Eurasia and increases the chances of WMD proliferation. As national security adviser Condoleezza Rice has suggested, Russia's weakness, not its strength, is the greater threat to America.

It is in America's strategic interest to support Russia's economic development so that the government can improve conditions for Russian citizens—including those who work in WMD-related industries and who might be led by a lack of alternatives to sell their knowledge or access. It is also in America's interest to foster an economic environment in which the Russian state can build competent institutions that will support security and stability in the region. Yet another strategic economic interest stems from Russia's position as the world's second-largest producer of oil. Russia's future productive capacity could support a diversification in energy resources that might reduce the dependence of the United States and its allies on Middle Eastern oil.

At a summit meeting this June in St. Petersburg, Russia, both Putin and President George W. Bush portrayed the basis of their countries' strategic partnership in terms of common interests in these areas. They signed the Treaty of Moscow at the meeting, limiting each country's strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads. They announced plans for cooperation in research on missile defense, agreed that North Korea must dismantle its nuclear program, and said that Iran must comply with its obligations

under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both highlighted the potential of Russian energy supplies to support a far-reaching strategic relationship.<sup>715</sup>

President Bush pledged again to work for Russian membership in the world, and to remove Russia from the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the Cold War legislation that denies Russia most-favored-nation trading status. They agreed that the US-Russian relationship had emerged intact after Russia's opposition to America's use of force against Iraq and the US decision to act without a UN Security Council resolution. Unlike German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who was perceived as personalizing his opposition to President Bush, and unlike French President Jacques Chirac, who was perceived as actively leading the opposition to US policy in Iraq as a pretext for resisting American hegemony, Putin was seen as advancing legitimate Russian interests in a professional manner and was thus "forgiven."

## **2. Gray Areas and Common Interests**

But appearances can deceive. While the two countries' presidents enunciate the strategic rationale for a partnership rooted in common interests, four aspects of reality undermine a US-Russian strategic partnership forged solely in realism.

First, despite acknowledgement that stopping terrorism and WMD proliferation are the two core strategic interests held in common, there is little agreement on the concrete nature of each problem and how to prioritize the threats. Although the Bush administration recognizes Al Qaeda's involvement in the war in Chechnya and does not strongly or publicly criticize the Putin leadership for ongoing human rights violations, it continues to draw a distinction between international terrorists and Chechen separatists, angering Russian officials and limiting the degree to which the countries can cooperate.

Domestic critics in the United States limit the extent to which the administration can ignore Chechnya even if the White House sought such leeway. Similarly, Russian critics point out that the US focus on state sponsors of terrorism conveniently neglects American allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and centers attention on

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<sup>715</sup> North Korea and Weapons of Mass Destruction, [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ North\\_Korea\\_ and\\_weapons\\_](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_)

countries such as Iran and Iraq, which had developed lucrative commercial relationships with Russia.

The United States and Russia also have different priorities when it comes to the nations that each believes must be a focus of nonproliferation efforts. Russian policy on North Korea has shifted during 2003 to more closely support the US view that a firm and united line must be taken against North Korean nuclear programs. Yet, while highlighting Russian and US agreement that Iran must comply with its international commitments for inspections of nuclear facilities, Putin has not entirely conceded that the key issue with Iran is the proliferation danger. At his St. Petersburg summit appearance with President Bush, Putin said Russia seeks to cooperate on Iran, but also expects the United States not to use nonproliferation efforts to unfairly compete in international markets for nuclear reactor technology.

Without agreement on the primary terrorist or WMD threats, it is difficult to see where the United States and Russia can turn their strategic partnership to operate as effectively as it did against the Taliban. That achievement may have been the high point rather than the model for future cooperation. This brings us to the second reality that checks the US-Russian partnership: the imbalance of power between the two countries and the mistrust this nurtures.

Russian officials welcomed the US military presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus as temporary and tied to specific counter terrorist missions. But they suspect that the United States may intend a long-term presence to limit Russia's own political and military influence in both regions, and they will consider their suspicions justified if Americans settle in for a long stay.

One scenario they fear is US pressure on Chechnya. Another is active support of the present or a successor government in Georgia. A third is US military protection of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline under construction that will enable Azerbaijan to ship oil without relying on Russian pipelines. Russians focus on the potential of US military pressure in the

region to undermine Russia's strategic and commercial interests through political pressure backed by superior military force.

The Russian government has also made clear that it views the potential relocation of us bases in Europe from Germany to Poland as contrary to Moscow's interests. It sees the potential as a violation of commitments made not to expand NATO's military eastward under both the 1990 agreements on German unification and the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, as well as a likely violation of limits on national deployments allowed under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.<sup>716</sup>

If the United States and Russia deeply held common values and understandings of one another's motivations, the imbalance of power between them would not be a source of mistrust. But this is where reality confronts realism: many Russians continue to fear and resent us power, and Americans continue to view that resentment as evidence of ill will.

The reality effects of Russian weakness and American preponderance were largely behind the near confrontation on Iraq. Russia had clear financial interests in preventing the US attack in March 2003, but these had been discussed and could have been addressed to Russia's satisfaction by post-conflict contracts and energy deals. In joining with France and Germany to try to force the United States to work through the UN, Putin was responding to domestic pressure to resist us power and wield one of Russia's few remaining great power instruments: its permanent seat on the Security Council and the veto power it carries.

This was clear in Putin's repeated appeals to the United States to abide by international law and his call for "multipolarity" rather than American hegemony as the basis for dealing with terrorism and WMD threats. His appeal was answered by national security adviser Rice in a speech in London, in which she reminded her audience that multipolarity led more often to conflict, and had in fact led to World War I; multipolarity was "a necessary evil" no longer required among partners with common interests and common values. The United States as a preponderant power that can choose to cooperate with like-minded partners

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<sup>716</sup> Helga Haftendorn, Almanya'nın NATO'ya Katılımı: Elli Yıl , NATO review, Summer 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/turkish/.html>



when it wants to-but will rely on itself when it must-has been unwilling to be constrained by international law when such constraints prove inconvenient in securing priority objectives.

To sum up we could briefly state that realist conception of US-Russian relations in the twenty-first century provides a clear understanding of just where the strategic security and economic interests of the two countries overlap. Without this basis, there are no joint objectives for a partnership to target. Similarly, a realist approach focuses on getting the structure of the relationship in place so that it is more than a house of cards to be blown over in the first crisis to test the relationship's commitment and capabilities.<sup>717</sup>

On the other hand a foreign policy that stops with realism will not be very productive, nor is it likely to address the broad array of issues that confront states in the modern world. It was enough in the nineteenth century to conduct a spare foreign policy based on national power and interests because states interacted primarily in the military and political spheres, and their societies and economies were not very integrated or interactive. Foreign policy bureaucracies were small and managed a limited set of requirements that focused on diplomacy.

In today's global structure, countries interact much more intensively in official and private contexts. Mobility, technology, and integration have supported economic growth through trade, more efficient global production, and global investment. They have also created the capacity for the transnational terrorism and global military reach that globalize vulnerability and the potential to defend against it. Realism is spare and elegant, but the US-Russian relationship has to embrace the realities of the twenty-first century. The sense that many observers express that us-Russian relations are cordial but hollow arises from a failure to seize the challenge of the realities.

As we have argued in previous chapters among the most important of these realities for US-Russian relations in the next decade is the failure of domestic constituencies and institutions in both countries to support the overall structure of strategic objectives. The problem with a US-Russian strategic partnership is not at the strategic level, but within the

competing domestic interests, divergent domestic views, and mismatched political and economic systems.

The onus in this respect is on Russia to create a functioning democratic state that is accountable politically and subject to societal oversight, including a free media. It is also a parallel obligation to continue economic reforms and to establish market institutions to encourage American business interest and investment.<sup>718</sup>

The United States for its part also could improve the coherence and accountability of executive agencies responsible for implementing the president's policy, but the focus of us efforts to build a partnership should be different. While Russia builds its democratic and market capacity for a real partnership, America can build a strategic partnership with Russia as a showcase of a responsible realist foreign policy deeply rooted in reality. Therefore it is less likely to create fear and hostility among potential competitors, which historically have fueled their efforts to build capabilities to protect themselves.

From a broader picture it might be said that Because Russia has been playing the energy and natural resources card as a weapon, the U.S. and Russia have recently been on opposite terms. In the near future, this fact is likely to result in a closer cooperation between the U.S. and China in the Eurasian geography. As an historical reality, unlike the United Kingdom, Russia or Japan, the U.S. has not so far engaged in a hot conflict with China. Furthermore, the Americans have abundant investments in that country. Such factors may pave the way to a closer cooperation between the U.S. and China against Russia. Thus, these two parties will increase their share of the opportunities that Eurasia promises.

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<sup>717</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, US-Russian Relations: Between Realism and Reality, *Current History*, October 2003, p. 309.

<sup>718</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, US-Russian Relations: Between Realism and Reality, *Current History*, October 2003, p. 310.

## CONCLUSION

So far different tenets of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States have been studied both from a theoretical and from a historical perspective. The same picture tried to be depicted from two different angles. The Picture however stands in wider angle namely a world system. Chapter four is an attempt to analyze the cooperation and conflict dynamics of the two countries from a system level.

Here we would like to elaborate the salient outcomes of the argument of the thesis. To remember let us repeat the main thesis of the study: The post cold-war era “unipolarity” is a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity (or multi-centrism) in the near future. Actually embryonic forms already exist. Reputing the Layne’s words “the unipolarity is an illusion and the new great powers will rise.”<sup>719</sup> The argument relies on the premise that states balance against hegemon, even those like the United States that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion.

First because unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and secondly the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its preeminence.

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<sup>719</sup> Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers will Rise”; in: Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (Eds.) **The Cold War and After, Prospects for Peace**, p.244.

We believe, and hope we properly defined the base for this belief; Russia could not be another super or global power but a great power in the new multi-centric world. Let us conclude the framework of conflict and cooperation between the superpower (USA) and a reemerging great power (RF) in a world heading from unipolarity to multicentrism. At the first fore side of the medallion lays the following cooperating moves of Putin: They include:

- Supporting a U.S. military presence in Central Asia,
- Limited but substantive military and intelligence collaboration with Washington against terrorism,
- Joint efforts to oust the Taliban and support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan,
- Closure of bases and intelligence facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Lourdes,
- Partnership with NATO and an appeal to NATO to help reform and restructure Russia's armed forces and Ministry of Defense,
- The start of negotiations with the Chechens and announcement of troop cuts there,
- Reports of support for the U.S. projected Bakü-Ceyhan pipelines,
- Refusal to cut energy production and suggestions that Russia can supplant OPEC as energy supplier to the West,
- An apparent abstention from overt pressure on states such as Georgia and Ukraine,
- Willingness to accept with equanimity the presence of U.S. forces in the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia, and the earlier willingness to modify the ABM treaty.

-And finally Putin's affirmation that those moves are not merely tactical gambits but rather a serious long-term policy and that those who think otherwise - a large number of Russian military and political elites-"are deeply deluded"<sup>720</sup>

Putin's actions and policies since 11 September highlight the close link between Russia's domestic politics and national security policy. They also outline and reflect the enduring four-part agenda of U.S.-Russian relations: Strategic and arms control issues, Regional security in Eurasia, Westernization, which includes the war on terrorism, economic reform, and integration with the West and internal democratization.

Since reduced tensions with the United States, facilitate Russia's liberalization and democratization, we must remember that US. Actions decisively affect Russian domestic debates over foreign policy as well as policymaking.<sup>721</sup>

The other side of the medallion could be understood from the opponents this moves within the Russian polices and academia. Vyacheslav Tetekin counts ten major step of Putin Administration in international affairs as blows "against Russia's international interests".<sup>722</sup> Actually these could also be interpreted as areas of reconciliation with the west. Let us first briefly mention about them:

1. The November, 2002 NATO summit in Prague admit a number of East European countries including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the Alliance. That gets NATO air bases close to Moscow, St Petersburg and other centers of Russia. Putin's reaction was like "the main threat to Russia's security originates from "international terrorism" but not from NATO's expansion to the East"
2. Instead of reinforcing our Southern frontiers the Kremlin is withdrawing Russian troops from Abkhazia, Adjaria and Transnistria despite the protests of the population, who are anxious to retain an alliance with Russia.

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<sup>720</sup> Stephen Blank, "The future of Russo-American partnership", *Dmokratizatsiya*; Spring 2003; 11,2; p.183.

<sup>721</sup> Stephen Blank, "*The future of Russo-American partnership*", *Dmokratizatsiya*; Spring 2003; 11,2; p.189.

<sup>722</sup> Vyacheslav Tetekin "Putin's ten blows" **The Guardian** January 30, 2002 originally appeared in Russian in *Sovietskaya Rossia (Soviet Russia)* on November 10, 2001, <http://www.cpa.org.au/garchve5/1077put.html>

3. Yugoslavia was Russia's only ally in Europe. Putin refused Yugoslavia political and economic support by cutting gas supplies right before the 2000 presidential elections. Slobodan Milosevic, committed to friendship with Russia, landed in prison. Power in Belgrade was taken over by persons fully dependent on the West, primarily Germany. It resulted with Russia's withdrawal from the Balkans.
4. In the Middle East the Kremlin's policy in the Arab-Israel conflict pushes further away traditionally friendly Arab countries allowing Israel to play "the Russian card" against both Arabs and the West which is no longer prepared to unconditionally support Israel.
5. The Americans have gotten the Kremlin's backing for a permanent US presence in Central Asia, that is, in the zone of Russia's vital interests. US military bases are encircling Russia.
6. Putin closed the Russian Naval base in Vietnam and the Electronic Surveillance Center in Cuba.
7. Putin's desire to get Russia into the World Trade Organization (WTO) which will completely open Russian borders for the expansion of powerful Western capital and will totally eliminate Russian industry and agriculture, already only half alive as a result of "reforms" started by Yeltsin and continued by Putin.
8. Sooner or later the Kremlin will stop resisting "modification" of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It is believed that it will simply agree to the creation of Star Wars system.
9. Russian-Chinese relations will inevitably be spoiled as Russia previously promised China to take a firm position on NATO and the ABM Treaty. China is obviously watching with deep concern Russia's surrendering of these positions as well as the appearance of the US Air Force close to its borders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz. One does not easily forget such things.

Tetekin believes that this is a no-lose game for the west and especially for the USA<sup>723</sup>. That is why he calls these cooperative moves as blows. Nonetheless these could also be interpreted as areas of reconciliation with the west. And it is so. Russian moves under the president Putin make Russia stronger since it seeks reconciliation to maximize her economic and Political Power. Recent developments in Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz politics are true signs of conflicting interests. But as shown above, no relation is problem-free.

The fact is that although Russia and the United States have moved closer to each other since the September 11 incident, the two countries still have important differences regarding anti-terrorism and a number of other major issues. Take the Iraqi issue for example. The Bush administration believes that Iraq has violated the resolutions related to weapon's inspection of the United Nations Security Council and has continued developing weapons of mass destruction, which, it says, has posed a grave threat to the security of the United States and other countries. It claims that it has the right to unilaterally launch military attacks against Iraq without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. But President Putin has pointed out that Russia does not have any intelligence to prove that Iraq already possesses weapons of mass destruction nor has Russia got any such information from other countries. The Russian leadership calls for a political solution of the Iraqi issue. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia insists that the Iraqi crisis must be solved on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and in accordance with the principles and norms of international law. Many Russian scholars have pointed out that the real purpose of the United States in the Iraqi issue is to dominate the world price of oil, protect Israel and serve American domestic politics, i.e., to prepare for the next presidential election. Russian high-ranking officials have made it clear that Russia is not going to make a deal with the United States in this issue. The reason for Russia to persist in this stand is not only because Russia has important economic and political interests in Iraq<sup>724</sup> but also because it is firmly opposed to

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<sup>723</sup> Vyacheslav Tetekin "Putin's ten blows" **The Guardian** January 30, 2002 originally appeared in Russian in *Sovietskaya Rossia* (Soviet Russia) on November 10, 2001, <http://www.cpa.org.au/garchve/5/1077put.html>

<sup>724</sup> If the United States succeeds in replacing Saddam Hussein with a "predictable" leader, it will obtain the goal of controlling the price of oil, which could drop to the level of US\$ 15-16 a barrel. As 40% of Russia's export revenue comes from oil, the drop of oil price will be a heavy blow to Russia's economy and also to many Russian oil companies and, besides, Russia probably will not be able to get back the money (about US\$ 7 billion) which Iraq owes to Russia. See: Ni Xiaquan, "Sino-Russian Relations Since The September 11 Incident," [http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/pdf\\_seminar/021127nipaper.pdf](http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/pdf_seminar/021127nipaper.pdf).

the attempt to establish a one-polar world dominated by one superpower. Russia insists that the United Nations and its Security Council should play a leading role in solving major international issues, which it believes will promote the establishment of a multi-polar and democratic world order.

Russia also has disputes with the United States over the issue of Iran. The United States considers Iran to be a sponsor of terrorism and has tried to persuade Moscow to stop building a nuclear power station in Iran, which, it says, will help Iran to produce weapons of mass destruction. But Russia has emphasized that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran "will not undermine" the process of non-proliferation. Shortly before the United States demanded that Russia stop its nuclear cooperation with Iran, Russia announced a ten-year plan to expand its nuclear assistance to Tehran. Russia not only insists in completing the unfinished reactor for civilian USA in Iran's coastal city of Bushire, the investment of which is about US\$ 800 million, but will also build five more reactors for Iran. It is estimated that the total projects will bring an income of US\$ 6-10 billion to the nuclear industry of Russia.

Russia is not happy with the United States either with regard to relations between Russia and ex-Soviet Georgia and to the new attitude of the U.S. government in the issue of Chechnya. Russia, irritated by constant attacks by the Chechen rebels, accused Georgia of harboring Chechen terrorists in its Pankisi Gorge and warned that it may take actions to defend her if Georgia fails to prevent cross-border attacks. But the Bush administration has declared that the United States will firmly support "the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Georgia and warned Russia not to take unilateral military actions to solve the issue of Pankisi Gorge.

After the "9.11" incident, the United States began to criticize Russia again for the latter's military actions in Chechnya, claiming that Russia "is continuing violating human rights and excessively using military force against civilians". From Russia's perspective, the Bush administration is pursuing a double standard in the issue of anti-terrorism. Russia still has differences with the United States regarding the implementation of the treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons, the missile defense program of the United States and some other issues. So, it is hard to say that since the September 11 incident Russia and the



United States have already become genuine strategic partners or that the two countries have already established a close relationship of mutual trust

The Kremlin has no long-term strategy for relations with the United States, while the Bush administration (except, perhaps, the president himself) is not prepared to build up a lasting partnership with Russia. The main element in the Russo-American relations is therefore cooperative than conflicting. This fact however should not shadow the fact that new great powers are rising in the post-cold war environmental and Russia, no doubt, is one of them.

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